Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems Volume 1 Series Editors Vassilis Cutsuridis John G. Taylor
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/8572
Mario Negrello
Invariants of Behavior Constancy and Variability in Neural Systems
123
Mario Negrello Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Okinawa, Japan
[email protected]
ISBN 978-1-4419-8803-4 e-ISBN 978-1-4419-8804-1 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8804-1 Springer New York Dordrecht Heidelberg London Library of Congress Control Number: 2011923227 c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
As a cognitive scientist, I realize that in the study of the brain, challenges of epistemological nature match those of empirical nature. Issues have to be resolved on both fronts, and with matching impetus. On the empirical forefront, one has to deal with complexities of measurement, system identification, and experimental paradigms. On the epistemological side, function has to be outlined, analyzed, localized, discussed, explained. The two sides must be alloyed if the explanatory summit is to be achieved. And as a mechanical engineer, I find it difficult to dispel my natural tendency to see mechanism in everything. The meaning of the mechanism analogy in the study of organisms and brain function has to be put under adequate light to be serviceable. In the brain, mechanisms are dynamical processes, highly context dependent, that subserve an incredible breadth of organismic behavior. They are evanescent, but reliable. They are expressible through words and theories, but are exhausted by neither. I found no common denominator for my conflicting quandaries until I was introduced to cybernetics through the works of von Foerster, Braitenberg, Wiener, Pask, and Ashby, and more recently, Varela, Maturana, Pasemann, and Beer. So pervasive as to be invisible, cybernetics percolated through most of the sciences in the second half of the previous century, and is, to my mind, the only true method of achieving understanding amid the vast amount of knowledge that all sciences currently amass. It was not only once or twice that a powerful epiphany of mine could be retraced 60 years into the past, back to those of the magnificent set of revolutionary scientists who understood what it means to understand. It is to them that I pay dues where dues are due, and in all humbleness offer this book as a cybernetic contribution from a mechanical engineer, turned cognitive scientist, converted cyberneticist. Some words about the format of the book are required. Skimming the table of contents, one will notice that I took the liberty of dividing it into two parts. Had I heard some good advice “keep it short,” it would perhaps indeed have been shorter, more to the point, more concise, and would primarily consist of Part II. But then it would not serve a particular purpose I wanted it to play, which was to make explicit the path towards conclusions. I wanted it to be a complete snapshot, or better, a long-exposure picture, of the considerations leading to subsequent results. For that reason primarily I have very intentionally laid emphasis on epistemology and v
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theoretical aspects of the problem, hence Part I. This discussion seems to me to be essential to frame both problems that can be fractally complex and conclusions that are strengthened when contextualized. I believe that the process of committing complex ideas to paper has paid off immensely, and I hope to be harvesting dividends of the extra effort in times to come. For that, I must beg to be excused of a certain independence and perchance unevenness in the treatment of topics, at times introductory, at times technical, at times controversial. For that reason also, the references are introduced in the individual chapters. If the reader shall indulge me, I believe that he or she may come to appreciate my choice that more (not less) is more. Finally, parts of this book have appeared in print before as journal articles (Chaps. 5, 8), a book chapter (Chap. 7), and a newsletter article (Chap. 9). They have all undergone substantial revision in an attempt to deliver a more unified package. Finally, in the spirit of an open work, the book can also be said to be ongoing. The ideas in it, especially the role of invariance in the study of behavior, and constancy and variability in neural systems and behavior, are vast, unexplored, and, I feel, immensely rich. If blinded by my excess enthusiasm I failed to offer the precision and depth the ideas deserve, as a way of apology I urge you to keep on listening. There is more to come. Bonn, Germany
Mario Negrello
Acknowledgements
A mind’s produce is contingent on other minds and circumstances. Thank you: Jackie Griego and Judith Degen, for jovially enduring my peculiar rants; Steffen Wischmann, Walter de Back. and Robert Maertin, mental brethren; Mark Hallam, worthy opponent and inspired reviser; Peter K¨onig, a training example; Hod Lipson, for hospitality; Christian Rempis and Keyan Zahedi, for friendly scientific software; Orlei Negrello, my first scientific collaborator; Thomas Christaller, for mindful interaction from Japan to Sankt Augustin; Frank Pasemann, for enthusing and entrusting me with ideas, with admiration.
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Part I Invariants of Behavior 1
Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Variation and Constancy in Neurobiology and Behavior .. . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Argument Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Part I: Invariants and Invariants of Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Models and Dynamical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Part II: The Organism and Its World . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4 Convergent Evolution of Behavioral Traits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.5 Modular Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.6 Concept Duals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 3 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 9
2
Invariances in Theory .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Invariants in Physics and Mathematics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Invariants Are That Which Remains When Something Else Changes .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Theoretical Invariants: Speed of Light, Planck’s Constant .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Theoretical and Relational Invariants: Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 Empirical and Relational Invariants: Law of Gases . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5 Context-Dependent Invariances: Sum of Internal Angles of the Triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.6 Invariants Prefigure Theories.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Invariants in Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Biology Borrowed Invariants from Physics and Mathematics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Invariants in Biology Are Context-Dependent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Three Examples: Life, Form, and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Ontogeny Needs the Environment . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.5 Development and Biophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.6 Evolution Operates on Organisms, Not on Genes. . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.7 Genes as Invariants of Species Identity .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 11 11 11 12 12 13 14 14 14 14 15 17 17 18 19 ix
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2.2.8
Invariants in Biology: Only Within Narrow Contextual Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.9 Genetic Triggers Do Not Build an Organism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Invariants of Behavior .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 What Is an Invariant of Behavior? . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Genes as Invariants of Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Genes Are Untenable as Invariants of Behavior, for They Are a Diluted Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Neuroanatomy: Invariant Connections Between Architecture and Behavior .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 Architectonic Invariances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6 Some Features of Gross Anatomy Can Be Traced to Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.7 Connections Between Anatomy and Function Do Not Always Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.8 Neuroanatomical Variation and Constancy of Function . . . . 2.3.9 One to Very Many Mappings from Anatomy to Function .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.10 Requirements for an Invariant of Behavior .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.11 Cybernetics, Reafference, and Sensorimotor Loops . . . . . . . . 2.3.12 Schema Theory and Functional Overlays . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.13 Behavioral Function and Invariants of Behavior .. . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Empirical Assessments of Invariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Empirical Assessments of Invariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Invariants in Neuroscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 A Brief Typology of Function and Invariance in Neuroscience .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Measurement of Neural Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Whatever Is Seen, Is Seen Through Lenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Contentions on the Measurement of Brain and Behavioral Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Scope of Measurement Tools and Analysis Methods .. . . . . . 3.2.4 Oscillations and Potentials: EEG . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5 Function Localization: fMRI .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.6 Brain Wiring: DTI and Diffusion Spectrum Imaging .. . . . . . 3.2.7 Electrophysiology: Single Unit Recordings .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.8 Empirical Methods and the Language of Explanation .. . . . . 3.3 Sources of Variation .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Instrumental Sources of Variation . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Repeatability and Variation in Different Levels .. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Sources of Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19 19 20 20 20 20 21 22 24 25 25 26 26 28 31 34 36 37 38 41 41 41 42 44 44 44 45 45 48 51 53 55 55 55 57 58
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Conclusions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Partial Pictures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 More Epistemological Contentions .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4
Modeling and Invariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Invariance and Computational Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Shared Invariant Rules from Natural Patterns .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Dynamical Neural Patterns .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Computational Models of Neural Invariance . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Constancy and Variability in Modeling .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Models and Invariance in Computational Neuroscience .. . . 4.2.3 Hebbian Plasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 Kohonen’s Self-Organizing Maps . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5 Backpropagation: Gradient Descent Methods.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.6 Hopfield Networks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.7 Decorrelation Principles .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Invariants and the Structure of the World. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Constancy and Variability in Modeling .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63 63 63 66 68 68 69 69 70 72 73 74 77 77 78 79
5
Dynamical Systems and Convergence .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Previous Conclusions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Dynamical Systems Theory as an Integrative Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Dynamical Systems Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Dynamical Systems Basic Terminology .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Coupled Dynamical Systems and Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 A Motor Act, as Coupled Dynamical Systems. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Integrating Levels.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Convergence in the Neuromuscular Junction . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Convergent Level Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 Convergence and Level Crossing . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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82 83 84 84 88 89 92 93 93 97 97 98 98
Neurons, Models, and Invariants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 6.1 Neurons to Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 6.1.1 The History of the Models of the Action Potential . . . . . . . . .102
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The Hodgkin–Huxley Model Illustrates How Variability Converges to Constancy . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106 6.1.3 Categories Emerge.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108 6.2 Network Models .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 6.2.1 Difficulties with the Hodgkin–Huxley Model .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 6.2.2 A General Template To Build a Network Model .. . . . . . . . . . .112 6.2.3 Parameterizing Structure to Analyze Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . .113 6.2.4 Properties of Units and Properties of the System . . . . . . . . . . .113 6.3 Recurrent Neural Network Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 6.3.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 6.3.2 Discussion of Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115 6.3.3 Fair Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 6.4 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 6.4.1 The Staggering Complexity of the Neuron .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 6.4.2 Neurons, Networks, and Organismic Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 6.5 Addendum: Level Crossing in Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120 Part II Neurodynamics of Embodied Behavior 7
Neurodynamics and Evolutionary Robotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 7.1 Crash Course on the Neurodynamics of Recurrent Neural Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 7.1.1 Varieties of Neurodynamics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 7.1.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127 7.1.3 Neurodynamics and Attractors .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 7.2 Evolutionary Robotics at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 7.2.1 Neurodynamics and Evolutionary Robotics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 7.2.2 From Evolution of Organisms to Evolutionary Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 7.2.3 Assumptions of an Evolutionary Robotics Problem . . . . . . . .137 7.2.4 Structural Evolution and Simulation .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138 7.3 Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
8
Attractor Landscapes and the Invariants of Behavior . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141 8.1 Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141 8.1.1 Outlook.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141 8.1.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 8.2 Toy Problem in Active Tracking .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 8.3 Methods .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 8.3.1 Problem Description .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 8.3.2 Challenges for the Tracker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 8.3.3 Convergence and Motor Projections of Attractors . . . . . . . . . .151 8.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 8.4.1 Tracking Behavior Across Attractors . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152
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8.4.2 Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 8.4.3 Analysis of Dynamical Entities Generating Behavior . . . . . .153 8.4.4 Convergent Activity and Equivalence of Attractors.. . . . . . . .153 8.4.5 Features of Evolved Attractor Landscapes .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 8.4.6 Attractor Shapes and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159 8.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 8.5.1 Structure–Attractor Landscape–Function . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 8.5.2 Invariants of Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 8.5.3 Explanations of Functional Behavior: Negative Feedback.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166 8.5.4 Behavioral Function Demands a Holistic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169 8.6 Linking Section: Convergent Landscapes .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 8.6.1 Direct Association Between Dynamics and Behavior . . . . . .170 Appendix I: Learning as Deforming Attractor Landscapes .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172 Appendix II: Related Work .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173 References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174 9
Convergent Evolution of Behavioral Function . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 9.1 Convergent Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 9.1.1 Outlook.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 9.2 Preliminaries.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178 9.2.1 Is Evolution Gradual or Punctuated? . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178 9.2.2 The Moment of Invention of Function.. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179 9.2.3 Neutral Mutation and Appearance of Function . . . . . . . . . . . . .180 9.2.4 Convergent Evolution Controversy . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 9.3 Evolutionary Phenomena in Evolution of Tracking and of Following . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .186 9.3.1 Invariance Organized Through Orderings and Selection . . .186 9.3.2 Gradual Improvement in Evolution of Simple Tracking .. . .187 9.3.3 Extensions to the Experiment on the Evolution of Tracking .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .192 9.4 Discussion: Convergent Evolution and Instinct .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201 9.4.1 Convergent Evolution of Attractor Landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . .201 9.4.2 Instinct: Convergent Evolution of Functional Behavior . . . .202 9.5 Constancy and Variability in Structure and Function .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203 9.5.1 Aspects of Constancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .204 9.5.2 Sources of Variability .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206 9.6 Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208 9.6.1 Convergent Function and Invariants of Behavior . . . . . . . . . . .208 9.7 Linking Section: Evolution and Modularity . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 9.7.1 Functional Selection of Modular Structures and Dynamics .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210 References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211
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10 Neural Communication: Messages Between Modules . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213 10.1 Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213 10.1.1 Neural Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 10.1.2 The Meaning of Neurons, Modules, and Attractor Landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215 10.1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216 10.2 Modularity .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216 10.2.1 Functional Semiotics of Neurons and Networks . . . . . . . . . . . .218 10.2.2 Anatomical Modularity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 10.2.3 Heuristics for Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220 10.3 Types of Modularity .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221 10.3.1 Vertical Modularity .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .222 10.3.2 Monolithic Modules and Dynamic Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . .229 10.4 Equivalence, Variability, and Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 10.4.1 The Geometry of Dynamical Modularity.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231 10.4.2 Other Mechanisms of Dynamical Modularity .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .231 10.5 Discussion: Modular Function and Attractor Landscapes .. . . . . . . . . . .234 10.5.1 Modules, Attractor Landscapes, and Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . .234 10.6 Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235 References .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .236 11 Conclusion . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239 11.1 The Search for Mechanism Within a Meaningful World .. . . . . . . . . . . .239 11.1.1 Contraptions, Analogies, and Explanation .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239 11.1.2 Empirical Invariances: Flickering Lights . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .240 11.2 The Current Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243 Reference .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .244 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245
List of Figures
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Acetabularia and its life cycle.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Genes and explanation of behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Invariance in the caterpillar neural system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Braitenberg vehicle.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reafference in the visual system of the fly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A schema functional overlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18 22 23 24 29 32
3.1 3.2 3.3
Brainbow and diffusion tensor imaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scales in electroencephalography .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brain activation as seen through functional magnetic resonance imaging lenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of diffusion spectrum imaging tract structure of five human subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Causation in spikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43 46
64 67
4.4 4.5
Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction and Dyctiostelyum spirals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Varieties of action potentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hebbian learning and a model for asymmetric expansion of place fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The rigged hill analogy of Hopfield networks .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Decorrelation and the formation of place cells . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 5.2
The levels of a gesture as coupled dynamical systems . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Convergence to muscle fibers implies equivalence of spike trains . . . . . . . . 96
6.1 6.2
6.5
Hodgkin–Huxley equations and agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 Fractal nature of channel activity revealed by the patch clamp. (From [22]).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 Crystal structure of the calcium-gated potassium ion channel .. . . . . . . . . . . .105 Dynamical analysis of the parameter space of the Hodgkin– Huxley model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 The Fitzhugh–Nagumo model.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109
7.1
A recurrent neural network .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3
6.3 6.4
49 52 54
71 74 76
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List of Figures
7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7
Orbit, phase space, and time series. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130 A period 5 periodic attractor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131 Basins of attraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Bifurcation sequence of a two-neuron network . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133 Landscape plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134 The ENS3 algorithm for artificial evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 8.15 8.16 8.17
Von Uexk¨ull’s Funktionskreis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 Neurodynamics explanatory loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144 Simulated environment and the agent.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 Stimuli sequence from a trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 Pattern-evoked functional attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Time series of an evolved period 4 attractor .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 Sequence of stimulus–action pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 Coexisting attractors not functionally equivalent.. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 Gravity matching linear increase of tracking velocity . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 Motor projections of attractor landscapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 Chaotic attractor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160 Morphing attractor .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160 Sequence of morphing attractors .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 Equivalent attractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 Agent–environment diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 The coupling of the agent environment and neural systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168 Dynamical schemata for behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 9.13
Punctuated equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .180 Divergence and convergence in a ball-drawing experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184 Gradual improvement of tracking .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187 Jagged gradual improvement of tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187 Convergence of attractor landscapes, first generations .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .188 Convergence of attractor landscapes, last generations . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189 Five different agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .190 The Sinai experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .194 The evolution of fitness in the Sinai experiment . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195 The R2 experiment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .196 R2 experiment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 R2’s holonomic arrangement of wheels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 A flow diagram representing acquisition of function . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211
10.1 Vertical modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 10.2 R2’s retinal module and wheel module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 10.3 Parameter modulation of the attractor landscape for the wheel module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225 10.4 R2 wheel module metatransient .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .226 10.5 Horizontal modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227
List of Figures
10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9
xvii
Modules outlined by a modularity finding algorithm . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230 Equivalent orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232 Chaotic itinerancy and stimulus-forced reduction .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233 Modular function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235
List of Tables
1.1 The prominent dichotomies and dilemmas in neuroscience and in the study of behavior as they relate to constancy and variability, with cross-references to the chapters where they appear . . . . . . .
8
2.1 Invariants in physics and mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1 Invariances in the structure of interaction with the world are represented in invariance in neural activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 7.1 Neuronal models and levels.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126 7.2 Types of attractors encountered in maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131 8.1 Simulation details of tracking experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 9.1 Graph theory connectivity measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .190 9.2 Graphic measures of evolved networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 9.3 Sinai simulation details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195
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Part I
Invariants of Behavior
The important things in the world appear as the invariants (or more generally [. . . ] quantities with simple transformation properties) of [. . . ] transformations. Principles of Quantum Mechanics, 4th. Edition PAUL M.A. D IRAC
Where there is symmetry, there is invariance. N OETHER ’ S T HEOREM
Symmetry is a characteristic of the human mind. Letter to the Prince of Russia A LEXANDER P USHKIN
Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract The study of the brain and behavior is illuminated with the discovery of invariances. Experimental brain research uncovers constancies amidst variation, with respect to interventions and transformations prescribed by experimental paradigms. Place cells, mirror neurons, event related potentials and areas differentially active in fMRI, all illustrate the pervasive role of invariances in neural systems in relation to their function. The introduction highlights the complementarity between constancy and variability in the study of neural systems, and outlines the elements of our plan to expose the mediating role of invariances between constancy and variability in behavior and neural systems.
1.1 Variation and Constancy in Neurobiology and Behavior It may at first seem like a paradox that in neural systems massive variability may peacefully coexist with conspicuous constancy. Variability and constancy are present in substrate (what it is made of – material cause), structure (how it is organized – formal cause), and function (what is it for – final cause). For any identifiable dimension of a phenomenon one may fancy to quantify, be that in morphology or in behavior, one finds simultaneously spreads of measures and consistent means. In neural systems this interplay finds its most impressive expression. In qualitative neurobiology it may seem as if, to any given scale, mostly everything varies. Across species, within species, or among individuals, the size of brains and structures, the number of neurons, their dendritic arbors, the size of cells, the number of synapses, the spread of dendrites, and the length and the diameters of axons and myelin sheaths vary widely. And the list goes on indefinitely, from the macroscopic to the nanoscopic, from the nanosecond to the lifetime. Such extreme variability notwithstanding, neuroscientists and other brain scientists are assuaged, each to various degrees (usually proportional to the proximity to the biological phenomena itself), by the fact that despite variations more or less stable patterns condense – invariants – given enough observations. That is, after a choice of measurable dimensions has been assumed, constancy may be revealed from the analysis of observable data, often in the form of statistical characterization M. Negrello, Invariants of Behavior: Constancy and Variability in Neural Systems, Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems 1, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8804-1 1, c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
3
4
1 Introduction
of the spread of variables about their averages. So, in the neuronal variables just mentioned, there will be the “average size” of a brain, an “average density” of neurons, the “mean length of the dendritic arborization,”and so forth. Each measurement is associated with its deviations. Both constancy and variability in biology are reflected in measurements, and afford the first step in understanding the organism as a system composed of variables. Through quantification we get a sense of the complexity of the system under study. But quantification of single variables does little else than to provide a sense of scale to the phenomenon. Measurable quantities in an organism are never insular; they represent parts that stand in relation to the whole. To paint a landscape picture of the system, the quantified variables must be integrated and interrelated. Constancy and variability of one variable must tell a tale about another variable for the picture of the workings of the system to be whole. It is the interplay of constancy and variability in measurement that hints at some such connections. In short, scientists reason that what varies together belongs together, in explanation as in reality. This is invaluable as first heuristics, and more than that, it is our most intuitive method for accessing the co-occurrences as representatives of causal connections. But this method becomes increasingly unreliable and cumbersome (1) the farther away variables are from each other and (2) the more variables are introduced. Concerning the first point, caution is advised in cases of correlation where the variables are not apparently immediate to avoid making spurious relations. In that sense, if one can reliably connect the length of an axon with the transmission time of an action potential, a spike, this connection is quite close and we are entitled to establish a lawlike relation, expressed in mathematical terms between axon length and propagation time. The case becomes more suspicious, however, when one tries to relate any physiological measurable characteristic of the system with behavior itself. Measurement alone does not reveal the connections between levels that far apart. In this case we will need a theory, one that stitches levels and is able to explain the constancies and variabilities of behavior in terms of the constancies and variabilities of the nervous system. It is desirable for any theory of the organization of behavior of living systems to account for the many-leveled assembly, from atoms to behavior. That is no small feat (and indeed it is not clear that it is possible). Here enters one of the most fascinating facts about organisms. Despite all the variation of organismic processes, variations at one level organize, through a large number of interactions, the next level. Regimented by physical principles, matter is constrained in the modes of interaction across scales. Through constraints and large numbers, matter self-organizes, life appears, behavior emerges. Self-organization principles seem to be the key to understanding the structure and function of nervous systems. Acknowledging this, however, does not simplify the problem. Any description of the workings of the nervous system cannot but be stultified by myriad complex interactions that occur in all levels of the system. Recent research has shown an active nervous system as never before imagined. Dendritic spines move on the micrometer per second scale [2]. Synaptic terminals bulge and swell with the action potential [1]. Neurotransmitter vesicles flow from within a presynaptic to a postsynaptic cell in microseconds. For
1.2 Argument Outline
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any received spike, synapses are altered, and across the brain such events happen in the trillions per second, resulting in a brain that thrives with nonstop activity and change. And yet, the organism seems to act in a regular fashion. How can behavior, not to mention thought, be meaningful in any way amid this relentless agitation? How can variability of the small be an ingredient for constancy of the large? How can one theorize about the order within which components of the system will be put together at any one level, let alone at the system level? Is there a best level for the analysis of behavior? What are the contributions of the variation of individual events to the overall behavior of the organism? What is an instinct? Throughout this book, I will be addressing these questions.
1.2 Argument Outline 1.2.1 Part I: Invariants and Invariants of Behavior The first chapter surveys the multifaceted roles that invariants play in theorizing, from physics and mathematics to biology and neurobiology. The question “What is an invariant of behavior?” is posed, and some alternatives are proposed and discussed: genes, neuroanatomy, and reflex theory. From that, the cybernetic take on the issue is introduced, and placed in an evolutionary context, in which single behaviors are identified in respect to the goals they achieve, and how they subserve the organism’s viability. The search for invariants of behavior is framed as a search for mechanisms. This search is far from trivial, as assumptions play a prominent role. The search for invariance is taken further with the analysis of empirical methods of behavioral invariance in the study of the mammalian brain. These methods are the bread and butter of the neuroscientist and cognitive neuroscientist: electrophysiology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and diffusion tensor imaging all search for measurable invariances that may illuminate function and mechanism. This is not simple to do as all methods have inherent particularities, both of empirical and of epistemological nature. A clear view on these issues is important as they have strong bearing on conclusions about results of experiments, and by extension, on the mechanisms of behavior. Further in the analysis of invariants and their explanatory roles, I present particular models of computational neuroscience that elucidate the interplay between constancy and variability, and illustrate the appearance of invariances. These methods rely on the interplay between structure of the input and rules of structural modification, in which a pliable structure organizes around the regularities in input. In analogy, organisms learning and adapting to their bodies and environments also self-organize function. Albeit powerful, both empirical assessment of invariances and models thereof present partial pictures. To assemble this mosaic, it is necessary to have a theory that is apt to cover the causal levels of behavioral phenomena. Dynamical systems is proposed as such a theory.
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1 Introduction
1.2.2 Models and Dynamical Systems The theory of dynamical systems is presented as an integrative theory, from nano to meter. Life in our world, and perhaps in our universe, is marshaled by physics, in time, in recurrent loops, where what happens next is what happened before plus how things work. The models abstract systems into state variables, rules, and parameters. Analysis of structure plus parameters can be done both analytically and computationally to address the invariances of a modeled system. Dynamical systems analysis reveals new facets of phenomena that are modeled, and may effectively lead to powerful reductions. The Hodgkin–Huxley model of the action potential is presented as a prototypical example of dynamical systems analysis applied to neurons. It illustrates several interesting aspects of the action potential generation, for example, how constancy in the action potentials appears despite variability in ion channel distribution. Effectively, dynamical systems modeling demonstrates how a phenomenon can be analyzed with respect to its parameters and structure, and helps solve the dichotomy between constancy and variability by a mapping between parameter domains and dynamical varieties. Furthermore, dynamical systems can be coupled to cover organismic phenomena on many scales, as it provides a general frame applicable to an ample range of phenomena. Describing a system as coupled systems highlights interfaces. Interfaces reflect the locus of organized transitions, or level crossings, places where constancy and variability merge. At interfaces there is convergence and/or divergence, so the vicissitudes of variation coalesce in meaningful averages, whereas, conversely, constancy may drift and spread into variation. These transformations depend crucially on a number of processes which are regimented by particular types of physical interactions. Variability may coalesce in averages, whereas constancy may drift. Mutatis mutandis, by the same operating principles – large numbers and physical laws – means smear again in variation. In a functioning system, these two stances of constancy and variation complement and define each other.
1.2.3 Part II: The Organism and Its World Add environment and body and the equation is complete. Behavior is a product set of the environment, the organism, and their laws, and I will show that complex behavior may very well be produced by the composition of loops of different path lengths within the neural structure, neural structure plus body, and finally adding the environment. In Part II, I will show why the archerfish does not require knowledge of ballistics to be able to spit on a beetle meters away [3]. What this means will only become clear then, but the general idea is simple. The organism does not represent the environment, rather, it is fit to act. Organisms are not only fit to act, they also evolve to be fit to act. The archerfish is knowledge of ballistics. Returning to the connection between variability and constancy in nervous systems, I will introduce a model showing how constancy in behavior may arise in evolution, despite variability in the nervous structures subserving behavior. For
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most of this part, I will be making use of the tools of evolutionary robotics, combined with neurodynamical analysis of neural networks, which are introduced in Chap. 7. In Chap. 8, two conceptual entities will be introduced (attractor landscapes and metatransients) and employed in the analysis of behavior of agents. Building on these results, I will show what a possible path of evolution of function can look like (Chap. 9). Although a large variation appears in the structure of the recurrent neural networks evolved, there is convergence in the evolution of attractor landscapes, and this convergence appears across robot morphologies. The attractor landscape is taken as an exemplary invariant of behavior, a level of the dynamical implementation of function that represents how structural coupling leads to convergent evolution towards function.
1.2.4 Convergent Evolution of Behavioral Traits To create viable beings, evolution builds on divergence given by mutation and convergence towards function. With mutation in structure, evolution divergently searches the space of possible designs, and the environmental tests constrain the possibilities for solutions. Mutations rearrange basic components with inherent potentialities for the invention of behavioral function. Sometimes, a mutation may lead to disorganization and collapse, whereas other times mutations are neutral. Between neutral and deleterious mutations are those that beget function and increased viability. The invention of behavioral function is often a punctuated event, whereas the development of function is a gradual process. I will show examples from an evolutionary robotics tracking experiment that exhibits both gradual improvement and punctuated functional invention. Attractor landscapes are a conceptual tool that show how invariants appear as agents converge to function. In nature, we find analogies in behavioral function across phyla and taxa, which also exhibit analogous solutions. In reference to our results, analogies in form and behavior derive from the ideal implementations of function to which evolution may converge, of which the attractor landscape is an example. Convergent evolution towards behavioral function underlies the appearance of instincts and analogous behavior of different organisms. Convergence and divergence also collaborate to resolve an old controversy about punctuated equilibria. In the interplay between the two, an answer can be given to Stephen Jay Gould’s question of what would happen if the evolutionary tape were replayed.
1.2.5 Modular Organization Finally, I will present an excursus into some implications concerning the modular organization of nervous systems. Behavioral function depends on useful distinctions gathered from interaction with the environment. When the capability of recognizing distinctions is acquired by an organism, it may be more or less compatible with
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1 Introduction
previously existing structures. Modularity exists in brains, I propose, because of this compatibility issue. If new function is not compatible with previous structures, a further structure must be adjoined independently of previously existing ones. In this case we have the appearance of a functional module. The more independent the functions, the more modularized the structure. Modularity analysis is a crucial analytical heuristic for the study of neural systems. There are, however, epistemological difficulties with the identification and attribution of function to a module. Because most brain activity is given in terms of the common currency of neural activity (action potentials, neurotransmitters, etc.), the issue of modularity is entangled. A fresh view on this issue is presented, taking a semiotic perspective. Neurons and neural modules are semiotic devices: what they mean is what they are about. This view suggests that the exchange of activity between modules should be conceived as the interpretation of messages. The view leads to useful conceptions about what a module may send, what it receives, and how it contextualizes information in its own terms. Activity exchanges in neural systems do not inherently carry meaning. Messages arise in the context of the receiver; meaning is produced locally. Attractor landscapes function as a model for meaning generation in modular systems. They are a conceptual shorthand clarifying the dichotomy between noise and variation, on one hand, and functional behavior, on the other.
1.2.6 Concept Duals This thesis builds on the resolution of dual and complementary concepts in the themes of variability and constancy. As these duals coalesce into a unified picture, solutions for prima facie paradoxes surface. Table 1.1 presents a concept map of where these dual concepts are handled.
] Table 1.1 The prominent dichotomies and dilemmas in neuroscience and in the study of behavior as they relate to constancy and variability, with cross-references to the chapters where they appear Duals (concept guide) Variability Constancy Chapter Transformations Invariances 2, 3 One to many Many to one 2, 5, 6, 8 Divergence Convergence 5, 6, 8, 9 Parameters Varieties 6, 7, 8 Rate Coding Temporal coding 5, 8 Complexity Simplicity 3, 4, 5, 6 Transients Attractors 7, 8, 10 Discontinuous Gradual 5, 7, 9 Variability Equivalence 8, 10 Generality Specificity 10 Noise Messages 10
References
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References 1. Iwasa K, Tasaki I, Gibbons R (1980) Swelling of nerve fibers associated with action potentials. Science 210(4467):338–339 2. Konur S, Yuste R (2004) Imaging the motility of dendritic protrusions and axon terminals: roles in axon sampling and synaptic competition. Mol Cell Neurosci 27(4):427–440 3. Schuster S, W¨ohl S, Griebsch M, Klostermeier I (2006) Animal cognition: How archer fish learn to down rapidly moving targets. Curr Biol 16(4):378–383
Chapter 2
Invariances in Theory
Abstract This chapter surveys the multifaceted roles that invariants play in theorizing, from physics and mathematics to biology and neurobiology. The question “What is an invariant of behavior?” is posed, and some alternatives are proposed and discussed: genes, neuroanatomy, and reflex theory. From that, the cybernetic take on the issue is introduced and placed in an evolutionary context, in which single behaviors are identified in respect to the goals they achieve and how they subserve the organism’s viability. The search for invariants of behavior is framed as a search for mechanisms. This search is far from trivial, as assumptions play a prominent role.
2.1 Invariants in Physics and Mathematics 2.1.1 Invariants Are That Which Remains When Something Else Changes Invariants are usually thought of as conserved quantities, relational structures, constant qualities or functions; in essence, invariants are properties of a system that are conserved irrespective of some manipulation. They are something describable about the system, which, often enough, are abstract properties existing nowhere but in the language of theory. But despite this dubious ontological status, invariants are invaluable as well as fundamental to theories. The discovery of an invariant may reveal connections between sorts of a theory previously thought unrelated. When something is conserved when the system is manipulated, that something becomes a latch for the other variables in the system to change around. It becomes a source of explanatory power, equating other variables in its terms.
2.1.2 Theoretical Invariants: Speed of Light, Planck’s Constant Without invariants both modern physics and mathematics are scarcely conceivable. Most appropriately the term originates from mathematical disciplines. Examples of M. Negrello, Invariants of Behavior: Constancy and Variability in Neural Systems, Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems 1, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8804-1 2, c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
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explanatory invariants are profuse and pervasive. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle draws a relation between our knowledge of a particle – how fast it moves, and where it is. It is bounded (above) by a number, Planck’s constant, representing the amount of knowledge we may extract in an experiment. Planck’s constant is an invariant in quantum mechanics that reappears in the resolution of physical paradoxes, such as the radiation of a black body. It gives a stance of solidity even in uncertainty. Another example of a theory that is anchored in assuming invariants is Einstein’s special theory of relativity. It is based on the axiom that the speed of light in a vacuum with respect to an inertial reference frame is always constant, a theoretical invariant. In the test of this assumption many physical paradoxes found resolution, e.g., the Michaelson–Moreley experiment. Incidentally, Einstein eventually regretted having called the theory Relativit¨atstheorie, having later preferred Invariantentheorie. Both the speed of light and Planck’s constant are theoretical invariants; no manipulation affects the conserved quantity, the former determined by postulate, the latter by deduction.1
2.1.3 Theoretical and Relational Invariants: Energy A giant leap in physical science followed the inception of the concept of energy of a system (Leibniz was the first to propose a formulation), an abstract quantity that is conserved through transformations of the components of a physical system. As an object falls from some height, the increasing velocity results from the transformation from potential energy to kinetic energy. As the object hits the ground, it produces sound, heat, and plastic alterations of the object, which are all expressible in terms of energy. Through the principle of conservation of energy we know that the heat, sound, and shape deformations produced all relate to the same quantity, which remains unaltered throughout the process. At a given time, the total amount of energy of a closed system is constant, and the invariant relates all components and their states within a system. Energy is the common currency across transformations, and is invariant for a closed system. If the system is open, i.e., other components are injected or removed, we know that the energy of the new state will increase or decrease by an exact number, representing the energy fluxes in and out.
2.1.4 Empirical and Relational Invariants: Law of Gases Other examples of invariants relate quantities, such as the Boyle–Mariotte law in thermodynamics, which relates the ratio of pressure and temperature of an ideal gas to a constant. The gas law was found experimentally; it is not absolute. An ideal
1
Other purely theoretical examples exist, such as the entities in the study of topology. For example, a torus – a donut – will always have one hole irrespective of deformations, because its shape identity is defined by its topological properties. The invariant property is a part of the entity’s definition.
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gas is an abstraction; there are variations dependent on particular gases. But all gases follow the rule, within some tolerance bounds, that pressure and temperature are inversely proportional. Similarly, the number of atoms in a volume, given temperature and pressure, is constant. They are related by a constant, first encountered in experiments, then derived analytically (among others, by Einstein [49]). Avogadro’s number specifies how volume relates to the number of molecules in a system. Like in Boyle’s law, Avogadro’s number closely follows reality; it is also an idealization conjoining empirical measurements. It works for ideal gases, which do not exist, but serves as a template for all real gases. Empirical invariants are constants and proportions and may indicate general principles underlying theories. Another example fitting this category is the thermal expansion coefficient, and it also fits in the next category. Both the thermal expansion coefficient and the gas constant are context-dependent, as both depend on the material or gas.
2.1.5 Context-Dependent Invariances: Sum of Internal Angles of the Triangle Some invariants are absolute, as Planck’s constant, and no conceivable manipulation affects the quantity bound by it. However, this is the exception; most invariants are context-dependent, requiring a ceteris paribus condition: that everything else should be kept constant. Some invariants are so only within a frame or a context (e.g., speed of light in a vacuum). Even in mathematics there are examples of context-dependent invariants Table 2.1. In Euclidean geometry the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is an invariant number (180ı). When Euclid’s parallels postulate is removed, the sum of internal angles ceases to be an invariant. This is a simple example of how invariants are dependent on the theories that define them, even in mathematics. Likewise, Planck’s constant, , is only valid within quantum mechanics, becoming meaningless when interpreted within, for example, Newtonian mechanics. The invariants from different theories may be incompatible, or irreducible to each other, or even devoid of meaning.
Table 2.1 Some examples of invariants in physics and mathematics Example Characteristics Speed of light Theoretical, postulate Planck’s constant Theoretical, formally deduced Avogadro’s number Empirical, relational Thermal expansion coefficient Empirical, idealization Energy Theoretical, relational, idealization Gas constant Empirical, relational Sum of internal angles of a triangle Theoretical, context-dependent
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2.1.6 Invariants Prefigure Theories Hence, invariants are bound by the assumptions of the theories that define them. Invariances are describable properties of a system that putatively remain unaltered irrespective of some classes of manipulations, or perturbations, or interventions in the system. Both in physics and in mathematics, invariants are the hallmarks of constancy, and often the axiomatic basis of a system of explanation, as in Einstein’s theory of relativity. This has also been phrased as a theorem stating that whenever there is symmetry, a quantity is conserved [44]. When there is symmetry, variables are coupled, and their interdependence begets predictability and explanation. The theorem finds support in a vast number of examples in physics. Invariants prefigure theories, and often theories are born when invariants are discovered.2
2.2 Invariants in Biology 2.2.1 Biology Borrowed Invariants from Physics and Mathematics How about biology? Modern biology motivated by the successes in physics has also made extensive use of invariants, more or less explicitly. In biological theories, invariants are as pervasive as – if less persuasive than, because they are less general – physical principles. In biology, mostly everything seems to be in constant change, contexts vary fluidly, boundaries are not well defined: there are few absolutes.
2.2.2 Invariants in Biology Are Context-Dependent But there are some constancies that, although not absolute, subsist healthily within particular contexts given that some conditions for existence are met. Through them order can be retrieved. Relational invariants figure prominently in models of systems biology, of which there are several, including high-level concepts such as order, organization, hierarchy, and structure. Explanations in biology, and particularly in systems biology, gravitated towards concepts such as balance, equilibrium, and exchange. Many models have been accordingly proposed. Relational invariants in biology produce cycles, equilibrating processes, oscillatory reactions, and the like. Numerous biological models deal with networks of processes assessed for their stabilities and asymptotic states. As examples we have homeostasis (Ashby) [4], the hypercycle (Eigen and Schuster) [18], autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela) [63], and gene regulatory networks [37]. In these cases, constituents of cyclic processes are 2
Noether’s theorem informally stated: differentiable symmetries generated by local actions have correspondent conserved current. An English translation of the original paper is found in [45].
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causally interrelated, where this begets that, begets that, and so on, in a systematized cycle of causes. One studies the bounds of operation of the networks, in terms of stability and in terms of the networks of interactions between constituents. The constancies resulting from networks of coupled processes are akin to self-organization, the idea that some arrangements of matter are endowed with certain equilibrating potentialities. Because of the necessity of assuming particular contexts and outlining a subpart of the phenomenon, most invariants in biology have a more tentative, hypothetical nature. Many are pure abstractions, such as the hypercycle or homeostasis. The further biology becomes from physics and chemistry, the flimsier, the more contextdependent its invariants. They lose the status of principles and axioms as in physics, and become conceptual ancillaries for characterizing the boundaries and identity of a biological phenomenon. Therefore, to employ invariants in biology, more than in physics, one is committed to a keen understanding of contextual influences, boundaries, and ceteris paribus assumptions. In biology, invariants dwell on very particular levels of description/analysis/explanation. Somewhat paradoxically, invariants in biology are most useful when contextual (and conceptual) boundaries are clearly discernible.
2.2.3 Three Examples: Life, Form, and Behavior To illustrate this, I will discuss three examples of the search for invariants in biology: life, form, and behavior. Each example will bring in an important set of considerations, historical, logical, epistemological, and ontological. From those we derive conclusions that inform and specify the search for invariants of behavior, which shall occupy us for most of the rest of this book.
2.2.3.1 Life, as an Invariant of the Living, Is a Tautology Some theories assume abstract invariant properties coextensive with what is to be explained. In this case, they become dry tautologies, and fail to provide an explanation. Such is the case, for instance, of life as an invariant property of the living.3 Tautologies, unless they can be framed as an axiomatic basis of a theoretical system, are dry in explanation. Difficult questions such as what is the fundamental property of the living led to many misconceptions, such as the supplanted idea of el´an vital (Bergson) and entelechies (Driesch) [38]; in trying to distill the general property of life, too dilute a concept evaporates. This happens because the abstract property
3 Coextensive: If P is an invariant property of a system, then for all members of set A, it is true that A has P . In the example of life, if all the living A have life (property L), then 8A W L.A/ ! L.A/, a tautology. An explanatory principle such as this has vaporous foundation, and no logical derivations are possible. Nothing can be learned; life becomes magic.
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(life) has too many instantiations (organisms); taken individually, each instantiation is fundamentally different, and therefore, life as a property can only refer to all instantiations of it when in a highly abstracted form. Attempting such overhauling levels of generality is disappointingly unproductive. The trouble with excess generalization in the search for invariants is that the result often becomes a self-referential tautology – devoid of predictive power – one with which one can have no hope of constructing a powerful theory.
2.2.3.2 Autopoiesis: An Invariant of Living Things Tautologies will be explanatory when they can be made pillars of axiomatic theories, when they are self-evident truths at the foundation of explanations. If the tautology is not an end in itself, but may be composed of other tautologies, it can become a principle of a system of explanation. In autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela’s theory of the living, the abstract invariant property “living,” being defined only loosely, is translated into more explanatory relations that take the actual organization of an organism into consideration. Maturana and Varela propose that living should be defined in terms of cyclical processes: processes producing more processes like the originals exhibit the hallmark of the living [61–63]. It is this smart move that replaces the idea that life is something independent of the organisms. Life becomes the organization of processes which maintain themselves by recurrently producing themselves. This is the abstract property that becomes the explanatory invariant. In studying life then, instead of a mystical search for some extra factor that confers life, one focuses the search on the kinds of processes that confer autopoietic properties to the living. Consequently, the study of the living becomes the search for processes that maintain themselves metastably under perturbations. This is a valuable reduction, for it frames the approach at large, and determines the further set of questions to be addressed.
2.2.3.3 Genes as Invariants of Form Many successful biological theories are founded upon invariances. Ever since Lineaus, and perhaps Aristotle, it is a set of morphological traits of a particular species that defines its identity. It was clear that there must have been some reason for the invariance of morphogenesis, although the reason itself was unclear. The whole exercise of taxonomy, despite its pitfalls, strives for the most explanatory level of morphological invariance; those properties that congregated define a species identity [39]. The discovery of the inheritance mechanism being a crystal lodged in all the cells of an organism (DNA) infused biology with optimism. There was finally a reason for constancy of form and behavior. The whole endeavor of molecular phylogeny results from the realization that genomes can be taken as invariants of species. But for form and behavior, the history was not complete until the cell and the environment had been brought back into the morphogenesis equation.
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2.2.3.4 Developmental Systems Theory Critique: Environment as a Determinant of Form The idea of the gene as the quintessential invariant of ontogeny has recently been called into question by researchers [17, 22, 24, 27, 33, 34, 47, 54].4 Developmental systems theory has emphasized the role of reciprocal interactions with the environment in ontogeny, in an attempt to bring the context as an integral part of explanation. Modern theories emphasized the role of developmental processes, such as triggers of biochemical environment, cellular environment dependent protein production, energy consumption, intracellular and extracellular transport, and consumable materials. All of these help scaffold a form. If the genes are regarded as invariants of form, they are so only within very complex contextual frames.
2.2.4 Ontogeny Needs the Environment Morphogenesis of some social insects, such as ants and termites, is a striking example of contextual dependency of form. It turns out that individuals with the very same genetic material, clones in every respect, will develop strikingly different morphologies and roles depending on the chemical context of the nest’s chamber in which they are born. And those morphological differences will be further expressed in the individual’s role in the colony, some becoming queens, some becoming winged soldiers, some becoming workers. Although not quite debunking the gene of its prominent role in generation of identity, developmental systems theory enforces contextual thinking in what may at first seem the stablest stance of invariance in biology. In the least, it becomes obvious that genes are only coresponsible for morphology and function. Because they are contextual, the genes are, at most, contingent invariants of form. In the extreme case, there are examples showing that even complex forms may be generated from a single cell, utterly devoid of genetic material, purely scaffolded by physiochemical processes [24].
2.2.5 Development and Biophysics The biophysical category of explanatory principles include examples such as adhesion, viscosity, permeability, rigidity, and elasticity, and in general the relational forces generating potential for rearrangements and self-organization, and by extension the organizing of constancies. Many of these properties are only remotely connected to genetic prescription. Brian Goodwin [24] describes the interesting case of the unicellular macroscopic alga Acetabularia, which despite being only one cell
4
See also [15] for an insightful book review on Oyama’s cycles of contingency.
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Fig. 2.1 Acetabularia and its life cycle
has complex form, resembling an umbrella (Fig. 2.1). Owing to complexity of its morphology, one would initially be inclined to attribute this complexity to genetic assembly. But a simple experiment precludes that conclusion. If the alga is cut at its stem, the nucleus of the cell remains at the bottom, presumably containing all genetic material with the information about the shape of the organism. There are now two parts, one with the nucleus at the bottom and no umbrella, and the other with no nucleus but with the umbrella. The surprising fact is that both parts regenerate a fully fledged version of the umbrella, irrespective of the presence of the nucleus. That is, the severed umbrella grows a second umbrella, at the severed side. So, the production of the material and the conditions that grow it are irrespective of the nucleus and its genetic material. Bri´ere and Goodwin [25] presented a model of the scaffolding of Acetabularia’s tip (the umbrella), where the assumptions are the physical properties of the cell’s substrate and time, excluding any further role for genetic production of material. This example illustrates well how complex form can originate solely from the physics of cell processes, even without gene transcription.
2.2.6 Evolution Operates on Organisms, Not on Genes The appearance of an invariant trait or feature in an organism is not a function of genes alone. So, instead of absolute invariants of form, it is perhaps more adequate to frame genes as invariants of cellular processes, as in gene regulatory networks, because at this level we are much more competent in defining a process in terms of components, dimensions of interdependence, as well as susceptibility to contextual influences. It is more parsimonious to keep genes at a proximal sphere of influence. For the same reason, it is a category mistake (sensu Gilbert Ryle) to say that evolution operates on genes [14]; an idea that finds much receptivity in the
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scientific community. Evolution is dependent on inheritance mechanisms; whether these are genetic or not is, in principle, irrelevant. Certainly, the gene pool correlates with evolutionary history, and has the potential of giving insight into the history of certain strains of beings. But it is a muddled conclusion that evolution operates on genes. Evolution operates on the level of the organism as a whole.
2.2.7 Genes as Invariants of Species Identity Arguably, genes are at their best with molecular phylogeny, the search for the branches of phyla across time. Comparing genetic data from fossils with those of modern organisms, similarities across genes may help reconstruct the tree of life, tracing back mutations and thereby finding branches that belong together. To an extent, genes are defensible as invariants of phylogenetic identity. Even so, there are many examples where the evolution of adapted traits is essentially regulated by the environment, such as the adaptive shape and color of some seashells [26]. Moreover, there are many mechanisms of epigenetic inheritance, such as chromatin markings, which are only now being demonstrated [33]. Inheritance is about any transmitted trait; if cellular material transmitted to progeny determines features of progeny, then there is epigenetic inheritance. Owing to other forms of inheritance, molecular phylogeny is also susceptible to misclassifications, and genes are not fail-free invariants of species identity.
2.2.8 Invariants in Biology: Only Within Narrow Contextual Boundaries As we proceed in our explanation, it turns out that most candidates for invariants in biology will follow this general rule; invariants in biology, if defensible, are so within narrow conceptual boundaries. Genes are the paradigmatic example. To say that the gene is an invariant of the form of an organism is to exclude too many formative levels. Genes are indeed crucial invariants of development and behavior, but are not almighty. By forcefully excluding the cell and the environment and their multifarious influences on the development of stable forms, the scope of explanation shrinks. In biology, it is counterproductive to try to attribute too much to one element of explanation. For the same reason, although genes and form do covary in certain experimental paradigms, it is a mistake to attribute form solely to genes.
2.2.9 Genetic Triggers Do Not Build an Organism So, genes do not hold the position of absolute invariants of form, as the gene’s causal prowess dilutes in development when the environment (also cellular) is taken into the morphogenesis equation. Molecular biology is at a stage where it can often
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say what a gene triggers, but remains silent and circumspect to the question how. Molecular biology errs if it confuses causes and triggers, because although there are many ways to cause some sort of function – by knocking a gene, for example – there are fewer to build one. To explain how something is built, it does not suffice to say which gene triggers what, rather the story must be spelled out throughout the development cascade, up until the generation of a full organism. The organism is not made up of a set of genetic triggers, because triggers are not stuff [28, 55].
2.3 Invariants of Behavior 2.3.1 What Is an Invariant of Behavior? Following on the definition of invariants, an invariant of behavior is that which remains constant with respect to an identified behavior. But what is it, and more crucially, is there such a thing? What is invariant when conspecifics execute similar motor behaviors? Further, will homologous behavior across phyla have similar invariances? Before these questions may even be asked, we must endure a demanding assumption: that it is possible to define functional behaviors.5 Start out with behaviors instinctive or stereotypical, preferably of simple organisms, and search for what may be the invariant concomitants of those. Think of a fly rubbing its hands, or a fish masticating, or a dog swallowing; simple behaviors. Ask what is invariant in those. At first glance, for the simple behaviors there are several candidates, of which three are discussed: genes, neuroanatomy, and reflexes.
2.3.2 Genes as Invariants of Behavior 2.3.3 Genes Are Untenable as Invariants of Behavior, for They Are a Diluted Cause In Sect. 2.2.6, we discussed the role of the genome as an invariant of form. We found that although genes are certainly fundamental for phylogeny and inheritance, they are insufficient as invariants of form. Cellular processes underlying morphogenesis exist which are independent of the genes. Hence, the environment (also cellular) has a formative and causal role in the creation of a form, where not all processes are directly caused by the genes. The creation of a living organism is not merely a sequence of genetic triggers, but a complex scaffolding process of interdependences. The same argument can be extended to include behavior. Enthusiastic with
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Our working definition of behavioral function: when a goal can be attributed to a behavior, then the behavior is a functional behavior. Contrast that with behavior in toto.
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the stability of genes, some have argued that the genome carries information, not only about species identity, but also a full program for the creation of a form, complete with modes of behavior. At this point, however, we address a matter of scope. Genes certainly have a crucial role in the development of the structure of an organism, and the structure in turn will produce, with environmental interaction, behavior. However, genes as explanatory entities fail to give proper answers to the “how” question. Genes can be associated with “which” behavior or form, but they alone cannot answer “how.” To say that genes are invariants of behavior, therefore, is an unwarranted exaggeration; one that simply vaults over too many levels at a time. A simple example will clarify the claim that genes are not the best level of analysis for behavior. Some species of fish are born without eyes. Genes have recently been found that trigger the formation of the eyes [43, 50]. If the eye-controlling motor neurons are present, then the fish uses them; so the presence of eyes modifies behavior. But the changes in behavior are better explained in terms of the newly acquired eyes than in terms of the gene that triggered the production of eyes. Behavior cannot be explained as a set of genetic triggers, for the genes do not see, the organism does. The form of an organism and its modes of interaction with the environment are more immediate to behavior than genes. To be sure, the structure is a consequence of development, genetically guided, so through circuitous routes, one may attribute behavior to genes. But this is like saying that the Sarajevo crime caused the First World War. Although it may have triggered it, all the conjuncture that made it a propitious trigger was given at a much larger scale of interdependences. Triggers are descriptions of linchpin transitions, which require quite a bit of context to be activated. A set of genetic triggers does not explain a developmental process, as much as an organism is not a set of triggers. Therefore, to pin a gene as responsible for behavior is to give too summarized a story about the behavior. Important in their own right, it is a hopeless game to exhaustively list all the genetic triggers of behavior. Invariances of behavior are to be found in the engaged interaction between the being and the world (see Fig. 2.2).
2.3.4 Neuroanatomy: Invariant Connections Between Architecture and Behavior That there must be a connection between neuroanatomy and behavior is nowadays beyond question (in the time of Aristotle it was not so, since he thought that the brain had a cooling function). Organisms of the same species with roughly the same behavioral traits also have, at certain scales, similar neuroanatomies. So, there are architectural characteristics that correlate with function and behavior. Occasionally, conspicuous features of similar neuroanatomies can be traced to function. However, this is the exception rather than the rule: although there are many distinguishable architectonic features, they do not always have obvious relations to function.
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Genes are not solely responsible for morphogenesis and development. The structure of an organism appears together with environment and the biochemical contexts of the cell. Genes help determine behavior inasmuch as they help determine the structure of an organism. Behavior appears as the organism couples with the environment, expressing the potentialities of behavior. Consider the question: how does gene A produce behavior B? Usually, the behavior-gene expert will not be able to answer. What he does instead, is to say: if we impair gene A, behavior B is not produced. Consequently, the gene is a better level for analysis of the processes leading to the development of structure, than those leading to behavior. For behavior, its causal powers become diffuse as levels are crossed.
Organism
Cell Development Genes
Cell Env.
CNS Organism
Morphogenesis
Behavior
Genes participate in development, as does the cell and the environment. In that, they help determine the structure of the organism, but they do not determine interactions with the environment, that ultimately become behavior.
Fig. 2.2 Genes and explanation of behavior. CNS central nervous system, Env. environment
2.3.5 Architectonic Invariances At first glance, some levels of neuroanatomical organization are distinguishable on the basis of constancy of architecture. Examples of such invariants are abundant: the organization of cortical layers in mammals, macroscopic morphological features of the brain (gyri, sulci), microscopic circuitry, the proportionality between neuronal density and the inverse of the cubic root of brain volume, or that between the square root of brain weight and the cubic root of body weight [10]. As Valentino
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Braitenberg writes, “Very likely these quantitative relations reflect some general principles of the architecture of neuronal networks.” When quantified, many features of neuronal circuitry will display invariance in a statistical sense, such as average length of dendritic spines, average number of synapses in a given cortical area, and a long list of other features [6, 11, 19, 20]. The number of distinguishable levels of neural organization correlates with the complexity of the organism. Nervous systems of simpler organisms may have wiring that looks almost fully prespecified, as the wiring of insect ommatidia [32] (the fly is also a neat example, especially in the plates in [8]), whereas in complex organisms the degree of variation is much greater. Still, for both, there are gross6 levels of organization that appear highly patterned and repeatable (as in Fig. 2.3). As Braitenberg writes, this gives clues that, at some level, there must be some invariance of neuroanatomy responsible for constancy in behaviors.
Fig. 2.3 Invariance at the coarse level of architecture in the nervous system of the caterpillar. The brain is marked with a. (From Swammerdam [57])
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Gross in the sense of coarse, at first glance.
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2.3.6 Some Features of Gross Anatomy Can Be Traced to Behaviors As an example, Braitenberg [9], a neuroscientist by training, derived from neuroanatomical observations a model of behavior now known as a Braitenberg vehicle that abstracts salient (gross) features of neural architecture, such as contralaterality or ipsilaterality, to explain simple functional behaviors, such as following or avoiding a light (see Fig. 2.4). This is a simple and powerful instance of how simple features of architecture could be taken as invariants of behavior (provided, of course, there is the body and the environment). Similarly, simpler organisms with only a few neurons (in the hundreds) may have almost identical wiring, to the extent that neuroscientists can find unique identifiers for every single neuron. At times, single neurons will be responsible for particular behaviors, such as escape responses, or simple reflexive behaviors, in which simple analysis of connectivity (sometimes one neuron, as in the case of zebra fish [58]) explains constancy in behavior. But there is no general method that relates architecture to function. Cortical layers, despite their similarity in construction, are often associated with very distinct functionality.
Fig. 2.4 A Braitenberg vehicle with phototropism. The contralateral connections establish negative feedback producing light-following behavior. Colors indicate contralateral pathways
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2.3.7 Connections Between Anatomy and Function Do Not Always Exist Such a clear connection between features of anatomy and functional behavior only exists for either the coarse level of the neuroanatomy or for very simple organisms. As architectures and organisms become more complex, this kind of direct relation between architecture and behavior becomes increasingly difficult to retrieve. Already in insects there is a considerable difficulty in tracing features of architecture to behaviors. Although many distinguishable regularities may be observed, it is not even clear whether for each of those there will be a function, or whether that architecture is the only way to realize the function. If it is the case that different architectonic features could express the very same analogous function, then an argument can be made against the case for anatomy as an invariant of behavior. An invariant of behavior, by definition, must be constant when the function is constant. So, if there are multiple neural implementations of a particular function, then those neural implementations reflect the invariant, but are not the invariant. What is more, although we may describe the brain in very fine architectural features, the relationship between those features and function can be elusive. For historical reasons the anatomical characterization of the human brain is either independent of function or based on historical hypotheses (as in Broca’s aphasia). Wernicke’s areas, for example, are described in terms of the different cytoarchitectures and gross features of anatomy such as sulci and gyri. Even if, on occasion, some localization of function is attempted (see also Sect. 3.2.5 on functional magnetic resonance imaging and epistemic magnetic resonance imaging), the matching between function and structure inherits the arbitrariness and biases of the architectonic description. Incidentally, localizing function in the architecture informs little about how the function is executed (as will be discussed in Sect. 3.2.5), which is our primary interest.
2.3.8 Neuroanatomical Variation and Constancy of Function If it is difficult to map constancy of function to architecture, which has an apparent order; it is even more difficult to account for the extreme neuroanatomical variation in complex organisms. Even in simple organisms there are many possible neuroanatomical implementations that express similar behaviors. In insects it is often a single neuron which realizes a complete pathway, and the variation across individuals is large. This suggests that although gross neuroanatomy may be taken as an invariant, it is so only at a coarse scale. One is hard-pressed to isolate features of geometry that are invariant with respect to function. However, this conclusion does service in constraining the search for an invariant of behavior, in that it adds one important requirement. An invariant of behavior has to give an account of which variations in neuroanatomy may express similar behaviors, and how (as we shall see in Part II).
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2.3.9 One to Very Many Mappings from Anatomy to Function Even if there is a level where gross neuroanatomy correlates with some simple functions (and there is enough reason to believe there is), the case is very different for finer neuroanatomical details and more sophisticated behavior. The problem is that for more sophisticated brains, mapping between function and neuroanatomy is one to very many. In one individual, one neural architecture maps to all the functions an organism potentially expresses. Therefore, except for very particular cases, neuroanatomical features cannot explain the breadth of behavior. As organisms become more sophisticated, they express a widening breadth of behavior [56], not necessarily traceable to gross features of the architecture. In a sense, the architecture “lodges” all possible behaviors an organism can express, and hence is not very informative about specific behaviors. This a strong indication that neuroanatomy is not the most adequate level to search for invariants of behavior. This many-to-one function-to-structure mapping is manifested in current neuroscientific literature, where particular anatomical structures are hypothesized to perform a number of functions, often incommensurable or even contradictory. To take an extreme example, the hippocampus has been associated with a large number of cognitive and behavioral functions. Examples include localization [46], declarative memory [13], emotion and motivation [59], face recognition [51], sequencing and planning [7], and language production [53]. This nonexhaustive list of functions attributed to the hippocampus betrays subjectivity in the attribution of its role, and more than that, it befuddles brain theorists as to whether it is possible to attribute to the hippocampus a unique function subsuming all the instances of function above. As Braitenberg puts it (p. 7 in [8]) (my emphasis): We will not be able, in most cases, to explain the peculiarities of a certain brain structure by invoking the rules and constraints of the mechanism that synthesize brains out of neurons, but will always have to consider explanations in terms of the function it performs.
The problem is that for any behavior that has the hippocampus as an active component, the role of the hippocampus may change, dynamically and within behavioral context, introducing a difficulty for any static functional label.7
2.3.10 Requirements for an Invariant of Behavior A theory of behavior certainly has to explain how constancies in the gross architecture level lead to constant function, but it cannot stop there. We may derive some 7
Schema theory (see more in Sect. 2.3.12) exemplifies the attempts to overlay the brain with a structure of functional components, “boxes,” to aide in explanation of overall behavior. But although being a tenable level of functional analysis, it encounters the problems of arbitrariness. That is because, in an important sense, a function only exists while it is being executed, and only within the frame of a theory. Often, there will be no fundamental way to distinguish between different overlaying schemas which one is better or best.
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requirements for an invariant of behavior, in that (1) it has to explain the appearance of gross features of neuroanatomy, (2) it has to explain its “capacity for behavior,” the fact that it may lodge a large number of “latent behaviors,” and (3) it has to explain how constancy in function appears despite variability in neuroanatomy. Much like genes, neuroanatomy subserves behavior but does not fully exhaust its explanation. The fact is that behavior exploits neuroanatomy in the same way that it employs the body, by being embedded in a context. For a Braitenberg vehicle to follow a light, there must be, in addition to the neural architecture, also a light source and a body that turns to it. Invariants of function rely on contingencies of the environment and are only definable in those terms. The behaviors expressible by the Braitenberg vehicle are only so when proper stimuli are present, which usually requires that the environment should be introduced into the explanation. Reflex theorists such as Skinner, Pavlov, Thorndike, and Herrnstein took this to heart. They proposed that the environment could be distilled into a number of stimuli, each evoking an action, where the sum of all reflex–stimulus pairs could make up an explanation of behavior. This was soon shown to be too reduced a picture to encompass the multitude of adaptive behavior [40].
2.3.10.1 Reflexes as Invariants of Behavior Although it has not been framed as such (a search for invariance), the most prominent example of the search for invariants in behavior is reflex theory. It departed from the observations that some stimuli were stereotypically associated with particular motor responses. At its inception, it seemed like a productive front of research, infused with optimism, but as the research program developed, dissatisfaction arose in the community. It soon became obvious that an organism is more than a finite list of stimulus-response reflexes [40]. Reflex theory is attractive because it hints at a possible systematic search of stimulus–response couplings. It may have caused some researches to believe incorrectly that it is possible to compile a comprehensive, if not complete, list of stimulus–response pairs. Summarizing Merleau-Ponty, the animal is more than the sum of its behaviors. The invariant reflex is too circumscribed, too contingent on precise definition of ceteris paribus conditions, to succeed as a theory of behavior. But in spite of its shortcomings, it was instrumental in the search for mechanisms behind behavior. The search for an exhaustive list of reflexes was an original and insightful attempt to explain the sources for the apparent invariances in behavior, albeit somewhat rudimentary.
2.3.10.2 Limitations of Reflex Theory Reflex theory faces two problems, one epistemological, one empirical. Empirical, because the laboratory setup is a far cry from natural behavior. As Merleau-Ponty (pp. 44–46 in [40]) writes, “few pure reflexes are found [because] laboratory reflexes
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are not biological realities.” Epistemological, because there was no obvious way to reintegrate the individual stimulus–reflexes in a whole picture of behavior. This highlighted the ludicrous nature of the original project of reflex theory. Because the environment is immensely complex, it is not possible to exhaustively list stimuli– reaction pairs. It is also not possible to assume a null context, because every stimulus presentation has a different context (even if that difference is merely time elapsed).
2.3.11 Cybernetics, Reafference, and Sensorimotor Loops The nervous system and the automatic machine are fundamentally alike in that they are devices which make decisions on the basis of decisions they made in the past. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics
There would be no adequate framework to resolve the quandaries from reflex theory until the appearance of cybernetics. Cyberneticists realized that single stimulus– reaction pairs were insufficient to explain behavior. Theirs was the insight that if one adds feedback from the environment, then a recurrent structure emerges in time, where a stimulus–reaction pair entails the next stimulus–reaction pair. The organism then has an active/positive role in producing its own stimuli, and so on, in a cycle. Behavior appears as stimulus–reactions are sequentially and smoothly chained. Moreover, cyberneticists acknowledged that the organism had internal states, which rendered it a “nontrivial machine,” sensu von Foerster [21]. That suggested that the structure of the nervous system was organized as a “negative feedback with a purpose” (see Sect. 8.5.3). Mittelstadt, von Holst [31], Ashby [4], Arbib [1, 2], Wiener [52, 64], and others [9, 23, 60] provided a rich set of examples of organisms whose neural structures could execute the function of negative-feedback controllers. Examples ranged from the flight of a fly, to the eye movements of frogs. Their seminal contribution spawned many fields of research [30].
2.3.11.1 Cybernetics Extends Reflex Theory As in Sect. 2.3.10, although in some cases the underpinnings of reflexes could be traced to anatomy and network structures, in most cases behavior still defied a mechanistic explanation. Although an important start had been made, at the time a general theory of behavior was still missing. That would be the case until cybernetics introduced the concepts of reafference, recursion, and the sensorimotor feedback. The notable contributions of cybernetics provided new ground towards an explanation for the immense variation of complex nervous systems.
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Fig. 2.5 An example of an explanation based on reafference. (From [31])
Despite much variation in neural structure, constancy in behavior was too pervasive for the concept of reflex to be relinquished altogether. Admittedly incomplete, on the upside it provided a stepping stone to the explanation of behavior and invariances, passive of further research on how specific mechanisms could underlie multifarious behavior. Cybernetic views enhanced reflex theory as reafference theory, and suggested a path for a more sophisticated take on a theory of invariances in behavior Fig. 2.5. It was to be searched for in the engaged interplay between body, nervous system, and environment.
2.3.11.2 Functions, Mechanisms, and Purpose The principal insight of cybernetics was to suggest that the organism could be regarded as a complex mechanism whose functions emerge as the organism becomes (sensu Varela and von Foerster) in its environment. Wiener and contemporary cyberneticists proposed that purposeful behavior is the outcome of a mechanism; that which a machine is built to do. It presupposes an abstract principle of construction – a mechanism – that entails function when in a sensorimotor loop. A machine that acts and corrects towards a goal is behaving purposefully, and its mechanism(s) for doing so is(are) the behavior invariant of that goal. In that reductionist sense, the simplest example in the literature of a machine with a purpose is a thermostat. Its construction is such that it compares two temperature values, a reference with a measured value, and sends corrective signals (which may be heating, or cooling), to reach a temperature equilibrium. More than an analogy, this was proposed as purposeful behavior. Many more such examples exist, as the watt regulator, or radar control, where negative feedback is the operating principle. Distasteful to some [36], the proposal that an organism acts as a feedback mechanism has profound implications. For if a certain mechanism entails a certain function, then it is the mechanism
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itself which is the invariant of function. The mechanism is, so to speak, coextensive with its functions. Moreover, it acknowledges the role of the environment as an inextricable part of function: for the function to be exerted, the environmental context must be given.8 The thermostat is the standard example of a cybernetic device: a system in the world, endowed with sensors and actuators that enable it to make feedback corrections to attain its goal. In that, it is similar in description to an organism that pursues a willed goal by deploying a set of actions and corrections to achieve it. The thermostat, however, has a goal in a rather narrow sense; in fact, it has only one goal, about which it is not cognizant. If, for example, the window is opened, the thermostat may huff and puff, but will not do more than keep the heater (cooler) on (off). Hence, compunctions to call its behavior multitudinal (or even adaptive) are more than justified. Multitudinal and adaptive behavior are hallmarks of organismic behavior of even insignificantly small mammals that do all sorts of cool stuff, such as finding a mate, finding a home, playing, fleeing, growing, finding food, killing food, and feeding, and all that flexibly, adaptively, and purposefully. Hans Jonas, in contemptuous disagreement, was quick to point out the analogy of purposeful behavior as a mechanism is misapplied [36]. Concerning the relationship between goal and purpose, in a mechanism, goal is that what the mechanism is built to achieve. To construct a machine is an exercise of defining a goal and constructing mechanisms to achieve it. An organism, on the other hand, seems to define its own goals. Its behavior not only exhibits purpose, but is also guided by it. That is the problem Jonas stresses: a machine has its goals attributed to it by us, an organism defines its own goals by existing and being intrinsically motivated (the concept of mediacy; pp. 106–114 in [36]). Opposite to a machine, an organism is not a set of stapled functions. Rather, an organism entails functions, which are exerted or not depending on the internal context and external affordances. Goals for the organism appear as the organism behaves, and as it does it changes, and consequently its goals change, and so on recursively. One may not discard Jonas’s criticisms lightly, but a closer look may help bring the two, machine and organism, together. First, we have it as a given that a mechanism may be taken as an analogy to an organism; after all, we initially built machines to accomplish purposes often copying those of organisms. We should not forget, as Jonas reminds us, that they are indeed our purposes, not the machine’s. But as a model for behavior, a cybernetic device is more than a cold machine. It outlines a set of prescriptions to assemble purposeful-like behavior, with a savory small set of assumptions. And it does not take too much dialectic effort to bring purpose back into the explanation, not as an analogy, but something which is embedded in the control loop, generating the specifications for behavior – even if it fails to show how the drives feel to their owner. My purpose here is to show that a mechanism is a correct, albeit hopelessly incomplete, model of the purposes, or
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Environmental context is meant broadly: a cell can be an environment for DNA, as blood can be an environment for a cell, or the body can be a contextual environment for a neural system.
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drives, or urges, of an organism. My reasons for the incompleteness claims are the same as Merleau-Ponty’s: “to build a model of an organism would be to build the organism itself” (p. 151 in [40], also Wiener [64]). This does not mean that we should give up building models, but that our models are not organisms – although they may help us understand the functions of an organism. And ultimately, it is not precluded that we will be able to assemble such a resourceful contrivance that will act as we do, although it may not have the same type of (organismic, motivational) reasons for its drives. If we bring evolution into the picture, the issue gains perspective. Goals appear as evolutionary viability imposes order on self-organizing structures, endowed with intrinsic potentialities. In evolution, mechanistic, functional behavior bestows organisms with enhanced viability. It is an orderly exploit of chaos, a selection, that what begets function. Life evolves towards function because function enhances viability. Very simple function, mechanical behavior, such as chemotaxis in a bacterium, was described as purposeful long before the advent of cybernetics as a theory. A bacterium as a complex organism has the purposeful behavior of a mechanism. All the behaviors a bacterium can express are latent in its structure, and are expressed when it encounters contexts, the environment. To the extent that we can disinter the mechanistic underpinnings of the behaviors of a bacterium, we can understand what its mechanisms are. Because an organism is a mechanism coextensive with all its potentials for functional behavior, a quest for function is fulfilled with the description of a mechanism. But the problem is a little deeper than that.
2.3.12 Schema Theory and Functional Overlays If we are compelled by the idea that behavior is subserved by a dynamical concoction of mechanisms operating in concert and context, the simplest way to study brain function is by finding a match between mechanisms and functions. One intuitive method would be to overlay the neural structures with hypothetical functional boxes, whose actions would produce the analyzed functional behavior. This method is essentially a product of systems theory applied to the study of neural function. The idea that function can be localized to particular substructures has been prolifically employed by cognitive scientists and neuroscientists. Unfortunately, this appealing project suffers from similar critiques as reflex theory. Whereas reflex theory falls short of explaining how the sum of functions builds the whole behavior, schema theory strains to show how brain areas shift between functions. As the same brain area may subserve different functions at different times (and even simultaneously), a static attribution of function to brain area is bound to be partial and incomplete. A functional overlay is a metaphor of localization of function, in which an idealized anatomical map of a brain, often hierarchical, is overlaid with functional boxes representing a mapping between brain areas and functions (an example is given in Fig. 2.6). The functional boxes are usually connected with arrows representing some kind of well-formed information exchange. The boxes are in fact black boxes
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Fig. 2.6 A schema as an overlay of functional boxes on brain areas. This particular schema proposes explaining the functional roles of brain areas involved in action recognition. Abbreviations: IT – infratemporal cortex; cIPS – caudal Infra Parietal Sulcus; AIP – anterior intra parietal cortex; STS – Superior Temporal Sulcus; MIP/LIP/VIP – medial, lateral, ventral intra parietal cortex. (From [48])
of function, implemented neurally somehow – perhaps instantiated with models, or with models pending. A structure of such boxes representing function–area associations is able to generate predictions about interdependencies, for example, in lesion studies. Outlining functional boxes is a basal tool for theory (and hypotheses) making, and in some incarnations is called schema theory [1–3, 16]. A schema is a relational structure of functional boxes standing for an explanation of a certain behavioral or cognitive ability. Hence, systems theory applied to brain function incurs a few critical difficulties. First, a function is a relational abstraction, subjectively outlined as in [5, 42]. Second, as discussed in Sect. 2.3.9, the same neural structure, such as the thalamus or the hippocampus (can there be a unique function for these structures?), may underlie different functions (also simultaneously!). Third, (vide Sects. 3.3 and 10.1–3) a neural structure may participate in two different functions in distinct ways. Fourth, to any functional question (what for?), there will be answers (for x), good or bad, as I will analyze in more depth in Chap. 3 about empirical assessments of invariance. Fifth, (as in Chap. 8.5.3) there is compelling evidence indicating that brain function is dynamically organized: a function is the product of dynamics that only really exist while the function is executed (else only as a potential). These points are individually addressed in the sections mentioned, and lead to the upcoming conclusion that these epistemological difficulties appear because the brain is a hermeneutic machine, one that can only be comprehended in terms of function, which only exists (in the eyes of the theory) once it is named. One finds (or does not), the function one names.
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A functional overlay map is similar to a labeled and tagged map used for navigation, where depending on one’s interests, restaurants, hotels, and entertainment venues, would be highlighted, depending on the search. A functional overlay is like a meta-data-laden navigation map, where a restaurant and a hotel may occupy the same place simultaneously. The analogy is wanting, because although restaurants and hotels exist even when not shown, functions are only there when they are executed. For instance, it is not productive to analyze object recognition in the absence of the object, nor to analyze speech production in the absence of words.
2.3.12.1 Descriptions of Schema Functions Are Abstractions Over Instances When a neuroscientist asks questions about cognitive or behavioral function, he or she asks questions about memory, perception, understanding, abstraction, categorization, attention, judgment, decision, volition, and learning. Essentially these abilities are abstract clusters derived from single instances. All these functions have a relational structure, and all these functions are “of” something. As Brentano [12] pointed out (in 1874), for all these cognitive and behavioral functions, there are objects. Memory is “of” some event, perception is “of” some thing, and so forth. The functions listed above are abstract categories that cluster a large number of instances in which similar purpose is recognized. Descriptions of function derive from categorizations across instances which inherit properties of the individual instances, which may be contradictory or even mutually exclusive. This is the source of many a misunderstanding in the search for mechanisms underlying function. Hence, the search for a mechanism implementing a function stumbles upon a problem equivalent to Minksy’s frame problem in artificial intelligence [41]. The more detailed the description becomes, the more it excludes. Between excessive abstraction and excessive specificity schema theories of behavior fail to display the flexibility necessary to explain the relations between structure and function. The important lesson to be drawn is that the search for brain mechanisms must fully embrace the multifunctional character of the brain, as it dynamically shifts from function to function. The explanation of a brain function remains the search for a mechanism, but one that lodges functions only as potentials until they are put to use. An explanation of organismic function based on mechanisms and functional boxes has to explain more than a single function at a time; it must also address the multifarious potentialities for function that one neural structure may deploy, in different contexts and moments. Because the functional role of the neural substrate is often dynamically organized, and thus only exists in the context of behavior, box structure overlays become invalid in different moments. Dynamical systems explains how this can be the case, as structures assume different roles in different contexts, vis-`a-vis dynamical parameterizations. Invariants of behavior arise within dynamical contexts, and admit only very flexible functional overlays. At the expense of sounding repetitive, behavioral functions are entailments of an organism. Schema theory confuses component functions with de facto structural functionality.
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2.3.13 Behavioral Function and Invariants of Behavior A functional behavior is a phenomenon, in the proper sense of the term: the object of a person’s perception; what the senses notice or the mind notices [35]. Functional behavior is immanent in organisms; whereas observers describe and categorize behavior (after Merleau-Ponty). When purposes and goals can be attributed to a set of actions, this set of actions can be outlined as a functional behavior. Consider an organism as a complex mechanism with the potential for many component functions. Deploying these capabilities in a concerted manner to achieve a particular goal creates an example of functional behavior. The potential for behavior is fulfilled in interaction with the environment, in context. An invariant of behavior appears with the minimum set of mechanisms with the inherent potential for those functions indispensable for a functional behavior. Incidentally, akin to other invariants of biology, the idea of an invariant of behavior obviates subjectivity in the definition of function and context. Behaviors have functions as prerequisites. Consequently, the search for an invariant of behavior begins with the description of a behavior, parsed into component functions necessary for that behavior. The act of outlining the functional components of behavior is, by necessity, a subjective activity. Correspondingly, functional descriptions may be contradictory or fuzzy – the best heuristics being parsimony; as when attempting to avoid excessive anthropomorphism, notwithstanding its ineluctability. In a rough description, a behavioral function of a fly such as h pursuing a matei, requires components to hlocalize a moving dot in visual fieldi and h flight controli. Those descriptions are shorthand implicitly assuming the existence of mechanisms that enable these functions (note, moreover, that the mechanism underlying both functions may be one and the same). The invariant of a behavior is the set of mechanisms fundamentally necessary for a behavioral function. In that, it is inextricable from the descriptions of the component functions. It implies the required functions for one functional behavior, and defines the outline of mechanisms to be explained. In reflex theory the atom of explanation is a stimulus–reaction pair. In my (constructivistic) conception, the atom of explanation is the association of a functional behavior (such as feeding), with all its component functions (e.g., the capacity for hunger, foraging, mastication), and the minimal substrate that can implement that behavioral function, within an organismically relevant frame. The invariant of behavior is a many-to-one association from behavioral function to mechanism(s). Because functions can be implemented differently, the substrates implementing an invariant of behavior may vary widely. The less similarity between organisms, the less likelihood that the mechanisms will be similar in implementation. Conversely, the more similar the organisms, the more probable that the implementation will evince similarities in mechanisms. Evidently, the mechanisms leading to feeding behavior in an elephant are more similar to those of a hippopotamus than to those of an ant. Still, even between conspecifics there will be variation in implementations. That which remains the same across compared organisms is the
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invariant of behavior, which may be a null set (e.g., a palm and an elephant) or an equivalent set (e.g., two worker ants). Different organisms with similar capabilities for behavioral function will in one way or another implement the same component functions. Thus, findings about behavioral invariants from one organism may tell tales about the selection of component functions of the behavior of different organisms. In that sense, invariants of behavior can be conceptualized as the overlapping regions of constancy, across the variable implementations of functional mechanisms across organisms. Invariants of behavior are conceptual shorthand for the definition of behavioral function and its possible implementations/instantiations. Invariants of behavior map to the space of (abstract) mechanisms with the potential for behavioral function.9 What is similar between an elephant feeding and an ant feeding? Simple answer: the description. Feeding is the function of acquiring energy through ingestion of food. Quite obviously, an ant and an elephant will have quite different mechanisms for feeding, but both share the description. This is the difficulty of the study of many a cognitive function with model organisms, the description is shared, but the mechanism is not. The main problem with that conception is also the necessary frame for any solution: language. A function is a description of a purpose. In the elephant as in the ant, the description for feeding is the same, because the goal is the same. At the abstract level of teleological analogies, the invariant of behavior is a description of that behavior and the possible analogies between component functions/mechanisms [23]. I participated recently in a round table of neuroethologists which included specialists in mammals, fish, and insects. At the event, results of operant conditioning in drosophilas were presented. In the paradigm, drosophila flies were made to couple an unconditioned stimulus with a conditioned stimulus. The source of disagreement was the number of trials until the response of the drosophilas was conditioned. Learning took place in very few trials (two to seven). Mammal experts pointed out that this process is much shorter than in mammals, where operant conditioning takes many more trials (more than 50) until the conditioned response is exhibited. Consequently, the mammal experts argued (with some support from fish experts) that what happened in drosophilas could not be called operant conditioning. Much to the dismay of the insect experts, who pointed out that apart from the number of trials, the descriptions of the experiments were essentially the same. The lesson to be learned from this event is that descriptions are dangerous. I take it that the problem behind the disagreement was that nothing learned about operant conditioning in insects could be imported to mammals. All the same, because the mechanisms are likely to be fundamentally different, a certain strictness concerning terminology is utterly justified. Component functions of a behavioral function may be more or less dependent on each other, and this dependence may vary between different organisms. Therefore, mechanisms may be more or less modularizable than others, reflected in the
9
This is one of the main difficulties with analogies in ethology and neuroethology. Descriptions of functions are shared across different organisms, whereas mechanisms are not.
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behavioral invariants. Lesion experiments test for that. In monolithic mechanisms, component functions may share the substrate with which they are implemented – the same neural structure may underlie two simultaneous functions. As an example, certain cephalopods use their visual system both to guide escape reactions and to select skin patterns for camouflage [29]. Because the visual systems underlie both abilities, damage to the common substrate impairs both behavioral functions. Although the substrate is the same, it may be employed by different subsystems in distinctive modes (as the experiment described in Sect. 10.3.2 will illustrate).
2.3.13.1 Invariants of Behavior from Convergent Evolution Because organisms share the world, along with some basic physics and biochemistry, some behavioral functions may be stumbled upon anew in different evolutionary lines. The phenomenon denominated “convergent evolution” may lead to similarities of form and of behavior, or both. A conception of evolution as procuring a maximum denominator in behavioral function may rely on invariants of behavior for a test bed of hypotheses. Invariants of behavior may be defined within individuals, across conspecifics, and beyond phyla. The amounts of overlap are informative about similar problems different organisms may have encountered in their evolutionary paths, leading to convergence in behavioral function, and structure. Invariants of behavior are proposed as a conceptual shorthand in the understanding of the multifarious behavior of organisms. In this chapter I exemplified how invariants of behavior affect the search for a mechanism for behavioral function. The procedure is simple: name a behavioral function, partition the behavioral function into necessary component functions, and finally, search for the minimum set of mechanisms with the capacity to subserve the behavioral function named. Invariances appearing as problems are solved similarly. It is in this sense that invariants of behavior will be henceforth employed.
2.4 Conclusion At the expense of having belabored the obvious, I argued among other things that to compose a powerful theory of one has to find those invariants that are most telling about a phenomenon. When aiming at an explanation of behavior, there are many stances not fully suitable for the task. It is unproductive, for example, to say that genes are invariants of behavior. Although that may be true, it is also very coarse. Unless genes show the mechanisms of behavior, they are improper candidates for explanatory invariants; likewise for neuroanatomy regarded in isolation. Neurons, networks, and their properties vary widely, even in conspecifics; and yet, most functions remain unaltered. The space of variation may have to be defined “outside” the
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range of neuroanatomy – for instance, in dynamical terms. So the most adequate level of description sees neuroanatomy as subserving the dynamics that mediate the environment and organism. The derivation of lawlike relationships from correlations is a class of inferences common in biology (this is a neutral statement of fact). Nonetheless, the considerable difficulties in measurement and control conditions must be acknowledged. Biologists are often forced – often owing to empirical limitations – to abduct relations between variables that may be quite distant in reality. Circumventing the difficulty by quantifying relations between behavior and neurons, or behavior and genes, does not quite solve the problem. Behavior and genes may be related, but not immediately related. Between them there is too big a gap, even for a leap of faith. It is better to build bridges. That bridge is constituted by the environment and the body as links between genes, neurons, and behavior. This chapter contained an analysis of epistemological aspects involved in a search for invariance in behavior. The following questions were asked: What is an invariant? What forms does it take? What is the nature of invariance in the study of behavior? What forms do an invariant take? How have theories employed invariants? The next chapter deals with invariants arising from empirical measurements, and how invariant function is measured in brains. Essentially, all empirical methods of brain measurement rely on experimental paradigms that attempt to isolate the invariants in brain function. In neurophysiology, invariants are used to indicate the relevant dimensions of change of a phenomenon. If something simply does not change when something else changes, no distinction can be drawn, hence nothing can be learned. At the other extreme, if it varies too much, it is also not very enlightening. Science operates on distinctions and on gradations of change and relationships between variables. Therefore, the susceptibility of a hypothetical invariant to change of context offers a qualitative assessment of the quality of that invariant. The relevance of an invariant is assessed in terms of its dimensions of change. Thus, the next chapter discusses methods of empirical assessments of invariance in brain and behavior.
2.5 Summary The argument of this (somewhat philosophical) chapter is as follows: Invariants are that what remains when something else changes (Sect. 2). Invariants underlie theories and are pervasive in physics and mathematics,
as well as in biology (Sect. 2.1.1). Invariants come in different forms, fitting assorted categories. We named five: theoretical, empirical, relational, idealization, context-dependent (Sect. 2).
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Invariants in biology are context-dependent, genes are taken as an example. Although genes help build an organism, and thus may be framed (somewhat narrowly) as invariants of form, they do not offer an appropriate level of analysis for behavior, for behavior appears in the engaged interaction between an agent and the environment (Sect. 2.3.2). Similarly, neuroanatomical features can be taken as invariants of functional behavior, either in simple organisms or at the level of gross architecture, but they fail to address three crucial aspects (Sect. 2.3.4). 1. The mapping between neuroanatomical features and function is not always clear. 2. One neuroanatomy subserves many behaviors. 3. Different neuroanatomies subserve similar behaviors. The reflex is regarded as a hypothetical invariant of behavior. Reflex theory assumed that behavior was composed of stimulus–reflex pairs (Sect. 2.3.10). 1. However, behavior is more than concatenated stimulus–reflex pairs. 2. Moreover, a characterization of behavioral function is inherently subjective (Sect. 2.3.9). For cybernetics, purposeful behaviors result from the interaction of complex feedback mechanisms (reafferences) with the environment (Sect. 2.3.11). An invariant of behavior is the set of the possible mechanistic implementations of a behavioral function (Sect. 2.3.13).
References 1. Arbib MA (1972) The metaphorical brain, an introduction to cybernetics and brain theory. MIT Press, Cambridge 2. Arbib MA (1982) Machine Intelligence 10, Chichester: Ellis Horwood, chap Rana Computatrix, an evolving model of visuomotor coordination in frog and toad, pp 501–517 3. Arbib MA, Fellous JM (2004) Emotions: From brain to robot. Trends Cogn Sci 8(12) 4. Ashby W (1960) Design for a brain: The origin of adaptive behavior, 2nd edn. Chapman & Hall, London 5. Bateson G (1972) Steps to an ecology of mind. University of Chicago Press, p. 533 6. Benavides-Piccione R, Hamzei-Sichani F, Ballesteros-Yanez I, DeFelipe J, Yuste R (2006) Dendritic size of pyramidal neurons differs among mouse cortical regions. Cereb Cortex 16(7):990–1001 7. Berns GS, Sejnowski TJ (1998) A computational model of how the basal ganglia produce sequences. J Cogn Neurosci 10(1):108–121 8. Braitenberg V (1977) On the texture of brains: An introduction to neuroanatomy for the cybernetically minded. Springer, New York
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9. Braitenberg V (1984) Vehicles, experiments in synthetic psychology. Bradford Book, Cambridge 10. Braitenberg V (2001) Brain size and number of neurons: An exercise in synthetic neuroanatomy. J. Comput. Neurosci. 10(1):71–77 11. Braitenberg V, Sch¨uz A (1998) Cortex: Statistics and geometry of neuronal connectivity. Springer, Berlin 12. Brentano FC (1874) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig 13. Cohen N, Squire L (1980) Preserved learning and retention of pattern-analyzing skill in amnesia: dissociation of knowing how and knowing that. Science 210(4466):207 14. Dawkins R (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press, New York 15. Di Paolo E (2002) Book review: Cycles of contingency. Artif Life 8(2) 16. D¨orner D (1999) Bauplan f¨ur eine Seele. Rowohlt, Reinbek 17. Edelman G (1988) Topobiology: An introduction to molecular embryology. Basic Books 18. Eigen M, Schuster P (1978) The hypercycle. Naturwissenschaften 65(1):7–41 19. Elston G, Rockland K (2002) The pyramidal cell of the sensorimotor cortex of the Macaque Monkey: Phenotypic variation. Cereb Cortex 12(10):1071–1078 20. Elston GN (2005) Cortex, cognition and the cell: New insights into the pyramidal neuron and prefrontal function. Cereb Cortex 13(11):1124–1238 21. von Foerster H, von Glaserfeld E (2005) Einf¨uhrung in den Konstruktivismus, 9th edn. Piper Press, Munich 22. Fox Keller E, Harel D (2007) Beyond the Gene. PLoS ONE 2(11):e1231 23. Glaserfeld Ev (1990) Teleology and the concepts of causation. Philosophica 46(2):17–42 24. Goodwin B (2001) The evolution of complexity: How the leopard changed its spots. Princeton Academic, Princeton 25. Goodwin B, Briere C (1989) A mathematical model of cytoskeletal dynamics and morphogenesis in acetabularia. The Cytoskeleton of the Algae. CRC Press, Boca Raton, pp 219–238 26. Gould SJ, Lewontin RD (1979) The spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian paradigm: A critic of the adaptationist programme. Proc R Soc Lond 205:581–598 27. Griffiths PE, Gray RD (2000) Darwinism and developmental systems. MIT Press, Cambridge 28. Griffiths PE, Stoltz K (2007) The cambridge companion to the philosophy of biology. chap Gene, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 103–119 29. Hanlon R (2007) Cephalopod dynamic camouflage. Curr Biol 17(11):400–404 30. Heylighen F, Joslyn C (2001) Cybernetics and second-order cybernetics. In: Meyers R (ed) Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology, 3rd edn. Academic, New York 31. von Holst VE, Mittelstaedt H (1950) Das Reafferenzprinzip. Die Naturwiss 37(20):464–476 32. Homberg U, Paech A (2002) Ultrastructure and orientation of ommatidia in the dorsal rim area of the locust compound eye. Arthropod Struct Dev 30(4):271–280 33. Jablonka E, Lamb M (2005) Evolution in four dimensions: Genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic variation in the history of life. MIT Press, Cambridge 34. Jablonka E, Lamb M, Avital E (1998) ‘lamarckian’ mechanisms in darwinian evolution. Trends Ecol Evol 13(5):206–210 35. Jewell E, Abate F, McKean E (2001) The new Oxford American dictionary. Oxford University Press, Oxford 36. Jonas H (2001 (1966)) The phenomenon of life. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL 37. Kauffman S (1969) Metabolic stability and epigenesis in randomly constructed genetic nets. J Theor Biol 22(3):437–67 38. Mayr E (1961) Cause and Effect in Biology Kinds of causes, predictability, and teleology are viewed by a practicing biologist. Science 134(3489):1501–1506 39. Mayr E (1976) Evolution and the diversity of life. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 40. Merleau-Ponty M (1963 (translation), 1942) The Structure of Behavior. Duquesne University Press, Philadelphia 41. Minksy M (1975) The psychology of computer vision, chap A Framework for representing knowledge. McGraw-Hill, New York 42. Nagel E (1979) The structure of science: Problems in the logic of scientific explanation. Hackett Publishing, USA
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Niven J (2008) Evolution: Convergent eye losses in fishy circumstances. Curr Biol 18(1):27–29 Noether E (1918) Invariante variationsprobleme. Gott Nachr 235 Noether E, Tavel M (2005) Invariant variation problems. Arxiv preprint physics/0503066 O’Keefe J, Dostrovsky J (1971) The hippocampus as spatial map: preliminary evidence from unit activity in the freely moving rat. Brain Res 34:171–175 47. Oyama S (2000) The ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and evolution. Duke University Press, Durham 48. Oztop E, Kawato M, Arbib M (2006) Mirror neurons and imitation: A computationally guided review. Neural Netw 19(3):254–271 49. Pais A (1982) Subtle is the Lord. The science and the life of A. Einstein. Oxford University Press, Oxford 50. Porter J, Baker R (1997) Absence of oculomotor and trochlear motoneurons leads to altered extraocular muscle development in the Wnt-1 null mutant mouse. Dev Brain Res 100(1): 121–126 51. Quiroga R, Reddy L, Kreiman G, Koch C, Fried I (2005) Invariant visual representation by single neurons in the human brain. Nature 435(7045):1102–1107 52. Rosenblueth A, Wiener N, Bigelow J (1943) Behavior, purpose and teleology. Philos Sci 10: 18–24 53. Ryan L, Cox C, Hayes SM, Nadel L (2008) Hippocampal activation during episodic and semantic memory retrieval: Comparing category production and category cued recall. Neuropsychologia 46(8):2109–2121, DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.02. 030, URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.02.030 54. Smith JM, Burrian R, Kauffmann S, Alberch P, Campbell J, Goodwin B, Lande L, Raul D, Wolpert L (1985) Developmental constraints and evolution. Q Rev Biol 60(3):265–287 55. Smith PG (2007) The cambridge companion to the philosophy of biology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, chap Information in Biology, pp 103–119 56. Sterelny K (2005) Thought in a hostile world. MIT Press, Cambridge 57. Swammerdam J (1737) Biblia Naturae, Sive Historia Insecto, vol 1. IDC (Leiden) 58. Ton R, Hackett J (1984) Neural mechanisms of startle behavior, Springer, Berlin, chap The Role of the Mauthner Cell in fast starts involving escape in Teleost Fishes 59. Tracy A, Jarrard L, Davidson T (2001) The hippocampus and motivation revisited: appetite and activity. Behav Brain Res 127(1–2):13–23 60. Turchin VF (1977) The Phenomenon of Science: a cybernetic approach to human evolution. Electronic URL http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/POSBOOK.html 61. Varela F (1979) Principles of biological autonomy. North Holland, New York 62. Varela F, Maturana H (1987, 1998) The tree of knowledge, 1st edn. Shambala, Boston, MA 63. Varela F, Maturana H, Uribe R (1974) Autopoiesis: the organization of living systems, its characterization and a model. Curr Model Biol 5(4):187–96 64. Wiener N (1961) Cybernetics: or the control and communication in the animal and the machine, 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge
Chapter 3
Empirical Assessments of Invariance
Abstract The search for invariances outlined in the previous chapter is taken further with the analysis of empirical methods of behavioral invariance in the study of the mammalian brain. These methods are the bread and butter of the neuroscientist and cognitive neuroscientist: electrophysiology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and diffusion tensor imaging all search for measurable invariances that may illuminate function and mechanism. This is a simple task as all these methods have inherent particularities, of both empirical and epistemological nature. A clear view on these issues is essential as they have strong bearing on the conclusions about the results of experiments, and by extension on the mechanisms of behavior.
3.1 Empirical Assessments of Invariance 3.1.1 Invariants in Neuroscience Much of the plausibility of hypothetical neural invariants of behavior derives from findings in neuroscience and cognitive neuroscience, whose empirical assessments of the relationship between behavioral function and cortical activity show some constancy in measurements. The rationale consists of assuming that for one type of task, one assumed behavioral function, in different instantiations/moments the brain will act similarly in some way, and that this similarity will be reflected in measurements. In fact, current neuroscience thrives on similarities – and is perplexed at dissimilarities. When correlations in measured activity are conspicuous across trials and similar experiments, there is support for the belief of the existence of a structural level that brings about correlations. The argument concisely is as follows: empirical invariants of brain activity with respect to function exist, consequently there must exist, at some level of analysis, something constant about brain function. What and where those levels of analysis are will concern us in the upcoming chapters. To commence the search, we will consider where and how some forms of empirical invariants appear, and then we will discuss the empirical assessments of invariance
M. Negrello, Invariants of Behavior: Constancy and Variability in Neural Systems, Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems 1, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8804-1 3, c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
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proper, that is, the methods and tools neuroscience employs to highlight invariance. To conclude the chapter, I indicate sources of variation in empirical assessments of invariance.
3.1.2 A Brief Typology of Function and Invariance in Neuroscience In brain theories invariants play numerous, variegated, and overlapping roles. Some scattered examples may help form a scenery. 1. Location to Function One of the first attempts at a paradigm for brain science was phrenology (Joseph Gall – 1760), a defunct field that attempted to associate brain areas to particular cognitive functions and personality traits. Modern methods and instruments (such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI, Sect. 3.2.5, magnetoencephalography, MEG, Sect. 3.2.4, and positron emission tomography, PET) have shown that, some epistemological contingencies notwithstanding, it is possible to relate locality with function. The same holds for lesion experiments, where the loss of specific function is related to particular brain areas. 2. Time to Function Thought and behavior unwind in time, and given the physical reality of the brain, processing takes time. It is therefore clear that some brain processes will correlate with their temporal aspects. The time course of concomitants of thought is therefore a powerful indicator of the durations of behavioral and thought processes, and may also expose structural underpinnings of behavioral function (Sect. 3.2.4). 3. Dynamical Patterns to Function Congregating measurement of time and location of brain activity with function brings about invariance in dynamical patterns. The development of brain measurement instruments has advanced to a stage where it is possible to simultaneously record both the spatial and the temporal aspects of brain activity. Multielectrode electroencephalography (EEG) and fMRI reveal invariant dependencies between different areas and their temporal courses, in terms of brain waves, firing patterns, or the shift of activity of one or more cortical and subcortical areas. 4. Structures to Function Static neural structures (neuroanatomy) may also be invariant with function. As a simple example we may take the law of reciprocal innervation (due to Sherrington) where agonistic–antagonistic connectivity in muscle innervation explains via an invariant structure how a muscle relaxes when the other muscle contracts. More sophisticated examples of how anatomy underlies function include the preprocessing of visual input, in terms of center surround connectivity patterns. Developments in methods unveiling macroneuroanatomical features, such
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Fig. 3.1 Advances in imaging of brain networks both at the macroscopic level (diffusion tensor imaging) and at the microscopic level (Brainbow)
as diffusion tensor imaging (DTI; a magnetic resonance imaging method for revealing the spatial structure of neural tracts, Sect. 3.2.6), and advanced staining techniques that colorize neurons indicating microscopic neural structure [25] will be fundamental to elucidate the dependencies between structures and function (Fig. 3.1). 5. Invariant (In)dependence Between Functions Measured invariants often reveal connections between different functions, with respect to their neural control structures. Invariant co-occurrences of activities may indicate levels of interdependence between tasks and contexts, and neural activity, such as variations of heart beating rates and emotions in social cognition research [1]. 6. Invariants of Behavioral Function As mentioned in the first point, a fundamental assumption for the procurement of invariances is that a set of behaviors may be invariant with respect to the goals. An invariant behavioral function is one with a single description. A set of behaviors such as hreach for objecti, which can perform the function hgrab the objecti in many different ways, is an invariant behavior. Such invariants are of fundamental importance for experimental paradigms, inasmuch as they define classes of functional behavior, with which brain activity may be correlated. 7. Biophysical Invariants Governed by the biophysical implementation of the neuron, alloyed to physical laws (such as ionic balance across a neuron’s membrane), the neuron displays invariance. The duration of the absolute refractory period, the shape of an action potential, and the travel velocity of a spike (or action potential) maybe invariant relative to the biophysical construction and context of the neuron. Despite much variation in construction, there are constant aspects within certain parameter ranges.
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Each of these invariant types will have a subset of suitable methods with which they can be accessed. Any such method has at its disposal a set of measurement tools that are subserved by the associated analysis methods within an experimental paradigm. In the next section we select and examine some of these methods, from the empirical and epistemological standpoints, considering the three elements. The upcoming analysis is crude because it is cursory, but it effectively brings home the main conclusion of this chapter: through different lenses, one sees different pictures.
3.2 The Measurement of Neural Activity 3.2.1 Whatever Is Seen, Is Seen Through Lenses Modern methods of brain measurement produce an amazing quantity of clues about what may be invariant in the brain for different tasks. However powerful, these methods are not without fault (as some are hasty to add). By necessity, all of the methods produce partial pictures, through their individual magnifying glasses. There are, in all cases, inherent empirical limitations. On occasion, these may also become insurmountable conceptual difficulties. In any case, better partial pictures, than no pictures. And as in a mosaic painting by Chuck Close, what may from up close seem as fragments in utter disorder, from a distance may expose identity.
3.2.2 Contentions on the Measurement of Brain and Behavioral Function Despite proverbial drawbacks, such as lack of temporal precision (in the case of fMRI), lack of spatial precision in EEG, and repeatability in electrophysiology (electrodes), some stable pictures of correlation between area and function, or oscillations and function, or firing rates and function, leave little doubt as to some level of organization behind the invariants produced. Stable correlates of measurement were encountered in experiments about perception (color [16], motion [15], sound, bodily and feeling states), in action (gestures [39], locomotion ), in cognition at large (language understanding [37], surprise and uncertainty [43], recognition [38], localization [32], empathy [5], emotion [33]), and in vegetative and other basal processes (respiration, hormonal cycles). Such a list may trick us into believing that invariants are everywhere. Unavoidably, however, each method reveals only the invariance illuminated by its flashlight, framed in terms of its own analytical tools (methodology, terminology, paradigm) and the form of data it generates. When regarding the phenomenon from different empirical angles, we build a heterogeneous mosaic composed of irregular tiles, whose reintegration in a coherent picture requires a concept of the picture they should compose. The metaphor of a puzzle of a colluding picture is evoked. But is there consilience in this picture? And what is it of?
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3.2.3 Scope of Measurement Tools and Analysis Methods A short incursion into how these invariants emerge from measurements may be enlightening, both by (1) showing what kind of information the methods produce about the invariants and by (2) understanding the empirical limitations and epistemological issues of the methods and the tools.
3.2.4 Oscillations and Potentials: EEG If tomorrow is Tuesday, how long will it take to milk the pink cow? This nonsensical sentence may have raised eyebrows, for it has violated expectations and aroused surprise (or befuddlement). How long did it take for surprise (or whatever evoked response) to dawn? Where and in what form will surprise, or any other mental state, show in brain measurement? Electroencephalograms assess the wave correlates of brain activity, searching for invariants to functions in wave characteristics, such as profiles, amplitudes, phases, time courses, and synchrony in similar circumstances or conditions. EEG purports to find the time and the places of thought, through invariants in potentials and oscillations. Thus, the pink cow and other nonsense evoke similar responses in brain waves.
3.2.4.1 Electrophysiology Has a Long History Electrophysiology is one of the oldest tools for measuring neural activity, and owing to its comparably long history, has correspondingly many variations and extensions. EEG measures electrical currents emanating from neural activity, with electrodes placed at one or many sites, from the surface of the scalp to intracranial extracellular medium (intracranial “mesoscopic” recordings) (Fig. 3.2). Measured activity is presumed to correlate with brain function, at times consistently, other times less so (especially across the brains of different subjects). But ever since its inception it has been a crucial tool in the neuroscientist’s portfolio for unearthing invariant temporal and spatial aspects of neural activity. A few well-placed electrodes, on occasion, indicate some qualitatively recognizable kinds of activity that are stable given a task. Nowadays, electroencephalograms are employed in a variety of experimental paradigms. The first and oldest measures the electrical fluctuation of a single electrode positioned somewhere on the scalp. It attempts to find invariant potentials evoked by a given task (event-related potentials), which may range from very simple perceptual tasks to very complex cognitive tasks. A class of stimulus is presented (e.g., a sequence of words), and the time course of the potentials evoked is recorded. In this paradigm, the invariant may be of the form of an amplitude of a peak, the sign (positive or negative), and the time frame of the evoked potential. In the EEG community, identifiable potentials receive names which indicate the polarity of the potential and the time between presentation of the stimulus (seminally,
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Fig. 3.2 Electroencephalography (EEG) spans spatial scales. The usual form of the data retrieved from these methods is seen on the right. Autocorrelation for the single units, waves, and principal components for local field potentials (LFPs), power spectrum for electroencephalograms. iEEG intracranial EEG. (From [45])
for example, the P300 [43], a correlate of uncertainty, or the P200, a correlate of noun/verb distinction [36]). In this nomenclature resides the assumptions of what kind of invariants EEG expects. EEG presumes that, for a given task, brain activity (1) is spatially bound (a place in the scalp corresponding to an area in the brain), (2) has a definite time course, and (3) has specific amplitudes (possibly correlating with neurons active). Hence, as EEG measures the responses of populations, these populations respond in a concerted fashion, which is temporally coherent, spatially bound, and activity-consistent. In the ideal case, all of these variables will offer invariants. In the standard (unpublished) case, there will be trivially few or none. High variability both across and within subjects is a constant. In EEG, invariants also appear in terms of phase correlations of evoked potentials, or synchronous activity. Electrodes in the scalp positioned far away from each other may synchronize with each other, indicating synchronicity from different
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brain areas, possibly indicating a collaboration of these areas towards function. To find synchronicity, one primary analysis tool is independent component analysis (ICA), a statistical method that attempts to reduce the dimensionality in terms of the independent wave components by means of variational statistics [23]. Further, ICA attempts to encounter the components most informative about the underlying processes in terms of patterns of phase and power from the oscillations recorded simultaneously from different electrodes. ICA (and also principal component analysis) highlights evanescent synchronies between areas as they phase lock to and release, shedding light, in addition to temporal aspects, on functional connectivity and interdependence of areas. Another method of analysis is Granger causality, a mathematical method meant to identify causal connections between the oscillatory activity of different electrodes. Developments of EEG introduced both technical and mathematical sophistication, correlating activity of many electrodes placed across the whole scalp, or in the brain (mean-field potentials). Local field potentials are measured intracranially and are rather precise, achieving temporal discrimination of the order of 1 ms and spatial resolution from several millimeters (depending on the experiment). MEG is yet another extension that measures the magnetic correlates of brain activity. Both serve as tools in similar paradigms as electroencephalograms, giving similar pictures, owing to the kinship of these methods.
3.2.4.2 EEG: Empirical Issues What we call a brain wave, is not properly a wave. In reality, a wave is the electronic fluctuation measured by an electrode evoked in response to large populations of neurons. The brain has no “waves” per se. They are what EEG sees, through its methodological and empirical lenses. The known and often repeated shortcoming of EEG is that it is unable to say which neuron does what, since only the population activity is measured (in 1 mm3 of cortex there are approximately 106 neurons – compare that with the precision of standard EEG of some surface millimeters). Most EEG recordings happen in the surface of the scalp (especially in humans), measuring from even larger numbers. Adding to that, only surface activity is addressed, disregarding the substantial portion of activity happening beneath. Epistemologically, from the standpoint of neural processing measured oscillations may be epiphenomena, as some have argued, because intercellular potentials were shown not to cause spikes [12]. Neurons fire, but measured populations oscillate. For that reason, it is hard to attribute causal properties to oscillations per se. Nevertheless, knowing that particular rhythms arise, and that they correlate with function, suggests that the oscillations at the population level may be at the level at which function is expressed. Alpha rhythms in the occipital cortex have been correlated with perception of simultaneity and motion [44], theta rhythms for path integration [40], gamma rhythms with binding [9] and memory consolidation [8]. It is clear that oscillations emerge as concomitants of neural activity and
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certain kinds of processing. It has been hypothesized that resonant oscillations are responsible for feature binding [9]. But the extent to which oscillations are necessary, or primarily causative, is open to debate. In any case, it is indisputable that the information they provide is crucial to understand timing in neural processing. Needless to say, questions remain that the method itself cannot address: Do oscillations have causal function? How do they arise in the population? What is the role of synchrony? Does it have causative roles? These questions are beyond the scope of the method because they are not about the measured concomitants of function, but are about the mechanism of function itself.1 These questions should be addressed through combinations of theory and paradigm.
3.2.5 Function Localization: fMRI Most fMRI studies pose a question of the sort: What is the part most active of the brain when task X is executed? Because of its high spatial resolution and noninvasiveness, fMRI became the primary tool for localization of mental function in the brain. fMRI measures the magnetic correlates of oxygen in blood flows, which are assumed to correlate with the energy consumption of brain areas, as their neurons consume oxygen in the production of action potentials (blood-level oxygenation level, the so-called BOLD signal) [26].2
3.2.5.1 The BOLD Signal fMRI uses as signals the magnetic properties of hemoglobin in the oxygen-bearing cell. Hemoglobin can basically have two states, it can be oxygen-loaded (oxyhemoglobin) or carboxyl-loaded (carboxyhemoglobin). As blood is constantly flowing around in the brain, and because the action potential is an energy-consuming event, one may take the oxygen consumption of a certain brain region as an indicator of the region’s activity during a certain mental task. This implies that blood consumption is a reliable indicator for predominantly localized neural activity (Fig. 3.3). Very appropriately, Freeman (p. 20 in [13]) has likened the BOLD signal to smoke in forest fires, where denser smoke indicates more trees being burned. A nice facet of this analogy is that the whole forest may be burning, or the whole brain may be active. Measurements of blood oxygenation levels are taken with respect to a threedimensional lattice of the brain, where the spatial resolution is given in voxels (a voxel is the volumetric equivalent of a pixel). The spatial resolution is dependent on the power of the magnetic field. Current equipment has a spatial resolution 1
Statements of the sort “These oscillations have multifold functions and act as universal operators or codes of brain functional activity” are too strong, and suffer from the confusion between correlate and cause [2]. 2 Timely. Logothetis [27] asks, “What can and what can’t we do with fMRI.”
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Fig. 3.3 Functional magnetic resonance imaging measures the oxygen consumption level of brain areas. The hippocampus and the occipital cortices are differentially active. (From [34])
of around 128 128 voxels, giving a spatial resolution of around 1 mm, roughly corresponding to one million, with a temporal precision of a couple of seconds. This is not very precise, with most of the coarse resolution being due to intrinsic limitations of oxygen diffusion times from the blood to inside the cells.3 Another interesting development comes from the physics of magnetic resonance, where superadiabaticity may lead to the development of more precise fMRI (along with smaller scanners) [6]. Brains vary in their morphology, so to find correspondent areas between brains of different subjects, interesting methods of brain mapping have been developed. These show the cortex as if unfolded in a surface. Gyri an Sulci (the valleys and ridges of brain the convolutions) are used to demarcate brain areas, and allow comparison between different brains [4].
3.2.5.2 Areas Comparatively More Active In most experimental paradigms involving fMRI, the activity in areas is found by taking the difference in the BOLD signal between experimental conditions and control conditions. So, instead of “active areas,” it is more correct to say “areas comparatively more active.” Quite a bit of other activity must be averaged out in the process before some area significantly more active can be found. To return to Freeman’s analogy, it is as if the whole forest is on fire, and we expect to find where the highest concentration of burning trees is by comparing patterns of smoke emission at two moments. The method gives coarse information about where the fire started, or how it propagated. 3
Recent articles have addressed the question of what precise cellular process is the closest correlate of the BOLD signal, whether it is from all neurons, only excitatory, inhibitory, or glial, cells, whether it applies equally to different areas, and so on. Recent articles have competently shown the different sources and how they contribute to the signal [26, 28].
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By observing the time courses of activities, one can also employ fMRI to examine functional connectivity. Granger causality, for example, purports to retrieve causal dependence between time series of activities, where one may be able to say which caused the other, and with what confidence [7]. The implicit assumption is that highly active peaks and depressions of the waves are more important for causality. Although a reasonable assumption, it may exclude quite a bit of activity, which may as well be causal, and thus relevant, for the function sought. Incidentally, a recent result showed that a single spike from a single neuron may be sufficient to trigger a postsynaptic action potential, and by extension, a complex cascading set of events [29]. This single spike is invisible to any fMRI study.
3.2.5.3 Localization of Function Localization alone does not unearth principles of neural organization, of course. The main issues with functional localization of this sort are twofold. First, it is unable to resolve questions of multiple implementability. Is the sequence of active areas necessary for function, or merely a contingent artifice of the paradigm? Is there a fundamental reason for the existence of particular hubs in the brain? The second issue closely follows our discussion on invariants of behavior in Sect. 2.3.13. It has to do with the type of question posed: What area is most active when function F is necessary? Hence, the answers are – by assumption – given in associations between area and function. For example, the search for a “god” area in the brain reveals activations in the prefrontal orbital cortex [31] (known as a high association area). What function is this association really about? Abstract words associated with cognitive states? Or an antenna for “god” (or, as Descartes postulated, the connection between body and soul of the transempirical self)? When area–function associations are done freely, we may end up with bemusing conclusions. This is perhaps too rough a critique, and an unreasonable demand from the tool that ex hypothesi assumes function–area associations. Initially, one defines the function as necessary for a task, which will be the guiding hypothesis for the correlation, and only then does one look for activation correlates. If these are consistent across individuals, there is at least good reason to believe that there is a connection. Furthermore, this information integrates with the results across experiments. Had the experiments been insulated from each other, which obviously is not the case, then it would be impossible to be certain about the connection between function and localization. The responsibility of integrating results, however, is the scientist’s not the method’s. All the same, often critics are justified to raise awareness of the fact that (1) functionally relevant activity is likely to be obfuscated and (2) much could vary in implementation. Averaging out all activity which is not large may suppress from the conclusions other areas (or even units) that have functional significance, but are either too small or too weak for fMRI to see. An extension of this method may help
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address the second question.4 On a lighter note, some recent work by Haynes and others [18–22] has addressed the critiques by shifting emphasis from localization to dynamic pattern recognition. His methods have achieved considerable success in determining the content of thought, through pattern classification (the pattern is the temporal activity of different voxels). In terms of correctness of the classification they have achieved impressive accuracy. As long as there is a procedure (computational) to categorize different patterns, then the content of thought can be recognized. Nevertheless, his approach is objective and does not focus on explaining the differences between patterns of activity within subjects and across subjects.
3.2.6 Brain Wiring: DTI and Diffusion Spectrum Imaging Both DTI and diffusion spectrum imaging ask the central question: How is the brain wired? [30] DTI is a modern variation of the magnetic resonance imaging used to retrieve the spatial structure of major neural tracts (bundles of axons), by measuring the diffusion tensions of water in neural tissues (water diffuses anisotropically, due to the differential permeability of neural tissues). Knowledge of how brain areas connect will be instrumental for comprehending the relationships between structure and function. The method has already generated impressive data – and stupendous pictures – including for humans and high apes [30,48]. We can expect that this is just the beginning. For the student of the dynamics of neural networks this is possibly the most important empirical development in neuroscience in this century. With much knowledge comes much responsibility. Although the preliminary results allow boisterous rejoicing, it is better to take a cautiously circumspect attitude. For one thing, to say that we can retrieve connectivity from individuals does not imply we shall ex machina be enlightened about function. As the neuroscientist has learned to expect, there is staggering variability everywhere, beyond a subset of identifiable hubs. In a recent article [17], Sporns et al. took connectivity maps from diffusion spectrum images of five humans, and submitted the connectivity to graph theory analysis. The calculations conducted measured node degree, structural motifs, path lengths, and clustering coefficient distributions. In addition, k-core decomposition was calculated, a measure derived by recursively pruning nodes with degree smaller than k (k is the node degree, defined as the number of connections of a unit in a binary matrix. The type of connection and the spatial distance are neglected.). It is a measure indicative of the presence of hubs (areas with comparably high connectivity). Among other discoveries, they confirmed an important hypothesis, also from Strogatz [47], that the brain follows a small world law [41]. A small world distribution is one in which the distribution of edge degrees follows a power law.
4
Also, a debate has recently arisen concerning unusually high correlations in fMRI studies of social cognition, where a fundamental flaw in some experimental designs has been unearthed [46].
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Fig. 3.4 Correlation of connectivity as seen from k-core decomposition from the diffusion spectrum images of five human subjects. Notice the variability in the distribution of cores across subjects. Notice also the variability from two scans of the same subject, possibly due to empirical variability. Network cores for each individual participant were derived by k-core decomposition of a binary connection matrix obtained by thresholding the high-resolution fiber densities such that a total of 10,000 connections remain in each participant. Nodes are plotted according to their core number, counted backwards from the last remaining core
Essentially this means that there are more neurons that connect to many neurons than there are neurons that connect to few neurons, and that the distribution of edge degrees follows an exponential: there will be very few that connect to very many. That shows unequivocally the locality of certain hubs, as, for example, the anterior cingulate gyrus.5 The result of the k-core decomposition from five subjects from [17] is displayed in Fig. 3.4. There is a considerable variability in k-cores across subjects, which signifies that some people have more hubs than others, and also that people have tract hubs at different brain ares. Also visible in three of the five subjects (A, C, and D) is an asymmetry in connectivity between hemispheres, with the left hemisphere having more hubs. To test for the repeatability of measurement, two scans were performed on separate occasions on subject A and the results were compared. There was consistency, although some variation between the two scans could be seen. In addition, the results reveal immense variability across subjects. Figure 3.4 shows the amount of correlation as seen from k-core decomposition of five human subjects. One notices that apart from known centers of connectivity (such as the cingulate gyrus, the basal ganglia, and the hippocampus), there is considerable difference across the tracts of different subjects. But as one moves away from the most salient structural correlations among subjects, one finds variability that increases considerably. And yet, despite variability in brain networks, all the subjects were fully functional human beings, similar to the extent that all humans are. Although we already came to expect significant differences between normal and abnormal brains, the large variation also between normal brains must also be addressed. Apparently our quandaries about variability and constancy are resilient to the greatest developments in neuroscientific tools. 5
Also noteworthy in Fig. 3.4 is the presence of cores in the left hemisphere in participant C.
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3.2.7 Electrophysiology: Single Unit Recordings Both in time and in space, the most precise technique of brain measurement is single cell recording (electrophysiology). The process consists in invading the brain with electrodes and recording the time course of the membrane potential from a single neuron. The method gives the closest proximity to the action potential, which presumably is the basis of most neural processes. Modern microelectrode arrays are able to record directly from hundreds of neurons, and indirectly from more. Because it is an invasive method, recordings are mostly done in laboratory animals, ranging from fish to apes. In special conditions humans have also been subjects.6 Electrophysiology revealed a complex picture of neuronal activity where variability and constancy coexist.
3.2.7.1 Invariants in Electrophysiology Electrophysiological recordings produce correspondences between the activity of a cell and some property being hypothesized as a correlate of function. A sampling of these functions (and cell correlates) includes localization (place cells [32], grid cells [24], prospective and retrospective cells [11]), pattern recognition (grandmother cells [38]), decision making (decision cells [35]), object recognition, somatosensory maps (finger cells), motor behavior, action production and recognition (mirror neurons [14]), and emotive behavior (empathy cells). One sees in the small sampling above that some of the most staggering invariants of neural processing resulted from electrophysiology. Mirror neurons, those that fire both when an action is performed and when it is observed, were first demonstrated with use of the technique. The place cells of the hippocampal formation, those most active when the animal is situated on a particular place, were among the first to be reported [32]. Decision cells were reported in the lateral intraparietal cortex of the monkey, and correlated with a particular decision the monkey may not even be conscious of yet [35]. There are other examples of cells that are invariant to very particular properties, for instance, the “Jennifer Aniston cell,”or the “Bill Clinton cell” [38].
3.2.7.2 Empirical and Epistemological Remarks It should nevertheless be quite obvious that these cells do not act alone,7 being members of larger networks that may or may not have been in the electrode’s path. In a
6
Usually when there is already the requirement for surgical interventions, or when the patient has full body paralysis. 7 Some popular science, as well as renowned scientists, have created much confusion on this particular topic.
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Fig. 3.5 Did the spike at electrode 1 cause the spike at electrode 2? The time between two spikes alone is not a reliable indicator of the dependence between two neurons
sense, the electrophysiological recordings are the narrowest of brain measurement instruments, for although the numbers of recorded cells have been increasing with the development of both technology and analysis methods, it is altogether quite a small set of cells when compared with the whole neural system. The method has limitations of an instrumental nature, such as the small number of cells recorded, and the lack of knowledge about local connectivity, and that only after posthumous histology does one learn which cell was recorded (Fig. 3.5). But the more interesting contention is one of an epistemological nature. When one attempts to find which neurons correlate with a certain property, one is a priori committed to that property. In extreme cases, one asks a yes/no question: does neuron A display property P, or not? Mostly, it is the paradigm which proposes the properties being looked at. The properties do not quite “offer” themselves (although that can be the case, via serendipity), but they are sought with the hypothesis of various degrees of tenability. For this very reason, it is quite hard to conceptualize how different cells with various properties may compose a picture of the processing in terms other than associating properties. It is hard to reunite a bunch of cells with various properties in terms of overall systemic function (the complications of reentrances and recurrences spring to mind). These often lead to exclusion of those cells that “do not appear” to be particularly telling about the function under scrutiny. It is quite hard to sum the function of different cells and come up with a consistent picture, for these cells may well have distinctive capacities (e.g., what are both face cells and place cells doing in the hippocampus? With what property does a cerebellar Purkinje cell, which is active all the time, correlate? Although some theories have been proposed attempting functional integration based on different functions of different cells, integration is one of the crucial theoretical challenges for the theoretician who is informed by electrophysiology.
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3.2.8 Empirical Methods and the Language of Explanation If all you have is a hammer, treat anything like a nail. Anonymous
Within its own scope and despite critiques that can be too harsh (the electrophysiologist and the imaging scientist often point at each other’s shortcomings, often neglecting their own), the methods reviewed in this chapter form the basis of empirical methods of cognitive neuroscience, in the attempt to retrieve the correlates of function, between and within areas, with admirable success. There exists an indisputable level of constancy in brain activity, although the principles, or mechanisms, are not immediately apparent. This enforces a prominent role for hypotheses, the formation of which is far from trivial, and often erroneously made dependent on the terminology associated with a method [2], and becoming heavily biased by the sort of data analyzed. Every method predicts more of what it sees, while tending to neglect what it does not see. Explanations given in terms of terminology of specific empirical methods are, however, often tethered to the methods themselves, tethers which become exposed when explanations are restrained to a small circle around the method to which they are umbilically connected.
3.3 Sources of Variation All empirical methods of brain measurement exhibit, and are subject to, the vicissitudes of variation. The variation sprouts from different roots, depending on (1) the methods, (2) experimental design, and (3) the brain itself. A categorization of variation may help weight the sources for their relative importance in individual cases.
3.3.1 Instrumental Sources of Variation A subset of those variations will be of purely instrumental nature, deriving from various imprecisions of the equipment, in which variations intrinsic to the method at hand will be reflected in a spread of measurements. Averaging out these variations and bringing out core features of the recorded responses is the purpose of much of the statistics applied to the measurements. Although the instrumental sources of variation are perhaps the simplest to grapple, they may well be some of the toughest to crack.
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3.3.1.1 Context and Initial Conditions Another source of variation is that given by the brain’s relentless agitation. The brain from now is different from the brain in 1 s, either owing to neural plasticity or simply by being. The brain of an experimental subject does not passively await the presentation of a stimulus, or the moment to act for that matter. The brain is alive and constantly active. Nonstop activity means constant change. Unlike machines that can be reset to an initial state, the brain cannot be reset, at a button press, to the very same state at each execution of a task. For that reason, it is virtually impossible to hold all the surrounding variables constant in different trials. The subject will be performing the task amid all the rest of his or her thoughts, which will mix with measurement. These variations are often handled by the statistics of large numbers, in which there will be a clustering and a clumping of the surrounding factors, which ideally will have no bearing on the function under scrutiny. This assumption of independence is frequently unwarranted. If the brain is highly precise, small differences in context will lead to variations in execution, which may be irrelevant with respect to function, but may have a smearing role, confusing measurement. If the brain is chaotic, slight variations in the initial conditions will lead to ample variation in measurements.
3.3.1.2 Neural Implementation Variations in measurement may also be due to variations of the neural implementation. Members of the same species may implement the same function in different ways, and even a single brain may handle the same task in different ways at different times. It is the prerogative of the brain to be creative, so in different instantiations of the same task, it is conceivable that one individual brain might be doing the same thing but slightly differently, not to mention the staggering differences across individuals for one and the same task. This variation can mean one of two things: 1. Equivalent structures subserving one function. There may be multiple coexisting architectonic implementations of one function, each of which is active at a different instantiation. This is the idea of degeneracy, that a function may be executed by multiple networks of the same brain [10]. It appears likely, at least for the early stages of brain development in mammals, that for one single function there may be many possible coexisting redundant implementations, which may be active at different times. There may exist general mechanisms in the development of network topology which effectively build two redundant networks. So, in each instantiation of a task, these may produce effective differences, which may, or may not, be retrievable from experiments (e.g., think of fMRI). 2. Multiple realizability: different structures to one function. More extremely, the brain may implement the same functions in fundamentally different ways, in a hypothesis that has been called “multiple realizability.” The philosophy is not lacking in arguments both for and against multiple realizability [3]. Ultimately, it may be that the issue is resolvable with harder science, integrating knowledge
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about what structure does what function how, and what types of variations there can be in implementation. Results from DTI studies of connectivity and neuroanatomy represent the current state of affairs, and on occasion appear to be contradictory. Although some hubs seem to be similar across individuals, this is most definitely not the standard case. So, to summarize, these are the possibilities for sources of variation at the neuronal level. given one type of behavior: Different networks, same neural mechanism Different networks, different neural mechanisms Same network, different context or initial conditions
3.3.1.3 Measurement and the Invariants of Behavior Implementation of function may be regarded as a tendency to achieve a certain type of network topology, to execute a certain behavioral function. It may be that the tendency of the self-organizing substrate is to beget particular functions, with particular mechanisms, by having inherent developmental tendencies (given ontogeny in the environment). If one concedes that experience may have a formative role in the establishment of networks, it is almost inconceivable that all functions will share really the same neural architecture. Nevertheless, we may speculate that given substrates (neurons) with certain potentialities of rearrangement have a directed developmental path, a trend so to speak inherent in the ways that matter (neural and otherwise) may organize. In that case, despite variations, the measurements will reflect a level of abstract generality for the function being considered. Measurements are projected shadows of an abstract behavior invariant, reflections of the set of possible mechanisms implementing a function.
3.3.2 Repeatability and Variation in Different Levels Some of the most informative experiments in neuroscience have produced explanations of neural correlates of low-level sensors and sensory sheets. These have elucidated transduction of worldly stimuli in terms of the physical properties most informative about the stimulus. Examples are many, ranging from correlates of whisking behavior in the mouse’s barrel cortex, to the perception of sky polarity in some locusts, to optic flow experiments with insects. These detailedly show some of the exquisite world–spike translations, in which an organism’s receptors are highly reliable measurement instruments. Some of these transduction mechanisms have uncanny repeatability, and show that biological mechanisms may be very precise. However, although recordings from interfaces close to the world show reliable and repeatable firing patterns, as activity is integrated in higher levels, the recordings
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appear more unpredictable (noisy?), to the point of being, on occasion, described as stochastic. This creates a mild paradox, one that should not to be fleetingly dodged by any theory of brain function.8
3.3.3 Sources of Variation 1. Epistemological There are varying contexts in the execution of a task, meaning there may be
concomitant processes which may influence, or even underpin, the execution of a task. During the execution of a task there may be the appearance of novel solutions. The function being sought is inadequately specified. Statistics tends to obfuscate small contributions that may be functional. 2. Instrumental/empirical Imprecisions inherent to methods. Noise in the measuring equipment.
3. Neural The brain is in constant change; therefore, the initial conditions never repeat. There may be redundant circuits realizing the same task in different manners. There may be equivalent circuits realizing the same task in different places.
3.4 Conclusions 3.4.1 Partial Pictures From this rapid survey of some of the most prominent methods of brain measurement, we see that each tool paints a narrow picture of the brain’s workings. EEG and MEG paint a picture of an oscillatory brain where mental function is a product of the coherent organization of oscillations and synchronicity among areas. fMRI paints a picture of an organized spatial structure and localized function, even across individuals. Single unit recordings show the capacity of a neuron to correlate reliably with high-level behavior, and even to predict behavior. Conversely, fMRI is unable to show the source of synchrony, EEG can only measure diffuse populations; single unit recordings are too local. Each method gives a partial picture. In any of
8
“Is the brain precise or noisy?” is a version of this paradox, which is also a rather poor way to pose the question.
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the methods, that which is not strictly protuberant statistically speaking is assumed to be irrelevant for the phenomenon, and is averaged out. Perhaps the problem would be solved if all measurements could be done simultaneously. If we knew from DTI the brain connectivity, then we could know from which cells we record, then integrate that with the level of EEG oscillations, summing up with the most active brain areas, and then we would have a more complete image. As it stands, we do not have the capability to do all at one time, and our best bet is to reintegrate the scattered results in the frame of a theory. Appropriately, that is the purpose of the following chapters.
3.4.2 More Epistemological Contentions Arguably, the most pertinacious critique to correlative methods is of an epistemological nature. Any experimental paradigm assessing function through correlated activity such as fMRI or PET or EEG is considerably committed to the functional hypothesis inherent in the experimental design. In a certain sense it is correct to affirm that for every function there will be brain correlates, and the most conspicuous of those are levels of activity. So, because the levels of activity are by necessity correlated with the task proposed, much depends on the definition of the task, which reciprocally defines the function searched for (examples abound in current cognitive neuroscience). In choosing a picture of Bill Clinton as a correlate of brain activity, one of two outcomes is possible. Either Bill Clinton correlates or he does not [38].9 The answer space is given by the question posed. Although a fascinating question – but contorted – “What is a good neural correlate?” will not be pursued here. I will say though, that no method is impermeable to this critique. In the retrieval of invariant correlates of function, the paradigm is an integral part of the answer, and the importance of the paradigm for conclusions can hardly be overemphasized. It is essential to see how the paradigm frames not only the question, but also the answer. On the other hand, the appreciation of this fact exposes the most basal characteristic of science made by people (with brains) who study brains (of people). As the long tradition of constructivism has reiterated, there is an inescapable – because it is inherent – circularity in explanation. We think with ideas. Every time we search for a brain function we assume that function (to various degrees). There is no escape. The only possible alternative for solace is to take refuge in purely descriptive analysis. But this in turn may conceal traps that jeopardize conclusions (see the mistakes of behaviorism). The danger is to think that there is no imposition of order on our part. This neglect abuts self-delusion, and paradoxically, the safest way around it is to face it. 9
A variation of this argument applies to the search for dendrites computing logical operations. One finds, or does not find, the logical operations sought. Usually this is done by restricting the context of dendritic function way beyond its biological context.
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3.5 Summary The invariance assumption. For one particular task or function, the brain will act in a similar way. This similarity can be encountered in measurement (Sect. 3.1.1). Methods of measurement. Because methods paint partial pictures of some of the brain’s constancies in function, the results can appear contradictory or difficult to integrate (Sect. 3.2). The role of statistics. All of the methods rely on some kind of statistics to show invariants. This may (1) smoothen out variations that may also be informative and (2) disregard contextual effects (Sect. 3.3.1). Types of variability. There are many sources of variation in brain measurement: instrumental, contextual (also known as initial conditions), neural implementation (Sect. 3.3). Languages of experiments. Measurement tends to produce a language for the conclusions of the experiment (Sect. 3.2.8). Integration of results. A powerful brain theory must be general, which implies it should encompass the findings of different experimental paradigms. Integration of results depends on hypothesis formation, ideally under the tutelage of an integrative theory (see the next chapter).
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12. Freeman W, Baird B (1989) Effects of applied electric current fields on cortical neural activity. Computational Neuroscience, New York, Plenum Press 13. Freeman WJ (1995) Society of Brains: A study in the neuroscience of love and hate. Laurence Erlbaum Associates Inc, Hillsdale, NJ 14. Gallese V, Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Rizzolati G (1996) Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain 119:593–609 15. Grossman E, Donnelly M, Price R, Pickens D, Morgan V, Neighbor G, Blake R (2000) Brain areas involved in perception of biological motion. J Cogn Neurosci 12(5):711–720 16. Hadjikhani N, Liu A, Dale A, Cavanagh P, Tootell R (1998) Retinotopy and color sensitivity in human visual cortical area V 8. Nat Neurosci 1(3):235–241 17. Hagmann P, Cammoun L, Gigandet X, Meuli R, Honey C, Wedeen V, Sporns O (2008) Mapping the structural core of human cerebral cortex. PLoS Biol 6(7):e159 18. Haynes J, Rees G (2005a) Predicting the orientation of invisible stimuli from activity in human primary visual cortex. Nat Neurosci 8:686–691 19. Haynes J, Rees G (2005b) Predicting the stream of consciousness from activity in human visual cortex. Curr Biol 15(14):1301–1307 20. Haynes J, Rees G (2006) Decoding mental states from brain activity in humans. Nat Rev Neurosci 7(7):523–534 21. Haynes J, Deichmann R, Rees G (2005) Eye-specific effects of binocular rivalry in the human lateral geniculate nucleus. Nature 438:496–499 22. Haynes J, Sakai K, Rees G, Gilbert S, Frith C, Passingham R (2007) Reading hidden intentions in the human brain. Curr Biol 17(4):323–328 23. Hyv¨arinen A, Oja E (2000) Independent component analysis: Algorithms and applications. Neural Netw 13(4–5):411–430 24. Jeffery KJ, Burgess N (2006) A metric for the cognitive map: Found at last? Trends Cogn Sci 10(1) 25. Livet J, Weissman T, Kang H, Draft R, Lu J, Bennis R, Sanes J, Lichtman J (2007) Transgenic strategies for combinatorial expression of fluorescent proteins in the nervous system. Nature 450:56–62 26. Logothetis NK (2003) The underpinnings of the BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging signal. J Neurosci 23(10):3963–3971 27. Logothetis NK (2008) What we can do and what we cannot do with fMRI. Nature 453(7197):869–878 28. Logothetis NK, Pfeuffer J (2004) On the nature of the BOLD fMRI contrast mechanism. Magn Reson Imaging 22(10):1517–1531 29. Moln´ar G, Ol´ah S, Koml´osi G, F¨ule M, Szabadics J, Varga C, Barz´o P, Tam´as G (2008) Complex Events Initiated by Individual Spikes in the Human Cerebral Cortex. PLoS Biol 6(9):e222 30. Mori S, Zhang J (2006) Principles of diffusion tensor imaging and its applications to basic neuroscience research. Neuron 51(5):527–539 31. Newberg A, Newberg S (2005) The neuropsychology of religious and spiritual experience. Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality. pp 199–215 32. O’Keefe J, Dostrovsky J (1971) The hippocampus as spatial map: preliminary evidence from unit activity in the freely moving rat. Brain Research 34:171–175 33. Panksepp J (1998) Affective Neuroscience, Oxford UP, chap The Varieties of emotional systems in the brain, pp 41–58 34. Peigneux P, Orban P, Balteau E, Degueldre C, Luxen A, Laureys S, Maquet P (2006) Offline persistence of memory-related cerebral activity during active wakefulness. PLOS Biology 4(4) 35. Platt ML, Glimcher PW (1999) Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex. Nature 400:233–238 36. Preissl H, Pulverm¨uller F, Lutzenberger W, Birbaumer N (1995) Evoked potentials distinguish between nouns and verbs. Neuroscience Letters 197(1):81–83 37. Pulverm¨uller F (2001) Brain reflections of words and their meaning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5(12):517–524 38. Quiroga R, Reddy L, Kreiman G, Koch C, Fried I (2005) Invariant visual representation by single neurons in the human brain. Nature 435(7045):1102–1107
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39. Rizzolatti G, Fadiga L, Gallese V, Fogassi L (1996) Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research 3(2):131–141 40. Skaggs W, McNaughton B, Wilson M, Barnes C (1996) Theta phase precession in hippocampal neuronal populations and the compression of temporal sequences. Hippocampus 6(2) 41. Sporns O, Honey C (2006) Small worlds inside big brains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103(51):19,219 42. Sporns O, Honey C, K¨otter R (2007) Identification and classification of hubs in brain networks. PLoS ONE 2(10) 43. Sutton S, Braren M, Zubin J, John E (1965) Evoked-Potential Correlates of Stimulus Uncertainty. Science 150(3700):1187–1188 44. Varela F, Toro A, John E, Schwartz E (1981) Perceptual framing and cortical alpha rhythm. Neuropsychologia 19(5):675–86 45. Varela F, Lachaux J, Rodriguez E, Martinerie J, et al (2001) The brainweb: phase synchronization and large-scale integration. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2(4):229–239 46. Vul E, Harris C, Winkielman P, Pashler H (2009 (to appear)) Voodoo correlations in social neuroscience. Perspectives on Psychological Science 47. Watts D, Strogatz S (1998) Small world. Nature 393:440–442 48. Wedeen V, Hagmann P, Tseng W, Reese T, Weisskoff R (2005) Mapping Complex Tissue Architecture With Diffusion Spectrum Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Magnetic Resonance in Medicine 54(6):1377
Chapter 4
Modeling and Invariance
The price of metaphor is eternal vigilance Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics
Metaphors are neither true nor false, but they can be more or less productive as heuristics for developing more precise theories. Peter Gardenf¨ors
Abstract Further in the analysis of invariants and their explanatory roles, this chapter introduces models of computational neuroscience that elucidate the interplay between constancy and variability, and illustrate the appearance of invariances. These models rely on the interplay between the structure of the input and rules of structural modification, in which a malleable structure organizes by assimilating the regularities in input. In analogy, organisms learning and adapting to their bodies and environments also self-organize function. Although powerful, empirical assessment of invariances and models thereof present partial pictures. To assemble this mosaic of models, it is necessary to have a theory that is able to cover the causal levels of behavioral phenomena. Dynamical systems is proposed as such a theory.
4.1 Invariance and Computational Models 4.1.1 Shared Invariant Rules from Natural Patterns Nature’s symmetric patterns have the hypnotic allure of awe-inspiring mysteries, inciting the natural philosopher to unveil them. Once the seductive signs are accepted and nature is stripped bare, graceful beauty often blossoms in the pure form of a mathematical abstraction. Behind stunning patterns in nature there are invariant properties of components and invariant rules, at once defiant and elusive.
M. Negrello, Invariants of Behavior: Constancy and Variability in Neural Systems, Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems 1, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8804-1 4, c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
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Once revealed, an invariant transmutes into a mathematical crystal, whose facets reflect both itself and others, with which it abstractly shares its essence, its mathematical soul.1 In a biological system, an invariant is an abstract property entailed by the substrate and its organization principles. Physical laws create potential for modifications of structural configurations and relations between components of the substrate, resulting in invariance perchance of form and perchance of function or behavior. The organizations of the substrate are, at least for those subscribing to materialist views, solely regimented by physical principles. In the world, self-organization is superordinate on the physical principles of organization of matter, such as adhesion, viscosity, permeability, rigidity, elasticity, magnetism, electricity, and combinations thereof—relational forces and functions which create potential for change. Physical principles can be distilled into mathematical rules, which on occasion are shared between different systems (mathematical analogies). It is part of the fascination of modeling that, at some level of analysis, models may be shared between diverse systems. Natural processes whose results appear analogous can be modeled via similar invariant rules. The same holds for neural systems.
4.1.1.1 Similar Patterns from Invariant Rules Studies of morphogenesis are searches for abstract rules of a process that explain the formation of natural patterns. As an example, see Fig. 4.1, comparing spiral patterns occurring in nature and in inorganic chemistry. One is formed by processes of a colony of organisms, Dyctiostelyum, whereas the other is formed by a complex chemical reaction involving bromide and an acid, the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction (more pictures of spiral patterns from different systems can be found at http://www.uni-magdeburg.de/abp/picturegallery.htm). The patterns do not share
Fig. 4.1 Similar abstract rules resolve the similarities in the patterns generated by the chemical Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction and the biological Dyctiostelyum spirals
1
Please forgive the somewhat exuberant exposition. It was written during an outburst of awe.
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substrate, and yet they look exquisitely similar. This similitude can be explained by an abstract description of a dynamical process that holds for both phenomena. Pattern formation results from two complimentary processes: a fast autocatalytic reaction (a positive feedback), and a slow inhibitory reaction (negative-feedback) loop. Roughly described, the pattern-forming process unfolds similarly for both. The autocatalysis is fast and exhausts the reactants, allowing a secondary, slower, process of regeneration of the catalysts to take place. The temporal dynamics of this process in a two-dimensional excitable medium [7] is oscillatory, producing a wavefront of reaction, and consequently the spiral patterns. The spirals are reliable indications of the existence of rules; both the bacteria and the chemical reaction share abstract, pattern-forming, invariant rules; and both produce, within an ample space of parameters, qualitatively invariant spatial patterns. Many other such examples of spiral patterns appear in nature (as in Fibonacci sequences in plant morphogenesis). Processes producing patterns can be modeled in a variety of levels of abstraction, from very abstract cellular automata, to very detailed reaction–diffusion models based on differential equations [21]. Across this range the processes are dynamic, unwinding in time, which introduces issues of stability depending on process rates, initial quantity of interactants, and influxes of energy (or perturbations) initiating the reaction. By analyzing changes to these parameters, one can study different qualitative behaviors that both systems exhibit. Parameters and potential regulate the processes. When there is too much potential and too few interactants, the process may be like a burst of flame, rapidly consuming the energy and quickly dying out. Likewise, when there is not enough potential, nothing ensues. Between the dynamics of pattern formation in bacteria and in the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction there is a similarity that allows both systems to be modeled by the same abstract model, similar parameters, at the level of pattern formation. Incidentally, a variation of the model has also been applied to the propagation of contraction forces of heart muscle. All three systems embody, in different substrates, the same abstract rules.
4.1.1.2 Causal Patterns with Different Entailments Naturally, bacteria, the heart, and chemicals are not the same; the set of potentialities of each is, of course, very different. The processes in bacteria are much more complex than those of the chemicals in the Belousov–Zhabotinksy reaction, with its much more intricate biochemical machinery. An explanation of the pattern formation, however, can reunite the two systems – at a certain level of abstraction – under the same model. At the level of pattern formation, the two systems are isomorphic – they share rules. The bacterium has, potentially, many more things it can do; many more ways it can interact with the environment and its colony. But at the level of pattern formation, bacteria are comparable to a chemical reaction, because at that level abstracted rules are shared. Structural similarities between the two phenomena translate into an abstract relational invariance that, within certain conditions,
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explains both patterns with one sweep. The set of implications of both patterns, however, is very different, and a crucial difference it may be. Patterns themselves may have further potential roles to play in some cases, but not in others. Spatial patterns of bacteria, more resourceful than bromide, may play a functional role, e.g., in the development of the colony. The emerged pattern may acquire function, an emergent function, which operates at the level of the population. The pattern may admit the attribution of a causal role. Differential occupation of a surface will lead to differences in light absorption, the distribution of nutrients, and conceivably many other factors. These patterns in turn may shape the development of the colony. It could even be that evolution operated in the types of patterns that a colony of bacteria may express (multilevel selection). Regarding the extremely sophisticated forms these colonies can take, the conclusion that patterns play causal roles seems necessary. In this sense, the abstract model (fast autocatalysis and inhibition) covers the outcomes of the chemical reactions better than they do for the bacteria. For bacteria, a complete explanation would require the inclusion of more levels, genetic and developmental. In that sense, the search for abstract principles in the brain is more similar to the search for invariants in bacteria. Explaining one level does not exhaust the phenomenon. The brain offers a wealth of patterns, in a variety of levels, that exist simultaneously, and are different dependent on the empirical lenses through which they are seen. Although some brain patterns might be distant correlates of causation, some might be very close to the cause itself. Models help in finding out which is which, by showing what is covered and what is not.
4.1.2 Dynamical Neural Patterns As in Sect. 3.1, the many measurement methods show a brain permeated with patterns. Perhaps the most conspicuous of those is the intricate neuroanatomy, but a simple glance at the pictures produced by any empirical method reveals patterns in a variety of forms, in a variety of spatial and temporal scales. Patterns of activity (and morphology!) in functioning brains are dynamic and evolve in time, inducing the question of what rules could be shaping the observed patterns. The appearance of a certain invariant in the nervous system, the qualitative shape of an action potential, for example (as seen through its membrane potential), is a product of physical laws and the structure of the substrate. The electrotonic equilibrium across the cellular membrane is purely a function of the ionic composition of the cell, its membrane structures with differential conductances, and the cell’s surroundings. The types of action potentials that a cell is able to emit are eminently dependent on the interplay of components and surroundings. We examine this more closely in Sect. 6.1. For now, it suffices to say that the observed shapes of the action potentials are invariants of neuronal models with respect to some parameter domains.
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The action potential is, furthermore, an example of a dynamical pattern with causal prowess, whose influences propagate throughout the organism. At the base of most measurements of functional invariance in the brain, there are action potentials. Oscillations, local activity, and receptive fields are all consequences of action potentials plus network (and dendritic) structure. And the action potential itself is a consequence of the properties of the cell producing it. So, the analysis of invariance in the brain begins with the production of action potentials (which we do in Sect. 6.1). There we will see that the patterns of action potentials can be understood through modeling at the level of the cellular membrane. At that level, a picture of constancy emerges from variability in the level crossing from the anatomical composition of the neurons to the dynamics of the membrane potential. Distributions of ion channels lead to varieties of dynamical behavior. We call them varieties [11]: qualitatively different dynamically, in that a neuron can fire different action potentials dependent on channel properties and distributions determining the dynamics of ionic exchange (a sample of action potential varieties is shown in Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.2 Varieties of action potentials. Their behavior can be framed as invariant properties according to parameterizations. DAP depolarizing afterpotential. (From [13])
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In the brain the presence of invariants leaves traces in many levels.2 The actual discovery (or invention) of rules connecting levels is anything but trivial, requiring as much knowledge as creativity. The discovery of rules and invariants usually follows a strenuous and windy historical path of experiment, discovery, and invention. In Sect. 6.1.1, we will see some of the facts leading to the Hodgkin–Huxley model of the action potential, one of the neatest examples of modeling neural invariances. Before that, we do a sampling review of models of computational neuroscience that have bearing on the present discussion. These models show how brain patterns could emerge as the outcomes of rules and components operating on structured input. Then we provide a description of the historical facts leading to our model of choice, the discrete time recurrent neural network, in the next chapter.
4.2 Computational Models of Neural Invariance 4.2.1 Constancy and Variability in Modeling Explanatory theories in biology (as well as in physics, more canonically) attempt to encompass variation with theorizing, where ideally a reductionistic view on the regularities from measurement meets abstract principles that may account for it. This epistemological direction, from constancies to rules and from rules to invariance, is also the prerogative of complex system models, where invariants in measurement mirror principles of organization, themselves a function of the potentialities of the substrate. The more fundamental the rule with the least neglectful exclusions, the more powerful the model/theory obtained. Through an explanatory theorization of this sort, even if by necessity about abstracted reality, one can claim to have found an organizational principle.3 2
The retrieval of rules from brain patterns stumbles upon contingencies. Crucially, data have to be arranged so patterns can be observed. This evokes the question of how much of the observed pattern may be a methodological artifact. Moreover, because humans are pattern-recognizers by nature, a reorganization of data to see patterns on occasion leads to specious patterns, and by extension to spurious conclusions. Rules inferred from brain patterns are more explanatory when they indicate causes, not correlations. Brain patterns are observed by an observer, who introduces his or her biases, which can take the form of theory-bound terminology or theoretical preconceptions. Unfortunately, I have found no general heuristics to distinguish wheat from hay. 3 Different entailments: Such principles belong to levels of explanation, by necessity, and are about the reality of the phenomenon, but are not the phenomenon. Confusion between simulation and reality, which some modelers indulge in, causes many of the quarrels with artificial life approaches. Artificial life, as Takashi Ikegami said, quoting Tom Froese, is actually dead, in the sense that the potentialities of matter in life-artificial and in life-organic are fundamentally different, and the combinations of different patterns will generally have different causal proclivities. Only a fullfledged equivalence among the self-organizing properties of elements could ever lead to life as we know. And because every chemical component of the periodic table has different properties, it is hard to imagine “component neutrality.” That is, that arrangements of different components would ever lead to equivalence expressed in all levels. That is not to say that we cannot build life as we do not yet know.
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Here is a very general template fitting every explanation of the interplay between constancy and variability in biological processes. Both constancy and variability are products of the self-organization of a complex system, governed by physical principles. Loosely speaking, order emerges from chaos when there is potential for lawful interactions between components. By “potential for lawful interaction” I mean that the results of the interactions between components follow some invariant rule. The presence of variability indicates that interaction between components can happen in more than one way, or that the outcomes display divergence. Complementarily, constancy appears when there is convergence. When things can happen in more than one way, they are more likely to happen in one way than in another. Often, the way a process begins biases the outcomes of the process one way rather than the other. Then constancy appears at the side of the bias introduced by the initial structures.
4.2.2 Models and Invariance in Computational Neuroscience Some of the most beautiful models of computational neuroscience have been proposed to disinter rules leading to neural patterns concomitant of behavioral function. In this section, I discuss some of these models and their explanatory characteristics. Whether explicitly or not, all of the following models are examples of a search for invariant mechanisms producing observable functions. Models abduct – or select – particular properties of the nervous system and transform them into invariant rules, from which patterns and function may emerge. The exertion of functions produces distinctive neural patterns. The upcoming subsections will exemplify the claim.
4.2.3 Hebbian Plasticity 4.2.3.1 Ongoing Synaptic Modification In 1949 Donald Hebb [10] proposed a candidate for the mechanism of neuronal change that would underlie memory that has since become coextensive with neural models of learning. “Neurons that fire together wire together,” or Hebb’s rule, is the classical example of a principle of self-organization in the cortex. In Hebb’s own words, “When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased” Hebb did not propose a particular mathematical formulation, but one of the simplest implementations operates as follows. The strength of a synapse (Hebb’s efficacy) between two neurons is increased (or decreased) by a number proportional to their joint activity. If the activity of the receiving neuron is lower than that of the sender, the synapse is reinforced proportionally to the product of
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activities. If, conversely, the receiving neuron has higher activity, the synapse is dampened proportionally. So, Hebb’s rule has two properties: it is local and it is symmetric. The neurons know nothing about their networks, but only about themselves and the incoming signal. There is no signal determining whether some plastic alteration led to some positive result at a higher level. Therefore, Hebbian learning is unsupervised. Many variations on Hebb’s theme have taken it from its original abstract phrasing and improved its biological adequacy, such as spike-time-dependent plasticity, which takes the recent history of spikes into consideration. Since then, on the basis of Hebb’s rule and variations many interesting systemic properties have been demonstrated (see, e.g., [5]). At the system level, Hebb’s rule has been prolific in proposing explanations for a number of behavioral phenomena. Abbott and Blum [1, 2, 4] used it to show how a mouse may implicitly learn to navigate a water maze. Metha et al. also presented a model of how predictive firing of hippocampal cells may be explained by Hebbian learning (and its biological counterparts, long-term potentiation and long-term depression). Fundamental to these results and others of the same type is the following: consistent experience leads to consistent alterations of network structure. In the network, an initial random distribution of weights becomes skewed with consistent experience. The skew of the weight distribution represents particular properties of the interactions of the simulated mouse with its environment. The outcome is a distribution of weights that approaches invariance by capturing (i.e., representing, in a weak way) the history of interactions (see Fig. 4.3).4 Hebbian plasticity has motivated biological explanations as well as machine learning applications, such as reinforcement learning, in various different guises (some in which the property of locality is forsaken, giving way to a system-level reinforcement signal generating the plasticity). Research has in most cases confirmed Hebb’s insight, and it is highly likely that Hebbian learning as an invariant rule represents the standard form of systemic alterations of neural structures.5
4.2.4 Kohonen’s Self-Organizing Maps Hebb’s insight motivated many models where plasticity begets invariance. Kohonen maps, also called self-organizing maps (SOMs), are an example. Kohonen maps are
4
In the original proposal, Hebb’s rule operates on real numbers representing neural activity, and learning happens when connections are repeatedly active. That leads to an unbounded positive feedback in the weight change, which in turn leads to scaling problems. Solutions inspired by biological mechanisms have been proposed to deal with the scaling problem by introducing homeostatic constraints on saturation [3]. 5 Hebb’s rule does, however, lead to paradoxes. There is the paradox of permanent change: if all synapses are constantly changing, the system must somehow avoid the so-called superposition catastrophe. How does the system handle contradictory information, always present in the real world, without forgetting?
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Fig. 4.3 Asymmetric expansion of the “predictive coding” of place fields as explained by Hebbian learning. (From [17])
neural networks that organize multidimensional feature spaces. On the basis of a principle unearthed by von der Malsburg [16], on the organization of visual feature maps, Kohonen [14] generalized the principle to any number of feature dimensions. Similar with similar is the principle behind SOMs. The maps employ measures of similarity to produce topologically organized feature maps that, resembling topical maps in the cortex, have a spatial arrangement representing the organization of a feature space. Its paradigmatic examples are the original paper from von der Malsburg, where the space of visual features becomes organized, and the emergence of somatotopic-like maps of tactile features. Because SOMs are not restricted to particular features, they can generate topological organizations even with abstract concepts, such as semantic maps [20]. Once trained, a SOM becomes an invariant similarity classifier. SOMs show how invariance results from repeated application of rules on disorganized feature spaces, as long as there is a metric of comparison between inputs. The metric, and by extension, the production of maps, is dependent on particular network topologies for the quantification of similarity. Contingent on the topologies of the initial networks, the resulting map will be different. But, the important conclusion is this: given a certain metric and a certain space of training examples, the outcome is necessary.
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This is not quite true. In fact, as should be expected, SOMs are highly sensitive to the training examples, the order of presentation, and the initial structure. The larger the dissimilarity between the training examples, the more divergent will be the resulting maps. This is worthy of mention because to understand particular maps, from particular sets of examples, it is important to understand the origin of the examples. Consider the following. Suppose the examples fed into the SOM are produced by a physical system. The distribution of features will follow the rules of the physical system. In that sense, the space of possible invariant maps will follow the particularities of the physical system. Now suppose that there are many maps, each trained from a different set of examples of the physical system. If, as we assumed, the outcomes of the physical system are randomly distributed, then maps with few examples will look considerably different. But SOMs that are fed with large numbers of examples will resemble each other, in unbiasedly representing the randomness of the original process. Although all SOMs will attempt to capture the invariances of the original system, only the larger maps will attain larger correspondences, and only to the degree that the metric is compatible with the incoming data. The SOM’s malleable structure assimilates the incoming data. The largest and more consistent the set of training samples, the better the emerging correspondences. There must be a match between the complexity of the data and the absorption capacity of the structure.
4.2.5 Backpropagation: Gradient Descent Methods Backpropagation was one of the first learning algorithms for neural networks. It is a method to create a categorizing network, and is an example of supervised learning, as the patterns are associated with desired responses. It works as follows. An initialized network with input, hidden, and output units is initialized with arbitrary weights. Then the network is fed with training patterns for which the classification is known. If the output units do not match to the desired output, the weights are changed in proportion to the error, which is the difference between the achieved and desired outputs. After the network has been fed with enough training examples, it will be able to extrapolate and categorize unseen patterns. Thus, the network becomes an invariant classifier. Analogously to SOMs, the structure of the network will represent the training patterns, and likewise, it will be dependent on the training examples. The networks trained by backpropagation may be feedforward or recurrent. In feedforward networks, the difficulty appears with contradictory patterns, which cannot be learned. Recurrent neural networks partially solve this problem by introducing internal states dependent on history, thereby providing context to the incoming patterns. Recurrent neural networks can also learn oscillatory patterns. The absorption capacity of these networks will be constrained by structures as well as size. Networks trained with backpropagation have been proposed as an explanation for perceptual categorization, as well as interpolation and extrapolation. In the past they were criticized for lack of a corresponding mechanism in biological networks,
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that is, the biological adequacy was questioned. Recently, some neurons have been shown to propagate signals in the reverse direction (axon to dendrites), which resulted in relinquishment of some of the critiques (as cited in [15]). The difficulty remaining is the necessity for supervision, and that training examples must be previously classified before feeding them to the algorithm. Although it is not difficult to conceive of biological situations in which the training examples are provided by the interaction of an agent and an environment, the biological adequacy is to be judged case by case. The capability of networks to learn with backpropagation (or any variations on gradient descents) is imminently dependent on the structure of the network and the training examples. But provided that the structure and examples may produce proper classifying networks, the network becomes an invariant classifier. For large data sets, large networks can vary wildly both in their structure and in the correctness of the classification of unseen examples. But because they embody the data that was fed to them, the categorization ability is an abstraction over the problem.
4.2.6 Hopfield Networks Responsible for the revival of neural nets in the 1980s, Hopfield [12] showed how a recurrent neural network (spin glass model) can be made to store and retrieve patterns. Hopfield networks are an example of content-addressable memories: given a pattern similar (but distorted in some way) to one stored in the network, the network will eventually settle on the stored pattern (minimum free energy). In dynamical systems terms the initial (distorted) pattern is an initial condition, the resulting (stored) pattern is a fixed point. The Hopfield network is a network where all weights are symmetric (which guarantees the existence of a Lyapunov energy function), and there are no selfconnections. Moreover, the update rule is asynchronous to avoid oscillations. Neurons in the network are Boolean (the neurons have two states, in some versions 1 and 0 or 1 or 1). Patterns are stored via some version of backpropagation or the delta rule, and retrieval happens by inserting a pattern and letting it settle on one of the stored patterns. In the terminology of dynamical systems the inserted pattern is an initial condition, and the transient follows an energy gradient into the closest minimum of free energy (see Fig. 4.4). The network effectively implements a categorization, in which similar patterns will fall into one of a limited number of basins of attraction, determined by the number of units in the network (there is more about basins of attraction in Sect. 7.1.2.2) Dynamically, Hopfield’s model is trivial because the initial state always finds itself in some basin of attraction, and stays in that basin, merely following the gradient. The asynchronous update rule guarantees absence of oscillations. Every retrieved pattern is a fixed point of the dynamics. Apart from the biological adequacy quirks (such as the necessity for symmetric connections, and the asynchronicity of updates, the Boolean values of activities), there are other limitations. Because the phase space is partitioned into a limited
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Fig. 4.4 The rigged hill analogy for basins of attraction of Hopfield networks. A minimum of free energy between two contiguous peaks is a basin of attraction, and the bottom point is a fixed-point attractor
number of basins of attraction (stored patterns, categories), the storage capacity is proportional to how this space can be partitioned. With more patterns, recollection collapses and the capacity for storage is in general quite limited [5]. The transient states have no functional role, and the attractor states are trivial fixed-point attractors. Nevertheless, Hopfield’s seminal idea showed how patterns can be stored and retrieved in recurrent neural networks. It provided the stepping stone for a comprehension of how neural networks could implement content-addressable memory. As in SOMs and Hebb’s rule, a trained Hopfield network is an implicit representation of the stored patterns. Essentially, every Hopfield network is a categorization machine that embodies the patterns with which it was trained. Its basin structure is an invariant of categories. Because it takes in distorted or disturbed patterns, and retrieves one single pattern, it is also a mechanism that reduces variation into constancy. As in the cases above, the invariant of a Hopfield network is a static representation of a history of interactions, which makes its way into a deformable space of neurons. That is to say, the systems described above all have a tendency: given rules, plus experience, the resulting network is a representation of an invariant.
4.2.7 Decorrelation Principles Recently, neat examples of the appearance of invariances from spatial–temporal influxes of coherent information have been demonstrated in the case of learning of temporal sequences. Wyss et al. [24–26] have tackled the problem of learning spatial–temporal patterns, where a temporal sequence of spatial stimuli is fed to a multilayered network that is altered according to a decorrelation rule. The idea behind a decorrelation rule is that as it learns, the neural system tends to minimize
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redundancy. So, if at the outset both neuron A and neuron B respond to stimulus S, after learning, neuron A responds to stimulus S and neuron B responds to something else, where it can be more useful. In an inspired experiment with a decorrelation rule, a robot stands for a mouse that learns a maze on the basis of visual streams. At first the robot explores the maze freely, acquiring sequences of pictures fed to its network (layered and hierarchically organized). After the training period in which the decorrelation rules are applied to the network weights, a particular view of the maze (pictures) will evoke an invariant pattern of network activity [23]. This amounts to saying that for each place in the maze there is a corresponding invariant pattern of activity involving all neuronal units – the whole brain of the robot. The invariant representation of place appears because there is structure in the image sequence fed to the robot’s network, structure which is about the world and about how the agent moves in it. When the system was tested with scrambled sequences of images, as expected learning was not stable and no invariant patterns appeared. The structure of the world is acquired in interaction through sensorimotor contingencies; to get from A to B, the robot must necessarily go by a connected path between A and B. Any contiguous movement in four dimensions follows a Lie manifold constrained by the embedding of the robot [18, 19]. It is the very structure of movement in the world that produces the network structure whose activity is invariant with respect to place. By minimizing redundancy, activity patterns end up representing places in the world (more or less univocally, dependent on the complexity of the environment to be learned).6
4.2.7.1 Place Cells as Relational Invariants The same mechanism (decorrelation of multilayered networks) may explain the appearance of some empirical invariants, such as place cells, grandmother (or Jennifer Aniston) cells, and even, with a tad of goodwill, mirror neurons. It is an interesting exercise to imagine a simulated electrophysiology experiment in the robot described earlier. Suppose, for instance, that we had no access to the whole pattern of activity, but only a sample of it, through electrodes inserted in some random units of the network and we measure their activity. Then, when a picture from the maze is presented, the corresponding invariant pattern is evoked. The random cells sampled will have a level of activity which is invariant with place. Since invariant patterns have a disjunctive character, because of decorrelation, cells measured at random will be more or less active in particular positions of the maze. These hypothetical units are akin to “place cells,” and they may (or may not) correlate with particular places in the maze (see Fig. 4.5). Similarly impressive results based on slow feature analysis [22] have been demonstrated by Franzius et al. [6]. More than place cells, other
6
Notice that the cell “abstracts” precise information about the incoming picture. A similar pattern of activity will be evoked in a given place P irrespective of viewpoint V. All the viewpoints in place P produce similar activity patterns in the higher layers. The invariant is not a “place” per se, but is about where the “presented picture” fits into the network attractors.
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Fig. 4.5 Left: Artificial place cells from sequences of pictures. Right: A place cell from a rat, with a trajectory overlaid. (Right from [23], left from [8]) Table 4.1 Invariances in the structure of interaction with the world are represented in invariance in neural activity Dimension Invariance in interaction Neural of transformation with the world invariance Rotation Place Place cell Displacement Orientation Head direction cell Displacement Vision target Viewpoint cell and rotation Velocity Step size (e.g, 2 cm) Grid cell
invariants were shown as outcomes of the trained algorithm, such as head-direction cells, viewpoint cells and grid cells. This makes sense because of the kinds of sensorial transformations that keep some relations to the world constant, and thereby define dimensions of change in relation to constancies in interaction with the world. The coherent structure of the world fed to a malleable model suited to acquire this structure (decorrelation, slow feature analysis) will produce the dimensions of invariance in patterns of activity. Examples of dimensions of transformation with invariants in interaction and respective neural invariants are given in Table 4.1. Because the transformations involved in locomotion are smooth (in Lie manifolds), a decorrelation method will generate abstract representations of smooth changes (of perceptual input). This will appear in constancies in the activity measured by electrophysiology, or by functional magnetic resonance imaging (as in [9]). Conceivably, if decorrelation (or slow-feature extraction) is a mechanism implemented by the brain’s matter, it explains the appearance of invariant place cells in measurement, as it minimizes redundant representations of the independent dimension that an agent’s relations with the world can change.
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Specific transformations will lead to types of invariants, but it is the act of exploration, the experience itself, that reveals the structure of the interaction with the world within the neural system. Consequently, different experiences lead to different renditions of the invariant patterns of activity, but all will refer to the same modes of interaction with the world. The grounding will be constant. The acquisition of sequences of pictures from an exploratory mode of behavior implies a relational invariant between the being, its malleable structures, and the constancies of the world.
4.3 Conclusion 4.3.1 Invariants and the Structure of the World The principles underlying the models described in this chapter were inspired by brain properties and functions, and purport to emulate the functions that inspired them. In all cases we see the appearance of invariances, which represent coherent orders in the influxes of data. The functions achieved by all the neural models here are versions of the principles of categorization and classification (prediction in the case of Hebbian learning). Although cogent biological confirmation for these principles is lacking, these models carry something of the actual phenomenon. Generally, the following can be asserted with confidence. All the systems described in this chapter (SOM, decorrelation, backpropagation) take in stimulus data and are incrementally altered to represent the structure of the data. The functions of the systems are relational invariants, which relate the training examples, with the structure, with the function. In behavior, the environment is a coherent source of training data, whose sample points, although very varied, are not random. They are as structured as the environment itself, and implicitly represent the rules they obey. In malleable systems, the influx of coherent data will mold the system to the regularities of the data. Variation is unavoidable, resulting from dependence on the initial structure and sequences of inputs. Constancy appears as invariant patterns are resolved through the structure of the input and the structural alteration rules. In a sense, the invariant patterns come to represent the data fed to the system. Note that this notion of representation is simple; it requires naught but a certain level of “aboutness.” For example., the resulting SOMs are “about” the data. The term “representation” is employed in a sense different from standard notions from cognitive science, in that they are only intelligible in relation to the data. There is an inextricable dependence between the influx and the system, and meaning is immanent when they are taken together, but inexistent if they are taken independently. Malleable systems will self-organize to absorb the data that they are given. In organisms, data is whatever streamed inputs the organism receives. If there is order in the data, and if there are mechanisms to change the structure of the system consistently, the system will, in whatever way, come to represent the data itself. When the
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distinctions and orders that were captured from data are used in behavior in some way, the loop is closed. Invariances of neural activity and structure are about how the organism is modified as it interacts in regimented ways with the environment. In that, all invariances thus produced are relational: they relate the organism to the world through experience.
4.3.2 Constancy and Variability in Modeling The previous sections presented a selection of computational models inspired by principles abstracted from neural systems. From those we derived a simple yet important conclusion: these models build on invariant rules and components to form around data fed to them, and come to implicitly represent regularities in the data. Regularities in the data are often about the structure of the world, and the modes of interaction between a system and its environment. When data is regular and components are similar, models develop equivalently. Constancy appears both at the level of function a model emulates (such as pattern categorization) and structure (such as weight distributions of a neural network). On the complementary side, sources of variability are the initial structures and the order of data presentation. Thus framed, the constancy and variability in models are analogous to those in organisms. But there is an important difference. Because models are abstracted from particular levels, they are by necessity only about those levels from which they are abstracted. It becomes difficult therefore to stitch models to cover the phenomenon without incurring gaps in coverage. How does one sum a network that does “place cell” with a network that does “similarity categorization” with a network that does “pattern retrieval”? Empirical assessments show partial pictures of invariance. Correspondingly, models emulate and explain particular levels of self-organization. Given the complexity of the problems of behavior and cognition, usually only one aspect is tackled at a time, only a subset of brain function. Abstract rules derived from the phenomenon reproduce, or emulate, some concomitants that are known to be present in the operation of the brain; however, none of them account single-handedly for all brain function. To sum models, as in uniting results from experiments, is a formidable challenge. To do so, one needs a framework where reintegration of partial models in a holistic model is possible and meaningful. Ideally, a model about brain function has to produce all the outcomes of the models described in this chapter, simultaneously. So, the abstract principles that were found in individual models must talk back to the phenomenon in all its scope.
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References 1. Abbott L, Blum K (1996) Functional significance of ltp for sequence learning and prediction. Cereb Cortex (6):406–416 2. Abbott LF, Blum KI (1996) Functional significance of long-term potentiation between hippocampal place cells. Cereb Cortex 6:406–416. URL citeseer.ist.psu.edu/abbott94functional. html 3. Abbott LF, Nelson SB (2000) Synaptic plasticity: Taming the beast. Nat Neurosci 3:1178–1183 4. Blum KI, Abbott LF (1999) A model of spatial map formation in the Hippocampus of the rat. Neural codes and distributed representations. MIT Press, Cambridge 5. Domany E, van Hemmen J, Schulten K (1995) Models of neural networks, vol I, 2nd edn. (updated). Springer, New York 6. Franzius M, Sprekeler H, Wiskott L (2007) Slowness and sparseness lead to place, headdirection, and spatial-view cells. PLoS Comput Biol 3(8):e166 7. Goodwin B (2001) The evolution of complexity: How the leopard changed its spots. Princeton Academic, Princeton 8. Harris K, Csicsvari J, Hirase H, Dragoi G, Buzs´aki G (2003) Organization of cell assemblies in the hippocampus. Nat a-z index 424(6948):552–556 9. Hartley T, Maguire E, Spiers H, Burgess N (2003) The well-worn route and the path less traveled distinct neural bases of route following and wayfinding in humans. Neuron 37(5): 877–888 10. Hebb D (1949) Organization of behavior. Wiley, New York 11. Heylighen F, Joslyn C (2001) Cybernetics and second-order cybernetics. In: Meyers R (ed) Encyclopedia of physical science and technology, 3rd edn. Academic, New York 12. Hopfield JJ (1982) Neural networks and physical systems with collective emergent computational abilities. Proc Natl Acad Sci (Biophysics) 79:2554–2558 13. Izhikevich EM (2004) Which model to use for cortical spiking neurons. IEEE Trans Neural Netw 15(5):1063–1070 14. Kohonen T (1982) Self-organized formation of topologically correct feature maps. In: von der Malsburg C (ed) Kybernetik 14(2), pp 59–69 15. K¨ording K, K¨onig P (2001) Supervised and unsupervised learning with two sites of synaptic integration. J Comput Neurosci 11(3):207–215 16. von der Malsburg C (1973) Self-organization of orientation sensitive cells in the striate cortex. Kybernetik 14(2):85–100 17. Metha M, Quirk M, Wilson M (2000) Experience-dependent, assymetric shape of hippocampal receptive fields. Nature 25:707–715 18. Philipona D, O’Regan J (2004) Perception multimodale de l’espace. Philosophie de la nature aujourd’hui?, MSH, Boston 19. Philipona D, O’Regan J, Nadal J (2003) Is there something out there? inferring space from sensorimotor dependencies. Neural Comput 15(9):2029–2049 20. Ritter H, Kohonen T (1989) Self-organizing semantic maps. Biol Cybern 61(4):241–254 21. Sandstede B, Scheel A, Wulff C (1998) Bifurcations and dynamics of spiral waves. J Nonlinear Sci 9(4):439–478 22. Wiskott L, Sejnowski TJ (2002) Slow feature analysis: Unsupervised learning of invariances. Neural Comput 14:715–770 23. Wyss R, Verschure PFMJ (2003) Bounded invariance and the formation of place fields. In proceedings: NIPS 24. Wyss R, K¨onig P, Verschure PFMJ (2002) Invariant encoding of spatial stimulus topology in the temporal domain. Neurocomputing 44–46:703–708 25. Wyss R, K¨onig P, Verschure PFMJ (2003) Invariant representations of visual patterns in a temporal population code. Proc Natl Acad Sci 108(1):324–329 26. Wyss R, K¨onig P, Verschure PFMJ (2006) A model of the ventral visual system based on temporal stability and local memory. PLoS Biol 4(5)
Chapter 5
Dynamical Systems and Convergence
Abstract Dynamical systems can be coupled to other dynamical systems to cover organismic phenomenon on many scales, as they provides a general frame applicable to an ample range of phenomena. Describing a system as coupled systems highlights interfaces. Interfaces reflect the locus of organized transitions, or level crossings, places where constancy and variability merge. At interfaces there is convergence and/or divergence, so the vicissitudes of variation coalesce in meaningful averages; whereas conversely, constancy may drift and spread into variation. These transformations depend crucially on a number of processes, which are regimented by particular types of physical interactions. Variability may coalesce in averages, whereas constancy may drift. Mutatis mutandis, the same operating principles – large numbers and physical laws – means smear again in variation. In a functioning system, these two stances of constancy and variation complement and define each other.
5.1 Introduction 5.1.1 Previous Conclusions To highlight correlates of behavioral function, experimental paradigms tend to amalgamate a large number of observations. Averaging results over different observations may eclipse subtle constituents of explanation. This is very much an inherent characteristic of experiment; it is usually not possible to control for all the variables, nor to know whether the selected variables are those most explanatory. The way to handle such vicissitudes and variations of experimental nature is to form hypotheses about what links together protuberant correlates from different experimental results with the structure of the phenomenon. In short, to model. Furthermore, the isolated methods of brain measurement when taken independently offer distinct viewpoints on the activity of the neural system. Depending on the viewpoint, a different facet of the phenomenon is illuminated. Consilience between the results of different methods can only appear if findings from the different
M. Negrello, Invariants of Behavior: Constancy and Variability in Neural Systems, Springer Series in Cognitive and Neural Systems 1, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-8804-1 5, c Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011
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methods tell tales about each other. Or better yet, if their results can be integrated on the general frame of an encompassing theory. Such an integrative theory has to explain why do the correlates of the different experimental paradigms appear. For instance, it has to explain where electroencephalography measured oscillations come from; it has to explain why there is localized activity in functional magnetic resonance imaging; it has to explain the emergence and the role of synchrony; it has to explain why a single cell correlates with Jennifer Aniston; it has to explain both variability in spike trains and the reliable single neuron responses; and it has to explain constancy in behavior, given variations in neural activity. And the theory has to explain all that in terms of the reality of organisms.
5.1.2 Dynamical Systems Theory as an Integrative Framework In this section, the theory of dynamical systems is presented as an integrative framework to the study of the behavior of organisms. The conception of the organism being best described in dynamical terms existed latent in many classical works ever since the Greek philosophers (especially Democritus)[16]. Phenomenologists departing from the ideas of Husserl and Heiddeger have flirted with the idea, such as in the works of Jonas [10] and Merleau-Ponty [12]. The idea evolved with works that emphasized the organism as a loop in the environment (Funktionskreis - von Uexk¨ull) [17]. Recently, the fertile idea that the brain is best described as a dynamical system has been extensively explored in a number of research areas, such as cognitive development [15], action and perception [7], minimal cognition [3, 4], perception and memory [14], and psychophysics [11], as well as philosophy [8], neuroethology and insect locomotion [5], and even language [6]. Other classical works have more or less implicitly upheld a dynamic conception of intelligence and cognition, despite having espoused apparently incompatible paradigms as artificial intelligence, such as those of Newell [13] and Hofstadter [9]. The prolificacy of the theory of dynamical systems attests to its generality, and the quality of the authors attests to the richness of these ideas. All and more have been both inestimable inspirations and sources for the present contribution, which humbly expects to adjoin such a smart lot in espousing dynamical views to cognition. The emphasis here is on the appearance of invariances at various levels, for which dynamical systems theory is fittingly suited. The theory of behavior of organisms based on a theory of neural dynamics is proposed as a framework that absorbs the results of empirical approaches. The analysis of how invariances are beckoned as dynamical systems underlie functional behaviors, I argue, is the most profitable level of analysis to understand the relations between neural structures and behavioral functions. It is in the language of dynamical systems that we find the common currency of explanation that is able to naturally address a wide range of questions about the behavior of organisms.
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There are good reasons for that. Dynamical systems is applicable to many levels of description, from macroscopic motor behavior, to the activity of networks, to the single neuron, and to behavior on a variety of temporal and spatial scales. Dynamical systems models can be (analytically) coupled, and so made to cover a substantial part of organismic phenomena relating to behavior, from the neuron, through the body, up to the environment as a driving force, closing the loop around the organism. The manner in which dynamical systems overlay phenomena highlights interfaces, loci of level transitions. Moreover, dynamical systems can represent different kinds of variables, and their relations, in a common language. Further, the dynamical systems approach urges us to make explicit assumptions about the constituents of a model. Ultimately, dynamical systems reveals many aspects of the invariants found in brain measurement, such as oscillations, localized activity, timed potentials, synchrony, and spike trains. With these properties as sufficient justification, one may welcome the dynamical systems approach as a powerful paradigm to study the behavior of systems, their dependency, their invariants, and expressions of variation and constancy.
5.1.3 Outline Before moving on to spell out answers, the alphabet of dynamical systems must be introduced. The basic components of a dynamical system – state variables, phase space, rules, and parameters – are introduced in Sect. 5.2.1. Then, I contrive a description of a gesture as coupled dynamical systems, to show how dynamical systems smoothly integrates levels (Sect. 5.3). Within that description, I present an example of how convergence transforms variability into constancy, with a description of the transmission of action potentials at the neuromuscular junction (Sect. 5.4.1). Following that, I present some historical facts leading to the Hodgkin–Huxley model of the action potential (Sect. 6.1.1), and show (1) how a stochastic description of cellular processes may be reduced to a deterministic model according to mild assumptions and (2) how variation of parameters representing ionic exchanges begets categories of action potentials, leading to an important class of explanatory reduction, that of convergence from parameter variation to categories of dynamical behavior (Sect. 6.1.2). Finally, I introduce our network model of choice, the recurrent neural network, in relation to the properties of the model and its assumptions (Sect. 6.3). In Part II, I will continue the exposition within the context of neurodynamics of discrete time recurrent neural networks.
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5.2 Dynamical Systems Vocabulary I have no doubt that a totally reductionistic but incomprehensible explanation of the brain exists; the problem is how to translate it into a language we ourselves can fathom. Douglas Hofstadter, G¨odel, Escher, Bach (p. 714)
5.2.1 Dynamical Systems Basic Terminology The basic components of a dynamical system are state variables, phase space, rules, and parameters.
5.2.1.1 State and State Variables In dynamical systems theory, a dynamical system is a theoretical expression of the fact that, for a given subpart of reality (a system), its tendencies are a function of where the system is, plus how it evolves (its dynamics). This is to say that a subsequent state is causally dependent on the previous state, plus its potentialities (transformation rules). Where the system is invokes the notion of state, and how the system evolves is about rules. According to the 1913 edition of Webster’s Dictionary, “state” is appropriately defined as the “circumstances or condition of a being or thing at any given time.” The definition can be applied ipsis literis when the circumstances and the condition of beings and things can be described through measurable variables. Everything that can be quantified within a given system may become a variable representative of the state. And by extension, every variable that can be quantified is also, in principle, relatable to a certain law, or rule, expressing the connection between state variables at subsequent moments.
State Variables May Take Many Forms State variables may take many forms because a phenomenon can be described from many angles. They may be any, or a combination, of the following: 1. The may be measurable variables from experiment (e.g., membrane potential of a neuron, activation in a brain area). 2. They may be abstract variables, which represent a cluster of variables congregating many events (e.g., the birth rate in a predator–prey model. The birth rate is dependent, presumably, on the reproductive encounters of members, but we subsume this variable under the all-encompassing birth rate).
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3. They may also represent altogether unknown variables, such as a hidden variables, hypothesized to play a role in the phenomenon, despite not being known. 4. They may stand for stochastic variables (e.g., probability of opening of an ion channel, or neutrotransmitter vesicle release). This list is not exhaustive, but gives a flavor. In principle, any dimension is quantifiable, although some dimensions will be more meaningful than others.
State Variables Describing a Phenomenon Give the State a Unique Identity State variables describing a phenomenon give the state a unique identity, at least ideally, so this knowledge permits full reconstruction of a snapshot of the system. Hence, state variables come in two main sorts: continuous, when the variable may take any real value (e.g., space dimensions) and discrete, when the variable takes one of a finite number of values. Furthermore, states may be represented at different levels of abstraction. For example, a stochastic phenomenon may be represented by an abstract state variable, representing many stochastic events. Such is the case with variables representing ion conductivity, which abstracts responses of large numbers of ion channels into membrane conductivity of ions. Similarly, some neural models represent abstractly the activity of a population, often analogized to firing rates. State variables may also represent singular events, as in spiking neural networks, where the event of an action potential is abstracted into a punctual event (the Dirac function). As we see, the choice of state variables is the crux; it determines how the theory views a phenomenon, and what the theory can talk about.
State Variables Are the Nouns of a Dynamical Systems Language Selection, therefore, becomes preponderant. Two aspects should be held in mind. First, that a balance should be kept between the number of variables in a model and the explanatory power they provide. Second, akin to conclusions on empirical assessments (Sect. 3.1), because any answer of a particular model is provided in terms of the state variables, everything beyond them is invisible. An artful selection of state variables is, therefore, central to modeling.
5.2.1.2 Orbits and Phase Space The space formed by state variables is denominated phase space. A combination of state variables describing a system at a certain time is a point in phase space. One may combine different state variables to produce different views of the phase space. One may also define subsets of phase space, which are essentially projections of the whole system, in the subspace of choice.
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If one records how the state variables change in time, or as a function of another variable, one may plot a trajectory representing the sequential history of states of a given system. The sequence of states is called an orbit. In dynamical systems models, the focus is on tendencies of the state variables, so the study of orbits in phase space is a central tool.
5.2.1.3 Rules In observing a phenomenon, we may deduce a rule that embodies relationships between measurables. Likewise, abstracted state variables influence each other, and in that case we design rules that specify how interdependent variables change. So, applying knowledge about how the variables in a system are interrelated,1 we construct a set of rules (or laws) that take a given state into the future. The rules, often equations, governing the course of the system may be (1) deduced via modeling the results of experiment, (2) analytically derived, or (3) a mixture of both. Generally, a system composed of rules operating on states to produce a subsequent state is a dynamical system. Rules may be applied recursively, producing sequences of states, or time courses of variables, called orbits. As with state variables, the rules of a dynamical system also take different forms. They might be modeled by differential or difference equations, finite state automata (rules), or even lattices and actions on partially ordered sets. In all these cases, the primary focus is on the temporal development of the system; how states become sequences. Temporality is inherent in the rules, doing away with the need for extraneous introduction of time.2 Mathematically, a dynamical system is a map, taking a selection of state variables to the subsequent state, according to rules, or equations. If V is a vector of state variables, representing a point in phase space, and F is some function which takes a state to the next state, a dynamical system is represented as such: V W7! F .V /: If the dynamical system has an explicit dependence on time, it is called nonautonomous. Some systems may be rewritten as autonomous by expressing time as a dependent variable: V W7! F .V; t/: In F are represented both the structure of a system and the laws which operate on it. In a mechanical system, for example, F includes the intrinsic properties of masses
1
Causes in a model are abstracted from the phenomenon in a particular level of analysis, and may not reflect the exact interactions of matter, but interesting slices of the phenomenon. 2 This is not inherently the case, for instance, in information theory approaches, nor is it for symbolic computation (good old-fashioned artificial intelligence) approaches.
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and objects (inertia, momentum), their relational properties (how the masses interact, e.g., springs, rigid links), and laws of motion. F operating on a state generates the sequence of states (an orbit). In the particular case of neural network models, F would stand for the structure of the network (connectivity), intrinsic parameters (e.g., recovery variables), and how activity is propagated (e.g., delays, capacitances). Through F the state would be taken into the future. Ideally, F would include all the factors necessary to unambiguously calculate the subsequent state (this ideal leads to complications that may lead to analytical intractability, though).
5.2.1.4 Parameters So, in a dynamical systems model, knowledge about the phenomenon enters in three forms: state variables, laws (rules, equations), and the yet the unmentioned, parameters. In a dynamical system, parameters represent something about the structure of the system. They may fall into one or more of the following categories: Material. They describe intrinsic properties of matter of the system, such as physical and biophysical properties (e.g., conductance, capacitance, rigidity) or biochemical properties (e.g., rate of reaction). Structural. They reflect some structural characteristics of the system, such as how components are interrelated. Structural parameters may result from the ways in which two systems couple and interact, so the system has an influence on the parameters, but on a slower timescale (e.g., the efficacy of a synapse, or inputs to a coupled system). Independent. They reflect factors extrinsic to the system, such as environmental variables (e.g., light, wind, temperature), which may input to the system. Strictly speaking, they are things that the system is influenced by, but has little influence on, i.e., to which it is loosely coupled. Amalgamated. They may represent amalgamated dependencies, which are assumed to act in combination. In this case, parameters are abstract. In a predator–prey model (an ecological model of species interdependence), there is a parameter representing death rate, agglomerating knowledge about, e.g., longevity or vulnerability. Also, the more abstract neuronal models become, the more their parameters belong to this category (not exclusively). In neuronal models, “synaptic efficacies” often fall into this category. In dynamical systems models it is often assumed that the timescale of change to a parameter is slower than that of the state variables. This is due primarily to analytical reasons (if parameters change as fast as state variables, they are state variables). Parameters are assumed to describe slower properties of a phenomenon, so the change of parameters has no bearing on the short-term dynamics. Consider, for example, the flow of water from a faucet. Irrespective of whether the gauge is being opened or closed (and the cross section through which the water flows increases or decreases), the immediate flow is dependent only on the section area opened. The state variable
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“flow” is dependent on the parameter “gauge section,” but not on “rate of change of gauge section,” a slow change of parameters. Similarly, the immediate ion flow through a membrane is dependent on the immediate number of opened and closed channels, but not on whether they are closing or opening. The proportion of channels is a parameter, the ion flow is the state variable.
Parameters in Networks In a network model, parameters may be the synaptic strengths between neurons, axonal delays, and neurotransmitter production and release. Parameters may be the sensory input if the dynamics of the network is much faster than that of the input. In this case, parameters may result from coupling with an environment, or a secondary system. Admittedly, parameters as slow-changing variables is a somewhat fuzzy description, and in fact much depends on the definition of what are the parameters and what are the state variables. The issue is, of course, the rate of change. I will come back to this later, for now it suffices to say that what moves fast is a variable and what moves slowly or does not move is a parameter.
A Choice of Rules, Variables, and Parameters Instantiates One Dynamical System The parameters themselves, however, are not produced by the model. Parameters are chosen to define a particular system from a set, or to study the space of possible systems (in changing some parameters while keeping others constant. This is denominated “parameter space analysis.”). With parameter space analysis one may look at the impact of different parameters (and their combination) on the behavior of the dynamical system.3
5.2.2 Coupled Dynamical Systems and Interfaces With the necessary terminology we now provide a description of how dynamical systems overlays multiple levels of organismic phenomena. The scope of the
3
One word about the role of parameters in a dynamical systems model. An often-voiced criticism has been that “given enough parameters, a model dances and sings (does anything).” Or “give me enough variables and I will create a green elephant”; the humorous comment is only appropriate on occasion, most often when directed towards models fitting curves. But in the case of dynamical systems, it is misapplied, a gross canard. For parameters in dynamical systems are very informative indeed. For one thing, they have the power of talking back to the phenomenon, contingent on the level of detail of the model. When a set of parameters that causes a certain model to behave as expected is found, it also says more about the phenomenon itself. Furthermore, qualitative analysis of dynamics based on parameter sets, as we will see in Sect. 6.1.2, informs about a wide breadth of dynamical behavior.
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dynamical systems perspective appears as one connects phenomena at different levels of magnification, both spatial and temporal. Dynamical systems are unique in that they may compose a holistic framework in what may be called coupled dynamical systems, in which the outcomes of one dynamical system produce what another takes in, thereby connecting levels of explanation. An example of this is given in the next section, spelling out some of the implications of level crossing (more general considerations are found in the addendum at the end of Chap. 6). In Sect. 5.4, I describe an example of coupled dynamical systems – the action potential transmission at the neuromuscular junction – highlighting the kinds of reductions dynamical systems modeling incurs. This section has the objective of showing constancy from variability in aliasing inertial effects in motor actions. Using the conclusions of the section concerning modeling as a hook, I will subsequently present different dynamical systems models of neurons and networks, according to an increasing level of abstraction, from the Hodgkin–Huxley model to recurrent neural networks.
5.3 A Motor Act, as Coupled Dynamical Systems The essential service of muscle to life is, quickly and reversibly, to shorten so as to pull. its shortening is called “contraction”. The importance of muscular contraction to us can be stated by saying that all man can do is to move things, and this muscular contraction is his sole means thereto. Charles Sherrington, The Man on His Nature
In a Descartian universe, one could define an organism by all its atoms and their interactions, and, in principle, simulate all of what the organism will do. It does not appear very likely though that this level of accuracy in description will be explanatory or will be ever reached. What we may do instead is to outline a subset of the observed phenomenon in some meaningful, albeit simplified, subparts more amenable to description and analysis. A gesture may be described as a collection of coupled dynamical systems,after a selection of a number of interrelated levels of analysis and the abduction4 of their respective variables. The idea is that coupled dynamical systems may constitute a whole picture of the system, where the outputs of one level are coupled to inputs of the other. Concisely, one level interfaces the next. Dynamical systems are coupled where separable levels of explanation and description are presumed. The action of selection of a certain level with its associated variables and rules, as in any exercise of modeling, implies sacrificing and eclipsing variables at levels
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Abduction is the process of selection of sorts (state variables, parameters, rules) of a phenomenon to construct a model.
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above and below. This is equivalent to adopting a certain magnification factor in a microscope, in which selecting any one factor causes the others to go out of focus or out of sight. Despite much philosophy of science, skeptical of the generality of conclusions because of this necessary neglect, one needs not to have compunctions about the abduction act. For although the conjugated levels above and below might have disappeared from sight, they must not have faded from memory. In the process of amplifying the resolution, one encounters first skin, then cell, then membrane, and then molecules, but knows, through the very process of magnification, that these structures are aspects of the same thing. Coupled dynamical systems for the explanation of organisms should be regarded in a similar manner, as integral parts of the same phenomenon, which are differentially magnified to highlight processes at different levels. It is therefore possible to describe organisms (if not experimentally) at least analytically as a set of coupled dynamical systems. Let us consider one such contraption, of the organism as coupled dynamical systems, in terms of control. To be more specific, let us describe the production of some limb motion in terms of coupled dynamical systems. Even simple motions as hand waving exhibit the fractal complexity of biology. A description of a gesture may then arbitrarily start at the body level, with the mechanics of the body and its physical constants. The arms masses and skeletal constraints are internal, and are subject to the external influences of gravity, temperature, etc. We may choose as state variables the angles at the joints, the distribution of mass of the body, and the forces applied to the muscles. External variables are made parameters, assumed constant with respect to our level of explanation, of a short time window. Then, the postures of the body result from forces operating on the muscles, constrained by the neuromuscular constitution. With that, it becomes possible to define a dynamical system that will allow prediction about the immediate future of posture, contingent on a theory of the generation of muscle force.5 So we depart to the next level, which regulates the forces applied in the muscles. The level responsible for the generation of muscle force is both faster and smaller than that of the muscle–skeletal constraints of the mechanical level. That is, the level of coalitions of muscle cells forming muscle fibers.6 Combined contraction of a large number of individual muscle cells generates muscle force. A muscle cell can be described as a dynamical system, and at this level an arm motion involves groups of cells, muscle fibers, whose contraction force at a given time is a function of a number of variables, including the cell skeleton, length of the cell, its elastic properties, its modulatory influences, and preponderantly, the number of action potentials landing on the cell. These properties become 5
We know of other contributions to the muscle forces, such as bodily factors (e.g., dopamine controls muscle tonicity), whose influence may be modeled as modulatory. These factors can be modeled as parameters which may interface levels. For example, dopamine modulation of the force on a muscle may be modeled as a scaling factor of muscle-cell contraction. 6 This level is not satisfactory for longer intervals, for the forces on the muscles are changing nonlinearly with a number of extra factors, such as neurotransmitters, and energy sources to the contracting cells.
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variables and parameters and rules of a dynamical system. In a coupled dynamical system, outcomes of this level propagate to the skeletal level, where the actions of individual muscle fibers will cause motion. The skeletal level (and other mechanical constraints) do their own sort of computing, an embodied computing. The neurons that project to and from muscle cells, motor neurons and proprioceptors, integrate the neural and the motor level in a closed system. In mammals, further simplification is possible, since a motor neuron innervates only one muscle fiber (except during development!). The motor neurons go up the spinal chord and eventually reach higher networks in the cortex and cerebellum, forging networks of interconnections at synaptic terminals. The neurons composing these networks admit a description as dynamical systems both at the individual and at the network level. At this stage, the model will describe variables as the activity of the networks of neurons, and would be parameterized by its connectivity, and by the inputs from the body, called proprioceptive. The inputs are transduced information about joint angles, and velocities. With this step, we realize a reentrant circle. Information about joint angles reenters, as transduced information, and we find that there is a dependency on what the network will tell the muscle to do and on what it is already doing. Higher networks integrate information about the current posture with the permanently ongoing activity. Coupling neurons as dynamical systems with the networks as dynamical systems and with the muscles as dynamical systems integrates the whole (see Fig. 5.1). The production of a gesture is thereby covered, because each of these stages may be
A Motor Act Crosses Levels Neuron Properties
Skeletal constraints Body Posture
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A depiction of how dynamical systems may be coupled, and how vairables of one level are difined by the neighboring levels. Represent parametrized dependencies between coupled levels. Rectangles represents a chain of levels that is recurrent. i just identify two reentrances, which are based on my particular choice of selection. Other models may add different variables as well as change the interfaces.
Fig. 5.1 The levels of a gesture as coupled dynamical systems
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parameterized at the interfaces of neighboring systems. The importance of these interfaces cannot be overstressed. Not only because they provide boundary conditions for the neighboring levels, where one level constrains the other, but also because a complete cycle is closed, from cells through the body, to the environment, and back. This circularity is a strength, not a fault, for it remains true to the cyclic character of the phenomenon itself. Noticeably, the exercise of modeling and outlining subsystems unavoidably commits one to selection of what are variables, what are parameters, what are state variables, and what is to be neglected. Indeed, one of the great strengths of the method is that it compels one to make assumptions explicit, also about exclusions. On these two pillars, mindful selection and explicit assumptions, lies the ability of dynamical systems modeling. “The art of good theory is to select the variables that really matter”, as Arbib (p. 58 in [2]) put it. The idea is to select those variables that are explanatory about the phenomenon, with the least overhead. Doing this to coupled levels, one may study the individual dynamical systems representing slices of the phenomenon, preemptively knowing how to reintegrate them.
5.3.1 Integrating Levels To integrate sets of neighboring levels becomes crucial for any theory of organismic function, since an organism is best described as a collection of interdependent levels. In the study of behavior, three levels are preponderant: the body, the world, and the brain. Similarly, to study organismic function, all the dynamics are important, the world’s, the body’s and the neural structures’. So, any theory that addresses problems of the organism has to cope with at least all three. I described roughly how dynamical systems theory handles coupled levels when describing one small aspect of the motor system. The following becomes apparent: Selection of levels and modeling. The exercise of modeling
coupled dynamical systems is an observer-based selection of levels, and functions associated with those levels. – No single-level description can account for all behavioral phenomena. – Levels can cross scales in time and in space. – When levels are coupled, they also constrain each other. Interfaces provide boundary conditions. – Levels may be tightly coupled or loosely coupled. – In interfaces, reentrant information is transduced. Embodied computation. Some computation is done by the me-
chanical properties of the body.
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The organism as a system is across scales and levels. It exists as a whole from atoms, to cells, to the body. By slicing the phenomenon and creating interfaces, it may appear that this fact has been neglected. But paradoxically, the assumption of interrelated levels of description brings about a stance of independence. Different levels can be analyzed individually, and reintegrated through the interfaces priorly defined,7 obeying the constraints imposed by the neighboring levels. It is perhaps ironic that it is through selection of levels that a more holistic understanding is achieved.
5.4 Convergence in the Neuromuscular Junction The following sections presenting a description of how motor commands are conveyed is primarily based on a critical reading of [1]. Here I frame the biology of neuromuscular junctions as a dynamical process that is maybe deterministic at their origin, but owing to large numbers invokes stochastic descriptions. The example will show two instances of how variabilities coalesce into meaningful averages. First, variation in ion channels can be reduced to dynamics of membrane potential; then, individual spike trains antialias into firing rates, in the loose coupling between spiking neurons and inertial, elastic, muscles, producing contraction forces. These two are modeling reductions that follow level crossings in reality, which massively reduces the dimensionality of neural problems. To show these points, I will rely on another example, which will compose a conflating picture with the ones before: the description of transmission of an action potential at a neuromuscular junction as a process with myriad stochastic processes that may be modeled deterministically. It is Part II that I will show how these points conflate, within the paradigm of evolutionary robotics research, combined with neurodynamics, where we will model the origins of invariance.
5.4.1 Convergent Level Crossing 5.4.1.1 Stochasticity and Determinism Lead to a Many-to-One Mapping Between Neural Activity and Motor Action What follows is a description of our current knowledge of the neuroscience of the synaptic transmission, from the motor neurons to muscle cells, at the neuromuscular 7
The experiments to come will draw heavily on the idea of coupled dynamics, and therefore I went to lengths to devise how to cover a natural system with coupled dynamical systems. The description was purely conceptual, but it is essentially the same kind of abstraction we employ when building models of behavior. Conclusions about the role and the forms of exchanges at interfaces is where much headway can be made in understanding the interplay between constancy and variability.
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junction. The transmission is the result of a complex sequence of physiochemical events, very often based on probabilistic descriptions, accounting for the untraceable variability of nanoscopic events. The events leading to transmission of the activating potential, which is mediated by the neurotransmitter acetylcholine, are thought to happen roughly as follows. On the presynaptic side the arrival of the action potential in the synaptic terminals of the motor neuron (step 1) creates electrotonic differences at the cell membrane (step 2), which causes the calcium channels to open (step 3), allowing inward flow of positive calcium ions from the interstitial medium to the cytoplasm (step 4), which starts a cascade of proteic bindings (secondary cascade) (step 5), subsequently releasing vesicles of acetylcholine (that had been produced intracellularly) in the synaptic cleft (the space between neuron and motor cell) (step 6). On the postsynaptic side, the process resumes with the uptake of the vesicles containing acetylcholine (step 7), which bind to receptors at the membrane’s sodium and potassium channels (step 8), promoting the active exchange of ions, (NaC in, KC out) (step 9), (10) leading to a postsynaptic potential (step 10), which spreads internally in the cell and the transverse tubules (step 11), causing the release of calcium ions from the sarcoplasmic reticulum (step 12), which finally initiates the mechanical process of contraction of the transverse tubules (step 13), where energy is used, mostly in the form of conversion of ATP to ADP. In all these steps we find a stochastic description of a large number of interactions that generates a mean, with a dynamical time course. They are not individually retrievable. We are unable to follow a single neurotransmitter vesicle as it crosses the synaptic cleft, or the precise numbers of vesicles taken up (at steps 6 and 7). We cannot precisely determine when an individual ion channel undergoes structural conformations (or what kind of conformation), or binding events (at steps 3, 5, 8, and 12). We cannot retrieve the nanoscopic-nanosecond pattern of electrotonic potentials around the membrane, or the exact number of exchanged ions (at steps 4, 9, and 11). But although we have a mass of unknowns, we can make claims about the reality of the minute individual interactions. The operating principles are the rates of molecular diffusion, the density and response of receptors, the density of released vesicles, and so on, all of which, owing to the coupling that ensues from those processes, may also produce a statistical theory of the tendencies of the averages representing the processes. And ultimately they may be introduced in a model that will exhibit similar qualitative dynamics, despite being agnostic about the individual formative processes (e.g., ion diffusion, protein conformation). Deep down reality exists, but at this level the model is independent of it.
5.4.1.2 Convergence at the Muscle Fiber An understanding of convergences and divergences in level crossing leads to a comprehension of the dynamics of neural commands. As an example, I describe macroscopic muscle contraction from the perspective of an incoming spike train. The simple but crucial point is that there are many different spike trains that will produce indistinguishable contractions. This is due to an aliasing effect that smoothens
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high frequencies as they divergently impact on the muscle. This effect implies a broad class of spike trains that, from a functional perspective, are equivalent. We start with the arrival of an action potential from a motor neuron to a muscle fiber. Because of a dendritic arbor coming onto muscle fibers, motor neurons discharge on many muscle cells, on many synaptic terminals simultaneously, in a divergent manner. In mammals it is the rule that one muscle fiber is innervated by only one muscle fiber (but a motor neuron innervates many fibers). The total contraction force of the muscle fiber is a function of the number of muscle cells that respond to the arriving action potentials by depolarization (discharge as described in the previous section). How and how many cells are going to respond at any given arrival is dependent on the state of the receiving muscle cells. For instance, some cells may be refractory from former discharges, whereas