Iraq: Sanctions And Beyond (Csis Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment)

Iraq

CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment

Sanctions and Beyond

Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim

All rights resenred. Printed in the United States of America, No part of this ptrbitication may be reprt.rduced or transmined in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, il-rcludingphotocopy, recording, or any il-rfc3rmationstorage and retrieval system, without permission in w r i t i ~ ~from g tlne publisher. Crjpyright 8 19547 by Anthony E-I. Cordc?smm hblislned in 1997 in the United States of girnerica bp West-iiiew Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westvim Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Iraq : sanctions and beyond /' Anthony W. Cordesman and Ahrned S. Hashim.

p. m. Indudes bibliographical referents (p. ). ISBN 0-823S32354 (hc). .--- ISBN 0-8133-323-2.(pbk.) I. Iraq-Poli tics and government-l 979- 2. Iraq-Foreign relations-1979l. Hasl~irn,AhmedS. Il, Title, W79,T.C67 1997 956,7043+1~20

96-46046 CTP

This book was tgPpaet by L&ra Libre, 1705 Fourteentln Street, Suite 391, Etot~lder,Colorado 80304. The paper used in this publication meets the reqrrirernenb of the American National Standard far Permanence of Paper for Printed Librar~~ Materials Z39.48-19M.

Contents List of T~blesand I1Zzastratio)ts Acbzowledpen bs 1

Introduction The Policy Options for f)@alingwith Iraq, 1 Key Policy Contlplic"~ions in Dealing with Iraq, 3 A. Lack of Present and Future Consensus, 5 Poliey and She Role of Analpis, 6

2

Internal Political Developments Since the G d f W%r Internal Political Developments Since the Gulf War, 8 The Informal m d Formal Basis sf Iraq's Power Structure, 10

3

The Infomal Politics of the ""Center" Sunni Popular Opinim m d the "Center'" Immediatelly After the GulS War, 12 Sunni Popular Opinion and the "Center" Shce the Gulf War, 13 Growing Alienation and the Death of "Reform," 16 Problems with the Key Clans, 19 Problems in Saddam" Family m d Coterie, 21 Current Trends in fraq's fnformal Power 5 t r u c t . u ~31~ Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 33

4

The h m a l PoZilics of Iraq's Xnskuments of State Power The Revolutionary Command CounciL 36 The Bdath Pafty, 37 ent Leadership, 412 The Cabillet and Gove Financial Resources, 42 The Security Structure, 44

The Iraqi Armed Farces, 49 The "Old Boy" Nehniork and the Interaction Between Ii-tformaland Formal Ii~stmmentsof Power, 57 Implica.t.ionsfor Western and SouChern GLtlf Strategy, 58 5

The "Periphery":Opposition Movements and

Ethnic and Sectahan Issues An ""Artificial" "ate, 59 I'he Politics of Conspiracy and Violence, 60 @position Parties, 63 Iraq's Crisis with the Kurds, 70 The Role of the Kurds in a "Centristf' or ""Peripheral" "rategy; 95 Iraq%CCsis with Its ShYites, 97 Impliations for Western a d Southern Gulf Strategy, 109 6

The ""Periphery": Political Alienation and Abuses of Human Rights Killings and Torture, 111 P1-isons and the Legal System, 118 Freedom of Speech and Politicd Dissent, 120 Realmefit of Minorities and Foreigners, 121 ImpIications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 122

'7

Sanctions and Economic Instability The Iraqi E c m m y Refore the GuXf War, 127 I'he Iraqi Economy After the GulE War, 1% UN Smctians m d the Policies of the Iraqi Governmnt, 137 I'he Iraqi Government's Refusal of Relief from UN Smdians, 147 Accepting UN Security Council Resolution 986,150 I'he Future Political Impact of Sanctions, 153 Debt and Reparations hfter the Gulf War, 156 ImpIications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy, 158

8

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities Iraq" Strategic Oil and Gas Potential, 161 Iraqi Oil Production Befnre the Gulf War, 163 Oil Production Efforts Since the Gulf War, 170

Iraqi Refirrhg m d Petrochemical.Capability; 173 Production and Development Prospects a c e Sanctions Are Lifted or Relaxed, 174 Natural Gas, 176 Implia"tions for Western a d Southern Gulf Strategy, 177 9

External Relations Iraq's Foreig~~ Policy Shce the Gulf War, 182 The Continuing mreat to Kuwait., 184 Relations with Irm, 189 Iraqi Support of the People's Mujahilieen, 193 Relations with Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, 193 Iraq, Egypt, and Other Arab States, 2110 Iraq and the Gulf States, 201 Iraq and the International C~mmuniQ,204 Implications for VVestem and Southern Gulf Strategy, 203

10 hailitay Developments

Iraqi Military Expmditures, 218 Iraqi Arms Imports, 224 Iraqi Efforts to Smug* Arms and Parts and Rebraild Its Iraqi Military hdustries Since the Gulf Was, 226 ImpIications for VVrestem and South= Gulf Strategy, 232 11 The Threat gram Iraqi Land Forces

The Impact of the ClJlf Was on Che lraqi Army 233 The Iraqi Army in 1996,236 I'he Republican Guards, 237 Deployments Against the Kurds, 238 Deployments Against the Shi"ites, 239 Land Force Equipment f l o l h g s , 240 Land Force Readi~~ess and Warfighting Effectiveness, 258 ImpIicatims for VVestem and Southern Gulf Strategy, 262 12 The Threat gram Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces

I'he Cost of the Gulf Lliar to the lraqi Air Force, 263 Currmt f i r Force Equipment Holdings, 265 Air Readiness and Warfighting Capabilities, 271 Land-Based Air Defenses, 274

Idand-BasedAir Defense Readiness and Warfighthg Cqability, 2277 Implica.t.ionsfor Western and SouChcrn GLtlf Strategy, 280 13 The Threat from Iraqi Naval Forces

Surviving Combat Ships, 281 Naval Readiness and Warfighting Capability 285 Implications for VVestem and Southem Gulf Strategy, 285 14 Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism

Recent Iraqi Terrorist Activity; 286 Attempti;ng to Assasshiate President Bush, 287 Otber Recmt lraqi Acts of Rrrorism, 288 Implica.t.ionsfor Mrttstern and SouChern GLtlf Strategy, 289 15 The Threat from Iraqi Weapons of Mass Bestmction

I'he Struggle to Elimimate Iraq's Weapo~~s of Mass Destruction, 298 Iraq" Future Missile Capabilities, 306 Iraq's Future Cl~emicalWeapons Capabilities, 314 Iraq's Future Biological Weapons Capabilities, 318 Iraq" Future Nuclear Capability 333 Impliations for Western a d Southern Gulf Strategy, 335 16 The Problem of Policy: Beyond Sanctions and "Dual Containment"

I'he Case for Continuing Military Containment, 34.5 Prospects for Political Change, 350 Iran and Trq: The :Risk of a "Devil%Bargain," 35356 I'he Problem af Smc.tions, 357

Sources a d Methods Notes Abo~sisfke Book and Authors

Tables and Illustrations

a e : Comparative Oil Reserves and Production Levels of t-he Gulf States Two: Gulf and World Gas Reserves and Production 'Three: Gulf Military Farces in I996 Four: The :Iran-Iraq Military Balance: 3967-1995 Five: : l r 4 Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers by Major Supplier: 1%>1996 Six: The Impact of Coalitinn f i r and Land Forces on Iraqi Equipment S t ~ n g t h in fie Kwaiti I'heater of qerations (KTO) at the of the Cease-Fire Seven: Eraqi Air Strength in Desert Storm/ Iraqi Combat Aircraft L,asses in Desert Storm Eight: Advmced Combat Aircraft by Type in Gulf Forces Nine: Gulf Land-Based Air Defense Systems Ten: Iraqi, Iranian, and Israeli Weapons of Mass Destsuctio~~ Eleven: Major Chemical Agents That May Re in Iranian and fraqi Forces Twelve: Typical Warfighting Uses of Chernfcal Weapons Thirteen: Key Biological LZleapons That May Be in fie Middle East Fourteen: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Weapons of Mass Uestntctim Fifteen: The Comparatiw Effects of Biological, Chemical, and :Nlaclear Weapons De1ivert.d Against a l'ypical Urban Target in the Middle East

Che: Iraqi GDC Population Growth h Millio~~s md Per Capita Income in Constant 1.987US Dollars

X

Tables and Dlustmtions

Two: Iraqi Population Growth in Millio~~s and Per Capita Income inConstant P987 US Dollars 'Three: Iraqi Oil m d Total Exports Versus Total Imports h Millions of Current US DoIlatrs Four: Iraqi Debt During 1982-1993 in Millions of Current US Dollars Five: Estimated Trends in the Iraqi Population During 1940--2035 Six: Total Oit Reserves of the Gulf States Seven: Iraqi Oil and Natural Gas Liquids Total Production and Exports Eight: Iraqi Oit Exports Nine: Total Gas Reserves sf the Gulf States Telz: Iraqi Natural Gas Production Eleven: Iraq: Military Manning-1979-1996 Twelve: Total Active Military Manpower in A11 Gulf Forces Thirteen: Major Measures of Combat Equipment Strength-l996 Fourteen: Comparative Military Spending of the Major GLIlf Powers Fifteen: Iraqi Centrai Government Expenditums, Military Expenditures, Total Exports, and Arms Import Deliveries: 1983--1993 Skixteen: Iraqi GNP Per Capita Versus Military Expenditutrcs Per Capita Seventeen: Comparative Arms h p o r t Deliveries sf the Major Gulf Powers: 1983-1993 Eighteen: Iraqi Arms Sales Agrttements by Supplier Country: 19117-19% Nbeteerr: Iraq: Armored Weapons Strength-1979-15396 Twenty: fraq: Artillery Weapons Strength-198&1996 Twenty-me: Total Gulf Military Mmpower by Service-1996 Twenty-Two: %tal Active Militar). Manpower in Gulf Armies in P996 Twenty-'Three: Total Gulf @erational Armored Fie;hthg Vehicle+1996 Twenty-Four: Total Operational Tmks hAll Gulf Forces, 1990-1995

Tables n ~ Ilr'zrstrntions d

Twenty-Five: Gulf Tanks in 1996 Twenty-Six: Gulf Modern Tmks in 1996 Twenty-Svezz: Total C>peratio~zal Other Armored khicles (Lt. Tanks, Scout, Alms, APCs, Recce) in Gulf Forces, 199&1995 Twenty-Eight: Tcrtal Gulf Othcr Armortld Fighting Vehicles (0AFVs)-1996 Twenty-Nbe: Gulf Armored Xnf antry Fighthg Vehicles, Reconnaissance Vehicles, Scout Vehicles, and Light Tmks in 1996 mirty: Armored Perso~znelCarriers (APCs) h Gulf Armies-1996 mirty-One: Total Operational Self-Propefled and %wed Tube Artillery and Multiple Racket Lawzchers in Gulf Forces, 1990-1995 mirty-Two: Total Operationat Gulf Artillery Weapons-l996 Thirty-1Phree: Gulf M e Artillcry Weapons in 1996 mirty-Four: Total Operational Gulf Multiple Racket Lawzchers-1996 mirty-Five: :Iraq: Fixed M(ing and W a r y M(ing Combat Air Strezzgth-1979-1996 mirty-Six: Gulf Combat Aisrcraft in 1 9 6 mirty-Seven: High Quality GulE Combat Ajrclsaft by Typ mirty-Eight: Gulf Attack Helicopters mirty-Nbe: Gulf Naval Ships by Category in 1996

Maps a e : Iraq

Two: Iraqi Oil Producrion Before the Gulf War Three: The Range of Iraq"s Missile E)evelopments at the Time sf h e Gulf War Four: 'The Location of Iraq's iZ,argestNuclear, Chemical., Biological, and Missile Facilities at the T h e sf the Gulf War

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Acknowledgments This volume is part cJf a six-volume series ~ p o r t i n gon a cltynamic net assessmnt of thc Gulf, The project was crmcehed bp David A b s h j ~ and :Richasd. Faiibanks of the Cmtes for Strategic and htemationa1 Studies and is part of a broader dynamic net assessment of the entire Middle East. The aut.lnars would like to thmk Kimberly Gaddes m d Kyalan Batmanglidj for their =search and e d i k g help h writhg this series, m d ?%tomasSeidmstein and David H a y a r d for helpint; to edit each votume. Many US and intemtimal andysts and agencies played a role in commenting on drafis of the mmuscript. So did. experts in each Southern Gulf country. 7'he authors cannot acknowledge these contrrihutions by name or agencly;but they are deeply grateful. The authors w u l d also tike to thank their collleagues at the CSlS who revicwed various manuscripts and commented on t"ne analysis. These colleagues include &chard Fairbanks, Arnaud de Rorchgrave, and CO-Directorof the Middle East Program Judith Kipper.

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Iraq

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Introduction Iraq's c u r r e ~regime ~t presents unambiguous security threats to the other states of the Gulf and to the West, While Iran" regime may offer some hope for clrnstntctive engagement, fray is virkally certai~nto be a revanchist and aggressive state as long as S a d d m Mussein is inpower, ",m if Saddam and his coterie shodd fall from power, their immediate successor will most likely cmsist of anothrr 5unni authoritarian elite, made up of other rnelnbers of the Ba"ath party, sselnior xnilitary officers, or a combination of both. It may well be a decade before any pditicat transformation occurs in Iraq that produces a stable, moderate goverment. In the interim, Iraq may go through several short-llived regimes and. even civil war. Its poiitics are likely to remain the politics of violence, many of its ft~tllreleaders are likely to seek revenge for the Gulf War and its aftermath, and its political elites are likely to reassert Tray" ss@archfor kgemcrny in the Gulf and seek to become thc. leading regional military power. This does not mean that Iraq cannot change, and should not be encouraged to change. It does not mean that sanctims and isdation are the only way of dealing with Iraq, or that Iraq's people should be p m ished indefinitely for the actions of its leaders, It does m a n , however, that the Gulf and t-he West must be realistic in shaping their policy towards Iraq, and must have a realistic understanding of its cllrrent regime and militafy potential.

The Policy Options for Dealing with Iraq 'The West and the other states inthe Cuff:must find ways to five with Iraq, seek to moderate the conduct of its regime, and crclate a climate for positive political ckange. The basic issue for policy is how tbis can hest be done. are several major p&cy options that the West, other C;ul,f states, a d other nations can pursue:

Lifting political and eco~~omic smctions under conditions that leave Saddam Mussein and the Bakath elite in power, and which effectively recognize that Iraq will not fully comply with the terms of the UN cease-fire, * Continuing the present UN sanctions that isdate Tray politically and cripple its economy, in order to force Saddam Iltxssein from power and to csrr;at-ea successor regi.me that will be less aggresshe and willing to trade changes in the regime" bEaehavior for a lifiing of sanctions; Lifting all or most political and ecmornic smctions in return for a large degree of Iraqi compliance with the terms of the UN cease-fire, reviring full Iraqi compliance in pmviding reparations and the recognition by Iraq of its new borders wiCh a sovereig~?Kuwait, but leaving Saddam Hussein and the present regime in power; * A step-by-step lifting of potitical and economic sanctions under condjtims wbieh trade spedfic changes in the conduct of Iraq's regime for each step in reducing the present smctions, while leaving Sadd m Hlasseh and the present Bafathand military elite in power; Seeking to create an alternative "centrist'begime that is still based on the Ba%th, Smni elites, andlor the military, but drives Saddam Husseh and his coterie from power by maintaining a mix of sanctions, using other economic and political pressures, usjing covert action, and prrsuadlng nei@boring states like Turkey and Jordan to support such a ""peripheral strategyf'; Aclopthg a "peripheral" stratew that connbines sanctions \zritb covert action, which attempts to mobilize the Kuds and SWites agalnst the central regime, and which seeks to persuade neighboring states liko Turkey m d Jordan to s ~ ~ p p osuch r t a ""peripheral strategyf'm d ; * :Pursuing an individual national policy towads Iraq that seelcs to maximize politricaf and/or trade benefits in etealb7g with Iraq, regardless of the character of its rclgirnc and its cor~ducttowards other states, The UN is stiifl committed to a policy of sanctions, but it is clear that &ere no longer is such a degree of internatimd uni.ty in pursuhg this pdicy. Some states-such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britah m d the U S continue to favm a had-Iirte approach because they believe it is impossible to deal with Saddarn Hussein's regime. Even Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, however, did not fully support the US during the k r dish crisis of August-Sptemher, 1986. * Other states, including major outside powers like France and Russid, believe that smctions now harm Iraq's people without ofterkg any

guarantee of changes in its hadership or the character of its regjn?e. They are more concerned with debt repayment and resuming trade, arms sales, and other ecommic relaticms &an with cmtaining and deposing Saddam Mussein. * Other naticlns support the conta t of Iraq's mititav build.-up but oppose continuing with sanc~ansthat cause massi\re hardship for Iraq's people and block oil exports, other tradc, and invesment. These states include many Arab, European, and Asian states friendly to the US, as well as ffiendly Gulf states like %m, Qatar, and.the UAE. 'There arc also a number of developing states which believe that the UN resolutions now take t h form of an oppressive or "neo-imperialistf"terference in the national affairs of Iraq. Still other states pursue a policy of covert opportunism, layjng the ground work for future economic tics and m s sales to Iraq. These divisions within the international community create growhg uncertainties as to whether a policy or strategy that relies on sanctions can be successful, IR spite of cclntinuillg discoveries that Iraq has lied to the UN about its holdhgs of weapons of mass destrudion, a combination of legitimate humanitarian concerns and Iraq" soil wealth and economic potential make it doubtful that a sanctions policy can remain in force for more than a few more years. One can never u~~derestimate Saddam Hussein" unique ability to alienate world opinion, but policy must begin to look at other options, including how to live with : l r q m different terms.

Key Policy Gompficatians in Dealing with Iraq

Filldlng such a new strategy for dealing with Iraq will not be easy. There is no que"ticm that Saddam Hussein and the present Iraqi regime are repressive and represe~~t a serious threat to regional peace. At the same t h e , there arc a number of other variables that m s t be considered in trying to shape such a policy towards Iraq, m d in developing a consistmt and hvorkable po:[icy approa,ch to deal with the Iraqi regime:

* T72e Iztcmnitarialz isszle is u e real, ~ ulzd mises gr-onring qzliestitms about honr nrzach an cnbirc. ~llltionCIXEhe pzal~ishifdforihe u c f h of an uuftlorifnriialz elite. Imy is a nation of over 20 rnilljon people, with a high birth rate, and a populatim that is two-thirds non-Sunni hrab. 'like UN sanctims have begun to inflict so much hardship on Iraq's peoplc that t h y thmaten widespread mahutrition. Most of the costs of these sanctions are being paid for by Iraqis who am victims of Iraq's authoritarian leadership.1

Tlie G u y and the West nrzast live zoilh the fraq fhuf CIN sanctions arri c%ating. The suffering caused by UN sanctions is creating broad Iraqi

resentment of the US, Kuwait, and Saudi Arhia-who are now seen as largely responsible for the continued, enforcement of sanctions, The rclsulting revanchism may well survive Saddam Hussein, and codd play an important role inshaping Iraqi politics and actiom for several decades. * The ferrr-lsof the ceasefire nccods cull for massive Iraqi repamtiolzs and afer no dear p t h to stabk peacefial rcllat-iclns, Coupled to the irrtpact of sanctions over the half-decade shce the cease-fire, a literal enforcement of curselrt rclparations agreements is certain to increase Iraqi revmchism, just as the "manomic consepences of the peacef9dlowing World War 1helped create the extremism that destroyed the Weimar Republic and.brought the Nazis to power. Thenr art. rprany mll-edzclcatd l r ~ ~mclderatrr d Iraqis, hut thercr is no nri.uFTitze&l nrclderatrr polificul opposition with any popzrlar sta~tdilzg.Iraq has long been an authoritarian state ruled by small, violent, mthless facticrns within its Sunni minority It has no tradition of legitknate representative government, or of providing representation that reflects the e h i c and sectarian differences hvithin its pop"Satim. Furtber, Saddarn's alliance with the Kurdi,sh Democmtic Party in, September 1996 allowed him to drive most of Iraq%sweak opposition elements out of the Kurdish exclusion zone in NorUlern Iraq, It is easy to talk in vague terms about the emergence of a mre representative regirne, but there is no real political base b r such change.. * Iraq is a deeply divided flatio~zthat.could be torn ayart by ciuil tuar, Recmt CIA estimates hdicate that 6M8% of Iraq" population is nonSumi (6045% Shi'ite) and that 20-25'Y0 are non-Arab (15-20°h KurdisW.2 These sectarian and etlnnic divisions withh Iraq have already created a separate Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq and a civil war between the Kurdish factims in tbis entity 'They have led to civil war between the Iraqi regime and some of its Sl1ifites.Any policy towards Iraq must deal with the Kurdish question, and the risk of Shi'ite separatism. Tlie Ktlrdish pestion onlznot be dealt with as an h q i isszle alo~le.It affects :Iran, Syria, and Turkeyr countries with sizable and restive Kurdish minorities. * Iraq canlzcrf be dealt with in isolation from Irm, A weak, dkided Iraq might lead to Iranian efforts to djvide or t?bsorb part of Iraq. At the same time, there is always the risk that Iraq may be willlng to strike a "devil's bargainf%ith Iran, and that both nations may act in unison to threaten the Gulf or try to break out from containment.

l r ~ qis u major oil powr with vast oil ~(1st'm tIwf es h u e u major i~tgpgct world merLwsupplies. W r h d y all pr*ectio~~s of .fuhre enerm balances call for large-scale Iraqi oil prtduction to ensure an adequate world supply of oil and,to keep oil prices moderate. The US Energy Lnformation Admhistratim (ETA) projects Iraqi, oil pductinrr at 4.4 million BD) in 2000,5.4 MMBD h 2005, m d 6.4 barrels per day ( ill 2010. These prqectio~~s would make Iraq the secnnd largest oil producer in the Gulf, providing narly 2% of all world oil production." A Lack of Present:and Fahnre Consensus

Iraq is a case where all the available policy options have powerful negatives, No policy can avoid the contradictions inherent h cbooshg between the near-term sec~~rity provided by sanctio~~s and conta and the resulting costs i,n terms olIraqi revancbm and h u m n szxffering. There are severai smatl, moeterate, a d demwratic Iraqi opposition movements, but they have little p w e r or internal influence in Iraq. Iraq's politics are hlghly nationalistic and violent in character, and they arc the politics of smdl compethg Sunni powm elites and clan grotrpings. Even if Saddam falls, his most likely successor would be anolher slnall autocratic elite. The rnilitary remains the seconli most pwerful e l m Iraq, m d seems 1i.kely to be the only real rival to some new '"extended family." No policy can expect to produce a moderate regime quickly or to reconc 's e t h i c and sectarian divisions. There also is little gSut chmce of forging a high degwe of lasting unity amcmg Westcm, Gulf, artd ot%ternations that deal with. Iraq. The United States and its allies can inhence the poky of oher states, and may be able to shape much of the outcorn of debate within the UN, but it cannot comt on the full -port of many of its allies Policy towards lraq wifl s divide inewifably becme steadily m m adversarid as n a ~ o n increasingly over the mforcemat of sanctions m d the level of milibry conta This makes the choice of policy optlions particularv difficult for the US, Saudi Arabia, m d Kuwait-the nations that face the most direct threat from Iraq. The fact that no policy towards Iraq can bring total co~~sensus or resdt in a clearly predictable end g m e is scartlely m a r g m n t for appeasement. The fact that there are no good altmatives to Saddam Husseh does not mean that some alternatives would not be better, As a result, the US, Saudi Ar.;rbia, and Kuwait will almost certainly be forced to take a harder line towards Iraq's prese~~t regime thm other states. This may fncrease the cfivisions between their policies and those of other states, but such divisions may well be a necessary element of any valid. policy in dealing with Iraq.

Policy and the Role of: Analysis No amount of analysis can resolve these p r o b l a s and provide easy answers to choosing the. right strategy towards Iraq. Andysis can, however, probride insights into the key faetors and contradictions involved. It can help the policy-maker find the proper balmce between eMorts to contain Iraq and efforts to e s e the plight of the Iraqi people, and to evaluate the potential for chmge within the Iraqi regime and Iraqi politim Analysis can also providc important i_nsightsinto Iraq's strategic iuture. It can look beyond poit-ical rfietoric and examhe t-he details of Iraq's present and possible military capabilities and the threats lraq can and cannot pose to other nations in the Gulf. The analysis in this paper focuses on the following issues: The c u r ~ npolitical t sit-uationin Iraq, a d the pmspects for pofiticd change, 'The problems posed by eirhnie and sectarian divisions in Iraq, and the creation of a Kurdish encla~re. The current economfc sihration in :Iraq, and the impact of smctions. Current energy developmnts withfn Iraq, and the strategic impact of Iraqi capability to resume oil and gas production. Iraq's external dations, and the threat it poses to its neighhors. Iraq's role in s ~ p p o r t h gterrorism and extremism. :Iraq's efforts to rebrtftd its c m e n t i m a l military fnrces, and the threat this poses to the region. * Iraq"s efforts to rebuiId its ability to manrafacture and deliver weapons of mass destructio~n.

The conclusion to each chapter makes specific recometndations for poliry action, but. the primary focus of this anavsis is to probride an improved basis for understanding current developments in Zraq and what given pdicy opticms can and c m o t hope to accomplish. A simple and consistent policy may look desirable on paper, but it will rapidly fail under the pressurc of events. Iraq is not a short-term, problem. Indced, it may be optimistic to think in terms oE a decade of dekrrencc, low lcvcl confict, and constant uncertainty. Iraq is a game of three-dhensimal chess in which each piece is a separate player, a d not a game of checkers in which the US or any other nation can contml the board agajnst a single oppctnmt. There are m y actors on the board with their own motives, d e s , and ~noves.Any policy that tries to be rigid in the face of both the uncertainties in Iraq, and the moves of other players, is almost certaixl to fail,

MAP ONE Iraq. Source: US State Bepa&ment.

Internal Political Developments Since the Gulf War Saddam Husseh has survived Iraq% defeat fn the Gulf War, and mom than haXf a decade of post-war sanctions. Mc and his supporters have managed to suppress a h o s t all active dissent, and have caused a new series of post war clatihes between Iraq and the West. They have survived more than h& a dccade of smctinn~,and agreed to an oil deal witfi the UN in 1996 that has mli.eved much. of the economic p ~ s s u r eupon the regime. Saddan-t may remain one bullet away fmm a new "electicm" to the "presidency," and m y have b e c m e more isolated from many of his traditionsll supporters, but he and his immediate coterie cmt.inue to rule, and Iraq's government is as ~pressiveas ever. h y strategic analysis of Iraq must, therefore, begin with Saddam. Mussej, and the present Ba%th. elite. As long as they are in power, Iraq is almost certai~~ to be rt.vanchist artd aggressiwe in character. This revanchism and aggressiveness may not lead to overt Iraqi use of rnilitary forces agahst other states, or to large scale conflicts, but it is almost certain to lead to cmstant Iraqi tests of Western resolve, and new lraqi efforts to htimidate the Southern G ~ dstates. f

Internal Political Developments Since the Gulf War 'The cease-fire in the Gulf War initially seelned to promise a very different future. The terms of 5he cease-fire set forth hUN Security Council Resolution 687, which was adopted on April 3, 1991, called for an Iraq that would accept peace with its neighbors, and which would be subject to powerful jntemational controls. Resdution 687 ~ q u i r e dIraq to:

* Recognize the ad-justed Kuwaiti-Iraqi border,

* Accept a UN guarantee of the bader,

X~ztemcklPolitical Der~elaiprrzentsSince the Gulf Mrnr

* * * *

9

Allow the UN to establish a peace observer force in a zone along the Iraqi-Kuwait border 1.0 klometers in Iraq and 5 kilometers in Kuwait, Reaffirm its commitisent to the Chemical Warfare and Nuclear NonProliferation Treaties, Atlow the UN to inspect the destmction of alT biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, long-range baXlistic misdes, and rcllated facilities, equipment m d supplies, Accept liability for Kuvvait's losses, Accept liability for all pre-war debts, Return or account for all Kuwaiti prismers, and Renounce terrorism.

At the same t i m , UN Security Council Resolution 688, called for major improvemcmts in political Liberalization and humm rights. The resolution, wl.rich was adopted on April 5,1991, declarcd that t-he UN Scurity Council was gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi people, and the massive fbw of refugees into neighboring countries, which threatened the peace and stability of the region. It: cmde ed the actions of the Iraqi gwernmnt, and called upon it to end its repression, to allaw immediate access for humanitarim agencies to all those in need throughout Iraq, and to respect the human and political righl.s of Iraqi citizens. In. addition, it called upon the Scretary General to pursue hummitarim t of the UN, and to address activjties hIraq by using the ~ l e v a nqencies the crit.ical needs of Iraqi refugees. The resolutio1z dcmanded that Iraq cooperate with the Secretar). General in his endeavors. If Iraq bad compfied with the terms of Resolutions 687 anci 688, and other relevant 19N resolut..ims, it would. soon have become a very different country. Xn practice, however, Sa.d.dam Hussein and the ru%ingelite of the Ba'ath Party made every possible effort to avoid such compliance. Iraq's state-controlled media continued to assert Iraq's claim to Kuwait, Iraq resisted every effort to cmstrah Saddam" regime, and to limit the government" control over its 5hi5tes m d Kurds. It resisted UN efforts to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and chalSmged UN efforts to pmvide relief to Iraq" Kurds and Shi5tes wherever possible. The first signs of Iraq's determfnatim to challenge the UN emerged even before the UN' voted on the final terms of the cease-fire agreement, Ch March 5, 1993, two days after the initial agreement to haft the fighting, Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan d-Majid as Minister of the Interior: Majid had helped had the szxppression of the Kurds in 1988, and his appointment was clearly designed to help Saddarn take a hard line in suppressing the Kurdish and Shi"ite uprisjngs that took place once the fjghthg ha,lted in Kukvait.

30

lrtfernnl Polifz'cnl Det~elopmentsSince trlte Gulf War

In the weeks immediately following the cease-fre, Saddarn demonstrated both his strength and his rejection of the spirit of the cease-fire accords. He ruf;hlessly put down a Shi5te upri"ing in the soufi-which was cclrtered arotlnd Kasra and Najaf, but encompassed most of the south. He was equall.y ruthless in putting down a major Kurdish uprising in the north. In both cases, he was rapidly able to ~ c m s t i t u t ethe instruments of state power that had give11 hirn control over Iraq for more than a decade before the Gulf War, m d the m a l l military forces that Shi5te and Kurciish ethnic groups were ahfe to muster proved no match for Iraq's main force combat units. Once Sacldam suppressed these uprisings, he began a broader political struggle with the UN over the issue of sanctions and humanitarian aid. He refused to accept the terms offered in UN Security Covncil ftesolutions 706 and 712, which would have allowed f r q to begin exportirtg oil under UN cmtrol and monitoring."nstead, Saddam used his security qparatus to harass the UPJ' and maintain conml over the fraqi people. H e also used his control over Iraq" buudget, and fhmcial and business inhastructure, to force a level of austerity on his people that allowed him to reconstitute and maiintain much of hir; nnilit.ary macl-tine, At Ihe m e t h e , he attempted to undercut support for sanctions by exploiting the humm cost of the UN sanctions, and highitjhting Iraq's potential value as a trading parher.

The Informal and Formal Basis aE Iraq's Power Stmcture Saddam did not reassert power by being loved or popular. W i l e Saddam has probabIy put morc3 effort into esta,bllishing a personality cult than any other contemporary leader in the Middle East, :Iraqi popular support for this cult is more an illusion than a reality. This became clear immediately after the Guld War when Kurds, Shi'ites, and Sul~nimilitary deserters we= seen defacing and destmyirrg posters and statues of the Iraqi mler in riots approaching raw fury. Even in the Sunni parts oE Iraq, many Iraqis privately expressed prohund bitterness over Iraq's dcfcat. They felt that Saddam had badly miscalculated. in invadbg both Iran and. Kuwait, and blamed him for s p n d e r i n g Iraq% =sources and wealth durjng both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. Saddarn was abfe to stay in power because of his immense power over :Iraq%pditicai leaders and rulir-rg S u n n i minority He used this political power to quickly purge potential rj'LPaisl rmove disaffected ofiicials and commanders, and remove uncertaisr loyalists. He used it to make other changes in Iraq's political and mftitary teadership designed to ensurt. that no opposing caters of power existed withjJ"rthe Ba'ath, fhe grrver

X~ztemcklPolitical Der~elaiprrzentsSince the Gulf Mrnr

22

the security services, m d the military And, he used his family; tribe, and fpiendh clans to help secure his power, Saddam also used his control w e r key state institutions tike the security forces, the army and the state-controlled w d i a . He used force Wherever this was desirable, At the same t h e , he used the power of government to provide econornic incentives for his supporters, and to deny eco~~omic resources to the Kurds, hostile Shi"tes, m d other opponents. He also used his control over institutions like the media to stress the "needff for his leadership in the face of Iraq's new difficulties. As one paper put it: "the years of war with Iran have proven the sottndness of the conclusion that Iraqi dignity, future territorial irttegrity are contingent upon maintaining the leadership oE Saddam. . . .'"add= was described as the "'honest struggler," and the symbol of fraq's achjevemem.t.s,havi.ng made a ""qualitative leap" by byrirrging Iraq out of its backward existmce to an era of military strength and scientific progwss. The lraqi media then drecv the coslclusion that Iraq c d d only regain its former strength under Saddarn's leadership. In short, S a d d m exploited both a pemealing informal political structurc of power based on ethnicity and ties of kinship and long-stmdi.ng hiendships, and a vast formal siirucfzlr-c(?I" power based on state institutions. hn understandiw of these power stnrcbres is essmtial to underst..anding Saddam's survival after eight years of" conflict wifi Iran and after the Gulf Wr. It is essential to understanding why Saddarn may survive several more years of UN sanctions, why it is so difficult to change the fundamentat cl-caraeter of"Xraq's regim through any measure short of direct invasion, And, it is essentid to understanding the s t ~ n g t h sand lhitations of a ""cntrist" "rtrategy towards Iraq, and the limitations of m y "peripheral stsategyf%hieh is not based on civil war*

The Informal Politics of the "Center" Sadciam Hussein-and those around him-base much of their power upon an informal and highly personalized domestic political structure which draws on support from Iraq" Sumi minority, which makes up 32% to 37% of the total population.5 The key clans and families trYithin the Sumi heartland-hi& is composed of the four provinces of Baghdad, Takrit, Mosul and Ramadi-form the bedrock of this poli.tical power structure although it also includes some proven Shi'ite and Christian loydists. Iraqis refer to this aspect of Iraqi politics as the ""enter," which is both a geographic term denoting the Sunni Arab heartland and the capital Baghdad (whose populat.ion is xtually 40"-i~5O% Arab S:kiriteand Kurd), and a political, socrioeconomic and cultural area that is largely Srnnni and which has the nationfs highest stmdard of living, econcrmir developm e ~ ~urbanization, t, and educatio~~. The "enter" is home to the vast majority of Jraq's large middle-class professionals and ixrtel1ectuaXs.h Sunni Popular Opinion and the ""Center" XmmediateZy After the Gulf War Saddam was able to draw heavily upon mpport from the "center" after the Gulf Mr. He drew upon broad sulppo" from the S ity, which included many of the middle class professionals in urban areas. He also drew on support from major tribes S L E C ~as the al-Bu-'Assaf, alHalabishah, d-Janahi, al-Bu-Fahd, al-Makdid, al-Mahamidah, al-fumayl&, al-SaUan, al-BuTsa, al-Mawali, al-Bu-'Alwm, al-Bu-Nimr, Shmmar and Dulaint all of kvhich are to be fnvl~djn Al Anbar province. 117 addition, he drew upon the group of '*TaKritiM clans of which Saddarn and his family are mernbers, and upon support frcrm his extended family. Saddam was able to obtain relatively broad s ~ ~ p p ofrom r t Iraq's Sumis for a number of reasons:

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

23

'The Sunni heartland felt little sympathy for the rebels in Che north and south during the insurrections following Plesert Storm. The rebels in the Shi5te south were perceived as being inspired by Shi'ite Islamists with ties to Iran, and as being determined to establish an Islamic Republic modeled on Iran. This goal was viewed as little more than treasm by many Sunni Iraqis, and was opposed by many Shifites as well. Similarly, the Kurds were see11 as putative separatists that had betrayed Iraq during the Iran-lray War and were doing so again. Eur&er, many educated Iraqis W even Kurdish autonomy as a threat to celztral control over the oil-rich Al-Tamim provisrce, * Many Sunnis and more secular 5hi"tes in the ""cntt.r" had a genuine sense of commitment to the Ba'athist goals of secztltarism and modern economic development within the framework of national unity, even though most had no deep ilieologicd co Ba"ath party. The ""ccnter" prceived the Sbifites and Kurds, and many of Iraq" outside opposition groups, as threats to these goals or as allies of the West m d the natiom that had "opposed" Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War. * Some in the ""center" "It that if Saddam" r e g h e collapsed, Iraq might unravel or they would come under Shi'ite control. 'f'hey accepted the "legitimacy ol thc worst alternative." * Finally, the pervasive prt.sence of the intdligence, security and military in the ""center" hrther discourqed overt opposition and ail but the most determined ins~l,rrectio~zi& and coup pl,onE?rs.

Sunni Popular Opinion and the ""Center" Since the Gulf War 'These Sunni groups do not offer S a d d m and his coterie the m e sccurity today and this may offer the West rand Southem Gulf states an opportunity to exploit a strategy focused m political chmge. The Iraqis in the "enterf' have grievmces m d problems which have grown steadily worse in the years that have followed the cease-fire. No accurate statistics are available on the Iraqi eccmomy since the Gulf War*There are many eslimtes, but oulsidC Observers have little ability to collect or verify data, and the Iraqi gove ent has fluctuated between making exaggerated clairns that Iraq can recower and survive the sanctions, and efforts to propt?$andj,e and exaggerate the very real h m a n suffering in Iraq in an effort to get UN sanctions lifted. It is dear, however, that Eraqi living s t a n d d s have d d i n e d p ~ c i p i tously since 1990, and that this decline has reached the 'keenter" as welf as

34

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

Shi'ite and Kurdish areas. Prices have increased sharply while wages and salaries have nut risen for the past six years. Poverty is widespread even in Sunni areas, and much of Iraq's pprspperous rniddle class has been wiped out. Many Iraqis have had to sell off or pawn their valtlables, and take second jobs-drivhg cabs or hawkin.g their w a s on the streets, More and mcrm of the lower classes am relying m the state for their basic nutritior~alneeds, or are on the edge of falling below subsistence. As early as 19%-1992, then Mhister of Commerce Mohammed Mahdi Sal& ctaimed that the rationed food products prwided by the gove could frxmish only tiEi'Jk,of the cdories requiscld for proper nutrition.. There is no way to validate this statement, but virtually all observers agree that Iraqi levels of nutrition have dropped steadily in the four years that have followed. Efforts to stabilize the Iraqi Ulnar (ID) between mid-1994 and spring 1995 collapsed in the summer of 1995 and the exchange rate feil by 23%. 'The Iraqi Dhar, \zrhirh had been close to 3.5:$1 in 1990, plunged to ZD 1,G00:$I and prices mached new heights, News reports indicated that me egg cost as much as 80 Iraqi f>inars-or $258 at .the official exchange rate-and t-he government was forced to ir-ttmduce yet another series of price controXs and rationing measures to try to halt the rise in the price of basic goods. In spite of i,ncreases inwages, price controls, and specid privileges, few in the "center" have been immun.e to these economic pressures. W i n a r y 5unnis have suffered almost at; much as urban Shi5tes. Mmy Sunni, pmrclgilrrc professionals, technocrats, teachers, Sa'ath functionaries, and journalists have been reduced from moderrilte wealtf7. at the time of the cease-fire to hardship and then to ppoverty. Even many of the "elite" withh the Ba"ath and military have been forced to sell m c h of their wealth, Further, it has become steadily harder for even priwiteged members of society to have the country, and new control measwes were unced in mid-1995, n e s e measures included a dramatic increase in the fees payable for all Iraqis wishing to travel abmad. The rc.quirt.d fees have risen from ID 6,000 to ID 200,000 in less than a year for normal addts. The fees for highly qualified pr&ssionals, including university professors, scientists, and engineers have been raised an additionat ID S million, as part of the government's effort to halt. the ""brain drain"9ollowing the war, This restriction has had a serjous financial impact on the "center,'kd other middfe class Iraqis, because Iraqi 6migrks are no longer able to send money to theis h i l y wrnbers, morley that has greatly helped those still in Iraq to survive. 'There is no way to gauge how much these ecmomic forces have uneiermined Saddam's support relative to the power base he could rely on

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

25

immediately after the Gulf War*It is also importmt to understand that much of the ~ s u l t i n ghostility is directed at the US, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia-rather fim the regime. Nevertheless, =ports f m visitors tc:, Iraq indjea.t.ethat the "eenter" feels a growing biHesness towards Saddam and the regime as a result of the steady erosion of t r q " wealth and power. Anecdotal reports hdicate that many Sumi Arabs have lost patie~~ce ent's repetitive propaganda claims that Iraq must pay a material price for standing up to the "imperialist' and Zionist%nemy and that Iraq is maiintaining its honor and pride. This theme of "pride" over wealth is one that Saadun Hammadi first advmced followkg his elevation to the post of Prime Minister in March 1 9 9 1 : T The citizen in Iraq and the Arab homeland and the free Muslims and free people in the world will see that Iraq has paid a price for a just and a noble aim: namely resisting imperialism, Zionism, and the old system. A just sbuggle for this cause or any other seric~uscause is not expeded to be without a price.

Rfietoric, however, is no substitute for food, shelter, savings, and.security Furthrr, the regime's current propaganda line cmtradiuts much of the propaganda &at it used to g a h the support of the %enterf" the late 1970s and.early 1980s. The Ba%th then told trayi "centrists'3ha.t the people of Iraq must judge the Ra'ath by its material acbvements for the country. It is not surprising, Chescfosc., Chat many Sunni Iraqis reacted with mger or despair to Saddam" initial statements that Iraq codd. survive for a lmg t h e under smctions, and that this anger and despi-lir grew worse with time. Iraq" aacceptance of the terns of UN Security Council Resolution 9% in April 1996 created an oil-for-food deal fiat has ~ l i e v e dsome of these pressures, but the imrneciiate impact of Che agreement between Iraq and the UN will be limited. The agreement only allows Iraq to sell $330 million worth of oil a mmth for a period of six months, and less than half the proceeds wiiX go to provide food and rnedicinc in the areas under Saddam Husseh" cmtrol, Another 3VX3 will go to war reparations, 15% for food and medicine in fie serni-auf;cmomcrusKurclisl.t region, and 10% to pay for the costs of UN operatims in Iraq. A total of about $106 mitlion a month will not give Saddam much with which to reverse the impact of a decade of war and a half a decade of sanctions in the in the areas under his control. Further, morc is involved than ecmomics. :No Iraqi in the "center" c m ignore the calamitous deciine in social and moral mows, the risjng crime, prim gouging, open prostitution, widespread cornaption, a d e c h e h

36

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

civic virtues m d the declke in the enrollment of Iraqi youth h schools, Even if Iraqi Sumis and other suppwters of the Bdath. are willing to live t they are likely to be less trYilling to live with with the p ~ s e ncmditiom, the cost to the future. Education has dishlegrated. Pare11t.s can no lmger afford to send their children to schuoi, instead they are sent to beg or steal, This has become a norm Fn a state which once had stiff smctions against such behavior.8

Growing Alienation and the Death of "Refom" The ""center%" reaction to the &if-ure of political reform since the Gulf War is more uncertain. Few lraqis in the center seem to demand or desire Western-style democracy, but many have lmg indicated they would like more liberalization and less state interference .intheir lives, n e r e are also repo&s of growing resentment among lraqi Sunnis of the arbitrariness, oppression, corruption, and jack of puhlic accountability enforced by Saddam and senior Iraqi officials, It seems likely that many Sunnis remember that Saddarn Hussein had proxniscd politicai, rc.fomt following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and that none of these promises have been kept, The gave beyond symbolism in implement* its postwar pro eralization-which included providing nekv politic& leaciership, altowing the creation of political,parties, and allowjng a freer pxless. fn March 1991, Saddam declared that the learlership's co itment tc:,building a ""dmocratic society based on. constitution, law hstitutions, and (party) pluralism. . . is an irrevocable and find decision." Official speeches were heavy with promises of democracy, political and administrative rebrm, m d m end to nepotism. Saddarn took some highly visible steps that made it seem like he might act u ~ c m these words. :ill March 1991, he appointed a well-hown Shi'ite Ba'athist and American-educated eco~~omist named Saadun Hammadi as Prime Minister, and charged him with irnplcmentjng reform. flammadi was a veteran pdilician with diplomatic experience. He had been Millister OE State for F o ~ i g nAffairs, and in June 1,989 was appointed deputy Prime Minister in which post he was tasked to deal with economic affairs, including fray's post-Irm-Zraq War mvitalizaticm, The fact that Hanmadj was given the post of Prirne Minister was seen as significant, because hitherto it had aIways been held by the President, Saddam himself. Saddm was seen as having etecided to delegate some authoriq to trusted follo.cvers, hcii~~ding granthg them the authority to implement political pmgrams, H a m a d i was very m c h a part of the Ba"ath powrr strucbr ut he had ~ p e a t e d l yercpressed tl-te belief that Iraq would move slowly but surely from the damb~anceof the revolu-

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

27

tionary phase of po:litical life, under which Iraq had existed since 1968, to constitutional politics chararterized by the rule of law According to one source, ""h (Hammadi) absorbed a commitment to democratic ideals that makes him unique in Iraq's top echelo~~," while studying agricultural econmics at the University of Wisconsin. The ifaqi government also announced political reforms which included the intpkmentation of a constitution drafted in 11990, credion of a free press, eventual abolition of the supra-legal hvolutionary Courts charged with trying crimes against the state, eventuat Lzbolition of the Revolutionary Command Council, and the establishment of a multipapty system. 0 x 1 March 24, 1991, Iraq announced its tentative acceptance of Kurdish autcmomy On May 8, 1991, Iraq announced that t-he rulhg Revoltltionary Cormrnand Councl (RCC) of the Ba'ath would be abolished and replaced with a more democratic government. fn March 1991, it declared an amnesty for deserters who were not officers. The coverage of this amnesq was expanded on July 21, 199XS9 These reforms are p~ciselythe kind of reform that Iraq should adopt in the fuh;lre, but Saddam's pmmises som proved to be little more than a political ruse designed to reduce foreign criticism and disguise the government" violent suppression of Shi'ite and Kurdish resistance. As the regime became more secure, it turned back to oppression, and this oppression begm to affect Ihe ""c.nterfks well as the ""pes@hery." The new multi-par9 law passed by the National. Assembly on August 24,1991 is a good example of the hollow natrare of Iraqi politic& m b m . 'The initial draft ctf the lahv dropped a provision banning any party whose ideology was inimical to Ba'athism, but insisted that all parties "should value and be pmud of Iraq's heritage, glorious history, and achiwements attained by natinm,ai strzlggle; particularly by the great =volutions of July 14, 1955 and July 17-30, 1968," which overthrew the monarchy and brought to power t-he Ba'ath p m y revectively. It was then changed so that parties could not be founded on the basis of sectarianism ayostasy, regionalism, or mti-Arabism. I'"mvisions were added so that mly the Bakath party was allowed to engage in political activity within the armed forces. As a reswlt, the nekv law had no real meaning by the time it was passed on September 3,1991, In various speeches during 1991, Saddarn made it clear that Mrestemstyle democracy and othcr f o r m of political liberalization we= not wlcome in Iraq m d that Iraiqis who adhered to it wou%dnot be allowed any leading positions in the political, social, and cultural domai~~s. Further, Saddam and the Ba'ath 1eadcrsEp proceeded systematicaily to purge the '"center," the military, and the Ba%th. They suppressed any real dissent, violated t-he civil rights of Iraqi citizens, as well as put additional military prcssure on Che Kurds and Sbi'ites"l0

3 t3

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

Mammadi was removed from office on September 13, 1991, at the height of the Ba%at)nparty's 10th regional (Xraqi)cmgrcss, wtnich had supposedly been cclnvened to elect new mmbers, 'Therc! were reports that. Hantcnadi had fallen victim to t-he party's "old guard" because it feared for the party" already tmuolxs position, but these reports seem to bave had little validity. The Bdath leadership no longer had the powerl Mammadi if he ltad assumiag it ever had had it-to force the ~ n n n v aof had Saddarn" support, Tnstead, Hammadi received an overwhelming vote of ns confidmce. Only 27 delegates out of 261 voted for him during the elections for the ~ g i o n acommand, l leaving him a hnmilialing 39th out of 42 possible candidates.11 Saddam proceeded to demonstrate that senior gove djrcctly mder his personal control. Me appointed another Shi'ite, Mohammed Ffamza al-Zubaydi-a fomer minister but a political lightweight-as Hammadi"s replacement. 'The 1991 Bdath party cmgress, dubbed Chc Congsess ol lieconstructio~~ and Jihad, then endorsed the princiyle that the Ba'ath party should have total control aver Iraqi political life. It =-elected Saddam as Srcretary Generaf of the :Region& Cornmand Cau~zcil,and Saddam's closest associates retahed their posts.. Sine &at time, Zraq's sministers have been "Lightning ds'9rather than leaders. Al-Zubaydi lasted until 1993, a d then was removed as a convenient scapegoat on. the gram~dshe had failed to deaf wit-;hIraq's worsening econmic fortunes. He was replaced by .Ahmad Hussein al-modeil; who was himself forced out: in M a y 1994-after Uday Hussein b1amc.d him for the Iraqi Dhar's wrsening pli(ght.2 Saddam then took back the post oi Prime Minister, and supposedly the task of dealing with the crisis in Iraq" eccmomy, However, Saddam has since ~ g u l a r l yblamed suborh a t e ministers for Iraq's problents. Me has tightelred his control ovcr the politics of the "ccnter," while maintainjng his strategy of maklng other government leaders the scapegcrats. Given this background, it is not: surprising that mmy Sunnis increasingly react to th actions and statements of ministers and government ofiFicials with apathy and cynicism, This tmnd was appartrnt in 1993, wheln one ol Iraq's leading inteuectuals and poets-Jabra rbrahim fabrasaid, "W are not concerned with democracy right now. We need a peace, then we need stability and then we can talk about political liberalization.""' R has grown more apparent with each year &at has followed. Many of the reporters the Iraqi regime allowed into Iraq in 1995 to observe a rekrendum on *ether Saddam should remain in p w e r cmcluded that fcw educated Iraqis belkved the rekrtndurn had any meaning, or believed Saddam" promise that there would be meaningful elections for the :National Assembly in 1996. In fact, Iraqis ir-t the center seelned to beiicve thcy would have to live with a steadily more intrusive

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

29

go~rernment,one that attempted to regulate virtually every aspect of their day-to-day economic behavior, and one that wodd. do less and less to prtrserve tbem from poverty PIE the same time, such tre~ldsdo not seem to threatell Saddam or offer any clear alternative. The '"center" ma)i want an end to sanctions, to g w ent oppression, and even tc:,Sadcfam and those amund hirn, but no popular forces have emerged within the ""clzkr" "at have been able to take on organj.zed political form, The ""center" does not have any domestic altemtiwes to Saddam, or any =ason to support outside political movement.^ l i b the largely Shi'ite lraqi PllationaX C o n g ~ s s . The Sunnis in the "center" still have reason to fear the consequences of any change that threatens Sunni pohtical dominmce. E'ur&er, the ""cntermhas little reason to admire or trust the West or other Arab states. 'The Sumi elite consists largclq..of technmrab, professionals, military officers, and party fuwtionaries who have no reascm to share the West's co mellt to political ideals such as l democracy or see the Gulf monarchies as a superior fnrm of gov t, Many in this elite also see the West-and particularly the US-as rt?sponsihIe for the &liberate and methodjcal destruction of lraq as a nnndern regional power. Even lraqi Sumi intetlcctuals who admit their opposition to Saddam in private are often far more nationalistic-and ""anti-colonid"m d ""anti-imperialistMthan pro-reform m d pro-democracy. Problems with the Key Clans

Saddam is experiencing growing problems with the key clans inthe "center'" which may pose more of a threat to his d e . The pobtics of the ""cnter" are far more depende~nton the loyalty of key clans, tribes, and families than m public opinion, Experts like Charles Tripp have noted that Iraqi politics are the politics of pntril~onklisn?wherc.ir.1 a co trust fillzl al-thiyu) foltnw or trust a leader who emcrges from within the community. The pah-imoniat.leader's positim is based an his abiljty to distribute tangible and c o n c ~ t emateriaf rewards, on his control of instrunnents of st.ate, m d on a vaciety of- personality characteristics such as charisma and ruthlessness that enable a patrimonial leader to maintairr authority. These factors explain why many of fie leading Sunni dans stayed loyal to S a d d m througl-cthe Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, and they have been as important in securhg his pawer as the mom iormal instruments of state control. The leader's position is also dependent on the "'rxnqzlantiliat7le ties" of kirrship that bind the community to the patrirnmial leadcr. These ties ediate family ties to s h w d dan, tribal, ~ligious,geographical, and ethnic ide1ntity.14Saddam Hussein has long been as depen-

20

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

dent on a s~nallcoterie of Sm7ni clans and personal suppllrters as he has upon the loyalty of the "center." Support from regional-clan and iamilial kinship groupfias been one of his most effective m a n s of conserving power. Sk-rce 1994, however, Saddam has had increasing probfems with even his most loyal clans and closest supporters. Dissatisfaction spread widely among several key Su~mitribes by 1995. For example, there were s t r o ~ ~ g indications that S a d d m was having growing pmblems with the Jubllri clan. The fuburis are centered around Mosul m d HiLZa, m d had colliaborated with Saddam's tribe for many years, and a n m b e r o.f Juburis had reached senior positions in the a r m d forces and internal security apparatus.15 Never&eless, two senior officers from this tribe: Major-General Salern al-Bassu, deputy commander of the air force, and Major-General Hasan al.-El4 Khader, air force director of operations, seem to have made coup attempts against Saddam in 49513. h o t h e r Sunni clan, of federation, the A1-Duris, had presented problems since early 1944, Two senior Bakathist oificials f r m the AI-Duris, Abdel fihnrtan al-Duri and m i d r Abed al-Aziz al-Duri were arrested in mid-I994 ostensilbly for objecting to Saddarn's demand that hjs son, Uday, be considered for the post oi Oefense Minister.l%~nother Duri, 5aber al-Duri was liivested of his power. Several Duri officers were purged at the same time from the military. h a t Xhrahinn al-Dz~ri,the most senior member of the clan in office conthues to hold the title of Vice-President, but has no real executive power.17 Moreover, his heaith is bad and the execution of mem:bers of his dan has reportediy had an dverse impact on h h . I'he powerful At-Dulairn tribal confecieration has traditionay been a strong suppllrter of Saddam Hussein. The Al-Dz~lairnclan is based inAAnbar psovhcc, in the Smnj heartland, which Saddam declared was the h 'white prouince' because of its complete loyalty durir-rg the M a ~ 49% rclbelljons*The A-Dulain?is are important for other ~ a s o n sThe . Takitis-the al-Bunasser clm horn Al'Au~a-are an offshoot of the a l a i n n tribal confederation. Al-hbar province dominates the trade and commercial activity of sanctioned Iraq, and it is the Al-Dulairn wfiu control most of this activity and trade with. josdan, and across Jordan with the outside world. Finally, the M-&laim clan is so large &at the tribe extends across the desert into Syria. Tn May 1995, opposition withh the AI-Dulajm clan reached the point of serious revolt. This revolt took place in the town of Al-Ran-tadi in the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab governate of M-Anha It was triggered by the delivery of the mutilated body of Major-General Mohammed Masloum al-&laimf to his family, Dulaimi had attempted a coup in Nave~nber1994, and Saddam had reacted with characteristic swiftmess

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

23

m d exacted ruthless retributio~~. He executed the would-be coup maker, and the general's body was delivered. mutilated to his family in a characteristic display of the brutality- the security services have used to try to intimidate Saddads opyosi.tion. The revolt was followed by an uprising which spread to the military installations in Abu Ghuraib, outside Baghdad. It wap; suppressed and 320-130 army officers were executed. Other problems occurred in Samara, another major Sumi Arab town, during the s u m m r of 1995. Accorbiq to s m e mports, 43 leading personahties from the t o m , including many from the powerful Samara'i family, were arrested. They WE accused of trying to w a n i z e an assassination atterrrpt against Saddam. Among the arrested were two Air Force generals: Yunis htallah al-Samara? and Uasi~~ JasFzn al-Abboud. 'There are many other less reliable reports of opposition within "centrist'" tribes and clans.18 'E'hese devebgmentri offer some hope that a "centrist'kopposition could still arise against S a d d m from withh the key elans in spite of the lack of orgaslized "centrist" phtical movemnts and institutions, Once again, however, there are prohlems for a "centrist" strategy. First, the longer Saddam succeeds in s ~ ~ p p r e s s such h g oppositionf the weaker the power base will be for cl-eating a stable successor. Second, none of the clm or tribal opposition to date seems "moderate" or "reform" oriented. h differew mix of centrist clans or tribes might prove to be more pragmatic, but it is unclear that it could. reach a lasting accommodation with Iray's :Kurds or Shi5tes by pemeful means or wodd abandon any of Saddm's r that it w s not forced to abmdon. a d i t i o n s for a g ~ a t e Iraq

Problems in Saddam's Family- and Goterie Saddam FXussein" ability to secure his rule through nepotism and personal patronage at the highest level of state power is reinforced by his ability to surround himself with relatives or friends from Tatkrit that form, part of his extended family. These members of Iraq" ruling elite art; bound closely to Saddam, a d allow him to extend his personal rule throughout the military, the security services, the Ba'ath, and the government. Saddam has b q placed rnemhers cJf his Reijat clan in key positions in the governing system. Early in his rule, fnc: gave senior positions to members of the Tulfah family, but this branch of his clm has faded into obscurity because of a lark of outstanding maie mernbers and their loss cJf influence followi.ng the death of Defense Mi,nister 'Adnan mayrallah Tulf& in 1989, Saddam has recently relied more on the Brahims (his halfZlrothers), and the M-Majids (his cousins from his paternal side of fie family). Until recelztly this small group of Takritis had become SO pre-

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

eminmt that it would have been difficult to see how a non-nkriti regime could. have been established without a major coup or civil war, In the past, Saddam has been abte to count upon the loyalv of these Takritis for a nurnber of rcasons: 'The kinship ties between them, the material benefits and power he has given them, and their role in mating a strong and powerful Iraq-one where they bemfit from corruptim and a p h c n o m a l growth in wealth. 'The Takritis h e learned to fear Saddam" personal mthlIessness, and Saddarn" actions have shown even his closest associates that they can lose power m die as easily as Hussein Kamel. At the s m e time, they have good reason to fear his fall. They know that that if Saddam goes, whether by their hands or the hands of non-Takritis, they may also fall, and do so at the cost of their lives. As a rclsult the Takritis face a Hobson's choice: Many incrcasi.ngly fear Saddam and want bisn w t of power because his presence endangers them and their gains, but they also fear what c d d happen to their t;ainP; and their lives if they remove him. The Takriti thrcat to S a d d m has also been diminished by the fact that neither the "f:akriticlan at large, nor Saddamfsimmediate kin group, constitutes a rnnnolithic bloc, Sadcd,amhas probably encouraged some family rivalsy and rifts by using his abjlity to grmt and withhold positions and. favors, but he has found his ""family'" to be as difficult to manage as Napdeon fo~lndhis own kactious faxnily. At the same time, t h r e has been constant in-figf-itixzgamong the Takritis, a d Saddam has long had to intervene to reconcile the cmflicting a d i t i o n s and greed of this group. C)ne of the first Takritis to fall from grace was General Hardan al-Takriti, a Bdathist, a popuhr and charismatic army officer, and a pri~~cipal instigator of the Jufy 1968 coup. He was dismissed in October 1970, Another noteworthy example of such infighting was the temporary decline in the role of the fbrahims-Saddm" half-brothers. This decllne occurred at about the same time as the death of Subha Tulfah, the mother of the Brahim brothers as well as of Saddarn.1' Saddam removed Barzm al-Xkriti fmm the job of intelligence chief, and then remved Barzan and Watban from senior positions in 1983.20 h 1989, he had a falling out wit;kl his Defense Minister, "dnm KPlayraIlah, whose sister Sayidah is Saddarn's wife. It was reported that the Tulfahs were infuriated by 5addmrs taking on of a mistress, Samira Shahbanctar-whom he reportedly m r ritzd. Not long after Kf-rayrallah dicd in a helicopter accident under 'mysteriouskcircumstmces. This fmily strife has also become progressively moro serious since the Gulf Wal= Before the war, Saddam was able to deal with most such infighting by dealing with indil"jduals, ratrher than groups. Ilc. had little rclason to fear a rnajor spiit i,n his extelrded fmiiy, or that such 'endj.ng

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

23

would become a potential threat. Shce the war, Saddam has experielzced growing problems with the al-Majid clan and even with his own sms, 'The first major sign of these problems surfaced on November 6, 3991, wheln Saddam removed Hussein K m e l d-Majid, his cousin and son-inlaw from the post of Defense Minister, and replaced him with hterior Minister Ali Hassan al-Majid, anoths paternal cousin and Hussein Kamel at-Majid's cousin." AAli Hassan al-Majid had led the rclpressiolz of the Kurds in 1988. Saddam also temporarily closed down Bnhil, the newspaper publisked by his elder son, Uday* pkis shjft was unexpceted because Mussein K m e l al-Majid had risen rapidly in the mgime in previous years, Kamel had led th build-up of :Iraq%rnmiitary industries and weapons of mass destructicm programs as Mhister of Industries and Military hdustrialiaation. Same experts feel Saddam" action was the result of a rift within the two main branches of Saddam" clan-and ir^ltt.fligencereports surfaced later fiat rivd securiq forces of Mi MI-tssan al-Majid and h s s e i n Kamel al-Majid had clashed when Ali Hassan replaced Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Others feel that Saddarn needed firmer military support and that F=arnelfsyouth, and lads of form1 military trainjng and experience, seem to have created friction with senior military afficers.22 At the same time, Saddam iz~creasedthe role of other members of his tribe and extended family He placed members of the Ibrahim and Majid branches in senior security positions. Un November 13,1941, he appointed a maternal half-brother, Watbm al-Tikriti, to =place Ali Hassan al-Majid as Interior Mjnister, He appQi"ted Barzan al-Tikriti (another half-brother) as Xraqk Permanent Representative in Geneva and a foreign affairs adwiser to Saddam. He appohted Sabawi al-Tikr"iti as head of the General Intelligence Service.2" Saddam also tried to heal whatever divisions had led him to fire Hussein Kamel a1-Majid from the post of Defense Minister. On December 4, he increased the po'cver of Musscin Kamel al-Majid and then appointed him as a presidential adviser on February 13,1992. AX-Majid rcltained his rank of Lieutenant General and the privileges of a Cabinet minister in this role, and was later =stored to hjs role in charge ol Iraq's defense industries. At roughly the same time, Saddam allowed Babil, to msume pubhcatim with Uday as editor. 'f'he first new issue descrjbed a cordial lunch attended by Saddarn and other major mennhers of the Tikriti clan. Even so, major new s i ~ ofs tmuble emerged in May 1995 when Saddarn shifted his half-brflther Watbar.1 Ibrahim al-Hasan from the post of Interior Mhister to the symbolic post of presidential advisor. h spite of the fnterior Ministry" importance in internal security matters, he assigned the post to a rcrlative unknown, Mohammd Zimam Abdel-Kazzaq, an inte:llige~~ce and secwily ofiic.iat.2-"It is not qwite clear why Wat-

24

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

ban was dismissed. Some reports co~~clude that Saddam had taken behhd the scenes control of the Interior Mk~istrybecause of the deterioration of the ecommic situaticm," %me reports argue that Watban had. mishandled the Al-Ramadj djstuibances. 0El-ret.sargued that Watban had ran afoul of Uday Hussejn. There were dso reports that Watbasr" demise symbolized the eclipse of the Ibrahirn branch oE the family and the return of the Al-Majids to the limelight

The Defeel-ion and Death of Hussein Kr;anzeE al-Majid These latter reports we= soon proven wrong on two counts. In mid-July, Ali Hasan al-Majid was replaced as Defense m i s t e r by General Sultan Hashint &mad, a professional officer who had served as the Amy's chief of staff since April 1995. Then, on August 7,1995, Lieutenant-Genera1 Hussein Kamel Hasan al-Majid defected to Jordan. He etefected with his brother Lieutenant-Colonel Saddarn Kmel al-Majid, wfio was also married to one of Saddm" daughters and with 16 other members of the Majid clan, This was the most important defection of a m i o r Iraqi durk g Saddarn" years in power. At the time Hussein Kamet Al-Mafid defected, he was 41 years of age and a case study in Iraqi nepotism. He was born in the same village of Al'Auja, outside W i t , as Saddam. He first rose to prominence and power in the mid-1.980s when he emerged as a bodyguard 'Eor Saddam. FXe then married Saddam" oldest cltaughter Raghida, and in 19%, Saddam put him in charge of ntilitary procttrement from fctrtlig11 suppliers. He is also the cousin of Saddam, being the son of Saddam" uncle Kaml Majid. When the Ministry of Mlitary Industrializati~nwas c ~ a t e dHussein , Kamel ai-Majid became its h a d . It was i,n that role that Kamel built up his rclputation as the managerid and organizational talent behhd Iraq's chemicai, biotogicai, ballistic missile, and nuctear program+although ail O( these progrants had c m e n c e d well before his rise. Hwssein Kamel.proved relatively efficient in acquiring the technologies needed for the nuclear progran-t by setting up an international network of fmnt campanies channeling dual-use technology to Iraq. As a result, Saddam also appohted him as Minister oi Industries in 198Tt and, Hussei.n Kaml was charged with the role Of implementing the privatization process launched by the government. Although Hussein Kaml was a man with no milimy experience, he was first appointed Colonel and tben given the rank of Major-General in April 1991. Fallowkg the Gulf War, Kamel was made a Lt. General and was made Defense Minister between April 3.991 and September 1991. He was =moved in November 1991-possibty for the reasons discussed earXier or because he failed to rebuild the armed forces or to deal with the

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

25

low-level insurgency in the south. He was made preside~~tial advisor, however, and was =placed by his cousin, Ali Hasan Al-Majid. After anotbrr cabinet reshuffle, Hussein K m e l was appointed Minister of hdustries and Minerals. He was also made the chairmm of the Higher State Engineering Effort Commission, a large inter-mjnisterial body created in March 19%, and tasked with the supervisim of recmstruetion. He and his brother also played a role in setting up and cmtrolling the Amn al-fias (Special Security Force) whjch was directly attaehed to the p~sident"cabinl.t.26 In short, as a true insider, Kamel was privy not only to the secrets of Iraq's massive weapons of mass destruction pmgrams, but as a member of the ermost circle of p w e r he knew intimately the workings oE one of the world.27 Hussein Kamel" defection &owed that Saddam could no longer trust even fie closest members of hfs family and almost certainly ~ p r e s m t e d a serious psychological blow to the Iraqi ruler. At the same time, the defection was the product of personal feuds, and not of any opposition to Saddam's zule or policies. Although I-lussein Kamef claimed fiat he dtkcted because he had lost conlidcnce in the rclghe and in its political stability and.because he wished to bring about change in the discredited. golitid system, his real ~ a s o n were s very different.

* First, Hussein Kamel" relationship with Saddam's oldest son, Idda:v, had deteriorated dramatically sfnce 1994. 'I'hey had stmggled over material rewards, power, prestige and money.zVt also seems likek that Uday-whose greed for power and money is legendary-had tried to move in on Kamel's turf hthe domain of military industries and control of the lintited oil exports allowed Iraq under sanctions. * Second, Husseh Kamel, who at fie time of his defection was M h ster of Industry and Minerals and I>isc?ctorof Mihtary fndustrialiaation, seems to have been convinced that sooner or later he would lose his power and pclssibly even his life. In May 1995, his uncle Watbm was dismissed as Mhister of Interior and in July 'Ali Hasan al-Majjd, one of the most powerful Tabitis, lost his post as Mhister of Defense. Both men were =placed by non-Takritis, Kamel implied that these cabinet reshuffles had an impact on his dtejsior~to defcct, as did a reported shoot-out on August 7 between the followers of m a y and the ~ c e n t l yfired 1"Jatf;7anIhrahim, following a gathering of mennbers of the Takriti clan durjng which Saddam's half-brother reportedly criticized both Hussein Kamd and. Uday * :Iraqi government and media statemmts described Karnel in biblicat leader. A terms as a "Judas," mther than as any kind of oppositio~~

26

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

typical statemmt reads as foilows, ""Just as Judas-who physically resembled fesus in Saddarn" mind-betrayed the Messiah, so did :Kamel-who resembles Saddam
Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

27

Saddam stated several months later that, "Had they asked me, I would have prevented them, but it was good that they did not,"3" Iraqi Vice-Presiefent Taha Yasin Ramadan declmd at the time of the killhgs that Chc "state had no say in the matter of his (Hussejn Kmel's) kiIling. It was the will of his family." He then seemed to invent a new definiticm of pardon when he & c l a d that ""pardon is not a right that belongs to traitors, It is a right that belongs to those who err or lose their way, but not to those who sell their country and its destiny."33 I h e participation of members of the government at a state fmeral for two of the melnbers of the al-Majids cvho led the assadt on the Karnel farnib also indicated Saddarn's satisfaction that the punishmnt had. been m t e d out m d family homr retrieved. On the other hand, the opposition gmups claifned thnt the dtat-hs of thc Kmels were foll,owed by wider purges and executions of members of the d-Majids and the killhg of Hussein Karnel and Saddam Kaxnel's chjldren, Saddam%own grandchildren." "ese claims have not been substmtiated m d may be part of the external opposition's strategy of painting the Takriti regime in the wcrrst possible light."" Why the Kamets Chose to return remains a mystery Mussein Kamel's arrival in Amman hAugust was regarded by many as the beginning of the end for Saddam Hussein's rt;gime. Hussein Kamel was seen as the source of information not only on Iraq's residual weapons of mass destruction, but also on the inner workings of the Ba"at_hist political elite, More significantly he was perceived as the potential architect of a ""pdacocoup" against Saddam Hussein. Mowever, this perceptim was flawed from t:he start, left unsaid was the questim of how a '6palace coup" plotter could succeed ff he were 600 miles away, Furthermore, Kameh suggestion to Western intel,lig;enco officials that the best way to unseat Saddam Hussein was to arm m d train an army inside Jordan to m v e on Baghdad under allied air cwer, indicates that he was scarcely the prime candidate to manage a palace coup." h fact, if Hussein Kamel, a senior member of the reginne and part of the T&riti d i n g family, courld not unseat Saddam tlussein, it was doublCuX Chat it would be any easier for others. mreover, the suspicion and. distrust of Kamel on the part of the opposition forces contributed to maintain his status as a pariah in m a n . Not surprisingly# Western states m d Jordan begm to o s e jnterest in Husseh Kmel. This took place notwithstanding the lattefs attempts to raise his profile and imprwe his i m q e by the creation of the still-born "Hi&r Council for the Salvation of Iraq.'' Husseh Kannel" failure to rally Iraqi opposition forces ultirnateIy did little more than provide the impetus for King Hussein of Jordan to take an acfivc role to bring some semblance of unity to the dispersed

28

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

Iraqi opposition. In turn, this more active Jordanian posture contributed to Hussein. KameX"s decision to return. He had expressed extreme displeasure with King Hussein" project. Flrst, he felt be was being fwther xnar&inalized. Second, he disagreed with the federal or confederal nature of the project. Third., he objected. to the inclusion of ""Iranians," by which he meant Shi'ite Islamists based in Iran. Furthermare, sources in the Middle East believed that Husseiz~Kamel feared that King Hussein would allow Iraqi opposition groups to bring war crimes charges against him for his artivi2ies in lraq over the years as a leading h e n c h a n of Saddarn Hussein"37 In condusion Karnel" ppolitical margiazalization h Ammm and his increasingly tense ~ l a t i o n swith kis hosts, his discomfort with a life Of' exile, his inability to be taken seriously by other regional. powers, especially Cairo and Damascus, and his belief that he could return mscathed because of his marriage to Saddam" ddaughter led him to take the fateful steps back to Baghdad.

Ifitep~esof Ofher Divisions Within Saddatn" Family Hussein KarneYs defection was followed by rumors about the loyalty of Saddam's half-brother, Barzan al-Tahiti--hay% aambasadcrr to the UN in Geneva. Barzan had writtell some extraardinary pieces on the deterioration of the Iraqi state, of the Arab world, the decline of Arab natimlal.ism, and on internatiod affairs generally in recent: years, particdarfy in rclgards to the factors behhd the collapse of the Sovkt Union. Although it is difficult to discern what led to his writing, it was c o m m d y accepted. that in mmy oE the pieces he was engaging in thinfy veiled criticism of the Iraqi regime. Barzan's impllrtance ljes not in the fact that he is Iraq's ambassador to the CJN but m m inhis cmtrd over Iraq" secret finances. Accordiq to some =ports Rarzm oversees a cornpiex web of undercover and d u m y colnpanies whieh, haw in excess of $20 billion in hidden investments.38 Durirrg August 3995, several sourtles in the Middle East reported. that Barzan al-Tahiti had ~fusecd.a direct order to reharn to Baghdad, that he had asked for political asylum inSwitzerland., and/or that he had sought rehge in m Arab country. 'These ntmcrrs came to an end, however, after a remarkable interview that Barzani gave on August 31, 1995. Barzan denied. that he had broken with Baghdad, but he dismissed the importance of Wussein :Kamel and indicated his growing disenchanment with some other rne~nbersof the ruling family* Barzan, who is Kamel" sncje, described Kamel as ""an impetuous, rough and aggressive boy who knows ncrtt7ing of civility.""""He also said that Karnel coufd not be seen as a legitimate alternative to Saddarn:")

Tke lrfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

In Iraq there are Arabs and Kurds, Sunnls, Shi?tes, Christians and hzidis, many minorities. What legitimacy does Hussein KameL have to gather the country around him? There is a deep chasm between him and the Iraqi KurQs. . . . How cc~uldthe Iraqi Shi'a coc~peratewith him when he was the one who attacked the tomb of the Imam Hussein bin A ' AXi?

Barzan dismissed Kamel" claim that Iraq was about to hvade Kuwait m d eastern Saudi Arabia out of hmd:41 I have only heard this story from him, and the western cl-runtries h o w that six years of stsnctionti on Iraq have afkcted its forces and its infrastructure. And even i f it were still capable o f attacking a small country like Kuwait, Kuwait has international, alliances to protect it. Simple logic refutes these allegations.

Barzan" commentary on the state o f affairs h :Iraq, particularly the m h d of Saddam a d the meteoric rise of the leader 'S son, tfday, was even more striking. He disxnissed rumors that the Iraqi leader was seeEng political asylum in Egypt, and confirmd the general perception of Saddarn as a m m Mxho is determined to stay the course or who would rather go down fightjng &an flee:42 President Saddarn Hussein is not the sort of man tcr seek political asylum or to accept to five outside his country; Nor wili he abandon his re~pon~ibiJitie~ and Lay them on the shoulders af otl-iers. And if he relinquishes pawer, the situatian will on1y worsen. The regime will not fall, and w e n if he is on his own and down to his last bullet, President Saddam will cl-rntinue to resist.

Barzan poured scorn an Uday fissein" ppretensions and ambitions:43 Iraq is not a monarchy with a son C>E" brother succeeding the king, it is a republic ruled by a revotutianary party. . . . I d o not know if Uday is preparing himself or not. But each man shouid know his values and abilitia if he is to avoid having many problems. Pro>btemsarise from people who do not know their true caliber. . . .

Uday: The "Son of Perielcsf'7 Hussein Kamel Hasan allMajid% reports that he feared for his life because of Wdayfsunp~clictahkbehavior, anci Rarzan" contempt for his nephew, highlighted the problems Saddam has in dealing with his oldest sm, in fhding a successor, and in relying an nepotism as a substitute for a broader base oE power, Wday :Elussein%is ncrw tJRirty years old, and seelns to be the closest thhg Saddam has to an heir apparent. 'There is a

30

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

broad c m s e ~ ~in s ~the ~ sMiddle East, however, that Barzm's description of Uday is largely correct and that may is a thug who larks Saddam's shrewdness, cumhg, political savvy, mthlessness, or ccmspiratorial mind-a:ll of wfiich are essential to survivc in Iraqi polities, The bluodiest reports of U'day's conduct centers around an incident in 1988.41According to a number of *ports, may bludgeofied to death Saddam's trusted m d loyd bodyguard K w l Hana Qgeo. He did so in a fit of rage over the fact that Kamd Hma Gegeo arranged for Saddarn to meet a new mistress, who later became his second a d most influcrntial wife. Saddam is reporkd to have been otlCraged by the murder of Gegeo and to have threatened to execute his son, although he then exiled him to Europe. After several years, however, Sa$dam forgave Uday allowd him to return from exile, and to estabbsh his o m power base and wealth. By 1990, Uday owned a chain of money-making food processing firms*He moved on to head the Iraqi Olympi~ommittee,thc.Football (soccer) iJeague, the Iraqi U'njon of Journalists, the W o n of Writers, and Iraqi Students Union. FXe took control of two papers, Babil and AlXafinnin-and used them to run articles critical of government officials and ministers like Information and Culture Minister, Harnid Uoussef Hammadi, who displeased Uday or Saddam. Uday b e c m e even richer after sanctions were imposed through his control of hotels, night-clubs, transportation centers, and the food smuggling business. He is the most prominent member of a parasitic class of Iraqis who have become fabulousfy wealthy because of their ability to make money through sanctions-breaking, Saddarn also increasingly involved Uday in intelligence and security mattcrs. In late 1994, Uday was given command of a new praetorian security detail, called Saddarn's Feda'iyeen (Saddads C a m a n d o s ) made up largely of teen-age toughs. -This securib- detail now has near carte Zllanche. Uday reportedly used this force in &-June to help put down the allegedly serious rcvolts or mutinies prompted by the Dulainni dissatisktion. The mom power and wealth he amassed., the mure brutal and g ~ e d yUday became, and more often than not, his prime victims were not ordinary f raqis-they often had nothing to give hh-but members of the ruling dite. Uday bullied or brutaIized other members of the Takriti ruling family-as w e l as other regime officials, and used his conkol of thc media to wage vitriolic campaigns in print ag&st men he dislikes, These targets included his half-uncle, Watba Ibrahim who became Il-tteriorMinister in 1,992 and was in overall charge d internal security, In 11994, Uday began to use his newspaper Babil to attack Watban, Wtban then lost his position as Mil-rister of Interior in late May 1995.45 It also seems possible that Uday was responsible for the abrupt removal of O l Nlin-

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

31

ister Safa Hadi Jawad al-Habubi and for the fall of Defelzse Minister Ali Hasan al-Majid.4" Qasny n ~ the d Hope 0fl)ysaasty

Saddam does have another younger, quieter, and far more effective son, atsay; 28, who cmtrols the Special Security Orgmization, which overseas all of the inl.elligence and security services of the regime. In contrast to his pathologically mlarderous older brother, Qusay, w11o shuns the limelight, is a l ~ ~ oinvariably st reparted as a mare serious and respo~zsible individual, Complicating Saddam" ppolLtical power over his family are repo&s of tensions building up betwecm t-he two bmthers over contml of the myriad number of security services, Saddam may have been alludj.ng to this still latent rivalry in a speech immediately following Kamelfs defection, He recounted the story of Cain and Abel, and said Cain, erroneously imagined that he had rights over his brother based on avarice, jealousy and envy; and not based on God's laws. 53)his avarice killed him when he tvas deprived of prestige, right, konor and kinship through kiIIing his brother. Thus, he became a wrongdoer.47

Saddarn seems to have little practical hope of ever fotrnding the equivalent of a political dynasty and may find it difficult to use his extended family as a secure asset in the future, It seems likely that Saddm has little hope that any of his snns could survi,ve him in power for more than a few months, and it is mom likely that the politically active members of his family will die if Saddm does, or be driven into exile. Famous fathers of ten breed infamous sons. Current Trends in Iraq's Infomal Power Stmcture The main short-term impact of Saddam" problems with key clans,

Kan-tel's defecticm, and the furor over tJLlay, has been to make Saddam rclach out to other sources of support from withh hjs coterie and rcverse his growing dependence on his family. %&am. s o u e t to do this in several ways.

* He curtailed U&y% visible political role and fnrced him to tone down his considerabiy f h k o y a n t lifestyle. Saddam reduced the visibility and power of Takritis in the state apparatus and widened the mling elite's power base by appointing older Ba'ath party mmbers and non-Takriti techncrcrats to positicms of power.48

32

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

Saddarn m d e new efforts to create the illusion of clemocracy In. 1995, he osmized a mssive national referendum to try to demonstrate that he was still in control and he still had the support of Iraq's people. This referctndum did not permit any oppctsjtion to run, it: simply asked the question, 'Uo you want Saddam to remain President for another seven years?" Citizens were given a choice of voting for or against an extension of Saddarn Mussein's rule for 7 years, and no other questions were included an the ballot, nor were there any political debates or carngaigne;.Vr>terswere obligated to identify themselves on. their ballots. The actual vote was held on. e t o b e r 15, 1995, and Saddam demonstrated that his police state was fully intact. Over 99 per cent OE the electorate reportedly voted, and 99.96 per cent approved the extension of Saddan's presidency. * Saddam promised in the fall of 1995 that there m u l d be new elccticrns for the National Assernbly in 1996. In March 1996, the government held the fourth and largst parli,an?ent.ary electiotns in Iraq's history. The highly publjcized campaign bad a number of '"independent""cmdidates, and reported voter turnout reached 93.5%. Ilowever, both Ba'athist and indepetndent candidates were screened in advance for loyalty to the regime and.for their support of the principles of the July 19B Ba'athist revolution. The Ba'athists won l69 seats and the now somewhat "wornffSa'adun Hmmadi was elected Speaker of the new National Assembly However, the 250-seat Iraqi Natimal Assembly is a political fiction which is comptekly suhordbate to the executive brmch. These cometic exercises have not changed the reaiities of Iraqi politics, lraqfmoerallprocess ol political repression and human rights violations have grown even worse during 1995 and 1996, and there is no real prosged that the rt;gime will take m e a s w s like moving the country acvay from "revolutionary'~o~vards "constjlntionat" legitinnacy. There is equal4 little prospect of a freer press, multi-paq plurafism, a more hdependent Nationd Assembly, and the disbanding of the Revolutionary Command Council. This makes the mid-to-tong-term impact of the recent tsends in Iraq's informal power strucbre hard to determine. There is no guarantee that Saddads declining s ~ ~ p p oin r tthe "center,'hith the clans, and with. his extended family will bring Saddam" downfall. The ""center" "ill lacks any clear alternative to Saddm. Blood kuds in ru1i11g clans and extended families have been the rule, rather than the exception, for thousands of yeas, Rders as diverse as Octavim, Gcnghis Khan, Napoleon, Louis X, Stalin, a d Hitler all survived such "fami1y'"robIems.. Now that the has accepted the terms of UN 5ecurit.y Council Resolution 986,

Tke lrfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

Saddam has at least a reasonable chance of s~~rviving several more pears of the impact of t:he remaining UN sanctions, and such a policy could simply end in increasing the ~vanchismand msenment within the ""center."Saddarn's acceptance of the t e r ~ of ~ UP9 s 9curity Council Resolution 986 has also giwn him. some mlief from the inlpact of economic sanctions. At the same time, Saddam. does sceln to be grllwing weaker over time. He scarcely seems Xikelp to pursue real reform, and his recent efforts to expmd his power base art. uniikely to bring him red loyaity or support from the ccnter-They may, however, iso1a.t.ehim more fmm key clans, and s m e members of his extended f m i l y This may make it progressively harder for S a d d m to avoid the backlash from his defeat in the Gulf War and UN sanctions, m k e coup attempts somwhat more likely, and i n c ~ a s ethe prhabilit). of more assasshation attempts. What is less clear is that any change in leadership in tbr ""center"of this kind will alter the rut.lnless, authoritarim character of Iraqi politics and whether there are w q s that outside powers can exploit the t m d s undern?ining Saddads ccmtml over the informal mechanisms of power. .h new Iraqi ruljng elite m y be somecvhat more pragmatic in character, and may turn inwards to deal with the problems posed, by Iraq%ppresent eccmomic crisis, the Kurds, and the Shi5iQs. Such a ~ g i m ehowever, , is still likely to perceive itself: as surrounded by encnnies, and therefore mahtain a high level of military spending. Further, any new "centristf"regime must deal with the threat posed by internal c h i c and sectarian conflict, and with the fact that Xraq's strategic position i s exposed in m a y ways. It is likely to see the growing military capabifities of Irm and Turkey as a threat, and tcr see the W s t and Southern Gulf stales as, at. least potmtialfy hodite countries, It is unlikely to trust Iran, which has a 1,448 kilometer land boundary with Xray. It i s likely to feel it must compete with its Gulf neighbors for a h a r e of oil revenues, and compete wit-h Iran in developing weapons of m s s destruction. As a result, future Iraqi regimes are likely to continue to seek weapons of mass destruction as long as any other state in the regim possesses them-incl~~dingIsrael. Implications for Western and Southem Guff Stsategy

This analysis of Iraq" hfol-mal power structure hdicates that the grosgeds for rapid, hndamental changes in the character oE Iraqfs rclgilrrc are anpfning but good. Saddam's recen.t. history in manipdatjng Iraqi pditics i s as strong an argument against any strategy that attempts to accommodate Saddam as is his past. Kogardless of any ag~ernents other nati.ons may reach with Saddam, hjs behavior will d y be as

34

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

restrained as it is forced to be and if Saddam becomes more sectlre wi.lhin Iraq, he is likely to translate this securiy into new foreip adventures. At one level, one may argue that virtually any leader other than Saddam is likely to be better and worth see&ng. No.t%tingabout Saddam's history indicates that he will be safe to deal withr or will ever be more moderate thm he is f o ~ e dto be. A strategy of living with S a d d m can only work if it is a strategy in kvhich the illusion of better relalinns is mixed with a strong US presence and power projection capability, firm deterrent action by the Southrm Gulf states, and efforts to insure that Iran remains a caunterbalmce to Iraq. No successor to Saddam can quickly acytlire the same personlal authority. :Most successors will probaZlZy be less ~vanchistand extrem in character, more willing to concenand less wilfing to jndulge in f o ~ i g n trate on Iraq's sterna1 prObl.e~~q adventures. Most successors are also more likely to rely m a coalition of factions and have less freedom of action, At another level, the previous analysis indicates that any successor to Saddam that is not the product of civil war is litkely to be an authoritarian Iraqi nationalist, and is likely to pursue many of Saddam" aambitians-at least covertly. Such a ""c~~trist'"eadermay initially use the language of moderation and democracy, but such rhetoric is li,kely to prove as hollow as Saddarn's, and sucl-ra leader will only be ""pragmaticf20the extent he is cleterred by Iraq's neighbors and the West. At least in the near-to-mid-term., the trends in Iraqi internal. politics seem likely to be a struggle for power by the same factims within the Sumi elites in the ""c~~ter" that brought Saddam and his coterie to power" Saddam" ruthlessness since 1979 has scarcely helped train moderates or teclx-rocrats,and his purges and executicms since the end of the Gulf \rJar have ensured chat mly the most rut-hless rivals can survive. As a result, even if sanctims succeed in brirtging down Saddam, a strategy of living with bis successor will probably be equal@ dependent cm the illusion of better relations, a strong US prc?semcc m d power projection capability, firm deterrent action by the Southern Gulf states, and eifurts to insure that Iran mmahs a comterhalance to Iraq. The very nature of Iraqi "centrist" ppolities atso ensures that- outside ot count on Saddam" fall and that they have little flexibility in trying to select some other ""centrist"' that will displace him. There are no vishle "cen.tristsf'outside pctwers can approaeln without mak-ing them targets for Saddam" securib-forces. There ma)i be an opportunity to support a well organized coup or assassination attempt, but this means tacitly accepting the coup leader as Iraq's next ruter" As a resultf any strategy based on using Ihe ""centr" to replace or moderate Saddam may well mean living with an elite that is incapable of putting litsthg- pressure on Saddarn to change or of finding any repface-

Tke Irfonrznl Politics of the "Center"

35

melnt for Saddam that will be a radical departure from a personalized authoritarian regime. m a t c m be done is to create a clear set of incentives and guidelines that wilI both set rues for the future?behavior of Iraq's rulers and encourage t h fall of Saddm. The problem with the present policy of sanctions is that it has no clear end game, offers m incentives, punishes the ordinary Iraqi far morc than the elites responsible for Iraq's actions, and sets only vague rules for the iuture. What is needed is to make it clear that the UN will be far more willing to lift smctions on favorable terns if Saddam goes, and l-hat debt rcllief, a forgivcncss of reparations, a forgiveness of war crimes trials, and trade and investment, will be dependent on Saddarn's depah"'e and the conduct of a successor regime. The US, I(uwait, and Saudi Arabia must face the fact that trying to force democracy m Iraq while mixing war crimes trials with massive reparations is simply a formula for another war. ?bey must be clear that no eMort will be made to try to i n t e r f c ~constantly i,n Iraqi "centrist" politics, and that the "'rules" h r better relations are limited to demands Iraq c m meet. n e s e include full recognition of Kuwait and the new border with Kuwait a settlement with the Kurds that ofers them protection and at least cultural autonomy, and Iraq" aagrclement to continuing UN inspedion over a period of years to limit sharply or prevent Iraq's reemergence as a power capable of using hveapons of tnass dcstruc.lim. At the same t h e , other Western states and other Gulf states must have no illusions. The word ""containment'kay bc unpopular, but military containmelnt will be needed until a new regime of a fundamentally different nature emerges in Iraq. The forces that have led to the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and an Iraq on the edge of becoming a nuclear power wilS rmt vanish with Saddam..me1.c also is little near-term prospect that any Iraqi regime drawn from the "center" will sulppo" political reiorm, humm rights, and liberaiization, or that these gods are cmes that outside pokvers can realistically hope to force on today"s Iraq.

The Formal Politics of Iraq's Instruments of State Power Saddam m d the present Bakath elite exert control over a number of strong instruments of state power. These instruments include the Revolutionary Comrnand Council, the Ka'ath Party, the security services and the military. Saddam and his coterie can exert control over these instrumnts & administrative structure, and a series of i n f o m l through both a h personal networks, Like Iraq's informal political structure, these instsummts of state power help to preserve Saddam Hussejn" rule and make it difficult for any rival other than anoher Sunni auf;horitarianelite to c m e to power. The Revo3tutionary Command Cauncil The Revolutionary Comrnand Council (RCC) is the supreme-decision making institution in the country. In practice, the RCC is a small clasekni."tody which includes Saddam Husseixr and his close associates. It is also a self-appointed body which appoints its chairman. The chairman of the Revolutionary Command Cowncil is Saddam Hussein, who is atso Pmsident, Pridne Minister, tbe Sccrctary-General of the Regional Leadership of the Ba'ath, i.e., head of the I r q i Ra'aEh partyf and Commander-inChief of the Armed Farces. The Revolutionary Command Council is under the total control of Saddam Hussein and his fmmediate supporters. Its decrees are issued under Saddarn's n m e and it has the power to appojnt the cabinet ulndcr his direction, It is a typical ruling body for an authoritarian state that combines the ability to rule through a personal elite with. an integrated line of control over party, governmernt, military e e o n m y m d security forces, Saddam's ability ta combine the political leaeiership of the Bakth, the leaders of governmmt' and the d i t a r y into one body whose actual dayto-day membership in dealing with any issue is under his direct c m t r d

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37

is ano&er factor that allows him to maiintain power and survive. Similar bodies in Nazi Germany and the Sovict Union helped prt.seme the power of Hitler and Stalin, ~spectively~ and have allowed ofher dictators to integrate personal rule into the adsninistrative structure of the st..ate.. The RCC does, however, make it difficult fur outside powers to deal with Saddam or any dictator fiat rules a sirnilar body. First, it allows the leader to eMectively bypass any apparcm.t.reform withir-t the formal strzlcent, If Saddam chooses, he can appear to permit reform et or National A s s e d l y and still use the other instwm e ~ ~oft sstate power to maintain cmtrol. Secmd, m y ""centrist" mug or change in government that ~ t a i n the s K C or its equivdent, also retains an authoritarim instrument of power that it is virtuaiiy certain to abuse. Few ""centrist" goups are likely to abandon the RCC renme it. The :RCC is another aspect of Iray's ppulitical structure that makes it likely that any successor to Saddam-short of one brougl~tto power by a civil war-will be similar in character. The Ba'aatk Party Like the Revolutionary Command Council, the Rakath Party of Iraq has shifted from a pan-Arab sociaiist party to become an extension of the Iraqi Sun,nj ruling elite. h the 196C)s,the Ba'ath had many of the characteristics of a genuine popular movement and a Sunni-Shi5ie partnership. h~deed,tbr founder of the Iraqi branch of the Ra'ath party, Fu'ad al-Rikabi, was a Writewfio conmlled an organization made up aimnst entirely of Shi5ie relatives and classmates, His successor, 'Ali Sal& aGSa%di was another Shi'ite from the workjng class neighhahood of Bah al-Shuyukh in Baghdad. Most of his supporters were petty gangsters from the m e neighborhood. This sihtatim & w e d radicdly by 4968, the t h e of the second Ba'athist coup. The role of Sunnis in the Ba'ath Party had risen sharply while that of the Shi5tes had precipitausly declined. This declhe can be explained by a number of factors, First, fobwing the cclllapse of the first Ba'ath regime in 1963, the Arab nationalist regime of AbdeZ Salam 'Aref hunted ShiriteBa'athists with more vigor and brutality than it did Sunni Bakthists. "T'his focus cm hunt* down the Shi?tes, rather than Sunnis, was a result of both the traditio~~al discrimhation against Shi?tes, and the fact that the Sumi Ba%thistswho were being hmted d o m were from the same fmilies, clans and tribes as the men i17 the security and intelligence services who were hunthg them down, The Depart~aentsof Interior and Security- were filled with functionaries from Al-Ramadi and the Sumi quadas of norlchem Baghdad, who made far less effort to find their Sumi ' ~ c o L ~ ~ ~ s . ' '

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Since 1968, the policies of the Ba'ath Party has also been reshaped by Saddarn Hussein" rehterpretatim of 8a"thist ideology* This took the form of pragmatism in the 3970s and 3980s, and opporknism in the mid1991)s.Saddam has dune much to de-legitimize Ba'a"chi&ideology. Me has never been an ideologue per se, but rather a quintessential political ortganizer, a conspirator and a m m of action, He has seen tbr party"s icleologues, particularly those on the left' as a threat and has done rnuch to drive them from power and to replace the Bakth P a r v s orighal ideology. Saddam was also ~sponsiblefar the emergence of an 'Iraqi-firstf ideological framework at the expelnse of pan-Arab nationalism-a basic principle of the Ba'ath. As part of his efforts to unite Iraqis of ail ethnic and sectarian bacict;rounds, Saddam developed the idea and practice of a Mesopotamian and Iraqi identity that was bofh Arab and non-Arab, and Islamic and.non-Islamic. He nut onIy transformed '"8tii"atkist socialism" into ""state opportunism," he made the Bakth party into a c m r for lraqi nationalism. S a d d m accelerated tfiis trend during the Irm-Iraq war when Iraq was figbaing for sheer survival. From 1982 omards, he tied Iraq" role in the Iran-Iraq War to Mesopotamia's llong history of warfartll with, the lranian plateau. and the tacit revival of the CaIipbate in Baghdad. He accused the Arab world of f a i h g to support Iraq im the stmggle against a "hated'Tersian enemy At Ihe same time, he faced the irony that Syda-l;he birth-place of modern Arab nationalism m d of Ba%a.thism-supported. Iran, He also faced a sihtaeon where the ctmservative Arab Gulf states never fully endorsd Iraq's hvasion of Iran, graduatly cut their aid, and insisted Chat Iraq accept loan agreements that saddkd it with billions of dollars in debk. After the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam struck another b h w to the Ba%&istedifice. Me began to dismantle t-he huge and inefficknt sncidist inrastruchre m t and to hplement a maswithin the Ba'ath party and the Iraqi gove and of op up the Iraqi economy to forsive pmgram of privatizatio~.~ eign invesfment. m e fact that Iraq's economic reform program failed to p d u c e any significant success by the time Iraq hvaded Kuwait did not prevmt Saddamfse.Miortsfrom cutting back the Bda& f"arqfshuge administrative stmchre, as well. as the bureattcracy, a sil-uatio~ncvl-ricfi adversely affected the lower middle class which serviced the state sector. I'he Bdath party suffered a fur&= loss of morale and pmstige dufing the rebellions foltowing the Gulf Ww. Party officials and functionaries we= not prepared for trouble, and mmy were either killed by the rebels or panicked and fled. Following the insurrections, the government established a comission of four high-ranKng officials to look into the conduct of the party cadre durislg the crisis. The result was that hundl-eds of mbers were removed f r m their posts and many arrests were pedally in the middle Euphraks rcgim A r e the morc seriotls insurrections took place.

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Saddarn maclie a decision to reduce the size of the party, and m y members were asked to surmder their party membership. Saddam took the public stand that it was better to ~witalizethe party by relying m the vanguard that had bmught the Ba'ath to power, and on an eli.tist party orgmization with mnrc dedicated hdividuak, rather than see the Ba'ath weakened by the presence of ""self-seeking" persons. Saddam put it this way, "let those who wish to leave the Balath pmty do so, so that the Ba'ath continues as a brigbt lantern to uur people and glorious nation." In practice, the criteria for selection was the wiliingness to support Saddam, The Ba'ath was sy"ematically purged in ways that stressed l011g service and proven loyalty, and this reixlforced the generatimlal gap between dder leaders who bad participated in the struggle for power before? 1968, and younger members who we= products of an Iraq which the Ba%th had ruled for more than a quarter of a century. At the same time, the Ba'ath was made into even more of a tool for selecthg careerists and obligixrg technocrats, and providhg a parallel bureaucracy to ensure the loyalty of the gove ent and armed forces, The end result is that the Babth is now almost totally an instrument aE state control and is virtually devoid of popular ideolngical cmtent or appeall. Barzan al-Takriti, Saddam" h&-brother' provided an accurate epitaph for the Ba'athfs pan-Arab ideotogy in 1993, when he stated:lq Now we as a government are unable to persuade the Iraqi citizem to take an interest in any issue except theirs. We have done mc)re than our duty. The Iraqis naw need to think abaut their cormti-y;... The Arabs should not expect anything from Iraq,

Indeed, the pmticipation of k a b states in Chc destruction of Iraq as a leading Arab power, as well as their near-silence or posturing in the face of the UN sanctions, may make it impossible to revive the f'an-Arab nature of the Ba"at-h or create any nekv pOtiticai parties which are not fcxrused on Iraq" ininternal needs. Furthermore, the onset of the ArabIsraeli peace process and the various Israeli-Palestinian agreements also prcsents problems in reviving the Ba'ath as a politied movement, Unyielding hostility to Israel seems to be becomhg obsolete as a catdyst for Pan-hrabism and it is unclear that any oher catalysts exist which are of serious interest to Iraqis. Even the regixne" efforts to oppose the peace process bave been lukwarn and udocwed. Iraqi officials like Tariq Aziz have takm the stmd &at since Iraq was not a party to the peace p c e s s and was not i,nvited, Baghdad can hardly be expected. to endorse it: while remaining a "pismer.""He expressed Iraq's views starkly in late 1995 MIhen he stated: ''Iraq is not party to it (the peace process). Wtle&er it is successfu1or unsuccessful, right or wrong, Iraq is not concerned, neither legally nos practicalfqi."w

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At the same time, the regime has give11 the Arab-Israeli peace issue little real emphasis. It has held covert talks with some Israeli officials, and. it is unlikely to commit itself to the Palestinian cause ir-t any serious way u ~ ~ l ethis s s cmtnibutes to Iraq's tactical m d political. advantage.

The Cabinet and Government Leadership Iraq has never been stable enough to crcate a structure of g u v has not been the scene of constmt st long manipulated the cabi.net and go control over the corntry; He used this to help restore his authorify over Iraq after the Gulf War, although he begm this process by cloaking his actims with an imago of moderation..As has bee11 discussed earlier, Saddarn talked. of democratic reform and ethnic autonomy right afier the war, On March 23,1991, he ounced that he was making a former Foreign Mhister-Sa'du11 Harnmadi-Prime Mhister. Harnmadi was a Bakath party veteran, but was also a ShYite who had advocated a somewhat more liberal, democratic, and less anti-Western form of f-5afathism. Saddam made several other gestures. Iraq amam~cedits tentative acceptance of Kurdish autonomy m March 24. Un May 8, 1991, Iraq announced that the rulirrg Revolutionary Command Cour~cil(RC61 of the Ba'ath wndd be abolished m d repaced with a more democratic government. In Masch 1991, it declared an amnesty for deserters who were not: officers, and expanded the coverage of this a The actions soon proved to be a political. smoke screen"a c e Saddam and his coterie reconsolidated power in the summer and fall oi 1991, they proceeded systematically to pwge t.he military a d governmen&as well as the Ra'ath. They s~tpprcssedany real disse~~t, viniated the civil rights of Iraqi citizens, and put additional Hlilitary pressure on the Kurds and 5hi"tes. Mihen the K C fhally did announce the law allowing opposition pasties on July 4, 1991, the law had vaguely deflrned security restric.lions that allowed the government to ban virtually any party it wanted and explicitly forbade any e t h i c or sectarian parties. By the time the new law was actually passed on 9ptember 3, 31991, it effectively prevented m y opposition from taking open polil-ical form. The government'?; totaf lack of il~dependencewas demonstrated when Saddam relnoved Prime Minister Hammadi from power on %ptember 16,1993. S a d d m Hussein, did appoint H a m a d i as a Presidential adviser, but the position had little real influence. Saddam's ""rhabilitation" of Hammadi, seems to have been part of a broader efSort to rebujld support from Shi5ites and other leaders in the Ba"ath Party that were not part of Saddam's immediate coterie. While Hammadi was replaced with another Shi5te-Mohammed Hamza Zubeidi-Zubeidi was little more than a stooge. Even cosmetic efforts at liberalization

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soon ended, and the Ba'ath elite effectively restored its control obrer most of Iraq. ent begm to take the public stand that it did not face any. hternal problei~sm d could meet all external threats. On October 12, 1991, at an Iraqi-organi.zed "cmkrence of Arab popular forces," "Sadtdanr ounced that Iraq could withstand the UN sanc~ons for ""twenty years." Saddam Hussein also used the gover~~xnent to support his stratew of firing scapegoats, He dismissed the Minister of Health, Abd atsalam aGSa%d on mcernber 23, 1991-making him thc. scapegoat fnr the deteriorating economic and pubjc halhh condit-iomcaused by the UN smctiom.~~ This dismissal set a pattcrn which Saddam has followed ever sinre. Saddam constantly finds new officials a d businessmen outside his key szxpporters he can blame for Iraq's pr&lems, while he rotares or "recycles" other supporters to maintain thejr loyalty while keeping them from emerging as an fndepmtfent power base. For example, Saddam reorganized the Iraqi cabinet on Jllly 30,1992. Saddarn made his Fmigin Mhister, Abed Hussein, the Finmce Minister and promoted the DepuQ Foreign :Minister, Rcrohammed Sa'ili Sahhaf, to Foreign Minister, He dismissed the formr Finance Mhister, Majid Abed Jaafer, m d m d e Ihe head of the Iraqi Atmic h e r g y Organization, Humam Abd al-aaliq Abd al-Ghafur, the Minister of Education. The exact rcasons for each of these changes to the cabinet and govemment are unclear. It is cleal; however, that their cumulative effect is to tigl~tencontrol over domestic affairs and demonstrate Saddam's cmstant efforts to deal with the faults ers. They also providc. SadiJam with a way of publicly blamjng go ent officials and cabkets for the fact that Iraq has not been able ke much progress tokvarcjs genuirne ~construetionand the lifting of sanctions. Saddam has also taken steps to impmve his control over the government at lower levels. 'Ilhroughout 1995, the Iraqi government forcibly trmsferred hundreds of government workers from one job to another, purportedly to prevent the development of potential opposition in any government institutions. After a f d e d coup a pt in f i r & and further djsturbances in May and June, the Gow nt arrested, removed fPom thejr jobs, or otherwise punished numerous 1raqi.r;for thejr alleged. association with these incidents, C)nce again, this manipdation of the instruments of state power is certajn to present problems fnr the future. The use of the formal structure of government as a scapegoat makes it mow difficult to create an effective administrative structure and to find a substitzzte for one man rule, or rule by a small elite. At the same time, a number of purges have reached far down into the structure of government, and delayed or unctercut: the development of modern state institutims, This again makes it difficult for any new regime to change the nature of Iraq" gov-

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ernmel~twithout massive purges of Saddam" supporters, and without changi.ng the entire way FR which the administrative structure of gove m e n t actuatiy operates.

Financial Resources Saddam Mussein and his coterie derive lurtber power from their ability to use governmental institutions to exert control over every aspect of :Iraq's wealth. They control the state's ecmomy t r o u g h their ability to allocate oil revenues, rcgulate d l mpects of trade and banki.ng, allocate over foreip exchange, allocate and control the sale of much of Iraq's land and housing, control education and many aspects of salaries and promotions, and more rece~~tly through the manipulation of rationing and subsidies, This centraiized cmtrol has always been abused, but it did provide some benefits for the Iraqi people during the period before the Iran-Iraq W r . The Bakath used much of the rcvenue from Iraq's oil exports to fund ecmamic development. Analysts like Muhamrwd Al-Zain)i, who completed a massive study of Iraq's cconomy in Arabic in f 995, point out that Iraq had one of the highest economic growth rates in the world in the mid-197"0s.Q This grokvth was fueled by the massive rise in oil revenues that followed the 1973 October War. In 1972, Iraqi oll revenues hovered around the $1billion mark. By 1980, this total was $25 billion. 111 the space of eight years, this weat* csrrated the opportunity for the regime to engage in economic development, k p r o v e the standard of living and diversify the economy The gove ent embarked on a massive spending spree, and total government expelnditure rose from $1.4 billinn in current dollars in 1972173to $21 billion h 1980. Even before Iraq iwaded Iran, however, many aspects of Iraq" ddevelopmelrt &fort were in seriow trouble. Xraq could or~lyabsorb a kaction of the wealth pouring into the country and into new industrial production m other forms of productiwe invesf-ment. While Iraq created many elemel~tsof a modern hl"rastsucture, it: made little progress in diversifyivlg the economy. Tke crude oil sector contri:buted 66% of the gross domestic product (GDI') in the mid-197(ls, and this cmly declined to 62% in 1980rclflecling a eoNhubg dependency on primary production and little diversification of the other sectors of the economyYMuch of the gmwth in other areas took place in new service industries Mihose net effect was to increase Iraq's reliance on impllrts and foreign lahor, Iraq" efforts in the area of ecmomic planning felf short of their dZocated targets between 195&19KO. Xraq had a timited "absorptive capacity" because of poor planning, shortage of skill.ed labor, and inadequate infrastructure. The state sector rernahed far too large m d inefficient and

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many barriers remained to private hvestment and the development of agrirulture, Only 58%of Iraq's total financial allocations were spent. Furthermore, the ~ g i m experienced e sericrus difficulties in making wise and eMicient invest~~ent choices in the public sector. It had been cut off from the m a i n s t ~ a mof the international capitalist economy for balr a decade. It retained shltifying socialist policies and a suspicion of 'Wstern imperia,lismt that made it difficult to consult. with f m i g n firms or rely on m r ket hcentives. It had few oificials experienced in international bushess, It had no idea of hcrw to draw up specificaticms, evaluate bids, and award cmtracts to international firms. The government" use of its control over Iraq" financial resources had far more negative effects after the start of the :Iran-Iraq War. Iraq shifted many of its =sources to miiitary spendjng and arms, spending that totaled 40% to 47'% of Iraq" GDP, Arms imports leaped from around 15% of totaf imports bellore the war to 60Y0to Kt)% of total imports. At the same time, Iraq's GDP per capita in cmstmt 1991 dollars dropped frnm $3,271 in 1982-when Syria cut off m a y of %ray% oil exports-to $2,278 in 1988 at the end of the Iran-Iraq W r . It dropped to $1,400 during 1990 because of low oit =venues m d a fail~treto djversjfy Xraq's exports, and then to $705 in 1991, because of the cut off of all Iraqi e~ports.~3 As a result, many of Iraq's current ecmornic prcrblems began long before the UN sanctions werc in?post.d in 1991*They art. the cuxnulative resU,It Of: vast mismanagement and waste during 1974-1979, and the dramatic accentuation of militarism and military spending that begm with the onset of the Iran-kaq War in 1,980,and which lasted until Iraq's defeat in the Gulf VVar in 1991, nroughmt his rule, Saddam has chosen g m s over butter, and has used the apparahs of the state to spend massive s m s on irmtemal and external security. Military expendihres in constant $1991 dollars irrcreased from $343 mdlion In 1970 to $10,121 mdlion h 1981 (about: IZO times) and then attained a wartimd. peak of $21,3@ million in 1984.s I:.,ongbefore the current crisis, Saddam used the state to subsidize and rewardt his supporters. His internal security strategy has a h a y s mixed targhib and tarI~ib,the ' s t i d k i t h the 'carrot.3hlrrtly after the 1968 coup Saddam esthtished a scparate and independent (i.e., indepel~dentof official state control) channd for allocating state funds, He set up large accounts inside and outside :Iraq, and used these funds to pay or bribe cronies, potential allies, and large groups of the Iraqi peaple. For example, Saddarn ordered the distribution of thousands of T V sets to the poor ent riots in the poor Shifite suburb of Medifollowi11g the anti-gove nat al-mawra h Baghdad. In the 1970s m d 1980s, the fraqi gove nt went on a major lmd-buying spree by forcing owners to sell land at huge discounts to the state. 'These lmds were then parceled out to supporters of the regime, party officials, the military and fmi2y members. At the s m e t h , the revenues

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from such sales or tsmsiers went to private accounts. In additior~,the government allocated state hrtusing and contrwts to supportersf and provided hcentives like automobiles, university entry, fo~itgnschcrlarships, and other consumer goods (m cash payme~~ts) to build Xoyalty. It then expanded these programs to reward the military during the Iran-Iraq War. The Irm-Iraq War led Saddam to create a new tool of e c m m i c power. He set up a massive network of purchasing offices otltside Iraq to buy arms, and to put billions into covert accounts to acqulre the technoiogy to build weapons of mass destructictn. Many of these accounts were held overseas in neutral states, and under blind fr0n.t.s.'They had virtually no government acmunting controls or suger\rision. 'E'here is no way to know how many of:these accounts survive, or what funds Saddam has drawn b n ? them since the C;& War, but thcy supplement his personal hvldings overseas and those of his family, and no Western government has yet ~ p o r t e dgreat success in tracking such accounts"At the sarnc time, Iraq's intelligence and security service mahtains surveillance over the foreign accounts of all other Iraqis and the state can control both domestic banking accounts and the albcation of f o r e i g ~exchmge ~ resotlrces, The UN sanctions have led Saddam and his coterie to add rationing, subsidies, price controls, and foreip exchange cmtrols to this list of instrunnents of state power. The state cannot control the black nnarket or the private distribution of personal wealth, but it does control the day-today ecmomic life oE many citizens, sipificant overseas assets, d l banks and most industrial capital transactions, the ratiorlixlg and docation pmcess, capital transfers, imports, export revmues, exit permits, and the repatriaticm of capital. Money is fungibLe, and the regime can manipulat-e the income it receives as a result of agreeing to the terms of t"Pd Securit)l Council Rcsolution 986 by shifting mtzney that tl-te UN does m t control away from food and medicine into other areas, and it has all the tools to find economic scapegoats and seize the private wealth of its opponents, The g w ent may have impoverished the people, but the result is a highly authoritarian poverty hvhese Ihe state still exercises ruthless contml.

Saddam has always relied heavily on Iraq" htelligence services and security stmcbre to maintain bis power. The only period in which he made any effort to moderate the public jmage oE these services was after the Gulf Was, and this efiort virtually ceased by late 1991, On December 23, 39Nf the Interior Ministry warned that an amnesty for tu cclwed firearms w u l d only last f 0 morc days. C h Jar~uary1,1992, Uday called for t:he public execution of dissidmts inhis newspaper, Nnbil, From

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that time onwards, the security services ruthlessly s u p p r e ~ e dany opposition with minimal regard for world. opinion, In 1995, Iraq's security and intcfligence forces ~ m a i n e done of the largest single instrume~~ts of gover ent power m d tofaled over 100,000 men. They hclude massive civil police forces, large intelligence and internal security units, and large military and paramilitary forces like the Repukllican Guards, Speejal Republican Guads, and Saddarn Hussein's bodqiguards or special security force. Saddam" elite security forces alone seem to total up to 35,000 men, There artr also state political intelligence and security services that help protect Saddam Hussein and his coterie, These organizations are afl beaded by officers supposedly loyal to Saddam H u s s e h e o m e of whom are related to hhn, members of his A1 Bu Nasser tribe, or the other two brmches of the Rkriti tribe. Iraq" security forces arc the subject of constant changes in command, at least some of which involve arrests or executions. The mail1 intellig e ~ ~and c e security services include:5"

* The Presriientinl Afail=cDqarfrrre~t07 S~ecialSearit:# Semtw (An-l~nlKhass). This orgmization operates within the presidential palace, and was established in the mid-1980s, after an attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein highlighted gaps or failures in the aiready extensive dnak of secwity around the Iraqi Leades, Its top leadership is ed by men personaily selected by Saddam Hussein, Its overall m is to protect Saddam from assassination a ing from withh the Army hjs family or the govc Some experts feel it manages Saddam Hussein' accounts, intelligence operations invoking the purchase of foreip arms and technology, and s o m aspects of secwily w i t h Iraq's military industries. It was headed by Mafor General Fanar Zibin Hassan al-Tikriti d u r a the Grrli War, and is now headed by Saddarn% younger son, Qusay The most important unit within the al-A Khilss is the @wat al-Himaya whose direct task is to act as bodygm" to the President. The tasks of the Special Security Service are extensive and they include: * Guaranteeing the security of the president and providing protection. * Ensuring the secufity of all presidential facilities such as palaces, guest-houses, etc. * Supervision of the other security and intdigence services and of government: ministries and agencies and maintenance of a close watch on the top brass of the armed forces. * Maintain caapcrlration with (and posibly mmitor) a unit of the Republican Guards, the "Special &publican Guard"3ivision formed in 1991192which was tasked pxrimarily with regime secu-

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rity. 'The "Special Republkm Guard" i s not to be canfused wit-;h the reguXar RagFtdad-based Republicm Guard. division. The fnrrner has three brigades MIhich guard the southern, norl.-hern and western arteries into the city * The General fntelligekzce Sevzrice !AI-Mukhabamfal-.Avlma).TheGXS is the intelligence and security service of the Bdath party. It grew directly out of the clandestine Ka'aCh party security organization built up by Saddam Hussein in the 19CtOs and known as the Jilmz Na~eerz(Instmment of Ycraming). Not surprisingly this securitycum-intellige~~ce service has been controlled by trusted m d Xoy al party members. General Intelljgence is divided into ur7its or bureaus that are spread throughout the country. Overseas, G1 operatives arc at-tached to Iraqi embassies. Its tasks incllade: * Conducting counterespionage and monitoring subversive activities. * Supervising of the Ba'ath party m d other political orgmizations. * Maintainhg a watch over internal minurities such as the Kurds and Assyrians. * Suppresskg opposition activities emanathg from Shi5tes and other mhori"t.es, * Maintaining a watch ower fomipers in Iraq, including those from Arab countries.. * Conducting sabotage, subversion, and terrorist operations against neighboring countries such as Syria and Iran. * Providing fkancial and nnilitary aid, including logistic& assistance, to opposition. * Targeting groups in countries hostile to Iraq. * Military I-tlltelligence Ml-IstikhkTilt 11l-Ashri~aJ.This organization dates back to the time of the mnarchy and is mamed. largely by army officers. It focuses m foreip militaq threats, but alscr is responsible for intemal security kvithhz Ihe lraqi mi,l.i-y Xt has ties to sorne radical movements and.has conducted intelXigence operations overseas. &ring the Gulf War, military intetligence was headed by Major Ceneral Sabir Abd al-Aziz Husseh al-hri-a Smni Arab from Dur, the hometown of tzzat tbrahh, the E)eputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Duri was m old-the Ba%athistwith ties to the army and senic,r party Leaders, but wati replaced after the Gdf War by Major Generd Wfiq Jassin7 S ara%Sammara? was later arrested and ffed to Syrin, and was replaced by either Major General a a l i d Salih al-Juburi or Ma~srGeneral Abd al-nadir S a h a n m m i s (a T h i t i rdated to Saddam), The head of military intelligenre is Mu'tamad Ni'mah al-Takriti who replaced a a l i d al-Juburi.x Some experts feel &at Colonel Abd Hassan aX-Majid, Ali Hassan al-Majid's yomger

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brother, was the true power hz miEbry hztelligence before his defection, It has the following tasks: Ensuring loyalty of the a m e d forces to the ~ g i m e . Supemision of sec~~rity and cou~zterintelligem in the armed forces, Collection of ir^ltt.fligence and tac"cica1 and strateljic research m cou~ztriesdeemed hostile or threde~zingto Iraq. * Miaging of psychological war against enemies. Implementation of deception plans during wartime. Cooperation with foreign htelligcnce services. * Conducting terrorist opemtims abroad against hostile countries, goup"(Kurds), anci opponents of Saddam Hussefn. During the 2981)s mili.tary intelLjge12ce operatives in the oftices of military attaches in Iraqi embassies in Western Europe werc involved in such activities, Reportecaty agents of the Istikhbarat were rczsponsible for the assassinat-im of Saddam"s opponents in Reinal, Lmdon, and Paris. Among the victilrns was Abdul Razzaq al-NayeE, a former senicrr Ba'athist official in the early days, who was murdered in Lmdon in 1978. * Conducting research and studies on technological issues. CmeraI Security or Stnlje btter~zalSeczcrit;y (Al-Ant~zral-Amd. Along wit-,h Military Intelligence, this organization is the ddest securit.y/ intelligme service in Iraq. Until the Ba'ath came to power in 1968, it ed by professional policemm and a m y officers, If was szxbseq~le~ntty purged and "Ka'alhized" by Saddarn's paternal cousin, "li Hasan al-Majid, who ran. the service from 1988 00 1988.This mgmizatim focuses largely on internal security, but occasitmally conducts f o ~ i g noperations. Major Gelled Abd al-R&man a l - h i headed this organization before the Gulf War, but Saddam appointed his half brother, Siba%wifbr&hn, as the head after the Gulf War. In July 2996 Siha'acvi Xbrahim w s replaced as &rector of inter~~al security by General T A a "&as al-hbabi. Saddam" relations with his half-brothers, the f b r h h s , have worsened considerably. The Ibrahims m longer trust their half-brother or those dosest to hixn, particularly his two sans, and have reason to fear for their lives. Watbm was shot in the leg by Uday and ultimately lost his Limb. This was Mlocved by the defection and subsequent murder of Mussein Karnel following his ill-advised. return to Baghdad. Then Barzm iPlsulted the patholcrgically mstable Uday from the relative safety of Geneva, and the latter vocved revenge. Wben Watban and Siba'awi developed a keen intercst in having Iraq f ~ l l m i n gthe murder of Hussejn Karnd and some of his relatiwes, Saddam responded by putting both Wathan and Sibdawi undcr house arrest in early July 2996.57

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Ba'ufh, Seczrrilcy (Am11 al HiZbl. This security office develops intelligence on party members, and has security-cells throul;hout the Ba'ath Party. * The Tribal Chil-ifs Bzlrentr (Muktrab nl-Shliytrkh). This is a new burcau that was created after the Gulf War. 'This service pays tribnl leaders to control their tribes, spy on posible tribal dissi&nts, and provide arms to loyal tribesmen to suppress m y disside~nts.It was headed by Major S a d d m Kamel, a coush and ssn-ill-law of Saddam Hussein and Mrassein Kacnel's youlnger brother, Saddam K m 1 defected with his brather to Jordan. Suddanl's Fedayenz. Saddam's Fedayem are led by Saddarn's eldest son, Uday* They were formed after the defection sf Hussein and Saddarn Kamel. They are ewipped MIith some heavy weapons, including PT-76 light tanks and Bm-70 armortrd personnel carriers. 'They are coolposed largely of teen age Takritir;Iron? the s m e clan as Saddam, and are. trained by the Republicm Guarcf. 'I'hey dress in black and often keep thcir k e s covered.3" * The Mililincj Bzkreu~lof fhe Bn'afh hrfy. The Military Burtlau was also stremglhened and rclorganized after the Gulf War* It is headed by Saddam, and his deputy is his cousin a d brother-fn-lw, Kamel Rashid Vassin. It acts as a commissar sydem to indoctrhate the armed forces, and cheek on their political loyaity %c. Ministry of X~~formafitllz, Most Middle Easkm governrne~ntscontrol their media and the press, and use it as an intelligence and pmpaganda senice. Iraq's Ministry of Information has served as both a particularly strmg and ruthless instrument of control. It tolerates some kjnds of csiticism-many of which seern to be mnipulakd to give tl-te image that it is safe to make Sad&, :Elussein aware of the faults of govemmmt or give outsiders the impression of a free press, At the same t h e , it contrals virtually every word written or spoken in the Xraqi mcdia, uses "journalists" to propagmdize internally and abroad, and has a long list of '"writers," "academics," m d ""artists" it can use to influence both domestic and foreign opixrion. 'The Ministry also has close Iinks to other intelligence services so that it can control or spy on foreign visitors and journdists, and manipulate crowds and media events in Iraq. For example, it maintains a long list of seelningly private Iraqis wfio arc fluent in foreign languages and who i t ensures appear in f m t oE cmeras. Some of these Iraqis are allowed to give private interviews that support Iraqi propagan""la+ven when the spokesperson appears to be scrmetruhat criticat. 'The Mjnistry of Information also atternpts to manipulate f o ~ i g n scholars and international bodies visiting Iraq. It also has a list of quasi-academic institutions it can use to hold and mmipulate meetings and conferences and use to develop contacts between foreipers and seeming "moderates" and "opponent-S" of the regime.

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Tlie Foreiglr Militistry. 'This ministry rnixes legitirnat-e diplomats with members of the intelligence and security servjces. Like the Soviet diplomatic serwic.e during tbe C o d War, it is so clcrsely linked tcr intellige~~ce operations that it is impossible to disthguish between diplomats and the Iraqi equivalents of the KGB. * T72e Iraqi fiulellonfntultiGUti~n~ sewices urzd 81ajo.rracudeffiicurzd wsmrc:bz itzstitrtlions. .hfl of these institutions have intelligence and security cells desigsled to improve state control. Mmy have special sections for military m d intelfigenw eefforts, for purchasing eyuipment to be used for military purposes, and supporting gover ganda and outreach efforts in dealing with foreipers,

and sczcurity eMort is so large and so permeatkg This Iraqi intellige~~ce that it gives Saddam Husseh far more power t h is oitm apparent, At the same time, its p w e r and ties to virtually ewry element oE the Iraqi gove r ~ ~ mme d~ Iraqi ~ t society act as a powerful. resistmce to political chmge. The intcrlligmce anlt securiv structure may not be loyal to Saddam as a man, but it is a h o s t ertainly loyal to its o \ ~ nself-interest and is likely to prove a lastlng barrier to the emergence of any new government or mllng elite which does not make shidar use of such instmments of state control.

The Iraqi Amed Forces 'The political rde of the Iraqi military is a n?ajor part of the problem lraq d stmcture very faces in creahg effective forces. Iraq has a b m a l c lar to that of other ~ g i m aml f i i t a q forces, with all the xqnired CwBM capabilitjes and fac2itic.s.At the same t h e it has highly p0li.ticizc.d military forces whirh have a long history of playjng a violent role in Iraqi, politics and which have fou&t repeated civil wars against Iraq%Kurds and SWites. of state control as they are 'The Iraqi armed forces are as much an hstrume~~t a means of national: deknse and mil4tary pwer, 'They axe a key to4 ipl the ruling elite's efforts to secure mems of power, t-ct coerce the Kurcls, m d to suppress systematicaiily m y theat hnt Iraq's Sfifit.es. The army has intervened in, politics many times since the emergence of modern Iraq as a state. The pcrliticization of the Iraqi Army began w2h the creatinn of the state in 1920, when King Faisal pkced ex-Ottoman Sunni Arab officers at the head of the political, administrative and military posts. The first coup dktat in the Arab world occurred in Iraq in 1936 under the helm of General Bakr Sidki, an Arabized Murdish officer from Mosul. There were eight successfulamong many other unsuccessful-coups d"etats in Iraqi politics between independence and the return of the Ra'athists in 1968. Thc first Bahthist regime was overthrown by the military in 1363, In Syria, the Ba"ath came to be dominated by the military-which re-

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mains a source of the bitter ideological disputes between a 'fraternal' Bdathist Syria and a Bdathist Iraq, Iraq's currcsnt military forces have been shaped by this history. Sacidam and hir; coterie fully understand both the risks and adwantages of using military force as an instrument of state cmtrol, Tahiti-domhated. Ba'athists took over in 1968 with the help of sympathizers within the kllnw g Takritis in key armored u~zits.C,mg beforc? armed fnrces, i n c l ~ ~ d b that time, however, they had learned ample and painful lessons in what the armed forces could accomplish through a coup dktat. Saddarn underst..ood all too well, that cooperation between Ihe military and Ihe Sa'ath could turn to the advantage of the militaryf which might seek to govern alone or independently of the party's principles and directives." Since 1968, the Ba'athists and especially Saddam Mussein have had considerable success in their constant efforts to h p r o v e their political c o n t d w e r the armed forces." ""f'heBa'ath regime began mass purges and r c t i ~ m e n o tf senior officers imediately after it c a m to power, By Dccembes 1968, the Chief of Staff,Faisal al.-Ansari, and eight divisional commanders we^ purged and replaced by t m t d Bgathists. By the end of 191i"0,3,000new commissions had been amamzced. These new officers led to the genesis of a political commissar system, Furthrmorc, the regime ensured that loyal d i c e r s held key positiom. By the early 1970s the Takriti Kdathists controlled the Ministry of Defcnse, the air forcep :Flabbaniy& air base outside Kaglndad, Baghdad security and.the city's ga"it;on, and the RepuHican Guards brigade.63 Saddam Mussein has steadiJy co~zsolidatedhis control over the military making it a key aspect of his control over the state. Not lmg after coming to full power in 1979, S a d d m stated in an hterview with the Bfi&h journalist David Mirst &at the skingelzt measkas of poliGcd co~ztrolbeing adapted by the Bakath would prevent any future group of ofjcers from being able to aver&row a revolutionay gave a t , "'Mlithout party m e h d s , there is no chmce for myone grees with us to jump on a couple of t m k and overfirow the go . These methods are gone."@ Saddam built on formidable methods of exerting control and surveillance over Chc armed forces. l r a q a k a * had the equj.vale1zt of the f o m r Soviet znmpolit or part)i commissars who are attached down to the level of the platoon and who ccruld veto the decisions oE professional unit commanders. These commissars, in turn, are?controlled by the Mzldiriy~faltazujih al-sipsi, the Directorate of Political Guidmce which was formed in 1973. The tasks of this directorate include:

* Spreadkg the ideology of the July 17,1968, rclvolutim to all military ranks m d units. Supervising the activities of the officers (i.e., political commissars) attached to the Directorate of Political Guidmce,

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Ovcrswhg the development of rnilitary cultustl on the basis of historic, scientific and technologiral data so as to keep pace with the wind of change. Seekhg to achieve maximum degrees of military discipline. * Expoundjng Saddam Hussein" party line and the "aspiratlions of pm-Arabism. At tfie same t h e , informers and spies from the securi-ty and inteuigence semices pemeated the military. Further, frequent puqes, suddm rota~ons, ~tirernents,m d executions were used as a means to keep the officer corps in line and to discwrage them from tryhg to overfimw the gove Saddam pufged the military again in 1979, and rotated or ~ p h c e key d commanders to ensure their personal loyait.4".Me also refined his contml durlng the Iran-Iraq War, From 1982 onwards, the Iraqi Army had severe morale problems. Many officrrs resented the excessive poiitical cmstrajnts imposed by pobtical officers, and klt the lraqi leadershjp's interference in operational mattcrs was a cause of Iray's defeats. I'hese developments led Saddam to loosen some of bis day-to-day operational controls over the military, but he m d e sure that the army never forgot who was commander-in-chief, He regularly rotated c m man&=, down-played the role of scJnior commanliers in whning victories, gave loyalists in the XZcpwbliean Guards the credit for victories, and used the media to turn leading officers into virtuaX non-persons, For example, Saddam took careful steps to e n s m that militarilp suceessfut gmerals like Maher hbdul Rashid, who was b o w n as t k "Iraqi Romme]" for his uutspOkenness on politica.2-strategk mattcrs and his military successes, would not pose a political threat in the af2ermatrh of the war. Saddarn also used his control over the media m d political education pmcess to try to persuade the lower ranks and the Iraqi people that Iraq owed its victories to his "military genius,bd that he was respmsible for provicting the military forces with all their needs. After the Xrm-Iraq War, %d.dam rotated or dismissed many officers whose mputation or success made them seem like potential rivals. While some ports of executio~zs and purgeHseern to be exaggerated, he altercd the militaq commmd structure at every level, He rapidly expanded the Replablican Guard-at the cost of sharply reducing the average quality of its forces-and reasserted the role of security services and party ""cmmissars" h supervising the military. At the same tirne, he continued to offer '"arrow to other officers in the form of promotions, housing and land, cash benefits, civil jobs, and a wide range of other bencf-its. The Gaff War ended so quickly and disiastrously that there was no time for any organized challenge to emerge from within the lrayi military as a wh&, although some of the forces sent to the Kuwaiti thcater ol operations participakd h the uprishgs that followed. At the same t h e , the

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fighti,ng failed to cripple the Republican Guard m d key dentents of the regular army because they were either never deployed forward, or escaped north during the linal d a y of the land battle. As a result, the uprisings right after the war had the effect of spotijghtjng potentiaily &Sloyal forces without depkving Saddam of the power to reassert control. Moreover, the links between the mflitary elemmts that did paticif-7atein the uprisings and various Shi'ite and Kwdish lenders made m n y in the Iraqi military see such units as traitors. In the months that followed, Saddam rapidiy consolidated Eraq's remainhg forces in ways that I"urt.lneremphasized the power of loyalists in the Republican Guards and loyal regular army units. He used the "rttbuilding" o'f the armed forces as a political as well as military tool. He conducted a series of rnajor shake-ups of his military command struct u r e f o u r of which were completed before June 1991, For example, Saddarn replxed his Minister of Defense Lt. General Sa'di Tufrna 'Abbas alJuhuti-a profcssimal solidcr and hero of the Iran-Iraq War-wi& his paternal cousin and son-in-laur, Hussein K a m l al-Majid, on April 6,1991. Saddam f i s s e i n replaced fhe Shfite Lt. General Hussein Rashid Mllhantmad al-Xkriti as Chief of Staff wi& Lt. Geslerall Iyad Futayyih malifa al-Rawi, the commander of the Republican Guard, in June 1.991. Rashid, who had been chief-of-staff since November 1990, was a rclspected c&& cornmandes, and a former cosnrnander of the Guard who had overseen its expansion durir\g the Iran-Iraq War, Some experts feel that Saddarn trird tc,use the fact that auubufi was a Shi'ite, and Rashid was Kurd, to signal that part of the blame for Iraq's dekat could be ascribed to these ethni.c groups. Yet, al-Jubd was retained as a senior military advisor and Rashid was later made supervisor of the Republican Gmrd-a posi.tion that ranks above the Guard's operational commndez Accordingly the shirts m y have been part of a long series of rotations desiwed to prevent any center of power from threatening Saddam's authority It is difficullt to confim many of the details of Saddarn" other actions in asserting his cmtrol over the military Unconfimed reports surfaced in late 1991 &at Saddarn had executed or hprisoned 18 generals for an assassination plot between June and August 1.991. These reports seem uncertain, but it is clear &at Saddam continued his policy of shiftkg m d rotatkg commanders to ellsure that no group of military or internal securiv forces would become loyal to a potential rival, For exampicl., he removed Major General Lliafiq J a s h Sarnarrai as head of mititary inteHigmce, purged this command, and put: in more loyal officers. General Mussein Rashid w s brmght back to power as supervisor of the Republican Guads in June 1992. Lt. G a r a l Iyad Futay& Khalifa al-Rawi-a~otber hero of the IranIraq W r and a key Saddam Hussein Inyalist-was made chief-of-staE

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At the same time, Saddam moved more nrte~~bers of his fmily to senior positions. For example, Karnal Yassin, a member of the Ba%thruling comcil and Saddam%brother-in-lw and cousin, was made deputy head of the Ba'a& d i t a r y bureau. His brother, &shad Ya,ssh, remained head of Saddarn's personal securit-yforce-a position he has occupied s h e 1986. I'hese actions, hokvevrtr, did not solve Saddam%problems in using the military as an inslrument of state control. New reports surfaced in late June 1992, that S a d d m had blocked a coup attempt within the miljtary. hlitial reports claimed fiat a mechanized brigade of the &publican Guard under the contmand of Brigadier Sabri Mahmoud-kvhich was located in Taji, m industrial area northwest of Baghdad-was prepar-ing an assault on Saddarn Hussein% hheadquarters in Baghdad, when the coup attempt was detected and halted by Iraqi securjty forces. Other reports mentioned fighting beheen the military and securiq forces. There were reports of clashes between elements of Saddam's personal security force, the Specid Republican Guards, and the rclgular Repzlbfican Guards in Baghdad and Kirkuk durirzg June 30 to July 2. Cki the other hmd, there has been no confljrmation of these details, and a few US experts feel that the coup reports were inspired by a series olcommand upheavals that follwed a new large-scale purge of military officers, possibly totaling up to 135 officers. According to these reports, Saddam called a large meting of his loyal oMicers together, charged the US and Jordan wi2.h supporting a military coup agajnst him, and used this as a rationale fnr his purge. W ~ i l eJordm denkd m y complidty- h a plot against Saddam, Jordan did begin to enforce sanctions on trmsshigrents of goods and,oil to Iraqr alt-hough it refused to allow UN jnspectorrj in Aqaba.& I'here have been reports of s i d a r coup attempts, arrests, and executions from late 1,992 to thc present-some of kvhich involve the Ju,buri clan. For a m p l e , reports appeared in mid-September 1992 that Saddam Hussein had executed a total of 26-30 more officers, including General Abed Mutleq Juburi." 51n 0c.lobc.t; he was accused oE executing 19 more officers, hduding Brigadier Anwar Tsmael Hentoosh and Brigadier Amir Rashid Hasson, two officers blamed for being insufficiently ruthless in putting down the Shi'ite rebellion in the south.66 Unconfirmed reports appeared of the execution or arrest of former h~teriorMinister Samir Abd ai-Wahalo al-Shaykhali in April 1993, and another serial; of a r ~ s t and s executions of military officers and civilians took place during August through September 1993. These arrests and executions =ern to have begun on h g u s t 20,1993, and to have e v m k ally involved a mixturrz of military officers and civii,liansassociated with the Juburi clm, mayd clan, and Saddam Husseisr" home town of Tikrit. Up to 11111-151) men were ir-tvolved, evidently including fassim Mawlud Mukhlis Mu&lis and Saqr Mualis. Saqr was the son of the Makvl~~d

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who was the Tikriti landlord and the original patron who had opened up the oificer corps to Tikritis under the monarchy. Anothel. welI known Iraqi executed was Brigadier General Ra@b TikriZi, a military physician who was head of the lraqi I'hysician's Association. le only uncertain reports of fighting or troop movements indicate a mqor coup attempt took place, there are unconfimed reports that the amsts fol:inwcd an effort to obtailn Western support for a coup. These reports indicate that the pllotkers asked for Western air support over Baghdad m d assurances that the Kurds would not seize Erkuk m d that Iran would not intervene in the s0ut.h." A n u h e r of Y'S and Bril.i;b exrxjrts fee1 that these arrests were the rcsult of a serious assassination a t t e q t , Yet Saddam Hussein and t;he Ba'atb elite may have been reaetin to threats &at had. not yet k e n transfomcd into p l m . Saddarn m&e little effort to lower his visibility, and continued to ipldulge in m d i a events that seemed desiped. to show his wealth in spite of Iraq's gmwkg economic prob1ms.e There is littie prospwt that Saddarn cm fully swure his control over the military or that he can ever efiminate the risk h t an assassinatinrr or coup attempt will finally succeed. :Ele no longer can rely on his key and family. -These are grocving reports of large-scale desertio~nsfmrn wi&in the regular military, breakdowns in morale, and problem in retajnhg or officers. A new sczkes of defections seem to have occurred in late 199?ir and these are reports of bontbilngs and fighthng wi&in ntilitary bmracks, Yet mother senior ogicer, General Nizar al-mazr;tji, a Iformer chief of staff, fled to fordm in late i?narch 1994 where in early April he that he would join the ranks of the opposition to Saddarn Fjiussein by seeking membership in the Iraqi National. Accord (A%Withnq nl-fmqi), the first Iraqi opposition group to be allowed to opm an office in the fordanian capital of Amman. M i l e in Alnman the Iraqi, General g m e an extensive interview to AI-Nnpt in whirh he hi&lights a number of aspccts of the modus operandi of Saddam Hussein, particularty as it pertains to his relawas apparent@eased out of his tiornship cvith the armed forces." 'azraji position as Chief of Staff in late 1990 after pointing out the military and strategic dmgers to Iraq because of its invasion of Kuwait. His reward was to be "'kicked upstairs" as a prcside~~tial advisor, Moreover, Khazraji stated that the invasion of Kuwait bypassed the Ministry of Bfense and. the General Staff:and was undertaken by tbr Republicm Guards on the direct orders of S a d d m Hussein..There is no rtf.ason to doubt a disgruntled Iraqi officer with an ax to grind. In KhazrajYs ophion:7" What is left of the Army commanders consists of those who are either grudgingly satisfied or who are weak elements . . . He orders and they- obey because he has gotten rid of the elements who may have had an opinion or were capable of making dedsisns.

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55

Further, Saddam took the unusual step of maLng a regular army of& cer the commander of the Repubficast Guard, and of appoinling a native of Mosd as his office chief-of-staff. 'This latter appointee was Awwad alBandar, the former head of Iraq's kvolutionary Court, and he seems to have been appoirzted to counterbalance the htctmal political Fnrpact of Saddam" earlier execution of several officers from Mosul.71 In late June-arly fuly 1996 reports indicated that Saddam Mussein survived yet mother serious coup atteznpt by the dlitary, which h l u d e d a plan to assassinate tbr Irayi leader. W ~ i it k is diffirult to sort fact from fiction, it seems that elements of the elite Republican Guards were involved, as well as officers from several other a m y corps. Operating under the n m e of a hitherto unknown group called "'The Popular Uprising Movemnt"' (ilarahf al-i~rtgadjtlrh al-slzir'nbiyah), a number ol seniof army officers decided to rid Iraq of Saddam and accused m a y external opposition groups of impotence and subservience to foreip powers. The coup and assassinatim atrt-empt falled. Scores of officrrs were detained: some reports indicated that upwards of 160 officers, of w h m 12 were from the Replablican Guards and 3 from the special or I'residesttial Guards hvere arrested. Three senior officers w:ho wre also provincial governors were arrested as well, They included: Lieutenmt General Iyad. n a l i l Zaki, governor of AI-Muth a in southwest Iraq, Lic-lutenantCeneral Mohammed 'Abd al-Qadir 'Abd al-Rhman, governor of Rlhevet.1 (Nosul), md. Major General Mahmud. Shukr Shahin, gwernor of AlWasit in central Irag. By late fuly a large number of Sunni Arab officers, of mainly j u ~ ~ i and or middle ranks, were executed, These seem to include the followilrg senior officers:

* Staff Brigadics General Ja"&r al-Tayyar, director of training at the Defense Ministry Brigadier Generd Amjad Tarjq 'Aziz, commandw of the Administrative Agairs School * Staff Colonel mamis Hadi Nihmah, commander of the 6th Presidential Guards Brigade * Staff Eeutenant Colonel Ahmad atfdu'aymi, 6th Brigade staff officer * Lieutenant Colonel 'Abdaltah Sharif al-Rubay", 6th Brigade Administrative office~1 Two other m i o r officers escaped with their lives, Staff Lieutenant General Talif Ruhayyim at-Dttri, a hem of the Iran-Iraq War, fled to notlnern Iraq and then Turkey. The alleged participation of this senior officer who held senfor c o m a n d s during the km-Iraq War and who is related tc:, Revduti,onary Command Cottncil n t e d e r h a t lbrahim al-Dktri wodd

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seeln to hdicate serious discontent withh the top echelon of the Sunni Arab ofiicer corps which has constituted the key element of Srnnni Arab domination of Iraq.7Wormer Air Force General Ilarnid Sha'ban, who commanded the Iraqi hir Forte for part of the Iran-Iraq Wrr, w s initidy suspected of in.volvernent in the coup attempt because the dissident officers had planned to make him titrular head of state in the event they succ e d e d h getting rid of Saddarn but was let go \zrhen it transpired he knew nofiixlg about the affair.7" Tl~esecoup anci assassinatim attempts were followed by the Bakath rclgimcfs castornary large-scale purges and djsmissals of officers from clans or tf-ibes suspected of dissident behavior. a c e again, much of the regimefs wrath fell upon officers from the Uulaim and al-Duri tribes of Al-Anbar pmvj,nce. Moreover, Saddam Mussein bcgan to admit large number of officers from the Al-SaUm S i Arab tribe from Al-BasrA prowince into the Revolutimary Guards. At the same t h e , Saddam retahs a massive appara(us to protect himself from the Hliljtary, and cmthues to demonstrate that he c m use the military as m instmment of state control. The Iraqi mihtary c o n ~ u c to s deploy nearly 14 of its 23-24 divisions along the border of the area under Kutrdisfi control, m d to deploy several divisions that conduct miljtary operations against Shi'itr. rebels in the marshes in the stluCh.74 Sadctarn has ~peatedly secudemo~nstrakdthat fie can deploy the Republican Guard for inter~~al rity missions, and fiat he can mthktssly purge potential power centers wi*in the military Mortrover, tJle kind of opposition to Saddam that has mrfaced withh the mihtary shows little sign of being "demcxratic.'?t is the pmduct of clm-oriented struggles for power or a d e s k to preserve power by getting rid of a m m that is perceived. as the rclason that smctions cmthue. The military may he mart! '"rag~n,atie" than Saddam, but it Wifl anly be as moderate as it has to be, The military will, also inevitably use any increase in its political power to favor its own hterests. Any "'centristfkapproachto fi~ndbgnew sources of pokver in Iraq must accept this realiq. The military may prove to be a better power base than Saddam and his coterie, the Bafath, or the security services, but it is scarcely a good option. For more than fifken years, Ihe Iraqi military has been systematically conditioned and structured to be an authoritarian tool and to support Iraqi nationalism and regional ambitims. It will see any civil po:litical movement as a rival and any civil mo~rementthat is Shi5te or Kurdish domirtated as a group of '"traitors," Similarly, any i-dominated military is "peripheral'5trategy must recopize that a S likely to both fight and win a civil war against any combination of Kurdish and Shi5ite groups that attempts to seize power and which does not have large-scale forc-rip rnilitary suppcrrt.

Tke For~rzrnlPolitz'm I?( lraqS lrtstrurrw~ztsof State Bower

The "Old Boyf' Network and the Interaction Between Informal and Fomal Xrxstrurnen.ls of Pawer It is h p o r t m t to note that there is no clear sqaration between Saddam's use of the hformal instntments of power discussed in the previous chapter m d his use of &ese hstruments of state control. Saddam reinforces his ex of cmtml over the instmme~ztsof state power by using a c o ~ ~ p l network trusted ,?sswiates, aides, m d personal supporters wit.hin t-he govemmtmt., Ba'alh Party, the miii-, and security services. Many of these supporters have been with him lfor decade kce the struggk fur power before 1968-md share his conspiratorial political mentaliq and experiences. The following exmples illustrate the lcind of men who make up this coterie withh the government and Ba'ath Party, and who provide Saddam with an important alternative to his immediate family, They also illustrate the fact that while the rufhg elite ma)i be largeiy Sunni Arab, Saddam has chosen senior members that come from other ethnic groups: kzat Ehrahirn al-&ri is a veteran Ba'aaEh party pbtter and is ViceChairman of fie Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ehr&knfs dau@ter is married to Saddam's eldest son, Uday*For his resolve and leadership during the Mareh 1991 insurrections, Saddam bestowed upon Izzat fbrahim the title of Lieutenant-General. However, Ezzat fbrhim has never been more than a ceremonial leader and is reported to be h poor healthT&a Uasin Itamadan al-Jazrawiis a Kurd born in Masul in 1938 and a s e ~ ~ i member A one ar of the Revolutionary Commmd Cou~~cil. tilnc bank crlcrk, he is consid,ered to be one of Che toughest and a m n g the most ruthless mcmtbers of the regime. He has headed a revolutionary court which handed down hundreds of death sentences in the early years of the rcgime. He became minister of industry in 1972 and reportedly threatened slackers and the inefficient with execution. He is also reputed tu have taken a harsh attihde towards Islamic fundamentalists over the years, a or 'Tariq Azizf'is tl-re one senior Christian member of the regime. He has been associ&ed with Saddam for many years, but is d i k e l y to ever be accepted as a leader of a Muslim country Nonetheless, he is noteworthy for many reasons. In recent years, he has been the fraqi Ba'ath party's chief ideologw. In this capaciqI.he has interyreted the writjngs of Michel 'AfIaq, the founder of Bakthism, to fit the lraqi context. Fur~ermore,he has written about the torturous twists and turns of Iraq's Ba'athist experience, especially in foreign policy matters. Indeed, in his capaciq as Foreign MiI~isterduring the 1980s, Tariq Aziz hclped lead Iraq's foreip pol-

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icy into a pragmatic phase m d presented Iraq's view to the outside world in its war with Iran. Since Desert Storm, Tariy Aziz has served as both foreign minister and deputy P r i m Minister, and has played a significant role in formnlating Ihe Iraqi diploma.t.ic strdegy desiped to deal with the outside world, and with the lifiing of sanctims. He is often =parted to have taken a soft-line view which urges complete Iraqi cmplimce wi& the UN Sec~~rity C-au~ncifresolutions pertainhg to Iraqi cease-fise obligations,

Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy At this point in time there arc:only timited s i p s that Saddam anci his cotcrie are losing control over the range of tools that help them remabn inpwer, in spite of Iraq's military defeat in the GuIf War m d f i e steadily deteriorating Iraqi economy There are no s i p s that independent caters of power are emerghng hlrit-hin the f o m d instruments of state pokver, or that- the rc3ghe is losing control over m y given instmrnent or part of the corntry. Saddarn may be experiencing grwing problems with Sunni puhEc opinion, the Szllnrri elite, key clans, and his i m e d j a t e family, but there does not seem to be a weahess in Iraqi gove ntal or politicat institutions that the West and the Souehem Gulf c m easily exploit to drive him from power. If there is a "fault line'" Saddm's security it lies in the fact that he lives in.a state whose institutions are vulnerable to ""onebullet elections." No matter how often the securilty services and military forces are purged, Saddam seelBs to face new opponents within these institutio~ns. This creates a constant risk of an assasSination or a catafptic coup attempt.. This kind of risk makes any strategy for dealing with Iraqfs brmal instrunnents of state control very uncertain. It must dtisnateiy be dependent on finding a smdl element within Iraq" institutions that will deal with outside powers, and that is discrete and effectiwe enough to have a rclasonable cfnmce of gaining pokvec 'The o~nlyother option is to wait and hope that that such a group will succeed witlnout outside support. Such a searrh presmts a number of practical prctblems. Any group that acquires enough visibility to be noticed outside Iraq, or which tries to contact outside powers, is likely to be detected. and kstroyed, before it can succeed in kflling Saddam and his supportrjrs. :Most such oppo?aitionsgroups are also k : L y to replace Saddads power elite with one that is very shim lar in.attitudes and conduct, The W s t and S o u ~ e m Gulf states might well have to accept a "gentler and kinder" version of Saddam, which is m~likely to sacrif-iceaufioritarim control over Iraq's ininihttions, m d whi& is likely to have bitter memories of Iraq" defeat in Ihe Gulf War and.the h p a c t of Idk;lsanctions-regardless of the political rhetofic used in coming to pwer.

The "Periphery": Opposition Movements and Ethnic and Sectarian Issues The a k n a t i v e to a "centsist" sstrategy is a "peripheral" strategy based on

seeki~~g a new rr.gime formed out of Iraq%opposition parties, its Kurds, or its SI1ifites.Such a "perifieral" strategy, however, presents problems and risks that are roughly equal to those inherent in a centrist strategy :Iraq%oppmition palitifal paties are very weak, and cmsitit largely of exile groups with a negligible power base. Iraq's Kurds prese~~t the risk of separatism or crcatjrrg a regime that may degenerate into civil war, and :Iraq%SShi'itcs present the risk of bacbtg an Islamic ~gime-possibly one sympathetic to Iran. These risks are not a reason for policy paratysis. There are many Kurds who wlruld accept a federation that ~ccrgl-rizedKurdish rights to a separate culture and a fair share ol Iraq's soil revenues. Many fraqi Shi%itesare secular in character, as well as being natimaIists and Arabs. :In spite of thc.gwernment" actions, many lraqi Shi'ites would also welcome a national government that included Sunnis and one focused on economic development. As is the case with a "centrist" strategy, the fact there are no alternatives to the regirne of Saddam Ilussein that offer any near-term prospect of a high degree of stabiiity, or of creating an ideal regime, does not mean that there are not many possi:bilities better than Saddam. An "Artificial" Stale

Iraq has never had the kind of leadership that has allowed it to obrercarne the ""artificiality" of its origins, The British, who drew Iraq" pdtical boundaries in 1920, created tbr natim by merging three dispi-lrate f the Ottoman Empire. In, t-he process, lhey created a country that was a msaic of competing and mtually antagonis-

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tic ethnic, ~ l i g i n u m s d tribal groups. Manna Rataha provided the following description af the origixrs of the Iraqi state:?' At the turn of the century the Iraqis were not one people or one political community This is not meant: to refer simply to the presence of numerc3us racial and religious minorities in Iraq: Kurds, Turkc~mans,Persians, Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, l"azidis, Sabeans, and others. The majority of the inhabitants of Iraq, the Arabs, though sharing common characteristics, were themselves in large measure a congeries of distinct, discordant, selfinvolved societies.

Batatu argues that Islam has proved to be m m of a force fctr divisiveness thm for htegration. He says of Arab Smmis and Arab Shi5tes: ""socially they seldom mixed, and as a mle did not intermarry. h mked cities, they lived in separate quarters and led their own scrparak lives."76 'This Sunsti-Shi3teclea~ragewas reinforced by the fact that it usually coincided with the social division behnieen classes. He also argues that the ethnic cteavage between Arab and Kurd was even more acute. 'The Kurds saw themselves as a separate people wit-;h their OTnJn culture and language and the rights to their own state. They perceived tbr Arabs as "~>ccupit-?rs" and interlopers who later '"stole" the oil resotlrces and revezzues of north Iraq. At the same time, the Arabs saw the Kurds as rebels and as primitives that needed to be made past of a mom modern and sophisticated culture. Finally, the Rritisln chose to c ~ a t ae monarchy led by a f o ~ i g nArab Sumi family the Hashemites. This monarchy initialty had the support of many Iraqis-inrluding both Sunni and Shi'ite Arah+but it gradually came to be seen as a pro-Western tool of Britain. It only established uncertain control over the Iraqi. military, did, little to unify the country, and became the natural target of every opposition group from liberal reformer to extreme Arab natianaXist.77 The Politics of Conspiracy and Violence

Iraq changed in many ways between its creation in 1921 and the fall of the monaxhy in 1958. Xt became more cosmopolitdn, communications improved, oil revenues mated some elements oE a modern economy, political parties formed that cut across ethnic and sectarian lines, and the a r q emert;-ed as a major political force.78 Yet, Iraq was still a politicaily 'primithe' slate when the monarchy Mf h 1,958-a fact which W@ reflected in the bloody execution of the king, crown prince, and several senior Iraqi officials. An unstable, kft-leaning =public was formed under General Abd al-Karim Qassern.

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61

Iraqi politics rclmained the politics of conspiracy and violence-with strong elements of inter-tribal and family feuding and divisims between Sunni, Kurd, and Shi5ite. &rir~g the 196Os, a myriad number of political groups and parties jockeyed for power or for a way to influence the stmcture of power in Baglndad. These gmups included the Kurds, the Iraqi Communist Party, fie largest and best organized im the Arab world, proNasserist pan-Arab nationalists, civilian technocrats with,out m identifiable party affiliation, the militantly pan-Arab nationalist Ba%ath. party, m d of course, fie armed forces. A clecade of violent struggle between these various groups did little to encourap the rise of moderate political movements or resolve any of the sectarian a d ethnic differences that affected Iraq at the time cJf its founding. If anything, &ab nationaiism becalne less tokrant of the Kurds, and the secularism of the military and Ba'ath h l p e d rcjnforce the difference is and more religious Shi'ites.7' In Jllly1,968, the Ba'aalh Party seized Lasting pocver. The power elite that led the Ba%ath was determisled not to repeat the ideological e x t m i s m m d other follies of fie short-lived first Ba'aaith gove on development and created the ary-November 1963. It co~~celztrated infrastructure and communications necessary to htegra te Iraq. At the same time, the new regime took steps to reduce the power of the opposition, and Saddam Hussein took further steps to wenken the opposition once he edged out President Hasan atBakr in 1979, and '"elected'%imself to thr prtrsidencyg"" These actions by the Ra'atb elite led to a steady declixle in Iraqi political opposition movements. Much of this decline was due to the Bapath's ruthless use of Che security forces. At the same time, there were other reasons opposition parties lost support: Most opposition parties had a long history of extremism, squabbling, and htecnal divisions. Aside frnm the Iraqi Cornmzlnist Party, they were seen as marginal, as offering little by way of solution to Iraqls problems, and as a poor alternative to the Bafath.The Cnmmunisi Party, in turn, was seen as pmtly under foreign control, and was a natural target for the securily services. Iraq evolwed into both a W&-pdiced and a ""slf-policing" wciety, im which the populace internalized ""crrectf"atterns of conformity and norms of behavioa: The slightest sign of discontent was dealt with ruthlessly m d effectively. 'The rtlgine created a wLfare state which seexned to justifq. its character and actions, This welfare state functioned quite effectively even dufing the Iran-Zraq War, and provided h e education and extensive social and health,services. Even k l r h c n living standards

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0ypo"it ion M ~ t ~ e mtse nraud Etit nic alzd Sectarint.2 Issues deelined during the Iran-Iraq War, Ihe regime seemed to offer a better economic future than most of its opposition. Many hayis fiought it was unpatriotic of overseas-based opposition groups to take advantage of Iraq's difficulties during Ihe Iran-Iraq War. The opposition to Saddam exhibited severe weahesses and divisions. M m y of the so-called parties were loose gmups of exiles celztered around individuals with a "party programf"hat consisted of no morc than a call for the overthrow of Saddm. The opposition groups were fragmented and disunited with most groups higl~ly suspicious of the others' political programs,. For example, the Supreme Assembfp for the Isllmic Revolution in Iraq (SAXEI%)w d d never deal with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). 'There were a wide range of disparate party programs. 'There was no easy way to reconcile secular and Islamist groups or Shi"ite aspirations for a greater role in:Iraqi political and social life with pan-Arab nationalists wfio inplieitly believed in the potitical supremacy of the Sumi Arabs. Many of the opposition groups claimed to be national, but wercr. structured along ethno-sectacim lines and thus subscribed to particdaristic party progrms which catered solely to the interests of their respective communities, and 'The oppo"ition to Saddam was bereft: of regional and international support. The two grczups which &d. have outside support and which also constituted the most effective internal source of dissent, the Kurds and Shi'ite elements sympathetic to Ihe Islarnic Republic of Iran, were skillEul2y portrayed by the Iraqi regime as unpatriotic traitors at a tkne when Zraq was struggling for its national exisknce. In short, durjng the war years, Ihe regime managed to identify opposition with treasm.NI

In conkask the divisions betwee11 the ""c~~ter," the Kurds, m d Shi"ites steadily widened a h r the late 1960s. The Bakatl failed to find an answer to the pditical problems raised by thc? Kurds, and became involved in a bloody civil, war with separatist Kurds durbg the early m d mid-1970s. From the mid-1970s onwards, the seruIar policies of the Bakath also led to a stake of poli~calf e r n a t and rc-tligiaus rclwivalisrn in much of the Shi"ite south. The Irm-Iraq War added a new dhension to the central go~rernme~~t's pmblems with the Kurds and the Shi5tes. Althollgh several Kurdish factions fnught Iran on the side of Zraq when Iraq appeared to be w the powerful B a r m i m d Talabani factio~~s turned against lraq o11ce it began to suffer serious &feats h 1982. As a resul.t, the Iraqi miliiary forces fought six mortr years oE civil war against the Kurds in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War.

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63

Iran's proselytizing efforts faiied to gain Ihc support of large numbers of religious %Cites, but the Irm-Iraq War c ~ a t e da constant uncertainty as to the loyalty of 5hi"ites hthe south and over whetbrr they might support Iran durj,ng one of its offeasives. While Iraq's tihi'ites did little to justify the regimds fears, this did not prevent the regime from eXiljYLg more 5hi"tes and =inforcing its ~pressivesewity arrangements in Southern Iraq. Disloyalty to Saddarn Hussein became Chc equivalelnt of treason durlng the Iran-Iraq Wr, further suppressing the development of any peacefixl or Icgitimate political opposition. Today; Iraq is almost as divided as it was at the time of its formation as a modern state. There is no meacrhgful overt political opposition within :Iraq and oniy weak crppositim within it. Iraq's K u d s and Shifitesrepresent a majority of the population. Recent CIA estjntates indicate that 63-68"/~ of fraq's population is n o n - h n i (6M5"ib Shi5te) and that 2&Z% is non-Arab (15-20% Kurdidr)." A number of experts believe these figures u~~derstate the number of Kurds, but there is little arg~~lnent over the fact that Iraq is now ruled. by a lart;ely S m i Arab elite that comprises well under 30% of its total population and wbich has done little since 1%8 to maiintah national cohesio~~ or unite the cowltry Opposition Parties

Saddam Hussein ;and the Bdath are opposed by a nurnber of opposition groq" m v based wtside of the country 'Thesegroups span the political spectrum, and i,ncSudc Islamic fu~darnentalists,r(u,rdish aubnomists, panArab nationalists, dissident Bafaallnists, communists, and liberals. These parties, however, arc?a weak fomdatim for a '"peripheral"" strategy Some are led by Shi'ite or Kurdish figures that artl still tied politically l;o their sectarian and e t h i c origins, and gcneraIly lack strong influence even withixr their own e h i c faction in Iraq. OZhers have little public suppmt within Iraq, brague or radkal ideologies, m d no practical experience in governhg. The mobiljzation of world ophion against Sadcfam Hussein foIlwing the invasion of Kuwait led many of Iraq's fractured opposition gmups to try to est-&&h a common anti-Saddam pldform, and to begin to court the members oi the t"N eoalltion, En December 1990, most of the Iraqi oppositim mcrvemcmts held a confemnce in Damascus. They establishrd a steering group, called the Joht Action Committee, which condemned the djctatorship of Saddam and agrced on the followSng objectives: toppling the Bdathist regime, fornation of a pmvisional gave would lay the basis for a constitutional system of government that wodd dismantle the vast repressive apparatus of the Iraqi state, restoration of political liberties, abolition of ethnic m d sectarian discrimination, and the holding of free elections to form a constituent assembly-=

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It is a si.gn of thejr isolation frnm the political dynamics withh their country, however, that the exiled Iraqi. opposition groups were as surprised by the outbreak of full-scale rebellions in the Shi'ite south and the Kurdjsh north fdlowing t-he end of the C;& War as wcre outside &servers. Tke upposition gmups in exile then underestimated Saddam's stayiw power, an$ wew stunned by the effectiveness with which the rclgilrrc crushcd the insurrections of Narch 1991.Since that time, they have onliy been marginally successful in making themselves seem a valid alternatiwe to Saddam Hussein, despite their attempts to coordinate their activities and present a united fmnt. The first serious post4ulf War meeting of Irayi opposition movements took place in Beirut on March 11-U, 1491, This meeting was held under the protection of the Syrians and organized by two ad hoc cornittees of Iraqi opposition forces based, in Lundon and Dmascus. This conference Zlrougbt togetber 350 delegates from &out 20 distinct groups, organizations, and parties, as well as many hcfependent personalities without a t ~ y discernible party structure or ideology. The parties to the conference which took place at the height of thr Kurdish and 5hi"te insurrectionscmcluded thatz84

They must unify and orgmize themselves as a credible aiternatiwe to the Ka'athist regime of Saddam Mussein, * External. opposition groups must provide direct support for the insurrections, and 'The various opposition movelnents must seek foreig~~ bacEng and sympathy The participants did not present: any ideas on how to unify and coordinate their disparate party platforms and ideological principles. Further, much of the irnpact of the Beintt meeting was nullified by the decision of the Kurdish parties to begin negotiations with S a d d m Hussein following the defeat of their insurrection in late March. These negotiations coilapsed in the fall of 1991, and seemed to offer a new opportunjty for unified action, but their contlmled lack of cooperation and suspicion of one another msurcd that a meethg of opposition groups in Kyadh, Saudi Arabia, in February 1992 produced m meaningful results..Fufther, most of the key Kurdish leaders avoided mceting.K"

The Iraqi Na.tiona E Clonpess The Iraqi opposition" two greatest weahesses-their lack of cohesjon and coordination-seemed equally evident when thr Lmdon-based groupdecided to call a cmference in Viema, to which they hvited all

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the opposition to participate. The conference met in June 1992, and resulted in the creation oi an urnbrella group-the Iraq National Council (INC). The confercsnce attendees put for& ambitious ptans for the INC. The confermce rapporteur declared that the IN'C did not wish to be wen as yet another coalition of opposition force, and that its gm1 was to emerge as a "shadow'kr alternative government, "The communiquP also stated that Rebel-controlled territory in Kurdistan would become the base from which the INC: could. pursue the conflict against Baghdad and draw adherents to the cause. Yet, the Uenna conkrence hiled to ullite the principd Iraqi groups. The sponsors were the tvvo main Kurdish pasties, the KDP and PUK, plus a small grollp of Wstern-based and backed Iraqi Arab exiles. Many Islamist, Arab nationalist, liberal, and leftist groups stayed away mese latter groups accused the sponsors of failing to coordinate or consult with them prior to the calling of the confemnce, and of unfair powersharirrg arrangements. Further, many of those groups which did not attcnd the Vienna meetirrg macted by treating the INC as a creature of the West, and as a front which the Wst supported only because it suited Western d e s i g ~ for ~ s Iraq. These divisions led to anotber oppositm meeting in November 1992, which was held in Salahedh on '"liberated" Iraqi in territory in Kurdktan, All Iraqi oppositio~~ groups were invited to participate, and the meeting was intended to add.ress the schisms and conflicts wi&h th Iraqi opposition, and to find a way to achieve a truly unitclid mti-Sadciam platfom. More of the opposi.tion decided to attcznd, including some groups whjch had stayed away from the VEenna cmference. Some 260 delegates hrned up, but the number oE groups that stayed. away was still sipif-icant. Thosc? who failed to attend included such groups as the:gb Supreme Assembly of the Islamic I(evolu.ticm fn Iraq (SAIN), vvhich denounced the cmference as 'konfessional" m d tribal. * Ucrnmratic Assesnbly of Salah Dejla. Assemhly for National Reconciliation of T&sh Mualla, a fctrmer Ba%thist group. * Islamic Group of Mahdi al malisi, Eibal Council of Iraq. National Democratic Assembly of h a d Haboubi, based in Cairo. * The pro-Syri.an Bakathist spllnter group of Fadel al-Amari and Wael al-Hif ali, Iraqi Socialist Party of Mubder Z,ouayt;, a Damascus University Professor m d ex-officer in the Iraqi military Assemhly of National Uemwratic ALfiance of Sal& Omar at-Ati. 'This gmup denounced the Sailhedin conkrence, adding that the

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0ypo"it ion M ~ t ~ e mtse nraud Etit nic alzd Sectarint.2 Issues participmts sought to trmsform Iraq into a "new Lebmo11," "cause they wmted to reiy m foreign parties to get rid. of the Bdathist reghe. A cluster of independe~~t political.personalities, among whom there is a large numtner of officers who have defected from the regime in the past or fled in the aftermath of tbr Gulf War. n e s e include the followhg generals: Abdel Arnir Oubais, Abdel Wahab al-Amh, %sahim Abdel Rahman al-Daud, and Col.. Abdel Moneim al-Kattan. These independent prnstmalities shared a prefewnce for a cmtrist strategy to o v e r t b w S a d d m , ratker than the emerging peripherd strategy of the Kurdistan-based INC.

In spite oE this lack of mited support, the conference led to the fomation of a presidential. council headed by a triumvirate drawn horn the three main :Iraqi communities and a 27-member Executive Coullcil headed by a leadirtg London-based figure, Dr. h a d Chalabi. Chalabi expremed his hope that the institutionalization of the opposition forces on Zraqi territory in the north would result in the steady erosion cJf support for and legitimacy of the rcgime as people deserted it to join the INC as f o ~ ~ o v J ' s : ~ ~ We hope to develop further and further our links with the Iraqi armed forces and government, to win them over, We d o not want the process crf change to be bloody and to entail civil war, we want it to be as peaceful as possible and we renounce the idea of collective punishment.

It seemed for a while that the Salahedin meefing had strengthmed the INC in spite of the fact that it proved unable to unify the various opposition parties. During 1993and 1994, however, the INCbegan to experience growing difficulties. First, the INC allimce with the Kurds resulted in growlng tensions. While the Kurds were pleased to bost m n y of the 11-4opposition forces, they had no desire to have the territory under their control become the springboard for armed confrontation with Baghdad. This risked re-igniting an armed conflict with superior government forces. Furhrmore, the Salahedin conference took place at a time when Kurdistan had achieved some measurrz of democratic freed- and peace, and before l-he onset of fratricidal conflict between the KDP and PUK which led to a state of qua"i-anarchy. This seemd. to offer the hope of Kurclish separatrism, and KDP and PUK were aware that many non-Kurdish opposition groups expremed their unhapphesr; during the conference with the idea of a federal solution to the peremial Kurdish collfticts with the central authorities in a post..-Saddarn Iraq, 011 the other hand, k m 1,994 onwards, the

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INC fom~ditself caught up in trying to mediate a growhg cmflict behnieen the PUK and KDI? Srcond, the parties and organizations that were mernbers of the 1NC became imasingiy vocal in their aiticism of the allegedly autocratic leadership style of Ahmad Chialabi.W TJp mid-1935, the INC seemed to be in organizaticmal disarray Of the 19 parties listed as mmbers of t_he INC in 1993, seven had suspended or withdracvn their mmbership by 1995, having accused Ahmad Chafabi of turning the IPdC into the "Ahmad Chahbi paty"" "ere wert. atso attempts either to oust Chalabi or to bring about changes in the INC."" t with its memThird, the MC did not emerge as a provisional gwe bers mited on co on issues. 11.rem&ed a broad-b sition groups with sharp djffermes. fn addition to quarrels over the leadership, these diBerences involved.the issue of sanctions-with s m e groups is ower&rown, wl~ileotharguing they Should he m&tai-rred until Saders increasingly became meas).. over their hpact m €he lraqi peop1c. pfhe members of the MC also quarreled over the possibility of dialogue with 5acfbam Husseh. This presmted furtber problems with the Kurds, because Masoud Sarzaxti, the head of the KDe was perceived as onc of fie opposi.tion leaders most wilhg to negotiate with Saddm Hussein. Fourth, externally-based oppositicm groups like the INC faced a credibility problem with lraqis jnsidc the country 'These Iraqis often did not believe that outside opposition forces had any credible plans to bring about change in Iraq, a tangible agenda on h w to m i d a collapse of central authority once Saddam was overthrown, or rncaningfuX plans to reconstruct Iraq in the post-Saddam era. Furthermore, the exiles3integrity and political judgment were vestioned Zly mmy Iraqis. Many exile groups hvere seen as paid, agents of Western or Arab inklligelrce services ancl governments, or as tainted by bavkg strong ties with an Iran that is seen as the historical enemy*lrayi offiicialt; like Barzan d-Takriti encouraged such feelings by dmouncing t,he opposition for "prost..itwtingf'themselves to foreign governments:gl Strangely enough, the Iraqi apposition has broken all moral and psychological barriers and gone about knocking on the doors of foreign ministries and intelligence sei-vices in the West to argue their case for rapid action tcr bring down the system of government in Iraq so they can take over. This kind of conduct is virtually the coup de grace that diqualifies them a s patriots.

These weak~~esses did not, however, prevel~tthe INC from fundi011ing or from attmctin.g defectors f r m the regime in Baghdad. h August 1993, two high-rartking amb~sadors,Hisham fbrahim ai-Shawi and Hamid Alwan al-Jibouri, defected in London, and declared themselves

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for the IIVC. In Decen?ber 1994, Maor-Gemraii Wafiq al-Smara'i, the former chief of Military htelligence joined the INC. Along with other defectims, these actions helped the INC retain a sense of optimism that there was a slow and steady erosi,on in the power of Saddam Mtdssein and fed it with a steady stream of irnportmt intelligence about the situation inside Iraq untif Saddarn Musseids dliance with the KPP in September 1999 allowed him to drive the INC and other opposition elements out of Northern Iraq. Nzlssein: Kanzel alrd the Higher Iraqi Salvulion Cotancil The defection of Hussein Kamel proved to be a difkrent story. The illfated defection of one of the leading " h e m h e n " of the regi.me exposed serious differences in Takriti support for Saddam Hussein, but the outside opposition had g w d reasons not to adopt Hussein Kamel as one of their om." First, many opposition groups h e w he had been jnvolved in the regime" ccrirnes agahst the Iraqi people, Rel-tabilitatjng Husseixl Kan-telwas like rehabilitating Saddam Hussein himself to many opposition leaders. Second, no one wanted Hussein Karnel to be seen as a possible successor to Saddam, This helps explain why Kamel's call upon oppositim groups to unite and establish a governmem.t. in exjle failled to &tract much suppmt. Nonetheless, Kamel: set up his own Higher Iraqi Salvation Council at the end of 1995 in an effort to attract opposition forces. K m e l stated that his mot.ive in setting up this opposition group kvas his belief that the cl-cances of foreign interference in Iraqi domstic affairs would increase if no decisive and orgmized action was taken to bring about a ""change" i n the Iraqi political scene soon. Hussein Kamd set forth the followixlg program for reshaping Iraq's internal, erctemal, and security situatim in a post-Saddam Iraq:%

* Saddam Husseixl must be overfirown, but Iraqis must not rely on the help of outsiders to get rid of him, 'There Wilj be no rcvenge on m d witchbunts in the shape of triats and executions conducted aajainst officials of the current regime once it is overthrom, Opposition groups based on "parochial" kndencies, sedarianism and ethnicity constitute a danger to the integriv of Iraq, * The Council opposes the idea of a federal solution tc:,Eraq's e h o sectarian divisions. Iraq must not be divided into "cantons," * 1raqi.s arc entitled to democrac~pluralism, m d free elections, * The Kurdish problem is an internal Iraqi matter, and the Kurcis are Iraqis who must be grankd their national rights kvithin a mified Iraq,

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Iraq will enter into a dialogue with the US inorder to explore the possibili,ty of establishixlg a ""strategic relationship" with Mshmgton, * ?he Council supports justice, equality among peoples, and economic alliances in the Middle East * Iraq will respect the choices made by the Palestinians and the confrontatim states barclerkg Israel. Iraq can rrcr longer "uphold the dogan of liberation" (Le, calling for a r m d conflicl) with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the * Iraqi Army will be =built but the Council is "opposed to wars, aggression, and the acquisition ol weapolls of mass destruction." It is clear from this manifesto that Kamel presented a ""cntristf"rogram for change that was at odds with the INC% '"peripheralf2trategy; Whereas the INC hoped to draw the "center" aaway fmm Saddam and join it, Kamel hoped that potentiai opposition groups within the "'centt.rf" like the army officers with whom he crlaimed to be in touch kvolllid takce matters into their own hands, Not surgksingfy, Kamel tailosed his program to appeal to those in the center, even though he watered down or elirninat-ed some idedogical positions that would tmditionally appeal to the Arab nationalist Sunni elite in the center, such as the importance of military power and an active role in the kab-Ismeli conflict. The Jardatzia~Card

Ironically, a necv form of "foreign interfemnce" eernerged as the result of Hussein :Kamel's defection. King Husseirr put forward his own preferred solution to Iraq% problems, and oft;ered to hold a cclnferclnce of Iraqi oppositioll parties to discuss the future of the country At Ihe same time, the fordanian monal-ch proposed a "federal solution" with few specifics, but which cailed for Iraq's major elhno-sectarian groups to live in peace and accept the fact l-hat none would dominate the country. King Hussein said he felt compelled to act because he did not feel that Hussein Kamel prtrsented a viable alternative to Saddam Hussein. :Kamel, in turn, expressed his displeasure with the fact that the prapowd conference included invitations to ""Imians" or those with Iranian comectiansprtrsumably meanhg 5AIH a d d-Da'awa party King Mussein indicated that he felt that the continuation of the statusquo (i.e., continuation of Saddam Hussein in power) in Iraq was aggravating the socitreccmomic condition of the Iraqi people and could lead to the b ~ a k u pof Iraq. Me also indicated that he felt that the Iraqi opposition had &led to pment an effective united front without his support. In November 1995, King Hussein contacted the opposition to sound out their viebvs on the propmals to extend his patrollage to the opposition

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by hosthg a mgor opposition cmference and the mare ambitious call to irnpkment a federal option for Iraq. He sent two advisers-Mustab alQaisi, director of the Jordanim General IntelTigence Directorate and one of' his deputies, nbdul Ill& al-Kz3rdi-to visit the faondon-basedINC to discuss the new Jordmim strategy. The King hhself called the four key p1ayc.r~in the Iraqi opposition, nan-tely &mad Chalabi as head of the INC, M h m m e d Baqir af-Haki.m head of the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution h Iraq (SAIRI), Masbd Barzani head of the Kurdish Democratic party WDP) and JalaI Talibani head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistm the PUK. Wble sonne Irayi opposition groups welcomed King Hussejn"~action, and indicated their support, others showed reservations. Furthemore, som opposition groups were suspicious of Jo&n"s stance because of thc strong relationship that had previously existed bemeen h m m and Baghdad. Others feared King Hussein" aambitions h Iraq, accentuated by the fact that neither the Iraqi opposition nor Jordm's neighbars were accustomed to seeing Jordm take such a leading role in inter-Arab pditics.g*I Jordan scarcely gat unified support from other countries. Iran warned oppositio~zleaders Eke M o h m e d Baqir al-Hakjm and Mas'ud Barzani against jumping on the Jordmian bandwagon, Most Nliddle Eastern states and the W gave :King tlussein's proposal only a lukewarm endorsement. E u p t i m Preside17it Hosni Mubarak and his Foreign Mk~ister,Arnr Moussa, declared that such a federal solution could lead to the break-up of Zraq. Syria expressed its displeasure with the unexpected foreip policy acCvism of lordam, whjch it sees as an 'hinsignificant' country; particularly in relation to Iraqi affairs where Syria had tried unsuccessfu%fy to play a role in the summer oE 39%. The Saudis, for their part, reacted with their traditional s u ~ i c i o n oE s Hashemite ambitions, feari.ng that King Fjiussein was exploring the option of a Hashemite option for post-Saddam Iraq. :King Hussein denied any ambitions tcr revive the H a s b i t e monarchy in a speech on August 23,1995, but this did little to end Saudi suspicionse9~ Lilce the EK, f i g Husseh also =&red a maJor setback in Sepknnber 19%. 5addmfsallimce with the KDP allowed hirn ta drive Jordanim-spmsored oppo"jtion element.s out of the Kurdish enclave as well as the N C and the CIA team that had backd such q o s i t i o n movements. As a =suit the chmces of a unified and e f f ~ t i v eopposiition seemed just as r a o t e at the end of 1996 as they had before the Gulf War, and no grou,p swmed to exist which c o d act as the nucleus of a credible periphaal strateg.

Iraq" Crisis with the Kurds Kurdish separatism presents different problems for a "peripkral strate g g ' Kurdislo separatism is the result of a b r d i s h search for autonomy or independence with a long and. bloody history. Iraq" Kwds have

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often revolted cvhen the governmrnt seemed we& or when they could obtain foreign support, They also have taken advantage of any weakness in the central government, or its preoccupation with ofher pmssing h e s t i c or foreign issues, to pressure Baghdad by bringing demands for autonumy Kurdish uprisings occurrcsd long before Iraq's creation in 192C), and occurred sporadjcally during the monarchy 'These uprisings havc been influenced by the fact that Iraq was created by th British out of thrce Ottoman vtlayefs or provifices: Baghdad and Basra which were overwhelmingly Arab, and Mosul which contained a large Kurdish minority The Kurds FR Mosd province sought their own independent state following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, only to see their aspiraticms dashed by the victorious Western powers, namely Britah and Frmce. The Leawe of Nations approved Iraq"s possession of M~osul,with the provision that fie Kurds be granted substantial political and cultural auto~nomy.As a resdt, &ere w r e many small Kurdish uprisings, and the Murds proved politically unruly, The Kurds proved politically and mftitarily ineffective, however, because the kjbally-factianalized nahlre of their socjety-accentuated by poor transportation networks and mountajnous tcrrah-prevented. them fmm formhg a united front. Tbis helped defeat fie two most serious uprishgs before World War II. The British Royal Air Farce crushed tribal Murdish =volts by the Barzani clan, which were headed by Mutlah Mustafa Barzani in 1922 and in 1943. Even so, Barzmi emerged as the hers of Kurdish aspirations, In 1946 he recommended the establishment of the Kurdish Democratic Party modeled aicltng the Kurdish Democratic Party of Irmian Kurdistan ( n w called the KDPI to distinguish it from Che Iraqi KDP). When secessimistmhded Murds within Iran established the short-tived Marxist-domisrated Replaiblic of Mahabad in 1945 with its own prtrsidency Mustafa Rarzani crossed the bordcr to &er his semiees to the new Kurdish Republic. I'he Iranian government oi Mohamrned Rcza Shah recaptured the town of Mahahad inJanuary 1947 and elimir-tatedthe Kurdish leadership with the exception of Mullah Mustafa who fled to the USSR and remained Chest mtil 11358. In 1958, Barzani was invited back to Eraq by the revofutionary and republican r e g h e of Gerneral Abdef.K a r h Q a s s e ~ to~participate in the build.ir;tg of a new and progressive state in Iraq, Iraq was defined for the very first time as a state comprising t w major nationalities: Arab and Kurd. Moreover, Qasseln saw the Kllrds as a powerhl countervailjng group to his enemis, the Nasserists and pan-Arabists. The Murds, for their part, were pleased that Qassem's rt.girne did not espouse pan-habist or Arab nationalist ideologies, which they saw as working to marghalize the role of the Kurds hIraqi political Iik.

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It was not long, however, before Barzmi m d the post-monarchicd regime in Baghdad fell out. Qassem became increasingly uneasy over the extent of the concessions the Kurds had wrung fmm his regime and began to view them as a threat to his rule, while the Kurds thought they had not reteked enougln benefits. Tensions m e fnllowing the government's deportation of Kurds from t-he oil-rich Kirkuk area and the movemelnt of nnilitary forces to the north. A full-fledged rebellion headed by Barzani, broke out in September 1961. Even thou& Qassern fell from power in 1963, the Kurciish insurrection was to last almost unintwmpted k m 1963to 3975, a p e r i d of twelve years. The KDP's fi@thg stmg.th rose from about 1,OW ill-trained. Peshmq~tk(literally "'those who face death'" )errillas in tate 3961 to about 2(1,OW seasclncd guerrillas by late 1963. mrottghou,t. thc 1 9 a s military-domhnated Arab nationalist regimes in Baghdad proved unwi.llhg to grant the Kurds the autrlnorny they scrught m d unable to sllbdue them militarily. The f rst Ba'ath regime whieh seized power in February 1963 made a concerted effort to subdue the Kurds by undertaking a farge-scale offene not last mom sive and Zly mass deportatiom of :Kurds. This ~ g i m did than njne months in office. It was rent by extenshe factimalism between the right and left wings of the party and was significantly weakened by the focus on the counter-insurgency war against t-he Kurcls. The new military governmem.t., hocvevcr, putswd very similar poljcies. Its poljcy relied on large-scale offensives in the Kurdish areas, belling and bombing civilians in Kurdish villages, and mass deportations oE the Faiti Kurds, who live in the mountainous region borderhg Irm. Baghdad, however, scarcely had its own way The Iraqi Army suffercld severe reverses at t-he hands of the Kurds, particularly at Ilendrin in n-tid-1966. M e n the Ba%th seized power again in July 1968, it was determhed not to be deflsted k m its vision of buifding a modern "mgressivekd socialist Iraq that would play a major role in hter-region& affairs. It recog~nizedthat a clontkuation of the insurgency in the north was bound to lead to increased foreip interference in Iraq's domestic affairs and support for the rebels in a manner detrimental to the regime's determhation to widan Iraq's regional role, and the ncw rclgixne initiated negotialions with the Kurds to discuss autonomy measures. I'he result was a March 31,1970, agreement Mthich stipulated that:

* The m l h g Revolutionary Command Council wodd have Kurdish members; m e of the Republic's siee-presidelnts must be a Kurd; * Kurds s h d d , be qresented in the armed. forces, tlte securiq seristrative m a c h e r y and bureauvices, the miniskies, the state" ad cfacy in direct proportion to the size of the Kurdish popuiat-io~n;

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Kurdistan would become an autonomous region in which the local ent officials would be ethnic Kurds, the Kurds would be allowed to set up a legislative assembiy, and Kurciish would be the official language in Ihe north. I'hese terms may stilt offer a solution to the Kurciish pmblem in Iraq, but the March 1970 agreeme~~t was never impleme~~ted. Problelxs arose over different interpretations of the territorial extent of the autmomous region, Specificaliy, the Kurds wanted to include oil-rich Kirkuk within the northern autonontous regio~~. Baghdad balked at t-he idea of losing control of a critically important ecmonic region, and. did not give the :Kurds any real share of power in the ""cmter.'"e Kurds who held positions in the central government we= pokverless. Moreover, the Ba'alhists did not cease tke practice of '%rabizingU Kurdish areas, nor desist from deportations of Kurds from :Kurdistan to the south or of the expulsion of Kurds-deemed to be "ZrmiansM-to Zrm. 'The Kurds were outraged by Baghdad" suspected involvement in assassjnation attempts against Kurdish Icaders like Mustafa Barzmi. In short, trust and goodwill was lacking on both sides, For its part, Baghdad. suspected the Kurds, particularly Barzani, of building links with foreign powers like Iran with which Iraq was on the worst ol term. f17 Decennber 1,973, Che governmem.t. put fmward a proposal for the implementation oi a watered-down autonomy that m d e a mockery of its Ma& 1970 agrrement with the KDI'. Not surpsjsingly in this climate of ta~sionand mutlaal rczcriminations, relations between Baghdad and the Kurds deteriorated rapidly and a fullscale -dish rebellion erupted irr March 1974. This stage of the Kurdish conflict lasted a year, m d turned out to be the most costly and bloody to date for both the Kuds and.Baghdad. Uetemined, that i w o u l d not be bogged down in an intermillable conflict, Baghdad committed the bulk of its armed forccs-eight djvisi~lzsor 1ZU,I)(NI men of the rcgular armyf most of its armor, and its entire air force in a massive two pronged offensive irr spring and summer of 19711. that succeeded in driving the Peshnlcqa into the Inhospitable mountains dong the Iraqi borders with, Turkey and Iran. Despite suffering extent;ive casualties among the gtrvernmentfs largely Shi5te infantry units-which prompted an outcry in the Shi'ite south silenced by the execution of a lfew clerics-and loss of material, the Iraqi Army perfomed prodigious feats in seizillg the mountainous Kurdish strongholds of Ranya, Qala Diza and Ruwanduz in fall 11974, thereby threateni-ng the Kurds-enuous lines of communications with Iran whose government was providjng the guerrillas with weaponry, supplies and safe haven. The Kufds had the backing of ltne Shah of ban,

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and training and military equipmel~tfrom the US CIA, and between January-March 1975 fought a long, bloody series of battles that held the Iraqi Army to a standstiil in spite of its attacks on -dish civilians and "ethnic cleansing.'" The Kurdish rebels were only defeated once the Shah traded an end to his support of the Kurds for Iraq's a a g r e m a tcr accept Iran's terns on variotls border disputes and joint control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. This agreement was formalized by the Algier.; Accord of March 1975. Saddam Hussein was the key negotiator of this accord, anci it is scarcely surprishg that it left him with a permanel-rt suspicion of the Kurds and of their loyalty to the I r 4 state. Fotlowing the colIapse of the Kurdish i ~ ~ s u r g e nMustafa c~; Barzani fled wif-;hthousands of ather Kurds to Iran. Barzani then moved to the USA, where he died in 1979. This left the leadership of the KUX, in the hands of his two inexperienced sons, Masu'd and Idris. Meanwhile back in fray itself a mixturc3 of ruthless force and occasional incclrtives kept t%te Kurds relatively peacehl from 1.975to 1980, :Moreover, the Kurdish movement itself was weakened when it fragmented folloLving the formation in 1974 of the I'atrjotic Union of Kurdistan (E'UK) by J a l a Talibani, a left-leaning urbm intellectual and long-time ideological antagonist oi the morc conservative Mustafa Barzmi, Furthermore, Barzmi" massive political miscalcztlatio~~ in relying so much m Iran" support had robbed the Barzanis of their aura of invincibility in Kurdish lore and had enabled a more modem and cosmopolitan leader like Talibmi to challenge the two Barzmi sons for leadership of the Kurdish movement. Followhg the outltareak of the Iran-Iraq VVar in 1980, the t w major Kurdish groups-the Kurdish Demcratic Party (KDP) and the I'atrjotic 19nior1 of Kurdistan (PUK)-fought the Iraqi government on the side of frm. ent respmtfed by depbying two fuil corps into the Kurdish region, ushg napall%m d poison gas against suspect: or hostile Kurdish towns, and forcing mass relocations, The Kurds were able to keep up tbeir ~sistanceas long as they had Irmian support, but developed only limited military strength and were deeply divided. Many Kurds sided with tbe gwernmnt and served inpro-government militias, Both the KDP and the PUK were bitter rivals and sometimes fought each other as well as the gover1nme11t.96

ent's attacks m the Kurds became steadily more violent between early 1987 and the fall of 3988. Iran's ddefeat in the spring of 1988allowed the go~rernmentto cancentrate on the Kurdish rebellion and

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it conducted a brutally effective pacification progrant in the north. 'The result was the so-cdled Anfat ("Spoils"')Campaip of 1988, in which tens of thousands of Kurds lost their lives, and which is the most prominent example of the mass poltical killing of dissidents by the Iraqi rcgime. A find offensive by over 60,000 veterans of the fran-Iraq War broke the back of the Kurdish belli ion. During this campaign, thousands of Kurdish civilims were murdered. Government forces also arrested thousmds of Murds, who have never been seen agah. I'here are no pmcise figures m h w mally Kurds died. According to the UN Special b p p m t e u ~the ; total figure for disappeared Kurds durjng AnM could, number in the tens of thousands. Hunlan riglnts organizations quote much higher figures, althoqh these seem to be exaggerated. Middle East Watch estimates the total losses at between 70,000 and 100,080, and Amnesty hternational estimates them at more than 100,000. ent documents seized by the Based on forensic evidence and gave Kurds in 1992, Middle East Watch and 13hysiciansfor Human RgMs est-imate that up to 4,000 villages were dcstrczycd. The evidence suggests that g o v e m e n t efforts to eliminate Kurdish cornunities were widespread, systemati.cally planned, and ruthrcssly implemmted. UN forensics experts are still exasnining forensic information cibtained from mass grave sites in northern Iraq. These gravewontah the =mains of hw~dredsof persons presunted killed in Che Allfal Cantpaig~n.According to opposition sowces, a new mass grave, cmtaining up to 250 bodies, was found in April 1994 near the M-Sharcfat district of Mosul. Sources said that the graves were discovered w h e heavy ~ ~ rains washed away the covering soil." The U:N has also uncovered information regarding the Barzani arrests of 1'383, in which security forces detalned thousmds of rcllali.\res and tribesmn of the late Kurdish natimaXjst hero Mustapha Barzani. None of these detainees were ever seen aajain. The Special Rapporteur observed in February, 1994 that the regime's treatment of the Barzmi tribe might constitute violations of the Genocide C~nvention.~B Tn a February, 19912 report, the Special hpporteur concluded that the :Iraqi rc.gimefs policies against the K d s - h particular, against the Barzani tribe-"raise issues of crimes against humanity and violations of the 1948 Gmocide Convention." He noted "significant similarities" between the Iraqi regime's past policies t o w 4 the Kurcls and its ctrrrent policies toward Shi%tecivilians living in the southern marshes. 'The Special Rapporteur recomencted that "further consideration be given to estahtish the facts and responsibilities associated with atrocities committed against the Kurdish pop~lation.'~g The Special Rapportear of trhe UN reported that he held the Iraqi regime ~sponsible for ""sericrus breaches" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohi:bition oE the Use 21War of AsphyxJahg, Poisonous or other

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Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Wartare. He observed that these breaches may demonstrate the Iraqi regime liable under the 1948 Genocide Convmtion. According to the Special Rapportcur, the ac"civities of the Iraqi rclgixne during the An.lal Campaign "left vi,rtually no Iraqi Kurd untouched." He cmcluded that "serious violations of human rights committed against the civilian population of Iraq both in times of war and peace involve c r h e s against humanity committed u ~ ~ d and e r pursuant to the commands of Saddam Hussein and Ali Massan al-Majid."~~l~ 'The Special Rapporteur has also ~ p o r t e dthat the L\ridows, cltaughters, and mothers of the Ktlrdish victims of the Anfa1 Carnpaigrr are economically dependent on their relatkes or villages, because they may not inherit t l ~ eproperty or assets of their missing family members. Othrr rclports s~lggestthat economic destitutim has forced m n y w o m n into prostihntion.

The success of e r r a t i o n Anfal led the Kurds to change their strategy between the end of Ihe Iran-kaq War and Iraq's hinvasion of Kuwait. AIong with a nurnber of smalkr Kurdish groups, the :Pm and KL)P formed the Iraq Kurdistan Front (W)to better coordinate their activities and their demands in dealing with Baghdad. The IKF stressed autonomy for Kurdistan wit.hin the framework of a democrratic Iraq as their goal. The Kurds did this in order to allay the suspicions of other Er* opposition groups with hvhom they wen. seeking closer relatio~zsfor the first the. The IKF moved cautiody once Iraq inwaded Kuwait. It was m a r e that international pressure agaiinst Iraq was mom~thg,but it also realized Sad.dam would have no qualms about using trooys and chemical weapons against any rnbellion,lm This fear declined with time. Iraq had. to deploy many of"its fnrces south, leaving only three combat eMective divisions in the north and a host of other ill-motivated hfantry uni."ts.The parasfin-Kurdish intelligence-became aware that the morale of the rclnnain,ing mjfs w s low and that the n u d e s of deserters and of reservists who failed to report for duty was high, By the time th Coalition air assault began, Kurclislz sources reported that about half of the Kurdish auxiliaries in the Iraqi Army units based in Kurdjstm had deserted with their arms.102 The EKF also initiated discreet contacts with ent Kurdish irregulars, the Furtled elemnts of the p r o - g m san, but derogatively b o w n as the j ~ s h ,or Saddam's do11keys.10" As a result, the :lKF took the risk of creating new uprisings after Saddarn's shattering defeat in the G u f Wr, and these uprisings soon became a mass movernenl., The Kurds had little military strength, but they were

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able to take advantage of the paralysis of the Iraqi Army m d disorganization withixl the security services. In fact, the various pro-government tribal militias often persuaded the lrayi Army forces inKurdistm to leave virtually without- a fight. As a result, the Kurdish revolt rapidjy expanded to cover most of the rural and urban awas with large Kurdish populations. Kurdish civilims, inchding professionals, inl.ellectuals, and tens oE thousands of Fursan units deserted the government side and.joined the IKET" Neither Barzani or Talihani were Mly prtrpared for the scale and success of tbis uprisi~~g, but- they acted quickly to take control of an incfnoate rclbeISious m s s and engaged their veteran Pahmerga guerrilla units in attacks on government forces. Wilhin days, the guerriltas took ower several major urhan cel~ters,including the oil-center of Kirkuk. In. the process they defeated ill-motivated troops who surrendered in droves, joined the guerrillas, or fled south. Large vantities of heavy military eyuipment including several tanks, helicopters, anthaircraft guns, artillery and mortars, fcll to che of Kurdistm was intl-teir rebels, By mid-March, the %KFdcclarcd that 75%~ hands. This Kurdish success, however, only occurred because of the power vacuum created by the Gulf war. Saddam begm to redepXoy regular a m y units into the Kurcfish area when he reaiized tbr UN would allow lraqi troops and helicapters to operate against the various uprisings, The UN did try to protect the Kurds by forcing Iraq to observe the terms of the cease-firc and to stop using its combat aircraft against the Kurds. US F15s shot down one Iraqi Air Foxce $13-22 on March 20, m d then another Su-22 on March 22. By limitixzg itself to attacks on Iraqi fixed wing fighters, however, the Ur\l allowed Iraqi ground troops to attack the poorly armed m d organized Kurds and they met little resistance. The Kurdish force did not stand a chance against the veterans of the Republican Guards a d better regular army units brought up from t-he south, whose residraal comklat capabjlities in Ihe wake of Desert Storm they had underestimated. AS Talfiani stated, "we did not realize that the Republican Guards wew still in such good shape.'"""" There was little military coordination between PUK and KDP forces. Both groups had little time after their victory to organize m effective defense, and the guemillas suffered from acute command and contrd prcrblems. Kurdish leaders had a great deal of experience in handlhg small groups of guerrillas, but not the vastly increased order of battle which they had in March 1991. Army clteserters did not have &e time to train the guerrillas in the use of captured heavy weaponry When the guerrillas fotlilld themselves in possession of many urban centers, they were uverwhelmed by the twin tasks of providing military leadership and emergency civilian administr&ion. They lacked any experience in wban war and fled into

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the motmtains, hoping to spare the urban population. Even in the mountains, they found they could not wage war because large tracts of land had been depopulated with no hiding places or access to food from a sympalhetic populace and which had been turned into f'ree-fire zones for the Iraqi military.l""h Iraqi forces retook Karbala in the south and K i r M in the north by March 28.1"' 7raq surroul-rded cilies like Irbil and Kirkufc in the north with army uni.ts, and sent brigades to control all key routes and. bridges, It used artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and a m e d helicopters against any pockets of resistance. The Kurdish guerrilXa forces had nnly a negligible capability to resist, and. the Klardish uprising collapsed like a burst bubble. The long history of Iraqi attacks on Kurdish civilians and Iraq's use of chentical weapons against Kurdish civilians led many Kurbs to flee as the Iraqi troops advanced, and one million to 1.5 million Kurdish ~ f u g e e shad moved near to, or across the Turkish and Iranian borders. This flood of refugees and the risk a new KurdiSh enclave would be created in k k e y , led the US and UN to imterwene tcr protect the Kurds and prevelzt the establishment of rehgee camps and e~zcla~res almg the border areas. On Agril. 5, the t"N passed Resolution 688, cmdemning and dernandint; an end to lraqi mprc_.ssionof the Kurcls. On April 7, the U'S hnd begun air drops of food. CI1I April, 8, Secrebry of State Baker promised the Kurds food, shelter, and medicine, and President Bush established an airlift called Operation Provide Comfort, Repeated fraqi attacks on the Kurds t-hen led the U'S to decliarcl that lraq would not be permitted to fly aircraft north of th 36th parallel he April If), 1991. The UN also put heavy pressure on the Iraqi gov to halt its attacks, m d allow US and allied troops to move into northern :Iraq to help set up refugee camps in the border area. As a result, Iraq signed an agreement on April 18,1991, that effectively created a UN ccmt r o M and demilitarized securjty zone b r Ihe Kurds, a mzlch larger Kurdish controlled enclave, and a no-fly zone north of the 36th paraltel. The agreement. allowed the UN to station 500 security guards tcr protect relief operations, and was to remain in force until December 31,1991, with the possibility of renewal. The UN forces in Iraq reached a peak in early Rcray cJf about E,OW mm, inchding French, Dutch, Italian, British, and US demerits, but. there was no political support for the kind of long-term occupation that would have been needed to secure Kurdish autonomy UN forces left Dahuk on June 15, and the n m b e r of troops in Iraq dropped to m u n d 8,000. The t)SV force was cut to 5,100 m June 23. The UN withdrew a11 forces fPom Iraq on July 15,1901, although it initially left a small brigade in southern Turkey

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Iraq at first responded by testing the UN% resolve, Some 200 Iraqi policemen attacked Kurds in the town of Zakhu on April 21. Iraqi antiaircraft artiltery fired on a US reelmnaissmce jet patrolling northern Iraq on May 7%Iraqi troops fired or1 British troops in Dahuk on M a y 13' and fired on a US army helicopter on May 14. They clashed with Kurdish demonstrators on June 5, and stole 7' tons of mlief supplies for the Kurds on June 6. W e n it becarnc a p p a ~ nthat t these txtics did little more than pmvoke the UN, Saddam used different tactics. H e entered into pmlonged negotiations with the Kurds that aIIowed him to delay any settlement until Ur\l forces had left northern Iraq, and the long stmding tensions between Turkey and the Kuds had reduced support to the Kurds from the north, The k r d s werc willkg to negotiate with Saddarn because of the sheer scale of their defeat and their belief that the mass exodus of Kurdistan's popdaticm to Turkey and Iran was leading to the depopulation of northern Iraq and playkg into Saddam" hands. These negotiations between Saddam and the Kurds broke down in the fall of 1991, howeveq and this led the Kurds to create their own autonomous zone within the area that was still under UN protection. Saddam, in turn, established a military line beheen the evolving Kurdish autonomous cmtity# witmrew Iraqi civil and administrative persomel from the region, and illstituted a string n t econonnic blockade. Iraq deployed some 16-18 divisions and 150,000--475,000 tsoops from its I Corps and V Corpmandi its &publican Guards. It deployed these forces along the snuthcm edge of the Kurdish controlled zone from Dahuk through Al Kuwayr, Il-bil, and Kifri to Khanaqin, Iraqi forces regdarly shelled Kurdis positions near the border of the Turkish security zone, and often harassed the UN' relief and hspection effort.

The Sea~iekfor Kardish Unity The Krards in the security zone responded by holding elections in May 1992. They establishrd a 'rt-lgimal' legislative assembly in Irbil, h m e d a ""cbinet" and begm economic recmstructior~.Although these elections pmduced a deadlock between the two main Iraqi Kurdish factionsPatriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdish Democratic Party-both parties agreed to set up a joint "government" with its capital at Irbil. m e y agreed to create a 105 man assembly, which met for the first tirne on July 4,1992. 'fhe assembly had 50 delegates each for the Barzani and Talahanf factior~s,and 5 seats for Kurdish Christians. This agreement effectively allowed the Kurdtish enclave an autonomous area, Lalthough the Iraqi g o v e m e n t called the new Kurclish leadiership ""illegal" and laheled its fifteen ministers as "bmdits.'"

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These Kurdish efforts initially had some sttccess. In the months that followed, the Kurdisb goverment was able to function, in spite of occasional fellding between the BUK alld KUP- The Kurds gradually built up an economy based partly on agriculture and smuggling between Turkey and Iraq, They began to repair some of the damage to nearly 2,000 of the 4,000 Kurdish towns and villages that the gowernment had attaeked in the region since 1970. 'They maintained a tenuous relationship with Turkey by agreeing to keep Turkish Kurds on their territory from launching military operations against Turkey, and to provide data on those Ijlrkish Kurds who use their territory as a sanctuary The Iraqi Kurds even fought several clashes with Turkish Kurds in the PKK. Much of t b progress collapsed in mid-1994, however, when a new power struggle begm between the Barzani and TaEabani factions. This struggle soon degenerated into a c m t h u i ~ ~ state g of civil war puncbated by cease-fires that are never bo~zoredfor more lhan a few days or weeks at most, The heads of the two rival Murdiskz orgmizatians, the KDP and PUK, were deeply divided over basic policy issues and the goals the Kurdish movememt should seek i,n dealing with the lraqi gover Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP m d son of the f m o u s Kurdish leader Mulfah Mustafa Barzani (who fought both :Iran and Iraq), has ofkm stressed the djfficulties i,n trying to get rid, oE Saddam Mussein. As he told journalists in early 19532:l"g 1 can tell you one thing. Ousting Saddam tzrill not be an easy task, We have fought him for 20 years in which we lost aver 150,000 martyrs, and he did not faXI. There is no Iraqi opposition which can topple him. He remained in power aMer a bitter eight-year war with Iran, and stayed in control in Baghdad after the multinational war that was waged against him. The reality is that he is stil in power. Tl-ie difficulty cjf removing him ties in trhe fact that he has a powerful army and party security and intelligence ol-ganizationsthat have remained effectively intact and under his contml.

Given this backgramzd, it is not surprishg that Barzani never ruled out a resumption of autonomy talks with Baghdad. Barzani"~pragmatism was also reflected in his analysis of the Kurdish elections for a local assembly in April 1992. Barzani stressed repeatedly that Iraqi law called for the formation of a Kurdish legislatuse in accordance with autonomy granted the Kurcis, but which was never implemented by Baghdad. Furthermorer he said the elections w r e aimed at filling the '"adsninistrative vacuum" prevaililrg ixr the north now that Baghdad was prevmted from exercising its authority in the nor2-h. In contrast, Jalaf Talibani saw Barzani as a rival for leadershjp ol the Kurdish movement, and has catled for full autonomy or ixrdependence. FXe also leads Murds with religious, geo-

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graphie, and ljnguistic backgrou~zdstrhat are often Merent from the Kurd s that follow Barzani, In November 19534,the t w Kurciish parties s i p e d yet another ceasefire but this collqsed amid mutual recriminations of bad faith. 'The 13W accused the KDP guerrillas of pockethg customs duties levjcd on tmcks crossing the Iraqi-Turkish border instead of giving it to the -dish rclgionnf admhistrati.on at Xrbil. The KDP inturn accused the PWK of corruption and of exphiting their control of the "finmcc ministry" and of the '"central bank" for their c ~ w particularistic n ends. Meanwhile, Iraq co~ztinuedto probe the Kurdish enclave and to try to find new vulnerabilities. The US Government announced in Apnl 1994 that it had infornation indicathg that the government of Iraq had offercld a toyorre who assassinates United Nations and monetary '%owztiesMf other international relief workers.11" kfraqalso continued to attack humanitarian relief efforts in northrm Iraq. fn 3994, two aid workers were killed in an execution-style shooting. Several other international workers involved in the relief effort, including six- U d e d Nations guards, were injured in bombing and shootjng attacks in March and April. (3m h/lartlh 27, 1994, Iraqi security forces permitted a crowd in Mos~dto attack and damage a URJ heliropter attempting to airlift wounded guards to safety TWOSwedish journalists were q u r e d in Aqrah on March 34 when a bomb exploded under theis arnt-omobi1e.n" The mcer2ain protection provided by Codition forces only existed wi&h the security zone. The Iraqi regime pursued its discriminatory resettleme~ztpolicies outside the Ktlrdjsh security zo~ze,jncluding demolition of villages and forced relocations of K d s , Turkomms, and other minorities, Middle East Wtch repmted that the Iraqi regime was continMing to force Kurdish reside~ztsof Mosul to move to Kurdish-controlXt3d areas jn the north, although the kaqi r e g h e directed. most of its resettIement efforts in 1994 a d 1995 at the 5hi"te residents of the southern marshes,

Near Civil War MTithipl the Kadish Enclave During 199415396, the Barzani and Talhani factions cmthued to fight a low-level civil war withixr the enclave in spite of repeated US and other attempts to mediate between the two sides. h esty Illternational. (AI) rclported in 1,994 and 1,995 Ihat three Kurdish political parties in northern :Iraq-the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and the Islarnic Party in lraqi Kurdistan-had committed scores of deiiherate and arbitrary killislgs against each other h 19993. Many press reports indicate that the Kurdish parties continued to commit arbitrary killings against each other in 1994.ljz Uolent figbling resum& over control of Xrbil, the k r d i s h regimal capital., ist mid-flecermber 1994 and continued into January 1995. This

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fighthg took place because Barzani's headquarters in S a l h a d d b averlooks ITbil, and 'TBIahani attempted to put Zrbil under bWK cmtrol, h r ing the conflict, 'Ihfibani's forces made some headway and launched a major anack m the strategic road l;inbg Irbil to the Iranian border, but Barzani and the KDP counterattacked. It was only after Saddam made an offer of mediatim that both sides dtejded to accept a cease-fire brokrcd by the Iraqi Natjorlal Congress (INC) on January 12,1995, which called for a return to the status-quo ante in Irbil (i.e., cessation of fighting) and a separation of the forces of the two rivals by the INC militia.ll3 A tenuous cease-fire betvveen the KDP and the PUK held. until April 1995, although minor clashes between t-he :K:UPand PUK took place. This cease-fire broke down, however, whet.3linrkish forces advancd into Iraq. The Turkish attack m the PKK triggered new fighting between the two factions, and this resurgence in i n t r a - K d i h fighting virtuaily paraiyzed the Kurdi* rclgional Parliarncnt in Irbil, whose rnancfate was due to expire in early June, 1995. The expiration of the mandate was supposed to be foltowed by fresh elections MIhich the weary Kurclish population hoped would end the cycle of vioiience. Howcver, the situation became so bad that the USA made a major effort to persuade the Iraqi Kurds to put an end to their fighting-an effort minforced Zly US desire to block an Irmian mediation effort. The KDP and PUK heid talks in Drogheda, Ireland, under the auspices of the United States, from August 9-11, 19%. These talks were aimed at resolvhg the deep-seated differences between the two leadivlg Kurdish groups. The Iraqi National Cmgrclss participated and Turkey sent &servers. The two parties then appeartld to agree to a cease-fire. They agreed to cease rnedja attacks against orle another, to respect the rights of the others followers, and to release detain.ees captured during hostilities between them. This agrclememt had the folowing terms:

The KDP and PUK will strive to finalize a permanent peace.. Irbil, the admhistrative ce~zteraf the Kurdish zone which has seen its share of violence dur;ing intra-Kurd strife will be demilitarized. Forces of both sides in the environs of the city will be reduced. A neutral commission to mediate between the KDF and PUM will be formed under the auspices of the INC. No later than 48 hours following the certrfied demilitarization of Irbil, customs and revenues colected by the parties wiil be deposited in banks to be used illth name of the regional authority* The elrcted regional parliament will be reconvmed within 48 hours af the demilitarization al Irbil.

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Fotlowing the restoration of order the regional authority will work with all possible haste to fashion a new broad-based administration for the area. .hfl of this wilt be carried out within the Irafne\ivork of the recognition of t e legitimacy oi Iraq% territorial integrity and will take into consider;ltion the legitimate scrctrrity i n t e ~ s t of s 7irfkey Despite the hopes fur this accord, figf-itixzg between the KDP and PUK intensified at the end of August 1995. h fact, the Drogheda agreement seelns to have unravcled b e f m it was even ixnplemem.t.ed.'Three days of intensive talks between the PUK and KDP failed to resolve their differences. They could not agree on how to demilitarize Irbil nor reach an understmding on hocv to split the lucrative custom revelnues that come fPom the tolls levied on the transport of goods from Turkey into northern Iraq and which =present an income of up to $150,000 a day. The ceasefire did sharply reduce the nurnber of civilian caszxalties and the use of torture on those detained or arrested. 'The Iraqi government maintained its internal embargo on fie three governates in northern Iraq, populakd primarily by Kwds and other et-hnic mjnorities, The embargo p ~ v e n t e dthe eentry of food, medicine, and other humanitarian suppIies to that area. Aftcr 1.993, the ernbargo also inchded electrie power cut-offs in specific areas, causifig Ihe disruption of water and sanj.tatim systems and interference with the delllvery of food and fuel. The Ul~itedNations and donor governments installed temporary generators to alleviate the crisis. h July 1.9995the Gover restored some electricity and allowed increased, fuel trade with the northem governate of Dohuk, but the fuel trade was again severely restricted wif-;hthe onset of wiulter. Even now, the elltire northern area remains subject to the threat of future cut-offr;. Tl~eKurdish sihtation also deteriorated skadily in mfd-49% when fierce clashes begm to take place between PKK guerrillas and KDP Peshmerga units in the areas of Z a b o , Sarsank and Badban, It is not clear what the PKK intended to achiwe by the sudden escalation of guerrilta activity, although the consensus oE opiaim was that its ehief, Abdullah Ocalan, was bent on torpedoing the Drogheda a p e m e n t between the :KUP and PUK. Recmciliation betwen these two parties would go a long way tokvards fadlitating their control aver northcrn Xraq, and ultirna.t.ely control over the movement of the P m guerrillas, ~g Indeed, in an August 29,1995 fnterwiew with AI Efnyaf, a l e a d i ~ Arab newspaper, Ocalan admitted that he was trying to sabotage the KDPPUK truce, and then called upon Iraq's Kurds to ""rip up" their agreement with 'litrkey to keep the PMK out of northern Zraq, addi~tgthat '"we want to drag themf"meaning the Turkish military-'"into north-

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ern Iraq in order to destroy them there.""l"egiarral press reports also added, that Ocalads strategy was &signed to please both Syria and Iran, traditionally supporters of the PKK, who were fearful of i~~creased Turkish and US influence in the clisintegrating s:ituation in northern Iraq. Furthermore, both Barzani and Wibani visited Tehran, thus signaiing their desire to avoid darning and a3ienatIlmg the Islarnic Republic wfiieh has rcpeatedty made its di,splcasure with Che event.s in Kurdistan widely known. The situation conthued to deteriorate in late 1995 and early 1996, although the US made repeated efforts to prevent this. The US dispatched in mid-November a delegation bcaded by the director of r\larthem Gutf Affairs at the State Department, Robert Deutch, to norChem Iraq to pressure the two Kurdish parties to resolve thcir differences. U'nfortw nately, the new effort hiled and resulted in a de facto division of Kurdistan into two clmflicting zmes of influence. At the same time, tension grew bctween Washington and some mernbers ol the Iraq National Council,over the growing role of Iran in the area and US support of new opposition groups backed by Jorclan. The presence of units of the Iranian-supported Badr Brigade in Northern Iraq also displeaw"dhe US, as did the growth of Iranj.an influence in the PTJK. At the same time, Syria has encouraged PI(K attacks on the KDP, and Iran has negotiated with the PUK.

The Impact of T@rkeyfsWar Against the P m The Irayi Kurdish problem had FRcreiasingly been complicated by %keys pr"bIems with its large Kufdish minority, which inhabits south-eastern Anatolia, bordering Iraq and Iran. 'The Turks are fighting a particularly violent Kurdish separatist organization, the Kurdish Workers Party-known as the PKK-Mthich has been waging a guerrilla campaitgn since the 1,980s. 'This war htensified &er a bloo* uprising during Kurdish new year celebrations in March 1942, As a result, thousands of Turkish troops supported by warplanes a d helicopter gunships moved into northern Iraq in October, 1992 to attack the camps of the PKK guerrillas. Irmicaliy, this Turkish move came only tvvo weeks after hkara perszxaded the Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas of the PU'K and the KDP to begia attacking PKK sacrctuaries in northern Iraq. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership felt it had no cbice but to comply because the Turkish government cmtrolled the flow ol aitical supplies to the Iraqi Kurdish enclavc As a result, the Turkish operation had cmsidcrable success. The PKK was unprtrpared and because the two Iraqi Kurdish groups cooperated with

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the Turks and with one another to push the PKK guerrillas into a Turkish blocking force which routed them, 11% 1994 and 1995, mmy Kurdish civilians near the Turkish border were caught in new raids by Turkish military f m e s on szlspected hideouts of the extremist Kurdistan M;iorkersT~arty(ZIKK). Ch August 8,1994, Turkish planes bombed a camp near Z a ~ o containing 10,0O('r Kurdish rcllugees from Turkey. Athough the rehngees s~1,Meredno casualt.ies, 10 Iraqi guarcfs were reported kiUed and 7 wounded. The Turkish Government claimed that I'KK terrorists were hiliing in the camps. On August 23, 1994, Turkish plmes ai-i;ac&ng a PKK camp in Zele bombed the nearby village of Bidewan, woundhg 7 Iraqi Kurdish civilians, On September 8, Turkish planes again bombed the large concentratrion of Turkish refugeemear Za,kho. No injurjcs werc ~ p m t e d but , sever& tents we= destroyed..ll" The Turkish-:PE conftict worsened dufing 1995. Early in the year, I'KK guerrillas jncreased thc tempo of their attacks against Turkey Turkey responded with its most masshe incursion to date into norhem :Iraq. It launched Operaticm Steel, with at least 30,000 troops, in late March, 1,995. The Erkish operati.on, whicl-c lasted 8 weeks, resulted in s m e civilian deaths, There were also several unconfirmed reports of civilian casualties b r i n g four smdler Turkish operations into norlhern Iraq during 11495, Hocvever, Turkish GovernmeM authorities skessed that the operation sought to avoid civilian casualties. The new Turkish operatim was at best a limited military success. 'The Turks had tclegraghed their intentions for weeks. They had made statements that they werc going to deal with the PKK ""tcrmrists," m d their build-up for the illcursion was visible to all who crossed the border between Iraq m d Turkey As a res~dt,the P.KK simply wilhdre1.v from its exposed forward positions.""hhe lack of Turkish success was evidmt in the fact that Turkish forces reh;lrned for a week in July with quick-reaction m o ~ ~ ~ ~commando tain forces who moved to engage the PKK along a 70-km Iron&extending 40 kilmeters deep into northern Iraq. Later in 1995, elements of the IPKK illcreased their activity in northern Iraq and reportedfy killed local residents in an effort to control a territorial base, These groups sometjxnes attacked civilians, foreign relief workers, a d jcrurnaiists. Several kidnappi~~gdook place during fighting among Kurdish factions in northern Iraq. In September s~~pporters of the PKK took several Iraqi and. foreip relief workers hostage at a k k i s h Kurd rt~fugeecamp. All were eventually leased unharmed. 'The PKK c o m i t t e d numesclus abuses against civilians in northern Iraq. In Septmber the PKK seized eight UN relief workers as hostages at the Atrush refugee camp. The camp has been suspected as a base for

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PKK terrorist activities. The relief workers were released unharmed after 3 days, and the UNFXCR successfu-ully consolidated the Atrush Refugee Camp facilities in late 1995 to enhance protection for the mf ugees there. There are still approximately 14,000 Tilrkish Kurds in Northern Iraq who have fled civil strife in southeastern Turkey. The UNHCR is treating these dispiaced persons as rclfugees m t i l it reaches an official determination on their status. However, many support the PKK and. there is no way to tell wl~enTurkey will attack agailz into Northern Iraq, or how long the Iraqi Kurds can obtah Turkish tolerance and support, What is clear is that any Iraqi Kurdish effort to build ties with the PKK would aliemte Turkey and yuite possibly lead to at least tacit military cooperation between Turkey and Iraq in s ~ ~ p p r e s s ia11 t ~ gKurdish resistance, The Kurdish Grisis of August-September 1996

The economic a d military sibation of the Iraqi Kurds became steadily grimmer, and more was involved Ihm the fightjng betwee11 Kutdish factions, Many foreign relief workers were forced to leave southern Iraq in August, 1992, and Iraq cmtlnued to harass relief workers in the nmth."T 'The Iraqi. regime maintahed an ot~gohginternal embargo of the north, which included necessities such as food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. Afier August 1993, the embargo also included massive electric pocver cut-oMs in specific areas, caushg Chc spoilage of medicines, breakdowns in local. water-purification systems, m d the loss of certah hospital services. A disaster was averted only by the prompt action of thr United Nations and donor governmem.t.s, who irnported and installed temporary generators to alleviilk the crisis, Additional electricity cut-offs wew imposed in August 1994. 'This embargo of the north m t only impacted on Kurds, but ~rariousother minorities such as T~~rkomans, who also live h the area.11" "Kurdistm" "became an economic shambles as a result of civil conflict m d the internal, embargo imposed by Baghdad which cut off the North fPom the markets i h a d depended on in the rest of the country. The region had no viable co ercial or financial infrastructure. The only source of ~~lve11ue came from the import/export custom duties imposed on goods c m j n g from Tariccry on their way south to Mosul and the rest of the country or on :Iraqi oil smuggled out via Km-ccmtrolled tt.rritor)i. But this revenue was more of a bane than a benefit to Kurdistan, because the KI)P and the PUK fought and quarrcled over control of the '6customs" points and the divisirrn of the mvenue. :Nor have the Kurds used tbis RVenue to buiid up their admhistrative inkastructure. This helped rej,nforce

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the semi-permanent state of militarization. an the Kurdish enclave because the largest and best equipped militias belonged to the KDP and PUK and represented the cmly major source of large-scaie employment for young Kurdish men. In spite oi this, the K d s had little military protection. Xn early 1936, the l.CDI.2 clahned. to have 25,000 tmops, m d a militia of 30,00C) additional men. These forces were arm& with light artillery, multi,plc rocket lamhers, mortars, small arms, m d SA-7s. The PUM clairned to have 12,000 tmops, plus 6,WO m m in support forces. It was armed with mme T-54 and T-55 tanks, &out 450 mortars, 106 m recoilless riftes, 200 light mti-aircrak guns, and SA-%. The Socklist Party of Kurdistan claimed to have another 5W men. 'l'hese divided KUP and PUK forces, however, were better prepared to fight each other t-han Iraq. They gave the Kurds some defensive capabjlitr, but their trainkg was minhal, and they lacjked adequate heavy weapons, sipificant numbers of modern anti-tank, m d Light anti-aireraft wevolla They were as vulnerable hall a dccade after lraqi (orces haw driven them into Turkey as they we^ when effnrts at Kurdish unity began. Virtrudy ail UN ground troops had left the Kurdi?;h security- zone w h e the ~ ~ UN agreement with Turkey that allowed it to s t a t i o ~troaps ~ an. Turkish soil expirt-d an September 30,1991. The only remaining force was a small military mission which patrols the Kurdish security zone, al;lhough the US keeps some military persomel in Turkey; and Ttzrkey still provides basing for British, French, and US aircraft to provide security for the Kurds. Iraqi ground forces remahled deployed inpositions arowld Irbil, Chamchmal, Efri, and Sulaymaniyah. While the depluyments currenay s e a designed to contain tbr Kurds, they could be altered to invade K d i s h have been territory Iraqi-spo~~sored political Elliings m d terrorist actio~~s frequent, and have been directed against civilians, foreigst relief workers, journalists, and opposition leakrs. The State Department reports that a m t a n jomalist Iissy Schmidt and her Kurdish bodyguard, Aziz Kader Faraj, were shot to death on April 3,1994, in m ambush near Suleymaniya, Kurdish authorities later arrested several suspects MIho reportedly cmf e e d t-hat the lraqi reginte had pajd them to colnmit the murders."g Kurdish vilXages a l q the h m i m boder werc subjected to recurrent shelling by the Iranian milikry, as well as to sporadic Irmian milibry incursi011s jnto Ira4 krrit.07. For exampleI lranian artil.li.7 shcHed civjlim mas in As-Sulaym.hy& pmlnce the night of hpril17-18,1996, Iranian forces were also rqortedly hvolwd in f i g h ~ tbetwem ; the main Iraqi Kurdish parties in August and &ceder, 1994, m d in 1,995,'2"'The Iraqi govesrt also mairrtained its eHorts to "Arabhe" wrtain areas, such as the urban caters of Kirkuk and Mosul, %rough tJle forced movment of Iwal by Arabs residents from their homes and villages m d their replace~~ent

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from outside the area. Further, lmd mhnes contislued to EH or m a d Kurdish civilians, Many of these m h m were laid during the Iraq-Iraq Mlar, but the a m y failed to clear them. The mines appear to have been haphazardly plmted in civilim areas. The Spmial Rapporteur has repeatedly remixlded the Xraqi regime of itrj ubligatiorrs under the Land Mm= Protocd, to which :Iraq is a party, to protect ckilims from the effects of mines.121 Furthel; Iran became a miljor player h northern Iraq during the course of 1996. Iran used its support of Talibani. m d the PUK to suppant the U s w h i c h focused on negotiating between the PUK and KC)P-md put prcssure on %key as wefl by supporting Kurdish elentetnts MIhich had ties to the PKK. Iran also made periodic claims that it was the only country able to bring peace to norlchem Iraq, and 2000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards entered Iraq i,n support of the PUK against Rarzani's KDP in August 1996, While the IZevoIutionary Guards withdrew after helping the PUK win a series oE victories againe;t the KUP, there were many reports that the Irmians still, mab~tainedintelligence m d security pers m e l . within 17UK terntoryr.Baghdad saw this 1rania.n presence as a national security threat, and Saddarn issued claims that Iranian troops were deployed 50 kilometers inside Iraq.122 At the end of August 1946, Iraq reacted with force. It sent elements of three Republican Guards divisions-variously estimated as a force of E,000 to tiQ,OOC) men wilh artillery and over 100heavy armnred vehklesinto the Kurdish safe haven, Iraq was able to take advantage of the fact that its klrces were a l r c a e positioned within 35 kilometers of Lhe Kurdish rclgiorlal capital of Arbi2, and i t had an extensive htelligence network in the city and thrwghout the Kurdish region. Further, this time Iraq acted. at the invitation of Masufd Barzani of ithe KDP and was able to claim it was allied to a m a h Kurdish faction agaislst Kwdisb separatists and Irm. The firepower provided by the Zraqi Republican Guards divisions allowed tbe KUI" to drive the PtJK out of the Kurdish mgiond capital of Arbil. by August 31. This, in turnr allowed Iraqi security forces to sweep into the city and drive out, arrest, or execute hundreds of members of the various (~tnpositionelements hradquartered h the area. 'The CIA team aiding these opposition groups also flcd, alo~ngwith nnnst .foreign relief workers and many of their Kurdish belpers, Wjthin days, S a d d m bad s h a t t e ~ dall of the opposition groups with a foothoid on Iraqi soil. The KDP then repeatedly outmanewered a panicked PU'K, and tricked it into defending the wrong strong points, By early September, the KL)P had pmhed the re ants of the PUK to the Iranian border, raising kars that the Iranims might intervene to prevent a mass exodus of Kurdish refugees into Iran. hstead., Iran sealed its bordcr to most refugees and fired artillery salvoes in the direetim of the Iraqi border to discwage the KDP k m pursuing the P W too closely.

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By Chc end of the first week of %pternt?er, the Baghdad-KUP alliance controlled all of northern fraq, Saddam Hussein then moved to declare a broad amnesty in Iraqi Kurdistan and lifted the five year embargo. This was donc partly to allay Kurdjsh fears that Saddam would seek indiscrin?inate revenge. On the other hand, Saddam had good reason to fear a mass Kurdish exodus which would focus wcrrld attention on the plight of the Kurds and would invite greater PrUrEsh and franian action in order to prevent an influx of Kurdish refugees. He also had good reason to fear that Rarzani might turn upon the Iraqis if Baghdad was too harsh%lz3 The Zraqi gwernment had a number of masons to act. Baghdad had been Zliding its t h e it.% order to re-establish its cclntrd w e r the north. Iraqi officiizls had made repeatedy clear that the 'abnorml conditions' in the northern part of the horneland (i.e., absence of central, government authority) was temporary. As a msdk Baghdad was ready to exploit any rcllali.veiy cost-fsae opportunity to R-establish central authority in the north, and this situation presented itself in late August when the KDP came under pressure from the PUM and Iran. This opened the door for Baghdad to intervezze in favor of the KDPf whose leadership the Iraqi ent favored over that of the ?raitorousTl"blK, Baghdad was in a good positicm to make such a mowe. 'f'he PUK had no air support and heavy land weapns. The "no fly'' zzone in the north had as little impact on Xrayi. ground operations against the wretchedIy led PUK militia as the ''no fly'kzone in the south had on such operations against the Shi'ite. Many of Iraq's land forces relnained positimed along the edge of the exclusion zone, and its =organized Republican Guards risZted little in supporting the :KUP militia s a i n s t FUK f m e s that were poorly trained, kd, and eqtt,ipped. Baghdad was also ahle to exploit the fact it had contributed greatly to the d e c h e in the security and stability of Iraqi Kurclistan by implementing an internal embargo against the safe-havezz, and by selectively encouraghg the rivalry between the KDP and PUK. The Ba%th regime had always made it clear that it fawored Mari;u"d Barzani and thcz KDR U'nljke Tatibani, it ncver attxked Barzani as a 'closet separatist.' Baghdad did wage a long and vitriolic prclpaganda campaign a g h s t Talibani as a "olitical chameleon,kand as a dmger to Iraq because he soticited help from Iraq's main ideoiogical and regjonal e~zemles:Syria, Iran, and Israel. At the same tjm.e, however, the Ba'ath regime had quietly encouraged. Barzani to negotiate-an mcouragement that chew a growing msponse because Barzani" father had been betrayed by Iran and the U'S, because of Barzani's belief that th Kurds of Iraq w d d eventually have to reach a deal with Baghdad, and because of his six-year-long experience with the failures of the Iraqi opposit.ictn.

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As a result, Saddam Husseh gained the opportunity to move into the northern part of Iraq where he could defeat the strongest advwate of :Kurdish separatism, force opposition elements like the Iraqi National Co~~gress to leave their one sanctuary in Iraq, and sectlre the fraqi-Turkish oil, pipeline that runs west of the city of Arbil into Turkey and on to the Turkish part of Ceyhan cm the Mediterranean, 9nding Iraqi troops to aid the KDP did mem risking a further delay in the implementation of UN Resolution 986, which aI1owed Iraq to sell $2 billim worth of oil over a period of six months-At thc same time, there were compe~nsathgadvantages There was little prospect of a prolonged delay and the intervention meacrt Saddam would greatly reduce t h ability of Kurclish separatists to exploit the Kurdish share of the oil revenues m d that Baghdad cot~1dtry to secure the pigelhe which was critical to Iraq" aag~ementto seI1 oil for food and which was to carry some 500,000 bpd once the agreement went into operation."z" Iraqi officials feared the pipeline would become yet anoll.ler target of the rivaIry between the KDP and PUK. From Baghdad." pperspective, there was a serious risk that the PUK w o d d try and sabotage the pipelix~ewith Iranian help- Moreover, the Turkish Kurdish mo~rement, the PKK, could, choose to target the oil pipeline in order to deny Turkey transit fees and revenue. This raised the prospect of Turltey moving force into northern Iraq and establishing a secur.g corridor for the pipeline in Iraqi Kurbistan, While Baghdad wanted the pipellne to be serurr., its best option would be to have the KDP guarantee the security of the pipeline discrcetiy backed up by lraqi firepower. This, hocvever, meant that a combination of Iraqi and KDP forces bad. to secure Arbil and push the I>tiF(forces as far w a y as possible from transportation and oil routes to Turkey. Iraq also moved its forces into the north as a warning to both Turkey and Iran to cease their interfercmce in norlchern Iraq. 'lhe gove published an editorial following the victory of newspapet; Af J~nzhouriy, the government and KDP forces which stated that, ""All countries in the region ccmcerned with the Kurdish issue have to extract correct lessons from the latest e v e ~ ~in t snorrthern Iraq, The roots of this lesson are? that meddling in Iraqi, affairs is a dangerous game that will evmtually burn the h a ~ of d those playing it.'"25 Baghdad had reason for its concern. Both Turkey m d Iran had moved to exploit the strategic vacuum innorthern fray during the past six years, Much to w h d a d ' s etiscornfort, 'litrkish forces hha mmoved into nor&Iraq almost every year since 1991: by Baghdad" count the Tbrks had undertaken ''90 militaq incursions" into Iraq since 1991, As a result, the Iraqi regime's alliance with Barzani offewd the prospect oE bringing stability to the north and "terminat[ing] the power vacuumf' in the north.12"

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Baghdad may also have co~~cluded that it could take advmtage of the emergence of Turkey" new Islatnic gove t mder Prime Mhister key had already made it Necmettin Erbdkan. &ring the past two ye clear that it would like to see Baghdad re-estabbsh central c ~ ~ ~ over t r o lthe north, and the new government actively sought to establish closer political with Baghrlad. &reover, the new gr,w and economic ~lations made its discontfort wiB Operatim Provide Comforl well kclwn. Indeed, Iraq clahed that Erkey had given it assurances that US planes based. in hlcirlilr would not be allowed to strike at Iraqi farces in tJle north.1" The Iraqi assadt inlo the northern ""nofly" zone did have a price. Although the Iraqi forces withdrew from the safe haven after helying the :KL>Pgain control of Arhil, the US ~ t a l i a t e dagainst Iraq's so-called act of ""aggression'hon Scpternber 2 and 3 by launching 44 crujse missiles against targets in the sollthern part of Iraq. n e s e strikes took place against targets in the south, rather than in the north where the Iraqi action was takng place, and against targets like air defense installations and command centers rather than against army ground forces such as armor and artillery unjts. Even then, the actim was largely symbolic. Less than half of the cruise ntissiles hit clnse e~~ough, to the target and only about 15%-2OCX3 appeared to hit close enough to do real damage, The cruise rnissifes did little damage to hardened Iraqi command centers, and the d m a g e they did to radars and surface-to-air missile sites was easily repairable. More significantly the US extmded the southern air exclusion or "no fly" zone some 711 mites further north from the 32n.d parallel to the 33rd paralkl, The 33rd parallel is only 30 miles south of Baghdad, and the new territory in t.he expanded ""nony" zone included an important air force trizhirtg area, two major air bases, m d three critical military installations which the Iraqis had used as staging points in the past for moving military n i t s south in the direction of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.128 Saddam m d the Ba%th leadership initially responded by callkg for confrontation m d by defiantly declarhg that Iraq would not r e c v i z e the air exclusion zone, and he ordered his air defense units to fire at British, Fre~~ch, m d Americm planes patrolling the no-fly zolle, Iraq launched several fighters in the arca where US forces were flying, fired a few surf=-to-air missiles and used its radars to illuminate US fighters, delayed moving its aircrdt out of the necv '%no fly'honc until the last minute, and stepped up its resistance to WPilSCOM inspections. These Iraqi actions rrtight well have ted tc:,further and m c h mom devastathg U'S action against Iraq, The US dispatched P117 Stedth fighkrs to Kuwait and F-16s to Bahrain, deployed a second carrier battle gmup to the Gulf, and rushed several thousand troops to Kuwait. It prepared the media and its d i e s for a far larger series of air and missile strikcs.

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This time, however, Baghdad backed down from hrther cot~frontatian and declared that it wodd not shoot at Coalition planes. It emphasized its charges that the US was violatir-rg international law and again taking measures to hurt the Iraqi people. fraqi brces withdre1.v from Kurdish amas and %ray said nothing when Barzani met with Turkish and US leaders and sought outside aid. 11%fact, Iraq" D~egutyPrime Mhister Tbriy Aziz declared on. &fober 8,1996, that Baghdad had issued an. open hvitation to Barzani to conduct talks on Kurdish self rule: "The call lfor dialogue exists. ... It does not need to be amounced. It is known ... Iraq is willing for di,alogu,e." The US actions we= controversial, US Presidcmt Bill Clinton justified the initial US military acticm on Sptember 2 and 3 by declaring that "our missiles sent the lollokving message to S d d m Mussein: whet? you abuse your own people and threaten your neighbors yczu must pay a price ... our policy is equalfy clear. m e n our interest in the security of our friends m d allies is threatened, we will act with force if necessitryf'22g The US atso declared that it was empowered to act in accordmce with UN Resolution 688 which calls upon Saddam Husseh to cease oppressh g his own people. Accordbg to US State Departrrrent spokesman. Nichoias Burns: ""the US has clear authoriq (to act) under resolution 688, Certainly considering the uneierstaneiings we had with Iraq and the international cmmunity in the sprhg of 1991-that set up *eration Provide Camfort-we had. clear authority to take the miliLary action that we did, There was never a questicm about that.f'j30 Mowcvcr, Resolution Q88did not providc for any enforcemelnt mechan i m , and it was unclear that military action could be taken under Chapter 7 of the UN to prtrvent Iraq from o p p ~ s s i n gits own people- It also was not clear that Iraq was oppressing its people whe11 it moved into the north at the direct request of one of the Kurciish factions. Fmnce, in particular, believed the American position to be of dolabtfd legality. The French Foreign Min.istry st&ed that., ""we do not see that the UN resolutions arc callled into question by the Iraqi intervention, especially since there was a written request by cme of the main Kurdish movewnts. Iraq is acting entirely on its own sail." The sihration becarne even mon. cmplex once it becme clear the US was not really rc-ttaliatingfor Saddam Hussein"~actions in the north or attemptillg to protect the Kurds, but. was rather ushg thc crisis to expand its control over haqi military forcm in the south wkich was the focus of US strateof Defase Wgiiam Perry made tJle US posi.Irion gic interests. US S c r e t a ~ fear on Sptember 4, when hc dwlared that ""ourvital natiw~alinterests in Iraq are in t h south, not in the north." He added that "our ubjectives, first of ail, are pmtecting our vital strategic interest, which mems protecting our friends m d allies in the =@on-fsraei, Jordm, Kuwait, m d Saudi Arilbia, Scondly, keeping the h e flow of oil from the GuIf,"131

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As a result, Saddam was able to exploit this situation by backhg away fPom further confrontation, and could claim a limited victory in terms of domestic and regicmal politics. Domestically, Saddanl showed that he was stil in control of his miljtary despite the political turmnil brought on by the attempted assassination and.abortive coup in the summer of 1996, H e improved his political position by destrcryiw t-he infrastructure of the Iraqi National Congress opposition in the narth. This cmstituted a grave sefback for the Iraqi opposition, many of whose memhers were captured. m executed and whose US-supplied hfrastmcbre and equipmat was captured or destroyed. Moreover, Saddam's seczrrity foxes had already penetrated anutf-rer opposition group, the Xrayi National Accord and bad unraveled its operations insicfe Iraq. This may be a masm why the coup attempt of July 1996 hvlnich was instigated by the lPJA failed. Only a few countries backt-td the US retaliatory strikes against Zraq. Many countries had almady re-established diplomatic rttlatims with Iraq, and were eagerly waiting the re-integratiorn of Iraq into the world economy Furthermore, Tray was not committing any act of aggression agahst a neighhor but was asserting cmtrol over its sovewign territory. As a result, many countries thought that Iraq had a sobrereign right to reassert control over its own territory. These countries included three powers on the UN Security Council-France, China, and Russia. Most Arab and Arab Gulf powers also defended Iraq's right to act wit-;hin its own territory. Only a relatively few countries-suck as Britain, Benmark, Germany, 'Japan, Israel, Kuwiiit, and the Nethmlands-supported the US retaliatory strikes against Iraq. While France did not directly criticize the US military action, neither . the second China nor Russia felt the need for such ~ s t r a i n tFollowing cruise missile ai-i;acks on Iraq, the Chirrese Foreign Ministry stated that '"we feel deep regret and want to express our strong displeasure at the missile attack once atgai11 by the US against Iraq ... the all too frequent use of force against a sovereign state has not only seriously violated the relevmt norms of international law and worsened the situation and tensions in the region cclncerned but will also give rise to grave conseguences.'"""2 China's strident pmtest- c m e in the wake of tensions in Sino-American bilateral mlations in the past year over trade issues, Taiwan, and human rights cmerns, coupled with a Chinese perception that the US is acting in a too 'hegemonic' and ?o~~llying' mmner in global affairs. Russids Foreip Mjnister, Yevgeni Prbakot: who has had long-standing relations with the :Iraqi leadership, was similwly scathing in his criticism of the US military action. He accused the Clinton Administration of engaghg in a cheap pre-electorat stunt, of playing with fire and contributing to a decline in the stability of thr I'ersim Gulf region, of acting in a hegemonic manner, and of co~nvenientlyignorirrg the UN Scurity Council as a forum for solving the crisis,l33

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Except for Israel and Kuwait, no regional power le~ntits support to the US retaliatory action. The rcticence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, both of which host US military forces, was noteworthy Turkey did allow the US to enforce the ""no fly" zoneinthe North m d to evacuate some I(urds t%imtrgh Turkey. It would not, however, allow US w q l a n e s to use hcirlik to strike at targets in Iray in suppoft of the US effort to punish Saddam for his thrust into the Kurdish enclave, m d never endorsed the US cmise missile attacks, The ?irrkish Ambassadsr; Nuzhet Kmdemjr, urged the US m t to escdate further: "We hope that these kinds of punitive strikes, particularly disproportionate ones, will not take place,""4 Turkey was loalh to see a lilngering crt.isj.s that would d e s t q all short-tern prospects of Iraqi oil flowing into Turkey allowing h k a r a to reap financial rewarcJs &er losing $25 billion in trade with lraq over the past sewn years. Saudi Arabia. also distmced itself from the US, It became clear that Saudi Arabia did not suppcrfi the US attack Prince Sultm, the Saudi Defe~nseMkister, declared that if: t k US had asked for permission to w e planes from Saudi bases, such a request would not have been looked upm favorably. This Saudi Arabian discomfort:was understandable both in h r eign policy terms and in light of events in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia not o d y did not s y ~ a t h i z ewith the Kurds, ihstrongly opposed any movement that might divide an Arah-ded Iraq anci vvhich favored Iran.Saudi strategic interests lay in emphasizhg territorial htegrity and Arab rule. Domestically King Falnd was in poor heallh, Saudi Arabia had growing economic wow, and the government faced increased reformist and fundamentalist pressures. The Smd-i mo~narchydid not hvish to be crit-icized for allowing the US to strike Iraq when Iraq was actkg within its own barders, or for m y further action tbat hurt the Iraqi people without hurting the regime-parlicularly when the Saudis had no guarantee t-hat any action would lead to Saddm" ouster, The only areas where Saddarn did not gain some adwntage from his actions werc the extension of the "no fly" zone in the south, Ihe fact that he took mhor losses as a result of US cruise missile strikes, m d in ensuring there would be no hrther Turkish incursions in Iraq. Shortly after the KDP-Iraqi victory over the PUM, Turkey declared it was settkg up a security cordon up to six miles deep into Iraq along its borcier with Iray in order to limit the freedam of movement of the PECK guerrillas and Turkey, then launched a n o ~ eseries r of rai,ds h t o northern Iraq. Turkey" action was widely viewed as its version of the Israeli security cordon in Lehanm, and the US tacit acceptance of Turkeys plan became another came for alarm in Iraq and Arab colmtriel;, It also further divided the US from some of its Arab atlies as the Turkish zone was seen as a legitimizing cover for another non-Arab power to estaZllish semi-permanent control over hrab land. Iraq's a n g q raponse came inthe shape of a state-

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melnt bp Iraqi prrzsidmtial ad\riser Macned Yousef Marnmadj who said, in mid-Septeznber: "mere are new facts in the north of Iray. That area is no longer free for a11.ff135

The Role of the Kuxds in. a "Centrist" or "Peripheral" Shategy It is, however, far from ckar how events wiU play out over the comhg years. The Iraqi Kurds are a deeply divided people, Barzani md Saddam c m turn on each other, Talibmi can colBe back, Zrm cm raise the stakes, Turkey can intervene, and new Kudish leadas can come to power. What is clear irm the near term is that the KDP and FUK have shown &at they are more effective in Sighling each other than Sacdda.mfsforces, m d that they can play little role in any outsidte strategy fr>r dealing with Iraq. @i.te aside from their weakness m d feuding, they do not co anli the support of any other majnr ehnic group in Iraq, Iran, or Turkey, and Iraq's h a b neigh:bors all oppose the creation of a Kurdish state or permanent Kurdish enclave. Kurdish separatists have little support from most Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'ites. M a t same Kurds see as Kurdish patriotism, many Su~miand Shi5te fraqis see as treason. Both the KDP and PUK have often taken money and support f m Iran in the past. Elements of both filctions fought on Iran's side in the Iran-fraq War, after taking nnnncy fmm Kaghdad to fight ag"jnst Iran for Iraq, Both factions have occasionally made demands for control, of territory and oil resources that other Iraqis feel would djvide or weaken the country 'The Iraqi government's abuse of the Kurds is also not a one-way street. The KDP and PUK have tortured their opponmts, attacked I r q i civilians, and executed prisoners. It is also importrmt to note that the KDI"),PUK, and other separatist Kurds inthe security zone scarcely speak for all Kusds or the Tarkomans, 111spite of Iraqi atrocities against the Kurclis, many Iraqi Kurds remah assimilated into Iraq's economy and political structure and do not support Kurdish separatism, Other Kusdish grwps have been alienated by the feuding and tribal prilnitivism of the :KL)Pand PUK, a d groups like the National Turkoman Front now see na reason to ally themselves with the Kurds, They confine their efforts to protectirrg Turkornan areas. Ihe West needs to accept the fact that the fighting in Sptexnber 1996 is yet mother de~~onstration that: ""Kzards have no frielzds" in the regio~nincluding tkeir fellow Kurds. The other Arab states do not support Kurdish ambi~ons.Iran sees the Iraqi Kurds only a tool to use against the r e g h e in Ba&dad, and Turkey kars them. Turltey has not been Ale to defeat its own radical, Kuds, and is increasingly rcrluctant ta support any version of Opaaticm Prclvilie Comfort that is not under its dkect control. The Turfish (jovemntent has problems with both natimdists m d Xdamists who oppose

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the presence of foreig~~ forces on Turkish soil, and h q ' s acceptmce of UN SecuriQ Comcil &solution 986 means that Turkey s t d s to obtain substantial revenues from pipehe fees and food sales to Iraq. At the same time, if the West does not seek to negotiate on the Kurds behalf, no one will. Nearly four million Kurds in northern Iraq live without any mal securiv other than the LIN,and any Western strategy for dealing with lraq must seek to offer the Kttrds a reasnnnble degree of protection as a precondition for lifting sanctions and better relations, Such protectim-and even limited autonorny-may still be negotiable with a "ce~~trist" ~ g i m irr e Iraq, provided that it is based on a clear recognition that Baghdad is indtimate control, and fiat the Kurds do not make mrealistic demmds for control of mixed cities like Mosul or far direct cmtrol of Iraq's northern oil ficlds and the revmues from these fields. The Iraqi people have not been educated or propagmdized to see Iraqi Kurds as a whole as enemit.s or traitors. 'lhe K d i s h uprising after the war is understmdable to many Iraqi Sullnis hvithin the military and reasonat?le terms for autmomy have been negotiated in the past-only to fail because of a cclmbination of Kurdish and Iraqi government extremism. At the s a w t h e , any agreemat will be difficult to reach, and couid prove to be hpassible to negotiate as long the Kurdish factions conthue to fight each other and/or as lcrng as Saddam is in power. R may also cmly be obtahable if it is el~forcedwith the %reat of far more serist~sWestern military actions than occurred in Septerrrber 19.96 and,control of the $50 d i m a month in food and medicine that the Kurds wi1l rclceive as a result of Iraq's agree~~ent to UN Scmity Comcil Resolution 986. The Xraqi people may not hate the Kurds, but the Jraqis in the securiw servires and some elements of the a m e d forces hawe been taught to deal with tJle Kurds who suppoft Barzmi and Tdabani as traitors and crimirlals for more than a quarter of a century, and mcent evmts have almost certainly minfortred that feeling. It is all too possible that the current cycle of violence and countcr-vioXence will take years to end, even if the Kurds and the central gover do negotiate a serious autonomy agreement and Saddam Husseh should fall. Any authoritarian or "centrist" regime that repkces hirn will draw on mmy of the san?e me11 who have used ext.reme vialence against the Kurds in the past. This codd. confront the West with another major civil war between the Iraqi regime and the Kurds under cmditions where Turkish and Arab support: for any intervation on the Krzrds' behalf is likely to d e c h e steadily with time. The West has already Eound it is afmost impossible to protect the Kurcjs with Operation Provide Coxnlort in place. The US is aXso likely to .find it steadily mom difficult to act in the futuse, particularly if Iraq continues to ally itself with a Kurdish faction, acts slowly m d incrementally avcrids an overt invasi.m of the Kurdish enclave, offers s m e form, of arntonorny, and

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keeps c l a h h g pro~rocation.Much will depend on Turkey m d whether it feels it can hest msolve its problems with its own K d s by supporting the West or dealing with the Iraqi central government. If the Kurds fail to ac,h,ieveunity and negotiates with the Iraqi central, government on redistic terms, the West may ultimate@ have to write them off as an unsalvageable stratregic liability. Suicidal behavior is suicidal behavior. Iraqfs Kurds m y well continue to divide among t-hemselvcs no maner how badly they are treated or how seriously they are threatened. Xf they do, there is little point in the West pursuing the issue. 'There is little reascm for Western strategic involvement with a peaple who are determhed to be their own worst enemy*

Iraq's Crisis with Its ShFites h y strategy towards Iraq must recopize that Saddam Hussein's ~ g i m e has equally serious problems with its 5hifites that are likely to continue to exist as long as Iraq is ruled by a Sunni elite. Iraq" Shi5tes are a m;ljority in a country ruled by a Sumi and clan-oriented mirrority, and their loyaity to any rcgime in Baghdad is affected by their pditical and sodoecmomic marginalization. As has been noted earlier, the US Centsal htelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that 60% to 65% of Iraq's total population is Sh2it.e versus 32% to 37'/0 S~lnni.1" "ese percrentages, howcver, &Sguise the fact that s o m Shi5tes identify themselves primarily inreligious terms while many do not. There are also majjor differences within Iraqfs Shi'ites over relations with Iran, loyalty to the central governme~~t, and the desire for s o m form. of separatism or separate political identity. T"%eHistorical Backqounrd to Curretzrzt Tmsa'ms

Once again, forces affecting a future strategy tokvarcjs Iraq c m only be understood with son?e hi,storical background. The lafx 11940s and 1,950s we= a time of profound socioeconmjc and poiitical chmge and fement for the lraqi Sl1i5ites. Rapid urbanization and the exposure to secular education and thus modern political ideas contributed to a decline in the political power and spiritual influence of the Shi5te theological schools and of the clergy in forming the values oE the community. Iro~~ically; cornmunis~~ made considerable headway in the Shi'ite south during the 1950s and early 1 9 6 0 ~as~people were attracted to its militant calls for socic~.conomicand pofiticat justice and to its hcrstitity to Sunni-donninated Arab nationdist ideas so prevalent in the "cel~tec'"e Iraqi Communist Party (KP) won mmy adherents in the south, h l u d ing the children of the local Shi'ite clergy, t-he ulema. As early as 1953 a leadjng religious scholar, .iZyatolla,hKashif al-Gta, exprrzssed his unease

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at the hroads that Marxism had made amollg the Shi'ites, while in 1960 two other .AyatolIAs, Muhsin al.-Hakim and Murtada al-Yasin, issued a fitzua or religious ruling conde ing rnemhership in the ICE In 1959, the SK'ite ulema took more decisive xtion. L ~ a d h gclerics founded tlne Jamilynt al al-Ukm al-Dil.r (Association of IZeligious U h a ) , which later became the Al-tlll hzoah al-lslnnziyalz (Party of ihe I s h i t CalI). fn its early yeass Al-Da'awh remninccf a very clandt?stjneparty but was very active in recmiting from ammg the ulema of the theological s c h d s , SIhi'ite intellechrals in miversif-ies,m d the Shi'ite petit bourgeoisie in towns such as Diwaniyah, krbala, m d Basza. While not specifically anti-Sw?i, AlDa'awah was agaillst secularism nationakm, and communism* AJDa'awA received a boost when athe massacre of ICF' cadre by the first Ba'aath rfr.gi,meleft pditicdy active Shi'ites with no organized political voice. Relations between the %%te community and the Ba.%tIn.istsdeteriorated further after the second Bakath rt;gime seized power in 1968. Many factors lay behind the growing antagonism, which exploded into full. fury in the late 1970s. First, there was no senior Shi5te =presentation in the new regime. Second, the Ra'ath's militant secularism hit the Shi'ite dema more than any other group h Iraqi society. Determhed to break once and for all the power of the clerics in the %Cite community-a task which the ICP had failed in-and fearful of their indepmdence, the regime closed down religious schools, imposed censorship on religious publications, and proceeded to deliberately harass the ulema. From the mid-197Us the regime was jolted into the realizaticm that Shi'ite discontent was a major problem when serious distuZ;bmce~occurred in 1974 and 1977 between Shilites and the seclurity services. The later disturbance was widespread in which Shi'ites were heard calting for the overthrow oE the regirne. Saddam wrote a tract Naslzra.fi ml-Dil.z zvir al-Rirutlz (n, GIance at kljgion and Culturc) in which he sternly warned against the mixing of religion and politics in Iraq society. D w h g the 197f)s,Iraq's e f orts to mixnipdate the Iranian Shi'ite opponents of the S h h backfired at a number of different levels, Allowkg Iranian opposition leaders like tl-te Ayatobh :Khomeini into Iraq ultimately backfi~d.As unrest aga,inst the Shab exploded into a full-flcdged revolution, Iraq acceded to an Iranian request to expel @atoll& Khomeini. Many of Iraq's mmo religious Shi5tes became even more hostile to the Ba'ath regirne, and several kading h i t j e s formed alliances with lranian Shi5te Ifactions. More militant groups such as hl-Dabwal-r, the illulzazamat ml-Anzala[Isltlnli (0rg;anizatim far Islamic Action) fo~tndedin 1,975 in Kacbda, and the Mzijaheciin founded in 1979 emboldened by the Islamic Revolution in :Iran, initiated a campaign of terror and assassinaticms in Iraq between 1,970-1980. As a resdt, the Iraqi regirne restricted pijgrimges and reli-

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gious activities in Iran, imprisoned or exiled mmy Iraqi Shi?tes, and establjshed a network of overlapping security forccs in every major 5hi"te city; town, and shrine.137

Mq's SfiifiiLrsand the Iran-fray War 'These actions by the Ba'ath government did not mean that Iraq's Shi%tes we= pro-Irmian or Iran" natural allies. Despite strident Iranian prclpaganda during trhe Iran-Iraq m r , which w e d the Sbi5ites to rise up against the Ba'ath reghe, most Shi'ites supported the gover remained quiescent. Most of the guvernment's troops during eight years of war were Shi'ite and they oftm fought with great courage and dedication. Iraq's Shi'ites supported the regime far several reasons. Many were Iraqi nationalists and Arabs first, and Shi3tes second. Others saw Saddarn as the lesser of two evils or benefited from state grants and aid. Still others were deteiscjd by Iraq's eMective security and inteiligelrce services, Iraq" SShi5tes codd hardly fail to notice the Islamic republic"^ failures: political upheavals, large-scale executiozzs, failure to implement socioeconomic programs, and international isolation. Above all, Iran's fanatical insistence on continuing the war after 1982 alienated Iraqi Shi5iZ.e~ who saw Iran prolong% an i r m t i m l war t-hat was kiliing Iraqi Shi'ite soldiers m d was devastating the south with 2s artillery.138 At the same tirne, powerful Shi5te families-like the Hakim familydid oppose tke Ba'atln regime during tl-re war with Iran. Some of these fantilies had ties to Iran-at Icast: in terms of obtaining Iranian funds, military training and eyuipxnent, and the use oi hcilitics m Iranian soil, There are some impmtmt differmces in clerical poZirtics and ritual between Iranian and Iraqi Shi'ites, but: thcre are also Iraqi. Shi'ite clergy who strongly oppose the secdar regime in Baghdad and who have close ties to the Irmian clergy. In November 1982, t-he head of the Ilakim family, blohafnmed Baqir al-Hakim amotlnced the formatim of the Majlis alA% lil Thaztra nl-islamiyah fi nl-'lmq (Supreme Assem:bly for the Islamic Rewlution of Iraq). Describing itself as an umbrella organization oE atl Mudint peoplcs opposhg the Ba'alh regime in Iraq, it set up military units to fight alongside the Irani.ans and to take advmtage of the turn of the tide of war in favor of Irm that occurred in mid-1982. Further, Shi'ite loyalty to Iraq during the Ism-Iraq War did not mem loyalty to S a d a m Hussein and U?e Bakath elite. Even before the Shi5te uprisingdoIlowing t-he GulE War, Shi'iite cities and areas often received kwer benelit.s from the ce~~tral government, and made more sacrifkes dzafiag warthe. The Bakath acted as a pervasive police state, some~mesflamthg 5Kfiirt,custom in ac?tivitiesliko the search of m o s w s , arrests of clerics, lirnits on religious celebrations, and escorting fomign visitors infa Shi'ite sanc-

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tuaries. Educatio~~al, military, m d political opporknnities were somewhat restrjcted for Sk?iles, alhough mainip in politically sensitiw areas. All of these prflblems grew much worse after the Gulf War, partly because of Saddam's ruthless response to the 5hi"ite uprisings &at took place ately after the war, and partly because Saddam has reacted to UN i ""cnter" over the 5hifitesouth. in ways that hvof the

"TheSkifife Uprisi~gsAffev the Gulf War 'The Gulf:War triggered a very different respollsc horn Iraq's Shi'ites than the Iran-Iraq War. A large-scale Shi'ite uprising against Saddam" regime took place in southl;m fray immediately after the Gulf War. mere were several rcasons why this intgar;lubroke out: First, there was a political and military vaczrttrn in the south folowing the Iraqi defeat in Ucsert Storm: the transportation and communications networks had been devastated by the coalition bombirrgs, the pornus border regions with Iran were unguarded, and the military and security services were in disarray. The vacuum and turmoil were fully exploited by the rebels. In cmtrast, even during the most desperate years of the Iran-Xraq war at times when it sclemed that the southern front mi@t collapse, there was no political or military vacu r n in the south. The army retained its cohesion and the ~ g i m e cmtinued to exercise tight control over the south. * Second, the ""social contract" k t w e m the poyulace and the government, wherein the former had tacitly accepted an authoritarian systern jn =turn for economic development and material Largesse, had unraveled in the south. The region bad suffered most of the devastation during two wars, and the male population which provided the Iraqi Army with the hulk of its regular infantry units had seen a disproportionate nurnber of sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers kilted or wounded in two ultimately wor&tess military enterprises. Well before the August 1998 crisis, the banhupt Iraqi gover no longer had the economic or fhmcial wherewithal to satisfy the material needs of the population. 'Third, because many Shi'ites felt they were marginalized in a political system from which they collectively felt excluded from genuine power sharing with their 5unni compatricrts, it is m t surprising that there existed a deep-seakd sense of li;ricvance. * Finally, the uprisings initially were anti-regime and had none of the character of "treason"" that uprisings would have had at the time of the Iran-Iraq War. A serlse of loyaity towards Iraq no longer memt

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support of Saddam's regim despite Che governmetnts past efforts to equate loyalty to Iraq with loyalv to the Ra%a.thistregime. The uprisings began when defeated and disgruntlgd infmtry soldiers streamed back into Basra from the front, bringillg back with them karrowing tales of dekat at t-he hands of"n, superior foe and mi,smanagement of t h war by their own government. These troops and sympathetic Shi'iks launched attacks against governmat installations including scrcurity, party and popular army buildings. Ka'ath party cadre and seeurif-y offjcials,most of whom were Shilite, who did not flee or go into hiding were hunted down and murdered. W i t h days, the revolt had. sprtrad to majnx cities including the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, as well as the Al-Hillah, Al KuS, and Al ar& and Mahmudiya. towns oi Diw-a, There was bitter fighthg in the area around Bdsra and Az Zubayr. The revolt spread because the government hitially failed to react effectively to the Shi5ite uprisjngs, because it was unsure of the Coalition reaction, because many of its forces were maldeployed or stili suffering from the shock of the war, and because it o1n1y had to deal with easily manageable Shi2te disturbances shce the rrrid-19Ij70seIt was stumed by the extent and ferocity of the =hellion, which was explained as the failure of ""politicalyconfused and we& people" to rise above their sectarian tendencies and it immedlatcly blamed Iran. h August 1991, the Iraqi Phme Minister stated that the 'kozoving force @ehind the uprising in the south) was foreign,""meanjng Iranian. The rebellion benefited from two other factors, Che was the Coalition prclsence in southern Iraq. This ini.tially ited the egime's use of the Iraqi army, and the Codition made it clear that Iraqi use of fixed wilng aircraft or chemical weapons agalnst the rebels wwld not be tolerated. %cond, despite discl ers to the contray, Irm allowed the Supreme Assembly of the Islmir Revolution (SAZR11) to infiltrate elements of the Iraqi Shi'ite forces it had built up in Irm into fray to help the rebels. These included ehm a t s of ehe Tawabin and Radr brigad W7,OW m m farce of exiled d B a k al-Hab. Iraqi 5hi"ites under the leadership of M Nevertheless, the uprisings failed ot and spread. This was partly because the initial uprisings were an explosim of pent-up rage and ~velnge,characterized by an orgy of looling and, destruction without any sustairring organization or ideological vision. It was also a result of the fact that when the uprisings did begin to take on m r e organized form, they were led by W'ite religious leaders and infiltrators Trom frm. mey acquired an ideological hue which proved disastrous. Many rebel leaders raised the green b er of Istam, portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini, and Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim, the head of the Tehran-based Writeopposi-

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tion p u p , the Suprelnc Assembly for the Islmic 8evolut.jon in Iraq. They also cal)led for an Xslmic state in Iraq. Rxis focus on SfifiteIslamic extremism alienated secular and nationalist Iraqi Shi'ites, most opposition groups outside Iraq and the m e ~ ~ b e r s of the UN coalition. It also produced a viscerally hostile reaction of the regime%elite, the S u n n i hrabs, and many members of the Sbi'ite middle class,.For these secttlar Irayis, the idea of an Iranian-supported Islamist regime comhg to power was a horrifying vision, Furfiermore, the atrocent officiafs were seen as a portent of the ities committed againe;t gowe bloodshed to come if the rebels were to prrzvail. The rebels soon paid the price. As in the north, the military vacuum in the south proved temporary, The Iraqi t;owemmc.nt fought back with its best-trajned and most loyal units, the bpubljcan Guards, and made liberal use of helicopter gunships in the towns whercl the rebels were holed. up. A large number of hapless civilians caught up in the crossfire fled into the xnarst-ry zone, the coalit-ion-controlled areas, or even into Iran itself. The tide turned in the governmmt" ffavor when Basra and KarbaZa were secured on March 12 and 17,1991. On March 18,1991, Baghdad declartld the rebelIion over and acczrsccf a h o d e of ""rancorous traitors" m d foreign governments of having inskiouncement was somewhat prtrmabre. Retwem March 20-29, dishxrbmces took in the Shi'ite quarters in Baghdad, inclmidbg Medinat al-mawra, Shdla, and Karrada al-Shaqiyah, n e s e disturhmces were dealt with by lraqi main force divisicms, however, and were quickly crnh.;l,iLI~ed, lraqi foxes fulfy sccured Karbala in the south by March 28.Bg The limited number of regular Iraqi Army units that went over to the Shi5te side c ~ d not d fight as an organized combat force, or sustain themselves in con?h&. The K a d r Brigade took heavy casualties and had to withdraw to Irm. Anti-regime Shi%tesnever succeeded. hcreating a segarate enclave. lraqi forces dmve some 70,000 Shi5tes across the border into Iran, killed and intprisoncd many ot.hers, and trapped still others in the extensive marsh areas in the. south.l"Wwt of the Shi5te areas quickly returned to centrai government cmtrol, and the =mining Shi'itc rebels were captured, fled to Iran, or fled into the nearly 6,000 square miles of marshes formed at the mouth of the Xgris-Euphrates and east of Amarah, Nasiriy*, and Basra.143 There is no way to h o w how many Iraqi Shi5tes died durhg this fighting. The Iraqi regime did, nut permit international visitors into many areas, and forensics experts hawe not been able to investigate grave sites, 'The tlN S p e d Rapportew djd report in 1994, hokvever, that he continued to receive accounts of mass graves in southern Iraq. Observers believe these graves contain the rt.main.s of many gerscrns killed following the civil uprising of March 11991,

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The UN attempted to provide hurnanitarim relief for the refugees, but the situation was different from the Kttrdish crisis irr the north, There was never a sepitrate 5K"iZe enclave, and Iraqi kcrops and security forces, as weli as ShYites lop1 to Saddarn, were always mixed wikh the general Sk'ik population. While the UN did set up a humanitarian relief cmkr in the marsh area in July 3991, the Iraqi gave ent orgmized protest riots and made e operation hpossible. C)xl July 14,1991, it told the UN personnel g the center to leave, and.cut the Sh.i"itesofi h m m y aid. T"%eFight-itzy in the Marshes

The plight of the Shi5tes who fkd into the marsh areas in Southern Iraq grew steadjly worse during the fall and winter of 1991, and the spring of 1992, Once the cmtral government recovered full control over the rest of ent began a military the populated awas in the south, tbr Iraqi gove campaign to root out the Shi3tes in the marshes. In April 1992, 36,00040,300 Iraqi troops were sent into the area, and Iraqi iorces built new roads and fire bases inthe swamps. They began to drain the marshes selectively, and fought their way through an area with lhausands of mall islets, 10 foot reeds, and date palm thickets. Ihese Iraqi forces were huntk~ga maxim of 10,0W20,000 deserters and Shi"ites in the these opposition forces were so poorly uld be classified as guerrillas. Even these organi.zed that only forces were only equipped with small a m s and flat bottom boats, although they had limikd Iranian and lraqi exile support. The rebels that did mrvive d y did so because of the cover provided by the mashes, the difficuIty gwemment forces had in locating m d ctmtainh~gthem, and because of the mpport of the largely Shifiteand anti-govement Marsh Arabs. Even this protection began to vani.sh in June 1992. Iraqi Mnister of Defense Ma~rrrGeneral Hassan d-Majid-the same mi1iWy leader who szxpewvised the Anfal C a m p a i g ~ ~ ~ t oover o k dZrection of the fightjng in the marshes. Reports soon appeamd that Iraq bad. moved additional elements of its 3rd and 4th Corps above Rasra and east of Amarah. 'I'hese rclports indicated that by August 1992, Ihe Iraqi regime had dcployed 5-6 divisions against the Shi'ites, includjng &publican Guard units, and was ushg artillery, attack helimpters, and fixed wing fighters. Saddam Hussein"s son Qusay and his half brofier Wathban d-lbrafrimi wcre also said, to play a role in overseejng the securiq operations in the south142 Strict security m e a s w s were taken, Curfews werl, enforced in most arcas, Shi'ite religious schools and prjntjng hauses were closed, and some Shi5te assemblies were forbidd.en. Government arrests were reported to have recjuced the clergy in tl-te Shi"ite hcrly city of Najaf from 8,000 b e f m the Iran-kaq War to less than 800 by the end of 1991, and driven most of

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the remaining members of key opposition groups like Al Dawa al Islamiya (Islamic Call) m d the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SBIRI) out of the country. The go~rernntentalso began a major effort to relocate the Marsh Arabs (NaQdlan)out of the marshes and expand its plans to drain the entirtz marsh area with a 3%-mac network of canals. According to Middfe East rs, Iraqi go~rernmentfiles captured Watch and US Gove by Kurdish rebels In Zitary plan for the destruction of the marshs and the pea+ living there. The plan appears to have been approved at the highest: levels of the Iraqi regime.""" These Iraqi government attacks became so intense that on August 11, 199Zf Britaln, Frmce, and the US issued a formal warning to Iraq to cease vhlating Security Com-rcil Res01utim 688, whieh c d e d far an end to all internal repression in the country.'& However, these warnings had little practical effect. ?'he same was true oE the establishment of a ""no-fly zoneff over southern Iraq. This no fly zone deterred aerial attacks on the marsh dwellers, but did not prevent artilleq attacks or the military" large-scale burning o1perations.l" Iraqi troops continued their sweeps into tbe marshes, and the governme~~t: cmtinued to drain the marshes and relocate the Marsh Arabs (Evltaum) in a ruthless effort to deprive the remaining Shi5ites of cover. m d 75,OQOtroops, from its Sh~ce1992, Iraq has had some 7-43divisio~~s, IV Corps, III Carps and Republican &ads deployed in the south. These forces have been sprclad out & r o u e the Shi'ite arclas from :Kaibala m d Al Kut in the nor& to h Nasiriyh m d Az Zubayr the south. In J m e 196 there was une a m t r y division in Kabala and one in Al. Kut. n e r c were two i n f m q divisions west of hn Nasiriyah, m amored division near Al Amarah, m infmfrry division near QaiatsaliJ7, an armored division between Qdatsalish m d Al Basrah, and a mechmized division near Al Basrah.146 The reghne has used these forces to virtually destroy the traditional way of :life of- the marsh Arab Shi'ites. The Iraqi regime's burning, draining, and water-diversion projects crcated a contixluing process of largeental destmc.tian in the marshes. The army constructed canals, causeways, and eart.Eten berms to divert water from the wetlands. Hundreds of square kilometers of marsh areas have been burned, imperiling the marsheskcosystem."~ The Iraqi regime claimed that the clrai,nage was part of a land reclamation plan to increase the acreage of arable land., spur agricultural production, and reduce salt polluticm in the Tigris and Euphrates. However, the evidence of laqe-scale hurnanitarim and ecological destructjon appears to belie this claim. Aerial. and. satellite photography the US Government made pubtic in 1994 depicted the almost total destruction of the marshes. Moreover, the regime's diversion of supplies in the

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south limited the population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and transportatian.148 As the marshes dried, military units launched land-based attach on villages, eln March 4, 1994, Ihe military begm the largest- search-anddestroy operation in the marshes in 2 years. The offensive included the razing of villages and burning operaticms concentrated in the trimgle bounded by N'asirjyah, Al-Qwmah, and Basrah. 'The magnitude of this operation caused th inhabitants to flee in several directions: deeper into the marshes, to the outskirts of sout)-ternIraqi cities, and to :Iran. In late June 1994, lraqi military forces &tacked several rnarsh vi,llages in :Nassjriya province. Sources said that army engineers burned the village of Al-Abra, cmtaining about H0 homes, to the ground. A k r the operation, the army transporkd the vi,llagefsinhabitants horn the scene. :In early Julyf the security hrces stormed the villages of Al-Sajiya and .AlMajawid in M-Cbibaish efistrict, near the main road leading into the marshes" ShultmeousZy armor units supported by heavy artiffery attacked the village of Al-meyout in the district of Al-Madina.149 The Iraqi military also condiucted large-scale artillery bomharclment in the JindaXa area of the M-Amaral-1 marshes. @position sources said ike bombardment destroyed several homes and in?uredseveral individuals, The military also attacked Al-Hashiya, Al-Wasdiya, and Al-Ma&a, and arrested some of their i,r\habi,tants.In Septefinber 1994, opposition sources reported that military iorces used incendiary b o l b s and launched an armowd attack against tl-te area of Al-Seigel in the M-Amarah marshes, 'The army fater set fire to the entirc. area.Ec' The UN Special.Rapportew stated in his February 1994 report that the extent of violations against the marsh inhabitants "places the survival of this hdigernous populatjon in jeo~mdy,'~and noted the sirnilarif-y between the Iraqi regime" '"genocide-type operations" against the K u d s and its operations in s0uf;hen-rIraq. In August, he dispatched two of his assistants to t-he Iran-:Iraq border to interview refugees fleeing the marshes. He reported in OctOber 1994 that the refugees are generally in goor physical and psychological condition, having suffered extreme deprivation of food and meciicine. Me reit.ecated hjs ""concern over the survi\ralHof the m r s h inlnabitants "as a c o m m m i ~ . " These military operations caused serious civilian casualties in the marshes in 1994, and led to massive movements of Shi'ites out of the area. More than 10,U00 refugees from the marslnes fled to Iran, where they joined betwem ,515,1306) and 60,1300 vvho had Red in previous years. Iraqi security forces relclcated many of the inhabitants of the marshes that they detained during the course of military operations to :Iraq%m& southern cities. M m y were later transkrmd to detention centers and prisons in celntral Iraq, prharily in Baghdad. @position sources reported in %p-

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ternber 19% that the Iraqi rcgime had rcllocated more? than 300 families fPom the marshes to a dctentim area h Diwaniya province. The Iraqi auttlorities reportedly returned other families wko had taken rduge in Baghdad to the province o( Antara.'"" Accosding to the US State Department, large numbers of Shi3te rehgees from southern Iraq fled to Iran, particularly after the escalation in military activity in blarch 1994. It was difficult to estimate the number of persons displaced by these operations, due to the lack of international monitors im the area. Hwever, in late 49514 the UN High Cummissioner for Refugees (UN'HCR) estimated Eh& mom lhan 10,000 rehngees from the marshes were in camps in Iran.1" The fighting in the marshes ccmtirmued during 1995, while the Iraqi armed forces conducted deliberate artillery and hfantry attacks against civilians In the southern marshes. There was littje real ~ s i s t m c e and , many of the government attacks were desiped to root out army eteserters m d displaced civilians. Nevert-heless, the UN Special Rapporteur stated 21 November 1995 that he ccznthued to receive reports of widespread disapent did not reply pearances, especialy in southern Iraq. The Iraqi gave to any of"the more than 15,000 cases conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995by the UN Working Group on Enforcement on Tnvoluntary Disappearances. Iraqi armed forces continued to cmduct artillery attacks against Shi'ite civilians in the southern marshes in 19995 and early 1996. mroughou't: 49995,the Government annomced that it would undertake several waterdiversion and other prqects, which d the proces of large-scale enviro~~mel-rtal destruction. The Gov continues to claim that the dralnage is part of a land reclamat to h r c a s e the acreage of arable land, spur agriculbal production, and reduce salt pcrliuf;im in the Tigris and Euphxates rivers. However, credible reports confirm the ongoing destruction oi the marshes. The army continues to constmct canals, causeways, and earthen b e m s tc:,divert water from the wetlands. Hundreds of square kilomters have been burned in military operations, and the regime" diversion of supplics in the south has limited th populat i d s access to food, medicine, drinking water, and transportation. According to the Spwial hpporteur, securiv force conthue to relocate S,ifite inhabitaslts of tfie southern marshes to m;\jor southern cities. Many have been tritnsfclrred to detmtim cmters and prisons in central Iraq, priBaghdad, or even to northern cit.ies like &rkak as part of the s attempt to "Asabke" traditionally non-&& areas. Large ther Shi'ik rehgees continue to flee from sau&em :Iraq t because of Ihe military operatjons jn southern Iraq. There is insufficimt information to esthatc tfie number of persons displaced. by these operations, but the W Wigh C ssl0nc.r of Humm fights has estimated that as of Spkmber 1995more thm 280,QQQ of the 250,QWformer Mabitmts of

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the marshes had been driven from the area shnce 1991. In late 1995, the UNHCR esthated that approximately 12,000 refugees from U?e marshes were in rehgee camps in Iran. Amar Appeal, a chafitable organization operathng several nf the cmps, placed the number at morcll than 35,C)CM)rehgees.

Bmader Actions Against Iraqf$ sShi9a"tes The regime's attacks on the Shi3tes in the marsh areas are only part of the story, The Iraqi authorities have arrested many other Shi'ites, and placed who survived them in detetntion centers in central Iraq. Many wit~~esses such detention bave reported that some of their comrades were executed, ?%toUN Speciat Rappmteu" on fluman Rghts noted in his 19534 report that the Iraqi rcgime had expelled severd ""Fajlj," or W'ik, m d Kurdish families in 1993, He mported in 1994 that the Iraqi regime may bave expelled a totai of m m than one fillion persons in cent years suspected of being ""Prsim syxnpai-hi~ers.~' According to the Special Rapporteur, abwt 500,000 of these displaced persons went to live in Iran. In 1995 and 1996, Iraqi security f w e s were still rc-.portc_.dto be mcmped in the shrine of Imarn Ali at M-N'ajaf, one of ShifiteIslam's holiest sites, and using parts of it as an interrogat-im ccntel: The forner e fol5hi"ite theological school in Al-Najaf, which the Iraqi ~ g i m closed lowing Chc 1991 wpris.ing, was reported to be used as a p21blic market. 'The Iraqi security f o ~ c contjnued s to expel foreign Muslim clerics f r m .Al.Najaf, under the pretext that the clericsfvisas had expired. The governmetnt kept up a ban on the Musliim calf to prayer in certain cities; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'ite programs on government radio or television; a ban m the publication of Shi5te books, includislg prayc.r books; a ban on funeral processions; and the prhibition of certain processions and public meetin.gs commemorathg Shifiiteholy days. I'he UN Special Rapportem and ogpor;ition sources ~ p o r k dthat the rclgilrrc continued to taget the ShifiteM u s h c l e r a and trhejr supporkrs ent reportedly forced for arbitrary arrest and other abuses, The Gove areas near Kirkuk, some Shi5tes of southern Iraq to move to no purportedly to "Arabizef"hat historically Kurdish area, The Gover also continued to detain Iraqi writers who criticized or questioned these government policies. fn 3995, security forces detained Aziz Said Jasim, a political theorist, and Dhargfiam Hashim, a journafist who published an article m th marsh Arabs of sout%lernIraq, Accordiing to the US State Department, the Iraqi ~ g i m ccmtinued . to arrest, detain, torture, and lcjll Shifites who had nothing to do with the military resistance in the mar& m a . fn 1991,the Iraqi, rcgim arrested the late Grand Ayatcrlah iabdul Qasim AI-naei, formerly the higbest rankk g Iraqi Shifiteclergymm, and 188 of his associates..The &atoll& died

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while under house arrest in Al-Najaf in 1992, m d only two of the persons arrested with him can be accounted for. Moreover, the regime has cmtirtued to insist that its own appointee replace the late Grand Ayatollah Abul Qasim M-FChoei although the Shi'ik religious establishment refus~sto accept the Government's choice. The regime has continued to harass and threaten members of the late Ryatollalz Al-X(boei's family The authorities have continued to subject the Shi'ite religious clergy, Shi5te ihabitants of the southern marshes, and various e t h i c mhorities to searches without warrants. The regime routinely ignortrs the comtihtiona, provi,sions safeguarding thc confident.iality of mail, telegraph correspondence and telephone conwrsations.fl3 Like the govenment" relations with the Kurds, the regime's control over the Shi'ites w e n d s on the continuing presellce of massive military forces and ruthless rczpression by Iraq" s ~ u r i forces, v The fighting from 1991to 1995 has alienated mmy SErifiteswho werc-1prclviously loyal to the reghe. At the s m tinte, it has hclped to worscn rcllations behlveen Iran and Xraq, and to create more tension m d hatred b e h w n Sumis m d Shi5tes. The central g o v e m m t must now be more oppressive and artt%toritarimin dealing the armed forces are mare likely to see m y Shi'ite wi& the S ~ ? t e s and , ~ s i s t m c eas trclason, p r o - f r ~ a nmti-Arab, , m d pm-Western. Authoritarianism and xcnophohia arc3 Likely to feed upon each other, m d grow.

'This historical background has rnixed impf,ications for both a "'peripheral"' and a "centrist" "strategy. It indicates that a significant number of Shi5tes want Saddam rczmtlved from power, and have good reason to want a more represe~ntativeor Shi'ite-dominated regime. It indicates that many Shi3ites will nut turn to Iran if they have any valid alternative. At the same time, any "ccentrist" "rategy towards Iraq must recopize that it i s not the Shj%teswho are a n?inority m d that any strategy that ends in allowing a narrow S i ditc to perpetuate power may lead. :Iraq%Shi5tes to align themselves with km. Tyranny has its price, and Saddam's method of treatjng the Shi'ites since 1981 has almost certainly alienated many ShYites that might otherwise have supported or tolerated a Sunni-dominated regime. Iraq's Su~tn,nismay pay thc price tag for such repression in the futurc, even if they are unlikeZy to challenge Saddam or an immediate Sunsti auccessor directly, and so may Western and Southern Guif states that support them,.The fact tkat a slnall group of Sunni clans and families now contrnl virtually all. the instmments of state power does not mean that the Sunrris can retain power indefhitely, Any Westem or regional policy towards Iraq must account for the fact that Ihe Sunni rcpressio~nof Iraq's Shi'ites

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creat-es a second t h a t of civil cmlirt and a cmtinuing potential for an Iraqi ShYite alliance with Irm. At the same time, any egorts to execute a ""peripheralstrategy'"must RCognize that Iraq's Shgites have had little rece~ztreason to admire or tmst the Wst, Many seem to blame the West for failing to mpport them or pmtect &em, and for a sanctions p d k y that has done them considerably morcl harm than fraq's Suxmis. Iraq's %Cites may not adxnirc!Iran, but sad darn"^ repression may also have driven them to take mose risks in accepkg Iranian aid and supporting an Iranian regime. The odds seem to be against it, but there is a definite risk that any outside stmtegy that at-lempted to exploit Iraq%Shi'itcs could backfire and ertd in stmgfiening Iran. More generaily, it is far from clear how any outside ""peripherdstrategy" that attempted to use the discontent among Iraq's SWites codif work h the near term. The Iraqi government m w has virtually total control over the South, and has powerful security and miitary forces in every S:hi'ite populatioln center. It can contml the flow of food, water, and utili"cies and virtually all llnes of communication. The only outside access to the Ski5te enclave is t h r o q h the heavily &tended borifers of ban and Kuwait. 'The mare secular Shifiteoppositio~ngroups outside Iraq have little real influence and power, and the Shi%tereligiws opposition groups are largely pm-Irlmim*

Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy 'This brief historical surnmary can give little flavor for the violence and hatred that has affccted many aspects of the recent history of the sectarian and e t h i c divisions in Iraq. 'fbere also is no way to supy>lementthis malysjs with any polls or other mcaswes of how many Kurds and Shi5tes have been alienated by the regime" vvioZcnce in putting down the Kurdish and 5hi"te revolts after the Gulf War and actions since 1991, and how many Kurds and S.hifitesfeel they are part of the "centerff"ather than owe their primary loyalty to their ethnic and sectarian faction. There are deep divisions within Iraq's Kurds and Shi'ite Arabs, just as there artr wit-;hinits Sumi Arabs, What is clear is that Iraq lacks strong secular opposition political movements that have any hope of uniting the country, and that its political movement.^ are deeply divid,ed along et-hnic and religjotts lines. h y '"centrist" strategy is likely to mean backrimg m o v m n t s that will produce a Sumi domi11att.d elite that can only rule tPtrougb the further oppression of the Kurds m d Shi5tes. At the same time, fiere are both opgorturrities and risks in a "peripheral'" strategy. The opportmity ties in the disaffection of a large part of Iraqfqpopulation with the "center," 'The risk lies in the fact that most of

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this opposition is Shi'ite or Kurdish, m d is unlikely to acquire power peacefully in the face of opposition by a Sunni-dominated ruling elite, military, ant( security forces. 11%spite of the rhetoric of groups like the INC, there is no unity in the oppositio~nmovements, there is no opposition outsidc the '"enter" that can command nation-wide support, and a "peripheral"' strategy threat- to create a civil war between Kurd, Shi'ite Arab, and Sumi Arab and possibly to divide the country. This risk of division may be more important than the risk of violenre. It woufd take an extrmrdinary combination of events for Iraq to m i d further civil ~riolence,m d Iraq is unlikely to resolve its sectarim and ethnic divisions peacefully-regardless of Western and. Gulf policies. The choice is essentidy one betwet-m conthued repressim by a Sunni elitist rclgilrrc m d broad civil violelnce within Iraq, m d much depelnds on whether it will be possible to encourage forms of violence that will be both limited and progres"ive. There are no good answers to this question. A. strategy that considers relying on Iraq" surds must take account of the fact that the Kurds have no unity, few prospects of creating a stable separate identity or federal relaticmship with the ""center," and a long history of seeking independence whenever they fee1 they have the opportunity. S a d d m has made it all too clear that he can exploit the divisicrns between Kurdish fxli,ons. Even if the h r d s were unified, S L I C ~a strategy would create a significant risk of civil war, and could easily spill. over into other separatist factions in many of Iraq's neighnatims. 'There are -dish bors. Kttrds make up 9% of the population of Iran, 3% of the popuiatisn of Syria, and 20""Io of the population of k k e y and the "Kurdish issue" has led to low-level civil wars in Iran m d TurkeyEU~nymovement tokvards Kurdish separatism in Iraq could trigger ncw fighting in Iran and more intense conflict in Turkey, and the Kurds already am political pawns in the regional feuds between Turkey, SSyri, Iran, and Iraq. The risk of Iraqi %ifites seeking a separate regionat identity in a civil conflict seems less serious, although it cannot be dis~garded..Iraq's 5hi"tes may well want autonorny or a dominant rote in a new Iraqi gouent, and many wmt a more religious regime, but there have been few signs that Iraq" SShi'ite Arabs want uni.ty with Iran" SShl"itePersians. There wert? many opportunities for Iraqi Shi'ite uprisings during tbe Iranian vktories horn 1,982to 1,987, yet virtually no uprisings took place. Similarly, the Iraqi Shi5ile uyrisings after the Gulf War were fiiigk.tly nationalistic in character, and showed little inf;erest in unity- with Iran. Nevertheless, any Iraqi Shi'ite dominated government or separate enclave might align itself with Iran to try to influence oil quotas and prices or establish a strategic position in the Gulf-creating the risk of at least a loose coalition between all or part of Iraq and Iran.

The "Periphery": Political Alienation and Abuses of Human Rights :It is tempting to focus on Iraq" sstrategic position and to ignore the violent artd repressive n a m e of Iray's p s m t regime. The p ~ v i o u analysis s has shown, hokvever, that Iraqi authoritarianism is not typiral of Third World states and does have an hportant impact on VVestern and Southem Gulf strategy. Saddarn Hussein's ~ g i t n enforces e its rutklless c m t d over Iraq's populatio~zthrough t-he systematic abuse of"human rights, and the scale of these abuses bas important implications for both a '*centristt' and ""peripheral" "strategy. They raise the risks i ~ i h e ~in n tany strategy that attempts to acczommadate Saddam or m y other centrist r e g h e that uses similal. techniques to stay in power. At the same time, they increase the risks t-he ccnantry will divide, or plunge into civil war, as the result of a peripheral strategy. The best available sources on Iraq" aabues of human rigfiits seem to be the amual US State Deparment reports on Humm fights and the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rghts. Bath hdicate that the :Iraqi regime has a long history of executing its opponents, and nothing has chmged since t-he Gulf War. 'There have been many credi:hlc reports shce 1992 that the regime has executed persons hvolved h plottjng against Saddam Hussejn, including some mmbers of Sa.ddmfsfamily and tribe. It is such =parts that led the UN Special Ragporteur to state that the lraqi regime's "aixn of killing is a political one, with the ob~ective of silenchg dissent and suppressing upposition" in his October 1994 rep"" tcr the UN Generat Assemklly.

Killings and To&ure M m y of the regime's abuses have already been described, but it is important to stress the systematic nature of its political violence, For example,

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the UN Special Rappodeur lists several cases of politically-motivated killings during 1943 in his February 1994 report, These include mass executions of ShifiteArabs at the AL-tZadcvaniy;-thand Abu Ghraib prisons in celztral Iraq. According to the Special Rapporteur, some of those killed had been involved in the uprising against the Iraqi regime in the spl-ing of 3991.211 Novernber 1993, the Special f3appo"t"ur reported that the Iraqi rclgilrrc had executed severai Turkomans whose bodes were mutjlated befose behg returned to their families. The Special Rapporteur also noted the frequent use oE the death penalty for such political offenses as ""insulting" the P~sjdelztor t-he Ba'aLlrr Party. His February 1994 report summarizes several RCC decrees that stipulate t h dcath penalty for political m d civil offenses. The killifigs of high-ranking civilian, mititary, and tribal leaders have already been described, hut Iraq also regularly assasshates opposition leaders outside Iraq. On April 12, an opposition figure, Tafib Suhayl AlTamtinni, was assassinated in Beirut, LJ&anon. LBbanese secttrity oMicials arrested two Iraqi diplomats assigned to Beimt and charged them with the murder. The suspects admitted their guilt, but at the end of 1995, there was no movemelzt toward a trial.13" The Iraqi regixne arrmges many ""accidents" and "disappearances." For example, the State Department reports that in July 1994, Taki Alm o e i (a prominent opponent to Saddam Hussein), and two other members of his fami2y and their driver we= killed under suspicious circumstances in an auf;crm&ile crash in sczuthem Iraq, near Al Najaf. It hdicates that strong circumstantia1evidence pobted to the regime's involvement. The regixne had lsng targeted the AI-aoei family for harassment and abuse, as the famiy is also rmowned in Shi"ite circles for its religious leadership m d o~ttspokcrzcondemnation of the regirne's human rights record.156 In February 1994, the LIN Special Rapportem ~ p o r t e dthat he continued to receive "reports on the widespread phenomenon of djsappearm e . " He stated that the UN Working G r o q on Enfmcment on Envoluntary Disappearances bad c m e y e d to the Iraqi regime 30,570 names of dj,appeared persons and p l a m d to convey another 5,000. The U'nikcd Nations has documented 16,000 cases of missing persons, The Iraqi ~ g i m has e failed to rczh;lm, or account for, a large number of Kuwaiti citizens and third-country nationals debined during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, It deni.es having any knowledge of the misslng persons. UN Security Council Resoluticm 687 rewres the Iraqi regime to "facilitatef9he seasch for and Che repatriation of those still misshg. In his October report, the Special Rapporteur noted that the Iraqi regime" failure to account for the missing p e s m s vicrlates provisions of the various Geneva Conventions, to wfiich Iraq is a party. M d d e East Watch esti-

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mdes that, apart front the tens of t h s a n d s of persons w:ho have disappeamd and are p ~ s u m e ddead, another 10,000 to 12,U00 persons were being held trYithouf;charge in prisons and detention centers. Every Iraqi government has made use of torture, but s ~ ~ c&uses h became m c h more systematic fol2owing the fall of the monarchy and have g m even worse since Saddam tlusseinfsrise to power. Althoqh the Iraqi regime is a party to internatio~~al, cmvezztions against torture, and the Iraqi Constitution prohibits the practice, the US State Deparhent reports that the security services routinely torture detainees. The UN Speciat Rapporteur continues to note the Iraqi regime's ""systemat-ic" use of physical and.psychulogical torture. According to former detainees, torture techiques ir7clude electric shocks admb~istewdto the gmitals and other sensitive areas, beati.ngspburnhgs with hot irons, suspension from c e i h g fans, dripping acid m the skin, rape, breaking of f.ixslbs, denial of food and water, and threats to rape or otherwise ham relatives. The torme~~tors Ell many torture victims m d mutilate their bodies before deliverirtg them to the victin\s9amiliese~~~ The US State Department =ports that the Iraqi authorities imtroduced new forms of torture inSeptennher 1994, including the amputation of ears and the branding of foreheads for certain ecmomir crirnes and for desertion from the military. Large numbers of persons ~ p o r t e d l ybled to death from such punisbents. Opposition media reported that the regime's use of ear amputations sparked. a large anti-regime demonstration in M a u l on September 8. Opposition mdia also ~ p o r t e dthat the authorities executed several doctors who had refused to carry out the amputatior1s~I38 The Iraqi regime also introduced the traditional. TsXarnic law punishment for thievery-amputatim cJf the right hand. It subsequently &$Ulated brmding of the forehead as the pulnishntelnt for thieves whose hands already had been amputated and the death penalty for certain categories of thievery. An OWciaf newspaper reporkd m September 9,1994, that: the authoritjcs amputated t-he right hand and branded the forehead of a person convicted of stealing a tekvisim set.159 In his October 1994 =port, the tdN Special hpporteur conde amputations m d brandings. He stated that the practices constitute '%agrant and determined violations of :Iraq% hinternational human rights obligations insofar as thry prescribe cruel and unusual punishments and insofr-tr as implernent.atiorz of the d e c ~ e compounds s these violatiorns by the conduct of torture." The relevmt obligation in this regard is Article 7 of the fnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rit;hts, to which Iraq is a party. The UPJ' General Assemt?ly likewise condcrnned what it termed "mutilations" in a December resolution, This s i b t i o n did not improve during 19535, despite =ports of Saddam" effosts to li:beraljze Iraq's politics. In 1995 the UP;I' M m a n Rights

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Committee, the UN Subcommission on Prever~tianof Discrirurinatio~~ and Protection of Minorities, and the UN General Assembly all adopted resoing the govemmmt's human rights violations. For the third consecutive year, the UNHCR called on the UN Secretary General to send human rights mnnitors to '"hdpin the independent verification of reports on the human rights sikation in Iraq.'"The UN Subcommission on Prever~Cjonof Biscrimhatim m d Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution reiterating the UNHCR request for the deployment of monitors. In December the UN General Assembly once s a i n endorsed the e H m a n Rights Comission for monitors for Iraq. The Iraqi continued, to defy these calls for the entry of monjtors. ecial R ~ p a r t e u lthe ; US State Deparmmt, A national, and Middfe East Watch rcported a nurnber of trends and incidents during 1995 and 1996 that c d i r m the fact that there is little chance that Saddam or the Babth elite will ever change their character:

* The UN Special Rapportem, the international media, and other groups reported m increased number of s m m a r y executions in 1,995. In his February report to the UN M u m XCights Commission, the Special mpporteur stated that the Gove ent's '"aim of killing is a political one, with the clbjective of sil g dissent and suppresshg opposition." * There were many reports that the Ba'ath regime executed persons involved in plotting against Saddam, including high-ranking ciwilian, military; and tribal leaders, as well as members of his family and clan, Une unconfirmed eyewibess report charged that 200 prisoners were executed in February at the Abu Ghurayb prism, Other executions occurred aAer several anti-regime disturbances, The most serious incidents inchded an uprising in March led by former Gen. Wafiq al-Samara'i; an uprising fn May led by Gm. Turki Ismail Dulaimi m d other members of the Dulaimi clan; and the August defections of Hussejn and Saddarn Kamel, Saddarn" ssonsin-lw who held high-ranking government positions, An mdetermiaed numt-?cr of people are believed to have been executed extrajudicially after each of these events. * ?he Special bpporteur noted continued reports of the frequent use of the dealt7, penalty for such offernses as "ins~dting"the President or the Ba'ath Party In reports submitted to the Wh: Human Rights ission in September and November 1995, the Special Rappm teur cited several go~rernmentdecrees stipulatjng the deai-12 penalty for certain political and civil offenses, Nurnemus mid-level offjcials and local leaders who fled government-controlled areas cited the fear of extrajudicid killing as a rcason for their flight.

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* * *

*

*

*

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'The Special Rapporteur, Humm Rights Watch (HRW), m d other human rigl-tts groups rclported that the Government executed several doctors who refused to perform amputations irnposed on persons convi,cted of certain crimes, or wh,o performed corrective surgery on such amputees. Government forces reportedly executed numerous Shi'ite imhahitants of the south marshes, but &ere was no indepemdcw means to verify these reports. Indicatiws pcrlrsist that the Gove ent continued to offer ""bunties" to anyone who assassirzates United Nations or other internationaI relief workers in northern Iraq. The Special Rappol-teur stated in November, 1995 that he cmtinued to receive reports on widespread disappearances, especially h southern Iraq. The Iraqi government did not respond to any of the more than 15,000 cases conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by tl-te UN Working Group on Enforcemelrt on Involmtary Disappearances. Iraq continued to filil to return, or account for, a large number of Kuwaiti citizens and third-country nationale; detained durirrg the Iraqi occupatim of Kuwait. IZegirne officials, including xnilitay leaders known to have been arnmg the last to see the disappeared dunt7g the occupaticm cmtinued to ref'use to respclnd to the hundreds of outstanding inquiries about the ntissing. The regjn?e denied having any howledge of them md. claims that retlevmt recods were lost in the aftermath sf the Gulf War, 'The regime continwed to practice amputation of ears and hands, as well as brmding, as punishment for crirnes ranging from theft to military eiesertion. Eyewitnesses rc-.portc_.dthat the Cove ried out second an?put&ions and brandings on rcpeat offenders and on those who sought corrective surgeq for earlier disfigurements, :111 some of these cases, the regime executed the sffcrnders as well as the doctors who either performed corrective szxrgery or refused to carry out amputations. h his November 1995 report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the amputations and Zlrandings are "gross vioXations of human rights,'" Sevaal government officials cited Islamic law (5hari"a) as a rationale for mputating the right hands of cclnwicted thieves, but nlrne commented on the prmiskmcnts imposed on repea.t. offcslders or the Government" disregard for rights protected under Islamic law URe senior official claimed that brmdings were instibted in order to avoid confwsing airurinals with war veterans who had lost lin?bs in battle, Certain prisons continue to be notorious fnr routine mist~atmentof prisoners. The AL-Rashidiya Prism, on the Tigris River north of Taji,

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reportedly has torture chambers. 'The A1-Shamma5ya Prism, located in east Baghdad, holds the mentally ill and is reportedly the site of both tclrbre and disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah Prison is a fomter prismer-of-war facility near Baghdad and ~ p o r t e d ythe site of torture as welll: as mass executions. This prison was the principal detention centcr for persons arreskd fntlcrwing the civil uprisings of 1991, and rekmed to prominence in May 1995, as the site of executions foltwing an uprising led by members of the h l a i m i ctan. :Many persms taken into custody in connection with this and other civil uprishgs have not been seen shce. 'There are estimates that the Al-Radwmiyah Prison holds more than 5,000 detainees, mly a few of whom may have been released fnllwing a so-called "amnesty" mnoulzcement in July 1995. * According to international human rights groups, numerous forcipers arrested arbitrarify in previous years remain in detention. 11% March 1995, the r e g h e arrested two Ameriems who unhowingly crossed the Iraqi border with Kuwait. The regime's efforts to link the fate of the two men to pditicai issues failed, and the two were released in July * :In 'July the Government issued two " esty" "decrees: Decree No. 61, for certain convicted criminals, an cree No. 64 for those convkted of political offemses. The Spedal Rapporteur noted that Decree No. 61 stipuktes that criminlals granted amnesty may be convicted agah of the same crimes for which were sentenced and sty to report to carnthat Decree No. 64 requires those granted noted that because petent authorities in ordcr to benefit. H "there is no effective zule of law in Iraq, there will be little confidence in the =liability of amnesty deesces." Human Rights Watch observed that when s o m 3,000 ~ s j d e n t of s southern Iraq c m forward for a similar a esty in 1991, they wert? placed on trucks and szxbsequently disappeared. Further, two Iraqis who specifically were granted amnesties before returning from Jordan, where they had earlier defected, were murdered shortly &er their return, 'The Special Rapporteur noted in his Nov numerif~slaws were used to support ttze opprtrssion, such as a 1994 decree stipdat automobile theft, smuggling, various cdegories of theft, and solicitation for the purposes of prostitution. Tn 1995 the Government also announced the death penalty for possession of stolen gwds and for the failure of agricdtural workers to supfly food for gover distribution, * :Incontrast, the Government continued to protect certain groups from prosecution for alleged crimes. A 1992 decree grants imrnunity

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from prosecution to members of the Bafa.trhParty and the security forces who kill anyone while in pursuit oi m y deserters. Unconfirmed but widespread =ports indicate that this decree was applied oftan in 1995 to prevent trial,s or punishmeznt of such gove officials as Uday Saddam Hussein, the President" son. unity to men who kill their mothers, daughters, and other km& fmily mem:bers wh,o have committed ""imnrrora:l deeds." The security services and the Ba'ath Party maintained their pwvasive networks of informers to deter djssident activity m d instil,l fear in the public. Voters in the October 1995 ""referendum" w-cvc requiwd to n m e relatives on their ballots and, accord@ to some opposition reports, were threatened with pmishment agahst their families if they voted against exteding Saddm's rule, In his NWember report, the UN Special Rapporteur noted that because of the htrusivezzess of the security apparatus "virtually no citizen would risk demnstrating any upposition to the Presidency or Government-or would (30 so at his mortal peril.'" 'The UN Special Rapporteur and others report that the Gover continued to engage in various abuses agairzst the countsy" 3350,000 Assyrim Christians. Most Assyrims traditimaliy h e fn the northern governates, and the Governrnelnt often has suspected them of '"coll.aboratjngUwith Kurds. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrim churches during the h f a l Campaign and reportedly tort u ~ and d executed m n y hssyrians, Accordjng to HRW and Assyriasr sources, the Government continued to harass and kill Assyrians &mugbout: the country by forced ~locations,terror, and artillery shelling. * The Government deported hundreds of Turkornans from their nortkrn lraqi homes, either to areas outside government control or to soutf.tem Iraq. It also refused to allow tens of thotlsands ol Kurds and Taskomans to return to their homes hKirkuk and Mosul. These fortled movements amount to a policy of internal exile. 'The Government continued to pursue its discriminatory resettlement polides, including demolition of villages and forced relocation of Kurds, Turkomms, Assyrims, and other minorities, Human rights monitors reported that the Government continues to force Murdish m d Turkoman residents of Mosul and Kirkmk to move to other areas in the north or the south. Accordjng to Che UNMCR, hundrtlds of thousands of lraqi refugees remained abroad-mainly in Iran, Saudl Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, ?ixrkey,Pakistan, and Jordan.Apart fmm those suspected of sympathizing with trim, most flcd after the Government's suppressiozz of

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the civil uprisjng of 1991; others are Kurds who fled the Anlal Campaign of 1988. In November, fie Special Rapporkur report& eyewitmess accounts that the children of seninr mernbcrs of the Ba'ath Party were treated to a varict), of favors in the educational system, ixrcluding privileged entrmce and ad\rancement throughout the system. n e s e reporZ-S confirm other;-;from rczccl~temigrants alleging systemic corruption that prevents fair advancement by deserving childm whose parents do not have the ~ q u i s i t political e ties. 'The Special Rappo&eur also reparted in November that "the obvious idalance between military expenditures and resources dZocated to fie fields of health care a d education clearly illustrates the priorities of the Government." 'The Special Rapprteur has repeat-edIy observed that the ongoing bormbardment of civilian settlements in the southern marshes has ~ s u l t e din the deaths of many persons, including women, children, and the elderly* Assyrims are m ethnic group as welt as a Christian community and a distinct language-Syriar. Public instmcticm in Syriac, which was to have been allowed under a 1972 decree, has never been implemented. The Special Rapparteur reported continued discrimination against Assyrims t h u g h u t 1995,Accord% to oppositicm reports, many Assyrian faxnilies wcre forced to leave Baghdad after they had fled to that city for safety iollowirrg the regime" suppression of the northern uprisit~gin 1991. Citizens cmsidered to be of Xranim origin must carry special identification and are often pmcluded from desirable employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of thousands oE citizel~sof Iri-mian origin.. Phsons and the Legal. System

The Iraqi legal system is more an instrument of state cantrd than a means of ensuring the rule of law. Iraqi prisons regular@ rnistreat their prisoners. The State D e p a r t ~ ~ e reports nt that the Al-Rashidiya Prison, on the Xgris Ever north of Ta~i,contains torture chambers in its basement. The Al-Shamma5iya Prison, located in east Baghdad, holds the mentally ill and is reportedly the site of both torture and disappearances. The AI-Radwaniyah Prison is a former prisoner-of-war faciljty near Baghdad and is mported to be the site of tcrrtw and arbitrary ki.llings, including m s s execution by firing squad. This prison was the principal detention centes for persons arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991. hllany persons taken into custody in connection with the uprisings have not been seen since."Widdle East Watch estimated in

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19994 that the Al-Radwaniyah Prison holds between 5,000 and 10,000 detainees, I'he UN Special Rapporteur, Middle East Watch, and A tional have cited the M-Radwaniph Prison and the Abu G h a i b Prison, located in Baghdad, as principd sites where torture and.disappearances contiinue to occur. Accordhg to opposition reports, authorities at the Abu Ghraib Prison begm to amputate the hands of persons convicted of theft in late 1994. I'he Iraqi securiy forces raped capbred chilians during the Anfat Campaign and l%te occzlpat-ionof Kukvait and the ClJXf War. The UN Special Rapporteur n&ed in his Februav report that he had interviewed numemus women who continue to suffer severcr. d e p s s i m after they were raped in official custody*The lraqi regime has ncver achowledged or taken any action to investigate reports of rape by its officjals.161 Although the Iraqi constituf;ionand legal code prohibit arhitrary arrest and dekntio~~, the authorities rotltinely elngage in these practices, In, his February report, the Special,Rapporkur described 'kidespxlead arbitrary arrest m d detention, irt violation of Article 9 of the Universal Declaration in the southern part of the corntry. He of Humm Rights,'"rimarily stated that the military and securiq services, rather than the orbinary police, carried out most eases of arbitrary arrest and detention.162 Like m n y Middie Eastern cotlnt.ries, Iraq has two pardlel judicial systems: the regular courts, which try common criminal offenses, and the special security ccnarts, which try cases invotvirrg national security, Trials in the rclgula courts are public, and defei~dmtsare entitled to counselat g o v e m e n t expense inthe case of hdigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the charges and evidence brought s a i n s t their clicmts, but there is no jury system: panels of three judges try cases. Defendmts do have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation, the highest court. The State Departiaent reports that Iraq's regular courts have been given steadily greater authority to use the death penalty In 1994, the regime intrclduwd Sbari'a pmishnlents for some types of crimirral offenses and for nnilitary desertion..The Spedal, Rapporteur &so reported in 1994 that the regular courts often assign penalties that are ""dsprczportionate" to the offense. Decree 33 of 1992 imposes the death penalty for automobile theft. h 19994 the Iraqi regime mnou~zcedthe death penalty would be invoked for autom&ile smuggling, various categories of thievery and solicitatim fctr the purposes of prostih;ltion. As oE late 3994, the penalty for possession of stolen goods was ljfe in prison.w3 The special securiv courts have jurisdiction in all cases hvolving espionage and treason, peaceful pditical dissent, smuggling, currcllncy exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Specid Rap-

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porteur, mititary officers or civil semmts with no le@ training head these tribunals, which hear cases In secret, Authorities often hold defendants incornmunicadrland do not pemit them to have contact with their lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by torture which often serve as the basis for conviction. Athough dekndants may appeal tl-teir sentences to Saddarn Hussein, many cases end in sumrnary execution shortly after trial. Further, "President" "Saddam Husseh may override any court decision, and there artr no checks on his powr. The UN Special Rappo&t"ur noted in his Fdruary 7,994 report that the executive interferes regdarly in "all aspects of normal judicial competence in matters ranging from property and clrmmercial law, to fmily law and crirnind lawef'

Freedom of Speech and Political Dissent Freedom of speech m d the press do not exist in Iraq, m d political dissent is not tolerated. The 11-4regime and the Bakath Party own LalZ print and b a d c a s t media, and verate them as pmpagmda outlets. They do not rclport opposition views. The UN Special Rapporteus noted in hjs February 1994 report that the regime has criminalked most forms oi personal exprt_.ssion.A 1986 ciecrt?estipulates the death p"nat5 for anyone insulting the President or other hjgh gover ent officials. Section 214 of the Penal Code prohibib '"singing a song likely to cause civil strife." Press Act 206 (19hEf) prohibits the writing of artides on 42, specific srthjects, including those detrimental to the President, Variotls Bafath Party and pxlesidential decrees define political dissent as mcompassing a wide range of activities. Persom suspected of engaging in dissent artl routinely imprisoned without charge or trial or after trials that do not meet minimum stmdards of fairness. The Iraqi ~ g i m periodically e jams news hmadcasts, inctueting those of opposition groups, from outside Iraq. Iraqi citizens may not legai,ly assemble or organize for any poiitical purpose other than to express support for the regime and fie Iraqi r e g k e cmtrols the formaticm of parties, rclgulates thcir internal affairs and crlosely monjtors their activities, %veral parties are outlawed by name, md. membership in them is a capital offense. A 1974 law also p~scribesthe death penalty for anyone "infiltrathgf"he BafathParty.la The Trqi regime frtzqrrentfy disregards the constitutional right to privacy particularly in cases in which national security is alleged to be involved. 'The %acv defhes security offenses so b r o d y that authorities are virtually exempt from the legal requirement to &ta.in search warrants. The securiy services and fie Ba'ath Party maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity m d instjll fear in the public. As the

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UN Spedal Rapportew noted in his February port, "the fear of informers and subsequent severe reprisals have prevented, virtually the entire popdaticm from exp~ssinggenuinely held o p i n i m which are not ccmsistent wiCh those of the lraqi regime.'" Treatment of Minorities and Foreigners The Xrayi. regime controls movement within the countsy of citizens and foreipers. Persons who enter sensitive border areas and numerous des-

ignn.t.ed security zolles are subject to arrest. Police checkpoints are c m m m on major roads and hi&ways. As has been discussed earlicr, the :Iraqi ~ g i m requires e citizens to obtain ercpensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may not make more than two trips abroad amually; and s m e citizens are prohibited to traveX abroad. Other citizens arc required to post collateral with the lraqi regime before traveling abroad, which is rclfundabk only upon their return to Iraq. There are ~ s t r i c t i m son the amomt of currency that may be taken out of the corntry. Students abroad who refuse to rt;h;lrn artl required to ~ i t n h u r s eany expenses paid by the Iraqi regime. Each student wishing to travel abroad must provid,e a gtlarantor. The guarantor and the student" p m t s may be liable if the student fails to rebm."s Foreip spovlses of citizens who have residcd in lraq for 5 years are required to apply for nationality, The requirement is I year of msidence for the spouses of lraqi citizms employed in gcrvemcmt offices, Many foreig~~ers thus have been obliged to accept citizenship m d are subject to official traveX restrictions, The penalties for noncompliance ulclude loss of job, a sdstantial financial penalty and =payment for any gove ents many citizens who also educational expenses. The Iraqi cially the children of fraqi hold citizenship in mother co fathers and fortrign-born mothers-from visiting the country of their other nationality Potential opponents, ShYites, and K u d s are often drivm out of the country Citizens considered to be of Iranian origin must carry special identification and are?often precluded from desirab)e employment. Over the years, the Iraqi regime bas deported hundreds of thuusands of citizens of Iranian origin." The tlN Special Rapporteur also =parted in 1,994that the Iraqi regim,e may have expelled a total of mnre thnn one miilion persons suspected of being "Persian sympathizers" h recent years, Accordir~gto the Special Rapporteur, about 500,0013 of these divlaced persons are now believed to live in Iran. According to the Specid Rapportcur, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees now remain abroadmaifily inIran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan. In addition to those suspected of sympathizing with Iran, m y fled after "

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the Government's suppression of the civil uprjsing of 1991; othcrs include k r d s who fled the h f a l Campaign of 1988. The UNHCR assists many refugees, not&Iy in Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey* The Special Rapportem noted in his February rcport that the Iraqi regime falled tu provide for the basic humanitarian needs of its civilian gopufatirm and that it is obligated to do so as a sipatory to the United Nations Chartec The Spekial Rapporteur reported that in S e p t e d e r the Iraqi regime cut food subsidies by one-third.. He once again called on the :Iraqi regime to implement United Natiom Security Council Resoluticms 706 and 712 Section 5, which is titled "Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religiun, Disability"m The cdtural, refiginus, and linguistir diversity of society is not reflected in the ccnantrfs political and ecmomic structure. Sunni Arabs, a small minority of the population, have effeetivriy controIled Iraq since independence in 1932, tjhi5te Arabs, the overwhelmjng majority of the popdatim, have long been economically, ppolitically, and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni K d s of the north, the Shj'ite Arabs of the south have been targeted for particular discrimination and abuse, ostensibly because of their opposition to the Iraqi regirne. As has been discussed earlier, the Kurds have long sMfferc3d plitical and economic dlscrimhatim. mere are, however, other e t h i c groups who suffer as well, such as the Assyrians. Public instruction in Syriac, which was to have been allowed under a 1922 decree, has never been implemented. In 1994 the Special Rapporkur stated that in late 1993 the :Iraqi mgime dismissed or expelled hundreds of Assyrian teaehers and S1ude11ts fmm mversities and puhlic positions.l@ The government also uses Zraq's trade unions as an instrument of state contml. '"The Trade tdnion Organhation Law of June 2, 4987, prescribes a monolithic trade union strzlcture for w a n i z e d labor. Wftrkers in private and mixed mterprises and cooperatives-but not public emplrzyees or workers in state enterpriseehave tbr right to join local union committees"The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions, which in turn belong to the Iraqi General Federation of Bade Unions, The Gcneral Federation is h k e d to the Ba%th Party, which uses it to promote party princirples and pdicies among union memben;, 7'he General Federation also is affiliated with the hternational Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. 'The Labor Law of 1987 restricts the right to strike, and no strike has been report4 over the past two decades,l@

Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy There is little point is h o p i q for an Eraqi government that wilt end all of these abuses, or for trusting in the p r a i s e s oE the various lraqi factions

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who have learned to use t-he rhetoric of human rights as a tool in seeEng Western political support, Iraq" divisions and ixrternal politics virtually ensure that change will corne slowly, particularly if it cltoes not come as the result of a viole~~t civil war*Further, even if those factions who claim to support h m a n rights do come to power as a result of a civil confljct, many are likely to turn to repression the moment they take control and have to deal with their rivals or Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions. At the s a m t h e , it is difficult to treat Saddam Hussein." regisne simply irr terms of realprxlilik, and m y strategy that effectively tolerates the c u r r e ~level ~ t of humm rights &uses in Iraq is likely to have short-term success at best. fray's current level of ~ r c s s i o nis a recipe for civil war. It forces any "centrist" ~ g i r n to e ride a tiger that is likely to turn m the rclgilrrc at thc first sign of w c h e s s - It szxppresses Shi'ite avirations at the cost of a steadily increasjng alienation of Iray's largest single ethnic faction, and of pushing this faction towards Iran. It creates a Kurdish time bomb h northern Iraq that can explode into Turkey m d Irm. Just as human rights advocates need to approach Iraq without illusions about its firturt., or the sincerib of those Iraqi's wko use human rights as a poitical tool, Western and Southern Gulf po:litical leaders wed to approach Iraq with a clear understanding that major improvements in humm rights are the price of any mid to long-term Iraqi stability. The issue ultimately is not one of whether the West m d the Southern Gulf can. live with Saddam or some lender like him, It is rathr, the fact that Iraq cannot be stahle or peaceful uniess its rr-?gimeis far less rqrczssive than Saddam's regime is today

Sanctions and Economic Instability The p ~ v i o u sanalysis has shown that Iraq's pcritics, state fnstit-uticms, e h i c and sectarian divisions, and human rights abuses interact in a matrix of cmflicthg forces that makes it extraordinarily &Hicult for the West and the Southern Gutf states to develop an effective strategy for dealing wi& Iraq. Iraq's ccurre~~t ecmornic problems add to these complications, with one important difference. Iraq faces a growing economic crisis that is impoverishint: the country and which threatens the social fabric of the cowry, wkle politics and strategy may he able to wait, food cannot. This crisis is partly the result of decades of mismanagement by the Iraqi government, and partly the result of massive spendkg and foreign borrowing during th Iran-Iraq VVar and Gulf War, The Ba'ath government has long indulged in extensive central pi ing and has exercised d hdustsial producheavy control over agriculture, foreign trad ustion-leavjng only small industries, shops, m d part of the serv ent try to the private sector. Its eight year war with Iran led the go to w a s k the liquidity it had b d t up during the oil b o r n of the 1,97t)s, and make Iraq a massive borrawer, It then grossly over-extended ki-tq" ccredit between 1988 and 1990 in a sknultmeous effort to fund wartime recovery, economic expansion, vast public works projeds, and a massive military build-up. As Charts One and Two show the Bakath governnnent bad efkctively crippled Iraq's ecmomy before the Gulf War begm and had forced devashting cuts in Iraqi ljving stmdards. In fact, Iraq's average per capita income dropped from a peak of $8,162, in 1979 to $2,108 in 1989-a cut of over 700/Q, 170 The cursent crisis is also, however, the result of d a m g o done during the Gulf lNar and of more than half a decade of UN sanctions, These UN sanctions forhid member states, companies and indkiduals from undertaking any ecmornic intercourse with the Iraqi governme~~t or with private Iraqi firms, except in regard to goods deemed by th UN Sanctions

120,000

w

100,000

El GDP ($ Constant 87)

0 Population (Millions) Per Capita Income ($ Constant 87)

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0 1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

CHART ONE Iraqi GDP, Population Growth in Millions, and Per Capita Income in Constant 1987 US Dollars. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oiland Gas, Paris, 1995, pp. 247-248. U h,

v1

0

l.

1

1970

1

1

1972

1

1

1974

1

1

1976

1

1

1978

1

1

1980

1

1

1982

1

1

1984

1

1

1986

1

1

1988

1

1

1990

1

I

I

1992

CHART TWO Iraqi Population Growth in Millions and Per Capita Income in Constant 1987 US Dollars. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas,Pans, 1995, pp. 247-248.

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Committee to be of a humanitarim nature. M i l e accurate data are not available, Chart One indicates that Iraq's per capita income has dropped from $2,108 in 1989 to well under $9,001) a year in 1992-1995-ancrther cut of well over 50%.'71 CM exports are at well under 5% of their pre4ulf VVar levels, there am shortages of imports and spare parts throughout the errnomy, and ccmsumer prices have doubled annuafly since 1993.17" Shce 1991, Saddam Husseh and the supporters of smctions have played a game oi "chicken" where each side waits to see which side is willing to let the Iraqi people suffer the most. This g m e has reduced Iraq to m economic m d social "asket case" m d may limit its economic development for several decades to come. Iraq's per capita income has shrunk from 60% of the OECI) average irr 1981) to 1570of the OECU average in 1,989, and less than 4% of the OECI) average in 1993.173 The human cost of this game is particularly striking because Iraq had relatively high living standards before the Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions. Before the war, Iraq had achieved a high level of economic and social development which had placed it in the World Bank category of upper middle i n c o m countries like Gwece, Vcnezuek, and Czechoslovakia, Frarthes, the caloric intake of Iraqis in the late 1980s was just under 3,000 calories per day-above average for an upper middle income country.17" Shce the Gulf Wa35; Iraq's per capita income and caloric intake have p h g e d irom the levels of advanced states of the Third World to the levels common to very poor states like Egypt, Yemen, and Sudan, and are ayproxhing t-he ranks of the "'Fourth Wodd" states like Rcvanda, Haiti, Zaire, and Somalia, Iraq now has an economy characterized by extreme poverty. There is a huge socioeconmic: gap between a tiny, powerfui and rich elite and the poor. Further, the middle-class outside Ehe natio11's power structure is largely bankmpt, m d Iraqi society is characterized by widespread corruption and enciernic violence.

The Iraqi Economy Before the Gulf V V j x Before? it inva&d Kuwail; Iraq's eeonolny was heavi,ly depemdent on oil-which provided 95% of foreign exchange earnings and funded most government operatricms. While Chart Two shows that Iraq's oil income was shnrply dfected by world. oil prices, and by war, Iraq still had enough incorne to fund both growth and Saddam fiussein" aambitions during the 1 9 7 0 and ~ ~ to survive nearly a decade of war during the 1980s. Iraqf=export income rose from only $484.7 million in 1970 to $8.3 billion in 1975, and $26.3 billion in 1980, While it dropped to $10.4 billion in the 1981 because of the Irm-Iraq Miar, Iraq still had $6.9 billion to $102 billion worth of export i n c m e betbveen 11981 and 1988, and its export

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income recovered to $12.3 billion in 1,989. Oil, NCL, m d refined prodwt. exportvrovided over 98% of Iraq" export income during this period.lT5

ImH~kstuu'alPolicy Uzder the B a k t h Iraq made little progress inindustrialization before the Bakthists came to pokver in 1,968. hllhough the industrialization of the country received high pl-iority in the development plans of successive regimes, the efbrt was badly mismanaged, slafered fmm an absence of skilled persomel including mmagers m d administrators, m d lacked the requisite capital, The end result was little m . 0 ~than waste-tbe state spent money on over-ambitious and badly concei\.ed projects which did Zittlo m r e than djstort the market and Iraq's economy."e When the Ba%thistscame to power, they indicated their determination to proceed rapidly with the industriaiization of the country*They produced two developme12t plans that spanned the periods m d 192&197,4 and 19761980. These plans provided a total allocation of Iraqi Dinars (ID) 5,199 billion for the indttstfial sector, This was over 15 thnes the allocat-ion for the period 1959-11369."" Very little was achieved between 19663and 1975, except in the oil sector. The reghe's priInary goals in those seven years were the achievement of "politica"~indepe~ndence (i.e., consotidation of Rdathist rule and the elhination of foreign-supported "counterrevolutionary"' acthities), "economfc" "dependence (i.e., nationatization of the oil industry), and investment in the eriticdy importmt oil industry itself. These goals reflected the kind of economic &surdism that has crippled virtually every Arab economy, and which are the curse of Arab socialism and eMorts to use the state sector to support economic development, They had little to do with promoting gmwth and the government s i v l y lacked the oif inrclme to fhance its efforts-a situation which did not change until the oil price increases between October 1,973m d January 1924. This situation changed with the development plan of 19761980. The Bakth government now had the money to back its commitment to industridization-particularly heavy industry. It invested D 4.4 bi,ltim ($18.15 bilfion) over the life of the fhe-year plan, and established fray's current heavy industrial sector-the Basra petrochemicals complex, the f i o r alZubair iron and steel works, and su1furI urea, phosphate and fertilizer industries, Most of this industrial infrastructure was concentrated in the south near Basra, and many of the plants were rdatively effic.ient "turn key" "planrs supplied by the West.17" Neverthetesrj, Ba%thist industrial policy still had severcl weaknesses which became far more appa'ent once the Iran-Iraq War limited thr ability of the Ba"&h party to substitute oil we&h for econolnic efficiency. By

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1982, even the Ba"ath Party was forced to admit puhljcly that these weaknesses included: A lack of a consistent sense of priorities among industrial programs;

* Too much of a hcus m grandiose and impressive industrial. infra-

* * *

* * *

* *

structure with far too large an iwestment in buildings and services; Not etnough of an understanding of the absorptive lhitations of the economy; Idndertaking the creation of an industrial infrastructure without taking into consideration the bottle~necksthat would be caused by underdeveloped transportation and.port infrastructure; A pervasive state sector and a bwaucracy which stifled initiative and made state sector officials afraid of assumiag aut.hority and responsibiliv;lT" Widespread techical ineffIiciency a d backwardness of the employees in the industrial sedor*The 1982 Ba'athist Political Report commented that this sector bad "hiled to keep abreast of recent kchnological developments," and its ""hmm base is still below the required standard in both quantity and quality;"M" The paucily of middle-mngc techical cadre, forcing engineers to do low to mid-level work instead of showing their creativity in the process of design and production;"l A lack of d e r s t a n d j n g of modem technology and hence an inability to deal with ordinary repair and stoppage" inoperatrim of equipment m d machinery;""2 The invohement of the socialist public sector in industrial concerns such as food and manufacbring which would have best been left tcr the private sector" 'This situdion wasted capitd and thc talents of techical and administrative cadre;lgs The hck of quality control of products. 'f'he result was that Eraqi-produced induskial goods could not compete with foreiw (joods;l@ When the Eran-Xmy War broke out, Xraq tried to m a h t a h the momenturn of its industrial etevelopment plans. This proved to be a drawback during the Iran-:Iraq War. The proxintity of the fighting caused damage or forced the government to mothb.all the factories.la Whjle the gove ent tried to take a ""business as usual"happroach during the first two years of the war*The government% 1981-1985 five-year plan called for further develophg import substitution industrialization (IS)) and t.he creation of an advmced industrial base.186

By 1983, the Iran-lraq War made it painfully appart-nt that Iraq could not conth-ruewith its massive econolnic developmat program in the face

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of massive military expenditures and a drop in oil export revenues"M m y projects were put on bold, pending t h end. of the war, and the government crrncentrrated on incjustrial projects that (a) contributed.directly and immediately to the national war effort h i c h took priority in terms of manpower, raw materialls, machinery and spare parts; and (b) wodd enhance national military capabilities. In fact, Chc Iran-Xraq War had the benefit of teack\ing the Iraqi kadtrship the necessity of building a strong and efficient industrial base, supporting and being suppclrted by an indigenous science and technolngy infrastructure, and establishing a nationd delense induslry, Saddam recognized this in 1987, when he embarked. on a series of major refoms in the country's political economy which included jettisoning much of t-he socialist baggage of twenty years:187 We believe that tzrithaut stepping into industrialkation and accepting risk in the early stages of the 19fi8 revolution, our country would have been kept far away Ercm this vitally important field, and lacking the necessary expertise and know-how . . . the most Impc,l"cant aspect is for the c o r t n t ~to be sdentifically and techologically developed. Therefore, its indmtriat progress is a must, Failure to do so leaves us in the category af backward countries, without any impartant influence on our national and international surrormding.

These same patterns seem to have affected Iraq"s attempts to develop its military industries. WI~ilelittle was known b o u t Iraq's military indus&ialiaion progrm prior to the Gulf Crisis which has exposed it, it seems that Iraq had established a s m l l arms industry in the mid-1970s. :It was only irr the mid-1981)s, at t-he h e i e t of t-he fran-Iraq War, that Iraq sought to expmd military industrialization greatly the short-term to deal. with the combat and.engineering repirernents of the war-infantry weapons, arnmuni-tion,radios, bombs. Iraq's post-war plans wem, in retrospect, more arnbitious than that.lg8 Iraq's mjlitary industrialization projects were initially directed by the Military industries Commission (MIC) and the Special Orgmization for Technical Industries (SOTX). 'These were attached to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals in 1987, which was then given the title the Ministry of Industry alld Military Industrialization (MIMI) which was headed by Hzd-ssehKamel.1" h ~n~arjous speeehcs in 1987 Saddam Hussein indicated that he would like to see the organizational set-up, efficiclncy and product quality of the mflitary fndustries put to the civilian industries, in order to develop stricter performance standards* Iraq, however, has had little opportunity to demonstrate how much it has Icarned f m its past mistakes. W i l e it emerged from the km-Iraq War with arnbitious plans fnr its industrial sector, it never had time to act

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between Ihe end of tftc Iran-fraq W r in 1,988and the onset of the Kuwait crisis in 1990. It also lacked the capital to fund more than uqent rcconstruction projects and oil-mlated prcjects to increase oil exports.

Mqi A ~ ~ E E C ~ and L IFLnYdCImports Iraq is the only Gulf state with considerable agricultural potential. About 12%of its land is arable, of which 4%is inigattd, Another 3% is suitable for gm"Zi"g, and 3% is forested. Iraq has abouf;$2.8 cubic kdometers of inkrnal renewabk water resowces, which is high for a Middle Eastern country. The Xgris and Euphrates provide about 1,575 cubic meters of water per person, m m than twice the tot& used by t-he average citizen of the U'Sfialthough population increases are cuttjng the totd water mailable per capita.'"This amount of water has drupped from 14,706 cubic meters per year in 1960 to S , 2 6 cubic mekrs in 1490, and is preected to drop to 2,080 cubic meters by 2025.191 Iraq, however, has not made effective use of its agricultural potentid. ldnder the mmarchy Iraq was self-sufficient in wheat and rice, and pmduced elnough barley to export almost 25% of that crop. Nevertheless, agrirultctre was not efficient, The land tenurc patterns inherited fpom the colmial Ottoman d e r s i~ihibitedagricuftural producti\lity Farm land was in the hands of absentee landacvners. By 1953,1,.7%of landowners owned 63'70 of the land. About two-thirds of the population owned 5%of the land, and over three-four&s of the rural populatim was mde up of landless peasmts.192 Earning was undertaken by sharecroppers and tenants who received a tiny pwtictn of the crop they famed. Any income derived from increased productivity wcrnt to the landowners. Consequently, ternant famers were not motivated to produce beyond subsistence level, and thus agricultural productivity mmajned low throughout much of t-he period of monarchical rule. T h e s problents WE compounded by the reluctance of landowners to invest more than a minimum of resources, financial or otherwise, in their lands. Agrarian reform was mar impossi,hle because of the po:[itical power of the landowners and their class alfiance with. the munarchy. Mrhm agrarian =form was undertaken in t-he early years of republican Iraq, the govent's lack of skilled personnd to ensure its irnplernentation, kick of marketing resources and expertise, and in.ability to providc basic resources such as seed, pumps, and fertilizer h i n d e ~ dthe effectiveness of the process,'" While 71)% of the Iraqi population still earlled a living in agrirulture h 195%ihunly produced 30% of the country's income.194 Saddam Hussein reportedly used to say that agriculture is '"ermanelnt oil'hand ufged investment in this sector to attain sel,f-s~~fficiency.

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'The Ba'ath regime also tried to do more than its predecessors to improve productivity in this sector.1" Nonetheless, agriculbre fared little better ent. Government expenditurtts m agriculunder f-he Bafathist gove ture dfopped from 18%of total government expenditures in 1976 to less than 10% in 1980, and then dropped even further throughout the IranIraq War.lg6 Socialist policies led to inefficiencies in the agricultural sedor: overinvestment in large agricultural schemes and cooperatives with poor pay-offs wmted much of the government%invesment. Poor pay rates for agricdtwrai wnrkers helped co~~tribute to Che heavy rural-to-urban migration and.created an acute llabor hortage in the agricdtural sector wbich the government tried to deal with by importkg wwkers from labor-ri&/htensive cou~ztriessuch as Egypt. Government interference h the dynmirs of the market, poor managment skills, and lack of technical expertise further contributed to low productivity A stark inciicator of the regimes failurrz to incscase agricdtural productivity during the years of Ba'athist rule is the fact that Iraq became a net imporkr of food, and the agricultural sector accounted for only Il% of the GNI" although it elnployed 3O0/o of tl-te labor f0rce.1~~ This situation grew so bad that the stagnant state of Iraqi agriculturcl was the subjwt of intensive self-criticism during tbr June 1982 Ba'ath Party Njnth Rcgio~~al (Le., Iraqi) Congress. W i l e glossing over the inefficiencies introduced by the socialization of the agricultural sector, the rep"" still highlighted the following problerns:I"N

* Tradition and backwardness retarded development in the rural areas and in the agricdtural sector itself. 'The guasi-Marxist tone of the assessment does not detract from the truth of the statement cancerni.ng the state of affairs in rural fraq. * The agricultural sector was heavi.ty mired in bmaucratic ~ d - t a p e . Further, the state over-regulated the agricultural sector and miesommaged, it to the extent that this contributed to lack of growth. h~stead,it was recommended that the '"tate should focus (m big productio~~, vital projects and i,afrastructurtlprctjects such as those of irrigation, desalinatim, rural electrifiratim. . . ."1g9 * The heavy salinity of the soil acted to reduce agricultural pmduc"civity considerhly.

?"he Bafath government compenmted fi,r much of its inefficiency dwing Che 1970s by pouring vast a m o ~ ~of" ~ the ~ t natiods s new oil wealth

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into dealing with every problem, It had more than enough money to do so. Chart Three shows the patterns in Iraq's liquidity, and on the eve of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 Iraq had $35 billion in foreip currency reserves. This situation changed rapidly after 1980. The Ba'ath leadership calculated that they wodd be able to fight and win a quick and limited 'itorder war without disruption of their "hnme front"' and ol ecoaomic ~ Iran i17 Sepdevelopmmt pEans when they launched their w a against tember. Their caiculations proved terribly wrong. 'The war dragged on for eight years, and Iraq was forced to adopt a capil.al and technologyintenshe war-fighting strategy which provided, servicemen and their families with lavish benefit pa"kagemn the home-front: while it =lied on the vast use and expendjture of combat m t e d e l on the banlefield.200 Until 1983, Iraq also tried to continue with a "guns and butter" plicy and to maintain the momentum of its ermomic development prctgrams.. As a result, expenditures on na.t.ionnl economic development peaked at about $24 billion h 1981.201 Becmse of fie escalating materiel and human costs of the war coupled wif-;ha lack of sound judg~aentcmcerning ecmornic priorities between 398&1983, Iraq was rapidly iorced to draw on its reserves and to borrow money overseas. As is discussed in detail in the next chapter, war related cuts in Iraqi oil export capacity and a major slump inoil prices in the mid3980s sharply affected Iraq%seconomy. This forced Iraq to continue to borrow, even t'hough it shelved its ambitious development plans and ccmcelztrated on waging the war and building a war-related infrastrudure which played a direct role in the defense of the country. As Chart Four shows, Iraq emerged from the Iran-Iraq War as a highly indebted nation."z At the Iran-Xraq War's end in 1988, various studies indicate that Iraq" debt lay somewhere between $50 billion and $60 billion.2" h 11989, an OECD study claimed that the Iraqi debt was $15.4 billion..e)n closer impectinn this figure accotlnts only for debts owed to the West. But it did not include the military debt owed to France nor the $3.5 biILion owed to Japanese companies and trading establishments. Neither did it include the debt awed to the USSR m d the Eastern Bloc nor the debt owed to the other Arab states of the Gulf. By mid-3990, =liable analysts had conclueted that Iraq's tot& indebtedness could be estimated at aromd $180billion, of which half was owed to the other Arab states of the Gulf even though Iraq still continued to insist that tbrse wew grants for services rendered during the Iran-Iraq War (i-et,protecting the weak Arab states from the lranian threat). It was estimated that between $7-$8 billion was owed to the Soviet Union and the Eastem Bloc. It was t h o q h t that Iraq wodd mtire this largely military aid partly through payment in oil.

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III Petrc->leurnExpc~rts E l Total Exports D Total Impc~rts Trade Balance

CHART Tff REE Iraqi Oil and Total Exports Versus Tr,tal Impads in Millions of Current US IDoXXars, Sazlrce: Adapted by Anthany H. Curdesrnan from International E n e r a Agency (IEA), Middlc East Oil and Gas, Paris, 11995, pp. 25G257.

FIowever, Baghdad faced a morc serious problem in dealing with a short-term-24 year l o a n 4 e b t of $35-$45 billion. Much of this debt had to be paid to Iraq's Western creditors at high hteresi: rates, The prhcipal and interclst (P+r) on this debt was anywhere between $7-$8 bifljon um. Many of Iraq" Westem creditms tried to convince the lraqi regime to re-structure its debt bardell into medium and long-term debts with lower interest rates, and.to undertake multilateral rescheduling of its debt with all its creditors. 'This would have allowed lraq to see a rapid improvente~~t of its c=& rating m d to be able to borrow snore capital to refinance its ambitious post-Iran-Iraq VVar reconstruction.20"

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CHART FOUR Iraqi Debt During 1982-1 993 in Millions of Current: US Dollars. Sotlrce: Adapted by Anthony H, Cordesman fmm International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle Egst 0 2 1 and Gns, Paris, 1995, pp. 260-261 .

Saddam" regime, however, saw its debt problems in cmspiratorial terms. It did not want to get into a close fkancial =tationship with its Western crrzditors, fearing that they would "gang up on it" and sought instead to pursue its puticy of bilateral negotiations with each country. Furthermore, such a relationship wodd have forced Iraq to make accurate disclosures about Che state of its economy and of its finances, inciuding its '"real'9oreign exchange boldings and its military spending. As a result, Saddam fired his Finance Minister, Hikmet Mubalif, wfio was in favor of Iraq prrblishing econonnic statistics alld indicators in October 1989.2" 11nstead of pursuing sound h c a l policies, Saddam.

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decided to fund his mbitious and massbe plans for reconstrucli,on, development, and military industrialization by ""rbbing the bank" to the south.

The Iraqi Economy After the Gulf:War 'The result of the Gulf War has been the ecmomic disaster summarized at ing of this analysis, Instead of rebuilding its wealth, Iraq suffered massive wartime damage and puIlishing sanctions, and lost virtually all of its capability to export. Accordi.ng to Ihe necv Iraqi Oil Minister, Lieutenant General Xmir Muhammad Rashid, Iraq lost $85 billion in revenue as a r e d t of the ban on the export of its oil bettveen August h, 39911 m d July 1"395."" At the same timef Saddam Hussein and the rulhg elite wasted resources on luxuries for themselves, and dealt with the growing ecmomic crisis &rough reprt-ssionand gross incompetence fn managing the domestic ecollamy. It is difficult to detemine just how much Iraq has suffered since 1990. Any attempt to reach tmgible cmclusions about tbe damage to Iraq's econonty as a result of the Cuilf Wrr is virtually impossible for a wide variety of reasons. First, statistics are hard to come by because of the obsessive secrecy of a regime that viecvs statistical m d econamic data an Iraq as state secrets."y This problem has been compounded by the extreme state of unccrrtainty and abnorn-taliq within the Iraqi ecmomy for the past five ycars under ecmomic smdions, Even the best figures of the Econamisit Intelligence Unit, the OECD# the UN or the Bank for hternational SttZernents are "guesstimates." "I fact, even as early as 1992 most a n e s e s had given up their attempts to put numbers 811 industrial and agriculhrd output, inflation, and wages. Second, there is no easy way to quantify the d a t i v e impact the Gulf War itself has had on Iraq's ecmomy skce 1990, as disthguished from the impact oi UN sanctions. There is no question that the war and the rebelljctns caused extensive damage. It may very well he methodologically impossible for anyone to separate the relative cost of each of these calanni-tiesvisited upon Zraq." 1'21ird, the Iraqi government has fluctuated between exaggemthg wartintc damage and incrrzdible claims at?otll: the speed ol its recovery Further, with the exception of the uncharacteristically detailed prcsentation of its financial obligations and the costs of reconstmcrcion to the UN in April 1991-cvhich even t-hen, in the view of some, played down the level of Iraqi debts and.exaggerated the cost of reconstruction-the Iraqi government has not been forthcoming with more statistics on Iraq's

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ecollomy between 1999 m d early 1996, and may well be un;rble to provide itself with accurate statistics, Fourth, while there has been no official US or other Wstem estimates of the impact of wartime bombing, many independent estimates or i m e d i a t e post-war assessments have been eitker exaggerations or imp~ssionsMIhich c m e immediately in the wake of the devastation causcd by the war and by the insurrections inMasch 19%. In this context, the Report of the United Nations Mission, March 10-16,1991, and headed Zly Martti Ahtisaari, set a tone for viewh~gtbr situation in cataclysmic terms that is typical of Ihe lack of subst-mthe analysis that characterizes many post-war studies oi Iraq:"v The recent cmflict has wrought near-apc~calypticresults upon the econamie infrastructure tlof what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. . . . Iraq has, far same time to come, been reIegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and t-echnolc>gy.

As events have shown, this UN report seriously o~rerestimatedthe extent of the damage caused by the war and underestimated the ability of thr lrayis to deal with the destruction and rebuild their infrastructum. So have mmy fater reports which have talked about massive medical and nukitional prohlems years before they actually began to surface, Such exaggerated reports have often done little m m than lead outsfde gouents to be indiffe~ntto the very real suMeJ-ing Chat now exists because of the cumulative impact of the trade embargo and Saddam's yuadter of a cenbry of war-mongering, selfishess, and incompeteme. UN Sanctions and the Policies of the Iraqi Government Smctj,ns are s c a e l y the d y prohlem that the Iraqi econmy has faced since 1990, but they are tbe primary cause of its present crisis. A number of UN Secwiry Cotlncil Resolutions affecting kaq have bee11 issued since August 1990..Tbese resolutions have dealt with a wide range of politicalstrategic matters, including:

* The condemnation of the tmqi invasion, caf.ling for withdrawal, of :Iraqi forces from Kuwait (United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, August 2,1990) * Nullification of the Iraqi prt.sence in the emirate WN Secruri-tyCouncil Resolution 662, August 9,1990)

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Demartlat-ion of Iraq's boundary with Kuwait

* Establishment of the United Nations fraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

It is the resolutions pertainhg to economic-strategic matters, however, which arc pertinent to the socioeconomic analysis of the impact of the sanctions m Iraq. 7'he UN passed tbr foliowing resolutions between August 19990 and April 1991:

* U N Seczisity Cuzatcil Retsolzcl-iot-r664 (August 6, 1990) imposed an eco-

*

*

*

*

nol-nic and trade embargo m Iraq with the exception of the p v i sion of medical supplies and ""in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs." UN Security Council Resolution 661 also created a Special Smdions Committee to mo~~itor the e ~ ~ b a r g o . U N Secztrify Cozrncil Xesulurtiorz 665 eragust 25, '1990) called upon the implementation of "W& measures as may be commenswate to the specific circlumstmces as may be necessary" to enforce the trade embarigo against Eraq. U N Security Council Resalzzfitm 666 (Spternber 13,19911) 'Satan" resohtion" granted the Specid Sanctions Committee the right to investigate whetlner a humanitarian need, had arisen in Iraq and to undertake to distribute food to the lraqi people irr conjunctitm with the Red Cross and other Xnumanitarim agencies. U N Security Cuztlzeil ResolztzLln 678 (Noverrtber 29,1991) granted UN member states the authmity "to use all necessary means""to make Iraq witfidraw kom Kuwait if Iraq had not done so by 35 January The resolutim declarcld that Iraq was in "flagrant contempt""of the Security Council, and that the deadline was set in order to ''allow Iraq one final opportunity" to withdraw from Kwait. UN Seczlrz'l-y Coulcil Rcsdufiot-r 687 (April 8, 1991) which came to be described as the "mother of all resolutions'bas passed one montl-r following the end of hostilities. Its effect is analyzed in detaiE in Chapter XV of this study. In brief, the resolution demanded that Iraq eiiminate all its weapms of mass destructicm, research into weapons of mass destruclion, and dismantle any infrastructure associated with those programs in accordance with Section C, paragaphs 7, K, 9, 10, 11, f2, and H.Iraq was called upon to undertake these measures subject ta monitoring and verification by the UN, The resolution stipulates that in accordtance with Section E;, paragraph 22 the UN prohibitions against the export of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the

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import of goods into Iraq would have no fl~rtherforce or effect once Iraq had. elisrtinated all its weapons of mass destruction and the means to produce them. These sanctions, and further clarifying sanctiosls in the yeass that have followed, have done much m m damage to Iraq than thr Gulf War. There is no question that the Gulf War did cause serious d a m g e to Iraq's economy and did tens of billions of dollars worth of damage to infrastructure, unications, and oil and refining power g e n e r " t a facilities, teleco facjlit.ies..P;l'ctnet%teless,between 1991 and 1942, using the reconstruction slogan of "To Hell with the :Impossible," Iraq was able to rebuild much of this destroyed infrastructure. Its reconstruction efforts have been particularly effective in regional areas which support the governme~~t and fcxrused on infrastmcture that buttresses the reginne. Most of the reconstmctisn efforts between 1991 and 1992 concentrated on:210 Strategic industries such as the oil sector addressed in the followhg chapter, * Pditically impmtmt infrastructure such as the securiv/int@IIigence agencies and telecommunications mir7istries, Recmstruction projects that the Iraqis criharacterize as risible symbols of "'dcfimce and steadfastness"' ranging horn the '6wasteful" construction of palatles and guest-houses for the Iraqi leatlership to the reconstruction oE milit.ary-industrial jnfrastructurcs and bridges, Kurdish and Shi'ite areas which are not fully under gove trol or where the sclcurity situaion is uncertain generdy have not benefited from this reconstruction effort. The wartime damage to hdustrial infrastructure in the Shi'ite south was also severely compomded by damage fmm the Iran-lraq War and the destructive inszxsrection j x March ~ 1991.21Even so, the Iraqi Industries Minister at the t i m , Leutenant-Genoudi al-Sa'adi, clahned in 1902 &at 75% of hdustrial projects destroyed during Che Gulf War had been rebuilt.Tl2 However, most of Iraq's reconstruction effart of 1941-1992 sputtered out in 1993. Iraq was isobted-without access to spare parts, raw materials, and industrid goods-and had used up available in-house supplies between 1991 and 1942, It had reached the limit of what it could repair and rebuild *rough sheer determination, improvisation, native hgenuity, and camibaliaation. As a result, most industry now continues a slow but steady decline, and the only industrial sectors which have received steady funding are the oil production hdustry, refineries, and cement fadories."13

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Iraq's industrial sector has been decimated, output havhg declhed by 50% since Allgust 19C)O."* Some economists estimate that Iraq's postsmctisns reconstmction bill for its hfrastmcbre and oil sector will be as much as $50-$1110 billion, of which $30 billion must be spent on imported equipment, machinery, and spare parts.25 Zraq also has not fnund any way to bypass the sanctions regimes. It has had only limited success in smuggling oil across its borders, and its main illegal export has been dates-exports worth, at most, $10 million a year. Even in the case of dates, Iraq has faced major probiems with the Multinational fnterceptim Farce (MZF) in the Gulf, 'The M1F has seized some $9 million worth of Iraqi dates since 1994.21"

Socioecarrolnic Impacts of the Sanetio~sRegime :Iraq%population has been devastated socially economically, and psyn spite of the near total, consumption of savhgs, the stmcholagically.217 X dard, of living has been reduced to well below balf of its pre-war level. The real gross domes.tic product bas been s h r i n h g steadily almost every year since 1,979, and the situation has become much worse since 1991. As has been mentioned earlier, this has sharply affected per capita income which stood at $8,161 in 1979 and had fallen to $609 h 1992 and to about $450-500 in 1995.2'' This crisis has highlighted Iraqi dependence on food imports and exposed the strategic vulnerability caused by years of neglect andfor ineff-icknt utilization of the agricultural sector. Before t-he war, Iraq imported of its food needs at an annual. cost of $1.1 billimzg The sanctions imposed on August 6,1990, did not immediately have a deleterious effect on food supplies as the country had adcquate stcxks. W e n these stocks werc run down, Iraqi agriculture proved incapable oi ds-ing to thr challenge. While Iraq has made some progress in increasing agricultural output of some crops since 1990, the country kas seen uniformly poor harvests for the past five years. In the summer of 3991, the harvest was poor despite a 50°/0 increase in acreage planted, and by 1994 the harvest was a third of the level of an Lalready poor harvest h 1993, The harvest of 1995 was thc. worst yet. The government still continues to interfere by attempting to fix prices and to maintain control of thc di,stri,bution of many items. The end ~ s distthat Iraq's etependence on imports has not really been djntinihed and this has bee11 a critical factor in the hardships faced by the Iraqi peope. Iraq had a backlog of $4.5 billion in unhnded food imports in 1994, while g m ent subsidized food rations had dropped to about: 5O"-iA0% of their previous level. The t?$ri,cuhralinfrastructure

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has not recovered from a lack of fertilizer, anirnal feed, s p m parts for mach;inery;and war d m a g e to irrigation and drahage. Iraq is also suffering from severe hyper-inflatic,n."o The situatic,n in the country is comparable to thc hyper-inf ationary situation of Wimar Germany FR the 1920s.At the end. of 1994 the government estimated that prices on uwrage had risen by 5,C)Olly~shce 1990, Mow speeificalb, statistics provided by an outside study indjcated that by 1,995 wfieat: prices had rism by 4,531%, powdered milk by 3,6Sl'%+bread by 2,85770, and sugw by 2,2C18"/n.22Mcefa basic staple of the Iraqi diet sold for ID 0.15 in 1990, skyrocketed to ID I4 in early 1,993."" combinatim of rampaslt inflation and liznited agricultural output has made it difficult for the average Zrqi to turn to the open market to find the products now reskicted under rationi,ng, Many consuntcr goods and basic necessities, induding medicine, are available on the black market at blghly Mlated prices. This hyperinflation has become so scriolts that Saddarn ordered inJanuary 1996, that the exchange rate must cease to drop below the offirial rate of D 1,000 to $1, a d described the order in terms of war: We are now in a real battle. Far na military victory can make up for an economic defeat . . . this year would like to say that the first practical step we can take is tcr halt the rate af deterioratim. That is, we should nat allow the exchange rate of the Iraqi Dinar to suffer any Iu&her set backs.233

The co~~trizst between the go~rernment'spolicy and reality is illustrated by the fact that the black market exchange rate had already shrunb; to ZU 2,600 to $1 at the tirne Saddarn was speakhg. Uet, even a mmor that Iraq mi&ht accept the UN oflizr to t?llo\v it to export oil rai,sed the exchange rate to ID 2000 to $1 ovemight.22" T"%eImqi Government's Resporase to the S a ~ c g o Recgime ~s

Furthermore, t-he mgime has been just as inccmlpetent in ecmomic matters inthe 1,990sas it has been in Ihe past, and has attempted to deal with far too many problems through '"economics by fiat" and repression. For in 1942 to combat economic example, the government set up a di~ctorate crimes under Brigadier-General Xbrahirn al-Batawi-who reported directly to Watban Brahim, the Interior Minstcr and Saddam" bbrofier. The task of the diwctorate was to pun;" mmchants and traders guilty of ""pofiteerirrg.'91n July 1982, the regime summarily executed 42 merchants in h m t of their shops in Baghdad's market district.225 Foollowhg Saddarn's execution of the 42 merchants and the arrest in March-April 1993 of mother 300 medants, the lraqi private sector as well as their foxdan-

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ian counterparts across the border that had kept the country supplied with nwessities were cowed into submission."2(i Saddam srtbsequently declared that the role of the private sector was to provide the Iraqi people wi& goads at cost and that it must not exploit the people: '*thereis no task ahove that of serving the people, alleviating their burdm and putting an end to their exploitation by middlemen, parasites, and those toying hvilh Ihe wenlth of the people and the co~11try'"Z7 This policy removed the ability of the open market to aflocate resources and forced reliance cm the Mack market, while it removed any incentive for legi.lrirnateproits and emoutaged corruption. Political uncertahties have also aggravated the economic situation, The coalitinn air raids in January 1993 led to a sharp rise in prices, while Saddam%movement of troops to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 led to the temporary doubling of food prices. As might be expected from the drop in per capita income, the purchasing power of the Iraqi, people has been dramatically rcduced over the years. By 1993the average income was ID 400, whereas ID 1000 was needed to feed a family adequately.228 Again, while reliable statistics may not be available, it is safe to say Chat the cost of basic food i t e m has far outstripped sdaries over the past five years: in 1993 as a result of the kpreciation of the Dinar, its buyU~gpower was 300 times less than in mid-hgust, h e r e a s salaries had only doubled. -The value of the Dinar has also cmtinued to plunge against the dollar, In late 1993, the Dinar traded on the black market at a rate of approxixnately 100 Dinars to the dollar. In late 1994 the official rate was approximat.ely 500 Dinars to the dollar, while on the black market it traded at 650-750 Dinars to the dollar after Saddam's October 1994, troop movements in the direction of Kuwait. The government has attempted to deal. with these problems by crcating a rationjng system designed to cushion the poorer elements of the population f r m the jmpact of sancljons. This system gcmerdly functioned well in meeting basic needs between 1990 and 1993, In early 1993, for example, the rationing system provided lraqis with 60% of thek basic necessities, jncluding 9 kilos of flour, 2.75 Mos of rice, 1.5 kilos of sugar, 500 grams of cooking oil, and small quantities of tea and soap.zz9 Shce 1993, however, the government has lost much of its ability to use its available income and savings to fund its rationkg system. A UN rep"" at the end of 1995 indicated that the mtions only provided 1,0W calories-down from over 3,OW before the Gulf War-whiJie monthly supplics of subsidized items to each individual barely last two weeks, :Iraqis must get the rest of their needs from tbr prohibitively expemive open market."""

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As a result, the government now controls the stockpile of food and increases or decreases rations as a form of political maneuvering to show the people who is still in ccmtrol or in order to celebrate an event or "happy" occasion. In the wake of his referelldurn victory in October 1995, the government anxlounced that ration allotments would "increase," with each Iraqi receking 15.4 p o d s of flour a month instead of 13.2 pounds.2" Nwertheless, the UP9 special commission investigatjng the impact of sanctions m Iraq claimed. in January 1996 that ""alarm food shortages" had put four mitlion Iraqis "at severe nutritional risk. Trade with Jordan, T ~ r k qand ,

11146~

Iraq has also sufiered because oi its deterioratjng relations with Jordan. The UN trade emhaqo alZows hay to export a limited amount of oif harrels to Jordan, m a b g Iraq that country" most important oil supplier" The money that comes from the legal sale of this oil has allowed Iraq to pay off:part of its debt to Jordan and to cover purchases of food and medicine, and the volume of trade between the two countries increased because forbanim and Iraqi mrchants have used the highway comecting Baghdad to the fordanim port of Aqaba to mve all kinds of goods into Iraq. In late 1995, however, Jordan decided to cut down on the two way trade and smuggling between it and I r q . Even though brdan rejected a US revest to cut off its trade compktely, it decided in early 1996 to cut in half from $400 million to $200 million its trade in food and essential goods with fraq.233 Since the war, trading with Turkey has required transit traffic firtlugh unstable northern Iraq in territory controued by Murds. In 11992, the volume of this trade was quite significant, The Iraqi Kurds had not yet fallen out a m g themselves, and the Turkish PKK had not yet establishcd itself in Iraq. As a result, a considerable volume of Iraqi oil was bartered, for Turkish goods and products via a free trade zone centered. on the Iraqi town of Faydah and which was controlkd by the Ministry of Industrjcs and Milit.ary Xndustries. This nninistry suppIied the oil to Turkish buyers at attractive prices and in return bought goods which it allocated to its own network of distribution centers and government cooperatives thronghout the country.234 Since that time, however, the volume of trade has been scaled back considerably because of the conflict pitting Kurd against Kurd and Turk against Kurd. By the fall of 1995, merchmts on both sides of the border stated that the number of trucks carrying Turkish food and mediche In exchaqe for Iraqi cliesel and gasoline has been cut back from 3,WO trucks a day in 1994 to about 150 a day in late 1995.35 While Iraq also moves oil

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east via Iran into the open market with the co~~nivmce of the Iranians, this trade has never been of significant importancee236 The Social ltnpaet af Sawzctiovzs The lietcrioration of the Iraqi economy to subsistence levels has contributed to the unraveliJlg of the social Wrir of society These are several aspects to this '%ecomposition" of the Iraqi sorriety which arc noteworthy. There has been a drmatic rise in corruption and bribery in a gove wh,ieh prided itself on being one of the least corrupt in the rcgion and whose leadership once chidcd its neighbors~ouvernmentsfor these failings. Furthermore, this has been cclmpounded by a seemingly endemic sense of indifference tokvards or resignaticm to the stixte of affairs in the country not d p among the population at large but also among government officials, bureaucrats and administrators, Furthermore, &ousmds of these pubhc sector enngloyees have left their jobs, became apmt from the poor, they are the class most aifected by the collapse of the Dinar. This has cmtributed, in turn, to the hrther deterioration of pubiic services; by Novcrnber 1994 &out 50% of the pllbljc sector health employees had left their ~abs~2.77 Social ills such as theft, beggir~g,prostih;lticm, and rural thievery that were rare or ""effiriently" ccontrolled in this once well-policed aut.hnrit.arian state have become widespread.2" Many of these crimes arc being commftted by the mass of young men who fou@t in the Irm-Iraq and Gulf Wars. Having spent the better part of their early adultfiood in brutalizing war, they have no marketable skills-and no prospects h Iraq's current economy-so they steal and kit1 to survive."%nwdotai stories seeln to indicate that the primary concern of Iraqis is not who rules the country but food, safety from risjng crime, and emigration to escape the harsh realities of Iraqi lifc..Z40 The colmt-ry"sefficient educatimal institutions have been ravaged with dire impi.ications for the future oi the economy, industrial development, and the promotion of a science and technology infrastructu~.Between 1991and 1993 Eke school dropout rate rose from 2% to 1,4Uir,. Accordjng to the Education Mlnistry 2000 teachers left the profession in 1994 aIone.241 h o t h e r stark statistic clairned that 25% of university professors had made their way to fordan.24" Iraq" health service has sharply dcteriorated, gradually approaching near-collapse. Iraq's health system was one of the best in the Third in 2990. A World Health Qrtganizatinn report issued in 1991 by Prince Saddruddin AgX-ia Khan showed that 96% of the urban population and. 7870of the m a l population had access to free state health care before tbe Gulf crisis.243

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M i l e the government rapidly rebuilt hospitals destroyed during the GuXf War, this has not been enough to prevent the erosion of the qualiv and qumtity of mediuai service provided by the state. Ilospital equipmelnt has deteriorated due to the lack of spare parts, and Iraq has not been able to import new and more sophisticated equipment h the last five years. Water supplies artr still pdluted in most areas, with the south being worst off, The government does not have the means to repair sanitation faciliges and sewage works which are working at 40% of capacity, :Iraq has not been able to get chemicals for the manufacture of anesthetics and for Ihe purification of water. Iraq has managed to get o d y small quantities of vaccines tu deal with serious diseases such as diphtheria, ?"B, meningitis, and polio. Not surprishgly; mortality inthe country has hcreased.24 Statistics are not reliable, and Iraqi figures must be treated with some caution. In September 1993, the Healtrh Minister, Umid Midhat Mubarak, clahed that as a result of medjeal shortages dmnst 4,000 childre13 under Ihe age ol five we= dying each month, comparcd to 700 before the Gulf Crisis, and that 30fZ,(X10 people kad died since 1990 as a direct resdt of ""sanons-causcJd shortages in Iraq's health services.""-ls In early 1994 Iraqi statistics claimed that 40(51000 Iraqi.s, including 140,000 child.ren under the age of five had died due to severe shortages of food and of medicines.""" There is no way to corroborate fraqi cla.ims, but indepmdent sot~rces and humanitaim agencies have provided strong indications of the dire social cmditiom in the country."y For example, imports of medical supplies, which totaled $5tN) million per year before the war, dropped to less than $130 million per year by 1994. Hospit.als, which now lack not only the basic necessities such as insulin for diabetics and respirators, operate at 30%-50% of capacity A UNICEF report released in October 1995 eoncluded, that 3.3 million Iragis, or about 15% of the totat populatjon, were at risk of malnutrition and disease, including almost three-quarters of a milljon eMdren under 5 years of age."B The report speciCically focused on children, discovering that due to pervasive mafnounshment, 12% are "wastedf\r untferdeveloped and 28% "stunted."xWy mid-1995, some sources warned that the overall situation throughout the country was catastrophic for the vast majority of the people, irrespectbe of whether they lived in the north, center, or south.""" The normal ecmomic differentiatio~nbetween social classes has been sharply reduced as f r q has pmgrclssjvely become a society in which there is a hutge gap between the privileged, who are tied to the regime and its secwity, and the rest of society. Cfn Ihe one hand, the number of destitutes-those with incomes of :ID50 or less has rism to three-quarters of a million in a popuiation fiat is just under 211 miltir,n. This destitutim is particularly common among the "urban poor," because the rural poor

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can grow their own food. At the same time, even those who are u ~ ~ a bto le grow tSleir OTnJn hod and withuut possessions to sell or contacts abroad to help are unlikely to topple the regime."253 As for the middle class, t h y have see11 their savings hviped out: and most careers become worthless or uneconomical to pursue, Many members of the mid& class have been forced to sell t3.leir possessions, leave their careers, or take on extra jobs just to provi,de their fmilies with basic needs."" Mmost one million Iraqis have emigrated since the Gulf crisis, of whom mughly a quarter of a million =side in Jordan, strategicaily placed to provide their relatives or 'siends with basics or money This exodus of Iraqis means that close to 4 million are now overseas, Most &migr(-5"tcnd to be memhers of the middle class simply because they had the m n e y to pay the exorbitant exit fee-the govcrment actually tried to prohibit the emigration of doctors and scientists-md because they had marketable skills.253 The political irnpfjcations of the disintegsation of the large, well-educated m d secuhr Iraqi mid.dle class are ominous in the view of some observers:z54 The middie class, tzrhich I-tad a good Level of education and which was Liberal and Westernized to a certain extent, is dying out and the West will pay the price for that. Its disappearance tzrill clpen the way for broad inroads tcj be made by all the fundamentafist movernrtnts, no matter who they are. C)n the other hand, a tiny privileged strata made up of the ruling elite exists, comprised of the several thousands of inbividuals who have become rich by providing the gove ent with basic necessities and goods at highly inflated prices which are trucked over from Jordan, other traders and small-time merchmts, farmers, and money-lenders, Parasitic elements of the ~ g i m depend e on this class of ""nm~z1eattxrkhes" for their own prditeering.55 One result is a growing gap between the poor who are not allowed to steal and the wealthy who have become a kleptcrcracy. The sericlusncss of this scrcioecmornic situatio~~ is illustrated by the growhg severity of pmishment for economic crimes. Thieves, of which there have been m alarming proliferation in &an centers, are subject to public amputation of a limb. Any hoarding of cropfias led the governmmt to withhold seed and fertilizer from farmers who fail to bring tl-teir crop"o market. Those farmers who fail to cultivate their 1md altogether have had their land confiscated. Capital punishment has been &creed for those smuggling cars and trucks from the country, Harsh penalties have been levied. on currency traders and "profiteers,'" while merchants have been executed for hoardhg m d for price fix2rrg*

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The Iraqi Goverxr.menCfsRefusal of Relief from UN Sanctions The human cost of sanction to Iraq" people has scarcely, however, been the fault of the UN. For four years after the imposition of sanctions, Saddam Hussein refused to accept the terms of the United Natio~~s Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 (1991), vvhich authorized the export of $1.6 billion oE Xraqi petroeurn during a six-rno~~lh period. Under the provisions of these resolutions, the proceeds of these sales would have gone to a United Nations escrow account, which would be used to purchase hunanitarian supplies for the Iraqi population to be distributed under UN eyes, as well as to fund =parations to b a i t and other programs mandated by the W, offer: 'The hayi regime offered severd reasons for =fusing the First, the regime clainted that- Iraq only aelnieved full control of its oil industry from Western oil companies after many years of struggle. TOaflow the UN (whih, in the eyes of the Iraqis is a mere front for the West) to dictate the terms under which Iraq could sell. oil, would be unpalatable and unacceptable.2" One Iraqi techncrcrat has been quoted as sayjng: "we are not goi.ng to put our majn ~sou,rcc,our oil industry, into UN receivership, which is what will happen if we accept their conditions [for the implementation of 706 and.712]."2'iT Second, the regime claimed that the tlM wanted to further infringe on Iraq%sovereipty, It has claimed that these resolutions cmstihtte an attempt by the West to delegitimize the government in the eyes of its own people with the stipulations that the proceeds from the sale would go into an escrow account controlled by the UN and that internati.ctnal &servers be placed throughout the country to monitor the distribution of food and medicine. Depuf;yPrime Mhister, Tariq Aziz stated in 1995 that "".the UN resolutions on the $1.6 billion oil sale for hummitarim aid wouM create a pardel governmelrt in Iraq. * Third, the regitne ridiculed the rwenue from the sale of oil as too small to m k e much of a diMerence. According to one source, Xraqi officials had calculated that arrangement would m d up providing every Iraqi m3y $6 -h cJf food and rwdicine. fn a series of rwetings between lraqi offidals m d rncntbers of the UN Screbriat in Viema between Januaq m d February 1992, Iraq asked for a substantially higher volume of sales and thus revenue than the $1.6 bilXion allocated over a six-month period. In particz~lar;Usam& al-Hiti, the thGn Iraqi Oil Minister asked for: a hi@er volume of exports, a revenue of $2.4 billion over a longer period than the six-month

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aut.lnorized, m d approval for the use of the southern oil terminal at M h a al-Bakr.""" * Fourth, Iraqi oil ministry officials, including the Oil Mhister at the time, ridicuied the procedlares for the &stribuli.on and marketing of the oil under UN supervision as bizarre; and convoluted beyond belief. In November 1991 Usam* al-Hitti declared that the oil export plan was akin to "'a spicier's web. . . . The steps which wodd have to be taken, the formalities, the arrangements are so complicated that it would make the sales operations very difficult."'h""I'he following month the Iraqi Oil Mhister stated that the UN oil export plan was "a totally impractical mess drafted by non-oil people.""l The Iraqis bMied unsuccessfu1.ly to have the t;wernmclmt% SState Organizat-ion for the Marketing of Oil (SOMC)) remain in charge of the sale of oi1,"z * Fifth, the ~ g i m emete it clear that it did not want its oil to be exported solely or primarily via the pipelhe runnb~gthrough Turkey It wanted to be able to export oil to h d i a and Jclpan from its southern off-show oil terminals which lraqi engineers and technicians had repaired. Iraq continued to reject the terns of the UN offer even after the Security Cattncil eased the terms of its injtial resolutions and passed Resolution 986. Security CounciZ Resolution 986 was passed in early 1995, as the successor to Resolution 206.263 It allowed Iraq to export $1billion worth of oil ewry three months for six mont.hs, wiCh the option of renekval. The resolution also, however, gave the UN authority over the allocation of the money and ~ q u i r e dIraq to accept the fotlowing division of ~venues:2@

* 30% to the UN Gulf War Reparations Fund * 10% to the t l N 4 % to tlRI ogerational costs in Eraq and 6% to fund the UN'SCOR/I arms inspection effort.

* 15% for direct humanitarian aid to the three northern Kardish governates.

* 45% of the reinaining funds for food and medicine for the rest of the country. 1Phe distribution of these basics would be monitored by the UN. These terns gave Saddam's regirne roughly $106 mi2lion a month for food, medicine, m d humanitarian goods, but they also gave $50 millim to the Kurds, $100 million to compensate victims of the Iraqi imvasion, m d $33 million to the UN.265 The Iraqi goverment initially rejected tlN Security Council Resolution 986 as an interference with its sovereigi~ty,The regime was also irri-

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tated by a stipulation that most of the Iraqi oil must be exported through the norlhern route via Turkey, and that UPJ agencies must distribute humanitarian supplies h the three northern (i.e., Kurdish) governates, In November 1995 the new Iraqi Oil Minister, Dr. Arnir Abdel Rashid, declared in Vienna that Iraq would not consider UN Security Council Resoiution 986 as it stood unless the UN Secret--General Bwtrus Boutrus Ghali wodd "'promise and guarantee that either l.he resolution is modified to take into consideration the two elements that Iraq rejected. . . .ffzG& Rashid indicated that these two stipulatio~~s constituted u ~ ~ d interue ference in Iraqi sovereignty and domstic affairs, and clairned that the US insisted upon tbem to force Iraq to reject the resolution. At the same time, he reitmated that Iraq was interested in a connplete, rather Chan partial' lifting of sanctions. Part of the reason for this refusal was that the Iraqi regime evidently hoped that the head of UNSCOM wodd prtrsent a mom positive report on the progress of the elimination of Iraqi w e q m s of mass destruction, thus opening the way br the lifthg of sanctions in accordance with paragraph 22 of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Amir Abdel Rashid stated that:zb7 You can't use your power in a cc~wboyfashion [lwre referring to the US penchant tcr veto anything cmcerning the rehabilitation of Iraq]. When Mr. Ekeus will report, sooner or later, that Iraq has met its obligations, the French and Russians will table a draft resolution to lift the sanctions, The British, being professional diplomats and legalistic, the least they could do is to abstain. They will not c~bject.The US will find it very hard to stop this process.

It is dificult to ascertairr the source of rash id"^ optimism Hussein Kan-tel's defection had already ercposed the fact that the Iraqi gove had contjnued to lie to UNSCOM m d that a substmtial amow~tof its equipment m d feedstocks for weapons of mass destruction were maccounkd for. There was little p r o v e d t a t LINSCOM could quickly certify Iraq's coqliancc wiCh the WPJ =solutions relatjng to the destruction of its capacit). to hui.l.d and deliver wcapuns of mass destruction. UNSCOM had to k1terprc.t the nearly half-mftlion pages of new docunrte~~tation it obtahed after the defection of Husseh Karnel. Further, it was confronted with new evidence relathg to Iraqi smuggling, cmcealment of nuclear and missile techology, and lies regarding Iraq's destmction of its bialogkal ~eapons.26~ It was hardly XikeIy that Britajn would reverse its policy, or respond to prtrssum fmm British companies with ecmomic intemsts in Iraq. Further, even Iraq's "supporters" in the tlN 9czrrity Cottncil had been embar-

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rassed by the new revelations concerning Iraq's massive biological weapons program.2H Even states which believed in the broader rehabilitation of Iraq andlor MIhich were deeply concerned by the hummitarian situation in Iraq, urged the Iraqi leadership to accept Resolution 986. France, Russia, and Egypt told Iraq to accept 986 without precmditions, but added that lraqi views should be taken into account during the implementat.i.onof the rclsdution.270 In addition, the lraqi rcgime had little reason to belreve that sanctions could be lifted before the US pxlesidential elections in November 1996 or that any Republicm Administration would be more favorable to Iraq than the CIinton Administrat.ion.

Accepting Ufif Security Council Resolution:986 These realities slowly forced the Iraqi regilne to chmgcr its position during the course of 1996, as did ewidcmce that the decline of Iraq" economy mit;ht be r e a c b g the point where it would trigger a political explosion. Accordestimates, Iraq%per capita ;income in. constant 1894 m ammd $3,200 in 19% to $2,100 in 1989, $1,400 in 1,990, and $885 in 1992. By late 1995, it had dropped below $50%less &an me-sixth of the level Iraq had iachieved during the middle of the Irm-fraq I before it invaded Kuwait"$ War m d less thm 25% of the level ~ Iachieved The governme~~t had to take increasingly more drastic measures between the fall of 1995 and the winter of 1996, On Jmuary 2,196, Sadounced that there must be m hmediate cessafion to the printing of money, a sikration which had contributed to hyper-.inflation.In addition, the government announced belt-tightening measures inthe public sector, the further sale of state property including cars, spare parts, factories, machinery and even scrap metal in order to rajse revenue. The Iraqi leader also stated that t h r e would be no salary increaises in 1 9 9 6 i n contrast with thr past five years-althoqh measwes wlruld be taken to protect the livhg stmdards of low-hcome civil servants.272 Iraqi statistics issued inJanuary 1996 showed the Dinar trading at 3,000 to the US dollar as compwd tc:,three D i ~ ~ ato r sthe dollar in August 19510, and that food prices overdl had risen sever& orders ol mag~mitudesince the Kuwait: crisis.27" The rr-?gimetried tc:,acce1erat.e the privatizaticm of public sector enterprises-a, process it shodd have implemented at least twenty years earlier-and which could. do little to help in the short tern. Further, Saddam indicated that taxes would be raised m d that there would be a seven-fold increase in the prjce o( gasolin atthough it still cost only about at 14 cents to the gallon and remain fpactim of the world pnce."4 As a result, Iraq began discussicms of ways to implemen Council Resolution 986 h February 1,"36."5 The Iraqi gove statements that it was ready to talk, although it indicated that it did not

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accept the resolution as it stmds. The regime also indicated that it was changing its broader strategy for lifSing sanctions, and was ready to accept the partial lifting of sanctions as a means to an end, through the dow but steady erosi.on of the full sanctions regi.me ovcr a period of time. Saddam" regime then began serious negotiations with the UN. On January 46,1996, Deputy Minister Tariq Aziz ineiicakd to UN %crcltary-General Routros-Boutras Ghali that lraq wodd enter into talks withvut "preconditions" concerning limited Iraqi oil sales rander the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 986. News reports followed that the government had met wif-;hthe UN and issued a staternel-rt which clahed, "We expect positive rclsullts for the dialogue with the Unikd Nations." This announcement had an immediate effect m the Iraqi economy. The Iraqi Dinar, which was valued at 3,088 to the dollars on New k a r % eve, suddenly tradcd at 450 to the dollar. The price of essential food items like sugar, rice, eggs, and flour dropped sharply and food hoarding was reduced.De At the same time the Imqi governant continued to raise its concerns relating to the procedures for the export of Iraqi oil and distributicm of the humanitarian supplies throughout the coulztry. Nizar Hamdool-r, the Iraqi Ambassador to the W, wrote the Secretary-General an January 17, 199fiFthat /'Iraq will respolld to tl-te call to enter into a dialogue on the szxbject: of oil in retzlm for food and mdicine on the basis that &ere should be no conditions imposed an ~ s + " 2Iraq ~ 7 made it clear that it wanted mordifications to the resdution to reduce its impact on Iraqi sovereignty and to allow it to accept the opemtional implementatio1-r of the resalutjm without publicIy referring to the fact that Iraq had accepted the UN Resolution. Iraq &so sought help from other Arab states, Russia, and France in putting pressure on the UN negotiators to compromise. Abdul Amir Am:hari-the chief Iraqi negotiator-stated that the UN conditions "are not a problemf%when he began talks in early February, 1,996. Ho'cvevcr, &is statemmt only set l.he stage for a first round of intensive ""tchni.cal deliberations" between UN and Iraqi ofiicials which lasted until February 19, The talks ended with a papevproduced by the Whi' and Iraqi officials which emphasized the technical conditions under which Iraq could sell oil-including the circumstances under which they can make contracts with potential buyers, operating procedures of the escrow account that would receive the proceeds fmm the sale of oil, and verification mechanisms to keep track of the money and to ensure that it is used to buy food and medicine.27" However, the two sides djd,not reach the expected Memorandum of Understandkg which would. have been the first stage towards the implementation of the resolution. The second round of talks resolved mmy kchnical issues but it ended an Masch 18, 1996, without resolving the mmaining political i~sues.27~

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Iraqi opposition to accepthg Security Cou~~cil Resolution "386 now centered around two key elemmts of solution: Iraq did not want to be limited solely to thc use of the oil pipeEne to Turkey which ran through Kurdish-controlled territories in northern :Iraq. It feartld that this expmt route would prowide both Kurds and Turks wi& too much of bargainhg lever vis-8-vis Baghdad. Cansequmtly, the Iraqi. government sollght to split the limited exports between the Turkish pipeline and :Iraq's own export terminals cm the Persian Gulf at M h a al-Bakr and Khor al-Atlmaya. * UNSCR 986 stipulated that 2OC%3of the proceeds from the sale of oil wlruld go to the autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and that the UN wot~ldbe responsible for t-he docation and distributio11 of humanitarim supplies to that area. Baghdad saw this as a humiliation a d an attempt to legitimize secession ism.^^^ These prOblcms in the talks were accmtuated by the Jordanian seizurcl of spare parts and equipment allegedly for weapms bound for lraq and by yet another stand-nff between Iraqi awthoritjes m d mcntbers of t-he United. Nations Special Commission. En mid-March Iraq prevented UNSCOM from seartlhifig fnr docurnentri relating to weapons of mass destrudion and for missile components, promptkg the Szrcurity Cau~zcil to declare on March 19 that Iraqi intransigence constituted. "clear violations" of the Gulf lnlar cease-fire.281 Iraqi officials m d e it clear that the deadiocked talks did not man that Baghdad was no longer interested in reachhg a solution amenable to both sicles. In particular, the lrayis managed to maintain a sense of optimism throughout the talks.2" 2 mnrt-March Vice-President Taha Uasin Ramadan stated that, "We are prepared to show flexibilitJi as long as it does not hfringe on our sr,vereii;nty.""2"" Iraqi Deputy Prime Mhister Tariq Aziz reiterated Iraq's cmcems in early Apl-il, just as a third romd of talks were beginnirtg, when he stated, "Important obstacles have been raised. The wmaining diffewnces between the two sides are very importmt. They touch on our country's integrily and sovewignty. "m Nevertheless, Iraq accepted the LIN's terms-after a ccmlpmmise on the way h which the Kurd's share of oil revenues would be ad~zhisMay 20, 1996, Iraq and the UN formally concluded a Memotered.28" randum cJf U~~derstanding calling for the complete implementation of U'NSCR 986. 'This c w p r m i s e followed weeks of" heated debates behnieen Iraqi diplomats and UN officials in New York, during which :Iraq and other states including members of thr Security Council hitterly accused both the US and Great Britain of interfering in the UN-Iraqi negotiations to prevent a resolution of the differences over UNKR 986.286

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The meznorandurn stipulated that Iraq must present the UN SecretaryGeneral with an outtine of its plm-which must then be approved by the ScreQry-General-for the purchase and distribu.tion of supplies, medicines and food to its people. Fudhermore, for each billion clollars worth of oil sold, the UN would act to ensure that $300 million will be allocated to the ""victims" of the Gulf War, $30 million would cover the cost of the disarmamew of Iraq, and $1.50 xnliilinln would be used to cover the costs of a UN-directed effort headed by Japanese diplomat Yasushi Akashi to provide relief for the three nor&em K d i s h provinces. There would be no Iraqi g0vernmem.t.presence in the djstributjon of the supplies in the north. The Iraqi government was to distribute supplies in the rest of the country cm an equitable basis to be supervised by UN ohservers who would be accordcd diplomatic status m d allmved frcedm of moventent throughout the country Iraq did manage to prevent the establishent of two very separate distribution system, one in the north and one in the rest of the cotmtry by managhg to retain the right to buy supplies, food and mdicines for the erztire country from whmever it chose.B7 I'he agreement had an fmmediate fmpact on Iraq's ecmomy. The exchange rate of the Dhar to the dollar dipped to as few as 450 DZn.ctrs to the dollar from the level of 800-1,000 that had existed once i " t a apparent that talks over sanctions were serious. m i l e the exchange rate climbed. back to its original level once the limited nature of the refief from sanctiolns became apparent, the deal led to popular rejoicing in many arcas and the first s i w of pLlblic cmfidence in the ecmomy in years. If few Iraqis felt the UN's terms were adequate, or expected the ecolnorny to improve to m y thing like prc-war levels, most seemed to feel that the= wwld be an end to malnutrition and Iraq's worst medical problems. At present, however, Resolution "386 is still awaithg implementation. Long, painfu.1negotiations took place during May-August 1.996 over the details of implemcmtation of the resoiutim. I'hese negotiaticms centered around US insistence on detailed UN cmtrol of the oil reveznues and on the detailed involvment of UN personnel in verifying the ways in which the money was spent. The Kurclish crisis of August-Septemba 1996 then led to a .further indefinite suspemsiorn of the agreement. It s e e m likely that the US will lift its objections after the November P996 election, but nothing is certai~~.

The Future Political Impact of: Sanctions Smc.lions and the declixlc of Che Iraqi economy have unquestionabl.y weakened Saddam" sregime, but it is far from clear that sanctions will lead to the Iraqi leader 'S dwnfall now that Iraq has accepted UN Resolution 986. In spite of alS their sufferj,ng, the Iraqi people hnvc been subjected to a massive propaganda campaign blaming the West for sanctions

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and Ihe war o11 Western conspiracks and the acts of corrupt

C;& and Arab leaders, The obserwtions of a Western diplomat in Baghdad in mili-1995 may still be apposite: "There is no direct comection between the sanctio~~sthe suffering of the people-and the future of the regime. The regime could exist under sanctims for another 10 or 2(1 years,"2" This liiplomat in question may or may not have been aware of Saddm's boast three years earlier that Iraq could survive for another 20 years under smetions, but it is unclear whet-her accepting Resolution 486 will really affect the rclgimc's credibilitry or survivd. Saddtarn" acceptance of Resolutiosl986 can be interpreted as a sacrifice he makes to protect the lraqi people in t-he face of overwhehing force. Such acceptance also does nothing to prevezzt Saddam Husseh from continuislg a Line of domestic propaganda line that tbe b l a m for sanctions on the West:289

They have imposed sanctions on us under the pretext of demanding our withdrawal from Kuwait. Now that we are out of Kuwait, why should the economic blo>ckadecontinue? Look how much they hate you. How can man live if he does not eat? . . . There are organizations in the West for the wetfare of cats and dogs, to protect them and feed them. . . . They are starving 28 miflion Iraqi people,

This propaganda had some sttccesses eve11 before the r e g h e accepted the terms of Resolution 986. Western journalists and observers who traveled to Iraq heard many Iraqis express their anger and dismay over what the West had "done to their count.ry" This is not to say that Iraqis did not b l a ~ l eSaddam and the Bdathist mgime for having brought them to this situation. tlcrwewer, it proved easier, safer, a d psyehoiogicaliy more reasswring for many Iraqis to pin the blame on outsiders. As a result, many analysts of the Iraqi political: and socioeconomic scene, including many Ira+ government officiaifs and intellectuals, feit that sanctions have only had a moderat-e effect in weakening Saddann Hussein's grip on power, The Iraqi ruling elite seems to have klt it could ride out the UN sanctions for a surprisingly long time. In spite ol the countrfs situation after 1992, the regime" elite seemed to feel that the system and the leadership coufd survive..This sentiment was expressed so often by so many Iraqi officials that many may \veil havc believcd it.As early as 1992, Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, declared:"'() Wet as a leadership and a people, are optimistic about the future. This is because sooner or later they will be forced to gradually ease the btockade

Snnetiot~sand Economk Irtstabilify

355

restrict.ic>ns.This blockade . . . will disintegrate, not by a Security Coundl resolution, but rather by the natural course of developments.

Another Iraqi official made a similar statement in an interview with a Western journalist in 1995:291 Is these another country in the world whose government is opposed by every one of its neighbors, and by the only superpower tzrhicfi atso funds the main vgosition group and by the world media. None. Yet you can see Ec7r yourself. There i s absoXutely no chance of a change. This is not a weak system.

Sufferkg does not axiomatically lead to revolution and it may end in s t ~ n g t h i n revanchism. g fn spite of the defection of Hussejn h m d , the Iraqi people still have every reason tcr fear the strcmgth of .the regime. 'There is little opposition that can challe~~ge the r e g h e in m y way The rampant banditry in the country by bands of roving ex-servicemen-particularly in the st-tutb--is just &at, not acts of political insurreeticm,"2 Further, the smctions focus the Iraqi people" atte~~tion on. sheer survival. Life has become a search for food. This deflects attention m d anger away from Saddam Hussein and the manifestly obvious failures a d crimes of the regime after a halt-decade of privation. W i l e there is no way to determine :Iraqi popular attitudes, it seems likely that many Iraqi see the UN sanctions as a Western-instigatd act of collective punishment agajnst all Iraqis, and may actualfy rally much of the :Iraqi people around their government, In the words of one Iraqi professor at the Uniwersity of Baghdad: "'is [the maintenance of sanctions] is part of the strengtk that this regime has-the outside threat creates a mison [sic] wi thin."m3 Iraqis have also tenlied to blame the UN and the West for both the prolong"tion of sanctions and the terms of Resolution 986, and there has been growing bitterness as the :Iraqi people have come to understand how little they would receive. One Iraqi merchant commented that, "We are a petroleum cowltry and this is all we are getthg?" Mututafa Tawfeeq al-Mu&ta.r, an Iraqi economist commented that, "It" a pittance, :I d d t believe those in the West understand the depth of the probiern.""z94As a rclsult, t-hc lraqi regirne can probably easily deal with the political c m plications of shifting from a total rejection of a, compromise with the W, and will benefit from accepting UN &solution 986. At the same time, Saddarn Husscin's decision to continue negotiatin& with the UN over :Resoiution 986, despite his anger over what he sees as Western attempts to further humiliate Iraq, almost certaintly rczflects a calcuatim by the Iraqi leadership that- one dent in the wall of sanctions-

356

Sanctions and Econo~rticInst-ability

no matter how circumscribed and humiliathg-will lead to further cracks, If nothing else, it will allow Iraq to achieve the tactical goal of reenterh~gthe oil market.

Debt and Repadions After the Gulf VVjr 'The acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 986 also highlights the issue of debt and reparations. Iraq must not only deal with its economic crisis, but with the problem of debt and wartkne reparations. Iraq has accumulated an irnmense backlog nl payments and potential obligations. a c e agah, there are no precise figures on the size of these obligations, but it is instructive to consider the fh~mcialreport the Iraqis ~Llbmittedto UN Screbry-Genera1 Bautrus Boutrus Ghali on April 29, 1991. This is one of the most detailed-if not necessarily accurate-fi~~ancial statements made public by the Iraqi gove

* Financial Obligafiolzs: Iraq" total external debt was estimated at $43 billion. Its size constituted 65'/0 of the Gross Domestic Product. Basic Requi~emnzf;c;: 'The repctrt indicat-ed that Iraq would reqrxjre fhmcial resources for the reconstitution, of the stock of food and of basic commodities, the cost of =pairing the damage to the civilian infrast-ructurc, and for the continued implemntation of development projects that were under way before the Gulf War, The Iraqis indicated that they would need at least ID 43.5 billion between 1991 and 1995 for imports of basics (food and medicine), other consumer goods and raw materials, spare parts and machinery reconstitution of strategic reserves of food and medich~e(i.e., note that this is not the s m e as annual imports of food and medicine. Iraq traditio~zally kept 25% of its k p o r t s as a strategic mserve for emergencies), repair of war damage, and continuation of the development plan to restore Iraq to normalcy * Anticipated Revenue: The Iraqis indicated that if sanctions were to be Wed in 1991, the country wodd earn an estimated D 20 billion between 1991 m d 1995. The Iraqi report based its figure on the assumption that Iraq wodd be able to export only 600,000 barrels of cm& oil a day at $16 per barrel for a suhstantial period of time because of the darnage sustained by the oil sector. * Gay Betzucm Reyuiremerzfs and Plnlicipafed F o ~ i g nCzlrrelzcy Reue~zzie: The Iraqis pointed out that in light of their debt-servicing cJbligations (PcX) and lheir various ixnport requi~nnentsover a five-year period., Iraq" ttod f m i p currency needs amounted to about ID 67 billion, of which D 23.5 billion were desthed for debt, and ID 43.5 bilfion w r e required to meet the needs of the Iraqi economy Given

Snnetiot~sand Economk Irtstabilify

357

the gap between anticipated revezzues from the sale of oil and the countrqi's financial requirements, the Iraqi government concluded that the ecmomy would be placed in an ""unenviable position h as much as such rcvezzues do not cover its ntinimw fi,nanci.al obligations or its requirements for food. and medicine,"" The situation has changed drastically shce that time. Smdions were not f.ifted in 1991, and Iraq has not been able to export oil at the rate repired to deal with its finmcial obligations and to m e t its ecclnornic rclquirememts. For the past: five years, Iraq" ffinancial obligations have continued to accrue and the cost of rebuildjng its economy and infrastructure will require a far greater infusion of capital than in 1.991. Further, UN resolutions stipulate that Iraq will have to compensate those countries, c0mpani.c.s and individuals whose interests, financial or otherwise, were damaged or wiped out by the Iraqi invasion of Kwait. As a result, they call for 30?&of Iraq's oil k c m e to be put into a special UN Fund to compensate those with claims a g b s t Iraq, Furthermore, :Iraq is financially liable for UN operations such as the eliminatim of its weapons of- m s s destruction. It is est.i,ma.t.ed that the cost of these 19N' p m g r a m ~ i lrequire l Iraq to divert up to 5% of its oil revenues. Some estimate place the total cost of debt, and recomtmctim, and Rparatiorw t?l. approximately $141 billjon over thc period from 1991--.200Cl.296 There is no way to h o w the true amount, but unless debt and reparations are reduced or foqiuen, they will be a major hindrance-if not a crippling Iraq's ability to rchuild its ecolzomy regardless of how and when sanctions are lifkd.297 It seems likely that they will be a lasting source of conflict and revanchism regardless of whether Saddarn s~~rvives., Even the implementation of URI Security Council. &solution 986 may m a t e such revanchism, Terms where Iraq only gets a maximum of $4 billion a year from oil exports wiil be unpopular, but Saddam will not be blamed for t e r m that permit the use of only half of this money to benefit the Iraq people. Few Iraqis are likely to ignortr the fact fiat. the roqhly $106 millim a month they receive for food, medicine, and humanjtarial~goods will fail to do more than ease a desperate crisis while $50 million will go to the Kurds, $100 million to compensate victilns of the Iraqi invasion, $20 million will go to defray the costs of t-he UN arms inspection et'fort, and $13 million will go to the UN to admhister the oil deal. Such terms may well validate Saddam Hussein's anti-sanctions propaganda in Iraq, as well as win him szxpport in the Arab and developing world. It is also important to remember that the legacy of impoverishment from the :Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, and sanctions will impact on a nation with a very rapidly growing populaion and with a steadily growing

358

Sanctions and Econo~rticInst-ability

number of lnales of military age. Chart Five is based on. a conservative World Bank estkate of the tsends in :Iraq% ppopulation, It estimates :Iraq's population grew from 38.3 million in 1990 to 21.0 mitlion in 1995, and wiil g r w to 24.5 million by thc year 2000,32.5 million by 2030, and 40.5 miilion by 2020. The total n u d e s of young Iraqi men reachhg job age (15-39 years) will rise from 3.2 millicrn in 1995 to 1.4 million in 2000, 1.6 million in 2005, 1.7 million in 2010, 2.0 million in 2015, and 2.2 million in 2020. Unlike many other Gulf countries, Iraq has a large female wlrrk force, and t-he population of young females will also nearly douhle by 2020.298

Implications for Western and Southem Guff Stsategy There is no easy way out of the current garne of ""chicken"' betwerrn Iraq and t-he natiom that suppo" the UN sanctions. Saddam%acceptance the terms of UN 9curity Cattncil Resdution 986 is d y a new mow i,n the game. The W s t and the Southen1 Gulf face a clear dile slrategic bcnefits of sanctions in limiting the military threat fm Iraq and supporting a strategy to rcmuve Saddam from power an the me hand, and the human cost of the sanctions together with the ~ s d t i n lraqi g popd a r retienh~el~t of the nations szxpporting sanctions on the olher. This dilemma is already dividing the Wst m d the Southern GuXf states, and the US from many nations that support the UN coalition. In fact, t-his dilemma ~~irtually ensures that the West, other states, and the Southern Gulf will not pursue a united policy. &spite their embarrassment over the revelations of Iraqi lying and cheating about their biologicaf w e q o n ~ r o gram in fal 1995, major trade p a r b r s and crc3diEors of Iraq will always seek a softer line than nations whose primary concern is Gulf security. Any incremental easing andfor lifting smctions redldces the pressure m Iraqis i,n the ""ccnter" to remove Saddam, m d internal Iraqi supportassuming it exists-for groups based outside. It inevitably increases the risk that Iraq will import new weapons and techncrlftgies for weapons of mass destruction. Yet mahtainirzg smctions i,nfIicts a high cost on the :Iraqipeople, and makes it progressively less likely that any hhrc rcgirne will not seek revenge, and probably heightens the risk that t-he internal &visions wiChin Iraq will grow to Ihe point where civil war or kagm,mtation could occur. I'here are no good alternatives to a relidnce on sanctions fn the sense that such alternatives offer the West and Sout.hern GLtlf real hope they can create a stable and friendly fraq. n e r e may, however, be better options now that Iraq has accepted UN Security Council Resalration 986. These options hclude:

l

Males (15-29 years of age)

CHART FIVE Estimated Trends in the Iraqi Pr>pulationDuring 1990-2035, Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesrnan from World Bank, World Popufntion Projectkrzs, 19962995, Washington, World Bank, lli394, and material provided by the CIA.

* Reaching a clear decision as to whether sanctions really are tied to the survival of Saddam and his coterie, and making the West's position clear to Iraq. The present US, British Saudi, and Kuwaiti position seems to be to use prolonged smctions in an effort ta remove Saddarn, but this policy is all "'stick" and na "carrot." It does not. make i t clear that Iraq would benefit i f it gets rid of Saddarn, or what kind af new gove ent would be acceptable. It also will fail if SadRgsohCion 9%. dam can szxsvive by cleeepting UN Security Cou~~cil The time may well have come to focus on the conduct of the Iraqi

3 &Q

Sanctions and Econo~rticInst-ability

reghe, rather than its leadership, and to use sanctions to alter Iraq's behavior, rather than its political leadership. Setting forth exact coneiitions for changes in the behavior of the current rcginne in return for a step by step liRing of sanctions and/or eashg of sanctions. Key condfiims could be continued UNSCOM operatims, full and uncmditional copi it ion oE the new border with Kuwait, an autonomy agreement with the Kurds, a halt to military operations in southern Xray, and an a m s import limitation agreement. Offering massive increases in shipmelnts of food and humanitarian aid without compensation-effectively limiting what Iraq can import, defusing the human problem, and undercutting Saddm's propaganda, * Offering stage by stage forgiveness of debt and reparations for m y regirne tryhose conduct proves acceptable. This forgiveness =cognizes the fact that Iraq a h o s t certainly Will never pay all its present debts and reparations, and c ot rebuild its economy if it tries to do so. It instead uses debts and reparations as a ""carrot" to create a more stable Iraq. One thing is clear, any strategy for eteating with Iraq must deal with debt and reparations as well as smctions. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia need to come fully to grips with the potentjal political cost of their demands for r e p a p e n t of debt and reparations. There are disturbi~~g paraliels between the present delnands on Iraq and the kind of "peace'9that Tacitus once warned against-"they created a wasteland and called it peace." Further, ff the tlRI attempts to enforce all of its current demands on Iraq in terms of smctions, potential war crimes trials, reparations, and loan repayments, it may end in creating the kind, of ""pace" 'the allies forced m Germany after W r l d Miar I. 'This was a peace which J. M. Keynes quite correctly warned the victorious pokvers could only lead to chaos and a second war. Tl~eEra+ people have already suffered through the Iran-Irq War and the Gulf War. Not every tragedy has to have a & i d act, Iraq's rich oil resources should be used to rebuild and rehabilitate the corntry, and not to pay puIlitive darnages tcr be shouldered by the next generation, Iraq may have a loathsme, gzlilty, and incompetent regime, but a Carthnginian peace can onlly contribute to Iraqi revanchism for years to come.

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities Oil is another critical dimension of any strategy towards Iraq. Eraq has long been a major oil exporting power, and had produced about 22 billion barreis of oil at the time the Gulf SnJBr begasl.299 Iraq" oil export revenues have allowed it to be a major trading patner, although they have varied sSnaryly accordi,ng to world oil prices and the impact ol Iraq's wars, Iraq had annual exports rangixlg from 416.8 bitlion to $26.0 billion during the 3980%but has not been able to export since it invaded Kuwait in A u g ~ ~l99Q.300 st Although frayi oil production peaked at slightly under 35 MMBD in 1979, Iraq produced cmly about 600,000 barrels per day (BPD) befnre it accepted UN Secz~rityCouncil Resolution 986. 'The acceptance of Resolution 386 adds about 700,000 barnis a day worth of exports to this totd at mid-3996 oil prices but scarcely brings Era+ pmduc"cicmback to pre-war levels or meets the production goals set for Iraqi in most Western e~zergy models. This makes the resumption of Iraqi oil production an fmportant factor in dekrm,jning world, oil prices and in settjng 013EC quotas. At the m e t h e , Traq's soil and gas reserves give it the potential to incrcase production far beyond its past peak Levels, and to bccclme a far more important oil producer than in the past.301

Iraq's Shategic Oil and Gas Potential

:Iraqi experts and technocrats claim that Iraq has proven reserves of 112 billim barrels, and ""probable and possible oil reserwesf"of up to 214 billion barrels. While this estimate of possible reserves is technjcally feasible, many outside experts think that Iraq is exaggerating these estimates in order to heighten the interest of foreign companies and convirrce foreign governments that Iraq must be treated as a critical strategic oil power. Even conservative Western experts agreer however, that Iraq has

3 62

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities

total oil reserves of at least 100 billion barrels, and proven reserves of at least 85 billion barrels, The US Energy hformation Agency (EIA) agrees with Iraq's estimate of total proven reserves of 112 billion barrels, or 13% of Chc wnrld's reserves."z The International E n m Agency ~ (iEA) est-imates that Iraq has 100 hillion barrels, or 10% of the w d & s supply of proven Eserwes. AIZ of these estimates give fray tl-re world's second largest oil reserves-surpassed only by Saudi Arabia."3 All of Zraq's crude oil productjon comes from m-shore fields, about two-thirds of which from two large fiel$s: Kirkuk and Ramalia. These f i d d s ,?re in dcclixre, despite water injection, but. lraq has a total of 73 known oil fields and only 15 have been put into production. Six of these fields are considered ""super gimt" with recoverable reserves of over C; billior~barrels, tkme are "big giants" with up to 6 billion barrels of reserves, and 20 are ""giant" fields with less than 5 billion bamls. Iraq has roul;hly 1,500 oil wells, of which 820 were actively pmducing before the Gulf War, Iraq also has a share of thc Saudi-Iraqi neutrd zone, with another 5 billion b a r ~ l of s prwen reserves,"M The fntemational Energy Agency (E4estirnates that Iraq has one of the four bwest p d u c t i o n costs per barrel of any countr>iin the world, and the lowest investr~ent cost per barrel of ad.ditional oil production, It costs Iraq less than $2 to produce a barrel of oil. Iraq is certain to be a major f-tlCure player in world oil and energy production. Industry estimtcs generally credit Iraq with at least 2.0 milfion barrc-rls of production per day (MMBD) if tiN sanctions and export restrictions are lifted, and es.t.mate that this production will rise by about 0.5 MMBD a year to at least 4.0 lLlMBD wiMn four years, ?"he IEA estimates that Iraq has the capability to prociuce 2.5 to 3.0 MMRD, but indicates that it will only be possible to determine Iraq's near-term capability after several months of effort to bring its existing fields on-line. Regardless of which estimate is right, Iraq has enough export capabiliq to make it one of the world's largest sources of spare oil production.3(]5 Projections by the tlS Department of Eneqy (UOE) estimate that Eraq e 4.4 MMBD by the year 2000 (with a range of 4.0-5 by 2005 (4.M.0 MMBD), and 6.4 MMBD by 20 ese estirnates are corrt-lct,Iraq will be a bigger producer than Kuwait by 2000, and a substantially larger producer than Iran by 2005. This means Iraq will, rise from less than 0.3% of total OPEC production in 1995, to 12% in Z000,13% in 2005, and 14% by 2030. lraq is prcjected to provide 18% of all Gulf production by 2010, and 7% of total world production. These projections mem Iraq will rise to the rank of the world's fourth largest oil producer, and witl be a major factor in meeting growing world dcrnand and li-miting the rise in futurc oil prjces-mb

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3 63

Iraq hdicated in March 1995 that it would gradually seek to increase oil product-ion to 6 MMBD by 2003, at an investment cost of $25 billion. This cost estimate was said to fnclude the cost of develnping new oil fields, increasing the gas prcxessing, storage, pipelines, and export terminals.Ny The US Department of Energy esthates that fray also has 109.5trillion cubic feet (tcf)of proven gas reserves, or 2.2% of the world suppty The IEA cubic meters (tcm), or esthates that Iraq's gas reserves total 3.1 killio~~ roughly 2% of the world"s supply.308 Experts estiHlate that Iraq has another 160 tril3ion cubic feet of free gas as yet mexplort.d.xp Iraq indicated. in Mar& 1995 that it is s e e h g to reduce gas flarhg m d use gas for power generation, petmchernicds, and possibly for export, It currently estimates its domskearn invesmmt costs at $6 bilfion between 1995 a d 2003.310 Iraq produced peak levels of 39,1100 BPD of naturd gas liquids (NGL,) in 1987, although production has dropped to 5,000 BPD since the Gulf War. 'f'here are no diabte estimates of the size of Iraq'?; future gas exports, but the hternational Energy Agency (1EA) estimates that Iraq can export gas to Turkey m d Syria, and in LNG form at prices that are lower than,or competitive with, thcrse of the Souf;hernGull states, It estimdes export prjces of $3.55 per &lion British trhermal u17jts (MKTU).311 Table Che and Chart Six show a recent IEA estimate of how :Iraq"s oil reserves compare to those of other Gulf states.

lwaqi Q i X Production Before the Gulf Mrar""' Iraq has been an exporter of oil since the early 1"330s, but the Iraqi government played no role in Iraq" oil dcrveloyment from the time oil was discovered in hay in 1927 until the early 1950s. This resulted in the slow development of Iraq's oil fields. Iraqi oil was left under the control of the :Iraq Petroleum Companyf a consortiunn of VVerstem oil companies such as British Petroleum, Esso (now Exxon), and France's Compapie Francaise de Petrole (CFP). Neither BP nor Ess giants in the oil business-werc interested in quickly developing and expanding Iraq" oil. They bad. access to cheap and abundant oif supplies elsewhere. CFP struggled to raj,, Iraqi oil output because it was a malfer parher and had few external =serves, but had only lhited impact. As a result, the P C treated. :Iraq%oil as a reserwe for the future. Iraq's production begm to rise in the 1"350s, as Iraq begm to gaiin some control over development decisions. The Iraqi National Oi.1 Company (fNCS(;I)was created in 1964, but it was only following Iraq's nationalization of the oil industry in 1972, that a rnassivc increase took place in the output of crude petmleum, and Iraq only liquidated the last traces oi foreign control in 1975. It comptrzted the integration of the INK into the Oif Ministry in 1987.

TABLE ONE Comparative Oil Reserves and Production Levels of the Gulf States

Comparative Oil Reserves in 1994 in Billions of Barrels County Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Total Rest of World World

ldent$ed

Undiscooered

ldent$ed and Undiscovered

-

-

-

69.2 90.8 92.6

19.0 35.0 3.0

88.2 125.8 95.6

3.9 265.5 61.1

0 51.O 4.2

3.9 316.5 65.3

583.0

112.2

695.2

-

-

-

-

-

-

PrOVf3I

% of World Total

.35 89.3 100.0 96.5 5.0 3.7 261.2 98.1

8.9 10.0 9.7 NA 0.4 26.1 9.8

654.1 345.7 999.8

64.9 35.1 100.0 (continues)

TABLE ONE (continued) Comparative Oil Production in Millions of Barrels per Day 1995

DOE/lEA Estimate $Actual Production

Maximum Sustainable Amounceti capacity 1995 2000 in 2000

Country

Actual

OPEC Quota

Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Total Gulf World

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3,608 600 1,850

3,600 2,000

-

3.2 2.2 1.7

-

3.6 0.4 1.1

-

4.3 4.4 2.9

5.0 5.4 3.6

5.4 6.6 4.2

3.2 2.5 2.8

4.5 5.0 3.3

4.5 5.0 3.3

449

378

0.5

0.4

0.6

8,018 2,193

8,000 2,161

8.5 2.5

9.6 2.6

18.6 69.6

17.7 67.4

-

400

1990

1992

2000

2005

2010

-

-

-

-

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.6

0.6

11.5 3.1

12.8 3.5

14.1 4.3

10.3 3.0

11.1 3.8

11.1 3.2

26.8 78.6

30.9 84.2

35.0 88.8

23.5

28.2

282

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from estimates in IEA, Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, OED/IEA, 1995, Annex 2 and DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2995, Washington, DOE/EIA, June, 1995, pp. 26-30, and Middle East Economic Digest, February 23,1996, p. 3. IEA and DOE do not provide country breakouts for Bahrain and Oman. Reserve data estimated by author based on country data.

III identified D Proven Identified

Bahrain

Iran

Iraq

-t-

undiscc~vered

Kuwait Oman

Qatar

Saudi

UAE

CHART SIX Total Oil Reserves of the Gulf States (in Billions of Barrels). Source: IEA, Middle Easf Oil urld Gas, Paris, QECD, IEA, Annex 2, and data provided by Bahrain and Oman. Bahrain's reserves are only 350 million barrels and d o not shcjw up on the chart because of scale.

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3 67

MAP TWO Iraqi Qil Prcduction Before the Gutf War. Source: US State Depar?ment-.

Iraq's exports and oil revenues changed drannatieally after 1973. The trends inIraq" soil exports since the early 3970s arc?shown inChart Seven, and the trends in the vafuc of Iraq's oil exports are shown in Cl~artEight. These charts show that Iraqi oil production more than doubled between 1971 and 1979, rising from 1.7 MMBD to 3.475 MMBD. In 1979, the fall of the Shah of Iran led to a sudden cut in lranian production and Iraq became the world's s e c o ~ ~largest d exporter after Saudi Arabh. Iraqi. oil production peaked in 1979 at 3.46 MMESD and annual production totaled 170.6m metric tons, as compared with 83.5 metric tcms in 1971, and 476 metric tons jn 1460. Exports im 1979 and 1980 averaged

0 Oil, NGL, and Refined Product Exports U Total Oil and NGL Production

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

CHART SEVEN Iraqi Oil and Natural Gas Liquids Total Production and Exports (in Thousandsof Barrels Per Day). Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Pans, 1995, pp. 252-256.

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

CHART EIGHT Iraqi Oil Exports in Millions of Current Bolbrs, Source: Adapted by Anthsny Et. Cordesman fram International Energy Agency QXEA),Middle East Oil n ~ Gas, d 13aris, 1995, pp. 256257.

3.3 million barrels per day, brjnging in revenues of $21.3 billion and $26.1 billion respectively. These two years constituted the heyday of Iraqi oil production.""" The Iran-Iraq War exposed Iraq's vuherability in terms of oil export capability. Iraq was dependent on exporting t h r o u e a narrow and vulnerable comtlixre only 52 miles lmg and sandwiched between :Kuwait on the south m d Irm on the north-east, and on pipelirzes carrying Iraqi oil through neighboring countries, En 1980, tkese pipelines included a reversible flow pipeline from Rumaliiii to Haditha and Kirkuk, link* its north and south oil fields, a 1,000 kilometer-long pipeiine from Erkuk to the port of Dortyol on the Medt.errmean; a pipeline from Haditha to

3 70

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities

Trip& in Lebanon and Raniyas in Syria; and flmaw, lines naming from the southern oil fields to the off-&ore export temjnals of Mina d-Bakr m d Khor al-Amaya. Iraqi oil production declked dramatically in early 1981, after Irmian attacks on Iraq" tmker Xoadlng terminaIs at M h a al Bah and.K&or al Amaya in the Gulf. In 1982, the Syrian gove ent closed Iraq" m a h export pipeline. This Bania pipeline linked the Kirkuk and R~~xnalia oil to terminals on Syria" Mediterranean coast. It had a capacity of 1.4 D and was carrying peak levels of riOO,OW BPU. As a msult, exports fell to ";"UO,UOO4O0,I)(I barrcls per day in 1912Lf983. Iraq then slocvly ed the capacity of its Iaortyol pipeline through Turkey to 1.1 ,a d exports rose to 913,000 BPD in 1%4, and 1.1MMBD in 4985. 'This increase in export capacity; however, did little more than campensate for cuts in ail prices. Iraq" cmde ail, NCL, and refined product exports were only worth $10.4 billion h-t 4981, $10.1 billion in 1982, $7.8 biUio11 in 1983, $9.3 biS_lionin 1984, and $10.7 billion h 1985,314 Iraq respmded. by building a parallel p i p e h e througfn Turkey which raised the capacity of tbr Dortyol pipeline to 4.7 MMRU, by exporting through Ku.\vai$ and by building a link to Saudi Arabia's pipeline to the :Red Sea. Its average exports slowly rose back to 1.9MMRD in 1986, but m u d revenues only totaled $6.9 billim, due to a col3apw of oil prices, 'The end of the han-Iraq War saw a turn .for the better inIraqi oil fortunes, duction went from 2.6 MMBD (17.4 million tons) in 1988 to 2.8 (138.6 millim tons) in 49B. This added output and a rise in cJi prices earned an increasingly debt-ridden Iraq =venues of $9.4 biition a year in 198%1989. By the first hatf of 1990, Iraqi d production was averaging about 3.1 MMBD, Iraq had brought enough new facilities 011-line to raise its export capacity to 3.5 MMBDt m d its total 1990 export earnings were expected. to be a l m s t $16 billion. 'This =venue wollld have been adequate to meet Iraq'ddcrnands if Iraq had not tried to fund both guns and butter, and had not faced the need to pay off a massive was debt while it funded post-war development. Saddam Husseil-t's ambitions went far beyond such trade-offs, however, and Iraq began to put pressurc on its neighbors to reduce their production as a means of rais-ing oil prices, It accused Kuwait and the LIAE of driving oil prices down by over-producing, and provokd a crisis with Kukvajt that led to the Guif War. Oil Productian EHa&s Since the Gulf War The UN errtbargo brought Iraqi oil production to a virtual standstill, white Coalition air attach during fie Gulf War caused extensive damage to Iraq's production and refirring capabilities. lraqi oil exports averaged

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3 71

1.7 MMBD in 1998, with export revenues of only $9.5 billion. h 1991, Iraqi oil exports averaged. only 52,000 BPD, with export revmues of $380 million. Since that t h e , Iraqi exports to Jordan, Turkey, and Irm have averaged about II0,OQOBPD, wi.Lh amual export revezzues of about $400 million, Iraq has, hwever, succeeded in rebuilding much of its war-damaged oil jndustry Wartime darnage to Iraq's soil productio~zfacilities was restricted, largely to bumisrg wells in the south, although the pumping stations for Iraq's sophisticated pipeline system were extensively damaged. As a resut-, the Iraqi government amottnced in its emergency six month reconstmction budget of May 2, 1991, that the restoration of oil production and the rebuilding of refineries and pipelines would be the primary target for reconstruction. By the early summer of 1991, Iraqi, oil production was ruming at about 270,000 barrels per day, with exports of 20,011040,000 barrels per day to Jordan. By the elnd of the s u m m r of 1992, Iraq had a production capacity of about 500,000 barrcls per day Uamage assessments by Turkish g w ent sources i~~dicated &at the pipethe into ?ixrkey and to the port cJf Ceyhm was capable of restarthg operations almost immediately Average oil production-including natural gas-has been limited by :Iraq%sinability to export legally to any naticm other than Jordan, although some production has been trucked into Turkey. Nevertheless it has i n c ~ a s e dfrm 235,U00 barrels per day in 1991 to 11.80,000barrels per day in 1992, and 500,000 barrels per day in 1993. Iraq now produces about 650,000 BPDf wi& IOO,QOO-150,000 BPD reinjeded into reservoirs" In 1995, the former Iraqi Oil. Minister Safa Hadi Jawad clairned that :Iraq codd export 2 MMRU immediately after sanctims were lifted, and could export up to 3.6 million MMBD wi.lhin 10-14 months, o~zceit abtahed the parts it needs to mpair damaged oil export hcilities, Iraq's current Oil Mi~~ister, h i r Muha ad Rashid, repeated this claim in Jmuary 1996.31Vhe IEA made a more conservative estimate that Iraq cwXd begin producing 1.5 to 2.5 MMBD within six months of the lifting of sancticms, n-tight regain the capability to produce 2.5 to 3.0 MMBU o res~lrnefull production, m d could defwithin a year dter it is d initely reach or exceed 3 in two to three yeass.3" Iraq only needs about 40,000 BPU for domestic consumption, and such production levels WOUL~,give Iraq enough export capacity to have a major near-term irnpact on oil quota and oil pnces. Iraq's present OPEC quota is only 400,000 BPD. Iraq has also laid the (jsolmdwork for developing new fields. It began to negotiate with Total and.Elf in 1992, and with Russia in 1995,Although no cmtracts can be signed until the UN smctims are lifted, Elf s e e m to have rcached an agreement to develop the M;ljnoon oil field, which has

372

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities

up to 15 billion barrels of reserves and a potentia1 production capacity of 1MMBD. Total seems to have reached an agreement to develop the Nahr Umr oil field, which bas up to 1 biflion barrels of reserves, Agip is discllssing the development of the Al Haliaya oil field, which also has up to 1billion barrels of reservese"17 Russia has explored devetogmmt of the West Qurnah oil field, with up to 112 billinn barrcls of =serves and an initial production goal of 200,OO BPD. The Russian firm of Lukoil seems to have signed a contract for this project in April 1995, which was appmved by the Iraqi parliament a month later. Iraq's payment to Z,takoil is be made in hard currellcy and crude oil. Russia also seems to have signed a much l a ~ eagreement. r Iraq reported in February 1996 that a $10 billion agreement had been reached between Iraq m d Russia. 'This agreement seelss to have been signed in Agril 1995 and was ratified b y the Iraqi parliament in November 3935. It allows Iraq to repay its $7 Zlillion debt to Russia with oiZ exgorts, and called for cooperative developmnt of the West Qwma and Rurnalia oil fields."B There may be many similar international irwestment projects to come. Pcfrrtmas of Malaysia, Repsal of Spain,and P A O of lurkey have ail held djscussions with Iraq. Iraq has 25 apprajsed field.^ ready for development, with a potential pmductim capacity of 4.65 MMBD.319 If Iraqi exports are. to rise much above the 7C)(l,(lOO barrel per day level permitted under Che fi~lancidterms of Resolution 984, Iraq wjll have to rebuild much of its pipekne and terminal systpm, and this codd present poiil-id and financial problems.. Syria has kept Zlhe Baniyas line closed since 1982, m d Saudi Arabia is unlikely to make its IPSA-1 (5Q0,OQOBBD capacity) and IPSA-2 pipelines (1.2 BD capacity) available for Iraqi exports in the near future..Iraq has claimed, howwer, that it?;engheers have completed the final rczpajrs to its key north-south oil pipe1in.e. The rebuilding of the K-3 oil station in Hadithah, north-west of Baghdad, means that Iraq c o d transport oil from Kirkuk oil field to the southern oil terminnl at Kasra. i\rs of &-l992 this pipeline had a capacity of 800,QUObarrels per day, Iraq also clahed that it could export up to 1.6 million b a r d s a day using its pipdine through Turkey m e it was properly flushed m d restored to workj.ng condition. The Tarkjsh pipel4ne is particularly important because the terms of Resolution 986 ensure this pipelille will carry much of the 700,000 barrels per day that Iraqi can export, and will give Tzrrkey s o m $50 to $101) million in fees-an issue of considerable importance to a country that had a $14 billion trade deficit in 1995, and which estknates that it lost $2 billion a year after it closed the pipeline h 19990 ta comply wi& UN smdionseao Iraq and Turkey began to discuss a proposal to drain some 12 millon barrels of oil from the Iraq-Turkey pipeline in early 1994. Both Iraq and Turkey claim that unless the oil is f l h e d from the pipeline, Che pipeline

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3x3

will be irreparably damaged by the deteriorating crude. Negotiations have failed to reach a satisfactory agreement, however, and are preventing the flushing and =pairs. 'The delays are due in part to differences cmccrning the distribution of the humanitarian aid that Iraq would rclceive as payment for the oil. Iraq has rejected the UN plan that puts 3Q"X3 of the proceeds into a UN escrow fund fnr Gulf War victims compensation, white talckg colltrd of the djstribution of the huntanitarian aid away from fray. Whether m agreement is made or not, the flushing and needed rep"irs will have to been dcrne between the spring and Late fall, due to Eke severe weai-her col~ditionsin the mountains between Iraq and Turkey through cvhich the pipeline passes. Iraq also has four termhals on the Guif at Mina a1-Bakr, Khor alAmaya, h m Qasr, and Khor M-Zubair, and had the capabiliiry to load tankers at Fao b e f m the Iran-lraq Was. Umrn Qasr and f i o r Al-Zubair are small coastal ports which were. incapacitated at the time of the Gulf War, but havc since been rebuilt. Min.a ai-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya are major off-shore loadjng termjnals. M h a al-Bakr had a capacit). of 1.6 BD fmm four berths before it was damaged in the Iran-Iraq War. It was restored to 4110,000 KPD after that war, daxnaged i,n the Gulf War, and then built back to a capaciv of 500,000 BPD. Khor al-Amaya had the capability to toad three major tmkers before it was damaged in the IranIraq War" Rcrbuiiding seems to have begun in 1993, but. its present capacity is unknown, The port at Fao has been rebuilt, but its oil export capacity is also unknt,wn."l The IEA, estimates that Iraq can now load about. 680,000 BBD from all of its coastal facilities w ajor fur&er work, md. has a total export ciueting the capacity of its Turkish capacity of about 4.7' pipeline. 'This is onIy about 65% to 80% of its near-term expo& capacity Iraq has, however, announced an ambitious program to add two $&inch pipelines and four sir7gle buoy m o r h g s to Mina al-Bakr and f i o r alAmaya, m d raise thek loading capacity to 1.6 MMBD each. The costs of this pwect wodd be $1bilIion, Iraq also has a fleet of n h e tankers which survived the Gulf War, although their present operating s t a s and capacity is not ~lcar.~22

Iraqi Refining and Petrochemical. Capability Iraq had the capacity to refhe 305,500 BPD before the Iran-Iraq War, which was reduced to 215,501'1 BPD by Iranian attacks on Basra in 1982. I'roductio~lwas ~ b w j l to t 293,500 KPU by 1985, m d nekv projects raised capacity to 550,000 BPD by 1990.323 Iraq's ~ f i n f n gcapability was then sharply reduced by the Gulf War. In a few short weeks nf d i e d bombhg, Iraq's refirrhg capacity was reduced

3%

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities

from 550,000 barrels per day @Id) to 68,000 b/d. Much of this production loss, however, was due to attacks on replaceable components rather than massive attacks on entire facilities. By n-tid-summer 1991, Iraq had. carried out major repairs, especially at the two modern d h e r i e s of Daura and. Baifi-both of which, reached full pre-war capacity in June 1991, This allowed Iraq to meet d o a s t i c demand. By mid-June 1992, Iraqfwoil minister declared that Iraq's repaired =fineries codd process 580,000 barrds per day or 84 percent of pre-war capaci-ty, Iraq has fully resrtmed operations at tbe three main refineries (Baiji, Basra, and Doura), although Basra has never fully recovered from damage done during the Iran-Iraq War, and has restored additional, capacity at several smdler facilities, It now has a total of ten operatra mfherit.s with a capacity of 593,000 BPD, and a new 290,000 BPD rcfinesy is mder construction near Bahplon. This compares with a capacity of 550,OUQ BPD before t-he Gulf War. The Iraqi Oil Ministry claims it has no plans to boost capacity further as all domestic consumption needs arc being met by the existing facilities. Iraq has nine petrocherrticaf facilities, with a total p o t a i d capaciv of 7.68 millio12 tons a year*These plmts produce ammonia, ammonium sulfate, benzene, Ethylene, ethylene dichloride, polyethylene, poly propylene, phosphates, sulhric acid, sulfur, Toluene, and.urea. Severaf suffertrd damage during the Iran-haq and Gulf Wars. They have since had sig~~ificant repair work completed, but their exact capacity is unclear, Iraq also operates a major phosphate plant at M-Qaim. This plant was damaged durjng the Gulf War, but production seems to have largely recovered.

Production and Development Prospects Once Sanctions Are Lifted or Relaxed :It is difficult to ascertain what Iraq's strategic h k r e for its oil industry will be, given the uncertah pditical future of the corntry m d the continuation of the sanctions, The UN now permits Iraq to export only 50,000 BPD of crude oil and 25,000 BPI) of products to Jordm, with the agreem e ~ that ~ t half of the crude is delivered free m d the other half is subsidized, Some additional oil is delivered to Turkey and Iran by trucks, and sold on the black market, but the amount is limited. There has been no real progress in resuming large scale exports since :Iraq rejected the terms oi UN Security Comcil Resolution i"06, which was passed in August 1991 and allowed Iraq to sell $1.6 billion wwth of crude oil for humanitarian purposes. Iraq has, however, shown signs of an inc~asingwillhgness to accept the WN terms, and the UN eased these terms slili;htly in 19%. As a =suit, it is possible that Iraq could suddenly rclverse its position on xccpting the 19N'offer with limited warning.

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3%

Iraq's longer term plans are more clear m d many of its development and production goals arc consistent with the strategic plan that Iraq issued follomring the end of the Iran-Iraq War*In 1988-1989, thc Oil Ministry-which was then headed by Issarn Abdel Rahim al-Chatabiounced that Iraq intended to i m p l e m t the iollowing strategy:

*

* * *

W i d e ~ ~ hexploration g to make up for the lack of exploratio~~ by international.cornpanics before nationalization in 1972; Increasing production capacity; Increasing refining and export capacity; aside from returning the Turkish oil pipeline to Ceyhan to full capacity, Iraq plans to expand export infrastructurt- significantly. Cm& storage facilitks will be to 21-24 million barrcls. Murh of this expanded from 14 millio~~ expmsim will come as a result of the rebuilding and modernization of the h o tank fam. "l'he loading capacities of Mina al-Bakr and Khor ai-Arnaya in the Persian Gulf will be increased to a total of 3 2 milion barrels per day; Increasing thrt efficiency of transpmation and distribution of oil and gas; Building up a strategic reserve of oil and gas for national security reasons; Increasing the level of in-house d e s i g ~m~d cmstructio~~; Enhancing the computerization of the industr)r

As has just been discussed, Iraq has shce developed these plms into far more detailed objectives since the Gulf War; and has established an oil outpUf;target of h muion b i d by the turn of the century*lraq appears to be conccntra.t.ing on the furtkr exploratim and development of four giant southern fields: Majnoun, West @ma, Halhya, and Nahr-Umar. Iraq has made it clear that it is pl ing m the assistance cJf foreign companies inits futurc exploration and development efiorts. As has been discussed earlier, 'fray is talkng with Russian finrrs about resurnjng development of the Wst Quma field mce the UN sanctions are lifted. Origkal plans for this field, interrupted.by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, called far production rates of lt00,000 b fd in the first stage and GOO'CXXI b/d in the second. Two French companies, Total and Elf, have been negotiatjng with Iraq as well, Total may develop N&r-Umar, while Elf is expected to undertake the development of the Majnoun field, by far the largest lraqi field waiting to be developed. Mowver, no cornmitrnents arc ikely to be m d e until the uncertain political sitwa.t.ionis resolved. Thew are good reasons that Baghdad now intends to solicit large-scale foreign ir-rvestment. Iraq wiIl need about $31) billion in the next eight years h r its oil and gas production and export faciXities to be revita:lizcd

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities

3 76

and expanded. Iraq can only get this money by offering u~~precedented access to its oil sector-a hctor that affects s m e of the growing opposition to sanctims. Negotiations have been going on with foreign companies 'or at least four years. T~IIf elds with a prndttction capacity of 3 million barrels per day have been put forward. as suitable lor production sharing and service agmements, trYhile 20 ather fields with a total capacity of 1.5 milfion barrels per day are being considered for various cooperative agreements. Iraq also continues to play a role in oil politics even fi:hough it cannot export oil. Iraq contiattes to attend W E C meetings. Iraq is a vodfcrous participant blaming the member states for failing to uphold their own intertrsts as producers. In mi$-1993, "Tjriq Aziz, then Deputy- Prime M h ister, indicated that Iraq's return to the market would be geared to the country" revenue needs, and that it would make no difference to Baghdad even if the ail price dropped to $5 per barrel, ""sce now we get 110thhg.'There has been no change in these policies in the years that have followed, and fray's return to the oll exporting business may lead to turbulent times for OPEC.

PifaturaZ Gas The size m d importmce of Iraq's gas reserves is shown. in Table Two and Chart Njne, and thr trends in Iraqi gas production are shown in Chart Ten. Until the late 398(Jtjfup to 85Y0 of the gas Iraq p d u c e d was flared. Irag's natural gas pmductio~~ was also tied closely to its crude oil produdion, shce all oi the gas produced was associated. Most of Iraq" assocriated gas came from the Ain Zalah, Bums, Erkuk, Bai Hassm, Rumalia, and Xubair fields. These reserves comprised rougnly 7Fi0,000 cubic meters of t?ssociated gas or on average about 90 cubic meters for each ton of oll. Production from these reserves was used to produce liquefied petrdeum gas and dry gas as feedstock for refineries, power stations, and illduskial.projects. At the end of the Iran-Iraq WBr, the government increased its efforts to use g a m m e widely in the home, industriaily, and for export, and began to develop new gas fields. h May 1990, the al-A,nfalgas field came online with an initial production rate oi 200 million cubic feet per day and estimated reserves af 4.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf), or 127 biUion cubic meters @cm). M-Anfd was Iraq's first non-associated gas field., and is connected by pipeline to a gas gathering station near Kirkuk, some 30 kiometers way. From there, gas is fed into a ~ g i o n anetwork l that supplies feedstock for the petrochemical industry and het, to power stations. Iraq has considerable potential to develop other nm-associated fields or use associate gas for producticm and export p w p o x s Al-Anfal currently produces about 6 millilln cttbic meters fmcm) per day.

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3 77

TABLE TMrO Gulf and VVorXd Gas Reserves and Production

Bahrain Iran Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Gulf Rest of World World Total "Othersources estirnate 6,320-7,280 &CM for M u Dhabi only Source: " R ereserve and production data are adapted by Anthony H, Cordaman from IEA, Middte East air und Cus, Paris, OECD, IEA, 2995, h n e x 2.

Iraq completed a major program to recover associated gas called the Northern Gas Project before the Iran-lraq War, with an initial handling capacity of 20 mcm a day. It completed anather program called the Sauthern Gas Project during the war, with a capacity of 3 mcrn a day The Southern Gas Project included a pipeline to ship gas to an L P 6 expod terminal at Khor Al-Zubair, Tray's gas facil2it.s suffered only 1imit.ed damage during th Gulf Mr. Iraq claimed in March 1995 that it had a capacity of 20.5 bcrn a year, with 5.6 bcrn from the Northem Prc>jeci:m d 15.3bcrn from the Southern Project. This is enough output to hmdle crude oil production of 3.5 will be ercpanded in stages as Iraq meets its crude oil production goal of 6 MMKD. Surplus gas will be w e d for electric pocver generation, petrochemical, LPC: for domestic fuel, fertiiker, and exports. Iraq has a sipificant newterm need to =store gas-fired electrir power, sirtce f l of Iraq's 2(3 power pfants were destroyed during the Gulf War-bcluding live gasfired plants-md six morc power plants we^ damaged. However, Iraq plans to give oil exports priori.ty over restoring gas distributicm and use."P"

Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy 'The issues relating Eo Iraqi oil and gas production camot be separated from the general issue of sanctions discussed in the previous chapter. At

Bahrain

Iran

Iraq

Kuwait Oman

Qatar

Saudi

UAE

CHART NINE Total Gas Reserves of the Gulf States (in Billions of Cubic Meters), Suztrce: Adapted by Anthcjny H. Cordesman from IEA, M i d d k Ensr Oil alzd Gas, 13aris,OECB, TEA, 1995, Annex 2, and data provided by Bahrain and Oman. Bahrain's reserves are too small to show C I the ~ chart because of scale-.

16

GrossProduction 0 Vented, Flared, & Lost 0 Domestic Marketed

14 12

10 8 6 4

2

0 1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

CHART TEN Iraqi Natural Gas Production (in Billions of Cubic Meters). Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Pans, 1995,pp. 252-256. U

2

3 $0

Oil and Iraqi Export Capabilities

the same time, Iraqi oil exports have special implications for Southern Gulf and Western strategy-altf-iough somewhat different implications for the Gulf and fie Wst. 011the one hand, Suthern Gulf producers have little desire to see Iraq suddenly raise its exports above the level permitted in Resolution 986 exports at a time when oil prices are low and virtually atl oil exporters are a k a d y violating their quotas. Nations like Saudi Arabia lose over $I billion for every $1drop in oil prices, and Iraqi exports in excess oi 1MMRD wodd almost certainly lead to significant cuts in oil prices. This would sharply reduce the oil export revenues oE all the Gull states, which already have substantjal cash flow and budget deficit problems.as The initial impact of Iraq's acceptance of Ilfd Resolution 986 was limited, in part because the market had already anticjpated Iraq's sccceptance. Some expe&s believe, however, that even sustained Iraq exports at the limited rate of 7CrO,O(fO barrels per day permitted under UN %curay Cottncil Resolution 984 could cut oil prices by $1-2 a basrcS."2" On the other hand, Suuthern Gulf producers have a mid and long-term interest in a stable wwld oil market and a st&k and predictable flow of oil and oil prices. The resuntption of lraqi production is an essential aspect of creathg such a market. Further, Iraqi production is a counterpoint to Iranian pmductim and reduces the risks and uncertainties i n h e ~ nin t any ixlterruption in oil productio~zor exports once Gulf capacity is morc fully utilized, Moreover, the Soutkm Gulf states have to live with Iraq, and Iraq is likely to become progressively more ~vanchistif it is denied export capability and the abi:lity to develop its oil and gas resources. The W s t % short-term interests differ from those of the Southern Gulf states largely in the fact that the West can benefit even in the short-term from any =ductions in oil prices that occur once Iraq is alfowed to resume its oi exports, and in making use of the vporh;lnity- to invest in new Iraqi oil and gas production efforts. Turltey certahly has much to gain from both a resu~lptionof Iraqi oil exports and any expansion of Iraq" oil and gas exports. The West's long-term strategic interests arc clear. Ail of the rnajor forecasts of world energy supply call for Iraq to be a major exporter by 2000, and a criticd exporter by 2010. Iraq camot instantty resume more tban li-mited production once sanctions are liked, and the forecasts of future pmduction discussed at the beginnhg oi this chapter already seem dubious. If Iraq was to meet W : E , EZA, IEA, and commercial estimtes of its production 'or 2000, the sanctions m hvestment: in new lraqi production facili.ties and the export of the necessary equipment would have needed to h e been lifted in 3992. As a result, virbally every world eneqy pro-

Oil nlzd Iraqi E,rpcrrt C~pbilities

3 133

jedicln drc.ady assmes total levels of Iraqi oil producrion in the late 1990s m d early 2000s that will not be available, Iraq's inability tct meet such pmduction goals is not a scrricaus near-term problem as long as all other mrtjor oil producers are stable, and Saudi Arabia, is willing to act as a swing produces: This assumption, however, is an uncertain one given the tcjnsions inside the G& and the uncertain future of the FSU. T'here is no question that the world ecmorny will be more stable if Iraqi production can be brmght back m-lhe and i f it increases at the projected levels. The risks involved do not seem serictus enough to influence nea~terrnpolicy regarding sanctims and the regime of Saddlam flussein, but they can scarcely be ignored indefinitely

External Relations :Iraq%eextmal relations and ioreign policy are a key mason the West and Southern Gulf states cmtinue to pursue sanc"cims, and m s t consider strategies to change the character of Iraq's regime. Twice in the last two decades, :Iraqhas attacked its neighbors-first Iran and then Kuwait. Iraq has used its military build-up to seek regional hegemony, and has aggrt_.ssively used its powcr to try to influence Ihe oil policies of the nations of the Southern Gulf. It has acted to serve the ambitions of Saddam Husscsh and one oE the most aggressive forms of nationalism in the Middle East. There are only two ways in which the West and the Southern Gulf states can deal with Iraq" aambitions and approach to external. relations, One is tbrou* containment. ^7he other is &mu& basic changes in the character of Iraq's regime. Both approaches present the problems discussed eartier, but a passive approach to Iraq's foreign policy-or accommodation a d appeasement-would a h o s t certainly trigger new aggression and new conflict.

Iraq's Foreign Potiey Since the Gulf War Ever since th cease-f re in 1931, the primary &us of Iraqi diplomacy has been to find a way to eliminate the sanctions inlposed m Iraq by tbr internati.onal community and to allnw Iraq to recover the power it had before the Gulf War, Iraq has sought to end the economic sanctions without complying with the terms of the cease-he, to restore its military capabilities, to rcbuild its progranns to rnanufachare and deliver weapons of mass destmction, to renew i t s pressure on Kuwait, and to exact revenge for its defeat, Iraq has only been "moderate" to the extent such maderation benefits its own short-term tactical advantage. For example, only three months after October 1994, when Iraq moved troops to its border with Kucvait, Iraq rcrnewed efforts to erode the sanctions by appealinlq to the international community% moral conscience over the human cost of

External Relations

3 $3

the sanctions in Iraq. Similarly; Iraq has used its economic potential to try to undermine international support for sanctions wherever possible. An example is its solicitation of- bids for the eventual recmstruction of the country in 11994, bids clearly designed to obtain support for lifting sanctions. Iraqi diplomatic conta
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The Continuing Threat to KuwaitIraq has no legitimate historical claim to Kuwait. Kuwa-it" northern border witfi Iraq had been established as part of the ag~ennent.Britain had reachrd with Turkey in 1913. lraq accepted. this claim h e n it was given its hdependence from Turkey, and accepted. it again in the "Agreed M h utes between t-he State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Kegarcling the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition, and Rclatcd Matters"" wh,ieh Iraq and Kuwait sigl~edin 1932. However, f r q i nationnlists began to claim t-hat Kuwait was legitimately part of Iraq as early as t-he mid1920s. This laid the ground work for later Iraqi. claims and threats to Kuwait. Iraq only challenged Kuwait" sovercignQ mce during the t i m the Iraqi monarchy rernai~~ed tied to British support and influence-durhg the reign of King Ghazi in the 1930s. This sibatim chmged dramatically, however, in 1961, The Iraqi monarchy fell in 1958, and Kuwait faced a growing h e a t fmm the radical Arab nationalism of Iraq's new regime. ?"kitsthreat was a major factor influencing Kwaitfs decision to become e but this decision led to fully independent from Britain on J w ~ 114,1961, almost immediate problems with Iraq. :Iraq%nnew rt;gime clahned Kuwait under t h preknse that Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman Empire and cmsequently subject to Iraqi suzerahty. Only a week after the withdrakval of British forces, Iraqi brces moved to the border and onIy halted when Britain rushed troops back into Kuwait and when it became clear that the Arab Leagw was prepwd to challenge Sraq's clairns. Iraq did s i w an agreement in l963 that appeared to recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and the border demarcation to which Britah m d 'lirrkey had agreed in 3913, but Iraq only did so because of a coup that killed the Iraqi dictator that had originally threatened to invade Kuwait. Iraq threatened Kuwait aajain in 1965, 1967, and 1972, Iraq occupied Kuwait's border post: at Sarnita on March 20, 1,973, in a further effort to gut p~ssurc.on Kuwait to cede it contrd of t.he islands in the Gulf. 'This led to the deployment of Saudi tsoops to the border. Iraq withdrew in early April, but d y aft- mediation by Vasser Ara,fat and a substantial :Kuwaitip a p e n t to Iraq. Iraq then attempted to lease Ml;a&ah and half of Bubiyan in 1,975 for a period of 99 years. According to some rcpmts, Iraq briefly sent troops into Kuwait again in 1976, and only wiLhdrew after mother Kuwaiti payment.328 Despite these difficulties, Kuwait suppcrrted its ""Arab brotherf"during the Iran-Iraq War, and was one of Iraq's most important allies, During 1980-1988, Kuwait supplied Iraq with at least $13.2 billion in grants and loans, and with up to $22 billion in overall assistance.""Yven so,

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Kuwait's problems in its relations with Iraq continued. Iraq again sought to lease Bubiym and Warbah in 1880 and provoked another horder incident in 1983. When Kuwait s a i n refused to lease the two islands, Iraq sent a token force across the bordez This Iraqi pressure led to a sudden visit to Baghdad by Kuwait Prime Minister Saad Sabah on November 10-13,19tfil. Once again, Iray was bought off by a substantid payment, although Iraq did estabtish a Hovercraft basc? across the river from Warbh.330 Control of the two idmds had become steadily more important to Eraq durhg the Irm-Iraq War because it was clear that Iraq was never likely to secure its access to the GuXf through the Skatt al-Arab, which it shared. with Iran. Furtl-ter, the Shatt al-Arab had s u f f e ~ dfrom 10 years cJf silting and minng dwring the Iran-Iraq War. As a rclsult Iraq steadily expancfed the city of Basra to the south; the town of Az-Bayer, just to the southwest of Bmra; and its naval base at Umm Qwr. Iraq had mwed south into territory that probhly belonged to Kuwait near Umm Qasr and the border town of Sahan, and had expanded a canal called the SI7attt al-Basra from Umm Qasr to a posi.tion mid\nray between Basra and Az Zubayr. This made the Khor Abd All&, the crlnamel from the C~zlfto Umm Qasr to the north of Buibyian and. Warbah steadily more important.""' KUM"ilitlSmppc)rt of Iraq during the Iran-Zraq War earned little gratitude. While Iraq emerged as the victor in the Iran-haq War, it had borrowed some $37 billion h loans from Kuwait and its other Arab neighbors, as well as massive additional loans from the West and Japan. By late 1,989, Iraq desperately nceded to reschedule its debts. The required principal and interest on the non-Ar& debt alone would have consumed half of Iraq's $13 billion worth of annual oil rcvenues.""2 At the same time, repayment costs of this scale scarcely s~zitedSaddam Hussein" ggrowing regional ambitions.. Iray had a military budget of $12.9 billion in 1990, which meant Iraq was spending approxhately $700 per citizen, in a county with a per capita income of only $1,950.33Us a result Iraq began to demand forgiveness of its Arab loans durirrg 1988 and 1989, and d i e d for new grant aid to be given to Iraq as the sole defe~~der of the &ab cause against trm. Iraq also made new requests to lease Warb;rh and parts of Kubiyan island in 1989, and rejected, the attempts of Kuwait%Emir to reach a general border settlement when he vi,sited Iraq in 9ptember 1,989."4 By mid-1990, Iraq" cash =serves were only equal to h e mon&s of imports and inflation was running at 40°/0. M e n Kuwait rehsed to forgive Iraq's debt, lease the islmds, and agree to Iraq's other border clahs, Iraq decided on was. S a d d m Hussein accused Kuwait of ""sabbing Iraq in the back" and fraqi fnreip minister Taiq Aziz c1aimd.d that Kuwait had, ""ixMplemmteda plot to cscatate the pace of gradual systematic advance

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towards Iraqi territory. He c l ~ m e that d the Kuwaiti goverment had set up military estahtishents, police posts, oil. installations, and, farms m Iraqi territory"9hat f(uwait and the UAE w r e conspiring to keep oil prices low and werc vjolating their oil wow,and that Kuwajt was stealjng oil from the Rumalia oil field, whose souhem tip enters Kuwaiti tenito~y.335On August 2,3990, Iraq invaded a nearly defmsett.ss Kuwait, Neither the C o a i t i o ~victory ~ nor the cease-fire agreement, however, ended the threat from Iraq. In August and Septezmber of 1992, the confrontation betwen Iraq and the UN over the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and Iraq's treatment of its Shi'ites and Kurds, forced the US to transform IJS Army, Marhe Corps, and Navy exercises into a demonstration that the US could protect Kuwait against any military adventures bp Iraq, The U'S rushed Patriot batteries to both h v a j t and Baf-trah and a 1,300 man battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division to Kuwait. It cclnducted a test pre-positionhg exereise called Native Fury 92, and carried out an annphilsious reinforcement exercise cdled Eager Mace 92. By th time these US efforts were over, the US had. deployed a total oE 1,900 Marines and 2,400 soldiers, including t w armored and two mechanized cornpanies.336 Kuwai"taced cmt.inuing Iraqi challenges to its new border with Iraq, As part of the cease-fire terms, the UN set up a special UN Iraqmrawait Bom~daryDemarcation Commission. This commission issued its final report on May 20, 1993, and found. that the anginal border marklng paints had long vanished, and that Iraqi fanners had steadily expanded their date farms to the south after the border was marked in 1923. As a result, correcting the border to the original line moved it to the north and into territory that lraq had occupie""lsince before World War E. The Secrcltary Qncral accepted this final report, and the tlN Security Council adopted Resolution 833 on May 27,1993-reaf irming the Commissianfs find demarcation oE the Iraq-Kuwait border, demnding both states rclspect that border, and guaranteeing the inviolability of the bodes, The new border o h r e d Kuwait considerable advantages at the expense of Iraq. It gave K w a i t greater control over the Ratga and Rumnalia oil fields in its northern border area, and reduces Iraqi access to the port facilities at Umm Qasr..337At the same t h e , these advantages created new political problems with Iraq that could. prove more costly t a n the bei~efts are hvorth. 0il:ly six days after the Secrebry General accepted the report, the Speaker of Iraq%National Assembly stated that the new border would keep tensions in the regirm high. Iraq refused to accept the new dernascation and Iraqi editoriais and its media made nekv claims to Kuwait as Iraq" 19th province. Iraq created a series of incidmts in the border area during the rmaining morllhs of 1,993m d l.hrough most of 1994. Iraq t-hen sent rniljor fnrces,

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h c l ~ ~ d i ntwo g Republicm Guards divisio~~s, into the border area in late 1994. n e s e movements forced the US to rush land and air forces into the area, and led to a new crisis between Iraq and the UN. The continuing threat from Iraq became even more apparent on October 3,1994, when Iraq began to move its Hammurahi and Al Nida Republican Guarcis divisions sou& from the area around Baghdad to positicrns about 20 kilometers from the border with Kuwait. 'These units were the two best equipped Republican Guards divisions h the Iraqi Army. They mwed by rail and road with full ammunition loads and then deployed h an attack capable formation which had one brigade forward and two in the rear, and a iull complement of divisional artillery These Iraqi movements involved two divisions sf 9,000 to 10,00(1 men each, and movements of FROG, SA-8, m d mobile AA units. Iraq also increased the readiness of the Adnan and Baghdad divisions of the Republican Guards in the north in a manner that indicated they migPlC move south, and aikred the deployments of Ihe three Iraqi divisions already in Ihe south-the 54th Mechanized Division, which was about 4&50 kilometers from the border, the 2nd Armored Division, and the 4th &publican Guards fnfantry Division..Iraq built up a total force of 70,OQO40,l)Omen, which led to signi.ficant hcrcases in the major weapons positioned in the area north of :Kuwait. fraqi tank strength increased from about 660 to 1,100, artilfery st..renglhfmm a o m d 401) to 7011,and QAFW strength from about 700 to If000.338 More than any incident since the Gulf War, this Iraqi build-up illustrated the problems that Kuwait and the US face h dealing with a major :Iraqi chiallenge, The Kuwaiti cabinet m t h emergmy session on October 7,1994, and decided to send the Kuwait army to the border, and put Kuwait forces on full alert. It tnnk 5-7 days to deploy the Kukvaiti army fully, however, and.its effective fighting strength, was less than one heavy :Iraqi RepuHican Guards brigade. The US decided to send additional forces to the G& on Cl)ctober 9 to supplement the 13,000 US perso~znel already in the theater. These forces hitially hduded the 18,000 men in the Ist Nfarine Expeditimary Force, 36,000 troops from the US army 24th lnfmtry Division, 306 fixed wing aircraft (inclding A-105, Plbs, RF-4Cs, , F/ A-18s, B-525, and EF-15Es, F-15C~,F-1115, EF-IPls, F-11i " ~ JSTARS, 3&), 58 helicopters (including 54 m-@~), two batteries of Patriot Misdeployed mother siies, and a carrier battle group. The U'S suhseq~le~ntly 73 fixed wing aircraft, By October 12, the US had a total of 19,241 men in the Gulf area (4,923 Army, 1,1,171 Navy, 1,977 Marine, 3,&4 Air Fofcc, 173Special @ e r d i m , and 153 Joint Task Force Headquarters). :It had two carrier task forces with 15 ships (comting one carrier battle group in the Red Sea), and 200 combat aircraft. fn contrast, the Gulf Cooperalion Council was only able

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to make a token commitl~entof the 17,080 m m Peninsula Shield forc which lacked the combat capability to play any sipificant d e in defending Kuwait. Although Iraq backed down, withdrew its forces, and then stated it would recognize the new border with Kuwait, it seems clear that this Iraqi acceptance was little mcrre than a tactic timed to try to put an end to UN smctions. In fact, there were nebv indications of Iraqi movements against Kuwait in 1995. Un August 8,1995, two oi Saddam Husseids sonin-laws, two of his daughters, and other members of thrir kmily defected to Jordan. This defection was followed by unusual Iraqi movements around Baighdad and in Southern Iraq, and rumors that Iraq may attack Kuwait or make a demonstration near the border. These hdications led Kuwait to create a new security rzolle near its capital. At the s a m time, the US rcspmded by dephying naval task forces where they codd pmtect Kuwait as part of "qeration Vigilant Sentinel." C)n August 10, it alerted the carrier battle group that- hcluded the Koosevelt (CCG-B), the 8th Carrier Wing, the guided missile cruiser Mississ@i (CCN), the guided .missile cruisers Hue City (CC;)and Tiemderoga (CC), and the gzJidcd xnissile Mgate Nichdlrrs (FFG), This force was on station near Port Said by August 12, with the capabiliQ to launch more than 150 nmahawk cruise d s s i k s . 'I'he US also alerted the 24th Rcrarine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the carrier battle group in the new US 5th Fleet h the Gulf remained on station, and Kuwait and the US decided to accelerate joint exertli~sfrom October to August. As a res~~lt, the US rushed some 128,000 troops to the regioll by mid-%ptember, including 5,000 in the Eastell7 Mediterranean. The US deployed 8 prtrposititrning ships from Diego Carcia to the Gulf, with enougb gear to %stain 16,000 Marines in connbat for 30 days, and 5,000-7,000 'US Army troops. The US deployed four additional prepositionjng ships in to the regior.3. It also preparc~dUS A r q troops in the f_IS for airlift to "marry up"' with the heavy equipment for an armored brigade that is prepositioned at Camp Doha in Kuwait. New tensions emerged in January 1996, when US intelligence conreadicluded that Iraq had brought five armored divisions to sufficie~~t ness to deploy to Kuwait with only five hours notice. In response the US deployed 32 prepositiol-rint-;.ships-enough to equip a Marine Division and a US Army Brigade-into the Gulf. The U'S did not send troops, but this move allowed the US to deploy up to 20,000 troops on short notice. ?"he US aIso deployed additional combat aircraft to Bahrain and Kuwait, and extended a joint exercise with K~twait.The US already had some 20,000 troops in the Mjd.d.le East area, and deployed 35 ships, and. 14,000 sailors and US Marhes in its Fifth Fleet between the Suer! Canal and lndjan Ocean. These forces inchded the Nimitz carrier bat.tle group,

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and a Marine Carps amphibious ready group. It is interesting to note that the US mly had 250 naval personnel stationed permanently ashore in Bahrain.39 There has, however, been a declhe in Iraqi-provoked incidents alo~ng the barber, Iraqi ini4ltrations and crossings dropped from several hundred a year between 1992 and 99% to a few incidents a week in the spring of 1995. However, this decline seems to be a tel~porarytactic rather than any commit.m.ent to a lasting recogni.tion of Kuwait's Isorder. Further, the decline in incidents is partly the result of the deportation of 9,500 Iraqis living in the U r n msr area ceded to Kukvajt fwf.lich occwred after Kuwait paid ior new housing), and partly the result of the construction of a nearly 218 kilometer-long security line. This l h e has a three met=deep tre~nch,followed by a five meter sand berm, and sensors which can detect the movement of vehicles. It is backed by a patmf road and outposts in the border area."o It seems likely that Iraq will continue to assert its crlaims in the border ama the moment it perceives a political and military opportmity to do so."Wuwait has a l ~ a d had y to abandon plans to allow Western oil companies to e x p l m and develop its oil fields near the Iraqi border because of the risk of new clashes and incidents. Iraq, on the other hand, is aggressively attempthg to negotiate deals with nations like Russia to exploit the fidds on its side of the border once the UN' sanctions are lifkd. Iraq's ambitions regarding Kuwait are unlikely to vanish, regardless of what Saddam Hussein or any new regime may say to achieve the objective of lifting the sanctions. Iraqi na.t.ionalistshave claimed that Kuwait js part of Iraq since the 192Qs, and while defeat m y force Iraqi to accept the inevitable, it is s c m e l y likely to legitimize Kuwaitfs independence or new borders i,n the minds of Iraqi nationalists. The issue of reparations may poison Iraqi-Kuwait relations for years, m d memories of the war and the sanctions that have followed will be dow to die. Iraq's access to the Persjm Gulf nokv consists of a 58 kilometer coastline on relatively shallow Gulf waters, Iraq's only major port on the Gulf is Basra, Mxhich c m only be reached via the Shattt al-Arab-a river whose waters Iraq shares with Iran. Due to a UN-sponsored border demarcatiun, Iraq has lost much of its only naval base at Umm Qasr, and even if it builds a new port, it will have to use a channd sharltd with Kuwait and dornhated by the Kuwaiti islmds of Warbah and Bubiyan."2 Relations with Iran

Iraq" rdatims with Iran have generally consisted of continujng c d j c t between the two states. At the same time, the West m d the Southern Gulf face the risk of s o m kind of slrategic rapproaehme~n

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RibbeMro:, Pact"-that might create a unified &eat in the mrthcrn Gulf. However, Iran and Iraq have never reached a full cease-fire or peace sett l a e n t after tbr end of t.he Iran-Iraq War, and Iran has made claims for up to $100 bilfion in reparatinns .from Iraq. Iran has mturned. some prisoners of war sixrce 1990, but Iraq claims Iran still holds up to 20,OO Iraqis c a p t u ~ dduring fie Iran-Iraq War, and is szxpporting several thousand Iraqi troops that fled into Iran after the uprisings following the Gulf War. In September 1994, the International Committee of the Red b s s (liCRC) issued a report on "unresotved hunanitarian i s m e " fmm thc Iran-Iraq War. I'he XCRC noted that che ent violated the Third Geneva Convention by failing to nts killed in action and to exchange information on those killed or ntissing. kcording to the report, the fate of almost 19,000 Iraqi prisoners of war (POThrfs)in Iran "remauled unknown." The report criiticized the Irmian gove ent for obstructing XCRC efforts tc:,register and repdride POWs."q:~ran, in turn, clairns that Iraq holds up to 5,O(Xi Iranians, while Iraq claims it has nune.344 Iran and Iraq have engaged in a low-levd conflict in which Iran has baeked anli-regime e f i r t s by Iraqi Shi"ites, and Iraq has backed the Iranian People" MMujaXlideen, During the Gulf Was, Iran supported Irayi Shi'iite m i l i t q attacks on the People's Mujahideen camps in Iraq. Since that time, the People's Mujahideelr has launched attacks on lran fsom camps in Iraq, while Iran has attacked the Peoyile's Mujahideen camps in Iraq. Iraqi officials rnet with Iranian officials before the Gulf War in an effort to persuade Iran not to support the UN Coalition, but this effort failed. Iran supported the UN CoaIiticrn during the Gulf Wtr, and seized the Iraqi aircraft that fled to Iran during Desert Storxur."s On April 5,1992, Iraq and Iran had their first significant mjfitary exchange since the Irm-Iraq War, Iraq had been providing money and arms to the Mujahideen e-Khalq, a radical Marxist Iranian opposition movement which had military camps and forcer; in Iraq. The Mujahideen launched several mallraids on Iran, and Iran sent 12 F-4 and F-5 fighters to attack the Ashraf Camp about 60 miles northeast of Baghdad. The aircraft attacked in six waver;, dropping cluster bombs, firing mckets, and strafing. Clne Iranian F-4 was lost to anti-aircraft fire during the attack. Iraq responded by scrambling ten of its fighters fnr the first tjlne since the Gulf Miar, in violation of UN Security Cotlncil :Resolutions 686 and 687. Iran claimed-wi& justificationhat these strikes were in retaliation for Mujahideen ground attacks on hnio Irmian towns near the border on April 5, 1992. Iran also stated that it conducted the raids in Esponse to other People" Mujhideen raids on. Irm that had been designed to dis-

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rupt its parliamentary eledions, sabotage pipelirzes, m d strike at Iranian borcler posts, Iran cmducted new air raids on Iraq on May 25,1993, and at least 12 Iranian aircraft struck against two of the People's Mujahideen c m p s in :Iraq, Une of these bases was at Jalat, near Sulayxnanirah, about 55 miles from the border. The ather was at AshraE, about 65 miles nor&east aE Baghdad-a carnp reported ta have between 1,500 and 5,000 g~~errillas. Iran stated that these air raids were h ~taliationlfor Mujahideen attacks in Iran that attempted to disrupt the Presidential elections, and for Mu~ahideensupport of lranian Kurdish rebels during the previous two weeks. Iran held manewers on the Iraqi border fn h z e s t a n in Rcray 1993and deployed a1 armored brigade, an IRGC force of about 8,000 men, helicoy-ters, and fighters, Iraq retaliated by announcing in June 1993 that it was deploying additiml air and land units to the border area, although it is unclear any major redeployments actually took place. C)n J d y 23' 1993, Iraq claimed that Iran conducted a major artillery assault on Mujahjdeen camps in Iraq, fncluding a three hour bombardment by mu.1tiple rocket law~chersin the area of Sttlaymaniyah."""lraqi and lranian officials met again in October 1993, but the talks produced little result. The mly real change in refations between 1991 and 1993 was a growing black market in the border area that traded oil snnuggled fmm Iraq fnr spa= parts and food smuggIed in from fran,"7 In the late fafi of 19534,Iran's attitude towads Raghdaci seemed to soften. Javad Larijani, the vice chairman of the Iranim Majlis" Foreign Affair Committee and an advisor to Rafsanjani gave an interview ill which he stated that no country was better placed to help hay repair its econonty than Iran and that ""Iran and Iraq will set the course for the major issues of the Persian Gulf." ".AlikAkbar Nateq-Nouri-the speaker of the Iranian Parliament and a passible candidate from p ~ s i d e n tin 1,997-gave another interview wl.rich seemed to advocate improving relations with :Iraq as a countesbalance to US power. These initiatives failed for reasons that are not entirely clear, but seemingly are linked to attacks by the People's Mujahideerr. ]In Novernber 1944, Iran announced that it fired four missiles at the Mujahideen camp at Ashaf, and claimed it had inflicted heavy casualties. Iran indicated that attack followed the cancellation of an Iranian diglornatie missicln to Baghdad, and Iran strengthened its army deplloyments in the border area,"B The new hard h e the US took towards Irm in 1,995did, however, lead :Iran to make another attempt to improve its relations with fray. lranian government radio began ta call for an end to the UN sanctions on fray an February 20, 1,995. Iran sent a delegation to Baghdad in May 1995 that

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was led by Ali n o r a m , a s e ~ ~ iadvisor ar to klayati. Ch May 26, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, Hossein Sheikholeslam, announced that arrangements had been made for Velayati to visit Baghdad. There also were news reports that Iran m d Iraq had reached m agreement to exchange prisoners of war, and that Iran had asked Iraq to exkadite Masoud bjavi, the leader of the People's Mujahideen, to Irm+349 C)nce again, the tdks failed. In, early 'July, Iran seems to 7 w e sent gunmen to assassinate three People" Mujahideen leaders in Baghdad. Iran also made statements on July 18, 1995, hdicating that it was backing away from its attempts to improve relations wi& Iraq. Hassan Ruhani, the Sccrctary of Iran" s:Natimal Supreme Securit)l Council issued a statement that Fornip Minister Velayati had been fnvited to Iraq, but had rejeded the invitatio~~. Ruhmi also stated that Iraq had not cmplied with many of the prwiijons in the July 1988 cease-fire and UN Securj.ty Councif Resolution 598, and that no visit would take place until Iraq did so:sm Most of the ar2icles of the resolution have not been implemented yet. The articles dealing with war reparations, reconstruction of war-stricken areas, repatriation of prisoners of war, and same other issues are not rewlved. There is stmng evidence substantiating that Iraqis are still holding some 5,000 grisc>nersof war. . . .

The Irmim Amed Forces Commmd wmt hr&er on July 30, 1995. It accused Iraq of rt~peatedlyviolat-img the terms of the 1988 cease-lire dzaring the first half of 1995, and of cornmitthg 80 violations from Jmuary 21 to June 22, It charged Iraq with plmting mines m d firing artillery shells into Iran, reco~maissanceoverflights by piancs m d helicopters, and bstalling anti-aircraft equipment near the border, It also accused Iraq of pmvokirmg clashes with Iranian border p a d s , and kidnapping Eranian ciwilims.'"fil Saddam Mussein, in turn, at;lacked Xran's iieadcrs irr a speech m hugusl 8, 1995, He criticized them for keeping Iraqi POWs m d Iraqi. combat aircraft, and for snubbirtg Baghdad" peace overturtrs. Saddam charged that Iran had ignored 2 5 lraqi calls IOr peace since the begilnrring of the IranIraq Mr. In rczporthg Sad.dam"sspeech, the Iraqi media referred to 20,000 Iraqi prisoners, 22 IL-76 bansports, five Bwing airliners, and over 1 0combat aircraA."z Iraq m d Ism then split agak over the Kt~rdsirn August m d September 1996, with :Iran backing the PUK md, Iraq backing the KDP Ihese developmmts itfustrate how harci it may be to achieve any rapproachment between Iran m d Iraq, and give m y such rapproach~~ent lasting strategic importance. The history of Irmian-Iraqi relations to date does not: make a ""devil" barl;ahUbetwen the two countries seem likely. No one, hokvever, can disnniss an Iranjan and Iraqi strategic relationship or "Molotov-Rbbentsop Pact" out of hand. Iraq resu~ledits calls for dialogue with Irm in January 1996,"""

External Relations Iraqi Support of the People's Mujahjdeen

It is quite clear that many differences continue to separate Iraq and Iran. Among the mnst salient of these is Iraq" support for the Mujakdin-e-Khalq opposition group. Iraq has suppwted the People's Mujahideen in a battle of assassination and counter-assassination against Iranian ofiicials. In late 1992, to the chagrin of Tehran, the Mujahedine-Khalq raised its politic& profile strbstantiaIly when it held a twoweek long conference in Iraq durilng kvhich it reportedly decided to broaden its social and political base in order to get rid of its undemocratic image and make itself more attractive to Iranians disgruntkd with the regime.34 Tension between Iraq and fran increased dramatiralXy in the spring of 1993 primarily because of a rise in Iraqi-sanctioned MKO infiltration of saboteurs into Iran. According to some reports h the first two weeks of May 1993, the MKO launched 14 cross-border operations in which 200 mernbers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps were killed and seven oil pipelines were blokvn up. The MKC) conthued with its crossborder inatration into Iran in the sprjng of 1994 attacking more oil pipelines and miitary i~~stallatims belonging to the Revolutionary Guards 14th Di\ris-ion and 21st "Imam Reza" brigade, At the same time, the Mujahedin-e-malq is an a h o s t perfect "sacrifice s Iran. Saddam" regime pawn" if Imq wants to improve its ~ l a t i o n with has nothing in common. with the ill-cmceated Marxist Iranim nationalism of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq. The Mujahedin-e-aal.q is little more than an irritant to Iran, It is seen as an organization of traitors by most Iranims, and it has no real chmce of seizing power. As a result, Saddam may find the Mujahedin-e-Khalq just as expendable in the iuture as the Shah found the Iraqi Kurds to be in 1975.

Kegations with Syria, 'Jordan,and Tarkey W i l e much of the focus on Iraq's external relations co~~ce~ztrates on. Kuwait and. Iran, Iraq aIso plays m important role in the future of Jordan, Israel, and Syria, and the rest of the Gulf. Further, its oi sources and potential economic wealth m k e it an attractive target for European and Asian investment and trade-a factor which bas alrcady had an important impact m the West's lack of cclhesion in dealing with Iraq and the issue of sanctio~~s*

Iraq and J~rdarz It is commonly forgotten that Iraq and Jordan were both ruled by dif erent branches of the same Sharifian Hashernite family h m the Hijaz,.

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Both mo~~archical Iraq and Jordan joked forces to establish the Arab Federation in early 1958 to confront the dynastic hostility of the AI5auds of Saudi Arabia and the rttvotutionary pan-Amahist rttpublicanism of Gamal Abdel N'asser of Egypt. T h i s alljance djd not last long. That very year, the Iraqis bloodjly uverthrew their monarchy and mrdcred. the king. As a result, Iraqi-Jordanian relations remained cool and distant u ~ ~ tthe i l late 1WOs. It was the Iran-%rayWar that led to a change in this situation. Iran effectively closed Iraq's ports, and Syria sealed off oil exports and trade acmss the Syrian border.. As a rclsult the Jorcfanian port of Aqaba becam a major lifeline for the import of goods destined for Iraq. Jordan opposed :Iranian religious extremism, had little sympathy for Syria, and needed jobs, hard cwrency, a d arms. As a rest&, fordan suppljed Iraq with military advice and expertise, while in, return Iraq pmvidcd Jordan with badly needed captured Western weaponry from the kanians. These economic and military ties helped ensure that Jordanian public sentiment was heaviIy pro-Iraqi durirrg the Gulf crisis. However, many other factors were involved. There was littie sympathy for the Kuwaitis and other Gulf k a b s m o n g the Jordanians, particdarly m o n g the Palestilrian element of the population and the many Mdanians who had wcrrked in the Gulf and felt they were twated as second-class Arabs, Many Jordanians also believed that what they cynically called, the "'cashregister" coalition was put together by the West to destroy 'X~rab"and :Iraqi power, rather than to liberate Kuwait.""" Iraqi-Jordanjan relat.ions havef howcver, dcteriora.t.ed significantly slnce the Gulf War. King Hussein has sought to refitore his relations with the US, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Since 1993, Amman has increasingly expressed its concern over the impact of the sanctims on the Iraqi people. Furthermore, King Hussein is irritated by the reticence with which the ent dealt with the Idk;l and the international commmity in gmeral, and the unpredictab5ty of the Baghdad ~ g i r n e . In October 1994, when Iraq massed two divisions on the border with Kuwait and p~cipitatedan international crisis, King Hussein pubiicly advised Saddarn HusseSn not to repeat his ""mistakesf' of Augtlst 1990, Jordan negotiated a peace treaty with Israel and King Husseirz used the opportunity provided by Husseh Kaxnel"~defection to improve relations with Saudi Asahia. The Saudis sent their head of int-elligence, Prince FaisaI al-Tarki, on a '"secret" visit to Jordan in mid-August to discuss the defection, bilateral Saudi-Jozdanian ties, and the pcrlieical situation in Iraq and prospects fnr change. Jordanian Foreign Minister AlKabmiti paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia not long after Turki's cloak and dagger trip, and this seemed to signal the begir~ningsof a thaw in Jsrdanian-Saudi relations.

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Shce that time, King Husseh has been increasingly aggressive in attempting to bring together Iraq" divided opposi.tim movments and support an ""externalstrategy" to overthrow Saddam Hussein. It is also clear from his actions that his goal is to develop a stable neighbor and not to restore Hashemite influence in I r q . Members of th fordanian royal family are ail too aware of the proba:ble life expectancy of any outside rulcr, and of the fact that the days of an Iraqi lnonarchy are long past There are, however, a number of constrahts on Josdasr" ability to break all relations with Saddam's Iraq. lraq owes Jordan $1.2 billion and h i s debt is large enough to threaten Jordm" reserves. Jordan's ecmomy is tied to the Iraqi economy: it gets its oil from Iraq at concessionary rates, and it could cost Jordan nearly @(X1 to $450 million a year to buy c_li at market ra.t.es-a cost that would seriously deplete its foreig11 exchange holdings. Jorcimian economic activity and commerce has benefited substantially from ties to Iraq. Jordan now plms to cut exports to Iraq by 50% in 1996 to reduce Ihe g r w t h of Iraq's debt. At the same time Jordan cannot sever all its economic ties without m a h g major sacrifices, and has indicated that it has no intention of doing so. Jordanian popular support for Iraq-and particularly for the Iraqi people who arc seen as victims of the West and of the Gulf . A r a : b ~ i svery strung, especially a m n g Jordanian I"alesthims."b

Mq nnd Syria Relations between Syria m d Iraq had been antagonistic ever since 1969, and relations betv\reen the two Bakathist states reached a new low during the crisis over Kuwait. 'T"here are four main factors which shape this Syrian-Iraqi antagonism: personal, ideological, ecmomic, and politicostrategic. 'I'he personal factor is uncertain. There has been an almost inevitable conflict of personatity, style, and prestige betwee11 Asad and Sacidram Hussein, but it i s difficult to judge reports that there i s a deep mutual loathing between Hafez Asad and Saddam Hussein. Mid& Eastern politics are highly personal m d it would not be surprishg if two men with burnixrg ambitions for their respective countries and who both come from minority sects fmm within their respective states developed a loathhg for one mother. It is interesthg, however, that Patrick Seale, the biographer of Asad, does not dwell, on the personal origins of Syrian-Iraqi differences, but focuses on other factors. Ideology m d Bdathism have definitely been k e y causes ol the IraqiSyrian conflict, Bakatln ideology-which calls for a sweeping renewal, rebirth and ~gmeraticmof the Arab world-does not lend itself to two ce~ztersof power any more than Commw~ismdid. Baghdad and Darnas-

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cus, whose rivalry for influence in the Arab world dates back to the Ummqad and Abassid Calgihates, have become just as divided as the Soviet &ion and China. 'f'hey have often attacked each other on ideological grouncts, and their confict has spread to Ba'athist pmties in other Arab countries. The Syrians have rcacted strongly to Saddam" attempts to use the fact that Iraq had greater resources to establish ideolcrgical and geopolitical paramoulzcy over Syria whe~zboth countries sought to establish a union h 1979. Syria has rcfused to be the junior partner in m Iraqi Bakathist enterprise, just as it refused to be a junior partner to Nasser. Syria and Iraq have quarreled over ecmomic and water issues, namely the export of Iraqi oil through Syrian territory to the Mediterranean, and the flcrw of the Euphrates originates in the mountains of liarkey and passcs through Syria into Iraq on its way to the Persian Gdf. In the 'all of 1971, Syria demanded higher transit fees from the Iraq Petroleum C m panyfs (PC) pipeline to the port of ESaniyas. The P C , despite its name was not in the hands of the Iraqi gover ent, and negotiated a 5076 hzcrease in fees to Uamascus, "IlIep i p h e was shut down temporarily in 1979. Problems over water have led to tensions and resulted Fn a concentration of troops atomg the mutual border in mid-1975. The Iraqi leadership, including Saddam, accused Syria of interfering with the free flow of the Euphrates, following their inaquration of the Tabqa Dam, and of causing ""social and economic disasters." "ese problems seern likely to grow in the future since both nations arc experiencing a steady drop in renewable water resources per capita. Iraq dropped from 14,706 cubic meters per person per year in 19770 to 5,285 e t h i c meters in 1998, and is projected to drop to 2,000 cubic m t e r s in 2025. Syria dropped from 1,196 cubic meters per person per year in 1971)to 439 cubic meters in 1990, and is projected to drop to 161,cubic w t e r s in 2025.""7uch a drop is m k i n g the sharing of water a steadity more serious issue for Turkey, Syrja, and Iraq, mere has been an enduring strategk rivalry between Syria and Iraq in both inter-Arab affairs and their bilateral relations. 'The growth in lraqi power between the mid-1970s and late 1970s aimed Syria considerably, as did Baghdad's request that Syrian-Irayi unity discussitrns in 1979 be cmducted on Iraqi terms. a c e the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Syria allied itseli with Eran in order to cut Iraq down to size. Syria provided substantial help to Iran, and closed down the oil pipline to Baniyas in April 1982-caushg Iraq serious economic damage. Iraq emerged from the Iran-Iraq War in a vengeful mood towards Syria and tried to isdate Syria in inter-Arab affairs. Further, Iraq sougbt to increase Syria's difficufties in I:,,ebanonby supporting Damascus's chief nemsis, General Michel Aoun with ams. This helps explains why Syria became a member of the Coaliticm, Syria could not dlow Iraq to succeed in its jnvasion of Kuwait, Such a vi,ctory kvolllid havc increased Iraq's power and ali.owed it to dictate the guidelines of inter-Arab politics. At

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the same time, Syria was cor~cemedby the destruction of Iraq's matarary power and by the heavy involvement of regional. and wtside powers in Iraq" domestic affairs.. Asad has sought:better relations since the war*m c e Asad consolidated his control over Lebanon and no longer felt a strategic threat from a beaten Iraq, he r e s u e d contacts with Iraq. In March 1992, it was revealed by the Lebmese newspaper Al-Nahar that Iraqi techicians and petrochemical engineers had visited Dmascus to discuss the reopening of the oil pipeline that s 650 miles horn :Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas m d which had relnained closed since 11982. So far, not%ringhas come froan.these contacts, alhough there were m c m fimed reports (21- meetings heween senior S y r i a and Iraqi oBicials in April 1996. There are several reasons why this may be the case. First, it is possible that the pipeline has dekrjorated beyond Iraq" or Syria" abi.Zity to put itback in opera.tion+Second, Syria was probably rclluctant to bring the wrath of the international cornmmity if it were to ailow lraq to e exports via the Banjyas pipehe. mird, Iraq may have been reluctant to go further in thc. matter because of potenfid Syrim "greed,'" i.e., sqrxeezilrg as much morley as possible from Ra@dad in the way of trmsit fees, Nonetheless, trade ~ s u m e dbetween the two corntries in December 1999 with an Iraqi shipmat of petmchernieals tryor& $15 miEon, During 1995, Saddam Husseh's growhg problems h Sm~ni-dorninated central Iraq-Al-hbar provinc+gositioned Syria to play a more active role in Iraqi politics. 7'he a l a i m i rebellion in the spring of 1995 highlighted the importance of this large tribe that: stretches 'sorn the outskirts of Baghdad into Syria itself. The location and the nature of the a l a i m revolt k d tc:,the crystallization around Syrian patronage of a new Iraqi opposi.tion mnvement of Sun,njs called the "Armed D~~lairn Tribes Sons Mavemmt." h ma-d-fme&med hlairni, the brother of the executed general fled to Damascus where in conjunction with thCl Al.-Bunimr m d Al-B~rshaunmarsub-clans of the Dulaimis, he formed the Iraqi tribes movemnt called the Supreme Leadership Council of the Union oi Iraqi Tribes to bring about a coordinated 'biked military action plan."It is still not clear wfiether Syrja is playing an active role h Dufaimi aMairs or is seeklng some sort of rapproachxnent with Saddam.. It is clear that Syria is in a position to exploit Saddam's troubles in the "center," m d cm eifier use this pressure to theaten the Iraqi r e g h e or help forcc conc~sims,but h r e is no guarmtee that Syria and lraq wlll always be hostile, h ~d-199Cithere we= rvorts from the NTiddle East &at seemed to h~dkatethat Iraq and Syria were swkk~ga way out of fheir decades-old [email protected] that Syrjan leader flafclz al-Asad and Saddam met secretly on the Iraq-Syria border early in 19967 c at be substmtiated. However, there were clear-cut r e a m s why both c0untri.e~might: be seekislg a rapprochement. For its part, Iraq bad good reasms to expIoit an)i potential

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crack in the wall of isolat-ionthat it has suffered for the past six years. A rapprochement with Syrja okred a way either to drive a wedge betwwn D m n s Tehran. ascus and Tehran sr f o m a clh el to improve r e l a ~ ~ with Syria has its own wasons to seek a rapprochement, From Damascus's perspective, the peace process with Xsrael had virtually collapsed by the 5 p k g of 19%. 7he mukaal mistwst between Jerusalem and Damascus had been intensified in April 1996 when Israel launched an attack against Hizbolfah guerrilfas in Lebmon that threatened to escalate into clashes between Israel and Syria.""" There were three other reasons for Syria to act. First, in Fdruary 1996 details of an Israeli-Turkish military accord emerged, causing constematian and worry ammg the Arabs and in Iran. This accord between the two most powerful countries in the Middle East called fnr intelljgence cooperation, joint collection of electronic intdigence along Turkey" borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Israeli assistance in the trainirrg sf Turkish forces stixt-ioned in the snutheastern borders, and joint air exercises behnieen the Turkish and Israeli Air Forcese"y Scond, the Jordianian-Israeli peace trt-laty was foflcrwed by k g Husseh's strategic decision to undertake a dramatic expansinn of relations between Amman and bmsaIem and to distance himself from Iraq, Syrja was cminced that it was being mcircled from the nor& by Turkey, from the south by Jordan and Israel, and talk of a Jerusalem-Ankara-hman axis heled Syrian afarn7.X' Relations between Amman and Darnascus worsened in the su er af 1996 when the former accused the latter af szxpporting termris~zagainst: it. The Syrian response came in t-he shape of a statement by Defense Minister Talaskhich poured scorn on Jordan's regional pretensims: "Jordan was created tcr separate Saudi Arabia, the lmd of the Xslamic message, m d Syria, the land of Arab conqraesb. Moreover, this entity was crcated to protect Israel and be its shied." To Syria's west was a weak vassal state, k b a n m , and to the east was Iray, now weak but thoroughly ho&ile and alienated from Damascus. A Syrian opening to Iraq under these circumstances is not inconceivable. Third, in June Likud leader B m j m i n Netany&u was elected Prime Mhister of Israel and proceeded to state that Israel would never give up the Golan Heights, A war of words erupted betwem Syria and Israel and Umascus initially acted tcr =affirm its strategic understanding with Tehrm when Syrian Prime Mhister Mahmud Zn'bi visited Tcrhran in August.""Zt the same time, Syria sought to mubilize a collective Arab respcmse to the rise of hard line g o w e m n t in Israel at the Arab Cairo Su~amitof June and claimed that the peace process betwem Israel and the Arabs bad ended when clashes took place behnieen Israel and the Palestix~iansin October 1996. It is far from clear that leader Hafez al-Asad and Saddam Hussein can ever to any kind of effecthe working refationship, and any such relation-

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ship rnight force Syria to make a pa,.inful choice between Iran and Iraq, but the possibiliv can never be dismissed.""

%key is one of two non-Arab states bordering Iraq, the other being Iran. Iraqfmapproacl-ctowards Turkey has, hokvever, been different from its approach towards Iran, fray has been dkided from Iran by his tor^ ideology, the &nlggle over cmtml of the Shatt al-Arab, the Kurdish war of 1969--.197,5,rivalxy for influelnce in the Gulf, alleged lranian subversim in Iraq after the fall of the Shah, and the Iran-Iraq Was. 11%contrast, Turco-Iraqi relations were cordial, even close, from the 1970s until Iraq invaded Kuwait and Turkey joined the UN Coalition. Relations we= strengthened by the fact that both countries were secular and kighly nationalistic states committed to eccmomic development and progres a"t time when Islamism was growing stronger. Both nations avoided interference h each other" domestic affairs, Iraqi exports through Turkish territory to the port of Dortyol steadily expartded, there was a significant- increase in Two-Iraqi trade and commercial ties, and both natians cooperated in curbing Kurdish natiana1ist activi-t).on both sides of their common border. This history heks to explah why Iraq began to seek a rapproche~~ent with Turkey h o s t immediately after the Gulf War. Iraqi officials stmssed the need for normalkation based on past "ideal"' neighhorly ~lali.onsand c o m o n political and economic interests. Turkey, suffering fPom the economic effects oi the embargo against Iraq-one of its largest trading parhers-cailed for the lifting of sanctims agah~stIraq, although it knows t-hat it. camot unilaferallly allow the fIokv of Iraqi oil through the Ekuk-DorQol pipelhe. Turkey has so far supported the UN effort to establish a Kurdish security aolne, but has never supported Kurdish autonomy and has been deeply ranhappy about the absence of Baghdad"~authority in the northem part of Iraq. Frclm Turky's perspective the gove was an exemplary secmrity partncr in securing Fheir muhaal border from the 1970s to the t h e of the Gulf Miar, Iraq's fractious K d s are scarcely a substitute. Turkey also wants command oE the UN effort to support, ""@eration Provide Comfort." It wants either a rcsumptim of Baghdad's control over the Kurds or more Turkish leverage over the Iraqi Kurds, as well as to defuse the criticisms made by Turkih Islamists and nationalists regarding the presence of forc?it;gnforces orn Turkish s d Iraq, iar turn, fears Turkey" pputential ambitions. These fears were stmngthened by the statements of some 'I'urkish analysts and political figurcs after Turkey joined the UPJ' Coalition in 1990. First, obtiqlle references by some Turks to the 'lost-vilayet of Mosul, which i s part of Iraq

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but which was once a part of the Ottoman Empire, have alarmed the Iraqis. Second, Iraqi fears were aroused by Turkish military incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan after 1992, which were not coordinated closely with Iraq as they had been when sinnilar h c u r s i o ~ took ~ s place during the IranIraq War. mird., Presjdent Sdeirnan Demirel made a statement in early May 1995 that there should bt, an adjuriment in T~rkey'sborders with Iraq-just as Turkish forces cmcluded 'Operation Steel,' its attack into northern Iraq against the separatist PKK: The border is wrclng. The MosuX Prc>vincewas within the Ottoman Empire's territory. Had that place been a part of Turkey, none of the problems w e are confronted with at the present time (i.e., unstable borders and separatist activities) would have exkted."""

Demirel retracted his statement fnllowing negative rezlctions from Mident, and Iraqi opposition forces, dle Eastern states, the Iraqi gowe However, the Iraqi rncdia began to refer to Turkey as the ""sick man," and threatened to ""cut off the hands of those who try to barm us." hrther, the creation of a Turkish ""s;curiv zone" in nnorlhern Iraq some 10-4,5 kilometers south of the Turkish border following the Kurdish crisis of Septembs 1996 scarcely reassured Iraq. Turco-Iraqi relations have also been strained in the past by Iraq's depmdence on the ojit pigeline t-hmugh Turkt-ry In late 1991 when t-he 19N'was negotiating the plan for the sale of Iimited yuantjties of Iraq oil via the Dortyol pipeline, Ankara demanded a very substantial increase in transit fees of a one-off Imp-sum paymmt of $264 miuion regardless oE the actual. level of Iraqi output. This increase would have drastically reduced. the sum of money availaklle to Iraqi purchase of basic necessities. h outraged Baghdad de~~ounced the Erkish dcmand as "dayrigl-\t robbery."3M In m y case, the matter became academic as Iraq chose not to exercise the option of seIIirzg the limited qumtity of oil allowed by the UN. Nonetheless, lraq has to consjder the fact that the Turks may prove recalcitrant in the future when it comes to Iraqi ail exports through Tarkey,

Iraq, Egypt, and Other Arab Stales Iraq's relations with other Arab states are mixed. A. number of Arab states-such as Algeria, Mauntmia, and Yemen-provided the UN Coalition with timited or no s u ~ p o rbt r i n g the Gulf War. Since that time many Arab and Islarnic states wbich had opposed or fought Iraq durjng Desert Storm have becom increasingly concerned over the impxt of sanctims, and resentful of what they feel are US efforts to use the UN Security Cau~zcifto impose its own political. agenda.

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Iraqi officials have tried to exploit these feelings. 'They have taken to calling the UN Security CounciZ, "the New Vork branch of the State Deparmmt.'" 'They have also made e v e 7 effort to exploit t-he tragic socioeconon?icimpact of sanctions, m d the issue of sovereignty posed by UN interventions in I r q . They have tried to generate the perception that the UN's mission is solely to blame for Iraq's plight in spite of the fact that the Iraqi regime has refused the UN% terms to self oil, and that the UN has been slrbordirzated to the West, which they claim is part of the West's search for a "new world order." The Iraqi leadership has sought to build support in the Arab and Islamic worlds by appealing to the masses, intellectuals, students, opposition gmups, and nationalists. Iraq has appealed to Arab states m the m e grounds, sometims adding thfeats about the consequences of sapparting smctions that will make Iraq an enduring enemy This d i p h a t i c offensive has had some success even in cases like Egypt, whose leader, President Mossli Mzzbaritk kvas a founder of the 19N' Coalition. Beghing in early 1993, Mubarak stated that restoration of Egyptran-Iraqi relations was only a "matter of timc.," and Zly late 3995 Egypt's position tocvards Iraq had softened considerat?ly- CBiro was inc~asinglyfmstrated by the lack of a move towards inter-Arab mconcifiatrion which would inclulie a reintegr;ltion of Iraq into the Arab regional system.,Furt.Etermore, Egypt indicated that it felt the abse~~ce of Iraq from the regional balance of power was detrimental to the security of the Arab world. Hence, it decided to take the initiative. In July 1,995, Iraqi,Foreign Minister, Muhmmad Said al-Sahhaf visited Cairo and met with Egyptian Foreign Minister %mr Musa. This visit was followed by Mubarak"s dismissal of the importance of Hussein Kamel-a position whiCh drew praise from the Iraqi government. Egypt also re-opened its trade center in Baghdad, decided to increase its staff at its embassy and to upgrade diplomatic representation, and to allow Egyptian workers-who once numbered almost 2 million-to return to Iraq, Iraq and the Gulf States

The Southern Gulf States alZ supported the UN Coaliticm, but they have become increasingly divided in their treat~aentof Iraq. In late 1,991, AbdulIah Bishara-then the Secretary-General of th Gulf Cooperation ComcilAeciared that the "Iraqi mgime is still there and remains a threat, although it is an machronism. As long as this r e g h e exists, we must stress ollr regional security" A1though Bishara was a Kuwaiti, this statement unquestionably reflected the consensus that existed amow t-he Southern Gulf states at the time.

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The Southern Gulf states still collectivelyand periodically reiterate that Iraq must adhere to all UN Security Council resolutions, especially those pertaining to the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction. However, they no longer have a united approach in dealing with Iraq. Dissension within the Southern Gulf states appeared as early as 1993. Except for Kuwait, the Gulf states expressed their dismay over the periodic Western air attacks on Iraq and at the socioeconomic costs of the sanctions regime on Iraqis. Most of the Southern Gulf states oppose the present rigid policy of economic containment-a position they reiterated during the Kurdish crisis of August-September 1996. Oman and Qatar began to oppose the indefinite extension of sanctions. Both nations saw Iraq as a potential counterbalance to the growing threat from Iran, and felt that sanctions were creating a revanchist state rather than leading to political change. Qatar took a particularly strong stand. It donated food to Iraq on a number of occasions, and reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in October 1992. In February 1995, it called for the rehabilitation of Iraq by the Arab world as a prelude to its return into the international community.365 Sheik Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, continued to maintain a sympathetic position towards Iraq when he came to power as Emir of Qatar. The Qatari Foreign Minister stated that Qataris sympathize with the Iraqis because of what they were going through and reiterated Qatar’s view that Iraq was important to the balance of power in the Gulf.% Sheik Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani also expressed his concern over the risk of the partitioning of Iraq, and dismissed the defection of Kamel as a dispute within the ruling Takriti family, similar to those that take place within the Qatari ruling family367 The Bahraini position has been more nuanced than policies articulated by Oman and Qatar. Bahrain too may see Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran, but Iraq is more of a direct threat and Bahrain has close relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In September, Bahraini Foreign Minister, Sheik Muhammad Bin-Mubarak a1 Khalifa told the Arabic language paper AIHuyah, that “full implementation of the Security Council resolutions is the only way to lift the sanctions and enable Iraq to interact freely with the rest of the world.”- Bahrain indicated that it was concerned by the socioeconomic situation inside Iraq and their implications for the future stability and integrity of the country. In discussing Hussein Kamel’s defection, the Bahraini Foreign Minister reiterated his view that the main problem with Iraq was the issue of the full implementation of the UN resolutions. Bahrain, he added, maintains the position that “what is happening inside Iraq and what the Iraqi opposition does, is an Iraqi matter.”w The Saudi and Kuwaiti positions towards Iraq are more hostile. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia adhere to positions that are similar to those of the US and Britain: Saddam must go and that there can be no tranquil-

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Xity and stability in the region until he does.. Kuwaiti officials like First Deputy Prime Minister Sheik Sabah aI-Ahmad al-Jabir have reiterated the Kuwaiti view that as long as the current regime stayed in power there would be ""no stability" in the regio11.370 The Kuwaiti Council. of Ministers welcomed the decision of the UN Security Comcil to renew sanctions cm lraq in mid-September 1995 and again in early 19%. Kuwait" Crown Prince, Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah also warned in Sepkmber 1995 that:"l Saddarn will never forget how his invading tmops were evicted frc~mour land, and he will never forget that one day he called your dear country 'Iraq's 39th prc>vince.Y am warning everyone, and in every language that everyone can understand w i t b u t exception, that this regime in Baghdad wili never let Kuw-ait be.

I-lowcver, the Saulii posltion has ecently been more sympathetic. Early in 1996, Prince Bandar Bin Sultm-lhe Saudi Ambassador to Washjngton-stated that Saudi Arabia supports ending, '%the sufferirrg of the Iraqi people." At nearly the same time, however, a top-ranking Saudi offlciaX reiterated his corntry's oppasitian to any dealhgs wi.Lh Saddam Husseisr" regime:3" We have the longest border with Iraq, and everyone is aware of our desire for the best of relations with that people. But Saddam is still a risk, No one trusts him. Even Gearge Bush now regrets having allowed Saddam to remain in power in Baghdad.

The UAE has sought conciliation. Ch C)ctober 15,1995, President Sheik Zayed Bin-Sultan Al Nuhayyan of the UISE called for inter-Arab rcroncifialion which was to include a rehabilitation of Iraq. Zayeci declared that while Saddam Hussein had committed a grave error in invadhg Muwait:"s Tb err is human-.The holy Koran teaches us. The irnpc~rtantthing is far the mistaken to learn from mistakes. Some people err, and others repeat their errors. . . . Let us take Saddarn, as an example, He erred once when he began the war against Iran, . . . Russia, Europe, and America entel-ed confrontations and wars, and then they achieved cooperation and demontitrated solidarity. Why do the Arabs not become like them? Saddam, one person erred. However, who is paying the price now? More than 18 million Trayis are being expc~sedto death. . . . Certainly Saddarn learned from his sin, and he will not repeat it, It is time for reconciliation.

The UAE ruler added that the Arabs must take the hitiative and rehabilitate Iraq, whether the West likes it or not. The W E position was

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endorsed by Omm and Q a t a ~both of which had previously been at the forchnt of the Southern Gulf States c a l h g for reconciliation with Iraq. b a i t and Saudi Arabia opposed the UAEfs initiative, as they had opposed the policy of C)m,mand Qatar. Kuwait's Foreign Minjster, Sheik S&& al-Abhmad al-Sab&, declared on October 24,1995, that "this matter is not on [sic] the hands of Kuwait or any other Arab comtry or the Arab Leag~~e. These are htematio~~al resolutions issued by the UN.'"ey also we= able to make their position the official position of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 7'be GCC conference in December 1995, MIhich took place h Muscat amid great d i s s e ~ ~ s inonetheless o~~, censured Iraq severely and called upon the UN Securiv CounciZ to ensure that Iraq is forced to c m pletely dismantle its weapons of mass of destruction.

Iraq and the International Community Iraqi diplomacy has d s o searched for ways to influence the international community to allow Iraq to rcsume its oil exports, m d to free Iraq of the strategic and military constraints of the cease-fire agreement with the UN. The lraqis realize that neither their propaganda against Western ents, can remove '"bination," nor the sympathy of the Arab gave the smctims. As a result, Iraqi officials-especially veteran diplomats like Tariq Aziz-have sought to take advmtage of differes~cesbetween the real power-brokers within the Uni.ted Nations, The Iraqis have tricd. to e ~ l o ihumanitarian t concerns, and they attempted to ohtain the support of their former trading parhers by okring incentives like trade, investment, oil, and =payment of past debts. Deputy Prime Minister 'Tariq Aziz described this two-tier strategy in an hterviebv with a Russian newspaper. He stated that the UN sandions regime would end because of: lmqi 'sfeadfastwss" I S E I W I Z Land ~ ) a principld slancir. a c e the West reco e z e s the fact that "they cannot bring us to our knees," the bblockade will end.94 lmqi diplomatic a c f b i t y fo make atrrlzfril.5 zrnderstal~dt k f tkiv suppw6. for the ""co~tin z.mi.irtl;tafuf'the embargo is Iln~u~qi~zg nuf ot-rly Iraq, buf f hcmselves-particutarly Russia, Turkey Jordan, and France. As well as China, India, and mmy other states that formerly had mutuatly beneficial ecmonic and trade contacts in our countryYm375

Aziz reiterated a view that Iraqi officials had advanced shce the end of the Gulf War. For example, a former fleputy P r i m Minister, TTaha Yasisl Ramadan described :Iraq's strategy of steadfastness in W91 by rderring to history whesz he said: ". . . we have not conceded our principles, The Arab prophet was victorious in some battles and defeated in others. H e

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did not a b a n d o ~Islam ~ during the defeats. We have living examples in our history. We Arabs consider the tripartite aggression against the Suez Canal in 3956 a victory, even ~ o u g it h led to the occupation of the canal militari,ly bp the cou~~tries that munted the aggression.""b Iraqi officials have focused their efforts to implement this strategy on Russia, France, and the PRC for a wide variety of reasons. First, these three powers were permanent m e ~ ~ b eofr sUN Scurity Council. Secmd, all three resented. Lhe perceived. A n g l o - k r i c a n dmination of the Security Council. Third, all three were importmt eccmomic, pobtical, and commercial part116.r~of Xraq for the past twenty-five years. Fourth, there was little prospect of persuadjng the US and Britain to take the lead in lifting sanctions. The US atzd Britaz"~

'The US and Brii-ah have remained adamant in maintainhg the sanctions on Irag, and have shown every sign that they will cmtinue to do so mtil Saddam Hussein falls from power. The Bush Administration opted to mairrtain "excruciating pressure'"^^ Saddam Hussein by the cmstant threat of renewed nnilitary action, cmtinuatim of diplomatic and political pressure to keep Iraq isolated internationally, and raising the possibility of covert activities ta destabilize the regime fin Baghdad. Men President Bush lost the Novernber 1992 elections, Iraq hoped that the new Clinton Administration would "depersonalize" the conflict and m e twvard better rcf.lat.ions. Not only did the new administration fail to do this, it showed m equal ideological hostility towards the entire Bakthist regime. This was ~ f l e c t e din its policy of ""dual conta direded against both Iraq m d Iran. It declared Saddam" regime to be ""iredeemabIeIf' and a threat to the United States and its allies and friends in the Middle East. It also effectively stipulated that sanctirrns wlruld be maintained until Saddam fell from powec The Clintun Administration's policy called for the US to establisfi,strong ties with the Iraqi opposition, especially the INC. Furthrr, the administration insisted that Iraq would have to comply fully with alS UN %cu,rity Comcil rttsolutions, including those relatirtg to missing Kuwaiti persons, reof Kuwaiti property renunciation of terrorism, ending of reprtrssitm and &use of human rights, and cooperation with of the Iraqi populatio~~ intemtionaI relief agencies. Last but not least, it demanded that Iraq must convince the world Of its ""peaefu%intentions." "ese stringent requirements did not mmtion Saddam by rime, but &ere was little prospect Ihat they could. be fulfilled wihout the regime falling from powes. On January 35, 1996, President Clinton reiterated the US positicm m Iraq, a day prior to the UN Security Cou~~cif" decision to carry over sanctions ag"jnst Iraq for a further two months. Statjrrg that Iraq represented.

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a real threat to peace m d stability h the Middle East, Clinto11 stressed that his "administration will continue to reject any easixlg of sanctiuns until Iraq proves its g w d faith Zly totally complying with the relevant resol~tions.'~ The British governeat provided s t r o ~ ~ s~tpport g fm this PO&tion, as it had for the previous policy positims of the Bush and Clinton Administrations.3n

Rzrssia and Iraq In contrast, Frmce m d Russia have substantial commercial and economic hterests in Iraq, and have taken a much more pro-Iraqi position. Iraq owes Frmce about $5 billion hmilitary and civilim debts, while it owes Russia about $m8billion. A fiussian source claims fiat Iraq owes Moscokv between $11)--$l4 bil:[io11 in miljtary m d civil debt.38 'The (?.RC does not have the same economic stake h Iraq as Frmce and Russia do, but l-ras always been ambivalent about impas% sanctions and has little strategic concern over the nature of the Iraqi r e m e . Russia began to show its sympathy for Iraq in 1994, On several: occasions, Victor Posuvalyuk, President "ieltsin's Special Envoy to the Middle East, expressed Russids posi.tion on Ihc conditions that Iraq needs to fulfill before sanctions are lifted:sTg We would like Iraq to come out of this state, but as a matter of principle, provided it abides by the UN Resolutian 687 which concerns aspects of disarmament and the termination of its military programs. Baghdad also must recopize the independence and sc~vereigntyof Kuwait and internationally recognized border, and finally make clear the fate of Kuw-aiti citizens taken priwners or missing during the war with Kuwait,

In March 1999,Russia johed wi& France and Chba in circztltating a draft resolution in the UN to lift the embargo on Iraqi oil exports. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian ambassador to the UN repeated Russia%well-estabXished position that:380 We act strictly within bounds of the Security Council" rremlutionti and procedures recorded in them. In its proposals, Russia proceeds from. the view that Iraq" recopition of Kuwait" sovereignty and Iraq" fulfilling demands for disarmament under appropriate remlutiom of the Scurity Council have created conditions for reply steps by the world community,

Russia bas had several reasons for taking this position, First, Russia wanted to show that it has m indepcmdent foreip policy. This search for independence has been accelerated by the replacement of h d r e i

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Kozyrcv by Evgeni Prixnah, the hcad of the Russian intdligemce service and a noted Arabist, hJanuary 1996. IZussian foreip policy is likely to be even more assertive and independent of the West, and there are likely to be further differences between Moscow and Washington over Iran,Iraq, and China, but not over the Middle East peace process, which Moscow supports. %cond, Russia had extelzsive commercial hterests in Iraq which it wishes to rebuild. The Russian 041 C m p m WKOIL ~ decided to step up its activities in Iraq follow* a meeting h1 September 1494 between an Iraqi delegation headed by the Oil Mnistry's Chief Engineer, Faysal alNasiri, and the LUKOIL president, Vagit Alekperav. Finally Russia saw ericm and British policy as a detemirration to punish Xray for keeping Jl"resid,en,tSaddam Hussein in ofiice, rather than as part of an effort to force Iraq to adhere to the conditions oi UN Resolution 687. Even a noted "Euro-dtlanticise""such as Andrtzi Kozyrev, then Russian Foreign Minister stated on July 11,1995, that "Those sanctions must not become an instrument for punishing peoples or replacing regimes, ~ g a r d l e s scJf whether such regimes are liked or not. . . . (7'he sanctions) must strictly conform to the g d s and reasons fnr wl.ricfi they have been imposed by the UN Sccurity Council. Otherwise they may have the opposite result. If people do not see any other way out, they will resort to extremism.""3~

France and hag SancEio~s France and fray had a close political, economic, and military relationsfip between 197'4and 19911.32 2a"thist Zraq admired French irrdependence of the U'S durjng t-he Cold War era and covcted French military and c m merciaI, technology in order to lessen Iraq's dependence m the Soviet Idnion. For its part, France did not see Eraq as a Soviet sateflite or puppet state in the 1970s, anymore than it sees Iraq as a ""rggue" state in the 1990s. Furthermore, France felt excluded commercially and politically from Imperial Iran-an American domair.1-and the smaller states of the Gulf which were under British influmce &spite the Mlithdrawd of Brit-ish lforces horn the area in 1971. Franctrhayi ~ l a t i o n sexpantfed rapidly during the Irm-kaq War whelz it became Iraq's strangest s~~pportrer h the West, its secmd largest supplier of arms afier the USSR, providing it with advanced military equipmat and aeivisers. Led by President E'rancois Mitterrand, the French govermnt. viewed Saddam's lraq as a secz11,arbulwark against the 'religious fmatieism' from Iran which threatened to engdf the Middle East. VVhile fiance had some qualms at times concerning the wisdom of s~tchstrong s ~ p o rfnr t Iraq which we= acccntmted by the extent of

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the Iraqi comrncrcial debt to France and fears that Iraq could colapse, the existence of a powerful pro-Iraqi fobby among militaq; political and industrid figures, continued to ensure :I;rmcefscommitment to Iraq. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War France believed itself well-positioned to play an important role in the economic m d military reconstruction of Iraq for its aggression :Iraq, but felt that it had no choice but to cmde against K w a i t and to jojn the coalitinn. 'This helps explain why France has never made its post-Gulf War policy towards Iraq emtingent upon the removal of Saddam Ilussein but has co~~sistently demanded that Iraq implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions reyuising d i s m a n h g of its weapons of mass destruction and recognition of Kuwait prior to the lifting of smctims. France's interpretdion is completely legalistic; once Iraq implements Ihe resolutions, sanctions must be lifted h accordance with paragraph 22 of Resolution 687. Like Russia, France believes that the goal posts should not be moved to suit American and British wishes. While analysts continue to ponder the reasons behhd Saddarn" decision to mve troops twarcls the border with K w a i t in Octcrber W94, the wh& &fair revealed growing differences between the Icadhg coalit.im powers, with France in the lead.. While Paris did co-sponsor UN Security Council Resolutin-in 949 which demanded that Eraq w i t h d r ~ the forces it had moved to the border with Kuwait, it- declined to support the Ang1oh r i r a n proposal to c ~ a t an e armor-free zone in southern Iraq. France believed that this cmstiSuted a t h a t to Iraq's territorial integrity.33 Durhg the .first week of January 1995, Main Juppe, then France's Foreign Minister, welcomed Tariq Aziz to Paris for discussions on prospects for easing of sanctions. France's action was sharply criticized by both the U'S and Britain as neither helpful nor constructive."""y early sprjng 1996, even though sanctions still remained and fray continued to be caught up negotiating over the 'food for oil-eat in accorclmce with Resin Frmcoolution 986, Baghdad was clearly pleased by developme~~ts Iraqi relations. h an interview with a French magazhe, Tariq Aziz, when asked whether Iraq was still mgry with Frmce for hav% participated in the Gulf War, replied:38b5 No. ... Moreaver; the government has changed. And we know that Jacques Chirac is one of those leaders who knows Iraq. The Gulf War is a page that has been turned.

?"u date, the efforts of nations tike Russia and France to help Iraq have been set back by the st-upimy, lies, and unnecessary belligerence of

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the regizne. Iraq's troop movemellts to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 and the lies uncovered concerning its biological weapons program in August 1985 have cost: hag dearly. Saddam Hussein also lashed out at hjs neighbors, verbally this t i m , on the anniversary of Desert Storm, referring to them as "the hyenas, jackds, and crows surrounding Iraq (who) thought that Iraq . . . was going to fall . . . and they proved nrtistakene""3"" There is no guarantee, however, that Iraq will be equally clumsy in the futrrre. Its acceptance of UN Resdution 984 is a mflection of the fact that it is becoming more redistic about what it can expect: from other states, and international support for the remaining sanctions is likely to decay with time. It also had considerable success in expbiting divisions within the international community after Ihe Kurdish crcisjs of September 1996, There are limits to how long other nations will. be willing to wait for Saddam to fail. The rising hunlan cost of sanctions is (jradually providing more support for the Ba'ath regim,e, alld sanctions offer no guarantee of a new or better regime, Saddam can dways accept the UP\I offer to sell oil, and attempt to use this to lift tke sanctions in stages.

Imp2ieatians far Western and Sauthern Gulf Strategy Uet again, there is no strategy that can easily resolve the issues involved in Iraqi external relations. Neither the W s t nor Southern Gulf states can rely m either a "centrist" or ""peripheral'btrategy to create a new regisne. Even those states who are willing to enforcle sanctions indefinitely have no assurance that this will bring down Saddam, or that he will. not accept UN terms for oil sales in order to remain in power. Further, the extensim oE sanctions has a very red cast in humanitarian terms, in alienating Arab priblic opi,nion and discrediting l.he use of international sanctions, in hcrcasixlg Iraqi revanchism, and in limiting :Iraq's oil export capability, Mowevcr, liftiing sanctions with Iraq's cwrent regirne in power will not offer Iraq's neighbors any securiv or ensure that Iraq" soil =venues will be used largely to benefit the Iraqi people. Unless Iraq faces firm military containmelnt by the US and Southern Gu[f states-kvith support from Iran, Syria, and Turkey-appeasement will almost certairrly be seen as weahess and acco odation will be exploited. Rather than end Iraqi rclvanchism, the Southem Gdf states will have to live with an Iraq that is more powerful and better ahle to act m its ambitions. This dilernma is another argrtment for changing the prt-sent a p p a c h to smctions, and exploiting the options discussed k Chapter 5. It is also

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an argummt fos prolmgjng military containment, rclgardfess of wfiat happens to the economic sanctions irnposed on Iraq. As the fnlIowing chapters make clear, Iraq is anything but a paper tig"': Et ~ t a h ~ o w e r ful conventimal foxes, it has significant c~albilitiesfor terrorism, and it will be able to rebuild its capability to deliver weapons of mass destmction m e the UNSC(-)M inspection effort ends.

Military Developments Iran m y be the rising military power in the C;&, hut lraq stjll prcsents the most direct threat to the Southern Gulf and the West" supply of oil, :Iraq%military hrces have been erctemively =organized since the Gulf War, and hnve =gained many of their military cvabilities, As Table Three shows, Iraq can still d q t o y massive land forces against Krawait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, and Iraq mmains the leading Gulf pokver in m n y areas of force strength. Chart Eleven s h w s a rough esthate of the trends in Imqi military manpower, and Charts Twelve and mirteen show how Iraq" strength comparcs with that of other Gutf slates. Iraq still has an active force structure with over 380,000 men, plus another 650,000 in reserve. It has six corps with 19 rc"g"tar army eiivisions, seven Republicm Guard divisims, 10 special forces and commando brigades, m d a Preside~~tial Guardlspecial securiw force. Its equipment holdings include muglnly 2,700 tanks, 4,400 other a m w d vehicles, 3,980 major artillery weapcms, 320 attack helicopters, and over 330 combat aireraft. Iraq has also made a rnajor effort to rebuil.d its miXitary industries and to compensate for its lack of arms imports with domestic pmduction. Neverthekss, moro than half a decade without sipnilicant rnilitary irnports is steadily mducing Iraq% mmtary capabilities. While Iraq was able to rebuild and consolidate. its forces after the Gulf Warf this period cJf recovery ended in 19993. Shce late 1993, Iraq has been unable to "recapitalize" its forces, and to fund a proper level of trahing and readmess. Iraq has not been able to obtain the imports necessary to modernize its technology m d make up key lasses from the Gulf War, or to provide the large deliveries of parts, new equipment, and munitions it needs to make up for the inefficiency of its maintenance and logistics capability. Readiness m d morale have declhed steadily as a result of Iraq's economic crisis, and desertions have hercased. The quality and strength oi most n i t s have declined sharply, and even Iraq%elite units have suffered. Iraq has had to cannibalize equipment and take equipment oltt of s o m ullits to maintah the ~ a d i n e s of s others.

TABLE THREE Gulf Military Forces in 19%

Manpower Total Active Regular National Guard & Other Reserve Paramilitary Army and Guard Manpower Regular Army Manpower Reserve Tanks AIFV/Recce, Lt. Tanks APCs Self Propelled Artillery Towed Artillery MRLs Mortars SSM Launchers Light SAM Launchers AAGm Air Force Manpower Air Defense Manpower

lran

Iraq

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia'

UAE

Yemen

320,000

382,500 382,500 0 650,000 24,800

10,700 10,700 0 0 9,250

16,600 16,600 0 23,700 5,200

43300 37,000 6,500 0 4,400

11,100 11,100 0 0 0

161,500 105,500 57,000 0 15,500

70,000 70,000 0 0 2,700

39300 39300 0 40,000 30,ooo

890 8300 0 81 46 235 13

10,000

350,000 1,350 515 550 294 2,oOo 890 3,500 46 700 1,700

350,000 350,000 450,000 2,700 1,600 2200 150 1300 120 2,000+ 12 3,000 5,500

31,500 25,000 0 85 136 7 6

8,500 8,500 0 24 50 172 28 12 4 39 0 58 12

127,000 70,000 20,000 910 1,467 3,670 200 270 60 400 10 650 10

65,ooo 65,000 0 133 515 380 90 82 48 101 6 36 62

37,000 37,000 4 0 , m 1,125 580 560 30 483 220 800 30 700 372

20,000 15,000

15,000 15,000

L500

800

18,000 4,000

3m

1,000 0

220,000

100,000 350,000 135,000 260,000 180,Ooo

36 9 18 0 65 0 0

10,ooo 0

220 130 199 38 0 0

%

24 0 48 0

74 0 62 18

2300 0

4,100 0

0

0

0

(continues)

TABLE THREE (continued)

Iran Total Combat Aircraft Bombers Fighter/Attack Fighter / Interceptor Recce/FGA Recce AEW C41/BM MR/ MPA" KU/COIN Combat Trainers Transport Aircraft" Tanker Aircraft Armed Helicoptersn Other Helicopters" Major SAM Launchers Light SAM Launchers AA Guns Navy Manpower Major Surface Combatants Missile Other Patrol Craft Missile

Iraq

295 0 150 115 8 1 6 0

92 68 4 100 509 204

60 0 3 8 , m 5

353 6 130 180 0 0 0 18 200

34 2 120 350 340 200 0 2,500

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

24 0 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 10 8 12 0 0

76 0 40 8 0 0 0 11 11 4 0 16 36 24 12 12

46

1300

4200

1,800

1,OoO

0 19 0 12 0 7 13 22 14 0 0 37 0 28 0

Qatar 12 0 11 1 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 20 7 0 9 0

Saudi Arabia' 295 0 112 122 10 0 0 36 66 49 16 12 138 128 249 420

UAE

97 0 41 22 8 0 0 15 35 20 0 42 42 18

Yemen 69 0 27

30

0

0 0 0 0 12 19 0 8 21 87 0 0

17,000

1300

1,500

34

2

0 1

3 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

8 0

0 0

0 0

10

1

4

2

4

3

9

10

7

(continues)

TABLE THREE (continued)

Iran Other Submarines

Mine Vessels Amphibious Ships Landing Craft

Iraq

26 2 3

a

17

7 0 4 0 3

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia‘

UAE

Yemen

5 0 0

12

a

6

20

ia

0 0

0 0

0 5

0

3 0

0 4

0 6

0 0 2

0 1

0 7

0 0 4

3 2 2

4

Note: Does not include equipment in storage. Air Force totals include all helicopters, and all heavy surface to air missile launchers. ‘60,OOO reserves are National Guard Tribal Levies. The total for land forces includes active National Guard equipment. These additions total 262 A I F V s , 1,165 APCs, and 70 towed artillery weapons. Yncludes navy, army, national guard, and royal flights, but not paramilitary. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance (US,London), in this case, the 19951996 edition; Military Technology, World Defense Almanac, 29941995; and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance in the Middle East, 29932994 (JCSS,Tel Aviv, 1994).

1,000,000 900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000

Total Active

400,000

0 Air Force & Air Defense

300,000 200,000

IY

-

100,000

0 1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

CHART ELEVEN Iraq: Military Manning-1979-1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from various editions of the IISS, Military Balance, the JCSS,Military Balunce in the Middle East, and material provided by US experts.

U N

m

E l Total B Regular

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia

Qatar

UAE

CHART TWELVE Total Active Militarq? Manpower in AI1 Gulf Forces. Mote: Iran includes active farces in kvolutionary Gnards. Saudi Arabia includes aellve in Natic~nalGuard. Soalrc.~.:Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IfSS, M i l i f ~ Bati~~zce, q 1995-2996,

Iran

Iraq

Total Combat Aircraft

Iran

iill

Iraq

Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

Saudi

UAE

Qatar

Saudi

UAE

Persia12 Cu!fForcers

Bahrain Kuwait Oman

CHART THIRTEEN Major Measures of Combat Equipment Strength-1996 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 2 995-31 996.

Iraq can scarcely be called a paper tiger, but it is hardly the military power that won the Irm-Iraq War. h many areas, :Iraq%order of battle is becoming a hallow sl~ell.11% other areas, military contakment is working and is steadily reduchg the threat Iraq can pose to Iran, Kuwait, and other states* Iraqi Military Expenditures Iraq has been able to remain a major regional military power because of the lcgacy of Iraq's ilnmense military expenditures and arms tranders before the Gulf War, the heritage of the decadesqmg a m s race with Iran summarized in Table Four, and the fact that the regime has given high priority to the military even at the cast of worsening the plight of :Iraq% people. Iraq imported w e l over one hundred billlm dollars wlrrth of conventional arlns between 1972 and 1990, and spent nearly $20 biilion dollars on thc arms and equipment to assemble, manulacture, and deliver weapms of mass destruction, It has been involved h an arms race with Iran since the 1960s. It spent billions fight@ the and nearly Q00 billion in fighting Kurds durhg the early to mid-1970~~ the Iran-Iraq VV;tr, a r k g much of the Iran-hay War, bay spent 40% to 75% of its GDP on military expenditures, m e h ol which has been lost in fruitless wars" :Iraq%llosses of weapms and ammunition expenditures alone total tens of billions af dollars, a d it has lost tens af billlons more in terms of wartime damagef casuall.y m d death payments, m d wasted economic opportunity costs,"T Iraq's tragedy is that it has been Messed with immense oft wealth and other natural assets and one of the best educated populations in the Middle East, but cursed. with one of the worst guvernments, Military expenditums and wartime losses have drained Iraq's economy for nearly two decades, and Iraq's oil wealth has not been adequate to pay them, &asured in constant 1988 dolilars, Iraq" GNP peaked. during 1979 and 1980, with totals of $118 billion and $120 billion respectively. The impact of the Iran-lraq War rapidly cut Iraq's GDP to $"70.4 billjon in 1981, A combhation of wartime damage, the loss of oil export routes through the Gulf and Syria, and lower oil prices then cut the GNlf to levels of $70 billion or less throughout the rest of the 1980s. Iraq's GNP was onXy $65.8 billion in 198%t:he year the Iran-Irq War ended.. This is &out half of Iraq%GNP in 1980. In spite of its growing econmic problems, Iraq kept its military expenditures at aromd 3OCX3of its GNP from 1980 to 1984, the first four years of the Iran-Iraq War. After 1984, when tl-te Iran-bay War grew more threatenifig, military spcnding msc? to 52% of the GNP in 1985, m d stayed close

TABLE FOUR The Iran-Iraq Military Balance: 1%7-1995 Manpower (1,000s)" Country

Total

A'-"'Y

Tanks

OAVs

Artillery

Combat Aircraft

1967 (Time of Arab-Israeli Conflict) Iran 221 200 225 Iraq 82 70 400-535 1973 (Time of October War) Iran 212 160 920 Iraq 102 90 990 1978 (Height of Shah's Military Build-up) Iran 413 280-285 1,62&l,775 Iraq 212 180-200 1,800-2,450 1980 (First Major Year of lran-Iraq War) Iran 240 150 1,735 Iraq 243 200 2,750 1987 (Last Year of Iranian Military Superiority and Occupation of Part of Iraq) Iran 1,030 605-735 Iraq 1m0 955 4,500 1988 (After August Cease-fire and Iranian Defeat in Iran-lraq War) Iran 604 550 5OO400 Iraq 1,100 1,000 5,500 1990 ( B e f i Iraq lnvaded Kuwait) Iran 605 555 550-650 Iraq 1,OOO-1,200 955-1,100 5,500-7,OOO (continues)

E V,

TABLE FOUR (continued) Manpower (1,000s)Country

Total

A-Y

Tanks

1991 (In Spring, Operational Forces After Iraq3 Defeat by UN Coalition) Iran 528-600 400-430 680-750 1 9 5o(Moo 300-200 2,900-3,OOO 1993 (In Spring, Estimated Operational Holdings) Iran 500-520 500-520 750-850 Iraq 430-450 390-410 2,900-3,OOO 1995 (In Fall, Estimated Operational Holdings) Iran 513 350-450 1,445 Iraq 383 330-350 2,200-2,700

OAVs

Artillery

Combat Aircraft

750-850 4,0004,400

1,700-1,500 1,800-2,OOO

180-210' 350-375

950-1,050 4,0004,400

2,20&2,400 1,80&2,000

250-280' 350-375

1,o00-1~00 4,000-4,400

2,700-2,900 1,800-2,Ooo

250-300 350-375

Does not count any of 113 Iraqi aircraft that flew to Iran during the Gulf War. Their operational status is unknown as of this writing. lncludes Revolutionary Guards forces and Popular Army forces omitted from some estimates. Source: Adapted by the author from interviews and various annual editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, M i l i f a y Bulance; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World M i l i f a y Expendifurn and Awns Transfers, and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Middle East Milifary Balance. These sources are extremely uncertain in many areas. The range of estimates has often been adjusted by the author As is the case with all numbers shown, there is a high degree of uncertainty. Even data like main battle tank counts differ radically.

Military Det~elopments

CHARWFOURTEEN Comparative Military Spending of the Major Gulf Powers f$ Millions Constant 1993). Source: Adapted by Antkony H. Cordesrnan frcrorn ACDA, World Ml'll'tatrj Expenditures mzd Arwzs Tratzsfers, 12993-2 994, Table 1.

to 50% for the rest of the 1980s. Iraq could sustain these expenditures only through a combination of massive foreign borrowing and aid from southern Gulf states like Kuwait mA Saudi Arabia. Iraq's debt to its Arab neighbars rose to $37 billion.^^^ To put Iraq's military expenditures in perspective, ACDA estimates that Iraq spent $10,010 million in current US dollars on military forces in 197'8, $11,350 million in 1979, $19,810 mallion h 1980, $24,610 million in 1981, $25,070 million in 1982, $13,230 million in 1983, $16,680 million in h 1986, $16,480 million h 1984, $22,670 million in 19885, $14,890 millio~~ 1987, $18,400 million in 1988, $13,230 million in 1989, $14,210 million in 1990, and $8,828 million in 1991.39

Military Expenditures

Cl

Total Expc~E"cs

B Arms Imports

CHARVIFTEEN Iraqi Military Expenditures, Total Exports, and Arms Import Deliveries: 1983-1 993 (Constant $93 Millions). Suzsrce: Adapted by Anthuny H. Cordesman from ACDA, World M i l i t ~ qExpet~diltlresand A r ~ z sTransfirs, 1993-1994, ACDA/CPO,Washlngto>n, 1995.

The US has not kstted official, unclassified estjrnates of Iraqi military spendjng for the period, since 1991, The TfSS estimates that Iraq spent $13,990 milllon in 1987',$$12,70 million in 1988, and $8.61 billion in 1990. It has issued estimates that Xraq spelrt $2.6 billinn in 1,992 and 1993, but these estimates seem far too low to include the dollar cost equivalent of the Iraqi effort. Both the ACDA and IISS estimates do not include substmtid expe~nditureson wearms of"mass destruction, and massive civil expenditures on preparing and recovering from, the Gulf Miar.39" By 1989, the year between fie Iran-Iraq Lliar and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's economy was experiezzcing a serious economic crisis,

Military Bet~elopments

GNP Per Capita llll Milex Per Capita

CHARXIXTEEN Iraqi GNP Per Capita Versus Military Expenditures 13er Capita (Constant $93). Source: Adapted by Anthony FT. Cordesman frcym ACDA, World M z ' l i f ~Expertdittr y res and Rrfns Trat~sfers,2 993-1 994, Washington ACDA / GPO, 1995, TesbXe 11.

Experts disagree over the economic statistics involved, but not over the serioumess of the crisis. Accodjlrg to the CIA, Iraq" GNP was then $35 billion and its per capita income was only $1,990. This level of per capita hcome is not unusual by mird World standards, but it was low compared to Iraq%economy in 1979 and to the wealth of a far less developed had a GNI" of $79 bifficln and a per capita income Saudi Arabia-*& of %,MO. lraq also owed $13billion in annual deht payme~~ts to the West, nearly hall ol: its oil revenues in 1989.""" M i l e Iraq unyuestionably could have funded its ecmomic recovery from Ihc Iran-Iraq War at the cost of further cutback in its military

expenditutrcs-md done so without risking an attack from Iran or any other neighbar-it chose to try to buy both guns and butter. It was this choice that steadily increased the impact of its debt burden and created the economic crisis which helped lead Iraq to in\rade Kttwait,392 Iraq planned an annual milital-y budget of $12.9 billion h 1990, and was spending an average of $721 per cit-izcn on military forces before it invaded Kuwait. Although lraq had cut its rate of new arms orders, it still took deliveq on $M35 milIim worth of arms, and ordered $1,125 million mom during the first six months of 1990. This level of expenditurt- raised Iraqf"inrnationai debt to the West to $40 billion or more. Some experts feel Iraq" ttod dcbt was well h excess oi $80 billion by early 1990, if one included all of Iraq's debts to Arab states.""" There are no reliable esthates of Iraq's mnrttary expenditures shce the Gulf War, and such estimates are almost impossible to make because Saddarn Hussein has used his control over Iraq" economy to shift assets to the miEtary in ways that arc not reflected irn any Iraqi budget documem.t.. :It is unlli.kely, however, that Iraqi, expenditures bave dropped below $6 billion to $9 billion in terms of their ddlar value equivalent. Much of haqfs armed forces have been consmtly involved in civil wars against the Kurds and Shi?tes, and expensive field deployments near the Kurdish security-zone in the north, m d in the urban and marsh areas in the south. At the s m e time, Iraq has poured massive assets into rebLIilding its military industry, and tryin.g to mahtain its operational readiness. The government has also offercld salary increases and other incentives that have become progressively more expansive wilh tirne. While no firm data are available, Iraq has probably spent about 33'70 to 45% of its postxulf War GDP on military expc~ndibresin spite of the economic crisis created by the tlN sanctions and Saddasn Husseh's refwsal to sell oil.

Iraqi Arms Imports Table Five shows an estimate of both Iraq" mmtary expenditures and arms imports over tbr last decade. Ckarly Iraq's arms imports have placed a major brtrden on Iraq's economy. During the latter half of che :Iran-Iraq War-which covers the period from 1984-198Gfraq took delivery on $29.7 billim worth of new arms, including $15.4 billion worth of arms from the former Soviet Union, $0.75 billion from Poland, $0.65 bilfim from Bulgaria, $0,675 billion from Czechoslovaks, and $2.8 billion from the People's Republic of China. Iraq obtained $3.1 billion from France, $0.37 billion from Italy, $0.03 billion from the W, $0.67,Ci billion from Germany, and $5.2 billion from other countries.%" Iraq could not sustain this level of orclers immediately following the end of the Iran-Iraq War*&ring 1989 and 1992-the period from the end

Military Bet~elopments

225

of the Irm-Iraq War in August 1988 to the b e g b h g of the embargo on arms shiymnts to Iraq in August, 1990-Iraq ordered d y $1.7 billjon worth of a m s , Some $200 million were ordered from the Soviet U~~ion, nonc fsom the People's Republ.ic of China, $500 lnillion fmm major West European states, $WO miIlim from other Eurclpean states, and $900 million from other comtries. This low rate of new arms orders was forced on Iraq by (a) its growhg econmic crisis, (b) the arms ermbargo on Iraq after August 1990, and (c) the fact that Iraq was still receivhg the backlog from the immmse amount of orders Iraq already %ladplaced durjng the Iran-Iraq War until it hvaded Kuwait."Y While Iraq had cmsistmtly ranked among the top 10 arms knporters during the Iraq-kaq War, it dropped off the list after the wac Iran, however, remained on the list with a total of $6.7 billion in new orders during 1989-16392. The size of the backlng of previous Iraqi arms orcters after the Iran-lraq War is indicated by the fact that Iraq took delivery on $5.0 billion worth of arms during 1989-1990, induding $1.5 bilfion worth oi arms from the former Soviet Uniofi, S 0 0 million from the People's Repu23lic of China, $2.1 billioll fmm rnajor W s t European states, $690 milli.on from other European states, and $400 million f r m other countries. h spite of the reductions in Iraq's orders and Iraq's smaive victory in the Iran-Iraq War, these transkrs exceeded those received by Iran. Iran took &Every on $4.5 billion worth of a m s and had a much smaller backlclg of prior orders.S6 Since 1990, the Gulf War has cost Iraq both its gulls ,and much of its butter. Iraq's GClP probably would have risen to N0.8 billion in 1990, if it had not: invaded Kuwait, Instead, it dropped to around $25 billim, h n y estimate of Iraq's GDP after 1990 is speet~lative,but it seems to have been about $24 billion in 1991, $20 billion In 1992, and substantially less than $20 billion in 1993. Estknates of Iraq's total foreign debt in 1993, hcluding interest, range fmm $80 billion to $109 billi~n.3~7 At the same time, Iraq has had no formal arms innports, A military machine that never organfzed effectively to support and repair its equipment, and wt.tich solved its logistic and supply problems by flooding the Iraqi military forces with new imports and replacements, has been virtually cut off from the outside world for five years. This has had a steadi,ly more crippling intgact on a nnjlitary force structurcl that requires a minimum of $2.5 to $3.0 billion in military i~xportsto sustain its existing readiness, sustainability and effectivernss. In fact, Iraq has seen l.he steady collapse of"m w h of its military readiness and effectiveness since 1994, and its efforts to substitute for imports with domestic modifications and production to its major weapons systems have been largely fruitless.

TABLE FIVE Iraqi Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers by Major Supplier: 1983-4996 (in Millions af Current US Dollars)

Imqi Efforts to Smuggle Arms and Parts and Rebuild Its Iraqi Military Industries Since the Gulf War Since the cease-fire in the Gulf War, Iraq has attempted tc:,compensate for its loss of access to a r m imports by makjng use oE the extensive purchasing and inteiligmce network it established overseas during the IranIraq War. This network includes a mix of firms in Chile, Europe, t-he US, China, Japan, Mong Kong, and olfner Asian countries. Iraq has refused to pmvide the UN with a full list of its suppliers, and. many of its frmts and contacts art? stilt opcrlrating.348 Iraq has ohtahed some supplies by using covert f o ~ i g nreserves and ful~dsit obta,ined by muggling out: petrochemical.products, but scarcely enough to meet any of even its most critical military and civilian needs. Iraq did obtain at least two shipments of tank p m t ~ a n done artilfery shipment, but it has not rclccived any major shipments of new weapons. Iraq has attempted to cmpmsate by making a crash effort tc:,restarc-. and improve its domestic mititary production capabilit.ies..In the process, :Iraq has been able to build, on an investment in the Iraqi Ministry of

Military Bet~elopments TABLE FIVE

227

(t?orztinucd)

Soviet Union China United States Major West European All Other European All Others Tc3taI

Deliveries Svvicst Union

China United States Major West European All Other European All Others Tbtal

12,170 3,180 0 5,225 3,615 1,920 26,116

2 0,900 2,180 0

400 200 0

1,400

2,2 00 100

3,800 2,600 19,800

2flO 2,900

11,300

2,300 0 3,500 3,WO 1,700 22,700

a S o u ~ Adapted ~~: bp Antl~onyH. Crjrdesman fr~xnACDA, World Mililzznj Exf?c?f~diturcs und Arms Eatzsfers, 1994-1995, Washington, GPO, 1996, Tables 1 cQr IT. All data from 1992 onwards estirnat-ed by Antkony H, Cordmxnan,l"" bSource: Adapted by Anthony H. Cosdesman from material p ~ ~ v i d by e d the US Govenment and Richard f", Grimmett, Gonwtllional Amnfs Btfz:f@s fo fl~cTI2ircl World, 19831990,Wasl~ington,Congessional Research Srvice, Cm92-5'786 August 2,1991, C O ~ U ~ E tic~tzalArrns Transf~rsto the T?rird Wurllil,2984-2992, Washington, Congessx'onal Research Service, C&92577F, July Z(f,IBl, and Canz~ertlier~al Arrns Bansfirus to fhc Third World' 1986199.3,WashingtcIn, Cong~ssionalRmearch Sc?n~ice, CRS-94-612E July 29,1994. "These figurs effectively apply only to 1990. ACDA indicates that no major transfers took place after the end of August 2990, from ACDA, World Military Exprrzditurfi utzd Arfns Tratzsfirs, 2993-1994, Washington, GPO, 1995, p*241.

I~~dustry and a f e n s e I~~dustry that totaled $14.2 billion between 1985 and 1,989. Many of these plants suffered limited damage during the war; and Iraqi oficials have chimed, that Iraq has repaired and tooled up 200 factory buildings associated with rnilitary production since the end cJf the Gulf War, and Chat more than 50 establishments of the former Ministry of Industry and Military Tndustrialization arc now operating-many using machine tools and specialized equipment that were orighaliy exporkd withwt pmper export l i c e ~ ~ s e s . ~ ~ ~ Q Acc0sdin.g to a report by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on h~temationalSecurity, International Organizations, and Human Rghts, this equipms~tm d related prodwtion facilities h c i u d e : ~ ~ ~ ~

B Iran m Iraq D Saudi B Kuwait

CHART SEVENTEEN Comparative Arms Tmpw Delheries of the Major Gulf Pc>wers:198S1993 ($ Mill-icmsConstant 19%). Sozdrce: ACDA, World Military Expe~zdituresand Arms Tra~zsfus,1993-199df Table 11.

Tank assembly plant operating under Polish and Czech licenses at Al-Amen. * Major armor refitting center at Base West World (Samawa). Manufacture of proximity fuses for 155mm and cluster munitions at April 7 /r\j,rawm Fuse) Factory * Manufacture of 122 mm howitzers, Ababil rackets, tank optics and mortar sights at Safad 5 (Sa'ad Engineering Complex). Manufacture of wheeled APCs under East Eumpem license, other armot; and artillety pieces at Al Taji).

US

Russia

PRC

Major Other Western Europe Europe

All Others

Total

CHART EIGHTEEN Iraqi Arms Sales Apeexnrtnts by Supplier County: 19871994 ($Current Millions). Nole: No arms sales 1991-19%. Sozkrce: Adapted by Anthony H, Cordesman from work by Richard F, Gri tt in Cc~fzzje~zf ional Arms Transfers.to Develapizlg IVaEiorzs, 1987-3994, Congressional Research Sexvice 95-8C-;2FtAugust 4,1994, pp. 56-57.

Manufacture and repnir of artillery, vehicle parts, and cannon barrels at SEHEE heavy engineering complex (AI h r a ) , * Aircrafi assembly and manufacturkg plant under cmstruction at Sa'ad 38 (Eao). * Manufacture of aerial bombs, artiller). pieces, and tungsten-carbide machine tool bits at Radr (al Uusufiy*). Prodlaction of explosives, TNT, propellants, and some vcl-ticle production capabiliv at Al Hiteen (Al Iskandariyh), * Production of cluster bombs and fuel-air expfosives at Fao. Productio~~ of aerial bombs, and s a d rocket propellmts at M

* Manufacture of small naval boats at Sawary (Basra). * * * * *

Productio~~ and modification of defense eledronics at Mmsour f Baghdad). Production and modification of defense electronics, radars, and frequency-hopping radios at Sa'ad 13 (Salah d Dia-Ad Dacvr). Digital computer software, assembly of pmccss line controllers for weapom plants, and plastic. castings at DigLia (Zaafarniyah). Precision machhing at AI Rabiyah. Manufacture of non-ferrous ammunition cases at Sa%d 21. (Mosul). Liquid nitrogen production at A1 Production of ethylene oxide for fuel-air explosives at PCf. Production of HMX and RDX exptosives at FaXlujah chemical pIant at Al. Muthanna, Manufacture of gas masks at Sa'ad 24 (Mosul).

Iraq has also manufacbred small arms and artiZlery ammunf tion. It has made some artiflery weapms like thc Ababil multiple launch rocket system, and has mconditimed and assembled some Soviet tanks, including ?r22s. It has manufactmd and adapted military electronics, and made some slnall crafts. Iraq has &so continued its efforts to try to produce weapons of mass destruction, oiten seeking to disguise the true puTose of its plmts by chmghg their n w s or description. For example, an October 1995 report by UNSCOM: claimed that Iraq has resumed "its acquisit.im efforts in support of its missile facilities," 'adding that it bad "placed a number of d e r s , both directly and ineiirectly (througl~midd e m n and k m t companies), for the purchase of eqwipment, technologies, supplies and material for both missile and non-missile rclated activities at these facilities.'"m :Iraq replied that it was merely expanding its .hhab,l-100 progrm to b d d surface-to-surface missiles of ranges between 100 and 150 km whirh it is alfowed to acquire. Iraq has, however, had little success in producing and R-manufacbring advanced equipment like tanks and ajrcraft, and in carrying out

Military Bet~elopments

231

many types of major contbat repairs, Its efforts have not been able to off-. set the steady attritian of :Iraq%surviving equipment which has been caused by a lack of spares and specialized support equipment. Fur&ermore, Iraq's problerxs in maintaining its hventory of operational combat equipment are likely to accelerate with t h e , in spite of its mmulacturing efforts. Cumulative wear and maintenance defaults will produce skadily more serious-and sometimes unrecoverable-problems, as Iraq's remahing sparcs arc consumed and machines and. major subassemblies wear out. fray may also exhaust its hidden supplies of hard currency, making it evert more diMicz~Ztto obtain limited supplies of critical s p a parts on the world"s black-market for arms, Saddam Husseir~~s cousin, Hussein Kamel at-Majid, was in charge of the Military 1ndustrializa.t.ionCommission (MIC), and m n y aspects of this industrialization effort before his defection in 1995. Senior Jordanian officials who talked to Hussein Kamel found that many of his claims regarding the effectiveness of" Iraq's military industry were hollow boasts intended to impress Saddam Hussein, and that most of Iraq's ctaims to produce major weapons systems never went beymd the prototype stage-many of which were unprodwable or non-operational showpiece demonstration systems. They report that Hussein Kamel's successor and fomer deputy-Lt. General Amir Mohammed Rashidhas found that virtually all of Iraq's efforts to carry out major modifications, rebuild and recondition sophisticated equipment, and assemble new advanced weapcms from parts have been a failure.403 US experts largely agree with this indict~~ent of Iraq's military production and the assessments of efEorts to keep :Iraq%major weapuns operational. ?'hey stress the steady declirre of Iraq's equipment ~ a d k ~ e s s and sustainability since late 1993. They note that Hussein K m e l seemed to deceive Saddarn deliberately with showpiece projects such as putting an SR-2 surface-to-air missile launcher on a truck and claiming he had. creat-ed a mobile surface-tu-air missile system, falsely reporting the indigenous production of transporter-ercctor-launchers (TELs) for surface-to-surface missiles, and the large scale production of prototy-pe selfpropded artillery syste~xslike the Mqnoon and Al Fao. At the same time, US experts do believe that Iraq has completed much of t-he rebuilding of plants and facilities necessary to start eyuipment assennbly orlce sanctions are Uted and that it will t?&g~sh,,lyseek to reduce its past dependence on weapons imports once it can ubtain access to foreign production eyuipment. They believe that Iraq can produce inctigenous weapons or mndif-ications like long-range rnissiles when given suificient prioriw, and they believe Iraq will, begin by seeklng assem'oly facilities with the gm1 of moving towards indigenous production and the ability to rcblljld and maintain its other equipment for a pro-

longed period in the face of another cutoff of supplies or embargo. In. short, they believe Iraq will seek the capabilities it has been ranlable to create since the Gulf War.

Xmplications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy The trends in Iraqi, military expenditures argue strongly against any policy that lifts smctions without retainhg some cmtrols over how Iraq uses its revenues and witl-\out a firm comntitment to military emta They provide overwhelming evidenre that Iraq" ppresent regirne will divert a large portion of any oil revenues it can to military expenditures, rclgardless of the cost to the Iraqi people. -They also indicate that a major effort will, be needed by potential supplier countries to prevent Iraq from importing the epipment it needs to irnprowe its military manufacturing capabilities, and restore its military capabilities.. These trctnds also raise Fnrportant issues for a "centrist" strategyfgiven the risk that any successor regime may well pursue similar policies towards d i t a r y expemditzlres, and strengthening Iraq's military industries, Finally fie trends in Iraqi military expenditurrs argue for a strong US and Southern Gulf military deterre~~t to Iraq. Any state that makes this kirrd of financial,comitnnent to a military build-up cannot be contained purely firougl~diplomatic or military means. Only strong deterrent and defense capabilities can pmvj,dc security

The Threat from Iraqi Land Forces :111 spite of a massive UN Coalition victory irr the Gulf m r , lraq maintains an army of 350,000 w n . 'This force has an imprrzssive order of bal.tle and a large inventory of combat equipment. At the same time, the Iraqi Army has scarcely been able to overcome the effects of the Gulf Walr: It has been cut:off fmm m s t arms imports"For the last five years, it has not been able to invest even a tmth of the capital that it invested in mndemizing and improving its land forces durkg the five years before thr Gulf War. The devastatio~~ of the Gulf Wr, m d the five years that have followed, have sharply reduced the composition and capabilities of the Iraqi Army, and this declirre has been increasingly precipitous since late 1993. The Impact of the Gulf MTar an the Iraqi A m y

'The Iraqi h y suffered massive fosses during the Gulf W r , atthough experts differ s h a ~ l on y the number of Iraqis who died, on the amount of equipment and munitions destmyed or lost during the air and pound offensive phases of the war, and the number and id,entity of the Iraqi combat units that lost cohesion or combat efl'ectiveness at any given time. forces had Just aAer the war, USCENTCOM estimated that Coalitio~~ virtually shattered more &an fifteen Iraqi divisions, and only 5-7 of 43 :Iraqi divisions were still capable of offensive operations. USCEN'TCOM estimated that the Coalition had captla~d86,OCX) Iraqi prisoners, 64,000 of which were taken by US forces,""4 The Department of Defense estimated after the war that 4.0 Iraqi infantry divisions, one armored diwisicm, and one mechanized division had been reduced to 625% of their cambat s t ~ n g t hSix . more infantry, two mechanized, and four armored divisions had been reduwd to 25-50% of their combat strength. Six infantry, two mechmized, and one armored division had been reduced to 50-7Soh of their corrtbat strength, and five infmtry divisions, one special forces divi-

234

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces

TABLE SIX The Impact of Coalition Air and Land Forces on Iraqi Equipment Strength in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) at the Time cjf the Cease-Fire Tan&

A

Artillery

Tbtal in KT0 on January 16, lli391, at start of air campaign (Xmagexy-) Tbtal left at begiming of the land campaign "Ital destroyed or abandoned during the land campaign (USCIENTCOIW estimate) Destroyed by air Destroyed by land or abandc~ned "Ital destroyed or abandoned during the land campaign (imagexy- Based) "Ital destroyed or abandon4 during air campaign and land offensive (Imagery Based) Stilt in Iraqi cmtrsl on March 4,4991 (Imagery) Source: Adapted by Anllrony H. Cordesman from cork by Eliot Ccihen, ed., Guv War Air I~OZL~PP" S~im7ey,VOE~U~~ZC 11, St?ctclionIt, pp. E9-261, and intewiews.

sion, one mechmized, and two armored divisions retained 75-100"r~of their combat strength.4(15 There are significant etifkrences between the diffewnt US Government estimates of Iraqi A r l ~ yequipment lasses, and these estimates have been extensively revised based on after-action analysis of intelligenw and damage assessment data. This range of estimates is shown in Table Six, and is based on imagery Which are probably most correct, These estimates indjcate that the Iraqi forces deployed in the Kuwaiti ?"heater of Operations (KTO) during the Gulf W r lost 76% of their tanks, 54% of their APCs, and 90% of their artillery Revised WS intelligence estimates have also concluded that the Republican Guards unj.ts lost roughly 50% of their weapons in these categories in spite of both the air cmgaign and Airland ba.t.tlc,""" These estimates of damt?$e to the Guard are much lower than those the US issued durir\g the Gulf War, and agah reflect the difference between battlefietd estimates based on thc claim of c o d a t U n j l s and estimates based on satellite ixnagery. For example, USCENTCOM's estimate of the Republican Guard" ttank losses as of February 23 was 388. The CM estimates based on imagery indicate the G ~ ~ a lost r d 166 tmks."7 If one considers the impact of the Gulf War on the entire Iraqi Army, rather than just the Iraqi forces in the KTO, US estimates indicate that the army suMered massive losses in operational capability. 'The Iraqi Army

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Land Forms

235

emerged f r m the Gulf War wilh as little as 25-33% of its prewar total national division strength fully operational with mly about ZO"% of its heavy armored and mechanized brigade strength combat effective, and with only 20-25% of its total rnmpower under h l l government cmtml. Some experts feel that Iraq lost about 50% of its total national operational tank strmgth, 40% of its other armred vehicles, and 50% of its artiilery-although such b s e s cot~11tsome equipment that was recovered from Kuwait m d nor2hern Iraq after the cease-fire. The Iraqi Army also lost much of its total stocks and infrastruct~reas the result of roalitian air attacks. This situation worxned imxnediateb after the war. Much of the Iraqi Army was in a state cJf disruption and potiticaf upheaval. Mmy Iraqi troops were djsdkcted. Unrest in the Army had triggered the first revolts in the south, and some elements of the armed forces then johed Shi3te and Kurdish rebels that attempted to seize power. Other commanders m d u~nitswavered in their loyalty or hesitated in obeying Saddam HusseiSILsoXlders."POK I-fowcver, this disruption of Iraq's forces was relatively short-lived. None of the fnrces that challelnged Saddam were strong enot~ghto confront the :Republican Guards and,the regular military uni"csthat remained loyal, It is idso clear in ~trospectthat Saddam Hussein began to rush Repubican Guards forces out of the theater no later than Febrwary 27, 1991, to use them to suppress the uprisings in soutl.lern Iraq. It is also likely that the Iraqi commanders negotiating the cease-fire at Safwan manjpulated his request to Schwarzkopf:to ensure that Iraq's helicopters could be used to attack both the uprising in the south and the Kurdish uprising in the nf.rrth."s Iraq then restructured its army c o r n a n d structure. It purged as many as 1,500 senior ofiicers, and shot others."'" The Iraqi Army also recovered. r fallen into hossome of the equipment that it initiauy abandoned c ~ had tile use in Iraq. It conducted a massive scavenghg hunt in the Iraqi territory that the Coalition had urrcupied the moment its forces left. Iraq sent infiltrators into K w a i t inan effort to =gain equipment, spare parts, and munitions. In many cases it was able to repair equipment that had been counted as '"killed" 'during the war because the damage was not sufficient to prevent repair or combing of parts from several damqed systerns."l By September 1992, Iraq" military forces were able to deploy 500,000 to 650,000 men-including a substmtial number of reserves. The lraqi Army retained 300,000--4t)0,000 actives, or &out 40% its prewar st..rength. Many of the regular a r y forces were manned by poorly trained and motivated cmscripts, Mihich had been drafted after the Gulf War or who had been defeated in that connict, These lower quality foxes were stiff-

236

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces

ened, however, by reorganized and relatively effective Republican Guads force, a number of moderate to high-quality ~ g u l aarmy r nits, and reorganized internal security forces.

The Xraqi A m y in 1996 'There are different estimates of the strmgth of the Iraqi Army in 1996. A USCENTCOM estimate lists a total strength of 400,000 full. time actives, 12 rt;gular a r y divisions (6 heavy and 11 light), and 6-7 Republican Guards Divisions (4 heavy and 3 light). The Army had a total of three armored divisions deployment in the vicinity of Baghdad-one near Taji, one near Baghdad, and one near As Swayrah. 'Them wew fourteen mom in the north, three mare divisions in celztral Iraq, and six dividisiisio~~s sions south of An Najaf.42 Amther estimate by US experts indicates that the :Iraqi Army had a total of around 350,000 full time actives (including 100,1100 rclcakd reserves), and a totd of seven corps, with two Republican Guards corps and five regdar army carps. 'T%leseforces have a total of 22 ~ g d a diwir sions, sevell Repwblican Guard divisims (4 arm,ored/mechanized and 3 infanky), I Presidential Guard/Special Security :Force, and 15 indcpctndent special forces or commando brigades. G e m m , US, and Israeli experts felt that Iraq had up to 4QOf000men, five to six corps, and a total of 28-30 divisions with 20 armored and mechanized divisions (four in the Replablican Guards and six in the lraqi regular army), and 18-40 infantry and mountain divisim equivalents (three in the Repllblisan G~mrdsand 15-17 in the Iraqi regular army), plus a division-sizd Special Republican Guards formatian.413 These lraqi forces were oqanized into f a ~ major ~ r echefons:

* The first echelon was composed of at least one heavy division equivalent of what Iraq called the Special Republican Guards or ""Presidential Guards" krces* * The secand echelon included six other divisions, and some independent special forces and support units, in Che rest of the Republ.ican Guards. AI1 of the Rrrpuhlican Guarcis units reyorted disettly to the Presidential Palace, and not to the Chief of Staff or Ministry oE Defense. * The third echelon was composed of a mmber of tmqi regular army units under exceptionally loyai cclmmanders..n e s e units had much of thc Iraqi rclgdar a m f s armor, and have an unusually high level of equipment, total persomel, and combat-experienced personnel, * Finally, a fourth echelon included the rest of the Iraqi rczgular army 'The units in this ecrihelon. were under loyal clommmders, but were

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Land Forms

237

oftan seriotlsly understrength. They lackcd the manpower and eyrripment of the other echelons, m d could. only be used in largely defensive s r rear area roles, Tn addition, Iraq had 20,000 frontier guards. These frontier guards we= deployed along every border-xcept the "border" along the Kurdish security zone, which was covered by regular Iraqi forces. 'The frontier guards are little mre than a light infmtry and surveillance force armed with light weapons and IitA guns. Training has generally been poor, but the force does free the army to perform c o d a t rnissions elsewhercz.

The Republican Guards The Iraqi Republican Guards arc still Iraq's most effectbe lmd forces and the most effective lartd forces in the regirm, The Gulf War forced Iraq to consolidate its Republican G u d s forces dokvn. from a total of 12 divisions to a current total of seven divisions, and to eliminate: a number of smaller formations. In 1996, the Republicm Guards disiisio~~s hcluded three armored divisions (the Al Nida division, the Hammurabi division, and the A l Medina al Munawarrah division), one mechmized division (Al Abid), and three to four infantry &visions (the Adnan division, the M'ebuchadnezzar &vision, the Baghdad division, and possibly one unidentified) equivalents. TWOspecial forces brigades seem to have survived from the pre-war special forces divisian, and up to ~ O L E independent infantry formationsnomjnially of brigade strength."4 Acccrrdiing tcr US and Israeli experts, the surviving &publican Guards have a total of between 60,O(Xf and 80,WO men, and. 26-,X) hrigade equivalents (6-8 armorcd, 3-4 mechmized, and the rest infantry). This total manning indicates that RepubIican Guards have about 6575% of the total maming needed for their c o d & units, and &out half the total manpower needed to deploy and sustajn a force of seven full divisions."s This is an indicaeion that Iraq is having some manpower probtems with even its most presti:ious foxe, and same US experts note that some of the forces for coup attempts have come from the Guard, that pay and privileges for junior officers and other ranks have decfjned in real value sirnce late 1,993, and that more Shi5tes and non-Writis are bekg recruited into the force. I'here is also a Special Repuhticm Guarcls f m r , under a ailitay command structure reporting directly to Saddam, that acts as a palace guard. This force is deployed in a nunnber of battalions whose mission is to pmtect Saddam Hlassei~~. It is largely infantry, but has some T-22s, RMPs, D30s and 122 mm artillery weapons. If the regular Repllblican Guards act

238

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces

as Chc "ring" of forces t-hat deknds Baghdad and Saddarn E-fussein, the Special Republicm Guards act as Saddarn's last line of defense, The precise equipment holdings of the surviving Repubiican Guards u ~ ~ i are t s alizost impossible to estimate, but they seem to be about 6670-75% of the size their prewar size. A very rough estirnate of the total equipmat holdings of thc. Republican Guards would be around 651)4(10 tanks (at least 550 T-712~)~ 800-2,100 other armored vehicles (about half BMP l/Zs and 25% MTLBs), and 35G500 artill.ery weapuns. Unlike other :Iraqi Am?y units, tbrse eyuipment holdings have also bem kept lart;ely operational since 1993, largely by consdidati.ng operational equipment out of other combat and support ranits.

Deployments Against the Kurds :Iraq%lland forces arc. now deployed in the area around Baghdad, near the Irmian border, near the Kurdish sec~~rity zonef and in the Shi3te south. The army" key formations irtchde a corps headquartered in. Mosul and. another corps headquarte~din Kirkuk. Another Iraqi corps or largescale formation is cmccntra.t.ed in the Baghdad area with many of the Republican Guards heavy divisions and the special Republican Guards (or "Presidentid guards'" fformations.4'6 Two more cmps are deployed h the scruth, with at least 50,QQQ-75,000men. 'These forces seemed to have included 5-10 divisions, with a mix of hfantry and heavy divisions, and at least some Republican Guard formatims in =serve-although no Republican Guards divisions have been deployed snu& of the 32nd parallel since October 1994. Iraq had some 16-lti divisions and 150,f)I)U-175,OOtroops from its I Corps and V Corps and its Republican Guards deployed near the Kurdish security zone and the north-central past of the Irmian border. These forces were stationed along the southern edge of the Kurdish cmtrolled zone from Dahzlk through M Kucvayr, Irbil, and Kifri to Khanaqin. In, June 1966, there were three infantry divisions in the north along the border of Kurdish controlled territory, with one more to the west of: Mosul. There were two infantry &isions and twn mechanized divisions along the border southwest of Irbil and north of Kirkuk, Three were three infantry diwisions alang the border with Kurdish controlled terrilory soulheast of Kirkztk, a mechanized division m d infantry division east of Tikrit, and an armored division near the Iranian border just south of the Kurdish controlled area47 lrayi forces have mgularly shelled Kurdish positions near the border of the Turkish security zone, and often harassed the UN relief and inspection effort, They have, however, done little else and they are basically a ""brder guard" hforce of uncertain operational value.

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Land Forms

239

At the same time, the Iraqi Kurds have little capability to defend against these forces. In early 1996, the KDP clairned. to have 25,000 troops, and a militia of 30,000 additional men, but these forces were only armed with light artillery, multiple rocket law~chers,mortars, small arms, m d SA-7s. Similarly, the PUE; claimed to have 12,000 troops, plus 6,WO men in support fnrces, but was armed with some 7-54 and F55 tanks, about 450 mortars, 106 mm rclcoillcss rifles, 200 ligkt mli-aircraft gums, and SA-7. mese divisions between the KDP and FUK fsrces reflected the collapse of efforts to create a unificd Kurdish force, with a total oE 16 brigades. As a m s d t the Kurdish forces lacked u ~ ~ i tand y a memingful stre11g.th of heavy weapons, modem anti-tank, and modem light anti-aircraft weapons.. Reployments Against the Shi5ites Iraq deploys some 7-43divisions, and 7fi,OOC) troops, from its IV Corps, 111 Corps and Republican Guards in the south. 'These forces are spread out near the Iranian border and in the Shi3iZ.eareas from Karbala and Al Kut in the north to An Nasiriynf~and Az Zuhayr in the south, although most perform occupation duties and are not: invdved in any military etfort. Iraq has used these forces to destroy the traditimlal way of life of the marsh Arab Shi'ites. In June 1996, there was one infantry efivision in Karbala and one in Al Kut. There were two infantry divisions west of An Nasiriyah, an armored division near Al Amarah, an infantry division near Qalatsalih, an armored division between Qalatsalih and Al Basrah, m d a mechanized division near Al. Basrh.41" The Iraqi regime" burning, draining, and water-diversion projects created a continuing process of large-scale envirflnmental destruction in t-he marshes, 'The arrny has constructed canals, causeways, and earthen berms to divert water from the wetlands. Hundreds of square klometers of marsh areas have been burned, irnperiling tl-re marsheskcosystem.419 The Iraqi Army has also launched attacks on m y villages in the region. On March 4, 1994, the military began its largest seal-ch-anddestroy operation hthe marshes in t w ycars. The offensive included the razing of villages and burning operations concentrated in the triangle bounded by Nasir*ah, AI-Qurnah, and Basrah. The magnitude of this c~perationcaused t e inl-cabitantsto flee in several directims: deeper into the marshes, to the outskirts of soUthem lraqi cities, and to Iran. In late June 1994, fraqi military forces attacked several marsh villages in Nasiriyh province.. Sources said that army engineers brtmed the village of AI-Abra, co~~taining about 80 homes, to the groulzd. After the operation, the army transported the village" inhahitants from the scene. In early July the security forces stormed the villages of Al-Sajiya and AlMgawid h Al-Clhibaih district, near Ihe main road leading into the

240

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces

marshes" Shultmeously armor units supported by heavy artillery attacked the village of Al-meyout in the district of Al-Madina."o The Iraqi military also condiucted large-scale artdlery bomharclment im the JindaXa area of the M-Amaral-1 marshes. @position sources said ike bombardment destroyed several homes and in?uredseveral individuals, The military also attacked Al-Hashiya, Al-Wasdiya, and Al-Ma&a, and arrested some of their i,r\habi,tants.In Septefinber 1994, opposition sources reported that military iorces used incendiary b o l b s and launched an armowd attack against tl-te area of Al-Seigel in the Al-Amarah marshes, 'The army fater set fire to the entirc. area.Ql The UN Special.Rapportew stated in his February 1994 report that the extent of violations against the marsh inhabitants "places the survival of this hdigernous populatjon in jeopmdyrtr asld noted trhe similarity between the Iraqi regime" '"genocide-type operations" against the Kurds and its operations in s0uf;hen-rIraq. In August, he dispatched two of his assistants to t-he Iran-:Iraq border to interview refugees fleeing the marshes. He reported in OctObes 1994 that the refugees are generally in poor physical and psychological condition, having suffered extreme deprivation of food and mcciicine. Me reit.erated hjs ""concern over the survkal" of the m r s h inlnabitants "as a c o m m m i ~ . " These militarql operations caused serious civdian casualties, and more &m I,C),C#II) refugees from the rnarshes fled to Iran., where they joined betvveen 50,000 and 60,000 who had. fled in previous years, According to the US Stak Deparment, large numbers of 5K'ites rehgees from soufiem Iraq &d to Irm, particularly dter the escalation in military rzctivity in March 19%. Ln late 1994 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees C1C) estimated fiat m m than 10,0Wrehgees from the marshes were ill camps in Iran. Arnar Appeal, a charitab[e orgmizatim operating severd of the camps, placed the number at more tlnm 35,000. US Government malysts estimated in September 1994that more than 21)O,W0 of thc.250,OW former il*abitmts of the marshes had been driven from the area since 1991.a.2" The fight-ing in the marshes persisted during 1995, m d the Xrayi. armed forces conlinued to conduct deliberate artillery and infantry attacks against civilians in the southern marshes"By 1995, however, there was little real resjstance, and many of the gwernment attacks were desjgned to root out arn?y deserters and &placed ciwilians.

Land Force Equipment:Holdings Charts Nbeteen m d Twenty show rough estimates of the tre~ndin the major weapons strength of Iraqi. land forces, Charts iTiYenty-One to mirty-Four provide srt ary comparisons of Iraq's s t m g t h relative tc:, that of other Gulf forces.

6,000

5,000

4,000

r

R

-

&3 Tanks U APCs H AFVs

-

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

I

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

I

I

1991

I

I

1993

I

I

I

1995

CHART NINETEEN Iraq: Armored Weapons Strength-l979-19%. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from various editionsof the IISS, Milifay Balance, the JCSS,Milifay Balance in the Middle Easf, and material provided by US experts. N

2

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces 3,000

2,500

Self-Propelled Multiple Rocket IJaunchers

2,000

1,500

1,000

GT3ART TMJENn Iraq: Artillery Weapons Strength-----198&1996. Sazlrce: Adapted by Anthony H. Curdcrsman from various editions of the IISS, Milihry Bnlance, the JCSS, Milihry Balance in Clle M i d l e East, and material

provided by US experts,

Estimates of fie equipment holdings of Iraqi forces different. UXEN'ICOM estimated in mid-1996, that the Iraqi A m p had 2,600 tmks! 3,(3(1C1 APCs and AFVs, 2,100 major artillery weapons and 1,100 other armored vehicles, include recovery, N8C, commmd and other vehicles. A more detailed estimate by other 215 experts hdicates that Iraqi Army" smajor equipment holdings to included Labout 2,700 tanks, less &an half of the 6,700 tmks it had before the war*About half these tanks were T-543, T-55s, T-59s, and T-69s. Iraq also has about 600-790 M-48s, M60s, Am-30s, Centurions, and Chieftains captured from fran or which it

600,000

H Total U Army H Guard H Air € AirDefense I U Navy

m,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

0

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART TWENTY-ONE Total Gulf Military Manpower by Service-1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 29952996.

N A

cu

Cl Total W Regular

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia

Qatar

UAE

CHART TWENTY-TWO Total Active Military Manpawer in Gulf Armies in 1996. Note: Iran includes active forces in Revolutionary Guards. Saudi Arabia includes active in National Guard. S U I ~ ~ CAdapted II: by Anthony H, Cordesman from the 1133, Illilita~yBnIn~ce,399S1996,

Main Battle Tanks AIFV/Recce/Lt. Tanks APCs

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART TWENTY-THREE Total Gulf Operational Armored Fighting Vehicles-19%. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 1995-1996.

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia

Qaitar

UAE

CT;IART TWENm-FOUR Total Operational Tanks in All Gulf Forces, 4990--1995. Raofe: Iran includes active forces in Revolutionary Guards. Saudi Arabia includes active National Guard-.Source: Adapted by Anthony H, Cordesman from various saltrces and the IISS, Milz'fa~yBala~zce.

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qaitar

UAE

Operatiotzat Moderr2 Tanks: T-72, M-84, f,-6OA2/A3, M-2A212, CfmlEe~lgel;Leopard/ OF-$@,fie Clerc

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuw-ait Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHARWTWENP-FIVE Gulf Tanks in 12996, S O Z I ~Adapted G~: by Anthany H. Cordesman from the IISS, Milirstrry Bnlnrzce, 1995-2996.

W LeClerc 0 Challenger 0 M-1 W M-60A1/2/3 0 T-62 W T-72/M-84 0OF4

1 Iran

Iraq

Saudi

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART TWENTY-SIX Gulf Modem Tanks in 1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 1995-1996.

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia

Qaitar

UAE

CHART TWENIm-SEVEN Tot231 Operational Qther Armored Vehicles (Lt. T a n k Scaut, AIFVs, APCs, Recce) in Gulf Forces, 1990-4995. Note: Iran includes active fc,rces in R e v o l u t i o n a ~Guards. Saudi Arabia includes active National Guard. Source: AtJapted by Anthctny H. Crtrdesmm from val-ious sources and the IISS, Mz'lz'fnryB~la-~zer.,

G: 0

Lt.Tank AIFV 0 Recce mAPc

0 Total

n J

Iran

Iraq

Saudi

Bahrain

Kuwait

CHART TWENTY-EIGHT Total Gulf Other Annored Fighting Vehicles (OAFVs)-l%. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 2995-2996.

Oman

Qatar

UAE

Source: Adapted by Anthony H.

Iran

Iraq

Qatar

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

UAE

'Totat Advatlced or Mt~dcrr-2Types: Scorpion, BMB-2, BMP-2, BMP-3, M-2

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART TWENTY-NINE Gulf Armctred 1nfanti-y Fighting Vehicles, Recmnaissslnce V&icXeq %out Vehicles, and tight Tanks in 1996. Source: Adapted by Anthon y FT. Cordesman from the IISS, Mz'lifn~y Bnh3nnce, 1995-1 996.

D In All Forces III In Regular Army B Mudern, Tracked, in Regular Army

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY Armored Perlic~nnelCarriers fAPCs) in Gulf Armie-1996. Mote: Iran includes active forces in Revolutionary Guards. Saudi Arabia includes active National Guard. Sottree: Adapted by Anthony H. Gordesman from the IISS, M z ' I i t ~ qBatlance, 1995-2996.

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Arabia

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY-ONE Total Operational Self-Propelled and Towed Tube Artilleiy and Multiple Rocket Launchers in Gulf Forces, 1990-4995, Note: Iran includes active forces in Revolutionary Guards. Saudi Arabia includes active National Guard. Sutdrc=e:Adapted by A n t b n y H. Cardesman from various sources and the IXSS, Miblz'tz'fa~y Balance, 2995-1996.

D Self-Propelled Tube III Towed Tube Multiple Rocket Launcher

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY-TWO Total Operational Gulf Artillery Weapons-1 996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the 11SS, M i l i f n y Balaizce, 1995-1 996.

Total Opemtional Towed Art Z'lIery

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuw-ait Oman

Qaitar

UAE

Qatar

UAE

Total Opemtional Sev-Propelted ArtilTeq

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuw-ait Oman

CHARWTHZRV-THREE Gulf Tube A&ilfery Weapom in 1996, SOZI~L:~": Adapted by Anthony FT. Cordesman from the IISS, Mifitn~yBalance, 1995-1996.

Total H Advanced Types

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY-FOUR Total Operational Gulf Multiple Rocket IJaunct?erw 1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H, Cordesman from the IISS, Ml'lifafyBalance, 1995-1 996;.

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Land Forms

257

obtained in small nulnbers from other countries. Iraq lost much of its prewar F72 strength during the Gulf War. Only about 500400 T-72s and 200-300 T-62s remained after the war, versus nearly 1,500 T-72s and T-62s before the war. Accordhg to some estimates, only about 2,000-2,300 of :Iraq%tanks are iully operationd. However, Iraq retains over 1,500 tank transporters and heavy vehicle trailers out of the several &ousmd it bought during the Iran-lraq Ware@3 These experts estlimated that Iraq had s o m 3,90M,000 other armored vehicles. Iraq had 1,@0 armowd recomaissame and co (BDM-2, EE-3, EE-9, AML-SO, AML-90, M n B ) versus 2,500 before the war, It had 800-900 armored infantry fighting vehicles (DMP-1, BMP-2, and M - I O P ) versus 2,000 before the war, and 2,300 armored persomel carriers (BTR-50, BTR-60, BTR-152, CJ)T-62, OT-M, MTLB, W-531, M-113, M-3, EE-11) compared to approximately 7,100 before the war. Regardkss of their number, many of tkese vehicles had only limikd operational capability Iraq did, however, retah large numbers of special purpose armored vehicles like command centers that it hha. bought during the Irm-Iraq War.424 Iraq's survivhg artillery hcluded about 1,500 towed artillery weapons (105 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155mm), It also ;includes aromd 150 selfpropelled artilery weapclns (251 122 mm, 2S3 152 mm, M:-30L)A/I/RZ m d GCT AUF-1 155 mm); m d 4,000-5,000 (60 mm, 81 mm, 120 mm, 160 mm) mortars, This compares with 3,000-5,000 towed weapuns, and.500 self-propelled tube weapom before the war, The data on multiple rocket launchers arc too contradictory to make any estimate of wartime losses possible, although it is clear that many such weapclns were destroyed c ~ rabandoned in the Kuwaiti 'Theater of @erationss However, Iraq retahs aroulzd 128 such weapolzs (240 mm, 140 mm, Astros I, Astros H, BM-21, 122 mm). Xraq seems to retain many of its pre-war holdings of the FRw surface-to-swface rocket launchers, m d at least several hundred rockets"4E Iraq had over 350 self-propelled mortars mounted 017 armored vehicles before the Gulf War, These do not seem to have been l~eavilyco to the Kuwaiti n e a t e r of @eratiolzs, and Iraq probably still held several hundred after the conf1ict. Iraq also retained large numbers of 81 m and 120 mm Soviet mortars. It has a total of over 2,000 mortars. The Iraqi Army lost large nurnbers of its anti-tank weapons durhg the fighting, many of which werc recovered intact by the UN Coalition forces. Nevertheless, lray ~ t a i n e dsubstantial anti-tank warfare capability. Its gujded wcapons inclt~dean unknown nu~nberof HQTs, AS-U, and AS-12s mounted on PAH-1 and SA-342 helicopters and AT-% mounted on Mi-8 and Mi-23 helicopters. It had Milan and HOT launchers mounted on VC-TH armored vehicles; Soviet AT-1, AT-3, AT-4 crew-portable anti-

258

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces

tank-guided missiles; m d Milm man-portable anti-tmk guided missiles, :It bad several. thousand 85 mm and l00 mm anti-tank guns and heavy recoilless rifles. There are def nitiand problelns in counting Iraq's szlmiving anti-aircraft guns because some estimates include machine gms, while others only include heavier weapms. W-war estimates put the total number of weapons inc1udIn.g nnachhe guns at around 7,(30,and the number of heavier weapons at 4,000. Iraq lost substantial numbers of self-propelled anti-aircraft gulls during the Gulf War, but it seemed to retain 300-5(Xf weapons, includjng s m e AMX-311 SAS, Egyptian-made gulls and ljght missile launchers, and 150-200 radar-guided ZSU-23-k. Iraq retajned 4,011&5,000 other mti-aircraft guns-although many may not be operational or m y be deployed as anli,-ixlfanky weapons. This gives it a total of approximately 5,500 weapuns, Post-war esthates do not provide many details on Iraqi A m y surfaceto-air missile holdings, altfiough they clearly included thousands of light and medium surface-to-alr missiles, These .included SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, SAB, SA-14, and SA-l6 vehiclr-momted, crew-served, and man-portable weapons, and perhaps 50-100 surviving Rolmd fire units on self-propelled armorcd vehicles, Accordkg to most estimates, Iraq retained at least 5W6% of its pre-war anti-aircraft weapons strtzngth, or around 3,000 light suriace-to-air missile lamchers. Estimates of Iraqi helicopter strengtfi are equally uncertain. Iraqi A m y aviation seemed to possess about 121) a m e d helicopters out of the 359 it had before the war, These included 20 PAH-1 (Bo-105);attack hdicopters with AS-PI, AS-l2 and HOT missiles, 30 Mi-24s and Mi-25s with AT-2 missiles, 40 SA-32s with AS32s a d HOTS,AUouettes with AS-31s and AS-I2s, and 5 SA-321s wi& Exocet. No reliable estimate exists of the nunnber of surviving heavy, medium, and light transports and utility helicopters, but it =ems likely that Iraq retained 200-300."6

Land Force Readiness and Warf ightirtg Ef fectivearess :Iraq%lmd iorces still retajn siwificant war fighting capabilities. They can still seize Ktrwait in a matter of days or wcupy much of Saulii Arabia's Eastern Pmvi,nce, if they do not face opposition fmm Wstern forces. :Iraq has the military strength to overrun its Kurds in a matter oi weeks if UN forces cease to protect them. The army has aireacJy effectively defeated all serious Shi'ite rclsistance. It can prnbabfy defeat any major Irmian attack and should be able to defeat the Irmian, army In detail in g a limited attack, Iraq c m pose the border area if given w a m i ~ ~about some threat to Syria, &hough with some logist.ical difficdties, m d can

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Land Forms

259

deploy two to three divisions into an Arab-Israeli conflict if it has Syrian as Jordani.an support.. Iraq has ~ f u r b i s k dmany of its a r y w e a p m , vehicles, and equipme11t to the exte~ztpermitted by its h~dustrialbase and spare parts. It has created new tailored logistic o~anizationsto try to improve its sustajnment in the ahsence of mititary ~ s u p p i y It , has slowly improved the rclorganiaation of its army, and in late 1995, it =stored cmpetemt military pmfessimals to a number of seni.or military positions, Nevertheless, the :IraqiArmy has severe limitatim, and its capabilities arc steadily deteriorating. 'This dekrioration is a prnduct of basic weaknesses in the organiziation and structure of Iraqi Army as well as a result of wartime losses, a loss of imports, and the decline of the lraqi economy Iraqfqgrowing readiness, sustainability and deterioration problems have interacted with these inherent weaknesses to degrade Iraq's ahiliw to conduct effec.tive combined arms and mobile warfare. Like many other Middle Eastern armies, Iraq has armed with little regard to standardization and ease of supply, training, and maintenance. It has emphasized combat arms over service support, sustainability;, and maintenance and never developed an effective cadre of trained PaCOs and technicians. Its officers have shown a skiking reluctance to become i~~valved in maintenmce activity or the kind of close contact and physical effort necessary to lead troops in such functions, initiative was discouraged and they were held respmsibie for losses and damage that resulted from their actions. Iraq has done little to remedy these probXems as a result of the Cull War* If anytxhing, wartime casualties, morale problems, desertions, and pay prt>blems have made the situation worse. Further, Iraq has consolidated much of its manpower and equipment into its combat arms beginning in 1,996steadity increasing the problem hherent in over-emphasizing combat arms relative to suppr~rtancl sustainability. Iraq had a relatively eff cient logistic system before the Gulf Warparticularly at the Corps and division level-by relying an constant resupply alld sec= rear lines of communication as a substitute for effective maintenance, overhads, and logistics. However, this system was dependent on contilruing imports of a wide mix of equipmnt supplied by the former Soviet bloc, France, Italy, other European states, and Third Wctrld countries. The supply ol innports ceased in August 1990, and the UN air oifensive did massive dannage to the Iraqi Army's facilities and stockpiles. As a result, much of Iraq's equipment is now d e a djned-or has Iimited operational effecliveness. Further, Iraq lost many of its logistic vehicles during the Gulf War, induding many specialized vehicles a d heavy lifters, a d has not been able to place them. Iraq will find it much harder to sustain operations in the field,

260

Tht Tllrcmt from Iraqi h n d Forces

partieu,tarly in offensive operations, sig~nificantdistances from its support facilities. The human b e n t has deteriorated in other ways. Many of Eraq's best armored and mechnnjzed ungs were s:hattered in CEte fightirtg, including s m e of its heavy Republican Guards units. Iraq lost many officers and techicians, and the lrayi forces l-tave since been subject to =current purges and upheads. It has also been seven years sjnce the end of the :Iran-IraqMiss, and many combat veterans of the war have now left military service. There has been little large-xde unit train* since 1991, and much of Iraq's army has eiCher been kept in stat.ic dcployme~ntsor has been involved in low-grade fighting against the poorly armed ShYites in the south. The Republicm Guards and best regular army units are relatively wellmanned and have had active field trainhg. The Republican Guards have acted l q e l y as a garrison force, and tbis has given them time to train at least at the battdim level. Even the kpwblicm Gwards, however, have had s m e manpwer problems and have had to accept more Shi'ites and promote non-Takritis to mom smior positions. Many other rcgdar army units are now filled in with a m i x of inexperienced troops and low-grade conscripts and reservists, Most of :Iraq's regular army infantry divisions m w have 50-75% of their authorized manniing, and the regular army has been ground down by havhg to act as an occupation force, carry out low-level counter-insurgency uperations, and remain in the field. There have been growing problems with desertions, m a l e , and call-ups, and Iraq has been forced to "exempt" its Kurds and some of its Shi"iks from military service for internal security reasms-depriving it of a substantial part of its manpower base. In spite of stendy increases in the fee for exemption, a nurnber of Iraqis also buy their way uut of cmscnption. Saddam Hussein has taken a number of rneasurrs desiped to irnprowe the loyalty of the armed forces, He has tried to increase salaries to cornpensate for inflation and has set up special stores which provide military personnel with better access to food and comun-ter goods. He has cut the period for conscription from 36 months to 18 for college graduates, and to four months for the holders of advmced degrees. He has revived special privileges for loyal officers like the car bans, land grants, housing benefits, and low-interest loans used to motivate officers during the Iran:Iraq War. He now aIlows automatic retirement after 25 years of servicc,427 These measures, hokvever, have failed to keep pace with inflation and offset the impad of sanctio~ns*Military salaries and living conditions steadily deteriorated since 1993, particularly in the regular a m y forces. This combination cJf problems means at least one-third to one-half of the post-Guld War lraqi Army ordcr of battle consists of hollow forces

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Land Forms

262

that will take years to rebuild to the level of capability they had before the Gulf War. This situation will continue to worsen until the UN sanctions are lifted. "lhe most critical mid-term limitation affecthg the war fighting caphility of the Iraqi Army will remain the irJnpact of the UN arms embargo. Xraq can work around some of its equipment problems, but it needs sipificmt imports of spare parts to maintail1 its army and bring it back to pre4u.lf War readiness. It is also having progressively greater difficulty with ""human factors,""If the UN embargo conthues to be effective, t-he Iraqi Army will continue to lose force strength and war fighting v l i t y relative to Iranr the Southern G d f states, and its other neighbors* :It is a h o s t impossible to predict the rate at which the army will. decline, but it is clear that Iraqi foxes have already lost a sipificmt amount of their con?h&eMectiveness and sustainability; At a minhum, Iraq will require severat years to modernize its ground forces in order to react to the lessons of the Gulf War once the UN smctions and embargo arc ended. Iraq not d y must rebuild its land fwes, but must make major changes in its equipment and technology if it is to compete with the force impmvements being made by its neighbors. For exmple, Iraq needs to upgrade most of its armot up-gun its dder tmks, and use improved tank rounds. Most of its tanks need modern fire control systems, armor, night and thermal visirrn devices, and need guns and ammmitim equal to those in the forces of the U'S and Saudi Arabia. If the Iraqi Army is to compete directly with Westem or Israeli land forces, howvel; it must solve its many qualitative defects and convert from the relatively static defensive force that lost the G d f War to become a force that can match the kind of highly mobile, firepower intensive, maneuver-oriented, 24-hour-a-day force the Coalition deployed dtlrh~g Desert Storm- This is a far more delnandjng challenge than acquiring spare p a t s or more modern equipment. Iraq must greatly improve the long-range sustainability of its forces in maneuver operations and its battlefield recovery and repair capabilities, :It must make sweeping improvements in its ni&t and punr weather warfare capabilities, and its ability to rapidly move artillery, mass and shift fires. It must restructure its entire artillery operation to emphasize combined arms and mmeuvert pmcision fire and the hilily to shift targets rapidly. Furthex; it needs to a c p i m beyond-visual-range and niglzt-targethg systrtms,. It must restructure its commmications, commmd, control, battle management, and training to support fluid mmeuver operatrions, and a much faster tempo of sustained ""24-how-a-day""operations. This means reequiping or rmodieing the fire control, sensors, and communications systems i17 mu& of its armor, p r o v i d a new support and batt3e management capabilities, retrahing the force at the Corps level, and givhg

officers far mare hdependence of action. Iraq will have to make fundamental chmges in tactics and trajnhg, m d acquise advanced training m d shnulatian techology. The Iraqi Army must stress joint operations as well as combined arms. :It must gl-eatIy imprwe its helicopter operations which have been largely ineffective, except in small independmt operaticrns. Mmeuver forces must train realisli.cally with helicopters and fixed-wi.ng aircraft. Train,hg must 'bcome lfar more effective above the battalion level, and modern targeting and rclcmaissance capabilities must be integrated into its corps, division, and brigade level operations. It will need improved mobile short-range air dcfenses and mm-portable surface-to-air missiles, tank transporters, secure communications, modem fire cmtrol systems, tracked suppo" equipment, m d self-propelled artillery. The Iraqi Army must also convert fmm a political to a professional force. Saddarn Hussein and the Bafathstill interfere constantly with ortganizatianal matters, exercises, training, promotio~~s, and equipment and supply matters down to the battalion Major and lieutenant colonel) level. Senior cammmders still face the canstmt threat of removal or even execlltion for the norm1 failures of war and for petty political reasons. Domestic political considerations, and mthless efforts to ensure the loyalty of all officers to the regilme often lead to fie promotion of fie politically Ioyal over the professimally competent. In many ways, Sactdam Hussein and the Bdatb elite have been as gl-eat a threat to the Iraqi Army as Iran and the UN Coalition.

Xmplications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy The trends in Iraqi land forces are a further warning against any policy

that lifts sanctions without retainh~gsome sort of cmtmls over how Iraq uses its revenues and hvithaut a firm commitment to matilitary co~~tajlrzmmt. These trends also argue for efforts to place strong long-tern limits on Iraq's ability to import modern main battle tmks and the equipment it needs to react to the lessons ol the Gulf War. In spite of the deterioration of its land forres, fray has no reason to fear a near or mid-term invasiftn by Iran. In cmtrast, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have good reason to fear that a revi,talized Iraqi Army will be used to thrcatem them, or takce new military action agahst Kuwait,

The Threat from Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces :In 1996, t h Iraqi Air Force had roughly 30,000 men, including some 15,OW air deknse personnel. It retained approximately 330 to 370 combat aircraft, &hough some of the Iraqi aircraft comted in &is tot4 were damaged or bad. limited or no operational combat capability. The Iraqi Air Force not mly continued to suffer from its losses during the Gulf War, but also from five years withod any sipificant imports of parts and eyuipment and foreign technical support. VVbile Iraq has been able to =build mmy of the shelters m d facilities it lost during the war, it has not been able to replace its munitions and the C4X/BM equQmcnt it lost, The creation of ""no fiy" zmes in the north m d south has sevemly restricted an already inadequate training program, and the Iraqi Air Force has exhibjted few s i g ~ of ~ sbeing able to react to the lessons learned during the Gulf Miar. Further, the participation of some air force officers in coup attempts has led Saddam to limit the resources given to the Iraqi Air Force.

The Cost of the Gulf War to the Iraqi Air Force As is the case with Iraq's land forces, the Gulf War has shaped the ctrrrent size and capability of the Iraqi Air Farce. W i l e again there are significant differences h official US esthates, Table Seven shows a USAF and US Marine Corps estimate of Iraqi wartime losses. In addition, many Iraqi aircraft trhat flew to lran have been seized by the Irmian government. 'The ent announced in late fuly 3992 that it would exprczpriate the Zraqi combat aircr& that had taken refuge in Iran durinl; the war, aircraft worth several billion doXlars.4'8 In 1992, Iraqi Prime Minjster Muhammed Hamzah al-Zubaydi described this Iranian seizure as part of a plot by :Iran that had begun before the Gulf W;;rr*He stated, "We realize that all this (Iranian) enthusiasm and readhess to fulfill our demands (before the war)-followed by

TABLE SEVEN Iraqi Air Strength in Desert Starm/lraqi Combat Aircraft tosses in Dexrt Storm August 1,

Januay 1,

F~brunryI,

April I ,

1990

1991

1991

3 991

Eletnent o f f orce Stw~gfrlt A z'v Force Personnel FighterslFighter Bombers Bombers Reconnaissance Subtotal Combat Capabte Trainers Total Helicopters Tramports Civil Barnports Air D e f i ~ s eForce Persc>nnel Surface-to-Air Missile Batteries Anti-Aircraft Guns

1718 15 12

745

728 15 12 755

699 9 12 720

370 2,225

400 1,155

4Ct0 1,120

547' 76 59

544 70 60

511 70 60

17,000

1TOO0

17t00ct

120 7,500

120 7,aO

200 7600

Iraqi Combat Aircraft. Losses irz Desert Storm Nzllrzber OM J ~ n u n f12, y Losf in Air Total A i ~ r ~Types ff 4394 Combnf Desfroycd Mirage F-1 Su-24 Fencer MiG-29 Fulcrum Su-7117120122, Fitter MiG-25 Fo>xbat Su-25 Frogfoc>t MiG-23 Flogger Mig-21 FisEFbed

75 25 41 119 33 61 123 208

Total

685

Fled to lrerzz

Sourcc: Adapted by the author from Lt. Generawalter E, Boomer, "Desert Storm, MARCENT Operatic3ns in the Campaign to Liberate Kuwait," US Marine Corps Headquarters, August 31,1931, and Eliot Cohen, ed., Gulf War Air i30wt*r5un7eyr Sr"olunzeIr; Pckrf I, pp. 17-19 and 65S654.

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Air alzd Air B e f i ~ s eForces

265

a chapter of treason m d treachery by Iranim eleme~~ts-waspart of a pxlepared plan, Thus, all that plundering, burnhg, and destmction within the chapter of teason and treackry took place.qB There are different estimates of how many aircraft of a given type went to Iran, Iran" Foreign Mhistet Ali &bar Velayati, said in November 1995 that Iran would only give back 22 aircraft once sanctions are liftedail of whieh, seem to be civiilian airlhers and transpmts. The Iraqi government has referred to 115 combat aircraft and 33 aidiners, worth some $3 bi1lion+430The author's estimate, based on conversations with various experts, is: 24 Mirage F-Is, 22 Su-24s, 40 Su-22s, 4 Su-17/2Qs, 7 Su-25s, 4 MiG-29s, 7 MiG-23Ls, 4 MiG-23BNs, 1, MiG-23UE3, and I Adnan. This is a total of 112 combat aircraft, Iraq's major trmsport m d support aircraft: included 2 B-747s, 1 B-707, 1 B-727,2 B-737s' 14 IL-765~~ 2 Dassault Falcon 20s, 3 Dassault Falcon 50s, 1 Lockheed Jetstar, 1A-300, and 5 A-310s. 'T%reseaircraf-t give Iraq a total of 31 nnajor nm-codal. aircrraft-not c o u n k g aircraft Iraq had seized from Kuwait.431 if Iraq's combat losses are combined with its losses to :Iran, the resrtlth g estimates hdicate the Iraqi Air Force retahed approxhately 330 to 3"i" combat aircraft in combat units, At the same t h e , about half of the :Iraqi aircraft counted in this total were probably damaged or now lack spare parts. This meam that about hatf of the lraqi Air Fosce's total inventory of combat aircrait has limited or no ogeratimlal combat capability. Current Air Force Equipment Holdings

Chart 'Ihirty-Five shows a rough estimate cJf the trends in Iraq's air stre~~gth, and Charts Thirty-Six to mirty-Eight and Table Eight show how it c o q a r e s with the air strcngth of other Gulf states. DcspiSe its losses, the Iraqi Air Force%total survi\ring inventory of combat aircrafi: in 1996 seelned to include 6-7 MD-6, Tu-16, m d Tu-2%.bombers-although it is not clear that these bornbers were still operational. It also included 1.30 J6, Mi(;-23BN, MiG-27, Mkage F-1EQ5, 5u-7, 5u-20, and Su-25 attack fighters; 180 J-7, MiC-21, MiG-25, Mirage F-1EQ, and MiG-29 air defense fighters; MiG-21, and MiG-E reconnaissance fighters, 15 old Hawker Hunters, a surviving 11-76 Adnan AEW alrtlraf-t, 2 11-76,tmkers, and large nunbers of transports and helicopters. Estimates of its total surviving inventory by aircraft type vary by source, but Iraq probably retajned. about 6 Tu-22, 1-2 Tu-16, 30 Mirage F-Is, 15 MiC-29s, 60 MiG-23s, 15 MiG-25s, 150 MiC-21s' 30 Su-25s, and 60 Su-I%, Su-IZQs,Su-22s.432 Although itis unrlear how many air munitions Iraq retatned after the as low as 50% of the pre-war Gulf War, some estimates put this figtotal, Iraq, however, rctains signifimant nu~nbersof rnodcrn air-to-air and

The ThreatJro~rz:Iraqi Air and Air DeJense Forces

266

Cl Fighter/ Attack W Armed Helicopter

CHART THIRTY-FIVE Tray: Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing Combat Air Strength-l9"7-1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from various editions of the IISS, Military Bralntzce, theJCSS, Milifay Baia~lcein ttze Middle East, and material prc~videdby US experts-.

air-to-ground munitions. mese stocks hclude AA-S, AA-7, AA-8, AA-IQ, Matra 530, Matra 550, and Matra Super 530 air-to-air missiles, and AM-39 Exocet, HOT, AS-11, AS-12, A S 6 AS-14, AS-301, AS-37 C-601 Silkworm; air-to-surface missiles; laser-guided bombs, m d Cluster bombs* Iraq retajned large numbers of combat-capable trainers, transport aircraft and helicopters, and m o t e l y piloted vehicles. The trainers h c l ~ ~ d esame d Mirage F-IBQs, 25 PC-7s, 30 PC-9s, 5 0 4 8 Tucanas (EMB312~1,$0 L-29s and 40 L-39s. Eansport assets jncluded a mix of Soviet An2, An-12, h - 2 4 , An-26, and lt-76 jets a d propeller aircraft, m d some Il76s modified to act as tmkers. -The rcmotely piloted vehicles (IIPWs)

Total Fixed Wz'lzg Combat Aircraft

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

UAE

Opemtional M~derrznud Adz7~nce.dCombat Aircraft: MiG-25, MiG-29, F-14, F-35, F-l C;, m-18Mirage , F-l, Mirage 2000

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuw-ait Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY-SIX Gulf Combat Aircraft in 1996, Sozlrce: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesrnan frc.rnthe IISS, Milifary Bn2nnec, 1995-1 996.

eP F-15 0 F-16 W F-18 U su-20 Su-24D U SU-25 M-25/2!5R MiG29 MirageF-1 Mirage2000 U Tornado

a

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY-SEVEN High Quality Gulf Combat Aircraft by Type-1996. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 1995-2996.

Total Armed filicopters

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

UAE

Modenz Attack Helkopters: AH-64 Mi-25, Mi-2dr SA-330, SA-342, AS-332F

Iran

Iraq

Saudi Bahrain Kuw-ait Oman

Qatar

UAE

CHART THIRTY-EIGHT Gulf Attack Helicopters. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesrnan from the IISS, Mililaly Bal~nec,1995-1 996.

The ThreatJro~rz:Iraqi Air and Air DeJense Forces

270

TABLE EIGHT Advanced Combat Aircmft by 'Type in Gulf Forces

Bahrain Iran

Iraq

Kuwait

Oman Qa tar

Saudi Arabia

UAE

24 16 295 30 30 353 30 1 12 38 12 15 4 76 40 8 46 19 12 6 295 42 24 98 5 97 9 2.2 6 8

Total Fixed Wing Combat

F-16C/D Total Fixed Wing Combat

Su-2411) MiC-29 Tc>taXFixed Wing Combat Su-20 Su-24D Su-25 Mirage F-1EQ5/ 200 MiC-29 MiG-25 MiG-25R Total Fixed Wing Combat F/A-18C/D Mirage F-1 /CM Tc>taXFixed Wing Combat Jaguar ($0) Mark 4, T-2 Total Fixed Wing Combat Mirage F-IEDA/ DDA Total Fixed Wing Combat Tomado 1DS Tomacto ADV F-lfiC/P> E-3A Tc>talFixed Wing Combat Mirage 2000E Mirage 20OQEAD Mirage 2000DAD Mirage 2QOOMD

Nufe: Older aircraft with inksliar avionics are not included. S~~personic fligl-tt perfarrnance is nut regarded a5 mure than a marginal measure of combat perfc7mance. Sotircc Adapted by htlzc~np13. Cordesman from the %S, MiEitlz?.y Bulntrce, 1995-1996.

included some Iraqi-made designs, Italian designs, and Soviet desips, It is unclear how effective lraq was in using any of these RI'V systems, but it djd m k e use oE them during the Gu,15 k 4 3 3 This equipment gives the Iraqi Air Force considerable combat potential. Furthermre, the Iraqi Air Force flew fighter and attack helicopter sorties against Shi'iites in southern Xraq in June and July 1992, until the UN established no-fly zones north oi the 36th parall4 and south of the

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Air alzd Air B e f i ~ s eForces

271

32nd paralllel. These no-fly zones barred any fraqi use of fighters m d hclicoy-ters. The norhem zone was establisf-ied. shortly after the cease-fire and the southern zone was esthlished on August 26,1992, Iraqi fighters initidy challenged UN fighters by tmking &cm or flying into the no-fly zones, At the same tirne, Iraq moved some of its more expmdable land-based air defense systems-tike the SAd-into threatming posi.tions or ""surface-to-airmissile traps" in or near the no-fly zolles. Iraqi fighters also challenged UN forces in Dccembcr 1992 and January 1993. 'These actions-oupled with further efforts to bar UN inspections and a challenge of h w a j t ' s right to seclnrc its new border-provoked a sipificmt clash between UN and Iraqi forces in January 1993. The UN forces shot down at least one Iraqi fighter, and attaeked the Iraqi surfaceto-air missile traps m d my Iraqi radars that illurnhated UN aircraft. 'They also launcbd two major attacks on Iraqi, command and control facil2ies. Air Readiness and Mi'arfigbting Capabilities The Eraqi Air Force and air defense forces have since backed down in response to UN crihallenges, but Iraq has stepped up its air trahing and has continued to rebuiid other aspects of its air defense capabilities. Beginnint; in late 1992, Iraq started to improve the quality of its air-to-air trainng, and to rcconsti.tute its surface-to-air ntissile net. It r e p a j ~ dand modified some of its surface-to-air missile systems in an attmpt to improve their resistance to US countermeasures. Wanwhile, Iraq established new missile sites and upgraded its aircraft dispersds. The Iraqi f i r Force, however, is now operating with consjderably less than half its pre-war ability to gmerate m d sustaill combat sorties, and continues to lose effectiveness with h e . Its training and depfoyment capabilities were also further conskained by the expansion of the ""no fly" zone in the south from the 32nd paratlel to the 33rd parailel. This brought the northcm edge of the zolle witkin easy stribcing range of Ba&dad, deprived Iraq of the use of two mavl air bases, and memt its aircraft could not fly in joint exercises w e r several key a m y trainh~gareas. The Iraqi Air Force has only been able to conduct limited cornbat aircraft operations since the cease-fire in February 1991 and its training and readiness have detericrrakd with t h e . It has m major repair facilities for many of its Soviet-made f@ters-which had previously been overhauled by Soviet tecchnicians or rebuilt in the fnrmer Soviet Union, It has growing shlrrtages of spare parts, and has no h~-countryaccess to the Soviet m d French technical support which, it had ret.ied on before the W ~ J : The Mirage F-l. is difficult to mainrain, and Iraq is likely to have severe problems in keeping tbis aircraEt operatimal without access to French techical support and new deliveries of parts and equipme~~t.

272

The ThreatJro~rz:Iraqi Air and Air DeJense Forces

Iraq cannot rebuiid its air farce to anyChing approaehjng its pre-war stre3ngt:b without massive arms imports and foreign assistance, At some point, Iray will also need substmtial deliveries of more modern F ~ n c or h Russim combat aircraft" However, imports done will not suffice. Like most Third World states, Iray has never organized effectiwely to fight as an integrated air force-as distj,nguished from clusl.ers of jndividztal fightix~gelements. Iraq still seems to conhse having a large order of battle with effectiweness, and puts far too little emphasis on high sortie rates, the effective mssing of air power against given types of targets, planning sustained air campaigns, and testing, exercising, and restructuring its mix of air and land-based air defense assets to fight as an effective overall force. fraq must reorganize its command structure to provide the same degree of professionalism, and freedom from political interfemnce that is needed h its army Its jury-rigged airborne sensor aircraft is a poor substitute for a true airborne warning and air cmtroj system (AWACS) or integrated airborne sensor and battle manqement system. Like Iran, Iraq lacks the t r a h h g m d sensors to compete with the West in beyond-visualrange combat, and the advanced training facilities to compete in close or dog-fight combat. To compete with Western air forces, ar that af Saudi Arabia, Iraq must acquire some form of 'hini-airborne warning and air control system (AWACS),'" large inwentor?/ of modem beymtf-wisual-rmge air-to-air missiles, modern remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), and aiharne refueling technology It will require outside support in repair.ing m d reconditioning its fighters. It must find ways of htegrating its fighters into an eMective air control and warning system that "nets" them with its ground-based. air dcfense system, m d whjch avoids its past over-dependence m ground-controlied inte~epts. Iraq needs to acquire modern recomaissance m d htelligence aircraft that are capahle of real-time transmission oi data to eJfective command centers and terminals in the field. The air force must work with the army to improve the sensors and weapons an. its attack helicopters, and to devejop an integrated concept for fixed and rotary wing close air support, and armred c~perations. Iraqi operations and training have not rclfkcted any significant understandilrg of modern AirLand Battle techniques. It needs to reorgmize its training system to s t ~ s far s more demanding and realistic ofenshe traisling that includes trainil~gin c o d i n e d arms exercises and realistic close support and interdjction missions, and strategic bombing missions. This must include constant training with smart

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Air alzd Air B e f i ~ s eForces

273

mul-ritims and actual ordnance, and far better training in evading air defenses and stand-off attacks. At present, the fraqi Air Force has negligjble targetixtg and battle mansement capabilities for offensive operations, and tends to deliver munitions into the gencral area of the target, release thern, and leave with little or no effect. Outside experts also hdicate that it has probably lost most of its capability to operate its Mirage F-Is with Exocet due to a lack of maintenance, trainirrg, and outside technical support. Iraqi air defense has performed dismatly, is wretchedly trained, and is poorly organized. The issue is not one of courage; individual fraqi pilots often pressed. home intercepts during the early days of Desert Storm. However, Iraqi air combat tactics were primitive to the pc;lint where even the lead pilots of Iraq's MMiG-29s often lost their willg nnan and were forced to seek guidance constantly from ground based sensors and comrnand facilities. Pilot air ccrmbat trail7ing rareiy rose above l.he initial levels of Soviet contbat training even befnre the Gulf War, and. these has been no meaningful training since that time. In fact, every aspect of Iraqi air defense training and organization needs to be connpleteb reorganized. Iraq's air intercept training and tactics fall far short of the aggressive air battle and qgressor squadron techniques used by the Saudi, US, and British air forces, a d ground-controIled il-rtercept tactics are vistually unworkable in modern air warfare and are little more than suicidal, Iraq needs modern alrbome waming and air control aircraft, beyond-visual-range combat capabilities, and electronic hvarfilre capabilitic.~.It: also needs to reorganize its air ddense forces completely if its air defense fighters are to operate effectively h the same environment as its attack aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and helicopters. Iraq needs to understand that it needs the spares, support organization, and trai~tirrgto greatly improve its sortie rates and sustainability. E,& most Arab air forces, Iraq aipples its potential effectiveness by emphasizing aircraft numbers over sustained sortie rates and effecthe uperations. As a result, it could only fly a small fracticm of the sortie rates its aircraft: strength wodd have allowed it to fly if the aircraft werc operated by a Western air force-mughly l / 10th to 1120th of the sortie rate of the Israeli Air Force. Fixis situation has grown steadily worse since 1990.As a rclsult the operational sort.ic rate of the Iraqi aircraft would probably decline by 75% or m r e below its initial surge rate h any colnbat lasting more than a few days. Iraq's own malyses of the lessons of the Gulf War indicate that it recognizes that it must have effecthe air deknse capabilities to defend its ground forces in any futurt. war. At the same time, bay also lacks cohe-

274

The ThreatJro~rz:Iraqi Air and Air DeJense Forces

sion as an air force. 'The mission-oriented weahesses described earlier am compomded by a lack of effective central air pl management, a clear concept of how to employ large n u h e r s of aircraft, and a lack of any effective coslcept for joint operations. The fraqi Air Force fights as individual combat elements, and not as a force, Even if the present UN emhqc:, and sanctions are lifted, these force improveme~~ts wilt takc time and rewire Iraq to make m investi~entof several billion dollars, h the interim, the war fighting capabilities of the Iraqi Xir Force will remain limited. The Iraqi Air F m e can probably dcrrnhate Ihe skies over the Iran-Iraq border area mtil Iran f~~1f.y jbsorbs its MC;-29s. It can play a major role in defeathg the Kurds, and rapidly defeat the Kuwaiti air force. It probably cannot defeat the Saudi and Turkish air forces in the border areas, but they might need US s ~ ~ p p otor t win a quick and decisive victory The Iraqi Air Force can conduct limited long-range air attacks against its neighbors, ~ t a i n some s rdueiing capability and can use s o m precision-guirded weapons, chelMieal weapons, and possibly biological weapms, Iraq codd. use these capabilities to mass a few air raids against selected t q e t s in Iran or acrclss the Guf, and could use its rernainhg Exocets to attack tanker and other naval targets in the Gulf, Like Iran, however, Iraq is at least half a decadc away from rebuildhg its air force.

Land-Based Air Defienses Iraq had a large land-based air defelrse system before Ihe Gulf War, which had been extensively reorganiz-ed after fsrael" Osirak raid in 1981.A network of radars, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft guns surrounded strategic and indu,st..rialareas, particulaly in the Baghdad area, A Frenchsupplicd. CVBN system called the KARI (Iraq spelled backwards in Frmch) became operational on a country-wide level in 198k-N87, but it was never really tested during the Iran-Iraq War. The National Air Defense Operations Center (ADOC) in Baghdad controlled Iraq's air defenses. The AL)OC maintained the overall air picture and provided Baghdad with idormation on the course of the air battle. There were five Sector Operations Centers (SOCs)covering the north, west, center-east, south-east and far south which established priorities for air defense engagements. Each was suhordjnate to the ADOC, and controlled air defense operations in a specific gcographic area. The S X s controlled large nurnbers of ground-bmed weapons systems and extei~siveCVBM assets. There were also a large number of Intercept Operations Centers (1OCs) to provide local air defense control. These had hadquarters at Ar-Ruthah, H-l, and H-3

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Air alzd Air B e f i ~ s eForces

275

in the West; Mosul and Qayyarah in the north, Al-Taqaddum, Salman Pak, Al-Jarrah, An-Najf, and An-Nukhayb in the center-east; and AlAmrah, As-Salman and Az-Zubayr in the southeast; and Al-Jahrah in the far south.. The Iraqi system, however, was a mix of technologies from, different nations with mcertain integration. Although part of Iraq" air defense systern was Frclmeh-supplied, lraq pdterned its o v e r d air dcfense network and operations on Soviet models. It also concentrated its coverage around Baghdad, Basra, a d key rnilitary and strategic targets. This left many areas uncovered, particularly in southern Iraq, and along air corridors striking north across the Saudi and Kuwait borders, Iraq's air defenses were fundamentally flawed because the S06s could not communicate effectively once the ADOC was destroyed or deactivated. This meant that the Coalition could attack andlor overwhelm each sector in isoiation from the others, fireover, the destruction of a giwen S K efectively opened up a corridor that could be used to attack the entire corntry. While it may not be a general lesson of the war, such design defects and vulnera:bilities artr common in Third World air defense systems, m d alrnost universal in systems dependent on Soviet or PRC surface-to-air missiles, sensors, m d electronics. There were other pm"hfems. Iraq had created a strmgly inter-netted, r e h d a n t , and layered air defel~sesystem that including a wick variety of radass, hardened and buried commmd- and-control sites, intesceptors, surface-to-air mfssiles, and anti-aircraft artillery. In practice, howeves, much of the communications, data processing, and software were inferior.434 Even so, Iraq's air defense forces were formidable in s o w ~ s p e c t at s the start of the Gulf War. According to one US estimate, Iraq had a totd of 16,U00 radar-guided and heat seeking surface-to-air missiles, including missiles for the large numbers of Lighter army systems described earlier, m d smaller numbers of missiles for the heavier SA-IZs, SA-3s, and SA-Gs, These heavier surface-to-a.ir defenae missiles were operated by an air defense force, organized into air defense units that were part of tbe Iraqi Army; but operationally tied to the Air Force. At the time of the war, Iraq had apprmimately 137-154 medium surface-to-air missile sites and complertes fn Iraq and 20-21 in Kuwait, and 18 nnajor surlace-to-air nnissile s ~ ~ p p m facilitjCs.$RS t These included 20-30 operational SA-? batteries with 160 launch units, 25-50 SA-3 batteries with 140 launch units, and 36-55 SA-6 batteries with well over 100 fise units. Iraq claimed to have modified Che SA-2 missile to use an inha-red terminat seeker, to supplement the SA-2%normal radio command guidance system, but it is unclear that such systems were actually

276

The ThreatJro~rz:Iraqi Air and Air DeJense Forces

dqloyed. k W ol these systems could still be fired on a taget of opportunity basis. Iraq's medium surface-to-air defense sites in Iraq were also a threat to a modern air force. They werr;, widely dispersed, often did not =quire the use of radar, and could be f red on a target of opportunity basis. The missiles on the sites in Iraq included at least 20 SA-8 batteries with 3040 fire units, 60-100 SA-9 fire units, and some SA-13s, and 50 to 66 RoIands-436 To put this level of air defense strength in perspective, Baghdad had mom dense air defenses at fie start cJf fie Gulf War than any city in Eastern Europe, and had mare than seven times the total surface-ta-air missile launcher stre3ngt:b deployed in Hanoi durislg the height of the Wetn m war. 'The US Department of Defense released a highly detailed post-war estimte of Iraq's land-basccf air defe~weat the o u t s t of the Gulf War that credited Iraq with 3,6753 major missifes, not includbg 6500 SA-7s, 400 SA-9s, 192 SA-43s, and 288 SA-Ms. This report indkated that Iraq had 972 anli-.aircsaftartillery sites, 2,404 fixed anti-aircraft g m , and 6,100 mobile mti-aircraft gms, Srparate tiS estimates k~dicatethat Iraq had extensilie numbers of crew/vehicle deployed SA-9s and SA-1,3s, and man-portable SA-14s, and SA-%S,dispersed throughout the KTO. These esthates indicate that Iraq had deployed more tban 3,700 anti-aircraft guns in the K T 0 with barmls larger than 14.5 mm, m d that these AA guns were supplemented by more than 10,000 12.7 mm guns in the ground hrces h the KT0 that could be used in some form of anti-aircraft role. While such weapons lacked accuracy, range, and high lethality; they could be deployed to expose aircraft flying under 12,000-15,000 feet to substantial cumuf ative risk,""' Many of tbr indiwidual surface-to-& missile, anti-aircraft gm, m d cmmand and cmtrol units in the Iraqi syste~x,however, had low operational readjness and proficiency. System-wide and unit-level electronic warfare capability was good by Third World standards, but was scartlely competitive with that- of the US. Iraq's overall sensodbattlie management system remined poor. Their trahing failed to deal with saturation and advanced countermeasure attacks, and was not realisl;ic in dealing with more conventia~~al penetratio~~s by advanced attack aircraft. This was demonstrated all too clearly when Iraqi guns and missiks shot down an Egyptran Alphajet flyhg tcr an a r m show in Baghdad inApril 19K9, even though it. flew along a p=-announced flight corridor at the scheduled tirne.438 Iraq still could not keep its land-based air control m d warning and CVBM systems operational 2% hours a day. There is no expert corrsensus on how much of Iraq's land-baspd air defense assets and air dcfense system survived the Gulf War, or on Iraq's hddings of surface-to-air missiles in late 1995. Many facilities surviwed because the Caaliition concentrated more on the suppression of air

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Air alzd Air B e f i ~ s eForces

277

d t f e ~ ~activity se than the physical dest.ructio~~ of land-hased fadlities and trying to hunt down and kill. indkidual air defense weapons. Table Nine shows how Eraq's past-war air defense strength compares with that of other Gulf stixt.es. h 1996, lraq rctained 13-180 %-2 launchers, 100-125 SA-3 launchers, 100-125 SA-65, 20-35 SA-8s, 3 M 5 SA-9s' some 5A-13s, and around 80 Rolmd surface-to-air missile units. Some af these systems were operated by the army. In addition, Iraq had large nunnbers of man-portale SA-7s and SA-14s, and some SA-16s.""" Most of these surface-to-air missile units are operaticmal. It is ullclear whether Iraq learned enough fmm the Jordanian offi,cers&at msisted it durlng the war, and during the initial, period after th war to operate its HaLvks. Iraq may also be avoiding any use of the weapons because it fears the US would attack any captured Hawks that showed signs of becomjng operational.40 Iraq's ground-based defenses remain cmcentrated amund Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk, as they we= during the pre-war period. Iraqi territory is too large to attempt territorial defense, and Iraq has always concentrated cm defendhg strategic targets, and deploying air defense zcrnes to cover critical land force clepluyments. However, Iraq redeployed some missiles durir\g 1992 and.1993 to c ~ a t surface-to-air e missile "traps" nnear the "no-fly zcmes" "that the Coalitim established after the war. These traps were designed to attack aircraft with over lappislg missile cobrerage when they attacked launchers dcpioyed near the no-fly zones. While the Iraqi efforts failed-md led to the destruction of a number af the missile law~clhershvolved-it is not clear what partion survived or what other redeployments Iraq has made in recent years.

Land-Based Air Refense Readiness and MIarfighting Capability Iraq has made extensive efforts to imprave its use of shelters, revetments, dummies, and other passive defenses. It has used such defenses shce the beginning of the :Iran-Iraq War, and has dc?ployc.dnew decoys after tbr Gulf: Was in an elFfort to reduce its vulnerability According to most experts, it repaired many of the bases md. air facilities that were destroyed or damaged durirlg the Gulf War. It has 16-20 major air bases, with M-3,H-2, and M Asad in the West; Mosul, myarah, and Kirkuk in the north, Al Jarah, TaliX, and Shaybah in the South, and 5-7 more bases within a 150 kilometer radius of Baghdad. Mmy of these bases have surface-to-air missile dtzfenses. Iraq has been able to restm much of its battle c m t d and managemnt system, reactivate its damaged airfields, and even build one new military airfield in the SotlCh."l M m y of its sheltered air dtfense and air force

TABLE NINE Gulf ZJand-Based Air Defense Systems

Count ly

M

Bahrain

None

Iran

Iraq

Muwait Oman

None Saudi Arabia.

UAE

M

Light SRM 40-t-RBS70 18 Stinger 7 Crotale SA-7 HN-5 30 Rapier 15 Tigellcrat Roland SA-7 SA-8 SA-9 SA-13 SA-14 SA-16 6 112 Aspede Blowpipe 34 SA-? 28 javelin 28 Rapier Blowpipe 12 Stinger 9 Rc>land Crotale Stinger 500 Redeye 68 Shahine mobile 48 Clrotate 73 ShaMne static 2Q-t.Blcwpipe 10 SA-16 12 Rapier 9 Crntale 13 RBS7Q 100 Mistral

AA Gzrrjs

1,500 Guns ZU-23 ZSU-23-4 ZSU-57-2 MS-19 FM-80 (Ch Croble) 5,500 Guns ZSU-23-4 23 mm M-1939 37 mm ZSU-57-2 SPf 517 mm, 85 mm,

6 12 x 35 mm Oerfikon 2 VAB/VT> 28 rnrn 4 ZU-23-2 23 mm 12 t-60 40 mm

92 M-463 Vulcan 20 rnrn 50 AMX-30SA 30 mm 128 35 mm. guns 150 t-70 40 rnrn (in store)

Sourep: Adapted by h t h t ~ n 13. p Cordesman from the H5SfMiliZa?.~BaEnnce, 29961995,

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Air alzd Air B e f i ~ s eForces

279

cmmand and control centers remained operational. Iraq's French-supplied KAfCT air defense communj.cationsand data-link system is not particularly effective, but it uses fiber optics and many of the links between its command elemews either have survivcd the bombing or ,?re now repaired.-CJ."ome radars and limited elements of Iraq" air defense C41 system are dso operating, including such prewar systems as the Soviet Spoon Rest, Squat Eye, Flat Face, Tall Kirng, Bar Lack, Cross Slot, m d 'Thin Skin radars. Iraq also has Soviet, Italian, and French jamming m d electrrmic intelligence equipwnt. There is no way to know how many of Iraqfuradars and underground comrnand and persomel shelters survived the Gulf VVar and.the US crzlise missilc strikes of September 1996, It seems likely that at least 5046% survived the Coalition bombing campaign or have been rebuilt shce the war, and that the more recent US cruise missile strikes in 1996 inflicted.no damage on Iraq" command sites and negligible damage m its surface-to-air missile sites and radars. Less than 20% oC the 44 US *-rissilcs seem to havc inflicted significant darnage on an Iraqi radar or SAM site, and no command centers seem to bave receiwed serious darnage. Nonetheless, Iraq faces major problems h makkg its air defense forces effectjve, in modernizhg them, and in reactirng to the lessons of the Gulf War. Most of Iraq" ssurface-to-air missile uni-ts, radars, automated data processing and transfer system, and central comrnand and communications facilities have d y limited operational capability. Iraq must rehabifitate a d improve its radar-guided anti-aixraft guns and most of its short-range air defe~~se systel~s,It needs to either modernize or replace its Rolands. It should replace its survivin.g patchwork system of radars and cornmand and cmtrol equipment, and in the short-term, must find a reliable source of parts for its SA-3s m d SA-6s. Iraq" most serious challenge will be to find replacements for its French and Russian-supplied air defense system, and tcr create a truly modem m d effective air defe~~se system, Iraq has recoglnized this requirerne~~t as a lesson of the Gulf Wr, but is confrunted with the problem that that the only way it can create an effective system is to buy the Patriot, sold by the US, or the SA-1O/SA-12, sold by Russia. The C4lBM aspeds of such a system would have to be tailored to Iraq" needs, integrate its purcbase of the Patriot, SA-lO or SA-12 hfly into its other air defenses, and provide szxitaklle ncw sensors and air deliense computer tecihnolou and software, Such a system could then become operational relatively quickIy, but giving fuli effectivemss by US or Russian standards wollld ?criv._cr it to be tai,l.ored to meet Iraq's specific topographical and operakg conditions. This would take a major effort in terms of software, radar depfoyment and technology, as well as &aptation of US or Kussian tactics and siting concepts to make such a system fully combat effective-""3

The ThreatJro~rz:Iraqi Air and Air DeJense Forces

Xmplications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy The trends in Iraqi Air Forces arc another warning against any policy that

lifts sanctions without retaining any controls over how Iraq uses its mvenues and without: a f'irm commiltnent to military containment. They astl a further argument for efforts to crclate a supplier regime that places strcmg limits on Iraq%military modernization and provides a particularly strong argumnt for limits on Iraqi imports of long-range strike aircraft, and advanced, heavy surf ace-to-air missile defenses.

The Threat from Iraqi Naval Forces Chart nirty-Nine shows the relative strength of Gulf navies. h 1996, the Iraqi Navy orlly had a swngth of about 1,600-2,000 mm, m d its mrviving forces included only the frigate Iblz E;haldan, one Osa-class missile boat, 13 light combat vessels, 5-44 landkg craft, the Agzadee~z,1 Uugoslav Spasilacclass t r m ~ p o r at ~floath~gclry-dock, and possihly o11e repakable Poinwnyclass LST. The fISS and Jarzc's report that Iraq also had. three 5,EjOU ton roll-on rd-off emsport ships with heliccrpter decks, a capability to carry 250 trcrogs and the ability to embmk small landing c&. These sEps may be under commercial flags, and do not have the abi1iW to beach.4M This imventory @es Iraq virtually no naval combat capability 'The Aglzadeen and W-dock are stitl in Mexandria. The lb)z fiatdun is a comparatively large 1,850 ton skip with a maximum speed of 26 h o t s , but it is designed only for training purposes. Its armament comists of one 57 mm Bofnrs gm, m e 40 rnrn Bofors anti-aircraA g m , and a fovlr barrel 16/20 mm anti-aircraft gun, The Ibn Khlkldgku c m carry a quadruple lamcher for Exocet missiles, but this launcher has never been fitted. 'There are reports that the fbr~f(hcrlilun m y have been rcndered lasgety inoperable dur-ing the fighting in 1991, and even if it was not, it probably has cmly very limited verational capability because it lacks spares for its Rolls-Royce maiin e~~gir\es. Surviving Combat Ships :Iraq%lightet survivjng combat ships only ixrclude a m a x h u m of one Osa-class guided missile patrol boat fdcrtrtntful), c ~ n eor two So\riet-SUPplied Bcrgornol-class patrol boats, two Zhuk-class patrol boats, one Poluchat-class patrol craft, six PB-X0 coastal patrol craft, some Sawaridass small inshore patrol boats, six SW-C; I-lovcrcraft, and some smalf boats. Its survivhg five m h e crdt inchde two Sovi,et kvgenya-class and three Yugoslav Nestin-class boats.

30 E Amphibious 0 Mine 4 PCC/PCI Q PC 0 PCM t Z i Corvettes 4 Frigates 4 DE 4 Submarines

25

20

15

10

5

0 Bahrain

Iran

Iraq

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi

1

UAE

CHART THIRTY-NINE Gulf Naval Ships by Category in 19%. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the IISS, Military Balance, 1995-1996.

CHART THIRTY-NINE (continued)

Bahrain Submarines DE Frigates Corvettes PCM PC PCC/PcI Mine Amphibious

1

2 4 4

4

lran

lraq

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi

UAE

2 2 3 2

-

8

1

10

9

2 8

-

3

26 3 11

17

9

7

-

8

4

N

m bJ

The Rogomd-class patrol boats arc the only craft large elnough to be taken seriously, and they have limited colnbat capability Several may also be dan-taged. n e s e boats are 245 ton vessels and normally carry only a 76 mm g m , a 30 mm GaElhg g m , m d one SA-N-5 missile. Iraq does not have access to any of the larger combat ships it ordered from Italy and littie futurt. pmspect of obtaining such access. Italy is holding the Mzrssu Ben Ntrssaiv and Tauiy lbn Ziyad at La Spaia. Italy has turned the four Lupo-class ships that Iraq ordered befose the Iran-Iraq War over to its ovvn navy, mand. will probabi)( sell the ~ m a i n i n gWadi Mr'agh-class corvettes to some other cou~ntryIt has sought to sell some ships to Morocco, and two to Malaysia.44-5The Apcadeen and Iraq" floating dry-dock are held in Alexandria, Egyf""t.All three of the roll-on mlloff transports ,?re held in foreign ports. C)ne of the persnnnl yachts that Saddam Hussein ordcrtltd. before the ban-Iraq War, the Al Manzcser was transferred to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in 1987, and has never even e n t e ~ dIraqi waten;. A second yaeht, the Al Qadissiya, which Saddam Hussein ordered, for use m Iraq's rivers has never been d.eli\rered.-CJ." Iraq also has even less access to the Gulf than it had whrn it invatlted Kuwait. It has been forced to close its naval base at Umm Qasr. Iraq is forced to use smdl craft and civilian ships for patrols incoastd areas. Virtually all of thr larger ships that are still under its contml artl now laid up h Khor as Zabair, Basra, and Mina al-Bakr, Iraq has never been able to implement its plans to acquire a large force of naval helicopters with mti-ship missiles and other specialized helicapters. 'The Iraqi Air Farce does have some Mirage F-Is armed with the Exocct anti-ship missile, but does not seem to rt3tain any rcrmaining capaZliIity to operate Soviet bombers with Soviet air-tcr-ship missiles. The air force lost some armed beljeopters during the Gulf War, hut may rcltain six to seven of the 13Aerospatialc SA-321s, armed with Exocct air-to-surface missiles ohtained during the Iran-Irq War, The Iraqi Navy ordered five Agusta Bell AB-212s; and 18 Agusta Bell A-103A helicopters from Italy belore the war. It was unahle to pay for most of this order, howevr;r; and it is mclear that it completed training for the few heljcopters it did pay for, No a r m d or specid purpose helicopters are currcmtly in service in the Iraqi Navy, m d the navy still has no meaninghl aviation training or capability, Even if the navy can obtain new deliveries, it will be years before it has operational capability. The fraqi Air Force also has not taken deljveq on any of the majm antiship helicopter orclers it negotiated with France in 1.989. These orders hchded six French Aero~atialeAB-332F Super Pumas; hvilh Exoccts, and six SA-365NIHF.Daiuphin with AS-15 air-to-ship missiles, These aircrdt might have given Iraq some added anti-ship capability against the UN, although they scarcely wndd h e dterczd the o u k m e of the

fighti,ng. The AS332Fs were to be fitted hvilh Vlrian search and fire control radars, Agrion chixl-mnunted radars and four AS-15T air-to-ship missiles each. 7be AS-15Ts have a range of up to l5 kilometers and am a much criheaper way to attack small ships thm the Exocetq4dy Naval Readiness and Warfighting Capabi1it-y.

:Iraq retairrs some mine warfare capalrrility, and most of its land-based Silkworm misSile systems. These Silkworms have ranges of up to 100 kilometers, and Iraq has s o m experieslcc in using them in combd. On February 25, 1991, :Iraq fired two Silkworm missiles against Coalition ships in the Gulf. Roth missiles n-tissed. One rnissile failed alzd crashed into the sea, the other was destroyed by British Aerospace Sea Darts fired by the HMS Gloeester. Iraq can also fire Exocet anti-ship missiles from some of its Mirage F-l fighters and helicopters. It may also hnvc some Flaw 70, Faw 150,and Faw 200 missiles, which it claims are Iraqi-made versions of the Soviet SSC-3 Styx, but these are obsolescent designs at best."B These limitations are so severc that there ir; no nea~termprospet that the Iraqi Navy will a c q u i ~more t h the most marginal, war fighting capabiliq. It can conduct limited raids and fire some anti-ship missiles, but if it atternpts to fight lranian or Western naval and air forces, it is a h o s t certain to be rapidly destroyed.

Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy Iraqi naval forces are so weak that they pose only a limited priority for cantahment, At the same time, careful attmtion is needed to two h d s of Iraqi imports: Advanced mine Laying capdilities and advanced antiship missjles. Any supplier reginte s h o d focus on s~lchimports as a significant potmtial risk to the flow of oil m d shipping in the Gulf. There are eyually gwd Easons to deny :Iraq submarirtes and modern surface combat ships*Every effort should be made to prevent Iraq koan joining Irm as a regional naval threat,

Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism Iraqi security and paramilitary forcles are a key tool in Iraq's efforts to use force to put pressure 811 its Gulf ncighbors and the Wst. Iraq has long manjpulated extremist groups and mnvements to serve its ambitions and ideotogical goals. Like other radical Middle Eastern states, Iraq has found such exploitation to be a cheap and effective substitute for overt political and military action. Such activities allow Iraq to partially decouple its actions horn public ~sponsibility,and to suddenly shi& support from one group to mother, and to disavow a given group at wiXI. Iraqi intelligence maintajns a large special operations component which operates directly out of Iraqi embassies, and through independent overseas ""fonts" ]like airline and purchasing dices. Whie Iraqi intelligence is deeply concerned with suppressing opposition to the Ra%th regime, I r q i intelligence has aiso been deeply involved in buying arms, ohtainhg the technotogy for weapons of mass destruction, providi.ng covert support for ethnic and political movements hostile to the enemies of the Iraqi ~ g j m eand , in attacks on forclip critics, intelligence agents, m d political leaders.

Recent Iraqi Terrorist Activity:Iraq has not been able to act as freeXy h supportjng revolutionary and ext~rnistgroups siznce the end of the Gulf War as it has in the past. :Many Iraqi agents were expelled from foreig~~ countries during the Gulf War. Nevertkless, Iraq has still been active in terrorism, The US State Department estimates that Iraqi intdigence conducted 39 terrorist attacks between the end of the Gulf War and April 1993. Iraqi agents seeln to have trained new hit squads to kill enemies in, foreign countries, including an Iraqi scientist who wati about to defect in lordan in December 1999. 'There have been dozens of attacks on. UN relief and aid workers in :Iraq, including many bombings, Eight time-bombs were found under

Uncrrnvent-z'onnlWafare and Terrorism

2137

UN trucks in Dece~n,ber1992, and explosives damaged 14 UN trucks a week later, Iraq cmtinucs to h a t a number of terrorist qanizations despite being forbidden to do so by tlN Scurity Covllcil Resolution 687. These gmups include the People" MMujahideen of Iran (Mojahedin-e m d q ) , which is c~pposedto the Gove ent of Eran. As has been discussed, the Peopfefs Muja:hideen has repeatedly law~chedraids m d c o ~ ~ d u c kterrorist d attacks in Iran. Iran bas retaliated by sponsorir\g anti-Iraqi foxes hIran, which operate s a i n s t Iraq and are led by the Hakim family.319 Iraq has supported extrel~istPalesthian groups like the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF),Abu Abbas" PPalestinian Liberation Front (PLI.'),and Abu Ihralzim. Iraq has also assisted the Turk.i.s:h Kurdistan Wc,rkers Party ( P K ) and anti-Iranian Kurdish groups in Iran. It supported gmups involved in blowing up the Pan Am airliner in 1992. It may have given some support to the gmup that bombed. the Wor Center, although thc avajlablc evidence is very weak.Ji"(1The Gov continued to prnvide safe haven m d logktical and miljtary support: to several terrorist groups m d individuale; like the People's Mujahideen and ANO. It has also aided Abu AbbasTalestinc I:,,iberation Front (PLF), and the notorious bomb-maker Abu Brahim. Both Abbas and Brahim en~cryedsanctuary in bay. None of these groups are partiewlarfy strong-at the mment, or seem tt? be attracting significmt popular support. They are, however, tools which :Iraq can use under at least some cmditims. Iraq can also use state terrorisxn,, and has tried to do so in the past. Attempting to Assassinate President Bush The Iraqi Zntelligence %mice (115) sponsored an assassination attempt on President Bush when he visited Kuwait on April 14-16,1993. lraq intelligence age~~ts-i-ncludk~g Mohammed Jawad and Abd al-hm-recruited 11Iraqis to drive a Toyota Land Cruiser and Chevrolet Suburbm across the Kuwait border on April 13. The vehicks cmtained pistols, hmd. grenades, timing devices, remote conh.ol, senshg devices, m d a 180 pounds of %mtex plastic explosive. They were also given 12 cases of whiskey to disguise the operation as smuggling. The key device inwolved in the plot was a car bontb that was jntended to be placed along the President's rout.@&sough Kuwait and kill both him and his entourage. One of the key Iragis in the plot, Wali Chazali, was also given a ""sicide beltf'as a back-up if the car bomb failed* The US originaly suspected that Kuwait might be exaggerating the plot-in part because Iraqi inteiligence recruited amateurs and then fati,led to kform its rclcrujts of: changes in President Bush's route.. Mow-

2138

Unca~t~entz'onaE Wn$~reand Terrorism

ever, later investigations confirmed that Iraqi intelligence was directly involved. While all of t h evidence has not been made public, FBI and CIA agents f o n d that a total of 14-17 people were imvotved in the plot, including II Iraqis and three Kuwaitis. Several had clear ties to the Iraqi Intelligence Service, some bomb components were Iraqi, and the bomb design was similar to an Iraqi bomb used in Turkey. Other evidence linked the plot to the highest levels h the Iraqi government.452 The United States retaliated on June 26,1993, by firing 23 Tomahawk cmise missiles against the center of the IIS headquarkrs in suburban Baghdad. However, the plot on President Bush's life was part of a much broader pattern of challenge and response that fray has carried uut since the cease-fire in the Gulf War. lraq continued to challenge Uru' aircraft in the no-fly zonc by tracking thcm with radar m d occasionally subjectjng them to mti-aircraft fire, Iraq also contirrued to attack Shi5te rebels in the south, to bomb UN aid n-tissions to the Kuds, to keep much of its troop stre~~gtlh on the border of the Kurdish security zone, m d to attack Kurdish leaders and villages in the security zone. 11% June 1994, the Kuwaiti court found 14 aE the individuals accused aE pasticipating in the plot to assassinate former President Bush during his Agril 1993 visit to Kuwait to be guilty. The preceding trial had clearly identikd Iraq's complicity in the assassination attempt.

Othex Recent Imqi Ads of Terrorism The US State Department reports that Isaqi-backed surrogates were prabably responsible for two attempts to bomb the Kuwait Airways ofice h Beimt in 1993, and another attempt to bomb the Kuwaiti Embassy, in Lebmon. The Iraqi r e g b e co~~tlnued its war of atkition on UN m d hummitarin targets in northern Iraq abed at driving the foreign prcsa c e out of ehe area anli depriving the :Kurdish pclpulation of relief supplies. tlN and relief workers werc. shot at, bontbs or grenades were tossed at residmes and vehicles, and bombs were placed m UN trucks loaded with relief q p l i e s . In March 3933, a Belgian official of Ffandicapped International was shot m d kl[led; a Iocat emp10yee of the same o ~ m i z a t i o n was killed m d six others were hjured when an aid station was bombed in December.452 CSxr Spte~xber26, 1999, a UN truck carrying 12 tons of medical supplies was compIetely destroyed by a bomb attacked, to the fuel tank probably by Iraqi agents at an :Iraqi checkpoint. The truck driver and 32 civilians were injured by the blast. The incident ill,ustrates Iraqi determination to reduce aid to the Murds."3 in 1992 the Iraqi Government agreed to comply with UN Resolution 687, hlrhish repires Iraq to prohibit any terrorist osganii.ation from oper-

Uncrrnvent-z'onnlWafare and Terrorism

2139

ating within its territory Nevert.Eteless, Baghdad has maintained contacts with the PKK, which has killed hundrc3d.s of peoplc in attacks inside %key and mounted two separate tmorist campaigns against Turkish interests in Europe in 1993. The PKK has traiining camps in Iraq.4.- At the same time, Iraq seems to be supporting rival factions withh the Kurdish mwernent, imcluding the KDP and PUK, to encourage divisions. Durhg 1994 and 15395, Iraq cmthued its terrorist attacks against political dissidents, both at home and abroad. It also continued its terrorist war of attrition ailned at driving UN and other foreign aid agencies out of morthern Iraq and depriving the Kurdish population of relief supplies, There were at least 17 attacks agahst UN and international relief personnel. Iraq cmtinued to provide safe haven and training hcitities for s ~ era1 terrorist organizations, illcluding Abu Abbas' Palestine Liberation Frmt (PLF), the ANO, and the Arab Liberation Front CALF). In April 1994, a prominent Iraqi member of the opposition =siding in k i n r t was assasshated. The Gover ent of Lebanon stated that it had firm evide~~ce linklng the killing to the Government of Iraq. Lebanese authorities subsequently arrested two Iraqi ddiplomats in clmnecticm with the incident and I:Jebanonbrnke djplomatic relations wiCh Iraq."s Imp2ieatians far Western and Sauthern Gulf Strategy

?"he West, and particularly the US, have abused charges of tcrrorism so often that it is sometimes temptin.g to ig~~orcl such charges hvhen they are legitimate. Iraq is likely to remain a real "terrorist nation" as long as it is under the control of Saddam Hussein, or any similar ""cerrist" regime. This is not a threat that can be dealt with through sandiorrs-in fact, Iraq may increase its unconventional warfare and terrorist efforts in reaction to prolonged sanctions. "rhe only mswer is strong counterterrorist capabilifies and close coordination between the US and its allies in the Southern Gulf.

The Threat from Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction :It is difficult to estimate the ability of l r q to recover its delivery capability in regards to weapons of mass destructio~n.Accurately assessing Iraq's capacity to rebuild its nuclear weapons progrm is equally problematic. :It is clear, however, that Iraq possesses significant potential in these areas and that it is almost certain to apply itself to developing both weapons of mass destmction and a means to deliver them.

The Struggle to Eliminate Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction

Ch April 3, 1991, the UN %curity Cou~ncifpassed Resol~~tio~n 687, which set forth the f o m d terms for a permanent cease-fire, This rcsolutim repired :Iraq to rmouncc; and cmdemn tenorism, repatriate all prisoners, restore all scized and stoletn pmperty, establish a fund based on oil revenues as a source for reparations paymnts to Kuwait, accept a continued arms and economic ernbargo (except on food, medicine, and essential civilim needs), and accept the eradication of its weapons of mass dcstructim, Resolution 687 also compelled Iraq to alllaw the UN to demarcate the Iraqi-Kuwait border, impose a demilitarized zcrne along that barder, and establish an observer brce to h s ~ ~ the r e continued integrity of such a boundary Saddarn later accepted Resolution 687 on April 6,1991-although he called the solution "unjust"-and the Resolution was the11 accepted by Ihe Iraqi National Assemt?ly 'The UPJ' Security Comcil subsequently declared a formal cease-fire to be h effect as of April 11,1991. The latter portion of UN 9cwi.ty Councjl Resolution h87 demanded that Iraq accept the destmction, removal, or dismantling of all bjalogical, chemicai and nuclear weapons; atl rescrarch, development and support faciljties associakd with these weayms; all stocks of chemical and biological aajents; Lall balktic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometas;

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Weapons I?( Mass Destr~ctiou

292

and all prodwtion and =pair fadlities associated with Ihe manulacturjng of such missiles. It linked Iraqi compliance to fray" aablliiy to export oil and other materials by stating that once the UN Scurity Council agreed that Iraq had completed t-he rcquired actions, the UN prohibjtions against the export of commodities and products originating in Iraq would, have no further force or efftlct. To assist in the implementation of Resolution 687 the UN established the UN Special Cammission for the purpose of plannhg th identification and destruction of Iraq" weapons of mass destruction. "The UN Specid Commission, or UNSCOM, in turn created a force of UN inspectors, while also arnthorizing the International Atomic Energy Agmcy (IAEA) to assist WSCOM irr its objective. From the beginning, Eraq agg~ssivelyresisted the UN and IAEA eMorts to eliminak its weapons of mass destruction. As early as April S, 1991, Iraqi forces werc detected sdvaging equipment for missiles and weapons of mass destmction, as well as cleanhg up suspect sites. On April 18,1991, Ihe Iraqi government lied to the UN in its first declaration regarding its holdings of weapons of mass destruction. fray claimed that its post-war stockpile of such weapons ccmsisted of cmly 52 regdar and modified Scud missiles, 1O,Q00c h e ~ ~ i cwarheads, al 1,500 chemical bombs and shells, and 1,000 tons of mustard and nerve gas, The UN later discovered 46,000 sufviving cherrtical weapms, and these discoveries proved Iraq's claims to be grossly inaccurate. Iraq made similar false chims to the EntemtionaX Atomic Enesy Agmcy (IAEA) about its nuclear weapclns effort in an April 29,1991, declaration. As a result of Resolution 687, a total of 53 UNSCOM and IAEA inspections were completed between June 1991-the date of the first inspection-and March 1993. During this peric,d, the LIN made many signilicmt discoveries. The inspecli,ons were colnprised of 18 nuclear inspections, 15 chemical inspections, 3 bioIogical inspections, 16 ballistic n-tissile inspections, S special missions, a d one mmitoring team \iisit-"W~ost of these inspectinns encountered sig~zificantIraqi resistance and lies. Iraq's continuing attempts at deception resulted in the passage of UN Security Cau~zcilResolutio~z707 on August 15, 1991. Resolution 702 requires fray to provide full,final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its biologicai, chemical, nuclear, and bailistic missile programs. The Resol~~tion also dernmds that Iraq allow UN hspedors unco~zditional and unrestricted access to all areas, facilities, e ~ i p m n t records, , and means which they may wish to inspect. The Resofution further rt?quires that Iraq immediately cease any &tempt to conceal, move, or destroy any material.or equipment relating to these programs. In adfition, Resolution 7(>"i"calls on l r q to halt all nuclear ac"civities of a n y kind, except for production of isotopes used for agricultural, industrial, or medical purposes.

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Tht Tllrcmf from Iraqi Weapons of M s s Des.stmct1'0t1

Ch October 11,1991, the UN Secz~rityCau~zcilalso passed Resolution 715, which requires Iraq to meet unconditionalty all of its obligations as repired in the UN plans for ongoing mcmitoring of Iraq% ccmlpliance with Resolutions 687 and 707. These ~ s o l u t j o n sand ~ UN efforts to implement them, were met with ent. 'l'he Iraqi g w e new challenges by the :Iraqi gove repeated signals hdicating that it intended ta regain its capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. fn March 1993, Iraq" continued ohfuscatim succeeded in prompt* Roif Ekeus, the head. of the LIN Special: Commission, ta declare that he was u~zableta acclotmt for 25% af :Iraq%s o w n pre-war Scud force."T The Iraqi government engineered confrontation after confrontation and backed down only after it had provoked a crisis or the UN Coalitio~zretaliated with force. When these Iraqi efforts failed, the government changed tactics. On November 26, 1993, Iraq appeared to shift its positricrn and accept the terms af UN Scz~rityCouncil Resolutio~zs687, 707, and 715. Iraq's Fareign m i s t e r , Moharnmed Said Sahaf, sent a letter to the president of the UN Security Council, Jot;&Luis Jesus, indkating that Iraq would accept the Security Cau~zcilrequirerne~ztthat Iraq could only resume its ail export"f it agrced to long-term UN inspection designed to prevent Iraq from resumirrg its production of w a p m s of mass destmction, Iraq made this ofter only after more than two years of actims demonstrating its intent to cheat on the t e m s of the cease-fire. Furthermore, Iraq" letter came only days after Iraq had agailn chailmged the demarcation of its border with Ktlwail; rnadc new claim to Kuwait been condemned by the UN for new human rights violations, and attacked the Shi3tcs in its southern marshes.45" Despite this assczrted willhgness to accept UN' etforts aimed at preventing the rcsumptim of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, :Iraq continued tcr try to obfuscate the n a m e of its efforts and to cheat whe~zeverpossible. In May 19995, Deputy Prime Mhister Tariq Aziz conditioned further Iraqi cooperation regarding its biological weapons pmgram on certificaticm by UNSCOM that Iraq had cclmplied with tfre terms of UN resolwtjnns 687 and 715. This ultimatum was re~ectedby UNSCOM which, in its June 1995 report, dedared that, while signiiicant progress had been achieved, lraq had not yet "' et all these terms.'"J-"" Although tlMSCOM refusczd to certify compliance, Iraq claimed to be pleased with its favorable portrayal h the report, and then responded on July 1 by officially achowledging an offensive biological weapons program. In its dcclaation, lraq admitted to manufacturing a variety of biological agents but denied that any weaponizatjon of these agents o c c u r ~ d The . conciljatory attitude fnllowing the June report, however, proved to be short-lived. C)n July 17, Sadifant Hrtsseh himself declmd

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that Iraqi cooperation wi& UNSCQM would cease pending further pmgress toward certification. Iraqi Foreign Minister Al-Sahaf subsequently proclailned August 33 as the deadline for compliance by UNSCOM.4bQ As a result, Rolf Ekeus tmvelcd to Baghdad on August 4, where the :Iraqi government p ~ s m t e d him with what was termed a "full, final and complete disclosure'kf its biological weapons progrm. During the visit, Dcputy Prime Minister Aziz reiterated Iraq" wwarning that a lack of progress on the liffing of ecclnomic sanctions &rough certification would rclsult in cessation of Iraqi cooperation with W X O M . Aziz furtber urged ME Ekeus to inform the Security Council of Zray's intentions, which he did on August 7'. That same day, however, a dramatic developme11t radically altered Iraq's intransigence, while simultmeausly u ~ ~ d e r mhing confidence in ZTNSCOM" previous assessments regarding IdNSCOM"s p ~ v i o u assessments s rttgarding Iraqi capabilities.""' 0 1 1August 7, Z,ieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, who had led part of Zray's weapons of mass destruction pmgrm, defected to Jordan. Baghdad clearly feared that this dekction would lead to further disrloszxres that lraq was still systern&ically lying to UNSCQM, and moved quickly to engage in damage control. fn an effort to preempt new disclos u ~and s undermine Kameh credibility, the lraqi government p0rtrayc.d him as a mgue officer who had concealed information regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction from botln UNSCOM and Iraqi officials. They then proceeded to ilnvite Mr. Ekeus to Baghdad to discuss the new information, while simdtaneousl.y dropphg their August 31 deadljne for certification."z M. Ekeus arrived in Iraq m August 17 and met with a delegation which included the Deputy Prime Mhister and the Foreign Mhister. While they revealed that Xrq's efforts in regards to acquiring weapons of mass destmction bad been prwiously uneierstated, no documents were produced for verification. After several complaints by Mr. Ekeus, the Iraqis reported that they had just ""discovered" a plethora of docctmnts at the farm of General Kamel. These werc. subseguently turned over to UNSCOM on August 20. A cursory examhation rcveded that most: of the half-million pages were concerned, with Eraq's nuclear program, but that a considerable number also discussed chemical, biological and ballistic missile progrms.a3 These disclosu~sand past discoveries have revealed the program summarized in Table Ten, along with the similar efforts of Iran and krael that are? locking the rclgian into a panern of creeping proliferati.on.m There may, however, be many further disdasurcs to come. In September, 1995, lraqi officials ~ v e a l c dthat other records, whose ertistence heretofore was denied, did indeed exist. According to UNSCQM, this acknowl-

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Tht Tllrcmf from Iraqi Weapons of M s s Des.stmct1'0t1

edgment and the production of the documents was ". . . one of Che most significant breakthroughs in the four years of its operations in Iraq.""""" Newertheless, the new information ~ v e a l e dthat Iraq's biologicat and ballistic missile programs were ". . . larger or more advanced in every dimension than p ~ v i o u s l ydeclared." hrther, in regards to chemical weapons, the UNSCOR/L report reveaied that ". . . Iraq acknowledged a much larger and more advanced program than hitherto admitted for the pmduction and storage of the chemical warfare agent VX,"4& While these revelations scarcely push U N S C M back to square one, its October 11,1995 report to the tl'N Security Council stated that:46? The revelations cast into doubt the veradty of Iraq's previous declaration in the missile area, including the material balance for proxribed weapons and items. . . . In the chemical weapons area. . . . (whether) Iraq still keeps p=cursors in storage . . . has not been fully clarified. . . . The Commissictn must adjust the direction of some of its monitoring actkities, especially to prevent Iraq Ercm using its chemical compounds, equipment, and activities for secret acquisition of chemical weapons. Further destruction of some Iraqi chemical assets has to be contemplated. . . . a hitherto secret offensive biological weapons program in Iraq, comprising large-scale production of biolcsgical warfare agents, the filling and. deployment of missile warheads and aerial bombs with these agents, as tzreld, as bido@caX weapons research and development activities of corniderable width and depth, . . . As late as August of this year, Iraq presnted to the Commission a formal, but essentially false, d ~ l a r a t i o non its bialc>gicalweagom activitjes. . . . Much remains to be verified with regard to these weapons, in padictrtar the destm&ion of munitions and bulk agents, . . . The Commission also detected undeclared eFfc>rtsby Iraq to establish a ccwert prc>curementnetwork for act-ivities mder monitoring. . . . @estic~rts can still be raised about the intenticsns of Iraq as regards pojssible remants of its proscribed prcjgrams.

It has shce become clear that Iraq has told new lies-or c o ~ ~ t h u etod conceal facts-regarding the destruction of its missile components, radiological wapons, chemical s e n t s , and bidcrgical weapclns. Iraq has asked UNSCOM to xcept its verb& assurances that it destroyed warheads m d weapons that include some 500,000 liters of botulism agent and 50,000 liters of anthrax. It has become clear that Iraq set up a clandtstjne ixnport progrm following the Gulf War to obtain missjlc guidance systems and fumces to make missile components for Scud-type missiles. On November 10, 3995, Jordan intexepted a shipment of Russian-made missile guid,ance systems, and specialized prrzcision macl-tixre tools to Iraq, In December 1995, brdan also revealed. that Iraq bad attempted to import 1110 sets of advanced missile guidmce eyuipmmt, hcl~~dirrg accelerometers and gyroscapes from Russia.468

295 TABLE TEN Iraqi, Iranian, and Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction Iraq Delivery Systems Delivery systems at the time of the Gulf War included: Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers. MiG-29 fighters. Mirage F-1,MiG23BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft. A Scud force with a minimum of 819 missiles. Extended range Al-Hussein Scud variants (600kilometer range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq, and at three fixed sites in northern, western, and southern Iraq. Developing AI-Abbas missiles (WOkilometer range) AI-Abbas which could reach targets in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus. Long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 kilometers. Iraq had long-range strike aircraft with refueling capabilities and several hundred regular and improved, longer-range Scud missiles, some with chemical warheads. Iraq fired 84 Al-Husayns, 3 AI Husyan-Shorts, and 1AI-Hijrarah (with a cement warhead) during the Gulf War. The Gulf War deprived Iraq of some of its MiG29s, Mirage F-ls,MiG23BMs, and Su-22s. Since the end of the war, the UN inspection regime has also destroyed many of Iraq’s long-range missiles. Iraq, however, maintains a significant delivery capability consisting of: HY-2, SSN-2, and C-601cruise missiles, which are unaffected by UN ceasefire terms. F R O G 7 rockets with 70kilometer ranges, also allowed under UN resolutions. Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery. Several Scud launchers US experts believe Iran may still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles. UN experts believe Iraq is concealing u p to 67 Scud launchers and 11-24 missile assemblies. Iraq has focused its missile programs around the Scud B. During the late 198Os, it began to enlarge the fuel tanks of its Scuds and reduce the weight of its warheads to extend their range beyond the normal 300 kilometer maximum range of the Scud. It also developed a capability to manufacture Scud variants in Iraq, and was working on production facilities for a development of the solid-fueled Argentine Condor missile called the Badr 2000. Iraqi missile programs at the time of the Gulf War included: Scud Bs with a maximum range of 300 kilometers. AI Husayns with a 600-650 range. AI Husayn-Shorts (a variant of the AI Husayn) with a fjOO-650 range AI Hijarahs with a 600-650 range Iraqi developmental missile programs at the time of the Gulf War included:

(continues)

296 TABLE TEN (continued) A1 Fahd. A conversion of the SA-2 with an intended 300 kilometer range. Abandoned in the R&D phase. Extended-range Al Fahd. A 500 kilometer range missile abandoned in the development phase after exhibition at the 1989 arms show in Baghdad. A1 Abbas. A longer version of the A1 Husayn with a lighter warhead which was intended to have a 900 kilometer range. Abandoned during R&D. Badr 2000. A solid-propellant two-stage missile based on the Condor with a range of 750-1,OOO kilometers. Was in R&D when Gulf War began. Facilities were constructed to begin missile production. Tammouz 1: a missile based on the Scud with an SA-2 sustainer for a second stage. It had an intended range of 2,000 kilometers but was not carried through to advanced R&D. AI Abid: A thnx-stage space vehicle with a first stage of 5 AI Abbas airframes. Test launch in December, 1989. Iraq also engaged in effort to develop a solid-fueled missile with a similar range to the Tammouz. Clear evidence that at least one Iraqi long-range missile design was to have a nuclear warhead. Iraq attempted to conceal a plant making missile engines from the UN inspectors. It only admitted this plant existed in 1995, raising new questions about how many of its missiles have been destroyed. Iraq produced or assembled 80 Scud missiles it its own factories. Some53seem to have been unusable, but 10 are still unaccounted for. Had design work underway for a nuclear warhead for its long range missiles. In addition, Iraq has admitted to: Hiding its capability to manufacture its own Scuds. Iraq claims to have manufactured only 80 missile assemblies, 53 of which were unusable. UNSCOM claims that 10 are unaccounted for. Developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 called the Laith. The UN claims to have tagged all existing FROG-7s to prevent any extension of their range beyond the UN imposed limit of 150 kilometers for Iraqi missiles. Experimenting with cruise missile technology and ballistic missile designs with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers. Flight testing AI-Hussein missiles with chemical warheads in April 1990. Initiating a research and development program for a nuclear warhead missile delivery system. Successfully developing and testing a warhead separation system. Indigenously developing, testing, and manufacturing advanced rocket engines to include liquid-propellant designs. Conducting research into the development of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) for the dissemination of biological agents. Attempting to expand its Ababil-100 program designed to build surface-tosurface missiles with ranges beyond the permitted 100-150 kilometers.

(confinues)

TABLE TEN (confkued)

* Sta&ing an indigenom 600mm superwn design effort, * US and UN officiats ccmclude further that: * Tray is concentrating pmcurement efforts on rebuilding its ballistic missile prc>gramusing a clandestine network of front companies to obtain the necessary materials and technology from Eurc~peanand Russian firms. * This equipment is then concealed and stockpiled for assmbly concomitant with the end of the UP4 inspection regime, * The equipment dandestinely mught by Iraq includes advanced missile guidance components, such as accelerometers and gyrosccfpes, specialty metals, special machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made, million-dollar furnace designed to fabricate engine parts for missiles. * Jordan found that Tray was smuggling missile components through Jordan in early December 1995. * US satellite photographs reveal that Iraq has rebuilt its Al-Kindi missile msearch facility. * Iraq retains the techology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing rmearch and development effort, in spite of the UN sancticms regime. * The fact that UN Security Council Resolutian 687 allows Iraq to continue producing and testing short range missiles (less than 150 kilometers range) has meant it can retain sipificant missile efforts, Iraq% on.-goingrocket and missile prcjgrams include: * %una/Frog-7, A Rusian unguided rocket with a 70 kilometer range currently in service and in limited product-ion. * Astros 11. A Brazilian unguided rocket with. a kilometer range currently in service and in limited production. * SA-2. A Russian surface-to-air missile tzrhich China has demonstrated can be converted into a 300 kilometer range surface-to-surface missile. * SA-3. A Russian surface-to-air missile tzrhich has same potential far cmver=. sian to a surface-to-surface missile, * Ababil-50. An Yugoslav-design4 Iraqi-produced 50 kilometer range artillery mcket with very limited growth potential. * Ababil-100. An Iraqi 308-150 kifometer range system with parallel solidfuel and liquid-fuel development prcjgrams tzrt-rich seems tu be used as a ""legal" kst-bed and fc3undation Eor much tongerrange missile programs once sanctions are lifted. Many of the liquid-fuel& prt2grams are compatible with Scud prduction. * Limited stocks of French- and Chinese-prc~ducdland and air launched cruise missiles. Chcmicnl Weapons * T z r c d ~ c dseveral thousand tons of chemical weapons from 39% on. Used chemical weapom extensively against Iran and its awn Kurdish pcrpula6on in 1988.

TABLE TEN (confkued)

* Use of Tabun gas against Iranians beginning in 1984 is first confirmed use of nerve agents in war.

* Had roughly 1,000 metric tuns of chemical weapom on hand at the time it invaded Kuwait, spiit equal1y between blister agents and nerve agents.

* UN destruction efforts at Samara destmy ed aver 27,000 chemical bombs, rock-

*

*

*

*

* * *

ets, and artillery shefls, including 30 Scud missile warheads. About 500 tons of mustard and nelve agents, and thousands of tons of precursor chemicals tzrer-e burned or chemically neutralized. In revelations to the UN, Iraq admitted that, prior to the Gulf War, it: * Maintained large stockpiles of mwtard gas, and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun. * Produced binary Sarin filled artillery shells, 122mrn rockets, and aerial bombs. * Manufactu~denough precursors to produce 490 tons of the nerve agent VX. These precursors included 65 tons of choline and 200 tons of pho>spl-rc~ rnus pentasulfide and di-isopropylamine. * Tested Ricin, a deadly nerve agent, for use in a&ilfery shells. * Had three flight tests of long range Scuds with chemical warheads. * Had large ;?X production effort underway at the time of the Gulf War. The destruction of the retated weapcJnsand fec;edstc>cks has been claimed by Iraq, but not verified by U N X O M , The majority of Iraq's chemical agents were manufactured at a supposed pesticide plant located at Sarnara. Various, other production facilities were also used, including those at Salman Pak, Muthanna, and Habbiniyah. n o u g h sever-ely damaged during the war, the physical plant for many of these facilities has been rebuiXt. * Iraq possessed the techology to produce a variety of other persistent and non-persistent agents, The Gulf War and after * UN inspection regime may have brgely eliminated these stockpilcsrj and reduced prc3duction capabiliq. * US experts believe Iraq has conceal& significant stocks of prwurssrs. It also appears to retain significant amounts of production quipment dispersed befoi-e, or d u r i q , D e s r t Storm and not recovered by the UN. Iraq has developed basic chemical wahead designs far Scud missiles, rcjckets, bombs, and shells. Iraq also has spray dispersal system. Tray maintains atentiive stocks of defensive equipmat. The UN maintaim that Iraq is not currently producing chemical agent% but the UN is also concerned that Iraq has ofkred no evidence that it has destroyed its V)(: production capability andior stockpile. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and evidence cXearly indicates an ongoing research and develctpment effort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime.

TABLE TEN (confkued)

BiologimE Wcapons * Syr;t-ematicallyIied about biological weapcJnseffort until 1995. First stated that had small defe'cmtiiveefforts, but no offenshe effort. In July 1995, admitted it had a major offensive effort, In October 1995, finally admitted major weaponization effort. * The August 1995 defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, formerly in charge of Iraq's weapons of mass destiwctic)n, led Iraq to reveal the extrtnt of its biological weapons program. liters o f * Iraq reporzed to the UN in Augmt 1995 that it had p r d u c d Botdinjiurn toxiin, 8,300 liters rrtfhtkm, and s i m c a n t quantitiesof other agents, * Iraq has, however, continued to lie about its biological weapons effort. * It has claimed the effort is head by Dr. Taha, a woman who only headed a subordinate effc>rt.It has not admitted to any help by fc>reignpersonnel or cmtradors- It has claimed to have destmyed its weapons, but the one site UNSCOM inspectors visited show-ed no s i p s of such destruction and was later said to be the tzrrong site. It has claimed only 50 people tzrere employed full time;?, but the scale of the effort would have required several hundred. * Kepc~rtsindicate that Iraq tested at least 7 principal bic~logicalagents for use against humans. * Anthrax, BcJtulinum, and Anatoxin known to be weaponized. * Looked at viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Examined the possibility of weaponizing Gas Gangrene and Mycotoxins. Some field trials were held of these agents, * Examined foot and moutl? disease, haemorhagic conjunctivitis virus, mtavirus, and camel pox virus. * Conducted research on a "wheat pathc>gennm d a Mycotoxin similar to "yellow rain" defcjliant. * The "wheat smut" was first pmduced at Al Salman, and then put in major production during 1987-1988 at a plant near Mosul. Iraq claims the program was abandon&, * The defection of Hussein KameX prompted Iraq to admit that it: * imported 39 tons of growth media for bialogical agents obtained from three European firms. According to UNSGOM, 17 tons remains unaccounted for. Each ton can be used to produce 10 tom of bacteridugical weapons. * Imported type cultures which can be modified to develop bistogieal weapons from the US, * Had a laboratory- and industrial-scale capability to manufacture various biolctgical agents including the bacteria wKch cause anthrax and botulism; ARatoxin, a naturally occurring carcin%en; clostridium perkingens, a gangrene-causing agent; the protein toxin ricin; tricothecene mycotc>xins,such as T-2 and DAS; and an anti-wheat fungus known as wheat cover smut, the camel pox virus and the Iraq also cmducted research into the rotavr'ru~~ virus wKch causes haemorrhagic conjunctivitis.

TABLE TEN (confkued)

* Created at least seven primary production facilities including the Sepp Institute at Muthanna, the Ghazi Research Institute at Amaria, the lfaura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute' and faciliees at Al-E-Xakim,Salman Pak Taji, and Fudafiyah. According to UNSCOM, weapc~nizationoJccurred primarily at Muthama thrcjragh May 198qlargely Botutinum), and then moved to At Salman. (Anthrax). Tn March 1988 a plant was open at At Hakjm, and in 4989 an Aflatoxin plant was set up at Fudaliyah. * Manufactured 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax at Al-Hakim during 1990; 5400 liters of cc3ncentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura Foot and ~VouthDisease Institute from November 2990 to J a n u a 15,1991; ~ 408 Xikrs of concentrated Botutinrtm toxin at Taji; and 150 Iiters of concentrated anthrax at Salman Pak. Produced 1,850 liters of Aflato>xinin solution at Fudaliyah. * Produced 340 liters of conccmtrated ctostridium perfringens, a gangrenecausing biological agent, beginning in August 1990. * Produced 40 liters of concentrated Ricin at AI Salam. Claim to have abandoned work after tests failed, * Relocated mueh of its biological weapom effort after Coalititicln strikes on its facilities at A1 Kndi and Salman Pak to A1 Hakim and other faciliees. This makes tracking the weapons effc~rtextremely difficutt. * Had at least 79 civilian fadlilies capable of playing some role in biological weapons prcjduction still extant in 1995. * Extensive weaponization program * Conducted field trials, weaponization tests, and live firings of I 2 m r n rockets armed with anthrax and Botulinurn toxin fmm March 4988 to May 4990. * TbtaX production reached at feast 19,000 liters of concentrated Botutinurn (lOtOOOlikrs filled into mmitictrts); 8,5W Iiters of cctrtcentrated Anthrax fGt500 liters filled into munitions); and 2,500 liters of concentrated Aflatoxin (1,850 liters filled into munitions). * Weaponized at least three bialogical agents for use in the Gulf War. The weaponization ccJnsistedof 108bombs and 15 missile wafieads loaded with Botulinum; 50 R-400 air-delivered bombs and 2 0 missile wanheads loaded with anthrax. * Also had 16nrtissile warheads loaded with thatoxin, a natural cardnogen. The warheads were d e s i p d for c>per&iliiQ with the AX-Hussein Scud variant. * A total of at least 166 bombs were filled with same biological agent. Iraq produced at least 2 "3 bombs and missile warheads with biological agents. * Developed and stomd drops tanks ready for use for three aircraft or RPV s with the capability of dispersing 2,000 liters of anthrax. Development took glace in December 1990. Claimed Iater that tests shcjwc3ct were ineffective. * Tested ricin, a deadly protein toxin, for use in a&ilfery shells. * The U N claims that Iraq has offered no evidence to corroborate its claims that it destroyed its stcyckpile of biological agents after tl-re Gulf War. Furthel; Iraq

TABLE TEN (confkued) r e t a i i the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development effcort, in spite of the UN sanctions regime. * UN currently inspects 79 sites-5 used to make weapcJnsbefore war; 5 vaccine or pharmaceutical sites; 35 research and university sites; thirteen breweries, distilleries, and dairies with dual-purpose capabilities; eight diagnostic laboratorim, * Retains laboratory capability to manufacture variom biological agents including the bacteria tzrhich cause anthrax, botulism, tulizremia and typhoid. * Many additional civilian facilities capable of playing some role in biafogical weapons production.

Nuclear Wenpritns * Sought tcr buy a plutonium production reactor similar to the reactor France us& in its nuclear weapons program in early 1970s. * Contracted with France to build Osirak and Isis readors in 3.976, as part of Tuwaitha complex near Baghdad, * Osirak raid in June 1981 prevented from acquiring reactors for weapons use, Led Iraq to refocus efforts on producing highfy emiched uranium. * Inspections by UN teams have fc~undevidence of W o successhl weapons designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering techology needed for production of bombs, plutonium prcJcessing technology centrifuge technology Calutmn enrichment technology and experiments with chemical separation technology. * Iraq used Calutmn, centrifuges, plutonium pmcessing, chemical defitsion and foreign p u ~ h a s e to s create new production capability after Israel destxlyeb most of Osiraq, * Iraq etablishd a cmtriluge esurichment system in Raskdya m d cmductd research into the nuclear fuel cycle tc) facilitatedwelcjpment of a nuclear device. * After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program to develop a nuclear weapon by using radioactive EueX from French- and Russian-built reactors. * Made a crash effcort beginning in September 1990to recclver enriched fuel from its suppwedly safe-guarded French and Russian mactars, with the goal of producing a nuclear weapon by April 2991. The program was onXy halted after Coalition air raid destroyed key facilities on January 17,1991, * Tray conducted research into the production of a radialogicat weapon, which disperxs lethal radioactive material without initiating a nuclear expicosion. * Orders were given in 15387 to explore t-he use of radiological weapom for area denial in the Iran-Iraq M r . * Three prototype bombs were detonated at test site-me as a ground level static test and two others drcrpped from aircraft. * Iraq claims the results were disappointing and the project tzras shelved but has no records or evidence to prove this.

TABLE TEN (confkued)

* U N teams have found and destroyed, or secuwd, new stockpiles of illegal enriched material, major production and R&D facilities, and equipment-including Calutrun enriching equipment. * UNSCOM believes that Iraq's nuclear program has been largely disabled and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq retains substantial tecl-rnolc>gyand established a clandestine purchasing system in 1990 that it Ftas used to impc~rt forbidden components since the Gulf War. * Iraq still retains the technology developed before the Gulf War and US expe&s believe an ongoing research and development effort continues, in spite of the UN sanctions regime. * A substantial number of dedared nuclear weapons components and research equipment has never been recovei~d.There is no mason to assume that Iraqi declarations w e l comprehensive, ~ Iran

BeEizpery Systelns * Used regular Scud extensively during Iran-Iraq M r . Fired nearly 100 Scud B missiles during 19851988. Scud missiles were provided by Libya and North Korea. * Has 6-12 Scud launchers and up to 200 Scud B (R-17E) missiles with 230-310 km range. * Has new long range North Korean Scuds with ranges near 500 kilorneters. * Has created shelters and tunnels in ib coastal areas to store Scud and other missiles in hardened sites and reduce their vulnerability to air attack. * Can now assemble missiles using foreign made components. * Developing an indigineous missile prcxliuction capability with both salid and Xiquid fueled missiles, Seems to be seeking capability to produce MRBMs. * May cooperate with Syria in developing capability to manufacture missiles. * Prc~bablyhas o r d e r 4 North Korean Nct Dong missile which can carry nuclear and biological missile ranges of up to 900 kilometers. Can reach t~irtuatliyany target in Gulf, Turkey and Israel, although CIA now estimates deliveries will on1y begin in 1997-4999.469 * Has recmtly bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles (converted SA-2s) from China with ranges of 130-150 kilorneters, * May have place order fcx PRC-made M-9 missile f28@620kilorneters range). More likely that PRC firms are giving assistance in developing indigenous missile R&D and prc>buctionfacilities. * Has Chinese sea and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, Iran fired 10 such missiles at Kuwait during Iran-Iraq Wax; hitting one Usflagged tanker, * Su-24 long-range strike fighters with range-payloads roughly equivalent to US F;-113 and superior to older Soviet medium bombers. * Iranian made IRAN 130 rc>cketwith 1501-kilometers range. * Iranian Qghab (Eagle) rc~cketwith 40+ kilometers range,

TABLE TEN (confkued)

* New SSM with 225 mile range may be in production, but could be modified FROG.

* F-$B/E fighter bombers with capability to carry extensive payloads tu ranges of 450 miles.

* Can modify HU-2 Silkworm missiles and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

* Large numbers of multiple rcxket launchers and tube artilleiy for short range delivery of chemical weapons.

* Experimenting with cruise missile development. Chenzical Weapons * At least two major research and production facilities. * Made limit& use of chemical weapons at end of the Iran-Iraq V\lar= * Began to create stockpiles of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas weapom after 1985, Include bombs and artillery * Was able to produce blister (mustard) and bloc~d(cyanide) agents by 1987; us& them in a&illiery shells against Iraqi troops. * Prc~ductionof nerve gas weapons started no later than 1994. * Has produced a minimum of several hundred tuns of blister, blood, and choking agents.. Some are weaponized for support of grc>uncf troops. Others are used in chemical bombs. * Has increased chemical defensive and offensive warfare training since 1993. * Seeking to buy more advanced chemical defense equipment. * Has sought to buy specialized equipment: on world market to develop indigenous capability to produce advanced fe:eedstc>cksfo nerve tveapons.

Biologiml Wenpo~ts * Extensive laboratory and research capability * Weapons effort documented as early as 1982.

* Bioresearch effort sophisticated enough to produce biological weapons as le*

* * *

thal as small nuclear tveapans. Working on toxins and organisms with biological warfare cagabif ities. Has biolc>gicatsupport structure capabte of prcducing many different biotogical weapons. Has evolved fmm piecemeal acquisition of biological equipmat to pursuing complete biological production plants. Seems to have the prc~ductionfacilities to make dry storable tveapans, This would allow it to develop suitable missile warheads and bcbmbs and covert devices. May be involved in active weapons production, but no evidence to date that this is the case. Some universities and research cmters may be linked to biological weapons grogram.

Nuclear W e n p ~ t s * in 1984, revived nuclear weapons program begun under Shah.

TABLE TEN (confkued)

* Received significant West German and Argentine corpc~ratesugpc~l-t.in some aspects of nudear technology during the Iran-Iraq War. * Limited transfers of centrifuge and other weapons related techology from PRC, possibly Pakistan. * Stockpiles of uranium and mines in h z d area. * Seems to have attempted to buy fissile material from Kazakbtan. * Has sought heavy water research reactors with no application to peaceful lightwater power reactor development. * Has sought to obtain uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technology whose main applications are in weapons programs. * Russian agreement to build up to four reactors, ;,beginning with a complex at Bushehr-with W O1,800-1,200 megawatt reactors and W o 465 megawatt reactors, and provide significant nuclear techofogy. * Chine* agreement tcr prwide significant nuclear technology transfer and possible sale of:h - - o 300 megawatt pressurized water reactors. * No way to tell when current efforts will produce a weapon, and unclassified lists of potential facilitieshave little credibility.kre simply d o not know where Iran is developing its weapons. * IAEA has fc~undno indications of weapons effc>rt,but found no efforts in Iraq in spring of 1990, IAEA only formally inspects Iran's small research reactors. Its visits to other Iranian sites are not thorough enough to cmfirm or deny tzrhether Iran has such activities. * Timing of weapcJns acquisition depends heavily on whether Iran can buy fissile material-if so it has the design capability and can p r d u c e weapons in 12 years-r must develop the capability to process Plutonium or enrich Uranium-in which case, it is tikely to be 5-10 years. Israel

Delz'zpery Systems * Mew IRBM/ICBM range high payload brtc~sterin development with South Africa. Status rmhown, * Up to 50 "Jericho I" mR"tiilesdeployed in shelters on mc>bilelaunchers with up to 400 miles range with a 2,200 pound payload, and with possible nuclear tzrarhead storage nearby. Unverified claims that up to 100 missile are deployed west of Jerusalem. * Jericho 11missiles now deployed, and some were brought to readiness far firing during the Gulf W r , These missiles seem to include a single stage followon to the Jericho I and a multistage longer range missile. The latter missile seems to have a range of up to 900 miles with a 2,200 pc~undpayload, and may be a cooperative devtzlopment with South Africa. (Extensive reporting of such coc~perationin p r s s during Qctc~ber25 and 26, 4989). * Jericho IT missile pmduction facility at Be'eer hkov. * A major missile test took place on September 14,1989. It was either a missile test or failure of 8feq-2 satellite.

305 TABLE TEN (continued)

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Work on development of TERCOM type smart warheads. Possible cruise missile guidance developments using GPS navigation systems. F-15, F-16, F4E, and Phantom 2000 fighter-bombers capable of long range refueling and of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs. Lance missile launchers and 160 Lance missiles with 130 kilometers range. MAR-290 rocket with 30 kilometers range believed to be deployed. MAR-350 surface-to-surface missile with range of 56 miles and 735 Ib. payload believed to have completed development or to be in early deployment. Israel seeking super computers for Technion Institute (designing ballistic missile RVs), Hebrew University (may be engaged in hydrogen bomb research), and Israeli Military Industries (maker of "Jericho 11" and Shavit booster).

Chemical Weapons Mustard and nerve gas production facility established in 1982 in the restricted area in the Sinai near Dimona. May have additional facilities. May have capacity to produce other gases. Probable stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery. Extensive laboratory research into gas warfare and defense. Development of defensive systems includes Shalon Chemical Industries pmtection gear, Elbit Computer gas detectors, and Bezal R&D air crew protection system. Extensive field exercises in chemical defense. Gas masks stockpiled, and distributed to population with other civil defense instructions during Gulf War. Warhead delivery capability for bombs, rockets, and missiles, but none now believed to be equipped with chemical agents. Biological Weapons Extensive researrh into weapons and defense. Ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but no reports of active pmduction effort. Nuclear Weapons Director of CIA indicated in May 1989, that Israel may be seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon. Estimates of numbers and types of weapons differ sharply. At least a stockpile of 60-80 plutonium weapons. May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with some weapons with yields over 100 Kilotons, and some with possible ER variants or variable yields. Stockpileof up to 200-300 weapons is possible. Possible facilities include production of weapons grade Plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons design facility at Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmikhim, nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya, nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee. (continues)

Tht Tllrcmffrom Iraqi Weapons of M s s Des.stmctiot~

306 TABLE TEN (confkued)

Mksile Befenss * Patriot; missiles with future PAC-3 upgrade to reflect lessons of the Gulf M r . * Arrow 2 WO-stageATBM with slant intercept ranges at aftikdes of 8-10 and 50 kilometers speeds of up to Mach 9, plus possible development of the RafaXe AB-10 close in defense missile with ranges of 10-20 kilometers and speeds af up t c a a c h 4.5. Tadiran BM/C41 system and "Music" "phased array radar. Israel plans to deploy two batteries of the Arrow to cover Israel, each with four launchers, to protect up to 85%of its pog~lation."~ Adzta~cedIt1 t e l l i ~ n e Systenzs e

* The Shavit I launched Israel's ssateflite gaytoad on September 19,1989. It used a three stage baoster system capable of Launching a 4,000 pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000 pound payload over 1,800 miles, * Qfeq 2 Launched in April 499041ne day after Saddarn P-iussein t h ~ a t e n stcr destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should attack Baghdad. * Launch& first intelligence satellite on April 5, 1995, cavering Syria, Iran, and Iraq inorbit evey 99 minutes. The Of- 3satellite is a 495 pomd system l a m c h d using the Shavit launch rcjcket, and is believed tc) carry-an irnagev system. Its orbit pass over or near Damasus, Tehran, and Baghdad!77 Soztrce: Prepa~c-I by Antkony H, Cordmman, Cc>-Director, Middle East Program, CSIS.

I'he UN has set up an import-expod monitoring system to try to deny Iraq the equipment it needs to build its progrm to deploy weapms of mass dcstruction, The UN Securily Council approved this system in Security Councif Resalutim 3051 on March 27, 1996, and acted on the basis it was implemcntjng Security Council Resolution 715, wfiich kvas passed as part of the cease-fire in 1991. The new regim.e requises exporters to Iraq to notify their govenlmcmts, the UN, and IEA cJf exports of d u d use iterns, requires Iraq to dcclaxe its intentions in using such item, and empowers UN ixrspectors to inspect al.f shipments before they arrive in Iraq. :Ncr one, however, has any iIlusilrns about the effectiveness of the systern. As Rolf Ekeus put It is clear that prc~hibitedcompc~nents,as apposed to prohibited cornpc~nents, still exist. (Iraq) retains a weapons option. The issue is not so much what Baghdad now possesses but what it could grcjduce quickly were the decision made to do so.

Iraq%Future Missile Capabilities :Iraq fired. a total of 88 long-range missile d u ~ the g Glrlf War. These h1c1udc.d 84 Al-Husayns, 3 .hl Husyan-%rts, and 1 4-f-lijrarh (wilh a

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307

ceme~ztwarhead). These missiles were the product of a masive development effort that fraq began durhg the frm-Iraq WBz &ring the mid-I980s, Iraq begm to d q e the fuel tmks of its Sczxds m d rcldltce the weight of its warheads to extelld. their rmge beyond the normal 3 0 kilometer maxkum racrge of the Scud., It also developed. a capabili"ry to mmufacbre Scud variants in Iraq, and attempkd to develop prclductim facilities for the developmcmt of the solid-fuekd Argenthe Cnndor missilc calk.d the Badr 20m. Buy the tirne of the Gulf Was, fray had, chemical and biological, warheads for its missiles, and was attemptirrg to liesip a nuclear warhead. It had at least 12 missile programs that were deployed or indevelopment:"3

* Stmdard Scud B: Russian and Chinese made missile and missile assemblies with a maximum range of 300 kilorneters.

* Af Husayn: An extended-rtmge Scud variants with a r40M50 rangcr. * At Husayn-Shorts: An extended-rmge Scud variant of the At Husayn wi& a 600450 rmge.

* Af Hijarah: An extended-range Scud variants with a 600450 range. * Al Fahd: A conversion of the SA-2 with an intended 300 kilometer range. Abandoned in the R&D phase.

* Extended-rmge Al Fahd: A 50Cf kilometer range missile abmdoned * * * * *

in the development phase after exhibi-tion at the 1989 arms show in Baghdad. Af Abbas: A longer version of the AL Husayn with a lighter warhead which was intended to have a 900 kilometer range. Abmdoned durk g R&D. Bads 2000: A solid-propellant, Wo-stage missile based on the Candor with a rmge of 750-1,000 kilometers. \AJas in R&D when Gulf War began. Facilities we= constructed to begin missile production. Tammuz 2: a missile based on the Scud with an SA-2 sustainer for a secmd stage. It had an intended rmge of 2,000 kilometers but was not carried throu$h to advanced R&D, Af Abid: A three stage space vehicle with a first s t a p of 5 AL Abbas airframes. Test launched in December 1989, A sold heled missile with a similar range to the Tmmuz.

Events since the war have clarified many aspects of Iraq's p=-war missile cap&ilityI.but Iraq has lied about its efforts at virtually every stage of the UN effort to destroy its capacity to deliver long-rtmge missiles. In its initial report to the UN after the war, Iraq d e c l a ~ dthat it had 52 ballistic missiles, 38 launchers, 30 chemical-filled warheads, and 23 cmvezztionally armed warheads at five sites,g4 11%the months and years that f~Uowed,the W found the facts were very different. Although lraq continued to make efforts to hide its rnissile

308

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holdings and production facilities. The UN Special Commission (UPtJSCOM) identified at least 1.7 facilities where the Iraqi governant had ccmducted =search, production, and testing and repair of ballistic missiles, launel-cers, and rocket fueS*"s By F&ruary 1992, t-he UN had destroyed over 80 missiles, 11missile decoys, dozens of fixed and mobile launchers, 8 missile transporters, and 3 4 missile storage units.Qb Iraqi efCorts to decehe UN5CC)hll continued Iong after these djscoveries. They incltlded the deployment of special fuel tmcks that were used for launching Scud missiles to was outside of Baghdad in February 1993 and attempts to deny UN kspectors access to Iraqi missile rmges hJ m e and July 1993,"T In 1994, UNSCOM" iinsistence on the destmction of five pieces oE manufacturing e y u i p e n t designed to produce missile engines evoked the Iraqi chalfe~~ges and delays before Iraq finally compf,ied. At the same time, satellite photographs showed. that Iraq had rebuiZt its .AlKindi missile resealrch facilitymg In spite of these efforts, the UN team had accounted for over 800 Scud missile assemblies by early 1.995, ixrcluding &ose Iraq fired durir\g the km-lraq and Gulf wars. A long series of discoveries led UNSC'OM to conclude in the spring of 1995 that it would soon be abte to certify that it had destroyed Iraq" missile productjon and delivery capabiiities. The UN, hwever, was relying on irnpmt and usage data that UNSCC)M had djscovered to estimate Iraq's total in\re~~tory of Scud variants at 819%It used this figure as a target for its efiorts to dismmtle or destroy Iraq's Scuds although it was contrtlversial even ammg members of the UNSCOM team. Mmy experts believed the UN underestimated the nunnber of Iraqi Scuds. tn fact, in testimony before Congress in Januas)i 199Zf the Uirectcrr of the CIA estimted that Iraq might still possess "hundreds" of rrtissiles""9 Iraq" revelations, following Hussein KameYs defection, showed that such outside experts were right. The documents Iraq s u r ~ n d e r e dto UNSCOM in August: 1,995 ~ v e a l e da number of previously undjsclosed missile projects. These projects included modification and production of missile systems (Project 144), productim of missile guidmce and c m t d systerns (Pmject Karama),production oE liquid-propelrant rocket engines (Project VB), and development of a two-stage solid-propellant missile (Project Badr-20ClO).jm Iraq also admitted that it had manufacturt?d some of its own Scuds before-. the C;& War and had a previously undjsclosed liquid-fuel engine production capabiliw and that it was developing new long-range missiles with ranges of 900 kilometers, 3,000 kilometers, and 5,000 kilorneters, and a nuclear warhead for its Al Husseh missiXe."8f UNSCOM found that Iraq had retained undeclared Liquid fuel engisre manuf;icturing facilities for its bng-rmge missiles, and that Iraq had lied about the number of missile warheads it had destroyed before the

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UNSCOM destruction eMort began. It fomd that Iraq had built or assembled 80 Scud-type missiles using its own engines, althaugtn 53 were unusable. It also found that 10 engines were unaccounted for. In the falf of 1995, UNSCOM also found that Iraq had established a clmdesthe purchasing network to buy missile components in 1930, and that it had. maintained this network following the Gulf War.@Ws a result, UNSCOM the reported that the doculnents Iraq had provided did ". . . not co~~tain full =cord of proscribed missile activities," which could have established the extent of lrayi production.483 It also became dear that Iraq had condwted a rnassivc black market smggIing effmt after the cease-fire and had created a whale new series oE cclmpartmented missile, nuclear, chemicai, and biological weapons programs which used new locations and which were not tied to the programs it had. created before the Gulf War. In November 1995, b r d m interilepted a major s h i p e n t oE missile guidance componentwand manzlfacturing equipment. 'This shjpment was worth nearly $25 million. It inchded 115 gyroscopes bound for IraqI and a total of 10 crates worth of equipmat that were air f ~ i g h t e dfrom Moscow to Amman on Nwernber 10,1995. The shipment included ewirc guidmce canisters for Russian :ICRMs, although these guidance systems w d d bave rcquired significant reengineering to be used with the much stower reacting missiles fraq had developed at the time of the Gulf War. Further, Mieaam miarbiyeh, th Palestinian who bad brought the equipment into forclm as "electricai equipment," was found to have imported significmt annom~tsof additional equipmel~tfor chemical weapolls. mese discoveries proved to be part of a much broader patkrn of irnports from nations like Russia, Gemany, and Frmce, and created further uncertainties about haw many rnissjles and warfieads Iraq had prodwed and needed to be destroyed, "Illis series of revelations led Ambassador Rolf Ekeus-the head of UNSCOM-to declare that Iraq's missile and biological weapons programs were ". . . larger and more advanced in every dimension &an previously deciamd." tJrJSCOM%October, 1995, report stated that there was "".. . no firm, basis for estab)ishing at this time a reliable account-ing of :Iraq%pmscribed missiles. Iraq's ad\iarrced covert pmcurement system has become a sMhject of increasing concern. While the UN has rcllused to name pllblicly the countries m d firms f o n d to be involved in, this effort, UN and US officials have stated privately that France, Germany Central European and h s s ian firms were most active. C)ne UN offkial speciSieally imflicated Ukraine, while a senior US official has expressed cmcern over recent Russian sales of missiie-=lated. equipment to Iray.3KWUNSCOM =cognized the importmce of lhese post-war muggling efforts in its Xlecelnber

32 0

Tht Tllrcmf from Iraqi Weapons of M s s Des.stmct1'0t1

21, 1999,report to the UN 9curity Council, and Ambassador Ekeus showed the Council a gyroscope that Iraqi mgIneers had thrown illto the ?igl.is in an effort to conceal it from t-he tlN inspectms.4S Iraq's missile program has been crlosely tied to its efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction. The UN found that Iraq not only possessed the ability to launch rnissiles with chernical warheads, but had conducted at Icast: t h e flight tests of M-Hussein Scud variants with chelnical warheads. The UN found the 30 chemical warheads for Iraq's Scud missiles stored in thr Dujael area, some 18 m i e s away from t-he positim Iraq had. deelmd. Sixteen of the warheads carried a unitary ncrve agent and fnurteen carried binary agents.487 The warheads were, however, crudely mmufactured and had limited carryhg capacity According to same experts, they possessed inadequate wellds and might have tumbled or dis-integrated in Ri@. The warheads also lackd the techndogy to disseminate chemical agents effectively and rclliably. There was little internal structure to the warfiead, except far three asymmetrically placed m t a l bars. The chemical agent was placed in a cmtainer within t-he cone that left substantial empty- space between the agent m d the cone, and t-he design did not stixbilizc the liquid t?gent, As a rrtsuk, any sudden acceleration or deceleration dwing the flight could have caused the warhead to m b l e or break up. Even so, it is likely that at least some of these warheads would have penetrated ta their targets and released enougtn agent to make them successful as a terror weapon.488 In additinn to chernical warheads, Iraq dewloped a si.gnificant stockpile of bjalogical missile warheads, The August 1.995 defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, fic,rmrIy in charge of Iraqfs weapons of Inass destruction, prompted a number of revelations by the Iraqi government. Chief among these was a detailed accounting of the number of missiles armed with biological agents and the type of agents employed. Iraq adrnitted to arming 10 misdes wjth anthrm-loaded war.. heads lfor the Al-Husseh missile, and another 15 missiles with Batulinun-t-loaded warheads in Oecernber 1990 for possible use duritlg the Gulf War.489 Tl~esediscoveries are a g r h warning. Xt appears almost certah that :Iraq will mcover some of its Scud launch capabilities relatively scrm after the end of the UN inspection etfort. Accordjng to both UN officials and US experts, Iraq has used its clandesthe procurement network and front compmies to put major sources into rebuitding its ballistic missile program-a level of effort that may be worth several hundrtld mi,llinn dollars a yeaw: The equipment involved includes advmced missile glridance components, such as accelemmeters and gyroscopes, specialty metals, special machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made furnace desig~~ed to

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Weapons I?( Mass Destr~ctiou

32 2

fabricate missile enghe parts. According to US m d UN officials, these irnports are pmmptiy concealed and stored, once ubtained. Furthermore, UNSCOM indicates that :Iraq is exploiting the fact that the cease-fire agreement atlows it to retain short-range missiles (with ranges of 150 kilometers or less), to test and modify missiles and components to pmduce much longer-range missiles in the future. Iraq is h o w n to have six rocket and ballistic missile programs wit-;h ranges under 150 Itilometers and which are permitted under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution Ci&"i":4W

* LunalFrog-7. A Russian unguided. rocket with a 70 kilmeter range currently in service and in limited production. racket with a 60 Elorneter rmge curAstros XI. A Brazilian ung~~ided rently in service and in limited production, * SA-2. A Russian surface-to-air missile which China has demonst..rated can be eonvcrted into a 300 kiinmter range surface-to-surface missile. * SA-3. A Russian surface-to-air missile which has some potentiai for cmversio~~ to a s~~rface-to-s~~rface missile. * Ababil-SO. A Yugoslav-designed, Iraqi-produced 50 kilometer range artillery rocket with very limited growth potential. Ababil-108. An Iraqi 180-150 Elometer rmge system with parallel solid-fuel and liquid fuel development programs which seems to be used as a ""legai"" test-bed and foundation for much longer range missile programs once sanctions are lifted. M m y of the liquid heled program are compatible with Scud production, It is relatively easy to hcrease the range and payload of a system like the Ababil 100 and to use it to test warhead, guidmce, and control systems. The ranges involved also allow this to be done wiahout telemetry, 'These e f orts arc another factor that will &Lour Iraq to rapi* reestablish its missile program once the UN inspections mgime is lifted.*l US intelligence experts also believe that Iraq is still cmcealing several Scud launchers and several dozen extended-range Scud missile assemblies, as well as some of the manufacturing eyrriyment, test equipment, and parts pwhased before the war. Some LIS expertmlso assert that Iraq could be biding these missiles in underground storage sites built before and after the Gulf War.492 If so, such missilcs are likely to remah operational. An analysis of East German Scuds revealed that such missiles have an unopened sheif-life of up to twenty years.@WrNhatis more uncertain is whether Iraq could obtajn the liquid fuel and midizer necessary to launch any covert holdings of Scud n-tissiles without building a new facility. AccordCng to one expert, Iraq obtained all o.f its fuel and oxidizer sup-

322

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p l i s from the former Soviet Union before the C;& War and such s~pplies only have a storage l& of 12-18 monthse4g4 If Iraq's Scud force does become operational again, it will face new point: clefenws based on the inprovecf Patriot misde. The US might also be ahle to preclude large scale Scud assaults by attacking their launch sites with US air power. Currently, however, the US has no way to prevent Iraq fmm conhonling Ihe UN, or some future coaljtion, with the same "Scud hmt" problems encountered by the US-led coalition during the Gulf War. Now, as then, it wodd be almost impossible for the US to hunt down and destroy enough of Iraq's rnissile capabilities to stop alf attacks. Iraq's concealmat a d fmport efforts pmwide strong evidence that it continues to attempt to acyuire more lethal chemical and bidogical warheads for its ballistic missiles. Iraq magi even be able to depfoy chemical and bicrlogical warheads rapidly for its missiles that arc. superior to those it possessed dming t-he Gulf War1"lraq has had five years to carry out research on such warheads, and they could be produced covertly in laboratories and other non-military f acilities.49" Iraq may also be changing its missile employment doctrine. Some experts believe Iraq may have concluded that its Scud vasiants have lost much of their "terrcrr effect'yf they are only equipped with convelntional warheads. Iraq may also determine that even chemical warheads have a lsnited terror or deterrent vatue, prompting it to concentrate on nuclear and biological warheads. While nerve gas warl~eads might ki.lX several hundred people with a lucky strike m d affect s m e crjtical targets, fray would not be able to launch a large enough vofley to achieve critical war-fightiq d m a g e until it can access a major source of resupply for its present holdings of rnissiles and missile parts. Iraq's capability to develop cruise rnissiles and UAVs presents a .further complication. Cruise missiles and UAVs offer important ways of producing delivery systems while avoiding many of the UN constraints on ballistic missiles, and Iraq experimented with weaponizil"8 UAVs and had much of the technology needed to produce cruise missile weapons before t:he Gulf M r . It was working on modifications of the Chinese SilkLvorm (HU-2) cruise missile, designed to have rmges of 75,150, and 200 kilorneters, at: its Nasr missile factory before the war.496 :It used remotely piloted vehicles (IIIJVs) during the Gulf War, which led to some initial fears that these WVs might be equipped with chemical or biological agernts. While Iraq has no more capability than Iran to develop and deploy a Tomahawk TT,AM-like missile, it may be able to build a missile about half the size of a small fighter aircraft with a payload of about 500 Elograms. Iraq already has the techology nceded for fushg and. equipping such a system with CBW and cluster war-

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MAP TE-IEE The Range of Iraq" Missile Developments at the Time of the Gulf Wr. Source: Office of the S ~ r e tofa the ~ Defens' Prol$~mfisn:Rzrenl and Repotzse, WasKngton, DeparZment of Defew, April 1996, p. 49.

heads. Development of navigation systems and jet engines could be a miljor problem. Iraq shodd be able to sohe the problem of acquirhg a suitable guidance system over time. Iraq" current inertial navigation systems (INS) would heroduce errors of at Least several Elomtcrs at ranges of 11,000 kilometers, and, the risk of total guidance hilure cwld exceed hivethirds of the missiles fired. Iraq, however, has already made a major ekfort to acquire better guidmce &rough its clmdtzstlne procureme~~t network. In December 1995, Jordan revealed that fray hait attempted to smuggk in at least 100 key guidmce ccm-tponmtsfrom Russh, including g ~ s m p m acct-kmed ters. In spite of Iraq's growing economic=crisis, the shipment was worth at least $25 million, Furthcl; UNSCOM reveded that Iraq had already received similar componmts, and has thrown missile gyroscopcrls into a canal of Ihe Trgris mar Baghdad in m effort to conceal its pmgrm.@7

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US studies indicate that a commercial differential global positionhg system (GPS), integrated with t h ixrertial navigation system and.a radar altimeter, might produce m accuracy as good as 15mc.ters.@""t"omeexisting rclnotely piloted vehicles, such as the South Mrican %m, already claim such pehrmance. Moreover, commercial technology is becoming avahble for differential global positinnir7g system guidance with accuracies of two to five meters. Xraq w ~ t ~also l d have to import cruise missi,le engines, W i l e thcre are many suitable, cmmercially available reciprocating and gas brbine engines, finding a reliable and efficient t d o f a n engine for stlch, an applicatim might be cliMicdt. It: is clouhtftll that- Xraq could. design and build such an mg4ne, although it has most of the needed design m d manufacme skills. The ease of building cruise missiles should not be exaggemted. Airhame-eng4ne-washead irntegration and testing is challeng.ing and possiZlly b q m d Iraq's manufactura skills. A cruise ,missile, however, is inherently easier to integrate than a long-range ballistic missile. It is also less detectable, if using no telemetry or coded telIemtry.@g If Iraq can develop such weapons, they could reach a wide range of targets. A system deployed in border areas with only a 500 Elometer range could cover half of Iran, southeastern Turkey, atl of Kuwait, the Ptzrsian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia, B&rah~m d most of Qatar, the northern UAE, and northern Oman. A system with a 1,200 Elometer range could reach Israel, the eastern two-f-klirdsof Turkey, most of Saudi Arabia and all of the other Southern Gulf states, including %an. Such a system could also be programmed to woid major air deknse concentrations at a sacrilice of about [2OCY0of its rmge. Iraq" Future Chemical Mleapons Capabilities :Iraq has produced thousands of tons of chernical weapons since the early 1980s' mny at facilities at Samara and Al Habbinyah. It used many of these weapons against the Iranj.ans and the Kurds in the mid and late 1980s. It first used mustard gas against Iranian troops in 1983, using weapons produced in civil laboratories m d fadlities at a lin?ited scale. It began to use Tabun nerve gas in 1984, and drapped the first nerve gas bombs in modern warfare. M i l e it inil;ially hiled to be able to use chemical weapons in the djrect support: of gmund operations, it developed the skills to do so by 1987, and chemical weapons played a major role in :Iraq%victories against Iran in 1987 a d 1988. Iraq also used chemical weapons against Kurdish rebels and civilians after the war in late 196138 and in 1989. It has experience in using chemical weapons in artillery shells, rockets, mortar rounds, bombs, and spray tanks.Wo

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At the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had an inventory of aromd 1,001) metric tons of chemical weapons. These were split evenly between blister agents likr mustard gas and nerve agents. It was just beg weaponize VX, a persistent nerve gas* It was prepared for a mssive chemical offensive and has preparcld its forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations with chemical defense eyuipment and extensive written hstructions.s01 Since the Gulf War, Iraq has lied just as systemtically about its chemical weapons p g r a m s and hofdings as it did about it missile capabilities, It has become clear, however, that Iraq's Guif War stockpile inclradcld s m e 70,000 filled and 79,000 unfilled cbemiraX munitions and 12 types of weapons.w"?e i m n s e scale of this chemical efforts is the resdt of a production p g a m that started MIith the production of mustard gas in 1981, and which began the production of nerve agents like Sarirr and ?Bbun in 1984. By 1990, the main Iraqi production plmt-the State Enterprise for Pesticide Prodtaction at at-Muthanna-occzrpied a facility with an m a of 25 square kilometas, Iraq also bad mmy other reseal-ch. and production facilities.SQ3 There is still cmsiderable uncertahty as to why Iraq did not use these weapons during the Gulf War, Iraq did m and d i s p e ~ etens of thousands oE weapons, and Saddam Hrlssein seems to have given orders to arm the al-Husseh missiles with chemical warheads and lam2ch them under attack if Baghdad lost its command cmtrd capabilities. Iraq did. not, however, use such weapons, ad-in spite of some rqorts to the contrary-there is nt:,evidence that Xray ever deployed chemical weapllns forward into Kuwait or the Kuwaiti theater of operations, Iraq may have been clteterred by the threat pmed by US pcrssession of nucllear weapms. Iraq may also have feartld that such escalation w o d d lead to total war and Coalition occupation of Iraq or destruction of the ruling regime. It may have lost the command and cmtml systems it needed to use such weapons, m d it m y have kept its hvcapons stocks so far to the rear that it lost the capability to deploy them forward. after the Coalition air attacks on its jnfrastmcture, Iraq also, hocvever, m y have fi11ed its weapons too soon, and foulld it had severe operational prob1ems in using them. Iraq's mustard. agent was the only itgent stable enough to be stored at length in bulk or munitims. It was &out 80% pure, and UN'fiC310M fow~dthat such rnzlnitions remained reliable several years after the war. Mustard gas, however, is of mly moderate lethality and is useful largely for attacking static rear arcas, suppressjng the flanks of an enerny force in a breakthrough, contaminating arcas as a defensive barrier, or attacking the rear echelon of an attacking enemy under favorable wind canditions.sM

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Iraq had far more severe proble~xswith its more lethal nerve agents. Its Tabm and Sarin nerve gas agents were only about 60"/1 pure and had very limited shelf-lives. Iraq had not yet developed the teehnobgy to purify these agents by distil% them, or the capability to add stabilizing chemicals. It also had crude binary weapons which required the chemical compments to be stored separately and to be mixed shortly before use. Its munitions tended to leak in storage and even nerve a g e ~ ~kept t s at a stable 18"C in al-Muthanna had to be used within. weeks of production or they started to break down. As has been discussed earlier, Iraq's missile warheads we= crude m d largely ineffective, Iraq lost: its offensive air capabilities in the first days of the war, and Iraq had not yet begun to produce VX in volume. As a result, lray may have been unable to make use of the most effective element of its chemical arsenal.50" Most of Iraq's chernical weapons did, however, survive the Gulf War. US reporting on the effectiveness of the bombing effort dufir~gthe Gulf War pmved to be grossly exaggerated, as did the Department of Deknse study of the lessons of the war. This study claimed that: At least 75% of Iraq% CW production capability was destroyed. At Sarnara, Coalition fc~rcesdestrcyed or severe1y damaged most known primary CW production, processing, or prcxluction support buildings. All three buildings used tee, fill munitions at Samara were destrcjyed, although the Iraqis may have moved the equipment from one building before Desert Storm for safekeeping. All three precursor chemicai facilities at Habbani yah were seriously damaged. Although Iraq previously had prc~ducedand distributed many CW agents to storage sites throughout the country, the meam for delivering these weapons tzrere badly Barnaged. Coalition air supremacy made Iraqi Air Force delivery of theso weapons unlikely; most artillery (Iraq's preferred method of delivering CW) was disabled.sa

The Coalition did cltarnage some key Iraqi facilities anci chemirat weapons, but most of these facilities and virtually all of the weapons survived the bombing. Iraq had time to dlsperse m a y of its precursors and key production sub-systems before the Gulf War began and cmtinued to hide and disperse these items after the signing of the cease-fire.~~7 The scale ol: Iraq" ssurviving assets is indlkated by the size of the stockpiles the UN has been able to locate and destroy tJNSCOM%Chemical Destruction Group (Cm)disposed of 398,046 liters (rim tons) of m s t a d gas, 21,365 liters (30 tons) of Tabun, 64,133 liters (70 tons) of Sarin, h r ing June 1992 to April 3994 t-he CDG destroyed 483,C)M liters at its m a h facility at al-Muthanna, inchding h,77,3 122 m rockets, 12,804 155 rnrn artillery shells, 8,390 bombs, m d 29 al-Hussein missile warheads, It destroyed another 33,829 unfilled chemical muniticms, 425 322 mxn chemical mcksrts at other sites, and 1,798,593 liteis and 1,040,,836 kilogrms of

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prccttrsor chemicals. UNSCOM, also verified Iraq's claims to have unilaterally destroyed 24,470 additional chemical munitions during the course of 1991, including 45 ballistic missile warheads,""" Impressive as these destruction efforts were, they did not dcstroy all of :Iraq%sapabjlitics, The UN found in the summer of 1995 that fray had continued to lie about much of its efl'ort to produce GF and VX nerve gas; had disguised the fact that it had produced large an?ounts of ZiX; and was hiding the fact it had been seeking to create an irndigmous capabili.tfito manufdcture cyclohexanot, a pmcurscrr of GFf and di-isopropylene, a precllrsor of VX. Iraq pursued the development of the deadly nerve agent VX from May 1985 to December 1990. As past of this effort, Iraq engaged in the industrial scale production of enough chemical prc.curscrrs to produce 490 tons of VX. mese precwsors included 65 tons of choline m d 201) tons of phosphorclus pentasul$d.e and di-isopropflamine. :Iraq also admitted that it had produced binary Sarin-fiZled artillery shells, 322 mm rockets, and aerial bombse5(B As a result, UNSCOM found that Iraqi, declarations as recent as March and May 1995 wercJ false, and a LINSCOM report stated that, "The new information invdirdates the material balances provided in Ihe March 1,995 (declaration) and subsequent arnendments,""i(l While UNSCOMs monitoriw has failed to reveal any recent chemical pmductiofi, Ambassador Ekeus has also informed the 9curjty Council that it has no documntary evidence verifying fmyi destruction of its VX precursors andim any VX stockpiles. Ac~orciingly~ UNSCOWl =parted that it could ". . .not exclude the potential existence of stocks of W, its djrect precursors and undtclared munitions in Iraq,"sl Iraqi ties and concealment effszts led Robert Gates, a former Director of Central Intelligence, to testify to Co~~gress in early 1992 that much of :Iraq%'%hard to get production equipment"" for chemical weapons bad been dispersed and "hidden" b e f m the allied bombfng attacks. He also estimated that . . if sandions are relaxed, we believe Iraq could pr~duce modest quantities of chemical. agents almost immediately, but it would take a year or more to =cover the cben-tical weapons capabilip it prtrwiousliy enjoyed.'"Iz More recent information obtained by UNSCOM and intelligence sourcles has ~ v e d e ad continuing Iraqi effort to indigenously develop tke prccttrsors for chemical agents Chat appears to support this assessment.513 :It is clear that Iraq has continued to irnport psecursors and chernical weapons manufacturing equipment cbndestinely since the Gulf Wardjsguising s m e as pharmaceutical supplies and mandacturjng equipment which it imported through Jordrn.514 Many experts do feel that ie might take several years and several hundfed million dollars war& of imt.ported equipment to develop a "".

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major war-fighting capability, Thcy note that lraq lost much of its feedstock production capacity during the bombing of Samara, which was very heavily d m a g e d during the war. ias a result, it will probably take Iraq three to five years to recovcc a signi,ficant capa,bility to empby enough chemical shells, rockets, bombs and warheads to fight a major land war,sls At the same time, the large amounts of chetnical a g e ~ ~needed ts to support a major land offensjve are very different from the comparatively limited amounts needed to arm several hundred missile warheads and aircraft bombs*A nation as advmced as Iraq could covertly produce e~nough chemical agents to a m several hundrcd weapons, including warheads, at small laboratory facilities, and it wollld be virtually imposible fiJr any current- i,nspc.ction and control regime to prevent this. Further, Iraq has had half a decade in which to develop ways of producing purer chemicaI agents, and m r e effective bombs and warheads. Table Twelve shows that even limited numbers of chemical weapons can be highly effective in a nrarnber of was fighting cmtingencies. Iraq, therefore, will &most certainy be able to recover a sipificant capability to threaten enemy population centers and area targets with missile and air strikes within a relatively short time after it is fmed from UN controls.516

Iraq's Future Biological Weapons Capabilities It is now clear that Iraq was ready to etnploy biological weapons against Iran if the Iran-Iraq War had continued and that Iraq had a major biological weapons program ready to use against the UN Cnalition at the time of thc Gulf Wtr, Iraq had at least 90,000 liters of Botul i n u toxin and 8,300 liters of Anthrax, as well as large stocks of an agent that causes cmcer. It had loaded both Rotulinum and Anthrax on Scud missile warheads and aerial, bombs. Iraq was also experimenthg with infectious agents and Mycotoxins. These programs were initially centered around Al Klndi and Salmm Pak, but were moved to Al Hakam and other facilities before the war, and were extensively Clispersed before the fighting began.517 Iraqi biolngical weapons aetiwiq did not receive the same attention givcn to Iraq's other weaporns of mass destru,cti,on si,nce the end of the Gulf War until new evidence surfaced in September, 1995. This was e v t dent from a clrmparism of thr number of biological weapons inspections UNSCOM conducted relative to Chc num:ber of inspectiolns devoted to chemical and nuclear weapons, m d ballistic missiles."fs

TABLE ELEVEN Major Chemical Agents That May Be in Iranian and Iraqi Forces NERVE AGENTS: Agents that quickly disrupt the nervous system by binding ta enzymes critical to neme functions, causing convufsions andfor paralysis. Must be ingested, inhaled, and absohed through the skin. Very low doses cause a running nase, cc>ntractic~n of the pupil af the eye, and difficulty in visual coordination. Moderate doses cmstrict the bronchi and cause a feeling of pressure in the chest, and weaken the skeletal muscles and cause fibrilation. Large doses cause death by respiratory or heart failure. Can be absorbed through inhalation or skin contact. Reaction normally occurs in 4-2 minutes. Death from lethal doses occurs within minutes, but artificial respiratian can help and atrupine and the oxirnes act as less lethal gases. Recovev is normally quick, if it o>ccursat all, but permanent brain damage can occur: Tabun (CA) Sarin (GB)-nearly as volatile as water and delivered by air, A dose of 5 mg/ mini& prijduces casualties, a rrpira"rory dose of 100 mg/mixz/ms is lethal. Lethality lasts 1-2 days. %man (GD) GF VR-55 ((Improved%man)-a thick oily substance which persists far some time. VK/VX-a persistmt agent roughly as heavy as fuel oil. A dose OF0.5 mg/mjn/m? prduces casualt-ies, a repirat-nry dose of IO m&/mill/m3 is lethal. Lethality lasts I -l 6 weeks. BLISTER AGENTS: Cell poisons that destroy skin and tissue, cause blindness upon cmtact with the eyes, and which can result in fatal respiratoxy damage. Can be calorless or black oily droplets. Can be absorbed thrcyragh inhalation ar skin contact. Serious intema t damage if inhaled. Penetrates ordinary clt,thing. Some have delayed and sc~mehave immediate a d i m . Actual blistering normally takes fialtrs to days, but effects on the eyes are much mure rapid. Mustard gas is a typical blister agent and exposure to emcentrations af a few milligrams per meter over several hours generally at least causes blisters and swollen eyes. When the liquid falls onto the skin or eyes it has the effsct of second or third degree burns. It can blind and cause damage to the lungs leading to pneumonia. Severe exposure causes general intoxication similar to radiation sickness. MD and FTN persist up to 12 hours. 1, HL, and CX persist for 1-2 hours, Short of prevention of expclsure, the only treatment is to wash the eyes, decontaminate the skin, and treat the resulting damage like burns: Sulfur Mustard (H or HUj---a dose of 300 m8lrnir.ilm.i produces casualties, a dose of 1,500 mg/min/m3 is lethal. Residual fethality lasts up to 2-8 weeks, Distilled Mustard (DM) Nit-rijgen Mustard (HN) LewisitC? (L) Phosgene Oxirne (CX) Mustard Lewisite (E-lt)

TABLE ELEVEN (mnfz'r-zued) CHOKING AGENTS: Agents that cause the blood vessels in the lungs to hemorrhage, and fluid to build up, until the victim chokes or drc>wnsin his or het c3wn Fluids (putmunary edema), Provide quick warning through smell or lung irritation. Can be absorbed through inhalation. immediate tc:, delayed action. The only treatment is inhalation of oxygen and rest. Symptoms emerge in periods after expomte of secc~ndsup to three I-iours: Phclsgene (CC;) Disphosgene (91,) PS Chlaropicrin Chlorine Gas BLOOD AGENTS: Mill through inhalaticyn. PrcIvide little warning except for headache, nausea, and vertigo. Interferes with use of oxygen at the cellular Xevef. CM also irritates the lungs and eyes. Rapid action and exposure either kills by inhibitwill either die within secmds to mining cell rspiratiort or it does not-asualties utes of expcJsure or recover in fresh air. Most gas m a s b have severe prc~blemsin prc~vidingeffective protection against blood agents: Hydrogen Cyanide (ACj---a dose of 2,OClt) m g / m i n / d produces casualties, a respiratory dose of 5,000 mg/rnin/& is lethal. tethality fasts 1 4 hc>urs, Cyanogen Chloride (CK)--a dose of 7,000 m g / m i n / d prudwes casualties, a respiratory dose of 51,000 mg/min/m"s lethal. Lethaliq lasts 15 minutes to one hour. TOXINS: Biological poisons causing neuromuscular paralysis after expcJsure of hours or days. Formed in fao or cultures by the bacterium clostridium Botuiirnun, I""rc3duceshighly fatal poisoning characterized by general weakness, headache, dizziness, double vision and dilation of the pupils, paralysis of muscles, and prc>blems in speech. Death is usually by respiratoxy- hilure. Antitoxin therapy has limited value, but treatment is mainly suppc~rtive: b t u l i n toxin (A)-six distirtct types, of which four are known to be fatal to man. An oral dose of 0.001 mg is Lethal, A respiratory dose of 0.02 mg/min/m3 is also lethal. DEVELOPMENTAL WEAPONS: A new generation of chemical weapcJns is under develvrnent. The only publicized agent is perffuoroisobutene (PFXB), wKch is an extremely toxic ~Jdorlessand invisible substance produced when I""F1B(Teaon) is subjected to e x t i ~ m heat e under special cmditions. It causes pulmc~naryederna or dv-land drcJwningwhen the lungs fill with Etuici. Short exgojsure disables and small concentrations cause delayed death, Activated chrcoaL and most existing protection equipment offers no Befense. Some ;?sourcesrefer to "third'" and "fourthi" generation nerve gases, but no technical literature seems to be available. CONTROL AGENTS: Agents which produce temporary irritating or disabling effects which in cmtact with the eyes or inhaled. They can cause serious illness or death when used in confined spaces. CS is the least toxic gas, followed by CN and DM. Symptoms can be treated by washing of the eyes andlor remojval from the area. Exposure to CS, CN, and DM produces immediate symptoms. Staphylococ-

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TABLE ELEVEN fmnfz'r-zued) cus prcwtuces symptoms in 30 minutes to four hours, and recovery takes 2 4 4 8 hours. Treatment of Staphytococcus is largely supportive: fiow of tears and irritation of upper respiratory tract and skin. Can Tear-ause cause nausea and. t~orniting: Chlororaeetophenon ( C N ) 0-Chlorobenzyl-maXc3ncjnitrite(CS) Vomiting-ause irritation, coughing, sever%headache, tightness in chest, nausea, vomiting: Adamsite (DAM) Stayhy locuccus INCAPACITATING AGENTS: Agents which normally cause short-term illness, psychoactive effects (delirium and hallucinatians). Can be absorbed throu$ inhalation or skin contact. The psychoactive gases and drugs produce unpredictabte effects, particularly in the sick, small children, elderly and individuals who already are mentally ill. In rare cases they kill. In other, they prc3duce a permanmt psychotic cmdition. Many produce dry skin, irregular heart beat, urinary retention, constipation, drowsiness, and a rise in body temperature, plus occassionrll maniacal bebvior. A single dose af 0.4 to 0.2 milligrams af LSD-25 will prc>duceprofound mental distu&ance within a half hour that lasts 10 hours. The lethal dose is l00 to 200 mitlignlms: BZ LSD LSD based BZ Mescaline PsiIocybin &nzi l ales Source: Adapted from Matthew Meselson and J ~ ~ l iPerry a n Robinson, "Chemial Warfare and Chemical Disarmament" "Scie~rfgcAltzericarl, b l . 242, No. 4, April ISW, pp. 38-47; "C1temical Warfare: Extending t11e Range of Destmction," "falltrr's Defitzse Weekly, August 25, 1990, p. 267; Dick Falowski, Changes in Tltreat Air Cotllbat Boctritz~and Form Strttcture, 212th Edifiot~,Fort VVort11~Generat Bynarnics DWC-01, Februarjir 1992, pp*11-35to B-339; US Marine Corps, Indiz~idualGuidefor NRC D#enst?, Field Manual OH-11-I A, August 1990; and unpublished t~tiimonyto the Special Irzvt?stigationsSubcommittee sf tlte Govermerzt Operations Committee, U.S. Senate, by Mr. David Goldbeqf Foreign %ir?nceand Techncllo?gy Center, US Army Intelligence Center on Februarjir 9,1989,

Biological. weapons, however, can be as effective as small nuclear weapons. One US study o f the Gulf W;ar notes that: Experimental data indicate Botulinurn toxin is about 3 milfio)n times more pcjtent than the nerve agent Sarin. A Scud missile warhead filled with b t u linurn could contaminate an area of 3,700 square kilomters (based on ideal

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TABLE TWELVE Typical Warfighting Uses of Chemical Weapons

AfI-ack nn i n j ~ r . zple;tsif.;ion: t~ Cover 1.3 square ki- 216 240 mm rockets (e.g., delivered lameters of territclry with a "surprise dcssage" by 48,12 tube Soviet BM-24 rcxket

attack of Sarin to kill 50% of exposed troops. launchers, each carrying 8 kilograms of agent and totaling 1,728 kilograms of agent,

Pralent tlrurtdr ofenemy mobile missiles: Contami- 8 MiC-23 or 4 Su-24 fighters, each nate a 25 square kilorneter missile unit operat- delivering 0.5)ton of W fltutatint;'7.2 ing area with 0.3 tons of a persistnet nerve gas tons). like V>(:per square kiltomter.

I~~~mobr'lz'ze nn air base: Contaminate a 2 square 1 MiG-23 with six sorties or any kilometer air base with 0.3 tons of VX twice a similar attack craft. day for 3 days. Defc~tda broad front ~gerinsflarge scale altnck: 65 metric tons of agent delivel-ed by Maintain a 300 metes deep strip of VX contami- approximately 13,OW 155nation in a front of a pc~sitiandefending a 60 lery mrrnds. kilometes wide area for 3 days.

Terruri~puptit~7Iio1~: Kill apprc~ximately125,000 8 MiC-23 or 4 Su-24 fighters, each unprc3tected civilians in a densely populated delivering 0.5)ton of W fltutatint;'7.2 (10,000 square kilometer) city, tons) under optimal conditions, Soztrce: Adapted by Antkony H, Cor~lesrnanfrom Wctor A- Utgoff, 77re Challenge of Chemical Wegpans, New York, St. Martin", 1W1, pp. 23%242, and Office of Technology Assessment, Protqeratiorz of Wea[?onsofniltzss D~>strucf.ion: Assessing tlre Risks, US Congress 0TA-LSC-559, Washington, A u p s t 1993, pp. 56-57.

weather condiglons and an effective dispersal mechanism), or 26 times greater than the same warhead filled with Sarin. By the time symptoms occur, treatmrtnt has fittfe chance of success, Rapid fiefd detection methods for biological warfare agents do not exist. Afthough BobuXinurn can debilitate in a few hours and kill in as few as 12, and anthrax takes two to four days to kill, anthrax is much more persistent and can cmtaminate a much larger area using the same delivery means.39

The UN is now actjvely engaged in tryirtg to discover and destroq. Iraq" bioologicai weapons capabilities, It has included 79 Iraqi facilities in its biological monitoring and verification regime. Of these, nine are e m sidered Category A, rcyuiring the most i n t m s e monitoring, while 15 are Category B, 10 are Category C and 45 are Category D. Many cJf the Category A sites were damaged during the Gulf War, but one fadlity at A-

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MAP FOUR The Location of Iraq's Largest Nuclear, Chemical, BioXogical, and Missile Facilities at the 'Time af the Gulf M r . Source: Office of the S c r e t a v of Defensef Pro.ol$erafion: Threal.and Response#Washington, Department of Defense, April 1996, p. 19.

Hakam was rnissed entirely by both Coalition intelligence and bornbers""0 The Iraqi government has adxniged that these plants pmduced. 1art;e quantities of anthrax, Botulinum, clostridium perfringens, and other agents prior to the Gulf War.

Mq's Eforts

the G I ~ War V The conceptual arigh~af Iraq's biological weapons progrm dates back to 1974, when the gave ent officially endorsed. its development, At that time, fie program was assigned to the A1 Hazen fbn A1 Haytl.lam h~stitute

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at A1 Salman. By 1978, poor mmagement and incompete~~ce resulted in the ternination of activities. The program was revived in 1985, however, a State Establishin accordmce with the recommendation of the Muth ment, the prinary faciliity responsible for chemical weapms development and production. By the end of the year, t h nascent program had a 150liter fernenter and a staff of 10 who devoted themselves to invesf;igating the el-caracter of the bacterium which produce anthrax and Botulin,urn.~2~ Tn May 198Tfthe program, with its fermenter and eight mre staff, was transferred back to Al Salmm. Here, Boblinum and anthrax were tested on mimals and this was f a k e d by the first initial weapms field triais in early 1988. A second production fadity with a 450-liter fermenter was established at Taji to concmtrate on the production of Rotulinum. 'The Taji plmt produced Botulinum for about six mo~zthsin 19638, while the Al SaIman plant accumulated 1,500 liters of anthrax. The success of these small trial runs ccmvinced the Iraqi glrve ent to pmceed with futl-scak production and weapons tests.52" The first of these tests occurred. in early March 1988 at al=-Mu& weapons testing range. Aerial bombs we= selected as the weapon of choice for this test and, accocdillg to the Iraqis, the res~dfswere considered a failure, .A second test later Ihe s m e month, however, proved to be successful. The next weaponization test occurred iP1 November of 1989, when 122 mm rockets were filled wi& Bahlhum, m anthrax simulmt m d AfZatsxZn, a naturally occurrhg cascinogen. These trials were considered successhl as were identical trials held in M a y 1990. These trials were followed by tests ilwolving R400 acrid h o d s fjlled with the same three agents-523 Cmshvction of a main biologiral weapons facility started at Al Hakam in early 1988 and was completed by the end of the year, To expmd production capabilities, the new plmt was equipped with two 1,850 liter and seven 1,480 liter fementers, transferred from the Viiterinary Research Laboratories in November 1988. The 450 liter fermenter from Taji was also transfer~dto nl H a k m in Oct&er 1988, By A p d 3,989, production of Botulinum had. started, wi& an anthrax simulant following inMay for the p w p o x of weapons tests. Iraq claims that production of anthrax and Botulinum at Al H a k m during 14963, amounted to 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum and 8,425 liters of anthrax."4 11%addition, research was started at Al S a h m on a number of other agezzts. In April 1988, a gangrene caushg agent h a w n as cfostridium perfringens was added. to the list, followed, a month later by Aflatoxin, which was produced by gmwing the fungus aspergillus. Other agents inclztded a grain destroying fungus b o w as wheat cover sm&, a deady pmteh toxin called. XZicin, and debilitating tricothecene Mycotoxins, suck as T-2 and UAS. Resemh into clostridium perfrirrgens was transferred to Al Haftam in 1989, while the production oE Afiatoxjn moved to a plant at

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1F"udaliyat.rwhere, between Aprilllvfay 1990 m d D e c e ~ ~ b 1990, e r where 1,850 liters we= produced. VVork on the wheat cover smut moved to Mosul, but according to the Iraqis, the infected wheat necessav to propagate the fungus was burned at Fuda1iyat.r in 1991). Rcin appeared the most promising of these agents, and ten liters of concentrate were prepartrd for weapms trials ushg artillery shells. Accord% to fie Iraqis, these trials were failures m d the project was disconlinucd.52" In'July 1990, while Al Flakam became the center of toxin production, A1 5 a h a n started to ccmduct =search into viruses. Et acquired fie Foot and MouCh Disease Facility at Daura and subseque~ntlyisolated three vir~rses indigenous to Iraq for possible weapons use, The first was haemorrhagic s extreme pain and tmporary blindness. conjunclivitis, which ~ s u l t in 'This was fctlXowed by the debi.litating rotavirus and the vints which causes camel pox. The initiation of research, however, occurred only months before tbe eruption of the Gulf W r , and the Iraqis have maintahed that very little progress was achieved.326 After Iraq's invasjon of Kuwait, it accelerated its bidogical weapons program, and placed a strong emphasis on production and weapmization. The Baura Institute was cmverted from viral research to Botulhum production and subsequently produced 5,400 liters of concentrate between November, 1990, and January 15,1991. &ring fie same period, Al Makads fermenters were c m e r t e d from Botulinum production to anthrax, while its older 150 liter fermenter was used to manufacture 340 liters of clostridium perfi.ingens ccmcentrate.m In D e e e d e r 1990, lhrcle of the biollogical agents-Botdinm, anthrax, and Anatoxin-were selected for weaponization, Une hundred :R400 aerial bombs and 13Al Husseh Scud warheads were filled with Botulix~um, 50 bombs and 10 warheads were filled with anthrax, and 16 bombs and 2 warheads werc weapunj.zed with Aflatoxh, These weapons were subsequently dispersed to four different locations, where they remailled through t-he wac In addition to warlneads and aerial bombs, the Iraqis attempted to develop a drop tank for either m ed aixraft or RPVs that wodd dispense up to 2,000 liters of mtbrax. B i d s are said to have been cmducted in Jmuary 1991, and the Iraqis contelnd that the tests were a failure. Nevertheless, Iraq mahtairred three of the drop tanks in a readyto-use posturc. until J d y 1991, when it says they were destroyed."2" Iraq admits it had arnassed a stockpile of some 1,9,000 liters of conccntrated Botulinum, 8,500 liters of anthrax, 2,220 liters of Aflatoxin, 340 liters of clostridiurn perfringens, and urtknown qumtities of various other biological agents by the end of the war. Iraq admits that 10,000 liters of Botulhurn were weaponized, as were 6,500 liters of anthrax and 1,580 liters of Mlatoxin. It also admits that it imported some 39 tons of (jsowth rnecaia before the Gulf War. Each ton of growth media can be

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used to prodwe 10 tons of biological hveapons, and 17 tons of this total are unaccoun ted f or."y There is no way to deterrnfne whether Iraq ~ t a i n significant s stocks of dry, storage biological agents.. As has been discussed earlier, the Iraqi t has adrnitted that it had at least five primary production biotogical weapons at the time of the Gulf War, including the Sepp Institute at Muthama, the Ghazi Ixesearch Institute at Amaria, the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, and facilities at Al-Hakh, 5 a h a n Pak and Taji. Iraq has so far adntitted that it manuCacturc3d 6,000 I trated Botulinum toxh and 8,425 liters of anthrax at Al-H ing 1990, lraq has admitted that it has manufactumd 400 liters of rclncentrated Batulirzum toxin at Ta~i;150 liters of co~~ccntrated mthrax at S a h a n Pak, and 1,850 liters of Aflatoxin in solution at Fudaliyah. Iraq has admitted it manufactured. a number of agttlnts it claimed it did not weaponize, although some were extensively tested. It has ad~zittedthat it produced 5,400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura Foot m d Mouth Disease hstitute from November 1990 to January 15, 1991, and there are some indications that it may have attempted to produce a variant of hoof and mouth disease for military purposese5">Yet, these admissions are not supported by records, evidence, or testimony. 'The details of each of these Iraqi production efforts remain unccrtah. The same uncertainties apply to the disposition of the weapons and munitions that hay could fill with biological agents. 'The lraqi government's admissions in the fall of 1995 havc already provided m indication of the massive scale oi Iraq" mmassive weapons production effort. Iraq's h o w n weaponization pmgrams consist of at least:

* 166 bombs loaded with Botulinum. 50 R-$00 air-delivered bombs loaded with anthrax. 10 anthrax-loaded missile warheads for the Al-Hussein missile* 15 AI-Husseisr missik warheads loaded with B ~ t u l h ~ m , 16 missile warheads loaded with Aflatoxin, a natlrral carcinogen. 'These warheads were &signed for operability wiCh the Al-Hussein Scud. variant, and were loaded in December 1390, for possii7le use during the GulE War.':il Field trials, weaponization tests, and Iive firing5 of 122 mm rockets armed with anthrax and Botuli.num twin (carried out durlng March 1988 to May 1990).532 Bombs, 122 mm rockets, m d artillery shells filled with 18,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin, and at least 1,580 liters of concmtrated Aflatoxin."3 Spray t m k prqared for use by helicopters, akcraA, or UAVs. Iraq has provided WPJSCOM with information regarding the Uecember 1990.

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* Development of a 2,008 liter aircraft or RPV drop tank designed to dispense mthrax, While Iraq claims that its test m the drop tank was a failure, it stored three of them in a ready to use posbre durk g the Gulf War"ix ent clairns that it took all of its biological bombs tc:, an airfield at some point during May-Jw~e1991, in order to use a ehemical agmt to deactjvate them, and then to have explosively destroyed and. burnt them. The Iraqi gave ent claims that it did the same with its has said, however, it missile warkads at a different site, The 1~overnmem.t. has no record, of the precise date it did this, or even the site. It took UN inspedtors to one site that had no evidence of such destruction, and then its story and claimed it codd no lmger find the site. The lraqi ent also claims to have used such procedures to destroy about lters of concentrated Botulhum, over 2,000 liters of concentrated .hnth,rax, &%I) liters of concentrated perf in and an unspecified 5 amomt of Aflatoxin that was stored at Al Ha The Major meerfainties Rega rdizg Iraqfs Efl0I-f:~

The revelations the Iraqi government made during 1995 have fortled the UN to reassess its efforts in rcgards to seeking out and destroying Iraq's biological warfare program. Until August 1995, UNSCOrJI was unaware of the advanced state of Iraq's bidogical warfare program. Rolf Ekeus has stated as much in a August 1995 press interview "Qprobably did underestimate the biological prograrn."""""n an October 1995 report to the UN Security Council, Mr. Ekeus described the advances achieved in Imq's biological weapms program as 'r(remarkable.''~3T Although the Iraqi government released s m e 688,000 pages of new documentation after Hussein Kamel defected, it did so under conditions where it claimed the doclnmnts kizd been hidden in a cfiickem coop and were only found after Hrxssein Mamel defected. In fact, the documents were spotless and had clearly been moved to the area days before the UNSCOM teams were notified of their existence. mese dac~~ments are also very general, and Iraq seems to have held back most documentation that would reveal the level of sophistication it has achieved, data on any current-suppkrs, and data that might reveat Che development: of its program shce 1991,""" Iraq has repeatedly asserted that it destroyed all of these agents after the war, but thus far has failed to provide any doclnmntation to vergy such an action, The inconsistency oi Iraqi assertions regarding the destruction have generated skepticism at LINSCOM, which . . does not believe that lraq has givcn a full and correct account ol its biological weapons program. " 5 3 l'".

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Iraq has had ample time to redistribute equipment, persomel, m d technology since the Gulf Was. S m e of Iraq's biological weapons production facilities wrc.damaged during the Gulf War, but: much of their eqrxjpment may have been dispersed before or during the wm, and C o d tion ir\tetligencc m d bmbers missed key facilities like the one at Al:t-iakim.q% fact, Kctlf Ekeus warned that tJNSCOM inspectors believed that Iraq might still have 16 operat.imal Scud variants with biological warheads that it kept moving around Iraq to evade inspection in testimony to +e US Congress m March 2C),1996."1 Further, it is now clear that Iraq created the same highly secret and cmpartmented program to c a r v on with its biological weapons program after the Gulf War that it created for its missile, chemical warfare, and nuclear programs. This program is particularly trace skce all key components are dual use items that can be used for peaceful medical.purposes and food processing and h c h d e everything from bio-medical eqrxjpment and micro-el~capstrlatio~z equipment for cold tablets to bwwery fermenters and dry food storage equipment for infant formula. British, French, Germm, and Swiss experts are awartl of Iraqi imports that can be used for biologkal weapons, as are WS and UNSCC)M experts. Further, both msearch and production efforts can be wideily dispersed and can he concealed in relatiwely small buildings-particularly if a govent is \zritling to take moderate risks of eontamhation of thc kind widely taken by the Soviet Wnion during the Gold War. I'he Eraqi government admits it had impol-ted extensive amountri of eqrxjpment and mat-eriais slritabiie for biological weapons produelion before the war-largely from Europe. n e s e irnports have nut yet been detail, and there is no way to know h w many have accounted for ir1 a~y been dispersed or have been used since the Gulf War in undeclared facilities, Iraq" imports also included tons of growth media for biological agents, MIhich were olotaified from three Eumpem firms. According to UNSCOM, 17 tons of these media remaiin llnaccouxlted for. Further, Iraq imporkd a wide range of type cdtures, which can be modified to develop biological weapons, and scrme came from the US."-"2 There also is no way of knokvhg exactly what- agents Iraq e x m h e d before the war, as has examined since. Outside experts add tularemia and. typhcrid agents to the list of agcynts Iraq has examined. Iraq's declarations admit to conductjng research ona MycoMxi11 s h 2 a s to ""yeUow rain" ddefo-liant, Iraq examined a wide range of vimses, bacteria, and fungi. It examined the possibility oE weaponking gas gangrene m d other Mycotoxins, and some field triais wcre held of these agents. Xt also examhed the use of haemorrhahjric conjunctivitis virus, rohvims, and camel pox virus,ss This means that UNSCOM may never be abte to dfiermine the exact types of biolngical weapons Iraq did or did not develop, how much it

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modjfied them before Ihe Gulf War, how well it weaponjzed them, or what it has done covertly in the five years since the Gulf VVar ended. Table mirteen provides a list of some of the weaponmat Iraq may have examined. It is importa2t to stress that all prc-production research, testj,g, and weaponizatim for many of these wcapuns could be conducted in smdl covert facilities that have been established sb~cethe Gulf War. At this point only another series of major defections is likely to reveal the full details of Iraq" accomplishments before 1991, or what it has done cowertly since that time. At least one ttf the p k c i p d UNSCOM investigdors of the Iraqi biological weapons program feels that no effort by UNSCCSM: can prevent Iraq from retainhg a 1najor biological weapuns effort a d resumfng productim and dcpfoyment within months of the end of the UNSCOM effort. There is a broad consensus among experts that even if the UN c d d account for all growth media, cultures, and :Iraq's overt biological weapons produclion fadtities at the time of the Gu,lfWar, Iraq can rapidy establish new covert production at university =search centers, medical. goods and drug manufacturing plants, or virtually any other facility that can maintain a =cure biological reseal-ch and produdion activity Robert Gates, Director of Central Intelligence in the Bush Administration, made this point as early as January 1992. He responded to questicms about Iraq's bidogicd weapolls efiort by stating Chat '".. . the biological weapons program was also dmaged, but critical equipment for it, ttoo, was hidden during the war,""He went on to note that Iraq could produce biologicat agents withh "a n?at;les of weds," once the UN sanctions and constant intrusive UNSCOM challenge inspections ended.%" Any such covert stockpile of highly lethal Zliologicai weapons would give Iraq considerable potentid to deter and hlirnid,ate the SotlChern Gulf states m d the West. Iraq could make use of bioiogical weapons in m c h the same way as chernical weapons. Iraq could also employ such weapons covertly, since trhey lend thcmseives to tailored at-tacks i,n terms of delay effects and are w e l suited to mconventianal warfare, or "terrorism." Biological weapclns arc. Iraq%only near-term answer to the effectiveness of the UN's inspection m d destruction regime of Iraq's far more visible nuclear, chemical and missile capabilities. Given Iraq's history, this makes biologkai weapons an option that Iraq is likely to choose.

.hlt.hough the effectiveness ol Iraq's missiles, bombs, and warheads in disseminating biological agents is uncertain, the potential consequences of even ineff.jcientdissemination artl potentialiy disastrous. 7'he amount of anthrax in those 10 missiles had the theoretical ability to Ell some

TABLE THIRTEEN Key Biological Weapons That May Be in the Middle East

Disease Viral Chikungunya fever Dengue fever Eastern equine encephalitis Tick borne encephalitis Venezuelan equine encephalitis Hepatitis A Hepatitis B Influenza Yellow fever Smallpox (variola) Rickettsial Coxiella Burneti (Qfever) Mooseri Prowazeki Psittacosis Rickettsi (Rocky mountain spotted fever) Tsutsugamushi Epidemic typhus Bacterial Anthrax (pulmonary) Brucellosis Cholera Glanders

lnfectimfy Transmissibilify Incubation Period high high high high high

2-6 days 2-5 days 5-10 days 1-2 weeks 2-5 days 1 5 4 0 days 40-150 days 1-3 days 3-6 days 7-16 days

Mortality

Therapy

very low (-1%) very low (-1y0) high (+60%) u p to 30% low (-1YO)

none none developmental developmental developmental

usually low U p t0 40% U p t0 30%

available available available

low (-1YO)

antibiotic

high high

10-21 days 6-14 days 6-15 days moderate-high 4-15 days none 3-10 days

mod-high u p to 80%

antibiotic antibiotic

high

none

6-15 days

U p t0 70%

antibiotic/vaccine

mod-high high low high

negligible none high none

1-5 days 1-3 days 1-5 days 1-2 days

usually fatal U p to 25% UP to 8O?/o usually fatal

antibiotic/vaccine antibiotic antibiotic/vaccine poor antibiotic

-

none none none none none

-

high high high

none none high

high

negligible

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(continues)

TABLE THIRTEEN (confinued)

Mortality

Therapy

Disease

lnfecfiuity Transmissibility Incubation Period

Meloidosis Plague (pneumonic) Tularemia Typhoid fever Dysentery Fungal Coccidioidomycosis Coccidiodes Immitis Histoplasma Capsulatum Norcardia Asteroides Toxin9 Botulinum toxin

high high high mod-high high

none high negligible mod-high high

1-5 days 2-5 days 1-10 days 7-21 days 1-4 days

usually fatal usually fatal low to 60% u p to 10% low to high

moderate antibiotic antibiotic/vaccine antibiotic/vaccine antibiotic/vaccine antibiotic/vaccine

high high

none none

1-3 days 10-21 days 15-18 days

low low

none none

12-72 hours

Mycotoxin Staphylococcus

high none moderate none

high neuromuscular paralysis low to high incapacitating

-

-

high

none

-

-

hours or days 24-48 hours

-

-

-

vaccine ? ?

“Manysourcesclassify as chemical weapons becausetoxinsare chemical poisons. Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from Report of the Secretary General, Department of Political and Security Affairs, Chemicaland Bacteriological (Biological) Weuponsand fhe Eflects of Their Possible Use,New York,United Nations, 1%9, pp. 26,29,37-52,116-117;]one‘s NBC Prufection Equipment, 1991-1992;James Smith, “Biological Warfare Developments,”June’sIntelligence Review, November 1991,pp. 483-487.

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60,000,000 people, while the Botulhum in the remaining 15 missiles could have contaminated m arf3a of over 21,000 square kilmeters.545 It is doubtful that Iraq's prt--war biological weapon+particularly its missile warheads-would have been highly lethal. While the debils of these weapon designs have not been disclased, Iraq's chemical weapms wew relatively unsophisticated and most of Iraq's pre-war designs were rushed into service. The weapo~~ization and deployment of more lethal munit.ions and warheads involves technical challenges in t e m s of dry stora:ble agents, micmencapsulation, dissemination at critical heights, m d predidions of w h d m d temperature over the target area that may be well beymd Iraq%ppm-war capability. I'here is no reason to believe, however, that Iraq has not taken a h n tage of the last five years to tailor more le&d wcapons, improvc their storability and resistance to heat and light, and improve the design oi its bombs and other dissemination devices. Missile warheads may still be a serious problem. There are some experts that question whether Iraq can meet the challenge of developing a suitable combination of hiologicai weapons and suithle warhead technology, and can develop a missile warhead that wodd achieve extremely high iethalities, Iraq, however, had a decade to work on this prohlem before the Gulf War and the WNSCOM effart has not been designed to prevmt substantial additionat "ttrther research and development since the war, Furthermore, it would be much easier for Iraq to weaponi.ze a Zliologicai agent for delivery by a relatively slow flying aircraft or cruise missile, than to weaponize it fos delivery by a ballist;ic missile,"" Iraq h o s t certairrly can now deliver moderately lethal weapons, and the ""terror" effcfect of even crude and inefficient biological warheads shodd not be dism.i,ssed. UAVs and slow flying civilim aircrdt rnake excellent delivery systems for such weaponsfrequire? minimal mounts of advanced techology, do not produce major indications of testing and development, and are inherclnlly difficdt to dekct and track to a given source and location. A successful weaponizaticm of highly lethal biological weapons could give Iraq rnajor political and strategic advantages in terms of both war fighthg and intimidation, It would give Iraq the potential ahility to deploy a force rapidly that could be used covertly in ""eerrorism,""or used offensively; u ~ ~ d elaw~ch-011-warning r and launch-under-attack conditions, md/or in a retaliatory mnde. Such weapmizatjon could provide :Iraq with the ability to launch strikes whose poiitical impact was out of ail propodion to t-heir direct military value. Th,c use of toxins as persistent biological agents, like anthrax, could achieve significant military effects or population darnage. Such potential results could prompt Iraq to take the risk of tdsjng an agmt that was a communicable disease, rathe &an

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military agelnts which require direct exposttre to the original payload, or which are tailored to control their infectiousness, Iraq has also s h o w that even its pre-war mix of delivery systems and weapons could have allowed the Iraqi government to use biological weapons at both the strategic and tactical level. Iraq djspersed biological weapons to at least four sites in January 1991 for use duritlg the Culf War. According to Iraqi sources, the commanders at these main storage sites wem givm authority in January 1991 to use these weapons in the case of a devastating attack on Baghdad, and the collapse of the Iraqi comrnand and contml systent. This release authority was grmted in order to ensure that Iraq had a retaliatory capability The release authority seems to have applied to massive conventional attack on Baghdad, as well as a nuclenr attackf and may have a p p k d to a successhnii &tack on Iray's leacrlersf.rip."47

Iraq's Future Muclear Capability None of Iraq's weapons devebgment efforts have been s+ect to more scruthy than its nuelear weapons program. UNSCOXW and the IAEA have been actively involved in the discoveq and destruction of Iraq's massive nuclear weapons program ever since 1991. This p m g m is so large that it is diMicdt: to smmarize, but: UNKC)M m d IAEA reporting indicates that Iraq spent up to $10 billion on its nuclear program before the Culf I/Var, and simultaneously pursued several different enrichment method~.~48 Iraq" preGuXf W;ar efforts aimed at acquiring traditional nuclear weapons were conducted under the auspices of the Iraqi Atornic Energy Cammissioln, wi& the code-name Petrochemical-3 or PC-3. 'The ultimate aim of this program was the production of an implosion-type nuclear dewice. 'Tb accomplish this, PC-3 concentrated on two areas. The first was the production of fissile material through uranium enrichment and the second was the weaponization of an actual nuclear device.%" Tl~efissile material pmduction efforts relied primarily on the employmelnt of electromagnetic isotope separation (EMS) and gas centri(uge Sp"
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duction by the time of the Gulf War, and was attempting to rush forward the production of at least one nuclear weapon by April 1991 by c izj,g the higbly enriched material in its reactcrrs,'n General Hwsseh Kamel" defectio~~ led to the disclosure of the fact that Iraq began a crash program to extract and further mrich the uraniurn in its F ~ n c band Russim safeguarded mactms, including the =actor at Tuwaitha, in Sptember 1990. Eraq intended to use the resulthg weaponsgrade material to advance its nuclear program to the pojnt where it would have a bomb in April 1991. 'Thetie plans, however, fell victim to c o d i t i o ~bonbs ~ which destroyed the eqraiprnenl necessary for such an activity fn March 1991, the IAEA accounted for all of the uranium at Tuwaitha. However, the IAEA also found samples of enriched urmium whose origin could not be determined."z Tn late 1995, UNSCOM and the fAEA also discovered Iraqi efforts aimed at developing a radiological weapon capable of scattering lethal radioactive d&ris without the necessity of a nuclear expjosion, and l-hat Iraq produced the casjngs for 80 such weapms. The weapons used irraoxide, and were desiped to produce an "area etenial" weapon for the Iran-Iraq War*mree prototype bombs were detonated at test sites, One as a gromb-level static test and t?No others we= dropped from aircraft. Iraq claims the irradiated material did not disperse widely enough from the crater and these tests proved to be a faitare, but has no detailed records to prove this or to describe the scale of its program."" m i l e UN resolutions do not specifically refer to radiologicat weapcms, Ro%fEkeus, the chief UN weapons inspector, has said that the newly &Scovered research would be covered by UN Resolution 707' which refers to all Iraqi nuclear programs. Estimates of how soon Iraq could have developed a nuclear weapon if the Gulf VVa.r had not occurred differ. It is clear, however, that Iraq would. have developed a nuclear weapcm witkin several years if had not been for the Coalition b o d i n g and UN iaspections. The Coalition bombings had only a moderate impact, Coalition intelligence and bombers were not successful in identifyh~gand destroying many oE Iraq" faciliities. The Coatition only targeted three of Iraq's 25 n?ajor facilities for prodwing weapons of mass destmction before the air cmpaign began. It attacked only seven of these sites during the war-severai largely by accidentand it did not fully destroy mmy of the facilities attacked. The UNSCOM and IAEA effort have been more effective. Much of :Iraq%suufleareyuipment was too big to conceal or disperse, m d the UN eMort has been successfui in destroying Iraq's relnaining l q e nuclear facilities and in developing a continuing moni.toring effort."WUNSCOM and the IAEA are monitclrhg 150 diffeent sites to prclvent a rewiwal of Iraqfwhemical and nuclear program, The mor~itoringeffort consists of

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177 remote control cmeras and sensors, or "sniffers," "Linked by microwave signals to a 94 meter tower above th UN base ixr Baghdad. The UN also uses information provided by satellites, U-2Rs of the USAF 9th Recomaissance Wing, m d 3 helicapters armed with 600 mm cameras, ground pmetrating radar, cbemical detection systems, and radiation detection systems.555 These measures have led Ambassador Ekeus to declare that Iraq currently has ". . . no nuclear progrm in the sense that there is no centrifuge operating, that there is [not] any production of fissile materials.'""5" At the m e time, the US has deelned them ""inadequate""m d has wged that UNSGOR/E% surveillance capability be "upgraded and adjusted." While adlnitting the need for minor adjustments, UNSCOM disputes any s q (jc.sti,olzs of inadequacy relating to its mndoring acti~ities.~ST There is no way to resolve this debate. No inspection efbrt can be totally succrssfu, and Iraq's game of nuclear hide and seek betwecm the UN and Iraq is likely to go on for years. Iraq r e b h s all ol the nucleas technology it developed before the Gulf Miss, and a substantial amount of la2loratcrry and test eyuipment remai~~s unaccounted for. It can carry out much of its nuclear weapons design effort in s~nali,scattered facilities with limited equipment other than dual-use computers and test% equipment. It can aggressively seek enriched or weapms-gmde material from the Farmer Soviet Union or other sources. It can stockpile larger pmduction and test equipxnent away from areas likely to be suhject to inspedtinn, For example, the lAEA announced that critical epipment for the manutacture of centrifuges had somehow ""gone astray" in lraq in late January 1996.558 Even if Iraq allows the UN to cmtinue and expand its mmitoring of activities-and UNSCOM can continue intrusive inspection and soil and water sampling at suspect sites-Iraq will retain the technological base that it acquired before the Gulf War. Iraq can still go on with a great deal of =search and engineering activity with little fear of a challez~geTram the UN,S9 Iraq has also developed a long list of secrclt suppliers, and it is ctear that it is reestablishing what is ~ f e r r e dto in UNSCOM" S~eptember 1995 report to the UN Security Council as a '*.. . very advanced proczlrement ~ystern*~~S@ Implications for Western and Southern Gulf Strategy 'There is no way to be certain how mmy resources Iraq will allocate to conventional weapons, unconventional warfare and security operations, or weapons of mass destruction in the fuh;lre. Even if Iraq has formulated detailed plans, which s e e m dolihtful, it must react to outside factors ljke

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the duration m d intel~sityof UN sandions, the level of UNSCOM inspections, future oil revenues, its problems in dealing with its Kurds and Shi?tes, its probtems with Iran and Kuwait, and the need to balance domslic demand against military antbition. Much will also depend on how long S a d d m Hussein remains in power, altf-iough it is easy to overemphasize his importance.. The t m d s in Iraq's eefforts to acquirc wapons of mixss destruction are, however, a strong argument that any strategy for dealing with Iraq must assume that Iraq will pursue its effort to acyuirt; weapons of mass destruclion indefinitdy illto fhe f ~ ~ t u rteh, t it will carry out a mgor clandestine prarchasing efl'ort, that it will maintain clandestine facilities, alld that i t will systematically lie about its efforts and that nothing the Iraqi government says can be taken seriously without total independent verification. They are also strong arguments for continuing the UNSCONI effort as l m g as possible, for pushing Iraq into arms control agreements and rnakjng every effort to e l ~ f o them, ~ e and for establishing the tightest possible supplier nation controls on thls aspect of Iraq's imports. It i s also dangerous to assume such eMorts can be linked to the sutvi,val of Saddam Hussein and the Ba%ath elite. Most future Iraqi leaders are likely to have somewhat simitar fears and ambition+at least in the near term,. No Iraqi leader will be jble to ignore the eMorts of Irm or Israel, or the potential challenge posed by the W and. its allies in the Southern Gulf. Such leaders are likely to be products of the same Sunni elite as Saddam, and to rely on a high degree of authoritarimim and use of the instrumnts of state power. Even "pragmatic" or "moderate" replacements for Saddam will not ignore the potential threat posed by Iran and Iran's wcapons of mass destruction programs. They are also ljkely to seek to use weapons of mass destmction as at least covert cwnters to US power prcrjection capability and ways oE intimidating or influtvncing their Southern Gulf neighbars. Barring regional arms contl.ol agreements with a degree of intrusiveness that now seems impossible to negothte or implement, they are likely to pursue Iraq's weapons of mss destruction progrms at some level. For similar reasons, virtually all near-term Iraqi leaders are likely to see arms control agreements as irritants or products of necessity forced on Iraq from the outside, and see cheating on such agreements while attempting to enforce them on neighboring states as legitimate. :Iraqi leaders other than Saddam may use all the right words, but they are almost certain to lie. Regardless of what Iraqi leader is in power, it seems likely that Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction will be pursued on a target. of oppmtu17jty basis, and to m e t broad pditical ambi.l.ions and the

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personal goals of Iraq's leaders. Iraq is unlikely to take completely reckless steps or ignore basic technological realities, but it is also unlikely to articulate m d implement highfy stmctured f m e development plans or to develop and implement a detailed military doctrine for employjng weapons of mass destruction, Furthermore, any Iraqi leader is likely to improuise his approach to deploying and using such weapons in reaction to a given crisis, m d to alter employment doctrine on thc basis of events. It is extremely unlikely that Iraq will seek to create a higbly structured pattern of deterrence similar to the one Ihat helped shape the Cold War, and wi1I develnp detai,l,ed targeting doctrines and escalation ladders. 'This does not mean such leaders, ilncluding Saddam, will be suicidal, fanatical, or take what thcy regard as jrsati.onal risks, It may, however, mean that such lcadcrs identify themselves with the state and with Iraq's future. It may mean they will use weapcms of mass destntction against lraqfmeighbors at the tactical level, and/ar against Iraq's Shi'ites and Kurds to stay in power or protect their conventional forces. It may mean they will strike preemptively agairrst a key enemy like Iran, or create forces desiglled to deter the US cvith a lawlch-on-wamingllaunch-underattack or retaliatory capability The West and the Sollthern Gulf cansrot ignore the fact that the Iraqi leaderhip might well feel that a ""ride out"" st..rategy wndd simply reinforce Iraq's s e a h e s s and be fundamentally "irrational" in character, Iraqi war fighting with wewons of mass etestmction may follow fundamemtaily different patterns from those that we= institutionalized during th Cold W r . Regardless of whether Iraq is led by Saddam, it may: Fail to articulate a strategy of deterre~~ce or employment, or only describe one consisting of rhetoric rather than detailed war fighting capahif ities Develop m d produce weapons of mass destruction ushg massive efforts at concealment, deniat, m d col"npartmrttation-focushg more on the acquisition and development effort than employmmt. Targeting plans, test and evaluation, m d understanding of lethality will be limited, Joint warfare concepts will rarely be articulated, and doctrine will not be practiced* Kcep actual dcljvery units covert or compartmented from other forces, and under the direct controX of ru1i.ng elitcs with little real military experience..Actual weapons may often be held separately from delivery system and by special units cfioseln more for loyalty than capability. * Prowide separate lines of C4I/BM rttporthg which go directly to the leadership.

338

Tht Tllrcmf from Iraqi Weapons of M s s Des.stmct1'0t1

E ~ ~ p l oweapons y in ways which are crisis driven, and utilization and escalation will be mom a product of the attitudes and decisions of a narrow ruling political elite rather than the result of the advice of the military command chain, Risk taking will be leaderspecific and based on perceptions of a crisis shaped, rnom by intesnal political attitudes than an objective undastanding of the military situation. Show limited restraht in attacking civilian targets or mass employment against armed forces, Regimes may take existetntial risks in escalatbg if they ktl they are lkely to lose power. Use proxies and unconventional delivery m a n s where this seems politically desirable, and improvise such employment without: warningPay detailed attention to US c o u n t e r p r l t i o n and ATBM efforts at the technical level, and the lessons cJf prrvious wars. They will seek to steadily improbre co~~cealment, denial, m d cauntermeasures* See arms control as an extension of conflict and rivalry by other means; not as a valid security option. Consider using proxy groups or unconventional delivery of weapons of mass destruction to attack wtside the context of a war. Such an attack might be launched against a peace proces, US commit.mem.t.to the defense of a given region, a peace keeping force, an ejection, a ruling elite, or internal groups hostrile to the Iraqi ru1in.g elite. Find covert or unconvemtinnal delivery of weapons of m s s destruction to be preferable to the use of advanced delivery systms. For example, Iraq c d d use cargo hips, passenger aircraft, commercial vehides, dhokvs, or eommerciill cargo shipmnts, and route them through multiple destinations. Iraq has a well established series of covert transport and smugglirng networks throughout the region, and might use proxy or terrorist groups to mmufacture biological weapons in situ, Use biological agmts for i n d i ~ c attacks. t Iraq mfght consider the use of s~tchagents to ntirsnr i m g e local diseases or hvilh long gestation tirnes. Persistent nerve agents could be used insubways, large buildings, shopping malls/bazaars, etc. to create both immediate casualties and long term risks. Use mixes of different biological and chemical agents to defeat detection and protection gear or vaccines. Develop a covert "break out""capability. The developmelrt of a capability to manufacture several hundred bjalogica.2 and chemical weapom suddenly, with littie or no wa g is well within Iraq's state of the art using nothing but commercial supplies and eqzt@-

Tke 7"tzli.a t from Iraqi Weapons I?( Mass Destr~ctiou

339

ment, and much of the effort could be cmducted as civil or defensive ~ s e a s c h , * See an incrmsing ilncentive for the unconventional use of cveapcrns of rnass destruction in proportion to Iraq's lack of parity in cmventional weapons, and/or or the prospect of catastrophic defeat. Table Fourteerz shows the possible relative streng-fis and weahesses Iraq may see in given types of weapons of mass dcstructim, Tfable F i feen shows that Iraq does not need nuclear weapcms to achieve nuclear lethalities qainst its neighbars or US forces-it already has the biological weapons technology to produce iar more lethal weapons than the ones shown in Table nirteen, m d these weapons clearly have fie lethality of tactical. nuclear weapons. 'The previous analysis of Iraq's biological weapons efforts has also shown that Iraq can rapidly manufacture biological agents by converting civil facilities. This analysis should be a clear hvaming to those Southern Gulf states and other countries interested in mixlimizing the risks infnerent in Iraq's future capability to use weapons of mass destruction. It should be an equal warning to those in the West who focus on a cottnterproliferatian strategy that is oriented towards nuclear weapons to the exclusion of other types of weapcms of mass destruction or who focus cm counterproliferati.on strategies that assulne that an enemy will not strjke frst or will simply ride out an attack.

TABLE FOURTEEN The Strengths and Weaknesses of Weapons of Mass Bestmction

Chemical Weapons Desfrt4ct.i~~ &gecls:Pc>ismingskin, lungs, nei-vclus system, or blood. Contaminating areas, equipment, and protective gear for periods of hours to days, Forcing military units to don highty restrictive prcjtection gear or use incapadtating antidc>tes. False alarms and panic. Misidentification of the agent, or confusion of chemical with biolc>gicalagents (which may be mixed) leading to failure of defense measures. Military and popular panic and terror effects. Major medical burdens which may lead to mistreatment. Pressure to deploy high-cc>stair and missile defenses. Paralysis or disruption of civil life and economic activity in threatened or attacked areas. Typical Ml'kitnl-y 5mrgcl.s: Infantry concentrations, air bases, ships, ports, staging areas, command centers, munitions depots, cities, key oil and electrical facilitier;,desalinization plants. Typical MiliCn~yMissions: Killing military and civilian populations. Intimidation. Attack on civilian papulation or targets. Disruption of military operations by Equiring protective measu5.tls or decontaminatian. Area or facility denial. PsychoLogical warfare, prc~ductionof panic, and terror, NZilifafyLimitatiotzs: Large amounts of agents are required to achieve high lethality, and military and economic effects are not sufficiently greater than carefully targeted cmventional strikes to offer major war fighting advantages. Most agents degrade quickly and their effect is highly dependent on temperature and weatlxer cmditions, height of dissemination, terrain, and the character of built-up areas. VVarning devices far more accurate and sensitke than for biological agents. Protective gear and equipment can greatly reduce effects, and sufficiently high numbers of rounds, sorties, and missiles are needed to ease the task of defense. Leaves buildings and equipment reusable by the enemy, although persistent agents may require decmtarninatic~n.Persistent agents may contaminate the ground the attacker wants to cross or occupy and force use of protective measures or decc~ntaminaticfxil.

BicllogimE Weapons DesfructivzreEflecfs: Infectious disease or biochemical poisoning. Contaminating areas, equipment, and protective gear for periods of hours to tzreeks, Delayed effects and tailored to prcwtuce incapacitation or killing, treatable or non-treatable agents, and be infectious on contact only or transmittable. F;ot;cimg military units to don highty restrictive protection gear or use incapacitating vaccines and antidotes. False alarms and panic. High risk of at Xeast initiat misidentificatron of the agent, or confusion of chemical with biolclgical agents (which may be mixed) leading to failure of defense measures. Military and popular panic and. terror effects. Major medical burdens which may lead to mistreatment. Pressure tcr deploy high-cost air and missile defmxs. 13aralysisor dismptiun of civil life and economic activity in threatened or attacked areas. (car?finues)

TABLE FOURTEEN (contkued)

Typical Military Targets: Infantry concentrations, air bases, ships, ports, staging areas, command centers, munitions depo~ts,cities, key oil and etectrieal facifities, desalinization plants. Potentially far more effective against military and civil area targets than chemical weapons. Typical MiliCn~yMissions: Killing and incapacitation of m i l i t a ~ and civilian poputations. Intimidation. Attack on civilian poulation or targets, Disruption of miXitary operations by requiring protective measures or decontamination. Area or facility denial. Psychobgicaf warfare, prc>ductionof panic, and terrclr, Mr'lilaty timil-nf ions: Most wet agents deti;rade quickly althou$ spores, dry encagsutated agent, and sc:,me toxins are persistent, Efkcts usually take some time to develop (although not in the case of some toxins), Effects are rmpredictable, and are even more dependent than chemical weapons on temperature and weather conditions, height of dessemination, terrain, and the character of built-up areas, Major risk of contaminating the wrong area. Warning devices uncertain and may rnisidentify the agent. Protective gear and equipment can reduce effects, Leaves buildings and equipment reusable by the enemy, although persistent agents may require decontamination. Persistent a g e n t m a y contaminate the ground the attacker wants to cross or occupy and force use of protecthe measures or decontamination. More likely than charnical agents to cross the threshold where nuclear retaliation seems justified. Nuclear Wcznp~ts Destn.rctiveEflects: Blast, fire, and radiation. Dstruct-iortof large areas and pc~rduction of fallout and contamination4epending on character of weapon and height of burst. Contaminating areas, equipment, and pratectirie gear for periods of b u r s to days. Forcing military units to don highly restrictive protection gear and use massive a m u n t s of decontamination gear, Military and popular panic and terror effects. Massive medical burdens. Pressure to deploy high-cost air and missile defenses. Paralysis or disruption of civil life and ecmomic activity in threatened or attacked areas. High long.-termdeath rates fram radiation. Forced dispersal of military fc~rcesand evacuation of civilians. Destruction of militar~r.and economic centers, and natic~nalpolitical leadership and command authority pc~tentiatlyaltering character of attacked naticyn and creating major recovery problems. Typical M i l l f a y Targets: Hardened taqets, enemy facilities and weapons of mass destruction, enemy ecmomy political leadership, and national command authority. Infantry and armored cmcentrations, air bases, ships, ports, staging areas, comrnand ccmters, munitions depots, cities, key oil and electrical facilities, desalinization plants, Typical MilifafyMissions: Forced dispersal of m i l i t a ~fc~rcesand evacuation of civilians. Destruc"Eionof military and economic centers, and national political leadership and command authority, potentially altering character of attacked nation and creating major ~ c o v e r yproblems,

TABLE FOURTEEN (confkued) Xblr'lr'laty tl'nzitrations: High cost. Difficulty of acquiring more than a few weapons. Risk of accidents or failures that hit kiendly tecritc3ry Crosses threshold to level where nuclear retaliatian is likely. Destruction or cantamination of territory and facilities attacker wants to cross or s>ccupyHigh risk of massive collateral damage to civitians if this is impc~rtantto attacker. Sourep: Adapted by h t h t ~ n 13. p Cordesman from Office of Technology Assessment, Fro/femutiot~of Weup~mfMlilssD~strt4~tiotz: Asst?ssit~g fjzr Risks, US Congres"TA-f%-559, Washington, Arrgtrst 1993, pp. 56-57.

TABLE FIFTEEN The Comparative Effects of Biotoglcal, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Delivered Against a Typical Urban Target in the Middle East

Ulsirzg nzissile zu~rlzeads:Assumes one Scud sized warhead with a maximum payload of 3 ,0UQkilograms. The study assumes that the bl"o>logicatagent would not make maximum use of this payload capacity because the country deploying such systems cannot make an efficient warhead. It is unclear if this assumption is realistic. A rea Coetered irz Square Kilorncftrrs

Cltiemic1-kI:300 kilograms of Sarin nerve gas with a density af 70 milligrams per cubic meter BiologimE: 30 kilograms of Anthrax spcJreswith a density of 0.1, milligram per cubic meter Nuclear: One 42.5 kilotron nuclear device achieving 5 pounds per cubic inch of over-pressure One 1 megaton hydrogen bomb

0.22

De~fktsAsszlmilzg 3,000--10,000 People Per Square Kilometer

60-200

1Q

30,000-1 00,800

7.8 190

23,000-80,000 57Q,OOQ-.4,900,OQO

Using one nircuaff dcliz~trrizzg1,000 kilogmnts I?J:Sarin nerve ~s or 100 kilogr~ms( f a n tfzmx sporlv~:Assumes the aircraft flies in a straight line over the target at optimal altitude, and dispenses the a p n t as an aemsal. The study assumes that the biological agent would not make mximtxm use of the weapons weight carrying capacity. It is unclear this assumptian is realistic. Area Covered in Square Kilometers

day, ligfst breeze C l e ~ szinny r Sarin Nerve Gas Anthrax Spcrres Overcast day or ~ i g h fmodcmte , zuind Sarin Nerve Gas Anthrax Spores Clem calm night Sarin Nerve Gas Anthrax Spores

De~fktsAsszlmilzg 3,001;t-10,000 i-"r;.ople Per Square KKilcrrrzeter

0.74 46.00

300-";"Q0 130rU00-460,000

0.8 140.00

400-800 420,006-2,400,OQO

'7.8 300.00

3,000-8,000 1,,008,000-3,000,808

Soztrce: Adapted by tlw autllor from Office of Tec1mofog;r~Assessment, I"rol$emtiot~of Wetzpons ($Mass Destrtrctic~tz:Assessing t l r ~Risks, US f ongress 0TA-ISC-559, Washington, Arrgtrst 1933, pp. 53-54.

The Problem of Policy: Beyond Sanctions and "Dual Containmentff Any strategy towards Iraq must recagnj.ze the fact that it will remain a revanchist state as long as it is under the control of Saddam Hussein or other mcntbers of its present ruli"g elite. Iraq has alfeady attempted to assassinate former President Busk, has systematically resisted the UWs efforts to destroy its capacity to prduce weapons of mass kstmction, has backed the People's Mu~afiideenin attacks on Iran, and has repeatedly infiltrated the Kuwaiti border. Iraqi media have often repeated Iraq's daim to Kuwait,and Iraq lmg deiayed its recopition of the new border the UN demarcated between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq continues to fight a low-level war with its Shi'ites. It has challenged fie UN no-fly zrmes. It has sent small inteligencc; groups into Kuwait, and about 40% of its arrny is currently positioned to attack into the Kurdirjh security zone in the north, Senior Iraqi leaders bave been ctear about their desire for reveve in their discussions with Arab leaders, m d Tariq Aziz has stated that it is dishonorable ta leave revezzge to one" sons. This may seem to be yet another example of rhetoric, but fraq has a k a * demonstrated that rhetoric can easily slip into reality"h1 M i l e Iraq has shce appeared to recag~zizeKuwait and the new border, there is little doubt that it has h e so as a tactic& mve. Iraq will cantinue to try violate the UN smctions whenever this seems possible and to rclsume its military build-up the mmew that sanctions on dual-use and military k p o r t s are ended. fraq is already fighting a low-level war with its own rebel S1-zi"ites. It regularly chailenges the UN m-fly zones. It has sent a nu~nberof small intelligence groups into Kuwajt, and it posi.tioned major armored forces near the Kuwaiti border last fall, About 40% of its a r q is currmtly positioned to attack across the Kurdish security zone in the north, and at least 60% of the Iraqi Army cadd =deploy to the Iranian border with& a week.

B q o ~ dSnnctions nnd "Dw1 Contninment "

The Case for Continuing Mflitaxy Containment:

Iraq'xz~rrcntd i t a r y weakness does not deprive it of the ability to fight a number of types of war that do not involve committing major forces against the organized opposition of Western and Soutbem Gulf forces. It can fight irstlgdar or unconvf.ntional forms of war*The use of third party terrorists, extremists, and proxies ofiers Iraq both a m a n s of revenge and far more security than large-scale military action, so does playing a spoiler role at the political level, and financirrg political rivals to its emmies in the southern Gulf and rest of the Arab warld. A nurnber of types of military conflict remain possible, and typicai scenarios could hcXuCSe:

* * * * * * * *

Clashes with Turkey or Iran over Iraqi efforts to attack its Kurds, or support of Kurds hostile to Iraq and Iran, Mid-intensity conflict with the US w a a major Iraqi attack on the Kurds in the Kurdish security zone. War with the K u d s in the Kudish security zone. Conflict with Iran over Iraqi treatmat of the Shi'ites in southern Iraq, andlor Iranian attacks on the Iraqi frazzt group, the People's Mujhideen. Major clashes ~ s u l t h gfrom refusal to atlow UN inspection, over chaitenges to ""no-fly zones," and incufsions into Kuwait. Military confrontation growing out of US or UN attacks in rcspmse to Iraqi suyport of terrorism or use of uncanventicma1 war fa^. Use of chemical, or biologicd terrorism. Use of mjnes or missiles against tanker traffic to Kuwait, ldncollventional attacks on Eacilities and h i p s in Gulf. Confrontation with Syria over a pote1zEia3. Syrian peace agreement with Israel or some other Ifactor, Conflicts with Syria or Turkey over water.

This list of possible contingencies shokvs h w difficuft it is to try to set bounds on the broad rmge of unpredictable cmthge~zciesthat could result from the actions oi even one of the radlcal powers in the Gulf. Further, the Southern Gulf states and the W s t c ot i g n m the need to plan for a hvorst ease scenario: a large-scale Iraqi con?bined operations attack on Kuwait andlor Eastern Saudi Arabia lamched with limited warning. Once again, the Southern Gulf and the West also cannot simply plan for today They already must plan forces and capabilities for the year 2 0 0 and well beyond. Someday the UN sanctions will end. Someday Iraq will be able to rebuild its forces with new techology based cm its interpretation of the lessons of the Gulf War*

346

Beyond Sanctions and ""nuckl Cc~fztai~z?rtent-"

Prospects for Fatgm CarzfZiet Prophecy is a dangerous game at a y tirne and is virtually impossible in the case of Iraq. Tkere is no way to prcdict how long S a d d m Hussein and the Ba'ath regime will last, or whether any successor government will, dtimately prove less authoritarian or aggressive. The hture univ and resolve of the UN Coalition is rancerhin, and there are limits to how long and how t h o r o u a y the current embargo and sanctions can be applied. In the near-term, Iraq seems likely to limit itsdf to internal, low-lwel, mdj'or mconventianal conflicts. n e r e is still a real risk that Kurdish and 5hi"te separatism could provoke some form of Iraqi civil war, but it is a war the Rakth regime wodd quickly win unless the UN intervenes. The risk oE new fighting between Iraq and its Kurds is particularly high. In spite of its alliance with Barzani in 9ptember 1996, the Bafa.trhelite is almost certain to rnake every effort to undermine the Kurdish enclave, and to use force the mommt it feels it is safe to do so. It will probably have the support of most Iraqi military officers" Turkey's co~~frontation with its own Kttrds, and Iran's support of Iraqi Shi'ites, are other major wild c d s in the equatio~~. Erkey may well reach the point where it: fears Kurdish separatism more than fray. fraq's Shi"i.tts are now mder tight government control, and many are :Iraqimtionalists. A new uprisirrg seems unlikely, but it might still occur. :If it does, such an uprising seems far morc likely to lead to bloody repression than partition of the country or any lastirrg alipment between Iraqi Shi'ites and Iran. There s e a s to be m)).a very limited possibility that a major uprising might create a sfpificant prcrIranian ShYite ~sistancein Iraq, mit;ht create a pro-Iranim ShYite enclave similar to the Kurdish enclave, or even give Iran part of Iraq's territory. What seems to be a m m likely scenario is that the Ba'ath regirne will systematically eliminate the last traces of Shifite opposition in the marshes, and defeat the Kurds by a mixture of polit;ical md economic action, low-level militay action, and military inli.m.jdation. Such an Iraqi vktory over the h r d s , and final el,imina.t.ion of the Write resistmcc, wi& Iran and Turkey; and seriously u ~ ~ d e r m h e could increase telzsio~~ the crcdilnility of Western mijitary capabilities. Such a victory would &so allokv traq to shjft from a focus or1 internal issues to revenge and eMorts at intimidation. Iraq's currelrt regime is almost certain to see reparations, the threat of war crimes trials, and competition for oil quotas and revenues as issues that merit at least the tacit threat of the use of military force. Iraq may be deterrcd f r m attacking Kuwait, but it certainly retairrs the capability to seize Kuwa-it if Kuwait does not have US support, Iraq coulld also pose a threat to Saudi Arabia, although it would have to reorganize its logistic and support capabilities to carry out a major it~vasionsf t-he Eastern Province.

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347

Active Iraqi efforts at revenge and intimidation are possib likely. At least some border hcidents with Ism, Saudi Arabia, are likely, and so is the use of terrorism and unconventional warfare against leaders or dites whieh, Saddam Hussein and the Ka'dh see as responsible fm Iraq" defeat, continued sanctions or reparation, or as placing limits on the reassertion of Iraqi power in the ~ g i o n . Even if Iraq does not fnrce anolhcr mititary confrontation with the UN, :Iraq will remain a major threat to regimd peace, Iraq not mly retains a significant: cap"17llity to h u i i weapons of mass destruction, its overall mix of conventional forces is still formidable by regional stmdards. Iraq's forces are still large mough to a majm threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if the two do not obta erican aid. Eraq has enough c m e n tional forces to enable it to d e f e ~ ~against d any attxk by Iran, and its forces should be fully capable of dealing with any of the various Kurdisb or Shi5te militias that arc. inteml tbreats to Saddarn I l u s s e W s power. Iraq has less ability to attxk its ncighbors. It has lost much ol its prewar dfensive capability. It cannot use its present forces h a sustained. conflict without major resupply of munitisns and spare parts, and its forces will cor~thueto deteriorate with time. Iraq not only is curre~~tly limited in military pawer, the UN embargo on arms and military technology e n s m s that it will shwly and steadify decline to a limited defensive caphjliiry. This dccline in Iraq's military forces, fiocvever, will not make it vulnerable to Iran unless Iran receives major additional arms and reorganizes and retrains its forces to the point where they can gain a decisive quajitativc edge over Iraq. Such an improvement in Iralnim forces now seems highly unlikely The mfd- a d hng-term prospects for conflict also etepend heavily m I r a q f ~ e g i mand e access to ncw supflies of conventiomai weaporls and the kchnology to make weapons of mass destruction. :It seems likely that :Iraq will be a ~vanchiststate as long as it is either under its p ~ s e n t Ba'athist ~ g i m or e u d e r the contrd of another authoritarian leader or hard-line military officer. The issue is not redly whether Saddam survives, but the f u m e character of the state. If any hard-he regime does szxrvhe, and Iraq can obtain signi,icant flows of arms and technology, it is likely to be exceedingly dmgeruus. It is certain to make growing use of the politics of intimidation and may reach the point of risk taking and significa~tconflid. The VaEue of Militauy Containment These trends and risks form a strong argument for separathg the issue of military containment from other aspects of any strategy for dealing with Iraq. is every reasor1 to continlre to enforce the UN Security Coun-

348

Beyond Sanctions and ""nuckl Cc~fztai~z?rtent-"

cil Resolutions that- deny Iraq arms innports and deny it imports of dualuse t e c b l o g y it can use for weapons of mass destruction. Iraq has played the role of m aggressor or destabilizing state for m&of its history silrce the fall of the mo~narchy* It rcltains enough military capabilily, in spite of the Gulf War, to thrt3aten its southern neighbors if they do not receive outside support, m d the technical skills and at: least s m e of the equipmtlmt to manhcknre and deliver w a p o m of mass destructio~n. Unlcss Iran becomes far stronger thm it is today no case can be made for a m s hrmsfers m l a s a more democratic, stable, and e t comes to " the future. UnIC-il a f m d m e ~ ~ tchmge al irr Iraq" go , there is a clear case for m i l i t v cosrtahm a t , and for t a h g every possible step to l h i t Iraq's military bufld-up and its efforts to rebuild its capacity to & h e r weapms of mass destmtion. Every step that strengthens Iraq's military capabilities increases the risk of more military adventures like its invasion of Iran and Kuwait. h military build-up in Iraq not only threatens the region, it threatells Iraq's people, and mems an Iraqi regime will allocate resources to military expenditures that do not benefit Iraq's peogIe in any way It provides an authoritarian regime with the tools necessary to oppress Iraq's Kurds and Shi?tes, and to m a h t a h controf.over its Smnis. It also means the continued diversion of vast resources from recclvery and d e v e l o p a t to useless expe~nditureson force. To put th,is in perspecthe, the US estimdes that Iraq spent aver $180 billion (in constant $i1.995)on military expenditures in the decade before the Gulf MJar, and over $80 billion on arms imports plus another $10 billion on wcapons of mass destructi~n.~bZ

Additional n/leaszsves to Limit Iraqi M i l i t a y Cqabilities At the same time, a realistic policy must recowize that the success of military cmtainmcrnt will aiways be ~ l a t i v elraq . ~ t a i n as major militarvindustrial complex. 'There are many duat-use technologies that are not practical to ban because they are '"civil" in character, but that can aid Iraq in improwing its rnilitary forces, in strengthening its rnilitary industries, and in rebuiiding its pmgrann to build. and deliver weapons of" mass destmction. The UN resolutions and cease-fire accords resulthg from the Gulf War cannot provide a lasting basis for preventing all military expctrts to Iraq, and neither can arms control agreements on supplier regimes. Prcsent international accords allow the sale and transfer of sipificant amounts of biological, chemical, and nuclear technology to Iraq, once it "complies'" with the key sanctions now affecting it. Some nations or indkidual campanies will always be willkg to deal with Iraq on a c m r t or overt basis. There is no cjeas difference between "guns" and "butter," and any easing

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349

of ""cvil" eco~~omic smdians will inevitably give Iraq some aid in st~ngtheningits rni1it.a~capabiXities. Given these uncertainties, it is clear that the US and its Southern Gulf allies must take every possible action to limit Iraq's present and future war fighting options. This involves four sets of interrelated measures: arms control, supplier regimes m d limits on the transfer of technology and equipment, strengthening the deterrent and defensive capabilities of Southern Gulf forces, and building up Western power projection capabilities. These measures should be taken in concert. Focuskg on one measure-such as a m s control or efforts to s t ~ n g t h e nSouthern Gulf forces-is almost certain to fail. The US and its allies must take every possible step to presszxsc Iraq to join internat-imd and regional arms control regimes that can bring stabiliv to the Gulf. At the same t k e , the West must organize to develop tight controls on transfers of military and dualuse technology to Iraq, focushg on the risks posed by the trans'cr of both conventional technologies and. those for weapons of mass destruction. Such limits on trade and technology tran&rs may or may not be part of arms control regimes and f o m d edargoes. One point, however, must be kept clearly hmind. Some arms control regimes stress equiw to all sipatories or tend to penalize moderate states that s i p and honor such agreelnents while extremist states do not. "Fairness" i s not the issue in dealing with Iran and Eray. Security is the issue and will best be achieved by understanding that weakenjng or limiting Southem Gulf and moderate Arab states is scarcely a way of: avoiding futurc co~~flicts in the Gulf, I'he worst possibte path that outside nations could follow would be to treat Iraq as an open market for arms, or to return to the Cold War struggle for influence in the northern Gulf, The US and.the heirs of the fomer Soviet Unfon need to recopize that their past efforts to make either lran or Iraq into alljes or strategic '"pil,lars" hbae been dismal faitures. The U'S never benefited from its miI-itar)i support of ban, and indeed was forced to intervene against Iran during 1987-1988. The former Soviet Union never obtained any meaningtul form of strategic. advantage or support fPom its a m s transkrs to Iraq, The ultimate answer to deaiing with Iraqi military capabifities, however, will be a c o ~ ~ t h u emilitary d alllimce between the US, Britain, and the Southern Gulf states. No deal with Iraq is likely to last longer than the West's military p m m c e in the Gulf, or be any stronger than a combination of Southern Gulf d i t a r y hrces and U'S and British power projection capabilities, Diplmacy will at best be an extension of forcc by other means. As is the case with Irm, the threat from Iraq can ultimately only be c o ~ ~ t a k eord cotmtered by war fighthg capability.

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Prospects far Political Change The choice of a strategy for dealing with Iraq" regime and the issue of sanctions jnv&es far harder choices. Saddarn is still in power and his demise has been predicted so often that, as one senior Bdathist offlcial put it: ". . . waiting for Saddam to go is like waiting for Godot to arrive."'"h" Further, there are no good c~ptionsfor pwsLling a new leadership withln either the existing "center" of the Iraqi politics, or within the ""perinhay""of Krzrdish groups, S.hifitefac.lions, and opposition plitical parties. Each approrxch has powerful liabilities. Zsaq's complex political and socioeconomic situation has created condjtions cvhere outside powers can only have an indirect influe~nceon whether S a d d m gves and who succeeds him. The West and Southern Gulf can back oppositio~~ movements but these have little influence and chance of success. They can back Kurdish and Shi5ie groups but these can, at best, trigger civil conflict, and pltesent serious risks in terms of Krzrdish separatism and its impact on Turkey and Shi'ite ties to Iran..Such options are only marginally better alterllatiwes than the prtrsent reliance on the race between the lifting o.f sanctinns and the collqse of Saddarn's regime.

Saddam Remains in Power

Any strategy towards Iraq must take explicit account of the possibility that S a d d m will, remin in power. Saddam is scarcely secure. lrhe previous analysis has shown that Saddam's regime face declhing support in the Sunni hcartlmd, fantiXy defections, worsening economic situation and poor agricultural harvest. hlthough Iraq's acceptmce of tlN Scurity Council ResoXutjm 986 has provided the regime with limited relief, the rclmaining sanctions are still f i r d y im, place, At the same time, Saddam Hussein has shorn an extraordinaley resilience for nearly a quarter of a century. He survived the Iran-Iraq war despite repeated claims by Ayatdlah fiomeini that the bloodshed. will onIy end with the demise of Saddam. He survived his humiliatjlrg defeat durjng Desert Storm,; he dcfeated twn rebellions, and rclmained in powcr in spite of more than five years of severr;,sanctions. Saddam's opponents face many problems and Saddam is a master conspirator who is one of the few world leaders whose early political career focused exclusively on matters of intellige~~ce and security. He began by providjng security for the Ba'ath party when it: was out of power, and then by ensuring the security of the Bafath regime once it had seized power in 1968. Saddam was and mmahs a man of action, His experience has given him an almost uncamy ability to detect and swiftly nip h the

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bud any threats to his security. Saddam also has shgle-mindedly practiced Mao Zedong's mxim: '"People arc not chives, when you cut their heads they do not grow new m s . " He has neutralized opponents and rivals from witfiin the system by the si.mple expedient of Wing &em, in stark contrast to previous Iraqi regimes who allowed their opponents to live or to go into exile and then to come back and haunt them. As a result, the cmtinuation of the Saddam regime now seems to depend largely m e i t k r the random success of some coup or assassjnation atternpt by some u n h o w n element of the ""cmter,'kd the cumdative political and econosnic impact of sanctions or1 the support Saddam can obtain from the "cenkr" and the tmyj people. Saddam would be most fikef y to survive if the UN gradual1y remowed the restraints ~ t a i n e d hResolution "38 6 d liif-ted sanctions with minimal or no conditions. 'The internal psychological, political, social, and economic impact of such a lifting of smcticms on Iraqi domestic politics would be tremcmdous, as would the external impact, Such a lifting would be seen as a major victory by Saddam and his regime. h y major fur&er relief from the UN sanctions seems unlikely in the immediate future. Many senior lraqi government ofiicials-possjbly including Tariq Aziz-are convinced that there is little prospect that oil sanctions will be lifted fur&er until well after the US presidential elections of November 1996.56.1 Saddam has, however, found other ways of improving his position which have a powerfu internal and regional impact. For example, his decisio~~ to make the Iraqi people vote or1 a dercndzam, on whcfier he should stay on as president for another seven years m October 15,1995, may seem farcical by Westem stdndarcls. 'The gol~ernment'"predicted" that: Iraq's vokrs would fully support Sa,ddmfsconlinuatio~~ as president long in advance of the vote, and the result was clearly manipulated by the state.?h"owwer, it is dmgemus to dismiss the symbolism involved by the referendum or the amount of power the regim demnstrated. Saddam can always act on his promises of further liberalization as a temporary tactic. Ile can thrn reverse them when this becomes convenient or even make good on such promises with littie risk of losing power. Iraq has no expesjfncc with representative government. Political activity has been Limited to mmbers of the Ba'ath Party-estimated at about ejght percent of the population-and this political activity cmsi.sts almost solely of a bureaucratic jockeying for power and efforts to Obtajn power, prcrmotion, and privilege by supporting the glrve If Saddam does relnain in power, the West and the Snul-tternGulf have few options other than to pursue the military containment as long as possible, find ways of defusing some of the econmic and humanitarian cmc e m over other sanctions and extend them as long as possible, and con-

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t h u h g to ai-i;e~npt to isolate Iraq politically and diplornaticalfy However, it is increasjngly rrdikely that W s t and Southern Gulf states will pursue such a pdicy with any unity. Britain, US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the US may pursue such a policy, but many other corntries are likely to seek political accommodation and ecmamic advantage. S a d d a ~ nFalls from Pawer It seems extraordinarily unlikely that Saddam will leave power voluntarily, or leave as part of some orderly transfer of power. This makes it likely that the next "president" of Iraq will be '"electedfrby putting a bullet into Saddam-md bullets into many of his supporter r by a bloociy coup. 'The only question is likely to be when this coup occz~rsand whether it occurs at the palace level or through broader fighting. If the West and the Southern Gulf are lucky, such a 'kcmtrist'" coup or assassination will occw soon and produce some benefits. There are several different types of leaders that might reptacc Saddam under these conditions:

* Saddam the lesser: Another leader from w i h h the present Barathelite might =place Saddam who has someL\lhat similar beliefs and ambitions. Such a leader will almost certainly lack Saddam's charisrna and authority,but might well be able to ccmvkce other nations to M sanrtions and recopke his regizne as legitimate. He is likely to be gttietly rclvanchist, but m y wcll act pragnatically as long as this results in the lifthg of sanctions and the restoration ol Isaq's oil bade and ability to import. There is no way to predict whether such a leader will become a quiet pragmatist, but such a figure could pursue many political paths. These could range from a slow move towards moderation to the! covert rc?buildk~gof Iraq's weapons of mass destmction and creating an Iraq which purs~teda subtler and more eEective pattern of hostiliv towards Iraq's nneighbors and the West. * Saddal~isnzwifholdt Saddam could emerge from within the rmks of Saddam's closest msociates, likely from \zrit.hin the ruling elite, or from withi_n the list of other Tahitis. Several come to mhd: Barzan al-T&riti who is stilf the head. of the Iraqi UN mission in Geneva, Husseh Rashid al-mriti, army chief-obstaff &ring the Kukvait invasion and currently a special military advisor to Saddam, Gcneral MuzAem Sa'ab al Takrit, fomer head of the air force, General Hamid Sha'aban aX Tahitii, commander of the air force during the Iran-Iraq, Nameq a1 Tahiti, commmder of the Special Guards, Abdel Sattar % r & h al Takriti, commander of the Repuhlicm Guards, and Kmal Must..afa d Takriti, currently joint colnmnnder with a s a y

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Hussein-Sactdam's younger son-of Special Security and the brother-h-law of Hussejn Kmel Hasan,'% If Saddam disappears 'violently' this may well open the Roodgates to a violent and protracted pocver struggle betweer1 competitors for power, a struggk which is like& to involve the opposition gruups and the military. * A l z uuthiwifarialz nzilderrlte: A coup rrtfght be led be a cent-rist authrsritarian without Saddarn's revanchist and militarist tendencies. M i l e Iraq may lack the structure to move towards democracy in the near term, it is possible that the initial violence of any e k r t to overthrow Sadcfam could be folf,ocved by a leader willing to focus orz Iraq's internal economic developmnt, the need to accommodate its Shi5te and K d i s h factims, and restoring Iraq's relaticms with other states. Iraq does hiwe a strong class of highly educated techrrocrats and this class & e t provide powerful support for such a leader, ft would be hard for such a new m h g elite to i p o r e the pressms for =vanchism, but there are stro~zghzcentives to concezztrate on developme~zt, to heal Iraq" sectarian and ethnic divisions, and reach a settlennent with Iraq's nei&bors that will free it OE the problem of reparatinne;. Unfortunately for the West and the Southern Gulf, this political sitnation makes it difficult to pursue a ""cntrist" "strategy. "Centrist" aasssshs or coup plamers may seek outside support, but it: is unlikely that either a Western or Southern Gulf state will be able to exercise much control over who is inVolVed, their pditicd character, or their actions if they achieve power. A "centrist" coup or assassirration may lead to mmy initial promises or claims of moderation, liberalization, and political change, but the reality is most likely to be very different. Any efforts to overthmw Saddarn within the present: ruling Sunni elite m likely to be foflowed by cmtinuhg repression of the Shi5tes and. Kurds, the arrest and execution of many rivals and suppcrrters of Saddam, and the eventual arrest m d execution of other opponents" The most the West and the Southern Gulf c m do under such conditions is to create st-rongincmtives and dishcmtives to influence the action of the new leadec The liftkg of sanctions, debt relief, forgivmess of reparations, univ to war crimes trials atl provide an important combination of carmts and sticks. The question is whe*er the West and the Southem Gulf have the ul~iryto use such took effectively. A rush to "forgive and forget" is not the right stratei~y,but it is far more Xikeiy than effective diplmacy A Man an "Ta~zk-Back"

The main alternative to a '"centrist" ccoup or assassination is an fndependent military coup. This prospect seems unlikely, but a miiitary officer or

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group of military officers might still eznerge at any time who differ h attitude and policy from Saddam Hussejn and his supporters. There is no way to determine L\lhefier such a leadership would pursue the hterests of some new Sumi faction, follow the path of ""Saddam the lesser" or move towads ""authoritarian moderation," A retfom-driven military coup seems unlikely, The Iraqi mititary has never been an effective agent of developmez~tand modernization, m d fraqi military r d e has never succeeded in implementing efiectivc political and socioeconomic programs. The Iraqi military has also long been riddlc.d by factiondim. It does not m t t e r whether onc strong dficer or a collective junta emergest it is likely that such a regime will become mired in intra-hctional strife, This contingency again makes it difficztltt to pursue a "cezztrist" strategy The military officers involved might seek outside support, but it is again unlikely that any Western or Southern Gull state will be able to exercise much control over who is involved, their political character, or their actions if they achieve power. It is swewhat mom likely, however, that such a mftitary gowe could be encouraged to hcarporate Shi3tes and Kurds h t o its leadership, to crcate a natimd provisional government, and to rule in cooperation with civilian technocrats..The West and the Soutkrn Gulf might: be mom eMective in offerjng incentives and djsincemtives, and in using the lifthg of sanctions, debt relief, forgiveness of reparations, and immuniw to war crirnes triafs as carrots and sticks. 'f'here might also be less risk of divisions wiChin the West and the Southern Gulf over such a policy, since it would not involve forgiveness of centrist political leaders invoked in the invasim of Kuwait, or with such direct ~sponsibilityfor attacks on the Kurds and Shi5tes. A Takeaver by the Opposition

A takeover by Iray's opposition parties seems extremely unlikely. :It stmtches credulity to believe that Lhe G(2-90 exiled c~ppositittngmups, inchding those under the mbrelfit organization of the Iraq National Council, could take over. The most credible groups in this mix of opposition g m q s artl the Kurds, the Shi'ites of various hues-including liberal delnocrats and secztltarists, moderate Islmists and Islamic fundamentalists, and Sunxli Arab natimal.ists, AIl were severely weakened by the evmts of August-Sptember 1996, and they could only succeed if they f o r m d a lasting coaiition that would constitut.e a drmatic break with :Iraq%770 year long history of domination by the center and Sumi Arabs. If such a contingency did occur, politicat p w e r would probably shift in favor of t-he S:kiiites, dthough the center ol political gravity wodd

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probably still be the geographic center of Iraq where Baghdad is located. The Smni Arabs would still play an important political role,given their prtrdominance in t-he administration, politics and military establisbment. The Kurds who are 20-22% of the population wodd constitute a pctkverful pressure bloc insuch a new system but would not be able to domjnate it t-he w v Iraq's Sunni Arabs--who are roughly 20% of the total p ~ l d l a tion-did for 78 years. The Kurds can never dominate fraq. They have no meaningfu.I strength in the armed forces a d are a minority in an ovefwhelmingly Arab (75%)comtry. 'The Kurds have also long been djstrusted by both Sunni and Shi5te Arabs, who fear that they are secessionist and who fee2 they take advantage of any Iraqi weakness to put forward autonomy claims. It is difficult to envision what such a provisional regime composed of a coalition of oppositim gmups would do in matters of domestic and foreign policy. It is possible to specdate based on evidence from past Iraqi history and the pronouncements of contemporary opposition groups.'g :If such oppositim groups can be taken seriously, they would support reform and a cmstitutio~~alist approach to gover enk 'They would end the one-party state system, and the Ba'ath would become one competing party amow many I'hey wollld dismantle the vast nationd-secwri(y qparatus assdated with the Saddam ~ g i n t esince 19751 and wodd reduce the size of the army. Unfortunately, its both fashionable and necessary for most opposition groups to advocate such moderdion wkle they are in opposition. It is far from clear what would happen if most actually achieve power, and whether the end result wlruld be reform or a struggle to produce a new authoritarian lender, Many oppo"ition groups may be far less modcrate in power than in opposition. Western and Southem Gulf efforts to create such a cmtingency are likely to be futile, regardess of the scale of overt or covert s~~pport. It may be worth providisrg limited, quiet support to the Iraqi opgosition simply to keep the possibility alive and to embarms the Ba'ath regime, but there are obvious risks in supporting one opposition faction over mother. Further, a major support effort not only is likely to be a waste of money, it is likely to end up in corruption and Iaheling the opposition as a tool of outside hterests. If such a contingency does occur, however, it w d d be the ideal contingency for Western m d Southern Gulf use of incentives and disincentives. Lifting of sanctions, debt relief, forgiveness of reparations, and i m u n i t y to war crimes trials could be used as carrots with only mhirnal concern for sticks. There would be far less risk of divisions withjlt the West m d the Southern Gulf over such a policy

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The Fragmentation of Iraq The merciless, ru-thless mmner with which Saddarn has treated the Kurds m d Shi3tes creates some prospect that a coup in the Sumi leadership could trigger ethnic and sectarian. civil war, Such a conflict might well end with a Sunni defeat of the Kurdish anrS Shi5ite factions-as the uprisings did in 1991. It also, hawever, might create a divided Iraq or even shatter the country-with a new Kurdih andlor Shi3iZ.emhi-state. This, however, seems an inc~asinglyuntikely prospect, and one that has probably triggered far m r e Western and %&hem Culf concern than is really justified. The Kurds w d d prdbahly settle for valid autonomy if this was coupled to a =asonable share of Iraq's oil =sources. Iraq's Shi'ites have exhifoited little wish to split the Iraqi state or follow in the path of Iran. What they have sought is politicd and economic power that ensurate with their demographic size. If this conthgency offers a lesson for the West d the Southern Guif, it is that they should intervene quickly in the event of any coup or civil codlict in Iraq to encourage the kind of refom that will give the Kurds an incentive to cooperate. a c e to stay in Iraq, m d Swmis m d ShYites m ince~~tive agaj,l the key tods are lifting of sanrtions, debt relieff and forgiveness of reparations. The US, in pa&icular, however, should be ready to offer cmcrete proposals to resolve the Kurdish issue m d should not leave this i s s ~ ~ e to chance, This also scarcely kvdves a great deal of poli.tical creativity. As the previous chapters have shown, the basic mtlines of m autonomy or federalist agreement have been &cussed for more & m three decad problem is to give such an agreement momentum at the proper oppor I'here may also be a case for strategy towarcis Iraq that wodd aei\iance concrete proposals for a federal, solution to stabilizing a post-Sacfdam Iraq, Under such prclposals, Iraq would do away with the traditional, highly centralized state strucbre MIhich has been in the hands d one etho-sectarian group sjncc the fctrrnhg of the state, In its place, Iraq would create: a non-centralized state with the various ethnic and confessional communities having greater say in their local affairs. This could be guaranteed in a witten constitution agreed upon by the central government m d the constituent polities and which w d d not be subject to unilateral change by the central authorities. Such a kderal agenda has been endorsed by King Hussejin of Jordan who believes that in a post-Saddam Iraq, a federal solution woulcjl save the territorial integri.9 of Iraq, Iran and Iraq: The Risk of a "Derrif"~Bargain" There is one more contingency which the Wcst and Southern Gulf must consider. W i l e there seems to be linle fmmediak prospect that Iran and

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Iraq would join together in such a "devil's bargaiin," plicies crihange and often do so suddenly and with ranpredictable motives. Seriolls Irmian and Iraqi cooperatim in using miitary force would radically alter the military bdmce in the Gulf, and a con?bir?ra.t.ionof Iranian and Iraqi military hrces could put far more militaq pressure on a y combination of Western and Southern Gulf forces. It would also be far harder for the Southern Gulf states to resist a combination of Iraslian and Iraqi intimidation short of war, In mmy cases, Southern Gulf states would be likely to compromise or accommodate Iran and Iraq as long as this did not affect a miljor strategic interest. Even a limited Iranian and Iraqi political,alliance c d d rapidly escalate into a very different and far more ser"ious war. Miscalculation, miscommunieation, ntisperceptions, and diiFferent values are more Ihe norm in military history than the exception, and this has certainly been true of the recent actims of Iran a d Iraq. Iran's failure to accept a favorabie ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq Mrar in 1985 is a good case in point. Given these uncertahties, it is clear that the West and the Southern Gulf need to pmvieie any new regirne with incentkes to pursue other poliries, and must act to limit Iran and Iraq's present- and future war fighting options. Unce again, such military conta ent would involve four interrelated sets of measures: arms control, limits on the trmsfer of techoXogy m d equipment, streng-fienhg the deterrent and defensive capabilities of Soutbern Gulf forces, and building up Western power projection capabiti.ties. Such masures shrttrXd be taken in concert. Focttsixtg on one type of measure-such as arms control or efforts to strengthen Southern Gulf forces-is almost certaitl to f a i . 7'he West must take every possible step to pressure Iran and Iraq to join international m d regional arms cmtrol regimes that can bring stabiliw to the Gulf. At the same time, the West must organize to develop tight controls on transfers of military and dualuse technology to fran m d Iraq, focusing on the risks posed by the transfer of both conventional technologies and those for weapuns of mass destruction.

The Frablern of Sanctions It is increasingly clear that the West and the Southern Gulf need to begin treati.ng econornic sanctio~~s as a different issue Trom seeking ehanges in Iraq" regime and military cmtajnment. Support for economic measures whose net: hnpact is to punish the Iraqi people is steadily eroding, as is szxpport fos efforts to the terms of the ceme-fie that c d for reparations and war crimes trials, Such measures ranquestionably weaken Saddam Hussein and Iraq's current d i n g elite, but they have a high humanitar-

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ian cost, and it is far knm clear that t h y can force a change in Iraq's government. They are clearly dkiding Western and Arab nations over their poiicies towards Iraq, they almost certairrly are making Iraq's population more hostile to the West and other moderate Arab states, m d their longterm, cost may welll: exceed any short-term benefits. I'he answer, however, is not to go sudden* go f r m the restrictive terms of UN Resolution 986 m d lift all economic sanctions. It is certain that any peace between Iraq and Kuwait will not be an easy one. The UN should not only insist that Iraq accept the UN Security Council resolutions that will prevent Iraq from rapidly recovering its capability to deliver weapms of mass destruction, the UN should, insist m obtaining firm lrayi cognition of Kuwait%sovereignty and new border. Shnilarly, the UN' needs to press for a clear autnnomy arrangement that protects :Iraq%K~urds.Rading Traqj agrceme~ton the Kuwait border issue and acceptance of Kurdish autcmomy for m end to economic sanctions, an end to the threat of war crimes trails, and more realistic proposals regarding reparations and debt repayments is one alternative. It s e a s likely to produce far mcrw mid and lmg-term stability in the Cdl: thm cmtinuh~g to try to win a far more sweeping victory after the Gulf War than the 19M chose to win during it. As has been discussed in Chapter 5, there artr no good or easy optims may, hocvever, be beller options for accon?plishing Chese goals. than the status quo and options that c d d be exploited hpursuing either a "centrist'kor ""pripheral" strategy*These options include:

* Reaching a clear decision as to whether sanctions arc or are not tied to the survival of Saddam and his coterie, and making this clear to Iraq. The present US, British, Kuwaiti, and Smdi posi.tion seelns to be a de facto attempt to mmove S a d d m , but it is all stick and.no carrot. It does not make it clear that :Iraq would benefit if it does so, or wfiat kind of ncw government would be acceptable. * Offering forgiveness of debt and reparations for a new ""centrist" or "peripheralf?egime with an acceptable character and composition. .hfternati\rely, s e t t a forth exact conditions for changes h the behavior of the current regime in return for a step by step fiting of sancticms and/or easing of debt and ~parations.Key conditions codif. be continued under UNSCOM operation, full and unconditional recognition of the new border with Kuwait (including a personal speech by Saddam), an autcmomy ~men-tentwith the Kurds, a halt to military operatims in southern Iraq and an arms intport limitation agreemmt, * Shifting the burden of blame for smctions to Saddarn Husseh by offering massive shipments of hwanitarian aid without compensa-

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tion-effectively limiting what Iraq can intport and defusjng the human problem. 011ce again, it must also be stressed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia need to come fully to grips with their demands for repayment of debt and repaations and fie West needs to abandon mrealistic demands for war c r h e s trials and instmt democracy and humans rights" 'There are disturbing parallels between th kind of peace the CJN has enforced on Iraq in terms of sanctions, potent-ial war crimes trails, reparations, and loan rclpaymemts and the kind of peace the allies forced on Qrmany after World War f. Once again, the West and the Sollthern Gulf need to remember that it is more. fmportant to make history fim r e m e h e r it. Not every tragedy has to have a seco~tdact.

Sources and Methods This volume is part of a series of volumes on each of the Gulf states which has been developed by the Center far Strategic and International Studies as part of a dynamic net assessment of the Middle East. This project has had the sponmrship of each of the %>uthernGulf states as well as US sponsors of the CSIS, and each text has been widely distributed for comment tcr experts and officials in each %>uthernGulf country, to US experts and officials, and to several international agencies and institution% and various private experts. Sources The authors have drawn heavily an the inputs of outside reviewers throughout the text. It was agreed with each reviewer, howeveu; that no individual or agency should be attributed at any point in the text except by specific request, and that all data used be attributed to sources that are openly available to the public. The reader should be aware of this in reviewing the foc>tnotes.Only open sources are normally referred to in the text, although the data cmtained in the analysis has often been extensively modified to reflect expert comment. There are other aspects of the murces used of which the reader should be aware. It was possible to visit each Southern Gulf states at various times during the preparation of this book and to talk to local cjfficials and experts %me provided detailed comments on the text. Intesviews also tc)ak place with experts in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and Germany Portions of the manuscript were circulated far informal review by Eurqean officials and diplomats in some cases. Once again, no details regarding such visits or comments are referenced in the text.. Data from open sources are deliberately drawn EI"CXTI a wide range of sources. Virtually all of these sources are at least in partial conflict, There is no cornensus over demographic data, budget: data, military expenditures and arms transfers, force numbers, unit designations, or tzreapans types, While the w e of computer data bases allowed same cross-correlation and checking of such sourcexthe repc~rtingon factors like force strengths, unit types and identities, tactics often could not be reconciled and citing multiple sources for each case was not possible becauw it involved many detailed judgments by the author in reconciling different reports and data, The fnternet and several on-line services were also used extensively.Since such the data bases are dynamic, and change or are deleted over time, there is no clear

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way to fc~c~tnote much of this materiat. Recent press but are often only part of the material consulted.

SC>UK~Sare

generally cited,

Methods A broad effort has been made to standardize the analysis of each country, but it became clear early in the prc>jecttliat adr~ptinga standard format did not suit the differences that emerged b e w e n countries. The emphasis thmughout this phase of the CSIS net assessment has been on analyzing the detailed trends within individual states and this aspects of the analysis I-tas been given priority over country-to-country consistency. in many casesf the authors adjusted the figuws and data use in the analysis an a ""best guess'" basis, drawing on some thirty years of experience in the field. In some other cases, the on"ginal data providd by a given source were used without adjustment to ensure comparability, even though this leads to some confficts in dates, pface names, force strengths, etc. within the material presented-parkularly between summary tables surveying a number af cauntries and the best estimates for a specific countr)~ in the text. In such cases, it seemed best to provide cmtradictory estimates to give the reader same idea of the range of uncertainty involved. Extensive use is made of graphics to allaw the reader to easily interpret campXa statistical tables and see long-term trends. The graphic program used was del'rberatefystandardized, and kept relatively simple, to alic3w the material portrayed to be as comparable as possible. Such graphics have the drawback, however, that they often disguise differences in scale and exaggerate or minimize key trends. The reader should carefully examine the scale used in the left-hand axis af each graphs. Most of the value judgments regarding military effectiveness are made an the basis of American military experience and standards. Althou& the principal author has lived in the Middle East, and worked as a U$ adviscjr to several Middle Eastern governments, he believes that any attempt to create some Middle Eastern standard of reference is likely to be far more aht'trary than basing such judgments on his own military background, Mapping and location narnes presented a major prcjbtem. The authors used US Army and US Air Farce detailed maps, cc>mmercialmaps, and in scjme cases cammerciall satellite photos. In many cases, however, the place narnes and terrain descriptions used in the cambat reporting by both sides, and by independent observers, p ~ s e n t e dmajor contradictions that could not be resolved fram available maps. No standardization emerged as to the spelling of place names. Sharp differences emerged in the geographic data published by various governments, and in the cmflicting methods of transliterating Arabic and Farsi place names into English. The same prc~blemapplied in recmciling the narnes of organizations and individuals-particularly those being transliterated from Arabic and Farsi, It again became gainfuFuXly o~bviousthat no progress is being made in reconciling the conEIicting methods of tramiiterating such narnes into English. A limited effcjrt has

been made to standardize the spellings used in this text, but many different: spellings are tied to the relational data bases used in preparing the analysis and the presematian of the original spelling is necessary to identify the source and tie it to the tranxript of related intei-views.

Notes Chapter l 4. CIA, InkarI~ZFactbook, 4995, "Iraq." 2, CIA, World Farfbook, 1995: "Iraq." 3. Energy Infc~rmatlic~n Administration, International Elrergy Oullook, 1995, Washingon, DOE/EIIA, June 1995, p. 29.

4. Ecunumist., August 23,1991, p. 36; Npro firk Ti~ncs,June 3,1994; June 11,1991, p. A-10; Nctvernber 3,1991, p. 4; WnshingfonPost, July 19,1991, p. A-16;.

Chapter 3 5. CIA, World Farfbook, 1995: "Iraq." 6. Besides Sumi Arab and Christian Arab% the center includes a large pc~pulation of Iraqi Shi"ites and Iraqi Kurds who have lived there far generations and whose ecmomic and politicat fo.urt.uner;are tied to the center. 7. Quoted in The EconomisC.,April 6, 1991, p.40. 8. ""lofile: President Saddarn Hussein of Iraq," MidEnsl Report, volume 23, number 46, August 45, 1990, pp. 1-5; Wall Street. ]out-rzal, August 27, 4990, p. 4; 8Era Bengio, ""laq," k inrni Ayalon (ed,), Middle Ensl Contcnzpor~tyS~rrzley,1993, Volume XVII, Boulder, Wstview Press, 4995, pp. 378-380. 9. Christian Ser'er~eeItlonz'tor, April 24, 1991, pp, 1-2; h r an extensirre analysis of the regime" '"cmmitment' to change as portrayed by Tariq Aziz-Deputy Prime Minister in the aftermath of the war-see Waslzl'ngto~Post, May 3, 1992, pp. Al, A23. 10. Economist Intelligence Unit, ""Xaq, Country Report,'" No. 4,1991, p. 20. 11. Saddarn Hussein did eventually bring Hamrnadi back as a as a Presidential "adviser," T11is position had not real influence, however; and Saddam" "rehabilitation" of Harnrnadi seems to have been part of a broader series of attempts to rebuild support from ShYites and other leaders in the Ba'ath Party that were not part of Saddam's immediate coterie. 12. See Cunrdinn, May SO, 1994, p. 6. 13, Quoted in Tke Middle East, March 2 993, p. 11, 14. For more detajts on this patrirnonial system of gc>\rernance see Charles Tripp, ""4'e Future of Iraq and of Regional Securiq," in Ceaffrey Kemp and Jan-

ice Gross Stein, Pt~zuderKeg ir-z tlze Middle East: The Sfrriggfefor Gz~~Securz'Cy, Washingtcm, DC: American Assaciation for the Advancement of Science 1995, pp. 133--159. 45. The S u n d q Ernes, April 48, 4993, p. 19; dixussic~nswith Amatzia Baram. 16. The Ti~zes,June 16, 1994, p. 5. 1'7. Arabies, July-August 1994, p. '7. 18. Arnhies, nos. 103-104, July-Augutit 2 995, p. 12. 19. For extensive details of these inter-Takriti dashes see Le n/londezSeptember 6, 44990, p. 6. 20. Experts differ sharp1y on the details of these changes. See Wastzizzgton Post, Sptember 14,1991, p, A-31; November "i", 1994, p. A-46, November 14,1991, p, A47, December 14, 2991, p. A-15; Wall Street Jotlmnl, November 12, 1991, p. A-10, December 26,1994, p, A-10 ;ja~leSDefense WeekIy, November 16,4991, p. 926, JuIy 13, 1991, p. 64; Tlze Esfi~znfe,November 22-December 5, 1991, p. 1; Washi~zcptorz Tinfes, Nc~vember26, 1991, p. A'7; New York Times, November '7, 1991, p. 3; Los Angeles Times, November 14,1991, p. 4; Michael Eisenstadt, "Recent Changes in Saddam" Inner Circle: Cracks in the Wall?" Poliqwafctz, Number 22, Nc~vember 22,1391, pp. 1-2; Baltimore S U E ,June 21,1991, p. 7. 21. New Tifizes, December 1l, 1991. p. A-7. 22. Much of this analysis is based on work by Kenneth Katzman of the Congressianal Research %mice; Waslringtolz fist, November 7,1991. p. A-414. 23. Neru %rk Tijr~cs~ November 44, 4991, p, A-45. 24. See Iraq, Economist IIntetiigence Unit, Country Report, 3rd @arter, 1995, p. 7. 25. See III-I~, Economist Intelligence Unit, Gauntry Report, 3rd Quarter; 1995, p. 7, 26. Le Monde, August 15,1995, g. 2. 27. See Neztf York T~~PECS, August 45, 4995, p, A-3. 28. For an extemive analysis see Amatzia Baram, "Turmoil in Iraq: The Regime's #2 Defects," Middle Ensf Que;lrferl!i, December 1995, p, 16, 29. Saddam's speech on August 12, 1995 on Iraqi Television as quoted in Fore i p Broadcasting Informalicl~tService! Near East and Sou$h Asia (hencefc,rth FBISN E S ) August 14,1995, pp. 25-26. 30. Quoted in Fcjreign Brc~adcastingInfc2rmation Sewice, August 14,1995,p. 38. 31. W~llStreet Jclumnl, August 1995, p. 2 . 32. Reuters, May 8,1996, %54. 33. Quclted in FBIS-NES, March 43, 4996, p. 44, 34. Plzz'ladelplfz'a 7fzquire1; F e b r u a ~28, 1996, p. A3; Wastzizzgfon Post, March 1, 1996, p. A24; Boston Globe, February 28,1996, p. 5, 35. "The Purge of the Majids: What is going on in Iraq?'The Esti~znte,March 1, 1996, pp. 5-8. 36. Kamran Karadaghi, "King Hussein in Washingon: View From The Iraqi Bpposition," Rjlicywntciiz, no. 18%March 6, 1996, p. 2. 37. Wall Street fo-rirznl, February 26,1996, p. 8. 38. 77~eL)nz'ly Telegrnpls, August 25,1995, g. 15. 39. AI-Hayat, August 31,1995, p. 1, 40. Al-Hdynf, August 33, 1995, p. 6.

41. AI-Hgynt, August 33,1995, p. 6. 42. AI-Hgyat, August 31,1995, p. 6. 43. Al-Htzyat, August 31,1995, p. 6. 44. Frrr an extemive analysis of Saddam Hussein's pc~liticalevoluticrn over the years see the biography by Efraim Marsh and lnarj Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biogr~pFsy,New York, The Free Press, 1991. 45. See Michael Colfins Bunn, ""Saddarn Hussein" Family: A Guide to the Quarreling Kin, Part 5"The Esfimnte, vol. Vlf, no. 17, August 1&31,1995, pp. 5-8. 46. This analysis of 'Uday" rise to pclwer is drawn from Washi~zgtorzPost, Oetober 22, 1995, p. A1; Christi~rsnScience Monitor, October 20,1995, p. 6; 47, Qucrted in FBI$-NES, August 14,1995, p. 25. 48, Middle Easf btterrzatlitnnl, October 20, 1995, p. 3.

49, Quoted in FBIS-NES, March 11, 2 993, p. 30. 50. Quoted in FBIS-NES, October 18,1995, p. 30. 51, New York Elincs, December 14,1994. p, AI?". 52. Muhammad al-Zainy The Iraqi Ecarznnty under Saladant Husseh: Dcvelapment or Declitzc, London: AI-Rafid Publishing Company, 1995 (in Arabic), 53. See Tables I and 211 in ACDA, liVodd Mz'lita~yExpe~~ditt~res n ~ Arms d Parzsfirs, 1992,1992, Washington, GPO, March 4994. 54. See Thble 1 in ACSZA, World Military Expenditzrres nud Arfrrs Tra~sfers,3991, 1992, Washington, GPO, March 1994, various editions. 55, The author is deeply inddted to Arnatzia Baram for his help in drafting this section. Also see Michael Eisenstadt, "The Iraqi Armed Forces Two Years Ont'' lane$ In tetlige~lceR c ~ z T ~March ~ w , 1993, pp. 424-127 and Like R Pizoerzix from flze Aslzes, pp. 10-1 3; Judith Miller and taurie Mytroie, Saddam Hzrsseir-z and the Crisis itz ljlze G u s New York, Random House, pp. 48-50; Samir al-UaEil, Republic of Fenr, New York, Pantheon, 1990, pp. 14-16, 30-31,36-39,133,143-145; Adel Dawish and Gregory Afexandel; Unlroly Brablon, London, Victor Goilfanez, 4991, pp. 139-140,219-226 257-260. 56. AI-Shnrq nl-Azusaf, July 4,1996, p. 4. 57. The Times! July 4, 1996, p- 25. 58. fane's Llqense Weekly, October '7, 1995. 59. For extemive details on civil-military relations see May Chartc~uni-Dubarrr, "The Development of Internal Politics in Iraq from 1958 to the Present Day," in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow and Thornas Koszinowski (eds.), Irerq: Power and Society, Reading, lthaca Press, 2993, pp. 19-36; May Cha&ouni-Dubaq "La "uestion irakieme\c>u 1"istoire dd"unepuissance contrariee," in Bassrna Kodmak-Dawish and May Chartouni-Dubarr (eds.), Perceptions de securite ef stmtegies nntionales nu Moyen-Orient, Paris: Masso)n, 1994, pp. 5740;Shahram Ghubin and CharXcsfi Eipy, Irnn alzd 1raq At Nr, Boulder, Westvim Press, 1988, pp. 114-120. 60. For more extensive background of military pc~liticsin Iraqi political life we AXi Tahrr, [yak: Aux Origines dzt r q i ~ ~ milit@iue, ze Paris: Albin Michef, 1989; Hamid

al-Shawi, "CInterventic>ndes militajres dans ta vie politique de Ia Syrie, de IfTrak et de la fordanie," Politiq~ieE f r n ~ ~ rno. e , 3,11974, pp. 343-374, 61. E;or fu&her details see Al Wasat, June 26,1995, p. 24. 62. The Guardi~~~z, November 26, 4972, p. 15. 63. Khalid Al-Ani, Tke Elzcyelopdi~zof Modern Iraq, vol. 111, Baghdad: Tke Arnb Enqcfopedin House, n. d., pp. 51&519. Post, April 15,1992, p. A-32, July 3, p. A-1, July 4, 1992, p. A-14, 64. Wasf?i?~gtnn July 10,1992, g. A-14; N ~ z uYork Tinfes,July 4,1992, p. A-4, July 6,1992, p. A-&,July 7; 1992, p. A-3, July 40, 4992, p, A-3. 65. The Sunday Tinges, April 18,1993, g. 19; discussions with Amatzia Baram. 66. Washiltgtu~th s l , October 4,1992, p. A-35. 67. Many of the details in this analysis are based on discussions with Amatzia Baram, 68. Baltimore Sun, April 15, 1993, p. 6A; Wasl?i~zgtonE~zes,April 27, 1993, p. A-2, 69. Al-H~ynt,April 16 1996, p. 5, excerpts of the intezlsiew are also in F131S-NES, April 18,1996, pp. 21-26. 70. Quo>ted in FBIS-NES, April 18, 1996, p. 24. Also see lane's Defense Weekly, March 27,1996, p, 4. 71. WsTtl'r-zgCnnErnes, November 22, 1995, p. A-12; United Press, February 1, lli396,0932. 72. On Tali' al-Buri see the exhawfive work on the Iraqi armed forces by Syrtil q u m f al-mzlsa/lrzlzal-iraqiyah ian Staff Colonel Ahmed Zaydi, Al bil?le;rkaffr~a'n~nrui (The Development of the Fighting Spirit of the Iraqi Army), Beirut: Dar al-Rawdah, 1990, pp. 336-341. 73. Al-Hayah, July 12,1996, pp. 1,6. 'I"$. USCENTCOM map, supplied June 1996.

Chapter 5 75, Hama Batatu, Tke Old Socinl Classes cdud the Ret7oluti;oua~y Movelrzents of Iraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 13. 76, t-fama Batatu, Tke Old Social Classes cdud fl~eRet~oluti;0ua?y Move~elrzenfsofIraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978 p. 17. 77. For more analysis see the classic study of the evolution of the Iraqi polity by Hanna Batatu, TIze Old Social Classes and the Rezlolzrfiona~yMoz?emcnlsI?J: Iraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. 78. For extensive details of the socioeconomic evolutio>nand changing nature of Iraq under the monarchy see Phebe Marr, The Mudenz kll'sfory of Irl~q,Boulder: Westview 13ress, 1985, esp. pp. 127-147. 7 9 , For detailed descriptions of the evcjlution of Iraqi political history we Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes, and Phebe Marr, Tke Modem Hktoq $Iraq, 80. Saddarn" rationale was that he did so after having quashed a '"conspiracy" masterminded by Syria. 81. For more details see Ahrned Hashim, "Iraq and PostKold War Order," in M, E, Ahrari and Jarnes H. Noyes, The Persi~rzG u y After ttic Cotd War, WesQort, CE Praeger Publishers, 1993, pp. 99-124.

82. CIA, World ILizetbnok, 1995, ''Iraqa'' 83. The oppc~sititic~n's first collective platfc3rm is detailed in Fctreign Broadcasting and information Service, Daily Report: Near East and Suzlttllt Asia, January 2, lli341, pp. 34-33. 84. Middle East Irtter~zatlitnnl,March 22, 1992, pp. 11-2 2, 85. lnfernafionafHemld Tribztne, F e b r u a ~28, 2882, p.1; Middle East Ece;tnontk Digest, March 6, 1991, p. 14. 86. "brak: cherche opposi tlon desesperement," Ambies, no. 72, December 1992, pp. 6-7. 87. Middle East ln!nlter;r.mtionnl,November 6,1992, p. 4. 88. "Opposition in disarray" The Middle Easf, December 1994, pp. 9-40. 89. The Glaardian, July 1, 1995, p. $4, 90. Karen Dabmwska, "The Iraqi opposition: falling apart?" Middle Ensf Infernntimznl, Qct&er 21, 1994, pp. 19-20. 91. Quc>t,tedin FBJS-NES, March 2,1993, p.26. 92. Ecctno~rtl'sfIntelli'qenee Unit, Iraq Country Report no. 4,1995, pp. 12-12. 93. FBI$-NES, December 12,1995, pp. 33-34. 94. Middle East Intenzalioiinl, December 4, 1995, pp. 44-42. 95. FCWKing Hussein" s p e e d see FBIS-NES, August 24,1995, pp. 4 3 4 6 96. Mcwt of this section is summarized from the Mz"ddlc Ensf Cunlemporary Stirzrey, variom years b e w e m 1976 and 1988. See also Fdmund Ghareczkr, Marion Farouk-SLuglett and Peter Stuglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revalzctiorz fa Dicfntorsfzip, London: Routledge, 1987, pp. 364-1 (47. 97. Based on US State Department, Countr)r Chapters on Human Right-Iraq, Internet edi"rion, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Intematic~nat,Report 1994 and other material. 98. Based on US State Depadment, Country Cl~apterson Human Kghts-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26, lli395, and March 46,1996, and Amnesty hternational, Report 2994 and other material. 99. Based on US State Depadment, Country Chapters on Human Kghts-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26, 1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesv International, Repout. 1998and other material. 100. Based on US State Department, Country Chapters on Human RightsIraq, Interwt edition, US State Department an-line data base, accessed August 26, 1995 and March 16,1996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other material. 101. Washi~zcptonPost, January 24, 1991, p. A18, 402, Was!zinglurz Post, January 24, 1991, p. A18. 103. See Vahe Petrossian, "Iraq: T'he Kurdish Reaction to the Gulf Crisis," Middk East Ece;tnontk Digcsl, November 30, 1990, p. 13. 104, Le Monde, April 6, 1991, p. 4; 105. Clzristi~nSeknce Monital; May 6, 1991, p. 2. 406. Christian Scietz(17eMonitor, May 6, lli391, p. 3, cmtains an excellent analysis of why the rebellion failed as seen frc3m the perspective of the Kurds themsetves.

107. SFti9ter; and Iraqi deserters fled into the Huwaizah Marshes which begin sc~uthof Amara between the Tigris and the border with Iran, and the other marsh areas along the Euphrates east of Nasirya, and exttfnd d m n past the junction of the two rivers to Basra. NPWYork Times, March 15,1991, p. 1, 108. A maximum of 400,000 moved into Turkey and 300,000 moved near to the border, 800,000 mc>vedinto Iran and 1700,800mc>vednear to the border. These estimates are high, and the true number may have only been 50%A6% as large. 109. Xlarzani in Al-Hayat, qucrted in Mideast Mirror, F e b r u a ~24, 1992, p. 21. 440. Baxd an US State Department, Country Cl~apterson H u m n iil-ight-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access& August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty IntemationaI, &port 1994 and other mterial, 111, Based on US State Department, County Chapters on Human Rights-Iraq, Intetnet editictrt, US State DeparZment on-line data base, aceessed August 26,495, and March 16,1996, and Amesty International, Report l994 and other material. 112. Based on US State Department, Country Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a q , Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Internatic~naf,Report 1994 and other material. 413, Middle East In tenzatiotzat, January 20,195, p. 5. 114. Al-Haynt, August 2% 1995, p. 6. 445. Basd an US State Department, Country Chapters on Human iil-ight-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty International, &port 1994 and other mterial, 116. Washirzgton Posf, March 31, 1995, g. A33. 11'7. Ecanomiss.l, August 23,1991, g. 36; Cziadian, January 14,19132, p. 8; New Vollk Ti"~~res, October 9, 1991, p. A-6, Octcriber 20, 3992, p. A-2; October 27, 1991, p, A-3, August 12, 1992, g. A-l; BnZtimore Sun, January 16, 1992, p. 7A, 0ctc)ber 28, 1991, p. A-2; Waslzington Pusf, October 12,1994, p. A-20, Qctclber 26, 4991, p. A-15, May 19,1992, p. A-1 2, May 21,19532, p. A-44, May 23,1992, p. A-20. For a discussion of sc~meof the history and activities involved, see Ofra Bengio, ""Efagl-tdad Between Sh'ia and Kurds,'Tolicy FOCUS, NO. 18, Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1992; Eirkisjr Times, June 15, 1992, p. 1; Christinrt Science Monit.06 June 10,19992, p. 1. 118. Based on US State Department, Country Chapters on Human Right-Iraq Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Intematic~naX,Report 1994 and other material. 449, Basd an US State Department, Country Chapters on Human Kght-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access& August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty IntemationaI, &port 1994 and other mterial, 120, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Country Chapters on H m a n Rights-Iraq, Intetnet editim, US State Depa&ment on-line data base, aceessed August 26,495, and March 16,1996, and Amesty International, Report 3994 and other material. 121. Based on U5 State Depart.mentfCount17Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a q , Internet edition, US State Department on-tine data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Internatic~nat,Report 1994 and other material. 422, Saeed Barzin, "Iran" cautious response," Middle East Inlenzatiotzat, %pternber 6,1996, p. 6.

Notes

369

123. Reuters, September 11,1996; Washington Post, September 8,1996, pp. Al, A28. 124. Peter Feuillherade, "Iraq agrees oil for food deal with UN," The Middle East, July-August, 1996, pp. 9-10. 125. Reuters, September 11,1996. 126. Reuters, September 11,1996. 127. Reuters, September 13,1996. 128. Middle East Economic Survey, September 9,1996, pp. Cl-C2. 129. Middle East Economic Survey, September 9,1996, p. Cl. 130. Middle East Economic Survey, September 9,1996, p. C2. 131. Middle East Economic Survey, September 9, 1996, p. C2. 132. Middle East Economic Survey, September 9,1996, p. C3. 133. Middle East Economic Survey, September 9,1996, p. C3. 134. Reuters, September 13,1996. 135. Retiters, September 16,1996. 136. CIA, World Factbook, 1992, p. 162. 137. For more on the activities of the militant Shi'ite groups see Antoine Jalkh, "L'Opposition Irakienne dans tous ses etats," Arabies, no. 51, March 1991, pp. 16-21. 138. This description of the Shi'ite rebellion relied on Antoine Jalkh, "L'Opposition irakienne dans tous les etats," Arabies, no. 51, March 1991, pp. 16-21; Phebe Marr, "Iraq's Future: Plus ca change . . .or something better," mimeo.; Pierre Martin, "Les chiites d'Irak de retour sur la scene politique," Maghre-Machrek, no. 132 April-June 1991; and Iraq, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, nos. 1-4, 1991. 139. Shi'ites and Iraqi deserters fled into the Huwaizah Marshes which begin south of Amara between the Tigris and the border with Iran, and the other marsh areas along the Euphrates east of Nasirya, and extend down past the junction of the two rivers to Basra. New York Times, March 15,1991, p. 1. 140. New Ymk Times, March 15,1991, p. 1. 141. New York Times, March 15,1991, p. 1. 142. Based on US State Department, Country Chapters on Human Rights-Iraq, Intemet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty International, Repwt 1994 and other material. 143. Based on US State Department, Country Chapters on Human Rights-Iraq, Intemet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty Intemational, Report 1994 and other material. 144. Anti-Ba'ath groups claimed up to 10,000 armed rebels and 100,000 civilians were present in the marshes but these estimates seem sharply exaggerated. Washington Post, April 30, 1992, p. A-37, July 2, 1992, p. A-32, July 24, 1992, p. A-32, August 12,1992, p. A-23, August 17, p. A-l; New York Times, August 12,1992, p. A6; Washington Times, August 9,1992, p. A-10; Economist, August 8,1992, p. 36; lane's Defense Weekly, June 6,1992, p. 967; US News and World Report, May 25,1992, p. 53. 145. Washington Post, September 7,1992, p. A-19, November 21,1992, pp. A-16 and A-21, June 29, 1993, p. A-14, July 24, 1993, p. A-18, Odober 18, 1993, p. A-l; Baltimore Sun, December 8,1992, p. 4A; Philadelphia Inquirer, November 21,1992,

p. A-2; New Yol'kr Tin~es, June 26, 19132, A-19, August 19, 1992, p. A-1, August 27, 1992, p. A-14, October 19,1992, p, A-46; Los RngcIes Ernes, August 44,1992, p. A1, August 19, 1992, p. A-2; Washirzgton Times, September 6, 1992, p. A-10, September 12, 1992, p. A-7, March 4, 1993, p. A-2, March 2, 1993, p. A-2; PfziladclpJzi~ X~zquirer,October 19, 1992, p. 1. The XISS, XbliEz'faqj Balalzce, 2993-1994, p-117. 146. USCENTCOM mnap, June 1996. 147, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Cumtry Chapters on H m a n Rights-Iraq, Internet editjon, US State Department on-line data base, access4 August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty IntemationaI, Report 1994 and other mterial, 148. Based on US State Depart.ment, Count17Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a c t , Intetnet editim, US State Depart.ment on-fine data base, accessed August 26,495, and March 16f1996,and Amesty International, Report 1994 and other material. 449. Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human 12i&t+Iraq, Internet edi"rm, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Intematic>nat,Report 1994 and other material. 150, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Cumtry Chapters on Human R;i$ts-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access& August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty InternationaI, Report 1994 and other mterial, 151. Based on US State Depart.ment, Count17Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a c t , Intetnet editim, US State Depart.ment on-line data base, accessed August 26,495, and March 16f1996,and Amesty International, Report 1994 and other material. 452, Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human 12i&t+Iraq, Internet edi"rm, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Intematic>nat,Report 2994 and other material. 153, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Cumtry Chapters on H m a n R;i$ts-Iraq, Internet &ition, US State Department on-line data base, access4 August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty InternationaI, Report 1994 and other mterial, 154. CIA, Wcjrld Factbook, 1995, ""lraq.""

455. Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human iil-ight-lraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty International, &port 1994 and other mterial, 156, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Country Chapters on H m a n Rights-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access4 August 26,1995, and March 16' 1996, and Amesty International, Report 1994 and other material. 157. Based on US State Depart.mentfCount17Chapters on Human Riglnts-Iraq Intetnet editim, US State Depart.ment on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Internatic>nal,Report 1994 and other material. 458, Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human Kght-lraq, Internet edigion, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty International, &port 1994 and other mterial, 159, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Country Chapters on H m a n Rights-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access4 August 26,1995, and March 16' 1996, and Amesty International, Report 1994 and other material.

160. Based on US State Depart.mentl Count17Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a c t , Intetnet editim, US State Depart.ment on-fine data base, aceessed August 26,495, and March 16f1996,and Amesty International, Report l994 and other material. 461. Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human 12i&t+Iraq, Internet edi"rm, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Intematio>nat,Report 1994 and other material. 162, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Corntry Chapters on Human R;i$ts-Iraq, Internet &ition, US State Department on-line data base, access& August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other mterial, 163. Based on US State Depart.mentl Count17Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a c t , Intetnet editim, US State Depart.ment on-line data base, aceessed August 26,495, and March 16f1996,and Amesty International, Report l994 and other material. 464. Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human 12i&t+Iraq, Internet edi"rm, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty Intematio>nat,Report 2994 and other material. 165, Based on US State Departmrtnt, Corntry Chapters on H m a n R;i$ts-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access4 August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other mterial, 16%. Based on US State Depart.mentl Count17Chapters on Human R i g h t ~ l r a c t , Intetnet editim, US State Depart.ment on-line data base, aceessed August 26,495, and March 16f1996,and Amesty International, Report l994 and other material. 467. Based an US State Department, Comti-y Chapters on Human 12i&t+Iraq, Internet edi"rm, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26,1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty Intematio>nat,Report 1994 and other material. 168. Based on US State Departmrtnt, Corntry Chapters on H w a n Rights-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, access& August 26,1995, and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other mterial, 169. Based on US State Depa~ment,Country Chapters on Human Right-Iraq, Intermt editim, US State Department on-line data base, accaseb August 2fit 1995, and March 16,1996, and Amnesty Xnl.ernal.iional,Report 1994 and other material.

Chapter 7 470. IMF International Financial Statistics, and International Energy Agency, Middle Enst Oil and Gas, Paris, IEAIOECD, 1995, p. 247. 171. IMF International Financial Statistics, and International Energy Agencl~~; Middle Enst Oil n ~ Gas, d Paris, IEA/OECD, 1995, p. 247. These statistics portray a sharper drop than the US gojvernment estimates provided by ACDA in WorM Militarp Expenditures and Arms Pat~sfirs,19962995, Washingtom, GPO, 1996, Table I, 172. CIA on-line Internet country data base, ""Eraq." Accessed January 31,1996. 473. IMF international Financial Statistics, and International Energy Agency, Middle East Oil nnd Gas, Paris, IEA/OECD, 1995, p. 247. 47'4. See "Gulf Ecc~namiesV111: Iraq," GuqStnfcrs Ne~ustefkel;vol. 49, no. 498, Qctclber 31,1994, p. 8; Thierry Brm, "%W fa tutelle de la Eairn," Le Monde Diplo~rzfitiqzde, December 1991, p. 14; Elizabeth Picard, "Le regime Irakien et fa crise: Les resl;ort.s d ' m e politique,'" MagIlreb-Macjt~k,no. 130; October-Deember 1990, p. 25,

175. IMF Internationa FinanciaX Statistics, and International Energy Agencl~~; Middle East Qil and Gas, Paris, IEA/OECD, 4995, pp. 2555-257. 176, See Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Iraq: n country study, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Cr~ngress,196 pp. 145-146; Makram Sader, "Le developernent industriel Be 17rak,'WngItreb-ZbSacItrek, no. 92, April-June 1981, pp. 25-30; Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq: Country Frofile, 29961995, pp. 25-26. 177. See John Tawmend, "Industrial Develvrnent and the Decision-Making Process," in Tim Niblock fed.), Tmq: The Gonlenzpomry State, Idondon: Groom Helm, 1982, p.258. 178. Makrarn Sader, "Le developernent industriel de ITrak," pp.34-37. 479, ' j o h Townsend, "Industrial Development and the Decision-Making ProIraq: Thf Contempmry State, London: Croom Helm, cess," in Tim Niblock (d.), 191132, pp. 257-258. 180. Arab Ba%ath Svcialist Party, Tke Centml Report of the Ninth Regional Cc~frgrcrss, June 1982, Baghdad, 1983, p. 124. 181. Arab Ba%ath Svcialist Party, Tke Centml Report of the Ninth Regional Cc~frgrcrss, June 1982, Baghdad, 1983, p. 124. 482. Arab Ba%th Socialist Party The Central Report oft!tc NinCti Regz'orzal Congrcrss, June 1982, Baghdad, 1983, p. 124. 483. Arab Ba%th Socialist Party The Central Report oft!tc NinCti Regz'orzal Congrcrss, J m e 1982, Baghdad, 1983, p. 2 24, 484, Arab Bakth Socialist Party The Central Report oft!tc NinCti Regz'orzal Congrcrss, J m e 1982, Baghdad, 2 983, pp- 2 25-126, 185. Jonatl3an Grusoe, "Ambitious plans for Iraqi industry" Middle Ensf Economic Digest, March 31, 2989, pp. 2-3, 186. Jonathan Cmsoe, Iraq: MEEL) Profile, Fdruary 1989, p. 44. 487. Cited in Jonathan Crusoe, Iraq: MEED Profife, February 1989, p. 45. 188. Yezici Sayigh, Arab M i l i t ~ ~Tndwsdty: y GapnbiEif, Fef-ar~~ance, and Ipnpact, London: Brassey%#1W2, p, 403, 189. For more detail on Iraq's military industries see the various chapters on the military of this book; and the fc3llauving saurces: Vezid Sayigh, Arab Military I~zdustry,pp. 203-1 30; Jonathan Crusoe, Iraq: MEED ProFke, February 1989, p. 47; George Willis, "Open Sesame: Baghdad shcw reveals Iraqi military-industrial capabititiies," hternntional Defence Reviezo, no, 6, 1989. 190. Los Angeles Ernes, January 28,1992, p. 6-1. 494. World Bank estimates, Wc3rld Resources Institute, and Middle East Economic Digest, January 26,1996, p. 7. 492. Cited in ALan Echards and John Watel-bui-y,A Poll'liuI Ect~nornyofthe Middk East: State, Class, and Economic Dareloyrmnt, Boulder: Weswiew Press, 1990, p. 147, 493. This sectic~non the evolution of Iraqi agricultuw relies an, Helm Chapin Metz (ect.), Iraq: a cozintq study, Federal Research B-ivision, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1990, pp. 153-162; Jonathan Grusoe, Iraq, M i d l c East Econontk Digest Profile, February 1989, pp. 54-64; Phebe Marr, The Modern History I?( Iraq, Boulder: Westview, 1985, pp. 131-1 32; Tariq 3'. Isrnael and Jacquetine S. Tsmaef, "Iraq" Interrupted Revolutic)n," Cumnt Hislurp, January 1985, pp. 30-31; ALan Richards and John Watehury; A Polilicnl Eeononty c$ the Middle East, pp. 151-1 52. 494. Phebe Marr, T!ze Moderr2 FIl'stoiy of lmq, pp. 131-132.

Notes

373

195. Quo~tedin Jonathan Crusc)e, ""Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter; Phase Two?" in inrederick Axelgard (ed.), lmq In Transitiorl: R Political, Ecorzumic, and S tm tegic Persjlective, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Boulder: Westview Press, lli386, p. 44. 196, IMF In terrzatr'onnl Fz'na~crialStafistics, and Internatianal Energy Agency, Middle East Qil and Gas, Paris, lEA/OECD, 1995, p. 247. 197. CIA, World Fncfhook, 2991, pp. 148-149. 198.Arab Ba%thSc~ciatistPady The Cefzlml Report of Cite Nirzflz Regional Congress, June 4992, Baghdad, 1983, pp. 128-135. 199.Arab Ba%thS3cialist Pady Tlze Cefzlrnl Report of Cite Nirz flz Regional Congress, June 4992, Baghdad, 1983, pp. 128-135. 200, For extensive analyses of Iraq war and home front strategies see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Imn and lmq Rt War, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 108-122; Arab Ba%th Socialist IX,arty,Tfze Centml Report of the Ninth Regi011nl Corzgress, June 1982, Baghdad 1983, for an lraqi assessment; Jonathan Crusc~, "Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two?" Eederisk Axelgard (ed,), Iraq hz Trgnsifitjn: A hl'itical, Economic, alzd S1rnfegl;c Perspecfive, Boulder: Westview Press, 44986, pp. 33-58. 201. Heten Chapin Metz fed.), Tmq:A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 123, 202. The estimates in this Chart are little more than rough indicators of the scale of Iraq" problems. No one outside the Bahth regime has a clear picture of: The exact extent of Iraq's debt, the b r e a k d m of the amount Iraq owed to its various creditc~rs,the ratios between civil and military debt, and the breakd m of loans authorized but never disbursed from Xoans authorized and disbursed. Most of the figures pro>vided in the fc3flowing analysis fc~rthe debt up to the period 1990 and cited by numerous other sources have come from international financial and economic institutions: the BECD states, the Bank of International Settlements, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the International Monetary Fund. 203. For example, see Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), h q : A cuza~fqStlidy, 424, yeZ two pages later she mentions that the total debt was beween $50 billion and $80 billion; Jonathan Crusc~,Iraq: M E E B Profile, February 1989, p. 13; Fipannciaf Et?rt>s, October 10,1989, p. 4. 204. Phebe Mitrr, "Iraq in the 1990s: Grcywth Dependent on Oil Revenues, Debt, Spending PzrioritiesIp%iddle Enst. Execzrfive Reports, June 1390, pp. 11-15. 205. Fifznncinl Times, Bctc>ber10, 1989, p. 4. 206. FBIS-NES, August 24,1995, p, 35. 207. The obsessive ssereccy of the Ba%thist regime concerning economic statistics and e c m m i c indicators has been remarked upon by a nurnber of analysts who study Iraq's political economy, e.g., see Benoit Paris&, ""L situation economique et financiere cle I7rak a X a mi-1990," p 336; John Tc)wnsend, ""lddustrial Development and the Becision-Making Process," where he says: ""Any serious study of contemporary Iraq is hampered by the lack of info~rmation,and particularly statistical information, on all aspects of ecmomic development. Much official pubtished material tends to be more of a public relations exercise than an 2"i". attempt to give precise facts,'".

208. For a similar assessment see The Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq Country Rliprt NO. 2,1991, p. 15, 209. "Report of the United Nations Missian To Asxss Humanitarian Needs in Iraq, March 10-44, 1991, led by MarZti Ahtisaari, Under-Scretary-General for Administration and Management, excerpts in Middle East Report, May-June 1991, p. 12. 210, For surveys of postxulf War recontitruction see the extensive analyxs in, izzfer-alia, Sztndny Times (Lc~ndon),October 4, 1992, p. 6; Middle Easl Irzletnntisnnl, May 45, pp. 8-44;Le M1?12de,August 2 4 1994, p. 1, 16; Washington Post, Nctvernber 8, 1992, g. A-41;Itzternntlional Her~ldTribrine, January 25, 2993, p. 1,4. 211. A description of the situation in the muth can be form8 in Tlte Gzlnrdia~t, February 6,1993, p. 4. 212, Ecrtnomist Intellgence Unit, lrerq, no. 2,1992, p, 14. 213, Le ILlonde, February 4,1993, p. 4. 214. Arner al-Roubaje and Wajeeh EIati, "The Finandal Implications of Economic Sanctions Against Tray," Arab St-Eldies Quarterly, vol. 27,no. 3, Summer 1995, p. 58. 215. These figures are cited by Dr. Fadhil Chalabi, "Iraq's Oil: The Ecctnnmic and Political Constraints," " i d l e East Econontic Szrrvey, April 17,1995, g. D7. 216, Reuters, February 1,1996,2057* 217, Once again hard statistical evidence is difficult to come by, The analysis that follaws is ovemhelmingly based on the first-fiand experiences and t~bseivations of journalists, analysts and aid officials that have visited Iraq over the past five years and which is to be fc~undin the fc,llowing sources: Le Munde, F e b r u a ~ 4, 1993, p. 4; Middle East I~ztemntimznl,Fctbruary 5, 1993; Tirrres (tondm), October 23, 1994, p. 5; lntetnlrfionnl Hemld Tribune, Octc,ber 26, 1994, g. 1, 6; Le Monde, Ncjvember 11, 1994, p. 1, 5; Bnslorz Globe, July 23,1995, p. 1; Rcyddy Scott, Miriarn Shahin and Kirk Albrecht, ""Saddarn" Fate in the balance?" Vtt7 Middl~Ensl, October 1W5, pp. 5-41. 218. Firtancl'nl Ti~nes,Spternber 11, 1995, p. 4, 219. Til~~es (London), October 23, 1994#p. I;, 220. AI Hayat, July 9, 1995, p. 10, 221. Cited in Arner al-Roubaie and Wajeeh Elali, ""7-he Financial Implications of Economic Sanctions Against Iraq," Arab Studi?s Quarterly, vol. 17, no, 3, 1995, p. 63. 222. Le itl~~l'rde, February 4,1993, p. 4. 223. Midle East Economic Digest, January 12, 1996, p. 11 224. Was!zr'ngfurzErnes, January 25,1996, p, A-11, 225. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq Cazlntq Report No.3,2992, pp. 18-19, 226, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Imq County Report No. 2, 1993, p. 18. 227. 13eter Feuilrehade, ""lraq: Privatization in desperation," The Middle East, Nctvernber 1993, p. 27" 228. Firzalreial T*il.rzes,May 6, 1993, p. 4. 229. Le Monde, February 4,1993, p. 4. 230. Nezv firk Ernes, December 1, 1995, p. A-9; Was/ritzgtnr2 Elnes, October 24, 1995, p. A-l . -.

231. Wnstzir-zgtonTi~nes,October 24,1995, p. A-1 . 232. Wnll Street. I~Turr-zal,February 5, 4996, p. C-l. 233. Reutess, January 22,2996. 234. Middle East Etjonornic Survq, October 24, 1992, p, A-10. 235. Firzaneinl Ti"?nes,Sptember 13, 1996, p. 4, 236. lnternnfiotfal Hernld Tribunez February 16, 1995, p. 1. 237, Le Motlde, November 11,1994, p. 4. 238. For extensive analyses of the so>cialills besetting Iraq see 61tristian Science Morzilol; October 30, 4995, p. 1; Le Morzde, 11 October 4994, November 7; 1 9 5 , p. 5; International Herald Tribzinc, July 25, 1994, p. 1 , 5, 239. On the rise of crime and the breakdown of sclcial discipline in a country that was once lauded as the "Prussia of the Middle East'" see the extensive analysis in Szirjdny Tijrtm, January 34, 1993, p. 5, 240. Andrew North, "Iraq: In a state of limbo," The Middle East, April 2 993, pp. 14--15;Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq, no. 3, 1994, p. 19, 241. FEIS-NES, September 26,1995, pp. 32-33. 242. Le Mo~zde,October 11, 1994. 243. Figures are cited in Middle East Intenzatiorzal, May 15,1992, p. 9. 244. Middle East Inlernat-ional, April 2, 1993, pp. 9-10. 245. Cited in Peter Feuiilrehade, "Iraq: Privatization in desperatian,"Tlje Middle East, Xti'c~vembctr1993, p. 27, 246. Reuters, January 13,19134; AP Worldstream, January 8,1994. 247, A summary of these views are contained in a journal that is hardly sympathetic to the Saddarn Hussein regime, see ""lraq: Down but- not out," The Economist, April 8, 1995, pp- 21-23, 248. Wastzirzgton Post, February 11, 1995, p. A-20. 243. Figures are cited in Ghristia~zScie~ceMonitol; October 30, 4995, p. 4. 258. Cltrisli~nScience Monital; June 28, 1995, p. 10. 254. Fergus McLeod, ""Efabylon By Bus: A Personal Glimpse Inside Saddarn Husseirn" Iraq," NatWest VVashingtan Analysis, March 23,1995, p. 2 . 252. Was/zingtor?Posf.,July 26, 1993, p. A-l, A-14. 253. Christi~rrScience Monitor, October 30, 2 995, p. 1, 254. Quoted in Le Mondez Nc~vernber'7,1995, p. 5. 255. See Le Molzde, Novtzmber 7, 2995, p. 5; Ame-Marie Johnson, ""Iraq: Life under sanctions," Middle East Infernnfiotfal,October 22, 1993, pp. 2Q--2. 256, See the comments of Tariq Aziz in FBI$-ME$, January 24,1992, p. 36. 257. Cited in Middle Enst Iniernafional, May 15,1992, p. 9. 258. Middk East Economic Survq, January 23, 4995, p. A-4. 259, Middk Ensf Econolrtic Szrrvq, January (4,1992, pp-AI--M, 260. Middle East Economic Survq, November 11,1991, p. A-6, 261. Quoted in Middle Easf Economic Szirzfey,December 9,1991, p. A-2. 262. FBIS-NES, October 3,1991, pp. 13-14. 263. Middle East Econolrtic Szrrvq, April 24, 1995, pp. AI-A2. 264. ""Traq says it wants to negotiate with UN on humanitarian oil salesf'' Energy Wire, NatWest %curities, January 16, 1996; Wall Street Joul-nal, May 23, 1996, p. A-11.

376

Notes

265. Boston Globe, February 4,1996, p. 6. 266. Quoted in Walid Khadduri, "MEES Interview with Iraqi Oil Minister," Middle East Economic Survey, November 27,1995, p. D-4. 267. Quoted in Walid Khadduri, "MEES Interview with Iraqi Oil Minister," Middle East Economic Survey, November 27,1995, p. D-4. 268. Middle East Economic Survey, November 27,1995, p. D-4. 269. See Middle East Economic Survey, November 20,1995, p. A-4. 270. Middle East Economic Survey, January 15,1996, p. A-5; Washington Times, February 8,1996, p. A-13. 271. ACDA print out of May 14,1996, and discussions with US experts. 272. Reuters, January 2,1996. 273. Cited in Middle East Economic Survey, January 8,1996, p. A-8. 274. Cited in Middle East Economic Survey, January 8, 1996, p. A-8.; Also see Reuters, January 22,1996. 275. Reuters, January 1,1996. 276. New York Times, February 6, 1996, p. Ad, February 7,1996, p. A-9; Washington Post, February 7, 1996, p. A-16; Boston Globe, February 7, 1996, p. 9; Wall Street Journal, February 5,1996, p. C-l 277. Quoted in Middle East Economic Survey, January 22,1996, p. A-2; Reuters, January 18,1996,0305. 278. Washington Post, February 20,1996, p. A3. 279. Middle East Economic Survey, March 25,1996, pp. A2-A3. 280. See Robert Copaken, "Iraq's Return to the Oil Market: Timing and rationale," Geopolitics of Energy, Issue 18, no. 3, March 1996, pp. 5-6; Washington Post, February 20,1996, p. A3. 281. For more details see Middle East Economic Survey, March 25, 1996, pp. A4-A5; Washington Post, March 12,1996, p. A9; Washington Times, March 12,1996, p. A13; Middle East International, March IS, 1996, pp. 11-12. 282. Middle East Economic Survey, March 4,1996, pp. AI-A2. 283. Quoted in FBIS-NES, March 13,1996, p. 43. 284. Reuters, April 4, 1996 285. Baltimore Sun, May 21,1996, p. l-A; Los Angeles Times, May 24,1996, p. A-l; Philadelphia Inquirer, May 25, 1996, p. C-7; Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1996, p. A-3, May 28,1996, p. A-12; Washington Times, May 21,1996, p. A-l, May 27,19%, p. A-13. 286. Middle East Economic Survey, April 29,1996, pp. AI-A4. 287. Le Monde, May 22,1996, p. 2. 288. Cited in Reuters, July 10,1995. 289. Quoted in Middle East Economic Survey, August 5,1991, p. A-5. 290. Cited in FBIS-NES, January 24,1992, p. 36. 291. Boston Globe, July 23,1995, p. 1. 292. Le Monde, November 12,1994, p. 3. 293. Quoted in Middle East International, February 5, 1993, p. 10; see also Times (London), October 23,1994, p. 294. Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1996, p. A-11. 295. For the whole report see Middle East Economic Survey, May 13,1991, pp. D 6 to D-9.

Notes

377

296. Chalabi, April 17, 1995. 297. Middle East Econornic Survq, May 13,1991, pp. D-G tcr D-9. 298. World Bank, Wol.ld Populatiolz Pro;jections, 39942995, Washington, WrXd Bank, 1994; Middle East Ecanumic Digest, July 28, 1995, p. 44; CIA World hctbaok, 3995, "Iraq.'"

Chapter 8 299. Oil and Cos foz-lrrzal,September 23, 1992, p. 62, 300. PetroXeum Economist, Petrofeum Finance Company and Cc>ngressional Quarterly, Tke Mi;ddle East, 7th Edition, Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1990, p. 195. 304, International Energy Agency, 02'1, Gas, alzd Cr2al Supply Outto&, Paris, IEA, 1995, pp. 55-57.. 302. Oil tk~dGas joul-rzal, December 30,4991, pp. 43-49; Other estimates indicate that Iran has 100 billion barrels of proven reserves and 45 billion barrels of probable reserves. See J o ~ p P.h Kva, Jr. of the Congressional Research Service, writing in the Oil and Gas Journnl, Spternhes 23,1991, p. 62. 303. Internatic~nalEnergy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gas, Paris, IEA/OECD, 1995, pp. 137-138. 304. Qil and Gas journal, December 30, 1991, pp. 43-49. 305. Frrr a typical industry estimate, see NatWest Securities SCrrattjgic Assmsmeni: Major Qils; Ideniz&ir-zg Valuefitjnt a Global Pe~spectlive,London, NatWest Securities (Mobil, Total, Shell and BP), 4995, p. 60, 306. Department of Energy, E n e r g Infommatian Agency, bz temn timznl Ertergy Outtook 1995, Washington, Energy Information Agency, June 1995, pp. 27-29. 307. Intematianal Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil arzd Gas, Paris, IEA/ BECD, 1995, pp. 137-1 38. 308, International Energy Agency QXEA), Middle East QiI alzd Gas, Paris, IEA/ BECD, 1995, pp. 137-138. Energ;! 309. Department of Energy, Energy InEc>rmationAgency, Inl.e~*rzatiorze;tl Ouflt?ok1995, Washington, Energy Informatic~nAgency June, 1995, pp, 36-43? Oil and Gas, Vol. 92, No. 52, December 25, 1994, pp. 4243. 310, InternatianaI Energy Agency QXEA), Middle East QiI alzd Gas, Paris, IEA/ OECD, 1995, pp. 137-138. 321. International Energy Agency, Oil, Gas, and Coal Supply Ozdflook, Paris, IEA, 1995, pp. 110-111. 312, "rhis section is based on reporting by DOE/EIA and the IEA and the following works: Fadhil Chalabi, ''Iraq's CM: The Economic and PoliticaX Gonstraints," MiddEe Etksf- Ecarzomic S Z ~ ? T ? CApril ~ , 17, 1995, pp. D4-D10; Nirou Eftekhari, ""L Petrole dans I%conomieet la societe irakliennes 1958-1 986," Peuples Mcldilera~enrls,no. 40 July-Sptember 1987; pp. 43-78; Pl-tebe Marr, "Iraq In the 90s: Growth Dependat an Oil Revenues, Debt, Spending Priorities," 'idle East Execlltizw Xcpurts, June 1990, pp. 41-15; David Mangan, "Iraq" LLiely Oif Policy: A New Conservatism,'Widdle East Exeetltizre Reports, May 29239, pp. 11-16; Benoit Parisot, ""L situation economique et financiere de ITrak a la mt1990," Magl~reb-

Maci'lrek?no. 130,Bctc)ber-December 1990, pp, 36-43; Iraq: A Coztntry Sttidy, Washington, DC: USGPO, 4490, pp. 133-142. 313. International Energy Agency, Oil, Gas, n ~ Coal d Supply Outlook; Paris, IEA, lli395, pp. 25&257. 314. Internatianal Energy Agency, Oil, Gas, n ~ Coal d Supply Outlook; Paris, IEA, 1995, pp. 2.562517. 315. Reuters, January 26,1996,1534. 316. International Energy Agency (IEA), M i d l e East Oil and Gas, Paris, TEA/ OECD, 1995, pp. 151-152; Intei-naGonal Energy Agency, 02'1, Gas, alzd Coal Supply Outlt>okfParis, TEA, 1995, pp. 56-57. 317. Internatic~nalE n e r g Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gm, Paris, IEA/ OECB, 1995, pp. 141-144; International Energy Agency, Oil, Gas, n ~ C d t ~Slipply l Outlook, Paris, IEA, 4995, pp. 56-57. 318. Mrall Street jclumnl, February 7, 1996, p. A-8, Associated 13ress, February 8, 1996,1906. 319. Associated Press, February 8, 1996, 1906; International Energy Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gns, Paris, TEA/QECD, 1995, pp, 141-144; International Energy Agency, Oil, Gas, and Conl Supply Outlook, Paris, IEA, 1995, pp. 56-57. 320. Los A n ~ l e snm~cs,May 24,1996, p. A-l. 324. International E n e r g Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gm, Paris, IEA/ OECB, 1995, pp. 145-147. 322. International E n e r g Agency (IEA), Middle East Oil and Gm, Paris, IEA/ OECB, 1995, pp- 145147. 323. Tnt-ernational Energy Agency (TEA), M i d l e East Oil and Gas, Paris, TEA/ OECD, 1995, pp. 150-151, 3%. Tnt-ernatic>nalEnergy Agency (TEA), M i d l e East Oil and Gas, Paris, TEA/ OECD, 1995, pp. 150-151. 325. Middle East Econontz'c Digest, January 19, 1996, pp, 9-34; Wall SIrt7et Juzrmnl, February 5,1996, p, C-l; Piziladelphia J~ttjtiirer~ February (";, 4996, p. C-1. 326, For typical estimates, see New Yo& Tip~zes,January 25, 1996, p. A-1.

327. Washi~zcptonPost, January 17, 1995. 328. Alfred B.. Prados, "Iraq and Kww-ait: Conflicting Historical Cfalms," Congressictnal Research %rvice, 91-34F, January 14,1991, p. 4. 329. Anze~ic~n Amb Afairs, Fall 1989, p. 3;Los Angeles Timncs, December 2,1990, pp. M 4 and M-8; Theadore Craig, "Kuwait: Backpomd, Retaration, ;mcl QMestiom for the Unj;ted Stats," Cmgessional Rexarch %mice, 991-.288F,May 21,1992, p. 9, 330. Wasl-rr'ngtorzPost., December 49,1987, p. A-27. 331, Department of Defensrz, Colzduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1992, pp. 6-7. 332. Departmat of Defensrz, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1992, pp. 3-4. 333. Department, of Defense, Conduct of Ilze I"ersia~tGu!f War; Final Repcjrt to Congress, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1992, pp. W.

Notes

379

3%. Alfred B. Prados, ""Eaq and Kuw-ait: Conflicting Historical Claims," Congressictnal Research %rvice, 91-34Ft January 44,1991, p. 4, 335. FBIS NES-90-138, July 18, 1990, p. 21; Theadore Craiig! 'Kuwait: Backgrc~rand, Restoration, and Questions for the United States," Congressional Research %mice, 91-288F, May 21, 2992, p. 8; Depa&ment of Uefense, Condzkct of rlze Pe~si~l.n GztV War; Final Report to Congress, Washington, Department of Defentie, April 1992, pp. 2-10. 336. Jclfle's DDeJse Weekly, February 22, 1992, g. 21711, March 7, 1992, p. 375, August 1,1992, p. A-10, August 4, 1992, p. A-44, August 8,1992, p. 6; August 15, 1992, p. A-15; Idefensr Riews, September 9,1991, g. 1, November 18,1991, p. 3, F&rrrary 17,1992, p. 3, June 45,1992, p. 26; Stars .sand Sfriprs, March 3,4992, p, 8; London F i n n ~ c i Times, ~l Jufy 8, 1991, p- 3; Wnshi~lgtonPost, August 28, 1991, p. A-7, Sptember 6; 4991, p. A-24, August 15,1992, p. A-45; WaslzingfanTifrles, Decernber 6, 1991, p. A-2, Augutit 5,1992, p,A-l; Aviafio:an Week, September 9, 1992, p. 21* 337. The border was laid out relatively quickly by a single British agent, Major John More, and no follow-up effort was made to create a fcjrmal survey or border markings. Econontisl, February 29, 1992, p. 45; Pt~iladef~?lzia lhlquirer, February 20, l jt~urr-zat,December 5,1991, p. A-1, 1942, p. A-16; W ~ lStreet 338, Department of Defense backgrc>und briefing, Octojber 20, 1994 (Federal News Srvice); Department of Defense handouts of October 41,4994 and Octc3ber 12,1994; Jlzne's Defe~zseWeekly, October 22,2994, p. 4, Uecmber 17,1994, p. 7; US Army briefing sheet (undated) October 1994; Congressional Research Service, lrraq Crisis, A Clzrmology, October 1994,94-808F, October 24, 2 994. 339. New York Times, January 30,1996, g. A-6. 340, Defense News, April 48,1995, p. 10; Wall Street Journal, J m e 27,1995, p. A10. 344. Defcnse News, April 48,1995, p. 40; Wall Street Journal, June 27,1995, p. A10. 342, CIA, InkarI~ZFactbook, 1992, pp. 161-163. 343. US Slate Department, Country Reports on Human 13jighl.s Practices, 1994, on-line Internet edition, June 24,1995. 344. Washi~zgtrsnTimes, spternbes 14,1994, p. A-14. 345. Wnsilirzgton Pt~st,July 1, 1993, p. A-18. 346.faneS Dejc~seWeekly, September 4, 2 993, p. 27. 347. Washiqto~tPt~st,July 1, 19533, p. A-18. 348. Was/zi~zgGunErnes, October 26, 1994, p. A-12, November 7, 1994, p. A-16; New York Times, November 7,1994, p. A-6. 349. New Vclrk Ernes, February 21, 4995, p. A-9; Was/zingGur?Ti~nrs,February 22, 1995, p. A-14, May 26, 2995, p. A-18, J m e 11, 1995, p. A7, June 22, 2995, p. A-13, June 44, 4995, p. A-19. 350, United Press, July 18, 2995,0807; Washr'qton Times, July 11, 2995, p. A-15. 351. Reuters, July 31,1995,0914. 352, Reuters, August 8, 1995,0730, 353. United Press, January 30,2996,2151, 354. 13eter Feuillherade, "Keeping the hostility alive," TJle Middle East, April 1993, p. 26.

355. For more extensive details on Iraqi-Jordanian relations over the years see Amatzia Baram, "haathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: Frtm~Hostility. to Alignment," Middle Easf jozarnnf, vol. "1, no. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 51-70; Laun" Brand, Jar&nfs Inlet-Arab Relafl'ons: 77~ePt~litical Economy @ Alliance Makir-zg, New Ybrk: CoXurnbia University Press, 1994, pp. 19&241. 356. Wall Sfrrcl. Jozirnnl, March 15,1996, p. A-7. 357. Middle East Economic Digest, January 26, 1996, p. '7; World Bank data. 358. J ohn King, ""Sria and Iraq: Paving the way for closer relations," 7"ke Middk East, July-August 1996, pp. 14--15. 359. '"rabs Slam New Israd-Turkey Accords," Tlze Middle Easl",June 1996, pp. 12-1 4. 368. John Battersby, ""Erael Wins New Friends, And Isolates an Old E n e m ~ " Clzrislian Seieczce Ma-rzilo;r,April 1'7, 1996, p. 6. 361. Rezalers, August 18, 1996. 362. Atan George, "Syria and Iraq call a tactical truce," "ne's Itztelligence Review, June 1996, pp. 262-263. 363. Cited in Daniel Pjpes, "Turkey Iraq, and Mc)sul," Mid~fdrEasf Qzlalzrtetly, Sptember 19535, p. 66. 364. Quoted in Middle EnsE Econonfic Sznrvey, Octcjber '7, 1991, p. A2. Am365. Antoine Jatkh and Hachem AI-AXi, "Le Qatar rebelle et ~~ulnerable," bits, April 1995, p. 29. 366. FBIS-NES, July 6, 1995, p. 46. 367. FBIS-NES, September 11,1995, pp, 2EF-30. 368. FBIS-NES, September 21,1995, p. 33.. 369. FBIS-NES, September 21,1995, p. 33. 370. FBI$-NEA, Sptember 6,1995, g. 31. 371. JnnefsDqense Weekly, October 7; 1995, g. 4. 372. FBIS-NES, January 19, 1996, p. 25; Wall Sfreef journal, F e b r u a ~5,1996, p. 6-1. 373. FBIS-NES, October 1'7,1995, pp. 46-47. 374. Foreign Broadcasfing h$omzafion Service, Ceszltrnl Ezrmsin fhencefc3'cathIL-1315SOV), September 8,1994, p. 13. 375. FBIS-SOV; September 8,1994, p. 13. 376. Quoted in Joint Publications Research Sewice, Near East and Africa, August 20, 1991, p. 2. 16,1996, p. 30. 377. Amb 02'1and Gas, vol. XW, nsj. 584, J a n u a ~ 378. FBIS-SOV, September 9,1994, pp. 12-13. 379. FBIS-SOV, September 9,1994, p. 12. 380. FBIS-SOV, April 4,1995, p. 12. 382. FBIS-SOV, July 12,15395, p. 5. 382. Clauder Anyeli and Stephanie Mesnier, Riotre Allie Saddam, Paris, Blivier Brban, 1992. 383. ""Sddarn" armor reveals crack in allianccr.,"h~nletnafionalDefence Revierut no. 12,1994, pp. 6-7. January 7-8, 1995, g. 1. 384. Irzlernnfional Hcr~ln"Tribzrn~~ 385. Cited in EBB-NES, January 31,1996, g. 16.

386. Wasfzir-zgtonTi~nes,January 18, 1996, p. AZ3.

Chapter 10 387. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency QACBA), Wol.ld Military Expendit u r n and Arnzs Transfers, 1993-1994, Wshington, GPO, 1995, p. 67. 388. Arms Controf and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Parlqers, 1989, Washington, GPO, 4990, p. 51; US Department of Defeme, Co~td~tcf of The 13ersia~tGulf Wal; Volzlme I, Washington, Department of Defentie, 1992, p. 4. 389. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency QACBA), Wol.ld Military Expendit u r n nlzd Arnzs nansfelrs, 198gfWashington, GPO, 1990, Tabte 1; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Militnfy Expenditures and Arnts Tra~tsjers, 19962995, Washington, GPO, 1996, Table I, 390. IfSS, Military Balance, 1990--1994 and 19f)l-lli392 editic~ns. 391- CIA, World Factbook, 2993, pp. 148-149; US Department of Defentie, Conduct of the Pe)"~iatz Gulf War, Volume I, Washington, Department of Defmse, 1992, p. 4, 392. Richard F. Grirnmett, Con-rjetelzfionalAr~ns Transfers to tlze Tlzird W(?rldf 1983-2990, Washington, Congrssional Resarch Srvice, CRS9 4-578I;, August 2, lli391. 393. US Air Force, "Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War,'" Washingon, USAF, September 1991, pp. 3-4, 394. Arms ControX and Disarmament Agency (AGDA), World Milifary Expendit u r n and Arnzs Transfers, 1989, Mshlngton, GPO, 1990, g. 117. 395. Richard F. Crimmett, Ciznventionnl Arms Transfers to ttic TIzird World, 1985-1992, Mrashingtcm, Congressional Research Sel-vice, CRS93-(;56Ft July 19, 1993, pp. CRS-56,57, 58,59, 396, IXichard E Gsimmett, Con-r7ent?;otznlArlrzs k n s f e m to fhe Third W o a , 1985-1992, Wshlngton, Congressional Research Service, CRS-93-G56E July 19, 1993, pp,CB567 68,69,17Q; Kennet11 Katzman, ""Traq's Campaign to Acquire and Develop E-fightechalagy," Congressional Research Service, CRS-92-6llI",August 3, 11994. US repclrting on this subject is inconsistent. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Wodd Military Expendit zkrr~s and Arms Eansfers, 3 9913, Washington, GPO, 1992, p. 133. indicates that Tray imported a total of $22,750 milXion worth of arms during 1985-1989, including $13,000 million from the Soviet Union, $2,780 million from France, $20 million from the UK, $3,608 million from the PRC, $90 million frorn West Germany, $2,W0 million from other Warsaw Pact cormtries, $1,500 million from other European eountrieq $420 million from other Middle Eastern countries, $20 million fram other East Asian states, $1,300 million from Latin American, and $200 million frorn other countries in the world. the TISS, MilirStrry Bal397. Author's estimate based on interviews, ETU repcjl-t.~, ance, 1993-1994, and CIA, World ILizetbook, 1992. 398. Waslzi~zgtorzErnes, May 2, 4993, p. A-8.

399. There are major uncertainties in these data. An alternative set of estimates is shc)wn below: Arms Sales to Iran by Year (in Millions of Current Dollars)

Viar

Dollar VaIzlc

Rank in T!zird Worl"

DDuzr Vatz~e

Rank 2'12 Third World*

"Out of top 10 buyers. Not shown if rank is mare than tenth. Source: Data in sections A 8r B are adapted from Ricl-rardF. Crimmett, Cvlzvcntiunal Arnis Trarzsfers to fIa7TjzirtE World, 2986-19963, Congressicrnat Research Service, 94-632F, pp. 57, The annual data in part C are taken from variot~sannual editions of Grimmelt" work.

400. Germany was Iraq's brgest supplier. Iraq imported $4.243 billion worth of equipment during 1985-1989, with $2.4 billion worth of heavy machinery- and transportation equipment, $1.3 billion worth of manufactured goods. $425 milXion worth of chernicaXs, and $114 million worth of controXIing instrument. 404. The analysis of Iraqi pmcurement networks and industries in this section draws heavily on Kenneth R. "Fimmerman,""lay ICebuilds Its Military Ind~stries,~' House Fctreip Affairs Subcc~mmitteeon Inteimational S e r u r i t ~International Organizatians, and Human Ri$ts, Washington, BC J m e 2% 1993; JaneS Defe~se Wekly, July 10,1993, p. 9; L~nnAonSunday Enzcs, Octojber 4,195)2, p. 16; Philadelylzia X~tquire~; November 7, 1992, p. A-5; W ~ s l z i ~ ~ g'ifirrres, t o n March 18, 1992, p. A-2 Nezu York Ti~zes,July 15,193, p. A-3; Newsweek, February 1, 1993, pp. 48-50; Wall Streef jara?-rzal,January 49, 4999, p. A-46. June 29,1993, p. A-6. 402. Quoted in jnne's Defense Weekly, October 21,1995, p. 5. 403. Interviews; Rettters, January 28,19f)t;,04312,1058.

Chapter 11 404. Department: of Defense, Tke Condrjct of file Pesian Gzky War: Fif~alReport, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1992' p. 411. 405. Department: of Defense, The Condrjct of flze Rrsian Gzky War: Fif~alReport, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1992, p. 35%. 406. Department of Defense, Tke Conduct of the krsian Gzklf War: Fif~alReport, Washington, Department of Defeme, April 4992, p. 355; Dr. Eliot A, Cohen, draft text of executive summary of Gulf War Air: Power Study dated April 28,1993, p. 43. Losses include withdrawals and sc~mesystems temporarily inoperable. Tbtal losses actually killed or captured are estimates to be 76% of tanks, 55% of APCs,

and 90% of a r t i l l e ~ Republican . Guards unlb, however, only lost 50% in these categories. 407. MichaelX3. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The GekzernlWar: The Inside Sforp of flu Colzpicf in the CulJ Boston, Little Brown, 1994, pp. 429439, 408. Waslzi~giorzPost, November 7, 2991, p. A-46, November 14, 19"3, p. ,447; Wall Street fuznrrzal, No~vember11, 1991, p. A-1 0; lane3 D~fenseWedly, November 16,1991, p. 926, July 2 3,2991, p. 61; Tht Esiin~aie,November 22-December 5,1991, p. I; Mew Yo& Titms, Nctvember 'l: 1991, p. 3; Los Aqcles Times, November 14, 1991, p. 4; Michael Eiwnstadt, "Recent Changes in Saddam" Inner Circle: Cracks in the Wall?" filicywntcll, Number 22, November 22,1992, pp. 1-2; Balt.i;morgSun, June 21, 1991, p. 7, 409. General H, Norman Schwarzkogf, X t Doesn't Tizk a Hero, pp.488489. 410. W~shiugtanPost, July 46,1994, p. 44, November 7,1991, p. A-$6, November 14, 1991, p, A-4'7; Wall Street Journal, November 11, 1991, p, A-10; Jane's Dcfense Weekly, November 16, 1991, p. 926, July 13, 1991, g. 61; The Estimnte, November 22-December 5, 1991, p. 1; New York: Ernes, November 7, 1991, p. 3; Los Arzgdes Tin~es,November 14, 1991, p. 4; Michael Eisenstadt, 'Tecent Changes in Saddam" Inner Circle: Cracks in the Wall?" PoI>otz'~yz~dratch, Number 22, Szrn, June 21, 19%, p. 7; Dnily Telcgraplz, November 22, 1941, pp. 1-2; Bnffi~rzow July 14,1991, p. 9; Londurj Tijrz'lnes,October 4,1991, p. 12; Washington Times, September 4,1991, p. A7, 411. New York Times, August 8,1991, p. A-42. 412. Estimate provided by UXENT'GO-M in J m e 1996. 413. In addition to the sources Xisted at the start of the Iraq section, the author has drawn on intemiews with various US and foreip expe&s in March, April, October, and Nctvember 1993, and IISS, The Mitl'fn~yBalnn~,1993-1994, TXSS, London, 1993, pp. 115-11 7 USNl Data Base. Military Teehology, World Defetrse Almanac: Tlt4 Balance ofMitl'tary I"Ozue~,VcA. XVII, Issue 1-1993, ISSN 0722-3226, pp. 139-142; Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Futuw Policy Options,'T~ongressionalResearch Service, CRS 91-596F, December 12, 1991, pp. 23-30; FBIS, October 13, 1991; Michaef Eisenstadt, "The Iraqi Armed Forces Two Years On," Inners I n telrigctzw Reviezu, pp. 121-127, March 1993, and RUSX Wrking Notes, August 2992-September 1993. 414. See the detail& history of the attack on Republican Guard units and the resulting losses by name in Department of Dei'enx, Tlz4 Gondztct ojflte Perskn Clay War: Fitzat Report, VVasNngton, Department of Defense, April 1992, pp. 93-95, 104113, 355,401. Also references in the April 15,1993 draft of the US Air Force Gulf War Air Pozwr Survq, pp. 9-10, 415. In additian to the sources Xisted at the start of the Iraq section, the author has drawn on intei-views with varic~usUS and foreign experts in March, April, Octctber, and November 19133, and IISS, Tht Militnty Balance, 2993-1994, IXISS, L m don, 1993, pp. 115-11'1"; USN1 Data Base, Military Technolc>gy; World Dqense Al~rzrn~nc: The Bakfinee qMilita~yPozoel; Vol. XVII, Issue 1-1993, ISSN 0722-3226, pp. 139-142; Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Future Policy Options,'' Congressional Research Srvice, CRS 91-596iF, December 12, 4991, pp. 2S30; FEIS, October 13, 1994; Mishaef Eisenstadt, "The Iraqi Armed Forces Two Years On," "nets Irztekligence

Review, pp. 121-127, March 1993, and RUSI Working Notes, August 1992-%pternber 1993. 416. Most estimates now indicate a strength of one Special Republican Guards diriisictn. %me experts feel that there are two divisictn equivalents. 417, USCENKGOM map, June 1996, 418. USCENTCOM map, June 1996. 419. Based on US Shte Department, Country Clzayters .so Hwzlmnn Riglzts-Iraq, Internet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26, 1995 and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other material. 420, Based on US State Department, Cuzar?dry Cfmpters on Hz.rrna?z Rights-lr~q, lnternet edition, US Shte Department on-line data base, accessed August 26, 1995 and March 16, 4996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other material. 421. Based on US State Department, Coznnlry CGlmpters on H~rntnnRigJlfs-Ir~q, lnternet edition, US State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26, 1995 and March 16, 1996, and Amnesty International, Report 1994 and other ma terial . 422. Based on US State Department, Coznnlry CGlmpters on Hzrntnn RigJlfs-Ir~q, Internet edition, U S State Department on-line data base, accessed August 26, 1995 and Marcl-5 16, 1996, and Amnesty Xnternatimal, Repart 1994 and other ma terial. 423. These estimates are based primarily on interviews with variam expe&s. The 1993 IISS data show only 2,200 tanks, but this count does not track with the inteligence data the US has declassified in its studies of the Gulf War or the estimates of other experts, It may represent an attempt to count fully operational tanks, but this is unclear. 424. The IfSS estimates 4,200 OAFV?;,including 1,500 BTR-50, BTR-60, AML-60, AML-40, EE-9, and EE-3 reccjnnaissance vehicles; 700 BMP-1 and BMP-2 armctred fighting vehicles; and 2,000 BTR-50, B"T-60, BTR-152,OT-C;2,0T-&l, M'T'LB, Y W 531, M-113AI/A2, PaAarQ M-3, and EE-11 armclred personnel carriers. A few experts estimates Iraq only had abcmt 2,006-2,300 operatianal other armored t~ehictes.Additional sources include intexviews in London, December 1991 and April 1993, in Switzerland and Israel, January 1992, in Switzerland, January 1993, IfSS data, and the views of VBT~C)USexperts as of May and June, Qctc~berand Nclvember 1993; ~ ~ P IDefettse CS Week[!{,February 22, 1992, p. 284; jendsalem Post, January 25,1992, p. 9; Wiirsiiz'r~gtonEnlcls, J a n u a 20,1992, ~ p. 10, J a n u a 1~7,1992, p. A-l; Wall Sfrcet. Iczurr-zal, November 11, 1991, p. A-40; Inners Defense WceWy, November 16, 1992, p. 926, February 22, 1492, pp. 284; TZ14 Estimate, November 22-December 5, 1991, p. 1; Michael Eisenstadt, "Recent Changes in Saddam's lnnes Circle: Cracks in the VValX?"Tdicyzuatclz,Number 22, November 22, 1991, h s l , November '7,1991, pp. 1-2; Deferzse News, February 24,1992, p. 1; W~~shington. p. A-$6, March 13, 1992, p. A-19, A u p s t 6, 1992, p. A-39; faneS Defizrzse Weekly, August 8, 1992, g. S., and 425. Sources in addition tcr those cited at the start of this section include intert~iew-sin London, December 1991 and April 1993, in Switzerland and Israel, Jan-

Notes

385

uary 39a2,in Switzerland, January 3993, IISS data, and the t~iewsof other experts as of May, June, October, and November 1993; The IlSS estimate is similar to the author". Also see fnne's Defense Weekly, February 22, 1992, p. 284; jrrusalcm Post, January 25, 4992, p. 9; New York .ki?rles,March 42, 1992, p. A-40; Washington Times, January 20,1992, p, 10; WashingfonPost, November 7,1991, p. A-46, November 14, 1991, p. A-47, March 13, 3992, p. A-19; Wall Street J O U Y I T R ~ , November 11, 1991, p. A-10; jla~e's Defe~zseWeekly, November 164, 1991, p. 926, February 22, 19%, pp. 284; The Estin?aEe, Nc~vember22-December 5, 1991, g. 1; Michael Eisenstadt, "Recent Changes in Saddam" Inner Circle: Cracks in the Wall?" &PcywnF.ch, Number 22, Nc~vernber22, 1991, pp. 1-2; Defense Mews, February 24,1992, p. I. 426. The IXSS estimates 500. It is doldbtlul that this many are verational. 427. Many af the details in this analysis are b a x d on discussions with Amatzia Baram.

Chapter 12 428. The author" estimate of aircraft last to Iran is discussed in the section an the Iranian Air Force. 429. FBlS ME$ E-054, March 19, 1992, p, 46. 430.faneS Dejcnse Weekly, November 18,1995, p. 16. 431. IfSS, The Milifar9 Balance, 1993-2994, IISS, Londcm, 1993, pp. 115-117; " ; N I Data Base. Military Techoloa, World Defense Al~rrannc:Tke Balance of Milifnry F)UZOI?~,Vol. XVII, Issue 1-1993, ISSN 0722-3Z6, pp. 139-1112; and working data from the Jaffee Center for S"Eate@cStudies. 432. The IISS estimates are similar. 433. In addition to the sources listed at the start of the Iraq sectic~n,see Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Future Policy Options," Congressitmal Research Senrice, 617s 91596F, December 12, 19491, pp. 2S30; FBIS, October 13, 4991; Wnslzi?zgton Ti~r~es, August 2,1991, p-B-5; tnndofz Fl'nn~cialTi"~rres, October 4, 1991, p. 4; AI-"AM cycle, June 42, 1991; Nezv York Times, March 2St 44991, p. A-1. 434, Department of Defense, C ~ ~ d u c(?f l f the Persian Gulf War: Final Rqorf, Department of Defense, April 1992, pp. 33-1 5; Slides to US Air Force presentation of the April 15, 1993 draft of the Gulf War Air 130wer study; Brigadier General Rc>bertH. Scales, Certain Victory: The U~ziCedStales Arnzy in Clip Gzky Wnl; Washington, Office af the Chief of Staff, "U; S Army, 44993, pp. 115-116. 435. Sc~meestimates show- 129-130 sites in Iraq. 436. See Dr. ELiot A. Cloften, Director, G21lf War Air Power Sti?x?qt Virtumc V , Washington, GPO, 1993, pp. 218-219; Department of Defense, Conducf of the Persian Czdj War: Final Report, Depadment af Defense, April 1992, pp. 13-45; Slides to US Air Farce presentation of IheApril 15,1993 draft af the Gulf War Air Power study; Brigadier General Bobert H. Scales, Cerfaz'nV;;etory: The Urzited States A r ~ y in the Gulf War, Washington, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army 1993, pp. 115-316. These estimates were grc3jected by different sources and the launcher or fire unit counts seem to be either rc~undedar based on standard Soviet battery holdings. According to Fatow-ski, Iraq had the fof lowing radar order of battie:

EnrEy Warning and Surt;eillanee Spoon Rest D/ P-12M Flat Face A/P-15 Squat Eye/P-15M Bar I,c~ck/I"f-35/37 Tall King/P-14 TKS2215 (mobile) TRS2230 AN / TPS-32 (3D) AWACS (IL-176)

USSR (147-161 MHz) USSR (800-900 HHz) USSR (800-900 HMz) USSR (2,695-3,125 MHz) ussn (160-180 MHz) FIT (E /F) (E/E") US (2,905-3,080) FR

Sztface-to-Air Missile Sysfenfs

SA-2 SA-3 SA-5 SA-& SA-7 SA-8 SA-9 SA-13 SA-14 SA-15 SA-16 SA-19 ROLAND HAWK ASPEDIITE

Fantirrmg/Guidelinr, Low Blow / Goa Square Pair /Gammon Straight Ftush/GainfuX Crail (IR Hand Held) Land Roll/Gecko Caskin (IR Vehicle Mc~unted) Gopher (XK Vehicle Mamted) Gremlin (IIP Hand Held) Rack with Tube Launched Missiles (not confirmed) (not confirmed) Mounted on 256 Gun-Rack (not confirmed)

Lorzdo~Fit2ntlc.inl Elnes, April 253, 1989, p. 11, July 26, 4989, p. 20; lane's Defettse Weekly, May 23, 1989, p. 837; April 22, 1989, p. 687, A u p s t 22, 1989, p. 255, %pternber 30, 1989, g. 6174, Defe~seNews, May 8, 1989, p. 6; lnfernlrfionnl Dqense Reviezo, 61189, pp. 835-M1. 437. Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, CerEaz'r-zV;;ctoy: The United Stales A r ~ y itz ljlze Guv Wnr, Washington, Office of the Chief of Stafff US Army 4993, pp. 115-116* 438. The Iraqis were on alert after repc~rtsthat Israel might attack Iraqi chemical and nuclear facilities. Wasl?irzgtolzf i s t , April 29, 9989, p- 16, 439. The reader should be aware that these estimates are extremely uncertain and are based largely on expert estimates of the estimated losses during the Gulf War. Tbere is a sharp difference of opinion among some US experts as to the size of Iraq%lasses during the conflict. 440. The SAM launcher estimates are based on discussions with an Israeli expert and are highly uncer2ain. 1ran"s decision was reparZed in the Npro firk TI'nlcrs,July 31,1992, p. 6. 444. Wall Street. jt~urr-zal,August 49, 1992, p. A-S.

442. Mishael Eisenstadt, "The Iraqi Armed Forces Two Years On," "ners hztelligertce Review, pp. 424-127. March 1993. 443. Based on inteuviews with British, US, and Israel experts. Washr'qton Ernes, January 16, 1992, p. G-4; Woshitzgtorz Post, February 1, 4992, p. Al, February 2, 1992, pp. Al and A25, February 5, p. A-19; Fizza~ciaETijfi~~es, February 6, 2992, p. 4; 61.aristianScience Monitor, February 6,1992, p. 19; Defense Neu~s,February 17,1992, p. 1.

Chapter 13 444. This analysis draws heavily on US Naval institute, The Naval hzstifute Gzrl'de tu the Combat Fleets of the World, 1993, T1zeir Slzips, Aircraft, and Armnmc~tC, Annapolis, Naval institute, 1993; J~ne"sIgttll.ing Slzipsp1992-1 993; IISS, The Mill'tnry Balallce, 1993--1994, IISS, London, 1993, pp. 415-117; USNI Data Base. Military Technology, World Defelzse Allrrannc: The Balance oflblilifnq Power, Vol. XVIX, issue 1-4993, ISSN 0722-3226, pp. 439-1 42. 445. Milz'fa~yTcclz~ology,2/92, pp, 97-98; JaneS Defense Weekly, November 4, 1995, p. 3. 446. Milz'fa~yTcclzlzology, 2/92, pp, 97-98; JaneS Defense Weekly, November 4, 1995, p. 3. 447. Defer?sc Mews, May 8,1989, p. 6. 448. These and other army strength estimates are based upon interviews in London, December 1991, in Switzerland and Israel, January 1492; lane's Defetzse Weekly, February 22, 2992, p-284; ferusnle~rz: Post, January 25, 1992, p. 9; Washingtun Titrtes, January 20, 4992, p, IQ; Washitzgt~rtPost, N~3vember7; 1991, p. A-&, November 24,1991, p. A-47; Wall Street lotarrzal, November 22,1991, p.A-10; j127.ze1s Defense Weekly, November 16, 1991, g. 926, February 22, 1992, pp. 284; The Esti~rzmfc,November 2SDecember 5,Z 991, p. 1; Michael Eisenstadt, "Recent Changes in Saddam's Inner Circle: Cracks in the Wall?" Poliqzr?ntc!~,Number 22, Novernber 22, 4991, pp. 1-2; Defcnse News, February 24,192, p. 1.

Chapter 14 443. Washington Post, ;New York Times, May 26,1993, p. A-8, June 24,4992, p. A-3, July 2 7, 1923, p. A-14, Agence France 13resse,April 12, 2 993, May 15, 1993, July 19, 1993, BBC ME/1664/Af April 16, 1993, ME/1721/A, June 22, 1993; Armed Forces Journal, July 1992, p, 23; Christian Science Monitor, ; FinanciaX Tirnes, May 26, 12993, p. 6; Washington Times, April 12, 1993, p. A-2, Baltimore Sun, May 24,1993, p. 5-A, 450. US Department of State, Patterns of Glc>balTerrc>rism,19132, Washington State Department Press, April 1393; Wall Street Journal, June 28,1993. 451. New York Tims, June 27,1993, p. A-l; Wasfingon Post, June 27,1992, p. A1; November 22,1993, p. A-44, For m article challenging Iraq" role in the plot, see Symour M, Hersh, "A Case Not Closed," New Yorker, November 1,1993, p. 80. 452. US State Department? 1994 and 1994 reports on terrorism, Internet on-line edition, accessed August 29,2995.

453. US State Department, 1994 and 1994 reports on terrorism, Internet on-line editionf accessed August 29,1995. 454. U S State Departmcunt, 1994 and 1994 reports on terrorism, Internet on-line edition, accessed August 29,1995. 455. US State Departmcunt, 1994 m d 1994 reports on terrorism, Internet on-line edition, accessed August 29, 2995.

Chapter 15 456. Arnzs Control To&y, April 1993, p. 29. 457.laneS Intetlz'get~ccReview, March 1995, p. 445. 458. Wnshi~zcptonPost, Not~emher27,1993, p. A-20, 45% United N ations Special Carrrmission, "Report tcr the Scurity CormcilS/1995/494," 20 June 1995, p. 10. 460. United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/ 19951864," "2 October 1995, p. 7. 463, United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/1995/liHffl 1 4 October 1995, pp. 7-8, 462. United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/1995/liM," 1 4 October 1995, p. 8. 463. United Nations Special Commission, "23eport to the Scurity CouncilS/1995/liMfH1 4 October 1995, pp. 8-10. 464. These comments are based on Ambassador Rolf Ekeus" speech to the Washington institute on Nc~vember2 6 1995, and hlicywafcjt, Number 175, November 20,1995, 465. United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/1995/liHffl 11 Octc3ber 1995, p. 11. 466. United Nations Spe""al Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/1995/liMffl 44 October 1995, p. 9. 467. JizneS Defetzse Weekly, January 3, 1996, pp. 17-18; United Nations Special Commission, ""Report to the Security Councit-S/1%5/864," 11 October 4995. 468. Washington Post, December 15,1995, p. A-30; JaneS Defe~seWeekly, January 3,1996, pp, 17-1 8. 469. fane's Dejc~seWeekly, May 23, 1995, p. 5. 470. JclrzeS Defetzse W.ekEy, May 6, 1995, g. 15. 471. Wasjzington Posf, April 6, 1995, p, 4. 472. Washington P05d, March 213, 1996, p. A-28; Jnne's Defelzse Weekly, April 10, 1996, p. 15, 473. Office of the Scretary of Defens, ProE$emfion: Tllrcmt alzd Res~onse,Washington, Department of Defense, April 1996, pp. 17-24, 474. Washinston Post, July 26, 19992, p. A-1; "Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Unearthing Iraq" Arsenal," Arms Control Today, April 1992, pp. 6-9. 475. "Tho UN refused to name the facilities at the time of this dwlaration, because it feared Iraq would move scyme of the quipment and missiles 1cxatct.d at those sites. 476. Washingtorz Pusf, February 44, 1992, p. A-33; Waslzilzglon Post, January 15, 1992, p. A-18,

Notes

389

477. Ncw Yol'kr Times, February 2% 19132, p. 28; Washington E~nes,February 11, 1992, p. 1, November 6, 4992, p. A-7. 478, Reuters Ltd., July 20,1995; faneS Defence Weekly, July 29, 1995, p. 13, January 6,1992, p. 1; Nero York Ti??zes,February 28, 4175). Tlze Afla~ztnCo~tstittlfZOlil, 1992, p. A-28, November 5,1992, p, A-10; Washington Ernes, February 22,1992, p. 1, November 6, 1992, g. A-7; 7;~;nslzingtonPt~sf,January 27, 1'493, p. A-16, July 7f 1993, p. A-28; Plziladel'yhr'Lz X~zqz-rirer,March 2 (4, 1993, p. E-1; Arms Co~trolToday, December 1992, p. '7. 480. United Nations Special Commissic~n,"&port tcr the Scurity CormcilS/1995/8C7$," H October 1995, pp. 24-15. 481. New York Ernes, August 26,1995, p, 3. 4%. UN Security Council, Note by the Secretary General, S/1995/864,11 Octobe& 1995, p. 15; lane's Dt$~zse W-rekly,January 3,1996, pp. 3, 15-49. 483. United Mations Special Commission, "23eport to the Scurity CouncilS/1995/864," "1 Octo>ber1995, pp. 14-15. 4%. United Nations Special Commission, "23eport to the Scurity CouncilS/1995/864," "1 Octc>ber1995, pp. 14-15. 485. Associated Press, October 14, 4995; Washingtor? Post, October 14, 1995, p. A-1 . 484. Npro York Ernes, December 22, 4995, p. A-18; Wnslzingtorz Ti~ncs,December 28, 1995, p, A-23; U N Scurity Council, Note by the Swretary General, S/l995/8@, 44 October, 1995, p. 45; j n ~ ~ eDqense S Weekly, January 3,1996, pp. 3, 15-19. e November 11,1995, g. 4; UN Securiq Coundl, Note 487. JanersD ~ e f z c Weekly, by the Scretary General, S/1095/8M, 22 Octobeu; 2 995. 488. Clzrisfinn Science Monitor, January 23, 1992, g. 1; Janers hztelligcnce Revierut December 1995, p. 559. August 2 6 1995, p. 3; Waslrington Post, August 26,1995, p. 489, New York Tifr~es, A-4. 490. Office of the %cr&ary of Defens, BroE$eration: Tllrcmt alrd Res~onse,Washington, Depadment of Defense, April 1996, pp. 17-24. 491, Wasizington Post, October 14, 1995, p. A-l; Polr'cyzuat.clz, Number 175, Nctvember 20,1995. 492, Washirzcpton Post, January 2 5, 2 992, p. A-18; Waslzington Ernes, September 12,1991, p. A-8, March 5,1992, p. 1; US N e w and World Report. published an article claiming that Iraq might have an underground factory and some 80O missiles on F e b r u a ~10,1992 (p. 22). Generat CoXjn Pr~welllater indicated that he had seen

no evidence of any rmderground facility and that Iraq3 s x i m u m holding might be about 250 missiles. Albatzy Ernes U~nion,February 5,1992, p. 7. 4%. lane's Intelligence Reztiezu, March 1995, p. 116. fhe Ashes, Washingtcm, Washington 494. Michael Eisenstadt, Like A Plzcte~zz'xfiorn Institute Policy Paper No. 36, pp. 36-37. 495. Michael Eisenstadt, Like A 13illoenixfiom fhe Ashes, Washingtcm, Washington Institute Policy Paper No. 36, pp. 36-37. 4%. Michael Eisensltadt, Like A Phuenixfiom tlic Rslrcs, Washingtcm, Washington Institute Policy Paper No. 36, p. 37.

497. Waslringtnn Post, December 8, 1995, p. A-13, December 15, 1995, p. A-30; Wnshingtorz Tinzes, December 8,1995, p. A-17'; Keuters, December 22,1995,0240498. The US is considering modifying its own drones to use GPS to achieve such accuracies. Dcfense Week, January 3,1994, p, 4. 499. JaneS Defence Weekly, January 30, 1993, pp. 20-21; Defe~seEkectmnl'cs and Contpzlf ilzg, TDR press, Spternber '11 992, pp. 115-1 20; lnletnatiunal Dflense Revieco, May 1992, pp. 413 - 4 3 5; faneS Remotely Piloted Vdzides 1994-2992; Meith Mmson, World Unrrmnned A i ~ r @ lEJondon, , Jane's 1988; Air Force Magazine, March 1992, pp. 94-99, May 4992, p. 155. 500. Office of the Scretary of Defenx, Prolferafion: Threal.and Response, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1996, pp. 17-24 501. There is no evidence of forward deployment of chemical weapons, but the author visited many Iraqi command sites which still had extensive instructions and orders relating to the use of chedcal weapons. Review, December 1995, pp. 556560. 502. Jnne's lnfelligk*c.azce 503. See the description in Anthany H. Cordesmm, 1 r a ~and Iraq, Tke Tfzreat firom the Riortlzern C;zkrt(; Bcjulde~;Weshrievk; 1994; Jane's Tnlel'lipnce Reui;r?zu,Vol. 4, No. 9, pp. 44M45, and December 1995, pp. 55&5(i0 504. Jnne's lnfellig~nceReviecu, December 1995, pp. 556560. 505, DF-2 and cyclohexanol, and isclpropan01 were stored separately and had to be hand loaded into the munitions. 506, Department of Defense, Co~tductof l h Pcrsialz Gulf Wnc Finat Report, Department of Defense, April 1992, p. 207. 507. New Yo& Times, Nowember 12, 1991, p. A-3; Clzristian Sc-ienceMunil.au, January 23,1992, p. 2; faneS DeJense Weekly, December 14,1991, pp-12441245; Associated Press, December 12, 19531, PM cycle-. 508.laneS Intelligemce Reztiew, December 1995, pp. 556-560, 509. Jane's Dfletzse Weekly, No>vember11,1995, p. 4. 510. UN Security Cr)uncil, Note by the Secretary General, S/1995/864,11 October, 1995, pp. 17-19; Policyzuafclt, Number 275, Navember 20,1995, 511. United Nations Special Commission, ""Repc~rtto the Scurity ComcilS/1995/8M," "2 October 1995, pp. 28-19. 512. Department of Defense, Conduct. I?J: klle 17elsi~nCzrlf War: Fir-zal Report, Department of Defense, April 1992, pp. 16-18; ""Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Unearthing Iraq%Arsenal," Amts Control Today, April 1992, pp. 6-9; 61ttistian Scietzce Monitor, January 23, 1992, p. 1; The A t t a ~ l aGo~stitutiorz,January 16, 1992, p. 1; Jane's Defense Weekly, December 24, 1991, pp. 1144--1245; Associated Press, December 42,1994, PM cycle. The UN fcx.tnd nearly 100 metal working machines for chemical weapons at the plant during a raid on November 20,1991, 513. United Naticllns Special Commission, "Report tcr the Security ComcilS/1995/8M," ll October 1995, p. 19. 514. Wnstzir-zgtonErnes, December 28, 1995t, g. A-13. 515. "fe technical content of this discussion is adapted in part from the author" discussion of the technical aspects of such weapons in After the Storm: Tke Ctzwrzging Mififary Bala~cein the Middle East, Boulder, Westview, 1993; working material on biological weapons prepared for the United Nations, and frcxm

Notes

392

the Office of Technology Assessment, Prol$eraCion c$ Weapons of Mass Dest ruetiun: Assessing Ijrc Risks, United States Congress OTA-1SC-559, Washington, DC, August, 1993; Kenneth R. T'irnmerman, Weapons of Mass Bestrzkction: Tlze Cases of-Iran, Syria, and Libpn, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, August, 4992; Dr. Robert A. Nagier, BnElisfic Missile Prolferatl'a~:An Emergr'lzg Threni.; Systems Planning Corporation, Arlington, 1992; and translations of unclassified documents on proliferation by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Bureau provided to the author by the staff of the Government Operations Committee of the US Senate. 516. The technical cmtent of this discussisn is adapted in part Ercm the arathc>rfsdiscussion of the techical aspects of such weapons in After the Storm: Tke Chnnging Milz'tn~yBnln~cein fhe Middle East, Bouldeu; Westview, 1993; working material on biological weapons prepared for the United Nationg and from the Office of Technology Assessmnl; Prol$eratiotz of Weapons of Mass Dcsfruction: Assessz'l-zg the Rish, United, States Congress OTA-ISC-559, Washington, DC, August, 1993; Meme1.h R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Tlle Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Sirnon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, August, 1992; Dr. Robert A. Nagler, B~llistieMissile Pmlifirralioion:Azz Enzcrgkg Thre~l;Systems Planning Corpc~ration,Arlington, 1992; and translatic~nsof unclassified documents on proliferatic3n by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Bureau provided to the author by the staff of the Govemmnt %erations Committee of the US Senate. 517, Office of the %cretary of DeEenw, Pru.ot@emliotz:mrcrrai and Response, Washington, Department of Defense, April 1996, pp-V-24, 518. Arnzs Control To&y, April 1993, p. 29. 519, Eliot Cohen, ed., Cz-llf War Air Power Szrrvey, Volume 11, Part IZ, p. 327. 520. United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/1995#8@," 11 October 1995, p. 20; Wns/zingt.o~z Pt~st,July 6,1995, p. A-17. 521. United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Secun"ty CouncilS/1995/8M," 11 October 1995, p. 22. 522. U ~ t e dNations Special Commission, "23eport to the Scurity CouncilS/1995/8Mffl 1 4 October 1995, p. 23. 523. United Nations Special Commission, "23eport to the Scurity CouncilS/ 195151864," H 11ctc)ber 1995, pp. 25-26. 524. United Nations Special Commission, "23eport to the Scurity CouncilS/1995/864," 3l 11ctc)ber 1995, pp. 23-24. 525. United Nations Special Commission, "&port tcr the Seurity CormeilS/1995/864," "1 1ctr.iber 1995, pp. 24-25. 526. United Nations Special Commission, "&port tcr the Seurity CormeilS/1995/8M," "2 October 1995, p-25. 527. United Nations Special Commission, "&port tcr the Seurity CormeilS/1995#8MrM"2 October 1995, p. 26, 528. United Nations Special Commission, "Report to the Security CouncilS/1995/864," "2 October 1995, pp. 26-27. 529. Jnne's DiClfelzse Weekly, January-3, 1996, p. 19. 530, Interviews with UN personnel and UN Security Cormcil, Note by the %cretary General, S/ 1995/864, 11 Octc>ber,1995.

531. New York Tin~es, August 2 6 1995, p. 3; Waslrington Post, August 26,1995, p. A-4. 532, Polr'c~~zuaEclz, Number 175, November 20, 1995; UN Scurity Council, Note by the Secretary General, S/1995/8&, 11 October, 1995. 533. UN Security Council, Note by the Secretary General, S/1995/864,11 October, 1935. 5M.faneS Dejcnse Weekly, November 11, 1995, p. 4. 535. UN Security Council, Note by the Secretary General, S/ 1995/864,11 Octobe& 1995, p. 27. 536. Wnsfzington Ti~nes,August 30,1995, g. A-10. 537, Rezd Eers Ltd., Octc?ber 11, 1995. 538. Interviews with UN persomet. 539. United N ations Special Commission, "&port tcr the Scurity CormcilS/19"3/8M," ll October 1995, pp. 27-28, 540. Wtsfzi~zgtonPost, July 6, 1995, p. A-1'7. 541. lane's Defuzse Weekly, April 10, 1996, p. 15. 542. Confirm& by intewiews wjth UN and US State Depar.t.ment perstmnel. Also see UN Secui-ItyComcil, Note by the Scretary General, S/4995/2%, April, 1495. 543. Wnshil-zglon Pt~st,August 26, 1995, p. A-l. 544, The Rthntn Co~stit~itiotz, January 16, 1992, p, 4. 545. Calculated based on estimates from the OWce of Technology Assessment as cited in Nesuszueek, September 4, 1995, p. 34 and fiiguws provided by the Pmtagon as cited in 'Time, Spternber 4, 2995, p. 41. 546. The technical cmtent of this discussion is adapted in part from the author" discussion of the technical aspects of such weapons in After the Sfarm: The Chnngi~zgMilitary BnZnlzce in llze Middk Ensl, Boulder, Wesbiew, 1W3; working material on biological weapons prepared for the United Naticlns and from the Office of Technology Assessment, Fzrolferatlion of Weapons of Mass Destruetiion: Assessing t h Risks, United States Congress 0TA-1%-554, Washington, DC, August, 3.993; Meme1.h R, Timmerman, Weapons $Mass Destruction: The Cases c?f I ~ P ISyria, , and Libya, Sirnon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, August, 1992; Dr. Robert A. Nagler, Ballistic Mksile Prolfcrcltlitn: An Emergkg Tfz~at;Systems Planning Corpc,rati~>n, Arf inaton, 1992; and translations of unclassified documents on profiferatian by the Russian Foreign Inteltligence Bureau provided to the author Operations Committee of the US Senate. by the staff of the Go>~rernment 547. UN and US experts commenting on the evidence to date, N o clear documentation is available to define the scope of Iraqi release authority. 548. Far detailed descriptic3m of the Iraqi effort see Anthony H. Cordesman, 1rau nud Iraq: The ?hli.at Fm~rtthe Nortrltern Gr4t"t;bulder, Westrriew, 2994; Afier ffze Storm, Bouldeq Westview, 1993; and Weaputzs ofMass Destrzicticln itz the NLiZdle East, London, Jane%/RUSl, 1992; and 549. Jnne's Infelligence Revierut December 19132, pp. 554-555. 550. Washilzgtorz Times, January 29, 1996, p. A-15; New Yo& Tijfi~~es, January 26, 1996, p. A-8. 554. Office of the Scretary of Defenw, Prot@eratiorz:Threat and Response, Washington, Department of Defense' April 1996, pp. 17-24.

552. Tnternatic>nal Atomic Energy Agency, "Repc~rtto the Security CouncilS/ 1995/844,"% October 1995, p. 4; Jn~ze'sIF$felligence Xevieru, December 1992, p, 556. York T'in~es, 553. Reuters Ltd., November 7,1995, December 18,2995,0342; NGZU December 22,1995, p, A-18. 554. For very different views, see Peter B. Zirnmerman, Imq's Nuclear Aclzl'ezlemenis: Contponcnfs, Soures, and Sfalztre, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 93-323F' February 18, 2 993; Gary Milhollin, "The Iraqi Bomb," Nezo Vorker, February 1, 1993, pp. 47-55, and Diana Edensword and Gary MilhoXIin, "Iraq's Bomb-an Update#" New York Times, April 26, 4993, p. A-47. 555. Jnne's D ~ e n c eWeekly, March 11, 1995, pp. 215--29. 556. Wasjrinfytor?Titnes, August 30,1995, p. A-10. 557. Waskington Tinzes, Octobm 14, 2 995, p. A-3.0. 558. Reuters, January 30,4994,1227; ;7;liznefsDefetzsc We(.~kIy, January 3,1996, p. 19 559, See Kenneth Katzman, ""Xaqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements," Congressional Research Sewice, TB9211'1: March 25,1994; and Note by the Secretary General, S/26584, November 5, 1993; Note by the Secretary General, S126825, D ~ e m b e r1, 1993; Note by the Secretary General, S/26"3 10, December 21,1993; Note by the Secretary General, 5/1994/31, January 14, 1994; Repc~rton the Twenty Secmd lAEA Tnspection, 1-15 Mc>vember,19933;Note by the Secretar)r General, 5/4994/341, March 24, 1994; and Nczte by the Scretary General, S/1994/355, March 25,2994. 560. Associated Press, October 14,1995; A full post-war list has never been published. A US govemmnt list published after the Gulf War is contained in the Federal. Register, Vo)lurne 56, Number 64, April 3, 1991, pp. 1 3 5 a to 13589.

Chapter l 6 561. Department of Befense background briefing, 0ctcr;ber 20, 1994 (Federal News Service); Department of Defense handouts of October 11, 195M4,and October 12,1994; jar-ze's Defc~zseWeekly, October 22, 1944, p. 4, December 17, 1994, p. 7; US Army briefing sheet (undated) October 1994; Congressional Research Service, Imq C?-isis,Ocfobcr 2994, A Chrarzology, 94-$08F, October 24,1994. 562. Author" estimate using $1991 f i p r e s from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), VVurtd Military Expendittires a d Arms Tratzsfers, 3991-2992, Washington, GPO, 1994, pp. 67 and ",and converting into 1995 dollars using OMB conversions. 563. Iraqi Ba'athist official quoted in The Guardian, October 29, 1994, p. 13, 564. See Middle Ensl Economic Suwry, vol. 39, no. 1,Octc)ber 1995, p. A5. 565. Was/ringtn~zTimes, October 46, 1995, p. Al, A22; Waslringtn~zPost, October 199SJp. A15 566. Safeh Kallab, "Irak et "oisins': La Roulette Russe," Arabies, no, 406, October 2995, p. 18. 567, See also Jamal al-Attiya, "Irak: CApres-Saddarn,"Vrabies, no. 50,1991, pp. 12-2 5.

About the Book and Authors This volume prcjvides analysis of the state of Iraq's sseuri3 and of current t also examines Western policy toward the country in the wake of the Gulf War. X the political, economic, and security impact of sanctions, Iraq's future role as an oil expoder, the U.S. policy of "dual containment" in relation to Iraq, and options for dealing with Iraq in the future.

Anthany H, Cordesman has served in senior positions in the office far the secretary of defense, NATO, and the U.S. Snate. EIe is currently a senior fellow and Gc~Directorof the Middle East Prcjgram at the Center for Strategic and International Studiest an adjrmct professor of national security studies at Geargetown University and a special consultant on military aEairs for ABC News. He fives in Washington, D.C. Ahmed S. Hashim is a fellow in Political-Miiiitav Affairs and the Middle East 13rogram at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he specializes in strategic issues. Previously, h e was a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, He lives in Virginia.