Justice and Conflicts: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

Justice and Conflicts

.

Elisabeth Kals

l

Ju¨rgen Maes

Editors

Justice and Conflicts Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

Editors Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Kals Katholische Universita¨t Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt Professur Psychologie III Ostenstraße 25 85072 Ingolstadt Germany [email protected]

Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Maes Universita¨t der Bundeswehr Mu¨nchen Fakulta¨t fu¨r Pa¨dagogik Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39 85577 Neubiberg Germany [email protected]

ISBN 978-3-642-19034-6 e-ISBN 978-3-642-19035-3 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19035-3 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011940317 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

Justice can be conceived as a norm, a value, a virtue, a standard of evaluation of almost any aspect of life and living together, and as a human motive affecting thoughts, emotions, and actions. There is hardly any subject that cannot be regarded in respect of justice. Not astonishingly, there are many scientific disciplines that are concerned with questions of justice, such as philosophy, jurisprudence, psychology, sociology, theology, and many others. Prevalently, they approach their questions with quite diverse perspectives. They analyze justice theoretically or normatively (e.g. by analyzing and determining criteria of just solutions) or empirically (e.g. by assessing and analyzing preconditions and consequences of justice-related cognitions and emotions). Diverging views on justice in groups and individuals represent a core element of social conflicts. The current book focuses upon theoretical and empirical research on justice and discusses various social conflicts in the light of their practical implications. The book traces back to the Eichsta¨tt symposium “The potential of justice research for conflict resolution and the understanding of societal problems”, which aimed at bringing together different methodological and disciplinary views of justice research. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the symposium was on empirical perspectives and their application. Distinguished scholars from various disciplines, from Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Asia, and the United States, came together to discuss mainly the following questions: 1. What is the impact of justice judgments on individual perceptions and constructions of conflict situations, and to what extent does justice determine human action as an independent motive? 2. How can the origin and the development of social conflicts be understood from the perspective of experienced justice or injustice? 3. How can social conflicts be alleviated or solved on the basis of perceived justice? This book completes and enriches the Eichsta¨tt talks. Therefore, two features are specific for it: First, it is an interdisciplinary book, integrating the research

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traditions of many disciplines that are involved with justice issues. Although the psychological contributions build the majority, many other disciplines are represented, like philosophy, economics, educational sciences, sociology, theology, and journalism. Second, all contributions aim at a final practical perspective to make the research fruitful for the concrete resolution of problems within society. This is also the case for the more theoretical chapters of the current book. Altogether, the edition embraces seven parts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Introduction Justice motive(s) Interpersonal justice Organizational justice Ecological justice Social conflicts on a macro-level Protective factors to strengthen and foster sustainable justice

Introduction Three chapters introduce into the subject of the book. Leo Montada reflects justice as a normative construct and specifies the impact of empirical justice research in eight theses that have implications for the contents of all following chapters and that cover the internal logic of the book: The first thesis refers to the justice motive as an anthropological universal, the last thesis touches upon the practical implication of justice as a peace-building construct. Kjell To¨rnblom and Ali Kazemi offer a new framework for the conceptualization of justice conflicts. They differentiate different types of conceptual distributive and social distributive justice conflicts and a mixture of both. Their chapter has an almost monographic character and offers a frame for the following chapters, dealing with justice conflicts. Susan Opotow introduces the reader to the concept of moral exclusion that describes the narrowing of the scope of justice. This concept is illustrated by a historical retrospect to the Third Reich, where Jews and other groups were devaluated as “life unworthy of life”, thus being excluded from the scope of justice. The Jewish Museum Berlin is used as the context for this justice research.

Justice Motive(s) In the chapters of the second part, justice motives are described and analyzed. How are justice motives developed, and what role do they play to explain human decision-making and behavior? Is justice a distinguishable motive or can it be unmasked as egoistic interests that are, for example, only hidden by rhetoric justice

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arguments? What justice motives can be differentiated, and what role do they play in organizational and transactional decision-making? Claudia Dalbert distinguishes between an implicit and a self-attributed justice motive that are part of the Dissociation Model of the Justice Motive. The implicit justice motive is based upon an intuitive level and gets salient by justice-relevant cues. The self-attributed justice motive, however, is part of the more conscious selfconcept and is triggered by social cues. Empirical research on the model underpins the differentiation of both justice motives. Ju¨rgen Maes, Christian Tarnai, and Julia Schuster look back on the history of just-world research and distinguish two phases which either highlighted rather negatively valuated effects of Belief in a Just World (BJW; namely derogating and excluding victims) or rather positively valuated functions of BJW for the believer’s daily functioning. Since both aspects may conflict, they plead for analyzing the complex interplay and considering the effects of BJW for self and others simultaneously. Nadine Thomas, Anna Baumert, and Manfred Schmitt analyze justice sensitivity as a risk and protective factor in social conflicts. They depict the construct of justice sensitivity as a stable disposition to perceive and react to injustice. The construct is differentiated into victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity; each of them has distinguishable functions, correlates, and even action tendencies. Jan-Willem van Prooijen offers another perspective on justice motives by analyzing suspiciousness of injustice in the context of conspiracy theories. He shows that conspiracy beliefs are functional in various perspectives when people are confronted with events that threaten the social order. The application of procedural justice principles can help to reduce conspiracy beliefs. Part three to six of the book deal with justice from a micro- to a macro-level in various social contexts: interpersonal justice, organizational justice, ecological justice, and finally social conflicts on a macro-level.

Interpersonal Justice The level of interpersonal justice is entered by Hans-Werner Bierhoff and Elke Rohmann. They analyze justice in performance situations and present the Expectation States Theory as a frame from which the reward expectation hypothesis derives. Based upon this theory, an estimation of the relative impact of equity and equality for a given reward allocation is formulated. The hypothesis is validated by empirical data obtained in a scenario study and offers new understandings of the perceived justice in performance situations. Gerold Mikula deals with perceived justice in the division of family labor between women and men. He analyzes the various connections between the division of family labor and its perceived justice, workloads, the relationship satisfaction, and well-being. It is shown that the division of family labor is mediated, to

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a large degree, by its perceived justice. Variables and processes that contribute to this justice perception can be derived, like the frequency and the outcome of comparing the amount of family labor performed by each spouse. Mario Gollwitzer, Livia Keller, and Judith Braun discuss laypersons’ punitive attitudes and their preferences for different sanctions that have strong justice implications. The authors show that the punitive attitudes and preferences are shaped by variables of the concrete social context, like the offender’s social category, the group-level status, or the normative implication of the offence. Examples for the effectiveness of the social context variables are given. Bernhard Streicher, Dieter Frey, and Silvia Osswald also deal with the general process of forming fairness judgments. They analyze when and how people search for information to judge the fairness of authorities, e.g. after fair and unfair events. Accuracy and defense motives are central to account for significant differences and at the same time influence conflict resolutions.

Organizational Justice Two chapters deal with justice in organizations from varying perspectives. Adrian F. Furnham and Evelyn M. Siegel open up the topic by focusing upon perceived injustice in organizations. The perception of injustices might lead to dissatisfaction and even to Counter Work Behaviors (CWB). Contrary, model behavior of supervisors and perceived fair treatment promote Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB). The motives of both behavioral categories, of CWBs and OCBs, are analyzed, leading to practical implications for the prevention of CWBs. Elisabeth Kals and Patrick Jiranek offer insights into the mega-construct of “Organizational Justice”. On a theoretical level, organizational justice provides prescriptive norms based upon justice as a fundamental and independent human motive. On an empirical level, organizational justice judgments are powerful predictors of various work-related outcomes, leading to the view of justice as a maxim for aligning behavioral decisions in organizations.

Ecological Justice Four chapters contribute to the ecological justice perspective. Markus M. Mu¨ller presents a justice framework for the solution of environmental conflicts. Environmental conflicts are reconstructed as justice conflicts, from which strategies to resolve the conflicts can be derived. It is assumed that behavior in ecological conflicts is driven by feelings of (in)justice that differ in dependence of individual scopes of justice and other variables, such as cognitive values or emotional valuations.

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Janine Bentz-Ho¨lzl and Manfred Brocker enter the political level of human-induced climate change and its various injustices: Industrialized countries are the primary causes of climate change, but the costs have also to be borne by developing countries. It is concluded that the distribution of trading with carbon certificates must be readjusted and that measures are necessary for an international distribution of costs. Further restructuring of intergovernmental relations and the international system seem, therefore, to be indispensable. Heidi Ittner and Cornelia Ohl focus this international level of climate change by integrating justice psychology and economics. Their conceptual paper focuses upon game theory that interprets the interaction of nations as a public goods game. Whereas game theory focuses on structural conditions, justice psychology emphasizes the justice motives that foster cooperative behavior within international negotiations. With this interdisciplinary approach insights for the support of international environmental cooperation are gained. Geoffrey J. Syme also refers to climate change and potential social conflicts, due to the demand for natural resources, like access to water. He shows that the application of environmental ethics and considerations of the social justice can assist in resolving potential conflict. The impact of lay ethics, including equity, distributive, procedural, and interactive justice, is represented and discussed using water resources management and climate change as important examples.

Social Conflicts on a Macro-Level The following chapters refer to various social conflicts on a macro-level. Nils Goldschmidt and Alexander Lenger present a cultural theory of economics and discuss the theory in the light of its impact for linking justice and the principles of market economy. The described fundamental tensions between justice and economic efficiency systems are traced back to cultural conditions. Consequently, the cultural perspective might help to overcome the tensions and to replace the existing concept of a homogeneous homo oeconomicus by a heterogeneous homo culturalis. John T. Jost, Ido Liviatan, Jojanneke van der Toorn, Alison Ledgerwood, Anesu Mandisodza, and Brian A. Nosek also touch upon the system level. They present the system justification theory and review research for its evidence. According to the theory, people aim to defend their current social systems, which might also include ideological defensiveness, as the justification serves, for example, their social and psychological needs. The theory and its specific findings can help to explain why people resist to social change or support it. These explanations are also applied to social conflict situations. A broad view on societal systems is also taken by Klaus-Dieter Altmeppen, Klaus Arnold, and Tanja Ko¨ssler by analyzing the principles of fairness in professional journalism that are discussed within the concepts of “media ethics”, “objectivity”, or “professionalism”. Fairness touches upon different levels and entities, like the sources of information, the audience, or the actors. Consequently, in some

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situations fair journalism implies that specific unfairnesses are taken into account, for example, when corruption is disclosed. Ronald Fischer proposes a new model of political inter-group violence and conflict escalation which encompasses five components: Against the background of a difficult life situation, individual perceptions of social injustice tied to social identities are used to frame conflicts, develop and justify focused political agendas and actions. Additionally, the role of catalyzing and intervening factors in the emergence and maintenance of violent political conflict is considered, in particular the interplay between leadership and national audiences and international sponsors.

Protective Factors to Strengthen and Foster Sustainable Justice The book closes with views on protective factors for sustainable justice. Forgiveness, moral courage, effective conflict resolution, and the acceptance of human rights are the key constructs of these chapters. Mathias Allemand and Marianne Steiner refer to concepts of forgiveness in close interpersonal relationships and transfer them to a lifespan development perspective. Based upon a thorough overview, situation-specific forgiveness is conceptualized as a process of change, which explicitly includes a process of change across lifespan. The process is influenced by dispositional forgiveness that is understood as a trait. Based on the results, clinical and non-clinical forgiveness interventions are reviewed and further supplemented. Tanja Gerlach, Dmitrij Agroskin, and Jaap J.A. Denissen analyze the processes of forgiveness in close interpersonal relationships: How do individuals in close relations manage to overcome feelings of hurt and judgments of injustices? Forgiveness is interpreted as a process of negotiated morality where the partner’s behavior indicates a return to relationship rules. From these analyses, intervention strategies for achieving forgiveness processes can be derived. Silvia Osswald, Dieter Frey, and Bernhard Streicher refer to moral courage as another key construct of justice. Moral courage aims to enforce norms without considering one’s own burdens and social costs. It is accompanied by anger and indignation and can be distinguished from related constructs, such as helping behavior, heroism, or social control. An integrative model of promoting and inhibiting moral courage is presented, which offers intervention approaches to promote moral courage. Finally, Carolyn Hafer’s chapter deals with the psychology of deservingness and acceptance of human rights as one of the broadest perspectives taken within justice discourse. In line with the Belief in a Just World, people have a strong motive to believe that they get what is deserved and that deservingness principles generally work. However, these beliefs endanger the acceptance of universal human rights. But deservingness can also help to reduce resistance towards universal human rights, corresponding practical implications are unfolded.

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All chapters are structured in a similar way in order to enhance the readability of the book: They are introduced by a short abstract, followed by an introduction into the specific research topics of the chapters. They close with an outlook on practical perspectives or concrete implications of the findings and thoughts discussed. The edition of volumes like this is always the result of the cooperation of many people. Therefore, we want to express our gratitude to at least some of these people: The authors sacrificed time and effort to make this volume possible at all. Jonas Bodensohn, our native speaker, took care of the language over a longer period of time. Julian Su¨ß tirelessly proof-read and edited the work together with Mathias Schieweck, Anja Brunner, and Carolin Straub. Evelyn Siegel always helped us, whenever it was necessary. The publisher Springer supported us in many ways and gave us the opportunity to get the innovative work published. Finally we want to thank Leo Montada, one of the founders of empirical justice research. Without his mentoring and the socialization through the tradition in Trier, neither the justice symposium nor this edition would have been possible. Thank you! Ingolstadt/Munich

Elisabeth Kals and Ju¨rgen Maes

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Contents

Introduction The Normative Impact of Empirical Justice Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Leo Montada Advances in Justice Conflict Conceptualization: A New Integrative Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Kjell To¨rnblom and Ali Kazemi Absence and Presence: Interpreting Moral Exclusion in the Jewish Museum Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Susan Opotow Justice Motives On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Claudia Dalbert About Is and Ought in Research on Belief in a Just World: The Janus-Faced Just-World Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Ju¨rgen Maes, Christian Tarnai, and Julia Schuster Justice Sensitivity as a Risk and Protective Factor in Social Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Nadine Thomas, Anna Baumert, and Manfred Schmitt

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Suspicions of Injustice: The Sense-Making Function of Belief in Conspiracy Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Jan-Willem van Prooijen Interpersonal Justice Justice in Performance Situations: Compromise Between Equity and Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Hans-Werner Bierhoff and Elke Rohmann Perceived Justice in the Division of Family Labor: Antecedents and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Gerold Mikula Retributive Punishment in a Social Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Mario Gollwitzer, Livia Keller, and Judith Braun Forming Fairness Judgments: Why People Favor Unfair Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Bernhard Streicher, Dieter Frey, and Silvia Osswald Organizational Justice Reactions to Organizational Injustice: Counter Work Behaviors and the Insider Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Adrian Furnham and Evelyn M. Siegel Organizational Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Elisabeth Kals and Patrick Jiranek Ecological Justice Justice as a Framework for the Solution of Environmental Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Markus M. Mu¨ller Climate Change and Global Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Janine Bentz-Ho¨lzl and Manfred Brocker International Negotiations on Climate Change: Integrating Justice Psychology and Economics – a Way out of the Normative Blind Alley? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Heidi Ittner and Cornelia Ohl

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Justice and Environmental Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Geoffrey J. Syme Social Conflicts on a Macro-Level Justice by Agreement: Constitutional Economics and its Cultural Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Nils Goldschmidt and Alexander Lenger System Justification: A Motivational Process with Implications for Social Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 John T. Jost, Ido Liviatan, Jojanneke van der Toorn, Alison Ledgerwood, Anesu Mandisodza, and Brian A. Nosek Are the Media Capable of Fair Reporting? Remarks on the Principle of Fairness in Professional Journalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Klaus-Dieter Altmeppen, Klaus Arnold, and Tanja Ko¨ssler Social Identity and Justice in Violent Conflicts – A Dynamic Model of Intergroup Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Ronald Fischer Protective Factors to Strenghten and Foster Sustainable Justice Situation-Specific Forgiveness and Dispositional Forgiveness: A Lifespan Development Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 Mathias Allemand and Marianne Steiner Forgiveness in Close Interpersonal Relationships: A Negotiation Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Tanja M. Gerlach, Dmitrij Agroskin, and Jaap J. A. Denissen Moral Courage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 Silvia Osswald, Dieter Frey, and Bernhard Streicher The Psychology of Deservingness and Acceptance of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 Carolyn L. Hafer Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447

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List of Contributors

Agroskin, Dmitrij, Department of Social Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria Allemand, Mathias, Department of Psychology, University of Zu¨rich, Binzmu¨hlestrasse 14/24, 8050 Zu¨rich, Switzerland Altmeppen, Klaus-Dieter, Department of Journalism, Catholic University Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt, Ostenstraße 26, 85072 Eichsta¨tt, Germany Arnold, Klaus, Department of Communication, University of Trier, Universita¨tsring 15, 54296 Trier, Germany Baumert, Anna, Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Fortstraße 7, 76829 Landau, Germany Bentz-Ho¨lzl, Janine, Department of Political Science, Catholic University Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt, Universita¨tsallee 1, 85072 Eichsta¨tt, Germany Bierhoff, Hans-Werner, Department of Social Psychology, Ruhr-University Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany Braun, Judith, Department of Psychology, Philipps-University Marburg, Gutenbergstraße 18, 35032 Marburg, Germany Brocker, Manfred, Department of Political Science, Catholic University Eichsta¨ttIngolstadt, Universita¨tsallee 1, 85072 Eichsta¨tt, Germany Dalbert, Claudia, Department of Educational Psychology, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Franckeplatz 1, Haus 5, 06099 Halle (Saale), Germany

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Denissen, Jaap, Department of Personality Psychology, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Rudower Chaussee 18, 12489 Berlin, Germany Fischer, Ronald, School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Kelburn Parade, PO Box 600, Wellington 6012, New Zealand Frey, Dieter, Department of Social Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Mu¨nchen, Germany Furnham, Adrian F., Department of Educational Psychology, University College London, Room BW 432, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0A, United Kingdom Gerlach, Tanja, Department of Personality Psychology, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Rudower Chaussee 18, 12489 Berlin, Germany Goldschmidt, Nils, Department of Social Sciences, University of Applied Sciences Munich, Am Stadtpark 20, 81243 Mu¨nchen, Germany Gollwitzer, Mario, Department of Psychology, Philipps-University Marburg, Gutenbergstraße 18, 35032 Marburg, Germany Hafer, Carolyn, Department of Psychology, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Ave., St. Catharines, Ont., L2S 3A1, Canada Ittner, Heidi, Department of Social and Personality Psychology, Otto-von-GuerickeUniversity of Magdeburg, P. O. Box 4120, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany Jiranek, Patrick, Department of Organizational Psychology, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zu¨rich, Switzerland Jost, John T., Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Kals, Elisabeth, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Catholic University Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt, Ostenstraße 26, 85072 Eichsta¨tt, Germany Kazemi, Ali, Center for Social Justice Research, School of Technology and Society, Social Psychology Section, University of Sko¨vde, 541 42 Sko¨vde, Sweden Keller, Livia, Department of Psychology, Philipps-University Marburg, Gutenbergstraße 18, 35032 Marburg, Germany Ko¨ssler, Tanja, Department of Journalism, Catholic University Eichsta¨ttIngolstadt, Ostenstraße 26, 85072 Eichsta¨tt, Germany

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Ledgerwood, Alison, Department of Psychology, University of California at Davis, 134 Young Hall, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA Lenger, Alexander, Global Studies Programme, Institute for Sociology, AlbertLudwigs-University of Freiburg, Rempartstr. 15, 79085 Freiburg, Germany Liviatan, Ido, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2-S-7 Green Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544–1013, USA Maes, Ju¨rgen, Department of Education, Bundeswehr University Munich, WernerHeisenberg-Weg 39, 85577 Neubiberg, Germany Mandisodza, Anesu, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Mikula, Gerold, Department of Psychology, University of Graz, Universita¨tsplatz 2, 8010 Graz, Austria Montada, Leo, Department of Psychology, University of Trier, 54286 Trier, Germany Mu¨ller, Markus M., Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Catholic University Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt, Ostenstraße 26, 85072 Eichsta¨tt, Germany Nosek, Brian A., Social and Cognitive Programs, Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, 102 Gilmer Hall, Box 400400, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Ohl, Cornelia, Department of Economics, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ, Permoserstr. 15, D-04318 Leipzig, Germany Opotow, Susan, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and The Graduate Center, City University of New York, 899 Tenth Avenue, New York, NY 10019, USA Osswald, Silvia, Central Psychological Service of the Bavarian Police, Trautenwolfstraße 4, 80802 Mu¨nchen, Germany Rohmann, Elke, Department of Social Psychology, Ruhr-University Bochum, 44780 Bochum, Germany Schmitt, Manfred, Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Fortstraße 7, 76829 Landau, Germany

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Schuster, Julia, Department of Education, Bundeswehr University Munich, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577 Neubiberg, Germany Siegel, Evelyn M., Catholic University Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt, 85071 Eichsta¨tt, Germany Steiner, Marianne, Department of Psychology, University of Zu¨rich, Binzmu¨hlestraße 14/24, 8050 Zu¨rich, Switzerland Streicher, Bernhard, Department of Social Psychology, Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversity Munich, Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Mu¨nchen, Germany Syme, Geoffrey J., Centre of Planning, Edith Cowan University 270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup Western Australia 6027, Australia Tarnai, Christian, Department of Education, Bundeswehr University Munich, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577 Neubiberg, Germany Thomas, Nadine, Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Fortstraße 7, 76829 Landau, Germany To¨rnblom, Kjell, Center for Social Justice Research, School of Technology and Society, Social Psychology Section, University of Sko¨vde, 541 42 Sko¨vde, Sweden Van der Toorn, Jojanneke, Department of Social Psychology, Yale University, 2 Hillhouse Avenue, p.o. Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520, USA Van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, Faculty of Psychology and Education, VU University Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, Netherlands

Introduction

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The Normative Impact of Empirical Justice Research Leo Montada

Abstract Justice is a normative construct. Widely shared is the opinion that normative truths cannot be proven or clarified empirically. While it is questionable whether truths about justice can be ascertained at all, the impact of empirical justice research is crucial. The argument is specified in 8 theses. 1. The justice motive is an anthropological universal. Humans care about justice. 2. The justice motive is primordial, it is not to reduce to other motives, especially not to self interest. 3. The justice motive as such is not a virtue, it may also instigate manifold new injustices. 4. While the justice motive is universal, the views of what is just and what is unjust are highly diverging. 5. We have no access to an objective truth about justice, we can ascertain only subjective views. 6. Diverging views about justice may cause social conflicts. Basically, all social conflicts are justice conflicts. 7. Disputes about the true justice are less productive than efforts to make peace by reconciling justice conflicts. Various strategies for the settlement of conflicts are to be considered. 8. Only a just peace is a sustainable peace. The conflicting parties have to settle their conflicts by an agreement. If the parties consent to an agreement equally free and equally informed, they will consider the agreement to be just. This does not mean objective, but inter-subjective justice.

Introduction It is neither the aim nor the claim of empirical researchers to determine what is truly just and what is truly unjust. The questions guiding psychological research are others: • What do people consider to be just or unjust? • How divergent or convergent are their convictions about justice?

L. Montada (*) Department of Psychology, University of Trier, Trier, Germany e-mail: [email protected] E. Kals and J. Maes (eds.), Justice and Conflicts, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19035-3_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

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• Which dispositions and which contextual factors have influence on the perceptions and appraisal of justice and injustice? • What is the motivational impact of experienced or observed injustice? • How do people cope with injustices they experience or observe? • How are justice beliefs shaped and how can they be changed? Empirical facts to those questions have, however, normative implications. These implications shall be emphasized and discussed in a sequence of eight theses.

Thesis 1: The Concern for Justice Is an Essential Feature of the Homo Sapiens, It Is What Is Called an Anthropological Universal Claims for justice and protests against injustice are ubiquitous in social life: • Political movements, revolutions, and wars are initiated under the banner of justice. • Justice is a prominent issue in all fields of politics. • The courts are swamped with law suits, and many of their sentences arouse protest or bitterness by those who consider them as unjust. • Perceived injustices are at the core of conflicts in private life. • Victims of misfortune have to cope with the perceived injustice of their fate. To capture the omnipresence of the justice motive, we merely need to bring to mind how many acts, facts and conditions we appraise with regard to justice (Montada, 2003): • Distributions, e.g. of gains and losses, of wealth and opportunities, of rights and duties, of burdens and risks. • Role relations and all other interactions where goods and services, love and loyalty, recognition, or, else, devaluations, hostilities and retributions are exchanged. • Evaluations of achievements of all kinds, also evaluations of actions – heroic as well as criminal ones. • Normative standards in social systems, e.g. maxims in constitutions, single laws, institutions, the norms of religions, social role standards and cultural rules for social interactions and relationships. • The procedures in elections and in decision making, wherever they may take place, in states or in clubs, in parliaments or universities, in courts or families, and whatever the decision may be about. • Even personal fates, which are deemed deserved or undeserved, depending on the attributions of responsibility. Appraisals of justice emotionalize and they have motivational impetus. Humans are averse to injustice. They have a justice motive (Ross & Miller, 2002). This is an essential contribution of justice research to anthropology.

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Thesis 2: The Justice Motive Is a “Primordial” Motive; It Cannot Be Reduced to Other Motives, Especially Not to Self-Interest, as Postulated in the Economic Theory of Behavior The behavior theory of economics shall make us believe that people only care about justice if it is to their own advantage – according to the credo that maximization of personal profit is the cardinal motive of man (Ramb & Tietzel, 1993). This idea of man as homo oeconomicus legitimizes selfish actions by “naturalization,” by assuming that it is the nature of man. This conception of man is deceptive and it is falsified (Green & Shapiro, 1994; Kals, 1999; Kals, Maes, & Becker, 2001; Maes, 2004). Based on the economic theory of behavior, hypotheses are offered which kind of self-interest may be the true motive for actions seemingly motivated by concern for justice. For a long time, an empirical examination of such hypotheses has not even been attempted in economics, which is typical for dogmatic belief systems (Montada, 1998). Ironically, this dogma has infected justice psychology, too (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). No doubt, the “flag of justice” often serves to mask self-interest. Politicians may in reality care about their popularity, employers about the productivity of their employees, which declines when they feel treated unjustly. However, a merely strategical concern for “justice” proves that the actors believe that justice is an important concern of others, which they try to abuse in a “parasitic” way for their selfish goals (Elster, 1989). Whether a person cares about justice categorically or for strategic reasons can be found out empirically by assessing actors’ motives. In psychological research the existence of primordial, irreducible justice motives has frequently been verified, intuitively convincing, for instance, in cases of injustices suffered by other people, when indicators of the justice motive are assessed and no confounded selfish motives are uncovered. Resentment is not only evidenced in case of self-experienced injustices, but also in cases of injustice suffered by other people. Existential guilt feelings were observed with people living in relatively fortunate conditions when they become aware of the bad fate, the harm and hardships suffered by foreign people. Both resentment and existential guilt stimulate prosocial commitments aiming at reducing these injustices (Montada, Schneider, & Reichle, 1988). Surely, the justice motive can be confounded with self-interest, but often, it comes into conflict with self-interest. Using experimental games (as the “Ultimatum Game,” “Public Goods” or “Resource Dilemma” games), critical economists, social and behavioral scientists have revealed a plethora of phenomena which do not fit into the “Rational Choice Model” of economic theory, phenomena which can only be understood by assuming justice motives (Fehr & Schwarz, 2003; Gerhard 2007). For instance, people surrender personal advantages and take considerable costs only to retaliate unjust actions of others (Fehr & G€achter, 2002).

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Summing up, the justice motive cannot be reduced to self-interest, it is a primordial motive: people care about justice – for themselves and also for others, some more, some less, according to various individual dispositions (Dalbert & Umlauft, 2009; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005).

Thesis 3: The Justice Motive Is Not a Virtue, Unless It Is Cultivated By far, not every action powered by justice motives is commendable. Under the flag of “justice,” dire wrong was and is done. Actors on all social levels “justify” their violence, their crimes, their selfishness. A large ratio of aggressions aim at restoring justice – surely, not all are appropriate (Montada, 2007b). Blaming innocent victims was observed in many experiments and studies (Lerner, 1980; Montada & Lerner, 1998). This injustice is done by subjects who try to preserve their Belief in a Just World, which is or would be threatened by the fact that innocent people are victimized. Belief in a just world can be assumed to be a resource (Dalbert, 2001). The defense of this resource is possible by blaming the victims for being responsible for their victimization (Maes & Montada, 1989; Reichle, Schneider, & Montada, 1998). Moreover, many attempts to prevent or to correct injustices result in new injustices. Typically, laws and policies are established to remove existing injustices. Quite often, however, they create new injustices. Some examples may illustrate this statement: • Justice for the defendants may mean injustice for the victims of crimes. When the “benefit of doubt” is granted to the defendant (which doubtlessly is a significant progress in the history of criminal law), the victim’s claim for punishment and compensation may be violated, assuming that the victim has no doubt that the defendant is guilty (Orth, 2000). • Legal punishment for crimes may be deserved, but it also bears the risk of unjust social discrimination of those close to the perpetrator, for instance his or her children, who are not responsible for the punished deed at all. • Are the typical affirmative action policies a just compensation for the unquestionable historical disadvantages of women in the labor market? There are good reasons for efforts to improve the ratio of women in the labor market, but is it just to compensate historical disadvantages by policies which privilege young women who have personally not been disadvantaged so far in competition with young men who have personally not been privileged? • Is raising taxes for caused pollution a just measure? Pollution causes risks and costs for others who do not profit from these polluting activities, e.g. industrial production, air-conditioning, car-driving. Raising taxes for pollution reduces the unjust externalization of costs, but may also cause new injustices, for instance because rich people are able to pay these taxes without the slightest reduction of

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their polluting activities, whereas poorer people may have to give up or restrict these significantly (cf. Montada & Kals, 2000). The justice motive needs culture. It requires actors’ readiness and the capacity to deal with the complexities of the social world and their awareness of the difficulties to anticipate effects and side-effects of every action or measure (enacting rules, laws, policies) which is aimed at establishing or restoring justice. Looking at the branched systemic effects of every intervention, it is not easy to avoid new injustices (cf. Ittner & Montada, 2009). Efforts to establish justice have to be diligently checked for the risks of new injustices. Hence, experience, expertise, and intelligence are needed. Moreover, wisdom is required in appraising the validity of justice beliefs and claims (cf. Montada, 2008, 2010b). The reasons for this plea shall become obvious by the next thesis.

Thesis 4: While the Justice Motive Is Universal, the Views about What Is Just and What Is Unjust Are Not at all Universally Shared Whatever the object of appraisal may be – distributions, social exchanges, evaluations of deeds and misdeeds, achievements and failures, policies, laws and other normative standards, personal fates, procedures in elections and in decision making – when we ask heterogeneous samples, we get divergent opinions about what is unjust and what would be just. This is especially true when specific cases are appraised, but we observe large divergencies also with respect to general maxims of justice, e.g. the various principles of just distribution. The opinions vary between cultures, contexts and individuals. Is only one of these true and all others are wrong? Do the normative disciplines have more uniform answers, more consensus regarding the question “What is just and what is unjust?” This question is controversially disputed in philosophy (e.g., Barry, 1989; Schmidt, 2000; Walzer, 1983), in the philosophy of law (Zippelius, 1994), and in political philosophy (Gosepath, 2004). Certainly, equality is widely accepted as the basic principle of justice (Koller, 1995). But what precisely is meant with equality? Is everyone to be treated equally or are only equals to be treated equally? The debates about justice start with the question which inequalities are relevant and have to be considered. The divergent answers to this question provoke discord. For instance, which inequalities can be seen as relevant concerning the just distribution of goods, burdens, rights, and duties: gender, age, social status, kinship, national, ethnical, or religious memberships, needs (self-caused needs included or not?), merits, acquired rights, skills and expertise, fates, responsibilities (e.g., for diseases or injuries which produce high costs for the community), etc.? What is to

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be applied in which cases? Or should various relevant inequalities be accounted for in combination – according to which formula? In the ongoing disputes, arguments are inspired by egalitarianism, liberalism, social welfarism, and utilitarianism. Human and civil rights are also a basis for pleas. Since Thomas Hobbes (1651, 1970), mutual advantage is a prominent criterion for choosing justice rules. However, apart from direct exchange relationships it is open to question, whose advantage is to be considered at all. To this day, we have interesting debates among philosophers and within the political arena but no consent: The preferred standards of distributive justice vary between and within cultures. Walzer (1983) has somewhat neutralized the justice problems with inequalities by his concept of “complex equality,” meaning that distributions in different “spheres of justice” (material wealth, social recognition in various contexts, political power, education, kinship and love, recreation time, etc.) are not perfectly correlated. Thus, a lower rank in one sphere may be compensated by a higher one within another sphere. Taking into account that the subjective importance of spheres varies, the subjectively perceived overall inequalities may be reduced. Similar questions are discussed in all other objects of justice appraisals, mentioned before. Likewise, when evaluating exchange relationships or accomplishments, heroic and criminal deeds, specific inequalities of actors are taken into account. The same is true for voting rights: Think of acquired rights, quota systems, imparted rights to veto, the weighting of votes, or think of all the arguments against political referenda. Conclusion: “Equality” is to specify. Divergent specifications are debatable and they are the cause for disputes and conflicts. A look at the codified constitutions and legal codes of states, as well as the normative rules and maxims of religions, communities and organizations, the charta of human rights also gives evidence of large existing divergencies: • • • •

The constitutions and legal codes of states are highly diverging. Every law can be criticized on the basis of some justice principle. Legal codes may violate some human rights or laws of some religion. The charta of human rights contravenes the normative traditions of cultures. For instance, may the dignity of human beings be determined universally or does it have to be specified according to culturally shared values or to individual values as formulated, for instance, in living wills (Montada, 2010b)? • Different cultures have, of course, diverging conceptions of justice, of ethics, of social roles and conventions, diverging standards of respectful behavior, of honor etc. Cultures are definable by their normative specifics.

All these codes of normative rules reflect formerly or currently predominant views of justice within social units and all may have an impact on shaping the sense of justice of individuals and of collectives. Within pluralistic societies, many of these diverging sources are available and may serve people to find their personal normative orientation.

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Thesis 5: We Have No Access to an Objective Truth about Justice; We Can Ascertain only Subjective Views The crucial question is whether the empirical fact of divergent convictions is normatively irrelevant, because these are subjective convictions and not normative truths. The counter-questions are: Do we have access to an objective truth at all, or do we only have access to subjective beliefs about the truth? The belief that the truth was conveyed to humans by divine revelation is also a subjective belief, which may be shared by more or less large collectives. All we can learn about justice has the status of subjective beliefs, which may be more or less well reasoned. This also holds true for ethical discourses in philosophy, aiming at gaining knowledge of universal ethical truths (Apel, 1976). We do not have empirical evidence that heterogeneously composed discourse groups come to identical results. Moreover, as Habermas (1993) has argued, the justification of the validity of an abstract moral maxim or principle is to be distinguished from the justification of decisions in concrete cases where competing principles are considered relevant with good reason. Nevertheless, everybody is speaking of justice in the singular – the justice – as if one single view of justice would be the valid one in general or in a concrete case and had to be acknowledged and shared by everybody else (R€uthers, 1991). We all have normative convictions which we believe to be “true,” or even “sacred” and “not negotiable.” And we tend to prefer mates, friends and peers who share our convictions. Some may be shared by large collectives; they are, however, not shared universally. Once again, generally approved truths about justice – suggested by the exclusive use of the singular the justice – cannot be identified, neither empirically, nor normatively. What is true or not cannot be decided objectively, it is a matter of subjective convictions. And we don’t know of any person or institution that were globally recognized as the authority to decide what is just and what is unjust. Consequently, the question what is just and what is unjust is debatable and may cause social conflicts. Within social units, conflicts are reduced when convictions are widely shared and when the decisions of institutions (legislators, courts) or personal authorities (priests, arbitrators) are broadly recognized. Trust in the justice of constitutional bodies (parliaments, supreme courts, courts) has the same effect (W€urtenberger, 1984).

Thesis 6: Diverging Views about Justice May Cause Social Conflicts. All Social Conflicts Are Basically Justice Conflicts The eminent impact of divergent convictions of justice becomes evident by the fact that all social conflicts are basically justice conflicts. It is a widespread assumption that social conflicts result from incompatible goals, interests, opinions, beliefs, etc.

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However, such incompatibilities between persons, groups and other social entities are not sufficient to cause conflicts: • Diverging goals may be considered as legitimate or as an offense. • Diverging views may be appreciated as worthy of consideration, or, for instance, as disrespectful or insulting. • Diverging religious beliefs may be tolerated as a matter of legitimate personal freedom or condemned as a betrayal or as an affront to a community. • Fair competition is not a social conflict. If all actors in competitive markets and sports are considered to behave legitimately, pursuing their legitimate selfinterest, frustrations and losses are possible, but they do not evoke resentment. There are winners and losers, but not victimizers and victims. The losers may have performed poorly, they may have been unfortunate, but they have nothing to reproach the winners for, unless they believe that the competition has not been carried out fairly. Being treated unjustly is quite another experience than having lost a fair game. Social conflicts result from perceived illegitimate and, insofar, unjust behavior of other actors, from violated or threatened normative expectations of how other people, groups, agencies, authorities, companies, etc. have to behave. People may expect that others meet the normative standards, entitlements and claims which they, personally, believe to be just. This is a new definition of social conflict. In their chapter in this book, T€ornblom and Kazemi cite ten definitions of conflict by prominent authors from various academic disciplines, highlighting different aspects of conflicts (Box 1). In my view, neither of these definitions refers necessary or sufficient conditions or reasons for a social conflict. By far not every divergency, not every incompatible or competing interest does end in a conflict. When they do end in a conflict and when they do not? The sole answer I can find is that conflicts arise when at least one party perceives own subjectively legitimate normative expectations violated or threatened by illegitimate actions or omissions of another party. Searching for the common core of all social conflicts, we will find manifest or latent reproaches of illegitimate actions or omissions or even of illegitimate thoughts and attitudes – one-sided or reciprocal reproaches. It makes a crucial difference, whether divergent views, values, beliefs, opinions, convictions of others are considered legitimate or not. The same holds true in case of divergent or incompatible needs, interests, goals of actors. And, of course, it holds true for incompatible behavior as can be illustrated in sport or in the markets: As long as nobody breaks the rules, we have legitimate competitions, not conflicts. Normative expectations are present in every social interaction, even in virtual ones as those between authors and readers of a text about justice. We become aware of our expectations when they get threatened or violated. The normative contents of those expectations may have various sources: human rights, a legal code, the imperatives and bans of a religion, the culture-bound

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standards of justice in specific situations, formal or implicit contracts, etc. Crucial is the fact that actors consider them as legitimate and as rightfully to be claimed. The key symptom of conflicts is resentment. Resentment has three conditions: (1) perceived unjust (illegitimate) behavior of actors, (2) the attribution of responsibility to the actors (meaning that they would have been able and free to act in another way and that they have intended the effects of their behavior or could at least foresee them) and (3) the lack of a convincing justification for the norm violation (Deutsch, 2006; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000). Perceived injustice instigates resentment, reproaches, wishes for retaliation, or claims for compensation or punishment. A look at aggression research reveals that it is not mere frustration that instigates aggressive tendencies, but only arbitrary, “illegitimate” frustration (Bierhoff, 1998; Moore, 1978; Pastore, 1952). Relative deprivation instigates aggression if it is considered unjust (Crosby, 1982). Aggression theories which emphasize anger as emotional antecedent of aggression share this basic assumption (Berkowitz, 1993). Aggression may have other motives, e.g. selfishness, envy, or striving for power, but, no doubt, resentment is one of the motives of aggression. Conflicts will become manifest (1) when “the victims” reproach “the perpetrators” for their behavior, (2) and “the perpetrators” do neither change their behavior, (3) nor excuse it, (4) nor justify it convincingly, (5) but ignore or refuse the reproaches. The latter is to be expected when they consider their behavior as justified, e.g. by legal, moral, or social norms, by legitimate self-interest, or as a just retaliation for an antecedent behavior of the claimant. In established conflicts, all parties consider their own behavior as just or legitimate and reproach the behavior of the adversaries. Who is the victim and who is the perpetrator is often a matter of “punctuations” in an ongoing sequence of interactions.

Thesis 7: Making Peace by Reconcilement of Conflicts about Justice Is Much More Productive than Fighting about the Truth of Diverging Justice Beliefs Disputes about the truth about justice are not productive. An objective, “ultimate” truth cannot be defined nor claimed. Therefore, a change of perspective is to deliberate: from the strife for the truth about justice to efforts to reconcile conflicts about justice. As conflicts stem from subjective “truths,” the objective truth would not even be relevant if we were able to find it out, unless it would be accepted as true by all conflict parties. For appeasing conflicts, it is sufficient if the conflict parties attain more convergence of their subjective “truths.”

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Strategies for the Settlement of Conflicts I would like to emphasize mediation as a procedure to analyze and to settle conflicts. Most of the relevant knowledge is compiled in the literature on conflict mediation. It offers a broad spectrum of procedural options, which are based on empirical, mostly psychological research – on justice believes and motives, on constructive and destructive forms of communication, on aggression, on emotions and their mental regulation, on creativity, which is needed for the generation of options for the settlement of a conflict, on cognitive biases, which may obstruct a constructive settlement, etc. (Montada & Kals, 2007). These bodies of knowledge should be available for professional mediators, they can, however, also be used by conflict parties when no mediator is involved in the settlement of their conflict. There are various options for the settlement of conflicts. I will mention and comment on some basic strategies.

Making Conflicting Normative Expectations Converge If the assumption is valid that social conflicts basically result from incompatible normative expectations or claims – which are conceivable as justice claims (Montada, 2007a) –, making conflicting convictions converge is the self-evident strategy for settling conflicts. This can be illustrated by the fact that sincere apologies by a norm violator have a verifiable pacifying effect. Why? As Goffman (1971) has emphasized, by apologies the perpetrators express that they fully share the victims’ view of the case. They affirm the violated norm as a valid ought, they concede to have offended the norm, to be responsible for their action or omission, that they are blameworthy because their offense was not justified. Moreover, the perpetrators concede that the victim is free to accept or reject their apology. It is empirically proven that sincere apologies reconcile victims (as well as judges and observers) and reduce their resentment and their desire for retribution (Bernhardt, 2001; Ohbuchi, Agarie, & Kameda, 1989). Thereby, a complete consent about the origin of the conflict is expressed, and the conflict is settled. (1) Convergence may be imparted by authorities who are recognized and whose justice is trusted by all conflicting parties: religious or political leaders, courts, authorities in a clan, in a community, or in the working context the conflicting parties belong to. For example, whoever puts trust in the jurisdiction of courts and judges will accept their sentence, even as the loser: the conflict then is settled. If this trust is lacking, it will be different. Then the losers deem the sentence unjust and might appeal or they will pursue their conflict on another field; they strive for retaliation, or, else, they suffer the subjective injustice helplessly. Active strife for justice might be given up as in vain, but the relationship between the adversaries remains poisoned, the conflict continues to be a mortgage for future exchanges, or the exchanges are broken off.

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(2) Convergence can be achieved by means of normative discourses, which must not have the objective to find the normative truth. In conflict mediation they merely serve to convey the insight that good reasons can be put forward not only for one’s own views and claims but, equally, for the opponent’s views and claims, and, maybe, also for further stances that could be taken in the case. The aims are to convey the insight that a dilemma or polylemma is on hand and to bring the conflict parties to phrase not only the arguments in favor of the own position but also to deliberate the counter-arguments as well as the arguments in favor of the position held by the opponents (Montada, 2010a). Settling conflicts is made easier when the opponents acknowledge that divergent norms or principles of justice may be advocated with good reasons, and, consequently, that neither party is solely right or wrong. If the opponents recognize that their conflict reflects a normative dilemma, they no longer view the position of the other side as completely illegitimate and their own position as the only legitimate one. Two examples for conflicts about distributions and losses may illustrate the point: • Should the inheritance of parents be divided equally among their children, or equitably according to their merits (e.g., their provided care for the parents, their contributions to the social status of the family), or according to their neediness (e.g., their income or the number of children). • Which employees should be dismissed first when business is running low? Several justice principles may be considered: seniority, acquired merits by previous performances, current performance level, neediness (e.g., number of dependent children), gender, age, the amount of wages to pay, etc.? Or should nobody be dismissed, and the worktime as well as the wages of all employees cut, proportionally or not, etc.? In normative discourses, the conflicting positions or claims for justice are both supported and criticized. When good arguments are put forward, the opponents may relativize their views and claims. They recognize that none of the conflicting claims is solely valid. This is not a normative relativism meaning “No norm or normative maxim is valid!” In contrast, it is the insight into a normative dilemma, meaning “No normative maxim has exclusive validity. Many maxims may be applied with good reason in the specific case at stake.” Applying, for instance, one single principle of distributive justice would violate all other principles that might be also taken into consideration with some good reason. When the opponents come to realize that a dilemma is underlying their conflict, the conflict will be attenuated, diluted – a precondition for future cooperation. It is the wisdom of institutions to consider and integrate various principles of justice in their regulations and decisions (Elster, 1992). The social market economy, for instance, is an attempt to harmonize the right of all citizens to free economic activities with the maxims of the social welfare state. Rawls’ well-known “Maximin principle” is also a suggestion to combine the freedom to economic activities – which

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produces common wealth – with the entitlement of every citizen to participate in the common prosperity (Rawls, 1971). (3) Also in trials, normative discourses would contribute to reconciliation. Sentences produce winners and losers. Only if also the losers view the law, the judge, and the sentence as just, the conflict will be settled. Judges can try to convince the losers that their sentence is just, or at least to justify as legally correct. To that end they have to give voice to all parties, make sure that they have understood their views and positions, and take time and effort to justify their views of the law, the case, and their judgment with convincing arguments. If that is done in a respectful way, the losers get the impression of being treated in a fair manner. This impression triggers “the fair procedure effect” (cf. Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) meaning that even unfavorable sentences are accepted without resentment. Judges have to obey the law. But the law may not adequately fit the essential features and contents of an actual conflict and the law may be criticized as unjust with some good reason. In that case, judges could refer the parties to possibilities of extra-judicial reconciliation, e.g. in a mediation process, in which they are not bound to a law that is problematic concerning the case.

Reappraising the Personal Importance Attributed to the Conflict, the Contingent Losses and Impairments, and the Perceived Injustice Transcending the actual conflict is the general advice for reappraising the personal weight the opponents attribute to the conflict, its consequences and the personally suffered injustices. Several strategies may be used to transcend a conflict (Montada & Kals, 2007). • Hot conflicts typically cause a mental constriction. The opponents are “out of their minds” insofar as they are no longer aware of the whole spectrum of their important concerns and all facets of their personal self-concept. The suffered injustice, the blameworthiness of the opponents, retaliation, enforcing one’s claims become the dominant mental topics. Making the opponents aware again of the whole spectrum of their important personal concerns and values will resolve this constriction. Consequently, they become able to recognize that continued efforts to enforce their positions in the conflict might generate many opportunity costs with respect to their important personal concerns. This might open their mind to think about options for a constructive settlement of the conflict. • Exploring opportunities for positive exchanges with the opponents is one category of such options. One of the important shifts of perspective in mediation is that from negative exchanges to the opportunities of positive exchanges, positive with respect to important concerns of the parties. It is easy to create win-win outcomes when opportunities of positive exchange do exist or can be generated. • Including unsettled previous conflicts in an overall solution. Frequently, the history of a conflict is the history of reciprocal retributions that are not intended

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to yield own gains but solely to harm the adversary. Giving them up mutually does not have costs, but only gains. • Considering the concerns of third parties affected by the conflict, as e.g. the concerns of the children in divorce conflicts. This will overcome the egocentrism in conflicts and open the opponents’ minds for the fact that their conflict causes problems with others who might not at all be responsible for the conflict. • Quite frequently, the opponents have some ambivalences with their own positions they are fighting for. Making these aware may change their attitudes in the conflict. These are productive strategies for settling conflicts and making win-win outcomes possible. I will not say more to this issue, because a second path is more important for the topic of justice.

Redefining, Reorganizing or Dissolving the Relationship Conflicts may result from diverging views of the relationship between the opponents and diverging claims of the opponents concerning the kind of their relationship. A typical structure of such conflicts is described as social role conflicts (Joas, 1973), which occur in all kinds of social interactions. Miller (2001) emphasizes the role of violated expectations of respectful behavior in a broad spectrum of social conflicts. Diverging views and claims with respect to the kind and structure of the relationship may cause conflicts in families, peer groups, neighborhoods, organizations, working contexts, between citizens and administrations, between majorities and minority groups, and between states. These conflicts give reason to reflect and, if needed, to modify the kind of relationship. A redefinition of mutual role expectations, a clear assignment of responsibilities, e.g. at the work place, may be helpful. In other cases, conflicts can be settled by drawing borderlines – fences between neighbors, safe and respected frontiers between states. In even other cases a separation might be a productive option, e.g. a divorce, or a split – off of a family enterprise, or the granting of autonomy to a province with an ethnic minority.

Thesis 8: The Aim of Conflict Settlement Is a Just Peace Conflicts are social exchanges. They result from perceived violations or threats of normative expectations and subjective entitlements. Conflicts may be costly for one or for all parties. They may be a mortgage for future exchanges or even end in lasting hostility. Productive and sustainable conflict resolutions presuppose that a new basis and/or new contents for the relationship and for exchanges will be found or created. In the agreement, it might be specified whether and how past impairments will be regulated, what shall be exchanged in the future, and which

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rules shall be observed in future exchanges. These questions have to be answered with reference to justice. A conflict is reconciled when the resentment of the conflicting parties is dissolved. Unquestionably, only a just peace is a sustainable peace – an unjust “peace” would be a cause for new conflicts. However, it is not objective justice which is required for peace, but inter-subjective justice, meaning that all parties consider the settlement of their conflict as being a just one. Sentences and decisions by authorities carry the risk that they produce winners and losers, and that the losers feel treated unjustly. Settling conflicts by an agreement, by a contract, is the preferable option.

What Is the Base of Justice in Contracts? Contracts are regarded to be just when the parties are equally free to consent or not to consent and when the parties are equally well informed about all relevant facts and risks (Nozick, 1974). If the parties consent to an agreement equally free and equally informed, they will consider the agreement to be just. This does not mean objective, but inter-subjective justice. A contract which the parties have agreed upon freely and well-informed cannot be unjust to one of the parties. However, justice would be at risk if relevant information had been withheld to one of the contracting parties, or if pressure had been exerted, or if a party had not been free to refuse the contract on account of some predicament, e.g. neediness. Therefore, unequal power, unequal neediness, unequal abilities to grasp complex information are risks which may jeopardize the justice of agreements.1 These risks can be reduced if the agreements are negotiated under the guidance of mediators who have the duty to actively balance such inequalities. Mediators also have to take care of the justice of contracts with regard to affected third parties, including communities. A possible misunderstanding should be avoided. The assumed autonomy or freedom of the parties does not mean that they are or feel free for every agreement. They may have normative convictions which they consider holy and not negotiable. They may feel bound by religious norms, by expectations of significant others (family members, peers, authorities, communities, etc.), by expectations of an organization which they represent in the actual negotiation (e.g., an employers association, a union, a citizen’s initiative) that they do not want to disappoint; they have personal concerns which they will not give up for an agreement and they may

1

Because contracts are of eminent importance for peace in social life, many legal norms have been established which specify the obligations of the contracting parties. Specific legal rules have been established to protect the supposedly less powerful or less informed parties in business contracts.

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feel responsible for third parties and their concerns. All this in mind, what they agree upon might be their free decision which they are responsible for. Equal freedom to consent or not to consent and equal information as sources of justice have also been the basic idea in social contract theories of the state (Kersting, 1994), beginning with Hobbes (1651, 1970): Free citizens agree upon the constitution and the legal code of a state. This agreement constitutes the justice of the constitution and the legal code which will be observed by the citizens because they are just. According to this model, majority decisions in parliaments can only be an “ultima ratio.” They bear the risk that the loosing minority considers the decision as an “octroy.” An octroy is a one-sided enforcement; it is rejected as unjust and intensifies the antecedent conflicts. Who will voluntarily observe laws which he or she views as unjust, especially if there is hope that the law will be cancelled after the next elections, when new majorities will be in power. Laws with expected half-life periods of 1 or 2 years have no binding force. Agreement is the prerequisite for their acknowledgment as just. Last but not least: Agreements shall not be unjust to third parties. In the settlement of conflicts, the opponents are considered autonomous to negotiate an agreement. However, appraising the justice of contracts would be incomplete without having a look at their impact on third parties. Adverse effects on third parties would raise new justice problems. Contracts may be fair with respect to the exchanges between the contracting parties but may be seriously unfair with respect to third parties or a community. For instance, cartel agreements may be fair for the contracting parties, but they are made at the expense of others. Therefore, it is prudent to expand the view from the contracting parties to the impact of an agreement on third parties and the public. Contracts at the cost of third parties are externally unjust and a cause for new conflicts. Extending this maxim, it is obvious that the contracting parties have to observe the existing law.

References Apel, K. O. (1976). Transformation der Philosophie. Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft (Vol. 2) [Transformation in philosophy. Apriority of a community based on communication]. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Barry, B. (1989). Theories of justice. Berkeley: University of California Press. Berkowitz, L. (1993). Aggression. Its causes, consequences, and control. New York: Mac Graw Hill. Bernhardt, K. (2001). Ein kognitives Trainingsprogramm zur Steuerung von Emp€ orung [A cognitive training to regulate outrage]. Doctoral dissertation, University of Trier, Trier, Germany. Retrieved from http://ub-dok.uni-trier.de/diss/diss11/2001 ¨ rger, Aggression und Gerechtigkeit [Anger, aggression, and justice]. Bierhoff, H.-W. (1998). A In H.-W. Bierhoff & U. Wagner (Eds.), Aggression und Gewalt: Ph€ anomene, Ursachen und Interventionen (pp. 26–47). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Crosby, F. A. (1982). Relative deprivation and working women. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Dalbert, C. (2001). The justice motive as a personal resource. New York: Kluwer. Dalbert, C., & Umlauft, S. (2009). The role of the justice motive in economic decision making. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 172–180. Deutsch, M. (2006). Justice and conflict. In M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, & E. C. Marcus (Eds.), The handbook of conflict resolution (pp. 43–68). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Elster, J. (1989). The cement of society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elster, J. (1992). Local justice. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Fehr, E., & G€achter, G. (2002). Altruistic punishments in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140. € Fehr, E., & Schwarz, G. (Eds.). (2003). Psychologische Grundlagen der O¨konomie: Uber Vernunft und Eigennutz hinaus [Psychological basics of economics: It’s not only about rationality and self-interest]. Z€urich: Verlag Neue Z€ uricher Zeitung. Gerhard, C. (2007). Gemeinwohl vs. Eigennutz [Welfare vs. self-interest]. Saarbr€ucken: VDM Verlag Dr. M€uller. Goffman, E. (1971). Relations in public: Microstudies of the public order. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Gosepath, S. (2004). Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus [Even justice. Basics of a liberal egalitarianism]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Green, D. P., & Shapiro, I. (1994). Pathologies of rational choice theory. New Haven: Yale University Press. Habermas, J. (1993). Justification and application. Cambridge: MIT Press. Hobbes, T. (1651, 1970). Leviathan. London: Dent. Ittner, H., & Montada, L. (2009). Gerechtigkeit und Umweltpolitik [Justice an environmental policy]. Umweltpsychologie, 13(1), 35–51. Joas, H. (1973). Die gegenw€ artige Lage der soziologischen Rollentheorie [The current situation of the sociological role theory]. Frankfurt am Main: Athen€aum. Kals, E. (1999). Der Mensch nur ein zweckrationaler Entscheider? [Is the human deciding purpose-rationally only?]. Zeitschrift f€ ur Politische Psychologie, 3, 267–293. Kals, E., Maes, J., & Becker, R. (2001). The overestimated impact of self-interest and the underestimated impact of justice motives. Trames. Journal of Humanities and Social Scienes, 55, 269–287. Kersting, W. (1994). Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags [The political philosophy of the social contract]. Darmstadt: WBG. Koller, P. (1995). Soziale Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit [Social equality and justice]. In H. P. M€uller & B. Wegener (Eds.), Soziale Ungleichheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit (pp. 53–80). Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press. Maes, J. (2004). Gerechtigkeit und eigennutz: Macht und mythos zweier motive [Justice and selfinterest: Myth and reality of two motives]. In K. Horstmann, M. H€uttenhoff, & H. Koriath (Eds.), Gerechtigkeit – eine Illusion? Anst€ oße zur interdisziplin€ aren Verst€ andigung (Vol. 5, pp. 125–143). M€unster: Lit-Verlag. Maes, J., & Montada, L. (1989). Verantwortlichkeit f€ ur “Schicksalsschl€age”: Eine Pilotstudie [Responsibility for “strokes of fate”: A pilot study]. Psychologische Beitr€ age, 31, 107–124. Mikula, G., & Wenzel, M. (2000). Justice and social conflicts. International Journal of Psychology, 35(2), 126–135. Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual Reviews Psychology, 52, 527–553. Montada, L. (1998). Justice: Just a rational choice? Social Justice Research, 12, 81–101. Montada, L. (2003). Justice, equity, and fairness in human relations. In J. Weiner, T. Millon, & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 537–568). Hoboken: Wiley. Montada, L. (2007a). Justice conflicts and the justice of conflict resolution. In K. T€ornblom & R. Vermunt (Eds.), Distributive and procedural justice. Research and applications (pp. 255–268). Burlington: Ashgate/Glower. Montada, L. (2007b). Emotions based aggression motives. In G. Steffgen & M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), Emotions and aggressive behavior (pp. 19–37). G€ ottingen: Hogrefe.

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Montada, L. (2008). Moral education by mediation. In F. Oser & W. Veugelers (Eds.), Getting involved. Global citizenship development and sources of moral values (pp. 251–264). Amsterdam: Sense Publishers. Montada, L. (2010a). Mediation – Pfade zum Frieden [Mediation – Establishing peace]. Erw€ agen, Wissen, Ethik, 20(4), 549–560. Montada, L. (2010b). Replik. Unterschiedliche Mediationsmodelle – Ein Fall f€ur Mediation? [Replica. Different methods of mediation – Can mediation help?]. Erw€ agen, Wissen, Ethik, 20(4), 586–607. Montada, L., & Kals, E. (2000). Political implications of psychological research on ecological justice and pro-environmental behaviors. International Journal of Psychology, 35, 168–176. Montada, L., & Kals, E. (2007). Mediation. Ein Lehrbuch auf psychologischer Grundlage. [Mediation. A textbook based on psychology]. Weinheim: PsychologieVerlagsUnion. Montada, L., & Lerner, M. J. (Eds.). (1998). Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world. New York: Plenum Press. Montada, L., Schneider, A., & Reichle, B. (1988). Emotionen und Hilfsbereitschaft [Emotions and helpfulness]. In H. W. Bierhoff & L. Montada (Eds.), Altruismus – Bedingungen der Hilfsbereitschaft (pp. 130–153). G€ ottingen: Hogrefe. Moore, B. (1978). Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt. London: Macmillan. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state and utopia. New York: Basic Books. Ohbuchi, K., Agarie, N., & Kameda, M. (1989). Apology as aggression control: Its role in mediation appraisal of and response to harm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(2), 219–227. Orth, U. (2000). Strafgerechtigkeit und Bew€ altigung krimineller Viktimisierung [Justice of punishment and coping with victimization of criminals]. Mainz: Weisser Ring Verlag. Pastore, N. (1952). The role of arbitrariness in the frustration – Aggression hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47, 728–731. Ramb, B.-T., & Tietzel, M. (Eds.). (1993). O¨konomische Verhaltenstheorie [Economical behavioral theory]. M€ unchen: Framz Vahlen. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Reichle, B., Schneider, A., & Montada, L. (1998). How do observers of victimization preserve their believe in a just world: Cognitively or actionally? Findings from a longitudinal study. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world. Critical issues in social justice (pp. 55–64). New York: Plenum Press. Ross, M., & Miller, D. T. (2002). The justice motive in everyday life. New York: Cambridge University Press. R€ uthers, B. (1991). Das Ungerechte an der Gerechtigkeit: Defizite eines Begriffs [The injustice of justice: Problems of defining the term]. Z€ urich: Edition Interfrom. Schmidt, V. A. (2000). Bedingte Gerechtigkeit. Soziologische Analysen und philosophische Theorien [Contingent justice. Sociological analyses and philosophical theories]. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer, M., Maes, J., & Arbach, D. (2005). Justice sensitivity: Assessment and location in the personality space. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 21, 202–211. Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural justice: A psychological analysis. New York: Wiley. Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). Social justice in a diverse society. Boulder: Westview Press. Walster, E., Walster, G. W., & Berscheid, E. (1978). Equity: Theory and research. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality. New York: Basic Books. W€ urtenberger, T. (1984). Legitimit€at und Gesetz [Legitimicy and law]. In B. R€uthers & K. Stern (Eds.), Freiheit und Verantwortung im Verfassungsstaat (pp. 533–550). M€unchen: C. H. Beck. Zippelius, R. (1994). Rechtsphilosophie [Legal philosophy]. M€unchen: C. H. Beck.

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Advances in Justice Conflict Conceptualization: A New Integrative Framework Kjell T€ornblom and Ali Kazemi

Abstract A thorough understanding of conflicts is crucial as conflicts may be destructive to the welfare of individuals, groups, and societies. Conflicts are closely related to justice concerns in that perceived injustices give rise to conflicts and destructive conflicts give rise to injustices. However, the notion of conflict is rather underdeveloped and the definition of it often taken for granted in justice theory and research. In this chapter we propose a useful conceptualization and classification of justice conflicts. Specifically, five types of conceptual distributive justice conflicts, five types of social distributive justice conflicts, and three types of a mixture of both are defined and described. Some of these basic types, in turn, encompass two or more subtypes of conflict. These result in different dilemmas and processes, the natures of which are likely to have important implications for conflict resolution. The present chapter highlights several shortcomings of current conceptualizations of justice conflict, and provides a new integrated framework for a more systematic approach.

Introduction Almost every academic discipline has its theoretical approach of understanding conflicts – economists are focused on game-theory and decision-making, psychologists explore interpersonal conflicts, sociologists take status and class conflicts as the focal point, while political science is centered on intra-national and international conflicts. Therefore to review the conflict literature as a whole is an almost impossible task. (Axt, Milososki, & Schwarz, 2006, p. 2).

K. T€ornblom (*) • A. Kazemi Social Psychology Section, Center for Social Justice Research, School of Technology and Society, University of Sk€ovde, Sk€ ovde, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] E. Kals and J. Maes (eds.), Justice and Conflicts, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19035-3_2, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

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The definition of conflict is often taken for granted or ignored in justice research. However, conflict is a very complex concept with lots of implied meanings. This chapter presents an attempt to construct a framework within which different types of distributive justice conflicts are distinguished and conceptualized. Five types of conceptual (or potential) distributive justice conflicts, five types of social distributive justice conflicts, and three types of a mixture of both types are described. Some of these encompass two or more ‘subtypes.’ We show, for a few of the basic conflict types, how the component subtypes may be rank ordered in terms of magnitude of injustice and conflict intensity. Several testable hypotheses are thereby offered. The framework proposed in this chapter may shed new light on previous research by relating and integrating individual and seemingly unconnected studies. It may also serve as a useful basis on which future studies of justice conflict may be designed, thereby making them comparable, cumulative, and theoretically meaningful, facilitating more precise predictions. Although no new data will be presented here, the proposed framework facilitates the generation of a multitude of inter-related studies.

Conflict Conceptual Confusion Conflict is a concept that is used and misused in many disciplines. Comparisons between existing studies of social conflict are difficult due to conceptual confusion and the multitude of existing definitions of conflict. Dirks and McLean Parks (2003, pp. 283–284) report that ‘A recent search on only the electronic database, PsychINFO, produced over 30,000 references to conflict.’ The concept is frequently used in different ways (it designates different phenomena), and the same phenomenon (conflict) is named by several terms: e.g., incompatibility, inconsistency, contradiction, discord, disjunction, divergence, disagreement, incongruence, or discrepancy. Indeed, ‘. . .the disagreement over the exact notion of conflict as a term dominates until today’ (Axt et al., 2006, p. 2). Examples of common definitions of conflict are listed in Box 1. Thus, ‘Conflict is . . . a rubber concept being stretched and molded for the purposes at hand’ (Mack & Snyder, 1957, p. xx). And this is true even for specific ‘subtypes’ of conflict. ‘Role conflict,’ for instance, has ‘. . .almost as many definitions as there were investigators’ (Biddle, 1979, p. 161). This situation hinders cumulative knowledge and makes theoretically interrelated and systematic predictions difficult.

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Box 1: Some Common Definitions of Conflict • ‘Conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously’ (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994, p. 5) • ‘Conflict is a situation in which interdependent people express (manifest or latent) differences in satisfying their individual needs and interests, and they experience interference from each other in accomplishing these goals’ (Donohue & Kolt, 1992, p. 3). • Conflict occurs ‘. . .when two or more interdependent actors have incompatible preferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from each other’ (Lawler & Ford, 1995, p. 236). • Conflict (Kampf) is ‘. . .a social relationship within which action. . .is oriented intentionally to carrying out the actor’s own will against the resistance of the other party or parties’ (Weber, 1947, p. 132). • ‘Conflict is social interaction in which the actors oppose one another in some manner’ (Olsen, 1978, p. 308). • Conflict is ‘. . .an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their goals’ (Wilmot & Hocker, 1998, p. 41). • Social conflict is ‘. . .a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals’ (Coser, 1956, p. 8). • Conflict is ‘. . .the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005, p. 27). • Conflict is ‘. . .a situation in which oppositely directed forces of about equal strength play upon the person simultaneously’ (Lewin, 1948). • Conflict exists ‘. . .whenever incompatible activities occur . . . an action which prevents, obstructs, interferes with, injures, or in some way makes (resolution) less likely or less effective’ (Deutsch, 1973, p. 156).

Typological Confusion A typology of conflicts is essential for the systematic analysis of conflict. A good typology should be exhaustive, contain mutually exclusive categories, and be operationally explicit. Unfortunately, current conflict research is in a state of (not only conceptual but also) typological confusion, with as many typologies as analysts, some of which contain two types and others more than 20 (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). Deutsch’s (1973) basic distinction between destructive and constructive types of conflict is well known as is his typology (Deutsch, 1973) which includes six types of conflict: vertical, contingent, displaced, misattributed, latent, and false conflict. Moore (1996) distinguishes among five types of conflict as seen

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by mediators: data, interest, value, relationship, and structural conflict. Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2004) proposed a four-level typology: conflict episodes, issue conflicts, identity conflicts, and power conflicts. Pfetsch (1994) lists five types: latent conflict, manifest conflict, crisis, severe crisis, and war. The criteria according to which the typologies are generated differ from one to the other.

Social and Conceptual Conflicts Among the sources of social conflict that Olsen (1978, p. 149) lists (under the category of ‘Disjunction between culture and social order’) are (1) ‘incongruences between basic values and norms and rules,’ (2) ‘inconsistencies among norms and rules,’ and (3) ‘discrepancies between cultural ideals and actual social practices.’ These subcategories hint at a distinction between ‘social’ conflicts and what we might call ‘conceptual’ conflicts – social conflict, referring to discord between actors (as defined by most of the theorists cited in Box 1), while conceptual conflict, refers to ‘discord,’ ‘incongruence,’ ‘inconsistency,’ ‘incompatibility,’ ‘divergence,’ ‘discrepancy,’ etc. (a) between concepts/phenomena such as values, norms, and rules, and (b) between concepts like these and behavior (e.g., non-conformity and anti-conformity, when defined as a discrepancy between a norm and behavior). It is obvious that social conflict and what we have termed ‘conceptual’ conflict are not identical phenomena, particularly if we take seriously Mack and Snyder’s (1957) six propositions about the essential nature of social conflict: 1. Conflict requires at least two actors (individuals or organizations), since it is by definition an interaction relationship. 2. Conflict arises from some kind of ‘scarcity,’ or desired but limited resources, activities, positions, or goals. 3. Conflict actions are designed to limit, thwart, destroy, control, or otherwise influence another actor. 4. A conflict relationship is one in which the actors can gain only at each other’s relative expense. 5. Conflict requires interaction among actors in which their actions and counteractions are mutually opposed. 6. Conflict relations always involve attempts to acquire or exercise social power. According to this characterization of social conflict, phenomena such as the following are not classifiable as a social conflict: Role conflict, norm conflict, value conflict, justice principle conflict, conflicting expectations, attitudinal conflict, ideological conflict, and intra-psychic conflict. These phenomena represent various kinds of incompatibility, inconsistency, mismatch or similar states of affairs (see above). Lacking a better label, we use ‘conceptual conflict’ as an umbrella term for these varieties, even though ‘conflict’ may be a misnomer, considering the ways in which (social) conflict is commonly defined. However, as perceived incompatible goals, values, norms, etc. are central to most social conflicts, what we call

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‘conceptual conflict’ may more properly be viewed as potential or latent conflicts. That is, discrepancies between concepts like values, norms, and attitudes are objects or sources of social conflict but not social conflict, per se, as conceived by Mack and Snyder (1957). Conflict is latent until action occurs. As Montada argues in his chapter (see his Thesis 6), while there are several reasons why incompatibilities will not cause conflict, ‘. . .conflicts arise when at least one party perceives own subjectively legitimate normative expectations violated or threatened by illegitimate actions or omissions of another party.’ Moreover, in Montada’s view, as other’s actions need to be perceived as illegitimate and unjust for conflict to emerge, all of the ten cited definitions of conflict in Box 1 are inadequate. Thus, we define conceptual (or potential, latent) conflict as when two or more ideas, beliefs, opinions, preferences, pieces of advice, or demands, etc., are incomparable or contradictory and cannot both be conformed to. Examples of conceptual conflict are situations in which new evidence conflicts with previous findings, in which two opposite norms both require conformity, and/or in which two or more justice principles are incompatible (e.g., when equity and equality are viewed as equally legitimate guides for resource allocation). Conceptual conflict may also occur between different ‘cognitive entities,’ e.g. between a preference and a norm (I like the idea that enemy soldiers should be killed, but I also endorse the 6th commandment ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill’).

Distributive Justice Conflict Like other types of conflict concerning various substantive or focal issues (i.e., what the conflict is all about, the objects of conflict – resources like power, land, oil, etc.), conflicts concerning how resources should be justly distributed may be of both the social and the conceptual type. A social distributive justice conflict is a situation in which two or more parties struggle against each other for (scarce) resources that each party feel entitled to, each party defining just entitlement in terms of the same allocation principle. For instance, both P and O may consider their respective contribution to be the largest, and will therefore feel justly entitled to more outcomes than the other. A conceptual distributive justice conflict is a situation in which different and incompatible allocation principles or ‘subprinciples’ are perceived as equally just and legitimate for a particular resource allocation event. Distributive justice conflicts may also consist of a mixture of both kinds, i.e. a conceptual-social distributive justice conflict. An example would be two or more parties who struggle against each other for resources that each party feel entitled to, each party defining just entitlement in terms of different and incompatible allocation principles. Research that specifically deals with how (in)justice relates to conflict and conflict resolution is relatively scarce: ‘Despite the potential for conflict whenever individuals or groups disagree over processes or distributions, and despite the plethora of actual conflicts . . ., until recently justice researchers had hardly studied conflict’ (Hegtvedt, 2005, p. 38). An impressive amount of research certainly exists on various aspects of

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‘conflict,’ but most of this work is not explicitly related to distributive or procedural justice – even though ‘Conflicts are unavoidable because the justice motive is universal but the views of what is just and what is unjust are not all universally shared’ (Montada, 2007, p. 255). Thus, conflict emerges from injustice which in turn affects the way conflicts are resolved (e.g., Kazemi, 2007). In addition, it is frequently true that ‘Justice emerges from conflict. . .’ (Deutsch, 1985, p. 100). In other words, injustice may result in conflict, and conflict often calls for its just and fair resolution. Certainly, as Mikula and Wenzel (2000, p. 127) point out, injustice does not have to be involved for conflicts to occur, but ‘. . .social conflicts frequently follow from perceptions of injustice, and pertinent divergent views of the existence of an injustice.’ Montada (2007, p. 256) makes a stronger case for a necessary connection between injustice and conflict: ‘All social conflicts may be interpreted as justice conflicts.’ If this statement is taken seriously, it seems that one of our duties as justice researchers is to clean up this rather chaotic research domain. The various ways in which conflict (social as well as conceptual) may be conceived in the context of justice seem almost endless. As an illustration of some of the ways, consider the ‘justice tree’ shown in Fig. 1 (please note that our focus is on distributive justice, not on procedural or interactional justice). The most CONCEPT

PRINCIPLES

SUB-PRINCIPLES

CRITERIA

FOCI

MEASURES

Effort

Contribution

X

Ability

Performance

Quality Quantity

a b

Y

Opportunity Distributive Justice

Equality

Treatment Results Biological

Need

Basic Functional

Conflicts due to perceived injustice may occur as a result of application of application of use of inappropriate inappropriate inapproprinciple subprinciple priate criterion

Fig. 1 The distributive justice tree

inappropriate focus

inappropriate measure

Advances in Justice Conflict Conceptualization: A New Integrative Framework

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commonly discussed and researched justice principles are the contribution (equity), equality, and need principles – although several others have been distinguished by different theorists (see T€ ornblom, 1992, for an overview of several of these sources). Furthermore, some of these that we may term ‘major’ principles may be understood in more than one way. Messick and Sentis (1983), for example, distinguished among six different types of equality principles, and Benn and Peters (1959) discuss three types of need principles. Other theorists who have noted that some of the principles are multi-faceted include Deutsch (1985), Reis (1984), and Rescher (1966). An experimental study conducted by T€ornblom and Jonsson (1985) suggested that analytical distinctions between different kinds of one particular major principle, termed ‘subprinciples,’ are empirically significant: Participants’ justice evaluations of the contribution and equality principles, respectively, varied with the subprinciples in terms of which they were represented (see T€ ornblom, 1992, for a discussion of additional studies focusing on subprinciples). In addition to distinctions among subprinciples of a particular major justice principle, it is also important to recognize its different subtypes. A typology developed by T€ ornblom (1977a) presented a large number of contribution (equity) principle (in)justice situations on the basis of the relative inputs and outcomes of two persons, when both local and referential comparisons are made. These different types of (in)justice were then rank ordered in terms of perceived intensity of injustice (for empirical verifications, see T€ ornblom, 1977b, 1982). We have included the contribution, equality, and need as major principles in the ‘justice tree’ illustration (Fig. 1). (1) Each one of these major principles may represent the very general notion of distributive justice in a particular situation. (2) Further, each major principle subsumes at least three subprinciples. Allocation of benefits on the basis of contributions to a group task may be assessed in terms of a person’s effort expended, the ability she brings to the task accomplishment situation, or her actual performance on the task. Equality may be conceived in terms of the same opportunity for all to receive some resource, the same treatment (share, allotment for) of all at every distribution occasion, or the same results for all involved recipients in terms of the goods or bads they receive over time. And allocation according to need may be determined on the basis of recipients’ biological needs (i.e., those relevant to survival), their basic needs (i.e., the bare minimum for a decent life where they live), or their functional needs (i.e., facilities required for fulfilling the requirements of one’s tasks). (3) Further, receipt according to a particular subprinciple can usually be calculated in more than one way. For example, performance may be assessed according to several criteria, say, its quality and/or its quantity. (4) In addition, one may focus different aspects of the chosen criterion. The quality of a scientist’s work may, for instance, be evaluated by the number of citations from the scientific community, or by how successful practical applications turned out to be, while quantity may be assessed by counting the number of published articles or doctoral students supervised. (5) Finally, the various aspects focused may be measured in more than one way. For example, the success of practical applications may be measured from the perspective of profit making or natural resource preservation.

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These (actually incomplete) conceptual distinctions should make it very obvious, that the number of ways in which distributive justice conflicts may occur is staggering. Thus, even though people in general normally use the umbrella term ‘justice’ in their daily encounters with others, they most likely have a specific major principle implicitly in mind that for them represent what they mean by justice. (1) If a person erroneously assumes that the term justice has the same meaning for another person with whom she interacts, miscommunication will ensue, and the stage is set for disagreements and conflict. Thus, even though both agree to divide a resource in a just manner, if one of them equates justice with the contribution principle and the other with the need principle, conflict is likely to erupt. (2) Even if both persons may define justice in terms of an identical major principle, a second type of conflict may still occur on the subprinciple level. Even though both may agree that some resources should be distributed equally, if one person has in mind an equal number of resource units to both (i.e., equality-of-treatment), while the other takes for granted that they would flip a coin to determine their shares (i.e., equality-of-opportunity), their preferences would be incompatible and in conflict. (3) Third, even if both persons agree that resources should be justly distributed, that the contribution principle should represent justice, that performance is what should count as a relevant and legitimate contribution, one person may consider quality to be the most just criterion for evaluations of performance while the other is set on quantity. Ironically, even though the two persons may have agreed this far into the decision process and avoided conflict, they are still at risk at this level. Finally, and if successfully reaching this point in the sequence without getting into conflict is not complicated enough, conflicts may still erupt due to (4) disagreements over which aspect of a criterion (by which a subprinciple should be evaluated) is the most just one to use, and due to (5) different opinions about the most just measure of an agreed-upon aspect.

Towards a Classification of Distributive Justice Conflicts Some basic questions regarding the connection between conflict and distributive justice may be stated as: (1) ‘What type and magnitude of distributive injustice is likely to result in what type and intensity of conflict?,’ (2) ‘What type and intensity of conflict is likely to result in what kind and intensity of reactions to the conflict?’, and (3) ‘What type and intensity of conflict and reactions to the conflict is likely to result in what type of conflict resolution strategies.’ As a first step several types of social, conceptual, and social-conceptual distributive justice conflicts may be distinguished. These result in different dilemmas and processes, the nature, ramifications, and resolutions of which are likely to have important implications for justice related conceptions and behavior. Of course, for concrete analyses of justice conflicts we also need to take into account important moderators such as outcome valence, resource valence, resource type, and social context/setting/relationship. In the following we propose a tentative conceptualization and classification of 13 major types of distributive justice conflicts; five conceptual, five social, and three

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conceptual-social justice conflicts (see Box 2). The interested reader may consult T€ornblom (1988) for an integrative framework delineating several types of socialconceptual conflict and propositions regarding influence attempts and their likely success. After brief descriptions of these types of distributive justice conflicts we will, due to space limitations, discuss only the five types marked with an asterisk (*), some in more detail than others. As we will see, some of the conflict types listed below may be further specified into subtypes. Thus, one may perhaps view the following as a ‘typology of typologies’ (i.e., a meta typology). Box 2: Conceptual, Social, and Conceptual-Social Justice Conflicts Conceptual/Potential Distributive Justice Conflict 1. *Justice Principle Determinant Conflict Two or more simultaneously salient determinants prescribe incompatible justice principles. 2. Justice Principle Conflict Two or more ‘major’ justice principles are equally relevant in a situation, and the choice of one excludes the others. 3. *Justice Subprinciple Conflict (a) Two or more justice subprinciples of one particular major justice principle are equally relevant in a situation, and the choice of one excludes the others (‘intra-major – subprinciple conflict’). (b) Two or more justice subprinciples of two or more particular major justice principles are equally relevant in a situation, and the choice of one excludes the others (‘inter-major – subprinciple conflict’). 4. *Violation of a Justice (Sub)Principle by Means of (an)other Conflicting Justice (Sub)Principle(s) (a) Inter-major inter-subprinciple violation. (b) Intra-major inter-subprinciple violation. 5. Conflict between Justice and other Goals/Considerations, e.g., (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Justice – self-interest conflict Self-justice – other-justice conflict Justice – empathy conflict Justice – efficiency conflict Justice – outcome favorability conflict, etc. • Favorable outcome vs. unjust outcome (i.e., advantageous injustice) • Unfavorable outcome vs. unjust outcome (i.e., disadvantageous injustice) • Unfavorable outcome vs. just outcome (i.e., disadvantageous justice) (continued)

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Social Distributive Justice Conflict 6. *Perspective Conflict (a) Recipient – recipient conflict (inter-recipient conflict) – the resource allocator is a non-recipient third party. (b) Non-recipient allocator – recipient conflict. (c) Recipient allocator – recipient conflict. (d) Non-recipient allocator – non-recipient allocator conflict (interallocator conflict). 7. Interpersonal Justice Conflict The allocation principle considered just for one individual is viewed as unjust for other individuals. 8. Individual-Group Justice Conflict The allocation principle considered just for the individual is viewed as unjust for the group, or vice versa. 9. Intergroup Justice Conflict The allocation principle considered just for one group is viewed as unjust for other groups. 10. *Individual/Group-Intergroup Justice Conflict The states of (in)justice for two or more groups at both the individual and collective levels are taken into account. Social-Conceptual Distributive Justice Conflict 11. Interpersonal Justice Conflict [cf. type 7] Two or more individuals endorse different justice principles for the same allocation event. 12. Individual-Group Justice Conflict [cf. type 8] The individual and the group endorse different justice principles for the same allocation event. 13. Intergroup Justice Conflict [cf. type 9] Two or more groups endorse different justice principles for the same allocation event. Conceptual Distributive Justice Conflicts Recall that a conceptual/potential distributive justice conflict was previously defined as a situation in which different and incompatible allocation principles or ‘subprinciples’ are perceived as equally just and legitimate for a particular resource allocation event. As a special case of this type of conflict we also include situations in which the goal of justice collides with other goals like efficiency, individual freedom, outcome favorability, etc. (see type 5 below).

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1. Justice Principle Determinant Conflict occurs when two or more simultaneously salient determinants prescribe incompatible justice principles. It is reasonable to assume that the justice conceptions of most people are formed on the basis of individual as well as situational factors, and that the thrust of a given factor may frequently conflict with that of another factor within the same category or with that of a factor belonging to the other category. There is a scarcity of research identifying and analyzing (intrapersonal, interpersonal, or intergroup) conflict situations that may occur when two or more simultaneously relevant and salient, but incompatible, justice principle determinants are considered (juxtaposed). For instance, an allocation principle (e.g., equity) deemed just according to an ‘individual-motive’ determinant (e.g., self-interest) may be incompatible with a principle perceived just according to a ‘situational’ determinant (e.g., a caring-oriented group climate). Most studies focus on one determinant at a time, even though more complex situations are likely to be the rule rather than the exception in everyday life. Rather than attending to conflicts among two or more equally legitimate allocation principle determinants, most researchers appear to assume that one particular determinant is more powerful than others, in which case the choice of a justice principle is rendered less problematic. Lerner and Whitehead (1980, p. 232), for example, argued that ‘Although virtually all interactions involve the integration of both [the perceived] Relation [to the other] and [the task-relevant acquisition] Process, in any given encounter one or the other may predominate.’ But a more intriguing focus is on those instances when one or the other does not predominate. And what goes on before one determinant has assumed dominance over another. Surely, a more common situation is one of conflict and negotiations among competing requirements or claims, rather than one in which a single determinant is unequivocally predominant. Failing to account for simultaneously salient and relevant allocation-principle determinants, however, will result in missed opportunities to examine interesting issues pertaining to this kind of conflict. Existing research appears to have been guided by questions on a different and perhaps less complex level, e.g., ‘Under what conditions will a given principle be chosen over others?’ or, ‘What principle will be adopted, considered just, etc., when determinant X is predominant?’ Thus, questions like ‘Under what conditions will the influence of determinant X overpower others?’, and ‘How will conflict be resolved, if a compromise is not possible among opposing determinants?’ will not appear and will therefore remain irrelevant and unexplored. See T€ornblom (1988) for predictions based on an integrative model. 2. Justice Principle Conflict occurs when two or more ‘major’ justice principles are equally relevant in a situation, and the choice of one excludes the others. A fair amount of theoretical and empirical research has been conducted concerning this type of distributive justice conflict (see T€ ornblom, M€uhlhausen, & Jonsson, 1991, for reviews). 3. Justice Subprinciple Conflict occurs (a) when two or more justice subprinciples of one particular major justice principle are equally relevant in a situation, and the choice of one excludes the others (‘intra-major – subprinciple conflict’).

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To illustrate this type of conflict, imagine a situation in which people view the allocation of some kind of resource, say respect, on the basis of the effort expended and on the basis of ability as equally just, and that they want both options to be available. These two subprinciples are, however, likely to be incompatible and viewed as just or unjust, depending on the recipient perspective. Which one of two persons is worthy of respect, if one is a highly able person expending low effort and the other put in a great amount of effort despite being on the low end of ability? Applying the contribution-of-effort principle will be seen as just and the contributionof-ability as unjust by the person high on effort, and vice versa by the person high on ability. As another example, although people may agree that equality is synonymous with justice, the application of one equality subprinciple, say equality-ofresults, will violate other equality subprinciples, e.g. the equality-of-opportunity subprinciple. And vice versa, an outcome allocation based on equality-of-opportunity will result in inequality-of-results and inequality-of-treatment (see T€ornblom, 1992, for some political implications of the ‘clash’ between these two subprinciples). Given the various possible ‘collisions’ between two subprinciples, we may be interested in knowing which is likely to be perceived as the most and the least adverse situation. It seems reasonable to suggest the use of ‘similarity’ as a criterion, on the basis of which a construction of rank orders among pairs of incompatible subprinciples may be established. We may characterize the above mentioned three contribution subprinciples on the basis of their similarity in terms of the achieved versus ascribed nature of the contribution (input) involved. The contribution-of-effort (Ce) and contribution-ofperformance (Cp) subprinciples are similar in that both call for achieved types of input, while the contribution-of-ability (Ca) subprinciple concern ascribed inputs and is, thus, dissimilar to the other two.1 Thus, on the basis of this distinction, and on the assumption that the more dissimilar or incompatible two relevant and competing subprinciples to guide resource allocation are, the more severe will a resulting conflict be. Thus, a situation in which the choice stands between Cp and Ca will be more conflictual than another, where either Cp or Ce is an alternative. In the first case the choice is between two very different subprinciples, one of which is achievement based and the other ascriptively based, while in the second situation the choice is between two achievement based subprinciples. Thus, we propose the following two hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: A conflict between the contribution-of-performance (Cp) and the contribution-of-ability (Ca) subprinciples will be perceived as more severe than a conflict between the contribution-of-performance (Cp) and the contributionof-effort (Ce) subprinciples. ½Cp  Ca conflict>Cp  Ce conflict

1

Ability is here conceived as a natural or innate talent or capacity beyond the individual’s control, thus an ascribed input. However, abilities such as writing skills, horseback riding and skating skills are acquired via training, practice, education, etc., and are therefore achieved.

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Hypothesis 2: A conflict between the contribution-of-effort (Ce) and the contribution-of-ability (Ca) subprinciples will be perceived as more severe than a conflict between the contribution-of-effort (Ce) and the contribution-of-performance (Cp) subprinciples. ½Ce  Ca conflict>Ce  Cp conflict A different criterion for similarity has to be used to distinguish between the equality subprinciples, equality-of-opportunity (Eo), equality-of-treatment (Et), and equality-of-results (Er), namely similarity of ‘end result’. The Et and Er subprinciples are more similar to each other with regard to their likely end result than they are to the Eo subprinciple (the latter of which is random in character as no one can be sure of receiving outcomes at all). Again, on the basis of this distinction, and on the assumption that the more dissimilar or incompatible two relevant and competing subprinciples to guide resource allocation are, the more severe will a resulting conflict be. The following two hypotheses seem reasonable: Hypothesis 3: A conflict between the equality-of-treatment (Et) and the equality-of-opportunity (Eo) subprinciples will be perceived as more severe than a conflict between the equality-of-treatment (Et) and the equality-of-results (Er) subprinciples. ½Et  Eo conflict>Et  Er conflict Hypothesis 4: A conflict between the equality-of-results (Er) and the equalityof-opportunity (Eo) subprinciples will be perceived as more severe than a conflict between the equality-of-results (Er) and the equality-of-treatment (Et) subprinciples. ½Er  Eo conflict>Er  Et conflict Justice subprinciple conflict may also occur (b) when two or more justice subprinciples of different major justice principles are equally relevant in a situation, and the choice of one excludes the other (‘inter-major – subprinciple conflict’). Thus, this type of conflict situation is more complex than the one we just discussed, as both the major principles and the subprinciples differ between the two situations of each pair. For example, consider a conceptual justice conflict between Ca-Eo, between Cp-Et, and between Ce-Eo. The magnitudes of conflict resulting from the second and third conflicting pairs of contribution-equality subprinciples are likely to be perceived and experienced as considerably greater as compared to the first pair. The clash between the contribution and equality subprinciples in the second pair and in the third pair is more severe, at least intuitively, than the clash in first pair. The choice between receiving benefits (or burdens) according to one’s performance (Cp), or in an amount equal to all (Et) regardless of one’s performance or any other input criterion, may require a decision regarding internal or external locus of control as a cause of one’s reward – or punishment-relevant behavior. The same

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holds true with regard to the choice between one’s effort and mere chance (e.g., a lottery). However, whether or not the contribution-of-ability (Ca) or the equalityof-opportunity (Eo) will be the guiding principle matters less, as the allocation outcome is likely to be relatively uncertain in both cases; both are pretty much beyond one’s control and likely to be viewed as about equally unjust. We now proceed to a discussion about what may happen when an ‘operating’ subprinciple is violated because another conflicting subprinciple is adopted in its place. 4. Violation of a Justice (Sub)Principle by Means of (an)other Conflicting Justice (Sub)Principle(s). (a) Inter-major inter-subprinciple violation. Perceived injustice may occur in several ways one of which is when, for some reason, an operating consensually agreed-upon justice principle is deliberately violated. Such a violation may be exemplified by organizational re-organizations. An industrial authority figure may be convinced that low productivity results from the existing egalitarian salary structure and decide to switch to an incentive system where wages are determined on the basis of a contribution principle, e.g. performance. As both allocation principles may be legitimized in terms of fairness, this situation may be conceived as one in which one operating justice principle is violated, the violation of which is justified via the application of another justice principle which replaces, conflicts with, and excludes the hitherto prevailing principle. Justice principle violation (or ‘change,’ to use a less provoking term) is indeed a common real life issue. When countries in the East (Baltic countries behind the iron curtain) changed their economic system from planned economy to market economy, from socialism to capitalism, during the 1990s, they changed the resource allocation principles to which people were accustomed. The communist system endorsed and championed a justice conception based on the slogan ‘from each according to ability, to each according to need,’ whereas a capitalist economic system tends to favor resource allocations according to the contributions (or, at best, according to some combination of two or more principles, e.g., equality of basic need fulfillment and on the basis of contributions above that level). (b) Intra-major inter-subprinciple violation. Equally likely is ‘intra-major justice principle violation, as exemplified by a change of what inputs are required to obtain outcomes according to a contribution subprinciple, i.e. intra-major intersubprinciple violation. Thus, this is a conflict where a subprinciple of a particular justice principle is violated by means of another subprinciple of that justice principle. It seems likely that certain intra-major principle violations would be perceived as less unjust than others. An intra-contribution-principle (i.e., contribution inter-subprinciple) violation is accomplished by changing the type (as opposed to the amount) of input required to obtain the outcome. For example, recipients who were used or promised to receive outcomes according to their efforts now receive them on the basis of their performances or abilities. Although some studies have examined the effect of justice principle violation upon justice perceptions, it seems none of them focused on other principles than equity. In addition, all of them were concerned with violation in the sense of

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a change of the amount (rather than the kind) of input meriting a given outcome (Crosby & Franco, 2003; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998; Vermunt, Wit, Van den Bos, & Lind, 1996). The changes made in those studies were not rule changes in the sense of a change from one distribution subprinciple to another, as the required type of input (i.e., performance) was not replaced by another type. Instead changes were made regarding the amount of input that merited a certain outcome. In order to generate hypotheses about intra-contribution-subprinciple violation (contribution inter-subprinciple violation), we assume (1) that people prefer similarity over dissimilarity, and (2) that, as previously mentioned, similarity between contribution subprinciples may be determined on the basis of the achieved versus ascribed nature of the input. Again, the achievement/ascription distinction between types of input allows a differentiation between the contribution subprinciples: effort (Ce) and performance (Cp) are similar in that both involve achieved input characteristics, while at least certain kinds of ability (Ca) are ascribed and, thus, dissimilar to effort and performance. Thus, the Ce and Cp subprinciples are more compatible with each other (and less conflicting) than Ce and Ca or Cp and Ca, respectively. Based on our earlier reasoning, it seems likely (3) that the violation of an achievement based subprinciple via another achievement based subprinciple will be more preferred, perceived as less unjust, and be less likely to result in conflict than a violation via an ascriptively based subprinciple, and vice versa. Further, assume (4) that injustice and intensity of conflict are positively related (see Box 3). Subsequently, the following hypotheses regarding (a) level of injustice and (b) conflict intensity may be generated: Hypothesis 5: Violation of the contribution-of-effort subprinciple via the contribution-of-ability subprinciple will (a) be perceived as more unjust and (b) result in more intense conflict than violation via the contribution-of-performance subprinciple. ½ðCe ! CaÞ>ðCe ! CpÞ Hypothesis 6: A violation of the contribution-of-performance subprinciple via the contribution-of-ability subprinciple will (a) be perceived as more unjust and (b) result in more intense conflict than violation via the contribution-of-effort subprinciple. ½ðCp ! CaÞ>ðCp ! CeÞ Hypothesis 7: A violation of the contribution-of-ability subprinciple via the contribution-of-effort subprinciple or via the contribution-of-performance subprinciple will (a) be perceived as equally unjust and (b) result in equally intense conflict. ½ðCa ! CeÞ ¼ ðCa ! CpÞ

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Box 3: Violation of Contribution and Equality Subprinciples Contribution-of-effort (Ce) Equality-of-opportunity (Eo) Contribution-of-performance (Cp) Equality-of-treatment (Et) Contributions-of-ability (Ca) Equality-of-results (Er) Assumptions: (1) People prefer similarity over dissimilarity. (2) Similarity between equality (2) Similarity between contribution subprinciples may be determined on the subprinciples may be determined on the basis of their ‘end result’. The Et and Er basis of the achieved versus ascribed subprinciples are more similar to each nature of the input. The Ce and Cp other with regard to their likely end result subprinciples are similar in that both than they are to the Eo subprinciple (the concern achieved characteristics, while latter of which is random in character, so at least certain kinds of Ca are ascribed nobody can be sure of receiving any and, thus, dissimilar. outcomes at all). (3) Thus, the violation of an achievement (3) Thus, a violation of a subprinciple that based subprinciple via another results in a minor change of the total achievement based subprinciple will be amount of outcomes will be more more preferred and perceived as less preferred and perceived as less unjust unjust than a violation via an ascription than a violation that causes major based subprinciple, and vice versa. changes in end results, i.e., very dissimilar end results. (4) The degree of injustice and intensity of conflict is positively related.

Hypotheses may also be derived, in a similar manner as above, about intraequality-subprinciple violation (equality inter-subprinciple violation). Since contributions or inputs are irrelevant when resources are allocated according to the equality principle, the reader may recall that we used ‘end result’ as a criterion to determine similarity between the equality subprinciples. On that basis Et and Er subprinciples are more similar to each other than they are to the Eo subprinciple. Again assuming (1) that people prefer similarity over dissimilarity, (2) that similarity among the equality subprinciples may be determined on the basis of the end result of their application, and (3) that a violation of a subprinciple that results in a minor change in total amount of outcomes will be perceived as less just than a violation that causes major changes in end result, i.e. a very dissimilar end result. Adding the assumption (4) that injustice and intensity of conflict is positively related, the following hypotheses regarding (a) level of injustice and (b) conflict intensity seem reasonable: Hypothesis 8: A violation of the equality-of-opportunity subprinciple via the equality-of-treatment or via the equality-of-results subprinciple will (a) be perceived as equally unjust and (b) result in equally intense conflict. ½ðEo ! EtÞ ¼ ðEo ! ErÞ

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Hypothesis 9: A violation of the equality-of-treatment subprinciple via the equality-of-opportunity subprinciple will (a) be perceived as more unjust and (b) result in more intense conflict than a violation via the equality-of-results subprinciple. ½ðEt ! EoÞ>ðEt ! ErÞ Hypothesis 10: A violation of the equality-of-results subprinciple via the equality-of-opportunity subprinciple will (a) be perceived as more unjust and (b) result in more intense conflict than a violation via the equality-of-treatment subprinciple. ½ðEr ! EoÞ>ðEr ! EtÞ These hypotheses are, of course, likely to be moderated by several factors, e.g. social relationship, institutional context, resource type, and resource scarcity. Thus, while the above hypotheses may have to be modified, a large number of additional hypotheses can be generated. For example, contrary to its great importance in a business context, performance is likely considered least important among the three contribution subprinciples within a family context. In a family, who you are (i.e., an ascribed characteristic) is usually more important than how you perform. Also, in a family it is likely that effort (often interpreted as a sign of good intentions) is more important than performance, i.e. the actual results (despite a poor outcome, s/he at least worked as hard as s/he could). If this is true, and as an example of how moderators may modify hypotheses, a violation of the contribution-of-effort subprinciple via the contribution-of-performance subprinciple will be perceived as more unjust in a family than in a business context. What about conflict between justice and other ‘goals’ or considerations? In addition to conflicts and incompatibilities among justice subprinciples, justice conflicts may also include conflicts and incompatibilities between justice and other considerations or goals. In some situations the accomplishment of justice makes the fulfillment of other goals impossible. Below follow some examples of this type of justice conflict. 5. Conflict Between Justice and Other Goals/Considerations (a) Justice – self-interest conflict (b) Self-justice – other-justice conflict (c) Justice – empathy conflict (d) Justice – efficiency conflict (e) Justice – outcome favorability conflict. (i) Unjust vs. favorable outcome (i.e., advantageous injustice) (ii) Unjust vs. unfavorable outcome (i.e., disadvantageous injustice) (iii) Just vs. unfavorable outcome (i.e., disadvantageous justice) (iv) Just vs. favorable outcome (i.e., advantageous justice)

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Thus, the dual goal of accomplishing outcomes that are both just and favorable is only realized in (iv) but may fail in three ways (i–iii).

Social Distributive Justice Conflicts A social distributive justice conflict was previously defined as a situation in which two or more parties struggle against each other for (scarce) resources that each party feel entitled to, each party defining just entitlement in terms of the same allocation principle. 6. Perspective conflict may occur in the form of a (a) recipient – recipient conflict (inter-recipient conflict) when the resource allocator is a non-recipient. Cook and Hegtvedt (1983, p. 227) identified an important shortcoming with research on distributive justice: ‘. . . rule appropriateness is typically assessed only from the allocator’s viewpoint and not from the recipients’ perspective’. Whether or not this statement is still true, we would add that it is also necessary to make distinctions among different types within a specific perspective category, in this case the recipient category. One may, for example, distinguish between two types of recipients, those who are responsible and those who are non-responsible for praiseworthy or blameful conduct. Imagine that subsequent positive or negative outcomes (in the form of reward or punishment, respectively) are provided or imposed in equal amounts or kind on both recipients by a third party. From an equity theory point of view, for instance, a responsible and a non-responsible recipient are likely to view the situation very differently, and the reactions of the two recipients will vary with the valence of the outcome. Although only the responsible recipient has ‘earned’ the positive or negative outcomes, she still receives the same as the non-responsible recipient who, in turn, is provided undeserved outcomes. The responsible recipient is likely to feel unjustly treated, robbed of half of her rightfully deserved reward (unless the relationship between her and the other recipient is such that her welfare is of great concern). Being relieved of half of one’s punishment is favorably unjust and might be less upsetting (depending, again, on the nature of her relationship to the nonresponsible recipient). Considering the non-responsible recipient is ‘innocent,’ she is likely to resent being imposed unjust punishment. And she may react with embarrassment (or even satisfaction, if she is able and willing to redefine her lack of entitlement) concerning the inequitably advantageous reward. Now, consider two allocation principles, equality (E) and contribution (C), outcomes of positive (+) and negative () valence, and situations in which outcomes of both valences are allocated according to the two principles. This yields four possible combinations or patterns (see Box 4). Two pairs are consistent and denoted [E+ E] and [C+ C], the former meaning that the equality principle is applied for the allocation of both positive and negative outcomes (e.g., rewards and punishments), and that the contribution (equity) principle is applied for both. The other two patterns, [E+ C] and [C+ E], imply inconsistency in that different principles are applied for positively and negatively valent outcomes.

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Box 4: Perspective Conflict Consistency Non-responsible Actor Responsible Actor

Inconsistency

E+

E

C+

C

E+

C

C+

E

a i d i

d i a i

d j a j

a j d j

a i d i

a j d j

d j a j

d i a i

E, Equality principle C, Contribution principle +, Positive outcomes (goods) , Negative outcomes (bads) a, Advantage (favorable) d, Disadvantage (unfavorable) j, Justice i, Injustice

The consistent application of the equality principle for both positive and negative outcomes [E+ E] is both advantageous (favorable) and disadvantageous for a non-responsible recipient, advantageous (but unjust) in that s/he receives ‘undeserved’ positive outcomes, and disadvantageous (and unjust) in that s/he shares undeserved negative outcomes equally with the responsible recipient. A consistent application of the contribution principle [C+ C] is advantageous and disadvantageous in a directly opposite manner – disadvantageous (but just) because s/he does not receive undeserved positive outcomes, and advantageous (and just) in that s/he does not receive undeserved negative outcomes. Inconsistent applications of the two principles for positive and negative outcomes, i.e. [E+ C] and [C+ E], are maximally advantageous and maximally disadvantageous, respectively, for a nonresponsible individual. Sharing undeserved positive outcomes [E+] is advantageous (but unjust) and not receiving undeserved negative outcomes [C] is also advantageous (and just) for the non-responsible recipient. Missing out on undeserved positive outcomes is disadvantageous (but just), and sharing undeserved negative outcomes is also disadvantageous (and unjust). It is not difficult to see that the four patterns are advantageous and disadvantageous in directly opposite ways for the recipient who is responsible for the praiseworthy and blameful conduct (subsequent to which positive and negative outcomes are allocated). However, unless they define justice and injustice according to different principles, we assume (ceteris paribus) that the responsible and non-responsible recipients concur regarding their assessments of how (un)just each situation is. Some observations that can be made from Box 4 are worthy of special emphasis, as they may have important implications for the design of empirical research with a focus on the connection between recipient perspective and reactions to (in)justice and self-(dis)advantage [(un)favorability]:

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1. Conflict between the non-responsible and responsible recipients always occurs with regard to their position on self-advantage. 2. Providing both recipients agree that the contribution principle represents justice, conflict never occurs with regard to their justice evaluation of the applied allocation principle. 3. Matching a recipient’s positive states of self-advantage and justice (i.e., a and j) appear in only four out of the eight situations. These are unlikely to result in intra-person conflict. 4. Matching a recipient’s negative states of self-advantage and justice (i.e., d and i) appear in only four out of the eight situations. These are also unlikely to result in intra-person conflict. 5. Intra-person conflict is likely to occur when the positions on self-advantage and justice do not match. This occurs in four situations for each recipient. The recipient will be motivated to change the negative component to a positive position (see the literature on status inconsistency and status crystallization for propositions and empirical research, e.g., Berger, Blackwell, Norman, & Smith, 1992; Geschwender, 1967; Lenski, 1954, 1956 – space does not allow elaboration here). 6. Interpersonal and intergroup conflicts are likely to occur in all situations, but only due to the two recipients’ opposite positions on self-advantage, as their positions on justice always match. Thus, care should be taken to make sure, in empirical studies, that the observed or manipulated conflict is not erroneously attributed to injustice when, in fact, other non-controlled factors (like selfadvantage, favorability) are the real causes. 7. Thus, if actors focus and compare themselves on the basis of both self-advantage and justice, conflict will always emerge, which is also likely if they only focus on self-advantage. However, no conflict is likely to occur on the basis of the described scenario if only justice is made salient. Clearly, the meaning and consequences of a particular application pattern may vary significantly as a function of the perspective from which it is viewed. Thus, the stage is set for conflicts between recipient categories, the intensity, consequences, and resolution of which will vary with the particular combination of principles that is applied for the allocation of positive and negative outcomes. Thus, not only should a distinction be made among perspective categories (e.g., allocator, recipient, observer), it is equally important to make distinctions within perspective categories, as we have just argued with regard to the recipient perspective category. Please note that the above scenarios are based on the premise that justice and self-advantage (or favorability) are equally weighty factors affecting recipients’ perceptions of the various situations as conflicting as well as their subsequent reactions to consistency and inconsistency between the justice principles that are applied for positive and negative outcome allocations. Another type of perspective conflict is (b) the non-recipient allocator – recipient conflict. This type of conflict has been the topic of a number of studies. Elliott and Meeker (1986) conducted a vignette study of non-recipient allocators’ preferences for outcome allocation to five group members subsequent to their contributions to

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a joint effort. And Mikula and Korytko (1990) studied allocators’ responses when their recipients’ views of which principle represents distributive justice differed from their own. Mikula tested the general proposition that the resolution of conflicting views between a non-recipient allocator and the recipient will vary with the relevance and salience of recipient expectations for the application of the principle s/he considers appropriate or just – thus creating various levels of pressure on the allocator to deviate from his/her own preferred justice principle (in this case equality). (c) A third theoretically and empirically important type of conflict is when the allocator is also a recipient, i.e. recipient allocator – recipient conflict. Again, this type concerns the opposing interaction between two recipients, but in this case one of the recipients is also an allocator who decides what and how much of social resources she and the other recipient will be provided. It is a more complex kind of conflict as compared to the previously discussed recipient-recipient conflict (i). In this instance, the recipient-allocator will have to apply restraint to counteract her possible and biasing self-interest in addition to considering the relative and just levels of rewards and punishments for herself and the other recipient. The other recipient, in turn, will likely be less tolerant of an unfavorably unjust position, knowing that her contender (rather than a third party) is the cause. Finally, an interesting type of perspective conflict that is not uncommon in reallife situations is (d) the non-recipient allocator – non-recipient allocator conflict (inter-allocator conflict). We don’t know, at the present stage of our literature review, whether or not studies about this type of conflict have been conducted and framed as justice conflicts. This type of conflict is probably not unusual in families, for instance, where the parents (as two resource allocators) may disagree about the severity of punishment for a child’s disobedience, or about the size of their teenage daughter’s monthly allowance in comparison to what is reasonable for their pre-teenage son. Another example that easily comes to mind is in the context of salary determination in organizations. Within an academic setting the departmental Chair and the Dean might disagree about the salary they think is necessary in order to recruit a highly merited scientist. 7. Interpersonal justice conflict may occur when the allocation principle considered just for one individual is viewed as unjust for other individuals. It is not possible to go into detail on this topic as a considerable part of the research on distributive justice has been concerned with this type of distributive justice conflict. A meaningful review would require more space than allowed for this chapter. Fortunately several extensive reviews are available (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983; Hegtvedt, 2005, 2006; Hegtvedt & Cook, 2001; Hegtvedt & Markovsky, 1995; Kazemi & T€ornblom, 2008; T€ ornblom, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998). 8. Individual-group justice conflict may occur when the allocation principle considered just for the individual is viewed as unjust for the group, or vice versa. This situation is typical for social dilemmas where individual interests are at odds with the welfare of a larger collective to which the individual belongs. An example from a real-life social dilemma may illustrate this type of conflict, namely income tax payment. Willingness to pay taxes is a distributive justice issue, as it concerns

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how social resources like subsidies, education, Medicare, child care, etc. are allocated among citizens who have contributed unequal amounts of income tax to the system. Thus, the more you earn, the higher is your income tax. The individualgroup justice conflict may arise when taxpayers demand that services that are financed by tax revenues should be allocated in proportion to their tax payments (i.e., equitably), while the stipulations of the system are formulated in such a way that equity is not applied for all services that are provided by the government via tax revenues (Kazemi, 2009). For instance, from the individual taxpayer’s point of view, the length of the waiting lines for health care services should be proportional to their contributions (i.e., their tax burden), while the system is opposed to the contribution principle and consider it as unjust in this case. 9. Intergroup justice conflict may occur when the allocation principle considered just for one group is viewed as unjust for other groups. We may again use social dilemmas as an example of this kind of social justice conflict. Public goods are, per definition, ‘public’ in that nobody can be excluded from utilizing the good (e.g., Medicare). However, as Foddy (2005) argues, excluding or restricting people’s access to scarce public goods is very common practice. In other words, public goods are provided only for some ‘publics’ or ‘groups’ (usually one’s ingroup) that somehow qualify for benefiting from the public good. Thus, the ingroup may be granted equal access to the public good for its members, while outgroup members are required to fulfill certain conditions before they are allowed to share the public good. Thus, conflict may occur due to the incompatibility between two justice principles that both are considered applicable for shares of the same resource pool, equality for the ingroup and the contribution (equity) principle for the outgroup. For instance, native citizens may argue that all their compatriots should be provided with health care based on equality, while demanding additional qualifying criteria for foreign citizens over and above group membership (citizenship). The conflict arises when the foreign citizens demand the same rights as the native inhabitants to equal access to health care. We now turn to an attempt at combining types 8 and 9 into a typology that contain novel distinctions among group conflict situations. 10. Individual/group – intergroup justice conflict. When the state of justice is taken into account simultaneously on both the individual and the collective levels for each of two (or more) groups, a typology of intergroup conflict may be generated, hypotheses about conflict propensity and intensity may be advanced, and a new approach to research on intergroup conflict may emerge. The classic problem encountered when (scarce) resources are to be justly divided among members of a social system is threefold: how can a distribution be accomplished that (a) does not unjustly favor one particular group of people over other groups, (b) does not result in an unjust distribution within the group as a whole (across its members), and (c) does not treat each single individual unjustly? Failure to establish justice on any of the three levels may bring serious consequences for the individual, the relationship among group members, and the relationship between different groups. Unfortunately, justice is frequently absent on more than one level. It is not uncommon that injustice is inadvertently created on one level when justice

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is established on another. Attempts to establish justice for the individual frequently runs into conflict with the struggle for collective justice, and vice versa. Justice on both levels is frequently experienced as incompatible, due to a presumed inherent conflict between the values of ‘individual liberty’ and ‘equality.’ Too much emphasis on one may restrict the other (Barker, 1951). ‘Just as principles of macro-justice place limits on what is under individual control . . ., principles of micro-justice place limits on what is under collective control’ (Brickman et al., 1981, p. 183). Although justice on one level must not be favored at the cost of the other (if a social system is to function satisfactorily) the balance between the individual and collective levels is frequently very unstable. There is a good amount of research concerning the consequences of inequity on the individual level, and the intragroup level. Early social psychological studies of injustice by Stacy Adams (1965), the father of equity theory, focused on reactions by (unfavorably or favorably) inequitably treated individuals in a work context. Existing research on reactions to inequity (i.e., violations of the contribution principle) usually did not focus interest on other justice principles like equality or need. Another research focus is concerned with the consequences of injustice on the intergroup level, i.e., how groups react when they are unfairly treated, or how individuals react when they are unfairly treated because of his/her membership of a particular group. Many of those studies are concerned with prejudice and discrimination and resulting types of violent behavior (e.g., riots, revolutions, and civil strife). This work, however, is usually not explicit about which justice principles were violated (see Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966). Injustice and conflict may occur on both the individual and collective levels, each of which may affect interpersonal relations within and between collectives (i.e., intra- and inter-collective relations). Thus, inquiry may be directed at six general relationships concerning how, why, where, and when Individual injustice affects intra-collective interaction and conflict Individual injustice affects inter-collective interaction and conflict Intra-collective injustice affects intra-collective interaction and conflict Intra-collective injustice affects inter-collective interaction and conflict Collective injustice affects intra-collective interaction and conflict, and Collective injustice affects inter-collective interaction and conflict On a more complex level, there is a paucity of theory and research that combines information about justice on both the individual and collective levels simultaneously, and how the resulting situations may affect intra- and inter-collective interaction. Therefore, we now focus attention on a combination between (2) and (6) into a seventh category that allows consideration of the combined and simultaneous effects of justice and/or injustice for the individual and the collective on inter-collective interaction and conflict, i.e., 7. How the combined effect of individual and collective injustice affects intercollective interaction and conflict

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

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Individual

Aggregate

Individual

Aggregate

Category

Group

IndividualIndividual, interpersonal, intergroup*

IndividualAggregate

IndividualCategory

Individual-Group

AggregateAggregate

AggregateCategory

Aggregate-Group

Category-Category Category-Group Category Group

Group-Group Intergroup

Fig. 2 Types of collectives. *What appears to be interpersonal (individual–individual) interaction may instead turn out to be intergroup (or inter-category) interaction. This is true when the individuals act in their capacity as representatives of their respective group (or category – as when a person act as a representative of their gender or ethnic belongingness)

A collective may be a group, an aggregate, a category, or any other type of collectivity, each of which may display different responses to injustice. Further, the nature and process of intra- and inter-collective conflicts is partly contingent on the nature of the interacting collectives (Fig. 2). Unfortunately, the term ‘group’ is often used indiscriminately by researchers and theorists to denote a variety of collectives. As ‘group’ is just one of several kinds of collectives, rather than the other way around, care should be taken to use appropriate terms (see Griffith et al., 1993), otherwise cumulative research will be difficult. Definitions of group usually include criteria like shared identity, goals, and norms, interrelated positions and roles, and a status structure. Most empirical studies have used other, less ‘developed,’ entities like aggregates or categories that lack several of those group characteristics. Thus, it makes little sense trying to integrate findings from studies of intergroup (i.e., group-group) conflict with results from group-aggregate conflict or aggregate-category conflict under the same headline of ‘intergroup conflict.’ We now describe two groups A and B as well their group members in terms of their just or unjust treatment and restrict our focus to disadvantageous (rather than advantageous) injustice, whether or not this results from the receipt of a too small (rather than a too large) amount of resources, from the use of an inappropriate allocation principle, or for any other reason. Considering justice (j) and injustice (i) on the individual and collective levels simultaneously, each group may be characterized in four ways – jj, ji, ij, and ii. A group described as ‘ji’ informs about justice on the individual level and (disadvantageous) injustice on the collective level. Thus, the two groups may be denoted ‘ji-ii’ which stands for justice on the individual level and injustice on the collective level for Group A, while both levels for Group B are characterized by injustice. Group B is, in other words, worse off than Group A due to its situation of injustice at both levels. As each group may

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OUTGROUP

INGROUP

jj

ji

ij

ii

jj

jj-jj [= =]

jj-ji [= >]

jj-ij [> =]

jj-ii [> >]

ji

ji-jj [= <]

ji-ji [= =]

ji-ij [> <]

ji-ii [> =]

ij

ij-jj [< =]

ij-ji [< >]

ij-ij [= =]

ij-ii [= >]

ii

ii-jj [< <]

ii-ji [< =]

ii-ij [= <]

ii-ii [= =]

Fig. 3 Types of intergroup conflict. (Category notations within brackets indicate the similarity between the ingroup and the outgroup with regard to state of (in)justice. The left part of the notation denotes (dis)similarity on the individual level and the right part on the group level. For example, the (¼ <) category means that the two groups share the same state of (in)justice on the individual level, but that the ingroup is worse off (i.e., suffer injustice) on the group level)

be described in four ways, a combined simultaneous description of both groups yields a matrix of the 4  4 ¼ 16 intergroup situations shown in Fig. 3. However, as six situations are mirror images of six on the other side of the diagonal in the matrix, we end up with ten different types. From an intergroup perspective ii-jj, for example, is likely to result in more intense intergroup conflict than ii-ij. A rank order among the ten situations can be established on the basis of four assumptions (see T€ornblom, 1995): (1) A situation in which P is exposed to unfavorable injustice while O is treated justly is likely to be more aversive to P than the opposite situation which, in turn, is more aversive to P than a situation in which both P and O are treated equally (whether justly or unjustly); (2) Injustice on the collective level is likely to be more aversive to a group than injustice on the individual level; (3) A situation in which group A is exposed to injustice on more levels than group B is likely to be more aversive to group A than the opposite situation or than one in which both groups are exposed to injustice on the same number of levels; and (4) The likelihood and intensity of intergroup conflict is greater the more levels at which groups A and B combined are exposed to injustice. These assumptions generate the following rank order among the ten types of intergroup conflict: ðii  jjÞ>(ji  ij)>(ii  ij)>(ji  jj)>(ii  ji)>(ij  jj)>(ii  ii)>(ji  ji)>(ij  ij)>(jj  jj):

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While this is a rather simplified and speculative model of ‘real life’ in need of empirical test and verification, it may provide a beginning for a deeper understanding of the nature of intergroup interaction and conflict and of how violations of justice expectations are likely to trigger intergroup conflict and affect conflict intensity. For instance, the case which may be the most likely to trigger intergroup conflict is when one group perceives injustice at both the individual and the group levels, while the second group experiences justice at both levels (because members of the first group get no satisfaction regarding justice at either of the two levels while observing the second group enjoying justice at both levels). Further, the nature of justice conflict will likely be affected by the particular justice (sub) principle and the type of resource in terms of which individuals and collectives are unjustly treated, as well as within which social context and relationship the conflict occurs. A deeper understanding of intergroup justice conflict also requires systematic research on the consequences of the various types of conflict distinguished by this model. Theoretically and practically interesting consequences include, for instance, those discussed by Reitz (1981) that concern: group cohesiveness, task orientation, leadership, organizational structure, unity, perceptions of opposing groups, selective perceptions, hostility and aggression.

Social-Conceptual Distributive Justice Conflict Recall that we defined a mixture of the above two types of conflict, a conceptualsocial distributive justice conflict, as two or more parties who struggle against each other for resources that each party feel entitled to, each party defining just entitlement in terms of different and incompatible allocation principles. Let us just mention three basic types which are slightly different from the social distributive justice conflict types 7, 8, and 9. The difference lies in the emphasis on the same principle for types 7–9 and different principles for types 11–13. We will not elaborate on these three in the following. 11. Interpersonal justice conflict [cf. type 7] Two or more individuals endorse different justice principles for the same allocation event. 12. Individual-group justice conflict [cf. type 8] The individual and the group endorse different justice principles for the same allocation event (see T€ ornblom, 1988, for reviews and a model encompassing different varieties of this type of conflict). An example from social dilemma research may serve as an illustration. One line of research in this field shows that the choice of allocation principle when a public good is to be divided is affected by the type of goal pursued by the actors. If the group’s primary interest is the welfare of the whole group, for instance, it is more likely to make an egalitarian or a needbased division. However, individual members (especially those who have made a greater than average effort) may be task orientated and focus on productivity according to which they want merit to be assessed, thus endorsing contributionbased (equitable) allocations (e.g., Kazemi & Eek, 2007, 2008).

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13. Intergroup justice conflict [cf. type 9] Two or more groups endorse different justice principles for the same allocation event.

Some Concluding Remarks The exact meaning of ‘conflict’ is often taken more or less for granted in justice research. However, conflict is obviously a very complex concept with a multitude of meanings, some of which were made explicit here in this chapter. The lack of a clear conceptualization of the conflict construct makes theoretical developments difficult and renders comparisons of the results of different studies a risky business, thereby making accumulation of knowledge a cumbersome task. In our attempt to contribute to a remedy of this situation, we noted the conceptual and typological confusion existing in the conflict literature and offered a conceptual framework containing distinctions among various types of distributive justice conflicts. More specifically, five types of ‘conceptual,’ five types of ‘social,’ and three types of ‘conceptual-social’ distributive justice conflicts were delineated, several of them encompassing subtypes. In addition, these types of conflict involve different levels of analysis – intrapersonal, interpersonal, intra-group, and intergroup justice conflict. The theoretical implications of this chapter are hopefully quite evident. However, the practical implications of the proposed framework for the purpose of conflict resolution may be less obvious. Social actors enter into conflict resolution processes, each with his or her own interpretation of the problem, including what issues are in dispute, why the problem has arisen, and how best to resolve the conflict. The way in which a party to the conflict describes or defines a conflict is known as framing (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; see also Gamliel & Peer, 2006, for a study on the effects of positive and negative framing on justice judgments). As the notion of justice is highly complex, whether or not a situation is just is not always self-evident, as the ‘justice tree’ (in Fig. 1) convincingly illustrates. Equity, equality and need principles can all be seen as just, not to mention that each may be interpreted and materialized in at least three ways. This complexity opens the door to several specific types of conflict, as we showed in some detail in previous sections. These different types of conflict will most likely require different conflict resolution strategies. Thus, efforts to resolve justice conflicts are likely to miss the target and be fruitless, unless the chosen strategies are carefully matched to the specific types of conflict at hand. The framework presented here coupled with the notion of framing may also make us more alert to the fact that, for instance, an intergroup distributive justice conflict may, at closer scrutiny, turn out to be an interpersonal conflict. Mistakenly perceiving an interpersonal justice conflict as an intergroup justice conflict may significantly worsen the situation and require very different strategies to accomplish successful resolution. Disagreements and hostility between a man and a woman is

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often framed as a gender (inter)group conflict (or more correctly, an inter-category conflict, i.e., men vs. women). Similarly, conflicts between individuals of different color may too easily be framed as an inter-racial conflict (again, an inter-category conflict). Issues in connection with conflict resolution and framing bring our minds to the notion of perspective as a central aspect of justice conceptions, given that they are highly subjective in nature. A study by T€ ornblom et al. (1991), for example, explored the differences between recipient categories concerning their endorsement of the equality-of-treatment subprinciple for the allocation of positive and negative outcomes. Role-playing subjects were asked to make evaluations of how just, desirable, effective, and acceptable it is to be rewarded or punished according to the equality-of-treatment principle for positive and negative conduct that they or others were responsible for. Among the findings could be mentioned that 42% of the subjects who took the perspective of a responsible recipient, but only 25% of those who viewed the situation from a non-responsible recipient’s perspective, believed s/he would view equality-of-treatment as a just way of allocating both rewards and punishments. Without going into detail about the plausible reasons for this seemingly counter-intuitive finding or about other findings, the general outcome of this study underscore the importance of taking different actor perspectives into account. We are again reminded of the well-known but still in practice frequently neglected adage that ‘Justice is in the eye of the beholder’. In this chapter we have developed the concept of justice conflict with a sole focus on the distributive aspect of an allocation event. In addition to this aspect, allocation events also encompass other facets that are evaluated in terms of justice, i.e. procedural (the formal aspects of how allocation decisions are arrived at), interactional (the interpersonal aspect of the event), and informational justice (how outcome decisions are communicated, and how procedures are explained; see Greenberg, 1993). However, analyses of justice conflicts pertaining to those aspects will have to await future efforts. We believe that the present framework sheds new light on previous research, facilitates more precise and testable predictions for future research, provide practical implications for resolving conflicts, and may serve as a beginning of a proposal for a research program in this area. In conclusion, this chapter highlights several shortcomings of current conceptualizations and operationalizations of justice conflict, and provides some suggestions via the proposed framework for a more systematic approach.

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Absence and Presence: Interpreting Moral Exclusion in the Jewish Museum Berlin Susan Opotow

Abstract This chapter describes research conducted in a museum that interprets injustice that occurred more than seven decades ago. From the vantage of the present, it looks back on the Third Reich, a period when the National Socialist Party (“Nazis”) gained adherents, power, and sought to exterminate Jews and other groups they denigrated as “life unworthy of life” (lebensunwertes Leben). Combining psychological theory with historical background, this chapter examines how museum professionals present this period that legitimated and then carried out a genocide of enormous proportions, The Holocaust. By examining how the Jewish Museum Berlin describes the Third Reich to the public, this chapter offers insight into representations of moral exclusion to engage museum visitors in reflecting on past injustice within their society. The museum’s approach offers scholars of injustice an understanding of the representation of moral exclusion designed to reach people in the present so that they can better understand the past, the dynamics of moral exclusion, and its import for present social relations.

Exclusion from the Scope of Justice The scope of justice is our psychological boundary for the application of fairness in social relations (Deutsch, 1975; Opotow, 1990). Moral exclusion describes the narrowing of the scope of justice so that those excluded seem morally unworthy, undeserving, and therefore exploitable and eligible as targets of harm. Moral inclusion, in contrast, describes the widening of the scope of justice so that fairness is extended more broadly to groups that were formerly marginalized. To investigate the scope of justice and study factors that change it, I developed a Scope of Justice

S. Opotow (*) John Jay College of Criminal Justice and The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected] E. Kals and J. Maes (eds.), Justice and Conflicts, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19035-3_3, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

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scale consisting of three attitudes: (Opotow, 1987, 1993): (1) the belief that considerations of fairness apply to others; (2) the willingness to allocate a share of community resources to others; and (3) the willingness to make sacrifices to foster others’ well-being. The Scope of Justice Scale operationalizes fairness (cf. Rawls, 1971) and what follows from it – respect, deserving, rights, and entitlements (Opotow, 1990). Consistent with Fineberg’s (1970) assertion that rightholders can exercise rights by asserting claims as well as by surrendering them to others, moral inclusion can be operationalized by acknowledging others’ entitlement to fairness, well-being, and access to societal resources, and acting on their behalf even when it requires some sacrifices by oneself to do so. The scope of justice scale can indicate partial, conditional, and unequivocal moral inclusion (Opotow, 1995), but uniformly negative loadings on the scale’s three variables indicate that a target is morally excluded. Moral exclusion is operationalized as an indifference or opposition to the processes, distributions, and policies that would support another’s well-being. This includes an unwillingness to consider fairness or allocate resources for others, creating and intensifying durable between group disparities in security, safety, and power. Because moral exclusion is consistent with an unwillingness to incur individual or collective costs or make sacrifices that would foster anothers’ wellbeing, it typically characterizes a socio-political context in which inequality, lack of concern or protection for others, and ungenerosity prevail. Exclusion from the scope of justice can be legitimized by derogating those excluded as inferior, pathological, criminal, or evil (Opotow, 2001). Moral exclusion is a societal-level as well as an individual-level construct. Based on shared social conventions, rationalizations, and justifications that render harmdoing acceptable, moral exclusion can be difficult to detect. It is evident in symptoms that include denial, victim blaming, unflattering and self-righteous comparisons, condescension, and double standards (Opotow, 1990; Opotow & Weiss, 2000). A person’s scope of justice emerges from beliefs and attitudes that are, in part, derived from prevailing views in a society about entitlement, deserving, and fairness. The scope of justice, then, is not entirely an individual or conscious construct. But even when it is neither obvious nor conscious, the scope of justice can influence social relations; normalize particular attitudes and actions toward others; justify harm directed at excluded social categories; and see such harm as normal, inevitable, and the way things are or ought to be (Opotow 1987, 1990, 2011). Because moral exclusion naturalizes contemporary forms of injustice, it is easier to recognize long ago and far away than in the present, when psychological mechanisms, such as denial (Opotow & Weiss 2000) and societal structures can conceal and normalize it. This chapter describes moral exclusion in the past as it is viewed from the present. Situated in an historical museum, The Jewish Museum Berlin, that, in part, addresses past social injustice, it examines how museum professionals represent past moral exclusion and harmdoing by their own country to the public. The museum is situated within Germany, a country that supported a genocide of immense proportions during World War II. Examining past moral exclusion in

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the Jewish Museum Berlin allows the study of: (1) the operationalization of moral exclusion by the Third Reich; (2) the presentation of past moral exclusion to the public; and (3) how moral exclusion and moral inclusion are presented within the same institution. This study on the practice of describing injustice contributes data to the psychological study of injustice. It offers insight into how people come to understand past injustice fostered by moral exclusion and the implications of this past for contemporary social relations.

Researching Injustice in Museums In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, social psychological research was conducted in a variety of congregate settings, including schools, camps, hospitals, camps, and universities (Opotow & Gieseking, 2011). Like these sites, which serve as background as well as foreground for researching social issues, museums are rich sites for psychological research on human behavior and social relationships. Called “technologies of classification” (Macdonald, 1996), museums contribute to a society’s quest for order and boundaries. They – employ physical objects in their constitution of culture, [and] are unusually capable among institutions of turning culture into an object: of materializing it. They have played a role not just in displaying the world, but in structuring a modern way of seeing and comprehending the world “as if it were an exhibit.” (Macdonald, 1996, p. 7)

Like museums, psychology depends on systems of classification, evident in the systematicity of its methods for collecting and analyzing data to develop theory. Both historical museums and psychology focus on the human experience. Psychological research examines how antecedent factors at the person and environment levels give rise to human behavior (Lewin, 1943). Historical museums concern past experience at individual and societal levels. They display materials (i.e., objects, documents, etc.) that connect with individuals’ memories; they sample and disturb collective memories that have been shared, passed down, and constructed and reconstructed by groups over time (Halbwachs, 1950/1992). Through the use of material to create exhibitions, museums describe human experiences in ways that can shape contemporary understandings of the past and the present. Interpretive strategies are decisions that museum professionals make when they select material to engage visitors’ interest in and promote their understanding of a topic. They are also educational approaches for gallery tours that guide visitors through exhibitions about the past. Interpretive strategies are decisions that theorize the relationship between particular material and how it will be received and understood by visitors. Museum professionals select materials, cognizant of their potential when grouped with other material, to generate understanding. The effectiveness of interpretive strategies depends on translating material into comprehension (cf. Macdonald, 1996) as well as bridging two distinct times and cultures, the past and the present. Professionals’ expertise about visual, written, spoken, and

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experiential communicative practice can inform psychological theories on the process of reshaping people’s justice perceptions. Museums’ interpretive strategies, therefore, are interventions with the potential to change people’s understanding that can widen the scope of justice. Interpretive strategies at the Jewish Museum Berlin educate visitors, Berlin, the nation, and the world about the Jewish presence in Berlin and Germany in the two millennia before World War II. This chapter on the museum and its permanent collection describes the presentation and communication of injustice in the Jewish past in Germany, particularly during the Third Reich (1933–1945). It results from several visits to the museum and informative interviews with two key members of museum’s senior staff, Ms. Maren Kr€ uger, Academic Leader of the Permanent Exhibition, and Mrs. Tanja Petersen, Head of the Educational Department. Both are experts who have developed interpretive strategies of the Jewish Museum Berlin.

The Jewish Presence in Berlin Berlin was a small garrison city that “expanded exponentially in the nineteenth century and started to acquire representative cultural institutions: museums, concert halls, opera houses” (Gay, 1998, p. 13). Around 1900, Berlin began to overshadow Munich culturally and became the envy of other German cities. Berlin has been noted for its residents’ blunt, cynical humor and its democratic deflation of pretention. Berlin’s characteristic speech, Gay (1998) reports, was quite antiauthoritarian; deflating in its harsh and terse accents, it came naturally to working-class Berliners and was affected by sophisticates who thought linguistic slumming chic. . . Berlin was the kind of city on which travel writers and visiting journalists inevitably bestowed the epithet “vibrant.” This vitality drew heavily on its diverse population, doubtless one reason why Jews felt so much at home there. In 1933, more than 150,000 of them, some 30% of the Jews in Germany, lived there. (p. 14).

Berlin’s Jews, Gay describes, “helped to shape its culture, far out of proportion to their numbers, as scientists, historians, poets, musicians, editors, critics, lawyers, physicians, and as art dealers, munificent collectors, and donors to museums” (p. 15). At present, Berlin is credited with having a “vitality unmatched among European cities: It’s now arguably the Continent’s capital of cool” (Hammer, 2009). When the National Socialists came to power, they found Berlin, its famed culture, irreverence, and vivacity a hard nut to crack, even when Goebbels was put in charge of winning it over to the “movement.” The city’s culture had contributed impressively to what was anathema to the Nazis and their supporters: modernist experimentation with its unconventional theatres, avant-garde novelists and publishers, adventurous newspapers and critics. (Gay, 1998, p. 15)

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Jewish Life from the Seventeenth Century to World War I The Jewish presence in Berlin increased steadily after 1671 when the Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm allowed Jews from Vienna to take refuge and settle in Berlin and Brandenburg (Nachama, Schoeps, & Simon 2002). In 1871, when Germany was unified as a nation 7%, of Jews in Germany lived in Berlin. In 1910, before World War I, this percentage increased to 23%. In 1933, at the end of the Weimar Republic as the National Socialists came to power, one third of Germany’s Jews lived in Berlin (Brenner, 2002). Berlin’s Jewish population in 1933 was 160,564, 3.8% of Berlin’s total (Simon, 2002). The Emancipation Edict of 1812 promised an end to discrimination (Sch€utz, 2002) by limiting economic and social restrictions on Jews, but anti-Semitism remained an influential dynamic. Anti-Jewish stirrings and uprisings in 1819 were partly the result of an economic downturn and partly a backlash to the Edict (Levinger, 2000). In the middle of the nineteenth century, Jews in Berlin increasingly assimilated and became influential in German culture and society (Schoeps, 2002). From 1850 to 1917 constitutional revisions increased Jews’ rights, but this period was also characterized by anti-Semitism. In 1879, a prominent tract, “The Jewish Question in Germany” by historian Heinrich von Treitschke gave rise to the “Berlin Anti-Semitism Dispute” (Berlin Antisemitismusstreit). The tract and a notorious sentence within it, “Jews are our misfortune,” (Sch€utz, 2002, p. 110) legitimized anti-Semitic attitudes, speech, and action. Such attitudes and events, which continued throughout in the nineteenth century, anticipated later National Socialist racial doctrines (Levinger, 2000).

Post World War I and the Rise of National Socialism (“Nazis”) In 1919 at the beginning of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), half of Jewish breadwinners were independently employed. The well-being of Jews and their participation in civic life eroded precipitously as National Socialists gained power from 1925 to1933. Independent employment declined to 23% in this period, resulting in a “proletarianization of Jews” (Brenner, 2002, p. 151). As unemployment increased so did suicide rates among Berlin’s Jews. In 1927, 117 of 100,000 Jews were suicides, double the number from 3 years before. Brenner blames these suicides on the deepening economic crisis and ever-increasing anti-Semitism, observing that a smaller percentage of Protestants and Catholics committed suicide during this period. Jews were increasingly excluded from the social and economic sphere. Many Jews had attended German schools and participated in German societies and clubs, but as discrimination and unemployment increased, Jews founded civic organizations, and sport clubs. It founded schools for its youth because of the unfriendly climate created for Jews by the German youth movement, fraternities, and student organizations (Brenner, 2002). Thus, Jews engaged in

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“building while sinking” (Simon, 2002, p. 187) as the diffuse exclusion of Jews from social institutions within Germany proceeded relentlessly. When Adolf Hitler assumed power on January 30, 1933, one-third of Berlin’s 500,000 German-Jewish population – who considered themselves German as much as Jewish – left Berlin. Six years later, in January 1939, when World War II began, the remaining Jewish population had been reduced by half as Jews emigrated to flee the increasing discrimination, threats, and abuse that had become endemic in the Third Reich. In addition to emigration and suicides, the Jewish population was reduced by disappearances and murders that were the forerunner of an even greater destruction that would engulf Germany’s Jews and the 4–5 and half million Jews living in countries soon to be overrun by the German Blitzkrieg [“lightening war”] (Gross, 1982). By 1941 half the Jews remaining in Germany were congregated in Berlin, largely because local actions had ousted them from smaller communities (Gross, 1982). By 1943 Berlin was declared judenrein (German, “clean of Jews”) signaling the final squeezing of Jews out of the body politic. At the end of World War II in 1945, only 5,100 Jews remained (Simon, 2002). The Holocaust had obliterated Jewish life in Berlin, Germany, and Europe. At present, Germany has a rising Jewish population with estimated 20,000 Jews in Berlin in 2010 (Shyovitz, 2010), a city of 3.5 million people, and 200,000 Jews in Germany, a country of 82 million (Smee, 2006).

Jewish Museums At the turn of the century Jewish museums were founded in Hamburg and Vienna. Berlin, a latecomer, founded its first Jewish museum in 1917 when an art collection donated by Berlin’s Jewish community opened to the public. The museum’s collection moved to its own venue and opened to the public on January 24, 1933 a week before a massive National Socialist torchlight parade on January 30th celebrating Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Germany (Gross, 1982). In spite of National Socialist opposition, the Jewish Museum mounted several exhibitions of Jewish artists over the next few years. Beginning in 1933, National Socialist laws and decrees forbade Jews from holding public office; practicing in law or medicine; owning businesses; owning radios; changing residences; having pets; obtaining ration cards for food; having rights to protection in German courts of law; enrolling in the university; attending sports events, concerts, museum; and much more (Simon, 2002). Such laws only allowed Jews to visit the Jewish Museum or exhibit in it (Young, 2000). National Socialists then took over the museum and used it exhibit what they labeled “degenerate art,” a National Socialist term describing virtually all modern art. Rudy Koshar (2000) observes that Although the Nazis aimed to eradicate Jewish culture from Germany and Europe, they had a “museal” attachment to some of the remains of this culture. Himmler had indeed drawn up plans for SS-run museums that would display the artifacts of an all but extinct Jewish life in Europe. (p. 126)

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On November 9, 1938, a violent anti-Semitic pogrom, Kristallnacht (“The Reich Night of Broken Glass”), murdered hundreds of Jews and plundered and destroyed the museum along with innumerable Jewish community institutions, synagogues, businesses, and homes. Nachama et al. (2002) argue Kristallnacht marked the end of Jewish life and culture in Berlin and signaled a break with the past. After Kristallnacht, it is not possible to speak of continuity between the Jewish past in Berlin, which was obliterated, and Jewish life today. Decades after World War II, Berlin’s Jewish culture was only a “topic of remembrance” (Nachama et al., 2002, p. 8). More than 40 years after the war, in 1988, an exhibition on Jewish life in Berlin opened on Kurf€urstendamm, a main, commercial West Berlin street. The exhibit, entitled “As If It Had Never Been,” was mounted by the Berlin History Workshop. The design of this exhibition sought to “enable people imaginatively to reconstruct lost connections and relationships” (Koshar, 2000, p. 252) that had resulted from the National Socialist eradication of the Jewish presence and culture in Germany. It described Jews as an integral part of Berlin’s history and culture and asked Germans to “look at what remained, or what could be imagined, of a culture that in its time was much more than the product of its victims” (Koshar, 2000, p. 255). Like the Jewish Museum Berlin that would open 13 years later in a unified Germany, this exhibit focused on “‘concrete knowledge’ of Jewish culture in German history” (p. 255, emphasis in original). Recognition of the void left in Germany by the obliteration of Jews and Jewish culture has been given voice in many ways over the past half century. For example, Gay describes a void in acknowledging of the loss of Jewish life he experienced when he returned to visit Berlin in 1961: “Wherever we went there were Germans: driving their cars, walking their dogs, lounging in cafes, waiting on customers. And they were all speaking German, as though nothing had happened” (p. 6). In 1965, Willy Brandt, an influential politician and mayor of West Berlin, spoke at the New School in New York and with his characteristic bluntness, stated: “We miss our Jews” (Gay, 1998, p. 14). The Berlin History Workshop’s 1988 exhibit addressed the Jewish void and, more recently, the Jewish Museum Berlin addressed this void in its architecture and subject matter, bringing remembrance of Jewish cultural life back to Berlin in a prominent civic institution.

Jewish Museum Berlin Jewish Museum Berlin opened in 2001 with audacious architecture, a comprehensive exhibit on 2,000 years of the Jewish presence in Berlin, and temporary exhibits on Jewish life (Jewish Museum Berlin, 2001). It was designed to “tell the story of German Jewry in all its dimensions” (Museum Berlin Director Michael Blumenthal, quoted in Jewish Museum Berlin, 2001, p. 16), to have broad appeal and “make a decisive contribution to our historical consciousness, our responsibility as a nation, and Germany’s cultural landscape” (German State Minister Julian

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Nida-R€umelin, quoted in Jewish Museum Berlin, 2001, p. 13). It was designed to be “a museum for everyone: young and old, German and non-German, Jewish and non-Jewish,” (Michael Blumenthal, quoted in Jewish Museum Berlin, 2001, p. 17). Most visitors to the museum are German, and although they may live in neighborhoods that were formerly Jewish, or in homes or apartments once occupied by Jews, or purchase goods from businesses founded and once operated by Jews, or visit cultural institutions which Jews founded and played an influential role, they may have little knowledge about Jews or their role in Berlin’s past. My research on moral exclusion is attentive to the museum’s treatment of the exclusion of Jews from German society, particularly from 1933 to 1945. As Museum Director Michael Blumenthal describes: In depicting the ups and downs of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews in Germany, the museum illustrates what becomes possible when religious, cultural, and ethic minorities are able to contribute their unique talents to national life – and how terrible the consequences for all can be when intolerance and prejudice prevail. (Jewish Museum Berlin, 2001, p. 16).

I will argue that the museum implicitly and explicitly focuses on moral exclusion and moral inclusion. For example, Director Michael Blumenthal delineates inclusionary goals when he states that the museum symbolizes “a widely shared determination to confront the past and to apply its lessons to societal problems of today and tomorrow. . . [and] the universal challenge of promoting tolerance toward minorities in a globalized world and to their integration into national life” Jewish Museum Berlin, (2001, p. 16).

Buildings The Jewish Museum Berlin has two distinct architectural parts. One is the old museum, the Baroque Kollegienhaus, a traditional building with a rectangular shape that houses the museum’s security, admissions, coat check, cafe´, bookstore, and an information desk, and larger temporary exhibitions. A second building, selected in a 1994 architectural competition, is designed by Daniel Libeskind and is structured by two lines: “one is a straight line, but broken into many fragments, the other is a tortuous line, but continuing indefinitely” (Jewish Museum Berlin, 2001, p. 178). This design, called “Between the Lines,” yields disorienting space, sharp angles, and six tall voids. Nothing is displayed in the voids, and they challenge the visitor to grapple with empty space and the loss they symbolize: The Jewish Museum is conceived as an emblem in which the invisible and visible are the structural feature which have been gathered in this space of Berlin and laid bare in an architecture where the unnamed remains the name which keeps still. (Libeskind, quoted in Schneider, 2007)

This statement captures an evocative and ghostly quality that is evident in photographs of the empty museum (e.g., Bunschoten & Binet, 1997; Libeskind, 1999). When opened to the public in 1998, still empty of its contents and 3 years

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ahead of the museum’s completion, the museum drew 350,000 visitors yearly to see the interior of this architecturally innovative structure. Libeskind’s architecture, now a prominent and celebrated Berlin landmark, creates space that engages and disorients visitors. Schneider (2007) describes how “people of all ages, walks of life and cultural backgrounds appear to experience the drama and emotional force of this extraordinary spatial configuration immediately and intuitively” (p. 58). Libeskind (1999) emphasizes the building’s connection to the museum’s mission: I erected the museum in response to a very specific program. I was commissioned to build a museum which deals with the fundamental question of Jewish participation in the history of Berlin. The museum was to allow for the exploration of the history dimension of Jews in Berlin and the consideration of what this means today in a world that has changed so much. (p. 31)

Visitors enter Libeskind’s structure from the Kollegienhaus. They descend a passageway into a basement and encounter a stark, bright, disorienting space that seems removed from the outside world. This section, “the axes,” includes the Axis of Continuity, the Axis of Exile, and the Axis of the Holocaust. It lacks familiar right angles, both horizontally and vertically, creating an off-kilter visual and spatial experience. Mrs. Tanja Petersen, head of the Education Department, describes how visitors might experience this section of the museum: “the sub-level is narrow and uneven. It is a kind of interaction, a kind of break to make visitors think that something is different here.” The Axis of the Holocaust includes the Holocaust Tower with five walls of different dimensions that rise to full height of the building. The tower, shut off from the axes by a heavy door that closes behind the visitor, is neither heated nor airconditioned. It is dark, unfamiliar spatially, and, except for a slit of natural light high up on one wall, sealed off. The tower can elicit psychological discomfort and, perhaps, a search for the demand characteristics of this context (cf. Sampson, 1998). It might cause visitors to consider an analogous experience in the past, when some people might have been cut off from anything comforting or familiar. Physically, the tower embodies both exclusion and incarceration – exclusion from the museum proper yet confined within it, and a removal from a sense of personal control, from more ordinary spaces we inhabit, and from ordinary contact with people.

Axes Exhibitions In addition to its dramatic spaces, the axes offer visitors their first exhibition experience in the museum. This section of the museum could have provided a historical overview of Jewish life in Berlin or an introduction to the larger museum, but instead it begins with a limited number of small exhibitions in vitrines (glass showcases) set within the angled walls of the axes. These vitrines are spare and focus on a particular object or a related set of objects donated to the museum.

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Memories connected with the object are displayed along with, for example, a toy, a painting, or a set of dishes that reflect on the social condition of Jews in Berlin during the Holocaust. Mrs. Maren Kr€ uger, Curator of the Permanent Exhibition, observes that the “combination of the architecture and the stories told in the showcases. . . goes together so closely,” and research indicates that visitors react to it well. Donations from survivors and relatives of people who experienced National Socialism in Berlin include precious personal material: letters, photographs, and household items. These donations are the largest source of the museum’s collection. Mrs. Kr€uger describes the role of the axes exhibition in the interpretive strategy of the museum. There we show only objects, like documents, photographs, three dimensional objects – mementos which are related to a story of a family or an individual and the murder of people related to them during the Holocaust. For example, objects like last letters, which were written before deportation, were kept by friends or family members who received them many years ago. These people gave them and donated them to the Jewish Museum. Objects like what we are showing at the moment, for example, a little toy, a little small toy ape. It was the toy of a boy who left Germany without his parents. He immigrated to Sweden with the children’s transport by himself when he was 15 years old. He could only take very few things with him. This toy was one of the objects. His parents stayed in Berlin and were murdered. This toy, together with a few other things he had from Berlin, was very important to him as a memento of his childhood in Germany. He donated it to the museum.

Objects such as the ape were precious to individuals as evidence of their own life history and its challenges. The objects represent comfort, connection, trauma, and change. “At a certain point,” Mrs. Kr€ uger explained, “they give them to the museum to share these memories with a wider public.” She designates material donated and exhibited in this section as “objects of memory.” The vitrine with the little toy she described displays only two objects – the small ape (perhaps 4–5 in. tall) on the right side of the case and a creased and partlyblackened letter on the left (see Photo 1). Entitled “My dear boy!” the wall text in front of the vitrine states: In 1939, 15 year old Gert Berliner went to Sweden on a children’s transport. In his luggage was his stuffed monkey. Gert’s parents, Paul and Sophie Berliner, remained in Berlin, and in 1943 they were departed to Auschwitz and murdered there. In November 1941, Paul and Sophie wrote this letter to their son. Parts of it were censored – probably because they alluded to the deportations that had just begun. “I cannot write much [censored] terrible conditions I am. Daddy told you about the details. As long as we’re here we’ll continue to write [censored] Chin up. With God’s help we’ll be reunited.” In 1947 Gert Berliner emigrated from Sweden to the USA where he became a painter, filmmaker and photographer. Gift of Gert Berliner

With minimal material – the toy ape, the letter, and a very brief account of Gert Berliner’s life – this display tells a powerful story about 8 years in one family’s life from the perspective of the mother and her son. Mrs. Kr€uger explained that the museum values objects such as the ape because they speak to visitors. They are

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Photo 1 “My dear boy!” Axis display at the Jewish Museum Berlin (Photo: Author)

familiar – many people have beloved childhood toys – and they therefore attract visitor interest. The museum values such objects in concert with the memories and stories connected with them rather than the object in isolation. Without such information, she said, it is just an ape. The museum’s interpretive strategy, therefore, begins with donors willing to give personal and precious objects to the museum so that it become part of a public institution and larger project. The museum receives donations with as much information as possible to reveal the story of the object: to whom did it belong, who took it into exile, who received it from them and safeguarded it. This elucidates the object’s meaning historically and personally. The museum’s collection of such objects is much smaller than Jewish museums throughout the Jewish diaspora, and as Mrs. Petersen, notes, “there is a story of why we don’t have it.” Through the rotating micro-exhibitions in the axes that depend on objects in the museum’s collection, visitors can grasp the macro socio-political circumstances lived by individuals and their families. These objects sample the history of Jews in Germany. They prompt a psychological connection between those who survived and those who did not through narrative and visual accounts that resonate with visitors’ lives today.

Gallery Tours Mrs. Petersen describes the education department’s interpretive strategy when leading school and other groups through the axes. She asks: “What kind of object attracts you?” The discussions that ensue interrogate the meaning an object can

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have in a person’s life and identity. She describes a museum visitor who asked about a walking stick in one of the vitrines: One of the students asked me once “Why did they take that?” I said that all the things that are here were taken by the family on their way from Germany to South America. They had to flee because they were Jewish. Then first of all they say “I can’t tell that they are Jewish. I can’t see it . . . It [an object] must have something to do with ‘Jewishness.’” Visitors ask, “Did they take – whatever-it-is – with them?” I say “Do you have something favorite, like a hobby or sport or something?” They say “Yeah, well, I am into football.” I say “A-ha. Can you imagine when you leave this town or this land? And, of course, you have to separate that you are not being forced to leave; today you do it voluntarily and so you have to be aware of the perspectives and the necessities that were important to those families.” Then he said, “Well, when I would leave somewhere for a year of course I would take this American football with me.” I said, “Maybe now you can explain to me and to the others why you think they took all these things with them.” . . . I go further and ask them so if the whole world around you is full of discrimination and injustice and increasing, when is the breaking point that you decide that enough is enough and you have to leave family, job, home. So this is a point of no return. It is a very, very individual point and it depends on the one hand on the pressure, the very personal feeling and periods of injustice and discrimination. Then you have to go further and say that in most of the cases the families fled or left the country or have been forced to leave the country when the men were put into concentration camps in 1938 and told “OK. We’ll let you go when you can prove to us that you can leave the country.”

She describes how visitors look for “Jewishness” in everyday objects such as the walking stick or a cup. The meaning of being Jewish, however, could not be found in these objects as they have recreational or utilitarian rather than religious value. This indicates to visitors that Jews were not distinctive in their preferences for sports, for example. The “Jewishness” of objects displayed can only be found in the socio-political context in which the walking-stick and its owner were embedded that pressured Jews to leave their home and country. The Jewish Museum Berlin’s interpretive strategy asks visitors to place themselves in the situation of Jewish people under National Socialism to understand what they might have experienced that influenced their decision to leave. Mrs. Petersen cautions that such decisions – when a family fled or what they took with them – cannot be judged by us today as right or wrong: It is not for us to judge. It is not for the Jewish Museum to say this is right and this is wrong but it is a very, very individual decision which depends on personal experiences, personal circumstances, and the circumstances of the state.

Decisions, she emphasizes, are influenced by an individual’s particular circumstances that include “neighbors, relatives, friends, all these things; money, financial background for instance; and disease, illness, those who had a sick grandpa at home, for example.” Objects in the exhibition evoke some of these difficult decisions – to stay or leave – place them within the socio-political circumstances in Germany’s National Socialist past that morally excluded people because of their group identity. Using familiar objects displayed as way to enter and imagine this past enables visitors to understand the demands and experience of moral exclusion and what ensued from it – emigration or deportation.

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The Permanent Exhibition: Two Millennia of German-Jewish History Visitors leave the axes and ascend an expansive staircase spanning the length of the Libeskind wing. Emerging at the top, they enter an exhibition area that narrates German-Jewish history and culture over two millennia. As visitors navigate through 14 historical periods beginning in the Middle Ages, the architecture presents a number of challenges. Although the space for the permanent exhibition is less dramatically askew than in the axes, the walls are irregular, angled, and sometimes blocked by ascending voids. In this extensive exhibition, several areas bear on moral exclusion and inclusion.

Anti-Semitism Within the permanent exhibition is a thin, narrow line of seemingly-endless wall text consisting of linked anti-Semitic statements in German and English (see Photo 2). A few examples include: “They are nowaday vampires of society” stated by Immanuel Kant in 1798; “Croak, Jew, Croak,” a slogan during anti-Jewish rioting throughout Germany in 1819; “The power of money lies in the hands of the Jews” in 1838; “The Jew does not work and does better than we do. Away with the vermin,” stated in 1848; and a statement decrying “the Jew-ification of modern art” by Richard Wagner in 1850. These statements document the enduring and damaging rhetoric of exclusion and hate.

Photo 2 Display on the 1965 Frankfurt-Auschwitz trials at the Jewish Museum Berlin with the documentary, Memorandum (1965, National Film Board of Canada) (Photo: Author)

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Mrs. Kr€uger links these anti-Semitic statements to an adjacent audio exhibition on equal rights: We hope that it’s possible to connect what we show in the museum to things that people are confronted with in their daily lives today. . . In the part of the exhibition with the antiSemitic quotes on the wall, there is a table at the beginning of the segment; the subject is emancipation in the nineteenth century. It is an audio station. We offer text on questions that were discussed in the nineteenth century like: Can a Jew be a German? Can a Jew have an office in a state institution in Germany? These questions were widely discussed during the process of giving Jews equal rights during the nineteenth century. . . The same questions are relevant today concerning people who were not born in Germany, whose parents migrated to Germany years ago, who live here, and who have the same problems that were discussed then. For example, “Can somebody be really German who came to Germany as a child with their parents from Turkey?” and these sort of things. How far does the assimilation of these groups have to go so that we can accept them as equal in our society? Of course, that is what we hope for – that people are aware of developments today which are related to German-Jewish history.

She expresses hope that these sections of the exhibition can “make visitors aware of the dangers that exist when different cultures or groups of people live together and how minorities have been treated and are treated today.” The exhibit Mrs. Kr€ uger describes, “The Emancipation of the Jews,” presents visitors with six questions that were debated from 1801 to 1912: • • • • • •

Should a Jew be granted the same rights as Christians? Can a Jew be a German? Are the Jews ready for emancipation? Should Jews be allowed to freely choose where they reside? Can a Jew hold public office? Is the emancipation of the Jews damaging to German society?

These are timeless questions about moral inclusion that emerge in periods when the scope of justice is changing and has the potential to widen to expand the applicability of rights, deserving, and entitlement to marginalized groups. Although these question concern anti-Semitic mores and laws in nineteenth century Germany, they are relevant (with proper nouns replaced, such as “Muslim” for “Jew”) in contemporary controversies in Germany and elsewhere that debate the inclusion of marginalized groups.

The 1965 Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trials A section of the permanent exhibition concerns the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trials (der zweite Auschwitz-Prozess) which took place from 1963 to 1965. Twenty-two defendants, mid- to lower-level officials in the Auschwitz-Birkenau death and concentration camp complex, stood trial under German penal law because of their roles in the Holocaust. This exhibition displays documents and photographs from the trials, including its trial verdict. It also includes an excerpt from a National Film

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Photo 3 Anti-semitic text, Jewish Museum Berlin (Photo: Author)

Board of Canada documentary, Memorandum (Brittain & Spotten, 1965; see http:// onf-nfb.gc.ca/eng/collection/film/?id¼10552). In it, defendants leave police vehicles to enter a courtroom (see Photo 3). Subtitles in the film identify each defendant. As they move from the police van to the courtroom, some defendants cover their faces; others, as they pass the videographer, throw objects and reach forward to punch the camera or the person behind it. This video clip is disturbing because it documents explicit acts of evasion and violence displayed by men charged with cruelty and mass murder. These defendants were, in 1965, some of the living remnants of Germany’s state-sponsored moral exclusion and violence. This trial was largely public and brought details of the Holocaust to the attention of people in the Federal Republic of Germany two decades after World War II, a period when public discussion about the war had been quiescent. Six defendants received life sentences; several others received the maximum prison sentences possible for charges brought against them. Mrs. Petersen describes interpreting this exhibition to visitors: In this installation, people usually come from here. These are benches to sit on. All your stations are here, and you can listen to the witnesses of the Auschwitz trial. Right here you can see some documentation and here in this corner is a short Canadian movie that shows the accused coming into the courts. We show it to visitors on guided tours (some guides do it). It is very, very interesting after you talk about National Socialism. Then you go to the question of guilt and responsibility. . . When we show them the movie we ask “Why do they [the defendants] act that aggressively?” We explain that Mr. So-and-so was accused of killing 3,000 or murdered so many people and so on and so on and then ask them, “What do you think? How should he or she be punished?”. . . Everybody usually says he should be punished to death, and this would be the minimum punishment, death. He got 5 years or 8 years. The feeling that stays, the feeling of the visitors, is that this is a big injustice. They would shout it out.

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This exhibition reveals the dramatic shift in the scope of justice from the early 1940s when the National Socialists were in power to the 1960s when some were tried for war crimes. Mrs. Petersen explains that moral issues in this exhibit connect with current controversy about guilt, punishment, and responsibility that had occurred recently with the release of Christian Klar of the Red Army Faction from prison in January 2009, a few weeks before. Mrs. Petersen also connected the issues of guilt and responsibility in this exhibit to Darfur: “What about genocide today?” she asks, cautioning that this is a very sensitive question; “you have to be very, very careful [and it] depends on how much time you have and how educated your group is.” In 2007, the Jewish Museum Berlin featured a Darfur Week inspired by a 2006 Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC exhibit, “Darfur/Darfur.” Mrs. Petersen describes the interpretive strategy for the Jewish Museum Berlin exhibition on contemporary large-scale, identity-based violence: We had a big installation of pictures that you can see from outside, just passing on the street, and we had a small exhibition on drawings of children of the Darfur region. We showed the drawings to [visitor groups] and gave them input on the political background, which is not easy. We explained different points of view [and asked] “Is it a genocide, yes or no?” “What is the definition of a genocide?” Then we asked them, “From the perspective of children, what would you suggest? How would you argue, what would you want from our government? Should they invest, yes or no?” They discussed it and we had more than 300 postcards which were written to the high politicians of Sudan.

By evoking parallels between moral exclusion and violence in the past and present, the Darfur exhibit asked visitors to apply their knowledge about the Holocaust and its violent consequences to contemporary intolerance, conflict, and injustice in the world.

Touch Screen on National Socialism Mrs. Petersen often asks visitors if they have seen the touch screen on National Socialism. This bilingual screen, situated at the end of the gallery tour, is a way for visitors to test their knowledge about National Socialist persecution. The Jewish persecution was supported by more than 2,000 laws – such as no pets, no telephones – that restricted the everyday life of Jews: You touch a button and a questionnaire comes up. The questions include: “How do you come to work? Do you own a bicycle? Do you own a pet?” . . .By pushing the buttons you will get all the laws that are restricting the lives of Jews in Germany. . . Jews are not allowed to own pets anymore because, by starting the deportations, the pets are starving and the Germans had a big, big spot for the pets but not for the Jews. How ironic is that?

She asks school age visitors: “What would it be like if they could no longer attend school?” They say – “Oh, this is great! This is what I wished for my entire school time!” But then you say, “What does it mean? The state restricts any possibility for the future for this generation [of Jews]. There is no future for this generation. This is the result.”

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In this brief exchange we see how the interpretative strategy of the Jewish Museum Berlin evoke past injustice at the micro level (a student who was no longer permitted to attend German school) and the larger macro environment (exclusion of Jews from societal resources) while connecting the past (what happened during the Third Reich) and at present (contemporary students’ attitudes toward school). These contrasts – micro and macro, past and present – offer visitors an understanding of the dynamics and effects of moral exclusion.

Longer Interpretive Programs Mrs. Petersen notes that the museum possesses objects associated with personal narratives that can deepen visitors’ understanding of the socio-political context of the past and its influence on people then. The museum also reaches the public through longer interpretive programs developed by the museum’s education department, some for students and some for adults. These educational programs are designed for engagement and active, discovery learning (forschendes Lernen). A half day program, “Forced into Exile,” uses improvisational theater. Participants assume a role in a decisional dilemma such as: “Do I leave my family back here and try to save my own life” or “Do I risk my and others’ lives?” “How important are my own feelings of injustice compared to the misfortunes of other people who were thrown out of their job?” The workshops are designed for participants without deep historical knowledge to help them reflect on and learn about situations in the past utilizing their own life experiences to foster understanding. In a 1 day workshop for intact classes in the museum archives, students led by a staff member work with original materials. Donning gloves to handle historic objects and conduct research, they work on a range of topic such as migration to Shanghai or how Jewish students fared after their 1938 expulsion from German schools. From documents, photographs, letters, and objects (e.g., a saxophone or a puppet taken to Shanghai), students learn about particular individuals and their lives. A museum donor who has given the museum relevant material may visit the students to give a talk or answer questions. The hands-on experience and contact with donors can be a rich experience because it builds upon information students have acquired, based on their own research, the day before. A 2 day program, designed for teachers and social workers includes a training and role play session to learn about anti-Semitism and how to combat it. A 1-week program connected with a temporary exhibition in 2009, “Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race” was designed for students who are 15 years and older and for medical professionals, including nurses and people working with care of the elderly. In sum, visitors to the Jewish Berlin Museum consider the Holocaust in a variety of ways. First, the Libeskind wing is an architectural landmark in the city that memorializes the historical Jewish presence in Berlin. Second, the axes and the tower of the Holocaust operate as interior memorial space. Third, the vitrines exhibit ordinary objects within hybrid space that creates an interaction among

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exhibition material, architecture, and memory. Fourth, the permanent exhibition narrates Jewish life and accomplishments before 1933 and the subsequent disruption and obliteration of Jewish life. Finally, the longer programs provide a laboratory for working, doing, learning in a group to stimulate learning and a commitment to the issues under study. Together, the museum offers visitors a complex experience designed to reach a wide variety of people of all ages and varied ethnic, geographic, and religious backgrounds.

Discussion The Jewish Museum Berlin delineates the history of Jews in Germany over the past 2,000 years while it memorializes their exclusion, exile, and murder. It sits in the breach between a lost past and the present. The obliteration of Jewish life in Germany began with the ascent of the National Socialists to power, forcefully signified by Kristallnacht (1938), when physical manifestations of the Jewish presence and culture in Berlin were attacked and destroyed. The destruction of communities and people on a vast scale followed in a period characterized by a pathologically narrow scope of justice operationalized in discriminatory values, restrictive laws, and exclusionary changes in all spheres of society. This study describes the role of the museum in communicating this violent and unjust past to the public. Its exhibitions probe shifts in inclusionary and exclusionary periods and engage visitors with practical and moral questions about rights, deserving, and fairness. The complex Jewish past in Germany can be understood through the expanding and narrowing of the scope of justice. Experts at the Jewish Museum Berlin have assembled material to consider complex, difficult, and deeply moral questions. They design exhibitions that engage, provoke, disturb, sadden, concern, and inspire. These exhibitions implicitly delineate a scope of justice in past times using evidence that make prevailing exclusionary attitudes, behavior, and outcomes evident and directs visitors’ attention to ways that moral exclusion influenced actions and policies in the past. This approach depends on contrasts with a wider scope of justice today (Opotow, 2011) and can foster insight into contemporary social issues in which exclusionary practices are normalized and diffused throughout society (cf. Fine & Ruglis, 2009). The Jewish Museum project intends its exhibitions on past injustice to foster moral inclusion, as Mrs. Kr€ uger expressed, “we hope that it’s possible to connect what we show in the museum to things that people are confronted with in their daily lives today.” C. Wright Mills (1959) argues that the study of social life must include biography, history, and their intersections within a society. Consistent with that, the Jewish Museum Berlin’s objects of memory attend to individual lives as well as to socio-political change. Their exhibitions emphasize how German-Jewish adults and children were challenged and engulfed by an increasingly violent and exclusionary socio-political context. By presenting this past so that its dynamics and

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effects can be grasped by people in the present, the museum conveys the complexity, tensions, and challenges of life during the Third Reich in nuanced ways. It offers evidence of the micro processes and technicalities of moral exclusion in the rules, laws, and policies enacted to inflict damage in multiple spheres of society. These societal changes, intended to harm people the Third Reich designated as unworthy of life, included forbidding employment, concert-going, and school attendance. Materials exhibited also delineate the operationalization of moral exclusion through its stages – forced emigration, ghetto-ization, deportation, and annihilation. Such museum exhibitions allow people who did not experience the cultural vitality of Berlin before World War II or the extraordinary violence of the Third Reich to enter a past period that is difficult to fully grasp. While it is ordinarily difficult to fully understand a socio-political period other than one’s own, the Third Reich is especially difficult because it was characterized by dispossession and exclusion in all spheres of society on a mass scale. Indeed, how is it possible to fully comprehend that more than six million individuals were irretrievably lost and countless more lives were indelibly changed? The exhibitions do this by engaging visitors, one person and one dilemma at a time, inviting visitors to enter this period through lives of people in the past. This learning is partly cognitive – concepts and facts about the period – but it is also emotional and visceral as visitors enter disorienting spaces within the museum and consider disturbing information (cf. Sampson, 1998). The museum’s attention to past injustice resonates with social justice research in psychology. Both concern identity, group-based stereotypes and discrimination, individual and collective memory, the embodiment of experience, social conflict and societal change, morals and responsibility, and the normalization of injustice. Like such venues as the workplace, schools, health settings, and the criminal justice system, this research project suggests the importance of museums as sites for psychological research. Mieke Bal (1999) has argued that traumatic events in the past have a persistent presence. The Holocaust produced deep and lasting loss of people and communities destroyed through forced removals, disappearances, mass murder, bombs, and obliterated records. Years later, museums gather up materials and memories they can that delineate events in particular places and times, but these material and memories also have universal meaning and speak to people today. Thus, museums have the capacity to restore as well as reshape individual and collective memories (cf. Halbwachs, 1950/1992) and are therefore sites of recovery and contact zones (Pratt, 1991) in which the past and the present interact. Because museums have the unusual capability to travel across time and space, they are important sites to examine complex social and psychological processes that unfold over time. Historical museums are a community resource and require a substantial public commitment to function and thrive. They therefore represent an inclusionary commitment to examine an unjust past and serve as a form of redress. Traces of history visitors find offer evidence of moral exclusion that can speak to their present lives and stimulate discussion on complex and avoided social issues that can go

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back years, decades, or even centuries (cf. Apfelbaum, 1979). By examining the experience and socio-political dynamics of moral exclusion and injustice, museums reshape collective memories and national identity. In his book, Commemorations, John Gillis (1994) stated that “identities and memories are not things we think about, but things we think with” (p. 5). Inclusionary change takes a long time. The commitment to commemorate the Holocaust did not emerge immediately after World War II in Germany but has deepened over time. Therefore in the psychological study of human relations historicity is important. What came before can help us understand socio-political contexts in which we now live as all social relations play out within the prevailing scope of justice of the time. For this reason, justice research on factors fostering harmonious intergroup relations or a more inclusive society can gain perspective by taking history into account.

Conclusion From 1933 to 1945 Germany’s National Socialist Party anti-Semitic socio-political agenda sought to exterminate all Jews. The Jewish Museum Berlin, with its spectacular presence, brings evidence, artifacts, and voices of the past back to Berlin to teach people today about moral exclusion and its catastrophic outcomes for those excluded and for the larger society. The museum is not only commemorative but also symbolizes the return of Jewish culture to Berlin. It is designed to describe the Jewish past, dynamics and effects of moral exclusion, and relationship of the Holocaust to contemporary social relations, particularly in contexts in which marginalization and injustice prevail. It exemplifies how cultural institutions can address an unjust past as well as educate people to appreciate and include the presence, perspectives, and contributions of minorities to the larger society. Acknowledgements I thank the Jewish Museum Berlin and Ms. Maren Kr€uger, Academic Leader of the Permanent Exhibition Mrs. Tanja Petersen, Head of the Educational Department, and Mr. Helmuth F. Braun, Head of the Temporary Exhibitions Department, for their kind and valuable assistance with this research. I thank Elisabeth Kals, J€urgen Maes, and Michelle Fine, wonderful justice researchers and colleagues, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors of fact or interpretation in this text are my own. Support for this project was provided by a PSC-CUNY Award, jointly funded by The Professional Staff Congress and The City University of New York.

References Apfelbaum, E. (1979). Relations of domination and movements of liberation: An analysis of power between groups. In W. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 188–204). Monterey: Cole.

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Bal, M. (1999). Introduction. In M. Bal, J. Crewe, & L. Spitzer (Eds.), Acts of memory: Cultural recall in the present (pp. vii–xvi). Hanover: Dartmouth. Brenner, M. (2002). The Weimar years (1919–1932) (M. S. Cullen & A. Brown, Trans.). In A. Nachama, J. H. Schoeps & H. Simon (Eds.), Jews in Berlin (pp. 137–179). Berlin: Henschel. Brittain, D., Spotten, J. (Producers and directors). (1965). Memorandum [film]. Ottawa: National Film Board of Canada. Bunschoten, R., & Binet, H. (1997). A passage through silence and light: Daniel Libeskind’s extension to the Berlin museum. London: Black Dog. Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 31(3), 137–149. Fine, M., & Ruglis, J. (2009). Circuits and consequences of dispossession: The racialized realignment of the public sphere for U.S. youth. Transforming Anthropology, 17(1), 20–33. Fineberg, J. (1970). The nature and value of rights. Journal of Value Inquiry, 4, 243–257. Gay, P. (1998). My German question: Growing up in Nazi Berlin. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gillis, J. R. (1994). Introduction. In J. R. Gillis (Ed.), Commemorations: The politics of national memory (pp. 3–24). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gross, L. (1982). The last Jews in Berlin. New York: Simon and Schuster. Halbwachs, M. (1950/1992). On collective memory. (Ed., Trans., and with an introduction by L. A. Coser). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hammer, J. (2009, October 17). A night to remember (cover story). Forbes, pp. 108–113. Retrieved March14, 2011, from EBSCO/host/. Jewish Museum Berlin. (2001). Stories of an exhibition: Two millennia of German Jewish history. Berlin: Jewish Museum Berlin. Koshar, R. (2000). From monuments to traces: Artifacts of German memory, 1870–1990. Berkeley: University of California Press. Levinger, M. (2000). Enlightened nationalism: The transformation of Prussian political culture, 1805–1848. Oxford/New York: Oxford. Lewin, K. (1943). Defining the “field” at a given time. Psychological Review, 50(3), 292–310. Libeskind, D. (1999). Jewish Museum Berlin/Architect Daniel Libeskind (with a photo essay by He´le`ne Binet). Basel: G+B Arts International. Macdonald, S. (1996). Introduction. In S. Macdonald & G. Fyfe (Eds.), Theorizing museums: Representing identity and diversity in a changing world (pp. 1–18). Cambridge: Blackwell. Mills, C. W. (1959). The sociological imagination. London: Oxford University Press. Nachama, A., Schoeps, J. H., & Simon, H. (2002). Preface. (J. S. Cullen & A. Brown, Trans.). In A. Nachama, J. H. Schoeps, & H. Simon. Jews in Berlin (pp. 7–8). Berlin: Henschel. Opotow, S. (1987). Limits of fairness: An experimental examination of antecedents of the scope of justice. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, New York, NY. Retrieved August 16, 2010, from Dissertations & Theses @ Columbia University (Publication No. AAT 8724072). Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An overview. Journal of Social Issues, 46(1), 1–20. Opotow, S. (1993). Animals and the scope of justice. Journal of Social Issues, 49(1), 71–85. Opotow, S. (1995). Drawing the line: Social categorization, moral exclusion, and the scope of justice. In B. B. Bunker & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), Conflict, cooperation, and justice (pp. 347–369). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Opotow, S. (2001). Social injustice. In D. J. Christie, R. V. Wagner, & D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, conflict and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (pp. 102–109). New York: Prentice-Hall. Opotow, S. (2011). How this was possible: Interpreting the Holocaust. Journal of Social Issues, 67 (1), 205–224. Opotow, S., & Gieseking, J. (2011). Foreground and background: Environment a site and social issue. Journal of Social Issues, 67(1), 179–196.

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Justice Motives

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On the Differentiation of an Implicit and a Self-Attributed Justice Motive Claudia Dalbert

Abstract This chapter deals with the Dissociation Model of the justice motive. The first part of the chapter presents the theoretical background to justice motive theory (Dalbert, 2001), namely the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980). The Dissociation Model assumes an implicit justice motive that is triggered by justice-relevant cues, operates on an intuitive level outside subjective awareness, and is particularly relevant in explaining intuitive justice-specific reactions. This implicit justice motive can be differentiated from an explicit or self-attributed justice motive that is part of the self-concept, is triggered by social clues, and is better able to explain controlled reactions. The explicit justice motive is satisfied and reinforced by social reactions and the reinforcement of the self-concept, whereas the implicit justice motive is satisfied by justice in itself. The second part of the chapter describes two lines of research investigating the Dissociation Model. Overall, the results emerging from both strands of research support the Dissociation Model. The implicit justice motive as indicated by the belief in a just world operates independently of the self-attributed justice motive. Furthermore, the implicit justice motive explains striving for justice as an aim in itself, as expressed in the just allocation of resources or the just distribution of punishment for wrongdoing.

Introduction All humans have a deep concern for justice. However, the expression of this concern differs remarkably. Some people react to observed injustice with moral outrage; some feel embittered when reflecting on their own life course; some fight for the rights of disadvantaged groups and individuals; others stick to the rules and

C. Dalbert (*) Department of Educational Psychology, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale), Germany e-mail: [email protected] E. Kals and J. Maes (eds.), Justice and Conflicts, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19035-3_4, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

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try to behave justly; and still others justify observed injustices by blaming the victims. According to justice motive theory (Dalbert, 2001), all of these responses are rooted in a common striving for justice (i.e., the justice motive), and the differences in its expression may be partly attributable to different types of justice motives. This chapter starts by summarizing the theoretical background to justice motive theory (Dalbert, 2001), namely the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980). Justice motive theory distinguishes two motives, the implicit justice motive and the explicit or self-attributed justice motive. The second part of the chapter describes two lines of research, both aiming at differentiating the two justice motives. Finally, the theoretical implications of the findings and their practical meaning for conflict resolution are discussed.

Justice Motive Theory The Just World Hypothesis Several psychological theories propose explanations for justice-driven reactions. One of the most influential is the just world hypothesis introduced by Lerner (1965, 1980). The just world hypothesis states that people need to believe in a just world in which everyone gets what they deserve and deserves what they get. This belief enables them to deal with their social environment as though it were stable and orderly and thus serves important adaptive functions. As a result, people are motivated to defend their belief in a just world when it is threatened by injustices, either experienced or observed. If possible, justice is restored in reality (e.g., by compensating victims). If the injustice seems unlikely to be resolved in reality, however, people restore justice cognitively by re-evaluating the situation in line with their belief in a just world. This cognitive process, called the assimilation of injustice, was first observed by Lerner and Simmons (1966). A substantial amount of the research on belief in a just world has been experimental in nature (for a review, see Hafer & Be`gue, 2005) and focused primarily on the maladaptive functions of belief in a just world (e.g., disdain for the victim). Since the 1970s, however, another strand of research has examined individual differences in the belief in a just world and found that it also serves important adaptive functions (for a review, see Furnham, 2003). This research agenda was triggered by the introduction of the first belief in a just world scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 1975), which assessed individual differences in the belief that the world is generally a just place. Since the 1990s, more studies have investigated the positive as well as the negative social consequences of the belief in a just world, and the focus of these investigations has been extended to cover its implications for believers. Based on suggestions originating from earlier research (Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lerner & Miller, 1978), these studies have shown that it is necessary

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to distinguish the belief in a personal just world, in which one personally is usually treated fairly, from the belief in a general just world or the belief in a just world for others, in which people in general get what they deserve (Dalbert, 1999; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996). In line with the self-serving bias in general (Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990) and fairness reasoning in particular (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985), research has evidenced that people tend to endorse the personal belief in a just world more strongly than the general belief in a just world and that the two constructs have different meanings. The personal belief in a just world is a better predictor of adaptive outcomes (e.g., subjective well-being); the general belief in a just world is a better predictor of, for example, harsh social attitudes (e.g., Be`gue & Muller, 2006). The shift from the experimental to the individual differences approach to the belief in a just world made it necessary to differentiate between a justice motive and justice motivation. In the context of just world research and theory, scholars often speak of the justice motive (e.g., Ross & Miller, 2002). Motives are individual dispositions reflecting individual differences in the tendency to strive for a specific goal. A justice motive is thus an individual disposition to strive for justice as an end in itself. According to Lerner (1977), the individual belief in a just world can be interpreted as an indicator of such a justice motive. The belief in a just world indicates a personal contract; the more people want to rely on being treated justly by others, the more obligated they should feel to behave justly themselves. Thus, the stronger their belief in a just world, the stronger their justice motive is. Experimental just world research typically does not assess individual differences, however, but interprets experimental reactions in the light of just world reasoning. Such research thus addresses justice motivation, and not the justice motive as an individual differences disposition. Motivation can be defined as a person’s orientation toward a specific goal in a specific situational state; thus, justice motivation means the orientation toward justice in a given situation. Justice motivation is triggered by specific situational circumstances in interaction with personal dispositions (e.g., the justice motive or other dispositions; Lind & van den Bos, 2002; Miller, 1999).

Functions of the Belief in a Just World In the last decade, research has shown that the belief in a just world as a personality disposition serves at least three primarily adaptive functions.

Assimilation Function When individuals with a strong just world belief experience an injustice that they do not believe can be resolved in reality, they try to assimilate the experience to their just world belief. This can be done, for example, by justifying the experienced unfairness as being at least partly self-inflicted (e.g., Bulman & Wortman, 1977), by

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playing down the unfairness (Lipkus & Siegler, 1993), by avoiding self-focused rumination (Dalbert, 1997), or by forgiving (Strelan, 2007). These mechanisms explain the positive relationships that have been observed between the belief in a just world and justice judgments in various domains of life. Most research into the assimilation function of the just world belief has dealt with blaming the victim and justice judgments. Observers of injustice may show disdain for the victims, reasoning that their fate is a deserved punishment for a bad character (characterological attribution), or they may blame the victims for having inflicted their fate upon themselves – after all, a self-inflicted fate is not unfair (behavioral attribution). Just world research has shown that observers prefer to blame the victim rather than to show disdain (e.g., Lerner & Matthews, 1967). Indeed, blaming the victim seems to be a crucial mean of defending the belief in a just world for observers of injustice. Similar mechanisms can be assumed to operate for the victims themselves. Comer and Laird (1975) showed experimentally that internal attributions seem to be a way of reevaluating one’s fate as just. The significance of causal attributions, and especially of internal attributions, has thus been a subject of much discussion in the context of the just world hypothesis (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978). People with a strong just world belief are expected to be motivated to defend their belief by making internal attributions of negative outcomes, thus maintaining their subjective well-being. Although some research has confirmed the hypothesized positive association between just world belief and internal attributions of the victims themselves (e.g., Hafer & Correy, 1999; Kiecolt-Glaser & Williams, 1987), other studies have found no association (e.g., Agrawal & Dalal, 1993; Fetchenhauer, Jacobs, & Belschak, 2005). The overall pattern of results for the belief in a just world and victims’ internal attribution is thus rather mixed. As a consequence of the assimilation process, individuals with a strong just world belief are expected to evaluate observed events and events in their own life as being more just than are individuals with a weak just world belief. For example, school students with a strong belief in a personal just world have been found to be more likely to evaluate their school grades and their teachers’, peers’, and parents’ behavior toward them as just (Correia & Dalbert, 2007; Dalbert & Stoeber, 2006). Similarly, research has shown prisoners with a strong personal just world belief to be more likely to evaluate the justice of the legal proceedings leading to their conviction, the treatment by their prison officers, and decisions on prison affairs as more just (Dalbert & Filke, 2007; Otto & Dalbert, 2005).

Trust Function People with a strong belief in a just world are thought to be confident in being treated justly by others, and this trust is hypothesized to give the just world belief the character of a resource in everyday life. Research has confirmed the expected positive association of just world belief with general interpersonal trust (e.g., Be`gue, 2002; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977), trust in societal institutions

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(Correia & Vala, 2004), and young adolescents’ trust in the justice of their future workplace (Sallay, 2004). This trust in future justice has a number of implications. The belief in a just world enables individuals to rely on their good deeds being rewarded at some point in the future. The certitude that everyone will ultimately get what they deserve encourages individuals to invest in their future. In contrast, those who do not believe in a just world doubt the value of such an investment, because the return on it is uncertain. Zuckerman (1975) was the first to observe that people with a strong just world belief may choose to invest in their future when they feel the need for confidence in the fairness of their own future. Hafer (2000) corroborated these findings and demonstrated experimentally that individuals with a particular need to believe in a bright future defended their just world belief more strongly in the face of threat. In the same vein, questionnaire studies with samples of students facing the school-to-work transition (Dette, St€ober, & Dalbert, 2004), young male prisoners (Otto & Dalbert, 2005), and young adults living in assisted accommodation (Sutton & Winnard, 2007) have shown that the personal just world belief is positively associated with confidence that personal goals will be attained. Individuals with a strong belief in a just world show more trust in their future and in others’ behavior toward them. Accordingly, they expect to be confronted with fair tasks in achievement situations and their efforts to be justly rewarded. They can thus be expected to feel less threatened and more challenged by the need to achieve, to experience fewer negative emotions, and to achieve better results. Tomaka and Blascovich (1994) conducted a laboratory study to test the basic hypotheses outlined above, presenting participants with two rapid serial subtraction tasks. Participants with a strong general just world belief felt more challenged and less threatened – and performed better than did those with a weak belief. Extending this laboratory research to the school and work settings, studies have shown that the personal just world belief is positively related to school achievement (Dalbert, 2001; Dalbert & Stoeber, 2005, 2006) and to self-rated performance at work (Otto & Schmidt, 2007). Finally, Allen, HungNg, and Leiser (2005) have observed that nations whose citizens have stronger just world beliefs show a faster pace of workforce modernization and economic growth.

Motive Function In a just world, a positive future is not the gift of a benevolent world, but a reward for the individual’s behavior and character. Consequently, the more individuals believe in a just world, the more compelled they should feel to strive for justice themselves. The just world belief is thus indicative of a personal contract (Lerner, 1977), the terms of which oblige the individual to behave justly. Strong just world believers are therefore more likely to help people in need (Bierhoff, Klein, & Kramp, 1991), at least as long as the victims are seen as “innocent” (DePalma, Madey, Tillman, & Wheeler, 1999) or as member of the in-group (Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2007). In addition, the belief in a just world has been shown to be one of the

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important correlates of social responsibility (Bierhoff, 1994), commitment to just means (Cohn & Modecki, 2007; Hafer, 2000; Sutton & Winnard, 2007), and, inversely, rule-breaking behavior (Correia & Dalbert, 2008; Otto & Dalbert, 2005). Moreover, the obligation for reciprocity has been found to be stronger among individuals with a strong just world belief (Edlund, Sagarin, & Johnson, 2006). Finally, a laboratory study found that only participants with a strong belief in a just world censured their own unjust behavior by a decrease in self-esteem (Dalbert, 1999).

The Justice Motive The justice motive reflects the striving for justice as an aim in itself. Accordingly, it is satisfied and reinforced by the experience of justice. In line with Lerner’s reasoning (1977), the belief in a just world can be interpreted as an indicator of the justice motive – namely, the striving for justice in one’s own actions and in the world in general. As indicated above, the belief in a just word operates on an intuitive and automatic level. Disdain for or blaming of victims is not the result of considered reflection. The same applies to the interpersonal trust accorded by a strong belief in a just world or to the decrease in self-esteem experienced after committing an injustice. Overall, empirical findings suggest that the belief in a just world is indicative of an implicit justice motive that is triggered by justice-relevant cues and that operates on an intuitive level outside subjective awareness – and that can therefore be expected to be particularly relevant in explaining intuitive justicespecific reactions. In line with theorizing on human motives (e.g., McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Spangler, 1992) and current debate on dual-process theories (e.g., Epstein, 1990; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), justice motive theory posits two distinct types of justice motive (Dalbert, 2001): the implicit justice motive or just world justice motive, on the one hand, and the explicit or self-attributed justice motive, on the other. The explicit justice motive is an individual’s conscious selfdescription of his or her justice-related values and is part of the self-concept. It can be assessed by self-report questionnaires tapping reactions toward justice or injustice, particularly from an observer or beneficiary perspective (e.g., Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005). It is expected be triggered by social clues and to be better able to explain controlled reactions. Further, it is thought to be satisfied and reinforced by social reactions and the reinforcement of the self-concept, whereas the implicit justice motive is satisfied by justice in itself. This reasoning is summarized in the Dissociation Model of the justice motive (see Fig. 1). The model is supported by a wealth of findings on the belief in a just world’s association with intuitive reactions and by some evidence of its independence from justice relevant self-descriptions (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987). Thus far, however, research systematically testing the Dissociation Model of the

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Implicit justice motive

Intuitive reactions

Self-attributed justice motive

Controlled reactions

Fig. 1 The dissociation model of the justice motive

justice motive is scarce. In the following, two lines of research addressing this double dissociation are described: research on allocation decisions (Dalbert & Umlauft, 2009) and research on unconscious decision making (Donat, 2010).

Research on Allocation Decisions This strand of research has investigated the justice motive and its meaning for justice-related decisions. Allocation decisions are prototypical examples of justicespecific reactions. They are widely investigated in the context of social-moral development (Damon, 1977; Takezawa, Gummerum, & Keller, 2006) and human altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). On the basis of justice motive theory (Dalbert, 2001), it is hypothesized that allocation decisions can be explained by two types of justice motive: (a) the implicit or just world justice motive and (b) the justicerelated self-concept or self-attributed justice motive. These hypotheses have been tested within the framework of experimental game theory (G€uth, Schmittenberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In the different paradigms of experimental game theory, the task is usually to allocate a certain amount of money. This money is generally a windfall that has not been earned by either the recipient or the allocator. A typical view is thus that it would be fair to distribute the money equally and egoistic for the allocator to keep the entire windfall. The conditions under which the decision is made differ across allocation games. Because the allocators have to decide whether or not to dispose of the money justly, thus giving a clear indication of how much they care about justice in the world, allocation games are of particular interest in the context of justice research. In one study, Dalbert and Umlauft (2009) had participants play the dictator game, in which an allocator has to decide how much, if any, of the money to give to an

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anonymous recipient whom s/he will never meet, and who has no say in the decision. In other words, the allocator acts as a dictator, who may decide to keep all the money without any negative repercussions. Interestingly, however, most players do not make egoistic choices. Generally, three subgroups of allocation decisions can be identified. Most allocators split the money equally, a decision that is generally seen as striving for fairness (Konow, 2005). A significant proportion of allocators fall into a second group, keeping all of the money for themselves (“egoistic” allocation). Finally, the remaining players give a share to the recipients, but keep more than 50% for themselves. Konow (2005) interprets this type of decision as a “trade-off” or compromise between equality and the temptation of egoism. Dalbert and Umlauft (2009) sought to provide insights into the substantial interindividual variation observed in these allocation decisions by focusing on the two contrasting decisions of equal and egoistic allocation. A striving for fairness in the dictator game can be seen as reflecting a justice motivation that is triggered by the specific situational circumstances – here, the allocation task – in interaction with personal dispositions. One important personal disposition may be the justice motive. In other words, Dalbert and Umlauft did not expect individual variation in allocation decisions to be solely attributable to the justice motive, but they did expect the justice motive to be one of the important sources of this individual variation. Equal allocation in the dictator game reflects a striving for fairness (Konow, 2005) and was thus expected to be explained by the implicit justice motive, namely the belief in a just world. Allocators with a strong implicit justice motive were therefore expected to choose equality. Moreover, individuals who described themselves as particularly concerned with justice – those with a strong self-attributed justice motive – were also expected to strive for justice in allocation decisions. In addition, these individuals were expected to avoid actions that were at odds with their self-concept. Allocators with a strong self-attributed justice motive were therefore expected to choose equality and, in particular, to avoid egoistic allocations. Two similar studies were conducted to test these hypotheses. In both, the dictator had to allocate €50 between him-/herself and an anonymous recipient. The implicit or just world justice motive was assessed with the Personal Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1999; seven items, Study 1: a ¼ .74; Study 2: a ¼ .82; e.g., “I believe that I usually get what I deserve”). Two measures were used to estimate the explicit or self-attributed justice motive, thus avoiding the confounding of the assessment of the self-attributed justice motive and method variance: (1) Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, and Arbach’s (2005) Justice Sensitivity Scale – Beneficiary Perspective, with seven items tapping feelings of distress over injustice that is to one’s own advantage (e.g., “I feel guilty when I receive better treatment than others”; Study 1: a ¼ .86; Study 2: a ¼ .89); and (2) the extended version (Dalbert & Umlauft, 2003) of the Dalbert et al. (1987) Justice Centrality Scale, with 13 items gauging distress about injustice and satisfaction with one’s own fairness (e.g., “Injustice that I caused torments me for a long time,” “There are few things that make me as happy as justice”; Study 1: a ¼ .91; Study 2: a ¼ .91). In both studies, latent structural equation modeling was used to examine relations among the explicit justice motive, the just world justice motive, and

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allocation decisions. One model tested the choice of an equal allocation as opposed to the other two decisions; one model tested an egoistic decision (“take it all”) as opposed to the other two decisions. In line with the Dissociation Model, the implicit justice motive was defined as being independent of the self-attributed justice motive in both studies. In Study 1, 119 school students played the dictator game as a paper-and-pencil task in a classroom testing session. No real money was at stake. The dictator had to allocate €50 in €5 steps. A majority of 57% split the sum equally; 37% allocated between €5 and €20 to the recipient; and 6% kept the full €50 themselves. The decision to split the sum equally was explained by both justice motives simultaneously and equally well. In contrast, egoistic allocations were negatively explained by the self-attributed justice motive, but not by the implicit justice motive. The stronger the self-attributed motive was, the less like the allocator was to opt for an egoistic allocation. Study 2 was run as a computer-based laboratory task and additionally controlled for social desirability. Again, the dictators distributed €50. In this study, however, real money was at stake for a random 16% of participants. Four of the 59 dictators decided to keep all the money and three allocated just €5 to the recipients. These two groups were collapsed into an “egoistic allocation” group (12%). Forty dictators (68%) split the €50 equally; the remaining 12 (20%) fell into the tradeoff group allocating between €10 and €20 to the recipients. At first glance, the pattern of results was very similar to that of Study 1. The decision to split the sum equally was again simultaneously explained by both justice motives, and egoistic allocations were negatively explained by the self-attributed justice motive, but not by the implicit justice motive. However, it emerged that the tendency for socially desirable responding was strongly associated with the selfattributed justice motive, but not with the implicit justice motive. Moreover, social desirability explained the allocation decisions as well as did the self-attributed justice motive. In sum, the results of both studies were very much in line with the Dissociation Model of the justice motive. (a) The implicit justice motive as indicated by the personal belief in a just world and the self-attributed justice motive as indicated by justice-specific self-descriptions were best described by two independent factors. (b) Both motives explained the equal allocation of resources, which can be interpreted as reflecting a striving for fairness. (c) Only the self-attributed justice motive explained the avoidance of egoistic allocations. (d) Moreover, as expected, only the self-attributed justice motive was contaminated by social desirability, confirming that this motive is triggered and reinforced by social incentives.

Research on Unconscious Decision Making Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) have suggested that unconscious thought is often better for complex

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decisions than conscious thought. A growing number of studies in different contexts provide support for this hypothesis (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Bos, van der Leij, & van Baaren, 2009; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Smith, Dijksterhuis, & Wigboldus, 2008; Strick, Dijksterhuis, & van Baaren, 2010): People who made complex decisions after unconscious thought consistently showed better quality decisions (e.g., chose the most attractive object more often) than did those who consciously thought about their decisions or those who decided immediately. Donat (2010) applied the unconscious-thought paradigm to a complex justicespecific decision, namely the punishment to be imposed on four students who had stolen examination papers from their school. As better decisions have been found to result after unconscious thought, and as the implicit justice motive operates at the unconscious level, it was expected that the quality of decisions made after unconscious thought would be positively associated with the strength of the implicit justice motive. The self-attributed justice motive operates on a conscious level and was thus expected – if at all – to improve decision making after conscious thought. In vignettes, information on the four students and the deed committed was embedded in a large amount of irrelevant information. In terms of responsibility for the deed, the vignettes clearly distinguished between two students, in particular: the agitator and the watchdog. The greater the difference in the punishment imposed on these two students by the participants, the better their decision was deemed to be. These hypotheses were tested in two similar experiments. In both experiments, the implicit or just world justice motive was assessed with the General Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert et al., 1987; six items, Experiment 1: a ¼ .74; Experiment 2: a ¼ .70; e.g., “I am convinced that in the long run people will be compensated for injustices”). The explicit justice motive was assessed with the same instruments as in the allocation decisions studies: the Justice Sensitivity Scale – Beneficiary Perspective (Schmitt et al., 2005), with seven items tapping feelings of distress over injustice that is to one’s own advantage (Experiment 1: a ¼ .86; Experiment 2: a ¼ .85); and the extended version (Dalbert & Umlauft, 2003) of the Dalbert et al. (1987) Justice Centrality Scale, with 13 items gauging distress about injustice and satisfaction with one’s own fairness (Study 1: a ¼ .87; Study 2: a ¼ .89). On a computer screen, participants were presented four vignettes describing the deed from each student’s perspective. They then had to decide on a punishment for each student (i.e., number of hours’ schoolwork). The difference in hours between agitator and watchdog served as the dependent variable. As in the unconscious thought experiments of Dijksterhuis and colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), three experimental conditions were compared. One group had to decide immediately after reading the four vignettes (immediate condition); a second group were given 3 min to deliberate before deciding (conscious thought condition), and a third group solved anagrams for 3 min before deciding (unconscious thought condition). In both experiments, there were 30 participants in each condition. In Experiment 1, the difference in hours of punishment significantly correlated with the implicit justice motive in the unconscious condition only, and with the

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self-attributed justice motive in the conscious condition only. Experiment 2 fully replicated the results for the implicit justice motive, but not for the explicit justice motive. In addition, social desirability was controlled, but did not explain any decisions. Thus, in line with the Differentiation Model of the justice motive, the implicit justice motive was particularly helpful in explaining complex decision making after unconscious thought. The stronger their implicit justice motive, the better able participants were to process the complex information, and to arrive at a better decision, after unconscious thought. Findings for the self-attributed justice motive were mixed.

Outlook Overall, the results emerging from both strands of research support justice theory in general and the Dissociation Model in particular. The implicit justice motive as indicated by the belief in a just world operates independently of a self-attributed justice motive. The implicit justice motive explains striving for justice as an aim in itself, as expressed in the just allocation of resources or the just distribution of punishment for wrongdoing. The notion that the implicit justice motive operates on an unconscious level is further supported by the strong association between implicit justice motive and punishment decisions observed in the unconscious condition only. The validity of the unconscious thought condition was supported by the finding that sympathy for the agitator or the watchdog partly explained punishment decisions in the immediate and the conscious condition, but not in the unconscious condition. The results thus indicate that justice-specific reactions are, to a large extent, generated on an unconscious level and are not the result of intentional deliberation. The meaning and the impact of the self-attributed justice motive is less clear. Does it depict anything more than a tendency for social desirable responding? And how does it operate – by deliberation? These questions remain unanswered. However, studies have consistently found the explicit justice motive and the implicit justice motive to be two independent constructs. Although findings on the implicit justice motive were consistent across studies, one point requires further consideration. In the dictator game studies, the implicit justice motive was indicated by the personal belief in a just world. This is in line with early observations on the motive function of belief in a just world, which showed that the personal – but not the general – belief in a just world explained the decrease in self-esteem experienced by individuals who had committed an injustice (Dalbert, 1999). Thus, it might seem reasonable to conclude that the personal belief in a just world is a better indicator of a justice motive than the general belief in a just world. However, in the agitator/watchdog experiments, the justice motive was better indicated by the general belief in a just world (Donat, 2010). How might this difference be explained? Under which conditions is the personal versus the general belief in a just world a better indicator of the implicit justice motive?

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It might be speculated that there is something specific about punishment decisions that makes the general belief in a just world the better indicator of a justice motive in this context. The personal belief in a just world seems to be the better indicator of the implicit justice motive in contexts pertaining to one’s own situation (confrontation with one’s own behavior, allocation of one’s own money). In contrast, punishment decisions relate to others – who are part of the general just world. The belief in a general just world may therefore be a better indicator of the implicit justice motive in this context. Future studies are needed to investigate these aspects further. The main message for conflict resolution is that there are great individual differences in the striving for justice, that most these strivings take place on an unconscious level, and that they are satisfied by the subjective experience of increased justice. Yet the subjective experience of increased justice does not necessarily mean that the victims’ situation is improved in reality. The stronger their implicit justice motive, the more people involved in a conflict may tend to assimilate injustices, thus playing down the conflict. Perpetrators may justify their acts and consequently perpetuate the injustice by failing to compensating the victim. Victims, on the other hand, may assimilate their fate by minimizing the injustice and blaming themselves for having a part in it, thus also perpetuating the injustice – as long as the injustice is not too grave or experienced too often. Thus, each partner in a conflict is at risk of perpetuating injustice – not through cynicism, but because of the urgent, yet unconscious, need to strive for justice. Mediation processes may aim to make these implicit unconscious processes more explicit and thus resolve the conflict in a way that is acceptable to all parties. However, it is important to remember that complex justice-specific decisions are better if made on an unconscious level. Thus, the parties should be given time to process the information unconsciously.

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