LAND AND LIMITS
This critical new analysis explores the impact of an influential idea – sustainable development – on t...
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LAND AND LIMITS
This critical new analysis explores the impact of an influential idea – sustainable development – on the institutions and practices governing the use of land. A central theme is the paradox that despite increasing attention to sustainability, conflict over land use is as ubiquitous, and as intense, as ever. The authors challenge many prevailing assumptions about ‘planning for sustainability’. After charting the remarkable growth in expectations of planning, they show how attempts to interpret sustainability must lead inexorably to moral and political choices of a fundamental kind. Planning, they argue, is not so much a means of implementing some pre-formed, consensual concept of sustainable development as a crucial arena in which different conceptions of sustainability are defined and contested. Important themes developed in the first half of the book are carried through into chapters that assess the role of planning in three vital areas: transport, biodiversity and minerals extraction. Challenging conclusions are drawn together in the final chapter, and the potential for planning to provide a space for dialogue about environment and development is explored. Offering a rigorous discussion of concepts, policy instruments and contemporary planning dilemmas, Land and Limits will be essential reading for academics, professionals and advanced students in the fields of environmental policy and land-use planning. Susan Owens completed her first degree and PhD at the University of East Anglia. She is now Reader in Environment and Policy in the Department of Geography, University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Newnham College. Since completing his PhD at the University of Cambridge, Richard Cowell has worked as a Research Fellow and Lecturer at the Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University.
ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE SERIES Editorial advisory board: Alister Scott, Jim Skea, Michael Redclift, Martin Parry, Timothy O’Riordan, Robin Grove-White, Kathy Homewood, Judith Rees, Camilla Toulmin, Kerry Turner, Richard Welford and Stephen Yearley THE CONDITION OF SUSTAINABILITY Ian Drummond and Terry Marsden WORKING THE SAHEL Environment and Society in Northern Nigeria Michael Mortimore and Bill Adams GLOBAL TRADE AND GLOBAL SOCIAL ISSUES Annie Taylor and Caroline Thomas (eds) ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND NGO INFLUENCE Land Degradation and Sustainable Resource Management in Sub-Saharan Africa Alan Thomas, Susan Carr and David Humphreys (eds) THE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY, BUILDINGS AND THE ENVIRONMENT Constructing Knowledge, Designing Practice Simon Guy and Elizabeth Shove LIVING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE Social Vulnerability, Adaptation and Resilience in Vietnam W. Neil Adger, P. Mick Kelly and Nguyen Huu Ninh (eds) LAND AND LIMITS Interpreting Sustainability in the Planning Process Susan Owens and Richard Cowell THE BUSINESS OF GREENING Stephen Fineman (ed.) INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA Rhys Jenkins (ed.)
Also Available in the Routledge Global Environmental Change series: TIMESCAPES OF MODERNITY Barbara Adam REFRAMING DEFORESTATION James Fairhead and Melissa Leach BRITISH ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND EUROPE Philip Lowe (ed.) THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Susan Baker, Maria Kousis, Dick Richardson and Stephen Young (eds) ARGUMENT IN THE GREENHOUSE Mick Mabey, Stephen Hall, Clare Smith and Sujata Gupta ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE MASS MEDIA Graham Chapman, Keval Kumar, Caroline Fraser and Ivor Gaber ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Michael Parnwell and Raymond Bryant (eds) THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Timothy O’Riordan and Jill Jagger (eds) POPULATION AND FOOD Tim Dyson THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS John Vogler and Mark Imber (eds) GLOBAL WARMING AND ENERGY DEMAND Terry Barker, Paul Ekins and Nick Johnstone (eds) SOCIAL THEORY AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT Michael Redclift and Ted Benton
LAND AND LIMITS Interpreting sustainability in the planning process
Susan Owens and Richard Cowell
London and New York
First published 2002 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
© 2002 Susan Owens and Richard Cowell All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Owens, Susan E. Land and limits: interpreting sustainability in the planning process/Susan Owens and Richard Cowell. p. cm. – (Routledge research global environmental change; 7) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Land use–Great Britain–Planning. 2. Land use–Environmental aspects–Great Britain. 3. Land use–Government policy–Great Britain. 4. Environmental policy–Great Britain. 5. Transportation and state–Great Britain. 6. Natural resources–Government policy–Great Britain. 7. Sustainable development–Great Britain. I. Cowell, Richard. II. Title. III. Routledge research global environmental change series ; 7. HD596 .O938 2002 333.73'0941–dc21 2001040372 ISBN 0-203-99682-8 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0–415–16276–9 (Print Edition)
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
ix
1 Old conflicts and new ideas Introduction 1 Land, environment and sustainability 4 The remit of land-use planning 6 Planning in the UK 8 An outline 10 2 Rhetoric, policy and practice: sustainable development as a planning issue Introduction 12 Sustainable development: the need for planning 13 A new rationale for planning? 21 Rhetoric and reality 22 Where next? 26 3 Interpreting sustainability Introduction 28 Environmental capital: a metaphor? 30 Ethics 33 Politics 39 Planning as a dialogical forum 43 Conclusions 45 4 Defining and defending: approaches to planning for sustainability Introduction 48 An analytical arms race 50 Engaging ‘the public’? 58 Integration: the elusive goal 64 Concluding comments 70 vii
1
12
28
48
CONTENTS
5 Moving targets: planning for an integrated transport policy Introduction 73 Transport, land use and sustainability: reframing the connections 76 A role for land-use planning? 80 Towards sustainability? 89 The new realism: planning in context 93 Conclusions 100 6 Planning for biodiversity: ethics, policies and practice Introduction 102 Conservation, land and planning 104 Nature as ‘environmental capital’ 109 In defence of nature 112 Interpreting protection 114 Progress and prospects 122 7 Distributing development: sustainability and equity in minerals planning Introduction 126 Sustainability, uneven development and non-renewable resources 128 Minerals planning in the UK: supply and sustainability 131 Place, power and spatial scale 136 Scales of justice 145 Conclusions 154 8 Conclusions and reflections Introduction 158 An active interface 159 Making a difference? 160 After sustainability 165
73
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Notes Bibliography Index
169 195 229
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The idea for this book first materialised in 1994, when Susan Owens held an ESRC Global Environmental Change programme fellowship and Richard Cowell an ESRC postgraduate award. Our first debt of gratitude, therefore, is owed to the ESRC for funding the work that originally stimulated our ideas, and especially to Michael Redclift (then director of the GEC programme) and Alister Scott, who encouraged us to produce the book proposal. At that stage, the project seemed more straightforward, and more tractable, than it eventually turned out to be. The more we thought about the issues of ‘planning for sustainability’ the more difficult and complex they seemed to become, but we learned a great deal during the process of writing and the result is a more critical book than the one we originally envisaged. Many colleagues helped in this process, and their perceptive comments on successive drafts contributed much to the final manuscript: we are especially grateful to Bill Adams, Michael Banner, Olivia Bina, Marguerite Camilleri, Alison Johnson, Andrew Johnson, David Lewis, Peter Owens, Tim Rayner, Joe Smith and Bhaskar Vira. Our thanks must also go to the supportive editorial staff at Routledge – most recently Simon Whitmore, Joe Whiting and Annabel Watson – who have waited patiently for the manuscript, and to Jane Robinson and Colin MacLennan in the Geography Department library at Cambridge, for their courteous assistance with numerous bibliographical queries.
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1 OLD CONFLICTS AND NEW IDEAS
We have failed to see how our economy, our environment and our society are all one. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 1999: 3 not all truths can fit into one social world. Rawls 1993: 197, citing Berlin 1969
Introduction Conflict over the use of land often seems ubiquitous. As we write, there are many examples to choose from in Britain, but a few will suffice to illustrate the range of issues at stake. In Berkshire, a major company wishes to build its new headquarters in a controversial green field location. Opponents raise the spectre of congestion and pollution and claim that the development would make a mockery of government planning guidelines seeking to reduce car dependency (Hetherington 1999). The local authority, alarmed at the prospect of a major employer going elsewhere, and influenced by the company’s ‘green transport’ plan, grants planning permission after ‘acrimonious’ debate (ibid.: 14; see also Groom 1999a).1 In Scotland, development interests propose a funicular railway to carry increasing numbers of tourists into the Cairngorms, the UK’s most significant mountain plateau, justifying the project – and around £12 million in public assistance – as a boon to the local economy. Environmentalists fear the impact of more visitors in a remote and ecologically vulnerable landscape. Planning permission is granted, but the decision, along with the case for public finance, is then subjected to challenges from environmental groups and a National Audit Office review.2 At the other end of the country, plans for a by-pass that would bisect the renowned water meadows of the cathedral city of Salisbury run into deep controversy, undiminished by a public inquiry and a recommendation that the project should go ahead. The government’s advisory bodies on landscape and nature conservation, consulted about ways of mitigating the impacts of the new road, agree that no measures could effectively 1
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do so: the scheme is returned to the drawing board.3 Expanding our focus to the regional scale, we see Britain’s ‘most important planning inquiry for a generation … bring[ing] to a head the battles between environmental protesters and developers’ in the south-east of England (Groom 1999b: 12). Draft regional planning guidance, produced by a grouping of local planning authorities, seeks to improve environmental quality by such measures as encouraging people to drive less, increasing woodland coverage and deflecting growth pressures from the fastest growing parts of the region (SERPLAN 1999). Industry complains that the guidance embodies ‘a presumption against economic development’, the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) that too many new houses are proposed, and the House Builders’ Federation that restrictive policies will increase house price inflation, exacerbate labour shortages and threaten international competitiveness (Groom 1999b: 12).4 Many characteristics of these conflicts would have been familiar to Roy Gregory, whose classic book, The Price of Amenity (Gregory 1971), explored some of the great planning controversies of the 1960s: the claims of growth and jobs set against concerns for less tangible environmental qualities; conflicts between different sets of public and private goals; and issues of distributive justice. Much has also changed. Whereas Gregory charted conflicts over projects promoted by nationalised industries ‘in the public interest’, the cases above centre upon more complex mixes of private and public development in the context of a more internationalised economy. The nature of environmental concerns has also shifted dramatically, with ‘amenity’ stretched to include invisible but potentially global threats, such as climate change and loss of biodiversity. What is most striking, however, is the persistent emergence of conflict over the use and development of land, apparently at odds with the more positive, less adversarial future for environmental politics heralded by widespread commitments to sustainable development. It is this paradox that forms one of the central themes of our book. Of the rise to prominence of ‘sustainable development’ it is hardly necessary to say very much here: this history has been thoroughly documented elsewhere (see, for example, Adams 1990; Elliott 1999; Holdgate 1996; Redclift 1987). Famously crystallised by Brundtland, sustainable development drew together ecological imperatives, the continuing need for development and concerns for global and inter-generational equity (WCED 1987).5 Promising to ‘transcend national differences and political interests’ (Yearley 1996: 100), it resonated with the themes of ecological modernisation already gaining currency in academic and policy communities, particularly in its insistence on the interdependence of environment and economy.6 Most significantly, sustainable development seemed to move the debate beyond ‘limits to growth’ and therefore to mark a departure from the old forms of conflict between development and conservation. Its multifaceted nature allowed a wide range of governmental, commercial and 2
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voluntary organisations to embrace it and support its use in guiding future policy. However, apparent universality of appeal did not lead to singularity of definition or noticeable coherence of approach. Competing interpretations of ‘need’ and ‘development’, and difficulties in delineating the ecological and social conditions for sustainability, quickly fractured the consensus. Nowhere did the schisms become more visible than in attempts to define principles and apply them to specific activities or environments – precisely where sustainability had to be interpreted if its appeal was to amount to more than ‘rhetorical genuflection’ (Blowers 2000: 371).7 By the mid1990s, many felt that sustainable development had become ‘a much abused term’ (Quinn 1996: 20) that proponents accused each other of hijacking. The finger was pointed at business interests for gilding their ‘green image’ (Blowers and Glasbergen 1995: 164); at the rich countries for seeking to sustain their dominance (Yearley 1996); at environmentalists for adopting ‘morally repugnant’ interpretations (Beckerman 1994: 191, 1995); and at government technocrats for emphasising their own claims to expertise over broader political agendas (see discussion in Rydin 1995). Borrowing a distinction made by John Rawls in his theory of justice, we might argue that the concept of sustainable development – the broad meaning of the term – became widely accepted, but the conception, which includes the principles required to apply a concept, remained (and remains) in profound dispute (Rawls 1972, 1993; see also Adams 1990; Jacobs 1999; Redclift 1987).8 Yet even if sustainable development fails to provide a straightforward ‘figure of resolution’ (Myerson and Rydin 1996: 26), it would be difficult to deny the discursive power of an idea that, in less than two decades, permeated policy agendas so as to become almost ubiquitous. The fact that Brundtland could promulgate the concept with such effect suggests that it must have been, in some sense, an idea whose time had come. This raises a number of interesting and important questions. How does an idea come to have influence in this way? How is it transmitted and developed? And to what extent can ‘the knowledge-based power of persuasion’, in which ‘ideas and discourses themselves may be powerful entities’ (Litfin 1994: 18, 15), challenge more traditional forms of domination and control? Such questions, in a more general sense, are of growing interest to scholars and policy makers. There is increasing evidence that traditional forms of policy analysis that emphasise agency, structures or institutions fail to capture the important role of knowledge, ideas and argument in the political process (see, for example, Fischer and Forester 1993; Hajer 1995; Kingdon 1995; Litfin 1994; Majone 1989; Radaelli 1995; Rein and Schön 1991; Sabatier 1987, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weale 1992; Weiss 1991); at the same time, power (in the coercive sense) is seen by many as integral to the legitimation of particular arguments and beliefs (Flyvbjerg 1998). Exploring the influence of a ‘new’ concept like sustainable development, which in fact has long 3
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antecedents (Owens 1994), may throw further light on the cognitive aspects of policy making. On the one hand, we might expect interpretations of sustainability – the emergence of particular conceptions – to be constrained by existing institutions, so that the new idea could be absorbed seamlessly with little threat to the status quo; alternatively, we might postulate that the very process of interpretation could stimulate institutional learning, leading ultimately to meaningful and lasting policy change.9 We have chosen to explore these issues in the context of policies concerned with the use and development of land. Not only do such policies demand the interpretation of sustainable development in terms applicable to hard decisions but, as we show in Chapter 2, the various processes of land-use planning and regulation have repeatedly been identified as key instruments for delivering a more sustainable society. In many respects, and in many countries, it is land-use planning that has acquired the political burden of reconciling development pressures with environmental concerns. We now turn, therefore, to a consideration of the significance of land in relation to sustainable development before looking briefly at the role of planning and identifying some of the more specific issues to be addressed in this book.
Land, environment and sustainability As a source of sustenance, resources and wealth, land ‘is literally the base upon which all human societies are built’ (Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette 1993: 3). Most of the profound changes in the physical and social conditions of human existence have had important land-use dimensions, including, over a long time span, the shift to sedentary agriculture, the Industrial Revolution, large-scale urbanisation (strongly associated with the rise of formal, public, land-use planning) and the globalising influence of information technology.10 But land is much more than a material base: it is imbued with diverse, sometimes contradictory, social and cultural meanings – as property, when ‘mixed with human labour’ in the Lockean sense (Locke 1988), as a wider ‘biotic community’, deserving of a ‘land ethic’ (after Leopold 1949), and ‘as a vast mnemonic system for the retention of group history and ideals’ (Lynch 1960: 126). Not surprisingly, therefore, land has been the subject of persistent political struggle (Caldwell and ShraderFrechette 1993; Grove-White 1991; Whatmore and Boucher 1993), and we might expect the governance of land-use change to present a challenging set of issues for the theory and practice of sustainable development. Certainly, land presents problems for the more sanguine, eco-modernist interpretations of sustainability, which see salvation in improving eco-efficiency, or ‘doing more with less’. While it is demonstrably possible to reduce the energy or materials intensity of the economy (and thus the environmental impacts of growth), relationships between economic activity, land and environmental change make analogous assertions about land-use intensity much more prob4
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lematic (Owens and Cowell 1994).11 Theorists of ecological modernisation have tended to focus on pollution and resource consumption while saying little about ‘intuited nature’ (Mol 1996: 315; see also Christoff 1996) – the spiritual, aesthetic and intrinsic qualities of the non-human world that are so often central to conflicts over the use and development of land. Part of the difficulty is that changes in land use are linked to environmental change through a multiplicity of direct, indirect, sometimes cumulative and often uncertain effects. These links operate at different scales and have economic, legal and political dimensions: conflicts arise between multiple rights and jurisdictions, which ecological science alone can rarely if ever resolve. Interactions between neighbouring land uses have focused the minds of scholars for centuries, as ‘nuisances’ of noise, odour or pollution have spilled beyond properties and sites (Agricola 1950; Coase 1960). Later came the recognition that impacts can cross national boundaries, as, for example, when land-use decisions in one country influence air or water quality in another. In the twenty-first century, ‘the issue of global climate change makes all nations neighbours’ (Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette 1993: 162), as, one might add, do other transnational concerns in which land use is deeply implicated, such as loss of biodiversity. In many instances, the growth of global agreements and international organisations concerned with environmental issues has modified traditional assertions of national sovereignty over land resources, already weakened by the effects of ecological and economic processes operating beyond state or local control. In the case of the Cairngorm funicular project, for example, environmental objectors were able to point to the international significance of the summit habitats and the risks posed to montane plant and bird communities by global warming. But internationalisation presents strong countervailing forces: communities can be reluctant to subject mobile economic capital to restrictive land-use policies, as illustrated by business responses to SERPLAN’s regional guidance, discussed above. If land use is of such significance for sustainability, it seems appropriate to focus attention on the planning and regulation of land-use change. All modern societies engage, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, in some such activity, and in a number of countries land-use planning has come to be accepted as an instrument for co-ordinating economic, environmental and social policies (Healey and Shaw 1994). It was an obvious candidate, then, for a central role in the delivery of sustainable development, a role widely endorsed by governments, diverse interest groups and land-use planners themselves. According to some observers, the challenge has been taken up with noticeable effect. Meadowcroft (1997: 167), for example, claims that planning for sustainability is now ‘a real world activity of officials and ministries’, encompassing the restructuring of traditional planning activities and genuinely novel developments. In the chapters that follow, we examine such claims, taking a critical look at interpretations of sustainable 5
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development in planning – their conceptual underpinnings, the instruments available and their manifestations in practice. We ask, in relation to the broader themes of knowledge, power and institutional learning identified above, whether sustainability has offered – or seems likely to offer – anything genuinely novel or radical. Has it, for example, proved its integrative potential in reconciling growth and ‘amenity’, or fulfilled its promise as an inclusive, participatory ideal? Recognising that there might be a twoway process, we consider not only whether the sustainability agenda has changed planning but also how the particular dilemmas encountered in the planning process have informed the sustainability debate. Thus the interface of sustainable development and land-use planning becomes the lens through which we address wider questions about the impact of a ‘new’ idea on established institutions, policies and practice. Our main focus is on land-use – sometimes referred to as spatial or physical – planning.12 In the UK, from which we draw much of our analysis, this means an emphasis on ‘development’ as defined in town and country planning legislation, which largely excludes the land-use changes associated with agriculture or forestry.13 But it is abundantly clear that planning in this relatively restricted sense cannot be treated in isolation from other aspects of environmental policy, including, for example, pollution control, the management of water resources and waste, and nature conservation. Not only must these different aspects interact, but the boundaries themselves have also long been matters for dispute (see, for example, CPRE 2000a; Healey and Shaw 1994; Miller 1993), with tensions highlighted afresh by the demands of sustainability. For many commentators, the very nature of environmental systems requires ‘an integrated and holistic approach’ (Evans 1997:5), linking land-use planning to other aspects of environmental protection and to policies in sectors such as energy and transport, which often seem to conflict with planning objectives. Certainly, as we shall show in chapters on transport, nature conservation and minerals, we must look to a wider context to understand the capacity of planning systems to respond to new ideas and deliver particular goals. Where ecological and economic processes operate at scales beyond the reach of local, territorially defined regulation, important questions arise as to how planning can be a proactive force in the quest for sustainable development. Throughout, we seek to avoid an insular, technical account of ‘land-use planning’, remaining sensitive to the porosity of the system’s boundaries, the limitations of its traditional remit and its relatively modest part on a wider political stage.
The remit of land-use planning There are more fundamental questions about the proper role for planning in general, and regulation of the use of land in particular. For some, land-use planning is a justifiable infringement of private property rights only in so 6
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far as markets fail because of the well-known problems of externalities and public goods. Beyond this, intervention becomes at best a distortion of market forces and a threat to competitiveness, at worst a form of coercion. Essentially, in this view, the market is seen as the institution that will best satisfy consumer preferences and lead to improvements in welfare.14 The role of planning is to correct for conditions where land prices provide an imperfect guide to land use, and thus to enable markets to operate more effectively (although some would question its capacity to do even this; see, for example, Pennington 1999). For other commentators, however, planning can and should do more than mop up after market failures. Through its commitment to public engagement (however imperfect the current arrangements), it could provide a forum for dialogue in which citizens, collectively, might choose outcomes that differ substantially from those reflecting the aggregation of consumer preferences (Sagoff 1988). Many see (idealised) planning as a dialogical institution, aspiring to the kind envisaged by Habermas (1986, 1987), one that provides ‘a space for conversation between competing conceptions of the good’ while meeting the requirements of pluralism that such a space be neutral between those conceptions (J. O’Neill 1998: 18). Such ‘communicative rationality’ has been a clear influence on planning theory, reflected in the work of a number of prominent thinkers (see, for example, Forester 1999; Healey 1993, 1997, 1998a). But there are other, important, ways in which the role of planning can be conceived. A moment’s thought reveals that for many of its proponents (and in practice), planning has always been more than a facilitator of markets or a neutral forum for dialogue. Rather, it is seen as an institution for promoting particular ends, either through some concept of the ‘public interest’ (identified by McAuslan (1979), alongside private property, as one of the dominant ideologies of planning law), or by providing a different kind of dialogical space in which particular conceptions of the good might be fostered. Such a view clearly presents a challenge for value-neutral models of professional activity, the image towards which many planners have been drawn (Thomas 1994). And none of the different perspectives outlined so far precludes an analysis of planning as a process through which power is exercised, both visibly, in defence of identifiable interests (Sandbach 1980), and more insidiously, ‘masked as forms of truth and knowledge’, after Foucault (Richardson 1996: 281; see also Flyvbjerg 1992, 1998; Foucault 1982, 1990).15 Some have suggested that ‘the turn to argument’ (Richardson 1996: 279) renders the planning process particularly vulnerable in the latter sense, so that planners, rather than being facilitators in a process of rational debate, become (conscious or unconscious) agents of normalising and disciplinary power. These different perspectives on the legitimate remit, and actual role, of planning are of crucial importance for conceptions of sustainable development. Fundamental issues emerge in the post-Brundtland era as consistently as they did in the ‘growth versus environment’ contests described in 7
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Gregory’s Price of Amenity. Central to different claims about sustainability (as we shall show in Chapter 3) are questions about the status of different needs and demands, the extent to which preferences should be accommodated or shaped, and the roles of agents and institutions in making the relevant choices and decisions. A recurrent dispute, involving all of these themes, is whether the role of planning – and latterly concepts of sustainability – should be ‘essentially subordinated to the precepts of growth’ (Blowers 2000: 374). We shall argue in later chapters that judgements of value – of what is right and what is good – are unavoidable. Indeed, in contrast to those who seek to minimise the ‘subjective’ element in decision making, we see them as highly desirable. How such judgements should be made then becomes a central question. Most conceptions of sustainable development have involved a dialogical model, seeing markets (even ‘corrected’ ones) as inadequate and stressing the importance – indeed the centrality – of public engagement in determining what is sustainable. Setting aside for now the vexed issues of subsidiarity and conflicts of interest between different scales (Dobson 1998; Saward 1993), this would seem to point towards a deliberative rather than a purely instrumental role for planning. However, there remains a deep ambiguity between process and outcome. A vision of planning as a neutral forum for arriving at consensus about policies (Blowers and Evans 1997) sits uneasily with the strong ‘outcome ethic’ (Jacobs 1997a: 227) that permeates much of the literature on sustainability, in which forms of development that are ‘more sustainable’ are clearly to be preferred and promoted over those that are not. In practice, as we shall show, the outcome cannot readily be separated from the process: planning is not so much a mechanism for implementing sustainable development as an important forum in which different interpretations come to be contested and defined. There is no prior conception of sustainability (as opposed to the broader, consensual concept) independent of this process.
Planning in the UK Where our discussion is concerned with institutions, practice and specific planning conflicts, we draw primarily upon experience in the UK (for detailed accounts of the planning system(s) in the UK, see Cullingworth and Nadin 1994; DoE 1997a; DETR 1999a, 1999b; Hall 1992; Rydin 1998a; for a view from the United States, see Callies 1999). While inevitably involving some sacrifice of breadth, this national focus helps to ground our argument and to give it coherence across chapters. The focus is not exclusive: we recognise the transnational character of epistemic communities in our field of inquiry and take account of European and wider international influences on UK policies. We also comment upon planning issues, institutions and policies in a range of countries where these provide useful illustrations or interesting contrasts. But we lay no claim to an overview or 8
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comparative analysis; nor have we attempted any systematic selection of case studies from different national contexts. Approaches to sustainable development in different planning systems will reflect administrative and legal traditions, ecological problems and political cultures. Acknowledging the important contribution of comparative reviews in both land-use planning and environmental policy (see, for example, Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991; Booth 1996; Davies et al. 1989; DoE 1996a; Hanf and Jansen 1998; Jänicke and Weidner 1997) but conscious of the pitfalls of such an approach given our subject, we have opted for more limited geographical scope. Our primary concern is with the underlying themes, conflicts and policy dilemmas, which, we suggest, transcend national boundaries and resonate across quite different political cultures and administrative systems. However, nowhere has the idea of sustainable development emerged or taken hold in a vacuum. Since we draw extensively on experience in the UK, it is worth noting at the outset some important aspects of the British political and economic scene that had particular significance for the way in which planning systems were able to respond to the challenge of sustainability. The most important of these was the neo-liberal economic agenda, with its emphasis on deregulation and privatisation (Blowers 2000). At its most intense in the 1980s, this ideology retained force into the following decade and was not substantially diminished by the election of a Labour government in 1997. While not unique – many other countries have pursued the goal of market liberalisation – these commitments have been particularly marked in the UK. The planning system was itself a direct target for deregulatory zeal in the 1980s, when it was seen as part of the ‘burden’ that it was the duty of governments to ‘lift’ (UK Government 1985; Allmendinger and Thomas 1998). Renewed emphasis on the presumption in favour of development (DoE 1980; Miller 1999a) had some significant impacts on the ground (notably in the proliferation of out-oftown retail facilities), but apart from the introduction of enterprise zones and simplified planning zones, in which development would not require planning consent, effects on the institutions of planning were surprisingly limited. Indeed, the tide seemed to turn with the introduction of a plan-led system in the Town and Country Planning Act of 1990. Nevertheless, concern about the adverse impacts of planning regimes on competitiveness persisted in the ‘modernising planning’ agenda of the late 1990s alongside, and indeed influencing, conceptions of sustainable development (DETR 1998a; McKinsey Global Institute 1998). Also significant were powerful centralising forces operating under successive Conservative administrations and the corresponding squeeze on local government finances. As much as the ideological attack on planning, this withdrawal of resources left local planning authorities in a demoralised position by the end of the 1980s and goes some way towards explaining the enthusiasm with which many planners embraced the sustainability agenda. 9
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As we shall show in Chapter 2, the recognition that sustainable development needed land-use planning, and the empowerment that this promised, can be positioned alongside a more general (if qualified) resurgence of interest in planning and positive regulation (Majone 1996). After 1997, the context for planning shifted again, with devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly, and increasing emphasis on the regional level of decision making in England. One effect is that planning for sustainability in the UK is likely to become an increasingly differentiated affair.
An outline The next chapter provides an overview of commitments to sustainable development from international to local levels, and of the prominence accorded to planning as a means of converting this rhetoric into action: its aim is to set the broad policy context. Chapter 3 then turns to the conceptual basis for sustainable development, beginning with models grounded in concepts of environmental capital and exploring variants of these and alternative interpretations. We show that attempts to move beyond Brundtland to introduce rigour and specific decision rules expose fundamental moral and political challenges, and we suggest that it is these basic tensions, rather than the absence of an unambiguous definition, that makes planning for sustainable development less tractable than some had expected. Chapter 4 returns the focus to planning practice, with a critical examination of selected policy instruments. In particular, we look at the propensity of different approaches to promote technical rationality or a deliberative agenda and, in turn, to favour particular conceptions of sustainability. Our arguments are then developed in three further chapters in which we are concerned with interpretations of sustainable development in specific policy sub-systems, all implemented at least in part through the land-use planning process. Each is chosen for its capacity to highlight fundamental questions that planning for sustainability raises but cannot, of itself, resolve. Chapter 5 addresses the potential to promote a sustainable land-use and transport system through locational policies, a much vaunted role for planning that, we argue, exposes tensions between accommodation and management of demands, and between planning as a means of promoting efficient outcomes (in the neo-classical economic sense) and planning as a forum in which preferences might be shaped and modified. Chapter 6 turns the attention to nature conservation, and to the conceptual and ethical difficulties that must be negotiated in generating defensible arguments and procedures for habitat protection: it shows very clearly that judgements of value are indispensable to the project of sustainable development. In Chapter 7, our focus is on issues of governance and spatial equity, addressed in the context of minerals planning and the problems of interpreting 10
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sustainability in ways that are responsive to diverse local economic and environmental conditions. We could have chosen to explore these issues within the context of any number of different policy areas with an important land-use dimension – housing, energy, water and waste management are prominent contemporary issues that spring to mind. However, while the specific challenge of sustainability in individual sectors is interesting in itself, the dilemmas revealed in the process of land-use planning have broader applicability precisely because of the fundamental nature of the tensions thereby exposed. We draw this material together in Chapter 8, where we revisit the core themes of the book and the questions identified in this introduction.
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2 RHETORIC, POLICY AND PRACTICE Sustainable development as a planning issue
The planning system, and development plans in particular, can make a major contribution to the achievement of the Government’s objectives for sustainable development. DETR 1999b: 20 Usable doctrines do not spring, fully armed, from a theorist’s brow. They have to be hammered out in the give and take of a debate, provoked and shaped by the lived experience of particular societies at particular times. Marquand 1988: 12
Introduction In his celebrated account of the ‘issue-attention’ cycle, Anthony Downs (1972) suggested that after the initial discovery of an environmental ‘problem’ and a stage of euphoric enthusiasm, proponents would come to realise the difficulties and costs of making significant progress. In many cases, this realisation would be followed by a gradual decline of public and political interest, and new concerns would then take over. A small number of issues would survive, however, to become matters for political attention or decision. Why some issues are consigned to oblivion while others stay firmly on the agenda has been a question of considerable interest to political scientists and policy makers (for an early but still fascinating ‘insider’ account, see Solesbury 1976; see also Kingdon 1995; Hajer 1995). Such an attention cycle might also be postulated for concepts and ideas, and similar questions asked about their durability. Our intention in this chapter is to tell the story of the diffusion of a new idea during the decade or so after its popularisation by Brundtland. We show how sustainable development took hold as a powerful normative and intellectual framework for land-use planning, from a period of euphoric enthusiasm at the start of the 1990s to more sober assessment as difficulties and complexities became apparent; and we note that, in many respects, this transition has been a microcosm of experience across a wider range of policy 12
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areas. Our intention here is to provide background and to formulate questions, and thus to set the scene for a more analytical approach to selected issues in the remainder of the book. We begin with a critical review of the endorsements heaped upon planning as an instrument of sustainable development and suggest that the range and potentially contradictory nature of the issues involved was always likely to overburden planning systems, in the UK and elsewhere, with unrealistic expectations. We then show that while sustainability found its way quite rapidly into formal statements of policy at all levels, significant discrepancies emerged between rhetoric and aspiration on the one hand and practice and implementation on the other. Such a shortfall, we contend, cannot simply be interpreted as an ‘implementation gap’ – a natural time lag in the application of new but broadly consensual principles. Rather, it reflects a struggle to interpret sustainability in which the process of definition – and not just ‘implementation’ – becomes integral to the politics of landuse change.
Sustainable development: the need for planning The rapidly diffusing attention to sustainable development coincided with, and promoted, a resurgence of interest in national and land-use planning. This can be traced in part to the international sphere, as first Brundtland in 1987, and then the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), took the view that addressing the interrelated problems of environment and development demanded the production and implementation of strategies or plans. A commitment to national sustainability plans was a key component of the UNCED agreements, while the main statement of principles for action, Agenda 21, regarded ‘environmentally sound physical planning’ as essential to sustainable development in urban areas and desirable in the integrated management of land resources elsewhere (UNCED 1992a: para 7.28; see also Selman 1996). At the European level, the Fifth Environmental Action Plan (CEC 1992a), Towards Sustainability, afforded planning a significant role in shifting from reactive responses towards anticipatory and strategic resolutions to environmental problems.1 Later, the European Union began to promote a more extensive role for spatial planning at all scales in pursuit of its agendas for the single market, social cohesion and environmental sustainability (Alden and Boland 1996). In 1999, it adopted the European Spatial Development Perspective as a legally non-binding framework for better integration of all sectoral policies with territorial effects (CEC 1999a). However, we should also note that nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), have helped to highlight the importance of comprehensive and environmentally informed planning systems (IUCN et al. 1991; Bishop 1996). 13
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These ideas about planning and sustainability found a receptive audience, especially among local governments. In the UK, as elsewhere, they coincided with (and reinforced) a wave of environmental concern, affecting ‘urban areas as much as rural, and local councils of all political persuasions’ (Hall et al. 1993: 24; see also Bain et al. 1990; Ward 1993). By the start of the 1990s, about three-quarters of councils in England, Wales and Scotland already had a ‘green plan’ or charter of some kind in effect or in preparation (Wilson and Raemakers 1992), some explicitly recognising the need to extend consideration to ‘issues such as global warming, ozone layer depletion, and destruction of the rain forest, as well as local matters’ (London Borough of Hounslow 1991, cited in Ward 1993: 460). Thus connections between planning and emerging concepts of sustainability were often forged in the light of earlier initiatives that for the most part lay outside the statutory domain. What was new in the 1990s was the degree to which central government began to give formal support to sustainable development, and to land-use planning as a means of achieving it, in some cases producing the relevant policies and legislation in response to international commitments. Indeed, in many countries, legitimation by central government was crucial in allowing innovation at the local level to become formalised in plans and strategies. In the Netherlands, spatial planning came to have a well-defined role in the National Environmental Policy Plan, in which environmental targets gave form to interpretations of sustainability (Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 1989, 1990, 1994, 1998).2 In Norway, the need to promote sustainable development was a major factor in the instigation of national planning policy guidance, and planning in a more general sense has been expected to co-ordinate activities concerned with the use and protection of resources alongside balanced and equitable regional development (Kleven 1996; Sverdrup 1998). There has been similar recognition of a role for planning in promoting sustainable development in Canada (Perks and Tyler 1991; Richardson 1989; Tomalty and Hendler 1991), Germany (Marshall 1992), New Zealand (Memon and Gleeson 1995; Southgate 1998; Upton 1995), Sweden (Elander et al. 1997) and (to some extent) the United States, where the relationship has been manifest in the ‘smarter growth’ movement.3 The UK government’s first official endorsement of sustainable development, in the Environment White Paper of 1990, urged planning authorities to ‘integrate environmental concerns into all planning policies’ (UK Government 1990: 65), and a statutory basis was provided by the Town and Country Planning Act of the same year, which required all development plans to include policies for conservation of ‘the natural beauty and amenity of the land’, improvement of the physical environment and the management of traffic.4 In the first national sustainability strategy for the UK, planning was seen as ‘a key instrument’ for delivering sustainable land-use change (UK Government 1994a: 221), an emphasis reflected (if not always coher14
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ently) in subsequent revisions to planning policy guidance notes (PPGs), which interpret, for local authorities, government policy concerning the role of the planning system in a range of different contexts. Significantly, a revised version of the guidance setting out general policy and principles established sustainable development as the first of three themes ‘which underpin the Government’s approach to the planning system’ (DoE 1997a: para 3). Beyond these core policy documents, endorsements for planning featured regularly in ministerial statements, speeches5 and evidence to parliamentary select committees (notably the House of Lords Select Committee on Sustainable Development 1995), and survived the 1997 change of government largely intact, although with some shift of emphasis. The British government has generally fought shy of making sustainable development a legal requirement, but exceptions, outside the town and country planning system itself, include the Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991 and the Government of Wales Act 1998. Section 121(1) of the latter charges the National Assembly for Wales with a duty to ‘make a scheme setting out how it proposes, in the exercise of its functions, to promote sustainable development’. The interest of the planning profession itself was reflected in a profusion of conferences and reports trying to make sense of sustainable development (see, for example, Blowers 1993a; County Planning Officers’ Society 1993; Welbank 1993). Initial confidence that planning should have a prime role in promoting sustainability seemed hardly diminished by confusion surrounding the concept and its implications for land-use change; in terms of Downs’ issue-attention cycle, the profession was caught up in the stage of euphoric enthusiasm in the early part of the 1990s, and the impetus was carried forward into statutory planning processes as a growing number of local authorities moved beyond rhetoric to integrate the new concept into their development plans. We consider the efficacy of these efforts in more detail later. Planning also attracted renewed attention from other organisations. Statutory conservation bodies were quick to draw connections between sustainable development, land-use planning and their own objectives. They endorsed the view that ‘the strategic planning process can play a key part in moving society towards the idea of sustainable development’ (Countryside Commission et al. 1996: 4) and continued to develop and stress these links (Collis et al. 1992; Countryside Commission 1996, 1998; Countryside Commission et al. 1993, 1996; David Tyldesley and Associates 1994; National Rivers Authority 1994). Pressure groups that had long regarded the planning system as an important lever on environmental change were also quick to seize new opportunities, sometimes seeming to inundate planners and policy makers with encouragement, information and advice. The Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE), for example, forcefully maintained that the planning system had a central role ‘in controlling the 15
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use of natural resources as part of meeting our local, national and international responsibilities towards the achievement of sustainable development’ (CPRE 1991: para 3; see also McLaren and Bosworth 1994; National Trust 1999; RSPB 1993). Less predictable, perhaps, was the acknowledgement of an important role for planning from organisations as diverse as the Rural Development Commission (1995) the Confederation of British Industry (CBI and RICS 1992)6 and the Automobile Association (AA undated). We might pause to consider why such diverse institutions seized upon land-use planning as a means of promoting sustainable development, using remarkably similar language (Myerson and Rydin 1996). That some strange bedfellows were able to endorse sustainable development at all demonstrates the versatility of the discourse and the ability of different groups to construct it in their own image. Planning was important in this context, as an arena in which favoured interpretations of sustainability could be directed and shaped, ensuring that particular environmental qualities, social practices or economic strategies could survive. In the case of government, we can sometimes detect political expediency and legitimation at work, with suitably vague planning rhetoric seeming responsive to demands for new approaches while deflecting awkward questions about the growth orientation of private investment and public policy. Land-use policies – at least before they bite – can sometimes provide a reassuring institutional alternative to measures with more immediate effect, such as green taxes; and when they do bite, local authorities, rather than central government, face the political repercussions. In such circumstances, it is convenient that advocates of sustainable development call for greater local autonomy. Planning undoubtedly has been, and continues to be, used in such ways, as we show in relation to environmental assessment, transport and other issues in later chapters. But it would be too simple to interpret developments purely in terms of expediency and legitimation. Faith in planning as an instrument of sustainability may also follow naturally from its function in ‘reconciling’ development and conservation, even if territorially rooted systems are less obviously equipped to respond to new and pervasive environmental problems. At some fundamental level, there is an inescapable role for planning if decisions about land use are important in determining what is ‘sustained’. Whatever the rationale, the broad consensus that sustainability needed planning at various levels resonated with – indeed, helped to provide – a renewed impetus for the organised, public direction of social and economic development (Blowers and Evans 1997), co-existing somewhat uncomfortably with the prevailing ideological emphasis on markets and competitiveness. By the mid-1990s ‘planning and sustainability’ was firmly on the policy agenda. By the end of that decade, the British government could strenuously assert that sustainable development lay at the heart of national policy for the planning system. Probing beyond such formal support, however, reveals uncertainty and confusion about interpretations of 16
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sustainability and about the remit of the land-use planning system in its pursuit of this goal. Almost inevitably, the expectations of planning, which we now go on to assess, outstripped the capacity of the system to incorporate new thinking in plans and policies and, more pertinently, to institute policies that were genuinely different from those that had gone before. Great expectations One aspect of the growing interest in land-use planning as an instrument of sustainable development has been the expanding range of social, ecological and political objectives that planning systems are deemed capable of promoting. Seen collectively, these aspirations amount to a potentially overwhelming brief for institutions with something of a mixed record in meeting public and political desires (Cullingworth 1997). A brief review of these expectations is useful for two reasons: it provides some insight into the different interests assembled under the banner of sustainable development; and it shows that planning in general, and land-use planning in particular, has become an important arena for articulating and mediating conflict about the meaning of the term. A prominent dimension of sustainable development has always been the requirement to confront global environmental problems, especially those that have become ‘emblematic’ (Hajer 1995: 7) at any particular time. So, for example, traditional planning concerns in the UK such as green belt, landscape quality and the built heritage were joined by issues such as climate change, consumption of non-renewable resources and the cumulative impact of development decisions on biodiversity. This constituted something of a new remit for planning (Owens 1994; see also Breheny and Rookwood 1993; DoE 1992a), recognising interrelationships between land use, resource consumption and environmental processes extending across space and time.7 By the end of the 1990s, draft planning policy guidance included a comprehensive list of environmental and natural resource considerations for development plans, by this stage set firmly alongside economic and social considerations, to which we return below (DETR 1999b). Here we elaborate on a selection of these environmental issues, which, although not exhaustive, indicates the interesting mix of ‘old’ and ‘new’ concerns with which the planning system has been expected to engage. First, and in spite of the traditional demarcation of land-use planning and pollution control,8 local planning authorities have increasingly been engaged in a wider pollution agenda, in some cases following policy developments at national level. Particularly important for its integrative potential has been the national air-quality strategy (DoE 1997b; DETR 2000a), which requires that local authorities set up air-quality management areas in localities where pollution objectives are unlikely to be met by 2005.9 No additional planning powers were provided in this context, the expectation 17
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being that planners would use the traditional instruments of locational policies (especially to influence traffic levels) and urban design (to encourage the dispersal of pollutants).10 Some local planning authorities have begun to test the extent to which they can influence land-use change on the grounds of air quality alone (Land Use Consultants 1999), for example by including appropriate policies in their plans and refusing applications for development that they consider would add to pollution.11 At the same time, reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (not covered by the air-quality strategy) has come to be seen as an important and legitimate consideration for development plans, with particular emphasis on reducing pollution from transport. Drawing inspiration from Dutch experience, planning policy guidance on transport was first published in the UK in the mid-1990s (DoE and DoT 1994), with a clear emphasis on reducing the need to travel and its associated environmental impacts. We consider the significance of this development in more detail in Chapter 5. A role also persistently urged upon the planning system, particularly by environmental groups, has been that of promoting the sustainable use of renewable and non-renewable resources – including water, minerals and energy – through appropriate policies and design. Here the desired input of planners ranges from the strategic level – where, for example, they might help to identify the capacity of different areas to accommodate emergent technologies such as wind energy – to the micro scale, where building design and layout can have a significant influence on energy consumption.12 Much of this thinking remains aspirational, however, not least because guidance on including resource management considerations in development plans stresses that they ‘must be capable of being addressed through the land use planning system’ (DETR 1999b: para 4.2). A role for planning in managing or even restricting resource use raises further contentious issues about environmental capacity (to which we return) and constitutes a challenge to the traditional remit of the system (Owens and Cowell 1996). Many have advocated restrictive planning policies, for example where meeting growing demand for water might have significant detrimental impacts (Summerton 1998; UKRT 1997a), and the government accepts that water resource availability should be taken into account in forward planning (DETR 1999b). Interestingly, however, in his report Regional Planning Guidance for the South East of England (see Chapter 1), Professor Stephen Crow argued that where social and economic considerations outweigh issues of water availability, ‘then it is simply up to the water companies to do their [statutory] duty cheerfully’ (South East Regional Planning Guidance Examination in Public Panel 1999: para 9.21). In other cases, as with minerals, the planning system has traditionally been seen as an instrument for ensuring the availability of resources by making sufficient land allocation. Closely related to these issues is the theme of making careful use of the land resource itself by encouraging the remediation and reuse of derelict or 18
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contaminated sites while conserving ‘undeveloped’ areas. Always a key concern – protection of green belts and agricultural land have been longstanding priorities in the UK – the need to recycle land was given renewed impetus in the late 1990s by the publication of controversial household projections (DoE 1995; see also Bramley and Watkins 1995; CPRE 1997; UK Government 1995a, 1996; UKRT 1997b). Policy guidance on the overall purpose of the planning system (PPG 1) sets out urban regeneration and reuse of previously developed land as ‘important supporting objectives for creating a more sustainable pattern of development’ (DoE 1997a: para 7), and the Labour government elected in 1997 increased its predecessor’s target for accommodating new dwellings on previously developed land from 50 to 60 per cent, a target still considered insufficiently ambitious by some (DETR 1998b; UKRT 1997b). A task force set up to identify causes of, and solutions to, urban decline was clear that if this target is to be met, ‘we must make best use of derelict, vacant and under-used land and buildings before we develop on greenfield sites’, and it proposed a number of planning and fiscal measures to achieve this objective (Urban Task Force 1999: 5).13 ‘To promote more sustainable patterns of development’ (DETR 2000b: para 1), revised planning policy guidance on housing reiterated the 60 per cent target, introduced a sequential test giving preference to brown field over green field sites, and placed the emphasis in housing provision firmly on existing towns and cities. A fourth example is the growing expectation that planning will link development with conservation, by ‘safeguarding the natural world’ (Breheny and Rookwood 1993: 9; see also DoE 1994a; DETR 1999b) and by ‘protecting what is most valuable in the cultural environment’ (Countryside Commission et al. 1993). These charges have been influenced, and to some extent reconstructed, by the new emphasis on sustainable development. Concepts of ‘environmental capital’, for example, have informed policies on conservation, and the rationale for nature protection has been greatly influenced by globalising concepts of biodiversity: we return to these issues in Chapters 3 and 6. Finally, a number of commentators have noted the potential for land-use planning to facilitate adaptive responses to environmental change, for example by regulating development in flood plains and in coastal areas affected by sea-level rise, or by allocating land for the migration of ecosystems adjusting to climate change (for a discussion, see Owens and Cope 1992). This ambitious environmental agenda dominated the engagement of the planning system with sustainable development during the early 1990s: if planning was to be an effective instrument of sustainable development, it had to take account of the environment ‘in the widest sense’ (DoE 1992a: para 6.3). In this process, two different but related sets of forces were in action. On the one hand, the holism of sustainability pushed at the institutional boundaries of the (town and country) planning system in a number of 19
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ways, raising questions about the adequacy of its traditional instruments and powers and extending engagement (intellectual if not always practical) into sectors where its statutory remit had historically been limited. At the same time, the concept of sustainable development, although rooted in strongly material concerns for poverty and ecological survival, was itself being elaborated to accommodate familiar planning issues of amenity, townscape and culture, in effect becoming part of a more generalised concern to maintain and enhance the quality of life (see, for example, DoE 1994b). Similar developments took place in other countries. In the Netherlands, for example, the theme of ‘disturbance’, relating to ‘environmental problems which threaten the quality of the immediate living environment of the population’, has been an important one in the country’s National Environmental Policy Plan (Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1998: 49). Social dimensions of sustainability were less prominent in Britain during the early 1990s, despite intra-generational equity being a central component of Brundtland’s interpretation (WCED 1987). However, this changed when first the European Union, then the Labour government elected in 1997, placed greater emphasis on reducing social exclusion. A second sustainable development strategy for the UK, significantly entitled A Better Quality of Life, was adamant that ‘development which ignores the essential needs of the poorest people, whether in this country or abroad, is not sustainable development at all’ (DETR 1999c: para 4.2). The strategy now added social considerations to the economy/environment axis that had previously dominated interpretations of sustainability, completing a shift in official rhetoric from a broadly environmental agenda (see, for example, UK Government 1994b, 1995b), through reassertion of the significance of growth, to the relative downplaying of environmental considerations in later interpretations.14 The more explicit emphasis on social inclusion expanded the sustainability agenda for planning in interesting ways. Because of its provisions for public involvement, planning could now be legitimised as a strategically important, if imperfect, set of institutions for inclusive participation and procedural fairness and, given its potential distributive role in relation to health and environmental quality (Blowers 1993b), as a mechanism for substantive aspects of social justice. The social dimension of sustainability became more explicit in planning policy guidance,15 which urged, for example, that development should ‘benefit communities economically, socially and environmentally’ (Scottish Office Development Department 1999: para 65), and that planning authorities ‘should consider the extent to which they can address issues of social exclusion through land use planning policies’ (DETR 1999b: para 4.11).16 It also began to appear in the criteria and objectives used in the appraisal of development plans (see, for example, City and County of Cardiff 1997; Leicestershire County Council et al. 1998). 20
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A new rationale for planning? It has not been difficult to show that sustainable development, in a wide variety of interpretations, needs planning. But by the end of the 1980s, planning, in Britain especially, had come to need sustainable development at least as much. Associated in the public mind with unpopular urban redevelopment, and blamed by neo-liberals and some business interests for retarding market forces,17 the profession was in something of a ‘marginalised and precarious position’ (Selman 1995: 1). We have already suggested that environmental issues in general, and sustainable development in particular, were sources of new momentum and support for planning, leading some to argue that planning could regain a more powerful and visionary role in constructing sustainable social futures (Evans 1997). On the ground, the role of planning in protecting popular amenities was strengthened in many constituencies by ‘an alliance of old-style preservationists, concerned with local issues of environmental defence, and new-style environmentalists, concerned with wider issues of environmental quality and “sustainability”’ (Cullingworth 1997: 948–9). Local government sought and gained legitimacy, if not necessarily more power or resources, as the centre came to recognise that some aspects of the green agenda could be pursued more effectively (and perhaps more safely) at a local level (Tewdwr-Jones 1996; Wilson 1998).18 At the same time, sustainable development helped to reinvigorate arguments for regional planning in the UK and at a European scale (Blowers 1993b; RSPB 1997). By the end of the decade, it was envisaged that regional planning guidance in England, which provides the strategic framework for lower-tier development plans, would be broadened to embrace a wide range of activities related to the use of land, such as regeneration, transport and environmental protection, as well as traditional locational policies that would be implemented through the statutory land-use planning system. In other words, it would constitute a more comprehensive and integrated ‘spatial’ strategy, and regional planning bodies would be expected to work closely with other interests, including the regional development authorities (RDAs), which became operational in 1999 (DETR 1999a, 1999b, 1999d).19 The guidance would also be subject to ‘sustainability appraisal’ (DETR 2000c). To summarise our argument so far, while the 1980s had seen something of an assault on the domain and remit of public planning, the growth of concern for sustainable development during the 1990s generated important changes in government rhetoric, some of which were backed by policy change. Expectations rose dramatically that planning could contribute to a broad spectrum of environmental, social, economic and democratic objectives. Voices denying a role for planning have been few and far between (Lai 1999; but see Pennington 1999); even so, the range of concerns, some novel, some placing a new emphasis on matters long found to be difficult, 21
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has raised questions about the cognitive, regulatory and political capabilities of existing planning institutions. Many commentators have stressed the need to integrate land-use planning with other environmental planning systems, and to co-ordinate the system with pricing and fiscal policy at a national scale (Blowers 1993b; Cullingworth 1997; Owens 1995). Others have called for less emphasis on technocratic regulation and more on the provision of a forum for democratic participation and social mobilisation (Blowers 1997; Davies 1998). We consider attempts to pursue these objectives in later chapters. However, we now turn to the experience of local planning authorities as they tried to meet some of their own and others’ expectations and grappled with the concept of sustainable development during the 1990s.
Rhetoric and reality Widespread endorsement of sustainable development has always been matched by a degree of circumspection as to how it might be achieved. It became customary for academics exploring the issue to set out a bewildering range of definitions (see, for example, Pearce et al. 1989), and those involved in planning quickly perceived that the breadth of concerns aligned under this banner might be difficult to translate into coherent policy initiatives. As the County Planning Officers’ Society (1993: 37) observed in an early report on the subject, ‘the picture is a particularly confusing one because some aspects of the argument involve … life threatening considerations at a global scale, whereas others are matters of qualitative judgement at a local level’. Nevertheless, as we have shown, almost everyone agreed that planning would be important in the achievement of sustainability, even if they were not quite sure how it would play its part. One way to gauge the impact of the new idea is to look at the extent to which it influenced the content of development plans, leaving aside for now more difficult questions about implementation. This approach is complicated by the notoriously slow process of revision and renewal of plans, so that their policies may lag behind the latest thinking on issues like sustainable development. Nevertheless, content analysis, especially when it follows the planning process through successive drafts, can be revealing about patterns of institutional learning and interpretations of sustainability. Here we consider experience in the UK, where enhancement of the status of development plans (in the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act) coincided with enthusiasm for sustainable development in the aftermath of the Brundtland Report. But the British experience is far from unique: similar issues have been faced in many countries in the production of spatial or physical plans providing a long-term framework for land use and physical development. By the middle of the 1990s, the sustainability agenda was making itself felt at the rhetorical level at least: more than half of the structure plans 22
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(prepared by counties) in England and Wales included some concept of sustainable development in a published document (Counsell 1998). Initially, many planning authorities used the idea as a vehicle for traditional environmental concerns (Healey and Shaw 1993; Myerson and Rydin 1994; Punter and Carmona 1997), although some embraced elements of the ‘new remit’ identified earlier in this chapter (Bruff and Wood 1995). In one of the most comprehensive analyses of the treatment of sustainability in development plans, Counsell (1998, 1999a)20 found that structure plans in England and Wales performed ‘best’ on the policy areas of wildlife and countryside, land use, built environment and – then a relatively new concern – waste management. The weakest areas were pollution, natural resource management and socio-economic aspects of sustainability. The evident progress in at least some well-defined policy areas was not matched by a grasp of what Counsell categorised as ‘key themes and principles’ of sustainable development (such as futurity, equity, holism and global stewardship); even the most innovative authorities tended to deal with these concepts ‘primarily in a rhetorical manner’ (Counsell 1999b: 46). These patterns should not be surprising, since it is relatively easy to make generalised commitments, such as minimising the threat to the Earth’s climate, or promoting the efficient use of energy resources, especially when they can be presented as aspirations with which it would be perverse to disagree. It is more difficult to translate these into policy measures that genuinely signal a change in direction.21 In pragmatic terms, planning authorities have limited resources, time and expertise to pursue and implement an ever-expanding array of objectives addressing global pollution and the management of resources. A more fundamental question is how robust the resulting policies can be in the face of competing aspirations and institutionalised presumptions about the legitimate remit and powers of planning. The processing of the first round of plans embracing sustainable development provides some indications. Policies seen as unduly restrictive of development (usually based on some concept of environmental limits) have tended not to survive; nor have those that trespass too far beyond the bounds of land-use planning. Counsell’s (1999a–c) findings in this context are revealing. In a celebrated case, West Sussex County Council, which had proposed growth-restrictive policies based on an environmental capacity study, was directed by the Secretary of State to increase its housing allocation. So was Bedfordshire, which had adopted a ‘precautionary’ policy on land allocation on the grounds that household growth forecasts might never be realised; in this case, the policy did not survive the examination in public.22 A commitment to the precautionary principle in the consultation draft of the Oxfordshire structure plan was moved to ‘supporting information’ following objections from developers. References to ‘social equity’ as an element of sustainable development were either modified (Bedfordshire’s was 23
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replaced, after the examination in public, by ‘social opportunity’) or had yet to complete the tests of consultation and inquiry. Also significant in this context is the geographical variation in treatment of sustainable development: in looking for the most comprehensive attempts to make the concept operational, Counsell (1999a: 132) found that: The results showed a geographical bias towards the south and south eastern parts of the country – areas which are experiencing the greatest pressures for development and where local politics favour restraint. The structure plans which performed least well, on the other hand, showed a bias towards Wales and the north of England, where political priorities tend to favour growth. Such spatial variation should not be surprising, since the planning system is unlikely to be a passive translator of broad policy initiatives. If sustainable development is constituted in terms of different goals, networks of local interest inevitably influence how such goals are reconciled in relation to their particular priorities. Thus in Glasgow, a city with high levels of unemployment and deprivation, the guiding principles of sustainable development for the local plan review, a preliminary to the production of a city-wide local plan by the new Glasgow City Council, included presumptions in favour of both job creation and the disadvantaged in society, and a firm emphasis on ‘sustainable regeneration’ (Glasgow City Council 1998). The overall picture is one of an unevenly advancing front along which, even when the rhetoric has been impressive, the depth, breadth and nature of commitment have varied a great deal. The institutionalised domain of development planning has confined attempts to deal with the ‘new remit’ primarily to land-use and locational policies; authorities that have tried to embrace a wider environmental or social agenda have been brought rather sharply back into line. It is not surprising, perhaps, that those that have run furthest with the concept of sustainable development, predominantly adopting an environment-led approach, have encountered major problems in reconciling their aspirations with what seem to be inexorable trends in production, consumption and mobility. This fundamental conflict has manifested itself most clearly when plans and proposals have come under scrutiny during the processes of consultation and examination in public. We can conclude that there has indeed been a marked change in planning discourse, but whether this is associated with sufficient power to challenge dominant paradigms of growth is a question for later chapters. For now, we can observe that despite the firm place of sustainable development on the national agenda, and its diffusion into plans and policies at all levels, there was still, by the end of the 1990s, a sense of implementation deficit. Real changes on the ground – to the nature and form of development, or to the intensity of 24
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conflict over land use – were not readily discernible, or at least could not unambiguously be identified as sustainability in practice. In this respect, the treatment of sustainability in development plans reflects a more widespread experience in different sectors and at different levels of governance.23 One obvious response to impatience is that to expect visible results so soon would be premature. Perhaps what should surprise us is the speed of diffusion and permeation of the idea of sustainable development in little more than a decade. Applying policies in the real world is inevitably less tidy than formulation of abstract principles, and implementation deficits are endemic to public policy as governments seek to address changing social and political priorities in the absence of consensus (Kleven 1996; Weale 1992). In the case of land-use planning, the slow pace of plan preparation results in an almost permanent state of dislocation between new commitments, policy action and land-use change (Quinn 1996; UKRT 1997c). Initially, such structural constraints were compounded by a dearth of practical advice, leading to complaints that planning was being asked to fight the battle of sustainable development ‘with no weapons and with very little strategic direction’ (Welbank 1993: 13), although gradually this vacuum was filled by revised planning policy guidance together with a profusion of good practice guides (see, for example, Barton et al. 1995; DETR 1998c; RTPI 1996, 1999). In Chapter 4, we return to the suitability of various ‘weapons’ and the ability of the planning system to deploy them to greatest effect. For now, we note two important features of land-use planning that have affected its ability to deliver. First, in common with a number of other regulatory systems, it has limited capacity in isolation to stimulate social and economic change. Second, as we showed earlier, planning authorities were dealing with many other pressing issues while trying to come to terms with sustainability: pressures to speed up the planning process; reductions in public spending; the privatisation of many services; and, from the late 1990s, devolution and the growing significance of the regional agenda (Blowers 2000). Some of these forces were clearly in tension with the thoughtful and inclusive incorporation of sustainable development, some offered new opportunities, but all demanded energy and attention. In short, it might be argued that the usual forces of insufficient knowledge, inertia and competing demands explain the implementation deficit: all that is needed is more time for the diffusion and institutionalisation of best practice. However, we suggest that the situation is more complex. If sustainable development genuinely offered tangible synergies between economic, environmental and social objectives, a persistent implementation deficit would be surprising. That such synergies remain elusive suggests that the ‘deficit’ cannot simply be read as a set of predictable obstacles to, and delays in, translating aspirations into practice. Instead, it points to a more fundamental dislocation between competing interpretations of what it means for development to be sustainable. And it is important to recognise 25
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that questions of process – how and by whom the debate should be conducted – have become as taxing, and as controversial, as those concerned primarily with outcomes.
Where next? We have shown that an early and somewhat naive enthusiasm for sustainable development was replaced, during the decade after Brundtland, by more sober assessments of what could be achieved in practice. Attempts to turn the concept into ‘real-world activity’, as in land-use planning, placed the earlier broad (if not very deep) political support under considerable pressure. This was in part because of a latent recognition that commitments to sustainability might, at least in some instances, challenge the dominant conventional goals of market-led development and competitiveness. As its potentially radical implications became clearer, so conflict intensified over its meaning: all those involved in the planning process soon encountered the difference, outlined in Chapter 1, between the broad concept and specific conceptions of sustainable development. Assessing the sustainability of different patterns of land use turned out to be inseparable from judgements about their feasibility and desirability, and these were often profoundly in dispute. A system characterised by deeply ambivalent objectives, complex and extensive links in the policy chain, actors with some discretion, and susceptibility to outside interference is not conducive to clear-cut ‘implementation’ (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979). Seen in this light, the implementation deficit that we have described is such a permanent feature that the phrase itself becomes a misleading description of the situation. Not only will policies be remade in the process of implementation but so too may the principles on which they have been legitimised. Acknowledging this much may not seem to take us very far, but it does at least move beyond simplistic notions of deficit, which imply some widely endorsed template for sustainability that can readily be applied in particular locations. Significantly, however, rather than being consigned to oblivion once obstacles were encountered (as might be expected in an ‘issue-attention’ cycle), sustainable development has strengthened its rhetorical grip, while different interests have taken up arms about its meaning. Some groups have sought to maintain its radical edge, others to incorporate it seamlessly into the status quo, confining issues to safe areas of debate and accommodating conflict, in time-honoured manner, ‘through the development of new institutions, compromise legislation and the appearance of acceptable explanations and solutions’ (Sandbach 1980: 35). However, it would be difficult to deny that important changes have taken place. New ideas, as Marquand (1988: 12) suggests, have been ‘thrashed out in the give and take of debate’, and we might postulate that institutional learning has occurred within a framework of power relations, which are themselves not immutable. 26
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The developments reviewed in this chapter suggest that planning has been an important forum for such learning, albeit an imperfect one. The nature of this process, the success (or otherwise) with which powerful interests have sought to capture the concept of sustainable development, and the significance of any changes on the ground are important questions for the remainder of this book. But before developing these ideas in the light of particular planning instruments, policies and conflicts, we must explore, in the next chapter, alternative conceptual bases for sustainable development in the context of land-use change.
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3 INTERPRETING SUSTAINABILITY
… when concepts (and hence the words that refer to them) become politicized, a struggle over meaning and morality takes place. When to classify is to decide, rival moral judgements contend for supremacy. Wildavsky 1993: 47 The merit of any definition depends upon the soundness of the theory that results; by itself, a definition cannot settle any fundamental question. Rawls 1972: 130
Introduction We have argued that the concept of sustainable development became powerful at all levels, at least rhetorically, during the decade that followed publication of the Brundtland Report. Most striking, perhaps, were the high expectations for its reconciliatory potential, expectations that were particularly prominent in the context of land-use change. In practice, land-use planning – with its relatively visible procedures and tangible results – has proved to be one of the most important arenas in which conceptions of sustainable development are contested. Here more than anywhere else, it has become clear that trying to turn the broad consensual principle into policies, procedures and decisions tends not to resolve conflicts but to expose tensions inherent in the idea of sustainable development itself. One response to these difficulties has been to blame the lack of a coherent, a priori definition, and thus to seek to move beyond Brundtland towards rigorous and robust conceptions. Others have preferred to set aside the perplexing issue of definition and to concentrate on putting the broad idea of sustainable development into practice. Skolimovski (1995: 70), for example, is unrepentant about the use of a vague concept: ‘It is better to muddle through to salvation than go crisply to damnation’ (see also Blowers 1993b; Holdgate 1996). In practice, conceptual and operational approaches proceed in parallel. Sustainable development cannot be theorised like gravitation, but, as with 28
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other broadly consensual concepts such as liberty and justice, it has to be constituted in ways that might be defensible. All conceptions invoking institutions and decision rules will be normative and must co-evolve with practice in a wider political framework, which they might also challenge. The difficulty of operational definition can be seen to indicate not that a concept is without merit but that new ideas are being conceived and tested (Meine 1992). In this sense, sustainable development serves ‘as a reminder of the chief concerns to which any policy must relate’ (Banner 1999: 202). Different conceptions expose assumptions, beliefs and contradictions, and thus become a basis for debate, reflection and further refinement of principles and policy prescriptions. This process of definition, challenge and reflection is well illustrated if we take, as a starting point, a set of interpretations of sustainable development that gained considerable currency in the post-Brundtland era: interpretations based on concepts of environmental, human and human-made capital. Our objective in this chapter is to show how elaboration of one general model can serve to expose core issues and divergent values, and to generate alternative conceptions of sustainability compatible with different interests and beliefs. We begin with ‘environmental capital’ because this approach, as well as having some general appeal for those seeking operational guidance, proved beguiling for many of those engaged in planning, where it became, on some accounts, ‘widely used and influential’ (CAG and Land Use Consultants 1997: 2). However, we shall show that what at first sight seems to provide a promising algorithm to guide land-use change reveals, on closer inspection, that decisions about what is ‘sustainable’ are inseparable from moral and political choices of the highest order. We argue that ethical dilemmas, judgements of value and important questions for liberal democracy must ultimately be confronted whatever our starting point, simply because they are so fundamental to the renegotiation of social and political priorities. It might be objected that the quest for defensible interpretations of sustainable development is naive in its implicit assumption that outcomes are responsive to reason and principle, when there is ample evidence to suggest that policy and planning conflicts are actually resolved in favour of powerful vested interests (Blowers 1984; Flyvbjerg 1998; McAuslan 1979; Sandbach 1980; Wynne 1975). But recognising such structural constraints does not absolve us from the need to ‘support our conclusions with viable principles’ (Johnson 1991: 5). Argument is important in the policy process. Indeed, the exercise of power itself often requires a legitimising discourse, and some would see the discursive power of reason and persuasion as significant in challenging dominant interests and ideologies (see, for example, Hajer 1995; Litfin 1994; and, for a discussion, Radaelli 1995); at least we might agree with Forester (1994a: 180) that it is ‘too simple and sweeping … to say that practical judgement in planning simply works to support the 29
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powerful’. To show how the concept of sustainability has been interpreted, and different interpretations defended, is therefore not merely an exercise in semantics; it can help to expose the choices and judgements that determining what is sustainable must entail, and it may enable us to see more clearly the connections between new ideas, argument and established forms of domination and control. Where relevant, we relate the abstract frameworks discussed in this chapter to the real planning dilemmas on transport, nature conservation and minerals extraction that we analyse in more detail in later chapters of the book.
Environmental capital: a metaphor? While Brundtland’s consensual principle was widely endorsed, the quest for policy relevance was initially dominated, at least in the UK, by environmental economists (see, for example, Bateman 1991; Hanley et al. 1990; Pearce et al. 1989; for a later discussion, see Foster 1997). These analysts linked Brundtland’s well-known axiom about the needs of present and future generations with the view that opportunities to generate well-being depend on the availability of various forms of capital. In this formulation, sustainable development implied that future generations should inherit no less opportunity for well-being than that enjoyed by the present incumbents, and the rule derived from such reasoning was that the productive potential of a stock of capital should at least be maintained over time. This was an idea with long antecedents (for example, Hartwick 1978; Hicks 1946; Locke 1988) and deep resonance in economic and managerial good sense. If this is the starting point, it remains to establish an appropriate relationship (in terms of human well-being) between human-made and human capital on the one hand, conventionally including technology and infrastructure as well as knowledge and skills, and natural capital on the other, including resources such as fossil fuels and forests, and the functions of the biosphere (see, for example, Holland 1994; Pezzey 1992; Solow 1986; Spash and Clayton 1995; Victor 1991).1 Many positions have emerged along a spectrum from ‘weaker’ to ‘stronger’ versions of sustainability. At the weaker end, while commentators accept that the positive (economic) value of environmental capital might usefully be given a higher profile in public policy, they remain sceptical that much in the environment has such special qualities that it should never be a candidate for substitution (see, for example, Solow 1992; for a vigorous debate, see Beckerman’s 1994 broadside on sustainable development and the responses of Daly 1995; Jacobs 1995; Holland 1997). In stronger interpretations, reflecting diminished faith in infinite substitutability, positive rates of discount and long-term ecosystem resilience (Pearce and Turner 1990), environmental systems are seen to provide vital functions that could not plausibly be replaced by human action (see also Daly and Cobb 1989; Jacobs 1991; Spash and Clayton 1995; Turner 30
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1988; Victor 1991).2 Given imperfect knowledge of what it is that might be vital, and limited human capabilities, precaution then suggests the passing on of some essential natural resource base ‘intact’ (Pearce and Turner 1990: 238). Although it could be interpreted in very different ways, the metaphor of natural environments as ‘capital’ had broad appeal, extending well beyond an environmental constituency. The International Chamber of Commerce (1992: 1), for example, was content to acknowledge that ‘sustainable development is about learning to value, maintain and develop our environmental asset so that we live off its income not its capital’. But maintaining natural capital is clearly not compatible with unrestrained growth of the kind that places ever greater demands on resources and ecosystems (Boulding 1966; Pearce et al. 1989). Rather, it implies that ‘we observe the “bounds” set by the functioning of the natural environment in its role of support system for the economy’ (Pearce and Turner 1990: 52). However, where the ‘bounds’ lie, and their implications for growth and development, have been matters for intense debate, in which the scope for substituting one source of well-being for another has been a central issue. Weaker versions of sustainable development see the bounds as relatively unconstraining, whereas stronger interpretations can be regarded as environmentled.3 Since even in the latter it is logically untenable to propose that all natural capital should be treated as inviolable, it has been necessary to make some distinctions. Thus the most vital elements of natural capital have been deemed ‘critical’, with the implication that their integrity should be protected in all but the most exceptional of circumstances. In other instances, it has been regarded as sufficient to maintain the overall quality or functioning capacity of the environment (‘constant natural capital’). Damage caused by development could then be offset by compensatory measures, such as environmental restoration or habitat creation: ‘investments to restore the natural capital of the supporting environments to some original position’ (Pearce and Markandya 1988: viii). By combining stringent protection of what is critical with environmental compensation for losses or damage elsewhere, development could then be reconciled with the maintenance, or even enhancement, of a natural capital stock.4 However, these distinctions have been complicated by widespread agreement that aspects of the environment valued for spiritual, aesthetic or intrinsic reasons, and not just because they are essential in some material sense, could be located in the critical category (see, for example, Countryside Commission et al. 1993; Owens 1994; UK Government 1994a, 1994b, 1995b). Qualities that might justify this special treatment, such as uniqueness and irreplaceability, separate neither what is natural from what is human-made (Holland 1994),5 nor what is essential to human life from what contributes to its quality and meaning: they can be found in seminatural ecosystems as well as in cultural landscapes and monuments. Significantly, this extension shifts delineation of what is critical more obviously 31
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and exclusively into the realm of values and judgement, and in doing so reopens an old divide. Just as the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American conservationists of soils, water and forests found their doctrine of ‘maximum sustainable yield’ challenged by those for whom the environment embodied non-instrumental values (Hays 1987), so contemporary debates about criticality encompass much more than the material significance of environments. Expanding the category of what is critical beyond ‘support systems for the economy’ stretches the metaphor of ‘capital’ (with its human-instrumental connotations) but articulates a widely held view that sustainability should not be defined solely in terms of survival, health or opportunities for future economic development. One can begin to see why maintaining natural or environmental capital (the term we shall now adopt) was attractive to many involved in planning, particularly those who felt that conventional approaches were resulting in an alarming (often cumulative) loss of much that mattered in the environment. It is not difficult to imagine that for a given geographical area – a region or a county, for example – ‘environmental capacity’ could be defined in terms of the need to protect critical environmental capital together with some version of the constant environmental assets rule (policies such as ‘no net loss of woodland’, for example). Indeed, a number of planning authorities in the UK attempted to do just this in the 1990s, using methods that we discuss in more detail in Chapter 4. For our present purposes, it is sufficient to note the theory that capacity would be breached if features or functions identified as critical were damaged or if other aspects of environmental quality were diminished in net terms. Development could be accommodated to the extent that it could reasonably be expected not to have such consequences. The amount permissible in any period would therefore depend on the potential – conceptual and technical – to eliminate, mitigate or compensate for environmental damage, and upon the degree of precaution considered appropriate in the face of uncertainty. Since sensitive development may avoid permanent loss and can sometimes result in environmental improvement, the relationship between capacity and growth need not be deterministic. Even so, on any typical planning timescale, a strong interpretation of sustainability must translate into limits to the amount of development (at least as conventionally defined in planning systems) that can be accommodated in a given area. If that development cannot be displaced, it might also imply ceilings on certain types of economic activity at national (or even international) level. Such interpretations of sustainability have clear resonance with earlier discourses on ‘limits to growth’. It is easy to understand, therefore, why those with interests in economic development might prefer weaker interpretations of sustainability, emphasising integration, substitutability and faith in technical capabilities for ameliorating environmental impacts. But interests are not always easy to disentangle from values and beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and must usually be defended in 32
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some degree. Thus, in the process of making policies and decisions, divergent interpretations of sustainability draw upon and reflect not only a range of scientific judgements (themselves entangled with interests) but also conflicting moral and political doctrines. Age-old dilemmas, as we now go on to show, are never far below the surface in land-use planning conflicts and contribute much to their intensity.
Ethics Perhaps the most immediate question arising from the framework discussed above is how to identify critical environmental capital. To say that some aspect of the environment should be placed in this category is (by definition) to claim that it ought to be protected intact, which in turn presupposes some rationale. When damage to environmental functions would pose severe threats to survival, human health or vital aspects of economic activity, an obvious rationale would be prudent self-interest: naturally, as Foster (1997: 233) points out, ‘we want to avoid blundering into ecosystem catastrophe’. In such cases, weak sustainability might be sufficient: the most important functions of the environment could be deemed ‘critical’, not in the sense that they must be removed from the arena of trade-off but because any trade-off is so strongly in their favour, even in the short term. Application of the precautionary principle might move us towards the stronger end of the spectrum, placing some limits on short-term substitutability, but the case for protecting certain environmental assets intact still rests on the assumption that such a policy will optimise human welfare. It differs little from economists’ traditional concerns with optimality, except in acknowledging that some environmental systems might constitute essential and non-substitutable material components of welfare, at least for the foreseeable future.6 The precise location of any particular ‘criticality boundary’ (Blake 1999: 13–14; see also Jacobs 1991), reflected in environmental quality standards or measures to protect resources, will always be a matter of dispute, since thresholds ‘can be informed by scientific understanding of nature’s properties, but … become determinants of decision making through political judgement and social choice’ (Jacobs 1997b: 67).7 The choice of protective measures is also likely to be contested. But the principle underlying prevailing definitions of what is critical in this domain is fairly clear: the environment is of instrumental value in human material welfare, and a requirement to protect it can be furnished by a utilitarian ethical framework in which the right course of action is that which tends to deliver the greatest well-being. As Norton (1982: 326) observes, ‘if present behaviours soon lead to an interruption of production, then utilitarianism will be able to generate an argument against their conduct’.8 Things become more complicated when we turn to aesthetically pleasing, historic, tranquil or wild environments, which many would seek to include 33
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in the critical category, although they are less obviously crucial to material well-being. These aspects of environmental quality have featured prominently in land-use conflicts: for example, they were important in the planning dilemmas with which we opened this book. But as we noted above, it is particularly difficult in this domain to determine what might be vital and non-substitutable. Some environmental economists have suggested that weak sustainability would once again be sufficient to provide an adequate case for protection, because such environments make an important contribution to human welfare, this time in non-material terms. Thus (they would argue) the rationale for protection of these less tangible assets could also be provided within a utilitarian framework. It is broadly within such a framework that concepts of environmental capital can become associated with the higher profile and controversial project of monetary valuation of environmental assets, and in particular with the inclusion of environmental considerations (both material and non-material) in cost–benefit analysis.9 The argument is that if preferences for non-market assets (clean air, species, beautiful landscapes) could only be revealed or stated, they would turn out to be strongly positive and could often outweigh whatever preferences might be satisfied by development. This premise, and the multitude of valuation techniques that it has spawned, have been the subject of a wide-ranging, sometimes acrimonious, debate, which has been extensively covered elsewhere (for different perspectives, see Bowers 1997; Kelman 1990; J. O’Neill 1993, 1997; Pearce and Turner 1990; Pearce et al. 1989; Sagoff 1988; Spash 1998; Victor 1991). The problems are legion (and we revisit some of them in Chapter 4). Even in relatively straightforward material cases (as when a pollutant has an acknowledged serious impact on human health), the limits of science and of techniques for revealing preferences mean that claims about benefits and costs can always be (and nearly always are) contested. But a more fundamental difficulty for those seeking a generous interpretation of what is ‘critical’ is that when preferences are aggregated, the outcome might indicate that we should not save a landscape, or protect health, rather than (say) construct a road that would enable a large number of road users to save many small increments of time. As Onora O’Neill (1997: 131) argues, utilitarianism and environmental protection are ‘uneasy allies’ because: There is … no guarantee that widely shared or trivial short-term pleasures that damage the environment will not outweigh the pains caused by that damage. The destruction of wilderness or environmentally sensitive areas will be a matter for concern only insofar as it is not outweighed by the pleasure of destroying them. It is precisely because of such thinking that the metaphor of critical environmental capital was so appealing for conservationists, many of whom sought 34
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to retain the policy implications of criticality while detaching it from any economistic associations. Critical environmental capital seemed to provide a category in which, to borrow Hargrove’s (1992: 161) words, certain things could be ‘set aside’ and exempted from use.10 One would no longer have to demonstrate that the benefits of protecting some habitat or landscape outweighed the economic gains from development; it would be sufficient to point to its critical status. But assertion is clearly not enough: before such decision rules apply, particular environments would have to be classified as critical for some a priori reason – despite utility considerations rather than because of them – and in the process, as Wildavsky (1993: 47) predicts, ‘rival moral judgements contend for supremacy’. To insist that protection is right even if the costs apparently outweigh the benefits is, in effect, to call upon frameworks that place ‘limits on what would otherwise be the implications of aggregative [human] welfare calculations’ (Keat 1997: 40).11 This might point in the direction of deontological ethics, based on rights or duties, requiring that agents ‘refrain from doing the sorts of things that are wrong even when they foresee that their refusal to do such things will clearly result in greater harm (or less good)’ (Davis 1993: 206).12 For some, it means expanding the moral community to embrace future humans, or the non-human world, or both, more fully and fundamentally than traditional frameworks, whether utilitarian or deontological, have allowed. Others find a rationale for protection in objective conceptions of what constitutes a good (human) life. In exploring these alternative perspectives, we begin with the familiar refrain that environmental assets should be protected ‘for future generations’. We deal with this first because, although often cited as self-evident, it is a claim that can hardly stand alone: it needs to be grounded within some wider ethical framework. The problem of inter-generational justice, however, ‘subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests’ (Rawls 1972: 284). Constructing a case for environmental protection around the interests or rights of future people is certainly less easy than the rhetoric might imply and has stimulated an intricate debate (for a range of views, see Laslett and Fishkin 1992). It is first necessary to establish that our descendants (even into the further future) have ethical standing, a task complicated by the fact that traditional concepts of benefit and harm ‘are tied to notions of identity that give way when choices involving future people must be made’ (ibid.: 1).13 If, as some have argued, it is enough that our actions might impact upon specifiable others, even if they cannot be individuated,14 the question remains as to what constitutes morally appropriate behaviour towards those who will exist in the future. Making reasonable assumptions about their basic needs might take us a good way towards protection of critical environmental assets with material and instrumental value; precaution would take us further. Even so, technological optimism and (within welfare economic frameworks) positive discount rates 35
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will pull in the opposite direction (Pearce and Markandya 1988; Hanley and Spash 1993). Moving into the realm of less material and non-instrumental values (and further away temporally), we encounter more vexing problems in identifying the interests or preferences of future people, let alone in establishing rules for their consideration. As Sagoff (1988: 63) remarks, future generations may not miss what they have never had: perhaps a ‘pack of yahoos will like a junkyard environment’. For some, therefore, a robust defence of environmental quality must lie in ideal regarding principles linking past, present and future. Thus ‘our obligation to provide future individuals with an environment consistent with ideals we know to be good is an obligation not necessarily to those individuals but to the ideals themselves’ (ibid., emphasis added). In this view, we should strive to ensure that future generations ‘belong to a community with ourselves’, that they are capable, for example, of appreciating the goods of the non-human environment, and of contributing to them ( J. O’Neill 1993: 34). If modern society produces ‘mindless consumers’, then the present generation fails not only the future but also itself and the past (ibid.). Although there is not scope here for a full discussion of environmental justice between generations, it is quickly apparent that appeals to futurity, although they have been so powerful in the discourse of sustainable development, often beg the question of ‘what we know to be good’, a difficult but central issue that we revisit below. A case for ‘setting aside’ certain environmental assets, embracing considerations of futurity, might be made within a deontological framework by showing that there is an obligation to protect them, so that it would be morally wrong to do otherwise even if the consequences in terms of preference satisfaction would be better. Onora O’Neill (1996, 1997) attempts to do this in her constructive account of practical reasoning, in which, having shown that utilitarian thinking may not furnish adequate arguments for protecting environments, she suggests that a fundamental obligation ‘to reject the principle of injury’ might take us much further.15 While such an obligation would not require agents to refrain from all injury, it would require them to refrain from systematic or gratuitous injury, including indirect effects arising from damage to natural or semi-natural environments: The basic thought … is that it is wrong to destroy or damage the underlying reproductive and regenerative powers of the natural world because such damage may inflict systematic or gratuitous injury (which often cannot be foreseen with much accuracy or detail) on some or on many agents. O. O’Neill 1997: 137 Although, in Onora O’Neill’s account, it is ‘agents’ (including distant others) who are the subject of fundamental obligations, and only humans 36
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are seen as having full capacity for agency, her argument is that the natural world would benefit indirectly because there would be a strong case for protecting the ‘shared environment of human and non-human life’ (ibid.: 137).16 The fundamental obligation not to injure other agents gratuitously or systematically would be discharged in particular contexts through a range of positive and institutional obligations, for example to promote transport policies that do not contribute to dangerous climate change or agricultural practices that do not irreversibly damage biodiversity. Although the environment is treated as the ‘material basis for human life and livelihood’ (O. O’Neill 1996: 168), and ‘injury’ is quite tightly defined (to include damage to bodies and minds or coercion, for example, but not – or not obviously – deprivation of pleasing environments), this deontological framework could provide a generous rationale for critical status, going beyond what could be justified in utilitarian terms. It might, for example, require more stringent air-quality standards than principles of utility maximisation: it would simply be wrong to put human health at risk, even if the costs of reducing pollution to non-injurious levels outweighed quantifiable benefits in terms of illness avoided or lives saved.17 It may be more difficult, on the grounds of rejecting systematic or gratuitous injury, to justify critical status for those aspects of the natural world that have (only) non-material value. For now, we note that the principle of precaution (as in utilitarian frameworks) would tend to justify wider boundaries for criticality. So too might the required virtues – imperfect obligations that are more selective and lack counterpart rights – which also form part of O’Neill’s (ibid.) account. On this, she argues that an ethically sound relation to the environment must ‘go beyond avoiding systematic and gratuitous damage that injures others’ lives; it must also be expressed in care and concern to sustain and conserve at least some parts or aspects of that environment in a flourishing condition’ (ibid.: 203).18 However, many commentators believe that a convincing case for protecting some environments, supporting what Norton (1982: 319) calls our ‘intuitive ethic’ for conservation, must ultimately depend on a less anthropocentric framework.19 The quest for such a rationale goes some way towards explaining the enormous growth in literature on environmental ethics and the attempts by many writers to establish that non-humans have ‘goods of their own’, unconnected to any instrumental value to present or future human beings, and, furthermore, that this makes them directly morally considerable. Some then seek to include the pains and pleasures of non-humans in a utilitarian framework, others to confer upon at least some of them certain fundamental rights (Hargrove 1992 provides a useful review; see also Clark 1977; Johnson 1991; Leopold 1949; Regan 1981; Singer 1976; Taylor 1986; Wise 2000). Deeming particular species or habitats to be ‘critical’ could be a powerful expression of such moral standing. We explore these issues in greater depth in Chapter 6, where we are more 37
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directly concerned with the interface between land-use planning and nature conservation. The point to emphasise here is that some claims for environmental protection, or for critical status, depend upon beliefs (and increasingly draw upon carefully constructed arguments) about the moral status of the non-human world. The implications of these claims for policies and decisions are not always compatible with those arising in more anthropocentric frameworks. We also note that such biocentric thinking cannot, except by coincidence, justify critical status for important aspects of human and cultural environments. This brings us to one further tradition, which is of particular interest because (when applied to environmental protection) it tends to blur anthropocentric and biocentric rationales and readily embraces the cultural as well as the natural. This is the view, advanced by John O’Neill (1993) among others, that an appreciation of the intrinsic worth of nature is one of the things that is constitutive of human flourishing; like friendship, it is part of what it means to lead a ‘good (human) life’ (see also Banner 1999; Goodin 1992; Hargrove 1992; Partridge 1984). Within this framework, the goods of non-humans ought (for the most part) to be promoted. For John O’Neill (1993, 1998), this is part of a larger argument in which he seeks to defend objective conceptions of the good,20 an argument that has wider implications for the role of planning in making difficult choices. It is useful to draw together the arguments at this point. Some aspects of the environment could be deemed critical – not to be damaged or destroyed – whether one adopts a utilitarian or non-utilitarian framework, an anthropocentric or more biocentric one. In many cases, however, claims and counter-claims about criticality must depend not only upon different degrees of precaution but also upon different views (not always selfconsciously held) about what is good and what is right, and about the boundaries of moral considerability.21 The positions taken up in planning conflicts can often be attributed to the identifiable interests of protagonists; even so, they normally have to be defended, and it is in this process that the various rationales will be employed, exposed or appropriated. What might have seemed to be a technical problem of classifying environmental capital (and planning accordingly) exposes enduring and fundamental questions; sustainable development is then interpreted on the basis of different interests, values and beliefs. And while we have focused this discussion on the determination of what is critical, the issues are scarcely less challenging in the context of non-critical environmental capital. It will still be necessary to decide how much it is right to protect overall and what might constitute appropriate compensation in the face of unavoidable damage or loss. The potential for restoration, relocation or recreation of habitats or landscapes depends not only on technical capabilities but also on what the original was valued for, and why. Thus, for example, the impressive skills of mining companies in restoring the agricultural capacity of land fail to placate those 38
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concerned about irreparable loss of meanings attached to landscape, or those for whom ‘naturalness’ or ‘wildness’ provides a vital reflective counterpoint to the human world (Elliot 1997; Goodin 1992; Holland 1997).22 The important point here is that since the underlying ethical questions are not of the kind that can quickly (or ever) be resolved, defining what is ‘sustainable’ was never likely to be an exercise in consensus. The best we might hope for is that alternative moral frameworks will point happily in the same policy direction, at least in particular cases. There may indeed be some – even much – common ground (Beatley 1994; Turner 1988), but, as forthcoming chapters on transport, nature conservation and minerals extraction will show, many instances remain where divergent conceptions of sustainability indicate fundamentally different choices about the use and development of land.
Politics So far, we have concentrated on different rationales for environmental protection and have dealt only imprecisely with the benefits of development – benefits, in the terminology of the environmental capital model, that flow from what is human-made. Yet the extent to which proposals for physical change, addressed through the planning system, contribute to development in the sense of social progress is equally fundamental to different conceptions of sustainability. This points to an important area where conceptions based on the metaphor of capital came to be seen as insufficient. In focusing on flows of benefits from different forms of capital over time, these models tended to treat generations as single, global meta-individuals (Hanley and Spash 1993) and had little to say explicitly about intra-generational justice and distribution (for further discussion, see Harvey 1996).23 This was changing by the late 1990s, when social considerations were explicitly added as a third dimension to conceptions of sustainable development in the UK, although usually without progressing towards the kind of decision rules that the environmental capital model (however inadequately) had tried to develop. This is important, because repeated assertion that environmental protection, economic development and social justice are mutually interdependent (or at least are not invariably at odds with one another) cannot disguise the evidence that these objectives are certainly not always harmonious (Dobson 1998). In the world of policies and decisions, legitimate interests, rights and obligations frequently conflict, and some claims are overridden, for good reasons or bad, as values come into play with the exercise of power. Foster (1997: 235) adroitly sums up the implications: ‘Values, as it were, can be left to disport themselves in happy plurality when offduty, but the need for a decision calls at least the relevant ones rather sharply into line’. This ‘calling into line’ is particularly sharp when land-use policies have to be adopted and decisions made. In any given area, planning might require a 39
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defensible definition of environmental capacity along the lines that we have outlined above. As well as working within national parameters (such as airquality standards or site designations), planners might wish to extend protection to locally important cultural landscapes or habitats, preserve tranquillity in particular places, or nurture a sense of history and civic space in towns. But most areas will also be subject to development pressures related to a range of anticipated demands, whether these are manifest in markets or through the provisions of the state, or via some combination of the two. Familiar examples include requirements for industrial and commercial development, transport infrastructure, housing and minerals extraction. Respecting environmental capacity may mean that not all such demands can be accommodated. But since determining what is critical, or what should be held ‘constant’, involves arguments about needs, preferences and values, it will rarely – perhaps never – be possible to establish capacity in isolation from consideration of conflicting priorities. The questions of how categories of critical and constant environmental capital might be defined and defended now become entangled with others concerning the definition, articulation and status of various demands and their relationship with social needs. It is here, and not only in refining methods of delineation, that more work needs to be done. Suppose, to take an example that we develop in Chapter 7, that the demand to extract minerals in a particular area is irreconcilable with environmental capacity as the relevant planning authority has sought to define it,24 and that there are no unexploited technical or spatial fixes that would permit conflicting objectives to be achieved simultaneously. Decision makers are then faced with at least two sets of claims: on the one hand, that minerals are essential to the economy and to society and must be provided, albeit with ‘least pain’; on the other hand, that certain environments in this area are not for trading off, and that loss of others must be compensated for in appropriate ways. They are also likely to be influenced by the ‘magic symbols’ of jobs and prosperity (Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette 1993: 33), with implicit or explicit implications for social justice. A familiar argument, in which the pro-development case is defended on grounds of preference satisfaction, would be that demands for minerals should be met, that this would improve well-being, and that the welfare gains would outweigh environmental losses. Losses should of course be minimised, but weak sustainability fails to furnish a case for protection, and the claims of environmental capacity must be loosened (at the stage of making plans) or overridden (in development control). If these are the arguments for more rather than less development, defenders of the environment (seeking to define sustainability in ‘strong’ terms) might rescue the case for conservation by adopting ethical frameworks that are not grounded in preference utilitarianism, or that are less anthropocentric, or both. They might argue that preferences cannot carry moral weight if satisfying them means breaching 40
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rights or obligations, thus violating the principles of justice (Rawls 1972). Alternatively, they might try to show that ‘the wants which people happen to have’ (Barry 1990: 38) – for more roads, for example – are simply not the ‘right’ ones, and that to satisfy them would not in fact improve wellbeing.25 Whether implicitly or explicitly, those seeking to establish a robust case for environmental protection have often drawn upon such frameworks, in effect suggesting that the preferences to be satisfied by development should have no prior claim on public policy. Policy should not be based on the aggregation of preferences that people ‘happen to have’ (J. O’Neill 1993, 1998; Sagoff 1981, 1988).26 However, the case for conservation cannot be rested there, as is sometimes implied. Few ethical frameworks (except perhaps the most biocentric) are likely to result in an automatic warrant for protection. For example, one could imagine circumstances in which an obligation to ‘reject the principle of injury’ would be breached if development does not proceed. After all (to pursue our hypothetical case), the working of minerals provides employment and income, and its products construct homes, schools, hospitals and public buildings, helping to satisfy not just ‘trivial pleasures’ but also basic needs; the latter might justly exert strong claims on public policy. Or, if drawn to objective accounts of the good, one might argue that efforts to ensure that people are creatively employed, housed or educated could hardly be construed as misguided. Although the desirability of meeting demands (without judging their merits) is frequently offered as a rationale, the case for development need not rest upon maximising the satisfaction of wantregarding preferences. Certain human requirements can be regarded, just as much as critical environmental capital, as special and non-negotiable,27 and developers too might legitimately have recourse to the claims of social justice, rights (including property rights) and obligations, or might invoke objective conceptions of well-being.28 And such anthropocentric considerations remain significant, even in ethical frameworks that accord a prominent position to the interests or rights of non-humans; although the relevant moral considerations might differ (as might outcomes), the fundamental problem of reconciling the legitimate claims of humans and non-humans remains (Beatley 1989; Norton 1982; Regan 1981; Taylor 1986). In short, there are no algorithmic answers to the question of ‘what is sustainable?’ Persistent misgivings about utilitarianism, and about the appropriateness (at least for some goods) of trade-off in markets or surrogate markets, points to frameworks in which we might be guided by different ends or principles. But none provides ‘an auto-pilot for life’ (O. O’Neill 1996: 78); all underdetermine action and leave substantial scope for judgement. While meeting multiple requirements is central to the concept of sustainability, in developing meaningful conceptions we cannot escape the need to adjudicate between claims that all carry moral weight (Holland 1997: 129).29 What seems to be required is some way of deciding what is of 41
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fundamental importance in environmental, economic and social domains, allowing for trade-off where appropriate but without allowing that everything can be traded off against everything else. In difficult cases, we have to be able to say ‘this is more important than that’, or ‘this is more valuable than that’ (Attfield and Dell 1996: 43), allowing for some goods (or obligations, or rights) to take precedence over lesser considerations. Immediate threats to human life, for example, might claim priority over protection of significant habitats, but demands for new roads or retail facilities might not. Some will immediately detect in such stratification a challenge to (modern) liberal neutrality between different conceptions of the good (Wissenburg 1998), and it is clearly quite incompatible with postmodern relativism.30 But developing any meaningful conception of sustainability is bound to demand judgements about what is good and right, even when proponents do not self-consciously engage in an exercise of moral and political philosophy. We have certainly travelled a long way from any notion that delineating different forms of environmental capital could be a straightforward technical process, or that it might point clearly (in the context of land-use planning) to decision rules for development. Little surprise, then, that sustainable development has failed to provide the resolution that many had hoped for and expected. Nor is the exposure of these questions an artefact of our particular point of departure: it seems likely that, wherever we start, determining what is sustainable takes us inexorably towards certain fundamental choices. Two examples, one moving in the direction of more specificity and one towards greater generality, will suffice to illustrate this process. The first is a refinement developed by the English statutory agencies, which were finding environmental capital a ‘surprisingly difficult’ concept to apply (CAG and Land Use Consultants 1997: 86). Focusing on environmental services rather than on specific entities, the agencies have sought a ‘consistent, systematic and transparent framework’ with ‘a finer grade of management implications’ than they could derive from the standard categories (critical, constant and tradable) of environmental capital (Cole 1997: 4, 5). But it remains unclear how even the most subtle delineation of what is important and irreplaceable could avoid the difficult issues outlined above, still less how a potentially reductionist methodology could constitute a ‘considerable step forward’ in settling questions conclusively (CAG and Land Use Consultants 1997: 86). The second (and politically more significant) illustration is what we might call the ‘Panglossian’ approach, incorporating economic, environmental and social considerations in which, through some magical process of integration, ‘achieving all these objectives at the same time is what sustainable development is about’ (DETR 1998d: 3).31 But recognising the significance of all three dimensions cannot evade the fact that ‘moral conflict is a real enough phenomenon’ (Holland 1997: 129). As Isaiah Berlin (1969: 167) famously argued, ‘not all good things are compatible, still less all the ideals of 42
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mankind’. Dilemmas arise (as we have shown above) when there are tensions between competing claims, and integration (or reconciliation) will not be achieved by fiat. No conception of sustainable development can be complete without some guidance on adjudication in such circumstances; and that has not been a prominent feature of definitions that set out a menu of potentially conflicting objectives.
Planning as a dialogical forum One way forward, for many commentators, lies in dialogical processes through which it might be possible to explore values and differences, test the possibility of consensus and (where appropriate) arrive at defensible, inter-subjective positions (J. O’Neill 1993, 1998; Sagoff 1988; Wiggins 1999). Clearly not every policy or decision could be made in this way (the result would be paralysis), but there is a growing consensus that difficult interpretations and choices should be made through ‘practical reason, exercised in judgement’ (Banner 1999: 200) and grounded in empirically verifiable evidence, when it is available. This implies the need for a forum, a ‘social, dynamic, creative and interactive context [for] the deliberative process’ (Holland 1998: 16), and it is arguable that land-use planning might provide at least one such context. This much has been recognised, as we noted in Chapter 1, by a number of prominent planning theorists, and the idea has also found favour among practitioners (see, for example, TCPA 1999). However, most agree that there is a great deal of work to be done. Current planning systems fall notoriously short of any such ideal, deliberative approaches may be as vulnerable as any other to control and manipulation, and the boundaries between deliberative forums and more formal aspects of the democratic process are often left obscure. There are also substantial, unresolved problems of ‘discursive competence’ (Foster 1997: 244), involving questions about the appropriate role for expert and lay knowledge of various kinds. If planning is to provide a forum for deliberation about sustainable development, a number of other difficulties must be confronted. The first is that planning authorities have generally been expected to judge not the merits of a proposed development (whether, in itself, it serves purposes that are good or right) but its acceptability in a particular location and the potential to minimise any negative impacts. In the UK, for example, applicants for planning permission have not normally been required to demonstrate the ‘need’ for a development.32 Although it is important to show that proposals are in accordance with the development plan, such plans are often themselves required to make land allocations to meet various demands; in effect, whole classes of goods and services are deemed to be ‘essential’. Although in some cases policy is informed by a concept of social need, in many others the role of planning may be better understood as one of promoting the efficient 43
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satisfaction of those ‘want-regarding preferences’ that people happen to have. Where considerations of ‘need’ have crept in, this has been contentious. A requirement to demonstrate ‘need’ for retail and leisure facilities, for example, became the subject of legal challenge, despite the fact that ‘need’ was interpreted primarily in terms of market demand and alternative provision, rather than in any more fundamental sense.33 And when any proposal is subject to environmental assessment, so that it is necessary to show some consideration of alternatives, local planning authorities are often neither capable nor empowered to consider alternative technologies or policy approaches, rather than simply alternative locations (Glasson et al. 1994; Jewell 1995). This traditional remit leaves little scope for making distinctions between wants and needs or for considering whether and in what circumstances different kinds of preference might claim priority; it affords a somewhat cramped opportunity for dialogue about what constitutes sustainable development. A second difficulty relates to the important spatial dimension in many planning issues. Conflicting interests at different scales and in different locations have long presented planning with some of its most intractable dilemmas, to which sustainability adds a new dimension. It is difficult enough to hold meaningful dialogue about the complex issues involved even in one self-contained area; all the more so when the dialogue must take place across administrative boundaries and different levels of governance. Take, for example, the task of maintaining environmental capital at a regional scale, along the lines that we have outlined in this chapter. This offers considerable scope for directing damaging development to ‘suitable locations’ (Cowell and Owens 1998: 797); indeed, because areas vary in their sensitivity, locational policies might allow for maximum development within any given environmental capacity and thus help to integrate environmental and economic goals. In practice, as we show in Chapter 7, such a strategy tends to concentrate locally unwanted land uses into locations already adversely affected, sometimes by exporting them altogether to more peripheral regions. Both the exporters seeking to protect environmental capital and the recipients giving high priority to the social objective of employment might see this solution as sustainable in a local context, but unless trends in production and consumption can be challenged, the effect might be to exacerbate spatial inequality on a wider scale (Blowers and Leroy 1994; Cowell 2000a; Cowell and Owens 1998). The more general difficulty is how to allow for the particularities of places and communities – acknowledging that ‘sustainable development issues are not the same everywhere’ (DETR 1998d: 24) – without abandoning all prospect of universal conceptions of sustainability. One approach, for which there is a degree of precedence in planning systems (see Chapter 6), is a hierarchical one in which internationally important agendas (for development or for conservation) carry greater weight than 44
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matters of national significance, which in turn exert authority over what can be conceived of as purely local interests. Thus a European transport project might take precedence over a nationally designated wildlife site, but local employment considerations might defer to protection of an internationally important habitat. Even if it was always honoured, however, such an ordering is unsatisfactory because in focusing on the scale at which particular options are deemed significant, it deflects debate about the nature of the preferences, needs or values to be satisfied in each case. Such hierarchies of scale interact in significant, and as yet largely unexplored, ways with the ordering of moral significance that we discussed earlier in this chapter. The challenge for any dialogical institution is clearly very considerable. A third set of difficulties relates to the role – and perceived role – of professional planners. With some notable exceptions, the profession has leaned towards an image of neutrality in which planners offer impartial advice to elected representatives on the formulation and implementation of policies (Tait and Campbell 2000; Thomas 1994); despite continued academic interest in ‘advocacy planning’ (Davidoff 1965; Forester 1994b; Heskin 1980), identification with particular causes or values has come to be regarded as ‘unseemly’ (Campbell and Marshall 1999: 475). This is not the place for an extended discussion of the ‘pivotal’ but ambiguous relationship between professionals and policy makers (Tait and Campbell 2000: 490), or about the credibility of the image of neutrality, but two questions are important in the context of our present discussion. One is whether planners would welcome the opportunity to provide an ‘interactive context’ for deliberation, and indeed whether they are equipped to do so (Tewdwr-Jones 2000). The other – if they do embrace such a role – is whether they should seek to act as neutral facilitators, expert participants or advocates of particular conceptions of sustainable development. Some commentators have argued that planners should be prepared to defend explicitly particular ethical positions on issues of social and environmental justice (see, for example, Campbell and Marshall 1999); in the context of sustainability, as we have seen, taking up virtually any position involves important ethical and political choices. If the planning system is indeed to develop any potential as a deliberative forum, then the relationship between elected representatives, professional planners and the wider public in this context will merit more rigorous attention.
Conclusions We began this chapter by outlining an interpretation of sustainable development based on concepts of environmental, human and human-made capital, one that seemed to have particular resonance with, and influence on, the field of land-use planning. We showed that attempts to operationalise this framework – determining, for example, what constituted critical environmental 45
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capital, or environmental capacities – led inexorably towards important questions of value: what contributes to well-being; whose good is to be taken into account; whether maximising the good necessarily defines the right course of action; and where the locus for such important decisions should lie. Fundamental disagreement about such issues, many of which are the subject of ancient and enduring debate, becomes internalised into conflict over the meaning of sustainable development itself. It should not be surprising, therefore, that concepts of environmental capital have proved difficult to apply in practice and have failed to provide a straightforward means of resolving land-use conflicts. What is surprising is that anyone ever imagined that they would. These conclusions do not seem to be dependent on our particular point of departure. All conceptions of sustainable development must involve ethical and political choices grounded in distinctive traditions. Even when such positions are not self-consciously held or articulated by proponents, and even when they may not be what determines outcomes, they underlie deep differences of view about what ought to be done. This explains why planning policies with divergent outcomes can be claimed by various groups to be ‘sustainable’. However, we do not suggest that the failure to converge upon a ‘figure of resolution’ means that attempts to apply concepts of sustainable development to land use have been unhelpful or even futile. For one thing, they have probably invigorated the search for solutions that meet multiple objectives. More significantly, where such solutions are not available, the debate has performed a valuable function in exposing different positions and in clarifying the sorts of choices that deciding what is sustainable must entail. Failure to recognise the fundamental issues and challenges has all too often fuelled unrealistic expectations, or fatalistic acceptance of a ‘Humpty Dumpty’ view of sustainability.34 Accepting such challenges, on the other hand, may allow for progress in practical reasoning to be made. One implication of our discussion is that to make such progress, there is a need for dialogue, deliberation and the exercise of good judgement. The ‘market’ alternative – involving the aggregation and monetisation of individual preferences – seems ethically and practically inadequate for addressing the kind of land-use issues with which we are concerned. Policies for land must engage with scientific and institutional complexity, and typically involve a plurality of values, often held ‘with deep emotion’ (Caldwell and Shrader-Frechette 1993: 3). While systematic treatment is useful, wholesale reductionism is not. The crucial question then becomes one of how and where such deliberation should be conducted. We have asked whether the planning process itself might provide a dialogical forum for debate and judgement that could inform the difficult choices to be made. We suggested that it might be promising in this respect, and indeed if ‘planning for sustainable development’ is to acquire any real meaning, there must be some provision for deliberation within the system. But we also 46
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identify a number of potential difficulties. Some relate to institutional and legal structures: scrutiny of demand, for example, and therefore of some of the competing claims in land-use conflicts, has often been beyond the reach of land-use planning systems. Other difficulties relate to unresolved issues about deliberation: who, with what credentials, should ‘deliberate’? How successfully, if at all, could such dialogue transcend boundaries and different levels of governance? What would be the (new?) relationship between participants, professionals and politicians? The challenges of interpreting sustainable development highlighted in this chapter will be illustrated when we look in more detail at nature conservation, promotion of integrated transport and minerals policy. These more specific contexts also provide insights into the actual and potential role of the planning system as a forum for argument and debate. Before moving on to this detailed analysis, however, we have one more task to complete in establishing the broad framework within which planning systems engage with sustainability. We examine, in Chapter 4, a range of techniques and procedures that have been widely held to promote more sustainable outcomes in land-use planning. This enables us to scrutinise claims about objectivity in the planning process more closely and to develop further some of our arguments about the role of deliberation.
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4 DEFINING AND DEFENDING Approaches to planning for sustainability
Until more sophisticated techniques of measurement and evaluation are available there will continue to be doubts as to the durability of the principles of sustainability. Winter 1994: 890 … reasoning quickly turns into rationalization and … dialogue becomes persuasive rhetoric under the pressures of reality. Flyvbjerg 1998: 5
Introduction The search for rational ways of making land-use decisions – traditionally afforded an important status in the planning process (Breheny and Hooper 1985; Thomas 1994) – has interacted with the rising profile of sustainability in interesting and significant ways. In a message that resonated with planning policy communities, both the Brundtland Report and Agenda 21 emphasised ‘assessing performance’ in relation to sustainable development (Hodge and Hardi 1997: 1). Governments and public agencies have shown keen interest in techniques for measuring sustainability, evaluating policies and monitoring progress; many academics have responded with enthusiasm. The result has been a plethora of methodologies, techniques and procedures, often conceived of as a ‘toolbox’ for implementing sustainable development. These include new approaches as well as developments of established ones – assessment techniques, indicators, audits of various kinds, ‘footprint’ studies, ecological accounts – all claiming to provide better information or structured evaluation to promote more sustainable policy choices. Not everyone is impressed. Some critics fear that the essentially political challenges of sustainability are disguised by such procedures as technical matters of better management and control. They argue that rather than perpetuating ‘the worthy but increasingly unrewarding search for “objective” methodologies’, we should be seeking ‘institutional reform aimed at enriching and refining open political debate about public values’ (Grove-White 1997: 30; see also 48
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Jacobs 1997a). In practice, both technical rationality and ‘deliberative and inclusive processes’ have become growth industries, so that experimentation with a variety of novel participatory forums has proceeded in parallel with the development of an ‘audit culture’ (Grove-White 1997: 22). We return later to the question of whether deliberation must necessarily be inclusive; for now, we note that such forums have often been brought together around statutory planning processes or non-statutory initiatives such as biodiversity action plans and Local Agenda 21.1 None of this may be sufficient, however. For many commentators, a further prerequisite of sustainable development is ‘integration’, involving changes to the ways in which policies are made and institutions operate. Integration is seen as a way of ensuring that environmental, social and economic objectives are all given due consideration, sometimes within a specific spatial framework. While this may require structural change, it is often assumed to be aided by formal assessment techniques or by deliberative participation. All of these approaches have been viewed in terms of ‘operationalising’ sustainability – translating a concept that is presumed to be agreed in principle into something workable on the ground. In this chapter, we adopt a more critical perspective, exploring the nature of the relationship between techniques and procedural reforms on the one hand and ideas about sustainable development on the other. We argue that appeals to ‘better (usually better quantified) information’, ‘greater participation’ or ‘more integration’ must be understood within a wider political context in which there are contested interpretations of sustainability and unequal relations of power. This means that assessing the effectiveness of different approaches – whether or not they lead to ‘more sustainable’ development – is far from straightforward and indeed may not be a fruitful exercise. Rather than accepting the analogy of a neutral ‘toolbox’, we consider how different forms of rationality become bound up with alternative conceptions of sustainability, and how they are deployed in the politics of land-use change. Increasing recourse to technical rationality, for example, might be seen as part of an ‘analytical arms race’, in which intangible environmental qualities must be rendered material in the planning process to match the apparently ‘objective’ status of other claims (Owens 1997; Owens and Cowell 1996). Deliberative rationality could be seen as empowering for participants, or as just another means of legitimation; in either case, new procedures for public involvement direct renewed attention to the relationship between process and outcome in the making of policies and decisions. And while integration in its various forms seems intuitively plausible as a precondition for sustainable development, there is a need for critical examination of the meaning and application of the term. We address such issues by considering how technical, deliberative and integrative approaches have been deployed in planning for sustainability, and with what results. Our analysis is necessarily selective, and we could have selected differently, but in covering three broad sets of techniques and 49
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procedures and relating them to conceptions of sustainability, we hope to address the critical aims of this chapter. We look first at examples of appraisal or audit-type approaches, which might be regarded as prime ammunition in the analytical arms race, focusing on environmental assessment, capacity studies and monetary valuation. We then examine procedures that seek greater deliberation and more inclusive involvement in planning, together with some of the fundamental questions that they raise. Third, we turn to the quest for ‘integration’, paying particular attention to experiments with holistic environmental planning in the Netherlands and to prospects for achieving multiple objectives under the auspices of development plans in the UK.
An analytical arms race Environmental assessment We begin our discussion along the well-travelled path of environmental assessment, defined by Kennedy (1988) as both a science – involving methods for identifying, predicting and evaluating the impacts of particular actions – and a set of procedures for ensuring that analysis takes place and informs the decision-making process. With a long-established role in landuse policy, and a claim to mitigate the social costs of development, environmental assessment was bound to be recruited to the cause of sustainability. Proponents have seen it as providing vital information that leads towards better and more sustainable decisions, as if the facts will ‘speak for themselves’ (Emmelin 1998: 142). Much analysis and comment has dwelt on procedural aspects and on the quality of environmental statements, generating numerous proposals for refinement and methodological improvement (see, for example, CEC 1996; DETR and EFTEC 1998; Foresight Energy and Natural Environment Panel 2000; Goodland and Mercier 1999; IEEP 1999; Therivel et al. 1992). For some critics, however, assessment techniques epitomise the managerialist practices through which modern states legitimise dominant patterns of growth and development (Paehlke and Torgerson 1990; Wynne 1975); in this view, the quest for ‘better’ methods and procedures entirely misses the point. In practice, environmental assessment has been neither straightforwardly instrumental (in the sense of promoting sustainable development) nor simply an exercise in technical rationality. Assessment of projects (originally, ‘environmental impact assessment’) has undoubtedly helped to identify and mitigate potential impacts, even if it has been unable to make ‘precise, verifiable predictions’ (Emmelin 1998: 138). Often, however, it has been little more than a compliance exercise, demonstrating that projects will satisfy existing environmental regulations. The presumption is that development, modified if necessary, should be able to proceed, and abandonment of 50
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proposals has been unusual. It might seem, therefore, that project-based assessment can mobilise only those conceptions of sustainability already embodied in development strategies and legislation (Sadler 1996), and that if these are weak it can lead at best towards an incremental greening of growth. But this would be to take too static a view of a longer-term process of policy change. Certainly, such a conclusion would overlook the opportunities for critical scrutiny that even a relatively restricted assessment process offers, especially as experience grows over time. Whatever its shortcomings, environmental assessment partially shifts the burden of proof, uncovers information that might not otherwise enter the decision-making process and exposes this information to a range of interested groups, even if not as early in the proceedings or as fully as some critics would like (Bartlett and Kurian 1999).2 The controversial Lingerbay superquarry proposal, which we discuss in Chapter 7, provides a clear case in which environmental assessment lubricated the production of information and stimulated intense debate about the acceptability of ecological risks and social change. One could also argue that repeated application has stimulated a process of policy learning, in which the inadequacies of project-based assessment have been exposed and ways opened through which stronger conceptions of sustainability might be mobilised. Opponents of specific developments have been frustrated by the failure of the system to consider genuine alternatives and by their inability to question the wider strategies of which individual projects form a part. Assessment on a case by case basis cannot always prevent environmental constraints being breached as the impacts of individual projects accumulate, and it sits uneasily with environment-led conceptions of sustainability. Acknowledgement of these problems explains growing support for strategic environmental assessment (SEA), in which the focus is expanded to plans, programmes and policies (Partidario and Clark 2000; Therivel et al. 1992). SEA is clearly more challenging than projectbased assessment, not only because of the added complexity of predicting and evaluating impacts at a higher level but also because of the potential for raising searching questions about policies and development strategies, directing the ‘light of examination’ (Wynne 1975: 125) towards dominant institutions and values. This is particularly the case given the openness normally envisaged by its proponents, with public participation and reporting being regarded as ‘basic elements in effective SEA’ (Partidario and Clark 2000: 8). This potentially radical challenge creates its own problems. Concern that SEA might be difficult to control probably accounts for the slow progress in establishing the necessary legislation and the tendency for strategic assessment procedures to pull in a technocratic rather than a participatory direction (Bina 2000; Bina and Vingoe 2000). A European Directive on SEA, first mooted in the 1970s, had still not been adopted by the end of the millennium, although its scope had been the subject of protracted 51
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negotiations (CEC 1997, 1999b).3 The final version does not extend to policies, and assessment might have been further restricted to plans and programmes forming part of an official land-use decision-making process had not the European Parliament (2000) challenged this narrow remit. Although progress in advance of the Directive has been somewhat uneven, a number of member states and the European Commission itself have adopted SEA-type procedures, with some positive effects, particularly in terms of learning and communication.4 In the UK, where the system is non-statutory, appraisal has become more strategic in certain policy areas (including transport and water resource planning), but elsewhere the application of SEA to sectoral plans and programmes has been ‘relatively limited and ad hoc’ (DETR 1998e: para 3.24; Therivel and Partidario 1996), and strategic assessment has had little apparent impact on many important national policies and programmes.5 At the local level, planning authorities have been expected to carry out environmental appraisal of development plans since the early 1990s (DoE 1993a), and this practice has spread and evolved, although, with some honourable exceptions, it has often been undertaken as an internal exercise with little public input (Therivel 1995). By the end of the decade, the government was urging that environmental assessment be absorbed into wider-ranging ‘sustainability appraisals’ of all plans (including regional planning guidance) in which ‘the same methodologies … can be developed to encompass economic and social issues’ (DETR 1999b: para 4.14; DETR 1999a, 2000c). This extension reflects a more general trend towards seeing strategic appraisal (like sustainable development itself) as a process that should encompass economic and social as well as environmental dimensions (Bina 2000). Such a move may seem both desirable and uncontroversial, but, as with the shift to ‘Panglossian’ interpretations of sustainability discussed in Chapter 3, it might also be read as a reassertion of economic primacy, in a pre-emptive challenge to environment-led interpretations of sustainability. How, then, might we characterise the relationship between environmental assessment and sustainable development? To the extent that it raises the profile of environmental considerations and encourages greener growth, there is evidence that assessment makes development ‘more sustainable’, at least in the weaker sense. More significantly, perhaps, in as much as it provides for the more open scrutiny of proposals, environmental assessment has the potential to stimulate learning within and between different groups and to provoke deliberation about what sustainable development should mean. Indeed, these might be among the more useful effects of assessment procedures. Rarely, however, has this deliberative or critical framework been highly developed, either in the appraisal of individual applications or plans, or in the institutional arrangements that govern assessment and planning systems alike. SEA has particularly interesting implications in this context. In exposing the environmental consequences of wider policies and plans, it 52
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might aid those who favour stronger conceptions of sustainability, but for this very reason it is more obviously challenging to the status quo. Little surprise, then, that governments have approached strategic assessment with caution, or that they have moved to extend its coverage to economic and social issues, potentially neutralising any environmental threat to dominant modes of development. An important implication of this discussion is that environmental assessment can mobilise different conceptions of sustainability, depending upon the context within which it is applied and what precisely is asked of the technique. The question ‘what are the likely impacts of this project, and how can they be mitigated at acceptable cost?’ is framed quite differently from one that asks ‘what are the environmental implications of alternative ways of meeting this (social or economic) policy objective, and are these implications acceptable?’ In the second context, environmental assessment, at the strategic level in particular, could assist in defining environmental capacities. At least it is hard to see how judgements about capacity could be arrived at without an assessment of sorts, or how this process could promote stronger conceptions of sustainability unless serious and irreversible impacts could be deemed unacceptable. Assessing capacities for development This brings us back to the concept of environmental capacity, which has enjoyed popularity among some planning authorities in the UK and, initially at least, seemed acceptable to government: the 1994 sustainable development strategy saw it as a function of the planning system to ‘ensure that development needed to help the economy grow … takes place in a way that respects environmental capacity constraints’ (UK Government 1994a: para 35.4). One widely accepted application has been in considering the potential for towns and cities to accommodate further development on brown field land without damage to the quality of the urban environment (Arup Economics and Planning 1995; Counsell 1999c; DETR 2000b; Government Office for the East of England 2000). Another – more controversial – has involved attempts by a small number of planning authorities to assess the capacity of whole areas (usually counties) to sustain development. This they have done in much the way that we envisaged in Chapter 3, by considering the extent, value and replaceability of environmental resources (usually employing adaptations of traditional constraints mapping) and the probable impact of development upon them (see, for example, Babtie Group Ltd 1993; West Sussex County Council 1996; and for discussion, Counsell 1999c; CAG and Land Use Consultants 1997; DETR 1997a; Jacobs 1997b). Related conceptually, if not always in practice, have been techniques for delineating environmental capital, moving from classifications as ‘critical’, ‘constant’ or ‘tradable’ to more nuanced methodologies such as that developed by the 53
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statutory agencies and piloted by a number of local authorities at the end of the 1990s (CAG and Land Use Consultants 1999). Interestingly, the greatest benefit reported by participants in the pilot studies was the potential to make the reasoning behind policies ‘rigorous’ and ‘inquiry-proof’ (Levett 1999a: 4), implying that an important appeal of the environmental capital methodology (and by extension, capacity studies) lies in the promise of technical rationality. But the assessments were also acknowledged by those participating in them to have been ‘a valuable learning experience’ (ibid.: 4). Even if planning authorities have disclaimed any intention ‘to give a precise amount of growth that could be accommodated’ (Counsell 1999b: 55), they have typically drawn upon capacity studies to argue that development above a certain level would be unsustainable.6 Critics (noting the preference for this technique in relatively affluent parts of England) have been swift to accuse planners and environmental groups of appropriating scientific authority in defence of politically motivated policies. But the solution, for such critics, lies in recourse to even greater technical rationality. Grigson (1995: 12, 14), for example, argues that capacity studies should involve ‘a systematic and comprehensive appraisal’, using a common methodology and based on standards with a ‘scientific basis’, preferably established by a body external to the planning authority. This is curious, for while ostensibly neutral techniques can mask arbitrary decisions (and this may be part of their appeal), ‘objective scientific analysis’ is not the only, or even the most helpful, alternative. What matters is that policies be defensible, which may require deliberation and judgement as well as science. In any case, it is difficult to think of any form of ‘scientific analysis’ in planning (including the social surveys that Grigson advocates) that is not itself prone to hidden assumptions and capture. As Wynne (1975: 111) reminds us, ‘even innocent data collection is tacitly guided by a previously assimilated framework of assumptions and explanatory commitments’. The way forward would seem to lie not in stepping up the analytical arms race but in stimulating a more explicitly political debate. For the fact remains that delineating environmental capital and making judgements about capacity are not just technical exercises but (however else they may be used) also offer ways of mobilising stronger interpretations of sustainable development, giving primacy to (at least some) environmental considerations. If, in this sense, they emphasise ‘the conservationist and preservationist tendencies of the planning system’ (Rydin 1998b: 756), they also have the potential to do more: they are, in effect, located on the front line in the battle for different conceptions of sustainable development. At times, this has seemed an unequal contest, not least because environmental claims have to be robustly defended in the planning process but preferences for many goods and services, ‘although actually based on judgements open to critical evaluation, [are] treated or responded to as if they were not’ (Keat 1997: 37). While Grigson (1995: 25) not unreasonably urges transparency 54
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in the use of environmental capacity concepts – ‘black box studies that cannot be understood are not evidence’ – many of the sectoral policies challenged by such concepts are themselves cloaked in dense technical rationality (Cowell and Murdoch 1999) or based on powerful presumptions about property rights and what constitutes ‘the national interest’ (Jewell 1995; Owens 1997). The ‘black boxes’ of demand projections and markets have not traditionally been held to account, with the effect that ‘calculations of future demand tend to arrive in local contexts in a form that makes them almost irresistible’ (Murdoch 2000: 509). Thus, for example, West Sussex County Council faced legal challenge when policies in its structure plan, based on an elaborate analysis of the county’s environmental capacity (Connell 1999; Counsell 1999b, 1999c), provided for lower levels of housing development than those set out in regional planning guidance (DoE 1994c). Although these provisions had survived the examination in public, the High Court upheld the Secretary of State’s right to direct what the housing apportionment should be. Rationality seemed to yield to power (Flyvbjerg 1998), or at least to the authority of central government and the alternative rationalities embodied in household projections.7 Nevertheless, capacity studies have exerted a kind of discursive power as metaphor, helping to ‘shape political argument over society’s relationship with the environment’ and capturing the idea that ‘society must learn to live within limits’ (Jacobs 1997b: 67). In highlighting tensions between environmental protection and the development trends implicit in strategic policies, they undermine conceptions of sustainability that depend on ‘balancing’ or ‘integrating’ competing priorities.8 It was inevitable, therefore, that capacity concepts would lead to bruising encounters with development interests (played out in planning inquiries in the UK throughout the 1990s), and that critics would emphasise the potential for ‘misuse’ (DETR 1997a: 60) and for undesirable distributive impacts; even some of its proponents have suggested that environmental capacity fails ‘because it is too strong and inflexible’ (Levett 1998:7). The charge of ‘environmental absolutism’ (Grigson 1995: 17) did lead to a tactical retreat, with many practitioners tempering their language at least. In the aftermath of the High Court challenge, for example, West Sussex outlined ‘Strategic Development Options’, seeking ‘the least un-sustainable locations for necessary development’ and informing debate about ‘the limits of acceptable change’ (Connell 1999: 9). Environmental capital assessments have also become more nuanced, as we have seen, and have been applied relatively safely to topics such as land characterisation and appraisal of alternative sites for development. Even so, the deployment of capacity concepts can be said to have prised open some ‘black boxes’, shifting the language of housing policy (following conflict over regional planning guidance for the south-east) from ‘predict and provide’ towards ‘plan, monitor and manage’ (DETR 2000b; Murdoch 2000), and challenging the primacy of demand 55
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projections in minerals planning, an issue that we consider in more detail in Chapter 7. However, we cannot leave the issue of capacity without touching upon a question that is invariably raised in this context. Surely, some would argue, there is already a basis – in the various methodologies for monetary valuation and in cost–benefit analysis – for dealing with vexed questions of value in assessments of environmental capital and capacity, and with relative priorities when there are conflicts with economic (or social) aspirations. For some analysts, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the use of techniques to quantify preferences for environments and include them in aggregative welfare calculations might be constitutive of the definition of critical environmental capital, or of what should be held ‘constant’, and thus of particular (utilitarian) conceptions of sustainable development. Such an approach is certainly invoked by the notions of ‘balance’ and trade-off, which remain firmly entrenched in policy-making communities. We now turn, therefore, to look at the forms of technical rationality most closely associated with these ideas. A common language? Costs, benefits and environmental capital The formal techniques of valuation and cost–benefit analysis have had less impact in land-use planning than in some related areas of policy,9 although monetary valuation has sometimes been used in setting environmental taxes that can be claimed to support planning measures.10 We do not attempt here to review an extensive and vigorous academic debate about the merits, shortcomings and methodological refinements of these techniques. Two points are worth noting, however. One is that the most robust critiques have focused on the ethical underpinnings of cost–benefit analysis and on the non-dialogical quality of an approach in which different moral claims are reduced to preferences measured along a single (monetary) metric (see, for example, Clark et al. 2000; Holland 1995; Kelman 1990; J. O’Neill 1993; Sagoff 1988). The other is that persistent unease has had some effect in shifting emphasis towards broader forms of appraisal, such as multi-criteria analysis (Dodgson et al. 2000; Martinez-Alier et al. 1998; Stirling and Mayer 1999) or the use of valuation techniques in a more dialogical setting (Turner et al. 2000). That such refinements cannot resolve all of the issues is illustrated by the new approach to appraisal of transport schemes, to which we return in Chapter 5. Still, the language of balancing, or weighing, conflicting considerations retains a powerful appeal in planning (Lichfield 1994; Moroni 1994). Protagonists in development conflicts have often felt the need to show that environmental protection would outweigh the benefits of development, and their frequent failure in this respect has contributed to a feeling that the only way for the environment to win the battle of political visibility is to reinforce environmental values in quantifiable, monetary 56
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terms. Occasional decisions might support this argument,11 but (as we argued in Chapter 3) environmentally favourable outcomes cannot be guaranteed unless a priori constraints have been introduced (Lichfield 1994; Pearce 1993): this was an important reason for the support by conservation agencies and environmental groups of capital- and capacity-based approaches (and, tacitly, of non-utilitarian ethical frameworks).12 Although not often applied in statutory land-use planning, monetary valuation and subsequent weighing up of costs and benefits have been used in ways that amount to deciding whether or not particular environments are ‘critical’. Such applications have been controversial, not least because notionally methodological choices mask important political and ethical assumptions. At a micro level, the choice between asking for people’s ‘willingness to pay’ to retain or acquire some valued environment, or their ‘willingness to accept’ compensation for its loss or denial, makes major presumptions about rights and entitlements and dramatically affects the responses given (Hanley and Spash 1993). The choice of constituency is also crucial. In a widely cited case in 1996, which for many epitomised the fragility of valuation techniques, the Environment Agency sought to protect the wildlife and conservation value of the River Kennet in Wiltshire by reducing licensed levels of water abstraction from a nearby borehole (ENDS 1998a). At an estimated net present value of £13.2 million, the ‘existence value’ of the Kennet was claimed by the Agency to outweigh the additional costs of obtaining supplies elsewhere. But the inspector at the public inquiry accepted the water company’s much lower non-use value of £300,000, tipping the economic balance in favour of maintaining abstraction. Leaving aside for now the framing of the issue in terms of meeting rather than managing demand, the difference in the estimates was due to assumptions about the size of the constituency over which willingness to pay should be aggregated. The Agency included all three million households in the water company’s supply area, but the company, and the inspector, thought it appropriate to include only people living in the more immediate vicinity, effectively denying that the Kennet could be valued as part of a river system by a wider community (and thus making something of a nonsense of the concept of existence value). The experience of trying to estimate the existence value of the Kennet bodes ill for the use of valuation techniques to determine whether particular assets constitute ‘critical environmental capital’. Refinement of methodologies will not avoid the problem that such techniques beg (or misrepresent) the fundamental questions that deciding what is critical must entail. Since they mobilise predominantly instrumental and utilitarian conceptions of sustainability, which are problematic and contentious for reasons that we elaborated in Chapter 3, they are unlikely to provide sound ammunition in planning conflicts; nor are they likely to prove reliable for those defending an environmental case.13 Rather, the use of valuation and 57
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cost–benefit analysis on the grounds that they will lead to ‘the right’ substantive results tells us much about the relationship between rationality and power, and certainly belies the idea that such techniques ‘merely inform’ the decision-making process. Winning the race? In fact, whichever means of assessment is selected, its conclusions rarely provide a technocratic trump card in the political arena – either because the basis of the analysis itself is open to dispute or because its proponents lack other forms of political power. Just as valuation techniques conspicuously fail to command authority, environmental assessments or capacity studies are likely to be challenged, however rigorously conducted. It is also clear that none of the techniques discussed above is simply a means of informing decisions to make them ‘more sustainable’; some evidently have the potential to mobilise distinctive conceptions of sustainable development, and all are open to capture. Nevertheless, methods allowing scope for deliberation about social priorities would seem to provide a more appropriate framework for ‘planning for sustainability’ than technocratic, non-dialogical approaches. This would suggest a move away from cost–benefit analysis and mechanistic forms of project-based assessment towards some combination of strategic environmental appraisal and capacity studies. Even if these latter techniques have themselves been driven by the ‘analytical arms race’, they have shown at least some potential to open up fundamental issues and may yet elude concerted efforts to contain or deflect such scrutiny.
Engaging ‘the public’? Our argument so far has suggested that at least some procedures with their roots in technical rationality may provide important opportunities for dialogue about the nature of sustainable development. But many commentators have called for more widespread use of processes that are both deliberative and participatory in their basic intent, advocating development of consensus conferences, citizens’ juries and panels, focus groups and neighbourhood forums, together with techniques that might stimulate wide-ranging debate (for a useful review, see Audit Commission 1999). Reflecting dissatisfaction with traditional approaches, such thinking has reinvigorated the long-running experiment with participation in planning and has stimulated action in related spheres such as Local Agenda 21.14 In some cases, such initiatives have gone hand in hand with the use of more formal techniques – ‘visioning’ in conjunction with indicators, for example (Brown 1998; Brugman 1997; Dean 1995), or stakeholder forums with environmental audits (Davoudi et al. 1997). The underlying premise of all of this activity is that more inclusive public involvement is ‘essential for a truly 58
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sustainable community’ (DETR 1999c: para 7.87), although rigorous defence of this proposition is less commonplace than its repeated assertion. One persuasive argument, as we have shown, is that defining what is ‘sustainable’ must be a deliberative, not simply a technical exercise, and for many commentators it is a natural extension of this view that deliberation should be inclusive. It is seen as a matter of democracy itself, and of justice, that people be involved in decisions that will affect their lives (see, for example, Petts 1999).15 Bound up with this agenda, and reflecting a wider questioning of scientific rationality and the authority of experts, is a conviction that public values and local knowledge could enrich (or challenge) conventionally recognised expertise, producing results that go ‘beyond the capabilities of authoritarian or technocratic methods of policy-making’ (Majone 1989: 2; see also Grove-White 1997; Healey 1997; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Macnaghten et al. 1995; Owens 2000; RCEP 1998). These democratic and epistemic rationales have become intertwined with more instrumental ones, some of which perpetuate elements of legitimation: participation must be ‘seen to be done’, or the public must be engaged in order to be converted to a more ‘objective’ view, or made more pliable (ESRC 1999; Owens 2000). Public consent is seen as a prerequisite for the macro-level policy changes needed to promote sustainability (Blowers 1993b), while consensual local solutions are deemed to require the ownership of affected parties (DETR 1999d; Parker 1995; Selman 1996). Thus, for example, involvement of a wide range of interests in capacity studies has been urged as a means of making their outputs ‘both valid and acceptable’ (DETR 1997a: 56). Whatever the rationale, it has been widely assumed that new forums are needed if the acknowledged difficulties of meaningful participation are to be overcome. It is worth reflecting, therefore, on the adequacy, or otherwise, of established statutory arrangements for public involvement. Broadly speaking, attempts to engage the public – or at least a wider public – in plan making, through the usual methods of consultation drafts, exhibitions, public meetings and inquiries, have enjoyed only limited success (TCPA 1999). Among the most prominent grounds for this verdict have been the persistent failure to reach certain groups (often those who are socially disadvantaged) and the tendency for exercises to be ritualistic, offering ‘the shadow rather than the substance’ (Hall 1992: 246) of participation.16 Even so, it would be misleading to imply that traditional arrangements have been wholly without effect. On the contrary, the apertures for ‘public’ involvement prised open over the years have admitted previously excluded interests, particularly environmental coalitions, edging the policy process in a more pluralist direction. Public inquiries, for example, have brought together diverse groups and individuals, raised the profile of important issues and provided a forum for evidence, argument and critical challenge. Although the reality falls a long way short of deliberative ideals,17 individual developments 59
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have been subjected to strong and effective challenge at inquiry, and successive challenges have contributed, in some instances, to a process of policy learning and change. In effect, procedures intended to give local people some right to be heard have been used in lieu of a wider deliberative process in the polity as a whole; we see this clearly in the context of the roads programme, and of minerals policy, examined in later chapters. Opportunities for participation have been promoted and defended by critics of government policy essentially for this reason, while development interests have persistently called for the ‘streamlining’ of the planning process, and for the remit of inquiries to be confined to local issues of siting, design and impact management (Owens 1985; see also DETR 1999e). If the status quo often proves resilient to challenge, and public involvement seems ritualistic, this might be attributable not to procedural shortcomings but to wider structural commitments to particular patterns of growth. Whether new approaches to engaging the public will prove more or less successful than traditional techniques depends on the criteria for measuring success, and (in turn) on the rationale for wider involvement. Some deliberative and inclusive forums have undoubtedly been of value for participants and have arguably been more constructive than conventional ways of eliciting public views (for examples, see RCEP 1998; see also Selman 2001). Local Agenda 21 initiatives are interesting in this context, given the enthusiasm for promoting sustainability within an inclusive localised framework and the fact that these exercises have often engaged in some way with the planning process (Davies 1998).18 Inclusion remains elusive, however. Although some Local Agenda 21 exercises have claimed to engage a broad spectrum of social and economic groups (Cartwright 1997), and there has been interest in novel approaches, one study found that ‘few authorities … employed techniques markedly different from those which have provoked little participation before’ (Buckingham-Hatfield 1997: 216).19 Commentators fret about a general inability to reach beyond the ‘green ghetto’ (Young 1996: 26) or to move outside policy areas where sustainable development is already an established concern (Littlewood and While 1997); engagement of business interests has been relatively limited, for example, potentially marginalising the strategies emerging from Local Agenda 21 groups (Carter and Darlow 1997; Selman 2001). Whatever the concerns about who is or is not included, a key issue is that deliberative exercises such as Local Agenda 21 are always likely to involve far fewer people (albeit more intensively) than the established democratic institution of voting, even when (as in the UK) there are dismally low turnouts in local elections (Levett 1999b). Their key role, therefore, is seen to lie in engaging stakeholders and generating ideas to complement and enhance the formal democratic process. Paradoxically, however, it seems that if emerging ideas are to be acceptable, they must be confined to ‘safe’ issues that do not represent a significant challenge to established interests and 60
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norms (Young 1996). When sustainability strategies have transgressed such boundaries, they have been marginalised. In Manchester, for example, a draft Local Agenda 21 statement immediately ran into difficulty because its proposals for civil aviation, including taxation of air travel, clashed with powerful city council support for Manchester Airport with its associated employment (Kitchen 1997). Similarly, on land-use planning issues, ideas expressed through community involvement tend to be rationalised by officers in terms that they regard as institutionally legitimate (Holt-Jensen 1997), and the extent to which Local Agenda 21 has actually influenced development plans is unclear. Lack of direct influence must sometimes be attributed to the proper role of a democratic process in which other legitimate considerations prevail. But it might also be explained (as might the limited participation of business interests, noted above) by the remoteness of these initiatives from the real levers of economic and political power. While it would be premature to reach definitive conclusions about deliberative and inclusive processes, it is appropriate to identify questions that merit more rigorous attention, particularly in the context of sustainable development. One of the most difficult – that of discursive competence – tends to be evaded, perhaps because it invokes accusations of elitism, yet it is a question that must be confronted, particularly where complex and demanding environmental and social issues are involved (Foster 1997). It has been difficult to disentangle calls for deliberation (as an alternative to arriving at outcomes through technocratic or non-dialogical processes) from advocacy of inclusive or ‘stakeholder’ participation, counterposed with decision making by ‘experts’. Dialogue, or deliberation, can take place at any level of decision making and may involve few or many people (expert or otherwise); ‘participation’, on the other hand, is not necessarily deliberative, and many forums have been far removed from Habermasian ‘ideal speech’ situations. It is ironic – or perhaps it is symptomatic – that the urge to cast the net more widely comes at a time when the demise of civic virtues has been almost universally acknowledged and lamented. Yet many advocates of deliberative and inclusive processes seem to follow Sagoff (1988) in seeing it as relatively unproblematic for participants to cast off the values of market consumerism (at the door, as it were) and to be instantly ready to ‘deliberate’ as citizens, in possession of all the necessary information, skills and dispositions. The risk that inclusive deliberation will produce little more than a chaos of voices can be lessened by dedicated input of time and information, but there is then a difficult line to be drawn between providing ‘neutral’ support and steering the debate, and the practicality of generalising such resource-intensive processes becomes an issue. If deliberative forums could, with patience and good practice, be brought closer to some ideal (and arguably might help to inculcate civic virtues20), questions about the wider legitimacy of outcomes reached in specific (often locationally specific) contexts remain. Even exemplary processes may lead to 61
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particularist interpretations of sustainable development (Dobson 1998; Jacobs 1997a), undermining the very concept that is normally held to transcend localities and incorporate ‘distant others’ (Agyeman 2000). The dilemma is acutely present in planning for sustainability, often strongly associated with ‘the local’ or ‘the local community’ (Littlewood and While 1997) but inevitably entailing conflicts of interest and obligation between different places and different scales. However inclusive the process through which sustainability is defined, local communities cannot be permitted a monopoly of interpretation simply by virtue of being local. On the other hand, there are dangers in too rigid a hierarchy, assuming automatic precedence for higher scales of political authority. Not only does local knowledge provide a valuable and sometimes vital perspective, but opportunities for ‘local’ involvement have become important apertures through which prevailing conceptions of sustainable development (and the ‘wider public interest’) can themselves be subjected to scrutiny and debate. The sharpness of these issues is exemplified in later chapters, perhaps most clearly in our discussion of minerals planning, but the point to be emphasised here is that they cannot be resolved simply by repeating the mantra of ‘involving the local community’. Even if the key issues could be confined to a single scale, one might question how far deliberation can reasonably be expected to converge upon agreed outcomes. Advocates of new procedures have placed a strong emphasis on consensus, apparently believing that dissent associated with sustainable development is ‘unproductive’ (Selman 1996: 78). But to argue that important issues should be approached through dialogue is not to say that all issues can thereby be rendered consensual. Indeed, an undue emphasis on consensus may ‘smother … the passion of ideological conflict’ (Jacobs 1997c: 4) and, if the starting point involves significant inequalities of power, might lead to outcomes that are unjust, even when all parties consider themselves better off. None of this is to deny that consensusbuilding approaches have potential, in certain situations, to forge agreements that represent more than narrow political compromises (FloyerAcland 1990; J. O’Neill 1993; Susskind 1981; Susskind et al. 1999). Learning can take place, interests are not always fixed and immutable, and areas of dispute can sometimes be narrowed or eliminated. However, certain principles may not yield easily to such treatment, and conflicts over sustainable land use often violate the contextual conditions for consensual solutions: that parties agree that the current situation is unacceptable; that they accept the ‘need’ for some facility; or that conceptions of fundamental rights are not involved (Susskind 2000). There is a danger, in such circumstances, that the search for consensus will become a means of suppressing weaker voices and defusing legitimate political activity. In the new enthusiasm for deliberation, we should not lose sight of the possibility that ‘forms of participation that are practical, committed and ready for conflict provide 62
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a superior paradigm of democratic virtue … [to those] … that are discursive, detached and consensus dependent’ (Flyvbjerg 1998: 236). Finally, in order to address widely neglected questions of agency, it is important to locate deliberative and inclusive approaches to planning within their political and institutional context. It is one challenge, as we have shown, to demonstrate that new ways of engaging the public can produce insights and ideas that make a legitimate contribution to some wider democratic process, but positive responses to this challenge simply beg another question, one that is familiar to students of traditional approaches: if outcomes favour radical policy change, how successfully can they confront the unsustainable practices perpetuated by dominant forms of economic power? Initial experience, at least, suggests that new approaches can rarely undermine the capacity of economic interests and bureaucracies to capture the agenda and frame what is to be regarded as politically acceptable: as Campbell and Marshall (2000: 340) observe, simply giving voice to different forms of knowledge need not mean that ‘the pervasive structures in society will be challenged’. There is even some evidence that initiatives might be counterproductive if their role and relation to the formal democratic process are unclear. In a study of transport planning in Munich, for example, Hajer and Kesselring (1999) found that the introduction of ‘add-on’ interactive forums had ‘by no means’ facilitated a move towards greater sustainability in the short term (ibid.: 17) but ‘might have eroded the power of “official” [legally embedded] practices of participation’ (ibid.: 19). What emerges from this discussion is that relationships between participation, deliberation and sustainable development need more careful thought, and any analysis must be mindful of the structures of economic and political power within which these relationships are established. We have suggested that traditional arrangements for public involvement in planning, although much criticised, have acted as crucial conduits for the introduction of new ideas and different world views, including, latterly, challenges to official conceptions of sustainable development. Deliberation has indeed taken place, fostered not by tailor-made procedures but by open political conflict over development proposals and the policies that lie behind them. Policy learning may be evident too, although (as we shall show in ensuing chapters) challenging dominant interests is invariably a slow and painful process. New approaches to ‘engaging the public’ seek to be more inclusive and accessible than the old, and (in many cases) to produce consensual strategies for sustainable development. Given time, deliberative and inclusive forums might themselves introduce new perspectives and ideas into the planning process; experience suggests that this is not something that can be judged in the short term. However, initial evidence does not neatly support the view that these approaches yield more legitimate or more influential results than traditional ones, and the emphasis on inclusion and consensus may have deflected attention from other important issues. If the failures of meaningful 63
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participation arise not from the confrontational or non-inclusive nature of particular procedures but from the wider political and cultural context of which those procedures are a part, it may be an illusion to think that anything better could be achieved by procedural innovation alone. This calls for at least some caution, since an uncritical rush towards new forums risks undermining the hard-won legitimacy of existing statutory arrangements. We conclude this section with a few reflections on the claim that participation is essential for a truly sustainable community. Deliberation and good judgement are, we have argued, integral to the interpretation of sustainable development, but deliberation and inclusive participation do not automatically go together; nor do deliberative and inclusive processes necessarily produce outcomes compatible with broader principles of environmental or social justice. The conceptions of sustainability mobilised by particular processes will depend on the context, on how the issues and possibilities are framed and on who gets involved – a contemporary example of Schattschneider’s (1960: 71) ‘mobilization of bias’. Whether these conceptions are influential will depend on their legitimacy in a wider political context, and on the extent to which they are consonant with powerful economic and political interests. The significance of many of these issues will be emphasised in later chapters. Now, however, we turn to the distinct but related agenda of ‘integration’, another set of reforms widely regarded as conducive – even essential – to the promotion of sustainable development.
Integration: the elusive goal As Downs et al. (1991) observe, integration is a term with multiple meanings. In the context of sustainability, it usually implies co-operation or co-ordination between different organisations, sectors and levels of government, and it sometimes requires significant institutional change. Horizontal integration, between different parts of the state apparatus (and, increasingly, the private sector), has been central to the discourse of sustainability, typically with a view to ensuring that environmental objectives are incorporated into decision making in vital sectors such as transport, energy and agriculture (see, for example, Farmer et al. 1999). Arguments for integration on a territorial basis, evident in the European Spatial Development Perspective and various regional planning initiatives, have also gained ground. Institutional integration, at the very least involving co-operation between different interests and organisations, has usually been regarded as indispensable in promoting all of the other kinds. While the rhetoric of integration is pervasive, its precise meaning and its implications for policy practice are often unclear. So are the mechanisms through which it might promote sustainable development, although the appraisal and audit techniques discussed earlier in this chapter, as well as participatory procedures, are usually assumed to be conducive to integration, 64
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and therefore to greater sustainability. Given the uncertainties, it is important to examine the ‘policy work’ (Healey 1998b: 3) that calls for greater integration perform. Who is being asked to integrate what, with whom and how, and what conceptions of sustainable development are different parties being invited to share? These questions, and the success or otherwise of integration in its various senses, are particularly interesting when we deal with specific policy sectors. Our discussion in Chapter 5, in particular, shows how ‘integrated transport’ provided a convenient (but ultimately unstable) storyline around which different interests could rally. Here, however, our aim is to make more general observations about integration in a territorial or spatial context, noting how often that land use or spatial planning is deemed an appropriate focal point for the co-ordination of sectoral policies (Farmer et al. 1999; Janssens and van Tatenhove 2000) and charged with the task of reconciling economic, environmental and social programmes. Integration in a spatial framework The Dutch ROM initiative That differences between rhetoric and reality may be substantial, even in states regarded as leaders in sustainable development, is illustrated by Dutch experience with a holistic approach to planning during the 1990s. The socalled ROM initiative sought to integrate land-use planning (ruimtelijke ordening) and environmental planning (milieubelied) into a regional framework and was initially applied in eleven areas.21 The projects were always intended to be participatory and deliberative: national, provincial and local tiers of government were drawn together with public and private interest groups around production of a vision for each area. This was to be accompanied by an action plan detailing specific objectives and projects, and an administrative agreement allocating responsibilities between the various parties (Bouwer 1994). The hope was that involving a broad range of participants, and including economic and social as well as environmental considerations, would forge agreement on innovative solutions to entrenched environmental problems (Glasbergen and Driessen 1994). ‘Integration’, in this model, would help to deliver sustainable development at the regional scale (Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1998). After the initial experiments, participants in the ROM initiative (including the Dutch government) remained positive about its prospects. A number of projects had been implemented successfully, with those aimed at economic development faring best but modest environmental enhancement also being achieved in some regions (Driessen and Glasbergen 1995; Janssens and van Tatenhove 2000). Commentators also noted improved communication between different actors, better prospects for achieving 65
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consensus and elements of learning (Bouwer 1994; Glasbergen and Driessen 1994; Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1998), all of which can establish fertile ground for reframing issues and policies in the longer term. With a little more experience and hindsight, however, it seems that some of the early optimism might have been misplaced: progress with regional integration has been slower than expected and accountability poor; indeed, weakly developed and largely aspirational goals have made the monitoring of achievements difficult (P. Glasbergen, personal communication 1999; see also Janssens and von Tatenhove 2000; Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1998). Instead of smoothly integrating different priorities and thereby promoting sustainable development, the ROM projects have often exposed the kinds of tension that we identified in Chapter 3, notably that between balancing ‘the interests of various societal activities’ and securing national standards or targets for environmental quality (Bouwer 1994: 109; see also Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1991a; van der Gun and de Roo 1994). In the Netherlands (as in the UK) these different approaches have become institutionalised in systems of land use and environmental planning respectively, creating a barrier to integration within any spatially defined framework. In some instances, environmental standards that seemed at odds with social or economic goals stimulated ‘coherent resistance in local communities’ (Bouwer 1993: 4, 1994), so that environmental protection proved difficult to reconcile with commitments to consensus and partnership. Elsewhere, environmental objectives had to bend to economic agendas that could not be renegotiated by ROM partnerships (Bouwer 1994). In the case of the Schiphol area, for example, a consensual vision had to accommodate the ‘national interest’ in growth of the airport, with concomitant threats to local air quality, noise pollution targets and national emissions objectives (Glasbergen and Driessen 1994: 36). Here the outcome of ‘integration’ appears in practice to have been the least-cost accommodation of growth. Generally, the ROM experience suggests that even concerted efforts at sectoral integration may not easily align different conceptions of sustainable development; if anything, they have mobilised weaker versions of sustainability and exposed the shallowness of Panglossian interpretations. Bringing different aspects of planning together in a stakeholder forum cannot of itself (and certainly not in the short term) exert leverage over powerful external actors, reconcile divergent beliefs about problems and solutions, or overcome structural contradictions between economic and environmental goals (Jessop 1997a). If such initiatives produce lasting benefits, these are most likely to be diffuse ones, emerging gradually from the process of learning within and between coalitions in the medium or longer term. Even then, changes external to the planning system and to the region will be needed if development is to become sustainable in a radical, or stronger, sense. The more 66
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immediate verdict on integrated regional planning is that ‘good intentions, focusing on processes of negotiation and cooperation, prevail over substantial and sustainable development’ (Janssens and van Tatenhove 2000: 169). Integrating objectives in UK development plans Although there has been no formal planning initiative in the UK to match that of the ROMs, the experience of trying to integrate environmental, social and economic considerations in development plans does have some parallels with that of the Dutch experiment. Land-use planning, as we have shown, has increasingly been expected to become an instrument of sustainable development, and regional planning guidance has moved closer towards becoming a spatial plan in which sectoral policies with land-use implications can be co-ordinated. The urge to ‘integrate’ – to achieve multiple objectives – is effective up to a point. Coverage of environmental and social issues in development plans has improved, in part because of requirements for environmental appraisal, and policies with adverse impacts have sometimes been rejected as a result (see, for example, Davoudi et al. 1997). But it is not always possible to meet diverse objectives simultaneously, and when conflict is unavoidable it becomes difficult to see what ‘integration’ means in practice beyond the inclusion in plans of mutually incompatible goals. Economic development still tends to be seen as the primary objective in regional planning, despite rhetorical support for the principles of sustainable development (University of Hull Institute of City and Regional Studies 2000), while local authorities have been unable or unwilling to eliminate growth-oriented planning policies even when they conflict with a range of environmental objectives. Road schemes, as we show in Chapter 5, are a particular case in point, often enjoying substantial local and regional support with sufficient political authority to override critical environmental assessments. As in the Netherlands, while integration is promoted rhetorically as an instrument of sustainable development, an important barrier to its achievement in planning practice is that environmental and economic networks promote different, and often incompatible, conceptions of what sustainable development entails (Clark et al. 1993; Davoudi et al. 1997; Gibbs et al. 1998; Healey and Shaw 1994; Myerson and Rydin 1994). Economic development coalitions are unlikely to accept sustainability as a challenge to the very nature of economic activity;22 for them, integration means (if anything) taking better account of environmental considerations and enhancing environments in order to encourage investment – environmental capital in the service of economic capital. Environmental coalitions favour stronger conceptions of sustainable development, in which environments are regarded as ‘foundational’ (Jacobs 1997b: 31): integration in this framework means modifying economic behaviour to take account of environmental constraints. 67
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Divergent perspectives were apparent, for example, in the protracted conflict over the redevelopment of Cardiff Bay in South Wales, an issue that we consider in Chapter 6. Local economic interests stressed the city’s vulnerability in a global economy, and the need to mould environments and social conditions to create stable market opportunities; conservation groups emphasised the fragility of the estuarine ecosystem and preferred to frame economic priorities in relation to environmental risks (Cowell 2000a; Thomas and Imrie 1999). Such positions are familiar to students of land-use conflicts; what is noteworthy is the apparent failure of those calling for ‘integration’ to grasp how deeply rooted are the differences in beliefs and interests involved. Perhaps the best hope (as with the ROM projects) is that channels of communication will be opened by attempts to pursue different objectives within a more integrated planning framework, and that this might ultimately lead to changes in prevailing concepts of development. To date, however, the evidence for fruitful dialogue of this kind is rather slim. Environmental interests have been inclined to pursue integration within the environmental sphere, forming ‘sustainability’ networks centred on plan making, while separate partnerships promote a parallel economic development agenda (Davoudi et al. 1997; Selman and Wragg 1999). We suggested earlier that requirements for policy appraisal have the potential to bring different interests together and stimulate debate about divergent goals (see also Gibbs et al. 1998), and in this sense appraisal might be seen as an important means of initiating communication and co-ordination. However, environmental appraisal of development plans has not – or has not yet – lived up to such expectations. It has often been ritualistic, relatively closed and (especially in its expanded, ‘sustainability’ format) seems more likely to reinforce the pre-eminence of traditional growth discourses than to locate the environment as a basic context for economic development. Nor is the relationship between more integrated, ‘joined-up’ policy making and greater public participation straightforward. Where effective integration and joint working require high-level brokering, the need for sensitive negotiation can militate strongly against public involvement (Wood 1989; see also Reade 1982). The real issues It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that enthusiasm for integration has been well intentioned but naive. As with sustainable development more generally, the impetus has come largely from environmental interests concerned about the absence of environmental considerations in key policy areas. This seems to confirm Degeling’s (1995: 295) observation that ‘calls for better policy coordination across or between sectors generally emerge as part of (and in the context of) sectoral politics … as actors within one sector attempt to get actors in other sectors to take on aspects of their concerns’. 68
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Usually, however, when environmentalists call for integration, they see it as a way of mobilising stronger conceptions of sustainability, believing that if environmental considerations are made integral to (say) economic development then the latter must be transformed. On the other hand, economic interests, and governments, have generally operated with different assumptions: they have tended to accept only those models of integration that mobilise weaker conceptions of sustainability (albeit taking ‘better account’ of the environment), or Panglossian versions in which (with a little institutional re-jigging) previously conflicting objectives somehow become mutually interdependent. Thus the UK government’s tripartite definition of sustainable development can be used in regional planning ‘to promote economic development and competitiveness as ends in themselves’ (University of Hull Institute for City and Regional Studies 2000: 1), in effect reducing the new discourse to little more than a rationale for business as usual. This also explains why ‘sustainability appraisal’, rather than the environmental kind, has become the officially favoured tool of integration. Degeling’s (1995) critique of simplistic models of ‘intersectoralism’, although written with regard to a different empirical context,23 contains much of relevance to our discussion of integration as an instrument of sustainable development. Appeals for intersectoral co-ordination, Degeling suggests, ignore the ways in which sectors themselves are constructed and maintained by particular forms of knowledge and expertise, well-defined policy territories and patterns of resource allocation. Such ‘modes of sectoring’ are too deeply ingrained to be overcome by ‘good intentions, snappy commonsense thinking or some optimum design fix’ (ibid.: 295). In a similar way, calls for ‘integration’ in planning fail to recognise deep differences between the sectors or objectives that are to be treated in this way. Not surprisingly, then, more co-ordinated or integrated approaches ‘rarely get beyond exhortation, and those that make a promising start often end in the sand’ (ibid.: 290). Our planning examples seem to confirm that even when integrative mechanisms are in place, ‘the structuring processes that are integral to existing modes of sectoring remain virtually untouched’ (ibid.: 295): economic and environmental coalitions do not suddenly begin to share compatible conceptions of sustainable development in their area, for example, or relinquish their normal constituencies or lines of influence. Like Degeling, we do not deny that existing, fragmented approaches may be problematic – after all, development has been far from sustainable under almost any definition – but we suggest that too much has been expected of administrative or technical approaches to integration when the real issues are those of power and advantage. The way forward, according to Degeling (ibid.: 300), will be found ‘not in the search for some bias-free universalism, but in creating room for manoeuvre for new biases and agendas’. The intriguing question is whether the various integrative initiatives in planning, although clearly subject to the structural constraints that Degeling 69
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describes in the short term, might nevertheless provide a forum within which radical new agendas can develop.
Concluding comments Drawing together our thoughts on the technical, participatory and integrative approaches considered in this chapter, it is clear that whatever their individual merits or shortcomings, none can be said to lead straightforwardly to ‘more sustainable development’. Indeed, an important conclusion is that to conceive of these approaches as instruments in promoting some preformed, consensual concept of sustainability is profoundly misleading. In practice, all are bound into power struggles in which conceptions of what is sustainable are actively constructed and negotiated. And since these struggles are invariably unequal, no assessment of the role of appraisal, or participation or integration, is likely to be adequate if it is divorced from fundamental questions of agency and leverage over the political process. Our argument is not that the techniques examined have always been without effect (indeed, the degree of resistance to them has sometimes been testimony to their potential), but that their role in informing policies and decisions has been inadequately conceptualised. As a result, more has generally been expected of various procedures than they are able to deliver, while the necessary ingredients of meaningful change remain unhelpfully obscure. Further, although methodological and procedural refinements may in some cases be beneficial, faith in their ability to make a significant difference to outcomes may be deeply misplaced. The relationship between techniques (broadly defined) and sustainable development is complex and often context-dependent. Some approaches, as we have seen, mobilise distinctive conceptions of sustainability. Capacity studies, for example, are strongly associated with environment-led interpretations, and cost–benefit analyses with utilitarian ones. In other cases, conceptions of sustainable development emerge from techniques or processes rather than being predetermined by their underlying premises; thus in many attempts to achieve integration, or inclusive deliberation, what emerges as ‘sustainable’ depends on the arrangement of actors, opportunities and constraints in any given setting. Sometimes techniques promote only those conceptions of sustainability that are implicit in prevailing policies and institutional arrangements – environmental assessment of projects, which tests for compliance with policy but does not change it, is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. When, as is increasingly the case, different approaches are employed in mutually supportive ways, much will depend on the permitted combination in a particular political context: if wide-ranging SEA can be used in conjunction with concepts of environmental capacity, for example, it may point towards radical modifications of conventional development trajectories. 70
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A second significant conclusion is that it may be less helpful than is often implied to counterpose ‘technical’ with ‘deliberative’ approaches. Our review suggests that most techniques – even the more technocratic ones – provide some forum within which knowledge can be assembled, argument can take place, and learning may occur within and between different coalitions. Although there is much to support the assertion that formal audits and assessments allow political choices to masquerade as technical issues, they do not ‘merely’ do this. To see only a bogus technical rationality is to fail to acknowledge how (for example) environmental assessment, or capacity studies, can be exploited strategically to challenge deeply embedded assumptions and inject different world views into the decision-making process. Over time, such techniques can thus become part of the ‘search for intelligible solutions’ (Weale 1992: 222). Even environmental valuation and cost–benefit analysis, conceptually the least dialogical of the approaches reviewed in this chapter, may have some such effects in application – certainly, the River Kennet case led to much reassessment and discussion, even if not immediately to a more palatable outcome. In planning, the ethical and political issues bundled together by sustainable development tend to elude confinement within technical, managerial rationalities, whatever their intent, and while this may disappoint the ‘beleaguered decision-maker’ (Petts 1999: 34), it can provide unexpected opportunities for learning and change. Of the processes that are more explicitly aimed at deliberation and participation, we have argued that traditional approaches have many shortcomings but have nevertheless provided important apertures for challenge to the status quo. This contribution should not be overlooked in the rush to embrace ‘deliberative and inclusive processes’, whose efficacy and legitimacy still require some clarification. Deliberation and participation may both be necessary in interpreting sustainable development, but their combination in particular circumstances needs more rigorous thought, and it should not be assumed that consensus is invariably more transformative than conflict. For both established and novel arrangements, the most important questions are whether, how and over what timescales they might influence thinking and policies. At root, these are questions – equally applicable to the use of more formal techniques and to initiatives aimed at ‘integration’ – about the relationship between agency and structure. Although we have argued that technical, participatory and integrative procedures, sometimes working in combination, offer scope for productive learning and policy change, our evidence also suggests that, in the short term at least, this scope may be severely restricted. A third conclusion – confirming what many others have shown – is that all techniques and procedures are subject to capture: they can be manipulated by dominant interests, or deployed in ways that reflect a more subtle exercise of power to ensure that they produce outcomes that reinforce (or do not threaten) established 71
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norms. At the same time, it may be difficult for others to challenge the powerful by adopting technical rationality themselves, or by participating in deliberative or integrative experiments. The ‘analytical arms race’, despite much effort, has produced few clear victories in which valued environments have been protected by better information and assessment alone, and some areas of policy and economy seem able to stay beyond the reach of ‘integration’ or public challenge. For many issues, the outputs of different techniques and procedures have proved most defensible when they lie safely within both the legislative remit of planning systems and the parameters of the broader political context. ‘Planning for sustainability’ seems to confirm a longstanding view that structural and contextual factors are a more important influence on outcomes than the technical (or, we might add, procedural) characteristics of the ‘instruments’ employed (Majone 1976, quoted in Rees 1988: 180). This leaves us with an interesting and important question. On the one hand, we claim that a range of techniques and procedures, because inter alia they provide forums for learning and apertures for new ideas, have the potential to mobilise radical conceptions of sustainable development. Some combination of capacity studies, environmental assessment and deliberation, taking place broadly within a spatially defined framework, looks promising in this respect. On the other hand, it would seem that because outcomes must always be constrained by existing structures of power, the various approaches will be deployed in ways that promote ‘safe’ conceptions of sustainability, and any that do not will be marginalised. Which of these perspectives dominates must in large part be a question for empirical inquiry. It is one that we address in ensuing chapters, paying particular attention to ways in which the various forms of ammunition are mobilised or disarmed in different planning contexts, and how this process is formative in wider political conflicts over sustainable development. But first we turn, in Chapter 5, to a set of issues that has certainly been the locus for one of the most intense of these conflicts – concerning transport, environment and associated land-use policies. Interestingly, in the context of the foregoing discussion, it was a conflict given form by dissatisfaction with standard assessment techniques and fragmented approaches to policy, and it has been one in which initially limited opportunities for public involvement have been exploited and expanded in a struggle over profoundly different conceptions of sustainability.
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5 MOVING TARGETS Planning for an integrated transport policy
The car has dramatically changed our lives, giving freedom to choose where we live and work, and how we enjoy our leisure. Automobile Association undated: foreword The triumph of despotism is to force the slaves to declare themselves free. Berlin 1969: 165
Introduction In the last decade of the twentieth century, remarkable shifts took place in thinking about transport policy in many Western countries. At the root of this change lay a conviction that the inexorable traffic growth of the postwar decades, and attempts to accommodate it, were having serious social and environmental impacts. Increasingly, these trends were seen as unsustainable. By the mid-1990s, key international organisations were expressing concern about land-use and transport policies leading to ‘excessive travel by car’ and agreeing that ‘large scale road investment is no longer seen as a solution’ (ECMT and OECD 1995: 13). The need to discourage road traffic growth, particularly through ‘internalisation of external costs’, was a recurrent theme of the European Commission’s Common Transport Policy (CEC 1992b: para 39).1 To varying degrees, individual member states adopted policies with less emphasis on accommodating road traffic and more on reducing the need to travel and promoting environmentally friendly modes; this was as true of countries like the Netherlands, which already had extensive and efficient public transport networks, as of the UK, where the neo-liberal economic policies and permissive land-use planning regime of the 1980s had accelerated the decline of public transport and done much to encourage the ‘great car economy’.2 In Britain, this ‘new realism’ (Goodwin et al. 1991) had been crystallised, ironically, by traffic projections published in 1989, followed by publication of ‘the biggest roads programme since the Romans’3 (DoT 1989a, 1989b). 73
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The prospect of a doubling or even tripling of the volume of traffic over a thirty-year period, the scale of road building envisaged, and the likelihood of prolonged political confrontation stimulated new thinking and, we shall argue, contributed to a process of policy learning within and between the different coalitions in the transport policy community.4 The influential Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution entered the fray with a substantial report (RCEP 1994) arguing that transport trends were unsustainable and proposing radical changes to policy, including sharp increases in fuel duty and deep cuts in the roads programme. In the same year, the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA 1994)5 confirmed the long-held view of many critics that new roads not only redistribute but also have the potential to generate traffic, sometimes substantially. The UK Round Table on Sustainable Development, set up by the government in 1995, produced several hard-hitting reports on transport in quick succession (UKRT 1996a, 1996b, 1997c, 1997d). Significantly, at a time of mounting concern about climate change, transport was officially acknowledged to be the fastest-growing contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in the UK. By the mid-1990s, there seemed to be a remarkable convergence of views and widespread adoption of broadly similar discourses about ‘integration’ and ‘choice’ in transport policy (Goodwin 1996). The Confederation of British Industry, complaining that successive governments had failed to integrate transport into strategic economic and environmental policies (CBI 1995), sounded remarkably like the Council for the Protection of Rural England, which maintained that transport policies were ‘failing the environment … society and the economy’ (CPRE 1995: 11). Local authorities, individually and through their associations, had already been calling for integrated and balanced approaches and were emphasising the importance of environmental considerations (see, for example, Association of District Councils 1990; Association of Metropolitan Authorities 1990). Even motoring organisations were forced to confront the adverse impacts of traffic growth. The Automobile Association (AA undated: section 3) acknowledged limits to ‘totally unrestrained vehicle ownership’ and called for investment in public transport as well as roads (its traditional concern), while the newly established RAC Foundation for Motoring and the Environment (1992: 13) considered it ‘inevitable’, in the absence of a major technical breakthrough, that greater restrictions would have to be placed on the use of the car. This reframing of the transport problem was finding its way into the political mainstream, partly through the ‘Great Transport Debate’ launched by Secretary of State for Transport, Dr Brian Mawhinney, in 1995 (Mawhinney 1995; DoT 1996), and the then Conservative government cautiously accepted the need for some restrictions on road travel, ‘if they improve other choices’ (DoT 1996: 30). Opposition parties acknowledged the futility of building ‘more and more roads to accommodate the projected 74
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increase in traffic’ (Labour Party 1996: foreword) and promised to develop ‘integrated transport systems’ to support a sustainable and efficient economy (Liberal Democrats 1995: summary). While a process of learning was arguably taking place in what Kingdon (1995) calls the ‘problem’ and ‘policy’ streams, a key event in the ‘political stream’ – the 1997 general election – provided a window of opportunity to take policy practice forward in line with the new realism.6 At such moments, Kingdon argues, problem, policy and political streams are merged and lasting policy change becomes possible. Certainly, the incoming Labour government hastened to produce a strategy for integrated transport, published as a White Paper in July 1998. Its opening words proclaimed ‘a consensus for radical change in transport policy’ (DETR 1998f: 3).7 With the important acknowledgement that forecasts would be revised in the light of policies, the Integrated Transport White Paper seemed to consign to history the old ‘predict and provide’ approach. It promised integration in a number of different senses: between modes, between transport and other government policies (including environmental objectives), and between transport and land-use planning.8 Local authorities would acquire powers to levy charges on roads and private non-residential parking facilities, and they would be allowed to recycle most of the revenue into public transport and enhanced conditions for pedestrians and cyclists; this would be in addition to a pre-existing commitment to increase the real rate of excise duty on fuel by at least 6 per cent per annum (the so-called ‘fuel duty escalator’).9 Emphasis would be shifted from construction of new roads to maintenance of the existing network, and concerted measures would be taken to improve bus and rail systems. Further, since road space and resources were to be reallocated in favour of non car users, the long-established dominance of motorised traffic was to be challenged. Although, as we discuss later, the White Paper failed to confront certain fundamental assumptions underlying transport policy, it would certainly qualify as a ‘new realist’ document.10 The prospects for achieving such radical change and the robustness of the ‘consensus’ that emerged in the 1990s are important themes for this chapter. However, we do not attempt to cover the whole dynamic and diverse field of transport policy. This has proved fertile ground for students of policy change, including its important cognitive dimensions, and there are many interesting analyses and overviews (see, for example, Adams 1981; Banister 1998; Banister and Button 1992; Dudley and Richardson 1996a; Goodwin et al. 1991; Hamer 1987; Haq 1997; Tyme 1978). Rather, while setting our discussion within this broad framework, we pay particular attention to those aspects of transport policy that relate to land-use planning, which has invariably been seen as a crucial component of new realist approaches. We look first at the connections between transport and land use, some direct and immediate (such as the landscape impacts of new roads), others subtle, 75
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longer-term and mediated by social and economic change. Into the latter category would fall the extraordinary upward spiral of mobility and dispersal common to many Western countries in the postwar decades. We then consider the options available to planners for ‘integrating’ land use and transport as they are urged by almost everyone to do, and we examine critically the policies adopted to date. Here we draw primarily on experience in the UK and the Netherlands, but we also look to some interesting developments in the United States. Finally, we ask to what extent such policies are contributing, or are likely to contribute, to more sustainable patterns of development and movement. We agree with many commentators that landuse planning must be part of a wider policy package if it is to be not only an effective instrument of environmental protection but also to have any lasting effect on travel demand. Even so, we suggest that implementing such a package (as set out, for example, in the UK Integrated Transport White Paper (DETR 1998f)) is likely to remain problematic given the resilience, and dominance, of core values and beliefs about growth, competitiveness and the satisfaction of want-regarding preferences.11 Thus we return to some of the central themes of this book: the interweaving of knowledge and power in policy change; planning as a forum for learning and its role in the articulation of preferences and values; and the profound challenge of sustainability if it is to mean more than a modest reorganisation of trade-offs between different societal goals.
Transport, land use and sustainability: reframing the connections The direct impacts of transport systems fall well within traditional planning concerns, although controversy surrounding them intensified with both general environmental awareness and the scale of development taking place. The actual land take associated with transport networks is modest but not insignificant: roads occupy about 3.3 per cent of the land area of the UK, for example, rising to as much as a fifth in urban areas (RCEP 1994). More important have been the often severe effects on wildlife habitats and landscapes, combined with less tangible impacts on cultural and social environments as traffic came to dominate in both urban and rural locations. Mounting protest against expropriation of these different spaces raised the public and political profile of transport issues and became a key factor in the emergence of the new realism. Nor should we forget those impacts on land arising at other points in the materials supply chain: of some 250 million tonnes of aggregates used annually in the UK in the early 1990s, for example, about a third was for construction and maintenance of roads; indeed, these uses have constituted an important part of the ‘need’ justifying aggregates extraction (to which we return in Chapter 7).
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However, of at least equal significance are the subtle and longer-term interactions between transport and land use, a relationship long recognised but one that has attracted renewed attention in the quest for sustainable development. It is widely accepted that transport systems influence forms of development and that patterns of land use affect travel behaviour. But the nature and policy implications of this relationship have been contentious, and the rationale for integrating land use and transport planning has shifted as problems and potential solutions have been framed in different ways. Within the ‘predict and provide’ paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship was represented, albeit in a somewhat crude and deterministic fashion, in large-scale land-use/transportation models made viable by the power of new computers. Subject to much criticism on epistemological and methodological grounds (see, for example, Sayer 1979), such models proved in any case too cumbersome and expensive for routine use, although modelling in some form remains a staple in transport policy and planning.12 In 1970, when the new UK Department of the Environment (DoE) brought together the functions of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, a key argument for the new ‘superministry’ was to include responsibility for urban planning and transport in one department in the interests of economy and efficiency (McQuail 1994). Emphasis at that time was on providing for travel demands. The Department of Transport was a separate entity again from 1976 to 1997, when the incoming Labour government merged it with the Department of the Environment. In the new realist 1990s, the objective of integration was reframed in terms of sustainability. Indeed, recognition that land use, transport and environment were connected across a range of temporal and spatial scales – that local development control decisions, for example, might ultimately have repercussions for the global climate – was an important factor in establishing the ‘new remit’ for planning discussed in Chapter 2, helping to legitimise concerns extending beyond the traditional spheres of amenity and the efficient use of land. Within the frame of sustainable development, an understanding of land-use/transport interactions was sought more as a means of slowing or even halting trends than accommodating them, and the whole relationship acquired a new policy significance. Before examining policies, however, we outline the co-evolution of land-use and transport patterns over several decades – a picture broadly discernible in many Western countries – and briefly review the claims that such trends are unsustainable. Growing prosperity, particularly since the middle of the twentieth century, has been associated with the increasing mobility of both people and goods,13 permitting geographical dispersal of land uses once more intimately mixed. At the same time, services in both public and private sectors have been ‘rationalised’ in a quest for economies of scale, leading to fewer, larger facilities often located where they cannot easily be reached by means other than (usually private) motorised transport: hospitals and retail outlets 77
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are prominent examples. Because such trends form a tangled web with social, cultural and political change from which it is difficult to tease isolated threads, simplistic assumptions about relationships between mobility and location are likely to lead to misleading policy prescriptions.14 However, there can be little doubt about the overall effects: an upward spiral of mobility and dispersal; increasing separation of homes, jobs and services; and travel patterns in which choice rather than proximity (at least for some) has come to dominate. New roads have been demanded to serve new patterns of activity, which in turn have generated their own development pressures, encouraging further changes in land use and more traffic generation (Headicar and Bixby 1992). Purely residential suburbs and villages, out-of-town retail and leisure centres and isolated business parks became the leitmotivs of the late twentieth century. So did vehicle pollution, congestion, the dominance of traffic and the decline of traditional centres. Claims that such trends are unsustainable have been supported by environmental, social and economic arguments. The mutual reinforcement of these different perspectives at a particular moment (in the UK, the early 1990s) was important in the context of the new realism because it allowed the kind of discourse coalition described by Hajer (1995) to organise around the storyline of ‘integrated transport’.15 This coalition was able to exert influence despite differences in the underlying beliefs and values of its members, although, as we shall show, such differences made it unstable. A key driver was recognition of the range and severity of the environmental impacts of transport and land-use trends, combined with the improbability that technical fixes would be sufficient to reduce them permanently to acceptable levels (for discussion, see Banister 1998; Cartledge 1996; Goodwin et al. 1991; RCEP 1994, 1997; UK Government 1994a; UKRT 1996a). In the UK, as elsewhere, increases in energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions from transport seemed almost inevitable.16 Total emissions of other pollutants, although initially expected to fall as European standards tightened (and to remain below 1990 levels until 2025), were predicted to have resumed an upward trend by 2010 (RCEP 1994). The government itself acknowledged that ‘gains could be at risk’ if traffic growth continued unchecked and that the downward trend in emissions would not be sufficient in all places to reach air-quality objectives set for 2005 (DETR 1998f: para 2.7). The revised UK air-quality strategy set a less demanding target for particulates – ‘the most important air quality challenge’ (DETR 2000a: para 260) – on the grounds that an earlier objective (DoE 1997b) was now ‘known to be unachievable’ (DETR 2000a: para 263).17 If technical fixes could not cope adequately with pollution, they seemed to have even less to offer in the context of habitat loss, landscape degradation or what for many amounted to a tyranny of traffic in urban and rural areas. In this environmental discourse, the ‘green car’ would clearly be no panacea for the environmental problems of transport.18 78
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An important social dimension was also recognised, more so since the mid-1990s, in line with the changing conceptions of sustainability outlined in Chapter 2. Health, poised between environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development, was a rapidly escalating concern (Fletcher and McMichael 1997; UKRT 1996a). The UK Transport White Paper (DETR 1998f) linked pollutants from road traffic to 24,000 premature deaths annually among vulnerable groups and also noted the concern of the British Medical Association, backed by a growing body of research, that car dependence in children could have serious effects on their physical health and mental development (see, for example, Acheson 1998). Furthermore, developments in land use and transport were severing communities, inhibiting social interaction and polarising society into those with and those without access to a car. The latter group, which remained a substantial one (30 per cent of households in the UK) despite a common misconception that it was somehow residual, was suffering not only from lack of access to a car per se but also from deterioration in local services, which could no longer compete with car-oriented facilities. This was becoming a serious new dimension of social deprivation. Finally, and crucially, there was a powerful eco-modernist component to the new realism, in which certain policies ‘derived entirely from arguments of economic efficiency … turn out to be precisely those policies which contribute most to the protection of the environment’ (Goodwin 1993: 268). Trends were seen as unsustainable because congestion imposed heavy costs on business and was detrimental to the efficient functioning of the economy. Even for the Automobile Association (undated: section 3), undeniably a member of the old roads lobby, this was ‘bad economics’. And while perspectives on new road construction differed within the transport policy community, ‘building our way out of traffic congestion’ was generally acknowledged to be neither feasible nor affordable.19 Expression of these concerns, significantly spanning a broad political spectrum, became more and more difficult to ignore during the 1990s. Transport was widely acknowledged to be a sector in which ‘almost everything’ had gone wrong (Pearce 1993: 150). It was possible to agree that trends were unsustainable, at least as a starting point, even in the face of widely divergent conceptions of sustainability: hence the degree of consensus on the need for change, the rapid diffusion of the new realism and the ascendancy of the storyline of ‘integrated transport’ over that of ‘predict and provide’. In many countries, and at different levels of policy making, technological, regulatory, fiscal and institutional measures were proposed in varying degrees, together with investment in improved infrastructure for public transport. Almost invariably, such proposals were accompanied by calls for land-use planning to be better integrated with transport policies and thus to play a prominent role in achieving sustainability – very much an appeal to intersectoralism of the kind that we discussed in Chapter 4. The 79
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House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1994: para 59), having heard evidence from many sections of the transport policy community, noted ‘growing agreement’ that it was essential for land-use planning to seek to minimise unnecessary movement. Indeed, some elements of the motoring lobby found a convenient scapegoat in the planning system, which, according to the Automobile Association (undated), had probably caused many of the environmental problems associated with transport by permitting development in unsuitable locations. We now turn, therefore, to consider the different facets of this role as it has been perceived and developed, and to review policies that have attempted to promote the integration of land-use and transport planning.
A role for land-use planning? In one sense, as we have noted, the remit of land-use planning in relation to transport is a traditional one: transport infrastructure is a form of development, and planners have a role in mitigating its often substantial impacts, even if delimiting this remit has itself been a matter of contention. More radically, the planning system might be seen as a forum in which environmental capacities – and thus the ‘space’ for a new or expanded transport infrastructure – could be delineated. But in a new realist framework, planners found themselves allocated the less familiar role of demand management. At one level, this would involve integrating land-use and transport planning to encourage neglected modes of travel, reversing the ethos of many years in which pedestrians and cyclists had been seen as impediments to the free flow of traffic. On a wider canvas, ‘reducing the need to travel’ came to be seen, from the early 1990s onwards, as a key task for planners, to be achieved through the instruments of urban design and appropriate location of traffic-generating activities. While the need for coordination of development and transport provision has long been recognised, the emphasis on demand management was new, and it resulted in marked shifts of policy in a number of countries.20 Transport infrastructure: impacts and capacities Mitigating the impacts of transport infrastructure on natural and cultural environments has a long history.21 From 1925 (as a result of the Highways Improvement Act), local authorities could acquire land alongside highways ‘for the purpose of planting and amenity’, and soon afterwards the Roads Beautifying Association was established, initially as a voluntary body but later as official adviser to the Ministry of Transport (Cullingworth and Nadin 1994). The impacts of traffic growth manifest themselves first in towns and cities, so that already by the mid-1960s the Buchanan Report (Buchanan 1963), in many ways a prescient document, had anticipated 80
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severe conflict between valued aspects of the built environment and accommodation of traffic in towns.22 The virtual cessation of major new road construction in urban areas by the 1970s,23 although too late to avoid destruction of much that was of value, was effectively a forced acknowledgement of environmental capacity (and financial) constraints (see, for example, Hall 1980). Outside the towns, although the effects of traffic were less immediately acute, conflict between roads and amenity gathered pace as impacts accumulated. Important habitats and landscapes, although taken into consideration in route planning, were not treated as major constraints on the roads programme (Cullingworth and Nadin 1994; Gregory 1974).24 Annual reports of the Countryside Commission through the 1980s, for example, provide a litany of cases in which roads were constructed in the face of strong environmental objections. The commission found it ‘discouraging that departmental and county road planners still accord so little importance to the need to protect designated countryside’ (Countryside Commission 1988: 4), and having suffered several ‘major setbacks’, reacted to the 1989 roads programme with trepidation (Countryside Commission 1990: 3–5). Latterly, greater attention was paid to mitigation and, more controversially, to various forms of ‘compensation’. Thus, for example, the much-criticised M3 extension at Twyford Down in the 1990s was accompanied by extensive efforts at habitat relocation and recreation.25 In all of this, the town and country planning system had a predominantly reactive role, because the planning of major roads was, until the late 1990s, largely exogenous to it. After the Trunk Roads Act of 1936, highways were planned by a central transport ministry until this role passed to the quasiindependent Highways Agency in 1994. Trunk road schemes were to all intents and purposes superimposed on development plans. Consents were granted by the Secretary of State for Transport, the role of the local authority being relegated to that of statutory consultee, with provision for a public inquiry in the event of objections. In what Dudley and Richardson (1996b: 576) characterise as the ‘serene’ days of road construction up to the early 1970s, such conflicts as there were centred on amenity, and the most that could normally be achieved to protect important aspects of the natural and cultural environment was some influence on the route – the classic spatial fix – and ‘beautifying’ by landscaping and design (for a fascinating case study, see Gregory 1974). As a powerful advocacy coalition, highway engineers and the roads lobby had ‘managed to structure debate around very few options’ (Dudley and Richardson 1996a: 73), so that completion of the trunk road network constituted an aspect of the national transport policy core that was virtually immune to challenge. During the 1970s, however, conflict over both urban and inter-urban roads mounted as a rival environmental coalition emerged not only to argue about amenity and alternative routes but also to challenge the legitimacy of traffic projections and the need for such developments at all (Tyme 1978). 81
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Public inquiries provided a critical venue in which environmental groups could mount this challenge (Dudley and Richardson 1996a; J. Smith 1994); in doing so, objectors contested the boundaries of the planning system – what could and could not be questioned – illustrating the significance of planning procedures as apertures through which new knowledge, values and beliefs can impinge on public policy. Even so, frustration with the limited remit of public inquiries and, for some, a perceived lack of legitimacy in the formal democratic process led to disruption of some hearings and ensured that the roads programme remained a focus for discontent. By the early 1990s, more than 200 groups were protesting about new roads throughout the UK (Ghazi 1994). In only a small number of cases did such protest result in reappraisal or abandonment of schemes.26 In some, it led to direct action, including site occupation. Over the years there were concessions to critics of the roads programme, notably in the way that trunk road schemes were assessed. As conflict intensified, the Department of Transport’s system of cost–benefit analysis (CoBA), much criticised for its narrow remit, was supplemented to take account of environmental considerations following the report of the Leitch Committee (DoT 1977)27, and a manual on environmental appraisal of road schemes was published in 1983 (DoT 1983), effectively anticipating the environmental assessment required by European legislation after 1985. Governments could thus be seen to respond to some of the pressing environmental concerns without reconsidering the main thrust of policy. What was at issue in conflicts over road building was precisely the kind of dilemma that we outlined in Chapter 3. Underlying transport planning seemed to be a premise that however regrettable the loss of natural or cultural assets might be, most were ultimately tradable against the benefits of mobility, which (it was assumed) would be delivered by new roads. For critics of the roads programme, although they may not initially have used this language, such assets constituted critical environmental capital, the protection of which should help to define environmental boundaries for transport policies and programmes. In this context, the ‘need’ for roads was not immutable, and not only the methodology behind the traffic projections but also the philosophy of making provision to meet demand could be contested. Concepts of environmental capacity, even if not expressed as such, were both constitutive of ‘the new realism’ and further legitimised by it. The UK Integrated Transport White Paper promised tighter protection for the natural and built environment. It set out a ‘strong presumption’ against transport infrastructure that might damage sensitive areas, and it anticipated few cases where ‘imperative reasons of overriding public interest’ might justify adverse impacts on the integrity of internationally designated sites (DETR 1998f: para 4.200). While avoiding any explicit suggestion of inviolability, the White Paper proposed that concepts of environmental capital being developed by the statutory agencies (see Chapters 3 and 4) 82
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would be incorporated into assessment and appraisal ‘as appropriate’ (ibid.: para 4.204). One implication was that the role of planners could move beyond reaction and mitigation to identification of features and functions of natural and cultural environments that should be protected intact, or (when appropriate) traded against the benefits of transport infrastructure only with compensating gains elsewhere.28 Significant in this context, because it provides an opportunity to employ the agencies’ environmental capital methodology, has been the ‘new approach to appraisal’ developed at the end of the 1990s, in collaboration with conservation interests, to replace the discredited CoBA (DETR 1998g: Annex B). Ministers had promised that they would ‘look at the transport problems which lie behind proposals for road schemes and then … seek solutions which are environmentally sustainable’ (DETR 1997b: 1). Transport options (not just roads) would be assessed against five criteria: economic efficiency, environment, safety, accessibility and integration. Against the various sub-criteria under the ‘environment’ heading, for example, options would be scored qualitatively, using measures such as ‘very serious adverse impact’. Acknowledgement of the need to identify alternative ways of tackling a perceived problem, to assess them against a broad range of criteria, and to do so in a qualitative and relatively transparent way, represents a degree of policy learning, for which planning processes – especially public inquiries – have provided an important forum over several decades. At the time of writing, the new system has been cautiously welcomed by critics of the old (see, for example, English Nature 1999a), but it remains to be fully tested in application. Whether outcomes will be different is an interesting question, not only for transport policy but also for students of policy appraisal (see Rayner 2001). In the context of our discussion in earlier chapters, it is worth noting the resilience of the notion of trade-off and the persistence of the quest for some ‘objective’ means of assessment that will minimise the need for judgement. For example, it has been suggested that a more explicit weighting system for the different criteria may need to be adopted (English Nature 1999a). The roads review that followed the White Paper presented an opportunity to apply the new transport philosophy. Its outcome was a ‘carefully targeted’ £1.4 billion programme (DETR 1998g: 7) of thirty-seven schemes, including a number of by-passes, to be started within seven years (subject to statutory processes). This replaced the inherited £6 billion roads programme of around 150 schemes, already scaled down from over 500 schemes in 1990.29 At first sight, the review would seem to represent a dramatic reversal of policy, but closer inspection (and subsequent events) suggests that such an interpretation would have been premature. Only thirty-seven schemes were actually withdrawn from the national programme, and many seemed likely to resurface in another guise.30 By the end of the decade, facing mounting criticism for failing to deliver on transport policy, the 83
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government’s stance on road building ‘as a last resort’ was softening. Towards the end of 1999, the Secretary of State asked the Highways Agency to look again at congestion ‘hot spots’ with a view to accelerating some of the projects in the roads programme (ENDS 1999a).31 These developments must be seen in a wider political context, to which we return when assessing the prospects for the policies outlined in the White Paper. First, however, we trace changing ideas about the relationship of land-use planning and transport at a smaller scale – that of the neighbourhood – and at a larger and more diffuse one, that of the urban (or larger) region, at which planners have increasingly been expected to manage complex and longer-term interactions. Reclaiming the streets In the decades of accommodation, if land-use planning had a role at the local scale it was essentially one of modifying the fabric of the built environment to facilitate the free flow of rapidly growing levels of traffic. Indeed, the main players in the field were not planners but traffic engineers, with surprisingly little communication between these professions, an interesting example of the institutional and cultural barriers to ‘integration’ that we identified in Chapter 4. The traditional approach to conflict between motorised and non-motorised transport was to subordinate pedestrians and cyclists, and the legacy of this thinking remains imprinted on many urban and rural areas. A later, and not altogether alternative, strategy was to segregate, so that in towns and cities throughout Europe, environmental conditions for those on foot, at least in restricted enclaves, were enhanced by pedestrianisation,32 and in some countries, notably the Netherlands, segregated cycleways have long been the norm. The emphasis among the more progressive local authorities later shifted towards a holistic strategy of ‘selective accessibility’, in which a conscious integration of land-use and transport policies at the local scale attempts to shift the balance of advantage towards environmentally friendly modes of travel. Adopting this philosophy, the historic UK city of York was one of the pioneers of a hierarchy of transport users as the basis for planning, with pedestrians given the highest priority and car-borne commuters and visitors the lowest.33 This hierarchy was consistent with a broader policy objective of achieving ‘development patterns which give people the choice of using more environmentally-friendly means of transport than the car’ (City of York 1993: para 8.1). Such patterns were widely held to include networks of safe and relatively direct cycle and footways, compact and mixed urban development related to public transport networks (Bartholomew 1995; Municipality of Schiedam 1991)34 and integration between environmentally friendly modes (ECMT and OECD 1995; UKRT 1997d). Inevitably, integrated planning for land use and transport at this scale challenges the hegemony of the private motorist and freight traffic. It has 84
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nevertheless gained gradual acceptance and won endorsement in national policies, to some extent led by pressures and responses at local level. In the UK, a spirit of greater co-operation between planners and highway engineers was detectable by the late 1990s, and new guidelines on residential roads and footpaths emphasised permeability of layouts for public transport, cyclists and pedestrians (DETR 1998h).35 The 1998 Transport White Paper explicitly proposed a reallocation of road space to buses, cyclists and pedestrians, and did so in robust language. It was no longer seen as acceptable for children’s freedom to be ‘severely curtailed’ (DETR 1998f: para 1.14), for people to be ‘intimidated’ by traffic, or for safety to be improved ‘simply [by] discouraging vulnerable groups from venturing on to the roads’ (Ibid.: para 3.220). What is significant is that developments at local level, reinforced by new discourses in national policy, have involved a reframing of concepts of freedom and choice, hitherto associated almost exclusively with travel by car. Reinforcing the pressures for change have been the physical problems of pollution and danger manifest at the local scale, campaigns to reduce traffic speeds (Slower Speeds Initiative 1998) and the readiness of some groups to take peaceful direct action to ‘reclaim the streets’. Reducing the need to travel Interest in the integration of land use and transport planning has not been confined to the local level. Longstanding recognition that land use and transport were interdependent led to calls over several decades for more strategic integration, which could, at least in theory, reduce travel needs, energy consumption and environmental impacts. The rationale was that decisions about location could have a significant impact on travel patterns and that land-use planning, therefore, could become an important instrument of transport policy. By the 1990s, integrated land use and transport planning had come almost to epitomise sustainable development.36 What is interesting (particularly in the context of institutional learning) is how and why a body of knowledge, some of it quite well established, crossed the threshold of policy significance so that measures aimed at integration were introduced in a number of countries at national or sub-national level. We return to this issue below in reviewing the experience of the UK and the Netherlands, and also that of Portland and Washington County in the USA. First, however, we outline briefly the research findings that provided the legitimation for these ambitious new policies. There is a history of research in this field dating back at least as far as the 1960s, and a substantial literature reflecting attempts to analyse and model the relationship between land use and transport. The energy crises of the 1970s gave considerable impetus to such work (for reviews, see ECOTEC 1993; Owens 1986; Webster et al. 1988). Modelling, with varying degrees of sophistication, was a favoured tool, but there were also many attempts to 85
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demonstrate empirical associations between travel patterns and various attributes of urban form. Given the complexity of the relationships and the essentially technical nature of most of this research (few studies paid much heed to the social and cultural context within which travel and locational decisions were made), it is hardly surprising that it produced few definitive answers. Although it was often possible to demonstrate associations between variables (that between urban density and travel was among the most frequently cited), cause and effect remained hotly disputed (for one particularly heated exchange, see Gordon and Richardson 1989; Newman and Kenworthy 1989), and it proved hazardous to make predictions. So, for example, reducing the physical separation of activities (by increasing densities or the mixing of different land uses) could reasonably be claimed as a necessary condition for reducing the amount of travel by car, but it was most unlikely to be sufficient. More generally, the relative performance of different land-use patterns would depend upon people’s propensity to travel, and therefore on a whole host of other considerations. A form that tended to emerge as robust, in that it performed reasonably well under a range of assumptions, was the small to moderate-sized urban area (free-standing or part of a larger conglomerate), with a mix of employment and services accessible by public or non-motorised transport;37 even so, there were many critics of the simplistic physical determinism that assumed that behaviour could readily be influenced by urban morphology (Owens 1995). In some ways it was easier to say what was inefficient, although one hardly needed a sophisticated computer to show that development in places that were only accessible by car would contribute to the growing volume of road traffic. The Dutch government was among the first, in the late 1980s, to seek explicitly to integrate land-use and transport planning within the new context of sustainability, with the express aim of influencing the amount and mode of travel (Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1991b).38 On the impeccably eco-modernist grounds that ‘good accessibility and a high quality environment and living space are vital for the economic and social functioning of the Netherlands’ (Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment et al. 1994: para 1.3), the ‘ABC location policy’ related mobility profiles of businesses and amenities, in terms of labour and visitor intensities and vehicle dependence, to accessibility profiles of locations by different forms of transport. Plans, produced jointly for each region by central government, the provinces and municipalities, in consultation with other interested groups, were to classify locations and indicate the types of development to be permitted.39 In an interesting example of transnational policy learning, the Dutch experiment exerted significant influence on UK policy in the early 1990s, at just the time when the new philosophy of demand management was calling for novel approaches. A Planning Policy Guidance Note on transport (PPG 13), published jointly by the Departments of Environment and Transport 86
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(1994), was similar in spirit to the ABC policy if less prescriptive in its provisions. It aimed, through a variety of measures, to reduce growth in the length and number of motorised journeys and to encourage more environmentally friendly modes of travel (see Table 5.1). The focus on urban containment and neighbourhood provision of services was far from alien to British postwar planning: the departure in PPG 13 was the explicit attempt to apply a brake to the spiral of mobility and dispersal, in line with the new realism. It was keenly supported by environmental groups. This emphasis on land-use planning has not been restricted to Europe, although the objectives pose a greater challenge in countries where urban sprawl, dependent on high levels of personal mobility, has been the dominant form of development. An initiative in the American state of Oregon provides an interesting example of policy change in such circumstances. In the late 1980s, opposition to a proposed suburban freeway in the city of Portland, spearheaded by an environmental group, 1000 Friends of Oregon, evolved into a substantial research project focusing on connections between land use, transport and air quality.40 The primary objective, ultimately successful, was to persuade policy makers to abandon the road scheme and adopt instead a policy emphasising changes in land-use policy and alternative modes of travel. A secondary goal was ‘to promote development patterns that reduce land consumption, vehicle trips, and air pollution nationwide’ Table 5.1 UK Planning Policy Guidance on Transport (PPG 13), 1994 Development plans should aim to reduce the need to travel, especially by car, by: •
influencing the location of different types of development relative to transport provision (and vice versa); and
•
fostering forms of development which encourage walking, cycling and use of public transport.
Planning and land-use policies should therefore: •
promote development within urban areas, at locations highly accessible by means other than the private car;
•
locate major generators of travel demand in existing centres which are highly accessible by means other than the private car;
•
strengthen existing local centres and aim to protect and enhance their viability and vitality;
•
maintain and improve choice for people to walk, cycle, or use public transport rather than drive between homes and facilities which they need to visit regularly;
•
limit parking provision for developments and other on- and off-street parking provision to discourage reliance on the car for work and other journeys where there are effective alternatives.
Source: DoE and DoT 1994: extracts from paras 1.7 and 1.8
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(1000 Friends of Oregon 1997: 1; Bartholomew 1995). The project challenged conventional assumptions and created an alternative land-use and transportation plan for Washington County, where, in prevailing conditions, ‘most people [had to] use their cars to get to every destination’ and where the traditional response to the resulting congestion had been to ‘build a new freeway’ (1000 Friends of Oregon 1997: 6). This plan was ultimately adopted as part of the region’s vision for the future, focusing on mixed-use development, minimum densities and green modes of transport. Action was to be based on three principles (see Table 5.2), which resonate strongly with those of the ABC policy and PPG 13.41 Such policies were not adopted purely on a wing and a prayer. Environmental groups and sympathetic policy makers drew upon or commissioned research on land use and transport, then used the results to argue that their preferred approaches could deliver significant benefits. As Flyvbjerg (1998) has shown, those who seek to change the status quo and challenge powerful interests have the greatest need for recourse to ‘rationality’; in this case, for new policies to be accepted, it had to be ‘discovered’ that travel demand was related to urban form and density, that out-of-town supermarkets were associated with quite different travel patterns from those at central sites and that employees in remote business parks invariably travelled to work by car. In the UK, a report commissioned jointly by the Departments of Environment and Transport synthesised a great deal of research on such issues and suggested (somewhat heroically) that land-use policies, if combined with a range of transport measures, could lead to a 16 per cent reduction in emissions from transport over a twenty-year period (ECOTEC 1993; see also RCEP 1994). PPG 13 rapidly followed (DoE and DoT 1994). In the Washington County case, the integrated alternative emerged as potentially superior to a ‘highways only’ option on all key criteria used in the models, including modal split, congestion, job access and air pollution (1000 Friends of Oregon 1997; Bartholomew 1995). In the case of integrated land-use and transport planning, it was not that Table 5.2 Principles in the LUTRAQ Plan for Washington County, Oregon, USA •
Land use plans should direct higher intensity development to locations well served by transit and should ensure that development is designed for pedestrians, bicyclists, and transit riders, as well as auto drivers.
•
The transportation system should serve and reinforce the nature of that development.
•
Market strategies should further support the development by correcting some of the current distortions in the pricing of the transportation system and other public facilities.
Source: 1000 Friends of Oregon 1997
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analysis over many years proved so conclusive and persuasive as to lead straightforwardly to policy change: uncertainties were always sufficiently great for anyone who disliked the implications of the results to be able to call the assumptions or the methods into question. Rather, as we noted earlier, a political disposition to act could be legitimised, at a particular juncture, by an appeal to ‘objective’ research. What actually emerged from a great deal of often confusing and contradictory evidence at this point was not a definitive answer but a new framing of the interconnectedness of land use and transport. This was both cause and effect of political consternation that the spiral of increasing mobility and dispersal was making car use a matter of necessity rather than choice – that unsustainable patterns of mobility were becoming, almost literally, set in concrete (J. Smith 1994). Providing some support for Kingdon’s (1995) ‘process streams’ approach, the new realist climate of the 1990s enabled a set of solutions to be attached to a (reframed) problem, so that policy change could take place. At this point, we can conclude not only that transport policies have been changing on a number of fronts but also that the remit of land-use planning in this context has been extended, sometimes consolidating previous experience and raising the profile of land-use issues, but in some cases crossing boundaries