Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process industries Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium, 19-21 June 2001, Stockholm, Sweden
Cover photo: R. Ryan
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Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium, 19-21 June 2001, Stockholm, Sweden
Edited by H.J. Pasman TNO Delft, The Netherlands 0. Fredholm Association of Swedish Chemical Industries Stockholm, Sweden A. J acobsson AJ Risk Engineering A6 Stenungsund, Sweden
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Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries Proceedings of the 10th InternationalSymposium Stockholm, Sweden, 19-21 June, 2001 Preface Human fate is one of continuous struggle, falling and scrambling up. This is also that of the chemical engineer and Loss Prevention officer and the previous nine symposia are witness to that tragedy. In fact, we had not nine, but ten symposia because the first true international symposium on the subject in the United Kingdom in 1971 was the starting point for the series. An accident is difficult to foresee if the knowledge of its possibility is not available. The previous Secretary of the EFCE Working party organising the symposia, John Bond, expressed that years ago in the Laws of Loss Prevention, which are a kind of “Don’t be so stupid as not to look backwards and not to use past experience for future projects”. A person’s ability to think ahead is very limited, especially when it comes to predicting what can go wrong. An accident can happen easily or as the rhyme says:
Here lies the body of Henry Bank Who struck a match to look in a tank They buried him quickly before he stank (John Bond, 1996, ‘The Hazards of Life and All thar)
On the other hand we can say that the symposia have been very instrumental in generating and sharing knowledge in the Loss Prevention community, although it still can further improve. We have no index of previous proceedings and as yet no undertaking underway to make the information in previous proceedings more easily accessible. In the era of information technology I trust this is just a matter of time. Also on this occasion I am glad to report that the Scientific Committee did much work and put much effort into selecting good and interesting papers and helping to optimise the programme (and at this time of commercial approaches even without any compensation!). The process industries and authorities are facing new challenges. Competition is a factor world-wide. Fewer people have to do more in the present plants. Safety requirements still go up. However overspending in equipment is wasteful. So where is the optimum? To determine this condition we need more facts. We need better models to describe the complex processes, which can make something go wrong. We need to know more about the properties of hazardous materials. We need more systematic approaches and concepts to get a grip on the safety situation and to be able to make the decisions for balancing safety requirements and economy in true risk control. In the present proceedings you will find examples. The future will be quite interesting. The rapid growth of computational capabilities that we have seen over the past thirty years will continue as far as can be seen. This will enable a change in the science of chemistry and engineering from an empirical to a more systematic “ab initio” or “from first principles” approach. The number of rate equations of transport processes and chemical kinetics that can be solved simultaneously is increasing to such an extent that massive and detailed simulation becomes possible. Not only will this enable breakthroughs in process engineering, but also it will give our community the tools to make Loss prevention more predictive indeed. It means that we will be able to do a risk analysis and carry out successfully identification of the unwanted events, even if no accident or near miss has occurred already. So, are we working to make these symposia redundant? To a certain extent this may be true, but it will take a long time before such a dream becomes reality. Safety and certainty are highly valued in society and every piece of human work has its limitations. I hope you gain much from the contents of these proceedings. Hans J. Pasman Chairman Scientific Committee
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vii
CONTENTS
Volume 2
Topic 5 - 10
Explanation of the paper numbering: E.g. T5-1 T5 Topic5 -1 Number of presentation
Number of presentation: One digit (1-9)
Full oral presentation
Two digits (11-xx) Brief oral / visual poster presentation
Topic 5 Hazardous substance/materials properties T5-1
T5-2
T5-3
T5-4
T5-5
A study into the explosive boiling potential of thermally stratified liquidliquid systems that result from runaway reactions Ronald I. A. Kersten, NL, G. Opschoor, B. Fabiano, R. Pastorino
771
Auto-ignition hazard of mixtures of ammonia, hydrogen, methane and air in a urea plant Luc Vandebroek, BE, J. Berghmans, F. Verplaetsen, A. van den Aarssen, H. Winter, G. Vliegen, E. van 't Oost
785
Review of recent results, trends and regulations affecting the assessment of electrostaticignition hazards in industry
Martin Glor, CH
799
Identification of autocatalyticdecompositionsby differential scanning calorimetry Leila Bou-Diab, CH, Hans Fierz
809
Flame arrester testing and qualification in Europe
Hans Fiirster, DE
823
...
Vlll
T5-11 Thermal hazard evaluation of vilsmeier reaction Atsumi Miyuke, JP,M. Suzuki, Y. Iizuka, Y. Oka, T. Ogawa
T5-12 The corrosion monitoring: Loss prevention and safety of complex systems in acid media Vladirnir Polyanchukov,RU
835
843
T5-13 Study on the explosion of run-away reaction triggered by a faint heat generation
Jinhua Sun, JF’,X. Li, W. Tang, K. Hasegawa
853
T5-14 Assessment of the thermal and toxic effects of chemical and pesticide pool fires based on experimental data obtained using the Tewarson apparatus Christian Costa, FR, G. Treand, F. Moineault, J. L. Gustin
867
T5-15 Hazards of surface explosions Hartmut Hieronymus, DE, Ph. Henschen, M. Hofmann, J. Bender, R. Wendler, J. Steinbach, B. Plewinsky
897
T5-16 Relation between ignition energy and limiting oxygen concentration for powders Andreas Gitzi, CH, Klaus Schwenzfeuer, Martin Glor
909
T5-17 Process safety at elevated temperatures and pressures: Cool flames and auto-ignition phenomena Andrzej A. Pekalski, NL, J. F. Zevenbergen, H. J. Pasman, S. M. Lemkowitz, A. E. Dahoe, B. Scarlett 917
Topic 6 Storage and transport of dangerous goods by road, rail, water and pipeline T6-1
Fracture statistics and offshore gas transport black sea and the Indian ocean Vadim Polyakov, RU, I. Kurakin
935
T6-2
Appropriate labelling of FIBCs for their use in explosion endangered areas Carsten Blurn, DE, W. Fath, M. Glor, G. Luttgens, C.-D. Walther 947
T6-3
Risk assessment and decision-making strategies in dangerous good transport. From an Italian case-study to a general framework Bruno Fubiano, IT, E. Palazzi, F. Currb, R. Pastorino
955
IX
T6-4
T6-5
T6-6 T6-7
Assessment of storage life of energetic substances close to safety critical conditions A. Eberz, DE, G. Goldmann
967
A new concept when designing parking areas for lorries carrying dangerous goods: The dynamic segregation J. Antonio Vilchez, ES, X. P6rez-Alavedra, J. Arnaldos, C. Amieiro, J. Casal
983
Gas-pipelines in tunnels or galleries: A sound solution?
Marc0 Montanurini, CH, C. Pliiss, G. Niederbaumer Fire test for the safety in transport and storage of dangerous goods Christian Bake, DE, W. Heller, R. Konersmann, J. Ludwig
993 1005
T6-11 Risk analysis of the transportation of hazardous materials: An application of the TRAT2 software to Messina M. F. Lisi, IT, M. F. Milazzo, G. Maschio, P. Leonelli, S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni 1017 T6-12 Best routing criteria for hazardous substances transportation Barbara Mazzarotta, IT, R. Bubbico, S. Di Cave, A. Guerrieri
1029
Topic 7 The prevention, protection and mitigation and modelling of accidental releases T7-1 T7-2
T7-3
T7-4
Loss of containment: Experimental aerosol rain-out assessment J,-P. Bigot, FR, J-C. Adrian, R. Lerible, V. Marchand, J. Hocquet
1043
Effective applications of fluid curtains to mitigate incidental gas releases
Menso Molug, NL, H. Schoten, M. Powell-Price
1051
Assessment of design explosion load for control room at petrochemical plant Stiun H~iset,NO, 0.Szter
1059
Heat-up and failure of liquefied petroleum gas storage vessels exposed to a jet fire Michael A. Persuud, GB, C. J. Butler, T. A. Roberts, L. C. Shirvill, S. Wright 1069
X
T7-5
Developments in the congestion assessment method for the prediction of vapour-cloud explosions
Jonathan S. Puttock, GB T7-6
1107
Explosion vent sizing in flammable liquid spill scenarios
Fruncesco Tumnini, US
1135
T7-11 Analysis of risk of transportation of the liquefied petroleum gases on pipelines Edward Telyukov, RU, F. Guimranov
1145
T7-12 Investigation OR the mitigation dunfig accidental release of heavy gas by technical devices E. Puls, DE, F. Engelhardt, S. Hartwig
1149
T7-13 Gas explosion in cement kiln: Causes and lessons learned Sjir VZiegen, NL, E. van 't Oost, A. van den Aarssen, B. Smit-Rijnhart, F. Michel
1153
T7-14 An innovative unified model for the rate of air mixing with releases from high velocity sources E. Pulazzi, lT,R. Pastorino, B. Fabian0 T7-15
Instantaneous velocity fields and vorticity distribution of the movement of coherent structures at the surface of large-scaleJP4-pool fires .
Christian Kuhr, DE, D. Opitz, R. H. G. Miiller, A. Schonbucher
T7-16
Experience with the What If analysis applied to specific operations or chemicals
Christel Perret, FR, J. C. Adrian
1167
1179
1189
T7-17 Explosion safety in gas transferring systems without using external control 1197 Alexundr Tyulpinov, UA, M. A. Glikin
Topic 8 Safety and environment in specific process industries T8-1
Sources and solutions of fire and explosion in semiconductor fabrication processes
Jenq-Renn Chen, TWD
1203
xi
T8-11 Radioactive contamination of city temtory due to work of uraniumprocessing plant and the ways of its solution Vadim Korovin, UA, G Shmatkov, Yu.Koshik, S. Ryaboshapka, Yu. Shestak
1215
Topic 9 The impact of legislation and industry initiatives T9-1
Strategies for industrial risk prevention and management in the European union: The major accident hazards bureau and the Seveso I1 directive
I. Stuart DufieZd, IT T9-2
Land use planning and chemical sites (LUPACS)
T9-3
Modeling the formation and release of hazardous substances in the loss of control of chemical systems containing brominated flame retardants
Tommy Rosenberg, SE
Federica Barontini, IT, V. Cozzani, L. Petarca, S. Zanelli T9-4
T9-6
T9-7
1239
1251
An approach to the assessment of domino accidents hazard in quantitative
area risk analysis
VaZerio Cozzani, IT, S. Zanelli
T9-5
1223
1263
-
Chemical accident risks in U.S.industry A preliminary analysis of accident risk data from U.S. hazardous chemical facilities
James C. BeZke, US
1275
Seveso I1 as an instrument for the introduction of formalised safety management systems in small and medium enterprises StyZianos Loupasis, NL, G. A. Papadakis, J. S. Duffield
1315
Finding a consensus on plant safety - the German way
Christian Jochum, DE
1329
Cost effective compliance with the risk assessment aspects of Seveso I1 Graeme Richard Ellis, GB
1335
T9-11 A consequence analysis for accidental explosions involving flammable gases Sergio Carol, ES, J. A. Vilchez, J. Casal
1349
T9-12 Risk management in land use planning Fredrik Nystedt, SE
1355
T9-8
xii
T9-13 Management support for SEVESO I1 safety demonstration Louis Goossens, NL, B. H. J. Heming, L. J. Bellamy
1361
T9-14 Impact of the Czech SEVESO I1 directive on industry Frantisek Babinec, CZ, A. Bernatii
1373
T9-15 Safety management systems in application of the Seveso I1 directive Lessons learnt from implementation in SMEs Oliver SaZvi, FR, I. Vuidart, M. Caumont, F. Prats
1381
-
T9-16 Seveso I1 directive How to comply to the safety management system requirements in small and medium size enterprises? Eric van der Schans, NL, M. A. M. Heijne
1393
T9-17 A combined approach to improve safety performance on existing process plants. Practical application according to Seveso I1 Renato Pustorino, IT, F. Currb, M. Del Borghi, B. Fabian0
1407
T9-18 Assessment of health effects Patrice Cadet, FR, T. Gallot
1419
Topic 10 Development of methodology, e.g. of risk assessment T10-1 The 'purple book': Guideline for quantitative risk assessment in the Netherlands PuuZA. M. Uijt deHaug, NL,B. J. M. Ale, J. G. Post
1429
T10-2 RACKETman, pro-active risk identification and assessment methodology for organisational change Stefan Svensson, SE
1439
T10-3 A comparison of deterministic and probabilistic risk assessment methodologies for land use planning J. Robert Taylor, DK, Y. Weber
1447
T10-11 Four explosions: Four times static electricity was the most probable ignition source M. Th. Logtenberg, NL
1459
T10-12 Risk analysis for soil protection and industrial safety Lex Stux, NL, P. Korvers, R. Klein Entink
1465
xiii
T10-13 Risk analysis on a closed landfill with chemical waste Lex Stux, NL,, T. Logtenberg, N. Klaver
Author Index
1475
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Topic 5
Hazardous substance/materials properties
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771
A study into the explosive boiling potential of thermally stratified liquid-liquid systems that result from runaway reactions R.J.A. Kersten",G. Opschoora,B. Fabianob,R. Pastorinob "TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, P.O. Box 45,2280 AA Rijswijk. The Netherlands bDICheP-Chemicaland Process Engineering Department "G.B . Bonino", University of Genoa, Via Opera Pia 15, 16145 Genova, Italy
ABSTRACT The occurrence of a rapid phase transition, or so-called explosive boiling, when a cold volatile liquid comes into contact with a hot liquid or hot surface is a potential hazard in industry. This study was focussed on the explosive boiling potential of thermally stratified liquid-liquid systems that result from a runaway reaction. The study comprised experimental work on a reactive and a non-reactive system. The experimental results showed that under the given conditions, the cold phase was superheated but did not evaporate explosively as the limits of superheat of the phase were not achieved. The response of the cold phase appeared to be completely controlled by the interface temperature between the hot and the cold phase. In general, based on the order of magnitude of temperature differences that result from a runaway reaction in a multi-phasic system and the fact that the system is pressurised by its own vapour pressure, the occurrence of explosive boiling under runaway conditions appears unlikely for these type of systems.
1 INTRODUCTION In the chemical industry, there are a number of reactions performed in mixed multi-phasic systems. Examples of these type of reactions are suspension and emulsion polymerisations or reaction systems in which the reactant and the product are present in an aqueous and an organic phase, respectively (or vice versa). In these systems, accidental loss of agitation might lead to a segregation of the phases and the occurrence of a runaway reaction in one of the phases. The complexity of hazard assessment for these kind of systems in terms of
712
temperature and pressure excursions is illustrated with an example on a polymerisation reaction as given below. The scenario that leads to the occurrence of explosive boiling in this example is often considered as the worst case for these kind of systems. In the case of a suspension polymerisation, the reaction is performed under wellstirred conditions to obtain the desired product specifications. A malfunctioning of the stirrer will lead to a segregation between the aqueous phase and the organic phase in which the exothermic polymerisation reaction proceeds. As a result of reduced heat transfer over the wall of the reactor and a concentration of reactive mass, a runaway might occur that leads to a system of a cold water layer with a hot polymer layer (possibly well above 400 "C)' on the top of it. A disturbance of the two-layer system (by venting, re-starting the stirrer or a rollover) leads to a flash evaporation of the cold liquid. Subsequently, a fast and unexpected pressure rise occurs as the flashing liquid enhances the mixing of the phases. If significant vaporisation occurs in a short period of time, the process resembles an explosion. Although studies on subjects related to the problematic nature of the process discussed above are described in literature, little information is available on the potential explosive boiling phenomena related to separation, runaway and vent behaviour of multi-phasic systems. Therefore, in the present study, the prediction of pressure-temperature relations at a sudden mixing of the phases and a characterisation of the effect of flash evaporation on vent requirements and outflow properties were addressed. Apart from the explosive boiling potential that results from a runaway reaction, the study is also relevant for related phenomena like accidental filling of a high temperature reactor with a volatile liquid, application of coolant injection for runaway prevention and equipment failure leading to a sudden contact between phases (heat exchanger or reactor jacket).
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Explosive boiling, or better, a rapid phase transition, results from superheating the cold phase to its superheat limit where homogeneous nucleation occurs in a short period of time. The superheat limit or homogenous nucleation limit, represents the deepest possible penetration of a liquid into the domain of metastable states. At constant pressure it is the highest temperature below the critical point that a liquid can sustain without undergoing a phase transition; at constant temperature, it is the lowest pressure.
773
In general, with respect to the type of systems considered in this study, there are two ways of reaching the superheat limit. Firstly, at constant pressure, the superheat limit is reached as the temperature exceeds a threshold value. This value depends on the physical properties of the system as viscosity, density and surface tension and equals the homogeneous nucleation temperature of the liquid. Explosive boiling is more difficult to achieve as the temperature of the hot phase in contact with the liquid increases well beyond the threshold temperature. Under this conditions, a rapid establishment of film boiling takes place. As a result, a vapour layer is produced that protects the bulk cold liquid from direct contact with the hot phase. The contact of two phases at different temperatures leads to the heating of a thin film of the cold phase well above its expected boiling temperature. According to [ 11 the following expression can be used to predict the interface temperature;
in which Th is the temperature of the hot liquid and T, of the cold liquid. The terms a h and q express the thermal diffusion of the hot liquid and of the cold liquid, respectively. The thermal diffusion is given by the following expression;
in which C, is the specific heat, p the density and A the thermal conductivity. Note that according to Eq. (l), the interface temperature follows the temperature of the liquid that has the highest thermal diffusion. Explosive boiling occurs if, at the given pressure, the interface temperature exceeds the homogeneous nucleation temperature of the cold phase. The second way to reach the superheat limit is, at constant temperature, a fast depressurisation that leads to a pressure far below the saturation pressure of the liquid. In general, due to the effect of pressure on bubble growth rates, explosive boiling is difficult to achieve at high system pressures. At high pressures, vapour bubble growth rates are relatively low and dominated by the rate of heat transfer into the growing bubble. Under these conditions, vapour explosions are difficult to initiate and only rapid (non-explosive) boiling occurs. At low pressures, the bubble growth rates are high and inertially controlled. An additional complicating factor in the experimental assessment of the phenomenon is the effect of scale. For large-scale events, the liquid must be prefragmented at the inception of explosive boiling. Whether or not this conditions
114
is met on the large scale (by the initial flash evaporation) is hard to predict from small-scale experiments. In general, with respect to the boundary condition on pre-fragmentation, small-scale experiments appear to be conservative.
3 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS Before experiments with a multi-phasic reactive system were performed, preliminary experiments were carried out to study the temperature development and to visually observe phenomena that might take place at the interface between two thermally stratified liquids. The experiments were performed in the so-called Constant Pressure Autoclave (CPA) on a non-real-time system. The two selected liquids are water, dyed by chrome-nitrate, and 2,2,4,6,6pentamethylheptane (isododecane).
3.1 Experimental set-up The heart of the CPA installation is a glass tube reactor with a diameter of 3.5 cm and a height of 15 cm. The tube is positioned in a containment section of the installation. The gas space of the tube and the containment section are connected via a condenser so that no pressure difference over the tube is build-up during operation. The headspace of the tube is connected to two large containment vessels, so a nearly constant pressure can be maintained during operations. The installation can be pressurised up to a pressure of 200 bars. A schematic drawing of the installation is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Constant Pressure Autoclave
775
Three thermocouples are placed in the tube to measure the water, interface and isododecane temperature. The height of the location of thermocouples from the bottom were 2.8, 6 and 10.8 cm. In the given set-up, the temperature of the water and isododecane phase can be modified by adjusting the power to the heater at the bottom of the CPA or the power to a heating spiral around and within the top half of the test tube. Upon filling the test tube with a pre-defined amount of water and isododecane, the tube is placed in the constant pressure autoclave (see Figures 2a en 2b) which is closed and pressurised. A video camera is put in front of the autoclave to record the events that occur at the interface (Figure 2c). The pressure and the temperatures are controlled from the control tower (Figure 2d). The recorded film is displayed on a screen. The measured temperatures and pressure are recorded by a computer for later evaluation.
Figure 2
Pictures of the Constant Pressure Autoclave (CPA)
776
3.2 Experimental results Four experiments were performed at a pressure of 4.5, 9, 24 and 40 bars. For each experiment the theoretical interface temperature was calculated on basis of heat transport between the hot and cold layer according to Eq.(l). The temperature curves measured in the experiment at a pressure of 4.5 bars are presented in Figure 3. During this experiment, a few minutes after the start of the experiment, boiling took place at the interface between the liquids. The boiling occurred as follows: first, a large bubble is produced at the interface. When the bubble was expelled from the interface, an another bubble was formed. At the beginning, this phenomenon took place at a low speed, but after a while, it occurred at a higher speed producing tiny bubbles at the interface. At a temperature difference between the liquids of about 90 "C (2500 seconds), a fast boiling process was observed at the interface between the liquids. Note that the irregularities in the temperature curve prior to this boiling effect were caused by adjustments in the power supply to the heating spiral. The fast boiling occurred together with a fast decrease of the isododecane temperature. This decrease of the isododecane phase was caused by evaporation of water. The evaporation of water, as well as heat transport by water vapour, extracted heat from the isododecane phase. The measured temperature curve in the water phase clearly shows that the volatile boiling was in fact restricted to the very top of this phase. 250 200
I , Boiling at interface
a2 50 -1
L
! n E 100
+al
50
0
Figure 3
500
1000
1500
2000
Time [s]
2500
Experimental result CPA experiment at 4.5bars
3000
3500
4000
The occurrence of the fast boiling process at the given conditions can be explained by a consideration of the vapour pressure at the top of the water phase and the total pressure of the system. The vapour pressure at the top of the water phase can be calculated from the temperature at the liquid interface, which, in turn, is calculated from the measured water and isododecane temperatures. The calculated interface temperature at the fast boiling process is approximately equal to 142°C which corresponds to a vapour pressure at the top of the water phase that exceeds the initially imposed pressure on the system. Hence, boiling occurs. The experiment carried out at 9 bars only showed boiling at the top of the aqueous phase. The experiments carried out at 24 and 40 bars showed no boiling, even upon pressure relief. The absence of boiling was caused by the fact that water temperature was still below its atmospheric boiling temperature. The results of the experiment at 40 bar are presented in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows the good agreement between the calculated and measured interface temperature between the liquids. Furthermore, the figure clearly shows that the interface temperature follows the temperature of the liquid that has the highest thermal diffusion. Based on the experimental findings, it is concluded that Eq. (1) provides a good estimation of the interface temperature. Apart from an experimental verification of this equation, the preliminary experiments contributed considerably to the understanding of the interfacial boiling phenomena and the effect of pressure on these phenomena. 200 180 -
F
160
~
F 1140 40 I
f
9
I
120 -
g 100 El00 E
$ 8800 60 60
~
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Figure 4
,
0
500
1000
Time [s]
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Experimental result CPA experiment at 40 bars
2000
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4
ONE-LITRE SCALE EXPERIMENTS
Upon the preliminary experiments in the CPA with a non-reactive system, a two-phasic reactive system was selected for experiments on a one-litre scale. The selected system comprised the decomposition reaction of an organic peroxide (dilauroyl peroxide) in a water-isododecane mixture. Apart from the studied phenomena in the preliminary experiments, the experiments on the onelitre scale were also performed to study the effect of flash evaporation on vent requirements and outflow properties. The study on the reactive system included the study of the system's behaviour upon pressure release.
4.1 Experimental set-up The experiments were performed in the so-called Controlled Runaway and Vent Monitor (CRVM). The CRVM is an in-house developed instrument for the characterisation of thermal properties and vent behaviour of, especially high energetic, chemicals. The CRVM consists of a 1.1 litre reactor (height over diameter equals 1.4), capable of operating up to a pressure of 250 bars at 350 "C, in combination with a process control and data acquisition system. The reactor is equipped with a flat-blade turbine impeller stirrer, a piezo resistive pressure transducer, multiple thermocouples (four internal and two mounted in the vessel wall), a 0.5" bursting disk, electrodes for ignition of the head space or for the use of an internal heater, two fillhelief lines (diameters of 3.7 and 9 mm) and a bottom drain. The bottom drain can be used for either emptying the reactor or for operating the reactor as a continuously stirred tank reactor. The reactor vessel is heated by two helical heaters (top and bottom section). Both heaters are independently controlled by programmable Process Controllers, which, in turn, are operated on basis of a selected temperature programme on the process control and data acquisition system. As a result, the reactor can be operated with an imposed temperature programme (constant power, constant wall temperature, constant temperature increase) or pseudo-adiabatically. In the pseudo-adiabatic mode, the wall temperature, measured by thermocouples positioned within the vessel wall, is kept equal to the temperature of a selected internal thermocouple (within 0.5 "C) by controlling the amount of heat supplied to the vessel. The maximum temperature rise rate of the tested substance that can be compensated in the pseudo-adiabatic mode equals approximately 10 "Chin. A schematic drawing and a picture of the reactor are presented in Figure 5a and 5b, respectively.
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Figure 5
(a) Controlled Runaway and Vent Monitor (CRVM)
4.2 Experimental procedure Six experiments were carried out with three different concentrations of peroxide in the organic phase (weight fractions of 50, 75 and 100%). Each concentration was tested with and without backpressure. In the experiments performed with back-pressure, the reactor is connected via the 3.65 mm diameter relief line to the gas containment section of the Constant Pressure Autoclave. The experiments were performed according to the following procedure. Firstly, the reactor was filled with the pre-defined amount of water (400 g). Subsequently, the reactor was heated to a temperature of approximately 60 "C. At the same time, the mixture of isododecane and peroxide was prepared. To easily dissolve the peroxide in isododecane, the dilauroyl peroxide was melted first and then added to the solvent (the melting point of the peroxide equals 56°C). To prevent an early decomposition of the peroxide, the temperature was carefully controlled below 60-65°C. The prepared peroxide mixture (with a total mass of 320 g) was introduced in the reactor and mixed with the water (speed of the stirrer = 900 rpm). The top heater of the reactor was switched to a 100%power. The relatively fast heat-up of the top of the reactor was done to reduce heat loss during the later stage of the runaway. The bottom heater of the reactor was switched off or lower than 40% of power at the beginning. At a liquid temperature of approximately 9OoC,the stirrer was switched off, upon which a separation of the phases occurs. After the separation, the temperature of the gas phase was measured by thermocouple T I ,the organic liquid temperature by T2 and T3 (with T3 close to
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the interface between the organic and the water phase) and the water temperature by thermocouple T4. Due to the high temperature of the organic phase, and the ongoing heat-up of the reactor, a runaway occurs in the organic phase upon the phase separation. Pressure and temperature of the organic liquid increase rapidly due to the runaway. When pressure reaches its maximum, the 9.5 mm with a restriction with a diameter of 1.8 mm is opened. In the experiments with back-pressure, the pressure is relieved via the 3.65 mm valve in the pressurised gas containment section of the CPA.
4.3 Experimental results The key values of the experiments are summarised in Table 1. Table 1 Overview of experimental results Peroxide concentration in organic phase [wt.%] Onset temperature runaway ["C] Maximum pressure [bars] Maximum temperature organic phase ["C] Temperature difference at pressure relief ["C]
50 70
40 205 100
75 70 62 240 140
100 81 94 280 200
In general, a comparison between the experiments with different peroxide concentrations shows the same features. The experiments with a peroxide concentration of 75% are discussed in more detail below. In principle, each experiment consists of two parts. The first part is the part in which the phase separation and runaway reaction takes place. The second part is the actual pressure relief, either to the back pressure of the gas containment system of the CPA or to the ambient pressure. Figure 6 shows the results of the experiment with a peroxide concentration of 75 %. In the initial stage of the experiment, when the phases are still thoroughly mixed, a decomposition reaction of the peroxide occurs. The temperatures within the system are equal up to the moment at which the stirrer is switched off (at about 90 "C). Without mixing, a fast separation of the two-phase mixture to an aqueous phase with an organic phase on top of it. The runaway reaction in the organic phase clearly accelerates upon the phase separation due to the concentration of the reactive mass. Figure 6 shows that due to stratification within the organic phase, and the fact that T3 is measured close to the water phase, the runaway starts at the top of the organic liquid. Upon reaching its maximum temperature, the temperature rise in the top layer of the organic phase stops due to reactant depletion. At this stage, the runaway in the layer directly below the top layer of the liquid is still going. As a result, the temperature of this layer approaches the temperature of the top layer. This
78 1
process continues in time and explains the correlation between T2 , T3 and the pressure increase. The temperature measured in the water phase (T4) does not respond to the runaway. After reaching its maximum, pressure begins to decrease slowly by heat loss from the gas phase to the top of the vessel. At the moment that the valve is opened, a steep drop in pressure to the back-pressure in the CPA system is observed. During the depressurisation, TI increases rapidly whereas the temperature measured with T2 and T3 reduces. This reduction in temperature is caused by evaporation that takes place at the interface of the liquids. The produced vapour mixes the organic phase and contributes to the heat removal by its heat capacity. Note that an initial temperature drop of T2 is measured due to the evaporation of light (volatile) reaction products from the organic phase. The vent process of the experiment is presented in more detail in Figure 7. Note that this figure shows the results of the experiment with an imposed back-pressure. The results of the vent process to ambient pressure are shown in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows that the part of the experiment prior to the pressure relief is equivalent to the part shown in Figure 8. In contrast with the experiment with back pressure, a flash evaporation of water is observed at the end of the relief period. The severity of the process of flash evaporation and the pressure at which it starts increases with the peroxide concentration. This shows a clear correlation between the evaporation process and the temperature at the interface T2. 60 55 50 45 40
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4.4 Discussion
Based on Eq.(l) and the measured temperature of the water phase and the and the vapour organic phase, the theoretical interface temperature Tinterface pressure of water at the interface was calculated for each experiment. The calculated curves are also depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 9. A comparison between the curves with and without back-pressure, combined with the information obtained from the calculated vapour pressure curves, reveals that the back-pressure prevents the flash evaporation of water from the interface. The process of flash evaporation does only occur when the vapour pressure of water at the interface exceeds the overall pressure of the system. None of the experiments showed explosive boiling as the criteria for a rapid phase transition or explosive boiling were not met. This was especially true for the criterion on the limit of superheat of the cold liquid at the given temperature differences between the two liquids. Note that in general, for vapour systems, high levels of superheat are not easily reached as the system pressurises itself. Furthermore, the pressure drop upon initiation of a vent process remains small. 5
CONCLUSIONS
Experiments with a non-reactive system have shown that water was superheated but did not evaporate explosively, as the limits of superheat of water were not achieved. There was only heat transfer by nucleate boiling. Further it appeared that the temperature at the interface between the hot and the cold phase can be calculated on basis of the bulk temperatures of these phases. The experimental results learned that the interface temperature, and in turn, the vapour pressure that results from the interface temperature, controls the response of the cold phase. The maximum vapour pressure exerted by the cold phase can be estimated on basis of the interface temperature. A vapour pressure higher than the ambient pressure results in a flash evaporation of liquid from the top of the cold phase (at relatively low levels of superheat) during venting. A vapour pressure lower than the ambient pressure results in evaporation of the cold liquid up to the level at which thermodynamic equilibrium with the gas phase is attained. The vapour production rate from the cold phase during a relief process is controlled by the given vapour pressure and the volumetric relief rate. The occurrence of a vapour explosion on a large scale can only take place when the level of superheat approaches the level at which homogeneous nucleation takes place and when fragmentation of the cold liquid takes place. Based on the order of magnitude of temperature differences that result from a runaway
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reaction in a multi-phasic system and the fact that the system is pressurised by its own vapour pressure, it appears to be unlikely that high levels of superheat are reached. Hence, it can be stated that the occurrence of a vapour explosion under runaway conditions is, in general, unlikely. Due to its dependence upon many factors, evaluation of the conditions under which explosive boiling can take place is a complex problem that should be approached with care.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS An important part of the work on which this article is based was performed during the performance of a training period at the TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory of Mr. L. Accame of the University of Genoa and Ms. V. Vaussier of the University of Orleans. The authors would like to thank Mr. Accame and Ms. Vaussier for their investigations.
REFERENCES 1. Milton Blander and Joseph L. Katz, “Bubble nucleation in liquids” AIChe Journal, (3,September 1975, pages 833-848 2. L. Accame, Tisa di Laurea “Rilasci in condizioni di emergenza: studio teorico sperimentale dei sistemi ibridi“, Universia’ deli Studi di Genova, Facoltisi di Ingegneria, Ottobre 1999. 3. V. Vaussier, “A study into the explosive boiling potential of thermally stratified liquid-liquid systems that result from runaway reactions”, TNOPML report nr 1999-SV 14, August 1999, Rijswijk, The Netherlands.
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Auto-ignitionhazard of mixtures of ammonia, hydrogen, methane and air in a urea plant L. Vandebroek'* ,J. Berghmans a ,F. Verplaetsena A. van den Aarssen ,H. Winter ,G. Vliegen ,E. van 't Oost a K.U.Leuven, Dept. Of Mechanical Engineering Celestijnenlaan 300A, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
DSM Engineering-Stamicarbon, P.O. Box 10,6160 MC Geleen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT The auto-ignition of ammonidmethanelhydrogedair mixtures constitutes a hazard that is of much concern in urea plants. In the present study, the autoignition behaviour of ammonidmethanelhydrogedair mixtures has been investigated experimentally for pressures up to 7500 P a . The experiments were carried out in a closed spherical vessel with a volume of 8 dm3. The concentration and the pressure dependence of the auto-ignition temperature (AIT) were determined for three types of mixtures: ammonidair, ammonidmethanehir and ammoniahydrogedair mixtures. It is found that the most ignitable mixture compositions were situated between stoichiometry and the upper flammability limit. Small amounts of methane and hydrogen decrease the AIT of ammonidair mixtures to a large extent. The pressure dependence of the AIT could be correlated by a Semenov relationship. For the multi-fuel mixtures a distinct deviation from the Semenov correlation was observed at the lowest temperatures. With respect to the explosion hazard in urea plants, the experimental results were used to assess realistic AIT values in the pool reactor and the ammonia scrubber, operating at a pressure of 15 MPa.
1. INTRODUCTION In many chemical processes combustible gases and vapours at high pressures and high temperatures are present. In order to evaluate the auto-ignition hazard involved and to ensure the safe and optimal operation of these processes, it is * Corresponding author.
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important to know the auto-ignition temperature (AIT) of the gas mixtures. The AIT values found in literature are usually determined according to standard test methods in small vessels and at atmospheric pressure (e.g. DIN 51795, ASTM-E 659-75, or BS 4056) [1,2]. However, since the AIT is not a constant but decreases with increasing pressures and increasing volumes, these AIT values are often not applicable to industrial environments [3-61. Futhermore, most available AIT data refer to single-component fuels, while information on multicomponent fuels is scarce [7-91. In the present study, attention is focused on the auto-ignition hazard inside a urea plant. In the ammonia scrubber and the pool reactor of the plant, mixtures of ammonia, methane, hydrogen and air are exposed to a temperature of 150°C and a pressure of 15 MPa. The maximum methane and hydrogen concentrations were calculated to be 10 and 20 mol% respectively. In order to evaluate these mixtures for their auto-ignition characteristics, the AIT of ammonidair mixtures is determined experimentally for pressures up to 7500 kPa and for concentrations ranging from 20 to 80 mol%. The effect of limited methane and hydrogen additions was also investigated. Simple scaling rules were used to estimate AIT values for the existing mixtures inside the urea plant.
2. EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE The experimental apparatus, illustrated in Fig. 1, consists of four major parts. The first part is the mixture preparation system, which is used to produce homogeneous mixtures of a desired composition. To do this, two different filling methods have been used, i.e. the constant flow method and the partial filling method. Homogeneous mixtures of only two components, e.g. ammonidair mixtures, are produced with the constant flow method. The flow rates of air and ammonia are controlled by a thermal mass flow controller and by a volumetric membrane pump respectively. In the evaporator, the seperate flows are mixed to obtain a homogeneous gas mixture. Downstream the evaporator, the total system is kept at a constant temperature of 150°C to avoid condensation of ammonia. Homogeneous gas mixtures of more than two components are produced with the partial filling method. The partial pressures for the different components are calculated for each desired composition and pressure. Successively, the different components are led through the evaporator and flow into the buffer vessel, which is the second part of the apparatus. The buffer vessel is used to maintain the premixed reactants at a high pressure (up to 15000 kPa) and at a temperature of 150°C. It has a volume of 8 dm3and can withstand pressures up to 350 MPa. When the partial filling method is applied, it is provided with a special filling lance to ensure the homogeneity of the mixture.
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Fig. 1. Experimental apparatus.
The explosion vessel is the third and most important part of the apparatus. The spherical explosion vessel has a volume of 8 dm3 and is designed to withstand explosion pressures up to 25 MPa at temperatures up to 550°C. The vessel is kept at the desired temperature by three electric heating units equipped with automatic temperature control. The explosion vessel is connected to the buffer vessel by means of a valved supply line. The last part of the apparatus consists of a data-acquisition system. The pressures in both vessels are measured with Baldwin 5000 psi strain gauges, while the temperature rises during the tests are measured with Cr/Al thermocouples placed in the centre of the vessel. All signals are analysed and recorded on a computer. To determine the auto-ignition limits, the following test procedure has been used. At the beginning of a test series, the temperature of the explosion vessel is set at the desired value. A homogeneous mixture of a desired composition and pressure is produced in the buffer vessel. After the explosion vessel has been evacuated, the gas mixture is transferred from the buffer vessel to the explosion vessel till the required pressure is reached. The pressure and temperature variations in the explosion vessel are monitored during maximum fifteen minutes. Finally, the explosion vessel is evacuated and another test is conducted at a different pressure. For each test series, a gas sample is taken from the buffer vessel and is analysed in a gas chromatograph (relative error 1 %). The occurrence of an auto-ignition is judged from the pressure and temperature histories, e.g. Fig. 2. When the temperature rise is smaller than 50°C and no
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pressure increase is observed, the attempt is considered unsuccesfull. A temperature rise larger than 50°C accompanied with a pressure increase is classified as an auto-ignition.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
3.1. Ammonidair mixtures A first series of experiments aimed at identifying the mixture composition which is most sensitive to auto-ignition. To do this the auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures was measured at a constant temperature of 550°C, being the maximum temperature of the apparatus. The results are summarised in Fig. 3. The solid line in Fig. 3 represents the pressure limit beyond which autoignition occurs. The most ignitable mixture composition is found to be about 50 mol% ammonia in air. This observation is in good agreement with the results of previous studies, which show that the AIT for many compounds is found at concentrations 2-3 times the stoichiometric value [3,10]. As a next step, the pressure dependence of the AIT was determined for the mixture composition most sensitive to auto-ignition. Due to pressure limitations of the apparatus, the auto-ignition limit could only be measured at 525°C and 550°C (798K and 823K). Fig. 4 shows the measured auto-ignition limit at these two temperatures together with the AIT value at atmospheric pressure [ 111. As can be seen from Fig. 4, the pressure limit for auto-ignition increases with decreasing initial temperatures. This also implies that high pressures lead to lower AIT values. However, the effect of the pressure on the AIT is rather small, e.g. the AIT decreases with only 25°C when the pressure is raised from 3400 to 7200 kPa.
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Fig. 3. The auto-ignition region for ammonidair mixtures at 550°C. 10000
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AITat 100kF'a
6000
4000
'.'...
2000
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I o auto-ignition x no reaction
8000
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Fig.4. The auto-ignition limit as function of the initial temperature, determined for 50 mol% ammonia in air.
3.2. Ammonidmethandairmixtures The influence of methane on the auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures was studied for methane concentrations up to 10 mol%. Preliminary experiments already indicated that small fractions of methane in ammonia lower the AIT with more than 100°C. First the auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures with 5 mol% methane was measured at an initial temperature of 450°C.
790
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~
5I 2000 -
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Fig. 5. The auto-ignitionregion of ammonidair mixtures with 5 mol%methane at an initial temperature of 450°C.
In contrast with the results of pure ammonidair mixtures, the auto-ignition limit exhibits a minimum in the lean fuel range, as shown in Fig. 5. A mixture with an ammonia concentration of 5 mol% is the most ignitable. It has a mimimum ignition pressure of 250 Wa. In a second set of experiments, the dependence of the auto-ignition limit on the methane concentration was investigated. The auto-ignition limits of ammonidair mixtures with 2,5 ,5 and 10 mol% methane are compared in Fig. 6.
-*-5 0
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m0l%CH4
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m n i a concentration [ml%]
Fig. 6. The auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures with various concentrations of methane additions, determined at an initial temperature of 450°C.
79 1
6ooo
i o auto-imon x no reaction
660
680
700
720
initial temperature [K]
Fig. 7. The auto-ignition limit as function of the initial temperature, determined for 5 mol% ammonia and 10 mol% methane in air.
It is found that the auto-ignition limit decreases with increasing methane concentrations. In the range investigated, the mixture composition most sensitive to auto-ignition was found to be 5 mol% ammonia and 10 mol% methane in air. The effect of the initial pressure on the AIT of ammonidmethanehir mixtures was determined for the most ignitable mixture composition. Fig. 8 shows the auto-ignition limit measured at various initial temperatures between 395OC and 450°C (668K and 723K). Again, the AIT decreases with increasing pressure, but tends to level off at about 1000 kPa. This could suggest that for these mixtures, auto-ignition is governed by the high temperature branch at pressures below 1000 kPa, whereas at pressures above 1000 kPa it is governed by the low temperature branch [4,5,12].
3.3. Ammoniahydrogedair mixtures
The influence of hydrogen on the auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures was investigated for hydrogen concentrations up to 20 mol%. Also here preliminary experiments indicated that small fractions of hydrogen in ammonia lower the AIT with more than 100°C. First the auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures with 5 mol% hydrogen was measured at a initial temperature of 450°C. The results are presented in Fig. 8. They are similar to those of ammonidmethanehir mixtures, i.e. the auto-ignition limit exhibits a minimum in the lean fuel range. A mixture with an ammonia concentration of only 1 mol% is the most ignitable.
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Fig. 8. The auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures with 5 mol% hydrogen, determined at 450°C.
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,
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Fig. 9. The auto-ignition limits of ammonidhydrogedair mixtures, determined at 450°C (a) and 425°C (b).
A second set of experiments was conducted to determine the dependence of the auto-ignition limit on the hydrogen concentration. The auto-ignition limit of ammonidair mixtures with 2,5 , 5, 10 and 20 mol% hydrogen are compared in Fig. 9(a) and 9(b). The exact auto-ignition limit for mixtures with 20 mol% hydrogen could not be measured at 450°C and was therefore determined at 425°C. It can be seen from Fig. 9 that the auto-ignition limit decreases with
793
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!
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initial temperam [K]
Fig. 10. The auto-ignition limit as function of the initial temperature, determined for 5 mol% ammonia and 20 mol% hydrogen in air.
increasing hydrogen concentrations. In the range investigated, the most ignitable mixture consists of 20 mol% hydrogen and 1 mol% ammonia in air. The effect of the initial pressure on the AIT of ammonia/hydrogen/air mixtures was determined for a mixture of 5 mol% ammonia and 20 mol% hydrogen in air. This is a mixture composition with a slightly higher ammonia concentration than the most ignitable one. The auto-ignition limit is measured for various initial temperatures between 395°C and 435°C (668K and 708K), as shown in fig. 10. The AIT decreases with increasing pressure, but tends to level off again at about 1000 Wa.
4. EXTRAPOLATION TO PLANT CONDITIONS Due to pratical considerations the AIT values could only be obtained for limited pressures in a vessel with a volume of 8 dm3. In order to apply the measured AIT data to full-scale urea plants, extrapolation is needed.
4.1. Extrapolation to plant pressures
The pressure dependence of the AIT could only be established for pressures up to 7500 Wa. The experimental results can be extrapolated to plant pressures by means of the so-called Semenov correlation [13]. Based on the thermal ignition theory, Semenov derived the following relationship between the AIT and the initial pressure:
794
(;)- ;
In-
-A-+B
with p = initial pressure [Pa] T = AIT [K] Eq. 1 can be plotted as a straight line in a ln(p/T) versus 1/T diagram. The Semenov plots of the investigated mixtures are presented in Fig. 11. The linearity of the plots confirm the validity of the Semenov correlation. The plots of the multi-fuel mixtures show a distinct deviation from the linear behaviour at the low temperature end of the experimental range. A possible explanation can be found in the transition from high temperature branch to low temperature branch at these specific conditions. The constants A and B in Eq. 1 were determined by the method of the least squares for the linear sections of the plots and are listed in Table 1. Eq. 1 was used to estimate AIT values at pressures above 7500 Wa. The operating pressure in a urea plant is 15 MPa and can reach a maximum of 16,3 MPa during abnormal operation. Calculated AIT values for pressures up to 20 MPa are listed in Table 2. Table 1
Values of the constants of Eq. 1. Ammonidair Ammonia/methane/air Ammoniah ydrogedair
1.1
30950 13850 21900
1.2
-29,5 -13,6 -25,O
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
in- [ ~ O - ~ K ] Fig. 11. Semenov plots for 50% ammonia in air,; 5% ammonia and 10%methane in air,---- ; 5% ammonia and 20%hydrogen in air,---..
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Table 2
Calculated AIT values ("C)at different initial pressures. Ammonidair Ammonidmethane/air Ammoniah ydrogedair
10 MPa 522 321 359
15 MFa 513 310 351
20 MPa 508 303 346
4.2. Extrapolation to plant volumes Unfortunaly, the effect of the vessel volume on the AIT could not be determined experimentally. Instead, calculations were made based on two existing correlations, i.e. the Beerbower correlation [ 141 and the Semenov correlation [131. The Beerbower correlation is a simple empirical correlation, which gives reasonably good AIT values which are on the safe side. Beerbower noticed that for a large number of fuels plots of the AIT versus the logarithm of the vessel volume tended to be straight lines, which converge to an AIT value of 75°C in a volume of 10" dm3. So the AIT values for different volumes can be calculated from a known AIT value according to Eq. 2. Table 3 gives the estimated AIT's for different volumes of interest in a urea plant, i.e. 120 dm3 (volume of the exhaust pipe of the scrubber), 1,42 m3 (volume of 1 compartment of the pool reactor) and 7,lm3 (total volume of 5 compartments of the pool reactor). Tz = (TI -75) (logv, - 12)
(l0gV1- 12)
with Ti = initial temperature ["C] Vi = vessel volume [ b 3 1 Table 3
Calculated AIT values ("C) at 20 MPa for different vessel volumes. Ammonidair Amonidmethandair Ammoniah ydrogedair
8 dm3
508 303 346
120 dm3 462 279 317
1,42m3 420 257 291
7,l m3 393 242 274
A second Correlation for the volume dependence of the AIT is based on the theory of thermal ignition. Semenov derived that the AIT is a function of the surface to volume ratio of the vessel. For spherical vessels, it is a function of the vessel diameter only. The relation between the AIT and the vessel diameter is given by the following expression:
196
In
(:)- f -
-A-++'+In
(:)
(3)
-
with p = initial pressure [Pa] T = initial temperature [K] d = vessel diameter [m] De constants A en B' can be calculated from the constants of Eq. 1 and are listed in Table 4. Eq. 3 was used to estimate AIT values for different volumes of interest in a urea plant. The calculated values are summarised in Table 5. Table 4
Values of the constants of Eq. 4. Ammonidair Ammonidmethane/air AmmoniaJh ydrogedair
A 30950 13850 2 1900
B' -30,9 -15,O -26,4
Table 5
Calculated AIT values ("C) at 20 MPa for different vessel volumes. Ammonidair ammonia/methane/air ammonidh ydrogedair
8 dm" 508 303 346
120 dm3 490 28 1 330
1,42 m3 474 264 316
7,l m3 464 25 1 308
4.3. Discussion
As the AIT decreases when the pressure and the volume of the gas increases , the lowest and thereby most critical AIT value is found for a volume of 7,l m3 and a pressure of 20 MPa. These values are summarised in Table 3 and 5 . Comparing these data shows that the estimated AIT values obtained from the Beerbower correlation (Table 3) are lower than these obtained from the Semenov correlation (Table 5). Therefore, the lowest value in Table 3 (242°C) corresponds with the most critical AIT value in a urea plant. This is even a conservative value, because of the following reasons:
-
the AIT's are calculated for a pressure of 20 MPa, whereas the maximum pressure in the plant is 16,3 MPa. the AIT's are determined in air, whereas the oxygen concentration in the plant is lower. the AIT's are determined in a spherical vessel, which gives the lowest AIT values. In vessels with a higher surface to volume ratio, e.g. the cylindrical pool reactor, the AIT values will be higher.
797
- the AIT's of the multi-fuel mixtures tend to level of at a pressure above 1000 kPa, e.g. Fig. 7 and Fig. 10. The Semenov correlations based on low pressure measurements will therefore give underestimated AIT values. Finally, as the maximum temperature in a urea plant is 185"C, which is lower than the calculated AIT, direct auto-ignition will most probably not occur in a urea plant.
5. CONCLUSION In order to evaluate the auto-ignition hazard in urea plants, experiments were conducted to define the auto-ignition limits of amrnonidmethanehydrogedair mixtures. The auto-ignition limits were measured for pressures up to 7500 kPa and temperatures up to 550"C, using a 8 dm3 spherical vessel. The experimental results were used to estimate AIT values in the pool reactor and the ammonia scrubber of a urea plant. The estimated values were achieved by extrapolation using the Semenov correlation and the Beerbower relationship. The lowest AIT for the existing mixtures inside the urea plant is calculated to be 242"C, which is higher than the maximum temperature in the plant. Based on these calculations, direct auto-ignition can be excluded as a possible ignition hazard in the urea plants.
REFERENCES B. P. Mullins, Spontaneous ignition of liquid fuels, Butterworths Scientific Publications, London, 1955. BS 4056: Method of test for ignition temperature of gases and vapours, British Standard Institution, 1966. M. Caron, M. Goethals, G. De Smedt, J. Berghmans, S . Vliegen, E. Van ' t Oost, A. van den Aarssen, J. Hazard. Mater. 65 (1999) 233. M. R. Chandraratna and J. F. Griffiths, Combust. Flame 99 (1994) 626. J. U. Steinle, E. U. Franck, Ber. Bunsenges. Phys. Chem. 99 (1995) 66. T. J. Snee, Loss Prevention Bulletin 081 (1988) 25. D. Kong, R. K. Eckhoff, F. Alfert, J. Hazard. Mater. 40 (1995) 69. J. F. Griffiths, D. Coppersthwaite, C. H. Phillips, C. K. Westbrook and W. J. Pitz, Twenty-Third Symposium (International) on Combustion, The Combustion Institute, Pittsburgh, 1990, pp. 1745. C.F. Cullis and C. D. Foster, Combust. Flame 23 (1974) 347. N. P. Setchkin, J. Res. Natl. Bur. Stand., Res. Pap. 2516,53 (1954) 49. J. Bond, Sources of Ignition, Flammability Characteristics of chemicals and products, Butterworth Heinemann, Oxford, 1991. G. M. Panchenkov, V. V. Malyshev, V. V. Makarenkov et al., Russian Journal of Physical Chemistry 46 (1972) 1303. I. Glassman, Combustion, Academic Press Inc., Orlando, 1987. R. D. Coffee, Chem. Eng. Prog. Loss Prev. 13 (1980) 74.
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Review of recent results, trends and regulations affecting the assessment of electrostatic ignition hazards in industry M. Glor Institute of Safety & Security, WKL-32.3.0 1, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland Summary Although nowadays those electrostatic phenomena that give rise to ignition hazards in industrial practice are generally well known, fires and explosions continue to be triggered by the accumulation of electrostatic charge. This paper presents various reasons why this should be so, and draws attention to the conflicts of interest which arise when other requirements need to be met. Current trends and new results are examined, especially in the field of bulk materials handling and packaging systems. In addition, the consequences of the Directives issued at European level are appraised. 1.
Introduction
In the present-day process industries fires and explosions continue to be triggered by ignition hazards due to the accumulation of electrostatic charge. There are a variety of reasons why this is the case: 1. The accumulation of electrostatic charge by products and equipment is in many cases directly associated with the processes and operations involved in industrial production. It represents a source of ignition that can be hazardous even under normal circumstances, i.e. without any kind of plant upset occurring, but also under abnormal conditions. 2. Often the measures taken to prevent electrostatic charge accumulation are of an organizational nature, such as ensuring that transportable equipment or containers are grounded. The reliability of these measures is therefore highly susceptible to possible human error. 3. The phenomena of electrostatics, for example electrostatic induction, are not always easy to understand and therefore predict. An assessment of the dangers due to the accumulation of electrostatic charge requires a fundamental knowledge of physics plus experience in a process industry. 4. These two requirements mean that all personnel, from the operators in the plant to the engineers and chemists, must be highly qualified. It is often
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difficult to ensure that such qualification levels are maintained, especially in times of rapid change in both human resources and corporate structures. 5 . The measures taken to prevent ignition hazards due to electrostatic charge accumulation often come into conflict with other requirements and objectives, such as compliance with GMP (Good Mamfacturing Practice), environmental protection, accident prevention, productivity, profitability, etc. 6. Changes are often made to the process and equipment or hnovations introduced without taking into account the consequences in terms of electrostatic charge accumulation and the ignition hazards posed by electrostatic phenomena. 7. Nowadays it is only in very rare cases that an incident must be attributed to some previously unknown electrostatic phenomenon. The most recently identified new phenomenon with a broad impact on the process industries is the occurrence of so-called cone discharges when silos and containers are filled with bulk materials. Investigations into this phenomenon date from the 1990s [l]. 8. In incident investigations, the source of ignition is still frequently attributed to electrostatics purely because no evidence of any other plausible source of ignition can be found. This type of approach is very dangerous, since any measures taken on the basis of these findings may prove to be neither appropriate nor far-reaching enough. The following sections examine the factors outlined above, citing practical examples, and review the impact of European Standards and Directives on the assessment of electrostatics as an ignition hazard. 2.
Trends and new results
2.1. Handling of bulk materials To assess the ignition hazards due to the accumulation of electrostatic charge in the industrial-scale handling of bulk materials it is necessary to know the minimum ignition energy of the dust cloud and the resistivity of the stored bulk materials. This applies particularly when assessing the ignition hazards due to cone discharges [l]. The CENELEC report [2] also pays due regard to minimum ignition energy and resistivity of bulk materials. Modem measurement methods have resulted in an increasing number of dusts being identified as having high ignition sensitivities [3]. A review of incidents occurring in the last 20 years shows that when bulk materials with a minimum ignition energy of less than 10 mJ are handled and processed on an industrial scale, it is as a rule not sufficient to preclude all effective sources of ignition as the sole protective measure. The subject of the incendivity of brush discharges for pure dusts has to date not yet been clarified definitively. This question arose in the past after it was found that the equivalent energy of brush discharges determined with gases was of the
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same order as the minimum ignition energy of some dusts [4]. Despite this, even the latest experimental results [5] and incident reports concerning this subject indicate that an ignition hazard is not to be expected. An explanation for this is offered by the differing temporal and spatial distributions of energy in brush discharges and spark discharges. These findings no longer hold true, however, if small amounts of flammable gases or vapors are present in the dust cloud, thus forming so-called hybrid mixtures. It is known that such low proportions of gas or vapor even at only fractions of the lower explosion limit can have a significant effect on the minimum ignition energy of the pure dust [6].Ignition due to a brush discharge can then no longer be excluded with certainty.
2.2 Packaging materials In many situations the wrong use of packaging materials and their incorrect handling have resulted in fires and explosions. Apart from the problems associated with grounding, the use of plastics that accumulate electrostatic charge for packaging materials continues to cause controversy. Brush discharges, which are incendive for gases and vapors, can originate from packaging materials of this type. To date no one has succeeded in developing an antistatic additive for commonly used polymers, such as polyethylene and polypropylene, that permanently and independently of environmental humidity reduces the surface resistance to a value of 18to 10" ohms and the resistivity to about 10' ohmm, and in addition has the following properties: the transparency and weldability of the polymer remain unaffected, there is no contamination of the container contents, manufacturing and incorporation in the polymer are simple and inexpensive. The techniques that are available at present, such as mixing in antistatic additives before the polymer is extruded or adding carbon particles, do not comply with the requirements stated above. 2.2.1 FIBCs The use of FIBCs (flexible intermediate bulk containers) in industry for bulk materials continues to increase. In the past, they have been the cause of several fires and explosions [7]. The required specifications for FIBCs differ according to the duty involved, and they are usually classified into Types A, B and C [2,8], the properties assessed being the breakdown voltage through the wall of the container and the leakage resistance fiom the surface of the FIBC to the grounding point. Recently a new type of FIBC has been developed which is often referred to as Type D FIBC. It is manufactured in such a way that it should release its charges without being earthed by the mechanism of corona discharges. More details on the electrostatic ignition hazards associated with FIBCs are described in a special paper on FIBCs presented at this conference.
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2.2.2. IBC Another increasingly popular means of shipping liquids, including flammable ones, is the IBC (intermediate bulk container). This has an inner plastic container which is surrounded by a metal outer enclosure or cage for protection and mechanical support. The potential ignition hazards remaining after grounding the metal components originate firstly in the plastic inner container and secondly in the electrostatically charged liquid. The following critical parameters in terms of the electrostatic ignition hazards are: ' Surface resistance of the plastic container Size of the charge-accumulating surface within the cage mesh Distance of the plastic surface from the metal enclosure or cage mesh (also taking into account any changes in pressure within the IBC) Wall thickness of the plastic container Leakage resistance of the liquid to the grounded metal enclosure or cage From existing guidance and recommendations [2] it can be concluded that for substances requiring apparatus groups IIA and IIB, assuming Zone 0 conditions inside the container and Zone 1 outside it, either the surface resistance of the plastic inner container must be limited to ld ohms at 23°C and 50 % relative humidity, or all the following conditions must be complied with: Maximum 2 mm wall thickness of the plastic container Maximum allowable surface area within the cage mesh 25 c d Metal cage or enclosure in close contact with the surface of the inner container. In addition it must be ensured, preferably by means of a grounded conductive bottom outlet valve, that the leakage resistance at at least one point inside the container does not exceed 1d ohms.
.
..
. .
2.2.3. Aluminum-laminated PE bags Aluminum-laminated PE bags offer a very good vapor barrier, the reason why these bags are used for bulk materials that are susceptible to moisture. The layer of aluminum is extremely thin, and as a rule is protected on each side by a layer of polyethylene. As a result of this, the aluminum layer cannot be reliably grounded without destroying the integrity of the polyethylene layer and hence the imperviousness of the bag. The author is aware of several cases where spark discharges were observed while bulk materials were being filled into alumhumlaminated PE bags. In one incident this resulted in the ignition of an explosive atmosphere. Even simple calculations show that when filling small quantities of electrostatically charged product into an ungrounded aluminum-laminated bag spark discharges can occur, which can ignite not only gases and vapors but also ignition-sensitive dusts. From Fig. 1 it can be seen that the accumulated energy is largely determined by the electrostatic charge of the product and the capacitance of the bag. The bag capacitance does not depend so much on its volume as on the way it is supported and its distance away from grounded
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Fig. 1
The energy accumulated by an ungrounded aluminum-laminated plastic bag after being filled with a product which has been electrostatically charged by the filling process. Electrostatic charges of to C k g as shown in the charts are typical for filling processes taking place under gravity [2].
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conductive plant surfaces. For example, the capacitance of a bag with a volume of some 25 liters is about lOpF if it is held at a distance of approximately l m from grounded conductive surfaces on all sides, but this rises to about 1O@F if it is in close contact with a grounded metal filling spout over a length of several centimeters. To ground aluminum-laminated plastic bags it is necessary to attach a grounding clamp with tight-gripping, sharply pointed jaws to the bag wall. A plastic layer of adequate bulk conductivity would also be a practical proposition in this application, since it would then no longer be necessary to perforate the bag, the aluminum layer being grounded with a normal grounding clamp or by providing a grounded metal surface to support the bag wall. 2.3 Conflicting objectives Measures are often taken for reasons of environmental protection, occupational safety, quality assurance, productivity, etc. which are instrumental in achieving objectives in these areas, but result in increased ignition hazards due to the accumulation of electrostatic charge. Typical examples of these are: 1. Solvent-laden exhaust air, which in the past was discharged to atmosphere as diluted as possible, is today collected in as concentrated a form as possible. This potentially explosive mixture is then led, often through plastic piping, to a central off-gas treatment system. 2. For reasons of occupational hygiene and environmental protection there is a growing trend to collect dust in local filters, in which clouds of fine dust particles can form a potentially explosive atmosphere, especially during filter shaking. If there is inadequate grounding of components such as the filter support elements, the dust cloud can be ignited by the electrostatic charge accumulated in the shaking operation. 3. The concrete surfaces of filling station forecourts, which actually conduct electricity quite well, are often provided with an insulating layer to protect the ground water against contamination in the case of a fuel spillage. Although car wheels are usually conductive, this insulating layer in the concrete means that grounding of the vehicles is not assured. When the pump nozzle is moved towards the car's filler pipe, a spark discharge can take place in exactly that location where a potentially expbsive mixture may be present. 4. Plastic hard hats are worn for head protection in the chemical industry, even in hazardous zones, where in principle they can cause incendive discharges. 5. The cleanroom garments required when working in GMP-compliant areas, in particular the boot covers, prevent the wearer fiom being reliably grounded, even though the flooring may be adequately conductive. 6. Corrosion protection measures such as painting, other surface coatings and the glass linings of piping prevent reliable potential equalization and grounding of flanges and pipe spools. In extreme cases the accumulation of electrostatic charge and the resultant breakdowns can even negate the
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original purpose of the coating. Examples of this are the damaged glass linings in reactor vessels [9] and the breakdown of PTFE linings in process piping. 7. The use of aluminum-laminated plastic bags as described in Section 2.2.3 is another example of two conflicting objectives, i.e. product qmlity requirements and the prevention of ignition hazards. It must be decided on a case-by-case basis which of the objectives or protective goals takes precedence, and what additional measures if any are necessary. There are also situations in which conflicting objectives regarding the measures taken to prevent ignition hazards due to the accumulation of electrostatic charge arise, and through which several explosions have occurred in the last two years, some of them severe. In operations such as taking a sample from a reactor vessel containing a flammable solvent, discharging solids still moist with solvent from a centrifuge or removing product heel from a centrifuge, the question arises as to which material is the most suitable for the sampling device, scoops or spatulas to be used. The conflicting objectives arise because if a grounded conductive sampling device or scoop is used, when this approaches the product, brush discharges can emanate from the electrostatically charged product. If on the other hand an insulating material is used, brush discharges can originate from the surface of the implement concerned. The selection of the most suitable material depends ultimately on the probability of an explosive atmosphere and an incendive electrostatic discharge occurring simultaneously. An assessment of this probability depends in turn on numerous individual factors such as the conductivity of the liquid or the bulk material still moist with solvent, the effectiveness of the inert gas blanketing during the manual intervention, the vapor pressure (over-rich mixture) of the solvent at the working tmperature, etc. Fig. 2 illustrates two possible locations where ignition could occur, depending on which components are electrostatically charged. In the case of a conductive, not electrostatically charged liquid (or bulk solid moist with solvent), a grounded conductive sampling device or scoop is preferable. In the situation with a highly charged insulating product the question arises as to how reliably the inert gas blanketing or over-rich mixture - in the case of a solvent with a very low flash point - can be ensured above the surface of the product. If this can be achieved, a grounded conductive sampling device or scoop should also be used in this case. A plastic sampling device or scoop is preferable, however, if the product is highly charged from the operation and a potentially explosive atmosphere directly above the surface of the liquid must be expected. In this case the surfaces that can accumulate charge must be kept as small as possible, and the implements must not be charged before they are used (for example by wiping them).
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3.
Directives and standards
The European Directive 1994/9/EC, also known as ATEX 1OOa [ 101, applies to equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. It states that not only must electrical expbsion protection be taken into account, but all other possible sources of ignition must also be prevented. In this context the ignition hazards due to electrostatic charge accumulation are also given explicitly. In addition to the important requirements for potential equalization for all conductive components, special attention must also be paid to limiting the surfaces than can accumulate charge. This limitation depends on the equipment category, and hence in which area (zone, expbsion group of the substances present) the equipment or protective system is used (see Tablel).
Fig. 2
a) Ignition by a brush discharge from the highly charged liquid to the grounded conductive sampling beaker. b) Ignition by a brush discharge from the electrostatically charged insulating sampling device to the rim of the filling nozzle.
The European Directive 1999/92/EC, also known as ATEX 137[14], describes the minimum requirements for improving the occupational health and safety of workers at risk from potentially explosive atmospheres. It sets out the obligations of employers to provide secondary expbsion protection (preventing the ignition of potentially explosive atmospheres), great importance being attached to electrostatics as a possible source of ignition. In their stipulations concerning the prevention of sources of ignition in hazardous areas both the 1994/9/EC and the 1999/92/EC Directives refer to the probabilities of a potentially explosive atmosphere and a source of ignition being present at the same time and place. This conceptual approach ultimately leads to hazardous areas being classified into zones, and equipment and protective systems into equipment groups. This makes sense provided that the
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simultaneous occurrence of an explosive atmosphere and a source of ignition is purely coincidental and not causally linked. In the case of ignition hazards caused by the accumulation of electrostatic charge this assumption does not always hold true. Taking the many product transfer operations that are carried out open to the atmosphere as example, the formation of an explosive atmosphere and the accumulation of high levels of electrostatic charge necessarily occur at the same time and place. Special attention must be given to this fact when planning preventive measures. Table 1
Limitations on surface area and coating thickness to prevent incendive brush discharges emanating from charge-accumulating surfaces [ l l - 131 (surface resistance > 1 G R measured at 23 +2 “C and 50 +S % relative humidity) Surface area limitations for charge-accumulating solid surfaces (4
Permissible surface area in cm2(The figures in parentheses apply when the surface is surrounded by a grounded conductive frame.)
Hazardous zone
50
1 I
100 (400)
I
GroupIIA
Category 1 (ZoneO)
I
Category 3 (Zone 2:’ )
I
Group IIB
I
GroupIIC
25
1
4
100 (400)
1
20 (100)
Permissible diameter
Hazardous zone
in mm
Category 1 (Zone 0)
Group IIA 3
Group IIB 3
Group IIC 1
Category 2 (Zone 1)
30*’
30%’
20:’
Category 3 (Zone 2)
no limit*’
no limit*’
no limit*’
CENELEC Report RO44-001 [2] was published in 1999 as a Technical Report, thus having the status of a recommendation and orientation aid. It is based on various national and industry-specific codes of practice [lS- 171. Major new considerations not covered by these standards impact on the handling of bulk
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materials by taking into account the phenomenon of cone discharges. Information on this subject is summarized in Section 2.1, which covers the problems associated with bulk materials.
References [l] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
[ 101 [ 111 [12] [13] [ 141
[ 151 [ 161 [ 171
M. Glor and B. Maurer, Journal of Electrostatics, 40 (1993) 123 CENELEC Report R044-001 “Safety of machinery - Guidance and recommendations for the avoidance ofhazards due to static electricity” 1999 R. Siwek and C. Cesana, Process Safety Progress, 14 (1995) 107 M. Glor, Journal ofElectrostatics, 10 (1981) 327 M. Glor and K. Schwenzfeuer, Journal of Electrostatics, 40 & 41 (1997) 383 W. Bartknecht, Explosionsschutz - Grundlagen and Anwendung, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York 1993 L.G. Britton, Process Safety Progress, 12,4 (1993) 241 - 250 M. Glor, B. Maurer and R. Rogers, Proceedings of the Conference on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, published by Elsevier Science B.V., Volume 1 (1995) 2 19 B. Maurer, Journal of Electrostatics, 40 & 41 (1997) 517 Directive 1994/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres EN 50014:1992 Section 7.3 prEN 50284:1997 Section 4.4 EN50021 Directive 1999/92/ECof the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres Richtlinien fiir die Vermeidung von Zundgefahren infolge elektrostatischer Aufladungen (Static Electricity Guideline), Institution for Statutory Accident Insurance and Prevention in the Chemical Industry, Heidelberg, Guideline No. 4, 1989 Code of Practice for Control of Undesirable Static Electricity. B.S. 5958, Parts 1 and 2, British Standards Institution, London, 1991 Static Electricity - Technical and safety aspects: a document published by Shell International Petroleum in 1988
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IDENTIFICATION OF AUTOCATALYTIC DECOMPOSITIONS BY DIFFERENTIAL SCANNING CALORIMETRY Leila Bou-Diab and Hans Fierz Swiss Institute for the Promotion of Safety and Security, Klybeckstrasse 141, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland A screening method based on dynamic DSC measurements for the identification of autocatalytic decompositions is presented in this work. The method consists of fitting a first order kinetic model to the measured heat release rate curve (dynamic DSC measurement) and determining the apparent activation energy. If the apparent activation energy is higher than 220 kJ/mol, the decomposition is autocatalytic. The proposed method has been applied to 100 autocatalytic and non autocatalytic reactions. The reliability of the method was tested by performing isothermal DSC measurements. The new method can not be applied in cases where the decomposition under investigation is directly preceded by an endothermal signal, and has to be used very carefully in case of consecutive reactions. 1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, risk is defined by the product of the severity of a potential incident and its probability of occurrence. Hence, risk assessment results in the evaluation of both, the severity and the probability. The thermal risk linked to a chemical reaction is the risk of loss of the control of the reaction and of triggering a runaway reaction [I]. In the chemical industry, estimation methods based on dynamic DSC measurements have been developed for a preliminary screening of such a risk at an early stage of the chemical process. The energy of reaction or decomposition is directly correlated to the severity i.e. the potential of destruction of a runaway reaction. The energies can be measured using Differential Scanning Calorimetry
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(DSC), in which the temperature of the oven is increased linearly over time. From the obtained energies of reaction and decomposition, it is possible to calculate the corresponding adiabatic temperature rise used to assess the severity of a potential incident. The probability of occurrence of an incident can be estimated using the time to maximum rate under adiabatic conditions (TMR,d). Keller et al. [2] developed a method for the estimation of the TMRd, relying also on dynamic DSC measurements. This model will be described later.
Another important point for the assessment of thermal risk is the identification of autocatalytic reactions. This type of reactions requires our special attention and should be clearly distinguished from nthorder reactions. A screening method for the identification of autocatalytic decompositions is presented. The reliability of this method was tested on 100 autocatalytic and non autocatalytic reactions. 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTOCATALYTIC REACTIONS
In autocatalytic reactions the observed rate of reaction is found to increase with conversion. An autocatalytic reaction is by definition a reaction in which a product catalyses its own formation. Thus, the term "autocatalytic" refers to a molecular reaction mechanism. The exact mechanism is usually not known for decompositions. The term "autocatalytic" used in this paper stands for the formal description of autocatalysis and is therefore not used in its proper sense. Such a reaction can often be formally represented by a Prout-Tompkins mechanism [3] involving two parallel steps. A first step (a), in which the autocatalyst B (B is assumed to be identical to the final product) is formed from the reactant A (first order reaction), and second (b), an autocatalytic reaction of A and B (second order reaction) which produces the final product:
A+Bk"_\2B At constant temperature the heat release rate of an nth order reaction decreases uniformly with time, whereas autocatalytic reactions show an acceleration of reaction rate with time and conversion (Fig. 1). The corresponding heat release rate passes through a maximum and then decreases again. The maximum can be characterised by its so called isothermal induction time.
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reaction
Time Fig. 1. Heat release rate curve as a f i c t i o n of time for autocatalytic and nth order reaction under isothermal conditions.
In case of runaway, where it is assumed that there is no heat exchange with the environment (adiabatic conditions), and the heat released will cause a temperature increase, these two types of reactions will lead to totally different temperature versus time curves (Fig. 2): for nth order reactions the temperature increase starts immediately after the cooling failure, while in the case of autocatalytic decompositions, the temperature remains stable during the induction period and then suddenly increases very sharply [4]. This difference in behaviour has some important consequences for the design of emergency measures for runaway reactions. For example, a technical measure to prevent a runaway could be a temperature alarm. This works well for decomposition reactions following a n* order kinetic law. However, autocatalytic reactions are not only accelerated by temperature, but also by conversion. Therefore a temperature alarm is not effective in this case, since the temperature increase can only be detected very late, at a time, where the temperature increase is so sharp that no measure can be taken anymore (Fig. 2).
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T
Temperature
Temperature level fo
Fig. 2. Temperature versus time curves for autocatalytic and n* order reaction under adiabatic conditions.
Autocatalytic reactions are also catalysed by impurities such as peroxides, rust, heavy metals or acids [5]. The amount and the type of impurity depends on the supplier, the quality level of the product and in some cases also on the production batch. Inconstant quality of products can dramatically change the decomposition characteristics. For example a nitro compound, which has been investigated over 20 years by our laboratory because of its tendency to decompose by an autocatalytic mechanism has shown considerable variation in its isothermal induction time (Table 1). Table 1
Consequences of inconstant quality of a nitro compound (decomposing with an autocatalytic mechanism) as measured in our laboratory over 20 years. The isothermal induction time has been measured by isothermal DSC measurement at 160 "C.
Isothermal induction time [min]
Year 1976
Year 1983
Year 1996
205
126
120
813
2.
METHODS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF AUTOCATALYTIC REACTIONS
Autocatalytic decompositions occur with many sorts of substances, organic as well as inorganic ones. Certain classes of compounds as for example aromatic nitro compounds, chlorinated aromatic amines or cyanuric chloride are known to decompose by an autocatalytic mechanism. A list of compounds decomposing with an autocatalytic mechanism can be found in the literature [6]. Experimentally, the most reliable way to detect and characterise autocatalytic decompositions is to record the decomposition rate as hnction of time, while the temperature is kept constant. An isothermal DSC measurement for example immediately identifies autocatalytic decomposition behaviour. Wheras isothermal DSC measurements are not common and can be very time consuming, dynamic, i.e. temperature programmed DSC measurements are widely used as a screening tool in industry. Therefore, an identification tool for autocatalytic reactions based on dynamic DSC would be of great advantage. Keller et al. [2] presented a model based on a zero order Arrhenius model for the estimation of the time to maximum rate from non-isothermal DSC measurements. Recently, PastrC et al. [7] have shown on the basis of Dewar experiments that the method presented by Keller indeed gives results on the conservative side, no matter whether the reactions involved are autocatalytic or not. The development presented above is part of the work of Keller. Assuming an Arrhenius model, the heat release rate q(T) for a zero order reaction can be calculated at a given temperature T according to the following equation:
Where E, is the activation energy, To is the onset temperature and is defined as the temperature at which the heat rate signal can first be differentiated from the baseline temperature reading and q,, the heat release rate at the onset temperature which depends on the sensitivity of the instrument and is usually between 1-20 Wkg. By taking a value of 50 kJ/mol for the activation energy, the heat release at lower temperatures can be determined. For a zero order reaction, the following expression for the TMRd at a given temperature may be derived:
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Where cp is the heat capacity and R the gas constant. Using equations (1) and (2) a TMRd value can be extrapolated to lower temperatures. As the extrapolation is based on a low value for the activation energy E, (never encountered for decomposition reactions), the calculated heat release rate is too high and the resulting TMR,d too short and therefore on the conservative side. This estimation method is based on the assumption that conversion which influences the reaction rate can be neglected. In the case of autocatalytic reactions the reaction rate is strongly influenced by the concentration of the formed product. Extrapolation to lower temperature needs therefore not only an estimation of the heat release rate, but also of conversion at a given temperature. Furthermore, this approach assumes that a DSC measurement is representative for the thermal behaviour of a substance, since the kinetics of decomposition is a physicochemical property of a given compound. Therefore it is not supposed to vary. This is theoretically correct. However in case of an autocatalytic decomposition, it can be difficult to find a representative sample of the compound, since these decompositions are often catalysed by impurities, which are not a property of a given compound, and often vary significantly depending on the origin and prehistory of a given sample. If the decomposition of a batch happens to start at lower temperatures than the analysed sample, the method of Keller is not conservative anymore. Therefore it was thought necessary to develop a reliable method for the identification of autocatalytic decompositions.
3 NEW SCREENING METHOD FOR AUTOCATALYTIC DECOMPOSITIONS
IDENTIFICATION
OF
As mentioned above, industrial screening methods are based on dynamic DSC measurements. In case of autocatalytic decompositions, these measurements usually show narrow signals with high heat release rate maxima and high potentials. It was found that an experienced person could identify such decompositions by their characteristic signal shape. Therefore, it seemed possible to develop an reliable autocatalytic screening tool recognising signals of the described size and shape. A quantitative method would be to characterise dynamic DSC curves of autocatalytic decompositions by their peak height and width. Another possibility
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would consist of fitting the measured curve to a simulated one and find a characteristic parameter to identify autocatalytic reactions. This method was chosen in this work. In the past, DSC software was developed to determine the kinetic data of a reaction on the basis of dynamic measurement by using a first order kinetic model. This fitting procedure gave in many cases unreasonable kinetic parameters. Autocatalytic decompositions will give very high activation energies [2]. As with this type of reaction the heat release rate increases not only with temperature, but also with conversion, high apparent values of activation energies are no surprise. Based on these considerations a new method for identification of autocatalytic decompositions was developed, where a simulated DSC curve based on first order kinetics was fitted to the measured heat release rate curve from a dynamic DSC. The signal-baseline must either be known or be based on a reasonable assumption. The heat release rate q(T) for a first order mechanism assuming an Arrhenius model is given by Eq. (3) where Eq. (1) has to be multiplied by a conversion term.
Where
M(t)
is the partial reaction enthalpy at a given time t, mRthe global the conversion.
reaction enthalpy and the ratio M
R
For a temperature-programmed measurement, the temperature is defined by the following equation:
Where Tstmis the start temperature of the measurement and a a constant heating rate in Ws. Eq. (3) using the tempearture function Eq. (4) can only be integrated numerically (see Appendix). Using this simulation, the apparent activation energy of the measured curve can be deduced. The apparent activation energy served as criterion to determine whether a decomposition was autocatalytic or not. The validity of this criterion was verified by measuring isothermal DSC’s of the same substances, because using these the autocatalytic behaviour can be corroborated. The following figures illustrate the influence of the different parameters on the simulation results.
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$ 2500 u
g 1500
I
4
8 1000
c
8
500 100
150
200
250
Temperature [“C]
Fig. 3. Representation of an ideal fitting with the corresponding onset temperature and apparent activation energy.
100
150
200
250
Temperature [“C]
Fig. 4.Influence of the apparent activation energy on the simulated curve.
-$
3000
3
2000
-
2500
-88
1500
3
$
u
8
1000 500
0 100
150
200
Temperature [“C]
Fig. 5. Influence of the onset temperature on the simulated curve.
250
817
4
EXPERIMENTAL
The kinetic model was written as spreadsheet (MS-Excel@). For the general applicability of the method, the following approach was chosen: The dynamic DSC-measurements were not required to exist as ASCII-files, but they usually existed as graphs (from e.g. a scanner) and were imported in bitmap form where they formed a background picture to the Excel graphics showing the simulated curve. By varying the parameters of the simulation the simulated and the measured curves could be superposed. Sloping baselines could also be corrected. As the fitting is made on a visual basis, an error margin of 10 % has to be taken into account. During the study, it became clear that the border value of the apparent activation energy distinguishing between autocatalytic and non autocatalytic reactions was around 200 kJ/mol. According to that the examples were chosen to narrow this limit. Therefore the distribution of the obtained activation energies was not representative of the real distribution in industry. In order to determine this real distribution, a second study involving 100 other cases from the fine chemical industry was made and is presented below. 5
RESULTS
The proposed method was tested with 100 substances known to decompose by nth order and autocatalytic pathways. The obtained results are summarised in Table 2. Table 2
Classification of nthorder mechanism and autocatalytic mechanism according to the apparent activation energy.
Apparent activation energy rkJ/rnoll
Non autocatalytic mechanism
Autocatalytic mechanism
Exceptions
50-180
220- 1000
140, 145, 120
818
Thus a general tendency was observed: the method delivered reliable results with 97 % of the cases. However some exceptions (3 %) were found and are discussed below: -
When an endothermic process precedes the exothermic decomposition, no fitting was possible (Fig. 6), since the real onset of the exothermic reaction necessary to perform the fit could not be determined. Therefore the method could not be applied in those cases. However, it is known that decompositions from the melt have a formally autocatalytic decomposition mechanism. Problems may also occur with consecutive reactions, where the autocatalytic reaction is preceded by an nth order reaction. By fitting the curve, the calculated apparent activation energy will reflect the first reaction which is nthorder and not the autocatalytic one (Fig. 7).
1000
y
I
Simulated measured curye
500 0
-500
5p
100
150
20b1
250
300
3$0
- 1000
-1500 Temperature ["C] Fig. 6. Fit procedure in case when the exothermicity is preceded by an endothermal effect.
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-
5000
D l
'z 4000 L
3000
%
Second reaction
-g 2000
\
2
g
4-0
I
1000
first reaction
0
0
100
200
300
400
500
Temperature ["C] Fig.7. DSC mesurement with more than one exothermal peak.
In the 100 examples analysed, this case was encountered three times. However, it is important to notice that in these three cases, the dynamic DSC measurement clearly pointed out the presence of several reactions causing different well distinguishable peaks. The proposed method is a rapid and easily applicable tool and allows us to differentiate between autocatalytic and non-autocatalytic decompositions. The error margin in the determination of the apparent activation energies of 10 % is important for borderline cases with apparent activation energies lying between 180-220 kJ/mol. For safety reasons, we recommend the application of isothermal DSC measurements if the activation energies are found to lie within 180-220 kJ/mol. Another statistical study involving 100 fine chemicals chosen at random and commonly used in the industry showed that 20 % of the analysed substances had apparent activation energies between 180-220 kJ/mol and that 60 % of the decompositions had activation energies higher than 220 kJ/mol and were thus considered to be autocatalytic.
820
6 CONCLUSION
A new method for the identification of autocatalytic decompositions was tested on 100 compounds. For apparent activation energies (obtained by fitting a first order kinetic model on the measured heat release rate of a dynamic DSC) higher than 220 kJ/mol the decomposition was shown to be autocatalytic. The method is not applicable in cases where the exothermal signal is directly preceded by an endothermal signal. The method has to be used with care when serial reactions occur (several peacks can be distinguished in the thennogram). REFERENCES [ l ] F. Stoessel, Chemical Engineering Progress, 10 (1993) 68. [2] A. Keller, D. Stark, H. Fierz, E. Heinzle and K. Hungerbiihler, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 10 (1997) 3 1. [3] E.G. Prout, F.C. Tompkins, Trans. Faraday SOC.,40 (1994) 40 [4] J-M. Dien, H. Fierz, F. Stoessel and G. Kill&,Chimia, 48 (1994) 542. [ 5 ] T. Grewer, Thermal Hazards of Chemical Reactions, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1994. [6] F. Brogli, P. Grimm, M. Meyer and H. Zubler, 3'd Intemat. Sympos. Loss Prevention, Swiss SOC.Chem. Ind. Basel. [7] J. PastrB, U. Worsdorfer, A. Keller, K. Hungerbiihler, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 13 (2000) 7.
NOMENCLATURE Heat capacity Differential Scanning Calorimetry Activation energy Heat release Rate Heat release rate at the onset temperature Ideal gas constant Temperature Onset temperature Start temperature of a DSC measurement Constant heating rate time Time increment Time to maximum rate under adiabatic conditions Total reaction enthalpy Partial reaction enthalpy Approximation of the partial reaction enthalpy
82 1
APPENDIX For the numerical simulation of the DSC curve the value of the heat release rate at a time t + At is needed and can be given by:
However the value of the specific heat of the reaction at t + At is unknown. A first approximation (Euler) is used to evaluate this value. The approximated value is given by AH*(t+ At) and can be expressed by: M*
(t + ~ t= m(t)+ ) q(t).~t
(6)
By replacing AH (t + At) by its approximation we get:
Knowing the value of the heat release rate at t + At a better approximation of the specific heat of the reaction at t + At can be calculated (trapezoid integration) : At ~~(t+~t)=(q(t)+q(t+~t)).2
(8)
Eq. (8) of the heat of reaction at t + At is then introduced into Eq. ( 5 ) describing the heat release rate at t + At and the simulated curve is then calculated.
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823
Flame Arrester Testing and Qualification in Europe H. Forster Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt, Bundesallee 100, 3 8 1 16 Braunschweig, Germany
1. INTRODUCTION Flame arresters are safety devices fitted to openings of enclosures or to pipework, which are intended to allow flow but to prevent flame transmission. They have widely been used for decades in the chemical and oil industry, and national standards for testing and use are available[ 1,2, 3, 4, 51. The development of the single European Market, here especially launched by EC Directive 94/9/EC, the so-called ATEX 100 Directive [6], requires harmonisation of the certification procedures and technical requirements also for flame arresters. This work started about ten years ago and has found a certain finalisation in the draft European standard pr EN 12874 “Flame arresters, Performance requirements, test methods and limits for use” [7]. This draft standard reflects the European state of the art in this field. The Directive 94/9/EC covers flame arresters under the term “autonomous protective systems”. The formal procedures go back to Annex I11 “Module: ECType Examination” and Annex IV “Module: Production Quality Assurance” of the said Directive. These combined requirements are most stringent: The manufacturer needs certification not only for his product but also for his production quality system. The certificates have to be issued by an independent third party, the so-called “Notified Body”. With respect to the technical requirements, the “Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSR)” in Annex I1 of the said Directive have to be complied with. These requirements are of a rather general nature. The necessary technical specification is laid down in the draft European standard pr EN 12874 which is mandated under the Directive 94/9/EC. This mandate means that a flame
824
arrester will be supposed to comply with the EHSR if it complies with the standard. According to its title, the draft standard addresses manufacturers (performance requirements), notified bodies (test methods) and customers (limits for use). It covers application under atmospheric conditions as specified by the Directive but extends also to slightly higher pressures (1.6 bar abs) and temperatures (150 "C) for static arresters (see below). The scope does not cover external safety-related measurement and control equipment or mixtures with self-decomposing fuels and of non-atmospheric oxygen concentrations. 2. HAZARDS AND FLAME ARRESTER CLASSIFICATION
2.1 Propagating flames For propagating flames the hazards flame arresters have to cope with can (apart from very special cases) basically be described by four situations (see Table 1). Each of these is reflected by a separate standard test procedure and consequently defines a separate class of flame arresters. Table 1
Hazards and flame arrester classification
The different situations are schematically shown in Fig. 1 (end-of-line deflagration arrester), Fig. 2 (pre-volume deflagration arrester) and Fig. 3 (in-line deflagratioddetonation arrester). The difference between in-line deflagration and in-line detonation arrester is merely the tested (installed) run-up length of the flame on the unprotected side: Deflagration arresters are limited to a maximum pipe length of 50 pipe diameters between possible ignition source and arrester; for in-line detonation arresters there is no such limitation.
825
Fig. 1. Application of end-of-line deflagration arrester
Fig. 2. Application of Pre-volume deflagration arrester
Fig. 3. Application of in-line deflagratioddetonation arrester
826
2.2 Stabilised flames While the basic classification relates to hazards from propagating flames, there might be the additional hazard of flame transmission after stabilised burning. This could happen after an explosion when the explosive mixture continues to flow through the arrester as in a Bunsen burner. The associated heating-up of the whole device could result in delayed flame transmission. Flame arresters, which prevent flame transmission for a time period of at least one minute in such situations are classified as safe with respect short-time burning. They have to be equipped (and tested) with an integrated temperature sensor capable of triggering an emergency action within 30 seconds. This action might be stopping the flow or, alternatively, bypassing, diluting or inerting the flowing mixture. Flame arresters, which prevent flame transmission from stabilised burning for an unspecified time, are classified as safe with respect to endurance burning. The corresponding test requires burning until temperature stabilisation results at the arrester; in any case a minimum burning time of two hours is necessary. With regard to the combustion loads, it has to be mentioned that deflagration arresting is an indispensable capability of any flame arrester. The capability of detonation arresting is an additional option which, if present, dominates technically and with respect to the classification. So every detonation arrester also has to prevent flame transmission from deflagrations. In the same way, the capability of withstanding stabilised burning is an additional option: For example, an end-of-line deflagration arrester can be endurance burn safe and then is often simply called an endurance burning flame arrester. In-line detonation arresters often are qualified for short time burning safety (which in this case is not reflected by the name). 2.3 Operating principle Apart from the type of combustion load for which they are suited, flame arresters are also specified by their operating principle. Table 2 lists those types which are now covered by the European draft standard. Static flame arresters are by far the most important and versatile ones, so they will be discussed here in some detail, whereas the specific requirements for the other types can be given only roughly.
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Flame arrester type Operating principle Quenching the flame in narrow Static flame arrester Producing flow velocities above flame velocity by valve action Producing and monitoring flow velocities above flame velocity by action of external equipment Forming a liquid seal (siphon) by liquid product in a product line Breaking the flow of explosive mixture into discrete bubbles in a water column
Field of application General use
High-velocity vent valve
Tank venting
Flow-controlled aperture
Burner injection, stacks
Liquid product flame arrester Liquid-filled lines Hydraulic flame arrester
In-line use
3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS In any case the test set-up simulates one of the basic situations identified in the hazard analysis ( Sec. 2, Table 1). The tests are carried out with representative mixtures of the well known explosion groups IIA, IIB and IIC, using a subdivision of IIB as shown in Table 3.
Marking according to pr EN 12874 IIB 1 IIB 1 IIB3 IIB
Maximum Experimental Safe Gap (MESG) of test mixture in mm 2 0.85 2 0.75 10.65 2 0.50
This subdivision reflects the need to combine sufficient quenching capability of static flame arresters with minimum pressure loss, which is fundamental for practical use. The protection “flame proof enclosure” (of electrical equipment) uses the same physical principle but - with a view to practice - may completely neglect the aspect of gas flow through the gaps. The flame arrester standard does not require flameproof gaps of the arrester housing to the outside. The possible risk from flame transmissions through such
828
“gaps” is covered by pressure and leak tests, which are carried out as production tests, and by proper maintenance. 4. SPECIAL ASPECTS AND REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Pressure and temperature conditions According to the draft European standard, all “non-static” flame arresters are tested under conditions where the mixture is under atmospheric pressure at least on one side of the arrester; this agrees with the fields of application (see Table 2, line 2 to 4). The pressure on the other side of the arrester may be slightly higher or lower (maximum about 200 mbar), depending on the set pressure (of a valve) or the height of a water column. So the use of these arresters is limited to “atmospheric” conditions. For in-line static-type flame arresters certification for operating pressures above atmospheric is often requested. Though a practical need for considerably elevated operating pressures cannot be seen, North American standards allow for such a qualification. So the European draft standard - mainly for reasons of competition - also provides the possibility of testing at elevated pressure. The maximum initial pressure in the tests (and for operation) is limited to 1.6 bar absolute. Testing under elevated pressures means indeed a higher load for the flame arresters (safe gap and pressure of the mixture are reciprocally related). In some standards [ 1,2,4] pressure venting during in-line explosion through a bursting diaphragm is allowed. The European draft standard does not provide such an unspecified relief and the test set-up has to remain closed throughout the test.
Fig. 4. Set-up for in-line deflagratioddetonation flame arrester testing
829
This closed system testing according to the schematic set-up in Fig. 4 is certainly more severe than test procedures with pressure relief. The use of a closed test system, possibly with higher pressures, has created a lot of technical problems. One problem which is still unsolved is that none of the existing standards provides test procedures for stabilised burning at elevated pressures. So the use of any in-line arrester with short-time burning or endurance-burning qualification presently is limited to use at atmospheric pressure. This aspect casts additional doubts on the testing at elevated pressures. The European certification under the ATEX 100 Directive is not affected since there is a formal and general limit to atmospheric conditions. Testing with elevated temperatures of the mixture - also outside the scope of an ATEX certification - is technically not so problematic. From a series of comparative tests it was found that heating the arrester only results in a more conservative test than heating arrester and mixture to a requested temperature. The explanation can be seen in the reduced gas density in the former case, which leads to a reduction of the combustion energy and hence the explosion load to the arrester. So - for testing at elevated temperatures - heating of the arrester only was accepted as standard procedure in pr EN 12874. 4.2 In-line static deflagration arresters - testing and limits for use The testing of in-line static deflagration arresters is well established. It could be shown that - for a given flame arrester - the most significant parameter for flame transmission is the transient explosion pressure at the arrester when the flame is just going to enter the arrester element (matrix of quenching gaps) [S]. The lengths of the pipes on the protected and unprotected sides reasonably influence this pressure. This knowledge allows flexible pipe length installations in the test set-up as well as specific limits for use: For example, the ratio of pipe length (between the potential ignition source and the flame arrester) and pipe diameter shall not exceed the tested ratio. A considerable safety margin is introduced by the requirement that at least 10 % of the cross sectional area of the pipe shall be open on the ignition source side (for example the mouth of a burner injection).
4.3 In-line static detonation arresters - testing and limits for use Depending on pipe diameter, pipe length and mixture concentration, a deflagration in a pipe may undergo a transition to detonation and then continue running down the pipe as a so-called stable detonation. The stable detonation exhibits invariable velocity and pressure characteristics, the so-called ChapmanJouguet values; for ambient conditions, these are about 1800 m/s and about 20 bar for most of the hels important in practice.
830
Transition from deflagration to detonation is a local phenomenon occurring within a length of few pipe diameters and showing extremely high detonation pressures (up to 100 bar); flame velocities can hardly be defined over such short pipe pieces. In test standards the transition phase is usually summarised as unstable detonation. Clearly, an unstable detonation is a much higher load on a flame arrester than a stable detonation. Fig. 5 shows typical examples of the pressure traces in a stable detonation and in an unstable detonation phase.
Fig. 5 Explosion overpressures of a stable (black) and unstable (grey) detonation
While stable detonation conditions are well reproducible and therefore well suited for test procedures, just the contrary holds for the unstable detonation phase: Experience shows that velocity and pressure characteristics are subject to considerable scatter (a factor of five is not unusual). The reason is seen in the highly stochastic nature of the extremely turbulent flame acceleration which summits in the transition phase. That extreme scattering prevents ease of use in test procedures. In this situation and in view of the claim of other standards to provide sound testing against unstable detonations [ 1, 2,4], the European standard specifies according to the tested combustion load - stable and unstable detonation flame arresters.
83 1
Testing with stable detonations is well established and supplemented by mandatory deflagration tests to qualify stable detonation flame arresters according to the European draft standard. Testing with unstable detonations first of all requires a technically sound definition of an unstable detonation. In the European draft standard this was tried by introducing a detonation pressure criterion, comparing the reproducible and tabulated 200 ps t h e average pressure Pmd of a stable detonation with the corresponding value pmuof an unstable candidate‘event (see Fig. 5). For the purposes of the standard a test counts for unstable detonations when pmu2 3 pmd. This approach is a first step in making assessments in that field comparable and reliable but it is by far not s&sfying:
- The applied minimum criterion in the testing presumably does not cover a still unknown maximum load in practice. - Assessments on the basis of a few tests (maximum 10) are statistically insignificant; on the other hand, extended testing does not find acceptance for economical reasons. - All known “unstable detonation” test procedures attempt to produce and measure conditions in a pipe section immediately before the arrester. Unfortunately the worst case has to be expected when the transition occurs in the arrester and where test data are very likely to depend on the design of the individual device tested. So further research has to show, whether - in connection with flame arrester testing - relevant and general unstable detonation characteristics can be found at all. The splitting into a stable and an unstable detonation arrester class might first be confusing for the customers as regards application and risk assessment. First of all, in practice the location of a possible transition (unstable detonation phase) is not predictable. Therefore the position of a detonation flame arrester in a practical pipe installation is irrelevant for the choice “stable - unstable”. Indeed the splitting allows for different safety concepts developed in various countries: The (former) national German requirements asked for stable detonation testing only so that these arresters to some extent correspond to the stable detonation arresters of the European draft standard. The risk from unstable detonations was reduced to an acceptable level by national safety regulations which require redundant measures against flame transmission, depending on the likelihood of explosive mixtures and effective ignition sources [9]. This concept has been
832
used ever since without bad safety records and is reflected - on a small scale by the requirements of the European directives (categories of explosion proof equipment [ 6 ] and accepted combinations of categories and zones [lo]). As far as known, a similar view is taken in some other European countries, for example in Italy, Austria and Switzerland. In Great Britain and North America the flame arrester standards established on a national level require unstable detonation testing. The detonation arresters in these countries then to some extent correspond to the unstable detonation arresters of the European draft standard. Irrespective of the problems with testing, unstable detonation arresters are clearly superior to stable detonation arresters with respect to their flame arresting capability. So the use of an unstable detonation arrester might be rewarded by reducing the above-mentioned number of redundant measures against flame transmission. This idea gives some logical guidance for the use of stable or unstable detonation arresters in safety concepts. The equivalence of such concepts with respect to the acceptable risk has still to be assessed. The significance of any unstable detonation test procedure which at present is very small is one of the most important points for these assessments. 5. CONCLUSIONS Flame arrester testing and classification in Europe is harmonised by the draft European standard pr EN 12874. The standard test procedures for deflagrations, stable detonations and stabilised burning have been developed from existing national standards and are well established. The known test procedures for unstable detonations suffer from statistical insignificance. This problem might be inherent to the unstable detonation process and it could not be solved satisfactorily by the European standard. Despite these problems, the standard introduces - apart from the well-known stable detonation arresters - a class of unstable detonation arresters. The effect of this possibility to use different classes on established safety concepts needs to be hrther discussed.
833
REFERENCES BS 7244: 1990, British Standard Specification for flame arresters for general use, British Standards Institution U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Register, Vol. 5 5 , No. 120 (1990), Appendix A to Part 154 - Guidelines for detonation Flame Arresters, Appendix B to Part 154 Standard Specification for Tank Vent Flame Arresters DIN Normvorlage Flammendurchschlagsicherungen, August 1990 Canadian Standards Association - CSA - Z 343-96: Test Methods for In-Line and Firebox Flame Arresters, Second Edition (1996) International Maritime Organisation, Maritime Safety Committee, Circular No. 677: Revised Standards for the Design, Testing and Locating of Devices to Prevent the Passage of Flame into Cargo Tanks in Tankers, IMO London (1994) Directive 94/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member states concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmosphere. pr EN 12874 Flame arresters - Performance requirements, test methods and limits for use, CEN, final draft, July 2000 H. Forster, Deflagrationen und Detonationen als Standardverfahren zur Prufung von Flammendurchschlagsicherungen, 8. Kolloquium zu Fragen der chemischen und physikalischen Sicherheitstechnik, Bundesanstalt fur Materialforschung und -prufung, Berlin, 1999 Technische Regeln fur bennbare Fliissigkeiten, TRbF 100 Allgemeine Sicherheitsanforderungen, Bundesminister fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (BArBl Heft 611997) [101 Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1999 on minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres.
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835
Thermal Hazard Evaluation of Vilsmeier Reaction M. Suzuki ', A. Miyake ', Y. Iizuka b, Y. Oka ' and T. Ogawa ' a Department of Safety Engineering
,Yokohama National University
Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku,Yokohama, 240-8501, Japan Yokohama Research Center, Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation Kamoshida-cho, Aoba-ku, Yokohama, 227-8502, Japan
ABSTRACT Vilsmeier reaction is one of important reactions in organic photoconductor industry, and quantitative information of thermal hazard of the reaction is needed for the process control and safety. In this paper, the thermal hazard of Vilsmeier reaction is investigated and heats of mction are measured using reaction calorimeters. It was found that thermal decomposition of the Vilsmeier complex and selection of the solvent might be a key for the suitable reaction.
1. INTRODUCTION
Formylation of aromatic compounds using the Vilsmeier complex is a popular reaction in the chemical industry, especially in organic photoconductor manufactures. However the complex has a thermal instability as reported [1,5], a quantitative understanding is needed for the process safety and optimization. The Vilsmeier complex is usually prepared by the reaction of phosphorus oxychloride (F'OCl,) and N,N-dimethyleformamide@MF) or N-methylformamide(MFA) shown below [2,3]. R2NCH0 + POCl,
--$
[R;;N+CHCl 2 R2N-C+HC1]O-POC12 [A1
(1)
836
Immonium salt such as P] is an intermediate in the Vilsmeier reaction. It is converted into formyl compound by hydrolyzation. ArH+[A]
P]
+
+ H20
ACH=N+R2.O-POCl2 +
ACHO
PI m
2
+HC1 +HOPOC12
Since the theoretical calculation of the heat of decomposition of the complex is generally difficult because of its structure, experimental measurement of thermal behavior using reaction calorimetrytechnique is usehl for the hazard evaluation. It is presumed that the Vilsmeier complex does not exist when reagents are mixed at lower temperature, and the complex is produced with the temperature rise. It is considered that POC13 are solvated with coordinating to DMF [4]. Therefore, the reaction heat of the Vilsmeier complex depends on the temperature of the system. Furthermore, the equilibrium of the complex may also depend on the temperature and the equilibrium shift cause the heat generation. In chemical industry, two typical methods of formylation using Vilsmeier reaction are used. In the first method adding the substrates to the solution including the Vilsmeier complex, and aldehyde is obtained by hydrolyzation. In the second method obtaining aldehyde by the hydmlyzation after dosing POC13into the solvent including the substrates for formylation. The thermal hazard of Vdsmeier reaction is d i f f m t in the method of formylation. In this paper, thermal stability of Vilsmeier reaction is examined by using reaction calorimeters such as RC 1, C80 and ARC, and the physical and chemical heats of reaction is determined. And the worst case scenario in this reaction is investigated. 2. EXPERIMENTAL
2.1. Reagents POC13(99wt% purity) and DMF (99.5 wt??purity, water h e ) or MFA (98 wt?! purity, water Eee) were used as the Vilsmeier complex reagents, and TPD (99% purity, solid) were used as substrate.
2.2. Experimental apparatus and methods The reaction calorimeter; Mettler-Toledo RC1 was used. Fig. 1 shows a schematic drawing of RC 1. RC 1 works to measure the temperature differencebetween the contents
837
Fig.1 Schematic drawing of Mettler-Toledo RC1
and the heat transfer fluid in the reactor jacket, and it controls the fluid temperatures according to the desired control mode. The heat release rate is determined based on the heat and mass balances in the mactor. In addition, the reactor was equipped with temperature sensors, calibration heaters and reflux units.The SVOl type glass reactor with the volume of 0.8L was used and the paddle stirrer was equipped. Experiments were carried out in semi-batch operation as follows. At first, an adequate solution for reaction, DMF or MFA or DMF dissolved TPD was heated up to the desired temperature in the RC 1 reactor. After obtainingthe thermal equilibrium at the desired temperature, POCl3 was added dropwise into the reactor with transfer pipette, and then the heat generation was measured. Fig2 shows the example of heat release rate 250
E 8
2
c,
-.
, DMF/POCl3=24/1
2oo 150
2
DMF or MFA 2oomL POC13 lOmL Reaction temp. T,= 298K
9e 100 a
c,
&
50 0
I\-_.
_I--,
2
4
I
6
.
Time[min] Fig2 Heat release rate versus time profiles of DMFPOC13 and MFAPOCI3 systems
838
versus time measured by RC1. Experiments were performed as shown below, respectively. 1. The Teaction heat (Q) of the Vilsmeier complex in DMFPOCI3 system at isoperibolic conditions was examined at a constant temperature between 288 and 323 K. The volume of DMF was 200mL, and POC13was 1OmL. 2. The dissolution heat of the Vilsmeier complex was measured by adding H20into the solution at 298K. 3. Formylation using the Vilsmeier complex proceeded in a similar manner as above. In the reactor, TPD was dissolved in DMF. POCl3 was added dropwise at 343K and 323K, and the heat generation was measured for several hours. Then the adequate H20 was added for hydrolyzation at 298K in the solution DMF with immonium salt and Vilsmeier complex, and recorded the heat generation, too. And aldehyde was obtained. The thermal behavior of Wlsmeier complex was also measured with a heat conduction calorimeter; Setaram C80. The Vilsmeier complex formed in DMF/POC13 system at 298K was heated up to 333K at a heating rate of 2Kmin-'. A SUS-316 stainless steel pressure vessel with inner glass vessel was used. The thermal stability of the Vilsmeier complex was also investigated using an adiabatic calorimeteq Arthur D Little, accelerating rate calorimeter ARC. The thermal stability of the Vilsmeier complex of DMF/POC13system was already reported [1,5]. The measurement was carried out for the complex of MFA/POC13 system. ARC was operated in a heat-wait-search mode with 5K step. A titanium bomb was used and the sample mass was approximately 4g.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 3.1. Thermal hazards of Vilsmeier complex From the results of RCI experiment, the heats of Vilsmeier complex generation in DMF/POC13 system at isoperibolic conditions between 288K and 323K showed a constant value as 57 kJ/mol at any temperatures.Neither exotherm nor endotherm was found by C80 scanning of the Vilsmeier complex. It is considered that the equilibrium of the Vilsmeier complex does not depend on the temperature, otherwise the complex phase does not exist.
3.2. Influence of the solvent on the thermal stability of Vilsmeier complex From the ARC data,exothermicpeaks of the Vilsmeier complex of MFA/POC13
839
system appeared at 339K and 488K. Table 1 shows the ARC test results compared with DMF/PoC13 system about the first exothermic peak. As a result, the maximum heating rate and the onset temperature of the complex in MFA system showed similar values as those of DMF system. However the heat of the complex in MFA system measured by RC1 was 2'7kJ/mol, the half in DMF system. Since the stability against thermal decomposition of the Vilsmeier complex of MFA system is the same level as that of DMF system, it can be stated that the thermal hazards of MFA system is lower than that of DMF system. Table 1 ARC test results of Viismeier complex in different solvent system Solvent
POCG / Solvent
DW [31 MFA
1114.4 U14.9
Onset temp. T[KJ 334.3 339.5
(dT/dt),
0.071 0.102
Thermal inertia 1-1 $=1.57 6 =1.59
33. Heats of reaction in formylation using Vilsmeier reaction Table 2 shows the heats of reaction of formylation at 323 K. From RC 1 data the heats of reaction of Vilsmeier reaction were determined such as generation, thermal decomposition and hydrolyzation of the Vilsmeier complex. The heats of gneneration and hydrolyzation of immonium salt of substrate TPD were able to calculate h m the data of formylation. In this experiment the obtained data involved the heats of the Vilsmeier complex and immonium salt when PoC13was dosing into the DMF solution dissolved TPD. When hydrolyzation of imrnonium solution occurred, the experimental data involved the heats of hydrolyzation of the Vilsmeier complex and immonim salt likewise. Each heat of reaction could be separated as shown in Table2. On the other hand the result of chemical analysis of the reaction products with liquid chromatography showed that TPD conversion was nearly 100percent. Table 2 The heats of reaction (0)in formylation at 323K Reaction
Generation of Vilsmeier complex
Q
57kTmol
-'
Decomposition of Viismeier complex Hydrolyzation of Vilsmeier complex
178!dmol-'
Generation of immonium salt
1.13kJg-'
Hydrolyzation of immonium salt
1.16Hg'
The maximumheat release rate 3 16Ktnin-IDMF/POC1~=3/1[5]
840
3.4. The worst case scenario in Vilsmeier reaction Fig.3 shows one of the worst case scenario; runway reaction of Vilsmeier reaction. In this scenario undesired reaction is caused by the thermal decomposition of the Vilsmeier complex. In case of adding substrates into the solution of the Vilsmeier complex, there is a potential hazard of thermal decomposition of the Vilsmeier complex. For example, adding the substrate solution involving water may raise the temperature in the reactor with the heat of dissolution or hydrolyzation of the complex or the heat of dilution of substrate solution, and it leads the decomposition of the complex. In case of adding POC13 into the solution dissolved substrate, the Vilsmeier complex is consumed immediately by formylation of substrate. Therefore it is considered that the above procedure is safer method for Vilsmeier reaction. But the heat of hydrolyzation of the Vilsmeier complex is so large that the excess mass of the Vilsmeier complex will induce runaway reaction of the system if the water exists. With regard to solvent, &om the calorimetric data of the Vilsmeier complex it is concluded that of MFA system is more stable than DMF system.
4. CONCLUSION Several kinds of heat regarding the formylation of Vilsmeier reaction were determined with reaction calorimetricexperiments,and the potential hazard scenario of
Dosing of substrate
Decomposition of Vilsmeier complex
Generation of
cooing failure
Time Fig.3 Runaway scenario of Vilsmeier reaction
84 1
the reaction was investigated. It is concluded that thermal decomposition of the Vilsmeier complex may cause a runaway reaction and MFA is more preferable than DMF as solvent in the Vilsmeier reaction system.
REFERENCES [ 1IY.IiZuka and A.Fujita, Proc. 7'hInt71Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the
Process Industries, vo1.2,76-1-76-12, Taormina (1992)
[2]A.Vilsmeierand A.Haack, Ber, 60, pp. 119-122 (1927) [3]L.F.Fieser,J.L.Hartwel1et al., Organic Synthesis, vo1.3, p.98, Wiley (1955) [4]Y.Takuma and N.Imaki, JSynthetic Organic Chemistry, Japan, 49, pp.587-592 (1990)
[S]Y.Iizuka and M.Wahkwa, Proc. 2nd IWAC-Workshop on Safety in Chemical ~p.220-226,Yokohama (1993)
[6]R.Gygax, Chem. Eng Sci., 43, pp.1759-1771 (1988)
production,
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The corrosion monitoring: Loss prevention and safety of complex systems in acid media V.G. Polyanchukov State Technical University of St Petersburg, 29 Polytechnicheskaya str., 195251, St Petersburg, Russian Federation. Fax: +7 (812) 557 32 18, E-mail:
[email protected] Worked out the notions of methodology of corrosion monitoring of constructions and equipment of potentially hazardous industries and facilities in acid media: expert systems. Worked out concept of analytical and information system for complex evaluating of technical and corrosion condition and residual life of highly hazardous facilities operations. The system includes as traditional (well run in methods of the information analysis both estimations of a technical and corrosion condition of objects of examination), and not traditional methods: the analysis of outcomes of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes and corrosion protection in acidic inhibition media. Such approach allows receiving of an authentic, adequate and reliable estimation of a technical and corrosion condition of objects of heightened danger in a broad band of data-ins. The high performance of expert-analytical systems with usage of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes is affirmed by available perennial experience of creation and operational development up to an optimum corrosion condition of the composite equipment of heightened reliability in strong oxidants on the basis of hydrogen nitrate. 1 INTRODUCTION Problems of corrosion protection and connected safety issues are topical for all developed countries. Major damage and catastrophes are, as a rule, associated with damage of equipment by corrosion. Modern traditional theoretical presentations and methods of study of corrosion processes in many cases do not ensure efficient corrosion protection of equipment. Problems of corrosion and corrosion protection are far from solved, but corrosion factors remain decisive in strategies of technology politicians.
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Local forms of corrosions present the most danger. Chemical interaction of metal with the ambience with provision for constructive-technological factors (CTF) plays define role in their development. An actual diversification of members of designs subject to local corrosion, dif-
ficulty of imitation and the supervision in them of corrosion processes complicate straight line experiment. Composite is the picture of transportation of material in a local seat of corrosion. In a number of cases the formation of selfcontained locuses of corrosion slightly associated with environment is rotined. Because of diffusive handicappings the speed of local corrosion can exceed speed of general corrosion on some orders, as is watched in practice. The influence of CTF upon the development of local corrosion by traditional electrochemical methods of studies completely was not taken into account, but mathematical models, adequately describing processes of local corrosion, till now were absent. Therefore until recently basic method of an estimation of a technical and corrosion condition of objects of heightened danger was the technical diagnostic with the purpose of well-timed detection of faults, possible locuses of corrosion and scoping of the subsequent repair. The lacks of the given approach are wellknown. To them concern: Difficulty of forecasting of development of corrosion processes in time (specially local) and definition of a ultimate (resource) effective life. Impossibility of carry in a full volume of the obtained outcomes on other equipment, diverse structurally - technological solutions, handling mediums, regional conditions etc. The material and financial costs were high. Offered new methods of system studies of corrosion processes and protection in acidic media are concepts of modern corrosion monitoring [ 1-31. Modern corrosion monitoring is a complex study system of checking and management of corrosion processes and protection in acidic inhibition media, in which alongside with traditional approaches to the problem of corrosion, methods of mathematical modelling are, used [4-81. By development of the concept monitoring were used: - Long-term experience of work under the decision of problems of corrosion and protection of the equipment in objects and systems developed in defensive departments former USSR, and intended for long operation in strong oxidisers on the basis of a nitric acid, - Results of the further development of the given direction at State Technical University of St Petersbura.
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(Such approach allows to realise more full decision of given problem. Perennial experience of fhnctioning (working) an author were used at the concept development on deciding the problems of corrosion protection of equipping increased reliability (not chemical profile) in the strong oxidisers on the base of nitric acid and results of the further development of given direction in the State Technical University of St Petersburg). Further development of the given direction is associated with developing of a methodology of modern corrosion monitoring: Expert systems. 2 EXPERT SYSTEMS
The complexity of problems of researches of corrosion processes and protection having complex (“polytechnic”) nature, demands federating the scientists and specialists of a different profile, including specialists working on potentially dangerous production. The specialists having a steep professional knowledge and a rich know-how, are rather rare. It excites to create consulting models for realisation of an independent expert appraisal at all phases of a “life cycle” of potentially dangerous production and equipment. In the given report are esteemed only expert systems as problems, directly associated with developing of a methodology of corrosion monitoring of production and objects of heightened danger in acid mediums.
2.1 Aims and problems Developing of a methodology of modern corrosion monitoring of complex systems in acid mediums. Developing of the concept of analytical and information system ( A I S ) for a complex estimation of a technical and corrosion condition and residual resource at exploitation of production and objects of heightened danger in acid mediums. Rendering of the practical help to the potential customers on maintenance of corrosion and ecological safety of different productions and equipment at exploitation in acid mediums.
.
.
2.2 Main principles Offered methodology of corrosion monitoring is an “Expert systems”. During development of expert system methodology were used followkg main ideas. Basic rules of corrosion monitoring. Traditional methods of evaluation of corrosion condition, quality and reliability on all “life cycle” of equipment: Design-making-maintenance-repairing. Traditional methods of information analysis - primary stage of transformation of the documentary information: collecting, generalising and analysis of
.. .
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.
obtained information (for the decision making about the technical condition, modernisation, repair and preliminary estimate of remaining resource to usages). Algorithm of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes and corrosion protection (system “medium-surface”). Algorithm of optimisation of concentrations of inhibitor, improvements of technology of inhibitor’s entering, improvements of standard design elements prone to local types of corrosion scientifically motivated term of corrosion and ecological safety.
2.3 Structure
The schematic diagram of corrosion monitoring is adduced on fig. 1.
Fig.1. Schematic diagram of corrosion monitoring in acidic inhibition media: Expert systems CS: Corrosion system “medium-metall” A: Expert system B: The analytic and information analysis for the technical and corrosion conditions of the industries and facilities C: The analytic and information analysis of the results of the mathematical simulation of the processes of corrosion and protection in the inhibiting acid mediums in the system “medium-surface”.
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The scheme mirrors intercoupling of separate units (subsystems) inside a system: corrosion monitoring. The flowchart of analytical and information system (AIS) for a complex estimation of a technical and corrosion condition of production and objects of heightened danger is adduced on fig. 2.
CORROSION
Block B System "constructiontechnologycorrosionquality
Q Block C
I
System "mediumsurface"
of the technical and corrosion conditions of the industries and facilities
I
Fig.2. Bloc diagram of the analitical and information system fo; the complex evaluation of the technical and corrosion conditions of the highly hazardous industries and facilities.
The block diagram of traditional (a) and non-traditional (b) methods of analytical and information system for the evaluation of the technical and corrosion conditions of the highly hazardous industries and facilities in acidic media is adduced on fig.3.
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1
CORROSION SYSTEM
c
SYSTEM
Q Block B
Objects for expert I
Results of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes and protection Technical an equipment Collecting, generalization, analisys of information
I
Evaluation of technical - Provision corrosion and ecological safety and corrosion conditions
Fig.3a.
The order of realisation of expertise of the unit with (System MS) by results of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes in acidic inhibition media is adduced on fig.3 (b).
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I
CORROSION
C
I
SYSTEM
I
“medium-surface’’ expert
Inhibitor’s
concentration
Inhibiting technologies
Geometrical characteristics of construction elements
Time-limit to usages
-
Complex evaluation of corrosion conditions of industries and facilities
Fig.3b. Fig3 Block diagram of traditional (a) and non-traditional (b) methods of analytical and information system for the evaluation of the technical and corrosion conditions of the highly hazardous industries and facilities in acidic media.
Mathematical modelling of corrosion processes and protection in system “medium - surface” is executed by means of modelling a limiting stage of process - kinetic of inhibitor’s diffusion, spent during corrosion on formation of a protective film. The theory of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes in inhibiting acid media, the base algorithm of system of mathematical modelling of corrosion processes and protection in acidic inhibition media (structure, routes, system of the equations of the mathematical description of corrosion processes, base
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models of objects of research as a basis for the subsequent development of the software) and theoretical basic of corrosion monitoring of complex system in acidic media were repeatedly reported on scientific forums and were published in domestic and foreign press [4- 121. Base algorithms for the calculation of optimum concentrations of inhibitor with provision for corrosion aggressiveness of media and actual geometric sizes of standard elements and calculation of optimum sizes with given initial concentrations of inhibitor (inverse problem) were offered. Tinned results confirmed experimental, of Russian Federation Patent executed ~31. 3 CONCLUSION
3.1 Worked out the notions of methodology of corrosion monitoring of constructions and equipment of potentially hazardous industries and facilities in acid media: Expert systems. 3.2 Concept of analytical and information system for complex evaluation technical and corrosion condition and residual life of highly hazardous facilities operations is determined. 3.3 The available successful experience of mathematical modelling of heat and mass transfer processes on the basis of modern information technologies, that the intrusion of modern corrosion monitoring in acidic inhibition media with usage of a designed system of software can be successfully resolved already as soon as possible. The legible organisation of activities, formation of creative group of the specialists and sufficient financing is required.
REFERENCES [ l ] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. 3rd Int. Congr. Protection - 98, Moscow (1998) 117 (in Russian). [2] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. 13th Int. Congr. CHISA’98,8, Prague, (1998) 80. [3] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. ELK.Corros. Congr. EUROCORR’99, Aachen (1999) 189. [4] V.G. Polyanchukov, P.F. Drozhzhin, J. Protection of metals, 28, 4, (1992) 604 (in Russian). [5] V.G. Polyanchukov, P.F. Drozhzhin, J. Protection of metals, 28, 4, (1992) 610 (in Russian). [6] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. 1st Int. Congr. PROTECTION- 92,2, Moscow (1992) 52 (in Russian). [7] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. 1lth Int. Congr. CHISA’93,2, Prague (1993). [S] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. Eur. Corros. Congr. EUROCORR’97,2, Trondheim (1997) 209.
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[9] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. 2nd Int. Congr. PROTECTION - 95, Moscow (1995) 98 (in Russian). [lo] V.G. Polyanchukov, J. Protection of metals, 32, 6, (1996) 598 (in Russian). [ l l ] V.G. Polyanchukov, in Proc. 12th Int. Congr. CHISA’96,5, Prague (1996) 127. [12] V.G. Polyanchukov, J. Protection of metals, to be published (in Russian). [13] V.G. Polyanchukov, Russian Federation Patent No. 2121525 (1998) (in Russian).
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STUDY ON THE EXPLOSION OF RUN-AWAY REACTION TNGGERED BY A FAINT HEAT GENERATION Jinhua Sun, Xinrui Li, Wanying Tang and Kazutoshi Hasegawa National Research Institute of Fire and Disaster, Japan 14-1, Nakahara 3 Chome, Mitaka, Tokyo 181-8633, Japan Abstract The asphalt salt mixture (ASM), which was produced by mixing low radioactive liquid waste containing NaNO,, NaNO,, Na,CO,, N&12P04and others with asphalt at 180°C in an extruder, induced a violent explosion. Its reactivity is related to both the ingredient and processing conditions. It has been found that when phosphate exists and water evaporating ability exceeds water feeding rate, the oxidation-reduction reaction in the mixture may be accelerated especially at lower temperature. A temperature increasing process which simulated the waste pouring into the extruder suggested that the existence of NaH,P04 suppresses the decomposition of NaHCO, in the evaporating process, leaving NaHCO, more in the salt particles mixed with asphalt and continues to decompose. This, as well as a certain waste feeding rate, in turn accelerates the reaction around 170°C. A heat flux calorimeter, C80D, with advantage of a very slow temperature rise rate of O.Ol"C/min, was used to investigate the reaction heat generation, finding that under the factors of phosphate .existence and slow feeding rate as 50mllh, the heat starts to evolve at 170°C and heat generation around this region increases. The porous salt particles, which under the SEM inspection looks like a bur or sponge formed by gas arising from the decomposition of NaHCO,, govern the interface reaction. Moreover, a runaway reaction was experimentally realized to be 190°C by using dewar vessel. 1.
INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 1997, a fire and explosion occurred in the Bituminization Demonstration Facility (BDF) when it disposed of low radio-active level liquid wastes coming from Reprocessing Plant in the Tokai Works of Power Reaction and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, Japan. The disposing process was that after the waste liquid including salt NaNO,, NaNO,, Na,CO, and NaH,P04 was mixed with asphalt in an extruder under 1SO"C, the mixture was poured into ten 220-liter drums and stored when the ambient temperature was at 50°C. The fire and violent explosion afterwards from the drums caused total damage to
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BDF and was considered as the most hazardous accident in the history of Japanese nuclear power development[11. On the whole, there were three singularities different from the standard safety operation in which accident never had taken place. They were: a decrease of the feeding rate of wastes into the extruder 2001h to 1601h; an occasionally addition of phosphate into the waste; and shorter agitation time for waste. So it seemed that the investigation should mainly focus on the effects of the three factors on the reaction and heat character of the mixture concerned [2]. Contrary to the existing opinions that the run-away reaction started at the onset temperature of 230 "C, caused by some physical factors like heat of friction[3,4,5], K. Hasegawa et.al. put forth a viewpoint that oxidizing reaction involving in the asphalt and NaN02 of the mixture might be improved by molecules containing intramolecular hydrogen, such as NaH2P04and NaHC03. Moreover, NaHC03 decomposition which produces gases creates many micro holes in the interior of the salt particles. This in turn promotes the oxidizing reactions that are diffusion controlled. The consequence of a runaway reaction at 180°C or lower is qualitatively by taking into account the chemical effect of intramolecular hydrogen and the physical effect of the NaHC03 decomposition gases[ 11. However, it is necessary to give a comprehensive and thorough investigation on such reaction promoting factors. To this end, in this paper, the decomposition of NaHC03, activated by the existence of NaH2P04,was discussed based on the experimental results obtained from the temperature-increasing process pretending the extruder. Then a special experimental setup was designed to prepare the mixture at higher temperature imitating the real process. The effects of various conditions like phosphate and waste feeding rate on reactivity were discussed by analyzing heat flux and fine structure of the salt particles. Finally an adiabatic dewar experiment was carried out to determine the onset temperature for a run-away reaction. 2.
EXPERIMENTAL
2.1
Waste preparation
The sample's ingredients and preparation are illustrated in table 1, simulated exactly to those of the accident when several kinds of inorganic salts like NaN03, NaN02, Na2C03, and NaH2P04 were dissolved at certain concentrations, precipitated by Ba(OH)2, with pH value modified to 9.0, and then added by other two extra salts, &Fe(CN)6*3H20 NiS04*6H20. To be convenient for
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discussion, W 1 to W6 stand for samples prepared under different conditions such as pH values, as well as with or without phosphate. Table 1 Simulated wastes samples Abbreviations of simulated wastes solution Mixing order and chemical reagents
WI
w2
w3
SimulatedNaN02 mixed Na2C03 aqueous NaH2P04 wastes Volume of distilled water Ba(OH)?* 8H20
w5
and making method Simulation wastes solution without phosphate
250
250
250
250
250
250
50
50
50
50
50
50
80
80
80
80
80
80
20
20
20
0
0
0
18.93
18.93
0.71 18.93
18.93
18.93
~
Precipita- With 13N HN03 step
W6
Composition of the simulation wastes solution (gll) Simulation wastes solution with phosphate
NaN03
w4
18.93 ~
8.5
9.0
10
8.5
9
10
&Fe(CN)6*3H20
9.72
9.72
9.72
9.72
9.72
9.72
NiS04 6H20
12.09
12.09
12.09
12.09
12.09
12.09
Total volume of solution is 1 I
2.2
C 0 2 Gas Collection in a Temperature-increasing process
To study the pertinent reaction in waste, two kinds of solution, with and without phosphate, were introduced under different pH values of 8.5, 9.0 and 10 modified by €€NO3based on table 1. In a three opening glass flask sealed by condensation, thermometer and gas collector, the solutions were heated in an oil bath to 90"C, and were kept at that temperature for another 48 hours. The C02 generated was collected by a silicon-oil substituted method all along the process of heating and keeping at constant temperature. All the chemical reagents used in the processing were the super fine products made by Kanto chemical limited company, Japan.
2.3
Bituminization process
In the accident, waste was fed in an extruder which provided heating by three electric-heating stages until 180°C where it was mixed with hot asphalt during
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which water in solution was evaporated. The key for accurately studying the effect of the condition on the reaction of mixture is to prepare and repeat the situation of the three singularities. For this purpose, Fig.1 shows a special experimental system equipped with a waste feeding part, a mixing and evaporation determining device and a temperature recorder. Among them the mixing and evaporation-determining device consisted of an oil bath, a stainless beaker filled with asphalt, stirrer and three thermocouples which were respectively positioned near the exit of the waste, about 2 mm distanced from the inside wall of the beaker and lmm outside the beaker's wall in the bath. The temperature of the oil bath was maintained at 18Ok3"C.The feeding rate of waste into asphalt was controlled by a syringe pump. The mixtures, ASM1, ASM2, and ASM3 manufactured at different feeding rates are listed in table 2.
To discuss the influence of the waste feeding rate on the reactivity of asphalt salt mixture, the limitation of water-evaporation ability of the setup was essentially measured as 40mlh before other experiments. Here waste feeding rates of 50ml/h and 100mlh were selected to make sample. Compared to the water evaporating ability of the setup, the former has lower water feeding rate of 36.5ml/h, while the latter has higher one of 73mlh.
Fig. 1. Experimental setup
Table 2. Manufacture condition of asphalt salt mixture Manufacture condition
ASMl
ASM2
ASM3
Waste Feeding rate (mlh)
w2 50
w2 100
w5 50
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2.3
Thermal and structural determination
The reactivity of the mixture was measured by a heat flux reaction calorimeter with a high detection sensitivity of 10 W, C80D, manufactured by Setaram Co. in France. 0.500g sample under test and alumna oxide as reference were put into two 8.5ml vessels, respectively. Temperature was controlled by program with rise rate of 0.0 1"C/min. The experiment was undertaken in nitrogen atmosphere. The micrograph of the sample was observed by a Scanning electron microscope of JEOL, Japan, with a magnification of 2000. In order to analyze the surface area of salt particles in the mixture, the salts were extracted from asphalt in the toluene solvent. After the solvent evaporated, the salt particles' surface area was determined by BET method. 2.3
Dewar Experiment
The construction for an adiabatic experiment is shown schematically in Fig. 2. 500ml cylinder-shaped dewar filled with the samples under test was placed in a chamber to execute ambient temperature controlling experiment. In order to cut down heat loss, the atmospheric temperature in the chamber was manually controlled so that it followed the dewar internal sample's temperature by the increment of 1°C. The dewar was equipped with three thermocouples, whose diameter was lmm in a type of sheath, to monitor the temperatures at different sites like the center, bottom and upper surface of sample. All the thermocouples including one measuring the ambient were connected to a recorder and a computer to collect raw data.
Fig.2. A measuring system for sample inside 500ml dewar flask (1 heater; 2 fan; 3 Aluminum box; 4 5 6 7 thermocouples)
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3.
ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION
3.1
Effect of Phosphate on Decomposition of NaHCO3 in Waste
It seems that the existence of phosphate is one of main reasons to lead to an accelerated reaction during the induction stage. In this case, the pH value of waste was adjusted to 9.0 by 1.3N nitric acid. It is important to point out that during this process, most of Na2C03 in the waste is changed to NaHC03 which is not chemically stable and starts to decompose above 65"C[6]. Fig. 3 shows the amount of collected gas C02 vs. time curves during heating for about 100 min and temperature constant stages. It can be seen that the amount of C02 generated by the two types of solutions is increased at first and then attains constant when all the NaHC03 has decomposed. But it quite varies with both phosphate and pH value. On the whole, the generation of C02 has nearly stopped in the W4, W5 and W6 solutions without phosphate for 100 min before the temperature gets to 90°C regardless of pH values. On the other hand, CO2 gas was continually generated from W1, W2 and W3 solutions with phosphate till about another 300 min at 90°C. The total amount of C02 from solutions with phosphate is as twice as from solutions without phosphate for each pH values, but at the beginning for heating process, it seems less than the latter. Meanwhile, as the pH value of the solution decreases, the total amount of C02 generated increases in the range of pH 8.5 to 10.
240
1
100
80 60
160
.ogY
40 20
40
0 Time, rnin Fig.3. CO, generating amount and temperature increasing program versus time in wastes
2
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The decomposition of NaHC03 can be described as 2NaHC03+ Na2C03+C02+H20 Therefore, the rate of C 0 2gas generated can be written as: d[C02]/dt=2k[NaHC03] where k is the reaction rate constant. Assuming that phosphate has no effect on the above reaction process, a rate constant k having the elementary property of the chemical reaction is supposed to be independence of the differences between two types of solutions. Accordingly, during heating progress to 90°C, the amount of C02 from solutions with phosphate should be nearly identical to that from the solutions without phosphate. However, the experimental result shows contrarily that when there is phosphate in the solution, below 90°C, the decomposition rate of NaHC03 is lower and the amount of C 0 2gas generated is less. It is 79ml/l, which is only 46% of the total amount, indicating that more NaHC03 will be conserved in the solution and continue to decompose afterwards. Whileas, it is 86% in solutions without phosphate, which almost occupies the total amount, that is to say, NaHC03 has decomposed when temperature goes up to 90°C. This phenomenon indicates that the existence of phosphate in the solution gives great influence on the decomposition of NaHC03 in the solution. At first, there is no doubt that phosphate serves as a buffer solution as follows:
At the mean time, there exist other two precipitation reactions in the solution if phosphate exists: NaHC03+ Ba(OH)2 +BaC03&+ NaOH+H20 Na2HP04+Ba(OH)2+ BaHP04&+2NaOH The real initial concentration of NaHC03 in the solutions with phosphate is a little bit lower than that without phosphate, because it has been consumed when it reacts with Na3P04. With the temperature increase, all the above equilibrium reaction will move to the left side, that is to say, the NaHC03 in the solution with phosphate must be replenished, indicating that such solutions continue to produce gas for so long time that more C 0 2 is generated afterwards. On the other hand, NaHC03 and Na2HPO4 are precipitated by Ba(OH)* competently,
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thus the latter will counter-balance and in turn there is more NaHC03 left. 3.2
Effect of phosphate and waste feeding rate on structure of salt particles
In order to discuss the effect of phosphate and feeding rate of waste into asphalt which were supposed as the main singularities of incident on the reactivity of asphalt salt mixture, three kinds of simulated waste with different concentration of phosphate and feeding rate were prepared. As shown in Fig.4- Fig.6, the micrographs of salt particles in the mixture were observed by a scanning electron microscope. It is clear that the appearances of salt particles also depend on the waste feeding rate and the existence of phosphate in the waste. In Fig.4, under the condition of the waste feeding rate of 50ml/h and with phosphate in waste, there are a plenty of porous particles, e.g. about 70% in the mixture ASM1, and the salt particles appears as a lot of needle-shaped crystals which are about 1-2fimthick and 3-8 fim long to form a bridged configuration like bur or sponge. When the waste feeding rate is 100mlh for ASM2, the porous particles occupy less than 30% of the total particles and most of them compose massive crystal about 3-5 fim ( as Fig.5). The reason for this phenomenon lies in different state of NaHC03 decomposition which depends on phosphate and competence between waste feeding rate and water evaporation. The water in waste is evaporated right away when waste is fed into hot asphalt at lower feeding rate, so no more NaHC03 decomposes in the liquid phase and instead it tends to form eutectic together with NaN03 and NaN02. It continues to decompose in the salt particle in the bituminazation when the temperature is controlled up to 180°C and have more porous structure left. On the other hand, when the feeding rate is larger than evaporation ability of the device, water can not be evaporated immediately and will retain in the beaker, under 90-100°C for longer time, leading to most NaHC03 decomposing in the liquid, so at last salt particles incline to emerge a lot of massive crystal by salt eutectic having no NaHC03 rather than many pores. It can be seen from Fig.4 and Fig.6 that phosphate also influences the decomposition of NaHCO3 because it can to some extent restrain the decomposition of NaHC03 in the solution. Therefore it is favourable to produce a porous Fig. 4. SEM of ASMl structure in the mixture.
86 1
Fig.5. SEM of ASM2
Fig.6. SEM of ASM3
At listed in table 3, the surface areas of salt particles were measured quantitatively by BET method. ASMl's specific surface area is 1.18 m2/g., much more than that of the other samples which are only 0.67 and 0.77 m2/g , respectively. Table 3 Average specific surface area of each asphalt salt mixture Sample ASMl ASM2 ASM3
Weight, g 1.847 2.226 2.212
Average specific surface area, m2/g 1.18 0.67 0.77
3.3 Effect of phosphate and waste feeding rate on reactivity of simulated asphalt salt mixture Figure 7 shows the heat flux versus temperature curves for the three simulated samples. For the sample ASM1, heat evolves from an initial temperature about 155"C, From this point heat flux increases slowly with temperature until 195"C, nearly maintains constant in the range of 195-250°C, and rises quickly above 250°C, Thus the reaction can be divided into three regions, that is, from 155°C to 195"C, 195°C to 250°C and above 250°C. At the first stage, asphalt can contact directly with oxidizing particles, and thus the reaction is mainly determined by an initially reaction-controlled stage on an interface. This results that with more and more product covered on the surface of the particles, the reaction mechanism turns to a diffusion-controlled stage in a product layer and its rate tends to slow down although it will be accelerated with the increasing temperature. As a result of the two contradicting effects, the reaction and heat generation become constant at the second stage. When temperature goes up to 250, at which a11 salt melts and asphalt becomes fluid, the reaction changes from solid-liquid surface to a homogeneous reaction-controlled stage in liquid phase and acts as an index law based on Arrhenius.
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The other two .samples, ASM2 and ASM3, have the similar tendency in heat flux. However, their onset temperatures of heat release are both 200 and heat fluxes are also smaller than ASM1. Fig.8. shows in detail a relationship of heat release and temperature by integrating the area. It is evident that at the lower temperature region the heat release of ASMl is much higher than the others.
As described above, it was difficult to verify on a lab scale that the run-away reaction happened at a lower initial temperature than 230°C[2,3], for the oxidation-reduction reaction of asphalt and salt in the mixture is very complicated, undergoing from an interface-controlled solid-liquid reaction to homogeneous liquid reaction. For the former stage, reaction under lower
TOO
150
200
250
300
Temperature, "C
Fig.7. Heat flux vs. temperature curves
FJ c,
1200
Y
400
200 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Temperature, "C
Fig.8. Heat generation vs. temperature curves
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temperature obeys neither Arrhenius and nor n order rules. So the heat generation from asphalt salt mixture is rarely dependent on temperature and its amount is so faint that it is readily lost during general experiments, thus it has led to too much doubts for discussion at one time[3-6]. 3.4
Temperature Controlling Dewar Experiment
The dewar experiment, one of the most usehl techniques in assessment of chemical reaction hazards, is herein developed to carry out a strictly adiabatic self-heating test under the lowest amount of filling sample. However, different Erom normal isothermal dewar tests keeping the surrounding temperature constant, considering a faint heat generated by the mixture, heat loss from dewar should be eliminated further by abating one factor like heat transfer forces, i.e., narrowing down temperature difference between sample and ambient atmosphere. Therefore, the particular method in our study is to let the ambient temperature follow the sample's temperature when it rises during the experiment. 290
r
.
,
,
,
,
,
.
,
,
, ,
,
280 210
d.,
280
-Tr
9
250
-T, ambient (controlled)
5
c
u
4-
upper surface
240
no 220
210
2w 190 0
time. min
Fig. 9. Dewar test (onset 190°C)
Fig. 9 shows temperatures versus time curves for asphalt salt mixture inside 500ml dewar under initial 190°C, in which TI, T2, T3 and Tq refer to temperatures of the center, the upper surface, the bottom of sample in dewar and the ambient, respectively. When the Sample's temperature inside went by 1°C up to the ambient since its self-heat, the ambient temperature was changed ladderlike by the increment of l°C,until above 265°C when the inside temperature rose quickly, the manually
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controlled ambient followed no longer i.e., runaway reaction. Finally the sample's temperature went beyond 290°C, and the sample burned violently.
As mentioned above, it is necessary to set up the experiment as close as possible in order to reproduce the adiabatic conditions of real process. Considering that only dewar's condition is not enough to protect the heat generated by a faint reaction from heat loss, the temperature of the sample will be taken as the set point for the ambient temperature control. These two temperature readings (the center of sample and ambient) are maintained at least 1°C for a judgment that there is certainly heat generated from the sample, making full allowance for a slight temperature difference among the thermocouples even after they are calibrated (only those whose temperature difference less than 0.4 "C were selected to use.). It took first 50 hours to go through the early stage of induction period and attain 210"C, and then took another 30 hours to give rise to a run-away reaction and fire. When the experimental initial temperature was descended to 170°C, compared with the former experiments, it was difficult for sample's temperature to go beyond the ambient, and it took much longer time for the simulated mixture's temperature to reach a balanced temperature, as shown in Fig. 10. So in this experiment, bigger temperature increment was taken. But even when the initial temperatures were changed up to 183"C, the sample's temperature did not go over 1"C higher than the ambient. I81 183
-
p
I
182
I61
IS0 (19 178
3 :;: 1 ;;: I13 112 111
I10
I69
I 1
0
1 m
2 m
3 m
um
smo
f
time (mid
Fig. 10. Dewar test (onset 170'c)
4.
CONCLUSIONS
In a summery, it can be seen that
a
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1) For the sake of settling down a long-time doubtfbl point that whether or not a run-away reaction can arise from a faint chemical reaction under a low feed temperature around 180°C, it is important to deeply study three singularities as the main reasons in an accident. To the end, a special experimental setup was established to prepare the sample which could be exactly simulated the real conditions. 2) It implied that if phosphate is introduced in the asphalt salt mixture, it will influence the decomposition of NaHCO, to such an extent that more NaHCO, will be maintained during water evaporation and brought to the asphalt salt compound where it composites continually and leave much pores in the mixture. This can be seen clearly by its micrograph under the inspection of SEM.
3) Waste feeding rate is another important factor that causes the change of the reactivity, because slower waste feeding rate will cause water having enough time to evaporate and NaHCO, having no chance to decompose in solution. As the same consequence, it leads to a porous structure when CO, gas is produced from the mixture. The BET test suggested that under the conditions that both there is phosphate and feeding rate is 50ml/h, the salt particles has larger surface area and the surface will control the initial reaction rate. 4) Heat flux from the thermal analyzing apparatus C80D also showed that the two factors are favorable to lead the heat generating from lower onset temperature about 155°C. While if either of them non-exists, the onset reaction temperature will rise up to 200"C, and heat generation will decrease much more.
5 ) An adiabatic dewar experiment proved that the runaway reaction can arise from 190°C. REFERENCES [ 11 K. Hasegawa and Y. Li, Explosion investigation on asphalt-salt mixtures in a reprocessing
plant, J. Hazardous Materials, in press (2000). [2] Y. Iwata and H. Koseki, Combustion characteristics of asphalt and sodium compounds, 29th Symposium of Safety Engineering, Tokyo, Japan (1999) 2 11. [3] An investigative committee for the fire and explosion in the Btuminization Demonstration Facility (BDF) of the reprocessing plant on the Tokai Works of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC), A report on the fire and explosion in BDF of the reprocessing plant of the Tokai Works of PNC, Nuclear Safety Bureau, Science &
866
Technology Agency of Japan, 15 December, 1997 (in Japanese). [4] T. Hasegawa, J. Chen, H. Uchida, A. Kimura, T. Kataoka and T. Yoshida, Thermal hazard Evaluation of asphalt-salt mixture, 23rd International Pyrotechnics Seminar, Tsukuba, Japan (1997) 193. [5] Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), The heating experiment of asphalt-salt mixture (1998). [6] K. Hata (Ed.), Handbook of Chemistry, Press of Maruzen, Tokyo (1984) 804.
867
Assessment of the thermal and toxic effects of chemical and pesticide pool fires based on experimental data obtained using the Tewarson apparatus Christian Costa, Guy Treand, Franck Moineault and Jean-Louis Gustin* Rhodia, 24, avenue Jean-Jaures - 63153 Decines - France ABSTRACT
The Tewarson apparatus is a combustion calorimeter developed by Factory Mutual Research Co. USA, in the 1970s. A modified and computerized version of this calorimeter is used at the Rhodia Decines Centre to study the combustion of plastics, fabrics, chemicals and pesticides on 30 grams samples in a 0.1 metre diameter glass dsh. The combustion of up to 100 products has been studied in this experimental set-up and the following thermal data obtained : mass of product burnt, experimental heat of combustion, combustion efficiency, burning mass flwc, ratios of convection and radiant heat, flame height, flame temperature. The on-line analysis of combustion gases provides the following chemical data : production of COZ,CO, HCN, NO*, NO, SO*, HCl, HF, HBr, chemical yield for the combustion of carbon, nitrogen, sulphur, chlorine, fluorine, bromine. The thermal data obtained is an input to the POOL 2.0 Computer code to estimate the thermal effect of chemical pool-fires. The combustion chemical data obtained is an input to atmospheric dispersion codes to estimate the toxic effect of chemical pool fires. The correlation of experimental data obtained using the Tewarson apparatus, based on the sample chemical formulae helps provide the missing combustion data. As an example, a correlation is given for the combustion characteristics of chlorinated organic chemicals. Keywords : Pool fires, combustion data, Tewarson apparatus, combustion efficiency, chemical yield.
* To whom corresyondance should be addressed
868
INTRODUCTION The assessment of fire hazards in chemical and pesticide storages and warehouses is based on both the determination of the material combustion thermal data and the identification of the toxic emission from combustion gases. The combustion thermal data is the input data required in fire simulation softwares to estimate the consequences of industrial fires. This combustion thermal data includes the determination of the mass of product burnt, the experimental heat of combustion, the combustion efficiency, the burning mass flux, the ratios of convection and radiant heat, the flame height and flame temperature. [l] [2]. The simulation of large industrial fires provides information on the thermal effect of the accidental fire on adjacent equipment and on the protection needed to prevent the fire from spreading. Large industrial fires are also source-terms for modeling atmospheric dispersion of volatile toxic combustion products. The input data to atmospheric dispersion models are combustion chemical data including the production of combustion gases COz, CO, HCN, NO2, NO, S02, HCl, HBr, depending on the burning material composition. Also necessary is the determination of the chemical yield for the combustion of the chemical elements present in the burning material formula : Carbon, Nitrogen, Sulphur, Chlorine, Fluorine, Bromine if any [3]. The thermal and chemical data characterizing the combustion of chemicals and pesticides can only be obtained using a bench-scale apparatus, due to the great number of experiments to be performed on a wide range of products. Such a combustion calorimeter was developed by A. TEWARSON at Factory Mutual Research Corporation (USA) in the 1970s [4]. A modified and computerized version of the Tewarson apparatus was built at the Rhodia Decines Centre to study the combustion of plastics, fabrics, chemicals and pesticides on 30 grams samples. This new experimental set-up is described in the following section with special attention to the improvement of the original design.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODIFIED TEWARSON COMBUSTION CALORIMETER The principle of the modified Tewarson combustion calorimeter built in Decines is shown on figure I . The experimental set-up may be divided in three sections :
869
Combustion chamber The lower part of the apparatus is the combustion chamber, section A on figure 1. The combustion chamber consists of a standing cylindncal quartz tube 0.160 metre in diameter and 0.490 metre high. In this combustion chamber, a 30 grams sample in a 0.1 metre diameter glass dish is placed on the plate of a balance to measure the sample weight during combustion experiments. An external heat-flux is applied to the combustion chamber by eight infra-red heaters in an air flushed jacket, allowing tht; sample to be heated to a temperature where its vapours or fumes can be ignited by an ignition source. The maximum external heat-flux applied to the combustion chamber is 30 kW/m2. The i p t i o n of the sample by an electric spark was preferred to the original pilot-flame ignition source, to avoid additional heat input and combustion gases to the experiments
The ignition of the sample is obtained without external heat-flux applied if the sample is flammable under ambient temperature. If not, an external heat-flux is applied to raise the sample temperature until ignition is obtained.
If the sample combustion is self-sustained, the sample is allowed to burn without external heat-flux applied. If not, an external heat-flux is applied to allow the sample combustion, in whch case the radiant heat-flux cannot be measured. Preliminary experiments are necessary to choose the most suitable operating conditions.
A permanent air flow of 5 m3h is blown to the combustion chamber bottom through a glass sphere bed to obtain homogeneous inlet gas composition and regular air stream. The inlet air is under flow control and its oxygen concentration may be varied by adding oxygen or nitrogen to the air flow. The combustion air composition is measured by a continuous oxygen analyzer during experiments.
A calibration of the external heat input to the sample is acheved by replacing the sample holder by a heat-flux meter. The heat-flux received by the sample is measured as a function of the power input to the &a-red heaters. This calibration allows the compensation of the mfra-red heater aging by an increased electric power supply to the external heating device. For samples exhibiting self-sustained combustion, the radiant heat-flux released during combustion is measured using a heat-flux meter. The heat-flux meter position is at flame mid-height, at 0.2 metre distance from the combustion chamber axis and directed toward the flame. The radiant heat-flux released during the sample combustion as a function of time is estimated assuming a spherical distribution of the radiant heat-flux around the flame centre. The reference area for the estimation of the radiant heat-tlux is that of the glass dish.
870
Figure 1. Modified Tewarson apparatus.
871
Dilution shaft The intermediate part of the apparatus is the dilution shaft, section B on figure 1. The dilution shaft is a standing Teflon cylinder 0.1 metre in diameter and 0.6 metre high intended to dilute and mix the flow of combustion gases and smokes with air. Teflon was preferred to stainless steel, to avoid soot deposits which could absorb contaminants such as HC1, HCN, dioxines, etc. The dilution air inlet flow to the dilution shaft is controlled by the exhaust fan mass flow rate of 70 kg/h. The aim of the combustion products dilution is to avoid losses of volatile combustion products by condensation or leaks, while limiting the dilution ratio to keep the oxygen concentration analysis accurate and controlling heat losses from combustion products. Mixing of combustion products with dilution air is acheved by the convergent nozzle at the dilution shaft bottom. At the top of the dilution shaft, the smoke temperature is measured by a thermocouple and the gas flow is sampled for continuous on-line analysis. The convection heat-flux is deduced from the smoke temperature and smoke exhaust mass flow-rate. The reference area for the convection heat-flux is that of the glass dish. The on-line gas analysis of the diluted smoke includes the determination of 0 2 , CO, COz, SO;! and NOx. Ths is achieved after passing the gas sample over a filter and a desiccant. Other analysis are performed after absorption of the gas on a Draeger tube followed by mass spectrometer analyses or after absorption on resins followed by gas chromatography. Smoke chamber The upper part of the Tewarson apparatus is the smoke chamber, section C on figure 1. This device, intended to measure the optical density of smoke, is equipped with an external photoelectric system to measure the optical density in a standing stainless steel cylinder 0.1 metre in diameter and 0.3 metre high, extending the combustion shaft. The smoke chamber exit is connected to the exhaust fan inlet. The fan flow cdntrol principle is shown on fig. 1. The fan volumetric flow rate is adjusted taking into account the smoke temperature to obtain a constant mass flow rate of exhaust gases. Data acquisition and processing system T h s section includes a CHESSEL recorder / converter and a graphic data treatment allowing display of the variation of the measured parameters as a function of time. A test result sheet is produced, giving the most important test characteristics and results.
812
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To date, up to 100 products have been studied using the modified Tewarson apparatus. An overview of the results obtained on well known chemicals and pesticides is given in tables where the following data is listed under the product current name :
-
Gross chemical formula
-
Molecular weight
- External heat flux applied
-
Initial sample mass Mass fraction of product burnt
- Net calorific value
-
Heat of combustion per kg of product burnt
- Heat of combustion per kg of sample - Combustion thermal efficiency i.e.The ratio of the combustion heat measured on 1 kg initial sample to the net calorific value of this 1 kg sample.
-
Average combustion mass flux
(g/m2.s>
Maximum combustion mass flux
(g/m2.s>
-
Ratio of convection heat to combustion heat
-
Ratio of radiant heat to combustion heat
(%I (%I
Production of C02, CO, HCN, NO?, NO, SOz, HC1
- Chemical yield for the conversion of carbon into C02, CO and HCN i.e.The ratio of the carbon contained in the C02 CO and HCN produced by 1 kg sample to the carbon present in that 1 kg sample.
(g of g a s k of sample) (%>
873
-
Chemical yield for the conversion of nitrogen into N02, NO and HCN i.e.The ratio of the nitrogen contained in the N02, NO and HCN produced by 1 kg initial sample to the nitrogen present in that 1 kg sample.
(“m
- Chemical yield for the conversion of chlorine into HCl i.e.The ratio of the chlorine contained in the HCl produced by 1 kg sample to the chlorine present in that 1 kg sample
(YO)
- Maximum flame height
(cm)
- Maximum flame temperature
(“C)
- Specific extinction area i.e.The surface darkened by 1 kg of fuel, deduced from the measured optical density.
(m2/kg>
The detailed calculation methods for the combustion heat, convection and radiant heat, opacity of smokes and other parameters are given in reference [ 5 ] and are not reproduced in the present paper. The total combustion heat was deduced from the oxygen depletion during combustion according to Thornton [6] [7]. The convection heat is the heat carried out in the gas plume over the combustion chamber. The radiant heat is measured using a heat-flux meter. The combustion data for some chemicals and solvents is given in table 1. The combustion data for some pesticides is given in table 2.
Table 1 :
Combustion characteristics of chemicals and solvents, obtained in the modfied Tewarson apparatus
875
Table 1 (continued) : Combustion characteristics of chemicals and solvents, obtained in the modified Tewarson apparatus
877
Table 1 (continued) : Combustion characteristics of chemicals and solvents, obtained in the modified Tewarson apparatus
879
Table 2 :
Combustion characteristics of various pesticides, obtained in the modified Tewarson apparatus
Note : n.m = not measured The net calorific value of 2,4 D acid was not available and was deduced fiom the combustion chemical yield for the conversion of carbon.
882
COMBUSTION PROPERTIES AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
In addition to integral combustion data deduced from experiments, dynamic and time dependent properties are also obtained from combustion experiments performed in the modified Tewarson apparatus. As an example, a set of time dependent combustion properties obtained using the modified Tewarson combustion calorimeter is gwen below, concerning the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile in methanol. The sample was flammable under ambient temperature and could be readily igmted by the electric spark. The sample combustion was self-sustained and did not require any external heat input to proceed. The sample mass loss during combustion was recorded as a function of time (see figure 2). The combustible mass-flux consumed as a function of time was deduced from the derivative of the sample mass loss as a function of time. The reference area for the combustible mass flux is that of the glass dish (see figure 3). The sample temperature measured in the glass dish during combustion is given as a function of time on figure 4. The flame temperature as a function of time is given on figure 5. The combustion heat-flux, convection heat-flux and radiant heat-flux measured during the sample combustion are shown on figures 6-7-8. The reference area for the heat-fluxes is the glass dish area. The mass-fluxes for the production of COZ and NO during combustion are shown on figures 9 and 10. Again, the reference area for the mass fluxes is that of the glass dish. In the example considered, combustion proceeds in two separate steps. In the first step, methanol is essentially burning exhibiting high COz and low NO production, hgh combustion mass-flux, high convection heat-flux and low radiant heat-flux. The flame temperature is hgh and the sample temperature is low as is the sample boiling point. In the second step, reached after 400 seconds of combustion, adiponitrile is essentially burning ehbiting a lower constant combustion mass-flux, high NO production, lower constant convection heat-flux, higher radiant heat-flux and higher sample temperature as the remaining sample boiling point is rising. The records of this combustion experiment show that methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately in their mixture and that the most volatile component, methanol, is burning first. T h s example chosen for convenience shows that combustion may present complex phenomena which can only be observed using a bench-scale apparatus such as the modified Tewarson combustion calorimeter. The many records obtained in an experiment help understand the sample combustion behaviour and provide the data necessary for computer simulation of large industrial fires.
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture 35
30
-
25
cn
I
tE
20
L.
0
v)
8 -J
\\\
15
10 I I
MeOH
I
5
ADN
I I 1
0
I
o
iw
m
3w
4w
500
600
7w
aw
900
1000
iiw
izw
1300
14~)
1500
Time (sec)
Figure 2 : Sample mass loss during combustion as a function of time for a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile in methanol. The dotted line shows two combustion steps where methanol (MeOH) and adiponitrile (ADN) are burning separately.
i-
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture
12
10
‘it
.-c0 Y
u)
3 a
5
0
4 I I
MeOH
I
ADN
I I I
I
Time (sec)
Figure 3 : Coinbustion mass flux as a function of time for a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile in methanol. The dotted line shows the separation between two combustion steps where methanol (MeOH) and adiponitrile (ADN) are burning separately.
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture
0
2w
~_
300
400
500
600
7w
800
900
1wO
1100
1200
Time (sec) -~
Figure 4 : Sample temperature ("C) as a function of time for the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the transition between two combustion steps where methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately. Also shown are the atmospheric boiling points of methanol and adiponitrile.
900
7w 600
I I
I I
, I
MeOH
ADN
I
I I
0
100
200
300
400
500
Mx)
700
800
900
lD00
11W
I200
13W
I400
1500
Time (sec)
Figure 5 : Flame temperature as a function of time during the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the separation two combustion steps where methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately.
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture 250
k
200
3
z
-
$ 150 F m
0
.c E
I
.a 100
I
+a
u)
na
I
I
5
0
I
I
50
MeOH
I I
ADN
I I I I
0
0
100
200
300
400
5W
600
700
BOO
900
1WO
1100
12W
13W
1400
1500
Time (sec)
Figure 6 : Combustion heat-flux as a function of time during the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the separation between two combustion steps where methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately.
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture
O C
0
100
_________
200
300
400
5W
600
700
800
Time (sec)
900
1000
1100
1200
__
1300
1400
1500
Figure 7 : Convection heat-flux as a function of time during the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the separation between two combustion steps where methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately.
I
I
40
I I
30
20
to
0
0
100
200
300
400
500
____
6W
700
800
Time (sec)
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Figure 8 : Radiant heat-flux as a function of time during the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the separation between two combustion steps where methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately.
W
0 UY
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture 16
14
K 7
8
10
E 8
F I B *-
O
I I
6
.se 4 C
I
0
I
c. 0
1
I I
MeOH
0.
I
ADN
I
2
I I
0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
9W
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Time (sec)
Figure 9 : Mass flux of CO;! released as a function of time during the combustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the separation between two combustion steps where methanol and adiponitrile are burning separately.
Methyl Alcohol I Adiponitrile Mixture 0.08
0.07 A
-2 Y
ol
\
0.06
x
iln m
4 c
-
.-0
0,05
0,04
0.03
0
4 0,02 g
n 0.01 I
0 0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Time (sec)
Figure 10 : Mass-flux of NO released as a function of time during the coinbustion of a 33.6 g sample of 50 % wt solution of adiponitrile (ADN) in methanol (MeOH). The dotted line shows the separation between two combustion steps where inethanol and adiponitrile are burning separately.
892
INFLIJENCE OF THE CHEMICAL COMBUSTION THERMAL DATA
FORMULA
THE
ON
The experimental results obtained on the chemicals and pesticides studied in the modified Tewarson apparatus, show that the combustion thermal data is influenced by the chemical formula. For the most useful combustion characteristics used as input data for the simulation of large industrial fires i.e. the coinbustion thermal efficiency, the chemical yield for the conversion of carbon, the ratio of radiant heat, whch were defined in the previous section, recommended specific values can be deduced from the experimental results obtained on the different types of chemicals. A summary of the thermal data suggested is given in table 3 for aliphatic derivatives, in table 4 for C, H, 0, N aromatic and unsaturated cyclic compounds and in table 5 for miscellaneous organic compounds including chlorinated and fluorinated organic compounds. The combustion thermal data in table 3, 4 and 5 may be used as a first estimate in fire simulation softwares such as the POOL 2 program in the absence of specific experimental data. Table 3 : Suggested values of thermal data for aliphatic derivatives Chemical compound Alkanes Alcohols Esters, Ethers, Ketones Nitiiles Amines C, H, 0, N compounds C, H, 0, S compounds
Combustion thermal efficiency
Chemical yield for carbon
Ratio of radiant heat
97 98 96 98 91 95 95
(Yo) 93 97 95 98 82 90 91
I
("/.I
(%) 22 22 23 26 12 22
Table 4 : Suggested thermal data for aromatic and unsaturated cyclic compounds Chemical compound C, H, 0, N compounds C, H, 0, N aniline derivatives C, H, 0, N, nitro derivatives
Combustion thermal efficiency
Chemical yield for carbon
Ratio of radiant heat
(%) 70 75 40
(%) 70 75
(YO)
45
30 40 40
893
Table 5 : Suggested thermal data for miscellaneous organic compounds Chemical compound
Combustion Chemical yield Ratio of theimal efficiency for carbon radiant heat
Monochlorinated compounds with C , H, N, Cl atoms Polychlorinated compounds with C, H, 0, C1 atoms C, H, N cyclic compounds Fluorinated aromatic compounds
w.)
(%)
(%)
55
51
35
50
50
40
90 55
95 55
40 40
INFLUENCE OF THE FUEL CHEMICAL FORMULA ON THE TOXIC EMISSION OF THE FIRES The combustion chemical data obtained in the modified Tewarson apparatus, on a great number of chemical compounds can be used to estimate the chemical yield for the conversion of Nitrogen, Sulphur, Chlorine, Fluorine, during combustion. This allows the prediction of missing data for chemical compounds whch have not yet been studied in combustion experiments. As an example the chemical yield for the conversion of Chlorine into HCl during the combustion of chlorinated organic compounds was studied on a selection of 25 chlorinated organic derivatives. A summary of the results obtained is given in table 6 for chlorinated and poly-chlorinated derivatives. The data in table 6 can be used as a first estimate of the chemical yield for the conversion of chlorine into HCl, to replace missing data on specific chemical compounds for which no experimental data is available. The chemical yield for the conversion of hetero atoms is an input data to atmospheric dispersion models. Table 6 : Suggested values of chemical yield for the conversion of chlorine into HCl during the combustion of chloiiiiated organic compounds Type of chlorinated compound. Number and position of chlorine atoms One CI atom per chain or ring Two C1 atoms per chain or ring 3 C1 atoms per chaiu or ling 4 C1 atoms per chain or ring 5 or 6 C1 atoms per chain or ring 3 C1 atoms on the same carbon (- C C13) Atnine hydrochloride (RNHz . HC1)
Chemical yield for the conversion of Chloiine into HCI during combustion 80 40
20 0 0 100 % 95 %
894
The definition of the chemical yield for the conversion of chlorine in table 6 is gwen in chapter 3 above. CONCLUSION
The modified Tewarson apparatus described in this paper, is a useful experimental set-up to study the coinbustion of chemicals and pesticides. To date, this apparatus has been used to investigate more than 100 different chemicals and pesticides. The thermal and chemical data obtained was used as input data for computer simulation of large industrial fires and for atmospheric dispersion calculations to evaluate the toxic impact of industrial fires. The modified Tewarson apparatus is also a valuable tool to compare the combustion behaviour of plastics, resins and fabrics whle determining the nature of the combustion products. The modified Tewarson apparatus was used as a bench scale apparatus in the STEP European Program to study fires and their consequences, in the MISTRAL 1 program. The partners associated with this European program are : CEA / IPSN (France) CIS1 (France) CNRS / LCRS (France) (Italy) ENEA / AEAS ISSEP (Belgium) Rhodia (France) University of Aveiro (Portugal) University of Poitiers (France) other partners who joined t h s project in the course of the program are :
EDF / CLI INERIS
(France) (France)
It was shown in the course of this European project that the modified Tewarson apparatus was a key item to investigate the consequences of large chemical fires on a wide range of chemicals and pesticides.
895
LITERATURE [l] G . Mangialavori , F. Rubino, "Experimental tests on large hydrocarbon pool fires", 7 t" Int. Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety promotion in the Process Industries, Taormina, Italy, 4-8 may 1992 - Paper no 83.
[2] S. Ditali, A. Rovati, F. Rubino, "Experimental Model to assess Thermal radiations from hydrocarbon pool fires", ibid Paper no 13. [3] L. Smith - Hansen, "Toxic hazards from pesticide warehouse fires''. 8 th Int. Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety promotion in the Process Industries, Antwerp, Belgium, june 6-9, 1995, I, 265-276. [4] A . Tewarson, F. Tamanini, "Research and Development for a Laboratoryscale flammability test Method for cellular plastics". Final report FMRC serial no 22524 RC 76 - T 64 ( 1 976). [5] C.Costa, "Step European program. Study of fires and of their consequences. Mistral 1 program, small scale studies", 1994. [6] W.M. Thornton, Philos. Mag. 33, I96 (I 91 7).
[7] C. Hugget, "Estimation of the rate of heat release by means of oxygen consumption measurements", Fire and Material, 4, no 2, 61-65, 1980.
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
897
Hazards of surface explosions Hieronymus, H., Henschen, Ph., Hofmann, M., Bender, J., Wendler, R., Steinbach, J.", and Plewinsky, B. Bundesanstalt fiir Materialforschung und - p r i i h g * TU-Berlin ABSTFUCT The explosion behaviour of liquid solvents such as toluene, cyclohexane, and methanol with smooth surfaces below a gaseous oxidiser composed of oxygen and nitrogen is reported. In these systems difhsion flames, both types of explosions, i.e. deflagrations and detonations, can occur even when the gas phase, composed of the vapour of the solvent and of the oxidiser, is below the lower explosion limit. Since the presence of the liquid surface plays an important role, explosions in such a system are called surface explosions. Experiments have shown that the most dangerous form of surface explosions, the surface detonations, occur within a specific range of physical and chemical parameters such as the composition of the oxidiser, the initial pressure, and the geometrical factors of the equipment. Experimental investigations on surface explosions are presented. From the experimental data proposals are derived for the experimental determination of safety characteristics to estimate the specific explosion hazards in such heterogeneous systems. The influence of obstacles on the behaviour of surface explosions is investigated, additionally.
Bundesanstalt fiir Materialforschung und -priifung Unter den Eichen 87 D- 12205 Berlin Tel.: +49 30 8104 3426 Fax: +49 30 8104 1217 e-mail:
[email protected]
898
1. INTRODUCTION
Oxidation processes involving a liquid solvent and gaseous oxidisers such as air or mixtures of oxygen and inert gases are widespread in chemical processes. Many of these processes can be improved by introducing a higher content of oxygen in the oxidisers or a higher process pressure. For gaseous systems as well as for heterogeneous systems it is obvious that both of these optimisation approaches can introduce higher explosion risks. A hrther aspect that is up to now not extensively investigated is the particular explosion behaviour of heterogeneous systems [ 11. According to different types of heterogeneous mixtures of organic liquids and gaseous oxidisers such as aerosols, foams, bubbly liquids, and the smooth surface of the liquid under the oxidiser, different types of explosions and detonations can be distinguished [ 1-61. This contribution concentrates on the type of heterogeneous systems consisting of a smooth surface of an organic solvent under a gaseous oxidiser. Since the presence of the liquid surface plays an important role, explosions in such systems are called surface explosions. Similar to gases, two major types of surface explosions exist. These are called surface deflagrations and surface detonations. For practical reasons it is useful to distinguish between surfaces of a long narrow and a large circular shape. Explosions in these sub systems are called one-dimensional and twodimensional surface explosions, respectively.
2. EXPERIMENTAL Two different experimental arrangements were used to investigate onedimensional and two-dimensional surface explosions. For the investigation of one-dimensional surface explosions a tube was used [6]. Two-dimensional surface explosions were investigated in a spherical autoclave using a flat cylindrical sample container. The solvents cyclohexane, toluene, and methanol were used for studying surface explosions. Pure oxygen and mixtures of oxygen and nitrogen were used as oxidiser. All experiments were carried out at room temperature.
A tube of 1174 mm in length with a diameter of 50 mm was used for studying one-dimensional surface explosions. The solvent could be filled into the tube directly or could be filled into a long narrow sample container placed in the tube. One flange is holding an incandescent wire used as ignition source. The pressure is measured with three piezoelectric pressure transducers.
899
The investigation of the two-dimensional surface explosions were carried out in a spherical autoclave. The experimental set-up is shown schematically in Fig. 1. The organic solvent was filled into a flat cylindrical sample container placed on a bed of steel spheres in the spherical autoclave. In most of the experiments the piameter of the sample container was 400 mm. The explosions were ignited by hn incandescent wire. The wire was located 2 mm above the centre of the liquid surface. The explosion pressure was monitored using piezoelectric pressure transducers. Furthermore high-speed video films were taken from a view point on top of the autoclave. The burning behaviour was observed through a glass window coupled to an endoscope that was connected to the high-speed video camera. The maximum frame rate was 4500 fi-ames per second.
1
Pressure sensor lngnition source
,
\
Duct for the endoscope
, / ;
- Sample
container
.Steel spheres
’/
Gas inlet
sensor
Gas outlet
Fig. 1. Experimental arrangement for the investigation of two-dimensional surface explosions
900
3. SURFACE DEFLAGRATION AND SURFACE DETONATION
The two major types of explosions well known from gaseous systems are also found in the heterogeneous systems under investigation, i.e. surface deflagrations and surface detonations. For illustration the different stages are shown in Fig. 2. In this case the spherical autoclave was used as a reaction vessel. Using toluene as solvent and oxygen pressures of more than 2.4 bar the gas phase above the liquid, i.e. the gaseous mixture consisting of the vapour of the solvent and of oxygen, is at room temperature not in the explosion range [ 7 ] . Despite of this fact an explosion in the heterogeneous system can occur. After activating the ignition source a pre explosion burning is observed that consists of a diffusion flame period and a cellular flame period. First the difhsion flame spreads over the surface concentrically from the centre of the surface. The propagation velocity of this diffusion flame is about 5 d s . Fig. 2a and Fig. 2e show a special frame from a high-speed video series imaging the stage of the diffusion flame after spreading a few centimetres over the surface of the liquid. The next phase of the combustion process creates cellular structured flames on the surface of the liquid that are shown in Fig. 2b and 2f, respectively. The size of the cells depends on the initial pressure and varies from 50 mm to 1 mm as the initial pressure is varied from 3 bar to 20 bar. After this period, typically 200 ms to 400 ms after ignition, the system explodes either in a deflagrative or detonative way. As an example the surface deflagration and surface detonation shown in Fig.s2c and 2g occur after 400ms and 330ms after ignition, respectively. Fig. 2d and 2h were taken after the main reaction has finished [8]. As can be seen in Fig. 2 surface deflagrations are characterised by a pressure rise similar to the corresponding explosion type in gases. Measurements with different variations in the experimental parameters led to the conclusion that surface deflagrations take place within the gas phase. A theoretical model explaining this deflagration must be based on a transport of solvent molecules during the burning period into the gas phase.
As can be seen from the corresponding pressure-time diagram in Fig. 2 the surface detonation produces much higher pressure rises and maximum pressures than the surface deflagration. Like surface deflagrations, surface detonations can take place within the gas phase. In this case the gas phase is enriched with he1 by a transport mechanism during the burning period. For the one-dimensional surface detonation in the system composed of tetramethyl-dihydrogendisiloxane and oxygen another transport mechanism was observed. In this case a
90 1
Fig. 2. Different stages of the combustion process in the spherical autoclave; system tolueneoxygen; oxygen pressure 8 bar (surface deflagration) and 11 bar (surface detonation)
shock wave is built during the combustion process that is responsible for the transport of solvent into the gas phase [9]. 4. SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS
To characterise the hazards of gaseous mixtures under atmospheric conditions safety characteristics are used that originally were defined in the literature [ 101 or in the European standard EN 1127-1 [ l l ] . For the application to heterogeneous systems it is useful to modify some of these definitions [5]. A selection of these safety characteristics related to heterogeneous systems is listed below. Maximum rate of explosion pressure rise Maximum explosion pressure Detonation run-up time Detonation pressure Detonation velocity Detonation range Detonation limits Limiting oxygen content In this contribution the two characteristics "detonation run-up time" and the "detonation velocity'' are discussed in more detail.
902
4.1. Detonation run-up time The safety characteristic detonation run-up time is known as the time delay between the activation of an ignition source and the transition from deflagration to detonation [lo]. This definition can be applied to heterogeneous systems without restrictions. One-dimensional as well as two-dimensional surface detonations show a dependence of the run-up time on the initial pressure. In Fig. 3 the measured run-up times for two-dimensional surface detonations in the system toluene-oxygen are shown in dependence of the initial pressure.
No significant dependence of the run-up time on parameters like the volume of the liquid or the volume of the gas phase above the sample container was observed. The initial pressure has significant influence on the run-up time. Up to an initial pressure of about 2 bar the run-up times are well below 100 ms. For higher initial pressures the run-up time ranges between 150 ms and 900 ms with an unsystematic spread. This behaviour can be explained by the fact that the gas phase, composed of the vapour of the solvent and the oxygen, is within the explosion range for low initial pressures and out of the explosion range for higher initial pressures. As will be show below, the run-up time can be influenced by obstacles placed on the surface of the liquid.
Fig. 3. Detonation run-up times of two-dimensional surface detonations in the system tolueneloxygen
903
4.2. Detonation velocity
In analogy to gas detonations, the detonation velocity of surface detonations is considered to be the propagation velocity of the shock wave coupled to the reaction zone. In tubes sufficiently long compared to the detonation run-up distance, the detonation velocity is generally constant. The detonation velocity in heterogeneous systems is normally lower than in gases. The velocity of surface detonations can not exceed that of gas detonations. But the detonation velocity of surface detonations is larger than the velocity of sound in the gas phase. In Fig. 4, the dependence of the detonation velocity on the initial pressure in the system cyclohexane-oxygen-nitrogen is shown for various oxygennitrogen mixtures [6]. The propagation velocity of the one-dimensional surface detonations shows no significant dependence on the composition of the oxidiser at corresponding pressures. In contrast thereto a noticeable dependence of the velocity on the initial pressure is seen. The dotted vertical line marks the gas detonation limit, that was determined experimentally. For low initial pressures the propagation velocity of the onedimensional surface detonations nearly equals the detonation velocities in the pure gas phase. For initial pressures well above the pressure indicated as gas detonation limit, the detonation velocities of the surface detonations are noticeably lower and nearly independent of the initial pressure. The solid line in Fig. 4 is calculated according to the Chapman-Jouguet theory for the corresponding gas detonation.
t 3000 I mls
.-E -8
100%02 60%02 A 55 %02 - gas det
: detonation
2000
0
> C
g. 1000 1 m
A
c
0 0 '0
h
a
A
=
a
+I
0
0
5
10
initial pressure
15
bar
Fig. 4. Detonation velocity of one-dimensional surface detonations in the system cyclohexane-oxygen-nitrogenfor different mole fractions of oxygen [6]
25
904
5. OBSTACLES
All the reported experiments involving obstacles were performed with sample containers of 400 mm in diameter (see Fig. 1). The filling height of toluene was 3 mm and 4.5 mm, respectively. The oxygen pressure was 11 bar. Under these experimental conditions detonations have been observed in all the experiments without obstacles. The obstacles used to divide the surface of the liquid were built of sheet-metal strips. The strips were formed to give obstacles of quadratic and circular shape with a height of 20 mm and 40 mm. These obstacles were placed on the bottom of the sample container so that the upper edge of the strip is located at a height h = x - y above the surface of the liquid, where x is the width of the strip and y is the height of the liquid layer. Two small notches in the lower edge of the obstacle served to connect the liquid inside and outside the obstacle. The inner area varied from 36 cm2 to 356 cm2. The ignition source was 2 mm above the liquid surface of the inner area. The influence of the obstacle height on the explosion behaviour can be inferred from the comparison of the pressure-time diagrams in Fig. 5 . The curves show the pressure development after ignition of the heterogeneous system without an obstacle, with a quadratic obstacle with a height of 17 mm, and with a quadratic obstacle with a height of 37 mm. The lateral length of the squares was 120 mm. In each experiment the height of the liquid layer was 3 mm. a
without obstacle
b
low obstacle (17 mm)
c
high obstacle (37 mm)
C
0
1 -
I
( 7 . -
0
1
time
2
1--r-
3
S
Fig. 5. Comparison of pressure development without obstacle and with quadratic obstacles of different height, t, denotes run-up time
905
Fig. 6 Frames from a high speed video illustrating the explosion process with a quadratic obstacle with a height of 37 mm
Without obstacle a detonation was observed after a run-up time t, = 337 ms. The obstacle with a height of 17 mrn was also not capable of preventing the transition from deflagration to detonation, but the run-up time was significantly prolonged to t,= 1111 ms. Using the higher obstacle, a detonation was suppressed completely. The corresponding pressure-time diagram shows a slow pressure rise with a maximum explosion pressure much lower than the detonation like process. The different stages of the deflagration can be seen in selected frames of a highspeed video in Fig. 6. The time written below each frame is the time at which the fi-amewas taken with respect to the activation of the ignition source. As can be seen from the frames at 20ms and at 80ms the diffusion flame spreads over the inner area and is stopped by the obstacle. After this period the cellular structured flame is burning in the inner area only. During this period the gas volume above the surface of the liquid changes to a flammable mixture that deflagrates at about 2400 ms after the activation of the ignition source. This deflagration is accompanied by the rise of pressure as can be seen from the corresponding pressure-time diagram in Fig. 5 . After this deflagration the rest of the liquid is burning as can be seen from the frame at 3320 ms. Selected frames from the video that was taken in the experiment with the lower obstacle (h=17 mm) are shown in Fig. 7. There was a shorter period of cellular flames which was followed by an inflammation of the outer area at about 800 ms. During the burning of the whole area, i.e. inner and outer area, the gas phase was changed to be detonable and the transition to detonation occurred after the run-up time tr = 1111 ms. Generally, a detonation was preceded by a burning of the whole surface of the liquid. This seems to be a necessary precondition for a surface detonation.
906
Fig. 7. Frames from a high speed video illustrating the explosion process with a quadratic obstacle with a height of 17 mm
Although the prolongation of run-up times does not provide a reliable concept of process safety, it can be useful in case of secondary explosion protection measures such as explosion suppression system. In Fig. 8 the run-up times for surface detonations with and without obstacles are compared. Because of the poor reproducibility of the measurements, the comparison is done in three different categories. The category "Minrrcompares the minimum of run-up times measured with and without obstacle under comparable conditions. Analogous the categories "Average" and ''Max'' compare the average and the maximum of the run-up times measured with and without an obstacle.
Fig. 8. Detonation run-up times with and without obstacles; system toluene-oxygen
907
Experiments with different shapes of the obstacles, i.e. circular and quadratic shapes with different areas, did not show significant differences in the prolongation of run-up times. Experiments of surface detonations show a lack of reproducibility. The obstacles have different efficiency when being applied to samples of different filling heights. Increasing the height of the liquid layer reduces the efficiency of the obstacles. Two measurements with the same type of obstacle that succeeded in suppressing a detonation at a filling height of 3 mm were carried out with a 4.5 mm liquid layer. The lateral length of the quadratic obstacle was 120 mm and the height of the metal strip was 40 mm so that the upper edge was 35.5 mm above the liquid surface. In contrast to the lower filling height both experiments with 4.5 mm liquid layer resulted in a detonation. The fact that a detonation could not be suppressed, might be due to the larger amount of liquid and the reduced effective height of the obstacles (35.5 mm instead of 37 mm). Another explanation could be the lower heat transfer to the bottom of the sample container resulting in a more spontaneous evaporation of a large amount of the liquid leading to a quick enrichment of the gas phase with the combustible vapour of the solvent. 6. SUMMARY Different stages of burning and explosion of a liquid in the presence of oxygen are presented. Depending on the oxygen pressure the final stages are surface deflagrations or surface detonations, respectively. The "detonation run-up time" and the "detonation velocity" are discussed as examples of safety characteristics describing explosion hazards in heterogeneous systems. The influence of obstacles on the run-up time was investigated. The presence of obstacles has a significant influence on the detonation run-up time. Although the prolongation of run-up times does not provide a reliable concept of process safety, it can be useful in case of secondary explosion protection measures such as explosion suppression system.
REFERENCES [l] Plewinsky, B., Hieronymus, H. Ch. 5.2 Heterogene Systeme aus organischen Fliissigkeiten und Sauerstoff in: Steen, H. (editor): Grundlagen des Explosionsschutzes,
WILEY-VCH, Weinheim (2000), pp. 518-557 [2] Sychev, A.N. Structure of a Bubble-Detonation Wave Combustion, Explosion, and Schock Waves; Translated from Fizika Goreniya I Vzryva (Russian); Vol. 31, No. 5 ; Consultants Bureau, New York; 1995
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[3] Henschen, Ph., Hieronymus, H., Rockland, U., Wendler, R., Plewinsky, B. Explosions and detonations of foams 9th International Symposium on Loss prevention and safety promotion in the process industries (1998) Proceedings 2, pp 632-640 [4] Bull, D.C., McLeod, M.A., and Mizner, G.A. Detonation of unconfined fuel aerosols, Prog. in Astronaut. and Aeronautics 75 (1981), pp. 48-60 [5] Hieronymus, H., Plewinsky, B. Anwendbarkeit sicherheitstechnischern KenngroDen zur Beschreibung der Explosionsgefahr im heterogenen System organisches Losemittel/gasfdrmiges Oxidationsmittel 8. Kolloquium zu Fragen der chemischen und physikalischen Sicherheitstechnik, BAM, PTB 1999, Berlin [6] Henschen, Ph. Untersuchung von Oberflachen- und Schaumdetonationen. Dissertation, BAM/TU Berlin 1999 [7] Hofmann, M., Bender, J., Plewinsky, B., Hieronymus, H., and Steinbach, J. Influence of obstacles on surface detonations 2nd internet conference on process safety paper EH 1 available at http://www.safetynet.de/activities/conference2/index.html [8] Hofmann, M., Dissertation BAM/TU Berlin, in progress [9] Plewinsky, B., Wegener, W., and Henmann, K.-P. Surface detonations and indirect ignition processes Prog. in Astronaut. and Aeronautics, 133 (1991) pp. 279-294 [lOIBerthold, W., Loffler, U. Lexikon sicherheitstechnischer Begriffe in der Chemie, Weinheim (198 1) [llIEuropean standardEN 1127-1 Explosive atmospheres - Explosion prevention and protection - Part 1: Basic concepts and methodology
909
Relation between Ignition Energy and Limiting Oxygen Concentration for powders Klaus Schwenzfeuer,Martin Glor and Andreas Gitzi
Swiss Institute for the Promotion of Safety & Security WKL-32.302, CH-4002 Basle, Switzerland ABSTRACT
During a preceding examination [ l ] a relation was found between the ignition energy of a dust cloud and the Oxygen concentration. This relation was tested for a series of different products and it always worked well. But it was not possible to use this relation for calculating the Limiting Oxygen Concentration of a powder. The present work was designed to investigate in general the relationship between the oxygen concentration and the ignition energy of powderNitrogen-Oxygen mixtures. For this reason the used ignition energy varies within a huge range from 1 mJ up to 10 kJ.For all products a steady relation was found across the whole energy range. With the results a model could be developed which shows the hdamental relationship between the oxygen concentration and the ignition energy. 1. INTRODUCTION
One of the common measures to avoid an explosion hazard is the inertisation. It means that the oxygen of the air will be exchanged with nitrogen or any other inert gas. The part of oxygen which has to be replaced depends on the Lower Oxygen Limit of the product and of the type of inert gas. This value varies between approximately 15 Vol% and 8 Vol% for most organic dusts. Sometimes the only possible ignition sources are electrostatic discharges with a low energy. In this case it often not necessary to reduce the Oxygen concentration below the Lower Oxygen Limit, because this limit includes ignition sources with much higher energy. The question arises, how the safe
910
limit can be determined based on known product data like Lower Explosion Limit, Lower Oxygen Limit or Minimum Ignition Energy. With a preceding examination [l] this question was investigated. An equation was found, which allows to calculate the necessary ignition energy (IE) of a dust/Nitrogen/air mixture based on the Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) and the existing Oxygen concentration ( co2) (Eq. 1). 23.2-(23.2/21).cO2 IE=MIE-e This numerical equation works very well for a large amount of products in a range between 10 Vol% and 21 Vol% Oxygen. The calculated ignition energy was in the range between 1 mJ and 1000 mJ. The relationship was tested with approximately 15 different dusts and the calculated data fit very well with the measured results for 10 dusts. These products were always synthetic dusts like dyes or antioxidants. Some dusts like pea flour and Lycopodium failed to give a good agreement. For some dusts, where the measured results fit well with the calculated values, additional tests were done with higher Oxygen concentrations up to 30 Vol%. No agreement was found between the measured and the calculated values. In the same way the Lower Oxygen Limit was measured and calculated with Eq. (1) for all 15 dusts. Also in this case no agreement was found between the measured values and the calculated ones. 2. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
The preceding examination [ 11 was done with a modified Hartmann tube and a spark discharge as ignition source. The available energy range was between 1 mJ and 1000 mJ. For the present work additional apparatus were used like the 1 m3 vessel and the 20 1 sphere. In the 20 1 sphere the tests were done with usual chemical igniters. The energy range varied between 100 J and 10 kJ. Additionally a spark discharge was used as ignition source. The energy range in this case was between 5 J and 50 J. Some of the dusts were measured in the 1 m3 vessel, too. In this case only the chemical igniters were used. The energy range was between 100 J and 10 kJ,as in the 20 1 sphere.
3. RESULTS For the whole measured energy range a continuos dependence on the Oxygen concentration was found, within the accepted measuring errors. Figures 1 to 9 represent all results obtained for different dusts.
91 1
The comparison between the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and in the 1 m3 vessel confirmed the statement by Bartknecht [2], that the Lower Oxygen Limit is only measurable, if the shape of the ignition source is a point. If this is not the case, corrections of the results must be done. Bartknecht [2] predicts a factor of 1.64 for the difference between the values measured in the 1 m3 vessel and in the 20 1 sphere. In the present work this factor was used to correct the values measured in the 20 1 sphere with an ignition energy of 10 H.The values, determined with ignition energy of 2 H, were corrected by the factor 1.32. Below 2 kJ no corrections were applied.
-25 P
’
30
25
Y
g
+Igniter
20
.I Y
80
g
8 “ 2
0
15 10
lm3
-0-
Igniter 201
-A-
Spark 201
+MIKE3
5
0 0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
100000
Fig. 1. Pea flour: The figure shows the results obtained in the 1 m3 vessel, the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 1 m3 vessel chemical igniters were used. In the 20 1 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2k.l and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Harhnann tube was a spark discharge.
Bartknecht [2] assumed, that the ignition source used for the 1 m3 vessel had always the shape of a point. The measured values for the Antioxidant A in the present work (Fig. 2) suggests, that even in this case the energy of the chemical igniter influences the result of the Lower Oxygen Limit established with the 1 m3 vessel.
912
+Igniter
%! 0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
lm3
-0- Igniter 201
+-Spark 201 +MIKE3
100000
Fig. 2. Antioxidant A: The figure shows the results obtained in the 1 m3 vessel, the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 1 m3 vessel chemical igniters were used. In the 201 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2 kJ and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
I 0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
+-Spark201
I
100000
Fig. 3. Lycopodium: The figure shows the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 201 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2kJ and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
913
8
30 25
Y
g
20
-0-
Igniter 201
8
15
-A-
Spark 201
. Y 3
8
8 ;
0
10
5 0 0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
100000
Fig. 4. Coal: The figure shows the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 20 1 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2 kJ and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
25 I
I
-c- Igniter 201 -A-
Spark 201
+MIKE3
0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
100000
Fig. 5. Anthrachinon: The figure shows the results obtained in the 201 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 20 1 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2k.T and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
914
0
L 8 *
30
25 20
A
.C
80
g G
15 10
2 5
8
fa
+Igniter 201
+Spark 201 +MIKE3
0 0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
100000
Fig. 6. Red dye pigment: The figure shows the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 20 1 sphere chemical igniters were used and a spark discharge with an ignition energy of 50 J. The values determined with energy of 2 kJ and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
25
Li -o- Igniter 201
c
R
0
5
0 0.001
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
100000
Fig. 7. Blue dye pigment: The figure shows the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE3). In the 20 1 sphere chemical igniters were used. The values determined with energy of 2 kJ and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
915
i?
0
I
1
, 1 1 1 , 1 1 1
I
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I
I
““L
Fig. 8. Meritena: The figure shows the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 20 1 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2 kJ and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
20 18
16 14
12 10
8 6 4 2 0 0.001
-0-
Igniter 201
-A-
Spark 201
+MIKE3
t
0.1
10 1000 Ignition Energy [J]
100000
Fig. 9. Antioxidant B: The figure shows the results obtained in the 20 1 sphere and the modified Hartmann tube (MIKE 3). In the 201 sphere chemical igniters and spark discharges were used. The values determined with energy of 2 k J and higher were corrected. The ignition source in the modified Hartmann tube was a spark discharge.
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4. CONCLUSION
With the results obtained in the present work a theoretical model on the relationship between the ignition energy and the Oxygen concentration can be developed. A reasonable approach is a steady relation between two asymptotes (Fig. lo). One asymptote represents the energy threshold, below which no ignition at all is possible even in a pure Oxygen atmosphere (LIE). This value should not be mixed up with the Minimum Ignition Energy, which is always tested under atmospheric conditions, that means at 21 Vol% Oxygen. The second asymptote represents the real Limiting Oxygen Concentration. Below this value no ignition is possible even with an unrealistic high ignition energy. Between this two asymptotes the relation between oxygen concentration and ignition energy is represented by a continuos curve for one oxidation reaction. A qualitative similar result was once found by Glarner [3]. Glamer did
'
0 ' """"' 0.001 0.1
' '
"""'
' '
10
"""'
I
1000
Ignition Energy [J] Fig. 10. Model, LIE = Lowest Ignition Energy, LOL = Lower Oxygen Limit
REFERENCES [ 11 M.Glor, K.Schwenzfeuer, Einfld der Sauerstoffgrenzkonzentrationauf die
Mindestziindenergie von Stauben, VDI-Berichte 1272, VDI-Verlag 1996 [2] Wolfgang Bartknecht, Explosionsschutz - Grundlagen und Anwendungen, Springer-Verlag 1993
[3] Thomas Glarner, TemperatureinfluO auf das Explosions- und Zundverhalten brennbarer Staube, Dissertation ETH Zurich Nr. 7350, 1983
917
PROCESS SAFETY AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES: Cool flames and auto-ignition phenomena A.A. Pekalski, J.F. Zevenbergen, H.J. Pasman, S.M. Lemkowitz, A.E. Dahoe, B. Scarlett
Explosion Group, DelfChemTech, Delft University of Technology, Julianalaan 136, 2628 BL Delft, The Netherlands The cool flame phenomenon can occurs in fuel (-air) -oxygen mixtures within the flammable range and outside the flammable range at fuel-rich compositions, at temperatures below the auto-ignition temperature. It is caused by chemical reactions occurring spontaneously at relatively low temperatures and is favoured by elevated pressure. The hazards cool flames generate are described. These valy from spoiling a product specification through contamination and the appearance of unexpected nomuzl (hot)flame (two-stage ignition) to explosive decomposition of condensed peroxides. Key words: Autoignitioin, slow oxidation, cool flame, explosion, hazard, risk, and two-stage ignition
1. INTRODUCTION Partial oxidation processes, carried out at elevated conditions, are widely used in the chemical industry. Propylene oxide, ethylene oxide, methanol, and phthalic anhydride are examples of versatile, widely applied petrochemicals. They are produced at elevated temperature and pressure. Table 1 lists some process conditions. Such conditions demand rigorous safety considerations. Due to these conditions, relatively explosiveness increases as flammability limits become wider while minimum ignition energy and auto-ignition temperature decrease. Detailed knowledge about relevant explosion indices is essential for operating not only safely, but also in the economically most efficient way. Such explosion indices must be known under realistic process conditions; thus at (high) temperature, (high) pressure (and high turbulence) conditions, as are encountered in practice.
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Table 1 Service c
Pyrolysis Gasification
230-875 260-1815
1-379 1-310
However, the explosion indices mentioned above, which are essential for design and safety assessment, are not complete. It is, for example, widely believed that a fuel-rich, flammable mixture kept in process apparatus below its auto-ignition temperature can not ignite and therefore can not explode. Unfortunately this is not always true, since phenomena like cool flames may lead to unwanted sidereactions and, in the worst case, to explosion. The resulting by-products may spoil the quality of the main product through contamination. The process in which a cool flame is followed by ignition so that explosion occurs is called two-stage ignition. Ignorance of cool flame behaviour leads to sub-optimal operation. To cite Coffee (1980): 'Due to the lack of available data and the complexity of the problem, to assure safety in high temperature operations, one must work at temperatures sufficiently below the cool flames initiation temperature such that a sudden change in pressure, temperature or composition cannot cause a transition to ignition." Another citation from the CCPS Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety (1993) ISBN 0-8169-0565-7 is ' Autoignition in chemical processes is poorly understood and the subject requires study under realistic conditions'. That such warnings should be taken seriously is illustrated by the following. D'Onofrio 1979, described several accidents in which cool flame phenomena was the cause. One of them refers to a distillation process. Long-chain fatty acid was distillated in a distillation column operating under vacuum (50-1OOmm Hg), at above 200 "C. The column was shut down and opened to air. As soon as pressure in the vessel reached atmospheric, or very shortly after, the manhole at the bottom of the column was opened. A big flash of flame came out and several workers had lSt, 2nd and 3rd degree burns. The trays in the column were
919
demolished. As well as human injury and process damage, the accident also caused significant business interruption. Indeed, any review of so-called ‘hnexplained” industrial losses will quickly uncover numerous incidents, which can be explained as possibly being due to the initiation of cool flames with subsequent transition to a hot ignition.
2. GENERAL COMBUSTION KINETICS Any combustion reaction of hydrocarbons in air or oxygen (even at stochiometric or fuel-lean concentrations) is not a one step oxidation process leading to the final products (typically carbon dioxide and water). In reality the mechanism of the process involves many intermediate compounds, like carbon monoxide, aldehydes, ketons, alkenes and oxygenated species. The general oxidation scheme (1) shows the overall reaction and contains absolutely no information about the intermediate steps the oxidation mechanism goes through as the fuel is converted to the final products.
C,H,O, + (n+x/4-y/2)02 +nCO2 + x/2H20 (1) It is very much unlikely that all of the molecules needed [C,H,O, + (n+x/4y/2)02], possesses energy exceeding the required activation energy and collide at the same place and time. The general oxidation reactions can be divided into three mechanisms namely: initiation, propagation and termination. In the initiation stage, fuel is converted into radicals:
RH + R - + H *
(2)
or RH + 0 2 +R-+HO2 (3) Where RH denotes any hydrocarbon and R- is its radical. At low temperatures formation of the HOz. radical is favoured. However, at low temperature the reaction rate of reaction (3) is much lower than for reaction (2), so the initiating oxidation reactions occur mainly through reaction (2). The lowest temperature at which the H abstraction reaction may occur is about 140 OC, in case of aldehydes, since the bond strength between the carbon and hydrogen atom is the weakest. In case of alkanes the rank of bond strength is as follows: weakest is a tertiary carbon atom, then a secondary carbon, strongest is a primary carbon atom. Additionally to reactions (2) and (3), especially higher alkanes (C4 or higher) may also decompose thermally forming two alkyl radicals. After undergoing the primary oxidation reactions, in which only compounds initially present in the mixture participate, there is a secondary oxidation reaction in which already formed compounds react together and with unconverted fuel:
920
RH + X + Re + X'
(4)
Where, X represents, depending on conditions, Ha, -OH, 0. and H02. radicals forming H2, HzO, .OH and H202, respectively. When initially radicals are formed, they react with other compounds present in the mixture (propagation) by a straight chain or a chain branching mechanism. In a straight chain reaction, one radical reacts with a stable molecule creating another stable molecule and one (other) radical. In a chain branching reaction, two radicals are formed for each radical consumed. Since both mechanisms are present during oxidation, the multiplication factor, mostly denoted as a,has a value in the range between one and two. It is very important to emphasise the difference between the effects of the mechanisms mentioned. We can express the time needed for full conversion by dividing the number of needed collisions by the frequency of the collisions. Let us consider a one cubic meter vessel kept at 300 'C. The number of moles in the vessel (ideal gas law) is 21. For hydrocarbons, typical oxidation reactions are bimolecular with a pre-exponential factor, A, in the range of 4 x 1013and 5 x 1014 cm3 mol-' s-'. To simplify, let us assume a value of A of 1014cm3 mol-' s-', which is equal to 10' m3 mol-' s-'. The estimated collision frequency between the molecules is (lo8m3 mol-' s-') x (21 m01/m3) = 2.1 x lo9 [s-'1. Assuming in the vessel only one active molecule initially, the reaction time for straight chain propagation mechanism is given by:
21-6.02~1023[moZ/m3 -molecules/mol] /;;molecule/ T=( 6.02.10"[s] = 190. lo6[ years]
m3l)
*( ,~!.1.109[1/
s]) =
If, by contrast, a pure chain branching reaction mechanism is assumed, the multiplication factor a equals 2. For full consumption of the reactants we need N number of steps: 2 = 2 1 .6.02.loz3[molecules/ m3] thus N = 83 steps, what results in:
In reality these two reaction mechanisms occur simultaneously, and the multiplication factor has a value lower than 2. Additionally, some radicals are
92 1
terminated and converted to a stable molecule. Assuming e.g. a is equal to 1.001, the number of steps N is 57827 and the time for consumption is 27.5 111s.
From this comparison one can conclude that the occurrence of chain branching reactions greatly shortens the oxidation time relative to that occurring via straight branching reactions. Moreover, if only one radical is formed in the system capable of undergoing branching reactions and if within the branching reactions there is at least one chain branching step and if no termination reactions occur, then the system is likely to convert all fuel and to be explosive. Due to the increase in the concentration of radicals formed during the initiation and propagation stages, the rate of termination reactions increases. When the rate of radical formation is lower than the rate of radical termination of newly formed radical, the termination stages begins, and the oxidation reaction ceases. It should be stressed that, although the general oxidation Chemistry of alkanes is reasonably well understood, many detailed aspects are still speculative. The oxidation proceeds through many intermediate compounds prior to the formation of the final products. These intermediates, whose formation is more pronounced at low oxygen concentrations and low temperatures, include aldehydes, ketones, alcohols, 0-heterocyclic compounds, alkenes, peroxides and carbon monoxide. They play an important role in the peroxy oxidation chemistry regime. One can generally state that the oxidation chemistry of hydrocarbons depends on temperature, pressure and oxygen contents of the system. The oxidation path can be divided into: A low temperature regime, where peroxy oxidation chemistry occurs, An intermediate temperature regime, where HOz and HzOz chemistry dominates, A high temperature regime, where small size radical chemistry occurs. Examples of dominating chain branching reactions in these regimes are (Westbrook 2000): Low temperature oxidation mechanism:
ROOH +RO. + *OH
Zntemediate temperature oxidation mechanism:
H- + 0 2 + M + HO2. + M RH + HO2- +R. + H202 H202 + M + 2 *OH+ M
922
High temperature oxidation mechanism: Ha + 0 2 + 0.+ *OH
0. and -OH radicals are very reactive and therefore generally do not react selectively with other molecules. In contrast Re and HO2. radicals are much less reactive, and one may consider them as termination radicals. At low temperature, the alkyl radical Re reacts with an oxygen molecule ( 5 ) forming a peroxy radical. At high temperatures, the equilibrium is shifted to the left, preventing formation of the peroxy radical.
Re + 0 2 ROz. (5) Therefore the low temperature oxidation path ceases at higher temperature. However, if the temperature remains below about 45OoC, at 1 bara the peroxy radial is formed, and the oxidation mechanism occurs as presented in Figure 1 (Ranzi 1995, Gaffuri 1997). It should be emphasised that the temperature limits are dependent on fuel molecular structure and system pressure. Increasing pressure favours the low temperature oxidation mechanism, so at higher pressure low temperature oxidation mechanism will dominate even at higher temperature. smaller R* and alkene The alkyl radical R. may thermally decompose giving a smaller alkyl radical and an alkene, or it may react with oxygen. Reaction with oxygen produces either the H02. radical and an alkene containing the same number of ROO* carbon atoms as the alkyl radical, or the Peroxy isomerisation alkyperoxy radical ROO-. The alkyperoxy radical undergoes peroxy / OH + cyclic ethers *QOOH isomerisation. During this process, hydrogen is transferred internally to OH + prodcusts Possible peroxy isomerisation form the hydroperoxide group (-OOH) I and a new alkyl radical centre. After *OOQOOH that, the molecule is denoted as QOOH. -Hop QOOH may contribute to the propagation stage by decomposition to R'OOH an .OH radical and further products (e.g. aldehydes), or it may undergo a RO*+OH cyclisation process forming cyclic ethers. Figure 1. Simpl$ed alkane low temperature oxidation mechanism
It
TI
\
923
At low temperature, QOOH may add molecular oxygen to form hydroperoxyalkylperoxy radicals, -0OQOOH (Baldwin 1982, Bozzelli 1994). Finally, this radical may abstract HOz, forming R’OOH, which is a degenerate branching agent. It decomposes into two radicals resulting in rapid multiplication in the number of radicals (Swern, 1970). However, in spite of a rapid and significant development of knowledge of the kinetics of hydrocarbon oxidation mechanisms, there is still a lack of kinetic data for elementary reactions. This lack of data particularly concerns reactions associated with large alkyl radicals. This hiatus is due to the complexity of the chemistry and the simultaneously occurring thermal effects as well as the complex interactions with surfaces (wall effects). Low temperature oxidation mechanisms of aromatic hydrocarbons are even less well understood.
3. THE COOL FLAME PHENOMENON
3.1. Introduction The reactions of hydrocarbons and air at low temperature, which occurs after an induction period, accompanied by a pale blue chemiluminescence was first reported by Humphry in 1812. In 1929 Emeleus used the name ‘cool flames’ to describe the weakly luminous flame that gave the same emission spectrum, regardless of fuel. The same spectrum was observed for different hydrocarbons (saturated and unsaturated), alcohols, aldehydes, ketons, acids, oils, ethers and waxes. In the past fuel whose capability to exhibit cool flame was questionable was methane. However, recent publications proved the existence of cool flame even for methane (Vanpee 1993, Barbieri 1995, Caron 1999). Cool flames are associated with the low temperature gas phase oxidation (gases and vapours) of an organic substance in air or oxygen in a fuel-rich region within the flammable range and above the upper explosion limit, Figure 2.
924
I
700,
I
1w 0
I
10
20 C W f R IN I1R. PERCENT
30
I
40
Figure 2. Flammability diagram for diethyl ether/air mixtures as a function of pressure. Typical values of temperature increase are up to 200°C; the highest value observed is 400 "C (Coffee 1980, Sheinson 1973). Similarly, the pressure pulses developed in confined spaces are small compared to those generated by normal flames and typically do not exceed twice the initial pressure. At certain conditions, several consecutive cool flames are observed in the system. Pressure and temperature rise generated by these cool flames are transient and fall almost to their initial value after passage of each successive cool flame. For a given fuel concentration, an example of envelopes of multiple cool flame is given in Figure 3. Shape and borders of the envelopes depends on fuel concentration, molecular structure, and vessel shapes and sizes (surface to volume ratio). 173. Y
c-
613,
20
10
60
r, kPa
80
Figure 3. The ignition diagram of a propane/oxygen (1:l) mixture (Lignola 1987). The numbers 1, 2, and 5 refer, to the number of cool flames occurring in the respective region.
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The cool flame temperature (CFT) is reported as the lowest temperature at which the pale blue luminescence can be visually observed. The CFT is significantly lower than the auto-ignition temperature, see Table 2. Table 2 Comparison between cool flames temperature (CFT) and auto-ignition temperature (AZT)(NFPA 325 M, CofSee 1980). Compound CFT["C] AZT
I
I
I
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
265
ISO-PrOpyl Alcohol n-Butyl Acetate
360 225
I
515 400 420
3.2. Visual appearance and products formed In 1926 Emeleus was the first to record the emission spectrum of cool flame phenomenon. The emission spectrum appeared to be the same for several different fuels. The spectra of cool flames consist of a series of bands, shaded toward the red, the intensity of which is greatest in the blue and near-ultraviolet regions. The blue luminescence originates from an electronically excited state of formaldehyde, which is formed in a chemiluminescent reaction mainly by the radical + radical reactions:
Additional emission sources might be present, but their contribution to emission is very minor compared to formaldehyde chemiluminescence (Sheinson 1973, Fowler 1935, Agnew 1957). The sequence of temperature increases before the appearance of a feeble pale blue glow, the increase in its intensity, the appearance of a cool flame, its disappearance, and finally the onset of ignition of a normal flame is the same for all hydrocarbon fuels investigated. The absolute value of these temperatures in the case of rich fuel mixtures varies slightly with the ratio of fuel to air. For the series of paraffin hydrocarbons, these temperatures decrease with increase in the molecular weight of the hydrocarbon. However, they increase if the corresponding olefin or aromatic replaces the paraffin.
926
A wide variety of stable and moderately stable products is created after cool flame phenomena occur. In case of alkanes, these are alkenes, alcohols, saturated and unsaturated aldehydes and ketones, and 0-heterocyclic compounds. In addition, oxides of carbon and water are formed, the concentrations increasing with the availability of oxygen. With increase of temperature, the yields of oxygenated organic products gradually decrease while those of alkenes and of hydrogen peroxide increase. Because aldehydes and carbon monoxide are formed (among many other products), rather than the water and carbon dioxide produced by normal combustion flames, cool flames are often referred to as the phenomena associated with partial or intermediate oxidation reactions.
3.3. Effect of pressure and temperature In hydrocarbon-fuel mixtures, for each temperature in the cool-flame zone, there is a certain critical initial pressure above which cool flames arise following an induction period. Below the critical pressure, cool flames are not formed (Figure 2). The induction period of a cool flame is defined as the time from the introduction of the mixture into the reaction vessel until the cool flame luminescence starts. Inside the cool flame zone, an increase in temperature for a certain constant initial pressure is accompanied by a decrease in the induction period and increase in intensity (brightness of luminescence, magnitude of pressure increase) of the cool flame. Further increase in temperature results in an even greater decrease in the induction period but with a decrease, instead of an increase, in intensity of the cool flame. This effect is due to disappearance of the peroxy radical (reaction (5)), whose presence is necessary for the further low temperature oxidation path. If, on the other hand, the temperature is kept constant and the pressure is increased progressively, then the duration of the induction period falls continuously and the intensity of the cool flame increases. (Figure 3 and 4). This effect is due to the fact that the low temperature oxidation path is favoured by increasing pressure. The appearance of cool flame at higher than atmospheric pressure (> 15atm) has also been observed (Minetti 1995, 1996, Affleck 1967). Since reactions leading to the cool flame are not isothermal, obviously the greater the volume the shorter the induction period.
927
INITIAL PRESSURE ( k P n )
Figure 4. The dependence of the induction period f o r a cool flame on initial pressure and temperature of Zsobutane/oxygen (1:2) mixture. The system temperature is shown close to the relevant curves (modified after Luckett 1973).
3.4. Two-stage ignition phenomenon During the cool flame induction period, a slow oxidation process occurs leading to the consumption of only insignificant quantities of the initial reactants. In a cool flame the extent of oxidation usually reaches 50 percent, so that the products contain about 50 percent non-oxidised hydrocarbon, 30 percent aldehydes, 10 percent peroxides and a more or less significant quantity of oxygen. In this mixture reactions, can occur involving both further oxidation of oxygen-containing compounds and oxidation of the hydrocarbon. With increase in the initial pressure, both the rate of these reactions and the quantity and rate of heat evolved increase. If the pressure exceeds a certain critical pressure, the rate loss of heat becomes less than the heat evolved; thus, a breakdown occurs in the heat balance and ignition takes place. Since the cool flame preceded this ignition, the whole process has a two-stage character and is called two-stage ignition (Figure 2 and 6 d,e,f). Important to note is that the products of the second stage (hot flame) are very different from those of cool flames. During the high exothermic second stage of ignition, the wide variety of oxygenated products produced in the cool flame stage is largely destroyed. However the concentrations of water, oxides of carbon, and of low molecular weight hydrocarbons increase. In fuel rich mixtures, extensive cracking of the excess fuel occurs, giving high yields of simple aliphatic and of aromatic hydrocarbons and, in very rich mixtures, depositing soot.
928
Concerning fuel concentration in the mixture, there are two possibilities of transition from cool flame to hot ignition, Figure 2. In the first possibility, the fuel concentration is within the flammable range, close to the upper explosion limit. In the second case, the mixture is kept above, but still near to, the upper explosion limit. The temperature and pressure of the mixture increase due to cool flame phenomena, widening the flammability range. When the flammability region is entered, an explosion may take place. This is illustrated in Figure 5 on a typical ignition diagram. At some pressure, Pg, the heat generated by cool flames is sufficient to rise the temperature to the ignition point. Increase in pressure causes the same effect: shift from point A to B on Figure 5. Since in closed systems the cool flame increases both temperature and pressure, the resulting direction of change will be upwards not parallel to either the temperature or pressure axis (Coffee, 1980, D’Onofrio E.J. 1979, Luckett 1973).
I Y/,
PRESSURE
-
Figure 5. Typical ignition diagram for fuel concentration within the flammable range.
Moreover, intermediate compounds created during the induction time and products of cool flames have higher upper explosion limits than the fuel. Due to the contribution of these more flammable gases, the upper explosion limit of the mixture increases and the flammability range becomes wider. For an illustration of this effect the Le Chatelier’s equation for multi-component mixtures can be used. This is a convenient method for making a rough estimation.
929
4. POSSIBLE PHENOMENA AT LOW TEMPERATURE OXIDATION
At low temperatures, several oxidation phenomena have been observed like a single cool flame, successive cool flames (up to seven, Luckett, 1973), two stage ignition, and multiple stage ignition (Griffiths 1971). These are presented on Figure 6.
I
TIME [arbitrary units)
Figure 6. Pressure versus time for isobutane/oxygen mixtures (1:2) (Luckett 1973). For experiments presented in Figure 6 a spherical Pyrex glass vessel of volume 500 cm3 was used with the mixture of iso-butane and oxygen at a ratio of 1:2. Below 340°C (line a), the pressure rise generated by these cool flames is transient, and the pressure falls almost to its initial value after passage of each successive cool flame. Between 340°C and 35OoC,the transient pressure pulses are smaller and are superimposed upon continuous pressure increase due to slow combustion (line b). Above 350"C, only one cool flame propagates, but its build up is much faster (line c) than previous cases. Two stage ignition (lines d, e, f) with and without intermediate temperature decrease are observed above 350°C and high initial pressure (> ca 51 P a ) . Additionally, a three-stage ignition is observed at high pressure and temperatures between starting from 310°C (line g). At temperature higher than 410°C auto-ignition always occurred.
930
-
5. SAFETY ASPECTS ACCIDENTS Since cool flames generate only minor temperature and pressure changes, them-selves, they do not present a significant hazard. However, products forn and mixed with the chemicals in a given process may lower the final qualitj the products through contamination. Build-up of peroxides during the induct period can create additional safety problems. Peroxides behave unstable, an( they manage to accumulate, they may lead to damage causing loss containment and may serve too as an unexpected ignition source. Accumulat may occur either in ‘dead spaces’ or due to condensation in cold spots within equipment. Peroxides have higher boiling points than their precuI hydrocarbons. Additionally, there is the danger of transition via ignition to flames, as shown in Figure 5 and 6 d, e, f, g. Temperature pulses associated u pressure changes may also promote transitions to ignition. A compari: between the effects of gas explosions and cool flames is given in Table 3.
Table 3
6. CONCLUSIONS We have shown that the generally followed practice of operating below the au ignition temperature does not always guarantee safe operation since cool flar can lead to hot ignition. On the basis of the information presented, the follow general conclusions may be presented: For a given compound in air or oxygen, cool flames may occur temperatures several hundred of degrees Centigrade lower than autoignition temperature (AIT) of that compound (see Table 2). Cool flames can be initiated by a process disturbance, e.g. hot spots ( metal ball) Cool flames may lead to explosion by so-called two-stage ignition. Pressure increase promotes the occurrence of the low temperat oxidation chemistry where, cool flames and two-stage ignition occur.
93 1 0
0
0
0
Temperature and/or pressure increase shortens the induction time for cool flames. Cool flames can not be seen in a lighted room. To an observer with a good dark vision adaptation and in a darkened room, cool flames appear as a pale blue luminescence. If the cool flame temperature is exceeded but the residence time is too short, cool flames will not occur. The same applies to the AIT. Products of cool flames and of the induction period increase the upper explosion limit. Formed peroxide (induction period) may condense in the system and accumulate, leading to increased risk of ignition and or even possible explosion.
Possible dangerous situations may occur if 0 Process conditions are within the cool flame regime. Residence time in the process equipment, for example due to 'dead spaces', exceeds the induction time for cool flame. Such conditions may occur, for example during shutdown of the process. Hot spots are present within the process equipment. Such conditions locally increases the rate of oxidation processes, thus increasing the concentration of active intermediate compounds. Cold spots exist in the process equipment, allowing condensation of peroxides. Their explosive decomposition may lead to damage causing loss of containment and may serve too as an ignition source In summary, cool flame temperature and limits should also be considered as a safety parameter for processes operating at elevated temperatures and pressures.
LITERATURE 1. Affleck W.S., Fish A., 1967, 'Two-stage ignition under engine conditions parallels that at
low pressures', 15thInternational Symposium on Combustion, pp.1003-1013. 2. Affnes W.A., Sheinson R.S., 1980, 'Autoignition: The importance of the cool flame in the two-stage process', AIChE 86" National meeting. 3. Angew W.G., Angew W.G., Wark J.K., 1965,'Comparison of emission s ectra of low temperature combustion reactions in an engine and in a flat-flame bumer',6! t International Symposium on Combustion pp.894-902. 4. Baldwin R., Hisham M., Walker R., 1982,'Arrhenius parameters of elementary reactions involved in oxidation of neo-pentane', J. Chem. SOC.Faraday Trans. 1, 78, pp.1615 5. Barbieri G., Dimaio F.P., et al., 1995,'Modelling methane cool flame and ignitions', Combustion Science and Technology, vol. 106, pp 83-102. 6. Bozzelli J., Pitz W., 1994,'The reactions of hydroperoxypropyl radicals with molecular oxygen', 25" International Symposium on Combustion, pp.783.
932
7. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1993. 8. Coffee, R.D., 1980,‘Cool flame and Autoignitions: Two oxidation processes‘, Journal of Loss Prevention’, Vol. 13, pp. 74. 9. D’Onofrio E.J., 1979,‘Cool flame and autoignition in glycols’, Loss prevention, vol. 13, pp. 89-97. 10. Emeleus H.J., 1926, J. Chem. SOC.pp. 2948. 11. Emeleus H.J. 1929, J. Chem. SOC.pp. 1733. 12. Fish A., Read I.A., Affleck W.S., Haskell W.W. 1969, Combustion and Flames vol. 13, pp. 39. 13. Fowler, A., Pearse R., 1935, Proc. Roy. SOC.London A152, pp. 354, 14. Gaffuri P., Feravelli T., Ranzi E., et al, 1997,‘Comprehensive kinetic model for low temperature oxidation of hydrocarbons’, AICHE Journal vol. 43, no. 5 , pp 1278. 15. Glassman I.,1996,’Combustion’,Academic Press, San Diego. 16. Griffiths J.F., Gray B.F., Gray P., 1971,‘Multistage ignition in hydrocarbon combustion: Temperature effects and theories of nonisothermal combustion’, 13th International Symposium on Combustion, pp. 239-247 17. Humphry D., 1817, Philos. Trans. Roy. SOC.London, pp. 77. 18. Salooja, K.C.,1964,’Influence of surface-to-volume ratio of quartz reaction vessels on preflame and ignition characteristics of hydrocarbons, Combustion and Flame, 8, 1964, pp.203 - 213. 19. Lignola P.G., Reverchon E., 1987,‘Cool flames’, Progress in Energy and Combustion Science, v d . 13, pp. 75-96: 20. Luckett G.A., Pollard R.T., 1973, ‘The gaseous oxidation of isobutane 1’, Combustion and Flame, vol21, pp. 265-247. 21. Caron M., Goethals M., De Smedt, G. et al., 1999,‘Pressure dependence of the autoignition temperature of methanehr mixtures’ Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 65, Issue 3, 19, pp. 233-244 22. Minetti R., Carlier M., Ribaucour M., Therssen E. and Sochet L.R., 1995,’A rapid compression machine investigation of oxidation and auto-ignition of n-heptane: Measurement and modelling’, Combustion and Flame, vol. 102, pp.298 - 309. 23. Minetti R., Ribaucour M., Carlier M. and Sochet L.R., 1996,’Autoignition delays of a series of linear and branched chain alkanes in the intermediate range of temperature, Combustion Science and Technology, 113-114, pp. 179 - 192. 24. Ranzi E., Feravelli T., Gaffuri P., Sogaro A, 1995,‘Low temperature combustion; Automatic generation of primary oxidation reactions and lumping procedures’, Combustion and Flame, 102, pp.179. 25. Sheinson R.S., Williams F.W., 1973, ‘Chemiluminescence spectra from cool and blue flames: Electronically excited formaldehyde’, Combustion and Flame, vol. 21, pp. 221230. 26. Swern D., 1970,’ Organic peroxides’, John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp. 191. 27. Vanpee M., 1993, ‘On the cool flame of methane’, Combustion Science and Technology, vol. 93, pp. 363-374. 28. Westbrook C.K., 2000,‘Chemical kinetics of hydrocarbon. Ignition in practical combustion systems’ 28” International Symposium on Combustion, to be published .
Topic 6
Storage and transport of dangerous goods by road, rail, water and pipeline
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FRACTURE STATISTICS AND OFFSHORE GAS TRANSPORT BLACK SEA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN V.Polyakov", I. Kurakin aDepartment of Corrosion, Central Construction Firm of Oil/Gas Equipment's Mail 117133Teply Stan 25-1-233 or 143500 Moscow region Istra Kirova 14 fax 7 095 3666201 Email
[email protected] bMaterialDepartment, Moscow OiVGas University , Lenin Avenue 65 Moscow, Russia
1.ABSTRACT In 1980-2000 there occurred nearly 600 heavy accidents of large diameter gas pipelines: 100-110 accidents of diameter 1420 mm, 190-210 catastrophes with diameter 1220 mm, about 300 accidents of diameter 1020 mm. Many thousands of short cracks are presented in gas transport pipelines. Stable crack growth fatigue rates in aged pipes have ranged from 5.10-* to 8.10-6 d s e c [ 1-4 ] and not differ much from those in new pipes. The economic effect from the Black Sea offshore gas pipeline transport would be tremendous: many thousands billion dollars. The Indian offshore pipelines might be much more profitable . However nobody has calculated money losses and ecology impact after fracture accident. To estimate transport possibility across any see; it's necessary to know sea's depth, pipeline length, see corrosion properties. Nowadays there are no data, suggesting optimism on safe operation of the Black Sedthe Indian Ocean offshore gas transport pipelines.
2.GAS TRANSPORT PIPELINES ACCIDENTS 1980-1997 (1965-2000) Gas transport pipe's fracture accidents-1965-2000 have been analyzed . Earlier data, concerning accidents 1980-1999, have been presented in [ 1-61. According to these these works, one of the maximum of accident number observed in 1986 for all diameters of gas transport pipes:-1420 mm, 1220, 1020, 820, 720, 520 and less. Many years different scientists have been using the same GASPROM data to analyze fracture statistics [ 1-14] but they obtained different results. Fracture statistics 1965-1990 worsened [14]. According to Russian officials 1980-1999 and Americans [12], the number of accidents, decreased for transmission and distribution systems. Some discussion
936
on this subject was held. Donald Strusma in his letter to Oil/Gas Journal explained this phenomenon by the decrease of the number of reports on fracture accidents [13]. But fracture time and fracture characteristics for aged materials and aged pipes are always lower than those for new pipes and new materials. Aged pipes are fractured at lower stresses and less fracture times than new pipes [9]. If we determine fracture accidentlphenomenon for one pipeline system, any improvement of fracture resistance and fracture time is impossible [6]. Inspection and repair prevent fracture. More honorable statistics would be a sum of fracture accidents plus a number repair events. "Inspection defectlaccident" is an accident without gas loss and without ecological impact. Inspection defect is not a catastrophe. Fracture mechanics estimates a minimum size of inspection defect. Nowadays diagrams of pipe pressure Vs crack depthlwidth are often used for this inspection.. Table 1 Data on transmission gas pipeline fracture accidents in the former USSR (Russia) 1980-2000 Year Pipeline Accidents'Corrosion Gas losses Accidents' number' length, number accidents' million cubic per 1000 kilometers per kilometers number meters vear 1980 124000 81 27 328 0.65 1981 129000 89 35 445 0.68 1982 138000 52 22 134 0.38 1983 148000 76 40 280 0.5 1984 160000 87 34 267 0.55 1985 170000 99 37 326 0.58 1986 177000 79 24 21 1 0.45 91 22 156 0.48 1987 188700 1988 196000 56 19 122 0.28 1989 207000 66 11 170 0.32 1990 212000 54 16 157 0.25 1991 215000 43 11 140 0.2 1992 138295 25 4 41 0.18 1993 139269 30 11 125 0.22 140000 35 5 450 0.25 1994 1995 143333 31 8 85.7 0.215 1996 thesame 35 13 138.1 0.24 1997 14400039 10-20 -148000 There were several heavy accidents of 1420 mm diameter pipes. One them 23.3.1997 3rd April in Moscow region there occurred large explosion and fire.
937
Diameter of the crater in the earth was 20 m. Some animals were in fire. Deaf of wild board was described by Moskovsky Komsomoletz paper 4 April 1997. June 1997 -a catastrophe near Myshkino (Moscow river), 14200 mm pipe. 10 July 1997pipeline fracture near Petersburg 1998 14500036 10-20 - 150000 1999 145500more than 8-15 150000 20 January-October there occurred 20 catastrophes 2000 25-45
3. OFFSHORE GAS TRANSPORT REALITY ACROSS THE BLACK SEA As was shown in [3-71, the Back Sedthe Indian Ocean offshore gas transport pipelines will fracture many times (Fig. 1). These scientists do forecast catastrophes and short cracks' appearance.
h4 36
The Earth's c o l l a p s e risk e d s t s due t o an increase of l a r g e diameter tranamisaion pipeline l e n g t h
/ /
24
Fig. 3 or 12
.
Dietanoe e f f e c t "Length e f f e c t " a
building new l a r g e diameter Pipes 1020 mm. 1220 mm and 1420 nun
0
200000
Small number Of catastrophaa
Large number of catastrophes
b
Pipeline system l e n g t h , Inn
3.1.The Black Sea geography The Black Sea is characterized by some problems, which may block long distance gas transport from Russia to Turkey. Some of them are as follows large depths, about 2000 meters, long transport distance, high concentrations of Hz S and other corrosion agents in the sea,
938 high pressures 20 MPa. Low-alloyed steels used for gas transport pipelines are very sensitive to sulfide corrosion cracking; especially high strength steels grades X60-X100. Carbon steels have better resistance to SCC than low-alloyed ones. But their strength properties are insufficient for transporting large amount of gas from Russia to Turkey. Russian officials refused to use large diameter pipes for the Black Sea because of the size effect that has been investigated in [ l , 21. They are planning to use 610-mm diameter pipes with large thickness 32-mm (0.032 m). Steel X65. Offshore gas pipeline length - near 400-km [15]. Russian seacoast is very steep, Turkish coast is slop [16]. In Russian coast gas operation pressure is 25 MPa, pipe diameter - 1.42 m. In Turkish coast diameter 1-1.2 m and pressure 7.6 MPa. The total gas pipeline length from the Russian gas fields to Turkey equals 1213 km. Another problem is the absence of hard seabed in the Black Sea. The sea floor consists of corrosion products, mud, gel.
3.2. SIZE AND THICkDESS EFFECTS
Many specialists consider that large and thick pipes prevent fracture [ 15,171. SCC cracking occurs less frequently on heavy wall pipe where hoop stresses are lower [17]. The results are in conflict with the physical phenomena of size effect and thickness the effect according to which the effects of fracture in large and small diameter pipes differ considerably i.e. fracture accidents involving smaller diameter pipes are considered to be less dangerous (Fig.2) and the risk of obtaining a brittle thin-wall material (5-mm wall thickness or less) is much lower than the risk obtaining a brittle heavy wall material (10-mm wall thickness and larger) (Fig.3a, b) [lS-201. 24 20 16
12
=
8
Fracturetime,
4
420
520 620 720
820
920
1020 1120 I220 1320 1420
Pipe diameter, mm
Figure 2. Statistics of life time and rupture lengths of fracture accidents of transmission pipelines in Russia (1980 - 1993)
939
TD=TC+66( two 055/t CO o 7 1- I00
Tc= The 85% shear area transition temperature based on a given8 i Z 8 Charpy gpecimen, OF TW= Nominal W.T. of pipe material,
in.
Tc= W.T.
,
of the Charpy V-notch
specimens, in.
-50
I
0
I'
0.2
I
0.4
00
W.T.
I
0.8
0
in.
I
1eO
I
1.
Fig.3a. Thickness effect: temperature correction for thickness effect. Correlation exists at 85% shear area (Kiefner and Maxey, 1995)
940
BB
h
a.a
P
1
Fig.3b. A comparison of how increasing ferritic stainless steel content and thickness reises the DBTT and lowers the impact resistance
3.3. DISTANCE EFFECT AND ECONOMY
A mayor participant in the international gas business, Algeria has been playing a leading role in gas exports over the past 30 years.. Projects for of 2010 call for nearly doubling these volumes. To provide growing share of supply, two major projects have recently started up: expansion of the Trans-Mediterranean line to Italy and the Maghreb-Europe pipeline linking Algeria to Spain and to Portugal via Morocco. The economics of a long distance (2000-2500 km), large diameter (40-48in.) gas transmission line depends on a minimum pipeline throughput of 10-15 bcmy (billion cubic meters per year). A pipeline bringing gas from the fields in Southern Algeria to southern Europe and having a capacity of 10-15 bcmy would require today an investment of $ 3-4 billions. Building of pipeline land section costs $ 1.5-2.5 million/km and $ 2.5-3.5 million/km for an offshore section. Transportation costs are critically important because they tend to represent an important element of the cost of gas supply for long-distance gas pipelines. They include technical costs and transit fees. When an international gas pipeline project must cross more than one country on its way to final consumers, a transit fee is paid to third countries crossed by the pipeline. In the case of Trammed and Maghreb-Europe pipelines, only one transit country is crossed by each line [21]. Concerning Siberia-Europe and Siberia-Turkey, there exist more problems for pipelines. There are several transit countries and distances from Siberia to Europe and to Turkey are longer. Long-distance gas pipeline transport from Siberia to Europe is profitable only using large diameter pipelines, mainly 1420 mm. Russia possesses an amazing gas resource base. However, official figures overstate the recovery factor for gas in place and appear to systematically overestimate volumes of recoverable gas in undiscoverable fields. Of 212 tcm of initial recoverable resources in Russia, approximately 33 tcm of remaining
94 1
recoverable gas is concentrated in 16 fields that constitute the nation's key gas resources. It is gas that will support most of the volumes supplied over the next 20 years. These key resources are distributed very unequally with respect to the technology and investment required bringing the gas to the market. The cheapest sources will be Urengoy and Yamburg fields. Zapolyarnoye fields and the Urengoy satellites follow these. Production and transportation of gas from Yamal peninsula, the Kara and Barents seas will times the current average cost of gas production in Russia. Only a few offshore fields will contribute to supply by 2015. All of approximately 39 tcm of offshore-undiscovered gas is irrelevant to Russia supply through 2015. These resources include those distributed in the Laptev, East Siberian and Bering seas, where cost of production and transportation will be astronomical and unquestionably place these volumes (which are probably exaggerated anyway) well beyond the pale of supply over the next 20 years [22]. 3.4. HYDROGENATION EFFECT occurs during corrosion. For large diameter pipe any hydrogenated surface crack may be critical [ 1,2]. The relation between stress and critical crack length is given by: o = (2y E / n L)OT5, (1) where y is the specific surface energy density, L is the length of the crack and E is Young's modulus. The quantity "y" can be presented it t e r n of the stress intensity factor K. Let us estimate the orders of magnitude of the fracture length:
L= Kz / no2
(2)
and with the data: E=2.105 MPa, the fracture toughness value Kc for pipeline steels ranging between from 50 to 150 MPad m, o = 170 MPa. Hence, L = 0.3 m. The pipes are operated under cyclic or dynamic loading conditions and critical threshold range of the stress intensity factor in fatigue, AKth decreased to a value of 2- 1OMPa-mo3'. Hence, L may even become smaller than 0,3 m this is also justified by noting that K may become less than the level of 50-150 MPa-.\Im. this is considered to be an acceptable result. However, hydrogenation will decrease the critical levels of the fracture length to 0.1 ...0.01...0.001....0.0001m. 3.5. CATHODIC PROTECTION. The Earth civilization has not built cathodic
protection systems, which can control and provide necessary cathodic protection currents along 400 kilometers of the route at the sea depth of 2000 meters. Additionally, high cathodic protection potentials result in hydrogenation. Sometimes anodic hydrogenation occurs. 3.6. REPAIR TECHNOLOGIES have never been used in such conditions.
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C Less than 0.05
I
Cr 25
Ni
7
Mo
4
I
Other elements, % N
However, large diameter pipes, made from this steel, have been never used. Supersteel 2507 possesses excellent corrosion and mechanical properties. But the usage of superstainless steel in the Black Sea (The Indian Ocean) will be astronomically expensive. 3.8. THE EFFECT OF SHORT CRACKS
Different definitions of short cracks may be presented. Classical definition is follows. A short crack length is less than a plastic zone size at the vicinity of the crack. Any crack with the same geometry may be physically short (e.g. large diameter pipes) or physically long cracks (small samples). Discussing this subject in Eurocorrosion 99 Congress, prof. A.Plumtree estimated short cracks as approximately five times smaller in comparison with long cracks [24]. However this is correct only for "geometry short crack definition". Long-distance fractures in pipes may be dealt with microstructure parameters e.g. distribution and geometry of second phase particles, the chemical composition [25] and also short cracks behavior in pipes . Short cracks initiate due to hydrogen induced cracking, SCC [26] or during mechanical loading. At the first stage they quickly propagate [27] (Fig.4).
943 r l
0
A
o
170 MPa 183 M€'a
174 MPa 192 YP.
u 4r'LL-LLLLLLLLJ po sw o,i o;,
4Q0''0
2oa so0 400
Crack longth, micron. Figure 4 . Crack growth rate cycle ration N,/Ni
0
0.1
0.4
0s
%I%
crack length( &,c) and (b,d). Komuxdr 5. e t al
YI
At the second stage the propagation rate decreases sharply. A part of them stops. During the third stage some of short cracks become long cracks and one or several ones develop according to Paris law: da/dN = C AK"'
(3)
Finally fracture occurs. There exist much more short cracks than long cracks (Fig.5).
944 (
>400L)
300
200
100
0
Figure
5
.
Short crack. number n VB crack length i n aged trannport large diameter pipeline
The process described is similar to classic reliability curve. Firstly, there are many fracture accidents (short cracks propagate very quickly), at the second stage fracture probability is very low (pipes "live" with unmovable cracks during long periods). At the third stage one or several cracks become critical.
3.9. Ecology Offshore pipeline gas transport across the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean is dangerous in comparison with gas transport by ships. The Black Sea ecology would suffer greatly [3-61. But the officials are planning to transport gas from
945
Russia to Turkey this year [28-301 Committee of Foreign Affairs of Russian parliament has recently adopted the project [29] Some west scientists support the project as well [23].
4. CONCLUSIONS 1. Fracture statistics of gas transport pipes have been presented in many works [l-14, 17-19, 24-26]. In Table 1 only heavy accidents are presented. Certainly the Black Sea offshore gas transport pipeline will be fractured many times. 2. Many effects can block offshore gas transport across the Black Sea from Russie to Turkey: distance, well thickness, size, hydrogenation, economy, cathodic protection, repair technology, corrosion effects, short cracks' behaviour. 3. The number of short cracks is numerous. The initiation of Short cracks may be dealt with several phenomena: hydrogen induced cracking, stress corrosion cracking, 0 static or dynamic loading during pipe fabrication from plates and pipes' transportation. Only macroscopic (small) samples can be without short defects . In oiVgas transport pipes they always exist. Studying cracks in brittle materials, A.A.Grithith opened the first page of fracture mechanics science. 4. The Black Sea gas offshore transport problems are tiny ones of the Indian Ocean offshore gas transport task. ~
REFERENCES [ 11 V.Polyakov, Proceedings of Eurocorrosion-97 Congress, Norway, Trondheim, 1997, vol. 1.165-170.. [2] V. Polyakov, et al. in Ibid 159-164. . [3] V.Polyakov, F.Ulmavsay, Proceedings of Eurocorrosion-99, Germany, Aachen, 1999, see material in laser diskette or in abstracts book., p.161. [4]V.Polyakov , T.Mitrofanova, Chen Nan-Ping, Fracture Statistics in Gas Industry. Transactions of 7" International Congress Fatigue99, Beijing, China, ~01.3,2473-2478. [5] V. Polyakov , G.Bulatov, O.Andronova, Why is a fracture of a large diameter pipeline is considered to be a catastrophe. Ecological and other aspects. Proceedings of 10" Anniversary. The Society for Risk Analysis-Europe. Stockholm, Sweden, 1997, 73 1, 850-854. [6] V.Polyakov, Transactions of the 2"d International Conference on Pipeline Rehabilitation and Maintenance. Hungary, 1988, paper n. 15.
946
[7] V.Polyakov , Gas Industry (Gasovaya Promyshlennost), Moscow, 1997, n.6. pp.29-32 (in Russian). [8] V.Dedeshko, Proceedings of the 4" International Business Meeting Diagnostics-98, Yalta, Ukraine, 1998, pp.4-9 (in Russian). [ 101 V.Kharionovsky, Gasovaya Promyshlennost, special edition. Petroleum Economist, 1996, n.3, pp.1X-X. [l11 V.Dinkov, V.Ivantsov, Gasovaya Promyshlennost, 1997, n.8 pp.16-20 (in Russian). [9] V.Dedeshko, Transactions on GASPROM Heads Meeting. Sochi, Russia, 10-12 November 1999 (in Russian). [12] P.Crow, Oil&Gas Journal,, 1995, April 25, pp.23-29. [13] D.Strusma, Oil&Gas J., 1995, Junel2, letters. [ 141 V. Kanaykin, A.Matvienko, Razrushenie trub magistrlnykh truboprovodov (Gas Transmission Pipeline Fracture), Ekaterinburg, Russia, 1997, pp. 1-102. [ 151 Y .Zaytsev, Technical Decisions Concerning Offshore Gas Pipeline RussiaTurkey. Proceedings of the 9" International Meeting Diagnostics99, Sochi, Russia, 1999, v01.2. pp.249-252(in Russian). [16] G.Yabstrebtsov, Writer G.Wells Was Not Dreaming About It.. Gas Transport from Russia to Turkey Across the Black Sea, Factor (Journal Factor), Moscow, Russia,1998, n.3, pp.34-36 (in Russian). [ 171J.Beavers, B.Harle, Proceedings of the lSt International Pipeline Conference M.Maintpour ed., Calgary, Canada, 1996, vol. 1,pp.555-564. [18] J. Kiefner, W.Maxey, Oil&Gas J., 1995, October 9, pp.66-74. [19] L.Rosenfield, Oil&Gas J., 1997, April 4, pp.66-74. [20] J.Douthett, J.Stainless Steel Industry, 1996, Jan., pp.273-278. [21] Eddine Khene, Oil&Gas J., 1997, Dec.15, pp.33-39. [22] J.D.Grece, Oil&Gas 5.1995, Feb.13, pp.79-81, Feb.6, pp.71-74. [23] Anton C.deKonig to V.Polyakov, Private Communication, 1999,Oct.6. [24] A.Plumtree,A.Lambert,R.Sutherby, Proceedings of Eurocorrosion99 Conference,G.Schmidt ed., Aachen, Germany, laser diskette. [25] S.Rousserie, Mhigalli, M.Touzet et al., In Ibid. [26] J.-L.Crolet, C.Adam, In Ibid. [27] D.Kosanda, S.Kosanda, S.Tomaszek, H.-P.Rossmanith (ed.), Failures and the Law. E&FN SPON, London, 1996, pp.353-361. [28] N.Dolgushina, Go Ahead, Many Billion Dollars Will Be Yours, Factor J., Moscow, 2000, N. 1, pp.4-7 {in Russian}. [29] M.Krutikova In Ibid, 2000, n.2, pp.34-36 (in Russian). [30] V.Sinenko, In Ibid, 2000, n.3, pp.4-9.
947
Appropriate Labelling of FIBCs for their Use in Explosion Endangered Areas Dr. C. Bluma,Dr. W. Fathb, Dr. M. Glor', G. Luttgensd and Dr. C.-D. Walther' aDeutscheMontan Technologie GmbH, Beylingstr 65, D-44329 Dortmund, Germany bBASFAG, D-67056 Ludwigshafen, Germany 'Schweizerisches Institut zur Forderung der Sicherheit, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland d
Am Berg 27, D-5 1519 Odenthal, Germany
'Bayer AG, D-5 1368 Leverkusen, Germany
1. INTRODUCTION The topic of electrostatic hazards has long been recognized as an important but often misunderstood subject. However, too often accidents have occurred in the processing industries including the Chemical Industry because of a lack of understanding static electricity. When filling or emptying Flexible Intermediate Bulk Containers (FIBC), fires and explosions have taken place [l]. Although such incidents up to now have been relatively rare, it is necessary when handling FIBCs to have a critical look at the hazards caused by static electricity. The use of FIBCs has increased greatly in recent years, primarily because of their convenience and economics in transporting large quantities of powders and other bulk materials. In contrast to IBCs, drums etc. they are collapsible, needing less space in the work area when they are empty. In order to design explosion prevention measures as is necessary in hazardous areas electrostatic ignition sources - e.g. caused by non conductive FIBCs - have to be taken into account. Thus, it seems reasonable to classify and to label such types of FIBCs which can be handled safely in the corresponding hazardous areas. Additionally it has to be considered that combustible dusts handled in the FIBCs particularly at filling and emptying operations can form explosive mixtures with air, which must not be ignited by the packing material as an electrostatic ignition source.
948
2. IGNITION HAZARDS CAUSED BY FIBCS
When filling or emptying FIBCs, in many cases explosive atmospheres are formed either by the dust itself or they are already present in the surrounding. In general, FIBCs are made of polypropylene woven fabric which as a highly insulating material impedes the dissipation of electrostatic charge, which has accumulated in the FIBC caused by the charged product. When bulk material or powder piles up in the FIBC, electrostatic charge builds up accordingly. If the electrical conductivity of the powder is very low, the charges settled on the particles cannot flow away to ground rapidly enough. This leads to an increase of the charge density in the upper region of the bulk heap, irrespective of whether or not the FIBC is conductive. To avoid electrostatic ignition sources caused by discharges of the FIBC the electrical charges inside and/or on the wall of the FIBC have to be dissipated (leading to a decrease of the electrical field strength) to a non hazardous degree. In view of electrostatic ignition hazards different types of FIBCs have been designed to avoid electrostatic ignition sources in the different types of hazardous areas. Thus, in order to safely avoid such electrostatic ignition hazards - as e.g. is also required in the EC Directive (99/92/EC, Annex I1 2.3) it appears to be reasonable to classify said containers by unambiguous labelling. 3. ZONES AND CATEGORIES
When explosion prevention will be achieved by the concept ,,avoiding of ignition sources“ it is compulsory to subdivide hazardous areas into zones. According to the above mentioned directive the plant management is responsible for that. The area classification has to be carried out according to the standard EN 1127-1 (Explosion prevention and protection). Zone 0:
A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is present continuously or for long periods or frequently.*
Zone 1:
A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.
* The definitions are taken from the Directive 99/92/EC (“ATEX 11Sa”), in which the term “hazardous place” has been taken to describe areas where an explosive atmosphere may occur. In the concerning guidelines normally the term “hazardous area” is used.
949
Zone 2:
A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only.
Zone 20:
A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is present continuously, or for long periods or frequently.
Zone 2 1:
A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.
Zone 22:
A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only.
For the safe operation of equipment in potentially explosive atmospheres precautions have to be taken to avoid ignition hazards, depending on the zone in which it will be used. As the manufacturer of equipment is responsible for constructional safety of his products in potentially explosive atmospheres, he has to label them according to the following system of groups and categories: Equipment group I applies to equipment intended for use in underground parts of mines, and to those parts of surface installations of such mines, liable to be endangered by firedamp and/or combustible dust. 0
Equipment group I1 applies to equipment intended for use in other places liable to be endangered by explosive atmospheres.
According to the level of protection categories are defined for the equipment for intended use in potentially explosive atmospheres: Equipment in category 1 meets the requirements of zones 0 and/or 20. Equipment in category 2 meets the requirements of zones 1 and/or 2 1. Equipment in category 3 meets the requirements of zones 2 and/or 22. As it is necessary to distinguish between the equipment suitable in the zones 0, 1 and 2 (gas atmospheres) or the zones 20, 21 and 22 (dust atmospheres) the letters G for gas and D for dust will be put after the category index. Example: equipment suitable for use in zone 1 will be marked I1 2 G.
950
4. TYPES OF FIBCS AND THEIR ELECTROSTATIC PROPERTIES
There are a lot of different FIBCs in use for different purposes. Concerning the aspects of the avoidance of - electrostatic - ignition hazards up to now 4 types of FIBCs (A,B,C and D) have been described, differentiated according their ability of charge dissipation and/or limiting the energy of possible discharges. These 4 types of FIBCs are given in the following: 0
0
0
Type A: A FIBC made from non conductive material without any measures against electrostatic charging. As no electrically conductive material is interwoven in the fabric, grounding and therefore charge dissipation is hardly possible. Explosive atmospheres of gases as well as explosive atmospheres of dusts can be ignited. Thus, a Type A FIBC must not be used to handle combustible dusts. If such a FIBC - containing inert material - has to be handled in hazardous areas, this may only happen in Zone 2 or Zone 22. Type B: A FIBC made from non conductive material (including the commonly applied inner coating) having a breakdown voltage not exceeding 4 KV to avoid electrostatic propagating brush discharges. This reliably prevents the ignition of explosive dust atmospheres but explosive gas atmospheres can still be ignited. Like Type A the Type B has no interwoven conductive material. Thus, a Type B FIBC can be used to handle combustible dusts; but it must not be used in hazardous areas Zone 1 or 0. Type C: A FIBC normally made of non conductive fabric with interwoven conductive threads (see CENELEC Report R044-001 [3])
-
forming a reliably interconnected grid of maximum 50 mm mesh size
or
-
having a distance less than 20 mm (threads interconnected at least once).
Those conductive threads must have a resistance to ground of less than lo8 Q and must be grounded especially during filling and emptying operations. Some Type C FIBCs have interconnected loops to enable grounding via a (grounded) hoist system. When grounded properly there is no risk of discharges effective for ignition. The inner surface of the FIBC may have a thin coating, its breakdown voltage to the conductive threads must not exceed 4 KV.
95 1
This description of the Type C FIBC differs somewhat from that originally given by Maurer et al. [2] and in [4],where a completely conductive or at least dissipative FIBC-material is named having a resistance to ground of (not more) less than lo8 0. The above given description refers the Type C FIBCs which are actually available and present in the market and can be used as well as the "original" Type C of Maurer et al. Thus, a Type C FIBC can be used to handle combustible dusts, and there is no risk using it in hazardous areas Zone 1, 2, 21, 22, provided it is properly grounded. Type D: A FIBC made from non conductive material containing a system of separated conductive fibres which have no electrical contact to each other. This FIBC is not conductive but enables a charge dissipation into the surrounding via corona effect. To decrease the charge (e.g. at voltages below 5 KV) which is still remaining after discharging via corona Type D FIBCS are sometimes equipped with an ,,antistatic" coating lowering the surface resistance of the fabric. Grounding of a Type D FIBC is not possible. Because of the charge dissipation into the surrounding via corona discharge the Type D FIBC - as available in the market - can easily charge insulated conductive parts or persons (who are conductive from the electrostatic point of view). Those parts or persons can generate electrostatic spark discharges being able to ignite explosive mixtures of gases or vapors in air when they contact ground or grounded parts. Thus, a Type D FIBC may be used with combustible dusts, but only in hazardous areas Zone 2 and 22+ as is allowed for FIBC of Type By if it can be shown by test that the breakdown voltage is less than 4 KV. The application of a Type D FIBC in a hazardous area Zone 1 requires further measures decreasing its effective charge (e.g. in terms of surface potential) to a non hazardous degree. A test method for the identification of Type D FIBC which are suitable in Zone 1 is given in Chapter 6 . 5. PROPOSAL FOR LABELLING FIBCS It is not the aim of this paper to discuss whether FIBC or like packaging could represent ,,equipment" in the sense of the ATEX 100 directive 94/9/EC. But nevertheless the precise labelling of equipment should apply to FIBCs. This will
Some manufacturers claim that FIBC Type D might be used in explosive gas atmospheres if the charge accumulation will not exceed certain values which are marked on the bag. These instructions seem not to be very helpful to the customer.
952
enable the customer to select the appropriate FIBC for the particular application following the requirements given in the ATEX 118 directive 99/92/EC. In general, equipment for use in hazardous areas is marked with the well known “EX“label (hexagon). It would be desirable and plausible to the customer when those FIBCs which are permitted to be used in hazardous areas were labelled with the ,,EX“label as well. According to the above mentioned categories FIBCs for the use in potentially explosive atmospheres might be labelled in the following manner: Type A: Attention: no use in hazardous areas Type B: “Ex” label + I1 2 D Type C: “Ex” label + I1 2 D + I1 2 G Type D: “Ex” label + I1 2 D This labelling should be done in the responsibility of manufacturer based on the demands given in the literature [ 1, 4, this work]. The label has not the status of an ATEX 100 label.
6. APPLICATION OF A TYPE D F€BC Bv HAZARDOUS AREA ZONE 1 In order to permit a Type D FIBC in a hazardous area zone 1 such that it may become labelled as I1 2 D + I1 2 G, the following tests and limiting values are suggested: To exclude discharges effective for the ignition of explosive gas atmospheres arising from the FIBC fabric and to avoid charging of insulated conductive parts or persons the following test procedures are recommended:
. .
A sample of the FIBC fabric of the size 1000 x 1000 mm2 supported by a highly insulating frame has to be charged to a high surface charge density e.g. by corona spraying discharge. When approaching a metal sphere with a radius of 25 mm at ground potential to the charged surface the measured maximum charge transfer by a single discharge must not exceed 30 nC (limit for gases or vapours of explosion group IIA and IIB). The ,,blown up“ FIBC has to be charged by corona. For this purpose a corona tip is located in the centre of the FIBC and a corona current of 5 yA is switched on. Charging by corona has to be stopped as soon as the electric field outside the bag attains a constant level. (This typically occurs after 2 to 5 minutes). Then the corona tip has immediately to be removed from the FIBC. The potential of an electrode made of a 500 x 500 mm2 metal plate placed 1 m apart from the FIBC is recorded. This plate is mounted parallel to
953
one surface (face to face) of the investigated FIBC already before the corona charging is started. The plate has to be kept electrically insulated from ground. Its total capacity including the measuring device has to be adjusted to 200 pF. 10 s after switching off the corona current the measured potential of this plate must not exceed 300V. The Test method is based on experimental investigations. The limiting value for the potential is chosen so that an explosive Hydrogedair-mixture will not be ignited under the conditions assumed. For a safe use of Type D FIBCs - meeting the requirements listed above - in a hazardous area zone 1, it should be stated that all conductive parts of the equipment and installations including the operators (who are conductive from the electrostatic point of view) within a distance of minimum 1 m from the surface of the FIBC must properly be grounded. This has to be implemented in the instructions for use.
REFERENCES [l] [2] [3] [4]
L:G: Britton, Process Safety Progress, 12,4 (1993) 241-250 B. Maurer, M. Glor, G. Luttgens and C. Post, Inst. Phys. Conf. Ser. No 85, Sect 3, Oxford (1987) CENELEC Report R044-001 “Safety of machinery - Guidance and recommendations for the avoidance of hazards due to static electricity”, ( 1999) Beispielsammlung zu den Richtlinien “Statische Elektrizitat” Merkblatt TO33 Ausgabe 3/98 der BG-Chemie, Jedermann-Verlag Dr.Otto Pfeffer oHG, Heidelberg (1998)
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
955
Risk assessment and decision-making strategies in dangerous good transport. From an Italian case-study to a general framework B. Fabiano, E. Palazzi, F. Currb and R. Pastorino DICheP - Chemical and Process Engineering Department “G.B. Bonino”, University of Genoa, Via Opera Pia, 15 - 16145 Genoa, Italy
1. INTRODUCTION The relentless drive of consumerism has required increased quantities of dangerous goods to be manufactured, transported, stored and used year on year, despite the relative recent move towards “inherent safe” materials [l]. The safety and efficiency of road transport is to be considered a strategic goal in particuIar in those countries, like Italy, in which about 80% of goods is transported by this means with a 30% increase with reference to the 2010 forecast. Moreover, recent severe accidents, like the Monte Bianco tunnel one, have emphasised the problem, making it clear that the present system does not hnction optimally and that the risk connected to dangerous goods transport is comparable with the fixed plants one. Generally speaking, the concept of risk is the relation between frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realization of specified hazards [2]. The recent EEC Directive 96/82/EC implies the evaluation of risk in highly industrialized areas by means of Quantitative Area R s k Analysis techniques. It can be noted that certain dangerous substances are transported along particular Italian road sections in quantities that would exceed the threshold for safety notification or declaration, set down in Italy by Seveso I1 Directive, if stored in a fixed installation. As reported by different researchers, a specifically tailored QRA methodology can represent an effective tool to assess the risk to people associated with the transport of dangerous substance. The risk from dangerous goods transport by road and strategies for selecting road loadroutes are faced in t h s paper, by developing a site-oriented framework of general applicability. Poor appreciation of factors related to road conditions such as road class, designated speed limits, traffic density, as well as of the population characteristics, is likely to result in a
956
risk assessment insensitive to route specifics and over- or under-estimating the overall level of risk [3]. It was therefore chosen to develop a high level of detail in the frequency model, by considering in-depth the traffic accident environment; a “cautious best estimate’’ approach was employed adopting either realistic and directly detected assumptions, or conservative overestimating hypotheses. Contrary to other models [4,5], this approach considers the risk from normal traffic accidents in addition to the risk from the major hazard aspects of the transport of dangerous substances. 2. RISK MODELLING
The frequency of an accident on the i-th road stretch can be expressed by the following equations:
fi = y,L,n,
(1)
6
Yi = Y o C h j j=l
(2)
where: yi = expected frequency on i-th road stretch (accidentkm vehicle); Li = road length (km); ni = vehicle number (vehicle); yo = statistical basic frequency ( a c c i d e n h vehicle); hj=local enhancing/mitigating parameters (-). The frequency of an accident evolving according to a scenario S, on the i-th road stretch, can be expressed as:
where: P, = probability of evolving scenarios of type S, following the accident initialiser (i.e. collision; roll-over; failure etc.); P, = ignition probability for flammable substances. In considering the magnitudo of the accident, it seemed important to include both the motorist on the road and the off-route population. The number of fatalities N, caused by the accident evolving according to a scenario S, on the i-th road stretch, can be calculated according to following equations:
where: N,,=road fatality number (fatalities); w e h i c l e density on the road area (vehicle/m2); k=average vehicle occupation factor; A,, = road letal area (m2); N,,= off-road fatality number (fatalities); A,, = letal area (km,); D=population density (inhabitants/km2).
957
When considering different concurrent scenarios y and j (i.e. toxic release and delayed ignition), in order to avoid overestimating, the total letal area will be considered as: A L,t=A,,+Aj-[Ay&,]. 3. A PRACTICAL APPROACH
It is clear that a realistic evaluation of the accident frequency is to be considered an essential step in the risk assessment. As an example, an evaluation at a national level, making reference to ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics) data referred to 1999, can be performed starting from the following data: national road gasoline consumption 12.5.1O6 T year-'; average distance covered 10 km/L; yearly distance covered 1.95.10" km year-'; number of accidents 168.103; obtaining an accident frequency for cars corresponding to 8.6.10-7 accident year-'.km-'. In a similar way, starting from the annual number of trunk accident (18 lo3 accident-year-')and an average yearly distance of 10 km year'.truck-', the truck accident frequency corresponding to 1.8. accident year' '.km-'can be calculated. When dealing with a particular route, a realistic evaluation of the frequency must take in account on one side inherent factors (such as tunnels, rail bridges, height gradient, bend radii, slope, characteristics of neighbourhood, meteorological conditions) on the other side factors correlated to the traffic conditions (traffic frequency of tank truck, dangerous goods trucks etc), suitable modifylng the national frequency.
Figure 1. Pilot area
958
In order to provide a framework of general applicability for a road evaluation at local level, field data were collected on the selected highway, by systematic investigation, providing input data for a database reporting tendencies and intrinsic parameterhite-oriented statistics. A pilot area was selected to this purpose, referring to the routes starting from the Genoa port area (the most important in the Mediterranean basin) towards the industrialized North Italian and Central Europe districts. Genoa-Milan A7 highway is characterized by high truck traffic (mainly ADR) and inherent factors determining to a major accident risk, with reference to both individual and social risk, defined according to European limits. As reproduced in Fig. 1, A7 highway is connected to A10 highway to the West and to A12 highway to the East. An alternative route towards Milano is represented by the highway Voltri-Alessandria A26, starting at the west side of Genoa and joining A7 highway after Serravalle exit. Historical frequencies, calculated for each highway stretch, are reported in Table 1. If compared with the historical accidents, it can be noticed that A7 highway is characterized by values higher at least an order of magnitude than the accident frequency calculated b other researchers for certain type of load threatening accidents [6], (6.0.10- ), thus approaching the calculated values for urban road. The results can be ascribed to the already-mentioned particular characteristics of the route, with intrinsic hazard factors also due to its old construction time (1935).
Y
Figure 2. Average daily traffic flux and daily traffic of hazardous materials (ADR), monitored on the different stretches of A-7 North highway, in the year 1999
959
Table 1. Accident frequency on the highway A7. ~~~
~
Highway stretch
~~
Length [km] Yearly traffic (n)
Accident frequency ( a c c i d e n m )
1
1.9
10977375
8.63.10-7
2
3
11541300
4.04.10-7
3
2.9
1013 1670
6.47.10-7
4
14.3
5648740
6.56.10-7
5
5
4485485
13.4.10-7
6
5.8
4395330
7.45.10-7
7
6.6
43 15395
4.56.10-7
As reported in Table 2, this assumption is confirmed by the average speed calculated for the different A7 highway stretches and vehicle type, making reference to the statistics obtained from Italian Highway S.p.A. Table 2. Average speed on A7 highway, for the different vehicle categories Average speed (km/h)
Highway stretch Car
Truck
Total
Genova Ovest-ConnectionA-7lA-10
84
67
83
Connecti0n.A-7lA-10Connection A-7lA- 12
80
64
78
Connection A-7/A-12- Bolzaneto
77
62
75
Bolzaneto- Busalla
80
64
77
Busalla- Ronco Scrivia
80
64
77
Ronco S.- Isola del Cantone
80
64
77
I. del Cantone - Piemonte
80
64
77
960
Figure 3. Accident hourly distribution on A7 highway Genova-Serravalle.
The statistical distribution of the accidents during the hours of the day, a resulting from on-site survey performed by Road Policy of Genoa district over span of one year, is reproduced in Fig. 3. In order to verify the existence of a correlation between accident and heav traffickazardous materials transport (ADR), a statistic elaboration over the Sam time span was carried out, considering as well the results reproduced in Fig. 4 .
Figure 4.Percentage daily distribution of heavy traffic (ADR)on A7 highway.
96 1
By considering the daily ADR traffic on the different highway sections, reported in bold number in the already mentioned Fig. 1, it results that the higher values of dangerous goods fluxes correspond to the intersection between the highways A10 (West riviera) and A12 (East riviera), in the stretch between the towns of Bolzaneto and Busalla and in the starting stretch, from the central port of Genoa (Genova Ovest tollgate) to the connection between the highways A10 and A7. Globally, the considered highway can be divided into 22.63 km of straight stretch ;9.33 km of tunnels and 7.54 km of bends. As a basis of comparison, the number of accidents in Liguria for the different vehicle categories was obtained by elaborating ISTAT statistics, as follows: motorcycles: 1024; cars: 5635; trucks: 444; other: 91. The proportion of severe accidents on A7 highway north during the years 19951999 is in the range 27%-40% of the total accidents, defining a severe incident as one involving death, serious injuries, a fire or explosion, or more than Euro 25.000 worth of damage. By elaborating the data collected on the field, over an observation time of one year, the immediate causes of the accidents on the highway A7 north, can be grouped as reported in Table 3. Table 3.
Immediate accident cause on A7 highway north.
Accident cause
Number of accident
Percentage [“h]
Speed
67
40,3
Lane change with no signalling
6
34
Dangerous overtaking
3
1,s
Fit of drowsiness, illness, carelessness
20
12,o
Loading loss or movement
3
1,s
No right of way at an intersection
2
12
No safe distance
5
3,1
Accidental obstacle on the caniageway
55
33,l
Loading back exceeding
1
076
Bursting of a tyre
1
0,6
Fire
1
0,6
Vehicle stop due to failure
2
12
166
100
Total
962
As is well known, various factors influence the accidents: mechanical, environmental, behavioural, physical, road intrinsic. The main points of interest resulting from table 3 are the high proportion of incidents due to speed, corresponding to 40.3% and the proportion due to drive errors equal to 21.7%. The striking high percentages of these factors are to be correlated again to the intrinsic characteristics of the analyzed highway. In fact, the high proportion of stretches with curves characterized by small radii (< 200m) and steep descent, make it necessary to respect low speed (i.e. 40 km/h), not usual on this type of road. When dealing with HAZMAT incidents, historical data reported by Hardwood et al. [7] show that the proportion due to traffic is 11%, while the proportion involving a failure of the truck (body, tank, valve or fitting) is as high as 44.5. It can be pointed out that, dealing with dangerous good transport, the main difference with process industry is the need of a noteworthy improvement in the inherent safety of the system and in the human factor. A statistical multivariate analysis was performed by correlating historical accident data, directly collected on the field, with relevant intrisic road factors and meteorological, traffic conditions. A significative (P<0.05) degree of correlation was highlighted making reference to following parameters: h,-h, geometrical characteristics; h,-carriageway type; h,-meteorological conditions; h,- baffic intensity and typology. The number of accidents verified in tunnel or road bridge was limited, allowing to obtain numerical results (h6), which would need fiu-ther investigation. It is however clear that the data reported are to be considered more from the qualitative viewpoint, as well as that the results of risk modelling would be considered for the comparison of different alternatives, rather than in its absolute value. Table 4 summarizes the results of the statistical elaboration of the different enhancing/mitigating factors, carried out on the highway considered. Table 4.
Factors correlated to intrinsic road characteristics. INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS Straight road Road bend (radius > 20Om) Road bend (radius < 200m) Plane road Slope road (gradient < 5%) Steep slope road (gradient > 5%) Downhill road (gradient < 5%) Steep downhill road (gradient > 5%) Two lanes for each carriageway Two lanes and emergency lane for each carriageway Three lanes and emergency lane for each carriageway Tunnel Bridge
h, 1 1.3 2.2
h2
h3
h6
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5
1.8 1.2 0.8
0.8 1.2
963
Table 5.
Factors correlated to meteorological conditions METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Fine weather Rain Snowlice
h4 1 1.5 2.5
Table 6 .
Factors correlated to traffic characteristics on the highway A7 TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS Low intensity < 500 vehicleh Medium intensity <1250 vehicleh with heavy traffic <125 trucWday High intensity > 1250 vehicleh High intensity > 1250 vehicleh with heavy traffic > 250 trucWday
h5 1 1.4 2.4
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The study on the density of the population which might be exposed to hazardous materials hazards from transport must include data on population density along the route and on the so-called motorist density, considering as well the proportion which may be considered particularly vulnerable or protected. Otherwise, all individuals within a threshold distance from a road stretches incur in the same risk regardless of their location. The average density on the route can be calculated starting from the collected statistical data relevant to average daily traffic, average speed and geometrical data of carriageway and lanes, in each highway stretch considered. A summary of the results is schematized in Table 7, together with the average population density along the route resulting from the elaboration of ISTAT statistics. By comparing these data with the usual classification of the environment typology, it appears that the first three stretches can be classified as urbanhuburban environment, while only the two last have rural characteristics. In order to evaluate correctly the number of on-road population involved in the accident, the response and variations in the motorists density following an accident were considered. In particular, heavy goods vehicle were assumed to occupy 20 m of lane length and other vehicle 4 m. Two classes of motorist density are to be considered: the former refers to the carriageway where the accident occurs, the latter considers the opposite carriageway, were the “ghoul effect” causes the slowing down of the traffic.
964
Table 7.
Average density on highway A-7. Stretch of A7 Highway
On-route density [vehicle/m2]
Population density [personflan2]
Genova Ovest- Al1.A-.//A- 10
2.52 10-3
2729
Al1.A-7lA- 10-Al1.A-7lA-12
2.85 10-3
1360
All.A-7/A- 12- Bolzaneto
2.57 10-3
2729
Bolzaneto- Busalla
1.40 10-3
766
Busalla- Ronco Scrivia
1.21 10-3
290
Ronco S.- Isola del Cantone
1.09 10-3
119
I. del Cantone - Piemonte
1.07 10-3
36
In order to evaluate the letality area, the consequence model was applied making reference to the event tree reproduced in Fig. 5.
Failure
Bum out of
of tanker
tanker by
, I
Release
of vapours
Blow out of tanker
I
I
23
23
POOL FIRE
Figure 5.
Event tree of truck accident
FIRE BALL
965
Making reference only to flammable and explosive events, five scenarios were theoretically considered, i.e. bleve, unconfined vapour cloud explosion, jet-fire, flash-fire and pool fire. Dealing with these scenarios, it seemed realistic to consider that owing to the congestion of the traffic and to the low protection offered by cars and trucks to these events, all motorists in the lethal area die. Making reference to off-road population a two steps model was considered [8], total lethality within the LD,, hazard range; 25% lethality between the LD,, and LD, ranges; no lethality beyond LD, range. The above-described technique was adopted for the evaluation of individual risk, defined as “the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of a specific hazard” [9]. In this way, an in-depth evidence on the distribution of the risk along the route and on the localization of high spots is performed, with good accuracy and precision. Considering the potential for transported hazardous materials to cause multiple fatalities and the likelihood of the occurrence, the well-known societal risk can be modelled with tha same approach, by the frequency of exceedance curve of the number of deaths (F/N curve) due to transport. The results show that the risk associated with the transport of hazardous materials on the highway considered, in the stretches 2 and 3 is at the limit of the personally acceptable level of risk set down aemrding te the w d l - h w n criterion [2)
where P, is the acceptable probability of death from the individual point of view and P,, is the probability of being killed in the event of an accident. These results are to be considered carefully also owing to the fact that the stretches defined at major risk are common to different directions, namely Genoa port-North and East riviera-North. On this basis, the opportunity of limiting hazardous materials travelling during particular time bands, must be considered. As an example, making reference to the already-mentioned Fig. 4, about 53% of ADR traffic is focused in the time interval 8 a.m. -13. A second strategic opportunity consists in imposing a different highway route for hazardous materials transport. In this case-study an alternative route is represented by A26 highway, from Genoa Voltri toward Alessandria. This highway actually collects the traffic from the West port of Genoa, from Multed oil port and from the West riviera, but being more recent and characterized by lower intrinsic risk factors, it could gather also the traffic from East and Genoa central port. However, the practical utilization of this option is made difficult by the need of crossing a long urban stretch, while the risk of the transport of hazardous substances is lower if the route followed avoids centres of population.
966
A solution for the risk mitigation is therefore the construction of a slip road connecting Genoa central port and highway A26, even if the feasibility of this option is obviously constrained by economical and environmental impact issues.
5. CONCLUSIONS The risk from transporting dangerous goods by road and strategies for selecting road loadroutes are faced in this paper, by developing a site-oriented framework of general applicability. A methodological approach for the assessment of standard vehicle and dangerous good truck flows was applied to a pilot area, allowing a statistical reinforced evaluation of intrinsic enhamindmitigating parameters. In this way a risk assessment sensitive to route specifics and population exposed is proposed and the overall uncertainties by the risk analysis can be lowered. The developed model, of general applicability, can represent a useful tool not only to estimate transport risk but also to define strategies for the reduction of risk (i.e. distribution and limitation of ADR road traffic, improvement of highway section, alternative routes) and emergency management.
REFERENCES B.J. Thomson, Proc. of International Workshop on Safety in the Transport, Storage and Use of Hazardous Materials, NRIFD, Tokyo, Japan, 1998. J.K. Vrijling, W. Van Hengel, R.J. Houben, J. of Hazardous Materials, 43 (1995), 245-261. P.A. Davies, Loss Prevention Bulletin, 150 (1999), 22-23. L.H. Brockhoff, Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries VII, SRA ed. Taormina, Italia (1992), 160-1-160-19. S.A. Gadd, D.G. Leeming, T.N.K. Riley, Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries JX,Ed. Graficas Sign0 S.A., Barcelona, Spain (1998), 308-317. I.A.James, Dept. Of Environment, Report DoE/RW, London, (1986), 85-175. D.W. Harwood, E.R. Russell, J.G. Viner, National Research Council , Transportation Safety Board, Transportation Research record 1245, Washington, DC, 12, 1989. G. Purdy, J. of Hazardous Materials, 33 (1993), 229-259. V.D. Dantzig, J. Kriens, The economic decision problem of safeguarding the Netherlands against floods. Report of Delta Commission, The Hague, NL, (1960), 3, 11, 2.
967
Assessment of Storage Life of Energetic Substances Close to Safety Critical Conditions Dr. A. Eberz", Dr. G. Goldmann" aBayerAG, WD-SI VA, Building B 407,51368 Leverkusen, Germany
SUMMARY An uncontrolled decomposition of energetic substances may cause considerable damage. When screening measurements such as DTA exhibit a critical exothermic decomposition close to the designed storage temperature, a sound assessment of storage life for such substances becomes a safety issue of great importance. This paper is to demonstrate the use of powerful software tools which will reliably give a kinetic model of decomposition behaviour of compounds such as Butadiene-1,2 and a nitro aromatic residue based on DTA/DSC measurements at a range of different heating rates, allowing to calculate the adiabatic induction time for different temperatures based on model parameters. Extended calculations based on the "Thomas model" even take realistic yet sufficiently conservative heat transfer conditions in a vessel or package into account. The application of such tools demonstrates that below a certain critical temperature a heat explosion will not occur even for an arbitrarily long storage time.
1. INTRODUCTION An uncontrolled decomposition of energetic substances may cause considerable damage. Nevertheless energetic substances often have to be stored before they are converted or dissipated. The storage of large amounts of these substances may come along with specific risks caused by long residence time in combination with heat accumulation because of missing heat transfer from the bulk material to the surroundings. As described by Arrhenius and van t'Hoff, most chemical reactions that run with significant rates at elevated temperatures will become much slower at lower temperatures yet they will not stop. That means that under strict adiabatic conditions, all thermodynamically unstable substances will decompose in a runaway reaction after a characteristic time, called the "time to maximum rate" (TMR). When the storage of energetic substances with respect to thermal stability needs to be assessed, the TMR at the maximum storage temperature is the most
968
important characteristic. For the safety assessment of chemical reactions or unit operations, the TMR may be directly measured using equipments that realize nearly adiabatic conditions, or the safe range of the TMR may be guessed by screening experiments [ 13. Such measurements are carried out on a time scale of several hours up to several days. Under storage conditions, TMR values at a year's scale may be critical if such residence times do occur and the storage conditions are really adiabatic. At that scale it is impossible to measure the TMR directly. In practice it is also impossible to measure any heat flow or self heating rate that corresponds to such a TMR. Thus, the TMR and the corresponding heat flows must be calculated by extrapolation of measured data carried out on a short time scale. For this purpose a kinetic model of the decomposition reaction is needed. Several simple models for the description of decomposition kinetics have been described in literature, and practical applications are established [2,3]. The parameters (e.g. activation energy, frequency-factor) needed to fit the model to measured values can be evaluated from DTA/DSC measurements or from adiabatic measurements. A widely used simplified model is based on the assumption of a one-step zero-order reaction mechanism with a temperature dependence according to the Arrhenius law. The TMR is related to the specific heat cp, the starting temperature TO,the activation energy E, and the heat release rate go, according to the following equation [4]:
The heat release rates go are extracted from isothermal DSC measurements. Only the maximum isothermal heat release rate is used. In most cases, TMRs that are calculated using this model are conservative but sometimes they are not [3]. In the case of autocatalytic behaviour the results may be extremely conservative. This situation is unacceptable. At any rate, it is desirable to apply a model on a correct chemical basis with realistic values of the parameters. In reality, decomposition reactions may be complex and cannot be adequately described by a simplified model. It is necessary that a realistic model describes correctly a complete set of measurements but not only a single plot. Then it may be appropriate for the extrapolation to conditions far away from the measurement conditions. 2. METHODS
A software package developed by J. Opfermann satisfies the above mentioned requirements. It has been commercially available for several years by NETZSCH Geratebau. Successful applications have been published [5,6]. A similar package is available by A. Benin and A. Kossoy at CISP in Saint Petersburg. By using the NETZSCH 'Thermokinetics'' program, up to eight
969
dynamic or isothermal DTA/DSC runs can be fitted with a kinetic model. Dynamic measurements should be preferred. Further DSC curves can be simulated. The model is selected from a list of about 30 models of one-step up to four-step reactions. The set of one-step, two-step and three-step reaction models is shown in Fig. 1. Model-free evaluations of the activation energy (Friedman and Ozawa-Flynn-Wall analysis) give hints for the appropriate type of model. A second program (“Thermal Safety Simulation”) can be used to calculate temperaturehime curves of exothermic reactions under adiabatic conditions and under conditions with realistic heat losses. In the Safety Laboratories at Bayer, the software package has been modified so it can be applied for the evaluation of DTA curves measured with the inhouse developed equipment. Two successful applications will be presented here.
me-step reaction
A -
Bl
A-B-C-D A - B C ; A - B C C A
A+B+C
A -
+ B
I C - D
~
A
B
c-D twwstep reactions
AB --
C
A
’ 0
A C
* B
E
.D
r F
three-step reactions
Fig. 1: One-step, two-step and three-step reaction models
3. EXAMPLE 1: STORAGE STABILITY OF BUTADIENE-12
3.1 Assessment task Butadiene-1,2, an extremely flammable liquified gas, is formed during the cracking process, enriches in a residue feed and is distilled to high purity. The product is stored in 400 1 pressure drums at ambient temperature (i.e. up to about 50 “C). The residence time may be up to 1 year. It is well known that the substance polymerizes and decomposes at elevated temperatures. A safety study should be carried out to assess the storage conditions. 3.2 Measurements and evaluation Screening DTA measurements show a high exothermic decomposition potential (> 2500 kJkg) with an onset temperature of about 170 “C (heating rate: 3 Wmin, sealed glass ampoule, in-house developed equipment). The
970
thermal behaviour is not influenced by the presence of steel or stainless steel (V4A), respectively (Fig. 2). 1000
s
0
e
-1000
0)
\
aJ
c
I
:
E
L stainless steel
I
I-2000 I
1I 100 200 300 400
-3000 0
Temperature I "C
Fig. 2: "Screening-DTA" measurements of Butadiene-1,2 (3 Wmin, closed glass ampoule)
Further measurements at decreasing heating rates (in-house developed bomb DTA, stainless steel vessels) yield a shift of the exothermic peak to lower temperatures. An onset temperature of about 110 "C is measured at a heating rate of 0,l Wmin. A set of 6 dynamic DTA runs at heating rates from 2 Wmin down to 0,l Wmin was used to find the kinetic model for the assessment of the storage stability. The best fit to the DTA curves was obtained for a two-step reaction model with autocatalysis in both steps (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3: Fit of 6 DTA curves (measured in stainless steel vessels) of Butadiene-1,2 by a twostep reaction model (Step 1: E, = 85 kJ/mol, lg k = 5.226, n = 2.125; Step 2: E, = 98 kJ/mol, lg k = 5.403, n = 0.964; lg Kcat = 0.92)
97 1
Table 1 Substance characteristics of Butadiene-1,2 and vessel data Geometry and geometry factor ( j )
Cylinder with infinitely long axis (conserative modelling) and j = 2
Inner diameter (2 Ro)
700 mm
Heat transfer coefficient ( k )
2,7 W/m2K
Substance density ( p )
0,675 g/cm3/ 0°C; 0,540 g/cm3 / 100°C; 0,405 g/cm3/ 200°C
Specific heat ( c, )
2,2 kJkgK
Thermal conductivity ( 2)
0,l w/mK
Heat of decomposition (AH)
3592 kJkg (measured by bomb DTA in stainless steel vessels)
Upon parameter optimization, temperaturehime curves for adiabatic storage conditions could be calculated corresponding to TMR values of about 22 days at 50°C and 151 days at 30°C (Fig.4). Thus it can be concluded that Butadiene-1,2 is thermally not stable at 30-50 "C under adiabatic conditions for long residence times.
'",",
A -1-
~
8 -2+C
Step i wth orderwth autocatalysls by B Step 2 Prout-Tompktns equatlon
120
'
TMR(adi
80
-
/'
TMR (ad ) = 55 2 days _._ ----'
1: /' TMR (ad ) = 151 0 days
As the product is stored in 400 1 pressure drums, the storage conditions are not strictly adiabatic. So a refined calculation was carried out using realistic geometrical and physical characteristics to allow for real heat losses during storage. The calculations were based on the "Thomas model" which includes the Semenov model and the Frank-Kamenetzkii model as limiting cases [7]. The
972
relevant equations with T, being the substance temperature and T, being the ambient temperature are:
d T / d r = 0 for r = 0
(4)
The parameters and characteristics used are given in table 1. The refined calculation based on the "Thomas model" showed that a run-away reaction will not happen at temperatures up to 50 "C. 100
80
. 9
-
-Ambient
temperature
?!
3
EQ
60
n.
E,
!-
40
20
0
100
200
300
400
500
Time I days
Fig. 5: Temperaturehime curves of the decomposition of Butadiene-1,2 in 400 1 drums at realistic heat loss conditions
As can be seen in Fig. 5, at an ambient temperature of 50 "C the core temperature inside the drum will rise slowly for 9 K within a year and then decrease again. The corresponding heat flux reaches a maximum value of 0,06 Wkg at 60 "C. The calculated degree of thermal conversion over a year is significant. At 30 "C, it is less than 2 % and at 50 "C it is about 13 % (Fig. 6). At 60 "C the n o d heat losses cannot prevent a runaway. After 18 days a thermal explosion is expected.
973 100 Yo
.-
80%-
c
o!
2
60%
E tl
c
40%
20 % 0
20
60 Time I weeks
80
40
100
Fig. 6: Calculated thermal conversion of Butadiene-1,2 at isothermal conditions
The calculations are conservative. Fig. 7 shows that the measured thermal conversion at 120 "C and 140 "C during several days is less than the calculated conversion.
-Simulation
(140 "C)
m Measurements at 140 "C
-Simulation
(120 "C)
A Measurements at 120 "C
0
50
100
150
Time I hours
Fig. 7: Thermal conversion of Butadiene-1,2 at isothermal conditions
200
-
974
The values have been obtained from tempering experiments under isothermal conditions (Fig.8). As no convection is assumed for the heat loss calculation this consideration is conservative, too.
500
. g
o
a
?!
-
5 L
x
-500
-1000 0
100
200
Temperature / "C
300
400
Fig. 8: DTA curves of Butadiene-1,2 after tempering the samples (measured in stainless steel vessels, 1 Wmin)
3.3 Safety assessment From a safety point of view, Butadiene-1,2 can be stored in 400 1 pressure drums at temperatures up to 50 "C with a residence time of several years without any risk of a thermal hazard. 50 "C should not be exceeded.
4. EXAMPLE 2: STORAGE STABILITY OF A NITRO AROMATIC RESIDUE 4.1 Assessment task Nitro aromatic compounds, which are formed as byproducts during a manufacture, are collected in a separator and then the residue is disposed in a 5 m3 combustion container at elevated temperatures. It had to be assessed whether the operation would be safe at a temperature level of about 80 "C. 4.2 Measurements and evaluation The screening DTA of the residue shows a minor decomposition above 125 "C, followed by the highly energetic nitro decomposition (in the closed glass ampoule as well as upon addition of V4A or HC4, respectively; Fig. 9).
975
-
500
u
l
.
$ c
o
128 "C 150 "C
500
after 8 weeks tempering at 80 "C
-500
! 3
0 -1000 F
m
c)
Q
-1500
-2000 0
100
200
300
400
Temperature I "C
Fig. 9: "Screening-DTA measurements of the nitro aromatic residue (3 Wmin, closed glass ampoule)
From a safety point of view, the question arises whether the temperature rise due to the first decomposition in the core region of an unstirred batch will be able to trigger the main decomposition. Exposed to a temperature of 80 "C for up to 8 weeks, the sample showed neither a complete decline of the predecomposition nor a relevant change in the main decomposition (Fig. 9). Using a low heating rate DTA (0.05 Wmin, sample mass: 2.5 g), another in-house developed method, the onset of the exotherm is detected at 105 "C (Fig. 10). The energy of the predecomposition amounts to about 75 kJkg, the calculated adiabatic temperature rise amounts to about 50 K. Therefore, presuming the heat produced is safely removed, the activation of the main decomposition is not to be expected at a temperature of 80 "C. In order to describe the thermal behaviour at adiabatic conditions, a simple zero-order kinetic was established and the TMR (time to maximum rate) calculated according to Eq. 1. The isothermal DTA values at 140 - 170 "C were enhanced by very precise measurements in the microcalorimeter SETARAM C 80 at 110 "C, resulting in a maximum value of 2,s W k g at 110 "C.
916
80
100
120
140
160
180
Temperature I "C
Fig. 10: Heat flow rate of the decomposition of the nitro aromatic residue, measured by long term DTA (0,05 Wmin, closed glass ampoule, 2,598 g sample mass)
The activation energy of 87 kJ/mol obtained from the data resulted in a TMR of 19 h at a temperature of 80 "C (Fig. 11,12). 1000,0 ~
100,o -
m x
5
~
*
~
.-
--
-__
Nitroaromatic residue
L
E = 86 7 kJlmol
C
0 130
031 2,20
2,30
2,40
1
2,50
2,60
1OOOfl IlIK
measured values -linear
2,70
2,80
regression
2,90
3,OO
I
Fig. 11: Temperature dependence of the maximum heat release rate of the nitro aromatic residue
977
TernperaturelT
Start tempPC
140 TMR (ad ),= 19 hours
120 100
i
TMR (ad ) = 1 7 days
____--- --0
2000
1000
I
/
---
__/
3000 Timelmin
4000
/ /’
_/c-
TMR (ad ) = 3 9 days
5000
6000
. 12: Calculated temperaturehime curves of the decomposition of the nitro aromatic residue at adiabatic conditions (using the simple zero-order kinetic model)
From this discussion one may conclude that this highly simplified kinetic )del, along with the assumption of adiabatic conditions, will result in a safe : unacceptable storage time. In order to obtain refined kinetics, the predecomposition was examined ng DTA measurements at different heating rates. Although the fit of the Aied kinetic model appeared relatively good, the onset of the decomposition, iich is important with respect to the TMR, could not be described in an :eptable manner. Therefore, a kinetic fit was done based upon the long term DTA measuremt, giving an improved description of the decomposition onset (Fig. 13). /Heat flow rate/(10A-3’(W/g))
A -l+B -2-
C
Step 2: n-th order
I
110
120
130 TernperaturelT
140
150
;. 13: Fit of a long term DTA curve by the two step reaction model
lg k = 19.091, n = 2.442)
160
(E, = 178 kJ/kg,
978
The DTA plots evaluated from these kinetics exhibit heat release rates higher than the measured ones; the lunetic model therefore being ,,on the safe side,, (Fig. 14).
0 -
-1 -
3 -2 - A-1-3
-
-4 -
B -Z+C
Step 1 n-th order
J ex0
-
Fig. 14: Comparison of measured Screening-DTA curves and calculated curves by using the parameters of the long term DTA fit
The temperaturehime curves that were calculated using this model are shown in Fig. 15. As can be seen a TMR of 46 days (i.e. less than two months) is calculated for the starting temperature of 80 "C. This value is much higher than the value valculated by the zero-order model. TemperaturePC T%(ad
i
;
Start templ"C A-I+B-Z+C
Step 1 wthorder Step 2 n-th order
80 {
__
I
-
100
) = 46 days
i '4
1
-
0
1
2
3 Time/( 10*5"min)
TMR (ad ) = 3 2 years -
4
5
6
Fig. 15: Calculated temperaturehime curves of the predecomposition of the nitro aromatic residue at adiabatic conditions (using the fit of the long term DTA)
A refined calculation was carried out using realistic geometrical and physical characteristics of the separator and the substance to allow for real heat
979
losses during storage. The data are given in table 2. The results obtained for the temperature profile will be described now. Table 2 Substance characteristics of the nitro aromatic residue and vessel data Geometry
Cylinder with infinitely long axis (conserative modelling)
Inner diameter
613 mm and 1400 mm, resp.
Thermal transfer
350 W/m2K (value from. VDI-Wtirmeatlas)
Substance density
1,30 g/cm3/ 100 "C; 1,18 g/cm3 / 200 "C; 1,05 g/cm3/ 300 "C
Specific heat
1,23 WkgK / 0 "C; 1,47 HkgK / 100 "C; 1,71 WkgK / 200 "C; 1,98 HkgK / 300 "C
Thermal conductivity
0,180 W/mK / 80 "C; 0,172 W/mK / 100 "C; 0,136 W/mK / 200 "C; 0,100 W/mK / 300 "C
Heat of decomposition
75,6 kJkg (measured by long term DTA)
In the core of the separator (613 mm diameter), from a starting temperature of 80 "C, a maximum of nearly 81 "C was predicted to be reached after about 10 days In Fig. 16 the temperature increase at varying distances from the centre is plotted. Respective data for starting temperatures of 90, 100 and 110 "C are 94 "C after about 6,3 days, 125 "C after nearly 3 days, and 155 "C after nearly 1 day. Thus, when a temperature of 80 "C is safely maintained, there is no danger of triggering the main decomposition. At a temperature level of about 130 "C (calculated final adiabatic temperature of the predecomposition), the main decomposition will run away within a few days. TemperaturePC
Simulation using parameters from a long term DTA
3
I3 1,
A_. 06
I
The vessel is a cylinder of infinite length and a diameter of 613 mrn Dist from Centre
0
,,="-
I
0.5
1.0 Timel(lO"4'min)
--_ -- -
1.5
2.0
2.5
Fig. 16: Calculated bulk temperature as a function of time at varying distances from the core of the vessel at an ambient temperature of 80 "C
980
For the combustion tank (diameter 1400 mm), the calculation predicted a maximum of 84 "C after 31 days starting from a core temperature of 80 "C. Starting from 90 "C, the maximum temperature is 122 "C after 12 days. Therefore, a storage temperature of 80 "C is not critical under these circumstances either. A variation of the heat conductivity up to an order of magnitude towards the ,,unsafe side,, resulted in a maximum temperature of 81,l "C for a starting temperature of 80 "C (Diagr. 17). 81,2
.
P
80,8
2
K
a
80,6
f
80,4
+0,018 W/mA2*K +0,1 W/mA2'K +-0,18 W/mA2*K
80,2
-
80,O 0%
10%
surface
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Percentage of distance
70%
80%
90%
100% center
Fig. 17: Calculated maximum temperatures in the vessel as a function of the distance from the center at an ambient temperature of 80 "C by using different values of heat conductivity
4.3 Safety assessment Therefore, on the base of the described results, the collection of the nitro aromatic compounds in the separator, as well as their disposal in a 5 m3 combustion container, does not present a thermal hazard presuming the heating temperature does not exceed 80 "C. 5. CONCLUSIONS
The "Thermokinetics" program is a very useful tool for the assessment of thermal hazards. On the basis of a set of thermoanalytical measurements, a reliable kinetic model of the chemical reactions can be obtained. Using the characteristics of the evaluated model, the temperaturekime behavior of chemical substances and mixtures can be calculated not only for the worst case of strictly adiabatic scenarios but for the case of realistic heat losses as well. With sufficiently conservative assumptions the results will be in the safe range.
981
Such calculations help to optimize chemical processes and technical operations and to minimize the need of safety measures.
REFERENCES [l] J. Past& U. Worsdorfer, A. Keller, K. Hungerbuhler, J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 13 (2000) 7-17 [2] T. Grewer, “Thermal Hazards of Chemical Reactions”, Elsevier, Amsterdam (1994) [3] A. Keller, D. Stark, H. Fierz, E. Heinzle, K. Hungerbuhler, J. Loss Prev. Process Ind. 10 (1997) 31-41 [4] D. I.. Townsend, J. C. Tou, ThermochimicaActa 37 (1980) 1-30 [5] J. Opfermann, J. Thermal Anal. Calorimetry, 60 (2000) 641-658 [6] J. Opfermann, W. Hadrich, ThermochimicaActa 263 (1995) 29-50 [7] P. H. Thomas, Trans. Faraday SOC.54 (1942) 60-65
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A New Concept When Designing Parking Areas for Lorries Carrying Dangerous Goods: the Dynamic Segregation J. A. Vilchez",Xavier PCrez-Alavedrab,J. Arnaldos", Carlos Amieiro', and Joaquim Casala aCentrefor Studies on Technological Risk (CERTEC), Department of Chemical Engineering, Universitat P o l i t h i c a de Catalunya-InstitutdEstudis Catalans, Diagonal 647, 08028-Barcelona,Catalonia, Spain bTr6mites,Informes y Proyectos, S.L. Rbla. Onze de Setembre, 62-64, 1". 08030-Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain 'Civil Protection Department, Barcelona City Council. Barcelona, Spain
ABSTRACT There is an urgent need in industrial cities to find solutions to the difficult -and sometimes dangerous- situation caused by the transport of hazardous goods by road. Suitable parking zones are required to park trailers when drivers are waiting for loading/unloading operations and resting to comply with regulations concerning maximum driving times. In this study, the main features that should be required by this kind of parking area are analysed both from the point of view of operability and safety. The study is based on a particular case (the city of Barcelona). 1. INTRODUCTION
A big city always entails considerable movement of dangerous goods; this movement is still more intense when the city is a major sea port. These hazardous materials are often just transported through the city area; however, a significant number of lorries are actually obliged to remain in urban areas for a certain time (often overnight, sometimes for a weekend) awaiting embarking or, simply, to allow the drivers to comply with the legal regulations on driving time. In many towns this situation has not been taken into account by local authorities, and lorries are parked in an uncontrolled way -often in highly populated areas. This gives rise to a rather dangerous situation, in which an accident with severe consequences could take place.
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Therefore, it is evident that suitable parking areas for trailers carrying these dangerous goods should be provided. There are several possibilities for such as area: a) a parking zone guarded by a person aware of the nature of the cargoes and the location of the drivers; b) a public or private parking zone where trailers cannot be damaged by other vehicles; c) an appropriate free zone, far from big roads and inhabited areas, an area which is not a meeting place or walking area for people. Usually, the city council regulations concerning the transport of dangerous goods encompass the following aspects:
. . 1
.
prohibition on parking on the public way, except for loadinghnloading operations; prohibition on transit-vehicles driving through the city; prohibition on driving on local holidays (and the eve), with occasional exceptions for specific routes; in the event of a breach of regulations, provision is made for immobilisation of the vehicle in a suitable area.
Furthermore, it is obvious that parked trailers carrying dangerous goods in nonauthorised urban zones pose a risk to the population. Another fact to be considered is that professional drivers have difficulties complying with regulations which limit driving times and often have insufficient technical training in the properties of the dangerous goods being transported. All these facts point to the need to prepare special parking zones for trailers carrying dangerous goods near large cities. However, in most countries there are no technical regulations with regard to the design of such areas. This paper describes the main features that such a parking area should provide.
2. FLOWS OF DANGEROUS GOODS IN THE URBAN AREA Dangerous goods can be of different types; the contribution of each type to total traffic can be seen in Table 1. Table 1 Distribution of dangerous goods transported % of total transported Type of Dangerous Goods Flammable Liquids 60 Gases 15 10 Corrosives Other 15
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This table shows the distribution for the approximately 6x107 tons transported annually in Spain (it can be assumed that the distribution for other industrial countries would be similar). As can be seen, flammable liquids are the most usual hazardous material transported, followed by gases. Another classification can be seen in Table 2, which shows the distribution of tank-trailers in Spain in 1984, according to the materials being transported. Table 2 Distribution of tank-trailers according to the material transported Product N. of tank-trailers Combustible 3,457 Butane and propane 253 Other gases 552 Chemicals 1,510 Total 5,772
The situation is a little more complex if the city is a large sea port. Sea ports involve major movement of goods and, consequently, of dangerous goods as well. As an example, Table 3 presents the 1997 figures for transport of the main dangerous goods in the Port of Barcelona (one of the largest ports on the Mediterranean). Table 3 Dangerous goods in the Port of Barcelona (1997) Dangerous Goods Tons (embarked + disembarked) Compressed, liquefied or pressurised gases 35,767 Flammable liquids 49,572 Flammable solids 77,293 Peroxides and comburents 41,385 Toxic materials 32,887 Corrosives 98,000 Other dangerous goods 16,914 Total 335,450
Looking at the figures in these tables, it seems evident that a city like Barcelona should have an area specially designed for tank-trailers carrying such goods. In the following paragraphs the main features of such an area are discussed.
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3. DESIGN OF THE PARKING AREA
In order to make the best use of available land, a well-designed trailer park should provide parking stalls for as many vehicles as possible, whilst still allowing for vehicles to be driven in and out with minimum manoeuvring. The philosophy of the parking area must incorporate two complementary points of view:
-
reduce the possibility of leaks, spills and collisions to the minimum by application of strict safety measures: physical checking of tanks or containers on admission; suitable design from the logistical point of view, avoiding the risk of collisions in the parking area; chemical segregation of dangerous goods, avoiding the risk that an accident in one area of the parking area could reach other goods and lead to even more damage. 1 1
.
3.1. Logistical criteria There are several logistical design criteria which must be borne in mind:
1. Avoid risk of collisions: - one-way direction lanes; - 45" angle at stall access; - entry and exit aisles of 10 m width; - suitably large parking stalls so as to reduce manoeuvring required.
--
Rigid vehicles Articulated vehicles
Fig. 1. Relation between aisle and stall width [3].
Fig. 2. Angle of 45" to access the stalls. Modified from [3].
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According to these criteria, a stall length of 21 m (vehicle length + vehicle width + operability factor of 2 m), and a stall width of 4 m were decided as shown in Figs. 1 and 2. These measures allow trailers to manoeuvre safely, cut down the risk of collision and in the event of fire would facilitate the work of fire fighting teams. 2. Minimisation of the parking area: - installation for 100 to 200 trailers according to previous studies [l-41. 3.2. Chemical safety criteria In the event of incidents occurring in a vehicle -collision, leakage, fire, explosion- the characteristics of the dangerous goods and the volume stored could entail that other vehicles would also be affected (domino effect) and the final consequences could even spread beyond the confines of the parking area. Three representative scenarios were studied for the consequence analysis: a) 20 m3 styrene spillage from a tank, causing a large pool fire; b) explosion (BLEVE) of a 20 ton LPG (propane) tank; c) release of 20 tons of chlorine. Thermal radiation, fragment projection and the dispersion of toxic cloud were studied. The results are presented in Table 4. Table 4 Consequence analysis Scenario Parameter a) Fire Thermal radiation b l ) BLEW Thermalradiation b2) BLEVE Fragment projection b3) BLEVE Overpressure c) Toxic cloud Gas dispersion
Distance of concern 50 m 500m 500 m 120 m 2,500 m
The distances shown in Table 4 correspond to the values of physical effects associated to the "alarm distance": 3 kWm-2for thermal radiation, 50 mbar for shockwave and IDLH of SO2 (30 ppm) for toxic gas dispersion. They have been calculated using classic methods or codes: EFFECTS [5] for thermal radiation, ALOHA [6] for toxic gas dispersion and the method described by Casal [7] for BLEVE effects. These distances show that the effects of the accidents considered clearly extend beyond the confines of the parking zone. They also highlight the fact that traditional segregation criteria, which are very difficult to maintain, due to the continuous variation of the materials stored, would not be very useful from the point of view of safety.
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Priority has therefore been given to a dynamic segregation, where different types of dangerous goods are distributed throughout the parking area according to demand and maintaining as far as possible the maximum distance between goods with incompatible hazard characteristics. Table 5 presents a fourfold classification of dangerous goods in accordance with their general characteristics. Table 5. Splitting up of dangerous goods Group I associated risk Group 1 Flammable gases Group 2 Comburents and oxidisers Group 3 Non flammable goods
Group 4 Flammable liquids and solids
Dangerous goods Flammable gases Flammable toxic gases Goods that in contact with water release flammable gases Comburents/Oxidisers Organic peroxides Non flammable non-toxic gases Non flammable toxic gases Chemical unstable gases Chemical unstable toxic gases Toxics Corrosives Flammable liquids Flammable solids Goods that can undergo spontaneous ignition
Finally, the distances of concern summarised in Table 4 imply an additional restriction that would have to be fulfilled by the location of the parking area with respect to other urban zones, industrial equipment, etc. 3.3. Final design Bearing in mind all the aforementioned considerations, the parking area was designed (see Fig. 3) for approximately 180 trailers distributed in four rows from 250 to 285 m in length and 15 m wide (corresponding to an axis length of approximately 21 m), with 42 to 48 stalls at an angle of 45". Three emergency exits were located in suitable locations to facilitate evacuation in the event of an incident. The total area of the stalls accounted for approximately 35,000 m2. Table 6 presents the main features of the parking area. The parking area equipment includes a complete fire protection system based on hydrants, foam, monitors and water reserves for two hours. A suitable drainage system for chemicals and fire fighting water was also established.
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.
.
,
”
-
ir
Entrance / Exit
Fig. 3. Lay-out of the parking area. Table 6 Main features of the designed parking area Parameter Angle to access 45” and exit stalls Length of stalls 21 m Width of stalls 4m Width of aisles (lanes) 10 m Lanes One-way direction Number of emergency exits 3 Capacity 177 lorries Total area 35,000 m2
Emphasis was placed on the flexibility of the parking area. Several designs -as shown in Tables 7a and 7b- can be derived from the original lay-out, allowing for a wide range in the capacity of the parking while maintaining the safety and operational principles. Table 7a Designs obtained considering short rows of stalls 115x310 m2 115x231 m2 115x152 rnz Park dimensions Row Stalls 4 42 28 14 3 45 32 19 2 48 34 20 1 42 28 14 Capacity 177* 122 67 - (n. of lorries) Total area (m’) 35,650 26,565 17,480 * Chosen design.
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Table 7b Designs obtained considering long rows of stalls 165x310 m2 165x231 m2 165x152 m2 Park dimensions Row Stalls 4
3bis 2bis 3 2 1
Capacity (n. of lorries) Total area (m2)
42 45 45 48 48 42 270
28 32 32 34 34 28 188
14 19 19 20 20 14 106
51,150
38,115
25,080
3.4. Filling-in procedure A dynamic segregation system establishes non-fixed areas in the parking area by grouping compatible dangerous cargo types and in accordance with the expected number of trailers of each class, as shown in Fig. 4. In the event of an incident, dynamic segregation will limit the propagation of consequences and allow the response team to act efficiently.
Entrance / Exit
Fig. 4. Dynamic segregation of dangerous goods. Proposed filling in procedure.
4. DISCUSSION
In the design of a parking area for vehicles carrying dangerous goods several aspects have to be taken into account, not only those associated with the intrinsic danger of these materials but also the variety, the variability over time and the mobility of lorries. In addition, these aspects have a noticeable influence on the location of the parking area, which must be at a safe distance from populated areas and other industrial equipment.
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Finally, the scarcity and high price of land, especially in large cities, demands optimum design so as to accommodate, through criteria of flexibility, the maximum number of lorries in a fixed area while still maintaining the desired safety conditions. Essential criteria to be followed in a preliminary design such as the one presented here are safety (through the estimation of distances of concern, dynamic segregation of hazardous materials, manoeuvrability of lorries and safety response equipment) and, from an urbanistic point of view, the location of the facility and its distance from populated areas and other industrial equipment.
REFERENCES [l] Sill, O., 1969, Construcci6n de aparcamientos, manual para la planificacibn, construcci6n y explotaci6n de aparcamientos y garajes subterrheos, Ed. Blume, Madrid. [2] Department of the environment, 1971, Lorry Parking, The report of the working party of lorries, London. [3] Brannam, M., Longmore, J.D., 1974, Layout of Lorry Parks: Dimensions of Stalls and Aisles, TRRL Supplementary Report 83 UC, Transport and Road Research Laboratory, Crowthorne, Berkshire. [4] McCluskey, J., 1987, Parking, A Handbook of Environmental Design, E. & F.N. Spon Ltd, London. [ S ] TNO Institute of Environmental Sciences, Energy Research and Process Innovation, 1989, Effects, Version 1.4A, Apeldoorn, The Netherlands. [6] National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1992, ALOHA-Areal locations of hazardous atmospheres, Version 5.5 User's Manual, Hazardous Materials Response and Assessment Division. NOAA, Seattle, WA98 115. [7] Casal, J., Montiel, H., Planas, E., Vflchez, J.A., 1999, Andisis del riesgo en instalaciones industriales, Edicions UPC, Barcelona.
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Gas-Pipelines in Tunnels or Galleries: A sound solution? Marco Montanarini", Christian Pluss", Gunthard Niederbaumer"
SKS Ingenieure AG, Consulting Engineers Oerlikonerstrasse 88, 8057 Zurich, Switzerland
a
Abstract Tunnels and galleries may be a convenient way to traverse with pipelines densely populated urban areas or topographic obstacles. Such solutions allow a direct traverse of such obstacles where alternative solutions are impossible or require long by-passing. Additional advantages of such solutions are the possibility of permanent survey and allow in urban areas to include other utilities infrastructure in the same corridor. However, considerable disadvantages limit the use of tunnels and galleries for pipelines: Besides the very high costs there are additional risks to be considered. In this paper an approach for risk assessment of pipelines in tunnels and galleries is presented. In three case studies it is shown, how the risk assessment was used as a decision tool to find solutions for pipeline planning in difficult environment.
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Gas-Pipelines in Tunnels or Galleries: A sound solution? Marco Montanarini",Christian Pluss",Gunthard Niederbaumer" a SKS Ingenieure AG, Consulting Engineers Oerlikonerstrasse 88, 8057 Zurich, Switzerland
1.
Introduction
Tunnels and Galleries' may be a convenient way to place a pipeline in densely populated urban areas or in difficult mountainous terrain. Reasons for putting pipelines in such infrastructures may be In urban areas - the lack of space in construction zones - the required minimal distance to housing areas - legal requirements - existing infrastructures of other utilities which may be combined In mountainous areas - topographic obstacles - the lack of space in narrow valleys - geographical hazards such as landslides or falling rocks To traverse short distances without trench the pipelines are usually placed using bi-directional drilling technique or microtunnels. These tunnels are usually less than 1 km long and are not accessible. They cause no additional risk compared to the conventional built pipelines. To traverse longer distances, galleries or tunnels can be constructed which are accessible for inspection. Despite the fact that these constructions are relatively costly they are more and more used due to the lack of easily accessible routes. In this paper the special risks of such tunnels and galleries are described. The methodology of risk assessment is presented and applied in three case studies.
'
Tunnels are defined as drilled holes in mountains reinforced with jetted concrete or concrete shells Galleries are defined as shafts with concrete walls in urban or industrial area.
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Risk analysis in tunnels and galleries 2. The risk analysis for high pressure gas facilities is in Switzerland standardised and described in a frame report [1,2,3] which was published in 1991 by the Swiss gas industry in collaboration with the federal authorities. A revised version of the framework was terminated in 1997. In these reports the risk caused by tunnels are only described in a very general way. Since then for several new projects risk analysis for tunnels were developed and successfully applied in the approval procedures. 2.1
Causes for failure in tunnels The failure rates of major gas pipelines in Western Europe is permanently reported by the European Gas pipeline Incident Group (EGIG, 1993 and updates)[4]. These data are currently based on the experience of 1.5 millions kilometre-years in eight countries in Western Europe (table 1).
Table 1: Failure frequencies based on failure causes and hole size. Source EGIG [4]. The hole sizes are defined as follows: Small hole: Hole size I 2 cm; Medium hole: Hole size > 2 cm up to the total pipe diameter; Large hole: Full bore rupture, hole size greater than the pipe diameter Failure causes
Failure frequency [kmyl-'
Percentage of total failure rate
Percentage of different hole sizes [%] small medium great
External interference
3.0 x lo4
51 %
25
56
19
Construction defects
1.1 x lo4
19 %
69
25
6
Corrosion
8.1
14 %
97
3
<1
Ground movement
3.6
6 Yo
29
31
40
Others/unknown
5.4
lo5
10 %
74
25
<1
Total failure rate
5.75 x lo4
100 Yo
48
39
13
[kmyl-' :The failure probabilities of pipelines are indicated per kilometre and year.
However, in tunnels and galleries, the failure rates may differ from the rates derived from failures of conventional pipelines. The deviations that were assumed in the investigations are the following:
External interference External interference are the main causes for gas leakage in Western Europe. Accidents usually occur due to not permitted construction works. Pipelines in galleries are normally not accessible to the public and are protected by
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the construction of the tunnel infrastructure. The failure rate due to external interference can be assumed to be much lower and was therefore reduced by 90% in respect to conventional pipelines.
Construction defects Pipelines in galleries have the same quality requirements as conventional pipelines buried in the ground. There was no reason found to assume a different failure rate as for conventional pipelines. Corrosion Pipelines in galleries are protected by a special paint against corrosion, but a cathodic protection system cannot be used as it usually is the case in buried pipelines. However, due to the better possibility for inspection, the failure rate is assumed to be unaffected. Ground movement Lower Probability because only earth quakes remains as possible reason for a failure. The pipeline in tunnels or galleries are protected from landslides or falling rocks. Others/unknown Same probability Failure rates Gas pipes in tunnels and galleries exhibit smaller failure rates as conventional pipelines buried in the ground. Pipes in tunnels and galleries can be inspected regularly and experience less external interference. Explosion Scenario If an escape of natural gas occurs in a tunnel or a gallery, a dispersion or different explosion reactions are possible depending upon the type of leakage and the existing ignition source. The most important ones are described below.
2.2
2.2. I Jet fire (or Torch Fire) If a gas release stems from a full bore rupture, the whole tunnel will be filled with a non combustible atmosphere in a short time. This methane/air mixture will flow to the portal at the end of tunnel. If ignition occurs there a horizontal flame will develop. The size of the flame will depend on the gas release rate or the diameter of portal and the gas pressure there.
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2.2.2 DeJlagration and Detonation Flame can propagate in a tunnel either as a deflagration or a detonation flame front and clearly these modes of propagation are very different in character. In the first case heat is transferred from the flame front to the adjacent layer of not burnt mixture so as to raise its temperature. Ignition occurs at the ignition temperature (for town gas-air mixture about 500OC). The speed of flame will obviously depend from the heat transfer process. The propagation of a detonation wave on the other hand depends upon the shock wave travelling at the velocity of sound at the flame front sustained by energy received from the flame. The high initial burning rate of a large volume of gas pressurises the products. The subsequent expansion of the products then accelerates the flame to high velocities [ 5 ] . Particularly high overpressures occur when the shock wave of a detonation is reflected at the end doors of the tunnel. The stability and velocity of detonations in tubes depend upon the diameter. The tube diameter beyond which the detonation propagation becomes impossible is termed the critical diameter [8,9,10]. It is very likely that detonation conditions may be met in gas explosions in very long accessible tunnels. The safety analysis of tunnels must therefore also include the possibility of detonations. The overpressure of detonations of methane/air mixtures in tunnels may attain the peak of 26 bar, according to Bartknecht (1993) [11].The detonation will be quenched in tunnel areas with not explosive methane/air mixtures. 2.2.3 Pressure wave propagation inside the tunnel The pressure wave generated by an explosion will be weakened continuously by the wall friction outside the area of flammable methane/air mixture. The peak pressure of the blast wave will be reduced and the pulse duration increased. The total pressure reduction depends from the length of gallery section in which the pressure wave propagates, the roughness of wall, the initial peak pressure and the initial pulse duration.
2.2.4 Pressure wave propagation outside the tunnel The maximum pressure in the portal of the tunnel is the determinant parameter for the effects of deflagration or detonation on objects outside the tunnel. This one may be 7.1 bar for deflagration and 26 bar for detonation. A detonation wave cannot exist anymore outside a tunnel of a diameter greater than the critical tube diameter. The pressure wave decreases in this case very quickly with distance from the tunnel portal. The isobaric surfaces of pressure p are nearly spheric. The distance of the outer surface increases reciprocally to the pressure p .
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Fig. 1 :Isobaric surface of pressure p outside the tunnel portal. Tunnel diameter d; Distance of the outer isobaric surface r.
The pressure of the blast wave becomes determinant for lethality of people in the open air at a pulse duration shorter than 300 ms.
2.3
Consequences to structure and people If a leak develops in a pipe transporting a flammable gas, a combustible mixture with the air contained in the tunnel or gallery will be formed. Then only a source of ignition such as a spark or a hot surface is necessary to start a fire. People in the flame area would be at great risk. People being present somewhere in the tunnel could be suffocated. The explosion of an ignited combustible gadair mixture produces a pressure wave which propagates in the tunnel or gallery. The blast wave can damage not only the structure of the gallery and some electrical and water conducts inside but also the buildings the gallery has access to by its ramifications. The damage of buildings and structures can be derived from the relation between the dynamic load and the response of the structure. This relation is often presented in the form of a so called pressure-impulse-graph (P-I graph) [14] Fig. 2. The curves in the graph represent threshold curves delimiting various structural damage class.
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Fig. 2 :Impulse and pressure load at various places in a service gallery: The curves delimit areas of damage level. Class 1: No structural damage expected; Class 2: Minor structural damages, damages at separation walls; Class 3: Major structural damages, damages to some supporting structures; Class 4: Partial demolition, more than 50% of walls may be damaged.
The damage to the people due to direct effect of the blast wave has a minor importance because of little people presence.. A blast wave in an open area of 0.21 bar will cost only 10% of injured and dead people. The most victims are due to collapsing buildings. The experience shows that 20 to 50% of people in a collapsing building will be dead.
3.
Case Studies
Example No 1:
Gallery in the centre of a city
In the context of a general urban rearrangement, two solutions of the display of service conducts shall be evaluated: In the first variant solution all urban service conducts shall be buried separately in the ground. The existing old (5 bar/ lo”) gas pipeline shall be replaced by a new one. In the second variant solution the conduction lines for gas ( 5 bar/ 10”) and water shall be placed in a gallery of cross section 2.6m x 2.3m and about 600 m length below the main road.
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The variant decision will be based on an evaluation of codbenefit and the safety aspect
Pipelines buried in the ground It follows from the statistics of Western Europe countries that there are rare cases of leakage in conventional 5bar pipes followed by ignition and danger to the people and objects. Leakage due to external interference uncovers usually the pipe building a crater and launching debris around.. The gas release occurs then directly in the atmosphere. Ignition of the gadair mixture would finally start a jet fire. People would be endangered until the distance of about 6 m. At Leakage not due to external interference (e.g. material failure) the released gas may creep in a house in the neighbourhood. A gadair mixture may develop inside and explode after ignition. People could be endangered by the collapsing building. The buried variant solution could produce in the worst case a great number of victims. Pipelines in galleries A leakage with gas release into a service gallery very rarely occurs. Venting holes usually prevent the formation of combustible gadair mixtures at small gas releases. Combustible gadair mixtures may develop due to greater gas releases. At ignition an explosion develops of maximum pressure of 7 bar. The gallery is therefore equipped with cover plates which produce a pressure relieve at lift up. The maximum inside pressure is then delimited to 1.1 bar by the particular choice of dimensions of gallery and cover plates. The pressure effects in proximity will be reduced sensitively. Only few persons staying close by the venting holes or at the pressure relieve gap will be endangered. Following safety measures were aimed to minimise in the case of an accident, the damage to people and objects: In respect to the possible effects to the population, the variant solution of a gallery has been considered to be better than the variant of buried pipe. The inspection capability of the gallery reduces also the accident probability. Additional safety measures may minimise the risk to a minimum. There are as follows: 0 special venting openings shall reduce the peak pressure of the explosion. 0 the ventilation system shall be a passive system. 0 the ventilation holes shall be placed closer together in places of small population density. 0 the fittings for domestic connections shall be placed outside the gallery. 0 the gallery shall be gas tight as to prevent a gas outflow in the ground. 0 an operation concept shall control the access to the gallery and minimise the access of unauthorised people.
1001 0
installation of gas detectors which are coupled to the alarm system.
This urban gallery is actually being studied by the government. The government will decide about its realisation in the next hture. Example No 2:
Service and access galleries connecting several buildings of an industrial plant.
The heating centre required the installation of a new supply line, a 25 bar/ 4”diameter natural gas pipeline. A variant solution consisted in a line in the existing service gallery. This ramified gallery serves as supply for generic products but would contain also the, 1.8 km long, high pressure gas pipeline. The gallery’s cross section has a 3.5m height and 7m width. The gas release rate of a full bore rupture of the pipe decreases so rapidly as to release the whole pipe content of 260 kg methane. A smaller leak size of 2 cm would release the whole pipe content within 4 to 5 seconds. After ignition of the gadair mixture a flame and pressure wave will propagate in the gallery. The run-up distance (the length of tunnel or gallery traversed by the flame front before the onset of detonation [7,11,12,13]) in this gallery is 330 m. But the side branches are spaced only at a distance of 260 m. The flame of an ignited gaslair mixture will therefore not propagate as a detonation flame. The propagating pressure wave is continuously weakened by the geometry of the gallery. Fig. shows the impulse and pressure loads at various places in the gallery. The total damage is eventually estimated using the defined damage classes. A risk analysis is therefore performed. Safety measures are proposed in order to further reduce the probability of accidents and the number of possible victims: an increase of wall thickness from 5 mm to 8 mm reduces the leakage probability. 0 installation of a powerful ventilation the pipe could be placed in a protecting tube which would keep the released gas inside it. the gallery could be subdivided in compartments by pressure doors as to prevent pressure wave propagation.
2
The whole project and the proposed safety measures appeared to be too expensive. The government rejected the project.
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Example No 3:
Series of tunnels of the Alps crossing pipeline from North Sea to Italy
The series of tunnels consists of 16 tunnels with length ranging &om 0.5 to 5.4 km, and 3 m diameter. The tunnels contain pipelines of 75 bar pressure and diameters of 36”and 48”. There are different scenarios with fire and explosions in pipelines accidents depending from the type of leakage. Figure 1 shows the event tree of gas pipe in a tunnel. There are basically two accident scenarios which are relevant for the risk analysis: 1. In case of a full bore rupture the gas will escape under high pressure and replace the air in the gallery. Due to lack of oxygen an ignition inside the gallery is not possible. If the ignition happened at the portal, there would be a horizontal jet fire at the portal. 2. If the pipeline in the tunnel has a small leak, the escaping gas will be mixed with the surrounding air. If the gadair mixture is within explosion limits and ignites inside the tunnel the flame would proceed towards the portal. In long tunnels the flame could theoretically reach the detonation velocity. Outside the tunnel the pressure would decrease rapidly, but in the vicinity of the portal damage to people or infrastructure due to the pressure wave has to be taken into account. There are usually no people inside the tunnel. The risk analysis focuses therefore principally on scenarios being effective in the portal area. A (48”/57 bar) pipeline in a tunnel creates in case of a failure and gas ignition an area of potential damage outside the tunnel portal of a radius of about two hundred meters. An isolated building with great population density such as a school or health resort hotel would be at great risk. Suitable safety measures are aimed to reduce the effects of pressure waves:
0
tunnel end opening has a sudden enlargement as to reduce the pressure level of pressure wave. a protection wall in front of the tunnel portal deviates the blast wave in a harmless direction.
This safety measures consist in massive concrete structures which increase the production cost of these tunnels.
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4.
Conclusion
While investments or benefits usually are rather well known by the project management, a decision should not be taken without knowing the risk involved in the projects of gas-pipelines in tunnels. There are tunnels and galleries which contain pipelines with great transport capability. These tunnels are usually placed far off the urban areas (e.g. the alpine crossing) with small population density. But some isolated buildings with great population density may stay in the impact zone. The tunnel is still executed applying particular safety measures. Whereas pipelines in galleries in urban areas have usually a smaller transport capability, but they present a much greater risk due to the great population density. The risk minimising safety measures are aimed therefore at smaller accident probability. This means additional structural measures to be carried out. The costs of required safety measures may be so incisive in the project as to decide about its execution. The risk assessment proves to be an effective decision tool for pipeline planning in difficult environment.
Acknowledgement We like to thank the Transitgas AG Company for the permission to publish this paper.
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References Swiss gas industry and SKS Consulting Engineers: High-pressure gas facility safety: Framework report. Swissgas SA, (1997) Zurich, Switzerland. R. Sagesser, C. Pliiss, M. Montanarini SKS Consulting Engeneers Successful Implementation of Standardised Risk Analysis for Pipelines. Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis (Europe), Vol. 1.2 (1997) Stuttgart SKS Ingenieure AG, RAPIF Version 2, Software for calculation of potential hazards of pipeline accidents, SKS Ingenieure AG: (1999) Zurich European Gas Pipelines Incident Data Group (EGIG), Gas Pipeline Incidents, Report 1970 - 1992. (Groningen 1993). P.A. Urtiew, A.K. Oppenheim: Experimental observation of the transition to detonation in explosive gas. Proc. RoySoc A295 (1966) 13 R. Knystautas, J.H.S. Lee, J.E. Shepherd, A. Teodorczyk: Flame Acceleration and Transition to Detonation in Benzene-Air Mixtures. Combustion and Flame Vol.115, Nr.3 (1998) M.A. Nettelton: Gaseous Detonations. Chapman and Hall (1987) London 1.0. Moen et al.: Detonation Length Scales for Fuel Air Explosives. Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics Vol 94 (1984) 55-79 R. Knystautas, C. Guirao, J.H.Lee, A.Sulmistras: Measurements of Cell Size in Hydrocarbon-Air Mixtures and Predictions of Critical Tube Diameter, Critical Initiation Energy and Detonation Limits. Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics Vol 94 (1984) 23-37 S.M Frolov, B.E. Gelfand: Limit Diameter of Gas Detonation Propagation in Tubes. Combustion, Explosion and Shock Waves. Vol27, Nr 1 (1991) 113-117 W. Bartknecht: Explosionsschutz, Grundlagen und Anwendung. Springer Verlag (1993) M. Hattwig: Detonationsanlaufstrecken von Gasgemischen in Rohren grossen Durchmessers, Amts- und Mitteilungsblatt der Bundesanstalt fiir Materialpriifung (BAM) Vol 10. Nr 4 (1980) 274-278 H. Steen, K. Schampel: Experimental Investigations on the Run-up Distance of Gaseous Detonations in Large Pipes, 4'h Int. Symp. Loss Prevention Process Industries, (1983) 111, E23, Inst. Chem. Eng. Rugby [14] W.E. Baker, P.A. Cox, P.S. Westine, J.J. Kulesz, R.A. Strehlow: Explosion Hazards and Evaluation. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company (1983)
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Fire Test for the Safety in Transport and Storage of Dangerous Goods Ch. Balke, W. Heller, R. Konersmann and J. Ludwig Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) Unter den Eichen 87, 12200 Berlin, Germany
INTRODUCTION In April 1999 a fire test with a 45 m3railway tank wagon partially filled with 5,l tonnes pressurised liquid propane (LPG) was carried out. The test was designed to investigate the effects that an accident fire would have on a partially filled railway tank wagon for LPG, and what consequences a bursting of the tank due to the temperature and pressure load would have for the environment. Due to the uniqueness of such a test, which to the knowledge of the authors had never before been performed in this manner in Germany or in Europe as a whole, the Saxon State Ministry for Environment and Agriculture, which partially sponsored this test agreed to provide in addition to the railway tank wagon a CASTOR cask of the type THTWAVR was also subjected to an engulfing fire. The report and the test results of the CASTOR cask are not integral part of these recitation.
OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT It is adequately known that, compared with other fossil fuels such as coal or fuel oil, LPG in compliance with DIN 5 1622 [11, in other words, commercially available technical grade gases of the C3 and Cq hydrocarbons propane, propylene (propene), butane, butylene (butene) and other mixtures, be have in a more environmentally compatible way. This has led to the situation that LPG in the above sense is also being increasingly used as fuel both privately as well as in the commercial sector. Consequently we have seen in the past, inevitably higher transport and trade activities, which have also led to an increase in storage capacities. Transportation
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is accomplished for the most part with railway tank wagons, tank vehicles as well as by means of tankers. To supply the population with LPG for domestic use and business for commercial use - particularly in rural areas in which other fuels are not adequately available in the right type (electricity, natural gas), or where for reasons of environmental protection and the type of handling they are no longer used (coal, wood, peat) - their distribution to the above named consumers is inevitably accomplished with vehicle tanks approved in compliance with transport regulations, and these are then either filled at stationary distribution depots or at so called railway tank transfer stations. At the distribution depots LPG is distributed from fixed (stationary) storage tanks, while at the transfer stations distribution takes place from mobile railway tank wagons. The transfer stations are generally located in track areas specially assigned for this purpose. To ensure the safe handling of LPG, but also to protect third parties, animals, material assets and the environment, it is necessary to adhere to defined safety engineering principles. These are in Germany not always the same for both distribution depots and transfer stations. Distribution depots for LPG with a capacity of more as 3 tonnes are subject to the regulations governed by the Federal Air pollution law (BImSchG) [2] respectively by the Major-accident Regulation (12* BImSchV) [3]; they must thus be built and operated in compliance with state-of-the-art safety engineering. Transfer stations are built and operated in compliance with state-of-the-art. This particularly applies to the area of fire-protection. In designing fireprotection measures, it is decisive to determine what type of fire hazard is to be covered for a transfer station or a distribution depot, so that adequate protection against overheating is provided for the railway tank wagon respectively the storage tank and also the tank vehicle to prevent a possible tank failure. Although there may be broader safety engineering aspects that may be technically and organizationally better implemented in individual transfer processes, the main safety engineering difference between distribution depots and transfer stations is the application of adequate fire protection measures. Safetyengineering aspects of a more far-reaching kind, which relate to the transport tanks of railway tank wagons or also to tank vehicles themselves and to there possible failure, e.g. due to overfilling, material defects etc. apply in a comparable manner to both distribution methods. According to the state-of-the-artof safety engineering (12* BImSchV) as well as the state-of-the-art (Pressure-Vessel-Regulation) [4], adequate fire protection is considered implemented in the sense of technical measure when tanks in storage plants are provided with an earth covering of 1 m thickness. In individual case, adequate fire protection is also considered implemented when tank surfaces are provided with a fire protection coating suitability or effective-
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ness has been proven and whose reliability has been defined as preventing tank failure for a period of 90 minutes under fire conditions. Under certain boundary conditions, comparable protection can also be provided by appropriately designed water-sprinkler or water-deluge systems if technical reasons make it impossible to provide a earth covering or a coating. Where on earth covering is provided a full engulfment or a direct firing of storage tanks is excluded. Because of these circumstances the BAM and the SMUL derive the requirement, that alternative measures must also ensure that a tankirrespective of whether it is being used as a storage tank in a distribution depot or a tank wagon or tank vehicle in a transfer station - must be adequately protected against direct fire endor full engulfment for a certain time. Although these safety engineering concepts are shared by several state authorities and have already found their way into corresponding decrees, e.g. joint decree by the Social (Labour) and Environmental Ministry in Lower Saxony [ 5 ] , so far no adequate discussions have been held; rather, fire-protective measures that are not in compliance with the state-of-the-art safety engineering and the state-of-the-art for storage tanks are still applied to tank wagodtank vehicle transfer-stations. A full engulfment of LPG tank not equipped with safety relief valve and without any other thermal protection can rupture within a reasonable short fire duration. LPG tanks ruptures in a fire produce very severe consequences due to the release of pressurised inflammable gas resulting in a BLEW (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion). Such a B L E W causes intensive heat radiation and explosion overpressure due to on expanding fireball, and . fragments of the ruptured tank are forced away with high energy. Since the end of the 1980’s BAM has carried out numerous fire tests on small (4,85m3) unprotected, protected with a water-sprinkler system and with protective coatings provided LPG tanks. At that time it was found that unprotected tanks of the above-mentioned dimension could fail within a period of approx. 7 - 12 minutes. Many times both in the past and present it has been stated in this respect that, due to their design in compliance with transport regulations, e.g. greater shell thickness, higher test pressure etc. tank wagons behave more favourably in fire condition than comparable storage tanks. This circumstance should therefore be taken into account in fire-protection measures, i.e. the requirements with regard to the sprinkling rates could not be transferred 1 :1 to larger tanks and could be considerably reduced. Research into the heating-up behaviour and the failure limits of large tanks was thus an essential safety engineering objective of this project. Furthermore, the test was to be used to evaluate the approximation methods recommended in literature with respect to the action radii, the purpose being to gain border knowledge with regard to disaster control.
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TEST OBJECTS AND TEST FACILITY The fire test facility was located in the centre of a circular sandy area, with a diameter of 400 m. In the centre of this area a 60 m by 50 m U-shaped sand embankment 6 m high was constructed by the Federal army. Two steel throughs for the fuel oil pools were positioned inside this wall (Figure 1).
Figure 1: BAM fire test site
A tank wagon with the followed technical Data would exposed to a full engulfment: Nominal Volume 45360 1 Test pressure 28 bar RID requirements for design and test pressure 27 bar (propane) Filler content approx. 22 % (5,l t) Total weight 17890 kg 14,9 mm (cyl.) a. 17,O mm (ends) Shell thicknesses length (along ends) 7600 rnm length (cylinder) 5950 mm Diameter 2900 mm Material BH 42 K (fine-grained-steel)
Due to the fact that in such a test extreme temperature an pressure loads as well as mechanical effects resulting from the explosion can be expected if the rail wagon fails as a result of the temperature the opportunity was taken to position
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next to the rail wagon a CASTOR THTFUAVR - a previously unused cask for radioactive material - to also subject it to the effects of the fire (Figure 2). Both test objects were put in the above mentioned separate fire throughs. The fire throughs were filled with fuel oil to feed the fire for approx. 40 minutes.
Figure 2: LPG rail wagon and CASTOR cask before test
The rail wagon was extensively instrumented with 10 thermocouples to measure the fire temperature and 11 were used to measure the temperature of the shell. During the entire course of the test, the internal overpressure was measured with 3 pressure gauges and the internal temperature with 4 thermocouples; this data were recorded (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Measurement points for instrumenting the rail tank and the CASTOR
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Similarly, 3 pressure sensors served to determine the ambient pressure when the tank failed, 3 thermo indicator strips were provided to determine the heat load of the fireball and two further sensors served to determine the heat flow of the fireball. The test was video-documented from four different ground positions and from a helicopter. Additionally, photographs were made from a further helicopter.
TEST METHODS AND RESULTS Three ignition devices were mounted in each of the fuel oil pools. These devices, consisting of plastic dishes filled with gasoline, positioned 30 cm above the fuel oil surface, were ignited electrically by small pyrotechnic detonator. The burning gasoline dishes were destroyed after about 100 s, and ignited the fuel oil pools. The pressure inside the rail wagon began to increase continuously 130 s after primary ignition, indicating that full fire engulfment of the test objects had been reached. Due to a slight wind from a northern direction (2 m s-l) the rail wagon were only engulfed partially by the flames.
Figure 4: Improved flame envelopment towards the end of the test
As a result the right and the front side fire temperatures were lower than at the left and back (Figure 4). After a continuous pressure increase over 15 minutes (approx. 17 min after primary ignition) the propane tank ruptured at an internal overpressure of 25 bar. The tank wall split at the weakest point, starting from 8,5 O above the horizontal centre-line (and well above the liquid level), at the middle of the side furthest from the cask, when the wall temperature there reached about 550 "C. The tank ruptured at first in the axial direction, along the cylindrical tank part (Figure 5). After that, the tank ruptured around the circumference, disconnecting the two tank ends. The tank content was released instantaneously, igniting and creating
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an expanding fireball (Figure 6). The approximate largest fireball is shown in Figure 5, where the diameter is about 100 m with the top about 150 m above ground level. The fireball burning time was about 7 s. Figure 7 shows the test facility shortly after the tank explosion. Fragments of the propane tank have been ejected from the walled area. The main part of the cylindrical tank shell, with a mass of 6700 kg was thrown 150 m.
Figure 5: Arrangement of the rail wagon and the CASTOR and the position of rupture line
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Figure 6: BLEW, expanding fireball, photographs taken from helicopter
Figure 7: View of the test facility after the rail tank explosion
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Overall, the tank became separated into 4 larger parts, the left tank end (with manhole) the right end, a larger cylindrical tank shell, as well as a smaller part of the tank shell, which dug itself vertically into the ground (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Smaller tank shell
After the test, the left tank end, the right tank end and the smaller part of the tank shells were respectively found approx. 130 m, 155 m and 200 m away from the test facility. All these fragments where thrown out of the open side of the Ushaped will, in the direction of the CASTOR.
CONCLUSIONS The test carried out here has shown that a rail wagon partially filled with 5,l tonnes propane and subjected to a full fire engulfment can fail within 15 minutes as less than 28 bar test pressure, even if the fire does not fully envelop the tank. The fireball - resulting from a bursting tank in which released propane evaporates instantly and then ignites (BLEVE) - which had a diameter of approx. 100 m as well as the distance that some of the fragments flew (up to 200 m) indicate that a fire situation will in a relatively short time cause a serious danger that should certainly be countered by applying and providing suitable safetyengineering measures. Due to the very short time periods available in such situations primarily and/or even just secondarily by means of the fire brigade must be considered as rather unsuitable, because it must be assumed that - in the short time available after the fire brigade has arrived - the fire brigade will not be able to provide suitable measures to protect the tank(s) against a BLEVE. Furthermore, the test leads to the conclusion that tanks having a higher test pressure and a greater steel-shell thickness than equally large storage tanks do not necessarily reveal higher safety reserves in a fire situation. It was possible to confirm experimentally that, in such a fire situation - which incidentally must be assumed when adequate safety
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measures are being designed for storage tanks - even for large tanks the decisive factor leading to tank failure is heat to the tank shell in the area of the gaseous phase in conjunction with the increase in internal pressure brought about by the input of heat. Because a sand embankment trilaterally surrounded the test facility and there was a specific wind direction during the test, the fire developed in such a way that primarily that side of the rail wagon facing away from the embankment opening was heated and thus got hottest. When the tank ruptured in this area the tank and the chassis were accelerated rocket-like onto the CASTOR cask and abruptly decelerated on impact with it. This circumstance can explain why the tank fragments flew in a preferred direction whereby some of these parts (larger tank shell and right end) had multiple ground contacts. During the impact of the tank wagon against the CASTOR a large part of the kinetic energy was transferred to the CASTOR so that it cannot be excluded that, with "unobstructed" movement, fragments could fly even further than when happened in this test, whereby it is impossible to quantify such distances because a large part of the energy was used up in deforming the parts, particularly the chassis of the tank wagon. Although it is theoretically possible to calculate the velocity of the CASTOR from the flight distance, the measurement results and the video recordings do not facilitate determining the contact time up to which acceleration took place. To sum up the results of this test, it can be said - at least as for as fire situations are concerned - rail wagons in LPG transfer stations should be safety-engineered to the some requirements as storage tanks set up stationarily.
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REFERENCES
111 [2] [3] [4] [5]
DIN 51622 Flussiggase Propan, Propen, Butan, Buten und deren Gemische, Anforderungen, December 1985 Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz(BImSchG): Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzesdated 14 May 1990 (BGBl I S. SO), revised by law an 22. April, 1993 (BGBl I S. 466) Zwolfte Verordnung zur Durchfuhrung des Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes(Storfall-Verordnung) dated 19. May 1988, revised 02. May 2000 (BGBl I Nr. 19 S. 603) Verordnung uber Druckbehalter, Druckgasbehalter und Fullanlagen (DruckbehalterVerordnung-DruckbehV) in the version of the announcement dated 23. October 1999, (BGB1 I Nr. 93 S. 1435) Sicherheitstechnische Anforderungen an Flussiggasanlagen Gem. RdErlal3 des MS u.d.MU V. 06.07.1995 - MS 504 - 40221/04/MU 303-40501/102 1.2 voris81640000000004
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Risk analysis of the transportation of hazardous materials: an application of the TRAT2 software to Messina R. Lisi, M.F. Milazzo, G. Maschio Universita di Messina, Dipartimento di Chimica Industriale ed Ingegneria dei Materiali, Salita Sperone 3 1, 98 166 - Sant'Agata di Messina, Italy P. Leonelli, S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni Universith di Bologna, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Chimica, Mineraria e delle Tecnologie Ambientali, Viale Risorgimento 2, 40136 - Bologna, Italy ABSTRACT The development of a methodology to study problems associated with the transportation of hazardous materials must be considered a very important target for risk analysis. For this scope an innovative procedure has been created, which represents the framework of the TRAT2 software. In this paper, after briefly outlining the main features of TRAT2, its application to the land transport of dangerous goods through the downtown of Messina is outlined. A detailed description is given of the rail and road networks, of the hazardous materials flows, of the population distribution which characterise Messina; then results about a preliminary evaluation of both individual and societal risk are shown. Finally future improvements of TRAT2 and major research developments in hazardous materials transportation risk analysis are presented and discussed. 1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of safety themes associated with the transportation of hazardous materials is considered to be as important as the study of risk problems connected with fixed installations, since historical evidence has shown that incidents related to the transportation of dangerous goods are comparable in number and magnitude with those occurred in chemical plants. Furthermore, hazardous materials releases during transport may occur in areas which are not sufficiently controlled or protected, such as zones of high population density or of natural and historical beauty [ 1, 21. For this reason risk analysis should address both fixed installations and transportation networks, thus obtaining a complete area risk evaluation, which represents the basis on which decision makers will establish criteria for risk management, risk control and land-use planning.
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2. THE TRAT2 SOFTWARE
For the evaluation of hazardous materials transportation risk an innovative procedure has been developed [3], coupling time effectiveness and mathematical accuracy; its great flexibility allows to analyse at the same time different transport modalities, like truck, rail, pipelines or inland waterways, and, for each mean of transport, different typologies of dangerous goods, like toxic substances, flammables or explosives. Recently this procedure has been implemented on the TRAT2 software [4], whose fiamework is shown in Fig. 1; it is basically composed by tree executable codes (written in C++ and Fortran languages) and an ACCESS database to which communicate through direct access libraries. A user-friendly Windows interface allows the risk analyst to introduce, while communicating with the database, all the input data necessary to describe the case in examination. Then information is exported from the database to the Processing Unity, which performs calculations and conveys the output results to the database. Presentation of results can be both graphical and numerical, thus allowing data exportation for further external processing.
Fig. 1. The fiamework of the TRAT2 software
The introduction of the data relative to a case study consists of two phases. Fig. 2 shows the main menu of the TRAT2 code at the beginning of the first phase, when only some menu options are available. Clicking on the choice “Cgnfigurazione”a window appears, through which it is possible to define, further clicking on the secondary menu options, the ‘Pasquill class-wind velocity’ pairs (e.g. B-3, D-5, F-2, ...) and the number of sectors of wind rose, the hazardous materials shipped (e.g. ammonia, LPG,. ..), the transport modalities (e.g. road, rail,....), the area categories of the case study (e.g. urban, rural,. ..), the number of holes through which describe a release (e.g. small, medium, big,...), the final scenarios (e.g. pool fire, toxic cloud,...), the population categories (e.g. residential people, scholars, motorists.. .).
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Fig 2. TRAT2: the main menu
Instead the option “lrasporti” leads to the description of the hazardous material ‘vehicles typologies’, which are ‘substance-transport modality’ pairs; for each ‘vehicle typology’ (e.g. ammonia road truck, LPG rail tank, ...) it is necessary to define the occurrence probabilities of the holes and to relate to each hole the possible final scenarios, defining their probability of occurrence and assigning to each a ‘vulnerability map’ for all area categories, which represents the distribution of the death probability in a Cartesian plane where the origin is the release source and the abscissa coincides with the wind direction. Vulnerability maps are stored in the database for a relevant number of combinations ‘vehicle typology, hole dimension, meteo pair, area category’; otherwise they can be constructed processing the outputs of commercial consequences evaluation codes. Finally the choice “Categorie” allows to assign to each population category the probability of being indoor.
Fig. 3. TRATZ: the window related to the choice “Meteo” of the main menu
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At this point a template has been created; templates can be stored and saved and thus can be useful for more case studies; obviously, if a suitable template already exists, it can be loaded (clicking on the main menu option “ljle”) and in this case the first phase of the data introduction is omitted. Starting the second phase, all choices of the main menu of Fig. 2 are available. First of all a graphical imagine of the case study area has to be imported and the North direction on it has to be defined. Then, clicking on “Meteo” the window reported in Fig. 3 appears and the wind direction probabilities for each meteo pair and all wind rose sectors can be given; instead the voice “Popolazione” allows a very detailed description of the distribution of all population categories. Furthermore, clicking on “Tyatte” the network can be characterised, giving for each arc its geographical co-ordinates and its accident frequency; finally, the voice “kiende” allows the definition of the factories interested by the transport, specifying for each one the vehicle typology shipped and its path on the network from origin to destination. After having introduced all data, clicking on “calcolo” the Processing Unit starts to performs calculations, evaluating the individual risk distribution and the societal risk expressed as F(N) curves. Results can be viewed clicking on “~isualizza”; a relevant number of options are available, both for individual and societal risk: in fact total risk can be viewed, or only the risk due to the shipments of a factory, or the risk due to a single substance on the whole network or on a specific path.
Fig. 4. TRAT2: the window related to the choice “TLatte” of the main menu
3. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION IN SICILY Sicily has a very high concentration of chemical plants and thus is an area with a great risk of accidents; in addition to industrial risk sources, natural risk
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sources like earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are present. To all this it is relevant to add the land decay, as well as the deficiencies of infrastructures and transportation networks. The chemical industry in Sicily presents some peculiarities; in fact there is only a limited number of small and medium units, while the major part of factories is constituted by big plants, which are located on the south-eastern side of the island in the vicinity of areas with a high population density and of strong environmental, artistic and tourist interest. The situation is summarised in Fig. 5 , where the location of the main production sites is shown together with the paths of the Mediterranean gas pipeline (coming from Algeria and directed to the Italian peninsula) and the gas pipeline network connecting the plants of Priolo, Gela and Ragusa.
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Fig. 5. Localisation of the main chemical plants in Sicily
The amount of oil and other chemical products which are processed in Sicily is about 50-106t/yr. This fact causes an over-production compared to the regional needs, and therefore a large part of these substances is exported; thus the region is characterised by an outflow of final products and an inflow of raw materials. Unfortunately the transportation infrastructure is inadequate to cope with such a level of traffic; the rail network, for instance, is still mostly a single track one, while important parts of the highway network are incomplete. As a consequence there are urban areas subject to an intense traffic of hazardous materials and no guarantee of the safety can be ensured.
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4. THE CASE STUDY OF MESSINA
The area which is the object of this study is the city of Messina, which has a population of approximately 280,000 inhabitants; its geographic position confers it the role of ‘door of Sicily’ for all the connections with the Italian peninsula which go through it. Since the downtown has developed around the harbour, the road network between the highway exits and the ferry terminals cross densely populated areas and zones of intense commercial activity. Fig. 6 shows schematically the situation. There are four highway slip roads for entering the city (Boccetta, Centro, Gazzi and Tremestieri) and two ferry terminals, one operated by the National Railway Service and one operated by private companies; the principal highway sliproad, Boccetta, reaches the sea between these two terminals. The use of the other sliproads, Centro and Gazzi, is sporadic because they have a larger travelling time due to high commercial traffic. About 22,500 trucks per year of dangerous goods are directed to the Italian Peninsula; in addition approximately 800,000 other heavy lorries and 2,500,000 cars cross yearly the Straits of Messina. For a careful evaluation of both individual and societal risk a detailed analysis of a census data is necessary, in order to define, among others, the hazardous materials traffic flows, the population distribution, and the meteorological conditions. Fig. 7 reports the road and rail networks for which risk has been
Fig. 6. Messina: connections between highway exits and ferry terminals
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Fig. 7. Messina: main centres of aggregated population ()., road and railway networks examined in the risk analysis study
evaluated, together with the main centres of aggregated population, that are sites where more than 50 persons are present (e.g. schools, hospitals, ...) Through the Straits of Messina about 115 different hazardous substances are transported. In order to simplify the risk evaluation, they have been grouped together into 8 clusters according to their physical-chemical properties and their hazard characteristics, in terms of flammability, explosiveness and toxicity. The yearly number of shipments of these clusters, each represented by a specific reference substance, are listed in Table 1 both for road and railway. Table 1
Road and railway annual flows of the ‘reference substances’ through the Straits of Messina Reference substances Road Railway veh iclelyear Yo vehicle/year Y O ACRYLONITRILE 103 0.5 272 3.8 CLORIDRIC ACID 771 3.5 22 0.3 FLUORIDRIC ACID 49 0.2 56 0.8 AMMONIA 0 0.0 118 1.6 CHLORINE 5 0.0 620 8.6 LIQUID FUELS 11,088 49.7 1,224 17.0 LPG 3,008 13.5 558 7.7 ETHYLENE OXIDE 360 1.6 2,398 33.3 OTHER 6,930 31.1 1,944 27.0 TOTAL 22,314 100 7,212 100 Data sources: chemical companies, Harbour Office, National Railway Service, private ferry companies.
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For a preliminary risk evaluation only some substances, among those listed in Table 1, have been taken into account. Results are shown in Figg. 8 and 9, where the individual risk distribution is reported both outdoor and indoor , and in Figg. 10 and 11, where the societal risk curves are plotted vs. English and Dutch risk acceptability criteria. As can be seen, in some zones along the routes the individual risk reaches values of 1-104 eventdyr, which are not acceptable on the basis of the both
Fig. 8. Outdoor individual risk due to road and railway transport (ACN, HF, Cl,, gasoline, LPG, EtOx)
Fig. 9. Indoor individual risk by road and railway transport (ACN, HF, Ch, gasoline, LPG, EtOx)
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English and Dutch risk criteria. This consideration is even more true if it is considered that risk values are underestimated, since not all shipped goods have been taken into account. The societal risk curves too put in evidence a very critical situation, especially for the road transport, where the frequency of having more than 10,000 deaths is EtOO
E-01 E-02 E-03
F
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EngHsh criteria
I--
E05
Dutch criteria
E-06
E-07 E-08 E-09 E-10
Et02
e+01
1
N
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E+04
Et05
Fig. 10. Societal risk due to road shipments (ACN, EtOx, HF, Clz, gasoline, LPG) vs. English and Dutch criteria EtOO E-01
E-02 E-03
F
E-04 E-05
_--Engllh
crltedn
E-06 E-07
ri_FI
Dutch
cNda
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E-10
1
EtOl
Et02
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Et04
Fig. 11. Societal risk due to railway shipments (ACN, HF, Clz, EtOx) vs. English and Dutch criteria
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still equal to 1.10-* eventdyr; this is partly due to the accident frequency, which is very high on Boccetta sliproad, which has a relevant gradient towards the sea. 5. RISK REDUCTION MEASURES IN MESSINA The results of the risk evaluation allow to make the following considerations about the hazardous materials transportation in Messina: risk values, in terms of both individual and societal risk, are not only not negligible, but even not acceptable, if compared with the English and Dutch risk criteria; especially the road trucks cross for convenience (in terms of travelling time) and necessity (due to the position of the ferry terminals with respect to the highway exits) the downtown which has a high density of residential population and a relevant number of schools, offices and commercial sites; the presence of hazardous materials trucks crossing Messina generally coincides with the rush hours of the downtown; actually there are no emergency plans to withstand releases, which could have disastrous consequences involving many people, though characterised by a very low frequency of occurrence. In order to find a remedy to this situation, it is possible to make the following proposals relative to risk prevention and emergency planning: > it is necessary to limit the hours when vehicles transporting hazardous substances cross the urban area, so that their presence in the downtown does not coincide with the rush hours; this requires the construction of a suitably equipped parking area outside the city centre; 9 furthermore a dedicated Operations Centre should manage, through radio contacts, the flow of hazardous materials trucks from the parking area to the ferry terminals. Each truck arrived in the parking area should inform the Operative Centre about the substance it ships and should ask about a permission to enter the city; the Operative Centre, will give it on the base of the time of day and the traffic conditions, also indicating the route to follow; furthermore each vehicle should be equipped with a GPS system to continuously monitor its position. In this way there would be great advantages also in emergency situations due to the involving of a hazardous good vehicle in an accident, since its position and the substance it ships would be immediately transmitted to the rescue services, thus optimising the response time and the remedial actions to be undertaken; 9 finally, referring to the ferry terminals, it is possible to suggest that a valid alternative, from the risk point of view, would be to locate all them in the
.
.
. .
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area southern to the actual National Railway Service ferry terminal, equipping an already existing dock actually in disuse. The new ferry terminals would be reached by truck leaving the highway at the Tremestieri exit (which has no gradient) and travelling on a new dedicated coast road running along the seaside and not passing through the downtown. This solution would put the private companies and the National Railway Service near each other, thus bringing the principal Strait cross carries into equal conditions of competition; furthermore the traffic of heavy vehicles through the city centre would be sharply reduced. 6. FUTURE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
The TRAT2 software joins mathematical accuracy of the procedures and simplicity of use due to its user-friendly interface, as extensively shown in this work; to allow a major internationally diffusion of it, an English version will be arranged in addition to the Italian one which has had a priority since the software has been developed for being used by Public Agencies. Referring to advances in the field of hazardous material transportation risk analysis, there are two main themes actually under study and on which attention will continue to be focused in future. The first research, in collaboration with the University of Pisa [5,6], is based on the consideration that risk analysis requires an homogenous approach to the problem and the minimisation of all the uncertainty factors present. In hazardous material transportation risk assessment these uncertainties are caused on one hand by data values (like those assumed for accident fiequencies and release probabilities), and, on the other, by the simplifying assumptions used to select and model reference scenarios for effects and damage evaluation. A revision of the accident and release frequencies data reported in literature has been made, to determine reference value suitable for the Italian situation and specifically for Messina; further the incidence on the final risk measures of different incident characterisations, that is the choice of different hole numbers, hole dimensions and probabilities of occurrence for each hole, has been investigated; further the importance of event tree assumptions has been studied. The aim of this research is to put in evidence the urgent necessity of developing a standardised approach to risk analysis studies at least in the Italian territory, in order to make risk measures more objective and thus more comparable. The second research consists in the application to the area of Messina of OPTIPATH [7,8], which is an innovative risk-based routing procedure, actually applied only on a semi-fictitious test area. First of all this code, processing the
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output data of TRAT2, evaluates for each network arc a parameter named ‘arc capacity’, which represents the maximum number of hazardous material vehicles of one or even more substances travelling simultaneously which can transit on the arc without exceeding both individual and societal risk acceptability criteria. Further the OPTIPATH procedure allows the determination of the optimal flow distribution on the network of all hazardous material shipments, so as to minimise societal risk while taking into account the economic feasibility of the transport. In particular this tool can be very usefil also to evaluate the incidence on risk of alternative routes, like the seaside running road suggested in section 5.0, or to establish the paths to be taken for different times of day.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The financial support of the CNR, Gruppo Nazionale di Ricerca per la Difesa dai Rischi Chimico-Industriali ed Ecologici is gratefully acknowledged. The Prefettura di Messina, Capitaneria di Porto, Polizia Stradale and Comune of Messina are acknowledged for the support given in the data collection.
REFERENCES [l] CCPS, Guidelines for chemical transportation risk analysis, AIChE, New York, 1995. [2] Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances, Major Hazard Aspects of the Transport of Dangerous Substances, HM Stationery Office, London, 1991. [3] P. Leonelli, S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni, “New detailed numerical procedures for calculating risk measures in hazardous materials transportation”, Journ. Loss Prev., 1216 (1999) 507. [4] P. Leonelli, G. Maschio, G. Spadoni, “I1 rischio da trasporto di sostanze pericolose: un’analisi d’impatto territoriale con il TRATT, Proceedings of the VGR2k 2000 Conference, Pisa, Italy, 2000. [5] V. Cozzani, S. Bonvicini, L. Vanni, G. Spadoni, S. Zanelli, “Analisi comparativa delle kequenze di incidente e di rilascio nel trasporto stradale e ferroviario di sostanze pericolose”, Proceedings of the VGR2k 2000 Conference, Pisa Italy, 2000. [6] S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni, “Effects of different incident characterisations in hazardous materials transportationrisk analysis”, Risk Analysis Conference, Bologna, Italy, 2000. [7] P. Leonelli, S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni, “Hazardous materials transportation: a riskanalysis-based routing methodology”, Journ. Haz. Mat., 71/3 (2000) 293. [S] S. Bonvicini, G. Spadoni, “Ottimizzazione delle rotte nel trasporto stradale di sostanze pericolose”, Proceedings of the VGR2k 2000 Conference, Pisa, Italy, 2000.
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Best routing criteria for hazardous substances transportation R. Bubbico",S. Di Caveb,A. Guerrierib,B. Mazzarottab a Gruppo Nazionale
Difesa Rischio Chimico Industriale ed Ecologico, CNR, c/o Dip. Ingegneria Chimica, Via Eudossiana 18,00184, Roma, Italy
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Chimica, Universith di Roma "La Sapienza" Via Eudossiana 18,00184, Roma, Italy
1. INTRODUCTION Road mode of transport is largely used for the movement of dangerous materials: in particular, in Italy about 83 Mtodyr of hazardous substances (corresponding to 53% of the total movement) travel by road and a similar situation holds for other European Countries. These transportation activities represent a potential hazard for the exposed population and the environment, and a number of studies are being carried out in order to assess risk level. However, such evaluation is, by far, more complex than that for fixed installations, since the risk source is continuously moving and, correspondingly, the surrounding environment is continuously changing [ 13. The traditional approaches to transportation risk analysis (TRA) are mainly focused on the evaluation of individual and/or societal risk, to be possibly compared with suitable threshold values. This procedure also allows comparing the risk level of different itineraries, but does not give immediately the less hazardous route between given localities. It has to be considered that most road transportation activities are currently planned in order to minimise the length of the route or the time needed, according to a "minimum cost" routing, regardless of the potential hazard. On the other hand, the evaluation of the "minimum risk" route requires the knowledge of a large number of parameters, including factors such as accident rate, weather conditions and population in the impact zone, which may vary remarkably along alternative itineraries. In the present work a route risk index has been defined and used to determine the "minimum risk" itinerary, basing on a commercial routine, a specially developed GIS (Geographic Information System) application, and a database containing information about the hazard presented by the transferred products, including the impact areas for a number of combinations of dangerous events, amount of the spill and weather conditions.
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2. METHODOLOGY
The hazard considered in TRA is that deriving from the loss of containment of the load and the dispersion of the dangerous product into the surrounding environment. Therefore, the risk measure to be minimised depends on the probability that a release will occur during the trip, on the probability that this release will give rise to a hazardous outcome (fire, explosion, toxic cloud), on the expected consequences of these outcome cases, and on the exposed population [l]. In order to obtain the "minimum risk' routing, the risks calculated at each point of any itinerary connecting the desired locations should be summed. In practice, the route can be divided into portions, associating a "risk level" to each portion. However, the extension of the impact zone of the possible hazardous outcomes largely varies depending on the characteristics of the transferred substance and on weather conditions. Accordingly, a minimum risk routing will need plenty of information and a great number of calculations; on the other hand, its practical application also requires short computational time. This objective can be reached by adopting some simplifying assumptions, aimed at limiting the number of scenarios to be taken into account, by separately performing consequence analysis for these scenarios, including the results in a suitable product database, and by collecting and manipulating detailed territorial data by means of a GIs. 2.1 Accidental scenarios The loss of containment during transport may take origin from a number of different causes (a leakage from a valve, the rupture of the container, etc.) and the initial scenarios will also differ depending on size and location of the orifice, physical state of the product, transport pressure and temperature, and ambient conditions. The probability or frequency of each initial scenario has to be assessed, both in normal travel conditions and following an accident. When the dangerous substance is dispersed into the environment the initial scenarios may evolve into a number of outcome cases according to different patterns, depending on the hazard presented by the product (flammable, toxic or both), the physical state of the spill, its amount, and, broadly speaking, environmental conditions, which include weather (temperature, wind velocity, etc) but also orography, characteristics of the ground, local distribution of ignition sources, etc. For a flammable liquid, possible outcome cases cover the following: jet fire, pool fire, flash fire, UVCE (Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion) and fireball; however, depending on the involved substance, toxic cloud and physical explosion of the container may also occur. The probability that an initial scenario evolves into any of the possible outcome cases has to be assessed, as well as the consequences of each outcome case, in order to determine an "impact area" where the thermal radiation, the overpressure or the concentration of a toxic represent a serious hazard to human health: such impact areas strongly depend on weather conditions. The shape of the impact areas originated from the outcome cases may be circular (fireball, pool fire,
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UVCE, physical explosion) or elongated in a preferential direction, which may be downwind (flash fire, toxic cloud) or casual (jet fire). Accordingly, the impact areas can be defined by proper effect distances and angles. In order to reduce the number of cases to be examined, the following simplifying assumptions were suggested [2]: - the product is transported in a standard vessel of fixed volume (35 m3), which is filled at 85%; - any loss of containment is accident initiated: the probability that, following an accident, a spill will occur is taken from historical data [3] relevant to the product under exam, or to similar products; - a spill can occur according to 2 modalities: from a 25 mm orifice (medium release) or from a 220 rmn orifice (catastrophic release); in both cases the duration of the spill is 15 min; - the impact areas of the outcome cases deriving from the 2 above scenarios are calculated under 6 reference sets of weather conditions, listed in Table 1; the probability that an accidental scenario will evolve into each possible outcome case is taken from historical data [3] relevant to the product under exam, or to products with similar physico-chemical and hazardous characteristics. The weather sets were selected basing on the average seasonal values of high and low temperatures, and of wind velocity, recorded at the main meteorological sites in Italy [4]. The Pasquill atmospheric stability class D (neutral) was assumed in all cases, as reasonably conservative. Consequence analysis was carried out by means of Trace 8.0b software, supplied by Safer System LLC [5]. The concentration, heat radiation and overpressure profiles were estimated for each outcome case and compared with suitable lethality thresholds to assess the relevant impact area, determining the maximum distance and angle of the effect zone.
2.2 Product database A product database (TrHazDat) containing information related to the hazard presented during road transportation was developed, as described in details elsewhere [2]. For each substance, it gives the following data: - physical state during transport; - normal boiling point; - flammability limits; Table 1 Reference sets of meteorological conditions used for estimating impact areas Reference set 1 2 3 4 5 Temperature ("C) 5 5 14 14 26 Wind velocity ( d s ) 3 6 3 6 3 D Pasquill stability class D D D D
6 26 6
D
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acute toxicity thresholds; - probability that, following an accident, a spill will occur; - probability that the size of the spill will be medium or catastrophic; - probability, for each spill size, that any of the possible outcome cases Qet fire, pool fire, fireball, flash fire, UVCE, toxic cloud) will occur; - maximum distance and angle of the effect zone for each spill size and weather condition. The product database TrHazDat contains at the moment information about 30 flammable and/or toxic products. -
2.3 Territorial information Territorial information needed for the analysis include accident rate, population density and meteorological data along each road. However, the accuracy of the available information about these variables is quite different. Yearly accident rate data are available, grouped for roads falling in the same category: in Italy, they are classified according to the district, the type of vehicle, and the occurrence of injuries or fatalities [6]. Moreover, the number of accidents occurred for each 1-km portion of some roads (highways and state roads) is also recorded [7], but without any indication about the type of vehicles involved. It has to be remarked that the accidents occurred to trucks transporting dangerous goods are not listed apart: some of them appear in the records of the Fire Brigades, which are usually alerted, in all serious cases. However, the accident rate data needed in TRA should be expressed as number of accidents per vehicle and kilometre [l], i.e. they should be referred to the number of vehicles travelling on the road. Unfortunately, in Italy overall traffic data are available for rather long portions of pay-toll highway [8], while they are very scarce for the other types of road. Exhaustive population data are recorded during census operations, which usually take place every 10 years: the information is available with various degrees of accuracy, from regional data down to single census units (about 400 people) [9]. The population is assigned to the place where it is spending the night, regardless of their different location during the day, and on-road people are not taken into account at all. Weather data are hourly recorded at meteorological stations, but are usually available as monthly average values. In Italy, the network of main meteorological sites includes about 36 station [4]; a number of minor locations is also present which, however, collect less exhaustive data. All the above data should be made available "along the road", i.e. they should be referred to route portions as short as possible, and should be associated to the location of such portions on a map. This operation can be conveniently carried out by means of a GIs, grouping the various informations into different themes.
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2.4 GIs application The territorial database was developed by means of ArcView 3.1 GIS software and a commercial product (RoadNet Connect supplied by TeleAtlas) was taken as the basis for the road network. The coverage is quite accurate, including all the suburban roads, as well as the main urban ones: each road is divided into a great number of segments, sometimes a few meters long, in order to identify particular spots, such as crossings, or just to follow a winding itinerary. The population data, at the accuracy of the built-up areas (7 1274 localities in Italy) were taken from the last available census [9]. The weather data were taken from those recorded at the main meteorological stations [4] as follows: - monthly average high, medium and low temperature; - monthly average wind velocity; - yearly average wind probability for the main 8 directions (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW). The first step of the procedure consisted of determining the expected weather conditions for each route portion, taking into account the period of the year and the moment of the day when the trip takes place. Initially, 36 combinations were assumed, basing on the month, and on the moment of the day (night, morninghfternoon, noon): temperature and wind velocity values were determined for each portion of road by weighting the data of the sites located on the same side of the watershed on the basis of the reciprocal of the distance (squared) between the portion of the road under exam and each meteorological station. The obtained values were then compared with the 6 sets of reference weather conditions listed in Table 1, selecting, for each period, the set closer to the actual values. As the work went on, it was noticed that the weather conditions did not vary too much within each season: therefore, also in order to reduce the size of the tables to be managed, a total of 12 combinations was assumed (4 seasons x 3 moments of the day). The probability of wind direction associated to each road portion was also included in the table. The available accident rate data were more or less accurate depending on the type of road, but only for long highway portions they could be expressed in the needed format (number of accidents per vehicle and km), while for all the other roads this was not possible, due the absence of reliable traffic information. For this reason, constant average values of accident rates were set for each type of road (highway, state, provincial, local and urban road) basing on the data of the Italian Automobile Club [6]. However, from a methodological point of view, this is not a great inconvenience: in fact, the data in the table can be easily updated and replaced with more accurate ones as soon as they will be available. Differently from meteorological data and accident rate values, the population density may change remarkably with the distance from the road; furthermore, it may also strongly depend on the direction along which this
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distance is measured. For example, Fig.1 shows two symmetrical routes nearby a built-up area: when wind blows from the direction indicated by the arrow, the population at risk is much higher for route 1 than for route 2. The hazardous characteristics of the substance, the release scenario and the possible outcome cases also play a significant role, since the maximum effect distance and angle may vary remarkably. Therefore, the population density to be associated to each road portion should be given at different distances from the road, and along different directions. However, it seems impractical to set the width of the buffers basing on the effect distances of the single outcome cases of all the assumed products. The effect distances listed in the product database were then examined, paying particular attention to the minimum and maximum values: then 14 buffer zones were assumed, as listed in Table 2. It can be noticed that the width of these zones increases with increasing their distance from the road: the maximum value (20 km) largely exceeds the maximum effect distance presently contained in the product database. As far as the direction is concerned, 8 axis were considered, oriented along the main 8 wind directions (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, NW). The population density was then determined within each circular area, with radius equal to the buffer distance, and within each 45" circular sector oriented along the above wind directions. The former values can be directly used for the outcome cases presenting circular impact zone (pool fire, fireball, UVCE) or casual direction (jet fire); the latter have to be combined and weighted according to the probability of wind blowing towards each direction, for wind dependent outcome cases (flash fire, toxic cloud). Accordingly, the table associated to the road portions includes 14 wind independent and 14 wind dependent values of the population density.
Prevailing wind direction\
Route
'
Route 2
Fig. 1. Effect of wind direction on symmetrical routes
Table 2 Distance from the road axis of the buffer zones used for estimating population density 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 BufferNo. Distance (m) 50 70 100 140 200 300 500 800 1200 2000 3000 5000 10000 20000
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2.5 Route Risk Index In order to find the less hazardous route for transporting a certain dangerous product between assigned locations, a risk index has to be defined and associated to each portion of the itinerary. Such index will depend on the period of the year and the moment of the day chosen for the trip, on the accident rate, on the probability of each outcome case, should an accident occur, and on the population falling in the effect zone of each outcome case, estimated for each portion of route. The risk index of the i-th portion of route, RI,, can be calculated as:
where ARi is the accident rate of the i-th portion of route, Li its length, ock the overall probability that the k-th outcome case will occur, Ak its impact area and PDi,kthe population density of the i-th portion of route, relevant to the buffer just exceeding the effect distance the k-th outcome case. The overall route risk index, which can be obtained by summing the risk index of each portion of the itinerary, takes into account both the number of people at risk and the probability that a hazard will actually occur. 2.6 Development of the routing program The routing program RouTrHaz was based on the Network Analyst extension of the GIS software ArcView. The program can be applied to road network coverages and creates a graph, calculating the route that minimises the summation of some fields in the table. The built-in functions to be minimised are: length of the route, trip time (calculated basing on an average speed rate for each road type), and fuel consumption. First, in order to get realistic estimates of the trip time, the values of average velocity listed in Table 3 were assumed for the vehicles transporting dangerous products. Then, the data contained in the product and territorial databases were used to directly calculate, for each product and period of the trip, the risk index to be associated to each portion of route, basing on the local accident rate, the probability of the outcome cases for each release scenario and the population in the impact zones for each outcome case. In fact, due to the very large size of the tables, it is inconceivable to perform route index calculations (which require extremely long computational times) together with the routing ones. The final table of each product directly lists the risk index relevant to each portion of route for the 12 combinations of trip periods. Table 3
Assumed average velocity of road tankers on different road types Road type Highway State Provincial Average velocity ( k d h ) 90 70 60
Local 40
Urban 30
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The routing program requires selecting the substance, the season and the time of the day, i.e. the relevant field of the above tables, which is copied into the proper field and minimised by the routing program. The procedure runs in a few tens seconds.
3. APPLICATION The routing program was applied to Latium, which is one of the largest and more populated regions in Italy (surface 17 200 km2,population 5 200 000): the road network of the region, supplied by TeleAtlas, consists of 42243 records. Even if the application was limited to this region, population data of the neighbouring regions (Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise and Campania) were also collected for the localities within 30 km of the boundary. Similarly, the main meteorological stations located on the same side of the watershed were considered. Fig.2 shows the used territorial coverages.
3.1 Less hazardous route between assigned localities The proposed application consists in the selection of the less hazardous route between a locality just south of Rome, and another one about 40 km northwest of Viterbo. The shortest and the fastest routes between the selected points are shown in Fig.3 (a and b, respectively). Then, it was assumed that some flammable/toxic products (acetone, cianidric acid, ethylene oxide and vinyl chloride) have to be transferred from one locality to the other, and the less hazardous route was determined for each product, obtaining the results shown in Fig.3 (c, d, e and f, respectively).
e
Fig. 2. Territorial information for Latium.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of shortest (a) fastest (b) and safest route for the transportation of acetone (c), cianidric acid (d), ethylene oxide (e) and vinyl chloride (0.
It can be noticed that, for each examined product, the safest route is different from the fastest and the shortest one: none of the safest routes crosses the city of Rome, and all of them are much longer than the direct ones. Moreover, even if all the safest routes avoid the city of Rome, they appear rather different, the shortest being that for vinyl chloride and the longer that for acetone. In
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particular, it seems that the larger is the effect distance for the product, the shorter the length of the safest route. Similar comparisons between shortest, fastest and safest routes were carried out choosing different localities, products and periods of the year, allowing to draw some general considerations: - the safest route is generally different (and longer) than the fastest or shortest one; - there is not a single safe route between assigned localities, since the minimum risk itinerary strongly depends on the characteristics of the transported product; - with reference to the transportation of a certain product, the safest route between assigned localities generally does not change by changing the moment of the trip; - as the hazard associated to the product increases (longer effect distances), the safest route becomes closer to the shortest one. This last behaviour can be explained taking into account that, in case of short effect distances a derouting can avoid that large built-up areas fall into the impact area. On the contrary, in case of long effect distance, large built-up areas will be affected in any case, and the selection of a longer route, running more distant from these areas, gives no practical benefit. Of course, RouTrHaz can use all the usual options of a routing program, such as calculating the safest route from a start point to a number of destinations, and it also offers the possibility of calculating the "local" risk of each portion of the route. This option allows detecting "black points" along the route, where the combination of accident rate and population is particularly critical. 3.2 Road transportation emergency management The use of information contained in the GIS application, coupled with those of the product database TrHazDat can be of great help in managing transportation emergencies. In fact, it is possible to view directly on the map the effect zones relevant to the various outcome cases possibly originated by an accident. Moreover, the impact areas shown on the map can take into account the severity of the accidental scenario (medium or catastrophic release) and local meteorological conditions at that moment, including wind direction. This information can be used, together with the coverage included in the GIS application, to identify populated zones to be evacuated, roads to be blocked or to be reserved to the emergency forces, possible traffic derouting, etc. Of course, the standard routing abilities of the program can be used to find the emergency services (fire brigades, hospitals, etc.) closest to the accident site and the fastest route for reaching this site, provided that the location of the different emergency services has been included in the GIS coverage.
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The safest routing program can be also used for assigning an alternative route to a vehicle transporting dangerous goods in case of obstacles (heavy traffic, adverse weather, etc) along the original itinerary. This just requires the vehicle to be equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) connected with a central location providing the information.
3.3 Discussion The proposed approach for determining the safest itinerary couples transportation risk analysis techniques with accurate territorial information. The tool is simple and effective, and presents a great potential and some limitations. The main advantages are represented by the flexible structure of the program, which allows to easily manage and update all data, and by the use of GIs, which provides the capability of dealing with a huge amount of territorial data, showing them on maps. However, the potential of GIS applications cannot be completely exploited due to the lack of some information, above all those relevant to the accident rates. The same type of limitation also affects the historical data needed for assessing, for each transported product, the probability of a release scenario and of its evolution into the final outcome cases, even if the uncertainty about this information probably affects to a lower extent the selection of the safest route. In fact, the proposed approach actually compares the risk values of different itineraries for the same product, but is not aimed at estimating some absolute value of the risk. For this same reason also the hypopthesis about release scenarios and reference meteorological conditions are expected to have very limited effects on safest route calculations. The knowledge of the safest route can represent an important achievement for increasing safety in the transportation of dangerous goods. However, the "minimum risk' itinerary should be checked also under other practical and economical aspects. In fact, the safest route is, almost in all cases, remarkably longer than the fastest one; furthermore, keeping more distant from cities and villages, it often runs on secondary roads. Therefore, the direct adoption of the minimum risk itinerary will considerably extend the trip time, both due to the longer itinerary travelled and to the lower average speed, possibly resulting in unsustainably high transportation costs. The need of taking into account also the economical aspects of these transportation activities suggests that some other factors should be considered in order to select a safe itinerary which is at the same time practicable. This can be done in a number of ways, such as by introducing some boundary conditions to the routing program or selecting a different objective function. In the first case, a limit in the length of the route or in the trip time can be fixed for the routing program during the calculations of the minimum risk itinerary: these limits can be set by comparing the safest route length and trip time with those of the shortest and fastest route, respectively. Another approach can be that of defining a new objective function in terms of cost, which combines the overall trip costs,
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(fuel, vehicle maintenance and depreciation allowance, etc.) and some "economical" value to be assigned to the risk suffered by the population due to the transportation activity under exam. This approach, which is certainly open to severe criticisms from an ethical point of view, can be easily implemented into the program setting an economical value for the human life, since the route risk index accounts for both the overall number of people at risk during the trip and the probability that they actually suffer the consequences of this risk.
4. CONCLUSION The proposed methodology allows to easily and rapidly select the safest route for transporting dangerous substances by road. The application has been developed for an Italian region, but it can be immediately extended to any different zone and transport modality, just providing the needed territorial and product information. The safest route is generally remarkably longer and slower than the direct one, thus resulting in more expensive transportation costs; this suggests to consider also economical factors, which can be easily included into the program. The applications are not limited to routing activities but also cover important areas such as emergency management.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of G.N.D.R.C.1.E.CNR, and the technical support of H.E.L.I.O.S.project.
REFERENCES [ 11 CCPS, Guidelines for chemical transportation risk analysis, New York, AIChE, (1995).
[2] R. Bubbico, S. Di Cave and B. Mazzarotta, TrHaz: a quantified risk assessment tool for road transport of dangerous goods in Italy, Proceeding SRA 1998 Annual Conference "Risk analysis: opening the process", vol. 2, pp.665-676, (1998). [3] OSH-ROM, HSELINE, ClSDOL, MHIDAS, NIOSHTIC, London, Silver Platter (1998). [4] ISTAT, Statistiche meteorologiche anni 1984-1991, Ann. n.25. Roma (1994). [5] Safer System LLC, TRACE 8.Ob User Guide. Westlake Village (1998). [6] ACI, Analisi dell'incidentalith stradale a livello nazionale e regionale, provinciale e nei comuni con oltre 250.000 abitanti, Roma (1997). [7] ACI-ISTAT, Atti 52" Conf. del traffic0 e della circolazione, Stresa (1996). [S] AISCAT, Informazioni, Anno XXXN, n.3-4 (1999). [9] ISTAT, 13" Censimento generale della popolazione e delle abitazioni, Roma (1992).
Topic 7
The prevention, protection and mitigation, and modelling of accidental releases.
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Loss of containment: experimental aerosol rain-out assessment J.-C. Adriana,R. Leribleb,V. Marchand‘, J. Hocquet and J.-P. Bigotd aAtofina,BP 32, F69492 Pierre-BCnite bGaz de France, SEC, BP 12417, F44024 Nantes cedexl “Rhodithec,24 Av. Jean Jaurhs, F69153, Decines-Charpieu cedex dEcole Nationale Supkrieure des Mines, 158 Cours Fauriel, F42023 St-Etienne cedex 1. INTRODUCTION
Aerosol rain-out prediction is now far from accurate despite its importance in the loss of containment event. The liquid mass flow entrained with the gas as an aerosol is often assumed to have the same value as the vapor mass flow obtained from a flash calculation. This can lead to a severe prediction error. Our objective is to establish an experimental data base in order to examine the validity of the assumptions in some existing models [l-51. 2. EXPERIMENTAL
We generated water flashing jets from a pilot scale set-up (.230 m3, .1 to 1.3 Mpa) [6] through 1.8 mm ID orifice (Fig.1.a.). Inlet temperature was varied from 3 13 to 453 K and sub-cooling from 50 to 600 kPa. Twelve capture basins (Fig. 1.b.) allowed to weigh the liquid rained out under the jet as a function of the distance from the source. A thermocouple also measures the final temperature of the jet.
Jet direct@
7 9 11
2 -3- - -4- - - 5- 6 +-I----1.8 mm ID a>
4
8 10 12
01 x2mcapture ..._
0
10 m
b
basin jet axis 1.8 mm ID Orifice
b)
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of: a) the orifice, b) the downstream area.
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Three types of jets (Fig. 2.a.; Fig.3.a. and Fig.4.a.) are easily distinguishable to the naked eye. 2.1. Type a jet
Fig. 2.a. Jet parabolic trajectory. The Fig.2.b. Liquid capture fraction versus distance from the orifice. three first basins can be seen. Initial storage conditions TO= 383.4 K ;PO= 180 kPa
The jet is a superheated liquid cylinder all along its trajectory (Fig.2.a.). There is almost no fragmentation, no dispersion of the jet (Fig. 2.b.; the second peak is due to spattering from one basin to the other), except when a small obstacle is put on the trajectory of the jet which causes violent fragmentation. The distance of impact varies from 4 to 6 m when upstream pressure is increased (Fig. 5.a.). The temperature decrease between reservoir and end of jet is quite low (25 to 50 K) because heat transfer area is low. 2.2. Type b jet The liquid initial core changes progressively to a flow of droplets which "rain" in the basins (not visible on Fig.3.a. because droplets are too small). This fragmentation enhances the heat transfer so that some vapor can be seen along the jet's trajectory. The liquid spreads out on four meters or more. The mass center at impact is farther from the orifice than in type a case (6 to 8 m) because the upstream pressure is higher and so does exit velocity (Fig. 5.a.). The spreading of the jet increases with increasing upstream temperature (Fig. 5.b.), leading to a faster decrease of velocity and a shorter trajectory (Fig. 5.a.). Temperature decrease from the reservoir to the end of the jet is higher (50 to 85 K), because heat transfer to air is more efficient when fragmentation occurs. Experimentally we do not notice any discontinuity in the transition from type a to type b. Type b seems to be typical of a disintegration due to momentum exchange with ambient air.
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.-$ 4
5%
_---
O%l
0
I I---
~~
+ - -I - -~- -_ I
1----1 I
I
2
4
6
8
10
Distance from the orifice [m] Fig. 3.a. Vaporization along an Fig. 3.b. Liquid capture fraction versus essentially liquid jet's trajectory. distance from the orifice. Initial storage conditions To = 383.6 K ;Po = 480 kPa.
2.3. Type c jet No liquid core can be seen anymore, disintegration takes place immediately at the outlet; it results in very fine droplets; the jet looks like a fog with a fine drizzle under it (Fig. 4.a.). The jet spreads out over four meters or more. Jet speed decreases from the orifice, which gives a short trajectory (2 to 3 m) as shown in Fig. 5.a.; the first few basins are the ones that are the most full. Trajectory length increases slightly with upstream pressure. Type c jet behavior seems to be typical of thermal fragmentation. Mechanical fragmentation can probably no longer occur, because droplets resulting from thermal fragmentation at the orifice before air contact are small enough to be mechanically stable. 30%
7
Fig. 4.a. Immediate fragmentation of the Fig. 4.b. Liquid capture fraction versus jet. distance from the orifice Initial storage conditions To = 443.6 K ;Po = 820 kPa
1046 9.0
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Fig. 5.a. Mass center position of water jets
Fig. 5.b. Spreading of water jets (number of basins in which more than 5% of the capture liquid deposited)
A discontinuity seems to appear while passing from type b to type c jet (Fig. 5.a.). At temperatures slightly less to the transition’s lower bound, an essentially liquid jet falls at 6 m from the exit. At temperatures just over the transition’s upper bound, we observe a fog which falls at 1.5 m. Fig. 6. allows comparison of our experimental rain-out data with those obtained at the CCPS [ 11 with different orifices. There is a general agreement which seems to mean that orifice diameter has not a crucial influence on this phenomenon. Every points lie approximately on the same curve, do they come from low or high initially sub-cooled conditions: rain-out fraction is not very sensitive to initial pressure conditions.
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Fig. 6. Rain-out: experimental data and model results.
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3. DISCUSSION As suggested by Brown and York [7], we have plotted our experiments on a graph (Fig.7.a.), using the growth rate constant C [8-91 (or TO- T,b) and the Weber number (or Po - Pa,,,b)as co-ordinates. C characterizes the rate of growth 0,12
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b. Brown and York data [7] (continuous lines); present study transition to rippled surface (dotted lines) Fig. 7. Effect of Weber number and growth rate constant on type ofjet breakup.
1048
of a bubble inside the bulk of the liquid. We measures momentum exchange to surface tension forces ratio. There we can see that there is no flashing at the orifice when C is less than .085 (To- Teb < 38 K), even at Weber number of 25 (Po- Pamb= 500 Wa). Jets are then either stable (We < 7, type a), or disintegrate far from the orifice (We > 9, type b). On the other hand, jets disintegrate just at the orifice (type c) when C is more than .088 (To- Teb> 40 K). When C grows from .085 to .088 (To- Teb from 38 K to 40 K), thermal disintegration seems to occur nearer and nearer to the orifice until reaching it. For Brown and York [7] however, transition to a flash at the orifice can be promoted by increasing We i.e. Po (Fig.7.b. continuous line). Moreover this transition occurs at low Weber number, between 8 and 24: Brown and York’s jets are less stable as ours are. High speed video of the first centimeters of the liquid jet allowed us to detect a transition from a smooth jet to a rippled one there (Fig.7.b. dotted lines), but with no consequence on further disintegration. Notice that this transition does not present any discontinuity, in contrast to Brown and York data. This different behavior could be due to a different geometry of the orifices, even if Brown and York did not observe significant differences between their different orifices, either sharp-edged or hole with a length to diameter ratio of 1 and a roughness of 20mm. It should be noticed that diameters involved in potential industrial accidents are generally 10, 100 or even 1000 times larger than the one we used. We are therefore interested in the higher Weber numbers (up to lo4!). The CCPS model to predict aerosol rain-out RELEASE [l] considers parallel expansion and atomization at the orifice from which a droplet size distribution is derived. Following the approach of Wheatley [2], the model determines a critical drop size d,. Droplets larger than d, are assumed to rain-out without further evaporation. There is no attempt to model droplet trajectories or droplet evaporation rates. It is obvious from Fig. 6 . that this model doesn’t fit adequately the experimental data. The other models that we considered [3-51 assume that the jet is homogeneous (no droplets rain out of the jet). Ambient air is entrained by the jet momentum. Continuous evaporation takes place along the jet trajectory. They differ from one another by considering either equilibrium between liquid and vapor phases [3] or kinetically limited heat and mass transfer rates, with [5] or without [4] simplifying assumptions (dilution in air is infinite, wet bulb temperature in pure air is reached at the end of the jet, etc ...). Results of both models in Fig. 6. clearly indicates that the second kind of models gives better predictions: evaporation due to entrained air after initial flashing is of primary importance compared to the effect of initial size distribution on trajectory. We are now trying to refine the considered models.
1049
Both kinds of models assume that the jet disintegrates as an aerosol. This hypothesis is adequate for type c jets, but not for type a or type b jets. It is not obvious if a slope change can be noticed when To is less than 408 K (Fig. 6.). Then previous models can tentatively be used. We are looking for modeling those kind of jets. 4. CONCLUSION
In the introduction to the RELEASE program Johnson and Woodward [ 11 assert: "the liquid release models available in 1986 could not adequately predict the complicated processes occurring during the release of a superheated liquid". We saw here that the RELEASE model does not lead to a sufficient solution. Our new experimental data demonstrates that different types of jets have to be considered and that some models for rain-out give reasonable predictions. We are now looking for an improvement of these models as well as the extension of their applicability to jets issued from long cylindrical ducts.
ACKNOWLEGMENTS Financial support from "Conseil RCgional RhBne-Alpes" is gratefully acknowledged
REFERENCES [I] D.W.Johnson and J.L. Woodward, RELEASE: A model with data to predict aerosol rainout in accidental releases, CCPS Concept book, AIChE, New York, 1999. [2] C.J. Wheatley, SRD Report R410 (1987). [3] M. Epstein, H.K. Fauske and M. Hauser, J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 3 (1990) 280. [4] A. Papadourakis, H.S. Caram and C.L. Barner, J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 4 (1991) 93. [5] H.K. Fauske, FA1 Process Safety News, winter 1997) 6. [6] P. Alix, K. Koeberl and J.P. Bigot, 9 Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, Barcelona, Vo1.3, (4-8 may 1998) 976. [7] R. Brown and J.L. York, AIChE J., 8 (1962) 149. [8] M.S. Plesset and S.A. Zwick, J. Appl. Phys. 25, (1954) 493 [9] H.K. Forster andN. Zuber, J. Appl. Phys., 25 (1954) 474
il
NOMENCLATURE C
Growth rate constant [8-91 (m s-")
Panib Teb
ambient pressure (Mpa) upstream (reservoir) pressure (kPa or MPa) and temperature (K) boiling point at ambient pressure (K)
We
Weber number (-)
PO,TO
We=-P J J d 2a
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Effective applications of fluid curtains to mitigate incidental gas releases M. Molaga, H. Schotenaand M. Powell-Priceb TNO Environment, Energy and Process Innovation, P.O. Box 342,7300 AH Apeldoorn, The Netherlands
a
bEuropeanProcess Safety Centre, 165-189, Railway Terrace, Rugby, United Kingdom
1. INTRODUCTION Safety is an important issue in the chemical industry. In recent years chemical companies have aimed, where possible to use an “inherently safe” approach to safety. In the inherent safety approach measures are implemented during design, construction and operation of a chemical plant or storage to avoid large inventories of hazardous chemicals and the potential for releases to the atmosphere. Although all kind of measures have been taken to avoid such releases, where practicable post release mitigation measures are applied. This paper concentrates on fluid curtains, one of the post release mitigation techniques. Companies can apply various post release mitigation systems such as physical separation, containment, rapid dump and fluid curtains. Which technique to choose in which situation depends on efficiency, costs, reliability and operability of the post release mitigation system. In 1995 the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) formed a Contact Group on the use of fluid curtains to mitigate gas dispersion. The objectives of the Contact Group’s investigation on the use of fluid sprays for the mitigation of gas dispersion were: To produce a comprehensive overview of the current practices with respect to the use of water and steam curtains in Europe. To give an overview of the design guidelines for water and steam curtains. 0 To give an overview of the available models to assess the efficiency of a specific fluid curtain application. To give an overview of the competent authority requirements on mitigation of gas dispersion To fulfil these objectives the Contact Group formulated and send out a focused questionnaire to all EPSC members seeking their current practice in the use of fluid curtains and commissioned the Department of Industrial Safety of the TNO Institute of Environmental Sciences, Energy Research and Process Innovation to perform an outline su~~lznary of Research & Development work conducted over the past 5-8 years. The results of the investigation are presented in [l] and summarised in this paper. First the basic principles of fluid curtains and the available efficiency estimates will be described, next the application of fluid curtains in the industry and finally conclusions and recommendations with respect to the application of fluid curtains in the process industry will be given.
1052
2. MITIGATING EFFECTS AND EFFICIENCY OF FLUID CURTAINS 2.1. Mitigating effects of fluid curtains Fluid curtains are used in chemical plants and refineries to mitigate the consequences of accidental releases of flammable and toxic materials to the environment. As well as water curtains steam curtains are applied, with and without additive to promote absorption of the gas in the curtain fluid. Different spray nozzles are used in fluid curtains such as flat fan nozzles, hollow cone nozzles, solid (or full) cone spray and fog nozzles. Fluid curtains are used to mitiga