NCRP REPORT No. 161
MANAGEMENT OF PERSONS CONTAMINATED WITH RADIONUCLIDES: HANDBOOK
NCRP REPORT No. 161 I
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NCRP REPORT No. 161
MANAGEMENT OF PERSONS CONTAMINATED WITH RADIONUCLIDES: HANDBOOK
NCRP REPORT No. 161 I
Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides: Handbook
Recommendations of the NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
December 20, 2008
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 400 / Bethesda, MD 20814-3095
LEGAL NOTICE This Report was prepared by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). The Council strives to provide accurate, complete and useful information in its documents. However, neither NCRP, the members of NCRP, other persons contributing to or assisting in the preparation of this Report, nor any person acting on the behalf of any of these parties: (a) makes any warranty or representation, express or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of the information contained in this Report, or that the use of any information, method or process disclosed in this Report may not infringe on privately owned rights; or (b) assumes any liability with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, method or process disclosed in this Report, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 701 et seq. as amended 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. (Title VII) or any other statutory or common law theory governing liability.
Disclaimer Any mention of commercial products within NCRP publications is for information only; it does not imply recommendation or endorsement by NCRP.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Management of persons contaminated with radionuclides : recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, December 20, 2008. p. ; cm. -- (NCRP report ; no. 161) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-929600-99-4 ISBN-10: 0-929600-99-1 1. Radiation injuries. 2. Radioisotopes in the body. 3. Environmental toxicology. 4. First aid in illness and injury. I. Title. II. Series: NCRP report ; no. 161. [DNLM: 1. Radiation Injuries--therapy. 2. Environmental Exposure. 3. First Aid. 4. Radioisotopes--adverse effects. WN 610 M266 2009] RC93.N37 2009 362.196'9897--dc22 2009045936
Copyright © National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 2009 All rights reserved. This publication is protected by copyright. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, including photocopying, or utilized by any information storage and retrieval system without written permission from the copyright owner, except for brief quotation in critical articles or reviews.
Preface The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) published Report No. 65 on Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides in 1980. This Report has served as a major resource for responders to accidents and incidents involving human contamination by radionuclides. During the last three decades a greater understanding has been achieved on the possible health effects in, and strategies for the immediate and late management of, contaminated individuals. In recent years, the range of situations in which contamination can occur has increased with the growing concern worldwide regarding possible incidents of nuclear and radiological terrorism. At the time of publication of NCRP Report No. 65, the main concern was the possible contamination of individuals working at, or living near, a nuclear-reactor facility and those working at, or living near, the government’s nuclear-weapons sites. This concern has now expanded into the broader public domain and involves a greater range of radionuclides than those of greatest concern in an incident involving nuclear-reactor operations, a reactor accident, or an accidental release of radionuclides at a weapons site. This Report therefore has been significantly extended beyond the set of radionuclides that were considered in Report No. 65, and contains recommendations on the management of persons contaminated by many radionuclides of concern in potential acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism. It also provides information based on advances since the 1970s in methods for decontamination and the decorporation of radionuclides in accidentally or deliberately contaminated persons. For example, the Report includes updated data and biokinetic and dosimetric models of organ doses, total-body and organ retention values, and excretion rates of radionuclides. Publications of the International Commission on Radiological Protection over the past three decades have provided valuable information that is utilized in this Report. The Report contains five major sections: 1. Part A is an update of the “yellow” section of NCRP Report No. 65 and contains quick reference information needed by an emergency responder to an act of radionuclide contamination; iii
iv / PREFACE 2. Part B contains a set of recommendations on onsite and prehospital actions that should be taken by responders; 3. Part C contains an extensive discussion of actions that should be taken in the treatment of contaminated patients at a medical facility; 4. Part D contains recommendations on post-treatment followup and guidance on contamination control in handling decedents; and 5. Part E provides an in-depth discussion of the scientific and technical bases for the recommended management procedures for individuals contaminated with radionuclides, including detailed discussions of internal dosimetry models for major radionuclides of 24 elements of particular concern. Parts A, B, C and D are presented separately as a handbook for the convenience of users who might want to have the information readily available at an incident site. Part E is presented in the second volume. Volume 2 (Sections 16 through 22 and Appendices A to J) of Report No. 161 contains extensive information on the Scientific and Technical Bases for the guidance provided in Volume 1. Included are a detailed presentation on the radiobiology of internally-deposited radionuclides, a discussion of sources of potential contamination in both planned (e.g., medical or industrial) and unplanned (e.g., nuclear accidents or acts of terrorism) settings, roles and responsibilities of responders to incidents involving radionuclide contamination, extensive dosimetry and case studies for radionuclides of 24 important chemical elements, and guidance on dose assessment methodologies. Both volumes of Report No. 161 were prepared by Scientific Committee 4-1. Serving on the Committee were: William J Bair, Chairman Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (retired) Richland, Washington Members Wesley E. Bolch University of Florida Gainesville, Florida
William E. Dickerson Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Bethesda, Maryland
PREFACE
Keith F. Eckerman Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Ronald E. Goans MJW Corporation Clinton, Tennessee
P. Andrew Karam New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene New York, New York
Richard W. Leggett Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Joyce L. Lipsztein State University of Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Michael G. Stabin Vanderbilt University Nashville, Tennessee
/ v
Albert L. Wiley, Jr. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site Oak Ridge, Tennessee
Consultants Eugene H. Carbaugh Bryce D. Breitenstein, Jr. Brookhaven National Laboratory Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (retired) Richland, Washington Long Beach, California
NCRP Secretariat Bruce B. Boecker, Staff Consultant Cindy L. O’Brien, Managing Editor David A. Schauer, Executive Director
NCRP acknowledges and thanks the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for providing funds to support the preparation of this Report. The Council also expresses appreciation to the members of Committee 4-1, who invested great effort and personal time in the preparation of the Report and thanks William J Bair, III, National Security Technologies, LLC, Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada, for his contributions to the operational health-physics aspects of the Report. Thomas S. Tenforde President
Contents Volume I Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 1. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2.1 Purpose of this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2.2 Target Audiences of this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2.3 Organization of this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2.3.1 Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides: Handbook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 2.3.2 Part A: Quick Reference Information . . . . . . . . . .19 2.3.3 Part B: Onsite and Prehospital Actions . . . . . . . .19 2.3.4 Part C: Patient Management at Hospital . . . . . . .20 2.3.5 Part D: Patient Management Post-Hospital . . . .20 2.3.6 Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides: Scientific and Technical Bases . . .21 Part A: Quick Reference Information 3. Compendium of Radiation Facts and Guidance . . . . . . . .25 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 3.1.1 Organizations Offering Radiological Incident Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 3.1.2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 3.2 Basic Radiological Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 3.2.1 Radiation Types and Recommended Personnel Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 3.2.2 Identifying Radiation Types Using a Pancake or Other Thin End-Window Geiger-Mueller Probe Survey Meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 3.2.3 Radiation Energy and Radioactive Decay Facts .32 3.3 Incident Response (Section 18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 3.3.1 Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 3.3.1.1 Small Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 3.3.1.2 Large Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 3.3.2 Roles and Responsibilities (Section 18) . . . . . . . .34 3.4 Guidance for Professionals at Incident Site . . . . . . . . . . . .35
vii
viii / CONTENTS 3.4.1
Radiation Readings and Their Significance (dose-rate meters) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.4.2 Surface Radiation Readings and Their Significance (contamination survey meters) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.5 Management of Potentially-Injured and Contaminated Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.5.1 Priorities for Aiding Contaminated Individuals . 38 3.5.2 Stages in Management of Exposed Persons . . . . 38 3.6 Radiation Exposures from External Sources . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.6.1 Health Effects from External Radiation . . . . . . . 42 3.6.2 Neutron-Radiation Dose from Criticality Accident (based on 24Na activation in body) . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.6.3 Exposures from Sealed Radioactive Sources . . . 45 3.7 Air Kerma and Skin Doses for Point Sources . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.7.1 Intervention Levels for Skin Contamination . . . 46 3.7.2 Guidance for Decontaminating Skin . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.8 Radiation Exposures from Internal Depositions of Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.8.1 Health Effects from Internal Radionuclide Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.8.1.1 Deterministic Effects (harmful tissue reactions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.8.1.2 Stochastic Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.8.1.2.1 Cancer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.8.1.2.2 Hereditary effects (Section 16.7.2.2). . . . . . . . . . 52 3.8.1.3 Developmental Effects (Section 16.7.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.8.2 Inhalation Intakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.8.2.1 Air Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.8.2.2 Nasal Swabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.8.2.3 Doses Received from Inhaled Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.8.3 Intakes Through Skin and Ingestion . . . . . . . . . 56 3.9 Medical Management of Internal Radionuclide Depositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.9.1 Clinical Decision Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.9.2 Decorporation Therapy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 3.10 Radiation Dose Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4. Radiation-Safety Guidance for First Responders . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 General Instructions for First Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Guidance for First Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 First on the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72 72 73 74 75
CONTENTS
4.3.2 4.3.3 4.3.4
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Immediate Goals for Protection of Exposed Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Control Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 Protection of First Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
5. Performing Surveys and Controlling Personnel and Area Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 5.1 Contamination Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 5.1.1 How to Perform Surveys of Individuals, Clothing, Samples and Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 5.1.2 How to Perform a Beta/Gamma-Radiation Area Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82 5.1.3 How to Perform an Alpha-Radiation Survey of Contaminated Areas, Individuals and Samples .82 5.2 Personal Protection Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 5.2.1 Examples of Personal Protection Equipment . . . .83 5.2.2 Personal Protection Equipment Inspection . . . . .83 5.2.3 Dressing in Personal Protection Equipment . . . .86 5.2.4 Removing Personal Protection Equipment . . . . .86 5.2.5 Actions to be Taken after Personal Protection Equipment is Removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88 5.3 Contamination Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88 5.3.1 Contamination Control Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . .88 5.3.2 Contamination Control of Exposed People . . . . . .88 5.3.3 Contamination Control Among Medical and Emergency- Response Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 5.3.4 Radiologically-Controlled Areas (further defined in Sections 4.3.3 and 18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 5.3.4.1 General Guidelines for Operation of a Controlled Contamination Area . . . . . .90 5.3.4.2 Leaving a Controlled Area . . . . . . . . . . .91 5.3.4.3 Transportation of Injured and Contaminated Individuals. . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.3.5 Decontamination of Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 Part B: Onsite and Prehospital Actions 6. Stage 1: Medical Assessment (onsite triage area) . . . . . . .93 6.1 Initial Actions of Medical and Radiation Safety Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 6.2 Potential Life-Threatening Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 6.3 Identification of Individuals Exposed to Radiation and/or Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96 6.4 Assessment of External Irradiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96 6.5 Contamination Screening of Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 6.5.1 External Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
x / CONTENTS 6.5.2
Internal Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.2.1 Inhalation Intakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.2.2 Intakes Through Skin and Ingestion . 6.5.2.3 Collection of Excreta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Onsite Treatment for Internal Contamination . . . . . . . Priorities in Processing Exposed Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . Documenting a Radionuclide Contamination Incident .
101 102 103 103 104 104 104
7. Stage 2: External Contamination Assessment (onsite triage area) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 External Contamination Assessment Procedures . . . . . 7.2 Dose Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Screening Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Treatment Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
107 107 109 111 111
6.6 6.7 6.8
8. Stage 3: External Decontamination (onsite decontamination area) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Decontamination of Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.1 Decontamination Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.2 Decontamination Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Guidance for Those Performing Decontamination Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Decontamination Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Saving Contaminated Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Management of Individuals After Contamination Assessment and Decontamination of Skin and Wounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part C: Patient Management at Hospital 9. Stage 4: Patient Evaluation and Emergency Care (hospital) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 General Issues in Initial Patient Evaluation . . . . . . . . . 9.1.1 Medical Evaluation of Persons with Internal Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1.2 Psychological and Behavioral Consequence Management After Radiation Incidents . . . . . . 9.2 General Instructions for Emergency Department Medical Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 Emergency Medical Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1 Caring for Contaminated Individuals with Life-Threatening Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2 Caring for Lightly Injured and Uninjured Contaminated Exposed Persons . . . . . . . . . . . .
113 113 114 115 117 118 120
120 121
123 124 124 125 127 128 128 128
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9.3.3
9.4
9.5
Caring for Persons Suffering from Radiation Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129 9.3.4 Caring for Persons Suffering from Radiation Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131 Initial Treatment Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 9.4.1 Radionuclides in a Wound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 9.4.2 Radionuclide Inhalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133 9.4.3 Radionuclide Ingestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134 9.4.3.1 Gastric Lavage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134 9.4.3.2 Emetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 9.4.3.3 Purgatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 9.4.4 Clinical Decision Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 9.4.5 Specific Drug Decorporation Therapy . . . . . . . .136 9.4.6 Algorithm for Medical Management of Internal Depositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 Medical Information Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136
10. Stage 5: Internal Contamination Assessment (hospital) 138 10.1 Preliminary Assessment Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138 10.2 Information About the Contaminating Incident . . . . . . .140 10.2.1 Location of the Individual and Time of Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140 10.2.2 Establishing the Route of Exposure . . . . . . . . . .141 10.2.3 Radionuclide Identification and Physical and Chemical Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142 10.3 Bioassay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 10.3.1 Indirect (in vitro) Bioassay Monitoring . . . . . . .144 10.3.1.1 Nasal Swabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144 10.3.1.2 Urine Bioassay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 10.3.1.3 Fecal Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 10.3.1.4 Blood Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 10.3.1.5 Tissue Specimens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151 10.3.2 Direct (in vivo) Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151 10.3.2.1 Whole-Body Counting . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 10.3.2.2 Chest (lung) Counting . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 10.3.2.3 Counting of Particular Organs or Tissues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 10.4 Intake and Dose Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 11. Stage 6: Clinical Decision Guidance (hospital) . . . . . . . .158 11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 11.2 Clinical Decision Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 11.3 Clinical Decision Guide Instrument Considerations . . . .169 11.4 Extrapolation of Data for Spot Urine Sample to 24 h Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169 11.5 Worked Examples with Bioassay Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171
xii / CONTENTS 12. Stage 7: Medical Management (hospital) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Decorporation Therapy for Internally-Deposited Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 Decorporation Therapy by Drug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.1 Deferoxamine Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.2 Dimercaprol Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.3 DTPA Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.4 Ethylenediaminetetraacetic Acid Treatment . . 12.3.5 Penicillamine Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.6 Prussian Blue Insoluble Treatment . . . . . . . . . 12.3.7 Succimer Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 Medical Treatments Arranged by Radionuclide . . . . . . . 12.4.1 Medical Treatment for Barium and Calcium Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.2 Medical Treatment for Cobalt Radionuclides . . 12.4.3 Medical Treatment for Iodine Radionuclides . . 12.4.4 Medical Treatment for Radioactive Phosphorus 12.4.5 Medical Treatment for Radium and Strontium Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.6 Medical Treatment for Tritium (radioactive hydrogen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.7 Medical Treatment for Uranium Isotopes . . . . . 12.4.8 Medical Treatment for the Actinide Nuclides (Section 12.3.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 Lung Lavage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
176 177 179 187 187 189 191 198 199 201 209 210 210 212 212 221 221 228 228 233 233
Part D: Patient Management Post-Hospital 13. Stage 8: Follow-Up Medical Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 Late-Occurring Health Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 Preventive Medicine Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4 Psychosocial Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
237 237 238 239 240
14. Stage 9: Contaminated Decedents (hospital and mortuary) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2 Guidelines for the Medical Examiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2.1 Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2.2 Autopsy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3 Guidelines for Mortuary Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4 Final Disposition of the Decedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 Religious and Cultural Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
244 244 245 245 247 251 252 253
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15. Contamination Control in Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . .255 15.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255 15.2 Standard Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255 15.3 Contamination Control Actions in the Emergency Department for Highly-Contaminated Patients . . . . . . .256 15.4 Working with Contaminated Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257 15.5 Hospital Emergency Department Contamination Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257 15.6 Contaminated Patients’ Rooms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .259 15.7 Patient Decontamination (Section 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .259 15.8 Responsibilities of Radiation-Safety Personnel . . . . . . . .260 15.9 Hospital Decontamination Procedures for Protection of Personnel and Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .260 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277
Volume II Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 16. Overview of Radiobiology Concepts Pertinent to Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287 16.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287 16.2 Radionuclides and Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288 16.3 General Characteristics of Radionuclide and Radiation Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293 16.4 Radionuclides as Internal Health Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . .296 16.5 Routes of Entry into the Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .297 16.5.1 Skin and Wound Contamination. . . . . . . . . . . .298 16.5.2 Inhalation of Radionuclides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .300 16.5.3 Ingestion of Radionuclides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .308 16.6 Internal Dosimetry Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .310 16.7 Quantities Used in Radiation Protection . . . . . . . . . . . .312 16.7.1 Units of Activity in Current Use . . . . . . . . . . .312 16.7.2 Dosimetric Quantities and Units in Current Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313 16.8 Health Effects from Radiation Exposures . . . . . . . . . . .315 16.8.1 Deterministic Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319 16.8.1.1 Thresholds and Unrecoverable Levels for Deterministic Effects. . .319 16.8.1.2 Dependence of Threshold and D50 Values on Dose Rate . . . . . . . . . . . 324
16.8.1.3 16.8.1.4 16.8.1.5
16.9
Acute Radiation Syndrome . . . . . . Relative Biological Effectiveness . Deterministic Effects of Concern Following Intakes of Radionuclides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.1.6 Beta Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.1.7 Hematopoietic (bone-marrow) Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.1.8 Impaired Pulmonary Function . . . 16.8.1.9 Gastrointestinal System Failure. . 16.8.1.10 Thyroid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.1.11 Summary of Deterministic Health Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.2 Stochastic Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.2.1 Cancer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.2.2 Hereditary Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.3 Developmental Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.8.4 Hot Particles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.9.1 Use of Dose Quantities and Units . . . . . . . . . . 16.9.2 Deterministic and Stochastic Health Effects .
17. Settings in Which Individuals May be Contaminated with Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2 Types of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2.1 Small Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2.2 Large Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2.3 Accidental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2.4 Deliberate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3 Settings in Which Contamination Incidents May Occur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3.1 Malicious Use: Stolen or Improvised Nuclear Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3.1.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3.1.2 Likely Radionuclides Involved . . . 17.3.1.3 Radiological Considerations . . . . . 17.3.1.4 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3.1.5 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 17.3.2 Malicious Use: Radiological Dispersal Device 17.3.2.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
324 325
326 327 329 330 338 339 339 341 343 356 358 359 360 360 361
363 363 363 363 364 365 366 367 391 392 392 392 392 393 393 394
CONTENTS
17.3.2.2 17.3.2.3
17.3.3
17.3.4
17.3.5
17.3.6
17.3.7
/ xv
Radiological Considerations . . . . . .394 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .396 17.3.2.4 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . .396 Malicious Use: Contamination of Food or Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .396 17.3.3.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .397 17.3.3.2 Likely Radionuclides Involved . . . .397 17.3.3.3 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .397 17.3.3.4 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .398 17.3.3.5 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . .398 Malicious Use: Deliberate Contamination of Another Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .398 17.3.4.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .399 17.3.4.2 Likely Radionuclides Involved . . . .399 17.3.4.3 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .399 17.3.4.4 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .400 17.3.4.5 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . .400 Nuclear Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .400 17.3.5.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401 17.3.5.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .401 17.3.5.3 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .404 17.3.5.4 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . .405 Industrial: Source Manufacture . . . . . . . . . . . .405 17.3.6.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406 17.3.6.2 Likely Radionuclides Involved . . . .406 17.3.6.3 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .406 17.3.6.4 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .407 Industrial: Source Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .407 17.3.7.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .408 17.3.7.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .408
xvi / CONTENTS 17.3.7.3
Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 17.3.7.4 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 410 17.3.8 Radioactive-Material Transportation . . . . . . . 410 17.3.8.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 17.3.8.2 Likely Radionuclides Involved . . . 411 17.3.8.3 Radiological Considerations . . . . . 411 17.3.8.4 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 17.3.8.5 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 412 17.3.9 Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412 17.3.9.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412 17.3.9.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . 415 17.3.9.3 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415 17.3.9.4 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415 17.3.10 Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 17.3.10.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 17.3.10.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . 417 17.3.10.3 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 17.3.10.4 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 419 17.3.11 Decontamination and Decommissioning . . . . 419 17.3.11.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421 17.3.11.2 Likely Radionuclides Involved . . . 421 17.3.11.3 Radiological Considerations . . . . . 421 17.3.11.4 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 17.3.11.5 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 423 17.3.12 Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 17.3.12.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 17.3.12.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . 424 17.3.12.3 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
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17.3.12.4
17.4
Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . .426 17.3.13 Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .426 17.3.13.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .427 17.3.13.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .428 17.3.13.3 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .428 17.3.13.4 Examples and Descriptions of Sources and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . .430 17.3.14 Spacecraft and Space-Based Applications . . . .430 17.3.14.1 Examples of Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .431 17.3.14.2 Radiological Considerations . . . . . .431 17.3.14.3 Important Nonradiological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .435 Conclusions and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .435
18. Roles and Responsibilities of Responders to Radionuclide Contamination Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .437 18.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .437 18.2 Small-Scale versus Large-Scale Incidents . . . . . . . . . . .438 18.2.1 Small-Scale Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .438 18.2.2 Large-Scale Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .438 18.3 Radionuclide Control Areas: Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .439 18.3.1 Inner Contaminated Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .442 18.3.1.1 Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .443 18.3.1.2 Emergency Medical Responders . .443 18.3.1.3 Radiation Safety/Health Physics . .443 18.3.1.4 Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .444 18.3.1.5 Other Emergency Responders . . . .444 18.3.2 Outer Contaminated Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .444 18.3.2.1 Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .445 18.3.2.2 Emergency Medical Responders . .445 18.3.2.3 Radiation Safety/Health Physics . .446 18.3.2.4 Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .447 18.3.2.5 Other Emergency Responders . . . .448 18.3.3 Secured Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .448 18.3.3.1 Triage Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .448 18.3.3.2 Medical-Response Base . . . . . . . . .449 18.3.3.3 Decontamination Area . . . . . . . . . .449 18.3.4 Secured Area Perimeter and Control Point . . .450 18.3.4.1 Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .450 18.3.4.2 Emergency Medical Responders . .450
CONTENTS
20.5 20.6 20.7 20.8 20.9 20.10 20.11 20.12 20.13 20.14 20.15 20.16 20.17 20.18 20.19 20.20 20.21 20.22 20.23 20.24 20.25
/ xix
Cerium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .522 Cesium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .536 Cobalt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .552 Curium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .565 Europium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .575 Hydrogen (Tritium) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .585 Iodine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .594 Iridium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .605 Palladium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .617 Phosphorus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .623 Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .632 Polonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .657 Radium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .673 Rhenium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .686 Ruthenium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .692 Samarium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .707 Strontium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .715 Technetium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .733 Thorium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .739 Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .754 Yttrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .772
21. Dose-Assessment Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .782 21.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .782 21.2 Collection of Data from the Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . .783 21.3 Interpretation of External Contamination Monitoring Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .785 21.4 Interpretation of Monitoring Data in Cases of Internal Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .786 21.4.1 Methods for Making Rapid Decisions Based on Monitoring Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .786 21.4.2 Use of Reference Values for Radionuclide Retention and Excretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .787 21.4.3 Considerations Regarding the Time of Intake 792 21.4.4 Intake Estimates from Multiple Bioassay Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .792 21.4.5 Particle Size/Chemical Composition . . . . . . . .794 21.4.6 Intake Pathways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .794 21.4.7 Model and Data Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . .795 21.4.8 Modifications to the Reference Biokinetic Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .797 21.4.9 Direct Methods of Tritium Calculation . . . . . .799 21.4.10 Interpretation of Air Monitoring Data . . . . . . .800 21.5 Initial Assessment of External Dose and Internal Radionuclide Deposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .801
xx / CONTENTS 22. Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 22.1 Decontamination Facilities for Removal of External Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 22.2 Instrumentation and Modeling for Assessment of Internal Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 22.3 Bioassay Facilities and Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 22.4 Biomarkers and Devices for Biodosimetry . . . . . . . . . . 805 22.5 Software for Rapid Estimates of Organ Equivalent Dose and Effective Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 22.6 Decorporation Agents for Use Postexposure . . . . . . . . . 806 22.7 Medical Follow-Up of Exposed Populations . . . . . . . . . 808 22.8 Educational Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Appendix A. Radiological Recordkeeping Following an Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1 Records for Exposed Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.2 Worker Records (Medical and Emergency Responders) A.3 Example Record Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix B. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1 Training Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.1 Law-Enforcement and Emergency-Response Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.2 Emergency Medical Professionals . . . . . . . . . B.1.3 Radiation Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.4 Radiation-Safety Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.5 Public-Health Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.2 Drills and “Hands-On” Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.3 Crisis and Risk Communications Training . . . . . . . . . .
810 810 811 812 819 820 820 821 822 822 823 824 824
Appendix C. Emergency-Responders’ Guidance on Radiation Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 C.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 C.2 Routes of Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 C.2.1 Skin Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 C.2.2 Inhalation and Ingestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 C.3 Exposure to High Levels of Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 C.3.1 Early Health Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 C.3.2 Late Health Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 C.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Appendix D. Communications with the Media and the Public via the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 D.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 D.2 Audiences to Consider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 D.2.1 The Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
CONTENTS
D.3 D.4 D.5 D.6
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D.2.2 Medical Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .832 D.2.3 Off-Duty Emergency Responders . . . . . . . . . . .834 D.2.4 Those Outside the Affected Area . . . . . . . . . . .835 Spokesperson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .835 Timeliness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .837 Correcting Information Already Provided . . . . . . . . . . .838 Prescripted Statements to the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .839 D.6.1 Brief Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .839 D.6.2 Other Information to Convey . . . . . . . . . . . . . .840
Appendix E. Communicating with Patients and the Families of Patients Contaminated with Radionuclides . . . . . . . .842 Appendix F. Tables of Reference Values for Bioassay . . . . . .845 F.1 Actinium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .846 F.2 Americium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .847 F.3 Californium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .849 F.4 Cerium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .851 F.5 Cesium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .853 F.6 Cobalt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .856 F.7 Curium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .859 F.8 Europium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .860 F.9 Hydrogen (Tritium) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .862 F.10 Iodine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .863 F.11 Iridium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .865 F.12 Palladium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .868 F.13 Phosphorus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .869 F.14 Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .871 F.15 Polonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .876 F.16 Radium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .878 F.17 Rhenium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .879 F.18 Ruthenium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .880 F.19 Samarium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .884 F. 20 Strontium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .886 F.21 Thorium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .889 F.22 Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .891 F.23 Yttrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .893 Appendix G. Information Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .894 Appendix H. Additional Radionuclide Exposure Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .896 H.1 Hanford Americium Accident (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .896 H.2 Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Accident (1986) . . . . . . . . .902 H.2.1 Initial Response to the Accident . . . . . . . . . . .902 H.2.2 Classification of Acute Radiation Sickness . . .903
xviii / CONTENTS 18.3.4.3 18.3.4.4 18.3.4.5
Radiation Safety/Health Physics . 450 Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 Other Emergency Responders . . . 451
19. Instrumentation to Measure Radionuclide Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452 19.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452 19.2 Direct (in vivo) Measurements of Body or Organ Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 19.2.1 Fixed-Facility Whole-Body Counters . . . . . . . 454 19.2.2 Fixed-Facility Special Monitoring Systems . . 456 19.2.3 Transportable Whole-Body Counters . . . . . . 458 19.2.4 Survey Meters for Large-Population Screening Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 19.2.5 Special Considerations for Children and Pregnant Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 19.2.6 Skin-Contamination Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . 459 19.2.7 Wound Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 19.2.7.1 Wound Monitors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 19.2.7.2 Survey Meters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464 19.2.7.3 Sequential Measurements. . . . . . . 464 19.3 Indirect (in vitro) Measurements of Body or Organ Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 19.3.1 Urine Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 19.3.2 Fecal Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 19.3.3 Breath Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 19.3.4 Blood Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 19.3.5 Nose Blows and Nasal Swabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 19.3.6 Other Biological Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 19.3.7 Analytical Methods and Techniques . . . . . . . . 468 19.4 Contamination Survey Instrumentation and Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 19.4.1 Surface-Contamination Measurements . . . . . 473 19.4.1.1 Alpha-Emitter Monitoring . . . . . . 476 19.4.1.2 Beta- and Gamma-Emitter Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476 19.4.1.3 Surface Monitoring with Swipes. . 477 19.4.2 Air Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 20. Dosimetry and Case Studies for Selected Radionuclides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.2 Actinium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.3 Americium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.4 Californium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
482 482 485 493 509
xxii / CONTENTS
H.3 H.4
H.2.3 Early Clinical Response and Treatment . . . . H.2.4 Bone-Marrow Transplantation . . . . . . . . . . . . H.2.5 Evacuated Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H.2.6 Late Effects of Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Goiânia Incident (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Institutes of Health and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 32P Incidents (1995) . . . . . . . . . H.4.1 NIH 32P Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H.4.2 MIT 32P Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905 907 907 908 908 915 916 916
Appendix I. Validation and Verification of Calculational Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Appendix J. Pregnancy Categories for Drug Use . . . . . . . . . 920 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 The NCRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 NCRP Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
1. Executive Summary The purpose of this Report is to provide guidance to those who may be called to respond to radionuclide contamination incidents. Such incidents may range from situations in which one or a few persons have received minor contamination while working in research, medical facilities, or industry to those in which large numbers of people are contaminated as a result of accidental or deliberate releases of large quantities of radionuclides. The focus of this Report is on the medical management of individuals exposed to and potentially contaminated with radionuclides in such incidents. Thus, it is directed to persons who would provide medical care and those who would perform radiation-safety functions. This Report is intended as an update and expansion of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Report No. 65, Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides (NCRP, 1980). The primary objective in the management of persons contaminated with radionuclides is to reduce the risk of health effects occurring either early after the contamination incident or later in life. Two types of effects are of concern. One type of effect is harmful tissue reactions, termed deterministic effects. Doses large enough (threshold doses) to damage a critical population of cells can result in serious tissue or organ malfunction and possibly death. These effects can occur early after the contamination incident or later in life. A second type is termed stochastic effects. Radiation damage to cellular deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) can lead to the expression of cancer later in life and to heritable effects in offspring. Radiationinduced cancer has been observed to occur in humans as well as in experimental animals. Although they have not been observed in humans, the potential for radiation-induced heritable effects is a concern because they have occurred in experimental animals. Heritable effects and cancer are not unique to radiation. According to the American Cancer Society (ACS, 2008), about one in three persons will be diagnosed with cancer in their lifetimes and one in four persons will die of cancer. The risk of radiation-induced lethal cancer is relatively low, ~5.5 % Sv–1 (100 rem) (ICRP, 2007). The total effective dose for persons in the United States in 2006 was estimated to be 6.2 mSv (620 mrem) (NCRP, 2009). In a population of >105,000 survivors of the atomic bombs in Japan, after 50 y, only 1
2 / 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 853 of nearly 17,000 cancers were attributable to radiation exposures which ranged from 0.005 to 4 Gy (0.5 to 400 rad) (Preston et al., 2007). This Report is intended to provide guidance and recommendations to medical and radiation-safety personnel for reducing external and internal radionuclide contamination levels and thus the risks of radiation-induced health effects. The risk of deterministic effects can be reduced by controlling radiation doses to below their threshold doses. The risk of radiation-induced stochastic effects can be reduced, but not necessarily eliminated, by minimizing the dose. Radiation doses can be controlled or minimized by removing external radionuclide contamination and treating with blocking agents to decrease internal depositions and decorporation agents to increase the rate of elimination of radionuclides from the body. This Report comprises two volumes, a Handbook and the Scientific and Technical Bases. The Handbook contains information for immediate “in-the-field” application to radiation contamination incidents. It is organized into four parts. Three sections in Part A provide Quick Reference Information for incident responders based on supporting information given elsewhere in the Report. Three sections in Part B contain essential information on medical and radiation-safety activities to be conducted at the site of a radionuclide contamination incident and prior to arrival at a hospital. This is followed by four sections in Part C that describe medical and radiation safety activities at the hospital. Part D comprises two sections providing guidance on medical follow-up of exposed persons and on handling contaminated decedents. Parts A, B, C and D are color coded for easy access by users. Concluding the Handbook is guidance on contamination control in medical facilities. Part E, the Scientific and Technical Bases volume is organized into seven sections and several appendices. It provides detailed scientific and technical information in support of the guidance in the Handbook. While much of the information in the Scientific and Technical Bases can be found through diligent examinations of other publications, few organizations involved in responding to radionuclide contamination incidents will have access to all these publications or the staff to research them. Therefore, the Scientific and Technical Bases are presented as a resource, supporting and supplementing the material in the Handbook and for possible use in training emergency-response personnel. Experience has shown that it would be extremely rare for trained radiation-safety and medical personnel to be first on the scene of any radionuclide contamination incident, whether it is an accidental spill in a laboratory or the deliberate release of a large
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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quantity of activity in a public place. It is more likely that the first on the scene will be a colleague in a work place and fire-protection and law-enforcement personnel in a public place. Also, contamination incidents can occur in locations where radiation-safety and medical personnel are not readily available. Therefore, this Report is intended for the broad spectrum of persons who may respond to radionuclide contamination incidents, those with limited knowledge of radiation-safety and medical response as well as the professionals with extensive knowledge. Handbook, Part A, is intended to provide quick reference information that may be useful to anyone responding to a radionuclide contamination incident regardless of their radiation knowledge and experience. It begins with Section 3, a Compendium of Radiation Facts and Guidance. To help ensure that all responders are communicating with clarity and understanding, a number of terms are defined as they apply to this Report. Also, relevant properties of radiations emitted by radionuclides are reviewed. Since medical and radiation-safety personnel should be working as a team in all radiation incidents, their individual responsibilities are briefly summarized as well as guidance on working onsite and making preliminary health and radiation assessments. Section 3 also summarizes guidance on the management of injured and contaminated persons, identifying priorities and the actions to be taken in assessing exposure situations, and providing appropriate medical responses. A decision tree (Figure 3.1) for managing persons contaminated with radionuclides is included to guide radiation safety and medical personnel. Section 4, Radiation-Safety Guidance for First Responders, is a quick review of the objectives for the first medical and radiationsafety personnel on the scene of a radionuclide contamination incident. These include providing medical aid to injured individuals, identifying irradiated and contaminated persons, detecting and identifying radioactive material, identifying sources of external radiation, controlling the contamination, and initiating decontamination of individuals and the site. All of this is to be achieved with attention to protection of exposed persons and the responders. If the incident is accompanied by serious hazardous situations like fire or explosive destruction of buildings and vehicles, evacuation of people may be the first priority. Guidance is provided in establishing radiation contamination control areas (e.g., an inner area containing the radionuclide contamination incident site; an outer contaminated area; and outside of these, an uncontaminated secured area where onsite medical and radiation assessments and decontamination of people should be performed). Guidance is also
4 / 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY provided to ensure protection of responding personnel. This is further discussed in Appendix C, Emergency-Responders’ Guidance on Radiation Risks. Section 5, Performing Surveys and Controlling Personnel and Area Contamination, provides a review of how to survey individuals, equipment and other surfaces. This section is supported by Section 19, Instrumentation to Measure Radioactive Contamination, in the Scientific and Technical Bases, which provides more detailed information on radiation detecting instruments. Section 5 provides a quick review of the instrumentation to be used for a particular survey and how it is to be used (e.g., the distance to hold the detector from the object or person being surveyed, calibrating the instrument, and correcting for background). Also important to first responders is guidance on personal protection and the equipment that should be used and how to use it (e.g., inspection of equipment for damage such as tears in gloves, taping at the wrists and ankles, where to wear dosimeters, when respiratory protection is advised, and also how to remove the equipment to maintain control of the contamination). The medical management activities described in Parts B, C and D are organized into nine stages as shown in Figure 3.1. The applicability of one or up to all nine stages depends upon the nature and consequences of the contamination incident. For example, a minor incident in a laboratory may be quickly assessed in Stage 1 as having no health consequences and the exposed individuals can be released to their home or workplace. On the other hand, a major incident involving a large release and intake of radionuclides, whether exposing one individual or many, could result in severe health consequences and even death. In such cases, all nine stages might be applicable. A description of the objectives and the recommended actions to be taken in each stage is the major focus of this two-volume Report. Handbook, Part B, Onsite and Prehospital Actions, addresses actions to be taken onsite to assess and control both radiation and medical aspects of a radionuclide contamination incident, Stages 1 through 3 in Figure 3.1. Stage 1, Medical Assessment (Section 6) describes the initial assessment of a contamination incident and of the persons exposed to radiation and/or radioactive materials. This normally occurs onsite in a triage area within a secured area as shown in Figure 4.1. Ideally this will be conducted by both medical and radiation-safety personnel (Section 18.3.3). The highest priority is to provide immediate emergency care to individuals who have been seriously injured. The next priority is to identify those who have been exposed
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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and contaminated and those showing psychological distress. If there is evidence of radioiodine intakes, consideration should be given to administer potassium iodide (KI) and if intakes of transuranics such as plutonium are suspected, treatment with diethylenetriaminepentaacidic acid (DTPA) should be considered, since in both cases, prompt treatment can be most effective. Stage 2, External Contamination Assessment (Section 7) provides a description of the steps to be performed onsite in the secured uncontaminated area by radiation-safety personnel, assisted by medical personnel as needed (Section 18.3.3). The objectives are to assess the contamination, examine for burns, wounds, shrapnel, and hot particles and make treatment and decontamination recommendations. Stage 3, External Decontamination (Section 8) by radiationsafety and medical personnel should take place onsite in a location specifically identified for that purpose (Section 18.3.3). It could be a shower room if the incident occurred in a work location. If the incident occurred in a public area, it could be in a nearby gym, temporary tented facility, or hospital. The objective is to control external contamination to avoid inadvertent intakes through skin or by inhalation or ingestion. A second objective of removing contamination is to reduce radiation doses to skin and the risk of dermal injuries and to decrease amounts of radionuclides in wounds and their possible absorption into blood. Handbook, Part C addresses activities that would normally occur away from the site of the contamination incident, in a clinic or hospital emergency department. Stage 4, Patient Evaluation and Emergency Care (Section 9). In most cases, the patients will have been assessed for external contamination and decontaminated, but some of those severely injured may have arrived without having been decontaminated. Thus, proper radiation protection practices should be enforced to prevent contamination of the hospital. The emergency department physicians should have in hand all of the available documentation about the incident and any preliminary dose-assessment information for the patient, including the potential for whole-body external exposures. The objective is to evaluate and provide emergency treatment for injuries and examine for possible whole-body radiation exposures. Unless administered onsite, consideration should be given to administering KI if there is evidence of radioiodine intakes and DTPA if intakes of transuranics such as plutonium are suspected since in both cases, prompt treatment can be most effective. Stage 5, Internal Contamination Assessment (Section 10) also occurs at an emergency facility or hospital. The objectives are to
6 / 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY verify the contamination and to evaluate the intake and radiation dose by determining the routes of intake, identifying the radionuclides and assessing their quantities with appropriate bioassay procedures. Information obtained during the previous stages will help ascertain how this is to be done. Specific information about the incident, air samples taken, location of the individual relative to a release of activity, and the length of time in a contaminated area can be very useful in establishing the routes of intake. Stage 6, Clinical Decision Guidance (Section 11), would usually take place at hospitals and involves analysis of the internal dose assessments to determine whether consideration should be given to decorporation therapy. Information on radiation dose, excretion, and nasal swabs are compared to model predictions to assess whether intakes of radionuclides exceed the Clinical Decision Guide (CDG) for the particular radionuclide. The objective is to reduce the risk of stochastic effects, cancer, to a level consistent with current regulatory guidance for responding to emergency situations and to prevent the risks of deterministic effects. To guide physicians in considering the need for medical treatment to achieve this objective, a new operational quantity, CDG is introduced. The numerical values of dose used as a basis for computing the CDG intake values for different radionuclides, excluding isotopes of iodine, in adults are: • 0.25 Sv (25 rem) (50 y effective dose) for consideration of stochastic effects [this represents about a 1.3 % lifetime risk of fatal cancer attributable to the radiation dose (ICRP, 2007)]; • 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed-dose value of 0.25 Gy-Eq (25 rad-Eq) for consideration of deterministic effects to bone marrow; and • 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed-dose value of 1 Gy-Eq (100 rad-Eq) for consideration of deterministic effects to the lungs. For radionuclides other than isotopes of iodine, the CDGs for children (0 to 18 y of age) and pregnant women are defined as one-fifth the adult value. CDG values for 131I are based on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommendations (FDA, 2001) that KI be administered to adults >40 y of age if the projected dose to thyroid is ≥5 Gy (500 rad), to adults 18 to 40 y of age if the projected dose is ≥0.1 Gy (10 rad), and to pregnant or lactating women or persons <18 y of age if the projected dose is ≥0.05 Gy (5 rad). CDGs are tabulated for 25 radionuclides. Stage 7, Medical Management (Section 12), provides guidance on treatment that will most often occur in hospitals, at least initially.
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The goal is to select a treatment modality that will enhance the excretion of the particular radionuclide from the body with minimal impact upon the health of the patient and thus reduce the lifetime risk of cancer and reduce the potential for both deterministic and stochastic effects. Treatment would include appropriate clinical follow-up. Handbook Part D addresses actions that would occur after contaminated persons are discharged from hospital or in the event of death of contaminated persons. Stage 8, Follow-Up Medical Care (Section 13), should involve a long-term plan for patients who experience radionuclide contamination sufficient to be considered for treatment as well as those who received treatment. They should be admitted to a registry for maintaining records of radiation dose, treatment, surveillance for subsequent malignancy, and other effects, including psychosocial. Stage 9, Contaminated Decedents (Section 14) provides guidance to protect medical examiners and mortuary personnel from excessive radiation exposure and to ensure that burial or cremation of the body is conducted with care to control radionuclide contamination. The Handbook concludes with Section 15, Contamination Control in Medical Facilities. Few emergency departments are staffed and equipped to handle radionuclide contaminated patients. Even in hospitals with radiation medicine departments there may not be sufficient expertise to assist emergency department personnel in controlling the spread of radionuclide contamination. While normal hospital sterility practices will in most cases be adequate, radionuclides do present special control problems with respect to the patients, the staff, and the facilities. However, treatment of contaminated patients is first priority. Guidance in this section is directed to those control issues. The Scientific and Technical Bases volume, Part E, comprises seven sections and 10 appendices. Although much, but not all, of the information can be found in other publications, it is compiled here to help explain some of the recommendations in the Handbook and offer supplemental information. Section 16, Overview of Radiobiology Concepts Pertinent to Radionuclides, is included in recognition of the fact that irradiation by radionuclides released in a contamination incident differs in major ways from irradiation by external sources. For example, radionuclides deposited upon the skin or in the body usually irradiate only part of the body, compared with external radiation that can irradiate the whole body (exceptions are when external beams are partially shielded or when radiation for therapeutic purposes is directed to specific tissues and organs). Also, except for
8 / 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY radionuclides with very short half-lives, radiation from radionuclides is delivered over a period of time that can range up to years. Radiation from external sources is delivered over a relatively short period of time, depending upon how long the individual is in the beam and how long a radiation generator is operating (exceptions are therapy doses protracted over weeks or months and natural background). These exposure differences can result in significantly different health consequences. When a person is in the vicinity of an uncontrolled radionuclide source, contamination of skin is more likely than an intake by ingestion or inhalation. Ingestion requires the source to be in food or water or moved to the mouth area by physical contact, and inhalation requires the source to be airborne in a person’s breathing space. Section 17, Settings in Which Individuals May be Contaminated with Radionuclides, describes numerous scenarios in which radionuclides can be released, inadvertently or deliberately. The radionuclides of concern are identified for each scenario. Also tabulated are deep-dose-rate and skin-dose-rate values from external sources. Contamination incidents can be small-scale such as an accidental release in a laboratory or large-scale, such as a rupture of a large radioactive source in a public place. Nearly all are accidental, but deliberate releases are becoming of greater concern with the increase of unaccounted-for (orphan) radionuclide sources. Section 18, Roles and Responsibilities of Responders to Contamination Incidents, supplements the information given in Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 for onsite and prehospital actions. It provides additional guidance on designating controlled areas and defining responsibilities for potential responders of various disciplines such as law-enforcement, fire-protection, medical, radiation-safety, and public-health personnel. Specific responsibilities are described for radiation-safety personnel ranging from determining the number of trained radiation-safety personnel required at the scene and conducting the necessary monitoring to documenting the actions for the incident commander. Section 19, Instrumentation to Measure Radioactive Contamination, supports Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 with detailed descriptions of the instrumentation and the analytical procedures required to detect radionuclide contamination and assess external and internal contamination. This includes initial qualitative surveys to identify the presence of radioactive material and relatively precise quantitative measurements for the purpose of estimating radiation doses. Section 20, Dosimetry and Case Studies for Selected Radionuclides, provides biokinetic and dosimetric information for the
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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radionuclides that are identified in Section 17 as being potentially involved in radionuclide-contamination incidents. This section is also the source of the dosimetric data tabulated in the Handbook. The information presented is intended primarily for assessment of radiation dose during the early hours or days after exposure. Forms of radionuclides and modes of intake were selected in an attempt to provide typical estimates of tissue dose from types of exposure that seem most likely based on case studies. Relevant case studies are included with each element covered in Section 20. It is assumed that consistent with past experience, while skin contamination is more likely, nearly all future inadvertent intakes of radionuclides will be by the inhalation route, although intakes by ingestion and through wounds or skin absorption are not excluded. Readers particularly interested in issues related to the behavior of radionuclides in wounds and their treatment should also consult NCRP Report No. 156, Development of a Biokinetic Model for Radionuclide-Contaminated Wounds and Procedures for Their Assessment, Dosimetry and Treatment (NCRP, 2006a). Section 21, Dose-Assessment Methodologies, provides an overview of information and considerations for evaluating intakes and radiation doses needed to make treatment decisions. Although much information can be collected about an incident, the most important is the information collected from the contaminated individual. This section illustrates the use of data obtained using the instrumentation and procedures described in Section 19, to evaluate external and internal doses to exposed individuals. Section 22, Research and Development, describes current and needed research and development to improve the effectiveness of responding to radionuclide contamination incidents. A concern is the paucity of facilities for decontaminating individuals, especially large numbers of people, and assessment of external and internal contamination including in vivo and in vitro bioassay capabilities. Cooperative agreements between local emergency planners and national laboratories and nuclear power plants around the country should be encouraged where they do not already exist. Research needs include improved instrumentation and modeling capabilities for internal dose assessment, development of biomarkers for biodosimetry, improved dosimetry software, and decorporation drugs. Current research on treating for internal contamination, described in this section, shows promise and should be continued. Appendices, glossary, and references complete the Scientific and Technical Bases. Ten appendices provide specific information on several important topics relevant to both the Handbook and the Scientific and Technical Bases and are referenced in the appropriate
10 / 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY sections of both volumes. Topics covered in the appendices include record keeping, training, guidance on radiation risks for emergency responders, and communicating with the media, members of the public, and with patients and their families. Reference bioassay tables are included as an appendix for use in assessment of internal contamination (Sections 10 and 21) and another appendix contains several case studies as examples of radiation-safety and medical responses to major radionuclide exposure incidents. A list of useful resource documents is included as another appendix. This is followed by an appendix that provides details on validation and verification of the models, software, and associated parameters used for the biokinetic and dosimetric calculations in this Report and a final appendix that lists categories for drug use in pregnancy.
2. Introduction In 1980, NCRP issued Report No. 65, Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides (NCRP, 1980). The report was a manual intended primarily for use by physicians in the management of accidental radionuclide contamination incidents. This 1980 report included a quick-reference guide describing steps to be taken in providing medical care and radiation protection to contaminated individuals. This guidance was supported by information on assessing levels of contamination of individuals, the potential health risks to be considered in decisions concerning treatment, and approaches to decorporation and medical intervention. Report No. 65 was mostly directed to accidental contamination incidents that might occur in hospitals, research institutions, nuclear power plants, national laboratories, military installations, and nuclear-weapons facilities. Its value is indicated by the fact it was reprinted several times and over 18,000 copies have been distributed worldwide. While the general guidance provided in Report No. 65 remains valid, the practice of radiation safety and the tools used by radiationsafety practitioners and the medical profession have progressed considerably since the report was published. Further, in addition to occupational contamination accidents, several contamination incidents have exposed members of the public and with the expanding use of radiopharmaceuticals there is an increasing probability of treatment errors resulting in overdoses of radionuclides. Therefore, NCRP chose to update Report No. 65 with the present Report to reflect improved medical and radiation protection technology and the experience gained in responding to incidents involving radionuclide contamination of multiple individuals including members of the public. Furthermore, there is significant concern that the frequency and seriousness of public contamination incidents will increase due to increasing numbers of unaccounted-for (orphan) radionuclide sources throughout the world, as well as the threat of deliberate releases of radionuclides in terrorist activities. This Report addresses radiation exposures that are beyond the regulatory framework and thus are not a matter of regulatory compliance. While the emphasis of this Report is on the medical management of contaminated persons, guidance is also directed to important supporting radiation-safety functions, broadly termed 11
12 / 2. INTRODUCTION “health physics.” A major component of this guidance is the incorporation of the best available data on radionuclide biokinetics and dosimetry. Guidance on medical management, radionuclide contamination levels, use of instrumentation, and radiation-safety procedures is drawn from, and referenced to, appropriate peerreviewed publications and other credible documents including numerous publications from national and international bodies. The threat of deliberate releases of radioactive material is the subject of NCRP Report No. 138, Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material (NCRP, 2001a). That report covers three areas in considerable depth. First, descriptions are given of types of nuclear terrorist incidents and the decision-making processes to be faced by law enforcement, medical staff, and publichealth officials regarding potential human casualties with their early and late health issues and psychological consequences. Second, detailed guidance is provided for management of a nuclear terrorist disaster including command and control responsibilities by local and national government agencies and their officials, communication requirements for emergency-response personnel, and communications to the media and public. Radiation protection considerations are also addressed. Third, recommendations for preparing for possible future nuclear terrorist activities are provided in detail. In another effort related to responses to possible terrorist activities, NCRP published Commentary No. 19, Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism (NCRP, 2005a). This commentary provides a technical basis for the support of preparedness activities such as the development of emergency-responder protocols, equipment procurement recommendations, and the frequency and content of training exercises. Report No. 138 and Commentary No. 19 are highly recommended as companions to this Report as are others listed in Table 2.1. 2.1 Purpose of this Report The primary purpose of this Report is to update the information and guidance originally given in NCRP Report No. 65 (NCRP, 1980) and broaden its scope to address the potential contamination not only of radiation workers, as was the focus of Report No. 65, but also members of the public, including children. Because many changes have occurred since 1980 in radiation protection concepts, philosophy and practice, much of the text in Report No. 65 required rewriting even though much is still valid technically. Information regarding specific radionuclides has been enhanced in this Report by updated data and summaries of biokinetic and dosimetric models
2.1 PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT
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TABLE 2.1—Examples of publications recommended for further information.a Development of an Extended Framework for Emergency Response Criteria
IAEA (2005a)
Disaster Preparedness for Radiology Professionals Response to Radiological Terrorism: A Primer for Radiologists, Radiation Oncologists and Medical Physicists
ACR (2006)
Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency
IAEA (2005b)
Guidebook for the Treatment of Accidental Internal Radionuclide Contamination of Workers
Bhattacharyya et al. (1992)
Handbook for Responding to a Radiological Dispersal Device, First Responder’s Guide–The First 12 Hours
CRCPD (2006)
Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
NCRP (2005a)
Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material
NCRP (2001a)
Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency
IAEA (2006)
Medical Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook
AFRRI (2003)
Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents
FEMA (2008)
Population Monitoring in Radiation Emergencies: A Guide for State and Local Public Health Planners
CDC (2007)
Procedures for Medical Emergencies Involving Radiation
HPS (2006)
Protecting People Against Radiation Exposure in the Event of a Radiological Attack
ICRP (2005a)
Radioactivity and Health: A History
Stannard (1988)
REMM: Radiation Event Medical Management
DHHS (2009)
aMore information on how to contact these organizations and obtain these reports and other related information is provided in Appendix G and in the reference list.
14 / 2. INTRODUCTION of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). These models were used to calculate organ absorbed-doses, wholebody and organ retention values, and excretion rates of radionuclides. These recently developed models and improved knowledge of health risks as a consequence of the intake of radionuclides provide increased confidence in decisions concerning vital treatment. While still focused on the management of persons contaminated in occupational settings, this Report also addresses the potential for exposure of members of the public through accidents involving radionuclides released from laboratories, medical facilities, power plants, industries, and material transport. This Report can also provide guidance in cases of a medical incident involving the administration of a radiopharmaceutical to the wrong patient, the wrong radiopharmaceutical to a patient, an excessive activity of a radiopharmaceutical to a patient, or the leakage of a sealed source implanted in a patient for brachytherapy. Special emphasis is given to managing persons contaminated as a result of terrorist activities since these could involve large numbers of people. An aspect of such incidents is the potential for social, psychological and behavioral consequences to comprise possibly more significant concerns for health and safety than potential radiation injuries. While this topic was addressed in NCRP Report No. 138 (NCRP, 2001a), it is also brought to the attention of readers of this Report because the potential for such adverse consequences exists for all types of contamination incidents and, thus, is not limited to incidents associated with terrorist’s activities. This Report also supplements the guidance given in NCRP Commentary No. 19 (NCRP, 2005a). The primary objective in the management of persons contaminated with radionuclides is to reduce the risk of health effects occurring either early after the contamination incident or later in life. Two types of effects are of concern. One type of effect is harmful tissue reactions, termed deterministic effects. Doses large enough (threshold doses) to damage a critical population of cells can result in serious tissue or organ malfunction and possibly death. These effects can occur early after the contamination incident or later in life. The risk of deterministic effects can be reduced by controlling radiation doses to below their threshold doses. A second type is termed stochastic effects. Radiation damage to cellular DNA can lead to the expression of cancer later in life and to heritable effects in offspring. Radiation-induced cancer has been observed to occur in humans as well as in experimental animals. Although they have not been observed in humans, the potential for radiation-induced heritable effects is a concern because they have occurred in experimental animals. The risk of radiation-induced stochastic effects can be reduced, but not necessarily eliminated, by minimizing the
2.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
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radiation dose. Heritable effects and cancer are not unique to radiation. According to the American Cancer Society (ACS, 2008), about one in three persons will be diagnosed with cancer in their lifetime and one in four persons will die of cancer. Even after 50 y, among >105,000 Japanese survivors of the atomic bombs, only 853 of nearly 17,000 cancer cases were attributable to radiation (Preston et al., 2007). The objective of this Report is to provide guidance and recommendations to medical and radiation-safety personnel for reducing external and internal radionuclide contamination levels and thus the risks of radiation-induced health effects. 2.2 Target Audiences of this Report Since 1980, the varieties of situations within which persons are likely to become contaminated with radionuclides have changed and public concern has increased. Therefore, this Report is directed at an audience broader than that originally intended for Report No. 65. The audiences for the present Report now include essentially all emergency responders and not simply medical personnel. This Report is written specifically for those who might become directly involved in responding to incidents in which a person or persons may be contaminated with radionuclides. In an occupational setting, this could include coworkers, supervisors, managers, radiation-safety personnel (e.g., health physicists and radiation safety officers), nurses, and physicians. In an accidental release into the environment from a missing source, nuclear power plant incident, transportation accident, industrial application, medical facility, or military, aviation or space activity, an even broader spectrum of persons could be involved. Such persons include publichealth officials, emergency medical personnel, hospital staff, fireprotection personnel, law-enforcement officials, and local, state and federal government officials. In the event of a terrorist incident, first responders could include untrained citizens as well as radiation-safety, emergency medical, fire-protection, and lawenforcement personnel. It is also intended that this Report be a source of information to be consulted by public officials well in advance of any serious radionuclide contamination incident to forestall the potential for chaos and panic should such an incident occur and to provide information needed in training programs for all relevant responding personnel. 2.3 Organization of this Report For the convenience of users, this Report is in two volumes. The Handbook is intended as an update of NCRP Report No. 65 and,
16 / 2. INTRODUCTION like Report No. 65, is of a size that can be readily accessible. It contains information, recommendations and advice relevant to management of persons contaminated with radionuclides in a broad range of potential incidents. The Handbook is for “in-the-field” use in responding to radionuclide contamination incidents. The Scientific and Technical Bases volume supports the recommendations and advice in the Handbook. There is some redundancy throughout these two volumes. This was deliberate because it was realized that many users of this Report will read only those sections most relevant to their technical discipline or interest. NCRP Report No. 65 was mostly directed to accidental contamination incidents in locations where trained radiation professionals and physicians are onsite or readily available. The broad spectrum of potential future contamination incidents means that many first responders will not be so well trained or have access to information and the relevant scientific literature. Therefore, this Report comprises much basic information that will be familiar to most medical and radiation-safety professionals, but may be of value as a review for them and a useful indoctrination for those planners and responders not trained in radiation sciences. 2.3.1
Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides: Handbook
The Handbook is in four parts. Part A comprises quick reference information that may be of use to all first responders to a contamination incident. The management of persons contaminated with radionuclides will usually occur at two locations, at the site of the contamination incident and at a hospital or other emergency facility. Part B describes activities most likely to occur onsite and prehospital. Part C describes activities that should occur away from the incident site such as in a hospital. Part D provides guidance on actions that would occur post-hospital. These four parts are color coded for quick access. The actions taken by medical and radiation-safety professionals at these three venues can be considered to occur in several stages. Patient flow through various stages in the management of contaminated persons has been described by Bushberg et al. (2007) and by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS, 2009). This Report defines nine stages and courses of actions to be taken to achieve a favorable outcome for exposed individuals. These nine stages are described in Table 2.2 with the objectives associated with each. Figure 3.1, decision tree for management of persons
TABLE 2.2—Stages in the management of contaminated persons. Stage
Location
Objectives
• Stabilize life-threatening problems (consider admission to emergency facility) • Treat other injuries and observe for psychological distress among exposed persons • Identify exposed persons and those externally and/or internally contaminated • Document incident
2. External Contamination Assessment (Section 7)
Onsite triage area (Figure 4.1)
• Locate contaminated body area, including orifices • Identify hot particles, shrapnel, and contaminated debris • Identify and quantify radionuclides • Evaluate potential for skin injury • Confirm internally-contaminated individuals • Assess need for decontamination • Document contamination on body surfaces
3. External Decontamination (Section 8)
Onsite decontamination area (Figure 4.1)
• Control external contamination • Reduce radiation dose to skin • Reduce amounts of radionuclides in wounds • Document
4. Patient Evaluation and Emergency Care (Section 9)
Hospital
• Evaluate and treat patients with injuries and psychological distress • Evaluate patients for evidence of radiation sickness • Evaluate patients with skin burns, contaminated wounds, and intake for emergency treatment • Confirm possible internal contamination • Document evaluations and treatment
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Onsite triage area (Figure 4.1)
2.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
1. Medical Assessment (Section 6)
Stage
Location
Objectives
5. Internal Contamination Assessment (Section 10)
Hospital
• Determine routes of entry into body • Identify radionuclides and their physical/chemical form • Determine radiation doses using in vivo and in vitro bioassay procedures • Document internal contamination and radiation doses
6. Clinical Decision Guidance (Section 11)
Hospital
• Evaluate radiation dose with respect to CDG • Provide guidance to physicians making treatment decisions • Document guidance
7. Medical Management (Section 12)
Hospital
• Begin appropriate decorporation therapy • Evaluate treatment efficacy • Clinical follow-up • Document treatment
8. Follow-Up Medical Care (Section 13)
Where appropriate
• Late deterministic effects • Latent acute radiation syndrome • Psychosocial indications • Internal contamination • Cancer • Epidemiology studies • Patient record documentation
9. Contaminated Decedents (Section 14)
Hospital and mortuary
• Protect medical examiners and mortuary professionals from radiation exposures • Control radionuclide contamination of individuals and facilities • Ensure proper disposal of decedent • Document
18 / 2. INTRODUCTION
TABLE 2.2—(continued).
2.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
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contaminated with radionuclides, depicts the normal flow of an exposed person through all stages, but there may be exceptions in which certain stages might be bypassed depending upon the status of the person involved. Both Figure 3.1 and Table 2.2 are intended as guides in the use of this Handbook. 2.3.2
Part A: Quick Reference Information
Part A begins with Section 3, which is largely a tabulation of radiation facts, definitions of terminology and specific guidance for both radiation-safety and medical personnel who are first on the scene. The information is tailored for easy use by early responders to contamination incidents and is referenced to other parts of the Report for details. For example, a foldout decision tree for managing persons contaminated with radionuclides is included. This chart is color coded to direct readers to appropriate sections of the Handbook for specific information. Section 4 offers guidance for radiation-safety and medical first responders to an incident. These responders will likely be familiar with guidance relevant to their professions, but not to the others’. Having this knowledge should enhance their ability to work as a team. Section 5 is a refresher on performing surveys and controlling contamination at the incident site. Again, this information will be familiar to health physicists and other radiation-safety professionals, but there may be occasions when persons not having this knowledge and experience will be on the scene. 2.3.3
Part B: Onsite and Prehospital Actions
Part B provides onsite guidance. The first three stages of managing contaminated persons will usually occur at the site of the incident, before individuals are transported from the area. The first stage is medical assessment in which potentially-exposed persons are screened for life-threatening problems and for evidence of radiation exposure and radionuclide contamination. Depending upon the nature of the contaminating incident, it may be that not all persons at the site will be exposed and contaminated. This assessment will usually occur in a designated triage area at the site of the incident. The highest priority action is stabilization of patients with life-threatening injuries. Preliminary screening for external and internal contamination is an important part of this assessment in that it may determine whether the exposed persons require further evaluation and/or evacuation. Medical assessment activities are described in Section 6.
20 / 2. INTRODUCTION The second stage is external contamination screening which also will occur onsite in a designated triage area. Guidance is given in Section 7 on locating and identifying contamination, evaluating possible skin injuries, and assessing needs for treatment and decontamination and possibilities of intakes. The third stage is external decontamination. This action should also be conducted in a secured controlled area, onsite or at a special facility when available. The steps and equipment necessary to externally decontaminate individuals are described in Section 8. 2.3.4
Part C: Patient Management at Hospital
Part C, addresses actions to be taken after the patient is transported to a hospital or other emergency medical facility (Table 2.2). The fourth stage is evaluation and emergency care of the patient by emergency department medical personnel. As described in Section 9, it includes evaluation and treatment of injuries, diagnosis of radiation exposure, and initial treatment decisions. The fifth stage is an assessment of internal contamination. Collection of biological samples such as nasal swabs and excreta should occur as soon as possible. If collected onsite, it should be done in a controlled area to prevent inadvertent contamination of the samples. Normally, collection of samples will occur at the emergency facility as would other bioassay procedures such as wholebody counting. Interpretation of bioassay data and assessment of contamination and radiation dose will usually occur after the exposed person has been transferred to a medical facility as described in Section 10. The sixth stage, an evaluation of the radionuclide intake and radiation exposure leading to decisions about decorporation treatment is described in Section 11. A new operational quantity, Clinical Decision Guide (CDG), is introduced in this section to assist physicians in making treatment decisions. The seventh stage is decorporation treatment. Drugs and treatment modalities are recommended for a broad range of radionuclides in Section 12. 2.3.5
Part D: Patient Management Post-Hospital
The eighth stage is medical follow-up of exposed persons that will vary depending upon many factors such as the nature of the contamination, decontaminating and decorporation treatment, physical and psychosocial trauma. Section 13 provides guidance for ensuring patients receive appropriate care after discharge from a medical facility.
2.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
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The ninth stage is the handling of contaminated deceased persons. Fatalities are a possible result of the more serious contamination incidents. Section 14 provides guidance on controlling contamination and protecting the professionals from unnecessary radiation exposures. Because the first priority is the care and management of contaminated persons, contamination of emergency department and other areas of the hospital can occur. Therefore, the Handbook concludes with Section 15, providing guidance in controlling the spread of contamination and decontaminating medical facilities and equipment. 2.3.6
Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides: Scientific and Technical Bases
The second volume, Part E, supports the advice and recommendations in the Handbook with detailed information. It is more comprehensive than might be necessary for most radiation-trained professionals, but it is also intended to provide basic information for those potential responders to radionuclide-contamination incidents who have little knowledge of radiobiology and radiation protection and who do not have ready access to the scientific literature. These might include such professionals as industrial hygienists, nurses, physicians, law-enforcement and fire-protection personnel and emergency medical personnel. Section 16 is an overview of radiobiology concepts pertinent to the intake of radionuclides. This includes information on radiation, radionuclides, radiation dosimetry, and the human health risks of radiation exposure. Section 17 provides descriptions of known and potential contamination situations that could lead to small- and large-scale radionuclide contamination of workers and members of the public. It also identifies the radionuclides most likely to be encountered. Section 18 includes a comprehensive description of the roles and responsibilities of responders in designated control areas of contamination sites. Section 19 describes the technology and instrumentation available to detect and measure radionuclide contamination. The detection and measurement of radionuclides on and in humans have improved dramatically in the last 25 y. This advanced technology is described with recommendations for its use in specific situations. The chemical, biological and dosimetric properties of important radionuclides of 24 elements identified in Section 17 are addressed in Section 20. Extensive information is provided on the potential for exposure, methods of monitoring and measuring intakes, biokinetics
22 / 2. INTRODUCTION of specific compounds, dosimetric models, and estimates of radiation doses. Absorbed and effective doses per unit intake are tabulated for these radionuclides. Readers particularly interested in issues related to the behavior of radionuclides in wounds and their treatment should also consult NCRP Report No. 156 (NCRP, 2006a). NCRP devoted considerable attention to the quality assurance issues by having members carry out independent calculations and reviews of the tabulated results. Further information on validation and verification of the models and dose calculations in this Report can be found in Appendix I. Case studies are included in Section 20 for several radionuclides to illustrate how some contamination incidents have been managed in the past, demonstrate some important principles or contain unique lessons regarding radiation protection, and provide important biokinetic and dosimetric information gained from real contamination incidents. The information in this section is available elsewhere, but its compilation in this Report from several ICRP publications and numerous journal publications is a valuable resource well beyond the purpose of this Report. Difficult decisions are required in responding to radionuclide contamination incidents. One of the most difficult issues is the evaluation of the exposures. Since direct measurements are rarely possible, indirect methods are required. Section 21 describes the collection of data and its interpretation using various dose-assessment methodologies that are the bases for making these decisions. Finally, Section 22 reviews current research and needs for additional research and development, facilities, and education to better prepare for managing persons contaminated with radionuclides, in both small- and large-scale incidents. Since the publication of NCRP Report No. 65, little research has been directed towards the technical problems associated with management of significant radionuclide contamination of large numbers of persons. Although several new approaches are being explored, a serious need continues for more effective methods for removing radionuclides from the body (decorporation) and therapy for reducing the effects of radiation exposure. Recommendations for future research in these areas as well as in biodosimetry, instrumentation and software, and needs for planning for the management of potential incidents as well as for facilities to handle contaminated persons are detailed in Section 22. Ten appendices are included in this Report. Appendix A contains example forms that might be used to document information concerning contamination incidents, radiation dose assessments, and patient treatments. Appendix B gives guidance in training potential
2.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
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early responders, while Appendix C explains the potential radiation risks to those who respond to contamination incidents and perform needed services ranging from law-enforcement, radiation-safety personnel to medical professionals. Appendix D provides some guidelines in communicating with the media, and Appendix E, communicating with contaminated individuals and their families. Appendix F supports Section 21 by providing reference tables for interpreting bioassay data. Appendix G provides information on other useful resources, such as documents, books and websites dealing with topics covered in this Report. Appendix H describes the responses to several serious contamination incidents, illustrating the medical treatment of internally-deposited radionuclides as well as the ingenuity and resourcefulness that can be employed when an incident occurs remotely from radiation expertise and facilities. Validation and verification of the models, software, and associated parameters used for the biokinetic and dosimetric calculations in this Report are detailed in Appendix I and Appendix J lists categories for drug use in pregnancy. While NCRP has adopted SI units, this Report generally includes both SI units and units of the previous system (rad, rem and curie), which are still in use by many in the United States.
Part A: Quick Reference Information 3. Compendium of Radiation Facts and Guidance 3.1 Introduction This section comprises a compendium of information for the medical and radiation-safety personnel who would respond to incidents in which persons may be contaminated with radionuclides. It consists of information, facts and guidance that may be needed quickly by those who are first on the scene of a radionuclide release. The information is deliberately brief for ease of rapid access. The locations of more detailed information are indicated throughout this compendium. The medical and radiation-safety personnel using this Report will likely be familiar with the information relevant to their disciplines, but not necessarily with information relevant to other disciplines, which is important as they work as a team to manage persons contaminated with radionuclides. The information provided also may be helpful to other personnel who might be early responders to contamination incidents. Incidents that result in contamination of persons with radionuclides can range from small-scale where one or a few individuals are contaminated with small amounts of radionuclides to large-scale incidents where perhaps hundreds of individuals may be contaminated with large quantities of radionuclides. Such incidents can be inadvertent releases in laboratories, hospitals, power plants, industry, and the military or they may be deliberate releases as a result of terrorist activities. Further information can be found in Section 17. 3.1.1
Organizations Offering Radiological Incident Assistance
A number of federal and state organizations are available to offer radiological emergency-response assistance in the event of a 25
26 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE radiological or nuclear incident or emergency, at the request of the affected community or facility. Federal organizations include the following: • Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) • U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - field offices and national laboratories - Radiological Assistance Program - Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) • U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) - Radiation Event Medical Management (REMM) Guidance (DHHS, 2009) • U.S. Environmental Protection Agency • Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assistance Center Information on how to contact these and other organizations for assistance and to obtain copies of publications and other related information is provided in Appendix G. 3.1.2
Terminology
In the management of persons contaminated or potentially contaminated with radionuclides, communication among the radiation-safety and medical personnel and other responders is important. To minimize misunderstandings and confusion, the terminology used must have clear meanings. To eliminate some of the current ambiguity in the meaning and use of some of this terminology, the following important terms are defined as used throughout this Report. There are some disparities in how these terms are used among government agencies, NCRP and ICRP. The following are generally consistent with NCRP and, in most cases, ICRP usage. These terms also appear in the Glossary along with other terms relevant to the subject of this Report. • absorption: Movement of material to blood regardless of mechanism. Generally applies to the uptake into blood of soluble substances and material dissociated from particles. • absorption functions: Mathematical equations describing the rate of transfer of radionuclides into blood after deposition on skin, in wounds, in the gastrointestinal (GI) tract and in the respiratory tract (equations can be exponential, polynomial or constant relationships). • activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD): Median diameter of airborne radioactive particles having the same
3.1 INTRODUCTION
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
/ 27
aerodynamic properties as unit density spheres. Fifty percent of the activity (aerodynamically classified) in the aerosol is associated with particles greater than the AMAD. A lognormal distribution of particle sizes is assumed. bioassay: Any procedure used to determine the nature, activity, location or retention of radionuclides in the body by direct (in vivo) measurement or by indirect (in vitro) analysis of material excreted or otherwise removed from the body. clearance: The action that results in the movement of radioactive material from the site of deposition in tissues and organs. This action can be natural or induced by therapeutic means. - pathways: Routes by which material deposited in organ systems can be transported away from the affected organs. For example, materials deposited in the respiratory tract can move out of the respiratory tract by absorption into blood, to the GI tract via the pharynx, and to regional lymph nodes via lymphatic channels (ICRP, 1994a). - pulmonary: The removal of material from the respiratory tract by particle transport and by absorption into blood (ICRP, 1994a). contamination: Radioactive material that is present in any substance, in any area, or on any surface where its presence is unwanted or unexpected. - external: Unwanted radioactive material deposited on the outside of the body on the clothing, skin, hair, body cavities such as the outer ear and eye. - internal: Unwanted radioactive material deposited within the body following an intake of the material by absorption through skin, ingestion, inhalation or through wounds. decontamination: Action taken to remove radionuclides from clothing and the external surfaces of the body, from rooms, building surfaces, equipment, or other items. decorporation: The therapeutic processes by which radioactive materials are mobilized from tissues and organs and removed from the body by enhanced material excretion. deposition: Any action resulting in the occurrence of radioactive material on or in external surfaces of the body or on or in internal tissues and organs. deterministic effects: Harmful tissue reactions that occur in all individuals who receive greater than a threshold dose; the severity of the effect varies with the dose. Examples are radiation-induced cataracts (lens of the eye), radiationinduced erythema (skin), radiation-induced pneumonitis
28 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
•
• •
•
•
•
(lungs), hematopoietic failure (bone marrow), hypothyroidism (thyroid), and GI failure (GI tract). dose: A general term denoting the quantity of energy from ionizing radiation absorbed in a tissue or organ from either an external source or from radionuclides in the body. When unspecified, dose refers to quantity of absorbed dose, measured in gray (1 Gy = 1 J kg –1) or rad (1 rad = 100 ergs g –1). dose coefficient: Radiation dose per unit of activity intake. effective dose: The calculated radiation dose to the entire body, accounting for the distribution of the dose among the organs and tissues of the body, the relative biological effectiveness of the different types of radiations and for the radiation sensitivities of the various organs and tissues that might be irradiated. The term effective dose, as used in this Report for internally-deposited radionuclides, always means committed effective dose calculated over a 50 y period beyond the radionuclide intake for adults and from intake to age 70 y for intakes by children. exposure: In this Report, “exposure is the act or condition of being subject to irradiation” (ICRP, 2005a) (e.g., when a person is near a radiation source) and does not imply that external or internal radionuclide contamination has occurred, only that the potential for contamination has occurred. In the context of airborne radionuclides, exposure is the product of the air concentration of radionuclides to which a person is exposed and the duration of the exposure (ICRP, 2002a). Exposure is often used in a general sense meaning to be irradiated. When used as the specifically defined radiation quantity, exposure is a measure of the ionization produced in air by x or gamma radiation. The unit of exposure is coulomb per kilogram (C kg –1). The special unit for exposure is roentgen (R), where 1 R = 2.58 × 10–4 C kg –1. ingestion: The process in which radioactive material is taken into the digestive system. Amounts ingested are equivalent to an intake, although only a fraction may be absorbed into the blood system and deposited in tissues and organs and eventually excreted in urine. The ingested activity that is not absorbed to blood is excreted in feces. inhalation: The process in which air and substances, such as radioactive materials, entrained in the air are taken into the respiratory tract through the nose or mouth. The activity of a radionuclide inhaled may differ from the activity deposited in the respiratory tract since some fraction, depending upon its physical and chemical properties and the physiological state of the individual, may be promptly exhaled.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
/ 29
• intake: The amount of radioactive material taken into the body by inhalation, absorption through the skin, ingestion or through wounds. It is distinguished from uptake, which is the amount of material that eventually enters the systemic circulation, or deposition, which is the amount of the substance that is deposited in organs and tissues. • ionizing radiation: Electromagnetic radiation (x or gamma rays) or particulate radiation (alpha particles, beta particles, electrons, positrons, protons, neutrons, and heavy charged particles) capable of producing ions by direct or secondary processes in passage through matter. • irradiation: The action of incurring radiation by a body, tissue or organ from either external or internal radiation sources. • radionuclide: Naturally-occurring or artificially-produced unstable ion that transforms to a stable or unstable atom and releases radiations in the process. • relative biological effectiveness (RBE): For a specific radiation, the ratio of absorbed dose of a reference radiation required to produce a specific level of a response in a biological system to the absorbed dose of the specific radiation required to produce an equal response. Reference radiation normally is gamma or x rays with a mean linear energy transfer of 3.5 keV μm–1 or less. RBE generally depends on dose, dose per fraction if the dose is fractionated, dose rate, and biological endpoint. When calculating RBE-weighted absorbed doses for deterministic effects in this Report, RBE values of two and seven were used for alpha-particle irradiation of the bone marrow and lungs, respectively. • retention: Describes the propensity for radioactive materials to remain at the site of deposition. Retention is frequently described by a rate function. • stochastic effects: Effects, the probability of which, rather than their severity, is assumed to be a function of dose without a threshold. For example, cancer and hereditary effects are regarded as being stochastic • translocation: The redistribution of radionuclides from the initial sites of deposition to other tissues and organs in the body. • uptake: Quantity of a radionuclide taken up by the systemic circulation (e.g., by injection into the blood, by absorption from compartments in the respiratory or GI tracts, or by absorption through the skin or through wounds in the skin) (NCRP, 1987).
30 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE 3.2 Basic Radiological Facts 3.2.1
Radiation Types and Recommended Personnel Protection
• alpha: alpha radiation consists of positively charged particles emitted by certain radionuclides with a substantial amount of energy, typically 5 MeV or higher. Alpha radiation of energy less than ~7 MeV will not penetrate beyond 70 μm, the nominal dead-layer of the skin assumed in radiation protection. Alpha particles of ~4 MeV can penetrate the shallow dead-layer over some parts of the body. Alphas with energies of ≥7 MeV are emitted by only a few common radionuclides such as 212Po. Alpha-emitting radionuclides may be a health risk if taken into the body through inhalation, ingestion, or through wounds. However, most alpha emitters are not readily absorbed from the GI tract. Two important exceptions are 210Po and 226Ra, for which 10 % or more of the ingested amount may be absorbed to blood. The maximum range of a 5.3 MeV alpha particle from 239Pu in tissue is ~40 μm; thus it will penetrate on average about five cells in solid lung tissue (NCRP, 1975). (Protective actions: Wear respiratory protection to minimize inhalation or ingestion, cover all open wounds.) • beta: beta radiation consists of elementary particles emitted from nuclei during radioactive decay and have a single electrical charge. Beta radiation will penetrate protective layers of skin if the maximum beta energies are above ~70 keV, which encompasses the majority of beta-emitting radionuclides. Beta-emitting radionuclides may be a health risk if taken into the body through inhalation, ingestion, or through wounds. [Protective actions: Wear heavy clothing or turnout gear to keep high-activity and physically small beta-emitting particles (hot particles) off of skin; wear respiratory protection to minimize inhalation or ingestion.] • gamma: gamma rays are short-wave-length electromagnetic radiation. External sources of gamma rays may irradiate the entire body. High doses delivered at a high dose rate can cause an acute radiation syndrome. Gamma-emitting radionuclides taken into the body can irradiate surrounding tissues as well as those in which they are deposited. (Protective actions: Wear gloves and anti-contamination clothing to reduce skin contamination. Wear respiratory protection to minimize inhalation and ingestion. Time, distance and shielding principles can be applied to reduce external exposures from gamma-emitting radionuclides in the surrounding area.)
3.2 BASIC RADIOLOGICAL FACTS
3.2.2
/ 31
Identifying Radiation Types Using a Pancake or Other Thin End-Window Geiger-Mueller Probe Survey Meter
• A Geiger-Mueller (GM) detector with a thin window will detect alpha, beta and gamma radiation. • Each of these types of radiation has different properties which must be understood to interpret meter readings. • Background radiation (from cosmic sources or naturallyoccurring radionuclides in soil or building materials) is always present and will produce counts (and a count rate) even in the absence of radioactive contamination. • First turn on the meter in an uncontaminated area. • Subtract the background reading from all subsequent instrument readings.1 • The properties of these types of radiation can be used to help differentiate between them and to determine their relative importance. - alpha radiation will not penetrate paper or thin plastic; to screen for alpha-emitting contamination, cover the probe with paper or a plastic bag; the percent reduction in count rate (if any) is proportional to the level of alphaemitting contamination. - beta radiation will not penetrate a hand or heavy gloves; to screen for beta-emitting contamination, cover probe with hand or put inside an empty work glove; the percent reduction in count rate (if any) is proportional to the level of beta-emitting contamination. - gamma radiation will penetrate all these materials; the count rate penetrating a hand or heavy glove is proportional to the level of gamma-emitting contamination. Example: If the count rate beneath a probe is 10,000 counts per minute (cpm), the count rate through paper is 5,000 cpm, and the count rate through a glove (probe inside the glove) is 2,000 cpm; then it can be concluded that alpha-, beta- and gamma-emitting contamination is present. In this case, the gamma count rate is 2,000 cpm (the amount that penetrated both paper and glove), the beta count rate is 3,000 cpm (the amount that penetrated the paper, but not the glove), and the alpha count rate is 5,000 cpm (the amount that did not penetrate the paper or the glove). 1For example, if background radiation levels are 50 cpm and the count rate in a contaminated area is 150 cpm, the net count rate (attributed to the radiation source measured) is 150 – 50 = 100 cpm.
32 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE 3.2.3
Radiation Energy and Radioactive Decay Facts
The energies required to penetrate protective layer of skin (lower-energy particles will not expose living cells to radiation if the exposure is only from external sources) are: • alpha: ~7 MeV • beta: ~70 keV Average beta and positron energies: • average beta energy is about one-third the maximum energy • average positron energy is about one-half of the maximum energy Beta particle range: • in air: 3.7 m (12 feet) per million electron volts (MeV) of energy • in matter: range (g cm–2) ≈ 0.5 Emax (MeV) Range in matter depends upon the density of the matter as well as the energy of the beta particles. Range in density thickness (g cm–2) can be converted to a linear range by dividing it by the mass density of the material. For example, water has a mass density of 1 g cm–3 so a 2 MeV beta particle will travel a distance of ~1 cm in water. • range (g cm–2) ≈ 0.5 × 2 MeV = 1 g cm–2 • range (cm) ≈ range (g cm–2 ) divided by density (g cm–3) ≈ (1 g cm–2)/(1 g cm–3) = 1 cm Gamma-radiation dose rate (for point sources): · • D = 6 AEn · where D is the dose rate in rad h–1 at a distance of 1 foot, A is the source activity in curies, E is the gamma energy in million electron volts, and n is the number of gammas emitted during each disintegration (e.g., every decay of a 60Co atom emits two gammas). In a similar manner: · • D = 0.53 A E n · when D is the dose rate in rad h–1 at 1 m and A the source activity in curies.
3.3 INCIDENT RESPONSE (SECTION 18)
/ 33
Also: · • D = 0.14 A E n · when D is the dose rate in mSv h–1 at 1 m and A is the source activity in gigabecquerels. Radioactive decay: • after seven half-lives, <1 % of the original activity remains • after 10 half-lives, <0.1 % of the original activity remains Unit conversion factors: SI units and previous system: • • • • • • • • • •
1 Bq = 2.7 × 10–11 Ci = 27 pCi 1 Ci = 3.7 × 1010 Bq = 37 GBq 1 Sv = 100 rem 1 rem = 0.01 Sv 1 Gy = 100 rad 1 rad = 0.01 Gy 1 Sv Bq–1 = 3.7 × 106 rem μCi–1 1 rem μCi–1 = 2.7 × 10–7 Sv Bq–1 1 Gy Bq–1 = 3.7 × 106 rad μCi–1 1 rad μCi–1 = 2.7 × 10–7 Gy Bq–1
3.3 Incident Response (Section 18) 3.3.1
Incidents
3.3.1.1 Small Scale. Incidents occurring in laboratories, hospitals, nuclear power plants, etc., involving small amounts of radionuclides with the potential contamination of one or a few individuals are small scale. Radiation-safety and medical professionals are likely to be on the premises or nearby as employees or contract personnel. In nearly all cases, initial responding individuals will be coworkers and supervisors who are responsible for notifying radiation-safety staff/ officers (health physicists) and upper management. The radiological control staff is responsible for initial assessment and, in consultation with management, for determining the course of action for management of the contaminated person or persons, and the steps required to confine the contaminating radionuclides to the location of the incident. Appropriate local, state, or federal regulators may require notification, depending on the nature of the incident (e.g., the theft of radioactive material or the innocent finding of radioactive material).
34 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE 3.3.1.2 Large Scale. Incidents involving relatively-large quantities of radionuclides and the potential contamination of large numbers of people are large scale. Examples of large-scale incidents include terrorist attacks with radiological weapons, nuclear-weapons detonations, and nuclear power plant accidents. Initial responders may be law enforcement, firefighters, and local disaster response teams. Incidents may require designation of several areas, based on levels of contamination and the needs for successfully mediating the incident. The latter includes ensuring the confinement of the radionuclides to the contaminated area while effectively managing contaminated people. Some of the personnel noted below may be involved in a smallscale incident, and even large-scale incidents may not call for all of these personnel (or they may not all be available). The person(s) in charge of the incident response will be responsible for determining which roles are required and to make the best use of the available personnel and resources. 3.3.2
Roles and Responsibilities (Section 18)
Emergency medical responders: • attend to medical needs of contaminated and/or injured persons; • take actions needed to stabilize the most badly-injured individuals; • perform triage as appropriate; • transfer contaminated and injured persons for medical treatment; • exercise appropriate radiological controls; • determine which critically-injured contaminated persons should be permitted to exit without undergoing decontamination; • help decontaminate less injured persons; • perform first aid; and • help stabilize individuals requiring such attention. Radiation-safety (health-physics) responders: • establish radiation control and secured areas (Sections 4.3.3 and 18); • provide radiological coverage for all responding personnel; • issue dosimeters and record relevant information;
3.4 GUIDANCE FOR PROFESSIONALS AT INCIDENT SITE
/ 35
• control the radionuclide decontamination areas; man all control points; • conduct personal and environmental radiation contamination surveys; • supervise the use of protective clothing; track exposure of workers; • assign radiological stay-times; • supervise contamination control and decontamination efforts; • take air samples; • determine the likelihood of radioactive-material intakes; • estimate potentially-contaminated persons’ radionuclide intakes and radiation doses; and • provide advice and guidance to all nonradiation-safety personnel, including medical professionals, law enforcement, firefighters, public health, and all other responders at the scene. 3.4 Guidance for Professionals at Incident Site • Entry into a contaminated area should be made deliberately and cautiously. Determine radiation levels prior to entry, either in activity count/disintegration rate (counts per minute/disintegrations per minute) or dose rate [mGy h–1 (mR h–1)]. Wear appropriate protective clothing. • Do not attempt to enter areas in which radiation levels are >0.1 Gy h–1 (10 rad h–1) without radiation dosimeters and radiation detector OR an accompanying radiation-safety specialist, AND the concurrence of the incident commander or a designated health and safety supervisor. Radiation levels should be determined by survey with an ion chamber, micro-R meter, or energy-compensated GM detector. • Consider critical medical concerns first, followed by serious radiological concerns. • Contaminated or irradiated patients, if clothes are removed, do not pose a health risk to emergency responders unless the patient contains embedded fragments of high-activity radioactive material. Health-care workers have not been injured by a contaminated patient. • Take precautions to minimize the risk of spreading contamination.
Radiation Readings and Their Significance (dose-rate meters) TABLE 3.1—Interpretation of dose-rate meter readings. Dose
20 μGy h
–1
Ratea
Significance –1
(2 mR h )
• Regulatory limit for radiation dose rate in an uncontrolled area
• Evacuate public if practicable • Establish control boundary
50 μGy h–1 (5 mR h–1)
• Regulations require posting as radiation area
• Entry requires wearing dosimetry
1 mGy h–1 (100 mR h –1)
• Regulations require posting as high radiation area
• Entry requires double dosimetry • Nonemergency turn-back limit
• Radiation workers will exceed annual dose limit [50 mSv (5 rem)] in 30 min
• Turn-back limit except for grave emergency or lifesaving
• May develop radiation sickness with 1 h exposure
• Turn-back limit except for lifesaving, minimize time in these areas
100 mGy h–1 (10 R h–1) 1 Gy h–1 (100 R h–1) 10 Gy h–1 (1,000 R h–1)
a
Actions
• Do not enter except under the most severe • May develop radiation sickness with 5 – circumstances 6 min exposure • Will reach LD50 dose (the lethal dose to 50 % of the population) in 30 min • Will receive lethal dose in 1 h
NCRP Report No. 138 (NCRP, 2001a) recommends a maximum radiation dose of 500 mSv (50 rem) for those engaged in emergency actions during a radiological emergency.
36 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
3.4.1
3.4.2
Surface Radiation Readings and Their Significance (contamination survey meters) TABLE 3.2—Interpretation of contamination survey readings (adapted from DOE, 1999). Significance
Actions
0.33 Bq (20 dpm); alpha
Lower limit for alpha emitters
• No control
0.33 Bq (20 dpm); alpha or 16 Bq (1,000 dpm); beta/gamma
Limit for contamination in uncontrolled area
• Establish control boundary • Wear anti-contamination clothing
33 Bq (2,000 dpm); alpha or 1,670 Bq (100,000 dpm); beta/gamma
Resuspended contamination may lead to inhalation or ingestion risk
• High control • Wear anti-contamination clothing • Consider respiratory protection
16.7 kBq (1,000,000 dpm); alpha, beta, gamma
Likely to lead to inhalation of significant amounts of activity
• Very-high control procedures required • Wear anti-contamination clothing and respiratory protection
a Instruments that readout in counts per minute or counts per second require calibration to give becquerel or disintegrations per minute. For example: dpm = counts per minute divided by counting efficiency (in counts per disintegration) Bq = counts per second divided by counting efficiency (1 Bq = 60 dpm)
3.4 GUIDANCE FOR PROFESSIONALS AT INCIDENT SITE
Contamination (Bq or dpm 100 cm–2)a
/ 37
38 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE 3.5 Management of Potentially-Injured and Contaminated Persons 3.5.1 1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8. 9. 10. 3.5.2
Priorities for Aiding Contaminated Individuals life-threatening injuries and medical conditions; high levels of internal contamination (thousands of disintegrations per minute in nasal or oral swabs from ingested or inhaled activity, or thousands of disintegrations per minute from contaminated wounds); evidence of radioiodine or transuranic intakes; serious injuries (not life threatening, but requiring rapid medical attention); high levels of skin contamination (hundreds of thousands of disintegrations per minute or more); moderate injuries (requiring medical attention); moderate levels of internal contamination (hundreds of disintegrations per minute in nasal or oral swabs or from contaminated wounds); moderate levels of skin contamination (thousands to hundreds of thousands of disintegrations per minute); mild injuries with low levels of contamination [<1,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm)]; and contaminated but uninjured persons. Stages in Management of Exposed Persons
REACT/TS (ORAU, 2009) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, National Library of Medicine, DHHS (2009) have prepared decision-tree charts for medical responses to radiological and nuclear incidents. Drawing largely from these sources, a decision tree (Figure 3.1) is provided to guide medical and radiation safety professionals through nine stages in the management of persons exposed to radionuclides. The first three of nine stages can be accomplished onsite. The subsequent four stages should occur remote from the contaminated area, preferably at a hospital, clinic, or other medical emergency facility. The final two stages will occur post-hospital at a site depending upon the circumstances. The nine stages in managing contaminated persons are not necessarily sequential. Depending upon the nature of the contamination and possible injuries, certain stages may be bypassed. These stages suggest the proper course of action to be taken to achieve a favorable outcome for exposed and contaminated individuals. It is recommended that the activities performed and the information obtained at each stage be documented and that
3.5 MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED PERSONS
/ 39
Fig. 3.1. Decision tree for management of persons contaminated with radionuclides (adapted from DHHS, 2009; ORAU, 2009).
40 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE copies accompany the patient. These nine stages illustrated in Figure 3.1 are color coded to appropriate parts and sections of the Handbook for specific guidance. Stage 1. Medical Assessment (Section 6): Onsite Triage Area Screen potentially-exposed persons for life-threatening problems and for evidence of exposure and contamination. Depending upon the nature of the contaminating incident, it may be that not all persons at the site will be exposed and contaminated. This assessment should occur at the site of the incident. • Examine exposed persons for signs of injuries and potential life-threatening problems. This has priority over assessing contamination and decontamination. • Stabilize life-threatening problems. • Observe for signs of psychological distress because psychosocial effects can be both widespread and long lasting constituting some of the most significant and challenging consequences of a radiation incident (Becker, 2001) (Sections 9.1.2 and 13.4). • Examine exposed persons for signs of acute radiation exposure. Table 6.2 describes early effects of whole-body irradiation from external and internal sources. • Survey the individuals’ facial areas and check nasal swabs with a GM, sodium iodide (gamma radiation), or zinc-sulfide (alpha radiation) detector for evidence of inhalation or ingestion. Consider prompt treatment with KI if high intakes of radioiodine are suspected and with DTPA if intakes of transuranics are indicated (Section 12). • Survey wounds with a GM, sodium iodide (gamma radiation), or zinc-sulfide (alpha radiation) detector for evidence of contamination or shrapnel and flush with sterile saline solution or water if contamination is detected or suspected (Section 9.4.1). • Attempt to determine the time of intake as accurately as possible. • Air samples and any other samples such as swabs of contaminated surfaces should be collected for analysis. Stage 2. External Contamination Assessment (Section 7): Onsite Triage Area In a controlled area, perform whole-body surveys and record the levels and locations of the contaminating radionuclides.
3.5 MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED PERSONS
• • • • •
/ 41
locate contaminated body area, including orifices; identify hot particles, shrapnel and contaminated debris; identify and quantify radionuclides; evaluate potential for skin injury; and confirm internally-contaminated individuals.
Stage 3. External Decontamination (Section 8): Onsite Decontamination Area In a controlled area, remove clothing and decontaminate all areas showing evidence of contamination until levels are less than twice the background reading (Section 8.1.1) and reduce amounts of radionuclides in wounds. Stage 4. Patient Evaluation and Emergency Care (Section 9): Hospital Evaluation of injuries and emergency care of contaminated persons in hospital; guidance in controlling contamination: • treat patients with injuries; • evaluate patients for evidence of radiation sickness and begin treatment; • evaluate patients with skin burns, contaminated wounds, and radionuclide intakes for emergency treatment; • consider treatment with KI if intakes of radioiodine are suspected and DTPA if intakes of transuranics are indicated; and • observe patients for adverse psychosocial reactions. Stage 5. Internal Contamination Assessment (Section 10): Hospital Collection and evaluation of bioassay data such as in vivo counting, nasal swabs, and excreta should occur as soon as possible in an emergency facility or hospital. Estimate radionuclide intakes and radiation doses. Stage 6. Clinical Decision Guidance (Section 11): Hospital Evaluate internal contamination and radiation dose with respect to the CDG. Stage 7. Medical Management (Section 12): Hospital This will generally occur in hospital if, after evaluation of the intake, the physician recommends treatment.
42 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
Stage 8. Follow-Up Medical Care (Section 13): Location Depends Upon Circumstances Patients should be followed for evidence of latent development of radiation injuries, monitoring internal contamination, possible epidemiology studies, and negative psychosocial reactions. Stage 9. Contaminated Decedents (Section 14): Hospital and Mortuary Guidance is provided to protect medical examiners and mortuary professionals from radiation exposure and to control radionuclide contamination of individuals and facilities. 3.6 Radiation Exposures from External Sources 3.6.1
Health Effects from External Radiation
Table 3.3, adapted from ICRP Publication 96 (ICRP, 2005a), may be useful in assessing the potential health risks of such wholebody doses. This table provides a summary of the health effects that can result from whole-body x- or gamma-radiation doses ranging from background to very-high dose levels. 3.6.2
Neutron-Radiation Dose from Criticality Accident (based on 24Na activation in body)
Naturally-occurring 23Na is activated by neutron exposure to produce 24Na, which then emits 1.37 and 2.87 MeV gamma rays. The half-life of 24Na is 15 h. Estimating neutron dose using the 24Na “quick sort” method (Tables 3.4 and 3.5): • Place probe of radiation monitoring instrument against the abdomen with the person bent over during the measurement (the armpit may be used if person is unable to bend over or external contamination prohibits such a measurement). • If the detector (e.g., Cutie-pie type ionization chamber) is used to measure radiation dose rate, the following relationships can be used to determine the neutron dose: · 3,600 ( D mGy ) D Gy = ------------------------------------------body weight (kg) · 8,000 ( D mrad ) D rad = -----------------------------------------body weight (lb)
(3.1)
TABLE 3.3—Simplified summary of radiation-induced health effects from whole-body radiation (adapted from ICRP, 2005a). Expected Dose
Effects
Outcome
No acute effect, extremely small additional cancer risk (<0.1 %).
No observable increase in the incidence of cancer, even in large exposed population (~1,000,000 people).
Low dose: towards 100 mSv (10 rem) effective dose.
No acute effects, subsequent additional cancer risk of <1 %.
Possible observable increase in the incidence of cancer, if the exposed group is large (perhaps greater than ~100,000 people).a
Moderate dose: towards 1,000 mSv (100 rem) (acute whole-body dose).
Nausea, vomiting possible, mild bonemarrow depression; subsequent additional cancer risk of ~10 %.
Probable observable increase in the incidence of cancer, if the exposed group is more than a few hundred people.
High dose: >1,000 mSv (100 rem) (acute whole-body dose).
Certain nausea, likely bone-marrow syndrome, high risk of death from ~4,000 mSv (400 rem) of acute whole-body dose without medical treatment. Significant additional cancer risk.
Observable increase in the incidence of cancer.
aEpidemiological
studies do not have the power to reveal cancer risks in the dose range up to ~100 mSv (10 rem) (ICRP, 2007).
3.6 RADIATION EXPOSURES FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES
Very-low dose: ~10 mSv (1 rem) effective dose or less.
/ 43
44 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE TABLE 3.4—Survey instrument readings on the body after an criticality accident (SI units) (Rathbone, 2007).
Weight of Subject (kg)
Pancake GM net Reading (cpm) for a 0.1 Gy Neutron Dose
Dose-Rate Instrument Reading (μGy h–1) for a 1 Gy Neutron Dosea
Time Following Exposure (h) 0
4
15
0
4
15
60
600
500
300
17
4
15
70
700
580
350
19
16
10
80
800
660
400
22
18
11
90
900
750
450
25
21
12
100
1,000
830
500
28
23
14
110
1,100
910
550
31
25
15
aAir-filled
ion chamber.
TABLE 3.5—Survey instrument readings on the body after an criticality accident (previous system) (Rathbone, 2007).
Weight of Subject (lb)
Pancake GM net Reading (cpm) for a 10 rad Neutron Dose
Dose-Rate Instrument Reading (mrad h–1) for a 100 rad Neutron Dosea
Time Following Exposure (h) 0
4
15
0
4
15
125
570
470
280
1.6
1.3
0.8
150
680
570
340
1.9
1.6
0.9
175
800
660
400
2.2
1.8
1.1
200
910
760
450
2.5
2.1
1.2
225
1,000
850
510
2.8
2.3
1.4
250
1,100
940
570
3.1
2.6
1.6
a
Air-filled ion chamber.
3.6 RADIATION EXPOSURES FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES
/ 45
· where D is the radiation dose-rate reading in milligray (millirad) per hour, using a probe calibrated with 137Cs. • If the detector (e.g., GM pancake-type radiation monitoring instruments) is used to measure radiation count rate (cpm), the following relationships can be used to determine the neutron dose: 0.01 (cpm) D Gy = -------------------------------------------body weight (kg)
(3.2)
2.2 (cpm) D rad = ------------------------------------------body weight (lb) Notes: • Decay correction is not necessary if the measurement is made within the first few hours after exposure (IAEA, 1974; Rathbone, 2007). • The radiation dose calculated by this method only addresses the neutron component. Gamma-to-neutron ratios or personal gamma dosimetry must be used to determine the dose from gamma radiation. Example 1: A 75 kg person was exposed to neutron radiation and measures 750 cpm above background using a GM pancake-type detector. The calculated radiation dose is 0.1 Gy (10 rad). Example 2: A 200 lb person was exposed to neutron radiation. Using the quick-sort method, a Cutie-pie-type ionization chamber is used to measure radiation dose rate, which is 0.022 mGy h–1 (2.2 mrad h–1). The calculated radiation dose is 0.88 Gy (88 rad). 3.6.3
Exposures from Sealed Radioactive Sources
In many situations it may be possible to determine the activity of a radioactive source by referring to shipping documents, source documentation, asking the source’s owner, contacting the source manufacturer, or by other means such as measurements. If the source activity can be ascertained, the information in Table 3.6 can be used to help determine the risk that the source may pose to bystanders and response personnel. In some cases, it may not be possible to determine the activity of a radioactive source but potential whole-body radiation doses to
46 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE TABLE 3.6—Activity and significance of sealed radioactive sources. Activity
Significance
Actions
10s of kBq (μCi)
Not a significant health risk
• Control as radioactive material
10s of MBq (mCi)
May be a minor health risk
• Control as radioactive material, do not handle directly, use tongs
10s of GBq (Ci)
May be a health risk
• Do not handle directly, use tongs
100s of GBq (a few Ci)
May be a health risk
• Do not approach closely • Do not handle source • Establish 20 μGy h–1 (2 mrad h–1) boundary
TBq (10s of Ci)
May be a severe health risk
• Do not approach without radiation dose and dose-rate monitoring equipment • Establish 20 μGy h–1 (2 mrad h–1) boundary
bystanders and response personnel may be estimated from measurements of the air-kerma rate (exposure rate) from the source and comparing them with the values in Table 3.7. 3.7 Air Kerma and Skin Doses for Point Sources 3.7.1
Intervention Levels for Skin Contamination
Deterministic effects are estimated to occur at skin doses of 2 to 3 Gy (200 to 300 rad), such as from beta emitters deposited on the skin. With respect to “hot particles” on the skin, NCRP concluded that the risk of stochastic effects was negligible compared with deterministic effects. It was recommended that the dose to skin (and the ear) at depth of 70 μm be limited to 0.5 Gy (50 rad) averaged over the most highly exposed 10 cm2 area of skin. This is a limit per particle, with no overlap. For the eye and respiratory tract (anterior nose) the limits are annual because of the small mass of tissue. For the eye, the recommended limit for hot particles is 5 Gy (500 rad) at 70 μm averaged over the most highly exposed 1 cm2 of ocular tissue. For hot particles sequestered in the anterior nasal
TABLE 3.7—Air-kerma rate (1 m from point source) and electron constants (skin dose rate at depth of 70 μm from source on skin surface) for selected radionuclides. Half–Life
Decay Modec
Air-Kerma Rated [Gy s–1 (Bq m–2)–1]
60
Co
5.27 y
β–
8.53 × 10–17
90
Sr
28.8 y
β–
*90Y
64.1 h
β–
1.65 × 10–21
—
Electron Constante
[rad h–1 (μCi m–2)–1]
[Gy s–1 (Bq cm–2)–1]
[rad h–1 (μCi cm–2)–1]
1.14 × 10–6
3.09 × 10–10
4.12 × 100
—
4.98 × 10–10
6.63 × 100
2.20 × 10–11
6.65 × 10–10
8.86 × 100
I
8.0 d
β–
1.45 × 10–17
1.93 × 10–7
4.82 × 10–10
6.42 × 100
137
Cs
30.2 y
β–
6.11 × 10–23
8.14 × 10–13
4.73 × 10–10
6.30 × 100
*137mBa
2.55 m
IT
2.26 × 10–17
3.01 × 10–7
6.88 × 10–11
9.16 × 10–1
192
Ir
73.8 d
β– EC
3.18 × 10–17
4.24 × 10–7
5.46 × 10–10
7.27 × 100
210
Po
138. d
α
3.60 × 10–22
4.80 × 10–12
8.53 × 10–17
1.14 × 10–6
235U
7.04 × 108 y
α
1.32 × 10–17
1.76 × 10–7
4.69 × 10–11
6.25 × 10–1
238
U
4.47 × 109 y
α SF
2.04 × 10–18
2.72 × 10–8
2.70 × 10–13
3.60 × 10–3
*226Ra
1,600 y
α
5.23 × 10–19
6.97 × 10–9
1.42 × 10–11
1.89 × 10–1
87.7 y
α SF
2.64 × 10–18
3.52 × 10–8
2.49 × 10–13
3.32 × 10–3
2.41 × 104 y
α
1.11 × 10–18
1.48 × 10–8
1.29 × 10–13
1.72 × 10–3
238Pu 239
Pu
/ 47
131
3.7 AIR KERMA AND SKIN DOSES FOR POINT SOURCES
Radionuclideb
Radionuclideb
Half–Life
Decay Modec
Air-Kerma Rated [Gy s–1 (Bq m–2)–1]
[rad h–1 (μCi m–2)–1]
Electron Constante [Gy s–1 (Bq cm–2)–1]
[rad h–1 (μCi cm–2)–1]
*241Am
432 y
α
9.80 × 10–18
1.31 × 10–7
7.60 × 10–13
1.01 × 10–2
252
2.65 y
α SF
7.54 × 10–17
1.00 × 10–6
1.32 × 10–10
1.76 × 100
Cf
a
See Section 7 for additional radionuclides and Section 21.3 for explanation of skin dose calculations. preceded by an asterisk are radioactive progeny that may be present in significant quantities. c EC = electron capture IT = isomeric transition SF = spontaneous fission dThe air-kerma rates include the contribution of annihilation radiations associated with the emission of positrons and neutrons, prompt gamma, and delayed gamma associated with spontaneous fission. eThe electron constant includes the contribution from delayed beta emissions associated with spontaneous fission. bNames
48 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
TABLE 3.7—(continued)
3.8 RADIATION EXPOSURES FROM INTERNAL DEPOSITIONS
/ 49
passages, the recommended limit is 5 Gy (500 rad) at 70 μm averaged over the most highly exposed 1 cm2. With the possible exception of situations where hot particles are continually moving within tissues and irradiating an increasing volume of tissues and numbers of cells, hot particles are a greater risk of causing deterministic effects than stochastic effects such as cancer (NCRP, 1999). Default operational intervention levels for skin contamination suggested by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2005a) are given in Table 3.8. Appropriate actions for each level are indicated in the fourth column (Section 7). 3.7.2
Guidance for Decontaminating Skin
The skin decontamination objective is to reduce the level to less than two times background by washing the skin. The number of washings should be limited to avoid skin injury; two cycles or as long as each washing reduces the level by 50 % (Section 8). When the lack of facilities or equipment or the number of contaminated people make it impracticable to achieve this objective, other guidance may apply as shown in Table 3.9. 3.8 Radiation Exposures from Internal Depositions of Radionuclides 3.8.1
Health Effects from Internal Radionuclide Contamination
3.8.1.1 Deterministic Effects (harmful tissue reactions). Table 3.10 summarizes the organs and tissues at risk for deterministic effects if sufficient quantities are taken into the body through the respiratory tract. If these radionuclides are ingested in sufficient quantities (especially the beta/gamma emitters) the GI tract is at risk as well as the other tissues in the body in which the radionuclides may deposit. If taken into the body through wounds in the skin, the tissues at risk from the more soluble radionuclides are those in which the radionuclides tend to deposit, as shown in the table. Ingested insoluble alpha emitters are a minimal risk to the body because little of the alpha radiation penetrates to the sensitive cells in the GI tract. Insoluble material entering wounds tends to be sequestered in lymphatic tissues. In these cases the radiation dose from alpha emitters is localized, while that from beta/gamma emitters may penetrate further into adjacent tissues. Deterministic effects observed following human intakes of radionuclides are very limited, primarily because the large intakes required to cause deterministic effects have been rare. These include thyroid nodules in Marshall Islanders exposed to radioiodine in the fallout from nuclear-weapon tests in the Pacific (Mettler and Upton,
Alpha {Bq cm–2 (nCi cm–2) [dpm cm–2]}
Beta/Gamma {Bq cm–2 (nCi cm–2) [dpm cm–2]}
Beta/Gamma (low background area)a [μSv h–1 (μrem h–1)]
<10 (<0.27) [<600]
<100 (<2.7) [<6,000]
Not detectable
None • allow release
>10 (>0.27) [>600]
>100 (>2.7) [6,000]
Not detectable
Intervention optional • decontaminate or advise to shower and wash clothing • no significant health risk • slow release
>100 (>2.7) [>6,000]
>1,000 (>27) [>60,000]
0.2 – 0.3 (20 – 30)
Intervention advisable • prevent inadvertent ingestion and inhalation, limit spread of contamination and decontaminate
>1,000 (>27) [>60,000]
>10,000 (>270) [>600,000]
2–3 (200 – 300)
Intervention required • prevent inadvertent ingestion and inhalation, limit spread of contamination and decontaminate
aAmbient
dose equivalent rate measured at 10 cm from skin surface.
Actions
50 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
TABLE 3.8—Skin contamination intervention levels (adapted from IAEA, 2005b).
3.8 RADIATION EXPOSURES FROM INTERNAL DEPOSITIONS
/ 51
TABLE 3.9—Decontamination guidance; applicable when large numbers of people are contaminated and the goal of less than two times background is impractical. Spota (0.2 cm2)
Body Surface
Alphab
<0.37 kBq (0.01 μCi) 22,000 dpm
17 Bq cm–2 (0.45 nCi cm–2) 1,000 dpm cm–2
IAEA (2005b)
Beta/gamma
<3.7 kBq (0.1 μCi) 220,000 dpm
<170 Bq cm–2 (4.5 nCi cm–2) 10,000 dpm cm–2
FEMA (2002) NCRP (2005a)
Contamination
Reference
aFor contamination fixed on skin. Limit is factor of 10 greater for mixed loose and fixed. bThe value for alpha radiation is a factor of 10 less than beta/gamma radiations consistent with IAEA skin contamination operational intervention levels.
TABLE 3.10—Summary of organs or tissues at risk from deterministic effects following inhalation of example radionuclides (Table 16.13). Radionuclide and Form
Emissions
Absorption Typea
Organs/Tissues at Riskb
β
F (fast)
Bone marrow
β
F (fast)
Thyroid
137CsCl
βγ
F (fast)
Bone marrow
144CeO 2
βγ
S (slow)
Lungs
90
SrCl2
131
I vapor
210
Po
α
F or M (fast or moderate)
Lungs, bone marrow, kidneys, liver, others
238
PuO2
α
M (moderate)
Lungs, thoracic lymph nodes, liver, bone
α
S (slow)
Lungs, thoracic lymph nodes
239PuO
aBased
2
on rate of absorption into blood from respiratory tract (ICRP, 1994a). Organs and tissues at risk are those in which the radionuclides are preferentially deposited and retained, in some cases, for relatively long periods. b
52 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE 1995; NCRP, 2008). Early death occurred in a person following the ingestion of a large quantity of 210Po (Harrison et al., 2007). The ingestion of large quantities of 137Cs resulted in the deaths of four persons and serious injuries in a number of others in Goiânia, Brazil (IAEA, 1988; 1998a). Deaths from radiation pneumonitis/pulmonary fibrosis occurred in early plutonium workers at the Mayak Production Association in the former Soviet Union (Claycamp et al., 2000). 3.8.1.2 Stochastic Effects 3.8.1.2.1 Cancer. Tissues at risk for the development of cancer later in life are primarily those in which radionuclides are deposited and retained for extended periods. Examples are the tissues listed in Table 3.11 for several radionuclides taken into the body through the respiratory tract. The same tissues are at risk when the route of entry is through the GI tract or through the skin except for those insoluble forms that are retained in the respiratory tract. Epidemiology studies have identified statistically significant increases in cancer incidence in only a few populations of the many that have been exposed to natural and man-made radionuclides through the years and extensively studied. Studies of workers at former Soviet Union nuclear weapons facilities and nearby residents are still in progress (UNSCEAR, 2008). Those showing increases include: • lung cancer in underground hard rock and uranium miners exposed to radon; • bone cancer in radium dial painters; • bone and liver cancers in patients treated with 232Th and progeny [Thorotrast® (VanHeyden Company, DresdenRadebeul, Germany)], lung, bone and liver cancers in plutonium workers at the Mayak Production Association; • thyroid cancers in individuals exposed as children at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident; • thyroid cancer in patients treated with 131I for thyroid disorders; and • bone cancers in ankylosing spondylitis patients treated with 224Ra (UNSCEAR, 2000; 2008) (Section 16.7.2.1). 3.8.1.2.2 Hereditary effects (Section 16.7.2.2). Hereditary effects have not been considered a serious risk following intakes of radionuclides. 3.8.1.3 Developmental Effects (Section 16.7.3). The risk of developmental effects occurring as a result of internal contamination is
3.8 RADIATION EXPOSURES FROM INTERNAL DEPOSITIONS
/ 53
TABLE 3.11—Tissues at risk for cancer induction by radionuclides taken into the body through the respiratory tract in a chemical form with the clearance characteristics specified (Sections 17.7.2 and 20 provide references and further information).a Radionuclide 3H
2O
Emissions
Tissues at Riskc
Absorption Typeb
β
F (fast)
Total body
60
Co oxides
γ
S (slow)
Lung
90
SrCl2
β
M (moderate)
Bone marrow, bone
β
S (slow)
Lung
β
F (fast)
Thyroid
137CsCl
γ
F (fast)
Total body
144CeO 2
β
S (slow)
Lung
210
α
M (moderate)
Lungs, spleen, kidney, blood cells, liver, bone marrow
Rn and decay products
α
F (fast)
Lung
226Ra
α
M (moderate)
Bone
α
S (slow)
Lung
106RuO 131
2
I vapor
Po
222
232
sulfate
Th
238PuO
2
α
M (moderate)
Lung, bone, liver
239PuO
2
α
S (slow)
Lung,
α
M (moderate)
Bone, lung
241
AmO2
a Natural and depleted uranium are not included because UNSCEAR concludes “… there is little or no epidemiological evidence for an association between uranium and any cancer.” (Volume I, Annex A of UNSCEAR, 2008). b Based on rate of absorption into blood from the respiratory tract (ICRP, 1994a). cOrgans and tissues at risk are those in which the radionuclide preferentially deposits and is retained.
54 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE considered minimal because the exposure of the fetus to at least 0.1 Gy (10 rad) would have to occur three to eight weeks after conception. 3.8.2
Inhalation Intakes
Only in very extreme situations can the inhaled amounts approach levels that would cause early health effects (deterministic effects). Relatively-high air concentrations of radionuclides would have to be sustained for many minutes or even hours for such intakes to occur (Section 16). 3.8.2.1 Air Samples. Air samples can be useful as indicators of exposures to airborne radionuclides and in estimating inhalation intakes. Personal air samplers are used in many occupational situations where airborne radionuclides are relatively frequent. These are generally accompanied by room or area air samplers. In incidents where large numbers of people may be contaminated, air samples are not likely to be collected, if at all, until sometime after the incident. When air samples are available, they can be used to assess the potential for deterministic effects. Table 3.12 gives estimates of the air concentrations of several radionuclides that would have to be breathed for 10 min to result in intakes that would give radiation doses approximating threshold levels for deterministic effects and effective doses of 0.25 Sv (25 rem) (see Section 16 for further information). 3.8.2.2 Nasal Swabs • Particle-size distribution of the inhaled material is an important factor. For aerosols with an AMAD of 5 μm, ~34 % of the inhaled amount is deposited in the anterior nasal passages of an adult working male, whereas only ~17 % is deposited when the aerosol has an AMAD of 1 μm (ICRP, 1994a). The portion of inhaled activity collected on nasal swabs in the early hours after inhalation of a radionuclide is highly variable, depending upon such factors as aerosol particle size, the extent of nose versus mouth breathing during the exposure, and the amount of nose blowing and wiping of the nostrils since the beginning of the exposure. Based on model predictions and controlled human experiments, it is estimated that the combined activity on swabs of both nostrils represents ~5 % of the amount inhaled. See Section 10.3.1.1 for guidance in taking and interpreting nasal swabs and Section 16.4.1.2 for additional information.
3.8 RADIATION EXPOSURES FROM INTERNAL DEPOSITIONS
/ 55
TABLE 3.12—Estimates of the concentrations in air [MBq m–3 (μCi m–3)] of several radionuclides that would have to be inhaled for 10 min to achieve intakes sufficient to produce deterministic effects or give effective doses of 0.25 Sv (25 rem) (Section 16.7). Radionuclidea
90 SrCl2 (Type F) 131I (Vapor) 137CsCl (Type F) 144
CeO2 (Type S) 210PoCl 2 210 PoCl4
Air Concentrations Required to Cause Deterministic Effectsb,c
Air Concentrations Required to Result in an Intake of 1 CDG Leading to an Effective Dose of 0.25 Sv (25 rem)c
2,600 (70,000) Bone-marrow depression
51
(1,400)
30 (800) Hypothyroidism
76
(2,100)
8,000 (220,000) Bone-marrow depression
350
(9,500)
3,700 (100,000) Pneumonitis
52
(1,400)
1,900 (51,000) Bone-marrow depression
0.67
(18)
PuO2 (Type M)
40 (1,100) Pneumonitis
0.049
(1.3)
239PuO
40 (1,100) Pneumonitis
0.18
(4.9)
40 (1,100) Pneumonitis
0.57
(1.5)
or
(Type M) 238
2
(Type S) 241
AmO2 (Type M) aThe
radionuclides shown here are used as examples to demonstrate the levels of airborne activity required to cause serious health concerns. Assumed a breathing rate of 1.2 m3 h–1 of unfiltered air for an adult and a lognormal particle-size distribution with AMAD = 5 μm. b Deterministic effects expressed within two to three months are given for the particular radionuclide. c Calculations based on a breathing rate of 1.2 m3 h–1 of unfiltered air by an adult, 5 μm AMAD particles, and a total deposition of 82 % (ICRP, 1994a).
• Other complicating factors include uncertainty about the length of time since inhalation, whether the individual was mouth breathing, and whether the individual has respiratory problems (e.g., sinus restrictions, upper respiratory infections, etc.). • High activity on a nasal swab does not always imply high penetration to lower regions of the respiratory tract.
56 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE 3.8.2.3 Doses Received from Inhaled Radionuclides. The following table, Table 3.13, is derived from data in Section 20 on absorbed and effective dose2 coefficients for radionuclides (5 μm AMAD particle-size distribution unless otherwise specified). 3.8.3
Intakes Through Skin and Ingestion
Wounds in areas of skin contamination are strong indicators of possible radionuclide intakes. More detailed information on the behavior of radionuclides in wounds and possible treatments is given in NCRP Report No. 156 (NCRP, 2006a). Contamination of skin surfaces suggest possible intakes through absorption, but only in cases of very heavy contamination would absorption result in significant internal contamination, even if the radionuclide is in a soluble form (Section 10). Injuries with contaminated debris and shrapnel are clear evidence of internal contamination. Discovery of contaminated food and water should be taken as evidence of possible ingestion intakes. Contamination of the mouth and other oral surfaces suggest possible intakes by ingestion, not necessarily in contaminated food, but by touching the face and mouth with contaminated hands. 3.9 Medical Management of Internal Radionuclide Depositions 3.9.1
Clinical Decision Guides
The Clinical Decision Guide (CDG), a new operational quantity, is defined in Section 11 to provide a basis that physicians can use when considering the need for medical treatment for internallydeposited radionuclides or as a screening level indicating the need for a more detailed investigation of tissue-specific absorbed doses over different time periods. For radionuclides other than isotopes of iodine, CDG is the maximum, once-in-a lifetime intake of a radionuclide that represents: (1) a stochastic risk, as judged by the calculated effective dose over 50 y for intake by adults and to age 70 y for intake by children that is in the range of risks associated with guidance on dose limits for emergency situations (DOE, 2008a; FEMA, 2008; ICRP, 1991a; NCRP, 1993; 2005a); and (2) avoidance of deterministic effects as judged by the calculated 30 d RBE-weighted 2The term effective dose, as used in this Report for internally-deposited radionuclides, always means committed effective dose calculated over a 50 y period beyond the radionuclide intake for adults and from intake to 70 y of age for intakes by children.
TABLE 3.13—Dose estimates for inhalation intake of radionuclides by adults (Section 20). Absorbed Dose (30 d) Radionuclidea
227Ac 241
Am
144
D
Ce, D
137Cs,
D
60Co
Method of Measurementd
Absorption Typee
21.8 y
αβγ
NS, IVC, U, F
Type M
432 y
αγ
2.65 y
αγn
285 d
βγ
Effective Dose (50 y)
Tissues (Gy Bq–1)
(rad μCi–1)
(Sv Bq–1)
(rem μCi–1)
Lung
8.2 × 10–7
3.0 × 100
4.8 × 10–5
1.8 × 102
2.3 × 10
2.7 × 10
–5
1.0 × 102
1.1 × 10–5
4.1 × 101
NS, IVC, U, F
Type M
Lung
6.3 × 10
NS, BC, U
Type M
Lung
9.7 × 10–7
3.6 × 100
Red marrow
1.3 × 10–8
4.8 × 10–2
Type M
Lung
–8
4.1 × 10
1.5 × 10–1
2.3 × 10–8
8.5 × 10–2
Type S
Lung
4.9 × 10–8
1.8 × 10–1
2.9 × 10–8
1.1 × 10–1
NS, BC, U
–7
0
30.2 y
βγ
NS, BC, U
Type F
Red marrow
1.5 × 10–9
5.6 × 10–3
4.3 × 10–9
1.6 × 10–2
5.27 y
βγ
NS, BC, U
Type M
Lung
1.5 × 10–8
5.6 × 10–2
7.1 × 10–9
2.6 × 10–2
Type S
Lung
1.7 × 10–8
6.2 × 10–2
1.7 × 10–8
6.3 × 10–2
244Cm
18.1 y
αγn
NS, IVC, U
Type M
Lung
7.3 × 10–7
2.7 × 100
1.7 × 10–5
6.3 × 101
154Eu
8.59 y
β, EC
NS, IVC, U, F
Type M
Lung
2.5 × 10–8
9.2 × 10–2
3.2 × 10–8
1.2 × 10–1
Type S
Lung
2.9 × 10–8
1.1 × 10–1
2.4 × 10–8
8.8 × 10–2
U
HTO
Red marrow
1.5 × 10–11
5.6 × 10–5
1.8 × 10–11
6.7 × 10–5
3H 131I, 192
β
8.02 d
βγ
IVC, U
Vapor
Thyroid
4.1 × 10–7
1.5 × 100
2.0 × 10–8
7.4 × 10–2
73.8 d
βγ
NS, BC, U, F
Type M
Lung
1.7 × 10–8
6.3 × 10–2
4.1 × 10–9
1.5 × 10–2
/ 57
Ir
D
12.3 y
3.9 INTERNAL RADIONUCLIDE DEPOSITIONS
252Cf,
Emissionsc
Half-Lifeb
Absorbed Dose (30 d) Radionuclidea
Half-Lifeb
Emissionsc
P
14.3 d
β
238Pu
87.7 y
αn
32
239
Pu
24,110 y
210Po
226Ra,
138 d
D
103Ru
106Ru
153
Sm
90Sr,
D
α
α
Method of Measurementd
Absorption Typee
IVC, U
Type M
IVC, U, F
IVC, U, F
U
Effective Dose (50 y)
Tissues (Gy Bq–1)
(rad μCi–1)
(Sv Bq–1)
(rem μCi–1)
Lung
1.4 × 10–8
5.2 × 10–2
2.9 × 10–9
1.1 × 10–2
Type M
Lung
6.3 × 10–7
2.3 × 100
3.1 × 10–5
1.1 × 102
Type S
Lung
7.4 × 10–7
2.7 × 100
1.1 × 10–5
4.1 × 101
Type M
Lung
5.4 × 10–7
2.0 × 100
3.3 × 10–5
1.2 × 102
Type S
Lung
6.4 × 10–7
2.3 × 100
8.4 × 10–6
3.1 × 101
Type M
Lung
5.5 × 10–7
2.0 × 100
2.3 × 10–6
8.5 × 100
Red marrow
3.2 × 10–9
1.2 × 10–2
Kidneys
3.5 × 10–8
1.3 × 10–1
1,600 y
αβγ
NS, IVC, U, F
Type M
Lung
4.7 × 10–7
1.7 × 100
2.2 × 10–6
8.1 × 100
39.3 d
βγ
NS, BC, U, F
Type M
Lung
8.9 × 10–9
3.3 × 10–2
1.8 × 10–9
6.6 × 10–3
NS, BC, U, F
Type S
Lung
1.0 × 10–8
3.7 × 10–2
2.1 × 10–9
7.7 × 10–3
NS, BC, U, F
Type M
Lung
3.3 × 10–8
1.2 × 10–1
1.7 × 10–8
6.3 × 10–2
Type S
Lung
3.9 × 10–8
1.4 × 10–1
3.4 × 10–8
1.3 × 10–1
NS, BC, U
Type M
Lung
3.2 × 10–9
1.2 × 10–2
6.8 × 10–10
2.5 × 10–3
U, F
Type F
Red marrow
4.6 × 10–9
1.7 × 10–2
3.0 × 10–8
1.1 × 10–1
374 d
βγ
46.5 h
βγ
28.8 y
β
58 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
TABLE 3.13—(continued)
D
1.4 × 1010 y
U,D
2.5 × 10 y
232Th,
234
90Y
f
5
64.1 h
αβγ
αβγ
B
NS, IVC, U, F
NS, IVC, U, F
U
Type M
Lung
3.1 × 10–7
1.1 × 100
2.9 × 10–5
1.1 × 102
Type S
Lung
3.7 × 10–7
1.4 × 100
1.2 × 10–5
4.4 × 101
Type M
Lung
4.6 × 10
1.7 × 10
2.1 × 10
–6
7.8 × 100
Type S
Lung
5.4 × 10–7
2.0 × 100
6.8 × 10–6
2.5 × 101
Type M
Lung
4.5 × 10–9
1.7 × 10–2
1.6 × 10–9
5.9 × 10–3
–7
0
a
3.9 INTERNAL RADIONUCLIDE DEPOSITIONS
/ 59
Radionuclides are listed alphabetically by element. D is the possible presence of daughters with a half-life of <25 y (the radiations of the daughters are not included in the listing). bRadioactive half-life. c The primary radiations are listed. These include radiations emitted by dosimetrically-significant chain members. β = both positron and electron emission γ = includes conversion x-ray emissions as well as gamma rays EC = electron conversion n = neutrons dThe following symbols are used to indicate principal techniques for measuring external contamination or indicating internal exposure. The order of the symbols has no significance in the listing: BC = whole-body count (standard gamma detection methods) F = feces sample analyses IVC = special in vivo counting techniques useful for low-energy counting (wound monitoring, thyroid counting), or special low-energy x-ray or gamma detectors for chest counts (e.g., plutonium or americium counting) NS = nasal swab counted in laboratory if inhalation suspected U = urine sample analyses e Absorption type in the respiratory tract as defined in ICRP Publication 66 (ICRP, 1994a), Type F (fast), M (moderate), and S (slow. fUranium always comes as a mixture of the isotopes 238, 234 and 235. Natural uranium is composed of 99.3 % 238U, 0.711 % 235U, and 0.0058 % 234U by weight. In equilibrium, natural uranium has the same activity of 238U and 234U (48.9 %) and 2.2 % 235U. Enriched uranium is obtained when the concentration of 235U is increased to significantly >0.711 % by weight. When the concentration of 235U is decreased from 0.711 % by weight to 0.2 to 0.3 %, the material is called depleted uranium (Section 20.24).
60 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE absorbed doses to red marrow and lungs, with allowance for uncertainties typically involved in the dose estimates. CDGs for radioiodine are defined differently from those for other radionuclides because the cumulative dose to the thyroid is the pertinent measure of risk in this case, and FDA (2001) issued specific guidance regarding projected thyroid doses at which treatment for intake of radioiodine is indicated for different risk groups (Section 12). Based upon the recommendations and limits for emergency situations and knowledge of deterministic effects, the numerical values of dose used as a basis for computing the CDG intake values for different radionuclides, excluding isotopes of iodine, in adults are 0.25 Sv (25 rem) (50 y effective dose) for consideration of stochastic effects [based on the population-averaged nominal cancer fatality risk coefficient of 5 % Sv–1 derived from epidemiological data (ICRP, 2007), this represents about a 1.3 % lifetime risk of fatal cancer attributable to the radiation dose]; a 30 d RBEweighted absorbed-dose (see Terminology, Section 3.1.2) value of 0.25 Gy-Eq (25 rad-Eq) for consideration of deterministic effects to bone marrow (RBE = 2); and a 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed-dose value of 1 Gy-Eq (100 rad-Eq) for consideration of deterministic effects to the lungs (RBE = 7). CDG for an adult is the intake that satisfies the constraints on the effective dose and the 30 d absorbed doses to the red marrow and lungs. Table 3.14 provides a list of CDG values for nine noniodine radionuclides in adults. CDG values for additional noniodine radionuclides are given in Table 11.1. CDGs for children (0 to 18 y of age) and pregnant women for noniodine radionuclides are defined as one-fifth the adult value, reflecting the increased vulnerabilities during development and maturation (AAP, 2003). Children weighing >70 kg should be considered as adults. For an intake or expected intake of radioiodine, FDA recommends that KI be administered to adults >40 y of age if the projected dose to thyroid is ≥5 Gy (500 rad), to adults 18 to 40 y of age if the projected dose ≥0.1 Gy (10 rad), and to pregnant or lactating women or persons <18 y of age if the projected dose is ≥0.05 Gy (5 rad). In this Report, CDGs for 131I (the only isotope of iodine considered here) are derived separately for the following subgroups of the population, considering not only FDA dose guidelines for different risk groups but also projected differences with age in dose per unit intake of radioiodine (Section 20): adults of age >40 y; adults 18 to 40 y; pregnant or lactating women; and age groups 12 to 18, 7 to 12, 3 to 7, 0.5 to 3, and <0.5 y. The dose coefficient for thyroid (committed equivalent dose to thyroid per unit intake) for a reference adult is applied to each of the first three subgroups, and the coefficients for intake
TABLE 3.14—Abbreviated list of model predictions used to assess whether a radionuclide intake exceeds the CDG.a,b Values are for a reference adult (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2 for a full listing).c Effective Dose Radionuclide
Intake Moded
CDG (intake activity)
Formd Sv Bq–1
mrem μCi–1
Bq
μCi
Early Excretion and Retention (percentage of intake)
Early Excretion and Retention Levels Indicative of Intake of 1 CDG (dpm)e
Urinary Excretion 0 – 24 h
Retention in Chest at 24 hf
Total-Body Retention at 24 h
Urinary Excretion 0 – 24 h
Retention in Chest at 24 hf
Total-Body Retention at 24 h
Nasal Swab Soon After Inhalationg
5.6 × 107
4.3 × 108
4.4 × 107
Co
Inhalation
Type S
1.7 × 10–8
6.3 × 101
1.5 × 107
4.0 × 102
—h
6.4
49
—h
90Sr
Inhalation
Type F
3.0 × 10–8
1.1 × 102
8.3 × 106
2.3 × 102
6.8
NAi
49
3.4 × 107
NA
2.5 × 108
2.5 × 107
Inhalation
Type F
4.3 × 10–9
1.6 × 101
5.8 × 107
1.6 × 103
2.2
NA
58
7.7 × 107
NA
2.0 × 109
1.7 × 108
Ir
Inhalation
Type M
1.7 × 10–8 j
6.3 × 101 j
5.9 × 107
1.6 × 103
0.31
5.7
49
1.1 × 107
2.0 × 108
1.7 × 109
1.8 × 108
226Ra
Inhalation
Type M
2.2 × 10–6
8.1 × 103
1.1 × 105
3.1 × 100
0.16
5.8
50
1.1 × 104
4.0 × 105
3.4 × 106
3.4 × 105
238
Inhalation
Type S
6.8 × 10–6
2.5 × 104
3.7 × 104
9.9 × 10–1
0.07 l
6.4
49
1.5 × 103 l
1.4 × 105
1.1 × 106
1.1 × 105
Pu
Inhalation
Type M
3.1 × 10–5
1.1 × 105
8.1 × 103
2.2 × 10–1
0.021
5.80
50
1.0 × 102
2.8 × 104
2.4 × 105
2.4 × 104
239Pu
Inhalation
Type M
3.3 × 10–5
1.2 × 105
7.6 × 103
2.0 × 10–1
0.021
5.8
50
9.6 × 101
2.6 × 104
2.3 × 105
2.3 × 104
241
Inhalation
Type M
2.7 × 10–5
1.0 × 105
9.3 × 103
2.5 × 10–1
0.18
5.8
50
1.0 × 103
3.2 × 104
2.8 × 105
2.8 × 104
60
137
Cs
192
Uk
238
Am
aFor radionuclides other than isotopes of iodine, the CDG for a specific form of a radionuclide and mode of exposure is the intake activity estimated to result in the most restrictive of the following doses to an adult: a 50 y effective dose of 0.25 Sv (25 rem), an RBE-weighted 30 d absorbed dose to red marrow of 0.25 Gy-Eq (25 rad-Eq), or an RBE-weighted 30 d absorbed dose to lung of 1 Gy-Eq (100 rad-Eq). Fivefold lower CDGs are applied to children and pregnant women. The following alpha RBEs are applied: 20 for effective dose, two for 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed dose to red marrow, and seven for 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed dose to lungs. Effective dose is more restrictive than the 30 d RBE-weighted absorbed dose to red marrow or lung in most cases.
TABLE 3.14—(continued) b The following example illustrates how this table may be used. A patient enters the emergency room a few hours after an acute inhalation of 60Co, thought to be in the form of a relatively-insoluble oxide. External measurements indicate that total-body activity is <106 dpm and activity in the chest is <5 × 105 dpm. Measurements of urinary 60Co indicate that 24 h excretion is <104 dpm. These measurements are considerably lower than the reference 24 h retention and excretion values in this table corresponding to inhalation of 1 CDG of a relatively-insoluble form of 60Co (Type S). The measurements are also considerably lower than the reference values for inhalation of 60Co in moderately-soluble form (Type M) shown in Table 11.1. Thus, it appears that the patient has inhaled considerably <1 CDG, even if the inhaled material is somewhat more soluble than suspected. cFor application to children and pregnant women the CDG and the activities in urine, chest, total body, and nasal passages that correspond to 1 CDG should be divided by five. d If no information is available regarding the mode of intake or form of the radioactive material taken into the body, and if multiple cases are provided in this table for the radionuclide of concern, then measurement of activity in urine, chest, total body, or nasal swipe should be compared with the smallest listed value for urine, chest, total body, or nasal swipe, respectively, given for that radionuclide. e Divide by 60 to convert to becquerels and by 2.22 × 106 to convert to microcuries. f Retention in the chest refers to activity measured externally over the thoracic portion of the respiratory tract. This is assumed to represent activity in the lungs. gThe portion of inhaled activity found in a nasal swab in the early hours after inhalation of a radionuclide is highly variable, depending on such factors as aerosol size, the extent of nose breathing versus mouth breathing during the exposure, and the amount of nose blowing and wiping of the nostrils since the beginning of exposure. The listed activity for nasal swab represents 5 % of the inhaled amount, based upon experimental data and model predictions summarized in Section 10.3.1.1 and in greater detail in Section 16.4.1.2. The presence of radioactivity in a nasal swab is suggestive evidence of an inhalation exposure, particularly if both nares are contaminated. The absence of activity in a nasal swab does not establish that there was no inhalation exposure. h For these cases, calculation of an intake based on urinary excretion data is not recommended because of the high sensitivity of the estimate to the GI absorption fraction, which is not well established. Where feasible, decisions concerning treatment should be based on external measurement of activity in the chest, supplemented with measurement of activity in feces. Fecal excretion data can be interpreted on the basis of tabulations in Section 20. i NA = not applicable. In many cases of inhalation of radionuclides, external counts over the chest are not useful. For example, after inhalation of highly-soluble forms of radionuclides, activity quickly moves from the lungs to blood. Also, radionuclides that emit little if any penetrating radiation (e.g., the beta-emitter 3H or the alpha-emitter 210Po) are not detectable by external measurement. j The indicated dose is the RBE-weighted 30 d absorbed dose to the lungs, which is more restrictive than the effective dose in this case. kTable entries for 238U may also be applied to 234U or 235U. Chemical toxicity of uranium (nephrotoxicity) is generally of greater immediate concern than radiological toxicity following acute inhalation of elevated quantities of natural or depleted uranium. l Measurement of the urinary excretion rate should be supplemented with measurement of fecal excretion rate where feasible. A number of inhalation cases have been reported in which little or no activity was measured in urine for an extended period following significant exposure to an insoluble form of this radionuclide (see case studies for uranium and plutonium in Section 20).
3.10 RADIATION DOSE LIMITATION
/ 63
ages 15 y, 10 y, 5 y, 1 y, and 3 months are applied to age groups 12 to 18 y, 7 to 12 y, 3 to 7 y, 0.5 to 3 y, and <0.5 y, respectively. The CDG for radioiodine for a specific subgroup of the population is defined as FDA dose guideline value applicable to that subgroup, divided by the thyroid dose coefficient for that subgroup (Table 20.56). The resulting CDG intake values are given in Table 3.15 and also in Table 11.2. 3.9.2
Decorporation Therapy
Comprehensive information on decorporation therapy for internally-deposited radionuclides appears in Section 12. Tables 3.16 and 3.17 provide synopses of this information for quick access. 3.10 Radiation Dose Limitation The NCRP and ICRP dose limits in Tables 3.18 and 3.19 apply to planned, controllable, routine work, including small-scale and nonemergency contamination incidents. In the event of a major radiation emergency (e.g., a terrorist attack), it may be necessary to exceed these dose limits to perform lifesaving and other emergency-response activities as described in ICRP Publication 96 (ICRP, 2005a) and NCRP Report No. 138 (NCRP, 2001a). For lifesaving or equivalent purposes: workers may approach or exceed 0.5 Sv (50 rem) equivalent dose, 0.5 Gy (50 rad) absorbed dose for x-ray and gamma radiation to a large portion of the body and 5 Sv (500 rem) or 5 Gy (500 rad) for x and gamma radiation to the skin of the extremities (hands, feet, lower legs, and forearms) (NCRP, 1993). The decisive control for emergency responders working within or near the inner contamination area with personal protection equipment (PPE) is 0.5 Gy (50 rad) to the whole body. These are considered once-in-a-lifetime exposures (NCRP, 2005a). In Table 3.20, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) dose limit is 0.25 Sv (25 rem) committed effective dose for lifesaving or protection of large populations when lower doses are not practicable; higher dose limits only on a voluntary basis to persons fully aware of the risks (FEMA, 2008).
Committed Equivalent Dose to Thyroid
CDG (intake activity)
Excretion and Retention During First 24 h (percentage of intake)
Excretion and Retention Levels During First 24 h Indicative of an Intake of 1 CDG (dpm)b
Group (Sv Bq–1)
(mrem μCi–1)
(Bq)
(μCi)
Urinary Excretion 0 – 24 h
Retention in Thyroid at 24 h
Total-Body Retention at 24 h
Urinary Excretion 0 – 24 h
Retention in Thyroid at 24 h
Total-Body Retention at 24 h
Adult >40 y
3.9 × 10–7
1.4 × 103
1.3 × 107
3.5 × 102
56
23
33
4.3 × 108
1.8 × 108
2.5 × 108
Adult 18 – 40 y
3.9 × 10–7
1.4 × 103
2.6 × 105
6.9 × 100
56
23
33
8.6 × 106
3.5 × 106
5.1 × 106
Pregnancy or lactation
3.9 × 10–7
1.4 × 103
1.3 × 105
3.5 × 100
56
23
33
4.3 × 106
1.8 × 106
2.5 × 106
Age 12 – 18 y
6.2 × 10–7
2.3 × 103
8.1 × 104
2.2 × 100
56
23
33
2.7 × 106
1.1 × 106
1.6 × 106
Age 7 – 12 y
9.5 × 10–7
3.5 × 103
5.3 × 104
1.4 × 100
56
23
33
1.8 × 106
7.3 × 105
1.0 × 106
Age 3 – 7 y
1.9 × 10–6
7.0 × 103
2.6 × 104
7.1 × 10–1
56
23
33
8.8 × 105
3.6 × 105
5.2 × 105
Age 0.5 – 3 y
3.2 × 10–6
1.2 × 104
1.6 × 104
4.2 × 10–1
56
22
32
5.3 × 105
2.1 × 105
3.0 × 105
Age <0.5 y
3.3 × 0–6
1.2 × 104
1.5 × 104
4.1 × 10–1
56
22
29
5.1 × 105
2.0 × 105
2.6 × 105
a The tabulated values are based on threshold doses estimated by FDA (2001) and listed in Table 12.14 for different risk groups, together with age-specific biokinetic and dose estimates for 131I inhaled as a vapor listed in Table 20.56 of this Report. bDivide by 60 to convert to becquerels and by 2.22 × 106 to convert to microcuries.
64 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
TABLE 3.15—Model predictions used to assess whether an intake of 131I by inhalation as a vapor or ingestion exceeds the CDG.a
TABLE 3.16—Decorporation therapy recommendations for radionuclides of concern.a Radionuclides
Treatment
Preferred Prescription Consider DTPA DTPA BAL BAL Section 12.4.1 DTPA DMSA DMSA DTPA Section 12.4.1 Consider hydration and nonlabeled carbon DTPA Prussian blue DTPA DTPA Penicillamine DTPA DTPA DTPA
Aluminum hydroxide Penicillamine
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Consider DTPA DTPA British Anti-Lewisite (BAL), penicillamine BAL, dimercaptosuccinic acid (DMSA) Barium, calcium therapy (Section 12.4.1) DTPA BAL, Penicillamine, DMSA DMSA, DTPA, Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) DTPA Barium, calcium therapy (Section 12.4.1) Consider hydration and nonlabeled carbon DTPA Prussian blue DTPA, EDTA (antacids are contraindicated) DMSA, DTPA, EDTA, N-acetyl-L-cysteine (NAC) EDTA, penicillamine, trientine DTPA DTPA DTPA Management depends on predominant isotopes present at time. Early: iodine; late: strontium, cesium, and others Aluminum hydroxide Consider penicillamine
3.10 RADIATION DOSE LIMITATION
Actinium Americium Antimony Arsenic Barium Berkelium Bismuth Cadmium Californium Calcium Carbon Cerium Cesium Chromium Cobalt Copper Curium Einsteinium Europium Fission products (mixed) Fluorine Gallium
Gold Indium Iodine Iridium Iron Lanthanum Lead Manganese Magnesium Mercury Molybdenum Neptunium Nickel Niobium Palladium Phosphorus Plutonium Polonium Potassium Promethium Radium
Treatment BAL, penicillamine DTPA KI, consider saturated solution of potassium iodide (SSKI), propylthiouracil, methimazole or potassiumiodate Consider DTPA, EDTA Deferoxamine (DFOA), deferasirox, DTPA, DFOA and DTPA together DTPA DMSA, EDTA, EDTA with BAL DFOA, DTPA, EDTA Consider strontium therapy (Section 12.4.5) BAL; EDTA; penicillamine; DMSA Limited clinical experience Consider DFOA and/or DTPA BAL, EDTA DTPA Penicillamine, DTPA Phosphorus therapy (Section 12.4.4) DTPA, DFOA, EDTA, DTPA and DFOA together BAL, DMSA, penicillamine Diuretics DTPA Radium, strontium therapy (Section 12.4.5)
Preferred Prescription BAL DTPA KI Consider DTPA DFOA DTPA DMSA DTPA Consider strontium therapy BAL Consider DFOA and/or DTPA BAL DTPA Penicillamine Phosphorus therapy DTPA BAL Diuretics DTPA Section 12.4.5
66 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
TABLE 3.16—(continued) Radionuclides
3.10 RADIATION DOSE LIMITATION
Rubidium Prussian blue Prussian blue Ruthenium DTPA, EDTA DTPA Scandium DTPA DTPA Silver No specific therapy. Sodium Diuretic and isotopic dilution with 0.9 % NaCl Diuretic and isotopic dilution with 0.9 % NaCl Strontium Radium, strontium therapy (Section 12.4.5) Section 12.4.5 Sulfur Consider sodium thiosulfate Consider thiosulfate Technetium Potassium perchlorate Potassium perchlorate Thallium Prussian blue Prussian blue Thorium Consider DTPA Consider DTPA Force fluids Water diuresis Tritium (3H) Uranium Bicarbonate to alkalinize the urine. Consider dialysis Bicarbonate Yttrium DTPA, EDTA DTPA Zinc DTPA, EDTA, zinc sulfate as a diluting agent. DTPA Zirconium DTPA, EDTA DTPA aThe majority of these drugs are not approved by FDA for the indications listed in this table (see Section 12 for further information and warnings).
/ 67
Dosage
Acetylcysteine [N-acetyl-L-cysteine (NAC)] (Section 12.4.2)
Consider dosage as for acetaminophen overdosage, start at 140 mg kg –1 oral loading dose (RxList, 2009).
Deferoxamine (DFOA) mesylate (Section 12.3.1)
FDA does not specify age: DFOA mesylate injectable; IM is preferred. 1 g IM or IV (2 ampules) slowly (15 mg kg –1 h–1); Repeat as indicated as 500 mg IM or IV q4h × 2 doses; then 500 mg IM or IV every 12 h for 3 d.
Dimercaprol [British Anti-Lewisite (BAL)] (Section 12.3.2)
FDA does not specify age: IM: 300 mg per vial for deep IM use, 2.5 mg kg –1 (or less) every 4 h for 2 d, then twice daily for 1 d then daily for days 5 to 10.
Diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (DTPA, calcium or zinc) (pentetate calcium trisodium and Pentetate zinc trisodium) (Section 12.3.3)
Adults: IV: 1 g in 5 mL IV push over 3 to 4 min or IV infusion over 30 min diluted in 250 mL of 5 % dextrose in water, Ringers lactate or normal saline. Nebulized inhalation: 1g in 1:1 dilution with sterile water or normal saline. Children under 12 y: 14 mg kg –1 IV as above, not to exceed 1 g.
Edetate calcium disodium [Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA)] Section 12.3.4)
FDA does not specify age: Ca-EDTA (edetate calcium disodium); 1,000 mg m–2 d–1 added to 500 mL 5 % dextrose or 0.9 % sodium chloride infused over 8 to 12 h. This same dosage can be given IM divided into equal doses spaces 8 to 12 h apart.
Penicillamine (Section 12.3.5)
FDA does not specify age: Oral: 250 mg daily between meals and at bedtime. May increase to 4 or 5 g daily in divided doses.
Phosphorus therapy Potassium phosphate, dibasic (Section 12.4.4)
Oral: 250 mg phosphorus per tablet. Adults: 1 – 2 tablets oral four times daily with full glass of water each time, with meals and at bedtime. Children >4 y of age: 1 tab oral four times daily.
Potassium iodide (KI) (Section 12.4.3)
Oral: tablets or liquid. Drug dose varies between 16 and 130 mg daily depending on age, thyroid exposure level, and whether or not pregnant or lactating (Table 12.14).
68 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE
TABLE 3.17—Dose schedules for drug or treatment modalities. Drug or Treatment Modality
Oral: 50 mg tablets, 2 tablets three times daily for 8 d. FDA does not specify age.
Prussian blue (Section 12.3.6)
Oral: Adults and adolescents 3 g three times daily. Children 2 to 12 y of age: 1 g three times daily.
Sodium bicarbonate (for uranium only) (Section 12.4.7)
Oral or IV (Table 12.22).
Radium and strontium therapy (Section 12.4.5)
Section 12.4.5.
Succimer [dimercaptosuccinic acid (DMSA)] [Chemet® (Schwarz Pharma, Monheim, Germany)] (Section 12.3.7)
FDA approved pediatric dosing: Start dosage at 10 mg kg –1 or 350 mg m–2 oral every 8 h for 5 d. Reduce frequency of administration to 10 mg kg –1 or 350 mg m–2 every 12 h (two-thirds of initial daily dosage) for an additional two weeks of therapy. A course of treatment lasts 19 d.
Water diuresis (Section 12.4.6)
Oral: Fluids >3 – 4 L d–1.
aUnless b
noted otherwise, the references for these dose schedules are given in the listed sections. Dosage notations: IV = intravenous injection bid = twice per day IM = intramuscular injection tid = three times per day mEq = milliequivalent qid = four times per day PO = per os or orally qd = every day q12h = every 12 h q4h = every 4 h
3.10 RADIATION DOSE LIMITATION
Propylthiouracil (Section 12.4.3)
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70 / 3. COMPENDIUM OF RADIATION FACTS AND GUIDANCE TABLE 3.18—NCRP dose-limit recommendations (NCRP, 1993; 2005a).a Population
Dose Limit
Occupational Effective dose, annual
50 mSv (5 rem)
Effective dose, cumulative
10 mSv (1 rem) × age
Equivalent dose, annual for tissues and organs; lens of eye
150 mSv (15 rem)
Skin, hands, and feet
500 mSv (50 rem)
Public Effective annual (frequent or continuous) (infrequent)
1 mSv (0.1 rem) 5 mSv (0.5 rem)
Equivalent dose, annual for tissues and organs; lens of eye Skin, hands, and feet aDose
15 mSv (1.5 rem) 50 mSv (5 rem)
limits, both NCRP and ICRP, apply only to planned exposure situations.
TABLE 3.19—ICRP individual dose limits (ICRP, 2007).a Type
Dose Limit
Public Exposure Individual
1 mSv (100 mrem) effective dose in a year
Lens of eye
15 mSv (1.5 rem) annaul equivalent dose
Skin
50 mSv (5 rem) annaul equivalent dose
Occupational Exposure Individual worker
20 mSv (2 rem) effective dose average over 5y
Lens of eye
150 mSv (15 rem) annaul equivalent dose
Skin
500 mSv (50 rem) annaul equivalent dose
Hands and feet
500 mSv (50 rem) annaul equivalent dose
a Recommendations of ICRP do not apply directly to persons in the United States, but may apply to those in other nations.
TABLE 3.20—Emergency worker guidelines in the early phase (FEMA, 2008).a Total Effective Dose Equivalentb Guideline
Activity
Condition
All occupational exposures
• All reasonably achievable actions have been taken to minimize dose.
0.1 Sv
Protecting valuable property necessary for public welfare (e.g., a power plant).
• Responders have been fully informed of the risks of exposures they may experience. • Dose >0.05 Sv (5 rem) is on a voluntary basis. • Appropriate respiratory protection and other personal protection is provided and used. • Monitoring available to project or measure dose.
Lifesaving or protection of large populations. It is unlikely that doses would reach this level in a radiological dispersal device incident. However, worker doses >0.25 Sv (25 rem) are conceivable in a catastrophic incident such as an improvised nuclear device incident.
• All appropriate actions and controls have been implemented; however, >0.05 Sv (5 rem) is unavoidable. • Responders have been fully informed of the risks of exposures they may experience. • Dose >0.05 Sv (5 rem) is on a voluntary basis. • Appropriate respiratory protection and other personal protection is provided and used. • Monitoring available to project or measure dose.
(10 rem)
0.25 Sv (25 rem)c
/ 71
aIn the intermediate and late phases, standard worker protections, including the 0.05 Sv (5 rem) occupational dose limit, would normally apply. b The projected sum of the effective dose equivalent from external radiation exposure and committed effective dose equivalent from internal radiation exposure. cEPA (1992) states that “Situations may also rarely occur in which a dose >0.25 Sv (25 rem) for emergency exposure would be unavoidable in order to carry out a lifesaving operation or avoid extensive exposure of large populations.” Similarly, NCRP and ICRP raise the possibility that emergency responders might receive an equivalent dose that approaches or >0.5 Sv (50 rem) to a large portion of the body in a short time (NCRP, 1993). If lifesaving emergency-responder doses approach or >0.5 Sv (50 rem), emergency responders must be made fully aware of both the early and the late (cancer) risks of such exposure.
3.10 RADIATION DOSE LIMITATION
0.05 Sv (5 rem)
4. Radiation-Safety Guidance for First Responders 4.1 Introduction Medical and radiation-safety personnel who are first responders to an incident in which persons may have been exposed to radionuclides have six major objectives: • • • • •
provide medical aid to exposed individuals; identify irradiated and contaminated individuals; detect and identify radioactive material; identify sources of external radiation; control the radionuclide contamination, preventing the spread of radionuclides beyond the incident site; and • initiate decontamination of individuals and the site. The highest priority should be to provide medical care to all injured, exposed and unexposed. However, in principle, all of these objectives should be pursued simultaneously by all first responders. It is important that these major objectives be achieved with the utmost attention to protection of exposed persons as well as the professionals attending them. This section describes the steps to be taken to achieve this protection. An effective response to an incident in which persons may be contaminated with radionuclides, whether the incident is small involving one or a few individuals or very large involving large numbers of individuals, requires that qualified experts, medical personnel (physicians, nurses, and medical technicians) and radiationsafety personnel (radiation safety officers, health physicists, and radiation protection technicians) work as a team. As described in Section 18, medical and radiation-safety personnel will also provide guidance to and cooperate with other first responders such as fire and law-enforcement officials. This is emphasized in the following guidance. In an ideal situation, a radionuclide contamination incident will occur in a location where both medical and radiation-safety staff are 72
4.2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
/ 73
available. Fortunately that is almost always the case since nearly all incidents are accidents occurring in facilities routinely handling radioactive materials, such as hospitals, research laboratories, universities, government nuclear sites, nuclear power stations, and industries using radionuclides. These institutions generally employ radiation-safety officers and have trained medical staff available. When contamination incidents occur, extensive prehospital care is generally possible, depending upon the training of the personnel and the availability of instrumentation. Ideally, the personnel at the onsite facility will have removed all transferable radioactive material from the patient, estimated the severity of internal contamination, and provided emergency first aid for wounds before the patient is moved to the hospital. In general, the hospital is used only for definitive medical care. While the following guidance is more specific for facilities having radiation-safety and medical support, the principles can be applied to nearly all radionuclide contamination situations. Obviously, when large incidents occur and many people are exposed, considerable ingenuity is required to manage contaminated individuals efficiently and effectively. 4.2 General Instructions for First Responders The radiological nature of an incident may not be immediately obvious, especially in the event of a large explosion that causes confusion, ignites fires, damages structures, and injures and kills bystanders. Until the radiological nature of an incident is recognized (and, to some extent, even afterwards), the highest priority should be devoted to rescue and lifesaving operations, performing triage on injured persons, evacuating the most seriously injured, and other immediately necessary actions (e.g., firefighting). Once the radiological nature of the incident is recognized, it will also be important to determine the nature and extent of the contamination, after which the entire contaminated area should be cordoned off and radiation warning signs posted and radiation control zones established. Inner and outer contaminated areas and a secured area should be established as described in Sections 4.3.3 and 18. The potential offsite transport of radioactive materials through air or water contamination and by people and vehicles passing through contaminated areas will be the concern of those responsible for public health and environmental safety (Section 18). The presence of radioactive contamination will determine the need for PPE such as gloves, respiratory protection, and shoe covers for those entering the area. Persons leaving a contaminated
74 / 4. RADIATION-SAFETY GUIDANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS area must remove their PPE and (if necessary) decontaminate themselves prior to exit (Section 5.2). The presence of elevated radiation levels will determine the radiological stay-times for persons working in the area. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations such as 10 CFR 20.1003 (NRC, 2002a) and 10 CFR 20.1601 (NRC, 2002b) define and specify postings and controls for these areas. Radiologically-controlled areas will be established to recognize both contamination and radiation levels. Personnel responding to a radiological incident will use radiation detectors to determine the location of perimeter boundaries. Radiation dose-rate measurements can be read directly from the meters in units of mGy h–1 or mR h–1. Contamination limits are typically provided in units of becquerel or disintegrations per minute in a reference area3 [e.g., becquerel per square centimeter (Bq cm–2), or disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeter (disintegrations per minute 100 cm–2)]. Radiation detectors do not read directly in units of becquerel or disintegrations per minute; they read in counts per minute. Each meter has a counting efficiency for each energy and type of radiation it is measuring; the meter reading is equal to the amount of contamination multiplied by the counting efficiency, which is calculated when a meter is calibrated. To convert from the meter reading of counts per minute to the required units of disintegrations per minute, the user must divide the displayed count by the counting efficiency. For example, if a reading of 1,000 cpm is displayed on the meter face, and the meter is known to have a counting efficiency of 10 %, then the amount of contamination present is equal to 1,000 cpm divided by 0.10 = 10,000 dpm. 4.3 Guidance for First Responders NCRP Commentary No. 19, Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism (NCRP, 2005a), provides emergency responders sound advice for conducting their critical work in a dangerous radiation environment. Although the focus of Commentary No. 19 is nuclear and radiological terrorism, the advice is applicable to the full range of potential radionuclide exposure situations described in Section 17. Emergency responders should have a basic understanding of external radiation exposure, external and internal radioactive contamination and the medical consequences of each. They should understand 3
1 Bq is 1 disintegration per second, so 1 Bq = 60 dpm.
4.3 GUIDANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
/ 75
what radionuclide contamination is and what processes are necessary to mitigate contamination and alleviate potential medical consequences, and know the appropriate measures to protect themselves, others at the site, and members of the public. 4.3.1
First on the Scene
NCRP Commentary No. 19 (NCRP, 2005a) provides recommendations for a radiation emergency until designated authorities declare the emergency over. At that time, the established radiation protection procedures for both occupational and public exposure would normally be reinstituted, as well as any special arrangements for long-term control of a continuing elevated radiation environment. Once a response to a radiological incident is initiated, the first emergency responders to a scene should be assigned radiationmonitoring equipment to record exposure rate and cumulative dose. The instrument should be designed so the emergency responder (e.g., a bunker gear-clad firefighter) can readily interpret the reading and operate the controls. The radiation-monitoring instrument for emergency responders should provide a digital readout for exposure rate, cumulative dose and estimated stay-time at the current exposure rate. The readout should be linked to a visual indication such as green, yellow and red indicator lights because of likely complex noise and activity environment at the response scene (NCRP, 2005a). While the fundamental concept of keeping all radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (the ALARA principle) applies, it may not be realistic to apply other traditional radiation protection guidelines for limitation of radiation dose. The traditional guidelines are based on an assumption of low-level chronic exposure over long periods, and govern activities that are more controllable than the release of radionuclides in a work place, or in a nuclear or radiological terrorism incident (NCRP, 2005a). 4.3.2
Immediate Goals for Protection of Exposed Individuals
The two important goals of radiation protection in such an emergency are: • to prevent immediate injuries and deaths due to acute highlevel radiation exposure including intakes of radionuclides, and • minimize long-term effects (i.e., cancer) associated with lower levels of radiation exposure from both external and internal sources.
76 / 4. RADIATION-SAFETY GUIDANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS Minimizing radiation doses in both cases, by taking advantage of the basic features of radiation protection (i.e., increasing the distance from the source, limiting time of exposure, utilizing intervening shielding, removing individuals from contaminated areas, and controlling contamination including external decontamination of individuals), is much more effective than subsequent medical treatment and countermeasures. The main protective actions in a radiation incident will be medical treatment for those injured by an explosion, evacuation from the affected area, external decontamination of those who were contaminated, and assessment of external and internal contaminations. 4.3.3
Control Areas
The area in which the release of radionuclides occurs should be isolated to prevent the spread of contamination to unaffected areas. Any emergency-response personnel entering the area should be prepared to work in a contaminated environment, and those leaving the area should be monitored and decontaminated as necessary. To prevent the spread of radionuclides beyond the area of the incident, control areas should be established. These are described further in Section 18. Figure 4.1 provides a generic example of how control areas might be established. Three defined areas are shown: • inner contaminated area where the radionuclide release occurred; • outer contaminated area where released activity may be transported such as by explosions, air currents or inadvertently by people walking and vehicles driving from the release area; and • secured (clean) area, where entry and egress are controlled to minimize further contamination of people, facilities and the environment. This radionuclide control concept can apply to a broad spectrum of accidental and deliberate contamination incidents such as explosions, fires, ruptures of sources, and spills of radioactive materials in industrial settings, laboratories and hospitals. Section 5.3.4 describes in detail the operation of radiation and radionuclide controlled areas, whether at the site of a contamination incident or at a hospital or other facility where contaminated patients are being examined, decontaminated or treated. The particular situation will determine the configuration of control zones and the criteria for establishing contamination levels. In situations where the released radionuclides are totally contained at the site of release, the outer contaminated area would not be
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Fig. 4.1. A generic example of areas designated for specific activities in management of exposed persons after an incident involving the release of radionuclides. Several areas would be appropriately cordoned off and identified (adapted from IAEA, 2005b).
needed. Control areas or zones could be defined quite differently, depending upon the nature and the magnitude of the radionuclide source. For example, to attain the same objective, control of the released activity, an incident in a building would require an approach different from those in rural or urban sites. Applying the example in Figure 4.1 to a spill in a laboratory, the inner contaminated area is the location of a radionuclide release or spill (e.g., on a bench or laboratory floor). A radiation control point would be immediately established (perhaps only a step-off pad) to minimize the spread of the contamination. The laboratory or the corridor leading to the laboratory might be established as the outer contaminated area where activity may have, or is likely to, spread as a result of movement of people, equipment or ambient air. The whole building might be defined as the third, secured (clean) area, where entry and exit of persons and equipment would be controlled. The controlling radiation dose rates and contamination levels established by the radiation-safety personnel would depend upon the nature of the incident. These control areas should be cordoned off with barriers in place or locked doors and identified appropriately. Applying this configuration to a high-level radiological terrorist incident, the site might be segmented into radiation control zones as described in NCRP Commentary No. 19 (NCRP, 2005a) (Section 18.3).
78 / 4. RADIATION-SAFETY GUIDANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS In the generic example, Figure 4.1, triage, medical-response, and decontamination activities are located outside the perimeter of the outer contaminated area but within the perimeter of the secured area. This concept of control zones is used in general response procedures for hazardous materials. Control areas at hazardous materials incident sites are designated based upon safety and the degree of hazard. In radionuclide contamination incidents control zones help to limit the absorbed doses received by individual emergency responders as well as to facilitate effective management of exposed individuals. Appendix C addresses risks to first responders. Section 18 gives further descriptions of activities performed in each area. A command post might be outside the perimeter of the controlled area, as well as other support functions deemed necessary to manage the incident. The inner contaminated area, that area immediately surrounding the release of a radionuclide, should extend as far as necessary to prevent individuals from receiving radiation doses sufficient to cause early radiation effects (IAEA, 2003). A prudent approach is to assume the activity present in the inner contaminated area has the potential to produce adverse health effects and thus those persons in the area should be restricted to time-sensitive, mission-critical activities such as lifesaving. As noted before, the outer contaminated area may not be necessary if significant quantities of activity have not been spread from the inner area. Within the inner contaminated area, the appropriate actions are to evacuate or temporarily relocate the people, isolate the area and ensure that all emergency workers inside the area follow appropriate personal protection guidelines. More specific guidance on working in radiologically-controlled areas is given in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. 4.3.4
Protection of First Responders
NCRP recommends that for lifesaving or equivalent purposes, emergency workers may approach or exceed 0.5 Sv (50 rem) equivalent dose, 0.5 Gy (50 rad) absorbed dose, for x-rays and gamma radiation to a large portion of the body and an equivalent dose of 5 Sv (500 rem) to the skin (NCRP, 1993; 2001a). These are considered once-in-a-lifetime exposures. The decisive control for emergency responders working within or near the inner contaminated area with PPE is the 0.5 Gy (50 rad) whole-body value. ICRP recommends doses to emergency responders involved in lifesaving procedures be kept <1 Sv (100 rem) to avoid deterministic health effects. For those involved in recovery operations, normal occupational limits apply, effective dose of 50 mSv (5 rem) (ICRP, 2005a).
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Standard PPE including respiratory protection devices should be sufficient for most emergency responders conducting lifesaving and other critical missions (Section 5 describes PPE). In a major incident during the initial scoping of the response, radiation levels should be communicated to the incident commander or other responsible individual(s), who must assess the “life hazard” to exposed persons and the emergency responders. Additional equipment is required to screen for contamination of large numbers of people and for screening at emergency facilities (NCRP, 2005a). In large-scale releases of radiation and radioactive materials, individual pocket-sized alarming dosimeters should be used by all emergency responders in the inner contaminated area and, if available, by responders in the outer contaminated area (NCRP, 2005a). The radiation-monitoring instrument for emergency responders should provide a digital readout for exposure rate, cumulative dose, and estimated stay-time at the current exposure rate. The instrument would warn the wearer when the radiation exposure approaches a predetermined level or is likely to reach the level. The instrument, which would also serve as a dosimeter, should produce a warning, such as a steady red indicator (and perhaps also an audible indication), that the wearer has reached a cumulative absorbed dose of 0.5 Gy (50 rad). The instrument would display a blinking yellow light when the exposure rate is >0.1 mGy h–1 (10 mR h–1) but <0.1 Gy h–1 (10 R h–1) and would indicate the presence of significant radiation by displaying a blinking red light at exposure rates >0.1 Gy h–1 (10 R h–1). The instrument would display a steady green light when the exposure rate is <0.1 mGy h–1 (10 mR h–1). This combination of digital and visual readout would warn the wearer of the radiation levels while providing enough information to manage the exposure and to complete important tasks (NCRP, 2005a). The cumulative absorbed dose that triggers a decision on whether to remove an emergency responder from the inner contaminated area is 0.5 Gy (50 rad). The cumulative absorbed dose received by an emergency responder while working in or near the inner contaminated area should be recorded.
5. Performing Surveys and Controlling Personnel and Area Contamination While the following is primarily for those who may not be trained radiation-safety personnel, it may also be helpful to those who have not had recent experience with radiation detection instrumentation and radionuclide contamination. In all cases, to ensure proper use of radiation detection instrumentation, consultation with knowledgeable experts should occur whenever possible (see Section 19 for information on radiation detection instrumentation). Additional information is available in NCRP Commentary No. 19 (NCRP, 2005a) and in Background Information on FEMA-REP-22: Contamination Monitoring Guidance for Portable Instruments Used for Radiological Emergency Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents (FEMA, 2002). It is essential that PPE be used and worn correctly. Therefore, whenever possible it should be under the direction of trained experts. 5.1 Contamination Surveys First responders may be required to perform various surveys to detect external radiation sources and radioactive contamination. A major objective of onsite medical assessment or triage (Section 6) is an early identification of persons exposed to external radiation and those externally and internally contaminated with radionuclides. Other stages in the management of contaminated individuals onsite and at treatment facilities, require further and more thorough surveys for radionuclide contamination. The following briefly describes, in general, the steps to be taken in operating various radiation survey instruments to perform surveys of persons who may have been exposed, their clothing, air samples, nasal swabs, and other items of interest, as well as decontamination areas, emergency facilities, hospitals, vehicles used to transport contaminated persons, equipment and surveys of the professionals responding to contamination incidents. Instrumentation used in these types of surveys is described in detail in Sections 19.2.4 through 19.2.7.3. Additional information on these 80
5.1 CONTAMINATION SURVEYS
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types of instruments and their applications is available in references such as: Radiation Detection and Measurement (Knoll, 2000), Background Information on FEMA-REP-22: Contamination Monitoring Guidance for Portable Instruments Used for Radiological Emergency Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents (FEMA, 2002), Direct Determination of the Body Content of Radionuclides (ICRU, 2003), and Introduction to Health Physics (Cember and Johnson, 2008). 5.1.1
How to Perform Surveys of Individuals, Clothing, Samples and Surfaces
It is advisable that these surveys be performed by trained experts or at least under their guidance whenever possible. 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Check the test or calibration certificate. Radiation survey instruments will generally be accompanied by a test or calibration certificate. The information on this certificate should be documented with the results of the surveys taken with the instruments. Turn on the meter, check the battery charge, observe the meter for response (many meters have a check source attached, or one should be obtained), switch to highest setting, engage audible monitor, if available, and be aware of how different scales on the meter may indicate different exposure rates. Obtain a background reading at ~1 m from the contaminated surface. When possible, the background should be taken in the general area, but not near the incident site. Subtract background from survey readings. Hold detector <1 cm (0.5 inch) for beta/gamma, 0.25 inch for alpha from the item being surveyed (avoid touching the contaminated material) and move it at ~3 to 5 cm (one to two inches) s–1. Turn switch to lower scales until the meter reading is less than three-quarters of the full scale. Instrumental contamination surveys cannot be performed if background level is too high (e.g., 300 cpm on a frisker)4 (Section 19.2.7.2). In these cases, smears must be used and counted in a low background area. Do not take smear samples from contaminated individuals in a high background area; take the individuals to a lower background area.
4Generic
name for hand-held instrument generally used for surveying external surfaces of people and objects.
82 / 5. PERFORMING SURVEYS AND CONTROLLING CONTAMINATION 6.
7. 5.1.2 1.
2. 3.
5.1.3 1.
2. 3.
4. 5. 6.
If the detector gives results in count rate, use the instrument’s calibration factor to convert measurements into activity Bq cm–2 (dpm cm–2) or, if the probe size is 100 cm2 (the size of newer probes), record the results as activity per 100 cm2 Record results on a survey map or diagram and note areas with high contamination levels. Observe if results could have been influenced by uneven surfaces or from visible contamination (especially important for alpha or low-energy beta contamination). Document results (Appendix A). How to Perform a Beta/Gamma-Radiation Area Survey Turn on the meter, check battery charge, observe the meter for response (many meters have a check source attached, or one should be found), engage audible monitor, if available, and be aware of how different scales on the meter may indicate different exposure rates. Hold detector or meter about waist height and walk slowly through area. Note areas with elevated readings on survey maps or diagrams. How to Perform an Alpha-Radiation Survey of Contaminated Areas, Individuals and Samples Turn on the meter, check battery charge, observe the meter for response (many meters have a check source attached, or one should be found), engage audible monitor, if available, be aware of how different scales on the meter may indicate different exposure rates. If the meter has a protective plastic cover over the alpha-sensitive area, this must be removed prior to performing the survey. Pass detector (probe) very close to, but not touching, suspected areas of contamination at the incident site. Pass detector (probe) very close to, but not touching, air samples, smears, and nasal swabs, and suspected areas of contamination on individuals, clothing and equipment. Identify areas with elevated readings on survey maps or diagrams. Document external alpha contamination of individuals on a body diagram (Appendix A). Document survey results of air samples, smears, nasal swabs, clothing, and other items relevant to external and internal contamination assessments.
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General characteristics of different survey instruments and different types of on- and offsite surveys are given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 5.2 Personal Protection Equipment It is important that personal protection equipment (PPE) be used or worn correctly to ensure adequate protection of the individual. Respiratory protection is especially sensitive to being correctly fitted to the face as well as being the appropriate type for the situation. Therefore, it is advisable that the use of PPE be under the direction of trained experts. 5.2.1
Examples of Personal Protection Equipment
The following items of protective equipment should be used as necessary, according to the risk and level of contamination: • • • • • • • 5.2.2
gloves shoe covers and booties coveralls outer shoe covers head/hair covering tape to close open ends of clothing respiratory protection Personal Protection Equipment Inspection
Prior to dressing, PPE should be inspected as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.
5.
examine gloves, shoe covers, and coveralls for rips, tears or split seams; examine gloves for holes or split seams; examine shoe covers for holes and for proper size; verify proper operation of respiratory protection: a. ensure nuisance masks or N95 filters5 do not have holes; b. ensure all masks fit tightly around nose and chin; c. confirm sufficient air supply in forced-air masks; and d. examine all hoses for damage and leaks; remove watches, jewelry, rings, etc., to reduce the risk of making holes in the PPE.
5By NIOSH classification an N95 mask or filter traps 95 % of particles with a diameter of 0.3 μm or larger. Any mask, including an N95 mask, should be tested to ensure a good fit prior to wearing.
Meter
Probe
Record Results in:a
Use for These Surveys
General survey instrument
GM
Becquerel (dpm)
Contamination
Hand and foot monitor
GM
Becquerel (dpm)
Contamination on hands and feet when leaving a room
General survey instrument
Energy-compensated GM
mGy or mSv h–1 (mR h–1) becquerel (dpm)
Radiation levels Contamination
General survey instrument
NaI scintillation
mGy or mSv h–1 (mR h–1) becquerel (dpm)
Radiation levels Contamination
Ion chamber or micro-R meter
Ion chamber or micro-R meter
mGy or mSv h–1 (mR h–1) or μGy h–1 (μR h–1)
Radiation levels
Alpha survey instrument
Zinc sulfide
Becquerel (dpm)
Contamination
Portable spectroscopy survey meter
Germanium semiconductor
Output varies; radionuclide and activity determination
Radionuclide identification and possible quantification
aMany
instruments readout in counts per minute. These readings should be converted to becquerel and or disintegrations per minute using the calibration factors appropriate for the particular instrument.
84 / 5. PERFORMING SURVERYS AND CONTROLLING CONTAMIANTION
TABLE 5.1—Radiation instrumentation used for contamination and radiation surveys.
TABLE 5.2—Types of surveys and appropriate instruments. Survey
Survey Type
Meter and Probe
Record Results in:
Contamination
Hand and foot monitor (GM)
Becquerel (dpm)
Smear wipe
Removable contamination
Count wipes in well counter, or with meter
Becquerel (dpm)
Area survey
Radiation
Energy-compensated GM, ion chamber or micro-R meter
mGy or mSv h–1 (mR h–1) or μGy or μSv h–1 (μR h–1)
Spills, personnel surveys
Contamination
GM and/or alpha detector
Becquerel (dpm)
Radionuclide identification
Contamination
Portable spectroscopy survey meter
Output varies, radionuclide and activity determination
Personnel
Contamination
Portal monitor
Becquerel (dpm)
5.2 PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
Hands and feet (exiting room)
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86 / 5. PERFORMING SURVEYS AND CONTROLLING CONTAMINATION 5.2.3
Dressing in Personal Protection Equipment
The equipment should be put on in this order. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
turnout gear or coveralls; shoe covers (tape at ankles if necessary and possible), wear two pair or booties over rough terrain; gloves (tape inner gloves at wrists if necessary); respiratory protection (if advisable); hood or head covering (if applicable). Tape hood to respiratory protection; and dosimeter (should be easily accessible)
Table 5.3 provides important information on appropriate PPE to be used during different phases of response to an incident. • if time and conditions permit, tape coveralls or turnout gear at wrists and ankles; • if there are not enough personal dosimeters for each person, give a dosimeter to at least one person in each response group (e.g., fire-hose team, rescue party).; • radioactive contamination on the ground or on an individual is only very rarely hazardous; • lifesaving actions (rescuing people, firefighting, stabilizing structures) may be performed, provided responders wear appropriate PPE and respiratory protection, even when contamination levels are very high; and • perform radiation dose rate and contamination level surveys at the earliest opportunity. 5.2.4
Removing Personal Protection Equipment
Remove protective equipment in this order: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
outer gloves give dosimeter to health and safety personnel tape at ankles, wrists coveralls (coat and pants) head cover, helmet and or hoods respiratory protection shoe covers (step to clean area) inner gloves
TABLE 5.3—PPE for emergency and recovery phases. Incident
• Hot particles on skin • Inhaling activity • Swallowing radioactive materials
Appropriate PPE Emergency Phase
• Turnout gear (gloves, boots, coat) • Full-face air-purifying respirator, forced air, or preferred, a self-contained breathing apparatus • Personal dosimeter
Recovery Phase
• Coveralls, outer clothes • Gloves (rubber, leather, surgical) • Shoe covers • Nuisance mask for dust (N95) unless air sampling indicates otherwise • Personal dosimeter
5.2 PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
Area contamination with radioactive dusts, liquids, or airborne spray of activity
Radiological Concerns
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88 / 5. PERFORMING SURVEYS AND CONTROLLING CONTAMINATION 5.2.5 1. 2.
3.
4. 5.
Actions to be Taken after Personal Protection Equipment is Removed Perform whole-body contamination survey in accordance with Section 7 of this Report. As it is removed, survey and dispose of contaminated PPE or set it aside for decontamination as warranted. Disposable PPE is usually deposited in waste containers without survey. Place contaminated PPE and clothing into designated radioactive-waste receptacles. If required, package each person’s removed PPE in a separate bag before placing into waste receptacle. Survey hands after handling PPE. Wash hands and face, shower if possible. 5.3 Contamination Control
5.3.1
Contamination Control Practices
Appropriate contamination control measures should be taken, when such measures do not interfere with necessary emergency medical attention. Factors influencing the need for contamination control measures: • injuries or other medical concerns (e.g., lacerations, smoke inhalation, embedded materials, burns, respiratory or cardiac distress, broken limbs, shock); • contamination of the individual (e.g., skin contamination, inhaled or ingested activity, contaminated clothing or hair); • contamination at the scene (e.g., spilled liquids, radioactive powder, and fallout); and • other dangers at the scene (e.g., fire, unstable structures, spilled chemicals, broken glass, dangerously high radiation levels, explosives). Contamination control will be a primary concern only if the contaminated person is lightly injured or uninjured and there are no other hazards at the scene. However, the presence of other significant hazards or serious injuries should take priority over contamination control. 5.3.2
Contamination Control of Exposed People
Contamination control should not interfere with caring for severely-injured people. Contamination control may include:
5.3 CONTAMINATION CONTROL
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• removing the person’s contaminated clothing; • wrapping the individual to control the spread of contamination; and • decontaminating the contaminated person. 5.3.3
Contamination Control Among Medical and EmergencyResponse Personnel
• medical and emergency-response personnel should not delay or deny treatment to contaminated persons; • following standard precautions (CDC, 1988) and wearing appropriate PPE will protect against contamination while working with a contaminated person (normally operating room precautions are adequate); and • changing PPE, using a step-off pad, and showering at the end of a shift is sufficient to prevent the spread of contamination into designated “clean” areas. 5.3.4
Radiologically-Controlled Areas (further defined in Sections 4.3.3 and 18)
Figure 5.1 illustrates important concepts of radiologically-controlled areas and their use. These apply to the sites of radionuclide releases (contamination incidents) and hospitals or other locations where contaminated patients are being examined, decontaminated or treated. • established boundaries should be at least waist high with clearly defined paths via step-off pads (e.g., rope, tape, or other device that can be controlled); • if possible locate a table with a barrier line separating clean and possibly contaminated surfaces at exit point for tools and equipment; • the markings on the floor at the designated exit points delineating the inner contaminated, outer contaminated, and secured areas should be low to permit crossing without tripping or losing balance. (To control contamination, persons should not cross boundaries anywhere except at designated points, the gates at the step-off pads.); • plastic sheeting (preferably textured to minimize slipping) should be used to cover the ground in the exit area; • “sticky mats” may be used as step-off pads to minimize transporting radioactive contamination from one area to the next; and • “hot” waste containers should be clearly marked “radioactive waste” and should be lined with plastic bags.
90 / 5. PERFORMING SURVEYS AND CONTROLLING CONTAMINATION
Fig. 5.1. Schematic drawing of radiologically-controlled areas and exit points at the scene of an incident.
5.3.4.1 General Guidelines for Operation of a Controlled Contamination Area • seriously injured patients and necessary medical personnel should use the contamination control corridor for evacuations to ambulances; • the inner and outer contaminated, and secured areas of the exit point should be used in the following manner: - the inner contaminated area and objects within are assumed to be contaminated at all times; - persons wishing to exit the inner contaminated area should do so only at an exit location such as that shown in Figure 5.1 unless their medical condition dictates otherwise; - the outer contaminated area is established for the removal of contamination control PPE, performing whole-body surveys, and necessary decontamination. This area should be surveyed and decontaminated frequently, if possible; - exit to the “clean” secured area should be restricted to those who are confirmed to be uncontaminated via wholebody survey and (if necessary) decontamination; - step-off pads (preferably consisting of “sticky mats” when available) should be used when stepping into the next area through the control points; - step-off pads should be surveyed periodically for contamination and should be replaced, decontaminated or renewed if found to be contaminated; and - contaminated clothing, tools, and other objects should be placed in radioactive-waste containers, in individual bags if possible.
5.3 CONTAMINATION CONTROL
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5.3.4.2 Leaving a Controlled Area 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
enter “hot” side of exit point; log name of responder entering the exit point; survey outer gloves or hands for contamination; survey coveralls or outer clothing for contamination; if contaminated, remove coveralls or outer clothing and place in radioactive-waste container or plastic bag (consistent with common practice, surveys prior to removing outer clothing may not be required as it doubles the survey time; in these cases, PPE should be removed at the step-off pad); step to “cold” boundary of exit point; remove shoe covers while stepping over boundary to “cold” side of exit point; remove gloves inside out and place into radioactive-waste container or plastic bag; survey whole body, concentrating on hands, feet, face, knees, elbows, and seat of pants; and survey exit point and step-off pad(s) periodically and decontaminate as necessary.
5.3.4.3 Transportation of Injured and Contaminated Individuals. Persons who require immediate medical care, prior to external decontamination onsite, can be transported to a hospital or other medical facility in conventional ambulances. The removal of contaminated clothing and initial skin decontamination at the incident site will eliminate most of the readily transferable contamination. In transportation accidents where no onsite decontamination is possible, placing the individual in a sheet or blanket and covering the litter and surrounding floor with plastic sheeting should prevent serious contamination of the ambulance or its attendants. Only in unusual cases would the driver or other personnel be at risk of being seriously contaminated. Nevertheless, the ambulance and the attending emergency medical responders should be monitored before they leave the hospital area if possible. If it is necessary to transport patients beyond the local area, by airplane or helicopter, similar precautions should be taken to minimize contamination of the vehicle. Ambulance and treatment area contamination control: 1. 2.
Wrap patient in blankets to contain contamination and reduce contamination of facilities. Establish dedicated routes for transporting contaminated patients.
92 / 5. PERFORMING SURVEYS AND CONTROLLING CONTAMINATION 3. 4.
5. 6.
7. 5.3.5 1.
2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8.
Establish dedicated areas for decontamination and contaminated patient care. Line dedicated routes and rooms with plastic to reduce contamination of fixed surfaces. Avoid use of slick plastic on floors and walking surfaces. Textured plastic or other nonslippery surface is preferred. Do not use contaminated vehicles or equipment for noncontaminated patients unless necessary. Use a “hot” stretcher to transport the individual to the boundary of the radiologically-controlled area, transferring to a “clean” stretcher for transport to the hospital. Wrap the patient in a blanket or sheet prior to placing on “clean” stretcher. Decontamination of Equipment Smooth surfaces (glass, plastic, metal) can be decontaminated using any of these methods: a. wipe with cloths dampened with water or commercial cleaning products; b. “tape press” using the sticky side of tape (duct tape, masking tape, etc.); and c. immersion in an ultrasonic cleaning sink. Contamination that cannot be removed can be considered fixed; if radiation dose rate is low, essential equipment may continue to be used. Porous or fibrous surfaces cannot be decontaminated by washing or wiping. Some items may be soaked in a cleaning solution or placed in an ultrasonic sink. Soft items (e.g., wood, plastic, lead) may be shaved with a knife to remove contamination. Contaminated sections of fabric or paper can be cut out and the remainder used. If contamination is fixed in equipment, and the equipment must be used, cover the contaminated area and continue using the equipment as necessary. Large areas (such as ambulance interiors or floors) may be decontaminated by wiping with a sponge or rags soaked in soapy water, detergent, or other cleaning solutions.
Part B: Onsite and Prehospital Actions 6. Stage 1: Medical Assessment (onsite triage area)
Objectives • identify individuals with life-threatening problems, stabilize and consider admitting for emergency care; • identify and treat individuals with nonlife-threatening injuries; • identify individuals exposed to radionuclides and external radiation; • identify those who may be externally and/or internally contaminated; • identify those who show evidence of psychological distress issues discussed in Section 9.1.2; and • document the radionuclide contaminating incident. 93
94 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA) See Figure 3.1 for flow of persons through all nine stages in the management of radionuclide contamination. The management of persons contaminated with radionuclides will usually occur at two locations, at the site of the incident and at a hospital or other emergency facility. In this Report, the actions taken by qualified experts, medical and radiation-safety professionals are considered to occur in nine stages. The flow of persons through these nine stages is illustrated in the chart given in Figure 3.1. The following describes actions to be taken in the first stage, Medical Assessment, at the site of the contamination incident. 6.1 Initial Actions of Medical and Radiation Safety Personnel • Remove individuals from the contaminated areas to a triage area within the decontamination area (Figure 4.1) • Remove contaminated clothing and replace with clean clothing or wrap in blanket. • Survey individual for surface-contamination levels and document. • Obtain nasal swabs and survey for evidence of an inhalation intake (see Section 10.3.1.1 for information on how to collect samples and to interpret the results and Section 6.6. for actions to be taken when swabs are positive). • Treat injuries and other medical concerns such as psychological distress issues discussed in Section 9.1.2. • Cover contaminated wounds with sterile dressings. • Alert hospital and call for ambulance service as necessary. • Take individual to the hospital if injuries require immediate medical or surgical care not available onsite or if further medical or dosimetric evaluation and treatment is required. • Take precautions to prevent spread of contamination during transport and movement of the patient. Have transport vehicles, attendants and equipment checked for residual radionuclide contamination before release from control area. • Advise family on the extent of injuries and exposure (Appendix E). • Obtain complete history of incident, especially as it relates to the activities of the individual. Where was he/she? What was he/she doing? Exit path? Symptoms (Section 6.8 and Appendix A). 6.2 Potential Life-Threatening Problems The highest priority is to provide emergency medical care immediately for serious injuries, prevent further injuries, and preserve
6.2 POTENTIAL LIFE-THREATENING PROBLEMS
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vital functions. This has priority over assessing contamination and decontaminating (Bushberg et al., 2007). Minor injuries can wait until after initial radiation survey has been completed. • Medical personnel should consider both medical and radiological issues so that critical medical concerns (e.g., injuries that threaten life, limb or vision) are addressed first. • Contaminated or irradiated patients do not pose a health risk to medical responders, except in extremely unusual situations where the patient is very heavily contaminated with radionuclides that may become airborne, or may have fragments of highly-radioactive materials embedded in the skin or clothing. • Unless knowledgeable about the teratological effects of radiation and the dose to the fetus, medical personnel should not advise pregnant women on the medical effects of their suspected radiation exposure until they have had the opportunity to consult with trained radiation-safety personnel, medical physicists, or other professionals who are competent to perform a fetal radiation dose estimate and to interpret the results. • The highest priority usually is to provide immediate emergency medical care to individuals who have been seriously injured in a radionuclide contamination incident. However, should there be an ongoing hazardous situation, such as a fire, evacuation may be the highest priority. When a life or death surgical emergency exists, the patient must receive immediate lifesaving first aid and transportation to a hospital regardless of contamination, except as noted below. A hospital emergency room or surgical suite can always be decontaminated after its use. Skin or wound contamination is almost never immediately life threatening. • In rare situations, it may be necessary to perform emergency amputation or extensive surgical debridement at the site of the incident, in the nearest first aid station, at a decontamination facility, or medical-response base established onsite (Figure 4.1). For example, in the case of an explosion, an individual could suffer a mangled extremity contaminated with embedded gamma-emitting foreign bodies such that the radiation level to the rest of the body and to first aid personnel is an overriding consideration [e.g., gamma levels of Gy h–1 (hundreds of rad h–1)]. High-level contamination of this magnitude provides the principal need and justification for use of mobile gamma shields to protect persons engaged
96 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA) in decontamination work or surgery in radiological emergency centers. However, since such incidents are expected to be extremely rare, it is not likely that mobile shielding sufficient for gamma rays >500 keV would be a stock item at most emergency centers; only those associated with facilities where work with radiation sources was routine. • Unless the exposed person has serious injuries or the contamination incident site is poorly equipped or staffed, there is usually no need to move the patient immediately to a hospital. Even with fairly serious injuries, it is better to stabilize the patient’s physical condition and remove all easily transferable contamination than to rush him/her to a poorly prepared hospital. 6.3 Identification of Individuals Exposed to Radiation and/or Radionuclides Preliminary assessment of radiation injuries and external and internal depositions of radionuclides onsite will necessarily be qualitative. However, information and survey instrumentation data gathered onsite will be valuable resources for complete medical and dose assessments conducted at the hospital. Table 6.1 suggests methods useful in identifying exposed persons who may have been irradiated from external sources, those who may be externally contaminated and those who may have had intakes of radionuclides and are internally contaminated. Many assessment methods can be conducted onsite (field measurement). These should be given first consideration. However, if these are not adequate to make an initial assessment, then samples will need to be collected and sent to an appropriate laboratory for analysis. Section 5.1 provides guidance on performing surveys for evidence of external contamination and internal deposition. 6.4 Assessment of External Irradiation Certain radionuclide contamination scenarios can result in exposures to penetrating radiation from external sources (Section 17). When this is a possibility, it is important to determine whether exposures occurred and to evaluate possible radiation doses. If the incident occurs in a facility where personal dosimeters are in use, the evaluation is straight forward. However, when personal dosimeters or other radiation measurement devices are not present, the evaluation must rely on clinical and biological indicators. Table 6.2 is a concise description of the clinical characteristics of different acute radiation syndromes from high-dose, whole-body radiation exposures delivered at high dose rates.
TABLE 6.1—Preliminary assessment of radiation exposures, doses and contamination. Source
External
Assessment Method
Assessment Location
Measure radiation levels near individuals and note their stay-time
Field measurements; radiation survey or dosimeter
Skin or clothing contamination
Measure radiation dose rate from contamination with survey instrument
Field measurement
Skin
Skin dose calculations based on dose coefficients (see electron constants in Table 7.1 and Section 21.3 for further information)
Inhalation (nasal and/or oral)
Monitor facial area for radioactivity; collect nasal swabs
Field measurement Collect in field and survey for preliminary evidence of inhalation intake; analyze in laboratory for further evaluation (Section 10.3.1.1)
Air samples
Field; for quick assessment, hold probe over sample surface. Count in field and/or laboratory
Obtain count rate from lungs (gamma only)
Field; for quick assessment, hold probe on chest or back to monitor for activity
Urine, fecal samplesa
Collect samples, analyze in laboratory
samplesa
Collect samples, analyze in laboratory
Ingestion
Urine, fecal
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Radioactive source
6.4 ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL IRRADIATION
Internal
Pathway
Source
Pathway
aIn
Assessment Location
Dermal absorption
Urine, fecal samplesa
Collect samples, analyze in laboratory
Absorption via a wound
Obtain count rate from wound
Count in field or in medical facility/laboratory
Urine, fecal samplesa
Collect samples, analyze in laboratory
Obtain count rate at site of injection (or wound)
Survey in field or laboratory
Urine, fecal samplesa
Collect samples, analyze in laboratory
Calculate dose using lymphocyte depletion or cytogenetic assays after 24 h
Over 1 to 2 d, collect and process samples in laboratory and perform dose assessment
Utilize software such as the AFRRI Biodosimetry Assessment Tool (AFRRI, 2007)
Assessment may be performed in field or in hospital
Injection (e.g., contaminated shrapnel, and debris)
Internal, external
Assessment Method
Whole-body radiation exposure
vivo bioassay samples, urine and/or fecal, should be obtained in all cases of contamination or exposure to an unsealed source of radioactive material to assess radionuclide uptake. However, in vivo bioassay samples collected shortly following an intake (e.g., within 2 to 4 h for urine and within a couple of days for feces) are not necessarily representative of a systemic uptake. Further, collection of samples onsite that are free of contamination is often difficult. Therefore, it is usually prudent to move potentially-contaminated persons to a noncontaminated control area (e.g., medical facility, before collecting samples). However, early urine and blood samples can in some circumstances be useful in gaining information about the initial intake and later for comparison with “after treatment” samples (Section 10.3).
98 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA)
TABLE 6.1—(continued)
TABLE 6.2—Acute radiation syndromes (CDC, 2005). Latent Stage
Manifest Illness Stage
Recovery
Hematopoietic (bone marrow)
>0.7 Gy (>70 rad) [mild symptoms may occur as low as 0.3 Gy (30 rad)]
• Symptoms are anorexia, nausea and vomiting • Onset occurs 1 h to 2 d after exposure • Stage lasts for minutes to days
• Stem cells in bone marrow are dying, although patient may appear and feel well • Stage lasts 1 to 6 weeks
• Symptoms are anorexia, fever, and malaise • Drop in all blood cell counts occurs for several weeks • Primary cause of death is infection and hemorrhage • Survival decreases with increasing dose • Most deaths occur within a few months after exposure
• In most cases, bone-marrow cells will begin to repopulate the marrow • There should be full recovery for a large percentage of individuals from a few weeks up to 2 y after exposure • Death may occur in some individuals at 1.2 Gy (120 rad). • LD50/60b is ~2.5 to 5 Gy (250 to 500 rad)
Gastrointestinal
>10 Gy (>1,000 rad) [some symptoms may occur as low as 6 Gy (600 rad)]
• Symptoms are anorexia, severe nausea, vomiting, cramps, and diarrhea • Onset occurs within a few hours after exposure • Stage lasts ~2 d
• Stem cells in bone marrow and cells lining GI tract are dying, although patient may appear and feel well • Stage lasts <1 week
• Symptoms are malaise, anorexia, severe diarrhea, fever, dehydration, and electrolyte imbalance • Death is due to infection, dehydration, and electrolyte imbalance • Death occurs within 2 weeks of exposure
• LD100c is ~10 Gy (1,000 rad)
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Prodromal Stage
6.4 ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL IRRADIATION
Dosea
Syndrome
Syndrome Cardiovascular / central nervous system
Dosea
Prodromal Stage
>50 Gy (5,000 rad) [some symptoms may occur as low as 20 Gy (2,000 rad)]
• Symptoms are extreme nervousness and confusion; severe nausea, vomiting, and watery diarrhea; loss of consciousness; and burning sensations of the skin • Onset occurs within minutes of exposure • Stage lasts for minutes to hours
Latent Stage • Patient may return to partial functionality • Stage may last for hours but often is less
Manifest Illness Stage • Symptoms are return of watery diarrhea, convulsions, and coma • Onset occurs 5 to 6 h after exposure • Death occurs within 3 d of exposure
Recovery • No recovery is expected
aThe absorbed doses quoted here are “gamma equivalent” values. Neutrons or protons generally produce the same effects as gamma, beta, or x rays but at lower doses. If the patient has been exposed to neutrons or protons, consult radiation experts on how to interpret the dose. bThe LD 50/60 is the dose necessary to kill 50 % of the exposed population in 60 d. c The LD100 is the dose necessary to kill 100 % of the exposed population.
100 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA)
TABLE 6.2—(continued)
6.5 CONTAMINATION SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS
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Patients who develop nausea and vomiting in the first 6 to 12 h after a radiation incident should be hospitalized. Since nausea and vomiting rarely occur as an emotional reaction to a radiation incident, they should be considered indicative of a serious exposure to penetrating radiation until proved otherwise. A complete blood cell count [CBC (total and differential)] should be performed promptly and then every 6 to 8 h as indicated. If the counts reveal a rapid fall or a low value in absolute lymphocyte count within 48 h, radiation injury is strongly suggested. Other laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as cytogenetic chromosome analysis may be useful. Except in cases of extremely-high exposure, radiation injury typically has a latency period of days to weeks (see Table 6.2 for signs and symptoms resulting from various levels of whole-body irradiation). Skin burns, vomiting, weakness, and other apparent radiation effects that appear after a short time may be caused by other factors. 6.5 Contamination Screening of Individuals 6.5.1
External Contamination
Depending upon the nature of the contaminating incident, it may be that not all persons onsite will be exposed and contaminated. Therefore, the first step is to identify the contaminated individuals. This screening should occur onsite using methods given in Table 6.1. All individuals in the area of radionuclide release incident should be surveyed with appropriate radiation detection instruments identified in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. These should be total-body surveys conducted in an uncontaminated area if possible. The results should be recorded on a body diagram (Appendix A). Individuals found to have external contamination should be admitted to a controlled area for assessment of their contamination (Section 7) and for decontamination (Section 8). 6.5.2
Internal Contamination
It should be assumed that those who have been determined to be externally contaminated also have had an intake of radionuclides and are internally contaminated. Internal depositions of radionuclides may result from inhalation, ingestion, skin absorption, contaminated wounds, and/or embedded radioactive shrapnel and other contaminated debris. An assessment of the incident and the triage findings should be well documented by radiation-safety and medical personnel (Appendix A). Most contamination incidents take place at facilities with radioactive-materials licenses (nuclear power plants, research
102 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA) universities, etc.), which are likely to have the capability to perform all of the following actions. In the event of a large-scale contamination incident (e.g., a terrorist attack), contamination may be spread to public areas with limited resources for rapid and appropriate response to radiological emergencies. Accordingly, it may not be reasonable to assume that all of the following actions will be accomplished rapidly by trained radiation-safety professionals. Once the radiological character of an incident is recognized, emergency responders should immediately request support from radiationsafety professionals, and should take those actions that they can while waiting for their arrival. When possible, direct-body measurements appropriate to the radionuclide of exposure and the mode of potential intake can be made onsite using methods identified in Table 6.1. These should provide useful information about the likely magnitude of intake. Initial indications of an intake may include external contamination in the vicinity of the mouth or nose, air sample results, a wound incurred while working with radioactive material, skin breaks or blood smears showing radioactive contamination, and oral or nasal swabs (or nasal blows) showing contamination. Such initial indicators should usually be considered qualitative rather than quantitative for the purposes of intake and dose assessment. However they may be adequate for making an initial determination whether dose-reduction therapy (i.e., treatment with medical countermeasures) is indicated. The possibility of false-negative results, such as from oral swabs because of rapid clearance from the mouth, should not be overlooked. More accurate measurement of internal contamination is dependent upon the collection of appropriate biological samples (Section 10). 6.5.2.1 Inhalation Intakes. Nasal-swab samples can be useful in providing qualitative information about an inhalation intake. However, collecting such samples may be limited in situations where there are many contaminated individuals. When collecting nasal swabs is practical, the swab samples should be obtained on anyone suspected of inhaling radioactive material, as soon as the person’s condition permits, and prior to showering or washing the face. The samples must be collected early to obtain an accurate result, before an individual puts a finger in, or blows, his/her nose (see Section 10.3.1.1 for guidance in collecting and interpreting nasal swabs). Nasal swabs should be surveyed with a GM or sodium iodide detector for beta/gamma emitters and a zinc-sulfide detector for alpha emitters. Positive results are indicative of possible intakes and should be followed by further sampling and laboratory analysis.
6.5 CONTAMINATION SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS
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Individuals with intakes of radionuclides should be further assessed by radiation-safety professionals at an appropriate facility after external decontamination. 6.5.2.2 Intakes Through Skin and Ingestion. Wounds in areas of skin contamination are strong indicators of possible radionuclide intakes. Contamination of skin surfaces suggest possible intakes through absorption, but only in cases of very heavy contamination would absorption result in significant internal contamination, even if the radionuclide is in a soluble form. Injuries with contaminated debris and shrapnel are clear evidence of internal contamination. Discovery of contaminated food and water should be taken as evidence of possible ingestion intakes. Contamination of the mouth and other oral surfaces suggest possible intakes by ingestion, not necessarily in contaminated food, but by touching the face and mouth with contaminated hands. • Survey the individuals’ mouths and nostrils with a GM, sodium iodide (for gamma radiation), or zinc-sulfide (for alpha radiation) detector for evidence of inhalation or ingestion (Section 5.1.1). • Survey wounds with a GM, sodium iodide (for gamma radiation), or zinc-sulfide (for alpha radiation) detector for evidence of contamination or shrapnel. • Attempt to determine the time of intake as accurately as possible. • Emergency medical personnel (with radiation-safety personnel guidance if needed) should attempt to collect samples for bioassay as tabulated in Table 6.1 for internal dose assessment. Such onsite samples should rarely include urine and fecal samples, as noted below and in Table 6.1. An accurate determination of internal contamination may take several hours to obtain and requires urine and stool bioassays or other procedures described in Section 10. 6.5.2.3 Collection of Excreta. Although it is important to collect samples for bioassay soon after a contamination incident, urine samples taken within 4 h and fecal samples within a couple of days are of little value because they may not be representative of the systemic uptake. In addition, samples taken in or near contaminated areas have a high probability of being contaminated.
104 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA) 6.6 Onsite Treatment for Internal Contamination Only rarely is it necessary to initiate decorporation therapy at the site of a serious radionuclide contamination incident. Treatment should be limited to simple actions such as oral, nasopharyngeal, and wound irrigation to remove radionuclides that might be ingested, taken further into the respiratory tract, or absorbed into the tissues surrounding wounds. Prompt administration of medical countermeasures or isotopic dilution can appreciably decrease the uptake of radionuclides into stable metabolic pools such as thyroid and bone, from which it is not possible to readily mobilize radionuclides. In order to be effective, these agents must be given as soon as possible after the intake (Section 12.2). For example, if intakes of plutonium or other actinides are suspected (e.g., from surveys of the facial areas or by positive nasal swabs), DTPA should be administered immediately (Breitenstein, 2003; IAEA, 1978; NCRP, 1980; Norwood, 1975) (Section 12.3.3). Also, if intakes of radioiodine are suspected, administration of the blocking agent, KI should be considered. The physician (or paramedic) at the site of the contamination incident should therefore administer the appropriate agent as soon as possible if it has been determined that intake levels were high. If the appropriate treatment agent is not available onsite, the physician should contact the hospital and suggest its administration as soon as the patient arrives. Specific recommendations for drug treatment are described in Section 12. Table 12.2 provides a rapid means of finding the appropriate agent to use for a particular exposure. 6.7 Priorities in Processing Exposed Persons The objective of Stage 1 is the identification and assessment of exposed individuals. This should lead to the characterization of each as to the degree of their injury and contamination. Table 6.3 suggests priorities to be considered in processing individuals through succeeding management stages. 6.8 Documenting a Radionuclide Contamination Incident Onsite physicians and/or other medical personnel should forward information on the radionuclide incident to the emergency department of their referral hospital and remain in contact with the hospital staff until treatment decisions have been made. Medical and radiation-safety personnel should carefully document the incident including their actions and observations. An example form for documenting radiological exposures is in Appendix A.
TABLE 6.3—Priorities in processing exposed persons. Degree of Injury and Contamination Level
Actions
High external radiation doses
Transport to hospital before decontamination and treat for acute radiation syndrome.
High levels of internal contamination (thousands of disintegrations per minute in nasal swabs from inhaled radionuclides, or thousands of counts per minute from contaminated wounds)
Intervene, if possible, to enhance the total-body natural elimination rate of the compound, or block the uptake of the radionuclide in sites where high uptake may occur (e.g., radioiodine in the thyroid and plutonium in bone). As noted above, if intakes of plutonium or other actinides are confirmed or suspected, immediate treatment with DTPA should be started if possible (Section 12) and if intakes of radioiodine are indicated, administrations of KI should be started. If immediate intervention is contra-indicated, decontaminate and admit to emergency facility for internal contamination and dose assessment (see Section 8 for decontamination guidance).
Serious injuries (not life threatening, but requiring rapid medical attention)
Decontaminate and admit to emergency department.
Evidence of contaminated wounds
Gently flush with sterile water or saline (see Section 9.4.1 for further information).
High levels of skin contamination (Tables 3.8 and 7.2) [>10,000 Bq cm–2 (>600,000 dpm cm–2) beta/gamma surface body contamination (IAEA, 2005b), or spot contamination >3,700 Bq (2.2 × 105 dpm) (NCRP, 2005a)]
Decontamination required and admit to emergency department for treatment of skin radiation burns (Section 8). Evaluate for internal contamination.
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Manage airway, breathing and circulation and transport to hospital emergency department before decontamination (see Section 5.3.4 for transportation of contaminated patients). 6.8 DOCUMENTING A CONTAMINATION INCIDENT
Life-threatening injuries and medical conditions
Degree of Injury and Contamination Level
Actions
Moderate injuries (requiring medical attention)
Decontaminate and admit to emergency department.
Moderate levels of internal contamination (hundreds of disintegrations per minute in nasal or oral swabs, or hundreds of disintegrations per minute from contaminated wounds)
Decontaminate and admit to emergency department for internal contamination and dose assessment.
Moderate levels of surface body contamination [>1,000 Bq cm–2 (>60,000 dpm cm–2) beta/gamma]
Decontamination advisable and evaluate for internal contamination (Table 7.2).
Mild injuries with low levels of surface body contamination [>100 Bq cm–2 (>6,000 dpm cm–2) beta/gamma]
Decontaminate to at least two times background and discharge if no evidence of internal contamination (Table 7.2).
Low levels of surface body contamination [>100 Bq cm–2 (>6,000 dpm cm–2) beta/gamma] but uninjured
Decontaminate to at least two times background and discharge if no evidence of internal contamination (Table 7.2).
Individuals with only surface body contamination [<100 Bq cm–2 (6,000 dpm cm–2) beta/gamma (IAEA, 2005b) or less than ~170 Bq cm–2 (<10,000 dpm cm–2) (NCRP, 2005a)]
Can be released.
106 / 6. STAGE 1: MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (ONSITE TRIAGE AREA)
TABLE 6.3—(continued)
7. Stage 2: External Contamination Assessment (onsite triage area)
Objectives • determine location, quantity and identity of external contamination; • identify hot particles, shrapnel, and other contaminated debris; • evaluate possible radiation-induced dermal and subdermal injury; • assess possible internal intakes of radionuclides deposited on skin; and • assess need for treatment and decontamination. See Figure 3.1 for flow of exposed persons through all nine stages in the management of radionuclide contamination. 7.1 External Contamination Assessment Procedures Characterization of external contamination is necessary to assess the risk of radiation injury to the skin and underlaying tissues, and 107
108 / 7. STAGE 2: EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT to determine the potential for internal contamination occurring as a result of absorption of radionuclides through the skin or from wounds or from intake by inadvertent ingestion and inhalation of radionuclides deposited on the skin and clothing. Characterization is also necessary for making decisions about treatment and decontamination. While a complete qualitative and quantitative characterization is ideal, the timely removal of external contamination usually takes precedence over any in-place characterization beyond a simple contamination survey. Radionuclide identification or detailed characterization by energy or material form may be more effectively accomplished using contamination material from a smear sample or clothing sample. Further information is available in several documents (FEMA, 2002; IAEA, 2006; NCRP, 2005a) and the REMM website (DHHS, 2009). The level of external contamination will determine the procedures and instrumentation needed for an accurate assessment of the nature of the contamination, its location on the body and the radiation dose rates to the skin and internal tissues. This assessment should take place away from the immediate contaminated incident site in an outer contaminated area or in a triage area (Figure 4.1). The specific objectives are: • locate areas of contamination on the body including body orifices (marking them may prove helpful for decontamination and subsequent monitoring); • locate contaminated wounds; • identify the nature of the contaminating sources, such as hot particles, shrapnel, and other debris; • determine whether skin contamination is “loose” and susceptible to being removed by washing or changing clothes or “fixed” in place (FEMA, 2002); • identify the contaminating radionuclides; • assess quantity of radionuclides and location, whether spread over the body or localized; • evaluate potential for skin injury; • confirm identification of those individuals with possible internal contamination; and • identify individuals for treatment and decontamination consideration. The following steps are recommended to achieve these objectives: 1.
Perform a complete body survey (see Section 19.4 for information on survey instrumentation).
7.2 DOSE ASSESSMENT
2. 3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
8. 9.
10. 11.
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Remove contaminated clothing and replace with clean clothing or wrap in sheet/blanket as needed. Survey individual completely with a radiation survey meter for surface contamination, identifying the locations of the contamination on the body and the levels. Assume the contamination is “loose” and susceptible to being spread around until proven to be “fixed” to the skin. Examine for contaminated shrapnel and other debris. Identify the contaminating radionuclides with a portable spectroscopic survey meter. A smear sample or clothing sample may facilitate radionuclide identification and allow more timely personal decontamination. Section 3.2.2 describes methodology for characterizing contamination using a GM detector in the absence of spectrometry equipment. Survey hair and body orifices such as eyes, ears and skin folds, for radionuclide contamination including hot particles using a detector appropriate for the contamination of concern (e.g., GM detector for beta/gamma radiation, sodium iodide detector for gamma radiation, zinc-sulfide detector for alpha radiation). Examine the individual for wounds and abrasions that could be routes for intradermal and internal radionuclide depositions. Survey wounds and abrasions with a detector appropriate for the radiation of concern. Survey the individual’s face with a detector appropriate for the radiation of concern as evidence of ingestion or inhalation intakes. Take nasal swabs and survey for evidence of inhalation intake. Document external contamination (see Table A.3.1). 7.2 Dose Assessment
Irradiation of the skin can occur from radionuclides deposited on the skin. It can also occur from sources located away from the body. However, estimates of the latter require information about radionuclides in the environment in which the individuals were at the time of exposure that is rarely available. Therefore, assessment of skin doses resulting from exposure to radionuclides focuses on radionuclides deposited upon the skin. These skin doses can be estimated using body survey data and the electron constants from Table 7.1. Section 21.3 gives guidance in interpreting external monitoring data.
110 / 7. STAGE 2: EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT TABLE 7.1—Electron constants (skin dose rate at depth of 70 μm from source on skin surface) for selected radionuclides. Electron Constantc Half–Life
Decay Modeb
P
14.3 d
60Co 90
Radionuclidea
[Gy s–1 (Bq cm–2)–1]
[rad h–1 (μCi cm–2)–1]
β–
6.55 × 10–10
8.72 × 100
5.27 y
β–
3.09 × 10–10
4.12 × 100
28.8 y
β–
4.98 × 10–10
6.63 × 100
90Y
64.1 h
β–
6.65 × 10–10
8.86 × 100
106Ru
374 d
β–
0d
0d
*106Rh
29.8 s
β–
6.98 × 10–10
9.30 × 100
103Pd
17 d
EC
2.87 × 10–15
3.82 × 10–5
131I
8.0 d
β–
4.82 × 10–10
6.42 × 100
137
Cs
30.2 y
β–
4.73 × 10–10
6.30 × 100
*137mBa
2.55 month
IT
6.88 × 10–11
9.16 × 10–1
144Ce
285 d
β–
2.74 × 10–10
3.65 × 100
192
73.8 d
β– EC
5.46 × 10–10
7.27 × 100
210Po
138 d
α
8.53 × 10–17
1.14 × 10–6
227Ac
21.8 y
β– α
1.79 × 10–13
2.38 × 10–3
U
4.47 × 109 y
α SF
2.73 × 10–13
3.63 × 10–3
*226Ra
1,600 y
α
1.42 × 10–11
1.89 × 10–1
238Pu
87.7 y
α SF
2.49 × 10–13
3.32 × 10–3
239
24.1 y
α
1.29 × 10–13
1.72 × 10–3
241Am
432 y
α
7.60 × 10–13
1.01 × 10–2
244Cm
18.1 y
α SF
7.78 × 10–14
1.04 × 10–3
252
2.65 y
α SF
1.32 × 10–10
1.76 × 100
32
Sr
238
Ir
Pu
Cf
aNames preceded by an asterisk are radioactive progeny that may be present in significant quantities. b EC = electron capture IT = isomeric transition SF = spontaneous fission c The values tabulated for radionuclides undergoing spontaneous fission include the contribution from delayed beta emissions. dBeta emission of insufficient energy to penetrate to a depth of 70 μm.
7.4 TREATMENT GUIDANCE
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7.3 Screening Guidance Operational intervention levels for skin contamination are given in Table 7.2 (IAEA, 2005b). These default values are suggested for use where “surface contamination derived limits are not specified by the national competent authority.” For individuals with skin levels <10 Bq (0.27 nCi) (600 dpm) alpha radiation per square centimeter or 100 Bq (2.7 nCi) (6,000 dpm) beta/gamma radiation per square centimeter, no action is required and they may be released. Decontamination is advisable when skin levels are >100 Bq cm–2 (2.7 nCi) alpha or 1,000 Bq cm–2 (27 nCi) beta/gamma and required at levels 10 times these values. NCRP (2005a) and FEMA (2002) guidance is to give decontamination priority to individuals with spot contamination >37,000 Bq (1 μCi) to avoid skin injury. The presumed spot size is 0.2 cm2. 7.4 Treatment Guidance The presence of dermal injuries such as skin burns, abrasions and wounds should be followed with further assessment and possible treatment. Individuals showing evidence of receiving skin doses >2 to 4 Gy (200 to 400 rad) averaged >1 cm2 at 70 μm depth have about a 10 % chance of clinically detectable effects (NCRP, 1999) and should be followed for possible dermal injuries (Section 16.7.1.6). Decontamination should precede treatment, unless precluded by the seriousness of the injuries.
Alpha {Bq cm–2 (nCi cm–2) [dpm cm–2]}
Beta/Gamma {Bq cm–2 (nCi cm–2) [dpm cm–2]}
Beta/Gamma [(low background area)a μSv h–1 (μrem h–1)]
<10 (<0.27) [<600]
<100 (<2.7) [<6,000]
Not detectable
None • allow release
>10 (>0.27) [>600]
>100 (>2.7) [6,000]
Not detectable
Intervention optional • decontaminate or advise to shower and wash clothing • no significant health risk • slow release
>100 (>2.7) [>6,000]
>1,000 (>27) [>60,000]
0.2 – 0.3 (20 – 30)
Intervention advisable • prevent inadvertent ingestion and inhalation, limit spread of contamination and decontaminate
>1,000 (>27) [>60,000]
>10,000 (>270) [>600,000]
2–3 (200 – 300)
Intervention required • prevent inadvertent ingestion and inhalation, limit spread of contamination and decontaminate
aAmbient
dose equivalent rate measured at 10 cm from skin surface.
Actions
112 / 7. STAGE 2: EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT
TABLE 7.2—Skin contamination intervention levels (adapted from IAEA, 2005b).
8. Stage 3: External Decontamination (onsite decontamination area)
Objectives • control external contamination to avoid internal intakes and contamination of personnel and facilities; • reduce radiation dose to skin and risk of dermal injuries; and • reduce amounts of radionuclides in wounds. See Figure 3.1 for flow of persons through all nine stages in the management of radionuclide contamination. 8.1 Decontamination of Persons Whenever possible, partial or complete external decontamination of injured patients should be performed at the site before they are sent to a hospital. All contaminated clothing should be removed. This will generally remove 80 to 90 % of the external contamination (Goans, 2004). Uninjured persons can frequently 113
114 / 8. STAGE 3: EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION decontaminate themselves but they must be given suitable instructions and be carefully monitored by an individual experienced with decontamination techniques and the use of radiation survey instruments. If only localized areas of contamination, such as the hands or face, are involved, these should be cleaned by washing the area with detergent and water. In cases of more generalized contamination, the person is instructed to shower or, if not ambulatory, the person should be thoroughly washed with soap or detergent. Often an initial shower can be given near the incident site and the patient then moved to an emergency medical and decontamination area where more elaborate skin decontamination techniques can be used. In most cases, radiation levels can be reduced sufficiently so that patients can be managed with but a few precautions at the hospital. In cases of very cold weather, washing of skin or showering will need to be performed at an indoor facility. 8.1.1
Decontamination Objectives
The goals of skin decontamination are to “decrease the risk of acute dermal injury, lower the risk of internal contamination and reduce the potential of contaminating medical and other personnel and the environment” (DHHS, 2009). It is also important to reduce the risk of skin cancer. However, the mortality rate for ionizing radiation-induced skin cancer is only ~1 to 3 %. Melanoma, the malignant skin cancer having the highest mortality rate does not appear to be induced by ionizing radiation (Mettler and Upton, 1995). While the ideal objective would be to reduce external contamination to background levels, in practice this is difficult to achieve except in cases of very minimal contamination. Decontamination is considered successful when the quantities of radionuclides on the external body are reduced to recommended levels. It is recognized that large numbers of contaminated people could overwhelm decontamination capabilities. This is taken into consideration in the levels recommended for decontamination. Therefore, a practical goal of whole-body decontamination is to decrease the level of contamination to no more than two times background (DHHS, 2009). However, in the event of large numbers of contaminated people, decontamination capabilities may become exhausted and the goal of two times background becomes impractical. In these cases, another set of decontamination criteria is recommended. For deterministic effects, FEMA-recommended guidance is 3.7 kBq (0.1 μCi) or 222,000 dpm for fixed contamination on a spot of skin (0.2 cm2 or a circle 0.5 cm in diameter). If the contamination
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is mixed (loose and easily displaced plus contamination fixed in place on the skin), the guidance is 37 kBq (1 μCi) or 2.2 × 106 dpm for spot contamination (FEMA, 2002). For stochastic effects, FEMA guidance is 2.7 MBq (73 μCi) or 1.6 × 108 dpm for fixed contamination over the body regardless of distribution. For an adult with the contamination uniformly distributed over the body, this corresponds to 150 Bq cm–2 (0.004 μCi cm–2) or 9,000 dpm cm–2. If the contamination is mixed (loose and fixed) the guidance is a factor of 10 higher. Table 8.1 gives decontamination goals applicable when large numbers of persons are contaminated. The values in the column labeled “Spot” relate to the FEMA guidance for deterministic effects and the values under “Body Surface” relate to the FEMA guidance for stochastic effects. In the absence of published values for alpha radiation, a value one-tenth of the beta/gamma value is recommended. This is based on IAEA skin and clothing criteria for alpha emitters being one-tenth the beta/gamma criteria. (For alpha emitters, the concern is not the risk to skin but the potential for inhalation of dislodged particles.) These criteria “indicate the level of skin contamination which could represent a hazard from direct irradiation of the skin, from intake by inadvertent ingestion, or that could indicate that the person has already inhaled or ingested significant amounts of radioactive material” (IAEA, 2006). 8.1.2
Decontamination Procedures
The following steps are recommended: 1. 2. 3.
4.
5.
6. 7.
Take individual to an area where skin decontamination or showering can be done. Perform a radiological survey documenting area of contamination. Carefully remove clothing; this generally removes 80 to 90 % of contamination (AFRRI, 2003; Bushberg et al., 2007; Goans, 2004; Koenig et al., 2005). Repeat a radiological survey of the unclothed body; marking areas of contamination with permanent pen may be helpful. Document area(s) of contamination. If multiple areas are contaminated, decontaminate areas with open cuts or wounds first, mouth and nose next, and then contaminated skin beginning with the most-contaminated areas. Decontaminate the skin with lukewarm water and soap, do not scrub vigorously. Carefully remove contaminated shrapnel and other debris with forceps.
116 / 8. STAGE 3: EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION TABLE 8.1—Decontamination guidance; applicable when large numbers of people are contaminated and the goal of less than two times background is impractical. Spota (0.2 cm2)
Body Surface
Alpha
<0.37 k Bq (0.01 μCi) 22,000 dpm
—
Beta/gamma
<3.7 kBq (0.1 μCi) 220,000 dpm
<170 Bq cm–2 (4.5 nCi cm–2) 10,000 dpm cm–2
Contamination
Reference
IAEA (2006)
FEMA (2002) NCRP (2005a)
aFor contamination fixed on skin, limit is factor of 10 greater for mixed loose and fixed.
8.
9.
Potentially-contaminated open wounds require special attention. NCRP Report No. 156, Development of Biokinetic Model for Radionuclide Contaminated Wounds and Procedures for Their Assessment, Dosimetry and Treatment (NCRP, 2006a) gives detailed information on decontaminating wounds. Flush with tepid sterile saline or water jet under mild pressure to remove as much contamination as possible without causing additional injury. If contamination with plutonium is suspected, consideration should be given to irrigating the wound with DTPA (Section 9.4.1). As with any other route of intake of plutonium or other actinides, consideration should be given to intravenous (IV), intramuscular (IM), or oral administration of DTPA (Section 12). Care should be taken to avoid over dosing with DTPA because the amount absorbed from wounds cannot be measured. If further decontamination of wounds is indicated, the patient should be admitted to hospital as soon as possible (see Section 9.4.1 for further information on decontaminating wounds). Decontaminate external body cavities: eyes, ears, nose and mouth with tepid saline or water. Large areas of contaminated skin may require a shower. Decontamination of intact skin usually requires only gentle scrubbing with soap and warm water. Use of hot water is contraindicated (not recommended) because of the subsequent vasodilation (increased blood flow to the skin) that could increase absorption of the radionuclide. If more aggressive decontamination is necessary, a mixture of half corn meal and half laundry detergent has been shown to be effective.
8.2 PERFORMING DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES
10.
11. 12.
13. 14. 15.
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Hair can usually be decontaminated with soap and water. If this is inadequate, the hair should be clipped rather than shaved, to avoid disruption of the skin barrier (NCRP, 2006a). Resurvey to confirm decontamination efficacy (see Section 19.2.7.3). No more than two decontamination cycles are recommended by the REMM website (DHHS, 2009) although typical occupational worker practice is to continue as long as each cycle results in reducing contamination 50 % or until reddening of the skin occurs. Document steps and actions taken using forms similar to those found in Appendix A. Cover the decontaminated patient with clean blankets or clothing. Using clear gloves remove the decontaminated patient to a clean secured area using clean gloves on a stretcher or in a chair, as appropriate. 8.2 Guidance for Those Performing Decontamination Procedures
• Save contaminated clothing and other items from the site to analyze for particle sizes and isotopic information. • Personnel should wear surgical scrub suits, surgical caps and gowns, and rubber gloves (surgical, household or industrial depending upon duties). • Rubber or plastic shoe covers are desirable. Those performing the actual decontamination with water should wear plastic or rubber laboratory aprons. • Air conditioning and forced-air heating systems should be turned off when practicable unless equipped with highefficiency particulate air filters to remove airborne contamination. • The floors should be protected with a disposable covering to reduce “tracking” by keeping surfaces clean and to aid cleanup tasks. • All contaminated clothing should be placed carefully into plastic or paper bags to reduce secondary contamination of the area. • Splashing of solutions used in decontamination should be avoided. • Patients and other potentially-contaminated personnel may move to clean areas only after surveys show satisfactory decontamination.
118 / 8. STAGE 3: EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION • All persons and property passing between contaminated and clean areas must be surveyed and regulated by monitoring teams. • Leaders of decontamination teams should be trained in radiation monitoring and decontamination techniques. • Fiberboard or steel drums with tight-fitting tops should be obtained for disposable contaminated materials (not those saved for analysis). Labels describing the contents should be affixed so that proper disposal can be carried out without reopening them. • Personal dosimeters [e.g., pocket chambers, thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), or optically-stimulated luminescent dosimeters (OSLDs)] should be supplied to all personnel working in the decontamination area. • Personnel are required to be rotated after a dose of 50 mSv (5 rem), the dose limit for emergency workers (FEMA, 2008). 8.3 Decontamination Facilities Onsite decontamination facilities exist at some installations where radionuclides are handled routinely. Emergency decontamination facilities can be improvised in a locker room, or shower room at some facilities such as industrial plants, hospitals, athletic buildings, and health clubs. The one essential feature is a shower or a bathtub. A fully-functional decontamination facility would have: • convenient equipment to wash both ambulatory and injured persons; • portable or permanent shielding for use in treating persons with high-level beta/gamma activities; • provision for collecting contaminated waste water; and • floor plan that will permit convenient decontamination work with a minimal opportunity for cross contamination of areas in the building. Supplies for decontamination, which ideally should be stored ahead of time, are listed in Table 8.2. These decontamination facilities would be located in a noncontaminated secured area (Figure 4.1). Floors of facilities used for decontamination purposes should be covered with heavy paper or plastic, the area should be isolated, all nonessential items should be removed from the room, and the staff
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TABLE 8.2—Suggested supplies for contamination assessment and decontamination. • Coveralls or surgical scrub suits • Plastic aprons • Surgical caps • Plastic or rubber gloves • Plastic shoe covers • Sterile surgical gloves • Respirators (prefit for team personnel) • Personal dosimeters • Sterile suture sets with additional sterile scissors (two), forceps (four), scalpel (one), and hemostats (six) • Sterile irrigation sets • Sterile applicators and miscellaneous dressings • Clean long patient gowns or coveralls, socks • Large towels • Bandage scissors (two) • Large plastic or cloth bags for collection of contaminated clothing • Radiation tags, radiation tape for marking areas • Radiation area signs, “Do Not Enter” • Masking tape (two inches wide) • Labeled containers for collecting urine and fecal specimens • Blankets • Adhesive labels and tags for labeling tissue or contaminated material • Specimen bottles (with formalin if freezing facilities are not available) • Felt pens (black and red) • Note books, papers, pencils • Data forms [e.g., decontamination forms (Appendix A)] • Portable beta/gamma survey meters. Include low range (up to 500,000 cpm or 50 mR h–1) and high range instruments (up to 500 R h–1) • Portable alpha scintillation detector • One large roll white absorbent (blotter-type) paper or wrapping paper as used in stores (tear-off dispensers are available for convenient storage and use of paper rolls) • Plastic sheets • Specific decontamination supplies (primarily detergents) • Fiberboard barrels or large waste baskets for disposal of contaminated clothing as well as other contaminated items - disposable or other alternative clothing for individuals whose clothing is too contaminated to be worn • Resealable plastic bags (various sizes) • Equipment for blood samples • Catch basin for decontamination liquids • Hair clippers • Self-adhesive labels
120 / 8. STAGE 3: EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION should be dressed in PPE before contaminated individuals are admitted (Section 5.2). PPE should be used and worn under the direction of trained radiation-safety personnel. Respirators should be easily available and worn if significant transferable contamination (especially alpha emitters) is anticipated. Unless the room has a separate air conditioning or ventilation system equipped with high-efficiency particulate air filters, the ventilation system should be shut off temporarily until the extent of transferable contamination has been determined and controlled. If control of ventilation is difficult, intake and exhaust vents can be covered with plastic. Where contamination levels may be high [MBq (μCi) levels] it is desirable that all wash water empty into a special process drain for radioactive contamination disposal or into holding tanks. However, inability to divert wash water from the domestic sewer system should not delay or retard the decontamination effort in an emergency. 8.4 Saving Contaminated Materials Sponges, applicators and instruments that have been used to probe or cleanse any contaminated wound should be kept in separate containers identified as to source and sequence. Each excised tissue specimen should be monitored for radioactive contamination, put in a clean separate container, and frozen, if possible. If freezing is not available, specimens may be put into fixatives normally used for surgical pathology specimens. In most cases, the amount of readily removable radioactive contamination on the skin or in the wound site, especially when initial decontamination has been done onsite, is too small to justify holding the wash water for special analysis and disposal. 8.5 Management of Individuals After Contamination Assessment and Decontamination of Skin and Wounds • No injuries and no evidence of internal contamination: Individuals who have been decontaminated to the levels defined in Section 8.1 can be sent home with follow-up instructions prescribed by attending medical personnel. • Injuries and no evidence of internal contamination: Individuals who have sustained injuries but with no indication of radionuclide intakes through the injured tissues can be admitted to hospital without special restrictions. • Evidence of internal contamination with or without injuries: Individuals who show evidence of having inhaled or ingested radionuclides or have had intakes through the skin
8.6 DOCUMENTATION
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by absorption through wounds or by contaminated shrapnel and debris should be admitted to a hospital emergency department or a special radiation treatment facility (if available) for medical evaluation and treatment and for internal contamination assessment. The referral hospital should be notified as soon as it has been determined that the patient may require hospitalization. Initial decontamination procedures and preliminary evaluations at the incident site may have taken several hours but advance notice during this time will enable the hospital to mobilize its resources. The onsite personnel must transmit all their information to the hospital staff and remain in communication until all early diagnostic and treatment decisions have been made. Names and points of contact of work associates and supervisors must be obtained for reference, even after the exposed person(s) has been transferred to the hospital, in case further information on details concerning the incident is needed. 8.6 Documentation Record the decontamination procedures and results (see Appendix A, Table A.3.1).
Part C: Patient Management at Hospital 9. Stage 4: Patient Evaluation and Emergency Care (hospital)
Objectives • evaluate and treat patients with injuries and psychological distress; • evaluate patients for evidence of radiation sickness and begin treatment; • evaluate patients with radiation skin burns, contaminated wounds and radionuclide intakes for emergency treatment; and • confirm patients with possible internal depositions. See Figure 3.1 for flow of persons through all nine stages in the management of radionuclide contamination. 123
124 / 9. STAGE 4: PATIENT EVALUATION AND EMERGENCY CARE 9.1 General Issues in Initial Patient Evaluation Although most radiological contamination incidents do not involve potentially-hazardous levels of radiation exposure or radionuclide uptake, there have been a number of instances of radiation injury. Very-high levels of localized radiation of the skin from external sources or from deposited radionuclides can cause skin burns while exposure of the whole body can cause generalized skin burns and radiation sickness. Internal radionuclide contamination can also cause serious health problems. The route of uptake, whether inhaled, ingested or through the skin, plays an important role in the severity of the expected outcome and in treatment decisions. It is important that an early effort is made to determine the radiation dose received by the patient from both external and internal sources. 9.1.1
Medical Evaluation of Persons with Internal Contamination
Persons exposed to radiation and possibly contaminated with radionuclides require prompt treatment of medical and surgical conditions and an initial evaluation of radiation exposure. Since radiation-related illness requires hours to days to become clinically evident, hospital emergency personnel should triage individuals of a radiation-related incident using traditional medical and trauma criteria. Patients should be medically stabilized and then assessed for radiation injury based on clinical symptoms, estimated dose, radionuclide involved, and whether internal depositions have occurred (Section 10). Resource limitations may necessitate some differences in the level of care rendered in mass casualty situations. The “golden hour” (the first hour after a traumatic incident) is widely recognized by trauma surgeons to be that period of time during which the lives of severely-injured people may be saved, provided they are rapidly triaged to definitive treatment by firstresponse personnel. Patients in shock or near shock can die if not treated within the golden hour. In an incident involving the inadvertent or deliberate release of radioactive material, the presence of radiation must not interfere with rapid triage and removal of trauma patients from the field of injury. As described in Sections 7 and 8, internally-contaminated individuals should be evaluated to determine whether decontamination is advised. Removing contaminated clothing will eliminate 80 to 90 % of external contamination; soap and water should be the first approach to removing any remaining radioactive material. Irrigation and decontamination of wounds may be optimized using a tepid
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saline or water jet under mild pressure. Ambient radiation levels from contaminated wounds rarely exceed a few tens of μSv h–1 (a few mR h–1) and hospital personnel should be reassured that their dose from such an exposure will be insignificant or minimal. In the analysis of external irradiation incidents, simple radiation dose estimates are generally sufficient for medical decision making. In the particular case of lost sources, a point-source approximation (Section 3.2.3) is quite adequate for an initial estimate of exposure. When the patient enters the medical care system, adequate data are rarely available for a complete health-physics analysis of the incident. For a treating physician to provide proper treatment to a patient of a radiation incident, it is helpful to be able to diagnose radiation illness in a timely manner. In the clinical practice of medicine, the correct diagnosis of disease may be made in ~85 % of cases using only a well-collected and reviewed medical history (Koenig et al., 2005). However, since radiation effects are rarely taught in medical schools, physicians often do not include radiation injury in the differential diagnosis of common radiation-induced prodromal symptoms (nausea, vomiting and diarrhea). If early radiation injury or acute internal deposition is not a consideration, then rarely will the diagnosis be made correctly, at least in a timely manner. 9.1.2
Psychological and Behavioral Consequence Management After Radiation Incidents
Exposure to radiation from an external source or an internallydeposited radionuclide, whether from an unintended release or from a terrorist attack, can create uncertainty and fear. The psychosocial aspects of a large radiation incident or terrorist attack are examined in detail in NCRP Report No. 138 (NCRP, 2001a). Other useful sources of information about the psychosocial and behavioral aspects of radiation incidents include Becker (2001), DHHS (2009), and DHS (2003). In the aftermath of such an incident, members of the public will seek advice from both health-care providers and members of the scientific community whose job it will be to determine the extent of internal and external contamination and radiation exposure. Individuals are likely to experience feelings of vulnerability, anxiety, and lack of control. Internal depositions of radionuclides may be particularly anxiety-provoking because the patient essentially has little control over radionuclide decorporation and must rely on evaluation from the medical community. In addition, where there is a lack of consensus among experts, this can increase public fear and anger.
126 / 9. STAGE 4: PATIENT EVALUATION AND EMERGENCY CARE Concerns about public radiation exposure and/or radionuclide contamination may also cause some exposed persons to seek medical treatment, even when none is indicated. For example, there have been many cases at industrial sites where workers had unintended inhalation of actinides with minimal activity. Despite their familiarity with radioactivity, some workers have nevertheless requested treatment with DTPA and other medications for years after the incident, even when shown that further chelation therapy would provide little medical benefit. Individuals who have internal radionuclide depositions will generally fall into one of two groups: those who manifest behavioral changes immediately or shortly after contamination and those who may experience mental health impacts at a future time. If there is a release of radioactive material, public distress will be common and may manifest as anxiety, sadness, fatalism, anger, fear, difficulty sleeping, impaired ability to concentrate, disbelief, or other symptoms. Psychological distress after a radiologic incident may also manifest as nonspecific somatic complaints [a presentation sometimes referred to as multiple idiopathic physical symptoms (MIPS)]. Fortunately, for the vast majority of people, distress and psychological and behavioral symptoms related to the traumatic incident will diminish over time. For a smaller number of others, however, symptoms will persist, affect function at home and work, and may even result in psychiatric illness. In the early aftermath of a radiation incident, many individuals may fear that they have been contaminated and will misattribute signs and symptoms of autonomic arousal to radiation. In the longer term, individuals may present to primary care providers with multiple somatic complaints for which no etiology can be determined. A well-organized and effective medical response can instill hope and confidence, reduce fear and anxiety, and support the continuity of basic community functions. Mental health professionals should be an integral part of the teams planning and performing initial screening and triage. Where feasible, the establishment of an “Emergency Services Extended Care Center” (a term first developed by the Rush Chicago Medical Center) may offer an important means of assisting persons who remain fearful even after receiving negative findings. Reinforcing self-reliant behavior, fostering self efficacy, and providing information that can be used to protect oneself and one’s family will help alleviate distress. Finally, the psychological value of receiving appropriate medical countermeasures and information about methods of self protection can be substantial (Koenig et al., 2005). The long-term aspects of these issues are discussed in greater detail in Section 13.4.
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9.2 General Instructions for Emergency Department Medical Staff Guidance for emergency room medical staff does not differ greatly from guidance to medical staff at the incident site, except for the greater availability of medical resources that allow for more intensive procedures. Individuals exposed to releases of radionuclides are unlikely to be admitted to a hospital emergency room unless they have incurred serious injuries or serious internal depositions of radionuclides. This is true whether the incident occurs in a facility with radiation-safety and medical support or in mass contamination incidents involving large numbers of people. When persons likely to be contaminated with radionuclides are evaluated in hospital emergency departments, it is important, if at all possible, to have radiation-safety professionals available as well as the usual medical staff. The presumption may be that only those with serious injuries and/or obvious significant intakes of radionuclides will appear at hospital emergency departments, but in reality following a mass exposure incident, there will be many “worried well.” The report entitled Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (IAEA, 2005b) is recommended as a source of further information. The following general guidelines are appropriate for most contamination incidents: • Contaminated or irradiated patients do not pose a health risk to medical responders except in extremely rare situations where the patients are heavily contaminated and the activity may become airborne or have highly-radioactive material imbedded in the skin. • Medical personnel should consider both medical and radiation issues, but critical medical concerns should be addressed first (Koenig et al., 2006). • Medical personnel should not be expected to advise pregnant women on the medical effects of their suspected radiation exposure until they have knowledge of the fetal radiation dose estimate. • Nausea and vomiting are signs of radiation sickness. However, unless exposed to a very-high-activity radioactive source, patients are unlikely to be exposed to sufficiently high doses of radiation to cause radiation sickness (Table 6.2 describes signs and symptoms of whole-body radiation exposure). • Except in cases of extremely-high exposure, radiation injury typically has a latency period of days to weeks. Skin burns,
128 / 9. STAGE 4: PATIENT EVALUATION AND EMERGENCY CARE vomiting, weakness, and other apparent radiation effects that appear after a short time may be caused by other factors (IAEA, 2005b). 9.3 Emergency Medical Management 9.3.1
Caring for Contaminated Individuals with Life-Threatening Injuries
A badly-injured patient is one at risk of losing their life, a limb, or their vision if treatment is delayed. In such cases, it is essential to attend first to life-threatening injuries. • Stabilize serious injuries and trauma first. If contamination is found around nose, mouth, or open wounds, or if high radioactive airborne concentrations are known or suspected to have occurred, consider the potential for internal contamination and sample before decontamination if possible (Section 10.3.1.1 has details on taking and interpreting nose swabs). • Decontaminate when patient is stable; follow contamination control measures (Section 5.3). • Consult with a radiation-safety professional (health physicist), radiation oncologist, or other radiation medicine expert for further evaluation and dose reconstruction. • Consider psychological (Section 9.1.2) and social needs of exposed individual, family and friends (Appendix E). This applies to all of the following categories of care in Sections 9.3 and 9.4. 9.3.2
Caring for Lightly Injured and Uninjured Contaminated Exposed Persons
Exposed Person is Contaminated and Lightly Injured • High radiation dose is most likely only to those nearest an incident. • If contamination is found around nose, mouth, or open wounds, or if high radioactive airborne concentrations are known or suspected to have occurred, consider the potential for internal contamination and collect samples (Section 10.3). • Decontaminate patients if possible, or implement contamination controls. • Treat minor injuries and other illness as appropriate.
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• Consult with a radiation-safety professional (health physicist), radiation oncologist, or other radiation medicine expert for further evaluation and dose reconstruction. Exposed Person is Contaminated but Uninjured • If contamination is found around nose or mouth, or if high radioactive airborne concentrations are known or suspected to have occurred, consider the potential for internal deposition and collect samples (Section 10.3). • Decontaminate if possible, starting with the face, and then the most contaminated other areas (Section 8.1.2). • Consult with a radiation-safety professional (health physicist), radiation oncologist, or other radiation medicine expert for further evaluation and dose reconstruction. 9.3.3
Caring for Persons Suffering from Radiation Injury
Only under rare circumstances will individuals contaminated with radionuclides incur significant whole-body irradiation and suffer serious early radiation effects. Examples are large intakes of soluble forms of 137Cs or 210Po. More information on these radionuclides appears in Section 12. However, it is important for emergency department physicians to be able to recognize such cases, because persons suffering early radiation effects will most likely appear at hospital emergency departments. Table 6.2 describes the signs and symptoms that result from acute, whole-body irradiation from an external source. The doses necessary to produce similar effects from internally-deposited radionuclides are substantially higher because they are received at much lower radiation dose rates. The doses persons receive in an incident occurring at a site where radiation monitoring is in place usually will be quickly estimated and the exposed individuals placed in one of the following categories. However, estimates of doses received by persons in a mass exposure incident at a site lacking radiation-monitoring data will usually not be known for several days. Therefore, assigning exposed individuals to one of the following categories will have to be tentative, based largely on signs and symptoms (Table 6.2). The following apply to all those suspected of receiving wholebody radiation: • stabilize serious injuries first; take appropriate contamination control actions;
130 / 9. STAGE 4: PATIENT EVALUATION AND EMERGENCY CARE • if contamination is found around nose, mouth, or open wounds, or if high radioactive airborne concentrations are known or suspected to have occurred, consider the potential for an internal radionuclide deposition and collect samples (Section 10.3); • decontaminate patient when stable; • perform assessment of external dose by obtaining a series of CBCs; • complete radiation dose assessment; consider observation with serial CBCs every 8 h; • treat minor injuries; • consult with a radiation-safety professional (health physicist), radiation oncologist, and radiation medicine expert for further evaluation and dose reconstruction; and • consider psychological and social needs of patient, family and friends. Exposed Person has Received Potentially-Lethal Radiation Dose: >6 Gy (600 rad) • This level of exposure is unlikely following the explosion of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) but may occur in case of a nuclear attack or when exposed to a high-activity radioactive source. • Nausea and vomiting should be taken seriously as indicators of radiation exposure. However, these symptoms can be caused by factors other than radiation (medical, psychological, trauma). If vomiting only occurs once, it is probably not radiation-induced. • For higher exposures, consider placing patient in reverse isolation • Patients exposed to >6 Gy (600 rad) will need intensive medical care due to profound immune suppression. Details of such care are provided in the article by Waselenko et al. (2004) and other similar publications. • Patients exposed to ~8 Gy (800 rad) will likely have received a lethal radiation dose. Exposed Person has Received a Serious Radiation Dose: 1 to 6 Gy (100 to 600 rad) • If the radiation dose is >1 Gy (100 rad), complete all surgical procedures within 2 d of exposure. • For higher exposures, consider placing patient in reverse isolation and managing as described above.
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Exposed Person has Received Mild Radiation Dose: <1 Gy (100 rad) • Doses in this range are unlikely to result in outward signs or symptoms. • Decontaminate patients if possible, or implement contamination controls. • Treat minor injuries and other illness as appropriate. 9.3.4
Caring for Persons Suffering from Radiation Burns
High levels of radiation exposure can damage the basal cells of the skin. This can lead to blistering (wet desquamation), peeling (dry desquamation), reddening (erythema), and loss of hair (epilation). Some symptoms (erythema, possibly itching) may appear transiently shortly after exposure, reappearing days or weeks later, accompanied by more severe symptoms depending on the level of exposure. Injury in small areas of the skin will normally heal by normal regeneration; larger-scale injury may lead to permanent discoloration, hair loss, fibrosis, tissue atrophy, ulceration, and/or necrosis of the affected tissue. Some of these effects and the radiation dose needed to produce them are summarized in Table 9.1. It is important to note that patients can have a high skin dose with little corresponding dose to the whole body or deeper lining organs and tissues [see NCRP Report No. 156 (NCRP, 2006a) for a detailed description of radiation burns and the healing process]. Erythema, ulceration, and other effects can be caused by chemical and thermal injury as well as by radiation, and it may be necessary to differentiate between these causes. TABLE 9.1—Radiation skin injury and associated skin dose (Gusev et al., 2001; IAEA, 1998b). Stage/Symptoms
Dose Range (Gy)
Time of Onset (d)
Epilation
>3
14 – 18
Erythema
3 – 10
14 – 21
Dry desquamation
8 – 12
25 – 30
Moist desquamation
15 – 20
20 – 28
Blister formation
15 – 25
15 – 25
Ulceration (within skin)
>20
15 – 25
Necrosis (deeper penetration)
>25
>21
132 / 9. STAGE 4: PATIENT EVALUATION AND EMERGENCY CARE • Many locations where radioactive materials are used do not contain sufficient concentrations to cause radiation injury if the sources are breached. Exceptions are high-activity radioactive sources such as those used in industrial radiography, radiation sterilization, well-logging, and those encountered in remediation of DOE former weapons production sites (Section 17). • In a laboratory setting, the risk of chemical and thermal burns is greater than radiation burns because most laboratories do not have radiation sources with sufficient activity to cause radiation skin injury (burns). • If the patient denies chemical or thermal contact, radiation should be suspected. • In a terrorist RDD attack, thermal injury from the explosion and subsequent fire is more likely than radiation skin injuries. Chemical and thermal exposures cause symptoms different from those caused by radiation and these can help identify the type of exposure. 9.4 Initial Treatment Decisions Individuals exposed to small levels of internal radionuclide depositions may not need any treatment. Since no treatment is completely free of risk, a benefit-to-risk decision must be made before embarking on an aggressive course of treatment. On the other hand, prompt action is most effective for individuals with significant internal depositions. However, undertaking mitigation procedures in the emergency department would be a rare occurrence. Generally such procedures would occur after the patient is admitted to hospital or on an outpatient basis. The following are possible exceptions. It should be noted that the use of interventional techniques to enhance the body’s natural elimination rate of the compound, or possibly block the uptake of the radionuclide in a particular tissue, may partially or completely invalidate the use of standardized model approaches to estimate the intake and dose. 9.4.1
Radionuclides in a Wound
Radionuclide contamination of a wound is a clear indication for a decontamination attempt. If not removed, the radionuclide may eventually be absorbed into the body, where it is metabolized and deposited in a target organ or tissue. NCRP Report No. 156 (NCRP, 2006a) provides detailed guidance. Case studies in Section 20 describe decontaminations of wounds in individuals and treatments and their outcomes for internal depositions of a number of radionuclides.
9.4 INITIAL TREATMENT DECISIONS
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In treating wounds contaminated with radionuclides, the first priority is to achieve homeostasis and take whatever medical and surgical measures may be indicated to preserve physiologic and anatomic function. Open contaminated wounds may allow rapid incorporation of radionuclides into the body, so they should be copiously irrigated with physiologic saline solution or sterile distilled water for several minutes. Depending upon the radionuclide, irrigation of the wound with a chelating agent such as DTPA may be considered. An effective irrigation solution is 1 g calcium diethylentriaminepentaacetate (Ca-DTPA) and 10 mL 2 % lidocaine in 100 mL of 5 % glucose solution or isotonic saline (NCRP, 1980; 2006a). If contamination with plutonium or other actinides is suspected, consideration also should be given to systemic chelation (IV, IM, or oral). Care should be exercised to avoid possible overdoses of chelating agents, since the amount absorbed when irrigating wounds is impossible to measure. Scrubbing action employed in cleansing the wound is more important than the cleansing agent used (NCRP, 2006a) (see Section 12 for further information on chelating agents). If contamination persists within the wound, surgical debridement may be necessary. When surgical exploration and excision of contaminated tissue/foreign material is necessary, it should be performed with assistance of a radiation-safety professional (health physicist) using a wound probe. The excised material should be saved for radioanalysis. There is no contraindication to the use of standard local or systemic anesthetic agents in managing these types of wounds. A wound containing radioactive material can be treated by primary closure once adequate decontamination has taken place as determined by monitoring the wound site and/or measuring the activity in the excised tissue and collected washes. Decontamination of intact skin usually requires only gentle scrubbing with soap and warm (not hot) water (Section 8). Aggressive scrubbing should be avoided because it can increase absorption of radionuclides through the skin. Hair can usually be decontaminated with soap and water. However, if this is not successful, it may be necessary to remove the hair. Hair should be clipped