Mechanisms of Democracy Institutional Design Writ Small
Adrian Vermeule Harvard Law School
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Mechanisms of Democracy Institutional Design Writ Small
Adrian Vermeule Harvard Law School
Mechanisms of Democracy Institutional Design Writ Small
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To Yun Soo, Emily and Spencer
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Contents
Introduction: Democracy and Institutional Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Part I. Impartiality and Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1. The Veil of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2. The Limits of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Part II. Accountability and Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 3. Submajority Voting Rules: Forcing Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4. Absolute Majority Rules: Optimizing Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 5. Delegation, Accountability and Judging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Part III. Deliberation and Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 6. Optimizing Transparency: The Budget Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 7. Optimizing Deliberation: Constitutional Issues in Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Conclusion Institutional Design as a Going Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Acknowledgments & Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
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Mechanisms of Democracy Institutional Design Writ Small
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Introduction
Democracy and Institutional Design
W
hat institutional arrangements should a well-functioning constitutional democracy have? Most of the relevant literatures in law, political science, political theory, and economics address this question by discussing institutional design writ large.1 The debates center on mass elections, the separation of powers, federalism, and other large-scale institutional structures. Answers to the large-scale question differ, of course. In democratic theory, for example, followers of Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist vision of democracy argue that mass elections are both necessary and sufficient to constitute meaningful democracy,2 while critics of Schumpeter argue, from various perspectives, that a thicker set of democratic institutions is required.3 At the stage of constitutional design, standard controversies 1
2 3
See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires: Theories of Institutional Design (2000); Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution (2002); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy (2000). See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (2003). See, e.g., Gerry Mackie, Schumpeter’s Leadership Democracy (University of Chicago Political Theory Workshop, 2005), available at http://ptw.uchicago.edu/mackie01.pdf.
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center on the relative merits of different electoral systems, of parliamentary versus presidential regimes, and of various types and degrees of judicial independence and judicial review of democratic processes and outcomes. In what follows, my ambition is to move beyond these debates, changing the subject to institutional design writ small. I assume the basic or large-scale institutions of constitutional democracy. Even within such a framework, there is much work for institutional designers to do. In established constitutional polities, I argue, law can and should—and to some extent already does—provide mechanisms of democracy: a repertoire of small-scale institutional devices and innovations that promote democratic values against the background of standard large-scale institutions. The bulk of the book is devoted to proposing such mechanisms and indicating the conditions under which they will, or will not, succeed. Examples include legal rules that promote impartiality by depriving officials of the information they need to act in self-interested ways (Part I); voting rules that create the right kind and amount of accountability for political officials and judges; (Part II); and legislative rules that structure deliberation, in part by adjusting the conditions under which deliberation occurs transparently or instead secretly (Part III). Why focus on institutional design writ small? The principal reason is that “[d]emocracy is inherently a device for regulating marginal political conflicts.”4 This reads as an essentialist claim about the very concept of democracy; in context, however, it is a claim about the insuperable costs of changing the large-scale structures of an ongoing democratic order on which the whole society has coordinated.5 The fact is that in most democratic polities, the basic constitutional arrangements are no longer up for grabs. New polities forming new constitutions may be interested in the basic structures of constitutionalism, as evident in the wave of Eastern European constitution-making in the 1990s. In places and times like that, there is a point to large-scale debates over parliamentary systems versus the separation of executive and legislative powers, or over proportional representation versus other representative forms. In the consolidated democracies of North America, the British Commonwealth, Western Europe and Scandinavia, and parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe, however, small-scale institutional design is all that is on offer. It is unlikely 4 5
2
Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy 309 (1999). See id.
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in the extreme that the United States will switch to a parliamentary system, or that the United Kingdom will switch to a system of separated powers. The point is not that these background institutions are adequately democratic; it is that they are not going anywhere. Even or especially if one believes that the background constitutional order in, say, the United States is pervasively undemocratic,6 it is all the more important to consider feasible smallscale reforms to promote democratic values within that order. In many of these polities, however, there are ongoing experiments with small-scale arrangements of the sort discussed here. In the United Kingdom, consider Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights, charged with reviewing proposed legislation for conformity with the United Kingdom’s statutory and treaty-based obligations to respect rights.7 Chapter 7 generalizes this approach from rights to all constitutional questions and proposes analogous institutions in the U.S. Congress, especially an internal Office of Constitutional Issues, as one of several changes intended to promote legislative deliberation on constitutional questions. It is crucial not to assume that institutional design writ small necessarily has small effects, or that design at the margin has only “marginal” effects in the colloquial sense. On the contrary; one of my central claims in what follows is that small changes can have large democratizing effects. Theoretically, this is a consequence of the sensitivity of institutional equilibria. It is not systematically true that small institutional changes produce small effects. Where discontinuities in important variables occur, small changes can produce large effects, while large changes can produce small effects.8 Seemingly minor changes in voting rules, for example, can profoundly affect both processes and outcomes in multimember institutions. Empirically, I will offer examples throughout in which small-scale mechanisms have produced or would produce important democratizing effects. Chapters 3 and 4, for instance, suggest alternative voting rules that can force majorities to make clear decisions on important questions. Chapter 6 suggests that modest reductions in the transparency of the budget process would produce large improvements in legislative deliberation on budgeting, even in the face of powerful interest-group pressures. 6 7 8
See Robert Dahl, How Democratic Is the Constitution? (2002); Sanford R. Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (2006). For a useful treatment of the Joint Committee, see Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 Int’l. J. Con. Law 1 (2006). See Bruce Talbot Coram, Second Best Theories and Institutional Design, in Theory of Institutional Design 90, 91 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996).
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Mechanisms of Democracy Defined In this framework, the mechanisms of democracy are small-scale rules that structure the process by which laws are made, given the background institutions of the relevant constitutional democracy. So defined, mechanisms of democracy may be contrasted, on the one hand, with large-scale institutional arrangements, as above; they may also be contrasted with constitutional or legal rules that directly police the outcomes of democratic institutions, such as rules protecting individual rights and liberties. At several points, especially in Chapter 1, I will emphasize the latter comparison, suggesting that mechanisms of democracy can substitute for constitutional rules that protect rights directly. Such mechanisms can even do a better job, in the sense that second-order institutional arrangements can promote the very goals that underlie substantive protections, but with greater collateral benefits or fewer collateral costs.
Democratic Values What goals, exactly, are the mechanisms of democracy supposed to serve? How might we judge whether or not they are successful, and under what conditions? I will propose mechanisms that advance four core values of democratic constitutionalism: impartiality, accountability, transparency, and deliberation. These values, I suggest, form something like the common ground among democrats of differing stripes. Although each of them can be specified in different ways, and although each is controversial in some quarters, anyone who rejected all of them simultaneously as basic aims of institutional design would cease to be a recognizable democrat. I use thin conceptions of these values—least-common-denominator definitions that capture premises widely shared by different democratic views. As used here, impartiality means that government officials do not act in self-interested ways, giving preference to their own good at the expense of other members of the political community. Rather, officials act to promote the public good, somehow defined—even if that good is defined in extremely thin procedural terms as the choices made through voting by democratic majorities. Accountability means that officials must answer for their actions to other members of the political community. Elections are the most obvious mechanism of democratic accountability, but I shall argue that other mechanisms are necessary as well. Transparency means that governmental secrecy is presumptively bad in a well-functioning 4
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democracy; citizens should in general be able to observe official decisionmaking in some way, although I will argue that there are good democratic reasons to overcome the presumption of transparency in a range of decisionmaking settings. Deliberation means that officials should make decisions on the basis of public-regarding reasons, rather than on the basis of “naked preferences.”9 In all of these cases, there are lurking questions about the boundaries of the political community—about how the demos is constituted.10 Officials are to serve impartially, and should be accountable to, voters and citizens; but a well-known set of issues in democratic theory involves the further extension of the democratic community. Does it include resident aliens, for example? Such questions, however, do not prove relevant to the mechanisms I will discuss, which are designed for the core case of governance affecting citizen-voters. In what follows, then, I will speak loosely of the political community of “citizens.” The values I have identified are not in general controversial among democrats, although there is appropriate disagreement about their meaning, nature and limits. A variety of high-level approaches to democratic theory converge to support some conception or other of each of these values. We may consider each in turn, as follows: Impartiality is underwritten by consequentialist theories of democracy, in welfarist or even utilitarian forms, that require government to weigh the interests of each citizen equally—in Bentham’s sense that “each person is to count for one, no person for more than one.” Nonconsequentialist democratic theories argue for a right of citizens, or an obligation of government, such that each person should be treated with equal concern and respect. A contractualist variant argues that impartial government would be chosen by reasonable persons deciding on arrangements for their common life. Whatever else such theories include or exclude, it is clear that self-interested behavior by government officials is ruled out. Accountability is also common ground among democratic theorists, although here too interpretations and conceptions differ.11 Schumpeterian 9 10 11
See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984). See Robert Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, 35 Phil & Pub. Aff. 40-68 (2007). For a taxonomy of various senses of accountability, see Jerry Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in Michael Dowdle ed., public accountability: designs, dilemmas and experiences 115–156 (2006). In
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theorists of elitist democracy suggest that accountability through elections is all there is to democratic institutions, but other varieties of democratic theory have a thicker conception of what accountability means. Political economists interpret accountability through the lens of political principal-agent models where voters lack full information about representatives’ behavior (the problem of moral hazard) or their type (the problem of adverse selection).12 In a very different interpretation, an essential component of accountability is that the reasons that ground official decisions be contestable by democratic citizen-subjects.13 Where possible, my aim will be to bracket such high-level controversies and find the common core of these differing conceptions. The accountability-inducing mechanisms I will discuss in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 can appeal to all camps. Transparency is necessary, at least to some degree, to any conception of accountability, however thin. How can voters meaningfully participate in elections if they have no idea what decisions officials have made or (more controversially perhaps) how they have made them? Transparency is necessary to democratic governance, but here too the details are all-important. In Chapter 6, I suggest that transparency is one democratic good among others, and trades off against democratic goods such as well-functioning deliberation. Transparency should thus be optimized rather than maximized; I examine some institutional structures for securing the democratic benefits of transparency while reducing its costs. Deliberation is a controversial ideal in its thickest conceptions. Some theorists believe that the aggregation of predeliberative preferences is the only feasible or even desirable form of collective action in a democracy, whereas many deliberative democrats believe or hope that deliberation can itself launder preferences14 to filter out morally objectionable desires and motivations, or more generally can mold preferences in socially or morally desirable ways. Even here, however, there is a thinner version of deliberation that commands widespread assent, which is that deliberation can at least constitute useful talk by which democratic actors exchange
12 13 14
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Mashaw’s terms, the different senses of accountability I examine here are all forms of political accountability. See Timothy Besley, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government (2006). Philip Petit, Democracy Electoral and Contestatory, in Designing Democratic Institutions 105, 119–20 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000). See Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in Foundations of Social Choice Theory 75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
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information and opinions.15 In this minimal and widely endorsed sense, deliberative capacity is a property of institutions that should and indeed must be one of the goods that optimal democratic design will consider. Deliberation, information and epistemic democracy. Deliberation is distinct from the aggregation of preexisting information, which can occur through voting without talk. However, deliberation can precede information aggregation without necessarily undermining the independent epistemic value of voters’ information.16 More generally, both deliberative democrats and epistemic democrats hope that democratic decision procedures can be designed to produce right factual or moral answers, where such answers exist.17 Democrats who emphasize the epistemic advantages of democracy, as opposed to its deliberative credentials or procedural fairness, use the Condorcet Jury Theorem and other mathematical insights to justify majority voting in democratic institutions (or plurality voting, where there are three or more options in play).18 I take account of these insights in many contexts, particularly in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, which all concern voting mechanisms. In some of those contexts, however, I suggest that nonmajority voting rules are not epistemically objectionable, even where there are right answers. The claim, made explicit throughout Part II, is that epistemic democracy is compatible with nonmajority voting more often than is believed. A common mistake is to assume that where there are right answers, epistemic democracy requires majority voting in every multimember institution, taken one by one. This is false; nothing in the Jury Theorem tells us what group of voters should be governed by majority rule. To think that jury-theoretic reasoning requires majority voting in every institution, taken one by one, is to fall into a version of the fallacy of composition. It is always necessary to ask “a majority of what?” Thus in Chapter 5, I suggest a supermajority voting rule for multimember courts, weighted in favor of government agencies. Even where 15 16
17
18
See James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in Deliberative Democracy 44 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). See Jeremy Waldron, Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 38 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1322 (1989); see also David Estlund, Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, 36 Theory & Decision 131 (1994). There is a large literature on epistemic democracy. For an overview by a leading contributor, see Christian List, Democracy and Epistemic Justification (Sept. 15–21, 2002), http:// personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST/PDF-files/KonstanzLectures.pdf. See Robert Goodin, Reflective Democracy (2003).
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there are right answers, this rule has the effect of counting the agency’s view in the judicial voting calculus, and thereby approximates the epistemic effect of majority rule over a group defined to include the agency officials as well as the judges. To the extent that epistemic democrats can be persuaded to support such aggregation of the voting calculus across institutions, then democrats of different stripes—including democrats with different commitments to the value or feasibility of obtaining “right” answers in political life—can approve of nonmajority voting in particular institutional settings, albeit on different grounds.
Information, Institutions and Mechanism Design How can these democratic values be advanced? Throughout, I suggest mechanisms that in one way or another act on the information held by institutional actors. In Part I, the basic strategy is to promote impartiality by depriving officials of information they might use in self-interested ways; the basic mechanism is that constitutional rules can create a veil of uncertainty that forces officials to act as though motivated by impartial considerations. It is not the case that more information always produces better decisions. Even apart from the costs of gathering information, it is often best if officials lack precise information about which policies will advance their personal interests—although Chapter 2 emphasizes a series of tradeoffs and costs that place limits on this principle in turn. In Part III, the corollary strategy is to promote deliberation and accountability by depriving some subset of constituents of information about what elected representatives are doing in some circumstances. It is not the case that all official decisionmaking should be fully transparent, even putting aside state secrets and executive confidences. Sometimes, transparency can make deliberation worse, by encouraging various forms of posturing and herding; and transparency can empower narrow interest groups, thereby enforcing a kind of bad accountability, at the expense of broader democratic values. The general point that transparency has costs is well understood. I go farther, however, by advocating selective transparency—disclosure of government decisionmaking to some audiences but not to others. Here the crucial mechanism is delayed disclosure, which takes advantage of the timing of election cycles: information of interest to multiple audiences can be released at a time when constituents may use it to inform their voting decisions, but when narrow interest groups can no 8
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longer use the same information to fund captive candidates. In a related vein, Part II suggests novel voting rules that structure information so as to promote democratic values in collective choice. The voting mechanism discussed in Chapter 3, the submajority voting rule, allows legislative or judicial minorities to force the majority to reveal democratically desirable information. The voting mechanism discussed in Chapter 4, absolute majority rule, allows faithful representatives to disguise or ambiguate their resistance to political pressures emanating from third parties rather than constituents; it thus promotes deliberative values and the best form of democratic accountability. Information is a crucial fulcrum for mechanism design because institutions are, among other things, systems for managing information. Institutions aggregate information held by individuals and attempt to reduce uncertainty in order to promote the (collective) goals of the institution’s members.19 A special case involves information that determines mutual expectations and common knowledge—beliefs about what others think about what others think (and so on) are the proper roles and activities of the institution’s members, and what sanctions will be applied for deviating from those roles.20 The fragility of equilibria based on common knowledge creates opportunities for institutional design writ small. By structuring mutual expectations in subtle ways, institutional rules can profoundly affect the behavior of individuals within the institution. If institutions are informational systems, mechanism design can in general play one of two roles, either improving upon or deliberately frustrating the extant institutional arrangements for managing information. Parts II and III illustrate the former, meliorative role. In Part II, the basic idea is to propose improvements in the process by which individually held information is aggregated through voting, in order to promote democratic values; these improvements are compatible with the motivations and beliefs of the institutional actors themselves. Likewise in Part III, which suggests improvements in the structures of democratic transparency that both promote democratic values and that representatives might themselves favor. From the perspective of the wider democratic polity, on the other hand, it is sometimes best to devise institutional arrangements that thwart 19 20
See Barry C. Burden, Introduction: Everything but Death and Taxes: Uncertainty in American Politics, in Uncertainty in American Politics 3, 12 (Barry C. Burden ed., 2003). See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
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the attempts of particular institutions to manage information in the ways their members would otherwise choose. In Part I, the basic idea is to hamstring representatives in their attempts to reduce uncertainty about which policies will promote their partial interests. Because self-interested representatives would not lower the veil of uncertainty over their own eyes, however, uncertainty must be created by constitutional rules. I return to this point below.
Theories, Conflicts and Tradeoffs: A Challenge to Institutional Design The most obvious, if not the most serious, problem with this approach arises from persistent disagreement about democratic values. Even if there is an abstract consensus across democratic theories that attach value to impartiality, accountability, transparency and deliberation, perhaps intractable theoretical conflicts remain. After all, different theories favor different conceptions of these concepts; it seems that, inevitably, high-level theoretical conflicts will arise and must be ironed out before we can speak coherently of designing democratic mechanisms. On this view, absent a full specification of theoretical goals, the criteria for sorting good institutional designs from bad ones are not well defined. Moreover, as I will emphasize throughout the following chapters, democratic goods trade off against one another, and against other goods as well. What is worse, there are democratically desirable and undesirable forms of these goods, so the tradeoffs are internal, within values, as well as external, across values. Detailing these claims is a central project of the book, but a brief sketch of the central tradeoffs might run as follows: Impartiality vs. Information, Motivation and Commitment. In Chapter 1, I suggest a range of mechanisms that generate a veil of uncertainty and thereby promote impartial decisionmaking by officials. Three tradeoffs are important, however, and are discussed in Chapter 2. First, impartiality trades off against information. Decisionmaking behind the veil of uncertainty is less informed decisionmaking. Second, and less obviously, impartiality trades off against motivation. Where decisionmakers have agenda control, a veil of uncertainty reduces the decisionmakers’ incentive to take any action at all, perhaps resulting in excessively low activity levels. Third, impartiality trades off against commitment. Impartial enactments are more likely to be undone in future periods, when it becomes clear whose 10
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ox has in fact been gored. Commitment problems are more serious for impartial enactments than for enactments that represent victories by selfinterested coalitions in the first instance. Transparency vs. Deliberation. Chapter 6 suggests that transparency deters self-dealing or corrupt bargains by officials, and thereby promotes a kind of impartiality. But transparency can also harm deliberation, in part because the glare of public attention causes officials to posture for the cameras, for interest groups and outside audiences, or for posterity; moreover, transparency can silence potential dissenters, who hesitate to take public risks and thus end up following the view of apparent experts, or of the crowd. If any of this is so, then transparency trades off against deliberative virtues. Transparency vs. Accountability. Transparency helps promote oversight by voters or constituents, and thus promotes the accountability of representatives to voters or constituents. Yet it also promotes oversight or monitoring by third parties—narrow interest groups, self-interested officials elsewhere in government, and others. In some cases, as Chapters 4 and 6 emphasize, the latter sort of monitoring can be undesirable, if it allows third parties to divert representatives from faithfully promoting the interests of or executing the wishes of constituents. Accountability (good) vs. Accountability (bad). The last point can also be put in terms of an internal tradeoff between two different types of accountability. The same structures and mechanisms that promote the accountability of officials to one group may have the unintended effect of promoting the accountability of the same officials to a different group. Under some range of circumstances, the former type of accountability might be democratically desirable, whereas the latter type would be democratically harmful. If so, there is a kind of tradeoff within accountability itself. Deliberation (good) vs. Deliberation (bad). Even in the minimal sense of deliberation as talking together, the very conditions necessary for deliberation to improve decisionmaking can also worsen decisionmaking. An exchange of views among officials, including information and instrumental arguments, can make decisions better. But deliberation in common can also produce decisional pathologies.21 Decisionmakers may herd in
21
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71 (2000).
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the same direction because some have private information that others rationally follow, because of concerns for their reputations in the group or elsewhere, or because of the phenomenon of group polarization, which under particular circumstances causes opinions to become more extreme within deliberating groups.22 The conditions that are necessary for good deliberation can also create a risk of deliberative pathologies. It does not follow, however, that it is feasible or desirable to stamp out deliberative pathologies. For one thing, some such pathologies may be the unavoidable price of deliberative structures that are optimal overall. For another, just as private vices sometimes confer public benefits, so too deliberative vices may contribute to improving group deliberation in the aggregate. Hot rhetoric and extreme views can illuminate the concrete implications of abstract principles, introduce new perspectives, and challenge complacent premises that are widely shared.23 All this poses two basic challenges to the project of democratic institutional design. First, if institutional design is thoroughly theorydependent, we cannot say anything very useful about democratic institutions without a fully worked-out conception of constitutional democracy, one that takes sides on all relevant theoretical questions. The prospect is a depressing one, because of the interminable quality of high-level debates over democratic theory. It seems we will be doomed to theoretical discord into eternity, never legitimately reaching the stage of institutional design— although during our theoretical purgatory we will necessarily have institutions of some sort or another, just unexamined ones. To make things worse, if it is really the case that theory comes first, institutional design writ large is also ruled out. The literatures in law, comparative political science and economics that address large-scale issues of constitutional design would have to be stamped as philosophically confused, because these literatures often fail to resolve all relevant and logically prior theoretical questions before addressing desirable institutions. Second, how can tradeoffs between or within democratic goods, or between democratic goods and other goods, be resolved without a fully specified theory of democracy? We would need a theory to specify, for example, how much transparency to give up in return for how much deliberative benefit. It is incoherent to make democratic tradeoffs 22 23
12
See id. at 71–72. Don Herzog, Romantic Anarchism and Pedestrian Liberalism (unpublished draft).
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without a full theory of what is democratically desirable—or so the argument runs.
The Place of Institutional Design The burden of the following chapters is to argue, and to illustrate, that the foregoing challenges fail. They fail, I will suggest, on three basic counts. First, there is the important possibility of operating-level convergence. Rival conceptions of democracy can and do converge on particulars at the operating level, in a type of overlapping consensus.24 Suppose that some democratic mechanism can help to dampen or eliminate selfinterested behavior on the part of legislators. We need not take sides on any (contested) questions of high-level democratic theory or the theory of representation to approve of such a mechanism. On some theories of representation, legislators are to represent specific constituencies or groups, geographically defined or otherwise; on other theories of representation, each legislator is charged with representing the general interests or welfare or good of the whole body politic. All such theories, however, unite in rejecting self-interested representation by legislators. To the extent that the mechanisms of democracy address the problem of self-interested representation, no ambitious theorizing is necessary. Another way to put this point is that the mechanisms discussed here aim to secure the minimal conditions of democratic governance. In many settings, the realistic task of institutional design is not the ambitious one of promoting perfected or rarefied democratic aspirations; it is the preliminary and mundane one of enforcing the basic ground rules and preconditions that any recognizably democratic set of institutions needs to function tolerably, let alone well. As to these minimum conditions, there is rarely much consequential disagreement among competing highlevel accounts of democracy; they are the common ground held by competing views. Securing the minimal conditions of democratic governance is as pressing a task in advanced constitutional democracies as in new or transitional democracies. Although basic institutions like elections and the separation of powers weed out the crudest forms of democratic dysfunction, there is plenty of dysfunction left to go around, as any observer of American government will attest. 24
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 340 (rev. ed. 1999).
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The second basis for rejecting the challenge is that the mechanisms discussed here can be defended as optimizing devices. In easy cases, some institutional arrangement will dominate another in the decision-theoretic sense. One arrangement will, under any state of the world, produce desirable accountability at no harm or cost to other democratic values, while another arrangement will produce lesser accountability with no offsetting benefit. In such cases no tradeoff arises, and the institutional choice is obvious. The harder cases arise when there is genuine conflict between or among democratic values. Even in such cases, however, it is sensible to respect a principle of marginalism. If a design innovation that would produce a small loss of transparency would also produce major gains in the quality of deliberation, then most democrats of most theoretical varieties will favor the change, because the new arrangement represents a move towards the democratic optimum. In what follows, I try as much as possible to consider the mechanisms of democracy in a non-sectarian way, appealing to all varieties of democratic theory. Where that hope fails, however, my premises are openly consequentialist: I assume that democratic values are comparable and commensurable goods subject to aggregation according to the principle of marginalism. Democracy, I assume, can be optimized. To be sure, even when marginal tradeoffs produce large gains in some democratic values at small costs to others, some band of theorists will protest. In Chapter 6, for example, those who attach intrinsic importance and lexical priority to transparency—theorists who favor maximal transparency at all costs—will jump ship, complaining that their philosophical arguments have been assumed away by the new institutional arrangements I suggest, which diminish transparency for larger gains in impartiality and the quality of government deliberation. Yet few such theorists exist; and one wonders why those who do exist would be entitled to block the large body of those who disagree from adopting optimizing innovations, at least until all the philosophical issues have been settled by persuading the obdurate outliers. Because we must have institutions of some kind or another while the theoretical conflicts rage, no particular theoretical view can be given veto power over the search for institutional innovations and improvements. In other words, the theory-dependence of institutional design cannot be converted into a kind of unanimity requirement, such that nothing can be done about institutions until all theoretical dissent has been squelched. 14
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There will always be some theoretical resistance to innovation, but I will be content if the mechanisms discussed here appeal to the broad middle range of democratic commitments. Throughout, I implicitly imagine a sort of second-order assembly of democrats, of varying theoretical views, who vote upon proposals according to whether the suggested innovations promote their preferred, particular version of democratic theory. If the proposals suggested here are carried in the assembly of democrats by large supermajorities (quite possibly by different supermajorities on different proposals), that is good enough, even if some vote nay. It should be mentioned that an important subcamp of democratic theorists will think that the marginalist or optimizing approach to tradeoffs among democratic values is itself dictated by their theory. This camp is comprised of consequentialist theorists of democracy, who believe that democracy is justified only if and because it produces better consequences than other political arrangements.25 Consequentialists need a value theory specifying what counts as “better,” and most theorists of this sort are welfarists, who see (human) well-being as the test of value, or utilitarians, who go further to favor a particular conception of well-being, usually subjective happiness or pleasure. Whatever the details, these theorists necessarily unite in rejecting the idea that some democratic values might have lexical priority over others, such that no tradeoffs are permitted. If large gains in, say, accountability require small sacrifices in, say, transparency, and if the shift produces net improvements in welfare or utility overall, then such theorists will think the shift mandatory, not merely permissible. On the welfarist view, the democratic values I have identified are but rules of thumb, considerations that enter into the optimal design of democratic institutions, but that are of no intrinsic value in themselves, apart from their tendency to promote the well-being of the political community. The third response is the most modest of all, but perhaps the most important: institutional design is perfectly sensible, and indeed unavoidable, conditional on adopting some high-level theory or other.26 Democratic theorists just cannot move directly from some abstract principle—say, 25 26
See Richard J. Arneson, Democracy Is not Intrinsically Just, in Justice and Democracy 40 (Keith Dowding et al. eds., 2004). See Archon Fung, Practical Reasoning About Democratic Institutions: Governance Innovations in Democratic Theory (Working Paper, Feb. 2006), http://www.archonfung.net/papers/Fung PracticalReasonFeb2006.pdf.
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Introduction
equal concern and respect—to concrete arrangements on the ground— say, a simple majority voting rule. Empirical questions and tricky problems of design always and necessarily intervene between the high-level principles and the operating-level outcomes. In reality, it is not the case that there is a prior stage of theory and a subsequent stage of institutional design. We will be living in the midst of some set of institutions or other while theorizing proceeds. It is not sensible—perhaps it is not even coherent—to say that we have no basis for examining, evaluating and improving those institutions unless and until we have a fully specified theory about what counts as an improvement, democratically speaking. Overall, the mid-level questions about institutional design are unavoidable, for two basic reasons. One is the ever-present possibility of unanticipated consequences and surprising second-best effects. A given institutional arrangement may, in certain circumstances, prove futile or even counterproductive relative to the high-level aims it is meant to serve. In Chapter 6, for example, one theme is that legal rules mandating the transparency of legislative deliberations backfire if they simply cause legislators to move real deliberation to other, less formal and indeed less transparent venues. Another reason is that institutions are frequently underdetermined by high-level commitments. Thus in Chapter 4 I argue that a commitment to equality within a voting group, for example, can be consistent with both a simple majority voting rule that looks only to a majority of the votes cast, and also with an “absolute” voting rule that looks to a majority of all the votes that could have been cast. An invocation of “equality” will not help us, even in principle, to figure out which of these two voting rules is best, under what conditions. The choice between them must be made on other grounds. At a minimum, institutional design can go forward without theoretical strain relative to some high-level value or set of values. The most modest ambition of the following, then, is to provide a repertoire of tools for democratic design that people of varying commitments can pick up and put down at will. But I have less modest ambitions as well. In real life, where time for philosophizing is limited and agreement seems always to lie over the next horizon, institutional design goes forward even without consensus on high-level commitments. I will attempt to show, throughout, that democrats of differing views can find common ground on institutional arrangements even under these daunting circumstances. 16
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Democracy and Institutional Design
Mechanisms and Limiting Conditions Democracy-promoting mechanisms are not panaceas to be prescribed under any and all conditions. In what follows, the limits of the mechanisms I discuss are as important as their virtues. The basic project, in each case, is to identify the conditions under which particular democracy-promoting mechanisms can promote widely endorsed attributes of democratic institutions or, more ambitiously, can optimize across democratic values. Some of the mechanisms I discuss are more fragile than others, in the sense that they function well or at all only under a narrow range of conditions. In Chapter 2, for example, I suggest that the veil of uncertainty is a highly fragile mechanism for reducing self-interested behavior by government officials. Understanding the limiting conditions for democratic mechanisms is a worthy goal in itself. I have emphasized that the mechanisms of democracy do not replace or compete with large-scale democratic structures, but rather supplement and complement them. Of course the particular mechanisms I discuss hardly exhaust the universe of available supplements. Identifying the limits of the mechanisms introduced here underlines the need for further progress in the theory of institutional design writ small.
Institutional Variables and Their Values Another limitation of the project is that, although institutional, it is not empirical, at least not in a large-number way. Throughout, I draw on comparative case studies of democratic mechanisms and institutional structures, such as various types of alternative voting rules used in various polities or at various levels of American government (Chapters 3 and 4). Nowhere do I engage in large-number empiricism, complete with regression analysis. The aim is to identify institutional variables, to indicate their signs (the direction of the effects they produce), and to give a rough estimate of their magnitudes. Although this is a limitation, it is for the most part an unavoidable one. The chronic condition of institutional reform is that the effects even of small-scale proposals are somewhat unpredictable until they have been tried, perhaps repeatedly. As far as many of the mechanisms suggested here are concerned, there simply is no large-number data available. In other cases, although the facts are in principle lying out there to be collected, it is beyond my competence to do so. Institutional Design Writ Small
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Introduction
Descriptive and Prescriptive Claims The book has dual aims: analytic and reformist. On the analytic side, I hope to explain the working of novel mechanisms that can, in principle or at the level of the first-best, promote agreed-upon democratic ends (under particular conditions). On the reformist side, I propose that practically workable versions of such mechanisms be adopted in real-world democratic institutions. In the latter vein, I attempt in every case to account for second-best problems, political constraints, and the costs of enactment and transition to the new rules. As will be explained shortly, it is a major virtue of institutional design writ small that small-scale proposals do not incur prohibitive costs of enactment and transition. Partly for that reason, small-scale proposals are more likely to slip past the political constraints on reform. By contrast, changes to institutional design writ large are unpredictable, rare, and rarely susceptible to deliberate institutional engineering. Where I do offer reform proposals, I do not mean to suggest that the mechanisms I suggest are entirely unprecedented. In most cases, I complement the prescriptive claims with descriptive claims that the existing landscape of law and institutions in democratic regimes already contains examples of the mechanisms I favor. In some cases the examples are not labeled as such by participants in the system; instead they represent my analytic interpretation or characterization of institutional rules. In Chapter 1, for example, I characterize many rules of American constitutional law as “veil rules” that produce uncertainty and thus, indirectly, produce a kind of impartial decisionmaking. The point of this work is to show that the mechanisms I suggest have real-world purchase. These mechanisms are in some sense feasible, at least under some conditions; the constraints on the range of institutional possibilities are not typically so tight as to rule them out, everywhere and right from the beginning.
The Demand Side, the Supply Side, and Constraints on Reform The topic just broached—feasibility constraints on democratic reform— deserves more extended comment. So far we have primarily addressed the demand side of mechanism design: the conditions under which various democracy-promoting mechanisms might be desirable, whether or not attainable. What of the supply side? Which democratic actors might adopt 18
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Democracy and Institutional Design
new design mechanisms, assuming they are indeed desirable? Are those mechanisms even technically or politically feasible? Proposals for new institutional arrangements will only be adopted if they are compatible with the desires, beliefs and technical and political opportunities of actors within the system. Absent some account of the supply side, or of the political and technical constraints that limit opportunities for reform, perhaps proposals of the sort advanced here are so much whistling in the wind. This is an important theoretical point. Yet paradoxically enough, we must be cautious not to internalize it if our interest is reform, rather than objective analysis of the political order. In many settings, it is sensible to recognize a division of labor: theorists propose optimal institutional designs (on the level of ideals or first-best), while politics disposes (on the level of practical constraints or second-best). In this role, theorists should delineate schemes that would be desirable if implemented, while legal and political activists attempt to implement them. Politics itself will serve as the filter that sorts feasible proposals from others. Of course the theorist whose interest is itself the analysis of political constraints is exempt from this point. As to theorists whose interest is in the optimal design of institutions, however, it is best from the systemic point of view to ignore political constraints, thus avoiding a kind of selfcensorship that inflicts social harms by prematurely filtering out ideas that might, in fact, have been adopted. The proponent of optimal design mechanisms is typically not an expert in politics, so self-censoring in light of the reformer’s estimate of political feasibility carries the risk that the reformer will mistakenly filter out an ideal solution that would actually have been enacted. By contrast, the opposite error—the proposal of desirable solutions that are politically infeasible—is solved automatically by the operation of the political filter. In accordance with this principle, my main focus throughout is on the demand side of mechanism design. Certainly, for the familiar reasons outlined above, it is also desirable for optimal proposals to be feasible; proposals of that sort are even better than first-best proposals thrown hopefully against the political filter. I suggest, in other words, a three-tier framework for the evaluation of proposals. Worst of all, for systemic reasons, is self-censorship by theorists of optimal institutions. Rather than self-censor, it is better to put forward first-best proposals and let politics dispose of them, usually by rejection but occasionally by surprising acceptance. Best of all, however, are proposals that are both desirable on first-best grounds and also feasible. Institutional Design Writ Small
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Introduction
I believe that the small-scale proposals offered here are both desirable on their own terms and quite thinkable, in a practical way, and thus fit into the third and highest tier. The comparisons to the experience of other polities that I draw throughout are helpful in this regard. In the case of the congressional Office of Constitutional Issues proposed in Chapter 7, for example, the fact that Parliament has set up a similar body —the Joint Committee on Human Rights — is a first step towards dispelling concerns about feasibility. There are many possible disanalogies between the two institutional changes, but their similar scale and purpose makes it implausible that the former would be politically out of bounds while the latter was actually adopted. More positively, feasibility in both the technical and political senses is an affirmative virtue of institutional design writ small. Precisely because small-scale proposals tend to incur lower costs of enactment and lower costs of transition from one institutional regime to another, they are also more likely to pass through the political filter. Adjustments to decisionmakers’ information (Part I), to voting rules (Part II), and to rules structuring transparency and deliberation (Part III), are not like proposals that the United States should switch to a parliamentary system,27 or the curious recent proposal for a new national holiday devoted to collective political deliberation.28 Feasibility is a central trait of the small-think proposals I offer here, whatever their other merits or demerits.
Self-Defeating Proposals Another aspect of the supply-side problem is that proposals must not be self-defeating. Proposals defeat themselves when the motives, beliefs or political opportunities ascribed to relevant actors by the theorist’s diagnosis are incompatible with the solution that the theorist offers. An inconsistency between the motives assigned to relevant actors in the theorist’s diagnosis and prescription is often called “incentive incompatibility”; in Chapter 2, I discuss several proposals that are incentive incompatible and thus self-defeating, most notably Bruce Ackerman’s scheme for a framework statute to govern emergency decisionmaking. 27
28
20
See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (Dover 2006) (1885); see also Lloyd Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 Foreign Aff. 126 (1980). See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (2004).
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Democracy and Institutional Design
To be clear, the problem with self-defeating proposals is not merely that they are ruled out by politics. I argued above that it is bad, from the systemic point of view, for proponents of novel arrangements to selfcensor in light of their estimate of the political constraints, although the external analyst may of course assess those constraints. Rather, the problem with self-defeating proposals is that the diagnosis and prescription make different assumptions about relevant features of the relevant actors. Such proposals are internally inconsistent from the inception, and thus incoherent, quite apart from whether they have any chance of being adopted. I do not think any of the proposals I offer elsewhere in the book stumble into this methodological trap, but the problem is very real, and my claim to have avoided it must be assessed after reading the whole. In outline, I propose to cope with the problem in the following ways. A proposal urging self-interested officials to subject themselves to a veil of uncertainty, in order to hamper their pursuit of their self-interested aims, would obviously be self-defeating. However, Part I makes no such proposal. Instead I suggest that various mechanisms for creating a veil of uncertainty might be and to a large extent already are embodied in constitutions, and in the United States Constitution turn out to be rather sensibly distributed across the branches of government. Of course there is no general reason to assume that constitutions are optimally designed, including the United States’ constitution; but it turns out that the framers of 1789 happened to adopt a number of veil-generating rules, in part to enforce impartiality and in part for other reasons. So the distribution of veil rules in the Constitution is best seen as a combination of intentional action and happy coincidence. Because the Constitution already embodies veilgenerating mechanisms, there is no need, at least in the American case, to propose a constitutional amendment, which would obviously raise serious feasibility concerns. In Parts II and III, by contrast, the argument is that the relevant proposals might straightforwardly be embodied in statutes or internal legislative or judicial rules, because they are compatible with the motives and incentives of the relevant institutional actors. Thus in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, for example, I suggest mechanisms that explain why and where legislative and judicial majorities might adopt and have adopted voting rules that give procedural power to legislative and judicial minorities. Institutional Design Writ Small
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Introduction
Overview The book is organized into three parts. Part I takes up the problem of promoting impartial action by officials, especially elected officials, and the related goal of dampening self-interested official behavior. These problems are not exactly coterminous. It is possible to behave altruistically, yet not impartially, as by favoring the interests of some ideological or ethnic group both over one’s own interests and over those of the whole polity.29 Yet the indispensable first step towards genuinely impartial and publicspirited government is to suppress self-interested representation. Were official self-interest to be eliminated or sufficiently constrained, many other problems would remain; but those are the sort of problems many democracies would not mind having. Many of the large-scale structures of constitutional democracy are intended to either remove the causes of selfinterested representation or to reduce the harms that flow from it. Elections, the separation of powers, and judicial review have all been justified in these terms. Even given such structures, however, supplemental mechanisms are needed. The mechanism featured here is the veil of uncertainty, which suppresses self-interest by depriving officials of the information needed to gauge where their interests lie and which policies might promote those interests. Chapter 1 introduces the veil mechanism and suggests that a range of constitutional provisions already embody veil-producing devices or tactics. Chapter 2 then indicates the limits of the veil mechanism by discussing three tradeoffs: (1) between impartiality and information; (2) between impartiality and motivation; and (3) between impartiality and ex post enforceability. A heavily veiled government might possess too little information to act effectively. Less intuitively, its officials might lack the motivation to introduce many beneficial projects, and might thus display an insufficient level of activity or energy. Finally, the impartial enactments that did occur might more frequently be undone in later periods, after the veil is lifted. A premise of Part I is that elections are not sufficient, although certainly necessary, to eliminate self-interested representation. Part II begins from a similar premise, but moves in a different direction. Elections are necessary but not sufficient to supply democratic accountability, a value 29
22
See Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (1977); see also Stephen Holmes, The Secret History of Self-Interest, in Beyond Self-Interest (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990).
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Democracy and Institutional Design
that sweeps beyond the suppression of self-interested representation. In a well-functioning democracy, officials are not merely free from self-interest; they are also accountable even for the public-spirited choices they make. The best conception of accountability is a matter of large controversy in democratic theory, but I will suggest some accountability-promoting mechanisms that fit comfortably with the major normative views of accountability and representation. The introduction to Part II clears away some ground by rejecting one of the principal accountability-promoting mechanisms in American constitutional theory, especially theory of a textual or historical cast: the nondelegation doctrine, which places constitutional constraints on legislative delegations of discretion to the executive branch. I argue that the nondelegation doctrine cannot be derived from any high-level account of democracy or accountability. The more natural view, which I will defend, is that delegations from the legislature to the executive are fully satisfactory, on the score of accountability, so long as the executive is independently accountable and so long as legislative decision to delegate is itself made in an accountable way. Accordingly, Chapters 3 and 4 change the focus from the nondelegation doctrine to legislative accountability for all decisions, including the decision to enact delegating statutes themselves. Here my aim is to suggest mechanisms that enhance the accountability of legislative voting. Chapter 3 describes submajority voting rules that allow minorities to force majorities to take a stand on public issues. Chapter 4 describes absolute voting rules that aim to block strategic behavior by legislative minorities and to liberate legislators from accountability to narrow self-interested groups. Chapter 5 draws a corollary for judicial decisionmaking in the administrative state. It suggests a supermajority voting rule for courts under which executive agencies will prevail, against a claim that they have exceeded their delegated authority, unless a defined supermajority of the judges rejects the executive’s position. The point of the voting rule is to channel policymaking discretion from the judiciary to the executive branch, acting under a legislative delegation. Where statutes contain gaps that must be filled in, the executive rather than the judges should do so. It is not just that the executive is superior to the judiciary on the score of democratic accountability, although that is true. The further point is that such a mechanism enforces the legislature’s second-order decision—itself fully accountable—to delegate to the executive in the first place. Institutional Design Writ Small
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Part III offers suggestions for promoting both transparency and deliberation, and for managing the tradeoffs between them; as will be seen, these values also interact in complex ways with impartiality and accountability. Chapters 6 and 7 provide a two-pronged approach; the former focuses on the distinctly secular arena of the congressional budget process—a fine testing ground for high-minded democratic aspirations— while the latter focuses on legislative deliberation about constitutional questions. Chapter 6 argues for selective transparency, in which some decisionmaking processes are opaque, and in which some information is disclosed to some constituents at some times but not to others at other times. I suggest that selective transparency should be instituted through a regime of delayed disclosure of legislators’ actions, to promote sound legislative deliberation and to liberate legislators from undesirable accountability to narrow interests. Chapter 7 turns to the production of constitutional deliberation in legislatures. I argue that constitutional deliberation is a collective good that will be underproduced in legislatures, and suggest some incentive-compatible mechanisms for overcoming this problem, such as a congressional Office of Constitutional Issues designed to encourage more successful legislative deliberation on constitutional questions. Throughout, my principal aim is to be suggestive and creative about mechanism design—to expand our repertoire of institutional tools, rather than to arbitrate or finally resolve contested institutional issues, let alone contested high-level questions of democratic theory. As I have emphasized, the appeal of particular democracy-promoting mechanisms, relative to competitors, will turn on difficult empirical and predictive questions about which information is sparse and judgments are inevitably uncertain. I both record my own judgments on such matters, primarily with a view to provoking the reactions and judgments of others, and also suggest second-order decision procedures for designing institutions under conditions of normative disagreement and severe empirical uncertainty.
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Part I
Impartiality and Uncertainty
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Impartiality and Uncertainty
I
mpartiality is a protean concept. A basic distinction is between firstorder and second-order impartiality.1 First-order impartiality would require me to treat your children as well as my own, whereas second-order impartiality would allow me to give preference to my children and you to give preference to your children. The latter conception merely bars me from claiming that impartiality requires you to give preference to my children, just as I do.2 Another basic distinction is between self-interested partiality and other-regarding partiality. The former arises, for example, when I allocate a valuable resource to myself, ignoring the impartially superior claims of others. The latter arises when I allocate the valuable resource to, say, coreligionists or coethnics or compatriots, ignoring the impartially superior claims of others (perhaps including myself). As the latter type of case shows, partiality and altruism or other-regardingness can easily coexist; governmental decisionmaking that is free from selfinterest is a necessary but not sufficient condition for governmental impartiality. Impartiality is, in turn, a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy.3 Later chapters will address other values that enter into a well-functioning democratic polity. In Chapters 1 and 2, I will be solely concerned with impartiality in the narrower sense of freedom from self-interest. Perhaps it would be simpler to choose a different term than impartiality to connote the value at stake—perhaps “public-spiritedness” or the like—but to do so would distort the substantive point. Although democracy goes beyond impartiality, and impartiality goes beyond the absence of self-interest, the first emphatically does include the second, and the second emphatically does include the third. A government whose officials systematically function in selfinterested ways is neither impartial nor democratic. The small-scale
1 2 3
See Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality: A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume 2 11 (1995). See Jon Elster, Mimicking Impartiality, in Justice and Democracy 112, 112–13 (Keith Dowding et al. eds., 2004). See Robert E. Goodin, Democracy, Justice and Impartiality, in Justice and Democracy 97, 99–101 (Keith Dowding et al. eds., 2004).
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Part i
mechanisms of democracy I urge are necessary to promoting the minimum conditions of democracy. Among these minimal conditions are that government officials not act in self-interested ways, whatever else we might desire of them. Promoting impartiality, even in the narrower sense of restricting self-interest in official decisionmaking, is thus a core democracypromoting project. How, then, can impartial government (in the narrower sense) be induced or promoted through institutional design? Typical answers center on institutional design writ large. Self-interested representation is to be checked by elections, which tie representatives to the wishes of their constituents, and by the separation of powers, which pits self-interest (Madison’s “ambition”) against self-interest. Chapter 1 proposes and scrutinizes a different sort of answer, one that is compatible with but that also goes beyond the baseline institutions of elections and the separation of powers. Self-interested decisionmaking is to be checked by mechanisms that generate a veil of uncertainty. Whereas elections and the separation of powers limit self-interested behavior by subjecting officials to political constraints, uncertainty-generating mechanisms suppress the information that self-interested officials would need to pursue their interests. Such mechanisms thus cause decisionmakers to act as though they are impartial, whatever their true motivations.
Veil Rules and Their Limits My project in this Part is twofold. The first aim is to introduce the veil of uncertainty as a small-scale mechanism for promoting impartiality. The second aim, pursued in Chapter 2, is to delineate the built-in limitations of the veil of uncertainty, the tradeoffs it produces. Throughout, I use the American federal constitution as a source of illustrations, although with lateral comparisons to other constitutions where useful. Does the Constitution make optimal use of veil rules? Is there good reason that it uses veil rules where it does use them, but not elsewhere? Chapter 1 suggests that Congress is subject to more constitutional veil rules, of wider scope, than is the President or the judiciary. Is there any good reason why should that be so, given that it would be perfectly possible to apply a range of veil rules to the latter institutions as well? It sounds paradoxical to move from an explication of existing veil rules in some settings to an explanation for their conspicuous absence in others, but that 28
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question illuminates the tradeoffs inherent in mechanism design. Having appreciated the power of veil rules to dampen self-interest, we should ask why the veil technique should not be ubiquitous. Chapter 2 thus offers an account of the limits of uncertainty as a technique of constitutional design. The centerpiece of the account is a crucial tradeoff between information and motivation, or (as the Constitution’s framers would have put it) institutional “energy.” Veil rules dampen both information and bias, including bias arising from self-interest; at the same time, however, they also suppress decisionmakers’ activity or energy. Removing the spur of self-interest threatens to reduce decisionmakers’ activity below acceptable levels, to the point where constitutional designers might plausibly prefer to lift the veil and spur more activity, even if the price is that some fraction of that increased activity is self-regarding. If we hope to spur energetic presidential activity, then something roughly like the current skewed distribution of veil rules suggests itself. Where the gains from executive energy outweigh the losses from self-interested executive action, unveiling the executive is justified overall, even if it produces executive abuses. On this view, the Constitution happens to adopt a rather sensible distribution of veil rules across branches. Methodologically, this conclusion is no more than a happy coincidence. There is no general reason to expect constitutions to be optimally designed, because the motives of constitutional framers and the political circumstances under which they work may often drive them to adopt suboptimal rules.4 My claim is just that the Framers of the American Constitution, for good reasons or bad, happened upon a sensible distribution of veil rules across institutions, as far as we can judge today. Moreover, whether this claim is correct or incorrect, it is intended only to illustrate the central tradeoffs inherent in veil mechanisms, and the limits of uncertainty as a technique of constitutional design. After identifying three important tradeoffs—between impartiality, on the one hand, and information, motivation, and ex post enforceability on the other—I critique recent institutional-design proposals that have appealed to uncertainty, in some cases erroneously.
4
See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound 172 (2000).
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Chapter 1
The Veil of Uncertainty
A
veil rule, I shall say, is a rule that suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of decisionmakers by subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision. For a simple example, consider a rule that requires an official with regulatory authority over the stock market to place her assets in a “blind trust.” Even if the official is self-interested, she will be uncertain whether any given decision will increase or decrease the value of her portfolio. She will thus be unable to skew her decisions in order to promote her personal interests. In these examples and others, the crucial feature is that more information is not always better than less. From the social point of view, denying information to decisionmakers can produce better—in the sense of more nearly impartial—decisions. Veil rules suppress bias that arises from information. That bias need not be based on self-interest, although it may be. Where orchestras audition candidates from behind a screen, denying evaluators any information about the gender or attractiveness of the candidate, information is suppressed in order to suppress a type of bias; but self-interest is not in play here. Bias arising from self-interest is the major worry where government officials are concerned, and will be my focus. To the extent that veil rules
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suppress both self-interested decisionmaking and other forms of biased decisionmaking, so much the better. A veil rule may produce distributive uncertainty by either of two methods. One method is to place decisionmakers under a constraint of ignorance about their own identities and attributes. Rawls’s famous phrase, “the veil of ignorance,” describes a hypothetical original position in which principles of justice are chosen under precisely this constraint.1 But that is a special case of veil rules generally, indeed a radical case. Rawls’s thought experiment introduces uncertainty by allowing the decisionmaker to know the distributive consequences of a decision on future citizens— call them A and B—but denying the decisionmaker the knowledge of whether she herself will occupy A’s position or B’s position. Where veil rules appear under historical rather than hypothetical conditions, however, the relevant decisionmakers will usually know their own identities and interests. Veil rules that appear in actual constitutions, then, more often adopt a second method for introducing uncertainty. Although the decisionmaker knows or can guess whether she will occupy A’s or B’s position, the rule introduces uncertainty about the payoffs to A or B—about what gains, if any, A or B will reap from the decision. In other words, constitutional design decisions give particular actors particular payoffs. The first type of veil rule suppresses the decisionmaker’s knowledge of the actors’ identities; the second type suppresses the decisionmaker’s knowledge of the actors’ payoffs. As we shall see, the second type of veil rule is more plausible or realistic. Such rules can take advantage of the inherent uncertainty that, in real polities, attends upon complex political decisions whose consequences extend into the future. Between these two types of veil rule, an intermediate case arises when a decisionmaker faces a decision that will principally affect not the decisionmaker herself, but her (genetic) descendants. If the time horizon over which the decision will matter is long enough, the attributes of descendants may be so difficult to predict that the decisionmaker will effectively be left ignorant of the identity of the persons whose interests she would favor, if she could. In this vein, participants at the Constitutional Convention argued that the Framers should impartially assess the interests of social classes, and of large and small states, because posterity 1
32
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999).
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The Veil of Uncertainty
would distribute their descendants throughout the strata and regions of society.2 The point of a veil rule is to prevent self-interested decisionmaking. Constitutional designers may plausibly fear that a decisionmaker who knows both her own identity and the distribution of future benefits and burdens that results from a decision will systematically favor her own interests, in ways detrimental to the quality of the decision. Self-interested decisionmaking need not arise from bad motivations. Cognitive mechanisms such as self-serving bias3 and the proclivity to engage in motivated reasoning4 can produce it even in public-spirited officials. Behind the veil, however, the decisionmaker afflicted with uncertainty will, for lack of ex post information about whose interests to favor, choose the option or rule that impartially promotes the good of all those affected in an ex ante sense. The dearth of information produces decisions that track the output of an impartially motivated decisionmaker. What constitutes “impartial” decisionmaking—the undistorted baseline from which to measure self-interested decisionmaking and suppress it by constitutional rules—is a more difficult question in democratic theory than in the legal enterprise mechanism design, simply because the law’s ambitions are far more modest. The constitutional choice literature debates whether decisionmakers in Rawls’s original position would or should choose rules to maximize average utility or total utility;5 should instead select a “maximin” criterion that works to the benefit of the leastwell-off, as Rawls advocates;6 or should implement some less formal 2
3
4
5
6
1 The Records of the Federal Convention of , 49 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). I owe this point to Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 345 (2000). See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of SelfServing Biases, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 109, 109, 111 (observing that self-serving bias causes decisionmakers to “arrive at judgments of what is fair or right that are biased in the direction of their own self-interests”). See Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Court of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10,371 (explaining “motivated reasoning”). John Harsanyi, for example, advocates a utilitarian account of choice in the original position and uses an “equiprobability postulate” that maximizes the mean utility level of all individuals in society. John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 39, 44–46 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). The maximin criterion instructs decisionmakers to choose, from among possible actions, the one whose worst possible consequences are better than the worst possible consequences of the alternative actions. See R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions 278 (1957). Rawls uses the maximin criterion to derive his “difference principle,” which says that
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interpretation of impartiality, such as decisionmaking that displays “equal concern and respect” for all parties.7 From the standpoint of mechanism design under historical circumstances, however, the alternatives are much less refined. The aim of real-world veil rules is simply to suppress the crudest instances of self-dealing and factional oppression—decisions that would be excluded on any plausibly impartial criterion for public choice, such as the retroactive punishment of political enemies, bills of attainder, or official self-dealing with regard to salaries and emoluments. This is an example of the modest aspiration, set out in the introduction, to suggest mechanisms that aim to secure the minimum conditions of democratic governance. Disagreement about the uniquely best definition of impartiality need not prove an embarrassment to the limited ambitions of real-world democratic design, which are fully satisfied by identifying a set of decisions that all competing definitions of impartiality condemn. For similar reasons, I shall subsume within the category of selfinterest a partial preference for decisionmakers’ relatives, descendants, political allies, and so forth. The justification for this treatment derives from the modesty of law’s ambitions and the crudity of its instruments. Although there may be conceptual reasons for treating these categories differently, as suggested above in the discussion of different forms of bias, uncertainty-creating mechanisms are not usually fine-grained enough to take such differences into account.
Constitutional Choice in Two Stages By speaking of veil rules in constitutions, I mean to pose a very different question than the one pursued in the standard discussions of the veil of ignorance. The constitutional choice literature stemming from James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and their successors conceives the uncertainty produced by the veil of ignorance as a mechanism for inducing hypothetical constitutional designers to approach the choice of the constitutional rules themselves in an impartial way.8 Decisionmaking by
7 8
34
allocative inequalities are permissible only to the extent they maximize the position of the least-well-off. Rawls, supra note 1, at 132–35. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 272–78 (1978). See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules 28–31 (1985); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 77–80 (1962); Dennis Mueller, Constitutional Democracy 61–64 (1996); Jonathan Riley, Constitutional
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legislators and other officials within the framework of the constitutional rules, by contrast, falls in the domain of “ordinary politics,” where selfinterested individuals and factions struggle for advantage. The constitutional designers’ self-interest is constrained by uncertainty;9 that of ordinary decisionmakers is constrained by voting rules (such as supermajority requirements), by substantive constitutional prohibitions on inefficient legislation, and by institutional competition resulting from the separation of powers. Here I ask whether and how constitutional rules might subject insystem decisionmakers to the same uncertainty constraint that governs the hypothetical stage of constitutional choice, and for similar reasons. To illustrate, I will survey a range of rules from the federal constitution of the United States. I will suggest that the federal Constitution itself contains a number of provisions best justified as (whether or not originally designed as) veil rules. Rules, provisions, structures, and practices as diverse as the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses,10 the Emoluments Clause,11 the Twenty-Seventh Amendment,12 Article V’s procedures for constitutional amendment,13 the doctrine of precedent, the original mechanism for selecting senators (by vote of the state legislatures),14 and the rules governing presidential election and succession15 may all profitably be considered in this light, although not all of these should count as examples of veil rules rightly understood.
9
10 11
12
13 14 15
Democracy as a Two-Stage Game, in Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule 147 (Ferejohn et al., eds., 2001). This claim is rarely accurate for actual constitutional designers, who are impelled by a variety of motives, including self-interested ones, and who are constrained by circumstances, including the need to secure popular ratification of the constitutions they propose. See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound 129–46 (2000). U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed [by Congress].”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder [or] ex post facto Law. . . .”). Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time. . . .”). Id. amend. XXVII (“No Law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.”). Id. art. V (specifying procedures for constitutional amendment). Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (stating that federal senators shall be chosen by the state legislatures), amended by id. amend. XVII (replacing legislative selection with direct election). Id. art. II, § 1, cls. 3, 5 (providing rules for presidential election and succession); id. amend. XII (providing rules for presidential election); id. amends. XX, XXV (providing rules for presidential succession).
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Self-Interested Decisionmaking: Two Strategies of Design The use of veil rules is not the principal means by which the Constitution constrains self-interested decisionmaking. The Framers’ simple theory of action held that decisions are the product of motives and opportunities, and described the principal motives as reason, interest, and passion.16 The theory suggests two different strategies for constraining the operation of self-interest. The first is to replace decisionmakers’ self-interested motives with the motive of impartial rationality, thus striking at the problem at its source. Veil rules aim to accomplish that end by interfering with decisionmakers’ information, introducing uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens, which forces the self-interested decisionmaker to proceed in an impartially rational way. Madison, however, argued in The Federalist No. 10 that suppressing self-interest at its source is infeasible. The aim of “giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests”—precisely what a veil strategy does in an ex ante sense, not by enforcing homogeneity in fact but by reducing decisionmakers’ information—Madison rejected out of hand as an “impracticable” method for suppressing self-interested factions.17 He therefore preferred a second strategy to constrain selfinterest: leaving self-interested motives in place while constricting the opportunities available to self-interested decisionmakers. The “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives”18 is to parcel out decisions among different officials and institutions with different self-interested agendas, in the hope that competition among institutions will block self-interested action by any one of them. This is just the separation of powers, which controls the effects rather than the causes of self-interest by ensuring that ambition is made to counteract ambition across institutions. Madison did not wholly carry the day; existing constitutional veil rules are precisely the sort of “parchment barrier” that he rejected in favor
16
17 18
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See Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution 102–28 (1987). In the present analysis, I will ignore the role of passion. Attempts by constitutional designers to prevent in-system decisionmakers from falling prey to their temporary passions is the subject of the theory of constitutional precommitments. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound 88–167 (2000); Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 271 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). The Federalist Papers No. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). The Federalist Papers No. 51, supra note 17, at 320 (James Madison).
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of institutional competition.19 Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the baseline constitutional strategy for suppressing self-interested decisionmaking is the separation of powers, and that the use of veil rules is a supplemental and exceptional strategy. One of my concerns here is to say something about where and why the Constitution uses, or declines to use, veil rules as supplements to the normal baseline.
Veil Mechanisms The veil of uncertainty is an institutional-design strategy that may be implemented by a variety of mechanisms. I will examine four particular mechanisms that all attempt to introduce uncertainty about the distribution of future benefits and burdens that will result from a decision. The mechanisms are prospectivity, by which constitutional rules require decisionmakers to create legal rules without knowing the identities of the rules’ violators; generality, which causes decisionmakers to anticipate that both the interests they favor and those they disfavor may be governed by a current decision; durability, by which rules that make decisions relatively durable cause decisionmakers to anticipate that a present decision will govern cases in the remote future, cases whose effect on the decisionmakers’ future interests is presently unpredictable; and delay—that is, delay of the effective date of a rule, which restricts the range of a decision’s future application to the long term, rather than the short term, in the hope that decisionmakers’ long-term interests are inherently unpredictable.
Prospectivity The simplest mechanism for introducing uncertainty is to entrench a constitutional requirement that rules be prospective—enacted in advance of the events they govern. The power of retroactive legislation, for example, enables legislators to identify the winners and losers from proposed policies—to know who will bear the costs and enjoy the benefits as well as what those costs and benefits will be. The opportunities for legislative selfdealing are obvious if legislators can match identified winners and losers with past or future friends and enemies, respectively. Under a prospectivity requirement, however, legislators are hard put to match consequences 19
The Federalist Papers No. 48, supra note 17, at 309 (James Madison).
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with allegiances, because prediction is intrinsically more difficult and less certain than backward-looking observation, and because targets who know of the law will be able to steer clear of its prohibitions. A related point is that a prospectivity requirement reduces uncertainty by attaching clear legal consequences to events in advance of the events’ occurrence. Despite appearances, this is wholly consistent with the claim that prospectivity requirements, like other veil tactics, aim to produce beneficial uncertainty; the two observations address different issues. Consider, for example, the many instances in which the Constitution delegates authority to Congress to “provide by law” for the contingencies of presidential and vice-presidential succession in cases of death, disability, and so forth.20 These are simple examples of constitutional veil rules if they are interpreted to require that Congress legislate in advance of the relevant contingencies. Akhil Amar praises the veil-like effects of these rules on the ground that “[u]ncertainty, especially over so vital an issue as Presidential succession, is not, on balance, a virtue,” so that “our Constitution . . . has explicitly invited Congress to lay down clear succession rules in advance of a crisis.”21 But this runs together the issue of timing with the separate issue of the clarity of legal commands. Certainty in the latter sense is a function of the specificity and comprehensiveness of legal commands, and it can be attained after the relevant events’ occurrence as well as before. Once the President dies, nothing at all prevents Congress from legislating quite clearly about who his successor shall be. The real fear that provokes the demand for veil rules is that after a presidential death or disability, decisionmakers’ knowledge of the identities of the possible successors will provoke socially harmful, because self-interested, congressional decisionmaking, as legislators maneuver to enthrone themselves or their partisans in the White House. That fear is dampened not only by the clarity of previously enacted succession rules but also by uncertainty at the time of enactment about whose ox a given rule will gore. It is true, however, that later interpreters who know the effects of the previously enacted rule on their current interests may take advantage of any ambiguities in the rule by means of tendentious interpretation. I discuss that problem at greater length below. 20 21
38
See supra note 15. Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 215, 221, 227 (1994).
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There is no general federal constitutional requirement that legislation (and a fortiori adjudication) be solely or even partially prospective. The most prominent prospectivity rules in the Constitution are the Ex Post Facto Clauses,22 which forbid federal and state legislatures from enacting retroactive punishments.23 The ex post facto prohibition is best explained as a veil of ignorance rule, albeit of limited scope. An older view held that the prohibition prevents unfair surprise to law-abiding citizens, but that is both circular (presumably, without the prohibition, fewer people would be surprised by retroactive criminal legislation) and morally unattractive (when, for example, the new rule punishes a defendant who previously tortured and murdered his own children,24 an act he ought to have known would upset the public’s representatives). It is a problem for the veil account that the ex post facto prohibition applies only to retroactive criminal laws and not retroactive civil laws. If identifiability is the key, why should not all retroactivity be suspect? One way out is to supplement the veil story with an interest-group tale of differential access to the political process, as does Harold Krent.25 Felons cannot vote, have no trade association and often no money, and the stigma of their past convictions or threatened retroactive convictions scares off potential political allies, so their interests will be underweighed in the legislative process. But the parties typically burdened by retroactive civil legislation have both cash and friends; they need no special judicial protection. This is a clever story, but in the end not a convincing one. For one thing, adding interest-group analysis might cut the wrong way, suggesting that no constitutional barrier to retroactive legislation is necessary. If the retroactivity of a pending bill makes winners and losers identifiable, 22 23
24 25
See supra note 10. E.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). The Supreme Court has occasionally read ex post facto principles into the Due Process Clause, with the result that a few cases hold unforeseeable judicial interpretations of statutes unconstitutional. E.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (holding that the South Carolina Supreme Court violated the petitioners’ due process rights by retroactively applying its new construction of a state statute). But the unforeseeability requirement is construed very grudgingly, and the official view remains that the ex post facto prohibition binds only legislatures, not courts. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693 (2001). See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (upholding, against an ex post facto challenge, a retroactive change in death penalty sentencing procedure). Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 Geo. L.J. 2143 (1996).
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interest groups may lobby all the more fiercely to block the bill than they would to block prospective laws that are less clearly harmful to their interests.26 For another, the interest-group tale explains a problem at the margins of the prohibition rather than the problem at its core. Krent focuses principally upon the case in which legislation increases the punishment for previously convicted criminals. Sentenced offenders, as Krent argues, are hardly a politically appealing constituency. But the core concern of the prohibition is with wholly new retroactive crimes, and it is not clear that Krent’s analysis works in that case. New criminals, unlike previously sentenced criminals, have the formal right to vote and the informal access to political resources that sentenced felons lack. In this respect, the veil account fits the scope of the ex post facto prohibition better than does Krent’s account. If the prohibition is a veil rule, then it sensibly covers both new crimes and sentence enhancements. In either case, the key concern is legislators’ ability to identify and to specify the targets of the new criminal rule, rather than the content of the rule itself. Rather than invoke the uncertain aid of interest-group analysis, we should probably just say that the distinction between permissible civil retroactivity and impermissible criminal retroactivity is a pseudo-puzzle. As a historical matter, the ex post facto prohibition may have been understood to cover both categories during the founding era.27 As a matter of judicial doctrine, to say that civil retroactivity is permissible is an accurate description of the ex post facto prohibition standing alone, but it is an overstatement if applied to constitutional law generally. Other clauses sometimes bar civil retroactivity that impinges on particular constitutional interests such as property; the Supreme Court occasionally invalidates retroactive civil legislation under the Takings and Due Process Clauses. If there remains a slight mismatch between the veil account and the scope of constitutional antiretroactivity rules generally, we might justify it simply as the law’s rough attempt to adjust the direct costs and benefits of veil rules. As a rough empirical generalization, subject to pervasive 26 27
40
Cf. Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. Legal Stud. 265, 280 (1993). The Clause was held to cover only criminal legislation in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). But that holding was hotly contested at the time. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 414–16 (1829) (Johnson, J., dissenting). It is still controversial in originalist circles today. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing his willingness to overrule Calder).
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exceptions and boundary problems, laws imposing criminal burdens are blunter instruments, which impose cruder, more fearsome, and more stigmatizing harms on those subjected to them than do civil or regulatory laws. Conversely, the loss in impartiality that arises when relatively lessharmful civil statutes are left outside the veiled domain is more than compensated by the corresponding gains in legislative information and flexibility. As Justice Iredell put the same point, “[w]ithout the possession of this power [to enact retroactive civil laws] the operations of government would often be obstructed.”28
Generality Closely entangled with the idea of prospectivity is the idea of generality.29 A variety of constitutional rules require generality, or more accurately, push official decisions in the direction of generality across a continuum between the highly specific and the highly general. The Bill of Attainder Clauses, applicable to both federal and state governments, prevent legislatures from inflicting criminal punishments on specific, identified individuals or groups (without a judicial hearing); “special legislation” clauses in state constitutions prohibit or hamper statutes that impose special burdens, or (in some states) statutes that confer special benefits, on particular individuals, groups, or geographic areas; various constitutional requirements of uniformity prevent disparate treatment of different states or regions;30 and the equal protection requirement serves as a constitutional backstop that may be invoked to scrutinize both federal and state official action that seems excessively targeted against identified individuals or classes. The generality requirement, like the prospectivity requirement, is said to produce veil effects that deprive decisionmakers of the information needed to pursue selfish or partial interests. “[G]eneralizations place people behind the veil of ignorance, depriving them of the knowledge of
28 29 30
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 400 (Iredell, J.). For the conceptual issues surrounding generality, see Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes 251–77 (2003). U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. . . .”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have power . . . To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States. . . .”); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (“No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another. . . .”).
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whether [a rule’s] application will help or hurt themselves or their friends.”31 If legislators, for example, must frame statutes in general terms, rather than tailoring their proscriptions to identified or (at least) identifiable enemies, there will be some risk, however small it may be in practice, that the legislator himself (or his allies) will fall subject to the law. That risk will moderate the legislator’s hostility or indifference to disfavored individuals or groups, bringing decisions more nearly into line with impartial decisionmaking, however defined. Untangling the relationship between generality and prospectivity helps us to appreciate the work that each requirement does. Granting that “the legislature must prescribe penalties generally and prospectively, behind a suitably impersonal veil of ignorance,”32 we may wonder whether either generality or prospectivity does any veil-generating work on its own, absent the other. Consider the following three hypothetical cases:33 (1) A statute providing that “all those who hereafter steal from another shall be put to death.” (2) A statute providing that “all those who have previously stolen from another shall be put to death” (where either there was no preexisting theft statute or the preexisting statute imposed a lesser penalty). (3) A statute providing that “anyone named Vermeule who hereafter steals from another shall be put to death” (where there is no other, general theft statute in force, and only one person named Vermeule). The first statute is both general and prospective, the second general but retroactive, and the third prospective but extremely specific. Under current doctrine the first is clearly valid, while the second clearly violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. It might be said that the generality of the second statute imposes a sufficient veil of ignorance, because the legislators will 31
32 33
42
Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1364 (1983); see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings 240 (1985) (justifying general tort rules on veil of ignorance grounds). For a recent attempt to make generality the master principle of constitutional choice, see James M. Buchanan & Roger D. Congleton, Politics by Principle, Not Interest (1998). Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 203, 210 (1996). Adapted from a similar list in Amar, supra note 32.
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be unable to identify the distribution of the law’s burdens with any precision, but that is only true in a very partial sense. Legislators enacting a general but retroactive statute may not know precisely who falls within the statute’s terms, but because the statute is retroactive they need only know whether they and their allies have already committed the relevant crime in the past; if they have not, then the statute’s burdens can only ever fall upon outsiders. The third statute presents a somewhat more difficult case than the first two. In a challenge to the statute brought under the Bill of Attainder Clause, the key question would be whether the statute is excessively specific, but the notion of “specificity” may itself be cashed out in different ways. One view has it that legislation displays unconstitutional specificity when, and perhaps only when, “the legislation defines a closed class, a class with a membership that is permanently fixed when the class is defined, from which members can never exit and into which nonmembers can never enter.”34 Yet, as the Supreme Court has noted, the closed-class test proves too restrictive if it supplies a sufficient condition for an attainder violation, because it would prohibit the imposition of seemingly benign burdens. Consider a statute that forbids epileptics from operating dangerous machinery without a license, on pain of criminal sanctions.35 So another view has it that the touchstone must be whether the legislative purpose in defining a suspiciously small or impermeable class is punitive or legitimately nonpunitive. On the latter view, the epileptic-licensing statute pursues a nonpunitive or essentially regulatory end and is therefore acceptable, while a statute making it a crime for any present or past member of the Communist Party to serve as a labor-union officer embodies punitive purposes and thus constitutes a forbidden attainder.36 Probably either view would condemn the third statute. Under the closed-class view, a statute subjecting a named individual (or an equivalent class of one) to a legal disability is a paradigmatic attainder. Even under the more permissive nonpunitive-purpose view, it is hard to imagine a nonpunitive rationale for legislating against a named individual that would not apply to some other potential malefactor as well. One could 34 35 36
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar’s Analysis of Romer, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 236, 240 (1996). See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 454 n.29 (1965); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 646 n.25 (2d ed. 1988). See Brown, 381 U.S. at 450–56.
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label the latter point as an equal protection problem rather than an attainder problem,37 but the core concern about inadequate generality is the same under either rubric. Hence, prospectivity without generality is as condemnable as generality without prospectivity, and the upshot of the hypotheticals is that the twin requirements of prospectivity and generality both do some independent veil-generating work. The former prevents decisionmakers from reaching into the past to burden identified parties, while the latter prevents decisionmakers from loading down identified parties with special future burdens. This account may load the dice by using examples that impose burdens rather than benefits. Constitutional rules that restrain the retroactive imposition of burdens, such as the ex post facto prohibition, usually do not restrain retroactive benefits at all. Likewise, the Bill of Attainder Clauses do not prevent legislatures from singling out named beneficiaries for special largesse. It might be thought embarrassing for the veil of ignorance account of prospectivity and generality that these rules reach only burdens. If the core feature of a veil rule is that it denies decisionmakers the ability to act on information about identified or identifiable individuals or groups in order to promote impartial decisions, the restriction of the ex post facto and attainder prohibitions to burdens rather than benefits may suggest that the current constitutional rules are underinclusive. This objection, while not frivolous, is probably overblown. First, a doctrinal point in the federal system is that while general benefits are usually immune from constitutional challenge, specific benefits are always subject to an equal protection challenge for lack of a rational basis, and will be strictly scrutinized if the specific class of beneficiaries is defined along illicit lines. In state systems, “special legislation” clauses go even farther toward prohibiting targeted benefits. In terms of constitutional clauses, the generality and prospectivity requirements are better tailored to the veil rationale than a constricted focus on the ex post facto and attainder prohibitions might indicate. Second, the harms of self-interested legislative decisionmaking are plausibly higher where decisions selectively allocate burdens than where decisions selectively allocate benefits, despite the abstract economic equivalence between losses and foregone gains. Constitutional designers might intuitively grasp that, for good or bad cognitive reasons, the law’s subjects 37
44
See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
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The Veil of Uncertainty
count the selective imposition of a burden, measured from some preexisting baseline, as a more grievous loss than the selective denial of an opportunity to receive some benefit, measured from the same baseline.
Durability A standard claim in the constitutional choice literature holds that as the durability of rules is increased toward the limit case of permanence, constitutional designers become increasingly uncertain about how the choice of rules will affect their future interests.38 Durability means that the designer must take into account long-term as well as short-term effects; the inherent unpredictability of long-term interests means that the designer can do no better than to choose impartially. An important special case of durability arises where the decisionmaker anticipates that she will occupy different, even opposed, roles in a series of future transactions that will be governed by a durable legal rule. In nonconstitutional contexts, a decisionmaker who must choose rules of contract law, for example, might be led to choose impartially by anticipating that (1) the rules will govern a long series of future contracts and that (2) she will sometimes occupy the role of buyer, sometimes the role of seller. The veil of ignorance arguments advanced at the Federal Constitutional Convention, noted by several commentators, have precisely this structure. In arguing for direct popular election of House members, rather than election by state legislatures, George Mason argued that: We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He [Mason] had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights—and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.39 38
39
See, e.g., Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 8, at 29–30. For a meditation on durability, with reference to Article V, see Lawrence Sager, The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution, in Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule 130 (Ferejohn ed., 2001). 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 49 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
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Likewise, Gouverneur Morris decried the delegates’ attachments to the interests of their home states, on the ground that “after all how little can be the motive yielded by selfishness for such a policy. Who can say whether he himself, much less whether his children, will the next year be an inhabitant of this or that State.”40 Similar examples are strewn throughout the Convention records. Here our subject is not durability at the level of decisions about constitutional rules, but durability at the level of decisions made under constitutional rules. Perhaps rules increasing the durability of in-system decisions will produce veil-like effects, as long as decisionmakers are aware that their decisions will remain in place for long periods. Thus Article V’s relatively onerous procedures for constitutional amendment have been said to produce a veil effect because amenders have to abide by the amendment in remote future circumstances that they are unable to predict at the time of amendment.41 Procedures for constitutional amendment are a special case, because they govern decisions of a hybrid character; proposals for amendment are offered by within-system decisionmakers, but once effective the decision has constitutional status, and to that extent represents an exercise of constitutional choice within a restricted domain. A cleaner example is the set of rules that govern the durability of constitutional interpretations rendered by in-system decisionmakers, principally the doctrine of stare decisis for constitutional questions. Here the claim is that interpreters will reason impartially if they anticipate that the decision may be invoked in future cases whose valence in terms of the decisionmakers’ future interests is unpredictable. Upholding the free speech claim of a left-wing dissenter now may require upholding the free speech claim of a right-wing dissenter later. The point generalizes beyond judicial decisionmaking to any institution that follows a de jure or de facto norm of precedent. If Republican senators impeaching a Democratic president in 1998 know that their interpretations of the relevant constitutional provisions may govern the impeachment of a Republican president by 40 41
46
Id. at 531. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 917, 967 n.173 (1990); John O. McGinnis, The Inevitable Infidelities of Constitutional Translation: The Case of the New Deal, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 177, 209 (1999); John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1958 (2003).
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Democratic senators on some unpredictable future occasion, the claim runs, they will be pushed toward impartial interpretations, or at least moderate ones.42 Durability is analytically distinct from generality. A fact-specific decision may be quite durable in the empty sense that it governs no future cases and thus provides no occasion for reconsidering its force, while general rules often prove short-lived. But there is a plausible empirical or causal connection between the two features. Constitutional designers might require in-system decisions to be durable as well as general in order to prevent decisionmakers from circumventing generality requirements. If generality requirements are only imperfectly enforceable, a decision cast in adequately general terms that favors decisionmakers’ short-term interests will prove more attractive if the decision can be rescinded once it has done its work, less so if it will remain in force for the remote future. As I discuss shortly, however, the converse point is that durability without generality will not succeed in producing a veil effect. A durability requirement can be circumvented if the original decisionmakers can issue a decision of excessive specificity, or if subsequent decisionmakers can eviscerate a prior decision by narrow interpretation. Despite the frequent invocation of durability as a veil-producing mechanism, it is hardly clear that durability successfully dampens decisionmakers’ self-interest. First, the mechanism supposes, implausibly, that decisionmakers care equally about both the present and the remote future. If decisionmakers substantially discount the future, however, it is perfectly rational for them to choose rules according to their short-term interests. If the rule indicated by short-term expediency is sufficiently beneficial, the discount rate will ensure that its expected value overwhelms other candidates even if that rule has predictably adverse effects on long-term interests. Introducing uncertainty about long-term interests does nothing to dilute the effect of the discount rate; indeed it strengthens it. Furthermore, when the decisionmaker has decent information about the short-term effects of the rule, as is often the case, ordinary principles of decisionmaking under risk or uncertainty will counsel that the unpredictable long-term effects of the rule should be ignored; the decisionmaker should take the bird in hand without worrying about what is 42
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 169, 186 (2000).
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left in the bush. The veil arguments advanced at the Federal Constitutional Convention proved largely inadequate to overcome this effect. In many cases, although not all, delegates from small and large states pursued their own and their principals’ short-term interests, making it necessary to settle the major choices not only by rational argument but also by frank bargaining.43 A second problem is that rules that make decisions relatively durable may be quite difficult to enforce. Decisionmakers who anticipate the durability of rules may opt for fact-specific standards, precisely in order to circumvent the veil effect of durability. A highly specific decision guts durability of any substance; the initial decision will govern any future cases to which it applies, but it won’t apply to any future cases.44 By making a decision in the form of a ticket good for one day only, courts may sidestep the veil effect that would otherwise arise from before-the-fact uncertainty about whether the decision might rebound in harmful directions in future cases. Of course, even that uncertainty might prove a feeble constraint where a majority of the court prefers to take the gains from deciding a current case in a manner conformable to the majority’s preferences, at the price of expected losses in future cases; this is the point about discount rates again. Durability rules are also extremely porous after the fact. Subsequent decisionmakers will attempt to undo prior decisions that constrain their current interests, and for two reasons they will often succeed. First, no durability rule does or could make an initial decision permanent. Under current American law at least, there is no absolute rule requiring adherence to past precedent, by contrast to the rule that used to govern the decisions of the House of Lords. The normative case for rejecting an absolute rule of precedent is that later decisionmakers have better information than initial decisionmakers about the current effects of prior decisions in light of changing social circumstances. Here again, hoped-for veil effects are compromised by the need to ensure that decisionmakers possess adequate information. But the revisability of decisions also means that subsequent decisionmakers may opportunistically overturn prior decisions 43
44
48
Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 345 (2000); Robert A. McGuire, Constitution Making: A Rational Choice Model of the Federal Convention of 1787, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 483 (1988). See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
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that disfavor them (at present), and if their information is also better than that of contemporaneous observers, it will be difficult for those observers to sort out warranted from unwarranted revisions. Second, even short of an outright overruling or revision of an earlier decision, the earlier decision is only as robust as whatever theory of interpretation is subsequently in place. If the interpretive rules are loose, clever readings can narrow or distinguish inconvenient decisions after the fact almost to the same extent that decisions can be limited at the outset. As a conceptual matter, this sort of subsequent gamesmanship does not detract from the initial veil effect produced by a durability requirement, but the twist is that the subsequent unenforceability of durability rules can be anticipated by the initial decisionmakers themselves. Those decisionmakers may reason that moderating their current decisions in order to forestall the possibility that the decision will rebound harmfully in future cases is foolish. If future interpreters of the current decision are hostile to the future interests of the current decisionmakers, and if the boundaries of fair interpretation are wide, then the future interpreters will not be constrained to abide by the moderate character of the initial decision in any event. This dynamic undercuts Neal Katyal’s claim that if there is a norm of legislative precedent, Republicans interpreting the constitutional standards for impeachment in the case of a Democratic president will moderate their decisions to forestall a future impeachment in the opposite direction.45 Current Republicans may reason that future Democrats can and will distinguish or redescribe the current decision in any event, so that current restraint would amount to nothing more than unilateral disarmament.
Delayed Effectiveness The pervasive weakness of the durability mechanism is that decisionmakers remain aware of their short-term interests, and if they discount sharply enough, or have decent information only about the short term, they will rationally ignore the long-term uncertainty produced by the durability requirement. A mechanism that attempts to lengthen the time horizon is to delay the effectiveness of decisions, either for some fixed period or until after some future event. An example might be a constitutional rule providing that all ordinary legislation will take effect only X years after the 45
See Katyal, supra note 42, at 186.
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date of enactment. Many constitutions stipulate that constitutional amendments or certain classes of statutes take effect only after being approved by two successive sessions of the legislature, and this has something of the same effect. A delayed-effect rule produces uncertainty only in an indirect sense. Such rules impose no direct restriction on decisionmakers’ information, nor do they introduce a new source of uncertainty. Instead, delay rules take advantage of a preexisting uncertainty—the inherent unpredictability of the decisionmakers’ long-term interests—that would otherwise be overwhelmed by the incentives to focus on short-term considerations. By confining the range of the decision’s application to cover only the period (beyond the delay period) in which decisionmakers’ interests are unpredictable, a delay rule ensures that the only period current decisionmakers can affect is one that is, from their ex ante standpoint, subject to a veil of uncertainty. The example of a general constitutional rule that explicitly delays the effective date of ordinary legislation is obviously fanciful, and that is interesting in itself. The closest analogue in the federal Constitution is a matched pair of rules in Article I and in Article V. The Article I provision forbade Congress to prohibit the “Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit” (read: slaves) until the year 1808. The latter provision made the former provision unamendable before 1808 (at which point any amendment would be moot). But the analogy is not very close. These rules prohibited action until a particular time certain; Congress could and did legislate in 1807 with no uncertainty at all about the distribution of benefits and burdens from the decision. A delayed-effectiveness rule, by contrast, produces veil-like effects only because it builds in a delay period that attaches no matter when the legislation is enacted or the decision made. Nonetheless, there are constitutional rules that might be explained or rationalized as incorporating a delay strategy of a sort. I will discuss two examples: the Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the Emoluments Clause. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment provides that “[n]o law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.”46 The Amendment was not formally ratified until 1992, but that is irrelevant 46
50
U.S. Const. amend. XXVII.
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for my current purpose, which is to use the Amendment as an example of the delaying tactic, rather than to make claims about its historical significance. The purpose and effect of the provision is less obvious at the second glance than at the first. Certainly the target is legislative self-dealing over salary and other compensation, a serious concern given the Constitution’s vesting of appropriations power in the legislature. But the question is why the ordinary operation of the election cycle will not prevent legislators from conspicuous feeding at the public trough. On standard public-choice premises, constitutional designers should worry more about less visible forms of self-dealing, such as kickback schemes and in-kind exactions from citizens affected by legislation. Put differently, the Amendment cannot be explained as an attempt to restrain legislators by subjecting them to the anticipation of a post-hoc electoral check. That motive would operate with full force even in the absence of the Amendment as long as the pay raise became public knowledge, and publicity is guaranteed elsewhere by constitutional rules that require each house of Congress to publish the journal of its proceedings, that require appropriations to be made by (published) statutes, and that require regular publication of the expenditures of all public money. The key to the Amendment’s design is that it delays the effective date of a legislative pay raise until after the next election (of representatives). The delay prevents legislators from benefiting during the interim period, and thus ensures that legislators will not consider the question of appropriate pay under the distorting influence of short-term personal interest. As Madison said while introducing the Amendment in the First Congress: Perhaps of all the powers granted, it [i.e.] the legislative power to set legislators’ salaries] is least likely to abuse; but there is a seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without control to put their hand into the public coffers, to take out money to put in their pockets; there is a seeming indecorum in such power. . . . I have gone, therefore, so far as to fix it, that no law, varying the compensation, shall operate until there is a change in the Legislature; in which case it cannot be for the particular benefit of those who are concerned in determining the value of the service.47 47
1 Annals of Cong. 457–58 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added).
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Madison’s explanation was not perfectly tailored to the scope of the rule proposed. To ensure that a salary increase could not operate for the “particular benefit” of the legislators who voted on it would instead require an eligibility restriction, either one that made legislators ineligible for election to a new Congress after voting for a (delayed) salary increase, or one that denied legislators a component of salary equivalent to the increase for which the legislator previously voted. But the Twenty-Seventh Amendment achieves a similar effect by introducing uncertainty about personal benefit, through the strategy of delay. Marginal legislators who are unsure whether they will maintain their seats after the next election will also be unsure whether a current vote for a delayed salary increase will benefit themselves or instead benefit future legislators who will have replaced them, perhaps political rivals from their home states or districts. Without the delay provision, legislators who anticipate a risk of losing the next election would be especially likely to vote for the short-term benefit of an immediate pay raise; with the delay provision, they are especially unlikely to do so. A more complicated and historically more important example is the Emoluments Clause, which provides that “[n]o Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time.”48 Justice Story’s view was that the Clause attempts to suppress “venality.” As Story wrote, “[t]he reasons for excluding persons from offices, who have been concerned in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, are, to take away, as far as possible, any improper bias in the vote of the representative, and to secure to the constituents some solemn pledge of his disinterestedness.”49 Absent the Clause, not only would legislators have the power to vote on the existence or perquisites of offices they would be eligible to fill, but they could strike collusive deals with the President, distorting policy in other areas in order to obtain a presidential promise of future appointment to a new or enhanced office.
48 49
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U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States at 311 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833). A somewhat different account of the purpose of the Clause emphasizes the fear that legislative-executive collusion would create an excessive number of new federal offices, expanding the federal government at the expense of the states. John F. O’Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 89, 164–68 (1995).
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Here too, however, the precise scope of the Clause seems poorly tailored to the aim of suppressing venality. Subjecting each legislator to a permanent ineligibility to federal offices that were created or whose emoluments were increased during the legislator’s term would detach selfinterest from decisions about the existence and compensation of federal offices. This is something of an exaggeration, because even a permanent disability would leave scope for legislators to advance friends and relatives to federal offices, to create a new office in the hope of assuming an old office after its current occupant has moved to the new one, or to carry out other subtle schemes of evasion. But the Framers argued that suppressing the core case of biased decisionmaking would be worthwhile even if other (but costlier) substitutes remained available.50 Instead, the Clause as enacted only makes the legislator ineligible for appointment during the term for which the legislator was elected. The historical explanation for this slight mistailoring is that the current form of the Clause was a compromise among the Convention delegates. An initial proposal would have made legislators ineligible for any federal office for up to one year after the legislator’s term ended. Madison’s eventual proposal, which he described as a “middle ground,”51 restricted the Clause along both dimensions to palliate other delegates’ concerns that a broad ineligibility would discourage too many talented but ambitious candidates from seeking federal legislative office. Purely as a textual matter, however, the actual wording of the Clause might be justified as a delay rule aiming to produce uncertainty and consequent veil-like effects. Consider the choices facing a legislator who must vote up or down on a bill to create a new office or increase the emoluments of an old one, and who has some hope or expectation of obtaining executive nomination and confirmation to the office. Absent the Clause, the legislator may strike a deal to obtain executive appointment as the price of supporting the bill, vote for the bill, and assume the office, all during the current electoral term—although a different constitutional rule that prohibits simultaneous service in the legislative and executive branches requires him to surrender his current legislative office as the price of moving into the executive. With the Clause, the legislator knows that if the bill is enacted, he will be ineligible to be nominated or confirmed to the 50 51
1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 387–89 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). Id. at 308.
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new or enhanced office until after the end of his current term. Note, however, that in this century the Clause has been partially diluted by the so-called Saxbe fix, in which Congress attempts to remove a legislator’s disability under the Clause by reducing the compensation of the office to the level prevailing at the beginning of the legislator’s current electoral term. Therefore, if Congress raises the salary of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the President nominates a sitting senator to the post, the Saxbe fix purports to remove the senator’s ineligibility.52 Nothing I say here turns upon the much-debated question whether the Saxbe fix is constitutional. The delay created by the Clause increases the legislator’s uncertainty about whether he will benefit from the creation or enhancement of the office. For one thing, the postponement decreases the credibility of a presidential promise, given at the time of the vote, to nominate the legislator in the future. The legislator will anticipate that if he loses the intervening election, the President may decide that he can renege without incurring the wrath of any current legislator (one of whom may be offered the job in place of the former legislator), and will also anticipate that if the intervening election coincides with a presidential election, the President may not be around to fulfill the promise anyway. For another thing, the delay takes advantage of the inherent unpredictability of future politics. The legislator may, for example, anticipate or fear that the intervening election will change the composition of the Senate in such a way as to preclude a realistic chance of obtaining senatorial confirmation to a principal office. Legislative salaries and appointment to federal office were two areas of paramount concern to Framers who feared self-interested legislative decisionmaking. The corresponding provisions, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the Emoluments Clause, are structured around delay mechanisms that introduce uncertainty about the distribution of benefits from the relevant decisions. The veil of ignorance strategy, then, is an important feature not only of negative restrictions on legislative action, such as the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, but also of structural constitutional law. Veil rules are a central feature but not a pervasive one; there remains a set of puzzles about why the veil rules we have are the only ones we have, and why the ones we have are located where they are. The next chapter turns to those puzzles. 52
54
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 907, 908–09 (1994).
Mechanisms of Democracy
Chapter 2
The Limits of Uncertainty
I
begin with a general consideration of the limits of uncertainty and the distribution of veil rules across legislative, executive and judicial institutions. Although the examples are drawn from American constitutionalism, the tradeoffs I identify have broader application. Three tradeoffs are central, and explain the appreciable constraints on law’s use of uncertainty-generating mechanisms. First, uncertainty reduces self-interest, but has the obvious cost of reducing the decisionmaker’s information. Under some circumstances, impartial but ignorant decisions will be worse, even from the social point of view, than decisions that are self-interested but well-informed. Second, and less obviously, impartiality trades off against motivation. Self-interest is often the spur to action. An impartial decisionmaker who can select his own activity level and agenda may often be an excessively passive decisionmaker from the social point of view, acting too rarely. Where a decisionmaker has control of his own agenda, yet cannot pursue self-interested projects, the decisionmaker may pursue too few projects, according to some given normative theory of proper activity levels. Third, impartial enactments face more serious commitment problems than self-interested enactments. The former are more likely to be undone after the veil of uncertainty has lifted, whereas self-interested Institutional Design Writ Small
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enactments will tend to have an ongoing constituency who will fight fiercely in their defense. The tradeoffs between impartiality on the one hand, and information, institutional motivation or energy, and ex post enforceability on the other, help to justify the constraints on uncertainty as a democratic mechanism for enforcing impartiality. To illustrate these constraints, I examine some recent proposals that in some way or other trade on veil-generating mechanisms to produce impartial reforms, in the areas of judicial tenure, the emergency powers of government, and electoral redistricting. I conclude that these proposals are less likely to succeed when they are addressed to decisionmakers who need take no action at all, and when the commitment problem is most serious, as in the case of statutes intended to govern future wars and emergencies. They are more likely to succeed when they are addressed to decisionmakers who lack agenda control (at least with respect to the subject of the proposal), and when commitment problems are overcome by the routine status quo bias of the legislative process.
The Distribution of Veil Rules A striking feature of the veil rules explicated in Chapter 1 is their skewed distribution across the Constitution. The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses constrain Congress, but there are no similar checks on independent executive action—meaning executive action taken pursuant to a freestanding grant of constitutional authority, such as the pardon power, rather than action taken in the President’s capacity as a participant in the process of statutory enactment, such as the signature or veto of a bill. Moreover, there is only a weak form of ex post facto check on judicial decisionmaking, as discussed above. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the Emoluments Clause constrain legislative self-dealing and collusion with the executive, but there are no equivalent checks on independent executive or judicial action. If this unequal distribution does not seem puzzling, it is only because it is so familiar to American constitutional lawyers. There is no reason rooted in the nature of things why constitutional rules might not aim to produce much more pervasive veil-like effects on executive and judicial decisionmaking. Start with the executive branch. Is presidential decisionmaking necessarily retrospective and specific because it is by some essential definition an exercise of the power to execute rather than to legislate? 56
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The pardon power, for example, could easily be subjected to requirements of prospectivity and generality; it would then resemble the powers of suspension and dispensation—prospective waivers of general laws—that were long claimed by the English crown.1 So, too, with the power to prosecute. Under the current constitutional rules, Congress may not enact a retroactive criminal statute that identifies and punishes individuals for actions undertaken in the past, but the executive may wait until identified individuals have violated the statute and then select particular violators for prosecution. A more veiled approach would require prosecutors to enact and abide by general and prospective guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion—akin to requiring that the Justice Department’s prosecution guidelines be given legal force. The point holds for judicial decisionmaking as well. Judges could be subjected to veil effects by anticipated durability, as a less malleable doctrine of precedent might accomplish, or by pushing courts to decide cases prospectively in order to suppress bias-inducing information. Federal courts, for example, might be permitted or even required to issue advisory opinions in advance of controversies, without knowledge of the identity of particular litigants or of particular facts; courts in several states and in other countries are subject to a variety of similar requirements. Many of those strategies could be adapted to executive-branch settings as well. It is something of a puzzle, therefore, that the Constitution uses veil rules principally to control legislative action, but not executive or judicial action. I will ask whether there is any justification for this pattern. I do not assume that the justification, if there is one, explains the pattern. There is no reason to presume, in the absence of argument, that the constitutional design is optimal in this (or any other) respect. Nonetheless, I believe that there happens to be a good justification for the pattern we observe; a wellmotivated constitutional designer could well approve of the distribution of veil rules across the American constitution, given certain empirical conditions I will indicate. I begin with some extant accounts of the skewed distribution of veil rules. One such account discernible in the literature, although more as an implicit assumption than as an articulated theory, is that veil rules are unnecessary where there are alternative institutional-design features that check self-interested decisionmaking. Legal scholar Rick Hills offers an 1
See W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 217–25, 240–41 (1927).
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elegant account of the Bill of Attainder Clause, for example, under which the Clause enforces legislative impartiality—a condition secured in the adjudicative context by design features such as life tenure, precedent, the ban on ex parte contacts, and so on. “The veil of ignorance in the legislative chambers, in effect, replaces the blindfold on the face of Justice in the courtroom, and creates a different sort of blindness that accomplishes the same sort of effect—a minimal degree of impartiality.”2 This resonates with important constitutional themes, but it supplies only an incomplete justification for the distribution of veil rules in the American Constitution. We would want to know what, on this account, secures impartiality in the executive branch, given that the presumed source of legislative partiality—responsiveness to self-interested factions— is also present in the executive, while the claimed guarantors of judicial impartiality are notably absent. Nor can we simply say that the executive and judiciary are both constrained by the obligation to enforce statutes that must themselves be enacted by legislatures subject to pervasive veil constraints. That would fail to justify the absence of veil rules governing independent, nonexecutory presidential and judicial powers, such as the pardon power and constitutional judicial review. Perhaps unique institutional-design features of the presidency might be said to promote executive impartiality. Madison argued that groups are more likely to indulge in self-interested decisionmaking than single individuals, since each member of the group incurs only a fractional share of the public opprobrium resulting from the self-interested decision.3 On this view, perhaps the relatively unitary character of the presidency partially forces the President to internalize the reputational costs of (visible) self-dealing. But then we would also be entitled to point to unique institutional-design features of the Congress as guarantors of legislative impartiality; examples are bicameralism, long Senate terms, and selection from large districts—all of which Madison argued would dampen self-regarding action by legislative groups. In that case the puzzle would be not why the executive and judiciary are not subject to 2
3
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See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar’s Analysis of Romer, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 236, 242 (1996); see also Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 35, 41 (1997) (arguing that “legislative retroactivity in the criminal context is more disfavored than lawmaking by judges” because institutional-design features such as life tenure insulate judges from interest-group pressures). The Federalist No. 10, at 125–26 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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veil-producing rules, but why the legislature is. The account based on alternative checks against self-interest either leaves unexplained the absence of executive-branch veil rules or else poses the question why veil rules are necessary or desirable for any branch. A different sort of account would invoke the pervasive tradeoff between information and neutrality. In many settings, supplying decisionmakers with more information produces more decisional bias; restricting information in order to reduce bias produces impartial but poorly informed decisions. The regulatory specialist or expert understands an industry because he worked in it and has lots of friends who still do, while the administrative or judicial generalist who is free of similar bias-producing ties does not understand the subject as well.4 We might trade on this insight in the present context to argue that veil rules are most likely to be found where the costs of poorly informed decisions are plausibly lower than in settings where veil rules are not found. Perhaps the direct informational costs of throwing veils over congressional decisionmaking are lower than in executive and judicial settings; perhaps the legislature’s information will remain in some sense adequate to its tasks even with veil rules in place, while that of other branches will not. The basic insight is powerful, and it does much to justify the fact that constitutional rules do not impose far more stringent veil strategies than they actually do. A rule delaying the effective date of all legislation for ten years, for example, might produce enormous veil effects, yet prove socially disastrous because of the rapid pace of social change; the legislation in effect at any time would have been enacted by the ill-informed legislators of a decade ago. However, the information-neutrality tradeoff is general across institutions, and thus lacks bite. It offers no account of the distribution of veil rules that the Constitution actually embodies. I suggest the following account. The key is to focus not on the direct informational costs of veil rules, but on their indirect and secondary effects on decisionmakers’ motivations and activity levels—on what the Framers called institutional “energy.”5 The Framers’ Humean theory of political psychology described self-interest as the principal spur to action.6 4 5 6
See Saul Levmore, Efficiency and Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-Nepotism Rules and Separation Strategies, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2099 (1998). See The Federalist Papers No. 70, supra note 3, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing “[e]nergy in the executive”). Morton White, Philosophy, the Federalist, and the Constitution (1989).
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Impartial reason was normatively superior but practically feeble; the pallid claims of reason could never provoke the same degree of energy and activity as the prospect of selfish gain. A constitutional designer who subscribes to this political psychology might see the distribution of veil rules not only as a direct strategy for checking decisional self-interest, but also as an indirect means for allocating or adjusting energy or activity levels across competing institutions. A decisionmaker who controls his own activity level or agenda, and is subject to a complex of veil rules, would predictably undertake fewer projects and make fewer decisions (and fewer selfinterested decisions) than would a decisionmaker enjoying full information about the distribution of benefits and burdens from its decisions. Conversely, the constitutional designer might sensibly decline to impose veil rules on an institution intended to display great energy; the price of that energy, more self-interested decisions, would be worth paying in order to secure more projects and activities overall. On this picture, the skewed distribution of veil rules in the Constitution—with legislative action heavily veiled and presidential action veiled hardly at all—indirectly encourages executive activity relative to legislative activity, even if the price is that a greater fraction of executive than of legislative activity will be selfinterested, because that price is worth paying for overall gains. Although it is not essential to the argument, which is justificatory rather than explanatory, I add that this rationale accords well with some of the Framers’ principal aims in constitutional design. The story is familiar. The excesses of populist legislatures in the period of the Articles of Confederation caused the Framers to regard legislatures as the “most dangerous branch”; the one that was most likely to usurp the powers of other branches, disturb vested property rights, and in general provide scope for unrestrained factionalism. Perhaps Madison’s central concern, both during the Convention and in the ratification debates, was to dampen the “restless energy” of faction-driven legislatures, and we may interpret veil rules as devices for suppressing that energy by removing the impetus of self-interest. To be sure, as previously discussed, Madison’s principal strategy for checking self-interest was the institutional competition arising in a system of separated powers. But it is noteworthy that when Madison sought to justify the constitutional requirements of prospectivity and generality embodied in the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, his defense sounded precisely this concern about the activity-dampening effects of veil rules: 60
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Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation. . . . The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding.7 Madison’s point here is not that enactments by legislative factions free to implement self-interested plans are necessarily substantively bad enactments (although we have other grounds for inferring that he held that view as well). Rather, the argument is that excessive legislative activity taken under the spur of self-interest produces instability that is socially damaging independent of the content of enactments. Self-interested factions will change property and contract rules too frequently, retarding productive investments and long-term commercial planning. Prospectivity and generality would dampen legislative turbulence and “give a regular course to the business of society.”8 The concern for property and settled expectations is why Madison ties prospectivity and generality to the Contracts Clause; although the Supreme Court has today largely abandoned that link, the specific character of the harm flowing from excessive levels of legislative activity is essential to the theory. Conversely, some of the Framers hoped to imbue the executive branch with the “vigor” it lacked in state constitutions built around legislative supremacy. Hamilton’s series of essays on the presidency has as its guiding thread the premise that “[e]nergy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government,” energy that Hamilton contrasts with the “deliberation and wisdom” that a (suitably impartial) legislature would display.9 Far from wishing to devise rules that would 7 8 9
The Federalist No. 44, supra note 3, at 287–88 (James Madison). Id. at 288. See The Federalist No. 70, supra note 3, at 402–03 (Alexander Hamilton).
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suppress self-interested motives for presidential action, Hamilton argued for structuring the office in ways that would encourage the President’s personal interest in and attachment to his station and the exercise of its powers. That personal interest would in turn supply the President with a motive to govern actively, to undertake publicly beneficial projects (from which a unitary executive would reap all the reputational gains), and to resist legislative encroachments.10 By combining self-interest with opportunity, precisely the combination that veil rules prevent through their effects on information, the Framers hoped to promote executive activity of the very sort that they sought to discourage in legislatures. There are many historical controversies about whether Hamilton’s view of the executive was shared by other Framers. And, of course, the power of the modern executive would have been unimaginable and perhaps horrific to Madison, or even to Hamilton. Again, however, it is inessential to the account I offer that the foregoing historical suggestions are correct. If the current distribution of veil rules across the Constitution is justifiable, given current conditions, then from our standpoint it is irrelevant how it came about. We cannot assume that current justifications also explain the constitutional design we now have, but we are under no compulsion to assume that anyway.
Uncertainty, Delay and Motivation I now turn to some applications of these ideas with contemporary relevance. The tradeoff between impartiality and motivation or energy becomes most critical where proposals trade on the mechanism of delayed effectiveness, discussed above. The delay mechanism is among the most appealing and broadly useful veil-generating mechanisms, as pointed out in important work by legal scholars Ariel Porat and Omar Yadlin.11 By diluting current decisionmakers’ ability to assess where their own interests lie, delayed enactments might be thought to ease the path of reform in a range of settings. In fact, however, successful delayed enactments are uncommon, as Porat and Yadlin acknowledge. Their explanation involves the 10 11
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See The Federalist No. 71, supra note 3 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing for four-year presidential terms on this basis). See Ariel Porat & Omar Yadlin, Promoting Consensus in Society Through DeferredImplementation Agreements, 56 Univ. of Toronto L. J. 151 (2006).
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commitment problems that afflict impartial enactments; I examine these shortly. Another major reason, the one I will turn to first, is the tradeoff between impartiality and motivation. Delay may buy off opposition, but it also eliminates the short-term, self-interested benefit that would accrue to the political actors who would otherwise support the proposal and incur the costs of shepherding it through the legislative process. Delay replaces self-interested motivation with impartial reason, but the latter motivation is frequently too feeble to produce action; the pallid claims of reason rarely provoke the same degree of energy and activity as the prospect of selfinterested gain. Political action oriented toward the long run tends to occur only where the political valence of the proposal is clear ex ante, as in proposals for environmental regulation with long-term effects. Even in such cases, the long-run character of the relevant concerns saps most peoples’ motivation to act; for both good and bad reasons, many think it acceptable to let future generations take care of themselves. To be sure, another possibility is that a political coalition may be organized around one issue and, on a separate issue, hold only weak preferences or even be indifferent. In this scenario, farsighted reform is possible because the coalition’s leaders enjoy a certain degree of slack or freedom from constituent pressure with respect to that issue; elected on another program entirely, they may seize the opportunity to implement reform if they happen to favor it, without fracturing their political base.12 But this is usually possible only with proposals that provoke no strong opposition, which will also tend to be low-stakes proposals for marginal reforms. Where the governing coalition is largely indifferent to the reform because the benefit to its members is small, but there is strong opposition because the costs to others are high, the coalition’s leaders, however devoted to the reform, will be unable to mobilize enough support to secure enactment. More generally, the higher the stakes in a reform proposal, the more opposition it will tend to provoke. Reform can and does occur, but this tendency means that most of the reforms that do succeed will be marginal accomplishments. For concreteness, I will consider several proposals that attempt to trade on uncertainty generated by a delayed onset date, but that run aground on the motivational tradeoff I have sketched. The first is Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton’s recent proposal for reforming the 12
Thanks to Mark Tushnet for emphasizing this possibility.
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Justices’ tenure to a fixed term of years,13 which in effect delays the proposal’s onset date by grandfathering currently sitting Justices. The grandfathering presumably buys off self-interested opposition on the part of sitting Justices.14 The safe prediction is that it will never be enacted (for reasons over and above the high base rate of failure for all public-policy proposals). The delayed onset of the proposal makes its political valence uncertain, which in turn means that no current political actor will be strongly motivated to shoulder the burdens of enactment. Another example is Bruce Ackerman’s proposal for a framework statute regulating emergency powers, which he hopes will be enacted “before the next attack.”15 In this proposal, the delayed-onset is de facto, not de jure. Ackerman’s framework statute would go into effect immediately as a nominal matter, but its operation would not be triggered until some point in the indefinite future, when a large-scale terrorist attack occurs. But legislators are unlikely to enact a framework statute to regulate emergencies in the hazy future. Although in such a position legislators would act impartially, behind a veil of uncertainty that suppresses knowledge of the statute’s short-run political payoffs, that very uncertainty saps legislators’ motivation to act, and thus makes it less likely that any legislation will be enacted in the first place. The high opportunity costs of political action, constricted agenda space in Congress, the horizon of reelection, and the tendency to discount the future all push legislators to rank projects by the amount of benefit they produce in the near term. Projects that will produce large collective benefits in the long run, but whose distributive valence is uncertain, will generally be subordinated to projects that produce larger factional benefits in the short run. Legislating for the remote future replaces self-interested motivation with impartial reason, but impartial motives are often too weak to produce action. As we will see in Chapters 6 and 7, quasi-constitutional framework statutes sometimes do slip between these two opposing forces in moments of (what Ackerman would call) “higher lawmaking.” But to date, at least, Ackerman’s own proposal does not seem to be of this kind. 13
14 15
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See Roger C. Crampton & Paul D. Carrington, Reforming the Court: An Introduction, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices (Roger C. Crampton & Paul D. Carrington eds. 2006). This is my interpretation of the proposal’s effect; I do not assert that Carrington and Cramton intend this effect. See Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism (2006).
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The civil-libertarian constituencies, of right as well as left, that would provide the core support for Ackerman’s proposal are most likely to be mobilized and highly motivated where there is a threat to civil liberties; and in such cases there will usually also be a corresponding or offsetting threat to security that will mobilize resistance on the other side. The special conditions required for impartial framework statutes to slip through seem least likely to occur during the very wars or emergencies that would be necessary to give Ackerman’s proposal any real base of support. A structurally similar problem afflicts John Hart Ely’s proposal that Congress should rouse itself to enact a strengthened version of the War Powers Resolution16 in order to place constraints on presidential warmaking before the fact—the same type of suggestion that Ely elsewhere mocks as “a halftime pep-talk imploring [Congress] to pull up its socks and reclaim its rightful authority.”17 Ely recognizes that political constraints prevent Congress from challenging the executive in times of emergency (even if legislators desire to do so), and he thus expresses the hope that “stepping up and taking responsibility on the question whether to fight a particular war for which the president is beating the drums, and binding oneself in advance and outside any particular context to do so, are at least potentially different matters.”18 Of the many possible objections to this reasoning, only one is relevant here: the very same abstraction from context on which Ely relies to loosen the political constraints also saps legislators’ motivation to take any action, given the opportunity cost of foregoing other projects with concrete short-term payoffs. The War Powers Resolution itself might be depicted as the rare moment of “higher lawmaking” in which legislators overcame this motivational deficit, but feasible proposals cannot count upon the repetition of an exceptional event. Overall, the tradeoff between impartiality and motivation forces reform proposals to slip between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, stipulating that a proposal should have a delayed effective date helps to remove the taint of self-interested or partisan motives and avoids triggering the heuristic that one should not try to change the rules in the middle of the game. On the other hand, delaying the proposal’s effect means that 16
17 18
John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath 63–66 (1993). I am simplifying Ely’s position here, because he also hopes that the courts may prod Congress to act. See id. at 54–60. Id. at 52. Id. at 65.
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concrete problems of the here and now, the sort of problems most likely to motivate reform, cannot be addressed. The delaying tactic makes reform possible by producing a kind of impartiality and buying off current opposition, but the tactic also makes the reform less likely to be proposed and pursued. Conversely, the short-term interest that motivates reform itself tends to create self-limiting political constraints. Proposals that produce short-term benefits for particular groups will attract motivated supporters but will also provoke opposition. This is not to say that generating uncertainty through delay is never a successful strategy of institutional design. It is to say that it is most likely to be successful when the decisionmaker or institution that is placed behind a veil of uncertainty lacks agenda control or cannot select its own activity level, at least with respect to the veiled subject matter. In such cases, where the veiled decisionmaker can be forced to decide, there is no alternative to deciding impartially. Consider Adam Cox’s proposal that legislatures should be required—perhaps by courts—to enact redistricting plans with delayed effect, perhaps as much as two or three election cycles. The benefit of the proposal is that legislators who would otherwise gerrymander districts for some mix of personal and partisan advantage will be pushed, by uncertainty, closer to the type of plan that an impartial designer would select.19 Whatever other costs such a proposal might have, it is not open to the objection arising from the tradeoff between impartiality and motivation. “[I]n the redistricting context . . . the motivational slack that veil rules can produce is not a problem. There is no concern that political actors will simply fail to undertake redistricting if they cannot as effectively pursue their self-interest through the process. This is because constitutional doctrine requires the political actors to redistrict regularly.”20 Institutions that lack agenda control in relevant respects may be subjected to a veil of uncertainty without collateral damage to activity levels or institutional energy.
Uncertainty, Impartiality and Commitment Porat and Yadlin state that Delayed Implementation Agreements (DIA)— a subcategory of veil rules—are rare, and explain this quite persuasively by 19 20
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See Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 131, 2006). Id. at 14.
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reference to problems of commitment. In general, unless the enacting majority in the first period undergoes the very costly process of encoding the DIA in a binding constitutional commitment, there is a high risk that a later majority will repeal the DIA, for reasons I will discuss shortly. Anticipating these commitment problems, the first-period majority will refrain from incurring the costs of enactment. This important point generalizes to all impartial enactments (at least nonconstitutional ones) passed behind the veil of uncertainty, in the following way. In the first period, behind the veil, suppose that a majority coalition can assemble to enact an impartial proposal. In the second period, when the veil has been lifted, the distributive implications of the enactment will become clear; some group or other will realize that its ox has been gored. Importantly, that group may well turn out to be a majority or even a supermajority. There is nothing at all that prevents the median voter, in the second period, from being in the class of those harmed rather than of those benefited by the earlier impartial enactment. By hypothesis the earlier enactment was impartially desirable, but that need not be at all the same thing as beneficial to a subsequent majority. Where the impartial enactment turns out to enhance overall welfare by making transfers from a (later) majority to a (later) minority, or by protecting (later) minority interests or rights at some cost to the (later) majority, the enactment may face a majority coalition agitating for its repeal in the second period. It is true that the first-period enactment will now represent the legal status quo, and will be protected by the ability of intensely interested minorities to block repeals in the legislative process. But that is true of all enactments. In one respect at least, the commitment problems are more serious for impartial enactments than for self-interested ones. Enactments that are rammed through by a self-interested constituency will, for some time at least, have a core group of intensely interested defenders around to defend them from repeal. Of course social circumstances may change, so that the self-interested constituency supporting the prior enactment may disappear. But the coalition that supported a prior impartial enactment may disappear as well; that point is on both sides of the comparison. Subtracting it out, self-interested enactments systematically tend to enjoy a protection against subsequent repeal that impartial ones do not possess. To illustrate these points, let us return briefly to Ackerman’s proposal for a framework statute governing emergencies. Suppose it were Institutional Design Writ Small
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enacted, and suppose that an impartial decisionmaker would approve of its being enacted, because the large gains in civil liberties for the few would outweigh the slight reduction in security for the many. The very circumstances that make the statute impartially desirable also make it especially vulnerable to being either formally repealed or effectively ignored in subsequent periods. Quasi-constitutional statutory frameworks are at their weakest during wars and emergencies. The War Powers Resolution, which limited the circumstances under which the president could use military force and imposed various reporting requirements when the president did use force, has been ignored—as shown by President Clinton’s clear violation of the Act during the Kosovo conflict.21 The National Emergencies Act similarly imposed restrictions and reporting requirements on the president’s power to declare emergencies, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act limited the president’s power to impose economic sanctions during emergencies. These statutes have failed, in the end, to constrain presidents very tightly.22 Statutory frameworks governing war and emergencies tend to fail because, when a crisis arises, the executive needs flexibility to protect the subsequent majority from harm, or so the subsequent majority often believes. Let us suppose, compatibly with Ackerman’s view, that the majority is perfectly willing to reduce the civil liberties of a minority, because it does not bear the costs of doing so, and its own security will be enhanced. (This common picture is deeply confused,23 but I will assume it here to elicit the logic of the proposal.) Because statutory limitations determined in advance reduce flexibility, in a way that does not anticipate the particular requirements of a new emergency, the majority will usually have little interest in insisting that these limitations be respected. Ackerman provides no valid reason for thinking that his emergencyregulating framework statute—which is far more ambitious than the other ones—might fare differently. It is true that Ackerman’s framework statute 21 22 23
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Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers Resolution, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1149 (2001). For documentation of these claims, see Adrian Vermeule, Posner on Security and Liberty: Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (2007). See Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts (2006).
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arranges the status quo differently than does, for example, the National Emergencies Act.24 Under the latter, Congress must take affirmative action to override a presidential declaration of emergencies, whereas under Ackerman’s proposal the President’s emergency powers will lapse automatically unless Congress votes to extend the emergency.25 But this is to confuse the legal status quo with the factual status quo; the latter is set by presidential action on the ground, whatever the law may say. The War Powers Resolution, which Ackerman barely mentions, sets the status quo in the same way that his framework statute would, by requiring the President to obtain congressional approval for deployments of U.S. forces after the initial sixty-day period has passed. And the War Powers Resolution is utterly defunct, as shown by the Kosovo episode, a 78-day conflict conducted with only a frivolous claim to congressional authorization.26 The President’s central power is to move first, in the world beyond the statute books, and thus confront Congress with a fait accompli.27 The ill-motivated President that Ackerman pictures will do just that, and the passive Congress that history reveals during times of war and emergency will be both unwilling and largely powerless to do anything about it, however the legal status quo is nominally set. In short, the problem with Ackerman’s proposal is that of the timeinconsistency of emergency policymaking, or the demonstrated inability of Congress to effectively bind future Congresses and future Presidents where emergencies and war are concerned.28 The point here is not that framework statutes enacted at one time never constrain legislators or other actors at a later time; above, I have indicated some mechanisms by which they might do so. The point is that they are least likely to constrain in the settings of war and emergency that Ackerman is discussing, and 24 25 26
27 28
See Ackerman, supra note 15, at 123. See id. at 4. Congress failed to vote formal authorization for the war; the Clinton administration then tried to locate such authorization in appropriations measures, despite the longstanding interpretive principle that appropriations measures are not to be understood as making substantive policy. For an overview, see Richard F. Grimmett, The War Powers Resolution: After Twenty-Eight Years, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/RL31185.pdf. For the Clinton administration’s position, see Office of Legal Counsel Opinion “Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo” (December 19, 2000), available at http:www.usdoj.gov/ olc/2000opinions.htm. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999). For skepticism about the constraining force of legal precommitments during subsequent emergencies, see Martha Minow, What Is the Greatest Evil?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2134, 2166–67 (2005).
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given the conditions he diagnoses. Where emergency measures would benefit majorities at the expense of minorities, earlier framework legislation is most likely to be circumvented, violated or repealed outright.
Impartiality, Motivation and Self-Defeating Proposals The most general problem with Ackerman’s proposal is that it is selfdefeating: the diagnosis that Ackerman offers itself rules out the prescription that he suggests. Here we need only focus on the problem of motivational inconsistency, which arises when the institutional actors who have the ability to adopt and enforce the theorist’s prescription have no desire to do so. In the general case, the tradeoffs between impartiality, on the one hand, and motivation and commitment, on the other, mean that self-interested decisionmakers with agenda control will not push impartial projects to the top of the agenda or will not protect them from repeal if they were somehow enacted in the past. In the special case of Ackerman’s framework statute for emergencies, the motivational problem is that those who might adopt the framework will have no incentive to do so, nor any incentive to enforce it once adopted. We might, with some charity, interpret Ackerman as simply offering his views about optimal institutional design, regardless of politics. But if his diagnosis and prescription make different assumptions about the motives, beliefs or opportunities of political actors, then the two parts of his proposals are mutually incompatible and incoherent, whether or not they take account of political constraints. And in any event, charity stretches only so far. Ackerman’s proposals are clearly not intended as ideal or first-best schemes, that might or might not pass through the political filter. They are already nonideal or second-best schemes designed to be enactable; that is the reason Ackerman gives for proposing a framework statute rather than a constitutional amendment.29
The Limits of the Limits of Uncertainty I have emphasized cases—the proposals by Carrington and Cramton, by Ely, and most of all by Ackerman—where reform proposals that attempt 29
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See Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism 77 (2006).
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to trade on uncertainty fall flat, by ignoring the basic tradeoffs between impartiality and other political goods. But we should not end on too negative or skeptical a note. As Cox’s ingenious proposal demonstrates, welldesigned mechanisms can harness uncertainty to suppress official self-interest, thereby promoting (one component of) impartiality, in turn promoting (one component of) well-functioning democracy. Overall, the limits of uncertainty are real, and rather tight, because of the pervasive tradeoffs between impartiality, on the one hand, and information, motivation, and commitment on the other. Yet they are not so tight as to make uncertainty-based proposals of low value as a class. And, of course, other mechanisms of democracy can also help to promote impartiality by suppressing self-interested representation. In Chapter 6, I suggest that this is a major benefit of transparency.
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Part II
Accountability and Voting
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Accountability and Voting
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or democrats of all stripes, it is not enough that officials be impartial (in either the broader or narrower sense). A benevolent social planner might be utterly impartial, yet the resulting government would not be recognizably democratic. Officials, to govern democratically, must also be accountable in some fashion to the broader citizenry for the policies they choose. Precise specifications of accountability differ, and are one of the main subjects of this chapter. In broad outline, however, there is democratic consensus on the principle itself. In this Part, I suggest mechanisms that generate accountability in democratic institutions, mechanisms that are for the most part agnostic as between and compatible with a broad range of specific and controversial conceptions of accountability. It will be one of my claims that the differences between or among such conceptions do not often make a difference on the ground; and it will be my hope that democrats of many varieties, all committed to accountability, can favor the mechanisms I suggest. In some domains, tradeoffs arise between accountability and other democratic values, or even within accountability itself. In such cases, a further hope is that the mechanisms examined here succeed as democratic optimizers— devices that strike a desirable balance, at the margin, between or among competing democratic goods.
Democracy and Delegation: A Preface Before proceeding, it is necessary to clear some thorny ground. For some democratic theorists, and for many legal theorists, any mention of accountability immediately brings to mind some version of the “nondelegation doctrine,” which places constitutional constraints on legislative delegation to executive officials and agencies.1 So far as relevant here, the main concern behind the doctrine is that delegation is said to undermine democratic accountability, by transferring policymaking to unelected bureaucrats. 1
For an overview of the doctrine, see Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 36–40 (6th ed. 2006).
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Although rarely enforced by American courts as a constitutional matter,2 the doctrine has many supporters who hope for a revival, and in Germany and other polities similar doctrines are enforced more vigorously.3 I shall argue that the nondelegation principle has no appeal as a matter of democratic theory; it is irrelevant to accountability, or accountability is irrelevant to it. The executive to whom delegations are made is also democratically accountable; even more important, legislators can themselves be held accountable for the very decision to delegate.
Nondelegation: The Standard View In a number of polities, a central constitutional device said to promote accountability is (some version of) the principle that legislatures may not delegate their power to the executive. In America, the “nondelegation doctrine” holds that Congress must supply an “intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of statutory authority by executive officials and agencies.4 In 1935, the United States Supreme Court, enforcing the doctrine for the first and only time, invalidated two federal statutes on nondelegation grounds.5 The doctrine has gone unenforced ever since, although it persists as a principle of statutory interpretation.6 Many legal scholars—typically historically-minded “originalists” or libertarian opponents of the administrative state, or both—hope to revive it in one form or another. Among their central claims, and the one of principal interest here, is that the nondelegation doctrine promotes democratic accountability.7 The main argument to this effect runs this way. Suppose that Congress delegates certain powers to an agency. Those who want to influence policy will make arguments to the agency, not to Congress. Those who are disappointed by the agency’s decisions will appeal to the agency, not to Congress. Members of Congress are thus not accountable for political outcomes under their responsibility. But in a well-functioning 2 3 4 5
6 7
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See id. at 38. See David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 125–134 (1995). J.W. Ham Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 398 (1935). The Court invoked the doctrine as an alternative holding in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See Cass. R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (2000). See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1993).
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democracy those who are ultimately responsible for policy should be directly accountable to those who are affected by it.8 However, this core claim of nondelegation proponents—that delegation dilutes accountability, and is therefore undemocratic—fails on two grounds: the executive also has democratic credentials, and legislators can be held fully accountable for the decision to delegate. The first point is that executive delegates are also accountable. In parliamentary systems with an executive who is elected by the elected legislators themselves, the executive is doubly accountable, both to the parliamentary majority or coalition, and to the voters in the executive’s constituency. In systems with an independently elected executive, agencies are accountable to the President, who is more or less accountable to the voters—more anyway than are the courts who are supposed to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. (In the United States and elsewhere, there are also independent agencies, not formally accountable to the President, but critics of delegation do not limit their arguments to those agencies.) When American critics of delegation equate congressional accountability with democratic accountability more generally, they are covertly assuming that Congress somehow has democratic credentials superior to those of the President. The basis for this assumption is obscure. Congress is a summation of local majorities or pluralities; the President is usually elected by a national winner-take-all majority or plurality (putting aside the Electoral College, which does not usually determine outcomes, although it does shape campaign tactics).9 It is not obvious, in the abstract, which form of democratic accountability is superior, and on what grounds one would make such a judgment. The point is not that presidential accountability is superior; it is that the critics of delegation offer no basis for assuming that the congressional form of accountability is preferable. In an illuminating treatment of the issues, Jide Nzelibe suggests, for the American case, that “the president will often have an incentive to cater 8 9
See Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 295, 296–98 (1987). Many point out that the Electoral College sometimes produces plurality winners. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (2006) 81–101. Of course, legislators are sometimes elected by plurality as well. In this setting, the right comparison is not between the outcomes produced by the Electoral College and some majoritarian ideal; it is between the Electoral College and actual outcomes under the first-past-the-post voting rule used in most American legislative elections. The Electoral College very occasionally hands victory to a candidate who was not even the plurality winner, see id., but this has happened only a few times in American history.
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to a narrower geographic and population constituency than the median member of Congress.”10 This is less consequential than it might sound. The median member of Congress is a modeling fiction, because the two Houses of Congress vote separately. In many cases, of course, the median member of either house does not control outcomes in that house because the pivots or veto gates are defined by supermajority rules, filibuster rules, and so forth. The pivotal player in a given house, however, need not correspond to the fictional congressional median either. Nzelibe’s treatment illustrates the complexity of these issues; comparisons of congressional and presidential accountability are sensitive to the precise political model at issue. It thus emphasizes that the typical critiques of delegation are, at a minimum, simplistic. Overall, critics of delegation arbitrarily equate democracy with legislative or congressional forms of accountability, ignoring that the executive is itself accountable in different ways. Perhaps each form of accountability is best for particular purposes. Perhaps legislative institutions are superior deliberators, while presidential institutions are superior at taking action and getting things done. An overall set of democratic institutions needs both the capacity for deliberation and the capacity for action; neither is obviously superior from the standpoint of democratic values. I return to the democratic accountability of the executive in Chapter 5. For now, let us put aside these points; suppose the democratic credentials of the relevant legislature, Congress or Parliament, are in some way superior, perhaps along the lines that Nzelibe suggests. Still, there is a second major problem with the democratic critique of delegation. The problem is that legislators are accountable when they delegate power—they are accountable for their second-order decision to delegate power to the executive or the agencies. I will illustrate by focusing on the American case, although similar arguments would hold, with appropriate modifications, in other polities. If Congress’s particular structure and organization give it a superior form of democratic accountability, or make it a superior democratic deliberator, then the decision to delegate, or not, will be made in an especially accountable and deliberative way, and will have superior democratic 10
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Jide Nzelibe, The Myth of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1217 (2006).
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credentials in its own right. Conversely, if an agency exercising delegated power performs its function poorly, citizens will hold Congress responsible for the poor design of the agency, or for giving it too much power or not enough, or for giving it too much money or not enough, or for confirming bad appointments, or for creating the agency in the first place. And, as noted above, agencies are accountable in a more direct sense as well. Congress retains the power to interfere with new laws when agencies make bad decisions; indeed, it does so frequently. A variant of the nondelegation argument emphasizes the ability of Congress to claim victory over some difficult problem (for example, pollution) by enacting a vague statute that seems to tackle the problem (the Clean Air Act) but in fact delegates authority to an agency that will have to make the difficult compromises (between clean air and economic growth).11 But Congress can engage in happy talk about nondelegating statutes as well.12 Either citizens and the media believe it or not; there is nothing special about delegation per se, as opposed to direct and very specific legislation. If members of Congress can be taken to task at the next election for saying that welfare reductions will help poor people, then they can be taken to task for saying that the Consumer Product Safety Commission will help small businesses. Critics of delegation believe that this response makes unrealistic assumptions about the psychology and capacities of the electorate. Anecdote and intuition tell us that a member of Congress is more vulnerable to criticism for voting in favor of a law that, say, shuts down a local polluter who employs many constituents, than for voting for a law that authorizes an agency to shut down polluters, or for not voting for a law that stops an agency that already has that authority. This argument overlooks the price that the member of Congress pays for delegating power. The member of Congress receives less criticism because he has less control over the outcome. The legislator shares the criticism with the president who appointed the agency officials, and the criticism is diluted to the extent that the agency otherwise does a good job. Moreover, if citizens have the capacity to sanction politicians who make bad policy in direct, fully specified statutes, they should also have the capacity to sanction politicians who fail to punish agencies that make bad policy, or who 11 12
See Schoenbrod, supra note 7, at 90–93. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance at 147 (1997).
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delegate authority to such agencies in the first place.13 Or at least they will develop such a capacity; the techniques of public monitoring of agencies are endogenous, not fixed, and should improve as agencies acquire more power through delegations.14 Accountability is not lost through delegation; it is transformed. Congress is accountable for the performance of agencies generally, and people properly evaluate the agencies’ accomplishments as well as failures when deciding whether to hold legislators responsible for authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power, fix its mistakes, or eliminate it altogether. It is important, in this connection, that the nondelegation doctrine restricts delegation to executive agencies but not to other agencies within the legislative branch. Political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran argue that if Congress could not delegate broad powers to agencies, it would delegate more power to congressional committees and staff members.15 Whether this substitution would occur, and whether it would reduce accountability if it did, are difficult questions, but ones that the critics of delegation have not adequately addressed.
Delegation, Deliberation and Constitutionalism Many views attempt to tie nondelegation to the forms and values of democratic constitutionalism. These views emphasize the deliberative virtues of forcing lawmaking to proceed through the hurdles of the legislative process, including passage by two houses and (in the American case) approval by the President, rather than through the brisker procedures of agency rulemaking. As legal scholar John Manning puts the argument (without necessarily endorsing it): By dividing legislative power among three relatively independent entities, that intricate and cumbersome process serves several crucial constitutional interests: it makes it more difficult for factions (or, as we would put it, “interest groups”) to capture the legislative process for private advantage, it promotes caution and restrains momentary passions, it gives special protection to 13 14 15
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Mashaw makes essentially this argument. See Mashaw, supra note 12, at 146–47. See Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 81–82 (1991). See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (1999).
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residents of small states through the states’ equal representation in the Senate, and it generally creates a bias in favor of filtering out bad laws by raising the decision costs of passing any law.16 Again, however, it is a full response to these points that delegatory legislation will itself pass through the full legislative process, and will thus enjoy all the deliberative advantages that first-order legislation would enjoy. If the legislative process reduces the influence of interest groups, enabling the legislature to serve the public interest, then legislators will have no incentive to create agencies that are themselves vulnerable to these same interest groups. If the legislative process prevents legislators from being carried away by momentary passions, then legislators will, quite calmly, burden agencies with procedural requirements that prevent the agencies from being carried away by momentary passions. Residents of small states can be expected to exercise their political power by blocking delegations that will disproportionately harm them or by insisting that the authorizing statutes enlarge the agencies’ ability to do good, and limit their ability to do harm, in small states. Bad delegations will be filtered out because of the cost of enacting the delegating statute. All of the deliberative and constitutional values mentioned by Manning are protected at one remove, because the delegatory statute itself must go through bicameralism and presentment. The scale of the policy choices that Congress must make is itself an appropriate topic for congressional deliberation. If Congress concludes that in light of its limited resources it should deliberate more about the general structure of government, including the delegation of powers, and less about policy minutiae, then constitutional interference with this choice can hardly be thought to promote deliberation.
Delegation, Accountability and Democracy: A Summation However the argument from democracy is understood, it cannot be used to justify the nondelegation doctrine in the absence of any grounds to believe that delegation interferes with accountability, deliberation, and other democratic values. The critics of delegation load the dice against 16
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 239–40.
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Congress by arguing that the absence of constant supervision of agencies by Congress shows that agency lawmaking is unaccountable, when the absence of constant supervision is the intended consequence of delegation. Constant interference with an agency would be evidence of delegatory failure.17 Besides, Congress does enact laws that reverse the decisions of agencies, weaken their powers, and even abolish whole agencies. And Congress often takes care to draft statutes to confine discretion, and give interest groups the ability to alert Congress by pulling a fire alarm when the agency goes astray.18 One cannot in the abstract say whether the observed level of monitoring and punishment shows that Congress remains accountable, but it suffices to undermine any basis for confidence in the argument of nondelegation proponents. To show that delegation has reduced accountability, one must provide a more particular kind of evidence, namely, that the agency regulates against the interests of Congress and the public or the interest groups that have influence with Congress, and that Congress does not attempt to discipline the agency. And that is only the first step. To show that this lack of accountability is due to the delegation rather than to the nature of Congress itself, one must show that when Congress does not delegate, the rules it creates reflect more closely the desires of the public or of interest groups. What systematic evidence there is tends to suggest the opposite: that the amount of delegation appears to reflect legitimate policymaking concerns, such as the similarity of the preferences of Congress and the agency.19 From the standpoint of democratic values, there is nothing special about delegation. A legislature can use its lawmaking powers for good or evil: to single out one of these powers for restriction one needs a theory that explains why this power is subject to greater abuse than others. Critics of delegation have made their case by pointing to the potential ill effects of delegation, but they have shown only that delegation is a powerful tool, and so its effects—whether good or bad—can be substantial. But the same can be said about any legislature’s power to tax. If one focuses only on the bad uses of the taxation power, taxation would seem an instrument of 17 18
19
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See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 768–70 (1983). See D. Roderick Kiewiet & Matthew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process 206–10 (1991); see also Matthew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in Congress: Structure and Policy 402 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987). See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 15; see also Kiewiet & McCubbins, supra note 18, at 235–37.
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evil, but no one argues that legislatures should not have the power to tax. Both taxation and delegation can be put to good and bad uses; what makes delegation especially bad? Someone might yet come up with a theory that explains why delegation should be restricted, but it is unlikely that any such theory will be found. A public-choice theory that envisions the political process as interest group warfare will not be able to explain why delegation is worse than any other tool at Congress’s disposal. A more subtle theory that focuses on the differential costs of monitoring political actors will have trouble explaining why those who monitor political actors face greater difficulties evaluating statutes that delegate, and the regulations they authorize, than statutes that do not delegate; why the technology and costs of monitoring are not endogenous to the amount of delegation that occurs, so that the costs will adjust over time; and why the additional costs of monitoring delegations, if they exist, are likely to exceed the gains from institutional division of labor. Those gains are the whole point of delegation, and it is not plausible to say that they are democratically suspect.
Accountability, Delegation, and Lawmaking in General The discussion so far merely aims to clear away some confusions. On the conventional nondelegation doctrine—or rather, the view that would hold were the nondelegation doctrine enforced, which it rarely is as a constitutional matter—accountability is to be enforced by constitutional constraints that require specific policy choices by Congress. On the view offered here, by contrast, accountability is equally present in delegatory legislation and direct legislation, because legislators are accountable for the choice to delegate itself. The consequence is that all legislative lawmaking, direct or indirect, is on the same footing; delegation is not special. Rather than trying to carve out special classes of legislative action for special concern, then, the project should be to adopt mechanisms that enforce accountability across all classes of lawmaking. The next two chapters turn to this task, suggesting legislative voting rules that can improve accountability across the board. Of course, accountability is one democratic value among others; and as discussed in subsequent chapters, there are internal conflicts between different forms of accountability itself. These points mean that accountability faces both external and internal tradeoffs, meaning in turn that accountability is to be optimized, not maximized. Institutional Design Writ Small
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What I have argued, however, is that the distinction between delegatory lawmaking and other forms of lawmaking is not relevant to the project of optimizing accountability through institutional design.
Optimizing Accountability Having cleared away the nondelegation idea, we should move on to the constructive work of improving accountability—regardless of the form of lawmaking, delegatory or direct. Part II attempts to do so. Chapters 3 and 4 each suggest a voting mechanism intended to improve upon existing structures of accountability, although in both cases the mechanism is already used in some legislatures, some of the time, and also in other democratic institutions. Chapter 3 suggests that submajority voting rules can improve accountability—both within and without legislatures—by allowing democratic minorities to force democratic majorities to squarely confront important public issues. Chapter 4 suggests that absolute majority voting rules, which require a majority of all eligible members or voters to take institutional action, can promote accountability by insuring legislative and democratic majorities against strategic behavior by minorities. Moreover, such rules simultaneously promote the accountability of legislators and other officials to broad electorates and minimize the accountability of officials to narrow interest groups and other democratically suspect third parties. These two effects are complementary—the first promotes accountability where it is desirable, the second dilutes it where it is undesirable. Absolute majority rules, which can be used in conjunction with submajority rules, thus provide a tool for optimizing accountability. Chapter 5 turns to judicial voting and legal doctrine. I suggest a supermajority voting rule that weights law in favor of the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority by government officials. Legal doctrine already requires this, but does not enforce the requirement with a voting rule. The suggestion here is that a small-scale institutional mechanism can better enforce the current law, promoting the democratic accountability of administrative law and policy at lower cost than the current regime. Chapter 5 thus connects delegation with voting rules geared to promoting accountability, the theme of Chapters 3 and 4. Throughout the chapters in this part, I begin to elicit the connections between accountability, transparency, and deliberation—the central topics of Part III.
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egal and political theory have paid a great deal of attention to supermajority rules,1 which require a fraction of votes greater than 1/2+1 to change the status quo, and thus empower a minority to block change. In this chapter I consider the opposite deviation from simple majority voting: submajority rules, under which a voting minority is granted the affirmative power to change the status quo. My central analytic claim is that institutions use submajority rules only for preliminary and procedural questions, and to set agendas—for voting on the question of which issues are to come up for a substantive vote by simple or special majorities. My central normative claim is that this empirical pattern can be justified by good reasons (whether or not it is caused by those reasons, an issue of functional explanation that I do not discuss). Submajority rules enable minorities to force public accountability and a kind of transparency upon majorities.2
1 2
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of a Constitutional Democracy (1962). Compare Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85 (1999). Chwe’s argument is not based on accountability-forcing, but
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Submajority rules are rarely discussed,3 either because they are assumed not to exist,4 or because they are assumed to lack any institutional virtues, or because submajoritarian decisions are assumed to be chronically unstable in light of the risk that subsequent majorities will reverse or undo the submajority’s decision. I will dispute all three assumptions. As to the first, submajority rules are to be found in a range of legislatures, courts, international bodies, and other democratic institutions. Among the examples I will consider are:
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• • • • •
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The Journal Clause, which allows one-fifth of the legislators present in either House of Congress to force a roll-call vote; The “discharge rule” in the House of Representatives, which (at various points, although not today) has permitted a specified minority of legislators to force bills out of committee for consideration on the floor; Senate Rule XXII, under which a cloture petition is valid when signed by sixteen Senators;5 The “Seven Member Rule,” under which a minority of designated committees in the House and Senate can require the executive branch to divulge information; House Rule XI, which entitles committee minorities to call witnesses at hearings; The famous “Rule of Four” that allows four Justices to grant a writ of certiorari and thereby put a case on the Supreme Court’s agenda. Rules governing direct democracy that permit a defined minority of a state’s electorate to place a question on the ballot, or to force a recall election.
on the idea that where minorities have special information, self-interested majorities might grant them special voting power in order to elicit that information. A useful exception is Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067, 1067–1133 (1988). But Revesz and Karlan confine themselves to courts (in fact the United States Supreme Court), whereas I shall incorporate submajority rules that arise in legislatures and other nonjudicial institutions. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III 77 n.7 (2003) (denying that either House of Congress uses a less than 50 percent majority rule). It is unclear whether Mueller means to confine his remark to final passage of legislation; if so, but only if so, the remark is correct. A motion for cloture must be carried by a Senate supermajority. In the other examples I give, the ultimate disposition, such as the final passage of a bill discharged from a House committee or the ultimate judgment in a judicial case, is by simple majority only.
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•
Rules governing international organizations, which frequently allow a defined minority to call an emergency session or to force a roll-call vote.
As to the second assumption, submajority rules have important procedural and epistemic virtues, I will argue. Their principal benefit is to enable a minority to force a kind of public accountability upon the majorities who would otherwise prefer to sweep minority views and desires under the rug. Democrats of many stripes—pluralist democrats who favor the aggregation of preferences through bargaining as well as deliberative democrats committed to an ideal of public reason—can converge to approval of submajority rules. Pluralist democrats can approve of them as institutional mechanisms by which groups excluded from the majority coalition can force their way to the bargaining table; deliberative democrats can approve of them as mechanisms that force majorities to take account of the views of all relevant parties and that encourage majorities to engage in reasoned deliberation, rather than governing through power. As to the third assumption, the reversibility problem can be and is dampened either through collateral institutional rules and norms that protect submajoritarian decisions, or by the simpler expedient of adopting submajority rules only for decisions that are inherently irreversible or costly to reverse, such as decisions that release information into the public domain. The irreversibility of public disclosure connects the positive and normative features of submajority rules: such rules are best used to set procedures and agendas for public deliberation and voting precisely because the costs to majorities of reversing submajoritarian decisions are highest in that domain. Conversely, restricting submajority rules to preliminary and procedural matters best enables institutions to cope with reversal and other problems.
Submajority Rules and Near Relations A submajority rule is a voting rule that authorizes (i) a predefined numerical minority within a designated voting group (ii) to change the status quo (not merely to prevent change) (iii) regardless of the distribution of other votes. The “status quo” to which I refer is always defined by the rules of the relevant institution. There is no claim here that the status quo would be well defined in some apolitical sense, apart from the institution’s rules, Institutional Design Writ Small
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but on the other hand there is no conceptual problem with identifying the status quo when it is so specified. This definition excludes majority rule, which trivially fails condition (i), and which also fails condition (iii) because any given individual (and thus any minority) can be decisive only given some particular distribution of other votes—in the individual case, where the other voters are equally divided. Condition (ii) excludes supermajority rules; in their usual asymmetrical form,6 supermajority rules afford decisive veto power to submajorities—typically 2/5 + 1, 1/3 + 1, or even 1/5 + 1—who are empowered to block alteration of the status quo, but not to alter it themselves. In any event supermajority rules often apply to substantive matters, whereas the “status quo” referenced in condition (ii) is typically procedural rather than substantive (as shown below). House Rule XXVII, which requires a two-thirds supermajority to agree to a suspension of the House Rules themselves, allows a minority to block change in the procedural status quo, whereas the Supreme Court’s Rule of Four authorizes a submajority of four Justices affirmatively to change the procedural status quo. The only voting procedure that directly determines substantive outcomes by submajoritarian standards is substantive lottery voting, under which the votes for and against a proposal become tickets in a random draw.7 In the most radical versions, a bill favored by only 10% of the legislature nonetheless has a 10% chance of being enacted. But lottery voting does not empower a predefined minority, so it fails condition (i). More substantially, I will suggest below that reversal problems are far more severe for submajoritarian decisions on substantive questions than on preliminary questions of process and agenda-setting—which may help to explain why substantive lottery voting, although occasionally defended in theory, appears so rarely in practice. Condition (i) excludes institutions, like states or provinces, legislative committees, or juries, that provide a submajority of some larger body 6
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Throughout, I bracket the complications that arise from symmetrical supermajority rules, which can be used where the status quo is not the default choice; then no decision is made unless it gains the requisite supermajority. See Robert Goodin & Christian List, Special Majorities Rationalized, 36 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 213 (2006). Because there is no status quo, symmetrical supermajority rules are thus excluded by condition (ii) in a literal, albeit vacuous, sense. These complications are tangential to my line of argument, so I shall use “supermajority rules” strictly to refer to asymmetrical supermajority rules. See Richard Zeckhauser, Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives, 83 Q. J. Econ. 696 (1969).
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(such as the whole nation or the whole legislature or the jury-eligible population) with decisionmaking authority or agenda control over designated issues. Such bodies can in effect grant minorities the de facto power to set the agenda or otherwise change the status quo within a certain domain,8 and are thus relatives of the institutions I will discuss. Nonetheless state legislatures, committees in the national legislature, juries and the like typically vote according to an internal majority rule or supermajority rule, not a submajority rule. My focus here is on formal or de jure submajority rules, which have the strikingly countermajoritarian property that, even within the designated voting group, the few may formally change the (procedural) status quo over the objection of the many. Condition (ii) is the most critical, for the following reason. Putting aside the location of the status quo, any rule that licenses a submajority of n/x to reach a decision D might be redescribed as a converse rule licensing a supermajority of (x-n+1)/x to reach a decision ~D.9 “[T]he rules ‘Four votes are required to grant certiorari’ and ‘Six votes are required to defeat certiorari’ on a nine-judge court are distinguished only by the impact of abstentions.”10 The difference is small in the judicial setting, but in institutions with many members, such as legislatures, the location of the status quo will often matter precisely because abstentions are predictable and important. As we will see, a prime reason for choosing a submajority rule over the converse supermajority rule is that institutional designers might justifiably prefer one status quo position over another, either because the supermajority reciprocal is conceptually ill-defined, or because the larger transaction costs of assembling a supermajority coalition in the face of abstentions make the default rule sticky.
Submajority Rules and Accountability A successful submajority vote emphasizes the countermajoritarian features of the decision, especially but not only in binary decisions. If one hundred Senators are present and twenty desire to record the Yeas and Nays then, by force of the Journal Clause, they are recorded; it is irrelevant 8
9 10
On the affirmative agenda-setting power of legislative committees (as opposed to their negative gatekeeping power), see David P. Baron & John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in Models of Strategic Choice in Politics 343 (Peter Ordeshook ed., 1989). Again, I bracket here the possibility of asymmetrical supermajority rules. Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82, 99 (1986).
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whether the various alternative methods of vote-counting are all on the table and the remaining Senators split their votes among them, or instead vote en masse, eighty-twenty, for some one other method and against the submajority. Submajority decisions thus contradict, flagrantly, the usual idea that “the minority gives way not because it is convinced that it is wrong, but because it is convinced that it is a minority.”11 In more formal terms, submajority rules violate the neutrality feature of majority rule, which requires that no choice be preferred over another by the voting rule itself.12 “Where submajority rules are in play typically one outcome is favored, in the sense that it will be adopted if it receives k votes, whether or not some other outcome also receives k.”13 The Rule of Four, for example, violates neutrality because four votes for certiorari prevail, whereas four votes against certiorari lose. Supermajority rules (of the asymmetric sort, the only sort I discuss here) also violate neutrality. Thus, in the Senate, forty votes to continue debate succeed in defeating a cloture motion, whereas forty votes to cut off debate fail. Yet supermajority rules allow a minority only to block changes in the status quo, not to change the status quo in the face of a contrary majority view. The most striking feature of submajority rules is this flaunting of countermajoritarianism, allowing a minority to effect an affirmative change to the status quo in the teeth of majority opposition. Why, and under what circumstances, would a well-motivated institutional designer wish to adopt a rule of this sort? The key point, or so I argue, is that submajority rules are rarely or never used directly for final substantive decisions, such as the passage or defeat of legislation. Instead they are used for procedural and collateral matters: to set institutional agendas, to decide what information the institution will gather before reaching a decision, and to make transparent the decisions that are reached by majority or supermajority vote. Decisions on these matters will, of course, have indirect effects on outcomes. But submajority rules are best understood in procedural terms, as devices that empower minorities to force public accountability and transparency on the majority. An institution that is committed to making final substantive 11 12 13
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James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 70 (Stuard D. Warner, Liberty Fund 1993) (1873). See Kenneth O. May, A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 Econometrica 680 (1952). Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 10, at 99.
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decisions by majority or supermajority vote, for the standard reasons, might work better if minorities have the power to force accountability upon the majority; and submajority rules are a useful way to confer that power. Accountability-forcing is accomplished by empowering minorities, through submajority rules, to force the majority to make a highly visible, ultimate substantive decision on a given question, rather than disposing of the issue in some less prominent fashion, including simple inaction.
Distributing Agenda-Setting Power Submajority rules often have the effect of distributing agenda-setting power away from majorities to minorities. The leading examples in American law are the Rule of Four,14 which authorizes any four Justices to put a case on the Supreme Court’s calendar for plenary hearing and disposition, and the rule governing discharge petitions in the House of Representatives, which, at various points between 1910 and 1935, authorized 145 or 150 legislators to force a bill out of committee.15 There are similar rules governing international organizations as well.16 Why, if at all, should agenda-setting power be distributed in this way? In the judicial case, the Justices first articulated the Rule of Four to assuage two related congressional fears: first, that granting the Court discretionary jurisdiction over (most of) its docket would result in arbitrary selection; second, that “too few” cases would be granted for plenary hearing, while most cases would be disposed of through summary action or simple denial.17 Yet these concerns are underdeveloped. As to the first, the 14 15
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See Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice, For Practice in the Supreme Court of the United States (8th ed. 2002). See Sarah A. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress 136–53 (1997). If the requisite number of signatures were present, the resulting floor vote would not be on final passage but on the motion to discharge the committee. Both the discharge motion and final passage would, of course, require a majority of a quorum. Such rules typically empower submajorities to convene special sessions of international bodies. See, e.g., UNESCO, Manual of the General Conference and Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board, Section D, Art. 9, http://www.unesco.org/confgen/en/articles/article4.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (authorizing 1/3 of members to call a special session); WIPO, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, Stockholm, Art. 6(4)(b) http://www.certh.gr/cordis/t_en/i/i_410_en.asp-adt_id=6&ads=0. htm (visited Nov. 10, 2006) (authorizing 1/4 of members to call an emergency session). See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1983).
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Justices’ criteria of fair selection are vague,18 and in any event it is unclear why a submajority voting rule would implement those criteria more accurately than an ordinary majority rule. The second concern articulates no theory of optimal docket size that would tell us how many cases are “too few,” and it seems to assume, oddly, that the Justices are docket-minimizers, perhaps from a desire to maximize leisure. The subsequent history of the Court’s discretionary docket, however, suggests if anything that the Justices will often push the Court’s agenda capacity to the limit, so no simple docket-minimizing picture is persuasive. A better justification is that a submajoritarian agenda rule can force majoritarian accountability. In these settings, we can interpret “accountability” in no fewer than three ways: (1) as accountability to the intrinsic claims of reason; (2) as accountability motivated by the desire to appear reasonable; or (3) as accountability in the sense that all affected groups are given a share of agenda control, and thus empowered to bring their preferred issues to the table for pluralist bargaining. Either of the first two interpretations are congenial to deliberative democrats, who see arguing on the basis of discursively justifiable reasons as the democratic ideal. The third is congenial to pluralist democrats, who see the aggregation of preexisting preferences as the central function of democratic institutions. We need not choose among these to approve of submajority rules. Within the bounds set by the collateral institutional costs of such rules, a subject I take up later, they exemplify the possibility of overlapping consensus, by democrats of differing high-level commitments, on small-scale mechanisms of institutional design. On the first interpretation, we assume that members of the majority will deliberate sincerely, on the basis of publicly justifiable reasons, if only the relevant questions can be forced upon their attention. The majority’s preferences, or its views, are endogenous to the quantity and quality of deliberation that the institution gives to a particular issue. The submajoritarian agenda rule then allows the minority to focus the majority’s attention by putting the decision under the most intensive form of scrutiny the institution affords—floor debate (in legislatures), full public argument on the merits (in courts), or some other equivalent. Applying this picture to the judicial setting, the five-member majority is especially accountable 18
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See Supreme Court Rule X (certiorari is discretionary; relevant factors are conflict between lower federal courts or state courts and the importance of the federal issue presented).
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to the claims of legal reason advanced by the minority during full-dress argument, and may change its views accordingly. On the second interpretation of accountability-forcing, we assume that members of the majority act strategically to maximize the satisfaction of fixed preferences. The underlying preferences themselves will not be changed by group deliberation, although deliberation might provide useful information. Nonetheless, a submajority agenda rule can still promote majoritarian accountability by raising the political visibility of the relevant decisions. If members of the majority are concerned for their public reputations, visibility can force majority-bloc members to behave as though their actions are motivated by publicly justifiable reasons. I will illustrate the second interpretation in both the certiorari setting and the legislative setting. In the former setting, on this account, the Rule of Four serves to prevent an entrenched five-Justice majority from simply disposing of disfavored claims through low-visibility procedures.19 At time one, let us suppose, the majority upheld Claim C by articulating Principle P. Suppose also that in a different case, to be decided at time two, Principle P underwrites not only Claim C but also Claim D—a claim that the majority dislikes and wishes to deny. A low-visibility disposition of the second case, as by a denial of certiorari or a summary disposition, would enable the majority to sweep D under the rug at time two. A highly visible decision on the merits, by contrast, would force the majority either to uphold D on the basis of the previously articulated Principle P, or else be exposed as opportunists; this is “the civilizing force of hypocrisy.”20 On this view, the submajoritarian agenda rule works to counteract the “subtle vices of the passive virtues”21—the ability of majorities to exploit various low-visibility techniques for disposing of cases in unprincipled ways. This account assumes that certiorari denials or summary dispositions are less visible than merits decisions. The assumption may be objectionable on methodological grounds. It casually posits that the audience for judicial opinions is differentially ignorant, either because it is costlier to monitor summary dispositions or certiorari denials than to monitor merits decisions, or because the audience is subject to some form of flawed 19 20 21
See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 3, at 1108. Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 345, 349 (2000). Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”: A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
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cognition that sophisticated interest groups cannot wholly dispel. But perhaps we ought not be too impressed by the methodological infirmity of the assumption, if it has the ring of truth about it. The analysis is similar in the legislative setting. In the House of Representatives, proponents of the submajoritarian discharge rule justified it by arguing that the rule empowered minorities to force majorities to “put up or shut up” on the floor.22 When a submajority requirement of 150 was adopted in 1924, Mr. Crisp of Georgia . . . stated that he was a believer in control by the majority party, but continued: “I believe the minority party has the right to smoke out the majority and make them face issues, make them vote on great public questions.”23 This argument assumes that floor disposition is more visible to interested publics than killing a bill in committee; if so, then the discharge rule forces public justification of the majority’s preferred disposition. And if the reasons that enacting majorities or their agents gave, on previous occasions, impose consistency constraints even on rationally self-interested legislators—as the civilizing force of hypocrisy supposes—then the requirement of public justification may indirectly constrain or alter legislative outcomes. So far we have spoken of public reason-giving as the democratic ideal—although the first and second interpretations of the accountabilityforcing effects of submajority rules differ about whether reason-giving is typically a sincere exercise or a product of reputational pressure and the civilizing force of hypocrisy. The third interpretation, however, abandons the deliberative ideal altogether. On this view, submajority rules promote accountability by empowering democratic minorities to force their way to the bargaining table. Pluralist democrats typically hope that competition among organized groups, aggregating their preferences through bargaining within 22
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Discharge is an issue only in the House, because only the House rules bar nongermane amendments on the floor. Senate rules allow nongermane amendments, so that any bill squelched by a committee can be proposed, by any Senator, as an amendment to unrelated legislation under debate. Paul DeWitt Hasbrouck, Party Government in the House of Representatives 153 (1927).
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democratic institutions, will approximate some overall public good. This picture is exposed to two lines of criticism relevant here. First, deliberative democrats emphasize that preferences are themselves, at least in part, endogenous products of the processes that democratic institutions use to aggregate differing views; deliberation and reason-giving can alter preferences and perhaps even channel preferences in public-spirited directions. On this view, the first and second interpretations of accountability are preferable, but we have already seen that they support the submajoritarian mechanism. Bracketing the deliberative critique of pluralism, then, the second major line of critique is that pluralism fails because many groups are left out of democratic bargaining. This is the public choice concern: differential costs of organization across interests—broad or diffuse interests find it harder to organize than concentrated interests with high per capita stakes—mean that the bargaining table only seats a few. In legislatures, a “majority” coalition can be composed of a group of representatives beholden to a narrow range of narrow interest groups. Let us also bracket the broad issue of whether this public-choice criticism of pluralism is correct. Suppose that it is. From a pluralist perspective, submajority rules can be viewed as an institutional fix for the public-choice concern. Such rules improve the workings of pluralism by allowing underrepresented interests to force their issues onto the institutional agenda and thus force their way to the bargaining table. One possibility is that, once the minority’s issue is put before the whole body, majority leaders will find that including the minority at the bargaining table is the path of least resistance. Furthermore, because agenda space— time—is itself a highly valuable resource in legislatures and other aggregating institutions, the mere fact of being awarded a measure of agenda control by the submajority voting rule gives underrepresented minorities a valuable resource—one that they may trade away, if they like, for a measure of satisfaction on other issues or policy dimensions. The institutional fix is, of course, not perfect, because of the sort of tradeoffs and optimization problems that are ubiquitous in institutional design. As we will see, submajority rules must be calibrated to ensure that very small minorities are not empowered to hold up institutional action. If the fix is not perfect, however, it is still, from a pluralist perspective, an improvement on the baseline of ordinary voting rules. The upshot is that we need not, in this domain anyway, settle all high-level theoretical differences about the best specification of common Institutional Design Writ Small
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democratic commitments. Democrats of many stripes can converge, from their different premises, to approve of an institutional design mechanism that promotes accountability of several different types and along several different margins.
Information, Agendas and Publicity A closely related function of submajority rules is to allow minorities to collect and publicize information that the majority would prefer not to admit into the public record. Examples are the “Seven Member Rule,”24 allowing a designated minority of designated committees to force formal disclosure of executive-branch documents, and House Rule XI, which entitles committee minorities to call witnesses at investigatory and oversight hearings.25 In some cases the power to generate information of record is just agenda-setting power in a de facto sense. Legislative majorities set their agendas in light of the information known to them and the information known to relevant publics; by changing the latter, submajorities may force a new agenda item upon the majority. Here too we may interpret the resulting accountability in three ways. On the sincerely deliberative interpretation, the power to put information or arguments on the public stage may force the majority to respond in kind, by generating better data in support of a proposed action, or better arguments. On the strategically deliberative interpretation, the pressure to respond to information or arguments generated by submajorities may force majorities who are subject to the civilizing force of hypocrisy not only to talk the language of public reason, but actually to act as if motivated by public principle. On the pluralist interpretation, the minority’s ability to threaten public embarrassment for the dominant majoritycoalition, itself a pluralist assemblage, can force the dominant coalition to 24
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5 U.S.C. §2954 provides: An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government Operations [now the Committee on Government Reform] of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee. See House Rule XI (j)(1) (minority members shall be entitled to call witnesses upon request by a majority of the minority). House Rule XI (2)(c)(2) allows three members of a standing committee to file a written request that the chair call a special meeting of the committee, but if the chair takes no action a majority is ultimately required to force a meeting, so this is not strictly a submajority rule.
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bring outsider minorities inside the tent, for fear of what they may do if left outside. High-level differences about democratic theory are not implicated, and we could imagine submajority rules winning a consensus or at least a supermajority in an assemblage of democratic theorists of various sorts.
Voting, Agency and Transparency The common theme of the foregoing is that submajority rules subject the majority to public accountability that improves majoritarian decisionmaking. Although the immediate valence of the rules is dramatically countermajoritarian, their downstream effects may be justified in majoritarian terms. On this account, the paradigmatic submajority rule in the U.S. Constitution is the Journal Clause, which provides: Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.26 This provision makes a number of fundamental design choices; most critically, for open voting rather than the secret ballot in Congress, at least as to some matters and on the request of a minority of legislators. Also important are the design possibilities the clause rejects, and that are present in constitutions of other jurisdictions, such as constitutionallymandated roll-call voting in legislative committees and a public right of physical access to legislative proceedings. The stakes are high in these matters: throughout most of its history the English Parliament operated in secrecy and indeed punished attempts to publish records of its proceedings; the Continental Congress initially closed its proceedings to outsiders and the Constitutional Convention did so throughout; and even today most legislatures use secret ballots to select their officers while some, like the Italian Parliament, have until quite recently used them for final voting on legislation. The transparency of legislative deliberation and voting is in broad historical compass a recent and problematic design innovation. 26
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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Transparency is a solution to an agency problem. Voters are the principals, legislators are the agents, and constitutional provisions that force agents to publicize their actions lower the monitoring costs that principals must incur, thereby making principals and trustworthy agents better off. Importantly, this picture is agnostic across theories of representation and across the divide between pluralist and deliberative accounts of democracy. Whether representatives are trustees representing the common good, or delegates from defined (perhaps geographic) constituencies of voters, we can still identify a common set of cases in which they act as unfaithful agents—say, by taking bribes from narrow subsets of the constituency in return for acts that impose net harms both on the broader constituency and on the polity as a whole. Likewise, voter-principals might want their representatives to bargain, or to deliberate. In either case, voters might rationally believe that increased transparency might help enforce their preference by allowing them to observe what their representatives do—although one must hastily add the important caveat, which I take up in Chapter 6, that transparency might itself dampen bargaining and have effects on how much deliberation, and of what kind, representatives conduct. At the Constitutional Convention, Framers spoke in general terms about the agency problem for which transparency is a cure. James Wilson argued that “The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings.”27 We may thus understand the one-fifth trigger for roll-call voting as a means by which constitutional designers join forces with future legislative minorities to control future legislative majorities. We may surmise that the Framers anticipated that competition between legislative factions would routinely produce public voting, as indeed it has done. Legislative majorities (although not voters) might be better off if legislators could agree to enforce strict secrecy provisions, but legislative minorities armed with the submajoritarian roll-call power produce democratically beneficial transparency. By enlisting the interests of future legislative minorities, constitutional framers force accountability upon future legislative majorities, in the higher interests of the electoral or popular majorities whose agents the legislators are.
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1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 260 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
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Problems with Submajority Rules I have argued so far that submajority rules allow minorities to force public accountability upon unwilling majorities; and that the pressure of public accountability pushes decisionmaking, by legislatures, courts and other institutions, in directions that both deliberative and pluralist democrats might favor, from their differing perspectives. Let us turn to the downside, to some problems with or costs of submajority rules. Of these, some are pseudo-problems, while some represent real costs of using submajority rules in institutional design. The most important example in the latter category is the reversibility problem, which can, however, be dampened by collateral institutional rules or avoided altogether by using submajority rules only for decisions that are costly to reverse or intrinsically irreversible.
Minoritarian Holdup We may illustrate the problem of minoritarian holdup by returning to the submajoritarian trigger for roll-call voting in legislatures. Constitutional designers in the American states28 and in other polities, such as Canada and Japan,29 have tied submajority rules to transparency, especially through rollcall voting, in similar ways. But no polity (of which I am aware) allows a single legislator to force a roll-call vote. In some international organizations a single member can force a roll-call,30 but these organizations typically have far fewer members than a domestic legislature. In a decisionmaking body with a small number of members, the optimum might also be equivalent to the minimum—one member.
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See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. IV, § 7B (stating “Each house shall keep and publish a journal of its proceedings. The rollcall vote of the members on a question shall be taken and entered in the journal at the request of 3 members present”); see also Haw. Const. art. III, § 12 (stating “The ayes and noes of the members on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of the members present, be entered upon the journal.”). International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation of the Inter-parliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium Vol. I 480 (1986) (in Canada, all votes are voice votes unless five MP’s request a roll call); Japan Constitution Chapter III Article 57 Section 3 (“Upon demand of one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes.”). See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev.6 (2001) (Rule 52), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2004); see also Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/C/4 (1991) (Rule 54), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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The general pattern is that the submajority voting rule requires some threshold, and nontrivial, number of members to achieve a submajoritarian outcome. This reflects a systemic tradeoff. On the one hand, submajority rules allow minorities to force accountability on majorities. On the other hand, roll-call voting creates transaction costs and opportunity costs: [In the Journal Clause] [t]he restriction of call of the yeas and nays to one fifth is founded upon the necessity of preventing too frequent a recurrence to this mode of ascertaining the votes, at the mere caprice of an individual. A call consumes a great deal of time, and often embarrasses the just progress of beneficial measures. It is said to have been often used to excess in the congress under the confederation; and even under the present constitution it is notoriously used, as an occasional annoyance, by a dissatisfied minority, to retard the passage of measures, which are sanctioned by the approbation of a strong majority.31 From the standpoint of institutional design this tradeoff creates an optimization problem, one that was debated quite explicitly at the Constitutional Convention. At one extreme, Gouvernor Morris “urged that if the yeas and nays were proper at all any individual ought to be authorized to call for them”; he feared that “the small States may otherwise be under a disadvantage, and find it difficult to get a concurrence of one-fifth.”32 At the other extreme, several members complained that roll-calls had been abused, in the states, by “stuffing the journals with them on frivolous occasions.”33 George Mason spoke for the silent majority on this issue: he praised the one-fifth rule as “a middle way between two extremes,”34 presumably the point at which the net benefits of the rule reach an internal maximum. Another submajority rule also illustrates this optimization problem. Under Senate Rule XXII (2), a cloture petition (a petition to vote to 31 32 33 34
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 842 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833). Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 407 (1881). Id. at p. 407 (quoting Mr. Gorham). Id. at p. 407.
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cut off debate) can be lodged with the signatures of sixteen Senators, and is given priority in the order of business. A much lower numerical threshold would permit harassing petitions by outlying Senators on either extreme, or by senators representing a small number of states. A much higher one would collapse the decision to file a cloture petition with the vote on the merits of the petition. There is nothing general to say about the solution of optimization problems such as this; the threshold of Senate Rule XXII(2) plausibly exemplifies Mason’s middle way.
Reversibility The most conspicuous problem with submajority rules is that submajoritarian decisions are exposed to reversal by subsequent majorities, and might thus be chronically unstable. If one hundred-odd members of the House may discharge a bill from committee, why may not two hundred and eighteen just send it back again? If four Justices may grant certiorari, what happens if five dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted? Majority rule is the lowest-decision-cost voting rule that guarantees stability.35 A great deal of work, however, slides towards the casual assumption that submajority rules are therefore infeasible or even nonexistent. But instability is just another institutional problem to be managed; it is a cost to be weighed against the benefits of submajority rules, rather than a hard constraint on the very possibility of such rules. The tempting mistake here is to assume that an institutional problem with a given voting rule can be solved only by adjusting the institution along the very same margin, by using a different voting rule. In fact there are at least two other margins on which institutions may cope with instability arising from the threat or fact of reversal. Most directly, institutions may employ formal collateral rules, or may develop informal collateral norms, that bar defeated majorities from reversing or undermining a submajoritarian decision—at least not right away, or not without intervening changes. Less directly, institutions may use submajority rules only for decisions that are intrinsically costly or impossible to reverse. I will take up these possibilities in turn. Institutions that use submajority rules may develop written rules or unwritten norms that preclude or limit reversals by subsequent majorities.
35
See Mueller, supra note 4, at 76–77.
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A judicial example involves the conventions surrounding the Rule of Four: The Court has construed and applied the Rule of Four so as to require all Justices to consider the case on the merits, following the grant of certiorari on four votes. Most members of the Court have felt that the other five Justices who did not vote to grant are thereafter precluded from voting to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted in the absence of additional intervening factors which were not known or fully appreciated at the time certiorari was granted.36 The requirement of “intervening factors” is vague, and has occasionally given rise to intracourt controversies where five Justices dismissed a case over the dissents of four Justices, with the latter group complaining that no intervening factors warranted the action. At various points, therefore, some Justices have claimed that the Court does or should adhere to a stricter practice in which no petition can be dismissed as improvidently granted, even given changed circumstances, unless one of the four Justices in the granting bloc switches her vote.37 There is inconsistency and variation in these practices over time, and all of the relevant practices are politically fraught. But the general picture is that strong normative rules dampen the potential instability of the submajoritarian agenda rule; marginal fluctuations in the rules or norms should not impress us too much. It is quite clear that the ability of subsequent majorities to reverse a grant of certiorari is sharply constrained, relative to a hypothetical baseline in which no such rules or norms exist. Legislatures may also develop rules or norms that dampen or control reversals. Consider the problems arising when a legislative submajority’s discharge petition is brought to the floor. The majority that controls the bill’s subsequent fate may well be the same majority that controls the committees whose jurisdiction has been ousted (depending upon the degree of agency slack between committees and floor); so a danger is that the floor majority will block the discharged bill through procedural subterfuges, or simply by refusing to take up the bill for a final substantive 36 37
Robert L. Stern et al., supra note 14, at 297. Id. at 298.
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vote if it is not privileged business. Thus, under the submajority discharge rules obtaining in 1924, the Howell-Barkley bill for settling railway labor disputes was discharged by a submajority, but eventually died after its initial consideration; its supporters could never obtain a majority to move the bill out of the pile of “unfinished business” in order to force final consideration.38 In 1931, therefore, a near-unanimous House adopted new rules that “explicitly provided for the consideration of discharged measures as privileged business after their initial consideration,” effectively ensuring discharged bills an up-or-down vote.39 Comparing Congress to the Supreme Court, the 1924 disposition of the Howell-Barkley bill is analogous to a dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted over four dissents, while the 1931 rule is analogous to the rule, or norm, that bars dismissals by a five-Justice coalition who lost at the certiorari stage. Institutional rules and norms are not the only way to safeguard submajoritarian decisions from reversal. Alternatively, some decisions might by their nature be costly to reverse or even intrinsically irreversible, and institutions might sensibly restrict submajority rules to that class of issues. We have seen that, as an empirical regularity, submajority rules often permit minorities to throw information into the public domain, by requiring roll-call votes that may be witnessed by spectators and later published in the legislative journals, by forcing other judges to hear public argument and dispose of the case with a full written opinion, by calling witnesses at committee hearings who will submit facts or arguments that undermine the majority’s preferred narrative, or by extracting documents or information from the executive. If there is a deep connection between submajority rules and information, the key to explaining it is that decisions about information are in some cases intrinsically irreversible. The basic asymmetry arises when a decision to reveal information today precludes a decision to conceal the same information tomorrow. Once published, perhaps by a submajoritarian decision, the information circulates beyond the power of subsequent majorities to suppress, whether or not they possess legal authority to do so. Thus Tom Paine mocked 38
39
Historically, this is a rather ambiguous case, because it is not clear whether a majority of the whole House would have supported the bill on final passage. Although the motion to discharge the bill from committee prevailed 194–181, a later majority voted 144–134 to strike out the enacting clause (rendering the bill inoperative); a yet later majority defeated a motion to refer the bill back to committee, 201–181. See Hasbrouck, supra note 23, at 160–61. Binder, supra note 15, at 149 n.28.
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Burke’s futile attempt to check the spread of popular enlightenment: “Ignorance is of a peculiar nature; once dispelled, it is impossible to re-establish it.” This is the “irreversibility thesis”40: once the veils have been ripped away from obscurantist traditionalism, they can never be restored. Although the irreversibility thesis is pitched at the level of high political theory, the same mechanism operates at the lower level of institutional design. Once the opposing witnesses have been heard in public session, or their testimony placed in the record; once the executive branch has been forced to divulge information to committee minorities; once legal arguments have been ventilated in a public hearing; once the roll-call votes have been published in the newspapers; what can subsequent majorities really do? A natural asymmetry obtains, such that initial decisions to disclose cannot easily be undone. This point connects the positive and normative features of supermajority rules. A well-motivated institutional designer can most easily apply submajority rules to preliminary and procedural decisions that force public accountability upon majorities. Because such decisions typically produce public revelation of information, submajoritarian decisions in that domain are costlier for majorities to reverse. In that class of cases, the decisionmaking benefits of submajority rules reach their zenith, while the prospects of reversal and instability reach their nadir.
Cycles, Agenda-Setting and Manipulation A standard social-choice concern is that a submajoritarian rule for agendasetting combined with a majority voting rule for substantive decisions enables submajorities to manipulate outcomes for countermajoritarian ends, by exploiting latent voting cycles. (This problem cuts across the difference between rules that empower submajorities to add agenda items, on the one hand, and supermajoritarian agenda rules, or equivalent structures like the committee system, that empower minorities to affect agendas by blocking items that a majority might wish to consider.) Two points alleviate this concern. Submajority rules do not inherently privilege any particular minority over any other in agenda-setting.41 On the Supreme Court, any four of the nine Justices may form an 40 41
Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders 86 (1998). Thanks to Robert Goodin for this point.
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agenda-setting coalition in particular cases. Thus the distribution of agenda-setting power by submajority rules has a kind of impartiality about it, at least when viewed ex ante, from behind the veil of uncertainty. The contrast is with institutional rules that concentrate agenda-setting power in the hands of an identified subset of the whole body, such as a Rules Committee. More broadly, the manipulation of outcomes by agenda-setters is not clearly a real-world problem. The massive literature on cycling and agenda-setting has achieved great technical refinement but few compelling results for students of lawmaking institutions.42 At the level of theory, exploitation of the voting many by the agenda-setting few is extremely difficult to achieve, and requires strong modeling assumptions even to become minimally plausible. At the level of fact, the cycling literature has produced few confirmed claims. The theoretical problems are legion. Some of the relevant cycling stories arbitrarily assume that the agenda-setter is strategic while the voters are sincere, or that the agenda-setter is fully informed about the voters’ rankings while the voters do not understand the agenda-setter’s aims.43 Real institutions never employ the arbitrarily long agenda chains necessary to move outcomes to the agenda-setter’s preferred point.44 In models that take a slice or snapshot of ongoing institutions, agenda-setters can affect outcomes in limited ways, as in the standard models of committees acting under a closed rule. Such models, however, just pose the familiar questions about whether and why floor majorities permit committees with outlying preferences, relative to the floor median, to exploit closed rules or to exist in the first place.45 Where Congress (rather than some abstract “legislature” or “committee”) is the subject, there is all the less reason to think that agenda manipulation is an important concern. Legislators are above all members 42
43 44 45
Here I essentially follow the lead of Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (2003), and Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, Texas L. Rev. 1141 (1993). See Mackie, supra note 42, at 171–72. See Grofman, supra note 42, at 1569; see also Scott Feld et al., Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games, 12 Mathematical & Computer Modeling 405 (1989). On the principal-agent problem between floor and committees, see Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (1992); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. Poli. Econ. 132 (1988); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 85 (1987).
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of political parties, and a two-party system dampens the possibility of the latent voting cycles that are a prerequisite for agenda manipulation. “[A] two-party system inevitably creates a single-dimensional competition along the ideological spectrum. The effect of this single-dimensional competition reduces the number of likely preference orderings.”46 And, in fact, about 85% of roll-call votes in the Congress are predicted by a simple model that uses a single dimension (left-right) to measure legislators’ ideologies.47 We may add epicycles about cycling, such as the claim that latent or hidden cycles occur within the two major parties and are thus important even if the observable action within the legislature occurs on a single dimension. This seems unpersuasive, however. Intraparty conflict is centrally about money—which factions can bring the most money to the table—and this sort of willingness-to-pay to influence political outcomes effectively cardinalizes preferences, whereas many cycling results hold only with ordinal preferences. Finally, and of critical importance here, agenda manipulation requires sophisticated voting. But legislators will find it difficult to justify clever votes to constituents who may see only that the legislator has conspicuously voted against their interests and against the legislator’s professed commitments.48 Here is another link between submajority rules and publicity or transparency: provisions like the Journal Clause increase the number of public roll-call votes, in turn dampening agenda manipulation. Empirically, it has been notoriously difficult for cycling theorists to demonstrate clear cases of agenda manipulation in legislatures. (Judicial decisionmaking displays better examples,49 in part because legislatures enjoy greater scope than courts for logrolling and other practices that measure the intensity of participants’ preferences and thus avoid the standard cycling conditions.)50 As far as Congress goes, early claims that 46 47 48 49 50
Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 Texas L. Rev. 1541, 1557 (1993). See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 357, 368 (1985). See Arthur T. Denzau et al., Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style, 79 Am. Poli Sci. Rev. 1117 (1985). See Maxwell Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Penn. L. Rev. 309 (1996). See Maxwell Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219, 1276–80 (1994).
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congressional history was replete with exploitative agenda-setting have been grievously undermined by subsequent work.51 Many studies have failed to find much or any evidence of the sophisticated voting that would be necessary to exploit cycles within Congress.52 Even if one or two examples are confirmed, still the frequency of cycles is probably trivial— too small a tail to wag the gigantic dog that is the legislative cycling literature. This apparent lack of cycling and sophisticated voting in Congress should not be too surprising. One point, already mentioned, is that it will be hard to explain sophisticated or strategic votes to constituents. Moreover, the danger for unscrupulous agenda manipulators is that those who have been duped in the short run eventually discover the bad faith, and band together to punish their overly cunning colleagues. So the possibility of sophisticated manipulation by agenda-setters looks theoretically abstruse, and empirically difficult either for participants to achieve or for analysts to confirm.
Submajorities and the Jury Theorem A different critique is that submajority rules may produce inaccuracy, or less accuracy than majority rule would attain, in situations where the conditions for the Condorcet Jury Theorem hold. This point does not hold uniquely for submajority rules; it is equally true for many deviations from simple majority voting, including supermajority rules, although the Theorem does hold for plurality voting.53 In the following discussion I shall address only versions of the Jury Theorem in which the “correct” answer is exogenously chosen or determined. In another, thinner version the Jury Theorem merely captures the probability that a majority of the voting pool has correctly chosen the result that a majority of voters would consider best promotes their individual interests, rather than the common 51
52
53
Compare William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (1986) (purporting to identify examples of agenda manipulation in congressional history) with Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (2003) and Keith Krehbiel & Douglas Rivers, Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration, 52 J. Pol. 548 (1990) (both works criticizing Riker’s evidence and conceptual premises). See Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting (1997), John D. Wilkerson, “Killer” Amendments in Congress, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 535 (1999). See Christian List and Robert Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. of Pol. Phil. 277 ().
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interest somehow defined.54 In the latter form, however, the Theorem lacks the special epistemic credentials that make it normatively challenging for nonmajoritarian decision rules. If all the Theorem is aggregating is the probability that the majority has correctly determined where its interests lie, minorities or submajorities with different interests owe it no normative respect, and the Theorem underwrites no objection to submajority or supermajority rules. To the extent that the sorts of decisions covered by submajority rules fall within the Jury Theorem’s scope, there is an epistemic cost to submajoritarianism. Then the only thing left to say would be that submajoritarian inaccuracy at the predecisional or agenda-setting stage might trade off against increased jury-theoretic accuracy at the stage of substantive decisionmaking. That tradeoff would obtain if, for example, the increased public accountability accompanying an up-or-down decision on the merits of a bill reduces the tendency of legislator-voters to follow the lead of party mavens, and thus increases the effective number of independent votes, with a resulting increase in the voting group’s overall accuracy. This is of course a contingent empirical conjecture. Public accountability might instead enhance the control of party leaders, by making commitments to vote in certain ways more easily monitored, and might thus reduce the effective number of independent votes, reducing in turn the accuracy of the whole voting group. (Of course if party leaders have a very high voting competence then group accuracy might possibly increase, despite the reduction in the effective number of votes,55 but under plausible assumptions a larger number of moderately competent voters quickly outperforms a single voter of even superhuman accuracy.) More importantly, however, most submajoritarian decisions probably fall outside the Theorem’s scope in the first place. Even with wellmotivated participants, agenda decisions are typically value choices about how the institution’s time is best spent, not judgments that we might label accurate or inaccurate. Participants in agenda decisions are not, or not commonly, trying to converge upon a correct judgment on the same 54
55
See Nicolas R. Miller, Information, Electorates and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in Information Pooling and Group Decisionmaking 173–192 (Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen eds., 1986); see also Paul Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. Legal Stud. 327, 337–39 (2002). David M. Estlund, Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1317 (1989).
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question; they are expressing different preferences about how a fixed resource, time, should be expended, and each participant may be right (about how best to satisfy their own preferences) even if they reach different answers. The same point holds for other collateral decisions typically subject to submajority rules, such as the decision whether to publicize legislative votes. Recall that to publicize voting is always an agenda choice in itself, since a principal cost of roll-call voting is time, and the framers’ principal fear was that roll-call voting would be abused to delay legislative proceedings. The Jury Theorem typically fails to bite on the preliminary and procedural matters that submajority rules typically regulate.
Selecting the Status Quo Point We have seen that for every submajority rule there is a reciprocal (asymmetric) supermajority rule, with a mirror-image status quo point. Why do those rules not exist, while the corresponding submajority rules do? Institutional designers might say that the legislative roll must be called for every vote on final passage unless 4/5 + 1 opt for a voice vote; is there any reason to think that rule a bad one? There is a mirror-image question about supermajority rules. Why should not the three-fifths rule for tax increases be a rule requiring 2/5 + 1 to reject any proposed tax increase? In some circumstances, submajority rules are undoubtedly equivalent to their supermajority reciprocals. It is hard to believe that a Rule of Six—all certiorari petitions are on the docket unless six Justices vote to deny them—would produce any different results than the Rule of Four; abstentions are sufficiently rare on the Court, and the alternatives are sufficiently similar, that nothing turns on the location of the status quo point. But this equivalence does not hold generally. First, in some situations the supermajority reciprocal is conceptually ill-defined. Under standard procedures for recall elections, some submajority fraction—say, 15% of the number of voters in the last regular statewide election—are empowered to alter the status quo by putting the recall question on the ballot in a special statewide election. Here the idea of a supermajoritarian reciprocal is obscure; what would it mean to say that a recall question is always on the ballot (every day?) unless 85% + 1 affirmatively vote not to hold the recall election? The supermajority reciprocal is well defined in the certiorari setting only because an outside actor—the litigant—is authorized to file a certiorari petition in the first place. In the direct-democracy setting, however, there is no exogenously defined pool Institutional Design Writ Small
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of potential questions that can be put on or off the agenda by supermajority voting. Second, even where the supermajority reciprocal is conceptually well defined, transaction costs may make the status quo sticky, thereby making consequential the choice between a submajority rule and its supermajority reciprocal. A submajority rule will be preferable to the reciprocal supermajority rule where, and to the extent that, the costs of assembling the necessary submajority are appreciably lower than the costs of assembling the mirror-image supermajority. In small-group settings like the Supreme Court, these two costs will rarely diverge to any appreciable degree. But in large-number settings, the costs of assembling a submajority will be far lower than the costs of assembling a reciprocal supermajority. The extreme case involves mass democracy; for concreteness, I will use the recall example again. Under current law, recalls occur when a submajority puts the question on the statewide ballot. Suppose that, contrary to what I have said above, we could imagine a conceptually coherent reciprocal rule under which a recall election would be held (at stated intervals?) unless recall opponents could muster a statewide supermajority to block the recall question from the ballot. But this scheme is silly; the difference between the two rules matters only if there are a sufficient number of abstentions, but it is predictable that there will be many. Put differently, if abstentions could be reduced to such a degree that a large supermajority of the whole statewide electorate could be mustered to exclude the recall question from the ballot, the recall issue would in substance already have been decided on the merits; a preliminary vote on the agenda, rather than the merits, would be otiose. Numerically, and in terms of the costs of assembling requisite fractions of the whole voting pool, legislatures are an intermediate case between courts and direct democracy. Submajority rules will sometimes matter in legislatures, because the difference between the lower-bound cost and the upper-bound cost will sometimes be appreciable, in turn because absenteeism or abstention is a chronic condition both in committee and on the floor. In a legislature that, like Congress at the beginning of the last century, is plagued by absenteeism, the difference between obtaining 145 signatures in favor of a discharge petition (under the pre-1935 submajority rule) and obtaining 291 signatures against a discharge petition (under the reciprocal supermajority rule) is highly consequential. Under the latter rule, the greater costs of assembling the requisite coalition would create greater scope for strategic behavior. Which bills would 110
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be subject to possible discharge (unless a contrary supermajority could be assembled)? Note that a smaller minority than the fraction required by the submajority rule (here, one-third of the House) must, in such a regime, be entitled to force a supermajority to coalesce against discharge on any bill. In that case the opportunity for strategic abuse will be greater, and the resulting costs of delay higher, than under the submajority rule. If the submajority rule already strikes the right balance between the costs of delay, on the one hand, and the benefits of forcing accountability upon the majority, on the other, then the combination of a reciprocal supermajority rule with a lowerthan-submajoritarian trigger will be nonoptimal. Finally, we may connect these points to the earlier discussion of reversal and instability. I have suggested that submajority rules are formally equivalent to supermajority reciprocals (abstracting from the location of the status quo and the transaction costs of assembling coalitions in the face of abstentions). I have also suggested that submajority rules are used exclusively for preliminary and procedural matters, including agenda-setting. Perhaps there is a tension between these claims. Supermajority rules are frequently used for ultimate substantive decisions; on the account here, why would they not be confined to procedural matters, like their submajority reciprocals? But in fact this pattern makes perfect sense, precisely because the risks of reversal and instability reach a nadir in the procedural and agendasetting domains where submajority rules are usually found. In such domains, well-motivated institutional designers can have their cake and eat it too: they may conserve on the transaction costs of assembling coalitions by selecting a submajoritarian status quo point instead of a supermajoritarian one, while avoiding large collateral costs arising from the threat of majoritarian reversal. Conversely, because reversal is a more serious problem for substantive decisions than for preliminary and informational decisions, the higher transaction costs of supermajority rules are more frequently worth incurring where substantive decisionmaking is concerned.
Supply-side Issues: Majority Motivations and Political Constraints I have offered a strictly evaluative and prescriptive account of submajority rules, not a positive account of how submajority rules come to be. Where submajority rules should be used but currently are not, who will have an Institutional Design Writ Small
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incentive to supply them? Why would a legislative majority ever commit itself to conferring accountability-forcing power on the minority, by adopting submajority rules? But of course, majorities often have done exactly that—both in Congress, where majorities created the submajoritarian committee discharge rule in place before 1935, and on the Supreme Court, where majorities created the Rule of Four. Apart from constitutional submajority rules such as the Journal Clause, it is always true that the submajority enjoys its special voting power only by virtue of rules created by the majority itself; in general, submajority rules are not constitutionally entrenched. Thus a majority of the Supreme Court could, today, doubtless change the Rule of Four, and a majority of Congress could certainly do so. Likewise a majority of the whole Congress has delegated submajoritarian voting power by statute (in the case of the Seven Member Rule), while a majority of the House has delegated power by internal rule (in the case of House Rule XI); both delegations are clearly revocable. Several mechanisms might cause majorities to confer accountability-forcing power on minorities.56 One possibility is that submajority rules come into existence when the majority that creates the rule fears that it will soon become a minority, and thus creates submajoritarian procedural rights to improve its lot when in opposition.57 Alternatively, in line with the veiling effect of uncertainty developed in Chapter 1, where the majority is uncertain about its future status, the uncertainty may cause it to adopt submajority rules that impartially benefit all parties. To be sure, these mechanisms operate only under special conditions. On one account,58 small majorities must often make procedural concessions to minorities, as a few defections from the majority to the minority can turn the tables. On the other hand, however, small majorities are sometimes more internally cohesive, perhaps because they incur lower costs of monitoring and disciplining their members; small majorities may thus be more likely to curtail
56
57
58
Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85 (1999) discusses a mechanism that might cause majorities to grant minorities special voting power on information-eliciting rather than accountability-forcing grounds. Similar mechanisms of partisan entrenchment are discussed in Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev 511 (2002). Binder, supra note 15.
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minorities’ procedural rights.59 The first point emphasizes a factor that reduces the capacity of small majorities to have their way, while the latter emphasizes an offsetting factor that increases the same capacity. The net effect is unclear. Overall, there is no reason to think that the only submajority rules we can have are the ones we actually observe, where we actually observe them. The political and motivational constraints are not so tight as that. Even self-interested majorities have perfectly sensible incentives to create and respect submajority rules. And, of course, sometimes majorities are not self-interested, and will adopt such rules if and when their public virtues outweigh their vices.
59
Douglas Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics (1997).
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Chapter 4
Absolute Majority Rules: Optimizing Accountability
C
hapter 3 introduced an institutional-design mechanism, the submajority voting rule, that enables democratic minorities to force accountability upon majorities, and examined how submajority rules can be tailored to maximize their benefits while minimizing the risk that very small minorities will clog up the working of democratic processes. This chapter introduces another voting mechanism, the absolute majority rule, and explains how it too can contribute to optimizing accountability in democratic institutions. Absolute majority rules are best introduced by illustration. In the United States Congress, the votes of a majority of those present and voting are necessary to approve a law.1 In the legislatures of California and Minnesota,2 however, the votes of a majority of all elected members are required. All these legislatures use “majority rule.” All respect equality 1 2
Subject to the requirement of a quorum, as discussed below. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 8B; Minn. Const. art. IV, § 22. For other examples, see International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation of the Inter-parliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium Vol. I 528 (1986).
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among the group of legislators; no one’s vote counts for more than one, and there are no supermajority requirements. What is the difference between these schemes, and is it consequential? Similar examples are found in many polities. In each house of the Parliament of India,3 to enact a constitutional amendment requires (for most subjects) both (1) a majority of the total membership of the house and (2) two-thirds of the members of the house who are present and voting. How, if at all, do these requirements differ? In Iraq in 2005, the Transitional La