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New Directions in American Reception Study
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New Directions in American Reception Study
Edited by PHILIP GOLDSTEIN and JAMES L. MACHOR
3 2008
3 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright © 2008 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. A portion of Barbara Hochman’s essay was first published in “Uncle Tom’s Cabin at the World’s Columbian Exposition,” by Barbara Hochman, from Libraries & Culture 41:1, pp. 82–108. Copyright © 2006 by the University of Texas Press. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data New directions in American reception study / edited by Philip Goldstein and James L. Machor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-19-532087-9; 978-0-19-532088-6 (pbk.) 1. American literature—History and criticism—Theory, etc. 2. Reader-response criticism—United States. 3. Books and reading—United States. 4. Mass media—Audiences. I. Goldstein, Philip. II. Machor, James L. PS62.A8 2007 810.9—dc22 2007013837
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
Acknowledgment
We wish to thank the University of Delaware, especially the Women’s Studies Program, the Black American Studies Program, the English Department, the Office of the President, and the University Committee on Cultural Activities and Public Events. Without their generous support, the conference on which this collection is based would not have been possible.
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Contents
Introduction: Reception Study: Achievements and New Directions xi Philip Goldstein and James L. Machor
I. (Re)Theorizing Reception Study Understanding an Other: Reading as a Receptive Form of Communicative Action 3 Patrocinio Schweickart Judging and Hoping: Rhetorical Effects of Reading about Reading 23 Steven Mailloux Activating the Multitude: Audience Powers and Cultural Studies 33 Jack Bratich Habitus Clivé: Aesthetics and Politics in the Work of Pierre Bourdieu 57 Tony Bennett
II. Texts, Authors, and the Receptions of Literature The American Reception of Melville’s Short Fiction in the 1850s 87 James L. Machor Placing Readers at the Forefront of Nowhere: Reception Studies and Utopian Literature 99 Kenneth m. Roemer Richard Wright’s Native Son: From Naturalist Protest to Modernist Liberation and Beyond 119 Philip Goldstein Main Street Reading Main Street Amy L. Blair
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Learning from Philistines: Suspicion, Refusing to Read, and the Rise of Dubious Modernism 159 Leonard Diepeveen Reception and Authenticity: Danny Santiago’s Famous All over Town 179 Marcial González Discourses in Dialogue: The Reception of Alix Kates Shulman’s Memoirs of an Ex–Prom Queen 195 Charlotte Templin
III. Books, Print Culture, and Historical Sites of Reception The Power of Recirculation: Scrapbooks and the Reception of the Nineteenth-Century Press 211 Ellen Gruber Garvey Accuracy or Fair Play? Complaining about the Newspaper in Early Twentieth-Century New York 233 David Paul Nord Sentiment without Tears: Uncle Tom’s Cabin as History in the 1890s 255 Barbara Hochman
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IV. Audiences, Fans, and Viewers in Media and Cultural Studies Kiss Me Deadly: Cold War Threats from Spillane to Aldrich, New York to Los Angeles, and the Mafia to the H-Bomb 279 Janet Staiger Textual Poaching or Gamekeeping? A Comparative Study of Two Six Feet Under Internet Fan Forums 289 Rhiannon Bury Political Talk and the Flow of Ambient Television: Women Watching Oprah in an African American Hair Salon 307 Andrea Press and Camille Johnson-Yale
V. Retrospective Prospects What’s the Matter with Reception Study? Some Thoughts on the Disciplinary Origins, Conceptual Constraints, and Persistent Viability of a Paradigm 327 Janice Radway The Reception Deception Toby Miller Notes on Contributors Index 375
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Introduction Reception Study: Achievements and New Directions PHILIP GOLDSTEIN AND JAMES L. MACHOR
What I have been saying is that, whatever they do, it will only be interpretation in another guise because, like it or not, interpretation is the only game in town. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (355)
Since formal methods came to dominate Anglo-American literary study in the 1940s, interpretation has been its central activity. Interpretation became, as Stanley Fish says, the “only game in town,” not only for scholarly publications and college or university English classes but also for secondary or public school classes, since acting out a story as well as explicating a text’s lines can count as interpretation. In the twenty-first century, when formal methods are no longer obligatory and literary study includes diverse literatures and media, interpretation may examine the author’s intention, the reader’s reactions, the text’s figures, structure, or rhetoric, as well as the sexuality, gender, race, or nationality of the author, reader, audience, or text.
Reception study, which says that an audience’s interpretive practices explain a work’s meaning, has grown remarkably because it accepts this vast explosion of literatures and interpretive methods.1 Initially scholars believed that reception study was an aspect of an author’s development, not an independent form of literary history. They assumed that, since an author’s work often responds to commentary provided by friends, reviewers, or formal critics, the study of these responses helps explain how and why the style, ideas, aims, or forms of a writer evolved.2 Modern versions of this criticism emerged in the 1960s in reaction against the hegemonic New Criticism, which reduced accounts of the reader’s responses to the infamous “affective fallacy” and treated the devices and structures of the text as purely objective. Opposing this fallacy, reader-response criticism claimed, for example, that the interpretive activity of the reader explains a text’s import. Drawing on Freud and other psychologists, some reader-response criticism maintained that interpretation invariably reveals the self of the reader or the critic, rather than the aesthetic norms of the text. As David Bleich asserted, the text’s aesthetics “do not matter” because they deflect attention away from the reader’s role in shaping the text (309). Other reader-response critics said that readers produce their own textual structure or object, but the text still signals, guides, directs, and manipulates them. Wolfgang Iser maintained, for example, that readers wander through a text, constructing projections (“protentions”) of new experience and reinterpretations (“retentions”) of past experience. He adopted, nevertheless, the traditional formalist assumption that the text establishes norms guiding and limiting readers (49–50). In the early essay “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” Hans Robert Jauss, Iser’s colleague, also defended the reader’s responses as well as the transformative force of the great text, but he rehabilitated the historical method that Anglo-American formalist criticism discredited. In his account, the reader’s constructive activity overcomes the destructive opposition between objective truth and formal methods, or subjective judgment and absolute literary value. As Jauss said, “If the historicity of literature is viewed . . . within the horizon of a dialog between work and audience that forms a continuity, the opposition between its aesthetic and its historical aspects is also continually mediated” (19). More important, he suggested that, by examining the readers’ changing horizons and sociohistorical contexts, criticism reveals literature’s historical influence or reception. Like Iser and Jauss, Stanley Fish claimed that the irreducible effects of a text’s language move readers to produce interpretations, and that, as a normative force, the author teaches or fashions the reader. In later work, he went on, however, to reject the belief that the text’s aesthetic norms ensure a reader’s self-consciousness, govern interpretive practice, or change anything at all. Adopting the pragmatist’s belief that the community of inquirers establishes the truth of a theory, Fish claimed that what determines an interpretation’s validity is not the identity of the reader or the norms of aesthetic theory but the ideals and methods of the reader’s “interpretive community”—groups of xii
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scholars who accept and apply a common strategy and evaluate performances of it (Is There 171). New Critics, authorial humanists, phenomenologists, structuralists, Derrideans, feminists, and Marxists break into diverse communities whose discourse institutions disseminate, students master, scholars judge, and journals and publishing houses distribute. Steve Mailloux and Tony Bennett also critique foundational aesthetic or textual norms and examine the reader’s interpretive community or, in Bennett’s terms, his or her “reading formation.” A neopragmatist, Mailloux emphasizes the broad, sociopolitical import of rhetorical practices, whereas the Marxist Bennett limits their constitutive force and acknowledges the governmental policies or technologies of power regulating cultural institutions; they both favor, however, a Foucauldian approach that undertakes the historical study of a text’s diverse readings and, more generally, their legitimating schools and movements. As these diverse reader-response and historical methods suggest, reception study accommodates the interpretive practices of the twenty-first century, when, in addition to an author’s intention, literary study examines the reader’s reactions, the text’s structures or rhetoric, as well as the author’s, reader’s, or audience’s sexuality, gender, race, or nationality.3 By contrast, this explosion of literatures and methods has generated anxiety among traditional scholars, who fear that it means anarchy, relativism, solipsism, and cultural decline. In The Death of Literature, Alvin Kernan complains, for example, that what “were once the masterpieces of literature, the plays of Shakespeare or the novels of Flaubert, are now void of meaning, or, what comes to the same thing, filled with an infinity of meanings, their language indeterminate, contradictory, without foundation” (2). Like E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Gerald Graff, Walter Benn Michaels, and many others, Kernan accepts a textual or authorial essentialism in which works of literature lose their meaning if it is “conferred on them by the reader, not inherent in the text or set in place for all time by the writer’s word craft” (2). In Truth and Consequences, which defends this traditional essentialism, Reed Way Dasenbrock argues that those who consider interpretation contingent on the reader’s preferences make a universal claim that itself is necessary, not contingent (110). This Socratic objection dismisses or ignores the historical context that explains why reception study has developed and become so important and that establishes its validity. In other words, what justifies reception study is not universal truth but contemporary circumstances, which include the vast explosion of methods, media, and literatures. More important, Dasenbrock claims that reception study does not allow rational disagreement: “What is the point of debating or even discussing questions of method if our allegiance to a given set of methods is simply a function of the community to which we belong and can claim no further validity or normativity?” (12; see also Michaels 278–83). The essays collected in this volume indicate, however, that this claim does not hold up. On the one hand, they expand the scope of reception study by analyzing previously unexamined INTRODUCTION
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responses to movies, newspapers, television shows, and traditional American as well as modern Hispanic and black literature. On the other, the essays differ not only in subject matter but also in methodology, and their differences and disputes are rational and important. Contrary to Dasenbrock’s claim, the essays’ methods, which include historical, biographical, reader-oriented, sociological, and rhetorical or poststructuralist approaches, substantially differ with, and at times oppose, each other and other approaches.
Theories of Reception Study Demonstrating such differences, the essays discussing reception theory raise issues about ethics, ontology, and institutional practices. For instance, in the opening essay, Patrocinio Schweikart outlines a reader-response approach that adopts the communicative theory of Jürgen Habermas. With some important reservations, she accepts his claim that rational communication can overcome the alienating effects of literary methods and socioeconomic position and enable critics to evaluate interpretations fairly and impartially. In her 1986 essay “Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading,” Schweickart argued that, to overcome “androcentric” bias, reader-response criticism should read texts by women and texts by men very differently (35). Similarly, in her essay in this volume, she argues that, as Habermas says, the best argument will prevail, provided those who debate interpretations set aside their biases and seek consensus. She complains, however, that he construes the reader or hearer as a passive recipient, rather than an active listener or producer, of meaning. Since such active listening assumes that the reader/listener respects the author/speaker as a person, she defends an ethics of care in which the reader produces an understanding that shows that he or she has fully and fairly considered the author/text. She argues that reconceiving what it means to be a “responsible reader” in this fashion can enable critics to understand more fully literary criticism’s function as a “worthy knowledge project.” Moreover, she faults reader-response criticism, which does not adhere to this ethics, as well as previous reception study, which, she says, glosses over the interaction between reader and text. Steven Mailloux also examines and evaluates practices of reading, but instead of the Habermasian faith that the best argument can prevail, he defends a rhetorical hermeneutics in which the rhetorical conventions or “biases” of “interpretive” communities, rather than the foundational norms of a neutral rationality, explain and regulate the reader’s interpretive practice (see, for example, his Reception Histories). As a result, he emphasizes the historical contexts and political import of reading, not its ethical norms. In “Judging and Hoping: Rhetorical Effects of Reading about Reading,” he turns to a new politics: the multicultural context of the relationship of thinking and reading. He xiv
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evaluates, in particular, how reviewers and critics judge the depiction of this relationship in Reading Lolita in Tehran, which shows how college students read and judge classic Western novels within the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following one critic, he explains this depiction in terms of Hannah Arendt’s belief that thinking, in a totalitarian regime, subverts accepted beliefs. Hence, he assumes that the novel offers its readers the “hope” that reading the Western classics will move the Iranian students to question their beliefs. That is, to clarify the politics of this multicultural reading, he shows that reviewers and critics esteemed the novel because it supports the “hope” that reading Western novels, especially The Great Gatsby and Huckleberry Finn, moves the Iranian students to challenge their theological beliefs, but he complains that neither the critics nor the novel challenges their own Western ideologies, which, among other things, count Iran as a member of “the axis of evil.” Jack Bratich discusses the responses of audiences, not the politics or the ethics of reading, but he defends the value of what has come to be known as “active audience” theory in media and cultural studies. Using Michael Hardt and Toni Negri’s concept of the “multitude,” he construes the audience as a discursive construction whose ontological truth, rather than its ethics or its politics, gives it constitutive power. He argues that the active audience theory of cultural studies also emphasized the constitutive power of audiences, but this theory was limited by its equation of audiences with consumers and its adaptation of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Consequently, he faults both the Frankfurt School’s claim that the cultural industry makes the audience passive and the cultural studies’ claim that, as consumers, active audiences resist the industry and make their own choices. In effect, Bratich asserts that active audience theory and practice conceptualize audiences not so much as active but as reactive—a narrowing that has prevented active audience study from “developing its own radical findings.” By contrast, an “autonomist” approach to audience activity can, he argues, help investigators define, explore, and understand more productively the complexity and nature of “audience power.” The post-Marxist Tony Bennett also emphasizes the interpretive activity of readers or audiences, but, rather than the ethics or politics of reading or the ontological status of the audience, he describes what he terms the “reading formations” or “literary technologies” regulating cultural institutions. As he shows in Culture: A Reformer’s Science (1998), libraries, television, movies, or academic disciplines form subjects with diverse economic, political, or literary kinds of loyalty or normality. In this collection, his essay, which faults the cultural analyses of Pierre Bourdieu, justifies this view of cultural technologies. However, unlike the earlier work, which called aesthetics useless, this essay defends the value of aesthetic norms. For instance, Bennett complains that Bourdieu’s distinction between bourgeois and working-class taste emphasizes their differences, but their preferences for high, middle, or low culture do not consistently divide them. On the contrary, they share such preferences in various ways, as Bennett’s detailed statistical analyses show. He INTRODUCTION
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also argues that Bourdieu reduces working-class taste to a reactive position because he accepts the traditional Marxist notion that the working class needs Marxist intellectuals to become free. Finally, Bennett claims that, although Bourdieu faults Kantian aesthetics in Distinction, in The Rules of Art he preserves the Kantian notion of aesthetic autonomy because he neglects the historical context of Kant’s theory. In Outside Literature (1990), Bennett considered aesthetics a useless form of knowledge because it does not establish universal values or exert transformative force. In his essay here, he accepts Jacques Rancière’s notion that an aesthetic regime organizes the community and has political import. Hence, he argues that what Bourdieu does not recognize is that aesthetics functions as a cultural technology providing public education and fostering self-government.
Literary Reception Studies The reception theorists dispute the importance of ethics, politics, ontology, and institutions for readers or audiences. By contrast, reception studies of literature, the media, and histories of the book dispute the relationship of text, reader, and their historical contexts. For example, James Machor, Kenneth Roemer, and Philip Goldstein engage in historical studies of reception that assume, as Hans Robert Jauss says, that time and change divide the perspective or horizon of the modern reader from that of the “ancient” author. However, while Jauss claims that interpretation requires a dialog in which the reader mediates between his or her perspective and the author’s, Machor, Roemer, and Goldstein favor alternative strategies. In “The American Reception of Melville’s Short Fiction in the 1850s,” Machor points out, for instance, that, while modern scholars have repeatedly sought to chart Melville’s relation to his contemporary readers, particularly as a factor in shaping his career, they have largely overlooked the reception antebellum readers gave to his short fiction. Although Melville turned to writing short fiction in an effort to restore his popularity and achieve some financial success following the disastrous reception and commercial failings of Moby-Dick and Pierre, reviewers did not respond to his stories positively enough to make them popular or financially successful. In examining these antebellum interpretations, Machor reveals that they differ markedly from modern interpretations of such highly regarded Melville tales as “Bartleby” and “Benito Cereno.” In addition, by virtue of the reviewers’ prominent position in the public sphere, these antebellum responses affected the public perception of Melville and his fiction and help explain much of the disappointment that led him to abandon short story writing and, soon after, fiction writing as a whole. Kenneth Roemer discusses the reception of Edward Bellamy’s utopian work Looking Backward, not Melville’s short stories, but he, too, examines the
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division between Bellamy’s reviewers and modern readers, whom he labels “alien” to emphasize their distance from the novel’s historical context and governing assumptions. He argues that utopian fiction mixes diverse genres and, as a result, has a hybrid nature that provokes a rich variety of readers’ responses. Examining the responses of 733 alien readers to questionnaires about the novel, he shows that, although the reviewers and the alien readers share a generic conception of utopian fiction and of the fiction’s competent reader, they have a remarkably different view of literature’s ability to transform social life. Philip Goldstein also shows that modern readings of Richard Wright’s Native Son differ substantially from contemporary readings, but he goes on to explain the historical evolution of the modern readings. He argues that Native Son can be and has been read in two incompatible ways: (1) as a naturalist protest novel, in which Wright shows how racial discrimination and class oppression destroy Bigger Thomas, the novel’s hero; and (2) as a modernist work that depicts the existential struggle whereby Bigger overcomes oppression and achieves liberation. To explain these incompatible accounts, Goldstein grants that Wright’s changing beliefs are important, but more important are the evolution of the naturalist and modernist literary movements and the emergence of a black aesthetics and black studies programs, as well as the massive cultural influence that the modern university and giant corporate media acquired in the twentieth century. Other critics also examine the reader’s responses to the text but do not examine the differences of the reader’s modern and the author’s historical context or the historical evolution of these differences. These critics, who count as reader-response critics, examine instead what the interpretation of the reader reveals about his or her personality or culture. As Wolfgang Iser explained in The Act of Reading, the text moves readers to synthesize what he calls “perspectives” derived from the text’s narrator, characters, plot, and explicit reader, but readers arrive at their own interpretation and thereby implicate themselves in it. Initiated by Iser, along with Stanley Fish, Norman Holland, David Bleich, and others, this approach was, to begin with, mainly literary, but now has various versions, which include, in addition to the literary, audience or media studies and the history of the book. Amy Blair, who adopts a literary form of reader-response criticism, attributes the immense popularity of Sinclair Lewis’s Main Street to an emerging middlebrow culture that encouraged early twentieth-century readers to read material intended to improve them. Thanks to advertisements and reviews that fostered this form of middlebrow reading, the novel acquired an extraordinary popularity; however, instead of describing reviewers’ responses to Main Street, Blair investigates what previously unexamined archival materials—the fan letters Lewis received—indicate about the novel’s middleclass reception. Those letters reveal that, unlike Lewis, who critiques small-town life and middlebrow culture, his contemporaries did not read the novel as a
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critique. Instead, both male and female readers identified with the protagonist, Carol Kennicott, and, as a result, formulated Main Street as an affirmation either of the readers’ own rural society or of the middlebrow commitment to self and civic improvement. Marcial González also examines readers’ responses in his essay, but he examines the issues posed by an author’s lack of ethnic authenticity, rather than his treatment of his culture. Turning to U.S. Hispanic literature, which has thus far received little treatment in reception study, he shows that readers and critics reacted very harshly to the discovery that Danny Santiago, the author of the Hispanic novel Famous All over Town, was not the Hispanic writer they took him to be. “Danny Santiago” is a pseudonym Daniel James adopted to escape the anticommunist blacklist of the 1940s and 1950s. What explains his extensive knowledge of Hispanic life is not his national origins but his decades of work in Los Angeles’ Hispanic community. González demonstrates that readers who faulted James subscribed to a notion of cultural authenticity that was itself called into question by the novel’s representations, which emphasize the disparity between the narrator’s fetishized viewpoint and the novel’s world. Charlotte Templin examines readers’ responses, but she discusses reviews of Alix Kates Shulman’s Memoirs of an Ex–Prom Queen (1972), often cited as the first novel to emerge from the women’s liberation movement. The novel’s reviewers fall into two groups that occupy two different reading formations and participate in two different discourses. Reviewers who participated in the first discourse, which she calls the discourse of the conventional woman, saw little literary merit in Shulman’s novel and accused the author of narcissism. They complained that the novel flies in the face of realism and that the author fails to create credible characters and plots. In the second discourse, the discourse of the new feminist consciousness, reviewers shared the view that realism demands objectivity but praised the novel’s realism, focusing on the depiction of the subordination of women by social structures and hegemonic beliefs and the implied need to reclaim female sexuality. Like Blair, González, and Templin, Leonard Diepeveen examines readers’ responses but instead of responses to a single author, he discusses modernist fiction and art. He demonstrates that modernism, far from being popular during its emergence, faced a range of skeptical, negative responses in the public sphere. Rather than constructing formal arguments or critical interpretations, reviewers made dismissive comments that simply labeled modernist art unserious, mannered, and aesthetically impoverished. It was a reception that, in effect, consisted of a “refusal to read.” To counter it, the modernist New Criticism rejected both intentional and affective or reader-response criticism in favor of textual interpretation. In other words, to answer these skeptics, literary study institutionalized a set of practices that made detailed textual interpretation the requirement of good criticism.
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Histories of Reading and the Book Historians of reading and the book also examine readers’ responses, but these scholars emphasize the sociohistorical contexts of reading practices, rather than the relationship of text and reader or the differences of modern critics and the author’s audience. For instance, David Nord explores the cultural politics of newspaper reading in the early twentieth century. He examines, in particular, the work of the Bureau of Accuracy and Fair Play, which was established by the New York World in 1913 and which addressed readers’ complaints about newspaper coverage and bias. Examining the archival record of the responses to newspaper reports and editorials the bureau received, Nord shows that readers, managers, and reporters understood key concepts of journalism such as “accuracy” and “fair play” in strikingly different ways. The records also trace the rise of an important new political player in the shaping of both the production and the reception of newspaper journalism in the early twentieth century: the organized interest group. Indeed, readers, especially those connected with interest groups, seized on the bureau to push their own agendas in the name of “fair play,” as they interpreted that phrase. Barbara Hochman also discusses readers’ responses but in a significantly different way: She problematizes the common distinction between reception and production. To be sure, within reception and response studies, the act of reading has repeatedly been seen as a form of production by virtue of its role in shaping—and even constituting—the meaning and significance of texts. Hochman, however, takes this insight further by demonstrating how the very physical act of producing texts both plays a role in and constitutes a version of response. She focuses, in particular, on the renewed popularity of Uncle Tom’s Cabin in the nineteenth century’s last decade, a popularity she attributes to the influence of the nineteenth-century publishing industry and cultural concerns about the legacy of slavery. Both the new editions of the novel published in the 1890s and the commentators’ responses to them reveal that Stowe’s novel was employed to show that post–Civil War history was a “record of the moral, social, and cultural progress” of the United States. At the same time, the interpretation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin provided by these new editions and their paratextual materials allowed turn-of-the-century readers to experience it without tears or angst and steered them clear of any sense that Stowe’s novel might have something to say about contemporary issues of race. This treatment of production as a form of reception is central as well to Ellen Garvey’s essay. Focusing on the widespread nineteenth-century practice of making scrapbooks from newspaper clippings, which the makers then recirculated among friends and family, Garvey treats such homemade texts as fascinating sources for exploring vernacular reading practices. Garvey not only shows how these scrapbooks reveal everyday readers’ interpretations of important events and textual accounts, thereby making production a key
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component of their reception activities; she also uses her discussion to address the value and problems of using unique cultural artifacts such as scrapbooks to recover reception as a historically specific act.
Media Studies: Film and Television Scholars engaged in cultural and media studies also examine a work’s reception. Although these scholars do not examine the historical context of a work, some of them do treat production as a form of reception, while others produce detailed, empirical analyses of viewers’ comments and reactions and their sociocultural conditions. For example, Janet Staiger examines Robert Aldrich’s film version of Kiss Me, Deadly, Mickey Spillane’s popular detective/spy novel. Staiger shows that, since Aldrich opposed the cold war ideology and McCarthyite repression of the 1950s, he meant the film to stand the novel on its head. For that reason, he retained the novel’s violence but changed the story: Mike Hammer, the protagonist, became egoistic and greedy, not vengeful and self-righteous, and the evil characters became spies seeking fissionable materials for an H-bomb, not Mafia members buying a package of drugs. Staiger shows that, except for the French, reviewers as well as Spillane missed the political critiques implied by these (re)interpretations, and that result leads her to speculate about what audiences’ reactions can tell us about the author’s intentions. While Staiger examines the authorial intention implied by the viewers’ reactions, Rhiannon Bury analyzes the interpretive practices of fans of the popular HBO television show Six Feet Under. Examining two of the largest internet discussion sites, an area new to reception study, she argues that their comments and disputes indicate a traditional commitment to correct interpretation. In one dispute, some fans said a female character’s visit to a doctor’s office implied that, thanks to her sexual relations with a married character, she had gotten pregnant, while others argued that, as her briefcase indicated, she was just doing her job as a drug-company representative. Drawing on Henry Jenkins’s concept of “textual poaching” as a form of audience resistance to the products of the culture industry, Bury argues that such disputes show that viewers are not homogeneous “rebellious poachers that hijack authorial meaning” but instead are in many cases textual “gamekeepers” on a collective quest for the “right” meaning, using methods learned from the dominant culture’s educational practices. Disclosing the way viewers from both sites were equally interested in close readings that mine the text for “authorial intention,” Bury demonstrates that in the digital age print-based literacies of mass education remain central. Andrea Press and Camille Johnson also examine the fans of a television show, but instead of analyzing internet discussions, they employ audience
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ethnography. Moving beyond the interviews, surveys, and viewers’ diaries of conventional ethnographic reception studies, Press and Johnson-Yale undertake on-site participant observation at a Midwest African American women’s hairdressing salon. To determine the role ambient television plays in the salon’s social interactions, they interview Janelle, the owner of the salon, who, together with her clients, regularly watches and discusses the Oprah Winfrey Show. Press and Johnson show that the conversations of Janelle and her clients frequently raise broad political issues. They conclude that television is not a privatizing medium, as scholars say; rather, it establishes a public space in which fans can discuss their political beliefs.
Retrospective Prospects The influential work of Janice Radway has spanned all types of response and reception study, including the literary, book history, publishing, and media studies. In her essay here, she goes on, however, to reveal the limits of these types and to outline a new form of sociological and anthropological reception study. She argues that the interpretations of texts and critics and the histories of books, publishers, and institutions produced by all types of readerresponse and reception study ignore or misconstrue the practices of readers and justify the privileges of the literary discipline. Instead of challenging the critic’s authority, reader-response and reception study elaborate that authority, making the reader secondary to the text and its production and the critic an expert not only on texts but on readings of texts and, in the case of cultural studies, on cultural forms and their audiences. On this basis she reconsiders her previous work, particularly her two best-known works: Reading the Romance, which examines how a group of approximately forty women readers received popular romances, and the later A Feeling for Books, which analyzes the preferences, habits, and socioeconomic status of the Book of the Month Club’s editorial staff. Now she argues that Reading the Romance participated in the “reification of the literary” because it made the reader a function of the romance genre and because neither it nor A Feeling for Bookschallenged the corporate conglomerates dominating cultural production. Such critiques should enable her to produce, she says, a more fluid, “simultaneous” account of the cultural production and consumption of girls (including her daughter) and a more complex understanding not only of their reception activity but also of its simultaneous function as a form of cultural production. Like Radway, Toby Miller, whose essay concludes this volume, criticizes reader-response and reception study that engages in “static” interpretations, instead of examining the whole complex process whereby texts are produced, distributed, and received. However, while Radway emphasizes the cultural production and consumption of girls, he examines the worldwide distribution
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and reception of movies and television shows. On the one hand, he outlines the history of their reception, in which, for the most part, academics and others considered audiences passive dupes and studied them “scientifically.” In the modern era, this view divides, he says, into two basic types: the domestic effects model, which studies the psychological effects of the media, including its propensity to encourage violence or perversity; and the global effects model, which evaluates the extent to which the media encourages or fails to encourage national, local, or cultural loyalties. Engaging in what he terms “the reception deception,” these models reveal, he says, various faults, including a commitment to rational individualism and a neglect of the media’s libratory and pleasurable character. To move beyond these models, which focus narrowly on audiences and texts, he suggests that reception study examine the ways the media are produced, distributed, received, and criticized across the globe, especially since modern cultural texts are caught up in what he terms a “multiform network,” which varies by country or region as well as by genre and which includes “books, movies, CDs, the Web, DVDs, electronic games, TV, computers, telephones, and multiplexes.” The arguments of Radway and Miller underline the extent to which the disagreements and disputes of those engaged in reception study have enabled them to evolve a diversity of approaches and methods, which include the reader-response, institutional, textual, historical, and theoretical, and which explain the diverse ways in which readers, viewers, and fans have found old and new literatures, newspapers, movies, television shows, and other textualities meaningful. It is simply not the case, then, that reception theorists cannot seriously debate interpretations or interpretative practices but can only express solidarity with each other or acknowledge and respect their different viewpoints, as traditional scholars say (see Michaels 278–83 and Dasenbrock 12). Our overview of this collection’s essays clearly shows that they dispute a number of subjects, including the status of ethics, aesthetics, and ontology, the relationship between an author’s historical context and modern readers, the character and responses of fans, viewers, readers, or audiences, and the influence and historical evolution of cultural institutions. Some readers may object, however, that these disagreements can be rational only if they enable critics to establish correct interpretations of a text. While all the versions of reception theory assume that good art produces meaningful experiences or revelations, a rational method would establish demonstrable truth or, at least, resist relativism. As Michaels says, “The minute we see no point in asking whether we got a text right or wrong . . . we cease to understand ourselves as interpreting the text at all” (76). This objection implicitly justifies the anxiety of Alvin Kernan and other traditional scholars, who, as noted, defend a textual or authorial essentialism. The recent history of literary studies suggests, however, that this method does not overcome disputes or resolve methodological disagreements; on the contrary, it has produced a number of impasses that, to an extent, explain the emergence of reader-response and reception study. xxii
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A Brief History of Modern Criticism Initially adopted by philological scholars, the traditional Anglo-American method of criticism developed out of nineteenth-century Higher Criticism of the Bible and effectively opposed absolutist or allegorical theology, which interpreted not only the Bible but classical texts as prefiguring modern religious views (see Compagnon 58–62). In the late nineteenth century, when Anglo-American university departments included both languages and literature, the scientific philologists construed the method as a historical approach providing causal analyses of a work’s sources and influences or an author’s development, as well as broad cultural ideals, what Matthew Arnold termed “the best that is thought and said in the world.” As John Guillory points out, this historical method remained central until the 1940s and 1950s, when literary study, which had acquired graduate programs, distinct fields, and professional associations, fostered formal methods opposed to the historical method (32–36). Often very intense, this opposition persisted until Anglo-American universities, expanding rapidly in the 1960s, began to encourage various sorts of approaches. For instance, eclectic critics such as Northrop Frye brought the formal and historical approaches together, establishing what scholars term “objective” or purely “literary” methods and concepts and eventually opening literary study to poststructuralist or “New Historical” readings (see Graff, Professing 14–15 and 204–8). When reception study emerged in the 1970s, it also sought to move beyond the opposed formal and historical approaches, but it justified the reader’s interpretive activity. As noted, some reader-response critics dismissed formal analyses on the grounds that interpretation projects the identity of the reader or the critic on to the text. Other reader-response criticism, including the reception study of Jauss and Iser and the affective stylistics of Fish, maintained that the reader’s constructive activity can bring together the text’s formal or the author’s historical context and the reader’s aesthetic “repertoire.” Later Derridean and New Historical readings, which examined the text’s broad tropes and figures or the historical context’s discursive practices, also moved beyond the opposition of formal and historical accounts and, at the same time, intensified the opposition. In Tropics of Discourse, the New Historicist Hayden White argued, for example, that historical criticism does not escape the ambiguities of rhetorical tropes, because, as an art as well as a science, historical study requires interpretations, not just facts, and rhetorical modes or genres, not formal logic alone (67; see also Greenblatt, “Towards” 8). Like Kernan, White maintained, however, that “absurdist” poststructuralist criticism reduces the text to language and language, in turn, to a mirror of the reader (265; see also Greenblatt, “What Is” 470). By contrast, reception theory also reconciles historical and rhetorical approaches, but it accepts a poststructuralist account of reading. As noted, Fish and others claimed that an INTRODUCTION
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interpretation’s validity depends on the norms, ideals, and methods of “interpretive communities” composed of readers who develop a common strategy and make it prevail. A pragmatic version of what Michel Foucault terms the archive or historical a priori, this notion of community both reconciled formal and historical approaches and exacerbated their conflict. In the 1980s and 1990s, when conservative politicians increasingly dominated federal and state government and the global economy was degrading American industry and finance, traditional scholars produced new disagreements, popularly termed “culture wars,” over newly established literary theory, women’s, African American, gay, cultural, and postcolonial programs. We do not intend to recapitulate these familiar arguments. We do want to suggest, however, that scholars as traditional as Allan Bloom, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., and Gerald Graff and as radical as Fredric Jameson, Terry Eagleton, Susan Gubar, and Edward Said blamed the universities’ expanding disciplines, black, women’s, or ethnic studies, or multicultural clientele for the humanities’ growing fragmentation and declining public support.4 Both the traditional and the radical scholars argued that, with its theoretical “jargon,” subjective readers’ responses, and attention to black, minority, and women’s literatures, academic criticism alienated the public. By contrast, with a few exceptions, reception theory justified “subjective” responses and modern academic criticism. Fish, for example, complained that “both the left and the right” adopted “an antiprofessionalism that regards with suspicion activities tied narrowly to disciplinary pressures” (“Being Interdisciplinary” 15). Moreover, he insisted that academic interpretation is professional, not political (Professional 51). As Patrick Brantlinger points out, in the twenty-first century literary studies have grown increasingly marginal because federal and state governments have reduced their financial support, students are increasingly majoring in technological and other job-related areas, the global economy is undermining the nation-state and the national culture, and the demand for writing programs has expanded, along with what Brantlinger terms “the pressure from new literatures in English” (22; see also Readings 465–83). Brantlinger is right; however, this marginal status has generated sharp, new debates about the relationship of traditional methods and the new cultural approaches. In these new debates, critics seeking to restore the lost centrality of literature defend textual and aesthetic criticism against cultural, gay, feminist, or multicultural studies, which these critics consider political or ideological (see Armstrong, Berubé, Clark, Delbanco, Fluck, Krieger, Schwab, and Thomas). The varieties of reception theory suggest that, on the contrary, to enhance its influence, literary/cultural studies can open itself to the cultural and multicultural programs composing it in the twenty-first century. As Patrocinio Schweickart rightly says in her essay in this volume, as professional interpreters, “we are happy to entertain a variety of critical approaches, and . . . a diversity of values.” This brief history of modern literary study indicates that the defenders of an essential text or an accessible “objective” meaning have not overcome
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or reduced disagreements about a text’s meaning. These defenders mean to preserve historical objectivity, establish correct interpretations, defend the “great” tradition, or restore the “lost centrality” of the humanities, but their defenses have led to impasses from which reader-response criticism and historical and poststructuralist reception study have emerged and developed. Indeed, the differences and disputes of these reader-response and reception theories suggest that their development has produced a complex situation in which interpretive communities are no longer marked by sharply defined or impenetrable boundaries. Instead, the communities interpenetrate and at times overlap, with the result that they consist of both disparate and shared assumptions and interpretive codes, which in turn enable readers to inhabit several interpretive communities simultaneously. While the traditional essentialist method has restricted literary study and repeatedly produced impasses, reception study, thanks to its complexity and variety of methods, as well as its many differences and disputes, opens literary study to its twenty-first-century constituents—the reader’s personality, literary and cultural repertoire, institutional contexts, the fans and audiences of the media, as well as the historical, evolving practices of reading, publishing, and cultural institutions. Notes 1. Since the mid-1980s, numerous collections and casebooks have reexamined the reception of Hamlet, Huckleberry Finn, Pride and Prejudice, and Their Eyes Are Watching God, to mention just a few titles, and major works, including Steven Mailloux’s Rhetorical Power and Reception Histories, Gary Taylor’s Reinventing Shakespeare, Jane Tompkins’s Sensational Designs, and Peter Widdowson’s Hardy in History have contributed markedly to Anglo-American reception criticism. In literary studies alone, the number of books, articles, and book chapters in reception study has constituted a virtual explosion of interest, with the MLA Bibliography listing over eight thousand items published in the field. Add to this work the research on reception in cultural and media studies, including Janice Radway’s Feeling for Books, Henry Jenkins’s Textual Poachers, and Janet Staiger’s Media Reception Studies, as well as collections by Lawrence Grossberg, Jon Cruz, and Roger Dickinson, among others, and the significance of reception study becomes striking. 2. For example, Jerome McGann wrote that a work’s “critical history . . . dates from the first responses and reviews it receives. These reactions . . . modify the author’s purposes and intentions, sometimes drastically, and they remain part of processive life” of the author and the work (24). 3. A different but related set of methodological shifts and broadening of approaches has occurred in audience and reception analysis in media and cultural studies, as the earlier “effects” and “uses and gratifications” models began to give way in the 1980s to active-audience theory and audience and reception ethnographies. For a brief overview and discussion of these shifts, see Machor and Goldstein 203–7. For the shape of and problems with “effects” models, see Toby Miller’s essay in this volume; for an
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analysis of both the value and the limitations of active-audience theory and methods, see Jack Bratich’s essay here. 4. For a full discussion of these polemics, see Goldstein 17–20.
References Armstrong, Isabel. The Radical Aesthetic. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. Bennett, Tony. Culture: A Reformer’s Science. St. Leonards, Australia: Allyn & Unwin, 1998. Bérubé, Michael. “Engaging the Aesthetic.” The Aesthetics of Cultural Studies. Ed. Michael Bérubé. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 1–27. Bleich, David. “What Literature Is ‘Ours’?” Reading Sites: Social Difference and Reader Response. Ed. Patrocinio P. Schweickart and Elizabeth A. Flynn. New York: Modern Language Association, 2004. 286–313. Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987. Brantlinger, Patrick. Who Killed Shakespeare? What’s Happened to English since the Radical Sixties. New York: Routledge, 2001. Clark, Michael P. Introduction. Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in Theory Today. Ed. Michael P. Clark. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 1–24. Compagnon, Antoine. Le démon de la théorie littérature et sense commun. Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1998. Cruz, Jon, and Justin Lewis, eds. Viewing, Reading, Listening: Audience and Cultural Reception. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994. Dasenbrock, Reed Way. Truth and Consequences: Intentions, Conventions, and the New Thematics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. Delbanco, Andrew. Required Reading: Why Our American Classics Matter Now. New York: Noonday, 1997. Dickinson, Roger, Ramaswami Harindranath, and Olga Linné, eds. Approaches to Audiences. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998. Eagleton, Terry. The Function of Criticism: From the “Spectator” to Post-Structuralism. London: Verso, 1984. Fish, Stanley. “Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard to Do.” Profession 89 (1989): 15–22. ———. Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. ———. “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics.” Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism. Ed. Jane P. Tompkins. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 70–100. ———. Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change. New York: Clarendon Press, 1995. Fluck, Winnifred. “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies.” Aesthetics in a Multicultural Age. Ed. Emory Elliott, Louis Freitas, and Jeffrey Rhyne. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 79–104. xxvi
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Gilbert, Sandra, and Susan Gubar. “Tradition and the Female Talent.” The Poetics of Gender. Ed. Nancy K. Miller. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 183–207. Goldstein, Philip. Communities of Cultural Value: Reception Study, Political Differences, and Literary History. Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2001. Graff, Gerald. Literature against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. ———. Professing Literature: An Institutional History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Greenblatt, Stephen. “Towards a Poetics of Culture.” The New Historicism. Ed. H. Aram Veeser. New York: Routledge, 1989. 1–14. ———. “What Is the History of Literature?” Critical Inquiry 23 (1997): 460–81. Grossberg, Lawrence, James Hay, and Ellen Wartella, eds. The Audience and Its Landscape. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. Guillory, John. “Literary Study and the Modern System of the Disciplines.” Disciplinarity at the Fin de Siècle. Ed. Amanda Anderson and Joseph Valente. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. 19–43. Hirsch, E. D., Jr. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know. New York: Vintage, 1988. ———. Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Holland, Norman. “Unity Identity Text Self.” Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism. Ed. Jane P. Tompkins. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 118–33. Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981. Jauss, Hans Robert. Toward an Aesthetic of Reception. Trans. Timothy Bahti. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Jenkins, Henry. Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture. New York: Routledge, 1992. Kernan, Alvin. The Death of Literature. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. Kreiger, Murray. “The ‘Imaginary’ and Its Enemies.” New Literary History 31 (2000): 130–74. Machor, James L., and Philip Goldstein. “Reception Study, Cultural Studies, and Mass Communication.” Reception Study: From Literary Theory to Cultural Studies. Ed. James L. Machor and Philip Goldstein. New York: Routledge, 2001. 203–12. Mailloux, Steven. Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. ———. Rhetorical Power. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. McGann, Jerome J. The Beauty of Inflections: Literary Investigations in Historical Method and Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1985. Michaels, Walter Benn. The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Radway, Janice A. A Feeling for Books: The Book-of-the Month Club, Literary Taste, and Middle-Class Desire. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. INTRODUCTION
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———. Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Readings, Bill. “The University without Culture?” New Literary History 26 (1995): 465–92. Said, Edward. The World, the Text, and the Critic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Schwab, Gabriele. “ ‘If Only I Were Not Obliged to Manifest’: Iser’s Aesthetics of Negativity.” New Literary History 31 (2000): 73–89. Schweickart, Patrocinio P. “Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading.” Gender and Reading: Essays on Readers, Texts, and Contexts. Ed. Elizabeth A. Flynn and Patrocinio P. Schweickart. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 31–62. Staiger, Janet. Media Reception Studies. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Taylor, Gary. Reinventing Shakespeare: A Cultural History from the Restoration to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Thomas, Brook. “Restaging the Reception of Iser’s Earlier Work, Or Sides Not Taken in Discussions of the Aesthetic.” New Literary History 31 (2000): 13–44. Tompkins, Jane. Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790–1860. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. White, Hayden. Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Widdowson, Peter. Hardy in History: A Study in Literary Sociology. London: Routledge, 1989.
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I (Re)Theorizing Reception Study
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Understanding an Other Reading as a Receptive Form of Communicative Action PATROCINIO SCHWEICKART
The term “audience” is problematical, according to drama critic Alice Rayner, not only because it obscures the diverse perspectives and reactions that can be found in every actual audience but also because it glosses over the “listening function” that constitutes the activity of the audience members. Something similar can be said of the term “reception.” Although reception study understands the variability of meaning and has long been concerned to restrain collectivizing and homogenizing tendencies, something like the second problem persists, particularly in the tension between reception study and readerresponse criticism. Reception study emphasizes the macroscopic analysis of reading conditions and effects, but it tends to gloss over the “receiving function,” the interaction between reader and a text that, multiplied countless times, constitutes the phenomenon of reception. In this essay, I will develop a theory of reading that portrays reading as a communicative activity in which the reader encounters other subjectivities. My point of departure will be Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative
action. I will argue that, contrary to Habermas, communication requires two modes of action, an expressive mode represented by speaking and writing and a receptive mode represented by listening and reading. The most developed corollary of Habermas’s theory is the moral theory he calls “discourse ethics,” in which the norm of mutual respect for individual dignity and autonomy is expressed in the ideal of domination-free discourse. I will argue that a theory of communicative action that takes account of receptive as well as expressive roles yields a different discourse ethics, and that the conception of reading within this framework enables a notion of the validity of interpretation that is not dependent on objective verbal meaning in the text but, rather, on the cognitive and moral constituents of the receptive role of understanding the utterance of an other.
Habermas’s Paradigm of Communicative Reason Habermas recommends the development of a paradigm of communicative reason, based not on the discredited metaphysical premises of the “philosophy of consciousness,” but on the capacities and presuppositions that enable everyday communicative practices (“An Alternative Way”). Habermas is particularly interested in “communicative action oriented toward understanding,” a group of practices stylized in the following scenario. Scenario 1: Two people are discussing an important topic, say the “Woman Question.” Assume that both speakers are skilled at argumentation. Speaker A says, “Women are equal.” Speaker B says, “What do you mean? Where in the world did you get such a notion?” A gives reasons for his claim, and B disagrees and gives reasons for his position. A contest of reasons ensues, and A and B agree to let the best reasons decide which position is worthy of agreement. For Habermas, “reason” goes hand in hand with a meaningful and usable notion of “validity.” Within the framework of communicative reason, “validity” is not a property of propositions, but a claim one makes when one speaks. When one speaks, one unavoidably makes four kinds of validity claims: a truth claim relating the utterance to the objective world, a correctness or moral claim relating it to the norms of interpersonal interaction, a truthfulness or sincerity claim relating it to the inner subjective world of the speaker, and an intelligibility claim relating it to the norms of the language of the utterance. When A says “Women are equal,” he is making a truth claim (women and men are really equal), a rightness claim (it is morally right to regard women and men as equals), a truthfulness claim (A is sincere), and an
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intelligibility claim (the utterance conforms to the linguistic norms shared by competent speakers of English). When B questions A, he could be questioning the truth, moral rightness, truthfulness, or intelligibility of A’s utterance. The goal of communicative action is to resolve differences and to arrive at mutual “understanding,” “meaning agreement,” regarding these validity claims. Habermas leaves sincerity and intelligibility claims largely unanalyzed. He is interested mainly in truth and rightness claims.1 I will not be concerned with the sincerity claim, but I will return to the issue of intelligibility later, because this is crucial to the problematics of reading. Truth and moral claims are intersubjective in the sense that when I claim something is true or morally right, I am claiming that this is so not just for me, but for everyone concerned. Habermas argues that the validity of truth and moral claims can be determined only through discussion in ideal domination-free discourse, where all participants have equal opportunity to speak their minds freely and openly and where no force operates except the unforced force of the better argument.2 When I say “Women are/ought to be equal,” my confidence in the validity of my claim rests on my willingness to submit it to the judgment of others, my readiness to give reasons for my position, and my commitment to let the case be decided on its merits. Habermas does not identify the properties of valid claims; instead, he designates a discursive procedure for distinguishing valid from invalid claims. Valid claims are those that everyone can willingly agree on because they are supported by the most cogent arguments. Habermas privileges argumentative discourse, but he does not commit himself to a specific definition of argument. For the purposes of this essay, it is enough to characterize argument broadly as claim-testing, reason-giving discourse, and “reason” as one’s response when one is asked to explain or elaborate. One might offer factual, logical, emotional, aesthetic, moral, political, and other considerations as reasons; it is not necessary to stipulate a priori qualifications for what might count as a reason. The paradigm of communicative reason advocated by Habermas has a number of appealing features: first, it presupposes a fallibilistic stance—all claims are in principle questionable; second, it recognizes validity as a social product and attributes epistemic and moral authority to the community of people who are willing to speak and collaborate with each other; third, it ties the notion of validity to the moral and political ideal of domination-free discussion in which all concerned have a voice; fourth, the idea of validity as the product of free and open discussion in which claims are evaluated strictly on their merits finds empirical corroboration in scientific and scholarly discourse, particularly in the practice of peer review; and finally, regardless of Habermas’s attachment to the notion of transcendent reason, the framework of everyday communicative practices brings “rationality” down to earth and invests it with the pragmatic quality of “reasonableness” we experience in productive and satisfying conversations.
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Habermas and Derrida: The Predicament of the Reader Habermas’s theory of communicative action has had very little influence on literary study, in part because of the current strong influence of critiques of the Enlightenment notions of reason and validity he is trying to preserve, and in part because the idea of literature as communication, whatever its practical uses, and in spite of the enduring favor accorded the metaphor of voice and the more recent appeal of “dialogism,” has been anathema in literary theory for nearly a century. The following scenario indicates the typical reading situation that forms the basis of the discipline of literary criticism. Scenario 2. C is alone in a room, reading a book, say Women in Love. Assume she is a skillful reader—a professor of literature. Lawrence’s novel can be read as being about the meanings of masculinity and femininity and the way these notions shape the relationship between women and men. However, C knows that underlying any discussion of the novel is the question of the validity of any interpretive claim. How does she know that her reading of the text is valid? Is there an objective ground—a verbal meaning in the text—to warrant a particular interpretation? Or is interpretation always a function of the subjectivity of the reader and the context of reading? How do readings vary with readers and contexts? If there are many readings possible, are they all equally valid? What is to distinguish valid interpretations from invalid ones? Does it even make sense to talk of validity with regard to interpretation? Scenario 2 reflects the general conception of reading as a relationship involving the interaction of a subject C and a textual object. Of course, someone wrote the book, but the author is typically absent from the scene of reading. The problem of interpretation highlights the inadequacy of Habermas’s treatment of the issue of intelligibility. In his model, the rational evaluation of validity claims presupposes that shared linguistic norms underwrite the intelligibility of utterances, and that competent speakers of a language are able (given enough time, effort, and good will) to agree on the meaning of utterances and hence on what claims are at issue. However, the experiences that inform literary criticism indicate that being able to recognize that an utterance consists of well-formed English sentences does not necessarily imply that we can determine what it is saying, that competent readers often interpret texts differently, and that there is no unproblematical way of deciding interpretive disputes. Moreover, as Derrida and others have shown, the problem is inherent in the nature of language. The meaning of a written text cannot be directly decoded from its language: Meaning is multiple, shifting, undecidable.3
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It might be said that the question of the decidability of meaning turns on whether one takes speech or writing as one’s paradigm for language. Habermas assumes an oral paradigm in which the utterance, or speech act, is the unit of communicative action. When I speak, I expect my interlocutors to understand what I am conveying through my utterance. If I think I am being misunderstood, I will object, give more information, elaborate, explain, and in this way bring my interlocutor’s understanding of my utterance in line with mine. Of course, this process may fail, and in this case, the discussion will go nowhere. Nevertheless, the expectation of being understood is one of the unavoidable presuppositions we make when we speak. It may require considerable time, effort, and good will, but in our everyday conversations, we expect to be understood, and we continue talking so long as we feel that this expectation is not futile. Derrida, for his part, argues that contrary to the dominant view, writing, not speech, is the primary form of language. It is true, one expects to be understood when one speaks, but this expectation, Derrida argues, is based on the illusory association of meaning with the sound of one’s voice—with the sensation that the sound is coming directly from inside the mind. But whatever I may feel when I am speaking or writing, other people always encounter my utterance as a textual object, the traces of meaning, not meaning itself. Any attempt by a speaker or writer to clarify and explain does not produce meaning, only more texts that need to be interpreted. Although Derrida designates his topic as “writing,” this does not refer to the activity, but to its textual product as it presents problems for reading. With regard to the question of meaning, in Derrida’s view, we are all in the predicament of the reader who is faced with the paradoxical task of tracking down meaning that is, and will always be, beyond our grasp. The situation is the same whether or not the author is able to respond. An authorial statement is an interpretation among other interpretations; it may be more or less illuminating, more or less persuasive, but it does not have decisive authority over the meaning of the text. We may seek meaning, but we can only produce oral or written texts that multiply the paradoxical call for reading. Habermas accepts the validity of the deconstruction thesis of the indeterminacy of textual meaning, but he localizes it to the “world-creating capacity” of language that is privileged in literature at the expense of its communicative function. Of course, any text can be read as literature. However, although the languages of science, philosophy, economics, law, and morality also “live off of the illuminating power of metaphorical tropes,” these rhetorical elements are “tamed,” enlisted in the service of “problem solving”—the formation of judgment regarding validity claims and the production of agreements that are necessary if people are to coordinate their action plans (“Excursus” 209). Habermas strenuously objects to the subordination of the communicative function of philosophical, scholarly, and scientific language (written or oral) beneath the world-creating capacity privileged by literature.
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Derrida’s mistake, from Habermas’s point of view, is to take the characteristics of one genre of writing—literature—as normative for writing in general. What is at issue for him is not the difference between speech and writing but that between different linguistic functions—between communicative uses of language that are oriented toward making and evaluating validity claims (e.g., philosophical, scientific, and scholarly discourse) and those that are not (literature and other discourses in which aesthetic and rhetorical functions are paramount). It is illuminating to examine the status of literary scholarship with regard to this distinction. According to Habermas, the “endemic self-doubt” of literary criticism with regard to its status as a scholarly discipline “forms the background” for its favorable reception of Derrida. Deconstruction appeals to literary critics, first because it “frees the critical enterprise from the unfortunate compulsion to submit to pseudo-scientific standards . . . [as it] lifts it above science to the level of creative activity,” and second because it allows literary criticism to share in the “business of the critique of metaphysics” and, in this way, to gain philosophical significance (“Excursus” 191–92). However, it is important to note that in spite of the theoretical power of deconstruction, the communicative function is practically normative in literary criticism.4 As much we may strive to partake of the creative quality of literature, our critical discourses have the goal of communicating with others, with the expectation that our claims will be shown, when subjected to critical examination, to be supported by cogent argument. We may or may not use the word “valid,” but in practice, we discriminate between scholarship that is competent, knowledgeable, incisive, informative, responsible, useful, “reasonable,” and thus worthy of recognition and further discussion, and scholarship that is not. Moreover, literary criticism provides empirical corroboration of Habermas’s claim of the crucial link between the notion of validity and the ideal of domination-free discourse. In practice, the integrity of the critical enterprise depends not on the existence of an objective verbal meaning, but on our ability, through peer review and critical discussion, to evaluate interpretive claims largely (if not strictly) on their merits. Like scholars in other disciplines, we would consider coercion, prejudice, or systematic bias to be damaging to our knowledge project.5 The idea of validity as the product of a discourse community is evident in Stanley Fish’s idea of the authority of interpretive communities. However, the closest approximation of Habermas’s model is Wayne Booth’s proposal of coduction as a method for the collaborative testing of interpretive claims. Coduction is a discursive procedure premised on the willingness and ability of each discourse participant to discuss her claims with others, to answer questions and give reasons supporting her views, and to let the better argument prevail, even if this means changing her mind (The Company We Keep). For Booth as for Habermas (but less clearly for Fish), the cognitive and moral integrity of interpretive claims depends on whether or not they are defensible in domination-free discourse. 8
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Habermas and other critics of Derrida are fond of pointing out that the credibility of deconstruction is undercut by a “performative contradiction.” Proponents of deconstruction, like everyone else, expect that their utterances (spoken or written) will be understood by others. As much as they may believe that all readings are necessarily misreadings, they bristle (or react more vigorously) when others misread their work. Nonetheless, the discourse of literary study offers conceptions of validity and of “communicative action oriented toward understanding” that deviate in crucial ways from the model proposed by Habermas. First, validity claims in literary study refer not to the world of objective states of affairs, but to the world of literature. Thus, when I make a claim, for example, that Women in Love puts forth such and such representations of women, the validity of that claim depends on whether it is supported by textual or contextual evidence. The issue is the validity of my reading, not the validity of Lawrence’s representation of women. Second, because we literary critics know from experience that texts can be competently read in different ways, we favor a pluralistic attitude toward validity claims. Like Richard Rorty, we regard relativism as a challenging fact of life, but unlike Habermas, we are not worried that it spells the end of “humane forms of collective life” (“Moral Consciousness” 3). We are happy to entertain a variety of critical approaches and to judge them in terms of a diversity of values; we do not think that we need, at all costs, to devise a procedure that, in theory if not in practice, would enable the resolution of interpretive disputes. Finally, we do not require critical consensus as a condition for the validation of an interpretive claim. Most of us would wonder why Habermas equates the communicative goal of “understanding” with “agreement.” Certainly, understanding a poem or a novel has no necessary connection with agreeing with anything it is saying, and we often understand and appreciate the merits of claims without feeling compelled to adopt them. In fact, some of us have found that the drive to agree or disagree often inhibits understanding. Above all, the universalizing impulse behind Habermas’s insistence on consensus as a necessary condition for the validation of claims runs counter to our practice of examining critical claims in the context of particular knowledge projects, our wariness of overreaching generalizations, and our experience that total consensus in the field of literary study is neither possible nor desirable. Booth is most Habermasian when he says that “ethical criticism that merely describes the [interpretive] conflicts, without permitting agreement or disagreement, is cowardly.” However, he speaks for many literary critics when he says that it is “from disagreements [that go to the center of the aesthetic achievement of a work] that the most productive literary criticism can emerge.” Reasonable disagreement can result in something critics value more than agreement, namely, growth in understanding, learning “something overlooked, either about the work itself or about the world of ethical values in which we all live” (“Why Ethical” 27). Understanding an Other
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Reading as a Receptive Form of Communicative Action Perhaps, one might say, the communicative function that is salient when critics are addressing each other recedes to the background when they are reading a literary text. Certainly, literary texts are different from scholarly texts and call for different reading practices. Nevertheless, in this section I will argue that reading any text is a form of communicative action. The key to my argument is the recognition of a receptive mode of communicative action represented by reading and listening that is different from the expressive mode of speaking and writing. By emphasizing the receptive role of the reader, rather than the nature of the text being read, I want to focus on what the reader is doing while she is reading, before she begins converting this activity into a spoken or written account. I will overlook the many controversies surrounding Habermas’s theory of communicative action in order to concentrate on what I take to be a fatal error in his model of communication—namely, the identification of communicative action only with speaking. Like Habermas, most of us think of scenario 1—people talking—when we think of communication. When we think of reading as dialogic, we form a picture of people talking—of voices in the text, of the real or implied author and the real or implied reader talking to each other, or of members of an interpretive community discussing what they have read. To think of reading as communicative action, it seems we need to convert readers into speakers. But when we look carefully at conversations, we see that I speak, you speak, the picture assumed by Habermas, is a misleading picture of what is going on. If communication is to happen, when I speak, you must listen; when you speak, I must listen. Every interval of communication consists of someone speaking and another listening. In oral situations, speaking and listening happen simultaneously, and the sound of the speaker’s voice masks the silent activity of the listener. When voice is taken to be the evidence of activity, silence becomes the sign of inactivity—listening becomes indistinguishable from doing nothing. I am not saying that Habermas does not see that someone has to listen as one speaks. But in his model, listening is drastically truncated to the quasi-speaking role of silently saying “yes” or “no” to what is being said in anticipation of one’s own speaking turn. The listener does not become a communicative agent until she speaks in response to the utterance of another. Paradoxically, Habermas’s conception of communicative action oriented toward understanding forecloses the theoretical elaboration of the activity—listening—specifically devoted to understanding the utterance of another. The simplistic treatment of intelligibility and the reduction of understanding to agreement follow directly from the underestimation of the receptive agency of the listener. Because writing and reading are usually temporally and spatially separated from each other, we see that the reader is clearly doing something dif10
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ferent from writing. Unfortunately, the absence of the author obscures the intersubjectivity that would qualify reading as a form of communicative action. There are, of course, differences between listening and reading, but I will discount these in favor of emphasizing the “receiving function” that defines both, that of understanding the utterance of an other.6 The analogy between listening and reading enables the recognition of listening as an activity different from speaking and of reading as the interaction between different subjectivities. Combining the vantage point of the oral and written forms enables us to define communication as a linguistically mediated interaction between subjectivities in two different communicative roles: the expressive role of speaking and writing and the receptive role of listening and reading. An objection might be raised to the idea of reading as interaction not with a text but with another subjectivity. There is actually only one subjectivity at work in reading—that of the reader. The text screens the reader from contact with any subjectivity other than her own. Furthermore, as Derrida argued, the situation is the same in an oral situation. What the listener engages is always a textual object, not a subject. In response, I would point out that objects always mediate human interactions. In particular, we always encounter each other through our bodies. A written or spoken text has a metonymic connection to subjectivity comparable to that Levinas attributes to “the face of the other.” Human faces, like (oral or written) texts, call for reading. Note that the intersubjectivity of reading is implicit in reading practices, said to be favored particularly by women, that are often derided for their “naïve” and “sentimental” tendency to confuse fictional characters with real people.7 I would argue that what such readers are after in “real people” is not the quality of being “real” but rather the subjectivity that can be imparted to fictional characters by treating them like “people.” These readers value reading as an occasion for engaging with other subjectivities and as an opportunity to exercise, enjoy, and refine the skills required for understanding other people by observing what they say and do. A similar approach is evident in Booth’s idea that the characters in the books we read, like the real people in the “company we keep,” affect us for good or ill, so that we have not only the right but the responsibility to understand and evaluate the way these characters live their fictional lives. The intersubjectivity of reading is also implicit in terms such as the “implied author” (Booth), “rhetorical criticism” (James Phelan), “authorial audience” (Peter Rabinowitz), and “authored text” (Derek Attridge), and in the concepts of “live-entering,” “acknowledging,” and “facing” that Adam Zachary Newton derives from Bakhtin, Cavell, and Levinas, respectively. Because a literary text consists of a multiplicity of shifting “voices” and “languages,” it is arguable that subjectivities are as undecidable as meaning. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the subjectivity one encounters in reading is only the reproduction of one’s self, the elaboration of one’s own “identity theme.” Nevertheless, these objections do not invalidate the thesis of the intersubjectivity of reading; they only indicate the complicated problems that could be addressed within this framework. Understanding an Other
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The Ethics of Reading There have been, roughly, two approaches to the ethics of reading.8 The first, within the framework of deconstruction, is exemplified by J. Hillis Miller’s account of the normative strictures on reading that stem from the linguistic nature of the literary text. The second, the ethical criticism advocated by Booth and Martha Nussbaum, conceives of literature as a vehicle for moral understanding and argues that critical approaches that address the ethical issues raised by, and the potential moral effects of, literary works ought to be among the things some (if not all) critics do. More recently, the recognition that reading is an engagement with other subjectivities opens up a third approach, which connects the ethics of reading with the general ethical concern with interpersonal relations. For example, Derek Attridge reads “the text on the assumption that it is ‘authored,’ that it is creative work, however mediated, of at least one mind. . . . A full response to the otherness of a text includes an awareness of, a respect for, and in a certain sense . . . a taking of responsibility for, the creativity of its author” (25). And Newton emphasizes that for him, ethics is “first and foremost . . . an ‘ethics of telling and listening,’ a layered performance model of encounter, and its interrelated binding ties . . . [at] narrational, representational, and hermeneutic levels” (“Humanism” 209). My approach is different from Attridge’s in that I do not take otherness as the opposite of familiarity, and my concern to understand the utterance of another person may include appreciation for, but does not privilege, the qualities of singularity and newness that he prizes. Newton points out that the three writers he invokes have a religious “understanding of communication as presuming untranscendable over and above simply humanist claims and exigencies. . . . Each thinks of language in the sense of liturgy” (“Humanism” 210). For my part, I prefer the mundane, nonliturgical, interpersonal, pragmatic perspective and tone of Habermas’s theory of communicative action.9 The most developed corollary of Habermas’s theory is the moral theory he calls “discourse ethics,” in which valid norms are defined as those that are worthy of the willing agreement of all concerned under the conditions of an ideal domination-free discourse. Habermas suggests we view discourse ethics as a revision of Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory that moral reasoning consists of six stages of development, in which the highest stage corresponds to the ability to reason about moral issues in terms of universal principles. Since for Habermas, all norms (including universal principles) are questionable and there are no uncontroversial criteria for deciding moral questions, Kohlberg’s schema has to be supplemented by a stage where the focus shifts from normguided action to norm-testing discourse. Morally mature adults at this highest stage are willing and able to examine moral problems in free, open, and mutually respectful discussion with others and to forego the use of all force except the unforced force of the better argument. They understand that valid norms are those that stand up under critical examination by all affected by 12
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the norm. Discourse ethics works best negatively. If we want to dispute the validity of a norm, all we need to do is look at the discursive procedure that supports it. All bets are off as to the validity of a norm—for example, of the Catholic rule that forbids women priests—when we see that a sizeable segment of the affected population—women—has been excluded from the deciding body.10 However, as I have argued, communication does not happen when I speak, then you speak, unless, when I speak you listen, and when you speak I listen. Each interval of communication consists of someone speaking and another listening. It follows that the equal distribution of the opportunity to speak one’s mind without fear of retribution is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an ideal discourse. I can say anything I want, but I accomplish nothing if no one gives me a fair hearing. When I speak, I place my communicative project in the custody of the listener. My communicative project can succeed only if an other is disposed to understand what I am saying. Similarly, the fate of a writer’s communicative project is in the hands of the reader. The writer’s project fails unless the reader is willing and able to undertake a careful and just understanding of what the writer has written.11 Habermas’s discourse ethics owes much of its plausibility to the confirmation, within its framework, of the widely held view that the basis of morality is mutual respect, understood as the symmetrical reciprocity of self and other. Unfortunately, this satisfying result stems from the erroneous reduction of communicative action to speaking. The obligation to give others a fair hearing or reading cannot be articulated within Habermas’s discourse ethics. A moral theory elaborated within the framework of communicative reason should show that the symmetrical reciprocity we look for in all moral relationships, like the apparent symmetry of speakers, is actually built on a more basic asymmetrical relationship between two subjects in different roles.
The Caring Relation as a Model for Reading Nel Noddings’s account of the caring relation offers a model of an asymmetrical relationship between two subjects in different roles. According to Noddings, caring is a relationship between a “one-caring” and a “one cared-for.” The one-caring acts to enable the project of the cared-for; the cared-for acknowledges the offered care, accepts it, and uses it to carry out her project. Two people in a caring relationship may alternate in the roles of one-caring and one cared-for. But Noddings insists that caring is essentially asymmetrical; the interval of care is completed when the one cared-for accepts and uses the service offered by the one-caring. People need to know how to be one-caring and how to be one cared-for. Responding to the offer of care by trying immediately to return the favor, like responding to another’s need to be cared-for by demanding care for oneself, will inhibit the completion of an interval of care. Understanding an Other
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The caring relation is usually exemplified by the relationship of a mother to her child, a teacher to a student, or a therapist, nurse, or doctor to a patient. In all of these cases, the one caring is presumed to be in the superior position of being capable and authorized to help the cared-for, who is placed in an inferior position by virtue of her dependency and vulnerability. Critics of Noddings object to her use of these asymmetrical relations as the basis for moral theory. They argue that the roles of parent, teacher, nurse, and patient have moral dimensions worth exploring, but ideally, the goal of good parenting, teaching, or caregiving is to abolish the inequality and restore the one in need to the normative condition of autonomy and self-sufficiency. Of course, it is good to be caring, but caring relations are special cases. Using them as the basis for moral theory suggests that inequality and asymmetry are morally ideal conditions.12 In response, I would point out that asymmetrical relationships even between equally competent adults are ubiquitous in everyday life. One person usually needs something—information, an object, a service—that someone else is in a position to give. If, in addition, we recognize that communication—the form of interaction that generally accompanies and enables human interaction—is an inherently asymmetrical relation, then we see that, far from being a special case, asymmetry is the condition of all human relationships and that comprehending relations like the caring relation ought to be the first task of moral theory. The role of one-caring is of particular interest to me because it is analogous to the role of the reader. According to Noddings, the role of one-caring has three features: engrossment, motivational displacement, and the cultivation of a duality of perspective (30–58). “Engrossment” refers to open, unrestricted receptivity toward the cared-for. Noddings gives the familiar example of the attentive attitude of a mother responding to a crying child, but she insists that this is also part of caring interactions among adult peers. In addition, caring requires motivational displacement. In caring, “I allow my motive energy to be shared; I put it at the service of the other” (33). Finally, caring is inhibited when one-caring is absorbed in the other without reservation. Competent caring requires the duplication of self, so that one part of the one-caring can be devoted to receiving the cared-for and the other part reserved for maintaining her own perspective. The quality of engrossment is evident in the openness that is often associated with good listening (Fiumara; Ratcliffe). It also recalls Keats’s “negative capability” and Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief.” Motivational displacement is a good name for the intellectual, moral, and emotional work undertaken by a reader in the service of the author’s project and for the personal resources she uses to animate the subjectivities she is called to understand. Reading literature is sometimes described as a giving of self or a losing of self in another, often with erotic or religious connotations. Noddings’s model offers a different picture—reading, understanding another, requires work comparable to the mundane, prosaic work care-givers do for those they care-for. 14
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The cultivation of the dual perspective Noddings attributes to competent caring is analogous to the skills Booth associates with critical understanding. If the role of one-caring is analogous to that of the reader, then the role of the one cared-for is analogous to that of the writer. In a face-to-face oral situation, the speaker can receive the benefits of being understood, in all of its senses—cognitive, psychological, moral, emotional, personal.13 But, given that the writer is typically absent, and often deceased, how does she receive any benefit from the service the reader renders? The full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this essay. I will only point out that the reading situation accentuates the asymmetry of the communicative relationship. The interval of communication is completed by the reader reading what the writer wrote. The writer’s presence is not necessary to the work of understanding that the reader undertakes in behalf of the writer’s communicative project. Noddings’s idea of expanding chains of circles of care suggests another applicable analogy. In the reading scenario described earlier, C reads Lawrence’s Women in Love. This completes one circle of care. Subsequently, C writes and publishes an essay offering her reading of Lawrence’s work. D, E, and F read C’s essay, completing additional circles of care that link C’s work to Lawrence’s. Then D, E, and F write essays drawing from their reading of Lawrence and of C, and so on. Each link in the critical chain is an asymmetrical relationship analogous to a circle of care. The writer’s communicative project—the continuing vitality of his work—is fostered by a critical reception consisting of expanding chains of readings. Works that do not survive the so-called test of time are works that have ceased to be cared-for.
Conclusion Habermas’s theory of communicative action is seriously hampered by the reductive account of communication as something that happens between speakers. His model of ideal discourse is built on the intuitions of competent speakers and foregrounds their expectations—first, that they can exercise their right to speak freely without fear of penalty, and second, that their claims will be understood and evaluated on their merits. Whereas the first expectation requires only the mutual forbearance of members of the discourse community, the second expectation can be met only if discourse partners are willing and able to undertake the work of understanding each other’s utterance. Unfortunately, Habermas’s account of communicative action forecloses the elaboration of the receptive competencies that would enable listeners and readers to undertake the work of meeting a speaker’s and writer’s expectation of being understood. The model I have put forth portrays communication as an asymmetrical relationship between two subjects in different roles: the expressive role of the speaker or writer, and the receptive role of the listener or reader. Although Understanding an Other
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I have taken listener and reader to be analogous with regard to their receptive role, it is worthwhile briefly to discuss Krista Ratcliffe’s idea of “rhetorical listening.” According to Ratcliffe, “when listening, we do not read simply for what we can agree with or challenge as is the habit of academic reading (in its multiple guises).” Instead, we choose to listen also for the exiled excess and contemplate its relation to our culture and ourselves. Such listening does not presume a naive, relativistic empathy, such as “I’m OK, you’re OK” but rather to argue for what we deem fair and just while questioning that which we deem fair and just. Such listening, I argue, may help people invent, interpret, and ultimately judge differently in that perhaps we can hear things we cannot see. (25) Emphasizing listening rather than reading as the model for the receptive mode of communicative action has the advantage of foregrounding the intersubjectivity that is obscured by the model of a reader reading a text: One hears the voice of another person, while one might only see black marks on paper or ideas and positions one might agree or disagree with. In addition, the trope of listening facilitates Ratcliffe’s conception of understanding, as “standing under . . . discourses that surround us and others while consciously acknowledging all particular—and very fluid—standpoints. Standing under discourses means letting discourse wash over, through, and around us and then letting them lie there to inform our politics and ethics” (28). I want to point out that the quality Ratcliffe specifically values—“fluidity”—is conditioned on the suspension of writing and speaking. Through the trope of listening, Ratcliffe tries to counter the habit, perhaps engendered by our system of education (and reproduced in Habermas’s model), of regarding reading primarily as a way of gathering material for speaking and writing. In literary criticism, a similar tendency is evident in the practice of conflating the activity of reading with the various “readings” on offer, and the process of interpreting with the process of composing defensible interpretations. One might also recall Roland Barthes’s famous elevation of active, creative “writerly” reading over passive “readerly” consumption. Obviously, the process of reading can be apprehended only to the extent that one talks or writes about it. Nonetheless, it matters to keep in mind that the experience of reading is more fluid and heterogeneous than anything and everything one might be able to say or write, that the reader’s communicative agency is exercised not in the composition of an interpretation or a response, but in the readerly (nonspeakerly and nonwriterly) work of understanding the utterance of an other. Much of the model of reading I am proposing resonates with Ratcliffe’s “rhetorical listening.” Nevertheless, there is a tendency in accounts of listening to overvalue the intimacy, immediacy, and identification associated with the process Noddings calls “engrossement.” My choice to explore the receptive function primarily in terms of reading counters this tendency by emphasizing 16
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the necessity of motivational displacement, the cognitive, moral, and emotional labor the reader must undertake in the service of the communicative project of another. Ratcliffe offers “rhetorical listening” as a “code of cross-cultural conduct” (34–40). In a similar vein, I offer my model of communication as an asymmetrical relationship, analogous to the caring relation, between two subjects in different roles as a framework for figuring out how people can understand each other across race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, class, and other categories of social difference. Let me return briefly to the question of the validity of interpretation. Habermas wants to protect the communicative, claim-making, claim-testing, problem-solving function of language from the encroachments of the worldcreating function privileged in literature. A key element in this argument is the distinction between the world of objective states of affairs, which is the referent of truth claims, and the fictional worlds created by literature, which is the referent of interpretive claims. Habermas’s fallibilistic stance about all claims implies that the real world, no less than literature, calls for interpretation. All claims, until they are vindicated, are interpretations. However, although he concedes that it is not necessary to come to agreement about fictional worlds, he thinks that it is both possible and desirable to agree about the real world. One might question the presupposition that there is something about the real world that allows for the resolution of interpretive disputes, but Habermas insists on the possibility of agreement only because he thinks that “ideas like truth and the unconditional with their transcending power are a necessary condition of humane forms of collective life” (“Philosopher as Stand-In” 3). We need to agree on some basic cognitive and moral level, in Habermas’s view, to coordinate our action plans. Rational agreement—on the basis only of what is true and what is right apart from all contingent interests—is the ideal goal of democratic decision making. Rorty argues that Habermas’s notion of “truth” overestimates the necessity of agreement to “democratic politics.” On my view, truth . . . is too sublime, so to speak, to be either recognized or aimed at. Justification is merely beautiful, but it is recognizable, and therefore capable of being systematically worked for. Sometimes, with luck, justification is even achieved. But that achievement is usually temporary, since sooner or later, some new objections to the temporarily justified belief will be developed. As I see it, the yearning for unconditionality—the yearning which leads philosophers to insist that we need to avoid “contextualism” and “relativism” . . . is unhealthy, because the price of unconditionality is irrelevance in practice. So I think the topic of truth cannot be made relevant to democratic politics, and that philosophers devoted to that politics should stick to that of justification. (2) I think that the emphasis on agreement has two additional undesirable consequences. First, it obscures what actually happens when, in negotiations Understanding an Other
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with others about various courses of action, a person decides reasonably to go along with what others want even if she is not convinced by their arguments: because she is moved by their plea, she wants to accommodate their needs, what they want is reasonably priced, she already has more than she needs and can afford to be generous, she is returning the favor for times when the others gave in to her, she wants to cultivate relationships, the damage that would be caused by continuing opposition is more than what could be gained by going along, she is laying the groundwork for future occasions when she would need to ask others to accommodate her, and/or because the terms of the agreement can be phrased in vague general principles that allow her to stand her ground while moving the group project forward. Second, in Habermas’s model, discourse communities achieve something only when they come to agreement; failing this, nothing is accomplished. Aside from the fact that instances of agreement are few and far between, the experience of literary criticism (and of work in academic or political organizations) indicates that we can work together productively in spite of disagreements, and that often, by restraining the argumentative drive to compel agreement, we achieve something more valuable—the mutual understanding that is the key to collegiality and to getting things done. The understanding that allows us to appreciate the merits of positions other than our own is actually the achievement that promotes solidarity and humane forms of collective life. Habermas’s theory has the advantage of moving the discussion from the question of the validity of a specific claim to the condition—domination-free discourse—for a valid knowledge project. My account of communication as an intersubjective relationship involving expressive and receptive modes of communicative action revises the conditions for the validity of a knowledge project. We need to be able to speak our minds freely and openly, but we also need to be willing and able to undertake the work of a careful and just understanding of each other’s oral and written utterances. All ethical theories put forth some idea for restraining the unwholesome human impulses and for cultivating the good ones. Instead of rules, Noddings identifies the desire to nurture the “ideal of oneself as one caring” as the motivating principle of an ethic of care. Something similar, I think, is at work, if largely taken for granted, in literary criticism. Our sense of literary criticism as a worthy knowledge project, our confidence that we are doing meaningful work, depends to a large degree on whether we can relate what we do to the cultivation of the ideal of oneself as an intelligent, careful, fair, responsible reader of the works of others.
Acknowledgment Work on this essay was supported by a fellowship at the Purdue College of Liberal Arts and Sciences for Humanistic Studies.
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Notes 1. Habermas contrasts communicative action to “strategic action,” which is oriented toward the successful achievement of a specific goal. Strategic use of language may include lying and various degrees of manipulation, and they are organized according to the principle of efficacy rather than validity (“Moral Consciousness” 133–34). Habermas says little about the sincerity claim and practically nothing about the intelligibility claim. In his most recent works, the intelligibility claim is not included in the list of validity claims. 2. The word “ideal” in Habermas’s early term “ideal speech situation” has been the target of critical attention. Habermas acknowledges that his earlier use of “ideal” may be somewhat unfortunate—but he maintains that the conception of validity as the product of domination-free discourse is substantially correct (“Discourse Ethics” 88). 3. E. D. Hirsch argued that there is a verbal meaning in the text against which all interpretations can be measured. This claim was problematical when it was advanced in 1969 because it ran counter to the practical experience of enduring interpretive disputes among expert readers. The metaphysical premise of an objective verbal meaning has been rendered untenable by deconstruction. 4. It is interesting that Habermas pursues his argument not by addressing Derrida, “who does not belong to those philosophers who like to argue,” but by examining the account of Derrida’s position given by Jonathan Culler, a “disciple of Derrida who works within the Anglo-Saxon climate of argument” (“Excursus on Leveling” 193). 5. This assumption is evident in the fact that charges of sexism and racism have been met either with vigorous denials that these have had a significant effect in shaping the critical tradition, or with efforts to disclose and correct the conditions that support such attitudes. One might also point out the discussion of the connection between “power” and “knowledge”—all of which indicate the suspicion that “power” somehow undermines the claim to “knowledge.” 6. Gemma Corradi Fiumara explores how the overestimation of the expressive function of language has caused “the capacity for attentive listening” to drop out of the purview of Western philosophy. She attempts to recover a philosophy of listening from the interstices of the philosophical tradition. Krista Ratcliffe undertakes a similar project in the discipline of rhetoric and composition. 7. For recent accounts of “reading like a woman,” see Berggren; Berg. 8. See Schweickart and Flynn 11–18. For other accounts that make finer distinctions, see Buell; Schwarz. 9. I agree with Levinas’s argument for the philosophical priority of ethics over ontology, and I appreciate his insight regarding the asymmetrical relationship with the other as interlocutor. However, I disagree that “understanding carries out an act of violence and of negation” (9). Perhaps the potential for violence in relations with others should always be considered by ethical theory. But I think it is misleading to characterize any reduction of independence or singularity that might come from “understanding” as violence. Levinas’s concern with issues of singularity, totality, and infinity pulls the center of gravity of his thought away from my more pragmatic interests.
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10. My thanks to James Machor for citing rules regulating the behavior of children— for example, those that prescribe a minimum age for drinking, driving, and voting—as counterexamples to the view that norms are necessarily invalidated by the exclusion of people affected by the norm from the deciding body. From Habermas’s point of view, pointing out such exclusions does not necessarily invalidate a norm, but it makes the claim to validity questionable. To vindicate the norm, proponents have to give good reasons for the exclusions (e.g., children are dependent and lacking in the relevant competencies) and explain how the interests of the excluded people are accounted for by the presence of parents and other legitimate representatives. The asymmetrical relationship of children and parents is a special case that can be addressed, with proper adjustments, within the framework of a moral theory based on the symmetrical reciprocity of mature, competent adults (see Habermas’s response to Carol Gilligan, “Moral Consciousness” 175–80). I argue, to the contrary, that asymmetry is the basic condition of all human interactions. 11. Concretely, a writer’s project is in the hands of readers who decide whether or not it is worthy of publication, reviewers who evaluate the book, readers who buy it, teachers who teach it, scholars and critics who write about it, students who read it in class, and so on. The “test of time” that great works have supposedly passed convincingly is really an abstraction for the energy and time generations of readers have devoted to the careful understanding of such works. 12. Of course, caring is problematical. Caring can be vicious as well as virtuous; power imbalances can interact badly with caring relations. Although it is a virtue to be “caring,” one should probably be judicious about who and what to care for. And under certain circumstances, one probably should refuse to be cared-for. The ethic of care is the framework for the elaboration of the problematic of caring. The strongest objections to the ethics of care have come from feminist critics. Claudia Card rejects the ethic of care for its “conservative gynocentricism” and for not being “feisty” enough (Feminist Ethics, introduction). Sara Hoagland criticizes the use of an “unequal relationship” as the basis for moral theory. She objects, particularly, to the service component of caring, associating “motivational displacement” with enslavement. On the other side of the debate are Annette Baier, Eva Feder Kittay, and Alasdair McIntyre. For a fuller account, see Held; Koehn. 13. Literature on caregiving draws a crucial connection between listening and caring and describes the benefits the cared-for—child, patient, partner, friend—derives from being carefully listened to. See also Ratcliffe’s account of pedagogical listening.
References Attridge, Derek. “Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other.” PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 144 (1999): 20–31. Baier, Annette. Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morality. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985. Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974. Berg, Temma. “Eighteenth-Century Reading Sites.” Reader 55 (2006): 15–35.
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Berggren, Anne G. “Reading Like a Woman.” Reading Sites: Social Difference and Reader Response. Ed. Patrocinio P. Schweickart and Elizabeth A. Flynn. New York: Modern Language Association, 2004. 166–88. Booth, Wayne. The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. ———. Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. ———. “Why Ethical Criticism Can Never Be Simple.” Mapping the Ethical Domain: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory. Ed. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001. Buell, Lawrence. “In Pursuit of Ethics.” PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 144 (1999): 7–19. Card, Claudia, ed. Feminist Ethics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Fiumara, Gemma Corradi. The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of Listening. Trans. Charles Lambert. New York: Routledge, 1990. Flynn, Elizabeth A., and Patrocinio P. Schweickart, eds. Gender and Reading: Essays on Readers, Texts, and Contexts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Habermas, Jürgen. “An Alternative Way out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason.” The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Trans. Fredrick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. 294–96. ———. “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification.” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. Christina Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. 43–115. ———. “Excursus on Leveling the Genre Distinction between Philosophy and Literature.” The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Trans. Fredrick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. 185–210. ———. “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. Christina Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. 116–94. ———. “Philosophy as Stand-in Interpreter.” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. Christina Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. 1–20. Held, Virginia. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Hirsch, E. D. The Validity of Interpretation. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967. Hoagland, Sara. “Some Thoughts about Caring.” Feminist Ethics. Ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991. 246–63. Holland, Norman N. The Dynamics of Literary Response. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
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Kittay, Eva Feder. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. New York: Routledge, 1999. Koehn, Daryl. Rethinking Feminist Ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy. New York: Routledge, 1998. Levinas, Emmanuel. Entre-Nous: Thinking of the Other. Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. MacIntyre, Alasdair. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need Virtues. Chicago: Open Court, 1999. Newton, Adam Zachary. “Humanism with a (Post) Social Face: A Reply to Daniel R. Schwarz.” Narrative 5 (1997): 207–21. ———. Narrative Ethics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Nussbaum, Martha. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Phelan, James. Narrative as Rhetoric: Technique, Audiences, Ethics, Ideology. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1996. Rabinowitz, Peter J. Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998. Ratcliffe, Krista. Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, Whiteness. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005. Rayner, Alice. “The Audience: Subjectivity, Community, and the Ethics of Listening.” Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 7.2 (1993): 3–14. Rorty, Richard. “Universality and Truth.” Rorty and His Critics. Ed. Robert B. Brandon. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000. 1–30. Schwarz, Daniel R. “A Humanistic Ethics of Reading.” Mapping the Ethical Domain: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory. Ed. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001. 3–15. ———. “The Hum and Buzz of Implication: Or, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, But If You Try Sometimes, You Just Might Find You Get What You Need.” Narrative 5 (1997): 223–25. Schweickart, Patrocinio P., and Elizabeth A. Flynn, eds. Reading Sites: Social Difference and Reader Response. New York: Modern Language Association, 2004.
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Judging and Hoping Rhetorical Effects of Reading about Reading STEVEN MAILLOUX
Reserving judgments is a matter of infinite hope. . . . And, after boasting this way of my tolerance, I come to the admission that it has a limit. —Nick Carraway, in F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby
Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran vividly stages Iranian receptions of novels by Nabokov, Fitzgerald, James, and Austen. This “memoir in books” itself became a popular object of reception as a 2003 best-seller in the United States, a reception demonstrating the rhetorical effects of reading about reading in a globalized culture that is always local. American reviewers and academic critics of Reading Lolita not only testify to the power of these effects but also interpret and evaluate the acts of reading represented in the book they are reviewing. Specifically, they judge the hope offered by a book about college students reading and judging classic novels of “Western secular values” within a political context dominated by a theological autocracy—the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In what follows, I focus especially on the section of Reading Lolita that most dramatically represents judging and hoping: the scene in which the author’s Iranian students put The Great Gatsby and “the American Dream” on trial in their classroom at the University of Tehran. I am guided in this reception study by three interrelated questions: What kinds of thinking take place through reading? How does thinking develop rhetorically in reading novels? What rhetorical paths of thought can be traced through the reading of a text and its reception? In the receptions it represents and in its own reception, Reading Lolita in Tehran illustrates the effects of getting people to think about thinking through or because of reading. One of the first academic treatments of the book underlines this aspect of the reception. In “Women and Reading,” Kate Flint writes, “From the start Nafisi felt passionately about the importance of getting her students to think about the value of reading fiction” (511). Flint then quotes a passage from the book in which Nafisi says, I wrote on the board one of my favorite lines from the German thinker Theodor Adorno: “The highest form of morality is not to feel at home in one’s own home.” I explained that most great works of the imagination were meant to make you feel like a stranger in your own home. The best fiction always forced us to question what we took for granted. It questioned traditions and expectations when they seemed too immutable. I told my students I wanted them in their readings to consider in what ways these works unsettled them, made them a little uneasy, made them look around and consider the world, like Alice in Wonderland, through different eyes. (Nafisi, Reading 94, qtd. in Flint 511–12) That is, Nafisi wished her students to think in the sense elaborated by Hannah Arendt, another writer about totalitarian regimes. In “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” Arendt ponders the question “Is our ability to judge, to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly, dependent upon our faculty of thought?” She defines thinking as “the habit of examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to come to pass,” and she ends up claiming that thinking does condition people against evildoing (160). This effect of thinking occurs primarily because it is the nature of thought to undo, unfreeze as it were, what language, the medium of thinking, has frozen into thought—words (concepts, sentences, definitions, doctrines). . . . The consequence of this peculiarity is that thinking 24
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inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics. (175–76) We might add that thinking precedes but also follows from judging, which works through rhetorical phronesis (practical wisdom) in specific times and places.1 Flint underlines the importance of these geopolitical conditions of phronetic judgment in another of her own judgments about Reading Lolita. After quoting Nafisi quoting Adorno, Flint comments that Reading Lolita in Tehran is remarkable for the ways it lends new eyes to those of us who take the reading privileges of a Western democracy more or less for granted. Reading—presented, to be sure, by someone whose experience has made her a fervent advocate of Western liberalism—becomes simultaneously an escape from oppression, especially gender oppression; an intellectual transgression; and a promise that life might and can be otherwise. Reading provides liberation through the imagination. (512) As we will see, Flint appears to be an example of Nafisi’s ideal reader, though it is important for my argument that she parenthetically notes Nafisi’s ideological position as a “fervent advocate of Western liberalism.” In late 2003 to early 2004, the reviews of Reading Lolita in Tehran in United States newspapers and magazines were overwhelmingly positive in their evaluations of the book’s form and content. Sonja Ostrow, a college junior, wrote the following in the Yale Review of Books, an undergraduate publication: “Chilling, exciting, stimulating: Reading Lolita in Tehran is all of these, and thus has the power to enlighten and inspire readers on a political, historical, literary, and even personal level.” Ostrow picks out the memoir’s representation of reading The Great Gatsby for special attention: In one particularly telling passage, Nafisi observes, “My students were slightly baffled by Gatsby. The story of an idealistic guy, so much in love with this beautiful rich girl who betrays him, could not be satisfying to those for whom sacrifice was defined by words such as masses, revolution and Islam. Passion and betrayal were for them political emotions, and love far removed from the stirrings of Jay Gatsby for Mrs. Tom Buchanan.” Ostrow then suggests how alien she found the Iranian students’ responses: “To a reader who takes the idea of romantic love for granted, who accepted Gatsby’s unrequited love without question, such a response is chilling, intellectually exciting, and stimulating in its strangeness.” Here Ostrow registers a Judging and Hoping
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troubling of her own assumptions, and thus we can say that this undergraduate found Nafisi’s book a spur to thinking. But there were other receptions by (I presume) older readers that seem harder to judge. Writing in the Christian Science Monitor, Heather Hewett praises Reading Lolita as a “stirring testament to the power of Western literature to cultivate democratic change and open-mindness.” Hewett goes on to say, “Drawing from vivid anecdotes (including an unforgettable scene when her university students put The Great Gatsby on trial), [Nafisi] reveals how literature can offer readers a valuable way of understanding the world.” But Hewett introduces her evaluation of the book with the following statement: “Azar Nafisi’s memoir makes a good case for reading the classics of Western literature no matter where you are” (my emphasis). Hewett is right that this is probably Nafisi’s intended argument, but such a statement of the case foregrounds that argument’s problems. A very different lesson might in fact be taken from Fitzgerald’s novel, its reception in Nafisi’s memoir, and the reception of that memoir: Where you are does matter in reading Western classics, indeed, in reading anything. And so, too, in thinking about judging and hoping: It is all about where (and how) you are.2 In the Middle East Journal, Cameron Kamran, an Iranian American, wrote admiringly about the way Nafisi relates great Western classics and their themes to life in the Islamic Republic. . . . Literature for Nafisi is a universal language that bridges cultures and instills a form of democracy by teaching us empathy for the complexities of the human condition. According to Nafisi, the principal sin of the Islamic regime is its unyielding judgment, its inability to feel compassion. (505) It is this dogmatic, absolutist, ideological form of judgment that is judged wanting in the Gatsby trial scene. Kamran takes the trial somewhat allegorically: “Gatsby, a character who ends up destroying himself by trying to re-imagine his past, is an apt metaphor for the Islamic Regime—a cabal of Ayatollahs that sacrificed the present by enforcing their own dream of a collective past on Iran” (505). While this figurative meaning is certainly part of the book’s staging of Gatsby’s reception, it is in no way all or perhaps even the most important aspect of that staging. Rather, as Kamran himself notes at the end of his review, the main question is how universal are the Western values of universality, rationality, and humanism. “Nafisi, through her love of Western literature and the values of empathy and choice that it holds universal and sacred, wages a . . . crusade in modern Iran, and one that is critical to its prosperity and indeed the future of greater Muslim society” (506). Nafisi’s teaching and writing are based on the hope that her judgment of value in Western literature can prevail in her native land. How she judges these values determines, in turn, what will count as hope.
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It is the judgment of both hope and judgment itself that is put on trial in the Gatsby section of Reading Lolita in Tehran. Nafisi arms her readers with something like a rhetorical hermeneutics to view thinking, judging, and hoping in the scene.3 “All through the week before the trial, [in] whatever I did . . . part of my mind was constantly occupied on shaping my arguments for the trial. This after all was not merely a defense of Gatsby but of a whole way of looking at and appraising literature—and reality, for that matter” (122). That is, interpreting and arguing, hermeneutics and rhetoric, are inseparable in Nafisi’s run-up to the trial of Gatsby: In planning her case for making a certain sense of and positing a particular value for the novel, Nafisi shapes an argument that would simultaneously defend the novel and advocate a way of interpreting and evaluating not only literature but sociopolitical reality more generally. As the trial unfolds, the reader hears various interpretive arguments mounted by both sides in the case. First there is the prosecution’s simplistic ideological reading of literature: Gatsby is immoral because its hero is an adulterer and a criminal and the novel values an American crass materialism that Islam rejects. The Islamist judgment that the book should be censored is ironically mirrored by a leftist reading that defends the book because at least it represents the failures of the capitalist American Dream. Both ideological judgments evaluate the book on the basis of its perceived political views. In contrast, the designated student defense attorney (and Nafisi, who plays the role of the defendant) judges the book according to what is presented as a nonideological view of literature: The defense argues that the prosecutor is unable to “read a novel on its own terms. All he knows is judgment, crude and simplistic exaltation of right and wrong.” A novel, she continues, “is not moral in the usual sense of the word. It can be called moral when it shakes us out of our stupor and makes us confront the absolutes we believe in. If that is true, then Gatsby has succeeded brilliantly. This is the first time in class that a book has created such controversy” (128–29). The lesson the defense attorney takes from the novel is that “it teaches you to value your dreams but to be wary of them also” (135). This is a judgment about judgment that leads to thinking. But the same thinking turns back on the supposed nonideologues even as it applies to their opponents. In fact, we might ask, are the defenders of The Great Gatsby just as dogmatic, absolutist, and ideological about reading and Western values as the Islamists and leftists are about their religious and political views? To answer this question, we need to distinguish among dogmatic attitude, absolutist belief, and ideological thinking.4 You can, for example, be dogmatic or flexible in your absolutism, as my final example will show. But we can ask further questions: In seeing the American ideology of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (341) as the hope for Iran, has Nafisi failed to see the United States as unthinking in its hope, as acting in another ideology with its own blindnesses when performed in another time
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and place? Is the rhetorical effect of Nafisi’s teaching Gatsby in Iran different from that of her teaching it in the United States, say, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where she was hired while neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz was dean, before he became deputy secretary of defense under President George W. Bush? Has Reading Lolita been used by neoconservatives to make sense of Iran as a tyrannical oppressor of women, “while the United States is at the height of its war on terror and Iran has been [singled] out by the US president as a member of an ‘axis of evil’ ”? (Bahramitash 230).5 These rhetorical and interpretive questions emerge from thinking geopolitically about the judgments and hopes represented in the trial of The Great Gatsby and throughout Reading Lolita in Tehran and its reception. Such questions become all the more pressing as Nafisi positions herself within current U.S. debates over nuclear proliferation and terrorism: “While Western governments are confused and obsessed with the threat of Iran’s potential weapons of mass destruction, the Islamic regime is dealing with threats of its own and increasing its repressive measures against workers, women, students, gays, minorities and, now, publishers and writers.” In defending publishers and writers, Nafisi condemns literary censorship, arguing for “the importance of books as channels for communication and creation of open spaces and genuine exchanges.” Consistent with her earlier rhetorical stance, Nafisi still sees these books as “transcending the limitations of politics, nationality, race, gender, religion or geography” (“It’s Literature”). In July 2005, Nafisi contributed to the National Public Radio series This I Believe by reading her essay “Mysterious Connections That Link Us Together.”6 She again takes up the topic of reading literature, citing the reception of still another book about judgment and hope, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, to make her points. “I believe in empathy,” she begins. “It is the urge to know more about ourselves and others that creates empathy. Through imagination and our desire for rapport, we transcend our limitations, freshen our eyes, and are able to look at ourselves and the world through a new and alternative lens.” She continues with a favorite literary example: “Whenever I think of the word empathy, I think of a small boy named Huckleberry Finn contemplating his friend and runaway slave, Jim.” Nafisi refers to the famous scene in which Huck struggles to decide whether to give Jim up and return him to slavery. His religious training says stealing a slave, someone else’s private property, is a grievous sin deserving of “everlasting fire.” But, in Nafisi’s words, Huck “imagines Jim not as a slave but as a human being and he decides that, ‘alright, then, I’ll go to hell.’ ” She comments that “what Huck rejects is not religion but an attitude of self-righteousness and inflexibility.” Nafisi goes on to relate an example of reception that she sees as confirming her argument: In the early 1980s when I taught at the University of Tehran, I, like many others, was expelled. I was very surprised to discover that my staunchest allies were two students who were very active at the Univer28
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sity’s powerful Muslim Students’ Association. These young men and I had engaged in very passionate and heated arguments [described in Reading Lolita]. I had fiercely opposed their ideological stances. But that didn’t stop them from defending me. When I ran into one of them after my expulsion, I thanked him for his support. “We are not as rigid as you imagine us to be, Professor Nafisi,” he responded. “Remember your own lectures on Huck Finn? Let’s just say, he is not the only one who can risk going to hell!” What lesson might we take from this reception anecdote, especially the final sentence, “Let’s just say, he is not the only one who can risk going to hell”? Nafisi most likely sees the student’s statement as an ironic confirmation of the universality of the values she taught, and she is probably right that, at the very least, her teaching a particular reading of Twain’s novel has encouraged this student to think about his religious beliefs. But what else might we say about religious belief (or any belief for that matter) in relation to this famous episode of Huck Finn’s decision to go to hell rather than betray his friend? The lesson certainly is not that Huck has given up his racist beliefs; their lingering presence is evident in his words and actions later in the novel. Rather, he has at one particular moment allowed one set of feelings and beliefs, his friendship with Jim, to trump another set, those of a slave society’s political theology. He has phronetically—from Twain’s and our perspectives—judged the situation, rhetorically deliberated his options, and chosen to act in favor of his friend and at a certain cost to himself. Some of us might claim that the author has simply represented Huck as beginning to trade one ideology— call it proslavery or religious racism—for another—call it abolition or liberal humanism. Still, there is no doubt that we—in our time and place—prefer the latter to the former. Similar to Huck, the Muslim students who defended Nafisi were willing to take a risk in opposing—at least temporarily and in this specific instance—a certain ideological belief or perhaps simply the dogmatic application of that belief. To point out the rhetorical specificity of their phronetic decision is to take nothing away from our admiration for it. But such thinking about their judgment does qualify a bit the hope Nafisi offers by citing it. That is, we have not moved from an “ideological stance” to a “nonideological stance” in judging literature or anything else but from one ideology (or attitude toward it) to another, one Nafisi and most of us today admire. Judgment cannot be depoliticized in the way Nafisi assumes. Rather, our hope depends very much on understanding the political nature of our judgment and the rhetorical process through which our thinking can change.
Acknowledgment I would like to thank Phil Goldstein and Jim Machor for all their suggestions, questions, and editorial help. Judging and Hoping
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Notes 1. See Hariman; Mailloux, Disciplinary Identities 43–66. 2. Some reviewers of Reading Lolita point toward this lesson. For example, Darlene Erickson claims that the book represents “an unusual environment” where “the cultural context within which one reads the novel becomes an integral part of the reading experience itself ” (144). 3. On rhetorical hermeneutics, see Mailloux, Reception Histories and Disciplinary Identities. 4. We can begin to make these distinctions by viewing attitude as a “stance toward something” and suggesting that one can have various stances toward a certain belief. Ideologies are particular kinds of beliefs (and practices) that serve specific sociopolitical interests at specific times and places (Mailloux, Reception Histories 100). 5. See also Dabashi; Byrne. I am grateful to John Carlos Rowe for bringing these two references to my attention; see his provocative “Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran in Idaho.” 6. I thank Vivian Folkenflik for bringing Nafisi’s essay to my attention.
References Arendt, Hannah. “Thinking and Moral Considerations.” Responsibility and Judgment. Ed. Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken, 2003. 159–89. Bahramitash, Roksana. “The War on Terror, Feminist Orientalism and Orientalist Feminism: Case Studies of Two North American Bestsellers.” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 14 (2005): 221–35. Byrne, Richard. “A Collision of Prose and Politics.” Chronicle of Higher Education, 13 Oct. 2006, A12. Dabashi, Hamid. “Native Informers and the Making of the American Empire.” Al-Ahram, 1–7 June 2006, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/797/special.htm. Erickson, Darlene E. Review of Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books, by Azar Nafisi. Christianity and Literature 55 (2005): 144–48. Flint, Kate. “Women and Reading.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 31 (2006): 511–36. Hariman, Robert, ed. Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. Hewett, Heather. “ ‘Bad’ Books Hidden under the Veil of Revolution: Iranian Women Resist Oppression by Reading Forbidden Novels.” Christian Science Monitor, 27 Mar. 2003, 21. Kamran, Cameron. Review of Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books, by Azar Nafisi. Middle East Journal 57 (2003): 505–6. Mailloux, Steven. Disciplinary Identities: Rhetorical Paths of English, Speech, and Composition. New York: Modern Language Association, 2006. ———. Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998.
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Nafisi, Azar. “It’s Literature That Tehran Really Fears.” Los Angeles Times, 4 Dec. 2006, A21. ———. “Mysterious Connections That Link Us Together.” This I Believe, National Public Radio, 18 July 2005. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story .php?storyId=4753976. ———. Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books. New York: Random House, 2003. Ostrow, Sonja. “Literature as Freedom: Seven Women Read through a Revolution.” Yale Review of Books 6.3 (Summer 2003) http://yalereviewofbooks.com/archive/ summer03/Review02.shtml.htm. Rowe, John Carlos. “Reading Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books in Idaho.” American Quarterly 59 (2007): 253–75.
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Activating the Multitude Audience Powers and Cultural Studies JACK BRATICH
To speak of active audiences today is an act that runs the risk of selfde-activation. What branch of media cultural studies has been so thoroughly pilloried as active audience studies? With the pendulum swing toward economic analyses over the last ten years, what does it mean to revisit reception, especially one as “excessive” as active audience studies? I turn to the “active audience” moment in reception and cultural studies (exemplified by Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding model and the Gramscian culmination in John Fiske’s work) as a way of rethinking audience powers and of inquiring into an ontology of media subjects.1 I will argue that, while the active audience moment recognized the ontological level of audience powers, it took on a number of theoretical and political burdens that stopped it short of developing its own radical findings. These discursive and conjunctural limits included overemphasizing decoding (language, reading), inheriting the equation audience = consumer, and working within a constraining hegemonic politics of Gramscian power/resistance. Finally, I evaluate the backlash against active audiences, or the de-activation moment. Via this autonomist reading of active
audience studies, I point to a perspective that is neither a proponent of consumer freedom nor a critical return to “active industry studies.”
Audience Studies as a Matter of Ontology and Constituent Powers Elsewhere, I have examined early problematizations of the audience in communication studies (Bratich). Using an autonomist concept of the “multitude,” I have argued that the audience is a product of discursive constructions but that these constructions themselves draw on the ontological domain of what may be called “audience powers” or “mediated multitudes.”2 I have examined three major discourses (propaganda, marketing, and moral panics) as they problematized the mediated multitude as a “mass.” Early audience research was forced to come to terms with audience powers, seeking either to pacify them or to activate them for particular ends. The major binary involved was not active/passive, but active/reactive. Ultimately, these early discourses sought to contain active audience powers in a reactive power. These discourses sought to split audience power from itself, dividing constituent power into two constituted powers (“media” and “audience”).3 The intersection of audience and reception studies could benefit from Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s call for a shift in perspective. This shift could be characterized as one from epistemology to ontology. As I use it here, the autonomist “ontological turn” primarily refers to Negri’s writings (with and without Hardt). Negri looks primarily to the work of Spinoza to develop his notion of being as a political metaphysics. Ontology refers to the way being is constituted by subjects-in-action; it is “a theory about our immersion in being and about being’s continual construction” (Hardt and Negri, Labor of Dionysus 287; for more on their reasons for a revival of ontology see 286–90). As Jason Read notes, ontology does not mean seeking first principles or a foundation of the nature of being. Ontology is immanent, recognizing “the manner in which being is constituted through desires, affects, and relations. . . . Ontology does not refer to any fixed essence of the world or of being, but to the process by which the world and being are continually produced by activities and practices” (28). Negri calls it “the ontological terrain”: “that experience of the common (that requires neither command nor exploitation), which is posited as ground and presupposition of any human productive and/or reproductive expression” (“Approximations”). Negri traces this terrain (as does Paolo Virno) to language and its creative capacity: to the moment of ontological community—or the ontological “common” that is revealed by language (Negri on Negri 104). Along with language, the autonomists turn to Marx’s notion of “living labor” to characterize the constitution of being.4 In this way we can call it a materialist ontology (Murphy; Negri, Subversive Spinoza). One effect of this turn is to 34
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displace a Hegelian ontology based on the dialectic and its deadening effects (see Hardt, “Anatomy of Power” 114). More important, for Negri, Spinoza’s “claim that being is material, revolutionary, ethically constructed being” is a necessary corrective to the crisis of Marxism, allowing for a renewal of revolutionary praxis (Subversive Spinoza 95). What would an ontological turn do for audience studies? As a first step, it would mean studying audiences, even studying audience studies, from the perspective of what Negri calls “constituent power” (Insurgencies). Constituent power is the immense pool of desire and action, the res gestae of subjective forces, that is the motor of history. Constituent power is an absolute process, unfinalized and unlimited, which, on the one hand, “bursts apart, breaks, interrupts, unhinges any preexisting equilibrium and possible continuity” (11). At the same time, it establishes or constitutes events: It is originary, commissionary, foundational, and generative. This milieu of subjectivity spurs dominant codes to create their problematizations in the first place. Rather than give priority to the series of problematizations, the ontological-constructive perspective begins with the notion that any hegemonic discourse “selects, limits, and constricts the possibilities of a more expansive field of social practices” (Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx 176). This expansive field of potentialities produces meaning and is only partially captured in representation, or what Negri calls “constituted power” (“Insurgencies”). Constituted power is the name given to the forms and arrangements that constituent forces take, which make them sensible and manageable. The processes become absorbed in political representation, in categories and administrative routines (3). But this absorption does not completely negate constituent power, which as absolute capacity and process is irreducible to the forms and procedures. Constituted power in this way is reactive. There is thus a lack of synthesis between the two types of power, producing a constant crisis.5 The important things to remember here are that (1) constituted power comes after constituent power, and (2) constituted power often gets conflated with constituent power, or the relationship is inverted, as if somehow constituent power is the result rather than the cause of constituted power. Within this perspectival shift, the audience is no longer tied to its problematized representation, as in early twentieth-century conceptions of the audience as “mass” (the desiring audience in marketing research, the vulnerable yet dangerous audience within moral panics, and the reactive audience of propaganda research). Rather than focus on these problematizations, an analysis working with constituent power turns to the milieu of immanent creative forces. This sphere of audience powers motors those problematizations in the first place, as well as offers the site and resource for new potentials of collectivity. The representations in these reactive discourses are responses to the immanence of creative powers. While early audience research could only acknowledge this milieu as threat and seek to defuse or harness it, in the following pages I will argue Activating the Multitude
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that the active audience moment directly recognized this milieu. Returning to active audience studies is designed not to rehabilitate a previous moment in cultural studies/audience studies, but to genealogically evoke the crisis it names. What can still be revived from that crisis? My argument is thus not about what audiences do but about the range of discourses that attempt to know and mobilize them. In this way it is an update in the spirit of John Hartley’s claim that the audience itself is a fiction, produced by discourses (industry, critics, regulatory bodies, researchers). Yet there is more to this than an assertion of social constructionism. Yes, there is no empirical audience, only techniques of audiencing, but the capacity to act (even as audience) does not belong to those techniques. Techne itself is a procedure, an arrangement of powers, a constituted power. It cannot account for the processes of subjectivation. I depart from Hartley on what we are left with when we move back to the discourses that call audiences into being. I do not think we simply end up with a series of discourses, or constituted powers. Inventing concepts (such as audience, active audience) is not done ex nihilo. They are creations and selections from a milieu. The constituted powers’ relation to that milieu needs to be addressed. The discourses are not active but reactive: They respond by capturing, appropriating, and diminishing the processes of constituting being. In other words, “the discourses that call them into being” are involved in an ontological intervention.6 What does a concept capacitate and incapacitate? How does it attach to ongoing processes of subjectivation? What follows is not an exhaustive account of the active audience (A:A) literature. It will concentrate mostly on the work of John Fiske, especially his theoretical reliance on Antonio Gramsci. I will also address the backlash against this strain of work. My selectivity in the choice of authors is designed to tease out a thread, a set of affinities (relations as well as limits). These tendencies allow us to reconsider the active audience moment for what it can tell us about constitutive activity more broadly.
Becoming-Active as Decoding and Reading As many have noted, the cultural studies turn to the audience was done as a way of displacing a number of models of communications research. Foremost among them was what gets abbreviated as the “Frankfurt School” (or the “cultural dope” model), in which audiences are victims of an overwhelmingly powerful ideology machine. For more mainstream researchers, Adorno and others are considered the premier proponents of the hypodermic needle or silver bullet model of media.7 Turning to an active audience was a response to a very specific target: those who fetishized the text and its operations. Within a critical tradition, this target meant the Frankfurt School but also screen theory, Althusserian ideology critique, psychoanalytic structuralism, as well as 36
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institutional determinations studied by political economy. As Jon Cruz and Justin Lewis argue, this moment was designed to give audience a specificity: a “distinct degree of agency and identity” (10).8 Stuart Hall’s groundbreaking essay “Encoding/Decoding” sought to specify this “distinct degree,” and in this touchstone work we can begin to see the limitations in the active audience moment from the perspective of constituent power. Hall does give the points in the communication chain separate conditions of determination and a nonnecessary relationship (in other words, forms of decoding do not necessarily follow those of encoding). This move is close to what Negri calls an antagonistic relationship, in which a structure cannot fully contain the separate constitution of subjects, and thus a split is always possible (labor does not necessarily follow the commands and determinations of capital) (Marx Beyond Marx). The autonomist emphasis on composition examines antagonistic subjects insofar as they attempt to defuse and reconstitute the powers of themselves and others. This is a nondialectical process involving separate principles and forces. While any technology of power/constituted power seeks to reconsolidate its own effectiveness through dividing and reorganizing constituent power, it does so as a result of constituent power’s own active composition of a world. In other words, any consolidation (or incorporation) is also a reconfiguration of the strategies of contestation. The encoding/decoding circuit approximated a constituted power that recognized the fragility of the circuit in terms of the subjects composing it. However, a few characteristics hampered the encoding/decoding model. Numerous cultural studies practitioners noted Hall’s reliance on an abstract notion of the audience as “decoders” or readers. This abstraction of reading practices from material contexts pushed a number of researchers (pioneered by David Morley) to break from an abstract hermeneutic model toward an ethnographic approach to practices. More important, relying on the model of decoding (as linguistic and hermeneutic practice) meant that Hall did not substantially modify the mainstream transmission model of sender and receiver. This model was inherited from the early days of audience research (especially in propaganda studies) and is perhaps the epitome of constituted power. Ien Ang most concisely presents this inheritance when she describes the encoding/decoding model as one where the “sender’s sphere is opposed by receiver’s sphere” (Living 20). She recognizes that a common structure is composed only of isolated, separated, even opposed elements. At the same time, that antagonism is instituted via the transmission model’s form of constituted power and its reactive subject. The “activity” that distinguished the separate spheres was a thin notion of interpretation, one that adhered to a notion of reception that was both secondary and abstract. The encoding/decoding model also relied on language to make its argument by highlighting the inherent polysemy of the “messages.” Texts, abstracted from subjective practices, were the condition for activity (which was then reduced to decoding). The openness that allowed activity came from the Activating the Multitude
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semiotic structures of meaning-making rather than from subjective forces. In other words, constituted power was taken to be an initiator, a type of constituent power. From the ontological perspective, we can ask “What if this relation were reversed?” Subjective practices (powers of transformation, capacity for innovation, ability to create effects) make meaning-making an open process, because semiotic structures are one elaboration/mediation of these powers. To put it succinctly, a linguistic system itself is a constituted power. In this formulation, productive capacities are the conditions for polysemy, not vice versa. Decoding thus depended on an already existing notion of “audience” as a recipient, responding to a set of productions that precede it. Encoding/ decoding-inspired active audience studies can be seen as conjunctural. While important from the standpoint of correcting the overemphasis on media power and pacified audiences, from the standpoint of the conceptual structure, the encoding/decoding model merely reinforced a reactive model of audience research. “Activity” became “nonpassivity.” In that sense, activity itself was de-activated, as it merely functioned to grant something (a positivity) to an assumed void (the lack-dope). Understanding the main binary to be active/reactive and not active/passive, we can say the encoding/decoding model allowed the audience to re-act more vigorously. If we take Negri’s distinction of a split constitutional power seriously, then the audience has always been a constituted category, target, and sphere that was a result of capturing audience power into a manageable form. “Audience” is a decompositional conceptual strategy: It seeks to isolate, separate, and represent audience constituent power. If we begin with the audience, we are already in constituted power and are faced with these preestablished pitfalls. The audience, even when made sovereign (perhaps especially then), is a diminishment of the strength of audience power, the renewable praxis of a free and constitutive act. A “degree of freedom” was given to the audience, but only within a given structure that forms the audience as recipient in a chain. Activating those audiences simply modified constituted power. What if we would pose, instead of degrees of freedom (variations within a structure), a level of capacity and potentiality that could even be considered prestructure? Such a move would mean delving into constituent power, and to do so we need to turn to that lightning rod of active audience studies, John Fiske. For Fiske, a sense of constituent power emerges when he makes a claim that there are “neither texts nor audiences” but reading practices. “Audiencing,” as he calls it, can refer to popular decodings as well as the negotiation of social interests (Fiske and Dawson). Rather than the constituted power of separate moments in a chain, Fiske evokes constituent power with his turn to practices, which do not find any necessary form for their processes.9 More important, Fiske’s populism places him in affinity with autonomist analyses when he prioritizes bottom-up forces. Drawing significantly from Michel de Certeau’s emphasis on poaching, guerrilla warfare, tactics of the weak, and everyday operations of innovation, Fiske tips the balance toward constituent power.10 In response to those cultural researchers that privilege 38
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the moment of domination and determination, Fiske wants to focus on the “popular vitality and creativity that makes incorporation such a necessity . . . the everyday resistances and evasions that make that ideology work so hard and insistently to maintain itself and its values” (Understanding 20–21). This focus does not mean, as many of his critics contended, that those popular forces are inherently radical, but neither does it lapse into a celebratory acceptance of the status quo.11 Fiske notes this shift in focus as a methodological perspective: “analysis has to pay less attention to the textual strategies of preference or closure and more to the gaps and spaces that open television up to meanings not preferred by the textual structure,” meanings “that result from the social experience of the reader” (Television 64). This method was infused with a political commitment toward a counterhegemonic project founded not on a lack among the masses (of desire, consciousness, action) but on an abundance that was routed into particular forms. He even notes how difficult it is to study this tactical consumption, as the products are “scattered, dispersed through our televised, urbanized, bureaucratized experience” (35). I will take up Fiske’s own cul-de-sacs later in the essay, but for now it is worth noting that his emphasis on audience activity was situated firmly in a Marxian analysis of culture, one that allocates a vitality to audience production missing in the encoding/decoding model. Audience power can also be found in John Hartley’s argument about “Power Viewing.” For Hartley, the audience is not a group in society but a process by which society creates itself in a sense-making mode. The audience, as a mode of gazing, constitutes society. Television viewing, with its pervasiveness and its style of glancing-as-apprehension, is a model of social power. It is this abstraction from any particular, concrete group of viewers that I am exploring ontologically. Instead of thinking of a social form via media, we open with a field of creative action and production of affect that exists prior to mass media and even tries to ward off media power. Owing to spatial constraints, I cannot pursue the range of works in the A:A tradition more carefully, but it is worth briefly mentioning what Pertti Alasuutari calls the “second generation” of cultural studies reception research, audience ethnography. The early wave of this moment, comprised of works by Janice Radway, Tony Bennett, Jacqueline Bobo, and David Morley (among others), made a significant leap into the material constitution of decoding by specifying the identities of the readers (race, class, gender, sexuality) as well as the spaces and times of reading practices. Even while breaking from the encoding/decoding model, however, these studies retained the fundamental constituted circuit whereby what they were studying were readers-as-receivers. Displacing the passive receiver from the field, these ethnographic projects nevertheless retained the reactive subject, even if this subject gained a new specificity and concreteness. The next wave of ethnography immersed itself in audience constituent power even more. We can think here of the work of the later David Morley, Ien Ang, Roger Silverstone, Ann Gray, James Hay, and others, in which the Activating the Multitude
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object of audience ethnography is not the audience per se but a set of domestic relations and practices, a zone of everyday processes and interactions, and a moral economy of the home. The convergence of media technologies (and other domestic appliances) has dispersed any easily locatable audience subject (especially its humanistic qualities). The audience as such vanishes as an object of a discourse, to reappear as a composition within the technological, economic, moral, and cultural networks that comprise everyday life. Finally, the most recent work by Henry Jenkins on convergence culture as a practice of popular democracy radically prioritizes subjective activity in a way that challenges its own categorization as audience studies.12 In sum, then, the formation of active audience studies was conditioned by a series of conjunctural responses. The activity promoted by encoding/ decoding and its legacies was housed within a reactive subject. Constituent audience power was transformed into the result of constituted power (the “audience”) rather than its cause. But this move is not enough to account for the significance of A:A or the hostility with which it was eventually met. For that we need to turn to another discursive predecessor to A:A: the marketing discourse on audiences.
Marketing Audiences, De-Activating Audiences When Jim McGuigan claims that Fiske’s uncritical populism ultimately results in a celebratory model of consumer sovereignty, he is only partially right.13 Fiske takes great pains to distinguish his approach from this kind of pluralism, and to any serious reader he is obviously not affirming the status quo or erasing oppression (as if reader pleasure meant acceptance of circumstances). He is a committed Gramscian and thus is involved in a counterhegemonic project. But McGuigan correctly points out a tendency in Fiske and others that eventually gets taken up by “critical consumer studies”; namely, taking A:A as a way of understanding the intricacies of consumer behavior (see Storey 202–3). What McGuigan and others might be responding to is the depoliticization of A:A, which took audience activity as a sign that consumers wanted their consumer society. In effect, these approaches took Fiske’s insights and gave them the opposite political outcome: that A:A demonstrated an acceptance of capitalism, even an active desire for it. How could two such disparate conclusions result from the “same” analysis? I want to argue here that it is not just a political choice that determines the varying uptakes of active audience but the conceptual structure held over from marketing discourse that equated audience power with consumer power. Elsewhere, I have argued that early marketing discourse was one of the first audience studies projects to take audience power seriously (Bratich). The fusion of selling and communication that came to define advertising agencies 40
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in the early 1900s meant creating an amalgam of two subjects: the audience (of advertising media) and the consumer (of goods) (Leiss, Kline, Jhally, and Botterill). As others have noted, advertising and marketing have not operated primarily via an external manipulation but have studied audiences in their concrete specificity (Balnaves and O’Regan; Jhally; Marchand; Lears). Audiences were problematized as a set of desires (e.g., aspirations for self, family, society; imagination of the good life, an optimistic future) and the capacities to satisfy them. These desires and wills existed prior to the marketing “audience,” being bound, for instance, to traditional institutions such as church, family, state, communal mores, ethnic rituals, and customs. The advertising and public relations industries, rather than imposing their will on passive audiences, sought to cultivate, tap into, and redirect audience powers to their own ends. Recognizing the creative capacities of human/media hybrids, they strove to enhance those capacities through particular media strategies in order to turn producers into consumers and to channel desires toward commodified solutions. Cultural studies, especially in its active audience moment, took on this historically produced equation of audience power with consumer power wholesale. While noting the similar acknowledgment of the mediate multitudes, this equation also framed activity within a consumer model. Essentially, the production-consumption circuit overlaid the encoding-decoding circuit, placing the audience at both ends of the chain.14 Any attempt at activating these audience powers was limited to the doubly layered reactive position of receiver/consumer. Fiske’s two economies attempted to redress this bind. The split into a financial economy and a semiotic economy established separate spheres of activity, which gave a nonnecessary correspondence to the classic economic circuit. This split was a version of the autonomists’ antagonistic method rather than the dialectical method that would always subordinate the subjects to the structure. Fiske made the semiotic economy more of an anthropological process, emphasizing goods, commodities, and resources (citing de Certeau and Marcel Mauss on how this economy was based more on gift-giving than on exchange). The limitation here, from the autonomist perspective, is that cultural economy was reduced to semiotic economy. Audiences, as producers of meanings and pleasures, were part of a separate process, but one whose autonomy was removed from the very capacity to generate value (left to the financial economy).15 To make this version of Marxist economic analysis clearer, a brief discussion of autonomist notions of affect, value, and labor is warranted.
Value and Affective Production For Negri, an ontological project involves understanding the material basis for value-production. Negri (and other autonomists) continue the MarxActivating the Multitude
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ist tradition of labor analysis, but one in which, significantly, labor finds its value in affect, defined as primarily the power to act. Rather than thinking of capital as the maker of value (even as extraction from labor power), Negri argues for an analysis from below, from the base of life (“Value and Affect”). This method shifts from deduction (where value was assumed abstractly as an element of the unity of calculation) to induction (from affect to value as the concrete line of construction).16 Four powers comprise affective production and its ontological qualities: the power of action (to produce effects), the power of transformation (to combine activities, to connect to what is common), the power of appropriation (where every obstacle overcome determines a greater force of action—where action absorbs the conditions of its own realization), and power as expansive (an omnilateral diffusion whose transvaluations can sustain the shocks and resist external commands). Affect refers to such processes as (1) small-scale circulation (link to earth, gifts), (2) cooperation as surplus, and (3) “historical and moral values” (“Value and Affect” 80). Taken together, these comprise a living labor that “expresses—through all the pores of singular and collective bodies—its power of self-valorization” (80). For Michael Hardt, affective labor is itself and directly the constitution of communities and collective subjectivities (“Affective Labor” 89). Drawing from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, he notes this labor as desiring production, which produces collective subjectivities, sociality, and ultimately society itself. Affect gets us to acknowledge an autonomous circuit for the constitution of subjectivity, one whose primacy is met with the processes of capitalist valorization. Ron Day argues that “capital’s measured capture and exploitation of desire imposes a restrictive, structural value on that which always-already ontologically gives the possibility of value to capital” (1079). Affect (as ontological constitution) is tied closely with Marx’s notion of species-being, which has been devalued in much of post-Althusserian cultural research, but as Nick Dyer-Witheford notes, we may be witnessing a species-being resurgence.17 What is needed, then, is an analysis of a material economy of desire and affect, one that comes from the perspective of the value-producers. Social reproduction precedes capital production. And social labor, the power of generation and transformation through the commonality of communication and affect, now gives the field of culture newfound importance (though one could trace this sense of culture as generative back to Raymond Williams).18 Culture exists not as a separate economy but as a source of value for the financial economy, which can, through a persistent increase in self-valorizing activities, autonomize itself. For the autonomists, this version of a cultural economy has increasingly become the norm in post-Fordism.19 The question of value-production has also been raised in cultural studies, as when John Hartley argues that “the source of value is no longer to be found only in the scale and organization of manufacturing industry alone; it is also to be found among the uses and creativity of consumers themselves” (“Value Chain” 131). It is not surprising then 42
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that corporate-friendly consumer studies could also use Fiskean approaches to study the elusive and active subject known as the audience/consumer. For consumer studies, the Fiskean recomposed active audience is a post-Fordist subject par excellence. This desiring subject is a desired subject of capital. Recognizing the complexity and activity of audiences is the first step toward incorporating that activity into value-production for capital. We can now revisit Fiske’s two economies with an eye toward valueproduction. What would it mean, for instance, to distinguish semiotic from financial economy when cultural production is even more networked in immaterial labor, ever more subsumed into capitalist value extraction? Hartley, with the benefit of two decades of changes after Fiske’s model, argues that we cannot examine the new cultural economy with “inherited presumptions . . . about what consumption means” (“Value Chain” 139). In this new conjuncture, the consumer does not exist as the end point of a linear transaction. It is not just that Fiske’s two economies merged, but that audience power has for a long time been a producer of value and affect economically. The split of culture from the economy, along with the reduction of mediated multitudes to an endpoint of an economic/communication chain, was a historical process. This decomposition becomes clear to us only in a new conjuncture that is recomposing forces into new forms of constituted power. Fiske senses this rethinking of value and affect when he says, “production takes on a new dimension that delegates it away from the owners of capital” (313). In splitting a presumed uniform economy, he cracks open a doorway to this dimension of value-from-below. But by limiting this productive dimension to a separate economy, Fiske cannot recognize that it is this “new” production (affect) that is the source of value in the financial economy. Financial economy itself was reduced to capital investment and the commodity-form, not to labor. Perhaps in the world of cultural studies and audience research, “delegating it away from owners” makes sense, but that move presumes already-existing analytic commitments to studying commodification, power, and ideology (as the primary agents). In the material world of valueproduction, it was the owners who usurped, mined, and exploited this ontological dimension from the outset. In keeping with the conjunctural debates between political economy and cultural studies of his time, Fiske’s two economies easily slotted into the inherited positions. Political economists could claim the financial economy, while culturalists (defined by their orientation to language) would have the latter. While not automatically equating audience power with consumer power, Fiske left himself open to charges that his semiotic economy could only explain what consumers did (even as users of resources). Fiske’s inheritance prevented a full break from the historical suture of the audience to the consumer. In sum, active audience study was built on a particular economic circuit, which reduced both production to commodification and the creative social process of generating value to consumption. Constituent powers could operate only via the constituted power of the consumer. By defining audience Activating the Multitude
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power as a subject at the end of a chain, the entire field lapsed into a cul-de-sac about the levels of activity of that subject. This position was held in common by Fiske’s champions (rational choice consumer studies) as well as his critics (materialism’s palace guard). By leaving the production-distributionreception circuit intact, the opposed camps never left their common ground. They neatly took their positions on active audiences as proponents and detractors, while the potentials opened up by Fiske’s intervention were now safely contained in a structured opposition.
Gramsci: Active Incorporation Studies and the Need for Resistance The Gramscian turn in cultural studies is well established, and one could say that the active audience moment was both its apex and its limit case. It is easy to see why active audience research found in Gramsci the theoretical frame for understanding power. Essentially, hegemony theory countered the reigning Althusserian framework (so crucial for textual and ideological criticism), which had a mechanical, even functional, notion of power. Hegemony theory noted that any reigning power bloc is comprised of a contingent arrangement that requires negotiating with subaltern elements. This process needs to be continuously maintained via a continual winning of consent. A hegemonic political body is a provisional response to a variety of interests and desires, a temporary assemblage, a moving equilibrium that incorporates opposition into its workings. In other words, Gramscian theory gave resistance an active role in any composition. For audience studies, this reconceptualization translated into the following: Active reception now had a resistant role to play in political formations. And this translation was what many critics latched onto as the fatal flaw in active audience studies. “How could consumption equal resistance?” these critics asked of Fiske especially. Shopping as an act of resistance? Surely this was the “epitome of the uncritical drift to cultural populism” (McGuigan qtd. in Storey 203). There was certainly a backlash, primarily against overextended readings of resistance, and an overpoliticization of the trivial (Butsch 283). We could call this a de-activated audience moment. In fact, there were so many critics, one wonders if Fiske’s generativity was less for a new line of audience research and more for a paradigm repair via backlash. For John Corner, active audience research was a form of sociological quietism and an overemphasis on the micro (Morley 18). For James Curran, it was a “new revisionism,” “an act of revivalism—reverting to the discredited wisdom of the past” (Morley 22). Some, like Michael Schudson and Kevin Carragee, saw A:A as ignoring textual, historical, and material influences on audience interactions (Morley 30 and 39). Others, like William Evans and John Frow, questioned the very voice of the active audience analysts, claim44
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ing that their desire to see ideology resisted was then imputed to audiences (Morley 31). Even those who could be called active audience researchers distanced themselves from this purported Fiskean position, as when Ien Ang said, “it would be utterly out of perspective to cheerfully equate ‘active’ with ‘powerful’ ” (Desperately Seeking 247).20 For Tony Bennett, Fiske (especially his de Certeauian influence) was not conjunctural enough (Barker 400). Ang and Meaghan Morris took Fiske to task for conflating “making do” with “resistance.” McGuigan called this uncritical cultural populism a “drift away from neo-Gramscian hegemony theory” (qtd. in Storey 202–3). In Gramscian terms, there was not enough attention paid to incorporation. In an ironic twist, the very hallmark of Gramscian theory (hegemony that finds an active space for resistance) now became the threshold of excess that took analysis out of the Gramscian framework. Much of the criticism rested on sliding the definition of activity from “diversity of readings” to oppositional or resistant politics. Criticisms of this sort were partially deserved, as the more open-ended dynamics of de Certeau (strategy and tactics, place and space) were now overlaid with Gramscian power/resistance. But there is some question as to whether explorations of activity and counterpractices needed to be conceptualized as resistance. Here we must ask how resistance functioned as a normative concept for classifying cultural studies work. According to Chris Barker, resistance is a metaphor, a conceptual tool: “a matter not of truth or falsity, but of utility and value” (400). As a discursive strategy, “resistance is not a quality of an act, but a category of judgment about acts” (401). In a Bourdieuian sense, it is deployed as a judgment that reveals the values of the cultural studies critic who wields it. Ultimately, resistance is a “normative concept with ‘success’ measured strategically against normative criteria. . . . Resistance has to be in pursuit of named values” (400). We can put it this way: Within the antipopulist backlash, resistance was a kind of political use-value, a space outside of incorporability. Negri notes that globalization, for example, has been opposed by an affirmation of the local, a “use-value configured in terms of identity” (84). Resistance is thus a position of externality, a “being-against” that does not run the risk of supporting market logics. Thinking of the audience as resistant (not even as actually resistant, but as an ideal that was never met) was an attempt to recover a use-value in the field of media studies. While it may have originated in class identity, resistant audience activity as use-value was extended to other social identities. However, there is a question of whether this external position even exists. For Negri, this notion of use-value is based on an inside/outside dichotomy that cannot stand in an era marked by “real subsumption (“Value and Affect”; see also Hardt, “Affective Labor”). But more important than the explanatory power of resistance is the discursive effectiveness wielded through it. This search for a use-value external position for resistance against power was a source of measurement for a critical discourse. The binary power/resistance retained a Marxist telos and Activating the Multitude
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standard by which to judge proper politics. Active audiences were not providing a useful constituted power concept for a counterhegemonic project. Activity did not meet the standards for a revolutionary subject, and thus could not be legitimated within cultural studies. The backlash against activity, or de-activation, took the form of a call for more attention to determinants, to get away from interpretation and to the institutional constraints of power.21 Marx’s dictum about humans making history but not in conditions of their own making underwent a pendulum swing, perhaps even a dialectical leap. But while this image gives the dyad an equal pull or equivalent space on the dance floor, the antagonism could hardly be said to have taken place on similar terrain. As noted, the active audience moment was an interruption that countered decades of multiangled approaches to what we might call “active ideology studies.” The long history of studying determinations (which did not disappear with the active audience moment) was met with an intense flash of decoding/active audience studies, which itself produced a prominent backlash. We could even say that by 1992 (after about a decade of Fiske and two decades after encoding/decoding) active audience/ cultural studies was known more for its excesses than for its generative research agenda. We can see this in the turn to what Alasuutaari calls the third generation of audience studies, the social constructionist moment. Here, audiences are merely the products of the institutions, discourses, and research agendas that posit them. Activity is located squarely within the constituted determinants in the social field. For some critics, active audience research was not just an excess within Gramscianism (which could be corrected with a proper rebalancing). The failure to connect consumption with production was endemic to hegemony theory ever since it split with political economy (Storey 204). But this revival of political economy is only one possible path. One can agree that turning audience power into active resistance is both premature and wishful thinking. However, it does not have to be a claim that comes from the sober analysis of dominant power relations nor from a de-activating pessimism. To open up another path, we need to focus not on Fiske’s excesses, but on his limits, limits drawn from his very reliance on Gramsci. The Gramscian moment in social theory and cultural studies is what Richard Day calls the “hegemony of hegemony” (8). Hegemony theory examines how dominant forces have organized the cultural terrain and then finds leaks in the structure. Leaks can be reorganized as (articulated to) a counterhegemonic project. Cultural activity (these leaks) is recognized primarily to understand how hegemonic forms successfully organize those actions. This formula is dual: how actually existing dominant forms have secured their authority and how counterhegemonic forms (read: future hegemonic ones) can contest them and do the same. The kinds of activity that are valued and sought after are ones that could be channeled into a proper political form: a counterhegemonic class struggle organized from the outside by a party. This
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outsiderness is offset by a submersion in the quotidian, in going to “where people already are.” Ultimately mediation is routed into party representation. The “audience” is plugged into this formula.22 One could even say that this moment represented a battle over Gramsci. Fiske shifted the cultural studies focus to Gramscian notions of popular vitality and creativity as a question of counterhegemony. The antipopulists prefer the hegemonic moment proper, the achievement of a balance of forces. For some, Fiske’s Gramsci was a threat to a certain kind of Gramscian politics, which made Fiske’s work, as the pinnacle of this neo-Gramscian turn to cultural action, a renunciation. His Gramsci was not authorized, and thus this ghost had to be exorcised. Critics of an autonomist position might legitimately ask, “Without resistance, what are the political implications of this ‘description’ of constituent power?” Where is the struggle? How do we move from ontology to politics? Certainly these are serious questions, ones that cannot be directly answered here, not only because of spatial constraints but because political effects do not automatically emanate from the method. In fact, part of my argument here is that it was precisely the lack of predetermined political effects that got Fiske into so much hot water (by courting danger via affirming pleasure and activity). The main conceptual issue here is the distinction between power and resistance. Instead of this binary, the autonomist framework finds a split within power itself, where constituent/constituted power is privileged over power/resistance. Perhaps Fiske overstated the freedom and powers of readers, but freedom and power were only the constituted power of audience. What he opened up as constituent power was reduced to its constituted forms (decoding, reading, consumption, audience), characteristic of audience studies generally, but now with the added constitution of a resistant subject (as potential). Constituent power, as resistance, is reactive. Fiske does understand that “resistances are not just oppositions to power, but are sources of power in their own right” (Television 316). But he only belatedly notes this autonomy of resistance, as well as its primacy in provoking incorporation. Coming close to a notion of antagonism and autonomization, Fiske tried to fit all of these discoveries within the hegemony of hegemony and ended up turning this ontological priority into a political measure (resistance). In other words, he was conjuncturally embedded in a Gramscian dialectics organizing cultural studies’ politics. From the perspective of audience constituent power, one can certainly see the affinity with Fiske over what might be called “active industry studies.” The antipopulist de-activators prefer to accentuate capital and the dominant powers of acting, transforming, appropriating, and expanding. Subjective power is a form of latency to be uncovered and organized by intellectuals (and other moral leaders). Fiskean audience studies resisted these imperatives but still tried to remain within a Gramscian framework. This was a big burden to take on, one that stopped it short of exploring its own radical findings.
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Conclusion As Meaghan Morris asks in her famous critique of Fiskean audience studies, what can we learn from failure? I would frame this issue not as an internal deficiency within A:A, but as a discursive defeat and canonical crisis. What do we take from the activation and de-activation of audience power? Rather than returning to A:A as a way of resurrecting it wholesale or abandoning it as an extreme betrayal of Marxism, we can revise this question as an economic one. Only this time “economy” itself has changed from its canonical sense of political economy via what Mark Cote and Enda Brophy call “the autonomous school of communication” (qtd. in Richard Day 144) or what Dyer-Witheford and Greg de Peuter name “transversal media studies.” Reconfiguring this political economic perspective, we can say that the active audience, rather than being an extreme example of ideological freedom, pluralism, and individuality, is an example of affective value-production.23 This is an insight not lost on corporate cultural studies, which recognized this activity-as-value as a way of integrating “interactivity” into the circuits of capitalist value-production. We can also learn from this failure/defeat that activity does not need to be equated with active receivers. Active audience studies, linking power to measure (resistance), experimented with but could not fully embrace audience power. This was not a flaw but a limit, turned now into an obstacle to overcome. The audience, especially the active audience, is the threshold through which we had to pass to get to audience power. To transform passive into active was a necessary first step, but now that activity needs another transmutation: from reactive to active. “Audience” is a media subject that is embedded in a larger set of subjective processes, an extract out of an immense sea of practices. Instead of this constituted object, we can begin with an affective and media-making multitude, whose valueproduction was captured as “audience” at a certain historical moment.24 Perhaps the most succinct way of saying this is that while ultimately the industry needs audiences, audience power has no need of industries or their attempt to capture them as audiences. Active audience studies did not pass into the night with Fiske’s retirement/ exile. Part of it was taken in by “critical consumer studies” and their consumer sovereignty proponents. By abandoning its political implications as “uncritical populism,” cultural studies left active audience research to consumer studies, which could incorporate Fiskean insights into new means of marketing culture. Within critical cultural studies, it was hung as a sign of a decade of excesses and a warning to future researchers. But in a larger sense, we can say that active audience research simply went dormant. Audience/cultural studies, both in its active phase and as target of a de-activation backlash, can now revisit this moment with an autonomist lens as a way of reconstituting its own powers. 48
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Doing this autonomist analysis of active audience studies and its backlash foregrounds the logic of hegemony’s “auto-deconstruction” (Richard Day). One need not take a position either as proponent of consumer freedom or as critical de-activator, promoting either “reading as resistance” or “active industry studies.” This rupture around the audience marked a moment of crisis not just for cultural studies, but for broader political and ontological processes. In the early audience studies discourses, audience constituent power made itself known only as threat and as possibility. With the active audience moment, what was once a danger and a spur received a conceptual density: a research agenda that highlighted actual activities and powers. This ontological discovery could be expressed only through the conceptual tools most available at the time. With the conjunctural transformations, not primarily in cultural/audience research, but in value-production in the cultural economy, we can now reread that “discredited” avenue of critical research for its offerings.
Notes 1. Ontology here is being used both as the study of being and as the processes that compose being. Much like the word biological, ontological refers both to the study of a particular range of objects and their dynamics as well as to those objects/relations themselves. 2. For more on the autonomist notions of multitude, see Hardt and Dumm; Hardt and Negri, Empire and Multitude; and Virno. 3. As Richard Butsch notes, this split was predicated on another distinction that was forged historically (pre–mass media): audience and performer (7–9). 4. The question of Negri’s and other autonomists’ fidelity to Marx is an open one. Certainly, the selection of key texts (Grundrisse, the “lost” chapter of Kapital) is unorthodox. However, even a casual familiarity with the early work of Mario Tronti or with Negri’s Marx Beyond Marx or with Nicholas Dyer-Witheford’s more recent Cyber-Marx would make it obvious that autonomist Marxism is seriously engaged with Marx’s writings. The fact that Hardt and Negri’s Empire inspired an extensive double-issue response by the journal Rethinking Marxism clearly demonstrates that autonomism is a strain within Marxist discourse. 5.. The best example of this process is evident in the workings of revolutionary will or enthusiasm, the set of desires that sweep away restrictive forms and seek to compose better worlds. The forms they end up taking (contracts, codifications, constitutions, states, parties) are constituted power. 6. I use the word intervention to get away from a notion that we are dealing just with representations here (which could be judged in terms of degrees of fidelity to a sphere outside of it). Intervention is a more materialist act, dipping into the system to rearrange it. The term also highlights the splitting power of reactive forces (separating a body from what it can do). Hence, while even “audience power is a fiction,” we can ask what kind of concept it is (e.g., is it adequate, in the sense Michael Hardt discusses [“Anatomy of Power”]). Activating the Multitude
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7. This is an extreme caricature of even Adorno’s work. The audience for Horkheimer and Adorno are turned by the culture industry into passive listeners and conformist subjects (through psychical adjustment and rhythms of repetition). However, this transformation is a process rather than a fixed state of affairs (to affirm the latter would be fetishistic and nondialectical). The culture industries persistently and rationally deprive their audiences of imagination, negativity, and antagonism. By confirming the world as it is, the culture industries attempt to foreclose thought and fantasy of a world as it could be. If Horkheimer and Adorno were simply defining audiences as passive dupes, they, too, would be as complicitous in this totalizing logic that reifies current processes as permanent. 8. Audience activity was already part of the administrative research known as uses and gratifications. For concise and compelling analyses of the administrative versus critical approaches to active audiences, see Morley, especially ch. 1; and Ang, Desperately Seeking. 9. At times, this text-audience interaction still has a constituted power ring to it, as when it takes a dialectical form. 10. It is easy to see why Michel de Certeau, particularly via The Practice of Everyday Life and Heterologies, became a key figure for the active audience researchers. He lays out a series of binaries and reversals that significantly shift the question of power and agency to everyday life and the popular arts (Silverstone, “Let Us” and “Television”). More than just being two different moments in an economic circuit, for instance, de Certeau finds production and consumption to involve two entirely different logics, processes, temporalities, and spatialities. More significantly for active audience studies, this domain of scattered and unformalized practices is ontologically prior to any strategic operations that form structures and places. At certain moments in his work, popular practices come first. Distinguishing strategies from tactics as two heterogeneous ways of acting is a prime example: strategies bet on place to evade the erosion of time, and tactics on the clever utilization of time as way of survival (Practice 38–39). Finally, a key characteristic of de Certeau that gets taken up by later active audience analysts is his claim that tactics and popular culture belong to the weak. His polemological analysis uses a guerilla war model, where poaching and reappropriation are actions used by weaker forces. This de Certeauian element (often taken up by analysts as “making do”) ends up making practices a conservative coping strategy rather than an experimental domain for constituted forms and expansion of constituent power. 11. Fiske himself often calls these practices progressive, explicitly distinguishing them from radical (Understanding 21). 12. We can define this conceptual chain as part of what James Hay calls the “landscape of inquiry” within audience studies (“Afterword”). The space of audience refers both to the physical surroundings of reception (from social theater, to home, to mobile technologies) and to the metaphoric space of framing the audience (e.g., the end of a chain). 13. Others made similar criticisms, as when John Corner calls Fiskean analysis a “complacent relativism,” which romanticizes the reader improperly (qtd. in Morley 20) and which, Graham Murdock claims, can “easily collude with a system of media power which actually excludes or marginalizes most alternative perspectives” 50
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(qtd. in Morley 36). Most risky is Fiske’s tarrying with pleasure, since “valorization of audience pleasure . . . leads easily into a cultural relativism” that validates populist neoliberal ideology and market logic (Morley 26). 14. Obviously the production-consumption circuit does not emerge from marketing discourse itself but is an economic chain that for cultural studies is a crucial Marxian tool for understanding culture. I am arguing only that the fusion of audience with consumer as target subject comes from marketing (but not necessarily solely there). 15. It is not surprising, for instance, that Fiske turns to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital to make sense of this process, rather than take seriously Marx’s claim that capital (even the cultural sort, at least in current assessments of post-Fordism) is grounded in productive labor. For an analysis of “value-added” cultural labor, see Andrejevic; Shimpach. 16. Others have worked via this induction of affect, according to Negri. He cites E. P. Thompson but claims that Thompson’s dynamic is too close to dialectical: Value from below is simply there to spur capitalist command (“Value and Affect”). 17. Species-being, another residue of the young Marx, situates creative capacities beyond the individual or even society (in the social constructionist sense) by affirming sociality as belonging to the species. It is thus easy to see why Negri’s ontological turn links production/living labor to what he calls a “faculty of humankind” (Insurgencies 35). 18. Williams’s notion of cultural materialism locates production in the heart of human practice, highlighting human capacity for creation. Later in his oeuvre (Marxism and Literature), Williams grounds this capacity in a humanist Marxism, highlighting the power of human agency in the materialism of species-being. This emphasis on the young Marx and away from the social determinations that capture productive processes finds overlap with autonomist commitments. At the same time, significant differences remain. Unlike the Italian autonomists, Williams did not emerge from within a Marxist tradition, which results in a different attachment to culture as a separate sphere. Williams begins with culture and seeks throughout his life to wrest it away from its Leavisite status and toward a grounding in the material, while the autonomists do not begin with a separation of culture from the economy (for instance the different conceptions of “value”). Negri and Hardt stress the role of real subsumption of use-value into capital, as well as equating production with living labor. They also go “beyond Marx” by turning to Spinoza to understand ontological processes. 19. As Maurizio Lazzarato argues, this audience becomes a cultural form of reorganized labor: participating in the production process (not just consumption) as a value-adding practice. The result of this participation is what has been called corporate interactivity and peer-to-peer marketing. 20. I would note that Ang’s statement contains much of the stakes here, as each term is undergoing a transformation (active/passive to active/reactive; power to constituent power/constituted power). 21. One way to trace this trajectory, as Aniko Bodroghkozy did, is to locate a split and antagonism at the University of Wisconsin in the early 1990s, embodied in the two leading figures of each camp: John Fiske and Bob McChesney. 22. While the emphasis on party representation-as-mediation is rarely explicitly stated, without an active disavowal it lingers in the importation of Gramscian analysis. Activating the Multitude
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Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s pivotal return to Gramsci, particularly in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, discarded some of this baggage (class-centrality, a necessary identification of hegemonic force) while keeping the party question (and mediation more generally) unaddressed. Richard Day looks to a later work by Laclau that makes more explicit this leadership function for one of the elements in the “chain of equivalence” (74–75). 23. For more on this perspective of audience labor, see Nick Dyer-Witheford’s discussion of Dallas Smythe’s famous article “On the Audience Commodity and Its Work” (Cyber-Marx 118–19) and Shawn Shimpach’s recent analysis of the work of watching. 24. In future research I would like to explore this concept of audience power and media-making multitude via concrete analysis. Included here would be audience power expressed at the point where production and consumption merge, in practices such as radical media, cyberactivism, indymedia, culture jamming, and DIY culture (see Klein; Critical Art Ensemble; Downing; Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx; Campbell; McCaughey and Ayers; Van Meter, Holtzman, and Hughes; Juris; Kahn and Kellner). A broader perspective would include a history of media amateurs (defined as an affective practice involving the power to act in common and as act of love). Finally, future research would entail looking at the way audiences have become interactivated via new communications technologies and media formats (e.g., reality television, blogs, and social networking websites such as Facebook and MySpace.
References Alasuutari, Pertti. “Introduction: Three Phases of Reception.” Rethinking the Media Audience. Ed. Pertti Alasuutari. London: Sage, 1999. 1–21. Andrejevic, Mark. Reality TV: The Work of Being Watched. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. Ang, Ien. Desperately Seeking the Audience. London: Sage, 1991. ———. Living Room Wars. Routledge, 1996. Balnaves, Mark, and Tom O’Regan. “Governing Audiences.” Mobilising the Audience. Ed. Mark Balnaves, Tom O’Regan, and Jason Sternberg. St. Lucia, Queensland, Canada: University of Queensland Press, 2002. 10–28. Barker, Chris. Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. London: Sage, 2002. Bennett, Tony. “Figuring Audiences and Readers.” The Audience and Its Landscape. Ed. James Hay, Lawrence Grossberg, and Ellen Wartella. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. 145–60. Bobo, Jacqueline. “The Color Purple: Black Women as Cultural Readers.” Female Spectators: Looking at Film and Television. Ed. E. D. Pribram. London: Verso, 1988. 90–109. Bodroghkozy, Aniko. “Media Studies for the Hell of It? Second Thoughts on McChesney and Fiske.” Flow 2.5 (2005). http://jot.communication.utexas.edu/flow/ ?jot=view&id=790. Bratich, Jack. “Amassing the Multitude: Revisiting Early Audience Studies.” Communication Theory 15 (2005): 242–65.
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Hardt, Michael, and Thomas Dumm. “Sovereignty, Multitudes, Absolute Democracy: A Discussion between Michael Hardt and Thomas Dumm about Hardt and Negri’s Empire.” Empire’s New Clothes. Ed. Paul Passavant and Jodi Dean. New York: Routledge, 2004. 163–74. Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. ———. Labor of Dionysus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. ———. Multitude. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. Hartley, John. “Power Viewing: A Glance at Pervasion in the Postmodern Perplex.” The Audience and Its Landscape. Ed. James Hay, Lawrence Grossberg, and Ellen Wartella. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. 221–33. ———. Tele-ology: Studies in Television. London: Routledge, 1992. ———. “The ‘Value Chain of Meaning’ and the New Economy.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7 (2004): 129–41. Hay, James. “Unaided Virtues: The (Neo)Liberalization of the Domestic Sphere and the New Architecture of Community.” Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality. Ed. Jack Bratich, Jeremy Packer, and Cameron McCarthy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 165–206. ———. “Afterword: The Place of the Audience: Beyond Audience Studies.” The Audience and Its Landscape. Ed. James Hay, Lawrence Grossberg, and Ellen Wartella. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. 359–78. Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture. New York: New York University Press, 2006. Jhally, Sut. The Codes of Advertising: Fetishism and the Political Economy of Meaning in the Consumer Society. New York: St. Martin’s, 1987. Johnson, Steven. Emergence. New York: Touchstone, 2001. Juris, Jeffrey S. “The New Digital Media and Activist Networking within Anti-corporate Globalization Movements.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 597 (2005): 189–208. Kahn, Richard, and Douglas Kellner. “New Media and Internet Activism: From the ‘Battle of Seattle’ to Blogging.” New Media and Society 6 (2004): 87–95. Klein, Naomi. No Logo. New York: Picador, 2002. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso, 1985. Lazzarato, Maurizio. “Immaterial Labor.” Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics. Ed. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 133–47. Lears, T. J. Jackson. “From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880–1930.” The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980. Ed. R. Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears. New York: Pantheon, 1983. 1–38. Leiss, William, Stephen Kline, Sut Jhally, and Jacqueline Botterill. Social Communication in Advertising. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2005. Marchand, Roland. Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920– 1940. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. McCaughey, Martha, and Michael Ayers. Cyberactivism. New York: Routledge, 2003. 54
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McQuail, Dennis. Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994. Morley, David. Television, Audiences, and Cultural Studies. London: Routledge, 1992. Morris, Meaghan. “Banality in Cultural Studies.” Logics of Television. Ed. Patricia Mellencamp. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. 14–43. Murphy, Timothy S. “Ontology, Deconstruction, and Empire.” Rethinking Marxism 13.3–4 (2001): 16–23. Negri, Antonio. “Approximations: Towards an Ontological Definition of the Multitude.” Interactivist Info Exchange. Trans. Arianna Bove. http://slash.autonomedia .org/article.pl?sid=02/11/13/100202. ———. Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. Trans. Maurizia Boscagli. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. ———. Marx beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse. Trans. H. Cleaver, M. Ryan, and M. Viano. Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991. ———. Negri on Negri. Trans. M. B. DeBevoise. London: Routledge, 2003. ———. Subversive Spinoza. Trans. and ed. Timothy S. Murphy. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2004. ———. “Value and Affect.” boundary 2 26.2 (1999): 77–88. Radway, Janice A. Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Read, Jason. “The Hidden Abode of Biopolitical Production: Empire and the Ontology of Production.” Rethinking Marxism 13.3–4 (2001): 24–30. Shimpach, Shawn. “Working Watching: The Creative and Cultural Labor of the Media Audience.” Social Semiotics 15 (2005): 343–60. Silverstone, Roger. “From Audiences to Consumers: The Household and the Consumption of Communication and Information Technologies.” The Audience and Its Landscape. Ed. James Hay, Lawrence Grossberg, and Ellen Wartella. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. 281–96. ———. “Let Us Now Return to the Murmuring of Everyday Practices: A Note on Michel de Certeau, Television, and Everyday Life.” Theory, Culture and Society 6 (1989): 77–94. ———. “Television and Everyday Life: Towards an Anthropology of the Television Audience.” Public Communication: The New Imperatives. Ed. M. Ferguson. London: Sage, 1990. 173–89. Smythe, Dallas. “On the Audience Commodity and Its Work.” Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness, and Canada. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981. 22–51. Storey, John. An Introduction to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998. Tronti, Mario. “The Strategy of Refusal.” Italy, Autonomia: Post-Political Politics. Ed. Sylvère Lotringer and Christian Marazzi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 36–61. Van Meter, Kevin, Benjamin Holtzman, and Craig Hughes. “DIY and the Movement beyond Capitalism.” Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigation, Collective Theorization. Ed. Stevphen Shukaitis and David Graeber. San Francisco: AK, 2006. Virno, Paolo. A Grammar of the Multitude. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004. Activating the Multitude
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Habitus Clivé Aesthetics and Politics in the Work of Pierre Bourdieu TONY BENNETT
Toward the end of the sketch for a self-analysis that he wrote shortly before his death, Pierre Bourdieu said that his was a divided habitus—a habitus clivé—as a consequence of the contradictions he experienced in coming from lowly social origins to achieve high scholarly distinction (Esquisse 127). This seems entirely plausible. Indeed, in this respect, Bourdieu might be seen as an ideal type for a generation that experienced similar kinds of social and cultural dislocation as the price of educational and occupational advancement. Yet the claim stands in sharp contrast to what Bourdieu had to say elsewhere about the concept of the habitus as a set of regulative principles organizing practices of cultural consumption. For here Bourdieu usually insisted on the unity of the habitus. This construction of the habitus is central to the analytical architecture of Bourdieu’s Distinction. It constitutes the key conceptual hinge through which analyses at the level of the individual and that of classes are integrated within the social space of lifestyles and through which the operation of cultural capital across different fields is mediated. If, therefore, the unity of the habitus is shown to be unsustainable, other aspects of Bourdieu’s approach in this study are also called into question.
In pursuing this line of inquiry, I subject Bourdieu’s concepts to an immanent critique and draw on two other bodies of work for the different kinds of critical purchase these offer on Bourdieu’s concepts and methods. These are, first, Bernard Lahire’s sociology of individuals and the different interpretation this offers of the habitus, and second, Jacques Rancière’s account of the aesthetic as a particular mode of the “distribution of the sensible.” I also contrast the implications of these accounts for the analysis of cultural consumption with Bourdieu’s approach to such questions by exploring some aspects of the data produced by a research inquiry into the relations between cultural capital and social inequality in contemporary Britain.1 In doing so, I shall be particularly concerned with the respects in which Bourdieu’s account of the habitus in Distinction is informed by his interpretation of the Kantian aesthetic and the divisions this account establishes between the bourgeois aesthetic ethos of disinterestedness and the working-class culture of the necessary. My contention here will be that Bourdieu’s position on this matter seriously disables an adequate understanding of the complex and contradictory ways in which the relationships between practices of cultural consumption and social classes have been affected by the variant forms in which postKantian aesthetic discourses have been inscribed within such relationships. I shall also argue that, appearances to the contrary, Bourdieu’s own position is best understood as a move within the tradition of Western aesthetic discourse, and one that repeats the terms in which this discourse has disqualified the working classes from full political entitlement and capacity.2
The Singular Unity of Class Habitus I look first at Bourdieu’s interpretation of the concept of habitus and the stress he places on its unity. In Practical Reason, for example, Bourdieu defines the habitus as a “generative and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, practices” (8). And in Distinction, writing about the aesthetic disposition as an aspect of the system of dispositions comprising a class habitus, he could not be more emphatic: Being the product of the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence, it unites all those who are the product of similar conditions while distinguishing them from all others. And it distinguishes in an essential way, since taste is the basis of all that one has—people and things—and all that one is for others, whereby one classifies oneself and is classified by others. (56) There are places where Bourdieu does opt for more elastic interpretations. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, he commits only to the probabilistic 58
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expectation that members of the same class will share the same experiences, stressing that not all the members of a class—or even two of them—will ever do so entirely (85). Similarly, the regularity he prescribes for the habitus in In Other Words is one in which “the habitus goes hand in glove with a vagueness and indeterminacy”; it has “a generative spontaneity which asserts itself in an improvised confrontation with ever-renewed situations,” obeying “a practical logic, that of vagueness, of the more-or-less, which defines one’s ordinary relation to the world” (77–78). Bourdieu also usually allows for a tension, in the case of artists and intellectuals, between their class habitus and the habitus associated with their distinctive position in a specific artistic or intellectual field—a position he proposes in his account of the scientific habitus, for example (Science of Science). And in Pascalian Meditations, finally, the habitus emerges in an utterly transformed form as full of “mismatches, discordances and misfirings” such that those who occupy contradictory social positions often have “destabilised habitus, torn by contradiction and internal division, generating suffering” (160). However, these later qualifications and revisions do not alter the fact that, in Distinction, Bourdieu argues that the generative schemas of the habitus apply across different fields of consumption through a simple mechanism of transference so as to produce a unified set of dispositions. “The practices of the same agent,” he writes, “and, more generally, the practices of all agents of the same class, owe the stylistic affinity which makes each of them a metaphor of any of the others to the fact that they are the product of transfers of the same schemes of action from one field to another” (173). His account of the homology between positions in the space of lifestyles means that the principles underlying an individual’s or group’s tastes in the literary field also apply to that person’s or group’s tastes in all other fields. This mechanism, Bourdieu argues, is made manifest in the systematic unity that is to be found across all aspects of an individual’s or group’s tastes: It is to be found in all the properties—and property—with which individuals and groups surround themselves, houses, furniture, paintings, books, cars, spirits, cigarettes, perfume, clothes, and in the practices in which they manifest their distinction, sports, games, entertainments only because it is in the synthetic unity of the habitus, the unifying, generative principle of all practices. Taste, the propensity and capacity to appropriate (materially or symbolically) a given class of classified, classifying objects or practices, is the generative formula of life-style, a unitary set of distinctive preferences which express the same expressive intention in the specific logic of each of the symbolic sub-spaces, furniture, clothing, language or bodily hexis. (Distinction 173) The possibility of exceptions is largely ruled out through the operation of a mechanism of structural causality through which deviations from the ideal-type of a class habitus are understood as variants of its underlying Habitus Clivé
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structure. Exceptions to the rule merely confirm the rule—as, Lahire notes, in the case of Bourdieu’s remarks on the phenomenon of “slumming it” according to which, when intellectuals or artists read popular novels, watch westerns, or read comics, they transform such popular works into props of distinction through distancing or ironic readings governed by the organizing principles of the bourgeois aesthetic habitus (La culture). This account of the habitus comprises a key hinge in the analytical architecture of Distinction. It comes immediately after Bourdieu’s account of the organization of the social space of lifestyles, in which cultural practices are placed close to or distant from one another and are connected to particular classes and disconnected from others, depending on where they are placed along the twin axes (of capital volume and the ratio of economic to cultural capital) that govern the organization of that space. This account sets the stage, in the chapters that follow, for his discussion of three distinct and internally unified class habitus: the bourgeois sense of distinction, variants of the “cultural goodwill” of the petit-bourgeois, and the workingclass choice of the necessary. The kinds of explanation of the processes of person formation that are elaborated in these chapters are often difficult to pin down, not least because the emphasis Bourdieu places on the different aspects of the habitus often varies. There are, however, usually three components in play: first, the notion that a person’s habitus is shaped by social position and trajectory; second, the respects in which forms of conduct are shaped by particular institutionalized trainings (the role of art institutions in training the pure gaze, for example); and third, the role of social position in determining access to particular kinds of institutionalized trainings and discourses. In Distinction, however, all of these aspects are subordinated to the operation of class in the construction of the habitus as “the internalised form of class condition and of the conditionings it entails” (101). The conditionings a person is subjected to are thus construed as the necessary effect of the class condition that supplies the habitus with a unifying principle: One must therefore construct the objective class, the set of agents who are placed in homogeneous conditions of existence imposing homogenous conditionings and trainings and producing homogeneous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices; and who possess a set of common properties, objectified properties, sometime legally guaranteed (as possessions of goods and power) or properties embodied as class habitus (and, in particular, systems of classificatory schemes). (Distinction 101)3 In Bourdieu’s assessment, the virtue of his concept of habitus is that, by accounting for how the agent (individual or class) acts on the determinations that structure it so as to make the habitus a mobile, structured-yet-structuring structure, it overcomes a series of dualities—between inside and outside, structure and agency, body and mind—while simultaneously offering an ac60
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count of how past moments of the shaping of the habitus are retained in the present. While these virtues are endorsed by some, although usually with reservations (see, e.g., Crossley, ch. 6), Lahire (“De la théorie”) offers a more full-fronted assault, raising three main objections. First, he shows how, in Distinction, the requirement needed to support the view of the habitus as unified—that is, that dispositions should be related to the habitus in a constant manner—is breached by the multitude of different and often conflicting formulations Bourdieu proposes for this purpose. Second, Lahire argues that Bourdieu’s view of the habitus as a “structured and structuring structure” serves as a purely rhetorical means of accounting for the interiorization of exteriority and the exteriorization of interiority. As such, it functions as a barrier to ethnographic and historical analysis of the different ways in which the relations between “inside” and “outside” are organized in different systems and practices of personhood. Third, he disputes Bourdieu’s contentions regarding the necessary unity of the habitus through time—or for the limited forms of discontinuity that result from social trajectory—viewing these as arbitrary assertions that minimize the respects in which changing life circumstances might result in earlier aspects of the habitus being sloughed off as “bad habits.” These perspectives lead Lahire to propose an alternative view of the habitus as a more or less fractious disunity, a congeries of disparately formed dispositions: Rather than presuppose that the systematic influence of an incorporated past necessarily acts in a coherent manner on the behaviors of individuals in the present . . . sociology must interrogate the extent to which it is or is not activated, is put to work or on hold, through diverse contexts of action, dispositions, and incorporated competencies. The plurality of dispositions and competencies on the one hand, the variety of contexts in which they are actualised on the other are what make sociological sense of the variation of behavior of the same individual, or of the same group of individuals, as a function of different fields of practice, the properties of the contexts of action, or the more singular circumstances of practice. (La culture 14, my translation) He also offers, in his account of consonant and dissonant taste profiles, a framework for considering the implications of this rival construction of the habitus for the analysis of cultural consumption data of the kind Bourdieu examines in Distinction. It is to this matter that I therefore now turn.
Consonant and Dissonant Taste Profiles Lahire’s general argument is that jettisoning Bourdieu’s a priori assumptions regarding the unity of the habitus requires analytical procedures that are as Habitus Clivé
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alert to possible differences and fractures—or dissonances—in the taste profiles of individuals, groups, or classes as they are to shared tastes and practices.4 Lahire contends that Bourdieu’s approach to cultural consumption minimizes the significance of such dissonances because it focuses attention almost exclusively on those aspects of the tastes or patterns of cultural participation that most distinguish a particular class from other classes at the expense of other tastes or practices its members share with members of those other classes. The consequence is the construction of ideal-typical class figures, which focus disproportionately on activities that, while they might pinpoint tastes that most specifically distinguish the class concerned in relation to other classes and thus most clearly identify (or dramatize) the relative positioning of classes in social space, are often of quite minor significance in the activities of that class as a whole. Commenting on 1997 French data, Lahire thus notes that while higher level managers and professionals might be most distinctly different from the working classes in their preferences for opera, classical music, jazz, and classical literature, such activities account for only a tiny fraction of the cultural preferences of these classes. Only 3 percent of senior managers and professionals identified opera as their preferred music, with 9 percent doing so for jazz, and 22 percent for classical music. When compared with the 56 percent who had never been to either the opera or a jazz concert and the 41 percent who had never been to a classical music concert, these figures suggest a class fraction with a somewhat distanced relation to legitimate culture rather than one immersed in it (La culture 160–65). In the sample for the Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion project, 33 percent of professionals similarly indicated action, thriller, or adventure movies as their favorite film genre; 32 percent said they would make a point of watching a Steven Spielberg movie compared to 3 percent for a Pedro Almodóvar film; 45 percent had read and liked John Grisham’s novel The Firm compared to 62 percent for Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice; 44 percent liked rock music and 33 percent country music, compared with 75 percent who liked classical music; and 41 percent described landscapes as their favorite genre of painting, compared with 21 percent for impressionism (table 1). By reverse, working-class respondents showed significant levels of involvement in some aspects of legitimate culture: 22 percent of semi- and unskilled workers had read Austen’s Pride and Prejudice; 3 percent had read Flaubert’s Madame Bovary; 35 percent liked classical music; 42 percent had listened to and liked Vivaldi; and 39 percent had seen and liked Picasso (table 2). To follow Bourdieu in interpreting figures such as these would mean focusing our attention on what are often the minority aspects of specific class practices: for example, the contrast between the 21 percent of professionals who most prefer impressionism versus the 6 percent of semi- and unskilled workers who do so, or the 8 percent of professionals who most prefer alternative or art cinema to the 2 percent of semi- and unskilled workers who do so. Yet such a focus would overlook the 33 percent of professionals who like action, thriller, and adventure movies (a higher ratio than for skilled workers, 62
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Table 1 Aspects of Class Taste: Professionals Most preferred action, thriller, adventure films
33 percent
Would make a point of watching a Steven Spielberg film
32 percent
Would make a point of watching a Pedro Almodóvar film
3 percent
Most preferred alternative or art cinema
8 percent
Had read John Grisham’s The Firm
45 percent
Had read Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice
62 percent
Liked rock music
44 percent
Liked country and western music
33 percent
Liked classical music, including opera
75 percent
Most preferred landscapes
41 percent
Most preferred impressionism
21 percent
at 29 percent) or the 41 percent of professionals who preferred landscapes, a figure little short of the 44 percent of semi- and unskilled workers who expressed the same preference. The results are equally telling if, in a variant of an exercise Lahire undertakes to assess the extent to which tastes are transferable across different fields (La culture 175–207), we group the different practices we asked about in our survey into different legitimacies and examine the degree to which tastes are consonant—as Bourdieu’s account requires—or dissonant across these. Table 3 allocates the different types of film, television, and art we asked our respondents about to different levels of legitimacy. It does so on the basis of correlation analyses identifying statistically significant connections between different first-preference choices for these genres and the strength of their association with different levels of education.5 Table 2 Aspects of Class Taste: Semi- and Unskilled Workers Most preferred action, thriller, adventure films Most preferred alternative or art cinema Had read Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice Had read Flaubert’s Madame Bovary
29 percent 2 percent 22 percent 3 percent
Liked classical music
35 percent
Had listened to and liked Vivaldi
42 percent
Had seen and liked Picasso
39 percent
Most preferred landscapes
44 percent
Most preferred impressionism
6 percent Habitus Clivé
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Table 3 Legitimacy Classifications of Film, Television, and Visual Art Genres Film Genres Low legitimacy: Musicals, war movies, westerns, romance, horror, cartoons, Bollywood Medium legitimacy: Action/adventure/thriller, comedy, crime, fantasy, science fiction High legitimacy: Alternative/art cinema, costume drama/literary adaptations, film noir, documentary TV Genres Low legitimacy: Quizzes/game shows, soaps, reality, variety/chat shows Medium legitimacy: Comedy, sport, police/detective, films, cookery/gardening/DIY High legitimacy: News and current affairs, arts television, natural and history documentaries, drama Art Genres Low legitimacy: Portraits, none Medium legitimacy: Performance art, still lifes, landscapes, modern art High legitimacy: Impressionism, Renaissance art
How far, for the members of our main sample, are tastes consonant across these three fields? Not very: Only 1.5 percent have consonant low-legitimacy tastes; 20 percent have consonant medium-legitimacy tastes, and 3 percent have consonant high-legitimacy tastes. When all those with consonant profiles across the film, television, and art subfields are combined, those with consonant taste profiles account for 24.5 percent of the sample, with the rest having dissonant profiles of one kind or another, mainly between low and medium and medium and high combinations, which jointly account for 60 percent of the sample (table 4). When we relate these different profiles to different occupational classes (table 5), it becomes clear that, for all classes, dissonant taste profiles are more common than consonant ones. A case for a simple mechanism of transference operating across fields is difficult to sustain on the basis of these figures. Similar issues arise if we look at the space of lifestyles that, following Bourdieu, we have constructed for the Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion project by means of multiple correspondence analysis.6 Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of those tastes and forms of cultural participation (or nonparticipation) that are the most statistically significant outcomes of this analysis. The positioning of these modalities within this space tells us about the distribution of tastes and practices relative to one another, the degree of interconnection being stronger for modalities that are coadjacent to one another and weakest for practices that are distant from one another. The place of occupational 64
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Table 4 Consonant/Dissonant Profiles: Film, Television, and Art Consonant: high legitimacy
3 percent
Dissonant: medium/high combinations
32 percent
Consonant: medium legitimacy
20 percent
Dissonant: low/medium combinations
28 percent
Consonant: low legitimacy
1.5 percent
Dissonant: low/high combinations Dissonant: low/medium/high combinations Not watch/other Total
3 percent 9 percent 3.5 percent 100 percent
classes relative to one another within this space is shown, alongside other demographic variables, in figure 2.7 It will be useful to look briefly at the practices, likes, and dislikes located in each quadrant of figure 1 and note the positioning of the classes shown in figure 2 relative to these. The lower left quadrant shows clustering of likes of a kind usually associated with traditional forms of high cultural capital: impressionism, modern literature, opera, visiting museums, art galleries, and stately homes. The high-legitimacy genres of film (literary adaptations and costume dramas) and television (news and current affairs, and documentaries) also appear here, as does classical music. High culinary tastes (French restaurants) and sports (squash and tennis) are also here. The main dislikes are of horror films, reality television, and fish-and-chip restaurants. The classes these likes and dislikes are most strongly associated with are large employers, higher level managers, and professionals, but we also find those in higher supervisory and intermediate occupations toward the right side of this quadrant. In the upper left quadrant, we find a more even balance of likes and dislikes, with some indifference in relation to a fairly wide range of items. Likes include rock music, heavy metal, electronic music, urban music (including hip-hop and R & B), modern art, football and rugby, and going to the cinema, pubs, night clubs, and Indian restaurants. The main dislikes are for country and western music and film musicals. Lower level managers are congregated within this quadrant. The upper right quadrant is most strongly characterized by dislikes or “never do’s,” particularly for genres or activities that feature positively in the lower left quadrant: classical music, museums, stately homes, modern literature, and French restaurants, for example. Likings are restricted to soaps on television and horror films, the latter figuring as a dislike in the lower left quadrant. Those who have never worked, lower level technicians, and those in routine and semiroutine occupations are located in this sector. Habitus Clivé
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Table 5 Consonant and Dissonant Taste Profiles/Occupational Class (percent) Low/ High Med/ Med Low/ Low Low/ High/ NumCons High Cons Med Cons High Med Other bers NSEC1
2
58
17
11
1
2
3
6
125
NSEC2
4
35
19
24
1
4
10
3
385
NSEC3
2
38
18
30
2
2
9
2
186
NSEC4
4
37
25
19
0
2
11
3
111
NSEC5
0.5
30
27
24
2
6
7
4
186
NSEC6
3
25
17
38
2
2
11
2
323
NSEC7
0.5
20
23
35
4
4
12
2
202
NSEC8
0
21
18
44
0
3
3
13
39
Key NSEC1: Large employers, higher managers, and professionals NSEC2: Lower professionals, higher technicians, lower managers, and higher supervisors NSEC3: Intermediate occupations NCEC4: Small employers and own-account workers NCEC5: Lower supervisory and technical workers NSEC6: Semiroutine occupations NCEC7: Routine occupations NSEC8: Never worked
In the lower right quadrant are a lot of dislikes, too, mostly of genres and activities that are featured positively in the upper left quadrant: science fiction, modern art, electronic music, urban music, horror films, and going to the cinema, night clubs, or rock concerts. The main likes are for westerns and musicals as film choices, country and western music, and fish-and-chip restaurants. Lower level supervisory workers and small employers are located in this quadrant. There is here, then, plenty of evidence that different modalities of cultural taste and practice are indeed distinguishable from one another in terms of their distribution within the space of lifestyles and that different tastes are more strongly associated with some class positions than with others. It is, however, important to be clear that such visualizations of the distribution of cultural practices statistically “salami slice” the tastes and practices of individuals and disperse these through the space of lifestyles depending on where the statistical nucleus for each choice or practice is located. We cannot therefore assume that likes and dislikes that are close to each other within this space are necessarily—as the notion of a unified habitus would require—shared aspects 66
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Figure 1. T he space of lifestyles—most active modalities.
of the taste profiles of individuals. If we look at the degree to which tastes are consonant for individuals across modalities relating to three areas of cultural practice—reading, visual art, and leisure activities outside the home—we find significant variations. The degree of consonance between these is highest in the lower right quadrant, with 71 percent of those who dislike modern art also not liking sci-fi movies and never going to rock concerts. But if we look at the related trio in the upper right quadrant—not liking any of the types of art we asked about, not reading any books over the past twelve months, and never visiting stately homes—the figure is only 26 percent. And in the upper-left quadrant, the degree of consonance relating to going to the cinema several times a year or more, preferring modern art, and most liking science fiction, fantasy, or horror literary genres is only 20 percent. Similarly, we find, in the lower left quadrant, that only 33 percent of those who like impressionism most and who go to stately homes several times a year or more also like modern literature. As with modalities of taste, each class position shown in this space is the nucleating center for classes whose individual members’ tastes might be dispersed throughout the four quadrants and have much in common with other classes. These are matters, however, that fall below the threshold of visibility, given that what this figure enables us to see are those aspects of the cultural practices that are most distinctively connected to particular classes relative to others. These are not necessarily the majority aspects of particular class tastes. As we have already seen, higher level professionals are, statistically, more prone to like landscapes than impressionism, for which their preference is highest relative to all other classes. Similarly, if, from the upper right quadrant, we group routine and semiroutine workers together with lower supervisory workers and lower technicians as the working class, we find a fair amount of “crossover” traffic to the tastes and practices located in the lower left quadrant that are most strongly associated with the higher managerial and professional classes. To give some examples: 44 percent of the working class like to read biographies and autobiographies; 15 percent like modern literature; 35 percent like classical music; 13 percent prefer news and current affairs programs on television; and 31 percent go to art galleries sometimes. To generalize the point, figure 3 plots the result of amalgamating the occupational class positions charted in figure 2 into three classes: the professional and large employers/upper managerial classes; an intermediate class comprising the lower managerial, higher supervisory, intermediate, and small employers groups; and the working classes, as already described. The three large dots indicate the location within the space of the means for each of these classes: the left-hand dot for the working class (the cloud of individuals encompassed by the left-hand ellipse for which it is the center), the middle dot for the intermediate class (the center of the cloud of individuals encompassed by the ellipse in the center of the space), and the right-hand dot for the professional/upper management class (the center of the cloud of individuals encompassed by the right-hand ellipse). While these three points 68
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Figure 2. T he distribution of occupational class, level of education, and age.
Figure 3. Overlapping class boundaries. occupy clearly distinct points in the space, there is clearly considerable overlap in the distribution of their members, and not just between the intermediate class and the two classes on either side of it; a good deal of space is shared between the working classes and higher level professionals and managers, too. It is clear that one thing we are not entitled to conclude from such constructions of the social space of lifestyles is that the tastes of either individuals or classes are homologous across different fields in the manner or to the degree that is required to suggest that classes constitute—in their relations to one another—the bases for unified habitus that are expressed, in the form of consonant taste profiles, as unified lifestyles.8 Yet this is precisely the conclusion Bourdieu reaches in Distinction. This is partly a reflection of the ways multiple correspondence analysis converts cultural data into binary opposites that do not allow finely graded distinctions to be taken into account and that, if not guarded against, exaggerate differences at the expense of shared tastes.9 However, it is also because Bourdieu focuses on those aspects of class practices that are most distinct from one another and discusses each class habitus separately. Shared tastes are interpreted as misleading appearances that are to be discounted as the results of different modes of appropriation arising from different class habitus (bourgeois cultural slumming or the arid scholasticism of the petite-bourgeois). Tastes, practices, and forms of cultural knowledge that might be the sources of dissonance within either individual or class habitus are thus visually and statistically disappeared. 70
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With considerations of this kind in mind, Rancière argues that Bourdieu’s procedures have a polarizing logic built into them such that they “produce inevitably what is required by the sociologist: the suppression of intermediaries, of points of meeting and exchange between the people of reproduction and the elite of distinction. . . . There must be no mixing, no imitation” (Philosopher 189). This suppression translates for Rancière into a missed opportunity with regard to the kinds of relations Bourdieu’s visualization of fields brings into view. “The fields whose interactions should define the thousand games of social mobility,” he writes, “are ever only redoubled mirrors where the simple law of distinction gets pulverized in a thousand reflections” (194–95). The source of this difficulty, Rancière suggests, lies in Bourdieu’s use of Kant to construct the cultural field in the form of a polarized opposition between the bourgeois aesthetic ethos of disinterestedness and the working-class taste for the necessary with all the related antinomies that this division brings in tow. It is to this matter that I therefore now turn.
The Contradictory Social Inscriptions of Aesthetic Discourse I begin here with a little-noted difference between the postscripts to Distinction and Bourdieu’s Rules of Art. In the first, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is explicitly center stage, its advocacy of disinterestedness—of the “purposiveness without purpose” of aesthetic judgment—serving as the very emblem of the denied social relationship that is at the heart of both the processes of purification through which refined taste is distinguished from the vulgar and the barbarous and of the social processes through which the bourgeoisie symbolically marks and legitimates its distinction from the working classes. But Kant is equally present, albeit entirely backstage, in the postscript to The Rules of Art, in which the commitment of writers, artists, and intellectuals to art as an end in itself, a form of “purposiveness without purpose,” is validated as a means of securing the autonomy of art against the dual encroachments of the market and the state. In developing this argument, Bourdieu urges intellectuals to accept responsibility for a project of historical anamnesis as part of a politics of freedom through which writers, artists, and intellectuals will seek, first, to recover the history of the struggle for a collective universal that is implicated in past struggles for artistic and intellectual autonomy, and second, to defend that autonomy against the state and market while simultaneously seeking to extend its social reach. In short, he proposes a version of the politics of freedom that is unimaginable without the role Kant envisaged for aesthetic judgment as itself a practice of freedom whose exercise involved the historical projection of a sensus communis. I point to this tension between the two postscripts to foreground two quite different “takes” on Kant’s account of disinterestedness: first, as the emblem of Bourdieu’s critique of the respects in which claims to disinterestedness in Habitus Clivé
71
aesthetic judgment serve as a cover for a class interest in distancing bourgeois taste from the interestedness manifest in working-class taste for the necessary, and second, as the precursor for his concern, evident in such later work as Pascalian Meditations, to mobilize a progressive account of art’s autonomy and of a disinterested interest in the universal as an aspect of his struggle for the Enlightenment. It is equally important to note that the stress Bourdieu places on both these aspects of Kantian and post-Kantian aesthetics occludes a third aspect of this legacy in which aesthetics was, and remains, connected to the state through cultural technologies of liberal government. As both Rancière and Jean-Phillippe Uzel have noted, this occlusion is fostered by Bourdieu’s failure to take account of the date of publication of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) and of the contemporary political and cultural controversies with which it engaged. Consequently, Bourdieu evinces little appreciation of how Kant constructed his account of the aesthetic by writing against, and seeking to mediate the relations between, two earlier traditions of aesthetic theory: first, the role played by the eighteenth-century British civic humanist literature on taste, particularly as represented by Shaftesbury, in relation to the development of market society (see Barrell; Klein; Paulson; Poovey, “Aesthetics” and History), and second, the connections that had been forged between aesthetics and poliziewissenschaften in the context of the Prussian state. In his brief sketch of a genealogy of aesthetic theory in The Rules of Art (294–95), Bourdieu, while including Kant’s relation to the civic humanist tradition, overlooks Kant’s engagement with Christian Wolff (1750), who, by legitimating the subordination of the lower faculty of judgment to the higher one of reason (and, thereby, of the people to philosopher bureaucrats) had served as the philosophical high priest of the Prussian state. Bourdieu thereby misses the significance of the ways Kant refashioned the stress that Shaftesbury had placed on aesthetics as a practice of self-formation to formulate a program for the exercise of aesthetic judgment that would disconnect it from the directive programs of social management of the Prussian state and transform it into a liberal practice of the self that was subsequently, in the Rechstaat introduced by the reforms of 1806, connected to the programs of Bildung (see Caygill; Chytry; Guyer). Rancière’s conception of the role of aesthetics in effecting a “distribution of the sensible” offers a helpful framework for understanding the consequences of these developments. In this conception, aesthetics is placed at the core of politics through the role the distribution of the sensible (that is, the capacity for sensory perception) plays in establishing a division between on the one hand those who are deemed to be a part of the community of citizens because their occupations grant them both the time and capacities to care and thus to take responsibility for what the community has in common—that is, to govern as well as be governed—and on the other those who are judged to be fit only to be governed because they lack such capacities. The example Rancière cites is Plato’s contention that artisans cannot play an active part in government because they do not have the time to devote themselves 72
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to anything other than their occupations. However, the “distribution of the sensible” operates similarly in the relations between liberal and mechanical occupations within the discourse of eighteenth-century civic humanism—in Joshua Reynolds’s theory of painting, for example (see Barrell). In this discourse, civic entitlements, just as much as the capacity to appreciate beauty disinterestedly, were restricted to those whose ownership of the land and/or pursuit of liberal occupations both freed them from the possibility of being subjected to the will of others and freed their minds from the routine drudgery of mechanical occupations so as to be able to take a “disinterested” interest in the common good. What matters from this perspective is less disinterestedness as a means of establishing a distance in social space from those whose horizons are limited to necessity by dint of their occupations than the role of disinterestedness in producing a position in political space that confers on those who can exercise command over and control of the self the capacity to direct the conduct of others. I shall return to this point. For now, though, we need to take account of the further distinction Rancière makes between two different regimes for the “distribution of the sensible”—the poetic or representative regime of the arts and the aesthetic regime of the arts—and of the different ways these construe the relationships between different ways of doing and making. In the first of these regimes—the “fine art” system of the classical age is the case Rancière mentions—art is distinguished from other ways of doing and making, those of mechanical occupations for example, and is organized into hierarchies conceived in terms of the representative capacities of different genres: the dignity of their subject matter, for example. These hierarchies function as analogies for social and political hierarchies and, thereby, as a means for the distribution of unequal civic capacities and entitlements. By contrast, the aesthetic regime of the arts does not establish a division between art and other ways of doing and making as such but “is based on distinguishing a sensible mode of being specific to artistic products” (Rancière, Politics 22). This mode disconnects the sensible from its ordinary associations and connections by subjecting it to the power of a form of thought that renders the sensible foreign or strange to itself. This conception of the aesthetic frees art from any specific rule, such as that of particular artistic hierarchies or genres. Rancière’s contention that the aesthetic regime of the arts aims to effect a redistribution of the sensible to the extent that it promises both a new life for art and a new life for individuals and the community is equally important. For this construction produces an orientation that is concerned both to secure the autonomy of art and to ground that autonomy “to the extent that it connects it to the hope of ‘changing life’ ” (“Aesthetic” 134). In contrast to Bourdieu’s account of the relations between autonomy and heteronomy as opposing principles defined in a relationship of simple antagonism to one another, Rancière argues that the aesthetic regime of the arts generates a series of different “emplotments” of the relations between autonomy and heteronomy. Flaubert’s l’art pour l’art, the educative Habitus Clivé
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mission of museums and libraries, early industrial workers’ search for freedom through literature, Adorno’s negative aesthetics, and the commercialization of art as a means of bridging the division between the art of the beautiful and the art of living are all different “emplotments” of the possible courses of action that are generated by the “and” that derives from “the same knot binding together autonomy and heteronomy” but which the emplotments operate differently (134). This framework makes it possible to take account of the multiple and often contradictory social inscriptions of aesthetic practices in the aesthetic regime of the arts. To the extent that it is no longer necessarily attached to a division between different ways of doing and making, art no longer necessarily functions as a means of marking divisions in the order of social occupations. The experience of the autonomy of art as the moment when the orders of the sensible are suspended becomes a moment and space, an opportunity, for free self-shaping that is, in principle, available to all. It becomes, in Schiller’s conception, a “specific mode of living in the sensible world that must be developed by ‘aesthetic education’ in order to train men susceptible to live in a free community” (Rancière, Politics 27). It is therefore easy to see how, as one of its social inscriptions, this conception of the aesthetic came to be connected to the programs of Bildung that were concerned, beyond the ethical training of state bureaucrats and the private cultivation of the bourgeois, to translate culture, in its Kantian conception, into programs of pubic education through which the governed were to be drawn into the orbit of practices of selfgovernment (Kosellek). This is not a role performed by aesthetic discourse in its pure forms. It rather concerns the respects in which—in Linda Dowling’s telling observation—aesthetics came to be vulgarized as, by being connected to programs of government intended to incorporate new constituencies into liberal techniques of self-rule, it was connected to socially utilitarian conceptions of art and its function. But this “muddying” of the relations between art and life is precisely what the aesthetic regime of the arts makes possible in its concern to connect art to the task of changing life. This remains a continuing aspect of the social inscription of aesthetic discourses, one of the ways relations of autonomy and heteronomy have been “emplotted” in the aesthetic regime of the arts. Bourdieu’s neglect of these considerations means that he ignores what has been and remains a tension within the rhetorics and practices of the public cultural institutions developed in the nineteenth century—art galleries, libraries, concert halls—to the extent that these have operated both as key sites for the operation of practices of distinction while also, and often at the same time, aspiring to function as institutions of civic governance committed to spreading the reach of art.10 Bourdieu is no doubt right to call attention to the role of the art gallery in producing the pure gaze of aesthetic contemplation. But this needs to be complemented by accounts of the parallel attempts to train the eye of the visitor in a civically utilitarian fashion that also formed—and still forms—an important aspect of the practices of public art galleries (Bennett, “Multiplication” and “Civic Seeing”). 74
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Rancière’s sense of the different ways the “and” is operated in the knot that binds autonomy and heteronomy together in the aesthetic regime of the arts helps to make sense of the relations between consonant and dissonant profiles discussed in the previous section. The degree of dissonance we saw here is probably best accounted for in terms of the operation of commercial forms of cultural production in spreading cultural practices across class boundaries in the interests of audience maximization. It is, however, also important to stress the degree to which the kinds of governmental inscription of aesthetic discourses discussed above have also—alongside traditions of working-class self-improvement—led to significant forms of working-class participation in the forms of high culture associated with the institutions of legitimate culture. This development is something Rancière set out to show in a project of historical recovery that, in a revision of cultural forms of ouvrièrism, aimed not to give back to forgotten traditions of working-class writing and reading their lost voice but to show how the literary activities of significant cohorts of nineteenth-century workers undermined the distinction associated with the earlier poetic regime of the arts between those who performed useful labor and those who aspired to freedom through the disinterested pursuit of aesthetics.11 Jonathan Rose similarly shows, for a range of periods from the early nineteenth century to the immediate post–World War II years, how far, for significant sections of the British working class, literary and musical tastes and practices were shaped both by governmental and commercial initiatives aimed at the diffusion of high culture and by working-class forms of autodidacticism shaped by institutional initiatives connected to the development of the labor movement within which the ethos of disinterestedness—mediated via Matthew Arnold—was much in evidence. When introducing the working-class aesthetic in Distinction, Bourdieu argues that it is “constantly obliged to define itself in terms of the dominant aesthetics” (41). Yet, a little later, he suggests that the sole function of the working classes in the system of aesthetic positions is “to serve as a foil, a negative reference point, in relation to which all aesthetics define themselves, by successive negations” (57). This is to conduct definitional work in a mirror structure in which the bourgeois and working-class aesthetic dispositions are constructed by serving as each other’s antithesis. Yet the five principles Bourdieu attributes to the working-class aesthetic—the taste for the necessary, carnivalesque excess, settling for the agreeable rather than stretching for the beautiful, confusing the beautiful with the good in the tendency to compound ethical and aesthetic judgments, and a failure to recognize the Kantian separation of content and form—will not serve this purpose when account is taken of muddied histories of the kind outlined above. The confusion of the good and the beautiful is rampant in post-Kantian aesthetics (Ruskin and Morris, for example); studies of subcultures have shown that a preference for form over content is by no means an exclusive feature of Kantian high aesthetics (Thornton); and not all high modernist aesthetics are premised on the disinterested appreciation of form—there is a strong utilitarian strain in Habitus Clivé
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early twentieth-century American modernism, reflecting its Puritan foundations (de la Fuente; Levine 146–60). Let us grant, then, that the antithetical structure informing Bourdieu’s conception of the aesthetic is unsustainable. The question I now turn to concerns the consequences of this point for his conception of the working class and its relations to intellectuals.
The Culture of the Necessary: Disqualifying the Working Class From Rancière’s perspective, Bourdieu’s analysis in Distinction is historically out of step in describing an articulation of culture to classes that conforms to the logic of the earlier poetic or representative regime of the arts in which some ways of doing and making are differentiated from others as art and connected to status groups on the basis of rigid and hierarchically organized divisions of genres. The analytical structure of Distinction is similarly informed by the discursive coordinates of the aesthetic traditions Kant wrote against, in which the link between aesthetic practices and social differentiation forms part of a broader set of practices that qualified some for citizenship while simultaneously disqualifying others. This pattern is evident in eighteenthcentury civic humanist aesthetics, in which the capacities to judge art and to govern are linked together as products of the freedom from toil and from political interference that the gentry derived from their ownership of land. The pursuit of liberal occupations also facilitated the development of an intellectual capacity to abstract from particulars so as to have regard for the civic good of the whole body politic that found its aesthetic complement in the disinterested appreciation of form. Both of these capacities were denied those in mechanical occupations, to the extent that their horizons were judged to be limited to the performance of routine functions. There are echoes of these earlier positions in Distinction, particularly in Bourdieu’s approach to the working-class culture of the necessary. This differs from his approach to other habitus. In his discussion of the relations between habitus and the space of lifestyles, Bourdieu identifies two factors structuring the habitus: first, the intrinsic properties that derive from the conditions of existence of the class concerned, and second, the relational properties each class derives from its position relative to other classes such that the whole system of such differential relations is inscribed within each habitus. However, the balance between these two factors is uneven, since the working class is assigned the role of functioning as a fixed point of reference in relation to which other positions differentiate themselves. The working-class habitus is therefore not itself a site of differentiating activity except purely negatively as, in the very process of rejecting the dominant culture, the working class is thrown back on its own pure class conditioning. Here the unmediated force of necessity speaks to and through the intrinsic conditions of class existence without any question of relationality entering into the matter. This has the 76
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further consequence of making the working-class habitus more singularly unified and fixed than those of other classes. As we have seen, Bourdieu allows exceptions to the unity of the habitus where tensions are generated by the contradictory location of individuals or groups across different fields—between the class positions of artists and their positions in the artistic field, for example, or, as in his own habitus clivé, where mobility trajectories open up a significant distance between class of origin and class of destination. And in later work (Social), Bourdieu’s account of the role of “technical capital” in organizing working-class choice in the housing market suggests a more open and differentiating approach to working-class habitus. For members of the working class in Distinction, however, the dire weight of necessity permits not the slightest chink of differentiation. They are not players in the field in which the game of distinction takes place; rather, they provide the setting against which that game is played, but only by others. As Rancière puts it: As for the poor, they do not play. Indeed, their habitus discloses to them only the semblance of a game where the anticipated future is not what is possible but simply the impossible: “a social environment” with “its ‘closed doors,’ ‘dead ends’ and ‘limited prospects’ ” where “the ‘art of assessing likelihoods’ ” cannot euphemise the virtue of necessity. Only those who are chosen have the possibility of choosing. (Politics 183) We can see the consequences of this exclusion in the following passages from Distinction, which deny the working class, evoked in the form of a proletarian sublime, any capacity for aesthetic judgment of form disconnected from the choice of the necessary. Nothing is more alien to working-class women than the typically bourgeois idea of making each object in the home the occasion for an aesthetic choice . . . or of involving specifically aesthetic criteria in the choice of a saucepan or cupboards. (379) Rooms socially designated for “decoration,” the sitting room, dining room or living room . . . are decorated in accordance with established conventions, with knick-knacks on the mantelpiece, a forest scene over the sideboard, flowers on the table, without any of these obligatory choices implying decisions or a search for effects. (379) Perhaps the most ruthless call to order . . . stems from the closure effect of the homogeneity effect of the directly experienced social world. There is no other possible language, no other life-style, no other form of kinship relation; the universe of possibles is closed. (381) In the chapter immediately following his discussion of the choice of the necessary, Bourdieu discusses the working class’s relation to politics. Taking issue with those he variously described as populists or class racists practicing an inverted ethnocentrism that credits the common people with an innate Habitus Clivé
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knowledge of politics, Bourdieu addresses the processes through which the working classes are politically disqualified, and disqualify themselves, because they are denied access to the appropriate means of forming political opinions and judgments. There is not space here to go into this account, beyond noting how Bourdieu sets this topic up by referring to Marx and Engels’s projection of communist society as one in which it is only the generalization of freedom from necessity across all classes that, by making participation in aesthetic practice and judgment possible for all, also allows “everyone sufficient free time to take part in the general affairs of society—theoretical as well as practical” (qtd. in Distinction 397). Marx and Engels’s position here echoes the ways that, in civic humanist aesthetics, the connections between aesthetic judgment and the political qualification of the gentry had been defined against the political disqualification of the artisan classes. The difficulty here is that, pending the equalization in the distribution of free time that Marx and Engels anticipate, the working class is disqualified from political agency in their work, too. Or rather, as Rancière argues, the proletariat is called on to fulfill a form of political agency (the revolution) that, in its actual forms, the proletariat cannot discharge until it has acquired the capacity to do so. This, however, is not something the proletariat can accomplish itself but must rather receive in the form of a gift by being impregnated by philosophy and thus, in practical terms, being subordinated to the direction of intellectuals.12 In the meantime, in its actual empirical forms, the proletariat is disqualified from political action unless guided from without by the philosopher. In Bourdieu’s account, too, the working classes, while possessing formal political rights, remain subject to informal political disqualification, owing to their exclusion from the means of forming political opinions and judgment. This disqualification, in turn, is an effect of their exclusion from the education system and the consequent limit