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pl ato’s l aw s Long under-studied, Plato’s Laws has been the object of renewed attention since the late 1990s, and is now considered to be his major work of political philosophy besides the Republic. In his last dialogue, Plato returns to the project of describing the foundation of a just city and sketches in considerable detail its constitution, laws and other social institutions. Written by leading Platonists, the chapters in this volume cover a wide range of topics central for understanding the Laws, such as the aim of the Laws as a whole, the ethical psychology of the Laws, especially its views of pleasure and non-rational motivations, and whether and, if so, how the strict law code of the Laws can encourage genuine virtue. The chapters make an important contribution to ongoing debates and will open up fresh lines of inquiry for further research. c h r i s t oph e r b ob on ic h is C. I. Lewis Professor of Philosophy and, by courtesy, Professor of Classics at Stanford University. He is the author of Plato’s Utopia Recast (2002) and of a number of articles on the Laws and other aspects of Greek ethical and political theory.
c a m br i d g e c r i t ic a l gu i de s Titles published in this series: Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
e di t e d b y de a n moy a r a n d m ic h a e l qua n t e
Mill’s On Liberty
e di t e d b y c . l . t e n
Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim
e di t e d b y a m é l i e ok s e n be rg r or t y a n d j a m e s s c h m i d t
Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals e di t e d b y j e ns t i m m e r m a n n
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason
e di t e d b y a n dr e w s r e at h a n d j e ns t i m m e r m a n n
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations e di t e d b y a r i f a h m e d
Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript e di t e d b y r ic k a n t hon y f u r t a k
Plato’s Republic
e di t e d b y m a r k l . mc p h e r r a n
Plato’s Laws
e di t e d b y c h r i s t op h e r b ob on ic h
Pl ato’s
L aws A Critical Guide Edited by
CHRISTOPHER BOBONICH Stanford University
c a m br i d g e u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521884631 © Cambridge University Press 2010 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2010 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Plato’s “Laws” : a critical guide / [edited by] Christopher Bobonich. p. cm. – (Cambridge critical guides) Includes bibliographical references and index. i s bn 978-0-521-88463-1 (hardback) 1. Plato. Laws. 2. State, The. I. Bobonich, Christopher. II. Title. III. Series. jc71.p264p53 2010 321′.07–dc22 2010038967 ISBN 978-0-521-88463-1 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
List of contributors
page vii
Introduction
1
C h r i s t op h e r B ob on ic h
1 The Laws’ two projects
12
2 The relationship of the Laws to other dialogues: A proposal
29
3 Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws
51
4 Virtue and law in Plato
71
5 Morality as law and morality in the Laws
92
M a l c ol m S c hof i e l d C h r i s t op h e r R ow e R ic h a r d K r au t Julia Annas
T e r e nc e I r w i n
6 Puppets on strings: Moral psychology in Laws Books 1 and 2
108
7 Psychology and the inculcation of virtue in Plato’s Laws
127
8 Images of irrationality
149
9 Family and the question of women in the Laws
172
D or o t h e a F r e de
R ac h a n a K a m t e k a r
C h r i s t op h e r B ob on ic h Th anassis Sa m ar as
10 The theology of the Laws
197
R obe r t M a y h e w
v
vi
Contents
11 Plato’s ‘truest tragedy’: Laws Book 7, 817a–d A n dr é L a k s
Bibliography Index
217 232 242
Contributors
j u l i a a n n a s is Regents Professor in Philosophy at the University of Arizona. She has published widely in ancient philosophy and also in virtue ethics. She is working on the topic of virtue and law in ancient philosophy. c h r i s t oph e r b ob on ic h is C. I. Lewis Professor of Philosophy and, by courtesy, Professor of Classics at Stanford University. He is the author of Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (2002) and, along with P. Destrée, the editor of Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus (2007). He has also published a number of papers on Greek political and ethical theory and ethical psychology. d oro t h e a f r e de is Professor Emerita of Hamburg University and currently Mills Visiting Professor at the University of California Berkeley. In recent years her work has focused on ethics and metaphysics in late Plato and on Aristotelian ethics and politics. She is currently working on a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics to replace Dirlmeier’s commentary in the Berlin Academy Series. t e r e nc e i rw i n is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Keble College. Previously he taught at Cornell University. He is the author of Plato’s Gorgias (trans. and notes, 1979), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (trans. and notes, 2nd edn, 1999), Aristotle’s First Principles (1988), Classical Thought (1989), Plato’s Ethics (1995) and The Development of Ethics (3 vols, 2007–9). r ac h a n a k a m t e k a r is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. She works primarily on Plato, and is currently writing a book entitled The Powers of Plato’s Psychology. r ic h a r d k r au t is Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor of the Humanities at Northwestern University. He is the author of How To vii
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Read Plato (2008) and Socrates and the State (1984). He also edited Critical Essays on Plato’s Republic (1997) and The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge University Press, 1992). a n dr é l a k s is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Université de Paris-Sorbonne. He taught for a long time at the University Charles de Gaulle, Lille, and at Princeton University from 1990 to 1994. He has recently published a book on Plato’s Laws (Médiation et coercition: pour une lecture des ‘Lois’ de Platon, 2005), an essay on the emergence of negativity in archaic philosophy (‘Le vide et la haine’, 2004), an introduction to the concept of Pre-Socratic philosophy (Introduction à la ‘philosophie présocratique’, 2006), and a collection of some of his articles on Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Pre-Socratic philosophy (Histoire, Doxographie, Vérité, 2007). A second, revised and augmented version of his edition of Diogenes of Apollonia (1983) was published in 2008. He is the co-editor, with Michel Narcy, of the journal Philosophie Antique. robe r t m a y h e w is Professor of Philosophy at Seton Hall University. His books include The Female in Aristotle’s Biology (2004) and Plato: Laws 10 (2008). He has recently finished a book on Prodicus of Ceos, and is currently working on an edition of Ps.-Aristotle, Problemata, for the Loeb Classical Library. c h r i s t oph e r row e was until 2009 Professor of Greek at Durham University. His recent publications include a new translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (accompanying a commentary by Sarah Broadie, 2002), a book on Plato’s Lysis (with Terry Penner; Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing (Cambridge University Press, 2007). He was awarded an OBE for services to scholarship in 2009. t h a n a s s i s s a m a r a s is a Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University. He is the author of Plato on Democracy. m a l c ol m s c hof i e l d is Director of Research at the University of Cambridge, where he has been teaching ancient philosophy for nearly forty years. With Christopher Rowe he edited The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2000). His first major study in this field was The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge University Press, 1991; expanded edn 1999), and his latest books are Plato: Political Philosophy (2006) and (with Tom Griffith) Plato: Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Introduction Christopher Bobonich
It is common to begin an article or a book on Plato’s Laws with the lament that the Laws has generally been neglected.1 Although it remains true that the dialogue has been vastly under-studied, much more has been written on it since the late 1990s or so. This volume is not intended to summarize that literature for the general reader. Instead it offers chapters that are on the cutting edge of current scholarship and that not only contribute to ongoing debates, but also start fresh lines of inquiry. The Laws is the longest of Plato’s dialogues and probably the last (given its length, its composition may have overlapped with that of other late dialogues). Aristotle reports (Politics 2.6) that it is later than the Republic, and there is internal and external evidence that it did not receive its final touches before Plato died. In the Laws, Plato returns to the project of describing the foundation of a just or good city and sketches in considerable detail its constitution, laws, offices, and other social institutions. The dialogue is set on Crete and consists of a conversation in twelve books among an Athenian Visitor (by far and away the main speaker) and his two interlocutors: Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Cretan. Their introductory conversation in the first three books is on topics relevant to lawmaking: the proper aim (telos) of legislation, which is the happiness (eudaimonia) and virtue of the citizens; the nature of virtue; some issues in ethical psychology; and the history of constitutions. At the end of Book 3, Kleinias reveals that he is one of ten Cretans in charge of making laws for a new city, Magnesia, to be founded in an unpopulated part of Crete. The rest of the Laws consists of a description of this city.
I would like to thank my wife, Karen, and our furry children, Arby, Plato, and Sappho, for putting up with me as I engaged in this project. 1 From the 1960s on, the late Trevor Saunders did more than anyone else to keep interest in the Laws alive. Everyone working on the Laws is indebted to him.
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Famously, the constitution of Magnesia is said to be “second-best” to one in which women, children, and property are held in common (Laws 739a–740a). Gods or children of gods inhabit the city in which all is held in common; real human beings will inhabit Magnesia and thus it has private households and a form of private property. Plato here explicitly calls the Republic to our attention, although it is controversial whether the city to which Magnesia is said to be “second-best” is the one sketched in the Republic.2 Aristotle, rather unfairly, dismisses the Laws as “mostly a collection of laws” (Pol. 1265a1–2) that is presumably without much theoretical reflection. But although specific statutes occupy a considerable portion of the Laws’ text, there is much more of philosophical interest to be found there. Let me note just a few topics. 1 There is an account of the origins and nature of political community. Plato advances and defends a conception of the good political community as one that aims at the common good and, specifically, aims at fostering all the virtues in the citizenship as a whole. 2 Plato here gives what is essential to a eudaimonist theory, that is, an account of what is good for human beings. Only virtue is good for its possessor no matter what else she has or lacks. Other things commonly thought to be good, such as health and wealth, are good for virtuous people, but are not good and may indeed be bad for those lacking virtue. Similarly, things such as ill health or poverty are bad for the virtuous, but are good or at any rate not bad for the unvirtuous. This theory of the dependency of other goods on virtue is philosophically subtle. It is related to views expressed in the Euthydemus and the Meno, and how it is related to the theories of the good in the Republic and Philebus is an important question. 3 The Laws treats of many topics essential to Plato’s ethical psychology, such as pleasure and pain and their importance in choice, weakness of will or akrasia, the nature and content of non-rational motivations, and how to educate and train citizens to be as stably virtuous as possible. 4 There is an extremely detailed account of the political, legal, and social structures that are designed to foster virtue and fellow feeling in a city that is, nevertheless, based on private families and households. As part of this, there is a sustained and controversial discussion of the political and social roles of women. Traditional interpretations straightforwardly identify the city of the Republic with the “best city”; for other interpretations, see, e.g., Bobonich (2002: 10–12) and Laks (2001).
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5 Given the centrality of law and obedience to the law in Magnesia, Plato takes up a number of topics in legal theory. The nature of just law, Plato thinks, is that it is an expression of reason (Laws 713e–714a). We should ask here how this relates to the criticisms of law in the Republic and especially in the Statesman in which Plato faults the law’s unavoidable generality. Further, in so far as law is an expression of reason and designed to lead people to genuine virtue, it is continuous with ethical education. Plato emphasizes this by attaching preludes to the laws and the law code in general that are explicitly seen as educating the citizens. But in so far as law has the form of a command and has an attached penalty, it is coercive. One of the central questions about law in the Laws is how to reconcile its educational and coercive aspects. 6 The Laws provides a general theory of punishment, and as part of doing so, Plato tries to show how to reconcile the old Socratic tenet that “No one does wrong willingly” with the distinction required by the law code between harms that are done deliberately or intentionally and those that are not. 7 Book 10 contains the official theology of Magnesia, which citizens are required to accept. Although acceptance is mandatory, Book 10 is intended to be read and studied by the citizens and contains arguments for the principles of the theology, including an argument for the existence of god that is based on a conception of the soul as a self-mover. The chapters in this volume, to varying degrees and in different ways, try to bring the claims, arguments, and problems of the Laws into contact with those in other dialogues. There are those who think that each dialogue is its own universe and can only be properly interpreted by drawing on the resources it itself provides without turning to any other dialogues. These people will not approve of the methods used here. But it is especially important to realize that the strategy of bringing the Laws and its arguments into conversation with other dialogues does not require any particular view about the development or unity of Plato’s philosophical views. Indeed, one can remain neutral on all issues of chronology. One might, for example, examine at one time the topic of obedience to the law in the Crito, Laws, Republic, and Statesman without any view about the chronology of these writings. Nevertheless, questions and puzzles from one dialogue may inform one’s analysis of others. Probably most of the authors in this collection make some chronological judgments about the dialogues and everyone, I think, puts the Laws very late. They differ among themselves as to whether Plato’s views develop
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and, if so, whether they do so by gradual addition and clarification or whether there are more significant shifts. Given the great variety of topics discussed in the Laws, there is much to be gained by bringing its views and arguments into the discussion of other dialogues. The process of doing so will encourage more careful philosophical analysis of what is found in each dialogue, and close attention to what the logical implications of each view are and from what other claims or arguments the views may follow. By attempting such readings, we shall only gain in our understanding of the claims that Plato makes and their implications. We shall thus better understand not only the Laws itself, but also the other dialogues with which it is in conversation. Although there has been much more scholarship on the Laws since the beginning of the 1990s than in the preceding decades, we are still at the very early stages of reflecting philosophically on the Laws in connection with Plato’s other dialogues. The chapters in this collection show some of the exciting results of doing so. We very much hope that their publication in one place will serve to stimulate work that will bring new illumination to standing debates and that will open up fresh avenues of inquiry that are not currently available. The first two chapters concern themselves with how to read the Laws as a whole. As Malcolm Schofield notes, the Laws has often seemed to lack a coherent structure and Aristotle in the Politics is dismissive of the Laws’ contribution to political philosophy. But Schofield argues that such attitudes are mistakes and finds in the Laws two distinct projects that are well integrated, in addition to finding that Aristotle’s Politics is far more indebted to the Laws than it initially seems. The starting point for distinguishing the two projects is Aristotle’s claim that Plato’s original intent in the Laws was to sketch a “more common form” (i.e., more capable of adoption by existing cities) of political system, but that he deviated from it. Schofield argues that starting with Book 5’s great introductory monologue to all the citizens we see Plato engaging in the project of describing a “second-best” city. Although such a city in some ways falls short of the city of the Republic, it is an idealizing project that attempts to construct a political system that brings out the very best that is possible in its citizens and gives them the best chance for attaining virtue and happiness. The second project is to describe a system that takes human beings much as they are and does the best it can to construct a society in which freedom is properly constrained by wisdom. This latter project is primarily developed through the histories of Athens, Persia, and Sparta that Plato sketches in Book 3. The educational lesson of these histories is that all
Introduction
5
three regimes did best when they combined freedom for the citizens with wise authority and thus engendered friendship among the citizens. As the variety in these regimes suggests, such a scheme can be instantiated in many different ways and can actually be found in real cities. These two projects are, however, not in conflict and as Plato reflects on the ways in which the political and legal system is both coercive and educational, the two projects gain in depth. But in the end, Schofield thinks, the project of finding a more common form of constitution remains subsidiary to the idealizing project of describing a community of the virtuous. Christopher Rowe in his contribution argues for a way of reading the Laws that is consistent with a wider methodology for reading Plato. The Laws, Rowe argues, operates simultaneously on three levels: that on which the non-philosophical interlocutors, Kleinias and Megillus, are, the level at which the colonists are to be, and finally the level of experienced and accomplished philosophers. The last group will expect to find adequate philosophical justification for the claims made. What makes Rowe’s proposal distinctive is that he thinks that the text of the Laws tends to direct the philosophical reader to the arguments and conclusions of other dialogues for such justification. (Rowe thus tends to read the dialogues less as dialectical and more as statements of positions.) A major part of Rowe’s evidence for this claim is found in the wealth of textual resonances in the Laws with other dialogues. Rowe, in fascinating detail, works through a number of such examples, especially in Book 4 of the Laws, and argues that they show that often the fundamental justification and, indeed, the real point of the Laws’ text may be missed by the interlocutors, but will be found by the philosophical reader deeply familiar with the other dialogues. The next three chapters turn to the topic of virtue in the Laws. Richard Kraut places his discussion of the Laws in a larger context, that is, Plato’s exploration from the Phaedo to the Republic to the Laws of how a political community can be formed among those who have more understanding of the good and those with less understanding. Starting with the Phaedo, Kraut considers the kind of virtue that ordinary people, that is, those who are not philosophers, can have. Kraut argues that ordinary people cannot have real virtue because they lack wisdom, but that many of them have a kind of virtue that is of some genuine value and they have something sound in their grasp of what is good. Kraut suggests that these people, like many portrayed in the dialogues, have conflicting beliefs. On the surface, they might say that virtue is only instrumentally good, but they also have, usually without their own awareness, a belief that virtue is good in itself. Kraut argues that
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Plato in the Republic thinks that the non-philosophical citizens will have an even higher sort of virtue since they realize – unlike the ordinarily virtuous in the Phaedo – that their own understanding of virtue is inferior to that of philosophers. Even the members of the producer class will typically believe that virtue is good in itself although they might believe other, possibly conflicting, things are also good in themselves. Nevertheless, Plato pays very little attention to the education and well-being of the producer class. The Laws, Kraut thinks, fills a major gap in Plato’s political theory by focusing on the sort of ordinary virtue that a member of the Republic’s producer class might have. But the members of the producer class are even better off than the vast majority of the citizens in Magnesia because they live under the direct supervision of philosophers. Nevertheless, on Kraut’s reading, we can see how the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Laws are all consistent with each other on the topic of ordinary virtue. Julia Annas notes that although in both the Republic and the Laws the city aims at the happiness of citizens, in Magnesia the citizens are to become virtuous and thus happy through obedience to law while in Kallipolis it is through obedience to the proper rulers. Indeed, in the Laws Plato emphasizes the idea of “slavery to the laws.” But Plato also expects the citizens in Magnesia to be virtuous in a full-blooded way and not out of fear of the law or mere habituation to it. In the Laws, Plato thinks that preambles should persuade the citizens. Annas focuses on how the preambles help the citizens become genuinely virtuous. She considers and rejects three previous interpretations of the preambles as not wholly satisfactory. The first emphasizes the way in which the preambles serve to provide rational justification of the law; the second suggests the preambles work on the citizens in non-rational, rhetorical ways to get them to want to comply with the law; and the third suggests that the preambles represent an unattainable ideal in which the citizens do not need law at all. Annas’ own solution suggests that we look to Philo, the first-century ce Jewish philosopher. Philo sees the Mosaic law as a system of law leading its followers to genuine virtue, and his work clearly shows the influence of the Laws. Philo’s project is to give an account of the ethical aims of the law that shows the point of the law or practice and how one can develop a good character structured by it. Annas suggests that the preambles in the Laws work in a similar way, employing both rational and non-rational means. Annas ends by suggesting that the Laws can help us think about the ways in which reliable rule-following might be embodied in a life of genuine virtue. (One might compare Annas’ and Kraut’s view on the nature of the citizens’ virtue in the Laws.)
Introduction
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Terence Irwin takes up the novel and important question of whether the Laws treats morality as a form of internal natural law. For a characterization of natural law, Irwin draws on Cicero. The moral content of “true law” comes from its agreement with human nature. Natural law binds all people and can be discovered by anyone with reason. In the Laws, Plato thinks of true law as an ordering by intelligence, and positive law as rational in so far as it approaches true law. But people are generally ignorant that (1) the political craft should aim at the common good, and (2) one achieves one’s own good only by aiming at the common good. Our motivational deficiencies stem from our tendencies to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. One line of thought suggests that Plato does not endorse natural law. On this view, law is inherently defective in two ways according to Plato: it would not be needed by someone with knowledge and the right nature, and law because of its generality cannot discover what is best in every case. Since experts nevertheless have general principles that justify their particular decisions, law would have to be something other than such general principles. There is evidence, however, that Plato is not committed to the idea that the law is second-best. The preambles or prefaces to the laws, Irwin thinks, aim at rational persuasion. (One might compare this view to Annas’.) Appealing to Plato’s analogy of the soul as a puppet in Laws Book 1, Irwin holds that Plato thinks of internal law, at least when correct, as moral principles based on facts about human nature and what is good for humans that provide the basis for criticism of positive law. Plato thus agrees with later natural law theorists. This internal law regulates our tendency to excessive self-love and is thus a prescription of practical reason that accepts the supremacy of one’s own happiness, but also accepts that attaining happiness requires aiming at the common good. The fact that Plato is not a deontologist does not exclude him from the natural law tradition if, as is plausible, we see this tradition as including the Stoics, Augustine, and Aquinas. The next three chapters consider issues in Plato’s ethical psychology. Dorothea Frede examines the role of pleasure in the Laws. Beginning in the Gorgias, Frede argues, Plato sees pleasure as a kind of process rather than a stable state or an awareness of such a state. Even in the Philebus, in which some have seen Plato as advocating a “steady-state” account of pleasure, Frede suggests that Plato still sees pleasure as a process, that is, the restoration of a natural equilibrium. In the Laws, in Frede’s view, Plato is not trying to give a theory of pleasure, but accepts our ordinary understanding of it as sufficient for his purposes there. Frede examines the famous analogy
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of the soul with a puppet in Book 1, and finds that although it does not provide a full account of the Laws’ psychology, it does stress how delicate the equilibrium is among the psychic forces in an individual. Unlike the Republic, in the Laws, appetites do not form a separate part of the soul and are not appeased or eradicated by reason. The consequence, Frede suggests, is that even the virtuous soul is not in a condition of permanent harmony. This need for continual educational correction explains Plato’s establishment of frequent religious festivals whose songs and dances reinforce the proper emotional attitudes. Correctly taken pleasure is a sign of moving in the right direction and, more than he did earlier, Plato also thinks that the citizens’ education must as well foster negative feelings such as hatred of the bad and fear of being shamed. Such stability as human, as opposed to divine, souls are capable of requires constant self-improvement and selfrestoration. Rachana Kamtekar begins with the question of why Plato prescribes the specific kinds of physical activity (e.g., dancing) that he does, but the chapter becomes a general discussion of the nature and role of non-rational motivations. Kamtekar argues that the Timaeus and the Laws see psychological attitudes as kinds of motion, and she shows how this is consistent with the tri-partitioning of the soul in the Republic and Timaeus (although she sees such partitioning as protreptic rather than as evincing ontological commitment). She also draws on the Timaeus to argue that non-rational soul-parts are motivationally self-sufficient and that this is part of our soul’s design. In particular, she argues that there is a teleological explanation for the ability of non-rational soul-parts to motivate action all by themselves. The good purpose served is that in this way the rational part is enabled to think and to rule without being disturbed by the affections of the lower parts. The details of how the non-rational parts do this are not made clear by Plato, and Kamtekar explores various possibilities. She ultimately finds the best-supported option is the idea that the rational part, having first experienced non-rational affections, is freed from them in virtue of other parts taking them on. This prepares the answer to her initial question. The right physical activities give the rational part a pleasing example of order from which it may develop more sophisticated conceptions of order; they make the appetitive less passive with respect to pain; and they cancel out psychological affections that have become detached from the opinions associated with them. In my chapter, I also consider the nature of non-rational motivations in the Timaeus and the Laws. I defend the view that at least some nonrational motivations have conceptual or propositional content (although
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they may also have imagistic content) against some recent interpretations that attribute to them only imagistic content. I consider the limitations of images: they are indeterminate or ambiguous; they are very limited in what they can represent; and it is hard to explain how they interact appropriately with information to produce action. I turn to examining passages from the Timaeus that seem to deny belief to the appetitive part of the soul. I argue that the appetitive part is not a genuine subject that is capable of being aware of and operating on its states and suggest a more nuanced understanding of what it is. I argue that a more philosophically sophisticated account is present in the Timaeus and that on it, at least some nonrational motivations have conceptual content (although they may have imagistic content as well). This allows us to recognize the complexity of non-rational motivations: some have content that goes beyond what is describable in purely sensible terms. Finally, I suggest that allowing conceptual resources to at least some non-rational motivations has two significant advantages over the imagistic interpretation with respect to Plato’s ethics. First, it allows us to see how they can embody, albeit partially and imperfectly, some value content and thus be of more than instrumental worth. Second, it allows us to see how ethical learning can be a gradual process and how non-rational motivations can play an important role in such an education in virtue of their content. The final three chapters concern specific topics in the Laws. Thanassis Samaras provides a learned and detailed account of the structure of the family and the role of women in Magnesia that is also very informative about Magnesia’s economic and educational structures. The ideal of the Laws, Samaras thinks, is not of an aristocracy of philosophers, but the conservative ideal of the Greek soldier-farmer. There is, however, Samaras argues, a recurrent tension in Magnesia between the concessions that Plato now thinks must be made to the household (oikos) as the fundamental social unit and those institutions designed to foster virtue and friendship among the citizens. Magnesia is in the first place a city of households: in the Laws, Plato makes citizenship and belonging to a landowning household absolutely co-extensive. Plato draws upon both the tradition of the past “ancestral constitution” of Athens and, to a lesser extent, that of Crete and Sparta in forms that are inherently conservative. Two primary ways in which Plato strengthens the household are by making land inalienable, a practice not found in contemporary Greece, and by allowing inheritance only by a single son, which conflicts with the universal Greek practice of dividing land among all the sons. But Plato also insists on universal mandatory education and common meals (both Spartan practices). These
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institutions restrict the household’s autonomy in order to foster virtue and friendship. But Plato never explains how to integrate these later institutions with the household, and this is a sign of the Laws’ not fully resolved tension between the household and collectivist institutions. With respect to women, Samaras argues, Plato gives them equality of opportunity even if he does not believe in essential gender equality. As part of equality of opportunity, Plato accepts that women can achieve virtue – which is a requirement of holding office – and makes them eligible for office (at certain periods of their lives), including the highest ones. But as part of accepting the household as a fundamental unit, Plato also excludes women from public life from about twenty to forty years of age in order that they may deal with childbearing and childrearing. Women, moreover, are denied the right to own property in their own person and have no control over whom they will marry. Plato does not reconcile the active political role he allows to women and their passive role as members of a traditional household. Robert Mayhew writes on the Laws’ theology, which he describes as “imprecise or incomplete” in important ways. But Mayhew also thinks that Plato is aware of this vagueness. Mayhew offers a wide-ranging discussion of the Laws’ theology and does not focus exclusively on Book 10. In examining Books 4 and 7, Mayhew shows how Plato develops the idea that god is the measure of all things and, in particular, is the measure of the virtues by possessing them all in the best way. Becoming like god is portrayed as becoming virtuous and thereby becoming dear to god. Mayhew then turns to the more sophisticated theology of Books 10 and 12 and discusses Plato’s refutation of the three impious views that (1) the gods do not exist, (2) the gods exist, but do not care for humans, and (3) the gods think about humans, but can be bribed by sacrifices. Raised as issues, but not resolved in Laws Book 10, are: (1) exactly how the soul manages the cosmos, (2) how many gods there are, and (3) what the ultimate cause of evil is. Why, then, does Plato leave the Laws’ theology vague? Mayhew suggests that the two main reasons are, first, that philosophical theology is simply so intellectually difficult. Some unanswered questions may not be answerable by humans and it may not even be pious to investigate them. But it is also the case that to expose citizens to deep and obscure questions at the cutting edge of Plato’s philosophy would risk leading them to doubt the three main, better-established tenets of Magnesia’s theology. In a rich chapter, André Laks elucidates Plato’s claim that the constitution of Magnesia is the “truest tragedy” (Laws Book 7, 817ab). Laks’ discussion is complex and subtle and the following remarks can only highlight
Introduction
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its most basic aspects. Laks thinks we should take literally the idea that Magnesia’s constitution (politeia) is a tragedy. “Tragedy” here is not to be understood in the sense given it in Republic Book 10; for there tragedy was condemned as mere imitation at second remove of the Forms, and for arousing emotions and passions. In Laws Book 7, tragedy is an imitation (mimêsis) in the sense of a representation. In Republic Book 3, imitation is understood as performance, and in Republic Book 10 as reproduction. In the Laws, the constitution is a representation of the best and finest life. Laks compares this to Aristotle’s conception of tragedy in the Poetics and notes the distinctive claim in the Laws Book 7 passage that it is “true law” that provides the appropriate completion of the constitutional drama. If we emphasize the role of law in apportioning punishment to transgression, Laks argues that we find important connections to understandings of tragedy in German idealism. But Laks also suggests that we should focus not only on the inevitability of punishment following transgression, but also on the idea that punishment is inevitable because the legislator must have recourse to it. The content of law should be an expression of reason, that is, of how things rationally ought to be, but the law’s form is that of an order and thus inherently violent. Even in Magnesia, rational understanding remains inevitably in conflict with pleasures. The inevitability of this conflict is part of the way in which Magnesia’s constitution is a tragedy.
ch apter 1
The Laws’ two projects Malcolm Schofield
1. A r i s t o t l e’s pu z z l e Plato’s Laws has probably been the most unpopular of all his dialogues. ‘Not only’, says the Loeb editor in his introduction, ‘does it lack the charm and vigour of the earlier dialogues, but it is marked also by much uncouthness of style, and by a tendency to pedantry, tautology and discursive garrulity which seems to point to the failing powers of the author.’1 It represents itself as the record of a rambling conversation, ‘framed apparently on no artistic plan’, between three elderly men, who get immersed in masses of detail often of little general philosophical interest. Damning remarks of this and other kinds can be found without difficulty in modern literature about Plato.2 On a first inspection Aristotle might appear to stand at the head of the queue of those thinkers who on reading the Laws have found little there to reward them. The last chapter of his Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to an explanation of why law is an essential instrument for shaping the characters and behaviour of citizens, and of what sort of knowledge and experience someone needs to become a good legislator. His concluding paragraph begins with the notorious comment (EN 10.9, 1181b12–14): ‘Our predecessors have left the topic of legislation unresearched, so it would probably be better to study it instead ourselves.’3 Aristotle’s remark here This essay was delivered as a lecture in Tokyo in September 2008: I am grateful to the Tokyo Plato community for their warm appreciation, and in particular to Shinro Kato (my host) and to Atsushi Kawatani and Satoshi Ogihara (my commentators). The present slightly revised draft incorporates my reactions also to helpful comments by Christopher Rowe and the Editor. 1 Bury (1926: 1.vii). 2 One further example may suffice. In his valedictory lecture as Laurence Professor at Cambridge, Myles Burnyeat concludes the paragraph he devotes to the Laws – commenting particularly on its pervasively repressive theocracy – with the observation (Burnyeat 1997: 9): ‘It can hardly be an accident that the first word of this long and appalling work is theos, “God”.’ 3 Perhaps he means: ‘better than going through their writings seeing if we can find useful observations on the subject’. If so, this contrasts strikingly with the procedure he says he will adopt with
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makes it sound as though he has temporarily forgotten even the existence of the Laws. For besides its mass of legislative detail, the Laws contains powerful general reflection on law: for example, the need for law to be the locus of supreme authority in the political community (4.712a–715d), the importance of prefacing the prescriptions which constitute law proper with explanatory preludes designed to persuade (4.719e–723d), the extent to which law once established should subsequently be modified or regarded as modifiable (5.745e–746d, 6.772a–d), the relation between written and ‘unwritten’ law (7.793a–d), and how the categories of the voluntary and the involuntary apply to acts of wrongdoing in which the law will need to take an interest (9.860a–864a). All that is left out of account by Aristotle’s sweeping assertion. In the Politics there is one chapter of Book 2 specifically devoted to the Laws, as well as one or two other explicit references to the dialogue elsewhere in the treatise. This time one wonders not whether Aristotle has forgotten the existence of the dialogue, but whether he has been reading the same dialogue as we have. ‘All the discourses of Socrates’, he says, ‘have in them something extraordinary and clever and original and inquiring – but it’s perhaps difficult to get everything right’ (Pol. 2.6, 1265a10). On the surface this sounds complimentary, and indeed a shrewdly appreciative assessment of works of Plato in which Socrates leads the conversation, whether one thinks of the early ‘Socratic’ dialogues or of the Republic itself. But the adjectives are not the ones that first spring to the lips of most readers of the Laws. Its main speaker is anyway not Socrates, but an ‘Athenian Stranger’ who doesn’t even sound very like Socrates. Should we infer that while Aristotle has decided to try to say something positive about the Laws at this point, he is so little focused on its overall intellectual project (as opposed to various particular topics in it that he has noted for criticism) that he has lost any sense of listening to the Stranger talking, or indeed of the dialogue as a dialogue at all? The only obvious alternative is to guess with Trevor Saunders that Aristotle here engages in ‘ironic jesting’.4 In which case he would presumably want us to read his string of epithets as meaning something like their exact opposite in their application to the Laws. Aristotle’s main interest in the Laws in the chapter he writes about it is not in its philosophy of law or the legal code it draws up, but in what it has regard to the related and more fundamental study of politeia, ‘constitution’ or ‘social and political system’, where going through predecessors’ writings with this intent is precisely what he prescribes for himself (1181b15–17), and does indeed do in Book 2 of the Politics. 4 Saunders (1995a: 128).
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to say on the subject of the politeia, the social and political system or constitution it envisages – understandably enough, given that this is the general subject of Book 2 of the Politics, and the main topic of the treatise as a whole. Here he comments that the dialogue actually contains relatively little on the politeia, but consists mostly of laws.5 And that little, he says, is not really very different at the end of the day from the ideal articulated in the Republic, even though the original intention of the Laws was to institute a form of political system ‘more common’ to cities: presumably ‘more capable of being generally adopted’ by political communities generally, not just ones deliberately constructed as ideal, like the Republic’s Kallipolis, whose principal social and political arrangements he has just subjected to an extended and unremittingly harsh critique (Pol. 2.2–5). Thus he comments (Pol. 2.6, 1265a4–8): ‘Except for holding women and property communally, he makes everything the same in both systems: the same education, life to be free from menial tasks, the same provisions for common meals.’ After these general remarks, Aristotle turns for the rest of the chapter to detailed criticism of political proposals unique to the Laws. As Richard Stalley puts it in his notes to Ernest Barker’s English translation of the dialogue: ‘His main concern is to point to what he sees as faulty in Plato’s treatment rather than to engage in constructive discussion.’6 The paradox is that when we look elsewhere in the Politics, we find Aristotle making extensive, albeit mostly unacknowledged use of the Laws. In fact Books 7 and 8 of the Politics read at times like nothing so much as Aristotle’s own abbreviated version of the Laws’ prescription for an ideal political community. Barker gives a useful list of parallels between the Politics and the Laws, noting that those with Books 7 and 8 are ‘too numerous to be mentioned’ (he selects just a few examples). One example he doesn’t mention is the focus on music in Book 8: without the Laws’ treatment of musical performance as the key shaping influence on character (especially as developed in Laws Book 2, to which particularly Chapter 5 of Politics Book 8 is heavily indebted), Aristotle’s decision to devote virtually an entire book of the Politics to music would be unintelligible. Certainly in Books 7 and 8 there is force in Barker’s verdict: ‘If Aristotle wrote the Politics, and arranged the content under the categories and in the scheme of his own philosophy, Plato supplied a great part of Aristotle is either exaggerating or adopting a much narrower definition of politeia (constitution strictly conceived as design of organs of government) than the more generous conception of social and political organisation he often operates with, not least in Book 2 of the Politics itself. 6 Barker (1995: 340). 5
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the content.’7 Whether this is because these books constitute a stratum of the Politics earlier than Book 2, or because Aristotle does criticism and construction in entirely different modes, almost as if they had nothing to do with each other, is a question to which one might return on another occasion. For the moment it will be instructive to focus on a point I have reproduced above from the critical treatment of the dialogue in Book 2. So far as I can see, scholars have not had much to say about Aristotle’s suggestion at Pol. 2.6, 1265a3–4 that Plato’s original intention in the Laws was to propose a ‘more common’ form of political system, from which he subsequently deviated. The same kind of issue recurs later in the chapter, where he writes as follows (1265b26–33): The tendency of the whole system is to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but midway between them. People call it ‘polity’, because it consists of those who qualify as heavy-armed infantry [i.e., in the community’s citizen army]. Now if he is framing this constitution for cities as the one which of all constitutions is most common [i.e., most capable of being generally adopted], perhaps the proposal he has made is a good one; but not if he meant it as the best after the primary constitution [i.e., the ideal of the Republic] – for one might rather commend the Laconians’ [i.e., the Spartan constitution], or some other with a more aristocratic leaning [e.g., perhaps Aristotle’s own in Book 7].
Here the idea that the political system to be worked out in the Laws is intended as ‘most common’ is put more hypothetically, and on a par with an alternative: that it is meant to be second-best after the city of the Republic. This isn’t really inconsistent with the earlier statement (1265a3–4) that the political system advocated in the Laws is ‘gradually brought back round to the other constitution’ (i.e., from the ‘more common’ form of politeia to the system of the Republic Aristotle has just been discussing). Aristotle is now simply wanting to be more cautious and accurate in his formulations. And when we reflect further, we can see that in finding two rather different political projects in the dialogue, he has noticed something very interesting about the progress of the argument of the Laws, and indeed has exposed rather acutely something initially puzzling about Plato’s whole enterprise in the dialogue. 2 . T h e
l aw s ’
t wo proj e c t s
There is no difficulty in identifying the parts of Plato’s text where it looks as though he is attempting to construct a ‘second-best’ to the ideal city of the Republic, approximating to more and more of the institutions of Barker (1918: 382).
7
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Kallipolis as the discussion goes on. In the great introductory monologue (occupying the whole of Book 5) that prefaces the detailed exposition of his specific legislative proposals, the Athenian Stranger reaches a point (739a–e) where he judges it appropriate to acknowledge that ‘reasoning and experience’ indicate that the organisation of a city (i.e., the sort of city under discussion) will turn out to be ‘second’ against the standard of the best. In consequence the right plan is to describe political systems in order of excellence: first, second, third. A brief sketch of the ‘first’ then follows. It is clearly a version of the communist society of the guards expounded in (mostly) Book 5 of the Republic. The Stranger’s verdict is that this is a system suitable for ‘gods or children of gods’. So – given that what is now being looked for is something more practicable – the discussants will certainly need to keep a hold on the ‘first’ as paradigm, but search now for the one that approximates to it as nearly as possible: the ‘second’. Perhaps they will explore the ‘third’ later. In the pages that follow (5.739e–745e), it becomes clear how the programme just articulated will be implemented. The abolition of private land-ownership and housing proposed for the guards at the end of Book 3 of the Republic is revoked. Marriage as conventionally conceived and the nuclear family (similarly abolished in Republic Book 5) are restored. Finally, the use of money, forbidden the guards in Republic 3 (416e–417a), is permitted for one or two circumscribed, non-mercantile purposes. None the less the ideals of community, equality and friendship are still guiding principles. The Laws seeks to regulate the economic system in such a way as to minimise the differentials in wealth usually associated with the family, for instance by providing that all landholdings are equal in size and unalienable, as well as by debarring those who are to count as citizens from commercial activity, with no gold or silver permitted in the city at all. The economic class of the Republic is now excluded from citizenship altogether, in fact, and the communistic agenda of the Republic rewritten in the account of what the Laws calls the ‘first’ politeia as a prescription which will apply to ‘the whole city’ so far as possible.8 None the less the ‘second’ city of the Laws is not itself communist. That is the most obvious way in which its political system is ‘second’, not ‘first’ (cf. also 7.807b–c).9 Aristotle is right, however, that as the exposition of the institutions of the city further develops, it gradually gets to sound more and more like the Republic. As evidence he mentions in the first instance the provisions On this latter point see Schofield (2006: 223 and n. 87). See further Schofield (2006: 231–4).
8
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for education, to which all of Book 7 is devoted. These do indeed flesh out in detail and at length the sketch in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic, with control of the use of poetry reaffirmed, and the role of suitable musical performance (already given extended treatment in Book 2) assigned particular emphasis, notably choral dancing and the singing of hymns in religious ritual. This is the general context in which leisure and its proper use are discussed (7.806d–807d; cf. 803c–804b) – another topic Aristotle mentions, and one which will become the guiding theme from Politics 7.14, 1330a14 to the rest of the treatise. Towards the end of the account of education mathematics, too, is discussed. As in the Republic, advanced study is restricted to an elite, although the basics of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy are to be taught to everyone, in the case of astronomy so that blasphemous opinions about the heavens are avoided (7.817e–822c). The final item on Aristotle’s list of parallels with the Republic, the institution of common meals, seems as if it is added just for good measure. The Athenian Stranger has already discussed the topic before he launches into education, in Book 6 (779e–783c), although (as Aristotle suggests) after other communistic institutions have been jettisoned in Book 5. One striking similarity with the Republic that Aristotle might have stressed is the insistence that the educational programme (like the common meals regime) will apply to females as well as males. In both these contexts the Athenian conducts a vigorous assault on contemporary social and political arrangements that confine women to the home, not least as a waste of half the human resource available to a political community (7.805a–d). So much, then, on how the project of discussing a second-best politeia gradually comes to resemble a detailed specification for the Republic’s ideal city, once communism is abandoned. But Aristotle implies that the Laws’ initial project, before discussion of any of the material we have just been considering, had a quite different objective: to institute a political system ‘more common’ than that of an ideal community – more capable of being generally adopted. Here he employs language he will use in the strategic opening chapter of Book 4 of the Politics, in categorising the different intellectual enterprises that belong to the single science of politics. First mentioned is consideration of what would be the best system if there were no external obstacles to the realisation of our hopes (or in Aristotle’s words, our ‘prayer’). This is the sort of theorising he sees as undertaken in the treatment of the ‘second’ city in Books 5 to 7 of the Laws (where the impracticability of the ‘first’ city is a matter of what human nature will stand, not external circumstances). He then lists three other kinds of project. These are examination of what system fits particular circumstances (e.g., if the
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ratio of poor to wealthy citizens is high); what system is desirable given a certain basic premiss (e.g., that political freedom is to be maximised, or that wealth is what must carry the greatest weight in constitutional provisions); and finally, ‘the system that is most suited to all cities’ – a question most writers on politeia ignore, Aristotle says, and in so doing ‘miss out on what is useful’ (Pol. 4.1, 1288b21–37). This last sort of enterprise is the one he has in mind when he characterises the original project of the Laws as aiming to institute a ‘more common’ system. He goes on to say this of his fourth and last category of project (Pol. 4.1, 1288b37–9): ‘For it is important to consider not only the best, but also the possible, and likewise also the one that is easier and more common for all.’ Once again, ‘more common’ must mean ‘more capable of being adopted’ by cities in general. What could have led Aristotle to read the Laws as embarked – initially, before the search for something that approximates the ideal begins in Book 5 – on that kind of more practical inquiry? I suggest that the beginnings of an answer are to be found in the title Ernest Barker gave to Book 3 of the Laws: ‘The Lessons of History’.10 After the discussion of the fundamental aims of legislation in the opening books, the third book makes a fresh start (3.676a–b): athenian: So much for that, then. But what are we to say of the origin of politeia? Wouldn’t this be the easiest and finest vantage point for someone to observe it from? cleinias: What vantage point? athenian: The one that has always to be adopted if we are to study the advance of cities to virtue or vice during the process of time. cleinias: What do you mean by that? athenian: I suppose taking an indefinitely long duration of time and the changes that occur in such a period.
Cleinias still needs more explanation, until he appreciates that a survey of the growth and decline of regimes, and their improvement and deterioration, is what the Athenian has in mind. In short, Plato proposes a historical survey, designed to discover basic principles of politeia construction which have to be observed if a political community is to achieve health and stability. The bulk of Book 3 is accordingly devoted to a highly selective history of Greece, from the flood –what the Greeks conceived of as Deucalion’s flood – and a speculative account of the primitive isolated communities which will have formed subsequently to the inundation, through the period described by Homer, and 10
Barker (1918: 307).
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on to more recent times, with a particular focus on the rise of Sparta. The book closes with parallel accounts of the histories of Persia and Athens. The narrative starts in each case with a period (under Cyrus in the sixth century bc for Persia, and for Athens the time of the Persian invasion at the beginning of the fifth) when each enjoyed a well-balanced constitution, but culminates for both in terminal decline into opposite excesses: in Persia, tyranny; in Athens, the lawlessness of extreme freedom. It is from Sparta and its success as a state in the classical period (in contrast with its neighbours Argos and Messene) that the Athenian Stranger draws the chief moral for politeia design that Book 3 teaches. After a review of the different bases on which those who rule over others claim their authority (3.689e–690e), he propounds the view that a principal cause of internal faction and ultimate self-destruction for a city is the arrogance bred in someone whose rule is absolute. He observes that neglect of due measure in any area of life brings disaster of various sorts. There follows a striking passage (3.691c–d): What are we getting at? Just this: my dear friends, there does not exist a mortal soul whose nature will ever be able to cope with the greatest ruling position to be attained among humans, when young and unaccountable, without being filled in his thinking with that greatest of diseases, folly, and earning the hatred of his closest friends. And when this happens, it quickly ruins the soul and annihilates its entire power. To take precautions against this by discerning the due measure is the task of great lawgivers.
The Athenian then documents the way this feat was successfully achieved at Sparta, in Persia and at Athens. At Sparta Lycurgus’ ingenious prescriptions for the division of powers between a dual kingship, a body of elders, and the annually elected ephors (five officials who exercised a degree of control over the kings as well as executive and judicial functions of their own) made of kingship a mixed constitution exhibiting measure, and thereby ensured both its stability and the stability of the political community in general (3.691d–692b). The contribution of the elders to the mixture is seen as wisdom (‘power prudent with age’), whereas the ephors constituted a democratic element in the system (‘a power which came very close to being held by lot’). Subsequently these ingredients in a measured constitution will be specifically identified as the attributes of wisdom (phronêsis) and freedom (eleutheria), associated symbolically with monarchy and democracy respectively. A third attribute alongside these is friendship (philia), which seems to be a way of articulating the harmony in society that is generated in a system which properly blends wisdom and freedom in the functions that are exercised by different agencies within it,
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although the Athenian couples it particularly with the equality that goes with political freedom in these circumstances (693b–694b; cf. 701d). It was because Persia in its long-past golden era under Cyrus embodied this trio of attributes in its political system that it ‘made progress’. The account of Athenian history is more nuanced. The Stranger refers only briefly and without naming him to the Athens of its great lawgiver, Solon. His narrative focuses on Athenian resistance to the Persian invasion in 490 and 480 bc, a century after Solon’s reforms. He stresses the role of respect for law and fear of the enemy as the key to their maintaining the solidarity and friendship that enabled them to defeat superior Persian forces (3.698a–699d). The terse formula ‘voluntary slavery to the laws’ (700a) is the way the elements of freedom (‘voluntary’), on the one side, and wisdom (‘laws’), on the other, are apparently being conceived in the case of Athens as integrating to produce social cohesion. Following this short summary of what were the main lessons Plato wanted his readers to draw from history, we are now in a position to return to Aristotle’s discussion of the Laws in Politics 2.6, and to suggest why he may have thought the dialogue’s initial constitutional project aimed to specify a political system ‘more common’ to cities. The historical reflections of Book 3 of the Laws are indeed devised with a view to prescribing for the sort of system capable of being generally adopted by political communities. What works – Plato is saying – is a constitution which by virtue of its measured balance of wise authority and popular freedom achieves social harmony. The evidence is supplied by Sparta, Persia and Athens, at the times when these three major states were at their most successful (at any rate as judged in terms of their military achievements). Each had a political system which embodied wisdom, freedom and friendship in a balanced system. Interestingly, the mode in which wisdom and freedom were mixed differed in each case. At Sparta it was a matter of division of constitutional powers in such a way as to ensure that both a form of popular representation and the voice of wisdom and experience were given effect. In Persia it was more a case of enlightened despotism, with the monarch encouraging free speech and the opportunity for anyone to contribute of their own wisdom in public discussion. At Athens it was no more than voluntary obedience to the law, in straitened circumstances where any other way of behaving would obviously have been suicidal.11 Presumably there would have been corresponding variation in the quality of social cohesion produced under the three systems – which from the point of view of On the fear that is represented as the Athenians’ predominant motivation, see Rowe (2007a).
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freedom we might characterise as representative democracy, direct democracy and legal democracy. Plato is obviously enjoying making both Sparta and especially his highly fictive Persia look more genuinely participatory than Athens. His Cyrus sounds very like Thucydides’ Pericles (see the Funeral Speech, especially 2.37–40),12 whereas his Athens more resembles the Sparta its deposed king Demaratus describes, when precisely at the time of the Persian expedition against Greece of 480 bc he says to Xerxes (Herodotus 7.164.4): When the Spartans fight individually, they are second to none, but when they fight in a body they are best of all. The reason is that though they are free, they are not completely so, because they have a master over them – the law – which they fear more than your subjects fear you.
Whatever the basis for the variations in the formula for the Stranger’s mixture, it is plainly important for recommending his project for politeia design that there be such variations. The recipe for success – wisdom, freedom, friendship – will be the more persuasive the more flexibly it can be applied within political communities in widely differing sorts of historical circumstances. 3. M a r r y i ng t h e t wo proj e c t s In the previous section I have tried to work out why Aristotle might have found two quite distinct constitutional projects in the Laws: the original one, designed to identify a system generally applicable to cities (with no presumption that these will be ‘ideal’ from an ethical point of view), which then turns into something much more resembling the attempt to construct the best city previously undertaken in the Republic. Book 3 of the Laws does indeed fit Aristotle’s notion of the original project. Books 5 to 7 – in the sections we have considered – do indeed ‘keep a hold’ on the ‘first’ city of the Republic as paradigm, and specify provisions for social organisation and education that approximate it as closely as possible, once granted the jettisoning of communism as too great a strain on human nature. The two theoretical enterprises clearly are different. The Book 3 project sees political system building as the attempt to strike a compromise which will recognise both political freedom for the citizens and the authority of wisdom in constitutional provisions. The Book 5 project is focused much more directly on community and on virtue and happiness (the chief topic But Plato did not believe in the wise Pericles portrayed by Thucydides: see Gorgias 515c–519b, with Schofield (2006: 67–74, 211–12).
12
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of the long ‘prelude’ which launches the book: 726a–734e), and on the institutions needed to promote these within the basic framework of private property and the family. Of course, both projects share a general aim, of producing a system in which there is ‘friendship’ among the citizens. This was already explicit in the formulations of the non-ideal project I cited from the latter part of Book 3. But it is likewise explicitly articulated in the project of approximating the ideal initiated in Book 5. Not only is the Pythagorean maxim ‘friends share what they have’ the keynote of the ideal city which is conceived as the paradigm (739c), but a little later – à propos of the second-best system – the Athenian says: ‘The premiss on which our laws depend was the imperative to ensure that the citizens should be as happy as possible, and friends to each other in the highest degree’ (743c). Yet the use of the superlative here is indicative. The non-ideal project looks for social and political cohesion, the project of approximating the ideal for maximal social cohesion. The presence of the two projects within one and the same dialogue reflects a deeper tension. Is it the Laws’ ambition to explain the kind of social and political system needed if we are to bring out the best in people, and give them the best possible chance of achieving virtue and happiness? Or is the dialogue more interested in taking the citizenry of any political community more or less as the human beings they actually are, and putting in place laws and institutions which (in the terms of Book 3) constrain freedom with wisdom? The first objective seems to be strongly implied in the prefatory first book (e.g., 1.630d–632e, 644e–645b), and to be reaffirmed at the very end of the dialogue in Book 12 (12.863a). But the focus on the extensive legal code worked out in the later books, with its elaborate penology, suggests that for much of the dialogue Plato is devising a system to deal with people whose appetite for virtue is limited, and where constraint has to be the main order of the day. There are a number of passages in which he has the Athenian comment on this last issue. They might be read as reflections on the problem of how the idealising and more pragmatic projects Aristotle diagnoses in the Laws are related in the mind of the author. Two are particularly worth a brief look, since they occur at strategic junctures in the argument of the dialogue as a whole. Both contrast the ambition to promote virtue with the human material the legislator will actually have to work with. The first comes in Book 4, at a point where the Athenian is beginning to explain his theory of the dual nature of legislation – its combination of persuasive preamble with coercive content. ‘I would want people’, he says (4.718c), ‘to be as easy to persuade towards virtue as possible; and this is evidently
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what the legislator will try to achieve in all his legislation.’ This statement shows that the idealising project is alive and well. But realism forces a qualification. Persuasion must count as a success if it accomplishes something much more limited: making people more amenable – ‘a trifle easier to handle, and so that much easier to teach’. There just isn’t much supply of persons eager to be as good as possible as fast as possible (718d). It could not be more plainly stated that the Laws envisages itself as trying to cope with human beings as they actually are. In Book 9 the Athenian makes a shift in direction, and takes up the subject of crime, and the legislative provision for tackling it. This turn in the exposition makes renewed discussion of the human material the legislator must deal with particularly well motivated. The Athenian starts with the reflection that there is something shameful in proposing laws on crime, in a city ‘which we are saying will be well managed, and where the provisions for promoting virtue are thoroughly sound’ (9.853b). Even to think that there will be anyone in it as wholly depraved as in other cities – rendering necessary appropriate laws and forms of punishment – is shameful. But (853c–d): Unlike the ancient legislators, we are not framing laws for heroes and sons of gods. The lawgivers of that age, according to the story told nowadays, were descended from gods and legislated for people of similar stock. But we are human beings, legislating in the world today for the children of human beings, and we shall give no offence by our fear that one of our citizens will turn out to be, so to speak, a ‘tough egg’, whose character will be so ‘hard-boiled’ as to resist softening; powerful as our laws are, they may not be able to tame such people, just as heat has no effect on tough beans.
In the light of a passage such as this, it is now possible to see not only that the two projects identified by Aristotle are there in the text, but that Plato has a rationale for both, and implies an indication of how they are connected. The fundamental enterprise of the dialogue is the idealising project which he relates to the political philosophy of the Republic in Book 5: the attempt to approximate to the best ideal system so far as possible, in order to promote maximal happiness and friendship. Had Aristotle in Politics 2.6 started his account of how thinking about politeia is developed with Book 1 of the Laws, and its preoccupation with virtue and education, not with Book 3, he might have recognised that himself. The project introduced in Book 3, on the other hand, turns out to be subordinate to the idealising project. On further reading and reflection, it will appear that the historical narrative of Book 3 is laying foundations for some principles that can be used to deal with ordinary human nature within the overall
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context of the idealising project, and with its resistance to or lack of interest in the life of virtue with which the idealising project is concerned. One of Plato’s reasons for resorting to history at this point in the Laws is presumably to emphasise that thinking about politeia needs to deal with the contingent and the empirical as well as the ideal.13 The empirical as Plato understands it in the Laws is not exclusively or straightforwardly a matter of how much or little ordinary humanity is disposed towards a life of virtue. He acknowledges empirical constraints in handling other – even if ultimately related – matters too. A notable example, which illustrates with great clarity the way the pragmatic project of Book 3 relates to the Laws’ primary idealising project, is supplied by the Athenian Stranger’s treatment of property. The idealising project takes great pains to regulate the ownership of land, so as to ensure that (though communism is not enforced) there is as much equality in landholding, and in general in financial resources, as possible. Division between rich and poor remains for Plato as great a threat to a city as it did in the Republic (5.736c–738a, 739e–744a; cf. Rep. 4.421c–423a). But realism requires qualification of the ideal (744b–c): It would have been good if each person, on joining the colony, had all else equal as well [i.e., as well as the equal landholding now allocated to every householder]. Since this is not possible, and one person will come with more money, another with less, it is necessary for many reasons, and for the sake of equalising opportunities in public life, to ensure that offices and taxes are distributed on the basis of what someone is worth. It is not just his personal virtues or his ancestors’, nor his physical strength or good looks that should be taken into account, but use of wealth or poverty.
Equality of landholdings did mean equality. ‘Equalising’ political opportunities means distributing them in proportion to property. A complex connection with virtue is made, notably through assessing use of wealth (or its opposite). But it is easy to understand why Aristotle objects that the politeia of the Laws is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, with a bias towards oligarchy (Pol. 2.6, 1266a5–28). For as he notes, proportionality supports a highly complicated system of election to the city’s governing council, albeit involving limited and indeed grudging use of the lot as well as arrangements designed (as Plato himself puts it) ‘to confer high recognition on virtue, but less on those weaker in virtue and education’ (Laws 6.757c). The objective as Plato sees it is accordingly not oligarchy. Samaras (2002: 219) proposes: ‘In the Laws, this type of experience [i.e., historical] becomes the main informing principle of Plato’s political philosophy.’ See also Morrow (1960: Part I).
13
The Laws’ two projects
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Because there is recognition of both virtue, doubtless taken to include wisdom, and the equality of the lot, which the Greeks associated with democratic freedom, the goal is something ‘midway between a monarchical and a democratic constitution, as should always be the case with the constitution’ (756e) – an explicit reference to the principles of political system building enunciated in Book 3. I suspect it is no accident that the last of the historical embodiments of the balance between wisdom and freedom (or monarchy and democracy) the Stranger discusses in Book 3 is the voluntary slavery to the laws that characterises Athens at the moment of the Persian invasion. The theme of voluntary slavery to law is to be sustained in the theory of law and the dual nature of legislation spelled out in Book 4, which will then constitute the overarching framework taken for granted in all the subsequent development of law in the dialogue. This theory might therefore be considered the guiding thread followed throughout the implementation of what I am calling Plato’s subordinate project. According to Book 4 (which after the historical Book 3 is devoted to placing the study of politeia on theological foundations), the final authority in a politeia that deserves the name is law, conceived of as public reason (4.713e–714a), an idea appropriated from this section of the Laws without acknowledgement by Aristotle (Pol. 3.16, 1287a28–32). Unless its authority is respected in a city, ruin lies round the corner. When the rulers are slaves of the law, on the other hand, and law is their master, ‘I see salvation and all the good things gods bestow upon cities’ (715d). But the political freedom that citizens enjoy as citizens is the counterbalancing element Book 3 has discerned as essential to a healthy constitution. Freedom is enshrined within it not simply or primarily by provisions making the politeia a matter of government by participating citizens, chosen for the job according to the terms of a principled electoral process.14 Freedom will be given due respect only if the lawgiver attempts to persuade the entire citizen population of the appropriateness of his legislation, so that they voluntarily accept its provisions. There is no denying that the great body of law developed in the later books of the Laws15 is designed to exercise a high degree of control over the lives of the citizens. None the less the voluntariness of their submission to law is of paramount importance. This is the principal ingredient in the dialogue’s conception of political freedom. The connection between freedom and voluntary compliance with On citizen government in the Laws, see Bobonich (2002: ch. v). The subject of a masterly treatment in Saunders (1991).
14 15
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law is all but explicit in Plato’s development – in the final section of Book 4 – of the notion of a preamble or prelude to a law. In the famous analogy which he draws between the modus operandi of a slave doctor and the procedure of a free-born doctor, dictating medical prescriptions without explanation or persuasion (as the slave doctor does) and without voluntary acceptance by the patient is branded ‘tyrannical’ (720c; cf. 722e–723a). The free-born doctor’s method of explanation and persuasion, employed as it usually is in dealings with free-born patients, shows him to be a better doctor (720e), and the lawgiver who does likewise in his preambles to laws reveals himself as someone who is not legislating so much as ‘educating the citizens’ (9.857e).16 4. C onc l us ion I began this chapter with a brief reminder of the harsh criticism of the Laws familiar in modern comment on the dialogue, and of some of Aristotle’s strictures too. I have been in effect attempting to respond to just two of the charges made against the dialogue: the Loeb editor’s complaint that it follows no apparent plan, and Aristotle’s that it seems to be attempting two quite different projects, which are not convincingly related to one another. The plan may not be articulated as such, but a detectable plan there certainly is. It does indeed involve two distinct projects, one idealising, the other more pragmatic, which, however, are connected to each other in a way that Plato himself indicates at crucial junctures as a clearly expressed rationale. Book 1 introduces the main enterprise: constructing a social and political system that will best enable citizens to achieve virtue and happiness. This project is further advanced and described in Book 5, which launches the substantive business of the dialogue after the different kinds of further preparatory discussion undertaken in Books 2 to 4. Key here is the Athenian Stranger’s introduction of the notion of the search for a secondbest politeia that will approximate the ideal of the Republic, and deliver on the promise of the enterprise articulated in Book 1. It will be implemented above all in the provisions for social organisation and education developed in Books 5 to 7 (and where education is concerned – the overriding preoccupation of the whole dialogue – anticipated in important ways in Book 2). It is reaffirmed at the end of Book 12, which returns 16
On the doctor analogy see the classic study of Bobonich (1991); also Schofield (2006: 84–8, 319–21).
The Laws’ two projects
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to the theme of education. However, Plato recognises that if the politeia is going to be realisable in communities consisting mostly of unregenerate humanity, another project – subordinate to the first – must be undertaken. Education for virtue and happiness is not enough. The coercion of law is also required. How to balance and relate these two requirements is the great challenge the Laws attempts to meet, with its distinctive theory of the ‘double’ nature of law: law is of its very nature coercive, but it must be made educative too. Plato’s subordinate project needs to encapsulate reflection on human nature as it is, not just as it could be.17 Hence the historical narrative that constitutes the fresh start in Book 3, which develops ultimately into a theoretical proposal. Experience shows that successful states are those where, through a balance between wisdom (a ‘monarchical’ principle) and freedom (a ‘democratic’ one), friendship or social cohesion is secured. This proposal is one conceived as having a general validity for the circumstances of all actual political communities. What follows in Book 4 is the beginning of Plato’s attempt to theorise the monarchical and democratic principles further, as the doctrine of the rule of law on the one hand, and the idea of preambles to legislation on the other. In other words, the idea of the dual nature of law should be read as the major ingredient in Plato’s own recipe for capitalising on political experience (as evidenced in Book 3) and striking the balance it dictates. The need for wisdom to govern will be recognised above all by assigning ultimate authority to the rule of law (although later books will embed wisdom and virtue also in particular bodies, such as the various boards and councils to be established in the city, and in the end most importantly in the Nocturnal Council described in Book 12 – which is to be charged with reviewing the city’s laws and keeping them in a sound state of preservation: 12.960b–969d). The need for the free status of the citizens to be respected is to be met principally by providing that law is to have a dual nature: with a persuasive and educational, as well as a coercive function. This subsidiary project is what is mostly being worked out in the later books of the dialogue (Books 8 to 12 especially), but as we have seen is already under way in the rules for property classes in Book 5 itself, and for appointment of officials and administrative and other bodies in Book 6.
17
‘By so resolutely taking into account the human factor,’ says Laks (2000: 275), ‘the Laws, in its specific and still very Platonic way, opens the path to Aristotle. One might even go so far as to wonder whether there is already something truly Aristotelian in the Laws.’
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The subsidiary project is indeed (as Aristotle puts it) ‘more common’. Plato’s ideas for a comprehensive legal code, worked out in detail, and for a variety of regulatory bodies ensuring that its provisions are respected, constitute a blueprint for an ordered citizen society that has quite general applicability, not confined to the particular ideal system envisaged in the Laws’ construction of Magnesia. In so far as law is educative, not merely coercive, however, it always has the potential to contribute to the higher goal of the dialogue’s main project: realising a community of the virtuous.
ch apter 2
The relationship of the Laws to other dialogues: A proposal Christopher Rowe
In the middle of Book 4 of the Laws, the visitor from Athens (henceforward just ‘the Athenian’) suggests that if the new city he, Megillus and Clinias are setting up ‘in words’ (logôi) is, like democracy, oligarchy and so forth, to be called by the name of the element in it that is master, then ‘it should have the name of the god that is truly master over reasonable people (noun echontôn)’. ‘And who is the god in this case?’ asks Clinias. Instead of offering a direct answer, the Athenian refers to the myth of the rule of Cronus, ‘which finds its imitation in the city that is best governed of those now existing’ (713b3–4: [archê te kai oikêsis] hês mimêma echousa estin hêtis tôn nun arista oikeitai). Now it looks clear enough that we are not straightforwardly to identify the god in question with Cronus: the rule of Cronus, after all, ended with the end of his age – and what the Athenian draws from the myth of Cronus is just that we must use every device at our disposal to imitate the life said to exist in the time of Cronus, and so far as we participate ourselves in immortality, this is what we must obey in governing both our private lives, at home, and our cities, calling law the disposition thus arrived at by reason (nous) (713e6–714a2).
And it is law – this law, representing the ‘disposition of reason’ – that must be master, and the rulers its slaves. The upshot is that the best kind of city, and by implication the one presently being constructed, will be a rather special kind of ‘theocracy’. It will be one that is governed, not so much by some external god, but – so it seems – by the divine in us: by human reason, that is, human reason at its best, and to the degree that human reason successfully reproduces (‘imitates’) the ratiocination of the god or gods I am most grateful to Malcolm Schofield, whose comments on a first draft of this chapter allowed me in particular to make my response to, and use of, his own positions more accurate and complete as well as more nuanced.
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themselves. This, nous, will be ‘the god that is truly master over reasonable people’, that is, those who possess it (hoi noun echontes). If we go by the etymology of Cronus in the Cratylus (396b),1 Cronus’ name itself stands for ‘pure reason/intellect’ (koros nous): the story of the rule of Cronus, by these lights, will have been a story of a time when reason was imposed on humankind from outside.2 By contrast, in our era,3 we are left to work out our own salvation, from within our own resources. Yet at the same time, the set of arrangements – the ‘disposition’, or dia nomê – that our reason is aiming at, or ‘imitating’, is actually what a god would have put in place if he had been available to do the job for us (even if, according to the story, he had other means at his disposal: a set of divine kings or rulers, as superior to us as we are to our cows or goats, rulers who therefore had as little need for written or even unwritten laws as cow- or goat-herds). Indeed, in so far as it succeeds at all in imitating, that is, in reproducing, the putative divine model or original, the law will be divine, and attributable to the gods (any of them, if they are all equally rational, and if pure reason may be presumed always to come up with the same solutions to the same problems).4 And in fact, such a law will be more authentically ‘divine’, by the Athenian’s lights, than the laws of Cnossus or Sparta, which according to Clinias and Megillus, in the opening sentences of the Laws (1. 624a–b), came respectively from Zeus and Apollo. After all, even if the Athenian is happy to concede that these two cities have genuine constitutions, apparently because of their mixed nature,5 the constitution of Magnesia will evidently be better than they are, and so, in the terms the Athenian is using, ipso facto more rational, more godlike. See Robert Mayhew’s chapter in the present volume. Plato’s gods are typically examples of pure reason in any case; no need to appeal here to the Cratylus, then – except that the Cratylus etymology will give extra point, for anyone who has read that dialogue, to the use of the Cronus myth. (The Laws passage itself suggests a less complete etymology: Kronou – nou. See Schofield 2003: 9 n. 11, referring to Alice van Harten.) It will be part of the general argument of the present chapter that the Laws is not only replete with, but in large part draws and depends on, references to other dialogues. The Cronus theme itself is not derived directly from Hesiod, but from its appropriation in the Politicus: see below. 3 Or, as I suppose, in real life (pace Robert Mayhew: see n. 1 above): the Athenian shows no sign of treating the age of Cronus as anything other than a story, if a useful one. 4 Cf. 12. 957c7 (‘our divine and wonderful law’). For what looks like the same analysis of the argument, only spelled out in less detail, see Schofield (2003) (a piece that will be of some importance for the present chapter): ‘The right politeia will … be one in which reason – the immortal in us – is what we obey’ (Schofield 2003: 8). 5 This is the feature that appears to exempt them from the judgement passed on other cities: that they are merely kinds of despoteiai (of the ordinary, human, kind), varying only according to which part is master, which the slave (4. 712e–713a). 1
2
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Yet none of these connections is explicitly made. The Athenian never spells his argument out to Clinias and Megillus, and nowhere spells out, in so many words, the answer he seemed to be promising to Clinias’ question: ‘Who is the god in this case?’ (‘Which of the gods should the type of city we’re constructing be named after?’) The god in question might in principle have been identified as Zeus (or Apollo, or … ), but that would have obscured the difference between the case of Cnossus or Sparta, on the one hand, and that of Magnesia on the other. The laws of Magnesia are not to be got directly from a god, in the way that Minos is supposed to have constructed actual Cretan laws following regular get-togethers between him and his father Zeus (1. 624a–b);6 they are to be – will be – put together by human minds, human lawgivers (the ones now talking to each other), using their own resources. But Plato seems content to allow even this apparently simple point, that is, the contrast between Magnesia and actual cities, to pass by the Athenian’s two interlocutors. Or at any rate, Clinias never presses his question (‘So which god is it?’); instead, he allows the Athenian to move straight into his opening address to the new colonists,7 in which ‘the god’ or ‘god’ (ho theos) is simply assumed as the basis of everything,8 and the law is from the beginning of the address labelled as ‘divine’ (716a3). To all appearances, the colonists will be allowed, indeed encouraged, to think of their system of laws in the way that Clinias and Megillus think of those of their own native cities’ laws, that is, as literally god-given. The pair of them must, one assumes, understand well enough that this cannot be true, in the case of Magnesia, in so far as they are themselves actually taking part in the process of writing up the Magnesian law code. To that degree, they are – or ought to be – ahead of the colonists. However, it is not at all clear how much else they really understand of what the Athenian is saying; that is, how much the author, Plato, wants us to think they understand. In particular, are they meant to have grasped the true answer to that question that Clinias asked?9 Nor, we may add, will the justice system in the city be ‘disposed’ (dianemein) as Rhadamanthys, Minos’ brother, disposed the Cretan system, presumably on the basis of what he is supposed to have heard from his brother after the latter’s visits to Zeus’ cave (Laws 1. 624b–625a); the ‘disposition of mind’ or reason (nou dianomê) that is nomos in Magnesia will involve a radically different approach to judicial matters from that used by any current city, including any Cretan one. 7 Imagined as assembled in the spot carefully chosen, at the beginning of Book 4, for the new foundation. 8 He ‘holds beginning, end and middle of all things that are, as the old saying confirms’ (4. 715e8–716a1); he is also ‘more than anything measure of all things’ (716c4–5). 9 We should recall here that the Athenian and his two interlocutors are in effect mimicking Minos’ visits to his father – making up a law code while walking to Zeus’ cave on Mount Ida (cf. Schofield 2003: 4). 6
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I suspect not. The evidence, I suggest, is provided by Clinias’ response at 715d7 to a particularly purple contribution from the Athenian: the one that actually provides the final element needed in order to construct the answer to Clinias’ question, about the identity of the god – that it’s the law that will be master (as the dêmos is in a democracy, the few in an oligarchy, and so on).10 In any city in which law is ineffective, the Athenian concludes, ruin is the consequence; ‘but where law is master of those in power, and those in power are slaves of the law, there I see safety coming about, along with all the goods the gods give to cities’ (715d3–6). ‘Yes, by Zeus!’ answers Clinias; ‘you have the sharpness of sight that belongs to your age.’11 He appears not only as not having followed the argument, but even as having lost interest in his original question; instead, he expresses his admiration for what the Athenian has just said, as an isolated sentiment, and by means of a commonplace that actually cuts across the Athenian’s own implied notion of reason. ‘Just the sort of wisdom we associate with age!’ ‘Everybody is at his dimmest in seeing such things when he’s young, and sharpest when he’s old’, the Athenian carefully answers, conceding nothing to Clinias’ suggestion that age by itself brings wisdom;12 the kind of godlike wisdom he has in mind could scarcely be acquired so easily. The truth is, I believe (and this is part, though hardly the most controversial part, of the ‘proposal’ announced by the title of the present chapter), that the Athenian is here talking over the heads of his two interlocutors, just as the lawgiver is talking over the heads of the colonists, and almost (if not quite) to the same degree.13 I also believe, and will shortly attempt to demonstrate in a small way, that this is a common if not ubiquitous feature of the Laws as a whole. That is: the Athenian – and so Plato, as author – is talking simultaneously on different levels: the level on which Clinias and Megillus operate, and that on which the colonists, or the bulk of them, are But, the argument will go, law is the ‘disposition of nous’; so the mastery will belong to nous – our nous, to the extent that it can claim godlikeness/‘immortality’. Schofield (2003: 7) seems to interpret kath’hêlikian here in a different way; I think wrongly. 12 That is, in so far as he makes any increase in wisdom with age purely relative to the individual; his own sentiment recalls, or is at any rate consistent with, e.g., what Socrates says about the dangers of allowing the young to practise dialectic at Republic 7. 537e–539d. Clinias’ remark itself shows his failure to grasp the full implication of an earlier passage (3. 689c ff.), about which the Athenian has just reminded him (714e): that none of the usual grounds for claiming authority – parent over child, high-born over low-, old over young, master over slave, stronger over weaker – stacks up against the ‘greatest claim to authority’ (axiôma: 690b8–9), that of the wise (phronôn) over the ignorant (anepistêmôn). Old age does not bring wisdom by itself (even if we do, for the most part, tend to get wiser as we get older – as no doubt we are meant to suppose that Clinias and Megillus have done, in their way, as well as the Athenian). 13 ‘Not quite’, if for no other reason than because of Clinias’ and Megillus’ role as fellow-lawgivers. 10 11
Relationship of the Laws to other dialogues
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presumed by the lawgiver14 to operate (if that is significantly different from Clinias’ and Megillus’); and then, beyond that, the Athenian talks on a further level, which is to be discovered beneath the surface, and which we, as readers, have to put in some effort to excavate. This is an important part of the reason – so I propose – that the Laws typically appears to us moderns as obscure and difficult, and its argument elusive:15 that is, because its real argument so often runs beneath the surface rather than on it.16 This suggestion has much in common, indeed considerably overlaps, with one that has been made by Malcolm Schofield: that the Laws is written – also17 – for the ‘practised’ reader.18 However, my own version of this idea puts emphasis on two points in particular, the second of which, at least, I mean to put in a more particular, and extravagant, form than the one proposed by Schofield. The first of these two points is the one that I have already been arguing for (and to which there is likely to be less resistance),19 namely that the Laws is a text written for two different sorts of readers: one resembling Clinias and Megillus, who have never encountered anyone like the Athenian before, and who probably have no experience of philosophy of any sort;20 the other composed of experienced philosophers. The second aspect that I wish to emphasise, in my version That is, given the limitations of what he says to them, and the degree of explanation or justification he is prepared to offer for the claims he makes about the way things are and should be. See further below. 15 Take as an example the passage Robert Mayhew refers to, at 903e–904a, despaired of by I. M. Crombie (‘anybody’s guess’) and Trevor Saunders (‘Mumbo-Jumbo’). I shall go on to suggest a key to understanding this and many other apparently obscure passages: that we try reading them as presupposing a knowledge of other things Plato wrote – and possibly, though I have no particular interest in insisting on this, of things that he never wrote down, but that would have been more or less familiar to an audience in the Academy. (One reason why I have no great interest in pressing the latter alternative is that I believe that the Laws is also, or even primarily, aimed at a non-specialist audience. See n. 17 below.) 16 See Penner and Rowe (2005), and especially Rowe (2007b), for other applications of this idea, to other dialogues. 17 ‘Also’ for this kind of reader, because there would be no obvious point in Plato’s having the Athenian address Cliniases and Megilluses at all unless he intended the Laws to be accessible, at least on some level, to people like them. The work is in itself emphatic proof of Plato’s ambition to have his voice heard beyond the narrow space enclosed by the walls of the Academy (even while he leaves the connection with, and application of, familiar ideas and arguments visible to the ‘practised’ eye). 18 Schofield (2003). 19 Apart from anything else, why would anyone want to resist making the Laws more philosophical, more intelligent, than it has seemed to so many to be? 20 Their closest analogue, among the characters of the dialogues, might be someone like Anytus in the Meno, except that Anytus has heard all about Socrates the philosopher, and has decided already that he doesn’t like him, whereas Clinias and Megillus are more responsive – and, in Plato’s eye, more responsible, not least by virtue of their membership of (relatively) well-governed cities. 14
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of Schofield’s idea of the ‘practised reader’, is that such a reader will differ from Clinias and Megillus, and their counterparts in Athens or anywhere else, specifically in that they will have had practice in reading Plato. But now the first point will quickly cease to be separable from this second one: the exposure of the ‘practised reader’ to philosophy (that is, Plato’s, in his conception of such a reader) will above all have been through reading through the dialogues, and/or through experience of dialectic in the Academy. Such readers will, at the most basic level, routinely expect some sort of closure to arguments, in a way that Clinias and Megillus evidently do not; more generally, they will expect a decent justification for proposals made. That is how Platonic dialogues normally work;21 why, our more sophisticated reader will ask – as we moderns typically ask – should the Laws be any different?22 So far I am, I think, doing little more than repeating what is recognisably a version of Schofield’s original thesis. But at this point I wish to add a new element – a different way of taking Schofield’s phrase ‘practised Platonic reader’ (Schofield 2003: 3). Schofield’s practised reader will for the most part simply be aware, in reading the Laws, that the argument is limited; aware that, while making it ‘capable of being persuasive – because inter alia generally intelligible – to a population at large, not to just an intellectual elite’, the author presents it23 ‘in a way which preempts further philosophical debate but at the same time intimates to the practised reader that and how he is preempting it’ (Schofield 2003: 13, 12). Such an idea That is, unless they put off conclusions, and answers to questions raised, ‘to another occasion’: itself a frequent feature of the dialogues, reflecting the limitations both of the genre and, often enough, of the interlocutors themselves. One celebrated case of this sort occurs in Republic Book 6, where Socrates backs off from attempting a direct account of the Good on the grounds of his own limitations. His interlocutors on that occasion, Glaucon and Adimantus, are philosophically quite adept, and by that stage have travelled quite a distance with Socrates; even so (as I propose in Rowe 2007b), a large proportion of the argument has been adapted to their needs, and differs from what one might call the real Platonic argument – that is, the argument as Socrates would have constructed it if he had been talking to others more like himself. In other words, there too, in the Republic, we shall need to distinguish the ‘practised’ reading from the more immediate one, which will in large part replicate that of Glaucon and Adimantus. The difference between the Republic and the Laws, or the one that matters in the present context, is that because Glaucon and Adimantus (and especially Glaucon) are not dialectical/philosophical novices, there can be argument with them, at whatever level. In the case of Clinias and Megillus, the argument has more often to be subterranean. 22 Or, as the question is more typically put, by ‘moderns’: why is the Laws so different? (But, as I propose to respond, in fact it is not: any gaps are to filled by us, following hints in the text, on the basis of what we have read – of Plato – before.) 23 ‘It’: generally, the argument; more specifically, ‘religion [as] used to present the attractions of a particular conception of law and politeia’ (Schofield 2003: 12 – actually part of the same sentence about to be cited in the main text). 21
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reflects a view of the dialogues as dialectical in a strong sense: as asking questions more than providing answers, as opening up debates that may end up at quite different destinations.24 My own proposal starts from a radically different view. For what I propose is that the text of the Laws tends specifically to direct the reader, for the required level of justification, to arguments, and conclusions reached, in other dialogues. (So: ‘a practised Platonic reader’ in the sense of one who has absorbed, and brings to the new text, the substance of – whatever number it may be of – previous ones.) On this account, a Platonic dialogue will be much less open-ended than in Schofield’s view. Platonic dialectic is not so much a matter of talking, and playing the game, but talking to get results; and the results tend to be treated as permanent rather than temporary, contextual, gains. Part of the basis of this aspect of my proposal for understanding the Laws – that is, as presupposing a knowledge of the substance as well as of the methods and approach of other dialogues – lies in the sheer wealth of connections with other Platonic texts, of which I have given a few examples, and will give more.25 Now of course, even if he were making a new start Plato might well be expected to repeat or recur to themes he had already treated before; indeed, one of the commonest views of the Laws in the modern period has been that it reveals a Plato who is rethinking, and turning his back upon, ideas that he had previously held, especially in his so-called ‘middle’ period’,26 and especially the political ideas of the Republic, the ‘middle’ dialogue par excellence.27 In fact, however, I see no evidence at all that the ‘intertextual resonances’ in question work in this way, at any rate in Laws Book 4.28 Rather, as I have suggested, they are there to take the real argument forward: that level of argument, often ‘subterranean’, that will provide the real and fundamental justification for what Thus, especially, for Schofield the Laws may take up positions different from those Plato has put forward, e.g., in the Republic or the Politicus. See especially Schofield (1999); and further below. 25 See, e.g., nn. 2 and 12 above. Schofield seems to me, at least by implication, seriously to understate these connections – and to understate their importance. 26 ‘So-called “middle”’: like Charles Kahn (1996, 2002), I reject the division of the dialogues that has become standard in recent decades, into ‘early’, ‘middle’ and ‘late’, even while accepting that they may well still fall into three groups, written in different periods. The crucial point made by Kahn is that chronological groupings do not necessarily reflect doctrinal differences (so that features often thought to be typical of ‘middle’ dialogues are in fact shared by some members of Group I as well as members of Group II). However, in other respects – not least in respect of what I believe it is to be a ‘Platonist’ – my position differs quite radically from Kahn’s: see Rowe (2007b). 27 Schofield himself distances himself from this camp (Schofield 2003: 9–11). 28 That is, the part of the Laws presently under consideration (though I would hazard that the other eleven books behave in a similar fashion). ‘Intertextual resonances’ is Schofield’s phrase (2003: 9). 24
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is proposed at the surface of the level of the text – even, sometimes (as in the case of the stretch of text so far considered), providing the actual point being put forward, which is at or beyond the limits of the understanding of the actual interlocutors. This is the proposal which I set out to provide with at least a minimum of plausibility in the remainder of this chapter. An important case in point is the use of the Republic and the Politicus in Laws Book 4,29 as the three speakers begin the process of ‘using words to put together a city’ – so Clinias phrases it in the closing moments of Book 3 (702d1–2). Here, in the following long paragraph, is an outline of this part of the dialogue (paraphrase with occasional quotations), down to the address by the ‘legislators’ to the new colonists. The Athenian first discusses the siting of the city, and its effect on the quality of the citizens.30 He then asks what the chief factors will be in determining the success or failure of a city, beginning with the pessimistic view that it is chance that governs all human affairs: that it is chance occurrences and disasters that are the legislators, not human beings, in so far as political arrangements and laws can be upset by war, or extreme shortages, or plagues, and generally misfortunes (akairiai) over a long period of many years. The same is true, he suggests, whether it’s a matter of seafaring, or steersmanship, or medicine, or generalship: that is, presumably, in all such areas it is a matter of events controlling us rather than of our controlling events (709a1–b4). But then he immediately corrects himself: it’s god, ‘and with god, chance and the right moment (kairos), that govern all human affairs. Yet it will be a less harsh view (hêmerôteron) to concede that expertise (technê) must follow these; for on the occasion (kairos) of a storm I would count it a great advantage to have got steersmanship along too rather than not. Or isn’t that so?’ ‘It is.’ ‘Well then, it will be the same in the other cases too, and lawgiving must be assigned the same role [sc. as steersmanship]: when the other things come together that have to coincide with the right place, that is, if it were ever going to run happily, then such a city must every time fall in with the lawgiver that holds to truth.’ ‘Very truly said.’ ‘So the person equipped in relation to each of the things I’ve cited [sc. seafaring, steersmanship, medicine, generalship] would, I imagine, be right to pray for whatever it is that, if it were present for For a rather different account of this subject, see Schofield (1999). Suitably far from the sea, without the kinds of timber available to build ships … Most of this context appears relatively straightforward, but there are some oddities; perhaps oddest of all is the phrasing of 705c9–d1, ‘It’s a good thing for a city not to be able easily to make bad imitations of her enemies.’ Clinias naturally asks the Athenian to explain, which he does (maritime nations end up giving honours to those who aren’t the best: 707a–b); what he doesn’t explain is what ‘bad imitation’ is. This we need to get from the Politicus (300d–e; see comments in Rowe 1995 on the whole context): ‘bad imitation’ is imitation on the basis of (unrecognised) ignorance of the goodness or badness of what is being imitated.
29 30
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him by chance, would only require expertise in addition [sc. to achieve his ends]?’ ‘Absolutely.’ ‘And all the experts just mentioned, if they were told to say what they would pray for, would do so. Right?’ ‘Of course.’ ‘Then I think the lawgiver would do the same.’ (709b7–d8)
And what he would pray for is a city under a tyranny: one with a tyrant who is ‘young, retentive, ready to learn, courageous and magnificent (mega loprepês)’; he must also have ‘what we were saying must accompany all the parts of virtue … if there is to be any advantage from the presence of the others’ (709e8–710a2).31 Clinias32 says to Megillus that he takes the Athenian to be referring to sôphrosunê: ‘the demotic sort, yes, Clinias,’ says the Athenian, ‘not the sort that one might mention in a loftier context (semnunôn), making sôphronein be a matter of wisdom (phronêsis) as well’ (710a2–6), but the sort of restraint in relation to pleasures that one sometimes finds in children and animals – ‘something that we said [sc. at 690e] was not worth much if it was possessed in isolation from the many good things we were talking about/the many things [we were saying were] called Schofield (1999: 45–50) draws attention to the phrase hê turannoumenê psuchê at 709e9– 710a1: extraordinary (I say) because the context gives us no reason to suppose that the young tyrant’s soul will be ‘tyrannised’, ‘under a tyranny’. The phrase is surely meant, as Schofield says, to recall the use of the identical phrase at Republic 9. 577e1; he goes on to argue that the reference is designed precisely to undermine the likelihood, or even the very possibility, of the solution apparently being offered (whatever others might be available), given also the presence in neighbouring contexts of repeated assertions of the unavoidable corruptibility of human rulers (3. 691c–d, 4. 713c–d, 9. 875a). In my view this argument of Schofield’s is not made. (1) The ‘soul under tyranny’ is actually required, in effect, not to be ‘under tyranny’, in so far as it is required to be ‘in control’ with respect to pleasures (710a–b, esp. a7–8; cf. Republic 9. 573a, etc.). (2) The tyrannical type of soul, according to the Republic account, takes time to evolve, whereas it is the first requirement of the tyrant of the Laws that he be young (709e7): the point, I take it, is that the solution requires concentration of power in a single individual – which, in the absence of wisdom, is likely to be describable only in terms of ‘tyranny’ (kingship, implying at least passable laws, is considered separately, and as a second-best solution, presumably because a kingship will be more settled: 710e3–4). (3) Neither the young tyrant nor any human being, according to the Laws account, will finally be in control of Magnesia; the tyrant himself is merely a means to an end. To take Schofield’s line will in effect be to miss these essential features of the argument of Book 4 (which earlier parts of his chapter show that he does not). ‘The soul under tyranny’, I presume, is at one level the simple and (at this level) misleading counterpart of ‘a city under tyranny’ in 710e6; at the same time, and at another level, it momentarily raises the very objection that a hardened reader of the Republic would raise – an objection that will then begin to be answered in the very same sentence (the tyrant must also be in control of himself). Of course such a gifted soul, in the absence of guidance, would become corrupted, and a slave to its desires; but given guidance, it won’t, and with the establishment of the best city will be enslaved to the law like every other soul. (Trevor Saunders’ translation of hê turanneuomenê psuchê as ‘his dictatorial soul’ seems to duck the problem – unless turanneuomenê could be taken as middle; but this is surely wishful thinking, especially after turanneuomenê polis a few lines before. ‘The soul under tyranny’ it must be.) 32 Apparently betraying some uncertainty; he surely oughtn’t to be uncertain, given how much was made of the point? 31
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good’ (a8–b2).33 If our tyrant has this quality as well as the others, this is the quickest and best way a city will acquire the constitution that will make it happiest; ‘there isn’t and won’t ever be a quicker and better way than this of establishing a constitution [sc. of the sort we’re after]’ (b7–9). Clinias is puzzled: ‘How would someone who said this – that a tyrant was needed – persuade himself it was correct; what argument would he use?’ It’s easy enough to see that this is so, in the nature of things, responds the Athenian;34 you just have to add that the young tyrant, in addition to everything else, will be lucky, specifically in having the right kind of legislator beside him – ‘for once this has happened, practically everything will have been finished by (the) god that he does when he wants some city to be exceptionally happy’ (710d1–3). Next best will be if there are two rulers of the right kind, third best and so on if there are more. So, infers Clinias, you’re saying: easiest and quickest from a tyranny, given a top lawgiver and a well-behaved tyrant, next easiest and quickest from an oligarchy – right? – and third from a democracy? Wrong – first from a tyranny, second from a ‘kingly constitution’ (710e4),35 third from some sort of democracy; an oligarchy would be least able tolerate the kind of reform we’re after (too many centres of power). In any case, that’s the only way of realising the changes needed. It hasn’t happened often, if at all; it happens only ‘when a divine passion (erôs) for sôphrona and just practices (epitêdeumata) occurs in great centres of power of one sort or another, whether expressed in the form of monarchy, or because of an excess of wealth or high birth or the like – or if someone should bring to a position of power the nature of a Nestor, who, they say, while excelling all human beings in the power of speech excelled them in A deliberate ambiguity? This sentence in itself, with 690e, constitutes another context that seems to need glossing from outside the Laws to be properly understood. Why exactly is the kind of sôphrosunê in question not worth anything without the other virtues/the virtues properly so called? Answer: (1) because, unlike the other virtues, it is unthinking – it belongs to children too, even animals (this much is in the text); (2) because, specifically, it is isolated from wisdom – without which the other ‘virtues’ are not even goods. See, e.g., Phaedo 82a–b with 69a–c (with the ‘Socratic’ refrain that echoes from the latter passage: ‘virtue is knowledge’). (1), I claim, is incomplete without (2), which is not in the text. 34 Holding back from criticising Clinias for not following? Not so; it’s that Clinias has only heard about tyrannies, without direct experience of one, and has heard nothing good about them (see 711a). 35 Given that the second-best has just been said to be when two people are in power (710d), one might suppose a reference here specifically to the twin kingship of Sparta. But actually the Athenian’s point of view seems to have shifted somewhat: in 710d, his suggestion was that the difficulty of establishing the best city would increase in proportion to the number of people in power; now he is saying that it would increase in relation to the number of effective centres of power (so that oligarchy now comes off worse than democracy: 710e4–7). The trouble, as it were, with kingship – i.e., constitutional kingship – is that all the power isn’t concentrated in one person’s hands. 33
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sôphrosunê even more. Well, they say that happened at the time of the Trojan Wars, but never in our time; but in any case if there has been such a person, if there will be, or if one of us is such, then he himself lives a blessed life, and so do those who obey what flows from the mouth of the sôphronôn. It’s the same in relation to power in general: that whenever the greatest power comes together with wisdom and sôphrosunê among humankind (en anthrôpôi),36 then the birth of the best constitution, and laws to match, will come about, but otherwise not at all. Well then, let this count as said in oracular fashion (kechrêsmôidêsthô), as if it were some kind of story, and let it count as shown that while it’s a hard thing for a well-governed city to come into being, still, if things were to come about as we say, then that would be by a long way the quickest and easiest route by which it could happen.’ ‘How?’37 ‘Like old men being boys, let’s try fitting [sc. what we’ve said?] to your city, and moulding its laws in theory/in our discussion (tôi logôi).’ ‘Let’s get on our way, then, and not dally any longer.’38 (711e3–712b3)
An invocation to god follows, then a question about what kind of constitution the new city should have: answer, none of those currently recognised, because these are not constitutions at all. We now arrive back at the passage with which this chapter began: if constitutions are to be called after whichever element or group in a city has the mastery, then this city should be called after the god that will be its master.39 The summary of the preceding parts of Book 4 will incidentally have served, I hope, to confirm the identification of this god with nous; after all, the chief requirement for bringing the best kind of city into existence has been said to be the co-presence of power and expertise – human power, that is, and human expertise, and any god or gods have been assigned only the most general In the case of Nestor, and all the other hypothetical cases just reviewed, the crucial requirement is for ‘a divine passion for practices that are sôphrona and just’; the case of the young tyrant will be parallel, except that his ‘passion’ for such practices will be expressed in his enlisting the aid of the expert lawgiver. There is no suggestion that Nestor et al. (if there ever were al.) themselves had such experts available, nor indeed that they were or are such experts themselves (pace Noburu Notomi, as reported to me by Malcolm Schofield: the image of the legislator who is himself a tyrant, at 5. 735d and 739a, is quite separate, arising specifically in the context of how a legislator might enforce his insights, and to my mind still presupposes the idea of the kind of true expertise not attributed to a Nestor). Their ‘passion’ – contrasting with the master ‘passion’ (erôs) that destroys the tyrant of Republic Book 9 (572e5, etc.) – is what counts. But when he goes on to generalise (‘It’s the same in relation to power in general’), the Athenian smuggles expertise, or wisdom, back in: ‘whenever the greatest power comes together with wisdom (phronein) and sôph rosunê among humankind … ’. So the past does bear out his argument – in a way; and after all, Homer did make Nestor ‘wisest’ (sophôtatos) of those who went to Troy (Hippias at Hippias Major 364c). See further on Nestor below. 37 Clinias’ obtuseness here (if that is what it is) does seem even more extreme than normal; the text may well be faulty, but this is by no means certain, given how much else Clinias actually does miss. In any case the Athenian apparently ignores his question. 38 So according to Clinias, it seems, what the Athenian has just been saying was just postponing the real business. 39 Then follows the address to the colonists, on which see further below. 36
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role in the wider world outside the city itself (‘god governs everything’, and so on). However, what is of greater importance in the context of my present argument – and of the ‘proposal’ of my title – is the relationship of the whole context, here in Laws Book 4, to the Politicus (and also, as it will turn out,40 to the Republic). It should, I think, be uncontroversial to claim in general terms that the Cronus myth, which the Athenian uses here in the Laws to answer Clinias’ question (‘Which god?’), is closely related to its counterpart in the Politicus, even if that is part of a much larger whole (268e–274e). In particular, both versions have the same outcomes, except in so far as the Laws version openly uses the imperative mood, as it were: in the Politicus, the visitor from Elea contrasts the age of the rule of Cronus with the present age, and remarks how human beings, bereft of direct divine rule, have had to rely on their own expertise, in its various forms;41 here in the Laws, the Athenian tells his interlocutors that it is the business of us humans to imitate ‘the life said to have existed at the time of Cronus, and so far as we participate ourselves in immortality, this is what we must obey in governing’ our lives and our cities42 – evidently via the expertise of the lawgiver. The only significant differences between the two versions of the myth, apart from the greater brevity of the Laws version, are (1) that the Laws version has Cronus himself intervening to save human beings from themselves (whereas in the Politicus ‘god’ intervenes, so beginning the age in which many people say Cronus ruled: Politicus 269a), and (2) that in the Laws god himself makes human beings happy in the Cronian era (whereas in the Politicus it is left an open question whether the subjects of Cronus were happy: it depends, we are told, on whether they did philosophy or not: Politicus 272b–d). Both differences, however, are easily enough explained: (1) the god who intervenes in the Laws version might as well be Cronus, since it’s only a story (and the story evidently needs to be short and uncomplicated);43 and (2) what Cronus does in the Laws is only to provide In itself, hardly news: again, see Schofield. However, the important question is about the precise nature of the intertextuality with the Republic. 41 Political expertise is not specifically mentioned, perhaps because it is not clear there has been anyone, yet, who could properly claim to have such an expertise – and the Eleatic visitor is, after all, describing how things actually are in the present age. Since the lack of real political expertise is by implication something to be deplored, the Politicus context will itself include at least a covert imperative. 42 713e–714a, already quoted at the beginning of the present chapter. 43 See 4. 713a–b, c. In the Politicus, the era of Cronus is supposed to be (pre-)historical (the account is of what lies behind people’s stories); but presumably we – practised readers – are not meant to be fooled. The Politicus myth is said to be unnecessarily long (277b); but actually it is long for a reason (that it performs several different functions simultaneously). 40
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the conditions under which ‘the races of men’ will be ‘ free from stasis and happy’, that is, as I take it, happy in so far as they are free from stasis. Taking all relevant considerations into account, I think it a reasonable inference that the Plato of the Laws is adapting the Cronus myth of the Politicus to serve the different requirements of a different context. But my claim is, of course (given the nature of my ‘proposal’), rather stronger than that: it is that Plato expects the ‘practised reader’ both to recognise a reference, in the Laws version of the myth, to the longer Politicus version, and, most importantly, to be able to fill out its sense from that source. Thus for example I suggest that Plato will expect such a reader to be able to recognise, and to resolve, the apparent tension, if not open contradiction, between the claim that ‘in whichever cities it is not a god that rules but some mortal, there is no escape for their citizens from bad things, or from troubles’ (713e4–6), and the claim, made less than two Stephanus pages earlier, that a combination of two human beings – the upstanding young tyrant and the expert lawgiver – can at least make a real difference (will achieve the equivalent of saving a ship in a storm, 709b7–c9;44 will allow a city to ‘be at its happiest’, 710b7). For the colonists, and I think also for Clinias and Megillus (see above), there is no tension or contradiction, because on the account that will be given to the colonists (715e ff.), which is also – so I have argued – the account that Clinias and Megillus seem at least inclined to accept, it is actually a god who will be in control in the city of Magnesia, as it is under present conditions in Cnossus and Sparta. (Clinias and Megillus have explicitly agreed to this.) By contrast, philosophical readers will find the juxtaposition of the two claims in question more or less jarring (that is, provided that that they have not already decided that there is no appropriately philosophical meat for them in the dialogue).45 But if they have read the Politicus – whose outcomes have been several times recalled in the Laws Book 4 discussion up to this point, especially in relation to constitutions – they will have ready to hand a large-scale specification of the kind of political expert – whether in power himself, or standing by the side of a ruler (Politicus 259a–b) – who by the application of impersonal, godlike reason will, or would,46 be able to save See also 714a: if a city has the wrong kind of ruler, ‘there’s no way it will be saved’ (a7–8). For another use of the analogy with seamanship, see the Politicus, passim, but especially at 299b–e, where the example of the expert being compared to the seaman or doctor is unmistakably Socrates. 45 Cf., e.g., Nightingale (1993). 46 ‘In relation to constitutions’: compare 712c–715d with Politicus 301c–303c (with important supporting material from the encounter between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic Book 1), and there is scarcely any point of difference – except that the Politicus context (and that in 44
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cities from shipwreck. Then indeed it would be god, not ‘some mortal’, who ruled.47 However, there is a much more specific intertextual reference in our Cronus passage here in the Laws; and it is not to the Politicus. ‘This story (logos), then, tells us, and tells us truly (alêtheiai chrômenos), that in whichever cities it is not a god that rules but some mortal, there is no escape for their citizens from bad things, or from troubles’ (713e3–6). No one reading this passage who has the slightest familiarity with the Republic can surely fail to hear an echo of that ringing statement, in Book 5, about the need to bring political power and philosophy together:48 ‘Unless … either philosophers exercise kingly rule in cities or those presently called kings and dynasts philosophise genuinely and sufficiently …, no respite from bad things is possible … for cities’ (473c11–d6). Of course, as I have conceded earlier, ideas can as easily be recalled to be modified or rejected as to be re-used and re-endorsed.49 However, in the absence of any clear signal, in the whole context of the Laws, of the rejection of the idea of philosophical rule,50 it seems to me entirely plausible to suppose that Plato means specifically to reintroduce that idea here: that is, to indicate that the rule of reason is to be understood very specifically in terms of the rule of philo sophical reason. More broadly, Plato means to invite us (if we are ‘practised’ the Republic) is meatier, providing more substantial argument and, particularly, a theoretical framework at which the Laws only hints. ‘Godlike reason’: as the Laws specifically treats it, not the Politicus; but it is something of a commonplace in the dialogues in general that we share in divinity just to the degree that we share in rationality. See, e.g., Phaedrus 230a, Republic 7.518e, 8.589d, e, 10.611e, Theaetetus 176a–177a, Timaeus 90a–d. ‘Would be able to save cities’: i.e., if he ever existed. Laws 4.710d takes a position on the likelihood of such a person’s existing that seems hardly distinguishable from that of the Politicus (292d–293a). 47 According to Malcolm Schofield (Schofield 2003 again) this outcome more or less cuts across the results of the Politicus discussion, which in his view ‘treats law as a very inferior substitute [to reason], rigid and universal, incapable of responding to individual variation or to change as the practitioner of the statesman’s precise knowledge is able to do’ (p. 10). My own reading of the Politicus (see, e.g., Rowe 2000: 244–51), however, sees it as allowing that even the expert statesman himself will ultimately have to set down laws, for the simple reason that he can’t be everywhere at once (294c–295b); and it is a city governed by his laws that will be second-best, because of the inherent weakness of law as an instrument, to direct rule by him in person. The picture of a city that sticks with absolute rigidity to its laws is part of a reductio ad absurdum of constitutionalism, and is not something recommended (except as something better than a city that changes its laws willynilly); how could anyone recommend sticking rigidly to laws unless they were good? (But if they are good, some expertise – some expert – must have been around, somehow.) 48 See, e.g., Schöpsdau (2003 ad loc.); Schofield (2003: 10). 49 See Schöpsdau (2003: 192): (‘Denn die Herrschaft des Gottes, d.i. des Gesetzes, … entspricht, wenn auch nur als “zweitbester Weg” (Pol. [= Politicus] 300c2), funktional der Philosophenherrschaft …)’. 50 That is, apart from the absence of any philosophers in Magnesia, or even (apart from the Athenian) among the speakers – and, above all, the absence of any real dialectic from the conversation between them. But see further below.
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readers) to import into our reading of the Laws whatever parts of the surrounding – and especially the following – argument of the Republic will appear to fit. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that the echo of that crucial sentence in Republic Book 5, in the context of an argument – at all levels – that cities must be ruled by expertise, and by wisdom, makes that outcome inevitable. The connections of Laws Book 4 to this same part of the Republic run deep. Thus, to take another example, the long treatment of the ‘quickest and easiest way’ of realising the best kind of city, involving the young tyrant and his expert adviser, surely finds its parentage in the description, at the beginning of Republic Book 6, of the kind of ‘philosophical nature’ to whom power should be ceded – because of all the qualities shown to be necessary for a soul that is to grasp ‘that which is’ (485a–487a), that is, that has the grasp on reality that must be the basic qualification for power.51 Or rather, the Laws passage reworks the one in the Republic on the basis of the premiss that power and expertise are likely to be located separately (if the latter is to be found at all); but that separation is itself suggested by the initial proposal for philosophical rule – that is, the union of political power with philosophy – as made in Republic Book 5. How to bring that union about? The fact that this question fits rather badly in the Laws context, in so far as that is supposed to be about establishing a new foundation rather than reforming existing cities, is in itself a kind of confirmation that the Athenian has an agenda rather larger than the one he has actually proposed to Clinias and Megillus; and the agenda, in this case, is recognisably that of the Republic. Or, again, take the long sentence that rounds off the Cronus passage in Laws Book 4, which is surely a clear evocation of the discussion of the different types of ‘diseased’ individuals and constitutions in Republic Books 8–9: But if a single human being, or some oligarchy, or else a democracy, having a soul that reaches after pleasures and desires and requires to be filled with these, one that succeeds in containing (stegousan) nothing but is in the grip of an evil that eludes completion or repletion (aplêstôi)52 – if the person in this condition rules Compare especially the lists of qualities that the ‘philosophical nature’ and the young tyrant must possess: the first must be phusei … mnêmôn, eumathês, megaloprepês (Republic 6. 487a3–5), the second neos kai mnêmôn kai eumathês kai andreios kai megaloprepês phusei (Laws 4. 709e7–8); the first has philosophically based versions of these qualities, the second has ordinary versions of them – the philosophy, as it were, being supplied by the wise expert who leads. For a response to a crucial objection to this reading, see n. 31 above. 52 The phrasing here recalls the image of the soul as a leaky jar in the Gorgias (492e–493d: nb especially 493b2–3 to akolaston autou kai ou steganon … dia tên aplêstian), as well as, or by way of, the 51
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over a city, or some individual, by trampling over the laws, as we said just now, there is no means by which safety can be achieved. (714a2–8)
The striking image of an oligarchy or a democracy with a soul, and the even more striking addition of ‘or some individual’ in a6 (‘if the person in this condition rules over a city, or some individual’), surely perfectly evoke – perhaps only make sense in the context of – the parallel analysis of souls and cities that begins in Republic Book 2 and reaches its climax in Books 8–9.53 The outcome – I propose – is that the Laws context appears to move happily between the Politicus and the Republic, and to use both indiscriminately to form the basis of what I have called its underlying argument. Those many scholars who have argued – exactly because of passages like 713e (‘there is no escape … ’) – that the Laws actually abandons the vision of the Republic wholesale, and indeed who see the Politicus itself as at least a step towards the pessimism, or realism, that they find in the Laws (human beings as irredeemably, and without exception, corruptible?): such a conclusion is in my view simply mistaken, being based on a misinterpretation of the Politicus combined with an insufficiently close reading of the Laws.54 A close reading of the kind that I have begun to attempt in this chapter shows that while at one level the Athenian does indeed suggest that control of the best kind of city cannot be entrusted to human beings, in so far as – he proposes – human nature is by nature and inevitably corruptible, at another level he holds out the hope that cities may be saved by the emergence of true expertise, and of true wisdom. The first position is one that treatments of the tyrant (whose soul is aplêstos, 578a1) and of pleasure in Republic Book 9. One subject that I believe deserves investigation, but for which there is no room in this chapter, is the degree of continuity or otherwise between the philosophy of law in the Laws and the theory of punishment that underlies the Gorgias: see Rowe (2007b: Ch. 4), and Sedley (2009 ). 53 ‘Some individual’: the individual, I take it, in this case is the tyrant; the state of the tyrant’s soul, over which he ‘rules’ (or, alternatively, fails to rule), resembles that of the city he governs. ‘Surely perfectly evoke’: as, of course, that passage at 709–10 already has: see n. 31 above. ‘The parallel analysis’: and once more, as we summon up that analysis, the Laws sentence will be that much richer for us than it can be for Clinias or Megillus – if they can be expected to understand parts of it at all. 54 ‘A misinterpretation of the Politicus’: see n. 47 above. ‘An insufficiently close reading of the Laws’: exactly which god is it that will rule Magnesia? (England 1921 is not interested in this kind of question; and Schöpsdau 2003, for all its virtues, does not press it hard enough, partly – I think – because it is too wedded to a developmentalist reading of the Laws.) The answer, it seems to me, is there in the text for all to see, even if some (including Clinias and Megillus) miss it; and given that answer, 713e echoes Republic Book 5 (or is in good shape to do so: see the likely objection I raise below, and my response to it). On the kind of reading of the Politicus and the Laws I have in mind, see Schofield (1999: 6); it has recently become considerably rarer than it used to be, being replaced by the for more nuanced sorts of interpretation advanced, e.g., in Laks (1990; see also 2000, 2005) and by Schofield himself.
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is intended to persuade the mass of the people, themselves insufficiently rational to remain permanently uncorrupted, to surrender themselves unconditionally to the law, represented as handed down by, or somehow originating from, the or a divinity. The second, by contrast, allows the possibility that there will emerge an individual or individuals who share sufficiently in the rationality perfectly exemplified by the gods to be able to construct a system of laws that deserves the unconditional obedience of the rest. At this point the objection might well be raised, probably by one of those whom I have accused of not reading the text closely enough, that I have yet to show that the Laws is committed to the rule of philosophi cal reason. There is no mention of philosophy in the Laws, and precious little evidence of any philosophy – any dialectic – being practised by the work itself. So why shouldn’t we suppose that what Plato is envisaging is something more humdrum and commonplace: the application of the same general ideas, certainly, as he has used before, about the ends of politics, but within the framework of what is no more than good, sound, practical and moral sense, anchored in a familiar-looking Platonic universe, additionally informed by the example of existing (especially Athenian) laws? Where exactly is the evidence of the survival of that peculiar, even eccentric, notion that power should be handed over to philosophers?55 My first response is that I could hardly myself envisage Plato as sponsoring any kind of wisdom that is not philosophical, or at least philosophically based. But that, for the objector, will of course be no more than a presumption, to which the Laws itself will be sufficient counterevidence. I should then, as a second line of response, ask the objector what she56 makes of the Athenian’s treatment, in the part of Laws Book 4 I attempted to summarise above, of sôphrosunê (which I continue to leave untranslated). This is a quality to be possessed by the young tyrant – the one who is going to bring about the best kind of city; but, the Athenian specified, what he has in mind is ‘the demotic sort …, not the sort that After all, the objector might add, there isn’t even any mention of it, as such, in the Politicus – and it has, it seems, disappeared from that sketch of the political argument of the Republic (if that is what it is) with which the Timaeus-Critias begins. (But on the latter, see Rowe 2004.) A form of this objection is already proleptically contained in Schofield (1999: Section III, ‘On statesmanship’): what, after all, has philosophy to do with ruling at all? Not only does Plato move away from the idea of the philosopher-ruler, but he was right to do so, because ruling – as the Politicus allegedly suggests – is a quite separate kind of expertise or technê, analogous to the expertise of the navigator or the doctor. (Whoever would want to be treated in the doctor’s surgery by a philosopher?) But see n. 59 below. 56 For the sake of argument let us suppose that the objector is female. 55
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one might mention in a loftier context, making sôphronein be a matter of wisdom as well’ (710a–2–6). Now Clinias and Megillus have no idea at all about this higher kind of sôphrosunê,57 which the Athenian will use again in the passage that sums up of this part of the discussion: ‘It’s the same in relation to power in general: that whenever the greatest power comes together with wisdom and sôphrosunê among humankind, then the birth of the best constitution, and laws to match, will come about, but otherwise not at all’ (711e8–712a3). This sôphrosunê, the one that ‘is a matter of wisdom as well’, will surely be – for the ‘practised reader’ of Plato – the one talked about in the Charmides, which is either or both (1) knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, in relation to the good and bad, or/and (2) substantive knowledge of the good and the bad themselves.58 So, at any rate, I propose. Why so (my objector might interject)? Why shouldn’t it be just sôph rosunê in its alternative, ordinary, everyday sense of ‘sound-mindedness’, guaranteed even – one might be tempted to say – by the etymology of the word? Why should the Athenian not be thinking of a Solon, say, or a Lycurgus (or of the good sense of a Nestor)? Answer: even the best of actual lawgivers, and a fortiori any ordinary, non-philosophical ‘soundmindedness’, will belong to the world that gives rise to the Athenian’s pessimism about the prospects for humanity – the world, that is, as it is. What he is arguing for, and hoping to help construct, is something better than has so far existed, certainly in Athens and in fact even in Sparta (or Cnossus). And what he is constructing, I propose, is meant to be better precisely because based on something more than sound sense, even with intelligence and experience added in: it is this claim, precisely, that lies behind the idea that Magnesia will be controlled by god, at the same Clinias needs confirmation from Megillus even that he’s got Socrates’ reference to ‘demotic’ sôph rosunê right (see summary above). 58 See Rowe (2007b: Ch. 3, §1, and Ch. 9, n. 11). In this case, Plato is to some degree talking across the Republic; for sôphrosunê as it appears in its leading role there, in Book 4, seems rather closer to sôphrosunê of what the Athenian in the Laws calls the demotic sort; at any rate it is specifically distinguished from wisdom. See Rowe (2007b: Ch. 5), where I argue that it is part and parcel of Socrates’ strategy in the Republic to treat of the ‘virtues’, in Book 4, from a viewpoint other than his own. The true, Socratic, view of sôphrosunê (one that equates it with wisdom), however, comes close to the surface in the description of the ‘philosophical nature’ at 5. 485d–e (see Rowe 2007b: Ch. 7, text to n. 9, with nn. 9 and 11). This will then give special point to the denial, in the parallel passage in Laws Book 4, that the young paragon will possess more than the demotic variety of sôphrosunê; what is presented to Clinias and Megillus, like what is presented to Glaucon and Adimantus, Socrates’ interlocutors in the Republic, is what they can recognise and accept (even as the trail to a richer account, recognisable to the ‘practised’ reader, is also laid: the Republic too requires such a reader). 57
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time that it is not ruled by ‘divinely’ given laws à la Crete or Sparta. That something more is: philosophy (Platonic dialectic).59 I do not claim in the least to have proven any of the above, which I mean still to possess the status of a ‘proposal’.60 However, I do claim that it explains rather more of the phenomena than rival readings, and, particularly, as we move down to the minute detail of the text itself, including the interchanges between the speakers. I recall here especially my diagnosis of the claimed obscurity of the Laws, namely that it derives from Plato’s strategy of working simultaneously at more than one level: at the same time addressing both a philosophically innocent audience (Clinias and Megillus), and one that is not only philosophically experienced but has read other dialogues, and is able to pick up the resonances and put them to work. Much, on any account, passes over the head of the interlocutors; there is much, even, that they ought to see is passing over them. They probably ought to be asking, far more often than they do, ‘what on earth do you mean by that?’ But they are practical people, with a clear practical objective in mind, and the sheer depth and regularity of the Athenian’s apparent obscurantism would in any case mean that calling him properly to account would stop the conversation in short order. We readers, however, I do not mean to suggest by this that Plato thinks philosophy is politikê. What I do suggest is that Plato thinks, and always thought, that politikê, whatever else it requires, has as an absolute requirement that its practitioners be philosophers. The claim is parallel to the one he makes about orators in the Phaedrus: only philosophers have that secure understanding – however secure it can be – of the true ends of life to ensure that their utterances, whether as orators or as statesmen, are always and wholly consistent with those ends (cf. also the outcomes of the encounter with Gorgias in the Gorgias). It is in this sense that philosophy must rule, somehow or other: perhaps, more or less fantastically (cf. Burnyeat 1992), by the medium of entrusting power to philosophers themselves – so long as they also acquire the necessary experience; (slightly) more realistically, by imagining, praying (cf. Laws 4. 709c–e) that a ruler and an expert (sc. and philosophically qualified) lawgiver will come together in a human community, at some time and in some place. So long as that link with philosophy is maintained, the actual detail of the legislation to be recommended might vary considerably: as much, say, as it does between the Republic and the Laws. (In truth, however, there is relatively little detailed law in the Republic: that is the business of the Laws. Cf. Laks 1990.) ‘Platonic dialectic’: in which, evidently, the Nocturnal Council will themselves indulge: see Laws 12. 963d–964a, and Rowe (2003, a first sketch out of which the present chapter has ultimately grown – along with discussions with Hyeok Yu in Durham in 2004–5). 60 The proposal, if fully spelled out, would break the bounds of the present chapter; it would include the claim – which to many, if not most, would seem preposterous – that the Plato of the Laws retains a Socratic-style psychology, according to which our actions are always and only driven by our desire for the good, and if we miss in our aim it is our beliefs alone that are at fault. This is why knowledge (philosophical knowledge) can be a guarantee of human incorruptibility; or rather, why it could be if it could be fully, or perhaps even ‘adequately’, attained. I shall in a moment recur briefly to this claim of mine, argued for at length in Rowe (2007b), but I do not wish to press it too hard here, for fear that adverse reaction to it might take attention away from other parts of my proposal that will, I hope, appear less outlandish. 59
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are in a different position, with the leisure to interrogate everything the Athenian says. Take as a further small example, of something he surely needs to explain, the sentence at 712a4: ‘Let this count as said in oracular fashion, as if it were some kind of story.’ ‘As if this were some kind of story’: this could perhaps be taken, by a Clinias, to be picking up the reference to Nestor in 711e1–4 (‘that happened at the time of the Trojan Wars, but never in our time’), and as reflecting the unlikeliness that the right people would ever be found. And yet this seems less than wholly consistent with the kechrêsmôidêsthô, ‘let this be said in the fashion of an oracle’, in a context that clearly refers to the future, and with at least a degree of optimism, rather than of pessimism.61 So here is an alternative suggestion. ‘As if this were some kind of story’ is a covert reference to the Republic itself (the dialogue which, as I have argued, provides the basis of the theme of the young tyrant), a conversation parts of which Socrates himself, twice, describes as a kind of ‘story-telling’.62 Here in the Laws, the reference is designed to mark the end of what is in truth – as I have argued – a digression from the business of the Laws, while also, to the close, ‘practised’, reader, acknowledging its source. Or, if this is too speculative, I offer a second example.63 This example is, appropriately, taken from the address to the colonists itself;64 it comes from the preamble to the law on marriage (but still in Book 4). ‘A man should marry’, the more sophisticated, ‘double’ version of the law begins, in between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, having reflected that there is a way in which (estin hêi) the human race, by virtue of a certain aspect of its nature (phusei tini), shares in immortality – something at which in fact (kai) every desire of every human being is by nature aimed (pephuken epithumian ischein pas pasan); for [sc. desiring] to become famous, and not to lie nameless after death, is a desire The sentence, after all, continues ‘and let it count as shown that while it’s a hard thing for a wellgoverned city to come into being, still, if things were to come about as we say, then that would be by a long way the quickest and easiest route by which it could happen’. 62 See Republic 2. 376d9–10 (‘let us educate the men, in our conversation [logôi], as if in a story [hôsper en muthôi], story-telling [muthologountes] at our leisure’), and 501e4 (‘the constitution we’re telling stories about [muthologoumen] in our conversation [logôi]’. See also Timaeus 26c7–8: ‘the citizens and the city which yesterday you [Socrates] described as if in a story [hôsper en muthôi]’; and Phaedrus 276e1–3, which describes it as a ‘fine form of amusement’ to write, ‘telling stories about justice’ and the rest – which Thomas Szlezák (1985: 14), following W. Luther, plausibly sees as itself a reference to the Republic. In the world of the dialogues, the construction of Callipolis as ‘a kind of story’ begins – perhaps – to look like a standing idea. 63 That is, of the way in which the Plato of the Laws operates, at one and the same time, on different levels (one of which requires previous reading). 64 Appropriately, in so far as I claim that the level of understanding shown by Clinias and Megillus is either the same as or rather close to that of the colonists. 61
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for this kind of thing. The human race, then, is something that has natural affinity with (sumphues?) the whole of time; it goes along with it always, and will always do so, in this way being immortal, by leaving behind children, and children of children, always being one and the same thing, and so having a share in immortality, through reproduction. So (dê) to deprive oneself of this willingly is never acceptable to the gods (hosion), and whoever neglects [sc. having] children and a wife does this purposely (ek pronoias).65 (721b6–c8)
At least two aspects of this sentence, apart from its overall logic, immediately require comment: (1) the double qualification of the idea that human beings ‘partake in immortality’ by virtue of their ability to reproduce (‘there is a way in which … by virtue of a certain aspect of its nature’), and (2) the claim that ‘every desire of every human being’ is aimed at immortality. It is possible to gloss over these two issues, and indeed that is what the colonists will presumably have to do, since they will have no opportunity for any discussion with the law. They’ll just have to take it or leave it. But the reader can, and presumably, should, ask questions; and Plato – I propose – will provide the answers. (1) is easy, since after all it is only a few pages since we have been told that human beings also share in immortality in a different way, that is, through our possession of reason (713e). But as soon as we remember this, a question is likely to arise: how will our fulfilment of our natures as reproductive beings relate to our rational natures? That, I think, is the motivation for the addition of that curious tini to phu sei (‘by virtue of a certain aspect of [our human] nature’). Plato is saying to us, even as he addresses his audience of colonists, that he is not giving up on his usual position, that reason, and the acquisition of wisdom, constitute the essential focus of a truly human life – one that will enable us, so far as possible for mere humans, to emulate the divine. This is, of course, one of the central themes of the Symposium; indeed, the central theme, in Socrates’ account of what he learned from the seer Diotima, which also happens to include a valuation of the achievements of the ‘true’ lover as against those of ordinary lovers who produce mere mortal children.66 And, of course, the same account includes, and explains, the idea of a universal desire for immortality: ‘And it follows from what’s been agreed that we must [sc. all] necessarily desire immortality along with the good, if indeed our passion is for the good to be ours always’ (Symposium 206e8– 207a2). I would venture that the argument here is wholly peculiar to the The Laws keeps the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate wrongdoing even while still repeating the Socratic maxim ‘no one does wrong willingly’: see Rowe (2003). 66 ‘Becoming immortal’, Symposium 212a5–7; valuation of ordinary reproduction as against higher forms, 208d ff. 65
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Symposium context, apart from being somewhat peculiar in itself, even if its ultimate purpose and purport are clear enough: namely that we all, in truth, desire the state that Diotima describes at the end of her account (because that, it seems, is true happiness, and what else would we want for ourselves?). I would also venture that the aspect of the Laws passage in question, that is, my (2) above (the claim that all desires are for immortality), will not make any sense without the Symposium passage. If that passage did not exist, we would scarcely be able to make it up, so peculiar is it, and so bound to its context. So much for my proposal: that we need always to read the Laws together with other dialogues (without distinction, i.e., not just dialogues of some particular ‘period’), at the risk of not understanding, with any completeness, what the author had in mind at all. Whatever he may say to a Clinias, a Megillus, or any other non-philosophical person (i.e., any nonphilosophical reader of the Laws), that will normally67 (1) be consistent with what he has said before, and (2) find its full and proper justification in what he has said before. ‘Normally’, because I should not wish to rule out in advance the possibility of genuine innovation in the Laws (see especially n. 59 above). At the same time I urge that readers of this difficult but important dialogue follow the lead of Laks (1990, 2005) and Schofield (1999, 2003, 2006) in seeing its continuity with other dialogues, rather than starting with the assumption that Plato is making a new start (or just starting to fail). The present chapter is intended as a contribution towards this end – albeit from someone who is considerably more of a unitarian than it has been fashionable for some time to be, and certainly more than either Laks or Schofield. (A ‘unitarian’ here is someone who tends to deny what he or she will regard as the excesses of ‘developmentalism’ in the reading of Plato.)
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ch apter 3
Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws Richard Kraut
I Pl at o’s F u n da m e n ta l I ns ig h t The principal thesis of this chapter is that Plato’s Republic and Laws should be read together as explorations of a theme that fascinates Plato at every stage of his career: the ability of those who have more understanding of what is valuable to lead those who have less. Notice that I say less understanding rather than none. Plato believes that human beings need not be put into one of two exhaustive categories: those who have perfect understanding of what is good, and those who are utterly ignorant of value. Most people, he assumes, fall somewhere between these extremes; and if someone has an unusually good understanding of value, it is appropriate – in fact, it may even be necessary – for him to try to educate those whose grasp of the good is smaller, but who are nonetheless educable. Not everyone, unfortunately, is educable. Plato holds that there can be no common understanding and therefore no stable political cooperation between those who are irreversibly sunk in ignorance and those who have a fuller (yet still imperfect) understanding of what is good. The hope that animates his political philosophy, from its initial steps to its culmination in the Laws, is that those who have some small grasp of value can form a community with those whose cognitive and ethical achievements are greater. Differential understanding of this or that topic is a theme that pervades Plato’s dialogues, even those that do not overtly deal with political or practical matters. In each of his works, one interlocutor emerges as the leading speaker, and is entitled to play this larger role because he most clearly recognizes the difficulties of the subject being investigated, and has the richest stock of ideas about how to confront them. Even in the short ethical I am grateful to audiences at Cornell University, the University of Michigan, and the University of South Carolina for excellent criticism of earlier drafts of this chapter.
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dialogues that end with the conclusion that a satisfactory definition of some concept has not been found, Socrates is portrayed as the speaker who has a better grasp of that concept than any others. In Plato’s avowedly political works, differential powers are assigned to those who have a greater and those who have a smaller understanding of value. That, of course, is evident to every reader of the Republic and the Statesman, but it is no less true of the Laws. The constitution of Magnesia requires that important offices be filled by an elected elite, and that method of selection is designed to give more authority to those of greater wisdom and virtue. One of Plato’s great contributions to political philosophy lies precisely here, in his recognition of the importance of this unequal relationship among human beings. In one respect, his idea is simply a piece of common sense. Successful and stable communities must endure over many generations, and that requires the transmission of their values to new members, who start with a small understanding of what is worthwhile and right. But Plato extends this idea to arrive at the conclusion that political institutions must be overseen by exemplary citizens who have achieved a deeper understanding of the values of the community than is possessed by ordinary citizens. If a polis is to flourish, there must be an ethical and political elite: a group of adults whose rule over other adults is based on their greater understanding of value. That idea animates the Republic and is no less vital to the Laws. So, at any rate, I will argue. I I T h e
pha edo
on Or di n a r y V i r t u e
Let us begin by reminding ourselves of one of the recurring patterns of the short ethical dialogues, many of which were likely to have been written at an early point in Plato’s career: when someone who lacks knowledge comes to recognize his ignorance, he can make at least some progress in remedying this deficiency, if he is properly guided by another person who has a better understanding of the subject. The Meno illustrates this idea by means of a geometrical example, but in many other dialogues that probably pre-date it, some progress is made toward a better grasp of this or that ethical notion. The interlocutors with whom Socrates speaks in these early dialogues are not so lacking in understanding that they cannot make improvements in their ethical beliefs, because they are open-minded enough to accept the arguments Socrates presents to them. (Think of Crito, for example.) These works reflect Plato’s optimistic assumption that progress in moral understanding is possible, provided learner and teacher are a good match for
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each other. There is an ideal state of wisdom to which we should all aspire; there are many who can make no progress toward that goal, because they are locked into systems of false evaluations; and, between these extremes, there is a sizable group, ranging from the ever-inventive Socrates to his less gifted interlocutors, who can, working together, collectively improve themselves. It might nonetheless be said that a significant change occurs in Plato’s thinking at the time that he wrote the Phaedo, for here he could be interpreted to be saying that unless someone subscribes to the distinctive tenets of Platonic metaphysics – an ontology of perfect forms, non-corporeal and eternal souls, and an unknowable world of perceptible objects – he is doomed to remain utterly distant from moral understanding and virtue.1 Socrates says in this work that when such virtues as courage and temperance are divorced from wisdom – as they are when they are valued only insofar as they are instruments for storing up pleasures and avoiding pains – they are “a kind of illusion” (skiagraphia) and “contain nothing sound or true” (69b6–8). If Plato thinks that wisdom, and progress toward that goal, is available only to people who subscribe to his metaphysics and epistemology, and who actively seek a better understanding of the forms, then most human beings must be counted as devoid of wisdom and every other virtue, and they must be deemed incapable of moral progress. Their brand of courage and temperance, which is practiced solely because of the role they play in the calculus of pleasures and pains, must be considered a sham – not a lower level of virtue, but no virtue at all. According to this interpretation, only a tiny band of philosophers is capable of virtue, and it would be fruitless for them to try to educate anyone who cannot be turned toward the philosophical life, because such people are irreversibly locked into an evaluative perspective that overvalues the pleasures of this world and prevents them from ever having any appreciation for what is genuinely worthwhile. But this interpretation of the Phaedo, tempting as it is when we read 69b and the material that immediately precedes it, becomes difficult to sustain when we look at the rest of the dialogue. In a fascinating interlude (89d–91c), Socrates warns Phaedo about the dangers of misology (hatred of argumentation). What is important for our purposes is the comparison he makes between misology and misanthropy, and his condemnation of The interpretation proposed here of the Phaedo should be compared with the very different reading ably defended by Christopher Bobonich (2002: 13–41). My way of interpreting the Republic and Laws is distant from his, but I am indebted both to this work for provoking me to defend an alternative reading, and to the challenging questions he posed about an earlier draft of this chapter.
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the latter as a cognitive error. Misanthropy – the hatred of human beings in general – arises, Socrates says, when someone is frequently betrayed by people he had trusted, and leaps to the overly general conclusion that there is nothing worthwhile in any human being (89d–e). The truth about humankind, Socrates insists, is that very good people and very bad people are small in number, and most people fall between these extremes (90a1–2). Ordinary people may not have real virtue, but they are not to be despised – although Socrates does not say, in this passage, what is creditworthy in them. This acknowledgement of an intermediate level of human worth is reaffirmed in the myth of otherworldly rewards and punishments with which the dialogue closes. Those who have been fully virtuous (that is, philosophers) will be posthumously rewarded with a permanently bodiless existence, and those who once gladly performed the most abominable crimes will be severely punished in Tartarus. Between these extremes are people who are judged to have lived average (mesôs) lives; they are both punished for their misdeeds and rewarded with honors for their good deeds (113d). It is safe to conclude that, according to Plato, most people have something sound in their grasp of value. The imperfections in their understanding of the good make them deserving of punishment for their misdeeds, but their partial moral insight makes them no less deserving of honors for their good behavior. So, even though Socrates describes the apparent courage and temperance of unphilosophical people as “a kind of illusion,” he works with a threefold taxonomy of character, not a simple dichotomy of the very good (namely, philosophers) and the very bad (everyone else). Unfortunately, he never explains, at any point in the Phaedo, why he adopts this more nuanced scheme. Why do most people not deserve our contempt, if their so-called virtue is merely illusory? It might be suggested that Plato gives ordinary people a bit of credit simply because their behavior conforms to minimal moral standards. After all, regardless of their motives they refrain from murder, rape, incest, theft, and so on. Common sense holds that people who commit horrible crimes are at the lowest level of human viciousness, and accordingly Plato, bowing to common sense, agrees that even though it is not virtue that stops most people from living a life a crime, at least something stops them, and that is to their credit. This interpretation does not give a satisfying answer to our question, because it is hard to see why Plato would assume that when we assess a person’s level of praiseworthiness, we can simply ignore their motives and look solely to their behavior. If someone refrains from trying to
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kill his father only because he thinks his father will overpower him and deprive him of his inheritance, we do not say that he is a better person than his counterpart who actually does kill his father. Praiseworthiness is necessarily sensitive to motivation; there is no reason for Plato to think otherwise, and no evidence that he does. When he says that many people deserve posthumous honors, he takes that judgment to be based on certain features of their souls, for it is souls that are judged in the next world. Evidently, some aspect of their motivation deserves a modicum of praise. What we must remember, if we are to solve our puzzle, is that, according to Socrates, most people are filled with beliefs that contradict each other. Yes, many of them believe that the only reasons to be a virtuous person are the extrinsic rewards that justice, courage, and temperance often bring. Insofar as that lies behind their behavior, they deserve no credit for abiding by ordinary social norms. But suppose that at the same time they also believe that there is some reason to be virtuous, apart from the extrinsic rewards of virtue. That feature of their motivation would make them deserve some credit. It might be asked: is it possible for someone both to believe that virtue is desirable only as a means and also to believe that it is desirable in itself? The answer is yes – especially when he is not aware of this contradiction. Someone may consciously think of the virtues as valuable because of their instrumental benefits. If asked, he may say, with complete sincerity, that they are valuable only for this reason. But it is possible, even likely, that at the same time there are beliefs and emotions within him that cannot be reconciled with that conviction. My proposal, then, is that this is how Plato thinks of ordinary people. This conjecture is made plausible by the presence in several dialogues (probably written soon before the Phaedo) of characters who are conflicted in precisely this way. Consider Meno, for example. He thinks of virtue as something that enables someone to manage a household or a city, and thereby to acquire material goods and positions of power. When Socrates asks him about the unjust acquisition of such goods, he shows no hesitation in saying that a virtuous person would never do such a thing (78d1–6), and no doubt he believes that one never should commit acts of injustice. Just below the surface, he both conceives of the virtues as valuable only because of their rewards and also thinks of them as qualities that hold us back from the pursuit of such rewards. Similarly, in the Gorgias, both its eponymous orator and one of his admirers, Polus, are shown to have contradictory beliefs about the relationship between justice and other goods. Justice and other virtues have
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a grip on them that cannot be based solely on their usefulness, for they assume that one should never use the orator’s power for unjust or shameful purposes. But their other beliefs give them no basis for resisting the widely held view that the virtues are valuable only for their effects. I take Plato to be suggesting to his readers that people like Meno, Gorgias, and Polus are not to be entirely despised. After all, Socrates does not think they are hopeless; otherwise he would not be trying to reason with them. Something in their system of beliefs makes them educable; it is possible for them to be shown that some of their convictions, the ones that are false, should be rejected. In this respect, they are representative of a very large portion of humanity. Socrates speaks at one point (Phaedo 82a11) of the “ordinary” (dêmotikê) and “political” (politikê) virtue that most people have – suggesting, with these words, that they indeed have such virtues as justice and courage, although the kind of virtue they have is of a lower order of value than full, philosophical virtue. Since, according to the Phaedo, there is no virtue apart from wisdom, we might say that their souls contain a shadowy form of wisdom – a partial grasp of the good, based on the vision of the forms their souls attained when it was disembodied. They have some true opinions about what is valuable, and these are not just lucky guesses, because they inhere in their souls through its earlier contact with the forms. It is on the basis of this shadowy wisdom that they deserve some small honors in the afterlife. We should recall Socrates’ statement that the virtue of most people is a kind of skiagraphia or illusion (69b6–7). That Greek term designates the kind of painting that creates the illusion, when the viewer is at a certain distance, of solid objects. Something two-dimensional appears as though it has greater depth. What the term is meant to convey, then, is that the virtue of ordinary people is a thin, two-dimensional thing, lacking the full depth of a truly virtuous person. Like a shadow, it has some of the features of what it resembles, because it is similar in shape and size. A painted horse that gives the illusion of three-dimensionality is not completely illusory; it is not like a light beam that looks green even though it is really the opposite color. Similarly, the virtue of ordinary people stems from a thin understanding of what is valuable – thin because it is underdeveloped and lacks the robust complexity that comes only when one’s opinions are worked up into genuine wisdom. Their virtue is illusory, then, in that it presents itself as being all there is to virtue, whereas in fact true virtue is a far fuller quality, requiring genuine wisdom rather than the more limited cognitive achievement of those who implicitly realize that there is something
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intrinsically valuable about virtue, but cannot consistently combine that insight with their other beliefs. I I I Or di n a r y V i r t u e i n t h e
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When we turn to the Republic, we find further indications that Plato’s taxonomy of psychological conditions includes a large area between the extremes of perfect virtue and utter vice. To begin with, we should recall that the analogy of the divided line posits intermediate levels of cognitive accomplishment between shadow-thinking and fully philosophical understanding. The analogy of the cave narrates a story, parallel to the divided line, of progressive moral and intellectual development. Between those who are forced to stare at shadows and those who understand the world of forms in the light of the form of goodness, there are people who occupy intermediate stages, and they arrive at those middle points by a process of learning. The progressivism of the early dialogues thus remains intact, and so too does the idea that to make progress we generally need a guide who has a deeper understanding than we do. The prisoners in the cave do not turn around on their own – they are rescued from their ignorance by others, and are guided through a period of initial confusion caused by the breaking of old habits. (In the same way, the speech of Diotima in Plato’s Symposium assumes that to learn the mysteries of eros we often need an instructor.) The guides who turn the prisoners around are philosophers who, having seen the form of the good, recognize, however reluctantly, that justice requires them to return to the cave and govern those who dwell there. Presumably their job, when they return, is not to supervise the parade of shadows on the wall of the cave, but to insure that the cave dwellers live a better life than that. Their goal cannot be to bring all of the cave dwellers out of the cave and into the sun, for Kallipolis (Plato’s coinage at 527c2) is not a city in which every citizen is brought to a state of full philosophical enlightenment. Plato must be assuming, then, that the non-philosophers over whom the philosophers rule make some progress, but not full progress, in virtue and understanding. These non-philosophers are made better off because of their submission to the governance of philosophers. Plato would not count them as better off unless that governance enables them to travel at least some small distance toward the ideal of full wisdom and virtue. Socrates calls the virtues that the philosophers inculcate in the citizens “ordinary” (dêmotikê, 500d9), and here, as in the Phaedo, we should
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understand him to be saying that they possess a lower order of virtue – not the mere appearance of virtue. It is no doubt a shadowy kind of virtue, since it is based on right opinions and not genuine wisdom, but we have already learned from our discussion of the Phaedo that Plato means to give credit to people whose virtue is two-dimensional. Nonetheless, the ordinary virtue of citizens of Kallipolis is, by Plato’s lights, a cut above the ordinary virtue of most of humankind, because it does not present itself as all there is to virtue, as a skiagraphia presents itself as though it were a genuine three-dimensional object. Ordinary citizens who have been exposed to the rule of philosophers acknowledge that it is the philosophers who truly understand what is valuable, and they defer to their greater wisdom (just as the appetitive part of a well-ordered soul is persuaded that reason should rule). It would therefore be inaccurate to call the virtue of members of Kallipolis’ economic class “illusory”; unlike paintings that create the illusion of depth, they are not trying to deceive anyone about what they are like. They acknowledge their limitations both to themselves and to others. In that respect, they are more admirable than the ordinary people who populate ordinary cities, for although the latter have something creditworthy in their souls, they complacently believe that the virtues they possess are as fully developed as virtues can be. Plato assumes that innate cognitive and affective limitations among many of those who are ruled in Kallipolis prevent them from making more than a modicum of moral progress, so they are incapable of full understanding and virtue. That is one of the underlying truths conveyed by the myth of the metals (414d–415c). Not only are these citizens limited in the cognitive tools they possess – tools that are needed to achieve a philosophical understanding of value; there are also powerful affective forces at work in them that would, if unchecked, take over their souls and fill them with injustice. They have the faculty of reason, but in them it is a weak force, like a charioteer who is not fully up to the task of controlling his horses (to use the image of the Phaedrus). Furthermore, the influence of the emotions and appetites is quite powerful in such people, threatening to chart the course of the chariot. Only the intervention of philosophical rulers prevents what would be the natural course of their misdevelopment from ruining them. In such a person, “the best element is naturally weak … so that it is unable to rule the beasts within him” (Republic 590c2–4). I take Plato to mean that the citizens who occupy the two lower classes are ruled by reason (in a way) and therefore are just (in a way). They are ruled by an external reason (590d5) – that of their philosophical rulers. When they act, they do so because they accept the framework of
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understanding that has been inculcated in them by their governors, somewhat in the way a passive interlocutor in a Socratic dialogue – someone like Crito, or Lysis, or Charmides – accepts the suggestions of Socrates. It is not merely fear of punishment that makes them act justly, but also their acceptance of the greater wisdom of those whom they have come to trust and admire. The craftsmen and soldiers of Kallipolis possess a passive virtue that can recognize the cogency of reasons offered by others, even though their reasoning faculties, operating on their own, could not have discovered those reasons. The values of such people would have been created by their appetites and passions, had they grown up under the usual circumstances that prevail in Greek cities. A second nature is instilled in them from the outside, overriding and overcoming the resistance of their first nature. I V G l auc on a n d t h e V i r t uous At h e i s t An adult who was trained as a child to take pleasure in acting justly did not thereby acquire any understanding of the nature of justice, and will at first be unable to answer Socratic questions about whether justice is properly classified as a virtue and a great good. That is the condition that Glaucon is in, at the beginning of Book 2 of the Republic. He tells Socrates that justice is good both for itself and for its consequences (358a1–3), but it is only by the end of that dialogue that he has some understanding of why justice is desirable for itself. The members of the lower two classes never reach that stage of comprehension, presumably because they lack the philosophical power to comprehend the arguments of the Republic. Nonetheless, there is no reason why Plato should not think of them as capable of believing that justice is good in itself, and that is presumably what they will believe, if the education arranged for them leads them to take pleasure in just acts. The craftsmen and craftswomen nurtured by the institutions of Kallipolis exercise their manual skills not only for the modest monetary rewards they thereby receive, but also because they genuinely care for all citizens (462a–e) and see the craft they enjoy practicing as a way to be just and useful members of the community. Similarly, in the Laws, Plato’s discussion of the dangers of atheism acknowledges the existence of religious doubters whose character nonetheless gives them a natural love of justice and hatred of injustice (908b). He says that they spontaneously and unreflectively dislike unjust people and their actions, and admire just people for what they do. These goodnatured and justice-loving atheists deny that they or anyone else will win
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otherworldly rewards for being just, and they have nothing approaching a philosophical understanding of what justice is, but even so there is, Plato thinks, something admirable in their character. They have an intuitive grasp of the value of justice, a value they perceive it to have on its own, because they have dismissed as an illusion the otherworldly rewards that others think are given by the gods to just people. Someone who, like Glaucon in Book 2 of the Republic and the justiceloving atheist of Book 10 of the Laws, believes that justice is good in itself is likely to act justly, at least in many circumstances; and he will do so, at least on some occasions, even when the rewards that come with a reputation for justice are not available to him. Otherwise there would no significant behavioral consequences of his sincere admiration of justice for its own sake. But that does not mean that his commitment to justice is absolute, or that he can always be counted on to do the right thing. Justice is one of the things he values for itself, but no doubt he values many other things. So, he might, at least on some occasions, be more attracted to those other goods, and be willing to act unjustly for their sake. It is no surprise, then, that in the Myth of Er Socrates finds in an individual who “shares in virtue through habit but without philosophy” (619c8–d1) the potential to make a grievous posthumous mistake when he selects his next mode of life. Making a snap judgment, he elects to become a tyrant in his next existence, although he comes to regret his decision when he has had more time to reflect on it (619b–d). That does not mean, however, that someone who “shares in virtue through habit but without philosophy” is not really sharing in virtue at all, and merely appears to be virtuous. Demotic virtue is a lower order of excellence than full, philosophical virtue, but it is not the mere appearance of virtue. People who have this unreflective virtue do not regard just acts as a mere means to further ends. They can in normal circumstances be counted on to do what justice requires. Alas, when they find themselves in extraordinary circumstances, such as those described in the Myth of Er, the defects in their understanding of justice and the limits of their emotional attachment to it are likely to become manifest in the choices they make, and they can easily go astray. V M ag n e s i a : A S e c on d -Be s t Ci t y I now turn back to my thesis that Plato’s Republic and Laws are complementary contributions to a single project. Needless to say, there are enormous differences between these works. There is no denying that the
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Republic proposes what is, in some sense, a utopian vision, whereas the Laws is a more practicable guide to political action and more accommodating to widely accepted social customs. But if we apply the label “utopian” to the first of these works and not the second, we should be careful about how we use that word. Malcolm Schofield’s usage is one that I find helpful: utopian thinking, he suggests, is “the imagining of a blueprint for a desired world which is nevertheless located in present-day concerns, with questions about practicability … not necessarily excluded, but regarded as secondary.”2 The Republic certainly does make “questions about practicability” secondary, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Socrates insists four times in this work that Kallipolis is not an impossibility (450c–d, 456b, 499c, 540d). There is nothing in human nature, Plato believes, that rules out a harmonious society governed exclusively by philosophers who have an objective and effective concern for the well-being of all citizens, care nothing for private possessions, and have abandoned ordinary practices of monogamous marriage and childrearing. The Laws contains not a word that retracts this vision of the ideal polis. On the contrary, it reaffirms the ideal of sharing sexual partners, children, and property (739c, 807b), and presents Magnesia as inferior to that ideal precisely because all Magnesians live in conventional households, overseen by a monogamous, child-raising, property-owning couple. From the fact that, for Plato, Kallipolis is the best city, and a possible city, it does not follow that he urges his readers to try to realize it, whatever their circumstances. Whether someone is well advised to improve the world by trying to mold a city’s constitution is a separate question from the problem of what the best city would look like. But in the Republic Plato certainly means to say that if circumstances are favorable, Kallipolis is the kind of city a politically minded person should try to establish, because it is the best possible city. It is not impossible, however unlikely and remote, for circumstances to be favorable for the construction of what is ideal, and in that case politically minded and enlightened people must treat the Republic as a guide to action. It would be a mistake to suppose that only Magnesia is imagined by Plato to be a possible ideal. Although Plato chooses to discuss political issues in the Republic because the best city is to be used as a large-scale model for discerning the best constitution of the soul (368e–369a), his discussion of the role of women in an ideal society, his proposals for the abolition (among the Schofield (2006: 199).
2
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governing class) of private property and conventional marriage, and his eugenic program would be extraneous material, if his sole purpose in describing Kallipolis were to help us better depict justice in the human soul. It goes without saying that the philosopher who wrote the massive and detailed treatise contained within the covers of the Laws had a deep interest in the reconstruction of Greek political life, and no one could seriously propose that we cannot find evidence of that interest in the Republic. Plato clearly believes that something is amiss when people have their own possessions and dilute their devotion to the good of the city by dividing their attention between its well-being and that of their spouses and children. He implicitly concedes in the Republic that a large proportion of humanity cannot be trained to accept any other arrangements than these, and since he wishes to remain with the realm of the possible, his radical changes in property rights and family relations are meant only for the small number of people who can be expected to have lost, through philosophical reflection and habituation, their attachment to the conventional household. By contrast, in his construction of Magnesia, he makes the civic institutions he constructs far less of a departure than Kallipolis was from what ordinary human beings find appealing, but he insists that his construction thereby makes Magnesia a worse city than a city can be. Magnesia achieves as much unity and civic friendship as a city can, if it is based on conventional households (739c–740a); but Plato remains firm in his conviction that a city can do better than that, when its governors are freed from those traditional arrangements. In a way, the construction of Magnesia provides an argument to demonstrate just how useful the political philosophy of the Republic is. Questions about practicability are certainly not secondary in the Laws, and yet one of the organizing ideas of this dialogue is the thesis of the Republic that the good-making property of a city is its unity, a property that is most fully instantiated when children and property are common rather than private possessions. In effect, Plato is telling those who read both dialogues: “See how useful my ideas in the earlier work have turned out to be! The households of Magnesia are as close to being common property as pieces of private property can be. So the ideal of having all things in common has wider application and practical utility than you might have expected. It is certainly not unrealistic to mold the households of existing cities on the model of those of Magnesia, which is, in turn, an approximation to the superior arrangements that would come with the outright abolition of the private sphere among as many citizens as possible.”
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V I Ph i l o s oph ic a l Ru l e a n d t h e Ru l e of L aw One of the most important and evident differences between the Republic and the Laws is that the earlier dialogue gives unlimited power to a ruling elite and none to those governed by them, whereas in the later work rulers are selected in a complex electoral process and scrutinized for malfeasance when their terms of office end. Plato might therefore seem to have become a convert to the ideal of limited government, having flirted in his earlier days with a naïve absolutism. But an attentive reader of these works will see that the truth is more complicated, and that there is no reason to take him to have had second thoughts about the confidence he places in philosophically trained governors. Those who are selected to the many offices prescribed for Magnesia are often described as “servants of the laws” (hupêretas tois nomois, e.g., at 715c7), and it is made clear in several passages that no officer of this city is legally permitted to violate a law, and that those who do so will be severely punished (948a–b). But Plato also affirms, both in the Laws and in the Statesman, that a constitution that adheres to the rule of law in this way is inherently defective. The best arrangement, rather, would be one in which a few individuals with extraordinary insight have the authority to set aside a law when they perceive that the particular circumstances with which they are faced are exceptional and that therefore the law, which is always general in scope, should not be applied (Statesman 294a–295e). That is not a legal freedom that the rulers of Magnesia enjoy, and so this is one respect in which Magnesia must be considered an imperfect political system. Plato recognizes as much when he designates it a second-best arrangement. In an important passage, he emphasizes how difficult it is to find a human being who will not let self-interest or partiality to friends and family distort his perception of the common good, but then he adds that if someone had, by divine dispensation, a nature that is free of the usual human biases, “he would need no laws for himself, for no law or order (taxis) is superior to knowledge, and it is not right for understanding (nous) to be subordinate or a slave to anything, but it is right for it to rule all things” (875c5–d1). He then adds that at the present time there are no such people, or at any rate, too few, and so “one must choose what is secondbest, order and law, which sees and looks after what holds for the most part, but cannot see and look after everything” (d3–5). So, Plato is not someone who once believed in the possibility of incorruptible rulers who must be allowed to serve without legal oversight, but then became convinced that no human being can rise to that level
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of unwavering and absolutely trustworthy moral excellence. The arrangements prescribed for Kallipolis, which place some godlike human beings above the law, are not rejected in his later work as an impossible ideal. V I I Or di n a r y V i r t u e i n t h e
l aw s
Instead of looking for radical alterations in Plato’s political philosophy, we should view the Republic and Laws as works that tackle different but complementary problems. The Republic depicts the highest possible level of human virtue and understanding as qualities underwritten by a philosophical education, and it prescribes institutions that allow for the full flowering of these achievements. Its rich portrayal, in Books 8 and 9, of the various inferior states of the soul and of the corrupt political systems that correspond to those psychological depravities are of interest to Plato not because one would ever want to imitate them but because studying increasing degrees of badness sheds further light on what is best. By contrast, the Laws is a study not of the height of human excellence but of ordinary virtue, which is an order of accomplishment that approximates full virtue and is not to be confused with the diminished psychic conditions examined in the later books of the Republic. Ordinary virtue is a topic to which the Republic pays scant attention, even though it is one that Plato’s political philosophy can scarcely afford to ignore. He devotes almost no attention in that dialogue to the question of how ordinary people, who are not philosophers or the military assistants of philosophers, are to be educated. He says nothing about how a city’s social environment can improve the character of ordinary citizens even when they are adults. This is a remarkable omission, because the householding population of Kallipolis, the group that looks after and generates its material resources, is its largest segment, and its well-being must be of great concern to the city’s rulers. In that sense, Plato had to write more about politics. If he had had no more to say about ordinary virtue, there would have been an immense gap in his political philosophy. Plato acknowledges in the Republic that his exquisitely trained philosophical rulers must return to the cave and become molders of moderation, justice, and the rest of what he calls demotic virtue (500d9), and we should recognize that demotic virtue is precisely the order of excellence that he spends much of the Laws studying: it is the level of virtue that most citizens of Magnesia attain. Only members of the Nocturnal Council – a small segment of the population of Magnesia – attain something more than ordinary virtue, because they alone have acquired a deep
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understanding of the cosmological truths demonstrated in Book 10 of the Laws (967d–968a). Plato expects that the Nocturnal Council will be an institution that trains the most important future leaders of Magnesia, and insists that those who remain at the level of demotic virtue cannot be fully competent rulers, but should serve instead as assistants to those who have a higher order of virtue (968a). So, the Laws advocates a civic hierarchy that resembles that of Kallipolis: political institutions create an elite whose power rests on super ior understanding, and that elite promotes the well-being of non-elite citizens by reasoning with them (in preambles to legislation) and training them (through drinking parties, common meals, public education, dance, song, and military exercises) to reach the level of ordinary virtue, which is the highest good they can attain. The ordinary citizens of Magnesia are related to those who occupy high office as students are related to teachers, and education speaks to them de haut en bas. They attend drinking parties organized by leaders who insure that wine will be consumed with moderation; the preambles to important laws that they read are the constructions of the philosophical founder of Magnesia (that is, the Athenian Visitor) or the city’s philosophically trained elite; and should any citizens lapse into atheism, they are sent to a school where experts on cosmology will try to show them the errors in their world view (908e–909a). Admittedly, although ordinary citizens are treated, in some respects, like the minor conversational partners of a Platonic dialogue (in which one interlocutor controls the discussion and proposes all of the major ideas, whereas the others soak up doctrine and ask occasional questions), their civic role is not one of complete passivity, because the citizens of Magnesia actively select their rulers, unlike the ordinary citizens of Kallipolis (751a–753e). Plato allows them to play this active role because he assumes that people who have acquired ordinary virtue are generally able to recognize which among their fellow citizens have extraordinary skills of political leadership, and will want those superior human beings to fill the most important positions. The philosophical rulers of Magnesia are admired by ordinary citizens, who want to see them continue in office, so long as their admiration continues to be earned. Likewise, Plato undoubtedly believes that the members of the economic class of Kallipolis, properly educated and therefore virtuous to a degree, would choose precisely the philosophical rulers who have overseen their education, were they given a choice. The citizens of Magnesia are given a choice, but no careful reader of Plato believes that in the Laws he comes to believe that political authority derives from the consent of the governed. In this work, as in
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the Republic, what makes it the case that some should have more political power than others is the good that is done by giving them this authority, not some legitimating transfer of power from those who are ruled to their rulers. V I I I T h e F r ag i l i t y of M ag n e s i a n V i r t u e My claim that most of the discussion of virtue in the Laws should be understood as having ordinary rather than full (that is, philosophical) virtue as its subject matter has, thus far, been based entirely on a passage in which Plato uses dêmosia, a variant of dêmotikê, to designate the qualities of mind that a citizen must supplement with cosmological understanding, if he is to be a competent governor (968a2). But there is far more textual evidence than that. In fact, nearly every page of the Laws testifies to this. Recall that I have been taking ordinary virtue to have two principal features. First, it is fragile rather than stable. Someone whose virtue is fragile might act badly in extraordinary circumstances, when temptation becomes overwhelming, as it would if he were given a magical ring that made his crimes undetectable. Second, ordinary virtue gives someone a non-instrumental appreciation of virtue for its own sake. It is a safe assumption that Plato does not take the virtue inculcated in Magnesia to be utterly spurious – a mere façade, resting solely on the recognition of the value of virtue as a means to other ends. What would be the point of composing this vast depiction of a second-best city if the bulk of its population is in no way improved by its legal system, but merely exhibits a pseudo-virtue? Furthermore, if it is asked what evidence we have that the virtues possessed by many of the citizens of Magnesia are fragile, we need only look at the highly restrictive regulations that Plato prescribes for them. Nearly every aspect of their lives is curtailed by legislation. Looking at the content of this legislation, we see that the restrictions imposed on the Magnesians express Plato’s conviction that were most citizens given a larger sphere of freedom to make their own decisions, they would go badly astray. To give some examples: Magnesians are not free to travel abroad at their pleasure, but must receive the city’s permission to do so, which is granted only if travel would benefit the whole city (742b, 949e–951a). We might at first be puzzled about the justification offered by the Athenian for this restriction: it is to prevent Magnesians from needlessly observing the novel customs of foreign cities (950a1). But what is the danger in their doing
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so? After all, the Magnesians are educated to think of their city as one of the finest possible, and so were they to visit other parts of the world and observe how life is lived under alternative political systems, there ought to be little chance that they will wish to change their way of life, when they get back home. The Athenian must be assuming that the meretricious attractions of foreign cities, and perhaps the psychological power of whatever is novel, will tempt them to adopt those inferior practices when they return home. His thought is that one can be genuinely satisfied with the social customs of one’s familiar world, but then become envious and therefore discontent when one observes people evidently enjoying themselves in ways that go beyond one’s own experience. That reaction would not occur in someone who had a deeper and therefore more stable appreciation of value, and so Plato must be assuming that many Magnesians need to be protected from experiencing the temptations on offer in other cities because they lack that deeper appreciation. Other examples: Magnesians are not allowed to profess atheism, or to publicly question whether the gods supervise human affairs (907d–909e). They cannot construct religious shrines in their houses (909d–e), because that would tempt them to think that if they commit a crime, they can privately make a sacrifice to some god and escape detection and punishment. Plato must be afraid that they would violate the law, at least on some occasions, if they thought that there are no gods, or that the gods are not watching over them, or that even if they are watching, they can be bribed. That does not mean that he thinks these Magnesians obey the law only for extrinsic reasons, but it does show that, in his mind, fear of punishment and expectation of reward are essential parts of the reason why these Magnesians act justly and uphold the law. These points about the fragility of the virtue of the Magnesians are crude generalizations, because Plato realizes that in any large population a variety of psychological types can usually be found. He expects that some citizens of Magnesia will have something better than ordinary virtue, and some others will have merely spurious virtue, or perhaps might even sink to the level of those who publicly or privately exhibit disdain for justice, moderation, and respect for the gods. But there is no reason to think that Plato has, in the Laws, revised his belief, on display in the Republic, that the largest part of any citizen body will be people whose reason is a weak force, and whose commitment to justice is sensitive to social circumstances. He realizes (as we noted earlier) that an atheist might love justice, but he insists that generally atheism is a corrosive cosmology (908b–c). For the most part, people will not reliably treat each other as citizens should
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unless they think that there are extra-mundane rewards and punishments that supplement the intrinsic worth of justice. I X Pl at o’s F u n da m e n ta l I ns ig h t R e vi s i t e d I close with three observations. First, if Plato is read in the way I propose, with the Republic and Laws fitting together as complementary treatises, then he must be assuming that a serious error infects the lives of the citizens of his second-best city: although they sense that justice has some noninstrumental value and this guides their behavior, they do not realize that its intrinsic goodness is so great that it is worth cultivating and exercising however bad its consequences, and however lacking it is in good consequences, in this life or any other. Plato assumes, in other words, that they cannot be persuaded of the principal moral thesis of the Republic. That is why he does not have the Athenian make that dialogue, unlike the Laws, required reading for every Magnesian (811c–e). (The workers of Kallipolis have the same defect: although they are taught to value justice for itself, they do not understand it well enough to assess it at its true worth. For them too, the worth of justice needs to be augmented, if it is always to compete successfully with unjust alternatives.) Why is he so pessimistic about this matter? My guess is that he takes the argument of the Republic to rest on the existence of eternal, changeless, and incorporeal forms, and he finds it unrealistic to suppose that this philosophical doctrine, so far removed from common sense, will ever be accepted by a large body of citizens. The Magnesians, after all, are deeply attached to household life. Private property – something they can see and touch – is, alas, important to them. Their sense of what is real and important cannot be expected to encompass entities that cannot be seen and are not made out of any corporeal or psychic stuff. Their physical bias is of a piece with their inability to take justice to be so great a good, by itself, that it needs no supplement in the form of material rewards, honors, or pleasures. Nonetheless, despite these failings, Plato must be convinced that these are people worth caring about, just as the cave dwellers of the Republic must be people worth saving from a life of gazing at images. Second, Plato, as I understand him, assumes that the members of the economic class of Kallipolis are better off than a large proportion of the Magnesians. Kallipolis is, he thinks, the better of these two cities, and it is made better by the fact that its citizens live better lives. But how can that be the case, if many of the citizens of Kallipolis are vulgar craftsmen
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(banausoi), whereas the Magnesians, freed from wage-earning and commercial activities, leave the building, baking, weaving, and so on to noncitizens? My conjecture is that Plato believes that the working class of Kallipolis is happier than their more leisured counterparts in Magnesia because those craftsmen and farmers live under the constant and direct supervision of philosophers and their assistants, whereas the householders of Magnesia are ultimately ruled not by superior individuals but by laws, which, according to the Statesman, are by their nature crude approximations of the ideal imperatives that could be tailor-made by a moral expert to fit the peculiar circumstances of each individual person and action. Wisdom at its best can rule better than a legal system designed for large populations, and it is better to be guided by wisdom than the gross generalizations of the law. It is remarkable, and not often recognized, that, according to Plato, whether one works with one’s hands is not all-important to one’s well-being. What matters much more is the degree to which one is ruled by reason – one’s own or that of another. Both the ordinary citizen of Magnesia and the ordinary citizen of Kallipolis are ruled by a reasonable external authority – a wise human being in one case, an approximation to such wisdom in the other. But if we read these two depictions of ideal regimes as complementary, then Plato’s message is that it is better to work with one’s hands and be ruled by real wisdom, with its flexible sensitivity to context, than to live at leisure but submit to the overly general and unbending generalities that laws must be. My third observation is the one with which I began, when I said that that one of Plato’s great contributions to political philosophy is his recognition of the importance of this unequal relationship among human beings. Like nearly every enlightened person of the modern world, I am a firm believer in human equality, which I take to mean that the wellbeing of every human being is equally important. I do not take that thesis to be incompatible with Plato’s insight about differential understanding and the need for social hierarchies to assign people of greater understanding to the most important roles. In Plato’s two exemplary cities, Kallipolis and Magnesia, the good of all citizens is equally served by social arrangements, and hierarchies of power are justified by their equal contribution to the good of both those who have more and those who have less power. At bottom, Plato’s political philosophy rests on the assumption, which I find plausible, that what is good for us is not immediately transparent to us, because we are not constructed in a way that makes it easily recognizable. The opacity of the good rests on a still
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more fundamental Platonic thesis, namely his conviction that goodness consists not in pleasure or the satisfaction of desire, or knowledge, but in something more elusive – order, harmony, proportion, and balance. We do not have to accept that account of the good to agree with Plato that political communities must be organized with a view to the good of all citizens, and that political philosophy must therefore rest on a theory of human well-being.
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Virtue and law in Plato Julia Annas
In both the Republic and the Laws, Plato delineates societies whose aim is the happiness of the citizens;1 and in both works they are to achieve happiness by living a life of virtue. It is the chief aim of Magnesia, the city of the Laws – one it shares with the Doric societies of Sparta and Crete, though with an enlarged and improved view of it – to make the citizens happy by rendering them virtuous.2 In the Laws we do not find an account of virtue as the harmony of the soul’s parts, as we do in the Republic, but this does not indicate that Plato has narrowed or impoverished his view of virtue as the good condition of the person’s character. Virtue is not merely a matter of reliably doing the right thing, but requires that the person do it in the right way, with the right understanding and with the right feelings. So much is clear from the important programme of education, which is to train the citizens of Magnesia not just to do the right things but to enjoy this, to find a life of virtue pleasant and a life of vice repulsive. There is one obvious change: in Magnesia the citizens are to become virtuous by growing up and living in a society explicitly regulated by laws. The Laws introduces much of the legislation for the new city, and also extensively discusses the nature and role of law in the life of the city, and the way in which the city’s aim, the virtue of the citizens, is to be brought about by the laws. In the Republic it is the education of the rulers, the I am very grateful for comments, which have greatly improved this chapter, from Christopher Bobonich, Christopher Gill, Zena Hitz, Hindy Najman, David O’Connor, and audiences at Princeton and Arizona who heard versions of it. I am solely responsible for all the remaining mistakes and infelicities. 1 Plato’s view in both works is, I hold, that virtue is sufficient for happiness, but by the standards of later theories his position on this is not ideally clear. It is at least clear that in both works virtue is necessary for happiness. 2 Happiness is said to be the city’s aim at Republic 419a1–421c5. In the Laws the aim is happiness (718a6–b5, 742d2–743c6, cf. 631b3–d2, 734d4–e2, 858d6–9); virtue (630b8–e4, 688a1–b4, 705e1–706a4, 770b4–771a4, 853b4–c3, 963a1–4); making the citizens happy by rendering them virtuous (631b3–632d7, 718a3–b5, 828d5–829b2).
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Guardians, which is the key to virtue, and so happiness, while in the later work law is prominent as the work of divine reason in the universe and in us. We are told that we should obey the immortal element in us as we order our homes and cities both publicly and privately, giving the name of law (nomos) to the distribution made by reason (nous).3 It is important, of course, not to exaggerate the differences between the two works. The ideal state in the Republic is envisioned as an exercise in ideal lawmaking, and its provisions and practices are sometimes referred to as laws that have been established.4 The Guardians are sometimes said to be guardians of the laws that structure the ideal state.5 Attention to legislation is said to be unnecessary, but only in matters of detail, in a context where citizens obey the city’s most important laws.6 Still, a new idea is introduced into the Laws by the idea that the citizens’ virtue, and thus happiness, is now to be sought through obedience to laws rather than to rulers. We can appreciate this if we reflect on the emphasis we find, in the Laws, on the idea of ‘slavery to the laws’. The Laws not only accepts the contemporary institution of actual slavery as part of the ideal city, but treats the position of the slave more rigorously and harshly than contemporary practice.7 A master’s communication to slaves, Plato holds, should be mostly one of command (epitaxis).8 For that’s just what the institution is: unquestioned authority on the one hand and unquestioning deference on the other. Given this, masters and slaves can never be friends.9 Plato thinks that we should look this fact in the face unblinkingly. He is notably unworried by humanitarian considerations about the slave; he worries only about masters ruining their own characters by abusing their authority or weakly evading it.10 Given this emphasis on slavery as unquestioning deference to authority, it is remarkable how prominently Plato uses slavery, in the Laws, as a metaphor for the correct human relation to laws. Law is a command (epitaxis), he says.11 He repeatedly says that Athenians of what he takes to be the exemplary generation of the Persian Wars were ‘willing slaves’ to 713e6–714a2; cf. also 957c4–7 for the play on nous and nomos. For example, 471b9–10 – ‘shall we establish this law?’ (about conduct in war). 5 421a5 (at 484b9–c1 they are said to guard the laws). However, the term ‘law guardian’ (nomophulax) is new in the Laws. 6 425c10–426e4. Cf. Morrow (1960: 577–84). 7 Morrow (1939) shows that where Plato departs from contemporary Athenian practice it is nearly always in the direction of strengthening the institution and emphasising the distinction between slave and free. 8 777e6–778a1. 9 757a1–5. Possibly a contrast is intended with Republic 590c7–d7. 10 777c7–778a5. 11 723a5. 3
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their laws and rulers. This kind of slavery is one that should be undertaken by anyone wishing to be virtuous; only the coward is free and fearless. The threat of the Persian Wars, Plato says of the Athenians, ‘made us serve an even greater slavery (douleian eti meizona … douleusai) to the rulers and to the laws’.12 He is describing what he takes to have been an actual society, so he is not limiting the idea to an ideally rational population.13 In Magnesia, we are told, offices will be assigned to those notable for their obedience to law. ‘We say that the highest service of the gods14 is to be given to the person who is first in being most readily obedient to the established laws, and wins this victory in the city … I have called servants of the laws those referred to as rulers not for the sake of innovation; rather, I hold that the city’s safety, and the reverse, depend on this most of all.’15 And it’s not just the rulers, the officials, in Magnesia who must have this attitude to the laws. We find that ‘Every man should have this view about every person, that he who has not served as a slave could not become a praiseworthy master, and that we should take pride in16 serving finely as a slave rather than in ruling finely – first serving the laws, this being slavery to the gods, and then the young serving their elders and those who have lived notably.’17 Plato cannot fail to be aware of the shock-value of this metaphor as applied to free citizens of a state, who pride themselves on not being slaves to any person, and who own actual slaves, and are encouraged to maintain an attitude of authority over them. This attitude, of recognising law as having unconditional authority, is of great interest, and I shall return to it. It inevitably, however, prompts the question of how this can be the basis of a life of virtue, which is what the citizens are to lead in order to be happy. There are two sources of worry here, which Plato does not distinguish, though his emphasis seems to be on the first, namely, that the citizens’ motivation for obeying the law 698b8–c2. In this passage, which stresses the freedom of the Athenians, slavery to the laws is mentioned repeatedly and emphatically: 698a5–c3, 699c1–d2, 700a3–5, 701b5–c4. 13 The idea has a partial antecedent (though we do not find the actual term doulos) in Demaratus’ claim to Xerxes, at Herodotus VII 104, that Spartans are ‘free, but not free in every respect, since they have law over them as a master, which they fear more than your people fear you; at any rate they do whatever it bids’. 14 Both the Oxford text and England defend the MSS reading theôn against editors’ suggestions thesmôn or nomôn. Service to the gods is service to the laws because law is an expression of the divine element in us. 15 715c2–d4, d4–6. 16 The word kallôpizesthai suggests taking pride in something in the sense of making a display of it, thinking of it as an ornament to show off. 17 762e1–7. The opening phrase shows that the thought is not limited to the immediate context concerning the country wardens. 12
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would prominently be one of fear of the sanctions for breaking it. It would also seem that even people habituated to obeying the law might be doing so merely out of deferential routine. In either case, how can a developed disposition to live in obedience to the laws, one for which a leading metaphor is service and slavery, amount to the virtue of citizens? Plato certainly expects Magnesian citizens to be virtuous in a full, rich sense. For one thing, virtue is to be produced and sustained by an elaborate and far-reaching system of formation and education of the citizens from birth (and even before birth) to the grave. It would be strange if this amounted to no more than the idea that ‘the citizens can become virtuous if only their desires and passions are disciplined in such a way that they obey the law as a matter of habit’, as one unsympathetic modern commentator has put it.18 Much in the Laws obviously fills the role of training the citizens to be virtuous; there is an entire system of physical, intellectual and aesthetic training whose goal is to produce citizens with good character. My question here is how this concern for becoming virtuous and living a good life (and thus being happy) is related in Plato’s thought to the idea that citizens not only live under a system of laws but regard themselves as having the deeply deferential attitude to it of slaves. Plato puts great emphasis on one aspect of his ideal legislation in the Laws, one whose originality he rightly stresses. The laws are to be preceded by prooimia, preambles or preludes (punning on the double sense of nomos as law and as musical composition).19 The preambles are introduced as a means of persuasion, in addition to the force that lies behind any law which comes with sanctions. Previous lawgivers, he says, have failed to ‘mix’ persuasion with necessity in their lawgiving, but have used force unmixed.20 It is a feature of Magnesian life that the citizens expect to be persuaded that they should obey the law, instead of merely giving in to a threat; the youthful atheist in Book 10 feels entitled to this.21 When the idea of the preambles is introduced, in Book 4, it is illustrated by an example later repeated in Book 9, which contrasts the behaviour of free doctors treating free people, and their assistants, slaves who treat slaves. Stalley (1983): 9. On p. 184 he talks of ‘Plato’s conformist conception of virtue’. 722d2–723d6. 20 722b4–c2. I accept Ast’s conjecture anagkên in 722c1; whatever word is read there the passage clearly and repeatedly contrasts persuasion with force, bia. The MSS reading machên seems impossible; the Oxford text marks corruption, while England, though he reads it, thinks that it can only be defended if the containing phrase is read as a poetical quotation. 21 885c8–d4. 18
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The latter just give instructions and hasten on to the next patient, while the free doctor listens to the patient’s whole history of the problem, and not only tells him what to do but discusses the matter with him until the patient is himself convinced to take the necessary steps.22 We get numerous examples of preambles. Plato gives, as an explicit example, a preamble to the law requiring men to marry.23 There is a long preamble to the whole law code,24 and we often find preambles to individual laws.25 There is a long discussion of the voluntary/involuntary distinction preceding the laws specifying penalties for different kinds of action,26 and most famously the bulk of Book 10 consists of a long argument for the three theses that the gods exist, that they exert providence for humans and that they cannot be deflected by human gifts, a passage preceding the laws against impiety.27 The preambles are a fascinating contribution to legal and political theory, despite the point that Plato found no followers in this area.28 They raise a number of issues that I shall not be able to touch on. I shall be focusing on the single issue of how the preambles help us to grasp how citizens living in a state where they are to give the laws unquestioned authority will become virtuous, rather than merely reliably rule-following. Since the preambles are emphatically aimed at persuading the citizens to be obedient to the laws, they have an obvious role in the citizens’ attitude to the laws, and to the citizens’ own self-definition as slaves to the laws. I will look at three suggestions about the preambles’ role in forming the citizens’ attitude to the laws, all of which have considerable merit but leave us with further problems. I shall then make my own suggestion, which involves looking at what I take to be a fruitful parallel. We find, I claim, that Plato’s ideas are, regardless of the rather dogmatic way in which they are put forward in the Laws, suggestive in opening up our thoughts about Plato’s political thought, as well as virtue and the forms that this can take. One thought is that what the preambles provide is rational explanation of the point of the law in question; the citizen is not just told what to do, 719e7–720e9 – the slave doctors follow the epitaxis of their masters (720b2), while the free doctor does not command (epetaxen) his patient until he persuades him (720d6–7); 857b9–e8. 721a3–722a2. 24 726a1–734e5. 25 E.g., 853a3–854d1 on temple-robbing; 916d1–917b7 on adulteration of items for sale; 930a3–932d7 on care for parents. 26 859b6–864c9. 27 890b3–907d8. Cf. 887a3–c1. 28 Seneca, in letter 94.38, tells us that Posidonius found the Laws absurd in this regard, holding that a law should be brief and memorable, and that the essence of law is to command, not to teach. Seneca disagrees, but neither he nor anyone else took the Laws as a model. 22 23
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but given an explanation which he can rationally scrutinise for justification as to why this is a good regulation, one operating for the citizens’ benefit.29 This is certainly an obvious message of the illustration contrasting the free and slave doctors, and it makes good sense of the second passage in which this occurs, in which the slave doctor is imagined as encountering a free doctor ‘conversing with the patient and using arguments (or accounts, logoi) close to philosophising, starting from the source of the disease and mounting to the whole nature of bodies’. The slave doctor sneers that this is educating the patient rather than curing him, as though a patient wanted to become a doctor rather than to get well.30 This certainly suggests that the preambles are designed to enable the lawgivers to convey to the citizens their own articulate grasp of the good of having the law in question. And we can see how this would contribute to the citizens’ becoming virtuous, for this will help to make them, as active reasoners, active participants in the rational ordering of the city, rather than passive conformers to the laws because of the threat of sanctions. Since, however, the citizens’ rational grasp of the good aim of the laws has to be compatible with the attitude of deference that Plato emphatically calls slavery, we should not overplay the contrast here between the free and slave doctor. It would be unsafe to take Plato to be adumbrating the idea that free citizens are entitled to have laws presented for them to accept on the basis of their own reasonings.31 It is moreover striking that Plato takes persuasion to be ‘mixed’ with force; the alternatives he presents are the single method of force and the double method of force ‘mixed’ with persuasion, never persuasion alone.32 Even for those capable of understanding it, rational persuasion alone does not provide an adequate basis for their attitude to the laws. Further, many of the preambles are rather far from providing rational argument; the great preamble to the law code as a whole, in Book 5, has the earnest character of an address, but provides no argument, and some preambles even make use of mythical tales of terror.33 This suggestion has recently been defended by Bobonich (2002). 857c7–e8. The Athenian’s response to Cleinias, where a connection is drawn between the doctor’s procedure and the speakers’ task, is problematic and has been variously interpreted. I take the Athenian to be saying that the critic is right (not to sneer but) to think that the doctor is educating his patient, provided that he realises that the procedure of the speakers in the Laws is indeed educating the citizens rather than legislating. Here ‘legislating’ must mean ‘merely legislating without education’, that is, using force alone without persuasion; this is because it is here cast in the role of the doctor’s cure, which presupposes that something has already gone wrong. It need not imply that Plato standardly thinks of legislating as being an alternative to education. 31 See Bobonich (2002) for discussion of the citizens’ entitlement as free and rational members of a community of equals very unlike the hierarchically ordered society of the Republic. 32 720e2–9; 722b4–c2. 33 865d3–866a1, 870d4–871a1, 872c7–873b1. 29 30
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Other considerations apart, however, how does the idea that the preambles give the citizens rational arguments for the laws help us to see how these citizens are developing and living virtuous lives? On the face of it, understanding the reasons for a law enables a citizen to see it as something she could give rational assent to, rather than as an alien imposition, something she can see no justification for but has to obey anyway. But there is a distance between this and the idea of the virtuous citizen as envisaged in the Laws, one whose every activity and enjoyment is in tune with those of the other citizens, whose life exhibits order and discipline even in singing and dancing. It is not clear how we get from rational argument and justification to the virtuous citizen’s unforced enjoyment of living virtuously. This suggestion, then, needs supplementation. A second suggestion is that the preambles, far from offering rational argument, are rather supposed to work on the citizens in non-rational ways, making them docile and law-abiding by rhetorical means which manage and manipulate their susceptibility to praise and blame.34 Some of the preludes do explicitly appeal to the force of non-rational myths – for example, that the soul of a murdered person will roam the earth seeking vengeance for the crime.35 Moreover, in some cases Plato stresses the way that the message will have to be embedded in a variety of more and less rational forms, as with the message that some forms of sex are unnatural: ‘we shall tell them from childhood, in stories and sayings and singing in music, putting them, as is likely, under a spell’.36 It is also a feature of the preambles that what they convey comes from experts to learners; the doctor is familiar from Plato’s other works as the expert whose recommendations you should follow, and his being prepared to explain them to you doesn’t take the edge off the fact that you still must do what he says. The Athenian gives an alternative: should we think of the written laws as being like loving and caring parents, or think of them as ordering and threatening, like a despotic tyrant, writing commands on the wall and then simply going away? 37 The first alternative is obviously more attractive than the second, but both involve authority being imposed. People are to be taught by those who know better, in ways adapted to their level of understanding, as children are taught by parents. This does not, of course, exclude rational argument where that is required, as with the This is the view of Stalley (1983: 42–4). 35 See above, n. 33. 840b9–c3; the verb here is kêlein. Compare the reference to epaidein (charm, enchant) in persuading people to obey the law, at 812b9–c7, 773d4–e4, 837e5–6, 903a10–b2. 37 859a1–6. The Greek of a4–6 is confusing; I follow England’s construal, though it has the odd result that the laws are likened to a tyrant putting laws up on a wall. 34 36
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young atheist in Book 10, but that will not be generally needed. On this view, the point of the preambles will simply be to make the citizen receive the law’s command (epitaxis) more readily, and hence learn it better.38 The preambles, on this view, will dispose the citizens to have the kind of characters which are ready to obey the law because they have learned to do so from authoritative sources, ones which have presented it in ways which, relying on praise and blame, and prominently shame, have resulted in the law’s being firmly internalised. These ways are appropriate to the citizens’ ages and levels of intellectual achievement. And the sources are not merely authoritative, but also have independent claims on the citizens’ attention because of the stability and benefits of the city life which are made possible by the laws and those administering them. This at any rate is one implication of the claim that the preambles present the laws as loving parents rather than arbitrary tyrants. Does this help us to see how living under a system of laws which you regard as having unquestioned authority could render you a virtuous citizen? It is not yet clear how Plato could think that the aim of Magnesia’s laws is the virtue, and so the happiness, of its citizens. The idea that the preambles are to render the citizens more docile and apt to accept the laws fits in with many aspects of the work – the importance of education, training and continuing vigilance in the way the citizens live, for example. But it falls short of what Plato requires for virtue, as we can see when we recall the passages where law, nomos, is connected with reason, nous. In obeying law, we have been told, we are obeying the immortal part of ourselves. If the citizens’ attitude is simply one of obeying law unquestioningly because any impulses or tendencies to do or think otherwise have been neutralised by the spell-binding effect of our upbringing, they appear passive and unthinking. A city, says the Athenian, won’t be able to preserve its laws unless they are grasped with understanding and not merely by habit.39 And all citizens are to have an education, particularly in mathematics, which will enable them to grasp at least the rudiments of the workings of reason, in the cosmos and in the city. It would be strange if citizens had an education in the workings of reason, but grasped its workings in law only in the reduced sense of being rendered by their upbringing incapable of not deferring to it. 723a4–b2, referring specifically to the preambles. The learning comes through the docility of the acceptance, not the other way round. 39 951a7–b4; the context is the need to keep aware of what those outside the city, good and bad, are doing. Mere habituation will leave the citizens unprepared for new challenges. 38
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Clearly, the preambles have the role of helping to make the citizens’ relation to the laws a richer one than that of being disposed to obey them out of deference or fear of sanctions. They do this by ‘persuading’, and Plato explicates this by appeal both to rational explanation and to nonrational aspects of the citizens’ upbringing which rely on praise and blame to mould their attitudes. We can see how in both kinds of case the citizens’ disposition to obey the laws would be reinforced. Some kinds of upbringing, especially those using shame, make some kinds of action repulsive, or even unthinkable to people; and rational understanding makes people able to withstand intellectual assaults on their positions. But Plato insists that his is a ‘double’ approach; obedience to the law and fear of its penalties is never replaced, only reinforced. So far we have just found factors disposing people to obey the law readily and firmly, as well as out of deference to its authority. This suggestion also needs supplementation: we haven’t yet found anything explaining how these law-abiding citizens are to be virtuous, to have good character. Part of the answer here is, I think, to be found in a third suggestion, which stresses the way that Plato claims that those persuaded by the preambles would not need law at all. Magnesia is to be a state where all the citizens get a thorough ethical education, and in such a state the need for law with its penalties at all represents a kind of failure. It is, the Athenian says, in a way shameful to be legislating for a city which is to be well run and well equipped for virtue.40 It has, then, been suggested41 that the preambles give us an ideal, while the need for law represents a concession to the greed and competitiveness of our actual human nature. In the ideal state of affairs of the preambles, law would not be needed because the citizens would have proper understanding of what the preambles direct them towards; real life, however, requires laws and the less ideal motivation of those obeying them. It is an objection to this suggestion that in the Laws the preambles are represented as an essential part of the same project as the laws – the ‘double’ project of making people be persuaded as well as obeying the law.42 853b3–c3. This position is defended by Laks (1990, 1991, 2000). I do not agree with Laks’ claim that 857e3–5 shows that for Plato the lawgiver’s task is to educate rather than to legislate; the passage is a vexed one, open to different interpretations (see above, n. 28). There are, however, many passages where Plato sees the need for law as an unfortunate fallback – for example, where citizens educated in Magnesia receive different penalties from those of foreigners and slaves who lacked the benefit of this education (e.g., 854d1–e6). 42 718b2–5, 720e2–5. Other objections to Laks’ view can be found in Bobonich (2002: 109–11, 506–8). Here I am concerned simply with the point about virtue. 40 41
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None the less, there is something right in the idea that the preambles put forward an ideal, while laws are there to correct actual defective behaviour. What we need is to find a role for the preambles that does justice to the point that they present an ideal, and shows how they can function to help people who obey the laws to become virtuous. If we cannot do this, we should note, we lack an adequate account of their role in the work, as well as an adequate account of how following laws will render the citizens virtuous. The account of such a role should also show why we cannot do justice to them by a focus on rational understanding alone or irrational habituation alone. Here we can, I think, be pointed in the right direction by looking at another ancient author presenting a system of law as a context in which people learn to be virtuous and so happy. This is Philo of Alexandria, the Jewish philosopher and commentator on Scripture, who in a series of works on the Decalogue, the Special Laws and the Virtues presents the demands of Mosaic law in a way which shows how those who follow them with the right kind of understanding develop the virtues of piety, wisdom, temperance, courage and humanity.43 Philo is interpreting the Torah, which he takes to be the work of Moses as lawgiver. Moses, he says, differed from lawgivers who simply lay down what is and is not to be done, for he thought that to command (prostattein) without encouragement (paramuthia) is the way to treat slaves rather than free men. ‘In his commands and prohibitions he suggests and advises for the most part rather than giving orders, trying to give guidance on the large number of necessary points by means of preambles (prooimia) and after-words, for the sake of exhorting (protrepsasthai) rather than forcing.’44 Philo’s own procedure can also reasonably be seen as aiming to show how the system of Mosaic law is not just a set of rules to obey but structures a way of life which can be positively and persuasively recommended. The Laws is obviously, from the above passage, among Philo’s influences,45 and despite their obvious differences of aim Plato and Philo On the Decalogue, On the Special Laws, On the Virtues. (I take no stand on the issue of whether the following sections, on repentance and on good birth, should be placed at this point or not.) Life of Moses II 51 (cf. all of 48–51). 45 The influence of the Laws is quite widespread in Philo’s writings. He borrows memorable phrases, though often using them with his own twist. For example, he uses the Laws’ notorious image of humans as puppets (Laws 644d7–645c6, 804a4–b8), putting it into a Stoic context where it is the ruling part or hêgemonikon which pulls the strings to move the other parts (Op. 117, Abraham 73, Fug. 46, QG III 48). The phrase about blind wealth at Laws 631c4–5 is used at Special Laws I 25 and elsewhere, adapted to the contexts. Other examples, gathered in the index to volume 10 of the Loeb edition of Philo, show similar changes and twists. 43
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share some important concerns.46 They are both interpreting a system of laws which, being divine in origin, is not to be changed by any human political process (though it may need ongoing interpretation).47 They both see these laws as aimed at making the community virtuous – in both cases, virtuous in a way in which piety, and the proper attitude to the divine, is dominant. Moreover, they both see living virtuously as being necessary for members of the community to live a happy, flourishing life.48 I suggest, then, that paying attention to some general features of what Philo is doing may point us in the right direction as we try to answer the question of the role of the Laws’ preambles in helping to make virtuous people out of Magnesian citizens who think of themselves as slaves to the laws. I am not suggesting that we can argue from specific features of what Philo does to interpret Plato; for one thing, their tasks are quite different.49 Philo is interpreting the Torah, and Plato is sketching an ideal state (a project of which Philo is quite critical).50 Two things are noteworthy about Philo’s procedure. One is that it does not occur to him that laws and rules might be ethically self-standing, that what is ethically basic might be simply the peculiar force of rules. Living according to Mosaic law, he holds, produces a virtuous character, and he does not by this mean the mere disposition reliably to follow rules. The character he has in mind is described as one in which reasoning, feeling and decision are harmoniously integrated: For each of the ten pronouncements individually and all together prepare and exhort us (protrepousi) to practical wisdom (phronêsis) and justice and piety and the rest of the chorus of virtues. They make our words (logoi) healthy with good deliberations, and attach good actions to our words, so that the soul’s instrument I am not a Philo scholar, and cannot address the issue of Philo’s intended audience for these works. I have been much helped by the work of David Runia, Gregory Sterling, Hava TiroshSamuelson and especially Hindy Najman. 47 See Life of Moses II 12–16. See Najman (2003) and Sterling (2003). Philo’s views about divine law are influenced by the Stoics, and my claims about similarities between these specific projects of Philo and Plato do not rest on any larger claims about Philo’s being a Platonist. I take him not to be committed to any of the pagan philosophical schools, but rather to use their work as material for his own interpretative task. See Mansfeld (1988). 48 That Philo should be read in a eudaimonistic framework, and further that this is part of an ongoing Jewish tradition rather than an alien import from pagan philosophy, is argued in TiroshSamuelson (2003). 49 From Aristobulus on (Fragment 3a Supplement in Holladay 1995), Jewish writers in the ancient world see Plato as influenced by Mosaic law, and thus see the Laws as an inferior, pagan version of a truth that the Jewish tradition has in a sounder form. 50 Life of Moses II 49–52: it is more appropriate to set lawgiving in a cosmic framework than in that of an invented city. Philo seems to think that the latter compromises the lawgiver’s task from the start. He ignores the Laws’ own cosmic framework. 46
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may throughout play in tune to produce concord of life and an unassailable harmony.51
Secondly, he does not treat the Ten Commandments as a list of isolated rules. Rather, he treats them as ‘generic’ rules which ‘summarise’ the specific ones, while the latter ‘tend towards’ the ten major ones.52 The Sixth Commandment, ‘You shall not commit adultery’, for example, is not treated as an isolated prohibition of one kind of action. Rather, it is treated as the ‘heading’ round which are grouped a whole cluster of diverse positive and negative rules and practices unified by concern with the proper management of sexual desire. Thus we find prohibition not only of adultery but of incest, homosexuality, bestiality, rape and seduction, as well as rules regulating sex within marriage. Practices and rules covering different areas of life are unified by their reference to the aim of properly controlling and conducting sexual desire, which is taken to be universally strong and liable to transgress boundaries.53 In this way a variety of rules and the way these structure social practices are grouped in ways that relate them to an ethically salient aim. In keeping with the fact that Philo finds the control of pathos, passion or feeling, to be an important part of what many rules are for, we find that the Tenth Commandment, which Philo reads as ‘You shall not desire’,54 is treated as the heading under which are brought rules to regulate desire. Nothing, Philo claims, is more troublesome than desire, the urge to get what we don’t have; it leads us to think things good which are not, and so to disturb our values. Desire leads the irrational part of the soul to get the person to take various irrational and disastrous courses, and to mistaken evaluations of what in life is important. This happens in all areas of our life; desire for money, for example, turns people dishonest, desire for fame turns them unreliable and desire for power turns them unscrupulous. It is important, therefore, to discipline from the start the most basic form of desire, which will help to render its other forms more amenable. Hence the basic desires for food and drink are from the start to be regulated and Special Laws IV 134. Philo appeals to the idea of virtue as a disposition not merely to act in certain ways, but to do so for certain reasons, and to have one’s feelings and emotions in harmony with this. 52 Special Laws II 189: the Ten Commandments are genikoi nomoi, while the particular rules of Mosaic law are ta en eidei; III 7: ta en merei are said to sunteinein to the ten. 53 Special Laws III 8–82. 54 Special Laws IV 79–131. The discussion of desire is prominent in the treatment of the Tenth Commandment in The Decalogue 142–53. Philo is reading this commandment, in the Septuagint translation, as prohibiting epithumein, and takes it to concern desire as a fundamental and potentially disastrous aspect of human psychology. 51
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trained by the dietary laws, which bring it about that even basic eating and drinking take place in a disciplined and discriminating framework. When hungry, members of the Jewish community will not just gratify desire, but will always think in terms of what foods are permitted and forbidden, and which ways food can and cannot be prepared. Thus desire for food will be trained to seek only orderly and discriminating gratification, and will come to take an orderly and discriminating form. This lays the foundation for a well-regulated character in a number of other areas where different kinds of desire are in question.55 The overall aim of managing desire as the basis of well-regulated character thus leads to what might seem at first like the unobvious bringing of the Jewish dietary rules under the heading of the Tenth Commandment. Similarly, Philo’s treatment of the Fourth Commandment, to honour the Sabbath, treats the seventh day as only one of all the Jewish festivals, grouping them by the idea of right observance of a festival, something that requires the right frame of mind and not just the performance of ritual. He gives the different details of the festivals, all of which are to be scrupulously observed, focusing on the different ways in which these celebrations bring the members of the community to understand their relationship with God and with one another. If only we were not dominated by the vices, ‘but the powers of the virtues had remained unconquered in any way, our time from birth to death would have been one continual festival, and families and cities, in peace and freedom from fear, would have been filled with good things in tranquility’.56 For properly understood, keeping a festival is not having a good time but ‘finding delight and festivity in the contemplation of the cosmos and what is in it, and in following nature and in harmony of words with actions and actions with words’.57 (This idea, that the true meaning of a religious festival is to be found in the joys of virtuous living, is reminiscent of the passages in the Laws where the Athenian says that a citizen’s life is properly to be thought of as one of ritual singing and dancing, these being proper forms of play (e.g., 803d2–c1 – a passage ending with a sharp reminder of humans’ littleness in relation to God).) Just from these three examples (more could be given) we can see that what is stressed is the ethical point of a given practice or following a given rule. This ethical aim is not obvious if we merely think of the rules in an isolated way, but a grasp of it can change the spirit in which the rules are The giving of first fruits is also important in this discipline (Special Laws IV 98–9.) Philo has many, mostly symbolic, explanations of why the dietary laws take the particular form that they do. 56 Special Laws II 42. 57 Special Laws II 52. 55
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followed. Obeying the Jewish dietary laws can be an exercise of temperance, not just rule-following, if done in relation to the aim of disciplining desire as the basis of good character. Avoiding adultery can be an exercise of virtue, not just obedience to rules, if done in relation to the aim of living in a manner in which sexual desire is from the start treated as more than mere gratification of desire, and is seen in a framework of marriage and its responsibilities. The rules, then, are to be obeyed, but obedience to them is embedded in practices which structure what we can see to be a good way of life. Rules require obedience but also enable us to aspire to an ideal in the way we live, trying to improve our characters rather than merely conforming to what is demanded. Keeping the dietary laws, for example, can be seen as a way of developing, and living in accordance with, a disciplined set of appetites. Understanding this enables the following of the rules to become not merely a habit, but first a learning and then an exercise of temperance, and ultimately part of the development of a steady and self-disciplined character. Philo, as I suggested, can point us in the right direction when we are thinking about the role of the preambles in the Laws. What his project suggests is the idea of presenting a system of laws supplemented neither by purely intellectual argument for their foundations, nor by merely rhetorical ways of inducing acceptance, but rather by a presentation of ethical aims – aims to be pursued not as an alternative to but rather in living in a way structured by these laws and rules. Such a presentation gets across the ideals of character to be achieved by the person who follows the rules, and such a person comes to see their education, and, when adult, their whole lives, as a constant exercise of self-improvement. If we approach the preambles of the Laws with this in mind, we can see that they give us an ideal which is not an alternative to following laws. The laws, by commanding and prohibiting actions in various areas of life – birth, marriage, farming, political interaction – structure the citizens’ activities and practices in those areas. The preambles set out for the citizens ideals of living that they are to achieve in following the laws. As they come to see obedience to laws in the light of ethical aims, they appreciate that following the laws is the way to become temperate, disciplined and thus better people.58 The citizens thus come to aspire to an ideal in Temperance, self-discipline and lack of self-assertion are strongly emphasised in the Laws; the Republic’s focus on justice is replaced by an emphasis on sôphrosunê as the citizen virtue (though even in the Laws itself it continues to be seen as a characteristically female rather than male virtue).
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doing what they do, and see their actions as aimed at a good beyond that of merely following the rules.59 They come to see that they have reasons for doing what they do, reasons referring to the good achieved for them and for society in their following these rules and engaging in the practices they structure. Further, if guided by the right kind of education, they come to internalise this understanding in a way that is harmonious with their feelings and emotions. They come to follow the laws in a way which expresses virtue. Take, for example, the Laws’ very first preamble, put forward as an example.60 Men are to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; otherwise they are to be penalised by fines and loss of status. They are also to be persuaded by a preamble, which briefly develops the idea that it is natural for a human being to look further than the span of his own61 biological life, and to aim at a kind of immortality, as is shown by the desire for posthumous fame. It is not ‘pious’ (hosion), the preamble claims, to break the link of generation which keeps humans going on without end, for this shows lack of understanding of a crucial fact about humans: the way in which individual humans look beyond their own lives and see themselves as part of a continuous linked family. This is not a piece of argument, or in any obvious way a rhetorical ‘spell’. It is a discursive attempt to give individual humans a correct, rather than a misguided, understanding of what it is to be human, one to be understood, as the context stresses,62 in tandem with the law and its penalties. Without the understanding provided by the preamble, someone might get married as a possibly disagreeable obligation. With it, he is more likely to think of getting married in an unforced way, as something he does without prompting at a certain stage of life because it is part of what he understands as living well. He will find getting married attractive, and will see his life as improved by his change in status, because he is aware of it as part of what humans do in a good society where the generations are linked.63
The latter will always be important, however, for the city’s stability. 60 721b6–d6. Despite the Laws’ (somewhat unclear) commitment to including women in the citizen body, it is definitely men who are in mind here. The passage is bound to remind us of Symposium 207c–208e (though without the contrast with the higher-minded who seek immortality through non-physical means). 62 The Athenian goes on to stress the benefits of using both methods, persuasion and force, not merely one (722e1–723b2). 63 The importance of family, of respecting elders and of maintaining family continuity, is a very strong theme in the Laws. 59 61
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He will see someone who fails to marry as not just a lawbreaker but as selfish, lacking appreciation for what makes a citizen’s life a good one. He will develop the appropriate disposition, one which will be expressed in contexts other than marriage, and will concern family life as a whole. Given that this disposition does in fact lead to humans living the best life for them (something which Plato assumes without arguing for it in the Laws), this is one way in which he will develop the virtues. Following this law in the right way can be, for someone with the appropriate understanding, part of living virtuously and thus happily. The great preamble in Book 5 to the laws as a whole is also neither rational argument nor rhetorical ‘spell’. It has sometimes been characterised as a sermon, and this is (for us) not entirely inappropriate. It makes the claim that a human should, after honouring the gods, honour his soul before his body and possessions; this is the attitude that should direct treatment of family, friends, fellow-citizens and strangers. Honouring the soul is explicated in terms of making virtue one’s overall aim, and this notion of virtue is then spelled out further in terms of combining what is good in spiritedness and gentleness, and avoiding selfishness and selfassertion. Moreover, the preamble ends, a life in which these are the priorities is in fact the most pleasant, and therefore the one that everybody really aims for. A citizen of Magnesia who took this preamble to heart would thereby have learnt that in obeying the laws he was not just avoiding penalties, but rather coming to live a good life, one in which he was being educated to have the right aims and ideals. This cannot be adequately seen as simply being given rational justification, or simply being ‘magicked’ into obeying the laws. Rather, he has come to see himself as having an aim, in living according to the laws, which he accepts in his life as a whole, in both rational and non-rational aspects. And so he realises that in living according to the laws he is not just staying out of trouble, but is coming to have good values, and is becoming someone to whom living virtuously is unforcedly pleasant. This is, in an obvious way, a more positive attitude to obeying Magnesian laws than he would have had without the preamble. A citizen seeing the preamble as giving him a positive ideal to work towards would see the laws, and obedience to them, not just as a way of keeping stable order in the state but as a positive help towards rendering himself and all the citizens virtuous. Magnesian citizens thus do not merely avoid breaking the law; they have a positive attitude to it and to its being obeyed, by themselves and by others. One aspect of this which Plato stresses is that part of
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being a good citizen in Magnesia involves not just obeying the law oneself but intervening and informing on lawbreaking by others.64 This account of the role of the preambles makes it easy to see why Plato lays stress on the importance of contexts for praise and blame which don’t fall under law proper, and why he puts great emphasis on informal regulation and social sanction. It is not practicable for laws to regulate every detail of family life, yet it is important for citizens’ lives overall to reflect correct values if the laws are not to be destabilised. Plato relies on the thought that citizens educated in his state will appreciate the values that are fostered by obeying the laws, and thus will come to praise and blame behaviour in ways that will, as we say, informally ‘police’ it, before it gets to the stage of needing law and hence punishment to be imposed.65 This fits well with the idea that obeying the laws should properly be done in awareness not only of their demands but also of the ideals that obeying them will enable citizens to achieve. We obey the demands of divine reason not only by habitually conforming to the laws but by coming to understand them. Since we obey them in the everyday contexts of our social practices, we come to have proper understanding of them by coming to appreciate how following them is part of a good way of life. Coming to understand this will in turn enable citizens to draw the right distinctions, and praise and blame the right things, in daily life. The informal system of praise, blame and other informal sanctions thus produced supports the actual laws in two ways. It enables the citizens’ law-abidingness to become a self-maintaining system, where education can ideally obviate the need for the threat of penalties. And it produces individuals who follow the laws and organise their lives in self-directed ways. It is not through fear of penalties that Magnesia’s citizens leap from their beds every day before dawn and get moving before the servants do.66 Citizens, then, are obliged to obey the laws – not just those enforceable in court but the ‘unwritten laws’ and practices of Magnesia which are enforced While doing no wrong is honourable (timios), the person who does not let others get away with wrongdoing is twice as worthy, since in informing to the magistrates he ‘counts as’ many rather than just one. Still more commendable is the person who assists the state officials in punishing wrongdoing (730d2–7). Sometimes legislation includes penalties for those who fail to inform on wrongdoing (e.g., 808e7–809a3). 65 793a9–d5, 822d2–823a6. Philo makes a similar point: ‘Habits (ethê) are unwritten laws, the resolutions (dogmata) of men of old, engraved not on monuments or on papyrus, which gets eaten up by moths, but on the souls of people who share in the same constitution’ (Special Laws IV 149–50). People should inherit these from their parents, and not despise them because they are not written down. Cf. On the Virtues 65. 66 806d7–808c6. Sleeping and waking appropriately is, obviously, a habit that cannot be commanded by law but must spring from a self-directed ordering of one’s life. 64
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by community praise and blame. Educating themselves to follow these laws, however, eventually renders them virtuous, because the laws structure practices that enable and encourage ideals that citizens can follow in order to live the good, and so happy, life. Hence it is not the most ‘complete’ praise of a citizen for virtue to say that he best serves the laws and is most obedient to them; more complete praise is that he passes his life throughout obeying the lawgiver’s words not only of law but also of praise and blame.67 This suggestion about the role of the preambles puts into context what is right about the previous suggestions. The preambles do present an ideal – but one which is to be achieved in following the laws, not as an alternative to them, though it is correct that for well-educated citizens the laws’ sanctions should always be a back-up and not foremost in their minds. We can also see that preambles will use both rational argument and nonrational rhetorical devices, and which will be used, or will preponderate, will depend on the topic. Citizens who have once got the idea of atheism need to be met with argument, since a rational challenge to tradition has to be met on its own ground; and we need argument to sort out the place of voluntariness in the legal code. But sometimes, as when dealing with unruly forces like sexual desire or homicidal rage, irrational means are a more effective way of getting across the point of a regulation. I have tried to show how the preambles in the Laws play an important role in showing how a society whose citizens’ lives are organised by a system of laws can also be seen as a society whose aim is the virtue (and hence happiness) of the citizens, without any weakening of the notion of virtue. As Plato stresses, the lawgiver’s task is always the double one of persuading as well as forbidding, since his aim is a society of virtuous people. Plato encourages us to see the preambles in this light, given his stress on them as well as on the formal and informal education of the citizens from the cradle to the grave. But how does this fit with the sharp insistence, which I earlier highlighted, on the citizens and their rulers as ‘slaves of the laws’? Plato goes out of his way to make us notice his harsh metaphor characterising free citizens as slaves to the laws. How does this fit with his picture of obeying the law as leading to virtue if done in pursuit of the ideals given by understanding of the laws’ aims? For Plato in the Laws, as we have seen, actual slavery embodies the idea of deference to unquestioned authority. In seeing ourselves as slaves to the 822e4–823a1; here the preambles as well as the laws proper are referred to as the lawgiver’s ‘writing’. The lawgiver must write down what things seem to him fine and not fine ‘interwoven’ (empeplegmena) with the laws (823a2–5).
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laws, we are to see ourselves as obeying their requirements without question. What is ethically basic is seen as a matter of demand. One of the most interesting aspects of the Laws is that Plato uses the highly charged metaphor of slavery to claim that this should be our relationship to laws. The laws, like masters, give us orders and commands (epitaxis) and we have to do what they say; that is just what the relationship is. Plato does not of course think that we should have this relationship to any actual laws, any more than to any actual rulers; we should have it only to laws of an ideally planned and governed society. We should have it to laws which aim at our good, so that in following them we live virtuous and so happy lives. Thus the authority we defer to is expert understanding of our good, which we ourselves lack. In the Republic it was the Guardians who had this expert knowledge; in the Laws it is embodied in the laws. Plato does two things which are new. One is to sharpen our understanding of obedience by means of the metaphor of slavery to the laws. The other is to pair this with the idea that we can, through the persuasion of the preambles, grasp the ideals to be achieved in following the laws, so that we become virtuous in so doing. Virtue is thus unified with the notion of obligation in a way which is distinctive. It is a commonplace that ancient social and political thought focuses its reflective attention on the notions of good and virtue rather than the deontic notions of rules and obligations. In the Laws Plato synthesises these two kinds of notion to produce a result which is far more similar to Philo’s interpretation of the Law than it is to the thought of Aristotle’s Politics, and which finds no substantive echo in pagan ethical and social thought generally. The plausibility of this relation between law and virtue rests, of course, on Plato’s grounds for thinking that the laws he discusses will in fact be the basis for the good and happy life. Plato himself makes the claim that law is not just reason but divine reason; those who use their minds and think rationally will come to understand the way that the cosmos as a whole, and human society in particular, is rationally organised by the divine. The way law thus comes from God makes it reasonable to see Plato’s Magnesia as a theocracy,68 and we should thus not be surprised to find analogies with Philo, although they differ in ways corresponding to the ways that their theologies differ. For Plato theology is a matter of rational understanding, based on mathematics and astronomy; for Philo it centrally focuses on interpretation of a sacred text. Still, Plato says many things in this text that became congenial to the later Judaeo-Christian tradition: God, not man, The actual word theokratia first occurs much later (Josephus, Against Apion II 165).
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is the measure of all things;69 self-love is the root of most evils;70 we should be humble before God, not self-assertive,71 and think of human matters as utterly insignificant in relation to God.72 As I said earlier, Plato’s ideas in the Laws are, despite the dogmatic tone, often suggestive in opening up the way we think, particularly about ancient ethical and political thought. I will end by suggesting two ways in which this seems to me to be the case. Recent discussion of the Laws has emphasised ways in which it anticipates Aristotle in taking political society to be a community of free and equal individuals taking turns ruling and being ruled,73 aiming at the common good. In such a society the individual is recognised as having a status missing in the hierarchical structure of the Republic. There are elements in the Laws which bring this out, but there are also the strong analogies I have stressed here to explicitly theocratic societies, where the ethical framework of the community is found in demands from a divine source, demands which have the force of obligations, and which, because their source is divine, can’t be changed by mere human agreement (though they will need ongoing interpretation).74 The Laws gives us an interesting combination of theocracy with the more familiar picture in ancient political thought of society’s aim being the virtue and so happiness of the citizens. The unfamiliarity of this combination indicates dangers in seeing Plato’s political ideas in terms of our own. This is a tendency which has produced particularly toxic results for the Republic but which is problematic with any ancient text. Rather than trying to locate the Laws in any one tradition of political thought, I think it is probably more fruitful for us to study the ways in which it can combine ideas which for us belong in different traditions. 715e7–716d4, esp. 716c4–6. 70 731d6–732b5. 715e7–716a4: the person hoping to be happy should be humble (tapeinos) in following God; the self-assertive person is doomed to unhappiness. Elsewhere tapeinos is an unfavourable term, and even in the Laws it appears as an undesirable extreme of spiritlessness and grovelling (728d1–5, 791d5–9). 72 The passage 803c2–804c1 is remarkable for its insistence that humans are altogether insignificant in relation to God; even Megillus is shocked by this idea. 73 643e3–6. 74 The Laws contains both the view that a successfully created society should be self-sustaining and complete (960b5–c1), and the recognition of the need for an analogue of the painter who can continue to improve his creation and teach others to do so (769b6–771a4). (The fact that ten years is set as the limit for improving the regulations about sacrifices and dances at 772a4–d4 should not encourage us to think of total stasis for the whole law system.) Cf. 951a4–c4, where the city, to preserve its laws, has to grasp them with understanding and not just habit; this is a reason for seeking useful information from foreign travel. Some kind of ongoing adjustment seems to be the province of the Nocturnal Council.
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The other way in which the Laws can perhaps open up or extend our philosophical discussions concerns virtue. It is a familiar fact that the last two decades have seen a huge revival of interest in virtue ethics, much of it focusing on naturalistic virtue ethics of an Aristotelian kind, in which the virtues are rooted in human nature. Much of the impetus for the revival of virtue ethics is rightly given to Elizabeth Anscombe’s article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, in which she does indeed make some statements which have been influential in the modern revival of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. But it has been less noticed that Anscombe herself makes the following striking statement: ‘To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man … – that what is needed for this, is required by divine law.’75 The modern development of Anscombe’s ideas has focused on neoAristotelian virtue ethics, which think of the virtues in the context of human nature and are congenial to modern naturalism and secularism. The idea of virtue as developed within a framework of divine law has not had similarly extensive contemporary examination. Perhaps some of this neglect has been due to the assumption that within such a framework all that virtue could amount to would be reliable rule-following, perhaps motivated by fear of sanctions. The Laws is one of the works that can enable us to see the limitations of this line of thought. For, despite the new kind of emphasis on law, one thing Plato does not do is to thin out his citizens’ disposition to obey the laws, making it mindless, merely habitual or motivated by avoidance of sanctions. He is not satisfied to make it anything less than virtue. For we all want happiness; and only virtue can lead to happiness. Anscombe (1997: 31). She adds, ‘Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a lawgiver; like Jews, Stoics and Christians.’ (I think it is reasonable to include the Plato of the Laws in this group.) See the articles by Roger Crisp, Sabina Lovibond and Onora O’Neill in O’Hear (2004).
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Morality as law and morality in the Laws Terence Irwin
1. T h e l aw w i t h i n Kant is well known for his admiration both of the starry heavens above and of the moral law within. He is not the first to believe that morality should be understood as internal law. Butler expresses the same view in his claim that human beings are ‘a law to themselves’.1 Butler quotes this phrase from St Paul, and in doing so he connects his view with the conception of natural law that Patristic and medieval writers derive from St Paul. This conception is not purely Christian. Lactantius endorses the conception of natural law that he quotes from Cicero’s De Re Publica, and so he allies himself with Stoic views. How is Plato connected with this belief in morality as internal law? The author of the Epinomis (986c) agrees with Kant’s view that the starry heavens above are an appropriate object of admiration. He finds there the embodiment of cosmic order and reason. The Laws has quite a lot to say about law and morality, but does it treat morality as internal natural law? If it does, we may take Plato to be part of a natural law tradition. If it does not, we may regard Plato as an ancestor of this tradition, but not as a part of it. This statement of our main question is not definite enough to allow a clear answer. We need to clarify claims about an internal natural law. (1) What does it mean to speak of morality as law? If we call it internal law, what do we mean beyond the mere claim that morality consists of internal principles or virtues? (2) What does it mean to speak of natural law? Do we mean that everyone is somehow aware of it, or can become aware of it without instruction, or do we refer to some different sort of connection with nature? Perhaps an answer these questions should precede a discussion of Plato, but it would be a long task to find an answer. To give a rough idea of what Butler (1950: ii 4), quoting Romans 2: 14.
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I am looking for, I will confine myself to one explicit statement of belief in natural law. We can try to see how much of this belief is present in Plato. In the De Re Publica, as preserved by Lactantius, Cicero sets out a doctrine of natural law: True law is correct reason agreeing with nature, diffused through everyone, constant, everlasting. It calls to duty by commanding, and deters from wrongdoing by forbidding. It neither commands good people in vain nor moves bad people either by commanding or by forbidding … And God will be the one common master and commander of all – God, who is its discoverer, arbitrator, and proposer (inventor, disceptator, lator). Anyone who does not obey it flees from himself and shuns the nature of a human being, and by this very fact pays the greatest penalties, even if he escapes the other things commonly accounted punishments.2
Cicero affirms that the moral content of ‘true law’ comes from its agreement with nature, and specifically with human nature. Law is not confined to the positive law of particular human societies, or even to divine positive law. God has discovered the natural law, but Cicero does not suggest that the natural law exists only because of some divine legislative act. Anyone who has correct reason and pays attention to it can discover the natural law, and is required to follow it. The moral content of natural law is available to everyone, but not everyone listens to it or is moved by it. Does Plato accept a similar doctrine of natural law? The fullest modern discussion of some of the relevant questions is the book by John Wild, Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law.3 The fortunes of this book may have suffered from its polemical aim. The ‘modern enemies’ mentioned in the title are the twentieth-century critics who attack Plato for his sympathy with views that have been described as reactionary, totalitarian and historicist. Popper, Winspear and Crossman are prominent among these critics. Wild defends Plato on all the main points on which his critics attack him, and his defence probably loses some plausibility by its attempt at exhaustiveness. Since he sees no merit in attacks on Plato’s political outlook, Wild’s exaggerated defence of this aspect of Plato may have diverted attention from some of his more reasonable claims about natural law.4 I do not believe the Laws takes a clear position on the doctrine set out by Cicero. But I believe we will find it instructive to ask ourselves how close Plato comes to acceptance of this doctrine. Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones, vi 8.6–9 = Cicero, De Re Publica iii 27. A further statement of Cicero’s view appears in De Legibus i 23. See further Irwin (2007: §197, 206). 3 Wild (1953). 4 See the reviews by Richard Robinson (1954: 596–8) and Colin Strang (1955: 282–3). 2
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t e r e nc e i rw i n 2 . L aw a s r at ion a l or de r
Plato summarises his view of law in his etymology of nomos (law) as nou dianomê (ordering by intelligence) (713e–714a). He finds rational order in the laws of a city, to the extent that they approach the order of true law. Without the rule of law, we would be no better off than wild beasts (874e–875b). Human nature without law cannot achieve the distinctive excellences of human society. Our natural cognitive deficiency prevents us from seeing what is best for a human society, and our natural motivational deficiency prevents us from acting on the appropriate convictions. The cognitive deficiency consists in general ignorance of facts about political society and its relation to the good of individuals. Most people are ignorant of two connected facts: (1) the political craft should aim at the common good; and (2) one achieves one‘s own good only by aiming at the common good. The first claim opposes two other claims about the aim of political society. (1a) Individuals and groups necessarily aim above all at their selfconfined and exclusive interest, which gives no non-instrumental role to the interests of others. Hence a state is governed by individuals or groups who aim at their self-confined interest without reference to anyone else’s interest. (1b) Individuals and groups tend to aim at their self-confined interest. Justice achieves an appropriate balance between the interests of individuals and groups. Hence the political craft should aim at this just balance. If it achieves its aim, I am not as well off as I would be if the state served only my self-confined interest, but I am better off than I would be if it served other people’s interests. Plato considers and rejects (1a) in favour of (1). He does not explicitly consider (1b). But he rejects it in so far as he accepts (2). If (2) were false, perhaps (1b) would be the best we could do to make the state stable and tolerable for most of its members. But since Plato accepts (2), he does not believe that the city should balance the interests of different people who aim at their own good. If we take a self-confined view of our own good, and we accept a political system only in so far as it seems to aim at our own good, we do not even achieve our own good. If we understand the good of an individual better than most people understand it, we see that selfconfined goods are not the only elements of an individual’s good. On the contrary, one important element in an individual’s good is the achievement of the common good of one’s community. If we give priority to the common good over our individual good, we do not sacrifice our individual
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good. Moreover, if we refuse to give priority to the common good, we cannot achieve our individual good.5 The motivational deficiency that undermines a state results from the presence of tendencies that lead us to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain. If we accepted (1b), we might say that these tendencies lead us to pursue our own interest contrary to the demands of justice. Since Plato rejects (1b), he believes that these tendencies lead us to pursue a mistaken conception of our interest, contrary to the common good of ourselves and others (875bc). Even if we believe that our individual good and the common good coincide, we have impulses that do not automatically conform to this belief, and that may cause us to act against it. Moreover, once we form the habit of acting on these impulses, they undermine true convictions about the common good. Plato infers that a political system should not allow individuals to rule without restraint by external laws. If they are allowed to exercise absolute and unregulated power (anhupeuthunos and autokratôr, 875b3), they act against the common good for the sake of their individual good (as they mistakenly conceive it), because their wayward impulses are not properly restrained. Even if they have been properly trained and educated, they should not rule without institutional restraints, because the motives that divert them from pursuit of the common good are always present and liable to emerge. 3. L aw v. k now l e d g e There might, however, be exceptions to this general rule that individuals and communities need law. If by divine arrangement someone with the right nature were born, he would not need law to restrain him, but his knowledge (epistêmê) would be supreme within him (875c3). But in the actual world we find this sort of nature only to a small degree (kata brachu, 875d3). Hence we need law to restrain almost everyone. Law is second-best because those who need no law to restrain them have a better nature than those who need restraint. Plato also believes law is inferior in a second way. It does not achieve by external means precisely the results that a good nature achieves by internal means. The results it achieves are inferior to those achieved by internal knowledge. Law suffers because of its generality. It can discover what is usually best, but it cannot cover every case (epi pan, 875d4–5). Apparently, someone with the right nature could form the right convictions and act This point is explained a little further in section 12 below.
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on them if he acquired the appropriate knowledge. He would not need restraint by general principles that would limit his powers; for he would know what to do in this or that particular case. This is Plato’s view in the Politicus. He argues that it would be foolish to restrain the expert by general rules (Pol. 293a). Medical expertise depends on what one knows, not on whether one persuades patients, or acts with their consent or in accordance with written rules. All that matters is whether one knows what promotes the health of patients, and whether one uses knowledge for that purpose. It does not matter whether one acts according to written prescriptions (293b3). If we maintain that a good ruler must rule in accordance with law, we have not grasped the difference between inexact general rules and the exact conclusions of the expert (293e). Laws are even harmful, because they are inflexible. Since a law is stated in ‘simple’ or ‘unqualified’ terms (295c7), it cannot cope with the variety and multiplicity of circumstances and their possibilities of unforeseen change. Hence the Stranger compares law to stupid and stubborn people who insist on getting their way, even when circumstances require them to give way and to change their mind. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to use law as the basis of principles on which the citizens might agree to accept a ruler. It is foolish to demand that a genuine expert must rule with the consent of the ruled, or must persuade them that they ought to depart from the laws in this case (296a). Such a demand is foolish because it suggests that a mass of people could be qualified to assess the proposals of an expert. If this is Plato’s view, law has no essential function in the best city or in the best individual. We need it only in communities where no one is naturally suited to acquire the appropriate expert knowledge and to act on it without distraction. Cities and individuals need law only when they fall short of the best. A contrast with Kant may capture Plato’s point. According to Kant, a holy will lacks impulses that tend to conflict with morality, and so it acts on the law without any imperatives.6 According to Plato, however, a will that lacks rebellious impulses does not act on a law at all, because it needs no external restraints; it would be worse if it tried to follow the provisions of law. Is this a significant difference from Kant? To see where the difference might be found, we should notice that Kant does not envisage the relevant law as a series of general rules that give us an inexact guide to action, leaving some exceptions where it would be better to act differently. The moral law On the holy will see Kant, Groundwork 439.
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does not contain rules such as ‘One ought to tell the truth’ or ‘One ought to keep one’s promises’; if such rules have exceptions, it does not follow that the moral law consists of rules that have exceptions. Still, the moral law is general in a non-trivial sense. It does not consist of all the answers that the ideal moral expert would give in every particular situation. And so knowledge of the moral law consists in something different from the knowledge that Plato seems to attribute to the expert. We grasp the moral law, as Kant understands it, in so far as we grasp the principles that make it right to observe or to violate more determinate rules on particular occasions. If we think of a moral law as a generalisation of this sort, Plato does not show that law is dispensable in someone with the best nature, or that it is inevitably inexact because of its generality. Experts could do without law only if they were simply machines for generating the right answers to particular questions, and had nothing to say about what makes their answers right. If they have something to say on this further question, they are guided by the sort of principle that Kant identifies with a law. But it would be entirely contrary to Plato’s conception of a craft to conceive the expert as a machine who produces the right answers with no account of why they are right. In that case the passage from the Laws that we have discussed does not express Plato’s commitment to any doctrine of natural law. Though the description of law as a rational order may make us think of the natural law tradition, his treatment of law as necessarily inexact and therefore secondbest suggests that he does not use ‘law’ to refer to the general principles underlying specific prescriptions. Since the expert does without law, but could not do without general principles, Plato does not treat these general principles as a law. But do our passages from the Politicus and the Laws give us the whole story about Plato’s view of law? When we look further at his discussion of external law (in the city) and internal law (in the soul), we may come to doubt whether he really thinks of law as second-best. 4 . L aw i n t h e c i t y a n d i n t h e c i t i z e n What is internal law? Do citizens have internal law in their souls simply in so far as they observe the laws of the city? Plato’s discussion (719e–722bc) shows that this suggestion is too simple. The citizens of Magnesia do not simply learn to keep the laws. They also learn something about the grounds and purpose of each law. The Athenian wants the actual statement of the law to follow a ‘preface’ that says why the law is needed and what general principles it relies on (see, e.g., 721b–d). He
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defends this policy through a comparison with medical practice (720b–e). Doctors who treat free people do not coerce them into undergoing treatment. They add persuasion and encouragement to compulsion.7 What does Plato mean in speaking of persuasion? We might suppose that persuasion is addressed to the non-rational parts of the soul so that citizens who are incapable of rational understanding will none the less support the laws and will conform to them willingly. Perhaps the Laws simply extends the policy of the Republic. The ‘noble lie’ embodied in the myth of the metals is an example of this sort of persuasion. This may be the sort of persuasion that the Politicus refers to when it denies that ability to persuade is a criterion for being an expert ruler. Wise rulers use persuasion, rather than force, as far as they can; but it would be unreasonable to claim that the expert’s prescriptions are right only if people can be persuaded that they are right. The truth or falsity of principles for separating the classes in the Republic does not depend on Plato’s ability to devise the myth of the metals. Alternatively, and more plausibly, we might take persuasion to require rational instruction. To explain the point of prefaces to the laws, the Athenian imagines a doctor who is criticised for ‘instructing’ or ‘educating’ (paideuein) the patient, as though he were making him another doctor (857d7–e1). This sort of instruction distinguishes the doctor who addresses free people from one who addresses slaves. Since the prefaces to the laws offer the sort of instruction that a doctor offers to free people, Plato implies that they convey rational instruction that should lead to rational understanding. It is reasonable to expect experts to offer this sort of persuasion in support of their prescriptions. The claim in the Statesman that persuasion is irrelevant to expertise is false for rational persuasion. If, then, the prefaces to the laws aim at rational persuasion and conviction, what sort of soul is open to this rational persuasion, and what condition of soul results from it? Answers to these questions will tell us how Plato conceives the law in the soul. 5. I n t e r n a l l aw a n d t h e pa r t s of t h e s ou l Plato introduces the rational function of internal law in the course of his description of the parts of the soul (644c–645c). Pleasure and pain are two opposed and thoughtless (aphrone) advisers in each of us (644c7). We On persuasion see Bobonich (2002: 97–105); Morrow (1960: 553–60).
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also have a golden cord, reasoning (logismos). In the city this is called law (644d3), and we always ought to follow it (645a6). This internal law does not simply find ways to satisfy one’s dominant desire on the basis of pleasure or pain. If it is correctly trained it achieves wisdom (phronêsis), and wisdom forms the right impulses in us. That is why we should not pray to get whatever we want; we should want our impulses to be guided by wisdom (687e5–9); for the ‘leader of all virtue’ is ‘wisdom, understanding, and belief, with passion (erôs) and appetite (epithumia) following them’ (688b1–4). Wisdom belongs to the rational part of the soul, and hence to the golden cord (644c9–645b8). We need wisdom to make sure that we use non-moral goods correctly (631c4–5), and wisdom itself is the leader among the goods of the soul (631c5–d1). In contrast to the wise person, the foolish (amathês) person recognises that something is fine and good, but hates it; or else he recognises that something is base (ponêron) and unjust, but still loves and welcomes it (689a5–7). Foolishness is discord between rational belief, on the one side, and pleasure and pain, on the other (689a7–9). Concord is necessary for wisdom: ‘For how … could even the least sort of wisdom come about without concord? It could not. Rather, the finest and greatest of concords would most rightly be called the greatest wisdom (sophia)’ (689d4–7). Wisdom is supposed to differ from the other virtues in so far as it involves rational judgement (963e5–8). 6. T h e c on t e n t of i n t e r n a l l aw The citizens of Magnesia, therefore, are not simply law-abiding, and are not simply disposed to follow the external laws of the city. They are also guided by an internal law that belongs to their reason and understanding, and, in so far as they are guided by it, they achieve wisdom. What does this internal law say? Perhaps it embodies the external law. In that case, the citizens follow internal law to the extent that they learn and understand the principles of the external law. If this is Plato’s view, he is an ancestor, but not a member, of the natural law tradition. If, however, the internal law consists of a set of moral principles that correspond to natural facts and provide some basis for the criticism of positive law, Plato agrees with later supporters of natural law. He recognises natural law most clearly in his appeal to nature as a basis for the criticism of positive law. According to Plato, Thrasymachus claims that nothing is just by nature, so that we have no reasonable basis for
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claims about justice that are independent of claims about particular positive laws made in the interest of the ruler (714c).8 Plato answers (715b) that positive laws are open to moral criticism; a law is not correct (orthos) unless it aims at the common good of the whole city. Constitutions that do not aim at the good of the whole are not genuine constitutions (politeiai),9 and the unjust laws that they enact are not genuine laws, because they do not meet the standards for law as a rational order.10 To see how Plato introduces natural law into this argument, it will be helpful to examine Thrasymachus’ conception of justice more fully. 7. J us t ic e a n d s e l f -i n t e r e s t In order to explain why constitutions that do not aim at the common good are not true constitutions with true laws, Plato points to the basic error in many arguments about justice. Many people assume that justice involves some sacrifice of their own interest to the interests of others, and that therefore they have good reason to accept a system of laws and justice only in so far as it achieves a satisfactory balance between one’s own interest and the interests of others. Plato ascribes to Thrasymachus a consistent and intelligible view of justice that relies on this widespread assumption. Readers have sometimes found it difficult to reconcile different claims that Thrasymachus defends in the Republic Book 1 and that Glaucon and Adeimantus revive in Book 2: (1) justice is the interest of the stronger; (2) justice is the good of another; (3) and systems of justice arise from a social contract. As Plato presents Thrasymachus’ position in the Laws Book 4, the first claim gives the essential character of justice; it is a set of rules designed for the maintenance of the existing regime. Since the survival of the state with its present regime does not always benefit the individual, the first claim about justice supports the second. The third claim explains why, in the light of the first two claims, systems of justice none the less come into being and survive. Though they demand some sacrifice of one’s own interest to the interests of others, they are none the less advantageous for self-interested individuals. If we agree The same idea is expressed at 890a. ‘Such societies, we are now, presumably, asserting, are not constitutional states (politeiai) at all, just as enactments, so far as they are not for the common interest of the whole city, are not correct laws (orthous nomous); men who are for a party, we say, are factionaries, not citizens, and their [claims about] just things are empty’ (715b). 10 This view that unjust laws are not real laws is explicit in Hippias Major 284c–e. 8
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to a system of justice, we are protected against aggression, even though it is not always in our interest to do everything that the system demands of us. In Plato’s view, this attitude to justice is deeply rooted in human nature. We need to see the natural basis of this wrong attitude to justice in order to see why the internal natural law takes a different view of justice. 8. S e l f -l ov e a n d h a ppi n e s s Plato discusses the common view that every human being is by nature a friend to himself, and must be so (731e1–3).11 In answer to this common view, he maintains that ‘the cause of all errors arises on each occasion for each person because of extreme love of oneself’ (731e3–5). But once we recognise these errors, we can avoid them, and so self-love does not inevitably dominate us. Self-love makes us excessively favourable and charitable to ourselves and to our own point of view; since we prefer what is our own before the truth, we are bad judges of just, good and fine things (731e5–732a1). Love of ourselves makes us slow to correct our ignorance, and prone to claim knowledge that we lack (732a4–b2). A truly great man, therefore, should not love himself or what belongs to him. He should love just things, whether they are his own actions or someone else’s (732a2–4). We may be surprised that Plato denounces self-love so strongly, given that he seems to appeal without hesitation to this motive. The frequent assertions of eudaemonism in the Laws seem to recognise the importance and rational necessity of self-love. The just person is happy whether he is rich or poor, strong or weak (660d11–e5), and the unjust person is miserable, no matter how healthy, strong and powerful he may be (661d6–e4). Plato affirms this connection between justice and happiness because he wants to give us an overriding reason to be just. He assumes, as he assumes in the Republic, that we have such a reason if and only if justice is best for the promotion of one’s own happiness. Plato does not, therefore, attack the self-interested outlook that attaches supreme practical importance to one’s own eudaimonia. On the contrary, he takes this outlook for granted. That is why we should not even contemplate the idea of the gods telling us to be just while agreeing that the just life is not the happiest. In 731e3 dein might be taken to refer to a natural necessity (derived from phuesi in the previous line) or to a rational necessity (i.e., ‘ought to be so’).
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This point is even clearer in Plato’s demand for a proof that the just life is not only happier, but also pleasanter, than the unjust life. In his view, we must not allow any separation between happiness and pleasure. If we separate the most just life from the pleasantest, we must decide which of them is happier. Plato assumes it would be intolerable in these circumstances to have to say that the pleasantest life is happier than the most just life (662c5–d7). When he explains why more pleasure belongs to the virtuous life than to the vicious life, Plato says that anyone who ‘knows’ this way of life (733e6–734a8) will agree. Similarly, he claims that we ought to praise the finest life on the ground that ‘if one is willing to taste it and does not become a fugitive from it when one is young, it is superior in what we all seek, greater enjoyment and less pain over one’s whole life’ (733a1–4). How, then, is Plato’s denunciation of self-love consistent with his appeal to self-interest? His appeal to self-interest seems to be addressed to people who care about their interest above all, and these people seem to be moved primarily by self-love. We might suppose that Plato addresses his eudaemonist arguments to people who are dominated by a motive that he believes should not dominate them. Though he may regret the fact that most people are dominated by self-love, he may suppose that he needs to defend justice to people in whom this motive dominates. We might compare Butler’s view that though conscience is rationally superior to self-love, he needs to defend morality to people who take self-love to be supreme.12 It is difficult to apply Butler’s distinction to Plato, however. When he defends justice by appeal to happiness, he does not suggest that he addresses people who are wrong about the place of self-interest, or that the enlightened person does not need such a defence of justice. He speaks as though the eudaemonist defence of justice is rationally indispensable, and not merely useful in arguments with excessively self-interested people. If the Laws does not take Butler’s approach, either Plato is inconsistent or his denunciation of self-love does not apply to the overriding aim of achieving one’s own happiness. In that case, the self-love that he attacks is not self-love as a whole, but only some sort of ‘excessive’ self-love. But what makes it excessive? For reasons we have already considered, Plato does not think it is excessive to treat one’s happiness as rationally supreme; hence
See Butler, Fifteen Sermons, xi 20. On disputes about Butler’s view of the relation between selflove and conscience see Irwin (2008: §708–9).
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excessive self-love is not taking one’s own happiness to be more important than it really is. Where, then, should the excess be found? 9. E xc e s s i v e s e l f -l ov e To see Plato’s point, we may return to our earlier discussion of his claim that many people fail to see that individuals are better off if they pursue the common good above their individual good (875a). A state that is governed by genuine law, as Plato conceives it, aims at the common good rather than the good of any individual or group within the state. Internal law within an individual also aims at the common good of oneself and others. Neither the external nor the internal law opposes one’s own good to the common good; for one promotes one’s own good by advancing the common good, and the common good does not require genuine self-sacrifice. This conception of the internal law does not settle the question of whether Plato takes the common good or one’s own good to be rationally prior. It is consistent with acceptance of Butler’s view, as we described it before. But if Plato sticks to a eudaemonist outlook in the Laws, he may affirm that if we understand our own interest correctly, we will find that we achieve it by advancing the common good. Plato’s remark that we should prefer the common good over our own good may be explained by a division between a practical and a reflective level. If we ask how we should decide the considerations that should guide our action, our question arises at the reflective level, and we answer by appeal to our own happiness. If we then ask what considerations should guide our action if we aim at our own happiness, our question arises at the practical level, and we answer that considerations about the common good should guide us. We do not give priority to our happiness in decisions at the practical level about what to do. We give priority to the common good at the practical level because we have already found, at the reflective level, that this policy achieves our happiness. To put it briefly and too simply, one’s own happiness is supreme at the reflective level, whereas the common good is supreme at the practical level. If this view of Plato’s position is right, Plato differs from Butler at the reflective level, but agrees with him at the practical level. This account is oversimplified in so far as it does not discuss the character of the two ‘levels’. Some defenders of indirect utilitarianism have spoken of two levels in order to indicate the different considerations that one ought to be thinking about on different occasions, and in particular to suggest that one ought not always to be thinking about how to maximise
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utility. It would be difficult to attribute such a view to Plato. He does not suggest that we ought to exclude or suppress thoughts about our happiness when we decide what to do. The prefaces to the laws do not encourage us to form any habit of excluding or suppressing such thoughts. The different levels mark different questions that we can ask. When we have answered the reflective question, we can see why we do not sacrifice our own happiness by refusing to give it priority at the practical level. Recognition of these two levels allows us to understand Plato’s attack on excessive self-love and his injunction to pursue the common good rather than one’s own good. Self-love is excessive in so far as we take it to be primary at the practical level; it should be subordinate, at this level, to the common good. Our own happiness, however, is supreme at the reflective level, and if we take it as supreme at this level, we are not guided by excessive self-love. If we take our own happiness to be supreme at the reflective level, and we understand the nature and composition of our happiness, we prevent the excessive influence of self-love at the practical level. 10. N at u r a l l aw, s e l f -l ov e a n d t h e c om mon g o od Further discussion is needed to decide whether this interpretation of Plato’s views about self-love and the common good matches everything that he says, or leaves him with a plausible position. But we may have said enough to draw some possible conclusions about the content of the internal law. We have a powerful natural tendency to form excessive self-love, but though this tendency is natural, it does not suit our nature. The internal law contains the principle that suits our nature. This law is a rational principle that affirms the reflective supremacy of one’s own happiness and the practical supremacy of the common good. It is a law in so far as it is a prescription of practical reason aiming at the common good. It does not ignore our natural tendency to self-love, but orders it appropriately in relation to the common good. If Plato holds these views, he believes in a natural law, in so far as he believes in rational moral principles that are correct because they fit the nature of human beings. He agrees with Kant in so far as he recognises an internal moral law that states principles of practical reason. This is a common natural law in so far as its principles are appropriate for the nature of each human being individually, and for all in common. Some believers in a natural moral law also hold that the relevant moral principles are natural in an epistemological sense, because they are either innate or readily acquired without ordinary learning, and hence are
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attributable to nature rather than to society and instruction. Plato does not hold a very explicit doctrine of this sort, but some of his remarks suggest that he takes the principles of natural law to be readily accessible to all sorts of people. We all have the golden cord in the soul that expresses practical reason; to this extent the provisions of the internal law are accessible to us all. Plato also implies that people who do not listen to the internal law are none the less aware of what it says. The foolishness of the foolish person does not consist in his unawareness of rational principles, but in his failure to prefer them over the suggestions coming from his non-rational part. It is difficult to say, on the basis of the Laws alone, what the foolish person misses in the internal law. Two interpretations seem to fit what Plato says. (1) The foolish person is aware of what the law prescribes at the practical level, but he does not see that these provisions can be justified at the reflective level. That is why he thinks he will lose if he accepts the practical principles that make the common good supreme. He fails to grasp the reflective argument for the natural law because he does not free himself from the suggestions of his natural tendency to favour excessive self-love. (2) He recognises that the provisions of the law can be justified at the reflective level, and so he sees that he promotes his own happiness by following the law. But he does not pursue his own happiness; he prefers the satisfaction of his non-rational desires guided by pleasure and pain. His non-rational desires make him act against his conception of his good. It is not clear, then, how much of the natural law the foolish person recognises. If Plato takes the first view, the foolish person only recognises the practical aspect of the moral law, and has not recognised its reflective aspect. According to the second view, even the reflective aspect of the natural law is available to the foolish person. Whichever of these views Plato accepts, he takes the provisions of rational morality to be natural in so far as they are naturally accessible to all rational agents. 1 1. T h e f or m of n at u r a l l aw It might appear, however, that we have asked too few questions in our effort to decide whether Plato has a conception of natural moral law. Perhaps a genuine conception of natural law should impose further conditions, and in particular perhaps it should make it clear how the natural law is a type of law. We might argue that laws are inherently and unconditionally prescriptive to a degree that precludes our attempt to fit natural law into Plato’s teleological conception of morality. If laws essentially prescribe
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in their own right, and not because of some end that they promote, they have to express a deontological outlook. If the provisions of natural law are principles directed towards individual and common good, they are not purely deontological. If, therefore, we take a belief in natural law to require belief in inherently prescriptive principles, and therefore in purely deontological principles, Plato does not belong to the natural law tradition. While he sometimes advocates humble submission to the demands of the law (tapeinos kai kekosmêmenos, 716a4),13 he does not demand the sort of unconditional submission that would treat the law as inherently obligatory apart from any end it might achieve. If, however, we exclude Plato from the natural law tradition on the ground that his conception of the law is not purely deontological, we also exclude a number of philosophers who claim t