SUDANESE WOMEN REFUGEES
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SUDANESE WOMEN REFUGEES
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SUDANESE WOMEN REFUGEES TRANSFORMATIONS AND FUTURE IMAGININGS
Jane Kani Edward
SUDANESE WOMEN REFUGEES
Copyright © Jane Kani Edward, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–8077–9 ISBN-10: 1–4039–8077–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Edward, Jane Kani. Sudanese women refugees : transformations and future imaginings / Jane Kani Edward. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–8077–2 (alk. paper) 1. Women refugees––Sudan. 2. Women immigrants––Egypt. 3. Sudanese––Egypt––Social conditions. I. Title. HV640.5.S9E38 2007 305.48⬘9691409624––dc22 2007007031 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: November 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
CONTENTS
Preface
vii
Acknowledgments
xiii
Abbreviations and Acronyms
xv
Map of Sudan
xvi
Introduction
1
1 Root Causes of the “North-South” Conflict in Sudan
17
2 Conceptualizing Refugee Conditions from Feminist Perspectives
37
3
49
Conceptual Framework
4 Interviewing Refugees in Transit: Implications on the Research Process
63
5 Sociocultural Institutions and Laws Governing the Southern Sudanese Society
79
6 Sudanese Refugees and the Challenges of Life in Cairo
103
7
Transformations and Future Imaginings
133
8
Race, Racism, and Ethnicity in a Refugee Context
159
Conclusion
189
Epilogue The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Decision to Return
199
vi
CONTENTS
Appendix 1
203
Appendix 2
205
Appendix 3
207
Appendix 4
211
Appendix 5
215
Notes
217
Glossary
243
Bibliography
245
Index
261
PREFACE
lthough some of the southern Sudanese cultural practices and traditions discourage girls’ education, my love and interest for learning and pursuit of knowledge was initially inspired by my parents. My father, Edward Lojeng Lado, believed in and recognized the importance and value of education for all his children regardless of their gender. As a result, all of us—five daughters and eight sons—were enrolled in school. One reason that might be attributed to his belief in education was his own background as an educator. My mother, Marata Ja’be Paulo, who did not complete her education because she was taken out of school to be married to my father, encouraged me to complete what she herself was unable to complete. My knowledge of some of the cultural practices and traditional values, which will be analyzed in this book, are drawn from my experience growing up in a family environment where rural and urban life experiences interact, as well as from the review of some scholarly writings on the subject. My parents were among the few people from their families living in the city, Juba, and while I was growing up, our home became a meeting place for relatives visiting from the Nyangwara village of Rokon in the Equatoria region of southern Sudan. During these visits, our relatives talked about life in the village, the cultural practices of the Nyangwara people, and their songs and the meanings attached to these songs and practices. Such talks and exchange of ideas that I was keen to listen to enabled me to learn more about some of the Nyangwara cultural practices and traditions that shaped and continue to shape people’s attitudes and perceptions about the relationship between women and men, and between the young and the elderly. Furthermore, social events such as marriage discussions and childnaming ceremony, meran or simaya, have enriched my understanding of the meaning of some of the social and cultural rituals. One of the rituals that is of relevance to discussion on gender roles and gendered division of labor is the child-naming ceremony. During the child-naming ceremony, for example, special foods, mainly black-eyed beans, some green leaf vegetables, sesame oil, and sesame seed paste, are prepared for the invited guests.
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The food is prepared without salt and no alcoholic drinks are consumed during the naming ceremony. Also some rituals are performed on both the mother and the new-born child during the naming process. If the child is a boy, rituals related to his gender roles are performed by the mother. For example, the mother carries the child on one of her shoulders in a traditional baby carrier made out of deer skin, referred to in the Nyangwara language as deepo, while performing mock hunting, herding, and so on, with her other hand. If the child is a girl, the mother will also perform mock women’s roles, such as fetching water, firewood, cooking, cleaning, and so forth. These mock performances symbolize the gendered roles, gendered division of labor, and gender ideologies that govern the Nyangwara society.1 Therefore, it is through participation in and observation of such events and ceremonies, as well as listening to what my relatives from the village talked about, I am able to acquire valuable knowledge about some cultural practices and traditions shaping the understanding and perceptions of many southern Sudanese people in general and the Nyangwara people in particular. Other factors further motivated me to study women in general and women refugees in particular. First, my personal experiences in my youth and adult life have given me the courage and motivation to focus on women’s conditions. Second, reflecting on my years of schooling in Sudan, Egypt, and then Canada, I realized that the experiences and voices of southern Sudanese women refugees have been either misrepresented, ignored, or marginalized both in Sudan’s national discourse that emphasize Arabism and Islamism as defining factors in narrating the nation and in the African refugee literature that tends to emphasize the victimized and dependent image of women refugees. As will be discussed in this book, southern Sudanese, in general, and southern Sudanese women, in particular, differ from northern Sudanese in terms of their cultural practices, language, education, religious beliefs, and experiences in life. Therefore, focusing on their experiences is important. Similarly, my review of the literature on refugees and forced migration shows that, experiences, achievements, and contributions of southern Sudanese women refugees are either marginalized or not adequately addressed. Therefore, my purposes in choosing southern Sudanese women refugees as the focus of my book are two fold: to give voice to the marginalized and silenced, and to challenge the negative representations and the victimized and dependent image of southern Sudanese women refugees in the refugee literature. In preparing to undertake this study initially as a doctoral dissertation and its subsequent transformation into this book, I took several graduate courses that focus on issues related to class, race, ethnicity, and gender. The theories and perspectives offered in these courses enabled me to shape and
PREFACE
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conceptualize my study. Moreover, my previous experiences of working with internally displaced communities in Juba, southern Sudan from 1989 to 1992; involvement in research on displaced and refugee communities in Egypt, Northern Uganda, and Yei, southern Sudan; as well as my involvement in community work, particularly in Egypt from 1992 to mid-1997, have given me the opportunity to observe and learn more about the experiences of refugees and displaced people. The selection of Cairo, Egypt, as the site of my research was based on my familiarity with and accessibility and relative safety of Cairo as compared to, for example, Northern Uganda where southern Sudanese refugees were settled during that time. It is also based on the high concentration of Sudanese there. However, my claim of being familiar with the research setting is challenged, especially considering that the city of Cairo has changed greatly since I left in 1997, and only returned to it in late 2001.2 The refugees I found were also different compared to those Sudanese refugees whom I knew and who were in Cairo from the 1980s to early 1990s. The study of southern Sudanese women refugees has both empirical and practical relevance. This study will contribute to filling in the empirical gap that exists in the contemporary field of refugee and forced migration literature. As I discuss in the introduction of this book, my review of the refugee literature has shown that there are very few detailed and significant studies done on the situation of southern Sudanese women refugees. For instance, very little is said about the roles and contributions of southern Sudanese women refugees to their families and communities in exile or in displaced people’s camps inside Sudan. Their political contributions are completely ignored. Furthermore, little is known about the ways in which southern Sudanese women refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) use newly acquired skills, knowledge, and experiences to challenge some of the repressive social and cultural aspects of the southern Sudan society. Similarly, the intersection of race, class, gender, and ethnicity in determining the status determination procedures at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the host-refugees relationship is rarely addressed. Even when women are included, the literature tends to represent them solely as victims of the civil war, dependents on men and/or international relief aid, and sees them as the most vulnerable group among the refugee and internally displaced population. It is true that women suffered and continue to suffer most during civil wars. For example, women are subjected to rape, forced marriage, forced prostitution, discrimination, and other forms of gender-based violence. Similarly upon arrival at a displaced people or refugee camp, refugees in general and women refugees in particular might need assistance to meet their basic human needs. However, this should not
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negate the fact that women have also struggled and made some important decisions and actions to help themselves and their families during the initial time of dislocation, resettlement, and before the arrival of outside help. Therefore, my study is significant because it brings to the fore the ignored contributions and achievements of southern Sudanese women refugees and those internally displaced, evoking the power and agency of these women and their resistance to a dependent image of the refugee. My analysis goes beyond the household or the family and reproductive ideologies, into exploring some of the cultural aspects of southern Sudanese, as well as the laws and customs that govern the southern Sudan society. Analyzing these issues sets the basis for understanding changes and transformations in women’s attitudes and perceptions as they experienced life in exile. In addition to its contribution to the existing knowledge on refugees and forced migration, the book is relevant and important for both southern Sudanese women refugees and those who are interested in Sudan’s studies. For the women refugees, the study will provide them with an opportunity to view themselves not only as victims and dependents, but also as creators of knowledge and agents of social action and change. The study will also allow them to see the positive aspects of exile as well. For example, life in refuge sometimes provides avenues for women to reimagine their lives, to perceive the world around them differently, to reflect on their past, and to question some of the societal structures and cultural meanings that constrained their freedom and progress. Finally, life in refuge allows for imagining a different future, given their experiences in exile. As for those interested in Sudan, the book provides them with a different understanding and analysis of the situation in Sudan in general and that of southern Sudanese refugees in particular. Such an understanding will allow hopefully for the rethinking and reevaluation of the past—and contemporary—ways of knowing that were—and are—used to study southern Sudanese refugees. Furthermore, the study reshapes and redirects the focus from an analysis of a general situation of refugees and IDPs and the impact of war on the civilian population, toward issues of gender, class, race, ethnic differentials, age, and other forms of social difference. It also helps us raise some critical questions, such as how all these issues have influenced the ways in which refugees are treated, or represented, how the refugees view themselves, and how they respond to the refugee situation based on their social position. Therefore, my book is both transformative and a challenge to the existing literature on southern Sudanese women and men refugees. For educators, the study certainly will enable them to engage in an educational exercise, which integrates gender, class, race, and sexuality
PREFACE
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as understood in the refugee context in their educational curriculum and practice. The book further helps educators at all levels to foster a strategy that ensures that educational activities serve local community needs and concerns for social justice, equity, and power sharing in a given society.3
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
his book is based on my revised doctoral dissertation. The completion of this book would have not been possible without the continuous support and encouragements of many individuals. I would like to thank members of my PhD thesis committee for their ongoing support and guidance. I am very grateful to my supervisor Professor George Dei for his helpful feedback, suggestions, and guidance throughout my doctoral program. I would like also to thank Professor Ruth Roach Pierson who took a keen interest in my work in the early stages of my doctoral program, and who remained in my thesis committee after her early retirement. Her close reading of my work and continuous guidance and encouragement are very much appreciated. Furthermore, I would like to thank Professor Rose Folson for her ongoing support, feedback, and helpful suggestions especially on areas such as African feminism and refugee and forced migration studies. Many thanks also go to my external examiner Professor Jok Madut Jok for his helpful comments and encouraging words. His suggestions are thoughtful and constructive. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who reviewed my book prospectus for their constructive suggestions. Numerous individuals and institutions have made my fieldwork particularly successful. Many thanks go to Professor Nicholas Hopkins of the American University in Cairo, for understanding my research endeavors and supporting me financially. I thank him especially for believing in me and in appreciating what I am trying to accomplish in my academic career. I would like to thank also the United States Institute for Peace for the financial support that enabled me to travel to Cairo, Egypt, to carry out my fieldwork. Special thanks go to Jeffrey Helsing of the United States Institute for Peace. I would also like to thank Ma’an Women Group, a nongovernmental organization based in Cairo for the financial support that helped me meet some of my research needs and expenses. My stay in Cairo would not have been possible without the generous support of Dr Magda M. Ali and Mr Kamal Ibrahim who welcomed me into the comfort of their home in Cairo. Of course, their quiet home environment and the special
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
care accorded to me by the family enabled me to accomplish many tasks related to my fieldwork. Special thanks go to the southern Sudanese refugee community in Cairo, women and men refugees, leaders of the refugee community organizations, and women’s and youth’s groups who shared with me their individual and collective experiences. Many thanks and appreciations also go to the personnel of the different international organizations, church groups, and other local organizations who allowed me into their offices to learn more about their programs that are designed for the refugees. Finally, I would like to thank my husband Amir Idris for believing in me and for his continuous guidance, support, and encouragement throughout the initial stages of this book as a doctoral thesis to its subsequent transformation into a book. Many thanks are also due to my children Amanawil and Bawila for their patience.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AU CEDAW CPA FGM GONU GOSS ICPD IDPs INS IOM JRM LRA NCP NGOs NIF NNGOs OXFAM PDF PVOs RDC SOSSA SPLA SPLM/A SSLM UN UNHCR UNHCR RO WCW
The African Union Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Comprehensive Peace Agreement Female Genital Mutilation Government of National Unity Government of Southern Sudan International Conference for Population and Development Internally Displaced Persons Immigration and Naturalization Services International Organization of Migration Joint Relief Ministry Lord Resistance Army National Congress Party Nongovernmental Organizations National Islamic Front Northern Nongovernmental Organizations Oxford Committee for Famine Relief Popular Defence Forces Private Voluntary Organizations Refugee Data Center Southern Sudanese Students Association Sudan People’s Liberation Army Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army Southern Sudan Liberation Movement United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Office World Conference for Women
Egypt Libya Wadi Halfa
N
llo
R
Port Sudan
Red Sea
.
Sawakin Atbara
Chad Omdurman
Kassala
Eritrea
Khartoum Wad Madani
Al Fashir
A Qadarif Kusti
Al Ubayyid Nyala
Malakl Ethiopia Central African Republic
Waw Bor Juba Nimule
Democratic Republic of Congo
Uganda
International borders Capital city Cities
Map 1 Map of Sudan
Kenya
INTRODUCTION
ince the second half of the twentieth century, Sudan has been ravaged by a series of civil wars. The first phase of the north-south civil war in Sudan started in 1955 and ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 between the central government and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The second phase of the northsouth civil war began in 1983 and ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Niavasha, Kenya, on January 9, 2005.1 The conflict in Darfur began in February 2003 and continues today. For many years prior to Sudan’s independence in 1956, the relations between northern and southern Sudanese were hostile and consisted largely of invasions by northern slave traders during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and aggression by the successive postcolonial northern-based governments trying to dominate the south. Despite the complexities of Sudan’s ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity, the first two wars in the Sudan have translated into a north-south dichotomy, with race and religion among others as its major factors. However, neither the north nor the south represents a homogeneous and undifferentiated group of people; rather, differences based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, region, class, and experiences do exist. During the first two wars, many southern Sudanese either died or became internally displaced whereas others fled the country to seek safety and better economic opportunities in the neighboring and Western countries.2 Although there has been no established statistical data as to how many Sudanese people are either dead or displaced by the (1983–2005) civil war in Sudan, various estimates put the figure of those dead at about 2 million, mainly from southern Sudan.3 Similarly, there is an estimated 5.5 million Sudanese who are displaced, of whom 4 million are internally displaced, most of them southerners. They were displaced from rural areas into garrison towns, such as Juba, Wau, and Malakal in the south, whereas others were/are living in displaced people’s camps, mainly in the outskirts
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of Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. The other 1.5 million sought refuge in the neighboring countries of Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), and in some Western countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and other European countries. The war also led to the destruction of the infrastructure and the social, cultural, and economic fabric of the southern Sudanese society. Much earlier literature on refugees, in general, and refugees from Africa, in particular, focuses on the conventional definition of a refugee, regional and international instruments pertaining to refugees, and the shortcomings of such definitions and instruments in our contemporary world of continuous refugee flow. In his study of the problems of refugees in Africa, Blavo Q. Ebenezer outlined the causes of refugee problems in Africa, definitions of a refugee, refugees’ life in refuge, and the ways in which problems of refugees in Africa should be addressed. He concluded his book by assessing the value and effectiveness of existing refugee policies in some African countries.4 Other scholars seek to understand the root causes of the refugee phenomenon, patterns of refugee flows, and the function of the international agencies dealing with refugees.5 Similarly, others offered a comprehensive analysis of refugee movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, tracing their origins and resulting responses. According to B. Q. Ebenezer, “[regional] analysis of refugee movements can serve to illustrate both the contrasts and commonalities across settings differing in terms of economic development, population size, availability of land, efficiency of territorial and boundary control, and ethnopolitical context.”6 Other analyses emphasized the function and politics of the international relief agencies and other private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in dealing with refugees. For example, Robert F. Gorman identified five phases of refugee situations: preemergency, emergency relief, postemergency, durable solutions, and post integration and development.7 Such analyses usually emphasize the paternalistic and sympathetic attitudes of these agencies, that is, their concern with the “needs and sufferings of people affected and not with the underlying causes which have led to their distress.”8 In terms of definition, the literature tends to universalize and homogenize the refugee category. In other words, the refugees are seen as a homogeneous group. According to McSpadden and Moussa (1993), “the term ‘refugee’ conjures up the assumption that all a person is and has been is a refugee.”9 For Liisa Malkki, the term refugee as represented by the international agencies and administrators of the hosting governments tends to “depoliticize the refugee category and to construct in that depoliticized space an ahistorical, universal humanitarian subject.”10 Malkki went further to argue that “[t]his dehistoricizing universalism creates a context in which
INTRODUCTION
3
it is difficult for people in the refugee category to be approached as historical actors rather than as mute victims.”11 Viewing refugees in such a way strips them of their preflight experiences, agency, culture, and their way of life. Therefore, as argued by Doreen Indra, “[t]he category ‘refugee’ . . . whose genealogy begins in the North . . . is now being constructed in other ways elsewhere, especially in Africa. Once assessed in terms of generic, universalized, genderless standards, even some Northern governments now assert that gender oppression should be officially recognized as criterion for political/legal refugee status.”12 However, the treatment of the category “refugee” as an undifferentiated or as an unchanging category is often problematic in my view. Treating refugees as a homogeneous group tends to erase the different histories, politics, and experiences of the refugee population, a treatment that will eventually structure the processes of their settlement. Similarly, such a conceptualization tends to obscure the significant differences between women, men, and children refugees. It also renders invisible the differences in class, race, ethnicity, age, (dis)ability, and other forms of difference.13 Embedded in the universalizing and undifferentiated category of a refugee is the view that refugees from Africa are also victims and dependents who rely solely on outside help. This victimized and dependent image of African refugees is evident in the early writings on refugees. For instance, in his analysis of the role of the United Nations in dealing with African refugees, George Ivan Smith (1967) emphasized the victim nature of African refugees, as those who need outside help. According to him, African refugees are victims; thus, “victims want help and we are helpers.”14 Emphasizing the combined effort by humanitarian agencies, Smith went on to note that “by common effort and intensive liaison we could get as near as humanly possible to a point at which we were consistently advising the victim of all the avenues open to him.”15 Sometimes the literature tends to represent the refugees as a “problem” or a “burden” of the international relief agencies. A review of earlier writings on African refugees has shown how the titles of books on African refugees convey the dependency, burden, and victimization of the refugee: Mink, Africa’s Refugee Crisis: What to Be Done (1986), Hamrell, Refugee Problems in Africa (1967), Gorman, Coping with Africa’s Refugee Burden: A Time for Solutions (1987), among many.16 L. Malkki has argued that “[a]sylum states and international agencies dealing with refugees, as well as much of the policy oriented, therapeutic literature on refugees, tend to see refugees as ‘a problem’ . . . They are constituted as an anomaly requiring specialized correctives and therapeutic interventions.”17 Viewing the refugee as a “problem” usually tends to shift the focus away from the circumstances and the root causes that led to the mass displacement of people
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in the first place. Thus, emphasis is placed on seeking ways of dealing with the refugees—ways that are usually temporary. Furthermore, it “locates ‘the problem’ within the bodies and minds of refugees rather than the violent condition that produces massive displacement of people.”18 The representation of African refugees solely as victims, desperate for outside help, is often problematic because it ignores the struggles and efforts made by the refugees to alleviate some of their problems before the arrival of foreign relief. At the same time, representing African women refugees as helpless victims of displacement usually ignores their agency, as well as downplaying the contributions and achievements made by African women refugees in their struggle for survival in refugee camps or elsewhere. Moreover, viewing African women refugees as backward, without skills and knowledge also tends to deny differences among African women refugees based on their class, age, ethnicity, race, educational achievements, and work experiences in their countries of origin. In other words, the “image of women as victims, and victimized is also a distortion of the varied and diverse experiences of refugee women.”19 Similarly, refugee literature that analyzes the situation of Sudanese refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) focuses on the war situation, factional fighting, unsuccessful peace talks, the shifting political climate in Sudan, famine, environmental degradation, military activities, and the effect of all these on civilian population.20 Furthermore, most of the literature represents southern Sudanese refugees and IDPs in similar ways as noted above. For instance, they tend to homogenize the category “southern Sudanese refugees” or “IDPs,” thereby erasing the differences that might exist between them. Similarly, the IDPs were/are seen as a danger and threat to public health, a threat to rural and national food security, and as a threat to cultural homogeneity and public order of the capital city.21 According to Salah el Din E. Ibrahim, “displacement has aroused mounting concerns in Sudan. Much of it, however, stems from a negative conception of the displaced. They are generally considered a threat to health, social order and responsible for the pressure on social services and the shortage of basic goods.”22 Viewing the IDPs as a threat to public order and national security, the NIF government in Sudan that came to power in 1989 used several strategies of discrimination, exclusion, and containment of the internally displaced. Among these strategies was the adoption of the policy of forcible relocation, which is locally referred to as kasha. According to a number of studies, the displaced were randomly rounded up by police and military forces and were relocated to their regions of origin, or to the desert on the outskirts of Khartoum.23
INTRODUCTION
5
This book challenges the victimized and dependent image of African women refugees, in general, and southern Sudanese women refugees, in particular, by invoking their power, agency, and placing them at the center of the study. It draws on the work that women refugees do, the new skills and knowledge they have acquired, and their struggle to survive to counter the victimized and dependent image claim. Challenging the victimized image of women refugees should not be understood as a refusal to acknowledge the fact that women refugees are victims of war, displacement, and other circumstance. On the contrary, women refugees have suffered and continue to suffer from the impact of war on their livelihood. Many of them have lost their love ones, property, sense of belonging, and a normal way of life. Furthermore, when refugees arrive in the host country, it is important to acknowledge that they may need some help in meeting some basic human needs, such as food and shelter. However, instead of seeing these needs as a state of victimization and total dependency, rather these should be viewed as a stage in the lives of the refugees. Emphasizing the victimized image ignores the power and agency of women in the face of all the challenges they face as refugees. In other words, despite the difficulties they face, they remain active agents in reshaping their lives and communities in exile. Similarly, challenging the victimized and dependent image of African women refugees should not be taken to mean that African refugees are not in need of external relief aid. Nor should this critique be taken as a dismissal of humanitarian intervention as useless or unnecessary. Rather, it is intended to show that when dealing with refugee populations particularly from Africa, it is necessary for those involved to capture the complexity of the refugees’ conditions, by identifying both refugees’ needs and their efforts in alleviating some of their difficulties before and after the arrival of external aid. L. Malkki has rightly argued that “[b]ecause humanitarian interventions are increasingly important we should have better ways of conceptualizing, designing, and challenging them. Thus it is useful to examine the idea of a universal, a historical humanity that forms the basis of much of contemporary progressive politics.”24 Another aspect, which is missing in the earlier literature on refugees, is gender and difference. Contemporary literature on refugees has shown that gender is an area where many negotiations and changes occur as a consequence of displacement.25 Working across disciplines and professions, feminist theorists on refugee and forced migration studies have brought women refugees’ issues to the fore in international refugee agencies and in particular the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). These theorists emphasized the lived experience of refugees as the basis of
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knowledge about the refugee situation. For instance, in the late 1980s and through the 1990s there was an increase in the need for a culturally and context-specific knowledge informed by the experiences of women refugees themselves.26 It is generally argued that, although all refugees are similarly affected by the situations that cause uprootedness and refugeeness, because of their gender, women refugees’ experiences differ from those of men.27 In addition to physical insecurity and fear of persecution, women refugees are further subjected to sexual harassment, rape, and forced prostitution during flight and settlement processes. Also another aspect that is not adequately addressed in the debate on refugees is the issue of race, racism, and ethnicity in refugee situations, particularly in Africa. For instance, in analyzing the host-refugee relationships, the literature tends to focus mainly on the economic dimension of these relations, which are seen as contributing to the unfriendly attitude of host populations toward refugees. Refugees and IDPs, for example, are frequently blamed for shortages in housing and social services, as well as for any rise in the cost of living.28 Similarly, when analyzing the failure of the UNHCR and donor countries to respond quickly and adequately to refugee situations in Africa, researchers emphasize the UNHCR’s lack of funds resulting from the strain felt by the donor countries in implementing programs intended to improve the conditions of refugees.29 However, little is said about how race and ethnicity are implicated in the refugee status determination procedures, and in the nature of support and programs extended and designed for refugees. This book examines the social, cultural, economic, and political transformations that have occurred among southern Sudanese women refugees as they experience life in Cairo, Egypt. Based on a research conducted in Cairo from December 2001 to January 2002, for my doctoral dissertation, the book traces the nature of the changes in the lives of southern Sudanese women refugees as they come into contact with new cultures, societies, and global affairs affecting women. It intends to show how these women use their newly acquired skills and knowledge to challenge their past and challenge the image of women refugees as victims and dependents in refugee literature. The argument that I make here is that the analysis of African women refugees in the 1970s and 1980s had been mainly gendered and racialized. That is, the situation of African women refugees has been analyzed from the varied perspectives of refugee policy makers, governments, academics, researchers, and relief workers who were predominantly male and who were mostly located in the North (North America and Western Europe). These individuals and institutions usually tend to “dehistorisize,” universalize, and homogenize the refugee category.30 The literature also tends to emphasize the victimized, dependent, and backward
INTRODUCTION
7
image of African women refugees, rather than their strength and contributions to their communities in exile. As a result, the experiences of African women refugees, if not completely ignored, were not yet adequately represented in the refugee literature. These gendered and racialized perspectives further affect the way in which governments and the international community respond to refugee problems, particularly in Africa. This book explores the experiences of southern Sudanese women refugees within the conceptual framework of the interlocking and the intersecting systems of oppression, and the idea of the “simultaneity” of oppression articulated by African feminists,31 black feminists,32 and antiracism and critical race theorists.33 The perspective of African feminism is important in the analysis of the experience of women refugees because it evokes the power of African women and their identities amid the obstacles that confront them by placing them at the center of the study.34 Black feminist thought is also useful in the analysis of the refugee experience because it places the experience of women at the center of the analysis. It also rejects the additive or hierarchization of social oppressions as well. Patricia H. Collins has argued that the interlocking nature of race, gender, and class oppression is one of the recurring themes in black feminist writings. Black feminists challenge both the grand narratives as well as mainstream Western feminism, pointing out the invisibility of black women in those scholarships.35 Many black feminists in North America, for example, have argued that mainstream feminism has excluded and silenced the experiences and voices of nonwhite women in their theorizing and feminist practices.36 Similarly, many of these feminists have rejected both the assertion that gender and patriarchy are the most important forms of oppression, and the assumption that the relationship among the various forms of discriminations is merely additive.37 I also use “integrative antiracism” as an alternative framework that allows me to explore issues of racism and ethnicity and how they are played out in a refugee context, and in particular within the context of a refugeehost relationship.38 According to George Dei, integrative antiracism is defined “as the study of how the dynamics of social difference (race, class, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, language, education, and religion) are mediated in people’s daily experiences.” Therefore, this framework “acknowledges our multiple, shifting and often contradictory identities and subject positions . . . [it] rejects meta-narratives or grand theories . . . in effect, calls for multiplicative, rather than additive analysis of social oppression.”39 Recognizing the difficulty in adequately addressing all intersectionalities, the book emphasizes issues of gender and gender relations and how they are played out in a refugee context because that is where many negotiations and
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changes occur as a consequence of displacement. However, this emphasis on gender and gender relations should not be understood as ignoring the importance of other forms of oppression, but rather as a starting point to understand the many issues affecting the lives of southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo. Like race and class, gender represents a central dimension of social structures. Thus, a focus on gender, conceptualized as a socially constructed relationship between the women and men, as they affect and, in turn, are affected by displacement conditions can yield important insights into the refugee phenomena. As George Dei rightly put it, “selecting one form of human experience as a point of entry may render another experience invisible. Yet we cannot adequately simultaneously explore all experiences with the same vigour and intensity. Therefore, we should attempt to capture, as much as possible, from the points where they intersect with one particular form of social oppression the diversity and multiplicity of human experiences.”40 Sudanese Refugee Population in Egypt Although there is no accurate statistical data on the number of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, estimates put the figure at about 20,000 or more, a figure disputed by many Sudanese living in Egypt.41 However, given the fact that Sudanese comprise the bulk of the caseload of the UNHCR Regional Office Cairo, as well as of the increase in the demand for services provided by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and churches in Cairo, one can claim that there is a large and increasing number of Sudanese in Egypt. These people can be categorized into two groups: those recognized by the UNHCR as refugees and those who are either waiting for their status determination interview or rejected or self-settled. According to the UNHCR staff that I interviewed, as of September 2001, there were 3,954 Sudanese refugees in Egypt (1,705 female and 2,249 male). This figure includes those already recognized as refugees as well as cases pending for status determination. Although the UNHCR office deals with all Sudanese, the majority of those seeking resettlement opportunities through the office were southern Sudanese. There were also few people from the Nuba Mountains, western and eastern regions of Sudan. Other Sudanese, especially those from northern and central Sudan, were in Egypt for several reasons. For example, politicians who were and are representing various political parties in Sudan, such as the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, and others, were in Cairo for political reasons rather than for the direct consequences of war. Others came to Egypt in search of better economic opportunities. The majority of these people had no plans to resettle in a third country. As a result, given their better economic
INTRODUCTION
9
situation, some of these people either own or rent apartments in the affluent neighborhoods in Cairo. Southern Sudanese refugees who are the focus of this study also ought to be divided by the time of their resettlement: those who came to Egypt in the 1980s to the early 1990s and those who came in the late 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century. They can be further divided in terms of class differences. This distinction is necessary because it shows how differently positioned refugees respond to refugee conditions and the life choices they make, and it also give insights into the dynamic relationship between refugees and the host population. During my fieldwork many participants made a clear distinction between southern Sudanese refugees based on the refugees’ personal characteristics, length of stay in Cairo, class, and the reasons that motivated them to come to Egypt. Earlier Arrivals Most of the southern Sudanese earlier arrivals came to Egypt mainly to pursue postsecondary education, under the “Egyptian Scholarship for Sudanese Students,” which was established after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement signed in 1972, between the then Sudan government and the SSLM, ending the first seventeen-year civil war. The scholarship was jointly funded by the Egyptian and Sudanese governments. Given the fact that the SSLM was struggling for a separate state in the south, the Egyptian government regarded the scholarship for Sudanese students as Egypt’s contribution to promote the unity of Sudan. It was believed that the exposure of southern Sudanese to Arab culture and language through education would minimize southern Sudanese’s interest for a separate state (personal communication).42 From Egypt’s point of view, this belief is particularly important because the unity of the Sudan is very important for Egypt due to Egypt’s interest in the Nile water that flows through the Sudan to Egypt and that Egypt’s livelihood depends on it. Therefore, it was seen that a creation of a separate state in the south would require Egypt to enter into new agreements regarding the use of the Nile water.43 As a result, in the period between 1972 and 1982 when the three southern provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bhar al Ghazal were administered as one administrative entity (see chapter 1), 100 southern Sudanese students were brought to Egypt each year for postsecondary education. Then, after the redivision of the south into three separate administrative regions, respectively, in 1983, 300 hundred students from the three provinces were sent to Egypt each year to study under the Egyptian scholarship. The scholarship program continued until 1992 after which it was terminated by the government of NIF in 1993, which took power in 1989.44
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Similarly, the takamul (integration) of the Nile Valley agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which was first signed in 1974, has allowed many Sudanese to come to Egypt. The takamul “had been worked out in details during [the] years by a joint parliament of the Nile Valley [and] was finally signed . . . on October 12, 1982.”45 Since the takamul agreement granted Sudanese people the right to live in Egypt without a residence permit, many Sudanese came to Egypt for several other reasons. In addition to those who came as students, others came to trade and to seek medical treatment. However, in June 26, 1995, when some Sudanese Islamists attempted to assassinate the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Mubarak held Sudan’s government responsible for the attempted assassination and thus revoked the takamul treaty.46 Despite this change, Sudanese were/are still able to enter Egypt on a one-month tourist visa. After the expiry of the one-month visa, Sudanese are required to renew their visa. However, given the refugees’ economic situation, securing money for a visa renewal, which costs about 150 Egyptian pounds, which is approximately US$37, is difficult. As a result, many Sudanese refugees continued to live in Egypt illegally (see chapter 6). As for those Sudanese who have been in Egypt long before the assassination attempt on President Mubarak’s life, they were allowed to stay in Egypt without a residence permit requirement. However, when traveling to another country with an intention of returning to Egypt, Sudanese were/are required to obtain a ta’ashira al a’wuda (reentry visa) to enable them to reenter Egypt. Without a reentry visa, one will not be allowed to enter Egypt again. As a result of their longer presence in Egypt and their status as former/ current students, many earlier arrivals have good knowledge of English and/or Arabic languages. Similarly, some of them might have a vision or a plan of what they want to do after finishing their studies. As students in a foreign country during that time, they were organized and committed to each other. For instance, the “Southern Sudanese Students Association” (SSOSA) was established in 1974.47 Also, in the past, the number of Sudanese was relatively small and thus their situation was much better as compared to those who arrived later. Newcomers In contrast to the earlier arrivals, the decision of a newcomer to migrate from Sudan to Egypt is determined by several factors: individual or family financial situation, geographical location (i.e., where a person hails from), familiarity with Sudan’s passport and visa institutions, and connections to those who are in positions of power, and so on. The majority of southern
INTRODUCTION
11
Sudanese who migrated to Egypt in the late 1990s to the early 2000s came from Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan, where they had lived for sometime as displaced persons, and where all the passport, visa offices, and foreign embassies are located. Similarly, some of them have money or property to sell, which they use for visas, passport processing, and travel costs. Throughout my interviews, respondents narrated how they managed to leave Sudan using all possible means to facilitate the process of their migration. For example, it was noted by many respondents that processing a passport, an exit or an entry visa through the formal channels is usually difficult and time consuming. However, knowing people in positions of influence, like the military or police officers, makes the process easier. Southern Sudanese refugees who arrived in Egypt from the late 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century mainly come to apply to UNHCR for resettlement. These people can be differentiated in terms of their age, gender, family structure, level of education, and experience. A large number of these refugees are families with small children, mostly headed by females. This is because when families migrate from Khartoum, many husbands prefer to send their wives and children to apply to UNHCR; once their wives are granted application forms and scheduled for an interview for refugee status determination, the husbands follow. However, there is also a small percentage of single fathers caring for their children who migrate as well. Increasingly, there is also a considerable number of unaccompanied minors. Some of them came to Egypt on their own with the hope of being resettled in the West. Other are sponsored by their relatives who are already resettled in either North America or Australia, to come to Egypt and apply for resettlement. Some of these refugees receive a monthly remittance from their relatives abroad to enable them to pay rent and food. Similarly, there is a sizable number of elderly people who migrated from Sudan with uncertain futures. Some of these people left their well-paid jobs or businesses, sold their properties in Sudan, and migrated to Egypt to apply to UNHCR for resettlement. As newcomers arrive at Cairo every Friday, the number of refugees seeking resettlement in a third country has increased, and thus it puts more pressure on the capacity of the organizations and churches helping refugees. The majority of the new arrivals are either uneducated or have little education, and thus lack basic language skills. The majority of the Sudanese refugees reside in Cairo, the capital city of Egypt, where the UNHCR, the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the foreign embassies, and most of the church groups are located. In Cairo most of the southern Sudanese refugees were concentrated in such residential areas as Al Abassiya, Sakanat El Maadi, El Maadi, Hadayik El Maadi, El Hay Al A’shir, and other areas where refugees can
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afford to pay rent. Few refugees (mainly former students) were also found in the cities of Alexandria and Al-Zaggazig. Class Distinction Besides earlier arrivals and newcomers’ distinctions, southern Sudanese refugees can further be differentiated in terms of class. Class distinction is necessary to counter the tendency to homogenize the experiences of those defined as refugees. Although they are subjected to similar refugee conditions, southern Sudanese refugees’ experiences, the choices they make and their responses to the refugee situation vary depending on their class position. Class here is understood not only on the basis of one’s economic position or income-property hierarchies, but also in terms of individuals’ level of education, marital status, professional experiences, and other factors of the refugees. Class difference among refugees is further reflected in their choices of residential areas, the schools which their children attend, and so on. As will be explained in chapter 6 of this book, some of the refugees who worked as domestic workers with non-Egyptian employers48 or those who were getting financial support from relatives abroad, were able to rent apartments in residential areas that were relatively better, as compared to those who lived in buildings that were under construction with no electricity and running water. Similarly some few refugees were able to enroll their children to relatively better nonpublic Egyptian schools. For example, during my stay in Cairo before migrating to Canada in 1997, some refugee families were able to enroll their children in some Egyptian private schools, notably the “Urman Language Schools.”49 Southern Sudanese Women Refugees in Cairo As noted above, many southern Sudanese women who migrated from Sudan to Egypt in the late 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century came either alone or with their children leaving their husbands behind or with their children and husbands. They came to Egypt to apply for the UNHCR with an aim of resettling in a third country, specifically, Canada, the United States of America, and Australia. To support their families, many women joined the informal Egyptian labor market as domestic workers in the homes of some foreign nationals working in Egypt and in wealthy Egyptian homes. Others carry out other income-generating activities such as basket making, knitting, sawing, or selling food. Some who have worked in Sudan as government officials or with NGOs operating in Sudan or former southern students in Egyptian Universities were involved in community and women activism among the refugee community.
INTRODUCTION
13
Southern Sudanese women refugees also faced racial discrimination, sexual harassment, and abuse in the streets of Cairo, in other public spaces, and in their employers’ homes (refer to chapter 8 of this book for details). The phrase “southern Sudanese women refugees” is used here to refer to women who are from the southern region of Sudan. These women, however, do not form a homogeneous group but are differentiated by class, ethnicity, age, religion, language, educational level, and other forms of social difference. The Structure of the Book The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 seeks to explain the root causes of the “north-south” conflict within the context of Sudan’s official national discourse that emphasizes Arabism and Islamism as defining factors in narrating the country’s national identity. Despite Sudan’s racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity, the northern-dominated governments in Sudan pursued the politics of Arabization and Islamization in an effort to project to the outside world a unified Arab and Islamic identity of the country. At the same time it facilitated the excluding, subjugation, and marginalizing of those who resist such dominants. Analyzing the official national discourse set the basis for uncovering the reasons behind massive displacement of people: loss of lives and violation of human rights. This chapter sheds light on the consequences of the (1983–2005) civil war, in terms of infrastructure and social and economic institutions of southern Sudan. The chapter also analyzes the economic and political disparities between the regions of Sudan. Chapter 2 draws on scholarship written by feminist scholars working in the field of refugees and forced migration to the shift in the ways in which women refugee conditions are conceptualized and analyzed. The chapter further provides operational definitions of the key concepts of the book, namely, a refugee, gender, gender relations, exile, race, racism, and ethnicity. The third chapter deals with the conceptual framework of the interlocking and intersecting system of oppression, articulated by African feminists, black feminists, and antiracism theorists within which the experiences of southern Sudanese women refugees are analyzed. Here I analyze the main arguments, points of departure, and emphases, as well as the common assumptions made by these theorists. The usefulness of the intersecting framework is that it treats all forms of social oppression, gender, class, race, ethnicity, and other forms of social difference, simultaneously rather than separate. For example, an integrative antiracism framework that shows how social differences are mediated in people’s experiences allows for the exploration of issues of race, racism, and class, and how they are played out in the
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context of refugee-host relationships. Furthermore, African feminism that invokes the power of Africa women provides insights into women refugees’ struggle for survival in the face of uncertainty and challenges. Chapter 4 focuses on the methodological approaches of the study. It covers such aspects as the approaches used, the implications of, and the difficulties involved in doing research among refugees, issues of power and authority in the relationship between the researcher and the researched, the interview process, and how the data is analyzed. As explained in chapter 4 a qualitative research approach was used to uncover the complexities of the refugees’ situation. An in-depth individual interviewing was used to investigate the lived experiences of women refugees. In addition, a group discussion was employed in conjunction with interviewing with an aim of generating insights and discussions on common themes and issues affecting all refugees—women, men, and children. Some of these themes and issues include, but not limited to, the general impact of exile on the lives of refugees; changes in gender relations within the family and the refugee community at large; issues of marriage, divorce, child custody, refugee status determination process at the UNHCR. The sociocultural institutions and laws governing the southern Sudanese society is the focus of chapter 5. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part covers a range of issues relating to cultural practices, perceptions, laws, and social institutions that have played and continue to play a significant role in determining the position of women in both the family and the larger society in southern Sudan. Exploration of these issues sets the basis for the analysis of change among southern Sudanese women refugees as they experience life in exile. The second part of the chapter focuses on the UNHCR’s resettlement program and its impact on many aspects of refugee lives. For example, the impact of the program on the patterns and meanings of marriage and on the institution of the family are analyzed. Chapter 6 focuses on two important issues. First, it addresses the main problems facing southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo. These include obstacles to children’s education; young people’s deviation from culturally accepted behavior; housing; problems facing women refugees; cases of rejection and of the closing of files of those who have applied for refugee status determination at the UNHCR; the relevancy of the refugee Identity Card, and how these issues have impacted the lives of the refugees. Identifying these problems and issues is crucial to establishing the basis for understanding how the UNHCR, the IOM, the churches and community organizations address these problems. In other words, such analyses provide an understanding of how effective the strategies and programs used and designed by these institutions are in alleviating some of the refugees’ problems. Second, the chapter focuses on the role of the UNHCR, IOM, the
INTRODUCTION
15
church groups, and the refugee community organizations in dealing with the refugees in Cairo. Thus, it focuses on the objectives, programs, and activities of these institutions, as well as the difficulties they encounter in dealing with the refugees. In chapter 7 I analyze the sociocultural transformations among southern Sudanese women refugees in Cairo. Here I explore the forces that led to changes in these women’s perceptions and way of life. These forces include the role reversal that occurred between women and men as a result of circumstances in Cairo, women’s economic independence, women’s newly acquired skills and knowledge, women’s involvement in leadership roles, and women’s organizational work. I look at the influence of all these forces on women’s lives, perceptions, and understanding. The chapter further analyzes the ways in which these women refugees challenge the past, the image of a woman refugee as a victim and dependent, and how they imagine a different future. It further identifies some of the cultural practices and perceptions, which these women refugees are questioning, as well as some of the solutions they suggested for overcoming such practices and perceptions. Issues of race, racism, and ethnicity in a refugee context are the focus of chapter 8. In so doing I focus on three important aspects of the refugee lives: the refugee-host relationships; the relationship between women refugees who serve as domestic workers and their Egyptian women employers; and Egyptians’ attitudes and perceptions toward southern Sudanese women refugees in the streets of Cairo, and how all these affect the refugees. The analysis of these three aspects are situated within the context of the host society’s economic situation, and the social, religious, cultural, and gender ideologies that shape Egyptians’ attitudes toward, and understanding of, outsiders, in particular “black” people. I argue that racial, ethnic, gender, class relations, cultural, and religious aspects interact to influence the host population’s attitude toward Sudanese refugees. The book ends with a conclusion that draws on the study’s main arguments and general findings.
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CHAPTER 1 ROOT CAUSES OF THE “NORTH-SOUTH” CONFLICT IN SUDAN
he Sudan, located in Northeast Africa, is dominated by the Nile and its tributaries and at 2,505,810 square kilometers is the largest country in Africa. Sudan is bordered by nine countries: the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda. Sudan can be divided into three general climatic regions: a desert area in the north, a semiarid central belt with increasing amounts of rainfall to the south, and a southern tropical rainy region.1 The natural resources of the country include petroleum, small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten mica, silver, and gold.2 Despite its racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity, geopolitically, Sudan is regarded first as an Arab nation. I remember in my first history class, the first sentence in the textbook entitled Mukhtasar tarikh al-Sudan al-hadith (A Brief History of Modern Sudan) clearly stated that “Sudan is part and partial of the Arab world.”3 As part of the Arab world, Sudan became a member of the League of Arab states after its independence in 1956. This geopolitical position represents one of the main causes of the conflict in the Sudan as it raises the issue of the Sudan’s national identity. Sudan is also part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is comprised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda. The Sudan, with its various peoples, languages, cultures, and religions, is often considered a microcosm of the whole African continent.4 Based on the 1999 census, Sudan has a population of about 34 million people.5 They consist mainly of a large number of heterogeneous people of diverse, ethnic, racial, and linguistic groups. According to the literature on Sudan, there are more than 500 ethnic groups in Sudan, speaking more than a hundred languages.6 The people of Sudan adhere to Islam, indigenous
T
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African beliefs and Christianity. Approximately 70 percent are Sunni Muslims (mainly in the north, east, and western Sudan). Few Muslims are also found in southern Sudan. Some 25 percent of Sudanese practice indigenous beliefs and 5 percent are Christians (mainly in southern Sudan and the city of Khartoum). Arabic is the national and official language of the country, and English is also used as an official language, particularly in the south. About 80 percent of the Sudanese people participate in the country’s major economic activity, which is agriculture and animal husbandry. As is true of Sudan as a whole, the people of southern Sudan also consist of diverse ethnic and linguistic groupings. According to Simon E. Kulusika, “there are 7 million people in the south.”7 Southern Sudanese can be classified into agriculturalists who live in Equatoria and parts of Bahr al-Ghazal provinces, and seminomadic pastoralists or cattle keepers, who are mostly the Nilotics in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces. The former include among many the Bari-speaking group, the Latuko or Otuho, Didinga, Azande, Bongo, Moro, Ma’di, and Krej. The latter include the Nilots, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk. The Dinka is regarded as the largest ethnic group in the south.8 Although southern Sudanese come from different ethnic groups and speak numerous languages, still, they share some common cultural practices, values, and similar experiences of oppression, marginalization, and discrimination (see chapter 5 of this book). Southern Sudanese adhere to indigenous African beliefs, Christianity, and Islam (particularly in urban areas). Due to the rapid spread of Christianity in the south over the years, many southern Sudanese converted to Christianity, thus making it a dominant religious belief system. Geographically, Sudan is divided into eastern, western, northern, and southern regions. The southern region, which is the focus of this study, is comprised of three provinces: Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria, “in accordance with their boundaries as they stood on January 1, 1956.”9 These provinces were administered as one political entity referred to as “Southern Sudan Regional Government,” with a People’s Regional Assembly and a High Executive Council as stipulated in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement reached between the SSLM representatives and the Sudan government of General Jaafar M. Nimeiri (1969–1985).10 However, with the shifting political situations and systems in the country, the southern region has undergone several changes. First of all, due to the Sudan central government’s intentions to control the south, coupled with the ethnic and personal rivalries between and among southern Sudanese political leaders, the southern region was redivided in 1983 into three separate administrative entities corresponding to the previous provinces.11
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Second, when the NIF government came to power by a military coup in 1989, the country’s regions were reconstituted into several administrative states, locally referred to as wilayat (singular—wilayah), governed by walis or governors. Currently, there are ten states in the southern region: Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei, Warap, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes, Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria. The new states are also reconstituted along the ethnic groups that inhabit the areas. However, both the current NIF government of General Muhammad Omar el Bashir and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) have different interpretations regarding what constitutes the southern region. On the one hand, the government of Sudan sees the southern region as consisting of the three provinces as they were defined on January 1, 1956, when Sudan gained its independence from the British. On the other hand, the SPLM/A leadership views the south as encompassing the three provinces, plus the Nuba Mountains, the southern Blue Nile, and the Abyei provinces. This understanding is based on the SPLM/A leadership’s conviction that these additional areas share with the south the common experience of oppression and marginalization by the central government. Also, the people of these provinces, in alliance with the SPLM/A, fought for the liberation of Sudan from injustice, discrimination, and marginalization during the second civil war, 1983–2005. However, for the majority of ordinary southern Sudanese, the south remains the three provinces as outlined above. These different interpretations and contestations as to what constitute the southern region will continue to dominate the political discussion for a long time. Root Causes of the “North-South” Conflict The “north-south” conflict in Sudan has attracted many scholars, academics, journalists, and human rights activists, both Sudanese and Sudanists.12 The debate on the root causes of Sudan’s “north-south” conflict clearly indicates that Sudanese and Sudanist scholars seem to differ slightly as to what constitutes the root cause of the conflict in Sudan. These differences revolved around points of emphasis and priority. In other words, what are the most important factors that led to the civil war and political instability in Sudan? Many Sudanese scholars particularly from the south tend to emphasize identity issues around race, ethnicity, religion, and economic deprivation, unequal distribution of natural resources and political power as the main causes of continuous conflict between north and south.13 According to Dunstan Wai, the north-south conflict in Sudan dates back to the precolonial periods. He argues that the conflict between the two groups results from
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historical roots as well as from cultural, racial, and economic antagonisms leading to distrust and desire for secession.14 Furthermore, the southern people’s experiences with Arab Muslim slave traders and raiders (Egyptians and northern Sudanese) during the Turko-Egyptian rule in Sudan (1821– 1885), the Mahadist state (1885–1898), the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan (1898–1956), and the brutal ways in which Islam and the Arabic language have been introduced in the south represent the bases for continuous conflict in Sudan. For Oliver Albino “[r]acial differences constitute the root of the problems which beset the Sudan.”15 Other scholars, mainly northern Sudanese, tend to blame cultural, economic factors, and British colonial policies toward the south for contributing to the unfriendly relations between the north and the south.16 For instance, Gamal M. Hamid, like many northern Sudanese scholars, dismisses the racial and religious factors of the conflict in Sudan as simplistic. Instead, Hamid attributes the root cause of the conflict to the following four factors: (i) Weak national sentiments between heterogeneous peoples, who share the same territory, yet have little in common in terms of a common culture or history. (ii) bitter memories of a distant past marred by human enslavement in which various people from the north, the south and from outside the Sudan participated; (iii) a series of mistrustful acts, un-kept promises, and dishonored agreements between the North and the South which have precipitated a deep sense of mistrust between southerners and northerners, and (iv) colonial policies and other historical forces that facilitated domination of the economy and the state apparatus by northern elites, who used it to perpetuate the subordinate position of the South vis-à-vis the North. The end result of this situation has been lack of socio-economic development in the south.17
Drawing from the above quotation, it is clear that racial and religious factors are not regarded as root causes of the conflict. And although I agree partly with Hamid’s analysis of the root causes of the “north-south” conflict, he, however, stopped short of explaining other reasons behind the weak national sentiments, apart from the heterogeneity of the Sudanese people. From my point of view, in addition to the heterogeneity of the Sudanese people, another reason for the existence of weak national sentiments, especially on the part of the southern Sudanese and other marginalized people in Sudan, can also be attributed to the fact that their experiences, and histories, were, and continue to be, excluded, and marginalized from the official national discourse of the country that emphasize Arab and Islamic culture. This exclusion is evident, for example, in the absence of southern Sudanese social and political history, geography, and sociocultural
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21
experiences in Sudan’s national educational curriculum, which prefers Arab Islamic history, culture, and geography. On the issue of slavery and slave trade during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many northern Sudanese scholars tend to emphasize the role of southern Sudanese (i.e., chiefs) in perpetuating the slave trade, without acknowledging the circumstances under which those southern Sudanese chiefs operated and were subjected to. For example, slave traders who were mainly Egyptians and northern Sudanese deployed soldiers armed with rifles and firearms to raid southern villages in their attempt to secure slaves.18 In the process, southern chiefs were compelled to provide these raiders with slaves to avoid further confrontation. Similarly, many northern Sudanese scholars emphasize the British colonial administration’s policy of “divide and rule” as a major contributing factor to the separation and worsening of relationships between the north and the south, as well as the underdevelopment of the south.19 For example, the most criticized British colonial policy is the “Southern Policy” of 1930–1947, which allowed the south to be administered separately from the north.20 The “Southern Policy” was intended to prevent the south from being influenced by Arab culture and religion, at the same time allowing the British to spread Christianity. According to the “Southern Policy,” northern Sudanese were not allowed to travel or live in the south without obtaining a special permit from the British authority. Also English rather than Arabic, was taught in southern schools.21 However, with pressure from the northern nationalists during that period, as well as from Britain and Egypt, the two colonial powers in Sudan, the British abandoned the “Southern Policy” in 1947 and decided to merge southern Sudan with the north by creating a unified administrative system for the whole country.22 As a result, by emphasizing the role of British rule in widening the gap between the north and the south and in the underdevelopment of the south, these scholars ignored the equal role of the successive northern-dominated governments in oppressing and marginalizing the south through economic marginalization and the imposition of exclusive national identity in the country. Furthermore, other Sudanese scholars reject the conventional understanding of the root causes of the conflict that emphasized deep-seated hatred, ethnic loyalties, and cultural differences. They further reject the understanding of the war in Sudan as a war between north-south, AfricanArab, or Christian-Muslims as simplistic. Instead they see the conflicts and political instability as a result of the racialization and the ethnicization of the state in Sudan. Amir Idris argue that “[i]t is the racialized state that transformed cultural identities into political identities through the practice of slavery in the precolonial period, indirect rule during the colonial period
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and an exclusive policy of citizenship in the postcolonial period.”23 Many Sudanists mainly from the West tend to emphasize religion and unequal distribution of resources and political power leading to the underdevelopment of the south as major aspects of the Sudanese conflict.24 Despite the differences placed on points of departure and emphasis as to what constitutes the root cause of the “north-south” conflict in Sudan, one can argue that all the factors outlined by Sudanese and Sudanists scholars represent some of the most important factors that led to the outbreak of the 1983 conflict in Sudan. In addition, the politics of exclusion and inclusion along ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic, and religious lines played, and continue to play, a devastating role in fragmenting the Sudanese people leading to further conflicts and instability of the country. The Darfur conflict, which erupted in February 2003, is a case in point. Furthermore, the imposition of a particular national identity based on Arab and Islamic ideologies on a racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse people represents an important factor in the “north-south” conflict. The Forging of a “Unified” National Identity Historically, Sudan is divided into two opposing dichotomies of north and south.25 The north is defined as Arab and Islamic, whereas the south is considered African, “animist,” and Christian. Given the fact that the above distinction revolves around racial, ethnic, and religious identities, analyzing these identity issues become especially important because they represent some of the contentious issues in the conflict and in the relationship between the Sudanese people, in general, and the relations between the north and the south, in particular. Identity here is seen in terms of how the Sudanese nation is narrated, and how the Sudanese people identify themselves and are identified by others. In other words, how should the Sudanese identify themselves? What is the national identity of Sudan? What cultural, social, and racial aspects are evoked in the process of narrating the nation? What measures were/are taken to insure the promotion and sustainability of the emerging national identity? In an attempt to address these questions of the Sudanese national identity, I focus on Sudan’s nationalist discourse with respect to this complex issue, which has become what many Sudanese scholars refer to as an “identity crisis.”26 According to Francis Deng, “northern Sudanese see themselves as Arabs and deny the strongly African element in their skin color and physical features. This denial of the African element is grounded on their perception and association of these features with the Negroid race and see it as the mother race of slaves, inferior and demeaned.”27 On the other hand, southern Sudanese view themselves as Africans and as people with cultural and
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moral values at the same time perceiving the northern Sudanese as people who are confused and have no origin.28 Therefore, identity within this context is viewed as “a function of how people identify themselves and are identified in race, ethnicity, culture, language and religion and how such identification determines or influence their participation in the political, economic, social and cultural life of their country.”29 In this quest to define oneself and the national identity, the most controversial issues revolve around the questions of language, religion, race, and ethnicity. In the following pages I present an analysis of how these contested and opposing identities of the Arab and the African are articulated and maintained within the context of the official national narrative. Here I draw on two important aspects, namely, the forging of a national identity based on Arabism and Islamism, and the place of women in the nationalist discourse. Narrating the Nation Edward Said, in his analysis of nationalism and its relation to exile, defined nationalism as “an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a heritage. It affirms the home created by a community of language, culture and customs.”30 The assertion of belonging in and to a particular place did not, however, emerge from a vacuum. Instead, it is informed and shaped by a particular interpretation of history, culture, and the myth of origin. As Benedict Anderson suggests, “nationalism has to be understood, by aligning it not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural system that preceded it.”31 Anderson went on to argue that “nationality, or . . . nationness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.”32 Following Anderson’s analysis, and the fact that in the process of imagining the nation, nationalists usually draw on particular histories, culture, origin, and ideology, the forging of a national identity tends to be exclusionary in nature. For example, given the heterogeneity of the people who inhabit a particular territory such as Sudan, the interpretation of nationalism solely from a particular history, culture, and ideology, that is Arab and Islamic culture, might not appeal to all. Therefore, those who feel they do not belong might opt to assert their own sense of belonging, which is also informed by their own understanding of history, value systems, and experiences. Nationalism in Sudan was and is closely linked to the pan-Arab and the Arab nationalist movements of the first half of the twentieth century.33
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According to James Gatkouth, “nationalism [in Sudan] is ultimately a particularized form of ideology: it defines cultural and social boundaries on behalf of a community and exclude those who cannot fit in.”34 As Amir Idris notes, in the early 1920s, “the question of race and descent became very significant in determining the course of Sudanese nationalism.”35 Idris went on further to argue that “[t]he nationalist narrative of the 1930s had created for itself a genealogy that stretches far into the Islamic Arab past. It suggested a primordial and essential identity shared by all those who lived in the north regardless of their particular historical experiences and affiliations.”36 As a result, the successive northern-dominated governments in Sudan have insisted on Arabism and Islamism as the defining elements of Sudan’s national identity.37 This insistence on Arabism and Islamism as defining factors in narrating the nation is clearly stated in Sudan’s permanent constitution of 1973. For instance, article 16[a] of the 1973 constitution stipulates that “in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Islam is the religion and the society shall be guided by Islam, being the religion of the majority of its peoples and the State shall endeavor to express its values.” The same article further states that “Islamic law and custom shall be the main sources of legislation while personal matters of non-Muslims shall be governed by their personal laws.”38 In this context, Arabic language, history, culture, Islamic religion, as well as the myth of Arab ancestry, are used to justify claims of inclusion and exclusion of groups in the emerging nation. In the process of forging a “unified” national identity, several measures were/are deployed to insure its success. These measures range from exclusionary practices, integration or assimilation of the other, subjugation of kinds of knowledge and history that are deemed incompatible with the idea of the national culture and identity, coercion to conform or elimination of those who do not conform or resist such ideas. For instance, since Sudan’s independence in 1956, one of the measures used to narrate the nation was/ is the process of Islamization and Arabization of the southern Sudanese, a process that did not begin after independence. Rather, it dates back to the period of the Mahadist state (1885–1898) in Sudan. The Mahadist state was “an Islamic state fashioned to revive the concept and practice of the early Islamic community of [prophet] Muhammad and his companions.”39 The northern Sudanese nationalists assumed that the southern Sudan was a “cultural vacuum,” which needed to be filled by Arab culture under an Islamic revival.40 Toward the end of nationalization of government institutions along Arab and Islamic line, in the period between the 1950s and the 1970s, the northern-based nationalists targeted the educational system as a structure through which Islamization and Arabization of the south could take place.
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During this period, an integrated educational policy was designed for the whole of Sudan, replacing the separate educational and administrative systems constituted by the British.41 This new educational policy was accelerated during General Ibrahim Abboud’s military regime (1958–1964) through the process of the enforced spread of Islamic education, conversion, and the promotion of the Arabic language as the national language at the expense of local languages spoken in the south.42 Among the measures taken to accelerate this process during this period was the nationalization of the missionaries’ schools, the expulsion of foreign missionaries from the south, and the change of the day of rest from Sunday to Friday in accordance with Islamic religious practice.43 All these developments triggered resistance from the southern Sudanese a situation that partly contributed to the uprising and outbreak of Sudan’s first civil war (1955–1972).44 In some parts of southern Sudan, particularly in urban areas, during this period also, school-age children were given Arabic names replacing their traditional and/or Christian names, to enable them to enroll in schools and to comply with the policies of Arabization as well.45 Therefore, it is common among southern Sudanese for one person to have three different names: traditional, Arabic, and “Christian or Baptism name.” The last can be either a European name or a name from the Bible. Similarly, the imposition of the Islamic Shari’a or law becomes a prerequisite for imagining the nation. For example, during the military regime of General Jaafer M. Nimieri (1969–1985), further steps were taken to reconsolidate the Islamic Shari’a in the Sudan. During this period several Islamic-oriented projects aimed at accelerating the spread of Islam and Arab culture in the south were designed and implemented: “Arab-funded projects such as the Islamic African Center, [and] the Islamic African Relief Agency, which were designed to help African Muslims” were/are operating in the south.46 A more radical move taken for the enforcement of the Islamic Shari’a was the amalgamation of the formally “autonomous [Sudan’s] Civil and Shari’a courts systems into a single Judicial hierarchy” in 1980.47 Subsequently, in September 1983, the Islamic Shari’a was proclaimed by President Jaafar M. Nimeiri to be the sole guiding force behind the laws of Sudan. As a result, certain measures were taken relating to punishment of crimes to ensure the enforcement of the new laws. For example, such measures as “amputation for proven theft . . . the death penalty for adultery . . . and the Islamic punishment of flogging for drinking, or for the possession, sale or transport or manufacture of alcoholic beverages,” were introduced.48 Although in theory the Islamic Shari’a should apply only to Muslims in Sudan, in real life, it has affected and continues to affect non-Muslims as well, especially those living in Khartoum and other northern cities as well.
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The measures taken to Arabize and Islamize the non-Muslims and nonArabs have become increasingly aggressive, particularly when the NIF regime seized power in a military coup in 1989. The main agenda of the new government is to establish an Islamic identity for the Sudanese nation, whereby both the constitution and the law would be based solely on the Qura’n and the Sunna.49 Like its predecessors, the NIF regime targeted the educational system at all levels to accelerate the Arabization and Islamization of the country. For example, in the period between 1990 and 1991 Arabic language became the medium of instruction in almost all universities in the country, replacing the English language which had been in use since the British colonial rule. Similarly, all primary, junior, and senior secondary schools were changed from English to Arabic.50 Also, new students enrolled in universities and other higher institutions of learning during this period were/are required to undergo militia training as members of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) before starting their studies.51 As a result, “registration for universities was moved from the campuses to the militia camps.”52 This requirement was crucial for the NIF government in its efforts to persecute the war in the south, as the new recruits are deployed after training to reinforce the government forces in the war front. All these measure have negatively affected both students and instructors mainly from the south who use English exclusively as a medium of instruction. The switch to Arabic further led to school closures in the Equatoria region in the south in mid-1991 to early 1992, as students protested the change.53 With the absence of well-trained and qualified Arabic teachers and the lack of Arabic textbooks in the south, learning the Arabic language has become extremely difficult for a student educated in English.54 Similarly, the compulsory militia training and eventual deployment to the south has forced many southern Sudanese students to avoid enrolment in a university. Drawing on the above discussions, one can maintain that the processes of Islamization and Arabization with all their measures of enforcement have sought to suppress the different languages, cultures, histories, and religious practices of the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in Sudan. These processes together with systemic exclusion further reduced the presence of southern Sudanese students and faculty in Sudan’s institutions of higher learning. On the other hand, rape, forced marriage, and forced prostitution represent other violent measures through which non-Muslims and non-Arabs are subjugated. For example, during my stay in Juba city, in southern Sudan in the late 1980s to the early 1990s, I observed an increasing number of young southern Sudanese women who have become the wives of, or have borne children to, northern Sudanese soldiers stationed in and around the areas of Juba.55 Worth noting is that the relationship between
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these women and the soldiers did not occur either in a peaceful way or in accordance with the culturally accepted ways of how marriage is conducted in the south. The women were either forced into such relationships or were raped. Given the situation in the south in general, and in Juba in particular—insecurity, economic hardships, and military rule—during the war, the parents or members of the extended families of these women were unable to prevent such actions, out of fear for their own lives. Worse still is the fact that, upon completion of their mission in the south, some of these soldiers return to the north leaving behind these women and their children to fend for themselves. This situation has led to an increase in the number of women who resorted to prostitution in order to support themselves and their children. According to the 1992 Human Rights Report, of the US State Department, “[t]he Sudanese Army was identified with numerous human rights abuses, including many civilian deaths . . . extrajudicial executions, forced conscription, rape and pillage.”56 Furthermore, the Near East Report (1993) notes that “government forces, especially the Popular Defence Forces . . . are said to routinely steal women and children. Some women and girls are kept as wives; the others are shipped north, where they perform forced labor on farms or are exported, notably to Libya.”57 Pointing out the actions of the government forces and militia does not imply that rebel forces, who were fighting in southern Sudan during the longest civil war in Africa, were free of human rights violations. On the contrary, both parties to the war in Sudan have engaged in one way or another in human rights abuses against the civilian population. For instance, in his chapter “South Sudan: A War-Torn and Divided Region,” Girma Kebbede outlined how both the government and the rebel forces have contributed to the suffering of the civilian population in the south, through forced conscription of young boys, especially by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the destruction of people’s livelihood. According to him, “[b]oth the government and the SPLM/A have little or no concern for the rights of civilians . . . [that] the SPLM/A has also attacked . . . the Mundari, Didinga, the Murle, and the Bari [ethnic groups in the south], for instance, for their neutrality or lack of support” for the liberation movement.58 Women suffer additional abuses as well. For example, many young women in the SPLM/A-controlled areas in the south have fallen victim to forced relationships with the rebel soldiers. Similarly, some married women have experienced domestic violence and abuse at the hands of their husbands. In his study of the experience of women in the western Dinka area, Jok M. Jok noted that “nearly 80% of the sample women [he interviewed] reported having been battered several times throughout their marriage life for reasons related to refusal of sexual
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services. Many cases of domestic abuse which took place at night were witnessed.”59 On another level, and as indicated earlier, the histories, experiences, voices, and the intellectual contributions of the non-Arab and non-Muslim people in Sudan were/are excluded from the official national discourse. This exclusion is evident in their absence from the educational curriculum and public media in particular. For instance, southern Sudanese children were/are taught about Arab history and literature, the desert, and animals, such as the camel, which are not relevant to their experiences and the local situation and environment in the south. Nothing is taught about such animals as the goat, the buffalo the elephant, or the rabbit that are common in the south. This exclusion is necessary for the successive northern-based governments to be able to justify their assertion that Sudan has a unified Arab and Islamic identity. As Edward Said has clearly pointed out, “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming or emerging is a crucial method by which imperialists impose their powerful all conquering value system.”60 Therefore, to retain control and disseminate Arabism and Islamism, the northern nationalists and the successive northern-dominated governments have pursued the strategy of control and/or elimination of the narratives and voices of non-Muslims and non-Arabs to ensure the imagined national cohesion, unity, and stability. Women and the National Project In the process of nation making, women also play a crucial role in the process of constituting and reconstituting the nationalists’ ideologies. As noted by F. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis, “women have additional important roles in the construction and reproduction of nationalist ideologies. By dressing and behaving ‘properly’, and by giving birth to children within legitimate marriages, they both signify and reproduce the symbolic and legal boundaries of the collectivity.”61 As explained in the above passage, in Sudan, the position of women in the nationalist project was/is shaped by the ideology of a nationally unified culture and identity, an ideology that finds the unifying principles in Arab culture and the Islamic religion. Similarly, the al mara’h al Sudaniyah, or the “Sudanese woman” in this nationalist discourse, is constructed in opposition to the non-Muslim and non-Arab woman. For instance, adherence to Islamic teachings, “modesty” and compliance with the Islamic Shari’a in all aspects of peoples’ lives represents the social and moral principles through which women are located within the Sudan’s nationalist discourse. Since the NIF came to power in 1989, such moral principles have been rigorously applied. Laws governing women’s conduct and behavior both
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within the family and the larger society are formulated specifically to regulate women’s conduct, roles, and lives. For example, such laws as the Law Governing Public Conduct for the Central State (1992), and the Law Governing Public Order for El-Khartoum State (1991) were formulated. These laws are mainly intended to regulate women’s as well as men’s conduct and behavior, particularly in public spaces. One of the provisions of these laws concerns the wearing of an Islamic dress code or al ziyy al-Islami (long skirt/dress, long sleeved blouse, and head cover) for all working women, and for all women who happen to be in public places, like the market, public transport, government offices, or parks. In such spaces, women are required to express in their conduct and appearance the moral and spiritual qualities that are regarded as characteristics of an Islamic people and state. For example, section 5(1) of the Law Governing Public Conduct for the Central State (1992: 3) stipulates that “[a]ny Muslim woman walking in the street or appearing in a work place or any public place without an Islamic dress will be punished by flogging and the payment of the sum of five hundred Sudanese pounds.”62 Though intended for Muslim women only, these laws affect nonMuslim women who lived or continue to live in Khartoum and other northern cities as well. Thus, non-Muslim female students and displaced women working in public offices in the north, and in Khartoum in particular are forced to wear Islamic dress on the grounds of “modesty”. Women are flogged or threatened with dismissal from their jobs for not conforming to the government’s idea of what constitutes decent dress.63 This is how a respondent I interviewed in Cairo relates her experience with the dress code imposed on all women in Khartoum: One day my sister and I were arrested by the security men who told us that we were wearing short dresses in the college premises. The security car took us to Al Nizam al-A’m [the Public Order] office. They [the security men] asked us why we are dressed like that. I answered that this is how I dress since I was born. I found all my relatives are dressed like this, so there is no reason that will let me not to dress like this. They said no, and I told them that I am not a Muslim. At the end we were flagged 30 lashes each. After that they [security men] said, “from now on you have to dress al-ziyy al-Islami,” and that was what I did. That is, long dress with long sleeves and head cover.64
Furthermore, a woman’s ability to move freely especially when traveling abroad is also restricted and controlled. For example, if a woman wants to travel abroad, she must be accompanied by a male relative if she is not married or by her husband if she is married. If traveling alone, the woman must obtain an authorization from her husband or a male relative to allow her to get exit visa from the Sudan immigration authorities to enable her to
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travel.65 All these measures apply to both Muslim and non-Muslim women. The Sudan nationalist discourse on women, thus, places a particular group of women in a privileged position. Such privileging in turn tends to exclude or marginalize those women who are racially, ethnically, culturally, and religiously different, or who do not fit the definition of ideal woman in the nationalist discourse. Therefore, it can be concluded that granting a privileged position to Arab and Islamic women of the country has contributed to the marginalization of other indigenous women’s identities and to the denial of their development and recognition. Economic and Political Disparities Underdevelopment, economic disparities, and unequal sharing of political power represent other seeds of the conflict in Sudan. Social and economic development in Sudan has been characterized by wide regional disparities. In other words, economic as well as political power have been, and continue to be, concentrated in the center, whereas the rest of the country is marginalized both economically and politically.66 As far as the south is concerned, the successive regimes in Sudan since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had neglected the development of the southern region. Instead, they were/are concerned about exploiting its natural and human resources. For example, the Turko-Egyptian rulers in Sudan were interested in exploiting its wealth, especially its gold, ivory, and slaves.67 Similarly, the British-Egyptian colonial powers who saw no immediate economic interest in southern Sudan were not interested in the development of the south. However, one of the reasons they wanted to hold onto the south was to secure the Nile that flows through it, and to carry out their “civilizing mission.”68 As a result of this neglect, coupled with the Islamization and Arabization policies pursued by the successive northern-dominated governments after independence, which led to armed conflict and instability, the southern region has remained far behind in terms of social infrastructure, trade, industry, and the development of other economic and financial institutions. Analyzing the factors that contributed to the underdevelopment of the south since independence, B. Yongo-Bure notes that “weak physical infrastructure, absence of a financial infrastructure and inadequate manpower” represent some of the factors that led to the underdevelopment of the south.69 The exploitation of southern Sudan’s natural resources and economic potential did not stop after the departure of the colonial powers, but continued. The successive governments in Sudan established a mechanism for
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controlling the southern Sudan economy. Although the south was given regional self-government after the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, southern political leaders were nevertheless striped of their power to decide on important economic issues affecting the region. Decisions regarding planning and budgeting of economic projects remain the responsibility of the central government. The situation is further aggravated by the discovery and exploration of oil in the south in the late 1980s. Since the government controls the oil production as well as benefits from its profits, the southern Sudanese were/are left out. Many are also displaced from their homelands to make way for further exploration of oil in their areas. Besides economic control and exploitation, the northern-dominated governments also control the political power in the country. For instance, decisions on issues pertaining to “defence, foreign affairs, currency, interregional communications, and the broad functions of economic, social and educational planning” are the responsibility of the central government in Khartoum.70 In other words, the central government decides who should be in charge of education, planning, and administration, and of setting and distributing the national budget. As a result, southern Sudanese and other marginalized people in Sudan are either excluded or relegated to noninfluential positions in the political structure. For example, as an Islamic state, a nonMuslim is not allowed to become a president of the state on the grounds that an Islamic state and Muslims should not be ruled by a non-Muslim.71 Therefore, it is against this background that southern Sudanese have resisted and continue to resist Arab domination and economic exploitation. Southern resistance to Arab domination was/is expressed in several ways. Defining themselves as Africans and the conviction that the south is not part of the Arab world, many southern Sudanese view northern Sudanese intentions as another form of Arab imperialism. This in turn led southern Sudanese to assert their identity as African to counter the hegemonic Arab identity. Africanness in the southern Sudan context encompasses racial, ethnic, and cultural factors as well as territorial or geographical location. As Francis Deng argues, in the Sudan “the more the north asserts its Arabness the more the south asserts Africanness as a counter identity.”72 This assertion can be best illustrated by an example from my personal experience in two United Nations conferences (ICPD 1994 and WCW 1995) NGO Forums.73 In such forums, participants are usually divided along regional lines to facilitate the discussion of issues that are of concern to them. The Sudanese participants always face the dilemma of whether the Sudan is an Arab or an African country. What happens in such a situation is the division of the Sudanese participants into two groups: northern Sudanese preferring to join the Middle East region and southern Sudanese often joining the East African region. In these regions the Sudanese find themselves
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marginalized further, as many of the issues discussed are not directly relevant to their experiences and realities either in Sudan or in exile. Though resisting militarily, southern Sudanese were simultaneously constructing their own national identity based on their shared experiences of war, oppression, and displacement, as well as in their common cultural practices, origins, and way of life. In the process of forging such a national identity, both men and women are expected to play important roles that will enhance the southern identity. Although men were fighting the war at the front, women were/are also expected to play specific roles, which will facilitate the process of the emerging identity. For example, within the context of civil war, instability, and displacement, women’s assumed role as guardians of the southern Sudanese cultural identity and traditions is emphasized. As Jok M. Jok notes in his study of the “emerging southern nationalism,” “[n]ewly established women’s organizations under the civil administration of the SPLA were involved in forging a women’s role in the national struggle through being held responsible for guarding the Dinka cultural identity.”74 Although some southern Sudanese women have joined the liberation movement as combatants, they are usually relegated to domestic roles, such as cooking, caring for the wounded, and so forth.75 As “guardians of culture and traditions,” women are expected to transmit southern Sudanese cultures, languages, and traditional values to the younger generations. This view is widely held by southern Sudanese both inside and outside of Sudan. Community leaders and other members of the refugee community in Cairo, for example, often refer to what women are supposed to do by raising their children in accordance with the accepted cultural practices and traditions of the south. As many women refugees tend to work outside the home to earn income for the support of their families, their absence from home is often blamed for their children’s misconduct. Similarly, as many southern Sudanese have died due to war-related causes, women’s reproductive roles have become very important under the emerging national identity. For example, young men and women are encouraged to marry and bear as many children as they can in order to compensate for the loss of many southern Sudanese lives in the civil war. At the same time, those southern Sudanese, who are in exile, are seen as the “seeds” of the south by those who are left behind. Viewed as seeds, they are often encouraged both to procreate and to get education and skills that would be deployed in the development of the future southern Sudan. For instance, during my interviews with refugees in Cairo, many participants concluded their interviews with a word of advice to be conveyed to those southern Sudanese who are resettled in North America. The most recurring advice was that southern Sudanese living in the diaspora should
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not forget about the problem that forced them out of Sudan, but to try to understand it, and to stand united against the injustices in Sudan. People in the diaspora are also encouraged to maintain their families, acquire education and technical skills, which will then benefit southern Sudan. They are also encouraged to extend financial support to the liberation movement. Similar advice and encouragement are often echoed by some southern Sudanese who happen to visit Canada or the United States and meet with southern Sudanese residents in North America. The Effects of the Civil War on Southern Sudan The two civil wars of 1955–1972 and 1983–2005 have had devastating consequences in Sudan, in general, and in southern Sudan, in particular. The war has led to massive displacement and death of millions of people and to the destruction of the infrastructure and the social, cultural, and economic fabric of the southern Sudanese society. During the war the existing infrastructure in southern Sudan has been destroyed leading to economic crisis and the spread of disease. For example, the few medical facilities that existed in the south have either been destroyed or are lacking sufficient medical supplies and equipment. Lack of medical facilities and medicine, poor sanitation, and malnutrition have further led to the spread of such diseases as sleeping sickness, sexually transmitted diseases, tuberculosis, and other respiratory diseases, which could have been prevented, particularly in the rural areas. As noted by Girma Kebbede, “[t]he war has made it impossible to distribute medicine against river blindness and vaccination for measles and polio.”76 Furthermore, the prevalence of land mines planted by both the government and the SPLM/A, particularly around the principal towns of Juba, Wau, Bor, Torit, and Kapoeta have claimed the lives of many civilians.77 In Juba, for example, where people depended largely on firewood as a source of cooking fuel, many women were killed by land mines planted by the government forces around the city, intended to prevent rebel forces’ penetration into the city. Furthermore, the war had negatively affected the educational system in southern Sudan. For example, from the late 1980s through the 1990s, many schools and other institutions of higher learning in the south ceased to function as the war intensified. This is particularly true in the rural areas. In towns, where many displaced people had taken refuge, many schools were temporarily occupied by the displaced people before they were relocated to displaced people’s camps constructed by some international agencies operating in the south.78 Similarly, because of this insecurity the University of Juba, the only university in the south at Juba, was transferred
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to Khartoum in 1987. The university campus, as well as the faculty and student residences, were then occupied by the Sudan government’s army and the PDFs. Furthermore, due to insecurity and lack of proper education in the south, many secondary school students migrated north in search of education and security. This situation led to the establishment of special schools for the displaced in Khartoum in the early 1990s because the existing public schools in Khartoum could not absorb all the displaced students. According to Stephen Wol, “[b]y the beginning of the 1990–1991 academic year, there were ten special secondary schools for displaced southern students” based in Khartoum.79 However, these schools lack basic educational requirements, such as textbooks, desks, science laboratories, chairs, and so on. As space was limited in these schools, classes were often overcrowded. Similarly, the living conditions of the displaced students were very difficult because most of them live in the slums of Khartoum. Therefore, given their conditions, both in Khartoum and in the south, students’ performance in school is constrained.80 This situation has further worsened the enrolment of southern Sudanese students at institutions of higher learning. For example, “in 1987, the share of the south in the total population of the country was 28.7 percent, but its share in student placements in higher education was a mere one-tenth of one percent.”81 Therefore, as Simon Kulusika clearly notes, “[s]ince the out break of the civil war in 1983, basic infrastructure in the south has been utterly devastated including schools.”82 The implication of such a situation for the southern Sudanese people, in general, and women, in particular, has been devastating. As far as women are concerned, many school-age girls ended up with unwanted pregnancies and uncertain marriages, either to members of the government or to members of the rebel forces. Similarly, youth of both sexes, because of frustration and uncertain future, have resorted to heavy alcohol consumption and to other kinds of unacceptable behavior, such as shaming or lack of respect for elders and inferring prostitution. In addition, as many people have died during the war there were in existence a large number of widows, orphans, and unaccompanied minors, particularly in the SPLM/A-held areas, and in some refugee camps in Northern Uganda and Kenya. Most of the orphans, for example, were/are, cared for by women.83 The war has also affected marriage and the institution of family in southern Sudan leading to changes in the family structure, and an increase in the number of teenage single parents, both inside Sudan and in the refugee camps in the neighboring countries. In July 1997, during a fieldwork study I carried out in some refugee camps in Northern Uganda and in Yei town, which was under the SPLM/A control then, I found that there was an increasing number of children who are cared for either by a
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teenage mother or by a grandmother. The father is either at the war front, has been killed, or has just left. Furthermore, as many men have migrated from rural areas to towns, and some are fighting at the war front, many women have become the heads of household, shouldering all the responsibilities in the family. However, despite their efforts, their contribution is usually ignored.84 The war has further affected the system of production and the means of livelihood in the south, leading to famines and economic difficulties, which greatly affected people’s lives. Those who practice agriculture, for example, were unable to effectively work the land because of the constant movement of people from one village to another due to fighting or because of the prevalence of land mines in their lands.85 As a result, southern Sudanese, in general, and women and their children, in particular, in both the rural and urban areas of the south, have been reduced to a relative state of dependency on the international relief agencies. This situation is evident in the images frequently shown on international media channels, particularly in the 1990s.86 For example, during my stay in Juba before departing to Egypt in 1992, almost all the population of Juba, including myself, were registered with the displaced people’s camps around Juba to enable them to get relief food that was intended for those displaced from the rural areas, to supplement what is purchased from the market. Besides its impact on economic, social, cultural, and educational aspects of the southern Sudanese society, the war has further contributed to environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Since the majority of Sudanese depend on land for their livelihood, the continuing war has degraded their means of livelihood, such as the soil, grazing land, and natural vegetation. For example, since the war was fought mainly in the bushes of rural southern Sudan, the degradation of vegetation has had devastating consequences for the wildlife of the south, leading either to the death of some animals or to their migration into the neighboring countries. At the same time, overgrazing and the cutting down of trees for a variety of reasons, by the government and the rebel forces on the one hand and some residents of the south on the other, have contributed to deforestation on a massive scale, land erosion, and ecological degradation. For example, during my stay in Juba many government soldiers deployed in the south were engaged in trade in wood and other economic products, particularly in garrison towns in the south. As a result, great quantities of lumber were shipped north for economic development. Furthermore, reports from the SPLM/A-controlled areas indicated that some SPLM/A commanders were involved in a similar trade, mainly between the liberated areas and the neighboring countries of Uganda and Kenya.87 Similarly, as wood became the main source of fuel for cooking in the south, many residents in southern
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Sudan were/are engaged in firewood trade, supplying households, local bakeries, and other business facilities. In conclusion, one can argue that the competing identities and narratives through which the official national discourse of the country is to be narrated represent an important dimension of the root cause and perpetuation of the civil war in Sudan. In other words, identity issues revolving around race, ethnicity, and religion, in my opinion, represent the main factors that let to the “north-south” conflict in the Sudan. Similarly, struggle over natural resources and political power remains a contributing source of conflict.
CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALIZING REFUGEE CONDITIONS FROM FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
opulation movement is not a new phenomenon worldwide. Throughout history, factors such as environmental disaster, political instability, and insecurity among others have triggered a mass movement of people from one place to another. In precolonial Africa, for example, population movement occurred during times of warfare between kingdoms, natural disasters, or as a result of people’s need to move in search of better livelihood or better trading opportunities. In contemporary times, the struggles for independence from colonial rule from the 1940s to the 1960s, and the postindependence wars from the 1960s up to the present have triggered far more movement of people both within the African continent and across international borders. In other words, both internal factors, such as civil wars, and external factors, such as foreign aggression, have interacted to produce such massive displacements of people, especially since the second half of the twentieth century.1 Over the past fifty years changes in the nature of refugee movement in Africa have been mostly attributed to the changing nature and duration of warfare in Africa. The prolonged periods of civil war, particularly in SubSaharan Africa, have greatly affected many African civilians since they become the targets of the warring parties. As Elizabeth Ferris argues, “[a] shift toward guerrilla warfare and the involvement of peasant populations has produced a much higher proportion of civilian casualties than earlier wars fought almost exclusively between professional soldiers.”2 The greater movement of people worldwide has led to the establishment of what Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Auayo refer to as the “International Refugee Regime”3 or what Rogers Zetter refers to as the “International Humanitarian Relief Regime” to deal with the refugee
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crisis.4 According to these scholars, a more specialized regime pertaining to the refugee crises of post–World War I and –World War II Europe, the struggles for independence, and the postindependent conflicts in the Third World countries was created. The main actors in this specialized regime according to them are the UNHCR and NGOs, the host governments and local communities, as well as the refugees themselves.5 Furthermore, this greater movement of people has led to an increase in the number of scholars and research institutions writing and researching refugee and forced migration issues. The refugee situation in Africa has attracted many international agencies from the Western countries, local NGOs, as well as academic institutions, researchers, and individuals. As a result, refugee work in general and work in Africa in particular are dominated by Northern relief agencies.6 For example, “in early 1994 there were over 2,500 Northern NGOs compared to hundreds of Southern ones receiving large amounts of international assistance.”7 All of these agencies and individuals, as well as the host governments, have their particular interests, objectives, and politics behind their involvement. These special interests, aims, and policies shape the way in which refugees from Africa are perceived and treated. They further influence the manner in which the international community and host government respond to each refugee crisis in Africa.8 As Rogers Zetter notes, “a handful of long-established ‘Northern-based’ NGOs (NNGOs) dominated the agenda of the relief regime and operational responses . . . [b]y networking among themselves they reinforce their power and control.” 9 Women and Gender in the Refugee Literature As indicated in the introduction of this book feminist scholars have contributed greatly in bringing the issue of women and gender to the center of refugee studies. In other words, these theorists have brought women refugees’ issues to the fore in international refugee agencies and in particular the UNHCR, and in major refugee-receiving countries as well. The recognition that 80 percent of the world’s refugees are women and their dependents,10 and that women refugees face specific problems through all stages of the refugee situation, as compared to men, has made the UNHCR and refugee-receiving countries, such as Canada, the United States, and others, rethink the 1951 UN refugee convention and policies relating to the refugee status determination procedures. It has further helped in the recognition that there is a need to take women refugees’ issues seriously. For example, in the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the UNHCR issued several publications to be used by those representing women refugees as
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asylum seekers. In 1985 the UNHCR urged states “to adopt the interpretation that women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a ‘special social group’ within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.”11 The UNHCR further issued guidelines on the protection of women refugees. These guidelines include “Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,” 1991; “Sexual Violence Against Refugees,” and “Guidelines on Prevention and Response (1995a).”12 These guidelines are issued to “address gender-related persecution and recommend procedures to make the asylum determination process more accessible to women.”13 According to Heaven Crawley also, “[g]ender-related persecution refers to the experiences of women who are persecuted because they are women [that is to say] because of their identity and status as women.”14 Furthermore, in their book titled Development and Diaspora: Gender and the Refugee Experience, Wenona Giles, Helene Moussa, and Penny Van Esterik outlined some of the progress made in the UNHCR with regard to women refugees. For example, it was recognized for the first time that women refugees might require specific action in their favor. This recognition has led to the consideration of women refugees as individuals and independent people. Thus, it was suggested that women refugees are to be issued with “individual ID cards and or registration documents.” In this manner women refugees “would not be dependent on male heads of household” as they used to be in the past.15 The recognition of women refugees’ specific needs, rights, and experiences has made women refugees’ issues, that is, the gender-related patterns of persecution experienced by women refugees visible in the refugee discourse. This recognition has further made it possible for women refugees who have experienced sexual violence during civil wars or during peace times, for example, to speak out. This speaking out was evident during the United Nations Convention on Human Rights in Geneva (1993) where several women refugees and immigrants spoke of the sexual violence they experienced in their lives. Following the UNHCR’s action in 1993 Canada became the first country to adopt formal guidelines for the adjudication of refugee claims made by women.16 The Canadian guidelines stipulated that “women fleeing severely abusive spouses [or circumstances] who can show that their countries of origin are unwilling or unable to protect them, can now argue that domestic violence is a form of persecution as understood in Canadian refugee law.”17 The guidelines further “spell out that the persecution women endure because they are women must be considered at each stage
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of adjudication of their claims for asylum.”18 The adjudication process according to Sherene Razack includes [t]he assessment of the particular circumstances of claim, the general conditions of the claimant’s country of origin, the seriousness of the treatment the claimant fears, the relationship between a claimant’s fear and one of the five grounds [i.e., reasons for persecution, namely race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion], the degree of state protection available, and the possibility of an internal flight alternative.19
Canada is followed by the United States, which became the second country to adopt formal guidelines recognizing gender-related persecution. In June 1995, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) “issued its Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women.”20 The guidelines “give specific instructions to decision-makers that recognize rape and other forms of sexual violence as persecution and also recognize that women who are beaten, tortured, or subject to other such treatment for refusing to renounce their beliefs about equal rights of women may be considered for asylum protection.”21 Other countries such as Australia followed suit by adopting such guidelines. Feminist theorists, activists, and legal practitioners in the field of refugees and forced migration acknowledged the importance of gender persecution in the process of assessing women refugees’ claims. As Sherene Razack put it, “Canadian recognition of gender persecution represents an important moment for women world-wide. For the first time in international law, private violence against women, and the state’s complicity in failing to protect them, is recognized as an injustice for which the law can offer redress.”22 Despite these achievements resulting from the introduction of the concept of gender-related persecution in dealing with the situation of women refugees, many theorists and activists in the field of refugee and forced migration also pointed to the limits of how gender persecution is used particularly in refugee determination procedures. As noted by Heaven Crawley, the UNHCR guidelines do not have “the force of law or form part of the Refugee Convention and therefore cannot override express terms of Immigration Acts or rules.”23 This lack of force sometimes makes it difficult for women refugee claimants particularly overseas claimants to claim refugee status solely on gender-related persecution grounds without linking it to one of the five grounds for persecution outlined in the UN definition of a refugee, which I discuss in detail later. Another shortcoming of the gender-related persecution is its poor distribution and utilization. According to Nahla Valji, “[w]hile [the gender
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guidelines] are important when reconceptualizing asylum, [they] have had nominal impact beyond the symbolic expansion of the definition of refugee. Limited application as well as, limited awareness of the new policies have crippled any real redress for women.”24 For example, the Canadian guidelines on gender persecution apply only to claims within Canada and do not apply to visa officers abroad.25 Overseas women asylum seekers usually rely on the United Nations Refugee Convention, which does not recognize gender as one of the five listed grounds for persecution. This is true for southern Sudanese women refugees in Cairo whose claims were/are determined by the UNHCR, which refers the accepted refugees to the respective embassies of major refugee-receiving countries such as Canada, the United States, and Australia. Despite these limitations, one can still argue that feminist scholars in the field of refugees and forced migrations have contributed in making gender and gender relations central in the study of refugees in general and women refugees in particular. Operational Definitions of Key Concepts To facilitate the analyses of women refugee experiences, it is always important to operationalize the key concepts used in the book. Therefore, in this section I provide working definitions of the following key concepts: a refugee, gender, gender relations, exile, race, racism, and ethnicity. Who Is a Refugee? According to the 1951 United Nations Convention and the Protocol relating to the status of refugees agreed upon by the United Nations in 1967, the term refugee “applies to ‘any person’ who is outside the country of his nationality . . . because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear is, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality.”26 This definition was originally intended for European refugees uprooted by World War II. It also “reflected the transformation and Cold War division of post-war Europe into the Eastern and Western Blocs.”27 However, as a new flow of refugees emerged in the 1960s in nonEuropean countries, as a result of civil wars and other circumstances, this definition needed to be reconceptualized to include new categories of refugees. Thus, in 1969 the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), in the convention governing specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa negotiated a relatively encompassing definition
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of a refugee. In addition to the established UN definition centering on individual persecution, the term refugee “shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”28 Similarly, the Central American countries that agreed in 1984 to the nonbinding Cartagena Declaration on refugees added that “[t]he definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one which in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 convention and the 1969 protocol, includes among refugee persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violation, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed the public order.”29 Drawing on the above definitions, one can argue that persons who fit the 1951 definition of a refugee are those who have been individually persecuted and forced to cross international borders. As the 1951 definition of a refugee applies only to individual claims to a “well-founded fear of persecution,” it ignores the fact that many factors have affected millions of people collectively, who have suffered similar consequences as refugees, for example, civil wars, human rights abuses, and systematic political oppressions. The OAU/AU and Cartagena Declaration definitions of a refugee added new elements for the understanding of a refugee, which highlight important aspects of the reality of refugee crises today. However, despite the progress in how a refugee is defined, one can still argue that the elements of the 1951 convention (religion, political opinion, ethnic origin, fear of individual persecution) remain at the core of their formulation of what constitutes a refugee. Invoking these core elements determines one’s recognition or nonrecognition as a refugee. This is evident in the process of refugee status determination by the UNHCR office in Cairo. For example, for a Sudanese to be recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR, he/she has to prove that he/she left Sudan for fear of individual persecution on the bases of religion, political opinion, or ethnic background. However, considering the current crises in Africa where many people live in a refugee-like situation inside their country of origin, the above definitions become inadequate. Similarly, the definitions did not take gender into consideration. This gender-blind approach to the definition of a refugee suggests that those who are defined as such are only men, which is not always the case. Furthermore, as the determination of those seeking asylum in a third country is based on the 1951 UN definition, those who do not fit the criteria are usually left out.
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Therefore, a refugee in the context of this study encompasses those persons—women, men, and children—who have been forced to cross international borders or who are internally displaced in their country of origin, and are living in a refugee-like situation. This refugee-like situation may be characterized by insecurity, fear, discrimination, lack of basic human needs, protection, human rights abuse, and gender-based violence, among others. African women refugees, on the other hand, refer to women from SubSaharan Africa who are forced to leave their countries of origin to seek refuge in other countries, either within Africa or in other European and North American continents.30 Similarly, southern Sudanese women refugees represent those women who are from the southern regions of the Sudan. The categories “African women” and “southern Sudanese women refugees” are not being used here to represent a unified, undifferentiated nature of women refugees. Rather, they are used to show the diversified nature of women’s experiences and responses to a particular refugee situation based on their race, ethnicity, class, geographical locations, religion, language, and other social differences. Gender As indicated in the introduction to this study, gender as an analytic and as a social process, is conceptualized in relational, culturally, and historically specific terms. Many feminist scholars in the field of refugees and forced migration have articulated this conceptualization. Doreen Indra sees gender as a “key relational dimension of human activity and thought.” She also considers gender as referring to “socially and culturally constructed notions of women and men, and how these notions structure human society, including their histories, ideologies, economies, politics, and religions.”31 M. Hammersely, in discussing feminist methodology, argues that “[a] key feature of feminist methodology is a central concern with gender and gender asymmetry. It is argued that human social relations of all kinds are heavily structured by differences in the social position of women and men, and most important of all by differences between them in power.”32 According to Lucia McSpadden and Helene Moussa, gender is “a way of understanding how present and past societies and cultures construct ideas and knowledge about men and women. It is a way of locating women and men in the context of differentiated gender relations.”33 Moreover, Jok Schrijvers defines gender as a “key relational and power dimension of human activity and thought. Informed by culturally and historically specific notions of masculinity and femininity, it has far-ranging consequences for the overall positioning of women, men, children in all social domains, and it determines . . . the way in which people experience their lives.”34 From
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the above understanding of gender, it is important to affirm that gender is seen both as a key relational term and as a context, both culturally and historically specific. This conception of gender has helped in the deconstruction of the universalizing and homogenizing notion of a refugee. Based on this understanding one can also argue that the introduction of gender in refugee studies has significantly contributed to the understanding of the complex aspects of refugee populations in general and women refugees in particular. For example, gender-based analysis has contributed to the recovery of southern Sudanese women refugees’ voices, experiences, struggles, and adjustments in the refugee context. Gender Relations In order to understand the power relations between women and men, feminist theorists focused on gender relations to explain the unequal power relations between the sexes. In their theorizing feminists viewed gender relations as relations of domination. For instance, according to Jane Flax, “[t]he study of gender relations entails two levels of analysis: of gender as a thought construct or category that helps us to make sense out of particular social worlds and histories, and of gender as a social relation that enters into and partially constitutes all other social relations and activities.”35 Therefore, analyzing gender relations among refugees has further helped in the understanding of changes in the lives of male and female refugees, gender roles, power relations, identity construction, as well as in the nature of family and household structures in a refugee setting. As noted by Wenona Giles, Helene Moussa, and Penny Van Esterik, an understanding of “gender relations and the refugee experiences will serve to empower refugee women and their advocates.”36 Moreover, a gender-based approach has contributed to the analysis of southern Sudanese women refugees’ experiences before and during flight, and in the settlement process. Although women and men are similarly affected by the refugee situation, the gender-based analysis has also helped in pointing out the differences among women and between women’s, and men’s experiences. In sum, the term gender relations “refers to the gendered dimension of the social relations structuring the lives of individual women and men—such as the gendered division of labour and of access to and control over resources.”37 Exile Exile is conceptualized differently by different scholars and in different contexts. In his article “Reflections on Exile,” Edward Said argued that
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“exile is a solitude experienced outside the group: the deprivation felt at not being with others in the communal habitation . . . [it] is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being . . . [it] is life led outside habitual order—it is nomadic, decentred, contrapuntal.”38 Acknowledging the fact that anyone prevented from returning to his/her country of origin is an exile, Said made distinctions between “exiles, refugees, expatriates and émigrés.”39 As far as exiles and refugees are concerned, Said noted that “exile originated in the age-old practice of banishment . . . [whereas] refugees are a creation of the twentieth century state. The word ‘refugee’ has become a political one, suggesting large [groups of people] requiring international assistance.”40 David P. Lumsden in his article “Broken Lives? Reflections on the Anthropology of Exile and Repair,” further identified five faces of exile. These include “external—internal, proper—improper, fraudulent exilic identities or claims, those left behind, and returnees.”41 Drawing on the above interpretations, exile denotes a state of being outside of one’s country or place of origin. According to Lumsden, “Ex—indicates ‘out’ or ‘from’ place, as opposed to those remaining ‘in.’ ” He went on to argue that “those who are in exile may be outside of or still inside of ‘their’ state boundaries.”42 Therefore, and agreeing with David Lumsden, I can say that exile in the context of this book refers to a state of being outside of one’s place of origin. Race and Racism Literature on critical race studies has shown that the meanings and understanding of the concept race have changed and shifted over time and in different contexts and circumstances.43 For example, race theorists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries emphasized the biological understanding of race. As a result, social relations and human behavior were believed to be determined by biology. This conceptualization of race as biologically determined have underpinned European conquest and colonization of non-European people. For instance, as noted by Maria Castagna and George Dei, “[r]acial typologies, buttressed by a Eurocentric view of the world, were critical in justifying European practices of cultural, economic and political genocide of non-European peoples.”44 However, over time such an understanding of the concept of race has become inadequate as realities have changed and new conceptualizations emerged, which move beyond questions of biology, skin color, and other phenotypical differences. As Maria Castagna and George Dei argue “contemporary critical race studies are characterized by a shift from biologistic and assimilationist conceptualizations of race to a discussion of race in the social, historical, ideological and political sense.”45
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Therefore, in the context of this book, my understanding of the concept of race follows Maria Castagna’s and George Dei’s conceptualization that it is “a social-relational category defined by socially selected real or imagined physical, as well as cultural characteristics.”46 In other words, the conceptualization of the social meaning of race depends on “the understanding that race cannot simply be defined ‘biologically.’ ”47 Similarly, as people are situated differently, the conceptualization of race must “recognize the importance of historical context and contingency in the framing of racial categories and social construction of racially defined experiences.”48 As a “social-relational category” and as historically and context specific, the concept race allows for the understanding of different ways in which southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo are viewed and treated both by the host population and by the international and local organizations and church groups dealing with the refugees. For instance, the race of those defined as refugees largely determines the process of “refugee status determination,” access to education, and the definition of the physical, cultural, linguistic, and religious characteristics of those seeking refugee status, work, and educational opportunities. Racism Theorists of race and race relations have further pointed out the complexity of meaning and usage of the term racism. For example, M. Banton identified four usages of the term racism: “a doctrine that race determines culture; the use of racial beliefs and attitudes to subordinate and control those who are racialized; as a label for a historical complex, generated within capitalism, facilitating the exploitation [of those] defined in racial terms; [and] anything connected with racial discrimination, prejudice, inequality, or with apartheid.”49 According to Tzvetan Todorov, racism “designates two very different things. On the one hand, it is a matter of behavior, usually a manifestation of hatred or contempt for individuals who have well-defined physical characteristics different from our own; on the other hand, it is a matter of ideology, a doctrine concerning human races.”50 Robert Miles on the other hand, emphasized two functions of racism, namely one “ideological” and the other “representational.”51 Racism is “conceived as an ideology because it represents human beings, and social relations, in a distorted manner.”52 As an ideology, racism operates in two ways. First, as a criterion by which a group of people may be identified. Second, those identified as such “must be attributed with additional, negatively evaluative characteristics and/or must be represented as inducing negative consequences for any other. Those characteristics may be either biological or cultural.”53
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As representational, racism involves the representation of the Self and the Other. Focusing on the Western representations of the Other and the European discourses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Miles noted that “the process of representing the Other entails dialectic of representational inclusion and exclusion. By attributing a population with certain characteristics in order to categorize and differentiate it as an other, those who do so also establish criteria by which they themselves are represented.”54 For example, by defining the Africans “as ‘black’ and ‘savages,’ and thereby excluding them from their world, Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were representing themselves as ‘white’ and ‘civilized.’” Furthermore, by employing the “discourse of ‘race’ to exclude and inferiorise, that same discourse, but with inverted meanings, served to include and superiorise.”55 According to Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, racism(s) can be understood as “modes of exclusion, inferiorization, subordination and exploitation that present specific and different characteristics in different social and historical contexts” . . . that, “racism is a set of postulates, images . . . which serve to differentiate and dominate.”56 These authors’ understanding of racism relate to Robert Miles’s understanding of racism specifically in their emphasis on the exclusionary, inferiorizing, and exploitative functions of racism. The complexity of the meaning and usage of the term racism expressed by theorists of race and racism in Canada, the United States, and Europe has led to the emergence of a new understanding of the term. Therefore, the conceptualization of racism in this book moves beyond black/white racism to speak of various racisms. These various racisms may include cultural, religious, economic, and other forms of racisms. Despite the fact that many people in Sudan and Egypt deny or dismiss the relevancy of race and the practices of racism there, in this book, I argue that the concept of race in its social construction is relevant and the practice of racism exists. This is evident, for example, in the ways in which southern Sudanese refugees are viewed and treated by the Egyptians, or the way in which Egyptian women employers treat southern Sudanese women refugees who work as domestic workers in their homes.57 Based on this understanding, therefore, I use the term racism here to refer to representational and discriminatory processes and practices. These discriminatory processes and practices are interpreted in both biological and cultural characteristics of those defined as refugees in Cairo. Given the historical memories between Egypt and Sudan, which is characterized by the Egypt conquest of Sudan, the practice of slavery, coupled with the deteriorating living conditions in Sudan as a consequence of war, many Egyptians tend to look down on people from Sudan, especially those from southern Sudan.58
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Ethnicity According to Peter Li, the term ethnic “refers to people of a common heritage. Sociologists . . . use the term to refer to a group of people who presumably share a common experience and origin.”59 Like race, ethnicity “involves the social construction of an origin as a basis for community or collectivity.”60 In the context of this study, ethnicity is conceptualized as a socially constructed, historically and context—specific, and relational category. Its social construction is determined by socially related cultural characteristics, involving such elements as a shared sense of common history, religion, language, shared experiences of oppression, and myths of common descents. In other words, ethnicity is a shared sense of identity. As a social and relational category, ethnicity usually involves differentiation between and among different ethnic groups on the basis of the different elements of ethnicity, as well as the differential power relations between a dominant and a subordinate group. For example, within the context of Sudan, ethnic identity is sometimes used to differentiate between northern and southern Sudanese, and other times to differentiate between people on the basis of origin, religion, language, physical features, economic resources, and other elements. Ethnic identity can further be used to deny full participation in the economic, cultural, social, and political life of the society. Similarly, within southern Sudan, southern Sudanese tend to differentiate among themselves on the basis of their ethnic origin, language, and place of origin. This understanding of ethnicity involves “partaking of social conditions of a group, which is positioned in a particular way in terms of the social allocation of resources, within a context of difference to other groups, as well as commonalities and difference within [the group].”61
CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
s indicated in the introduction, this book explores the experiences of southern Sudanese women refugees within the conceptual framework of the interlocking and the intersecting systems of oppression, and the idea of the “simultaneity” of oppression articulated by African feminists,1 black feminists,2 and antiracism and critical race theorists.3 The underlying assumption in the interlocking and the intersecting systems of oppression framework is the refusal either to address one form of oppression while leaving others intact or to hierarchize oppressions. This point has been well illustrated by Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack, when they argue that “attempts to change one system while leaving the other intact leaves in place the structure of domination that is made up of interlocking hierarchies.”4 Therefore, in order to change the situation of women or any other marginalized group, race, gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality should be addressed simultaneously. This model treats these forms of oppression as interlocking rather than as additive systems.5 For example, “Black feminist thought treats the intersection among multiple systems as the object of study. Rather than adding to existing theories by intersecting previously excluded variables, Black feminists aim to develop new theoretical interpretations of the intersection itself.”6 Accordingly, Gloria T. Hull, Patricia B. Scott, and Barbara Smith (1982) pointed out that the commitment of black feminists is to struggle “against racial, sexual, heterosexual and class oppression.” Thus, the particular task of black feminists is to develop an “integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that major systems of oppression are interlocking.”7 In her work, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, Patricia Hill Collins further uses the notion of intersectional paradigms to explain how all systems of oppressions operate simultaneously. According to Collins, “intersectional paradigms make two important contributions to understanding the connections between knowl-
A
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edge and empowerment.”8 She goes further to note that the notion of intersectional paradigms are not only useful in explaining the experience of black women in the United States, but can also “shape the experiences of other groups as well . . . Intersectional paradigms further shed new light on how domination is organized.”9 Intersectional paradigm as a concept “provides an interpretative framework for thinking through how intersections of race and class, or race and gender, sexuality and class, for example, shape any group experience across specific social contexts.”10 Despite the fact that the notions of the interlocking and the intersecting systems of oppressions are widely accepted by many nonwhite feminists as a useful conceptual framework, at the same time agreeing with Collins, one can argue that the intersection of the systems of oppression does not affect women similarly. Its effects vary greatly depending on women’s race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, region, religion, level of education, age, and so forth. For instance, as Patricia Collins pointed out, “although intersectionality is valid as a heuristic device, treating race, class and gender as if their intersection produces equivalent results for all oppressed groups obscures differences in how race, class and gender are hierarchically organized, as well as the differentiated effects of intersecting systems of power on diverse groups of people.”11 I adopted these conceptual frameworks with an aim of capturing the complexities of the everyday experiences and situations of women refugees. Recognizing the difficulty in adequately addressing all intersectionalities, this book emphasizes issues of gender and gender relations and how they are played out in a refugee context because that is where many negotiations and changes occur as a consequence of displacement. However, this emphasis on gender and gender relations should not be understood as ignoring the importance of other forms of oppression, but rather as a starting point to understand the many issues affecting the lives of southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo. Like race and class, gender represents a central dimension of social structures. Thus, a focus on gender, conceptualized as a socially constructed relationship between the sexes, as they affect and, in turn, are affected by displacement conditions, can yield important insights into the refugee phenomena. Significantly, African feminists, black feminists, and antiracism perspectives, though connected, differ in their points of departure and emphases. They share common assumptions and an understanding of the interlocking and the intersecting nature of oppression, that is, they refuse to address only one form of oppression while leaving others unchallenged, which usually “leaves in place the structure of domination that is made up of interlocking hierarchies.”12 In the following pages, I briefly outline the main features of each framework to show points of convergence and divergence, as well as their importance in analyzing refugee experiences.
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African Feminism African feminism articulated by African women both in the continent and in the diaspora is very important in the study of women refugee experiences because it invokes the power of African women by placing them at the center of the study. In defining African feminism, Filomina Chioma Steady wrote, “African feminism combines racial, sexual, class, and cultural dimensions of oppression . . . [an] ideology which encompasses freedom from oppression based on the political, economic, social, and cultural manifestations of racial, cultural, sexual, and class biases.”13 African feminisms are as multiple and heterogeneous as African women themselves, who are differentiated by class, age, race, regionalism, colonial experiences, education, urbanism/ruralism, center/periphery, and African/ diaspora.14 Molara Ogundipe-Leslie has agued that “there are many feminisms [in Africa], depending on the center from which one is speaking or theorizing. These feminisms have to be theorized around the junctures of race, class, caste and gender, nation, culture and ethnicity, age, status, roles and sexual orientation.”15 Furthermore, Susan Arndt argued that “[i]n analogy to the ethnic, cultural, social, economic, political and religious diversity of the African continent, there are numerous varieties of African feminism.”16 As a result, and concurring with Arndt’s argument, African feminists from different locations, both in Africa and the diaspora, address a range of themes and issues pertaining to African women and their societies. While addressing different issues affecting their lives, African women also recognize commonality of experience among them. As Juliana M. Nfah-Abbenyi clearly put it, “[w]omen translate their ‘cry’ or ‘drum beat’ into a universal war-cry, while at the same time stressing the particularities and/or complex and multiple levels of their own oppression.”17 Based on Nfah-Abbenyi’s conceptualization, within many African societies, the “cry” or the drumming metaphor though pointing to a commonality of women’s experiences still represents or conveys different messages, depending on the context or the occasion in which the drumming occurs. Furthermore, African feminism, as well as the various ways in which differently located African women conceptualize African feminism, were and are determined partly by their regional differences, colonial and personal experiences, and generational background. For instance, African feminists from war-torn societies in Africa tend to focus their feminist analysis on the impact of war and displacement on the lives of women. Women living under the Islamic rule often focus their analysis on the situation of women within the Islamic Shari’a, or law. Furthermore, others combine their criticism of gender relationships with the issue of race and racism.
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Issues of Concern for African Feminists Before addressing the main issues of concern for African feminists, as well as making any conclusion as to whether feminism is relevant to Africa or not, it is important to make a distinction between African feminism(s) and Western, mainstream feminism, a distinction based on the issues raised and addressed by the two forms of feminisms. The term “mainstream Western feminism” refers to a body of knowledge and the perspectives developed in the West by privileged, white, middle-class and heterosexual women. This body of knowledge and perspectives are rooted simultaneously in the disciplinary structures of the academy and the women’s social movement of the 1960s and the 1970s.18 According to Cheryl Johnson-Odim, “mainstream feminism” is defined as “a liberal bourgeois, or reformist feminism.”19 At its inception the main concern of the mainstream feminism was to challenge sexism in Western societies. Gender, together with patriarchy within mainstream white feminist theorizing, came to represent the most important forms of oppressions. Thus, in order for women to be liberated, the task of mainstream feminists was/is to deconstruct the concepts and social structures that sustain gender oppression. The assertion of the centrality of gender oppression or sexism is evident in some of the writings of both early and contemporary mainstream white Western feminists.20 Most of the early writings, for instance, revolved around the oppression of women by men within the private sphere, that is, the patriarchal family and unequal treatment of both women and men in public institutions. The varieties of mainstream feminist thinking, however, pointed to the different forms of oppression women experience within the family. For example, the main argument of the liberal feminists is that female subordination is rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that hinder women’s entrance into the public sphere. Therefore, for women to be liberated, liberal feminists call for equal opportunity and pay between women and men in the public sphere. This call for equal opportunity emphasized women’s rights as individuals to choose and to determine for themselves what they need irrespective of biological sex.21 Radical feminists, on the other hand, pointed to men’s control over women’s bodies and sexuality as the most pervasive form of women’s oppression. For them the biological base of women’s subordination is viewed as the fundamental oppression eclipsing class or race. “Patriarchy is seen as a transhistorical all embracing structure” . . . and “the family is identified as the key instrument in the oppression of women through sexual slavery and forced motherhood.”22 On the contrary, Marxist feminists emphasized the material base of oppression, which rests in men’s control over women’s labor power.23
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As noted by Evelyn N. Glenn, the “Marxist-feminist perspective views women’s subordination as a product of two intersecting systems[:] Patriarchy and capitalism . . . According to this analysis, the main mechanism by which patriarchy was established and is maintained today is the sexual division of labor.”24 At the core of this argument is the understanding that the sexual division of labor has contributed to the subordination of women by making them economically dependent on a male wage earner. In short, as Rosemarie Tong has argued, men’s control of women’s labor power is “constituted by restricting women’s access to important economic resources and by disallowing women any control over female sexuality and especially female reproductive capacities.”25 This focus of mainstream Western feminism on sexism, gender, and patriarchy as the main forms of oppression has been seriously criticized by black and Third World feminists and feminists of color for its neglect of racism and imperialism. Therefore, as a result of the involvement of Third World women both within and outside of the United States, Canada, and Europe in feminist theorizing, the definitions of feminism have been broadened to incorporate race and class analysis. Their involvement further led to the realization that feminism is not universal and unifying; rather, there are diverse, historicized, and context-specific forms of feminism. Ayesha M. Imam argues that “[t]here is no universal feminism, no abstract feminist theorizing but rather local feminisms that develop in particular contexts, at particular periods, and in particular ways.”26 Therefore, what distinguishes African feminism from Western feminism is its origin, the issues around which African feminists theorize and analyze, as well as their points of emphasis. As Gwendolyn Mikell argues, “[t]he new African-feminist approach differs radically from the Western forms of feminism with which we have become familiar since the 1960s. African feminism owes its origins to different dynamics than those that generated Western feminism. It has largely been shaped by African women’s resistance to Western hegemony and its legacy within African culture.”27 As shown in the following pages, African feminists in their theory, practice, and organization often stress issues that affect their lives and everyday experiences directly, both within the family and in the larger society. For example, such issues as basic needs—water, food, shelter, and health—as well as global and local state policies, cultural practices, and patriarchal manifestations that are oppressive and discriminatory to women are also emphasized. Another aspect that distinguishes African feminism from Western feminism is its lack of total opposition to men. On the contrary, it seeks to create an alliance between women and men. As Susan Arndt clearly notes, “African feminists frequently assume that men and women should form an alliance in their fight against these social phenomena—and
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that this fight should include a common challenge of patriarchal social structures.”28 However, based on realties in many African countries, forging such an alliance is sometimes difficult, since challenging patriarchal structures is seen by many men as a threat to their power and authority over women, particularly within the family. Therefore, as Ama Atta Aidoo argues, one must conclude that feminism is not foreign to Africa as many people tend to argue. Feminism has always existed in Africa, in theory, and in practice. In other words, feminism in Africa is manifested in women’s daily struggle to improve their living conditions and that of their families and societies. What is foreign is a Western feminist terminology.29 Juliana M. Nfah-Abbenyi further notes, “[b]efore feminism became a movement with a global political agenda, African women both ‘theorized’ and practised what for them was crucial to the development of women, although no terminology was used to describe what these women were actively doing, and are still practising on a day-today basis.”30 As for the relevancy of feminism to Africa, Molara Ogundipe-Leslie argues that “feminism is relevant to Africa because African women [and other women] are oppressed as women by race, class and other realities.”31 Contrary to this, I argue that feminism is not only exclusively relevant to Africa solely because of the oppression of women, but it is also relevant because of what the women do in their everyday lives. As indicated earlier, African feminism(s) is/are as multiple and heterogeneous as African women themselves. As a result, African women, with their diverse social locations and experiences, exemplified both the theorizing and practice of feminism by their everyday experiences, such as in the family, marketplace, farm, and other sites of social organization. For instance, in her analysis of gender and social movements in Africa, Ifi Amadiume noted that “most African societies had women’s organizations which controlled or organized agricultural work, trade, the markets, and women’s culture and its relevant ideology.”32 Similarly, Marida Hollo in her study of the lives of women in southern Nigeria noted that, “‘market’ women with little formal education were often the major earners of their households, and they played a more forceful and controlling role in their families,” and politics as well.33 One of the issues addressed by African feminists is the representation of African women in most Euro-American discourse. For instance, African feminists challenge the representation of African women in the EuroAmerican discourse as homogeneous, illiterate, backward, and voiceless, and as a powerless group subject to poverty.34 Similarly, African feminists challenge the assumption that feminism is foreign to Africa and that feminism is irrelevant to Africa, an assumption, which is also prevalent in African societies both at home and abroad. For example, the foreignness and irrelevancy
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of feminism to Africa is sometimes used by some Africans, especially men to silence those African women who challenge some of the cultural practices such as wife beating, polygamy, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), among many—which they view as oppressive to women. Another important theme that African feminists focus on is the condition of and obstacles faced by African women. In describing the conditions of African women, Molara Ogundipe-Leslie identified six “mountains” that an African woman carries on her back. These include “oppression from outside in the form of colonialism and neo-colonialism; oppression from traditional structures: Feudal, Communal, slave-based; [woman’s] own backwardness; the African man; [her] color or her race; and the woman herself because she has internalized all these oppressions.”35 Many of the above issues raised by Ogundipe-Leslie have been and continue to be the main focus of many African feminist writings. For example, issues of polygamy, the institution of bride price, the levirate, gender relations, FGM, and marriage conventions among others, continue to dominate the current debate on the state of African women. African feminists both in the continent and in the diaspora, in theory and in analysis, uncover the oppressive and discriminatory nature of these institutions and practices on women’s lives. According to Susan Arndt, “African feminists often combine their criticism of gender relationships with a challenge to one or more of the other . . . forms of discrimination and oppression. [These include] racism, neo-colonialism, cultural imperialism, religious fundamentalism, socio-economic mechanisms of oppression and dictatorial and/or corrupt systems.”36 Although African women are affected and are constrained by many oppressive conditions and obstacles, both internal and external, still the kinds of oppression an individual woman is subjected to depend on the position she is in. Therefore, not all women in Africa, for example, have internalized all the oppressive conditions or cultural traditions and practices they are subjected to, as Ogundipe-Leslie suggested above. Instead many women have challenged and continue to challenge some of the oppressive conditions experienced by women. Furthermore, African feminists do not stop at the criticism stage of the discriminatory and oppressive patriarchal and other structures of their societies, but they move beyond criticism to offer alternative perspectives and view points on how and what should be done in order to improve the conditions of African women both on the continent and in the diaspora. Susan Arndt writes, “[a]s a rule, African feminists do not stop at the criticism of patriarchal structures, but also discuss alternatives to what is criticized. They discuss scopes of action and alternative perspectives for women which might help overcome their discrimination and oppression.”37 This point of seeking alternatives to what is
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being criticized is reflected, for example, in the narratives of many of the women participants I interviewed in Cairo. Therefore, in order to reconstruct and rewrite African women’s experiences, scholars have to rethink and refocus their ways of thinking and of studying African women. One also needs to look for “African women’s voices in women’s spaces,” that is, in such spaces as “kitchens, watering sites, kinship gathering, and women’s political and commercial spaces where women speak.”38 African feminists have to analyze and critically challenge some of the negative aspects of African culture and heritage. Based on the above understanding, it is important to note that African feminism is an important theoretical framework in the study of African women refugees, by evoking the power of African women. Using this framework provides insight into women refugee’s struggles for survival in the uncertainty, fearful, and oppressive refugee and displacement conditions. It also helps in challenging the unifying nature of the category “refugee,” as well as the victimized and dependent image of an African woman refugee. For, despite the difficulties they face, southern Sudanese women refugees in Cairo are able to make life possible for themselves, their children, and other members of the family. Therefore, they are challenging the assumptions that emphasize the victimized and the powerlessness of women refugees. Black Feminist Thought Black feminist thought is defined as a multiple level engagement,39 placing African American women at the center of the analysis.40 Patricia H. Collins has argued that the interlocking nature of race, gender, and class oppression is one of the recurring themes in black feminist writings.41 Black feminists challenge both the grand narratives as well as mainstream Western feminism, pointing out the invisibility of black women in those scholarships. Many black feminists in North America, for example, have argued that feminism has excluded and silenced the experiences and voices of nonwhite women in their theorizing and feminist practices.42 Similarly, many of these feminists have rejected both the assertion that gender and patriarchy are the most important forms of oppression and the assumption that the relationship among the various forms of discriminations is merely additive. As Rose M. Brewer notes, “[g]ender as a category of analysis cannot be understood decontexualized from race and class in Black feminist theorizing. Social constructions of Black womanhood and manhood are inextricably linked to racial hierarchy, meaning system and institutionalization.”43 Debora K. King further argued that the exclusive focus on either gender or class oppression, or their treatment as separate models, tends to “ignore the fact that racism, sexism and classism constitute
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three interdependent control systems.”44 Thus, King suggested an interactive model or what she refers to as “multiple jeopardy,” whereby the multiplicity “refers not only to several simultaneous oppressions, but to the multiplicative relationships among them as well.”45 Emphasizing the usefulness of the intersecting framework, Patricia H. Collins argued that “intersectionality references the ability of social phenomena such as race, class and gender to mutually construct one another.” Thus, this approach is useful in highlighting “how African American women and other social groups are positioned within unjust power relations, but it does so in a way that introduces added complexity to formerly race-, class- and gender-only approaches to social phenomena.”46 Therefore, it can be argued that these feminists call for the rethinking of feminist theory and epistemology so that feminism becomes encompassing and inclusive. The interlocking and the intersecting conceptual framework and the simultaneity of oppression thus represent an alternative for those perspectives that privileged one form of oppression over others. This framework further suggests a reformulation or a shift in feminist theory and epistemological consideration. For instance, black feminists call for the acknowledgment of social differences among women. They further call for all feminists to address all systems of oppression simultaneously, instead of treating race, gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity, and other forms of difference as separate and discrete systems of hierarchy. For example, instead of analyzing gender roles solely within the patriarchal system of oppression, it is important to analyze how the racialized construction of gender roles affects women differently depending on their race and class. As noted by Dionne Brand, “the examination of how gender roles are racially constructed can only deepen our analysis of how gender oppression actually works and how gender oppression is firmly tied to racial oppression and class oppression.”47 However, for black feminists, the emphasis on social differences among women does not mean that alliance between women across racial or class lines is endangered or impossible as some feminists have argued. Instead they suggested that analyses of women’s experiences be locally situated because women are thought of as “being locally situated . . . and therefore differently and multiply located.” Emphasizing situated perspectives allows women to “think of difference among women without losing sight of the commonalities.”48 At the same time, “differences as central to feminist concern represent an attempt to understand the variety of socio-cultural spheres in which women exist.”49 Therefore, in order to build solidarity and sisterhood between women, black feminists have noted the necessity to address racism and classism within the feminist movement. As bell hooks has argued, “racism is
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fundamentally a feminist issue because it is so interconnected with sexist oppression.”50 Since racism and classism have created and continue to create divisions among women, black feminists have suggested that feminism should come to terms with the multiple processes through which exclusion and racialization have taken place within feminism. Furthermore, the intersection of race, class, gender, sexuality, and other forms of oppression in determining women’s condition are to be contextualized and historicized. In other words, the analysis of women’s oppression should be situated within specific contexts and should be historically specific. Integrative Antiracism Framework My review of the refugee literature, in general, and that of the African refugee, in particular, has shown that issues of race, racism, and ethnicity, and responses to refugee situations, which are sometimes determined by the race and ethnicity of those defined as refugees, are either ignored or not taken seriously into consideration. Based on this realization, I also used “an integrative antiracism” as an alternative framework that allows me to explore issues of race and racism and how they are played out in a refugee context, and in particular within the context of a refugee-host relationship.51 In other words, I show how refugees from Sudan are racialized and ethnicized using labels such as northern or southern Sudanese, African, Arab, Muslim, Christian, or “animist.” According to George Dei, integrative antiracism is defined “as the study of how the dynamics of social difference (race, class, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, language, education, and religion) are mediated in people’s daily experiences. [It] is also an activist theory and analysis that must always be consciously linked to struggles against oppressions.”52 Dei’s integrative antiracism framework challenges hierarchical and additive analysis of social oppression. Such analysis, according to Dei, “denies the complexity of experiences that can, and must, be examined, explained and addressed.”53 Therefore, this framework “acknowledges our multiple, shifting and often contradictory identities and subject positions . . . [it] rejects meta-narratives or grand theories . . . in effect, calls for multiplicative, rather than additive analysis of social oppression.”54 An integrative antiracism framework is “based on the principle that myriad forms of oppressions are interlocked . . . [thus] a study of one [form] entails a study of [the others].”55 Accordingly, I argue that an integrative antiracism approach is useful in the study of Sudanese women refugees because of its emphasis on the intersectionality of social oppressions, and on the idea that “individual subjectivities are constituted differently by the relations of race, class, gender, age,
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disability, sexuality, nationality, religion, language and culture.”56 For example, women refugees’ responses to their refugee situation differ according to their age, class, social status, ethnic and regional background, education, and other forms of social difference. Similarly, international relief agencies’ responses to refugee situations are determined by the same social differences. In her analysis of women refugee claimants from the Third World, Sherene Razack has shown how gender persecution in refugee discourse “can function as a deeply racialized concept in that it requires that Third World women speak of their realities of sexual violence outside of, and at the expense of, their realities as colonized people.”57 Moreover, as the integrative antiracism framework recognizes the power of subordinated or oppressed groups to challenge and resist positions of marginality, it further sheds light on how differently located southern Sudanese women refugees in Cairo are challenging and resisting the victimized and dependent image of an African woman refugee, both individually and collectively. As Dei notes, integrative antiracism “integrates how groups positioned differently come together on the basis of a common abhorrence of social oppression and fight the prevailing culture of dominance.”58 Based on my experience as a refugee, and my understanding of the refugee and immigration policies of North America, as well as of some African countries hosting refugees, I maintain that gender, race, ethnicity, class, age, (dis)ability, among others, do intersect to determine how hosting governments respond to the refugee situation in Africa. For instance, these differences affect the decision to accept or reject asylum seekers, the decision to extend or not extend relief aid to refugees, as well as the type or kind of relief assistance given to refugees in Africa. Taking the refugee resettlement program to a third country as an example, one can argue that the intersection of race, class, gender, and other forms of social difference do play a great role in the resettlement process, particularly in the refugee status determination procedures. Such aspects as country of origin, educational level, gender, physical ability, and health represent the criteria for determining the acceptance or rejection of a refugee claim for resettlement. In their analysis of the health issues affecting Sub-Saharan African women refugees, Haragua Getu and Joyce Nsubuga maintained that “women have fewer opportunities to resettle in countries with well organized social/ health services because the criteria used by Western countries when accepting African refugees for resettlement are discriminatory to women refugees. Such criteria include high education levels, the ability to integrate into Western societies, and potential refugee health care costs.”59 Several points of convergence as well as divergence can be drawn from the above discussion of the frameworks. First, all three frameworks
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challenge hierarchical and additive analysis of social oppressions, calling for simultaneous and multiplicative analysis. Similarly, they reject grand narratives, arguing that these narratives ignore, colonize, and misrepresent the experiences and realities of non-European people. All frameworks also emphasize the relevancy of personal experiential knowledge. But the frameworks have different emphases. On the one hand, an integrative antiracism framework emphasizes the saliency of race without dismissing the importance of other forms of difference. In other words, “[i]n recognizing the centrality of race and its ‘immediacy in everyday experience,’ integrative anti-racism also acknowledges the co-determinant status of race, class, and gender dynamics.”60 On the other hand, Black feminist thought and African feminism stress the centrality and power of women in any social analysis. Whereas African feminists trace the roots of African feminism to the precolonial Africa past,61 black feminists locate the roots of black feminism “in the historical reality of Afro-American women’s continuous life and death struggle for survival and liberation.”62 In analyzing the situation of southern Sudanese refugees, using these frameworks helps me understand how gender, race, ethnicity, class, age, (dis)ability, and other forms of difference determine hosting governments’ responses to the refugee situation in Africa. For example, by employing these frameworks, I am able to analyze the refugees-host relationships from a race and class perspective, instead of from a purely economic point of view. Similarly, these frameworks are useful in analyzing issues of complicity by researchers of international and local agencies working with refugees. As well, these frameworks help me to understand how differently located southern Sudanese women refugees respond differently to the refugee situation, and the different ways they question the past that has informed their perceptions of themselves and the world around them. They further give insights into southern Sudanese women refugees’ differing ways of resistance to the refugee situation. This book follows George Dei’s analysis and understanding of the concepts of intersecting and interlocking systems of oppression. Dei distinguished between “intersecting” and “interlocking” oppressions. According to him, “‘intersectionality’ has one aspect of identity as a foundational base through which other oppressions are read as interconnected.”63 On the contrary, “[a]n interlocking analysis is a political, constructive and . . . [a] transformative framework that exposes how subject locations are secured by the dominant power and articulated through the disempowerment of the subordinated.”64 This distinction is particularly important in my analysis of the experiences of Sudanese refugees for two reasons. First, through intersectionality, I am able to analyze the interplay between gender, class, ethnicity, and refugeeness in determining how the southern Sudanese
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refugees in Cairo responded to the refugee situation as well as how they relate to and interact with both the host population and the different international organizations and church groups working with the refugees. Similarly, it allows for the understanding of how differently situated southern Sudanese women refugees make different choices in their response to the circumstances in Cairo, as well as how they challenge their past and the dependent image of a refugee woman. Second, the interlocking analysis enables me to analyze the process through which a refugee is defined, the refugee status determination procedures, and the social structures set up for refugees that are designed to sustain the processes of domination and subordination. For example, as we see in chapter 6 of this book, the UNHCR caseworkers provide themselves with job security by making the refugee status determination extremely time consuming and complicated. Furthermore, the interlocking analysis also allows political engagement and the evocation of a relative saliency of identities even when such identities are interrelated.
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CHAPTER 4 INTERVIEWING REFUGEES IN TRANSIT: IMPLICATIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS
Methodological Approach qualitative research approach was used to collect the data for writing this book. Brigit Brock-Utne describes this approach as “holistic, in the sense that it attempts to provide a contextual understanding of the complex interrelationships of causes and consequences that affect human behaviour.”1 The term qualitative method covers a range of techniques such as interviewing, observation, and documentary. I used interviewing to collect the participants’ narratives. Although it is widely used by social scientists, interviewing has both advantages and disadvantages. The chief advantage of interviewing is its flexibility in collecting data. This is particularly true when the interviews are guided by unstructured or open-ended questions. This allows the respondent to provide detailed information about the issues under discussion.2 As a social process involving social interaction between the researcher and the researched, “interviews yield a dynamic insight into the lives of the interviewees [i.e.] how they experience, interpret and act upon their lives.”3 Similarly, individual interviews enable the respondent to offer a personal perspective on the issues under investigation. That is, through body language, and the way in which the researcher and the researched interact, interviewing can provide useful and unique insights and perspectives on the research process. However, the success of the interview can depend on the nature of the interaction, the techniques used, and the setting in which the interview is conducted. One way of dealing with that is to share one’s thoughts and life experiences with the interviewee. This is because interviewing, according to Barbara Merrill (1999), “is not a one-way process with the researcher
A
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exploiting the researched for their own ends.”4 Therefore, throughout the course of my interview, in some instances, I shared my thoughts and experiences, which are either similar to that of the participant or relate to the issue under investigation. As a result of such sharing, I was able to elicit information that the participant(s) was (were) hesitant or unwilling to share. Another advantage of the interview method is that it allows for “dialogue between researcher and respondent to clarify questions and responses, ask more information, or follow up with probes that elicit additional information.”5 The prime disadvantage of interviewing is that it is time consuming both during and after the interview is over. For instance, during the interview process the researcher needs to concentrate, and to be able to “listen, write, and anticipate a future question all at the same time, and [develop] strong human relations skills.”6 Similarly, interviews are usually emotionally charged for both the researcher and the respondent. For example, doing research among refugees usually involves emotions and pain for both the research subjects and the researcher. This is because many refugees have experienced loss of property and loved ones, and discrimination. As someone who has experienced war and its consequences, I cannot deny the fact that many times I find myself struggling to control my emotions. As noted by Elisa Facio (1993), “[b]eing interviewed can be a very emotional experience for the respondent . . . [Similarly] researchers many times may find themselves struggling to maintain emotional neutrality.”7 Furthermore, interviewing refugees who are experiencing hardships on many fronts, be they economic, social, or environmental, can be a difficult thing to do, particularly if the intent of the study is not mainly to identify the problems and difficulties the refugees are experiencing. Participants in such a situation usually tend to talk more about their economic problems and how that affects their lives, and the lives of their families. Part of my struggle, then, was to balance their concerns and the objectives of my study. Therefore, I was often required to divert the attention of a participant from focusing on her/his problems toward answering the questions. For example, posing follow-up questions on some of the issues raised became necessary. This strategy of shifting the focus was important because I did not want to give the impression that I was not interested in what she/he was saying, but to show that what she/he was narrating was as important as the other issues I was pursuing. It was also necessary to maintain the trust. Another disadvantage is that although interviews may provide in-depth information on particular issues under study, they sometimes sacrifice breadth of data. This is often the case because the research process is shaped by time, the researcher’s efforts, and the ability to interview as many people
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as possible, as well as by the research setting and situation. For instance, conducting interviews among refugees in an insecure camp setting can be risky business. Often time researchers might be worrying about their own safety and security and that of their participants. Thus, the researcher may not have the time or courage to interview all the people who are willing to be interviewed individually. As a result of these shortcomings, interviewing is often used in conjunction with other forms of data collection. Therefore, in addition to interviewing, I employed a group discussion approach that generates insights and discussions on common themes and issues affecting both women and men refugees. Discussion groups were organized around such issues as the general impact of exile on the lives of refugees; changes in gender relations within the family and the refugee community at large; issues of marriage, divorce, child custody, refugee status determination process at the UNHCR; the role of the church, interethnic and interracial relations, polygamy; health problems; refugee-national relations; and global issues affecting women, among others. Discussing these issues in their totality is very important because they set the context within which refugees’ experiences and actions are shaped and affected. They also allow for the understanding of other aspects of exile that have impacted the refugees. For instance, my review of the refugee literature has shown that the role of the church in changing refugees’ spirituality, perceptions, and the way they experience life is not adequately addressed. Most of the existing studies focus mainly on the role of PVOs, some of which are church-based organizations that engage in delivering material support to the needy.8 Drawing on the above analysis, one can argue that context is very important in analyzing refugee experiences. As Douglas notes, “concrete human events are always to some degree dependent on the situational context in which they occur and can adequately be explained only by taking that context into account.”9 In sum, both interviews and group discussion methods allow the participants to provide detailed information and personal perspective on the issue under study, as well as insights and discussions on common issues affecting both women and men refugees. Authority and Power Doing research in refugee communities usually poses unique methodological concerns. This is particularly true when refugees are in the state of transition, a temporary place where refugees are waiting for relocation to a permanent settlement. Egypt has become for the Sudanese refugees a country of transition, a place to acquire refugee status before resettling in a
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Western country. As noted in the introduction, the majority of Sudanese refugees who arrived in Cairo in the period 1998–2001 mainly came to apply to the UNHCR for resettlement. Therefore, they consider Egypt a stepping stone into other parts of the world. Every refugee is looking forward to be resettled either in the United States of America, Canada, or Australia. Using the interviewing method in research, one faces issues of authority and power in the researcher/researched relationships that create methodological challenges that should be addressed. Being in an academic institution located in Canada and conducting research among refugees in Egypt, my relationships with research participants is never equal, despite the fact that I have been in Cairo before and had experienced similar resettlement procedures that my participants were experiencing. These relationships are not equal because of such factors as age, gender, social status, and study intent. Similarly, these factors complicate the claim of authority over the text as well as how the researched defines the research situation and responds to the interview.10 As indicated earlier, the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee is never an equal situation, which raises concerns relating to authority and power over the outcome of the research. For example, the oral story or testimony, narrated by the respondent, usually reaches the public in the form of a text presented by the researcher. Therefore, as noted by Sherna B. Gluck and Daphne Patai, “[n]arrators typically are not true partners in the [interview] process. Whatever control they exercise during the interview, when they are able to negotiate the terrain, usually ends once the session is completed . . . it is precisely at this moment, when the individual narrator’s power over the process recedes.”11 Thus, how one transcribes, analyzes, and presents the data becomes vital if the purpose of the research is to enable the participants to tell “their own story.” For instance, after the fieldwork, the researcher transcribes, analyzes, and interprets the data collected. She decides which narratives are included in the text, which ones are left out and why. In this way, the researcher also exercises her authority as an interpreter of the research participants’ testimonies. Interpreting oral interviews is an important part of the process of examining the lived experiences of the research participants. Similarly, researching refugees in a state of transit further affects the researcher/researched equation. This is particularly true when the researcher is from the same community as the participant(s). During my fieldwork endeavor, the “researcher/researched” equation was reversed, as typically I became the subject of a different study. For instance, each time I approached a group of refugees with the hope of convincing some of them to participate in my study, the moment I mentioned that I am studying in Canada,
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I found myself answering questions about the situation in Canada. I allowed them to inquire as much as they wanted before shifting the focus to my study. This strategy enabled me to establish trust and acceptance because most of the refugees are new in Cairo and unknown to me. Insider/Outsider Issue Scholars of the qualitative research approach “have commented on the insider and outsider dilemma of investigators’ experience in research process. [It is argued that] what is at least implicit in the insider/outsider research debate is that the autobiographies, cultures and historical contexts of the researcher matter, these determine what researchers see and do not see, as well as their ability to analyze data and disseminate knowledge adequately.”12 As such, acknowledging one’s subject location is to admit that being a researcher studying one’s own community does not automatically eliminate social differences and unequal power relations between the researcher and the researched. Instead such social differences based on gender, education, class, urban/rural, and the like might outweigh the status of being an insider. In other words, these differences position the researcher both as an insider as well as an outsider at different times and contexts, and may affect the research outcome. As noted by Wharton-Zaretsky (1999), “[a]lthough the researcher can situate herself as the insider, the researcher, because of her role as investigator, cannot escape her outsider status.”13 As a result, the social differences and power dynamics that exist between the researcher and the researched shape both the interview process and the outcome of the interviews. That is, they determine the type of questions asked, how they are asked, and the language used to conduct a particular interview, as well as how to frame the questions. While in Cairo, the refugees were mostly newcomers, but even the lives of some of those I left behind when I migrated to Canada in 1997 also had changed. Thus, I had to relearn how to relate to them in new and different ways. Similarly, being a woman interviewing other women can sometimes pose some challenges. Studies on feminist methodology have shown that women respondents are more forthcoming in interviews with women.14 Although I did not face serious difficulties accessing refugees to participate in my study, it is worth pointing out that I did encounter some minor resistance from some refugees, particularly women, whom I had approached, or were suggested to me by others. For instance, some of the women who refused to participate in the study first wanted to know my ethnic background, level of education, and what would be done with the data collected. Several factors can be attributed to these concerns. One would be the fear that the information they provide, which they regard as private,
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would be made public, despite my assurance that the data will be kept confidential. Similarly, given the political and social structures in Sudan and among refugees in Cairo, which are characterized by interethnic conflicts and differences, as well as the exile context, which revolves around the UNHCR status determination, people are usually suspicious of others. In such a situation, people usually prefer to be secretive and avoid discussing their concerns or private lives with others. Also, the misunderstanding of the essence of my research and the general belief among refugees in Cairo that those engaged in gathering information about refugees usually use the data collected to get money from international NGOs are two other contributing factors behind some people’s refusal to be interviewed. What I noticed during my fieldwork was that it was easier to get a man to be interviewed than a woman. This difference in the way men and women responded to me, is in my opinion might be that the men I approached were not concerned about what kind of a person I was in the first encounter. Such a concern tends to emerge later in the discussion. However, for some women they want to do a background check, either by asking me directly or through other people known to me. Also, some women are suspicious of women conducting research from their community, especially if they are asking questions about issues they regard as private. Although they might agree to be interviewed, they are selective about which experiences to reveal. However, to overcome this and to allow participants to speak freely, the method of posing the questions, when to ask them, and the setting in which the interview is conducted become very important. Also, sharing one’s thoughts and experiences relevant to those of the participant becomes very important. For example, asking the more general questions first, and then moving slowly to follow-up questions allowed me to learn a great deal about the experiences of the many women refugees I interviewed. However, it is worth noting that the privilege of being a southern Sudanese woman and a refugee has helped me interpret some of the cultural meanings usually attached to such issues as gender relations, customary laws, marriage, and the family as understood in southern Sudan. As John H. Stanfield II notes, “[p]eople of color, women, and others traditionally outside the domain of research authority have argued that only those researchers emerging from the life world of their ‘subjects’ can be adequate interpreters of [their] experience.”15 Also, my “refugee status” has allowed some of the participants to realize that “refugee” does not always equate with “victim,” “dependent,” and “vulnerable.” Similarly, being an insider allows access to some information, which is regarded as “sensitive” by the participants. In response to my question about the situation of musharadin, that is, southern Sudanese children living in the streets of
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Cairo, the member of the riyada I interviewed concluded by saying that “I am telling you this because you are a southerner, for we do not talk about these things in public.” The Interview Process The study employs a methodology that uses unstructured questions to guide the interview process. I designed different sets of questions based on the objective of the study, as well as the characteristics of the participants. The questions generally focused on identifying new skills and knowledge learned by participants in exile, and how they used these skills and knowledge to challenge or not to challenge their past, the image of victimized and dependent women refugees, and the strategies they used to imagine a different future. Some sets of questions also focused on the objectives and activities of women’s associations, youth and community leader groups, programs, and services offered to refugees by some international organizations and churches, and the challenges they faced in dealing with the increasing number of Sudanese refugees in Egypt. I also included questions on the role of the church in changing refugees’ perceptions about their spirituality. These questions helped me to elicit information as well as to rate the effectiveness of the refugee programs offered by the international organizations and church groups to improve refugees’ situation. Both English and Juba Arabic languages were used in conducting the interviews.16 I used Juba Arabic to interview refugees who do not know English, and English to interview refugees who prefer English, international organizations, and church personnel who do not know Arabic. Translating what the participants said from Juba Arabic to English sometimes poses the danger of misinterpretation. For example, some words or phrases convey only their precise meaning when used in the original language, rather than a translation. Thus, to overcome this dilemma, I decided to leave some of the terms or phrases in their Arabic form. I used a tape recorder and took notes to record the interviews and group discussions. Throughout the course of the interviews I did not experience much resistance either to the use of tape recording or to note taking. The Study Sample This study draws its participants from the southern Sudanese refugee population living in Cairo, Egypt. This research setting was selected because of the high concentration of southern Sudanese refugees, as well as my familiarity with it.17 The process of selecting the participants for both the individual interviews and group discussions was not an easy task. As I
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mentioned in the introduction, there is no reliable statistical data on all Sudanese refugees in Egypt. As a result, it was difficult to use the conventional method of sample selection. Given this difficulty, I explored alternative methods of sampling during my fieldwork. One of these alternative methods was to rely on my personal judgment as well as on suggestions by community leaders, churches, and some organizations working with Sudanese refugees. Since refugees in Egypt are not settled in refugee camps, the different churches dealing with refugees became the only centers through which I could contact the refugee population. Sample Size and Its Selection Several strategies were used for the selection of the sample. First, personal contacts were made with some leaders of the southern Sudanese refugee community, as well as the priests and staff of the different church groups working with the refugees. These people were informed of the purpose and objectives of the study and what could be expected from the participants. These initial contacts were necessary to establish relations and gain the trust of the refugees. Through frequent visits to the churches, I was able to select some of the participants who would be interviewed individually, by talking to them directly and explaining the purpose and objectives of my study. Some participants were referred to me by friends. To draw refugees to participate in the group discussion, I made contact with leaders of the groups, who in turn helped me contact their members to set the date, time, and place for the discussions. As for the personnel of the international organizations, I contacted them personally by visiting their offices. In the case of the UNHCR where it is difficult to enter the premises without prior arrangement with the staff, I used e-mails. During the time of research, I attended some of the events organized by the refugees, such as the Tuesday meetings organized by the rabita women group, workshops, and church’s Sunday services. In this way, I was able to learn more about some issues affecting refugees as well as convincing some refugees to participate in the study. All the interviews except for one were conducted in locations chosen by the participants. Therefore, some interviews were conducted on the church premises, others in the apartments of the participants, and still others in the offices of the personnel of the international organizations and churches that work with refugees. In total, individual, in-depth interviews were conducted with fifteen women and three men. This sample reflected differences in class, ethnic groupings, region, religion, educational level, age, length of time spent in exile, marital status, and other differences. Recognizing these social differences is necessary because they determine how women refugees are
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differently affected by the refugee conditions, and how their responses to the circumstances in exile vary depending on their social locations. In-depth interviews are necessary because they allow for the understanding of the women refugees’ lives, their perceptions, and the meanings they attach to their experiences. As I. E. Seidman argues, “[t]he purpose of indepth interviewing is not to get answers to questions, nor to test hypotheses and not to ‘evaluate’ . . . the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in understanding the experience of other people and the meaning they make of the experiences.”18 In addition to the individual interviews with women, I organized four discussion groups: one was with a youth association, referred to here as nesaya, and three were with women’s groups that are referred to as nawsa, rabita, and aswani. I also conducted interviews with ten people from the following organizations, churches, and schools: the organizations include the UNHCR, the IOM, the SPLM/A, and riyada (a sport association for Sudanese youth). The churches include ma’mudiya, al-mughadas, and kamalia. The schools include muwanga, afendiya, and nusiya. Although I was not able to organize a group discussion with the elders of the community because of reasons beyond my control, I interviewed four leaders of the following communities: shela, abanus, lumaring, and zaituna.19 In addition, I reviewed church records on marriages conducted in the church, applications for certificates of traditional marriages, and baptisms conducted in the period 1990–2001. This review was intended to identify patterns and changes in marriage practices as well as to show the role played by the church in influencing refugees’ spiritual lives and perceptions. The review was also necessary in order to provide a clear understanding of how the number of marriages and conversions have increased over the years. For example, using the church records enabled me to trace changes in marriage practices and to understand why southern Sudanese refugees resorted to church to obtain marriage certificate. Analysis of the Data A thematic approach is used in the analysis of the data, which draws on the key concepts of the study. These concepts include exile and how its social, cultural, economic, and political aspects impact women refugees’ lives; gender and gender relations, and how they are understood in the refugee context; and race, racism, and ethnicity, and how they affect the ways in which southern Sudanese are identified, treated, and managed. In this context, the experiences of women refugees were analyzed not solely in relation to their individual experience; rather, their experiences were explored in relation, but not exclusively, to men, the social environment,
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economic conditions, the UNHCR refugee status determination procedure, and the church groups that help refugees. Furthermore, changes in gender roles and relations and in women refugees’ perceptions are analyzed by women refugees’ situation in exile with the southern Sudanese traditional and cultural practices and values that have shaped and continue to shape women’s lives and perceptions. Similarly, the nature of the relationships between the refugees and the host population are analyzed within the broad context of ethnic, race, and class relations in Cairo’s society, historical memories between Egypt and the Sudan, exemplified by the institution of “domestic slavery,” and the cultural, religious, and gender ideologies of the host population toward a woman’s place within its society. As will be illustrated in the following chapters, all these aspects shape and influence the way in which Egyptians perceive, respond, and treat southern Sudanese refugees, whether in the street, public transportation, or in Egyptian homes where southern Sudanese women refugees work as domestic workers. Using a thematic approach in analyzing the data, I was able to identify recurrent themes from the interviews, as well as the different strategies in which the participants responded to life in Cairo. In other words, this approach helped me to understand how the refugee situation has affected the participants depending on their different social locations in the refugee context. Similarly, the themes elicited from the participants allowed me to figure out the nature of the relationship between refugees and the host population, and which groups of women refugees are engaged in the process of challenging the past and the imagining of a different future and which are not. It also helped in identifying specific cultural aspects and laws that some of the women refugees hope to change, as well as the nature and kind of problems faced by refugees in general and women refugees in particular. * * * Selected Profiles of the Study Participants The following participants of my study (with one exception) are drawn from the southern Sudanese refugee community in Cairo. All of them are from the three provinces of southern Sudan, namely Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Equatoria. All the participants migrated from the south to Khartoum, then after living in Khartoum for some time, migrated to Cairo in search of a better life and the possibility of getting resettled in the West. They range in age from twenty-five to late fifties. Most of them are educated and have worked in Sudan before coming to Cairo. One participant is from northern Sudan. She requested to be included in the study to share
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her experience as a domestic worker in Cairo with me. Fifteen participants are female and three are male. 1. Joby Joby came to Egypt in the late 1990s. She was accepted by the UNHCR and was expecting to be resettled in Canada. Joby has a university degree from a Sudanese university. She worked as a government official in Sudan before traveling to Egypt. She is divorced and has brothers and sisters who live in Canada and the United States. During the time of the interview, Joby was working as a live-out domestic worker with an Egyptian family. The money she earned was used to support her mother, sister, other male and female relatives living in Cairo, and herself. Joby was the community leader of their community organization in Cairo during the time of the research. 2. Zuzu Zuzu came to Egypt in February 2001 to attend a conference in Cairo. However, after the conference she decided to remain in Cairo. She has worked in three Egyptian and two northern Sudanese homes. During the time of the interview Zuzu was working as a mubeed (live-in) domestic worker in an Egyptian family. She was not married. Zuzu is from northern Sudan but is included in the study because of her willingness to tell her experience as a domestic worker. She is educated up to secondary level. Zuzu had applied for the UNHCR and was waiting for a refugee status determination interview. 3. Rasha Rasha came to Egypt in March 2001. She is married and has one child. She lives in a two-bedroom apartment with her husband and other relatives. She is educated and has worked with many NGOs in Sudan before coming to Egypt. Rasha has also attended several national and international conferences. She is recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR and is waiting to get resettled in the United States. Rasha was the chairperson of the nawsa women association based in Cairo. 4. Reba Reba came to Egypt in October 1999. She has completed her secondary education and had been enrolled in a university in Sudan. However, she
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was unable to complete her university studies due to some problems related to her political opinions. She is married to a southern Sudanese man who lives in the United States. Her application for the UNHCR was rejected and her file was closed. However, she was in the process of traveling to the United States to join her husband who sponsored her. She attended several workshops and short courses organized for Sudanese women refugees in Cairo. Reba was working with the rabita women group during the time of the interview. She lives with her sister whose husband is also in the United States. They depend on her salary and monthly remittance from her husband and her sister’s husband. She has no children. 5. Du Du came to Egypt in late 2000. Du is a single mother who lives in a twobedroom apartment with her five children, her mother, and six other relatives. She has completed secondary school and had worked in Sudan before migrating to Egypt. Because of health problems Du was not working outside of the home. Instead, she knits and sells her craft to southern Sudanese women who are migrating to the West, and the cash earned is used to support her family. Du has two sisters living in the West who sometimes send her money. 6. Ani Ani came to Egypt in December 1999. Ani lives in a two-bedroom apartment with her four brothers, one sister, and six other relatives. Ani, who was working with the rabita women group during the time of the interview, was the only one who supported the family financially. In the Sudan, Ani completed secondary school and enrolled in a university, but was unable to complete her education. She has worked in Sudan. In Cairo, Ani attended a three-month course organized by the rabita women group for Sudanese women refugees. She is on the staff of the Amal (hope) Sudanese newsletter, which focuses on refugee issues. Ani is not married. 7. Mama Mama came to Egypt in June 2000. She completed secondary school in Sudan. In Sudan, she used to run a small business selling tie-dye clothes and cooked food. Mama is married and has three children. During the time of the interview, Mama was working as a live-out domestic worker to support herself, her children, and her jobless husband. She had also worked as a mubeed (live-in) with an Egyptian family. She was also trained as a tailor
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and a dressmaker. Mama had already applied to the UNHCR and was waiting for a refugee status determination interview. 8. Ziya Ziya came to Egypt in October 2000. She lives with her husband and three children. Ziya dropped out of school at a young age because of financial difficulties while growing up in Sudan. While her husband works, Ziya takes care of their small child. Ziya and her family share an apartment with another family because they cannot afford to rent their own apartment. Ziya had applied to the UNHCR and was waiting for an interview for refugee status determination. 9. Kaku Kaku came to Egypt in December 2000. While in Khartoum, Kaku used to sell dried fish to sustain herself and her children. In Egypt, she was not working but depends on a monthly remittance from her husband who lives in Canada. Kaku has had no formal education. She had registered with the UNHCR and was waiting for an application form for status determination. 10. Saki Saki came to Egypt in August 2000. While she lives with two of her children, her other children remain in southern Sudan. She does not know the whereabouts of her husband. While in Sudan, Saki had worked in both the government and NGOs operating in the south. Saki completed secondary school in Uganda, then studied theology in Zambia for one year. She also attended short courses in Nairobi, Kenya, which were oriented toward women’s programs and gender issues. In Cairo, Saki was not working outside the home, but knits and sells her craft. She also depends on remittance from her daughter who lives in Canada. Saki is registered with the UNHCR and is expecting to get her application form. 11. Glo Glo came to Egypt in November 1999. She came to pursue her postsecondary education. But she was unable to enroll at a college or a university owing to lack of funding. Glo has applied to the UNHCR, did an interview for refugee status determination, but was rejected. She appealed her case and was waiting for a response from the UNHCR. Glo was working as a live-out domestic worker in the residence of Netherlands’s ambassador
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to Egypt. Glo lives in a two-bedroom apartment with six male relatives, and the wife of one of her brothers and her child. They all contribute to the rent and food. Glo is not married. 12. Rox Rox came to Egypt in 1994. She is married and living with her husband, two children, and her mother in a two-bedroom apartment. Rox is educated and works as a teacher in one of the church-based displaced children’s schools in Cairo. Rox has applied to the UNHCR, did the interview for refugee status determination, and was rejected. She was planning to migrate to Australia through a sponsorship from a relative who lives there. 13. Ding Ding came to Egypt in 2000. Ding is an executive committee member and a participant in the group discussion with the nesaya association based in Cairo. He has two wives and six children. However, one of his wives who came to Cairo in 1998 has migrated to the United States with her three children, before he arrived in Cairo with his second wife and three children from Sudan. Ding was a businessman in Khartoum before coming to Egypt. In Cairo, he stays at home caring for his children, while his wife works as a domestic worker with an Egyptian family to support the family. 14. Ome Ome came to Egypt in 1997. She was the leader of the aswani group and a member of the Mothers’ Union, a church-based group located in one of the churches in Cairo. Ome has three grown children, two of whom are living with her in Cairo. She has worked as a teacher in Sudan. Ome had no plans of seeking resettlement at the time of the interview. 15. Gon Gon came to Egypt in June 2000. She has six grown children, but joined her son in Cairo. She has applied to the UNHCR, did the interview for refugee status determination, and was waiting for the results. Her son’s wife works as a domestic worker with an Egyptian family to support their family. Gon has no formal education and like Ome, she is a member of the Mothers’ Union.
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16. Marc Marc came to Egypt in 2000. She is one of the participants of the rabita training program of health worker providers. Since she came to Cairo, she has worked as a domestic worker in several Egyptian homes. Then after receiving training, she worked as a health care provider for a senior Egyptian man. She got the job through the rabita office, of which she is also a member. She was not working at the time of the interview. Marc has applied to the UNHCR, did the interview for refugee status determination, and was waiting for the results. Marc lives with four of her older brother’s male friends and another female friend in a three-bedroom apartment. Marc is not married. She has completed secondary level in Sudan. Marc sometimes goes to the church to get financial assistance and sometimes receives remittance from her older brother who lives in the Netherlands. 17. Ale Ale came to Egypt in 1999. Ale is a member of the musa’adin program and was trained as a musa’ad. He works with the ma’mudiya church in a program designed to support African refugees. He is married and has two children. He is recognized as a refugee by the UNHCR and was in the process of being resettled in Canada at the time of the interview. Ale has a formal education. 18. Yak Yak came to Egypt in early 2000. He is a member of the executive committee of the nesaya association based in Cairo. He used to work in Sudan before traveling to Egypt. He was in charge of the program planning and designing of the association.
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CHAPTER 5 SOCIOCULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS GOVERNING THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE SOCIETY
PART ONE In this chapter, I deal with the sociocultural institutions and laws governing the southern Sudanese society. These cover a range of issues relating to cultural practices, perceptions, laws, and social institutions that have played and continue to play a significant role in shaping and determining women’s and men’s position in southern Sudan. Through analyzing these issues, I have been able to trace changes and transformations among and between southern Sudanese women refugees as they experience life in exile. Such analysis also helps in understanding women’s and men’s responses to changing circumstances in Cairo. Similarly, the chapter also analyzes the resettlement program and its implication for many aspects of refugee lives, particularly its impact on the patterns and meanings of marriage, and the institution of the family. The resettlement program is very important to analyze because it represents a turning point in the lives of many refugees. A “family” in this context refers to the nuclear and polygamous family unit common in contemporary southern Sudan. Culture in the context of this book refers to the learned customs, belief systems, language, ideas, arts, social relationships, and other behaviors and characteristics that are shared by a group of people who inhabit a particular territory. As learned behavior, culture is passed from one generation to another through the process of socialization. Similarly, culture is also conceptualized as nonstatic and it changes over time and space due to changing circumstances that affect people’s lives and perceptions. As people move across borders, their way of life, thinking, and perceptions also change as they tend to acquire new skills, knowledge, and ideas. However, this process of change does not
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imply complete alteration of previously acquired cultural practices and way of life. Rather, some cultural aspects and practices are either retained and/or modified to necessitate adjustment and adaptation to the new social environment. Sociocultural Features in Southern Sudan The cultural, religious, racial, ethnic, and historical diversity in Sudan, in general, and in southern Sudan, in particular, does not allow for easy generalizations about its society, culture, and laws. However, despite this diversity, one can argue that common features and systems exist that affect women similarly, regardless of their ethnic identity and position in the society. Within the scope of this chapter, such aspects as gender, gender relations and roles, different positioning of women and men, family or personal laws governing the southern Sudanese society, polygamy, and the levirate or the institution of widow inheritance will be considered. These features are important because they represent the areas that directly affect a large number of women’s lives and experiences. Furthermore, it is within these areas where renegotiations, contestations, and transformations occur between men and women in exile. Studies on the forms of marriage have made a distinction between polygyny and polyandry. The former refers to a practice where a man has more than one wife living with him at the same time, and the latter when a woman has more than one husband at the same time.1 The term polygamy, which is sometimes used interchangeably with polygyny, might refer either to the practice of a man living with his wives in the same household, as it was in the past, or to the practice of each wife having her separate house in different neighborhoods and the husband rotating between his wives, as it tends to be increasingly common in urban areas. In the context of this study, I use the term polygamy to refer to a practice where a man has more than one wife at the same time, either living with him in the same house or in separate houses. Like many Sub-Saharan African societies, the southern Sudanese society has undergone many transformations resulting from foreign invasions, particularly the British colonial rule (1898–1956), which brought the colonial patriarchy, the introduction of a “Victorian ideology of domesticity,” and the imposition of the doctrine of separate spheres. Writings by many African feminists suggest that class, race, and sexual inequalities that existed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were reflected in many aspects of colonial, legal, and administrative treatment of the colonized people.2 Amina Mama has identified two sides of colonial patriarchy in Africa, namely “violent and benevolent patriarchy.”3 On the one hand, there was
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widespread violation and degradation of African women through forced prostitution, rape, and sexual abuse. Reference to violence against African women during the colonial period in Africa does not mean that such violence did not exist in precolonial Africa, nor that violence against women ended in postcolonial African societies. Instead violence against women has continued and has become widespread throughout many postcolonial African states. Practices such as rape, FGM, forced marriage, wife beating, and sexual harassment are among many forms of violence against women, which are still common. Reports by human rights organizations reveal evidence of women being sexually abused and tortured into submission by both repressive regimes and by rebel forces in many war-ravaged African countries. The consequence of Sudan’s civil war upon women’s lives is a good example.4 On the other hand, there is the other side of colonial patriarchy “which sought to ‘domesticate’ a significant number of African women” through the introduction of “a bourgeois Victorian ideology of domesticity in Africa.”5 For instance, missionaries, colonial officials, and administrators, through educational and religious institutions, disseminated this ideology. Furthermore, the curricula of colonial education in Africa emphasized subjects that differentiate between public and domestic spheres, with the latter exclusively occupied by women.6 In her study of colonial and missionary education in Uganda, Nakanyike Musisi argues that the formal education offered to women by the missionaries and colonial government “did not go beyond preparing women for the domestic life, nor did it differ significantly from pre-colonial education for women. The methods and philosophy of the missionaries were greatly influenced by the ideologies of domesticity prevalent at the turn of the century in both Uganda and Britain.”7 Such methods and ideologies have further implications on gender relations and roles. Despite the fact that women in southern Sudan shoulder familial responsibilities ranging from child care to food production and processing, men are always regarded as heads of the household. This claim is reinforced both by the colonial legacy of patriarchy noted by Amina Mama above and by the traditional belief that the man is the protector and breadwinner, whereas women are caretakers of the family. Different Social Positions of Women and Men The different social positioning of women and men in southern Sudan is determined by the roles, duties, and behavior each is expected to perform and display. Socially women are expected to behave in particular ways prescribed by the society. For instance, women’s involvement in politics and other public activities is restricted or discouraged because it is assumed that
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men control the public sphere whereas women’s roles are confined to the home or agricultural activities, especially in the rural areas. The public/domestic dichotomy as well as masculine and feminine ideals in southern Sudan context take root right from childhood as sons and daughters are socialized differently according to their parents’ roles in both the family and society, respectively. Thus, male and female children are taught to perform specific roles, which are inculcated in their minds since the time of birth. This socialization takes place in early childhood, during which girls and boys learn the appropriate roles and behavior for their sex. For instance, girls are taught how to carry out household chores like cooking, cleaning, agricultural work, and family responsibilities, and to respect their parents and elders. Similarly, boys are encouraged to learn how to be courageous and strong since they are deemed to be the future protectors of the family. Such institutions as the family, education (both formal and informal), and the media play important roles in perpetuating this process.8 Therefore, when a girl or a boy becomes an adult, each knows which role she or he is expected to play. Masculinity and femininity are usually seen in opposition, with the former being superior to the latter. According to the Nuer masculine ideals, for instance, “[t]he man should be the ruler of the home, and his wife should unquestioningly act according to his will.”9 Similarly, children are raised to obey and respect their parents, particularly their fathers and other elderly people in the society. For instance, daughters are expected to respect and obey their male relatives. Upon marriage, this respect is transferred to their husbands and male in-laws. Through obedience, respect, hard work, and mutual understanding, married women achieve the praise and love of men. Furthermore, within the family, and in the larger society, male children are preferred over female. This preference emerges from the cultural belief that male children are the heirs and preservers of the family line, whereas females are not since they will be married off to other families. Thus, a woman’s failure to bear male children is usually a ground for conflict, not only between the woman and her husband, but also with her inlaws. Such a situation sometimes leads a man to experience pressure from his parents and relatives to consider either marrying a second wife or resorting to an extramarital affair that might result in pregnancy. Gender Relations and Gender Division of Labor Social relations and roles are strictly gendered in southern Sudan. “Social relation” is used here to refer to the gendered dimension of the social relations structuring the lives of individual women and men such as the gendered division of labor and gender division of access to and control of
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resources.10 Social relations between women and men are characterized in southern Sudan by men’s imposition of their power and authority over women. Within the family and society, women usually occupy a subordinate position compared to men. This is evident in the fact that women are not involved in decision making regarding major family and societal matters such as marriage discussions, financial, legal, and political issues. Moreover, men exert their power and authority over women through the control of women’s mobility, their bodies, and their sexuality. According to Reba, one of the participants, “[i]n the past, when a young, unmarried woman wants to go out, she must ask permission from her parents and must come home early before dark. Returning home early is important so as to avoid interrogation and neighbors’ suspicion about her.”11 Therefore, restrictions placed on women’s movement or involvement in public life is in a way intended to control women’s bodies and sexuality. Thus, the idea of a single woman, whether unmarried or divorced, having her own home is not tolerated, and further, she would be regarded as a “bad” or “loose” woman, and thus a threat to social order of the society. Similarly, emphasizing procreation as the main objective of marriage represents another strategy through which men control women’s bodies and sexuality. As John W. Makec argued in his study of the Dinka12 customary law, “[a] man has absolutely exclusive rights over the private part of his wife which, may be described as sacred.”13 Thus, men have exclusive rights to a woman’s reproduction as well as to their sexuality. Furthermore, Jok Madut Jok, in his study of the women of western Dinka in the war zone of southern Sudan, pointed out that “[i]n the name of reproduction, a man assumes the right to the woman’s sexual services. The rules of sexual taboo are easily breached when the husband is determined to expose his wife to pregnancy before he is taken away for his military duties.”14 For him, if he leaves and his wife is not pregnant, the woman might seek extramarital affairs with other men.15 In the areas of political power, property ownership and public events, such as the performance of rituals, particularly in rural areas, or the organizing of political rallies, women occupy less important roles compared to men. For example, women are not allowed to own property. In the case of inheritance, male children always have the right to inherit properties within the family. As Jean Buxton notes in her study of the Mandari people of southern Sudan, “Mandari women, though displaying dignity of person, independent mindedness and influence, are still from the point of view of property-ownership and the exercise of political power, much less advantageously placed than men.”16 The division of labor is also gendered in southern Sudan. Work that is carried out within the confines of the home, such as food producing and
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processing, cleaning, fetching of water and firewood, child rearing, and so on, is regarded as women’s work. In contrast, hunting, especially in rural areas, politics, fighting wars, and all other work performed outside the home are regarded as men’s work. Men are also responsible for the disciplining of children. As such, boundaries between the domestic and public spheres are defined by the nature of the work that women and men perform. Crossing from one world to another is, therefore, regarded as a transgression and thus generates a conflict situation, which has become more prevalent, particularly during the war and among refugees in exile. Thus, because of this understanding of the division of labor, men in a refugee context sometimes find it difficult to take up familial roles and accept the fact that women are the ones earning money to support the family. Laws Governing Southern Sudan Society There are three primary sources of law in Sudan in general. These include Islamic Shari’a or law, customary law, and general territorial or English laws. Although all three sources are tapped in Sudan, it is necessary in the context of this study to note that both Islamic Shari’a and customary law are administered to address personal and private matters, such as marriages, inheritance, and some property rights issues, of the Muslim and non-Muslim Sudanese, respectively. As for the English law, it is mainly confined to areas such as “law of contract, torts, commercial law, evidence, procedure, conflict of laws and some parts or aspects of property and public law.”17 Despite the fact that current Sudanese Islamic Shari’a is supposed to deal with the personal Muslim issues whereas customary law is to be for nonMuslims in Sudan, points of convergence and contestation can be identified between the two sources, particularly in matters such as marriage, inheritance, polygamy, child custody, and property ownership. My review of the two systems of law suggests that both Shari’a and customary law restrict women’s rights to civil and political rights, in particular, the right to hold a high public office that involves making decisions concerning national affairs. Both laws allow men to practice polygamy. For example, in Islam “[a] man can marry up to four wives and divorce any of them at will without having to justify or explain his decision to any person or authority.”18 Similarly, customary law allows a man to marry more than one wife without specifying the number of the wives. Some men in the south, particularly chiefs, have married up to ten or fifteen wives. Another point of convergence between the two systems of law as practiced in Sudan is that they both grant “the husband the right to exercise guardianship and control over his wife [or wives] to the extent of chastising her [them] in a variety of ways,” including the administration of beatings.19
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Furthermore, on the issue of inheritance, both systems of law discriminate on grounds of gender. Whereas Shari’a states a “female is entitled to half the share of a male who has the same degree of relationship to the deceased,”20 customary law as practiced in the south does not allow a female to inherit, on the grounds that she will be married off to another family. Two major differences between Islamic Shari’a and customary law are that whereas Shari’a is written, very few customary law systems in the south exist in written form. The majority of the systems is not documented. For example, the “Customary Law of the Dinka”21 written by John A. Makec documents how the law deals with personal issues such as marriage, divorce, adultery, child custody, and dispute settlement among the Dinka. Makec also helped draft and enact the “Bahr el Ghazal Customary Law Act [of] 1964. This Act comprises three customary law codes [of] Dinka, Luo and Fertit”22 ethnic groups. Also the Nuer customary law has been recorded but needs revision and elaboration. However, most of the systems of other ethnic groups in the south are unwritten.23 Whereas Shari’a draws on the Qur’an as the basis of its content and interpretation, customary law draws on the unwritten customs, values, and traditions of the different ethnic groups in the south, as well as on the oral interpretations of chiefs and the male elders of the society. As I explained in chapter 1 of this book, the official discourse in the Sudan emphasized and continues to emphasize the Islamic and Arab character of the Sudanese state. As such, the successive regimes in Sudan have striven to impose Shari’a in the public and private lives of all Sudanese people, both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, continued attempts to impose Shari’a have been met with resistance particularly by southern Sudanese. For instance, the first attempt to impose Shari’a in the Sudan as a “public law” affecting all people was in September 1983, during Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri’s regime (1969–1985).24 However, southern Sudan is governed by a dual legal system, in which customary law exists side by side with the English law, due to the failure of the policies of Islamization. Despite the practice of both systems of law, customary law predominates and governs the private issues relating to family, the home, property ownership, inheritance, marriage, divorce, maintenance, and child custody. According to Aleu A. Jok, Robert A. Leitch, and Carrie Vandewint, “over 90% of day-to-day criminal and civil cases [in southern Sudan] are executed under Customary Law.”25 Customary Law in Southern Sudan A recent study of customary law in southern Sudan defines it as “the body of traditions, mores, social conventions and rules that through long usage
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and widespread acceptance direct and govern traditional African society.”26 The study further defines the word “custom” in the context of customary law as “local custom originating by usage in the Sudan, and is not applicable to the imported rule of law of foreign origin.”27 As I have already noted above, many customary law systems in the south are not written. In addition, customary law varies from one ethnic group to the other and owing to the changing circumstances in Sudan, in general, and in the south, in particular, customary law changes over time, making it very difficult to implement. Furthermore, since the majority of customary law systems is not documented or unwritten it poses serious challenges in local courts, especially when it is applied to issues affecting women’s lives. This is because its interpretation rests on and is dominated solely by the male chief and the committee of elders of each ethnic group concerned. In my opinion, this has negative consequences for women. Despite its variety and changing nature, customary law affects southern Sudanese women similarly across ethnic and class lines. For example, almost all cases of marriage, divorce, and child custody are dealt with in local courts headed by local chiefs assisted by committees of elders representing each ethnic group. To avoid local courts, some people tend to settle such cases between members of the two families involved. Among many ethnic groups in the south, for example, the legality of marriage does not lie with the state, but rests on an agreement between the two families concerned.28 This situation thus diminishes the priority of registration and certification, particularly in rural areas. Although some Christian southern Sudanese conduct their marriages according to church tradition, still the initial stages of marriage—consent, payment of the bride wealth, and elders’ blessings—are conducted according to the customs and traditions of the ethnic groups involved. Only at a later stage will the couple go to church for further blessings. Cases of divorce and child custody or problems arising in marriage or in the family are also dealt with in accordance with the customary law of each ethnic group. In such situations, women are usually at a disadvantage since they have no power or authority to claim their rights as mothers in a maledominated local court or family. For example, a man usually invokes the issue of bride wealth when a child custody case arises, in order to justify his right to child custody. As is explained later in this chapter, one of the main purposes behind the payment of bride wealth is to transfer membership of the woman from her father’s family to that of her husband, and “to make any children resulting from the marriage legitimate members of the [man’s] family.”29 Similarly, owing to the patriarchal beliefs deeply rooted in the society, which are reinforced by the colonial experiences, a child born out of
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marriage is always seen as belonging to the father. Whether the child is raised by the mother alone, or with the support of her family, the father usually assumes his “natural” right of custody. Such a father might claim his child(ren) from the mother through the child(ren)’s maternal uncles and other male relatives from the mother’s side. During the negotiation process, the decision to allow the child(ren) to establish relationship with the father, to hand over or not to hand over the child(ren) to his/her biological father is the responsibility of the maternal uncles and other male relatives. The mother of the child(ren) has no say in such negotiations or decisions. Under such circumstances, a mother who wants or attempts to get involved or to argue in support of the well being of her child(ren) is usually seen as disobeying her brothers and male relatives, and dishonoring the family. Therefore, in nearly all the ethnic groups in southern Sudan, women have no right to the custody of their children. The general rule is that children from birth always belong to their father, and in the case of divorce, the children revert to their father. Younger children, for example, those still breastfeeding when divorce occurs, are usually left with their mother until they are 6 or 7 years of age and are then given to the father. Divorce process as understood in southern Sudan differs from that in northern Sudan, which is based on Shari’a, and in the West. As noted earlier, most divorce cases in southern Sudan occur in local courts administered by chiefs, where the procedure differs from that in civil courts where lawyers and judges predominate. For example, the distribution of property, the ownership of the family/marital home, child or spousal support issues are not usually addressed or taken seriously either by the courts or by the husband. When divorce occurs, it is usually the wife who is forced out of the marital home whereas the husband remains. When the divorce is settled in a local court, and when the husband is required to pay child support to the wife, some husbands ignore the issue of child support since there are no mechanisms set in place to enforce such decisions. As a result, the wife is left alone struggling to raise the children. When the husband marries another woman, the children are in most cases taken from their mother and are raised by the step-mother, a situation which creates tension between the women concerned. Similarly, because bride wealth is involved—in the form of cattle, among the cattle keepers, and cash and goats among the agriculturalists— women find it difficult to seek divorce because such a move will always trigger the return of the bride wealth by the wife’s family to the husband’s family. Therefore, to avoid divorce, members of the two families usually get involved to settle any dispute that arises between the couple. Although a man can decide to divorce his wife by his own free will, divorce is not
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usually encouraged, particularly when children are involved. As noted by Paul S. Bwogo, “[d]ivorce is rare among the Collo [or Shilluk ethnic group]. For the Collo, marriage is a social institution that must be kept intact at all cost. Therefore, divorce is not an individual decision matter, but it involves the whole extended family, which will decide whether the case at hand really warrants a divorce or not. In most cases, it is the husband who decides to divorce his wife but not the other way round.”30 Marriage Process and Polygamy Traditionally marriage is an important institution among southern Sudanese people. In general terms, marriage is the bringing of two (or more) families or clans together for peaceful coexistence. “It is a bond that is essential for sexual satisfaction, progression into manhood and womanhood, establishing relationship between clans and growth of the family.”31 Similarly, women are important as wives and mothers since their reproductive capacity is crucial to the maintenance of the husband’s lineage. Since progression into manhood and womanhood is determined by getting married and bearing children, it is common, for example, for southerners to refer to an unmarried female as a “girl” and an unmarried male as a “boy,” even if she/he is over 18 years of age.32 In other words, to become a woman and thus be respected, she must be married and must bear children. Similarly, manhood is determined by making a woman pregnant. For women “marriage meant the achievement of high status associated with being a married woman, having children and gaining respectability in the society.”33 Furthermore, marriage is usually understood in terms of a union between a man and one or more women. For instance, the Dinka family law defines marriage as a union between one man or his successor and one or more women for their lives for the purpose of sexual cohabitation, procreation of the young and maintenance of the homestead, provided that such union may take place between one barren or childless woman and another, or others [for] whom male consorts are provided; provided also that such union may take place between a deceased male person and one or more women through his successor.34
Based on this definition of marriage, it is important to clarify here that the union between a childless woman who remains in the family of her husband and another woman or women does not apply to all ethnic groups in southern Sudan. Similarly, such a union should not be interpreted as lesbianism because, “male consorts are provided” who will procreate with the woman or women who is/are in union with the childless woman. This
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point is clearly noted by Jok M. Jok who argued that “to reward the barren woman for loyal services to the family and economic contribution, she becomes a ‘social man.’ At old age, the family of her husband may marry a wife for her to whom she assigns a man to procreate. The children from this arrangement belong to the lineage of her husband.”35 According to these definitions of marriage, polygamy is a common practice among almost all ethnic groups in the south. Southern Sudan customs and traditions allow a man to marry as many wives as he can “maintain” well, that is, provide them with shelter and agricultural land particularly in rural areas. Polygamy has also been regarded as a way of displaying wealth and power. A chief or any rich and powerful man, for example, may have several wives who will share the household tasks and will provide him with children. Based on the above understanding of polygamy, one can say that the belief that a man can have multiple partners or wives is deeply rooted in people’s consciousness early in life. Many factors allow a man to prove his manliness, and they vary from one ethnic group to the other, as well as from rural to urban areas. While growing up, for instance, a young man, particularly in urban areas, who has multiple partners or girlfriends usually thinks of himself as being manly enough to have sexual relations with his partners simultaneously. Those few young men, who tend to refrain from involving in sexual relations with several women, or those who tend to restrict their relationship to only one woman, are usually seen as unmanly, or as not “real” men. It is common to hear many young men making fun of such men. During my fieldwork several interpretations were offered by some participants to justify the practice of polygamy. Most also distinguished between interpretations based on traditions, and those based on rural and urban contexts. First, in the past, especially in rural areas, polygamy was seen as a solution to societal problems. For instance, participant Ding noted that “among some Dinka people, a girl who has passed her marital age, or a woman with disability, can be married off to a man who is already married to several wives.”36 This is due to the traditional understanding that a woman remaining unmarried for a long time is usually seen as a problem, and thus a threat to the social order. The decision to remain single or unmarried is not always seen as a choice by the woman concerned, that is, whether or not it is her decision to remain unmarried. In such a situation, polygamy is seen as a solution to a social problem, as well as a way of assuring male guardianship for the woman. Second, polygamy is seen as a way of avoiding divorce and the subsequent conflict between the two families or clans involved, since divorce partly entails the return of bride wealth by the bride’s family to the groom’s
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family, particularly if there are no children. For example, as Ding argues, a “woman who is lazy, and is not taking proper care of her house, husband and in-laws, will not be divorced sometimes. Instead, her husband will decide to marry a second wife. Therefore, a woman’s success in her home is based on her activeness and hard work. Thus, a lazy woman has no place even if she is beautiful.”37 Given this understanding, a link is always established between hard work and being a good wife. Also, as I indicated earlier, in a case where a wife failed to bear children, or to bear male children in particular, a husband will decide either to marry a second wife or will engage in extramarital affairs to increase his chances of having children. The failure to bear children is always seen as the woman’s problem, not the man’s. Upon marriage, for example, a woman is expected to get pregnant within the first 3–6 months after marriage. A woman’s failure to become pregnant in a given period of time usually raises several questions and sometimes leads to a misunderstanding between husband and wife, and between the wife and her in-laws. Questions commonly asked, particularly by in-laws and relatives, include “how is the wife of so and so? Is she pregnant or not? Why is it taking long for her to get pregnant?” The childbearing burden of proof is always placed on the woman. She is usually pressured to seek treatment either through the use of local remedies as is common in rural areas or through medical advice, without even identifying whether the fertility complications are hers or not. In such situations, the man is always seen as blameless until proven otherwise. In other words, as Jok M. Jok notes, “[w]hen a year passes without pregnancy, questions are raised about the fertility of the woman, and childlessness is a target that, because of disappointment, the woman may at best be suspected of misconduct and at worst, but rarely, be divorced.”38 Third, the practice of polygamy is seen as a family planning or birth control method, and as a way of limiting husband’s extramarital sexual relationships. As Reba noted, “[i]n the past, the Dinka used to marry four to five wives just for the husband to have many children and to help the wives in birth control. In this way, the husband keeps on rotating between his wives as he wishes. This allows him to have sex continuously while the wives control their birth cycle.”39 For example, if one wife is pregnant or is breastfeeding, the husband will be with the other who is not. In other words, as William G. Blum clearly put it, “a prolonged period of sexual abstinence (from the part of a woman due to breast-feeding, pregnancy or menstruation) is sometimes cited . . . as a justification for the practice of polygyny. An additional wife would permit a man to carry on normal conjugal relations, while his other wife would be observing the particular taboos noted above.”40
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Based on the above definition of marriage and the different interpretations of polygamy provided so far, one can see that women are clearly discriminated against on many fronts. Men have the right to control women’s lives and bodies, and as a result, women are stripped of their right to define marriage and social relations on their own terms. In other words, the practice of marrying for the sole purpose of sexual cohabitation and procreation subjects women’s bodies and sexuality to male control and exploitation, without considering the health or reproductive risks that may affect women’s physical and emotional well being. In these situations, women have little say or control over their own fertility, as well as encouraging the practice of polygamy with all its forms and interpretations. Similarly, viewing polygamy as a problem-solving strategy makes it especially difficult for women to challenge and eradicate the practice completely. The Institution of Widow Inheritance Since custom allows men to have several wives, the existence of the institution of “widow inheritance,” as well as the “levirate or ghost marriage” has been common among southern Sudanese, especially in the past and in the rural areas. These practices, which are again linked to the payment of bride wealth, amplify in my view other means by which women are subjected to men’s authority and power.41 As noted by Benaiah N. Duku, “[o]nce a woman is married to a family and bride-wealth is paid, she is considered as family asset/wealth, referred to locally as tor’buti lo mede. [Thus] she has no right to desert the family when the husband dies . . . [instead she is] inherited by the deceased’s brother or cousin. For a polygamist who is old and has grown up sons, his younger wife is inherited by the elder son.”42 Similarly, among the Nyangwara ethnic group, a young widow of reproductive age is usually required by her marital family to be inherited by the deceased husband’s brother or relative to continue childbearing. Children born out of this union are regarded as the children of the deceased.43 Thus, to avoid the return of the bride wealth, which is the concern of men, or to avoid the separation of a mother from her children, a woman is subordinated to such interests. Despite the spread of Christianity in southern Sudan, and the changing social and economic situations in the south due to war, displacement, and political instability, polygamy still predominates. For instance, not all aspects of Christian marriage are strictly followed or valued, since some men who are married according to the church tradition still engage in extramarital affairs. Similarly, as Jok Madut Jok argues in his study of the
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women of western Dinka ethnic group, “[d]espite some changes in Dinka marriage patterns . . . the core of the system in the community remains the same.” He went further to argue that “Dinka is a polygamous society, with 45–60 per cent of men having more than one wife at some point in their lives.”44 Therefore, one can argue that customary law, which is rooted in the customs, traditions, and cultural practices of the southern Sudan, has contributed to the suppression of women’s view points, and their subordination and exclusion from the public arena. The pressures women experience as a result of the dictates of custom and cultural values further make many women to internalize their subordinate position. As a result, some women became reluctant to struggle for their rights or to get involved in politics, public decision-making positions, and to challenge some of the cultural practices that are oppressive to women. However, while women are discriminated against within the customary law, they still find empowerment in some aspects of the traditional cultural practices as well. For example, at old age women gain powerful positions as ritual performers, midwives, spiritual experts, and healers. Similarly, women gain respect for their role as mothers of new members of the community. On the other hand, polygamy represents another area that led to the subordination of women and their disunity. In southern Sudan, for example, polygamy is one of the major causes of domestic disputes and family problems as well as partly contributing to a lack of solidarity among women at the community level. Struggle over a husband’s limited financial support and emotional attention makes co-wives resentful of each other. Such resentment, which results from an unequal distribution of financial assistance, land, and other favors, sometimes pushes women to engage in practices such as witchcraft with an aim of winning the heart of the husband. Some women in nonpolygamous families might also engage in such practices to prevent the husband from the possibility of engaging in extramarital sexual relationships, or from marrying another wife. It is still common in the south, especially in urban areas, to see both married and unmarried women seeking the services of a fortune-teller who they believe is able to foresee the direction of one’s marriage or relationship.45 Because of the economic pressures facing families, as well as the spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, polygamy as an institution for solving social problems has long lost its meaning. As a result, polygamy and extramarital affairs are seen as risks to the health and well being of the family. For instance, the AIDS epidemic has made married women both inside Sudan and in exile more concerned about their family’s well being, health, and livelihood due to the threat of second wives, or husbands’ infidelity.46
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PART TWO Resettlement Program and Its Implication for Many Aspects of Refugee Lives In addition to uprootedness and economic pressures that led to the alteration of many cultural practices among southern Sudanese refugees, the resettlement program designed for refugees in Cairo has further accelerated the process of altering some traditions and cultural practices of the southern Sudanese society. Some of the most affected cultural practices include the patterns and meaning of marriage, and the unity of the institution of the family. Deteriorating conditions in the Middle East region, particularly in Sudan, led the UNHCR Cairo office to promote a resettlement program, both as an instrument of protection and as a durable solution for the refugees living in Egypt.47 The limited prospects for local integration into Egypt, particularly for southern Sudanese, have made resettlement the best option.48 According to the UNHCR official I interviewed, the main reason to recommend resettlement as a solution for a large number of people is the lack of opportunities in which “a refugee can build for himself/ herself life in Egypt. In addition, there are already economic problems in Egypt that means it is not always easy to find a job anywhere.” As a protection and durable solution, resettlement poses many challenges to both the refugees and some of the international organizations and church groups dealing with the refugees in Cairo. In the following pages I illustrate how the resettlement program contributed to changes in many aspects of the refugees’ lives. These aspects include, among others, the patterns and meaning of marriage, the issue of idafa (i.e., addition or inclusion of a partner in the file of someone who is recognized by the UNHCR), and the different interpretations attached to it, the unity of the family, and the challenges facing polygamous families. Focusing on these aspects is necessary because they are the ones most affected by the resettlement process, and the most demanding to the resettling countries. Also, it is within these areas that negotiations and tensions among women and between women and men occur. Changing Patterns and Meaning of Marriage As noted earlier in this chapter, marriage in the past was viewed as the knitting together of two families or clans for a peaceful coexistence. Marriage is also regarded as important for the continuity of the man’s lineage and expansion of his clan through procreation. However, due to war, displacement, and the changing circumstances in exile, such as resettlement, the
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patterns and meaning of marriage have changed. Madawi Al-Racheed in his study of exiled Iraqi women in London showed how “exile leads to the reconstruction of the meaning of marriage which in their minds becomes associated with security, family life and stability in general,”49 rather than with the achievement of high status. Such a situation applies to the situation of southern Sudanese women refugees in exile and inside Sudan as well. In the war-affected areas in Sudan, and in the refugee camps in the neighboring countries of Kenya and Uganda, where security of women, especially was and is at risk, marriage has become more associated with security and protection. To protect their daughters from rape or sexual abuse by rebel and/or government armed forces, or to reduce economic pressure on the family, for instance, many parents in the war zone during the “north-south” conflict have given up their daughters for marriage at a younger age. Similarly, in Cairo where refugees were pursuing resettlement to a third country as the only suitable option for overcoming their suffering, marriage has increasingly become associated with material gain, personal interest, and the possibility of getting out of Cairo. This situation has been reflected in the increasing number of marriages, mostly through the idafa of one partner in the file of the other who is already recognized by the UNHCR and was either being processed or in the process for resettlement. Stories from relatives and friends already resettled either in North America or in Europe suggested that men especially need a partner if they wish to make a strong case for resettlement. According to many refugees, if one migrates as a single man, it will be more expensive to sponsor a wife from Sudan or Egypt; therefore, it is wise to personally look for the right spouse before emigrating.50 Such stories have encouraged many of the refugee men planning to migrate to look for wives before leaving. Because of the lengthy status determination procedure at the UNHCR, as well as the uncertainty involved in such a procedure, idafa has become the fasttrack option for both women and men who are not recognized as refugees and are in dire need to leave Egypt. Different interpretations were given by participants regarding the issue of idafa and the resulting increase in the number of marriages among refugees. The participants provided three possible explanations as to why idafa occurs. The first explanation is that there are those refugees who include partners in their UNHCR files based on their previous romantic relations, and their determination to get married and establish a family. In such cases, resettlement is not seen as the main factor behind their decision to get married. Second, some women or men who are recognized by the UNHCR tend to add either their male relatives or friends as husbands or wives just to get
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them out of Cairo. In such cases, idafa is seen as a good gesture by those including a name in their file. Inclusion of a relative or a friend as a husband or a wife (which is very rare) occurs, because, as Ani argues, “[i]t is unwise to go to the UNHCR and say that this is my cousin, brother/sister or nephew [who is 18 years or older, and is rejected or waiting to have his/her status determined] and I want him/her included in my file.”51 This is because the UNHCR policy clearly states that those family members who are 18 years or older must apply on their own, independently of their parents. Since married partners are required to provide a marriage certificate or other documents as proof of their marriage, many refugees resort to the church or some refugee community organizations to obtain a “certificate of traditional marriage.” Upon arrival in the resettling country, the couple believe such marriage will cease to exist, and each partner goes his/her separate way. However, the implication of such arrangement is that, when the couple arrive at their final destinations, such as Canada, United States of America, or Australia, and each goes his/her own way, the burden of paying back travel expenses to the resettling government or the sponsor rests with the principal applicant, which in most cases is the woman. Similarly, some women refugees are encouraged to include male relatives or friends in their files, to facilitate their lives in the new country, because some of the women refugees who have been resettled or are being processed for resettlement have no knowledge of the English language which is the main language of most of the resettling countries. According to the leader of the zaituna community organization I interviewed [s]ome of the women from our community do not know English. When they arrived in America they found themselves in trouble due to lack of language. To address this problem, it was suggested that those single women who are recognized by the UNHCR should include men in their files and migrate together. When they agree, the community organization looks for young men who know English and single women who do not know English to include them in their files. The women have the right to choose whom they want to include.
In this way, idafa is seen as a way of helping someone out of a difficult situation. However, it was noted by many participants that such cases are very few as compared to the third possibility. The third interpretation of idafa is based purely on selfish interests and is in most cases regarded by many participants as exploitative in nature. In this situation, most of those who enter into such an agreement either have no previous knowledge of each other or have no past romantic relationship. According to an official of the IOM I interviewed, “[t]here are cases of people who got married [through idafa] and you really can see that they
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have never stayed together. This is because, during the interviews conducted with refugees referred from the UNHCR to our office, such partners either keep quiet or they argue differently and we really find that they have not been together.” Based on the above narrative, clearly the only reason the two entered into such a marriage was to get out of Egypt. Some participants view all the circumstances within which idafa occurs exploitative, particularly in the third interpretation and especially for those women who include men in their files. According to Ani, “[w]hen a woman is accepted by the UNHCR, many men will approach her and they will start talking about marrying her, even though the idea of marriage was not there before she was accepted.”52 Given that it is human nature for people to talk about what is going on in their lives, it is not surprising that southern Sudanese refugees talk with their friends about the circumstances that led them to be included in someone’s file. Many participants believe that many men who seek idafa into women’s files are just exploiting women without even appreciating the generosity and the help that these women have offered them. The following conversation between two men that Ani overheard illustrates the complexities within the idafa issue. Ani narrates: One day I was sitting in the SPLM/A office. Then a man came in. He was coming I think to process a marriage certificate or some document. Then the man in the office asked him, “[i]s the woman accepted by the UNHCR?” Then he replied, “[o]f course, if she is not accepted do you think I will accept to marry her?” I was really angry with his reply. From this conversation it is clear to me that men always exploit us women because we have better chances to get someone out of Cairo to the peaceful land.53
The above narrative was echoed by many participants and it reflected the general view held by southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo about how men exploit idafa. Despite this general view held by refugees, however, one can still argue that exploiting idafa is not only one sided since there were also some single men who were recognized as refugees and have included single women trying to get resettled in their files. Stories and rumors move back and forth between Cairo and North America or Europe, either through the Internet, telephone, or letters. Refugees in Cairo who have friends or relatives resettled abroad have more information about what is going on abroad than they did formerly. Stories about broken families, separation, and divorce cases among southern Sudanese refugees in the United States of America or Canada, for example, are well known among refugees in Cairo. Therefore, during my discussion with participants about the issue of idafa, many of them attributed the breakdown of families and marriages abroad to the shaky grounds on which these marriages were based. As noted by Ani, “[t]here are so many
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problems in families that migrated from Cairo to America. When they arrive there problems will start. This is because their intention was not to get married in the first place. Instead they just got married because one of them wanted to be included in the file of the other for resettlement.”54 However, it must be noted that not only those families or marriages that were established through idafa that broke up in the resettling countries, but also those that existed long before resettlement that have disintegrated in the West, including some couples who have been together for more than fifteen years. Therefore, attributing the breakdown of marriage solely to idafa would be incorrect. Circumstances in their newly adopted country have also certainly contributed to these break-ups. Based on the above analysis, one can argue that, whether through idafa or through culturally accepted ways of conducting marriage, the resettlement program has contributed to the steady increase in the number of marriages in Egypt. This increase has been reflected in the church records of marriages conducted in the church, as well as applications filed for a “certificate of traditional marriages” from 1995 to 2001, I reviewed.55 For example, during this period there were 219 marriages conducted in al-mughadas and kamalia churches as compared to the 6 marriages in the two churches in Cairo from 1990 to 1994. There were 559 applications filed for certificate of traditional marriages and approved by al-mughadas church from 1995 to 2001 as compared to only 1 application from 1990 to 1994.56 Besides these, there are those marriages that are conducted outside of the church, where marriage documents are obtained from other legal sources. In order to process a certificate of traditional marriage through al-mughadas church, for example, the concerned parties have to file an application form to the parish priest in charge. The application must be supported by photocopies of the man’s and the woman’s passports, the passports of two witnesses for both the man and the woman, and any other document that is regarded as significant. The application is then put up on the church notice board for all members to see. If the church authority does not receive a complaint objecting to the union of the two people from any one in the refugee community after two weeks from the date of the posting of the notice regarding the applicants, then the priest will issue the certificate. However, for it to be valid, the certificate must be signed and stamped by three authorities: the Foreign Ministry of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Bishop of the Catholic Church in Egypt, and the Cairo Security Municipal office. It is the responsibility of the applicants to undertake all these procedures. According to the priest of al-mughadas church dealing with Sudanese refugees in Cairo, the increase in marriages can be attributed to both the increase in the number of refugees as well as to the resettlement program. He went on to argue that “many young people have come to the church
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to get certificates without the knowledge of their families. They just want to get married. What they call Moudo al idafa [i.e., the issue of idafa] sometimes drives people crazy. Some people who are in the process of resettlement will try to squeeze in someone, and they do crazy things for this, and this is what is happening.” Therefore, it can also be argued that resettlement has led to the alteration of many culturally accepted ways of conducting marriages. Family background and the family’s social position in the society, which were once measures for acceptance of marriage, have become irrelevant when women marry across ethnic and racial lines, as they tend increasingly to do in Cairo. Similarly, marriage certification and legal registration of marriage have become important compared to a marriage’s recognition only by the families involved, as it was the case in the past. The marriage certificate has also gained significance because applying for resettlement in a third country requires certified marriage documents as proof that the applicants are really married. The absence of elderly or close family members in Egypt has led many marriages to be witnessed by distant relatives, friends, and the church. Since securing money, goats, or cattle for bride wealth payment has become very difficult in Cairo, bride wealth was negotiated and an agreement signed between the parties involved, indicating that the issue of bride wealth will be settled when peace prevails in Sudan. Unity of the Family The family is considered one of the most significant social, cultural, and economic institutions in southern Sudan. Therefore, maintaining family unity is necessary. However, due to war, displacement, and the resettlement program, the unity of the family is threatened. As noted earlier, the main purpose of the resettlement program in Cairo was not to separate family members or to disrupt relationships, but to maintain the unity of the family for the betterment of its members. However, the ways in which some refugees have pursued resettlement have proven disruptive to family cohesion and survival. As is explained in chapter 6 of this book, the desperate economic situation in which southern Sudanese refugees lived and continue to live has forced many of them to pursue, and to engage in, practices that are threatening to family unity. Since resettlement to a third country represents a “lasting solution” to their problems, both men and women have pursued different ways and means of how to get resettled. As I noted in the introduction, the majority of married women refugees in Cairo are only there with their children, whereas their husbands remain in Sudan, waiting to follow when the wife’s application has been processed by the UNHCR
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and she awaits an interview. However, circumstances in Cairo and the inability of some husbands to come from Sudan and join their wives have forced some women refugees to abandon their husbands who were still in Sudan, remarry, then leave for resettlement. Others just process their case at the UNHCR with the children without including the husband in the file. According to an IOM official I interviewed, “[s]ome women who are single mothers here [in Cairo] and their husbands are in Sudan, influenced by such stories that in America, for example, one can easily get a job, they begin to process divorce papers and begin adding new husbands. So there are some husbands who ended up divorced in absentia and the wives marrying new husbands.” The availability of Egyptian lawyers who are willing to process divorce papers for those women and men refugees seeking divorce have facilitated the process. Some participants noted that some women refugees go to these Egyptian lawyers to seek divorce. They usually explain to the lawyers that their husbands’ whereabouts is not known, and that they have not seen them for several years. Since the services offered by these lawyers are not free, some women refugees ended up paying up to LE500.00 (approximately US$125) in legal fees to obtain divorce papers. The UNHCR office in Cairo has also confirmed this fact. According to the UNHCR official I interviewed, “[i]f a person has not seen a spouse for five years, we have been working with Egyptian lawyers and there are ways now of, in fact, documenting if they have not seen the spouse and if they have divorced through a court system. Because people do have the right to marry and so in fact the card to resettlement is an incentive to try to abuse the system sometimes.” As noted earlier in this chapter, idafa or adding a spouse in one’s file at the UNHCR requires valid legal documents as proof of the relationship. To meet such requirements, many refugees have resorted to the church or community organizations to obtain such documents. As the UNHCR official said, the “UNHCR is not as legalistic as some resettling countries. [So] if relations exist, that is, common law, religious or traditional, and are proven, we tend to be inclusive. [However], it is difficult to combine being inclusive, giving the benefit of the resettlement program with relationships where we end up adding spouses to people who are already married.” Therefore, to minimize or avoid refugees’ chances of abusing the system, the UNHCR has become very cautious when evaluating and reviewing people’s cases for resettlement. Similarly, al-mughadas church priest responsible for processing marriage certificates further noted that the church has created a computer database for documenting all cases of marriage certificates processed by the church. According to him, this measure has been taken because some refugees have attempted to obtain certificates by using documents of other people who have been granted marriage certificates already.
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On the other hand, there are some men who find that maintaining a wife and children in Cairo was not possible given their desperate economic situation, or the status of their applications at the UNHCR. For example, in cases of rejection and closing of a file at the UNHCR, many men leave their wives and children and look for another single woman so as to avoid responsibility. Some of these men may decide to be added on a file of a single woman who is already recognized by the UNHCR, effectively abandoning their wives and children. Saki, one of the participants, related this story: “There was a man living in our area who, left his wife and six children some days ago and is now staying with another elderly woman.”57 Some men, due to reasons known only to them, will also decide to marry a second wife, add the children of the first wife secretly without the knowledge of the mother and leave for resettlement taking the children with him without their mother. Most of those men who do so are themselves recognized by the UNHCR. There are some women also who think of leaving their children and husbands, looking for single men who are recognized by the UNHCR to be added in their files. However, according to Saki, “[m]ost of the time, it is men who abandon their children, but it is difficult for a mother to leave her children to an unrelated person. Those women who leave their children are not thinking well.”58 All these practices, which are done for the sake of resettlement, have led to the break-up of families and have increased the frequency of divorce, separation, and the abandonment of children. Polygamy and Resettlement Polygamous families are also affected by the resettlement program. According to the UNHCR Cairo office, polygamy is not their concern. For example, a UNHCR staff member cannot tell men that they cannot marry more than one wife. However, the UNHCR mandate is about maintaining family unity, protecting refugees, and considering the best interests of minors. Acting in accordance with its mandate, the UNHCR Cairo office usually does not refer polygamists for resettlement to countries where polygamy is not permitted. As the UNHCR official I interviewed put it, “[v]ery often a man typically might intimidate an older wife into giving him custody of the children and the older wife can be left behind. It is not in keeping with our mandate concerning, or the principle of, the unity of the family, [that] you should force a man to choose between his two wives and take one of them, and leave the other one without his protection.” However, as noted earlier, the main refugee resettling countries are the United States, Canada, Australia, and lately Finland. Since the laws of these countries do not allow for the practice of polygamy, polygamists are usually
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faced with the challenge of how to pursue resettlement in these countries, while keeping their families intact. This challenge can force a man to choose between his wives, and thus pit one wife against the other, which usually puts the first wife in a disadvantageous position. To avoid problems and misunderstandings, sometimes members of a polygamous family will opt to apply for resettlement separately. For instance, the husband will apply with one wife [usually the second wife] and her children, and the other wife will apply as a single mother. Or in other cases, the first wife is included in the husband’s file as a sister. But since she is an adult, her case is processed separately from the husband. However, such arrangements are very rare, and their success depends on the level of cooperation and understanding between the people involved. Sometimes those who attempted such arrangements ended up being resettled in different countries. Or in some instances, where similarities between cases are detected by officials of the resettling country (e.g., similarities in children’s last names), the cases of both applicants will be closed, and thus they all lose their chance of being resettled. Although many refugees, particularly men, have secretly processed their resettlement cases without the knowledge of the first wife, such actions do not always pass unnoticed. Sometimes secrets are revealed, which usually leads to conflicts that threaten the very process of resettlement. For example, some women, upon learning that their husbands are in the process of resettling with another woman, will report the case immediately to the UNHCR. This in turn will lead to the reevaluation of the case, and if proven otherwise, the man and his “new” wife will be banned from resettling. When I asked how some first wives learn about what their husbands were doing, and about the UNHCR policies relating to polygamous families, Mama replied as follows: Sometimes a friend will inform you about the laws relating to issues of polygamy. At times some women are not aware that their husbands are having extra-marital affairs. So those women who knew will inform her of what is going on. Some of the women who are familiar with the UNHCR laws have been working with the UNHCR office while in Sudan so they know that. Such women usually advise women who are having such problems to go to the UNHCR to explain their situation because the UNHCR follows the human rights standard. When the UNHCR becomes aware of the case, the couple concerned will be called for the review of their case. Depending on the circumstances, sometimes the UNHCR will cancel the husband’s case, schedule an interview with the first wife, and at the end she will be the one going for resettlement. There are so many women who are now living with their children only. The husband, because of shame, will decide to leave.59
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In some cases, some men who attempted to abandon their wives had applied to the UNHCR for resettlement, whereby they included their wives and children in their file, but afterward decided to abandon the wife and add a new wife instead. Others never included their wives or children in the application form when applying for the UNHCR. The purpose might be to process his own application and leave without his wife and children. In some cases, the woman is the main applicant. All these practices in my view challenge the unity and stability of the family unit. According to the UNHCR official I interviewed, many cases of abandonment, separation, or divorce exist. As she explains it, [t]here were cases where there is a real divorce, and then we can’t penalise the man. We have cases where maybe there is a woman who really wants to hurt her ex-husband. You can have many different motives. And we do have other cases where either a man or a woman is less truthful . . . it is really difficult because first of all people want to be resettled and they will not be forthcoming about having more than one wife. And so we are very, very careful in our questioning, and examining case composition. So if there is more than one mother involved, we don’t let one mother be left behind.
To conclude, despite the fact that resettlement is viewed by the UNHCR and the refugees as the suitable solution to the problems faced by refugees in Egypt, the ways and means through which it was pursued by refugees have turned it into a disruptive program, not only to families but also to people’s lives. As families separate and divorces occur people’s feelings and emotions are hurt. Where children are involved, they usually pay the price of being caught between the struggling parents and thus face serious consequences. Despite the fact that many refugees are in a desperate financial situation, because of the legal fees associated with obtaining legal documents, some of them will sacrifice what little money they have to process divorce papers to facilitate the resettlement process at the expense of both their children and their own well being. Although refugees might have high expectations about the prospects of improving their situations in the resettling country, sometimes their dreams will not be realized, given the fact that in the new setting they are faced with new and different challenges as well.
CHAPTER 6 SUDANESE REFUGEES AND THE CHALLENGES OF LIFE IN CAIRO
PART ONE This chapter addresses two important issues. In part one, the chapter briefly outlines some of the main problems and challenges encountered by southern Sudanese refugees in Cairo. These problems include, but are not limited to, obstacles to refugee children’s education; youth and children’s deviation from culturally accepted behavior1; housing; and cases of rejection and closure of files by the UNHCR, and the impact of that on refugees’ lives. Identifying these challenges allows for the analysis of how refugees respond to them. In part two, the chapter deals with the role of international organizations—particularly the UNHCR, the IOM, church groups, and community organizations—and how they handle the refugee situation in Cairo. In this part, I focus on the objectives, programs, and activities of these institutions, as well as the difficulties they encounter in dealing with the refugees. Obstacles to Children’s Education UNHCR policy on refugees in urban areas promotes self-reliance among refugees through education and training programs. This policy was adopted and was the priority of the UNHCR Cairo office during the late 1970s and 1980s. However, in the 1990s, with the increasing numbers of refugees from Somalia, Sudan, and other countries, the focus shifted from education and training to care and maintenance. This shift, as well as UNHCR’s reduction in funding for education, has reduced the likelihood of those children recognized by UNHCR to obtain a proper basic education.2 Besides the cutbacks in UNHCR funding for education, many other factors combine to create a major obstacle to refugee children’s education.
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First, it was practically very difficult for southern Sudanese refugee children to enroll in Egyptian public schools. According to a UNHCR Cairo office official I interviewed, refugee children are allowed to attend Egyptian public schools since December 2000. However, the entry process to these schools is not easy. In order to enroll in these schools, children are required to provide documents from their previous school, an ighama (i.e., resident permit), and a birth certificate.3 However, given the fact that many of the refugee children who arrived from Sudan in the late 1990s were coming from IDP camps in Khartoum, obtaining school documents or birth certificates might represent a great challenge. Similarly, there is the practical difficulty of literally finding a place in Egyptian public schools, which are quite crowded. As well, it is difficult to place children in the proper grade. To do so would require that the child make up for the work he or she has missed. Also, a southern Sudanese child would find