The Anthology in Jewish Literature
David Stern, Editor
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Anthology in Jewish Literature
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The Anthology in Jewish Literature
David Stern, Editor
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Anthology in Jewish Literature
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The Anthology in Jewish Literature
Edited by David Stern
1 2004
1 Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sa˜o Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto
Copyright 䉷 2004 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The anthology in Jewish literature / edited by David Stern. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. Contents: Ancient Israel and classical Judaism, Anthology in the Torah and the question of Deuteronomy / Jeffrey Tigay—Wisdom and the anthological temper / James Kugel—Order, sequence, and selection: the Mishnah’s anthological choices / Yaakov Elman—Anthological dimensions of the Babylonian Talmud / Eliezer Segal— Anthology and polysemy in classical midrash / David Stern—The Middle Ages. The prayerbook (siddur) as an anthology of Judaism / Joseph Tabory—Yalqut Shimoni and the medieval midrashic anthology / Jacob Elbaum— The Hebrew narrative in the Middle Ages / Eli Yassif—Midrash rabbah and the medieval collector mentality / Marc Bregman—The modern period. Homo anthologicus: Micha Joseph Berdyczewski and the anthological genre / Zipora Kagan—Sefer haaggadah: creating a classic anthology / Mark Kiel—The ingathering of traditions: Zionism’s anthology project / Israel Bartal—Gender and the anthological tradition in modern Yiddish poetry / Kathryn Hellerstein—Our poetry is like an orange grove: anthologies of Hebrew poetry in Eretz-Yisrael / Hannan Hever— Anthologizing the vernacular: collections of Yiddish literature in English translation / Jeffrey Shandler— Textualizing the tales of the People of the Book: folk narrative anthologies and national identity in modern Israel / Galit Hasan-Rokem—The Holocaust according to its anthologists / David Roskies. ISBN 0-19-513751-5 1. Jewish literature—History and criticism. 2. Anthologies. 3. Rabbinical literature—History and criticism. 4. Judaism—Literary collections—History. 5. Jews—Literary collections—History. I. Stern, David, 1949– PN842 .A58 2004 808.8'98924—dc22. 2003061137 2 4 6 8 9 7 5 3 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
Acknowledgments
his book began as a workshop entitled, “The Anthological Ontology in Hebrew
TLiterature,” held in May 1995 under the auspices of the Porter Institute of Tel Aviv University and with the special encouragement of its director at the time,
Ziva ben Porat. Some of the papers from that workshop along with numerous others appeared as three special issues of the journal Prooftexts: A Journal of Jewish Literary History (17:1 [January 1997], 17:2 [May 1997], and 19:1 [January 1999]). I especially want to thank Alan Mintz and David Roskies, the editors of Prooftexts, for lending the journal’s support and resources to the topic. A special acknowledgment of gratitude goes to Cynthia Read, our editor at Oxford, for both her support and her patience; to Robert Milks and Theo Calderara for overseeing a complicated process of publication; and to Patricia Wright for her extremely discerning eye for detail. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude that even an anthology of thanks could not convey to Kathryn Hellerstein, my beloved, and to our children, Rebecca and Jonah, for their constant inspiration and for allowing me occasionally to use the computer.
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Contents
Contributors ix 1. The Anthology in Jewish Literature: An Introduction
3
David Stern
I. ANCIENT ISRAEL AND CLASSICAL JUDAISM 2.
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy
15
Jeffrey H. Tigay
3.
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper
32
James Kugel
4.
Order, Sequence, and Selection: The Mishnah’s Anthological Choices 53
5.
Anthological Dimensions of the Babylonian Talmud
Yaakov Elman
81
Eliezer Segal
6.
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash
108
David Stern
II. THE MIDDLE AGES 7.
The Prayerbook (Siddur) as an Anthology of Judaism
143
Joseph Tabory
8.
Yalqut Shimoni and the Medieval Midrashic Anthology
159
Jacob Elbaum
9.
The Hebrew Narrative Anthology in the Middle Ages
176
Eli Yassif
10.
Midrash Rabbah and the Medieval Collector Mentality Marc Bregman
vii
196
viii Contents
III. THE MODERN PERIOD 11.
Homo Anthologicus: Micha Joseph Berdyczewski and the Anthological Genre 211
12.
Sefer Haaggadah: Creating a Classic Anthology 226
13.
The Ingathering of Traditions: Zionism’s Anthology Projects
Zipora Kagan Mark W. Kiel
244
Israel Bartal
14.
Gender and the Anthological Tradition in Modern Yiddish Poetry 259
15.
“Our Poetry Is Like an Orange Grove”: Anthologies of Hebrew Poetry in Eretz Yisrael 281
16.
Anthologizing the Vernacular: Collections of Yiddish Literature in English Translation 304
17.
Textualizing the Tales of the People of the Book: Folk Narrative Anthologies and National Identity in Modern Israel 324
18.
The Holocaust According to Its Anthologists 335
Kathryn Hellerstein
Hannan Hever
Jeffrey Shandler
Galit Hasan-Rokem David G. Roskies
Contributors
Israel Bartal is Avraham Harman Professor of Modern Jewish History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Marc Bregman is Professor of Rabbinic Literature, Hebrew Union College, Jewish Institute of Religion, Jerusalem, Israel. Jacob Elbaum is Professor of Hebrew Literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Yaakov Elman is Associate Professor of Judaic Studies in the Bernard Revel Graduate School, Yeshiva University. James Kugel is Meisler Professor of Bible at Bar Ilan University. Galit Hasan-Rokem is Max and Margarethe Grunwald Professor of Folklore at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Kathryn Hellerstein is Ruth Meltzer Senior Lecturer in Yiddish Language and Literature and Jewish Studies at the University of Pennslyvania. Hannan Hever is Professor of Hebrew Literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Zipora Kagan is Professor of Hebrew Literature Emeritus at Haifa University. Mark W. Kiel is Rabbi at Congregation Bnai Israel in Emerson, New Jersey. David G. Roskies is Sol and Evelyn Henkind Professor of Yiddish Literature at The Jewish Theological Seminary. Eliezer Segal is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Calgary, Canada. Jeffrey Shandler is an assistant professor in the Department of Jewish Studies at Rutgers University.
ix
x Contributors David Stern is Ruth Meltzer Professor of Classical Hebrew Literature at the University of Pennslyvania. Joseph Tabory is a professor in the Talmud Department of Bar Ilan, incumbent of the Zoltan and Lya Gaspar Chair for Talmudic Studies. Jeffrey H. Tigay is A. M. Ellis Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Languages and Literatures at the University of Pennsylvania. Eli Yassif is professor of Hebrew Literature at Tel-Aviv University.
The Anthology in Jewish Literature
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1 david stern
The Anthology in Jewish Literature An Introduction
rom the Talmud to the latest collection of contemporary American Jewish
Fwriters in your local bookstore window, the anthology has been a pervasive, ubiquitous presence in Jewish literature throughout its history. The anthology may also be its oldest literary genre—if, that is, one accepts the documentary hypothesis, according to which the Pentateuch is a collection from different literary sources. Even if one does not accept the thesis, it is clear that many biblical books either are themselves collections, such as the books of Psalms or Proverbs, or tend to exhibit what might be called the “anthological habit”—that is, the tendency of gathering together discrete, sometimes conflicting retellings of stories or traditions (e.g., the two versions of the creation of woman, or analogous lists of unrelated commandments and miscellaneous laws) and preserving them side by side as though there were no difference, conflict, or ambiguity between them. Eventually, of course, this tendency assumes its full shape in the many explicit anthologies, or anthology-like works, that populate later Jewish literature. Among these are almost all the canonical texts of the rabbinic period, including the Mishnah and the Tosefta, the classical midrash collections, the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds, and the siddur (prayerbook) and its offshoots, including the Passover Haggadah. Subsequently, in the Middle Ages the anthology continues to hold its prominent position in the literary spectrum. In addition to the many summae of the classical rabbinic heritage that are compiled throughout the medieval period, the anthology becomes a primary medium for the recording of stories, poems, and interpretations of classical texts original to the period. Finally, in the modern age the anthological genre is transformed into a decisive instrument for cultural retrieval and re-creation, not only in such classic works as Sefer Haaggadah and Mimekor Yisrael but also in innumerable works of the early Zionist project and in modern Yiddish literature. No less important, the anthology has played an indispensable role in the creation of significant fields of research in Jewish studies, including midrash, Hebrew poetry, folklore, and popular culture. And yet, despite the ubiquity of the anthological presence in Jewish literature 3
4 The Anthology in Jewish Literature
and its centrality to that tradition, the genre has hardly been recognized, let alone studied or analyzed. As a literary form, the anthology has typically been shrugged off as the slightest of genres, “a hodgepodge of this and that,” as one well-spoken scholar in the field has put it. This neglect of the genre is not unique to Jewish literary studies. In general literary studies, the anthology has hardly been noted, at least until recently, and even today, when it has become a subject of some critical discussion, that is almost exclusively for its significance for canon formation. This volume hopes to redress this neglect by presenting essays that treat exemplary anthologies in Jewish literature throughout its history and significant moments in the evolution and development of the genre. Among the works treated here are many of the classical foundational texts of Jewish literature. Alongside these canonical works, however, are a number of lesser-known but no less significant works that equally, and sometimes even more revealingly, show how the anthology has played a formative role in the history of Jewish literature and culture. In selecting the primary texts to be treated in these essays under the anthological rubric, I have more or less kept to the dictionary definition of the term as “a collection of choice literary extracts,” although one might quibble with the use of the word “choice,” and I have not limited myself in any way to conventionally literary—that is, belletristic—sources. Surely one of the more striking signs of the genre’s significance in Jewish literature is the fact that, at one point or another, there has been an anthological composition for virtually every discipline and field in the Jewish intellectual and literary heritage. But as the essays in this volume demonstrate, the definition of the form is hardly settled; what is called an anthology is still open to redefinition. In addition to conventional anthologies, I have included such works as the Talmud—even though it may resemble an encyclopedia more than an anthology—precisely because it was a collaborative project that programmatically preserved and systematically collated the traditions of earlier generations. In fact, for such works as the Talmud, which are generically “problematic” precisely because they do not fit neatly into any of the familiar literary genres, the category of the anthology provides an extraordinarily useful heuristic tool for defining literary identity. I have not, in any case, allowed the strict definition of the term to delimit or discourage exploration of the anthology’s generic possibilities. As the essays in this volume repeatedly show, the Jewish anthology has taken numerous forms and played many different roles; all in all, it has shown itself to be far richer and more flexible than anyone might initially suppose. Furthermore, precisely because its features may appear so antithetical to many of our usual assumptions about literary form, authorship, and genre formation, the anthology offers a splendid opportunity to test and expose the boundaries of our conceptions about literature. Although it is customary in an introduction of this sort for the editor to offer a kind of summary of the essays that follow, it may be more worthwhile here— because of the absence of an existing “theory” of the anthology—to offer some prefatory remarks on significant theoretical issues that are raised by the subject of the anthology in Jewish literature.1 Of these, there are at least five worth mentioning.
An Introduction 5
The first is the anthology’s own literary form. Although this would seem to be an obvious fact, it is important to acknowledge that not all anthologies collect and organize their contents identically. One needs to distinguish, for example, between compilations in which the editor or compiler chooses relatively small units of preexisting material and then recombines and revises them to create essentially new compositions, and anthologies that consist of larger blocks of material that the editors have not tampered with but simply combined with other large blocks, sometimes even with entire works so as to form what are in effect small libraries.2 (In contrast, the Hebrew Bible, which analogously combines whole books, is a large library.) This is a useful distinction, but it is not entirely adequate, since even anthologies that simply present texts “as they really are” (to paraphrase Ranke) can radically alter and shape their readers’ reception and understanding of their contents according to how they are placed within the anthological context. For example, a poem by Bialik juxtaposed with a Rabbinic aggadah will have a different meaning than when it is juxtaposed with another poem by Tchernichowsky. Unlike beauty, which lies in the eyes of its beholder, the meaning of an anthologized text always lies in the mind of its compiler. Or to put the same point in more jargon-laden terms, there is no anthological organization devoid of an ideological orientation. In the anthology, literary form, organization, even sequence, are all ideological subjects.3 A second distinction one might make in regard to literary form is that between “explicit” and “implicit” anthologies—that is, works that present themselves overtly as collections of preexisting sources and traditions, like the classical midrashic collections, and those that don’t, like certain books in the Bible or the Talmud or some medieval collections of narratives or even a modern work like Louis Ginzberg’s Legends of the Jews, a monument of twentieth-century Jewish scholarship that retells the biblical narrative by reweaving nearly every strand of extrabiblical lore its author could gather into a single narrative cloth.4 Whether to consider these last examples under the formal rubric of the anthology is less crucial than to recognize those elements in them that have been shaped by the collecting-andpreserving needs of the anthological habit. The “explicit” anthologies, on the other hand, may profitably be viewed as forming a kind of continuum along whose trajectory we might characterize different works by the strength of their principle of selection. Accordingly, one might distinguish between an “archive,” which claims to have no significant principle of selection except for the wish to preserve material; a “collection,” which is determined by a clear and acknowledged principle of selection although the sheer desire for preservation still remains its primary motivation; and an “anthology proper,” in which a very strong principle of selection regardless of desire for preservation is the operative criterion of inclusion. These gradations in anthological “strength” are only a small indication of the varieties of anthologies, and of the different kinds of choices and decisions that stand behind the historical genre. But what, then, are the primary principles of selection that have historically determined the genre? Is it possible to discern explicit, or even implicit, conventions according to which anthologists have dealt with their materials? Do these conventions or principles themselves form a tradi-
6
The Anthology in Jewish Literature
tion that is in any way continuous? And how has the anthology as a literary genre changed, and to what extent have those changes been shaped by the gentile, nonJewish host cultures in the many lands of the Diaspora in which nearly all Jewish anthologies were composed until the Zionist renaissance in the modern period? The study of the anthology as a literary genre leads to the second issue raised by the genre, namely, the study of the “anthologist” and “editor” or “redactor” as a literary agent and persona in his own right, and the mechanics of anthologizing. How have anthologies actually been produced? What have been their compositional and publication histories? What causes and motives have led their authors to compile them, and how have the editors looked upon what they have done? How have the processes of their production related to the nature of the material collected, that is, the politics of anthologizing? Have Jewish anthologies in different cultural centers and historical periods been influenced by comparable models or processes in the non-Jewish host culture? In responding to these questions, scholarship in other areas of Jewish studies and related fields often proves helpful. For example, Bible scholarship has long concerned itself with the processes of redaction, and some of it has touched upon questions related to the anthologizing process.5 In a different vein, contemporary scholarship on Jewish manuscript culture in the Middle Ages and on the history of the Jewish book in the early age of printing has demonstrated the often highly creative and formative role that scribes, correctors, and early printers played not only in silently transmitting Jewish texts and their traditions as passive agents of intellectual commerce, but in actively shaping the contents and forms of those texts and traditions and thereby determining the ways in which they were read and disseminated.6 The editors and anthologists of Jewish literature were no less creative and formative; indeed, even such seemingly passive acts as the decision to copy several discrete texts within a single codex—which may be considered a rudimentary form of the anthology— may have given shape to a major moment of literary history, as we are just now beginning to understand. What, then, can we learn from our anthologies about their often anonymous creators, and what can such knowledge about anthologizers and editors teach us about Jewish literary culture? The question of the anthologist/editor brings us to the third issue of interest raised by the genre of the anthology, namely, its function. Surely the most (and often the only) discussed aspect of the anthology has been its role as a medium of canonization, its service in authorizing, sacralizing, and legitimating certain works and in marginalizing, delegitimating, and anathemizing others. Some of these canonical questions have been raised by contemporary critics in respect to modern Hebrew and Yiddish literary anthologies, but outside this specific area the topic has hardly been treated.7 Even when the subject has been treated, little attention has been paid to the special valence that the concept of canon possesses in Jewish tradition and the different natively Jewish ways in which the act of canonization has historically been exercised in traditional Jewish literature (such as through the composition of authoritative interpretations and commentaries). But how has the canonizing process changed as it moved from the classical sacred tradition to the modern, more secularized realm? How do certain anthologies not
An Introduction 7
only canonize and authorize the traditions they choose to preserve, but become themselves canonical documents? The fourth area of theoretical interest is perhaps the most singular Jewish trait of the anthology: its role in serving as a medium for the transmission, preservation, and creation of tradition. In his seminal essay “Revelation and Tradition as Religious Categories in Judaism” (published in The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays), Gershom Scholem demonstrated how the commentary genre has served as a medium for innovation in Jewish religious tradition precisely by pretending merely to present the “original” meaning of earlier, more ancient, and typically canonical texts when, in fact, the commentary has regularly presented some of the most radically new ideas in Jewish thought. A similar argument can be made for the anthology that pretends merely to present, quote, and select sources from earlier authoritative works. In fact, the very act of selection can be a powerful instrument for innovation; juxtaposition and recombination of discrete passages in new contexts and combinations can radically alter their original meaning. This is certainly the case with implicit anthologies—the Talmud is easily the best example—but it is also true of explicit anthologies in classical, medieval, and modern Hebrew and Yiddish literature. In modern Jewish culture, the anthology has also explicitly served an additional function. This is the fifth and final area of special interest: the anthology’s role as an agent in the creation, or re-creation, of Jewish culture and community. Not only has the anthology functioned as a medium for retrieving and re-creating tradition—the most famous case is Bialik and Ravnitzky’s Sefer Haaggadah—but it has also served as a figurative, idealized space for imagining new communities of readers and audiences, for transforming the past into a new entity through conscious fragmentation, literary montage, and collage. In these works, political and cultural ideology takes on material form in the shape of the anthology, and inevitably these examples of the literary form most insistently raise the question of the relation between ideology and literary production. Whether we are talking about early Zionist anthologies or more recent attempts to anthologize the Holocaust, it is in their writing that the anthology as a genre meets history. While the seventeen essays in this volume do not cover every aspect of the anthology in Jewish literature, let alone every anthology, they touch upon most of the major topics I have just delineated.8 The essays are arranged chronologically in three sections, devoted to Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism (through Late Antiquity), the Middle Ages, and the Modern Period. The five essays in the first section, on anthological compositions in the Bible and in the classical literature of the Rabbinic period, together constitute a powerful argument for the anthology as perhaps the single most important literary genre in early Jewish literature. By making this argument, of course, the authors in this section are using the term “anthology” broadly. As Jeffrey Tigay suggests in his essay on Deuteronomy and anthology in the Torah, the anthological dimension is partly to be found in how we imagine the redactor thought; on the other hand, Tigay also makes a strong case for viewing anthologization as a compositional device in putting together even a “single” passage like Moses’ first speech. In his
8 The Anthology in Jewish Literature
essay on Proverbs and the wisdom literature, James Kugel follows an analogously double-pronged approach to what he calls “the anthological temper.” As Kugel argues, the anthological form of this literature is intrinsically connected to its basic assumption: that there exists a divine plan behind human reality in all its chaos. Further, it is understood that even if a sage might never know everything, it is still possible for him to compile a collection of what he does know, and that is decidedly not—as the collections demonstrate—an idle activity. Kugel’s insight about the cultural value of the anthologizing activity in the ancient world finds direct application in the three essays devoted to the anthology during the classical Rabbinic period—Yaakov Elman’s study of the Mishnah, Eliezer Segal’s essay on the Babylonian Talmud, and my own exploration of the subject in relation to the various midrashic collections. As all three essays acknowledge, the literary works they focus upon are all sui generis—that is, each is difficult to define independently in ordinary generic terms. To give only the most obvious example: What is the Mishnah? Is it a law code, study collection, or textbook? Or a gathering of lecture notes, or a philosophical work? Different scholars have proposed each of these possibilities. By focusing upon its anthological dimension, it is possible for one to avoid the necessity for a monolithic or single answer to the question of the Mishnah’s identity; it is also easier to isolate its “ungeneric” features and thereby to identify its salient features. The same is true of other Rabbinic texts. Even if in the end it is impossible to arrive at a satisfactory or conclusive definition for the documents, the anthological approach helps us articulate “how little these generic categories help us in defining the singularity of a work like the Mishnah,” as Elman writes. Eliezer Segal comes to an even more radical conclusion in his study of the Babylonian Talmud: the final editors / redactor of the BT sought to make their text more than an anthology, that is, more than a mere collection. For Segal, the Talmud challenges our notions of anthology itself, demanding an even more dynamic notion of the genre if it is to prove useful in describing works like the Talmud. Finally, in my own essay on midrash, I use the anthological genre as an avenue for appreciating both the elementary forms of midrashic discourse and the nature of the larger collections, but the very nature of the latter as anthologies also leads me to the conclusion that these were not commentaries to be studied by ordinary readers but essentially source books for professionals. The four essays on the anthology in the Middle Ages begin to show even more dramatically how the genre is a category of cultural as well as literary significance—indeed, how literature and culture are inseparably linked through the medium of anthology. Thus the prayerbook, in its multiple and variegated designs, has historically reflected different communal identities, as Joseph Tabory conclusively demonstrates in his article on the literature of liturgy, and its very anthological dimension points to an inherently communal function. So, too, in his fascinating study of medieval Hebrew story collections, Eli Yassif shows how Eleazar Halevi’s habits of anthologizing in Sefer Hazikhronot, especially his repetitions of the same material, seem to reflect an attempt to present a pluralistic account of the Jewish historical narrative that would appeal to different audiences of readers and thereby link them. Jacob Elbaum’s investigation of late midrashic collections
An Introduction 9
such as Yalqut Shimoni raises the additional question of the “originality” of anthologies. Anthologies are typically conceived as inherently secondary and lacking in originality, but, as Elbaum shows, it is often impossible to distinguish between early and late collections of traditional material and to know precisely how the editors of “late” anthologies like Yalqut Shimoni viewed their work in relation to that of their predecessors. The real question Elbaum’s essay raises is the role of the anthologizer or editor: How active is his (or her) intervention in the act of anthologizing? This question is implicitly advanced in Marc Bregman’s groundbreaking study of the compilation and publication history of Midrash Rabbah, which was, as Bregman shows, essentially the creation of a printer who joined a number of disparate midrashic collections together to make a more marketable commodity, thereby creating a new community of readers as well. Bregman’s study transports us out of the Middle Ages and into the Early Modern period, but he also shows how the abiding problematics of the earlier period survive into the later one. Fittingly, the final section, devoted to the Modern Period, is also the lengthiest. The first three essays—Zipora Kagan’s study of Berdyczewski and his many anthologies, Mark Kiel’s treatment of Bialik’s Sefer Haaggadah, and Israel Bartal’s essay on the Zionist kinnus anthologies—all vividly demonstrate the multiple functions of the anthology in modern Hebrew literature: on the one hand as a primary medium for the retrieval and transmission of past tradition, and on the other as a force of cultural consolidation and community building. In all three cases the very act of anthologizing and anthology making comes to possess a virtually ontological status. The next two essays in the section—Kathryn Hellerstein’s survey of Ezra Korman’s anthology of Yiddish women’s poetry against the backdrop of other Yiddish poetry anthologies, and Hannan Hever’s treatment of modern Hebrew poetry anthologies—both demonstrate unequivocally the power of anthologies as canonizing labors. Hellerstein’s study connects the act of canonization to the politics of gender, Hever’s to the politics of Zionism. The final three essays in the section extend the cultural reach of anthologies in modern Jewish culture in three very different directions. Jeffrey Shandler shows vividly how anthologies of Yiddish literature in translation essentially saved and transmitted different visions of Yiddish culture for English-speaking, primarily American, audiences. Galit Hasan-Rokem’s study of Dov Noy and the Israel Folklore Archive shows how the act of anthologizing played a formative role in creating both notions of modern Israeli identity (by, paradoxically, reflecting the diversity of Israeli society) and (perhaps less wittingly) the scholarly discipline of Jewish folklore—and how these two were inseparably connected as well. Finally, David Roskies’s treatment of various Holocaust anthologies offers a compelling demonstration of the abiding power of anthologies to shape contemporary Jewish culture in its own self-understanding by presenting and authorizing different ideological visions of the most horrible trauma in Jewish history and its impact. If nothing else, this collection of essays should show readers that, to paraphrase Horatio, there exist more types of anthologies in Jewish literature than you have ever dreamt of. One of the more famous literary adages of our age proclaims: “The meaning of a literary work is always another literary work.” The anthology, perhaps
10 The Anthology in Jewish Literature
more literally than any other literary work, realizes the truth of this formulation through its very existence. Yet the same recognition has also enabled us to appreciate the anthology as a literary form and to make it such an invaluable key for unlocking the enigmatic identities of so many classic, foundational Jewish texts. More than being simply a subject of literary interest and value, the anthology as a form and genre seems to touch upon essential aspects of the Jewish imagination: its desire always to incorporate opposites, to preserve multiplicities of traditions, to incorporate parallel traditions rather than impose orthodoxy by accepting one version and excluding the other. These aspects, along with the anonymity and collective nature of the genre, its fragmentary yet collage-like effect, and above all, its utopian dream to gather in the dispersed sparks of Jewish literary creativity, all make the subject of the anthology a uniquely fitting vehicle for broaching new questions about the meaning and shaping of Jewishness. By reinserting the anthology into the Jewish literary tradition, it is hoped that this anthology of essays on the Jewish anthology will stimulate such questions.
Notes This essay was adapted from Prooftexts 17 (1997):1–7 and Prooftexts 19 (1999):83–86, by permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1. While there is as yet no definitive book on the theory of the anthology, see pro temp Anne Ferry, Tradition and the Individual Poem: An Inquiry into Anthologies (Stanford, Conn.: 2001); cf. The Whole Book: Cultural Perspectives on the Medieval Miscellany, ed. Stephen G. Nichols and Siegfried Wenzel (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), esp. Barbara A. Shailor, “A Cataloger’s View,” pp. 153–67, and James J. O’Donnell, “Retractations,” pp. 169–73. The classic work on the medieval anthology remains Richard A. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies on the Manipulus florum of Thomas of Ireland (Toronto: 1979), esp. pp. 3–92. 2. On compilations, see Sara Japhet, “The Nature and Distribution of Medieval Compilatory Commentaries in the Light of Rabbi Joseph Kara’s Commentary on the Book of Job,” in The Midrashic Imagination: Jewish Exegesis, Thought and History, ed. Michael Fishbane (Albany, N.Y., 1993), pp. 98–130. I want to thank Marc Bregman for calling my attention to this essay as well as the one in the next note. 3. Lucia Re, “(De)Constructing the Canon: The Agon of the Anthologies on the Scene of Modern Italian Poetry,” Modern Language Review 87 (1992):585–602. 4. On Ginzberg, see my introduction to the new edition of the Legends of the Jews (Philadelphia, 2003). 5. See Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism, ed. Jeffrey H. Tigay (Philadelphia, 1985), esp. Tigay’s introduction, pp. 1–20; and his essay, “Conflation as a Redactional Technique,” pp. 53–96. 6. For a good survey of the current state of scholarship in this emerging field of Jewish scholarship, see the proceedings of the conference “Artefact and Text: The Re-creation of Jewish Literature in Medieval Hebrew Manuscripts,” published as a special issue of the Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 75, no. 3 (autumn 1993), esp. the essays of Israel M. Ta-Shma, Malachi Beit-Arie, and Stefan C. Reif.
An Introduction 11 7. See, for example, Abraham Novershtem, “Yiddish Poetry in a New Context,” Prooftexts 8 (1988):355–63; Kathryn Hellerstein, “A Question of Tradition: Women Poets in Yiddish,” in Handbook of Jewish-American Literature: An Analytic Guide to Themes and Sources, ed. Lewis Fried (New York, 1988), pp. 195–237; “Canon and Gender: Women Poets in Two Modern Yiddish Anthologies,” Shofar 9 (1991):9–23, reprinted in Women of the Word: Jewish Women and Jewish Writing, ed. Judith Baskin (Detroit, 1995), pp. 136–52; and Hellerstein’s essay in this volume. See also James Kugel’s review essay of T. Carmi’s Penguin Anthology of Hebrew Verse in Prooftexts 2 (1982):209–26; and David G. Roskies, “The Treasures of Howe and Greenberg,” Prooftexts 3 (1983):109–14. The reader may also find relevant a number of the essays in the special issue of Prooftexts 15 (January 1995), “The Role of Periodicals in the Formation of Modern Jewish Identity,” esp. Alan Mintz’s insightful introduction, “The Many Rather Than the One: On the Critical Study of Jewish Periodicals,” pp. 1–4. 8. I would like to mention two important essays that appeared in Prooftexts (19, no. 1 [January 1999]) and that, for reasons of space, could not be reprinted here: Marjorie Lehman, “The Ein Yaaqov: A Collection of Aggadah in Transition,” and Boaz Huss, “The Anthological Interpretation: The Emergence of Anthologies of Zohar Commentaries in the Seventeenth Century.” The reader interested in additional aspects of the Jewish anthology will find much of significance in both essays.
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i
ANCIENT ISRAEL AND CLASSICAL JUDAISM
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2 jeffrey h. tigay
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy
nthologies go back to the oldest stage in Jewish literature.1 The Bible consists
of twenty-four distinct books according to the Jewish count, and the very term A “Bible,” though singular in English, goes back to the Greek plural ta biblia, “the
books.” The original separateness of the Bible’s components was manifest in the fact that prior to the adoption of the codex (by Christians in the second and following centuries and by Jews after the talmudic period) it was, physically, a group of scrolls rather than a single volume.2 Accordingly, early writers had no name for the collection as a whole and could use only descriptive phrases such as “the Law, the Prophets, and the other books” (Prologue to the Greek of Ben Sira [Ecclesiasticus]) and “the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms” (Luke 24:44). Several of the names eventually adopted also reflect the Bible’s anthological character: not only rabbinic haSefarim, “the books” (cf. Daniel 9:2) and Kitvei haKodesh, “the sacred writings,” but the names used in the Middle Ages even after the codex was adopted: Esrim ve-arbah or Kaf-dalet, “the twenty-four (books),” and Tanakh, the acronym for Torah, Neviim uKetuvim, “the Torah, Prophets, and Writings.” Note as well Bibliothe¯ca, “collection of books,” used by Jerome and others.3 In this sense the Bible as a whole is what David Stern calls an explicit anthology.4 The same is true of certain of its individual books, which explicitly contain the works of different writers, such as Psalms, Proverbs, and Trei Asar, “the Twelve” (i.e., the Minor Prophets, which were written on a single scroll).5 The term “anthology” also refers to a collection of the works of a single author. This sense applies to most of the individual books of the prophets, which consist of the collected speeches of the prophets whose names they bear. Other books are implicitly anthological, combining materials from originally separate sources without explicitly saying so.6 A few prophetic books seem to contain the speeches of two or three different prophets, such as Isaiah, Hosea, Micah,7 and Zechariah. The best-known implicit anthology in the Bible is the Torah, as 15
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its composition is understood in modern scholarship. In the next section we look more closely at its composition.
The Torah The Torah presents a running narrative of Israel’s early history composed of materials from originally separate sources. Its evolution was a process of composition followed by conflation. That is, three variant narratives of early Israelite history (called J, E, and P by scholars) were each created by the combination of originally separate materials; they are each, in other words, composite. Subsequently, these three variants were interwoven, or conflated, with each other, and a fourth source (D) was added, thus creating the Torah essentially as we know it today. Sources A typical view would summarize the process of composition more or less as follows.8 The original literary units underlying the Torah were narratives about the early Hebrew tribes and their leaders. Such narratives were for the most part created, and at first transmitted, orally, some think in poetic form. In the course of time some of them were gathered into cycles dealing with various individuals (e.g., Abraham, Jacob) or other common subjects (e.g., the Egyptian bondage, the Exodus); the cycles were later linked together into lengthier narrative series (such as the patriarchal period), and, later still, these series were linked into comprehensive historical epics (such as the history of Israel from the patriarchs through the death of Moses or the conquest, or later). Apparently from one such epic (what Martin Noth termed “G,” for gemeinsame Grundlage, the “common basis”) there branched off separate versions which then in the course of transmission developed their own unique characteristics in terminology, style, ideology, and content. These versions are called the Yahwistic, Elohistic, and Priestly sources, or J (from German Jahwistisch), E, and P, respectively.9 By this stage the narrative was in prose. Whether G itself was written is debated, but in the view of most critics, J, E, and P were. By this time certain older written documents had also been incorporated into the narratives, such as the book of the Covenant (Exod. 21–23) and quotations from “the Book of the Wars of YHWH” (Num. 21:14). Other traditions about early Israelite history were omitted from these written sources. Some disappeared forever while others survived, either orally or in other written forms, for centuries and in some cases were picked up in postbiblical literature. When the old narratives about early Israelite history were gathered into larger complexes, they were organized by the itineraries and genealogical links of the patriarchs and the Exodus generation and held together by the theme of the divine promise to the patriarchs of land, progeny, and protection. This promise was probably an original part of at least some of the old traditions. In any case, many of the original narratives had nothing to do with this theme; each had a meaning and function of its own. Once drawn together, however, these narratives were transformed into episodes on the way to, or threatening, the fulfillment of the
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 17
promises. Literary topoi were pressed into service to this end: for example, the promise was threatened by the repeated barrenness of the patriarchs’ wives, and the future deliverer, Moses, was endangered and hidden in infancy and saved in a basket in a river. The smaller cycles within the larger complex also have their own subthemes. The biography of Abraham, for example, appears as a story of personal growth from loyalty to God based on an expected reward to loyalty even when that reward is threatened. This theme, too, is not present in all the individual narratives, but it is imparted by the literary frame (note how Genesis 12:1–4 is echoed in 22:1–3) and the recurrent promises appearing in the narratives. Redaction After developing independently for a time, the two main offshoots of G (J and E) were ultimately conflated into a single running narrative, one serving as the basis of the new narrative, with selections from the other supplementing it. Later, two other elements were added to this complex. One was the P source, which was now spliced into the combined JE much as J and E had been joined. The fourth element, D, was placed near the end of the account of the desert period because for the most part it was not a variant account of the earlier history, parallel to J, E, and P, but dealt with Moses’ last days. The relative order in which P and D were composed is debated. Most scholars have considered P the latest element, while a minority regard P as roughly contemporary with or earlier than D and think that P and D were joined to JE simultaneously. Recently a new approach has been suggested: the author(s) of the “Holiness Document” (H)—which was previously thought to be an older source embedded in P—represent a separate priestly school later than P; it was he / they who edited and rewrote P and blended it with the other sources, producing the Torah as a whole.10 By the time these documents were to be joined, their texts had become largely fixed, and the redactors did not have, or at least did not exercise, much freedom to revise them. Rather than rewrite the sources in their own words, they strove to incorporate them essentially as they found them, using the documents’ own wording, making only such modifications as were necessary for fitting the various extracts together, or for other purposes they hoped to achieve with the new version. Where the two versions extensively duplicated each other, one version would be dropped, except for significant variants which were maintained alongside the other version. Depending on the nature of the materials or the redactors’ intentions, the separate versions of the same episode might be interwoven to present what was taken as a more complete account of it (e.g., the account of the flood, where the doublets are presented as different moments in the unfolding sequence of events),11 or left apart and treated either as separate events (as in the case of the three stories in which a patriarch presents his wife as his sister) or as a main account and a partial recapitulation with greater detail (as in the two creation accounts in Genesis 1–2). The redactors added their own connective and transitional phrases between the passages and often achieved fine artistic effects simply
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by skillful arrangement of the material. Somewhere in this lengthy process, material deemed objectionable or not suitable for the traditionists’ purposes was omitted, but on the whole they seem to have preserved as much as they could. This summary is far from encompassing the complete range of opinion on the subject, but it gives a fair impression of the kinds of processes that most critical scholars think were involved in the evolution of the Torah. While the role of these processes in the case of the Torah is hypothetical, inferred from contradictions, doublets, and other phenomena identified by reading between the lines of the text, it can be documented, by the comparison of older and younger versions of many ancient texts that such processes regularly operated in the development of ancient literature.12 The Redactors’ Thinking That the redactors who combined the Torah’s source documents preserved so much of the sources’ original wording and contents, even when doing so caused inconsistency or redundancy, appears to be due to the status of the sources when they received them. The comparison of older and younger copies of certain ancient texts shows that in the earlier stages of a work’s development, when it was not yet considered classical or sacred, editors felt free to rewrite almost at will, and early revisions of a work show very few inconsistencies even when new matter has been added to them. But once a work acquired sacred or classical status, it became increasingly difficult for editors to revise it even in order to remove inconsistencies. The inconsistencies in the Torah are due to the fact its source documents were combined at a time when they already had a quasi-canonical status, and the compilers did not feel free to do much more than juxtapose or interweave the sources and add some transitional phrases. Probably they resolved the inconsistencies exegetically in their own minds but did not feel free to add their explanations to the text.13 Some of the harmonistic interpretations of the Rabbis may well be similar to those of the editors. It is hard to be certain exactly what the redactors thought made their sources almost inviolable even when they were inconsistent with each other. It could have been the authority of their respective authors. Talmudic and post-talmudic literature records numerous instances of liturgical texts created by combining the wording proposed by different rabbis because the authorities refused to choose between the differing views.14 Their thinking seems nicely expressed by a latter-day authority, Rabbi Jacob Emden, who explained how he resolved the disagreement over which version of Kol Nidrei to recite, the older one, which nullifies vows made from last year to this, or Rabbenu Tam’s version, which refers to vows made from this year to the next: The statements of the ancients of blessed memory, that the wording was formulated with reference to the past, are convincing, and I have no doubt at all about that. Nevertheless, in deference to the statement of Rabbenu Tam, since it comes from the mouth of that tzaddik, my custom is to say it in both formulations and to conflate the wording: “[vows] that we vowed and will vow, swore and will swear, with which we bound ourselves or will bind ourselves, etc. from last Yom
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 19 Kippur [to this and] from this Yom Kippur to [the next], etc.” so as to satisfy both views.15
But it could also have been the redactors’ belief that elu veelu divrei Elohim hayyim, “these and those are the words of the living God,” that all of their sources were divinely revealed and hence were all valid, or at least potentially so. This phrase, in which the Talmud characterizes conflicting opinions of different sages,16 may be applicable as well to the redactors’ evaluation of their sources. In either case, the redactors seem to have felt that no one version of the past, of a law, or of a belief necessarily preserved the whole truth, and where they felt unable to decide, they preserved what they had received, harmonized inconsistencies as well as they could, and left the rest to posterity. As one nineteenth-century scholar observed, “It is this way of writing that makes the Bible history so vivid and interesting,” for no book written by the modern technique of digesting and rewriting the sources “could have preserved so much of the genuine life of antique times.”17 By not imposing unity and consistency on the sources, the compilers preserved the variety and richness of ancient Israelite belief, tradition, law, and literature.
Deuteronomy Deuteronomy, on the explicit level, is an anthology of speeches by Moses, connected by brief narrative passages. The speeches are the three main discourses (1:6– 4:40; 5:1–28:68; 29–30) and the poem and blessing of Moses (Ha’azinu in 32 and Ve-zo’t haBerakhah in 33).18 Deuteronomy is also anthological on the implicit level. First of all, it contains some material from the non-Deuteronomic sources, JE and P as well as other sources independent of those, including the two poems just mentioned.19 Further, even some of the Deuteronomic narrative material seems to come from different hands within the Deuteronomic “school.”20 But here I wish to raise the question of whether one may also view Moses’ first two discourses as implicitly anthological, that is, whether each of them consists of shorter, originally separate speeches. The Analogy of Prophetic Literature Before turning to these speeches, it is worth looking more closely at prophetic literature, which is analogous to Deuteronomy because it, too, consists of speeches. As was noted, most of the books of the classical prophets are clearly anthological. They consist of speeches by the prophets, and since most of them were active for many years (as is indicated in their headings), their books consist of different speeches uttered on different occasions during their careers (whether they also include interpolated matter not written by the prophets will not concern us here). The book of Jeremiah (36:2) says explicitly that God had him dictate to Baruch Ben Neriah “all the words that I have spoken to you . . . from the time I first spoke to you in the days of Josiah [the thirteenth year of Josiah, 627 b.c.e., according to Jer. 1:2] to this day” (in the fourth year of Jehoiakim, 605), and Jeremiah remained
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active until after the exile began in 586. Many of his speeches, and those of other prophets, contain headings, often dated, indicating that they are separate speeches. Moreover—and this is why the subject is pertinent for present purposes—many scholars believe that these “speeches” are actually not single speeches, publicly delivered in their present form, but “literary speeches,”21 collections of shorter oracles, uttered on different occasions, that have been secondarily gathered together in the larger entities of which they now form parts.22 The demarcation of the putatively independent units is based on such criteria as introductory and concluding formulas, changes of subject, grammatical person or number or literary genre, different function, abrupt shifts, completeness and independence of thoughts, and above all, the obliviousness of one unit to another. This approach is controversial because the testimony of such criteria is not always unequivocal, and some scholars deny the validity of at least some of them. We cannot be certain that what we perceive as logically unconnected would have been perceived the same way in antiquity.23 The approach is especially problematic if one becomes so “programmed a priori to discover small separate units” that one ignores the units’ present context (regarding it as both chronologically and qualitatively secondary) and the meaning that it imparts to them, effectively ignoring the character of the prophetic book qua book.24 Increasingly, scholars have shown that the prophecies are arranged in ways that show careful design, being grouped into complexes that share common subjects or extrinsic similarities (such as key words) and arranged in esthetic patterns (such as chiasmus) and framed by similar opening and closing verses, and that have meaning as wholes.25 These groupings may sometimes be secondary, but after one reads the books over repeatedly in light of such studies, it can become increasingly difficult to be sure that these groupings are secondary.26 On the other hand, ignoring the possibility of original separateness brings its own dangers, particularly the likelihood of forced interpretations and rationalizations that can be no less subjective than the criteria used for identifying separateness. Those criteria at least have the heuristic value of focusing attention on each unit’s potential discreteness and forcing the attentive reader to ask how it fits into its present context, a question that can stimulate one to discover the design of the context as a whole. Furthermore, even though separateness may be difficult or impossible to prove, it is also difficult or impossible to disprove, and as a historical question it is worth considering the possibility of original separateness and secondary arrangement as a working hypothesis to see how much clarity it brings to our understanding of a literary work. The Units Underlying the Homiletic Speeches in Deuteronomy Returning to Deuteronomy,27 we can observe that in some places the homiletic speeches in 1:6–4:40 (the first discourse) and 5–11 (the nonlegal prologue and preamble to the second discourse) look as if they have incorporated brief sermons or teachings, or pre´cis of such, that were originally composed for oral delivery28 and at least some of which were originally separate from each other (whether
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 21
composed by the same author or different ones).29 More important, many of the smaller sections within these speeches have no inherent connection to each other and are largely oblivious of each other. They could easily be moved elsewhere without the reader feeling that something is missing from their present context or that they are extraneous in their new context. Frequently, after a few verses the text seems to have reached a conclusion and then changes topics, sometimes without any transition. All of these phenomena are illustrated by Deuteronomy 4:1–8.30 Note first that although all of vv. 1–40 are a discrete unit within the first discourse of Deuteronomy, both vv. 1 and 5 have introductory formulas (“Hear” in v. 1 and “See” in v. 5; similarly, introductory formulas appear four times in chaps. 5–11, though they are presently part of a single discourse: “Hear” in 5:1; 6:4; and 9:1; “See” in 11:26). Vv. 1–4 read as follows: And now, O Israel, give heed to [lit. “hear”] the laws and rules that I am instructing you to observe, so that you may live to enter and occupy the land that the Lord, the God of your fathers, is giving you. You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it, but keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you. You saw with your own eyes what the Lord did in the matter of Baal-peor, that the Lord your God wiped out from among you every person who followed Baal-peor; while you, who held fast to the Lord your God, are all alive today.
In this paragraph the consequences of the Baal Peor incident demonstrate that observing the laws, particularly the law prohibiting worship of other gods, is essential so that Israel may live to enter the Promised Land. Then in the next paragraph (vv. 5–8), the argument that observance is a matter of life and death is dropped and replaced by the argument that Israel should observe the laws because they are uniquely just and uniquely effective in securing God’s closeness, hence following them will demonstrate Israel’s wisdom to the nations. See, I have imparted to you laws and rules, as the Lord my God has commanded me, for you to abide by in the land that you are about to enter and occupy. Observe them faithfully, for that will be proof of your wisdom and discernment to other peoples, who on hearing of all these laws will say, “Surely, that great nation is a wise and discerning people.” For what great nation is there that has a god so close at hand as is the Lord our God whenever we call upon Him? Or what great nation has laws and rules as perfect as all this Teaching that I set before you this day?
The two arguments are of very different character. The first, rooted in an experience in which gentiles lured Israelites to sin (Num. 25), is historical and is focused on a specific law. The second, unrelated to the first, refers to all the laws. It appeals to national pride and sounds almost contemporary in its contention that the Torah is uniquely just and will win Israel the respect of the gentiles, who are portrayed positively as appreciating justice and prepared to give Israel credit. Logically this argument has nothing to do with vv. 1–4 or the following verses (9–31) and, if moved elsewhere, would not be missed. In fact, vv. 5–8 would fit very nicely in chapter 6, before or after vv. 4–9 or 20–25. Finally, the arguments in 4:1–4 and 5–8
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are brief and virtually beg for elaboration, suggesting that they are outlines or pre´cis of longer speeches. As in the prophetic books, in Deuteronomy units such as these appear as parts of larger groups that share common subjects, vocabulary, and themes and are arranged in esthetic patterns and framed by similar opening and closing verses (see below). It is these arrangements that may be secondary. Again, as in the case of the prophetic books, the original separateness of these units is difficult to prove. They are not overtly contradictory, inconsistent, or characterized by a different worldview, style, or vocabulary the way that J, E, and P are. If they were originally separate from each other, they may still have come from one writer or school of writers who shared the same worldview, style, and vocabulary.31 But the occasion of viewing the Bible through the conceptual prism of anthologies suggests that we give this theory a try and see how much this perspective clarifies. 1. Deuteronomy 6:4–25. This passage (beginning with the introductory formula shema ) is divided by the traditional parashah breaks into four units, (A) vv. 4–9, (B) 10–15, (C) 16–19, and (D) 20–25. A calls for exclusive love and loyalty toward YHWH, taking His instructions to heart and teaching them to future generations. B warns Israel, after they take possession of the Promised Land and its infrastructure, not to forget YHWH and turn to other gods, lest he wipe Israel out. C warns not to try the Lord but to do what is right and good in order to thrive and capture the land from the Canaanites. D calls on people to answer their children’s inquiries about the meaning of God’s commandments by telling about the Exodus and explaining how observing the commandments will bring merit. Although these four paragraphs share certain themes, they are themes common to much of Deuteronomy; they do not bespeak a closer connection between these paragraphs than between any one of them and many others in the book. The later paragraphs in the chapter do not build on the earlier ones, and they show no particular awareness of them. In fact, paragraph B seems to put the cart before the horse: its perspective is after Israel has already conquered the land, while paragraph C states that loyalty to YHWH is a precondition for successfully doing so. Furthermore not “try[ing] YHWH . . . as you did at Massah” in paragraph C refers to an incident when Israel lacked water (Exod. 17:1–7), a warning that fits oddly after paragraph B, which refers to the time when Israel will settle in a land full of bounty, including cisterns, vineyards, and olive trees. Not only could these four paragraphs appear separately in many other places in the book without seeming out of context or being difficult to understand, but in view of the incongruities between paragraphs B and C, some other locations might make those paragraphs easier to understand. Notwithstanding the seeming disparateness of its components, however, as a unit 6:4–25 can also be shown to possess a chiastic, symmetrical structure and certain shared themes well suited to its location in Deuteronomy. Paragraphs A and D mirror each other in referring to teaching God’s words and instructions to one’s children; paragraph B refers to God’s providence and C warns against testing His ability to provide. B’s warning not to forget God can be seen as continuing A’s exhortation to recite and teach His words constantly. In addition, C and D, emphasizing the rewards for obedience and the role of the laws in expressing and
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 23
inculcating reverence for God, echo the first paragraph of chapter 6, vv. 1–3, which, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed, can be seen as the concluding section of the previous masoretic parashah, 5:19–6:3, or as the introduction to the preamble to the laws given in Moab starting in 6:4.32 Deuteronomy 6:4–25 also suits its location following the Decalogue because allusions to the Decalogue, especially the first commandment, appear throughout the chapter. Vv. 4 and 14 restate the first commandment, “you shall have no other gods beside Me,” and vv. 12, 21, and 23 echo its introduction, “I the Lord am your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage.” In v. 15 the injunction against worshiping other gods is backed with a warning about God’s jealousy, just as we find after the first two commandments. The exhortations to love God and keep His commandments in vv. 5 and 17 echo the Decalogue’s description of God as showing kindness to “those who love Me and keep My commandments.” V. 18 echoes the reward promised for observing the fifth commandment, “that it may go well with you” (vv. 2–3 also echo both rewards promised in that commandment). In light of these allusions, the exhortations to love God, to remember Him, to teach children about His words and deeds, and all the other themes of chapter 6 can be regarded as a sermonic reflection on the first commandment, explaining what must be done to carry it out. Thus, although the individual units of 6:4–25 do not relate directly to each other, they all relate in some way to the Decalogue of the preceding chapter. 2. Deuteronomy 11:1–25. This passage consists of three self-contained arguments for obedience to God’s commandments: (A) vv. 1–9 (which are a natural continuation of 10:12–22),33 (B) 10–21, and (C) 22–25. Like 6:4–25, they share certain common Deuteronomic themes34 but have no inherent connection to each other. In A Moses argues from history that Israel should obey God’s commands because, having witnessed His punitive acts against Egypt and rebellious Israelites, which he enumerates, this generation is able to understand better than any future generation that success, both in conquering the land and in remaining in it, depends on obedience. In B he argues for obedience on the basis of nature and topography: the mountainous Promised Land, unlike Egypt, depends on rain, without which Israel would perish, and God will dispense the rain only if Israel is loyal and obedient. In C he urges obedience on the strength of a promise: if Israel is loyal and obedient, God Himself will dislodge the Canaanites for them. These arguments for obedience are independent of each other. A and C refer to military success while B refers to avoidance of starving. The three paragraphs make distinct points and none refer to each other or build on each other. Nevertheless, these three paragraphs share many features and complement one another. Each calls for “loving the Lord your God” (vv. 1, 13, 22) and “keeping/ obeying the commandment(s) which I command you (this day)” (vv. 1, 8, 13, 22; the verbs shamar, “keep,” and shama, “obey,” sound alike). The first two paragraphs share the themes of “the land which you are about to cross into/invade and occupy” (vv. 8, 10, 11)35 and “enduring long upon the soil which the Lord swore to your fathers to give to them” (vv. 9, 21). They complement each other in that the first and third section deal with God’s power as manifested in historical events, while the second deals with His governance of nature.36 In context, B and C
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explain the two conclusions of A (success in conquering the land and in surviving in it) in reverse order. All three paragraphs fit nicely as a sequel to 10:12–22. In the latter, having reviewed the Israelites’ history of faithlessness during the wilderness wanderings, Moses summed up God’s demand for loyalty and obedience, the central theme of Deuteronomy (10:12–22). In 11:1–25 he seeks to persuade Israel that its future depends on compliance with this demand. He frequently refers to it, urging Israel “to walk in all His ways,” “to love Him,” “to serve Him with all your heart and soul,” “to keep/obey all His commandment(s) which I enjoin upon you this day,” and “to hold fast to Him” (11:1, 8, 13, 22), echoing the same phrases in 10:12–13 and 20. 3. Deuteronomy 4:1–40. This speech, part of which has already been discussed, consists of four main sections, each arguing in its own way for obeying God’s laws and rules: (A) vv. 1–4, (B) 5–8, (C) 9–31, and (D) 32–40. Section A calls for obedience, prohibits adding to or subtracting from the commandments, and backs up the prohibition by a reference to the worship of Baal Peor and its disastrous consequences. B appeals for obedience on the ground that it will earn Israel the admiration of its neighbors, who will perceive the justice of the laws and the nearness of God that Israel enjoys because of obeying them. C is a lengthy argument for obeying the prohibition of idols. It shows that this prohibition is based on the Exodus and particularly the encounter with God at Horeb, and it backs up the prohibition with the threat of exile. D argues on the basis of the Exodus and Horeb experiences that there is no other God but the Lord (YHWH) and that His laws should therefore be obeyed. Logically each of these sections is self-contained. They do not refer to each other or rely on each other for their effectiveness and, in fact, any of them could be removed without the others losing any of their force. They are very different in character. A and B are short and skeletal, each appealing for obedience to all the commandments and briefly stating a reason for it. They read like pre´cis rather than speeches or even parts of a speech. Unlike the others, B is based not on history but on the justice and effectiveness of the laws. C is a lengthy argument for the commandment against worshiping idols and heavenly bodies, based on a somewhat detailed narrative and warning of the long-range consequences of disobedience. D is an appeal, of intermediate length, to consider history and realize the truth of monotheism, followed by an appeal to obey all the commandments. In context these four sections are held together by a frame in which Moses urges obedience to God’s laws so that Israel may live to occupy the land and remain in it indefinitely (vv. 1, 40). This message is underscored within the chapter by a warning that failure to observe the law against idols will lead to banishment from the land (vv. 23–28). The four units of the chapter have numerous features in common, both thematic and verbal, which reflect the sermonic, didactic character of Deuteronomy. In all of them Moses refers to the laws he is teaching or commanding and to the land Israel is about to enter.37 In three of the units Moses bases his argument on history. In A he argues that history shows the consequences of obeying or disobeying the commandments. In C he argues that history justifies the prohibition of images. In D he argues that history proves that the Lord is the only true God. Each unit opens with an appeal to the mind: “hear,” “see,” “do
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 25
not forget,” and “inquire” (vv. 1, 5, 9, 32). The themes of seeing and hearing— the senses through which Israel experienced history—are mentioned throughout,38 as are teaching and learning (l-m-d),39 knowing and making known (y-d- ),40 forgetting,41 wisdom and understanding.42 In each unit Moses lends immediacy to his words by referring to ha-yom (“today,” “this day,” “as is now the case”).43 B and D show that Israel and its laws are unparalleled among the nations and the Lord is unparalleled among the gods.44 C and D refer to the theophany at Horeb and the Exodus, and both speak of heaven and earth.45 The four units of the chapter are arranged in reverse chronological order, based on their allusions to the past: A alludes to the recent incident at Peor (v. 3), C to the theophany at Horeb, the Exodus, and the division of nations (vv. 10–14, 19–20), and D to the creation and the patriarchs as well as the Exodus and Horeb (vv. 32–34, 36–37) (the order within each unit is not chronological).46 Unlike 6:4–25 and 11:1–25, 4:1–40 as a whole doesn’t have many similarities to the preceding chapters. Its first unit, referring to the Baal Peor incident, does connect nicely with 3:22, which locates Israel at Peor. But the other events in the chapter have nothing to do with that incident, and although chapters 1–3 revolve around the issue of obedience and disobedience, the point of 1–3 is the importance of obeying God’s orders about conquering the Promised Land, whereas the emphasis of 4:1–40—and the rest of Deuteronomy—is obedience to God’s laws as a way of life in the land, not to ad hoc orders. Hence the transitional “And now” in 4:1 looks like an editorial link, and despite the many similarities and connections between these two sections, they may have had separate authors.47 I do not believe that phenomena that lend unity and design to each of the three sections described are strong enough to argue that the units comprising them were originally composed to stand with the others as they now do. These phenomena consist primarily of simple patterns of arrangement (chiasmus, frames, reverse chronological order) that are not integral to the contents of the units, and common Deuteronomic themes and formulas. They do not overcome the disjointed impression that these sections make on the reader. For the sake of contrast, consider how different these sections are from chapters 7, 8, and 9–10. Each of these sections develops a single theme, and when another theme is introduced, it develops naturally from the main theme. Chapter 7, for example,48 is concerned with the conquest. Its first section (vv. 1–6) states the requirement to eradicate the Canaanites and their religious artifacts, and its final section concludes with that theme (vv. 17–26). Since v. 1 refers to the Canaanites as more numerous than the Israelites, the second section (vv. 7–16) uses this statement as the occasion to warn Israel against delusions of numerical importance (v. 7) but promises that if Israel obeys God’s commandments, God will increase its numbers (v. 13). The last section urges Israel not to be discouraged by the Canaanites’ numerical superiority (v. 17), since God will defeat them. The surface unity of the chapter is supported by the fact that it is based on the covenant documents in Exodus 23:20–33 and 34: 11–16 and that allusions to those documents are found throughout the chapter.49 In view of this contrast between smooth-reading sections such as chapter 7 on the one hand and more disjointed sections such as 4:1–40, 6:4–25, and 11:1–25, a
26 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism
plausible case can be made that the latter consist of originally separate units, many of them sermon pre´cis, brought together by a compiler who arranged them in their present patterns. If this is indeed the case, it represents another sense in which Deuteronomy is anthological. Whether the smooth-reading chapters 7, 8, and 9–10 should also be seen as originally distinct works is a question that will have to be left to another occasion.
Conclusion We have seen multifaceted aspects of explicit and implicit anthologies in the Bible, with special attention to the Torah, and to Deuteronomy in particular. Anthology is not only a literary phenomenon but an intellectual one as well. As David Stern has written, the anthology as a form and genre seems to touch upon essential aspects of the Jewish imagination: its desire always to incorporate opposites, to preserve multiplicities of traditions, to incorporate parallel traditions rather than impose orthodoxy by accepting one version and excluding the other.50
The viewpoints of the various books gathered together in the Bible vary widely. The four main sources of the Torah not only have different views about the details of Israelite history and law, but—particularly Deuteronomy and the priestly materials—markedly different ideologies on such matters as God, sacrifice, the Temple, and holiness.51 Even within the priestly materials, recent scholarship has shown pronounced differences between H (the Holiness Document) and the rest of P.52 Similarly, Chronicles covers much the same ground as Samuel and Kings from the perspective of very different interests and ideology.53 On key issues, such as eschatology and the relative status of ritual and morality, the classical prophets see things differently than the Torah and the Former Prophets do.54 Wisdom literature differs from the Torah and prophecy regarding “the source, the ground, and the bearers of moral responsibility,”55 while at the same time within wisdom literature Job and Ecclesiastes see the question of reward and punishment very differently than Proverbs, and the prose framework of Job has a different approach to that question than do the poetic sections of the book. The Bible’s “anthological habit” set the pattern for subsequent Jewish thought about the Bible, as it did for many other aspects of Judaism, as is manifest in every chapter of this volume. The midrashic works of talmudic and later times bring together the teachings and sermons (or pre´cis thereof) of numerous sages, both named and unnamed, along with the explicit and implicit views of their redactors.56 A more recent case is the Mikraot Gedolot, in which separate commentaries “of diverse authorship, provenance, dating and exegetical approaches, often mutually incompatible and contradictory . . . coexist within the confines of a single page, all accommodated within the framework of a single tradition” (N. M. Sarna).57 Ever since the Second Rabbinic Bible of 1524, no Rabbinic Bible has ever contained a biblical book accompanied by only one commentary, and different editions vie with each other to claim the largest number of commentaries on
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 27
their title pages (e.g., 32, 50, and even 120 commentaries).58 As B. Barry Levy has observed, this practice is a forceful statement about the multi-dimensional approach to Scripture put forth by the collective rabbinic tradition and the limitations inherent in approaching the text through the eyes of a single commentator.59
The conviction that “these and those are the words of the living God” has thus followed both the composition and the interpretation of Scripture throughout history.
Notes 1. The vast majority of biblical books are anthologies, composed, according to M. Haran, to preserve the remnants of ancient Israelite literature and with the aim of becoming “canonical” or “scriptural.” See M. Haran, HaAsupah HaMikrait (The Biblical Collection) (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute and Magnes Press, 1996), pp. 5, 7, 39–40, 92, 308 (Hebrew). 2. See N. M. Sarna, “The Order of the Books,” in C. Berlin, ed., Studies in Jewish Bibliography, History and Literature (New York: Ktav, 1971), pp. 407–8. 3. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Bible,” etymological section. 4. David Stern, introduction to this book, p. 5. Stern observes, by the way, that “in the anthology, literary form, organization, even sequence, are all ideological subjects” (p. 3). Although this is not always the case (the components of an anthology can also be ordered by mechanical criteria, e.g., chronologically, by length, by similarity of phraseology or theme, etc.), it is nicely applicable to the differing organizations of the Hebrew Bible in the Jewish and Christian canons. The order described in b. Baba Bathra 14b ends with Chronicles, indicating that “for Jews, the canon of Scripture ends with a narration of the return of the Jewish community to its homeland” (M. Signer, “How the Bible Has Been Interpreted in Jewish Tradition,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, ed. L. Keck et al. [Nashville: Abingdon, 1994], 1:65; essentially the same effect is achieved by ending with Ezra– Nehemiah, as in St. Petersburg [Leningrad] Codex b19A and related manuscripts). Christian Bibles, on the other hand, follow the order of the Septuagint, which places the prophets last so that they immediately precede the Gospels, thereby reflecting the Christian view that the primary significance of the “Old Testament” is found in its prophecies of the Messiah. 5. N. M. Sarna, Ancient Libraries and the Ordering of Biblical Books (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1989), pp. 9–10. 6. It is not clear whether and how the various royal chronicles and prophetic writings cited in Kings and Chronicles were used by the authors of those books. The text does not identify them as sources but as places where further information is found, but it is conceivable that the writers extracted information from them and perhaps even incorporated parts of them in their own texts. For a recent discussion see M. Haran, “The Books of the Chronicles ‘of the Kings of Judah’ and ‘of the Kings of Israel’: What Sort of Books Were They?” Vetus Testamentum 49 (1999):156–64. 7. The cases of Isaiah and Zechariah are well known and discussed in the standard biblical introductions and encyclopedias. On Hosea see Y. Kaufmann, Toledot ha Emunah haYisreelit (Jerusalem/Tel Aviv: Mosad Bialik/Dvir, 1955), 3:93–107, 319 (Eng. trans. by M. Greenberg, The Religion of Israel [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960], pp. 368–
28 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism 77); H. L. Ginsberg, “Hosea, Book of,” EJ 8:1010–22. On Micah see Ginsberg, The Israelian Heritage in Judaism (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982), pp. 25–30. 8. The following several paragraphs are drawn from my “The Evolution of the Pentateuchal Narratives in the Light of the Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic,” pp. 22–25, in Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism, ed. J. Tigay (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). Interested readers will find fuller documentation there. 9. The names Yahwistic and Elohistic are based on the fact that in the J source the divine name YHWH is known to humans throughout the patriarchal period, whereas in the E source it is first revealed to Moses and until then God is called Elohim. The Priestly source is so called because it includes extensive cultic rules and even its narratives reflect the concepts and terminology found in those rules. Some scholars think that the priestly material was not a fully developed source document but rather a redactional strand produced by a priestly writer or school that edited JE and supplemented it with extensive priestly lore. For bibliography on, and a refutation of, that view see B. J. Schwartz, “The Priestly Account of the Theophany and Lawgiving at Sinai,” pp. 103–134 in M. V. Fox et al., Texts, Temples and Traditions. A Tribute to Menahem Haran (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1996). It has long been recognized that the priestly materials are also not all of one cloth. The “Holiness Code,” or H (Lev. 17–26 and some related passages), is generally thought to constitute a distinctive work; both it and P seem internally composite as well. The relationship of H and P is debated; see n. 10. 10. I. Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995). See further H. T. C. Sun, “Holiness Code,” Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 3:254–56; J. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 1, 13–42. 11. See Tigay, “Conflation as a Redactional Technique,” in Empirical Models, pp. 53– 89 and the comments of M. Greenberg cited there, p. 54. 12. See Tigay, Empirical Models. 13. Cf. Tigay, “Evolution,” in Empirical Models, pp. 44f., and the comments of Greenberg cited there. 14. Tigay, “Conflation,” in Empirical Models, pp. 84–85. See also D. Sperber, Minhagei Yisrael (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1989—), 1:39–45; 2:23–75, 203. Examples include various blessings, including the different versions of Modim Anahnu Lakh, the different answers to the Four Questions in the Haggadah shel Pesah (that is, the answers of Samuel and Rab, respectively—namely, Avadim Hayyinu and Mitehfi illah Ovedei Avodah Zarah, b. Pesahim 116a), and Ahavah Rabbah vs. Ahavat Olam. Not only what is recited, but physical practices as well are sometimes “anthological,” combining different versions of what a practice ought to be, sometimes intentionally trying to satisfy multiple opinions; one well-known example is the practice of wearing two different sets of tefillin, each made in accordance with a different view of how the texts in them should be arranged. See further Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy (Devarim) (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), p. 241, comment to Deuteronomy. 26:10. As Sperber notes, some Jewish practices are conflate because they are based on books of customs that are anthological. 15. Sheelat Yaavetz, no. 145, cited by Y. Weingarten, HaMahfi zor HaMeforash, Yom Kippur, Nusahfi Ashkenaz (Jerusalem: Gefen, 5747 / 1986–87), Introduction, p. 25. 16. B. Eruv. 13b; Git. 6b. See D. Weiss Halivni, Peshat and Derash (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 116–19; A. J. Heschel, Torah Min Hashamayim 3 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1990), esp. chap. 4. While the issue in Eruvin is halakhic, that in Gittin deals with the interpretation of a biblical narrative and provides an
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 29 instructive example of exegetical harmonization. R. Abiathar (a third-century Palestinian Amora) and R. Jonathan debated the reason why the Levite’s concubine deserted him (Judg. 19:1–2). The former held that it was because the Levite had become angry at finding a fly in his food, while the latter held that he had found a hair. R. Abiathar met Elijah and asked him what God thought of the matter, and Elijah answered that God had quoted both opinions. When R. Abiathar questioned whether God could have doubts, Elijah answered that both opinions are the words of the living God and went on to explain (harmonistically) that the Levite first found a fly but had not become angry, but later found a hair and did. By indicating that both opinions reflected different moments in the same episode, God had removed any conflict between them and enabled them to coexist, exactly as redactors do in arranging conflicting details of the same event (see earlier, text to n. 11, and “Conflation,” in Empirical Models, p. 76). 17. W. Robertson Smith, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church, 3d ed. (New York: Appleton, 1892), pp. 328–29. For the evidence see Tigay, ed., Empirical Models, chap. 1. 18. See Tigay, Deuteronomy, p. xii. 19. See Tigay, Deuteronomy, pp. xxiv–xxvi, 494–97, 502–07, 510–13, 518–21, 522–24. 20. Tigay, Deuteronomy, p. 504. 21. This phrase is modeled on “literary homily,” a phrase used by J. Heinemann to describe the final stage in the redaction of homiletic midrashim, as he understood the process (J. Heinemann, “Profile of a Midrash: The Art of Composition in Leviticus Rabba,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39 [1971]:141–50; “The Art of Composition in Midrash Vayikra Rabbah,” HaSifrut 2 [1971]:808–34). 22. The existence of short oracles does not depend on the now discredited evolutionary assumption that prophecy originally consisted of short oracles and only later of longer ones. Short oracles are actually attested, both early and late. See, for example, J. B. Pritchard, ed., Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament. 3d ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 624, texts e, f, and g (note the contemporaneous longer prophecies on pp. 623, 625–26); 1 Kings 20:13; 22:11, 17; Jonah 3:4; Josephus, War, 6.301, 304, 309. 23. Cf. M. Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20 (Anchor Bible 22; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), pp. 5–6. 24. A. Berlin, Zephaniah (Anchor Bible 25A. New York: Doubleday, 1994), pp. 17–23 (the quoted phrase is from p. 21). 25. See, for example, Greenberg, Ezekiel, Berlin, Zephaniah, and S. Paul, Amos (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 11–15; M. Haran, “Amos, Book of Amos,” Entsyklopedia Mikrait 5, cols. 275–76. 26. The difficulty is nicely expressed in Steven Fraade’s description of a similar problem in analyzing the composition of midrashic compositions: Do the apparently disjunctive way in which individual traditions have been combined and the internal incongruities reflect the conscious creativity of the “storyteller” or rhetor who works such tensions into his narrative so as to hold his audience in suspense, or the haste of a collector/preserver of traditions who does not get to ironing out all such “seams”? . . . At what point does relative formal and thematic unity such as we have witnessed cease to reflect the redactor’s conscious intent and begin to be simply the text’s effect on the mind of its reader/ listener? Here the line between the relatively objective literary criteria and more subjective impressions becomes blurred and our task of describing and evaluating the redactional activity which produced such a midrash meets its limits. For the more we read and reread this kind of text and it becomes lodged in our minds,
30 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism the better its pieces seem to fit together, the more its language seems to echo, and the more its messages seem to coalesce. The historian must be careful to recognize the limits of such inquiries into midrashic redaction, distinguishing always between controlled analysis and intuitive impressions. It is all too easy when searching for a consistent “mind” behind such a collective text to find it, but only after having read too much between the lines. Steven D. Fraade, “Sifre Deuteronomy 26 (ad Deut. 3:23): How Conscious the Composition?” HUCA 54 (1983):292–93. 27. Much of the following is drawn from the pertinent sections of J. Tigay, Deuteronomy, where interested readers can find fuller documentation. 28. Cf. C. Brekelmans, “Wisdom Influence on Deuteronomy,” in D. L. Christiansen, ed., A Song of Power and the Power of Song (Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbraun’s, 1993), pp. 125– 27. 29. The tannaitic chronological work Seder Olam Rabbah implies that the five main speeches of Deuteronomy actually consist of several shorter speeches. The Seder Olam says that Moses expounded (peresh) the entire Torah—that is, delivered the speeches of Deuteronomy (ending at 31:14, hen qarevu yameikha lamut, “the time is drawing near for you to die”)—over a period of 36 days, from 1 Shevat through 6 Adar. See Seder Olam Rabbah 10 (ed. Ratner, p. 41, re: Deut. 1:3). This implies that Deuteronomy contains 36 days’ worth of speeches, in other words that it consisted of units that were smaller and more numerous than what is implied by the headings in the book. This view leaves room for the possibility that the present arrangement is secondary and not in the order in which the speeches were originally given (ein muqdam umeuhfi ar baTorah). 30. The translation that follows is based on Tanakh, The Holy Scriptures (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985) (slightly modified). 31. See M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972). 32. See Tigay, Deuteronomy, p. 74. 33. Together, 10:12–11:9 are printed in siddurim as Parashat haYir’ah. 34. See Tigay, Deuteronomy, p. 109. 35. Yarash, “occupy,” is also echoed in the third paragraph, where it and its derivative are rendered “dislodge” and “dispossess” (v. 23), and in the assonant noun tirosh, “wine” (v. 14). 36. For the juxtaposition of these two themes, see Tigay, Deuteronomy, pp. 237–38. 37. Vv. 1, 5, 14, 21, 26, 40. 38. What Israel saw, or did not see, with its own eyes (vv. 3, 9, 12, 15, 34–36); the impression observance will make in the eyes of the nations (v. 6; see also 5, 19, 28); hearing (vv. 1, 6, 10, 12, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36). 39. Vv. 1, 5, 10, 14. 40. Vv. 9, 35, 39. 41. Vv. 9, 23, 31. 42. V. 6. 43. Vv. 4, 8, 20, 38–40. 44. Vv. 7–8, 33–34. Both of these units refer to “great” things (vv. 6–8, 32, 38). 45. See vv. 10–12, 26, 32–33, 36, 39. 46. This arrangement contrasts with that in Deuteronomy. 1:6–3:29, which begins with the departure from Horeb and progresses chronologically up to the encampment at Peor (see 1:6; 3:29) (N. Lohfink, cited by J. Levenson, “Who Inserted the Book of the Torah?” HTR 68 [1975]:203, 204). 47. See M. Noth, The Deuteronomistic History (Sheffield, England: Sheffield University, 1981), pp. 13–14, 33–34.
Anthology in the Torah and the Question of Deuteronomy 31 48. Chapters 8 and 9–10 display similar integrity. See Tigay, Deuteronomy, pp. 91–92, 96–97. 49. See A. Rofe´, The Belief in Angels in the Bible and in Early Israel (Jerusalem: Makor, 1979), pp. 289–97; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, pp. 34, 46. 50. Stern, “Introduction” to The Anthological Imagination in Jewish Literature, Prooftexts 17, no. 1 (January, 1997):6. 51. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, pp. 179–319; “Theological Currents in Pentateuchal Literature,” in Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, 1969, 117–39. 52. I. Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995). 53. S. Japhet, The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles and Its Place in Biblical Thought (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997). 54. Kaufmann, Toledot 1:23–44 (Eng. trans., The Religion of Israel, pp. 157–66). 55. Kaufmann, Toledot 3:557–87 (Eng. trans. The Religion of Israel, pp. 316–27). 56. The redactional techniques of the midrashim are the subject of lively discussion. See, for example, Heinemann, “Profile of a Midrash”; R. Hammer, “Section 38 of Sifre Deuteronomy: An Example of the Use of Independent Sources to Create a Literary Unit,” Hebrew Union College Annual 50 (1979):165–78; R. Hammer, “Complex Forms of Aggadah and Their Influence on Content,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 48 (1981):183–206; Steven D. Fraade, “Sifre Deuteronomy 26 (ad Deut. 3:23): How Conscious the Composition?” Hebrew Union College Annual 54 (1983):245–301; J. Neusner, Judaism and Scripture. The Evidence of Leviticus Rabbah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Deuteronomy has more in common with midrash than its anthological character. Its argumentation resembles that of midrash in that it builds its arguments on specific premises much as midrash uses biblical verses as the premises of its arguments. In Deuteronomy the “texts” that serve as the premises of arguments are not verses of sacred writ but historical events (such as the Exodus, Horeb, the manna, the Golden Calf and Baal Peor incidents), the topography of the Promised Land, the justice of God’s laws, and other phenomena; these play a role analogous to that of biblical verses in midrash. When historical events are mentioned, for example, they are not narrated in full or for their own sake as they are in Exodus and Numbers, but in order to prove a sermonic point: the Exodus and Horeb events are cited to show that the Lord is the only true God and that Israel should therefore obey His laws and shun idols (4:9–20, 32–40); the journey from Horeb to the Promised Land is cited to point out that Israel’s faithlessness caused an entire generation to perish in the wilderness (1:1–46); when the manna is mentioned, it is to show that God controls nature and can make anything He chooses nourishing, for which reason Israel should always obey Him (8:1–6). In this way Deuteronomy can be seen as a kind of forerunner of the homiletic exposition of biblical verses in the midrashim. 57. N. M. Sarna, Studies in Biblical Interpretation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2000), pp. 69, 258–59. 58. See Mikraot Gedolot im l″b peirushim (New York: Pardes, 1951); H fi umash q″k peirushim (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company, n.d.); Sefer Keter HaTorah. Ha″Taj″ HaGadol . . . kolel hfi amishim mefarshim . . . , ed. Y. H fi asid (Jerusalem, 5730/1970). 59. B. Barry Levy, “Rabbinic Bibles, Mikra’ot Gedolot, and Other Great Books,” Tradition 25 (1991):69.
3 james kugel
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper
here existed in ancient Israel a particular notion, “wisdom,” which uniquely
Tfavored the anthology genre; the biblical books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes present the clearest examples of the anthological character of wisdom within the Jewish canon. Indeed, wisdom was an international pursuit, and wisdom anthologies are found elsewhere as well in the ancient Near East, constituting among the oldest surviving literary texts from that region.1 Before examining how these anthologies emerged in Israel, however, it will be necessary to explain what it is about wisdom that is inherently anthological. The word “wisdom” (Hebrew hfi okhmah) does not generally designate in the Bible a person’s capacity for understanding or insight, though it can sometimes be used in this sense. Principally, however, “wisdom” designates a body of knowledge. So, for example, the Bible’s assertion that Solomon’s wisdom “was greater than the wisdom of the people of the east, and all the wisdom of Egypt” (I Kings 5:10 [some books, 4:30]) does not seek to compare his power of understanding with that of the sages of other nations, but refers to the greater body of learning that he had acquired. (For this reason, indeed, the text goes on to specify what that body of learning consisted of: 3,000 proverbs, 1,005 songs, plus a knowledge of plants, animals, birds, reptiles, and fish [I Kings 5:12–13].) So similarly, when Qohelet, the author of Ecclesiastes, speaks of acquiring wisdom, it is clear that he does not mean increasing his potential for understanding, but coming to possess some actual body of learning: “I had gotten more and greater wisdom than all who ever ruled before me over Jerusalem, and my mind had come to know much wisdom and knowledge” (Eccles. 1:16). Wisdom usually designated things known. Those things, however, were neither infinite nor random, for in the ancient world, knowledge was conceived to be an altogether static thing: whatever a person might come to know belonged to a defined corpus of things; it was this finite body that “wisdom” designated. This defined corpus of insights was deemed to play a special role in the world: it underlay all of reality, constituting the great set of 32
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 33
master plans by which the world—the natural world, of course, but also human society—was governed. In biblical Israel, as indeed elsewhere in the ancient Near East, this meant that wisdom had a divine character.2 Wisdom was, in an oft-stated biblical view, the set of plans with which God had created and continued to run the world: By wisdom the Lord founded the earth, by understanding He established the heavens. Prov. 3:19 How great are your works, Lord, you made them all with wisdom, the world is full of your creations. Ps. 104:24 How great are your works, O Lord, deep indeed are your plans. One who is a fool cannot know this, nor a boor understand it. Ps. 92:6–7
God, in other words, had established a set of highly detailed rules by which His world would be governed: the sun would rise in the east and set in the west, precious metals would be hidden inside rocks and extracted therefrom with fire, storks would roost in fir trees, and so on. Such rules as these three were obvious enough. Other parts of the divine plan, however, were hidden; however finite, the totality of wisdom, of the divine plan, was somehow beyond the grasp of any human being. In alluding to this circumstance, the Bible offers various explanations for it. One, certainly, was that God had intentionally hidden the rules by which the world worked, leaving it up to this or that sage to discover individual pieces of the puzzle: It is the glory of God to conceal things, and the glory of kings to find them out. Prov. 25:2 If only God would speak, if only He would open His lips to you, then He would tell you the secrets of wisdom, [reveal] understanding twice over; Yea, God would make you forget your suffering! But can you grasp God’s insights? Can you probe to the Almighty’s limit? Job 11:5–7 But where does wisdom come from? And where is the place of understanding? She [⫽ wisdom, understanding] is hidden from the sight of all the living, and concealed [even] from the birds of the sky . . . God [alone] knows the path to her, yea, He knows her place. Job 28:20–23
On the other hand, how could a mere human being even hope to discover all of wisdom? After all, the paltriness of human life was a byword among Israel’s sages:
34 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism Since his [mankind’s] time is apportioned, numbered by You [God] down to the months, who have set his portion irrevocably, Leave him alone, desist, and let him finish out his day like a hired hand. Job 14:5 The time of our lives is but seventy years, or if mightily [doled out], then eighty, and most of them [are consumed in] toil and fatigue. . . . Ps. 90:10
It is only toward the very end of life that human beings can begin to grasp God’s ways: Wisdom is with the aged, and understanding in length of days. With [God] are wisdom and might; He has counsel and understanding. Job 12:12–13
And so, finite though it might be, the corpus of knowledge underlying the world could hardly be mastered in a single human lifetime. For we are from yesterday, and [therefore] know nothing, our time on earth is a fleeting shadow. Job 8:9
Indeed, sometimes the two motifs—God’s hiding of wisdom, and man’s brevity on earth—were combined to explain human ignorance: [God] creates everyone nicely in His time, but He puts something hidden in their hearts, so that man cannot find out what God has created from beginning to end. Eccles. 2:11
Given these fundamental circumstances, what indeed could a human being hope to discover of the great rules governing life on earth? It is here that wisdom literature comes in. For if human beings could not discover the whole of the divine plan underlying reality, surely parts of it were indeed given to discovery. Already mentioned were those elements of the natural world—sunrise and sunset, the phases of the moon and movements of the stars, plus the ways of animals and birds and plants—that could be understood through careful observation. If it is true that observations such as these scarcely had a place as such in biblical wisdom literature, well, this is in itself an important datum (to which we shall return). But it is nonetheless the case that such “scientific” matters certainly formed part of the theoretical corpus of wisdom known to biblical sages, as the above-mentioned passage detailing Solomon’s wisdom (I Kings 5:10 ff) attests on one end of the biblical time line. On the other, there is the figure of the biblical sage Enoch, to whom is attributed, in a section of the relatively late (third century b.c.e. and later) treatise bearing his name, observations about the length of the solar year as opposed to the lunar year and other complex astronomical and me-
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 35
teorological calculations (I Enoch 72–82). So what we think of as science was certainly part of the ancient sage’s domain. But it was only part; the other part had to do with human affairs, with how people behaved with one another and how God (sometimes in consequence) treated human beings. In the wisdom mentality, such matters were, no less than the path of the stars, subject to careful observation and formulation—and so these too were, from ancient times, set down, formulated, fixed. The manner in which such insights were formulated was itself fixed. For while the “wisdom mentality” infuses all manner of different compositions and genres within (and outside of) the biblical world—from the biblical narrative of Joseph to the prophecies of Amos to a good number of biblical psalms—wisdom itself was typically imparted through one literary form alone, the mashal, or proverb. A biblical mashal is a brief sentence consisting of two parts, A and B. This two-part construction is hardly an incidental detail: it is the very genius of the form, for the relationship between A and B is often quite subtle. A good example might be a biblical mashal whose subject is, as a matter of fact, meshalim (that is, the plural of mashal): A thistle got stuck in a drunkard’s hand, and a proverb [mashal] in the mouth of a fool. Prov. 26:9
Drunkards in the Bible are known not particularly for their boisterousness or meanness or insensitivity to pain, but for their lack of balance: they are often depicted as “staggering” and falling to the ground (Isa. 19:14, 24:20; Ps. 107:27; Job 12:25, etc.). So, apparently, the drunkard in this proverb: he must have fallen to the ground and, in groping around, thrust his hand into some sort of thornbush or briar and so gained possession, as it were, of a thistle or thorn: it got stuck in his hand. The event described in part B, the proverbist asserts, is of a similar character: a fool may quote proverbs, but this does not mean that he has purposely set about learning them, nor that he truly understands, or lives by, their wisdom. Like the drunkard’s thorn, the fool’s proverb has been acquired quite by accident. Part B, as is usually the case, is thus the whole point of the mashal here, and part A, as frequently, is an image or specific case to which B is being compared. But of course, to say only that is to pass over the little details, the poetry, of the comparison. Certainly it is important that the fool of part B is being compared to an utterly senseless drunk in part A, and still more that the proverb mentioned in part B is implicitly compared to something sharp and prickly in part A—since, in the biblical world, proverbs were proverbially sharp (Eccles. 12:11, also Deut. 28: 37, I Kings 9:7, etc.).3 The aptness, the associatedness, of likeness and likened in both cases seems to confirm the truth of the mashal well beyond the matter of accidental acquisition, which is its overt common term. And so, yes, a proverb in a fool’s mouth is indeed just like a thistle in a drunkard’s hand—isn’t it obvious once you think about it? It is noteworthy that the comparison in this proverb is not formally stated: the mere juxtaposition of two assertions is sufficient for us to understand that one is being compared to another. So similarly:
36 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism Gold ring in a pig’s snout, a beautiful woman of errant sense. Prov. 11:22
Here, too, the genius is all in the details—the fact that, in this proverb’s syntax, we first glimpse the gold ring and only afterward its repugnant setting, so to speak, is meant precisely to duplicate the onlooker’s experience of glimpsing first the woman’s beauty and only later that beauty’s unfortunate, larger context. What is more, the proverb’s assertion that the “beautiful woman of errant sense” is fundamentally inappropriate, conjoining two things that don’t, or at least shouldn’t, go together, does not mean that they are opposite equals. On the contrary, the woman’s physical beauty ends up being submerged and overwhelmed by something much bigger, a dirty, sloppy, wallowing: it becomes a small detail, an insignificant little glint of gold quite lost in or dwarfed by her piggish behavior. Proverbs like these were certainly pondered, studied. I do not mean to imply that biblical sages were literary critics, or that they would have formulated their thoughts precisely as I have above; but if a proverb was to be truly understood (and not simply picked up like a thorn), it had to be savored for its full implications. Better is a name than scented oil, and the day of death than the day of one’s birth. Eccles. 7:1
Part A seems quite indisputable: one’s name, one’s reputation, is better than any material possession, better even than the precious oils that, in biblical times, were scented with rare spices and imported from distant regions at great cost. Valuable as such oils might be, they could, in the world of biblical wisdom, scarcely match in value the worth of a person’s own name. Indeed, the truth of part A is only driven home by the near-perfect chiasmus of its sound, bwj !mXm ~X bwj. But what about the second half of the proverb: how is the day of death better than the day of one’s birth? Birth is almost always a happy occasion and death almost always a sad one; in what sense can the day of one’s death be “better”? More overtly than most, this mashal is a riddle. Yet a biblical sage would probably say that every mashal is a riddle in that it needs pondering in order to reveal its full sense. Here the precious oil mentioned in the first half of the proverb provides the clue. Such oil was valuable, so valuable that it was usually kept stoppered in little vials to protect it. In such vials it could survive for some time. Even so, precious oils could, would, eventually go bad. As Ecclesiastes itself later mentions, “flies of decay,” tiny fruit flies, can get into the oil and become the proverbial “fly in the ointment,” causing it suddenly to turn and go bad (Eccles. 10:1). And if it were not such a fruit fly, then the mere passage of time would eventually do the same thing; no matter how valuable the oil, sooner or later it would turn, and what was worth hundreds of dollars one day would be quite worthless the next. So is it with the human being, or at least the human body. Sooner or later our physical existence gives out; this does not necessarily happen all at once, but eventually what had once been vigorous and full of strength begins to deteriorate,
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and the way of all flesh leads to the grave. Quite the opposite, says Ecclesiastes, is a person’s name (by which he means, I think, not only a person’s reputation— what other people know about him or her—but rather, more abstractly, the sum total of a person’s accomplishments, what can be said afterward, a kind of condensation of everything that he or she has done). A name, in this sense, is not acquired at birth: the newborn baby quite literally has no name, and even after it has lived for a time, it has no name in the sage’s sense: that name begins to be acquired only as the person does things on earth, starts to show the world what he or she is made of. The more a person lives and does, the more that name grows and becomes more detailed and specific. Quite unlike the body, a person’s “name” in this sense is altogether immune to the inroads of time. A name—in this abstract sense of the sum total of all a person’s deeds—is immutable, so that eventually that name is all that remains of our earthly existence; years, centuries after our death, the name—in this abstract sense—is what we are, what our life has amounted to. For this reason, the proverbist says, the day of a person’s death may be a sad day, but it is indeed better in the sense that the process of building that name, which only began on the day of birth, is now at last complete. Just as you concede, says Ecclesiastes, that a good name is better than precious oil in the sense that the precious oil is bound to go bad but the name is immune to decay, so you must also admit that the day of death, although the precious substance of the body has at last gone, is nonetheless better than the day of birth, for on this day the person’s “name” is now complete and set for eternity. Similar sentiments are found in the Book of Proverbs: In the goodness of the righteous a city rejoices, and when the wicked disappear there is gladness. Prov. 11:10
At first one might think that this proverb simply presents a straightforward contrast: a city rejoices in the life of its righteous citizens and in the death of its wicked ones. But that is not quite the point: if such had been the Hebrew sage’s intentions, I think he would have written something more like: In the lives of the righteous [and not in their “goodness”] the city rejoices, and when the wicked die [and not “disappear,” which is not precisely a synonym of death] there is gladness.
The fact that the proverbist avoided this obvious, and rather simple-minded, bit of parallelism, writing instead goodness and disappear, suggests a different interpretation. As a matter of fact, everyone in this proverb is already dead. The proverb’s claim is that, even after their deaths, the righteous leave a legacy of goodness to the world, a goodness (in biblical Hebrew the word can, in fact, mean “abundance” or “wealth”) from which people will continue to benefit long afterward, whereas the wicked, however harmful they may be during their lifetime, do not merely perish at the end but disappear without a trace: they leave no legacy. In other words, this proverb’s sentiment is quite the opposite of Marc Antony’s
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in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. The evil that men do, it says, can scarcely outlive them: as soon as they die they are powerless to harm us. The good that people do, on the contrary, lives on after them, so that generations not yet born will reap the benefits of that good. The city that rejoices, in this proverb, thus stands for all our fellow human beings: our true achievement is in what we are able to leave to them, whereas wickedness (which in Proverbs is often a synonym for selfindulgence or even foolishness) simply spends itself out and leaves nothing. The mashal form, , . A B was thus the basic building block of wisdom. True wisdom, that is, any true insight into the great divine plan underlying all of reality, could be, and was, packaged in this two-part sentence. This form was, in fact, used for many things other than wisdom: from earliest times all manner of laws, prophecies, songs, and other carefully constructed pronouncements had been put into pithy, two-part utterances like this. It is important, therefore, to distinguish the wisdom mashal from its close cousins, namely, most of the rest of what has been called the “poetry” of the Bible (all the more so because the spirit of wisdom truly does inform much of the Book of Psalms, a good part of the prophets, and even some legal sections of the Bible). The wisdom mashal is essentially an independent insight, a great general rule about the way the world works, packaged in a two-part sentence of the type seen here. It stands on its own, a one-line poem, and invites our contemplation. Despite their modular form, these individual insights were, from earliest times, gathered into collections. The reason is not hard to find. As was already mentioned, the sage was one who had acquired wisdom—the wisdom set down in proverbs—and acquiring wisdom meant, quite literally, coming to possess (whether orally or in writing) a large stock of proverbs.4 So it was altogether natural that sages themselves would assemble such collections and pass them on to their pupils. Indeed, here and there within the biblical corpus are clear signs of the anthologist at work. Sometimes meshalim are organized within an individual book according to some mechanical principle, like the bwj sayings of Ecclesiastes 7:1– 18, with their recurrent “Better X than Y. . . .” Often individual meshalim are juxtaposed in the Bible because they deal with the same or related subjects. It is clear, for example, that chapter 26 of Proverbs methodically deals first with the subject of fools (vv. 1–12), then that of lazy men (13–16), then that of quarrels: One who grabs a dog by the ears, a passerby who meddles in a dispute not his own.5 Like a jester6 who shoots [real] firebrands, arrows, and death, so is one who cheated his fellow and said, “I was just joking.” Without wood the fire goes out, and without [third-party] slanderers, the quarrel is quieted. Charcoal to embers and wood to fire, a quarrelsome man to a heated dispute. The words of a slanderer are gulped up fast, but they end up in one’s guts. Prov. 26:17–22
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 39
Such thematic organization notwithstanding, it seems likely that these proverbs originated independently, or at least were composed as individual units rather than as continuous discourse. Indeed, the anthologist of the just quoted passage is scarcely bothered by the repetition of images (wood added to fire) or specific terms (the roots for “slander” and “quarrel”) in it, precisely because each verse is an independent unit; each can, and probably did, travel on its own before being anthologized here. So it is no accident, for example, that the last mashal of the passage appears elsewhere in the same book, Proverbs 18:8. The tendency to bring together meshalim of similar subject or importance is still more pronounced in the late wisdom collection of Ben Sira (early second century b.c.e.), which consists principally of miniature treatises, each made up of individual meshalim dealing with such subjects as friendship, honoring of parents, or divine providence. Beyond this phenomenon are passages of what is called biblical “wisdom literature,” which are only formally meshalim but which in fact present a continuous, developing argument. Even a unit as large as chapters 1–9 of Proverbs, it has been argued, may be a consciously composed whole, however much it may here and there appear to be a collection of individual proverbs.7 Whether or not one accepts this particular argument for chapters 1–9, it is certainly beyond dispute that, for example, chapter 7 is a narrative, though written in the two-part, mashal form: And now a woman meets him, dressed as a harlot, wily of heart. She is loud and wayward, her feet do not stay at home; one step outside, then a step to the market, and at every corner she lies in wait. She seizes him and kisses him, and with impudent face she says. . . . Prov. 7:10–13
But again, that is just the point: so much was the one-line mashal the vehicle of wisdom, the accepted form by which wisdom insights were expressed, that this author, in wishing to dramatize the dangers of a smooth seductress (herself, apparently, representative of “foreign wisdom”), had little choice but to tell his story in two-part bursts, adopting the familar rhythms of wisdom-speak to narrate his young hero’s downfall.8 Wisdom meant the mashal. The anthological character of wisdom in the ancient Near East thus derives directly from the various considerations just outlined. It begins with the belief that nothing that happens in the world is random: everything occurs in keeping with a highly detailed set of (divinely established) rules, divine “wisdom.” No single human being can hope to discover or master the whole of the divine rule book, for God has hidden at least part of His plans far beyond human discovery, and, in any case, human life is much too short to allow a single sage, no matter how discerning, to understand everything. But parts of the divine plan have been grasped by sages past, and they have formulated their insights and set them down for later generations. Their understanding, packaged in individual meshalim, might best be compared to sets of coordinates on a graph. While the detailed totality of the graph is beyond human ken, a number of specific insights—forty-seven squares
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to the right, five squares up, or again seventeen units to the left, three units down— had already been established for all time. One who wished to know at least some wisdom had thus to master these fixed points on the graph, master meshalim, and in so doing one could gain, in addition to the specific insights, a feel for the existence of the divine plan in its entirety. But these meshalim, the encapsulation of divine wisdom, hardly constituted a single individual’s, or even an individual nation’s, undertaking. Some points on the wisdom graph, like stars in the stratosphere, had been glimpsed only once, by this or that sage in a distant land ages past. Charting wisdom was thus inevitably a collective, international enterprise, and one who wished to acquire wisdom had willy-nilly to learn from all true sages everywhere. (It is thus scarcely surprising that Sumerian proverbs were translated into Akkadian,9 or Egyptian ones into Hebrew,10 nor yet that the Hebrew Bible can unashamedly speak, as we have seen, of the “wisdom of the people of the east, and all the wisdom of Egypt” [I Kings 5:10].) By the same token, one who wished to transmit wisdom to one’s students would be foolish to limit them to one’s own insights. However much he may have reformulated old truths in his own idiom, however much the individual sage weighed and studied and made many proverbs Eccles. 12:9
his stock-in-trade consisted of the timeless, collective insights of all sages everywhere. By definition, then, any sage was an anthologist, any wisdom book a bouquet de pense´es gathered from here and there.11 One might think it unlikely, given the anthological character of wisdom literature, that it would end up possessing a particular character or espousing a particular point of view: after all, it had been assembled from here and there, formulated by sages of every nation and ideology. But, of course, any student of anthologizing knows better. Anthologies are often, and quite consciously, tendentious, the hand of the anthologizer visible in every act of inclusion or exclusion. And even when such conscious Tendenz is not apparent, there are the “rules of the game” observed by all players, sometimes quite unconsciously; in our case, the common background and training and literary experience of all those who contributed to the wisdom undertaking could not but make itself felt in what they had to say. It might thus be appropriate, at this point, to say something about the overall character of biblical wisdom and, in particular, the ideology that stands behind the Bible’s wisdom collections. The first element of that ideology has already been mentioned, the belief in a great set of divine plans underlying all reality. To those trained to read the Bible through the lens of later Judaism or Christianity, the idea of such a set of plans might seem to be pan-biblical: is not God’s control of all of reality everywhere assumed? It is necessary, therefore, to be precise: it is not merely God’s control of reality that this ideology postulates (though even that idea is hardly attested universally in the Bible), but the existence of the great, preestablished pattern. In a sense, God Himself is subject to that pattern (though He is, of course, frequently
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 41
presented as its author), since everything that He does or will do must obey its general stipulations. This is hardly an assumption shared by every biblical writer. Indeed, the author of Hannah’s song of celebration in I Samuel 2 seems to glory in just the opposite notion, that God breaks all the rules: The bow of the mighty goes slack, but the ones who were weak now triumph. Those who had plenty are hired out for food, while the formerly hungry are feasting. A barren woman gives birth to seven, and she who had many is left alone. The Lord can kill and bring back to life, send down to Sheol and lift up again. The Lord can make poor and make rich, humiliate or exalt. He picks the needy up from the dust, lifts the destitute out of the scrapheap, Yea, sets them up next to princes, grants them a glorious throne. I Sam. 2:4–8
Not so in the world of wisdom: here everything is regular, and almost everything is predictable. It was remarked earlier that the wisdom included in the Hebrew Bible contains very little of what we would call “science”: the materiae of the natural world may be alluded to in catalogs such as Job 28, but the setting forth of such learning is decidedly not the purpose of biblical wisdom literature. This, too, seems to be an ideological statement: biblical wisdom is not so much out to educate as to inculcate. Not startling new facts, but timeless old verities, is what the biblical sage wishes to pass on, and his clever formulations stand in contrast to the obvious character of what he has to say: tread the straight and narrow, resist all excess, be good, wait for your reward. That is why inculcating—pounding, grinding, the ideas in—is what he is all about: his point needs to be driven home again precisely because it has been heard, and ignored, so often in the past. It should be observed in this connection what an abstract, spiritual world is that of biblical wisdom: it is a place of essences and ideal states. The previously cited Proverbs 11:10 could not be more eloquent in this regard. Shakespeare, who lived nowhere but on this earth, knew all too well about the power of the wicked to continue to affect our lives long after their own demise; they rarely just “disappear.” Perhaps the biblical proverbist knew this too. But if so, he chose nevertheless to maintain the opposite, for that is the way things ought to be, that is what would suit the great divine plan underlying all events. Indeed, it is this same otherworldly, abstract sense of things that caused wisdom writers to divide all of humanity into the two groups mentioned in Proverbs 11:10 (and almost everywhere else in wisdom writings), the “righteous” and the “wicked”—though “good” and “bad” might be a better translation, providing at least a feel for how these paired opposites usually function. Anyone who inhabits terra firma knows full well that few human beings belong entirely to one category or another; why, then, does wisdom literature insist on assigning all of us to one of these two groups? It is, I think, because in that severe eternity of spiritual essences, there really is no room for, no point in, nuance and shadow: the great
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choices are made in the depths of the human soul, far from the sunlight. In this sense, the world of biblical wisdom is very much akin to that of medieval European painting or medieval and Renaissance allegory: here is no attempt to render realistically the human form or the ordinary events of this world, since that reality is, in any case, trivial. What counts is what is underneath, the true significance of ordinary things, and so everything turns into heraldry and symbolism; life happens in slow motion. For the same reason, the mentality of biblical wisdom could never be translated into, for example, ordinary cinema; but animated cartoons—there is a medium suitable for its spirituality. In that domain of primary colors, there are no shadows, and if the sun is seen at all, it is as a big yellow circle with squiggly rays shooting out of it. Only such a medium can capture the inside events of the soul, such as the time when the (wicked) cat, out to trick the (righteous) mouse, quickly sketches a picture of a tunnel and tacks it up onto a brick wall. Along comes the mouse on his motorcycle, heads straight for the picture, and drives on through it—it is a tunnel! Then the cat, in hot pursuit, heads his motorcycle toward the same spot, but craaash! It is back to being a picture of a tunnel tacked to a brick wall. This is wisdom’s world as well, in which the testimony of the senses is by definition suspect and treacherous, and everything that happens obeys a set of higher moral laws. Indeed, the human being depicted by orthodox wisdom is not so much man as little man, that small, sometimes laughable little fellow glimpsed from above, as if from the divine perspective.12 This is how the poor fool of Proverbs 7 first appears: For at the window of my house, through my lattice, I looked down. There, among the foolish ones, I glimpsed amidst the boys a senseless lad, passing in the street next to her corner, now striding up toward her house. Prov. 7:6–8
It is from this same perspective that a wisdom-imbued psalmist could assert: From the heavens the Lord looks out, seeing all of humanity. From the place of His dwelling He looks down on all of earth’s inhabitants. He who made the hearts of all of them [likewise] perceives their every deed. No king will escape through force of arms, no mighty man through power. The cavalry’s useless for victory, no matter its force, it will not be saved. But the Lord’s eye is turned to those who fear Him, who trust in His beneficence. Ps. 33:13–18
Just as little man’s vaunted powers are as nothing before God, so his little plans are meaningless in the presence of the Great Plan, the underlying “wisdom” that guides all the world’s affairs. This same psalmist likewise asserts: The Lord overthrows the nations’ plans, undoes the peoples’ designs. The Lord’s plan stands forever, the designs of His heart for every age. Ps. 33:10–11
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Similarly: The Lord knows human designs—that they are a breath [i.e., passing, futile]. Ps. 94:10 A man’s mind may plan his path, but it is the Lord who will determine his steps. Prov. 16:9 Many are the designs in a man’s mind, but the Lord’s plan—that is what will stand. Prov. 19:21
The divine plan is not, however, indifferent to little man, for all his smallness. On the contrary, what happens in human affairs, no less than the great cataclysms of nature, is determined by God’s underlying set of rules. So it is that the theme of reward and punishment is also a crucial one in wisdom literature. As orthodox wisdom would have it, the righteous will inevitably be rewarded for their goodness, while the wicked will just as inevitably be punished. Indeed, one might call this— beyond the very existence of the divine plan—the great theme of wisdom writings: since the world is fundamentally divided into the righteous and the wicked, there can be no doubt that their Maker will, in the course of events, apportion to each group its just deserts. Here, however, reality intrudes. The author of Ecclesiastes was certainly not the first to observe that Sometimes the righteous receive what befits the deeds of the wicked, while the wicked sometimes receive what befits the deeds of the righteous.13 Eccles. 8:14
Even in the ideal world of wisdom, one could not hide from the fact that boorish fat cats drive around town in limousines while wellborn professors must take the bus (Eccles. 10:6–7). So it is that patience is the cardinal virtue of the sage: since he knows that all happens according to the divine plan, the apparent triumph of the wicked must be only temporary. In the end, right will win out, so it is necessary simply to wait. What one waits for is not the world to come or a reward after death, but something in this world: eventually, right here on earth, the wicked of each generation will get what is coming to them, and so will the just. Therefore, patience meant not just waiting for the divine equilibrium to be established, but waiting patiently: Better is the end of a thing than its beginning; better is patience than a haughty spirit. Eccles. 7:8
Once again, a mashal’s coordinated assertions really stand in the relation of “Just as A, so B,” or “You agree with A, now therefore admit B.” The wisdom of A here is indeed undeniable. Anyone would concur that something completed is far better than something that is merely in the planning stage, its final outcome far from
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sure; the difference is that between unarguable fact and laudable intentions. Just as this is so, says the sage, so patience, a willingness to take the long view, is better than haughtiness. For if you are not willing to hold off until the thing is completed, your “I will not allow this to happen” or even “How can this happen to me?” will always be off the mark, a reaction to something-in-potential rather than something that really is. There is only one of Israel’s ancestors who is described as “wise,” and that is Joseph (Gen. 41:39); not only is he so described, but he does precisely those things—interpreting dreams, advising the king—that were typical of the ancient Near Eastern sage.14 So it is hardly surprising that the cardinal virtue of patience characterizes this wise hero’s action at every turn. Sold as a slave by his brothers, he does not despair but soon rises to the top of Potiphar’s household staff; even his next reversal—when he is cast down into a dreary dungeon because of a false accusation by his master’s wife—does not break Joseph, because, like any sage, he knows that righteousness in the end will win out. And so it does: he becomes, through a series of divinely manipulated events, viceroy of Egypt. The divine plan is thus not only something Joseph believes in; it is something that his whole life story demonstrates. For everything here had indeed been plotted in advance, the seven years of plenty followed by the seven years of famine; God in fact communicates this plan to Joseph, using Pharaoh as a mere conduit to the true sage’s powers of understanding. Then, set in his justly deserved place of honor, Joseph never seeks to repay his brothers the ill that they caused him—since, in any case, all has happened according to the Great Plan. As Joseph himself tells them, “You are not the ones who sent me down here, but God” (Gen. 44:8), and later, “As for you, you planned evil against me, but God planned it for the good, so as to keep alive a mass of people, as indeed has happened” (Gen. 50:20). Being patient is related, in Latin as in Hebrew, to bearing and suffering. The ancient Near Eastern sage’s patience included, prominently, his ability to suffer, to take it, knowing as he knew that his pains were either the just punishment for some sin he had committed, or part of some divinely instituted test; in either case, if the divine plan means that the righteous will ultimately be rewarded, what harm could there be in a few bumps along the way? “Are your sufferings pleasing to you?” asks one exponent of Rabbinic Judaism—the most direct heir of the biblical wisdom tradition in postbiblical times—to another (b. Ber. 5b). It is a reasonable question if you believe, as he did, that human suffering is ultimately a way of setting things right again between the sufferer and God—indeed, a down payment for future rewards. But if a toothache is always the true test of one’s philosophy, then Israel could scarcely be said to have passed that test with distinction. However much patient suffering was part of the ancient Near Eastern sage’s ideology, it is hardly the dominant note sounded in Hebrew Scripture, and surely it is indicative that even of the three biblical wisdom books mentioned, only one—Proverbs—might be said to subscribe to the rigors of “orthodox” wisdom in this crucial regard. The Book of Job, as is well known, is actually an Israelite’s own view of what he considers this strange, eastern philosophy. Even Job himself, who speaks for
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 45
the book’s author, is not an Israelite, but one from the land of Uz, and all his comforters are similarly identified as foreign sages, graduates of the elite academies of wisdom far from the Israelite west coast. So when Job is struck down, these easterners come up with the pat wisdom answer: everything goes according to the divine plan, therefore your sufferings must be deserved. Indeed, their words are not so much intended to “comfort” Job (though this is a common misunderstanding of the book) as to bring him to the state called, in mishnaic Hebrew, !ydh qwdyc, that is, the acceptance of the justice of God’s unfavorable decree. The ritual of repeatedly refusing to accept the assertion of friends and loved ones that the world makes sense despite the pain, that God’s decree must have been fair—a ritual called “refusing to be comforted” (Gen. 37:35)–was part of the mourning process; “accepting comfort” (!ymwxnt tlbq in mishnaic Hebrew) meant finally giving in. But Job will not. Despite his years of training and mastery of the wisdom idiom, he will not stand by (or rather, sit, since that is what mourners did) and allow black to be called white. The comforters’ words are full of high sentence and a bit obtuse, but behind them it is not hard to glimpse an Israelite author of, probably, the exilic or early postexilic period who, for all his own fascination with wisdom, cannot quite make his peace with patient suffering. Nor, of course, would it be correct to call his book a “wisdom anthology.” It is more like a drama written by someone who can sound like a sage—indeed, who peppers his speech with just enough recherche´, usually foreign, words and roots so as to give it an altogether alien flavor—but who is actually rather short on meshalim. His point is to sound like a sage in order to protest the flawless simplicity of the sagely view of suffering. If, paradoxically, he himself ends up justifying God’s decrees in rather classical wisdom fashion—hence justifying, in no uncertain way, wisdom itself— well, the paradox is the point: he wants wisdom to be true but cannot stand the smugness of its orthodox exponents. The Book of Ecclesiastes presents a rather more complicated situation. Many early wisdom collections from the ancient Near East had taken the form of, for example, a master’s instructions to his pupil, or a father’s words to his son15 —but these were by and large a literary fiction for the anthologist, a framing device. In Ecclesiastes the literary fiction has become fact, to the point that it compromises the very abstract, ideal world of wisdom that it seeks to inhabit. Ecclesiastes is apparently a real person. The name Qohelet (“Ecclesiastes” is but a misguided attempt to render this name in Greek)16 comes from a relatively rare root qhl, which means “argue” or “harangue,”17 and it probably was indeed the man’s real (by)name or, possibly, a very thin persona through which a real man spoke. A sage of probably the fifth or fourth century b.c.e., he was a wealthy Jerusalemite who apparently served for a time as governor of the Jews there, an office he describes, perhaps a bit grandiloquently, as “king” (Eccles. 1:12).18 The very fact that we know these things about him, the fact that he recounts at length (Eccles. 1:12–2:11) his youthful pursuit of self-indulgence (“all for the sake of science, of course,” Eccles. 2:3) and details further stages of his life, is indicative of how far this book is from the idealizing, inner spirituality of Proverbs. Qohelet is a man of this world, and his particular time and place intrude into the world of
46 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism
wisdom he constructs like a ray of afternoon sunlight seeping in under the screening-room door. Indeed, one phrase that he repeats and repeats, a linguistic tic that reveals his true frame of mind, is “under the sun” or “under the heavens” (Eccles. 1:3, 9, 12, 14, etc.); he is down here, out here, making deals, bemoaning the cruelties of fate, growing older. He is a sage, irredeemably so, yet he frequently holds the received wisdom of sages up to the light and finds it wanting. This he reports without joy, since, as he has discovered, there is no alternative to the path of wisdom. If only things were different! But how can you maintain that a person’s “name” is imperishable (Eccles. 7:1) when you know perfectly well that those of former times have no remembrance and even those who live in time to come will have no remembrance with those that come after them. Eccles. 1:11
His discontent is reflected in the very style of the book. Gone are the seamless, measured niceties of the mashal: there are meshalim, of course, plenty of them, but they are interrupted here and there by bits of autobiography, transitional sentences, sidelong glances. What Qohelet particularly likes is to quote an established mashal and then argue with it, or merely comment, “This also is unfair” (Eccles. 6:9; in the same sense, Eccles. 2:15, 21, 23, 26; 4:4, 8, 16, etc.). He takes a perfectly good mashal such as Two are better than one, and a threefold cord is not quickly broken
and, instead of just citing it, interrupts it with a long, prosy parade of illustrations: Two are better than one, since they will surely profit from their work. For if they should fall, one of them will pick up the other, but if there were only one and he fell, the second would not be there to pick him up. Likewise, if two people lie down together, they will keep warm, but one person alone cannot stay warm. And if one of them is attacked, the two will be able to withstand it; and a threefold cord is not quickly broken. Eccles. 4:9–12
It is almost as if Qohelet cannot stand the symmetry, the poetry, of wisdom.19 It would be inexact to call this brief book an “intellectual autobiography,” but the little intrusions of Qohelet’s life represent a clever strategy on the anthologistauthor’s part. At the beginning of his composition, Qohelet is young, vigorous, planting gardens, building himself a pleasure palace without equal: he tells us, in the language of wisdom’s eternal verities, how the world looked to him then (Eccles. 1–2). But time passes and he reaches new conclusions: “Then I turned to consider” (Eccles. 2:11), “I understood [or “saw, considered”]” (Eccles. 2:13, 14; 3: 10, 14, 16; 4:4, 15; 6:1; 9:1, 13, etc.), “I thought to myself” (Eccles. 1:16; 2:1; 3:17, 18, etc.), “I returned and saw [that is, “I reconsidered”]” (Eccles. 4:1, 7; 9:11, etc.), “Here is what I myself have seen” (Eccles. 5:17), “Here is what I have found out” (Eccles. 7:27, 29), and so forth. These personal references are not merely little reminders of the man behind the mashal, but a way of encompassing a host of
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 47
different, sometimes jangling, bits of wisdom in one book. What was obvious back at the beginning, when the sage was relatively young, no longer holds by the end, when he is old. Names may be forgotten, but a name is nonetheless all that remains; woman may be all traps and snares (Eccles. 7:26–28), but “enjoy life with the woman whom you love” (Eccles. 9:9); sages and fools may meet the same end, “so why should I be wise?” (Eccles. 2:15), but still, “a sage’s mind is his right hand, a fool’s his left” (Eccles. 10:2), “there is nothing better for a man than that he eat and drink and enjoy what he has gotten” (Eccles. 2:24); nonetheless, “know that God will bring you to judgment concerning all these things” (Eccles. 11:9). To Qohelet well applies the French barb, Il se contredit pour avoir tout dit (“He contradicts himself in order to have said everything”). An anthologist could scarcely aim higher. The wisdom tradition in Hebrew hardly ends with Qohelet: after him follow Ben Sira, the anonymous author of 1 Baruch, and a host of apocryphal and pseudepigraphic writers of the Second Temple period, culminating in the anthologized wisdom sayings of the mishnaic tractate Abot. But Abot is something of a selfconscious throwback, an attempt to resurrect one last time the old wisdom anthology genre at a time when the very nature of wisdom in Israel had changed radically, and with it the whole role of the anthology in Jewish writings. What changed was that, sometime before the start of the second century b.c.e., “wisdom” came to include Torah. It is a striking fact that nowhere among the wise sayings of Proverbs, Job, or Ecclesiastes is there the slightest reference to anything from the Bible—not a mention of Israel’s illustrious ancestors Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, nor of Moses or the great Sinai revelation, nothing! One could scarcely doubt that relatively late sages like Qohelet or the author(s) of at least the later sections of Proverbs were keenly aware of Israel’s glorious past, nay, knew parts of its sacred library of texts by heart; yet they give not the slightest evidence of such knowledge in their own writings. The reason is not hard to discover: references to biblical Israel or to individual figures or events in its history surely must have seemed to violate the international, eternally valid character of wisdom. Abraham or Jerusalem were far too particular, too earthly, too historical; wisdom’s domain was the general and ethereal and eternal. As time went on, however, Jewish sages began to view things differently: the Torah was not merely a single people’s book, a record of that people’s past history and laws, but a divine guidebook, the text in which the Great Plan finds its most complete expression. Thus, after having praised the figure of wisdom very much in the fashion of earlier sages, Ben Sira (a wise man of the early second century b.c.e.) relates that at a certain point she (wisdom) left heaven in order to dwell among men: [Wisdom says:] “Then the Creator of all things gave me a commandment, and the One who made me assigned a place for my tent. He said: ‘Make your dwelling in Jacob, and in Israel receive your inherited property.’ ” Sir. 24:8
48 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism
Wisdom’s coming to dwell in Israel’s midst is no idle boast on Ben Sira’s part. What he means is that the Torah, Israel’s sacred book, is nothing less than eternal wisdom come down to the human realm: All this [wisdom] is the book of the covenant of the Most High, the Torah that Moses commanded us as an inheritance to the congregation of Jacob. Sir. 24:23 (cf. Deut. 33:4)
In the same fashion, another Jewish sage some decades later could assert about wisdom:20 He [God] found the whole way to knowledge, and gave her to Jacob His servant, and to Israel whom He loved. She is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that endures forever. Bar. 3:36–4:1.
It is important to spell out the consequences of the change heralded by such pronouncements. For where wisdom had previously consisted of contemplating the natural world and the social order and deducing from them the general plan by which God conducts the world, it was now more and more Scripture that was to be contemplated in order to understand God’s ways. And so the sage, who had previously walked about the world or stood at his window looking out, now sat down at his table and opened the Book. The Book, even more than the world, was the place in which God’s will and God’s ways were expressed—but it required much thought and contemplation in order to understand fully the sacred messages contained therein. Thus, starting in the early second century b.c.e. (or conceivably still earlier), sages began to add to their repertoire of ancient proverbs and sayings other texts, biblical laws and narratives and prophecies, which likewise embodied discrete formulations of the Great Plan. Not surprisingly, however, their approach to analyzing texts remained basically unchanged. That is, schooled in the ways of meshalim, in the careful comparison of part A with part B and the search for all the hidden nuances, these sages quite naturally applied the same techniques to the rest of Israel’s literary heritage. Were not its other words just as likely to be cryptic, esoteric, in need of sustained contemplation in order to be fully understood? Likewise, the very conception of Scripture as a great corpus of divine instruction whose lessons, therefore, are relevant to every age—a notion that underlies all of ancient biblical interpretation—was not this also merely a projection of the sage’s assumptions about wisdom literature onto all of Israel’s variegated corpus of ancient writings? The treatment of various biblical figures as examples, models of proper conduct, is similarly a sagely construct. Indeed, it is certainly significant, in light of wisdom literature’s polarized division of humanity into the righteous and the wicked, the wise and the foolish, that a similar polarization takes place in ancient exegesis: biblical heroes are altogether good, with any fault airbrushed away, whereas figures like Esau or Balaam are altogether demonized—as if their neithergood-nor-evil status in the Bible itself is somehow intolerable.21 (The most convincing instances of such polarization occur with figures like Lot or Enosh, si-
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 49
multaneously demonized by one group of interpreters while pronounced altogether righteous by another. Apparently they could go one way or another, but not remain in the intolerable ambiguity of the middle.) Thus the ancient sages of Israel’s past now became interpreters of Scripture. This is quite literally true of Ben Sira, who devoted not a little of his book to the elucidation of biblical laws and narratives, and who concluded it with an extensive—six chapters long!—review of Israel’s biblical heroes, replete with allusions to well-known biblical phrases and a considerable body of interpretive material. The anonymous sage who authored the Wisdom of Solomon (first century b.c.e.) did no less, devoting chapter 10 of that work to a similar catalog, and a good deal of the remaining chapters to exploring the wisdom contained in, specifically, the Exodus and desert-wandering narratives of the Pentateuch. This author did not simply retell Scripture, but included the fruits of interpretive research, his own and that of earlier sages, in its every word. Thus, in retelling the events of the Exodus, he observed: She [wisdom] gave to holy men the reward of their labors; she guided them along a marvelous path, and became a shelter to them by day and a starry flame through the night. She brought them over the Red Sea and led them through the deep waters; but she drowned their enemies and cast them up from the depth of the sea. Wisd. 10:17–18
Quite a bit in these two sentences testifies to the advanced state of biblical interpretation at this time. For example, the biblical account presents the Israelites as having borrowed silver, gold, and other precious items from the Egyptians before leaving, and so having “despoiled” them (Exod. 12:36). Wisdom of Solomon is quick to explain that this was not thievery or even deception, but “the reward of their labors”; that is, it was only fair of the Israelites to take these items in recompense for all the years of slavery in which they had served the Egyptians without being paid. As for the pillar of cloud and pillar of fire that accompanied the Israelites on their way out of Egypt (Exod. 13:21), Wisdom of Solomon here explains what the book of Exodus somehow had not, that while the nighttime pillar was made of fire in order to guide them in the dark, the purpose of the daytime pillar of cloud was to give shelter to the Israelites from the sun—hence two pillars were necessary. Moreover, this same author specifies that, after drowning Israel’s enemies, Wisdom “cast them up from the depth of the sea.” This is no gratuitous flourish, but an attempt to resolve an apparent contradiction in the Exodus account, which at one point specifies that the Egyptians “were drowned in the Red Sea, the floods covered them, they went down into the depths like a stone” (Exod. 15:4–5) but on the other hand says that the Israelites “saw the Egyptians dead upon the seashore” (Exod. 14:30). Where were they, on the seashore or at the bottom of the sea? This author’s answer is that they at first sank to the bottom of the sea but then were “cast up” to the shore again to be seen by the Israelites. In short, wisdom’s course took a sharp new turn in Israel at this time. Henceforth the sage would be a Schriftgelehrte before all else, and his stock-in-trade would
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include most prominently the Torah itself, written by the greatest of sages, Mosesour-teacher. It is thus no exaggeration to state that the true Rabbinic continuation of the biblical wisdom tradition is not so much Mishnah Abot as the Mekhilta deR. Ishmael or Genesis Rabbah, those anthologies of pithy explanations of individual, isolated verses from Scripture. Surely there is no mystery in the fact that these and so many other midrashic collections of the opening centuries of the Common Era are anonymous anthologies rather than authored commentaries (such as appeared among Christians in the same period). The Jewish sages (called, in fact, hfi akhamim, “sages”) responsible for these early midrashic works were, consciously or otherwise, continuing an anthological tradition of wisdom that stretched back centuries and centuries into the distant past, back to the time when humans had first concluded that, while no one can know all that is worth knowing, a sage, mastering a thousand discrete insights handed down from here and there, can nevertheless assemble them into a single book and so pass on to future generations something of the great divine order by which the world is run. Notes Prooftexts 17 (1997):9–32. Reprinted by permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1. From Old Kingdom Egypt (third millennium b.c.e.) come such collections as the “Instruction of Ptah-hotep” and the “Instructions from Kagemni”; see R. O. Faulkner, E. F. Wente, and W. K. Simpson, The Literature of Ancient Egypt (New Haven, Conn., 1972). Old Sumerian proverbs survive from early in the second millennium b.c.e.: S. N. Kramer, History Begins at Sumer (New York, 1959), pp. 119–26. 2. As has been frequently pointed out, this notion of wisdom is to be connected with the Egyptian concept of maat, the divine order; see A. Volten, “Der Begriff der Maat in den a¨gyptischen Weisheitstexten,” in Les sagesses du Proche-Orient ancien (Paris, 1963), pp. 72–102; E. Wu¨rtwein, “Egyptian Wisdom and the Old Testament,” in J. Crenshaw, Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom (New York, 1976), pp. 113–33. 3. This subject is developed further in my Idea of Biblical Poetry (New Haven, Conn., 1981), pp. 11–12. 4. For this reason Ecclesiastes complains, in a famous phrase that is almost always mistranslated, “there is no end to the collecting of books, and much study wearies a person” (Eccles. 12:12). On s´h in the sense of “collect” or “gather” in Ecclesiastes (parallels Phoenician p l): J. Kugel, “Qohelet and Money,” Catholic Bible Quarterly 51 (1989):34–35n. 5. The point, of course, is that the dog will end up biting the hand that grabs him— that is, one cannot remain an uninvolved, or uninjured, meddler. But beyond this obvious lesson, it seems that the proverbist takes delight in the fact that, while the passerby begins with the dog’s ears—namely, speaking to the ears of the disputants—he ends up getting it from their mouths. 6. Reading, conjecturally, mithalhel. 7. On the subject of larger compositional units in Proverbs there is a substantial scholarly literature, some of it quite delirious: see P. Skehan, “The Seven Columns of Wisdom’s House,” “A Single Editor for the Whole Book of Proverbs,” and “Wisdom’s House,” all collected in his Studies in Israelite Poetry and Wisdom (CBQ MS 1) (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 9–45; Christa Kayatz, Studien zu Proverbien 1–9: Eine form- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1966); G. E. Bryce, “Another Wisdom-Book in
Wisdom and the Anthological Temper 51 Proverbs,” JBL 91 (1972): 145–57; B. Lang, Die weisheitliche Lehrrede: Eine Untersuchung von Spru¨che 1–7 (Stuttgart, 1972); B. Lang, Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs: An Israelite Goddess Redefined (New York, 1986); T. Hildebrandt, “Proverbial Pairs: Compositional Units in Proverbs 10–29,” JBL 107 (1988):207–24; Daniel Snell, Twice-Told Proverbs and the Composition of the Book of Proverbs (Winona Lake, Ind., 1993); J. Goldingay, “The Arrangement of Sayings in Proverbs 10–15,” JSOT 61 (1994):75–83. On the same question with regard to Qohelet: W. Zimmerli, “Das Buch Qohelet: Traktat oder Sentenzensammlung?” VT 24 (1974):221–30; S. Glender, “Ecclesiastes—a Collection of ‘Diverse’ Sayings or a Unified Worldview?” Beit Miqra 26 (1981):15–23. 8. The same thing may be said of the Book of Job, another wisdom composition with a story to tell. True, the mise-en-sce`ne here has been entrusted to normal, straight, narrative style (chapters 1–2 as well as the conclusion, 42:7–17). But what occurs in the middle is not so much an exchange of individual insights as an argument framed in the idiom of wisdom sages, a kind of drama in mashal form; see later. 9. J.J.A. van Dijk, La Sagesse sume´ro-accadienne (Leiden, 1953); W. G. Lambert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature (Oxford, 1960). 10. The Egyptian origin of Proverbs 22:17–24:34 was first argued by A. Erman, “Das Weisheitsbuch des Amen-em-ope,” Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 27 (1924):241–52; see also J. M. Plumley, “The Teaching of Amenemope” in Winston Thomas, Documents from Old Testament Times (London; 1958), pp. 172–86; R. J. Williams, “The Alleged Semitic Original of the Wisdom of Amenemope,” JE 47 (1961):100–106; and Diethard Romheld, Wege der Weisheit: die Lehren Amenopes und Proverbien 22:17–24:22 (Berlin, 1989). Further on Egyptian and biblical wisdom: B. Gemser, “The Instructions of Onchsheshonqi and Biblical Literature,” Vetus Testamentum Congress Volume, Vetus Testamentum Supplements 8 (1960): 102–28; Kayatz, Studien zu Proverbien 1–9; F.-J. Steiert, Die Weisheit Israels (Freiburg; 1990); Nili Shupak, “Where Can Wisdom Be Found?” The Sage’s Language in the Bible and Ancient Egyptian Literature (Go¨ttingen; 1993). 11. To be sure, some collections of wisdom in the ancient Near East were presented as the Teachings of X, So-and-so’s words to his son, etc. This format is found very early in Egypt: “The Instruction of Ptah-hotep,” “The Instruction of Amen-em-he´t for His Son Sesostris I,” “The Instruction of the Scribe Cheti,” etc.; see Gemser, “The Instructions of Onchsheshonqi,” pp. 103–4. Nevertheless, it is clear that these are collections of individual proverbs, anthologies. 12. Such is, of course, also the effect achieved by depicting human beings as talking animals, whether in animated cartoons or Aesop’s fables or the reasoned moralities of Marie de France or La Fontaine. 13. Jeremiah, for example, asked the same question: Jer. 12:1–2. 14. This was discussed by G. von Rad in his “Josephsgeschichte und a¨ltere Chokhma,” Vetus Testamentum Congress Volume, Vetus Testamentum Supplements 1 (1953):120–27. I do not believe that the foundations of his argument have been undermined by more recent examinations; see G. W. Coats, “The Joseph Story and Ancient Wisdom: A Reappraisal,” Catholic Bible Quarterly 35 (1973):285–97. 15. See n. 11. 16. “Man of the assembly,” as if the Hebrew were derived from qahal, “assembly.” Later, of course, the Greek ekklesia became the Christian “assembly,” the Church, whereupon Ecclesiastes became “the preacher.” 17. See Nehemiah 5:7, and the Arabic and Syriac cognates of qhl—all of which were pointed out by E. Ullendorf, “The Meaning of Qohelet,” Vetus Testamentum 12 (1962):215. To these examples might be added Numbers 16:3, 17:7, and Job 30:28, where the word clearly means “complain.”
52 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism 18. Kugel, “Qohelet and Money,” pp. 47–48. 19. A different view of this passage (and of the phenomenon it represents): R. Gordis, “Quotation in Wisdom Literature,” in Crenshaw, Studies, pp. 220–44. 20. Note in the same connection a wisdom text from Qumran that asserts that God has granted wisdom “to Israel, He gives her as a gracious gift,” (4Q185) Sapentiential Work 2:10. 21. Particularly suggestive in connection with this topic is B. Otzen, “Old Testament Wisdom Literature and Dualistic Thinking,” VTS 28 (1974):146–57. “Dualistic thinking” in his definition includes the polarization of humanity not only into good and evil or wise and foolish, but as well such dualisms as the “sons of light/sons of darkness” and “two spirits” found at Qumran. See also such texts as Ben Sirah 15:14–20; Testament of Asher 1: 3–5; Philo of Alexandria, The Worse Attacks the Better, pp. 82–84; as well as R. A. Baer, Philo’s Use of the Categories Male and Female (Leiden; 1970).
4 yaakov elman
Order, Sequence, and Selection The Mishnah’s Anthological Choices
n the tenth century, nearly 800 years after the Mishnah’s “publication,” R. She-
Irira Gaon described how Rabbi Judah the Prince, the Mishnah’s editor, “compiled . . . and added to it what was in his time, and reconciled it[s difficulties] properly.”1 In reconstructing the Mishnah’s formation, R. Sherira repeatedly emphasized Rabbi’s faithfulness to his sources—primarily the earlier compilation of R. Meir—and the faithfulness of the latter to his sources. “And not in his own words [lit., “from his [own] heart”] did Rabbi compile them,” or, “nothing was omitted or added but for a few places”—this theme recurs in his description of the process, along with a detailed series of proofs for his contention.2 The motive for this emphasis is clear: the anti-Karaite polemic which underlies R. Sherira’s history of the Oral Torah. Whatever may be its historical value today, Sherira’s monograph was the first to seek to understand Rabbi Judah’s motives and methods.3 This investigation has been renewed each time the authority or authenticity of the Oral Torah has been called into question and, with the emergence of the modern critical study of Rabbinic literature, has gained particular force since the middle of the nineteenth century down to our own time.4 R. Sherira employs four verbs to describe the process of compiling the Mishnah: liqqet, tereiz, osif, and hibber—“collect,” “solve [its difficulties],” “add,” and “formulate,” respectively.5 R. Sherira emphasizes that, before Rabbi’s time, the existence of differences of opinion made it impossible “to recite it with one voice and in one formulation.”6 The implication would seem to be that Rabbi’s intention was to produce a code of Rabbinic halakhah as it existed in his time. A few lines further on he adds that “the words of the Mishnah were like [those that] Moses enunciated from the mouth of the Most High.” Rabbi’s code was based on earlier sources, in particular the views of R. Akiva and his disciples, as formulated by R. Meir. In responding to the implicit question of why minority opinions were cited as well, R. Sherira quotes the view of R. Judah b. Ilai, that this was done “in order 53
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to invalidate them” should a person wish to decide a dispute in favor of the minority view.7 The Mishnah is thus both authentic and authoritative, a conclusion that the polemic needs of his time—that is, the Karaite challenge—required. Less than a century before Sherira, another of the gaonim, R. Saadiah, dated the beginning of the redaction of the Mishnah to the early years of the Second Temple period. His motives were the same: in order to assert the antiquity, authenticity, and authority of the Oral Torah against Karaite claims to the contrary.8 R. Sherira, however, was the first to devote a monograph to the subject and, in doing so, to set the agenda for the discussion of such matters for the next millennium.9 The debate surrounding Rabbi’s motives and the purpose for which the Mishnah was composed has continued into our own time. As Eliezer Segal writes elsewhere in this volume, “a long-standing dispute has focused on whether the Mishnah was intended to serve as a normative codex or corpus iuris, or as a digest or encyclopedia of sources for theoretical instruction.”10 In fact, many more theories of the Mishnah’s genre have been proposed in the last century and a half, and many of them reflect the religious polemic of the nineteenth century.11 And nearly all of these theories relate to David Stern’s second area of concern in regard to anthologizing: the question of its genre, and the distinctions he draws between an “archive,” a “collection,” and an “anthology proper.”12 In regard to the Mishnah’s genre, we can begin by saying that no one argues that the Mishnah was composed de novo.13 The Mishnah is clearly an anthology of some sort, a collection of previously existing sources. The question is the purpose of this collection. Among the many definitions that have been proposed for its genre we may single out five: (1) a code, (2) a collection of halakhic sources for study, (3) an introductory textbook of halakhah, (4) Rabbi’s lecture notes, and (5) a philosophical work. Let us briefly consider each one separately and then return to the problems raised by each definition. The first two views of the Mishnah—that it is a code or a source collection— have a long history. Both views assume that the Mishnah was intended from the beginning to be authoritative. As we have already seen, R. Sherira considered the Mishnah to be an authoritative collection of halakhic sources, that is, a code. So too did Maimonides, the Codifier par excellence. In the introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah and elsewhere, he accounts for a number of its features in terms of that assumption. The third view—that of the Mishnah as a “textbook of halakha”—is of more recent invention and was proposed by Abraham Goldberg. The precise meaning of the term “textbook” is somewhat ambiguous. A legal textbook is authoritative, but only in the pedagogical sense, not in the legal sense: it is not meant to be a code, or even an immediate source for working lawyers. The fourth view—that the Mishnah was “Rabbi’s lecture notes”—was a popular notion in the nineteenth century, when Maimonidean ideas of order and arrangement were taken as all but normative even by “enlightened” scholars, and it has more recently been revived by Abraham Weiss. This view attempts to explain the Mishnah’s anthological features; it does not directly address the question of
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authoritativeness, although it could be used as an argument for the Mishnah’s authority despite its somewhat disordered state. On the other hand, this argument is something of a double-edged sword; it could as easily be employed against such a view. Finally, there is Jacob Neusner’s view of the Mishnah as a philosophical work. The critical term here, of course, is the word “philosophical,” which Neusner uses in his own, somewhat idiosyncratic way. We shall examine his view in greater detail, but in light of the thumbnail historiographical sketch, the apologetic thrust of this view should be sufficiently clear. None of the views just set forth can dispense with a consideration of the Mishnah’s structure and contents. All views of the Mishnah as a code or as an authoritative legal work must deal with at least three problems: (1) its lack of cohesiveness and particularly its inner contradictions and unresolved disputes; (2) its lack of comprehensiveness, namely, the areas of tannaitic halakhah that it does not cover; and (3) its shortcomings in organization, particularly its duplications and its noncontextual arrangement of material. Thus, some sections are famously heterogenous, like Megillah 1:4–11, Pesahim 4, and all of Eduyot. Usually these problematic sections are explained as having resulted from oral transmission and are used as evidence for the view that Rabbi did not or hardly altered his sources. This view, however, is the opposite to Maimonides’, at least according to the account of Isadore Twersky. According to Twersky, Maimonides glowingly praises the Mishnah’s “comprehensive scope, muscular method, apodictic form, brief yet mellifluous style,” and Rabbi’s “nearly perfect wisdom, unexceptionable piety, personal austerity . . . , unrivaled mastery of Hebrew.”14 Nothing of its arrangement was left to chance—least of all, its contents and the order of its tractates. Whether or not Maimonides was correct in this view, his discussion essentially set the terms of the modern debate over the Mishnah’s form and structure, and permutations of his views make their appearance in virtually every theory that has been proposed to date. Two aspects of the Mishnah’s form—its arrangements and its omissions—were of particular interest to Maimonides, both for what they told him about the Mishnah’s place in the history of the Oral Torah and for his own codificatory efforts. Because of the systematic cast of his thought, Maimonides preferred philosophical/theological explanations to literary or historical ones. This preference is no more apparent than in his discussion of the Mishnah’s arrangement which, as we shall see, is closely tied to the question of its genre. Consider, for example, Maimonides’ explanation for the order of the different tractates in Seder Moed, the Order of Appointed Times. The Order begins with Shabbat, the tractate dealing with the Sabbath, because of the latter’s “precedence in sanctity; the fact that it recurs every seven days and so occurs frequently in the course of time; and that Scripture begins with it in its list of festivals (in Lev. 23: 3).” Maimonides thus explains the placement of the tractate in separate theological, sociological/personal, and scriptural terms. Eruvin comes next in the Order because of its obvious thematic relationship to Shabbat. Pesahim follows “because it was the first mitzvah the Israelites were commanded by Moses, and also because it is adjacent to the Sabbath in the [scriptural] section on festivals.” To explain the placement of the next tractate, Sheqalim, Maimonides again turns to scriptural
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order as the reason, but in this case he shifts the focus to another part of Scripture, Exodus 30:11–16, which follows the exposition of the Passover laws in Exodus 12. To do so, however, he skips over the mention of all the pilgrimage festivals in Exodus 23, aside from shifting back from Leviticus 23. Thus, because a theological/ philosophical explanation will not serve in all cases, Maimonides must fall back on scriptural order, even when that “order” is itself not “orderly”! Yoma then follows because, according to Maimonides, the scriptural description of the service of the Day of Atonement occurs in Leviticus 16—although he again ignores the passages in Leviticus 23:23–27, where the order is different. Indeed, were the Mishnah to have followed the order of Leviticus 23, all the Pentateuchal festivals would have been presented in the order in which they occur through the year. Maimonides’ explanation for the order of tractates is also not the only possible explanation. The Babylonian Talmud itself uses scriptural order to explain the order of mishnayot within a tractate15 but in some cases attributes the arrangement of tractates to the amount of material to be covered (and related matters).16 In other cases, it explains their order on the basis of a law’s derivation (e.g., from Rabbinic exegesis),17 and in one case it even raises the possibility that tractates could follow a causal, quasi-midrashic rationale. Thus, R. Judah explains that the reason the scriptural passages detailing the laws of the Sotah precede those of the nazirirte (Num. 4:11–5:21) is that “one who sees a suspected adulteress in her degradation will withhold himself from wine [by becoming a nazirite]”—a homiletic explanation. In the Mishnah, however, the order of tractates relating these two laws is reversed. In response to why this is so, the Talmud explains: Since the Tana taught [Tractate] Ketubot [Marriage Settlements] and taught [the laws governing] “one who imposes a vow upon his wife,” he next teaches [Tractate] Nedarim [Vows]; and since he taught [Tractate] Nedarim, he proceeded to teach [Tractate] Nazir, which is analogous to Nedarim [because a Nazirite undertakes a vow to observe the Nazirite prohibitions], and then [the Mishnah] continues with the Tractate Sotah for the reason given by Rabbi.18
The reason for their sequence, in other words, is partly thematic and partly the result of causal connections. Over a century ago Abraham Geiger suggested still another reason for the order of tractates within an Order of Mishnah. In Abraham Goldberg’s summary of Geiger’s argument: The logic of the arrangement is purely external: it is according to the size of the tractates, the largest being first and the smallest last. . . . The only exception to this principle of arrangement is the first Order, according to its traditional sequence. Yet even here certain manuscripts preserve a more basic arrangement, as does the Vienna MS of the Tosefta. Here the arrangement is as follows: Berakhot (9 chaps.), Pea (8), Demai (7), Terumot (11), Sheviit (10), Kilayim (9), Maasrot (5), Maaser Sheni (5), Halla (4), Orla (3) and Bikkurim (3). In this arrangement there are two distinct frames with a descending order, the second starting with Terumot. What we really have, then, are two sub-orders. Indeed, the first three tractates are a unit by themselves, differing from the rest of the Order which deals either with hallowed or with prohibited agricultural products. As the
Order, Sequence, and Selection 57 first three tractates could hardly make up an order by themselves, they were placed with no change in their own sequence together with the tractates making up the other “sub-order.”19
The logic of the order, then, was neither thematic nor scriptural but virtually “material,” that is, based on the actual size of the tractate. In his own Code, Maimonides followed still another logic in arranging its topics—a logic which, as Isadore Twersky showed, Maimonides chose while fully aware of the other options, including that of the Mishnah, that were available to him.20 As Maimonides wrote in a letter, “I follow neither the order of the Talmud nor the order of the Mishnah, but I have collected all the laws, wherever they have been formulated, relating to every subject.”21 While Maimonides used some of the Mishnah’s principles in arranging topics in the Mishneh Torah itself, his avowed rejection of the Mishnah’s principles of order is noteworthy. Maimonides seems to be saying, as Twersky writes, that “even if my explanatory insights [of the Mishnah’s order] are correct and valid, the [Mishnah’s] scheme itself has too many conceptual lapses and superficial links.”22 In rectifying these lapses, Maimonides subdivided and rearranged the Mishnah’s ordering and sequence; the result is a reclassification of the Mishnah’s six orders into fourteen books. Thus, the Mishnaic Orders of Seeds, Appointed Times, Women, and Purities find their equivalents in the Maimonidean books of Seeds (with the exception of Berakhot), Times, and Women. Damages is subdivided into Damages, Acquisition, Statutes, and Judges, while Holy Things is divided between the Temple Service and Sacrifices. But Maimonides also created several new classifications. Sanctity (Qedushah) included laws regarding the sanctity of marriage and food; Hafla’ah covered laws that in the Mishnah were divided between Nedarim (vows) in Seder Nashim and Shevuot (oaths) in Seder Neziqin. Finally, Maimonides created an introductory book which had no precedent in any order or even tractate in the Mishnah: Fundamentals of the Torah. This book included both theological principles and fundamental laws: rules relating to human behavior and the laws pertaining to idolatry and blasphemy. The Book of Love (Ahavah) deals with liturgy, including prayers and blessings, and thus replaces the mishnaic tractate Berakhot, but it also includes the laws of circumcision, which have no formal place in the Mishnah.23 Thus, Maimonides’ code differs from the Mishnah not because of its certain codificatory intent as against the Mishnah’s possibly anthological one, for the subject of each work is legal exposition; Maimonides’ Code differs from the Mishnah in omitting disputes, and in its introduction, which lays out a programmatic theological/historical foundation for the entire work. In essence, though, both are legal expositions, and the arrangement of rules, rituals, and laws in the Mishnah is not dependent on whether it was composed as a code or as a collection; in either case, pedagogical or expository needs take precedence. The question of what constitutes a code relates more to the manner of presentation than to its arrangement. Generally speaking, we expect a collection to contain divergent opinions, whereas a code does not (or ought not to). The fact that the Mishnah does contain many such divergent opinions is problematic. Indeed, the very fact that the Mishnah seems to contain an attempt to explain why
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it preserves divergent opinions (in Mishnah Eduyot 1:5) seems to indicate that the Mishnah’s redactor himself felt that the practice had to be explained.
The Question of Codification The question of the Mishnah’s intended genre is closely bound up with the question of its purpose. Here the matter is somewhat clearer, since the Mishnah’s concentration on legal material limits the choices to essentially two. Was it intended to be an authoritative collection, that is, a code, or “merely” a guide or textbook?24 These seemingly simple alternatives, however, mask a far more difficult and ambiguous question, since both codes and textbooks can take different forms that may even meld into one another, as the appropriation of Gaius’s Institutes as a prologue to Justinian’s Code illustrates—a case to which I will return. Still, a code is by definition legally authoritative, whereas other genres of legal material, whatever prestige or authority they may possess, are not authoritative in the same sense. It is thus no wonder that much of the debate over the presumed function of the Mishnah has centered around the question of whether it was intended as a code. Several features of the Mishnah seem to belie codificatory intent. First is its scope: it is manifestly incomplete, as we shall see. Moreover, it contains alternate views of important matters and does not explicitly decide between them. If we assume that opinions cited anonymously are meant to be authoritative, we must ask why an anonymous opinion in one place is disputed in another. In this respect and in others, the Mishnah seems to contain contradictory material, surely not the mark of an authoritative code. Numerous scholars have dealt with these questions, but because modern Rabbinic scholarship began in the nineteenth century, there has been an unfortunate tendency to transmute these essentially literary questions into historical/sourcecritical ones, chiefly the question of the Mishnah’s sources. Yet because the Mishnah is also the earliest surviving collection of Rabbinic material, it was impossible for scholars to pursue comparative work in the usual sense. Instead, Mishnah scholars based their work mainly on internal evidence in the Mishnah, aside from occasional talmudic obiter dicta that assumed historical importance far out of proportion to their actual significance. Thus, Zechariah Frankel, in his Darkei haMishnah, claimed that Rabbi had “critically reviewed” the Mishnah he had produced. This claim was based on Frankel’s understanding of a talmudic statement that R. Ashi, the presumed redactor of the Babylonian Talmud, had produced two editions of his work, a statement that Frankel assumed was also true of Rabbi Judah, even though there is no textual support whatsoever for it!25 Nonetheless, Frankel used this rationale to explain the existence of contradictions in the Mishnah which, he argued, resulted from R. Judah’s change of mind over time. And in order to explain why Rabbi himself did not eliminate these contradictions, Frankel proposed that he could not because the Mishnah had already begun to circulate in oral form. From this one example, one can see how certain sourcecritical assumptions, once accepted, generated wide-ranging conclusions about the nature of the Mishnah without, however, much evidence to back them up.
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The classic period for the adoption of source-critical methods in researching the Mishnah was the generation before World War II. Hanokh Albeck and Y. N. Epstein exemplified this trend, the former in his early volume Untersuchungen ueber die Redaktion der Mischna,26 the latter in the lecture notes that were edited and published by E. Z. Melamed as Mevo’ot le-Sifrut ha-Tanna’im.27 Albeck and Epstein had virtually opposite understandings of the Mishnah’s redaction. According to Albeck, Rabbi Judah did not alter his sources in the least; according to Epstein, he did. Albeck based his view on the twin facts that the Mishnah contains duplications, contradictions, and differences in style, all manifestations of a collection built on earlier sources. He explains that the duplications are sometimes identical as a result of Rabbi’s policy of not changing or modifying his sources. On the other hand, when duplications occur in different formulations, Albeck explained, the reason is that they stem from different schools, while contradictions were to be seen as representing the views of different authorities.28 Similarly, Albeck used the large blocks of texts that deviate from the Mishnah’s order by subject matter— mini-collections of diverse, unrelated laws all attributed to a single early authority,29 or passages in which disparate laws share identical literary formulations such as “no less than . . . nor more than. . . . ,”30 or “the only difference between. . . .”31 —to prove that these passages were incorporated from earlier collections without change. The Mishnah’s manifest incompleteness, however, was more of a problem for Albeck to explain. Why, for example, does the Mishnah omit views cited in the parallel Tosefta passage? Albeck argued that Rabbi’s Mishnah began to circulate among his disciples before it was complete and, as a result, Rabbi had not been able to include certain views as yet. This explanation is hardly sufficient to explain the absence of a specific rule that was the subject of a tannaitic dispute. This is especially so in cases (which are not uncommon, as in M. Sheviit 3:2 and T. Sheviit 2:14) where R. Meir’s view is omitted. After all, according to Albeck, R. Meir was the author of the putative version of the Mishnah which is said to have played a part in Rabbi’s redaction.32 Further, and more seriously, Albeck’s explanation of premature circulation did not explain why a number of important matters never receive systematic treatment in the Mishnah; indeed, some are missing almost entirely. Among these are discussions of ritual objects like phylacteries and ritual fringes, and systematic expositions of the laws and history of the festival of Hanukkah. Although Albeck tried to argue that these omissions were also due to the premature circulation of the Mishnah,33 it is difficult to imagine that Rabbi would have sanctioned the release of his work without these matters being treated at some point, either then or later. Albeck’s explanation also does not account for another of the Mishnah’s signal characteristics, namely, its tendency to devote great attention to subjects that were not practically relevant in Rabbi’s own time; indeed, probably more than half the Mishnah is devoted to laws dealing with either the Temple service or ritual purity (which was truly relevant only to priests actively involved in the Temple service) and to the laws of agricultural tithes (although some of these were still being
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collected after the destruction of the Temple, at least in the land of Israel). How could Rabbi treat these matters in exquisite detail and leave out systematic expositions of tefillin, tzitzit, and Hanukkah? What, in other words, was Rabbi’s plan for his work, his purpose in carrying it forward? Maimonides, in his introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, suggested that the Shavuot festival was not treated in the Mishnah because its observance did not involve any rituals peculiar to it,34 and so the exposition of the general laws of festivals in Tractate Betza were sufficient. This explanation, however, does not explain why the laws of Hanukkah never made it into the Mishnah. In contrast to Albeck, Epstein attempted to show that Rabbi had, in fact, altered and edited his sources. Whereas Albeck, to prove his point (that Rabbi had not altered his sources), pointed to duplicate mishnah-sections in which no alterations were made, Epstein, in good source-critical style, seized on infelicities of expression which, he explained, were the result of Rabbi’s editing. Similarly, Epstein claimed that the anonymous opinions in the Mishnah were anonymous because Rabbi preferred those opinions, not because they were really anonymous.35 Albeck, in contrast, insisted that these opinions had come down to Rabbi anonymously. To capture the flavor of the debate between the two scholars, it is worth citing some of Albeck’s arguments in his own words. (Epstein’s side does not survive in his own words.) Albeck describes in exemplary fashion the ways in which the Mishnah’s structure and style lend themselves to a source-critical analysis, and how this explains the Mishnah’s repetitions, contradictions, changes of style, and so on. Albeck emphasizes the importance of his contention that Rabbi did not edit his sources and ends on a distinctly apologetic note.36 According to current concepts (lit., “in our own generation”) we must admit that had Rabbi not proceeded in this manner, but would have changed his sources according to his own judgment, his production would have been deficient (hayah be-maasehu pegam), and it would have been said that he “traduced” the traditions, that he did not say things in the name of the one who said them— and not only that, but that he put words in the mouths of people who did not say them but never thought of them—as those who attribute to Rabbi changes, omissions, and additions. . . . How was he permitted to choose what seemed plausible in his eyes and to reject early views or change them according to his own judgment? On the contrary! His entire goal in the redaction of the Mishnah was to preserve their words with exactitude so that they would not be forgotten, and to mention even the opinion of a single individual [who differed] with the majority in case “a court sees the words of the individual it may rely on him” (Eduyot 1:5).37
Mavo la-Mishnah was published in 1959, two years after the publication of Epstein’s lecture notes on these matters by E. Z. Melamed,38 and it is difficult not to see Albeck’s harsh words as a reference to Epstein, Albeck’s erstwhile colleague. It is revealing that Albeck rejected Epstein’s conclusion on ultimately apologetic grounds rather than on scholarly ones. According to Albeck, Epstein had in some sense impugned the Sages by asserting that Rabbi had changed his sources and had thus undermined the authority of the Mishnah, the foundation of halakhah.
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Recently Shamma Friedman has attempted to demonstrate that the origins of certain difficult texts and of problems in the arrangement of the Mishnah may at times be traced to Rabbi’s desire for concision.39 Consider, for example, Mishnah Shabbat 16:1 and its parallel in Tosefta Shabbat 13:1–2. In the Mishnah, which is much shorter than the formally parallel toseftan passage,40 the order of exposition begins with the requirement to save scrolls of scriptural texts from a fire that has broken out on the Sabbath, even though such activity (i.e., taking objects out of one’s personal domain into the public domain) is generally forbidden on the Sabbath. Appended to this general rule are two other laws. The first is the stipulation that these scrolls must be saved whether or not they are used as texts for the public reading of the Torah, and the second is that even though the scrolls may be written in languages other than Hebrew, they still must be stored away in a respectful manner. This mishnah text then concludes with a somewhat gnomic explanation for why such texts are not read: “Why are they not read? Because of the neglect of the study hall.” As Friedman notes, the parallel Tosefta is more topically arranged, beginning with various rules regarding the reading of scriptural texts in 13:1 and continuing with an exposition of the rules of storing them away in 13:2. The two passages are joined by the term kitvei qodesh, “holy writings,” which is deployed in two different ways. In Tosefta Shabbat 13:1, as in Mishnah Shabbat 16:1, the term refers to Scripture in general, “the holy writings,” but the last clause of the mishnah refers to kitvei qodesh (without mentioning them explictly) in the sense of Hagiographa— those writings that may be not be read on the Sabbath at the time that the legal and ritual expositions are presented in the synagogue. The purpose of this rule is to discourage people from staying home to read the stories in the Hagiographa rather than attend these study sessions. Friedman continues: The redactor of our mishnah, that is, Rabbi, taught the text regarding the saving [of scriptural scrolls] (Shabbat 13: 1–7). If [these] early mishnayot, which were recited before Rabbi, were formulated in the style of the halakhot before us in the Tosefta, it is clear that Rabbi wanted, on the one hand, to include some reference to the halakhah that one may not read sacred writings [⫽ Hagiographa] on the Sabbath. On the other hand, he did not want to leave it as an isolated addendum unto itself in his new compilation without building it into the flow of the chapter. In order not to relinquish this halakhah, and also in order to retain the tight structure [of the new Mishnah], he combined this halakhah with the primary one, by interleaving their cases one within the other.41
Friedman thus attributes the lack of clarity in the rule to the impact of these conflicting desires on Rabbi’s part. The assumption underlying this chain of reasoning is that Rabbi had before him not only the halakhot that now appear in Mishnah Shabbat 16:1, but also those in Tosefta Shabbat 13:1–2. Friedman’s claim, however, is somewhat problematic, since even the synoptic chart of these halakhot that he provides shows hardly any overlap between the two groups of laws, except in the most general way. Moreover, if Rabbi’s desire for concision led to the lack of clarity which Friedman rightly laments, what may we say of Rabbi’s redactional
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skills? Even if the process of oral transmission generally leads to such condensation,42 conscious editing on the part of a careful redactor can hardly be the cause for such a result. Nonetheless, Friedman opens up what is potentially a highly fruitful method of gauging Rabbi’s intentions and purposes, for if the Tosefta is the compilation from which Rabbi worked, the differences between it and the Mishnah must be a result of his planning. However, Friedman’s argument cannot be fully evaluated until he has presented a far larger number of examples in which the two texts are parallel. In this case, as his own synoptic table shows, there is hardly any overlap except in general subject matter. Still, the argument that Rabbi consciously edited the Tosefta to produce his Mishnah bespeaks his desire to produce a concise text. The question is whether concision is more the mark of a code or of an anthology. For the present moment, this question must remain moot. In either case, there is no question that concision would have been looked upon with favor in the world of late antiquity however the Mishnah was transmitted, orally or in written form. This last point brings us, in turn, to a question that Friedman’s source-critical predecessors hardly ever considered: the cultural context within which the redactional activities that produced the Mishnah took place. The long-time debate over whether the Mishnah was originally redacted from written or oral sources, and whether it was intended to be transmitted in written or oral form, is too involved for us to enter here.43 In passing, it is worth noting only that oral transmission somewhat more adequately accounts for the existence of texts whose brevity makes them difficult for us to understand. In any case, it is a better explanation for the Mishnah’s recurrent obscurity than the alternative— namely, that their editor was incompetent. Albeck and Epstein carried on their debate over whether the Mishnah was intended as a code or an anthology, but now that debate has subsided, perhaps because most contemporary scholars have felt that neither Albeck nor Epstein produced a decisive argument for his position. Scholars today seem to assume a priori that the Mishnah is one or the other but without considering the other possibility. For Abraham Goldberg, the Mishnah is a textbook anthology; for Dov Zlotnick and David Weiss Halivni, the Mishnah was intended as a code.
The Mishnah as Pedagogical Text As was noted earlier, two theories have sought to show that the Mishnah was originally composed as a pedagogical text of one sort or another. According to Avraham Weiss, the Mishnah represents the material that Rabbi employed in his lectures, a collection of his “lecture notes,” in other words. In this way Weiss attempts to explain, or explain away, the various problems of the Mishnah’s order. In the nature of the matter, a lecturer does not present the material, or the variants, which serve as the basis for the lecture. On the other hand, it may occur that in one circumstance or another he will present a particular source in one version, and in another circumstance, when discussing another issue, he will cite
Order, Sequence, and Selection 63 this material in another version. Likewise, he will present not only the material that fits his position. It is probable that he will present that material in the form it is in [even when he disagrees with it—Y. E.], and his own position he will enunciate during his analysis. . . . In essence, the selection of material and its form of presentation will certainly demonstrate the trend of his own thought and his own position. From here [we can understand how] the early amoraic theory [could] see in the Mishnah, as it were, a collection of Rabbi’s legal decisions, that could be relied on for legal decisions, [and this] even though in essence the Mishnah is really only a collection of sources used as the subject of analysis in [Rabbi’s] lectures [italics added].44
More recently, Avraham Goldberg has argued a similar theory, but to the exact opposite effect. Goldberg, who has produced detailed commentaries on a number of the Mishnah’s tractates,45 proposes that the redactor had a precise set of pedagogical rules according to which he presented the opinions in the Mishnah. The Mishnah, according to Goldberg, more than being simply a collection of halakhic opinions, is a “textbook of the Halakha.”46 Where Weiss sees disorder in its structure, Goldberg sees order, with a strong pedagogical intent. The Mishna consists of several layers of legal teaching corresponding to consecutive generations of teachers. Later layers often are a presentation of possible interpretations to unspecified teachings given in an earlier layer. The chief aim of the final editor was to present the gamut of possible interpretations, and not to compile a definitive, canonical code of Pharasaic law. In particular, as we shall see, the editor is interested in presenting the teachings of R. Akiva as they become reflected in the interpretive teachings of his prime pupils.47 In essence, Goldberg’s theory is not so very different from Weiss’s view that the Mishnah is a set of Rabbi’s lecture notes, except that he goes much further than Weiss does in investigating the means by which the pedagogical goal was reached. According to Goldberg, the Mishnah’s editor employed the following principles in arranging his textbook: 1. The anonymous opinion is usually that which comes closest to the generalized teaching of R. Akiva. 2. In an extended discussion, different points of view will be introduced in the course of the discussion. 3. Ease of presentation determines the place where a certain opinion will be introduced. 4. A single point of view will be taught where it serves most easily as a starting point from which differing points of view may be apprehended. 5. Topical arrangement of subject matter often calls for a selection from a variety of sources. This last principle applies even if the differing points of view mentioned in number 4 are not represented in the Mishnah itself but in Tosefta, as he suggests in discussing this principle.48 What then becomes of the Mishnah as a “study book of the Halakha”? Did the editor expect students of the halakhah to resort to Tosefta as a supplementary resource? Given the vastly larger size of the Tosefta, and the
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material independent of the Mishnah that it contains, this would be a cumbersome enterprise. The editor should have incorporated the relevant toseftan material into the Mishnah in accordance with the principles that Goldberg himself has laid down! Indeed, the final principle (number 5) makes precisely this point, and thus it conflicts somewhat with the preceding three principles. The essential problem with Goldberg’s view of the Mishnah is that he views the Mishnah in two different, not entirely consistent ways: first as a “textbook,” and apparently an elementary one, of tannaitic halakhah; and second as a record of the teaching of four successive generations beginning with the generation of the Yavneans, who are responsible for “the primary, but very shortest layer of the Mishnah . . . , comprising late Second Temple teachings as formulated by the first Yavneh generation.”49 These separate views of the Mishnah conflict, because historical survey and effective pedagogy do not necessarily coalesce. Thus, at one point Goldberg states, “the truth is that the Mishnah can be properly understood and interpreted only when the relationship between each layer remains clearly recognizable. . . .”50 Elsewhere, however, he writes that, for pedagogical reasons, “the editor will obviously seek the most striking opinion,” in accordance with principle number 4, and from this Goldberg asserts that “differing views will not be hard to fathom.”51 These separate conclusions are not entirely consistent. Perhaps even more difficult to determine is how “the” editor managed to juggle these principles, synchronic, diachronic, and pedagogical, all at once. It is little wonder that Goldberg concedes that “it is very hard to find a single mishna with all four [generational] layers”52 and that most often only two opinions or layers are presented. How then is the range of opinion to be fathomed, especially when it is often a representative position that is given pride of place and not, say, two extreme positions? Indeed, given the problem of coordinating these various conflicting goals and editorial principles, one wonders if one overriding intention guided the redactional activity that went into the Mishnah’s formation. Do these conflicting goals represent the work of different compilers or redactional circles? Did the final editor intend the Mishnah to be no more than a compilation of sources, as Albeck suggested, without the active editorial intervention that Goldberg assumes took place? Goldberg himself attempted to resolve some of these problems by adverting to the historical context in which the Mishnah was composed to explain its literary nature. [The] contemporary Hellenistic climate where systematic and well-thought-out programs and theories of education played important roles. On the other hand, some of them may seem quite modern. Thus a good textbook of necessity needs to be selective in the presentation of the material, in order to offer the student a maximum of information in a minimum of text. Moreover, it would not have a stereotyped approach to every issue, but rather employ a variety of patterns of presentation, each in that context where it would be most effective.53
Goldberg never demonstrates how all this all fits into Hellenistic theories of pedagogy. But if the features Goldberg cites—like stratification and the various pedagogical principles he lists—can be said to fit the Mishnah as we now have it,
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something else must have been at work that melded history and pedagogy. This may have been something like Neusner’s scheme of halakhic evolution, since such a scheme would allow for a development from simple to complex, as may be required for pedagogical purposes. Goldberg, by insisting that R. Akiva’s disciples were merely interpreting his views and not recasting or altering them, seems to reject this approach. In a large sense, Goldberg’s scheme is merely an adaptation of R. Yohanan’s principle that the major tannaitic compilations, as he and we know them, were “all according to the opinion of R. Akiva.”54 Whether the solution works as an explanation of the Mishnah’s purpose and arrangement is another question. Thus, for a number of reasons, Goldberg’s scheme is unconvincing. But the other “pedagogical” theory—that of Weiss, who argues that the Mishnah was constituted from Rabbi’s “lecture notes”—is no less problematic. For one thing, Weiss, by attempting to use the lecture-note theory to explain the Mishnah’s disordered structure, makes it more difficult for himself to explain those not insignificant instances of order that he himself finds in the Mishnah. Furthermore, Weiss at times contradicts his own view of the Mishnah’s disorder by explaining difficulties as the result not of a lack of order but of the combination of two differing and well-conceived “proto-tractates.” For example, he argues that the differing amoraic views of the meaning of the word maveh—one of “the fathers of damages” and a major category of the Rabbinic tort system—was the result of the inclusion of two large blocks of material now found together in Bava Qamma but originally separate collections of categories of damages, one made up of what is now BQ1:4–3:5 and the other BQ3:8–6:6. Each of these blocks had a separate view of the meaning of the word maveh, and each, according to Weiss, was systematic and orderly in itself.55 The two collections are, in Weiss’s opinion, parallel in their exposition of the four “fathers of damages,” except that the first interprets the opaque category, maveh, as referring to the damages done by a human being, while the second collection interprets it as shen, “tooth.” If so, the ambiguity in 1:1 is built in, so to speak, or rather we may say that the ambiguity gave rise to two complete “prototractates” that were then combined. If one were to accept this type of explanation in many cases, the difference between Albeck’s position and Weiss’s would be minimal, while, in contrast, Goldberg seems to envision Rabbi as a far more active redactor than does either Albeck or Weiss.
Roman, Persian, and Syriac Parallels As we have seen, Goldberg suggests in passing that Hellenistic ideas of education served as the Mishnah’s—that is, Rabbi’s—model.56 Unfortunately, he offers few details about his suggestion, and there are both cultural and historical reasons to question whether such influence or connection was possible. In the first place, Hellenistic education was literary and cultural in the general sense, philosophical in some sense, but not legal.57 For legal parallels one must look to Roman law, and, in particular, to its classical period, which is, however, slightly earlier than the mishnaic. Gaius’ Institutes, which was intended as an introductory textbook of Roman law and eventually served as the preface to Justinian’s Code, was pub-
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lished about 160 c.e., a generation before Rabbi edited the Mishnah. Further, the actual impact of Gaius’s work is uncertain. Roman jurisconsults, certainly those who were Rabbi’s contemporaries, resisted the systematization of Roman law58 and, in his own time, Gaius was not particularly celebrated; while Justinian called him Gaius nostra, we do not even know his patronymic. Further, Gaius lived and taught in Rome, and although he may have had provincial connections (perhaps to Asia Minor), it is not clear how the Rabbis would have known of his work. Nevertheless, his approach to systematization of Roman law resembles at least some tendencies manifested in the Mishnah; he and Rabbi lived approximately at the same time and both were, generally speaking, members of the same cultural world. As a result, a comparison of the Institutes and the Mishnah is not without grounds. Even so, we must bear in mind that Gaius was concerned only with civil and criminal law and not at all with religion or ritual per se. But this is true of most law books that have survived from late antiquity, including the Syriac law books produced by various Nestorian ecclesiastics of the seventh and eighth centuries, such as those of the patriarchs Henanisho Mar Abba, and especially that of the Persian archbishops Jesuboht and Simon. Jesuboht’s “Corpus Juris” actually provides the closest parallel to the Mishnah, since it is not restricted to one subject (e.g., inheritance or marriage law) as are the others. It contains sections on marriage, inheritance and contracts and obligations, as well as an introductory “Institutiones.”59 This is true as well of the Sasanian law collection, Madayan i Hazar Dadestan (“The Book of a Thousand Decisions”) of Farroxmard i Wahraman, which dates to the beginning of the seventh century but clearly contains extracts from earlier works.60 A number of scholars have recently investigated the connection between the Rabbinic corpus and various Hellenistic late antique legal compositions. Lee Levine offers an admirably balanced summary of the current consensus: The timing of certain developments within rabbinic society, especially with regard to internal organization and compilation of various corpora, both aggadic and halakhic, has interesting parallels with what was transpiring at the time in Roman and later Byzantine society. Is it coincidental, for instance, that the earliest Pharasaic schools of Hillel and Shammai crystallized at the time of Augustus, when legal training was becoming formalized in Rome in the early Roman law schools founded by Labeo and Capito? Or that R. Akiva and his colleagues began collecting and organizing rabbinic traditions under Hadrian, when Julianus, Celsus Pomponius, and others were actively involved in making similar compilations in Rome? Or that Rabbi Judah the Prince compiled and edited his Mishnah, and tannaitic midrashim were collected under the Severans, at a time when Gaius, Papinianus, Paulus, and Ulpianus were likewise compiling codices and responsa of Roman law and commenting on earlier material? The argument that these recurring parallel activities in Roman and Jewish societies might be related is more compelling when we realize that both Roman jurists and the rabbis centered their activities in schools of higher learning, and that at least one of the most famous Roman schools was located in Berytus, not far from the center of rabbinic activity in the Galilee.61
Whether or not we posit any direct connection or influence between the Rabbinic and the classical Roman legal enterprises,62 the synchronic juxtaposition of these
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two phenomena is tantalizing. And still more important for our purposes is the usefulness of the Roman, Syriac, and Persian law collections of late antiquity in setting out the parameters of what an ancient or Late Antique legal genre would consist of.63 We begin with the following lengthy excerpt from Gaius’s description of Roman marriage: 108. Now let us examine those persons who are subordinate to us in marriage. This also is a right peculiar to Roman citizens. 109. While it is customary for both men and women to be in power, only women fall into marital subordination. 110. Formerly there used to be three methods by which they fell into subordination: by usage, by sharing of bread, and by contrived sale. 111. A woman used to fall into marital subordination by usage if she remained in the married state for a continuous period of one year: for she was, as it were, usucapted by a year’s possession and would pass into her husband’s kin in the relationship of a daughter. The Twelve Tables therefore provided that if any woman did not wish to become subordinate to her husband in this way, she should each year absent herself for a period of three nights, and in this way interrupt the usage of each year. But this whole legal state was in part repealed by statute, in part blotted out through simple disuse. 112. Women fall into marital subordination through a certain sacrifice made to Jupiter of the Grain, for which reason it is also called the sharing of the bread. . . . This legal state is still found in our own times; for the higher priests, that is the priests of Jupiter, of Mars, and of Quirinus, as also the Sacred Kings, are chosen only if they have been born in marriage made by the sharing of bread, and they themselves cannot hold priestly office without being married by the sharing of the bread. 113. Women fall into marital subordination though contrived sale, on the other hand, by means of mancipation, that is, by a sort of imaginary sale; for in the presence of not less than five adult Roman citizens as witnesses, and also a scaleholder, the man to whom the woman becomes subordinate ‘buys’ her. . . . 115a. Formerly a contrived sale used also to take place for the purpose of making a will; for at one time women, with certain exceptions, had no right to make a will unless they had made a contrived sale and been remancipated and manumitted. But on the proposal of the Emperor Hadrian, the Senate remitted this requirement of making a contrived sale. . . . 116. It remains for us to describe what persons are in bondage. 117. All children, whether male or female, who are in the power of their father can be mancipated by him in the same way as slaves can. 118. The same rule applies to persons in marital subordination; for women can be mancipated by the other parties to the contrived sale in the same way as children by their father.64
Gaius continues by providing us with a detailed description of mancipation, bronze scales and all. Now while Gaius certainly used sources in compiling his Institutes—in this short passage he refers to the Twelve Tables, to legislation of Hadrian, and to
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senatorial decisions—he presents a summary of these sources rather than citing the original texts themselves. In this respect his Institutes is really a textbook rather than an anthology. Again, while he refers to, and even describes, practices that have fallen into disuse, these do not take up a large part of the work. Compare, however, the opening sections of Tractate Qiddushin in the Mishnah: 1. A woman is acquired [in marriage] in three ways and acquires herself in two. She is acquired by money, by deed, or by intercourse. “By money”: Beth Shammai maintain, a denar or the worth of a denar; Beth Hillel say, a perutah or the worth of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? An eighth of an Italian isar. And she acquires herself by divorce or by her husband’s death. A yevamah (i.e., a childless widow subject to levirate marriage) is acquired by intercourse, and acquires herself by [the ceremony] of halitzah (as mandated in Deut 25:7–10) or by the levir’s death. 2. A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by deed, and acquires himself by years (i.e., after six years of service, as mandated by Exod. 21:2), by the jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price. A Hebrew maidservant [is more privileged] in that she acquires herself by signs [of puberty]. [A slave] whose ear is bored (i.e., one who refuses freedom at the end of six years of servitude; see Exod. 21:5–6) is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by the jubilee or his master’s death. 3. A heathen slave is acquired by money, deed, or by hazaqah (i.e., taking possession, by ordering him to do the master some personal service), and acquires himself by money through the agency of others, and by deed. . . . 4. Large cattle are acquired by “pulling”; small cattle by lifting: this is the opinion of R. Meir and R. Eliezer, but the sages rule: small cattle are acquired by “pulling.” 5. Property which offers security (i.e., real estate) is acquired by money, by deed or by hazaqah. [Property] which does not offer security (i.e., moveables) may be acquired in conjunction with property which provides security by money, deed, or hazaqah, and it obligates the property which provides security, to take an oath concerning them.
There is no reference here to ancient practices or to the history of the Mishnah’s laws. If the texts in the Mishnah derive from earlier sources, the editor does not identify or even refer to them. A more exact parallel to Gaius’s practice would be those mishnayot in which obsolete practices or decisions of early courts are briefly described. These include, most famously, the mishnayot that begin with the formulaic “at first” (of which the Mishnah contains nearly two dozen65) and other forms as well.66 We do not know if the reasons that motivated Gaius and Rabbi to include such references to earlier practices were similar. The eternal character of a divine law might naturally lead a compiler to include such matters so as to better define the interplay of divine law and human legislation, whereas Gaius’ excursions may involve nothing more than a certain antiquarian temperament on the part of the author. Even so, a cursory comparison of the two passages indicates that whereas Gaius takes pains to define and describe the practices he reviews (e.g., usage, sharing of bread,
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mancipation, etc.)—presumably for the benefit of the student using the Institutes as a textbook—the Mishnah assumes a level of legal knowledge that Gaius does not (even if it is also concerned to define areas of dispute or minimum requirements). The number of bracketed comments appended to the translation gives an indication of how much knowledge the Mishnah assumes on the part of its reader. The Mishnah cannot, and did not, stand on its own as a “textbook of the Halakha,” and it clearly was not meant as an introduction to the field for students of Rabbinic law. On the other hand, even though he occasionally notes that the two schools are in dispute on an issue, Gaius seldom refers to disputes among the jurists. 196. Guardianship ends for boys when they reach puberty. Sabinus, Cassius and others of our teachers certainly think that a boy shows he has reached puberty by physical development: that is, he is capable of begetting. However, in the case of those who cannot reach puberty such as eunuchs, regard must be had to the age at which puberty is normally reached. The authorities of the other school think that puberty should be reckoned in years: that is, they judge anyone who has reached the age of fourteen as having reached puberty.67
Gaius clearly identifies himself as a Sabinian, and in opposition to the Proculians, whom he calls “the authorities of the other school.” In contrast, the Mishnah contains an infinitely greater number of disputes, but nowhere does its editor explicitly identify his allegiance; indeed, this objective stance is maintained even when the debates between the Pharisees and the Sadducees are reported, as in Yadayim 8. Roman law preserves several genres of legal collections that may be pertinent to categorizing the Mishnah: textbooks such as the Institutes of Gaius, codes such as Justinian’s, early collections such as the Twelve Tables, and responsa literature. Sasanian law preserves one important survival; the Madayan i Hazar Dadestan, which, while certainly not a code, is nonetheless a large collection of laws (comprising some fifty chapters in its two parts) on major areas of civil law.68 Yet none of these contains the wealth of disputational material that the Mishnah does, even if their authors register conflicting opinions and sometimes present a short history of the law on a particular point. Other ancient collections, such as the ninthcentury Zoroastrian encyclopedia, the Denkard (“Acts of Religion”), contain—like the Mishnah and even more like the Talmud—a variety of material, history and legend, ritual, and a smidgen of civil law, but also do not contain disputational material. Likewise, the Videvdat and the Pahlavi Vendidad (“Law Against Demons”)69 —the part of the Avesta that deals with purity laws—does not contain such material. As we have seen, it is unlikely that a code would have been composed in this way, and all these other ancient codes and legal books are testimony to that fact. That the Mishnah was eventually viewed as authoritative does not mean that it was originally intended to be a code, since, as far as we can tell, it never was looked upon as the last word in legal decision making. Nor, as we have seen, does it serve particularly well as a textbook. On the other hand, all of this may be a matter of degree. The Mishnah contains a registry of disputes but not all that much disputational material, espe-
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cially compared with the talmuds or the midreshei halakhah. On the other hand, Gaius, Justinian, and the Madayan i Hazar Dadestan do contain varying but not insignificant amounts of divergent opinions—the reason being, perhaps, as Macuch notes in her introduction to the first volume of the Madayan,70 that The author of the lawbook was not interested to explain simple relationships, nor to provide some sort of definition for the legal terms he employs. Apparently, he conceived of the work as a sort of aid to decision making for jurists, for he assumes an exact knowledge of all of these legal institutions.71
There is, however, another significant difference between these works and the Mishnah. All the other works have introductions. Justinian, as we have seen, appropriated Gaius, and Jesuboht, in the thirteen chapters of Book One, provides his law collection with an introduction reminiscent of Gaius that provides a framework for understanding the means and purposes of law, both in a legal and religious context, and the place of law within an eschatological context, and that contrasts human law with nomos, the ideal law. Possibly Jesuboht provided this introduction in order to provide his flock with an understanding of the place of “rendering up to Caesar what is Caesar’s,” on the one hand; he may also have been influenced by Justinian’s appropriation of Gaius. Farroxmard also provides something of an eschatological and doxological introduction to Madayan, but one that does not take up any legal issues whatsoever. Generally, he does not discuss basic rules or simple cases (although such rules or cases can be extracted from the precedents he does provide). Nevertheless, as Macuch makes clear in her introduction, the Madayan was certainly a collection of legal decsions that was compiled for the guidance of jurists who were obligated to enforce the laws. Historians of Roman law have emphasized the unique and unusual nature of Gaius’s Institutiones. Roman jurists were not legal theorists in the larger sense nor particularly interested in generalizations. As has been noted, Gaius was a not particularly successful law professor in his own time. It is therefore noteworthy that Justinian’s committee chose precisely his textbook as a prologue to its own code. It may be that the lack of alternatives forced this choice on them; there were not many other such overviews of the law. Ironically, the uniqueness of Gaius’s work makes the absence of such a prologue in the Mishnah, along with the paucity of definitions of legal terms in it, more in line with general Roman practice and less problematic in its own terms. In any case, it is clear that the inclusion of divergent views and the lack of clear definitions are irrelevant to the question of whether a particular work was intended as a code. Gaius composed a textbook, not necessarily meant for legal decision making in the proximate sense, which was later appropriated into a code. Farroxmard compiled a collection (not unlike the Mishnah’s), which was intended to be authoritative. Justinian’s Code, also intended as authoritative, contained elements of both the authoritative code and the textbook. Given the absence of a real parallel to Gaius’ Institutiones in Rabbinic literature, or, for that matter, in Roman or Sasanian law, we may conclude that there is no reason not to believe that Rabbi wished to provide a collection that could be used for both study and decision making.
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The Mishnah as Philosophy The fifth and final view of the Mishnah that has been proposed by modern scholars is as a philosophical treatise. The foremost proponent of this view has been Jacob Neusner, who has also pursued what is certainly the most extensive contemporary attempt to view the Mishnah in its own right and to define its characteristic traits in their own context. That is, he avoids viewing the Mishnah through the lens of other ancient Rabbinic (and non-Rabbinic) documents. By comparing the Mishnah’s and the Tosefta’s respective treatments of Seder Tohorot (Purities), Neusner has carried out an exhaustive study of the forms and formulary patterns of that Seder and its redaction. He summarizes his findings as follows: Tosefta to Mishnah Seder Tohorot both correlates with, and presents a striking contrast to, Mishnah. . . . Tosefta’s cognitive units (⫽ Mishnah-sections) are formulated out of phase with [the] formal patterns characteristic of Mishnah. In particular they ignore Mishnah’s stress on highly patterned syntactical formulations, carefully grouped units of threes and fives, and disciplined declarative sentences, one following the next in large-scale blocks of formal and conceptual intermediate divisions (⫽ roughly, chapters). Indeed, it is in Tosefta that the redactional formulations become fully apparent. Here, in the document generated by Mishnah, we see little of Mishnah’s interest in imposing structure upon intermediate units and formal patterns upon small ones. . . . When we eliminate Tosefta’s cognitive units and intermediate divisions which cite or gloss Mishnah, we are left with intermediate divisions and cognitive units which in the main form a mass of mutually indistinguishable, generally unbalanced and unpatterned declarative sentences.72
From this uniformity of language and style Neusner concludes that the Mishnah was redacted by a small group of people over a short period of time; a longer duration or a more heterogeneous group or groups of redactors could not sustain such uniformity.73 “Despite its socially diverse foundations and categories of interest, the Mishnah expresses itself in one mode of thought and expression and through one manner of speaking.”74 Moreover, there is very little “history” to the Mishnah’s own composition. History itself plays almost no role in the Mishnah. From the fact that its rules are formulated in the present tense, Neusner concludes that “after all, what the Mishnah really wants is for nothing to happen. . . . It portrays a world fully perfected and so fully at rest. . . . There is room only for a description of how things are: the present tense, the sequence of completed statements and static problems.”75 And again: “The whole corpus of prophecy and history is neglected by the Mishnah. . . . When the philosophers [of the Mishnah] confronted the sizable heritage of Israel and made the choice to ignore most of what had been done since the formation of the Mosaic codes . . . , they made a stunning comment. . . . Their judgment was that nothing of worth had happened from the time of Moses to their own day.”76 Partly because of this lack of concern with history, Neusner speaks of the
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Mishnah’s authors as “philosophers” and defines the Mishnah as “philosophy.” As E. P. Sanders puts it in a trenchant review of Neusner’s work on the Mishnah, Neusner proposes that the authors were philosophers and intended to construct a metaphysical and anti-historical world view. . . . He makes the fundamental assumption that the contents of the Mishnah tell us all that the authors want to say “about their view of the world as they see it or as they want to see it” (p. 15). . . . Since he assumes that the Mishnah is metaphysical philosophy, Neusner marvels at the things which are not there and which would be there if it were ordinary metaphysics. . . . But the things that are not there . . . are not there because they are not subject to legal discussion.77
In other words, the Mishnah’s genre cannot of course be determined by a formcritical study of its language. As Sanders points out, use of the present tense is generally characteristic of legal and semi-legal writing, as is neglect of historical data. Likewise, this accounts for its relative neglect of theology.78 Along the same line, Sanders argues, “laws characteristically do not give historical preambles and eschatological conclusions. Prophecy is entirely missing.” As an example of what the British Highway Code does not contain, he suggests the following: “Once upon a time Britain had no Motorways, until the great minister . . . arose, who built the M1, at which time there was only one. And now we look forward to the time when all Britain will be paved and, besides Motorways, there will only be slip roads.”79 Nevertheless, the inclusion in the Mishnah of large bodies of material—Qodashim and Toharot—that were all but completely inapplicable in Rabbi’s time points to its utopian character. G. Stemberger, in his revised edition of Strack’s Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, concludes his discussion of this issue with the following suggestion: Given today’s knowledge, it is no longer possible unequivocally to determine whether M[ishnah] was originally conceived as a collection, a teaching manual or a law code. Indeed, this alternative probably arises only for modern readers; what is more, it fails to account sufficiently for the utopianism of M[ishnah], its idealized order of the perfect harmony of heaven and earth, and the underlying philosophy. For in principle the ancient tradition is of course regarded as law which must be transmitted in teaching—and thus the three concepts almost coincide.80
Both Sanders and Stemberger are essentially correct, but even their characterizations of the Mishnah are not entirely accurate. Pace Stemberger, the Mishnah is hardly unique in containing elements of a code, a collection, and a teaching manual. Further, some law codes do contain historical summaries, as we have seen with Gaius, Justinian, and Madayan. As to the last of these, we may illustrate its historiographical dimension with an example from its very beginning: It is said: Until the reign of Wahram people were considered slaves whose fathers were slaves, (and) not those whose mother was;81 in contrast, Soshans said: “The child belongs to the father,” and now we say: “The mother.”82
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Any number of parallels from the Mishnah come to mind,83 as do examples from Gaius84 and Justinian.85 It should also be noted that any reference to an earlier authority—a practice common to all these collections—is in a sense historical. Sanders’s assumption that a philosophical work will not contain historical references is itself something of a non sequitur. Such historical references are not necessarily inappropriate in a law collection, a ritual text, or even a philosophical work. The same is true of eschatological conclusions. In Farroxmard’s somewhat rambling and repetitive introduction to Madayan, preserved in one manuscript which at this point has suffered losses in transmission, we find the following assertions. Because of the lacunae in the manuscript, and the loose syntax, it is difficult to follow the arguments exactly, but the general drift is clear. In the name of Ohrmazd, the lord of spiritual and earthly being [ . . . the Good Religion] of Mazdanaysians. This book is [called] the Book of a Thousand Decisions, in that it [shows] the greatness, goodness, and worth of people, aside from the qualities which they by their [own] effort [as well as] the gift of the gods, achieve in their own essence. The book is that instrument [of] efficacious power that the creator, in [his] omniscience, in order to ordain the destruction of the Lie, and the restoration to one’s own [domain], to ordain the organization of creation, the non-opposition [to the good], the undying bliss, the ever-enduring light, and to ordain [his] total sovereignty in the [eschatological] end of time, that has endured to such an extent as an essential [ability]. For the sake of the existence of that nature of mankind is that achievement praiseworthy, on account of which God created man. In the era of the [eschatological] end of time was the “preservation of the existence” of wisdom, insight, power of discernment, and understanding (perceived, taken advantage of?). . . . As one may come to perceive, from the religion of the gods, through searching and asking, to make one’s own person free of sin [is] the way to the realization of one’s own proper function, of [Good] Thinking, Speech and business dealings, keeping oneself [ritually] pure through integrity, I, Farrohmard i Wahraman, . . . this highest well-being. . . .86
Whether this introductory statement (which, it should be noted, appears as a separate section after chapter 32 of 50) was intended by the compiler as part of his work, or whether its placement is due to the vagaries of transmission, is not clear. As it stands, however, it may argue against Sanders’s point that legal works do not normally contain eschatological or philosophical discussions. The essential question is the definition of “philosophical” in this context. Neusner himself concedes that “the Mishnah’s is a philosophy in an odd and peculiar idiom to be sure.” He goes on to assert, however, that, properly studied, “it will emerge as a work of systematic thought on a sustaining program of issues that, in the Mishnah’s authorship’s time and place, other philosophers addressed and people in general [addressed] as philosophical.” When Neusner details his somewhat idiosyncratic use of the term “philosophical,” however, it becomes much less vulnerable (at least in part) to the criticism that Sanders mounts against it. He writes that the philosophical issues addressed in the Mishnah include the rules of classification and generalization, the issues of mixtures, the resolution of doubts, the relationship of the actual to the potential (chicken, egg), the role
74 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism of attitude or intention in the assessment of an action and its consequences . . . and the like—these abstract issues of general intelligibility turn out to form the intellectual program of considerable portions of the Mishnah as well.87
Neusner insists that these concerns take the Mishnah beyond the usual range of the term “philosophy of law” because they involve two additional criteria: First, they are principles that can apply to a considerable range of specific topics. Second, they are subject to generalization (“generalizable”) even beyond the limits of the law, for instance, in matters of metaphysics or physics (as with mixtures and connection), in matters of ethics (as with intentionality), in matters of the fundaments of philosophical inquiry (as with the interplay of potential and actual, which meant so much to Aristotle).88
Thus defined and circumscribed, Neusner may have a point, though if intentionality is a criterion, we may say that Farroxmard’s work also meets that requirement, as would most law books. Implicit in nearly all manuals of ritual are principles that parallel the Mishnah’s concern with mixtures and connection (e.g., sympathetic magic) without being the least bit “philosophical.” To this last point, Neusner would probably respond that what differentiates the Mishnah from nonphilosophical works is also its methodology, as in the matter of resolving issues of doubt.89 On this point, too, however, jurisprudential systems have their own “rules of statutory construction.” The real problem with Neusner’s philosophical approach to the Mishnah is that, in the end, categorizing the Mishnah as a philosophical work does not assist us in understanding its immediate, social purpose, or its redactional history and intent. It has always been read as a legal work of some type. No one, until Neusner, ever thought of reading it as a philosophical work—not even Maimonides! But can the form-critical differences that Neusner noted between the Mishnah and the Tosefta aid us in defining the Mishnah nonetheless? Sanders’s critique of Neusner on precisely that point appears sound. The matters of style that Neusner adduced as characteristic of the Mishnah as a philosophical work are typical of Tosefta as well. There may, however, be other differences which would help us in defining the nature of the Mishnah more precisely. Among these differences is the Tosefta’s inclusion of prooftexts to a far greater degree than in the Mishnah, an observation that even a cursory examination of both collections will confirm. This also accords with the much greater quantity of nonlegal material incorporated into the Tosefta than within the Mishnah. Tosefta’s redactor(s) clearly had a broader purpose in mind than did those of the Mishnah. This point is also reflected in the comparative sizes of the two works: Tosefta is about three times the size of the Mishnah. Its focus is also somewhat different—for example, it contains a number of very detailed expositions of the parameters of various ritual obligations, reminiscent of Maimonidean style, but even more of Sefer Hahinnukh. In this respect, then, Tosefta resembles a code more than does the Mishnah! Perhaps most telling, however, is the fact that Tosefta does not systematically make good on the Mishnah’s omissions. There is no tractate in the Tosefta on
Order, Sequence, and Selection 75
phylacteries, on ritual fringes, on the laws of Hanukkah or Shavuot, nor does Tosefta contain a detailed exposition of the Jewish calendar. To some extent, it may be that omissions of this type mirror the difficulties of describing in words rituals that are more easily transmitted mimetically. Nevertheless, one must inquire as to why the Mishnah (and the Tosefta) concentrate on some matters and not on others. To the extent that a clear rule cannot be formulated, we must accept the possibility, at least as a working hypothesis, that, as Albeck insisted, the Mishnah was not complete. In turn, since it now exists as a commentary on the Mishnah, Tosefta too must be incomplete. Both characteristics of the Mishnah—its excurses, on the one hand, and its omissions on the other—detract from its usefulness as a code. But an incomplete legal anthology also loses something of the usefulness of a complete register of sources, perhaps even more so since we expect greater “coverage” in an anthology than in a code, which should omit divergent sources. Even Albeck, who rejects the view of the Mishnah as a code and instead considers it as an anthology of sources, nevertheless feels compelled to explain its deficiencies as an anthology as being a consequence of its premature circulation. Still, we expect more of a code than from a collection of sources. A religious code that for some reason fails to cover matters of daily ritual can hardly be said to have fulfilled its purpose. In the end, therefore, the Mishnah’s manifest incompleteness remains a puzzle, whether we consider its redactors’ intention as having been to produce a code or an anthology. Nevertheless, our examination of parallel collections in other literatures of late antiquity has demonstrated that the division between a code or an anthology was not as great as nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars imagined. Nor was the division between a formal legal work—code or anthology—and a study text. The difficulty in categorizing the Mishnah as one or the other is a powerful example of how little these generic categories help us in defining the singularity of a work like the Mishnah. Notes 1. Iggeret Rav Sherira Gaon, ed. B. M. Lewin (Haifa: n.p., 1921, repr. Jerusalem, Makor, 1972), p. 29. The translation follows both the “Spanish” and the “French” versions, without one addition in the French version. See Margarete Schlueter, Auf Welche Weise wurde die Mischna geschrieben? (Tuebingen: J. C. Mohr, 1993), p. 97, nn. 2 and 3. Most MSS have leqateih, but O2198 has neqateih, “he took it,” which may have influenced Schlueter’s preference for nahm R(abbi) sie auf as opposed to sammelte in translating the former. On the question of the two versions, see Schlueter, pp. 24–30, and the literature there cited, and on the various words R. Sherira employs to describe the process, my discussion in the following paragraphs. In this essay, “Rabbi” and “Rabbi Judah the Prince” are terms used to signify the redactor or redactors of the Mishnah, without necessarily identifying the historical Rabbi Judah as the sole or even necessarily the primary redactor. Even R. Sherira, who like his contemporaries and successors, saw redaction in personal terms of nearer to modern ideas of authorship than of selection and editing, describes his effort as the culmination of a three-generations-long process, beginning with R. Akiva, continuing with R. Meir, and
76 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism ending (more or less) with Rabbi. I use brackets within ancient quoted material to indicate restorations and parentheses to indicate explanations, other editorial interpolations, and original language. 2. See Lewin, Iggeret Rav Sherira, pp. 23, 29; the second phrase occurs on p. 29. 3. See Schlueter, Auf Welche, pp. 376–372, and my comments in my review essay in AJS Review 20 (1995):180–85. 4. On the matter of historicity, see Schlueter, Auf Welche, pp. 360–66, and see my review in AJS Review 20 (1995): 180–85, and D. Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction in Sasanian Babylonia (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 35–43, Y. Gafni, Yehudei Bavel bi-Tqufat haTalmud (Jerusalem: Merkaz Shazar, 1990), pp. 239–45, and “Le-heqer ha-Khronologia haTalmudit be-Iggeret Rav Sherira Gaon,” Zion 52 (5747), pp. 1–24. 5. For habber as “formulate, fix,” see Shraga Abramson, “Ketivat ha-Mishnah (Al Daat Geonim ve-Rishonim),” in Tarbut ve-Hevrah be-Toledot Yisrael bi-Ymei ha-Benayyim: Qovetz Maamarim le-Zikhro shel Hayyim Hillel Ben-Sason, ed. R. Bonfil, et al. (Jerusalem: Merkaz Shazar, 1989), pp. 27–52, but compare M. Friedman, “Al Terumat ha-Genizah leHeqer ha-Halakhah,” Madaei ha-Yahadut 38 (1993): 277–301. On the whole issue, see Robert Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 156–61. On the question of the exact relation of some of these terms to the vexed question of whether Rabbi actually produced a written text, see most recently my “Orality and the Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud,” Oral Tradition 14/1 (1999): 52–99, and in particular, pp. 65–67, and see S. Lieberman, “The Publication of the Mishnah,” Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1950), pp. 83–99; B. Gerhardsson, Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity (Copenhagen: C.W.K. Gleerup and Ejnar Munksgaard, 1961 (repr. by W. B. Eerdman’s, 1998, with a foreword by Jacob Neusner); J. Neusner, The Memorized Torah: The Mnemonic System of the Mishnah (Chico, Cal: Scholars Press, 1985); and J. Neusner, Oral Tradition in Judaism: The Case of the Mishnah (New York: Garland, 1987), among many other contributions. See Martin S. Jaffee, “Oral Tradition in the Writings of Rabbinic Oral Torah: On Theorizing Rabbinic Orality,” Oral Tradition 14 (1999): 3–32, as well as Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, “The Fixing of the Oral Mishnah and the Displacement of Meaning,” in the same issue, and Jaffee’s new book, Torah in the Mouth: Writing and Oral Tradition in Palestinian Judaism, 200– 400 CE (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 55–83. 6. Lewin, Iggeret Rav Sherira, p. 23. 7. Lewin, p. 30, based on the statement in mEd 1:5. 8. S. Schechter, ed., Saadyana: Geniza Fragments of Writings of R. Saadya Gaon and Others (Cambridge: Deighton and Bell, 1903), p. 5. 9. On the relation of R. Sherira’s Epistle to Seder Tannaim va-Amoraim, written about a century earlier, see Brody, The Geonim, p. 278. 10. Eliezer Segal, “Anthological Dimensions of the Babylonian Talmud,” Prooftexts 17 (1997): 33–61; the quote appears on p. 34. 11. This shows up in large and small ways; see my comments in “Nahmanides and the Search for Omnisignificance,” Torah Umadda Journal 4 (1993):6–7, esp. n. 32. 12. See Stern’s introduction to this volume, p. 5. 13. Jacob Neusner’s rejection of source-critical methodologies should not be taken as a rejection of the existence of “sources” in Rabbinic documents; his avoidance of such methods is heuristic, since, as he often puts it, “we do not know what we cannot show.” See, for example, his discussion of the redaction of Mishnah and Tosefta in The Tosefta: Its Structure and Its Sources, Brown Judaic Studies 112 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), pp. 1– 8.
Order, Sequence, and Selection 77 14. Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 238. 15. Thus, bBer 2a accounts for the placement of the rules dealing with the evening Shema before those of the morning Shema because of their respective placement in Deuteronomy 6:7. 16. See, for example, bNaz 2b. 17. See bYev 2b, 3a; B.Q. 17b; B.B. 108b; Zev 48a. 18. bSot 2a. 19. See Abraham Goldberg, “The Mishnah—A Study Book of Halakha,” in Shmuel Safrai, ed., The Literature of the Sages, First Part (Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum), Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987, pp. 211–252; the observation quoted is on pp. 233–234. 20. See Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 4, “Classification,” pp. 238–320. See most recently Haym Soloveitchik, “Hirhurim al Miyyuno shel ha-Rambam be-Mishneh Torah: Beyot Amitiyyot u-Medummot,” Maimonidean Studies 4 (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2000), pp. 107–15 (Hebrew numbering). 21. Kovetz Teshuvot ha-Rambam ve-Iggerotav, ed. A. Lichtenberg (Leipzig, 1859), p. 26a, quoted in Twersky, Introduction, p. 242, n. 8. 22. Twersky, Introduction, p. 243–44. 23. Twersky, Introduction, p. 286. 24. From this point of view, Avraham Weiss’s view (at least at one stage in his life) of the Mishnah as Rabbi’s “lecture notes” is a variation on the latter theme; it differs from the view of the Mishnah as a collection chiefly in that it attempts to explain the Mishnah’s lack of strict order, as will be discussed. 25. See Zechariah Frankel, Darkei ha-Mishnah (1859; repr. Tel Aviv, Sinai, 1959), p. 228, esp. n. 6; the Bavli’s remark about R. Ashi is found at bB. B. 157b. Modern scholarship does not interpret the comment in this way; see Avraham Weiss, Hithavvut haTalmud bi-Shelemuto (New York: Kohut, 1943), pp. 245–46. 26. Hanokh Albeck, Untersuchungen ueber die Redaktion der Mischna (Berlin: C. A. Schweitschke & Sohn, 1923); a pale reflection of this work appears as part of his Mavo laMishnah. 27. J. N. Epstein, Mevo’ot le-Safrut ha-Tannaim: Mishnah, Tosefta u-MidresheiHalakhah, ed. E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957). 28. See Albeck, Untersuchungen, pp. 14–61, for dozens of examples. 29. Albeck points, inter alia, to the enactments of Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai in mR.H. 4:1–4, or those of Yohanan the High Priest in mSot 9:6 and mM.S. 5:15. 30. mAr 2:1–6. 31. mMeg 1:4–11. Albeck, Mavo la-Mishnah (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 5727), pp. 88– 89, assembles a large number of such examples. 32. See his Mavo la-Mishnah, pp. 99–101. 33. See his discussion of this matter in his Mehqarim ba-Baraita ve-Tosefta ve-Yahasan la-Talmud (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1969), pp. 180–84. 34. See Y. Kafih’s translation, Mishnah im Perush Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 5729), vol. I, c. 14b. 35. So the Bavli’s use of the phrase satam lan Tanna . . . at Bez 2a, Yeb 11b, Ket 43b [satam lan Tanna ke-Rabbi], Qid 54b, Sanh 27b, Bek 11a, Tem 34a. 36. Albeck’s arguments are to be found in two places: in the chapter devoted to the question of the sources of the Mishnah in his Mavo la-Mishnah, pp. 88–98, and in his Untersuchungen, esp. pp. 78–88.
78 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism 37. Albeck, Untersuchungen, pp. 107–8. 38. Epstein, Mevo’ot. It may not be without significance that Magnes, which ultimately published not only Epstein’s lecture notes but also three volumes of his collected papers (Mehqarim be-Safrut ha-Talmud uvi-Lshonot Shemiyot, also edited by E. Z. Melamed [1983– 1988], and which reprinted (along with Devir) his Perush ha-Geonim le-Seder Toharot (1981/ 2), did not reprint this article in the three-volume collection. 39. See his article, “Tosefta Atiqta,” Tarbiz 62 (1993): 314–38. 40. I say “formally parallel” because Tosefta is generally arranged according to the order of the Mishnah, and in this case the topics are roughly parallel. It is the discordance between them that draws Friedman’s attention. 41. “Tosefta Atiqta,” pp. 320–21. The translation is mine. 42. See my Authority and Tradition (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1994), pp. 83– 86. 43. See the literature cited in n. 5. 44. Avraham Weiss, Diyyunim be-Bava Qamma (New York: Feldheim, 1966), pp. 29– 30. 45. See his commentaries on Mishnah Shabbat and Eruvin, Perush la-Mishnah: Masekhet Shabbat (Jerusalem: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1976), and Perush la-Mishnah: Masekhet Eruvin (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986). 46. See n. 19 for the volume; the article, “Ve-kulhu aliba deRabbi Aqiva,” Tarbiz 38 (1968/9): 231–54. Another article, Goldberg, “Darko shel R. Yehudah ha-Nasi be-Hibbur haMishnah,” Tarbiz 28 (1958/9):260–69 is also relevant. 47. “Ve-kulhu,” p. 214. 48. Ibid., p. 225. 49. Ibid., p. 216. 50. Ibid., p. 219. 51. Ibid., p. 226. 52. Ibid., p. 219. 53. Ibid., p. 223. 54. bSanh 86a, cited by Goldberg, p. 223; indeed, the title of his Tarbiz 38 article is simply a reprise of this statement. 55. See A. Weiss, Al Hamishnah: [Osef Maamarim], (Ramat Gan: Bar Urian, n.d)., pp. 1–15, esp. pp. 4–6, originally published as “Ha-Palugta be-Ferush ha-Millah Maveh beMishnah, ba-Bavli, uvi-Yrushalmi,” Hatzofeh le-Hokhmat Yisrael (Budapest, 1926), pp. 144– 58. 56. Goldberg sees the fourth and final layer of the Mishnah as having been “formulated under the aegis of R. Yehudah the Patriarch” (“Ve-kulhu,” p. 217). 57. See Martin Goodman, The Roman World: 44 BC–AD 180 (London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 149–56. Note in particular the following, from p. 154: “A cultured Greek speaker [by the time of Augustus] would be expected to know Homer well and the plays of the great tragedians, which ensured familiarity with the Greek myths. He or she could be expected to have some acquaintance with Herodotus and Thucydides, and with the greatest of the orators, such as Demosthenes and Aeschines.” 58. See Alan Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 1995), pp. 1–9, 201–03, 181–93, 117–45, and O. F. Robinson, The Sources of Roman Law (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 102–27. 59. See Eduard Sachau, Syrische Rechtsbuecher, 3 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1907– 1914). Jesuboht’s Corpus constitutes the largest section of the third volume and covers a hundred pages of Syriac text. 60. See now the comprehensive edition of Maria Macuch, Rechtskasuistik und
Order, Sequence, and Selection 79 Gerichtspraxis zu Beginn des siebenten Jahrhunderts in Iran: Die Rechtssammlung des Farrohmard i Wahraman (Iranica 1) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1993) and Macuch, Das Sasanidische Rechtsbuch “Matakdan i Hazar Datistan (Teil II) (Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenlaendische Gesellschaft-Franz Steiner, 1981). For a recent translation of the Russian edition of A. G. Perikhanian, see Perikhanian, The Book of a Thousand Judgements (A Sasanian Law-Book) (Costa Mesa, Cal: Mazda Publishers, 1997). 61. Lee I. Levine, Judaism & Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence? The Samuel & Althea Stroum Lectures in Jewish Studies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), pp. 134–35; see also the article on education and the appended bibliography by Robert Kaster in G. W. Bowersock et al., Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 421–24. For the later period, see Catherine Hezser, “The Codification of Legal Knowledge in Antiquity: The Talmud Yerushalmi and Roman Law Codes,” in Peter Schaefer, The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture, vol. II (Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck 1998), pp. 581–641. For the earlier period, see Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), pp. 83–86. Lest I be accused of an unheeding parallelomania, see Levine’s measured cautions on pp. 112–13, though for a very different view on this point, see Louis H. Feldman, Jew & Gentile in the Ancient World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 62. Or whether we may posit any connection, however remote, between that of the redaction of the Bavli and various Sasanian law books, for that matter. 63. It is perhaps not inappropriate to note here Jacob Neusner as far back as 1969 called for the study of Madayan i hazar dadestan as “at least as interesting for comparative purposes as Justinian’s Code.” See his History of the Jews in Babylonia, IV. The Age of Shapur II (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), p. 432. 64. The Institutes of Gaius, trans. with an introduction by W. M. Gordon and O. F. Robinson, with the Latin text of Seckel and Kuebler (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 75, 77. 65. mShevi 4:1; M.S. 5:8; Bik 3:7; Sheq 1:2, 7:5; Yom 2:1; Suk 3:12; R.H. 2:1, 2:2, 2:5, 4:3, 4:4, 4:9; Ned 9:6, 11:12 (twice); Git 4:2 (twice), 6:5; Bek 1:7; Ar 9:4; Nid 10:6; T.Y. 4:5 (twice). It is perhaps noteworthy that the orders of Qodashim and Toharot, which might be expected to contain a great deal of such material, contain nearly no such reports. 66. Thus, see mShab 1:4–8 or Yad 4:1–4. Sot 5:2–5, which are described as occurring bo ba-yom, “on that day” that R. Gamaliel was deposed from being patriarch. 67. See Gordon and Robinson, Institutes, p. 121. 68. Judging from other collections, including the Syriac law books edited by Sachau and the tenth-century Rivayat i Hemit Ashavahishtan, no major area of law is omitted from the Madayan i Hazar Dadestan. However, this impression may be due to the paucity of our sources. For a discussion of the sources of Farroxmard’s collection, see Macuch, Rechtskasuistik, pp. 11–15. It is noteworthy, however, that only the Dadestan Namag would seem to have been comprehensive in this regard. The other works Macuch lists on p. 14 are clearly partial, along the lines of the praetorian edicts of Roman law. 69. See Shaul Shaked, Wisdom of the Sasanian Sages (Denkard VI), Persian Heritage Series 34 (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1979), and for an old and not altogether reliable translation, see Dinkard, ed. and trans. P. B. and D. P. Sanjara, 19 vols. (Bombay, completed in 1928). 70. That is, the most recently published volume. 71. Macuch, Rechtskasuistik, p. 2. 72. Jacob Neusner, The Tosefta, p. 201. This was first published in vol. 21 of his A History of the Mishnaic Law of Purities: Volume 21: The Redaction and Formulation of the
80 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism Order of Purities in Mishnah and Tosefta (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), p. 235. See my reviews of his work in “The Judaism of the Mishna: What Evidence?” Judaica Book News 12, no. 2 (1982): 17–25, and “Neusner’s Tosefta,” Jewish Quarterly Review 78, no. 1 (July 1987):130– 36. 73. J. Neusner, Purities, vol. 21, p. xiii. 74. J. Neusner, Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 241. 75. Ibid., pp. 235–36. 76. Ibid., pp. 169–71. 77. E. P. Sanders, “Jacob Neusner and the Philosophy of the Mishnah,” in Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies (London: SCM Press, 1990), pp. 313– 14. 78. Ibid., pp. 314–17. 79. Ibid., p. 315. 80. H. L. Strack and G. Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. Markus Bockmuehl (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), p. 154. 81. I have simplified the syntax somewhat. 82. See Rechtskasuistik, pp. 22 and 24, and Macuch’s long discussion on pp. 27–31. 83. See, for example, the famous mishnah in B.M. 4:1 and the talmudic discussions in both Bavli and Yerushalmi. The term ba-rishonah, “at first,” appears some eighteen times in the Mishnah, introducing a rule or procedure that had been applied at one time and was no longer the case (see mShiv 1:1; M.S. 3:7; Sheq 1:2, 7:5; Yom 2:1; Suk 3:12; R.H. 2:1, 2:2, 4:3, 4:4; Ned 9:6, 11:2; Git 4:2, 6:5; Bek 1:7; Ar 9:4; Nid 10:6; T.Y. 4:5); in a famous case, an earlier rule is contrasted with the procedure followed by a later court (bet din shel ahareihem). Conditions from the time of the “early prophets” (nevi’im rishonim) are introduced at Yom 5:2. Many more such points are raised in various contexts; see, for example, Martin Jaffee, “The Taqqanah in Rabbinic Literature: Jurisprudence and the Construction of Rabbinic Memory, JJS 41 (1990):204–25. 84. See the quotation from I.111, reproduced previously. 85. See Hezser, “Codification of Legal Knowledge.” 86. Macuch, Rechtskasuistik, pp. 16. 18, 19, 21. Compare also Nina Garsoian’s translation of Anahit Perikhanian, The Book of a Thousand Judgements (New York: Bibliotheca Persica, 1997), pp. 193, 195. 87. Jacob Neusner, The Philosophical Mishnah: Volume One: The Initial Probe, Brown Judaic Studies 163 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), p. 1. 88. Ibid., p. 226. 89. Ibid.
5 eliezer segal
Anthological Dimensions of the Babylonian Talmud
he Babylonian Talmud defies attempts to categorize it according to the stan-
Tdard literary genres of Western literature. Even when we take care to define it on its own terms, the undertaking is likely to be frustrated by the realization that the classification is susceptible to many different possibilities, depending on the vantage from which it is approached. To complicate the efforts even further, talmudic scholarship itself is often in disagreement over fundamental issues related to the Talmud’s purpose and composition. Let me begin by surveying the principal models that have been proposed as frameworks for understanding the Talmud’s distinctive literary character, taking note of the divergent scholarly approaches that have been applied to them.
The Talmud as Commentary The fact that the Talmud is not an independent work but is arranged as a commentary on an earlier work, the Mishnah, sets obvious limits to its contents. It has no real structure of its own but follows the order of the Mishnah, adding comments by later authorities or comparative material from earlier sources, provided that these sources relate directly or indirectly to matters mentioned in the Mishnah.1 Nevertheless, it is immediately apparent that the Rabbinic conception of a commentary is a much more flexible one than we are used to in the Western tradition. The straightforward elucidation of the meaning and intention of the commented texts is only one of the purposes of the Talmud’s commentary on the Mishnah, and not necessarily the most prominent among them. The talmudic sugya tackles an infinite spectrum of topics that bear only peripheral or indirect connections to the Mishnah, including comparisons with (apparently) conflicting sources and new applications of legal principles.
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The Talmud as Legal Literature Since legal literature knows its own distinctive literary forms,2 it is not necessary to evaluate the Talmud according to the esthetic and formal criteria that would be applied to more conventionally “literary” genres. In particular, a long-standing dispute has focused on whether the Mishnah was intended to serve as a normative codex or corpus iuris, or as digest or encyclopedia of sources for theoretical instruction. Though it would have to be reformulated,3 a corresponding argument could be applied to the Talmud as well. Viewing Talmud through this lens as a type of legal literature might allow us to understand and appreciate heretofore inexplicable or unrecognized features. For example, legal literature is universally renowned for its hairsplitting casuistry and careful logical argumentation. Although we do not customarily value such dialectic as literary activity, there is no prima facie reason not to do so. There is an undeniable esthetic enjoyment involved in the experience of a beautifully crafted mathematical theorem or scholarly thesis.4 The authors of the Talmud appear to have been conscious of the esthetic dimension of their undertaking.
The Talmud as an Anthology The Talmud assembles material from diverse schools and over many generations. The sources preserved in the Talmud are distributed between the two major Jewish population centers of Palestine and Babylonia. The citations and stories attributed to Babylonian Rabbis appear to have undergone simultaneous redactions in several different schools.5 This situation suggests the existence of synchronic parallel redactions that were afterward combined into a unified Babylonian Talmud.6 Further, the citation of traditions of Rabbis from successive generations suggests an image of each generation adding its newer stratum to a literary heritage left by its predecessors.7 Clearly, these two models for the Talmud’s evolution, one synchronic, the other diachronic, are not mutually exclusive. To appreciate the two preceding models, it is also important to understand that the Talmud was studied orally and not set to writing until much later in the history of its development. Whatever the original grounds for the Rabbis’ prohibition against writing down the teachings of the Oral Tradition (referring, essentially, to anything other than the Bible and Megillat taanit), it is clear that the prohibition remained in force throughout the talmudic era,8 and the transmission of the sources was through memorization. Other than some discernible effects on the rhetorical character of talmudic expression, it is not immediately clear how this fact affected the literary character of the Talmud. Although it is possible that the Talmud’s redaction was carried out in writing, there is considerable evidence to the contrary.9 Our understanding of the redactional process has been altered decisively by recent scholarship. Until well into the present century, research into the study of the Talmud’s redaction remained bound to an agenda that had been formulated by Sherira and Maimonides, who had perceived the redaction of Rabbinic compendia as the work of individuals. Basing themselves on questionable anecdotal
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traditions, scholars continued to rehash old attempts to identify the Rav Ashi and Ravina mentioned by the Talmud as “the end of instruction.” Twentieth-century research has preferred to concentrate on careful analysis of the contents and structures of individual sugyot.10 From a clearer understanding of textual transmission, enriched by newly available geonic texts and manuscripts from the Cairo Geniza, it has become evident that the text of the Talmud remained fluid for centuries after the traditional dates of its redaction.11 A new paradigm emerged that emphasized the distinction between formal statements in Hebrew attributed to specific Rabbis, and anonymous Aramaic explanatory materials in which the dicta are embedded. According to the prevailing theory, the anonymous Aramaic sections are the work of the Talmud’s redactors. Although some scholars have reserved judgment on the precise chronological provenance of these texts, allowing for the possibility of continuous redactions, the widespread opinion is that they are the contribution of the saboraim, an obscure group of Babylonian sages whom Sherira located between the talmudic and geonic eras and whose activities had been hitherto perceived as confined to a few minor additions to the Talmud text.12 In light of the vastness and importance of the anonymous stratum, it would now appear that these saboraim should actually be credited with shaping the Talmud into its present form. A radically different formulation of the relationship between the redactors and the individual traditions that make up the Talmud has been proposed by Jacob Neusner.13 With respect to the issue of the Talmud’s composite nature, Neusner’s most far-reaching assertions are the ones that deal with the relationships between individual traditions, dicta and stories, and so on, and the works in which they are contained. Beginning from the premise that the units were included only in order to serve the agendas of the completed documents, and taking into account that many of those units have no historically verifiable or recorded existence outside those completed documents, Neusner arrives at the conclusion that any attempt to deal with the units is futile and ultimately misleading. According to Neusner, the focus of study must be the “document” as a whole—in the case of the Babylonian Talmud, for example, the entirety of the Talmud. In response to this assertion, the following can be said: While there can be no denying the importance of examining the incorporation of the units into their respective “documents,”14 Neusner fails to convince that this is an either-or proposition. The certainty that no attributed dictum is reliable is as dogmatic as the certainty that all of them should be believed uncritically—and there seems to be less plausibility to an approach that views the entire Talmud as no more than a sixth-century work of fiction. At all events, philological method has long recognized that the meanings of texts can be studied without prior commitment to their historical veracity.15 Furthermore, in the specific instance of the Babylonian Talmud, the many attempts by current talmudic research at interpreting attributed dicta independently of their redacted, anonymous contexts have produced an impressive and consistent body of evidence demonstrating that the original authors of those dicta meant something different from what emerges from the context of the redacted talmudic sugya. The original meanings of the dicta are frequently found to correspond with the simple sense of the Mishnah, with the interpretations
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of the Tosefta, or with the Palestinian Talmud.16 Furthermore, it seems entirely inconceivable that the supposed authors of cogent and consistent documents would have knowingly introduced into their works indications of discrepancies between the whole and the parts.17 Finally, Neusner is less than persuasive in his assumption that the main agendas of the various documents, which dictated the criteria for inclusion of their component materials, were ideological or theological. As we shall see, this view largely runs counter to the common-sense reading of the documents themselves, which are, after all, compendia of technical legal argumentation directed to specialized judges and jurists (in the case of the Talmud) or of Bible-based homiletics (in the case of the aggadic midrash)—not of theology or philosophy. Neusner himself contends that to posit a nonideological program for the publication of a religious work would relegate that work to triviality. But this argument is no more compelling. Once we have accepted the fact that a given body of tradition (such as halakhic argument or midrashic homiletics) was deemed valuable by the community that produced it, then the preservation of those traditions can also be accepted as a fully legitimate purpose in its own right. It follows from this that purely literary or functional considerations can provide adequate criteria for the structuring of Rabbinic compendia. And despite Neusner’s arguments, there is no reason to warrant an abandonment of investigations into the composite structure of the Babylonian Talmud, or of any other rabbinic collection. In the remainder of this essay, I wish to elaborate upon the anthological model by considering some talmudic material that did not originate as Mishnah commentary. It is this type of material that best highlights the anthological dimension of the Talmud, and that we shall be focusing on in the present study. Since all works in the Rabbinic corpus present themselves to us as collections of opinions and dicta ascribed to several generations of Rabbis, it follows that the redactors of each of these works were acting as anthologists when they assembled the particular traditions that were to be included in a given compendium. This applies not only to the final products, the compendia that were acknowledged by posterity as completed works worthy of study and authoritative standing, but also to whatever earlier collections might have been utilized by the redactors of later works. In most instances, modern Rabbinic scholarship regards that process of assembling traditions as a creative one: the selected sources and traditions were not only gathered together as they would be according to the conventional definitions of the anthologizing process, not merely juxtaposed to one another in order to elicit new associative meanings; but it would appear that the redactors took a more dynamic role in rewording the received traditions, or in deconstructing them and reassembling them into original literary creations. The anthological character of the Talmud must also be understood from within the context of amoraic literature in general. The surviving literature of the amoraim suggests that the Rabbinic curricula of the time were more varied than what came to be reflected in the overriding structures of the completed Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds. Although both Talmuds are organized as commentaries
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on the Mishnah, giving the impression that the Mishnah was the sole subject of amoraic study and that all other types of material were included by virtue of their direct or indirect bearing on the exposition of the Mishnah, it is evident that much of the material that came to be included in the Talmud did not originate in Mishnah study but developed elsewhere. Allowing that some extraneous tannaitic compilations (baraitot) might have been integrally connected to the elucidation of the Mishnah,18 it is very hard to make such arguments convincingly with respect to large “foreign bodies” whose links to the Talmud are indirect or nonexistent. Some of my own research has focused on two such nonmishnaic components of the Babylonian Talmud, namely, the anecdotal records of Rabbinic legal decisions and court cases,19 and the units of aggadic midrash.20 With respect to both those instances, it is likely that most of the material was originally collected and arranged in separate venues (perhaps through the court system or synagogues, respectively) and was incorporated into the Talmud at an advanced stage of its development. The formal links that connect such passages to the main body of the Talmud are rarely to the Mishnah or to its direct explanations, but usually to peripheral topics that were introduced associatively in the course of the amoraic discussion. Similar methods characterize the editorial inclusion of several other types of talmudic passages, such as lists of practical legal decisions, anecdotal aggadah, and magical recipes.21 Whereas the tannaitic era has bequeathed us a rich and multifaceted “library” of distinct Oral Torah compendia, covering all conceivable permutations of the fundamental categories of halakhah/aggadah and midrash/mishnah,22 the amoraic era in the land of Israel, especially its earlier, “classical” phase, seems to have produced only two genres of Rabbinic literature: the Talmud embodied the tradition of scholastic halakhic discourse as applied to the Mishnah, whereas the aggadic midrash (to books from the Pentateuch, “five Scrolls,” and special readings) were principally related to the homiletical exposition of the Bible in the synagogues. Whatever additional categories were considered worthy of preservation had somehow to be connected to one or the other of these two genres. The situation of Babylonian Oral Law literature was, of course, even more limited. The single literary monument that was left of their religious learning was the Babylonian Talmud,23 and it was into this work that the redactors chose to include all that was to be preserved of the Babylonian Rabbis’ contributions to Rabbinic scholarship. Underlying this decision was their conviction, probably selfevident to them, that the intricacies of talmudic legal debate constituted the most valuable form of religious discourse. There are several indications that this description of the Talmud’s scope reflects a deliberate policy on the part of the Babylonian Jewish sages to produce a veritable “encyclopedia” of the Oral Law. It is particularly discernible in their treatment of materials for which no obvious bond can be found with the Mishnah (or at least with those sections of it that were selected for inclusion in the Babylonian Talmud).24 Thus, special mini-tractates, as it were, were incorporated into artificially chosen locations in order to deal with topics like Hanukkah, mezuzah, and tefillin, for which traditions existed but which had no natural home in the Mishnah. Several scholars have observed how, when confronted with mishnayot
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or baraitot from tractates that lack an amoraic commentary (e.g., Zeraim and Toharot), the Talmud makes a point of assembling as much material as it can find on the topic, well beyond the requirements of the current pericope.25 A similar pattern may be perceived in connection with biblical interpretations and homiletical expositions. Unlike their Palestinian colleagues, the Babylonian Rabbis never composed separate compendia of aggadic midrash, and consequently they sought all manner of intricate and devious ways to justify linking their biblical commentaries to the talmudic Mishnah commentary. With respect to the above source types, as with other nonmishnaic components of the Talmud, we often find that their formal connection to the larger body of the Talmud is not to the Mishnah, or even to the exposition of the Mishnah, but rather to extraneous issues and sources that were themselves drawn in through circuitous chains of reasoning. All this leads us to the view that the inclusion of these materials in the Talmud was part of an overall redactional project belonging to the later strata of its literary evolution. As such, it can be characterized as a sort of anthologizing, designed to expand the scope of the Babylonian Talmud from its narrow definition, as a record of the amoraic discussions of Rabbi Judah the Prince’s Mishnah, and to make it a repository of the full heritage of Babylonian Rabbinic lore. If we adopt the prevailing view of current talmudic scholarship, the lion’s share of the Talmud’s anonymous Aramaic dialectical framework (the setama digmara) can be ascribed to post-amoraic (saboraic or “stammaitic”) redactors, and the redactors themselves were dynamic and creative anthologists. Only on rare occasions were the Talmud’s editors satisfied merely with gathering materials and juxtaposing passages in appropriate locations. Rather, they expended considerable imagination in creating literary links to the host pericopes. In keeping with the dialectical character of talmudic discourse, this was frequently done by invoking the external source, or a portion of it, as a prooftext in a debate or in the clarification of a halakhic question. I will survey some representative passages from Ketubot in which the editors have incorporated elements that do not relate directly to the local mishnah, and presumably did not originate in the study of that mishnah. My principal interest will be in reconstructing the process of the incorporation: I will be attempting to determine where (i.e., in what institutional setting or literary context) the material originated, why it was included in its current setting, and what literary techniques the editors employed in order to connect it to the new setting. Example 1: Transposition of Materials Relating to Other Mishnayot (Ketubot 2a–3a) The structure of the opening pericope of Ketubot is peculiar. Ostensibly, it comes to elucidate the ruling in Mishnah 1:1 that A virgin is married on Wednesday and a widow on Thursday. Because on two days of the week, the courts convene in the towns: on Monday and on Thursday.
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For if he should have a charge to bring regarding her virginity, he would proceed early to the court.
At the outset of the talmudic passage attached to that mishnah, we find the following passage: Says Rav Joseph: Says Rav Judah: Says Samuel: For what reason did they say “A virgin is married on Wednesday”? Because we have learned in the Mishnah (Ketubot 5:2): If the time26 arrived and they were not married, they are entitled to support from his property and from terumah.27
Rav Joseph is thus reported as citing a tradition of Samuel that interpreted the Mishnah (which assigns specific weekdays for the holding of weddings) in light of Mishnah 5:2, where a twelve-month deadline was established for the betrothal period (by which time, in other words, the man had to complete the marriage ceremony), with the bridegroom-to-be becoming subject to various obligations if he failed to meet that deadline. This leads the Talmud to a series of discussions that would have been more plausibly attached to Mishnah 5:2 (57a–b in the Talmud). Our current pericope, then, is primarily concerned not with the elucidation of the local mishnah, but with a quite unrelated matter, a lengthy examination of the conditions under which an unavoidable delay would be accepted as a valid reason for not fulfilling a time-defined obligation.28 This examination leads in turn to a discussion, cited in two versions, that is based on a dictum of Rava, which draws a comparison between cases of marriage and of divorce. According to the first version, Rava states that, although unavoidable delay is taken into consideration where it involves the postponement of a wedding, it is not accepted as an excuse for nonfulfillment of a condition attached to a divorce. According to the second version, Rava does not differentiate between the cases of marriage and divorce and allows the plea in both cases. An identical series of tannaitic and amoraic prooftexts is adduced for each version. As applied to the first version of Rava’s statement, the texts are presented as attempts to identify the source on which Rava based his ruling; all are rejected as incomplete, and the Talmud concludes that Rava did not base his opinion on any source, but on logical considerations. As applied to the second version, the same prooftexts are treated as contradictions to Rava’s opinion, each of which is ultimately resolved. It appears, then, that the main elements of this passage were indeed transposed from an original location in chapter 5. Conversely, the talmudic commentary that is currently attached to 5:2 deals with the exegetical roots of the twelve-month deadline and with the issue of the fiance´e’s rights to partake of terumah,29 but not with any of the topics that are discussed in the opening pericope. This situation indicates that the final redactors made a decision to expand the tractate’s opening pericope at the expense of the pericope on 5:2, a practice that is consistent with the acknowledged “saboraic” tendency to construct elaborate introductory passages in which tannaitic and amoraic dicta from diverse parts of the tractate, or of the Talmud, are woven into a complex dialectical fabric.30 Although the present pas-
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sage, founded on attributed sayings of Samuel, Rav Joseph, Abaye,31 Rav Ahfi ai,32 and perhaps Rav Ashi,33 does not fully conform to that model, it is nonetheless possible to discern features of the typical saboraic introductory pericope in the redactors’ linking together of diverse sources and themes. If the intention of the redactors had been merely to elucidate the local mishnah and to collect the relevant tannaitic and amoraic sources, the passage would have been considerably more compact and focused, skipping over all the discussion that now intervenes between Rav Joseph’s initial comment and the dictum of Rav Samuel Bar Isaac at the bottom of folio 3a. However, by thus choosing to divert the pericope away from a narrow interpretation of the prescribed dates for weddings, as defined at the beginning of Ketubot 1:1, the redactors fashioned a flexible framework that permitted them to assemble a diverse selection of sources that would otherwise not have been included in the Talmud. The editors, then, were guided by a wish to connect and include as many sources as possible in the pericope. The product of such editorial activity can legitimately be regarded as a modest form of an “anthology.” In the discussion that follows these passages about the legal consequences of unavoidable delays on the fulfillment of contractual conditions, some twelve talmudic sources are adduced. In an appendix, I have listed these sources, and the reader is invited to refer to them. The first source records an attempt by Rav Joseph to reformulate the initial version of Samuel’s tradition that he had earlier traduced, and following several other passages that respond to this reformulation, a pericope is cited that relates a comment by Rava to M. Ketubot 5:2. Following this, the Talmud records seven additional passages in its quest for a source for Rava’s ruling, drawing these passages from various texts connected mainly to Mishnah Gittin 7:7–8. We see then, that by means of inventive manipulation of a brief original pericope to M. Ketubot 1:1, which in its original form might well have consisted of no more than Rav Joseph’s citation of Samuel’s dictum, the talmudic redactors provided an intricate literary framework in which they were able to embed a remarkable range of talmudic sources, including mishnayot, baraitot, amoraic statements, and a case precedent. In most of the instances, the individual source units had already been incorporated into composite pericopes prior to their being utilized by the redactors of the present passage. A number of different objectives were achieved by this tactic, not the least of which was the desire to assemble and analyze all the known talmudic materials that bear on the question of deadlines missed because of unavoidable delay. However, the beginning of Ketubot still strikes us as an implausible place in which to situate such a discussion.34 Probably, the redactors were simply determined to have Ketubot open with a suitably elaborate opening pericope. Beyond this, however, one of the important objectives that guided the redactors of the pericope was precisely their urge to “anthologize.” In the present context, this meant to collect as much material as they could reasonably conjoin to the text from the Mishnah. Characteristic of the organizational esthetics of the Babylonian redactors is their preference for devising intricate paths that incorporate the sources as part of the argumentation (e.g., as evidence for an objection, in
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order to illustrate a halakhic principle, or to demonstrate a fine legal distinction that resolves an apparent contradiction), rather than merely cataloging sources that have a straightforward connection to the topic matter of the local mishnah. In this example, which is typical of the more advanced (“saboraic”) stages of the redactional process, the editors have enhanced the specific pericope but have not augmented the total quantity of materials that are included in the Babylonian Talmud, since all the components are being copied from other locations in the Talmud, and all of them have natural affinities to topics raised by the Mishnah. Moreover, it seems that the redactors of the pericope were making use of material that had already been incorporated into composite passages in their previous locations. Nevertheless, the understanding of the sources was substantially enriched by their juxtaposition and by their inclusion in a novel setting.
Example 2: An Anthology of Aggadic Sayings (Ketubot 5a) As we saw, Mishnah Ketubot 1:1 stipulated that weddings of virgins should be scheduled for Wednesdays so as to shorten the time between the couple’s first act of intercourse and the traditional Thursday session of the court, in case a question should arise concerning the bride’s virginity. In connection with this ruling, the Talmud inquired anonymously (using the ibba’aya leho form) whether the Mishnah understood “Wednesday” literally, i.e., even before sundown, or if it actually referred to the following evening, which would normally be considered part of Thursday, but which would better satisfy the Mishnah’s concern for shortening the interval before the convening of the court. In connection with this query, the Talmud cites the following tradition: Come and hear: For Bar Qappara teaches [de-tanei]:35 A virgin is married on Wednesday and has intercourse on Thursday, since that is when the blessing was said for the fish.36 A widow is married on Thursday and had intercourse on Friday, since that is when the blessing was said for humans.37
The Talmud proceeds to discuss in an anonymous passage the implications of Bar Qappara’s teaching with respect to the question under discussion. In typical Rabbinical fashion, they examine the validity of the arguments and their consistency with other rulings. Now having introduced one teaching of Bar Qappara that has obvious relevance to the interpretation of the Mishnah, the Talmud goes on to cite additional traditions in his name that have no such relevance:38 Bar Qappara expounded [darash]: The deeds of the righteous are greater than the creation of the heavens and the earth, for with regard to the creation of the heavens and the earth it is written, “Mine hand also hath laid the foundation of the earth, and my right hand hath spanned the heavens” (Isa. 48:13), whereas concerning the deeds of the righteous it is written, “The place, O Lord, [which] thou hast made for thee to dwell in, [in] the Sanctuary, O Lord, [which] thy hands have established” (Exod. 15:17).
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The Talmud appends to this tradition an objection raised by “a certain Babylonian, Rabbi H fi iyya by name,” and a final resolution of the difficulty by Rav Nahfi man bar Isaac. Afterward, it brings a third tradition of Bar Qappara: Bar Qappara expounded: What is it that is written, “And thou shalt have a peg upon thy weapon” (Deut. 23:14)? Do not read azenekha (“weapon”), but rather, oznekha (“ears”), implying that if a person should hear anything improper, he should insert his finger in his ears.
To this exposition the Talmud also attaches a number of related traditions, in the names of Rabbi Eleazar, the tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael and an anonymous baraita (tannu rabbanan). As is true with several talmudic lists of aggadic dicta, it is not clear why these particular items were grouped together. Evidently, they were so grouped in an original list that was utilized by the pericope’s redactors. The mere fact of Bar Qappara’s authorship does not provide a satisfactory criterion, since Rabbinic literature contains many other traditions introduced by the formula “Bar Qappara expounded.” Nor are the three statements grouped together anywhere else in the literature. The first tradition is, however, cited in Palestinian sources in connection with our mishnah in Ketubot:39 Bar Qappara says:40 Because in connection with them [i.e., Wednesday and Thursday] a blessing is written. But the blessing is written only in connection with the Thursday and the Friday, on Thursday for the birds and the fish, on Friday for Adam and Eve.41 R. Yose´ says: Bar Qappara’s reasoning is that42 Wednesday [means] the evening of Thursday, and Thursday [means] the evening of Friday.43
A tradition similar to the second of the Talmud’s three homilies is found in the Mekhiltas of R. Simeon ben Yohai44 and of Rabbi Ishmael,45 though without the attribution to Bar Qappara: “The sanctuary, O Lord, which Thy hands have established”—Beloved is the Holy Temple before Him Who spoke and the universe came into being. For when the Holy One created His universe, He created it by means of only one of His hands, as it is said: “Yea, My hand hath laid the foundation of the earth.” But when He came to construct the Holy Temple, as it were, it was with both His hands, as it is said: “The sanctuary, O Lord, which Thy hands have established.”46 “The Lord shall reign”—When?47—You shall construct it with both your hands. This is expressed in a parable. . . .
In spite of the striking general resemblance between the two traditions, it is evident that Bar Qappara’s dictum is not identical to the passages in the Mekhiltas, and the precise relationship between the two traditions remains obscure.48 Are they to be viewed as two versions of a single tradition, or are we to suppose that Bar Qappara was familiar with the Mekhilta’s homily in praise of the Temple, which he was consciously expanding in a slightly different direction?
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The third of Bar Qappara’s expositions, about insulating one’s ears against inappropriate talk, appears to be unique to this pericope. The obvious question that arises here is, how did these three disparate traditions come to be linked together?49 There is no clear answer to the question, but a number of possibilities can be considered.50 For example, we may note that all three dicta have a common connection to the biblical Creation story, though in the last instance, the connection is very indirect.51 The juxtaposition of Isaiah 48:13 and Exodus 15:7 in the second dictum suggests that it might have originated in a proem structure (petihfi ta), according to which the homilist opens from a passage in the Prophets or Hagiographa to conclude with the opening verse of the day’s scriptural reading (usually from the Pentateuch). However, such a reconstruction involves some difficulties, seeing as none of the pentateuchal verses cited in the passage are actually known to have introduced lection units in either the annual (Babylonian) or triennial (Palestinian) cycles and hence would not have served as appropriate proem verses. In many similar instances in the Talmud, we have grounds for surmising that the dicta were originally parts of a single homily.52 In principle, that premise is applicable here. However, since no actual homily of that sort has been preserved in the literature, any attempt at reconstructing such a lost homily would necessarily involve us in unverifiable speculations. One likely possibility is that the dicta belonged to a wedding discourse that dwelled upon the creation of man and woman as the culmination of Creation, and focused on the couple’s obligation to uphold the purity and holiness of their marriage. However we might choose to reconstruct the evolution of the pericope, there is no escaping the fact that the straightforward elucidation of the Mishnah, no matter how liberally we perceive such an elucidation, would not have required the inclusion of any but the first dictum in the series. That all three are in fact found in the Babylonian pericope, which is further enhanced by additional talmudic materials, provides us with further evidence of the redactors’ concern for turning their Talmud into a framework for anthologizing a broad and diverse spectrum of Rabbinic oral tradition. Example 3: Cases and Judicial Materials (Ketubot 91b–93a) Anecdotal traditions and case citations, virtually by definition, cannot have originated in a literary context. Insofar as they record actual events (or at least preserve a “historical kernel”), we must accept that they arose in connection with the random developments of actual life and only afterward were appended to the literary works in which they are now found. In a previous study,53 I proposed as a plausible working hypothesis that most of the cases involving Babylonian Rabbis that came to be included in the Talmud had initially been recorded in court archives, after which they were collected into straightforward lists arranged in accordance with a variety of different organizational criteria.54 Their incorporation into the Talmud occurred at an advanced stage of its evolution, as is evidenced by the facts that (a) many of them connect formally to the dicta of later amoraim;
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and (b) relatively few of them are discussed or analyzed in the Talmud, and of those almost all are dealt with only by the anonymous redactors or (in rare instances) by amoraim from the fifth generation and later. Ketubot 91b–93a contains a list of decisions and legal dicta by several Babylonian amoraim. Although, as we shall see, the items in the list are heterogeneous, the mnemonic siman that introduces them indicates that the Talmud’s redactors viewed them as a single, integral collection.55 Of the nine items in the list, only the first three have the appearance of cases, formulated according to the common hahu gavra (“a certain man”) pattern.56 The remainder are theoretical halakhic dicta. However, closer inspection raises some questions about whether even the first three ought to be perceived as actual cases rather than theoretical formulations, since none of them contains the usual clause “He came before [ata leqammeh] Rami bar H fi ama,” which would indicate beyond question that the case had been adjudicated by the Rabbi in question. Although it is not common for the attributed legal dicta of amoraim to be worded in Aramaic, there are exceptions to that rule, including some lists of halakhic rulings that originated in contexts other than the amoraic interpretation of the Mishnah.57 The construction “Rami bar H fi ama considered saying, etc.” (according to which the proposed verdict was refuted while still under consideration) seems more natural to an academic than to a judicial setting.58 Within the collection of nine items we may discern various smaller groupings of two or more units that have some common features. The similarities relate to their content,59 the identities of the presiding judges or sages,60 of the auxiliary or junior scholars who question the original rulings,61 or of the participants in subsequent discussions that focused on the original sources, etc.62 The presence of such patterns suggests that the present collection evolved from a smaller original list, to which additional units were later attached by virtue of associative affinities to the original units. In spite of its daunting heterogeneity, there are a number of general observations that can be made about the collection as a whole: 1. The items in it all deal with a similar theme: namely, the legal position of those who acquire property (whether through purchase or inheritance) vis-a`-vis the creditors who wish to seize the properties in payment of debts incurred by the original owners. 2. This theme is not mentioned at all in the local mishnah.63 The formal link to the mishnah is contained in the fact that it was cited by the Rabbis who adjudicated the first two cases in the sequence. None of the other units has any connection to the mishnah.64 3. These considerations support the conclusion that the collection did not emerge from the study of the Mishnah. On the contrary, it evolved in the domain of judicial institutions and was afterward incorporated into the Babylonian Talmud’s commentary on the Mishnah. The Talmud preserves many examples of materials that appear to have been generated by the judiciary, or at least in a context of legal study that was not directly related to the Mishnah. Such materials are frequently
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collected into series of cases, halakhic rulings,65 or—as in the present instance—combinations of both types. As with the other Rabbinic genres described here, since no separate compendia were created in which to collect them, the editors of the Babylonian Talmud sought ways in which to embed them, through associations of form and content, into the main body of the Talmud. The limited observations I have made in this essay regarding the dynamics of the Talmud’s redaction are consistent with the structural and historical models that have emerged from recent work in Rabbinic philology. Talmudic scholarship in the last generation has become increasingly aware of the fact that the redactional process was a protracted one, extending over several centuries.66 Much of what is conventionally characterized as belonging to the “redactional strata” is the result of later students examining preliminary versions: comparing, contrasting, and resolving discrete traditions from their received text. Although in practice, it might not always be possible to confidently assign particular passages to identifiable editorial stages, we should at least acknowledge the basic theoretical distinctions, noting that large portions of the Talmud as we possess it do not reflect a unified or systematic editorial policy but rather evolved unpredictably through the academic give-and-take of the beit midrash.67 The later phase of editorial activity, usually ascribed to the saboraim, involved the comparison and rearrangement of materials that were already included as part of the corpus68 and hence should not be perceived as an anthologizing activity. It is to an earlier stage of redaction that we should ascribe the intentional and programmatic assembling of Rabbinic traditions that was evident in the examples described earlier. Moreover, the most distinctive achievement of the Talmud’s anthologizing program was directly associated not with its selection of texts for inclusion—as one might imagine would be the case with most anthologies—but rather with the skill and inventiveness with which the individual units were incorporated into the total work. In the present article, I have focused upon instances where heterogeneous elements were grafted onto the main trunk of the amoraic commentary on the Mishnah. Although the techniques are more readily discernible in such examples, it is clear that similar procedures were employed in other contexts as well, with a view to combining the various classes of Rabbinic sources, dicta, and pericopes from different schools or localities into unified literary entities—sugyot. As I have noted elsewhere, there appears to have existed “a general tendency among the redactors and formulators of the Talmud (and we are thinking here of a process which continued for centuries after the official sof horaah, and finds expression in variant readings in manuscripts and medieval citations) not to leave unconnected units, but rather to weave all the sources into a unified fabric.”69
If we limit the investigation of the Talmud’s anthological character to the most limited criteria, it will focus on three areas of editorial activity: (a) the criteria for exclusion and rejection; (b) the criteria for inclusion of additional traditions; and (c) the manner of organization of the material.
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As regards the first of these areas—namely, the selection process—in most respects the surviving data prevent us from fully reconstructing what traditions might have been rejected from the Talmud, and on what grounds. We have been left with a final product, with no preliminary versions against which to compare it.70 Of course, it is not unreasonable to assume that a more selective and exclusive process of editing traditions was a primary concern during the amoraic era itself, as individual schools favored specific authorities or halakhic positions. The more advanced stages of the redaction, as exemplified in the passages that were examined in this study, appear to have striven for the opposite result, namely, the assembling of the greatest number of teachings of the previous generations. Perhaps this was done in the assurance that the winnowing of earlier schools had successfully eliminated all the chaff. The dogged determination of the later editors to juxtapose variant versions of the traditions attests to their desire to broaden the corpus of talmudic sources beyond the commentaries to the curricular tractates from the Mishnah. Yet the assertion that the Talmud’s editors may have been striving for comprehensiveness and inclusion does not mean that they intended to produce “little more than a scrapbook, a compilation of this and that.”71 A measure of literary Darwinism must have played its part in ensuring that the only traditions to survive the channels of transmission were the ones that were able to withstand the rigorous logical analysis and challenges of consistency to which traditions were subjected as they were studied in the amoraic schools.72 Even so, the question of what it was that the editors were trying to collect is not really as daunting as it may initially appear to be. No doubt what was ultimately preserved represented what was supposed to be preserved, and the most direct way to reconstruct the selection criteria of the Talmud is by summarizing what actually came to be included in the final product. While the Talmud contains a sampling of diverse genres of Rabbinic discourse, it is evident that preference was given to scholarly dialectical argumentation in the area of halakhah, as exemplified in the discussions surrounding the study of the Mishnah.73 As we have noted, the editors took upon themselves the additional task of anthologizing other areas of Rabbinic activity, such as biblical interpretation, legal decisions, and aggadah. In doing so, it appears that their concern was more with structural appropriateness (i.e., whether the elements could be fit into the talmudic context)74 than with their contents. All the examples that were analyzed in the present study remind us that the standards of thematic and topical uniformity that guide our current classification systems cannot be imposed upon the editors of Rabbinic collections. For those editors, formal analogies or incidental citations of a common biblical verse provided equally valid grounds for grouping texts together.75 The most successful undertakings in talmudic research are those that have built upon this theoretical foundation. Because each unit of talmudic tradition exists in at least two contexts—as it was originally intended by its tannaitic or amoraic author, and as it functions in the context of the redacted sugya76—it follows that a full appreciation of the Talmud must deal with both the parts and the whole. Although we might initially be skeptical about the possibility of recovering the pristine ipsissima verba of the talmudic Rabbis,77 an impressive body of research has by now provided valid grounds for optimism: careful analysis of spe-
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cific sugyot and tractates has indicated with remarkable consistency that the Talmud’s editors refrained from tampering with the wording of the original (usually, Hebrew) statements. Similarly, sophisticated typologies have been formulated for distinguishing between “authorial” and editorial strata.78 Our readiness to classify the cited examples, and the Talmud as a whole, as an anthology is obviously vulnerable to valid objections. The recognized literary definition of “anthology” is a straightforward one, denoting a collection of sources (in ancient literature it would usually consist of epigrams or poems) selected according to some criterion, such as quality, genre, place, or time.79 The classic anthologies of the past have tended to limit the editor’s involvement to selection and arrangement or, at the most, the composing of introductions to the individual selections or to the volume as a whole. If the Talmud’s intricate and ingenious literary intertwining goes beyond the typical borders of the anthological genre, perhaps the literary lexicon requires a literary term that better expresses the kind of dynamic anthologizing that is exemplified in the Talmud. Certainly, world literature knows of many other instances of such works. Virtually all “higher criticism” or synoptic theories posit analogous paradigms of redactors stitching together antecedent documents or oral traditions so as to render the seams indiscernible to all but the most alert of redactional critics.80 The Talmud may simply be more candid in owning up to its composite origins and identifying its constituent baraitot, memras, and so on.81 It follows from this that when we come to define our scholarly objectives in studying the Babylonian Talmud, the alternative topics need not be restricted to either the individual parts or the whole.82 Indeed, one of the most fascinating areas of Rabbinic study is the subtle and dynamic process by which the parts undergo transformation through their incorporation into the whole. That process may be the very nature of the anthologizing process that stands behind the Talmud, and ultimately, by understanding that process in the Talmud, we may also learn something more about the possibilities of anthologizing in general.
Appendix: Talmudic Sources Cited in Ketubot 2b–3a [1.83 “Says Rav Joseph: Lord of Abraham! He makes something which has been taught dependent upon something which has not been taught!84 . . . Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows.”85 The alleged logical difficulty that provoked Rav Joseph to reformulate the initial version of Samuel’s tradition is unwarranted, since the two texts are clearly dealing with different questions. Mishnah 1:1 provides a reason (albeit an inadequate one)86 for the establishment of Wednesday as a preferred day for weddings; whereas Samuel is inquiring “teleologically” about additional halakhic implications that result from the choice of a specific day.87 Under the circumstances, it is conceivable that Rav Joseph’s objection and the ensuing emendation of Samuel’s statement are all pseudepigraphic, the work of later redactors, modeled after the similarly structured pericope in Shabbat 22a or Bava Batra 134b.]88 [2. Possibly: Tosefta Ketubot 1:1: “If so, then let her be married on Sunday!—Rather, in order that he might make preparations all week, they ordained that he should marry her on the Wednesday.”
96 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism As noted earlier (see previous item), it is not clear whether the Talmud is attributing this passage to Samuel (according to Rav Joseph’s emendation), or proposing it as a new synthetic reformulation, in which the pericope’s redactors combined Rav Joseph’s original statement with the Tosefta and structural elements from Shabbat or Bava Batra.] 3. M. Ketubot 5:2, along with a talmudic discussion involving Rav Aha89 that might subsequently have been excised from its original location.90 4. A pericope built around Rava’s comment to M. Ketubot 5:2.91 In its quest for a source for Rava’s ruling, the Talmud cites several additional talmudic texts, all of which deal with cases in which a husband is prevented by uncontrollable circumstances from fulfilling a condition attached to a divorce. 5. M. Gittin 7:8: “This is your divorce if I should die . . .” (with explanatory material that is apparently copied from the pericope in Gittin 76b). 6. M. Gittin 7:7. 7. A baraita attached to M. Gittin 7:7: “But our Rabbis permitted her to remarry.” The source is in Tosefta Gittin 5:9,92 though it is cited in other talmudic passages in which the mishnah is cited.93 8. A brief talmudic passage related to the preceding: “Who are ‘our Rabbis’?—Says Rav Judah: Says Samuel: The court which permitted oil.” The text is most likely being quoted from Gittin 76b.94 9. The view of the tanna Rabbi Yose´, that the inclusion of a date on a document implies its retroactivity. Here as well, the tradition is being cited from the talmudic pericope to M. Gittin 7:7 (Gittin 76b).95 10. The continuation of M. Gittin 7:8: “From now if I do not come twelve months from now.” 11. The case of “that man who said to them: If I do not come thirty days from now,” which was adjudicated by Samuel. This case had already been cited in connection with the appropriate mishnahs in Gittin.96 12. The discussion between Rav Ashi and Ravina about the conditions under which the Rabbis might retroactively invalidate a betrothal was probably copied here from one of several places in the Talmud where it also appears, most likely from Yevamot 110a.97
Notes Prooftexts 17 (1997):33–61. Reprinted by permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1. An extensive discussion on the broad possibilities of “commentary” in Rabbinic and other literatures is contained in Baruch M. Bokser, Post Mishnaic Judaism in Transition: Samuel on Berakhot and the Beginnings of Gemara (Chico, Cal., 1980). Cf. my review of Bokser’s book in Tarbiz 51 (1982):315–18. 2. For a useful overview of the fundamental types of Western legal literature, including some suggested equivalents in Jewish jurisprudence, see Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, trans. from the Hebrew by B. Auerbach and M. J. Sykes (Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 228–30, 1017–19 (where Elon surveys the principal scholarly opinions concerning the codificatory purpose of the Mishnah) and 1057–58. Note in particular the citation from Salmond on p. 1018, n. 3, which deals with the fine distinctions between
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primary historical or legal sources of law, and literary sources, including commentaries and textbooks. 3. The Talmud’s evident encouragement of argument for its own sake, its insistence on arguing for and against all the recorded opinions, and its reluctance to disprove any of the recorded opinions, attest to its generally non-codificatory purposes, which engendered the need for the post-talmudic Codes literature. There are, however, a significant minority of passages that are concerned primarily with practical decision making (and these are not limited to the many interpolations from geonic sources). 4. This undoubtedly accounts in part for the appeal of the detective story and kindred genres, including the ideal of “elegance” in computer code. 5. For purposes of the current question, it is not necessary to take a stand on the precise institutional nature of these “schools”; see D. Goodblatt, Rabbinic Instruction in Sasanian Babylonia (Leiden, 1975). 6. This theoretical model was explored with particular zeal by my late teacher E. S. Rosenthal, who saw himself as continuing a program initiated by Israel Levy of Breslau. 7. The classic description of the Talmud’s gradual evolution “generation after generation” was formulated by R. Sherira in his Epistle. D. Rosenthal, “Early Redactions Embedded in the Babylonian Talmud,” Mehfi qerei talmud 1 (1990): 155–204, contrasts this approach with that of Rashi, who rejects explicitly any redactional activity prior to Rav Ashi and Ravina (in phraseology that bears an uncanny resemblance to Maimonides’ description of Rabbi Judah the Prince’s role in compiling the Mishnah). 8. A concise survey of the literature and main arguments may be found in H. L. Strack and G. Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 35– 49. The most exhaustive collection of arguments in favor of the writing of the Oral Tradition during the talmudic era is probably that of J. N. Epstein, Mavo lenosahfi Hamishnah [Introduction to the Text of the Mishnah] (Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 692–705. In spite of his determination to assemble even the most dubious and indirect references to written sources, Epstein acknowledges that such documents were rare exceptions and were not permitted for use in the schools. The widespread claim (which still appears in most textbooks and popular introductions) that Rabbi Judah the Prince rescinded the prohibition in publishing the Mishnah has no basis in the ancient sources, nor is it found in the unabridged text (the so-called French recension) of Sherira’s Epistle, or among the medieval FrancoGerman commentators. Its main proponents were Saadia and Maimonides, whose readings of the sources were presumably influenced by the need to defend the authority of the tradition against the Karaites and Muslims in a culture that venerated written over unwritten traditions. 9. E.g., the need for mnemonic abbreviations to organize units, and the testimony of the geonim that as late as the eleventh century manuscripts of the Talmud could not be used or cited in the Babylonian academies. 10. See the summary in Strack and Stemberger, pp. 219–27. 11. Ibid., p. 225: As its history of redaction shows, BT was not edited by a specific editor or a group of editors at a precisely datable time. Hence we cannot assume a uniform and universally accepted BT text at any time. Not only is it impossible to draw a clear boundary between redaction and text criticism, but the coexistence of two geonic academies will also have prevented the standardization of the textual shape of BT. 12. Ibid., p. 224. Halivni, in particular, has argued that he has yet to find a talmudic passage whose reconstruction would require the positing of an amoraic setam. 13. A recent summary of Neusner’s views (written partly for my benefit), along with a
98 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism bibliography of his previous writings on the question, is included in his The Documentary Foundation of Rabbinic Culture (Atlanta, 1995). 14. Neusner’s division into individual documents does not always seem consistent. On what grounds, for example, must we treat Leviticus Rabbah and Pesiqta deRav Kahana, or the individual halakhic midrashim from the “School of Rabbi Ishmael,” as separate documents, while we regard “Mishnah-Tosefta” or individual talmudic tractates as belonging to single units? 15. This principle was applied to the domain of Rabbinic textual criticism in Saul Lieberman’s oft-quoted distinction between “textual truth and historical truth”; see his review of L. Finkelstein’s edition of the Sifrei to Deuteronomy, Kiryat sefer 14 (1937):323–24. Neusner is guilty of similar credulousness when he accepts that the sixteenth-century printings (or even their thirteenth-century prototypes) are faithful records of documents composed in the fourth or fifth century. 16. As far as I can tell, Neusner makes no use of the Hebrew-language research that makes up the bulk of current Rabbinic scholarship. One consequence of his limited research is that he seems unaware of the liberties that scribes and commentators were allowed to take with the setama digmara sections, which constitutes strong evidence against the view that the Talmud text was revered as a canonical document. Such a consistent and widespread phenomenon cannot be facilely written off as inconsequential. Until Neusner produces detailed commentaries on specific passages that take into consideration the details of text, redaction, and historical context, his arguments must be treated more as opinion than as scholarship. 17. The closest analogy I can find for Neusner’s reasoning is the claim by some fundamentalists that God intentionally left fossils, complete with their Carbon-14 attributes, when He created the world 5,000 years ago. Intentional pseudepigraphy and forgery never fail to give themselves away through linguistic, chronological, or biographical bloopers (cf. the case of the Zohar)—none of which is evident in significant proportions in talmudic literature. 18. This could apply not only to collections like the Tosefta and analogous (no longer extant) works that were explicitly devised as supplements to the Mishnah, but also to midrashic passages that would have naturally and routinely been cited in connection with relevant sections of the Mishnah. 19. Case Citation in the Babylonian Talmud: The Evidence of the Tractate Neziqin (Atlanta, 1990). See “Example 2” later in this article. 20. The Babylonian Esther Midrash: A Critical Commentary, 3 vols. (Atlanta, 1994). 21. In Case Citation, pp. 6–8, 220–21, I survey some of the traditional and modern scholars who have addressed the question of the heterogeneity of the amoraic curriculum and the incorporation of diverse materials into the Talmud-qua-Mishnah commentary. 22. I.e., Mishnah and halakhah converge in the Mishnah and Tosefta; midrash and halakhah in the halakhic midrashim; Mishnah and aggadah in the tractate Avot; midrash and aggadah in Seder olam or in the tannaitic midrashim in which the nonlegal material far outweighs the legal (e.g., Sifre´ Deuteronomy). 23. The only possible exception that comes to mind is the Babylonian-Aramaic (“Onkelos”) Targum. 24. The phenomenon is noted and described in Strack and Stemberger, p. 210. This leads to the conclusion that “the overall character of BT is encyclopedic. Everything was included which was taught in the rabbinic schools and considered worth preserving. . . . Thus BT is less a thematically closed book than a national library of Babylonian Judaism whose structure emulates M.” It seems to me that the “encyclopedia” model brings us substantially closer to the “anthology” being explored in the present volume. For an anal-
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ogous assessment of an aggadic compendium, see Marc Hirshman, “The Greek Fathers and the Aggada on Ecclesiastes: Formats of Exegesis in Late Antiquity,” HUCA 59 (1988): 155–58. (Thanks to David Stern for directing me to this article.) 25. J. Sussman, Sugyot bavliyot lasedarim zeraim vetoharot [Babylonian sugyot to the orders Zeraim and Toharot] (Diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1969); B. M. Bokser, Samuel’s Commentary on the Mishnah: Its Nature, Forms, and Content (Leiden, 1975). 26. I.e., the time referred to in the preceding clause of the Mishnah there: “A virgin is given twelve months from the time when her husband has proposed marriage to her, in order to prepare her belongings. And the same period that is given to the woman is also given to the man to prepare his belongings.” 27. Normally, only priests and their households may eat terumah. If the twelve-month deadline has elapsed owing to the fiance´’s delay, the woman is treated as his wife for purposes of entitlement to terumah (when the fiance´ is a priest), or to support (in all cases), even though the wedding has not actually taken place. 28. The instances that are considered include: (a) the groom fell ill; (b) the bride fell ill; (c) the bride had her menstrual period. According to one version of the passage, all three are accepted as legitimate causes of delay, exempting the husband from financial obligations. A second version deals with each of the instances as a separate and distinct problem, to which a collective solution is proposed by Rav Ahfi ai (discussed later). 29. If the fiance´ is a kohen. 30. See the references to N. Bru¨ll, A. Weiss, and others in Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, p. 24. 31. Abaye is quoted as objecting to the initial formulation of his teacher Rav Joseph’s tradition, on the grounds that the Mishnah contains an explicit reason for its ruling (because of the days of the court sessions), and hence there would have been no need for Samuel to seek an explanation in Mishnah 5:2. In consequence, a revised version of the tradition is offered, in which Samuel is not giving a reason for Mishnah 1:1 but rather extending its indirect implications. Thus, it is explained that Sunday was excluded by Rabbinic enactment as a day for weddings, even though courts convene on Mondays, out of concern for the bride’s presumed desire for an elaborate wedding celebration, in order to allow plenty of time for preparations after the Sabbath. Because this delay is based on a Rabbinic ordinance, the groom is not held financially responsible if it should take him beyond the twelve-month deadline. 32. Rav Ahfi ai claims to prove from a precise reading of the Mishnah’s wording that the groom would be held responsible if the delay were caused by anything less than a Rabbinic ordinance, as in the cases of illness and menstruation already discussed in connection with the version of the passage that presented the issue as a question. The Rashbam’s attempt to argue on form-critical grounds that this Rav Ahfi ai is a post-talmudic figure was justly refuted by his brother R. Jacob Tam (see Tosafot). It is possible that Rashbam’s mention of Rav Ahfi a of Shabhfi a, the author of the She iltot, was inspired at least in part by the fact that the structure of this inquiry conforms to that of a typical She ilta, branching off as it does into various hypothetical possibilities until the normative solution is determined on the basis of a talmudic citation. 33. In the printed Talmuds, Rav Ashi refutes Rav Ahfi ai’s attempt at answering the above question. However, his name is missing from several manuscripts, including two Geniza fragments; see M. Hershler, ed., Masekhet ketubot im shinnuyei nushfi aot [The Babylonian Talmud with Variant Readings: Tractate Ketubot] (Jerusalem, 1972–77), 1:4 lines 7–8, and n. 5. Presumably, if the name were contained in the early French manuscripts, that fact would have been adduced by Rashbam and R. Tam in connection with the identification
100 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism of R. Ahfi a (see later). Cf. H fi . Albeck, Mavo latalmudim [Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Yerushalmi], p. 514; J. Z. Du¨nner, H fi iddushei hariza″d [Novellae] (Jerusalem, 1983), ad loc. 34. It would have been far more reasonable to attach it to the mishnayot in Ketubot 5:2 or Gittin chap. 5. 35. This is the reading in all witnesses (Hershler, Masekhet Ketubot, p. 21 line 14), though the subsequent statements are introduced as “Bar Qappara expounded.” 36. Genesis 1:22. 37. Genesis 1:28. 38. Thus, Rashi: “It brings it here on account of Bar Qappara, who was quoted previously in connection with an aggadic tradition.” 39. TP Ketubot 1:1 (24d); the passage is also found with variants in Genesis Rabbah 8: 12 (p. 66). There is a virtual consensus among modern Talmud scholars that Bar Qappara’s positing a different reason for the law in the Mishnah proves that the Mishnah of the Palestinian Talmud, at least in its earliest strata, did not include the current rationale about juxtaposing the wedding to the court sessions, the latter explanation being introduced there by R. Eleazar. A similar implication was discerned in Samuel’s (unemended) tradition at the beginning of the Babylonian tractate (see earlier) and in the fact that the Mishnah’s explanation is included in the Tosefta (1:1, p. 56). See the discussions in H fi . Albeck’s Mishnah Commentary (3:345); Lieberman’s long commentary in Kiryat Sefer, p. 185; Halivni, pp. 129–30 n. 4; and literature cited in these works. While there is little room for doubt that tannaitic literature knew of several optional explanations for the ancient customs that governed the days of weddings, the extension of this situation to the amoraic era is at best circumstantial and is contradicted by the unanimous testimony of the Mishnah manuscripts, including those whose Palestinian traditions are considered superior. The Tosefta’s practice of including and explaining long lemmas from the Mishnah is well known, as is the Talmud’s inclusion of baraitot that dispute the positions of the Mishnah. Bar Qappara, in particular, has been accused of maintaining a conscious independence of the Mishnah (see S. Lieberman, Sifrei Zutta [New York, 1968], pp. 11–13, 64, 114ff.). The most explicit of the proofs remains TP’s report about R. Eleazar citing the Mishnah’s rationale for the Mishnah as his own, and the Talmud’s subsequent adducing of a baraita in support of his—rather than the Mishnah’s—explanation. However, Epstein (Introduction to the Text of the Mishnah, p. 294) is able to argue that this is merely one of several instances in which R. Eleazar defends the version preserved in the Mishnah against that of a baraita. 40. Genesis Rabbah does not cite this explanation in the name of Bar Qappara but merely asks, “Why?” The attribution is attached only to the revised interpretation, reproduced here. 41. The explanatory comment “On Thursday . . . and Eve” is missing in Genesis Rabbah. 42. “R. Yose´ . . . is that”—In Genesis Rabbah: “Bar Qappara says.” 43. The TP passage continues to examine the implications to Bar Qappara’s dictum of the fact that Genesis 2:3 also contains a blessing. The pericope leads to a discussion of the question of deflowering a virgin on the Sabbath. The subject of that passage is analogous to the B. passage that commences immediately following the three expositions of Bar Qappara. 44. Mekhilta D’Rabbi Sim’on b. Jochai, ed. J. N. Epstein and E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 99–100. 45. Mechilta D’Rabbi Ismael, ed. H. S. Horovitz and I. A. Rabin (1930; repr. Jerusalem,
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1970), Shirah 10, p. 150; Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, ed. J. Z. Lauterbach (Philadelphia), 1933), vol. 2, p. 29. 46. Cf. Aboth de Rabbi Nathan, end of chap. 1 (ed. Schechter, 4b): “An alternative explanation: ‘And laid thine hand upon me’ (Ps. 139:5)—From this [it follows] that when Adam and the Temple were created, they were created by means of both his hands. Whence do we know that the Temple was constructed with both his hands?” See the editor’s notes there with references to problems in the order of the passages. Rabbi Josiah Pinto (the “Rif” to the Ein yaaqov), who was evidently unaware of the Mekhilta version, protested: “Seeing as the works of the righteous are equated with the Temple, then it ought to have said ‘Great is the Temple!’ ” 47. The text and translation are difficult to reconstruct. See the text-critical notes in the respective editions. See also Midrash haggadol al hfi amishah hfi omshei torah: Sefer shemot [Midrash Haggadol on the Pentateuch: Exodus], ed. M. Margulies (Jerusalem, 1956), p. 311. 48. The Mekhiltas stress a contrast between the Temple and the created universe, whereas Bar Qappara speaks instead of “the deeds of the righteous.” Nor is it clear how Bar Qappara read that theme into the biblical text. (Cf. Rashi’s suggestion that the midrash is alluding to the fact that the sanctuaries were actually erected by righteous mortals, presumably with divine assistance. However, if that were true, there would be no symmetry between the two elements of the comparison.) Maharsha refers us to the midrashic traditions (which he reads through a kabbalistic framework) about how Bezalel and Aholiab employed supernatural skills in fashioning the Tabernacle. Pinto emphasizes the role played by the righteous King Solomon in the building of the Temple: “Once the Temple had been erected by the righteous, it was a simple matter for the Holy One to establish it, since the merit of the righteous established it in part, and the Holy One completes its establishment. Nevertheless, he had to apply both hands to this task.” It strikes me as possible, though admittedly contradicted by all the textual evidence, that the references to the works of the righteous were introduced here mistakenly under the influence of the discussion later on the theme of “Who shows the handiwork of the righteous” (expounding Ps. 19:2). There, too, the plain sense of the grammatical object of the verse is diverted to refer to the righteous. 49. There are many parallels and similarities between the opening pages of B. Ketubot and the equivalent pericopes in the Palestinian Talmud. These would normally lead us to suppose that the Babylonian editors were expanding upon material that had already undergone a literary redaction in Palestine. Although this possibility is not to be ruled out here, the fact is that both the Yerushalmi and Genesis Rabbah cite only the first tradition. Thus, the issue is not where (in Palestine or Babylonia) the link was made, so much as how and why. 50. This question is posed by Rabbi Jacob Reischer in his Iyyun yaaqov commentary to the Ein yaaqov. He devises an ingenious, though unconvincing, explanation connected to the linking of wedding days to the blessing of Adam and Eve, rather than that of fish. 51. It assumes that we read it in the light of R. Eleazar’s comment about why human fingers were created with a peg shape. 52. I discuss several such examples in my The Babylonian Esther Midrash: A Critical Commentary. See, e.g., 2:265–309; 3:121, 221–23. 53. Case Citation in the Babylonian Talmud: The Evidence of Tractate Neziqin. 54. There, as here, I evaded the question of whether these collections were oral or written. In favor of an oral model, we must note that the general halakhic prohibitions against writing down Oral Torah appear to have been observed consistently throughout the amoraic era, and that the Aramaic dialect in which the cases were preserved is substantially identical to that of the rest of the Talmud, without the telltale signs of written texts (as
102 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism found, e.g., in legal documents or geonic writings). In favor of a written model of transmission, we may observe simply how unlikely it seems that a formal mechanism for oral collection of court decisions (parallel to the tannaim who were charged with the memorization of baraitot) should have existed without that fact’s being mentioned anywhere in our sources. 55. For textual variants, see Hershler, Masekhet ketubot 2:346, to lines 1–2. The siman is found in several manuscripts, though the printed editions seem to preserve the most complete version, and is supported by the readings of Halakhot pesuqqot, Halakhot gedolot, and other geonic works. See E. Hildesheimer, Sefer halakhot gedolot (Jerusalem, 1980), 2: 278. Noteworthy is the reading of MS Vatican 130, in which the siman is subdivided into two discrete units of six and three units. 56. On the distinction between the two main literary types of cases in B., see Stern, Case Citation, pp. 14ff. 57. As noted by Rashbam to Bava Batra 150b (Case Citation, p. 89). 58. The structure is also found in item no. 4 in the sequence, adjudicated by Rami bar H fi ama, as well as in no. 2 (involving Rav Joseph and Abaye). 59. See later. Units nos. 1 and 2 are virtually identical but for the names of the participating. Rabbis and the values of the disputed properties. Some of the traditional commentators (see Shittah mequbbetset) expressed surprise that the Talmud should have included two identical cases. For that reason, several of them (see Meiri, Nahfi manides, Ishbili, Ditrani, etc.) considered the possibility that the two cases were dealing separately with instances where the properties were acquired by a single purchaser, or by two separate purchasers. Du¨nner (H fi iddushei) sees the two cases as variant traditions (lishana ahfi arina). The MSS that read Rami bar H fi ama’s name, rather than Rav Joseph’s, in unit no. 2 are clearly mistaken, since he would not have engaged in an exchange with Abaye. See Hershler, Masekhet ketubot 2:345 n. 44. 60. E.g., the prominence of Rami bar H fi ama in units nos. 1, 4, 5, and 6. Rami died c. 350. For biographical overviews, see Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, pp. 379–80; Strack and Stemberger Introduction, p. 105. The other main participants are Rava, who decides no. 7 (this reading is probably more reliable than “Rabbah” in the printed editions; cf. Hershler, 2:352, n. 25), and Abaye in nos. 3, 8, and 9. 61. Rava fulfills this role in nos. 1, 4, and 5 (some texts have “Rav Dimi” in the latter; see Hershler 2:344, line 7 and n. 24); Abaye in no. 2. 62. All but no. 4 have some discussion attached. In nos. 3,5,7, and 9, the comments are anonymous (in the last two, variants are presented introduced by the ikka deamerei formula). Each of the first two units is followed by an identical dispute between Ravina and Rav Avira. Presumably, this is the sixth-generation student of Rava. This Rav Avira appears in a dispute with Ravina on Bava Batra 131b. See Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, p. 416. On the identity of that Ravina see ibid., pp. 420–21. 63. On the other hand, the right of a creditor to collect from property sold subsequently to the contracting of the debt is an issue that crops up in many places in the Mishnah, including Ketubot. 64. Cf. Du¨nner (H fi iddushei): “From here [no. 3] on, the cases were included here only by virtue of two incidental similarities: (a) that they all begin with the formula “a certain man,” and (b) that Rami bar H fi ama, Abaye, and Rava are all involved in the discussions.” As I noted here, the similarities in form and content are actually somewhat more substantial. 65. A complex and methodologically instructive example of such a hybrid collection is analyzed in Case Citation, pp. 94–113.
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66. See earlier. Basic bibliographies for research into the related questions of the development of the sugya and the contribution of the saboraim may be found in Strack and Stemberger, pp. 221–23. Note in particular the contributions of A. Weiss, M. S. Feldblum, S. Friedman, Z. A. Steinfeld, and D. Weiss-Halivni. The apparent impossibility of pinpointing the transition from redactional to textual history has been noted in many studies by E. S. Rosenthal, S. Friedman, D. Rosenthal, and others. 67. In view of the length and complexity of the process that gave birth to the Babylonian Talmud, it seems to make a singularly inappropriate candidate for the application of Neusner’s documentary theory (see earlier), which presupposed a unified editorial policy. Neusner seems to be reverting to a traditionalist religious view of a quasi-personified Talmud, or at least to the simplistic nineteenth-century attempts to identify a particular “redactor.” 68. See S. Friedman, “A Critical Study of Yevamot X with a Methodological Introduction,” in H. Z. Dimitrovsky, ed., Texts and Studies: Analecta Judaica, vol. 1 (1977), pp. 275–441. 69. Case Citation, p. 125. 70. Even if we were to assume that the Talmud’s redactors had before them the same independent compendia of baraita, talmudic debates, or midrashic homilies that have come down to us in the extant collections of halakhic midrash, Tosefta, Palestinian Talmud, or classical aggadic midrash, it is hard to pinpoint essential differences between what is contained in those sources and the material that was accepted for inclusion in the Babylonian Talmud. The elimination of certain tractates from the final scope of the Talmud does not seem to have been a direct reflection of the quality of those tractates’ contents so much as it was a pragmatic way of dealing with the paucity of usable material—a situation that presumably resulted in turn from those tractates’ exclusion from the academic curriculum of the later amoraim. See Strack and Stemberger, pp. 209–10. 71. Formulations of this sort are employed frequently by J. Neusner in order to characterize what he sees as the inevitable consequences that follow from rejection of his “documentary” approach to Rabbinic literature. See earlier. 72. The typically laconic formulations in which the amoraim transmitted their teachings, which may have been forced upon them by the requirements of memorization, must have impelled them to pay meticulous attention to what should be included and what excluded from the material to be handed down to future generations. 73. Neusner’s singling out of the theological element as constituting the main purpose underlying the Talmud’s composition flies in the face of its obvious concern for the mechanics and theory of religious law. 74. Admittedly, some of the “acceptable” connective links are so ingeniously contrived as to raise doubts about whether any unit could not have been provided with a link. In two of the examples here, it was sufficient to establish a valid association with one item in a series in order to justify the inclusion of the complete series. 75. The Rabbinic work that conforms best to Western notions of systematic organization, the Mishnah, contains precisely the same kinds of digressions that I have described, in which a sequence of topically unrelated sources are inserted into a tractate because one of the items in the list is relevant to the context (e.g., Megillah 1:4–11). See H fi . Albeck, Mevo hamishnah [Introduction to the Mishnah] (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 88–99. 76. The “at least” qualification alludes to instances in which redacted pericopes were utilized subsequently by even later redactors and introduced into newer contexts. Such instances are not uncommon. 77. As is Neusner; see earlier.
104 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism 78. The most complete of these is Shamma Friedman’s in “A Critical Study.” 79. See S. H. Steinberg, ed., Cassell’s Encyclopedia of Literature (London, 1953), 1:23–24. 80. One striking ancient parallel to the talmudic esthetic of anthologizing is a work that in other respects belongs to a polarly different universe. I am referring to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, whose author has strung together a representative sample of the Greek and Latin mythological heritage by means of an elaborately contrived sequence of associative links. It is granted that Ovid’s work, carefully crafted by a single author, is not in itself an anthology. Nevertheless, there are some striking literary similarities in the way the individual units relate to one another and to their respective totalities. Some of the classic controversies of Ovid criticism offer uncanny and instructive parallels to questions raised in talmudic literary scholarship. To cite just a few of the features that enhance our appreciation of the Talmud’s literary form, I might refer to: difficulties that confront scholars in their attempts to find thematic consistency in Ovid’s selection of legends (see Joseph B. Solodow, The World of Ovid’s Metamorphoses [Chapel Hill, 1988], p. 11; all the following page references are to Solodow), and the poem’s general impression of “shapelessness” (13); lengthy digressions based on formal similarities frequently are often interposed between units that logically belong together (14); like the Talmud’s redactors, Ovid consistently eschews the presentation of separate units in favor of formal literary transitions (15), no matter how artificial those transitions sometimes appear (26); while the juxtapositions of some legends can be justified on grounds of thematic similarities (16), these similarities (including the metamorphoses themselves) can sometimes be merely incidental or peripheral to the main purpose of the unit (28); like the Babylonian Talmud, the Metamorphoses strives for comprehensiveness in its historical range, breadth of subject matter, and its variety of literary genres (17–18), and its author frequently collates sources belonging to different genres (24–25); in both collections, the resolve that was invested in the fashioning of literary transitions between the units was felt to be as important as the content of the units. Indeed, to stretch the comparison only a little bit further, we might justly submit that the relationship between the Talmud and a conventional anthology is equivalent to the one that exists between Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Bullfinch’s Mythology. 81. In this respect, it bears some resemblance to the maqamas or picaresque novels of later generations, allowing always for the essential differences between single-author and multi-author works. To a more limited degree, this is true of a medieval midrashic “anthology” like Rabbi David Adani’s Midrash hagadol, which so often exasperates modern scholars with the liberties it takes in its presentation of the ancient sources (see Strack and Stemberger, pp. 386–87). 82. The delimitation of the “whole” is open to varying interpretations. Scholarship has been focused largely on the individual sugya, though other units can reasonably be used, such as a chapter, tractate, or the entire Talmud. At this stage of scholarship, it would seem that the more ambitious the scope, the less likelihood there is of reaching conclusions that are both well-founded and meaningfully specific. 83. Sections are enclosed in square brackets when there exists an ambiguity about their status as “talmudic sources.” 84. The formula davar telei bidla telei is found in tannaitic midrashic texts. See Sifre´ Numbers 91 (p. 91); Deuteronomy 312 (p. 353) and 333 (p. 383). 85. Rashi insists that the “corrected version” of Samuel’s tradition on 2a (“Rather, if it was stated, thus was it stated”) is being presented as the words of Rav Joseph himself. There are several considerations that recommend this view, including the facts that Rava
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appears to be responding to it, and that the emended tradition is formulated entirely in Hebrew, after the manner of authentic amoraic traditions (cf. Du¨nner (H fi iddushei): “The style of the emended dictum follows that of a baraita”). Neither of these factors constitutes irrefutable proof, and Du¨nner has noted that the ruling that appears to be assumed by Rava is, at any rate, challenged by later amoraim. The textual evidence seems to suggest that it is the redactors who are citing the emended version of Rav Joseph’s tradition, since the older texts, as attested by the medievals, read “Rather, if it was stated, thus was it stated: Says Rav Joseph: Says Rav Judah: Says Samuel” (see the evidence collected in Hershler’s edition, p. 2, n. 13). Most of the manuscripts have incorporated the emendation of Tosafot—often in a garbled form—and therefore cannot be relied upon as proof for the original reading here. However, the i itamar formula is a stereotyped one, and we should not attach too much weight to it. A similar ambiguity attaches to the fact that the Talmud has Rava refer explicitly to Rav Joseph’s emended version when he states either “And with regard to divorce it is not so” (2b), or “it is so” (3a). Here, too, it is conceivable that Rava’s original statement did not allude so explicitly to that tradition. The central item of new content that was added in the “revised” version of Samuel’s dictum, the statement about how “the Rabbis were concerned for the welfare of the daughters of Israel,” is being cited verbatim from the Tosefta Ketubot 1:1 (The Tosefta, ed. Saul Lieberman [New York; 1967], Nashim, Ketuboth, p. 56) as found on folio 3b, a fact that would also account for its Hebrew formulation. It is thus not entirely unreasonable to view the revision as the “anonymous Talmud’s” typical creative rearrangement of existing materials. This possibility is strengthened by the questionable logic of the objection, and by the possibility that the literary structure of the passage might have been copied from a pericope elsewhere in the Talmud, as I will soon discuss. We should also note that the tradition about Rav Joseph suffering from a memory loss, though cited as a biographical “fact” by Albeck, Introduction, p. 293; Halivni, Meqorot umsorot—Seder nashim [Sources and Traditions—on Seder Nashim] (Tel Aviv, 1968), p. 131; and others, is an invention of Rashi, based on a number of instances when Rav Joseph’s traditions were challenged by Abaye (e.g., Eruvin 66b, 73a, 75b, 89b; Pesahfi im 13a). 86. It does explain why Sunday is not considered a legitimate day for weddings. 87. What is the rule when waiting for Wednesday prevents the groom from complying with the twelve-month deadline? The artificiality of Rav Joseph’s objection was aptly noted by the Tosafot ad loc. 88. Such a reconstruction was proposed by Halivni, though his objections against the present form of the pericope are somewhat different. He notes that Bava Batra 134 has a similar structure, but “in Shabbat it is smoother.” Apparently, he is alluding to the fact that in Shabbat, there is a clearer delineation between “what was taught” (i.e., in a baraita) and “what was not taught” (i.e., is found only in an amoraic dictum). At any rate, the question is not entirely clear. 89. See earlier. The current version of the pericope in which Rav Ahfi a appears alludes explicitly to the emended version of Rav Joseph’s tradition, particularly to the fact that the delay mentioned there was in order to comply with a Rabbinic enactment. However, the passage could make sense without that reference. 90. There does not seem to be a consistent redactional policy for such cases. The Talmud sometimes leaves duplicated pericopes in the same tractate, and it is not obvious why it chose not to do so in the present instance. 91. The principle “there is [no] plea of force majeur in connection with divorce,” worded in Hebrew, has the earmarks of an allusion to a tannaitic or amoraic dictum. It is
106 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism found in Gittin 30a and 34a, but in both those passages it is part of an anonymous comment attached to Samuel’s ruling in the case (later in the passage here) of the husband who was prevented from keeping his thirty-day deadline. Rashi to Gittin 30a surmises plausibly that the Talmud there is actually referring to the Ketubot passage here and its two opposing versions of Rava’s comment. 92. The Tosefta, ed. Saul Lieberman (Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, 1973), Nashim, Gittin, 267. See his discussion in Tsefta Ki-shutah (New York, 1973), part VIII, 881. 93. Gittin 72b, 76b; Avodah Zarah 37a; cf. Gittin 7:3 and parallels. 94. The passage, its historical dimensions and its implications vis-a`-vis the text of M. Avodah Zarah have been discussed at great length in the course of modern rabbinic scholarship, from the time of S. J. Rapaport. Some recent studies (containing references to earlier works) include Lieberman, Tosefta kifshutah, loc. cit; David Rosenthal, Mishnah avodah zarah—Mahadurah biqqortit [Mishnah Aboda Zara—A Critical Edition] (Diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 166–74; Z. A. Steinfeld, “Gentile Products That May or May Not Be Eaten,” Sinai 86 (1980): 83–84. The Babylonian and Palestinian sources (TP Gittin 7:3 [48d]) agree in ascribing the enactment to Rabbi Judah Nesiah, the grandson of the Mishnah’s redactor. 95. Rabbi Yose´’s position is stated in Mishnah Bava Batra 8:7 in connection with a father’s ability to will his property to his son while retaining the rights of usufruct. However, the explanation of Rabbi Yose´’s view on the grounds that the date implies retroactivity is supplied by Tosefta Ketubot 8:4 (ed. Lieberman, The Tosefta, Ketuboth, p. 85; Tosefta kifshutah, p. 319). The reason is also cited in TP Gittin 7:3 (48d). Its primary location in the Babylonian Talmud is in Bava Batra 136a, as is noted by Rashi here, and from there it came to be cited in several pericopes that deal with posthumous fulfillment of conditions. 96. Its primary location in B. is Gittin 30a, where it is included in a sequence of cases. Mishnah 3:6 there deals with an agent for delivery of a get who finds himself unable to deliver the document, and the case brought immediately before this one in that talmudic passage also involves the questions of agency and unavoidable delay in meeting a stipulated deadline. The current case appears to have been attached to the previous one by virtue of the fact that it also deals with delays, even though it has no tangible connection to the issues of interrupted agency that are dealt with in the local mishnah. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Case Citation in the Babylonian Talmud, esp. pp. 90–125, 215–16; and see later here), this situation is entirely consistent with the manner in which cases were generally incorporated into the Talmud, indicating that they were originally assembled into simple collections and afterward attached to existing pericopes at a relatively advanced stage in their redaction. The case is adduced by Rava in Gittin 34a. 97. David Halivni, Mekorot Umasorot: Be’urim Batalmud (Tel-Aviv, 1968), vol. 1, p. 530 note 2, aptly summarizes the question: “[The text] is found six times in the Talmud . . . and it is unlikely that Rav Ashi would have failed to reply to Ravina’s question in all those instances. Rather it is the Gemara that copied the question and answer from its original location to the other places. Where did it originate? It would appear that it was in Yevamot 110a.” Halivni goes on to observe that Ravina’s argument does not constitute a strong objection if directed against the principle, “All who betroth do so subject to the approval of the Rabbis,” and hence it probably did not originate in any of the passages where it is appended to that principle. See also Shamma Friedman, “A Critical Study,” pp. 356–57, and the extensive literature assembled in nn. 57–58 there. Friedman notes that in Yevamot 90b the conversation is evidently a later addition to a pericope that originated with a dispute between Rabbah and Rav H fi isda. The discussion there deals with the validity of the divorce, not the betrothal, as is stated in Ravina and Rav Ashi’s comments. In Yevamot 110a, by
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contrast, Ravina and Rav Ashi are responding directly to a case (of the hava ovada type) involving students of Rav, to which Rav Pappa had already commented. In Gittin 33a, Rav Ashi and Ravina are directly interpreting a baraita (the same one that was cited as a prooftext in Yevamot 90b); however, there too, the issue at hand is the annulment of the divorce, not of the betrothal.
6 david stern
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash
o feature of midrash has drawn more attention from modern readers than its
Nproclivity for multiple interpretation. The claim that biblical verses can be read in more than one way seems to be a virtual axiom underlying ancient Rabbinic exegesis, encoded in the oft-quoted Talmudic dictum, mikra ehad yotsei lekamah te’amim, “one verse may have several meanings” (just as, the same passage continues, “no two verses hold the same meaning”).1 Even if the precise meaning of this statement has not always been absolutely clear, its applicability seems to have been inscribed in nearly all surviving midrashic collections insofar as they regularly record multiple interpretations. Indeed, no editorial feature of midrashic literature seems to be more consistent than the use of davar aher, “another opinion,” as a superscription for still another interpretation. This habit of collecting multiple interpretations may be called the inherently anthological element in midrash. The anthological element can be located on virtually every plane of midrashic discourse—on the hermeneutical level (in polysemy, as an exegetical axiom, as was just noted); on the micro-level of the various rhetorical-literary forms in which midrashic traditions are actually recorded (and that constitute virtual mini-anthologies of interpretations, as we shall see); and on the macro-level of the various documents in which all these separate midrashic traditions have been preserved. On each of these separate levels, midrash appears to have been not only an effort of interpretation but a project of organizing and preserving the multiple interpretive traditions of the past. I am hardly the first to point this out. Scholars in the past have extensively discussed the genres of the various midrashic collections and their identities as literary documents. So, too, there has been extensive investigation of polysemous, multiple interpretation in midrash and its hermeneutical significance, particularly in the last several decades. The anthological character of the midrashic literaryrhetorical forms has also been studied, though less extensively. As yet, however, there has been no attempt to discuss these separate dimensions of midrashic anthologization in connection with each other, let alone assess their combined sig108
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nificance. This is the task I wish to undertake in this essay—not only so as to understand the general phenomenon better but also in order to speculate upon its function, that is, the purpose such anthology making may have served in Rabbinic culture. Why, indeed, was the anthology, as it seems, the Rabbis’ literary genre of choice? To answer this question, it is necessary first to survey the anthological “question” on each of the separate planes I have identified. If only because the anthological element can be seen most clearly when it manifests itself on the largest scale, we shall begin with the documentary plane and then proceed to the literary-rhetorical and, finally, to the hermeneutical.
Anthological Documents: The Case of the Literary Homily At first glance, there is no reason to suppose that the various classical midrashic collections are anything but anthologies. This is not to say that all midrashic collections are identical, or that they are only anthologies. Scholars have traditionally distinguished between two types of midrashic collections: the exegetical and the homiletical.2 The former is organized basically according to the biblical text itself; the midrashic comments are recorded simply by the order of the verses upon which they comment, verse after verse, with no other discernible logic to their selection. In contrast, the homiletical collection is divided into so-called chapters (parashiyot); rather than interpret an entire section of the Torah, each chapter devotes its comments solely to the first or the first several verses in the section, and its comments often seem to be motivated as much by topical and thematic concerns as as by the verses themselves. As we shall see, attempts have also been made to attribute to the homiletical midrashim an even deeper literary unity and coherence. Even so, there is no prima facie evidence to suggest that the basic dynamic behind these works’ editing was ever more than anthological—that is, more than an attempt on the editors’ parts to collect exegetical traditions in recognizable literary units that the editor preserved more or less in their original form and without significant intervention (conceding the fact, to be sure, that in most cases we have no way of knowing what the original form was). In this respect, the midrashic collections are not in fact different from other Rabbinic works, nearly all of which are multilayered works, preserving (and often reworking) past traditions and, at least on the surface, not acknowledging their editors’ intervention. To be sure, not all contemporary scholars would agree with this characterization of Rabbinic texts. The greatest challenge to the “anthological” approach to midrash (as well as to other works of Rabbinic literature) has come from Jacob Neusner, who has argued that each separate work produced by the Rabbis should be seen as a document in its own right with an inner integrity and a coherent point of view all its own. Even if the document was compiled from previously existing traditions, Neusner claims that the author responsible for the document assembled his work with a plan and with an intelligible purpose so as to create a “composition.”3 The only alternative, Neusner writes, is to view the Rabbinic work as “a scrap book,” a “random and essentially promiscuous” literary expression.4 There are many difficulties with Neusner’s documentary hypothesis, some of
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which have been explored by other scholars.5 For our present concerns, the main weakness of his argument is in his contention that a text must be either “a composition” or a “scrapbook.” This is a false opposition. There is, in fact, no reason to dichotomize literary works so extremely. Even if it is not a monograph—that is, an original work consciously and deliberately created by a single author—an anthology of diverse works need not necessarily be, and usually isn’t, a “random,” let alone a “promiscuous” text, a mere scrapbook of this and that. Indeed, the opposition between “composition” and “scrapbook” is especially inappropriate in the case of Rabbinic documents. In the first place, structure or organization in any anthology can take place on at least two separate levels—either on the macrolevel of the collection-document as a whole, or on the macro-level of its constitutive literary-rhetorical forms (to which we shall turn shortly)—and it is particularly in the latter that structure is to be located in the case of Rabbinic texts.6 Moreover, even the rudimentary organization of an exegetical midrash—in which interpretive opinions are listed sequentially by their lemmata or base verses—is, after all, still a form of organization, and not to be dismissed as meaningless. And finally, the very anthological form of the midrashic collection, with its proclivity for preserving multiple interpretations, may sometimes disguise the presence of an editorial hand that has consistently excluded an unnamed interpretive approach— an approach, in other words, that could not, for ideological or political reasons, be preserved. Such, for example, may have been the case with the cosmogonic interpretations on the first chapters of Genesis as preserved in Bereishit Rabbah, and so, too, certain Rabbinic exegeses of the Song of Songs as preserved in Shir Hashirim Rabbah. Both these works, despite the variety of exegeses they preserve, may have excluded certain esoteric interpretations that their Rabbinic editors found objectionable or impossible.7 Virtually every Rabbinic text, including the various midrashic collections, is in some fashion sui generis, and their anthological character takes on a somewhat different expression in each case. Consider, for example, two early tannaitic collections which are usually considered under the rubric of exegetical midrash. The Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael is a collection of interpretations on Exodus 12:1–23:19— that is, from the first commandment regarding Passover through the end of the laws given on Mt. Sinai—with an addendum, as it were, on nine verses about the Sabbath (Exod. 31:12–17 and 35:1–3). Yet while the collection is an “exegetical” midrash inasmuch as its interpretations are listed by the sequence of verses, the book as a whole is not in fact a mere running commentary on Exodus. Organized into nine tractates (massekhtaot), the Mekhilta is, as J. Z. Lauterbach pointed out a long time ago, “a collection of tractates dealing with certain events recorded or topics treated in the book of Exodus.”8 It is not merely a commentary or collection of interpretations on verses. In contrast, Sifra, the tannaitic commentary on Leviticus, originally followed the sections in the Torah literally word for word, as is already made clear in the reference in Shir Hashirim Rabbah 6:8: “ ‘There are sixty wives and eighty concubines’ (Song of Songs 6:8)—‘Sixty wives’ refers to the sixty tractates (massekhtaot) in the Mishnah (literally, halakhot), ‘eighty conclubines’ to the eighty sections (parashiyot) in Sifra (literally, torah kohanim).”9 As Shlomo Naeh has shown,
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these original eighty parashiyot correspond to the eighty sections (also known as parashiyot) in the book of Leviticus, thereby making Sifra the first truly complete exegetical midrash.10 While Mekhilta and Sifra are, then, both “anthologies,” and even though both are usually described as “exegetical” midrashim—insofar as their main procedure seems to be simply to list interpretations by the verses upon which they comment—it is clear from their larger macro-organization and the titles of their different divisions that their editors also created and organized them for different purposes: in one case, to treat selected topics and sections of a book; in the other, to follow a scriptural book through its entirety. Whether or not the latter was a commentary in our sense of the term—that is, an ancillary text meant to be read and studied alongside the primary core-text—is a separate question to which I’ll return.11 Most scholarly debate about the literary identity of midrashic collections has revolved, however, not around the exegetical but the homiletical collections, specifically the two amoraic works, Vayikra (Leviticus) Rabbah (henceforth VR) and Pesikta de-Rav Kahana (henceforth PRK). As I have already noted, these midrashim differ from the exegetical midrashim in several factors: 1. They are organized in “chapters” (parashiyot). 2. These chapters share a common shape—at their beginning, the chapters open with at least one example and usually a group of passages in the literary-rhetorical form of the petihta or proem (to which I shall return). These multiple petihtaot are then followed by a series of midrashic interpretations that are sometimes linked to the chapter’s opening verse or two and sometimes to a topic raised by the opening verse; and this series of interpretations typically culminates in a “happy end,” the simana denehemta, literally “a token [or sign] of consolation.” This conventional conclusion sometimes explicitly evokes the redemption of Israel in the time-to-come but it may also consist solely of a kind of blessing or a tying together of previous motifs in the chapter in such a way as to effect a satisfying and optimistic point of closure.12 3. In interpreting the Torah section (which may or may not have corresponded to the sections of the Torah that were read in synagogue in one of the Palestinian triennial cycles), the homiletical midrashim generally limit their comments to the first verse in the section (and sometimes only to a phrase or two in that verse), or at most to the first several verses in the Torah section—never, in other words, to the entire reading (as does an exegetical midrash). 4. Finally, in the homiletical collections, this opening verse (or group of verses) is often interpreted in a singularly figurative, nonliteral fashion, and almost always, in a way that, initially, seems to have little to do with its context in the larger Torah reading. These distinctive features of the homiletical midrash have been a staple of modern midrash scholarship virtually since its beginning, but their significance continues to be a matter of scholarly debate.13 In two articles first published in 1971, the Israeli scholar Joseph Heinemann proposed a more radical explanation
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for the homiletical midrash’s singular features.14 According to Heinemann, the homiletical midrash represented a new literary genre in classical Hebrew literature, one that he called the “literary homily.” The chapters in VR (or PRK) are not mere anthologies of midrashic traditions, indeed not even exegesis in its traditional sense; rather they constitute attempts by the anonymous editor to take “separate and often heterogeneous parts” of past tradition—the many disparate biblical interpretations and extrabiblical legends on specific verses and passages that had originally been orally transmitted and that probably reached the editor in that form—and to meld them together into a new “organic unity,” namely, the literary homily, which is essentially a thematic composition. The organization of the literary homily in each chapter “is dictated by the inner logic of the theme and the need to attain coherence and integration.” Even so, Heinemann acknowledged, the anonymous editor’s most striking editorial habit was his tendency to emphasize “contradictory or conflicting viewpoints” of the same theme or idea and thereby to expose “the complexity of Torah.”15 The difficulty with Heinemann’s argument lies in his notion of the “organic unity” of the chapters in VR. This difficulty is partly due to the problems inherent in the notion of organic unity itself—an idea that was more fashionable in Heinemann’s time than it is today, some thirty years later—and partly because the socalled literary homilies in VR are not usually as unified as they should be, a fact that Heinemann himself admitted.16 In truth, there is no necessary reason to consider the separate chapters in VR to be unified entities in any sense even if they all tend to share a common organizational structure of petihtaot (usually multiple examples, in a very few cases a single petihta) followed by a group of separate exegetical traditions culminating in a simana denehemta. It is equally possible to consider each chapter as simply having two halves—one of petihtaot, the other of separate exegetical traditions leading to a conventional peroration. As I will argue in greater detail later, the petihtaot may have served as source material for a preacher who needed models to use in order to compose and preach his own petihta in synagogue; the second half of the chapter may have furnished material for a different type of sermon or for a teacher who needed to prepare a lesson for students. The two halves of each chapter, in other words, did not necessarily have anything to do with each other. The question of unity aside, however, it nonetheless seems to me that Heinemann was correct in his basic intuition. There is something different about VR and PRK, and what is different has to do with a certain shared feature, even a kind of “coherence.” Rather than view this coherence as thematic, however, I would propose that it is exegetical—that is, each chapter uses a more or less common approach to the verse (or verses) that serve as the explicit subject of its interpretations. The typical—one might even say universal—feature of the homiletical midrashim is that the interpretations in each chapter not only focus almost exclusively on the first or the first few verses in the Torah passage but also almost deliberately ignore the remainder of the verses in the passage and their contents. For example, VR 1, the first chapter in the midrash, has as its ostensible subject the first chapter of Leviticus, a lengthy treatment of the laws of the burnt offering. The midrash, however, limits all its interpretations in the chapter to the first phrase
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in Leviticus 1:1, vayikra el moshe, “And He called to Moses,” and ignores all the rest of Leviticus 1, hardly even alluding to the subject of sacrifices.17 So, too, VR 4—whose ostensible subject is the reading beginning with Leviticus 4:1, a series of laws about sacrifices incurred “when a person unwittingly incurs guilt,” nefesh ki teheta (Lev. 4:2)—limits virtually all its interpretations to the word nefesh, which it reads not as “person” but as “soul” (which is the primary Rabbinic understanding of the word’s meaning), and uses the phrase nefesh ki teheta as an occasion to explore the relationship between the soul and sin.18 Or in VR 20, the chapter entirely ignores the reading’s subject, the scapegoat offering, and instead devotes its entirety to a treatment of Nadav and Avihu, the sons of Aaron, whose deaths are alluded to in the opening phrase of the first verse in the reading. According to Heinemann, these chapters used Scripture merely as a pretext, a peg upon which to hang, as it were, their thematic essays about, for example, the uniqueness of Moses (in VR1) or the nature of the soul (in VR 4). In Heinemann’s view, in other words, there is nothing authentically exegetical about these chapters. Their editor wanted to put together thematic “essays,” not biblical interpretations, and he used “midrash” merely as a pretext. In contrast, I propose that these chapters are exegetical compositions and that their exegetical content can be identified on at least two levels. On the most obvious level, each chapter presents a series of interpretations that follow a common interpretive approach to the chapter’s prooftext(s). Beyond these exegeses, however, the chapter as a whole may also suggest an implied interpretation of the remainder of the Torah reading, or at least some kind of response to that reading’s significance. In a detailed study I have published on VR 1, I have argued that the book of Leviticus posed a special problem for a Rabbi who wished to preach on the book in the fourth or fifth century c.e., some 300 years after the destruction of the Temple and nearly as many centuries after the last hope to rebuild the Temple (in the time of Julian) had collapsed.19 The problem was, simply: What to do with this book of the Bible? The vast majority of laws in Leviticus (especially in its first half) deal with the Temple cult, and these sections had little if any practical import or relevance for an audience in a fourth- or fifth-century synagogue. How could a preacher make these readings from the Torah meaningful, let alone interesting? As I have proposed, the solution that the Rabbis found—as reflected in the exegeses found in VR—was to shift the burden of meaning away from the cultic substance of the chapters in Leviticus and to locate it instead in some other aspect of the scriptural passage. For example, VR 1, which deals exclusively with Leviticus 1:1 and ignores the remainder of the chapter (namely, the substance of what God tells Moses, the laws of the burnt offering), uses its interpretations—and in particular its multiple exegeses of vayikra el moshe, “And God called to Moses”—to reveal the type of revelation wherein God speaks to Moses (rather than its contents); elsewhere I have called that type of revelation “the language of havivut,” of “intimacy,” and through it, I have proposed, VR shifts the burden of the Torah’s meaning from its content to its style. In VR 4, the midrash uses the first verse in its reading to discuss “how a nefesh, a soul, might sin” (nefesh ki teheta); the result is not so much an essay on the soul as an exploration of the reason why a person is obligated to bring the sin offerings whose details the rest of the Torah chapter
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goes on to delineate. In VR 16, the chapter is devoted to the section beginning with Leviticus 14:2 ff., the laws of the metzorah, the so-called “leper”; this section details the procedures through which a person stricken with tzara’at (leprosy) ritually purifies himself through the cult. The midrash, however, deals with none of these ritual procedures. Instead, it exploits an already well-established aetiological interpretation that reads the word metzorah as an elision of motzi shem rah, namely, the slanderer or gossip, and thus rereads the verse, zot tihyeh torat hametzorah” (literally, “this is the law of the metzorah”) to mean in effect “this is how one avoids tzara’at,” namely, by avoiding the sin of slander and gossip, whose punishment is the skin disease. What all this means, in short, is that VR (and its sister midrash, PRK) remain exegetical compositions, but the singular features of the exegetical approach pursued in each chapter—the habit of focusing on the opening verse(s) at the expense of the rest of the readings, the unusually “spiritualized” or “quasi-allegorical” readings of those verses, the implied responses to the contents of the remainder of the weekly Torah readings—all reflect the historical dilemmas and practical problems facing a Rabbi in the third or fourth or fifth century. Now by claiming that these chapters adopt a common or shared exegetical approach to their prooftexts, I do not mean to say that the exegeses they present are all identical or even that they necessarily agree with each other. Quite the opposite; as Heinemann noted, the various traditions preserved in each chapter not infrequently contradict each other. What is “shared” or “common” among the different exegeses recorded in each chapter is not substantive agreement on the meaning of a verse but a shared impulse to place the exegetical “weight” or “burden” of meaning upon one element in the Torah lection rather than upon another, and thereby to “read” the larger Torah reading of which that verse is a part in its light. For example, in VR 1, as I have already noted, the chapter deals largely with the opening phrase, vayikra el moshe, but it reads that phrase variously as “He [God] spoke only to Moses,” “He invited Moses,” “He named Moses,” “He held a teˆte-a`-teˆte with Moses,” “He screamed at Moses,” and “He spoke intimately with Moses.” So too, in VR 4:5, in one of the most famous cruxes in all midrashic literature, two contradictory views of the nefesh’s culpability and responsibility for a person’s sinning are put forth: in one, the body and the soul share culpability and are judged together; in the other, the soul is held more culpable precisely on account of its heavenly origins.20 For the chapter’s editor, the substantive contradiction between the two traditions was not an issue, because he was trying to put together not a unified thematic essay on the soul but rather an anthology of available traditions and interpretations that dealt with the soul and its character—in respect to sinning, and in relation to God, to the human body, and to the corporate body of the people Israel. The anthological impulse served the purpose of inspiring the editor to collect traditions and exegeses that could support an interpretation of the Torah reading in line with this exegetical and homiletical approach.21 In short, the kind of documentary organization found in the homiletical midrashim, VR and PRK, is not so different from the organization of an “exegetical” collection like Bereishit Rabbah. Both are primarily anthologies of earlier interpretations. Indeed, if the original chapter divisions in Bereishit Rabbah accorded
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with the weekly Torah readings, as Joseph Heinemann has argued, and if the original chapters in Bereishit Rabbah all began with petihtaot, as do the chapters in VR and PRK, then these various amoraic collections were in fact even more similar in structure than has been previously supposed.22 The major difference in midrashic collections would be not the distinction between the exegetical and homiletical midrashim but that between those with petihtaot at their chapter beginnings and those without petihtaot—namely, the difference between the tannaitic and the amoraic collections. Exactly what the presence of the petihtaot in the amoraic collections may teach us is a question to which I will return. Before doing so, however, let us turn to the petihta itself as the paradigmatic anthological literary-rhetorical form in midrash.
Anthological Literary-Rhetorical Forms: The Example of the Petihta The distinctive literary-rhetorical forms of midrash are its most striking and identifiable feature—what sets midrash off from the many other different types of ancient Jewish biblical exegesis like Targum and the Re-Written Bible. The midrashic forms not only record individual interpretive opinions, they also collect and organize separate traditions and opinions into larger, more inclusive structures that tend to make their own points in addition to those of the specific exegeses they convey. In the tannaitic collections, the most prominent of these forms are the several different types of exegetical lists and enumerations. In the amoraic collections, the most typical form is the petihta or proem. The exegetical enumeration (and list) has been studied with exemplary clarity by W. Sibley Towner.23 In this essay I will limit my discussion to the petihta. In an influential and still debated article that appeared in 1971, Joseph Heinemann first proposed that the petihta owed its unusual shape to its Sitz im Leben as a mini-sermon that was delivered immediately before the Torah reading.24 Unlike most midrashic literary forms, which essentially follow upon the verse or scriptural phrase that they interpret, the petihta typically ends with the verse that is its real subject, the so-called lectionary verse (which is usually the first or close to the first verse of a section of the Torah, which may or may not have been [depending on the scholar] the beginning of the weekly Torah lection in the Palestinian synagogue).25 The classical petihta begins, however, with another verse, the so-called “remote” verse (or petihta verse), so called because it is usually taken from an unrelated, “remote” location elsewhere in Scripture (most frequently from the Writings, sometimes from one of the books of the Prophets, least frequently from the Pentateuch). It is also remote in the sense of having little or no connection to the lectionary verse, at least not an obvious connection. From this “remote” verse, the preacher evolves a chain of interpretations, often involving the quotation and interpretation of still other verses along with additional rhetorical forms (like parables and enumerations), building in the process an exegetical bridge that eventually culminates in the lectionary verse. At this conclusion, the lectionary verse takes on a new meaning or sense. Heinemann himself seems to have believed that the petihtaot preserved in
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the existing collections were actual sermons that had once been delivered by preachers in synagogues. This possibility now seems much less certain.26 It is equally if not more likely that the petihtaot in the collections were literary creations of the editors of the collections. Further, it is possible that they were preserved in the collection not only to record compositions that had once been delivered but to provide would-be preachers or teachers with models of petihtaot that they could then use to “work” up their own sermons. For our immediate purposes, however, what is most important to note is not only that the petihta had the clear and identifiable outer form or shell that Heinemann identified—the conventional beginning and end—but that its inner structure, its contents, namely, the substance of the exegetical bridge between the petihta and lectionary verses, also possessed its own structural conventions and rules of composition. These conventions and rules are so obvious (once they are recognized) that they must have been familiar to every preacher. In an as yet uncompleted study in which I have been engaged for the past several years, I have sought to analyze the inner structure of the petihta in order to identify and describe those compositional rules and conventions. In an appendix to this essay, I briefly describe the study and some of its provisional conclusions. For our present concern with the topic of anthology, however, two examples of typical petihtaot will suffice to make my point about the petihta’s anthological character. The first example is a petihta from VR 20:1, whose lectionary verse is Leviticus 14:1. I have laid out the translated text in outline form so as to give the reader a sense of its highly organized structure and components. All quotations from Scripture are in boldface, and all formulae and deliberately repeated phrases are italicized. Rabbi Shimeon bar Abaye recited a petihta [that began]: “For the same is in store for all: one fate for the righteous and for the wicked; [for the good, and for the pure, and for the impure; for him who sacrifices and for him who does not sacrifice; for the good man and for the sinner; for him who swears and for him who fears oaths].” (Eccles. 9:2) “The righteous”—this is Noah, “Noah was a righteous man” (Gen. 6:9). Said R. Yohanan, the son of R. Eliezer the son of R. Yosi Hagelili: When Noah left the ark, a snake bit him and a lion gave him a fracture, and he was no longer fit to offer sacrifices, so Shem his son offered sacrifices in his stead. “And for the wicked”—this is Pharaoh Nekho. When he wished to sit on the throne of Solomon, he did not know [how to use] its mechanical contrivance, and a snake bit him and a lion gave him a fracture. This one died limping, and this one died limping. Is it not “one fate for the righteous and for the wicked”? “For the good”—this is Moses, as it is said, “And when she saw that he was good” (Exod. 2:2). R. Meir said: He was born circumcised. “For the pure”—this is Aaron, for he was busy with purifying Israel, as it is said, “In peace and in right-
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash 117 eousness he walked with Me, and turned many away from sin” (Malachi 2:6). “And for the impure”—these are the spies. These [Moses and Aaron] spoke in praise of the land of Israel, and these spoke in disparagement of the land of Israel. These did not enter the land of Israel, and these did not enter the land of Israel. Is it not “one fate for the good and for the pure and for the impure”? “For him who sacrifices”—this is Josiah, “And Josiah donated to the people small cattle—lambs and goats” (II Chron. 35:7). “And for him who does not sacrifice”—this is Ahab, who did away with sacrifices on the altar, for this is what is written, “And Ahab killed sheep and oxen for sacrifices for him [Yehoshafat] in abundance” (II Chron. 18:2)—he killed for sacrifices to him [Yehoshafat] and not for sacrifices [to God]. This one died through arrows, and this one died through arrows. Is it not “one fate for him who sacrifices and for him who does not sacrifice”? “For the good one as for the sinner”—the good one is David, “So they sent and brought him, and he was ruddy-cheeked, bright-eyed, and a good one to look at (tov roi)” (I Sam. 16:12). Said R. Yitzhak: Good at seeing the law (halakhah).27 Everyone who looked at him recalled his learning. “As for the sinner,”—this is Nebuchadnezzar, “Redeem your sins through charity” (Dan. 4:24). This one built the Temple and reigned for forty years, and this one destroyed the Temple and reigned for forty years. Is it not “one fate”? “For him who swears”—this is Zedekiah, “He also rebelled against Nebuchadnezzar, who made him take an oath by God” (II Chron. 36:13). “And for him who fears oaths”—this is Samson, “Samson said to them, Swear to me that you will not attack me” (Judges 15:12).28 This one died by having his eyes picked out, and this one died by having his eyes put out. Is it not “one fate” for all of them? Another interpretation for “One fate for the righteous and for the wicked”— “For the righteous”—this is Aaron, about whom it is written, “In peace and in righteousness he walked with Me” (Malachi 2:6). “And for the wicked”—this is the followers of Korah, about whom it is written, “Move away from the tents of those wicked men” (Num. 16:26). These went in to offer sacrifices out of dissension, and they came out incinerated, and these went in to offer sacrifices without dissension and came out incinerated. This is what is written—“And after the deaths of the two sons of Aaron” (Lev. 14:1).
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As the reader will observe, the petihta parses its petihta verse, Ecclesiastes 9: 2, into separate phrases, and then, following the initial phrase in the verse, it identifies each of the pairs of types of persons named in each successive phrase who share the same fate as referring to specific figures from the Bible who Scripture teaches us did in fact share the same fate. Thus, we are told, Noah and Pharaoh Nekho both suffered the same end—both died limping after having been bitten by a snake and having suffered a fracture at the hands of a lion—even though one, Noah, was righteous while the other, Pharaoh Nekho, was wicked. The same strategy is repeated for each of the five following pairs: Moses and Aaron, on the one hand, and the spies, on the other; Josiah and Ahab; David and Nebuchadnezzar; Zedekiah and Samson; and finally, in a second interpretation of the first phrase in the verse’s sequence, Aaron and Korah. The petihta’s return to the first phrase appears to be a technique of closure, but there does not appear to be any other logic underlying the sequence of the biblical figures treated. Each of them appears to have been chosen solely for his appropriateness as an example of the type named in the verse. The petihta’s author clearly did not invent every midrash in the petihta. A good number of the paired figures and the midrashim attached to them—Noah and Pharaoh Nekho, and Moses and Aaron, for example—had independent existences long before this petihta.29 The petihta, in other words, seems to be an anthology of various traditions about pairs of biblical figures who famously suffered the same fate despite the fact that one was wicked (and therefore deserved his fate) while the other was righteous (and did not). In terms of its overall message, the petihta can be read in one of two ways: either as an even more radical expression of cynicism than the original Ecclesiastes verse, or as a repeated demonstration of the fact that a person’s righteousness or wickedness cannot be judged by his (or her) fate. Each reading, in turn, casts the deaths of Nadav and Avihu, Aaron’s sons, in a very different light. According to the second alternative, their deaths cannot be read as proof of their wickedness (since the righteous and the wicked die the same deaths); according to the first possibility, their righteousness or wickedness had no effect on the fate they suffered. Whichever of these interpretations one wishes to choose, however, the reader will also notice that this anthology of examples is very carefully organized, with each unit in the petihta following a nearly identical, patterned, and symmetrical structure. Each interpretation of each biblical type begins in the same way (“ ‘the biblical type’ is a given ‘biblical figure’ ”); nearly every identification is then followed by a citation of a biblical prooftext; and after the figures in each pair are identified, their identical fates are then spelled out in symmetrical statements which are followed by the identical rhetorical question, “Is it not ‘one fate’ ” for each of the figures in the pair? The phrase “one fate” is, needless to say, a quotation from the opening petihta verse, mikreh ehad. For all the petihta’s cynicism, and despite its implicit questioning of any providential justice in the universe or to human existence (for the righteous and the wickedness share the same fate), the highly organized structure of the petihta gives the impression of a strictly ordered world in which everything has its proper place and articulation.
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The next example offers an even more impressive illustration of how a petihta can collect a large series of different exegeses in a highly organized and symmetrical structure of discourse that takes on a meaning that is significantly larger than the sum of its parts. The petihta appears in Bereishit Rabbah 8:1 as a comment on Genesis 1:26, “Let us make man in our image. . . .” Rabbi Yohanan recited a petihta (patah) [that began] “Before and behind (ahor vekedem) You created me (tsaretani30); You lay upon me Your palm” (Ps. 139:5). (1) Said R. Yohanan: If man proves himself worthy, he enjoys two worlds, as it is said, “Before and behind You created me”; And if he does not, he will have to stand in judgement, as it is said, “You lay upon me Your palm.” (2) Said R. Jeremiah ben Leazar: At the time the Holy One, blessed be He, created the first man (adam harishon), He created him an androgyne, as it is said, “Male and female He created them [ . . . and called them Man] (Gen.5:2). (3) Said R. Samuel bar Nahman: At the time the Holy One, blessed be He, created the first man (adam harishon), He created him two-countenanced (diprosophon), and sawed him in half, and made a back on this side and a back on that side. They challenged him (meteivin leih): But it is written: “And He took one of his ribs (mitzalotav) [ . . . and fashioned the rib that He had taken from the man into a woman]” (Gen. 2:21–22). He answered: [Yes!] God took [her] from [Adam’s] side, just as you say, “and for the other side (uletzeleh) of the Tabernacle” (Exod. 26:20). (4) R. Tanhuma said in the name of R. Benayah and R. Berechiah said in the name of R. Leazar: An unformed mass (golem) He created him, and he was spread out from one end of the world to the other end—“My unformed limbs (golmi) Your eyes saw” (Ps. 139:16). (5) R. Joshua said in the name of R. Nehemiah and R. Judah b. Simon said in the name of R. Leazar: Filling the entire world He created him. From “east to west,” from where? From, as it is said, “Before and behind You created me.”31 From “north to south,” from where? From, as it is said, “[ever since God created man on earth] from one end of heaven to the other” (Deut.4:32). And from where [do we know] that He created him to fill even the
120 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism space of the universe? This is what Scripture teaches, “You lay upon me Your palm”—just as you say, “Keep your fist away from me” (Job 13:21). (6) R. Leazar said: [He created him] last (ahor) on the last day of creation and first (vekedem) on the last day of creation. This is the view of R. Leazar, for R. Leazar said: “Let the earth bring forth every kind of living creature (nefesh hayah)” (Gen. 1:24)—[the word nefesh means] the spirit [i.e., the soul] of the first man.32 (7) R. Shimeon ben Lakish said: [He created him] last (ahor) on the last day of creation and first (vekedem) on the first day of creation. This is the view of R. Shimeon ben Lakish, for R. Shimeon ben Lakish said, “And the spirit of God (ruah elohim) was hovering” (Gen. 1: 2)—this is the soul (ruho) of the first man, just as you say, “The spirit (ruho) of the Lord shall alight upon him” (Isa. 11:2)33 (8) Said R. Nahman: [He created him] last (ahor) of all the creatures and [He punished him] first of all those to be punished [as in Gen. 7:23, “All existence on earth was blotted out—man, cattle, creeping things, and birds of the sky. . . .”] Said R. Samuel b. Tanhum: So too man’s praising [God] comes only at the end (beahronah). This is what it says—“Praise the Lord from the heavens”(Ps. 148:1), and then the entire series [of heavenly creations are listed] until [the series concludes with] “He established an order that shall never change,” (Ps. 148: 6); and after that [comes] “Praise the Lord, O you who are on the earth” (Ps. 148: 7), and only after [naming every earthly creature does it come to] “all kings and peoples of the earth” (Ps. 48:11). Said R. Simlai: Just as man’s praising [of God] came only after animals and wild beasts and fowl, so too man’s creation came after animals and wild beasts and fowl. At the beginning [of the fifth day, it says], “Let the waters bring forth swarms of living creatures” (Gen. 1:20) and after all [the creatures were created—] “Let us make man in our image” (Gen. 1: 26).
Whereas the previous petihta from VR had taken a single verse, broken it up into its constituent phrases, and interpreted each phrase sequentially according to a single logic, this petihta offers some eight different interpretations for a single verse, “Before and behind You created me and You lay upon me the palm of Your hand” (or at the least for the first half of the verse). As I have tried to indicate in the outline form of the translation (and the line spacing), these eight interpretations
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are in fact divided into three pairs of interpretations (nos. 2 and 3; nos. 4 and 5; nos. 6 and 7), with single interpretations (nos. 1 and 8) bracketing them. Further, each of the middle three pairs of interpretation are, in fact, doublets—that is, the second interpretation in each pair is a variant upon the first. Thus 2 and 3 both offer versions of an Ur-Adam, who is either androgynous or two-sided (with each side possessing a different gender); 4 and 5 offer different versions of an Ur-Adam who is literally a microcosmos (filling the entire universe); and 6 and 7 offer different chronologies for the creation of the soul and body of the Ur-Adam. Taken together, these six interpretations offer a virtual encyclopedia of nearly every conceivable view that existed in the ancient world concerning the creation of man, the original human.34 In turn, the first and last interpretations in the petihta, numbers 1 and 8, do not offer contrasting views so much of how the primordial Adam was created— the facts of androgony, as it were—as of the purpose for which man was created (along with corresponding understandings of man’s place in the order of creation, a place that the different traditions in the petihta understand as related to man’s deeds such as his praising of God). This difference also affects the purpose underlying study. The three pairs of interpretation treat their scriptural prooftext— Genesis 1:26 and its surrounding verses—as a subject worthy of study for what it can teach us about the “facts” of cosmogony. In contrast, the theological approach contained in the first and last interpretations offers a very different rationale for why a Rabbi should study the opening chapters of Genesis—not to know how the world was created but to understand the purpose for which the universe and man exist. Both the cosmogonic and the teleological (or theological) approaches to the reading of the opening chapters of Genesis are reflected in many other interpretations preserved in Bereishit Rabbah.35 Indeed, as seen from within the context of the entire section, this petihta is not only an anthology of Rabbinic views on the creation of man specifically, but also a kind of microcosm of the entire Rabbinic approach to the subject of cosmogony. At the same time, the intrinsically anthological character of this petihta must also be appreciated in conjunction with the highly organized and symmetrical character of the petihta’s language and structure—even more striking in this petihta than in the previous one from VR. As in the translation of the latter, I have italicized all symmetries in this petihta. In the VR petihta the symmetries were constant throughout the composition. In this petihta in Bereishit Rabbah, in contrast, the powerful symmetries lie within each pair of exegeses (namely, between nos. 2 and 3, 4 and 5, and 6 and 7) in which the two halves (or by-forms, since they essentially state the same idea, slightly differently) repeatedly duplicate each other’s language. The sole exception to this rule is that, in each of the three pairs, the second interpretation of the two (namely, 3, 5, and 7) is always longer and has an “extra” interpretation or tradition appended to it. In its entirety, then, this petihta is extraordinarily highly organized and symmetrical; indeed, it is one of the most organized and symmetrical petihtaot in all midrashic literature. To be sure, it is not entirely clear precisely what purpose all this symmetry and stereotyping in the petihta actually served. Was symmetry primarily an esthetic
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criterion, or was it merely a device for organizing petihtaot in a kind of outline form? As I have already suggested, these petihtaot may have been meant to serve as models for preachers—that is, as models to be used and worked up by a preacher however he wished so as to create his own petihta. If this were the case, however, we might well ask whether a preacher was meant to use all eight interpretations in his sermon, or whether the full panoply was more like a menu in a restaurant from which the preacher was intended to pick and choose? Was it understood, perhaps, that he would use only four or five interpretations in a passage but not all of them in a single sermon? Or was the petihta a “perfect” work in its entirety that was intended to remain intact and whole? We do not know the answers to these questions, but we can say with certainty that the petihta as a literary-rhetorical form is not very different from other literaryrhetorical forms of midrash in using highly stereotyped, even formulaic language and highly organized structures of discourse. One sees this in the “controversyform,” so common in tannaitic midrashim, where the opinions of two Rabbis whose interpretations diametrically disagree with each other nonetheless mirror each other’s language. So, too, one finds comparably stereotyped and symmetrical language in the enumeration form and in other types of exegetical lists, particularly in what Towner has called their “regularized” forms. Equivalent stereotyping is also found in the mashal’s highly formulaic narrative themes and diction; and even in the exegetical narrative, the sippur hadarshani, though to a somewhat lesser extent (if only because the sippur hadarshani is itself more amorphous and difficult to categorize generically).36 Indeed, such a tendency toward highly stereotyped, structured discourse seems to be typical of nearly all Rabbinic literature, from the Mishnah through the Bavli. Even so, the petihta uniquely combines the seemingly unregulated freedom of anthological collection with the high degree of organization characteristic of symmetrical discourse. When one analyzes a petihta like VR 20:1 or Bereishit Rabbah 8:1, it is difficult to explain why certain opinions found their way into the petihta while others did not. Did the author of the petihta deliberately exclude any current views of the creation of man? Or was there a reason why he included some interpretations in the petihta and left others out? We simply do not know. In the case of the biblical figures in pairs cited in VR 20:1, it is not difficult to imagine other figures taking the place of some of those used in the petihta; in some cases the pairs may even seem unlikely despite their inclusion in the petihta.37 Again, what is the logic determining the choice of examples? Both these questions touch upon the hermeneutics of anthologization. Yet in contrast to these indeterminate realities, the highly organized and symmetrical nature of the petihta’s discourse—the language of its exegesis—lends a kind of structure and order to the literary form that its hermeneutics do not provide. In this sense, the petihta’s discourse, its language, may be said to be the source of its stability as a literary form. Perhaps, indeed, the very stability of its language guarantees and grounds the petihta’s hermeneutical freedom, its capacity for remaining so unregulated on the interpretive plane. It is to this last dimension of the anthological habit—the hermeneutical plane—that we now turn.
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The Hermeneutics of Polysemy and the Making of Anthologies The first impression that most midrashic collections give is not dissimilar to that given by the petihta—namely, that its contents are fairly unregulated; that to a greater or lesser extent the editor chose to preserve nearly every possible interpretation that came down to him from past tradition; and that the selection, if indeed the anonymous editor did make a selection from earlier tradition, was done without any easily discernible rhyme or reason. Even when a collection records criticism of a specific exegesis, it also tends to preserve the exegesis being criticized—a propensity that, if nothing else, makes it difficult to ascertain what was left out, let alone censored.38 We know, however, that this impression is only partially true. As I’ve already noted, it seems likely that in a few cases, as in the cosmogonic sections of Bereishit Rabbah and possibly in parts of Shir Hashirim Rabbah, the Rabbinic collections excluded certain esoteric traditions of interpretation that scholars today can reconstruct from non-Rabbinic sources.39 Even so, these indications of editorial intervention and selection only highlight the overall propensity of the collections and their editors for preserving multiple interpretations, and only make that propensity all the more puzzling. Where did this editorial habit come from? Probably the most frequently cited rationale for why the editors of Rabbinic literature preserved multiple interpretations in midrash—why, in other words, these compositions are anthologies—is that they were simply putting into practice an ideological belief about the nature of Scripture, namely, the hermeneutics of polysemy. This axiomatic belief is documented in several well-known Rabbinic statements such as the talmudic dictum in reference to Jeremiah 23:29 (“Behold, My word is like fire—declares the Lord—and like a hammer that shatters rock”), “Just as this hammer produces many sparks [when it strikes the rock], so a single verse has several meanings.”40 So, too, the mishnaic/Rabbinic tendency to record conflicting and even contradictory interpretations is often treated as the direct reflection of a statement such as “These and these [i.e., the opinions of both the Houses of Hillel and of Shammai] are the words of the living God.”41 Similarly, multiple interpretations in midrash are justified through the oft repeated claim that the Torah has “seventy aspects” or “faces” (panim).42 The anthological character of the midrashic collections is simply a reflection or product of all these axiomatic beliefs. Over the past twenty years, however, our understanding of those beliefs and of the documentary practice they supposedly reflect has changed considerably. In the first place, it is now commonly recognized that these various ideological statements appear mainly in relatively “late” sources like the Babylonian Talmud, and there they seem to be the outcome of editorial tendencies already crystallized in much earlier Rabbinic documents. The “polysemous utopia” seemingly envisioned in Rabbinic texts like B. Hagigah 3a-b—where “the disciples of the wise” sit “in assemblies and study the Torah, some pronouncing unclean, others pronouncing clean, some prohibiting and others permitting, some declaring unfit and others declaring fit,” all of them agreeing to disagree—is in fact an editorial artifact, a
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fantasy created by the editors and redactors of the final Rabbinic documents. In historical actuality, there seems to be as much evidence if not more for Rabbinic factionalism and sometimes even violent discord as there are testimonies for pacific disputes.43 Yet if the various midrashic collections were not mere reflections of a Rabbinic ideology of the polysemy of Torah, then why indeed did the Rabbis choose to use the anthology as their primary literary form? We may begin to answer this question by saying that the Rabbis’ anthological habit seems to have a very ancient pedigree that can be traced back to earlier Israelite literature and its sacred “compromisetexts.” In the Pentateuch, for example, separate documentary sources are effortlessly combined into a single composition as though their different agenda and ideologies were compatible (which they eventually were made out to be). A number of narratives, like the creation of woman and the kidnapping of Joseph, are preserved in multiple versions. So, too, are many laws. Similarly, in the New Testament (another ancient text with a partly Palestinian pedigree), the four Gospels, each with a different Christology, stand side by side.44 Yet even the invocation of these literary precedents highlights the difference between them. Where the biblical precedents are literary compositions, the Rabbinic documents are clear-cut anthologies of past traditions. Why did the Rabbis so prefer the anthological genre over nearly every other literary type? And why for midrash in particular? To answer this question adequately, it would be helpful to know what function a midrashic anthology could have served. Was it meant to be used as a commentary, that is, as a text to be actually read and studied along with Scripture by a student? Or was it, as I have already suggested, a source book for professionals, that is, a manual for teachers or preachers for whom the collection was not a document to be read in its own right as a full-fledged literary composition but rather a repository of material to be consulted and extracted and turned into a lesson or sermon? Are the texts that the collections preserve transcripts or reports of previously delivered sermons? Or are they model texts possibly derived in part from pieces of actual sermon material but largely composed by an editor? Alas, we have almost no evidence for the literary history of these collections. Comparable evidence from other ancient literatures or from other genres of anthologies is also scarce or less than enlightening. We know, for example, that Origen’s sermons appear to have been written down by stenographers as he preached them ex tempore, but the difference between Origen’s polished and wellcrafted sermons and the fragmentary, highly elliptical, and truly stenographic character of the midrashic collections is so great that the relevance of the one to the other is virtually negligible.45 We have little knowledge of the literary history of other ancient Christian sermon-texts, and even fewer attempts to make a comparative study of the frameworks or formats of Jewish and Christian exegesis—namely, their shape as documents. In the single study that has directly broached the topic, Marc Hirshman has sought to compare the midrash on Ecclesiastes, Koheleth Rabbah, with contemporary Greek commentators on the book.46 Hirshman identifies four different types of compositions among the Christian fathers: the commentary (Olympia-
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dorus), the homily (Gregory), the school lecture (Didymus), and the catena (or Greek seira, namely, “expositions of earlier exegetes on the respective biblical passages [which] are strung together without any personal opinion [of the editor or author] being offered”). Hirshman’s example for an author of a catena is Procopius of Gaza (died c. 538), who was the first author to compile extensive catena commentaries. While the catena might seem to be the form closest to that of the midrashic anthologies—both types string together earlier traditions of exegesis without offering preferential judgments or comments—Hirshman argues that the midrash is far more inclusive than Procopius’ catenae. In contrast to all the Christian genres, Hirshman argues that Koheleth Rabbah served its students primarily as an “encyclopaedia” and used the scriptural verses (of Ecclesiastes) as a system of rubrics to provide topical headings for various subjects and topics in the Rabbinic curriculum. This use of Scripture as a pedagogical tool was analogous, Hirshman argues, to the Roman educational practice of teaching specialized subjects, like mathematics and music, “incidentally in the literature lesson as the subject arose in the course of the ennaratio.”47 Koheleth Rabbah, it should be added, is a relatively late compilation, probably edited in the sixth or seventh century c.e. By this time, the Rabbis were very likely in control of the educational system in Palestine and in need of “textbooks,” a fact that makes Hirshman’s proposal plausible. Hirshman’s encyclopedia is another type of “functional” genre that might have served, with the preacher’s source book, as a type of “practical” anthology.48 Even so, Hirshman’s recourse to an educational context as the Sitz im Leben for the midrashic collection recalls one of the oldest and most frequently discussed questions in the history of midrash scholarship: the question as to whether certain works or types of material derive from the academy or from the synagogue, the Beit Midrash or the Beit Knesset.49 According to the former view, midrash was primarily a product of the elite, of the Rabbis and their disciples; this theory is easily argued in the case of midrash halakhah but, according to adherents of this view, it is equally true of the aggadic material. In contrast, the view seeing the synagogue as the Sitz im Leben of midrash tends to emphasize its more populist, volkish, and folkloristic aspects, its appeal to a wide popular audience and its rootedness in oral, popular traditions. While this view is obviously more applicable to the aggadic material, it also argues for a more popular setting for some midrash halakhah as well. Recent scholarship on early Rabbinic history, however, has radically altered the terms within which this traditional conceptualization must be framed. Two separate though related developments in our knowledge of Jewish antiquity are relevant here; both are closely connected to what one recent historian has called the new and revisionist “minimalist” approach to Rabbinic history in contrast to the traditional “maximalist” approach with which previous generations of Jewish historians had depicted the development of Rabbinic Judaism.50 The difference between these two approaches might be summed up briefly as follows. According to the “maximalist” approach, the Rabbinic period is essentially a continuation of the Second Temple period, with the Rabbis inheriting the mantle of the Pharisees, seeking to maintain—despite the changes in national,
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social, and economic life—the coherence of the nation and its unity in the hope of serving as the center for Jews throughout the world. In this view, the Rabbis were the religious leaders of the nation, and their laws and prescriptions essentially governed the behavior of Jews. The Rabbis’ preeminent religious and cultural position is reflected in their literature, and that literature can be read as a description of Jewish life with even the disagreements among the Rabbis pointing to deeper social and political conflicts among contemporary Jews.51 The minimalist view calls into question the very assumptions with which the maximalists begin their work of historiography. Instead, it views the history of Palestinian Jewry within the more general context of Roman imperial provincial rule in the Near East. Basing themselves on a narrower, more “suspicious” reading both of what the Rabbis say about themselves and of the available archaeological and material evidence, the minimalists argue that the Rabbis were a class of selfappointed religious experts who, at least in the first two or three centuries after the destruction of the Temple, exerted little power or influence beyond their own circles. Further, these circles themselves were very small. Indeed, according to the estimate of one scholar (who himself was not in fact a minimalist), the number of Rabbinic sages living in Palestine over the 150-year period between 225 and 375 c.e. numbered no more than 367, with an average of 50 to 70 sages active at any one time.52 Admittedly, there was a significant rise in the power of the Rabbinic class in the early third century, during the patriarchate of Rabbi Judah the Prince, when the Rabbis began to establish a foothold in the urban centers of Palestine. As an identifiable class, however, the Rabbis did not have recognized legal authority until the fourth century. Further, at least in the view of some minimalists, the Rabbis did not really succeed in establishing themselves as significant forces in the religious institutions of Palestine Jewry until the sixth century. In the case of the synagogue, for example, it was not until the third century at the earliest that the Rabbis even began to play a significant role in its activities.53 For our present concerns with midrash and the history of its “literature”— that is, the writing down of its traditions and their preservation in anthologies— this new historiography of Rabbinic Judaism has several important implications. In the first place, it suggests that the question as to whether the academy or the synagogue was the site of origin for the Rabbis’ literary production is in a sense misframed. Instead of asking where midrash originated, we would do better to inquire for what audience and to whom this activity could have been addressed. If the minimalist view is even only partially correct, it would appear that, until the mid-third century, the impact and reach of the Rabbinic sages beyond their own small number of teachers and students were so minimal that it is impossible to conceive that what remains in the literature came from anywhere other than the Rabbis’ own tiny circles; so far as we know, the sages had hardly any involvement in synagogues. Indeed, given the fact that education in the circles of the early Rabbis was essentially a matter of master–disciple relationships, even the designation of the term “academy” for their higher educational stratum seems too grandiose.54 If all this is correct, the origins of the material in the tannaitic collections almost certainly lay in these tiny circles and probably not in any more popular
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sphere. On the other hand, there can be little question that the formation of these earliest collections as documents was part of the larger spurt of literary production that began with and followed upon R. Judah’s patriarchate, including the “publication” of the Mishnah and, later, of the Tosefta. In whatever way the Mishnah was “published”—whether it was in a memorized oral mode or in a written form— this early codification of Rabbinic law was certainly connected in some way to the increased prestige and role of the patriarchal office and of the Rabbinic class as active participants in Jewish legal discourse in Palestine. One can safely assume that the compilation of the tannaitic midrash anthologies must also have derived from this larger literary and social matrix.55 Along parallel but different lines, the composition and publication of the amoraic “homiletical” anthologies should be viewed within the context of the increased involvement of the Rabbis in synagogue life in Palestine. From the third century on—that is, from the beginning of the amoraic period—many sources attest to the growing presence of sages in the synagogue. This fact is significant because, as I have already remarked, the synagogue, unlike the academy, was not initially under the Rabbis’ control or within their sphere of authority.56 In the third century, however, this state of affairs began to change. Certain Rabbis, like R. Yohanan in Sepphoris and R. Abbahu in Caesarea, became famous as preachers; in Jerome’s oft quoted statement, even gentiles would say to each other, “Come, let us listen to this or that Rabbi who expounds the divine law with such marvelous eloquence.”57 We know too that there were itinerant preachers who traveled from town to town and who were required to come up with sermons on the spot.58 The synagogue was also used by the Rabbis as a site for the education of the young, and it is possible that some of the material in the present collections (especially the non-petihta sections of the amoraic midrashim) could have served as source material for Rabbi-teachers.59 It is immaterial whether the petihtaot that have been preserved in the surviving midrashic collections were once actually delivered in a synagogue, or whether they were the independent literary creations of an editor; the practical difference between the alternatives is historically trivial (since the first possibility would be meaningful only if we could identify the date and place in which the sermon was originally preached). Heinemann’s Sitz im Leben for the petihta as a mini-sermon delivered before the Torah reading in the synagogue still seems the best explanation for the literary-rhetorical form’s unusual shape, and it is this essentially material question (namely, the origin of its shape) that is our basic concern. Is it merely coincidental that the “sudden” rise of the petihta as the dominant literaryrhetorical form in the amoraic collections correlates to the increased role amoraim appear to have taken in Palestinian synagogues in the late third and fourth centuries? Taken together, however circumstantially, these separate facts would seem to indicate that the amoraic anthologies were indeed closely tied to the activity of synagogue preaching. This is true not only of the clear-cut “homiletical” midrashim like VR and PRK, but also of the “exegetical” midrash Bereishit Rabbah (whose organization and chapter divisions, as Joseph Heinemann has shown, originally corresponded to the weekly Torah readings in the triennial Palestinian cycle, and whose “chapters” were marked, as in VR and PRK, with multiple petihtaot,
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thereby making Bereishit Rabbah much more similar to VR and PRK than has previously been supposed).60 While our evidence suggests that preaching and teaching were done orally, without the aid of written texts, it is not hard to imagine the need that individual sages would have felt for preachers’ and teachers’ source books, for collections from which they could draw raw material for sermons and lessons. Such source books probably began as private notebooks kept by individual Rabbis and must have slowly grown into the collections that we possess today. Because these books were never more than private notebooks, the strictures against writing down “Oral Torah” were not applied to them. In any case, we know that actual books existed in use in Rabbinic culture—Sifra, for example.61 A famous passage in B. Temura 14b describes the third-century sages R. Yohanan and R. Shimeon ben Lakish studying a sifra deaggadeta, a book of aggadah with scriptural interpretations in it, on a Sabbath afternoon, and there are several other references to such books (though they are not always complimentary in tone).62 To the best of my knowledge, there is unfortunately no explicit reference to preachers’ or teachers’ source books in Rabbinic literature, but we do know of the existence of such books in the Middle Ages in the form of sermon collections and florilegia.63 In fact, however, the Rabbis did not need to confess to the existence of such books, for they were in essence the private tools of their trade. No one other than preachers read these books, no one read them in place of sermons, and what most people heard and doubtless related to each other were reports of spoken sermons delivered in synagogues. So why mention the source books that were no more than private notebooks in any case? That the midrashic collections were originally source books for professionals, anthologies to be used by preachers and teachers, and not texts to be read or studied, probably best explains their origins as documents and their spare, laconic, almost stenographic literary form. The highly stereotyped, symmetrical, and organized discourse of so many midrashic literary-rhetorical forms—the petihta, the mashal, the regularized enumeration—all suggest an “outline form” rather than an actually delivered sermon, while the telegraphed nature of so many midrashic passages suggests that these were also not literary compositions meant as “finished” texts. The most accurate description for the larger works containing such passages is that of a trade manual compiled for professionals in the field. To repeat: these books were not composed to be read in any ordinary sense of the term. At some point, however—precisely when, we do not know—people did begin to read and study these books. Our earliest evidence for this change in how these books were perceived and appreciated (and eventually used) comes not in the form of documentary evidence to the change but in the rewriting of their contents to make them look less anthological and fragmented and more coherent and continuous as exegetical narratives in their own right. This change first appears in the “late” midrashim of the Tanhuma school, which, as scholars have shown, consciously revise, and thereby “rewrite,” earlier midrashic traditions, smoothing out their rough edges, eliminating the most frequent gaps and inconsistencies in their atomistic interpretations, and seeking to find a more continuous interpretive approach that can span the separate exegeses of an entire section or episode. Whether or not the editors/composers of the Tanhuma collections actually read
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Bereishit Rabbah (for example) in more or less its present form, they seem to have been familiar with the text in one stage of its formation, and they “read” that text rather than merely “used” it as a source book for sermons.64 At some later point, students probably began to read the various midrashic collections as true commentaries, that is, as supplementary texts to be read alongside the primary text, Scriptures. Eventually the midrashic tradition was preserved for popular Jewish culture by becoming subsumed in a genuine commentary, the first complete Jewish commentary on the Bible, that of Rashi. By this point, however, the anthology had yielded its role as the primary literary medium for the preservation and recording of biblical exegesis to the commentary proper, and late antiquity in turn had yielded to the Middle Ages.
Appendix: On the Composition of the Petihta As was noted earlier,65 the late Joseph Heinemann proposed a form-critical explanation for the petihta, or midrashic proem, and its unusual shape.66 In the body of this chapter I summarized Heinemann’s proposal and his putative Sitz im Leben for the form’s original setting, both of which seem to me convincing. Heinemann’s proposal, however, concentrated solely upon the literary-rhetorical form’s “shell,” its beginning and end. In an as yet uncompleted study in which I have been engaged now for several years, I have been studying the inner contents of the petihta, the “exegetical bridge” by means of which the preacher connects the opening petihta verse to the concluding lectionary verse. The primary focus of the study is the types of harizah used in this exegetical bridge, harizah being the technical term for the rules of exegesis according to which the preacher connects the opening and closing verses.67 The study is based on analyses of approximately 400 petihtaot preserved in the classical amoraic collections of Bereishit Rabbah, Vayikra Rabbah, and Pesikta de-Rav Kahana. Two assumptions underlie the study: first, it is possible to categorize all petihtaot according to inner structure and their types of harizah; and second, these structures and types of harizah constituted compositional conventions that were familiar to all preachers. The following are the various types of petihtaot as based on their structures and methods of harizah. All petihtaot can be categorized as either simple or complex. The Complex Petihta: The complex petihta uses an identifiable midrashic literaryrhetorical form other than harizah as the primary bridge between the opening and closing verses. That other literary form might be a parable (mashal), an anecdote or exemplum (maaseh), an exegetical enumeration, or some other prominent literary form in midrash. For example, in the following petihta on Genesis 1:6 (Bereishit Rabbah 4:1), the anonymous author uses a simple “custom of the world” parable. It is written, “He sets the rafters of his lofts in the waters” (Ps. 104:3). It is the custom of the world that a king-of-flesh-and-blood builds a palace and makes the roof out of stones and wood and dirt. But the Holy One, blessed be He, made the roof for His world out of water! as it is said, “He sets the rafters (hamekareh) of his loft in the waters”—“And God said, Let there be an expanse (raki’a) in the midst of the water” (Gen. 1:6). The word raki’a in Genesis 1:6 is interpreted as “roof” through a pun on the word hamekareh in Psalms 104:3, but the connection between the two verses is made via the parable.
130 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism The Simple Petihta: The simple petihta makes its connection solely through exegesis, that is, harizah. There are three different modes of harizah and hence three different types of simple petihtaot. Type I: In this type, the opening petihta verse is “atomized,” or parsed into its smaller phrases and segments, and each unit is then interpreted separately according to a single thematic or interpretive logic. VR 20:1, translated earlier in the article, is a typical example of this type; Ecclesiates 9:2 is atomized into its separate phrases, and then each phrase is interpreted as referring to a different pair of wicked and righteous biblical figures. The following petihta from Bereishit Rabbah 3:3, on Genesis 1:4, is a much briefer example of the type: R. Shimeon ben Yohai recited a petihta (patah): “Joy to a man is a ready response, and a timely word is how good!” (Prov. 15: 23). “Joy to a man”—this is the Holy One, blessed be He: “The Lord is a man of war” (Exod. 15:3). “is a ready response”—“And God said, Let there be light” (Gen. 1:3). “and a timely word is how good”—“And God saw that the light was good” (Gen. 1:4). This petihta is virtually pure exegesis, indeed almost stenographic in its brevity. The only nonscriptural insertion is the identification of the word “man” in Proverbs 15:23 as referring to God, a deliberately shocking exegesis which is then confirmed through the citation of Exodus 15:3. Type II: In this type, the exegetical bridge is made not by dividing the opening petittha verse up into smaller units but by interpreting the entire verse (or section of the verse) three or more times. Bereishit Rabbah 8:1, translated earlier, is a typical example of this type. The opening verse, and especially the opening phrase of that verse, “Before and behind You created me; You lay upon me Your palm” (Psalms 139:5), is interpreted some eight times. In many cases, this type of petihta also uses the petirah form, identifying the verse as “speaking about” or “being applied to” a series of different Biblical figures. For a typical example, see VR 1:4, where Psalms 89:2 is “applied to” Abraham, David, and Moses. Type III: As in Type II, the entire verse is interpreted but in this type, there are always only two interpretations, and the second interpretation always contrasts deliberately with the first interpretation. The following example, from Bereishit Rabbah 60:1, is a petihta for Genesis. 24:12. It is written: “Who among you reveres the Lord, heeds the voice of his servant; is the one who walks in darkness, and has no light; let him trust in the name of the Lord and rely upon his God” (Isa. 50:10). “Who among you reveres the Lord”—this is Abraham. “heeds the voice of his servant”—[heeds the word of the Holy One, Blessed be He, to His servant]. “is the one who walks in darkness”—from Mesopotamia and its environs. “and has no light”—And who did light up [the path] for him? The Holy One, blessed be He, lit up for him every place where he went. “let him trust in the name of the Lord and rely upon his God”—“And You found his heart true to You” (Neh. 9:8). “Who among you reveres the Lord”—this is Eliezer. “heeds the voice of his servant”—who was the servant of Abraham. “is the one who walks in darkness”—at the time that he went to bring back Rebecca.
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash 131 “and has no light”—And who did light up [the path] for him? The Holy One, blessed be He, lit it up for him with shooting stars and lightning. “let him trust in the name of the Lord and rely upon his God”—“And he said, ‘O Lord, God of my master Abraham, etc.” (Gen. 24:12). The petihta interprets the entire verse twice, once in relation to Abraham, the other in relation to Abraham’s servant, Eliezer. Inasmuch as one is the master and the other his servant, the two biblical figures may be said to be opposites, and in a comparable sense the two interpretations are also opposites, or two sides of a single coin. In its biblical context, the subject of the petihta, its lectionary verse, is spoken by Eliezer, who recites the verse as a prayer to God in which he invokes God as the God of his master Abraham. The petihta’s audience would probably have assumed once they heard the preacher quote Isaiah 50:10 that he would apply the verse to Eliezer. Contrary to their expectations, though, he first applies it to Abraham, who, we learn almost immediately, is God’s servant. Rhetorically, the effect of this counterinterpretation, as it were, is to make the second, more predictable interpretation (in reference to Eliezer) less predictable. For now we know that if Abraham is Eliezer’s master, then God is Abraham’s master. When Abraham’s servant, Eliezer, then addresses God as the God of his master Abraham, he is only placing himself in a natural hierarchy, appealing to the master of his master. We now see both Eliezer and Abraham in a new light, and we understand why Eliezer makes a point of invoking his master’s name so as to remind God that not only is Abraham his—Eliezer’s—master; he is also God’s servant. As the reader will note, the two halves of this petihta are also strikingly symmetrical, with the same phrases and constructions repeated in symmetrical positions in the two halves of the petihta. This is the same phenomenon we saw in VR 20:1 and Bereishit Rabbah 8: 1, and it should now be clear that the different modes of harizah are not only different techniques of exegesis but also different frameworks in which a preacher was able to organize a petihta and its micro-exegeses in symmetrical patterns. In this sense, one may understand how these conventions and the rule of symmetry actually facilitated the composition of petihtaot. For once a preacher knew the rules of composition, and once he had chosen his opening petihta verse and the mode of harizah that he would use (which clearly was dictated in part by the verse he had chosen for his petihta verse, since some verses are more naturally appropriate to one mode than to others), the task before him—to construct an exegetical bridge to the lectionary verse—was clear. There are several additional compositional rules that underlie the use of these different types of conventions. First, different techniques of harizah are often employed in subordinate sections in the same petihta. For example, a Type II petihta, which interprets its petihta verse multiple times, will often use the atomization technique of Type I (parsing the verse up into its component phrases and then interpreting each one separately but according to a single consecutive logic) as a subordinated mode of exegesis in each of its individual sections. So, too, Type I petihtaot sometimes use either Type II or Type III techniques of multiple applications of a single phrase or word in each of their individual segments. Second, one of the individual exegeses in the petihta will often beget a “loop” or digressive interpretation. These loops often reenact in miniature the overall exegetical structure of the larger petihta. Generally, these “loops” also come near the beginning of the petihta, although in at least one document (PRK) they regularly come closer to its end. Third, deviations from symmetry commonly come at the end of the petihta and are used for purposes of closure. In addition to being a compositional and organizational tool, then, symmetry may also be an esthetic criterion of this highly architectonic form.68 Obviously, there are varying degrees of symmetry, and some petihtaot are more symmetrical than others. It is a rare petihta, however, that exhibits no clear signs of symmetry, just as there is almost no petihta
132 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism that is not constructed along the model of one of the types I have described. Which is to say: If there is a1, there will be a2. In its use of symmetry and in its adherence to the compositional types, the petihta thus receives its shape and its stability as an anthological form.
Notes I wish to thank Rachel Anisfeld, Jacob Elbaum, Marc Hirshman, Tammy Jacobowitz, Tamar Kadari, and Burt Visotzky for reading and commenting upon earlier versions of this essay. 1. Sanhedrin 34a; cf. Shabbat 88b, and my chapter on “Midrash and Hermeneutics” in Midrash and Theory (Evanston, 1996), esp. pp. 17ff. 2. This distinction was already made by L. Zunz in Die Gottesdientlichen Vortrage der Juden Historisch Entwickelt (2nd ed. 1892), translated to Hebrew as Haderashot Biyisrael (Jerusalem, 1974), p. 79; and restated by Chanoch Albeck in his introduction to J. TheodorCh. Albeck, Bereschit Rabba (Berlin, 1912–36; repr. with corrections, Jerusalem, 1965), vol. 3, part I, p. 1; and M. Margulies, Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah (Jerusalem, 1953–54), part V, pp. ix–x. The exegetical midrashim are usually considered to include all the tannaitic (aka halakhic) midrashim and the amoraic collections Bereishit (Genesis) Rabbah and Eikhah (Lamentations) Rabbah. The classical homiletical midrashim are Vayikra (Leviticus) Rabbah and Pesikta de-Rav Kahana. The postclassical Tanhuma collections (Tanhuma itself, Shemot Rabbah II, Bamidbar (Numbers) Rabbah, and Devarim (Deuteronomy) Rabbah) combine features of both earlier types. 3. Neusner has worked out his “documentary hypothesis” in a slew of works, as is his habit; for a clear and summary statement of his position, see Comparative Midrash:The Plan and Program of Genesis and Leviticus Rabbah, Brown Judaic Series (Atlanta, 1986), 1–19. The references in the last sentence to “producers,” “authors,” and “editors” is mine; Neusner tends to avoid the problem of naming the human agents responsible for the production of the document by personifying the works themselves (as though they were self-created). 4. Neusner, Comparative Midrash, 15. 5. See the essays in Shaye J. S. Cohen, ed., The Synoptic Problem in Rabbinic Literature (Providence, 2000), esp. R. Goldenberg, “Is ‘The Talmud’ a Document?” pp. 3–10, and Hans Jurgen Becker, “Texts and History: The Dynamic Relationship between Talmud Yerushalmi and Genesis Rabbah,” pp. 145–58. 6. See Goldenberg, “Is ‘The Talmud,’ ” 7–8, who speaks directly about the “anterior” documents that lie “behind,” such as Mishnah or the Bavli, and can no longer be recovered as independent documents; his argument certainly includes the component literary forms in such texts. 7. On Bereishit Rabbah, see Philip Alexander, “Pre-Emptive Exegesis: Genesis Rabba’s Reading of the Story of Creation,” in JJS 43 (1992):230–45, and on the Song of Songs, my forthcoming article, “Ancient Jewish Exegesis of the Song of Songs and the Problem of Comparative Exegesis,” in Jewish Biblical Interpretation in a Comparative Context, ed. Natalie Dohrmann and David Stern (University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming). 8. J. Z. Lauterbach, “The Arrangement and the Division of the Mekilta,” HUCA 1 (1924):433. Compare Judah Goldin’s comments in The Song at the Sea (New Haven, Conn., 1971), pp. 3–12, but note, too, the presence of the songlike passages in which the midrash
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash 133 re-enacts Israel’s song to God with its own song, and the clear allusion at the Shirta’s very conclusion to its beginning (see Goldin’s notes ad loc., p. 248). 9. Shir Hashirim Rabbah, ed. S. Dunsky (Jerusalem, 1980), p. 146 10. See Shlomo Naeh, “The Structure and Division of Torah Kohanim (B): Parashot, Perakim, Halakhot,” Tarbiz 69 (1999):72–76; and “The Structure and Division of Torah Kohanim (A):Megillot” Tarbiz 66 (1996):485–86. Naeh argues that there were two methods of organizing halakhic midrashic texts in the ancient world: one, according to the order of Scripture and its divisions (essentially sequentially, and into parashiyot); the other, hierarchically, corresponding to the way the texts were studied. The Sifra was originally organized according to the first system; early on, however, the second system was superimposed upon the first, thus creating a double organization of parashiyot and of perakim. As Naeh has shown in the first part of his study, Sifra was first written down (probably in the Babylonian Rabbinic period) in nine scrolls whose contents were determined neither by the parashiyot or perakim but by simple considerations of length. 11. I have deliberately omitted from my discussion the question as to whether there existed different schools of exegesis among the early tannaim (namely, the School of Rabbi Akiva and that of R. Ishmael), and whether these schools were responsible for the editing and redaction of different collections; on the history of scholarship on these schools, see Jay M. Harris, How Do We Know This?: Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism (Albany, N.Y., 1995), and H. L. Strack and G. Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (Minneapolis, 1996), pp. 247–51. Significantly, whatever terminological differences may exist between collections from the supposed different “schools,” none of the parallel collections have any significant organizational or structural differences. All are exegetical and both tend to follow the same passages. 12. For this definition of the simana denehemta, see Margulies, Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah (Jerusalem, 1953–54), part V, p. xii. The nature of the peroration is often misunderstood, partly because of its title, as necessarily requiring an explicit reference to the final redemption. This is not the case. 13. Most of the features of the homiletical collection were already identified by J. Theodor, “Zur Composition der agadischen Homilien,” MGWJ 28 (1879):271–78, 337–50, 408–18, 455–62; MGWJ 29 (1880):10–23; they are reiterated and expanded by Albeck, “Midrash Vayyiqra Rabba,” (Hebrew) Louis Ginzberg Festschrift (New York, 1945), pp. 25–43. After completing this article, I was fortunate to receive an extremely important new book by Burton L. Visotzy, Golden Bells and Pomegranates (Tuebingen, 2003), the first booklength study to be written about Vayikra Rabbah and a very significant advance in our understanding of both VR and the homiletical midrash. Visotzky develops some of the same ideas that I pursue in this article, albeit in different directions. Wherever possible at this late stage in writing, I will refer to Visotzky’s suggestions; at the outset I should also say that some of my contentions may require re-thinking in light of Visotzky’s arguments. 14. Joseph Heinemann, “The Art of Composition in Leviticus Rabba” (Hebrew), Hasifrut 8 (1969–71):809–34; “Profile of a Midrash: The Art of Composition in Leviticus Rabba,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39 (1971):141–50. The latter is essentially an abbreviated version of the earlier Hebrew article. 15. Heinemann, “Profile of a Midrash,” 146; 150. 16. See, for example, the end of the “Art of Composition” (in Hasifrut) where Heinemann goes through the chapters in VR and assesses the relative unity of each. On organic unity in the midrashic collections see also N. J. Cohen, “Scripture and Editing in the Homiletic Midrashim,” AJS Review 6 (1981):1–20. The most trenchant criticism of Heinemann is in Jacob Neusner’s “Bibliographical Essay, Joseph Heinemann on Leviticus Rabbah,” in Neusner, Judaism and Scripture: The Evidence of Leviticus Rabbah (Chicago, 1986):
134 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism 130–36. Ironically, though not really surprisingly, given his documentary approach, Neusner himself adopts a view of VR’s unity that in certain respects argues for an even stronger coherence—a “logos of both intellect and aesthetics,” “a sustained syllogism” (7)—than did Heinemann. According to Neusner, VR is the first Rabbinic document to be “organized solely around large-scale theological themes” (10). 17. On this homily, see my chapter in Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and Contemporary Literary Studies (Evanston, Ill., 1996), pp. 55–71; the chapter is a revised version of an article that first appeared as “Midrash and the Language of Exegesis,” in Midrash and Literature, ed. by G. Hartman and S. Budick (New Haven, Conn., 1986), pp. 105–24. The reader should note that over the years my views have changed considerably about the “unity” of the chapters in the homiletical midrashim. In the article as it first appeared in Midrash and Literature, I still accepted Heinemann’s basic contention that there was some kind of unity even if not “organic” to the chapters. In the revised version of the article in Midrah and Theory, I tried to back off from that contention. In the present essay, I dispute the claim entirely although I do argue for a common exegetical approach that informs many if not all the exegeses in the chapter. 18. See my article, “Vayikra Rabbah and My Life in Midrash,” Prooftexts 21 (2001):23–38. 19. See the articles cited in nn. 16 and 17. 20. On this contradiction in particular, see my article cited in n. 17. 21. One could cite virtually any other chapter in either VR or PRK as a similar example of this anthological impulse. Just to give one additional example: VR 20 (⫽ PRK 26) deals with the Torah reading beginning with Leviticus 16:1, a verse that introduces the account of the famous scapegoat ritual. This chapter also appears in Pesikta deRav Kahana as the “sermon” for Yom Kippur, which is hardly surprising since the scapegoat ritual was performed in the Temple on Yom Kippur and because Leviticus 16:1ff. was the Torah reading for Yom Kippur. (According to J. Heinemann, “Chapters in Vayikra Rabbah Whose Originality Is Disputed,” Tarbiz 37 [1968]:339–54, the chapter originated in PRK and was later copied over to VR.) In any case, the chapter makes no allusion to the scapegoat ritual but concentrates entirely on the opening verse of the reading, “The Lord spoke to Moses after the death of the two sons of Aaron who drew close to the presence of the Lord . . . ,” and specifically on the phrase “after the death of the two sons of Aaron.” This phrase alludes, of course, to the terrifying story told several chapters earlier in Leviticus 10:1–3 about how, at the conclusion of the joyous eight-day ceremony dedicating the sanctuary, Aaron’s two sons Nadav and Avihu offered up a “strange fire” on the altar and were immediately consumed by a divine fire. In what is one of the most astounding compositions in Rabbinic literature, the chapter collects what is in effect an anthology of differing interpretations and traditions about the deaths of Nadav and Avihu including various views as to the sins they commited that “justified” their deaths as punishment; a highly cynical view that uses their deaths as “proof” of the claim that the the righteous and the wicked suffer the same fate; and traditions that argue that their deaths took place solely to ensure the atonement of others (implicitly equating them and their deaths to the fate of martyrs). Needless to say, the chapter as a whole makes no effort to reconcile these different, often contradictory views. What “unifies” them is the fact that they all serve the common function of seeing Nadav and Avihu as implicit surrogates for the “scapegoat” whose ritual could no longer be performed in the Temple; their deaths, in other words, become the focal point of the anxiety over life and death that pervades the Yom Kippur liturgy. On this chapter, and on Rabbinic traditions about Nadav and Avihu, see Avigdor Shinan, “The Sins of Nadav and Avihu in Rabbinic Aggadah,” (Hebrew) Tarbiz 48 (1979): 201–14.
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash 135 22. J. Heinemann, “Structure and Organization [Division] in Midrash Bereishit Rabbah,” Bar-Ilan 9 (1972):279–89. 23. W. Sibley Towner, Rabbinic “Enumeration of Scriptural Examples” (Leiden, 1973). 24. Joseph Heinemann, “The Proem in Aggadic Midrashim: A Form-Critical Study,” Scripta Hierosolymitana 22 (1971):100–122. 25. Heinemann assumed that the parashiyot in VR and PRK correlated with the Torah readings as the Torah was read in one or the other triennial cycles as practiced in Palestinian synagogues, although he also argued that the division was not uniform and had many variants. This latter view has been called into question by some more recent studies; see, for example, Shlomo Naeh, “Orders of Reading the Torah in Eretz Yisrael: A New Inquiry” (Hebrew) Tarbiz 67 (1998):167–87. 26. See Richard S. Sarason, “The Petihtaot in Leviticus Rabbah: ‘Oral Homilies’ or Redactional Constructions,” Journal of Jewish Studies 33 (1982):557–67. 27. See Margulies’s note ad loc., p. 443; the text is probably slightly defective. In Koheleth R., R. Yitzhak adds: The word tov means “Torah.” 28. Margulies (ad loc.), p. 444, explains that Samson, by making the Philistines swear, proved that he himself feared the power of oaths. 29. On this, see Margulies’s notes ad loc.; and Avigdor Shinan, “Letorat Hapetihta,” Mehkerei Yerushalayim Besifrut Ivrit 1 (1981):133–43. 30. The word tsaretani literally means “hedged” or “fenced me in.” The midrash here is based upon a “misreading” of the word through the “minor” addition of the tiny letter yod to its beginning so as to make it read yetsaretani, “you created me.” 31. The Rabbis take kedem as “east” and ahor as its opposite. 32. In other words, man’s spirit was created at the beginning of the sixth day, and his body at the end of that day. 33. Here, again, they take the word ruah as referring to the messiah’s soul to prove that the same word in Genesis 1:2 referred not to God’s own spirit but to the spirit of the messiah, namely, his soul which had already been created. 34. A serious study of Rabbinic androgony and cosmogony is an urgent desideratum; for the present, see E. E. Urbach’s chapter on creation in HaZaL; Gary A. Anderson, The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination (Louisville, 2001); and G.M.G. Teugels, “The Creation of the Human in Rabbinic Interpretation,” in G. P. Luttikhuizen, ed., The Creation of Man and Woman (Leiden, 2000), pp. 107–27. Louis Ginzberg’s footnotes to his retelling of the Creation story in Legends of the Jews (Philadelphia, 1925), vol. 5:88–89, remain to this day a valuable bibliography of cross-references to both Rabbinic views and their parallels in other ancient traditions, both ancient Near Eastern and classical. The best-known part of the petihta, and the sole part that is usually cited, is no. 3, in particular the exchange between Samuel b. Nahman and his anonymous interlocutors over the question as to whether the word tsela means “rib” or “side,” and its bearing upon the difference (or agreement) between the two Creation stories in Genesis 1 and 2. For a recent attempt to see the exchange as support of the claim that the Rabbis did not necessarily privilege the “rib story” and its implied misogyny, see Daniel Boyarin, Carnal Israel (Berkeley, Cal., 1993), pp. 42–46. In fact, if the passage is viewed within the context of other ancient cosmogonic theories, the passage may hold a somewhat different, and more surprising meaning. As is often noted, the “androgyne” theory of man’s creation has an intriguing parallel in Aristophanes’ famous speech on the origins of love in Plato’s Symposium (189d, 190d); in addition, Ginzberg cites a number of other parallels in ancient literature (most of which, I must confess, I have not been able to locate). One does not have to assume that the Rabbis knew the Aristophanes’ story (or Plato’s Symposium) firsthand to suppose that they were familiar in one way or another with the “myth,” and indeed,
136 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism may have known it as one regnant “scientific” explanation for how the two genders came into existence. Given this possibility, the debate between R. Samuel b. Nahman and his interlocutors may have to be understood as being over the question, in effect: Which version of the creation of woman is less implausible—the rib story or the androgyne myth? Significantly, Samuel b. Nahman opts not for the biblical rib story (which, it is clear from the exchange, is the dominant interpretation for the word tsela ) but for the latter—probably because it was widely known in the ancient world generally and was therefore a more plausible “scientific” explanation. 35. See, for the present, Philip Alexander, “Pre-Emptive Exegesis: Genesis Rabba’s Reading of the Story of Creation,” in JJS 43 (1992): 230–45; cf. as well Robert Hayward, “Pirqe de Rabbi Eliezer and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan,” JJS 42 (1991). 36. On the exegetical enumeration, see Towner, Rabbinic “Enumeration of Scriptural Examples”; on the mashal, see David Stern, Parables in Midrash: Exegesis and Narrative in Rabbinic Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 24–45; on the exegetical narrative, Ophra Meir, Hasippur Hadarshani Bivreishit Rabbah (Tel Aviv, 1987). 37. See Shinan, “Letorah Hapetihta” (n. 29 of this essay). 38. See, for example, the interpretation of R. Meir in Bereishit Rabbah 36:1 about God’s behavior during the flood, to which the Rabbis respond, “Enough, Meir!” Or the similar exchange between Meir and the Rabbis in VR 5:1. Or the exchange between R. Yosi ben Dormaskit and R. Judah in Sifre Deuteronomy, ed. L. Finkelstein (New York, 1969), p. 7. Or the famous exchange in B. Sanhedrin 67b between Akiva and Eliezer ben Azariah on the giant frog in Exodus 8:2. 39. See the references in n. 7. 40. B. Sanhedrin 34a; cf. B. Shabbat 88b. For the midrash behind this interpretation, see my rejoinder, “Literary Criticism or Literary Homilies? Susan Handelman and the Contemporary Study of Midrash,” Prooftexts 5 (1985):102–3, n. 1. 41. B. Eruvin 13b. 42. Bamidbar Rabbah 13:15; cf. Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer o Midrah Shloshim u-Shtayim Middot, ed. H. G. Enelow, p. 45. On the phrase, see Jacob Elbaum, Lehavin Divrei Hakhamim (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 93, n. 78, and the bibliography Elbaum cites there. 43. On the question of midrashic polysemy and its relation to modern critical notions of indeterminacy as well as to ancient historical contexts, see my article “Midrash and Indeterminacy,” Critical Inquiry 15 (1988):132–62; reprinted and somewhat revised in David Stern, Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and Contemporary Literary Studies (Evanston, Ill., 1996), pp. 15–39. See also Catherine Hezser, “Social Fragmentation, Plurality of Opinion, and Nonobservance of Halakhah: Rabbis and Community in Late Roman Palestine,” in Jewish Studies Quarterly 1 (1993–94): 234–51, who makes much the same point I do, though using very different evidence; I cannot help but note, however, that her references to my article and her summary thereof on p. 249, n. 65, grotesquely misrepresent what I say in the article. More recently, Daniel Boyarin in an article to be published in a volume on the Yerushalmi and Greco-Roman culture, to be edited by Peter Schaefer, and in Boyarin’s own forthcoming book, argues persuasively that the various ideological statements in the passages I cite in the text (and that are typically cited as proof of the Rabbinic ideology of polysemy) are all late Babylonian texts and reflect an ideology that first emerges in the Bavli as part of a Rabbinic ideology of orthodoxy and heresy. I wish to thank Boyarin for allowing me to read his manuscript. 44. Midrash and Theory, 33; for Ancient Near Eastern and other biblical parallels, see Empirical Models for Biblical Criticism, ed. Jeffrey H. Tigay (Philadelphia, 1985), and especially Tigay’s article on Deuteronomy and Anthology in the Bible in this volume. 45. For Origen’s use of stenographers, see Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History VI, xxxvi,
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash 137 trans. J.E.L. Oulton (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), vol. 2, pp. 89–91. On Origen and the redaction of other early Christian sermons, see the helpful introduction by Mary B. Cunningham and Pauline Allen to their edited book, Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics (Leiden, 1998), pp. 1–20, and 11–12 in particular. See also Hughes Oliphant Old, The Reading and Preaching of the Scriptures in the Worship of the Christian Church, vol. 1: The Biblical Period (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1998), pp. 312–13. 46. Marc Hirshman, “The Greek Fathers and the Aggada on Ecclesiastes: Formats of Exegesis in Late Antiquity,” HUCA 59 (1988):137–65; cf. Emilien Lamirande, “Etude bibliographique sur les Peres de l’Eglise et l’Aggadot,” Vigiliae Christianae 21 (1967): 1– 11. 47. The Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford, 1970), p. 371, cited and quoted in Hirshman, “Greek Fathers,” 164. On the use of the Bible as a rubric for education, see the references in my article “On Canonization in Rabbinic Judaism” in M. Finkelberg and G. Stroumsa, Homer, the Bible, and Beyond: Literary and Religious Canons in the Ancient World (Leiden, 2003), pp. 227–52, esp. 237–40. 48. For another example of such a “functional genre,” see Visotzky in Golden Bells and Pomegranates, pp. 23–40, who invokes the Hellenistic genre of the “miscellany” as a possible precedent for VR. The literary models he invokes are those of Aelian’s Historical Miscellany as well as the sketch drawn by Lucian in his satire, “How to Write History.” Visotzky also makes the very interesting suggestion that the terms petihta and gufa (for the two parts of the chapters in VR) may be paralleled by Lucian’s terms “proem” and “body” for the two parts of the historical collection/miscellany he describes. 49. See, for example, Zunz, Haderashot Biyisrael, pp. 163–75; Saul Lieberman, Greek in Jewish Palestine (New York, 1965) p. 161; Jonah Fraenkel, Darkhe Aggadah Vemidrash (Jerusalem, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 16–44; Marc Hirshman, “The Preacher and His Public in ThirdCentury Palestine,” JJS 42 (1991):108–14. 50. I borrow these terms specifically from Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society: 200 b.c.e. to 640 c.e. (Princeton, N.J.: 2001); see esp. 2–14 and throughout the book. The other “minimalist” historians who have had an impact on my thinking in regard to the question I discuss are Shaye Cohen, in his many articles and books; Lee I. Levine, The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late Antiquity (Jerusalem, 1985) and articles cited in other footnotes; and Catherine Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine (Tuebingen, 1997). By “maximalist” historians, I refer specifically to the major historians of the last century, including Gedaliah Alon, The Jews in Their Land in the Talmudic Age (Jerusalem, 1980); Michael Avi-Yonah, The Jews of Palestine (New York, 1976), Shmuel Safrai, in his many articles; not to mention still earlier figures like Graetz, Zeitlin, Finkelstein, Halevi, and Weiss. Needless to say, the historical sketch I offer in the next paragraph is radically simplified and truncated. 51. Schwartz, Imperialism, p. 6. 52. Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, Babli and Yerushalmi (Tel Aviv, 1969), pp. 669–81; cited in Levine, The Rabbinic Class, pp. 66–67. In contrast, as Levine notes, other maximalist scholars like Hyman and Safrai estimated the number of sages in Palestine as being between 2,000 and 3,400. 53. Lee I. Levine, The Ancient Synagogue: The First Thousand Years (New Haven, Conn., 2000), pp. 460–61. See also Levine’s essay, “The Sages and the Synagogue in Late Antiquity: The Evidence of the Galilee,” in Lee I. Levine, The Galilee in Late Antiquity (New York, 1992), pp. 201–22. Schwartz’s view is even more radical: he does not see Rabbinic involvement in the synagogue documented as truly significant until the rise of piyyut in the sixth century (pp. 263–74). 54. On Rabbinic master–disciple circles, see Shaye J. D.Cohen, “Patriarchs and Scho-
138 Ancient Israel and Classical Judaism larchs,” PAAJR 48 (1981):57–85; Martin Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth: Writing and Oral Tradition in Palestinian Judaism, 200 b.c.e.–400 c.e. (New York, 2001). 55. The idea of the oral publication of the Mishnah was first broached by Saul Lieberman in Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York, 1950), pp. 83–99. See now, however, Catherine Hezser, Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine (Tuebingen, 2001), pp. 427–28, who strongly contests Lieberman’s theory. 56. Levine, The Ancient Synagogue, pp. 469–70. For a general introduction to Rabbinic preaching in the talmudic period, see Joseph Heinemann’s introduction to his collection, Derashot Betsibur Bitekufat Hatalmud (Jerusalem, 1982), pp. 7–28. 57. Jerome, In Ezek. 33:33, quoted in Levine, The Ancient Synagogue, p. 462; on the Rabbis in the synagogue, see Levine, pp. 458–63. 58. Levine, The Ancient Synagogue, pp. 549–51. For an itinerant preacher, see VR 3: 6 for one example. 59. Levine, The Ancient Synagogue, pp. 462–63. 60. For Bereishit Rabbah, see J. Heinemann, “Structure and Organization [Division] in Midrash Bereishit Rabbah,” Bar-Ilan 9 (1972):279–89. The literature on PRK is relatively sparse but two important, as yet unpublished studies deserve to be mentioned. Elsie Stern is currently completing a monograph based on her University of Chicago dissertation in which she studies the chapters in PRK devoted to the Sabbaths before and after Tisha B’av (the telata depur’anita’ and the shiv’ata denehemta), and Jacob Elbaum, in an article to be published in a festschrift for Jonah Fraenkel, has studied the chapter in PRK devoted to Shabbat Shuvah (the Sabbath before Yom Kippur). In both cases, the chapters, which are devoted primarily to exegeses of haftarot from the Prophets, are clearly not determined by the Torah lectionary; in fact, these chapters in PRK are our earliest evidence for the dedication of these special Sabbaths in the first place. So far as we know, the latter may even be the “products” of the midrash (and its editors) rather than a reflection of an existing liturgical practice. As Elbaum notes, several manuscripts preserve the eleven chapters for the eleven special Sabbaths as a separate collection called Midrash Aftarot. 61. See Shlomo Naeh’s articles on Sifra (cited earlier in n. 10). 62. See as well the story in B. Berakhot 23a–b about R. Yohanan; in B. Sanhedrin 57b, the Babylonian Amora is mentioned as seeing a halakhah in a sifra de’aggadeta. For other references to Palestinian Rabbis, see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, p. 34. 63. The classic text on medieval sermon aids (primarily of the thirteenth century) remains Richard A. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies on the Manipulus florum of Thomas of Ireland (Toronto, 1979), esp. pp. 3–92. See as well Siegfried Wenzel, “Sermon Collections and Their Taxonomy,” in The Whole Book: Cultural Perspectives on the Medieval Miscellany, ed. S. G. Nichols and S. Wenzel (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), pp. 7–22. 64. On these tendencies in Tanhuma and other “late” Rabbinic midrashic texts, see Jacob Elbaum, “From Sermon to Story: The Transformation of the Akedah,” Prooftexts 6 (1986): 97–116; “Between Redaction and Rewriting—On the Nature of the Later Midrashic Literature” (Hebrew), Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Section 3 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 57–62. See as well Elbaum’s article on the Yalkutim in this volume. 65. See n.23. 66. This appendix summarizes a lecture I delivered on “Composition and Meaning in the Petihta” at the Twelfth World Congress of Jewish Studies, held in Jerusalem in August 1997. 67. The term harizah, literally “stringing together,” is borrowed from the famous story in Song of Songs Rabbah 1:52 (ed. Dunsky, p. 42), which describes flames descending from
Anthology and Polysemy in Classical Midrash 139 heaven as Ben Azzai sits and studies (doreish), whereupon Akiva accuses Ben Azzai of studying the esoteric “works of creation” and Ben Azzai denies it, saying he was only sitting and “stringing together” (horeiz) words of Torah. 68. There is a clear parallel here to the esthetics of piyyut; on the topic, see pro temp, Ezra Fleischer, Shirat Hakodesh Ha’ivrit Biyemei Habeinayim (Jerusalem, 1975) pp. 62–63. I hope to explore this parallel in the future.
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ii
THE MIDDLE AGES
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7 joseph tabory
The Prayerbook (Siddur) as an Anthology of Judaism
he prayerbook, or siddur, is certainly one of the most popular books among
TJews. If a member of the people of the book owns only one Jewish book, it is most likely to be a siddur rather than a Bible. The siddur is perhaps the most 1
explicit example of an anthology in Judaism and may arguably be considered not just an anthology of prayers but an anthology of Judaism—for the Jewish prayerbook is a veritable museum of the Jewish people. It contains passages from almost all periods of Jewish history, from the Bible to the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, and mementos from many of the lands in which Jews lived. In addition to its importance as a book of prayer, it may also serve as an anthology of Jewish literature, as it contains representatives from almost all branches of this literature. In addition to the prayers themselves and the extensive poetic selections that serve as prayer, one can find in the prayerbook passages from the Bible, tannaitic and amoraic literature, selections from mystical and devotional literature, philosophical statements such as the creed that begins “I Believe,” together with historical literature such as Megillat antiochus. One might say that if one were required to choose one Jewish book to take to the proverbial desert island, it would be hard to find a better choice than the prayerbook, an anthology of all of Jewish life and literature. However, in this discussion of the siddur we must be aware that there is no standard edition of the siddur nor can there be one. When we refer to the siddur, we refer not to a single book but to a genre of anthologies, whether printed or in manuscript, that contain collections of Jewish prayers and other matter. Some of these books try to be comprehensive, while others are avowedly selective. Thus we find siddurim that include Kol bo or Otsar in their titles, implying that they are meant to be comprehensive collections, and we also find siddurim (or mahfi zorim) that include only select prayers for special occasions: prayerbooks for the Sabbath; prayerbooks for holidays; prayerbooks that include only the weekday evening services; prayerbooks for the table, which include blessings before and after the meal, sometimes together with selections of poetry for singing at the 143
144 The Middle Ages
Sabbath meals; and prayerbooks with other selections.2 To understand the history of this genre and of its contents, it would be well to begin with an understanding of the anthological principles behind these creations. It would seem that most anthologies can be ascribed to one of two motivations: either what one might call a collective principle or what one might call a selective principle. The former is present when one tries to collect scattered material to create a corpus, frequently because the individual items are short and may easily be disregarded and lost. This was apparently the motivation for creating the early anthology of Greek epigrams and, hitting closer to home, the motivation attributed by the Rabbis to those who collected the Twelve Prophets into one book of Latter Prophets. This was apparently the motivation of Judah David Eisenstein, who may well be described as “the master of anthologies.”3 The selective principle is evident when one is faced with a vast corpus of material and it is thought that one cannot master it all. The anthologist believes that it is his task to select from this unwieldy corpus representative material in order to put a manageable composition before the reader. He may often select what he considers its most important items and present his selection as an anthology meant to give the reader a taste for this type of literature and an introduction to the corpus without it being necessary to study or read it all. However, there are other selective principles, such as the desire to prepare a work for a suitable occasion—for example, a prayerbook for the holidays. The corpus from which the anthologist selects his material is not always a unified body. He may have to select his material from a wide range of sources to create his anthology, such as was done by the compilers of the classic midrashic anthologies Yalkut shimoni and the Midrash hagadol.4 Thus the selective anthologist may also be faced with problems of collection. After collecting and selecting their material, both types of anthologists are faced with a common problem: how to arrange the collected material. It is worth noting that Meleager, the earliest Western anthologist, did not use the term “anthology”5 but called his composition Garland, thus expanding the metaphor of collecting flowers into creating a garland by intertwining the flowers into a pleasing whole composition.6 However, the organizing principle of Meleager is not clear: a scholiast thought that his collection was arranged alphabetically by the first line of each poem, but modern scholars think that his collection was grouped by author and subject.7 These ideas must be kept in mind as we examine the anthological aspects of Jewish liturgy. This discussion of the siddur must begin with the geonic period, since the siddur as a book was unknown before that time.8 What is generally considered the first book of prayers, the so-called Order of the Hundred Blessings of R. Natronai Gaon,9 is not even a book of prayers in the strictest sense. This work was composed as a responsum to a community that requested a list of the hundred blessings that one is required to recite every day. This list is, of course, an anthology of blessings following the collective principle, an attempt to create a corpus of the hundred blessings,10 but R. Natronai did not find it necessary to include the full text of all these blessings. The gaon arranged the blessings according to the order of the day, beginning with the morning. This point is of great significance for the understanding of Jewish prayer, as it is well known that the calendrical day of the Jewish
The Prayerbook as Anthology of Judaism 145
calendar begins in the evening. In Rabbinic tradition, only in the Temple worship was the day considered as beginning in the morning, and the organization of R. Natronai’s anthology of blessings shows that he considered the “day” of blessings to be concurrent with the “day” of the Temple. This pattern has been followed by almost all prayerbooks.11 The oldest extant book that contains the full text of the prayers is known to us as the Seder [of] R. Amram Gaon.12 This work was also composed as an anthology of prayers in response to a request from a Jewish community in Spain.13 The ages have not treated this work well. Not only is the original work, as issued by R. Amram Gaon, lost in the shadows of history, even the nature of the original request is not absolutely clear. In R. Amram’s preamble to his response, he reports that they requested “the order of prayers and blessings for the whole year.” But the Passover Haggadah included in the work begins, “and the order of Passover that you asked about,” implying that this was a separate request and R. Amram combined the answers to several requests in one work, much as R. Sherira Gaon did in his work about the history of tradition. The work that is known today as Seder R. Amram Gaon may be described as a collection of anthologies. It consists of what be may considered two separate works: a compendium of the prayers themselves and a compendium of laws and responsa that regulate the way people are supposed to pray. Each of these compendiums may be considered an anthology. I have already pointed out that the texts of prayers may consist of an answer to several questions, and the collection of prayers, probably the first of its kind in Jewish history, intends to present a comprehensive corpus of this literary genre. The compendium of laws and responsa clearly betrays its anthological nature by the inclusion of what seem to be complete responsa of various gaonim, in addition to those of R. Amram. Some of the material included in this work is clearly post-R. Amram, and thus we may wonder whether this description would be true of the original work. Nevertheless, the work that has survived under this name may be called a collection of anthologies or perhaps even an anthology of anthologies.14 Although there is great doubt whether the siddur of R. Amram is the actual work that was sent by R. Amram to Spain, there is no real reason to doubt that the general format of the work, including both prayers and the laws of prayer, was the format of the original work. This format appears also in the siddur of Rav Saadia Gaon, in works such as Mahfi zor vitry (although this work does not contain a complete version of the prayers), and it has served as a general model for later versions and editions of the prayerbook. The inclusion of a halakhic work on the siddur, interspersed with the prayers as part of the siddur, has become such a common feature of the siddur that almost no siddur is published today without the inclusion of minimal instructions about the performance of the prayers. The halakhic instructions, even when compiled specifically to be included in the prayers and among them, have been considered separate works with their own power for promoting the distribution of the siddur.15 One of the earliest compositions of this type was compiled in Italy in the twelfth century and was considered such an important work that it was “deanthologized,” that is, it was extracted from the siddur and distributed as a separate work, known as the Tanya.16 Among the anthologies of halakhic instructions included in the siddur, I
146 The Middle Ages
should mention the Maagelei tsedeq of Benjamin ben Meir Halevi, first published in Salonika in 1548–49 and frequently afterward.17 This work is a potpourri of instructions, comments on and explanations of the text, and edifying material meant to impress the reader with the importance of praying properly. Its successor, Hadrat qodesh, compiled by Isaac ben Yaakov Yozbel Halevi, was first published in Venice in 1599–1600. Its anthological nature is a source of pride for the compiler. He writes in his introduction that the first part of his commentary, until the blessing beginning Barukh sheamar, is based on the Maagelei tsedeq; the continuation of the commentary for the weekday prayers is taken from the commentary of R. Hirtz Trevitsh, printed in Tu¨bingen in 1560; the commentary on the Yozrot was that of Moses ben Yosef Bezalel Katz; and Halevi included material from many other commentators. He also added an anthology of laws, customs, and ethics, part of which was printed in the beginning of the book and part as an appendix. The sources for this were Rabeinu Yonah, Maharil, R. Joseph Karo, R. Moshe Isserlis, R. Isaac of Tyrnau, R. Abraham Klausner, and his own teacher, R. Avigdor Zwiedel. One of the more popular works created for the siddur was the Derekh hahfi ayyim of Rabbi Jacob Lorbeerbaum (c. 1760–1832), first published with the siddur in 1828. This work was considered so important that, thirty or forty years later, it was also de-anthologized and published as a separate work.18 Modern siddurim are often accompanied by other anthologies of halakhic works, such as that of the Mishnah Berura. The independent nature of these halakhic commentaries to the siddur is also demonstrated by their migration from edition to edition. Publishers of prayerbooks wished to include the traditional commentaries even though the particular commentary was written for a different text from the one about to be published. Thus, there was sometimes inconsistency between the text and the commentary, the commentary actually explaining a text that was different from the printed version.19 The classical siddur Otsar hatefillot—published in Vilna by Rom—with its great commentaries, was issued in two editions, one according to the Ashkenazic tradition and one according to the Hasidic tradition, with the necessary changes introduced into the commentary. Siddurim were occasionally published not so much for the siddur itself but rather for the work that was attached to the end of the siddur. I might mention in this context the Meqor haberakhot of Zeev Yavetz and the Yesodei yeshurun of Gedalya Felder. A work on the sources of the prayerbook, called Meqor hatefillot, by H. Friedman, was published in two editions, one with the text of the siddur and one without it. The prayerbook turned into an omnibus anthology and was the one indispensable book in the Jewish library, even more basic to the Jew than the Bible. It thus became a repository for other works that were thought to be indispensable for a Jew. Important additions to the daily prayerbook were blessings that were to be said before eating and after meals, blessings recited at various occasions during the day, and the blessings recited at various religious rituals, primarily those connected with the life cycle. Although many of these blessings were included in the list of the 100 blessings of Rav Natronai, they were not always thought to be an
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integral part of the siddur. Nevertheless, publishers, in an attempt to make the siddur a more complete prayerbook, included many of these blessings in the siddur. There were two main traditions about where to include these blessings. The Ashkenazi siddur often included such a compendium after the morning prayer, in accordance with the order of the Tur.20 This arrangement followed the order of the daily activity, because one ate after the morning prayer. But the siddur went further than the Tur, because of its more limited options. The Tur was able to relegate blessings and rituals connected with the life cycle to other books, but the editors of the siddur did not have such an option, and they included these blessings here. In a different approach, many Sephardic siddurim included the blessings connected with food as a supplement to the Grace after Meals, which itself appeared after the Friday evening ceremony. The rationale for this is not quite clear, and it gives the impression that the only time during the week that a formal meal, requiring Grace, was eaten was on the Sabbath. The blessings for the life cycle appeared in the Sephardic siddur as a separate work, Sefer toldot adam, which contained the blessings for circumcision, redemption of the first born, and so on, and a summary of the laws applicable to these occasions. This work was usually attached to the end of the prayers, either after the prayers for Purim21 or at the end of the volume.22 Other books of prayer were combined with the siddur. The Passover Haggadah, which is a microcosm of the anthological aspects of the siddur,23 has been incorporated into many siddurim.24 Perhaps the most noteworthy example of a complete book attached to the siddur is the addition of the book of Psalms, which has been printed at the end of the siddur in many editions. Chabad Hasidism has gone even further and now publishes, together with the siddur and the attached book of Psalms, its bible, the Tanya. This anthology is known as H fi TT, an abbreviation for these additions: Humash, Tehillim, Tanya.25 Some of the items added to the prayerbook were thought to be necessary complements to specific prayers. Thus, calendars were added to the prayerbook in order for one to know when the new month was to be blessed and when the conjunction of the moon and the sun occurred.26 In a similar vein, modern prayerbooks often include calendars with the times of sunrise and sunset in order for one to know the proper time for prayer. Another important supplement to the siddur was the inclusion of the passages from the Bible read during the week. The earliest edition known to me that included this was Amsterdam 1677, but today it is almost impossible to publish a siddur without this addition. The case in point was the first edition of the Rinat Yisrael siddur, which was originally published without it. The publishers were forced to include this feature in subsequent editions, and they did so by photographing the reading from Roedelheim editions.27 Finally, I close this section with a description of a siddur that best exemplifies the idea of the anthological prayerbook intended as a sort of vade mecum for the Jew: the siddur called Minhfi at yerushalayim—Kol bo hashalem, published by Rabbi Dworkes in Jerusalem in 1983. Here the anthological concept has created an omnibus book. In addition to the prayers and an extensive anthology of the laws applicable to them, the volume contains selected laws about the Sabbath,
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including a map of Jerusalem so that one can know where it is permissible to carry things on the Sabbath; the laws of mourning (about twenty-five pages!); timetables for sunrise, sunset, and other times of halakhic importance during the day, with separate tables for London and New York; the laws of mezuzah (fortyfive pages, including numerous diagrams); a seven-year calendar; and much more.28 Although the trends in the history of the prayerbook that have been portrayed until now consist totally of accretions to the prayerbook, I should point out that prayerbooks have also omitted material. This is consistent with the selective principle of anthology. This is most obvious in those prayerbooks that have been created for special occasions, which obviously omit all prayers that are not relevant to the occasion. However, prayerbooks also omit prayers that have fallen into disuse. The best-known example is much of the poetry that has commonly been used in the synagogal ritual and that no longer appears in siddurim and mahfi zorim. Some of the earlier forms of prayer have been replaced by forms that were considered more acceptable. For example, the poetic introduction to Barukh sheamar in the Sephardic tradition was replaced by the parallel passage in the Ashkenazic tradition. One can trace the history of this replacement in early printed siddurim, which printed both traditions side by side, until later editions omitted the early text completely. We may consider this an extension of the metaphor of flower collecting in the sense that some of the flowers in the collection wither and die and may be replaced by fresher flowers.29 The anthological tendencies found in the siddur may be considered expansions of anthological tendencies found in the very creation of Jewish prayer. But there is a significant difference between this type of anthology, which may be unique in anthological literature, and the types of anthologies discussed previously. Here we find new creations, which are considered distinct units, although they were composed anthologically, that is, by selecting existing units rather than attempting to create a new unit ab ovo. A number of prayers recited on various liturgical occasions are nothing but anthologies of sentences from the Bible. We may count among these the first chapter of the pesuqei dezimra, which appears in print as if it were a separate chapter but is actually an anthology of biblical verses,30 and the collection of biblical passages that serves as the extended tahfi anun for Mondays and Thursdays.31 The last blessing of the evening Shema, according to the Ashkenazi tradition, is a collection of biblical sentences that has become known as the “blessing of the pesuqim.”32 There are a number of other such collections, such as the seventy-two biblical verses that are meant to represent the seventy-two-letter name of God, but most of these other collections cannot be documented as early creations. On the other hand, we may consider what is probably the earliest stratum of obligatory prayer, the reading of Shema, as an anthology of chapters from the Bible. The anthological principle governing the selection of the first two chapters of Shema is clear: the primary passages that were chosen are the chapters that include the commandment to discuss the words of Torah when lying down and when rising up (Deut. 6:9, 11:19).33 This, of course, is the same principle that decreed that those passages should be included in the mezuzah, for they also contain the commandment for writing the words of Torah on the door-
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posts of the home.34 In addition, this principle also prescribed that the phylacteries should contain the four passages in which the Torah mentions the obligation to tie the words of Torah to one’s hand and between one’s eyes.35 The reason that the third passage of Shema, the section whose main subject is the fringes required on garments, was included in the Shema is not clear. The only thing that we can say about it is that at the time of the tannaim, it was not considered an integral part of the Shema: it was included in the reading only in the morning and not in the evening (Berakhot 2:1). It would thus seem possible that its recital was originally connected with putting on the tallit, which was done in the morning. We can thus understand the true significance of the inclusion of the Ten Commandments as part of the daily Torah reading.36 This was clearly meant to be an indication of the centrality of the Ten Commandments in the Torah tradition, and it supplied very real ammunition for those heretics who wished to reject the rest of the Torah.37 An anthology of the complete Bible, including the Prophets and the Writings, is the basis of the special blessings of the Amidah for Rosh Hashanah.38 The Mishnah prescribes that one should recite in each blessing ten verses (from the Bible) that relate to the subject of that blessing (Rosh Hashanah 4:6).39 The Mishnah mentions only verses from the Bible and from the Prophets, but the Tosefta states specifically that verses from the Writings are also to be included in this anthology.40 Discoveries in the Geniza show that this was also the pattern for the Amidah of the holiday,41 thus implying that the very basis of the Amidah for holidays was an anthology of biblical verses. A further ancient anthology of passages from the Bible is the Kedushah. Isaiah reported that the Seraphs, the fiery servants of God, praised Him with “Holy, Holy, Holy! The Lord of Hosts! His presence fills all the earth!” (Isa. 6:2), whereas Ezekiel reported that His angelic servants declared, “Blessed is the presence of the Lord, in His place” (Ezek. 3:12). Although Rabbinic tradition presented different ways of reconciling the apparent contradiction between the two reports,42 the mystical understanding of these visions—that the two groups of angels were two parts of a heavenly choir that was singing praises to God, and that a third group of God’s servants, the people of Israel, was a third participant in this choir—was the image that was accepted into the prayerbook.43 The biblical verse recited by the people of Israel was a verse that referred to the kingdom of God. However, not all versions of the Kedushah used the same verse. The standard Kedushah of the Amidah used Psalms 146:10 while the qedushah desidra used a verse taken from the Song of the Sea (Exod. 15:18), and this same verse appears in the blessing after the Shema, apparently to complete the angelic Kedushah found in the first blessing of the Shema. Understanding the Kedushah as an anthology may shed some light on the problem of the expanded Kedushah, used today only in the Musaf prayer,44 which includes the Shema. Since it was possible to utilize various biblical passages for the expression of God’s kingdom by the people of Israel, the recital of the Shema should certainly be acceptable—and even desirable since it was the key statement of the acceptance of His kingdom. Therefore, it is possible that the Shema was originally an alternative statement of His kingdom in the Kedushah, but in accordance with the tendency to adopt all alternatives as necessary parts of
150 The Middle Ages
the tradition, it was included with the passage from Psalms as an expression of the kingdom of God.45 The creation of the Kedushah illustrates an important aspect of Jewish anthological thought. The collective principle of anthology seems to be more important in Jewish prayer than the selective principle. In other words, Jewish prayer tended to create a complete anthology, omitting nothing.46 This principle was stated clearly in the Babylonian Talmud by R. Pappa, who said, “Therefore we shall say them both,” and it extended even to cases in which the choices were mutually contradictory.47 The principle was even applied to cases in which the choices were more than just two. Rav Hamnuna declared, “Let us say them all” (BT Berakhot 11a). We now turn to another type of anthological prayer: prayers that are anthologies of blessings. We may count among these the most basic prayer of Judaism, the Amidah. Although a Rabbinic tradition claimed that the Amidah had been instituted by the members of the Great Assembly, the Rabbis admitted that this earlier tradition had been forgotten and the creation of an Amidah of eighteen blessings was an act of Shimon Hapaquli,48 under the direction of Rabban Gamliel of Yavneh, shortly after the destruction of the Second Temple. Scholarly opinion is divided today about the nature of this creation. Joseph Heinemann has argued that Shimon Hapaquli was essentially an anthologist—he collected groups of blessings that had been in common use toward the end of the Second Temple period and created from them a new collection. Recently Ezra Fleischer mounted a monumental attack on this theory and claimed that the Amidah of eighteen blessings was a new creation ab ovo.49 However, Fleischer admitted that there were collections of blessings prior to the work of Shimon Hapaquli and that Shimon utilized these collections in creating the Amidah. Thus Shimon Hapaquli remains an anthologist, although there is also a consensus that his anthological work consisted not only of collecting the earlier works but also of editing and improving them according to his conceptions. In this, Jewish tradition followed his pattern, continuously reworking ancient tradition. The collection of these blessings was much more than an anthology because the requirement that they be said while standing, emphasizing the direct contact between God and the person who was praying, gave the total unit an importance and significance that these blessings did not have in earlier times.50 In addition, the number of blessings in the anthology, eighteen, quickly became a ritual number. This is evidenced by the fact that when it became necessary to add another blessing, shortly after the enactment of the eighteen blessings, the Palestinian tradition deemed it necessary to combine two other blessings into one, in order to retain the sum of eighteen blessings.51 The three blessings associated with the reading of the Shema may also be considered an anthology. It is true that the second and third blessings, Ahava, which directly preceded the Shema, and Emet veyatsiv or Emet veemunah, which immediately followed it,52 were apparently always connected with the Shema. Ahava served as thanksgiving to God for granting the Torah before reading the chapters from the Torah that were part of the Shema, while Emet veyatsiv or Emet veemunah served as a declaration affirming the Shema. However, the final blessing is actually a composite one, including—in addition to the general affirmation of
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the Shema—a blessing thanking God for the redemption from Egypt. Although later theology considered this blessing a parallel to the third chapter of Shema, consideration of the evening Shema shows that this is not historically correct. The addition of this blessing to the evening Shema was a point of discussion after the destruction of the Temple, and we know that at that time the third chapter of Shema was not recited during the evening. More significant in this context is the first blessing, known as the blessing of the lights, which was a praise of God said at the change of day, morning and evening, and which originally had nothing to do with Shema. This is demonstrated by the fact that the priests of the Temple, who prayed before the first light, apparently omitted this blessing.53 Nevertheless, the whole became more than the sum of its parts. This collection was considered a unified entity, called Yotser after the beginning of the first blessing, as evidenced in the tannaitic halakhah limiting talk between the various blessings (Berakhot 2:1). A third type of anthology found in the liturgy is an anthology of passages selected for learning, and this type follows the selective principle. The earliest such selection is found in the passages selected for reading after the morning Torah blessings. Although the Talmud required one to recite a blessing before studying the Torah, the blessings included in the prayerbook were not a daily requirement in talmudic times. According to the Talmud, the blessing Ahavat olam or Ahavah rabbah,54 recited before the reading of the Shema, was considered the blessing for Torah study. Only one who studied Torah before reciting the Shema was required to make a separate blessing for Torah study. This ruling continued until the later gaonic period. Maimonides maintained the ruling that the morning blessings for studying Torah were required only for those who got up to study before reading the Shema (Prayer 7:11). Nevertheless, a popular custom developed of studying selected passages before prayer in order to be able to recite these blessings. However, the Talmud had discussed whether one was required to recite these blessings before reading from the Oral Law, the Mishnah, and midrash/Talmud,55 or perhaps the blessing was required only before reading passages from the Bible. Naturally, the custom developed of reciting selected passages from all these branches of Jewish learning, thus creating an anthology of Jewish learning. Two variant traditions developed. The first one, mentioned already in the socalled Seder Rav Natronai Gaon and generally adopted in the Sephardi siddurim, selected passages that related to the Temple sacrifices. The passage from the Torah was Numbers 28:1–8, which prescribed the daily sacrifice; the passage from the Mishnah was the fifth chapter of tractate Zevahim, which gave general instructions for all the Temple sacrifices; and the midrashic/talmudic passage selected was the introduction to the Sifra, the midrash to the book of Leviticus, whose main subject is sacrifices. The second tradition was found in French sources and was generally adopted among Ashkenazim. According to this tradition, the biblical passage was the priestly blessing, while the passage from the Mishnah was the first mishnah of the tractate Peah. The midrashic/talmudic passage was the continuation of the mishnah of Peah, which had been expanded and conflated on the basis of the talmudic discussion of this mishnah in BT Shabbat 127a–b. The principle behind this an-
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thology of passages was apparently to collect passages that dealt with the importance of Torah study. Both these traditions tried to create representative anthologies, in which selected passages stood for the whole. The all-inclusive anthological principle eventually determined that both anthologies would be used by all traditions. A later anthology of this type, which was meant to be an addition to the liturgy at the end of the morning prayer, was the Seder maarakhah of Rabbi Elijah the Elder. This order was fashioned after the manner of the maamadot that were held in the Second Temple. They included—in addition to the passages from the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings that were part of the Second Temple liturgy—passages from the Mishnah and Talmud. Although this Seder was apparently never wide-spread, parts of it have been incorporated into the morning order of service in almost all communities.56 A later anthology, also meant to be recited and studied after the morning prayer, was the H fi oq leyisrael. The original anthology, compiled by R. Yitshfi ak Baruch and first printed in Egypt in 1740, included passages from the Torah, Prophets, Writings, Mishnah, Gemara, and Zohar, to be studied, recited, or read for every day of the year. This anthology was expanded by Rabbi H. Y. D. Azulai (HIDA), who added selected passages from ethical works and halakhot, called Yosef lehfi oq. This anthology became standard fare for many, no doubt because of the influence of the Hida.57 However, it was usually published as an appendix to the Bible and never became part of the prayerbook. A similar type of anthology was the tiqqunim, orders of study for special nights of the year—the last night of Passover and the night of Shavuot. The order of study followed the same principle of collecting passages that were thought relevant to the particular day, from almost all branches of Jewish literature. Later editions of the tiqqun for Shavuot, under the influence of the mystics, changed this pattern. They selected the opening and closing sentences of the books of the Bible and the books of Oral Law, as if to say that the whole Torah had been studied on the night of Shavuot, the night preceding the reenactment of the Sinaitic reception of the Torah. What is clear is that the anthological principle is a basic force in the creation of prayer, if not the basic force. It is very likely that this force is inherent in a religion and culture that continuously faces the challenge of adapting traditional life to changing circumstances. Entirely new creations are considered a break in tradition, while new creations that are essentially anthologies of older material serve as a valid method of renewal within tradition. This is well illustrated in the attempts to create a liturgy for Yom haatsmaut. The early institutors of the ritual took bits and pieces from the liturgy of the holidays to create a new liturgy. Although their opponents considered this ritual a parody, its authors were really following the traditional methods for creating liturgy. It was an expansion of this methodology that made the siddur not merely a book of prayer for organized prayer services but an anthology that would cover every religious occasion in life and its pertinent halakhot. Thus we may consider the literary genre of the siddur as a true anthology of Jewish life.
The Prayerbook as Anthology of Judaism 153 Notes Prooftexts 17 (1997):115–32. Reprinted by permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. This essay was written while I was a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I wish to thank the Institute and its director, Dr. David Shulman, for their kindness and hospitality. I wish to thank my colleagues at the Institute, Dr. Esther G. Chazon and Dr. Stefan Reif, who carefully read a draft of this paper and gave me a lot of helpful criticism, advice, and suggestions. Special thanks are extended to David Stern for his advice and help in revising earlier versions of this essay. 1. An estimate of this can be derived from the index of Isaiah Vinograd, Thesaurus of the Hebrew Book, part 1 (Jerusalem, 1995). The index of editions of biblical books occupies five pages (pp. 329–33) while the index of editions of prayerbooks is over thirteen pages (pp. 343–56). It is difficult to discuss definitive statistics, since we do not know the number of copies printed in each edition, but these facts do contribute to creating an impression. See also my introduction to the facsimile edition of the Siddur of Hanau 1628 [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan), 1994, pp. 5–7. 2. The sociological significance of these various prayerbooks is greater than their significance for the history of prayer. Thus, the evening prayerbooks show that the persons who are praying are frequently not in their normal home bases at the time of these prayers, but they do succeed in gathering together a quorum for prayer. The collections of Sabbath prayers show the existence of communities in which the number of congregants on Sabbath is much greater than the number of daily congregants, and thus it was considered advisable to prepare a siddur for the Sabbath. Sociologists may also learn from the existence of these siddurim that the synagogue is expected to supply the congregants with siddurim rather than expecting them to bring their personal siddurim to the synagogue. It is interesting to note that some of the prayerbooks that contain only table blessings, often published for use at wedding meals, contain both Sephardic and Ashkenazic versions, implying the frequency of intermarriage with a measure of tolerance and recognition of the legitimacy of both versions. 3. For a list of some of his anthologies, see A. M. Haberman, “Eisenstein, Judah David,” Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1972), vol. 6, pp. 552–53. 4. A better example of the use of a broad range of sources is the anthology of aggadic literature by Louis Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews. However, this cannot be used as an example in our context because Ginzberg was trying to create a comprehensive anthology rather than a selective work. It is interesting to note that his work served as the basis for a selective anthology, the one-volume Legends of the Bible. 5. The term “anthology” came into use only in the Byzantine period, several hundred years later. See Gilbert Highet, “Anthology,” Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (Oxford, 1970), p. 67. Macrobius—one of those classical authors who used the literary form of the symposium for their anthologies—in the beginning of his Saturnalia compared his work to that of a bee, which collects pollen from many flowers but produces honey that is far superior to a mere collection of pollen. 6. Alan Cameron, The Greek Anthology, from Meleager to Planudes (Oxford, 1993), p. 5. 7. Highet, “Anthology,” p. 67. 8. It may well be that there were no other Jewish books in existence, besides the Bible, until that period. Nevertheless, people may have had written notes of various traditions that were not considered “books.” For a survey of the remains of written prayers before the
154 The Middle Ages gaonic period, see Stefan C. Reif, “Codicological Aspects of Jewish Liturgical History,” Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 75, no. 3 (1993):119. 9. The best edition of this responsum is in Teshuvot rav natronai bar hilai gaon, ed. Robert Brody (Jerusalem, 5754), pp. 106–7. 10. The later Rabbis who created lists of the hundred blessings in accordance with their local customs thought that the number was typological. Although we might think that 100 was the minimal number of blessings that one was to recite during the day, these Rabbis were careful to point out why certain blessings were not to be numbered among the 100, and the total number was an exact one, at least on ordinary weekdays. 11. The major exception to this order is the siddur of Rav Saadia Gaon. Although Rav Saadia also begins with the morning prayer, his arrangement is based on logical grounds rather than practical considerations. I may just mention that the morning blessings, with which most siddurim begin, appear in his siddur after the daily prayer, since they are not strictly “prayer,” but rather incidental blessings. A number of prayerbooks follow the practical, chronological order, but they do not begin with the morning prayers. The most notable examples of this are the prayerbooks for Sabbath and holidays, which open with the evening prayer that begins the holy day, and later kabbalistic siddurim, which include the tiqqun hfi atsot, which was said at midnight but appears in the siddur before the morning prayers. However, this latter example is not really an exception, since the kabbalists thought of arising from one’s sleep for tiqqun hfi atsot, and thus the midnight prayer was really the beginning of the liturgical day. This followed a pattern also found in the Temple, in which, on the Day of Atonement, the day’s work began at midnight to facilitate the successful completion of the appointed tasks before sundown of the next day. 12. The most important scholarly edition of this work is that of Daniel Goldschmidt (Jerusalem, 1971). Another edition of the first part was published by David Hedega¨rd, Seder R. Amram Gaon (Lund, 1951). See the review by Goldschmidt, Kiryat sefer 29 (1953–54): 71–75. The section on Sabbath prayers was published by Tryggve Kronholm (Lund, 1974). See the review by Stefan Reif, JSS 23 (Spring 1978):119–22. None of these editions can be considered critical editions in the sense of an attempt to restore the original work sent by Rav Amram to Spain, and it is doubtful whether this can be done. 13. We are not sure whether this siddur was sent to Christian Spain, perhaps to Barcelona (see S. Assaf, Tequfat hageonim vesifrutah [Jerusalem, 1956], p. 180), or to Muslim Spain (Gerson D. Cohen, The Book of Tradition [Sefer haqabbalah] [Philadelphia, 1967], p. 53). 14. Most of this paragraph is based on Robert Brody, “The Enigma of Seder Rav Amram” [Hebrew] in Knesset Ezra: Literature and Life in the Synagogue: Studies Presented to Ezra Fleischer, ed. S. Elizur et al. (Jerusalem, 1994), pp. 21–34. 15. Manuscript prayerbooks often have complete halakhic works inscribed in the margins. A manuscript of the prayerbook found in Hattstatt, apparently written in the sixteenth century, had the Sefer mitsvot qatan of R. Isaac of Corbeil in the margin, together with several minhagim books. See Moses Ginsburger, “Ein Siddurhandschrift in Hattstatt,” Magazin fu¨r die Wissenschaft des Judenthums 19 (1892):110–32. 16. See Israel Zvi Feintuch, “Tanya rabbati” [Hebrew], in Versions and Traditions in the Talmud (Ramat Gan, 1985), pp. 65–76. 17. See M. Benayahu, “The Complete Mahzor for the Whole Year According to the Minhag of the Ashkenazim and the Siddur of the Ashkenazim Savionetta 1567” [Hebrew], in Hebrew Printing at Cremona: Its History and Bibliography (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. 141–78. This commentary was considered halakhically important and was often referred to by R. Abraham Gombiner in his commentary to the Shulhfi an arukh, entitled “Magen avraham.”
The Prayerbook as Anthology of Judaism 155 18. Ephraim Kupfer, “Lorbeerbaum, Jacob ben Jacob Moses,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1972, vol. 11, pp. 492–93. This work was published separately (with notes by R. Abraham Lovat) and called Netiv hahfi ayyim (Vilna, 1887; repr. Brooklyn, N.Y., 1990). The purpose of the notes was to mark all the places where the traditional instructions of Rabbi Lorbeerbaum were in conflict with the decision of the Lubavitcher Rebbe. 19. Aaron Mirsky, “Variants between the Commentary and the Text in Siddurim” [Hebrew], Kiryat sefer 54 (1979):195–200. 20. The Shulhfi an arukh, of course, also followed the order of the Tur. For the precedents for this order, see Chaim Tchernowitz, Toledoth haposkim, vol. 2 (New York, 1947), pp. 199–203. 21. See the siddur printed in Florence, 1736. 22. Amsterdam, 1765. 23. The Haggadah also contains passages from a broad range of literature: Bible, Talmud, Rabbinic literature, liturgical poetry, and folk literature. Historically, these passages range from biblical times to modern selections, reflecting modern historical events and contemporary views. 24. The Passover Haggadah was included already in the siddurim of Rav Amram and Rav Saadia. Many of the later siddurim have not incorporated the complete text of the Haggadah but only the part that was traditionally said on the Sabbath before Passover. 25. A catchier acronym would be TTTT, which could stand for Tefillah, Torah, Tehillim, Tanya. However, the acronym chosen was apparently based on Genesis 35:5. 26. The earliest evidence for this known to me is the calendar for the years from 1511 to 1528 found at the end of the Rothschild Miscellany. The dates of this calendar are of particular interest, since it has been assumed that the Miscellany was commissioned about 1470. Although a great part of the Miscellany consists of liturgical works, the Miscellany is not considered a prayerbook. In a true prayerbook of that period, the Rothschild Mahzor—a manuscript written according to the Italian rite in 1492, six years after the first printing of this rite—we find rules for the calculation of the calendar, Christian as well as Jewish. See M. Schmelzer, The Rothschild Mahzor (New York, 1983), p. 27. 27. A siddur published for Oriental communities, Shaarei tsiyyon hashalem (Jerusalem, 1990), also used the Roedelheim edition for the Torah reading. 28. There is a resemblance in this collection to the Rothschild Miscellany, although the Miscellany is not considered a siddur—even though it contains a complete siddur— and Minhfi at yerushalayim is explicitly a siddur. 29. One of the extreme examples of the creation of an open-ended anthology is the publication of a loose-leaf siddur, meant to enable the community to add new readings but also permitting the assigning of earlier selections to the wastebasket. See Allen S. Maller, “Prayer Book and Self-Revelation to God in Judaism,” Journal of Dharma 9:3 (1984):216– 29. David Stern informs me that there is another siddur, entitled P’nei or, which was published in loose-leaf form, not to enable a continuous process of selection but simply to enable rearrangement of the material in accordance with the wishes of the participants. 30. Anthologies of biblical passages for liturgical purposes are found already in Qumran. See M. Goshen-Gottstein, “The Psalms Scroll (11 Q Ps a),” Textus 5 (1966):22–33. It is possible that the biblical book of Chronicles itself contains anthologies of passages in Psalms for liturgical purposes. See Moshe Weinfeld, “Traces of Qedushat yotser and Pesuqei dezimra in the Qumran Literature” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 45 (1976):24. 31. According to a legend transmitted by R. Abraham ben Nathan of Lunel, the expanded tehfi inah is in itself an anthology of anthologies. It is a collection of tehfi inot written by three different individuals. See Sefer hamanhig (Jerusalem, 1978), p. 102, and the literature in the note to line 88.
156 The Middle Ages 32. For the history of this blessing, see N. Wieder, “The Blessing of the Pesuqim” [Hebrew], Sinai 76 (1975):126–33. 33. This reason was mentioned in the Sifrei (Deut. 34, pp. 60–61) and by Palestinian amoraim (PT Berakhot 1:3 3c). However, at a very early date these passages were considered as reflecting basic Jewish principles: the recognition of the kingdom of God and the acceptance of the Torah (Berakhot 2:2). The unit took on a significance of which the whole was greater than the parts. See Israel Knohl, “A Parasha Concerned with Accepting the Kingdom of Heaven” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 53 (1984):11–31; Reuven Kimelman, “The Shema and Its Rhetoric: The Case for the Shema Being More than Creation, Revelation, and Redemption,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 2 (1992):111–56. Cf. E. E. Urbach, “The Place of the Ten Commandments in Ritual and Prayer” [Hebrew], in The Ten Commandments as Reflected in Tradition and Literature Throughout the Ages, ed. Ben-Zion Segal (Jerusalem, 1985), pp. 129–30; Yitshak D. Gilat, Studies in the Development of the Halakha [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan, 1992), pp. 285–86. 34. Urbach, “The Place of the Ten Commandments,” p. 130. This is also followed by the Samaritans, who, however, inscribe these passages on the doorpost itself rather than on a piece of parchment attached to the doorpost. 35. It has been suggested that the early phylacteries contained the four biblical passages that constituted the early Shema: the Ten Commandments and the three surviving passages. According to this theory, the Ten Commandments and the passage that dealt with the fringes were eliminated and replaced with the passages referring to the commandment about the phylacteries. See A. M. Haberman, “The Phylacteries in Antiquity” [Hebrew], Erets Yisrael 3 (1954):174–75. 36. We have no way of knowing whether the Ten Commandments were originally part of the daily Torah reading, whether they were added to the passages of Shema, or whether they were, by themselves, the original reading to which the passages of Shema were later added (cf. E. E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs [Hebrew] [Jerusalem, 1969], pp. 15–16). It should be noted that the Ten Commandments were never part of the evening reading, but this may mean that the evening recital was instituted after the elimination of the Ten Commandments from this ritual. The fact that the unit was known as “Shema,” even though the Shema itself was actually the second passage—being preceded by the Ten Commandments—is not significant, since the earlier sources often use the term “reading” rather than “Shema” (Cf. Gilat, “Studies,” pp. 285–86; Reuven Hammer, “What Did They Bless? A Study of Mishnah Tamid 5.1,” JQR 81 [1991]:310). 37. See Geza Vermes, “The Decalogue and the Minim,” in In Memoriam Paul Kahle, ed. Matthew Black and Georg Fohrer, Beiheft zur ZAW 103 (Berlin, 1968), pp. 232–40; repr. in G. Vermes, Post-Biblical Studies (Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity) (Leiden, 1975), pp. 169–77; Urbach, “The Place of the Ten Commandments,” pp. 130–40. 38. See J. Tabory, “On the Place of the Malkhuyos Blessing in the New Year Prayer” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 48 (1979):8–11. 39. See Eliezer Eliner, “Die Auswahl und Anordnung der Pesukim von ‘Malchiot’ in der Synagoge,” Ju¨dische Schule Zu¨rich: Festschrift (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 53–55. 40. For a further discussion of this point, see J. Tabory, Jewish Festivals in the Time of the Mishnah and Talmud [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 19962), p. 234. 41. See I. Elbogen, “Die Tefilla fu¨r die Festtage,” MGWJ 55 (1911):426–46, 586–99; 58 (1914): 323–25. 42. Another tradition, found in Seder eliyahu rabbah (chap. 6, ed. Friedmann, p. 34) and preserved in some editions of Vayiqra rabbah (2:8, ed. Margoliot, p. 47), claims that the angels of Isaiah praised God during the day whereas the angels of Ezekiel praised Him during the night. The Babylonian Talmud claims that there was really only one vision,
The Prayerbook as Anthology of Judaism 157 which was reported differently by the two prophets because of their own subjective differences (H fi agigah 13b). 43. This is not meant to say that there was a disagreement between the mystics and the Rabbis. See Lawrence A. Hoffman, “Censoring In and Censoring Out: A Function of Liturgical Language,” in Ancient Synagogues: The State of Research, ed. J. Gutmann (Chico, Cal., 1981), pp. 19–37. For the precedents of the idea of a heavenly choir, see M. Weinfeld, “The Heavenly Praise in Unison,” in Meqor Hajjim: Festschrift fu¨r Georg Molin zu seinem 75. Geburtstag, ed. Irmtraut Seybold (Graz, 1983), pp. 427–37. 44. This was the standard form of the Kedushah used by the Palestinian Jews in the Byzantine period. 45. It is worth pointing out that, according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, the blessing of Malkhuyot on Rosh Hashanah should be added to the Kedushah. Cf. Joseph Heinemann, “Kedushah and ‘Malkhut’ in the Reading of Shema and in the Kedushah of the Amidah,” in Studies in Jewish Liturgy (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 12–21. Heinemann considers the expanded Kedushah a macrocosm of the entire Shema reading, including its blessings. 46. See J. J. Petuchowski, “Some Laws of Jewish Liturgical Development,” Judaism 34 (1985):312–26. 47. The passages in which this statement appears are collected and analyzed by Y. Efrati, “The Advantage of the Integrative System for the Study of the Talmud” [Hebrew], Bisdei hfi emed 20 (1976):74–82, 174–79, 242–49, 288–92, 366–71. 48. There is some doubt about the meaning of the term “Paquli”: some think it is a designation of his occupation—that of a flax worker—and others think it is derived from the name of his home. 49. E. Fleischer, “On the Beginnings of Obligatory Jewish Prayer” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 59 (1990):397–441. Cf. Stefan Reif, “On the Earliest Development of Jewish Prayer” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 60 (1991):677–81; Fleischer, Tarbiz 60:683–88; M. Z. Fuks, “Response to Two Revolutionaries” [Hebrew], Sinai 114 (1994):164–70. 50. See Uri Ehrlich, “Modes of Prayer and Their Significance in the Time of the Mishnah and the Talmud” [Hebrew] (Diss., Hebrew University, 1993). 51. The Babylonian tradition did not have a problem with this, and the Amidah of this tradition, in use today, has nineteen blessings although it is frequently referred to as the Eighteen Blessings. For a comparison of the Palestinian versions of the Amidah with those of the Babylonians, as found in the Geniza, see Yehezkel Luger, “The Weekday Amidah Based on the Geniza” [Hebrew] (Ph.D. diss., Bar Ilan University, 1992). Some scholars are of the opinion that the early Amidah consisted of seventeen blessings and that it was only after adding the blessing against the minnim that the number reached eighteen. According to this theory, it was the Babylonians who changed the original number by dividing the blessing that referred to Jerusalem and the house of David into two separate elements. However, the fact that this blessing in the Palestinian tradition is the only one with a double ending would seem to imply that this is really a combination of two earlier blessings. 52. I do not claim that the actual text is ancient. See Stefan Reif, “Liturgical Difficulties and Geniza Manuscripts,” in Studies in Judaism and Islam Presented to S. D. Goitein (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 99–122. 53. Mishnah Tamid 5:1. The Mishnah actually states that the priest recited only one blessing before the Shema, without specifying which blessing was said. Statements found in both Talmuds report that the blessing recited was Ahavah and the blessing of the lights was omitted. However, the Babylonian Talmud gives a conflicting opinion according to which it was the second blessing that was omitted. Hammer (“What Did They Bless?” n. 36, pp. 313–23) suggests that the whole talmudic discussion is an anachronism: the blessing
158 The Middle Ages recited before the reading of the Shema in the Temple was entirely different from the blessings before the Shema of the later tradition. 54. See I. Ta-Shma, “Ahavat Olam and Ahavah Rabbah—Two Versions of the Blessing Preceding the Shema” [Hebrew], in Rabbi Mordechai Breuer Festschrift, ed. Moshe Ahrend et al. (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 601–11. 55. “Talmud,” in this context, did not refer, of course, to the redacted compilations of commentaries on the Mishnah and related subjects known to us today as Talmud. What is meant here is more the method of study by which earlier sources were analyzed. For a discussion of the various branches of study, see Abraham Rosenthal, “Torah sheal peh vetorah misinai—halakhah umaaseh,” in Mehfi qerei Talmud: Talmudic Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Eliezer Shimshon Rosenthal, vol. 2, ed. Moshe Bar-Asher and David Rosenthal (Jerusalem, 1993), p. 463, n. 48. See also David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishna and Gemara (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). 56. For the history of this order, see I. Ta-Shma, “Meqorah umqomah shel tefillat aleinu leshabeahfi besiddur hatefillah: Seder hamaamadot ushelat siyyum hatefillah,” in Sefer zikkaron leefrayim talmag’ (Haifa, 1993), pp. 85–93. 57. See M. Benayahu, Rabbi H fi ayyim Yosef David Azulai [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1959), pp. 148–49.
8 jacob elbaum
Yalqut Shim oni and the Medieval Midrashic Anthology
alqut—literally, a collection—is the common name in the Middle Ages for an
Yanthology of midrash, or rabbinic scriptural interpretation. The term yalqut, taken from the title of one such collection, yalqut shim
oni (which scholars through the ages have often simply called Yalqut), would indeed seem to be an appropriate name for these works. They are, after all, collections of midrashic tradition as it was preserved in the various collections made during the so-called classical or canonical period of midrash during the Byzantine period in the land of Israel. At first glance, these works also appear absolutely different in character from the classical canon of midrash. The singular literary genres of “authentic” midrash from the classical period, which had retained some vitality even in the collections edited at a relatively late date, no longer appear in their pure form in the yalqutim but are adulterated by disparate elements. So, too, in the yalqutim, the crystalline literary editing and original formulation of classical midrash give way to mere technical arrangement, which seems to have involved nothing more than a hackneyed conglomeration of passages from various sources. The sketch in the preceding paragraph, which more or less encapsulates the standard scholarly view, is based upon certain assumptions and beliefs that need to be reexamined. The first of these is the belief that the appearance of the yalqutim coincided with the close of the original period of midrashic creativity. This classical period culminated in the redaction of Genesis Rabbah, Leviticus Rabbah, and Lamentations Rabbah, among other works, between 400 and 500 c.e. By then, so the argument goes, midrashic creativity had run its course and exhausted its powers of originality; where it continued to be composed, it did so by force of inertia until the time of the Arab conquest in the seventh century, after which it steadily deteriorated through the geonic period. There may also have been a pervasive sense among those persons involved with midrash that, just as the Mishnah had been succeeded by the Talmud, and just as the Talmud had been “closed” and completed, so too midrashic tradition had reached closure and there no longer existed free license to add new midrashic material, even what 159
160 The Middle Ages
circulated but had not already been set down in writing. Stagnation inevitably leads to regression. Some scholars would argue that this was evident even in the later anthologists’ mode of presentation of the ancient sages’ sayings, in which everything was apparently perceived as equivalent and passages were lumped together without regard for their sources’ varying levels of diction or their characteristic terminology. Old and new were mixed indiscriminately. The anthologists’ only touchstone, according to this view, was the detection of some link between an utterance of the sages and the biblical text, the sole purpose here being to associate the sages’ comments with the biblical texts, often verse by verse, as comprehensively as possible. This linear history of midrashic literature is difficult to accept for many reasons. First, it is based upon certain uninspected assumptions about the nature and life span of aggadic midrash, and, no less so, about anthological literature in general. Without trying to present a comprehensive history of midrash in general, one might nonetheless question whether even the “classical” midrashim like Genesis Rabbah were intentionally edited with a program and plan rather than being mere collections artificially linking opinion to opinion according to the text of the book of Genesis. Perhaps the only thing that truly separates a work like Genesis Rabbah from the later yalqutim is that the former’s sources are mostly anonymous (and as a result, its contents may appear more original), while the sources of the yalqutim are usually known and sometimes explicitly acknowledged by their editors (and therefore, in the view of certain modern midrash scholars, they are of no importance beyond being “witnesses to textual variants”). Let me add that my comments on Genesis Rabbah were made solely for the sake of argument; I personally believe there was some kind of plan to its editing. Yet the possibility I broached surely applies to at least some of the midrashim collected under the title Midrash Rabbah. This famous collection of midrashim is itself in its entirety an “anthology” or “yalqut of midrashim,” whose editing is largely inconsistent.1 As we know, some of its constituent midrashim (and in some cases the separate parts of the same “midrash”) were composed even later than some of the yalqutim. Indeed, some parts of Midrash Rabbah from some of its most important sections were drawn from the yalqutim. Another difficulty in demarcating strict boundaries between midrashic literature and the later medieval anthologies can be seen in M. D. Herr’s attempt to periodize the history of midrashic literature in his entry “midrash” in the Encyclopaedia Judaica. Herr lists, among the midrashic works of the “Late Period” (1000–1200 c.e.), the work of R. Tobias ben R. Eliezer (eleventh century), Leqahfi tov (even though Herr himself calls it an anthology), as well as the “midrashim” based on the composition of R. Moses Hadarshan (who lived and worked in the same century). As the “Period of the Yalqutim (anthologies),” Herr designates only the era that followed (1200–1550). Within this category, he first mentions Yalqut shim oni, then Midrash hagadol (both of the thirteenth century), Yalqut makhiri (at the earliest, according to the view of some scholars, the second half of the thirteenth century), Ein ya aqov, and Haggadot hatalmud (in that order, though it should be reversed, because R. Jacob ibn H fi abib, whose Ein ya aqov was printed in Constantinople in 5276/1516, the year of his death, was himself fa-
Yalqut Shimoni and the Medieval Midrashic Anthology
161
miliar with Haggadot hatalmud, which had been printed in Constantinople in 5271/1511). The difficulty here is obvious. How did Herr distinguish between earlier and later personages—between R. Tobias or R. Moses Hadarshan and their successors? Indeed, it should be stated that medieval scholars generally call R. Moses Hadarshan’s composition a “midrash,” and those who came after him sometimes mistook his words to be those of the classical sages. The same held true, it seems, for his homiletical interpretations, which were his own innovations (according to our best knowledge of midrashic literature).2 There are, moreover, collections gleaned from his work that everyone termed midrash—possibly because they were ignorant of their sources. These include Midrash aggadah and Numbers Rabbah (the first sections of which, Bemidbar and Naso, were based on material from “R. Moses’ midrash”)3 and finally, Genesis rabbati, also called Genesis Rabbah or Bereshit rabbah magna in Raymond Martini’s Pugio Fidei. The same applies to Leqahfi tov; it was considered by many to be a stock midrash.4 There is, of course, a certain justification to Herr’s attempt to periodize in light of his fundamental assumption that Yalqut shim oni, the work of R. Simeon Hadarshan (“Our Rabbi, Simeon, Foremost of the Preachers, may his memory be a blessing, from the holy community, Frankfurt,” as inscribed on the title page of the anthology’s second printing, Venice 5326/1566) was the most important of the yalqutim and should therefore be given the distinction of opening the era of the yalqutim.5 One consequence of this distinction, however, is that it ignores such earlier works in the genre as those mentioned before, as well as Pitron torah, which may be dated to the ninth century (also absent from Herr’s listing).6 Moreover, by grouping Yalqut shim oni with the others, Herr blurs its singularity. No other anthology, before or after, attempted to present a similar kind of summa of midrashic tradition: that is, no other work ever attempted to quote the sages’ commentaries on all the books of the Bible solely by following the order of the original verses. Another ostensible point of distinction often made between a “midrash” and an “anthology” or yalqut is that while the midrashic collections tend to be anonymous, the editors of the yalqutim tend to specify their names. The obvious drawback to this claim is that unambiguous attribution says nothing about the nature of the materials in the work. Taking credit for producing or editing a book is largely a matter of cultural convention, and this convention was simply not normative in any way in ancient Jewish literature. The decision whether to identify one’s authorship or role depends on the author’s own perception of the link between his writings and his sources. But the marks of the anonymous authors of Pirqei derabbi eli ezer or Seder eliyahu on their respective works are no less prominent than those of the compilers of Leqahfi tov, Yalqut makhiri, and Yalqut shim oni on their works. Attention must be paid to developments within midrashic literature itself. The methods that a midrashic editor used to determine the shape of his work changed with time. For better or for worse, the redactors of the later midrashim changed and revised the words of their predecessors; it was no slip on my part that I called the compilers of Pirqei derabbi eli ezer and Seder eliyahu “authors.” These two compositions are different from other midrashim. As Meir Ish Shalom (Friedmann) famously wrote in describing the uniqueness of Seder eli-
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yahu, “All the Rabbahs and the Pesiqtot and the Tanhfi umot are nothing but yalqutim [arranged] according to either the order of the writings or the commentaries to the portions,” but Seder eliyahu, he added, “has an author . . . who does not merely cobble [texts] together [emphasis added]; rather, he wrote his composition in a distinctive style and order; his writings are not just pearls strung on a thread but links in a continuous chain.”7 Were the editor of Midrash Proverbs known, his work would undoubtedly be labeled a yalqut or anthology. The manner in which sources are mined in this work, the omission of the names of the sages, the addition of bits of old aggadah in new combinations and of explanations for ancient statements—all these familiar criteria would easily lead scholars to categorize the work as an anthology. Characteristically (and rightly, it seems), Ish Shalom would have associated it with Seder eliyahu. As regards terminology, it is also the case that even the most distinguished modern scholars have indiscriminately used the terms “midrash” and “anthology.” In his famous article “The Legends of the Jews—East and West,” L. Ginzberg, surely one of the preeminent authorities in this century on Rabbinic aggadah and midrash, considered both the aforementioned Pirqei derabbi eliezer and H fi ibbur yafeh mehayeshuah (the work of R. Nissim of Qairawan, d. 1062) as Rabbinical anthologies. Their common denominator was that both were influenced by Muslim literature—the latter linguistically, the former in its organization and structure; he describes Pirqei derabbi eliezer as “a grouping written according to the pattern of Arab anthologies based on tales from the sacred writings.”8 Ginzberg’s association of the term “midrash” with the genre of anthology has deep roots. Nearly all medieval scholars also used the term “midrash” to denote what we would call an “anthology.” The term yalqut, once adopted to designate the anthological literature of the midrash, was reserved for, at most, two such compositions: Yalqut shimoni9 and Yalqut hamakhiri (both of which were composed, as was noted earlier, at approximately the same time, although there is no sign that the anthologist of Yalqut hamakhiri ever saw its predecessor).10 Furthermore, Yemenite Jewish literature is well known to have been replete with what we call anthologies (of which Herr cites only Midrash hagadol, which is admittedly the most important of them all). Almost without exception, though, these works are called by the term “midrash,” and it appears that they were regarded as such.11 Midrash hagadol was described by its author, R. David Ha’adani, without a trace of self-consciousness, as “the midrash of the five books of the Torah,” and there existed other such compositions, including Midrash hahfi efets of R. Zechariah the Physician (whose writing ended in the year 1427) and Midrash habeur of R. Said ben David Dhamari (written in 1441). Indeed, R. Nethanel ben Isaiah, author of the Yemenite yalqut Maor haafelah (composed in 1328–29),12 generally refers to it as a “collection” (majmua ) or “composition,” but those who follow him call it a “homiletical interpretation” (derash) or “midrash.” In either case, it seems that these Yemenite works were never called by the term yalqut. Abraham Joseph Wertheimer, in choosing to title the fifteenth-century work that he published from a manuscript Yalqut midreshei teiman (Jerusalem, 5748/1988), evidently did not share the view of the works’ own compilers!
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I have gone into these terminological minutiae not only to clarify the terminological facts but also because they can help us understand how the anthologists saw their work not only as similar to but as a continuation of the classical midrashic compilations. That is to say, they did not view their works as belated or secondtier compilations, of lesser stature than the classical midrashim, nor was this estimation shared by the earliest readers of the yalqutim either in Central Europe or elsewhere. For these readers, the term “midrash” (as the name of a composition or collection of homiletical interpretations on a biblical book) simply denoted a collection of homiletical interpretations, and nothing more. The term carried no value judgment, nor did it characterize how its materials were used; the term “midrash” was, in any case, a consciously rehabilitated term, and it is doubtful if it was used in this sense before the Middle Ages.13 This being the case, it is hardly surprising that many works that we would probably not choose to include under the rubric of midrash, such as Midrash aseret hadibberot, were called “midrashim.” Indeed, the contributor who wrote the entry on this particular “midrash” in the Encyclopaedia Judaica, Joseph Dan, speculates on why it was called by this term.14 Modern sensibilities distinguish it from “midrash” per se, but terminological usage has simply changed. At one time, it was sufficient for a work to be loosely based on the verses of the Ten Commandments for it to be called a “midrash,” and we could speculate further about several other “smaller midrashim” in light of their content and form. The scholar who wishes to find striking differences between Midrash yonah and the compilation of homiletic interpretations on the book of Jonah in Yalqut shimoni will not have an easy task. From my preceding remarks, it might appear that there is no distinction between “midrashim” and yalqutim, particularly because I have shown how the two terms are often used as synonyms. Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate between them. Just as some types should not be separated, so, too, others should not be joined. Let me briefly set out some features that tend to distinguish the yalqutim from the classical works of midrash. First, the anthologies show a tendency to collect together ancient midrashic materials, regardless of their sources or different genres. Some anthologists (like R. Jacob Sikili in his Talmud torah, by his own attestation) quoted their sources verbatim; others chose to abridge and rework the original material. Second, in some anthologies there is a clear desire to blend halakhic and aggadic sayings; in others, to set forth midrashic traditions, and next to them, a commentary. Indeed, modern scholars have often used this last practice as a way of distinguishing between a midrash and an anthology, so that a work that contains a blend of homiletical interpretations and biblical commentary (particular peshat or plain-sense exegesis) is called an “anthology.”15 Third, another type of work that is often called an “anthology” is one with an ethical, moralizing orientation. To this group belong, for example, the two works called Menorat hamaor (one by R. Israel alNakawa and the other by R. Isaac Aboab), as well as R. Jacob Ibn H fi abib’s Ein yaaqov. At first glance, the latter seems to be merely a collection of talmudic aggadot, presented in their original sequence, alongside of which is the compiler’s commentary (that is, the commentary of the “author”). The moralistic purpose of
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Ein yaaqov can be ascertained from the author’s introductions and the indices he appended to it (the latter were omitted from the accepted printings, thereby occluding this central purpose of the compilation).16 These three distinguishing features of the yalqutim, as opposed to those of midrash—the mixing of aggadah and halakhah, the blending of homiletical interpretation and commentary, and the making of collections with an ethical purpose—are not, however, necessary conditions for the genre. The proof of this fact is Yalqut shimoni itself, the one work that serves as a representative model for the medieval anthology. Yalqut shimoni lacks all three of the previous features. Thus, while it quotes halakhic traditions, especially where the biblical context is halakhic, its intent is assuredly not to intermingle words of Scripture with halakhah and aggadah throughout. The latter sort of commentary, which is to be found in Leqahfi tov and other works, is not present in Yalqut shimoni, and any reader can easily see that Yalqut shimoni does not discuss ethical issues except insofar as they appear in the ancient midrashim. The primary model for the compiler of Yalqut shimoni was unquestionably Genesis Rabbah. Precisely this sheer heterogeneity confounds attempts to bundle all the anthologies neatly together. What they have in common is an attempt to excerpt the ancient texts in a new and changed way. These changes need not lie within the quoted texts themselves; they can manifest themselves in their arrangement and in the juxtaposition of homiletical interpretations from various sources. This is true of Yalqut shimoni, although abridgments were made there too, especially in the narrative sections.17 Such is also the case with Midrash hagadol, except that its compiler chose to expand rather than abridge his sources. In some anthologies, the modifications are more extensive and include linguistic substitutions (especially when it comes to difficult technical, foreign, or even Aramaic expressions); omissions of the names of the original authors; text abridgments; and paraphrasing. Some anthologists felt free to add commentary to the words of the midrashim, as well as numerological and acrostical material either from extramidrashic sources or of their own devising.18 Indeed, even those who were careful to transmit the words of the sages in their original form did not refrain from contemporizing the material. R. Simeon Hadarshan quotes Rashi (et al.) in Yalqut shimoni, and in Midrash hagadol, R. David Ha’adani adds the sayings of the geonim as well as excerpts from the halakhic texts of R. Yitshfi ak Alfasi and Maimonides. Having shown where the midrashim and the anthologies share features and differ from each other, we come now to the question of why these anthologies were compiled in the first place. The reasons must be manifold, since the anthologies did not emerge from a single academy, nor were they the products of a single cultural center or period. I will merely mention some possibilities. (1) Some compilers apparently responded to a felt lack of available books, either because such books were too expensive or because they were scarce; obviously, I am speaking of the period before the invention of the printing press. Thus, compilers aspired to amass, in one all-inclusive collection, a kind of encyclopedia of traditions that they considered most worthy of preservation and study and that previously had been scattered among many books. (2) The anthologies may also testify to a desire to restore midrash to its former glory and to return it to its rightful place
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alongside the literature of biblical commentary. The latter literature had developed as a genre of its own and thereby distanced the general populace from the classical tradition of midrash. (3) In connection with this last point, there may have been a polemical motivation as well. There are reasons to suggest that the return to the midrash via the anthological literature (especially what followed the sequence of biblical verses) may have stemmed from the fact that the genre of biblical commentary had distanced itself from this kind of presentation as the result of doctrinal controversy, as with the Karaites. The previously mentioned Leqahfi tov is an example of this case. (4) Another impetus to the writing of anthologies was surely their capacity for serving as sources for sermons—that is, basic material that could be used for public homilies, whose delivery was a popular occupation. This is apparently the reason for the great number of Yemenite anthologies in comparison with the number of similar compositions elsewhere in the Diaspora. (5) Finally, the Middle Ages witnessed a large-scale tendency toward anthologization in general. This was the case in the sphere of halakhah, and the practice of collecting aggadah can be seen as a kind of response to the latter. An examination of the previously cited introduction to Ein yaaqov shows that R. Jacob ibn H fi abib tried to model his work on the compositions of R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Asher ben Yehfi iel.19 Indeed, there is no doubt that the principal motivation for the creation of the anthologies was the ancient desire and habit of collecting traditions. It was not just the urge to collect, however, that created these works but a desire to make a new (or at least complete) connection between Rabbinic tradition and Scripture. This is what appears to have motivated R. Simeon Hadarshan, the compiler of Yalqut shimoni (insofar as we know anything about his motives). R. Makhir b. R. Abba Mari explicitly attests to this very intention in his introduction to Yalqut hamakhiri to Psalms: The main purpose of my plans and my goal was to benefit others like myself, so that even the learned might find occasional satisfaction in it, for the midrashim and aggadot are scattered and dispersed all over. Most are not to be found in their right place, and since they are occupied in their diligent study of the laws of what is prohibited and what is permitted, students will not find quickly the midrashim they seek after for the verses as they need them. May this book be for them a means to reach the trove of their thoughts and intentions.20
Remarks similar to these, as well as testimony to the far-reaching objective of the act of compilation, are also found in the anthology Talmud torah (1366), whose title and goals are explained by its author, R. Jacob Sikili: And since I included in this book all halakhic and aggadic traditions and statements that were expounded and cited in all the midrashim and the two Talmuds and the Sifrei and the Sifrah,21 I called this work Talmud torah. This title is appropriate and correct, for it instructs man in the knowledge to understand and teach, and on its basis the principles of the mitzvot and their halakhot, in their general rules and particulars, as well as their reasons and details, will all be clarified. The reader will have no further need of the words of other commentators, be they little or great, because the study of Torah [Talmud torah] is greater than them all.22
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The work was entitled Talmud torah (rather than Yalqut talmud torah, as it was occasionally referred to by scholars) not only because “the study of Torah is greater than them all,” but also because it is a kind of Mishneh torah in the field of exegesis, meant to obviate the need for the words of further exegetes. Indeed, some compilers of anthologies were not content solely to collect homiletical interpretations but included biblical exegeses as well, undoubtedly in order to make their works all-inclusive, as described before. These expansive anthologies have been called by different scholars midreshei habeurim or midreshei haperushim (in both cases, “the midrashim of exegeses”), to distinguish them from midreshei hayalqutim (“midrashim of the anthologies”).23 To this group belong Leqahfi tov, which Zunz described as “half commentary and half aggadah,” as well as Midrash aggadah and the “midrashim” of the thirteenth-century sage R. Samuel ben Nissim of Sanut, including the anthology that Buber titled Midrash genesis zuta but R. Samuel himself called Midrash genesis. The statements of R. Makhir and R. Jacob Sikili, and Zunz’s brief description of Leqahfi tov raise two central issues that must be considered in the study of medieval midrashic anthologies. 1. Anthologies are rarely treated as works in their own right, principally because the production of an anthology is, on the face of it, a mere technical feat— the gathering, organizing, and ordering of extant material, and these acts are usually not considered sufficiently creative or even important enough to warrant recognition. So, too, the work of a “learned man who collects [sources] from everywhere”—in the words of the fifteenth-century Yemenite sage H fi oter ben Solomon (Dhamari Mansur Suleiman), compiler of Ner hasekhalim (or Or hasekhalim)— does not usually command respect because “collecting [sources] from everywhere” may at best attest to naivete´, and at worst to an inability to discriminate between what is valuable and what is not.24 Nevertheless, it is important to delve into the inner construction of each anthology, if only on the chance that such investigation will reveal an ideological core or stance that makes the anthology more than merely a vehicle by which a speaker from the past is made to address the present. If such is the case, the anthological production is not mere technical work, in which there is “naught to distinguish, praise, or marvel at, since even schoolchildren can do it, and no one in the land cannot,” to quote the words of the anthologist of Yalqut hamakhiri in the introduction cited earlier. This is not necessarily a complicated matter. We can, it seems to me, fairly easily reveal the principles guiding an anthologist as he shapes his anthology in both its overall and specific dimensions. Despite the general absence of explanatory prefaces to anthologies, it is not difficult through study and analysis to ascertain the underlying principles by which the anthologist mined the corpus of his sources. If I have spoken little about these principles with respect to the anthologies I have discussed, it is because past scholarship, when it has paid any attention to these works, has almost exclusively concentrated upon the question of “sources,” and then only in order to work backward from the anthologies to learn more about their sources in the classical midrashim and their variants. To be sure, the contribution of anthologies in general to the identification of lost works has been of great significance. But what is usually found in anthologies
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serves only to confirm what is already known. If a version of a text preserved in an anthology differs from the known versions, it is not necessarily a reflection of another textual tradition; the changes may have been the work of the anthologist himself. In contrast, inquiry into the texts themselves, as they emerge from their presence in the anthologies, may be a subject of greater importance. This is what gives the anthologies a value beyond mere copyists’ handiwork and justifies distinguishing between the different anthologies as works in their own right. To illustrate this last point, let me comment briefly on one small matter relating to Yalqut shimoni. In general, arguments from silence or absence lead only to conjectures. Nevertheless, it is surely significant that the anthologist of Yalqut shimoni overlooked and omitted all references to works of ancient esoteric literature like the Heikhalot and the merkabah tradition, even though he was undoubtedly familiar with them. Except for an allusion to a midrash from the Alphabet of Rabbi Akiva, there is not a single mention of this extensive literature in his entire wide-ranging anthology. This obviously reflects the fact that even though all anthologies are compilatory texts, not all acts of compilation are to be measured by the same standard. Every compilation is accompanied by processes of selection, classification, and appraisal, and each of these processes is distinct; taken together, they are also distinct from the craft practiced by the scribe-copyist. All this should be a commonplace in the study of anthological literature; yet only rarely do scholars address such questions as: Did the compiler, in sequencing his texts, follow the order of importance of the midrashim from which he culled them?25 Or did he present them in an order corresponding to the degree of eminence of the speaker (if the speaker was, for example, a tanna or an amora—that is, according to the anthologist’s hierarchical perception of the sages involved)? Or did he use an order based on the proximity of the homiletical interpretation to what the compiler presumed was its “simple meaning”? Perhaps he ordered the texts according to some external principle (such as length or brevity)? Or did he try to construct a conceptual problem that he saw raised in the biblical text, or according to other such matters? Even more difficult to pursue is the detailed analysis of what was omitted from the anthologies, and why—whether its cause was a response to heretics or to detractors from within the community or outside it, or to other entirely different causes. It is worth investigating, for example, whether the widespread tendency in the Yemenite midrashim to divert their contents in the direction of philosophical topics has parallels in the non-Yemenite anthologies. Are there grounds for comparison between such anthologies and midrash Maor haafela, in which the author’s goal of doctrinal guidance is plainly evident (following Maimonides, he involves himself in philosophical discussions)? Here we must take into account J. Tubi’s trenchant claim26 that, except for Midrash Hagadol and Midrash Lamentations (whose precise character has not yet been clarified), the works that fall under the rubric of “Yemenite midrashim” are essentially books of commentaries and that, “in the linguistic tradition of Yemenite Jewry, the word ‘midrash’ is used in the sense of a commentary on Scripture, the Pentateuch in particular.”27 Moreover, according to Tubi, two factors remove these Yemenite works from the domain of “midrashic literature”: first, their language, which is mostly Arabo-Judaic (although sayings of the sages are quoted in Hebrew,
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as was the widespread custom in Arabo-Judaic philosophical literature); second, their content, with its strong link to the allegorical philosophical commentary tradition.28 These criteria undoubtedly demand further clarification.29 In any case, a rigorous examination of different anthologies along such lines would, in my opinion, lead to extremely interesting conclusions about their methods. They would not seem quite so blurred and undefined as they do at present. 2. The anthologists’ utilization of aggadic and midrashic literature raises the question of how “closed” this literature was, in their view. This question is a complex one and should by no means be examined exclusively along this axis. The work of copyists and printers should also be studied. Nonetheless, the work of the compilers suggests that, in their view, aggadah and midrash were in the category of a “possible interpretation” that did not rule out other opinions, and thus they did not hesitate to add their own, and others’. The Yemenite anthologists whom I mentioned occasionally put Maimonides’ words into midrashic formulations, which then became part of their “midrash.” Nor was this “midrashizing” restricted to the writings of Maimonides; the same was done to exegetical and homiletical passages, which were easily added (in these and in the anthologies in general) to the sayings of the midrashim. Joining them to the original midrashic utterances made them all into a kind of midrash.30 All these examples suggest that, in the views of the anthologists, midrash remained a vital tradition; this suggestion is further confirmed by the flexible use by later authors (not just Yemenites) of the term “midrash,” a matter I have already discussed extensively. On the other hand, it is possible that the very blending of old and new paved the way for the reduced stature of midrash, a view that emerges from the remarks of some authorities. Such is the upshot, for example, of R. Abraham Ibn Ezra’s criticism of Leqahfi tov in the foreword to his Perush hakatsar of the Torah, in which he disapproves of the exegetical methods of midrash.31 So, too, in the introduction to his commentary to Lamentations, he offers the generalization that “of the midrashim . . . some are as fine as silk, others as coarse as sacks.” Paradoxically, while the anthologies relate to midrashic tradition as though to an “open” text, the anthologies themselves are “closed” insofar as they bear their authors’ signatures. Furthermore, some authorities actually “close” midrashic tradition with these works. This, as I mentioned earlier, was apparently the intention of R. Jacob Sikili in his Talmud torah, and even if it was not the intention of the anthologist of Yalqut shimoni, from a practical and functional perspective that work effected the “closing” of midrash. The fact is that, after it became widespread (in the wake of its printing), Yalqut shimoni came to be, in the hands of many, the primary medium through which midrashim were cited. I refer not only to those midrashim that were lost, their contents known to us solely through their citation in this anthology. For many later authors who refer to midrashic sayings, we do not know whether they saw the actual midrashim themselves or whether they consigned to paper a reconstruction based on what they saw in the notations of the anthologist of the Yalqut. This question arises particularly when the later citations merely transmit the contents of the midrashic sayings, not its language verbatim.32 Yet the anthologies did not succeed in fully “closing” midrashic tradition. Nor,
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for that matter, did the rise of printing, for the printers themselves often added to the midrashim as they saw fit. This is a phenomenon known from the Mantua edition of Midrash Tanhfi uma (5323/1563) and the additions to it by R. Ezra of Fano to the earlier Constantinople printing (5282/1522), among them both tanhfi umaic and nontanhfi umaic sections. The same phenomenon occurred with other midrashim, such as Midrash Psalms, whose contents on Psalm 119 ff. are not original; likewise, every commentary cited therein on Psalms 112–37 was copied from Yalqut shimoni. Even in the case of Genesis Rabbah, the printers mingled diverse elements in it, interweaving sections from the Tanhfi uma and from other sources. All this goes to show that the later authorities who served as printers and proofreaders in the Hebrew printing houses did not regard the midrashim they worked with as closed texts.33 Here is yet another manifestation of the same paradox I discussed above: the very act of printing gave final shape to certain works, and occasionally without inner justification. The aforementioned Mantua edition of Midrash tanhfi uma determined the shape of the midrash; the numerous later editions all followed it. Such was the case as well with Seder eliyahu; its later printers followed the exemplar not of the Venice 5358/1598 edition, but of R. Samuel Heida’s Prague 5436/1676 edition, which was, according to its printer, fixed with the aid of the providential spirit that descended upon him. Indeed, having shown how open midrash remained even at this late date, we may ask again how completely even the editors of the classical midrash collections viewed their work as completed and sealed acts. Once again, it is obvious that a simplistic comparison will not be sufficient, but there is reason to speculate that many of the early editors did not regard what passed through their hands as closed works to which no one was allowed to add or subtract material. A fine example of this view is provided by the various recensions of the Tanhfi uma, among them those included in the Midrash Rabbah, but this is a separate discussion. I can bring this discussion full circle with a few final comments on the transition from midrash to yalqut and on what seems to be the decline of the latter genre. As I remarked at the beginning of this essay, if one reads the existing scholarship, one receives the impression of a sharp, clear transition between midrashic creativity and the period of the anthologies. This picture is mistaken because it derives from some less than cautious transferences of characteristics unique to classical midrash to all midrashic literature. The result is the habit of trying to fit all midrashic literature into the procrustean bed that sharply divides the entire tradition into “exegetical” and “homiletical” midrash when, in fact, this distinction applies only to the contrast between Genesis Rabbah and Leviticus Rabbah or Pesiqta derav kahana. These types of organization, when they are found mixed together in the anthologies, are construed as characteristic of the broken forms by which the anthological genre is defined. Even experts lose sight of the fact that this kind of mixture was already present in midrashic literature after its classical period (which concluded no later than the seventh century). So, too, the use of the “adaptation of ancient midrashic materials” as a criterion for defining anthologies. Here again, scholars overlook the fact that such adaptations had been made for a long time and that they clearly characterized the Tanhfi uma tradition, inter alia.34 And so, too, other supposedly clear defining characteristics that scholars
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offer to define the anthological genre actually abound in midrashic literature from the so-called interim period of aggadic creativity (from 640 until the end of the tenth century).35 Still, it is not unreasonable to try to define a beginning for the anthological period. Even if we cannot offer a firm determination, and the genre’s initial channels of diffusion remain unclear, it is not too much to suppose an Eastern connection. Some evidence for this may come from the work Pitron torah (which should perhaps be seen as the oldest extant anthology) and from Leqahfi tov, which originated in Byzantium. Viewing from this perspective, it may also be possible for us to question anew the accepted Western orientation of the works of R. Moses Hadarshan. In mentioning these three compositions, my intention is not to suggest that the literature of the anthologies directly evolved in a chain from these works. Any attempt at this stage to present a “genealogical tree” for this literature would be contrived. Nonetheless, it can be stated unequivocally that, from the time the anthologies emerged, the genre lived an intensive life for hundreds of years— indeed, until the coming of print. At that point, the genre began to diminish, apparently because midrashim now became readily available and the need for the anthology vanished. Yemen, however, again followed its own path. There, the creation of the midrashim continued energetically until at least the seventeenth century.36 It is perhaps more accurate to speak not of the decline of the genre but of its conversion and integration into a more encompassing genre, namely, aggadic commentary in works like Ein yaaqov, including the booklet appended to it on the aggadot of the Palestinian Talmud, already mentioned here several times; Zikhron torat moshe of R. Moses ben Joseph Figo (Constantinople, 5313–14/1543–44); R. Jacob Luzzatto’s Kaftor vaferahfi (Basel, 5741/1581); and R. Samuel Jaffe Ashkenazi’s Yefe mareh (Venice, 5350/1590).37 In this context, it is also worth asking whether such non-Hebraic compositions as Tsenah urenah or Meam loez belong to the anthological genre; these works are not customarily mentioned by scholars working in the field.38 On the other hand, even if we wish to delimit the anthological genre rather than broaden it by adding works of aggadic commentary and compilations in translation, it should be remembered that creativity in this sphere reemerges at specific cultural junctures, and that is certainly not happenstance. Take, for example, the case of Yalqut reuveni of R. Reuven Hacohen, first printed during the author’s lifetime in Prague in 5420/1660, which united the worlds of kabbalah and midrash. Certain well-defined reasons can be adduced for the revival of the genre in the modern period when many new anthologies were composed: I. B. Levner’s Kol aggadot yisrael, M. J. Berdyczewski’s Mimekor yisrael, H fi . N. Bialik’s and Y. H fi. Rawnitzki’s Sefer haaggadah, E. E. Halevy’s Yalqut haaggadah, and L. Ginzberg’s Legends of the Jews, as well as R. Baruch Halevi Epstein’s Torah temimah and R. M. M. Kasher’s Torah shelemah and Yalqut sinai. These works (and still others) can shed light on their predecessors; it is not too much to suppose that like literary phenomena are nurtured by like causes. In conclusion, as difficult as it may be to locate the precise beginning of the midrashic-aggadic anthological tradition, it is no less difficult to determine its
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conclusion, especially if we include in the genre its capacity to assume multiform and renovated guises. Nevertheless, if indeed the midrashic anthology was meant primarily to be a literary medium in the manuscript age for the transmission of classical texts of aggadic literature when they were rare, scattered, and not widely available, it is also the case that the anthologizing of these texts was a positive response both to a felt personal need (as in the gathering of the ancient Megillot hasetarim) and to the compilers’ desire to impart to the masses the essence of rabbinic aggadic tradition, which they regarded as something that could lead people “to recognize He who spoke and the world came into being.” The labor of anthological collection did not end once “iron pen and lead” were set into motion—that is, with the introduction of the printing press—when the words of the sages became readily available to all in their own form. Still, time marches on. Nothing remains static. Things past are viewed through the lens of the present, and they inevitably alter their image. New developments are forced into existence by the vicissitudes of historical circumstances, spiritual interests, the languages serving the author and his audience, and other such factors. Literature, after all, evolves from within as well as in response to its environment.
Notes Prooftexts 17 (1997):133–51. Reprinted by permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1. On the work of joining sections, done in Spain in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, until the completion of the text, Devarim rabbah shel benei sefarad [Deuteronomy Rabbah of the sons of Spain], i.e., the Lieberman edition of Deuteronomy Rabbah, see M. B. Lerner’s important article “New Light on the Spanish Recension of Deuteronomy Rabbah [1]: The Evolution of Ed. Lieberman” [Hebrew], Teudah 11 (Studies in the Aggadic Midrashim in Memory of Zvi Meir Rabinowitz, Tel Aviv, 1996): 107–45. This phenomenon of “building” midrash, like that of creating what I have termed an “anthology of midrashim” (a good example of which is Midrash hfi akhamim; see H. Albeck, Mavo umaftehfi ot livreshit rabbah [Introduction and indices to Genesis Rabbah] [Jerusalem, 1965], p. 115), merits its own discussion. I will not enter into it, although in theory and in practice, lines of similarity can be found between their modus operandi and those of the compilers of the yalqutim, as well as in the manner of treating the homiletic interpretations that constitute the works. 2. Rashi, however, called the composition yesod, which he uses to mean “book.” Unlike many of his day and later, Rashi distinguished clearly between midrash and what was not midrash. 3. On the acceptance of Numbers Rabbah, see H. Mack, “Numbers Rabbah: Its Date, Location, and Circulation” [Hebrew], Teudah 11 (supra, n. 1):91–105. 4. Abraham ben Azriel acknowledges Leqahfi tov by name in his Arugat habosem, but he also refers to it simply as a “midrash.” Moreover, he attributes statements to the Mekhiltah and to Genesis Rabbah that do not originate there but in Leqahfi tov. See E. E. Urbach, Arugat habosem, 4 vols. (Jerusalem, 1963), 4:175; see also S. Buber’s introduction to Midrash leqahfi tov (Vilna, 1880), pp. 58–59. Furthermore, Leqahfi tov’s title in its first printed edition (Venice, 5306/1546), Pesiqta zutarta, contributed to its mistaken reputation as a stock midrash (R. Azariah del Rossi even thought the yalqut was based on an earlier
172 The Middle Ages midrash to which R. Tobias merely added; see Meor einayim, “Imrei binah,” chap. 19. What concerns us is the widespread phenomenon of offering citations via the yalqutim while attributing words to their sources (see later notes). For more on the method of quoting midrash in Arugat habosem, see Urbach, Arugat habosem, pp. 168–69. 5. It was first printed in Salonika in two parts: on the Prophets and Hagiographa in 5281/1521; on the Pentateuch in 5286–87/1526–27. 6. See E. E. Urbach, Sefer pitron torah (Jerusalem, 1978), introduction and esp. pp. 28– 33. 7. Seder eliyahu (Vienna, 5664), introduction, p. 102. 8. L. Ginzberg, Al halakhah veaggadah [On halakhah and aggadah] (Tel Aviv, 1960), pp. 261–62; and cf. Ish Shalom’s remarks on Pirqei derabbi eliezer, Seder eliyahu, ff. 9. This title may not even have been the original one. In the colophon to the oldest manuscript of Yalqut shimoni (Oxford: Bodleian, 2637), written in 1308, the copyist, Kalonymus ben R. Jacob, calls the composition “a book . . . [whose author] is R. Simeon Hadarshan of blessed memory.” In any case, the transitional stages in the meaning of the term yalqut, from its biblical sense as “a shepherd’s sack” (I Sam. 17:40; see Targum Jonathan, Rashi’s and Radak’s commentaries to the verse) to its medieval usage as a collection into which excerpts from many books are gathered, remains to be clarified; see further, n. 13. 10. On this and on the difference between them with regard to their use of sources, see S. Buber, introduction to the Makhiri to Psalms (Berdichev, 1900), pp. 12–13. 11. For further discussion, see n. 27. For a fuller list of Yemenite midrashim and biblical anthologies, see M. B. Lerner, “The Case as It Is and as It Should Be in the Publication of the Midrash Hagadol” [Hebrew], Peamim 10 (1982):110; cf. M. M. Kasher, Torah sheleimah 1 (Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 10ff., who includes among anthologies both Rashi’s commentary to the Torah and R. H fi ezekiah ben Manoahfi ’s commentary on the Pentateuch, H fi izzequni. For the most recent survey of “Yemenite midrashim,” see Y. Ratzaby, Toratan shelivnei teiman [Yemenite Jewish Literature: Authors and Their Writings] (Kiryat Ono, 1995), pp. 102–15. 12. Some consider it the first Yemenite “midrash.” They date Midrash hagadol to the fourteenth century; see Ratzaby, Toratan, p. 102. 13. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, in his dictionary under the entry “midrash,” notes one ancient appearance of this meaning in Avot derabbi natan, version A, chap. 18 (Schechter 67), but this seems to be a misreading of the source. In any case, M. Margolies (Leviticus Rabbah, introduction, p. xxvi, nn. 78–79; and p. xxvii, n. 47) notes that the term “midrash” as a title for midrashim is a late usage that replaces the earlier term “haggadah” or “aggadah.” Either way, we must look up the dictionary meanings of terms used in the world of midrashim, anthologies, and similar works. These terms includes perush and perushim (singular and plural forms for “commentary”), which often serve to denote collections of commentaries but also works sometimes called yalqutim; see, for example, the terms used by the author of Sekhel tov to describe his work; “foundation” (yesod); “booklet” (kunteres); “compilations” (liqutim); “book” (sefer); and, of course, midrash, which also serves as an appellative for the sayings of commentators, and not only in traditional Yemenite usage (see n. 27 here). The scribe of R. Shemaiah Hashoshani’s commentary called it “the midrash founded by Rabbi Shemaiah”; see also R. I. Aboab, Menorat hamaor (Mosad Harav Kook edition), p. 21. To the best of my knowledge, the terms “notebooks” (mahfi barot) and “collections” (asuppot) did not serve to designate midrashic anthologies in the Middle Ages (the book Haasuppot of R. Eliyahu bar Isaac of Carcassone, a student of R. Eliezer of Worms, is a book of halakhah). Indeed, Sephardi authors spoke of “masters of collections” (baalei asuppot) and Rabbi Abraham ben Ezra, in his remarks on Ecclesiastes 12:11, defined them as those who
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“gather from many books and compose notebooks.” To characterize the genre of anthological literature accurately, we must also consider its relationship to the literature of the maftehfi ot (“indices”) to Rabbinic aggadah, homiletic interpretations, and so on, as well as its links to the literature of the commentaries to aggadah, which themselves were based on compilations. See my concluding remarks. 14. On this work (also known as Haggadah shel shavuot), see E. Yassif, Sippur haam ha ivri [The Hebrew folktale] (Jerusalem, 1994), chap. 5, passim. Yassif correctly included, as part of the discussion, the H fi ibbur yafeh mehayeshuah and Sefer hamaasim. 15. See Buber’s vacillations regarding R. Menahem ben R. Solomon’s Sekhel tov (Italy, 1139) until he decides to call it a “midrash”; Sekhel tov to Genesis and Exodus (Berlin, 1900), pp. xiv–xvi. 16. In this regard, Ein yaaqov differs from the work Haggadot hatalmud, which he rejected (and which has often been overlooked by scholars who have surveyed the field of anthologies). Still, the two works share an aspect, which also sets them apart from other anthologies: they require a defined corpus from which to begin, and they then try to extract from it what they called aggadah. The parameters they used are themselves a matter for further research. See, for example, the statements of R. Samuel Jaffe Ashkenazi (Yefeh toar [Venice, 5350/1590], introduction, 2b), who complained against the collection of aggadot from the Palestinian Talmud in Ein yaaqov that its author “did not record one in a thousand . . . and what is more, there are errors of deletion and insertion, because he did not have at hand the book of the Palestinian [Talmud], but only one misleading booklet, as he wrote in his introduction.” 17. The anthologist of Yalqut shimoni often abridges material, even when he quotes talmudic discussions and cuts to the conclusions. This entire matter can now be discussed in light of the books of Dov Hyman, Meqorot yalqut shimoni to Prophets and Hagiographa (Jerusalem, 1965) and to Pentateuch (Jerusalem, 1974); cf. Yalqut shimoni to the Pentateuch, ed. D. Hyman and I. Shiloni (Jerusalem, 1973–92). 18. See, for example, Buber’s remarks on R. Tobias b. R. Eliezer, Leqahfi tov, introduction, pp. 28, 31. 19. On the tendency to eclecticism in the realm of biblical commentary, see S. Japhet, “The Nature and Distribution of Medieval Compilatory Commentaries in Light of Rabbi Joseph Kara’s Commentary on the Book of Job,” in M. Fishbane, ed., The Midrashic Imagination (New York, 1993), pp. 98–130. It is possible to use the literature of biblical commentary to illuminate that of the midrashic anthologies, and vice versa. On a similar tendency, as manifested in a collection of folk narratives/exempla, see Yassif, Sippur haam haivri. 20. S. Buber edition (Berdichev, 1900), p. 3. The introduction is restated in similar language in Yalqut hamakhiri to the Twelve Minor Prophets and to Isaiah. 21. R. Jacob notes that he culled his material from 234 works, and he lists them. 22. S. A. Poznansky, “The Yalqut Talmud Torah of R. Jacob b. R. H fi ananel Siqili” [Hebrew], Hatsofeh meerets hagar 3:1 (5673/1913):5. The writing of the work was completed, it seems, in Damascus. 23. See E. Horowitz’s critique of D. Hyman’s “The Sources of the Yalqut Shimeoni” [Hebrew], Hadarom 24 (1967):216–20. If we accept this definition, we may include in this category the anthology of R. Judah Lirma, Tsintsenet haman, discovered by M. Kahana in the Firkovich collection in Leningrad (“Midrash Preserved in the Leningrad and Moscow Libraries” [Hebrew], Asufot 6 [1992]; see ibid., pp. 62–67). Among other things, Kahana quoted lengthy excerpts from the introduction to Tsintsenet haman, and there is cause to compare them with the introductions of Hamakhiri and R. Jacob Sikili, portions of which have been cited here. R. Judah Lirma writes, inter alia, of his intention to quote the sayings
174 The Middle Ages of sages whose “books are not to be found, [and with whom] most people are not familiar, for they are dispersed at the ends of the earth.” 24. See S. Lieberman, Midreshei teiman [Yemenite midrashim], 2d. ed. (Jerusalem, 1992), p. 39; and see ibid., pp. 18–22, his remarks on this midrash. 25. On this matter, see R. Jacob Sikili: Poznansky (supra, n. 22), p. 6; and on the preference shown by the compiler of Midrash hagadol for Genesis Rabbah as the basic text for Midrash hagadol to Genesis, see J. Tubi, Hamidrash hagadol—meqorotav umivnehu [The sources and construction of the midrash hagadol] (Doctoral Diss., The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1994), p. 287ff. 26. See Midrash hahfi efets, M. Havatselet edition (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 489–91. 27. Ibid., p. 489. Tubi notes in his remarks that the redactor of Midrash hahfi efets called (inter alia) the commentaries of Rashi and H fi izzequni, “Rashi’s midrash” and “H fi izzequni’s midrash”; see my citation of Rabbi Kasher in n. 11. 28. Ibid., p. 490. 29. For example, the position of Yalqut midreshei teiman, constructed along the lines of Midrash hagadol (a rough generalization), and written in Hebrew, must be clarified in Tubi’s system. On midrash and commentary in the Yemenite midrashim, see Lieberman, Midreshei teiman, pp. 6, 10. 30. The compiler of Sekhel tov cites the Sheiltot under the heading, “so said our Rabbis”; see Buber, introduction, p. xxx. Perhaps this is connected to the phenomenon that the term H fi aZaL (hfi akhameinu zikhronam livrakhah, “our Sages of blessed memory”) and others like it were not used exclusively in the Middle Ages to refer to the sages of the Talmud and midrash. 31. Compare his remarks in the introduction to the long commentary in Derekh hashelishit with his remarks in Derekh harevi it to the short commentary. See my book, Lehavin divrei hfi akhamim: mivhfi ar divrei mavo laaggadah velamidrash mishel hfi akhamei yemei habeinayim (Jerusalem, 2000). 32. See, for example, M. Ish Shalom (Seder eliyahu, introduction, pp. 87–88), on quotations from Seder eliyahu as it appeared in Reshit hfi okhmah of R. Elijah de Vidas by way of the Yalqut. Many certainly regarded the Yalqut as highly as did S. Y. Agnon, who wrote: “First and foremost is the book Yalqut shim’oni [Simeon’s compilation], by Rabbi Shim’on the Greatest of the expounders. All who seek to know the Torah, its interpretations, its allusions, its elaborations, and its secrets will find this book edifying” (Present at Sinai, trans. M. Swirsky [Philadelphia, 1994], p. 9). Indeed, the quoting of midrashic sayings by way of the anthologies was prevalent enough a practice as early as ancient times; see M. B. Lerner, “Concerning the Source of a Quotation in the Epistle of R. Solomon b. Judah and Studies in Midrash shir hashirim” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 52 (1983):581–90. 33. The great diversity of manuscripts assuredly had an impact here. There were copyists who shortened and added as they wished, as is obvious from the manuscripts to any midrash. I will mention as a generic example the Paris manuscript (Arles, 1291) of the rabbah midrashim (which include Genesis Rabbah, Leviticus Rabbah, and five portions of Numbers Rabbah). The printers of Midrash Rabbah in Constantinople (5272/ 1512), apparently on their own initiative, appended to Leviticus Rabbah three sections from Seder eliyahu, chap. 6, at the end of its portions A, B, and C. See also M. Kahana, “Genesis Rabbah MS Vatican 60 and Its Parallels” [Hebrew], Teudah 11 (supra, n. 1):17– 60. 34. See, for example, Lieberman in the introduction to his edition of Deuteronomy Rabbah, and my article “From Sermon to Story: The Transformation of the Akedah,” Prooftexts 6 (1986):97–116. 35. For now, see my article “Between Redaction and Rewriting—On the Nature of
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the Later Midrashic Literature” [Hebrew], Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, section 3 (Jerusalem, 1986), pp. 57–62. 36. Among them Midrash hfi emdat hayamim, attributed to R. Shalem Shabazzi of the seventeenth century. The work was first printed in Jerusalem in the year 5645/1885 by the traveler R. Jacob Sappir. On this, see Lieberman, Midreshei teiman, pp. 32–39; Ratzaby, Toratan, p. 53. 37. See on this supra, n. 13, and my remarks there on the matter of “indices” to aggadah. 38. On the question of the linguistic criterion, see earlier, near n. 29.
9 eli yassif
The Hebrew Narrative Anthology in the Middle Ages
he history of the Hebrew story in the Middle Ages corresponds, to a great
Textent, to that of the literary anthology. In turn, the evolution of the Hebrew tale in the Middle Ages is linked to what was arguably the most important cultural 1
phenomenon of the early Jewish Middle Ages, namely, the “separation of disciplines.” Talmudic literature, central to the literary activity of the preceding period—and, to a great extent, of the Middle Ages as well—is an all-encompassing creation. This one composition incorporates most of the period’s cultural components: scriptural commentary and medicine, law and astronomy, linguistics and historiography, prayer and liturgical poetry, botany and agronomy, all in the course of a single, unbroken, and largely undifferentiated discussion. By the height of the geonic period (eighth and ninth centuries), a tendency had evolved to create special works on law and Hebrew grammar, Jewish philosophy and hermeneutics, liturgical poetry, and Jewish history.2 This important cultural phenomenon was undoubtedly connected to the parallel development in Arab culture of the first centuries of Islam. Arab scholars in Iraq and Persia, the lands in which the phenomenon first manifested itself in Jewish culture, distinguished between separate branches of knowledge, defined the various subjects, and devised special works in the different branches.3 The question of who influenced whom is of no consequence here. Jewish culture may have borrowed the norms of the ruling culture, or perhaps Jewish culture’s internal needs led to the creation of new modes of expression, which influenced Muslim culture. Like any complex cultural phenomenon, it was undoubtedly the result of a number of interlocking factors, and only the particular confluence of an encompassing cultural atmosphere with the specific needs of the Jewish world of that time can explain its appearance. Hebrew literature’s first literary anthologies were the product of that time and phenomenon. Although the collections of medieval Hebrew tales, with a few exceptions, were anonymously composed, scholarship has proven that two of the earliest—Midrash aseret hadibberot (Midrash on the Ten Commandments) and The Alphabet of Ben Sira—date from the eighth and ninth centuries and origi176
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nated in the cultural expanse of Iraq-Persia. The prominent characteristic of these anthologies, in keeping with the separation of disciplines, is that they contain stories alone. This is not an insignificant matter: at a time when the Talmud and the midrash constituted the exclusive literary model, such an esthetic decision (to contain only narrative material) was culturally and socially audacious. Indeed, the independence that the Hebrew tale strived for in the Middle Ages was not realized quickly. Until later in the Middle Ages (the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), production of midrashic anthologies such as Yalqut shimoni, Midrash hagadol, Yalqut hamakhiri, and Yalqut reuveni continued, zealously preserving the literary frameworks of the past.4 These traditional midrashic anthologies did not carry forward the endeavor to create new literary frameworks, which would establish new contexts for the period’s Hebrew literary creativity. This task fell to the two collections of tales aforementioned, the Midrash aseret hadibberot and The Alphabet of Ben Sira. Midrash aseret hadibberot epitomizes the transitional stage. It preserves the classic pattern of the midrash: biblical verse, its homiletic interpretation, an exemplary tale, and a “circular” conclusion with the opening words of the midrash and the verse. Yet all of these are formal features, a kind of midrashic veneer over a collection of folktales. Although the tales are offered ostensibly to exemplify the scriptural commandments, the homiletic portion of Midrash aseret hadibberot is minimized. It has already been noted that the connection between the opening commandment and the tales that follow is often tenuous and forced, making it seem as though the editor-author sought to justify the multitude of tales by tacking them on to biblical verses.5 His artistic efforts focused more on the development of the tales than on emphasizing their exemplary features, a significant departure from the way stories are employed in Rabbinic literature. Moreover, while all the composition’s homiletic passages connecting the commandments to the tales originated in Rabbinic literature, most of the tales themselves, in the various formulae of Midrash aseret hadibberot, are fresh, appearing here for the first time in Hebrew literature. This suggests that the anthologist sought new and original narrative material while relying on haphazard, uninspired selections from Rabbinic literature for the homiletical-didactic portion. His dual loyalty is therein exposed: on the one hand, he cannot divorce himself from the literary norms of the preceding period; on the other, he wants to give expression to new literary trends that focus on the tale itself instead of on its homiletic context. The composition’s formal-midrashic framework made possible its acceptance by the period’s Jewish culture. Its form, however, more closely resembles that of the framework grouping (see later) than classic midrash, giving it the latitude for a wider variety of tales and the development of their plots than anything that had been accepted earlier in the period. This clashing of orientations, so prominent in Midrash aseret hadibberot, is muted by the time of The Alphabet of Ben Sira. Unlike the earlier compiler, who maintained the traditional midrashic forms even when he filled them with basically new contents, the authorial hand behind the Alphabet’s composition has given up even this formal allegiance. This author selected the literary pattern of the framework tale—Ben Sira as an infant of five is called to Nebuchadnezzar’s
178 The Middle Ages
court, where he answers the ruler’s questions and riddles in story form—in order to bind together the fundamentally new narrative material. This being the case, Midrash aseret hadibberot and The Alphabet of Ben Sira can be viewed as two sequential stages in the development of the Hebrew anthology of the Middle Ages. The first still feels duty-bound to preserve the normative midrashic pattern, although the material it presents to the Hebrew reader is fundamentally new. The second is more daring and revolutionary—as is its narrative content—and forgoes completely the literary norms prevalent in the earlier Hebrew literature. It presents the narrative material as part of a new literary pattern, apparently intended for an audience of readers other than Torah scholars and study-hall devotees. The transition described here, from the anthology with a midrashic construction to one with a framework construction, is not the end stage of development for anthologies in the Hebrew literature of the Middle Ages. Another anthological construction was a collection of tales without any formal editorial framework. Examples include: the collection of tales from the early thirteenth century preserved in an Oxford manuscript; the cycle of Yemenite folktales, also, it seems, dating from the thirteenth century, published by Gaster; and the collections dating from the late Middle Ages, such as the collections of tales in the Jerusalem Mss., and the various editions of the Mayse-bukh, in Hebrew and Yiddish.6 Almost paradoxically, it is precisely those amorphous anthologies of tales, with no editorial hand or narrative framework to bind them together, which indicate a more developed literary phase. In these anthologies, the cultural objective of “separation of disciplines” has already been completely achieved: each story is independent, free of any ideational, exegetical, or literary ties to the other tales in the anthology, collected together solely on the basis of their narrative character. In other words, in these anthologies the literary text is not beholden for its existence to any external factor, such as an idea or context, and it exists only on the strength of its own merits. This is the great difference between story cycles in Rabbinic literature and narrative anthologies of the Middle Ages: The former were created in order to reinforce a position or illustrate the legal or ideological issues into whose context they are woven, and the ties between the cycles’ tales are ideational, exegetic, or associative.7 In contrast, the narrative anthologies of the Middle Ages demonstrate near total independence: they appear as distinct compositions, and their constituent narrative texts are gathered without ideational or other intent. Each text can stand alone; the justification for its existence and narrative development is unquestionably literary. It seems to me that this is an important cultural development toward educating the audience of readers of literary works that the reading of literature is self-justifying; it need not rely on other motives such as education, ethics, or religious precepts. Alongside the framework anthologies and those containing independent tales, the Hebrew literature of the Middle Ages developed another type—the chronological anthology. To this category belong such works as the Chronicles of Moses, Midrash vayissau (The wars of Jacob’s sons), The Scroll of Ahimaaz, Shevet yehudah, Shalshelet haqabbalah, and Divrei yosef. These anthologies are generally constructed from a collection of independent texts, the great majority of which
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belong to the genre of historical legend, culled from various written and oral sources and arranged by editors in chronological order, as historical documentation of an individual hero (Moses, Jacob), a family (Ahimaaz), a community (Shevet yehudah, Divrei yosef), or the history of Jewish tradition (Shalshelet haqabbalah). The generic division mentioned here, between the framework anthology and the chronological one, interestingly coincides with the geographical divide between east and west. That is to say, most of the framework anthologies, especially those dating from the start of the period, were the product of the eastern Jewish communities—Babylonia, Persia, north Africa—whereas the chronological anthologies came out of Europe. Although by the close of the Middle Ages the eastern communities had also produced chronological compositions (such as Divrei yosef), whereas independent story groupings, such as those of the Oxford manuscript and the Mayse-bukh, had been compiled in Europe, for the most part the generic models were distributed along geographical-cultural lines. This distribution may indicate outside influence on the creation of the anthology in Jewish literature: one salient formal characteristic of narrative traditions among eastern peoples is its inclusion in a framework. The Arabian Nights, The Tales of Sendebar, and Kalila wa-dimnah were vastly influential examples of eastern, frameworkbound anthologies.8 European literature of the early Middle Ages was, conversely, characterized by rich and developed historiographical writing, beginning with the historiography of families, tribes, regions, and kingdoms, and on to world histories.9 There seems to be further evidence of this phenomenon in that Jews living under Islamic rule were familiar with such compositions as The Tales of Sendebar and Kalila wa-dimnah, which had been translated into Hebrew. The Book of Josippon and the Romance of Alexander the Great appeared in Europe in Hebrew and thus became part of Jewish culture of the time. A historiographical composition, according to its definition, cannot be considered an anthology. It is ordered chronologically and uses all existing documentation and evidence to present as complete a historical picture as possible of the period or event it treats. On the face of it, nothing is more antithetical to this definition than the anthology, whose editor collects texts, usually literary ones, according to his own preexisting taste and ideology, as representative examples of broader cultural elements. In the Middle Ages, however, the perception of historical writing and the attitude to literary sources were fundamentally different from these principles, which are derived from modern perceptions.10 Indeed, the most important, encompassing, and paradigmatic anthological work to come out of the Jewish culture of the period belongs to this category. This is the chronological anthology of Eleazar ben-Asher Halevi, Sefer hazikhronot (SZ, The Book of Memory) from the first half of the fourteenth century, consisting of some 400 manuscript pages, in the Bodleian Library, and as yet unpublished in its entirety.11 A detailed analysis of SZ’s composition and construction may more clearly define the concept of anthology as perceived by medieval Jewish culture, the principles guiding the collection, selection, and editing of its components, and the ideational and social basis underlying such a literary endeavor.
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We can begin by describing the composition and its author. An unpretentious Jew by the name of Eleazar ben-Asher Halevi, who professes to be neither rabbi nor scholar, writes a will in the early fourteenth century. In it he bequeaths to his children a single item, admonishing them neither to sell it nor to let it out of the family’s hands, but to safeguard it as something precious and irreplaceable. The legacy is a single volume in which he invested all his energies and wealth, copying it out with his own hand, which he calls Sefer hazikhronot. Accounting to his children for the content of this priceless property, Eleazar Halevi says: “For I have seen many scrolls of the external books [sfarim hahfi itsonim], dispersed and scattered about . . . I have set them down in writing for admirers of parables and poetical style [melitsa] . . . though I know that most men will not approve; in their hearts they will question how I could have invested so much time and effort in such a book, on what seems to them mere parables.”12 Toward the end of the will, he apologizes again: “though I knew those that follow me will accuse me and mock me in saying: what an ignoramus, to write a book and put so much effort into a book of parables like these . . . to compose a book of parables like this.” Eleazar uses two generic terms here: “external books” and “parables.” It is not difficult to ascertain his intent in using the first term. By “dispersed and scattered about,” he meant unknown books, or works not studied in Jewish educational institutions. His reference is apparently to the noncanonical works of the period’s Jewish literature. Moreover, since this composition includes the largest collection of apocryphal texts translated into Hebrew, he may have been referring to them when he said, “external,” which was also the talmudic sages’ term for them.13 The technical term appearing over and over in the course of the will is mashal (parable). In biblical Hebrew, this concept had various meanings, beginning with proverb and rhetorical language and ending with a complex tale. The term had the same variety of meanings in the Rabbinic period and on into the Middle Ages.14 The Latin parallel is fabula, which for medieval culture denoted all types of tales—from comic stories by way of animal tales to historical stories and exempla.15 Eleazar Halevi uses the term in this sense, giving us an indication of the literary homogeneity he perceived in the plentiful material he gathered for his composition. He labels all the varieties of literary types as “parable” and in so doing apparently distinguishes the narrative texts from the canonical texts such as legal rulings, responsa, liturgical poetry, and so on. As Salo W. Baron put it, SZ is composed of “tracts loosely connected with one another,”16 as the work includes a wide range of literary types, subjects, and narrative patterns that differ enormously from one another. What Baron stated negatively, I construe as positive: Sefer hazikhronot is the greatest, most encompassing, and diverse literary anthology of the Jewish Middle Ages that we know of. It embraces nearly all the period’s known literary types: midrashic story, historical tale, local legends, hagiography, novellas, women’s stories, parables, comic tales, martyrological narratives, miraculous rescue of a community, tales of war and heroism, journey tales, and foundation legends. Yet Eleazar also states in his will, “I wrote them in a book . . . [they] will see, comprehend, and know the truth of some of the acts committed beneath the sky, and some of the trials and tribulations to find our fathers in their exile . . . lest
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their descendants forget. Therefore I named the book The Book of Memory . . . as I have collected in this book, The Book of Memory, all that has happened and all that has been done from the creation of the world until today.”17 Eleazar’s chosen title for his book is very significant, echoing as it does the verse from the Scroll of Esther (6:1): “On that night the king could not sleep, so he commanded the book of memory of the chronicles to be brought; and they were read before the king.” In other words, the conceptual identification of the term “book of memory” with “chronicles”—the Hebrew equivalent of the word “history”—indicates, from another perspective, the character and function of the composition. Indeed, as Eleazar Halevi said, Sefer hazikhronot opens with the creation of the world, covers the prominent events in Jewish history such as the Exodus, the period of the judges, the Second Temple, the Destruction and Exile, the gezerot tatnav (that is, the massacres of 1096), and concludes with the End of Days and the coming of the Messiah. From this perspective, the work is constructed according to a purely chronological principle, establishing an encompassing historical picture of the world and the Jewish people. What follows from this description is that Sefer hazikhronot carries an internal, essential contradiction between its character as a literary anthology and its construction and orientation as a historical work. Literary texts have a narrativeentertainment orientation or are, in R. Eleazar’s words, “for admirers of parables and poetical style . . . who have no other pursuit.” He also asks, “for who would spend money on scribes for such a book?” and uses words such as “leisure” and “broad-spiritedness” to describe the disposition suited to its reading. In other words, before us is a self-proclaimed example of recreational reading in Hebrew literature of the Middle Ages.18 Yet Eleazar Halevi defines the composition as a historical book with a didactic function: “So that they will ponder, see, comprehend, and know the truth of some of the acts committed beneath the sky, and some of the trials and tribulations to find our fathers in their exile . . . lest their descendants forget.” In other words, intrinsic to the author-editor’s perception and orientation is that same duality we discerned regarding the nature of the texts included in Sefer hazikhronot and their overall construction. The duality of literary nature and historical orientation in SZ becomes very clear when examined against the background of the time and place in which it was compiled. In the 100 years between 1250 and 1350, a genre of historical writing known as “universal history” developed, mostly in Germany and the surrounding area. This genre included such titles as Weltchronik, Chronikon mundi, Historia univeralis, Summa istoriarum, Memoriale historiarum,19 all of which echo the title Sefer hazikhronot (“Book of Memory,” or “Chronicles”). Students of the genre in Christian culture have defined it as a history of the world from its creation until the author’s time, and sometimes on to the end of time and the Second Coming. For example, Aron Gurevich writes: The Middle Ages saw the efflorescence of the Encyclopaedias, the Summae, the Specula. All of these exhibit that same obsession with comprehensiveness which we find in medieval universal histories, which claim to tell the story of mankind from Adam to the moment of their writing—or even beyond that to the end of the world and the Day of Judgment.20
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It indeed seems that no other Jewish work of the period so precisely corresponds to these notions of European historiography: there is a single universal history and, as Jacques Le Goff has noted, “that history has a beginning and an end.”21 So, too, Eleazar Halevi bracketed his chronicle between these two temporal moments—the beginning and end of history—basing himself on authoritative Jewish documents like the midrash, which “documented” the process of the Creation and the visionary books that describe in detail the End of Days and the time of the Messiah. It may be possible to find more than a circumstantial connection between this genre of European historiography and Sefer hazikhronot. One of the longest and strangest tales to appear in SZ concerns Virgil the Necromancer. Eleazar Halevi inserts this tale among those of Titus and his punishment for desecrating the Temple. It is an erotic-magic novella about the sorcerer’s attempt to seduce the wife of a Roman nobleman, and how he punishes her for rejecting him by humiliating her before all the denizens of Rome.22 The tale is told here with detail and polish, and it bears consideration that this was perhaps a translation from one of the European languages. The first complete known version of the story appears in the book of Jansen Enikel of Vienna, Weltchroniken, in the year 1280, one of the first and most popular universal histories.23 This link between SZ’s inclusion of so alien a tale, and the European work preceding it by not too many years (a work that was one of the foundations of the historiographical genre, written in Eleazar Halevi’s language—medieval German—and whose version of the tale is similar) is not necessarily an accident. It may indicate that Eleazar Halevi’s historiographical conception, as well as the literary techniques he employs, were influenced directly by a similar work of European literature. Earlier chronicles and annals, or various sorts of literary works, were the primary raw materials from which the European universal histories were composed. In other words, the duality of SZ was not atypical for the culture of the time and place. Eleazar Halevi was not alone in recognizing the possibility of employing literary texts in historical writing, provided they bore the “authority” of time (that is, they came first, and as such, were reliable) or of personality (having been written by, or about, a credible individual); this was a common notion underpinning the period’s historical writing. As Gurevich writes, quotations and borrowings, set phrases and cliche´s, were a natural way of expressing oneself in an age when authority was everything and originality nothing. . . . As a rule, the historian saw himself as continuing the work of his predecessors; since, strictly speaking, there is only one universal history which cannot be rewritten anew: it can only be continued.24
Eleazar Halevi’s statements, quoted earlier, do signify that he viewed all the materials he collected for his work as just such historical “authorities,” as sources for understanding the history of the world and of the Jews. For him, even an erotic novella such as that concerning Virgil the Necromancer had positive historical value. The same orientation is manifested in the literary act itself: alongside such explicitly historical texts as Josippon and the Hebrew Chronicles of the Crusaders
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there appear the mythological tales of Romulus and Remus, Apollonian rites, the wit and wisdom of the Jerusalemites, and more of the like. The text’s authority derives not from its nature, but from its source. It then stands to reason that had R. Eleazar penned an original historical text, based on the testimony of his own eyes and ears, he would have accorded it less importance than an entertaining novella like Virgil the Necromancer, which he had found in an authoritative historical work. In other words, in Sefer hazikhronot, as in other universal histories, the sum outweighs its parts in importance: each of the dozens of texts included here is known from previous sources, some with the most dubious documentary credibility, and so in and of themselves devoid of historical value. But any one of them inserted into an encompassing chronological conception, Jewish and universal, and thereby assimilated into it from a literary perspective, becomes a component in the overall historical journey. This issue puts the act of editing at the center of historical-literary writing: Eleazar did not write any of the compositions himself, but he is the individual primarily responsible for its overall composition. And as the work’s historical meaning and cultural role are, as aforementioned, the products of the sum, not its parts, questions pertaining to the work’s editorial conception, the selection of the components, and the manner of their treatment become key literary and historical questions. Interestingly enough, R. Eleazar sees his literary role in a similar light: For I have seen many scrolls of the external books, dispersed and scattered about . . . I have set them down in writing for admirers of parables and poetical style . . . I said [I would] faithfully collect and join them in one book . . . as I have collected in this book, The Book of Memory, all that has happened and all that has been done from the creation of the world until today as is written in this book and which I found and wrote and assembled into one tent to become one book . . . and much have I troubled and toiled to couple each item to its neighbor and position it as a pearl into the mounting and as clasps into the loops.25
In other words, Eleazar regards the brunt of literary endeavor to be the gathering of scattered, unfamiliar works, and their “coupling,” as he put it, into a single textual entity. The allusion is to the building of the Tabernacle as described in Exodus 26:11: “and put the clasps into the loops, and couple the tent together, that it may be one” (we must not forget that Eleazar was, after all, a Levite!). By alluding to this verse and by using its language, Eleazar raised his literary endeavor to a virtually sacred level. Contesting Eleazar Halevi’s principal claim of unity and coupling is the criticism of those modern historians who have discussed Sefer hazikhronot. They fault Halevi for using “tracts loosely connected with one another” (Baron), and though they describe SZ as “a rich anthology of texts of historical character,” they also note that its author “did not succeed in integrating them into a unified work.”26 First, it should be emphasized that most modern historians, if they even mention SZ (and most do not),27 do so perfunctorily, and moreover they rely on Gaster’s translation into English, which is fragmented and imprecise, and do not bother to look at Eleazar Halevi’s own manuscript. Before deprecating Eleazar Halevi on the basis of our anachronistic notions of “tracts loosely connected with one an-
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other,” and what constitutes a “unified work,” we should identify what Eleazar himself meant when he spoke of “clasps and loops” to couple together separate books, as a pearl is set into its mounting. Beside its “technical” literary value, this question has, more important, a cognitive aspect: how did people of the Middle Ages perceive the links between historical events, and how did they grasp the structure of chronological continuity within Jewish history and in the broader context of general history? The first and most prominent characteristic of the work of editing chronologically is the sequencing—the editor’s ordering of texts. The placement of texts from different periods and sources alongside or within others is particularly significant in a historical chronicle, the basis of whose organization is the passage of time. In midrash, too, verses are taken from various books of the Bible, belonging to different periods, and even more so in the midrashic compilations of the Middle Ages, which cull texts from earlier and later sources and place them alongside each other without distinction. But the organizing principle of the midrash is the link to biblical verses and their interpretation, and as such, they do not require any “clasps and loops” to couple them together under one tent. Let me illustrate the placement of separate works in a single chronological sequence with SZ’s first chapter—“The Creation.”28 It opens with sections copied from Pirqei derabbi eliezer, describing the creation of the world according to the order of the days of the week, until the point where Adam is created and his children born. Here ends the midrashic excerpt; the text continues with material extracted from Sefer yezirat havalad (The creation of the child). This work concludes with a description of death and the ensuing decomposition of the body, and from here Eleazar proceeds directly to copy Masekhet hfi ibbut haqever (Treatise on suffering in the grave), describing, as its title implies, the agonies of the corpse in its grave, and concluding with the types of people that “Gehenna devours.” Eleazar now advances to the work Seder gehinnom, which describes the travels of Joshua ben Levi in Paradise and Gehenna. This concluded, Eleazar writes, “Let us return to the matter of the first man” and retells Adam’s fathering of children by Lilith and Eve, from an unknown source. Since he was dealing with the progeny of the first man, Eleazar copies Midrash shamhazzai veazael, two sons of God who married human women and stayed in this world. From here he progresses to excerpts from the Second Temple period’s Biblical Antiquities, attributed to Philo,29 and apparently translated from Latin to Hebrew in the Chronicles of Jerahmeel, one of SZ’s main sources. He continues copying, generation by generation, until he reaches Abraham, where Maaseh avraham, a relatively short midrash from the Middle Ages, is rendered in full. From here, the chronology moves on to Jacob and his offspring via another medieval work—Midrash vayissa or Milhamot benei yaakov—which details the wars of Jacob and his sons against the Canaanites after Dina’s incident in Shekhem, in the style of medieval tales of knights. After this comes The Testament of Naftali, a translated and reworked medieval version of The Testaments of the Patriarchs from the Second Temple period. Eleazar Halevi’s choice of The Testament of Naftali over all the other testaments in the book is typical: only this one boasts tales of battle and bravery, similar to those recounted in Midrash vayissa. In other words, the “clasps and
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loops” coupling the texts are not only chronological-associative, but generic as well: tales of war and courage. The Testament of Naftali concludes with two dreams linked to Joseph, which portray him in an especially negative light, as prideful and arrogant toward his brothers. Immediately afterward comes the tale of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife, offering a detailed picture of his exemplary modesty and righteousness. Here, too, it seems on the face of it that the placement of this story immediately after The Testament of Naftali is a combination of “tracts loosely connected with one another,” as Baron put it. However, insight into Eleazar’s motives can explain this editorial decision: since the earlier passage concluded with a negative image of “Joseph the Righteous Man,” Eleazar feels duty-bound to give equal weight to a normatively correct perspective of the tzaddik to his readers. He therefore inserts the story of Potiphar’s wife here, so that Joseph’s image is not tarnished by a final, unfavorable portrayal in the chronicle. Eleazar Halevi’s editorial effort was indeed comparable to the artisan’s setting of a pearl in its mounting. Culling dozens of works from various sources and periods and linking them together with chronological, associative, generic, and ideational “loops and clasps” required considerable skill and craftsmanship. At any rate, that is how he, as a fourteenth-century man, perceived the editorial craft. Though the modern reader may view SZ as a collection of “tracts loosely connected with one another,” we cannot accuse Eleazar Halevi of ignorance of editorial practice for, as we shall see, this is precisely what he considered to be his chief skill. Therein lay the medieval perception of the treatment of literary and historical documents, and it is up to us to seek out and apprehend the underlying logic. One of the most amorphous chapters from an anthological, editorial perspective is the one concerning the departure into exile. If we wish to understand the underlying logic, this is precisely the kind of material we must examine. After recounting the destruction of the Temple as per Josippon, SZ presents Josephus’s testimony on Jesus.30 Following this, he tells three tales involving Titus: the departure of captive Jewish sages in a ship bound for Europe, their sale into slavery, the establishment of communities in southern Italy and France, and the prayer Vehu rahfi um, written to commemorate the event. Afterward comes the legend of Titus and the gnat, and finally the erotic novella mentioned earlier of Virgil the Necromancer, which also takes place, in Eleazar’s opinion, in the days of Titus. After this come legends of the fall of Bethar, Zechariah’s blood, and the sins of the Jerusalemites. Baron’s and Shulvas’s accusations of loosely connected tracts and lack of fusion are more on target in this chapter than anywhere else. Yet this very disorder, so glaring to the modern reader, may yield a better understanding of the editorial conception of SZ. Eleazar Halevi ends the previous chapter with the largest extract from any work to appear in SZ, that from The Book of Josippon. It crescendos to the harrowing and tragic destruction of the Temple and the loss of national political existence—a circumstance expected to continue until the messianic age. From this crossroads extends the new era in the life of the Jewish people: departure into exile and life amid the Christian peoples (Eleazar’s reference group). Josephus’s testimony on Jesus, the Testimonium Flavianum, signals the inception of a com-
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plicated relationship between Jews and Christians, the hard kernel of the European Diaspora. Here, then, is the reason for what seems, on the face of it, to be unnecessary backtracking to the preceding period of the Great Revolt and the destruction of the Temple. No disruption of chronological order, this is rather a logical and correct insertion in the eyes of a denizen of the Middle Ages. Immediately afterward comes the legend of Vehu rahfi um, describing the dispersal of the Jewish sages among the European communities and the establishment of Torah centers. This segment belongs to the same chronological sequence, to the same “seam” joining the Destruction to the founding of an established, culturally developed European Diaspora, home to Eleazar and his readers.31 Of course, from his medieval vantage point Eleazar had to acknowledge not only the suffering of his brethren, but also the punishment of those who caused it. Two of the tales concerning Titus—the legend of the gnat (Titus’s personal punishment for causing the Destruction), and the story of the sorcerer in Rome who caused harsh civil wars and devastation (the collective punishment)—belong to the perception of past punishments as a harbinger of what would befall the nations in the End of Days. The last texts of this chapter, concerning Zechariah’s blood and the sins of the Jerusalemites, describe events that preceded the Destruction. Eleazar Halevi seems to have had two reasons for “coupling” these episodes nonchronologically. First, he found these legends in other sources, in midrash, and was averse to inserting them earlier and breaking the flow of the story from Josippon. Second, and perhaps more important, midrashic legends of the Destruction focus less on historical events than on their ethical causes. It is as if Eleazar were saying to his readers: the terrible events of which you read just now were not happenstance but the direct consequence of these serious transgressions. In other words, these texts, seemingly out of order, were deliberately placed to make a point: their goal is to give meaning to the horrific destruction and make of it a historical lesson for future generations. One of the longest and most impressive chapters in SZ is the one Eleazar Halevi calls the “Book of Massacres.” Most of it consists of extensive extracts from two works, Eliezer ben Nathan’s Chronicles of the First Crusade, and Sefer zekhirah (Book of Reminiscence) of R. Ephraim of Bonn.32 Between these two, Eleazar sandwiches the story of Amnon of Mainz, whom he sees as belonging to the same martyrological circle of the Crusades. But especially interesting is the fact that the entire chapter opens with Asarah harugei malkhut (The ten martyrs), which, chronologically speaking, belongs to a much earlier chapter.33 Eleazar’s decision to include this piece in the “Book of Massacres” instead of in the section covering the Rabbinic period, as would be chronologically indicated, shows that the subject and ideas took priority over chronology as an organizing principle. Thus the martyrs of the 1096 massacres are presented as the successors of the Ten Martyrs. Some of the characters in the Chronicles discuss this very continuity, but SZ gives the argument (that the Ten Martyrs were forerunners of the martyrs of the Crusades) a formal literary framework by putting them in the same chapter. No less interesting is what immediately follows the “Book of Massacres.” SZ’s last chapter is devoted to the End of Days and the messianic age. As has been
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mentioned, this is typical for universal histories, which choose to end in the foreseen future (i.e., the return of the Messiah) as a fitting conclusion to the history that the work as a whole treated. Thus, actual historical survey in SZ stops at the close of the twelfth century, that is, more than 100 years before Eleazar Halevi’s time. Why here? Why didn’t Eleazar bring it up to date as did, for example, Jansen Enikel in his world history, cited earlier, which included documents and testimony relating to Vienna’s contemporary history? There can be several answers. One is that Eleazar could not find any works on more current events. Another possible explanation is that he did not consider any of the more contemporary events to approach the Destruction or the Crusades in power—thus they were not worthy of documentation to be “a remembrance for coming generations,” and he stopped. And there may be yet a deeper reason. The principal works included in the last chapter on the End of Days are the Book of Zerubbabel and Otot haqets (Signs of the End of Days). The description of the wars of Armilus and Gog and Magog, said to bring great suffering and devastation upon the kingdoms of the nations in preparation for the messianic age, is central to both works. Countless gentile dead, the ruin of the mighty kingdoms, blood in every place and shape will characterize the age. One quotation from Otot haqets will suffice: “[This is] the third sign: the Almighty sends dew of blood and it will seem to the nations [of the world] like water and they will drink of it and die.” It can be stated that on a deeper, perhaps unconscious level, the wars of the End of Days are the ultimate punishment for the “Book of Massacres” perpetrated by the nations against the Jewish people: the non-Jewish blood to flow like water in the End of Days avenges the rivers of Jewish blood that SZ recounted in such detail only in the stories of the massacres. Perhaps here lies further evidence of Israel Yuval’s argument of a connection between the descriptions of blood, tortures, and mass suicides during the Crusades and the anticipation of divine vengeance against the gentile nations.34 Until this point, we have focused on chronological sequence as the main technique of forming the “loops and clasps” that join the anthology’s dozens of separate works into “one tent.” Another salient technique is deconstruction, namely, the dismantling of entire compositions and their reassembly in a new sequence. This was the rule, for example, for the broad example we looked at earlier concerning the creation of the world. The basic text is Pirqei derabbi eliezer, but SZ excerpts it selectively and intersperses among its disconnected parts small works such as Sefer yezirat havalad, H fi ibbut haqever, Seder gan eden, Seder gehinnom (Paradise and hell), and Biblical Antiquities. Thus, the original midrashic construction of Pirqei derabbi eliezer is transformed into a chronicle, based no longer on verses and midrash, but on the historical story of the creation of the world and human life. In any case, Eleazar Halevi (and likewise, perhaps, Jerahmeel, upon which much of SZ is based) did not feel much of an obligation to preserve the entirety of the work he copied, and he made masterful use of it according to the needs of the chronological anthology and his own perception of its forward movement. SZ’s primary source is undeniably the Book of Josippon. To retell the Creation tale and the dispersion of Noah’s sons after the Flood, Eleazar copies from the beginning of Josippon.35 Once Josippon moves on to cover topics not relevant to
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his chronological perception, however, R. Eleazar states: “[U]ntil this point, the words of Josippon, and what is written afterward, beginning with ‘And it came to pass when God scattered’ I will write [in the section] concerning Esau and the Edomite kings.”36 He then moves to accounts of other genealogies that he found in other sources, and continues his saga of the Jewish people—Abraham, the tribal wars, Joseph’s deeds. At this point, after inserting various passages from many other works, he says, “here too it seems right to me to go back to the Book of Josippon, to the place where I left off, in the generations of the sons of Noah, as the Josippon began to tell of Adam, Shet, and Enosh and explained the names of the families descended from Yefet and the borders of their lands, to Kittim and Dodanim as I wrote above in the generations of the descendants of Noah. And this is what he wrote afterward and, since it belongs here, I wrote it here.”37 And here he copies Josippon’s tales of the abduction of the Sabine women, the myth of Tzefo ben Eliphaz, the foundation myths of Rome and its first rulers. The reason for the deconstruction of Josippon and the pasting of its parts next to other works is, in Eleazar’s words, that the parts “belong here,” that is, since he believed all these events pertaining to the history of the nations took place during the 400 years of Egyptian servitude, he slips them in between the stories of Joseph and the Exodus. Indeed, when he encounters events that divert him from what he perceives as the proper course of things, he says: “Until here, the language of the Josippon. And afterward the Josippon wrote [of] the kingdoms of Darius and Cyrus and the Book of the Maccabees and the kingdoms of the Second Temple until the Destruction. And I will write of this in its proper place with God’s help, all as is found written in the Book of Josippon until their conclusion,”38 and he continues with the story of the Exodus. SZ is studded with such editorial remarks, which illuminate Eleazar’s clear awareness of his editorial undertaking, and the priority he gives a particular chronological perception over loyalty to the ancient works available to him. Perhaps more than anything else they reveal his historiographical perception, which regards sources as documents composed of independent units, which he could separate and rearrange according to another historical and editorial conception. In other words, Eleazar was not guilty of belittling the editorial craft or of connecting “tracts loosely . . . with one another” out of neglect. Instead, the opposite is true; he regarded the available sources as eclectic and, as such, felt free to cut and paste them with the aid of those “loops and clasps”—the main tools in the realization of his historical perception. Another literary phenomenon, similar to the last two in that it is likely to leave an impression of slipshod and disorderly editing, is repetition. Eleazar Halevi retells a number of tales in the course of his story: the legend of Raban Johanan ben Zakkai’s escape from Jerusalem is recounted in an extract copied from Midrash Lamentations Rabbah (12, 3), and again later in the excerpt taken from Seder olam raba;39 the tale of the Septuagint is told in the context of Second Temple stories, and then again in a Rabbinic framework,40 to list some examples. These repetitions lend themselves to a simple technical explanation: they stem from the copying of compositions containing different versions of the same tale, consequently, tales Eleazar already told are recopied. The anthological nature of the work can hardly prevent such phenomena as repetition and doubling. Still, when
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these repetitions occur with respect to encompassing texts that claim a central portion of SZ, and when the various versions have different and contradictory orientations, mere technical explanations do not suffice. The story of the Destruction is the first instance of this phenomenon. It can be said without hesitation that this is SZ’s central story: it stands at the crossroads of Jewish history, as does the Incarnation for Christian history. It splits the historical horizon of SZ into “before” and “after”: all history of the past took place prior to that point, whereas the events of the present—the Diaspora, the establishment of centers of Torah scholarship, the wanderings and persecutions—came “after,” the direct result of that devastation. Indeed, the two primary bodies of texts relating to the Destruction, which are the longest unbroken excerpts in the work, are from the Book of Josippon and Midrash Lamentations Rabbah,41 and both recount the same episode. Differences between the Josippon/Josephus version of the tale of the Destruction and that of Midrash Lamentations Rabbah exist on almost all possible levels: the historical story versus midrash; an eyewitness to the event who penned his impressions some years afterward as opposed to legends crystallized over hundreds of years following; the professional historian with military training and experience in contrast to sages of the study hall; a Hellenistic author writing in Greek for a Roman audience juxtaposed with the compilers of the midrash, writing mostly in Aramaic for broad sectors of the Jewish people. And, of course, we cannot dismiss the dissimilar orientations of the two narratives of the Destruction: whereas the former tells a historical tale with apologetic tendencies, Lamentations Rabbah seeks to tell an ethical tale with didactic intent. The Josippon version describes the zealots’ internecine struggles and their battles with the Romans, the political forces active in that arena, the disposition of forces and their logistical situation, the technical details of the conquest and the destruction. The chapter copied in SZ from Lamentations Rabbah begins with the legend of Zechariah’s blood, documenting the sins of the Jerusalemites, continues with a description of their wickedness and the wantonness of their daughters, and goes on to detail, by means of the appropriate verses, the punishments for these transgressions. Afterward the editor collects the martyrological tales from the midrash—among them the infants drowned at sea, the children of Zadok the Priest, the mother and her seven sons— to show how the reproof was carried through. Neither the passage from Lamentations Rabbah nor that from Josippon is quoted in the original order; they are thoroughly deconstructed. As a result, the conceptual pattern woven herein can be seen as the work of Eleazar Halevi, although its foundations originated in these two sources. Is it possible that Eleazar failed to sense the differences between the two texts? Even if he did, how could he overlook the fact that they both told the story of the same event, and that copying both in the chronology would be redundant? Answering these questions draws us to the status of the texts in Jewish culture. Eleazar Halevi declared in his will-cum-introduction his intention to gather in this work the scattered and dispersed external books, those that had not been graced with interest, that were defined as noncanonical literature. The Book of Josippon was still part of this category at the time. But what was Midrash Lamentations Rabbah, an inalienable, uncontested part of the Jewish canon, doing here? There
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is no escaping the supposition that Eleazar copied the story of the Destruction from the Book of Josippon, knowing of another narrative describing the event, one accepted by devout Jews. Offering only the noncanonical version of the story would have been tantamount to challenging the normative Jewish narrative and contesting its version of the course of events. Had Eleazar not included the passage from Lamentations Rabbah, he might have been accused of asserting, for instance, that the causes of the Destruction were political, social, and military, as Josephus maintained, and not theological as per the “official” Jewish version. Copying the passage from Lamentations Rabbah after the one from the Josippon was intended to communicate that he had not forsaken