The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
Aristidis Bitzenis
THE BALKANS: FOREIGN DIRECt INVEStMENt ANd...
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The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
Aristidis Bitzenis
THE BALKANS: FOREIGN DIRECt INVEStMENt ANd EU ACCESSION
Transition and Development Series Editor: Professor Ken Morita Faculty of Economics, Hiroshima University, Japan The Transition and Development series aims to provide high quality research books that examine transitional and developing societies in a broad sense – including countries that have made a decisive break with central planning as well as those in which governments are introducing elements of a market approach to promote development. Books examining countries moving in the opposite direction will also be included. Titles in the series will encompass a range of social science disciplines. As a whole the series will add up to a truly global academic endeavour to grapple with the questions transitional and developing economies pose. Also in the series: Transition and Development in China Towards Shared Growth Yun Chen ISBN 978 0 7546 4834 5 Globalization and the Transformation of Foreign Economic Policy Pawel Bozyk ISBN 978 0 7546 4638 9 The Political Economy of Asian Transition from Communism Sujian Guo ISBN 978 7546 4735 5 The Periphery of the Euro Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in CIS Countries Edited by Lúcio Vinhas de Souza and Philippe De Lombaerde ISBN 978 0 7546 4517 7 Transition, Taxation and the State Gerard Turley ISBN 978 0 7546 4368 5 The Institutional Economics of Russia’s Transformation Edited by Anton N. Oleinik ISBN 978 0 7546 4402 6
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
ARIStIdIS BItZENIS University of Macedonia, Greece
© Aristidis Bitzenis 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Aristidis Bitzenis has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identi.ed as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Bitzenis, Aristidis. The Balkans : foreign direct investment and EU accession. -- (Transition and development) 1. European Union--Balkan Peninsula. 2. Balkan Peninsula- Economic conditions--21st century. 3. Investments, European --Balkan Peninsula. 4. Balkan Peninsula--Foreign economic relations--European Union countries. 5. European Union countries--Foreign economic relations--Balkan Peninsula. 6. Balkan Peninsula--Economic integration. I. Title II. Series 337.1'42'09496-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bitzenis, Aristidis. The Balkans : foreign direct investment and EU accession / by Aristidis Bitzenis. p. cm. -- (Transition and development) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-4566-5 -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9082-5 (ebook) 1. European Union-Balkan Peninsula. 2. Investments, Foreign--Balkan Peninsula. 3. Balkan Peninsula-Politics and government--1989- I. Title. HC240.25.B28B58 2009 332.67'309496--dc22 2009007624 ISBN EISBN
978-0-7546-4566-5 (hbk) 978-0-7546-9082-5 (ebk.V)
Contents
List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations
vii ix xi xiii
Introduction
1
1
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies: Increased FDI Inflows in Transition Economies
3
2
Privatization Theory: Privatization Deals as a Reason for Increased FDI Outflows
57
3
Foreign Direct Investment Theory
75
4
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence
103
5
Trends of FDI under Globalization: The Case of Regionalization of FDI Inflows
127
6
The European Union (EU) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): Prospects of the Balkan Countries Integrating into the EU 155
7 Case Studies
253
8 Conclusion
375
References Index
381 403
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List of Figures
3.1
Foreign involvement using entry modes
6.1 6.2
Forms of integration Inflation rate and long-term interest rate of some EU members
76 156 231
7.1 Frequency of general ratings as ‘important’ and ‘very important’ 278 7.2 Frequency of obstacles rating as ‘very important’ and ‘important’ 279 7.3 Groups of motivations (hunters) 314 7.4 Ways (entry modes) used by MNEs to invest in Bulgaria 315 7.5 The key motivations for FDI in Bulgaria (research from 64 MNEs) 316 7.6 The most important obstacles for Bulgarian FDI inflows (research from 64 MNEs) 317 7.7 Groups of motives (hunters): Foreign vs. Greek MNEs in Bulgaria 353 7.8 Ways (entry modes) used by MNEs (foreign vs. Greek) in order to invest in Bulgaria 354 7.9 The most important FDI motives for MNEs (foreign vs. Greek) that invested in Bulgaria (research from 64 MNEs) 355 7.10 The most important FDI obstacles for MNEs (foreign vs. Greek) that invested in Bulgaria (research from 64 MNEs) 357
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List of Tables
1.1 Planned economies vs. market economies 1.2 Market economy characteristics 1.3 Nine reform models 1.4 Four steps for the transition to market economy
5 6 9 34
3.1
FDI inflows in Poland
82
4.1
Determination of FDI inflows according to the literature review: Survey based approach
FDI inflows by host country, economy or region in million US$ (1991–2002) 5.2 Cross-border M&As with values of over US$1 billion (1989–2002) 5.3 Distribution of world FDI inflows, 1986–2001 5.4 FDI inward stock (cumulated FDI inflows) by host country, economy or region in million US$ (1980–2002) 5.5 FDI outflows by home country, economy or region in million US$ (1991–2002) 5.6 FDI outward stock (cumulated FDI outflows) by home country, economy or region in million US$ (1980–2002) 5.7 Structure of West European trade, 1928–1998 5.8 West European foreign direct investment outflows, 1980–1997
105
5.1
141 144 145 146 147 149 152 153
Box 6.1 The main reasons behind the ERM crisis in 1992/93
170
6.1 List of European treaties 6.2 National currency weights to the ECU value 6.3 Conversion rates of EMU currencies 6.4 ERM II bands, central rates (conversion rates of future EMU members – not finalized rates), and dates of entrance 6.5 Stages of the Maastricht Treaty 6.6 Greek exchange rate during 2000 (Drachma against Euro) 6.7 Greek GDP and Greek deficit in 2002–2006 6.8 Revised Greek GDP and revised Greek deficit in 2002–2006 6.9 Greece: Long-term interest rates 6.10 Greece: Exchange rate stability
160 167 172 172 174 177 179 180 186 187
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
6.11 Greece: General government financial position 6.12 Greece: HICP inflation 6.13 Sweden: Long-term interest rates 6.14 Sweden: HICP inflation 6.15 Sweden: General government financial position 6.16 Sweden: Exchange rate stability 6.17 Advantages from being an EMU member and from the introduction of a common currency (EURO) 6.18 Costs of participation in the EMU 6.19 Debt over GDP 6.20 Surplus/deficit over GDP 6.21 Progress towards Maastricht – an overview of economic indicators of convergence 6.22 Membership referendum results 6.23 The enlargement of the European parliament 6.24 Chapters of acquis correspondence 6.25 Advantages and disadvantages from being an EU member 6.26 Economic indicators and the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria 6.27 Economic indicators of convergence 6.28 GDP in European Union 6.29 GDP growth rate 6.30 Minimum wages in euros per month in EU member states, candidate countries, January 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 6.31 Minimum wages in PPS per month in some EU member states, candidate countries, 2004, 2005, 2006 6.32 Human development index 6.33 Standardized unemployment rates in Europe 7.1 Mobile operators in associate candidate countries (ACC) and Western Balkan countries (WBC) 7.2 FDI inward stock in millions of US$ 7.3 FDI inward stock per capita in US$ 7.4 Active banks in Serbia as of 21 June 2006 7.5 Corruption perceptions index 2003 7.6 External debt/GDP per cent in EEC countries (1991–1993) 7.7 Current account balances of Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–2002 7.8 Current account in per cent of GDP in EEC (1991–1993) 7.9 Bulgarian inflation rate, 1990–2000 7.10 Direction of Bulgarian trade (1945–1998) 7.11 Merchandise exports of Eastern Europe, 1980, 1989–2002 7.12 Merchandise imports of Eastern Europe, 1980, 1989–2002 7.13 Inflows of foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–2002
188 188 189 189 189 190 192 194 198 201 214 218 219 220 222 228 229 232 234 235 237 238 239
269 276 276 303 319 335 336 337 339 342 345 346 348
Acknowledgements Εγώ ειμί το φως του κόσμου. Ο ακολουθών εμοί ου μη περιπατήση εν τη σκοτία αλλ’ έξει το φως της ζωής. ‘Ιησούς Χριστός’
This book would have never been completed without the valuable support of my wife. Also, the comments and suggestions from Dr. Marangos were of greatest importance for the finest preparation of this book. I would also like to thank some other people for the help they offered me during the preparation of this book such as Prof. Klaus Meyer, Prof. Gabor Hunya, Prof. Bruno Sergi, and Prof. Paul Hare. I am most grateful to all of them. Special mention needs to be made to the splendid Ms. Christou Angela, who has spent hundred of hours and a great amount of her precious time checking on my written English, proofreading and editing all the chapters in this book. Her suggestions, comments and corrections were invaluable. Also, I would like to thank Kafteranis Xarisios, who not only supported my efforts, but also encouraged and helped me in every difficulty I faced during the preparation of this book. I should not forget Dymphna Evans, Brendan George, Carolyn Court, Aimée Feenan and Adrian Shanks from Ashgate for their kindness and full support, as well as Ashgate Publishing for giving me the opportunity to publish this book. Last but not least, I am especially grateful to my wife Anna – Xenia Lyssikatou, and to my sister Bitzeni Yiouli, for their continuous emotional and economic support and for helping me bring this task to its completion. I dedicate this book with my deepest love and affection to my son Loukas, my daughter Eftychia and to my whole family.
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List of Abbreviations
BGN Bulgarian Lev BOP Balance of Payments CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation and Stabilization CEE Central and Eastern Europe CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries CEFTA Central European Free Trade Association CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CPI Consumer Price Index DEM Deutche Mark EAD Economic Analysis Division EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EC European Community ECB European Central Bank ECE Economic Commission for Europe ECSC European Coal and Steel Community ECU European Currency Unit EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EIB European Investment Bank EIU Economist Intelligence Unit EMS European Monetary System EMU Economic and Monetary Union EU European Union FDI or DFI Foreign Direct Investment FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GDR German Democratic Republic GNP Gross National Product IBI International Banking Institute IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IFC International Finance Corporation
xiv
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
IIB International Investment Bank IMF International Monetary Fund IPO Initial Public Offering M&As Mergers and Acquisitions MEBO Management and Employee Buyouts MNC Multinational Corporation MNE Multinational Enterprise NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PETs Planned Economies in Transition PHARE Poland/Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy [Pologne/Hongrie: Assistance a la restructuration economique] PPP Purchasing Power Parity SAAs Stabilization and Association Agreements SAP Stabilization and Association Process SEA Single European Act SEEs South East European Economies SEECs South East European countries SGP Stability and Growth Pact SMEs Small & Medium Enterprises SOEs State-Owned Enterprises UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nations on Trade and Development UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe US United States USA United States of America USD United States Dollar USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VAT Value Added Tax WB World Bank WIIW The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies [Wiener Institut fur Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche] WTO World Trade Organisation
Introduction
The fall of communism and the subsequent developments have put a renewed spotlight on the potential of the Balkan economies. Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia & Montenegro, Romania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are countries that have attracted rather low levels of investment, with poor political leadership in the majority of these countries delaying the much needed and anticipated reforms. However, there are now signs of improvement and this timely book aims to fill a significant gap in the literature. This book demonstrates and supports the idea that these countries must engage as fully as possible with the world economy via EU accession and explores the implications of the specific characteristics of these countries which have made the transition process more difficult. It is well known that FDI plays a potential role in encouraging and supporting a successful transition. FDI in transition economies appears to be an effective tool for several reasons such as transfer of knowledge, increased productivity, upgrading of managerial and labour force skills, improving the state balance, balancing deficits, accelerating privatization of state-owned enterprises and quickly restructuring of them. Over the last 30 years economists and investors have dealt with countries mainly from Latin America, and Asia such as Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, China, and a few others like the UK, the USA, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece for their inward investment activities. After 1989 and the collapse of communism, Central and Eastern European countries along with the Baltic States and the CIS have been an ‘attractive area’ for business. The interest is always with countries that open their borders; their economies offer great opportunities, incentives and challenges for inward FDI. In the last two decades (1990s–2000s), the interest of foreign investors has focused mainly on the Central and Eastern European Economies and secondly on the South East European Economies. Therefore, the fall of communism in Central and Eastern European countries raised the interest of economists, entrepreneurs and multinational enterprises (MNEs) in analysing and exploiting the potentials of Central and East European markets and especially the Balkan market. Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia & Montenegro, Romania and FYROM are among the countries that have not been studied yet. In reality, what makes this book interesting is the fact that the Balkans is a relatively neglected region in studies of transition, as well as being one that presents some unusually difficult problems. The economic environment in the region has not proved especially attractive to business, and the poor political leadership in most
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
of these countries has delayed much needed reforms for way too long. However, there are signs of improvement in most countries, and that might make this book quite timely. These countries must simply engage as fully as possible with the world economy (globalization, EU integration), otherwise there is no way they will ever escape their present poverty. At the same time, the Balkan region displays the following specific characteristics: geographical distance from the Western markets, cultural distance from the West, strong dependence on the former Soviet Union and its subsequent dissolution (Russia and CIS), strong dependence on the CMEA trade organization and its collapse, adverse initial conditions, and political instability and/or inability of the respective governments that hinders the success of the whole transition process. This book will therefore prove suitable for gaining a greater understanding of the South East Economies as special case studies as well as understanding their prospects to enter to the EU. The book can be used in modules relating to transition economies, those discussing international business in the Balkan region, and the European business environment as it relates to the South Eastern Europe region. The book includes more than 20 case studies (uniquely from the Balkan region) and topics such as FDI, privatization (entry modes), and prospects for an EU entrance have been presented and analysed. The book is designed to further understanding of the reasons behind the low accumulation of FDI flows in the Balkan region and provides detailed coverage of the difficulties of the Balkan’s business environment (mentality, entrepreneurship, banking reform, legal reform, etc.). The book will also assist in comprehending the macro environment of the SEE region.
Chapter 1
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies: Increased FDI Inflows in Transition Economies
1.1 Introduction: Planned vs. Market Economies; The Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy The breakdown of centralized socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Central and Eastern Europe and Asia resulted in the adoption of the market process as a means of organizing the economy. The movement from a centralized socialist economy to an economy based on market relations has been termed transition, and thus the economies that have adopted this process are named transitional economies. In particular, the transition process was associated with an explicit end-state. The transition economies associated this end-state with the establishment of a capitalist economic system. Hence, the transition involved, in essence, the introduction of private ownership as a result of privatization and/or restructuring of state-owned enterprises, and the establishment of market equilibrium as a result of abolishing centrally administered commands. The transition went further to involve liberalization of economic activity, an institutional reform, a change in economic behaviour as a result of economic actors adjusting their behaviour in line with self-interest, and the rules of the exchange market. It also involved the reduction of the state’s role as a legislator and facilitator of economic activity. The term transition has been criticized as being inadequate, as it does not capture all the complications involved during the process. The term implies a linear movement from A (centralized socialism and disequilibrium) to B (capitalism and equilibrium). Specifically, as the term transition implies an endstate, the achievement of the end-state completes the whole process. It can be argued that the process is already completed as transition economies have adopted a capitalist economic system and most countries of the Central and Eastern Europe have become members of the European Union (EU). Hence, the term transitional economy is obsolete. On the other hand, it can be argued that the ‘transition’ process is ongoing and equilibrium can never be achieved by using terms such as transformational economies or simply developing economies. In addition, since capitalism comes in many forms, the question arises as to what type of capitalism should be the goal. This further complicates the process (Sergi, 2003; Marangos, 2004a). Even the goal
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
of achieving a capitalist economic system was questioned by some commentators who offered alternatives such as market socialism as the most appropriate economic system, pointing out China and Vietnam as examples (Marangos, 2006a; 2006b). The economic programme of transition involved the following four factors, but in no particular order. The first was macroeconomic stabilization, in order mainly to reduce inflation and to decrease the debt burden. The second was liberalization of economic activity such as prices, trade, currency convertibility, etc. The third was the reduction of the size of public sector by privatizing and restructuring state-owned enterprises. The last factor required introduction of new laws and regulations. For example, property rights, corporate law, accounting practices, tax regulation, etc. Hence, the decision to move to a market-based economy required a total transformation of the economy as a whole (see also Zloch-Christy, 1994). Meanwhile, as citizens had been protected for so long by the socialist state, they were ill prepared to face the economic adversity and uncertainty that came about as the result of the free market process. Although all countries in transition had more or less the same final goal, the results of their efforts diverged. This was due to the diverse and/or adverse internal as well as external conditions each country initially faced and to the different strategies, policies, and paths they undertook to ensure smooth and successful transitions (Bitzenis, 2006b; 2007). A market economy, or a free economy, or a free enterprise economy is an economic system which allocates scarce resources, based on the interaction of market forces of supply and demand. It is an economy that operates by voluntary exchange and it is not planned or controlled by a central authority. It is the conceptual opposite of a command, or central, or planned, or government controlled economy, where all goods and services are produced, priced and distributed under government control. Nowadays, a market economy is associated with a capitalistic economy (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). The market is a process in which individuals interact with one another in pursuit of their separate economic objectives. The basic principle under which the market functions is: if you own something which you are entitled to and you wish to exchange it for something else which belongs to someone else and you execute the exchange without violence, theft or deception then you become entitled to what the other person was previously entitled to, and vice-versa. Both parties in an economic transaction in the market benefit from it, provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and the parties well-informed. Otherwise, the transaction will not take place. In this way, through the market process, everyone is able to escape coercion at the hands of any buyer or seller by turning to another buyer or seller.
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
Table 1.1 Planned economies vs. market economies Planned (centralized or central planned) economy characteristics
Characteristics of an economy during its transition to a market economy
State owned enterprises (SOEs), no private sector Bribery, lack of transparency, bureaucracy, corruption No effective allocation of resources Governmental inability/unwillingness for adequate reforms (political cost) (natural + human + capital) No unemployment, no or limited inflation Black economy Limited quantity, variety and quality of products Nomenklatura, criminality, mafia Central plan Unclear property rights (the government set the prices, salaries) Central plan (what to produce, in which Unemployment and increased poverty quantity and quality → secured clients – secured trade partners) Subsidies → on products for the local/ Legacy of communist regime as an adverse initial condition foreign market → on enterprises (bad loans), soft budget constraints Manipulation of output, pricing and employment Economic crises and output decline Free education – health system (high levels) Small savings, low GDP per capita Production of certain products High inflation, exchange rate devaluations, monetary overhang Lack of competitiveness Trade with Eastern countries (CMEA – COMECON) Exchange of products in special (low) prices Lack of sound financial institutions, political instability Over-inflated macroeconomic data Adverse economic initial conditions Lack of commercial legislation and market Reductions of trade quotas and tariffs, oriented taxation systems, one-tier banking Elimination of subsidies system, no stock exchange State: the guiding force of the market Unstable legal framework Lack of experience (managerial skills, Geographical and cultural distance from the west, isolation of the country reformers, governance, mentality, entrepreneurship)
There is currently no country where all markets within its borders are absolutely free. Rather, a free market economy is one with limited government intervention (otherwise known as laissez-faire). Market based economies require appropriate laws and institutions which include defined property rights that are respected and enforced, as well as procedures to guarantee the execution of contracts. Many states which are said to have a capitalist system do not have the level of market freedom that some would prefer. Even the United States of America (USA), a worldwide representative of capitalism, has placed restrictions upon the freedom of individuals in the economy.
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
Markets are also characterized by market failure, i.e. an allocation of resources which is not efficient. The market is able neither to produce public goods (defence, law and order, etc.) nor to ‘cover’ the social cost or benefits of externalities (environmental pollution, education, etc.). Thus, it creates monopolies and oligopolies. Then, the state takes on the responsibility of producing public goods and subsidising positive externalities funded through taxation, while it restricts negative externalities, monopolies and oligopolies.
Table 1.2 Market economy characteristics Market economy characteristics Market forces (supply and demand) State: A role of the legislator and facilitator of the economic activities Competitive environment Free prices, trade, interest rates, exchange rates Private sector Hard budget constraints, new corporate governance New laws and institutions Taxes on private companies (corporate and personal income taxes and VAT) Black economy, under-reported data Unemployment Effective governance, competition Advanced two-tier banking system (central bank + commercial banks) Stock market exchange Financial intermediaries (insurance companies, pension funds etc.) Limited or even absence of subsidies, trade quotas and tariffs Reforms at all levels (tax, financial, legal etc.) Privatization and restructuring, macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, institutional or structural reform (new laws, new institutions, new mentality) Open country, FDI flows, open trade, open economy
Finally, Bitzenis and Marangos (2007) argued that the terms ‘integration and transition’ are more appropriate than just ‘transition’ of what essentially took place in the Central and east European region and generally in transition economies. They stated that in fact, it is an integration-assisted transition. These terms, integration, assistance and transition, are not substitutes but complements in demonstrating the transition process in the CEE economies. Integration means that a country becomes a part of the globalized world. Integration is the goal of globalization, and integration is achieved by inviting multinationals and entering the EU. Integration is further enhanced by membership of the EMU and the adoption of the single currency. Both the European Union (EU) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are the best examples of integration and globalization, as
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
membership involves the abolishment of barriers to entry, liberalization policies, and the adoption of the 35 chapters of the acquis (6th EU enlargement policy). All of them determine the legal, political and economic convergence among member countries, and create the fundamentals for stability for the members and a sound business environment to attract FDI and trade flows (Sergi, 2004).
1.2 The Transition Reform Paths to Democracy and/or Market Economy A successful transition process may be treated as a tool for the economic development of a country. However, … (transition) is not only an intermediate goal contributing to economic development. It may also be regarded as an ultimate objective in itself. The market economy, in contrast to central planning, gives, in principle, the individual the right to basic choices over aspects of his or her life: occupation and place of work, where to live, what to consume, what risks to take or avoid, and so on. (EBRD, 1994, 3)
An important factor in studying the transition process is the way in which the initial dismissal of the communist regime occurred. Regimes ‘fall’ in many different ways. For example, the transition of power was smooth and peaceful in Poland and Hungary, which had a tradition of dialogue and negotiations; it was peaceful but painful in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria; and it was painful and violent in Romania which was on the verge of civil war by Christmas 1989. (Berglund et al., 1994, 241)
There is a distinct difference between transition from a planned to a market economy and transition from a communist regime to democracy. In other words, after the Central and East European countries faced the collapse of the communist regime and moved towards democracy, they adopted monetary, income, fiscal stabilization policies and institutional reforms in order to establish all the elements of a functioning market economy in their economic environment. Thus, it is important to present and analyse the transition reform paths and the need to have a ‘strict government’, which would not sacrifice the successful implementation of its reform policy for the sake of popularity. Meyer (1998, 209) characterizes the transition from communism to democracy as a: ‘… decisive precondition for the establishing of new democratic institutions and the restructuring of economic institutions moving away from the planned towards the market economy’. The political transition comprised political liberalization, free elections and general democratization and aimed at replacing the single-party political regime and establishing liberal democracy and a civil
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
society (Sokol, 2001). The transition from communism to democracy in most of the countries was supported by the previous development of a civil society whose characteristics reflected the revolutions themselves: it was anticommunist, anti-ideological, and anti-political (Tismaneanu, 2001). However, certain barriers might arise in the development of the new political system such as the risk the old elite faced to transfer its political power into new forms in the new system, along with the lack of democratic traditions and experience (Mygind, 2000). Despite the fact that transition countries adopted rapidly multiparty democracy regimes, some reversals of political reforms and many tensions, controlled by the previous regimes arose (EBRD, 1995). There is also a common consensus that the implication of a market-oriented transition might be deemed as a political development because of the robust relationship existing between the political and economic reforms (EBRD, 1995). We agree with Kolman et al. (2003, 87) who found that in spite of the small geographical distance, there are cultural differences between countries from the Central and East European region and the Western European countries. It was also their belief that, from a managerial perspective, it would be dangerous to treat the Central East European countries as a homogeneous group or cluster. In an earlier article, Ronen and Shenkar (1985) had attempted to create clusters among different countries and to group them together basically according to their geographical area, their language and religion, their beliefs that arose from certain norms and values and their technological development. Ronen and Shenkar had also argued that geography casually precedes the other variables such as language and religion and that the geographical grouping may contain countries from all five continents as the spread of culture may be attributed to colonization and immigration. They included in the proposed clusters only one country from the Central and East European region, ex-Yugoslavia. By applying a political economy approach to the transition process, Marangos (2004a) develops alternative models of transition. The alternative models of transition can be distinguished on the basis of what the author defines as the primary elements of each transition model: (1) Economic Analysis; (2) What is a Good Society?; (3) Speed; (4) Political Structure; (5) Ideological Structure; and (6) Initial Conditions. On the basis of the primary elements, Marangos (2004a) distinguished five transition models: The Shock Therapy model of transition; the Neoclassical Gradualist model of transition; the Post-Keynesian model of transition; the Pluralistic Market Socialist model of transition; and the NonPluralistic Market Socialist transition model (Chinese model). In Kolman et al. (2003), Ronen and Shenkar (1985) and Marangos (2004a), the grouping of the countries into clusters is profound and is based on cultural, geographical and transition elements in order to provide a framework for theoreticians and practitioners to study the interaction between companies and a host country (destination country of an FDI project) and to understand the values and attitudes of employees in such a country. To this end, the nine reform models
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
presented in this paper will be our contribution to the categorization of transition countries into clusters, based on their political and transition reform features.
Table 1.3 Nine reform models Reform models
Countries/Year
Diplomacy
East Germany Bosnia & (1989) Herzegovina (1995)
Russia (1991)
Serbia & Montenegro (1995)
Croatia (1995)
Quiet/peaceful/ colour or flower revolutions
Ukraine (Orange Revolution) (2004); Georgia (Rose Revolution) (2003); Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution) (2005)
Czech Republic (Velvet Revolution) (1989)
Slovakia (Velvet Revolution) (1989)
FYROM (1991); Slovenia (1991); Serbia & Montenegro (Peaceful Revolution) (2000)
Estonia (Bloodless – Singing Revolution) (1991)
Disguised
Hungary (1994)
Bulgaria (1990)
FYROM (1992)
Russia (1991); Albania Lithuania (2002); Serbia (1992) & Montenegro (1990)
Compromised
Bulgaria (1997); Albania (2002)
Hungary (1990)
China (1989)
Poland (1995-)
Violent
Romania (1989); Albania (1997)
China (1989)
Serbia & Montenegro (2003)
Lithuania Latvia (1991) (1991); Russia (1993)
Rebellion
China (1987)
Poland (without revolution) (1989)
Albania (1991)
Belligerent
Serbia & Montenegro (1992)
Bosnia & Herzegovina (1992)
Croatia (1992)
Transparent
China (1978)
Vietnam (1979)
Mixed
Bosnia & Herzegovina; FYROM; Albania
Croatia; Serbia & Montenegro
Source: Bitzenis, 2007.
Lithuania; Latvia; Estonia; Russia
China
Estonia (1992); Latvia (2002)
Bulgaria (1990, 1997)
Poland; Hungary; Bulgaria
10
The Balkans: Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession
Studying the transition models to a market economy and the economic development of transition countries, one recognizes similar and different characteristics among transition procedures of the various countries especially at the beginning of the transition period (1990s), during the collapse of the communist regime. Thus, our introduction of nine general transition reform paths with regard to the way that the reform from communism to democracy and to a market economy was achieved: (1) the Diplomacy Reform; (2) the Quiet Reform; (3) the Disguised Reform; (4) the Compromised Reform; (5) the Violent Reform; (6) the Rebellion Reform; (7) the Belligerent Reform; (8) the Transparent Reform; and finally (9) the Mixed Reform (see Table 1.3). The Diplomacy Reform model: In the Diplomacy Reform model transition is achieved through political intervention of an external power. This transition path is recognizable in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) where the collapse of the old regime and the subsequent reunion with West Germany was demanded by the East Germans. It is also recognizable in the countries that have been created from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (e.g. Russia, FYROM, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Estonia, etc.). However, in most cases a Diplomacy Reform was an outcome of a Belligerent Reform (see below). The Quiet or Peaceful Reform (colour or .ower revolutions) model: In the Quiet or Peaceful Reform model the old regime is faced with a peaceful yet determined opposition and through a proclamation of national elections eventually hands over power to the democratic opposition without any resistance. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia (the Czech and the Slovak Republic) and its transition to democracy is such an example. This specific reform is also known as the velvet revolution. In November/December 1989, a peaceful student demonstration in Bratislava and in Prague along with other popular demonstrations and strikes led the communist party to announce at the end of that year the end of its monopoly on political power. This resulted in the first democratic elections since 1946 for Czechoslovakia. The Quiet Reform with the simultaneous establishment of independence of the country in a peaceful way can also be called the Quiet/Diplomacy Reform. It took place in Slovenia, FYROM, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia & Montenegro and Estonia. Both Slovenia and FYROM broke away from Yugoslavia (FRY) in a peaceful manner. Under the same kind of reform we have the so-called colour revolutions, the rose, tulip and orange revolution. The first of such kind, the Rose Revolution started in Georgia in November 2003. In the parliamentary elections, Saakashvilli, the opposition leader who was supported by independent exit polls, claimed that he had won the elections. However, this result was unacceptable to the leading party and led to a non-violent and anti-governmental demonstration in Tbilisi and other cities of Georgia. The demonstrations of the supporters of Saakashvilli
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with roses in their hands along with the elite military units’ refusal to support the government, forced President Shevardnadze to resign. In the same direction, in the Ukrainian presidential election at the end of 2004, Yanukovych (President from the end of 2002 until the end of 2004) was declared the winner. However, this outcome was not accepted by the majority since the exit polls proclaimed Yushchenko (Prime Minister from the end of 1999 until the end of April 2001) the winner. Thus, mass demonstrations in Kiev and many other Ukrainian cities took place at the end of 2004. Over half a million protesters, wearing orange ribbons demonstrated and supported Yushchenko (orange was the official colour of the movement and the predominant colour in Yushchenko’s election campaign). They peacefully asked for new elections in which Yushchenko finally won in the third round (Orange Revolution). This revolution has sometimes also been called the Chestnut Revolution due to the abundance of chestnut trees in Kiev, the capital city of Ukraine and the centre of this revolution. In March 2005, there were demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan against President Akayev and his government who were increasingly corrupt and authoritarian. These demonstrations were known as the Tulip Revolution and ended with Akayev’s resignation. Another peaceful revolution of the same kind took place in Serbia, in October 2000 with mass demonstrations in Belgrade when Kostunica and his supporters doubted the results of the presidential elections and the demonstrations replaced Milošević’s autocratic regime. Last but not least, another similar revolution took place in Estonia. It was in 1991 when mass demonstrations blocked the Soviet tanks and proclaimed the restoration of the independence of Estonia with the Singing Revolution which lasted four years (1988–1991). The Singing Revolution started in 1988 with various protests, acts of defiance, yet without violence. It ended with demonstrations with thousands of Estonians singing forbidden national songs and finally, winning Estonia’s independence. The Disguised Reform model: In the Disguised Reform model the old regime anticipates the inevitable changes and in an attempt to stay in power, ‘disguises’ itself as a democratic socialist party. For example, Bulgaria’s regime was transformed by a ‘Disguised Reform’. The ruling elite in Bulgaria lacked pressure from a strong opposition and moved to the ‘political opening’ only when the Soviet Union politically intervened. Then the communist party renamed itself the Socialist party, ousted its president, scheduled and won the first elections. The Compromised Reform model: In the Compromised Reform model under no significant pressures, the communist regime gives in to the demand for change and democratization by joining or co-operating with the democratic party. Together, they proceed to the first free elections (after 50 years of communism) and make the transition reforms. The Compromised Reform can also take place when the communist regime ‘allows’ the democratic opposition to hold and win the elections in order to proceed to the necessary transition reforms. The Compromised Reform
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can also be seen as the result of a conscious political decision for a gradual reform to a market economy. The starting point of such reforms goes back to the 1980s or even to the 1970s, during the communist era (e.g. Hungary, China, and Vietnam). In 1989, the communist regime gave up power voluntarily, and Hungary became a parliamentary democratic Republic. The first free parliamentary elections were held in May 1990 and were won by the populist, centre–right and liberal parties. The Magyar Demokrata Fórum (the Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF – conservative/Christian democrat party) became the dominant party and won 43% of the votes. Its leader, József Antall, was elected prime minister of the centre-right coalition government. This was a coalition with the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). They commanded a 60% majority in the Hungarian parliament (Compromised Reform). In October 1989, the communist party was reformed into the social-democratic Magyar Szocialista Párty (Hungarian Socialist Party, MSzP). The poor performance of the Hungarian Socialist Party in the first free elections (won 24% of the votes) raised the political need for compromise solutions. In May 1994, the socialists made a comeback by winning a plurality of votes and 54% of the seats in Parliament after an election campaign which had focused largely on economic issues and the substantial decline in living standards since 1990 (the Disguised Reform). However, dissatisfaction with the pace of economic recovery, the rising crime rate, and government corruption convinced people to vote centre-right parties in the Hungarian national elections of May 1998. The Violent Reform to Democracy model: In the Violent Reform to Democracy model the old regime is overthrown by a violent uprising (violent uprising or violent the way that it was countered – e.g. Romania). Reforms and changes could be proposed by the opposition, or by the reform communists who came into power. It was some days before Christmas in 1989 in Romania, when the Dictator Ceausescu was swept from power in a popular uprising. The Romanian people had begun to rebel in Timisoara on 17 December 1989, when demonstrators stormed the Communist Party headquarters. On 23 December 1989, Romania’s ‘Revolution’ or Romanian coup d’état came to an end with the summary execution of Ceausescu and his wife Elena at the hands of a secret tribunal. The square where Ceausescu faltered was officially renamed Piatza Revolutiei (Revolution Square). The Rebellion Reform model: The Rebellion Reform model is the result of pressure put upon the communist regime during the communist era (e.g. the worker’s union pressures in Poland). It appeared with strikes, demonstrations, social anarchy, and demands for liberty and workers’ rights, especially in periods of economic crises and political uncertainty and where corrupted governments existed. More specific, in Poland in 1978, Lech Walesa along with other activists began to organize free non-communist trade unions. In August 1980, Walesa led the Gdansk shipyard strike which gave rise to a wave of strikes over most of the country with Walesa seen as the leader. The primary demands were for workers’ rights.
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The authorities were forced to capitulate and to negotiate with Walesa the Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1980, giving the workers the right to strike and to organize their own independent union. When the Polish communists made this concession, which had been without precedent in the history of the communist world since 1917, the new union was named Solidarnose [Solidarity]. The country’s brief enjoyment of relative freedom ended in December 1981, when General Jaruzelski, mainly in fear of a Soviet armed intervention, imposed martial law, suspended Solidarity, arrested many of its leaders, and interned Walesa in a country house in a remote spot in Poland. In November 1982, Walesa was released and reinstated at the Gdansk shipyards. Although kept under surveillance, he managed to maintain contact with Solidarity leaders in the underground. Even though martial law was lifted in July 1983, many of the restrictions in the civil code were kept in practice. In October 1983, the announcement of Walesa’s Nobel prize raised the spirits of the underground movement, but the award was attacked by the government press. It was in 1988 when there was another occupation strike in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, which Walesa joined again. A few months later, in 1989, the Polish communists entered into negotiations with Solidarity at the first Round Table. The Jaruzelski regime became even more unpopular as economic conditions worsened, and it was finally forced to negotiate with Walesa and his Solidarity colleagues. In April 1990, at Solidarity’s second national congress, Walesa was elected chairman with 77.5% of the votes. Walesa and his colleagues secured semi-free elections in which Solidarity proceeded to triumph. In August 1990, Poland got its first noncommunist prime minister in a non-communist government in more than 50 years. In a general ballot in December, Walesa was elected President of the Republic of Poland. He served until defeated in the election of November 1995 (the Rebellion Reform – a genuine workers’ revolution). The next phase in Walesa’s political career is more controversial. Angered by the fact that his former intellectual advisers were running the country in cooperation with the former communists, he declared ‘war’ on the heads of Solidarity. Thus, it can be argued that in that time period in Poland there was a co-operation of the two oppositions and thus, Poland also followed a Compromised Reform (therefore a Mixed Reform). The Belligerent Transition Reform Path model (e.g. Serbia & Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia): Τhe old regime of Yugoslavia, being the most liberal compared to those of other ex-communist countries during the pre-transition period, remained in power and promised transition reforms. However, it failed to change the situation. Only after 1999, after many years of the totalitarian dictatorship of Milošević, when the country had suffered immensely from the NATO war and its embargo, a democratic regime finally was established in the country, starting from scratch the reforms and the actual transition to a market economy. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the federation, followed by FYROM (September 1991) and Bosnia & Herzegovina (March 1992) (the Quiet
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Reform was followed by all these countries but only at the early transition years [except for Slovenia]). However, the presence of large Serb minorities in Croatia (580,000) and Bosnia (1.6 million) led to wars (Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia). Hundreds of people died and nearly 100,000 fled from their homes (the Belligerent Reform). More specifically, on 1 March 1992, 64% of the Bosnian electorate voted in response to a simple question: ‘Are you in favor of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, Croats and others who live in it?’ The overwhelming answer to this question was ‘Yes’. In April 1992, an alliance was established between the Croatians and the Bosnians in order to combine their strengths against the Serbian forces. On 1 March 1994, an agreement was reached between Croatian and Bosnian ministers to create a Muslim (Bosniak)-Croat Federation. Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman signed this agreement in Washington DC, USA on 18 March 1994 and it was quickly ratified by the Bosnian parliament. On 21 November 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord was initiated in Dayton, Ohio by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, calling for the division of the republic into two ‘entities’ (the Diplomacy Reform). Thus, as both the quiet and belligerent together with the diplomacy reform models appeared in the cases of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia, it can be argued that a Mixed Reform path again is the appropriate one for both countries. The Transparent Transition Reform path model relates to the move towards a market economy without the abolishment of communism (e.g. China, Vietnam). In this case, the previous communist regime remains in power while monitoring the changes taking place in the Eastern bloc and in the former communist countries. At the same time, it proceeds to transition reforms, liberalizing the economy, opening the borders and ‘asking’ for FDI inflows in order to become a market economy (e.g. China, Vietnam). As mentioned in Marangos (2004a), the Communist Party is still in power in China and Vietnam – unlike the situation in the other transition countries – and the development of a socialist society is still the official state goal. A quarter of a century ago, the Communist leadership under Deng Xiaoping initiated a marketization process in China’s centrally administered socialist economic system. The start of these reforms is usually identified with the Communist Party Plenum in December 1978. Thus, the period of reform has been at least double of that of other transition countries. China’s reforms differed markedly from those reforms implemented in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The reforms in China consisted of small step-by-step changes. Neither was the ultimate goal announced, nor was any timetable for the transition mentioned. Some of the changes were initiated spontaneously ‘at ground level’, and only after they were successful were they ratified by the government and implemented as official policy. The reforms proceeded by trial and error, with frequent mid-course corrections and reversals of policy. Marangos (2004a) concluded that the Chinese economic
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growth rate is among the highest on record and fairly stable. It has been achieved without sacrificing external equilibrium, and inflation has been kept under control. However, China also followed the Compromised Reform model when the communist regime adopted transition reforms just by following the pressures for changes that existed in other transition economies. Worthy of mention is the fact that the Transparent Reform in China was backed-up by a failed rebellion (1987) and the Violent Reform (1989). The latter took place with various demonstrations in 1989, and was supported by thousand of students and workers in many major cities. Both students and workers peacefully demanded democratic reforms, asking for equality and protested against government corruption. The Chinese government answered with forceful military action with troops and tanks in Tiananmen Square. Hundreds of civilian deaths resulted from this unsuccessful violent reform. Marangos (2004a) mentioned that Vietnam’s transition was greatly influenced by China’s successful experience. The beginning of market reforms dates back to the Sixth plenum of the Fourth Party Congress in September 1979. After a long period of unsuccessful partial and gradual reforms in 1989, the course of transition in Vietnam broke away from the Chinese model and a shock therapy approach was adopted. The pace of reform in Vietnam from 1989 to 1991 was anything but gradual, and the stabilization programme adopted in 1989 was certainly as ambitious as the shock therapy approach in other transition economies. The Mixed Reform model is evidenced in FYROM, where the transition to democracy was achieved through a combination of the following: the Quiet Reform and the Disguised Reform. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was on the edge of disintegration. Many political, ethnic and economic problems that had been successfully hidden throughout the communist years had risen to the surface, sparking civil wars with Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina and the break down of the Federation. FYROM was the only country together with Slovenia, which had managed to achieve its independence peacefully in 1991 (the Quiet Reform). After the break-up in January 1990 when the last Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists was held and the Slovenians and Croatians had left, many changes occurred, including the change of the political system. In November 1990, the first multi-party elections were held in FYROM. In January 1991, Kiro Gligorov was elected as the first president of the country and after a while the first government, ‘the experts government’, was formed. However, by 1992 three governments had succeeded one another and finally the SDSM (Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia that originates from the former Communist Party) got the right to form a government by coalition with the PDP (PDP – Albanians Party of Prosperity and Integration). Actually, the SDSM is the successor to the League of Communists in FYROM which renamed itself after the 10th Congress in 1991 (the Disguised Reform).
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By analysing the above information we can conclude that the country has followed the Quiet Reform model, but as a result of the SDSM’s history in the government it can be said that a Disguised Reform also took place (the communists were again heads of the state). Thus, a Mixed Reform path is appropriate for the case of FYROM. The Mixed Reform path was taken by the Baltic countries. Estonia held free elections on 18 March 1990. The Popular Front coalition, composed of left and centrist parties and led by former Central Planning Committee official Edgar Savisaar, held a parliamentary majority. Parliament chose nationalist Lennart Meri of the Isamaaliit Party (Fatherland Union) as the president of Estonia in October 1992. Lennart Meri appointed Mart Laar, a free-market supporter, as prime minister, who referred to himself as ‘Thatcher’s grandson’ (the Compromised Reform for the case of Estonia). Through a strict, non-confrontational policy in pursuing independence, Estonia managed to avoid the violence which Latvia and Lithuania incurred in the bloody January 1991 crackdowns and in the border-customs post guard murders that summer (Violent Reform for the case of Latvia and Lithuania). The central government of the Soviet Union granted independence to Estonia on 20 August 1991 (Brown, 1993; Hoag et al., 1999) (the Quiet Reform for the case of Estonia). On 6 September 1991, the central government of the Soviet Union granted independence to Lithuania, although the USSR had used economic, political, and military pressure to keep it within the union. Lithuania’s independence was achieved through mass demonstrations, violence and bloodshed where a number of Lithuanian protesters died at the hands of Russian soldiers in Vilnius, the capital city of Lithuania at the beginning of 1991 (the Violent Reform). In reality in 1993, Lithuania became the first of the three Baltic countries to be free of Russian military presence. The last unit of Russian troops left the country on 31 August that year. As in several other former Soviet republics, former Communists in Lithuania staged a political comeback in the post-USSR period (the Disguised Reform for the case of Lithuania). Although the anti-Soviet, pro-independence coalition (the Lithuanian Movement for Reconstruction) won the country’s first open parliamentary elections in February 1990 and successfully led the struggle for Lithuanian independence, the coalition could not maintain political leadership. Its popularity dropped as a result of (a) political infighting in the coalition; (b) the severe economic crisis caused by the disruption of trade ties with the former Soviet Republics; and (c) the deterioration of international relations with neighbouring countries. Consequently, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP; the former Communist Party of Lithuania) won a majority of seats in the Seimas in February 1992. In November 1992, Algirdas Brazauskas, the DLP leader, was elected president with 60% of the vote (the Disguised Reform) (Reardon, 1996). Various governments rose to power throughout the years in Lithuania, which succeeded in bringing about economic
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recovery and Lithuanian’s full membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. Nonetheless, some scandals or negative events came to the spotlight: • • •
•
the major banking scandal with two of Lithuania’s largest commercial banks, the Innovation Bank and the Litimpeks Bank in 1995; corruption problems in the public sector along with the resignation of Prime Minister Vagnorius in 1999; economic problems and inadequate reforms (the resignation of Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas in October 1999 due to a protest of the privatization sell-off of a Lithuanian petroleum refinery to a United States company); the financial crisis in Russia in 1998 which led to an economic recession in Lithuania in 1999.
In 1991, Latvia claimed de facto independence. The central government of the Soviet Union granted independence to Latvia on 21 August 1991. The process up to independence was marked by violence and Soviet aggression especially in January 1991 when some people from Latvia were killed in Riga by the Soviets and the subsequent soviet coup failed in Latvia on August 1991 (Violent Reform). Throughout the political situation in Latvia, it can be argued that several coalition governments came into power and the Compromised Reform path was always adopted. Thus, in the 1993 elections, eight political parties passed the 5% threshold to enter parliament, but the Latvian Popular front (LTF) was outvoted. The liberal Latvijas Celš (Latvia’s Way, LC) became the largest party, forming a centre-right coalition with the Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība (Latvian Farmers’ Union, LZS). The 1995 elections resulted in a deeply fragmented parliament represented by nine parties, with the largest party commanding only 18 of the 100 parliament seats. Attempts to form right-of-centre and leftist governments failed and a broad but fractious coalition government of six of the nine parties was formed under the non-partisan Prime Minister, Andris Skele. In 2000, as a compromised candidate, Andris Berzins became prime minister. His four-party coalition lasted until the elections of 2002 (the Compromised Reform path for the case of Latvia). The Mixed Transition Reform path to democracy (e.g. Albania): After the collapse of communism, the first liberal elections in Albania took place in March 1991. The results gave the Communists a decisive majority, but a general strike and street demonstrations soon forced the all-Communist cabinet to resign (the Rebellion Reform). In June 1991, the Communist Labor Party renamed itself as the Socialist Party and renounced its past ideology (the Disguised Reform). However, the opposition Democratic Party won a landslide victory in the 9 April 1992 elections, and Sali Berisha, a former cardiologist, became Albania’s first elected president of the transition years.
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The political career of Mr. Berisha started with the students’ movement of December 1990. He had become well known for his public criticism of the old system and his speeches about the need for the democratization of the country. Despite many reforms that took place, his administration was marked by widespread corruption and abuse. The following year, ex-Communists, including Ramiz Alia and former Prime Minister Fatos Nano, were imprisoned on corruption charges. Finally, in March 1997, Albania’s experiment with the democratic reform and a free-market economy went disastrously wrong when large numbers of its citizens invested in dubious get-rich-quick pyramid schemes. When five of these schemes collapsed in the beginning of the year, depriving Albanians of an estimated $1.2 billion in savings, the citizens’ rage turned against the government, which appeared to have sanctioned the nationwide fraud. The country’s fragile infrastructure collapsed and gangsters and rebels overran the country; people were killed, a civil war began, buildings were set on fire and half a million rifles and other weapons were stolen when arms depots across the country were raided – plunging the country into virtual anarchy. During this time, Albania’s already inadequate and antiquated infrastructure suffered tremendous damage, as people looted public works for building materials (the Violent Reform or Armed Rebellion Reform). The anarchy of early 1997 alarmed the world and prompted intensive international mediation. A multinational protection force eventually restored order and set up the elections that formally ousted President Sali Berisha. It also led to the victory of a socialist-led coalition of parties. In July of 1997, Berisha was replaced by the socialist Rexhep Meidani. Later, Ilir Meta was elected prime minister in 1999 and rapidly moved forward in his first years to modernize the economy, privatize business, fight crime, and reform the judiciary and tax systems. He resigned in January 2002, frustrated by political infighting. In June 2002, former general Alfred Moisiu (a non-partisan figure) was elected president, endorsed by both the Socialists (headed by Fatos Nano) and the Democrats (led by Sali Berisha) in an effort to end the unproductive political fractiousness that had stalemated the government (Compromised Reform). Between 1997 and 2002, a series of short-lived governments succeeded one another. Fatos Nano, Chairman of the Socialist Party became prime minister in July 2002. Having in mind the political history of Fatos Nano, it can be argued that in that time period a Disguised Reform model appeared in Albania. The peaceful transfer of power from Meidani to Moisiu was the result of an agreement between the parties. This ‘truce’ ushered in a new period of political stability in Albania, making significant progress in democratic and economic reforms and in the rule of law possible and leading to the development of Albania’s relations with its neighbours and the USA. Yet, a decade of friction in Albania between the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party has delayed Albania’s transition to a market economy and postponed its admission to key European institutions. Most of the Transition Reform paths appeared in the case of Albania. This can partially be a significant reason for the delay in reforms and economic development
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in Albania. As the Violent, Rebellion, Disguised and Compromised Reform paths are all valid for the case of Albania, we are led to conclude and argue that Albania together with Serbia & Montenegro are the most complex transition country case studies in the region (the Mixed Reform). The Mixed Transition Reform path for the case of Bulgaria: Except for the Disguised Reform model for the case of Bulgaria, it can be said that two Rebellion models occurred in Bulgaria. One (with the help of a general strike) took place in late 1990 and replaced the Bulgarian socialist party by a coalition government and the other in 1997 when the Bulgarian people demanded the resignation of the corrupt government which remained in power from December 1994 up to February 1997. In this period, three economic crises took place. After this, a caretaker cabinet was appointed by the Bulgarian president and in April 1997 the united democratic forces’ coalition won the elections. Together with the International Monetary Fund, they brought about quick and successful transition reforms (Compromised Reform). The Mixed Transition Reform path for the case of Russia: After the resignation of Gorbachev in 1991, the USSR was dissolved and Russia as the Russian Federation became its largest successor state, inheriting its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The 12 June 1990 is celebrated in Russia as its Independence Day. In the first democratic presidential elections in Russia, held on 15 June 1991, Yeltsin captured more than 57% of the vote, defeating Nikolai Ryzhkov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, amongst other candidates. Yeltsin was well-known for his harsh criticism of Mikhail Gorbachev and the communist hardliners. In Yeltsin’s opinion, Gorbachev should have increased the pace of reforms in the USSR but got tough on the conservatives. However, in July 1990, Yeltsin quit the Communist Party. Boris Yeltsin’s career in the Communist Party administrative apparatus began in 1969, when he became Chief of the Construction Department of the Sverdlovsk Region Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In 1976, Yeltsin was elected as the First Secretary of Sverdlovsk Region Committee of the CPSU. He was also elected President of Russia by popular vote in 1991 (the Disguised Reform). It was at the end of 1991 when Yeltsin and other presidents of all former Soviet Republics signed the treaty dissolving the USSR (the Diplomacy Reform). At the beginning of 1992, just after the breakdown of the USSR, Yeltsin and his government started a hard-lined monetary economic policy which became increasingly unpopular. This policy was called ‘a shock without therapy’, in contrast to the economic reform of ‘shock therapy’ which took place for example in Poland. However, Schlack (1996) suggests that Russia’s parliamentary elections proved that the reformers of the shock therapy received far less support than they had enjoyed three years previous and that this happened after a ‘successful’
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transition. Schlack (1996) added that those who offered advice should have been more sensitive to the question of how ‘success’ might be defined. In September 1993, President Yeltsin issued a special decree on presidential rule and the use of a referendum to gain approval for his transition and economic reform policies. Publicly opposed by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, when Rutskoi refused to submit his resignation at Yeltsin’s request; Yeltsin stripped him of all of his vice-presidential powers. Yeltsin removed Rutskoi as Vice-President on charges of corruption, an action opposed by the parliament. Subsequently, Yeltsin issued a decree dissolving parliament. Although, many deputies obeyed Yeltsin’s order to disband, around 100 deputies and several hundred armed supporters led by Rutskoi occupied the parliament building. On 4 October, several elite divisions of Russian military forces decided to support Yeltsin. Tanks rolled up to the ‘White House’ (the Russian Parliament building) and firing began. Large crowds of Moscovites ‘attracted’ by the unusual events encircled the parliament building. Many were injured or even killed by stray bullets. A tense stalemate ensued between government and rebel forces that lasted for several days, ending when rebel supporters staged an attack on the city hall in Moscow and Moscow’s main television complex. The government responded by shelling the ‘White House’ and suppressing the rebels. A few days later, under Yeltsin’s pressure, the Head of the Russian Constitutional Court was fired, because he opposed the military and violent solution of the conflict between the presidential and parliamentary side (the Violent Reform). Thus, Russia followed a Mixed Reform, a Disguised Reform when an excommunist leader (Yeltsin) was elected president of Russia and remained in power for many years, a Diplomacy Reform after the breakdown of the USSR and finally, a Violent Reform in 1993. The Mixed Transition Reform path (e.g. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia & Montenegro): The historical analysis starts with Milošević who began his professional life as a banker, working for the Beogradska Banka (the Belgrade Bank), at times residing in New York as the bank’s official representative abroad. However, he emerged in April 1987 as a leading figure in Serbian politics. His political views have sometimes been termed as nationalistic, despite the fact that his ideology was strongly marked by socialist and leftist viewpoints. However, after he was elected president of the Belgrade City Committee of the League of Communists, Milošević publicly opposed nationalism. His mentor and godfather, Ivan Stambolić, was the party leader in the Serbian section of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In September 1987, Stambolić became president of Serbia and supported Milošević in the elections for a new leader, to the dismay of the other leaders in the party. Stambolić spent three days advocating Milošević’s election and finally managed to secure him a narrow victory, the tightest ever in the history of the Serbian Communist Party’s internal elections (the Disguised Reform).
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In February 1988, Stambolić was officially voted out of power, leaving the path clear for Milošević. Milošević would later be charged with ordering the murder of Stambolić, something that has never been proved. Milošević presided over the transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia into the Socialist Party of Serbia (July 1990) and the adoption of the new Serbian constitution (September 1990) which provided for the direct election of a president with increased powers (the Disguised Reform). Milošević was subsequently re-elected president of the Serbian Republic in the direct elections of December 1990 and December 1992. Milošević’s rejection of claims of a first-round opposition victory in the elections for the Federal presidency in September 2000 led to mass demonstrations in Belgrade on 5 October and the collapse of the regime’s authority (the Peaceful Revolution). Opposition-list leader Vojislav Koštunica took office as Yugoslav President on 6 October 2000. Ironically, Milošević lost his grip on power by losing the elections which he had scheduled prematurely (before the end of his mandate). On 25 January 2001, Zoran Djindjic took over the leading position in the Serbian government. However, the assassination of Djindjic in March 2003 created political instability in the country and a significant delay to the required reforms for Serbia & Montenegro (the Violent Reform). As previously mentioned, Serbia & Montenegro became involved in a war with the Croats and Bosnians due to the presence of large Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and together with the Kosovo war, as well as the war and sanctions with the UN, it can be argued that for a long time period the Serbians followed a Belligerent Reform path. However, at the end of 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, calling for the division of the republic into ‘entities’ (Diplomacy Reform). Serbia & Montenegro suffered greatly during its transition, following a disguised reform path for many years (more than any other transition country) under the Milošević regime, a rebellion reform path when the Serbians ousted this regime together with belligerent and diplomacy reform paths during its war with the Croats and Bosnians, and another war with the Albanians and the United Nations army forces in Kosovo. Lastly, a violent reform model took place with the assassination of Zoran Djindjic in March 2003. Consequently, the Mixed Reform is the appropriate model for Serbia & Montenegro. It is the author’s conviction that there is a close connection between the transition from a planned economy to a market economy with the transition from communism to democracy. Countries which faced a mixed reform and especially the belligerent, violent and disguised reform models, are less advanced countries and weak reformers with limited institutional and transition (macro) reforms. To this end, nine reform paths were explored and analysed in order to describe the chosen democratic and reform paths of the transition countries. It is therefore concluded that the least advanced transition countries followed, or were forced by conditions to follow, problematic reform paths such as the violent, belligerent or disguised models.
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These countries have limited economic growth and not only lag behind other transition countries in the region, but are far behind the levels of industrial output they had attained in 1989. To be more specific, according to UNECE (2005), the figures show that Russia’s level in 2004/5 was -28.7% of its level in 1989, Bulgaria being -35.6%, Romania -45.6%, FYROM -55.5%, Bosnia & Herzegovina’s 84.7%, Albania’s -74.2%, and Serbia & Montenegro’s at -58.3%. Moreover, the same source claims that these countries are far behind the real GDP levels they had in 1989 (e.g. Bulgaria -8%, FYROM -16.5%, Russia -17.5% and Serbia & Montenegro -46.3%). We can thus infer that these countries have high unemployment rates, and high corruption rates. Moreover, they lag behind the other transition countries in institutional and transition reforms. Furthermore, they are proved to be countries with low living standards, low GDP per capita even in PPP prices, and low wages. They also rank low in the human development index; have a weak infrastructure, an unfavourable, bureaucratic business environment and an unstable legal framework. Finally, they are the least attractive destinations for FDI inflows in the region. To conclude, we strongly believe that such drawbacks are linked to the above mentioned unfavourable reform models existing in these countries.
1.3 The Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy: The Four Steps Needed for Transition Reform Given the common goal of the transition countries to move to a market economy and therefore to promote enhanced economic efficiency and high growth rates, there is a widespread agreement that the crucial elements (steps) of the transition process are macroeconomic stabilization, price and trade liberalization, restructuring and privatization and institutional reform (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Fischer et al., 1996; Fischer et al., 2000; Gomulka, 2000; World Economic Outlook, 2000). The four dimensions (steps) of the transition reform are interrelated and progress should be made in all of them (sequence and speed of reforms). Otherwise, distortions, negative effects and the risk of a breakdown of the pursued market economy might appear. When the transition reforms were launched, the inherited imbalances were expected to bring about severe inflation. Therefore, an essential element of the transition towards the market economy was macroeconomic stabilization, which is comprised mainly of money, finance and exchange rate policies (Meyer, 1998). A macroeconomic stabilization programme reduces the inflation and money-overhang followed by severe efforts to decrease the huge debt burden. Kiguel et al., 1991, 85, 90) have argued that: ‘The effectiveness of alternative stabilization strategies largely depends on a country’s inflationary history … hyperinflation cannot be stopped always and everywhere in the same way’. Macroeconomic stabilization implies implementation of measures and policies related to key macroeconomic
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
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variables such as policies for low inflation, higher output performance, improved balance of payments, lower debt, and lower unemployment (EBRD, 1994). In most countries of the CEE, macroeconomic stabilization was based on the standard IMF heterodox approach, applying an income anchor simultaneously to a tight fiscal and monetary policy, and a fixed exchange rate when feasible. Yet, by considering the credit to government and enterprises, it might be inferred that money was the key nominal anchor, while the exchange rate and income policy had a supportive role (Gomulka, 2000). After the initial years of transition, there was a tendency in the transition countries to move to more flexible exchange rate regimes, as although inflation declined, it did not fall enough to stop a significant real appreciation. This created balance of payment problems (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003). However, during the transition course it became clear that the choice of the exchange rate regime did not seem to be a critical factor influencing the stabilization results in the transition economies, because a successful anti-inflation policy is primarily determined by pursuing a consistent monetary and fiscal policy (World Economic Outlook, 2000). The macroeconomic stabilization programme should be initially adopted in order to reduce inflation and money-overhang, and severe efforts to decrease the huge debt burden should follow. There are two determinants for the stabilization process, each of which includes two different stabilization strategies; the orthodox and heterodox approaches combined with money based and exchange rate based stabilization strategies. The orthodox approach is based on elimination of the budget deficit by using strict fiscal policy (fiscal anchor), simultaneously using a monetary policy (monetary anchor). In the heterodox stabilization approach, income policy is used together with monetary and fiscal policy, as an extra tool for rapid and synchronized cut of inflation. Thus, there is direct intervention in wages and prices (income anchor). [The] heterodox approach argues that budget adjustments and tight monetary policy alone are insufficient to stop high inflation … in [the] … contrary … wage and price controls may be superfluous … [The] … price controls may be difficult to enforce beyond a very small group of commodities … controls might be anticipated, controls may be addictive, giving policymakers the idea that inflation can be stopped without any other pain … [Those] … controls can introduce a great deal of rigidity in the relative price structure of the economy … controls may prove hard to phase out. (Jeffrey Sachs, 1993, 754)
In the money based stabilization policy, the central bank chooses the money stock or the net domestic assets as its main policy target. Alternatively, in the exchange rate based stabilization strategy, the exchange rate serves as the main nominal anchor. Therefore, a country has to choose between heterodox and orthodox stabilization policy, setting the option of having the exchange rate as an extra nominal anchor or using the money based stabilization programme. However, if a country chooses
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the heterodox exchange rate based stabilization programme, but after a short or long time removes the wage and price measures, then the programme becomes an orthodox exchange rate stabilization programme. Miguel A. Kiguel et al. (1991, 85, 90), argued that ‘The effectiveness of alternative stabilization strategies largely depends on a country’s inflationary history … hyperinflation cannot be stopped always and everywhere in the same way’. It should be pointed out that money based stabilization applies an inadequate solution in the wrong way: because of the unstable demand of monetary targeting is inadequate, applied in the wrong way, designed as a medium-term concept and not as a strategy for short-term macroeconomic fine-tuning (Bofinger, 1996, 665–7). Most Central and Eastern countries followed the heterodox stabilization programme (Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary). Only Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, followed the orthodox programme (Bofinger, 1996). Bulgaria and Romania, having limited foreign reserves, chose a money-based approach. However, the other countries mentioned have selected the exchange rate based stabilization programme. The Bulgarian economy suffered from economic and political instability from 1989 until 1997, when on July 1997 the introduction of the currency board finally brought ‘peace’ (see also Zloch-Christy, 2000). The excuse of lack of currency reserves, the inability of each government to draw loans from the western countries or institutions, or the foreign countries’ or institutions’ unwillingness to help, brought about three major economic crises in Bulgaria in the first eight years of the transition period. Those crises weakened the economic position of the Bulgarian people. As a result of which per capita consumption fell drastically, discouraging any significant FDI inflows. Reaching the main transition goal, sustained economic growth implies that inflation should be kept at a low level, as Fisher et al. (1996) suggests the positive growth in transition economies could be observed within two years of inflation decreasing below 50%. Ghosh (1997) infers that if the inflation level is above 10%, a GDP growth above 2% cannot be attained. Given the negative impact of inflation on the output level, fighting inflation was a major goal of the macroeconomic stabilization programme at the onset of transition and as stated by Fisher and Sahay (2000, 7): ‘Several checks were introduced in the stabilization programs to contain inflation: tight monetary and credit policies, wage control policies, monetary reforms, and non-inflationary sources of financing the budget deficits’. By applying either the orthodox or heterodox approach combined with the money- based or exchange rate based stabilization strategy, policy-makers of transition countries can pursue the desired macroeconomic stabilization. The orthodox approach aims to elimine the budget deficit by conducting stringent fiscal policy and by employing a monetary anchor through monetary policy at the same time. The heterodox approach not only implements monetary and fiscal policy, but it also uses income policy, as well as wages and prices controls for fighting inflation.
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There were some controversies with regard to the type of stabilization programme to use. Calvo and Vegh (1999) assert that choosing between the exchange rate and money supply as nominal anchors presupposes a trade-off between ‘recession now’ (related to money-based stabilization) and ‘recession later’ (indicative of exchange rate based stabilization). It has been pointed out that the exchange-rate anchor is a more easily observable target and if monetary and fiscal policies exhibit discrepancies from the defined exchange rate target, doubt will be cast on the ability of policy makers to conduct the reforms efficiently. Drabek and Brada (1998) argue that if fiscal policy or other stabilization policies are improper, the decision of choosing exchange rate as a nominal anchor may result in a significant pressure to conduct protectionist trade policies. Christoffersen and Doyle (1998) imply that output losses could be observed due to the employed undervalued pegs, when a rapid disinflation policy involving pegged exchange rate is pursued. On the other hand, money-based stabilization involves reduction in the growth rate of the money supply. This means a lower level of liquidity. Subsequently interest rates will rise and the economy will be driven into a recession (Calvo and Vegh, 1999). Jonas and Mishkin (2003) contend that in the transition countries the use of monetary aggregates as a nominal anchor is not appropriate because of the instability of money demand and the unstable relationship between the growth of money supply and inflation. Rusek (2001) investigates the effectiveness of the monetary policy in the transition countries by focusing on the stability of the relationship between the money stock and macroeconomic variables such as output, price level, interest rates, and exchange rates. He infers that active use of monetary policy is difficult in the transition economies because of their significant rigidities, which in turn lead to an unstable relationship between monetary aggregates and macroeconomic variables. The best outcome a monetary policy can provide is to discourage inflation in the long run, by being excessively loose and not impeding growth by being too tight, while the short run application of monetary policy is limited only to maintaining a stable real exchange rate and to providing necessary liquidity. Klyuev (2002) supports the advantages of the exchange rate anchor in fighting inflation but questions the effectiveness of the exchange rate stabilization in the long run. He argues that the inflation rate does not decline instantly to tradingpartner levels that yield a real appreciation of the domestic currency and negative effects on the trade balance and current account balance. The basic inference is that there is a non-linear relationship between the inflation rate and the exchange rate flexibility; an increase in inflation from a low level requires a flexible exchange rate, while the fixed exchange rate regime would be a necessity when a rise in already high inflation appeared. At the start of transition it was recognized that a crucial part of the macroeconomic stabilization is the change that both state’s revenues and expenditures should undergo. However, the need for major fiscal reforms was overlooked and the reforms of state structures and public administration received
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little attention until a number of fiscal crises appeared in late 1991 and 1992 in transition economies (UNECE, 2000). Regarding the revenues, the taxation policy should be modified as a new tax system based on general tax rates, value-added tax, income taxes, profit taxes etc., should be adopted. As to expenses, the subsidies to goods and to state enterprises should be eliminated or replaced by credit subsidies. At the same time, many of the government expenditures related to social issues should remain unchanged. Tight wage policy should also be implemented in order to avoid an increase in monetary overhang and to improve the government budget (Meyer, 1998). Another element (step) of transition is liberalization of economic activity aimed at abolishing the centrally planned system and central regulations by establishing market determined prices, foreign trade liberalization and currency convertibility. Price liberalization is one of the most significant factors for the creation of a market economy because market determined prices are the essence of the market mechanism, reflecting both the consumers’ demand and the producers’ costs and supply. An additional decisive condition for the establishment of a market economic system is that trade liberalization should provide for enhanced competition, elimination of trade monopolies and the opening of the economy to foreign investors (Meyer, 1998). Thus, the second step of transition, is liberalization of economic activity (prices, trade, currency convertibility etc.), which should be supported by institutional restructuring. This structural reform provides an efficient system of laws regulating the economic activity and redefining the role of the state. This also includes the restructuring and privatization of the bulk of the state assets, which constitute a large percentage of the total assets of the country. The sudden exposure to market forces is likely to cause instability in the economy. This, complemented by the trivial experience of people and the mediocre economic legacy of the past, may lead to severe economic crises. In order to avoid these crises, the state needs to establish macroeconomic stabilization policies. The typical symptoms of the ‘transition shock’ are a drastic increase in inflation, reduction of total output levels, increase in the unemployment rate, increase in prices, a severe social impact, and citizens’ negative reactions due to their bad economic condition. Liberalization of prices is of vital importance for the transition towards a market economy. Prices should be undistorted so as to facilitate enterprise decisionmaking, as they should be changed significantly and liberalized in order to reflect the required reduction of subsidies needed for the successful macroeconomic stabilization (EBRD, 1995). In the beginning of transition, it was recognized that the expected considerable increase in the prices of basic goods, such as food and energy products should be avoided and either a price ceiling should be placed on them, or the desired price level of the basic goods should be maintained through subsidies (Meyer, 1998). Since the beginning of transition the relative price adjustments were more divergent among the transition economies. This was because of their greater
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
27
susceptibility to external shocks such as significant changes in world market prices for commodities, large devaluations of some of the domestic currencies and the various degrees of price control. Although most other product prices were liberalized during the early phases of the reform process, the prices of most formerly state-provided services remained under control, as an element of the social safety net, and their prices increased only gradually. It might be inferred that one of the crucial trade-offs in the transition countries is between achieving macroeconomic stability, and at the same time gradually moving towards market determined prices or instant liberalization of most prices. However, the decision to keep inflation low through price ceilings proved to be counter-productive in the long-run. To this end stable relative price structure is vital for macroeconomic stability and sustained growth (UNECE, 2000). The more intense the price liberalization in the transition countries is, the sharper the initial fall in the level of output will be and the more rapid the contraction of the old enterprise sector will become. On the other hand the creation of new, more profitable enterprises will be encouraged and a favourable environment for higher levels of income in the medium term will also be in place (Herdandez-Cata, 1997). Herdandez-Cata (1999) analyses the main determinants of the intensity of liberalization reform in the transition countries and concludes that political freedom, proximity to the West, and the level of underground economy are all associated with low resistance to price decontrol. Therefore, they affect positively the intensity of liberalization, while the membership in rouble area and the longer period under central-planning impede liberalization reforms. However, integration of the transition countries into the world economy requires opening up the domestic economies through an orthodox commercial policy: elimination of the CMEA’s regimes, removal of tariffs, establishment of an effective exchange rate reflecting price-based international competition, and entrance into global economic regimes and organizations (Van Brabant, 1994). Many discussions took place regarding the way under which trade liberalization would be conducted. Many studies support the application of a more gradual approach in liberalization of the international trade and the opening of the economies of the transition countries. Van Brabant (1994) maintains that the effectiveness of trade liberalization heavily depends on the credibility of the government policies pursued, pointing out that if liberalization coincides with macroeconomic instability or with an unstable political climate, as in Eastern Europe, there may be a trend toward a lower level of investment. The author suggests that in this case rapid trade liberalization might destroy much of the transition countries’ productive capacity. He further argues that the trade regime must be tailored to longer terms, because of the time required for building up production and exporting capacities and capabilities and well functioning capital markets. These findings are supported by Hare (2001) who asserts that a sudden liberalization may cause a significant adverse shock to domestic enterprises, because they lack the necessary time to adjust to the new environment and external competition will drive them out of the country.
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Marangos (2001) offers a set of international trade policies for transition economies, comprised of a fixed exchange rate and protection policies from imports that are expected to result in substantially reducing the transition cost and corruption, thus stimulating a civilized society. He argues that as international trade is an important ingredient of the transition process, it should be introduced gradually, in an organized fashion and by using social benefits as a measure of its effectiveness. He reasons that the total liberalization of foreign trade would damage those industries which were technologically advanced but uncompetitive in the international market. Designing the proper path for trade and exchange rate liberalization for transition economies means that the initial conditions, political processes and the incomplete nature of domestic markets should be considered. Furthermore, CMEA ties should be maintained at least in the short run, given the substantial volume of idle resources in the transition countries and their considerable absorption capacity (Van Brabant, 1993). Gowan (1995) asserts that after trade liberalization takes place, only a small number of the transition countries (Central European countries) will be able to uphold the considerable market pressures resulting from liberalization and thus be ready to compete in Western markets. Effective trade liberalization requires re-integration of the formerly centrally planned economies into the global trading system. Almost all countries in transition from central planning have accepted the WTO rules in principle, despite the variations in trade policies and performance. WTO membership is a key factor underpinning the reform process. It provides some protection against imposition of non-tariff barriers and offers dispute mechanisms in case of disagreements between the members. Moreover, in respect of European transition economies aiming at EU membership, WTO membership shows their sincere ambition to create a market economy and to observe international trade law (Pomfret, 2001; Hare, 2001). Foreign trade liberalization policy is closely linked to the liberalization of the foreign exchange market, particularly with the exchange rate regime, current account convertibility, and capital account liberalization (Hare, 2001). A third step to transition is the privatization and restructuring of the economy. Privatization and restructuring have a crucial importance for the creation of a market economy, as they are essential determinants for the transition of the decision and motivation structures (EBRD, 1994). Thus, a decisive step in the transformation process is the size reduction of the public sector through quick privatization and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. It is essential that this be supported by the introduction of new corporate governance and property rights. The expected positive outcomes of privatization imply that it should lead to a new private and institutional ownership structure, replacing the old state administered system and together with deregulation and demonopolization, privatization should reform and overcome the inherited industrial structure. It is also anticipated that privatization encompassing all economic areas, including the banking sector, will
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
29
eliminate the inefficient capital and labour allocation inherited from a centrally planned economy (Schusselbauer, 1999). With regard to the privatization of state-owned banks, Fries and Taci (2002) contend that in real terms privatized banks developed more rapidly not only than state banks, but also more rapidly than the newly established banks as well. This implies that there is inadequate regulatory control of entry into, and exit from, the banking sector. No evidence has been found that foreign banks have a higher real growth than privatized and newly established private banks, a fact that might reflect an informational disadvantage concerning local markets or the existence of obstacles to their expansion. Although privatization, restructuring, imposition of hard budget constraints and elimination of subsidies may create high unemployment rates and decrease living standards, they are all necessary for the successful transition to a market economy. The relationship between privatization and restructuring appears to be rather complex as EBRD (1995, 128) defines restructuring as a: … multidimensional, encompassing: reactive policies brought about by the hardening of firms’ budget constraints (e.g. labour-shedding, wage reductions, plant closure); strategic aspects, including export reorientation, changes in the mix of products and changes in management structures; and deeper restructuring, generally involving substantial new investment, that can deliver large improvements in enterprise performance and growth over the long run.
The restructuring process in the majority of the transition countries took place in response to privatization and consisted of the introduction of hard budget constraints; a result of product market competition and elimination of direct and indirect state subsidies (EBRD, 1994). The progress in market-oriented restructuring depends on the effectiveness of price and trade liberalization, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization, as well as on the development of the financial sector (EBRD, 1995). In the first decade of the transition procedure (1990s), the privatization programmes in the countries comprised diverse methods and reflected the transformation of the political environment, as during that time, the focus and the intensity of the privatization strategies, as well as the role of the foreign investors in the different stages of privatization altered (Schollmann, 2001). There were many obstacles to achieving the privatization objectives in transition economies; political constraints, unwillingness to accept foreigners in the privatization process in the early years of transition, lack of funds for the government to implement privatization procedures and for the population to buy privatized assets, absence of market-based financial and business skills, existence of undeveloped financial markets and legal systems (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997). Privatization was not successful enough in some transition countries to lead to efficient enterprise restructuring and it could be inferred that the change of
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ownership is not sufficient for an effective reform. The transfer of ownership should be accompanied by the implementation of procedures and measures such as the imposition of hard budget constraints on enterprises, the development of a competitive environment, and the establishment of an effective legal framework, an effective property rights system and effective standards of corporate governance (World Economic Outlook, 2000). A considerable obstacle exists at government level which blocks privatization reform and makes privatization slow and inefficient. The governments in transition economies on the one hand should conduct fiscal policy aimed at keeping public deficits at certain limits in order to fight inflation, while on the other hand the restructuring process increases government budget expenditures, because of the cost reallocation in the restructured firms. Therefore, policy-makers might not be able to implement effective restructuring, because of the subsequent negative impact on the budget deficit (Schroder, 2000). The methods through which privatization of state-owned enterprises can be implemented might be divided into direct and indirect methods (Schusselbauer, 1999). Direct methods include forms such as public auctions, tenders, public invitations, capital privatization and employee or management buyouts, while indirect methods include different distribution schemes developed to privatize a major part of state-owned enterprises in one mass privatization programme. Given the limited capital and savings in transition economies, the direct methods of privatization have limited application. Mass privatization was widely implemented as it was considered to be the second best solution, meeting both efficiency and distribution goals (Schusselbauer, 1999). The aim of mass privatization promotes a rapid privatization programme by minimizing the role of the state and maximizing the role of the market in the privatization process. Mass privatization functions by offering privatization vouchers to the population, in most cases for free, as proxies for shares in state-owned companies, as these vouchers, often through investment funds, are invested in a particular company (Spicer, 2000). Ferreira (1999) suggests that although mass privatization is meant to be a fair process, as the assets are uniformly distributed through vouchers, it may influence the level of the public sector wages and consequently lead to an increase in the income inequality. Mramor (1996) criticizes the way voucher privatization was designed in the transition countries, pointing out that instead of the increase in economic efficiency; the redistribution of wealth appeared to be the primary goal of this type of privatization. The method of privatization has been a major factor determining the speed and fairness of privatization, but a clear relation between the privatization methods and the post-privatization ownership and restructuring cannot be found (World Economic Outlook, 2000). A study by Frydman et al. (1999) asserted that privatization is effective if the ownership is transferred to outsiders, but produces no considerable effect in employee-owned firms. If outsiders control the firms, an increase in revenue will be observed and productivity performance will be enhanced. Moreover, there
Transition Economies vs. Market Economies
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will be an insignificant negative effect on employment, while the performance of insider-controlled firms will not be significantly different from the performance of state firms. Privatization that concentrates ownership in the hands of workers and managers might lead to a slower speed of the restructuring process. However, the dispersed outsider ownership is likely to cause corporate governance problems and to create obstacles for the owners to control managers. Therefore, it may be inferred that the change of ownership is not a sufficient condition for effective restructuring (EBRD, 1995). The above mentioned steps/reforms in the transition process should be accompanied by an Institutional Reform in order to facilitate the transition process. Namely, the creation, consolidation and strengthening of the institutions, policies and behaviours that underpin the market economy (Stern, 1998). In the fourth step, new laws must be issued in order to establish market institutions (corporate law, an accounting system, a tax system, a pension fund system, etc.). Unlimited and unrestricted private ownership/property must be legally established. New laws should also be issued regarding the banking system structure, bank rehabilitation, privatization of banks, foreign banks participation and the payment system. Methods for dealing with bad loans as well as bankruptcy and liquidation laws must also be enforced. New social policy is needed and social expenditures such as unemployment benefits (e.g. unemployment allowances, lessons/means for finding new jobs, and increasing employee’s skills, etc.) must be introduced. Hard budget constraints must also be introduced, together with a generous elimination of subsidies from the government to the state-owned enterprises in order for the governmental expenditures to be lowered. The tax system should be reformed in order to encourage individuals and companies to acknowledge profits. A financial reform is also necessary to support any other activity. The creation of a stock exchange will facilitate the privatization process, and it should be met by currency reforms, including the introduction of unlimited currency convertibility. Moreover, all deficits must be balanced; the overvalued domestic currency must be devalued and generally there is a need for introduction of adequate institutional reforms. The transition from socialist to market economies requires the development of many institutions including the market itself (Koslowski, 1992). World Economic Outlook (2000, 141) states that: There are two dimensions to the massive changes in the structure of the transition economies since the start of transition: the wide range of structural and institutional reforms implemented by governments and the resulting changes in economic behaviour and institutions.
The establishment of relevant market institutions facilitating macroeconomic stability, entrepreneurship and competition is a basic precondition for a successful
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transition process. The fundamental institutional reform of the economic system comprises a wide range of significant changes in institutions, types of ownership, corporate governance, laws, norms and modes of attitudes and interpersonal behaviour (Gomulka, 2000). Menshikov (1994) emphasizes the importance of the appropriate institutional reform, pointing out that the divergent institutional settings as well as the varying levels of political stability are the main causes of the variations in the macroeconomic performance of the transition countries. It might be inferred that the institutional structure, improved state corporate governance prior to privatization, as well as the redefining of the role of the state are vital elements required for systemic renovation, growth and stabilization (Kolodko, 1999). Behrman and Rondinelli (2000) suggest that six basic institutions (patterns of behaviour and guiding structure) provide for efficient transition: development of new forms of economic motivation, protection of private property rights, guarantees of freedom of enterprise, decisions based on market signals, development of competitive environment and employment of government regulations for the private sector. These reforms may be accomplished slowly and their development depends on the dedication of the policy makers to the reforms as well as on their effectiveness in employing and pursuing the transition goals and policies (Gomulka, 2000). The massive transformation of the structure of the transition economies resulted in market-determined prices, in a reduction of the level of industrialization and a rise in the service sector share. It also resulted in the replacement of public sector dominance by increasing private sector activity and the development of financial sector (World Economic Outlook, 2000; Hare, 1993). While the pursued structural reforms have led to rapid liberalization and expansion of private sector activity in goods and non-financial services, the reforms regarding financial markets have been more gradual, starting with the break-up of the monobank system into two tiers: a central bank conducting monetary affairs; and state-owned commercial and specialized banks responsible for deposit mobilization, lending and other commercial banking activities (Borish et al., 1997). Fries and Taci (2002) emphasize that the state plays an essential role in the banking sector’s reform and should provide prudential regulation and supervision of banks by enforcing new banking laws and regulations. They infer that the progress in the reforms of the banking sector and in complementary enterprise reforms, particularly in areas such as corporate governance and bankruptcy are a vital requirement for the development of a market-oriented banking system. Although the primary elements of a legal and regulatory framework regarding financial sector were set up in most transition countries, there were problems in enactment and implementation of new laws, due to the absence of independent regulatory authorities (World Economic Outlook, 2000). At the same time, issues concerning the failures of banks were politicized and biased (Fries and Taci, 2002).
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Maliszewski (2000) investigates the central bank’s independence in the transition countries and concludes that an independent central bank plays an influential role in protecting price stability. However, if there are acute macroeconomic imbalances, such as an institutional change, it might not influence economic stabilization. He also maintains that central bank independence is an effective device for fighting inflation, only when a significant progress in liberalization reforms is made. He further observes that in most countries the new central bank laws were adopted after the stabilization programs commenced. The speed of the progress in the establishment of non-bank financial institutions such as security markets and insurance companies is even slower than that in the banking sector (World Economic Outlook, 2000). That slow progress could be attributed to the incomplete enforcement of regulatory rules and institutions providing independent share registers, secure settlement procedures, protection of minority shareholders and supervision (EBRD, 1995). Despite the efforts of the policy makers in the transition countries to enforce new laws and regulations facilitating the market economy, the progress varied across countries (EBRD, 1999). Raiser et al. (2000) investigated the factors that cause divergent results in respect of institutional reform and analysed the obstacles to institutional change in the transition countries. The main set of factors affecting the institutional performance outlined are comprised of initial conditions and path dependencies, implemented policies that generate a demand for new institutional framework, and the state capability to enforce new rules and regulations. Rosenbaum (2001) asserts that the variances in the success of the institutional reforms in the economies in transition might come as a result of a specific historical, cultural and social background and places emphasis on the importance of informal institutions. The author suggests that institutional reforms cannot be limited to the implementation of formal institutions, but should comprise a wider range of social practices combined with relevant ideas and concepts. Stahl-Rolf (2000) investigates the divergence in the institutional reform in the transition countries and contends that the main determinant of the degree of success in creating new efficient institutions is the historic experience of forming models and social learning. In his opinion, the change in behaviour models particularly in the underlying mental models and individual behaviour, defines the success of the institutional reform. The effectiveness of the institutions rests on the ethical system that comes from religious or philosophical beliefs and encourages individuals to contribute to the common wealth as well as to their own well-being sharing at the same time common societal values (Behrman and Rondinelli, 2000). The most important element of a transition process in CEE is the institutional change required to satisfy the criteria for EU membership, as the institutions of regional integration are specific, focused on macroeconomic measures and comprise high levels of government involvement (Tihanyi and Roath, 2002). It is assumed that the institutional system in the transition economies will be strongly
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influenced by west institutional models, and that external assistance is of crucial significance for institutional development (Meyer, 1998). Thus, an efficient transition takes place in four steps (Table 1.4), each contributing, independently and inter-dependently, in transforming the country in question.
Table 1.4 Four steps for the transition to market economy Macroeconomic stabilization
Liberalization
Monetary policy, decrease in monetary overhang, control of money supply
Increased competition, increased product prices, ending of subsidies
Exchange rate policy, fixed exchange rate as an anchor for stabilization Wage policy, social safety net, unemployment benefits, increased wages, decrease in unemployment rate
Liberal interest rates
Credit policy, interest rate policy, low interest rates needed, increased competition, competitive environment, growth
Financial policy, decreased foreign debt, decrease all deficits, balance the state budget, increased revenues from privatization deals
Institutional or structural reform Legislation, extensive introduction of new laws and rules for a new market environment, rules to support a free market economy Commercialization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
Privatization and restructuring Clear (well defined) property rights, demonopolization
Restitution and settlement of claims
Open trade rules, new trade partners, new trade agreements, ending of subsidies, new competitive products, increased competition, differentiation of products, increased quality products, no trade barriers, elimination of quotas and tariffs Currency convertibility, free move of currency, easier foreign transactions, attraction of foreign investments, capital mobility
New worker’s environment, workers’ councils, new accounting rules, consumer protection, infrastructure improvement, environmental protection
Introduction of privatization and liquidation laws
Adoption of new commercial code, privatization rules and competition rules
Open economy, easy entry access for foreign investors, worker mobility, establishment of relations with foreign organizations
Two-tier banking system, bankruptcy laws, clearing bad debts, end of subsidies, hard budget constraints, new banking rules
End of monopolies, large scale privatization, financing state budgets, decrease in deficits, increase of competition, increased quality and variety of products Small scale privatization, incentives for creation of new firms, increasing private sector, increasing services’ sector
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Table 1.4 continued Macroeconomic stabilization Income policy, strict income policy as a nominal anchor for stabilization, elimination of subsidies Taxation policy, revenues from VAT, taxation of revenues of profits in the new private sector (or in privatized state-owned firms) Fiscal policy, decreased governmental expenditures, increase revenues Inflation policy, decreased/low inflation rates
Liberalization Establishment of new foreign companies, liberal market rules, competitive environment
Institutional or structural reform
Privatization and restructuring
New market rules and introduction of FDI laws and incentives for foreign participation
Elimination of governmental intervention, giving power and ‘space’ to private ownership, elimination of state bureaucracy Introducing hard Introduction of rules for financial budget constraints, new intermediaries and corporate governance, stock market exchange, new bankruptcy laws creation of commercial banks, establishment of foreign branches and foreign banks New tax system, new Settlement of bad loans social security system
Source: Bitzenis, 2007.
1.3.1 Assistance and External Help for Transition Economies A successful transition comes about not merely from within the country. Outside assistance is essential, either in the form of guidance or directly in the form of financial or other support. The countries in transition obtain assistance on technical aspects from international institutions, mainly the IMF and the World Bank, which guide the way into the set up of a functional market economy. They receive assistance in organizing legislation, in deciding on monetary policies and tools, in issuing new tax and treasury systems and in improving the management of administration and public expenditure. The help of international institutions is also reflected in the financial sector, in the restructuring of the banking system and in the creation of financial markets. Finally, with help from the IMF, inaccurate statistical systems used in the past are upgraded, so that dependability of the data can be trusted for evaluation of the country’s progress (World Economic Outlook, 2000, 185). International organizations provide the country in transition with financial help in order for the country to meet certain stabilization goals, and to be able to repay the old and new debts. The steps required from the IMF assistance plans and shared among the transition countries are large-scale liberalization of trade, prices and
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exchange rates regimes, demonopolization of large state owned enterprises, rapid privatization, development of the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), a social safety-net provision in the state budget, and adjustment of the taxation systems. Each plan provides additional steps, appropriate for each individual country. International organizations are willing to embrace reformed countries. Some of the countries that took the path of transition to a market economy, have already joined the OECD, WTO and NATO and a number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are likely to enter the European Union (actually eight countries from the CEE region became EU members in May 2004) (EBRD, 1997). Although all countries in transition have the same final goal, that is the creation of a market economy, the results of their efforts vary. The different reform paths, the different transition strategies and policies, the sequence and speed of reforms which are followed by each country, and the different adverse initial economic conditions along with other external facts each country has faced or started with, are decisive factors for the amount of success each country will achieve in the transition process (Bitzenis, 2007).
1.4 The Speed of Transition Reform Policies for Becoming a Market Economy; The Shock Therapy vs. Gradualism Debate The speed of adaptation of each policy is crucial in the transition process. The concepts of gradualism and gradual changes that lead to a market economy in the long-term, and the concept of shock-therapy or big-bang and rapid changes which were refined in time, are the two main approaches that can be used, either separately, or combined in the different steps of the transition. An alternative speed of reform is the ‘stop and go’ or ‘trial and error’ approach. According to this approach, the government proceeds in the announcement of a concrete plan of reform policies. However, during the implementation of the plan, endogenous and exogenous factors prevent its completion or a provisional freeze of reforms befalls. A provisional postponement of these reforms may also occur due to the political cost of changes that were proposed (e.g. various reactions of citizens, or a delay in the appearance of the positive factors that result from reforms, or an inability of the government to succeed in the reforms, etc.). Furthermore, divergence in the programme of reform, or a short delay in the achievement of reform (either through a gradual or shock therapy) does not alter the speed of reform, changing the speed of reform into the alternative of ‘stop and go’. Finally and sometimes on purpose, the ultimate goal of the reform is not announced. For example, for the case of China, some of the reform changes were initiated spontaneously at ‘a ground level’, and only after their success, were they ratified by the government and implemented as official policy. In this case, a trial and error speed of reform existed. The World Bank (2002), pointed out that some economists were in favour of promoting reform in all aspects of the economy and the transition as fast as
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possible, while others were critical of a strategy imposed at such a high cost on the country’s economy. World Bank (2002, 16) pointed out that: The relationship between the speed of reform and economic growth has been the subject of controversy. Some economists argued for advancing reforms in all areas as fast as possible; others criticized such a strategy as imposing un-necessarily high cost. The most interesting part of the debate focuses on the sequencing of policies-on the relative speed of different types of reform. Advocates of moving fast in areas amenable to rapid reform argue that the synergies among different components-for example, privatization together with liberalization of prices and trade-may generate enough gains and winners to maintain the reform momentum. The need to take advantage of windows of opportunity is also cited as important in that decision. By contrast, advocates of slower reform point out that going ahead with reforms that can be implemented quickly – ‘stroke of the pen’ reforms – without waiting for those that take more time, such as the creation of institutions that support markets, significantly reduces the benefits of these reforms. The loss could be so severe as to generate output losses and also lead to the creation of interest groups opposing those reforms requiring more time.
The government must focus on what is beneficial to its economy and not on what is urgent. It is impossible for the government to protect the entire population from the burden of the transition process and the imposition of strict measures. Dornbusch (1991) argued that radical change is the only realistic option, and gradualism opens the door to an unstructured free-for-all market: consumers will go to the black market and firms will produce for the black market. Temporary collapse may be inevitable one way or another, but in the context of radical reform it may at least be the seed for reconstruction. Transition needs to be accomplished extremely fast because the ice is melting, the distance to go is far, and the task is overwhelming. The belief that transition could be accomplished over many years is an illusory one. The gradualist solution is appropriate only when a market economy is already in place and the issue is how to improve the use of resources at the margin. Dornbusch concluded that this is not the case for Central and Eastern economies. Therefore, a radical and rapid reform is the correct remedy. Stanley Fischer et al. (2000, 1) suggests that the faster the speed of reforms, the quicker the recovery and the higher its growth. Although, rapid changes were favoured by most countries, they have sometimes been criticized by theorists. By observing countries in transition, some researchers concluded that the shocktherapy approach leads to drastic increases in the level of poverty and income inequality. Especially in the case of privatization of state owned firms, such rushed The World Bank (2002), Transition The First Ten Years; Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Washington DC, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, USA.
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moves have often led to the disorganization of valuable operational enterprises, which subsequently assisted the drop of the output level. However, advocates of a rapid reform object to this view, pointing out the fact that the output would drop anyway and that output had already been manipulated before the transition. They also claim that the level of poverty and income inequality is higher in countries following the gradualist method, a method that provides more space for the satisfaction of personal interests and corruption (World Economic Outlook, 2000, 190). The supporters of the shock therapy approach (even in the case of sequencing) assert that the precondition for successful transformation and stabilization of the economy is the simultaneous and rapid development of reform. Lipton and Sachs stated: … a rapid transition to a market economy, with a heavy emphasis on economic integration with the Western Europe – through free trade, active participation of foreign firms in the domestic economy, and closer political ties – will permit the Eastern European economies to overcome some of the thorniest problems of transition, both economic and political. (1990, 77)
The advocates of the shock therapy method regarded the gradual approach to be both unnecessarily costly in respect of time and lost output, and also infeasible in some cases, given the unstable political situation (Hall and Elliot, 1999). The transition reforms, according to Lipton and Sachs (1990), should be performed as quickly as possible in order to prevent reverse political processes that might impede the whole transition strategy. Heavy criticism of the shock therapy’s propositions exist in a large amount of literature, which maintain that radical reforms produce more negative than positive effects in the transition economies, such as; economic decline, high unemployment, inflation, uncertain privatization outcomes, decline in standards of living and income inequality. The gradualists favour a prolonged period of state intervention in terms of price and wage controls, fixed exchange rates, postponed privatization, and the state establishment of market institutions (Van Brabant, 1993; Zajicek and Heisler, 1995; Kolodko, 1999; Marangos, 2001; Hall et al., 1999; Sergi, 2003). Basing his arguments on the Post-Keynesian propositions, Marangos (2001; 2006c; 2004c) maintains that the goal of transition should be the development of a civilized market society that could be achieved by a managed transition process with active government intervention. A transformation is an evolutionary process that necessarily takes place over a rather long period of time (Lichtenstein, 1996).
World Economic Outlook (2000), A Survey by the Staff of the International, Chapter III, 190, ‘Transition: Experience and Policy Issues’, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
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Angresano (1994, 26) states that one of the main shortcomings of shock therapy is that economic change is perceived in a mechanical and simplified way. He also regards shock therapy as a social experiment, stressing the high social cost caused by that approach. More specifically, Angresano (1994, 26) states that one of the main shortcomings of shock therapy is that: … economic change was perceived in a mechanical and simplified way … the reformers believed that certain stimuli, consisting of such available tools as stringent monetary and fiscal policy and liberalized prices will induce desired changes throughout the economy. It was assumed that using the proposed stabilization measures as stimuli, the desired changes in economic behaviour were virtually guaranteed, as the chemist’s combining of particular is certain to produce specific reaction.
Kolodko (1999) contends that the main reason for the severe output contraction and social pressure lies on the set of radical reform policies adopted by the majority of transition countries. Those policies underestimated the role of the state and erroneously assumed that the emerging market forces will quickly replace the government as a facilitator of new institutional settings, in the development of infrastructure and the investment in human capital. Sokol (2001, 645) infers that shock therapy did not lead to quick and smooth ‘closure’ of the wealth gap with the West, but brought about a painful change from a planned to a market economy and lead to fragmentation and increasing disparity between the transition countries and the West, as well as considerable discrepancies within the transition countries themselves. Meyer (1998) insists that shock therapy recommendations for reforms did not consider the political and social consequences, while Kolodko (1999) insists that the set of radical policies performed in the beginning of the transition were induced by psychological and political rather than economic and financial decisive motives. Finally, Van Brabant (1993) maintains that in order to have a well-functioning market economy, there is a need for an almost simultaneous completion of all the reforms rather than a simultaneous start of the various policies of the transformation process. Moreover, he views ‘shock therapy’ rather as a mode designed to improve resource allocation. Zajicek and Heisler (1995) argued that the shock therapy reform strategies have disregarded some of the limitations that remained from the centrally planned economy, namely the concentrated and outmoded industrial structure, the absence of developed financial infrastructure, the specific social infrastructure in terms of behaviour modes and attitudes, and the existing net of costly social programs. They maintain that given these constraints, the employment of a comprehensive transition-period policy focusing on the effective and realistic removal of the barriers to a free market system rather than focusing on the application of quick
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market solutions, is a more appropriate approach. They estimated that the time required for the creation of basic market institutions, the adoption and enforcement of corporate laws and the antitrust legislation is at least 15–20 years and that the aims of the economic policy should be instant stabilization of the economy, promotion of economic growth, stimulation of investments, a new approach to privatization, and a clear economic role for the government. Goodhue et al. (1998) maintain that government policies supporting information provision and institution-structuring are important in the earliest phase of transition, when their benefits are most significant, especially in industries with more privatized production. It is argued that the big-bang approach leads to highly optimistic forecasts, because it does not consider the costs of rapid privatization in an uncertain environment and only when there is almost no uncertainty and learning is correspondingly unimportant, will the big bang predictions be realistic. To be more specific, the difference between shock therapists and gradualists can also be seen from the following: the shock therapists believe that you cannot jump over a gorge in two jumps. The gradualists, however, believe that the passage to market economy is the ascension of a mountain where the top cannot be reached in one jump.
1.5 The Sequencing of Reforms and the Importance of Institutional Reforms In the early stages of reformation, the majority of the reformers supported the idea that the initial focus should be on liberalization and privatization, because institutions will need a longer period to develop and the creation of markets will also make the institutional reform easier (Raiser et al., 2000a). However, there were considerable differences in the type of reforms to be implemented, especially in the pursued privatization strategies (Stern, 1998). In Van Brabant’s (1993) opinion, monetary stabilization must be done quickly and with great intensity, while price and foreign exchange liberalization are policies that could be introduced quickly but might be performed over a longer period of time as well. Transformations that cannot be accomplished rapidly are privatization and restructuring of state-owned enterprises, because a radical transformation in attitudes and behaviour of economic agents will appear over a longer period of time. Meyer (1998) argued that the reforms in the initial stage of the transition should focus on the critical elements of liberalization and stabilization. He claims that successful liberalization is a necessary precondition for privatization at a later stage. This rests on the foundations of the market mechanism, as market adjusted prices are required for a market valuation of the assets that should be privatized. It is assumed that the institutional system in the transition economies will be strongly influenced by western institutional models, and that external assistance is of crucial significance for the institutional development (Meyer, 1998).
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Castanheira and Roland (2000) argued that an optimal transition requires immediate price liberalization, openness of the economy and elimination of governmental intervention. A model created by Castanheira and Roland (2000) presents at the same time an ‘evolutionary’ as well as a ‘big bang’ view of transition, as optimal transition is characterized by coordinated development of the new private sector through capital accumulation and through the gradual phasing out of the state sector. At the same time, attaining this optimal transition requires immediate price liberalization, openness of the economy and elimination of governmental intervention. However, there is no optimal path (sequence) for a successful economic reform. Given the absence of an optimal model, each country must draw its policy approach in the first steps on the road to a market economy out of practical guidance rules and the past history of transition experiences. The major objectives of transition policies are to raise economic efficiency and promote growth. However, despite the fact that all transition countries had similar objectives and final goals, actual transition policies have differed both in measures and sequence implemented and results achieved to date. The sequence of adaptation of every policy is important in the transition process and refers to the order in which either macroeconomic policy action or specific reforms are introduced. Specifically, it involves the order in which reforms are undertaken across sectors and the order in which reforms are undertaken within sectors (IMF, 2002). The issue of sequence and the importance of the institutional reforms have also been mentioned among others by Marangos (2003, 963) who concluded that an optimal sequence of the transition process primarily requires a combination of state and market-produced institutions. Moreover, immediate government intervention is required in setting up the minimum institutional structure essential for the operation of the market. An institutional core was essential to ensure economic development in transition economies. Moreover, Marangos (2004a) added that it is important to allow the market to nourish and expand state-produced institutions through the development of both formal and informal market-produced institutions and trust. Finally, economic policy makers and advisors would normally require time to experiment and make mistakes to bring about an efficient institutional structure. To be more precise, the transition process sometimes requires gradualism. As mentioned above, the concepts of gradualism and gradual changes that in the long term lead to a market economy and the concept of shock-therapy and the rapid changes, which are refined in time, are the two approaches that can be used, either separately or mixed in different perspectives of transition. However, there is no optimal path for a successful economic reform. The main reasons for that are the differences in the country’s initial position, the external environment, and the particular policies pursued during the transition process. As mentioned above, the major steps of the transition process are macro stabilization, restructuring and privatizing state enterprises, price and market liberalization and redefining the role of state (Fischer and Gelb, 1991, 91–105).
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Roe (1992) suggests the following guiding principles for economies aspiring to liberal reforms: • •
•
•
•
Allowing of prices that are both flexible and reasonably reflective of international price movements. Elimination of impediments that could abort necessary producer responses to changing prices. In particular, insurance of a reasonably liberal basis for both new products and producers to enter markets and for failed products and producers to exist. Allowing of productive agents to emerge and agents who are motivated to change in response to changing conditions. Those who manage capital without ownership involvement may not have the proper incentives to build a sound capital base, resist unaffordable wage demands, and generally champion the needs of corporate profitability and capital. Establishment of macro (economic) stability; a difficult prospect in many of the reforming socialist economies because of the inherent tendencies toward instability caused by large monetary overhangs, as well as the perceived need to generate important changes in relative prices, an essential feature required by the reform process. Establishment of sound and flexible financial systems.
In price and market liberalization, trade rules are open and there are new trade agreements. Trade barriers are eliminated, and a competitive environment with differentiation of products established. According to Exeter and Fries (1998), the main benefit of liberalization is the adjustment of relative prices. As a result, prices begin to reflect production costs and market demand, and they are able to provide clear, market-based signals to producers. Many studies choose to spot the speed of transition process by examining measures of liberalization. These measures of liberalization were defined by De Melo Denized and Gelb (1996). Liberalization was measured in terms of internal markets, external markets and private sector entry. The measure of internal market liberalization reflects domestic price liberalization and progress in abolishing state trading monopolies. The external market measure assesses the liberalization of the foreign trade regime, including currency convertibility, elimination of export controls and taxes as well as substitution of low or moderate import duties for import quotas and high import tariffs. Finally, private sector entry depicts the openness of the economy to private sector development. Lipton and Sachs (1990), and Gerloff (2000) argue that tight macroeconomic stabilization policy has to be accompanied by price and trade liberalization, currency convertibility, promotion of private enterprises, free market competition, privatization restructuring and institutional reforms from the very beginning of the transition from a planned to a market economy. In restructuring and privatizing state enterprises, the property rights should be clear and monopolies should be stopped. Political commitment to transparent
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privatization outcomes should exist combined with the elimination of bureaucratic systems. More incentives should be given for new companies to be established in the country with no governmental interference (Bitzenis, 2002a; 2002b). According to Johnston and Sundararajan (1999), structural reforms should include the reform of the interest rate regime and of monetary operations, the development of the banking sector (reforming selective credit regulations), the development of money and interbank markets, fostering of competition in financial markets and the development of long term capital markets. Exeter and Fries (1998, 27) stated that: one of the most important lessons to be gleaned from the diverse approaches to privatization is the strong influence the method of privatization has on the creation of ownership structures. These structures have important implications for corporate governance in the post-privatization phase and, in turn, for the pace and extend of restructuring, enterprise performance, and growth of output.
One of the most widespread structural changes, as a consequence of privatization, was the foundation of millions of new family enterprises, improving the previously backward service sector throughout regions. Finally, while redefining the role of the state, it is essential to introduce new laws and rules in order to create a new market economy and provide incentives for foreign direct inflows. Gray (1997) suggests three factors that appear to be essential to a reform in both the content and processes of legal systems. The first one deals with the supply of market-friendly laws that clearly define individual rights and responsibilities and that embody market-friendly economic policies. The second one is the establishment of supportive institutions. Formal institutions include judges, arbitrators, prosecutors and court functionaries so that the laws are effective. The third factor is the creation of a set of incentives for individual market participants that can motivate them to take full advantage of both their legal rights and the information and enforcement capacity provided by institutions. Additionally, commercialization of state-owned enterprises is another major issue that could lead to a new working environment, providing power to work councils, new accounting rules and protection for consumers. Finally, changes in the subsidies system, bankruptcy rules and hard budget constraints of the banking sector need to be looked into (Matousek and Sergi, 2005). As mentioned above, there are four steps that should take place so that an economy can be deemed a market economy. Regarding the sequence or the speed of reforms, we can argue that the first step is to conduct a careful long-term plan of stability, which must be used in order to improve the economic condition of the country. This is the longest (in time duration) of all steps, but in order to successfully stabilize the whole there is a necessity for liberalization of the market, together with structural or institutional reforms and privatization and restructuring of state owned enterprises. In our opinion, the recommended approach here is one of gradualism because of the time taken for changes to occur (costly measures).
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The second step is to change the whole legal framework in order to be in position to protect the changes which will lead to a market economy. A shock therapy approach is important to be used, at least initially, so that the most important changes of the laws that will support the rest of the system finish quickly. Of course, a change in the legal system is not easy and for the rest of the process that will take a long period of time, gradualism should be used. Gradualism in this occasion does not mean that things will an inordinate amount of time to be completed or that the process will stop for a period and then continue (avoidance of stop and go sequence/speed of reforms). It means that things will change steadily until the desired result is reached. The third step relates to the liberalization of trade, prices, interest rates, exchange rates, etc. Those who support shock therapy suggest that this step should be achieved in that way in order to quickly obtain the benefits of the transformation, while the supporters of gradualism suggest that people are not ready for such a change and that, for example, a liberalization of prices at once will create high inflation. Finally, the fourth step relates to the reduction of the public sector and the restructuring of the publicly owned firms. The choice between shock therapy vs. gradualism used here, largely depends on what the government decides (among others) upon the issue: whether the state owned enterprises (SOEs) are firstly will undergo an initial restructuring and then become private or will be firstly privatized, allowing the private sector to restructure them. Of course, in order to have results from this step, the other steps should also show an important improvement. For example, clear laws, property rights, transparency, economic and political stability, monopoly abolishment and a well-defined competitive environment should exist in the country so that the government can expect successful privatization deals. The essential element of a transition process in CEE is the institutional change required to satisfy the criteria for EU membership as the institutions of regional integration are specific, focused on macroeconomic measures and comprise high levels of government involvement (Tihanyi and Roath, 2002). To sum up, transition is a massive and complex task and very few of the transition countries are close to the completion of the transformation process. The aims of transition were clear from the very beginning: the establishment of political pluralism similar to Western European models, the substitution of the administrative planning system with market-based decision making, the speedy integration into the world economy and participation in the European Union. In some transition countries without previous experience of economic decentralization, the dismantling of central planning proved painful. In others, overcoming the legacies of administrative planning created decisive problems. Despite that, the macroeconomic situation in all CEE countries in the early phases of the transition process had its main characteristics; a collapse of output and employment, accompanied by rising inflation. The diverging trends among the transition economies became noticeable during the course of the transition. Through close observation of the experiences of many countries, theorists have set
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up the guidelines for the transition economies. The results are valuable not only for countries in transition, but also for other countries, developed or not, in their application of any reform strategies (World Economic Outlook, 2000, 166). Technically, it is impossible to simultaneously implement all the reforms required to bring about a market economy. If a country prefers to a successful ‘big bang’ approach and a rapid sequence of reforms, the country should already have the basis for the restructure (political stability, a legal framework base and experience, a competent government, eagerness and support from the citizens, and sufficient per-capita income so that citizens are able to endure the changes). The changes must be induced in such sequence that will provide the framework for the changes to come. For example, how can a government liberalize the exchange rate regime, when the foreign currency reserves of the country do not exist? Or how can a government achieve a quick and successful privatization process when the country lacks a sound banking system, financial intermediaries, and a stock exchange market? How can a country attract significant FDI inflows, when state monopolies in basic goods (gas, electricity etc.) have not yet been abandoned? Hence, in the cases where a reform in one step is highly dependant on the success of a reform in another, the reform should take place gradually. However, this argument should not be confused with the policy of continuously and deliberately postponing changes such as the privatization and restructuring of state-owned enterprises and the introduction of a new legal system (‘stop and go’).
1.6 The Impact of Adverse Initial Conditions in the Transition Process of a Country 1.6.1 Adverse Initial Conditions and the Speed and/or Sequence of Reforms In studying the transition strategies and the outcomes of the reforms, it is of paramount importance to be aware of the initial conditions in the transition countries. In spite of the common purposes and guidelines of transition economies, there were considerable variations in the transition countries performance due to the initial conditions, external shocks and the conducted policies to facilitate transition (World Economic Outlook, 2000). Given the legacies of the centrallyplanned economy, the vital economic, political and social reforms, were to be implemented in a very complex environment characterized by severe economic crises, weak political institutions, lack of experience in operating in a market economy, influential communist presence, and often serious ethnic conflicts (Lipton and Sachs, 1990). When the transition process was launched, there were two distinct views in the literature regarding the initial conditions, the result of two distinct views regarding the speed of implementing the reforms: shock therapy vs. gradualism. The transition process for the shock therapy supporters was neither peculiar, complicated or enigmatic. While the problems associated with the transition process might be
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serious and complex, they were not unparalleled. ‘In fact in many ways it is a welltrodden path’ (Sachs, 1993, 2). These problems needed to be solved by ordinary means and the ‘uniqueness’ of the situation required unhesitating and determined action. ‘Everything in this setting pointed to the need for a hard and (of necessity) rough stabilization policy’ (Aslund, 1997, 186). Many elements of the transition programme did have general application across economies with immensely different initial economic and political environments (Woo, Parker and Sachs, 1997, xi). Initial social factors do not substantially influence economic growth in transition economies; rather openness and investment do (Thomas and Wang, 1997, 230). Thus ‘in principle the tasks and instruments of macroeconomic stabilization are the same in Russia as elsewhere’ (Aslund, 1995, 181). The Chinese model of gradualism was not irrelevant as a guide to transition economies for the shock therapy supporters. Three quarters of China’s population lived in rural areas at the time of the reforms and agriculture was the main source of income. Economic growth was initiated outside the state sector. In contrast, Lipton and Sachs (1992, 277) argued that in Russia and Eastern Europe a majority of the labour force was employed in urban industry. Thus, the main source of growth, in the short run, would come as a result of privatization of the public sector. As already said, there is no universally optimal speed. The Chinese gradualist process was a succession from easy to hard, addressing the easy problems first and leaving the difficult ones for later (Cao, Fan and Woo 1997, 38). However, once the honeymoon period was over, the Chinese authorities had to deal with more difficult problems. In direct contrast to gradualism, the shock therapy approach addresses all problems simultaneously from the start. The shock therapy supporters argued that it would not be a surprise if China abandoned gradualism in favour of more rapid economic reforms. The different strategies implemented in China, and in Russia and Eastern Europe were mainly due to the varying economic problems confronted. The Chinese reform strategy was a traditional development issue – reallocation of surplus agricultural labour to manufacturing – while Russia and Eastern Europe were faced with the common adjustment problem of reallocating labour from uncompetitive industries to efficient existing or new industries. It was thus much easier to establish family agriculture in China than in Russia, especially when the bureaucratic obstructions are taken into account (Aslund, 1993, 96). ‘The fact is that economic development is easier than economic adjustment both practically and politically’ (Woo, 1994, 305). It was a priori plausible, for the shock therapy supporters, that a gradualist strategy was more likely to succeed in an under-industrialized country, like China, where there was a vast amount of surplus labour, rather than in Russia and Eastern Europe which were over-industrialized and dominated by state property (Cao, Fan and Woo, 1997, 28). However, this does not mean that it would have succeeded in Russia. Thus, ‘the recommendation that Russia should take the same path as China amounts to telling apples to be pears. The actual preconditions must be taken into account’ (Aslund, 1993, 99).
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Consequently, for the shock therapy supporters, a successful transition could only take place via the shock therapy approach, and a gradualist one would only fail. The Chinese experience demonstrated that a gradualist approach could only be realized where special initial circumstances existed. Here lies a contradiction. The shock therapy process was supposedly based on simple truths and applicable to any transition economy, independent of the initial conditions. ‘An economic program can be easily adopted from the Polish experience’ (Aslund, 1992, 178). By arguing that the success of the gradualist Chinese approach was due to the specific characteristics of the economy, the universality of the shock therapy approach was undermined. The experience of China weakened the arguments of shock therapy approach. This anomaly was explained by Parker, Tritt and Woo (1997, 15) who argued that in ‘Hungary, Poland and Russia, the transition process involved structural adjustment, while in China and Vietnam it involved ‘normal economic development’. Nevertheless this argument reinforces the position that initial conditions play an important role in determining the speed of the reform process, which shock therapy ignored. At the same time, it undermines the catholicity of the shock therapy approach. In contrast to the shock therapy approach, the gradualist process was inconsistent with rigid thinking and the implementation of the reform programme independent of the initial conditions. ‘Sensible economics’ required the incorporation of the initial conditions in the transition process (Murrell, 1995, 165). Policy instruments and goals had to reflect the specific economic conditions of the time and change accordingly. This required constant reassessment of the specific economic situation and active government participation in economic affairs. The government had to be flexible and responsive to economic changes. In terms of economic development, the socialist experiment was a temporary aberration in the course of historical events (Kornai, 2000, 27). However, the initial conditions of each ex-socialist country determined both the output response during marketization and the speed and sequence of transition policies. The different initial conditions made the situation quite unique and there was ‘no ready-make recipe’ (Kornai, 1995, 34), ‘no single detailed road map’ (Fischer and Gelb, 1991, 91). Incorporating the initial conditions in the transition process justified a gradual approach (Kornai, 1992a, 17). This was because the level of a society’s civilization, history, culture, size, efficiency and the degree of social satisfaction were correlated with what actually occurred in the economy. As a result, the dynamics and the speed of reform differed among transition economies because the starting points were different (Kornai, 1992b, 168). The starting point required clarification; there could not be a uniform line, and thus governments could not undertake liberalizing measures simultaneously. Instead, there was an ‘optimal’ order of economic liberalization, depending on the initial conditions (McKinnon, 1993, 4). While history and culture are important, for the gradualist supporters of the neoclassical persuasion, they were not such a binding
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constraint that a fatalistic approach had to be adopted. Based on the gradualist neoclassical approach, cultural values can mutate and history can change. Nonetheless, the transition process took place in a specific dynamic cultural context, characterized by instability and unpredictability. There was no single strategy. Ultimate success depended on whether or not sufficient non-economic conditions prevailed, including political, ideological and cultural dimensions, as the Post-Keynesians argued. Russia and former republics of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were characterized by widely different civilizations, history, religion and different levels of economic and political development. This strongly influenced the way transition problems were solved, since capitalism comes in many forms (Arestis, Dunn and Sawyer, 1999, 541; Minsky and Whalen, 1996–7, 161). The assumption of the shock therapy transition model was that cultural differences were not an obstacle to the introduction of market relations. The shock therapy model could be implemented independent of any specific economic, political and ideological conditions. However, Post-Keynesians and gradualists disagreed because they believed that culture, ideology and, the initial conditions in general, were extremely important. Institutions and social practices function and are founded on customs, traditions, and habits which are deeply ingrained and only slowly deserted and replaced by others (Argyrous, 1996, 113). For example, prices are determined in a social market, not just an economic market, by customs, power and competition (Whalen, 1996c, 9). In particular, in an oligopolistic and monopolistic market environment, prices are based on a mark-up pricing scheme. As normal cost is quite constant, mark-ups are established in the short run by customs, convention and reasonableness and in the long run by competitive pressures and market power (Lee, 1996, 93). In this environment, firms may maintain prices by reducing profits in the face of a threat of entry (Norman, 1996, 525). In this way, prices are not a means of resource allocation but rather a way of generating funds for expansion of the firm (Shapiro, 1977, 549). The transition process was a heterogeneous phenomenon. It was not possible to copy existing market models, contrary to what the supporters of shock therapy argued. Even though the transition process was dominated by shock therapy, ‘one sees in Eastern Europe several different transformations and transitions, not one transformation and transition. From country to country throughout the entire region, there are variations’ (Share, 1995, 572). Post-Keynesians argue that economic development is a path-dependent process. Economic processes, most importantly the transition process, ‘are generally to be seen as path-dependent, and as such, any outcome whether equilibrium or not, depends on the route followed … in other words, current developments depend on past events as reflected in expectations, beliefs, institutions, etc.’ (Arestis and Sawyer, 1993, 9). Consequently, the transition process was a path-dependent process that relied on the initial conditions, the policies initiated and the external environment. While the initial conditions may exhibit some commonalties there were definite differences as well. The economy, history, politics and government
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intervention were inextricably linked in the development of a market system (Reardon, 1996, 634). Thus, as the transition process depended on historical, political cultural and ideological conditions prevailing in the country, PostKeynesians argued that reform strategists should not ignore these factors. However, if the problems associated with the transition process involved the specific socio-economic conditions of the country in question; introducing private property and market forces could not in any way deliver success. The neoclassical transition models, ‘ignore[d] the real environment in which the economy is located’ (Rider, 1994, 595). The shock therapy approach did not incorporate the differences between countries, even though they were recognized: Instead economic, political and social differences across countries are treated as aberrations on the model’s assumptions which will be ironed out over time with further market liberalization. (Smyth, 1998, 386–7)
For the neoclassical transition model, any endeavour to embody the noneconomic factors would only result in undermining the operation of the free market process. Although the characteristics of each transition economy differed, the neoclassical transition model did not consider it important enough to justify a change in strategy. This was due to the fact that transition programs were devised by technical experts who were ignorant of the economic, political cultural and history of the country in question (Share, 1996, 580). However, it is not accidental that Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics are performing much better than the former Soviet Union, since centrally administered socialism was established much later in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics (Smyth, 1998, 368). There is currently an attempt to explain the economic outcomes of the transition process and the differences in magnitude of these outcomes due to the speed and sequence of the transition policies. In addition, there is also currently an attempt to explore the various characteristics of transition economies, which existed at the beginning of transition process, which naturally influenced the speed and sequence of reforms. This is in contrast to the shock therapy approach to the transition process, which involved the immediate establishment of a market economy with no consideration of the initial conditions. The initial conditions of transition economies incorporate among others the external and internal shocks derived from the breakdown of the central planning system, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the wars and civil strives, all of which had an impact, one way or another, on the transition process. As a result, there was a variation of policies, which the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region adopted in order to achieve a transition to a market economy. A question that has been derived from the above analysis and requires an answer is: How did initial conditions influence the overall economic performance of transition countries and the consequent policies adopted in order to become a fully-functioning market economy?
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Gradualists argue that economic development is a path-dependent process. The transition process depends on historical, political, cultural and ideological conditions prevailing in the country. Post-Keynesians argued that reform strategists should not ignore these factors. In summary, literature and empirical evidence reveal that the initial conditions have a major influence not only in the speed and sequence of reforms, but also in determining the outcomes of the transition process. 1.6.2 The Importance/Influence of Adverse Initial Conditions on the Performance of a Successful Transition Process of a Country The argument developed in this chapter is that there are several characteristics that affect a country’s economic performance, not only at the start of the transition to a market economy but also at any stage of adaptation of a specific programme or measure, which encouraged or discouraged the country’s transition to a market economy. For example, countries with little experience as independent nation states had, on the one hand, more difficulties in creating efficient political institutions and on the other hand, the legacy of the communist regime and the external economic shocks delayed the economic recovery. In general, transition economies had to restructure in numerous ways, notably from heavy to light industry, from industry and agriculture to finance and services, and from CMEA to world trade. … Within existing firms, new products lines and production methods had to be developed, while simultaneously reducing input waste, notably in terms of energy, labor and the environment. (Estrin et al., 1997, 9)
While the goal of all transition economies was the same, the performance of these countries was uneven and disheartening. Bulgaria’s macroeconomic development is lagging behind, compared to other countries in Central and Eastern European region. We argue that the reason for this is due to the adverse economic initial conditions and exogenous shocks that were extremely problematical. Balcerowicz (1994, 49) stated that ‘initial conditions greatly affect the sequence of economic transformation’. He emphasized the importance of the initial elements of the economic system – the initial economic structure, macroeconomic condition, the size of the public sector – maintaining that these elements are the factors that determine the response of the economy to the introduction of stabilization and liberalization policies. According to Stern (1998), the differences in initial conditions are related to the length of the period under central planning, the previous adoption of some of the principles of the market economy, the economic structure, debt level, geographical location, natural resource endowments, and history and culture. Fischer and Sahay (2000) surveyed to what extent initial conditions influence the transition performance, by including in their analysis seven variables
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representing the initial conditions: the share of agriculture in GDP, natural recourse endowment index, years under communism, secondary school enrolment ratio, trade dependency, an index of over-industrialization, and the distance of the country’s capital city from Düsseldorf. It was found that explanatory power for almost 50% of the growth performance was due to the secondary school enrolment ratio which represents the economic development at the time of transition, and the years under communism. Fischer and Sahay (2000) also suggest that anti-inflation policies and structural reforms have a positive influence on the growth level. Price liberalization and small-scale privatization have a more significant impact than the large-scale privatization, while the fiscal deficits have a positive effect on output, only if the inflation is controlled. A fundamental factor behind the path of output growth was the extent and quality of the reforms pursued by the transition countries. There is a rapidly growing literature of empirical studies that analyse the effect of reform policies on the transition path. Many studies maintain that there is a strong relationship between comprehensive reform and output performance during the course of transition and infer that the economic and political reforms in the transition countries have strong impact on the growth and inflation rates (De Melo et al., 1996; Stern, 1998; EBRD, 1997; Fischer and Sahay, 2000; Gungur and Yamak, 2002). As the reform process intensifies, the influence on inflation and growth becomes more significant and the inflation rate compared to growth rate is more sensitive to changes, in the degree of the economic and political reform. Fischer et al. (1996) argue that there is a positive influence of the liberalization and the structural reforms on the performance of a successful transition process and infer that a pegged exchange rate regime and a tight fiscal policy have a strong positive effect on reducing inflation and enhancing growth of the countries in transition. Herdandez-Cata (1999) analyses the effect of economic liberalization, including price decontrol and monetary growth, on inflation in the transition countries. He concludes that despite price liberalization causes a significant increase in the average price level, particularly in countries with heavily repressed inflation; however, there is no lasting negative effect on the inflation level as the main determinant of inflation is monetary expansion. Berg et al. (1999) maintained that the main determinants of the variations in output growth in the transition countries were the extent to which structural reforms are effectively performed and the tight macroeconomic policy that was pursued. Although tight macroeconomic policy is less significant than structural reforms, the higher the speed of the reforms is, the faster the growth will be. Berg et al. (1999) investigate which factors have the strongest impact on the initial output decline and infer that in the early stages of the transition, the influence of adverse initial conditions was more profound than that of inflation and fiscal deficits, and that the progress in structural reforms does not affect the output negatively. The positive relationship between successful macroeconomic stabilization and the following enhanced growth and adequate microeconomic adjustments is argued by Svejnar (1991).
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Christofferson and Doyle (1998) contend that there is a robust relationship between export market growth and output in the transition countries and that inflation could be linked to low level of growth just above a threshold inflation rate. They infer that the structural reforms might be connected to weaker output only at the very beginning of the transition, as thereafter structural reforms are associated with increased output. World Bank (2002) upholds that the influence of the policies becomes more significant as the transition process advances, though it is substantial in the initial phases too. However, in addition to the fact that the efficient reform policies enhance growth level in the medium-term, they reduce the negative outcomes of the transition in the short run. According to the findings of Falcetti et al. (2000), average growth is strongly determined by initial conditions, both directly and indirectly, through their influence on structural reforms. Stern (1998) concludes that the different outcomes of the reforms in the transition countries are influenced by policies and actions during the transition rather than the initial conditions, and if the countries fail to move ahead in reforms after the initial developments this may destabilize their economies. 1.6.3 Four Groups of Adverse ‘Initial’ Conditions The argument developed in this section is that there were several characteristics which we consider to have the most important influence on a transition economy’s performance, not only at the start of the transition to a market economy, but also at any stage of adaptation of a specific programme or measure, which encouraged or discouraged the transition. For example, countries with little experience as independent nation states had more difficulties in creating efficient political institutions, and at the same time, the legacy of the communist regime and the external economic shocks delayed the economic recovery. While the goal of all transition economies was more or less the same, the performance of these countries was uneven and disheartening. The adverse ‘initial’ conditions of a country may be divided into four groups. Before the discussion of these four groups we should clarify that with initial conditions we mean initial or primary conditions (economic, social, and political). In addition, when we refer to initial conditions we suggest that the countries may suffer from these conditions not only at the beginning of their transition but also during the whole transition period. For example, the embargo in FYROM, or the wars in Kosovo, and in Serbia can be considered as initial or primary conditions for these countries, or in other words as decisive problems in their transition way for becoming market economies. Economic conditions The country’s adverse economic conditions, which could be strong enough to underpin the delay in the whole transition process (For example large foreign debt/
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GDP, low foreign exchange reserves and rather large monetary overhang, large current account deficit/GDP, etc.). The legacy of the past The legacy of the communist regime provided the transition environment with negative characteristics and worsened the situation. Therefore, time, sacrifices and hard effort were required in order the subsequent negative outcomes could be overcome. Typically these include: the negative attitude against consumption, labor and entrepreneurship, non-profit oriented enterprises, the low level of productivity, non-efficiency oriented behaviour, along with the absence of the private sector pursuing profitability and efficiency. In particular, the adverse initial conditions due to the legacy of the past may be: • •
•
• • •
The lack of regulations, legal framework, financial intermediaries, stock market, which are essential elements that facilitate a market economy. Macroeconomic instability due to the fiscal deficits burden, low productivity, external and internal loans (bad loans), increasing shadow or black economy, heavily industrialized GDP, low quality of produced products together with the lack of the possibility of finding new trade partners, inability to balance the state budgets, monetary overhang and depressed inflation. The low per capita income and living standards and the growing poverty, which may lead governments to be sceptical and at times to postpone tightened policies, especially in the early years of transition. The insufficient quality and variety of products, and the limitation of natural resources. Illegal activity during the transition process, which made business environment unwelcoming. The magnitude of the restitution problem and the significant delay in reprivatization of property that created a subsequent delay in the privatization process.
Political conditions Political instability together with political inability or unwillingness of various countries’ post-communist governments to adopt adequate and proper policies, leading to a successful transition. Furthermore, politicians and governments may be unable to adopt effective transition policies in order for a country to become a completely functioning market economy due to (a) inability of the governments to cope with economic crises and to overcome them; (b) a significant delay in the liberalization of prices in products that had remained and had been produced by state monopolies in sectors such as energy, gas, petroleum, telecommunications, railways, television, etc.; (c) a noticeably low progress in the development and increase of the private sector; (d) a slow privatization progress, along with a slow creation and establishment of new small enterprises due to the inadequate institutional framework (EBRD various reports; Economist Intelligence Unit,
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IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/26 April 1999); (e) a ‘favourable’ introduction of specific laws in the early years of transition for the ‘nomenklatura’ and the governmental financial support they received, which later created an unfavourable business environment with no significant economic development, low FDI inflows, soft budget constraints, slow and inadequate restructuring, inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises, accumulation of new debts and slow privatization process of the state owned enterprises (SOEs); (f) the governments borrowing in convertible currencies from private commercial banks; this only worsened the situation, as the national currency was devaluated; (g) The effort of governments to get the higher possible proceeds from the privatization of the larger and more significant state owned companies, led the governments to decide on restructuring before privatization, which led to a slower privatization process and to a lack of significant offers from foreign investors; (h) The lack of transparency in the privatization process, the inexperience in valuation of SOEs, the bureaucracy, the complex criteria of selecting the buyers, corruption, the late introduction of bankruptcy laws and hard budget constraints, the accumulation of bad loans, as well as the large debt accumulated in most of the SOEs that the governments did not restructure rapidly and effectively; (i) The inability to stop inflation, and lastly; (j) the inadequate legal framework and the constant changes of the legal framework itself. External shocks Various external shocks, may also obstruct the way to becoming a market economy (e.g. The Persian Gulf crisis, which caused higher oil prices, the USSR’s energy crisis, the interruption of trade between Iraq and Central and East European Countries, as well as the collapse of trade relations with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and CMEA members, the unification of East Germany with West Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, the wars in the Balkan region, the economic crisis in Russia, etc.). USSR’s energy crisis (after 1988) and the termination of the USSR subsidies and exports of energy resources and commodities in preferential prices, along with the subsequent political fragmentation that followed the USSR’s collapse was a decisive external shock. During the period 1956–1960, the East European trade had a larger growth rate than the total world exports rate and even that of the trade of Western industrialized countries (Bruno, 1992, 763). The growth rate decelerated from 1961 to 1965, to a rate below the Western one, only slightly above the world total. Most of the trade among the CMEA countries was conducted on a governmentto-government basis. It was based on five-year agreements, supplemented by annual protocols which fixed the quantities and prices of the products to be traded. The commodity composition of CMEA trade and the international trade of each country was planned from the government. That was one of the problems of a centrally planed international trade.
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Lastly, the economic crises of Mexico, East Asia and the former USSR, which discouraged investors from investing in Eastern Emerging Markets, can be considered as external shocks for they contributed to delaying or interrupting the recovery of output in transition economies. Furthermore, repressed inflation, high black market exchange rates, and the war and civil strife in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan in 1992–94, in Georgia and Moldova in 1992, and in Croatia and FYROM in 1991–94, all took a major toll on the lives of the people in transition economies, on infrastructure and on the institutional development, undermining the political consensus on reforms required for successful transition (World Bank 2002, 11–15). Although all countries in transition had the same final goal to create a market economy, the results of their efforts are different. This is because of the different strategies, policies, paths followed, different adverse initial economic conditions and external shocks, which each country faced or started with. Some countries lagged behind others in the CEE region, mainly because of their adverse initial economic conditions, the geographical distance from the west, the legacy of the communist regime, the external shocks they suffered, and the political instability. Besides the political aspect, the adverse behaviour of people regarding privatization together with the inadequate legal framework with its constant changes, or even the total absence of appropriate laws at the beginning of transition strengthened the nomenklatura, and thus bribery and corruption appeared, and the situation discouraged the inflow of significant amounts of FDI. The increase of nomenklatura’s power further delayed the privatization process, created social problems and income inequality, caused discontent to the citizens and reduction of per capita income, decreased governmental revenues, increased illegal actions, and most importantly created an unstable economic environment, which also discouraged foreign investors. Finally, the restitution problem and the unclear property rights in the beginning of the transition as well as bureaucracy are only some of the reasons that did not assist the transition process.
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Chapter 2
Privatization Theory: Privatization Deals as a Reason for Increased FDI Outflows 2.1 Defining Privatization The word ‘privatisation’ … is used in two senses. In the narrower sense, it means the transfer of assets hitherto owned by the state into private hands. The broader interpretation covers the property relations in the economy as a whole, so that privatisation of the economy means that the share of the private sector grows until it ultimately becomes the dominant economic sector. (Kornai, 1995, 32)
An extension of the broad definition provides us with more insight. Besides the selling or leasing of public property, the term further implies the abandonment of any government control over all units of the economy, as well as the abandonment of the state monopoly in certain sectors. It also includes the return of property that had been illegally confiscated to its rightful owners, the promotion of private enterprise and the effort to attract foreign investors. The broad definition may also be expressed as ‘the restructuring of the independent and private sectors’ (Hare, 1994, 34–35). The creation of small private firms may, eventually, achieve the revival of the private sector, even without the help of the privatization of state firms (Koves, 1992, 40) or in other words, privatization represents the transfer of state-owned assets to private ownership, alongside the creation and fostering of de novo private businesses (Hare and Canning, 1994). Privatization is an alternative way of distributing and choosing the means of generating wealth. Consequently, it may also be considered as a distribution of political and economic power in the long run. This is particularly so in the context of former communist countries, Estrin (1996) views privatization as a ‘reversal of communism’, considering the restoration of private property rights essential to a free market economy. In the same sense, … the emergence of a de novo private sector using the fixed assets of former state owned firms purchased after bankruptcy or liquidation, can lead to industry-level supply responses to demand changes even in the absence of supply responses from current and state owned firms. (Estrin, 1996, 2)
In contrast with the Western economies, where privatization represents only a transfer of the ownership of a few state-owned enterprises functioning in a fundamentally
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market economy dominated by private property, where reorganization, new corporate governance, and better allocation of resources are not needed, along with an entire restructure of the national economy; in the planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) privatization plays an invaluable role in the transition process to the free market economy (Hunya et al., 2000). Thus, it is aimed at improving productivity, efficiency and competitiveness, lessening the burden of the state budget, and raising funds for financing areas of the economy. The privatization process and the emergence of de novo private entities for example in Central and Eastern European economies require an institutional reform that relies on an effective property system, and assists the stabilization of the economy (at a macroeconomic level), prices, trade, exchange rate liberalization, etc. (Frydman et al., 1992). The broader meaning of privatization incorporates the restructuring of the economy as a whole, including the mentality of entrepreneurship and the profit seeking under private ownership. Besides the privatization of municipal and state firms that reflect the tangible privatization observed in the everyday life of citizens, the creation of new firms is also essential for the total development and expansion of the private sector.
2.2 Reasons/Incentives for Privatization: Costs and Benefits Derived from Privatization A justifiable question is why privatization is necessary for advanced western countries and concomitantly why it is so vital for countries to be transformed into market economies. The answers lie in the social, economic and political aspects of the country. An examination of all the reasons for privatization is essential in order to understand the concept, for the identification of the goals of privatization and for the choice of the appropriate method(s) for each country. The following is a summary of the reasons and the benefits, as seen by those who are in favour of privatization: •
•
•
Privatization assists the creation and promotion of a competitive environment through the termination of monopolies, the creation of new small private firms and the passing of state companies into private hands. The individual/private owner is a better producer than the state, because the individual’s goal is profit maximization, therefore the privately owned firm will aim for larger percentage of the market, adapting to consumer tastes and needs. ‘The government is not a good manager of economic resources or a good monitor for the assets it entrusts to others’ and fails to provide motivation for managers and employees to increase production (UN, 1992, 213). For example, in a centrally planned economy the central authorities lack the incentive for good governance of the state-companies, neither do managers
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• •
•
•
•
•
•
•
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aim to maximize profits, manage effectively, or encourage innovation etc. It is difficult for the state to monitor and control managers, as managers may pursue their own rather than state’s interests. Estrin (1994, 15) has pointed out that, ‘even if they had the appropriate skills and experience, such managers rarely have the incentive to restructure their organizations for competition on world markets’. The socialist economy has no rational criteria for the effective allocation of capital, something that can be efficiently achieved by privatization. Private ownership will impose stricter control on management and hard budget constraints for the creation of extra revenues. Private owners recognize the necessity to upgrade and update the technological and management capacities and lifestyle of the companies; introducing new corporate governance ‘incorporating’ new ranges of products to meet the increased needs and demands of citizens. The state will be relieved by the burden of financing the deficits of lossmaking state owned enterprises (SOEs). The development of the private sector will assist the development of financial markets, which in turn, will assist with the financing of new investments, through the creation of a stock exchange market. In this way companies may find cheap capital, formerly provided (in many cases) by the state. The effect of privatization, for example, in transition economies is crucial for employees’ motivation, since their abilities are judged according to their work contribution and not according to their connections with the government. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurship and innovation are encouraged and productivity is increased (Aslund, 1991, 19). The creation of a healthy market will provide solid ground for further advancement of trade that will create a substantial market and may even attract foreign investment. The revenues from the sale of state assets and the saving of financial capital formerly given as aid to loss-making state companies may be used to cover for the budget deficits or for other governmental priorities such as social policy. Another source of revenue that will assist the state financially is the taxation from the new or transformed private firms’ revenues (Estrin, 1994, 17). Privatization results in more and different owners; an increased number of producers, leading to increased competition, more consumer choice, more and better products, better quality, and possibly better/lower prices. Privatization along with the clearance of property rights, the liberalization of the market, the elimination of monopolies, and the increase of competition is a necessary step for planned economies to grow into successful market economies. There are expected taxes on profits for privatized SOEs.
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•
• • • • •
Civil servants are not entrepreneurs. Public sector organizations are bureaucratic and fail to function in a way that will make the level of profit necessary to run and expand a business. Private firms and private owners become accountable to their shareholders and their desire for profit. Private enterprises are run on commercial rather than political grounds. Losses incurred by enterprises will accrue to the company and not the taxpayer. Privatization breaks down monopolies into more competitive industries and thus competition is introduced into the markets. Private properties guarantee the efficient use of resources and eliminate shortages (Marangos, 2004b).
The following can be considered to be a summary of the costs and disadvantages as seen by those who are against privatization: • •
•
• •
• • • •
Privatization simply creates private sector monopolies with barriers for new firms entering the industry. Privatized firms make decisions based on commercial profit maximizing grounds. Nationalized firms make decisions in the interests of the public. The state runs companies for the benefit of consumers: private companies will run their companies for profit. Privatizing strategic and profitable industries means that government revenues will be diminished. Profits are directed to the shareholders, as in the case of multinationals abroad. Lower government revenues may mean lower government spending on education and health. Privatization may sell-off national assets which the public, through taxation or work, has yielded and developed. The production and distribution of certain goods and services (such as medical care, education, water and electricity) especially for those with the lowest incomes or least ability to provide for themselves, should remain in the hands of the state. The state should also intervene in the market in terms of offering social security and welfare benefits. People have a basic right to enjoy basic goods or services without the state considering the cost it will have to pay. Privatized enterprises are sold at very low prices. Privatized companies take less heed of social costs. Prices (after privatization) may be raised whereas in SOEs the government has full control over prices. In the short term, and during the restructuring process, the unemployment rate may increase.
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2.3 Methods of Privatization Generally speaking, there are two distinct ways of privatization. The first is commercialization; which refers to the transformation of state companies to joint stock companies that in due time offer their stocks for privatization through the methods detailed below. When commercialization involves changes in management structure and working rules, it is also called corporatization. This conversion is an intermediate stage before the enterprise ownership and control can be transferred into private hands. The other way to privatize a state company is liquidation, a method involving the sale of separate assets of a company to different investors, and one preferred for the privatization of small-scale enterprises. A distinction should be made between the ‘insiders’, who are the people inside a firm (such as managers and workers), and the ‘outsiders’, who comprise of every other citizen local or foreign outside a firm. This distinction is important during the privatization process since the insiders are well-informed and enjoy a privileged position. Another element with which we can distinguish the privatization methods is the control mechanism of the procedure; whether it is centrally controlled by the government, or de-centrally by an independent agency supervised by impartial experts such as well-known consultant companies who evaluate assets and set the rules. If the procedure is centrally controlled by central courts, then the procedure is slow and requires a long period to bear results. Still, there is more clarity in any transaction and avoidance of ‘wild privatization’. Decentralized control is a quicker, more efficient way, but more vulnerable to personal interests and corruption. The control mechanism may adopt features from both ways in order to assure better results. An example is the model that transfers the ownership to institutional investors, like privatization funds or banks and insurance companies, who in turn, start trading shares. This third way necessitates the existence of a stock market (Meyer, 2000, 268–269). Mentioned below are particular methods of privatization: a. Selling by the public offering of shares, by initial public offering (IPO), and by public auction; b. Selling through financial intermediaries; c. Leasing of assets of public firms (a method that is not real privatization since the state still holds ownership of the assets); d. Human resources buyout (managers, workers, MEBO); e. Free distribution of shares (mass vouchers) to the public, workers and managers, and social institutions; f. Liquidation or bankruptcy; g. Return of the property to the rightful owner (restitution) (Hare, 1994, 34–35).
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A discussion of the privatization methods is as follows: 1) Sale of state property through auction By this the transformation of state property into private property can take place by auctioning state enterprises and selling them to the highest bidder. In this way all individuals have the opportunity to become owners at real market prices. Non-nationals can also participate as long as guidelines are imposed to protect the country’s interests. This protection policy, however, should not be based on isolationism or xenophobia. A substantial obstacle to this is the fact that the financial assets of the people may not be adequate to purchase state enterprises. The state could solve this problem by providing loans to individuals to finance the purchase of state enterprises (Marangos, 2004b, 587). 2) Sale of state property through financial intermediaries This involves the transfer of ownership of enterprises to financial intermediaries whose ownership structure may consist of pension funds, worker and/or management funds, citizen funds, or private financial institutions such as banks and government agencies. The advantage of this method is that it is quick and can be viewed as equitable. However, a loss of government revenue is involved. Moreover, there is a shortage of experienced financial managers operating in a market environment who can administer these financial intermediaries efficiently (Marangos, 2004b, 587). 3) Sale of state property through mass (voucher) privatization This involves the distribution of an amount of capital to private hands, in enough quantity to enable the purchase of state assets. This capital is distributed in nontransferable equity such as vouchers, only valid for purchasing state owned assets. In most countries, the distribution is equal among all the population, but in some countries nationalistic criteria may be applied against ethnic minorities which prohibits the fair allocation of vouchers. Another determinant of this method are the ‘rules’ for the use of the vouchers. Some tactics observed in different countries are the direct trading of vouchers for company stocks (Czechoslovakia), the trading for shares in government funds for the joint ownership of the formerly state owned assets (Poland), or the option of exchanging the vouchers for housing and assets other than firms (Latvia, Slovenia). The mechanism of the exchange should be determined as well the timing, or rights to assets (manager-employee buyouts, free to everyone, etc.) (Estrin, 1995, 8–10). The mass privatization method became increasingly popular after its success in several countries. The advantages of such a method are the speed of privatization and the equity in the distribution, avoiding the accumulation of wealth and thus power to the nomenklatura. In this way, voucher schemes can give a popular legitimacy to privatisation itself, for example by returning assets to people from whom they had originally been
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confiscated or by giving the general population a stake in the assets accumulated through forced saving in the communist era. (Estrin, 1994, 23)
Other advantages are the elimination of the need to find local buyers, and the creation of instant ‘players’ for the stock market. Furthermore, it is a very low cost method for the state to administer. Mass privatization is also contingent with the common public dislike of nonnationals as the majority of the privatized companies remain under local control. Mass privatization accelerates the privatization process, correcting the potential delay in market privatization. It also accelerates the establishment of social securities funds, and meets with the desire of the state for the broader participation of the population. One of the main objections to mass privatization is that it requires the existence or creation of financial infrastructure, including financial intermediaries, pension funds, mutual investment funds, investment banks, a stock exchange market and securities commission, prior to the implementation of the plan. Other drawbacks are that it generates minimum income for the government and that the wide range of parties involved foster fraud and financial speculation. Moreover, it creates problems in the governance of the firm, failing to compensate the government or generate the money-capital required for restructuring. Although many argue that mass privatization does not require the evaluation of assets, it is essential that each citizen receives vouchers not only of equal number but also of approximately equal value. The effort to fairly evaluate the companies and other operational problems may cause delays or even postponement in the process (albeit it remains much quicker than other methods). The wide distribution of the shares may prevent the establishment of a firm ownership, thus perpetuating the company’s problems in terms of effectiveness and managerial monitoring. In the mass privatization model, citizens ‘acquire’ the vouchers free or for a trivial price. Thus, they may view the vouchers as ‘free lottery tickets’, believing that they actually have nothing to lose if the company they acquire faces failure. This notion makes most citizens behave rather indifferently towards their investment. The mass privatization method is sometimes perceived as a way for the government to indirectly admit the failure, or insufficient success of the market privatization. 4) Management and employee buyouts (MEBO) This method combines the employee buyout (EBO) method and the management buyout (MBO) method. A company can be acquired by the existing management of the company (MBO) or by the ‘combined forces’ of the employees of a company (EBO) who can have the control in the respective company when acting as a group of individuals. Usually EBO and MBO are supported by one or more financial institutions. MEBO was established mainly in the Central and Eastern European countries, either as the only means of privatization of a company or, combined with other privatization methods. MEBO is facilitated with preferential policies for employees
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and management such as the lower purchasing price of the shares, payment for shares in instalments, higher dividends or preferential credits, etc. MEBO is favoured not only by employees and managers, but also by the governments as it offers a simpler and faster route than standard privatization methods. MEBO may reduce the resistance to the privatization process often seen from managers and workers, who may otherwise view it as a threat to their job security. This method creates ‘less valuation problems’ since the interest in the price of the privatized company that it is ‘sold’ is minimal, and the objective is not the creation of the maximum possible privatization revenue. MEBO has some negative effects, specifically on a company’s efficiency. Initially, MEBO privatization rarely eliminates the lack of funds of the companies due to the favourable payment agreements (sale price) mentioned above, which are provided by most of the eastern European countries’ legislation. Moreover, if the price of the company is trivial, the workers or managers risk very little. Consequently, the danger arises that they will not put much effort into the efficient operation of the company, returning the company to a loss-making position. The state however can minimize the effect of loss-making companies by imposing hard budget constraints and clear bankruptcy laws. Another danger of the MEBO method is that employees will support the undervaluation of the company in order to purchase it at a price significantly lower than its real value. If this happens, the method turns into wild privatization. Still another drawback is that under the employees’ ownership, the process of reducing the number of human resources of the company either as a form of cutting expenses or restructuring, is a matter not easily decided. Lastly, reinvestment of earnings is expected to suffer, since a common policy is to allocate the revenues to the labour compensation. 5) Leasing For some state assets, where privatization is not desirable or possible due to the high risks involved, privatization can take the form of leasing state property to individuals. As long as the lease or rent is market-determined, this will result in the productive exploitation of resources, as well as the creation of the preconditions for transforming these assets into private property (Marangos, 2004b, 588). 6) Asset privatization through liquidation For unsuccessful enterprises that cannot be restructured, and shares of companies that cannot be sold, the government can initiate liquidation proceedings and sell the physical assets owned by the state enterprise. This process would facilitate the reallocation of resources to the most productive activities (Marangos, 2004b, 588). 7) Initial public offering (IPO) This is the process of offering the initial shares of a company, private or state owned, for public sale. Potential investors are invited, through advertisements in
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the national press, to subscribe to the company’s shares. This method is used either when one or more shareholders wishes to sell their stake(s) in the company or when the company wants to raise capital by issuing equity or debt. In this privatization process, the major shareholder (the state) wishes to sell its holdings in a particular company. Under the IPO–PLUS scheme, private interests are allowed to establish special investment funds called Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs) in order to buy the shares of enterprises being privatized. The PIFs issue their own Public Participation Shares (PPS’s) to the public. These participation shares are issued at a uniform low price to ensure broad public participation. To initiate the programme, private interests form management companies. 8) Return to ‘real owners’ (restitution or re-privatization) The concept of this privatization method is to return the assets to the parties that owned them prior to communism. This may seem legitimate but needs consideration. First, there is the procedural ‘who owns what’ matter. At least one generation has passed since the communist regime was established, and the initial ownership may have been distributed to various parties, or the property may have been enriched by value added by the state, or even yet no real evidence of the former ownership status exists. This method is slow and complicated. If, as was the case, during the period of communism all citizens contributed equally to the state assets, how can one claim to be the sole owner of an asset on which ‘value’ was added during communism? Another issue that arises is that since the distribution of wealth was unequal before communism, the restitution may also be unequal today. A better way of returning wealth to the real owners is to offer the approximate value of the formerly state owned assets in the form of government funds, as was the case in Hungary. In countries where there was an actual return of assets, including Bulgaria, the process was very slow and provided the economy with little help (Estrin, 1995). The success of the restitution process depends on the existence of the past owners and of the appropriate documentation and political judgement. 9) Spontaneous privatization Here the managers or the state are authorized to issue stocks, transform a SOE into joint-stock company/ies, and sell them to anyone interested. By allowing managers in place or self-management councils, enterprise or workers councils to turn existing firms into corporations, these ‘autonomous’ firms were to become fully responsible for their own financial health. (UN, 1992, 231)
Usually the state requires the auditing of the firms’ assets, and at least one major investor, holding at least 20% of the shares. In the end, the company and the state share the profits. This method of privatization is the one that brings the fastest
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results but also leaves many ‘doors’ open for suspicious or even illegal exploitation, such as biased deals, and under-evaluation of assets. [The] insiders are likely to have a far better idea of the true value of the firm than the authorities, and are therefore likely to be able to obtain a very good price. Problems of this short led to a public outcry against so-called spontaneous privatisation, even in highly pragmatic Hungary which therefore introduced fairly strict state supervision of the privatisation process. (Estrin, 1994, 25)
10) The creation of small, privately owned firms (privatization from below) This is also a ‘method’ of privatization in the broader sense. In many countries this practice helped the re-creation of the private sector, especially in sectors like construction, local retailing, trade, and services, preferring trade rather than production. These firms are created from scratch or through reinstitution and other privatization methods. The emergence of small firms shows a development in entrepreneurship. Most of them have been relatively successful despite their vulnerability to heavy taxation, corruption and crime, and to the lack of infrastructure (Brada, 1996, 75–76). 11) ‘Wild privatization’ (Quiet, underground, illegal, mafiasation, hidden, or nomenklatura) This is a model rather than a method of privatization. It is the informal mobility of information that favours the people who have inside connections in agencies and firms, and allows them to obtain assets in informal and illegal ways, usually assisted by external capital. The parties that are favoured are state bureaucrats, managers, rulers of the former regime and, though very rarely, workers. In this way, the nomenklatura exchanges the political power they had during the regime with financial power, at the expense of both the state and the citizens, and continues the uneven distribution of wealth and the delay of social efficiency. Depending on the separate ‘informal’ situations, wild privatization has gathered many names through time: •
•
•
Spontaneous privatizations started as an effective indirect way of privatization in Hungary and Poland but, as mentioned above, its form nourished illegal actions from the part of the insiders (managers, workers, nomenklatura) in all the CEE countries and ended up as wild privatization. The corporatization procedure was very slow, and very modesty efficient. For example, in many cases in Bulgaria, it followed the path of spontaneous privatization and ended up as wild privatization. When the information about a public offering is restrained from the general public and becomes available only to potential investors selected by insiders (friends, relatives, investors willing to bribe government officials, etc.) with the criteria of personal profit, the privatization resulting from such a situation is characterized as ‘quiet’ or ‘underground’.
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•
•
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A privatization is characterized as ‘illegal’ if the working rules of any procedure, such as auctions, are violated. For example, many companies sold shares to insiders before the enactment of the Privatization Law, when the Law on Incorporating Single-Owner Firms with State Property, strictly forbade it. Also, long after some auction procedures were invalidated by the Law of Commerce, many state assets continued to be sold according to those past procedures (Frydman et al., 1993, 34–35). Especially in the case of MEBO, privatization employees and managers may have inside information about the real value of the company, but allow the under-valuation of the company in order to benefit from the marginal value. This type of privatization is characterized as ‘hidden’. In times when the phenomenon of wild privatization is widely spread and reaches a peak or the criticism about wild privatization is exaggerated and strong, then the phenomenon can be called ‘mafiasation’. Since the power to get involved in the different types of wild privatization is usually a privilege of the nomenklatura, wild privatization is also sometimes called ‘nomenklatura privatization’.
2.4 Sequence and Speed of Privatization: The Dilemma of Restructuring before or after Privatization The speed of introduction and completion of a privatization plan is crucial in the privatization process. The concepts of gradualism and gradual speed in the privatization programme and the restructuring process, and the concept of shocktherapy or big-bang and the rapid speed in the privatization, are the two main approaches that can be used, either separately, or combined in different stages of the privatization process. As mentioned in a previous section, an alternative speed of privatization is the ‘stop and go’ or ‘trial and error’ speed or sequence of privatization. Accordingly, the government proceeds in the announcement of a concrete plan of privatization process. However, during the achievement of this plan and the successful closure of a few privatization deals, endogenous and exogenous factors prevent its completion, a provisional freeze may befall it, or even a provisional postponement of the remaining deals may occur due to the political cost of the proposed privatization deals (e.g. various reactions of citizens, increased unemployment rates, a delay in the appearance of the positive outcomes that results from the finalized deals, government inability to succeed in privatization deals, etc.). Furthermore, divergence in the privatization programme, or a short delay in the achievement of the deals (either through gradual or shock therapy) does not alter the speed of the process, changing it into the alternative of ‘stop and go’. Sometimes, and on purpose, the ultimate goal of the privatization plan is not announced. Finally, the difference between shock therapists and gradualists can also be seen from the following: the shock therapists believe that you cannot jump over a gorge in two jumps. The gradualists, however, believe that the passage to
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market economy is the ascension of a mountain where the top cannot be reached in one jump. Rapid privatization is favoured by some countries, but it has been criticized by theorists. Fischer et al. (2000, 1) mentioned that, ‘the faster is the speed of reforms, the quicker is the recovery and the higher is growth’. Lipton and Sachs (1990, 77) argued that a rapid transition to a market economy with a heavy emphasis on economic integration with Western Europe is needed. Fischer (1992, 227) has concluded that: small firms should be privatised by sale almost immediately … larger industrial firms should be corporatized as soon as possible … plans envisage the corporatization phase being completed within a year or two … the key to the long-run transformation of the formerly socialist economies may lie less in the privatisation of the very large industrial firms … than in the development of new firms and the growth of existing smaller firms … for that reason, rapid progress in other areas, such as the creation of a suitable legal environment, price decontrol … is as important to the development of a vibrant private sector as privatisation of large firms.
The characteristics of the ‘big bang’ sequence favour fast privatization techniques – including mass privatization plans, leaving the task of restructuring to the owners of the privatized firms. On the other hand, others have suggested that, especially in the case of privatization of state owned firms that the rushed moves have often led to the disorganization of valuable operational enterprises, thus assisting the drop of the output level (Fischer, 1992). Lipton et al. (1991, 231) argued that: In Eastern Europe, privatisation is a very difficult task, involving nothing less than the complete redefinition of property rights for literally thousands of enterprises … Advocates of rapid privatisation are typically confident that even if quick Privatisation initially leads to an inappropriate distribution of ownership with, for example, too diffuse ownership, or firms in the wrong hands, then the capital markets will encourage a reshuffling of ownership through takeovers, mergers and buy-outs so that there is a proper matching of owners and firms …
Regarding the speed of privatization from an empirical point of view, we can safety infer that after the first decade of a transition process, privatization should be accomplished in a more gradual manner, and it should be preceded by enterprise restructuring along with the creation of an adequate institutional framework (World Economic Outlook, 2000). On the same line, Laban and Wolf (1993) argue that a more gradual strategy is beneficial, because a big-bang approach involves significant financial risks for the government. Threshold limits with regard to the level of transformation costs that should not exceed a certain threshold level (indicated by huge output decline and a high rate of unemployment) should also be
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considered. Spicer et al. (2000) argue that rapid mass privatization destroys the old system of central planning but does not build the institutional settings that facilitate the restructuring in the post-privatization environment. They advocate that by implementing a gradual reform process, new institutions will evolve gradually from the economic and social relations intrinsic to the initial post-communist economic environment. Rosser and Rosser (2001) maintain that gradual privatization is more appropriate, believing that an increase in the speed of privatization leads to a rise in the level of corruption, and therefore rapid privatization may have negative outcomes such as insider takeovers and corrupt asset stripping. Castanheira and Roland (2000) researched the optimal speed of transition from a state-owned to a private market economy, with respect to the closure or restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By applying a benchmark general equilibrium model, the authors infer that if the closure of the SOEs is too slow relative to the optimal path, the resources left to new enterprises will be limited and the speed of transition will be reduced because of the smaller investments made. Only if SOEs are subject to hard budget constraints will the optimal speed of transition will be achieved. On the other hand, if there is an excessive rate of closure of inefficient SOEs (a case that happens early in the transition process), the speed of transition will be reduced. This means that policies aiming at accelerating the speed of sectoral reallocation might have negative outcomes. A more gradual approach is also upheld by Rider (1994), who asserts that an accelerated process will favour established interest groups (with their associated political links) and will encourage the establishment of monopolies. As mentioned previously, in the sequence of the restructuring and privatization process, first of all, property rights should be clear, and governments should tackle the restitution problem. Furthermore, clear and market-friendly laws that clearly define individual rights and responsibilities and that embody market-friendly economic policies should be introduced and enforced without discrimination. Constant changes in the legal framework should be avoided. Moreover, sound institutions have to be introduced and monopolistic markets should be abolished. Formal institutions that include judges, arbitrators, prosecutors and court functionaries should be established, so that laws become effective. Political commitment to transparent privatization outcomes should exist; combined with the elimination of bureaucratic systems and more incentives should be given for new companies to be established in the country without government interference. Finally, changes in the financial sector, such as the introduction of a stock exchange market, and investment and pension funds, along with the introduction of bankruptcy rules and hard budget constraints are also necessary. Goodhue et al. (1998) argue that during the transition process, market liberalization is accompanied by market uncertainty. There is a welfare trade-off related to the privatization policy in transition economies. Goodhue et al. highlight the role of the learning process and argue that the greater the degree of initial uncertainty about market conditions, the more gradual the privatization should
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be. It is suggested that if policy makers are more interested in short-run results, a policy of a less complete privatization will be optimal, because active privatization will result in a rise of short-run prices and production volatility. Overall welfare will decline. However, if the policy makers are concerned with strategic, longterm results, the policy of full privatization will be optimal, as the increase in private ownership will reduce the misallocation effect of the resources and welfare will rise. Moreover, the sequence and the path of a privatization plan also depends on speed. Thus, the shock therapists are in favour of the immediate privatization of state-owned enterprises through restitution, liquidation, auctions and free distribution of vouchers. Conversely, neoclassical gradualists favour a slower pace of privatization through liquidation and auctions (Marangos, 2004b, 589). However, when speed and sequence are considered, a decisive question that arises is whether a country should privatize before or after restructuring or should both proceed simultaneously. Another question is whether there is a need for sequencing in privatization and if there is, what principles should underline it. Since the question of whether privatization should preside over or follow restructuring emerges, the definition of restructuring is needed. Once again the definition of, restructuring is … a multidimensional, encompassing: ‘reactive’ policies brought about by the hardening of firms’ budget constrains (e.g. labour-shedding, wage reductions, plant closures); strategic aspects, including export reorientation, changes in the mix of products and changes in management structures; and ‘deeper restructuring’, generally involving substantial new investment, that can deliver large improvements in enterprise performance and growth over the long run. (EBRD Transition Report, 1995, 128)
Restructuring may also be viewed from a macroeconomic perspective. As companies restructure by adopting policies and strategies that increase their efficiency, governments restructure by adopting laws, regulations and policies in the same direction, in hope of increasing the efficiency of the state economy. In the macroeconomic sense, the adaptation of companies to new market standards is also restructuring (Hunya, 1997, 275). There are three kinds of restructuring, the physical, the organizational and the financial. They may be used separately or in combination, depending on the needs of each company. Physical restructuring involves the updating of the physical elements of a company, such as the introduction of new high technology equipment, and generally changes in the production facilities, like shifts to another production site. Organizational restructuring involves the improvement of the management in all functions of the company (such as marketing, human resources, etc.), but also the improvement in strategic decisions concerning the operation of the company, such as potential joint ventures or other forms of co-operations. Financial restructuring refers to the rearrangement of capital sources, in a way that
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best suits the needs of the firm. This kind of restructuring includes, in the case of state owned-firms in countries in transition, the termination of state subsidies, the restructuring of the internal and external debt, the exploration of other sources of capital, and generally the establishment of financial autonomy. If the state decides to undertake restructuring prior to the privatization of a firm, it needs to spend additional capital, time and effort on the company, in return for a more successful presentation of the privatization deal as well as higher revenue from the sale. On the other hand, if it avoids restructuring, the state achieves quick privatization and is relieved of the burden of financing the loss-making company. Restructuring before privatization holds another, hidden, drawback. The managers and employees of the company under restructuring procedures will be ill-motivated to participate in the restructuring given that, in the long run, they may lose their position in the company (because of restructuring). What governments may fail to consider is that the restructuring they are intent on applying on may be far from what the potential investors expect. A close inspection of the company should determine the path which is more profitable for the state. Sometimes the government uses restructuring as an excuse to delay privatization in order to avoid the political burden of mass dismissals of employees and generally to stall hard restructuring methods by the new owners. A long restructuring period leaves space for corruption and increases the possibilities that the nomenklatura will profit by wild privatization. All methods of privatization need different implementation periods and may be applied before or after the restructuring of a firm. Slow privatization: Most of the state companies will be restructured and sold, only after the domestic savings are adequate enough for purchasing the larger percentage of the state-owned assets, or when the host governments believe that the offers from foreigners are large and lucrative enough. Usually there is a delay for the sake of increased revenues from the sale or due to the search for a strong strategic investor, who will transfer know-how and other positive spillovers into the host economy. Rapid privatization: The country aims to privatize all companies either through inviting foreign direct investments (FDIs), or through vouchers, before they are restructured. This requires at least 2–4 years. Mixed privatization: Selected privatization methods for selected state assets that aim to quickly privatize 25–40% of the total state assets in three years, and 90% of the total state assets in seven to ten years. The choice of method depends upon the specific characteristics of each country. Most commonly, countries use combinations of different methods in order to achieve the highest possible efficiency in the privatization procedure. Kornai (1995, 34) commenting on the selection of the mass or voucher privatization method, and the manager’s or employee’s buyout, the return of
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property, compensations, solution of the restitution problem, etc., argued that all the above may be used for political reasons (to collect votes for the coming election by creating a favourable image for the party in power).
2.5 Problems during the Completion of a Privatization Deal: Reasons for the Delay of Privatization The obstacles for privatization are generated by the considerations each government has to make before and during the privatization process. The issues a government considers in order to efficiently start the privatization process are: • • • • •
The selection of the companies to be privatized in different time periods (the selection of sectors). The sequence and different paths (e.g. small enterprises first, or small and medium enterprises, or large companies at the end, etc.). The specific methods to be used for each company, the use (or not) of the mass privatization method. The speed of the whole privatization process (to restructure the companies before privatization or to pass on the task to the new owners). The selection of the percentage the state will maintain, and the time limit for the abolition of all monopolies.
Certain obstacles to the privatization process should be considered so that governments can take immediate action to resolve them and maximize their positive effects: •
• •
• •
The lack of legal distinction of property rights should be dissolved by the introduction of the appropriate legal framework. The clearance of the rights and obligations of the new owners of a formerly state-owned company, in terms of employ treatment, the debt of the company, and the environmental policies that will be imposed on them, should be considered and resolved. The lack of financial intermediaries and a stock exchange should also be addressed by institutional reforms. The claim of property rights by former owners (the restitution problem) must be fairly and equally resolved in order that such problems can be avoided. The uncertainty and economic instability that discourages foreign investors should be alleviated and show signs of improvement. The lack of information (lost documents, weak/inappropriate accounting standards) regarding the companies that are offered for privatization, which is due to misleading data from the former style of management and different accounting rules and techniques, need to be resolved by a proper evaluation of past performance together with the value of the assets.
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• • • • •
•
•
•
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The mentality of the citizens that may be against privatization should be dealt with, through informative campaigns by the state. The lack of private savings that prohibits citizens from directly participating in the privatization process, may force the government to introduce a specific privatization method (e.g. mass privatization) ‘to correct’ such a situation. The power of the nomenklatura needs to be decreased and the corruption during the privatization deals minimized. The lack of experience in the choice of appropriate privatization methods and processes in general has to be overcome by experts. Conflicts of interests among politically strong parties need to be avoided. Lack of transparency, corruption, briberies and bureaucracy must be overcome and abolished. The postponement of privatization in hopes of a higher return proved to be an illusion, because the debt that the government undertook during the time of the restructuring of SOEs was not covered by the alleged higher privatization price, not to mention that during the years of the ‘restructuring’, the country suffered great economic instability, accumulation of debt, and an enlarged deficit. It also lacked the revenues to cover its deficits. The complex criteria for selecting buyers created in many cases a process corrupted by the insiders and the nomenklatura and this should be avoided. The implementation of methods such as MEBO, imperfectly supervised, allowed insiders and the nomenklatura to acquire state property through informal ways and this should be avoided in the future. The constant changes of the laws and their inadequate enforcement fail to provide investors with any measure of safety. A feature that needs to be corrected. Some SOEs had large accumulated debts and the slow restructuring of them by the governments led to the delay in their privatization them. Isolation of the debt, bankruptcy or/and quick restructuring could be a solution.
2.6 Conclusions Private property is the foundation of market economies. Without private ownership the market cannot exist, and vice versa. The privatization of state property aims (a) to guarantee the efficient use of resources and eliminate shortages; (b) to provide revenues to the government; (c) to stimulate the restructuring process; and (d) to entice foreign investors to become active participants. At the same time, privatization has its drawbacks; the creation of private sector monopolies, and increased unemployment. Moreover, it takes less heed of social costs. The speed and sequence of the introduction and completion of a privatization plan are crucial in the privatization process. A decisive question that arises is
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whether a country should privatize before or after restructuring or should it proceed in both simultaneously (Bitzenis, 2003a). To this dilemma there is no clear answer. The choice of privatization method and privatization procedure depends upon the specific characteristics of the country (countries usually use combinations of different methods in order to achieve efficiency in the privatization process). The privatization methods are not a major concern in Western countries, since there has never been an urgent need for such actions. The typical method used was auctions, aiming for the highest possible return, either direct or through stock markets. The characteristic that differentiates the privatization in former communist countries from that in Western economies is the lack of significant private savings of the citizens in the former communist countries. Moreover, the trivial private savings that were heavily devaluated by inflation were not enough to purchase stocks in the sectors involving large enterprises. If the state held open, westernstyle auctions, the bulk of the assets would be purchased by non-nationals only. Central and Eastern European countries have used several methods in order to resolve these problems in the optimum way for both state and citizens. Needless to say, most of the methods did not bring about the expected results, and the privatization process has proven to be an extremely complicated and difficult task for the transition countries (Estrin, 1995, 8). Thus, the preferred method of privatization should depend on specific characteristics of the country in question, and on value judgments with regard to equity, sequence, and speed of privatization.
Chapter 3
Foreign Direct Investment Theory
3.1 Foreign Involvement and Foreign Direct Investment as an Entry Mode The topic of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been thoroughly researched by academics and organizations alike. The literature originally sought to understand how organizations in developed countries made investment decisions in other developed markets. Gradually, however, as these opportunities dried up, the literature focus shifted towards opportunities provided in developing markets (e.g. South America, South-East Asia, Central and East Europe) as more and more companies seek greater returns on their investments due to expanded growth potentials in these markets. The commonly accepted goal of a multinational enterprise (MNE) or a multinational corporation (MNC) or a transnational corporation (TNC) is to maximise shareholder’s wealth. Thus, firms enact strategies in order to improve cash flow and enhance shareholder’s wealth. The company has a target which is to increase its market share and, therefore, it proceeds to various local or foreign investments: (a) if the foreign market ‘offers’ better opportunities (market size, liberalized economy, market prospects, etc.); (b) if the home market (local market, company’s market of origin) is over-saturated; or (c) due to globalization and competition pressures, in order to increase its sales and profits. Thus, the company and its management must decide when and which market(s) to enter and which entry modes to implement. All the possible obstacles that the enterprise will face in the foreign market must be considered and the various incentives offered by the host country (recipient country) must also be taken into account. The choice of a market entry strategy is a critical part of international business strategy. Companies employ special modes to cope with international markets that differ in the control that the entrant attains over the local operations and in the resources required for the entry. Firms entering a foreign market can choose between an array of possible organizational modes. Foreign involvement looks at different lucrative ways of expanding operations, or at different capital generating activities in a foreign country. There are five general entry modes in the economic activities of a foreign country. The first one is trading, either importing from or exporting to (directly or indirectly) a foreign country. Two other ways are foreign direct investment (FDI) and indirect (portfolio) investments. Portfolio investment is merely the transfer of money capital that allows the investor to participate in the earnings of a company.
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Foreign Involvement Using Entry Modes
A. Exporting
A1. Direct A2. Indirect A3. Intra-company transfers
C. Portfolio Investment
(indirect investment <10%)
E. Entry Mode (Collaboration)
E1. Strategic Alliance (limited entrepreneurial link, just a strategic agreement, an alliance – not a subsidiary)
D. Entry Modes with No Transfer of Money D1. Licensing D2. Franchising D3. Turnkey Project D4. Management Contract
B. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – Direct Investment >10% of shares B1. Acquisition B1.1 Acquisition (minority stake, >10%, <50%) B1.2 Acquisition (majority stake, >50.01%) B1.3 Acquisition (wholly owned subsidiary, 100%) B2. Joint Venture B2.1 Joint Venture with foreign partners B2.2 Joint Venture with foreign and local partners B2.3 Contractual joint ventures B3. Greenfield FDI B3.1 Greenfield FDI (wholly owned subsidiary) B3.2 Greenfield FDI (joint venture) B4. Brownfield FDI B4.1 Brownfield FDI (acquisition + extensive incorporation of changes) B4.2 Brownfield FDI (wholly owned subsidiary) B4.3 Brownfield FDI (joint venture) B5. Privatization B5.1 Privatization (acquisition of a minority stake >10%, <50%) B5.2 Privatization (majority stake >50.01%) B5.3 Privatization (acquisition of a 100% stake, wholly owned subsidiary) B5.4 Privatization (joint venture acquisition) B6. Strategic alliance (Joint Venture) B7. Representative office B7.1 Representative office (limited invested funds) B7.2 Representative office (joint venture) B7.3 Representative office (wholly owned) B8. Subsidiary (Branch) B8.1 Subsidiary (Branch) (wholly owned) B8.2 Subsidiary (Branch) (joint venture) B9. Merger & Acquisition B9.1 Merger & Acquisition (wholly owned) B9.2 Merger & Acquisition (joint venture) B10. Fade out or planned divestment agreement
Figure 3.1 Foreign involvement using entry modes Source: Bitzenis, 2008, 198 (revised version).
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Foreign Direct Investment is differentiated due to the intent of the investor. In portfolio investment the goal is short-term, focused on the quick increase in the money capital of the investor with no intention of interfering in ownership rights, management and voting equity. In direct investment, the primary goal is the beneficial influence (enlargement of market share, elimination of competition, strategic alliance, etc.) of the investment to the investor-company, which should eventually lead to increased profits. Another difference between the two is the percentage of the financial capital involvement. What is considered as FDI is different throughout the world due to different regulations concerning the percentage of ownership in the operations in question. However, there is a commonly accepted definition of FDI as shown in Figure 3.1. The most common ways of undertaking an FDI project are: 1) Wholly owned subsidiary 100% ownership of the assets by a single company. This involves the internal transfer of capital, technology, know-how and rights to production from the parent firm to the subsidiary and full ownership of the subsidiary by the parent firm. 2) Joint ventures A commitment to a long period of capital funding, facilities and services, by two or more legally separate interests to an enterprise involving doing business together, the sharing of profits, the sharing of business risk and losses, and longevity of cooperation. A special kind of joint venture is the contractual joint ventures where a local and a foreign firm form a joint venture (but without creating a separate entity), of limited time (long term or short term), in order to conclude a certain project. 3) Greenfield investment The establishment of an entirely new entity; including the building of production facilities, the creation of an organizational structure, distribution channels, human resources, etc. 4) Brownfield investment The acquisition of an existing establishment; followed by the development of entirely new production facilities (Estrin et al., 1997, 23). 5) Acquisition of an existing company Direct acquisition or privatization of a state-owned company (SOE) or acquisitionmajority holding or even an acquisition-stake. 6) Merger and acquisition (M&A) The merger of two or more companies. Usually one being larger than the other, having as a main purpose the dismantlement and restructuring of the small company(ies). The banking sector is a pioneer in M&A. Major banks or enterprises
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merge in order to survive in a time of high levels of information, strong competition and pressures from global integration and globalization (Bitzenis, 2004a). The fourth way of foreign involvement is employed by MNEs when they perceive a strong need to complement and reinforce their knowledge through collaboration with other MNEs, in order to cope with pressures of intense global competition and increasingly complex and rapid technological development. Collaboration can be achieved through participation in a strategic alliance. An alliance is a weaker form of contractual agreement or even minority shareholding between two parent companies and usually falls short of the formation of a separate subsidiary. The fifth way of foreign involvement concerns agreements that do not involve money transfer on the part of the foreign partner. Instead, the foreign partner contributes its knowledge and experience around the investment project in return for a reward, either financial or other (strategic). Such involvements include: Licensing agreements, Franchising, Management contracts and Turnkey projects. In the latter, a foreign company starts the facilities from scratch in the host country, and the company operates for a short period of time, after which it hands over the operation to another local or foreign company. A management contract may follow if necessary. It involves transfer of know-how, training the local workers and the managerial staff of the local company (Buckley and Casson, 1985). The world is becoming less domestically oriented as companies aim to increase profits by growing beyond their own borders. However, empirically they do this mainly in two entry ways: exports and/or FDI (Rugman, 2003). Thus, the choice of the appropriate entry mode is a key strategic decision for international business. A ‘greenfield investment’ gives investors the opportunity to create an entirely new organization, specific to their own requirements. However, this is a gradual entry mode. On the other hand, an acquisition facilitates a quick entry, but the acquired company may require restructuring. Sometimes this restructuring is so extensive in emerging markets, that the new operation resembles a greenfield investment. This investment can be called a brownfield investment since it is a hybrid entry mode (Meyer et al., 2001, 575). Each company has a different way of fully exploiting the potential of an investment besides the usual direct contact with the foreign country or the longterm involvement with foreign operations: (a) Offshore company: this is a method rather than a way of undertaking FDI. The parent firm creates the ‘offshore’ company in a country where certain aspects about the relationship between MNEs and the government, like taxation, are favourable, in order to undertake all FDI activities presenting as parent company the offshore company from a country with lower taxation rates. These countries are sometimes referred to as tax-heavens (e.g. Cyprus, Bermuda ($7.7 billion FDI outward stock), Cayman Islands ($20 billion FDI outward stock), and the Virgin Islands ($23.7 billion FDI outward stock)); (b) A Fade-out or planned divestment agreement may also be applied in all kinds of FDI agreements that involve a local partner. The agreement states that
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the foreign company agrees to liquidate the investment by selling its stakes after a certain period of time. 3.1.1 Defining FDI According to the Balance of Payment Manual (IMF, 1993), Direct investment is a category of international investment made by a resident entity in one economy [home country] (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy [host country] other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). ‘Lasting interest’ implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.
The IMF’s definition emphasizes ‘a lasting interest’, ‘a significant degree of influence’ of the investor over the company outside the home country (Brewer, 1994, 117). ‘FDI is defined as investment in equity to influence management operations in the partner company’ (Meyer, 1998, 125). ‘There are many different operational definitions of FDI, but all aim to encompass the desire of a home country firm to obtain and manage an asset in a host country’ (Barrell et al., 1997, 64). ‘A Foreign Direct Investment is the amount invested by residents of a country in a foreign enterprise over which they have effective control’ (Ragazzi, 1973, 471). Some definitions use ‘lasting interest’ and ‘significant amount of influence’ to define FDI. This is more accurate in explaining the current status of several FDIs, but it remains vague as it does not specify the target of the ‘influence’. ‘Influence management operations’ is more accurate, but again insufficient. In fact, in order to clarify this issue, one must first specify the amount of control the investing company needs over the company that receives the investment. This differs according to what the investing company expects from the investment. Through time, many theorists studied the concept of investing abroad, and foreign direct investment in particular. What FDI is cannot be defined in a fourline definition, since it involves much more than a simple money transaction which aims at profit. The complications begin with the very first step economists might take; measuring and comparing FDI flows among several countries. This is because each country may have different standards for a foreign investment to be considered direct. The IMF/OECD (1999) has recommended that the minimum equity stake for an investment to qualify as direct should be 10%. The international manuals recommend that this 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise) establishes a direct investment relationship; the so-called ‘10% rule’.
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The differences though, among countries are distinct. For example in the USA, Canada and Australia the minimum is 10%, in France and Germany 20%, and in New Zealand 25%. It is obvious that any comparison among the state records of these countries on FDI would be unequal (Dunning, 1993, 12). 3.2 Difficulties in Defining Foreign Direct Investment: Statistical Inaccuracies during the Transition Period Despite the difficulties in defining FDI, there are generally accepted characteristics of FDI that coincide with the following definitions taken from several sources. The issue of control and influence is important in defining FDI, but does need further clarification. The fact remains that, depending on the host country, when an entrepreneur or a company acquires more than 10% or 20% or even 25% of a foreign company, it is considered FDI. But does such a small percentage ensure control for the investor? The ownership rights issue over a company is a complicated subject. The individual who has control over the decisions affecting the company’s decision making process is determined by the complex workings and characteristics of each company; as such these vary greatly enough to preclude assumptions and generalizations. Sometimes an individual may have management control owning 10% of the company (if, for example, the given company’s shares are divided among many shareholders through the stock market); or have no management control even if he/she owns more than 50% of the company; or have both management control and over 50% of the shares and he/she and still not be able to make important decisions (if the agreement of all parties dictates that in order for a decision to be valid, two thirds of the owners must agree). Thus, one must keep in mind that not all investments over 10% or 25% aim for, and lead to, control. As mentioned above, not all countries use the 10% threshold for defining FDI. Although the 10% criterion is specified for defining direct investment in the balance of payments, some countries choose other criteria. For example, data on inward FDI in China is based on information collected from foreign-funded enterprises, which are resident enterprises with an aggregate of 25% or more of their equity funded by non-residents. In Malaysia, FDI data is collected through a survey of a limited number of companies, and foreign controlled companies are those in which non-residents hold more than 50% of the equity capital. Another rule to the% threshold is applied by Portugal. According to this, when the total foreign ownership in a resident enterprise is greater than a certain percentage, the transactions between the enterprise and its foreign investors are recorded as FDI, even though no single investor owns 10% or more of the enterprise. The threshold of total foreign ownership used in Portugal is 20% (IMF/OECD, 1999). Another difficulty is how to specify the components included in FDI measurement. The following components should be used in FDI when reporting to the IMF:
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Equity capital: the value of the initial investment. Reinvested earnings: all earnings of the affiliate company that are reinvested on the initial investment. Other capital: the transfer pricing (this is really difficult to be measured) between the parent company and the affiliate (short and long-term capital).
A problem arises because many countries tend not to record at least one if not two of those components. Brewer (1994, 117) argued that ‘The reinvested earnings component of FDI is particularly problematic. It is the most difficult component to measure because the data are not collected from foreign exchange records, but are based on surveys of the firm’. Consequently, this component is left out in many national FDI records. Another problem that often appears is the failure of many countries to record cross-border real estate transactions. A significant number of countries exclude all cross-border purchases and sales of real estate in reporting FDI flows, while many other countries exclude ‘non-commercial’ real estate transactions from the statistics. A further problem appears when incremental rather than accumulated ownership is used to define FDI. For example, if an investor purchases 5% of the shares of an enterprise as a portfolio investment, and subsequently acquires another 7% of the shares of the enterprise, only the 7% is recorded as direct investment. In other words, shares previously classified as portfolio investment are not reclassified in the balance of payments (BOP) as an FDI when the 10% threshold is reached. Moving now to the sources from which one may find data on FDI, it can be said that these are numerous. The primary sources of information are the company itself and the government of the home and the host country. The secondary sources are the international and regional economic agents. Some of them are the United Nations on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the WIIW (Vienna Institute), the World Bank, EUROSTAT, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and its Economic Analysis Division (EAD), the industrial and commercial trade associations and academic scholars. In general, one should be careful when using statistical data on FDI because of several inaccuracies. Dunning (1993) has presented some of them: •
•
The book value of the capital assets of the MNE’s is noticeably underestimated compared to the replacement value estimated with current market price. The way home governments deal with foreign currency translation adjustments, regarding outward FDI, differs from country to country, so the affiliated firm’s capital gains and losses are either included or not in the parent firm’s reports.
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• • •
• •
• •
The accounting techniques concerning depreciation are different from country to country. Some countries base the data on FDI intentions (passive and active), while others only on those in progress (active only). The collection of data by governments is derived in different ways and at different time periods. There are also many variations of the quality and accuracy of the research, depending on the level of confidentiality and how willing the firms are to produce all the data the government asks for. Because of cross-border transfer pricing, some of the economic data of a company may be inaccurate. When investigating the country of origin of an FDI, we have biased results if the investment is contacted through an offshore company, which is directed by a third country firm. Companies may overestimate their capital assets in order to be able to repatriate more profits and to avoid double taxation. Many of the entrepreneurs choose not to take the legal way of transferring/ repatriating money, and move great quantities illegally through borders. This is easier if the countries are neighbours and the investors are small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This results in an underestimation of the total FDI inflows, since money capital is invested in a foreign country without being declared anywhere.
Sometimes the deviations are so significant that the FDI outwards (outflows) of country A to country B are markedly different when measured as inwards (inflows) for a country B received from a country A. Such deviations also exist when the data is derived from two different sources regarding the same variable. According to the Polish research department of PAIZ (until December 2002 ), Poland had received $65115 million, while at the same time (until the end of 2002) according to UNECE, Poland had received less than $40 billion (see Table 3.1). Table 3.1 FDI inflows in Poland (in US$ millions) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 10
117
284
580
Total
542 1132 2768 3077 5130 6474 8293 6995 4119 $39521m
Source: UNECE, 2004 .
As is obvious, global capital flows can be examined by looking either at capital outflows (flows coming from the source home country – outward FDI) or at capital inflows (flows received by the recipient host country – inward FDI), which
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theoretically should be equal in magnitude. In practice, world capital inflows tend to be larger than world capital outflows. Since there is little anyone can do about those inaccuracies, a researcher should always consider that all estimates are only as good as the data on which they are based.
3.3 Major Developers of Foreign Direct Investment Theory The expansion of a company’s operations across the same value chain of production in the same or in a differentiated sector is referred to as horizontal integration. It is a strategy used by a company that seeks to sell a ‘similar’ product in various markets (local or foreign) by creating subsidiary companies. The purpose of horizontal integration is mainly to expand the company’s market share, eliminate competition, or if applied to a different sector, to employ the company’s expertise in a specific level of production (raw materials supply, production, distribution channels, etc.) in order to exploit an opportunity. Vertical integration is the acquisition of control of other stages of a product’s passage from being raw materials to becoming available for retail sale. Vertically integrated companies share a common owner and produce different but integrated products or services. For example, a producer of a certain product expands in retail (forward vertical integration) or a car producer, expands the production of its inputs (e.g. tyres) (backward vertical integration). At the end, balanced vertical integration occurs when a company decides to produce, supply itself with inputs, and distribute its products. All the above can be done either within a country or internationally. As in the case of horizontal expansion, the company will search for the most cost effective site that simultaneously fulfils the quality requirements. The new location may offer easier access to production factors, such as physical resources or skilled labour, if the integration is backward (or limited competition suitable for a new company for both backward and forward integration). 3.3.1 FDI Theories Based on Market Imperfections Through his early analysis, Coase (1937), was the first to recognize that the market is imperfect although he did not put it in exactly these words. Coase (1937; 1960) suggested that traditional basic microeconomic theory was incomplete because it only included production and transport costs, whereas it neglected the costs of entering into and executing contracts, and managing organizations. Coase also added the marketing costs such as the price mechanism costs (information, knowledge, searching or uncertainty costs), the costs of negotiating or costs of contracting, the bargaining, decision, policing or enforcement costs, and the costs of organizing – which subsequently became known as transaction costs. Today, transaction cost economics are used to explain among other things: vertical integration, outsourcing and corporate governance. Coase’s theory discusses the
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costs of market transactions and how the internal organization of a firm may help avoid them. The minimization of these costs is an incentive for the firm to try an approach of vertical integration, so as to control the intermediate products. Vertical integration is efficient only if the costs mentioned above are very high, or if there is no market for the intermediate product that the firm requires for the final product. Coase (1960) also argued that the power of analysis may be enhanced if it is carried out in terms of rights to use goods and factors of production, instead of the goods and factors themselves. These rights can be called property rights in economic analysis. Coase concluded that there are transaction costs for preparing, entering into and monitoring the execution of all kinds of contracts, as well as costs for implementing allocative measures within firms in a corresponding way. A large amount of legislation would serve no material purpose if these transaction costs were zero. Coase also concluded that transaction costs are never zero, which indeed explains the institutional structure of the economy, including variations in contract forms and many kinds of legislation. In cases where transaction costs absolutely prevent a contract, there is a tendency for other institutional arrangements to arise, e.g. a firm or an amended legislation. Hymer’s work (1960; 1968; 1970) is best known for its application of an industrial organizational approach to the theory of foreign production. In order for a firm to undertake an FDI project, it relies on certain advantages, which may be called monopolistic, exclusive, or ownership advantages, such as monopoly control of raw materials, financial or marketing advantages, managerial and research skills, etc. He argued that FDI involvement was merely a geographic expansion that exploited the power coming from the use of the above advantages, and pointed out that a MNE is a creature of market imperfections. He over-emphasized the market power advantages of a MNE and mentioned that a MNE transfers its assets abroad in order to minimize risks and to achieve monopolistic power. Hymer (1960) distinguishes FDI from portfolio investment in terms of the presence of control in the former case, and its absence in the latter. Hymer showed that FDI can not be explained by the interest differential theory (as portfolio investment) since, if FDI is motivated by higher interest rates abroad, the practice of borrowing substantially abroad seems inconsistent. Hymer also explicitly distinguishes between different foreign entry modes such as joint ventures, licensing, tacit collusion, and FDI. He also concluded that if markets were perfect and if a firm could buy everything at a fixed price determined by competition, then the incentive for direct investment would be weak. Finally, he thought (as Coase did) that market imperfections can also be exploited through vertical integration (Hymer 1968). Williamson (1973; 1992) suggested that there are market failure reasons which favour the internalization of a firm’s activities in the field of market operation. It can be argued that these are also reasons for FDI. He created a framework that leads to the advantages of the hierarchical organization instead of markets, and mentioned the contractual costs, which may be considered as transaction costs.
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These are: information costs (the cost of informing traders), bargaining costs (the costs of reducing – bargaining) and enforcement costs (the costs of enforcing the terms of trade). He added that transaction costs would be zero if individuals were honest and possessed unbounded intelligence. Thus, Williamson’ types of limitations exist in reality as transaction costs. All individuals are unable to absorb all available sources information in order to facilitate decision-making. Thus, there is a cost in the acquisition and absorption of information. According to Williamson, the factors mentioned above are the reasons why a company may internalize through vertical integration which may happen through FDI. Williamson’s contribution to FDI theory also introduced the importance of managerial skills in the operation of a firm and the importance of internal organizational structure in the efficiency of a firm. In a later article – based on earlier studies by Coase – Williamson (1992) examined the value of transaction costs in the cost-efficient operation of a firm and how they work as incentives for internalization. This study, despite its microeconomic nature, constituted the base for many contemporary theories of FDI. 3.3.2 FDI Theories Based on a Company’s Strategic Behaviour Aharoni (1966) initiated the behavioural explanation of FDI, especially the initial decision of where to locate FDI. He mentioned the reasons why FDI is more complex and risky than investing in a home country. Among others, he also directed attention to the lack of knowledge concerning the host country regarding the level of political, business and financial risk. The behavioural approach has been extended and improved by internalisation theory which explains not only the initial FDI decision, but also the reinvestment decisions. Kogut (1985) also treats FDI as a sequential process that leads to the creation of MNEs. The experience of managing diversified activities in different locations and the spreading of environmental risk gives the company a significant edge, when competing in either local or international markets. Conversely, the Capital Arbitrage Theory assumes that there is a movement of equity capital from countries where returns are low to countries where they are higher, in order that profit is generated from the difference (arbitrage) among returns. Aliber (1970) went on to update this theory and mentioned that there are substantial differences among countries in terms of their nominal and real interest rates. Because nominal interest rate differentials are poor forecasts of future changes in exchange rates, a wedge is introduced between returns on similar securities denominated in different currencies. In essence, Aliber treats exchange rates as an incentive for MNEs if favourable and as a barrier if unfavourable in regard to the MNE’s home and host country. Graham (1978) hypothesized that an MNE that found its home territory invaded by a foreign MNE would retaliate by penetrating the invader’s home turf. A firm may even predict the invasion by a significant competitor and take the first step itself.
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Knickerbocker (1973) argues that in oligopolistic industries which are characterized by high seller concentration, one reason for FDI is the tendency of firms to ‘match their rivals move to move’. The firm that takes the first step in a new market exploiting any business opportunities draws the attention of similar firms that can exploit the same opportunities (first mover, be the leader, follow the leader, prevent the leader). Finally, Kindleberger (1966) argued that a significant part of the decision to undertake FDI is based on the advantage of knowledge and the existence of high economies of scale that enable the MNE to operate the subsidiary more efficiently and with less cost that any local firm. Before undertaking FDI, a company analyses all the alternatives (exports, licensing, FDI) and decides on the optimal solution. 3.3.3 FDI Theories Based on Internalization Dunning (1973; 1981a; 1981b; 1988; 1993; 1995; 1996 with Narula; 2000) was the first to provide a more comprehensive analysis based on ownership, location, and the advantages of internalization (OLI). Dunning’s Eclectic Theory provides some answers for the geographic distribution of FDI by analysing location factors. His taxonomy of location factors emphasizes possession of raw materials, labour costs, government incentives, and the servicing of local markets. According to Dunning, the level of FDI of a firm is governed by three sets of factors; namely ownership (firm-specific) advantages (O), location (country-specific) advantages (L) and internalisation advantages (I). The advantages discussed are different in separate countries, industries, and firms and in different time periods. The optimal use of these advantages may lead a firm to FDI. Rugman (1980; 1982) developed a general theory that studies the FDI activities of the MNEs using the concept of internalization to link various theories of FDI motivation. Based on the market imperfections theory and several early theories about internalization, Rugman incorporated many of those FDI theories in one general theory of internalization. The first step towards accepting the absence of free trade was the realization that imperfections exist in all markets (goods and factor markets, capital markets, etc.), which make arm’s length transactions a utopia. Market imperfections may relate to various trade barriers, the asymmetry of information and technology, the transactions costs (real and nominal), while other factors emerge when trade activities have aims that run in parallel to smooth and efficient trade (making profits for governments, firms and individuals). These market imperfections suggest that there is no absolutely free trade. Instead, transactions are affected by external forces as well as the maximum benefit of the parties involved. What Rugman and previous researchers suggest is that companies turn to internalization in order to bypass imperfections by developing an internal market and thus achieve maximum efficiency and profits in their operations. When internalization is conducted outside national borders, then an MNE is created.
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According to Rugman, if the world were characterized by a model of free trade, there would be no need for MNE’s. Finally, Buckley and Casson (1976; 1981; 1985; 1991) discussed the internalization process as a response to market imperfections. The two theorists added several variables to the internalization theory such as the management decision making, the cultural influence in management decisions, innovation, entrepreneurship, and arbitrage. Buckley and Casson (1985; 1991) discussed the internalization process as a response to market imperfection. The two theorists added several variables to internalization theory: •
•
•
•
•
Management decision-making has a significant influence in all company actions. The same external environment may lead managers of different mentalities of different firms to different decisions. Cultural influence in management decisions is acknowledged and the parameters are examined both by economic concepts and anthropological or organizational behaviour theories. Cultural differences and the physical distance between the home country and the host countries, may cause difficulties in terms of language or mentality when doing business (cultural shock). Cultural differences may be observed in different regions of the same nation, but on international level they are usually more obvious. Multinationality is a great asset for a company, since MNE’s have easier and cheaper access to information and technology and can distribute them to the subsidiaries at minimum cost. Innovation, entrepreneurship and arbitrage. The entrepreneur ‘must take important decisions that are difficult to make’ (Casson 1985, 171–172). The entrepreneur may be the owner of a firm or a manager hired by the owners. Any wrong decision, any mistake will be very costly for the firm. Successful entrepreneurship requires the synthesis of different kinds of information from different sources. Innovation must be used in order to synthesize the technology, the inputs, the demand price and the law and institutions which govern transactions in the markets. On the other hand, the arbitrager must combine information about technology, price differentials and laws and institutions that govern transactions in the markets.
Buckley (1995) also placed great significance to the role of the manager in the firm. An effective management may achieve economies of scale and economies of scope, which are primary goals of a MNE. The management role is also vital in reducing the transaction costs arising from multi-plant enterprises.
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3.3.4 FDI Theories Based on Trade Theories One of the most discussed trade theories is the Factor Endowment Theory of Heckscher and Ohlin (H/O Theory or H/O Model). The theory states that a country will produce and export products that depend mostly on the production factors (particularly capital and labour) that are relatively abundant in the country and will import products that depend mostly on production factors that are relatively scarce in the country. The H/O Theory assumes that the production factors are completely mobile domestically and that capital and labour factors are completely immobile internationally. Moreover, H/O Theory assumes that production functions are the same and that technology is freely and instantly available in all countries. Although the H/O Theory is not absolute, it reflects the locational specific advantages of a country that an MNE takes into consideration before directly investing there. David Ricardo created a model in which trade is based on comparative advantages such as international differences in labour productivity. These differences result from differences in production functions and the use of technology. Differences in productivity functions are exogenous or derived from differences in national characteristics such as climate and the quality of natural resources. It can be said that these differences can also be called country-specific advantages. This model also assumes complete international immobility of factors of production. The model considers technological differences which result in productivity differences. Neither the H/O Theory nor the Ricardian model can explain FDI. However, extensions of these models such as the H/O extension model (neo-factor trade theories) which introduces additional factors such as human capital and natural resources and the Ricardian extension model (neotechnology theories) which introduces economies of scale, product differentiation, etc., can both be used as a basis for a significant number of FDI theories. It can be said that there is a link between trade and FDI using the Ricardian model if we expand it with factor endowments mobility and keep in mind the international differences in technology and production functions as a firm specific advantage and country-specific advantage. Vernon (1966; 1979) was the first to focus on the so-called country-specific/ locational advantages. Given that cross-national trade occurs and all natural and human resources are immobile, Vernon points out that trade also depends upon the technological capability of firms to upgrade these inputs and/or to create/ innovate new ones. The ability to renew ones’ resources may be considered as an ownership/competitive advantage. At first, the firm is willing to export its products to foreign markets with similar demand patterns and supply capabilities. When the product matures and the demand becomes more price elastic, the attraction of establishing foreign direct investment activities in a foreign location increases. The final decision of choosing the host country depends on various factors such as the macroeconomic and market conditions in the host country. The distance between home and host country is also an important factor, as the MNE may be
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intent on having the products manufactured in the host country available for reexportation to the home country. 3.3.5 FDI Theories Based on New Trade Theories Governments are the main source of impediments to the free flow of products between nations. Barriers of trade are much more complicated than mere tariffs (quotas, government restrictions, etc.). By placing tariffs on imported goods, governments can increase the cost of exporting, as an entry mode, relative to other entry modes such as FDI and licensing. Similarly, by limiting imports through the imposition of quotas, governments increase the attractiveness of FDI and other forms of foreign involvement. For example, the wave of FDI by Japanese automobile companies in the USA during the 1980s was partially driven by protectionist threats and quotas imposed by the US government on the importation of Japanese cars. Krugman (1983; 1991) suggests that firms of certain industries tend to concentrate in regions that already have a high sectoral activity. In his opinion, this happens for sector-specific reasons rather than location-specific reasons. When many firms of the same sector are concentrated in the same location, then skilled labour, technology and suppliers are similarly concentrated. Therefore, the location will attract other firms, assuming that they can overcome the transportation cost and trade barriers of exports. The firm may establish a subsidiary in a certain location in order to be close to the technological information flow, supporting at the same time the production stage that is not complicated by exploiting location specific advantages (like cheap unskilled labour) in another location. A typical example of agglomeration is the Silicon Valley in the USA, which is the centre of R&D activity concerning computer technology. Helpman (1984) in his conclusions mentioned that cross-country penetration of multinational corporations is a result of impediments to trade (such as transport costs or tariffs). This theory explains the simultaneous existence of intersectoral trade, intra-industry trade, and intra-firm trade. 3.4 Factors that Influence Company Motivations and/or Barriers of FDI Empirical studies regarding the determination of FDI motives have shown that the majority of foreign investors have undertaken such projects to service domestic demand in the host country, particularly to overcome natural or policy-induced barriers to trade. Most investors further emphasize that their goal is to invest in countries with large markets and promising growth prospects. At the same time, investors with efficiency-seeking investments prefer low labour force costs, while those engaged in extractive activity note that foreign investments will be driven largely by the availability of natural resources. However, investors engaged in
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efficiency-seeking activities, cite the significance of the availability of skilled labour and wage-adjusted labour productivity. Generally, investors prefer sound macroeconomic fundamentals (stable exchange rate, low inflation, and sustained growth), the availability of infrastructure, a stable and favourable tax regime and stable institutional and regulatory factors and policies. At the same time, investors cite the importance of free trade agreements and regional trade integration schemes. Most investors stress the importance and availability of infrastructure (electricity, water, transportation links, and telecommunication), rather than their costs in influencing FDI location decisions. One of the key factors a company considers before undertaking FDI is the minimization of the investment risk. When a country has an unstable legal system (i.e. frequent changes in the regulations), lacks appropriate laws, and insufficiently enforces the existing ones, then the investment risk increases. From the economic point of view, if the exchange rate is volatile and the country suffers macroeconomic instability (inflation); and from the political point of view, if the country suffers from political instability or social instability (e.g., high labour unrest and strikes), the risk of investing in this country is also enhanced. This is exacerbated in transition economies when the transition process is delayed due to unclear property rights, delays in solving restitution problems, slow progress in privatization, in the banking reform, and in liberalization, the existence of the mafia, nomenclatura, corruption, briberies, bureaucracy, etc. In such circumstances economic and political instability is heightened, and risk increases. Moreover, a significant number of investors observe that the financial crises of the 1990s have highlighted the underlying risks of investing in emerging and transition markets and made it necessary to pay greater attention to issues relating to political and macroeconomic stability, the legal framework, corruption and bureaucracy. 3.4.1 Reasons, Incentives, Motives, Possibilities, Opportunities for FDI Based on Dunning (1988) and Bitzenis (2003b), from the theoretical point view, we can outline the motives for FDI according to their content as follows: 1. Market seekers (size of the market of the host country, market growth prospects of the host country, the host country is a new market for the MNE to expand its operations). 2. Market seekers from a strategic point of view (e.g. meeting local needs and tastes of the host market, a perceived lack of local competition in the host country, a local unsatisfied demand for products, an MNE acquires the assets of a local company in the host country (through a joint venture or a M&A, etc.). A MNE may decide to substitute prior trade relations with a country by undertaking local production in order to avoid trade barriers. Lastly, if a company finds it profitable to expand, either vertically
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4. 5.
6. 7. 8.
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or horizontally, it may look for opportunities abroad, and thereby expand through FDI). Factor seekers (availability of natural resources, exploiting managerial, organizational, marketing and entrepreneurial advantages existing in the host country, access to high technology, low cost of acquiring and using raw materials and human resources in the host country). Efficiency seekers (economies of scale, economies of scope, diversify the risk). Locational seekers (climate and infrastructure in the host country, geographical proximity, cultural closeness and/or cultural distance between home and host country). Exploiting ownership advantages (strong brand name, product innovation, know-how, marketing expertise, existing business links, multinationality) Seekers of financial benefits (tax relief or other financial incentives). Political reasons (existence of ethnic minorities, special government treatment for a company due to the specific ‘nationality’ of the foreign firm, discrimination of specific companies coming from a specific country). Others (overcoming imperfections). In general, motives may be derived from the solutions in order to overcome market imperfections. Thus, there might be other solutions for the same imperfections that may produce many other motives (an MNE may avoid search and negotiating costs of acquiring raw materials from other companies, by moving to vertical integration). However, we can argue that a lot of examples of FDI could fit in more than one of the above categories.
Moreover, as outlined by Bitzenis (2004c; 2006a) and Bitzenis and Szamosi (2005) the motives of FDI can be categorized according to their source of creation into the following groups: 1. Incentives offered directly by the host government (e.g. financial incentives, tax relief). 2. Motives ‘derived’ from the host market or the host country, or given indirectly by the government, or ‘derived’ from the passive behaviour of the host market (e.g. climate, market size, raw materials, lack of local competition, political and macroeconomic stability, stable legal framework, transparency, liberalization, and unsatisfied local demand). 3. Motives that stem from the interrelation of the home and host country; motives which can only be connected with the multinational, its origin country, and the host country (e.g. geographical proximity, cultural closeness, historical links) (Bitzenis, 2004c). 4. Internal incentives owned and ‘provided’ by the MNEs (strong brand name, experience, know-how and expertise). 5. Motives/incentives which have been created from an external event (from outside the host country), or from the global market pressures or even yet that are derived from exogenous reasons outside the host market (war,
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globalization pressures, a saturated home country market, collapse of the communist regime and transition). More specifically: 1) Market hunters •
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The size of the market of the host country is one of the major factors (if not the most important) that an MNE takes into consideration in the decision making process on FDI. The prospects of the host country for market growth are am important factor and along with the market size are the most frequently considered. Empirical studies suggest that these are the main determinants of FDI. An MNE is profit oriented and in order to generate more profit it is constantly seeking new markets to expand its operations. This process aims at increasing the company’s market share in the host country.
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When managers of an MNE realize that there is lack of local competition in a host country, they will try to exploit the opportunity. According to the product cycle theory, when a product is losing market share in the home country, the company starts searching for other markets elsewhere to introduce the product. If the company’s market share, either because of increased production cost or low quality of the product (low competitiveness of the product), is gradually but dramatically reduced, the company will turn to another market, sometimes abandoning the home market as a way to stay in business (a way to survive). In a similar manner, pressures of competition in the home country that result in the reduction of the company’s market share lead the company to try to substitute the lost market share with participation in a foreign market. When a company is not strong enough to become a multinational but spots an opportunity in a neighbouring country, which is within the company’s capabilities, then the former company undertakes FDI just to become a multinational firm (for marketing reasons for the home country, for reputation). This is the case of most Greek investments in the Balkans. Some companies realize that their presence in a given market may assist their efforts of meeting the local needs and tastes of that market, since the direct contact will provide them with more adequate information. When the company concludes that its production line has potential, but the home market is too saturated to allow it to exploit this potential, they seek new markets.
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A MNE is motivated to undertake an FDI project in a host market when there is a local (host) unsatisfied demand for products. Companies may undertake strategic moves in response to the actions or expected actions of competing firms in the same or a related industry. Many theories have studied such cases. In some instances the investment is aimed at thwarting a competitor. When a competitor enters a foreign market, the company follows its ‘market leader’ in order to prevent the competitor from acquiring a significant share and dominating the foreign market (follow the leader). In many cases, this strategy brings losses in the first years for the company that follows and even for the leader, but the follower may still persist in order to prevent the ‘leader’ from being the only company to establish brand recognition in the host country. Many firms follow their competitors in order to exploit their competitors experiences; following their successful steps and avoiding their mistakes (follow the competition). Firms in sectors such as financial services follow their clients in the host country in order to ensure their clients do not hire a local firm or another multinational that might, in time take up their operations in the home country; and to exploit the ready-to-use clients in foreign markets. For firms that utilize raw materials which are supplied only by a given number of suppliers, an FDI may open the way for the firm to follow (follow the supplier). The pressures of globalization leads companies to undertake FDI in multiple countries in order to secure their physical presence in most of them and establish an advantageous economic position. In many cases, the selection of the region is done according to the ‘fashion trend’ of the time that suggests which regions are profitable or offers investment and privatization opportunities (ex. Central and South America, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries). Acquiring the assets (via a joint venture or a M&A, etc.) of a local company in a host country for (a) increasing market share in the global market, or (b) decreasing the global competition (becoming a global leader) in the specific industry/sector (decrease competition or weaken the competition), or (c) for a geographical dispersion of knowledge-based assets from foreign locations. A company may decide to undertake FDI if they find a market where no foreign company from the same industry has any operations (first mover). When a foreign competitor ‘invades’ the company’s home market it ‘steals’ some of its market share that the company hopes to replace by entering the competitors home market (defensive/counterattack). When the competitor’s move is predicted by the home company, it ‘attacks’ the competitor’s home market first, in order to cause problems in the competitor’s market share (offensive/attack).
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An MNE may decide to substitute prior trade relations with a country by undertaking local production in order to avoid trade barriers. If a company finds it profitable to expand, either vertically or horizontally, it may look for opportunities abroad, so that it expands through FDI.
3) Factor hunters A company may seek either factors unavailable in the home country or ways to minimize factor costs (availability of natural resources). Examples include: •
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Exploiting managerial, organizational, marketing and entrepreneurial advantages, technological skills, labour skills (of the host country), access to high technology, etc. There are companies which seek the location that offers the optimum production factors necessary for their operation. The factors that dominate production are the ones that determine their choice of location. The companies might look for: • • • • •
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A skilled, educated (and preferably low cost) labour force. A semi/unskilled low cost labour force. Availability of natural resources and an adequate labour force. Low cost of raw materials. Inexpensive land (the low cost of acquiring and using raw materials and human resources).
Companies that focus on intensive production search for a cheap labour force. When an export base is focused on minimizing the cost of production with the intention to re-export raw materials and human resources in the home country, the company is a factor hunter.
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When companies own certain assets that are mobile and transferable at a low cost, such as technology, R&D findings etc. they may choose to create subsidiaries either local or more usually foreign in order to achieve economies of scale by distributing the fixed costs of obtaining such assets. When companies are focused on achieving economies of scope, they require larger markets in order to supply significant quantities of their diversified goods or services. These products or services are offered in order to cover most of the consumer needs.
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Many companies create foreign subsidiaries either by multi-sourcing (many production sites in different countries) and/or by participating in other companies in related industries, in order to diversify the risk of operating by having alternatives in times when a certain industry or location experiences difficulties. Multi-sourcing is also efficient for companies, with many parallel production stages, that may exploit the factor endowments of each country by assigning each stage to the country that most efficiently provides the dominant production factors for the given stage of production. Companies diversify their product either to secure the survival of the product in different markets, or to meet needs and tastes of the host market. As factor hunters search for cost minimizing, efficiency hunters search for managerial expertise, new and advanced technology, common governance, arbitrage of currency, cost incentives and entrepreneurship in order to maximize efficiency. Synergistic economies and geographical concentration (agglomeration) may also constitute reasons for FDI.
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The specific climate of a region may attract the kind of companies that can exploit it, such hotel chains, or farming companies. Moreover, international transport, communications’ networks and infrastructure facilities are also considerations. The openness of a country is one of the major factors that may attract foreign investors and led the author to the argument about fashion trends of the MNEs to a region in different time periods. During a certain time period a country, a combination of neighbouring countries, or a whole region (e.g. CIS, Central and Eastern Europe, North America etc.) open their borders, liberalize and stabilize their economies and provide their state-owned enterprises for privatization programs. They also provide incentives for FDI inflows, which will help their macroeconomic development. Many companies recognize opportunities to exploit the cultural closeness of their country with another country by providing products for the host market similar to the products provided in the home market or according to their tastes, needs and mentality. Cultural distance may also be exploited by a MNE that introduces a totally unfamiliar product in a host country that might attract customers by raising their curiosity or their admiration for the foreign culture. The geographical distance is mirrored by cultural differences, especially so in Central and Eastern European countries which tend to follow the trends of Western civilization. Although the advanced infrastructure in the host country is a factor that encourages FDI decisions, lack of infrastructure in certain sectors may
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