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Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions Series Editor: Professor Philip Molyneux The Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions will be international in orientation and include studies of banking within particular countries or regions, and studies of particular themes such as Corporate Banking, Risk Management, Mergers and Acquisitions, etc. The books will be focused upon research and practice, and include up-to-date and innovative studies on contemporary topics in banking that will have global impact and influence.
Titles include: Yener Altunbas, Blaise Gadanecz and Alper Kara SYNDICATED LOANS A Hybrid of Relationship Lending and Publicly Traded Debt Elena Beccalli IT AND EUROPEAN BANK PERFORMANCE Santiago Carbó, Edward P.M. Gardener and Philip Molyneux FINANCIAL EXCLUSION Allessandro Carretta, Franco Fiordelisi and Gianluca Mattarocci (editors) NEW DRIVERS OF PERFORMANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD Violaine Cousin BANKING IN CHINA Franco Fiordelisi and Philip Molyneux SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN BANKING Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui THE BANKING SECTOR IN HONG KONG Competition, Efficiency, Performance and Risk Munawar Iqbal and Philip Molyneux THIRTY YEARS OF ISLAMIC BANKING History, Performance and Prospects Kimio Kase and Tanguy Jacopin CEOS AS LEADERS AND STRATEGY DESIGNERS Explaining the Success of Spanish Banks M. Mansoor Khan and M. Ishaq Bhatti DEVELOPMENTS IN ISLAMIC BANKING The Case of Pakistan Mario La Torre and Gianfranco A. Vento MICROFINANCE Philip Molyneux and Munawar Iqbal BANKING AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN THE ARAB WORLD Philip Molyneux and Eleuterio Vallelado (editors) FRONTIERS OF BANKS IN A GLOBAL WORLD Anastasia Nesvetailova FRAGILE FINANCE Debt, Speculation and Crisis in the Age of Global Credit
Dominique Rambure and Alec Nacamuli PAYMENT SYSTEMS From the Salt Mines to the Board Room Andrea Schertler THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE Alfred Slager THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANKS Noel K. Tshiani BUILDING CREDIBLE CENTRAL BANKS Policy Lessons for Emerging Economies
Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions Series Standing Order ISBN 978- 1–4039–4872–4 You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Competition, Efficiency, Performance and Risk Edited by
Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui
Selection and editorial matter © Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui 2008 Chapters © their authors 2008 Foreword © Peter S. T. Pang 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their right to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–20266–5 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–20266–7 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The banking sector in Hong Kong : competition, efficiency, performance and risk / edited by Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–20266–7 (alk. paper) 1. Banks and banking—China—Hong Kong. 2. Mortgage loans—China—Hong Kong. 3. Financial risk—China—Hong Kong. I. Genberg, Hans. II. Hui, Cho-Hoi. HG3352.B36 2008 332.1095125—dc22 2008015885 10 17
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Figures
x
List of Tables
xiii
Foreword
xv
Acknowledgements
xvi
Notes on the Contributors
xvii xviii
Introduction Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui
Part I: 1
2
Competition, Efficiency and Profitability
1
The Cost Efficiency of Commercial Banks in Hong Kong
3
Jim Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong and Ka-Fai Choi 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Methodology 1.3 Data and estimation methods 1.4 The inefficiency estimates 1.5 Efficiency, bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions 1.6 Conclusion
10 12
Competition in Hong Kong’s Banking Sector: A Panzar-Rosse Assessment
17
Jim Wong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Ka-Fai Choi 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Panzar–Rosse approach 2.3 The empirical specifications 2.4 Data and estimation methods 2.5 Estimation results 2.6 Conclusion
17 18 19 22 24 28
v
3 4 6 8
vi Contents
3
Testing for Collusion in the Hong Kong Banking Sector Jim Wong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Ka-Fai Choi 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The conjectural variation approach 3.3 The empirical specifications 3.4 Data and estimation methods 3.5 Estimation results 3.6 Conclusion
4
32
32 33 36 39 39 43
Determinants of the Performance of Banks in Hong Kong
50
Jim Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong and Ka-Fai Choi 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Literature review 4.3 The empirical specification 4.4 Data and estimation method 4.5 Estimation results 4.6 Conclusion Appendix 4A Measures of scale inefficiency
50 51 53 56 58 61 62
Part II: Interest Rate and Default Risks in the Mortgage Market
67
5
69
Interest Rate Risk in the Pricing of Banks’ Mortgage Lending Jim Wong, Laurence Kang-Por Fung, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Cho-Hoi Hui 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Narrowing of spread during the tightening phase of interest rate cycle 5.3 Shift in risk premium 5.4 Potential reduction in interest rate margins 5.5 Conclusion Annex 5A Effective mortgage rates Annex 5B Test of lead-lag relationship between LIBOR and BLR Annex 5C Graphical illustration of the narrowing of interest spread between BLR and HIBOR during the tightening phase of an interest rate cycle Annex 5D Cointegration and error correction model Annex 5E Model specification and estimation results
69 71 72 74 80 82 83
84 85 86
Contents vii
6
Hong Kong Mortgage Rate Setting -- An Alternative Reference Rate? Jim Wong, Cho-Hoi Hui and Laurence Kang-Por Fung 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Overseas experience 6.3 Possible alternative reference rates: an evaluation 6.4 Conclusion Annex 6A Reference rates for pricing mortgage loans in the US, UK and Australia Annex 6B A technical note on the construction of the effective deposit rate and the composite rate Annex 6C Relative features of alternative reference rates Annex 6D A quantitative assessment of the approximation of alternative reference rates as a measure of average cost of funds Annex 6E Simulation of interest margin for the loan portfolio acquired in January 1999 under the scenario of different reference rates
7
Residential Mortgage Default Risk in Hong Kong Jim Wong, Laurence Kang-Por Fung, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Angela Sze 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Theoretical background and literature review 7.3 Methodology and data 7.4 The model and estimation results 7.5 Default probability and the level of CLTV 7.6 Estimated default probability and macro variables 7.7 The 70 per cent LTV ratio and asset quality 7.8 Conclusion Annex 7A Estimation results for initial model specification with the CLTV ratio and CDSR as core variables Annex 7B Estimation results for initial model specification with the CLTV ratio and mortgage rate (as a proxy for CDSR) as core variables Annex 7C The derivation of the relationship between default probability and the CLTV level
95 95 97 97 108 113 115 122
123
127
132
132 133 134 138 141 141 146 148
149
150 151
viii Contents
Part III: Quantifying Risks, Capital Adequacy and Stress-Testing Framework of Systemic Risk
157
8
159
Determinants of the Capital Level of Banks in Hong Kong Jim Wong, Ka-Fai Choi and Tom Pak-Wing Fong 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Possible determinants of capital holdings of banks 8.3 Conclusion Annex 8A A quantitative analysis of determinants of bank capital in Hong Kong Annex 8B Details of the survey results
9
10
11
159 160 170 172 176
Benchmarking Model of Default Probabilities of Listed Companies
191
Cho-Hoi Hui, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong, Chi-Fai Lo and Ming-Xi Huang 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Structural model of term structures of PDs 9.3 Benchmarking process 9.4 Data and empirical results 9.5 Summary Appendix 9A Appendix 9B Appendix 9C
191 194 198 200 206 207 208 210
Measuring Provisions for Collateralized Retail Lending
214
Cho-Hoi Hui, Chi-Fai Lo, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong and Po-Kong Man 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Model for measuring provisions 10.3 Empirical analysis 10.4 Numerical results 10.5 Summary Appendix 10A
214 220 223 229 233 235
A Framework for Stress Testing Banks’ Credit Risk
240
Jim Wong, Ka-Fai Choi and Tom Pak-Wing Fong 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Elements of stress test and the common methodology 11.3 The framework 11.4 The model and estimation results 11.5 The simulation of future credit losses and stress testing 11.6 A stress test for banks’ mortgage portfolio 11.7 Conclusion
240 241 242 246 248 253 256
Contents ix
12
Assessing the Risk of Multiple Defaults in the Banking System Ip-Wing Yu, Laurence Kang-Por Fung and Chi-Sang Tam 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Methodology and data 12.3 Empirical results 12.4 Conclusion Appendix 12A Technical details for deriving the default probability based on the structural approach
Index
261 261 262 266 270 271 277
List of Figures 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5C.1 6.1 6.2a
6.2b
6.3 6.4 6B.1 6B.2 6B.3 6B.4 6D.1 6D.2 6D.3 6D.4
Trends of the inefficiency estimates Dispersions of the inefficiency estimates Major changes in market concentration around 2001 Rolling estimates of H statistic of Model A Rolling estimates of H statistic of Model B Degree of oligopolistic coordination before and after structural changes Time series plots of average quarterly ROA and IRS Market concentration and regulatory liberalization Average mortgage rate and BLR Interest spreads and BLR Movements of 3-month HIBOR and 3-month LIBOR Risk premium Flow of influence Illustration of interest spread narrowing Alternative reference rates and BLR ( January 1997 to April 2005, monthly average) Mortgage rates based on possible reference rates (for mortgage loans priced in January 1997 with constant mark-ups throughout the remaining contractual period) Relative monthly fluctuations of selected reference rates (February 1997 to April 2005, monthly average, in absolute terms) Ranking of the reference rate in terms of stability and conduciveness to interest rate risk management Adjustments of the mortgage rate (based on a prescribed triggering rule) and BLR Interest rates of retail market funding Interest rates of wholesale market funding EDR The composite rate Based on the composite rate Based on HIBOR3 Based on EDR Based on BLR
x
9 9 22 27 27 35 57 58 70 71 72 73 74 84 99
104
104 110 111 116 116 119 121 123 124 124 125
List of Figures xi
6D.5 6D.6 6E.1 6E.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.2 9.1
9.2 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.2
10.3
10.4
Based on EFN3 Based on the base rate Cost of funds represented by the composite rate Cost of funds represented by HIBOR3 Mortgage delinquency rate in Hong Kong Default probability and CLTV ratio by snapshot month (with other explanatory variables held at mean levels) Default probability and CLTV ratio (an enlarged graphical exhibition of Figure 7.2) Default probability and CLTV ratio (all other variables at mean levels) Default probability and CLTV ratio at different unemployment rates Default probability and CLTV ratio at different mortgage rates Default probability and CLTV ratio at different changes of Hang Seng Index CAR and bank size CAR and economic cycles PD term structures generated from the structural model and actual cumulative default rates reported by S&P’s (2002) of ratings of CCC, B, BB and BBB Benchmarking process of benchmark PD estimation Mismatch distribution of benchmark ratings versus S&P’s ratings of 3,943 sample companies Receiver operating characteristic curve and accuracy ratio of the benchmarking model Private domestic price index (V) and problem-loan ratio (D) of residential mortgage loans Provisions of pools of loans with different loan-to-value ratios and volatilities of collateral value for a three-year time horizon Changes in provisions with respect to changes in loan-tovalue ratios (that is δ) under different loan-to-value ratios and volatilities of collateral value for a three-year time horizon Percentage changes in provisions of pools of loans with different correlation between collateral value and PD compared with the provisions with zero correlation under different dynamics of PD
125 126 127 127 137 142 142 145 145 146 146 161 163
197 199 202 204 224
230
231
232
xii List of Figures
10.5
Provision-given-default of pools of loans with different time horizons and correlation between collateral value and PD 11.1a A GDP shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss under baseline and stressed scenarios 11.1b A China GDP shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss under baseline and stressed scenarios 11.1c An interest rate shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss under baseline and stressed scenarios 11.1d A property price shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss under baseline and stressed scenarios 11.2a A GDP shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss for RMLs under baseline and stressed scenarios 11.2b A property price shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss for RMLs under baseline and stressed scenarios 11.2c An interest rate shock: simulated frequency distributions of credit loss for RMLs under baseline and stressed scenarios 12.1 One-year default probability of listed banks 12.2 Aggregate one-year default probability of listed banks 12.3 Monthly asset correlation between banks 12.4 Multiple default risk index (based on one-year probability of at least one default of listed banks) 12A.1 Asset value, default barrier and default probability
233 250 250
251
251
255
255
256 266 267 268 269 272
List of Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3
Some descriptive statistics of retail banks as of 2005 Q4 Inefficiency estimates of retail banks in Hong Kong Panel data regression of inefficiency estimates Competitive structures and the H statistic Summary statistics on the sample (1991 Q1–2005 Q4) Empirical results of the Panzar–Rosse model for the Hong Kong banking sector 2.4 Empirical results of the Panzar–Rosse model for the Hong Kong banking sector (analysis of bank size) 3.1 Empirical results of the conjectural variation parameter for the Hong Kong banking sector 4.1 General features of the data (sample period: 1991 Q1–2005 Q4; no. of observations: 1,418) 4.2 Estimation results of ROA and IRS 5.1 Potential reduction of mortgage spreads (with an increase of 120 bps in US interest rates) 5.2 Simulated impact on net interest margin of currently priced loans and banks’ overall mortgage portfolio (with an increase of 120 bps in US interest rates) 5B.1 Tests of lead-lag relationship between LIBOR and BLR 5E.1 ADF unit root test results 5E.2 ADF unit root test on long-run equilibrium 5E.3 Estimation results of Models A, B and C 6.1 Merits and drawbacks of alternative reference rates 6.2 Volatility of monthly payment burden of possible reference rates 6.3 Changes in monthly average rates and differences between daily high and low of reference rates during two particularly volatile periods 6.4 Variability of margin for banks’ mortgage portfolio of January 1999 (during the period January 1999 to April 2005) 6.5 Estimated squeezes of interest margins resulting from the recent rise in cost of funds under different reference rates (for banks’ mortgage portfolio acquired during January 2005) 6.6 Ranking of possible reference rates xiii
7 8 11 19 23 25 26 40 57 60 76
78 83 87 87 88 101 103
103
107
107 109
xiv List of Tables
6B.1 Major funding sources of banks and interest rates 6B.2 Derivation of EDR (for April 2005) 6B.3 Derivation of the composite rate (for April 2005) 6D.1 Estimation results (from January 1999 to April 2005) 7.1 Explanatory variables for the logit model 7.2 Number of loan cases 7.3 Estimation results 7.4 Estimated default probability at different CLTV levels 7.5 Estimated default probability (%) at different CLTV levels under varying macroeconomic conditions 7.6 Estimated loan defaults with and without a relaxation of the maximum LTV ratio guideline 8A.1 Description of the explanatory variables 8A.2 General features of the data (sample period: 1992 Q1–2004 Q3; No. of banks: 28; No. of observations: 1,221) 8A.3 Determinants of banks’ capital level: GMM estimates 8A.4 A summary of the estimated effects of exogenous changes 8B.1 Response rate of the survey 8B.2 Banks’ replies to question 6.15 9.1 Assignment of ordinal numbers to S&P’s ratings and numbers of sample companies with S&P’s ratings 9.2 Mismatch statistics of benchmark ratings versus S&P’s ratings of 3,943 sample companies 9.3 Degree of association between benchmark ratings versus S&P’s ratings of 3,943 sample companies 10.1 Statistics of the data series of V and D 10.2 Estimation results of alternative models of X (ln D) and Y (ln V ) 11.1 SUR estimates for the equation system (sample period: 1994 Q4 to 2006 Q1) 11.2 The mean and VaR statistics of simulated credit loss distributions 11.3 Post-default operating profit of a hypothetical local bank (in HK$ million) 11.4 SUR estimates for the equation system for RMLs (sample period: 1998 Q2 to 2006 Q1) 11.5 The mean and VaR statistics of the simulated credit loss distributions for RMLs 11.6 Post-default operating profit of a hypothetical local bank for RML (in HK$ million)
115 118 120 123 136 138 140 143 147 148 172
174 175 175 176 180 200 201 206 224 226 248 252 253 254 257 257
Foreword Financial innovations steadily increase the complexity of financial markets creating new challenges for monetary authorities whose responsibility is to safeguard financial stability. In this environment it is essential that central banks stay at the forefront of research in order to be in a position to evaluate possible sources of fragility and signs of instability. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority is Hong Kong’s central banking institution, and one of its responsibilities is to promote the safety of Hong Kong’s banking system. The Research Department of the HKMA supports this function by conducting research that serves as an input to the surveillance of the Hong Kong economy in general and the banking sector in particular. The papers included in this volume were written by staff of the Market Research Division of the Research Department as part of this process. Together they present an up-to-date view of the degree of competition, efficiency, and profitability in the banking sector; of interest-rate and default risk in the mortgage market; and of measuring risk and capital adequacy as well as conducting stress testing in the context of the implementation of the Basel II regulatory framework in Hong Kong. By promoting research on banking issues and by encouraging its dissemination to a wide audience the HKMA seeks to contribute to an understanding of the banking sector in Hong Kong as well as to scholarly research on banking and risk assessment issues more generally. We hope that the papers collected in this volume will stimulate others to carry out similar research for other economies and to conduct further research on banking and financial issues in Hong Kong. Peter S. T. Pang Deputy Chief Executive Hong Kong Monetary Authority
xv
Acknowledgements We are very grateful for the advice and encouragement received from Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. We also wish to thank Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, who oversees researches in the authority, for his strong support and providing the inspirations for many of the studies in this book. Colleagues of the Banking Departments of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, in particular Y.K. Choi, Deputy Chief Executive, and Raymond Li and Arthur Yuen, Executive Directors of Banking Development and Supervision respectively, have our gratitude for their invaluable comments and suggestions on the analyses in this volume. We would like to extend our thanks to authors of the papers, as well as colleagues of the Market Research Division of the Research Department for their contributions to the production of this volume. Special thanks are due to Bloomberg L.P., CEIC Data Company Ltd, Standard and Poor’s, Thomson Financial, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited, and the Census and Statistics Department and the Rating and Valuation Department of the Hong Kong SAR Government, for the permission of the use of their data. Last but not least, we would like to thank Lisa von Fircks and Nick Brock of Palgrave Macmillan for their excellent works in coordinating and seeing through the production of this volume.
Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui
xvi
Notes on the Contributors Ka-Fai Choi was Manager Trainee, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Tom Pak-Wing Fong is Manager, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Laurence Kang-Por Fung is Manager, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Hans Genberg is Executive Director, Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. He is also the Director of the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. Ming-Xi Huang was Research Associate, Department of Physics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Cho-Hoi Hui is Head, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Chi-Fai Lo is Associate Professor, Department of Physics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Po-Kong Man was Research Associate, Department of Physics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Angela Sze was Research Analyst, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Chi-Sang Tam was Research Analyst, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Jim Wong is Senior Manager, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Eric Tak-Chuen Wong is Manager, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Ip-Wing Yu is Senior Manager, Market Research Division of Research Department at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
xvii
Introduction Hans Genberg and Cho-Hoi Hui
The banking sector in Hong Kong has undergone significant changes and developments over the past decade. A series of market liberalization measures took place during this period. In particular, the interest rate deregulation was fully completed by July 2001, and the restriction on the number of branches and offices for foreign banks was completely removed in 2001. At the same time, there were major mergers and acquisitions in the industry, resulting in a higher degree of market concentration. How these changes may have affected competition, efficiency and the performance of banks are issues of interest. Market liberalization has also brought about increased price competition, which calls for greater attention to interest rate and credit risks. In this regard, one main area of interest has been the interest rate risk of mortgage lending, which accounts for about 24 per cent of banks’ domestic loan portfolios. Internationally, an important initiative regarding the adequacy of capital under the Basel New Capital Framework, also known as Basel II, has begun to replace the current Basel Accord in various jurisdictions since 2007. Under the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach in Basel II, credit risk measures are estimated by banks. Quantifying risks and capital requirements have thus also become an important field of banking studies. To cover each of these three areas of interest, the chapters in this book is grouped into three respective parts.
Part I: Competition, Efficiency and Profitability Chapters 1 to 4 assess the current levels and trends of competition and efficiency in the banking industry, whether collusion exists, and whether large banks are benefiting from scale economies and have substantial pricing power over smaller banks. While each of the chapters is by itself a stand-alone study and examines specific issues, together they present a consistent picture for the industry. Four themes are highlighted: cost efficiency, market structure, effects of mergers and acquisitions on competition, and the pricing power of large banks. The main conclusions of each will be described briefly. xviii
Introduction xix • Cost Efficiency
Given banks’ special role in channelling funds from savers to investors, their cost efficiency has a significant effect on the supply of credit and, in turn, on overall economic performance. In addition, inefficiency would affect banks’ earnings, thus hampering their ability to withstand shocks. Using the stochastic frontier approach and a panel dataset of retail banks, Chapter 1 assesses the cost efficiency of the banking sector in Hong Kong. The average cost inefficiency during the period 1992–2005 is found to be about 15 per cent to 29 per cent of observed total costs, which is largely in line with the experience of US and European banks. Cost efficiency is found to be correlated with macroeconomic conditions, with a significant rise in cost inefficiency triggered by the Asian financial crisis and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) during the period 1998–2003, partly due to the lack of perfect flexibility by banks to adjust their factor inputs (labour, funds and capital) in response to falling outputs. Additional resources spent on risk control, new business initiatives and strengthening customer relationships may also have contributed. Nevertheless, the cost efficiency has started to improve by 2004 Q1, along with the recovery of the economy. This suggests also that the adjustments and streamlining by the banks in recent years may have begun to bear fruit. Empirical results also indicate that cost efficiency is positively correlated with bank size, suggesting large banks are on average more efficient than smaller banks. • Market Structure, Competition and Collusion
Competition could have a significant impact on efficiency and profitability. The degree of competition in the banking industry is therefore always of interest. This is particularly the case for Hong Kong, where the industry is characterized by a few major banking groups and a relatively high degree of market concentration. Evidence of co-movements of the best lending rates and fee setting among banks, even after the removal of the interest rate agreement, has also caused some concerns about the possible existence of oligopolistic coordination among banks. Whether such a phenomenon reflects collusive pricing behaviour or is simply the result of price competition is of interest to policy markers. To examine the issue, three different approaches have been employed: (i) The first is the Panzar-Rosse approach in Chapter 2 which reveals the market structure by investigating the responsiveness of revenues
xx Introduction
to changes in input costs of banks. The relationship between the responsiveness and market structure is directly derived from standard economic theories. (ii) In Chapter 3, the conjectural variation approach is adopted, which reveals the degree of price coordination among banks by estimating price inter-dependence from a system of equations that describes the demand, supply and cost structures of banks. (iii) In Chapter 4, the third approach, due to Berger and Hannan, provides estimates of how market structure (such as market concentration and market shares of banks) and efficiency affect the profitability and pricing power of banks.
The empirical results all suggest that the degree of competition in the banking sector was fairly high during the period 1992–2002, with banks operating in a competitive fashion without any significant sign of collusion on pricing. This situation was largely maintained from 2003 to 2005, notwithstanding significant changes in the operating conditions, in particular a number of mergers and acquisitions. The studies show that the market structure of Hong Kong’s banking sector is one of monopolistic competition, which is similar to most other banking centres, including Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, the US and many other OECD countries. Such a market structure has the following characteristics: (a) Each bank provides some products which are differentiated from other banks (that is imperfect substitution of products), implying that any particular bank would find it difficult to get the entire market share of a particular product. (b) There is free entry and exit of banks in response to profit. If any bank is making significant profit with a particular product, it signals to other banks to produce similar products. Other banks which are not then present will also be attracted to the market. Because of the large number of suppliers and choices available in the market, high competitive pressures are maintained, and they force abnormal profit to zero in the long-run. In reality, while bank entries and exits are not frequently observed in Hong Kong, it is not difficult to observe that if a bank launches a new product which draws positive responses from customers, other banks will usually offer very similar (but not exactly the same) products to compete in a very short period of time (for example, HIBOR-based mortgages). This observation is consistent with the finding that the banking market in Hong Kong is one of monopolistic competition.
Introduction xxi • How Have Recent Mergers and Acquisitions Affected Competition?
The impact of industry consolidations on market concentration is apparent. As shown in the studies, the degree of market concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index increased sharply around the second half of 2001, reflecting merger and acquisition activities. Unfortunately, the precise effect of increased market concentration on competition cannot in this case be clearly estimated econometrically, as the major mergers and acquisitions around 2002 happened to coincide with major regulatory liberalization, including the full implementation of interest rate deregulation. This has resulted in a close resemblance of the time series data representing de-regulation and those representing market concentration. As a result, our analysis in Chapter 2 can only estimate the net effect of these two developments, but not their separate impacts. On the whole, the results indicate that market concentration either has not had a significant negative impact on competition, or that its adverse effect has been largely offset by regulatory liberalization (and technological progress). The emergence of a number of larger banks through mergers and acquisitions which should be more capable of competing with existing large banks may have also contributed. Given the uncertainties surrounding the estimates of the effect of market concentration on competition, the consequence of ongoing industry consolidations should be monitored closely in the years to come. • Do Large Banks Have Substantial Pricing Power Over Smaller Banks?
Chapter 4 assesses the main determinants of banks’ profitability and finds that banks’ profits and margins are mainly determined by their cost efficiency and the macroeconomic environment. The empirical results suggest that banks with lower production costs may earn higher profits through optimizing the input mix. Combined with findings in Chapter 1 that larger banks are in general more cost efficient than smaller banks, this finding suggests that larger banks can offer services at lower prices than smaller banks, yet attaining a similar or even higher level of profit. Smaller banks are therefore more vulnerable to intense competitions than larger banks.
Part II: Interest Rate and Default Risks in the Mortgage Market Part II examines the issue of interest rate and default risks in relation to banks’ mortgage portfolios. In Hong Kong, mortgage loans extended by
xxii Introduction
banks are primarily adjustable rate mortgages, which are largely priced with reference to the best lending rate, while banks’ cost of funds is determined by a mix of interest rates including customers’ savings and time deposit rates and Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rates (HIBORs). Under Hong Kong’s Linked Exchange Rate system, local interest rates tend to largely follow their US counterparts. However, due to the interest rate and market structures of Hong Kong’s banking system, the various local interest rates have shown different responses to changes in US rates, in terms of speed and magnitude. This gives rise to possible interest rate risks to banks’ mortgage loan portfolios. During periods when the upward adjustments by banks of the best lending rate (BLR) lag significantly behind the rises in HIBORs and time deposit rates, banks’ interest rate margin could be squeezed. Such risk in fact materialized in early 2005. Strong price competition in Hong Kong’s mortgage market, coupled with the abundance of liquidity, resulted in a significant reduction in the effective mortgage rates by late 2004 to a level which was not sufficient to buffer for a possible sharp rise in the funding cost (due to a possible sharp increases in HIBORs arising from the liquidity situation returning to normal) along with a more moderate rise in the BLR. As a result, as HIBORs rose sharply during the first half of 2005, some banks which relied heavily on time deposits and interbank borrowing as funding sources had suffered from a squeeze of the interest rate margin of their mortgage loans. In Chapter 5, a stress-testing framework is developed to assess this particular type of interest rate risk to which banks in Hong Kong are exposed. The framework utilizes a model that describes the dynamics of the BLR and therefore the net interest margin of banks in Hong Kong in response to variations in US interest rates and the differential between Hong Kong dollar and US dollar interest rates (resulting from changes in the liquidity situation). The framework can be employed to assess the impact of interest rate shocks on the interest income of banks in Hong Kong. The use of BLR as the reference rate for setting mortgage rates has been adopted by banks for many years. However, the analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that such a practice may not be conducive to banks’ management of interest rate risk, as the movement of BLR may deviate significantly from banks’ cost of funds. Drawing on overseas experience, Chapter 6 examines several local interest rates in order to assess their relevance as alternative reference rates. The assessments are made by evaluating the appropriateness of each rate based on criteria of importance to consumers and factors relevant to banks. Together with other factors, the two key criteria for the assessment are (i) the stability of mortgage rates over time which is regarded as important by both borrowers and banks, and
Introduction xxiii
(ii) conduciveness to interest rate risk management which is important for banking stability. A comparative analysis suggests that a composite rate reflecting movements in various deposit rates, interbank and other interest rates is probably the best as it tracks closely the cost of funds of most local banks and is more stable than the interbank rates and the yield of exchange fund notes. These findings have later resulted in the compilation of a composite interest rate by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), which is now updated and released regularly on a monthly basis, and has become an important indicator of the average funding cost of Hong Kong banks. In the mortgage loan market, the importance of underwriting standards has been highlighted vividly by the subprime loan problems which are currently plaguing global financial markets. In addition to proper assessment of repayment capability, Chapter 6 examines what other factors are crucial to residential mortgage default risk. The empirical analysis reveals the role of current loan-to-value ratio (CLTV) as a major determinant for mortgage default decisions. It also finds that the default probability is positively correlated with the level of interest rates and the unemployment rate, and negatively correlated with financial market sentiment. Given the importance of the CLTV for defaults, this study lends strong support to Hong Kong’s prudential policy of encouraging the adoption of a maximum 70 per cent LTV ratio in residential mortgage lending.
Part III: Quantifying Risks, Capital Adequacy and Stress-testing Framework of Systemic Risk While banks have faced difficulties over the years for a multitude of reasons, the major cause of serious banking problems continues to be directly related to lax credit standards for borrowers, poor portfolio risk management, or a lack of attention to changes in economic conditions and interest rates or other circumstances that can lead to a deterioration in the credit standing of their counterparties and narrowing of banks’ net interest incomes. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has played a leading role by fostering an appropriate credit risk assessment approach and by setting out principles for sound banking practices. The Basel Committee is responsible for proposing regulatory requirements, including capital and provisioning requirements, for internationally active banks. Typically, bank supervisors around the world adopt the guidelines put forth by the committee. These practices should be applied in conjunction with a system of quantitative risk
xxiv Introduction
measures for determining the adequacy of capital and provisions and for assessing interest rate risk. Such development has been supported by an enormous expansion in the areas of financial economics including equilibrium analysis in financial markets, asset-pricing theory and option-pricing theory during the last two decades. Under the initiative regarding the adequacy of capital under Basel II, banks are allowed to calculate regulatory capital charges for their credit exposures using the standardized approach based on supervisory risk weights or the IRB approach. Over time, banks are expected to evolve to the IRB approach, which relies on the banks’ own measures in determining the risk components of various asset classes. In Hong Kong, banks generally maintain capital adequacy ratios well above the regulatory requirement. Chapter 8 shows that such buffers are largely determined by internal considerations of the banks, their responses to market discipline, and the regulatory framework. The chapter also argues that to the extent that part of the high capital buffer is due to the agency problem, information asymmetries, or a mismatch between the expectation of the regulator and banks over the approach to maintaining a capital buffer, action could be taken to improve the use of capital. In this connection, the initiative under Basel II is expected to help. Under the IRB approach in Basel II, credit risk measures are estimated by banks. Systematic underestimation of such measures and the corresponding regulatory capital in a bank (or a number of banks) will increase the bank’s vulnerability to adverse changes in market conditions, in particular during a financial or banking crisis. Therefore, the validation of IRB systems has emerged as one of the important issues of the implementation of Basel II. For validation purposes, Chapter 9 uses an approach pioneered by Merton to provide structural model-based methodology for credit risk assessment (probability of default) and capital requirements under Basel II. Benchmark probability of default obtained from the model could be used as external and independent probability of default estimates for comparisons with banks’ internal probability of default estimates of listed companies. Significant deviations from this benchmark provide a reason to review the banks’ internal estimates and their credit rating processes. Apart from capital adequacy, the development of the methodologies of determining provisions has also emerged as an important research area. Chapter 10 develops a simple model for measuring the provision for a pool of collateralized retail loans with homogenous characteristics, where the collateral coverage is treated as a put option with the
Introduction xxv
strike price equal to the outstanding loan amount of the pool. The collateral value and the probabilities of default of borrowers in the pool are the two correlated stochastic variables in the model. As the information associated with these factors is in general available in banks’ retail portfolios, the model can be readily incorporated into their internal risk management systems as a useful quantitative tool for measuring provisions. To monitor stability of the Hong Kong banking system, stress testing and vulnerability indicators are important tools for assessing systemic risk. Chapter 11 introduces a stress-testing framework that involves the construction of macroeconomic credit risk models, each consisting of a multiple regression model explaining the default rate of banks’ credit exposures, and a set of autoregressive models explaining the macroeconomic environment estimated by the method of seemingly unrelated regression. Chapter 12 derives a multiple default risk index based on an optionpricing model to assess the multiple default risk of a portfolio of publicly-listed banks in Hong Kong during the period of January 1997 to January 2006. The index jumped in advance of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, indicating its early-warning capability. By incorporating asset correlations between banks, this indicator has the advantage of providing high frequency information that can be used to assess the systemic risk in the banking system.
Disclaimer The views and analysis expressed in this book are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Part I Competition, Efficiency and Profitability
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1 The Cost Efficiency of Commercial Banks in Hong Kong Jim Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong and Ka-Fai Choi
1.1 Introduction In recent years, the cost efficiency of banks, along with scale and scope economies, has attracted much attention from both academics and policy makers. Given their special role in channelling funds from savers to investors, poor cost efficiency of banks would restrain the creation of credit, thus jeopardizing the level of economic performance. In addition, inefficiency would affect banks’ earnings, hampering their ability to withstand shocks. The cost efficiency of the US and European banking industries has been examined intensively.1 As for the banking sector in Hong Kong, the issue has only recently been studied by Kwan (2002, 2006) and Drake et al. (2006a, 2006b). By using a non-parametric approach, Drake et al. (2006a) analysed the potential impact of environmental and market factors on the efficiency of the Hong Kong banking system. Many institutions were found to have a high level of technical inefficiency, and there were considerable variations in efficiency levels and trends across size groups and banking sectors. Their results also suggested that the efficiency of banks in Hong Kong had been affected by external factors, mainly macroeconomic and housing market factors.2 Kwan (2002, 2006), based on quarterly data from 1992 to 1999 of 51 banks in Hong Kong and using the stochastic cost frontier approach, found that the X-efficiency was about 16 per cent to 30 per cent of observed total costs. Kwan also found that the average large bank was less efficient than the average small bank, but the size effect appeared to be related to differences in portfolio characteristics among different sized banks. After controlling for on- and off-balance sheet characteristics and loan growth, Kwan (2002, 2006) showed that large banks had higher cost efficiency than smaller banks.3 This suggests that empirical results on the 3
4 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
size–efficiency relationship are sensitive to the specification employed, in particular the specification on how banks’ outputs are measured.4 As for the evolution of efficiency over time, Kwan (2002, 2006) found that between 1992 and 1997 banks were becoming more efficient, but they were less efficient in 1998 and 1999. The deterioration after 1997 may be explained by the effects of the Asian financial crisis. It is, therefore, of interest to see how the banks have fared in recent years. This chapter reassesses the efficiency level of banks in Hong Kong and the size–efficiency relationship by incorporating off-balance sheet (OBS) outputs into the analysis, in view of the increasing importance of OBS business as a source of banks’ incomes.5,6,7 It also examines the relationship between cost efficiencies, bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. In addition, the efficiency estimates are extended to cover the period up to 2005, with the focus on retail banks. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the methodology of evaluating banks’ cost efficiency. This includes an exposition of the stochastic cost frontier approach as originated from Aigner et al. (1977). Section 1.3 describes the data employed and the estimation methods, and presents summary statistics of the dataset. Section 1.4 presents the efficiency estimates and section 1.5 examines the relationships between efficiency, bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Methodology There are two main approaches to the estimation of efficiency – the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the data envelopment approach (DEA).8 In this chapter, we adopt the stochastic cost frontier approach developed by Aigner et al. (1977), a technique that is commonly used in banking studies.9 In this framework, the banking firm is viewed as an intermediary that combines various factor inputs to produce a number of outputs. The log of production cost is assumed to take the following general form: ln Ci = f ( ln yji , ln wki ) + εi ,
(1.1)
where Ci is the total production cost of the ith bank, yji is the jth output of the ith bank, and wki is the price of the kth input of the ith bank. With the functional form of f in equation (1.1) specified as a multi-product translog with the usual symmetry restrictions based on
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 5
the duality theorem, equation (1.1) can be written as10,11 ln Ci = α0 +
J
τj ln yji +
j=1
+
1 2
K K k=1 h=1
K
1 γjl ln yji ln yli 2 J
φk ln wki +
J
j=1 l=1
k=1
K J
ϕkh ln wki ln whi +
ωjk ln yji ln wki + εi .
(1.2)
j=1 k=1
The error term εi has two independently distributed components: εi = vi + ui .
(1.3)
The first component, vi , is a statistical noise and is assumed to be distributed as a symmetric normal N(0, σv2 ). The second component, ui , is bank-specific and is assumed to be distributed as a half-normal |N(0, σu2 )|. Given the above, the lowest attainable production cost is f ( ln yji , ln wki ) + vi . This is precisely the stochastic cost frontier of the ith bank.12 With the estimated cost frontier of banks, the level of cost inefficiency can be assessed. In this chapter, what cost inefficiency refers to is the situation in which the bank can reduce the production cost in obtaining the same quantities of outputs, given the input prices, but it has failed to do so. This means the production cost is not on the stochastic cost frontier. In other words, ui is positive. Cost inefficiency is therefore an estimate of the percentage by which total production cost could have been reduced if the bank had operated on the stochastic cost frontier, holding the output levels and input prices constant. In the analytical apparatus of the standard production theory, such a deviation occurs when the bank does not choose the right mix of inputs to produce the target output or employs excessive quantities of the factor inputs to produce the same amount of output.13 Following Jondrow et al. (1982), we estimate the observation-specific cost inefficiencies by computing the conditional expected values. For the nth bank, the inefficiency estimate (IE estimate), represented by the conditional expectation of un , can be derived as: g(εn λ/σ) εn λ σλ + , (1 + λ2 ) G(εn λ/σ) σ
(1.4)
where λ is σu /σv , σ 2 is σv2 + σu2 , g and G are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions respectively.
6 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
1.3 Data and estimation methods In the estimation we employ a panel dataset that involves 38 retail banks in Hong Kong and covers the period from 1992 Q1 to 2005 Q4.14 Retail banks are the locally incorporated banks plus a number of larger foreign banks whose operations are similar to those of the locally incorporated banks in that they operate a branch network and are active in retail banking. The banking data are obtained from the regulatory returns that Authorized Institutions in Hong Kong must file with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). Since our purpose is to examine the cost efficiency in Hong Kong, the sample is restricted to incorporate only data on the Hong Kong offices of retail banks. Following past literature (see Clark and Siems 2002 and Kwan 2006), the banking cost function is dependent upon input prices and the level of output. As for the banks’ output variables, we adopt the intermediation approach by Sealey and Lindley (1977), which views banks as an agent to employ labour, funds and capital to produce interest-bearing assets. Outputs are measured by the amount of interest-bearing assets generated by the banks. We follow Kwan (2006) to define outputs which relate to banks’ intermediation function. Accordingly, they are (1) loans to finance imports, exports, re-exports, and merchandising trade (y1 ); (2) loans for non-trade-related financing (y2 ); and (3) non-loan earning assets including negotiable certificates of deposit, all other negotiable debt instruments and equity investments (y3 ). Since many banks have moved to provide financial services off the balance sheet, the traditional measures of on-balance sheet output based on the intermediation approach tend to underestimate output levels of banks. Following the specification of Rogers (1998) and Clark and Siems (2002), non-interest incomes are added into the estimation to serve as a proxy for OBS outputs generated by banks.15 With regard to the input variables, banks are considered as employing three factor inputs: labour, funds and capital. The unit price of labour is computed as the ratio of staff expense to total assets. The unit price of funds is proxied by the ratio of interest expense to total funding (the sum of deposits from customers, due to banks, amount payable under repos and negotiable debt instruments issued and outstanding). The unit price of capital is derived as the ratio of expenses, other than staff and interest expenses, to fixed assets. Table 1.1 provides some descriptive statistics of retail banks. In 2005 Q4, the average values of the three groups of interest-earning outputs (trade-related loans, non-trade-related loans, other non-loan-earning assets) and non-interest incomes per retail bank were about HK$5.0
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 7 Table 1.1 Some descriptive statistics of retail banks as of 2005 Q4 Mean
Median
Amount % change Amount % change from 1999 Q4 from 1999 Q4 Average output values per bank (HK$ million) Loans to finance trade Non-trade-related loans Other earning assets Non-interest incomes
4,997 68,876 47,394 539
124.7 107.5 310.5 6.5
2,475 34,949 20,842 127
82.1 76.8 383.8 −0.9
1,645
−4.4
1,442
0.9
8,431
−36.3
7,601
−42.7
1,397
106.7
896
56.8
Others (HK$ million) Average total assets per bank 190,902 Average total costs per bank 1,732
120.9 47.4
81,062 766
97.4 28.7
Input prices (HK$) Labour (per HK$1 million of total assets) Borrowed funds (per HK$1 million of total funding) Capital (per HK$1,000 of fixed assets)
billion, HK$68.9 billion, HK$47.4 billion, and HK$539 million respectively. On the input side, the average cost of labour per HK$1 million of total assets, and borrowed funds per HK$1 million of interest-bearing liabilities were HK$1,645 and HK$8,431 respectively, and the average cost of capital per HK$1,000 of fixed assets was HK$1,397. Compared with 1999 Q4, all interest-bearing output values increased significantly by over 100 per cent, and non-interest incomes rose by an average 6.5 per cent. On the input side, while the average price of capital also increased, the average cost of labour and borrowed funds registered reductions. The stochastic cost frontier can be estimated by the pooled time-series cross-section observations of the dataset with the assumption that all banks have the access to the same production technology. By using the maximum likelihood method, the coefficients of the cost function are obtained. The conditional expectation of inefficiency in equation (1.4) for each bank and of each period is obtained by using the residuals and their variances derived by the estimated stochastic cost frontier.
8 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Table 1.2 Inefficiency estimates of retail banks in Hong Kong
1992 Q4 1993 Q4 1994 Q4 1995 Q4 1996 Q4 1997 Q4 1998 Q4 1999 Q4 2000 Q4 2001 Q4 2002 Q4 2003 Q4 2004 Q4 2005 Q4
Weighted average
Median
Average
28.9 23.9 21.7 20.1 17.1 15.1 16.1 15.1 19.9 25.0 25.8 26.3 23.9 18.0
19.7 19.5 19.6 16.1 12.8 10.0 11.3 12.2 15.1 15.4 17.7 17.9 15.3 11.7
21.8 21.3 19.9 17.7 14.9 13.8 13.4 14.0 17.9 20.4 19.0 21.2 19.6 17.2
Notes: 1. The figures are in percentage terms. 2. The weighted averages are calculated with banks’ efficiency estimates being weighted by their asset sizes.
1.4 The inefficiency estimates The inefficiency estimates (IE estimates) are presented in Table 1.2. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict the time series of some descriptive statistics of the IE estimates. A higher IE estimate will be observed when higher input costs or lower levels of output value take place, resulting in a larger deviation from the minimum cost. In other words, a higher IE estimate means lower efficiency, and vice versa. As can be seen from the table and figures, the weighted average IE estimate started to increase by 1998 and reached 26.3 per cent in 2003 Q4, after declining gradually from 28.9 per cent in 1992 Q4 to 15.1 per cent in 1997 Q4. Nevertheless, since 2004 the IE estimate has resumed its declining trend and improved to 18.0 per cent by 2005 Q4.16 An examination of the evolution of the IE estimates over time shows that the estimates systematically relate to economic cycles. During the period when Hong Kong suffered from two significant economic shocks – the Asian financial crisis and the outbreak of SARS – the IE estimates deteriorated significantly. However, as the economy recovered in recent years, the IE estimates began to decline. The positive correlation between the cost efficiency of banks and economic performance will be tested formally in section 1.5.
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 9 (%) 40 Weighted average 30
20
10
Median Average 2003Q2
2004Q3
2005Q4
2004Q3
2005Q4
2002Q1
2000Q4
1999Q3
1998Q2
1997Q1
1995Q4
1994Q3
2003Q2
Figure 1.1
1993Q2
1992Q1
0
Trends of the inefficiency estimates
(%) 100 80 Upper quarter 60 40 20 0
2002Q1
2000Q4
1999Q3
1998Q2
Median 1997Q1
1995Q4
1994Q3
1992Q1 Figure 1.2
1993Q2
Lower quarter
20
Dispersions of the inefficiency estimates
Notes: 1. The shaded area covers all the obtained estimates of retail banks’ inefficiencies. 2. The weighted average is weighted by total assets.
A possible reason for this time-series property is that as risks are more likely to materialize during economic downturns, banks may have to spend additional resources (factor inputs) or to reduce the amount of outputs (such as credit) in order to better control the risks. In addition, banks may incur more costs on new business initiatives and strengthening customer relationships. In consequence, they would be using more
10 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
inputs to produce the same quantity of output, or to produce a smaller quantity of output with the same amount of inputs, giving rise to higher IE estimates. Another possible reason is that there are fixities in the factor inputs. The quantity of physical capital is obviously not easy to adjust and, with the existence of recruitment cost and investment in specific human capital, labour is likely to be quasi-fixed.17 Moreover, banks generally do not have perfect control over the quantity of deposits. With such fixities, banks may be unable to reduce by an enough extent the input quantities when the demand for banking services is weakened by an economic downturn. Even if such fixities may not be very rigid, it would take time for banks to adjust and streamline their operation. As a result, in economic downturns, some factor inputs may become idle, thereby deteriorating the cost efficiency. Apart from the time-series variations, the IE estimates also differ substantially among banks. Figure 1.2 displays the range and interquartile range of the IE estimates. It can be seen that the cost efficiency of banks was rather diverse, for example, it ranged from 10 per cent to 80 per cent during 2003. It is worth noting that banks with very high IE estimates were also found to have a very low loan-to-asset ratio. Another interesting finding is that the distributions shown in Figure 1.2 are skewed significantly. Both the upper and lower quartiles and the median were very close to the minimum, indicating there were more relatively efficient than inefficient banks.
1.5 Efficiency, bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions To examine the relationship between cost efficiencies, bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions, we estimate a panel data regression model to relate the IE estimate to a number of variables, including bank size, funding sources, business mix, loan quality, and real GDP growth rates.18 The regression model, Model A, is as follows: IEit = β0 + β1 log (TAit ) + β2 + β5 GDPGit + f (eit ),
Depit y1it + y2it LLossit + β3 + β4 TAit TAit TLoanit (1.5)
where TA is total assets, Dep is customers’ deposits, y1 and y2 are loans to finance imports, exports, re-exports, and merchandising trade and loans for non-trade-related financing respectively, LLoss is loan loss provisions, TLoan is total loans, GDPG is the real GDP growth rate, and the
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 11
Table 1.3 Panel data regression of inefficiency estimates
Constant Log(TA) Dep/TA (y1 + y2 )/TA LLoss/TLoan GDPG Adj. R2 DW
Model A
Model B
1.0361** −0.0347** −0.0114 −0.5333** 0.4344** −0.2777**
1.0237** −0.0344** − −0.5328** 0.4232** −0.2785**
0.6661 1.9080
0.6659 1.9082
Notes: ∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
function f (e) consists of autoregressive terms of a white noise process to capture autocorrelation in residuals.19 The variable TA is used to proxy the bank size. The variables of deposits and loans to total assets ratios Dep/TA and (y1 + y2 )/TA capture banks’ funding mix and asset portfolio composition respectively. Regarding the sign of their coefficients, literature does not have a priori expectation. The loan-loss provisions capture the quality of banks’ loan portfolio.20 There are different views about the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable.21 Finally, the growth of GDP tests the relationship between banks’ operating results and the overall economic performance. The sign of the coefficient estimate should be negative, since banks operate in poor economic conditions are likely to incur higher costs or produce less outputs. Applying the method of generalized least squares with fixed effects and cross-section weights, equation (1.5) is estimated with the IE estimates obtained from section 1.4. The results are reported in Table 1.3. The diagnostic test statistics show that the multiple regression model adequately fits the data, with the adjusted R-squares at 0.67 and the DW statistic close to two. With the exception of the ratio of deposits to assets, all coefficients of the explanatory variables are significant and the coefficient for GDPG has the expected sign. As the deposits to assets ratio is not significant, another model (Model B) which excludes it is considered. The estimation results show that all variables remain significant and the signs of their estimated coefficients are unchanged. Key findings from the estimation results are as follows: 1. The level of efficiency of banks is found to be positively correlated with bank size. In other words, large banks are on average more efficient than smaller banks. This is consistent with Kwan (2006) and
12 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Drake et al. (2006a) that there is a strong size–efficiency relationship, with larger banks outperforming their smaller competitors. Drake et al. (2006a) commented that such results may have important implications for policy analysis on the area of mergers and consolidation. Similar observations were found in the US banking industry (Berger et al. 1993). Efficiency is also found to be positively correlated with the ratio of loans to total assets, suggesting that banks’ efficiency level may be sensitive to their business mix, with banks which focus more on lending business exhibiting a lower level of inefficiency.22 Banks with higher loan loss provisions appeared to be less efficient. Banks with more provisions indicate poor loan quality, which may call for higher operation costs relating to credit risk and loan loss management, such as credit approval control, foreclosing bad loans, debt recovery expenses, and other loan-restructuring expenses.23 Efficiency is positively correlated with economic performance, with banks found to be less efficient during economic downturns. As discussed in section 1.4, this may be partly due to the fixities in factor inputs, and additional required resources spent on risk control, new business initiatives and customer relationships during economic downturns. The funding structure is found to be not statistically significant. This suggests that while banks with a stronger deposit base could fund their assets less costly, the high cost arising from maintaining a large branch network may have offset such comparative benefit. The relative magnitudes of coefficient estimates suggest that the changes in cost efficiency due to a one standard deviation change in business mix, total assets and economic performance are 7.1 per cent, 4.7 per cent and 1.3 per cent points respectively.24
1.6 Conclusion Using the stochastic frontier approach and a panel dataset of retail banks, this chapter assesses the cost efficiency of the banking sector in Hong Kong. The average cost inefficiency during the period 1992–2005 is found to be about 15 per cent to 29 per cent of observed total costs, which is close to the findings of Kwan (2002, 2006), and is largely in line with the experience of US and European banks.25 Cost efficiency is found to be correlated with macroeconomic conditions, with a significant rise in cost inefficiency triggered by the Asian financial crisis and the outbreak of SARS during the period 1998–2003,
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 13
partly due to the lack of perfect flexibility by banks to adjust their factor inputs (labour, funds and capital) in response to falling outputs. Additional resources spent on risk control, new business initiatives and strengthening customer relationships may have also contributed. Nevertheless, the cost efficiency has started to improve by 2004 Q1, along with the recovery of the economy. This suggests also that the adjustments and streamlining by the banks in recent years may have begun to bear fruit. Empirical results also indicate that cost efficiency is positively correlated with bank size, suggesting large banks are on average more efficient than smaller banks. Efficiency is observed to be sensitive to banks’ business mix, with banks which focus more on lending business exhibiting a higher level of efficiency compared to banks which focus relatively less on loans. In addition, banks suffering from larger loan loss provisions are found to be less efficient, probably as a result of higher operational costs relating to credit risk and loan loss management.
Notes 1. For example, Berger and Humphrey (1991), Kaparakis et al. (1994) and Clark and Siems (2002) studied the cost efficiency of the US banking industry, and Altunbas et al. (2001) and Vennet (2002) studied that of the European banking industry. 2. Drake et al. (2006b) presented their further work on the issue in a Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR) seminar in April 2005. In their study, they examined both cost and profit efficiencies for financial institutions in Hong Kong by using a parametric approach. They found that both profit and cost efficiencies revealed a secular decline over the whole sample period, but a much smaller deterioration in profit efficiency levels was observed. It suggested that Hong Kong’s financial institutions were able to generate significant improvements in revenues relative to costs. Note that the paper is not yet publicly released. 3. Drake et al. (2006a) based on the non-parametric approach and a panel dataset of banks in Hong Kong for the period 1995–2001 also showed that large banks were more efficient than their smaller competitors. The existing literature in this area also suggests that larger banks are in general more efficient. For example, Berger et al. (1993) reported evidence that larger banks were more X-efficient than smaller banks in the US banking industry. 4. Similar observations were found in the US banking industry. While Kaparakis et al. (1994) found that banks generally became less efficient with increasing size for the US banking industry, they noted that the findings would alter if off-balance sheet activities were included in the analysis. 5. Instead of using a non-parametric approach as in Drake et al. (2006a), this chapter adopts the stochastic frontier approach, similar to Kwan (2002, 2006). However, the output variable is represented by the sum of both on-balance
14 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
6.
7.
8.
9. 10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
sheet and off-balance sheet items. The initial set of input variables included in the estimation is similar to Kwan (2002, 2006). Another possible extension of the current approach, which can be considered in future research, is to take a similar approach to Drake et al. (2006b), in that both the cost and profit efficiencies were estimated and the productivity growth was decomposed into two portions: one due to changes in business conditions and the other due to changes in the best practice and inefficiency. Omitting off-balance sheet (OBS) outputs in the cost efficiency estimation not only affects the size-efficiency relationship estimates, it also affects estimates of the efficiency level. Rogers (1998) and Clark and Siems (2002), by comparing the results which included proxies for the OBS outputs in the estimation, such as non-interest incomes, with those without incorporating OBS outputs in the estimation, showed that omitting OBS activities in the cost efficiency estimation could seriously understate actual bank outputs and efficiency levels. The Data Environment Analysis approach is a non-parametric method that applies mathematical programming technique to envelop the input/ output data. See, for example, Kaparakis et al. (1994), Goldberg and Rai (1996), Vennet (2002) and Kwan (2002, 2006). The translog cost function can be viewed as a logarithmic second-order approximation of the true cost function, assuming that the true cost function is twice continuously differentiable (see Greene 1998). Thus, it is a flexible functional form that is less prone to the problem of specification error. The usual symmetry restrictions γjl = γlj , ϕkh = ϕhk and ωjk = ωkj are imposed to help circumvent the multicollinearity problem arising from the fact that the same interactive explanatory variable enter into the regression equation twice in the translog specification. Conceptually, the reduced form f in equation (1.1) corresponds to the cost function of the standard production theory which assumes that given the target output levels the firm chooses the quantities of inputs to minimize production cost. Therefore, in the absence of ‘luck’, so that vi is non-zero, the production cost of the ith bank when it is fully cost efficient is f ( ln yji , ln wki ). However, vi may not equal zero because in reality there could be random factors that are beyond the bank’s control but influence its production cost. Given this, the stochastic cost frontier becomes f ( ln yji , ln wki ) + vi . Why the banks may not minimize the production cost is in itself an interesting question. The explanation offered by Leibenstein (1966) is that the management may have objectives other than profit maximization, which is known as X-efficiency. Apart from psychological reasons, this can result from a principal–agent problem. Aigner et al. (1977) attributed such deviation to productive inefficiency arising from factors such as technical and economic inefficiency, and the will and effort of the producer and his employees. Initially, there were a total of 45 banks in various periods covered by the study. After removing samples with missing information, 38 retail banks remained in the estimation. Note that the number of banks covered by the study varied in different periods. After the major mergers and acquisitions, the number fell from 38 during 2001 Q2 to 28 during 2005 Q4.
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 15 15. An estimation which excludes non-interest incomes as an output was also tried. Consistent with other studies (Rogers 1998 and Clark and Siems 2002), the estimated efficiency level is lower when the non-interest income variable is excluded, indicating that omitting OBS activities in the cost efficiency estimation could understate actual bank outputs and efficiency levels. 16. The Mann–Kendall test suggests that there exists a significant declining trend for the time series of IE estimates from 2003 Q4 to 2005 Q4 at the 0.05 level of significance. 17. See Oi (1962) and Rosen (1968) for a discussion on the fixity of labour input. 18. Note that the statistical relationship needs not imply causality. 19. Data on provisions from banks’ returns are used to proxy loan loss provisions. The data may include some items unrelated to loan loss such as provisions against the values of other claims and investments. 20. Another variable CAR which represents either the respective risk level or banks’ leverage is found to be insignificant. 21. This is to be discussed in details in the following section on key findings from the estimation results. 22. This appears to be in line with banks’ conventional role. It suggests that banks specializing in their main intermediation function are more cost efficient. 23. In this case, both the management board and bank supervisors may require banks to increase their resources in credit assessment and approval. Alternatively, as noted by Kwan (1997), the correlation between poor asset quality and inefficiency may be an indication of poor management of banks, or a direct consequence of the tendency of inefficient firms to make risky loans. On the other hand, to the extent that the efficiency benefit of larger revenue generated through more aggressive lending (with less stringent credit risk control) may more than offset the increased cost arising from greater resources required for the credit risk and loan loss management, the coefficient estimate may have a negative sign. 24. As both GDP growth and loan loss provisions correlate to the business cycle, their estimated coefficients are combined to represent economic performance in the calculation. 25. See Kwan (2002, 2006).
References D. Aigner, C. K. Lovell and P. Schmidt, ‘Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models’, Journal of Econometrics, 6 (1977) 21–37. A. Altunbas, L. Evans and P. Molyneux, ‘Bank Ownership and Efficiency’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33 (2001) 926–54. A. N. Berger, ‘Distribution-free Estimates of Efficiency in the US Banking Industry and Tests of the Standard Distributional Assumptions’, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 4 (1993) 61–92. A. N. Berger and D. B. Humphrey, ‘The Dominance of Inefficiencies over Scale and Product Mix Economies in Banking’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 28 (1991) 117–48.
16 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong A. N. Berger, W. C. William and S. G. Timme, ‘The Efficiency of Financial Institutions: a Review and Preview of Research Past, Present, and Future’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 17 (1993), 221–49. J. A. Clark and T. F. Siems, ‘X-efficiency in Banking: Looking beyond the Balance Sheet’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34 (2002) 987–1013. L. Drake, M. J. B. Hall and R. Simper, ‘The Impact of Macroeconomic and Regulatory Factors on Bank Efficiency: A Non-parametric Analysis of Hong Kong’s Banking System’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30 (2006a) 1443–66. L. Drake, M. J. B. Hall and R. Simper, ‘Efficiency and Productivity Change in Hong Kong Banking’, HKIMR’s seminar in 2004/2005, (2006b). L. G. Goldberg and A. Rai, ‘The Structure-performance Relationship for European Banking’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 20 (1996) 745–71. W. H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 3rd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 693–6. J. Jondrow, C. A. K. Lovell, I. S. Materov and P. Schmidt, ‘On the Estimation of Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model’, Journal of Econometrics, 19 (1982) 233–8. E. I. Kaparakis, S. M. Miller and A. G. Noulas, ‘Short-run Cost Inefficiency of Commercial Banks: A Flexible Stochastic Frontier Approach’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26 (1994) 875–93. S. Kwan, ‘Efficiency of U.S. Banking Firms – An Overview’, FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, (1997). S. Kwan, ‘The X-efficiency of Commercial Banks in Hong Kong’, HKIMR working paper, 12/2002. S. Kwan, ‘The X-efficiency of Commercial Banks in Hong Kong’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30 (2006) 1127–47. H. Leibenstein, ‘Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-efficiency”’, American Economic Review, 56 (1966) 392–415. W. Oi, ‘Labour as a Quasi-fixed Factor’, Journal of Political Economy, 70 (1962) 538–55. K. E. Rogers, ‘Nontraditional Activities and the Efficiency of US Commercial Banks’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22 (1998) 467–82. S. Rosen, ‘Short-run Employment Variation on Class-I Railroads in the US, 1947– 1963’, Econometrica, 36 (1968) 511–29. C. W. Sealey and J. T. Lindley, ‘Inputs, Outputs and Theory of Production Cost at Depository Financial Institutions’, Journal of Finance, 32 (1977) 1251–66. R. V. Vennet, ‘Cost and Profit Efficiency of Financial Conglomerates and Universal Banks in Europe’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34 (2002) 254–82.
2 Competition in Hong Kong’s Banking Sector: A Panzar–Rosse Assessment Jim Wong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Ka-Fai Choi
2.1 Introduction The operating environment of the banking sector in Hong Kong has undergone major changes in recent years, including regulatory liberalization, technological progress and industry consolidation.1 These structural developments could have implications for competitive conditions in the sector. Competition could lower financial intermediation costs and contribute to improvements in economic efficiency. However, since it may also reduce the market power and profitability of banks, it could weaken their ability to withstand adverse developments. It is important for policy makers to know the extent of competition in the sector and how it has evolved over time. Jiang et al. (2004)2 examined the evolution of the market structure of Hong Kong’s banking sector during the period 1992 to 2002 by using the Panzar–Rosse assessment.3 The study suggested that while there was evidence that competitive pressures in the sector may have eased somewhat in the latter years, the sector remained highly competitive. However, the analysis which is based on aggregate data of the banking sector was significantly restrained by data limitations, in particular the relatively small number of observations. To address such drawback, this chapter re-visits the issue of the competitive structure of the banking industry in Hong Kong, adopting also the Panzar–Rosse approach as in the previous study, based on a panel dataset which covers all retail banks in Hong Kong for the period of 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4. The use of a panel dataset not only enhances the efficiency of the estimates,4 thus allowing the drawing of a more precise inference on the population characteristics of the market structure, but also facilitates the construction and testing of more complicated models, 17
18 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
such as the relationship between competitive pressures and bank size in Hong Kong, which was difficult to achieve in the past study due to the data constraint. Moreover, in this chapter, the data available for analysing the impact of the recent developments on the competitive structure in the banking sector are extended from 2002 Q4 to 2005 Q4. As the interest rate deregulation was only completed in July 2001 and a number of other significant market liberalization moves and substantial bank consolidation only took place around 2001 and 2002, the overall impact on the competitive conditions in the banking sector of these structural developments may not have been fully visualized in Jiang et al. (2004), the study period of which only covered up to 2002. It is important to assess properly how the extent of competition in the sector has changed in the subsequent years, with the effects of both market liberalization and consolidation being more fully realized. With longer time series of data, this chapter should provide a more accurate assessment. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The Panzar-Rosse approach will be discussed in the next section. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the empirical specifications, and data and estimation methods respectively. Section 2.5 presents the estimation results. Finally, section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Panzar–Rosse approach The Panzar–Rosse approach estimates the sum of elasticities (H statistic) of a firm’s revenue with respect to input prices in a reduced form revenue equation. The measure is grounded in the idea that competitive firms are price takers and must pass through cost changes to customers, while a monopoly can vary output to maximize profits in the face of higher input prices. Let R be the revenue function of a vector of k input prices, w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wk ) and a vector exogenous variables x that shift the revenue function: R = R (w, x) H=
∂R wk ∂wk R k
Panzar and Rosse showed that the H statistic indicates the nature of market structure under certain assumptions5 (Table 2.1). In a monopoly
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 19 Table 2.1 Competitive structures and the H statistic Competitive structure
Values of H
Monopoly Monopolistic competition Perfect competition
H ≤0 0
market, H is negative, as an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs and reduce equilibrium output, and subsequently a decline in total revenue given the profit maximization hypothesis. In contrast, in a perfectly competitive market, H is equal to one, as any increase in input prices raises both marginal and average costs and in turn leads to a oneto-one increase in total revenue, without changing the optimal output of banks. This is true since those institutions that cannot cover the increase in input prices through increased revenue will be forced to exit the market. If the market structure is characterized by monopolistic competition, H will be between zero and one, with the total revenue rising less than proportionally to the changes in input prices. The Panzar–Rosse approach has been widely applied to assess competitive conditions in the banking systems of the United States, Canada and Japan since the early 1980s, with later work focusing on European countries. Most of these banking systems exhibited characteristics of monopolistic competition (Bikker and Haaf 2002).
2.3 The empirical specifications In our application of the Panzar–Rosse approach, the following equation is estimated to derive the H statistic from a panel dataset of banks in Hong Kong: log
Rit TAit
= α0 +
K
αk log wkit + xit β + εit
(2.1)
k=1
where R is the revenue; TA is the total assets; wk is the unit price of factor k; x is a vector of control variables; ε is the disturbance term; i and t denote bank and time respectively. The H statistic is the sum of α1 to αK in this specification.
20 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
In addition to equation (2.1), an equation for unscaled total revenue will also be estimated by:
log (Rit ) = α0 +
K
αk log wkit + xit β + βTA log TAit + εit
(2.2)
k=1
with the variable TA controlled as an explanatory variable. Equation (2.1) is a special case of equation (2.2) if βTA equals to one. In this regard, equation (2.1) is a restricted model of equation (2.2). The consideration of equation (2.2) follows the idea in Gelos and Roldos (2002). With the specification in equation (2.2), the value of the coefficient of TA can identify the presence or absence of scale economies. We measure the revenue as total revenue6 rather than the gross interest revenue to account for also the growing off-balance sheet business in the banking sector which mainly generates fees and commission-based incomes. Taking total revenue as the dependent variable is consistent with other studies such as Shaffer (1982), Nathan and Neave (1989), Hempell (2002) and Claessens and Laeven (2004). In this study, banks are considered as employing three factor inputs: labour, funds, and capital. The unit price of labour is computed as the ratio of staff expense to total assets.7 The unit price of funds is proxied by the ratio of interest expense to total funding (the sum of deposits from customers, due to banks, amount payable under repos and negotiable debt instruments issued and outstanding). Finally, the unit price of capital is derived as the ratio of expense other than staff and interest expenses to fixed assets. Bank-specific factors which reflect differences in risk and funding structures are incorporated to control for other heterogeneities in the samples. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is considered as a proxy for bank risk. The coefficient estimate is expected to be negative, as a lower level of bank risk (that is a higher value in CAR) should lead to lower bank revenue. To capture differences in the funding structure, bank’s deposit mix (DM) as measured by the ratio of deposits from customers to bank’s total funding (the sum of deposits from customers, due to banks, amount payable under repos and negotiable debt instruments issued and outstanding) is included in the estimation. Regarding the sign of the coefficient of DM, literatures do not have a priori expectation. In addition to the bank characteristics, certain macroeconomic variables are included. We incorporate the real GDP growth rate in Hong Kong into equations (2.1) and (2.2) to control for the influence
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 21
of economic cycles. Generally, banks should generate larger revenue with the same quantities of inputs under good economic conditions. Inflation rate is incorporated to avoid obtaining a spurious relationship between revenue and factor prices, as their movements are to some extent driven by inflation.
2.3.1 The models A total of six models are specified for estimation: 1. To provide insights on the overall competitive condition during 1991– 2005, Models A and B are specified as equations (2.1) and (2.2) respectively – specifically, scaled R and unscaled R are regressed on the explanatory variables with a constant H statistic for the entire sample period. 2. To study how the degree of competition has evolved over time, two models (Models C and D) will be estimated for scaled R and unscaled R with time-varying H statistic. Models C and D are modified from Models A and B, respectively, to include the interactions between the input-price variables and a dummy variable, DUM. DUM is defined as one after 2001 Q2, and zero otherwise. DUM is so specified as to examine the effect of the structural changes in the banking sector in Hong Kong on the competitive condition in the sector. The time point 2001 Q2 is so chosen to distinguish the two periods as major structural changes either completed or took place around this time: (a) The interest rate deregulation was fully completed by July 2001, with interest rate restrictions on current and savings accounts also removed8 ; (b) the restriction on the number of branches and offices for foreign banks was completely removed in 2001, (c) the market entry criteria have been relaxed since 2002, and (d) most major bank consolidations took place in 2001 and 2002, including the forming of the Bank of China Group, and DBS Bank (Hong Kong) through mergers and acquisitions.9 The impact of industry consolidation on market concentration is apparent. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the market concentration measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI)10 increased sharply around the second half of 2001, largely due to the merger and acquisition activities.
22 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong HHI 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 HHI*
0.02
Figure 2.1
2005/03
2004/03
2003/03
2002/03
2001/03
2000/03
1999/03
1998/03
1997/03
1996/03
1995/03
1994/03
1993/03
1992/03
1991/03
0.00
Major changes in market concentration around 2001
Note: *The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of assets of all the retail banks in the market, ranging from zero to one. Source: HKMA.
In addition to Models C and D, time series of rolling estimates of the H statistic from 1999 to 2005, which are generated by a series of rolling regressions of Models A and B, are also employed to assess the change of H statistic from 1999 to 2005. 3. To study how competitive pressures vary with bank size, Models E and F will be estimated to facilitate the analysis. Models E and F differ from Models A and B in that the formers include the interactions between the input-price variables and bank-scale dummies, Size, to examine whether the competitive condition among large banks is different from that of smaller banks. In a given period, a bank is considered as large (that is Size = 1) if its asset size is one of the seven largest. These model specifications can deliver a more in-depth analysis on how the competitive condition relates to bank size.
2.4 Data and estimation methods The dataset used in the estimation is a panel dataset of all retail banks in Hong Kong covering the period from 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4. Retail banks are the locally incorporated banks plus a number of the larger foreign banks whose operations are similar to those of the locally incorporated banks in that they operate a branch network and are active
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 23 Table 2.2 Summary statistics on the sample (1991 Q1–2005 Q4)
Total revenue (HK$ mn) Unit price of labour Unit price of funds Unit price of capital Total assets (HK$ mn) Capital adequacy ratio (%) Deposit mix (%) Growth (%) Inflation (%)
Median
Mean
584 0.0015 0.0122 0.6995 32,352 19.7 83.1 1.200 0.250
1,169 0.0019 0.0115 3.6293 76,628 25.9 78.6 1.123 0.232
Notes: 1. Deposit mix is defined as the ratio of deposits from customers of a bank to its total funding. 2. The Growth series is the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP growth rate series published by the Census and Statistics Department. 3. The Inflation series is constructed by quarter-end figures from the seasonally adjusted monthly CPI(A) inflation series published by the Census and Statistics Department.
in retail banking. The banking data are obtained from the regulatory returns that the Authorized Institutions in Hong Kong must file with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). Since our purpose is to examine the banking competition in Hong Kong, the sample is restricted to incorporate only the data on the Hong Kong offices of retail banks. Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the sample. The six models, Models A to F, are estimated by the panel dataset, and the first difference forms of equations (2.1) and (2.2) are estimated instead of the original series. This is for several reasons. First, differencing the equation removes the individual effects (which are time invariant and cross-section specific), reducing the number of parameters to be estimated. Secondly, removing the individual effects also avoids complications arising from the possibility that they may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Thirdly, differencing the equation avoids the omitted-variable bias stemming from the cross-sectional unobserved heterogeneities that are constant over time. In estimating the equation, we follow a feasible generalized leastsquares (FGLS) procedure instead of applying the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) because estimators of the former are more efficient with a large sample.11 In the FGLS procedure, we use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) weights to correct for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.12
24 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
2.5 Estimation results Empirical results of the six models are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The adjusted R-squared statistics of the six models, which measure the goodness of fit, range from 0.613 to 0.792. This is considered as satisfactory, given that the dependent variables are in first difference form. The coefficients of all input-price variables are positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, except that of the unit price of capital in Models C and D which are significant at the 10 per cent level. The estimated coefficients of all input-price variables are in line with the theory and empirical findings of other developed banking systems. As for the estimated coefficients of other bank-specific factors, CAR and DM are significant at the 1 per cent level in all the six models. The variable CAR has the expected negative sign, indicating that the level of risk positively affects the level of revenue. The variable DM has a positive sign, suggesting that banks with a larger portion of their funding from customer deposits may generate larger revenue. As for the macroeconomic variables, all estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, except for the variable Growth which are only significant at the 10 per cent level in Models A and B and at the 5 per cent level in Model F. Overall, the estimation results appear robust and stable, as the signs, values and statistical significance of coefficient estimates are not sensitive to the model specifications across Models A to F. The empirical results from Models A and B (Table 2.3), which mainly attempt to provide insights on the overall competitive condition during 1991–2005, suggest that the market can be characterized as monopolistic competition during the period 1991–2005.13 The estimated H statistics are around 0.64 in the two models, broadly in line with results obtained in other studies.14 Both the hypothesis of H = 0 and H = 1 are rejected statistically at the 1 per cent level, indicating that the market can neither be classified as perfect competition nor monopoly. Nevertheless, while the market structure cannot be described as perfect competition, the degree of competition was fairly high. The estimation results in Models C and D (Table 2.3), which facilitate the study of evolution of the degree of competition during the sample period, show that the H statistic for the period 1991 Q1–2001 Q215 is slightly higher than the H statistic for the period 2001 Q3–2005 Q416 . To evaluate the statistical significance of the change in H statistic over the two periods, the hypothesis of H1 = H2 is tested. The hypothesis is not rejected at the 10 per cent level in both Models C and D. This suggests that the competitive condition was not statistically different between the two periods. Time series of rolling estimates of the H statistic from
25 Table 2.3 Empirical results of the Panzar–Rosse model for the Hong Kong banking sector Independent variables
Regression results Sample period: 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4 Models A
B
C
D
Dependent variables
Constant Unit price of labour Unit price of fund Unit price of capital Unit price of labour*DUM Unit price of fund*DUM Unit price of capital*DUM CAR DM
Total revenue/ total assets
Total revenue
Total revenue/ total assets
Total revenue
−0.007*** (0.001) 0.156*** (0.008) 0.462*** (0.008) 0.022*** (0.004)
−0.008*** (0.001) 0.157*** (0.009) 0.464*** (0.008) 0.020*** (0.004)
−0.031*** (0.007) 0.238*** (0.027)
−0.026*** (0.007) 0.267*** (0.027) 1.051*** (0.011) 0.002* (0.001) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.641
−0.009*** (0.001) 0.186*** (0.011) 0.490*** (0.014) 0.007* (0.004) −0.043* (0.016) −0.051*** (0.017) 0.070*** (0.010) −0.025*** (0.006) 0.215*** (0.026)
−0.010*** (0.001) 0.185*** (0.011) 0.497*** (0.014) 0.007* (0.004) −0.046* (0.016) −0.054*** (0.017) 0.067*** (0.010) −0.021*** (0.006) 0.237*** (0.027) 1.049*** (0.011) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.002)
TA Growth Inflation H statistic (1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4) H statistic (1991 Q1 to 2001 Q2) (H1 ) H statistic (2001 Q3 to 2005 Q4) (H2 ) Number of banks F -statistic Adjusted R-squared DW statistics Number of observations
0.002* (0.001) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.640
30 205.437 0.617 1.972 1,394
30 417.879 0.782 1.967 1,394
0.002*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.002)
0.683
0.690
0.659
0.656
30 169.722 0.629 1.978 1,394
30 353.726 0.792 1.974 1,394
Notes: 1. The regressions are estimated by the FGLS method with cross-section seemingly unrelated regression weights. Except for the variables Growth and Inflation, all variables used in the estimation are expressed in first difference form of the natural logarithm of the series. The residuals are specified as an AR(4) process. 2. Numbers in brackets are standard errors unless specified. 3. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Source: HKMA.
26 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Table 2.4 Empirical results of the Panzar–Rosse model for the Hong Kong banking sector (analysis of bank size) Independent variables
Regression results Sample period: 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4 Models E
F
Dependent variables
Constant Unit price of labour Unit price of fund Unit price of capital Unit price of labour*Size Unit price of fund*Size Unit price of capital*Size CAR DM TA Growth Inflation H statistic (large banks) (HL ) H statistic (non-large banks) (HNL ) Number of banks F-statistic Adjusted R-squared DW statistics Number of observations
Total revenue/ total assets
Total revenue
−0.032*** (0.008) 0.163*** (0.009) 0.467*** (0.008) 0.019*** (0.004) −0.015*** (0.005) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.014*** (0.004) −0.026*** (0.007) 0.223*** (0.026)
−0.032*** (0.008) 0.165*** (0.009) 0.468*** (0.008) 0.018*** (0.004) −0.017*** (0.005) 0.027*** (0.008) 0.015*** (0.004) −0.021*** (0.007) 0.256*** (0.026) 1.058*** (0.011) 0.002** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.675 0.651
0.002*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.673 0.648 30 158.915 0.613 1.969 1,394
30 328.815 0.779 1.964 1,394
Notes: 1. The regressions are estimated by the FGLS method with cross-section seemingly unrelated regression weights. Except for the variables Growth and Inflation, all variables used in the estimation are expressed in first difference form of the natural logarithm of the series. The residuals are specified as an AR(4) process. 2. Numbers in brackets are standard errors unless specified. 3. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Source: HKMA.
1999 to 2005, which are generated by a series of rolling regressions of Models A and B, show similar results – as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the H statistic estimates move around 0.6 to 0.8 between 2001 and 2005 and do not have a persistent upward or downward trend. The results of Models C and D suggest that despite significant changes in the operating environment of the banking sector in recent years, competitive pressures have been maintained.
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 27 Perfect competition
Monopolistic competition
Monopoly Figure 2.2
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2003
2004
2005
Rolling estimates of H statistic of Model A
Source: HKMA.
Perfect competition
Monopolistic competition
Monopoly Figure 2.3
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1999
2000
2001
2002
Rolling estimates of H statistic of Model B
Source: HKMA.
As for the relationship between competitive conditions and bank size, estimation results of Models E and F show that the H statistic among larger banks17 has a slightly higher value than that of smaller banks18 .19 Interestingly, the hypothesis that the H statistic among larger banks (HL ) equals to the H statistic of smaller banks (HNL ) is rejected at the 1 per cent level in both Models E and F, suggesting that competitive pressures among larger banks are higher than that among smaller banks. The result is consistent with other studies. For example, Bikker and Haaf (2002), based on a panel dataset of 23 industrialized countries, concluded that competitive pressures were statistically higher among larger banks and lower among smaller banks. A plausible explanation is that while
28 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
larger banks compete keenly with smaller banks in local retail markets such as mortgages and credit cards, they compete even more fiercely with other competitors at regional or international levels in the corporate banking market, wealth management or other off-balance sheet activities where larger banks usually are relatively more heavily involved than smaller banks. This may lead to higher competitive pressures observed among larger banks.
2.6 Conclusion With both the effects of major market liberalization and consolidation now being more fully realized,20 this chapter re-visits the issue of competitive conditions of the banking industry in Hong Kong, which were first examined in Jiang et al. (2004), to see how the extent of competition has changed in the years subsequent to the last study. Facilitated by a panel dataset of banks and with longer time series of data up to the end of 2005, the chapter also aims to provide a more accurate assessment. The empirical analysis based on the Panzar–Rosse approach reconfirms the previous findings that the degree of competition was fairly high during the period 1992–2002, and suggests that competitive pressures have been maintained in the subsequent years, notwithstanding significant changes in the operating environment. The estimation results also find that competitive pressures were higher among larger banks and lower among smaller banks. This may suggest that while larger banks compete with smaller banks keenly in local retail markets on products such as mortgages and credit cards, they may be subject to even stronger pressures from other competitors at regional or international levels in the corporate banking market, wealth management and other off-balance sheet activities, where they are more heavily involved. While relaxation of regulations and advances in technology tend to enhance competition in the banking system, the effect of consolidation may depend on the prevailing market settings. To the extent that bank consolidation in recent years may have hampered competition, regulatory liberalization and technological progress appear to have largely offset the adverse effect. The emergence of a number of larger banks through mergers and acquisitions, which should have become more capable of competing with existing large banks, may have also contributed to the maintenance of competitive pressures in the sector. Nonetheless, with bank consolidation expected to continue, how market
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 29
concentration may impact on competition in the years to come needs to be closely monitored.
Notes 1. Following the banking sector consultancy study in 1998, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has gradually removed several barriers to competition, including regulated interest rates, branching restrictions for foreign banks, limited access of restricted licence banks (RLBs) to the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, and certain market entry criteria to the banking sector. Technological advancement also enhanced competition by eliminating geographical barriers and facilitating product innovations. Meanwhile, bank consolidation has resulted in increased market concentration. The effects of the Asian financial crisis, an ongoing process of consolidation of international banks and weak credit demand have created ongoing pressures for mergers and acquisitions in the Hong Kong banking sector. 2. The paper was published as a HKMA Research Memorandum, RM 04/2004. 3. See Panzar and Rosse (1987). 4. Panel data, by combining inter-individual differences with intra-individual dynamics, offer many advantages over cross-sectional or time series data. Panel data enlarge the number of observations for estimation, increasing the degree of freedom and reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables, hence improving the efficiency of estimates. A more detailed discussion on the advantages of panel data estimation can be found in Hsiao (1986). 5. The assumptions include (1) banks are profit maximizing, single product firms facing normally distributed revenue and cost functions; (2) banks produce revenue using labour, capital and intermediated funds (mainly deposits) as inputs; (3) higher input prices are not associated with higher quality services that generate higher revenue; and (4) banks are in long run equilibrium. The single product firm assumption is consistent with the ‘intermediation’ approach, where banks are viewed mainly as financial intermediaries, transforming inputs of labour, capital and deposits into outputs including loans and investments (De Bandt and Davis 2000). Nonetheless, product differentiation is allowed in the monopolistic competition model (Gelos and Roldos 2002). 6. Total revenue includes gross interest revenue and non-interest revenue. 7. This follows Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) and Gelos and Roldos (2002). Note that other measures of unit price of labour as the ratio of staff expense to the number of employees are also frequently used (see, for example, Molyneux et al. 1994 and Claessens and Laeven 2004). 8. The deregulation of interest rates in Hong Kong was undertaken in two phases. Phase 1 of the deregulation took place in July 2000 which removed the interest rate cap on time deposits with a maturity less than seven days and the prohibition on benefits for all deposits with the exception of Hong Kong dollar current and savings accounts. Phase 2 of the deregulation took place in July 2001 which removed all interest rate rules over current and savings accounts.
30 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong 9. A detailed summary of other regulatory liberalization measures can be found in Box 1 of Jiang et al. (2003). The forming of the Bank of China Group involved the consolidation of the ten member banks of the Bank of China Group into the Bank of China (Hong Kong); the forming of the DSB Bank (Hong Kong) involved the merger of DBS Kwong On Bank, Dao Heng Bank and Overseas Trust Bank. Details of the consolidations can be found at Table 1 of Jiang et al. (2004). 10. The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of assets of all retail banks, ranging from zero to one. A large number of banks, each with a small share, produce an HHI close to zero. A monopolist bank with a 100 per cent share produces an HHI of one. 11. With a panel dataset, the number of observations is sufficiently large, and FGLS is considered more appropriate. Note that OLS may be more efficient than FGLS with a small sample, if the departure from classical assumptions is not too severe. 12. Alternatively, we have also made use of the fixed effect model by adding individual effects into the differenced equation, which requires us to follow the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation. Estimates obtained from our FGLS procedure and the fixed effect model suggest the same competitive structure of the banking industry. The random effect model is not attempted because the residuals are expected to follow an autoregressive process. 13. For the H statistic to be valid and interpretable, the market under study needs to be in long-run equilibrium for the sample period (Panzar and Rosse 1987). In long-run equilibrium, the rate of returns should not be correlated with input prices (De Bandt and Davis 2000). To conduct the equilibrium test, equation (2.1) is estimated by replacing the endogenous variable with the rate of return and the hypothesis of H = 0 is tested. The results found that H = 0 cannot be rejected at the 10 per cent level, indicating that the rate of return is not correlated with input-price variables, satisfying the long-run equilibrium condition. 14. The H statistics obtained by Claessens and Laeven (2004) for the different banking sectors of 50 economies range from 0.41 (USA) to 0.92 (Costa Rica). The paper estimated the H statistic for Hong Kong to be 0.7, which was quite similar to our estimate of 0.64. The study also showed that a number of other developed countries have similar H statistics as Hong Kong, such as Austria (0.66), Belgium (0.73), Canada (0.67), Denmark (0.50), France (0.69), Germany (0.58), Italy (0.60), Luxembourg (0.82), Norway (0.57), Spain (0.53), Switzerland (0.67), and UK (0.74). The H statistic for Japan was estimated at 0.47. 15. H1 = 0.683 and 0.690 in Models C and D respectively. 16. H2 = 0.659 and 0.656 in Models C and D respectively. 17. HL = 0.673 and 0.675 in Models E and F respectively. 18. HNL = 0.648 and 0.651 in Models E and F respectively. 19. The estimation results are robust to moderate changes on the assumed thresholds for classifying the large banks. 20. The interest rate deregulation was fully completed in July 2001 and a number of other significant liberalization moves and substantial bank consolidation took place around 2002.
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 31
References J. A. Bikker and J. M. Groenevald, ‘Competition and Concentration in the EU Banking Industry’, Kredit und Kapital, 33(1) (2000) 62–98. J. A. Bikker and K. Haaf, ‘Competition, Concentration and Their Relationship: An Empirical Analysis of the Banking Industry’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (2002) 2191–214. S. Claessens and L. Laeven, ‘What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36 (2004) 564–83. O. De Bandt and E. P. Davis, ‘Competition, Contestability and Market Structure in European Banking Sectors on the Eve of EMU’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 24 (2000) 1045–66. R. G. Gelos and J. Roldos, ‘Consolidation and Market Structure in Emerging Market Banking Systems’, IMF Working Paper, no. 186 (Washington DC: IMF , 2002). H. Hempell, ‘Testing for Competition Among German Banks’, Discussion Paper, Economic Research Centre, Deutsche Bundesbank, (2002). C. Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). G. Jiang, N. Tang, E. Law and A. Sze, ‘Determinants of Bank Profitability in Hong Kong’, HKMA Research Memorandums, 14/2003. G. Jiang, J. Wong, N. Tang and A. Sze, ‘Banking Sector Competition in Hong Kong – Measurement and Evolution over Time’, HKMA Research Memorandums, 04/2004. P. Molyneux, D. M. Lloyd-Williams and J. Thornton, ‘Competitive Conditions in European Banking’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 18 (1994) 445–59. A. Nathan and E. Neave, ‘Competition and Contestability in Canada’s Financial System: Empirical Results’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 22 (1989) 576–94. J. C. Panzar and J. N. Rosse, ‘Testing for “Monopoly” Equilibrium’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (1987) 443–56. S. Shaffer, ‘A Non-structural Test for Competition in Financial Market’, proceedings of a conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (1982) 225–43.
3 Testing for Collusion in the Hong Kong Banking Sector Jim Wong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Ka-Fai Choi1
3.1 Introduction The banking industry in Hong Kong is characterized by the existence of a few major banking groups and a relatively high degree of market concentration. Reflecting this, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI)2 of the banking sector in Hong Kong is around 0.14 in 2005, which is higher than some other developed banking centres, such as the US (0.02), the UK (0.06) and Japan (0.06).3 The three-bank concentration ratio4 of Hong Kong is also high at around 0.56 in 2005, compared with 0.15 in the US, 0.34 in the UK, and 0.39 in Japan.5 Such a structure could be conducive to the forming of oligopolistic coordination, as large banks may gain strong market power and could exercise leadership in pricing. Indeed, the existence of the interest rate rules (IRRs) prior to 2001 had long been a competition concern. When the IRRs were in place, deposit rates offered by banks under an administered rate structure were to an extent dictated by the large banks. At the same time, the best lending rate (BLR), the reference rate for most bank loans, was set by the large banks, which was followed by other banks. There also appeared to be similar feesetting trends among banks.6 Even after the full deregulation of the IRRs, for a considerable period of time banks still adopted the same BLR set by the large banks, although the effective interest rates could be different due to different mark-ups. It was not until April 2005 that smaller banks began to adjust their BLRs differently from large banks.7 However, the gap between different BLRs has so far never exceeded 25 basis points. Our previous tests for market structure using a Panzar–Rosse approach in Wong et al. (2006) have shown that the banking sector in Hong Kong was highly competitive during the period 1992–2005. Nevertheless, evidence of the co-movement of BLRs and fee setting among banks, 32
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 33
even after the removal of the IRRs, has caused some concerns about the existence of oligopolistic coordination among banks. Whether such a phenomenon reflects oligopolistic coordination or is simply the result of price competition thus needs to be examined. This is particularly important in view of recent market consolidations that have resulted in fewer banks and an even more concentrated market. Oligopolistic coordination may lead to higher profit for the colluding banks at the expense of customers and other competitors, and would adversely affect economic efficiency. The issue is therefore of interest to policy makers. This chapter, based on the conjectural variation approach derived from the oligopoly theory, focuses on evaluating the degree of oligopolistic coordination of the banking industry in Hong Kong. It forms part of our series of projects examining the market structure and competitive environment of the banking sector. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The conjectural variation approach will be discussed in the next section. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the empirical specifications, and data and estimation methods respectively. Section 3.5 presents the estimation results. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The conjectural variation approach The conjectural variation approach involves identification8 and estimation of a conjectural variation parameter of the market being examined. In our context, the parameter is defined as the bank’s belief about its rivals’ pricing responses to changes in its own interest rates charged on loans (hereafter referred to as λ).9 The theoretical model employed in this study to estimate λ is based on Coccorese (2002, 2005)10 which specifies a price-setting game in a duopolistic market with heterogeneous products, where each bank faces a demand function for its loans, qi = q(pi , p−i , Zi ),
i = 1, . . . , N
(3.1)
where N is the number of banks in the market, qi is the quantity demanded. pi and p−i are the interest rates charged (that is prices) on loans by bank i and by all other competitors respectively. Zi is a vector of exogenous factors affecting demand. This demand function assumes that each bank faces a single competitor which is formed by all other banks, and hence the demand for loans for each bank depends on the
34 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
interest rate charged by itself as well as the average interest rate charged by all other banks. The cost function of banks in the model is specified by Ci = C(qi , wi , Yi ),
i = 1, . . . , N
(3.2)
where costs depend on quantity and a vector of k factor prices, wi = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wk ), as well as a vector of exogenous cost factors affecting bank costs, Yi . Based on equations (3.1) and (3.2), the profit function of banks can be written as πi = q(pi , p−i , Zi )pi − C(qi , wi , Yi ),
i = 1, . . . , N
(3.3)
where πi is the profit earned by bank i. To maximize profit subject to the exogenous factors, p−i , Zi , wi and Yi , banks must satisfy the following condition:11 1 pi = MCi − ηi (3.4) η−i , i = 1, . . . , N +λ pi p−i i where MCi = ∂C is the marginal cost, ηi = ∂qi
∂ ln qi ∂ ln pi
=
∂qi pi ∂pi qi
< 0 is the own-price
= > 0 is the cross-price elasticity, and λ = ∂p∂p−ii elasticity, η−i = is the conjectural variation parameter of bank i. The derivative λ = ∂p∂p−ii , if identified, can be interpreted as the degree of oligopolistic coordination between banks on pricing loans. By estimating λ, the existence of collusive behaviour on loan pricing can be detected. Specifically, a positive λ implies that collusive pricing behaviour exists in the loan market (see Figure 3.1). Such a pricing behaviour can be revealed by changes in the market equilibrium price and quantity as a consequence of an initial increase in price by one of the banks. For illustration, suppose a bank raises its loan price and thereby reduces its loans made. If its rivals are expected to increase their prices (λ > 0) too, then their output levels are expected to move in the same direction as that of the bank which initiates the price increase. On the whole, the equilibrium quantity is reduced, the equilibrium price is raised and the joint profit of banks is increased. In other words, such evidence suggests that the bank expects its rivals to match its prices, and to co-operate with each other in order to hold revenues at a profitable level. In the limit, the joint profit of the banks is maximized by perfect coordination in prices where the bank expects its changes in price to be followed exactly by all other banks (that is λ = 1). ∂ ln qi ∂ ln p−i
∂qi p−i ∂p−i qi
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 35 Perfect collusion
1.0 0.8
Oligopolistic collusion exists
0.6 0.4 0.2
λpre
λpost
0.0 0.2 Oligopolistic collusion does not exist
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Perfect competition Figure 3.1 changes
∞ Degree of oligopolistic coordination before and after structural
Notes: λpre = The estimated value of the conjectural variation parameter for the period 1991 Q1–2001 Q2. λpost = The estimated value of the conjectural variation parameter for the period 2001 Q3– 2005 Q4. Source: HKMA.
In contrast, non-positive values of λ imply that banks react in a competitive fashion to any increase in price by their counterparts. A zero value for the conjectural variation parameter (that is, λ = 0) indicates that each bank does not (or fails to) consider rivals’ choices when setting prices. In other words, banks are expected to keep their prices fixed despite an increase in prices of their counterparts. For the banks to maintain their prices unchanged, they must increase their loans to fill the loan supply gap arising from the upward price adjustments by the bank which initiates the price change. On balance, the total amount of loans made by the banking sector as well as prices should be little affected or even unchanged. A negative conjectural derivative indicates that a bank raising its prices expects its rivals to react in a competitive fashion by reducing their prices. In the extreme, λ = −∞ implying perfect competition. While the formulation of the theoretical model varies somewhat in the literature, the conjectural variation approach has been widely applied to assess the degree of oligopolistic coordination between banks in the banking systems of the US (Shaffer 1989) and Canada (Shaffer 1993) since
36 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
the 1980s, with later work focusing on European countries (Berg and Kim 1998; Angelini and Cetorelli 2003; Coccorese 2002 and 2005). Most of these studies found no evidence of significant oligopolistic coordination in the banking systems.
3.3 The empirical specifications 3.3.1 The system of equations In our application of the conjectural variation approach, a system formed by equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4) is estimated simultaneously to infer the λ statistic from a panel dataset of banks in Hong Kong. The demand function corresponding to equation (3.1) is specified by the following log-linear equation: ln qi = φ0,i + φ1 ln pi + φ2 ln p−i + φ3 ln Y + φ4 ln Bi + εD ,
(3.5)
where the quantity demanded qi and the price pi are measured by total loans produced by individual banks (the sum of loans and advances to customers and amount due from banks) and the ratio of total gross interest incomes to total loans respectively. The competitor’s price p−i is calculated as the ratio of the sum of gross interest incomes to the sum of total loans of all other banks. The estimated coefficient of ln pi (that is, φ1 ) is interpreted as the own price elasticity and that of ln p−i (that is, φ2 ) is interpreted as the cross-price elasticity, and they are expected to be negative and positive respectively. The demand for loans is assumed to be affected by two exogenous factors: Y and Bi , the quarterly real GDP growth rate in Hong Kong and the number of bank branches respectively. Generally, demand for loans should be higher under good economic conditions and for banks with a large branch network. Therefore, the estimated coefficients of φ3 and φ4 are expected to be positive. With respect to cost equation (3.4), a multi-product translog cost function, which is adopted by many related banking studies,12 is specified. Two regularity conditions are imposed on the cost equation to ensure that the estimated cost function is well behaved.13 The cost equation can be written as ln Ci = α0,i + α1 ln qi + α2 ln oqi + β1 ln w1,i + β2 ln w2,i + (1 − β1 − β2 ) ln w3,i + 0.5σ11 ln qi ln qi
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 37
+ 0.5σ22 ln oqi ln oqi + σ12 ln qi ln oqi − 0.5(γ12 + γ13 ) ln w1,i ln w1,i − 0.5(γ12 + γ23 ) ln w2,i ln w2,i − 0.5(γ13 + γ23 ) ln w3,i ln w3,i + γ12 ln w1,i ln w2,i
(3.6)
+ γ13 ln w1,i ln w3,i + γ23 ln w2,i ln w3,i − (δ12 + δ13 ) ln qi ln w1,i + δ12 ln qi ln w2,i + δ13 ln qi ln w3,i − (δ22 + δ23 ) ln oqi ln w1,i + δ22 ln oqi ln w2,i + δ23 ln oqi ln w3,i + εC where Ci is total costs of bank i. While this study mainly assesses the existence of collusive behaviour in the loan market, off-balance sheet (OBS) outputs generated by banks, oqi , are incorporated into the cost function estimation to serve as a control variable to avoid understating bank outputs.14 In this study, banks are considered as employing three factor inputs: funds, labour and capital. The unit price of funds, w1,i , is proxied by the ratio of interest expense to total funding (the sum of deposits from customers, due to banks, amount payable under repos and negotiable debt instruments issued and outstanding). The unit price of labour, w2,i , is computed as the ratio of staff expense to total assets.15 Finally, the unit price of capital, w3,i , is derived as the ratio of expense other than staff and interest expenses to total assets. Based on the specification of equation (3.6), the marginal cost function of bank i for producing qi can be derived as MCi =
∂Ci ∂qi
=
Ci ∂ ln Ci qi ∂ ln qi
=
Ci [α1 + σ11 ln qi + σ12 ln oqi qi
(3.7)
− (δ12 + δ13 ) ln w1,i + δ12 ln w2,i + δ13 ln w3,i ]. With the specification of equations (3.5) and (3.7), equation (3.4) can be specified as pi =
Ci [α1 + σ11 ln qi + σ12 ln oqi qi
38 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
− (δ12 + δ13 ) ln w1,i + δ12 ln w2,i + δ13 ln w3,i ] −
(3.8)
1 + εp φ2 φ1 +λ pi p−i
The conjectural variation parameter λ can be inferred by estimating the system of equations formed by equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.8).
3.3.2 The models A total of three models are specified for estimation: 1. To provide insights on the overall degree of oligopolistic coordination between banks during 1991–2005, Model A is specified to estimate a constant λ statistic for the entire sample period based on equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.8). 2. To study how the degree of oligopolistic coordination in the banking sector has evolved over time, Model B, a modification of Model A, will be estimated. By including the interaction between λ and two dummy variables which separate the whole sample period into two sub-periods – one from 1991 Q1 to 2001 Q2 and the other from after 2001 Q2 to 2005 – Model B attempts to examine the effect of the structural changes on the degree of oligopolistic coordination in the banking sector. The time point 2001 Q2 is so chosen to distinguish the two periods as structural changes including major bank consolidations and bank deregulations either completed or took place around the time.16,17 Theoretically, while bank consolidations, which lead to a more concentrated market, may favour the development of collusion,18,19 bank deregulations can constrain market power of individual banks, and hence lower the likelihood of establishing and maintaining collusive behaviour among banks.20 The results of Model B would shed light on the net impact of these structural changes on the industry conduct. 3. To study how the degree of oligopolistic coordination varies in different bank markets, such as the local retail market versus the corporate loan market, Model C is estimated with the interaction between λ and bank-scale dummies, Size, included. As large banks in general are more active in the corporate loan market than smaller banks, the difference in the degree of pricing coordination between the group of larger banks and the group of smaller banks can facilitate our analysis of price co-ordination in different markets. In the model, a bank is
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 39
considered as large if its asset size is one of the seven largest at the specific point of time.21
3.4 Data and estimation methods The dataset used in the estimation is a panel dataset of all retail banks in Hong Kong covering the period from 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4. Retail banks are the locally incorporated banks plus a number of larger foreign banks whose operations are similar to those of the locally incorporated banks in that they operate a branch network and are active in retail banking. The banking data are obtained from the regulatory returns that Authorized Institutions in Hong Kong must file with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). Since our purpose is to examine the degree of oligopolistic coordination among banks in Hong Kong, the sample is restricted to incorporate only data of their Hong Kong offices.22 All nominal values of the variables are deflated by the composite consumer price index. The three models, Models A to C, are estimated with equations (3.5) and (3.6) specified in the first difference form. This is for several reasons. First, differencing the equations removes the individual effects (which are time invariant and cross-section specific), reducing the number of parameters to be estimated. Secondly, removing the individual effects also avoids complications arising from the possibility that they may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Third, differencing the equation avoids the omitted-variable bias stemming from the cross-sectional unobserved heterogeneities that are constant over time. In estimating the system of equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.8), we follow a non-linear three-stage least squares method instead of applying the single-equation method such as ordinary least squares, limited information maximum likelihood or two-stage least squares because estimators from the former are statistically consistent and asymptotically more efficient than the other estimators.23
3.5 Estimation results Empirical results of the three models are presented in Table 3.1. The adjusted R-squared statistics of the three models, which measure the goodness of fit, are all over 0.9, indicating that the specification of equations is appropriate. The estimated own-price elasticity (φ1 ) and cross-price elasticity (φ2 ) are negative and positive respectively, with a statistical significance at the 1 per cent level. The former implies a
40 Table 3.1 Empirical results of the conjectural variation parameter for the Hong Kong banking sector Independent variables
Regression results Sample period: 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4 Models A
B
C
Dependent variables Equation (3.5): demand equation φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 R-squared Equation (3.6): cost equation α1 α2 β1 β2 σ11 σ22 σ12 γ12 γ13 γ23 δ12 δ13
ln qi −1.0350*** (0.0064) 0.5430*** (0.0488) 0.8294* (0.4373) 2.4701*** (0.0786)
−1.0344*** (0.0063) 0.5422*** (0.0489) 0.8448* (0.4379) 2.4668*** (0.0787)
−1.0476*** (0.0070) 0.5508*** (0.0488) 0.8202* (0.4367) 2.4858*** (0.0786)
0.9837
0.9837
0.9834
−0.0130 (0.0414) −0.1671** (0.0792) 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.4232*** (0.0766) 0.0159*** (0.0055) 0.0379*** (0.0081) −0.0122** (0.0053) −0.1027*** (0.0013) −0.1040*** (0.0012) −0.0361*** (0.0010) −0.0092* (0.0047) −0.0116** (0.0047)
−0.0803* (0.0459) −0.1297* (0.0751) 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.5129*** (0.0770) 0.0207*** (0.0057) 0.0279*** (0.0081) −0.0081 (0.0057) −0.1026*** (0.0013) −0.1044*** (0.0012) −0.0362*** (0.0010) −0.0145*** (0.0047) −0.0058 (0.0047)
ln Ci −0.0096 (0.0420) −0.1546** (0.0786) 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.4716*** (0.0765) 0.0148*** (0.0056) 0.0339*** (0.0080) −0.0104* (0.0053) −0.1027*** (0.0013) −0.1043*** (0.0012) −0.0361*** (0.0010) −0.0120** (0.0047) −0.0084* (0.0046)
(Continued)
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 41 Table 3.1 (Continued) Independent variables
Regression results Sample period: 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4 Models A
B
C
Dependent variables δ22 δ23
0.0032*** (0.0008) −0.0041*** (0.0011)
0.0031*** (0.0008) −0.0035*** (0.0011)
0.0033*** (0.0008) −0.0043*** (0.0011)
0.9958 1,887
0.9958 1,887
0.9964 1,887
R-squared Number of observations Equation (3.8): first-order condition λ
Pi −0.0023 (0.0067) −0.0048 (0.0066) 0.0054 (0.0068)
λpre λpost
−0.0156* (0.0082) 0.0003 (0.0070)
λL λNL R-squared Number of observations
0.9998 1,887
0.9999 1,887
0.9996 1,887
Notes: 1. Numbers in brackets are standard errors unless specified. 2. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Source: HKMA.
downward sloping demand curve for loans for individual banks and the latter implies that loans offered by a bank are substitutes of loans offered by other banks; both results are in line with standard economic theories. The estimated own-price elasticity in absolute value is larger than the cross-price elasticity, suggesting that the demand for loans of customers are more sensitive to the variation of prices offered by the bank which they currently bank with than to price changes of other banks. The estimated coefficients of the income variable (φ3 ) have the expected positive sign, and are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.24 The number of bank branches is also estimated to be positively related
42 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
to the demand for loans (that is φ4 > 0 and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). As for the estimation result of the cost function, since the specification involves cross-product terms and quadratic terms, it is difficult to visualize the reasonableness of the estimated coefficients based on themselves alone. Nevertheless, a check on the marginal cost values for all observations, derived based on equation (3.6) with the estimated coefficients, found that they are all positive as expected. Overall, the estimation results appear robust and stable, as the signs, values and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients do not vary significantly with different specifications across Models A to C. The empirical result from Model A, which attempts to provide insights on the overall degree of oligopolistic coordination between banks during 1991–2005, suggests no evidence of oligopolistic coordination between banks during the period. The estimated conjectural variation λ is −0.0023 and is not significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level, indicating that banks react in a competitive fashion in response to any increase in price by their counterparts in the market. As the estimated value of λ is far smaller than the perfect collusive value of one and is significantly larger than the perfect competition value of negative infinity, the market can neither be classified as a monopoly (formed by all of the banks) nor be considered as perfect competition. These findings are in line with Wong et al. (2006), which concludes that the degree of competition in Hong Kong’s banking industry was fairly high, although the market structure cannot be described as perfect competition. The estimation result in Model B, which studies the evolution of the degree of oligopolistic coordination during the sample period, shows that the estimated values of the conjectural variation parameter for the period 1991 Q1–2001 Q225 is slightly lower than that for the period 2001 Q3–2005 Q426 . However, they are both statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10 per cent significance level. The result suggests that despite major mergers and acquisitions of banks taking place around 2001, which have resulted in higher market concentration in recent years, no significant evidence is found of collusive behaviour of banks in either the period before or after the bank consolidations. As for the analysis of oligopolistic coordination by different markets, the empirical results of Model C show that the estimated conjectural variation parameter among larger banks has a negative value27 while that of smaller banks has a positive value28 , although both values are close to zero. The null hypothesis of a zero value conjectural variation of large banks can be rejected at the 5 per cent significant level.29 On the
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 43
other hand, the null hypothesis of zero value conjectural variation of smaller banks cannot be rejected at the 10 per cent significant level.30 As large banks are more heavily involved in corporate banking than smaller banks, these findings suggest that while banks in general do not have sufficient market power to exercise any collusive pricing in the markets, it is relatively less likely to have oligopolistic collusion in the corporate loan market than in the retail market. This is in line with findings in the literature on collusion that it appears in general more feasible to develop and maintain effective oligopolistic collusions among firms in markets with more standardized products, less asymmetry on sellers, particularly on their cost structures, and more small buyers.31,32 To the extent that these characteristics play an important role in developing collusive pricing behaviour, the corporate loan market, especially for large and multinational corporations, in which regional and international banks also actively participate, is less prone to developing and maintaining oligopolistic coordination than the local retail market.
3.6 Conclusion The empirical analysis, based on the conjectural variation approach and a panel dataset which covers all retail banks in Hong Kong for the period from 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4, suggests that banks in Hong Kong operated in a competitive fashion in the loan market without any significant sign of collusion on pricing during the period 1991–2002, and market conduct was largely maintained in the subsequent years, notwithstanding significant changes in the operating conditions. While major bank consolidations taking place in 2001–02 have resulted in fewer banks, and thus a market more conducive to developing and maintaining collusions, interest rate deregulations implemented around the same time have promoted a more competitive environment. Empirically, the evidence indicates that banks do not exercise any collusive pricing in either the retail market or the corporate loan market. The estimation results also suggest that oligopolistic collusions are less likely to develop in the corporate loan market than in the local retail market. This is probably due to the fact that in the corporate loan market, where the products are usually highly customized and wider product scopes exist, effective collusions are more difficult to be developed. Moreover, there are more participating banks in the corporate loan market, which is not limited to local larger banks, but also larger banks at the regional and international levels.
44 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
Notes 1. The authors are grateful to Hans Genberg for his suggestions and comments. 2. The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of assets of all retail banks, ranging from zero to one. A large number of banks, each with a small share, produce an HHI close to zero. A monopolist bank with a 100 per cent share produces an HHI of one. 3. Bikker and Haaf (2002) estimated the HHI for the banking industries of 20 countries. The HHI are found to range from 0.02 (US) to 0.26 (Switzerland). The average HHI for the 20 selected countries is found to be 0.11, which is lower than the HHI in Hong Kong in 2005 (that is 0.14). 4. The three-bank concentration ratio is defined as the ratio of the sum of assets of the first three largest banks to the sum of assets of all banks. 5. Besides the HHI, Bikker and Haaf (2002) also estimated the three-bank concentration ratio of the banking industries for 20 countries. The values range from 0.15 (US) to 0.78 (Netherlands), and the average value is 0.47, which is lower than that of Hong Kong in 2005 (0.56). 6. One of the notable examples was the service charge/maintenance fees imposed on small depositors, which were first introduced by one of the larger banks during 2001 amid the removal of the remaining interest rate rules. This was followed by most of the smaller banks later. 7. All banks have the same BLRs from July 2001 to March 2005. Since April 2005, they started to have different BLRs in response to the recent tightening of US interest rates. Concerns over the impact of fewer and larger banks in a market on competition resulting from bank consolidations stem from the structure–conduct–performance paradigm, which asserts that the degree of competition is positively related to the number of banks in the market. Fewer banks and a more concentrated market are said to be conducive to oligopolistic coordination, as it reduces the coordination problem among the incumbents, and favours the development or maintenance of collusion agreement among banks. 8. The conjectural variation parameter may be difficult to estimate econometrically due to the identification problem. For detailed discussions, see Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and Nevo (1998). 9. The concept of conjectural variation was introduced and defined by Bowley (1924) and Frisch (1951) as the firm’s belief about the rivals’ response to changes of its decision variables. Regarding the decision variables, most past studies formulate the model with only one decision variable by assuming firms choosing either the output level (that is the Cournot model) or the price level (that is the Bertrand model). While the Cournot model is extensively applied on banking studies such as Spiller and Favaro (1984), Shaffer (1989, 1993), Berg and Kim (1998), Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) and Bikker (2003), the Bertrand model that assumes banks compete with their rivals by using prices is also very common. See Coccorese (2002, 2005) and Haan and Sterken (2006), for example. 10. For a more complete explanation of the model, see Roller and Sickles (1995) and Neven and Roller (1996) which develop the model originally to examine the market structure of European airline industry.
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 45 11. This is derived from the first-order condition of the bank profit maximization problem. Mathematically, the problem can be expressed as Max πi = q(pi , p−i , Zi )pi − C(qi , wi , Yi ). Pi
12. See Gilligan et al. (1984), Mester (1987) and Berger et al. (1987), for example. 13. Homogeneity of degree one in factor prices and symmetry are imposed. 14. Past studies on the cost structure of banking industry generally suggested that omitting OBS activities in the cost estimation could seriously understate actual bank outputs. For example, in cost-efficiency studies, Rogers (1998) and Clark and Siems (2002), by comparing the results which included proxies for the OBS outputs in the estimation, such as non-interest incomes, with those without incorporating OBS outputs in the estimation, showed that omitting OBS activities in the cost efficiency estimation could seriously understate actual bank outputs and efficiency levels. 15. This follows Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) and Gelos and Roldos (2002). Note that other measures of unit price of labour as the ratio of staff expense to the number of employees are also frequently used (see, for example, Molyneux et al. 1994 and Claessens and Laeven 2004). 16. (1) The interest rate deregulation was fully completed by July 2001, with interest rate restrictions on current and savings accounts also removed; (2) the restriction on the number of branches and offices for foreign banks was completely removed in 2001; (3) the market entry criteria have been relaxed since 2002, and (4) most major bank consolidations took place in 2001 and 2002, including the forming of the Bank of China Group and DBS Bank (Hong Kong) through mergers and acquisitions. 17. An alternative way to analyse the evolution of the degree of oligopolistic coordination is by including a time trend variable. However, such specification implicitly assumes that the evolution of the degree of oligopolistic coordination is either increasing or decreasing continuously and linearly over time, which is unlikely to be true in reality. Given that major bank consolidations and deregulations were concentrated around 2001–02, the evolution of the degree of oligopolistic coordination may be more appropriate to be specified by a structural break around the period. 18. This argument is based on the structure–conduct–performance paradigm (Bain 1951) which asserts that the degree of competition is positively related to the number of banks in the market and negatively related to the market concentration. Theoretically, joint profit of banks is maximized if all banks tacitly collude to behave as a single monopolist in the loan market. To form such a collusion or cartel, it would be more possible with fewer banks in the market. 19. Early studies based on the conjectural variation approach (Spiller and Favaro 1984; Shaffer 1993; Angelini and Cetorelli 2003; Toolsema 2002; Coccorese 2005; Uchida and Tsutsui 2005) generally suggested that the degree of strategic interactions across banks is lower after bank deregulations, while the impact of bank consolidations is inconclusive empirically. 20. This argument is based on the implication from the contestability theory which follows the lead of Baumol (1982) in stressing that potential competitors, like currently active competitors, can effectively constrain market
46 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
21.
22.
23.
24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
power of incumbents, so that in a market with only few competitors, sufficiently low barriers to entry which make potential competition highly possible can serve to discipline the established firms to act in a competitive fashion. Regarding the classification of large and small banks, another way of classification is based on the ranking of average asset size of banks in the whole sample period. Under such classification method, each bank will be classified into only one specific group for the whole sample period regardless of changes in the asset size of the bank during the period. This classification method should be appropriate in a case that only a few mergers and acquisitions happen in the sample period and the asset size of banks has not changed substantially over time. Since there were major bank consolidations taking place during 2000–01, which changed the asset size of some banks dramatically, we choose to adopt the classification of banks according to the asset size of each bank at each point of time. Regarding the data for estimation, another common source is from banks’ annual reports. Such data source is subject to various limitations. First, the relatively small number of observations constrains the construction and testing of more complicated models and the estimation results may be subject to large statistical variances, given the large number of parameters estimated under the conjectural variation approach. Second, most of the data disclosed in annual reports are on a consolidated basis that contain the operation of banks’ overseas branches and their subsidiaries, which may not be appropriate for analysing the local banking market structure. This is in particular the case for some large banks which have substantial operations overseas. Using such data to examine the banking market structure in Hong Kong may also generate results that are affected unduly by large banks’ data as their market shares and assets are exaggerated. The three-stage least squares estimator takes account of the fact that the system of equations be disturbance-related and makes use of the covariance matrix of disturbances among the equations within the framework of the seemingly unrelated regression method. So, the estimator is asymptotically more efficient than other single equation estimators. With a panel data, the number of observations is sufficiently large and the three-stage least squares method is considered more appropriate. Note that the singleequation estimator may be more appropriate if the number of observations is small. This is in line with Coccorese (2005) in which the income variable has a positive sign but is statistically significant in only some of the cases. λpre = −0.0048 λpost = 0.0054 λL = −0.0156 λNL = 0.0003 The null hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis of a negative value conjectural variation of larger banks. The null hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis of a positive value conjectural variation of smaller banks. See Stigler (1964), Eckbo (1976), Baker and Faulkner (1993), Symeonidis (2003), and Suslow (2005).
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 47 32. In essence, markets with such characteristics are more able to facilitate colluding firms to reach some mutually agreed prices in a single market and easier for colluding firms to monitor each other’s behaviour in order to deter or prevent cheating, which are fundamental for successful collusions. For instance, loan arrangements for large multinational corporations usually involve more customized terms to fit for the unique needs of individual corporations. These loans are also very common to tie-in with other related products provided by the bank or its affiliates such as legal and financial consultancy services, leading to the loan arrangements being more differentiated and involving wider product scopes. The complexity of such loans prevents banks from reaching a mutually agreed collusive price in this market. Moreover, potential colluding banks in this market could be banks operated in the domestic, regional, or international levels, leading to higher monitoring costs for detecting if each colluding bank follows the collusive agreement. These may contribute to the less likelihood of oligopolistic coordination observed among larger banks than among smaller banks.
References P. Angelini and N. Cetorelli, ‘The Effect of Regulatory Reform on Competition in the Banking Industry’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(5) (2003) 663–84. J. Bain, ‘Relation of the Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936–1940’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65 (1951) 293–324. W. E. Baker and R. R. Faulkner, ‘The Social Organisation of Conspiracy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry’, American Sociological Review, 58(9) (1993) 837–60. W. Baumol, ‘Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure’, American Economic Review, 72 (1982) 1–15. S. A. Berg and M. Kim, ‘Banks as Multioutput Oligopolies: An Empirical Evaluation of the Retail and Corporate Banking Markets’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 30(2) (1998) 135–53. A. N. Berger, G. A. Hanweck and D. B. Humphrey, ‘Competitive Viability in Banking: Scale, Scope, and Product Mix Economies’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 20 (1987) 501–20. J. A. Bikker and K. Haaf, ‘Competition, Concentration and their Relationship: An Empirical Analysis of the Banking Industry’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (11) (2002) 2191–214. J. A. Bikker and J. M. Groeneveld, ‘Competition and Concentration in the EU Banking Industry’, Kredit und Kapital, 33(1) (2000) 62–98. J. A. Bikker, ‘Testing for Imperfect Competition on EU Deposit and Loan Markets with Bresnahan’s Market Power Model’, Research Series Supervision, 52 (2003), Netherlands Central Bank. A. L. Bowley, The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). T. F. Bresnahan, ‘The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified’, Economic Letters, 10 (1982) 87–92.
48 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong J. A. Clark and T. F. Siems, ‘X-efficiency in Banking: Looking beyond the Balance Sheet’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34 (2002) 987–1013. S. Claessens and L. Laeven, ‘What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36 (2004) 564–83. P. Coccorese, ‘Competition Among Dominant Firms in Concentrated Markets: Evidence from the Italian Banking Industry’, Centre for Studies in Economic and Finance Working paper, 89 (2002), University of Salerno. P. Coccorese, ‘Competition in Markets with Dominant Firms: A Note on the Evidence from the Italian Banking Industry’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29 (2005) 1083–93. P. L. Eckbo, The Future of World Oil (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976). R. Frisch, ‘Monopoly–Polypoly: The Concept of Force in the Economy’, International Economic Paper, 1 (1951) 23–36. R. G. Gelos and J. Roldos, ‘Consolidation and Market Structure in Emerging Market Banking Systems’, IMF Working Paper, No. 186 (2002), Washington DC. T. Gilligan, M. Smirlock and W. Marshall, ‘Scale and Scope Economies in the Multiproduct Banking Firm’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 13 (1984) 393–405. L. D. Haan and E. Sterken, ‘Price Leadership in the Dutch Mortgage Market’, Working Paper, 102 (2006), Netherlands Central Bank. G. Jiang, N. Tang, E. Law and A. Sze, ‘Determinants of Bank Profitability in Hong Kong’, HKMA Research Memorandums, 14/2003. G. Jiang, J. Wong, N. Tang and A. Sze, ‘Banking Sector Competition in Hong Kong – Measurement and Evolution over Time’, HKMA Research Memorandums, 04/2004. M. Kim and S. A. Berg, ‘Banks as Multioutput Oligopolies: An Empirical Evaluation of the Retail and Corporate Banking Markets’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30(2) (1998) 135–53. L. J. Lau, ‘On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output Data’, Economic Letters, 10 (1982) 93–9. J. L. Mester, ‘A Multiproduct Cost Study of Savings and Loans’, Journal of Finance, 42(2) (1987) 423–45. P. Molyneux, D. M. Lloyd-Williams and J. Thornton, ‘Competitive Conditions in European Banking’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 18 (1994) 445–59. D. J. Neven and L. H. Roller, ‘Rent Sharing in the European Airline Industry’, European Economic Review, 40 (1996) 933–40. A. Nevo, ‘Identification of the Oligopoly Solution Concept in a Differentiatedproducts Industry’, Economic Letters, 59 (1998) 391–5. K. E. Rogers, ‘Nontraditional Activities and the Efficiency of US Commercial Banks’ Journal of Banking and Finance, 22 (1998) 467–82. L. H. Roller and R. C. Sickles, ‘Competition, Market Niches, and Efficiency: A Structural Model of the European Airline Industry’, CEPR working paper, (1995), London. S. Shaffer, ‘Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry’, Economic Letters, 29 (1989) 321–3. S. Shaffer, ‘A Test of Competition in Canadian Banking’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(1) (1993) 49–61. P. T. Spiller and E. Favaro, ‘The Effects of Entry Regulation on Oligopolistic Interaction: The Uruguayan Banking Sector’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(2) (1984) 244–54.
Wong, Wong, Fong and Choi 49 G. Stigler, ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’, Journal of Political Economy, 72(1) (1964) 44–61. V. Y. Suslow, ‘Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence from Inter-War International Cartels’, Industrial and Corporate Changes, 15(5) (2005) 705–44. G. Symeonidis, ‘In Which Industries is Collusion More Likely? Evidence from the UK’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(1) (2003) 45–74. L. A. Toolsema, ‘Competition in the Dutch Consumer Credit Market’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (2002) 2215–29. H. Uchida and Y. Tsutsui, ‘Has Competition in the Japanese Banking sector improved?’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29 (2005) 419–39. J. Wong, E. Wong, T. Fong, and K. F. Choi, ‘Competition in Hong Kong Banking Sector: A Panzar–Rosse Assessment’, HKMA Research Memorandum, 16/2006.
4 Determinants of the Performance of Banks in Hong Kong Jim Wong, Tom Pak-Wing Fong, Eric Tak-Chuen Wong and Ka-Fai Choi1
4.1 Introduction What factors determine the performance of banks in general, and how banks’ profits and pricing behaviours are affected by market structure in particular, have been extensively studied. Amongst the various approaches, a number of studies have focused on the structure–performance relationship of banks, with the structure– conduct–performance (SCP) hypothesis and the efficient-structure (EFS) hypothesis widely tested.2 In general, banks’ profitability and pricing power are hypothesized to be determined by the market structure of the banking industry, such as the number of participating banks in the market and the market shares of banks, and bank-specific factors, such as cost efficiency, scale efficiency, and the risk attitude of banks. Macroeconomic factors, such as real GDP growth and unemployment, may also be important determinants. As for the structure–performance relationship of banks, empirical results have been mixed. In some studies, market structure of the banking sector was found to be one of the main determinants of banks’ performance. Specifically, banks’ profitability was found to be positively related to the level of market concentration. This was interpreted as profitability being enhanced by a higher degree of price coordination which was facilitated by fewer competitors. This suggests that concentration could have an adverse effect on the competitive environment of the industry. Likewise, some studies found that banks with larger market shares possessing strong market power could earn supernormal profits, which would hamper competition and could affect the health of other smaller banks. On the other hand, other studies found that the relationship between banks’ performance and concentration/market power is 50
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 51
spurious, with efficiency being the principal determinant of both profitability and market structure. Individual banks’ relative performance and the sector’s profitability were more dependent on the production efficiency of banks, in addition to other operating factors and macroeconomic conditions. Which of these hypotheses is valid thus points to different implications of increased concentration (and thus of mergers and acquisitions) for the banking industry. Understanding the crossrelationships among market structure, production efficiency and banks’ performance in Hong Kong is therefore useful to policy makers. This is particularly important given the recent market consolidations resulting in fewer banks and new larger banks, and the fact that larger banks appear to have generally performed better than smaller banks.3 Our previous studies using the Panzar–Rosse approach in Wong et al. (2006b) and the conjectural variation approach in Wong et al. (2007) have shown that the banking sector in Hong Kong operated with a high degree of competition with no significant sign of collusive pricing. As part of our series of projects examining the market structure and competitive environment of Hong Kong’s banking industry, this chapter further examines the issue through identifying the key determinants of banks’ relative performance. Based on the approach proposed by Berger and Hannan (1993) and with the aid of a panel dataset of retail banks covering the period 1991–2005, this chapter examines what factors determine the performance of banks, and tests whether market concentration and efficiency are among the main factors contributing to the profitability of banks in Hong Kong. It also evaluates possible policy implications of what effects these and other determinants may have on banks’ performance. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A literature review, particularly the Berger–Hannan approach, will be presented in the next section. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe the empirical specifications, and data and estimation methods respectively. Section 4.5 presents the estimation results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature review The structure–performance relationship of banks has been extensively studied in the case of the US banking industry.4 Earlier studies on the structure–performance relationship of the banking industry have usually been based on regression analyses in which indicators of bank performance, such as bank profitability and prices, were regressed on indicators of market structure such as the concentration index of the
52 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
banking industry and market shares of individual banks. While a positive correlation between banks’ performance and market concentration (or market shares) was found frequently, the interpretation of this result, and hence the policy implication, varied among the studies: some authors interpreted it as support of the SCP hypothesis, which asserts that banks in a concentrated market are more likely to engage in some form of non-competitive behaviour such as collusions, consequently setting less favourable prices to customers and earning higher profits.5 Others viewed it as supporting the EFS hypothesis, which states that efficient firms increase in size and market share because of their abilities to generate higher profits, which usually leads to an increased concentration of markets and higher market shares for individual banks.6 The ambiguity in interpreting the result indicates the significant limitation of the approach. Berger and Hannan (1993) tackled the problem by explicitly incorporating two efficiency indicators, which measure the X-efficiency and scale efficiency of banks, as explanatory variables in the regression equations, together with two market structure indicators, which are proxied by market concentration and the market shares of banks. In Berger and Hannan (1993), profit rates and prices are employed as the dependent variables to proxy for banks’ performance. The X-efficiency variable, which is computed from an estimated efficient cost frontier from the data, aims to measure the closeness of cost of banks to the minimum that could be achieved on the efficient cost frontier which is defined by the best-practice banks in the sample. The scale–efficiency variable, which is derived from an estimated cost-function of banks from the data, aims to measure the closeness of cost for the bank’s actual output level to the cost of the bank’s minimum average cost output. Other factors such as the population of the state where the banks’ headquarters locate, branching restrictions of banks and the business failure rate were included in the estimation to control for the differences in market size, regulatory restrictions and business conditions respectively. Four important hypotheses that relate to the performance of the US banking industry were tested in Berger and Hannan (1993). In addition to the SCP, Berger and Hannan (1993) also tested the relative market power (RMP) hypothesis which asserts that banks with larger market shares are able to exercise market power to earn higher profits. Since the SCP and RMP hypotheses assert that higher profits are associated with anti-competitive pricing behaviours in the markets, prices should be positively related to market concentration and market shares of banks. The remaining two hypotheses tested by Berger and Hannan (1993) relate
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 53
to the EFS hypothesis: Under the X-efficient hypothesis (ESX), banks with superior management of costs for a given output level should attain higher profits. Under the scale efficient hypothesis (ESS), banks operating at optimal economies of scale should have the lowest average costs, resulting in higher profits. Both ESX and ESS imply that efficiency is positively related to banks’ profitability. It is also expected that efficient banks can offer more favorable prices to bank customers, leading to a negative relationship between efficiency and prices. Empirically, Berger and Hannan (1993) found that market concentration (that is the SCP hypothesis) better explains bank profits and prices than do efficiency (that is the ESX and ESS hypotheses) and market share (that is the RMP hypothesis). Goldberg and Rai (1996) later applied the Berger–Hannan approach on 11 European banking industries, but found that cost efficiency was the main determinant of banks’ performance in some low-market-concentration European countries, while scale efficiency and market structure only played a little role.
4.3 The empirical specification In this chapter, we employ the approach of Berger and Hannan (1993) to examine how banks’ performance is determined, by including direct measures of efficiency in the empirical analysis, along with variables representing market structures and other controlling factors. Two equations are specified as follows: it = β0 + β1 CONCt + β2 MSit + β3 DUMt + β4 CIEit + β5 SIEit + β6 z it + f (eit ),
(4.1)
and Pit = β7 + β8 CONCt + β9 MSit + β10 DUMt + β11 CIEit + β12 SIEit + β13 z it + f (eit ),
(4.2)
where i and t index bank and time respectively; and P are the profitability and pricing ability of banks, which are adopted as the measures of banks’ performance; CONC is market concentration and MS is banks’ market shares, which represent the market structure of the banking sector; DUM is the dummy variable which is introduced to quantify the impact of regulatory liberalization; CIE and SIE denote cost inefficiency (that is X-inefficiency) and scale inefficiency of banks respectively.7 z is a
54 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
vector of control variables and f (eit ) consists of autoregressive terms of a white noise process to capture autocorrelation in residuals. Profitability of banks, , is measured by the return on assets (ROA), which is defined as the ratio of post-tax profits (or losses) to total net assets.8 The pricing ability P is proxied by the interest rate spread (IRS) of banks, which is defined as the average price of interest-bearing assets minus the average cost of interest-bearing liabilities. The former is adjusted to exclude the portion of interest incomes and assets contributed by interbank placements, so as to reflect more closely the price of loans to non-bank customers. A higher IRS may suggest greater market power, as banks with greater market power could charge loans with a higher spread over their interest costs. CONC is proxied by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), which is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of assets of individual banks, ranging from zero to one. A large number of banks, each with a small share, produce an HHI close to zero, while a single monopolist bank with a 100 per cent share produces an HHI of one. MS is measured as the ratio of individual banks’ total assets for each period to the sum of assets of all banks for that period. Regarding the sign of the estimated coefficients of CONC and MS, the SCP hypothesis suggests a positive sign for CONC in equations (4.1) and (4.2), while the RMP hypothesis predicts a positive sign for MS in the two equations.9 DUM is defined as one after 2001 Q2, and zero otherwise. DUM is so specified as to examine the effect of a series of regulatory liberalization measures in the banking sector taking place around 2001. The time point 2001 Q2 is so chosen to distinguish the two periods as major regulatory liberalization measures either completed or took place around this time: (a) The interest rate deregulation was fully completed by July 2001, with interest rate restrictions on current and savings accounts also removed;10 (b) the restriction on the number of branches and offices for foreign banks was completely removed in 2001; and (c) the market entry criteria have been relaxed since 2002. Note that since the regulatory liberalization was implemented almost at the same time when there was a sharp rise in CONS due to a number of mergers and acquisitions taking place, putting CONS and DUM in the same equations may subject the estimation to the problem of
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 55
multicollinearity. This issue will be further discussed in the following sections. The variable CIE, which is derived from a stochastic cost frontier, represents the cost inefficiency of banks. Cost inefficiency is an estimate of the percentage by which total production cost could have been reduced if the bank had operated on the stochastic cost frontier, holding the output levels and input prices constant. What cost inefficiency refers to is the situation in which the bank can reduce the production cost and still obtains the same quantities of outputs, given the input prices, but it has failed to do so. Theoretically, such a deviation occurs when the bank does not choose the right mix of inputs to produce the target output or employs excessive quantities of the factor inputs to produce the same amount of output. The estimate of CIE in this chapter is equivalent to the variable IE (that is inefficiency estimate) in Wong et al. (2006a). Under the ESX hypothesis, the sign of the estimate coefficient for CIE is negative in equation (4.1) when ROA is the dependent variable, and is positive in equation (4.2) when IRS is the dependent variable. Scale inefficiency SIE used in the regression analyses is computed from the parameters of the cost function estimated in Wong et al. (2006a), which is also adopted to calculate the CIE. SIE measures the absolute deviation of the bank’s actual output level from its optimal-scale output level that has the minimum average cost. By definition, SIE ranges from zero to one. The lower the value of SIE is, the closer the bank operates to its optimal scale. Detailed derivations of the CIE can be found in Wong et al. (2006b) and the definition of SIE is provided in Appendix 4A. The coefficient estimate for SIE is expected to be negative in equation (4.1) and positive in equation (4.2), if the ESS hypothesis holds. Some variables reflecting bank characteristics are incorporated to control for other heterogeneities in the samples. These include the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLoss), the ratio of total interestbearing funds11 to assets (DEPASS), and the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). LLoss is included in the estimation to capture differences in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. A higher LLoss of banks indicate a loan portfolio of poorer credit quality, which may lead to lower profits due to higher operating costs relating to credit risk and loan loss management.12 It may also trigger banks to shift to other assets with lower risks, resulting in lower IRS. DEPASS is adopted as a proxy for the leverage of banks. A higher DEPASS indicates that a greater portion of the bank’s assets is funded by non-equity funds which could lead to higher funding costs, resulting in lower ROA and IRS. Such a relationship implies a negative estimated coefficient for DEPASS in regression equations (4.1) and (4.2).
56 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
However, according to Goldberg and Rai (1996), a higher DEPASS may indicate that banks are more aggressive in asset-liability management which could lead to higher ROA and IRS. If this is the case, a positive sign for the coefficient estimate of DEPASS in equations (4.1) and (4.2) is expected. CAR is considered as a proxy for banks’ risk attitude. The coefficient estimate is expected to be negative, as a more aggressive portfolio (with a lower CAR value) should normally require a higher ROA or IRS for compensation. In addition to bank characteristics, we incorporate the real GDP growth rate (GDP) and the unemployment rate (UR) in Hong Kong into equations (4.1) and (4.2) to control for the influence of economic cycles. Generally, banks should generate higher profits and be able to charge higher prices under good economic conditions.
4.4 Data and estimation method In the estimation we employ a panel dataset that involves 38 retail banks in Hong Kong and covers the period from 1991 Q1 to 2005 Q4.13 Retail banks are the locally incorporated banks plus a number of the larger foreign banks whose operations are similar to those of the locally incorporated banks in that they operate a branch network and are active in retail banking. The banking data are obtained from the regulatory returns that the Authorized Institutions in Hong Kong must be filed with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). Since our purpose is to examine the profit–structure relationship in Hong Kong, the data used in the study cover only Hong Kong offices of the banks. After removing outliers and missing data, 1,418 observations are used for the study. Table 4.1 reports some descriptive statistics about the dataset. Figure 4.1 depicts the average ROAs of retail banks for the study period. It shows that prior to 1998 Q4 (before the full reflection of the effect of the Asian financial crisis), banks’ profitability was usually higher than 0.4 per cent. A sharp fall to the negative region of the ROA for the fourth quarter of 1998 indicates the lag effect of the Asian financial crisis. Although banks on average recovered from their quarterly loss after 1998 Q4, their ROAs were shown to have since stayed at a lower level of around 0.3 per cent. The IRS exhibited a mild downward trend in the study period, suggesting that the pricing ability of banks was generally lower in recent years than previously. The impact of industry consolidations on market concentration is apparent. As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the market concentration measured by the HHI increased sharply around the second half of 2001, reflecting merger and acquisition activities. As major regulatory
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 57 Table 4.1 General features of the data (sample period: 1991Q1–2005Q4; no. of observations: 1,418) Variable
Mean
Median
Std. dev.
ROAa IRSa CONC MS CIE SIE LLoss DEPASS CAR GDP growthb Unemployment rate
0.0036 0.0076 0.0973 0.0275 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.83 0.22 0.0110 0.0440
0.0035 0.0074 0.0869 0.0101 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.85 0.20 0.0120 0.0445
0.0030 0.0034 0.0211 0.0510 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.0158 0.0215
Minimum −0.0263 −0.0053 0.0790 0.0001 0.03 2.13e–05 0.00 0.19 0.09 −0.0390 0.0150
Maximum 0.0434 0.0377 0.1392 0.2860 0.79 0.45 0.21 0.92 1.10 0.0650 0.0860
Notes: (a) Quarterly figures, not annualized. (b) Seasonally adjusted Hong Kong real GDP growth rates, obtained from the Census and Statistics Department.
(%) 0.70
(%) 1.60
0.60
1.40
0.50
1.20
0.40
1.00
0.30
0.80 0.60
0.20 ROA (lhs) IRS (rhs)
0.10
0.40 0.20
0.10
0.00 1991Q3 1992Q1 1992Q3 1993Q1 1993Q3 1994Q1 1994Q3 1995Q1 1995Q3 1996Q1 1996Q3 1997Q1 1997Q3 1998Q1 1998Q3 1999Q1 1999Q3 2000Q1 2000Q3 2001Q1 2001Q3 2002Q1 2002Q3 2003Q1 2003Q3 2004Q1 2004Q3 2005Q1 2005Q3
0.00
Figure 4.1
Time series plots of average quarterly ROA and IRS
Source: HKMA.
liberalization took place at almost the same time as market consolidations, the variable DUM is shown to be very similar to the evolution of market concentration. Such a close resemblance of the time series pattern of CONS and DUM suggests there may exist a degree of multicollinearity. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated by the least squares method. A fixed cross-sectional effect is specified in the estimation so as to capture
58 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong DUM
HHI 0.15
1.2
0.14 DUM (rhs)
0.13
1.0 0.8
0.12 0.11
HHI (lhs)
0.10
0.6 0.4
0.09
0.2
0.08 0.0
0.07 1991/03 1991/09 1992/03 1992/09 1993/03 1993/09 1994/03 1994/09 1995/03 1995/09 1996/03 1996/09 1997/03 1997/09 1998/03 1998/09 1999/03 1999/09 2000/03 2000/09 2001/03 2001/09 2002/03 2002/09 2003/03 2003/09 2004/03 2004/09 2005/03 2005/09
0.06
Figure 4.2
0.2
Market concentration and regulatory liberalization
Notes: 1. The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of assets of all retail banks in the market, ranging from zero to one. 2. DUM is defined as one after 2001 Q2 and zero otherwise to capture the effect of regulatory liberalization which took place around 2001. Source: HKMA.
unobserved idiosyncratic effects of different banks. To correct for the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity, the cross-section weights are used in the estimation. The coefficient variances are derived by the White cross-section method so that the estimator is robust to cross equation correlation and different error variances in each bank.
4.5 Estimation results Estimation results are presented in Table 4.2 where Models A and B follow the specification in equations (4.1) and (4.2) respectively. The adjusted R-squared statistics of the two models, which measure the goodness of fit, are 0.46 and 0.41 in Models A and B respectively, indicating that the specifications are reasonably adequate. While not all variables included in Models A and B are statistically significant and obtain an expected sign, the F-statistics for both models reject the hypothesis that the set of selected variables do not give significant explanatory powers on ROA or IRS. Key findings are summarized as follows: 1. The estimated coefficients of CONC, MS, and DUM are found insignificant in the models (at the 5 per cent significance level). It was also
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 59
found that the sign and significance of the coefficient estimate for CONC change significantly when DUM is included in the estimation due to the problem of multicollinearity.14 Given this, the dummy variable is finally excluded in the specification of the equations (4.1) and (4.2). The estimated results for CONC and MS are therefore representing the net effect of increased market concentration in conjunction with the series of regulatory liberalization. This empirical evidence suggests that market structure, as measured by market concentration and market shares of banks, is either not a significant determinant of banks’ performance or, to the extent that market consolidations in recent years have hampered competition, thus enhancing banks’ profitability, its adverse effect has been largely offset by regulatory liberalization and technological progress during the same period. The emergence of a number of larger banks through mergers and acquisitions which should be more capable of competing with existing large banks may have also contributed. This is in line with the empirical results found in Wong et al. (2006b) and Wong et al. (2007) which showed that banks in Hong Kong operated in a competitive fashion in the loan market during the period 1991–2005 without any significant sign of collusion on pricing.15 2. For cost efficiency, the estimated coefficient of CIE is found to be negative in the ROA regression and positive in the IRS regression. CIE is statistically significant at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent level in the ROA and IRS regressions respectively. This suggests that banks with a higher level of cost efficiency are able to improve their profits through optimizing the input mix to produce a given level of outputs, and to offer more favourable prices to customers. This empirical result is consistent with the X-efficiency hypothesis. 3. Since larger banks have been found to be more cost efficient than smaller banks,16 the above finding suggests that for the same product in the loan market, larger banks can offer lower prices to customers than smaller banks, yet attaining a similar or even higher level of profits. Therefore, to the extent that price competition squeezes interest margins and profits of banks, smaller banks are more likely than larger banks to find themselves operating with loss. This suggests that smaller banks are more vulnerable to intense price competition in the loan market. 4. For scale efficiency, the coefficient of SIE is found to be negative in the ROA regression but positive in the IRS regression. However, it is statistically significant only in the IRS regression. This suggests that while banks can offer more favourable prices to customers by optimizing
60 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Table 4.2 Estimation results of ROA and IRS Variable
ROA model (1)
IRS model (2)
Constant CONCt MSit CIEit SIEit LLossit DEPASSit CARit GDPt URt
0.0027 0.0046 0.0040 −0.0068** −0.0005 −0.0165* 0.0035 0.0015 0.0112** −0.0359**
−0.0004 −0.0346 −0.0088 0.0027* 0.0051* −0.0107 0.0127** −0.0025 0.0287* 0.0027
Adj. R-squared F-statistics
0.4573 33.2766
0.4143 24.8776
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
their production scale, the effect of scale efficiency on profits is not significant. 5. Credit quality of loan portfolios, as expected, is found to be one of the determinants of banks’ profitability. Banks with higher loan loss provisions to assets appear to earn lower levels of profits. A higher level of loan provisions suggests poorer credit quality of loan portfolios, which may call for higher operation costs relating to credit risk and loan loss management, such as credit approval control, foreclosing bad loans, debt recovery expenses, and other loan-restructuring expenses, leading to lower profits. On the other hand, the ratio of loan loss provisions to assets does not appear to be a significant determinant of loan prices. 6. DEPASS and CAR, which measure the risk attitude of banks, appear to be not significant determinants of banks’ profitability. However, DEPASS is found to be positively correlated with the IRS. This indicates that aggressive banks may be more likely to participate in markets with higher risks, where higher prices are charged. 7. With regard to macroeconomic factors, the real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate are found to be positively and negatively related to banks’ profitability respectively, and the real GDP growth rate is found to be positively related to the IRS of banks. This indicates
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 61
that under good economic environments banks are more capable of charging higher prices in the loan markets and earn higher profits.
4.6 Conclusion Empirical evidence finds that market structure, as measured by market concentration and the market shares of banks, is either not a significant determinant of banks’ performance or, to the extent that market consolidations in recent years have hampered competition thus enhancing banks’ profitability, that its adverse effect has been largely offset by regulatory liberalization and technological progress during the same period. The emergence through mergers and acquisitions of a number of larger banks which should be more capable of competing with existing large banks may have also contributed. This finding is consistent with the empirical results of our previous studies17 which showed that the banking sector in Hong Kong operated with a high degree of competition without any significant sign of collusive pricing. Nonetheless, with bank consolidation expected to continue, how market concentration may impact on competition in the years to come needs to be closely monitored. On the other hand, cost efficiency is found to be positively correlated with banks’ profitability and negatively correlated with loan prices. Banks with a higher level of cost efficiency appear to be able to enhance their profitability and offer more attractive prices to customers. This suggests that bank with a lower production cost may earn higher profits through optimizing the input mix to produce outputs. Since larger banks are found to be more cost efficient in general, as shown in Wong et al. (2006a), larger banks can offer their services at lower prices to compete with smaller banks, yet attaining a similar or even higher level of profits. To the extent that price competition squeezes interest margins and profits of banks, smaller banks are more likely than larger banks to incur loss. Smaller banks may, therefore, be more vulnerable to intense price competition in the loan market, particularly under an operating environment of cut-throat price wars.18 Empirical results also indicate that banks with a loan portfolio of lower credit quality earn less profits, probably due to higher operational costs relating to credit risk and loan loss management. Loan prices are observed to be sensitive to banks’ risk attitude. Aggressive banks may be more likely to participate in markets with higher risks, where higher spreads are charged. In addition, banks’ profitability and loan spreads are in general positively correlated with macroeconomic environments.
62 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
Appendix 4A Measures of scale inefficiency The measure of scale efficiencies indicates how the scale of banks with a particular level of production and management technology deviates from their optimal economies of scale.19 It is given by:
Si =
J ∂ ln Ci j=1
=
J j=1
∂ ln yji τj +
J J
γjl log yli +
j=1 l=1
K
ωjk log wki .
k=1
The variable Si is estimated for each of the banks at their respective output levels. Other notations can be referred to Wong et al. (2006a). Banks experience a constant return to scale when the estimate of Si is equal to one. If Si is less than one, banks are operating below their optimal scale levels and they could lower costs by increasing output further. On the other hand, while Si is greater than one, banks are required to downsize in order to achieve optimal input combinations. Both cases imply a degree of inefficiencies. A measure of scale inefficiency, SIE, is used in the actual regression: SIEi
=Si − 1 =1 − Si
if Si > 1 if Si < 1
(4A.1)
In such form, the smaller the SIE is, the closer the banks’ scale is to the optimal level.
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 63
Notes 1. The authors are grateful to Hans Genberg for his suggestions and comments. 2. For a detailed summary of the studies published on or before 1983, see Gilbert (1984). For studies published after 1983, see Smirlock et al. (1984, 1986), Smirlock (1985), Allen and Hagin (1989), Timme and Yang (1991) and Berger (1995), for example. 3. Using the panel set of retail banks in Hong Kong covering the period 1991– 2005, a regression of banks’ return on assets on their asset sizes shows that the two variables are positively related. 4. See Note 1. 5. See Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan (1991). 6. For example, see Demsetz (1973, 1974) and Peltzman (1977). 7. For estimation convenience, for the study of how cost efficiency and scale efficiency affect the performance of banks, the actual explanatory variables used in the regression analyses are cost inefficiency and scale inefficiency instead. This approach follows the specifications of Berger and Hannan (1993) and Goldberg and Rai (1996). 8. The total net assets are the total assets less provisions. 9. The SCP hypothesis suggests a positive sign for CONC in equations (4.1) and (4.2), as it asserts that banks in a concentrated market are more likely to engage in some form of noncompetitive behaviour which allows banks to set less favourable prices to customers and earn higher profits. The RMP hypothesis suggests a positive sign for MS in the two equations as it asserts that banks with larger market shares are able to exercise market power to earn higher profits. 10. The deregulation of interest rates in Hong Kong was undertaken in two phases. Phase 1 of the deregulation, which took place in July 2000, removed the interest rate cap on time deposits with a maturity less than seven days and also the prohibition on benefits for all deposits with the exception of Hong Kong dollar current and savings accounts. Phase 2 of the deregulation took place in July 2001 which removed all interest rate rules over current and savings accounts. 11. Interest-bearing funds are defined as the sum of deposits from customers, interbank borrowings, and the amount payable under repos and negotiable debt instruments issued and outstanding. 12. This includes, for example, cost relating to credit approval control, foreclosing bad loans, debt recovery expenses, and other loan-restructuring expenses. 13. Initially, there were a total of 45 banks in various periods covered by the study. After removing samples with missing information, 38 retail banks remained in the estimation. Note that the number of banks covered by the study varied in different periods. After the major mergers and acquisitions, the number fell from 38 during 2001 Q2 to 28 during 2005 Q4. 14. The correlation coefficient between CONC and DUM is around 0.95. 15. Despite that market consolidations in recent years have resulted in an increase in market concentration, which favours the development of collusions among banks. 16. See Wong et al. (2006a).
64 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong 17. See Wong et al. (2006b) and Wong et al. (2007). 18. For illustration, we select three larger banks and three smaller banks to calculate the impact of cost efficiency on profits and IRS. Based on the dataset used in this study, the average X-inefficients (XIEs) of the three larger banks and three smaller banks in 2005 Q4 were 0.066 and 0.190 respectively. Using the estimated coefficients in Table 4.2, the difference in XIEs of larger banks and smaller banks has caused an annualized ROA gap of 0.34 per cent, while the resulting gap on IRS is −0.13 per cent. In other words, ROA of larger banks in general is larger than that of smaller banks by 0.34 per cent, while their IRS is lower than that of smaller banks by 0.13 per cent due to the difference in their cost efficiency. The differences are considered significant, given that the average values of annualized ROA and IRS of all banks in the dataset are 1.44 per cent and 3.04 per cent respectively. 19. Detailed discussions of scale economies can be found in Murray and White (1983).
References R. F. Allen and A. S. Hagin, ‘Scale-Related Efficiencies as a (Minor) Source of the Profits–Market Share Relationship’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 71 (1989) 523–6. A. N. Berger, ‘The Profit–Structure Relationship in Banking – Tests of Market-power and Efficient-structure Hypothesis’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27 (1995) 404–31. A. N. Berger and T. H. Hannan, ‘The Price–Concentration Relationship in Banking’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 71 (1989) 291–9. A. N. Berger and T. H. Hannan, ‘Using Efficiency Measures to Distinguish among Alternative Explanations of the Structure–Performance Relationship in Banking’, Federal Reserve Board Working Paper, (1993). H. Demsetz, ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’, Journal of Law and Economics, 16 (1973) 1–19. H. Demsetz, ‘Two Systems of Beliefs about Monopoly’, in H. Goldschmid (ed.), Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, (Boston: Little Brown, 1974). R. A. Gilbert, ‘Studies of Bank Market Structure and Competition: A Review and Evaluation’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16 (1984) 617–44. L. G. Goldberg and A. Rai, ‘The Structure–Performance Relationship for European Banking’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 20 (1996) 745–71. T. H. Hannan, ‘Bank Commercial Loan Markets and the Role of Market Structure: Evidence form Surveys of Commercial Lending’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 15 (1991) 133–49. J. D. Murray and R. W. White, ‘Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope in Multiproduct Financial Institutions: A Study of British Columbia Credit Unions’, Journal of Finance, 38(3) (1983) 887–902. S. Peltzman, ‘The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration’, Journal of Law and Economics, 20 (1977) 229–63. M. Smirlock, ‘Evidence on the (Non) Relationship between Concentration and Profitability in Banking’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17 (1985) 69–83.
Wong, Fong, Wong and Choi 65 M. Smirlock, T. Gilligan and W. Marshall, ‘Tobin’s q and the Structure-Performance Relationship’, American Economic Review, 74 (1984) 1050–60. M. Smirlock, T. Gilligan and W. Marshall, ‘Tobin’s q and the Structure-Performance Relationship: Reply’, American Economic Review, 74 (1986) 1211–13. S. G. Timme and W. K. Yang, ‘On the Use of a Direct Measure of Efficiency in Testing Structure–Performance Relationships’, Working paper, (1991), Georgia State University. J. Wong, T. Fong, E. Wong and K. F. Choi, ‘The Cost Efficiency of Commercial Banks in Hong Kong’, HKMA Research Memorandum, 12/2006 (2006a). J. Wong, E. Wong, T. Fong and K. F. Choi, ‘Competition in Hong Kong’s Banking Sector: A Panzar-Rosse Assessment’, HKMA Research Memorandum, 16/2006 (2006b). J. Wong, E. Wong, T. Fong and K. F. Choi, ‘Testing for Collusion in the Hong Kong Banking Sector’, HKMA Research Memorandum, 03/2007.
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Part II Interest Rate and Default Risks in the Mortgage Market
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5 Interest Rate Risk in the Pricing of Banks’ Mortgage Lending1 Jim Wong, Laurence Kang-Por Fung, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Cho-Hoi Hui
5.1 Introduction Intensive competition among banks in Hong Kong has driven the effective mortgage interest rates down to a historic low of around 2.75 per cent below best lending rate (BLR) with cash rebates of 1 per cent of loan amounts in general since early December 2004.2 This, together with falling interest rates, has brought the average mortgage rate down gradually from over 11 per cent in early 1998 to just over 2 per cent in December 2004 (see Figure 5.1). One key reason why banks can offer such low rates is their extraordinarily low funding cost. The spread of BLR over 3-month Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) has been maintained at around 460 basis points (bps) since September 2003, as a result of the abundance of liquidity in the banking sector. At the same time, customers’ deposit rates have also been at very low levels. On average, the spreads of BLR over the average time deposit rate (TDR) and the effective deposit rate (EDR) have been about 500 bps.3 The keen competition and high liquidity have benefited home mortgage borrowers. However, given the long repayment period of mortgages, for loans priced on the currently very low funding cost, there are risks of a reduction on the interest rate margin in the time ahead and over their mortgage life. These risks could arise from the following two sources: 1. Historically, the average BLR – HIBOR spread narrows during periods of increasing interest rates. Looking forward, therefore, as US interest rates continue to move upwards, spreads are expected to decline, other things being equal. 2. The currently very loose monetary conditions are not expected to be permanent. The HIBOR will eventually return to a level close 69
70 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong % p.a. 12
Weighted average mortgage rate Average BLR Average TDR
10 8 6 4 2 0 Jan-97 Figure 5.1
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Average mortgage rate and BLR
Sources: CEIC and HKMA staff estimates.
to US dollar interbank rates, from its current level of a substantial discount. When this happens, the BLR – HIBOR spread will revert back to the more normal level.4 It is even possible that the spread could become smaller than the normal level during the lifetime of the current mortgage pool. Banks are thus faced with interest rate risk, and in this case the basis risk in particular, which could affect banks’ net interest margin through changes in the spread between rates earned (the mortgage rate) and rates paid (the HIBOR or deposit rates).5 Given that mortgage lending represents a significant component of bank assets, how banks are affected by the interest rate risk is therefore an issue of interest.6 This study looks at the historical BLR – HIBOR spread and its behaviour during different phases of an interest rate cycle, as well as the movement of the risk premium of Hong Kong interest rates over US rates, and illustrates how the above risks may affect the interest rate margin of banks’ current mortgage portfolio. A distinction is made between mortgage loans that are funded on the interbank market and those that are funded by customers’ deposits. Using estimates of a cointegration and error correction model, the study also attempts to quantify the impact, by simulating different scenarios of interest rate upswing and risk premium reversal. It is found that loans priced on the basis of the current low funding cost could face a tangible reduction in their interest rate margin.
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 71 Spread (bps) 600
BLR (% p.a.) 12
500
10
400
8
300
6
200
4
100
2
0 100
0 BLR - HIBOR (LHS) BLR - EDR (LHS) BLR (RHS)
200 Jan-89 Jan-91 Jan-93 Jan-95 Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Figure 5.2
2 4
Interest spreads and BLR
Sources: CEIC and HKMA staff estimates.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 examines the narrowing of interest margin during the tightening phase of an interest rate cycle. Section 5.2 discusses the possible shift in the risk premium. Section 5.3 assesses the potential reductions in the interest margin under different scenarios, based on the estimation results of an error correction model. Conclusions are provided in the final section.
5.2 Narrowing of spread during the tightening phase of interest rate cycle The average BLR – HIBOR spread in the past 16 years (January 1989 to December 2004) is 300 bps. For the easing phases of the interest rate cycles during the period, the average spread was 310 bps. In contrast, in the tightening phases of the cycles, the average spread was much tighter at 250 bps (Figure 5.2).7,8 One often-cited reason for the narrowing of spread during the rate tightening phase is that Hong Kong’s market rates tend to incorporate expected BLR increases ahead of actual BLR adjustments. This is because HIBOR is very responsive to changes in US market rates, while BLR normally only adjusts when there is a change in the US Federal funds target rate or when pressures from changes in cost of funds are built up to a certain level.9
72 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong % p.a. 14 HIBOR LIBOR
12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Jan-89
Jan-91
Figure 5.3
Jan-93
Jan-95
Jan-97
Jan-99
Jan-01
Jan-03
Movements of 3-month HIBOR and 3-month LIBOR
Source: CEIC.
To examine the hypothesis that Hong Kong’s market rates move ahead of BLR, joint tests of cross-correlations and Granger causality test are conducted. Details of the tests are presented and discussed in Annex 5B. The results confirm that the observed narrowing of spread during the tightening phase of the interest rate cycle was due partly to the lead-lag relationship between HIBOR and BLR in their response to US interest rate adjustments. A graphical illustration of the lead-lag relationship and the narrowing of the spread is given in Annex 5C.
5.3 Shift in risk premium Under the Currency Board system, interest rates in Hong Kong have to track their US counterparts closely. Short-term deviations in interest rates reflect the risk premium of Hong Kong dollar over the US dollar. Since June 2003, HIBOR has been at a consistent discount relative to LIBOR (Figure 5.3), averaging 94 bps from June 2003 to December 2004, and 200 bps in the past two months.10 However, the current difference is not expected to be permanent. HIBOR will eventually return to a level close to interbank rates of the US dollar. To illustrate the potential size of the HIBOR – LIBOR differential, a longterm mean level is established by taking the average of the differential
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 73 bps 700 (F)
600 500 400 300 200
95% confidence band
Historical mean
(C) (A) (B)
100
(D)
(E)
(G)
0 100 (H)
200 300 Jan-89 Figure 5.4
Jan-91
Jan-93
Jan-95
Jan-97
Jan-99
Jan-01
(I)
Jan-03
Risk premium
Notes: Historical mean and the confidence band are calculated by excluding observations during the Asian financial crisis and the ‘double-market play’ episode. Some of the fluctuations of the risk premium over the period appear to have roughly matched the following events: (A) June 4 event, 1989. (B) Interest rate hikes by a total of 100 bps in April 1990. (C) Closure of BCC (HK) in June 1991. (D) ERM turmoil in the fourth quarter of 1992. (E) Mexican currency crisis in January 1995. (F) The Asian financial crisis and the ’double-market play’ episode between July 1997 and September 1998. (G) Tension over the Taiwan Strait in 1999. (H) Strong demand for Hong Kong dollar assets in the second half of 2000, as the US economy began to show signs of slowing down. (I) Increased inflows of funds from the fourth quarter of 2003 onwards, triggered by US dollar weakness and increased pressures on a renminbi appreciation. Sources: CEIC and HKMA staff estimates.
over the past 16 years.11 This mean level is estimated to be near zero (negative 1.4 bps) with a standard deviation of 56 bps. At 95 per cent confidence level, the upper bound of the risk premium is at +109 bps and the lower bound is at −112 bps. This 95 per cent confidence band provides a simple illustration of the historical dispersion of the risk premium (Figure 5.4). The analysis shows that if the risk premium shifts to its historical mean level, HIBOR could rise significantly from its current level (by more than 200 bps), even if US market interest rates remain unchanged.
74 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Reflects movements of US money market rates and expectations of changes in Federal funds target rate BLR
LIBOR
HIBOR
Risk premium (HIBOR – LIBOR)
TDR (or EDR)
Reflects the speculative pressure on the HK dollar, as well as liquidity and credit risk Decomposition Influence Explanations Figure 5.5
Flow of influence
5.4 Potential reduction in interest rate margins12 In order to assess the potential impact on interest margins of banks’ existing mortgage portfolio of: (i) the narrowing of spread during the current tightening phase of the US interest rate cycle; and (ii) a possible reversal of the risk premium, we make use of estimated error correction models.13 In the models, the two sources of influence are examined separately by decomposing the HIBOR as follows:14 HIBOR = LIBOR + risk premium The flow of the two sources of influence is illustrated in Figure 5.5. While these two influences will have one-to-one effects on changes in HIBOR through the above identity, the transmission of the effect to the BLR, the TDR and the EDR can be estimated by the models. In turn, the impact on the interest rate margin of banks’ current mortgage loan portfolio can be assessed by comparing the difference between the response of HIBOR and BLR to these two influences for HIBOR-financed loans, and between the response of TDR (or EDR) and BLR for loans financed by customers’ deposits.15,16
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 75
5.4.1 Model specification and estimation results Three models (A, B and C) are established for the assessment. Model A examines how BLR may move in response to changes in LIBOR (representing changes in US interest rates) and risk premium, while Models B and C capture the relationships between TDR or EDR, respectively, and changes in LIBOR and risk premium. The model specifications are given in Annex 5E. They are constructed so as to facilitate the identification of long-term co-movements and short-term deviations as well as their interactions.17 The models are estimated using data from January 1989 to January 2005. The estimation results are summarized and discussed in Annex 5E. The main findings are as follows: 1. A 100 bps increase in LIBOR would result in a 42 bps increase in BLR in the short run, while a 100 bps rise in risk premium would increase BLR by 29 bps. In the long run, a 100 bps rise in HIBOR, arising either from changes in LIBOR or risk premium, would increase BLR by 74 bps. 2. A 100 bps increase in LIBOR would result in a 59 bps increase in TDR (or a 52 bps increase in EDR) in the short run, while a 100 bps rise in risk premium would increase TDR by 61 bps (or by 49 bps in EDR). In the long run, a 100 bps increase in HIBOR (either from changes in LIBOR or in risk premium) would increase TDR by 91 bps and EDR by 81 bps. 3. The fact that (i) the responses of BLR to HIBOR, LIBOR and risk premium are less than unity (as against the unity response of HIBOR to LIBOR and risk premium); and (ii) the response of TDR and EDR to a rise in LIBOR and risk premium is greater than the response of BLR underlies the risk of a possible reduction in the interest rate margin of banks’ existing mortgage loan portfolio. As a result, the BLR – HIBOR, BLR – TDR and BLR – EDR margins will narrow on a rise in LIBOR and a risk premium reversal.18,19 4. The possible reduction on interest margin would be less severe for deposits-financed loans than HIBOR-financed loans, as the former’s funding cost would increase less than the latter’s, given that TDR and EDR would rise not as much as HIBOR.
5.4.2 How interest margins of banks may be affected To illustrate how the estimated response arising from a rise of US interest rates and shifts in risk premium may translate into possible effects on banks’ interest rate margins, we consider the following three scenarios where the LIBOR and Federal funds target rate increase by 120 bps over a
76 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Table 5.1 Potential reduction of mortgage spreads (with an increase of 120 bps in US interest rates) Scenario of risk premium level (i) Current (ii) Historical (iii) Upper bound mean of two-standard deviations over mean (−197 bps) (−1 bps) (109 bps) Short-term effect (bps) BLR HIBOR TDR EDR
+51 +120 +71 +63
+119 +355 +213 +178
+158 +488 +293 +243
Long-term effect (bps) BLR HIBOR TDR EDR
+89 +120 +109 +97
+263 +355 +324 +288
+361 +488 +445 +396
Total cumulative effect in one year (bps) BLR +46 HIBOR +120 TDR +93 EDR +70
+148 +316 +240 +195
+205 +426 +322 +265
−74 −47 −24
−168 −92 −47
−221 −117 −60
Interest Margin (BLR – HIBOR) Interest Margin (BLR – TDR) Interest Margin (BLR – EDR)
Notes: For interpretation of the impact, please see Notes 22 and 24. ‘−ve’ numbers indicate decreases while ‘+ve’ numbers indicate increases. The short-term effect reflects the response of the dependent variable in the immediate month, while the long-term effect measures average changes in the dependent variable over the study period.
12-month period20 and the risk premium (i) stays at the current level (at −197 bps), (ii) moves to its historical mean level (at about −1 bps), and (iii) moves to two-standard deviations above its mean level (at 109 bps).21 The short-term and long-term impacts on the interest margin as well as the cumulative effect over a 12-month period are presented in Table 5.1.22 The simulations of the above three scenarios show that: 1. If we assume an adjustment of 120 bps in LIBOR and the Federal funds target rate, and no change in risk premium, the cumulative effect in a year’s time on the spread of BLR over HIBOR is estimated at −74 bps.23 The cumulative effect by the final month of the simulation period on
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 77
the spread of BLR over TDR will be −47 bps, while that for BLR over EDR will be milder at −24 bps.24 2. If the risk premium reverts to its historical mean level (from the current level of −197 bps to −1 bps), the combined impact of an increase of 120 bps in US interest rates and the risk premium reversal would be much larger. The spread of BLR over HIBOR would be reduced by a cumulative 168 bps in 12 months’ time, while the spreads of BLR over TDR, and of BLR over EDR, would narrow by 92 bps and 47 bps respectively. 3. In a drastic scenario that the risk premium shifts to the upper bound of the two-standard deviation level (from −197 bps to 109 bps), the spread would be under significant pressure.25 The spreads of BLR over HIBOR, and that of BLR over TDR and over EDR, are expected to narrow by a cumulative 221 bps, 117 bps and 60 bps respectively in 12 months’ time.
5.4.3 Impact on net interest margin of currently priced loans and banks’ overall mortgage portfolio Table 5.2 presents the simulation results of the impact on net interest margin of currently priced loans and the overall mortgage portfolio. With mortgage loans currently priced at about BLR −3 per cent,26 HIBOR, TDR and EDR at 0.70 per cent, 0.07 per cent and 0.03 per cent respectively, the gross interest margin for loans financed with interbank funds is about 1.30 per cent, while for loans financed with TDR and EDR, it is 1.63 per cent and 1.67 per cent respectively, including the acquiring cost of deposits. In this study, the gross mortgage margin is derived as the mortgage rate less the funding cost. The funding cost includes the interest cost and the acquiring cost. The interest cost for HIBOR-financed loans is HIBOR, while that for deposits-financed loans is correspondingly TDR or EDR. The acquiring cost is defined as the cost for acquiring deposits. This cost is small for HIBOR-financed loans but quite substantial for depositsfinanced loans, since maintaining a retail deposit base requires a bank to operate a large branch network. Specifically, the acquiring cost for HIBOR-financed loans is assumed to be zero, while for deposits-financed loans it is conservatively estimated to be 30 bps, as discussed in detail in Note 27. Taking into account the operating cost for mortgage lending and credit cost, the net interest margins for loans financed by HIBOR, TDR and EDR are estimated at 90 bps, 123 bps and 127 bps respectively.27,28 Under the scenario where US interest rates rise by 120 bps and the risk premium reverses back to its historical mean level, such mortgage loans
78 Table 5.2 Simulated impact on net interest margin of currently priced loans and banks’ overall mortgage portfolio (with an increase of 120 bps in US interest rates) Scenario of risk premium level (i) Current
(ii) Historical mean
(−197 bps)
(−1 bps)
(A) Impact on net interest margin of currently priced loans HIBOR-financed loans (bps) Mortgage Pricing 200 200 Funding Cost −70 −70 Current Gross Mortgage Margin 130 130 Operating Cost −30 −30 Credit Cost −10 −10 Current Net Mortgage Margin 90 90 Estimated Reduction of −74 −168 Mortgage Margin Simulated Net Mortgage Margin After Impact 16 −78 TDR-financed loans (bps) Mortgage Pricing − currently priced Funding Cost Current Gross Mortgage Margin Operating Cost Credit Cost Current Net Mortgage Margin Estimated Reduction of Mortgage Margin Simulated Net Mortgage Margin After Impact EDR-financed loans (bps) Mortgage Pricing Funding Cost Current Gross Mortgage Margin Operating Cost Credit Cost Current Net Mortgage Margin Estimated Reduction of Mortgage Margin Simulated Net Mortgage Margin After Impact
(iii) Upper bound of two-standard deviations over mean (109 bps)
200 −70 130 −30 −10 90 −221
−131
200
200
200
−37 163 −30 −10 123 −47
−37 163 −30 −10 123 −92
−37 163 −30 −10 123 −117
76
31
6
200 −33 167 −30 −10 127 −24
200 −33 167 −30 −10 127 −47
200 −33 167 −30 −10 127 −60
103
80
67 (Continued)
79 Table 5.2 (Continued) Scenario of risk premium level (i) Current
(ii) Historical mean
(−197 bps)
(−1 bps)
(iii) Upper bound of two-standard deviations over mean (109 bps)
(B) Impact on net interest margin of banks’ overall mortgage portfolio HIBOR-financed loans (bps) Mortgage Pricing 260 260 260 Current Gross Mortgage Margin 190 190 190 Current Net Mortgage Margin 150 150 150 Estimated Reduction of −74 −168 −221 Mortgage Margin Simulated Net Mortgage Margin After Impact 76 −18 −71 TDR-financed loans (bps) Mortgage Pricing Current Gross Mortgage Margin Current Net Mortgage Margin Estimated Reduction of Mortgage Margin Simulated Net Mortgage Margin After Impact EDR-financed loans (bps) Mortgage Pricing Current Gross Mortgage Margin Current Net Mortgage Margin Estimated Reduction of Mortgage Margin Simulated Net Mortgage Margin After Impact
260 223 183 −47
260 223 183 −92
260 223 183 −117
136
91
66
260 227 187 −24
260 227 187 −47
260 227 187 −60
163
140
127
Notes: The mortgage pricing conservatively estimated in this section includes cash rebates of around 1% of the loan amounts and assumed a full amortization period of three years. In this section the assessment covers only the first year but it is worth noting that by the fourth year the effective mortgage pricing will become BLR − 2.75% when the cash rebates are fully amortized. See section 5.4.3 for a discussion of the funding cost which consists of interest cost and acquiring cost, and notes 27 and 28 for the operating cost and the credit cost respectively. The same funding cost, operating cost and credit cost are applied to estimations of the net mortgage margin of currently priced loans as well as banks’ overall mortgage portfolios. For interpretation of the results, please see Notes 22 and 24.
80 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
financed purely with interbank placements (and any new loans made with similar pricing) would become loss-making assets of banks. The simulation results show that net mortgage margin for these loans by the end of the simulation period (January 2006) could fall to −78 bps. The loss would be significant if the risk premium shifts towards its upper bound of historical two-standard deviations range – net mortgage margin would drop to −131 bps by January 2006. For loans financed by a mix of customers’ deposits, the impact would also be tangible, but the net mortgage margin should remain positive. It is noted that banks active in Hong Kong in the residential mortgage business generally have a sizeable customers’ deposit base. For the banks’ existing overall mortgage portfolio, the average mortgage pricing is estimated to be roughly BLR minus 2.4 per cent.29 As there remains in their books a large portion of loans made earlier with less aggressive pricing, banks would have a larger buffer to absorb the possible reduction in the mortgage margin. Taking into account the deposit-acquiring cost, operating cost and credit cost, the net mortgage margin of HIBOR-financed loans would be reduced to negative 18 bps in 12 months’ time, if US interest rates rise by 120 bps and the risk premium reverses back to its mean level. Under the drastic scenario that the risk premium shifts to the upper bound of two-standard deviations above its historical mean, when the effect filters through, the net mortgage margin would be reduced to negative 71 bps by January 2006. For depositsfinanced loans, their loan portfolios would remain profitable under the three scenarios, although their net mortgage margin would be materially curtailed. The impact would be less significant for EDR-financed loans than for TDR-financed loans. Note that the above analysis simulates the cases of entirely HIBOR and deposits-financed loans. How the margin of the mortgage portfolio of individual banks may be affected depends to a considerable extent on their funding compositions and their actual operating and credit costs, with banks more reliant on interbank fundings estimated to be more adversely impacted. Compared to large retail banks which have substantial demand and savings deposits in their customers’ deposit base, banks with a larger share of time deposits, which are more HIBOR related, could be more adversely affected.
5.5 Conclusion With US interest rates in the tightening phase of the interest rate cycle, and given the long repayment period of mortgages, there are risks of a
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 81
reduction on the interest rate margin for mortgage loans made under the prevailing monetary conditions, in the time ahead and over their mortgage life. Such risks could arise from an expected narrowing of BLR – HIBOR, BLR – TDR and BLR – EDR spreads and a reversal of the risk premium of Hong Kong dollar against the US dollar to a more neutral level. As suggested by simulation results derived under the assumption of a further rise in US interest rates and different scenarios of risk premium reversal, the mortgage portfolio of banks priced on the currently very low funding cost could face a reduction in their interest rate margin. Under the scenario that the risk premium reverses to its mean level, loans financed purely with interbank placements may become loss-making assets of banks. It is noted that banks active in Hong Kong in the residential mortgage business generally have a sizeable customers’ deposit base. Nevertheless, banks should take into account such interest rate risk in the pricing and management of their mortgage portfolios.30
82 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
Annex 5A Effective mortgage rates A brief survey of selected retail banks on 15 January 2005 shows that they were offering cash rebate ranging from 0.7 per cent to 1.4 per cent of the mortgage amount. Taking into account this cash rebate and assuming a full amortization period of three years, the effective mortgage rate is conservatively estimated at around BLR – 3 per cent. Note that by the fourth year of the loans, when the cash rebates are fully amortized, the effective mortgage pricing will become BLR – 2.75 per cent. On 28 February 2005, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued a circular to all Authorized Institutions (AIs) reminding them of the need to monitor carefully the risks associated with residential mortgage lending including setting out the treatment of cash rebates and interest/repayment holidays within the context of the 70 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio guideline. The term ‘cash rebates’ applies to lump sum payments, payments by instalments, and interest or repayment holidays offered to borrowers. The circular states that: • if a cash rebate is in excess of 1 per cent of the loan amount of a
residential mortgage, it should be treated as part of the loan amount for calculating the LTV ratio; • if a cash rebate is not in excess of 1 per cent of the residential mortgage, there is no need for it to be counted as part of the loan amount. However, disbursement of the cash rebate should be made only after completion of the purchase of the property in question; and • for residential mortgage schemes involving cash rebate subsidy offered by property developers, the lower of the discounted price or the valuation of the property should be used as the basis for calculating the LTV ratio. AIs should ensure that adequate disclosure regarding such schemes has been made to the borrowers in conformity with the spirit and objectives of the Code of Banking Practice.
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 83
Annex 5B Tests of lead-lag relationship between LIBOR and BLR To examine such a hypothesis that Hong Kong’s market rates move ahead of BLR, joint tests of cross-correlations and Granger causality test are conducted. In order to perform the assessment, HIBOR is decomposed into US market interest rates (LIBOR) and the spread of HIBOR over LIBOR, with the latter reflecting the risk premium of the Hong Kong dollar against the US dollar, which is determined by speculative pressures on the currency, as well as liquidity and credit risk. The influence of risk premium is controlled and the tests are conducted on BLR and LIBOR. As shown in Table 5B.1, the test result of cross-correlations shows that past adjustments of LIBOR has predictive ability for current changes in BLR, while that of Granger causality also accepts that changes in LIBOR Granger cause changes in BLR. These findings confirm that the observed narrowing of spread during the tightening phase of interest rate cycle has been partly due to the lead-lag relationship between HIBOR and BLR in their response to US interest rate adjustments.
Table 5B.1
Tests of lead-lag relationship between LIBOR and BLR
Joint test of cross-correlations1 Null hypothesis: BLRt−k does not predict LIBORt LIBORt−k does not predict BLRt
Test statistic 22.60 73.31*
Pairwise Granger Causality test2 Null hypothesis: BLR does not Granger cause LIBOR LIBOR does not Granger cause BLR
1.48 5.69*
Notes: 1. Joint tests with up to 12 lags of cross-correlations are considered. The test statistic follows asymptotically a χ2 distribution with 12 degrees of freedom. 2. Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis are reported. The test is based on the past 12 lags of observations. * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
84 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
Annex 5C Graphical illustration of the narrowing of interest spread between BLR and HIBOR during the tightening phase of an interest rate cycle Figure 5C.1 illustrates the narrowing of interest spread between BLR and HIBOR during the tightening phase of an interest rate cycle. During the easing cycle of US interest rates (when interest rates move from point A to point B), the HIBOR falls ahead of BLR and the average interest spread between the two interest rates is represented by Area X. During the up cycle of US interest rates (when interest rates move from point B to point C), the average interest spread is represented by Area Y. Area Y is smaller than Area X.
% p.a.
C1
A1
A2
C2
Area X Area Y B1
BLR HIBOR
B2
A
B Easing phase
Time
C Tightening phase
US interest rate cycle Figure 5C.1
Illustration of interest spread narrowing
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 85
Annex 5D
Cointegration and error correction model
Consider a vector of n time series, Yt = (y1t , y2t , . . . , ynt )T , all of which are integrated of order one, such that their first differences (Yt , or Yt − Yt−1 ) are stationary. If there exists at least one linear combination of these time series such that the residuals exhibit a stationary pattern, they are said to be cointegrated. The error correction mechanism allows short-term deviations from the long-term equilibrium and measures the rate of correction. Thus, the whole model provides a more general form to describe the co-movement of several nonstationary time series. The general representation of the model is as follows: Yt = μ + αβYt−1 +
K
φi Yt−i + εt .
(5D.1)
i=1
Equation (5D.1) is the error correction representation of the evolution of the variables in Y. The term βYt−1 captures the long-run relationship between them and α measures the speed with which deviations from long-run equilibrium are eliminated. The lags of Y are included to capture the short-run interactions between the variables. A full description of the cointegration and error correction framework can be found in Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991). Some recent empirical applications of the model to interest rates can be found in Scholnick (1996, 1999) which focus on bivariate variables of Yt in the error correction form.
86 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
Annex 5E
Model specification and estimation results
In order to assess the potential impact on the interest margin of banks’ existing mortgage portfolio of (i) the narrowing of the spread during the current tightening phase of US interest rate cycle and (ii) a possible reversal of the risk premium, an error correction model is specified. Three models (A, B and C) are considered. Model A is specified with the BLR as the dependent variable, while Model B is specified with the TDR and Model C with the EDR as the dependent variable respectively. They both have LIBOR and risk premium as independent variables in the short-run and long-run equations. A restriction is imposed on the longrun equations to require the coefficients for the variables LIBOR and risk premium to be the same. This is because the long-run response of local retail interest rates to changes in market rates should be similar regardless of whether such changes are arising from movements in LIBOR or in risk premium.31 Past M lags of the changes in BLR, TDR and EDR are included in the models to control for serial correlations among observations.32 In addition, dummy variables are introduced to control for the effect of the Asian financial crisis. This model specification can facilitate the identification of short-term deviations and long-term co-movements as well as their interactions. Specifically, the error correction models for BLR (Model A), TDR (Model B) and EDR (Model C) are as follows:
Model A BLRt = α0 + α1 RAt−1 + φ1 LIBORt + φ2 premt + φ3 DSt +
M
ϕj BLRt−j + et
j=1
(5E.1) with RAt = BLRt − β1 LIBORt − β1 premt
(5E.2)
Model B TDRt = α0 +α1 RBt−1 +φ1 LIBORt +φ2 premt +φ3 DSt +
M
ϕk TDRt−k + et
k=1
(5E.3) with RBt = TDRt − β2 LIBORt − β2 premt
(5E.4)
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 87 Table 5E.1 ADF unit root test results Variable
BLR TDR EDR HIBOR 95% Critical values
Level No trend
Trend
−1.84 −1.13 −1.11 −1.61 −2.88
−2.04 −1.75 −1.62 −1.98 −3.43
First difference −7.03* −10.76* −10.35* −4.63* −2.88
Notes: * denotes significant at the 5% level. The unit root test is conducted with lags of up to 12.
Table 5E.2 ADF unit root test on long-run equilibrium Null hypothesis: Residuals have a unit root
Level No trend
Cointegrated variable BLR, HIBOR (LIBOR + prem) TDR, HIBOR (LIBOR + prem) EDR, HIBOR (LIBOR + prem) 95% Critical values
−4.01* −3.94* −4.92* −3.78
Notes: *denotes significance at the 5% level. Critical values are provided in Engle and Yoo (1987).
Model C EDRt = α0 +α1 RCt−1 +φ1 LIBORt + φ2 premt +φ3 DSt +
M
ϕl EDRt−l + et
l=1
(5E.5) with RCt = EDRt − β3 LIBORt − β3 premt
(5E.6)
where premt is the risk premium at time t, DSt is a dummy variable controlling for the dramatic behaviour of interest rates during the Asian financial crisis, RAt , RBt and RCt are variables for the long-run equilibrium, and is the difference operator.33 Monthly data from January 1989 to January 2005, taken from CEIC, are used for the empirical studies. Results of the tests of nonstationarity and cointegration support that the movements of BLR, TDR and EDR have equilibrium relationships with HIBOR (LIBOR + risk premium) in the long run. The test results are summarized in Tables 5E.1 and 5E.2.
88 Table 5E.3 Estimation results of Models A, B and C35 Variable
Coefficient
t-statistic
p-value
0.47* −0.11* 0.42* 0.29* 0.18 0.07*
4.54 −4.75 5.67 3.34 1.65 2.74
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01
0.74* 0.74*
15.40 15.40
0.00 0.00
−0.06 −0.09* 0.59* 0.61* 0.14* 0.43*
−1.80 −3.30 7.14 7.29 2.15 8.24
0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
0.91* 0.91*
14.22 14.22
0.00 0.00
−0.06* −0.08* 0.52* 0.49* 0.15* 0.34*
−2.02 −3.20 7.67 7.35 2.08 8.30
0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Model A: BLR Short run (1) Constant RAt−1 LIBORt premt BLRt−1 DSt Long run (2) LIBOR prem Adj. R-squared Q(6) Q(12) DW
0.50 6.89 11.41 2.17
Model B: TDR Short run (3) Constant RBt−1 LIBORt premt TDRt−1 DSt Long run (4) LIBOR prem Adj. R-squared Q(6) Q(12) DW Model C: EDR Short run (5) Constant RCt−1 LIBORt premt EDRt−1 DSt
0.71 11.90 14.88 2.34
(Continued)
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 89 Table 5E.3 (Continued) Variable
Coefficient
Long run (6) LIBOR prem Adj. R-squared Q(6) Q(12) DW
0.81* 0.81*
t-statistic
p-value
13.38 13.38
0.00 0.00
0.72 15.77* 18.07 2.37
Notes: *denotes significance at the 5% level. DW indicates the Durbin-Watson test statistic. Q(k) is the Ljung-Box test statistic up to lag k. It asymptotically follows the χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, which is denoted by χ2 (k). The critical values for χ2 (6) and χ2 (12) at the 5% level are 12.59 and 21.03 respectively. The short-run effect reflects the response of the dependent variable in the immediate month, while the long-run effect measures average changes in the dependent variable over the study period.
Estimation results of equations (5E.1) to (5E.6) are summarized in Table 5E.3, and discussed in section 5.4.1. All estimated coefficients, except the constant term in equation (5E.3) and the previous change of BLR in equation (5E.1), are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and have an expected sign. The significance of the coefficients for RAt−1 , RBt−1 and RCt−1 implies that the cointegration and error correction models are appropriate to describe BLR, TDR and EDR.34 Diagnostic tests for all three models, including the Durbin-Watson test and the Ljung-Box test, suggest that they are adequately specified without significant serial correlations. Given that all estimated coefficients for LIBOR are less than unity in Model A and changes in LIBOR have one-to-one effects on changes in HIBOR, the interest rate margin between BLR and HIBOR will respond asymmetrically to a tightening and a easing of US interest rates (Note that the asymmetry discussed in this chapter refers to the difference between the responses of interest rate margin to an increase and a decline in US interest rates and does not refer to the difference in the estimated coefficients.) Based on the estimation results, an increase of 100 bps in LIBOR will increase BLR by 42 bps and HIBOR by 100 bps. The difference in the rates of change narrows the spread by 58 bps at the end of the projection period, that is, the interest rate margin will decrease. On the other hand, when LIBOR decreases by 100 bps, BLR and HIBOR will fall by 42 bps and 100 bps respectively. The change will widen the spread by 58 bps at the end of projection period. Thus, the slower response rate of BLR compared with that of HIBOR will give rise to an asymmetric
90 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
performance in interest rate margins during the tightening and easing phases of an interest rate cycle. The asymmetric responses to different phases of an interest rate cycle are also observed in the interest rate margins of BLR – TDR and BLR – EDR. Since all estimated coefficients for LIBOR in Models B and C are larger than those in Model A, the response of BLR to LIBOR will be slower than that of TDR and EDR. Similar to the interest rate margin of BLR – HIBOR, the margins of BLR – TDR and BLR – EDR therefore behave asymmetrically to a easing or a tightening of US interest rates.
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 91
Notes 1. The analysis of this chapter covers the market situation up to January 2005, and uses data up to that month. Since then the market situation has changed, with banks raising their effective mortgage rates, along with the narrowing of risk premium of Hong Kong dollar over the US dollar to a more normal level. 2. In Hong Kong, mortgage rates are set by individual banks. The majority of mortgage loans are adjustable-rate mortgages and the rate is commonly referenced to BLR with a mark-up, which account for about 96 per cent of new loans approved. The average mortgage rate has come down from around BLR plus 1 per cent in mid-1998 to around BLR minus 2.75 per cent since early December 2004. Taking into account also the cash rebate and other benefits offered by banks, the mortgage rate is estimated conservatively at around BLR minus 3 per cent, assuming a full amortization period of three years for the cash rebates. Note that the effective mortgage pricing will become BLR – 2.75 per cent by the fourth year of the loans when the cash rebates are fully amortized (see Annex 5A). 3. This refers to interest rates that banks offer to non-bank customer deposits. The TDR is the average rate of time deposits weighted by different maturity composition. The EDR is the average interest rates on demand, savings and time deposits weighted by the deposit composition of the entire banking sector. 4. A normal level in this study refers to a BLR – HIBOR spread in a situation where HIBOR is close to the corresponding interbank interest rate of the US dollar. 5. The HIBOR, which is the wholesale money market rate, normally represents the interest cost for wholesale and foreign banks. On the other hand, for banks that have large retail deposit base, their interest cost is dominated by the interests paid on customers’ deposits. It should, however, be noted as far as total funding cost is concerned, while the interest rates of customers’ deposits are usually lower than HIBOR, a significant acquiring cost, as part of the funding cost, is required to obtain customers’ deposits. See Note 27 for a detailed discussion. 6. As at end-November 2004, mortgage loans accounted for 29 per cent of total loans and advances for use in Hong Kong. 7. The spreads discussed in this section exclude those occurred during the Asian financial crisis and the ‘double-market play’ episode (from October 1997 to September 1998). 8. The average spread of 250 bps during the tightening phases of the interest rate cycles is statistically smaller than the average spread of 310 bps during the easing phases at 5 per cent significance level. 9. Such as in the cases of October and November 1997. BLR was raised twice due to changes in cost of funds, in particular increases in HIBOR, when the US Federal funds rate was unchanged. 10. LIBOR stands for London Interbank Offered Rate, which is the interest rate on US dollar-denominated deposits (also known as the Eurodollars) traded between banks in London. LIBOR is widely used as a proxy for US market interest rates.
92 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong 11. The average is calculated by excluding the risk premium during the Asian financial crisis and the ‘double-market play’ episode. 12. In this study, the assessment focuses on the potential reduction in interest rate margins in the future period (that is when US interest rates continue to rise or there is a reversal of risk premium). The issue of intertemporal maximization (of the current period and the future period) is not examined. In addition, it is assumed that, given the highly competitive environment and consumer protection, banks will not be able to unilaterally change the current interest rate structure of fixing mortgage rates in relation to BLR or HIBOR for the existing loan portfolio, or to set BLR significantly different from market BLR rates. They will also refrain from charging different BLRs for new and existing loans. 13. See Annex 5D for a discussion of the cointegration and error correction model. 14. This follows the analysis of Peng et al. (2003) in which they examine how different sources of change in interbank interest rates impact on the banking sector’s profitability, as well as lending and deposit rates. 15. In this study, to simplify the analysis, we classify mortgage loans into three groups: HIBOR-financed loans, time deposits-financed loans, and loans financed by a mix of customers’ deposits weighted by their relative shares (the interest cost of which is proxied by EDR). We further assume that the former group of loans is entirely funded by interbank borrowings while the latter two groups by the respective types of customers’ deposits. 16. Savings deposit rate is generally adjusted along with the BLR by similar magnitudes. However, as time deposit rates are influenced by the movement of HIBOR, the spread of EDR over BLR varies overtime. 17. The short-run effect reflects the response of the dependent variable in the immediate month, while the long-run effect measures average changes in the dependent variable over the study period. 18. As discussed in section 5.1, the less than unity response of BLR to LIBOR and risk premium reflects the current practice of banks in setting BLR and deposit rates – BLR normally only adjusts when there is a change in the US Federal funds target rate or when pressures from changes in cost of funds are built up to a certain level. As a result, the transmission of changes in HIBOR (either arising from changes in LIBOR or from risk premium) to BLR is on average less than one. 19. The greater response of TDR and EDR to changes in LIBOR and risk premium (that is to HIBOR) than BLR reflects the fact that, while interest rates on savings deposits have a similar feedback as BLR to changes in LIBOR and risk premium, interest rates on time deposits are more sensitive than BLR to changes in HIBOR. 20. According to the Federal funds futures traded at the Chicago Board of Trade, the market has priced in a further rise of interest rates of 120 bps by December 2005. 21. See section 5.2 for a discussion on risk premium. 22. Note that by assuming that the rates of changes in LIBOR and risk premium are gradual and constant throughout the period, the cumulative impact presented in this study refers to the estimated changes between the projected situation in the final month of the forecast period (that is January 2006), and
Wong, Fung, Fong and Hui 93
23.
24.
25.
26. 27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
the current situation in January 2005 whence BLR is at 5 per cent, average HIBOR at 0.70 per cent, average TDR at 0.07 per cent, average EDR at 0.03 per cent and average risk premium at –197 bps. The less than unity transmission is due to the fact that market interest rates tend to price in expected BLR increases ahead of actual BLR adjustments. For a detailed discussion, see section 5.1. Since the savings rate moves largely in line with the BLR, the reduction on mortgage margin for loans financed entirely by savings deposits would be minimal, while the margin for loans financed purely by demand deposits would in fact widen. For mortgage loans which are funded by customers’ deposits which are mainly savings and demand deposits, the impact would be small. The selected high level of two-standard deviations upper bound represents the extreme risk at the high end. There is, nonetheless, a probability of 2.5 per cent that the mean of risk premium may happen to be even higher than this level under the normality assumption. See note 2. The average acquiring costs of deposits or the average operating costs for all banking activities (such as deposit taking, mortgage lending and other transactions) are assumed to be the same in this chapter. They include staff and other operating costs. Specifically, they are derived as the average ratio of operating expenses to the sum of total assets and total liabilities for the banking sector as a whole, and by assuming the same operating cost per dollar of transaction for all banking activities. Based on the annual survey from the Census and Statistics Department and HKMA staff estimates, the average operating cost of banks is around 50 bps which is in line with the operating cost estimated in a research note by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter of November 2000. In this study, for simulation purposes, such cost is assumed to be a conservative 30 bps. However, it should be noted that such cost varies greatly among different banks. The credit cost is estimated with information provided informally by a few banks. This is lower than the 30 bps estimated in a research note by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter of November 2000, and is in line with the fact that, based on recent performance of the property market and the low level of delinquency rate, the current provisions for mortgage loans should be smaller than in 2000. It should, however, be noted that in the case of a sharp reversal of risk premium, which could result in a significant increase in interest rates, the provision cost could increase materially. The average pricing is derived by averaging the interest margins for new loans from December 2001 to October 2004 collected by HKMA’s Residential Mortgage Survey. Detailed supervisory guidance on interest rate risk management is set out in the HKMA guidance note on ‘Interest Rate Risk Management’ (IR – 1) of the Supervisory Policy Manual. The imposition of such restriction is equivalent to estimating the longrun equation with HIBOR as the explanatory variable; where in Model A, the equation RAt = BLRt − β1 HIBORt , and HIBOR = LIBOR + prem. Similar restriction is imposed for Models B and C.
94 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong 32. The number of lags M included is chosen according to the Schwarz criterion (SC). Compared with the Akaike information criterion (AIC), SC imposes a greater penalty for the number of estimated model parameters, hence the use of minimum SC for model selection will always result in a chosen model which has a smaller (or at most equal) number of parameters than that chosen under AIC. 33. The value of Yt is the difference between Yt and Yt−1. 34. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients for RAt−1 , RBt−1 and RCt−1 describes the speed of adjustment for the disequilibrium. A larger coefficient would imply a faster adjustment to the equilibrium. The negative sign of the coefficients indicates that when the BLR, TDR or EDR are too high relative to the LIBOR and risk premium, the current BLR, TDR or EDR will be adjusted downward to restore the long-run equilibrium relationship. 35. Models A, B and C are estimated with the restriction that the estimated coefficients for the variables LIBOR and prem in the long-run equations are the same (see Annex 5E). Note that, consistently, if no such restriction is imposed, the estimated coefficients for the two variables in the long-run equations are not statistically different from each other.
References R. F. Engle and C. W. J. Granger, ‘Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation and Testing’, Econometrica, 55 (1987) 251–76. R. F. Engle and B. S. Yoo, ‘Forecasting and Testing in Cointegrated Systems’, Journal of Econometrics, 35 (1987) 143–59. C. W. J. Granger, ‘Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Methods and Cross-Spectral Methods’, Econometrica, 34 (1969) 424–38. S. Johansen, ‘Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models’, Econometrica, 59(6) (1991) 1551–80. P. Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics, 3rd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). W. S. Peng, K. Lai, F. Leung and C. Shu, ‘The Impact of Interest Rate Shocks on the Performance of the Banking Sector’, HKMA Research Memorandum, 07/2003. B. Scholnick, ‘Asymmetric Adjustment of Commercial Bank Interest Rates: Evidence from Malaysia and Singapore’, Journal of International Money and Finance, 15(3) (1996) 485–96. B. Scholnick, ‘Interest Rate Asymmetries in Long-term Loan and Deposit Markets’, Journal of Financial Services Research, 16(1) (1999) 5–26. C. Sims, ‘Money, Income and Causality’, American Economic Review, 62 (1972) 540–52.
6 Hong Kong Mortgage Rate Setting – An Alternative Reference Rate?1 Jim Wong, Cho-Hoi Hui and Laurence Kang-Por Fung
6.1 Introduction Currently, the lending rates for most mortgage loans are set with reference to the best lending rate (BLR). Such a pricing method has been adopted by banks for many years, and it is well received by borrowers. While mortgage products with fixed rates or rates set with reference to Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rates (HIBORs) are also offered in the market, they have not been popular. It is, however, commonly accepted that the use of BLR as a reference rate for pricing mortgage is not necessarily conducive to banks’ management of interest rate risk, as the movement of BLR may in times deviate significantly from the cost of funds. This is particularly the case for those banks which do not have a sufficiently large BLR-related deposit base which is commensurate with their BLR-based lending.2 In times when HIBORs rise faster than BLR (typically during an interest rate hike cycle or when the risk premium of the Hong Kong dollar over the US dollar widens), the interest margin of these banks’ existing mortgage portfolios would be squeezed. Such basis risk is one of the major sources of risk underlying the interest rate risk exposures of banks that are active in mortgage activities. If the level of the basis risk in some banks is high due to the current interest rate environment, this may lead to a material decline in their earnings and may impact on banking and financial stability. The market conditions during late January to April 2005 demonstrate vividly such risk. Intense competition drove down the mark-ups of effective mortgage rates relative to the BLR to as low as around minus three percentage points by January 2005, which was made possible by the extraordinary low funding cost, with HIBOR being at an unusually deep 95
96 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
discount to LIBOR of about 200 basis points (bps). However, with US interest rates rising and as funding cost increased faster than the BLR in subsequent months, the margin on loans priced on the previously very low funding cost came under pressure. Simulation results of our study show that such a squeeze of margin could be tangible. For instance, based on the market situation and data up to January 2005, under the scenario where US interest rates rise by 120 bps in the 12 months from February 2005 and the risk premium of Hong Kong dollar over the US dollar reverts back to its normal level (that is, HIBORs rise to close to the level of their US counterparts), the net mortgage margin for loans financed by a mix of customers’ deposits would be materially curtailed, while loans financed purely with interbank placements would become loss-making assets of banks.3 Indeed, the reduction of the interest rate margin has already been taking place since January 2005, with 3-month HIBOR (HIBOR3) rising by 190 bps, but BLR only by 45 to 70 bps.4 For the mortgage portfolios that banks acquired during January 2005, the margins for HIBOR-financed loans have been reduced by 125 bps. For those financed by customers’ time deposits or a mix of customers’ demand, savings and time deposits, their margins have also been reduced by 17 bps and 7 bps respectively. Further reductions may be expected if the above scenario continues to materialize. In addition, since the abolition of the Interest Rate Rules (IRR), banks are free to set their BLR-related deposit rates. To maximize profit, banks may make different adjustments to these deposit rates according to their different balance sheet positions. In the past, BLR set by the major banks which have a large retail deposit base was largely followed by other banks, even if the latter did not have the same retail deposit base.5 However, more recently some banks have changed their practice, and have raised their BLR independently of the major banks in order to preserve the interest margin of their existing portfolios amid rising interbank rates.6 With banks changing their previous practice of making concerted adjustments for their BLRs, there are concerns that the different BLRs among banks may cause confusion to mortgage borrowers. In view of the above, there have been calls to consider the merits of adopting an alternative reference rate (to the BLR) for the setting of the mortgage rate.7 By drawing on overseas experience and by examining the characteristics of the various local interest rates, this chapter investigates the possibilities, and the pros and cons, of the use of these rates as an alternative reference rate.
Wong, Hui and Fung 97
It should, however, be stressed that, given the widespread use of BLR as a reference rate for mortgage lending and other loan products, and its dominance in existing loan contracts, any change in the pricing method would have far-reaching impacts. Administratively, it could also be a complex process. Due to the absence of relevant data (such as the cost data), a complete assessment of the cost and benefit of a change is beyond the scope of this chapter.
6.2 Overseas experience The practice of setting mortgage rates varies among countries. The mortgage markets in different countries are characterized by different types of mortgage contracts, partly reflecting regulatory differences and partly contracts and conventions established in earlier periods. It should be noted that rather than converging towards a certain type of contracts or mortgage rates, the mortgage markets are characterized by different variations in the products. This has made the ‘typical’ products almost impossible to define. For example, in the US and Japan, fixed rate mortgage loans are more common, while in the UK, Switzerland and Australia variable rates are more popular. When the mortgage rates are adjustable, the reference rates chosen are commonly the interest rates which reflect banks’ cost of funds. They are either tied to the Treasury bond or a cost of funds index, like that in the US, or they are adjusted in line with the policy rates of the central banks, like that in the UK (the bank rate of the Bank of England) and Australia (the cash rate of the Reserve Bank of Australia). In Germany, mortgage loans are mostly fixed for at least one year and up to five years, or over five years to until maturity, before being renegotiated.8 A more detailed description of the use of some of these reference rates for the pricing of mortgage loans in respective countries is given in Annex 6A. In other EU countries, such as Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, mortgage rates are mostly fixed for more than five years to until final maturity. On the other hand, in countries like Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland, mortgage rates are variable and are renegotiable or tied to market rates after being fixed for less than one year.9
6.3 Possible alternative reference rates: an evaluation 6.3.1 Some suggested criteria Drawing on overseas experience, we examine a number of local interest rates as possible reference rates for mortgage rate setting,
98 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
which can serve as alternatives to the BLR. Such possible alternatives include:10 3-month HIBOR (HIBOR3):
The rate of interest offered on Hong Kong dollar loans by banks in the interbank market for a 3-month period
Effective deposit rate (EDR):11
The average interest rate on demand, savings and time deposits offered by selected banks weighted by the deposit composition of the entire banking sector. EDR is currently calculated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) for research purposes
Composite interest rate of HIBOR3 and EDR (Composite rate):11
The average interest rate of HIBOR3 and EDR weighted by the amount of interbank borrowings and the deposit composition of the entire banking sector.12 The composite rate is currently calculated by the HKMA for research purposes
Base rate of the HKMA (Base rate):
The interest rate the HKMA charges licensed banks when they approach the Discount Window for overnight liquidity
Yield of the 3-year Exchange Fund Note (EFN3):
The official mid-yield fixing of the 3-year benchmark Exchange Fund Note
Figure 6.1 shows the movements of these alternative reference rates and the BLR since 1997. In the evaluation of their appropriateness, several criteria are considered, some of which are highlighted by the drawbacks of using BLR as a reference rate. These criteria can be classified into two groups: criteria from consumers’ requirements and factors relevant to banks: (i) From borrowers’ point of view, they would prefer a reference rate that is stable and with a low level of volatility. This is important as borrowers normally have a steady monthly income and would like to limit fluctuations in their monthly mortgage payments. In addition, it
Wong, Hui and Fung 99 % p.a. 14 12
Base rate
BLR
10 8 EFN3 6 4 HIBOR3 2
EDR Composite rate
0 Jan-97
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Figure 6.1 Alternative reference rates and BLR (January 1997 to April 2005, monthly average)
should be market-determined, simple, transparent and easy to understand. To avoid confusion, there should be only one such rate in the market and for all banks. (ii) From banks’ point of view, important criteria for a good reference rate are that it should closely represent (and move in line with) banks’ cost of funds, and there should exist efficient hedging instruments, so that on the whole the use of such reference rate helps banks in their interest rate risk management.13 In addition, the factors relevant to customers are also relevant to banks. Administrative simplicity is an important factor to be considered by banks. The criteria that the rate should be unique, simple and easy to understand would help banks in their daily operation, in particular in their dealing with customers. At the same time, a mortgage rate with lower volatility would help reduce repayment risk of customers. To the extent that the use of an alternative reference rate will benefit banks’ risk management, it would result in reductions in credit and management cost. Through competition, some of this gain would be passed through to customers in the form of lower mortgage rates.
100 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
6.3.2 The evaluation Based on our econometric analysis and qualitative assessments, the relative features of the possible reference rates, in terms of the various criteria from customers’ requirements and banks’ considerations, are discussed in this section, and the merits and drawbacks of these rates are illustrated in Table 6.1. The discussions are summarized in Annex 6C.
6.3.2.1 Customers’ requirements All of the possible rates under study have a single rate, and they are either fully or largely market determined. HIBOR3 has the advantage of being completely market determined. It is widely quoted in the market and is relatively well known to borrowers. Unlike HIBOR3, which has a daily fixing provided by The Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB), the derivation of EDR and composite rate requires data collection and calculation. Nevertheless, as the HKMA is currently compiling EDR as a routine for research purposes, the additional work required would be moderate. The concepts of these rates are not difficult to understand but they are relatively more complex than the others. Some efforts would be required to explain the calculation of these rates to the borrowers. Both EFN3 and the base rate are quoted in the market but they have the disadvantage of not being well known to retail borrowers.14 However, in terms of volatility of the possible rates – the most important criterion as far as customers’ requirements are concerned – EDR, the composite rate and the base rate are clearly superior to HIBOR3 and EFN3. In this study, we assess their relative volatility by comparing the average monthly fluctuations of these rates during specific periods, which is presented in Table 6.2. It shows that the average monthly variations of HIBOR3 and EFN3, at 0.46 per cent and 0.40 per cent respectively, are significantly larger than that of EDR (0.21 per cent), the composite rate (0.27 per cent) and the base rate (0.11 per cent). This is particularly the case during the Asian financial crisis, when the monthly average of HIBOR3 and EFN3 surged to as high as 10 per cent and 8.5 per cent respectively in October 1997, while EDR, the composite rate and the base rate only rose to 6 per cent, 7.3 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. In Table 6.3, we compare the changes in the alternative reference rates during two particularly volatile periods, September/October 1997 and July/August 1998. We find that in terms of both changes in the monthly average rates and the differences between the highest and the lowest daily rates, HIBOR3 has the largest variations, followed by EFN3 or the composite rate, while EDR and the base rate have the smallest changes.
• It has a higher volatility, in terms of both the average monthly changes and the frequency of changes, as compared with most other reference rates.
• Data collection and calculation are required. Nevertheless, as the HKMA is currently compiling EDR for research purposes, only a small amount of additional work would be required. • The concept is not difficult to understand, but it is more complex than the others. • No direct hedging instruments are available. • It has the same drawbacks as EDR.
• There is only one single rate for all banks and it is relatively well known to the public. • The rate is completely market determined. • It is simple, transparent, and easy to understand. • HIBOR3 is a good measure of banks’ short-term cost of funds at the wholesale level. • The availability of exchange-traded and OTC derivative instruments also enhances its conduciveness to risk management.
• There is only one single rate for all banks, which is largely market determined, as its calculation includes retail savings and time deposit rates of selected banks. • It is a good measure of the short-term cost of funds at the retail level. However, in terms of desirability per interest rate risk management, it is not as good as the composite rate and HIBOR3. • Less volatile than the composite rate and HIBOR3.
• Similar to EDR, there is only a single rate for all banks and it is largely market determined. • It offers the best measure of banks’ cost of funds (better than HIBOR3 and EDR) as it represents the funding cost of an average bank with mixed funding sources.
HIBOR3
EDR
Composite rate
(Continued)
Drawbacks
Merits and drawbacks of alternative reference rates
Merits
Table 6.1
101
• Its movements mainly reflect changes in the US policy rate. As the liquidity condition in Hong Kong and the US may at times be different, it may not be a good measure of banks’ funding cost. • The rate is downwardly rigid, barred by the level of the US Federal funds target rate, but with no cap on upward adjustment. • Less well known to customers. • Similar to HIBOR3, it has a higher volatility. • It is not as good a measure of banks’ funding cost as HIBOR3, EDR or the composite rate. • Less well known to customers.
• Similar to HIBOR3, it is unique, market determined, and has direct hedging instruments available.
EFN3
Drawbacks
• A unique and transparent standard rate. • It has the lowest volatility among the alternative rates under study.
• The use of composite rate as a reference rate would reduce banks’ mortgage margin variability and help reduce banks’ exposure to interest rate risk. • Although no complete hedging instruments are available, partial hedging can be done for the HIBOR element of the rate. The close approximation to cost of funds also reduces the need for hedging. • Its volatility is less than HIBOR3, but larger than EDR.
Merits
(Continued)
Base rate
Table 6.1
102
Wong, Hui and Fung 103 Table 6.2 Volatility of monthly payment burden of possible reference rates January 1997 to April 2005 (The period including the Asian financial crisis) (%)
January 1999 to April 2005 (%)
Reference rate HIBOR3 EDR Composite rate Base rate EFN3
0.46 0.21 0.27 0.11 0.40
0.24 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.29
Memorandum item BLR
0.10
0.09
Note: Volatility (in %) is defined as the average monthly changes (in absolute term) in the reference rate over the specific period. The higher the figure, the higher is the volatility.
Table 6.3 Changes in monthly average rates and differences between daily high and low of reference rates during two particularly volatile periods Asian financial crisis
Government stock market operation
(October 1997/September 1997) (August 1998/July 1998) Increase in the monthly average rate (%)
Difference between high/low (%)
Increase in the Difference monthly between average rate high/low (%) (%)
Reference rate HIBOR3 EDR Composite rate Base rate EFN3
2.5 0.2 1.0 0.5 1.9
17.8 1.5 7.3 0.8 2.7
3.3 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.1
10.5 1.3 3.9 0.0 0.5
Memorandum item BLR
0.2
0.8
0.0
0.0
Figure 6.2a shows the movements of derived mortgage rates since February 1997 based on HIBOR3, EDR and the composite rate for loans priced in January 1997, and Figure 6.2b presents their relative monthly fluctuations. It is clear that both EDR and the composite rate are more stable than HIBOR3 and have lower monthly fluctuations.15
104 % p.a. 16 14 12 10
Mortgage rates set with reference to: EDR
8 6 4
Composite rate 2 Jan-97
Jan-98
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
HIBOR3
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Figure 6.2a Mortgage rates based on possible reference rates (for mortgage loans priced in January 1997 with constant mark-ups throughout the remaining contractual period) Note: The mark-ups of mortgage rate over the reference rates are as follows: HIBOR3 + 3.4%, EDR + 4.8% and composite rate + 4.3%.
% p.a. ± 3.5 3.0
HIBOR3 EDR Composite rate
2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Figure 6.2b Relative monthly fluctuations of selected reference rates (February 1997 to April 2005, monthly average, in absolute terms) Note: The fluctuations are in terms of monthly absolute changes, which can be an increase or a decrease in the specific month.
Wong, Hui and Fung 105
6.3.2.2 Banks’ considerations This section focuses on the criteria regarding interest rate risk management.
(a) A good measure of cost of funds A reference rate which closely reflects the average funding cost of banks could offer a stable margin for the loan portfolio once the pricing is fixed. As a constant mark-up over such reference rate is guaranteed by the contracts and the movement of such reference rate resembles the cost of funds, such a pricing would be conducive to banks’ interest rate risk management. To test which reference rate has such a property, we examine how each of the rates might have been considered (as cost of funds) in the setting of the mortgage rate during the period from January 1999 to April 2005. Using monthly average interest rate data, the assessment is done by a single equation regression analysis which is specified with the average mortgage rate as the dependent variable, and each of these reference rates as the explanatory variable.16 The estimation results (presented in Table 6D.1 of Annex 6D) indicate that the composite rate, as a funding cost proxy, offers the best approximation to the actual mortgage rate, judging from the adjusted R-squared statistic of the regression and the fitted average mortgage rate. This is followed by HIBOR3 and EDR. EFN3 and the base rate have a lower goodness of fit and are poor approximations to the funding costs. These econometric results are largely expected. In the wholesale market, the interbank rate is certainly one of the best measures of cost of funds. It is most widely traded and reflects closely the short-term funding cost of banks – in particular, those who do not have a large retail deposit base. In the retail market, on the other hand, for banks which have a large retail deposit base, the most widely quoted funding costs are the savings deposit rates and time deposit rates. To measure the aggregate change in such cost of funds, the EDR is derived, which is defined as the average interest rate on demand, savings and time deposits weighted by the deposit composition of the entire banking sector. However, as most of the banks have a mix of funding sources, the composite rate, which is the weighted average of EDR and HIBOR3, is a better measure of cost of funds than HIBOR3 and EDR. The base rate is the interest rate that the HKMA charges licensed banks when they come to the Discount Window operated by the HKMA, with Exchange Fund paper, at the end of the day when they find themselves short of liquidity. The base rate is set mechanically through the use of a transparent formula, which is 150 bps above the prevailing US Federal
106 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
funds target rate or the average of the five-day moving averages of the overnight and 1-month HIBOR, whichever is the higher. Hence, the base rate is automatically determined without any discretion from the HKMA or any banks.17 Given this, the base rate may at times be not a good measure of banks’ funding costs, when the liquidity condition in Hong Kong is different from that in the US.18 The base rate also has the characteristic of being downwardly rigid in particular situations. Specifically, when there is ample liquidity in the banking system which drives the interbank rates to a low level, banks will enjoy a widening of mortgage margin, as customers will be stuck with the same base rate, if there is no policy rate adjustment in the US. On the other hand, when there is a shortage of liquidity in the banking system and the short-term interbank rates rise to a high level, the base rate will adjust upward. There is no cap on upward adjustments.19,20 Similar to the base rate, EFN3 clearly does not offer as good a fit as the other three rates, suggesting that it probably plays a lesser role in banks’ decisions of setting the mortgage rate.
(b) Variability of interest rate margins
To assess how the various reference rates may perform under the criterion of offering a stable interest rate margin, we study possible changes in the margin variability of an actual mortgage portfolio acquired in January 1999, based on monthly average interest rates. Under the scenarios of adopting different reference rates, we examine how the variability of such portfolio’s margin may be affected based on the two identified best measures of average funding costs – the composite rate and HIBOR3. The results, as reported in Table 6.4 and Annex 6E, show that on the whole a mortgage rate that is set with reference to a composite rate or HIBOR3 offers lower margin variability, compared with those derived from using other reference rates. A lower margin variability is considered to be a desirable property in banks’ risk management, which can be demonstrated especially when there is a sudden change in interest rates that goes against the mortgage margin. Based on monthly average interest rates, Table 6.5 illustrates how the interest margin of banks’ mortgage portfolios may be squeezed when the mortgage rate is set with reference to BLR. By using the pricing data of loan portfolio acquired during January 2005 and the changes in cost of funds through April 2005, we show that the squeezes in the net mortgage margins were more severe when the mortgage rate was set with reference to BLR, than under the scenarios that the mortgage rates were set with reference to the composite rate or HIBOR3.21
107 Table 6.4 Variability of margin for banks’ mortgage portfolio of January 19991,2 (during the period January 1999 to April 2005) Average funding costs represented by Composite rate
HIBOR3
Reference rate HIBOR3 EDR Composite rate Base rate EFN3
0.42 0.14 0.00 0.47 0.64
0.00 0.55 0.42 0.64 0.74
Memorandum item BLR
0.36
0.72
Notes: 1. The margin is defined as the mortgage rate set with the reference rate plus a mark-up, less the cost of funds proxy. 2. Variability (in %) is defined as the standard deviation of margin during the period January 1999 to April 2005. It measures the average dispersion of margins from its mean level during the study period. The lower the figure, the lower is the variability.
Table 6.5 Estimated squeezes of interest margins resulting from the recent rise in cost of funds under different reference rates1,2 (for banks’ mortgage portfolio acquired during January 2005) The estimated squeeze compared with the margin in January 2005 (bps) 2005 March
April
(A) Cost of funds represented by the Composite rate Reference Rate (i) BLR −17 −33 (ii) HIBOR3 63 118 (iii) Composite rate 0 0
−40 110 0
February
(B) Cost of funds represented by HIBOR3 Reference Rate (i) BLR −80 (ii) HIBOR3 0 (iii) Composite rate −63
−151 0 −118
−150 0 −110
Notes: 1. The mortgage margin is defined as the mortgage pricing less funding cost, operating cost and credit cost. 2. Positive figures indicate a widening of margin.
108 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
(c) Availability of hedging tools
Of the various local interest rates, only HIBOR3 and EFN3 have their derivative instruments traded in the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd., although the trading is not very active. As for other local interest rates, no hedging instruments are currently directly available in the market, but for the composite rate, partial hedging for its HIBOR element can be performed. Note that the need for hedging is less if a reference rate that reflects closely banks’ funding costs is adopted.
6.3.2.3 Overall assessment Each of the possible reference rates has its own merits and drawbacks. In the selection of an appropriate reference rate, these merits and drawbacks should be carefully assessed and weighted against each other. A balance will have to be struck between the requirements of customers and banks. The weights given to each of the criteria in the evaluation of the suitability of the alternative reference rates can be drawn from industry experience. To illustrate this idea, we focus our assessment based on two major criteria in this section: (i) the stability of the reference rates which is key to customers’ acceptance; and (ii) the conduciveness to interest rate risk management in terms of whether the rate is a good measure of banks’ cost of funds. The ranking of the reference rates based on these two criteria are given in Table 6.6. Using a two-dimensional chart, we illustrate the relative positions of the five alternative reference rates in terms of the two major criteria – their stability and conduciveness to interest rate risk management (Figure 6.3). Note that the scale (or unit) used to plot the chart is arbitrary as the relative weights of the criteria are not known. The chart shows that the ranking of the five rates is clear in terms of each of the two major criteria. However, their ranking based on the combined performance of the two criteria is not easy to determine, although some rough ideas can still be obtained from the chart. Moreover, in the complete analysis, other factors including the criteria of being simple, transparent and easy to understand, as well as administrative simplicity, should also be considered.
6.4 Conclusion Each of the possible reference rates discussed above has its own merits and drawbacks. In the selection of an appropriate reference rate, these merits and drawbacks should be carefully assessed and weighted against each other. A balance will have to be struck between the requirements
109 Table 6.6 Ranking of possible reference rates Ranking
Major criteria Stability of the rate1
Conduciveness to interest rate risk management2
High 1
With an average monthly change of 0.11%, Base rate has the lowest volatility among the reference rates.
Composite rate offers the best measure of cost of funds for an average bank which has a mix of wholesale and retail funding sources.
2
EDR has a slightly higher volatility than the Base rate. Its average monthly change is 0.21%.
HIBOR3 is a good measure of banks’ short-term cost of funds at the wholesale level.
3
The volatility of the Composite rate is slightly higher than EDR, but lower than EFN3 and HIBOR3. The average monthly change in the Composite rate during the study period is 0.27%
EDR is a good measure of banks’ short-term cost of funds at the retail level.
4
EFN3 is slightly less volatile than HIBOR3. But its average monthly change of 0.4% is higher than other reference rates.
EFN3 is not a good measure of banks’ funding costs.
Low 5
HIBOR3 has the highest volatility among the alternative rates under study. Its average monthly change over the study period is 0.46%.
Base rate’s movements mainly reflect changes in the policy rate of the US. It may be in times not a good measure of banks’ funding costs. In addition, the Base rate has the asymmetric characteristic that it is downwardly rigid but with no cap on upward adjustment.
Notes: 1. Stability is measured by the volatility of the reference rate, which is defined as the average monthly changes (in absolute term) in the reference rate from January 1997 to April 2005, including the Asian financial crisis period (as shown in Table 6.2). The lower the volatility (or the lower the average monthly change), the higher is the stability, and vice versa. 2. Conduciveness to interest rate risk management is measured by the goodness of fit of the regression using the specific rate to explain the actual mortgage rate (measured by the adjusted R-squared as presented in Annex 6D). The higher the R-squared, the higher is the conduciveness to interest rate risk management, because the reference rate would track the funding cost more closely.
110 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Average monthly change (%) 0.0 Base rate
Stability of the rate
0.1
EDR
0.2
Composite rate
0.3 0.4
EFN3 HIBOR3
0.5 0.6 0.76
0.80
0.84
0.88
0.92
0.96
1.00 R-squared
Conduciveness to interest rate risk management
Figure 6.3 Ranking of the reference rate in terms of stability and conduciveness to interest rate risk management Notes: 1. Stability is measured by the volatility of the reference rate, which is defined as the average monthly changes (in absolute term) in the reference rate from January 1997 to April 2005, including the Asian financial crisis period (as shown in Table 6.2). The lower the volatility (or the lower the average monthly change), the higher is the stability, and vice versa. 2. Conduciveness to interest rate risk management is measured by the goodness of fit of the regression using the specific rate to explain the actual mortgage rate (measured by the adjusted R-squared as presented in Annex 6D). The higher the R-squared, the higher is the conduciveness to interest rate risks management, because the reference rate would track the funding cost more closely.
of customers and banks. The weights given to each of the criteria in the evaluation of the suitability of the alternative reference rates can be drawn from industry experience. It is noted that mortgage products with reference rates other than BLR (such as HIBOR) are currently being offered in the market. However, they are not as popular as BLR. This may be due to: (i) their high volatility in the past, (ii) the lack of standardization in terms of product features and price fixing, and (iii) the lack of promotion and low transparency of the products. If any of the above rates is chosen to be the alternative reference rate, smoothing methods may be employed to reduce its volatility.22 This is quite important for both the borrowers and the banks. Borrowers will be skeptical about the use of a reference rate that could fluctuate widely within a short period of time, such as during the Asian financial crisis. The ‘smoothed’ reference rate can be used as the standard reference
Wong, Hui and Fung 111 % p.a. 10 9 8 7 BLR
6 5
Mortgage rate (based on the monthly average Composite rate, excluding the mark-ups) Mortgage rate (based on the daily Composite rate, excluding the mark-ups)
4 3 2 1 0 Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Jan-05
Figure 6.4 Adjustments of the mortgage rate (based on a prescribed triggering rule) and BLR∗
Note: ∗ Prescribed adjustment rule: a change in the mortgage rate would be made only if the reference rate changes by more than 25 bps.
rate, which would be made public on a pre-determined regular basis (for example monthly or quarterly basis). If the 1-month average is used, the reference rate for the current month would be calculated based on the average of the daily rates of the previous month. The new reference rate would be announced on the first day of the current month and would be applicable for the pricing of new mortgage loans and the re-pricing of existing mortgage loans in banks’ mortgage portfolios throughout the month.23 To further reduce the frequency of mortgage rate adjustments so as to improve borrowers’ acceptance to the chosen reference rate, a rule may be adopted so that a change in the mortgage rate would be made only if the reference rate changes by more than a prescribed amount, for example, by more than 25 bps.24 As an illustration, if we use the composite rate as the mortgage reference rate and adopt the above rule, the number of instances that the mortgage rate would need to be changed from January 2001 to April 2005 would be 12 times based on the monthly average reference rate.25 This compares with 15 actual adjustments in the BLR during the same period (see Figure 6.4). On the other hand, it may be desirable to have contingency arrangements in place, under which the composite rate can be adjusted before
112 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
the regular rate fixing date, if necessary, such as when interest rates move drastically. The conditions for activating such arrangements should be clearly specified,26 in addition to the normal rule governing how the rate is adjusted regularly on a monthly basis. To promote such a reference rate, its specific features should be carefully designed in order to increase borrowers’ acceptance. In addition, the calculation and fixing of such reference rate should be standardized. Promotion, such as educational campaigns, would need to be made to improve public understanding.27 The new reference rate can be introduced either as an alternative or as a replacement for BLR. Given the need for BLR to continue to be the reference rate for loans made prior to the introduction of a new reference rate, it would be desirable to have the new reference rate introduced to the market along with the BLR. Market forces will determine which rate is more acceptable. Given the widespread use of BLR as a reference rate for mortgage lending and other loan products, and its dominance in existing loan contracts, any change in the pricing method would have far-reaching impacts on the mortgage market. Administratively, it could also be a complex process.28 While the HKMA has a supervisory interest in the vulnerability of bank earnings to interest rate risk, it is up to the industry to decide which reference rate to use for mortgage lending. If it is agreed that any of the above rates can be considered as an alternative reference rate, a more complete analysis would be required to assess the cost and benefit for such a move. Such a complete study would require the active involvement of the banking industry. We would be happy to assist in the process, through participating in the discussion and by providing technical support. If a decision is made to introduce an alternative reference rate, the HKMA is prepared to help ensure its transparency through encouraging the use of a single rate and the standardization of its calculation and quotation. In particular, if the composite rate is adopted, the HKMA could help by taking up the task of the computation and announcement of the rate, if deemed desirable.
Wong, Hui and Fung 113
Annex 6A Reference rates for pricing mortgage loans in the US, UK and Australia In the US and Japan, fixed rates mortgage loans are more common, while in the UK, Switzerland and Australia variable rates are more popular. When the mortgage rates are adjustable, they are either tied to the Treasury bond or a cost of funds index, like that in the US, or they are adjusted in line with the policy rates of the central banks, like that in the UK (the base rate of the Bank of England [BOE]) and Australia (the cash rate of the Reserve Bank of Australia [RBA]). In the US, there are several cost of funds indices for pricing mortgage loans. The one that is most widely used by mortgage lenders (especially in the West Coast) to set the floating interest rate on adjustable rate mortgage loans is the Eleventh District Cost-of-Funds Index (COFI). The monthly weighted average COFI has been published by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco since August 1981. COFI is not an interest rate, but a ratio that reflects the interest expenses reported for a given month by the COFI reporting members. The COFI is computed from the book values of liabilities for all insured savings and loan institutions in the Eleventh District (institutions in California, Nevada, and Arizona). These liabilities include money on deposit at the institutions, loans obtained from a Federal Home Loan Bank and money borrowed from other financial institutions. The interest paid on these types of funds is the cost of these funds. The ratio of the dollar amount paid in interest during the month to the average dollar amount of the funds for that month is the weighted average COFI for that month.29 Mortgage lenders will periodically adjust the interest rate on adjustable rate mortgage loans based on this COFI. In countries like the UK and Australia with inflation targeting as one of the central banks’ core objectives, the instrument of monetary policy is a short-term interest rate that can be closely controlled by the central bank. The relevant interest rate for the UK is the ‘base rate’ and for Australia is the ‘cash rate’. They are also called the policy rates in the sense that they reflect the monetary policy stance of the central banks. In the UK, the BOE sets the base rate for its own dealing with the market and that rate then affects the whole pattern of rates set by the commercial banks for their savers and borrowers. For instance, two mortgage loan interest rates that are influenced by the movement of the base rate are the standard variable rate and the base rate tracker. For the standard variable rate mortgage, the lender’s variable interest rate charged
114 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
to existing borrowers is set marginally higher than the base rate, and it usually varies in relation to the increase and decrease imposed by the BOE’s base rate. So if the base rate changes, the variable rate will change accordingly (although lenders can also choose not to pass rate changes on to their customers). The base rate tracker is a variable rate mortgage loan where the interest rate is a set amount above (or below) the BOE’s base rate for a fixed term period, and so its changes are always in line with (or ‘track’) changes in the BOE’s base rate. The base rate tracker thus removes part of the discretionary elements in the standard variable rate. In Australia, the cash rate is the market interest rate on overnight funds. The RBA exercises close control over the cash rate through its financial-market operations, so as to keep the cash rate at or near an operating target decided by the RBA. The cash rate is the rate charged on overnight loans between financial intermediaries. Movements in the cash rate are passed through quite quickly to the whole structure of deposit and lending rates. For example, mortgage and business loan rates tend to move broadly in line with movements in the cash rate. Thus, changes in monetary policy mean a change in the operating target for the cash rate, and hence a shift in the interest rate structure prevailing in the financial system.
Wong, Hui and Fung 115
Annex 6B A technical note on the construction of the effective deposit rate and the composite rate 30,31 Banks in Hong Kong obtain Hong Kong dollar funding from various sources. Broadly speaking, these sources can be categorized by funding from the retail market and from the wholesale market. Retail market funding consists of Hong Kong dollar deposits from non-bank customers,32 while wholesale market funding includes interbank borrowing from banks in Hong Kong and abroad.33 The funding costs incurred by banks can be assessed by the interest rates charged on the funding components from the retail and wholesale markets. Table 6B.1 presents the components which make up the average funding of banks and their associated interest rates. Figures 6B.1 and 6B.2 plot the interest rates associated with the different funding components from the retail and wholesale markets.
Table 6B.1
Major funding sources of banks and interest rates
Funding component1 Retail market Customers’ deposits Demand deposits Savings deposits Time deposits No more than 1 month Between 1 and 3 months Later than 3 months Wholesale market Interbank borrowing In Hong Kong On demand Within 3 months Later than 3 months From abroad On demand Within 3 months Later than 3 months
Interest rate2
Interest rate on demand deposits is assumed to be zero Average savings deposit rate Average rate for 1-week time deposits Average rate for 1-month and 3-month time deposits Average rate for 6-month and 12-month time deposits
Overnight HIBOR Average rate of 1-week, 1-month and 3-month HIBORs Average rate of 6-month, 9-month and 12-month HIBORs Overnight HIBOR Average rate of 1-week, 1-month and 3-month HIBORs Average rate of 6-month, 9-month and 12-month HIBORs
Notes: 1. The classification of funding components in customers’ deposits and interbank borrowing is based on ‘Return of Assets and Liabilities of an Authorized Institution’. 2. A detailed discussion of the various interest rates is given in sections 6B.1 and 6B.2.
116 % p.a. 10 Savings deposit rate 1-week time deposit rate average rate for 1 and 3 months deposits average rate for 6 and 12 months deposits
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-97
Jan-98
Figure 6B.1
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Interest rates of retail market funding
% p.a. 14 Overnight HIBOR Average of 1-week, 1-month and 3-month HIBORs Average of 6-month, 9-month and 12-month HIBORs
12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Jan-97
Jan-98
Figure 6B.2
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Interest rates of wholesale market funding
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Wong, Hui and Fung 117
The construction of the effective deposit rate (EDR) and the composite rate makes use of the above mentioned funding components and their corresponding interest rates.
Annex 6B.1
Effective deposit rate
The EDR is a measure of banks’ retail market funding costs. It is defined as the average interest rates on demand, savings and time deposits weighted by the Hong Kong dollar deposit composition of the entire banking sector. As shown in Table 6B.1, the deposit composition of the entire banking sector is as follows: 1. Demand deposits of licensed banks 2. Savings deposits of licensed banks 3. Time deposits of licensed banks, restricted licence banks and deposittaking companies, which are further classified into three groups based on their maturities: – No more than 1 month – Between 1 and 3 months – Later than 3 months. The interest rates on savings and time deposits of various maturities are the simple period average rates taken from Table 6.4.2 of the Monthly Statistical Bulletin (MSB). Currently, these average interest rates are calculated based on the daily quotations of eight selected banks.34 On a particular day, the interest rate on savings deposits is the simple average of the quoted savings deposit rates.35 The group of selected banks can be enlarged to include more banks to improve the representation. Criteria can be established and reviewed for the selection of these banks. For example, a group of banks, which have the largest market shares of deposits and as a whole represent the market, can be selected based on their average deposit sizes over the past 12 months. The group of selected banks can be reviewed annually. EDR is derived by summing the individual average interest rates on demand, savings and time deposits, weighted by their corresponding shares in the deposit composition as reported to the HKMA at monthend, based on the following equation: EDR =
CCirm × IRrm i CCirm
(6B.1)
118 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong Table 6B.2
Derivation of EDR (for April 2005) Average Deposit composition interest rate (month-end outstanding) of the month (% p.a.)1 (A) HK$ Share to million total (%) (B)
Demand deposits Savings deposits Time deposits No more than 1 month Between 1 and 3 months 1 month 3 months Later than 3 months 6 months 12 months
Weighted average rate (% p.a.) (A × B)
0.0002 0.098
240,117.7 953,412.6
0.12 0.48
0.0000 0.0470
0.1053⎫ 0.3014⎬ 0.260 ⎭ 0.342 ⎫ 0.6305⎬ 0.460 ⎭ 0.800
571,608.3
0.29
0.0305
148,776.4
0.07
0.0211
89,501.4
0.04
0.0252
EDR is
0.1238
Notes: 1. This is the period average interest rate on the deposits (less than HK$100,000) quoted by the eight selected banks. 2. The interest rate on demand deposits is assumed to be zero. 3. Since there is no breakdown on the deposit composition of less than 1-month time deposits, the interest rate taken is the average 1-week time deposit rate. 4. Since there is no breakdown on the deposit composition of 1-month and 3-month time deposits, the interest rate taken is the simple average rate of 1-month and 3-month time deposit rates. 5. Since there is no breakdown on the deposit composition of time deposits with maturity later than 3 months, the interest rate taken is the simple average rate of 6-month and 12-month time deposit rates.
where CCirm is the i funding component from the retail market, IRrm i represents the corresponding interest rate of the i funding component from the retail market (as shown in Table 6B.1 under the heading ‘Retail market’) and CCirm is the sum of all funding components from the retail market. Table 6B.2 illustrates the derivation of EDR for a particular month. Note that the interest rates used in the derivation of EDR as reported in the main text of the chapter are slightly different from those presented in Table 6B.2. In the main text of the chapter, for simplicity, the 1-month time deposit rate is used to proxy the interest rate for deposits with maturity less than 1 month. The 3-month time deposit rate is used to proxy the rate for deposits with maturity between one month and three months. Figure 6B.3 presents the profile of EDR, as composed based on the calculation method illustrated in Table 6B.2.
Wong, Hui and Fung 119 % p.a. 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-97
Jan-98
Figure 6B.3
Jan-99
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
EDR
Annex 6B.2
The composite rate
The composite rate is a measure of banks’ wholesale and retail funding costs. It is the average interest rates of HIBOR and EDR weighted by the amount of Hong Kong dollar interbank borrowing from the wholesale market and the Hong Kong dollar deposits obtained from the retail market.36 As shown in Table 6B.1, interbank borrowing includes the following items:37 1. Amount due to Authorized Institutions in Hong Kong (MSB Table 4.2), which can be further categorized into: – payable on demand and money at call – repayable or callable within 3 months – repayable or callable later than 3 months 2. Amount due to banks abroad (MSB Table 3.9.1). While the MSB table only shows the total amount, the ‘Return of Assets and Liabilities of an Authorized Institution’ has breakdowns with categories similar to that of the amount due to Authorized Institutions in Hong Kong. The interest rates used for the derivation of EDR are discussed in the previous section. The interest rates for various categories of interbank borrowing are the period average of HIBORs taken from the MSB Table 6.3.2. Similar to the derivation of EDR, the average HIBORs quoted
120 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
by a group of selected banks can be used in the calculation. Alternatively, Hong Kong Dollar Interest Settlement Rates, which are fixed by the HKAB, can be used for the calculation of the composite rate. The composite rate is derived by summing the individual average interest rates on HIBORs, demand, savings and time deposits, weighted by their corresponding shares in the combined interbank borrowing and customers’ deposits as reported to the HKMA at the end of each month, based on the following equation:38 Composite rate =
Table 6B.3
CCi × IRi CCi
(6B.2)
Derivation of the composite rate1 (for April 2005)
Funding components
Retail Market EDR2 Wholesale Market Interbank borrowing In Hong Kong (total) On demand3 Within 3 months4 Later than 3 months5 From abroad (total)6 On demand Within 3 months Later than 3 months Total funding (retail + wholesale)
Amount (HK$ mn)
Share to total (%) (A)
Interest rate (% p.a.) (B)
Weighted average rate (% p.a.) (A) × (B)
2,003,416
0.81
0.12
0.0972
311,205 33,791 240,168 37,246 146,241
0.13 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.06
1.36 1.98 2.61 2.25
0.0136 0.1980 0.0522 0.1350
2,460,862 The Composite rate is
0.4960
Notes: 1. This table provides an illustration of the derivation of the composite rate which is slightly different from the one composed in the main text of the chapter. 2. The EDR is the derived figure in Table 6B.2. 3. The interest rate for interbank borrowing callable on demand is the overnight HIBOR. 4. Since there is no breakdown on interbank borrowing callable within three months, the interest rate taken is the simple average rate of 1-week, 1-month and 3-month HIBORs. 5. Since there is no breakdown on interbank borrowing callable later than three months, the interest rate taken is the simple average rate of 6-month, 9-month and 12-month HIBORs. 6. The amount of Hong Kong dollar interbank borrowing from abroad is from MSB Table 3.9.1, which is the total amount and no breakdown is available. For illustration, the interest rate is assumed to be the 3-month HIBOR. If breakdowns of interbank borrowing from abroad are available, the specific interest rates should apply to these breakdowns as indicated in Table 6B.1.
Wong, Hui and Fung 121
where CCi is the i funding component from the retail or wholesale markets, IRi represents the corresponding interest rate of the i funding component (as shown in Table 6B.1) and CCi is the sum of all components from the two markets. Table 6B.3 presents the derived composite rate for a particular month. From Table 6B.3, it is shown that the shares of customers’ deposits, interbank borrowing in Hong Kong and from abroad used for the calculation of the composite rate are 81 per cent, 13 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. Figure 6B.4 illustrates the profile of the composite rate. % p.a. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-97
Jan-98
Figure 6B.4
Jan-99
Jan-00
The composite rate
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Yes
Yes
Base rate
EFN3
Yes
Yes
Yes The concept is not difficult to understand, but it is complex than the others Same as EDR
Yes
Simple and transparent
Simple
Simple
Simple Requires compilation by the HKMA, but only a small amount of additional work would be needed Same as EDR
Simple
Administrative simplicity
A weighted average of HIBOR3 and retail deposit rates, which are largely market determined Rule-based, not entirely market determined Market determined
Market determined A weighted average of retail deposit rates which are largely market determined
Largely market determined
Rate setting: market determined or rule-based
0.40
0.11
6
5
2
1 3
0.463 0.21
0.27
4
Desirability per risk management purposes2
0.10
Volatility of monthly payment burden1
Notes: 1. Volatility (in %) is defined as the average monthly changes (in absolute term) in the reference rate over the specific period from January 1997 to April 2005. The higher the figure, the higher is the volatility. 2. The ranking is based on the assessments in section 6.3.2.2. The lower the ranking, the higher is the desirability. 3. If the Asian financial crisis period is excluded, the volatility of HIBOR3 (for the period from January 1999 to April 2005) reduces to 0.23, which is compatible to that of other possible reference rates ranging from 0.12 to 0.29 under the same period.
Yes, compiled by the HKMA
Used to be a single rate, but recently banks have started to quote different BLRs Yes Yes, compiled by the HKMA
A single rate in the market and for all banks
Relative features of alternative reference rates
Composite rate
HIBOR3 EDR
BLR
Annex 6C 122
Wong, Hui and Fung 123
Annex 6D A quantitative assessment of the approximation of alternative reference rates as a measure of average cost of funds With monthly average interest rate data, a simple linear regression model is used to assess the property of the alternative reference rates as a good measure of the average cost of funds in the banking sector. In the analysis, the changes in pricing due to competition and changes in operating costs are assumed to be the same under the various scenarios of using different reference rates. To avoid the wide fluctuation in reference rates during the Asian financial crisis period, which is rare and extraordinary, the Table 6D.1 Estimation results (from January 1999 to April 2005) (Specification: Mortgage Ratet = Constant + Alternative reference ratet ) Alternative reference rate
Adjusted R-squared
Composite rate HIBOR3 EDR BLR EFN3 Base rate
0.93 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.85 0.84
Actual and fitted mortgage rates % p.a. 10 9 8 7 Fitted mortgage rate
6 5 4 3
Actual mortgage rate
2 1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6D.1
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Based on the composite rate
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
124 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
regression estimation starts from January 1999 to April 2005. Only the adjusted R-squared statistics are reported. Figures 6D.1 to 6D.6 show the actual and fitted mortgage rates, based on the above model specification. % p.a. 10 9 8 7 Fitted mortgage rate
6 5 4 3
Actual mortgage rate
2 1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6D.2
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Based on HIBOR3
% p.a. 10 9 8 7 6 Fitted mortgage rate
5 4 3
Actual mortgage rate
2 1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6D.3
Jan-00
Jan-01
Based on EDR
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
125 % p.a. 10 9 8 7 6 Fitted mortgage rate 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6D.4
Actual mortgage rate
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Based on BLR
% p.a. 10 9 8 7 Fitted mortgage rate
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6D.5
Actual mortgage rate
Jan-00
Jan-01
Based on EFN3
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
126 % p.a. 10 9 8 7 6 Fitted mortgage rate 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6D.6
Actual mortgage rate
Jan-00
Jan-01
Based on the base rate
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Wong, Hui and Fung 127
Annex 6E Simulation of interest margin for the loan portfolio acquired in January 1999 under the scenario of different reference rates Interest rate margin (in per cent) 7 BLR
Base rate
EDR
6 5 4 3 Composite rate 2 EFN3
HIBOR3
1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6E.1
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Cost of funds represented by the composite rate
Interest rate margin (in per cent) 7 6 5
BLR Base rate
HIBOR3
4 3 Composite rate
2
EDR EFN3
1 0 Jan-99 Figure 6E.2
Jan-00
Jan-01
Jan-02
Jan-03
Cost of funds represented by HIBOR3
Jan-04
Jan-05
128 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
Notes 1. The analysis of this chapter covers the market situation up to May 2005, and uses data up to that month. 2. In this chapter, BLR-related deposits refer to retail deposits (such as savings deposit rates) of which the interest rates move largely in tandem with the BLR. 3. See Chapter 5. 4. The interest rates are monthly average rates, covering data up to May 2005. Using daily data, the 3-month HIBOR was in fact at par with LIBOR by the end of May 2005. 5. Although the BLR was not part of the IRR, it was in most cases adjusted along with changes in retail deposit rates. When differences in the movements of BLR and HIBORs emerged, in the trade-off between variability of interest margins and the maintenance of market shares, the smaller banks usually chose to accept a degree of margin variability (sometimes a squeeze in the margin of the existing mortgage portfolios), in order to maintain market shares. 6. A few small and medium-sized banks raised their BLR by 25 bps in early April amid rising interbank rates, while the three big banks with large retail customers’ deposits did not adjust their BLR. Instead, they raised their effective mortgage rates to a level compatible to these small and medium-sized banks by increasing the mark-ups slightly and eliminating cash rebates to mortgage borrowers. 7. Some banks proposed alternative reference rates which are either based on HIBORs or the base rate of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). However, some other banks still consider that the BLRs should be used as the reference rate. 8. See D. B. Diamond, Jr. and M. J. Lea, ‘Housing Finance in Developed Countries: An International Comparison of Efficiency’, Journal of Housing Research, 3(1) (1992) 1–271 and European Central Bank, ‘Structural Factors in EU Housing Markets’, March (2003). 9. See European Central Bank, ‘Structural Factors in EU Housing Markets’, March (2003). 10. The use of similar interest rates of different maturities as reference rates can also be examined. For simplicity, only these rates with the specific maturity as listed are assessed in this chapter. 11. A detailed discussion of the construction of EDR and the composite rate is given as a technical note in Annex 6B. 12. The amount of interbank borrowings is taken from the Monthly Statistical Bulletin and refers to the Hong Kong dollar borrowings by Authorized Institutions in the local interbank market and abroad regardless of maturity. 13. Another way of calculating banks’ cost of funds is the one adopted by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco in the US for the calculation of the Eleventh District Cost-of-Funds Index. For details of its calculation, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of the use of such an index, please refer to Annex 6A and Note 29. 14. This may change over time as Exchange Fund Notes are now being issued specifically for retail investors.
Wong, Hui and Fung 129 15. The patterns of derived mortgage rates based on EFN3 and the base rate are not shown here. Their relative performances as compared with HIBOR3, EDR and the composite rate are similar to those represented by the figures in Table 6.2. 16. In the analysis, the changes in pricing due to competition and changes in operating costs are assumed to be the same under the various scenarios of using different reference rates. 17. It should be noted that the use of the base rate of the HKMA is different from the policy rates of other central banks, such as the base rate of the Bank of England or the cash rate of the Reserve Bank of Australia. In the UK and Australia, their policy rates are used as a monetary policy instrument to influence the short-term interest rates, and thus the interest rate structures in the respective financial markets (see Annex 6A for a discussion of these policy rates). On the other hand, under the Currency Board system in Hong Kong, the base rate of the HKMA mainly follows the interest rate movement in the US. 18. For example, the base rate was raised eight times from June 2004, but the short-term interbank rates fell to their low levels up to early January this year, before rising in the subsequent months. 19. Under extraordinary situations, the base rate could rise to a level as high as HIBOR3. This makes mortgage loans using the base rate as the reference rate suffer from the same interest rate risk as using HIBOR3 as the reference rate. 20. This asymmetry works clearly against borrowers. Note also that if the base rate is used as a reference rate, any revision of the formula of setting the base rate in the future would need to consider the reaction from the mortgage market. 21. For a detailed study regarding the derivation of the estimated squeezes in interest margins, please refer to Chapter 5. 22. Such as using the monthly or quarterly average of the daily rates. 23. For example, the monthly average rate in March announced on the first day of April can be used for the pricing of new mortgage loans and the re-pricing of existing loans throughout April. 24. The change will be assessed on a cumulative basis. For example, if the reference rate increases from 3 per cent in the previous month to 3.24 per cent in the current month, no change will be made on the mortgage rate. However, the mortgage rate will be adjusted when the composite rate increases by cumulatively more than 25 bps, say to 3.3 per cent in the following month. Using a mark-up of two percentage points as an illustration, the mortgage rate would be at 5 per cent in the previous month. The rate would not be changed in the current month, but will be raised by 30 bps to 5.3 per cent in the following month. 25. The mortgage rate would need to be changed by 16 times if the adjustments are made based on the changes in the daily composite rate. 26. Detailed arrangements should be worked out by the industry, if an alternative reference rate is to be adopted. 27. To avoid imposing additional administrative burden on banks, the standard reference rate can be calculated and announced through specific arrangements. Similar to their current practice, banks just need to set a mark-up over this standard reference rate when pricing their mortgage products. This
130 The Banking Sector in Hong Kong
28.
29.
30.
31.
32. 33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
arrangement also facilitates banks in their management of interest rate risk because a standard reference rate is provided and instruments for hedging purpose, such as deposits with interest rates based on the reference rate, can be developed. There would also be costs for system changes, documentation, public relations, calculation and dissemination of the new reference rate. The cost could be significant if customers are allowed to make a choice to switch their existing contracts (mostly set against BLR) to contracts based on the new reference rate. One of the advantages of using the actual dollar amount paid in interest during the month when calculating the COFI is that it reflects more accurately the average funding costs incurred by the reporting institutions. However, it would involve additional information from the reporting institutions and it may further widen the time gap between data collection and the release of the COFI. This technical note provides a detailed description on the construction of the effective deposit rate (EDR) and the composite rate. Note that while the actual derivation of the EDR and the composite rate used in the main text of the chapter is a simplified version of the methodology described in this annex, the underlying concepts are the same. Another way of calculating banks’ cost of funds is the one adopted by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco in the US for the calculation of the Eleventh District Cost-of-Funds Index. For details of its calculation, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of using such index, please refer to Annex 6A and Note 29. In this chapter, all non-bank customers’ deposits, regardless of their size, are classified as retail market funding. Other funding sources such as the negotiable debt instruments issued by banks and amounts payable under repo are not being considered in the analysis. The eight selected banks are HSBC, Hang Seng Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of China (Hong Kong), Bank of East Asia, DBS Bank, Citibank and Nanyang Commercial Bank. Note that in this chapter, the average interest rates for the groups of banks are the simple averages of their quoted rates. Alternatively, weighted rates can be calculated based on the actual shares of individual banks’ deposit base. Note also that for some banks, the quoted interest rates and the interest rates actually offered to clients may differ. When possible, the actual rates should be used in the calculation. On the calculation of the composite rate, some banks suggested that other Hong Kong dollar funding should be included such as those Hong Kong dollar funds obtained through Hong Kong dollar/US dollar swaps and, therefore, the weights of HIBORs in the formula should be upward adjusted. They also suggested that, if the average rate is to be calculated as a weighted average rate by the shares of individual banks’ deposit base, there should be an upper bound for the weights assigned to individual banks, in order to avoid the dominance of the rates quoted by a few banks. The classification of interbank borrowing is based on ‘Return of Assets and Liabilities of an Authorized Institution’.
Wong, Hui and Fung 131 38. Note that the components and interest rates used in the derivation of the composite rate as illustrated in Table 6B.1 and equation (6B.2) are slightly different from the composite rate reported in the main text of the chapter. In the main text of the chapter, for simplicity, the 1-month time deposit rate is used to proxy the interest rates for deposits with maturity less than one month. The 3-month time deposit rate is used to proxy the rate for deposits with maturity between one month and three months. In addition, 3-month HIBOR is the interest rate for interbank borrowing, regardless of the repayable periods. Nevertheless, the difference does not affect the analysis in the main text of the chapter.
7 Residential Mortgage Default Risk in Hong Kong Jim Wong, Laurence Kang-Por Fung, Tom Pak-Wing Fong and Angela Sze
7.1 Introduction The sharp fall in property prices following the Asian financial crisis has led many residential mortgage holders in Hong Kong to experience negative equity. At the end of September 2004, there were about 25,400 loans with a market value lower than the outstanding loan amount. The total value of these loans was HK$43 billion. The mortgage delinquency ratio reached a peak of 1.43 per cent in April 2001. While it has improved since the second half of 2001, the delinquency rate in September 2004, at 0.47 per cent, is still higher than 0.29 per cent in June 1998 when data were first collected.1 Given that residential mortgage lending represents a significant component of bank assets, how borrowers’ decisions to default are affected by the negative equity position of their mortgages is of interest to policy makers.2 This study utilizes micro-level mortgage loan data to examine the determinants of residential mortgage default risk in Hong Kong, and the effect of changes in these determinants, in particular the current loanto-value (CLTV) ratio, on default probabilities. A preliminary attempt is also made to assess the impact of macroeconomic variables on default probability. Overall, the results suggest that the CLTV ratio is central to mortgage default decisions. The study finds that default probability is positively correlated with the CLTV ratio, as well as with interest rates and the unemployment rate, and negatively correlated with changes in stock prices. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief review of the theoretical framework in explaining mortgage default behaviour. Section 7.3 discusses the specification of the logit model and the data for empirical estimations. The estimation results 132
Wong, Fung, Fong and Sze 133
are summarized in section 7.4. Simulations to estimate the impact of the variation in CLTV ratio on default probabilities are given in section 7.5. Section 7.6 introduces two macroeconomic variables, the unemployment rate and changes in stock prices, into the model. Section 7.7 simulates how a relaxation of the maximum 70 per cent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio guideline on mortgage lending may affect banks’ asset quality. Concluding remarks are provided in the final section.
7.2 Theoretical background and literature review There are two main views relating to home mortgage default behaviour ( Jackson and Kasserman 1980). The equity theory of default holds that borrowers base their default decisions on a rational comparison of financial costs and returns involved in continuing or terminating mortgage payments.3 An alternative is the ability-to-pay theory of default (the cash flow approach), according to which mortgagors refrain from loan default as long as income flows are sufficient to meet the periodic payment without undue financial burden. Under the equity theory, the CLTV ratio, which measures the equity position of the borrower, is considered to be the most important factor impacting on default decisions. By contrast, under the ability-to-pay model, the current debt servicing ratio (CDSR), defined as the monthly repayment obligations as a percentage of current monthly income, which captures the repayment capability of the borrower, plays a critical role in accounting for defaults. More recently, research has attempted to incorporate trigger events, such as divorce, loss of a job, and accident or sudden death, in influencing default behaviour (Riddiough 1991). In the simple model, some defaults may be driven by a sudden drop or loss of income caused by unemployment, job shift or a sudden increase in expenses such as medical fees. Furthermore, there was also empirical evidence that transaction costs were present in default decisions (Vandell 1990, 1992; Riddiough and Vandell 1993). For instance, borrowers may consider the value of their reputation and credit rating when deciding on whether to default or not. A final issue relates to the lender’s influence on default decisions. Workout plans helping borrowers who are faced with financial hardships to overcome payment difficulties have long provided an alternative to default. Upon consideration of the financial health of the borrower, the lender may respond in different ways to the threat of a possible default, such as loan restructuring, mortgage recourse, and the adoption of extended repayment plan or refinancing.4 In Hong Kong’s case, post-foreclosure debt collections and possible initiation of a bankruptcy
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petition by creditors are believed to be the major deterrent to default. Transaction costs and lender’s influence are clearly part of the reasons why a borrower does not default when the value of the property falls below the outstanding amount of the mortgage loan. Earlier empirical work has not come to firm conclusions regarding the relative importance of equity and affordability in mortgage default behaviour.