The European Union and the Developing Countries
The European Union and the Developing Countries The Cotonou Agreement
...
22 downloads
1844 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
The European Union and the Developing Countries
The European Union and the Developing Countries The Cotonou Agreement
edited by Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN / BOSTON
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN 90 04 14199 5 © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Printed and bound in The Netherlands.
Preface This conception of this project dates back to the European Studies Association (EUSA) meeting in spring 1999, where both of us had separately presented papers on the on-going negotiation of the future of the enduring relationship between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU). Our panel of four presenters, which was wellattended, was the only one devoted to the subject of EU–South relations at the biennial meeting. Moreover, our quick and unscientific analysis of the volumes on display at the Book Exhibition hall revealed a paucity of scholarship on EU–South relations in general, and ACP–EU relations in particular. This seeming lack of interest in the topic inspired us to contemplate an edited volume, which would enable a comprehensive analysis of the future of the ACP–EU relations from a team of experts on the subject. We set out to sketch the volume, its chapters, and sequence before approaching contributors. Our hope was to edit a volume as though we were the co-authors as opposed to the co-editors, by minimizing the inevitable overlaps between chapters, while maintaining a consistent level of sophistry without being needlessly esoteric throughout the volume. Following in the ensuing chapters of this volume are original contributions by scholars in their own rights on the subject of ACP–EU relations. The analyses are, by design, invariably and universally descriptive, positive, and conjectural rather than theoretical, normative, and retrospective. We hope that this volume will fill a noticeable void in the scholarship on the EU, and that we have produced a reference book that can be useful to students and practitioners of ACP–EU relations and international development. We would like to acknowledge many people who, by their direct and indirect support, helped to make this project a reality. Foremost, we want to express our gratitude to the contributors for their contributions and for their patience with the editors in bringing this project to fruition. We thank anonymous referees for their useful suggestions. Finally, we acknowledge Georgia Lessard and her wonderful staff, especially Kay Stroehle, at Thunderbird’s Instructional Program Development and Support department for their invaluable assistance on this project. We are grateful to all of the contributors who have participated in the project.
v
Contents Preface Tables Charts Abbreviations 1 From Lomé to Cotonou: ACP–EU Partnership in Transition Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber 2 The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations Olufemi Babarinde 3 The Negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement: Negotiating Continuity or Change? Joseph A. McMahon 4 Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements: Contexts and Strategies Stephen Wright 5 Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration among ACP Countries Gerrit Faber 6 An Alternative Strategy for Free Trade Areas: The Generalized System of Preferences Christopher Stevens 7 European Development Aid in Transition Paul Hoebink 8 Political Dialogue in a “New” Framework Karin Arts 9 The Role of Civil Society in the Cotonou Agreement Maurizio Carbone 10 Foreign Direct Investment in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Building on Private Sector Initiatives Dirk Willem te Velde and Sanoussi Bilal 11 The EMU and the ACP countries Peter Macmillan and Alison Watson 12 Conclusion: Synopses and Future Research Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber References List of Contributors Index
vii
v viii ix x 1 17 37
65
85
111
127 155 177 197
219 261 267 289 293
Tables 1.1
Selected Data of ACP Countries
5.1
Selected Economic Indicators of ACP Countries
103
5.2
Membership of RIAs in West and Central Africa
106
5.3
Membership of RIAs in South and East Africa
107
5.4
Average Applied Tariffs and Other Duties and Charges in West and Central Africa in Percentage Terms
108
5.5
Average Applied Tariffs and Other Duties and Charges in South and East Africa in Percentage Terms
109
6.1
Fishing Vessel Characteristics Necessary for Originating Status
122
7.1
131
7.2
EDF and EIB Budgets for Financial Cooperation with ACP Countries Top 15 recipients of EC Aid to ACP Countries, 1986–1998
134
7.3
Cotonou Agreement Financial Resources for 2000–2007
149
7.4
Distribution of Programmed Resources under EDF 9
152
10.1
Foreign Direct Investment and Host-Country Development
200
10.2
Inward FDI Stocks as a Percentage of GDP
206
10.3
Gross Exposure to Investment in Developing Countries
208
11.1
EMU, the EU, and the U.S.: Some Comparative Statistics
222
11.2
The ACP Countries: Selected Economic Information
246
11.3
The ACP Countries: Selected Economic Information
253
viii
13
Charts 10.1
FDI as Percent of Total Fixed Investment in ACP Countries
ix
205
Abbreviations AASM
Associated African States and Madagascar
ACP
African, Caribbean, and Pacific
AGOA
Africa Growth Opportunity Act
APEC
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU
African Union
BCEAO
Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
BEAC
Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale
CA
Cotonou Agreement
CAP
Common Agricultural Policy
CACM
Central American Common Market
CARICOM
Caribbean Common Market
CBI
Cross Border Initiative
CDC
Commonwealth Development Corporation
CEMAC
Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CFA
Communauté Financière Africaine
CFSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy
CDE
Centre for the Development of Enterprise
CET
Common External Tariff
CID
Center for Industrial Development
CIB
Industrial Cooperation Board
COMESA
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COREPER
Committee of Permanent Representatives
CRNM
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery
CSO
Civil Society Organization
CSP
Country Strategy Paper
CSS
Country Support Strategy/ies
CU
Customs Union
DG
Directorate General
DSB
Dispute Settlement Body x
EAC
East African Community
EBA
Everything But Arms
EBAS
EU–ACP Business Assistance Scheme
ECHO
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office
EC
European Community
ECB
European Central Bank
ECU
European Currency Unit
ECGD
Export Credits Guarantee Department
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EDF
European Development Fund
EEC
European Economic Community
EIB
European Investment Bank
EKN
Exportkreditnämden
EMU
Economic and Monetary Union
EPA
Economic Partnership Agreement
ESCB
European System of Central Banks
EU
European Union
FDI
Foreign Direct Investment
FICs
South Pacific Forum Insular Countries
FSU
Former Soviet Union
FTA
Free Trade Area
GATS
General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GNI
Gross National Income
GNP
Gross National Product
GSP
Generalized System of Preferences
HIPC
Highly Indebted Poor Country
IFC
International Finance Corporation
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INFAC
Investment Facility xi
IOC
Indian Ocean Commission
IOR-ARC
Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation
LDC
Least Developed Country
LDLIC
Least Developed, Landlocked, and Island ACP State
M&A
Mergers and Acquisitions
Mercosur
Common Market of the Southern Cone
MFA
Multifiber Arrangement
MFN
Most Favored Nation
MIGA
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NAFTA
North American Free Trade Agreement
NEPAD
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO
Non-governmental Organization
NIP
National Indicative Program
NTB
Non-tariff Barrier
OCT
Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA
Official Development Assistance
OECD PARI
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Programme d´Assistance Regionale Intégré
PPP
Purchasing Power Parity
PRSP
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
R&D
Research and Development
REPA
Regional Economic Partnership Agreement
RIA
Regional Integration Agreement
SAARC
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACU
Southern African Customs Union
SADC
Southern Africa Development Community
SAP
Structural Adjustment Program
SCM
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
SEM
Single European Market
SMEs
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
xii
SSA
Sub-Saharan Africa
SSI
Sector Specialization Index
STABEX
Stabilization of Export Receipts Scheme
SYSMIN
System for the Stabilization of Mineral Exports
TRIPS
Trade Related International Property Rights
TRIMS
Trade Related Investment Measures
UEMOA
West African Economic and Monetary Union
UN
United Nations
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
US
United States of America
WTO
World Trade Organization
xiii
Chapter 1
FROM LOMÉ TO COTONOU: ACP–EU PARTNERSHIP IN TRANSITION Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
1. Introduction At a 23 June 2000 gathering in Cotonou, the capital of Benin, the 15 member states of the European Union (EU) and 77 Sub-Sahara African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries signed a new partnership agreement. Otherwise christened the Cotonou Agreement, the new pact succeeded and replaced the durable Lomé Conventions, which had expired on 29 February 2000 after a quarter-of-a-century of shelf life. The Cotonou Agreement (hereafter, Cotonou) is the outcome of 18 months of protracted and arduous negotiations between the partners. On the one hand, Cotonou constitutes an affirmation and a continuation of an age-old tradition and relationship that was formally begun in
Olufemi Babarinde & Gerrit Faber (eds.), The European Union and the Developing Countries, pp. 1– 15. 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 14199 5.
1
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
March 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed.1 On the other hand, the new partnership agreement amounts to a profound shift in the nature and essence of the relationship, relative to previous ACP–EU conventions. In a sense, the name change from ‘Lomé Convention’ to ‘Cotonou Agreement’ is both symbolic and an embodiment of the shift in philosophy and in design of the relationship. It is symbolic, partly because the agreement could, and was supposed to, have been signed earlier in May 2000 in Fiji.2 It is, however, also an embodiment of a break from the past as if to signal that the new relationship would not be business as usual, but the dawn of a new era. A careful scrutiny of the composition of the two groups of partners, as well as of the scope and instruments of cooperation, might enable a conclusion that the Cotonou Agreement is essentially a continuation of past practice. Indeed, Forwood aptly argues that: ‘Despite modifications in the instruments and objectives, all the features of Lomé have fundamentally been rolled over into the new convention. In the area of trade, where the most obvious change has taken place, the framework for trade will be determined at some point in the future, and the current arrangements will continue for at least another decade. Rather than radical overhaul, the story of Lomé is one of incremental change.’3
Other authors discern a different kind of continuity. For example, Raffer argues that ‘After a quarter of a century, the EU has finally been able to move decidedly towards the situation it had initially wanted when signing Lomé I but was unable to force on ACP countries then’, thus suggesting that perhaps the EU made many more concessions to the ACP than it was prepared to do during the negotiations of Lomé I, and that from Lomé II onwards, the EU has been rolling back these concessions.4 In contrast, however, Oyejide and Njinkeu conclude that ‘Although its trade elements are not yet in place, the Agreement already clearly indicates that these trade elements will represent a major departure from those associated with the Lomé Convention’, thus suggesting that Cotonou amounts to a break with the past.
1
2
3 4
Part Four of the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty made special allowances for the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) of the European signatories of the treaty. To be sure, the relationship between the two groups of countries, which was not always benign, can be traced back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centureies, the era of European adventurism, through the colonial era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Agreement was initially slated for a May 2000 signing ceremony in Fiji, which had to be scrapped because of a coup d’etat in early May in the country. Forwood, 2001. Raffer, 2001.
2
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the fact that the two groups of countries have had a ‘special relationship’ for over 25 years makes it almost impossible to create a completely new form of cooperation agreement all of a sudden. And, indeed, the ‘Lomé acquis’ is visible in many parts of the Cotonou Agreement. This raises the question whether the new agreement constitutes a genuine innovation on the Lomé Convention and, second, whether this amounts to a more effective vehicle for development cooperation. This is the focus of the present volume. 2. A Brief History As noted earlier, ACP–EU relations can be traced to the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty of Rome in which provisions were made to preserve the special economic relationships that existed between some EEC countries and their colonies, also known as Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), and also to promote their economic and social development. Following the independence in the early 1960s of most of their OCTs, the EEC negotiated and concluded an association agreement with its largely francophone former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The accord between the EEC (with six member states) and 18 Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) was signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon in 1963. The essentially reciprocal trade, technical cooperation, and economic assistance pact was renewed for another five years in 1969 (Yaoundé II). The accession of the U.K. to the EEC in 1973 paved the way for the Community to negotiate and conclude a new, single agreement with the AASM group and former British colonies in SSA and in the Caribbean and Pacific islands.5 The agreement was signed in Lomé, the capital of Togo, in 1975 between the EEC (with nine member states) and 46 ACP countries. The Convention was subsequently renegotiated, signed, and entered into force in 1980 (Lomé II), 1985 (Lomé III), and 1990 (Lomé IV). A midterm review of the fourth Convention was undertaken as required in 1995, which involved a new financial package. At each successive Lomé Convention, new issues were introduced, which was partly a tribute to the logic of gradualism and incrementalism that underpinned ACP–EU relations. Broaching new and sometimes sensitive topics was also as much a sign of the changing time as it 5
Protocol 22 of the U.K.’s accession accord stipulated that an economic and social development package that was comparable to the EEC-AASM pact would be extended to the U.K.’s former colonies in Africa, especially south of the Sahara. However, led by Nigeria, and almost fortuitously, both groups of less-developed countries announced their preference for a single negotiated accord, purposely to enhance their solidarity and to pool their limited resources.
3
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
was a reflection of the partners feeling more comfortable with each other. Among the sometimes delicate and controversial issues that have been introduced in ACP–EU relations since 1975 were nonreciprocal trade concessions (Lomé I), the globalization of ACP–EU cooperation (Lomé II), and economic, social, and cultural rights as well as human dignity (Lomé III). Others included human rights, structural adjustment policy, economic diversification, intra-ACP regional cooperation, democratization, and rule of law (Lomé IV). According to most observers, Lomé remained the most farreaching, elaborate, and complex North–South contractual agreement among its contemporaries.6 During most of the accord’s 25-year history, it was widely held as the undisputed flagship of the EU’s development initiative, largely because of its unrivaled extensive concessions to the ACP group. Thus, it occupied the apex of the EU’s pyramid of privileges for almost two-and-a-half decades. One of the principal provisions of all four Lomé Conventions was nonreciprocal trade preferences, which allowed more than 90 percent of ACP exports, predominantly primary commodities, to enter the EU duty free. Special protocols that governed the exports of ACP sugar, rum, beef, veal, and bananas to the EU were appended to the Convention. Another privilege of the pact was the provision of economic assistance to the ACP countries via the European Development Fund (EDF). The disbursement of funds and the management of the EDF, which was first introduced for the OCTs in 1958, were based on ‘need’, defined by, among other requisites, per capita income. The third privilege the ACP group enjoyed was the provision of two commodity insurance schemes, viz., the stabilization of exports (STABEX) in Lomé I and the system of minerals (SYSMIN) in Lomé II, respectively, for countries that were dependent on agricultural exports and on the exports of minerals. The insurance schemes were designed to help mitigate the economic and budgetary impacts of shortfalls in export revenues of the aforementioned primary commodities. A fourth privilege was the provision of industrial and technical cooperation to enable the utilization of the know-how of the EU to facilitate the industrialization and development of ACP societies. To this end, a Center for Industrial Development (CID) and an Industrial Cooperation Board (CIB) were established. A final major provision of the arrangement was the creation of a handful of institutional frameworks to facilitate policy dialogue.7 In spite of the aforementioned privileges, many ACP countries remain in the ranks of the Least-developed countries. Lomé was unable to catapult even a 6 7
See, for example, Babarinde, 1998. It is important to bear in mind that the last two provisions are not unique to the Lomé Convention, because they can be found in other EU agreements with developing countries.
4
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition
majority of the ACP countries to the community of middle-income countries after 25 years of privileged concessions. Economic and social progress in the ACP group was uneven over time and space, but, generally, dramatically slow or even in reverse (see Table 1.1 in the annex to this chapter). It eventually dawned upon the partners and development experts that in many ACP countries—particularly in SSA—the Lomé Conventions were not effective in improving the environment for viable private investment in productive activities. The Lomé Conventions insufficiently addressed macroeconomic imbalances, low quality of public services, and lack of competition. As a result, economic growth was low, and financial and technical aid could not be very effective.8 It was only toward the end of the Lomé era that the EU tried to more effectively channel aid to those countries that attempted to formulate and implement policies that contributed to economic growth. With the benefit of hindsight, it might be argued that this change was a prelude to the much larger alterations that the Cotonou Agreement was to bring about. To its credit, however, Lomé had its moments and accomplishments, without which it would be difficult to fathom why it existed for as long as it did. One of its bright spots was that it remained, throughout its existence, the largest North–South economic relationship, involving almost one billion of the world’s population—71 ACP states (roughly 630 million people) and 15 EU states (roughly 370 million people)—spread across multiple continents.9 Lomé, thus, sensitized each side to the concerns, yearnings, vulnerabilities, and constraints of the other group, in an increasingly and extremely competitive global economy. Another achievement was that the relationship provided a forum for dialogue and cooperation in international fora, thus raising the visibility and stature of both groups of countries, especially the ACP group. Furthermore, none of the Lomé Conventions was imposed on the ACP group. Instead, all four Conventions were negotiated, signed, ratified, and implemented. It could, therefore, be argued that another achievement of Lomé was the fact that, despite the size of the countries involved and the fragility of many of the issues, the partners persevered and the relationship did not collapse. Moreover, Lomé attracted more developing countries to the ACP fold, as its membership grew by more than 50 percent between its inception in 1975 and its expiration in 2000. However, during the 1990s, it became clear that these achievements were insufficient compared to the cost of the cooperation. 8
9
These notions were already discussed at the end of the 1980s, e.g., in T. Killick and C. Stevens, 1989. See also: World Bank 1981, 1983, 1984, 1994; Ravenhill, 1986; Faber and Roelfsema, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999. These statistics were applicable to the Lomé Convention at the time of its expiration in February 2000.
5
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
3. Is Cotonou Really Groundbreaking? Is the Cotonou Agreement a mere change of rhetoric or is there a change of substance? This question constitutes the essence of the discussions in the chapters of this inquiry. First, however, we will turn next to a cursory review of some of the significant innovations of the Cotonou Agreement. The Nature of the Agreement The Cotonou Agreement differs from the Lomé Conventions in a number of formal aspects. Most importantly, the Cotonou Agreement is a framework agreement consisting of objectives, principles, and options for instruments, while the Lomé Conventions were self-contained rule systems. This appears from several facts. First, the text of the new agreement contains only 100 articles, while Lomé IV-bis had 369 articles. Many of the implementation rules have been shifted to the annexes of the Cotonou Agreement. This applies for the trade rules during the preparatory period (2000–2008) and the implementation of financial cooperation. Second, the Cotonou Agreement itself has been concluded for a period of 20 years. The practical parts will or can be renegotiated at shorter intervals. The Financial Protocol applies for a five-year period, while the trade regime has to be negotiated before the preparatory period lapses. Consequent to the framework nature of the agreement, its implementation depends on the outcome of further negotiations and discussions. Both parties have already agreed to the financial package for the first five years of the agreement, while the trade part will require major negotiations between them in the years up to 2008. The Objectives The Cotonou Agreement is explicit as to its objectives: the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty is the prime goal of the cooperation. Poverty reduction should be ‘consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries in the world economy’ (Cotonou, Article 1). This is more precise and different from Lomé IV in which the parties said that their central objective was ‘to promote and expedite the economic, cultural, and social development of the ACP states, and to consolidate and diversify their relations’ (Lomé IV, Article 1). It was only in Lomé IV-bis that improving international competitiveness was included as an objective of trade development (Article 15a), but it was not an overall objective 6
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition
as in the Cotonou Agreement. Thus, the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement are highly consistent with the objectives of the policy of development cooperation of the EU as formulated in Article 177 of the EC Treaty.10 The Principles of Cooperation The Cotonou Agreement has reaffirmed and refined the cooperation principles. Under Lomé IV, the principles of cooperation were equality between partners, the right of self-determination, and security of the ACP–EU relationship. The change in the new agreement is striking. While the principles of equality and sovereignty of ACP states in determining their development strategies are retained from Lomé, they are now qualified in the sense that there should be ‘due regard for the essential elements’ (Cotonou, Article 2). These essential elements are respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law (Cotonou, Article 9). In addition to the aforementioned, three new principles were added: participation of other sections of society in the cooperation between the ACP and the EU ‘in order to encourage the integration of all sectors of society, including the private sector and civil society organizations, into the mainstream of political, economic, and social life’. The development of the private sector has become a priority in the new agreement. In Title I on development strategies, the first area for which such a strategy is outlined is the private sector; dialogue and fulfillment of mutual obligations; parties will be accountable towards each other for meeting their obligations; and differentiation and regionalization, which enables the parties to attune the ways and means of cooperation to the level of development, needs, performance, and long-term strategy of the affected ACP country. The changes in the principles make it clear that there is a strong wish—at least on the part of the EU—to put the ACP–EU relationship on a new footing by broadening the cooperation from a state-to-state relationship to a state-to-civil society and to private sector organizations. Similarly, the regionalization and differentiation principle does away with the previous practice under Lomé to continue to support a country even if it implemented policies that were inimical to development, human rights, rule of law, etc., as long as it did not suppress large sections of the populations or disregarded human rights on a large scale.
10
One might argue that poverty reduction has a higher priority in the Cotonou Agreement compared with the EC Treaty.
7
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
Political Dialogue The parties have agreed to regularly engage in ‘comprehensive, balanced, and deep political dialogue, leading to commitments on both sides’ (Cotonou, Article 8). Subjects to be discussed in the dialogue include arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs and organized crime, and ethnic, religious, or racial discrimination. In addition to conflict prevention and peace promotion, the dialogue will regularly assess the ‘developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance’. If a country does not meet its obligations concerning human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law, ‘appropriate measures’ may be taken, including suspension as a measure of last resort (Cotonou, Article 96). A comparable procedure applies for the obligation of good governance (Cotonou, Article 97). Trade Arrangements For 25 years, Lomé has granted the ACP nonreciprocal preferences that were more generous than the other preferential systems the EU operated. There are several options for the replacement of this system after 2007. Regional groups of ACP countries can negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU that liberalize trade in a reciprocal way during a 10–12-year period. Least-developed ACP countries can opt for the continuation of nonreciprocal preferences under the EU’s preferences for the Least-developed countries (LDCs) that cover almost all products.11 Non-LDC ACP countries that are not in a position to conclude an EPA can try to export under the EU’s GSP after 2007, which is also nonreciprocal in nature. These options are World Trade Organization-compatible, and do away with the discrimination that previously favored the ACP group, based on history and geography. EPAs are characterized by the mutual obligation to liberalize trade. Financial Support The changes in the aid mechanism are in line with the foregoing. The distribution of resources will be based on more explicit criteria than before, namely, need and performance. The latter is a striking innovation. Under Lomé, ACP countries got indications of the amounts of EDF money they could 11
Except arms, and, temporarily, some temperate zone agricultural products (such as sugar). This system is indicated as the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative by the EU.
8
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition
expect for the five-year period of a particular EDF. There were no general criteria for the allocations. The performance yardstick now introduced will be assessed ‘in an objective and transparent manner on the basis of the following parameters: progress in the implementation of institutional reforms; country performance in the use of resources; effective implementation of current operations; poverty alleviation or reduction; sustainable development measures; and macroeconomic and sectoral policy performance’ (Annex IV to the Cotonou Agreement, Article 3). The financial cooperation will be reviewed on a country-by-country basis. There will be annual operational reviews and midterm and end-of-term reviews. A second major change in the aid section involves the pledges to support capacity building of community organizations and non-profit nongovernmental organizations in all spheres of cooperation (Cotonou, Article 7). A third change is the demise of the STABEX and SYSMIN mechanisms. Hailed as the major innovation of Lomé I and Lomé II, but unable to effectively tackle the instability of export receipts, these aid instruments have now almost disappeared. All told, it is evident that the traditional approach to development cooperation through state-to-state relations and government interventions that characterized Lomé has given way to a more mixed approach in which the participation of civil society and the private sector in the formulation and implementation of development strategies is actively supported. Furthermore, the EU seems determined to hold the ACP states more accountable, in return for trade and aid benefits, through political dialogue and reviews of aid implementation. Does this mean that the EU is finally taking the ACP countries seriously? Or should it be seen as the eventual translation of the decreased strategic importance of the ACP for the EU compared to the 1970s? Whatever the answer to these questions, one may argue that the ACP–EU relationship now has more in common with the contractual relationships between the EU and other developing countries. The discriminatory concessions to the ACP group in terms of trade and aid regimes are disappearing, as is the uncritical attitude towards the ACP as a result of ‘automatic entitlements’. 4. The Organization of the Volume Over the past quarter-of-a-century, the environment within which the ACP–EU relationship has existed has naturally and understandably changed. That changed international climate has profoundly affected what is required from the new Cotonou Agreement and has also changed the challenges ACP countries have to address in order to improve their standards of living. In 9
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
Chapter Two, Olufemi Babarinde identifies the most salient factors as well as analyzes how they have impacted the convention and necessitated a new and different arrangement for the twenty-first century. The negotiation of the new agreement that lasted from 1998 to early 2000 is the subject of Chapter Three. During that time period, the pressures for change and for conservation of the past came together. Formally speaking, these negotiations took place between two groups of countries, the EU and the ACP. In practice, the negotiations were much more complex, as noted by Joseph A. McMahon in his discourse of the negotiations and outcomes in terms of the interests and power positions of the parties. The Cotonou Agreement necessitates a continuous negotiating process until at least 2008, when the old nonreciprocal preferential trading system will expire. EPAs will replace it. Which international contexts and strategies will influence the outcomes of these negotiations? How can ACP countries organize themselves in order to optimize the gains that accrue to them from the EPAs? An important issue in this context is the traditional Lomé principle that all ACP countries have the same rights and obligations. Should a new regime adhere to this myth of equality? These and ancillary issues are the subjects of the discourse by Stephen Wright in Chapter Four. The trade regime of the Lomé Convention had at least two problems: its effectiveness, and compatibility with the World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations of the partners. In the transition period up to 2008, the ACP and the EU will have to clarify the options they are going to apply to solve these problems. In Chapter Five, Gerrit Faber discusses free trade areas (FTAs) between groups of ACP countries on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. Relying on a number of economic-theory-based conditions, the chapter investigates the economic effects of FTAs. The chapter then applies these conditions to the practice of regional integration among ACP countries, and answers the question whether FTAs will be a means to stimulate development in ACP countries. The alternative to free trade areas might be a reformed Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which is the focus of the analysis by Christopher Stevens in Chapter Six. The chapter analyzes the amendments of the GSP that would be required to make it a trade instrument to serve the development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. Apart from the trade arrangement, development aid has always been the main instrument of ACP–EU relationship. Although this policy area was not the most debated element of the negotiations, a number of important changes have been introduced. These changes are analyzed by Paul Hoebink in Chapter Seven against the background of the history of EU aid programs and a description of the decision-making structures of the EU aid machinery. Will the 10
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition
EU become a more effective and efficient donor for the ACP group under the Cotonou regime? An important aspect of the ACP–EU cooperation has always been political dialogue, which took place at different levels, including meetings of parliamentary representatives in the Joint Assembly. The new agreement continues and reinforces the dialogue (Cotonou, Article 96). Is such a dialogue an effective instrument to help create a development-oriented environment? Karin Arts tries to answer these questions in Chapter Eight by analyzing two examples of political dialogue during the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement (on migration and on the possible accession of Cuba to Cotonou) and three cases of recent political dialogue between the EU on the one hand, and Haiti, Fiji, and Côte d’Ivoire on the other. One of the most innovative provisions of the Cotonou Agreement is the inclusion of non-state actors in the ACP–EU partnership. The implementation of the Lomé accords was the exclusive preserve of nation-states, and dialogue was very much a government-to-government affair, embodied in a ‘top-down’ development strategy. In light of the disappointing performance of ACP countries, and in view of an emerging consensus in the international development community that favors a ‘bottom-up’ approach to development, non-state actors have been accorded prominent roles in the new pact. In order to avail themselves of the concessions in Cotonou, civil society is to be involved in programming, political dialogue, and project implementation. The feasibility of the new ‘participative development’ paradigm is the focus of Maurizio Carbone’s analysis in Chapter Nine. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can provide a vital complement to domestic resources and foreign financial aid. Sanoussi Bilal and Dirk Willem te Velde argue in Chapter Ten that FDI, although not the sole panacea, can contribute to the transfer of technology and can help developing economies to take full benefit of their potential competitive and comparative advantages. In Chapter Eleven, Peter MacMillan and Alison Watson examine the potential impact the Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the Euro will have on the ACP group, particularly on those countries that are very dependent on trade with, and credits from, the EU. They further examine what the advent of the Euro is likely to mean for those African/ACP countries that already have a pegged currency regime with Europe, especially in terms of advancing their development. Chapter Twelve is, foremost, a synopsis of the conclusions of the volume’s chapters. In addition, it identifies research questions for future analysis. After reading these chapters, the reader will be able to answer the central question that this volume addresses: Is Cotonou only old wine in a new bottle? 11
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber
The authors will discuss the innovations of Cotonou in terms of potentials and conditions that have to be met in order to realize a successful implementation.
12
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition
Annex Table 1.1
Selected Data of ACP Countries Pop (Millions) 2002
Country AFRICA Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verdeb Central Africa Republic Chad Comorosb Congo Congo RDC Côte d’Ivoire Djiboutib Eq. Guineab Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique
GN Income (U.S. bn $) 2002
GN Income p.c. ($) 2002
GDP % Growth 2001– 2002
GDP % Growth 1980– 1990
GDP % 1990– 2002
13 7 2 12 7 16 0.46
9.3 2.5 5.1 2.9 0.7 8.7 0.62
710 380 3,010 250 100 550 1347
15.3 6 3.1 4.6 3.6 4.4 NA
3.6 2.5 11.0 3.6 4.4 3.4 NA
2.7 4.9 5.1 4.0 -1.8 2.4 NA
4 8 0.76 4 52 17 0.67 0.49 4 67 1 1 20 8 1 31 2 3 16 11 11 3 1 18
1 1.8 0.24 2.2 5 10.2 0.59 2.2 0.8 6.5 4 0.4 5.5 3.2 0.2 11.2 1 0.5 3.8 1.7 2.7 0.8 4.7 3.6
250 210 310 610 100 620 880 4490 190 100 3060 270 270 410 130 360 550 140 230 160 240 280 3860 200
-0.8 9.9 NA 3.5 3 -1.8 NA NA 1.8 2.7 3 -3.1 4.5 4.2 -7.2 1 3.8 3.3 -12.7 1.8 4.4 3.3 4.4 7.7
1.4 6.1 NA 3.3 1.6 0.7 NA NA NA 2.3 0.9 3.6 3.0 NA 4.0 4.2 4.5 -7.0 1.1 2.5 0.8 1.8 6.0 -0.1
2.1 2.5 NA 1.6 -4.4 2.8 NA NA 4.3 4.6 2.5 3.3 4.3 4.3 0.7 1.9 3.5 7.4 2.1 3.1 4.2 4.4 5.2 6.9
13
Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber Pop (Millions) 2002 Country Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sao Tomé & Principeb Senegal Seychellesb Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwea Total Africa, SSA CARIBBEAN Antigua & Barbudab Bahamasb Barbadosb Belizeb Cubab Dominicab Dominican Republica Grenadab Guyanab Haiti Jamaica St Kitts – Nevisb St Luciab
GN Income (U.S. bn $) 2002
GN Income p.c. ($) 2002
GDP % Growth 2001– 2002
GDP % Growth 1980– 1990
GDP % 1990– 2002
3.5 2 39.5 1.8
1790 180 300 230
2.7 3 -0.9 9.4
1.3 -0.1 1.6 2.2
3.7 2.6 2.4 1.7
0.16 10 0.08 5 9 45 33 1 35 5 25 10 13
0.05 4.6 0.59 0.7 NA 113.4 12.2 1.4 9.7 1.3 5.9 3.5 6.2
312 470 7607 140 NA 2500 370 1240 290 270 240 340 480
1.1 NA 6.3 NA 3 5.5 3.6 6.3 4.6 6.7 3.3 -8.4
NA 3.1 NA 0.5 2.1 1.0 2.3 6.7 NA 1.7 2.9 1.0 3.6
NA 3.9 NA -3.8 NA 2.2 5.5 3.2 3.5 2.0 6.9 1.1 1.1
687.62
309.99
449.78
2.9
1.6
2.6
0.7 0.33 0.27 0.26 11 0.71
0.64 4.31 2.5 0.8 44.4 0.27
9096 13255 9123 3252 3952 3733
NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA 3.9 NA
9 0.09 0.88 8 3
19 0.42 0.65 3.6 7
2230 4498 742 440 2690
2.7 NA NA -0.9 1.1
3.1 NA NA -0.2 2.0
6.0 NA NA -1.0 0.7
0.37 0.16
0.33 0.63
8850 3951
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
2 11 133 8
14
ACP–EU Partnership in Transition Pop (Millions) 2002 Country St Vincent/the Grenadinesb Surinameb Trinidad & Tobago Total Caribbean
PACIFIC Cook Islands East Timor Fijib Kiribatib Marshall Islands Micronesia Naurub Niue Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islandsb Tongab Tuvalub Vanuatub Total Pacific
GN Income (U.S. bn $) 2002
GN Income p.c. ($) 2002
GDP % Growth 2001– 2002
GDP % Growth 1980– 1990
GDP % 1990– 2002
0.12 0.42
0.35 0.54
2986 1283
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
1
8.8
6750
2.7
-0.8
3.5
36.31
94.24
2611
1.4
NA
NA
NA NA 0.83 0.08
NA NA 1.73 0.05
NA NA 2085 538
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA 0.01 NA NA
NA NA 0.18 NA NA
NA NA 13408 NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
5 NA
2.8 NA
530 NA
-0.5 NA
1.9 NA
3.1 NA
0.46 0.09 0.01 0.19 6.67
0.25 0.13 0.05 0.26 5.45
NA NA NA NA -0.5
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
549 1311 458 1333 833
a
denotes data from 2003 World Development Indicators denotes data from The World Economic Factbook 2003/04 (Euromonitor), and income data are in terms of domestic output, i.e., reported as GDP instead of national output or GNP; NA means ‘not available’. Sources: 2004 World Development Indicators (The World Bank).
b
15
Chapter 2
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF ACP–EU RELATIONS Olufemi Babarinde
1. Introduction On 23 June 2000, the Cotonou Agreement (hereafter, Cotonou), was signed by the European Union (EU) and 77 Sub-Sahara African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.1 The pact marked both a continuation of, and a new beginning in, the long-standing relationship between the two groups of countries. As noted in Chapter One, it is a North–South partnership that dates back to the origins of the EU in the 1950s, when the European Economic Community (EEC) was established.2
1
2
Since the signature of the Cotonou Agreement, Cuba acceded to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group in December 2000, and East Timor joined in May 2003. They thus became the 78th and 79th members of the group, although Cuba has yet to sign the Cotonou Agreement. Part Four of the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty made special allowances for the overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) of the European signatories of the treaty. To be sure, the relationship between the two groups of countries, which was not always benign, can be traced back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the era of European adventurism, through the colonial era of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Olufemi Babarinde & Gerrit Faber (eds.), The European Union and the Developing Countries, pp. 17– 35. 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 14199 5.
17
Olufemi Babarinde
Given that a cursory review of the precursors of Cotonou has already been furnished in Chapter One, that exercise will not be repeated here.3 Against the backdrop of the preceding chapter, therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to flesh out the forces that have characterized the changing climate of ACP–EU relations, particularly since the final decade of the twentieth century. Whereas this chapter provides a broad overview of some of the forces that inspired and necessitated Cotonou, how they were tackled in the new agreement is the subject of subsequent chapters. In any case, in order to provide the context for the discourse in this chapter, the ensuing section will provide in-depth analyses of the forces that comprise the changing environment of ACP–EU relations and explicate why Cotonou had to be different from its forerunners. The penultimate Section 3 will examine the Cotonou Agreement, highlighting inter alia, its main provisions and innovative features. The discourse concludes with a summary and an analysis of Cotonou’s new approach, especially the likelihood that it will accomplish in two decades or less what Lomé failed to achieve in its two-and-a-half decades.
2. The Imperatives of Cotonou There is no doubt whatsoever that the environment within which ACP–EU relations have existed and will continue to exist has profoundly changed. For starters, the EU has become a more visible actor on the global stage, inter alia, by concluding a series of formal bilateral and multilateral relationships with virtually every nook and cranny of the world. To the extent, therefore, that the ACP–EU relationship is merely a part of the EU’s myriad external economic relations nowadays, it must be fine-tuned in order to coexist with other EU third-country accords, as well as compete with them for scarce EU resources. Additionally, both the competencies and the memberships of the EU and the ACP countries have grown since 1975, implying a diffusion and divergence of interests, which, in turn, would necessitate a fine-tuning of the age-old relationship. In any case, the focus of this section is to identify and explicate three imperatives that inform the Cotonou Agreement as a noticeable departure from the ‘business as usual’ approach that characterized the (re)negotiation and implementation of Lomé.
3
See, among others, Babarinde, 1994; Cosgrove-Twitchet, 1978; Dolan, 1978: 369–394; Frey-Wouters 1980; Ravenhill, 1985; and Stevens, 1980.
18
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
The Global Arena Imperatives THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Another imperative on the global stage was the swish of the ostensibly impenetrable Iron Curtain and the concomitant end of the Cold War in 1989– 1990. The end of the Cold War ended an ideologically based bipolar world between the erstwhile Soviet Union-led camp and the U.S.-led Western alliance. Similarly, the dismantling of the Berlin Wall that had partitioned the European landscape during much of post-World War II affected ACP–EU relations in at least two significant ways. First, it broadened the horizon and scope of the EU’s external economic relations. In other words, the EU had to redefine its relationship with its eastern neighbors, but in the broader context of its overall external relations. In redefining the relationship, the EU had to take short- and long-term perspectives, both of which had profound consequences for the ACP. In the short term, the EU provided immediate assistance to the former communist governments, especially as they began reforming their inefficient and neglected economies. In the long term, the EU also had to provide adequate financial and nonfinancial resources to prepare the former totalitarian European states to ‘return to Europe’, via institutional reforms and economic transformations, as it prepared them for eventual EU membership. After all, Article 49 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the EU4 invites any European state to apply for membership, and East and Central European countries promptly queued up. Indeed, the EU welcomed aboard eight countries from Eastern and Central Europe on 1 May 2004.5 In any event, in both of the above scenarios, ACP countries felt threatened and reacted negatively, and the European Commission’s response was just as snappish. The perception of the ACP group was that funds that had previously been earmarked for the group were being redirected to Eastern Europe.6 ACP countries would now have to compete for EU attention cum resources, because of a more immediate and urgent need in the EU’s neighborhood. Second, the collapse of the totalitarian states and planned economies of Eastern Europe meant, in a sense, the vindication of laissez-faire marketoriented economies and of pluralist democracy. The EU was, thus, emboldened 4 5
6
See Title VIII, Article 49 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (1997). At its 12–13 December 2001 summit in Copenhagen (Denmark), the European Council completed accession negotiations with ten countries, only eight of which were from Eastern Europe—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Cyprus and Malta were the other two welcomed to join the EU (Eurecom, December 2002), and they all did in May 2004, bringing the total membership of the EU to 25 (http://www.eurunion.org/News/ urecom/ 2002/eurecom1202.htm). For a trenchant discussion, see, for example, Cosgrove, 1993: 63–74.
19
Olufemi Babarinde
by the enthusiasm and the vigor with which East European countries pursued the precepts of liberal democracy, free and fair elections, and so forth. If postCommunist Eastern Europe could democratize its polity and liberalize its economy, why couldn’t and shouldn’t the ACP countries be compelled to follow suit? Besides, political and economic reforms in ACP states might increase the odds of those societies benefiting from the concessions of the ACP–EU relationship. Ostensibly, enabling civil society and other non-state actors to join the economic and political arenas would widen the political landscape, revitalize political dialogue, enable fresher ideas, and, ultimately, increase the chances for (sustained) development, ceteris paribus. Additionally, the willingness of East European countries to subscribe to transparent decision-making also meant that the EU could no longer turn a blind eye on the political intransigencies of ACP (and non-ACP) states. In a sense, therefore, the positive developments of Eastern Europe could prompt a renaissance of the principles of rule of law, human rights, pluralist democracy, economic liberalization, etc., in ACP–EU relations. To that end, the EU proposed making the disbursement of its limited resources to its ACP partners more contingent-based and more performance-oriented. Previous attempts by the EU to influence the behavior of ACP governments under the Lomé conventions had been resisted on the grounds that such overtures encroached on their sovereignty. To be sure, the inclusion of these conditionalities in the EU’s negotiating mandate for the Cotonou Agreement was also greeted with resistance, but the EU side prevailed.7 The insistence of the EU to include such conditionality clauses in the new pact can be attributed to global changes that emanated from Eastern Europe, as well as to the realization by the ACP group that it had to compete for the EU’s resources in the new dispensation. GATT/WTO OBLIGATIONS
Perhaps the most important reason why the innumerable concessions of Lomé were no longer tenable was the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT and the entering to force of its successor, the WTO, in 1995. These events occurred about the same time Lomé IV was due for its midterm review. To be sure, one of the virtues the GATT/WTO tries to promote is the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle that aspires to establish and advance equal treatment and nondiscrimination among its member states. Given the exclusivity of most of the privileges of Lomé, the conventions were vulnerable on legal grounds. Arguably, the most susceptible of the concessions under Lomé was the 7
For example, see ‘Comparing the ACP and the EU Negotiating Mandates’, The Courier, No. 173, January–February 1999: 72–74, and ‘After Lomé, What Next?’ West Africa, 9–22, November 1998: 798–802.
20
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
nonreciprocal trade regime, which was not compatible with WTO rules because it was extended to only and all ACP countries, irrespective of their level of development. Such a restricted market access privilege is a violation of the MFN principle. Although allowance is made in the GATT/WTO for North– South arrangements such as the ACP–EU pact to elicit a waiver from the WTO for restricted nonreciprocal trade preferences, such exemptions are not meant to be indefinite.8 In response, and to remedy the problem by complying with Article XXIV (GATT/WTO), the EU proposed a series of free trade agreements (FTAs), also known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), with individual and blocs of ACP states in future ACP–EU relations.9 The EU wanted FTAs to replace nonreciprocal trade preferences exclusively for ACP countries. In other words, nonreciprocal trade regimes would be a privilege of the past, perhaps with the exception of the least-developed and highly vulnerable (ACP and non-ACP) countries.10 Another area where the Lomé accord was inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules was in regards to the special protocols on veal, rum, sugar, bananas, etc. Clearly, as designed, the protocols favored ACP producers over non-ACP exporters. Not surprisingly, therefore, some non-ACP exporters of bananas, for example, complained to the EU and to the WTO about the discriminatory nature of the relevant protocol. Their complaints became more strident by the mid-1990s. In fact, by 1994, two Dispute Settlement Panels on bananas ruled that the protocol was incompatible with Article XXIV of the GATT. The EU, however, blocked the adoption of both reports. Following the inauguration of the WTO, the U.S. government, joined by four other governments,11 filed the first of a series of complaints with the WTO in 1995, challenging the legality of the Banana protocol. The complainants alleged that the protocol was in violation of the MFN, national treatment, and nondiscrimination clauses of the GATT, because it discriminated against importers and distributors of non-ACP bananas, especially the so-called ‘dollar banana’ producers of Central America. In 1997, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruled against the EU and 8
9
10
11
The ACP group and the EU indeed requested such a waiver from the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the midterm review, as a transitional measure to help mitigate the impact of the cessation of nonreciprocity in ACP–EU relations. The waiver was granted in 1997 and expired in February 2000. For a trenchant discourse of both partners’ negotiating mandates, see ‘Comparing the ACP and the EU negotiating mandates’, The Courier, No. 173, January–February 1999: 72–74, and ‘After Lomé, What Next?’ West Africa, 9–22, November, 1998: 798–802. See also, Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the Eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and options for a new partnership (1996). The least-developed and highly vulnerable countries tend to have a large pre-literate population, depend on commodity exports, be susceptible to the volatile commodity markets and prices, be encumbered by huge external debt, be unattractive destinations for FDI, and so on. The Central American countries were Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.
21
Olufemi Babarinde
the ACP states, citing several areas where GATT rules were violated.12 Despite the EU’s attempt to modify the banana regime of Lomé, it was later determined by the DSB that the EU’s proposed remedies on the protracted banana dispute did not sufficiently comply with the EU’s WTO obligations under the previous DSB ruling on the subject.13 The DSB ruled that while the EU could, under certain circumstances, grant preferential treatment to ACP banana exporters, the EU’s quota and licensing system of Lomé still discriminated against nonACP producers.14 In the final analysis, legal imbroglios that stem from the commodity protocols of Lomé have rendered such exclusive privileges increasingly indefensible. GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION
A third global imperative is the advent of globalization and regional integration. Both are in vogue and are clearly evident in many regions of the world. However, there are growing misgivings in some quarters of the world about globalization in particular.15 In light of this, the EU seems to be taking the view that the phenomenon need not be zero-sum or be disastrous for the South, nor widen the gulf between the North and the South. It seems the EU is hoping to use the ACP–EU relations to demonstrate that globalization can be positive-sum and beneficial to all and sundry. To this end, and in consonance with WTO principles, the EU, during the negotiations of Cotonou, argued that regional integration could and should be used to effectively link ACP societies to the global economy. The EU took the view that ACP countries would be better positioned to advance their development only if they were properly and effectively integrated into the global economy. Hence, the EU proposed replacing the nonreciprocal trade regime with a series of FTAs/EPAs that, after a transition period, would allow ACP states to develop their national and/or regional infrastructures and capacities. The EU/European Imperatives WIDENING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Every enlargement of the EU has certainly influenced the need for a different ACP–EU relationship since 1957. Each time the EU has welcomed new members to its fold, the relationship between the EU and the ACP group has 12 13 14 15
See, among others, Eurecom, October 1995: 2, October 1997: 1, and November 1998: 2. The DSB ruling was in response to a complaint by Ecuador, and later by the EU. See Eurecom, February 1998: 3 and April 1999: 2–3. Seattle 1999 and Prague 2000 are two examples where organized movements against globalization forced the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank to either cancel or abruptly end their meetings.
22
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
been affected. Before the first enlargement of the 1970s, ACP–EU relations were tilted in the direction of former French and Belgian colonies in Africa. As noted in Chapter One, U.K. accession in 1973 brought about a more comprehensive and expanded relationship between the EU and its ACP partners. Specifically, former British colonies were brought into the ACP–EU picture. The enlargement of the 1980s further sensitized EU external relations to Latin America—the former colonies of Portugal and Spain. Following the 1986 accession, EU contacts with Latin America steadily grew as Spain, in particular, lobbied for the region within the EU, both in the Commission, when policies are being formulated, and in the Council, when the fate of policies are being decided. The 1986 enlargement arguably marked the beginning of the ebbing of the ACP group’s importance with respect to the EU’s pyramid of privileges. The enlargement of the 1990s, when Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the EU, continued the ebbing of ACP importance in Brussels, especially as the new EU member states historically had no colonial ties with the ACP countries.16 The 1989–1990 political earthquakes in Eastern Europe and the eventual accession of East and Central European states to the EU by 2004 will further challenge the importance of the ACP group in the EU. For instance, it is a well-known secret that Sweden and Finland have enthusiastically championed the impending accession of their Baltic neighbors. As noted above, the latest enlargement will amount to a fiercer competition by the ACP group for the EU’s finite resources, especially as its internal and external obligations grow. Additionally, given the lack of any colonial ties with the ACP group among the former Communist bloc countries, and in view of their own economic challenges/needs, it is yet to be seen if, upon accession, East European countries would enthusiastically support, for example, a considerable increase in the tenth EDF package. COMMISSION REFORMS
A second European imperative that has informed the changed environment of ACP–EU relations is the growing competence and bureaucratic apparatus of the EU. The increased number of Directorates General (DGs) of the European Commission and of its Eurocrats has translated into a proliferation of ideas and policies, as well as the diffusion of influence within the supranational entity. More poignantly, the cultivation of an ACP–EU relationship, for which the DG for Development was created, is no longer the only (external/development) policy for which there is a bureaucracy to lobby on its 16
Sweden, however, has a credible history of generously assisting LDCs, especially SSA, financially.
23
Olufemi Babarinde
behalf. Given the importance the EU has attached to enlargement,17 it would be naïve to think that the DG and Commissioner for Enlargement would not carry more weight within the European Commission nowadays, relative to their Development counterparts. Indeed, the DG for Enlargement and Commissioner Günter Verheugen have become among the busiest in Brussels and beyond, nowadays. DEEPENING INTEGRATION
The consolidation of European integration is equally forcing changes in ACP–EU relations. Most notably and most recently, the entering to force of the European Union Treaty of Maastricht (1993) and of Amsterdam (1999), and the imminent entering to force of the 2001 Nice Treaty necessitated the modification of some aspects of its relationship with the ACP countries (and others). After all, EU mandates on external economic relations derive from the establishing treaties—the legal bases for EU policies around the world, including ACP–EU relations. For example, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Maastricht treaty provided the legal underpinnings for the inclusion of political dialogue, economic partnership, and social development in the negotiation of Cotonou. Article 11.1 of the consolidated European Union Treaty provides that the CFSP shall ‘Preserve peace and strengthen international security…promote international cooperation, develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’.18 In order to comply with the provisions of the article, the EU overtly pushed for development cooperation policies to promote pluralist democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance in ACP societies. Similarly, in the negotiation of Cotonou, the EU also pushed for explicit provisions for poverty alleviation and eradication to be placed at the core of future ACP–EU relations (as discussed in subsequent chapters of this volume). The EU also argued for the inclusion of gender equality as a means of enabling sustained economic development. The aforementioned measures were proposed by the EU partly to make the ACP–EU relationship consistent with the European Union Treaty of Maastricht. Another example of how the deepening of European integration would affect the new ACP–EU pact was the launching of the SEM initiative, which 17
18
A Commissioner with the Enlargement portfolio was created under the Prodi presidency to underscore the seriousness with which the EU treats the issue. See either the Official Journal of the European Union, C 325, 24 December 2002, or http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf. The provision is also available in the Treaty on European Union, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.
24
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
sought to eradicate trade barriers within the EU and create an opportunity for one-stop shopping. To that end, Lomé concessions, such as the Banana protocol, were inconsistent with the logic of the SEM. The banana protocol, for example, restricted the distribution of imported ACP bananas within the EU, which was a clear violation of the free movement of goods (Title I, Treaty of Amsterdam).19 The negotiation of ACP–EU relations also had to be altered by yet another attempt by the EU to consolidate its integration, namely, the inception of the euro. For instance, in 1998, the Council of Ministers for Finance agreed to allow the CFA Franc, which is widely used by France’s former colonies in SSA, to be pegged to the euro. The implications of the euro for ACP–EU relations are the subject of another inquiry in this volume. 20
THE GLOBAL VISIBILITY OF THE EU
In addition to the structural position of the EU in the global market,21 the growing visibility of the EU in the international arena, as noted earlier, also necessitated an alteration in the relationship between the EU and the ACP group. The enhanced profile of the EU on the global stage means that more constituencies are dependent on its benevolence nowadays, especially in light of evidence of growing poverty in absolute terms, unequal distribution of wealth in the world, and increasing donor fatigue. Already, the EU is the largest provider of economic assistance and relief measures across the globe. Yet the demands on its finite resources have not abated, even in the face of budgetary constraints at the national and supranational levels. One can, therefore, appreciate why it would be frustrated, especially if the previous privileges of Lomé have failed to advance the development of ACP societies. ACP Imperatives22 DISAPPOINTING RESULTS IN ACP SOCIETIES
Notwithstanding the concessions of the Lomé Convention and the preferential access to the EU market, the overall welfare of the ACP countries has been disappointing. Perhaps the most telling of the statistics is the share of ACP products in total EU imports (imports from the South), which has precipitously declined from roughly eight percent (20 percent) in 1975 to
19 20 21 22
Treaty of Amsterdam, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf. See, among others, van Dijck and Faber, 2000; Rhodes, 1998; and Piening, 1997. By this, we mean the EU is more dependent on export markets in different regions of the world. To be clear, the discourse that follows is from the perspective of observers/critics of the ACP–EU relationship, including some ACP countries, particularly in the Caribbean.
25
Olufemi Babarinde
under four percent (nine percent) by the late 1990s.23 Conversely, the nonACP developing countries of Asia and Latin America more than doubled the proportion of their products in total EU imports from the South. Despite the poor performance of the ACP group, most of the member countries still `depend today, as in 1975, on the exports of the same handful of primary commodities for foreign exchange, thus implying a lack of diversification. For example, in 1998, of their total export earnings, oil accounted for roughly 80 percent in the Congo, and 90 percent in Angola and Nigeria. In that same vein, the degree of commodity dependence was estimated at 90 percent in Botswana (diamonds), Burundi (coffee), Rwanda (coffee), and Zambia (copper). Other commodity-concentrated economies in the late 1990s included Ghana (cocoa at 46 percent), Sudan (cotton at 43 percent), Central African Republic (diamonds at 41 percent), and Malawi (tobacco at 40 percent). Indeed, labor-intensive primary products constitute over 80 percent of ACP exports to the EU, while the share of such products in total extra-EU imports has declined since 1975.24 Not surprisingly, and despite two-and-ahalf decades of EU concessions, 42 of the 64 countries in the World Bank’s unenviable category of least-developed countries (LDCs) are ACP Member States.25 Additionally, an estimated 45 percent of the SSA and almost 40 percent of the Caribbean peoples still live below the poverty threshold, surviving on $2 or less daily. UNWIELDY GROUP
Another ACP imperative for altering ACP–EU concessions stemmed from the size of the group, which had increased from 46 in 1975 to 77 in 2000, at the time Cotonou was signed. The argument was that the group had grown too large for any meaningful and effective development strategies to be 23
24
25
Trade data for this inquiry were (reported in U.S. dollars and in percentages) obtained from a variety of sources, including the Direction of Trade Statistics (various years), The International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.; and International Trade Statistics Yearbook (various years), The United Nations, Geneva. While it is plausible that the ACP group could have diversified their markets, hence the reason for the decline of their exports in total EU imports, it is doubtful that the group would have consciously restricted its exports to the EU, the only economic entity that granted it unfettered nonreciprocal dutyfree access to its market, and instead increased its exports to other non-EU countries with far less generous trade concessions. More importantly, what we are after here is the extent to which the ACP group availed itself of the EU’s nonreciprocal concessions. Ceteris paribus, one would expect the ACP group’s share of total EU imports to increase (steadily) since 1975, unless the concession was a sham or the ACP group was incapable of taking advantage of the concessions, or both. The bulk of the EU’s imports from ACP countries included food beverages, raw materials, textiles, fuel products, and other primary products. 2004 World Development Indicators, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004. East Timor is excluded from this observation, because it did not join the ACP group until May 2003. Otherwise, the number of ACP countries in the least-developed countries would have been 43 out of 64.
26
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
developed. The growing concern among observers was that it was time to abandon the straitjacket ‘one size fits all’ logic that underpinned previous ACP–EU arrangements. It was argued by the EU and by observers of the relationship that perhaps the reason why previous concessions had not advanced the development of ACP societies was because the strategy was predicated on a flawed assumption that all ACP countries suffered the same maladies. Critics pointed out that previous concessions made little distinction between the development challenges of ACP countries.26 The new thinking that informed the strategy and the EU’s negotiating mandate for the new agreement was to cluster ACP countries by needs and levels of development. Doing so, for example, would allow the EU to devote certain resources/concessions to certain ACP states, while complying with WTO rules. Furthermore, clustering would enable a narrower and more accurate diagnosis of afflictions among ACP countries, which, in turn, should lead to a more effective panacea. Clustering, argued the EU, would also allow an individual ACP country or a subgroup of ACP countries to travel at different speeds, by concluding a series of free trade agreements with the EU, and to enable intra-ACP cooperation and integration. To this end, opportunities would exist for differentiated treatments, vis-à-vis national indicative programs, of land-locked and island countries. On these points, both partners agreed that the arrangement would promote South–South interaction, a departure from the stodgy North–South framework of previous accords. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
A third reason why an altered approach was considered necessary was the fact that the most recent of the pre-Cotonou models was not designed to reward performance; after all, some ACP countries, such as the Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji, Mauritius, and Trinidad, and Tobago have availed themselves of EU concessions, and should have been rewarded. Thus, in the negotiation of Cotonou, the EU introduced performance-based provisions/concessions, exemplified by its positive differentiation initiative. It was also felt that the reason why most ACP countries showed no evidence of development might have something to do with the cumbersome procedures that governed the disbursement of the EDF. In fact, almost € 10 billion of unspent funds remained from the Lomé Conventions, arguably due to the burdensome procedures for accessing funds, the incompetence of ACP bureaucrats, and extenuating circumstances in ACP societies. To that end, both parties,
26
For example, see negociation10_en.htm.
‘ACP–EU
Negotiation’,
27
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/event/
Olufemi Babarinde
especially the ACP countries, wanted the procedures for accessing funds to be streamlined. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN ACP COUNTRIES
Another important reason why a different approach was considered essential was the advent of political and socioeconomic reforms, albeit grudgingly, in ACP countries. Reforms, manifested largely in democratic renaissance and socioeconomic emancipation were increasingly noticeable in many ACP countries since the early 1990s. To be sure, ACP countries did not always embark on reforms of their own volition, but were pressured to do so by Western governments and the external donor community, which increasingly tied development assistance and debt relief measures to the development of pluralist politics and a veritable market economy cum expansive space for the private sector. The pressure to reform in Africa and other ACP states was consequent to the deteriorating economic condition and growing public discontent in many ACP countries, coupled with the swish of the Iron Curtain in the defunct Soviet bloc Eastern Europe, where economic and political reforms were quickly embraced in their bid to ‘return to Europe’. In any event, in many ACP countries, nowadays, the relationship between the state and non-state actors (civil society) is being redefined, governments and the populace are paying more than a lip-service attention to the notion of good governance (accountability, popular participation, and transparency), human and minority rights are becoming important in the popular lexicon, and adjudication increasingly relies on the rule of law. In addition, microeconomic and macroeconomic policies in virtually all ACP countries continue to emphasize the private sector, enterprise development, reduced state intervention and involvement in the economy, and creating an enabling environment for private capital. In short, in the reform-minded ACP societies of today, there is an auspicious window of opportunity for both the EU and its ACP partners to explore a different, and, hopefully, a more effective approach to their relationship.
3. The Cotonou Agreement:27 The Devil Is in the Detail Next, we turn to a discourse of the new partnership agreement, with special emphasis on its innovative provisions, thereby highlighting how it has accommodated the foregoing imperatives. The new accord essentially builds on the acquis of the Lomé Convention by reforming the relationship. Unlike 27
The Cotonou Agreement, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/ cotonou/index_en.htm.
28
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
its precursor conventions that were concluded for five- or ten-year periods, the Cotonou Agreement has a 20-year duration. However, the pact is to be reviewed every five years, and some of its components, such as the procedures for the implementation of financial assistance, may be reviewed annually. Similarly, the financial protocol is designed for five-year periods. The agreement is divided into six parts, all but two of which are further subdivided into titles, chapters, and sections. The six parts deal with general provisions; institutional provisions; cooperation strategies; development finance cooperation; general provisions for the least-developed, landlocked, and island ACP states (LDLICs); and final provisions, in that order. Appended to the main text are five annexes, respectively on financial protocol, institutional support, implementation procedures, management procedures, and trade regime applicable during the preparatory period. Finally, there are five major protocols that cover varied and all-too-familiar issues from the Lomé era, such as rules of origin, sugar, beef, veal, and bananas. Summarily, the main objectives of the new partnership agreement are the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, sustainable development, and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the global economy. The new agreement is also based on the fundamental principles of equality of the partners, ownership of the development strategies by ACP countries and populations, inclusion of different kinds of actors, and differentiation and regionalization of the cooperation agreement. The accord is intended to significantly advance the economic, social, and cultural development of the ACP societies; to help them cope with the challenges of globalization; and to strengthen ACP–EU partnership. Consequently, each ACP country is to take the lead in setting up its own development strategies and initiatives, which must be supported by the financial and ancillary instruments of the Convention, and driven by the stated objectives of the new partnership. Additionally, the development initiatives are to be integrative and holistic with a view to the political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental aspects of sustainable development. Next, we will flesh out the five major interrelated dimensions of the Cotonou Agreement. The Political Dimension This provision addresses such issues as political dialogue, peace building, and other essential and/or fundamental elements of sustainable development in ACP countries. Essentially, this dimension calls for regular dialogue between the EU and the ACP groups to address specific political issues of 29
Olufemi Babarinde
mutual interest or of general significance. Such dialogues would include the employment of regional initiatives and conflict prevention, and resolution policies to tackle the perennial problems of political instability within and between ACP countries. The dimension also identifies respect for human rights as well as democratic principles and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of sustainable development. Serious violations of any of the elements would trigger sanctions on the affected ACP country. Consequent to the ACP group’s earlier opposition in the 1999 Santo Domingo Declaration, ‘good governance’ was derogated from ‘essential elements’ to ‘a fundamental and positive element’. What it means is that, while the partners acknowledge the importance of good governance, violations would not necessarily result in financial penalties. To be sure, the partners clearly recognized that a politically stable, democratic, and rule-abiding society is a precondition for sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, as stated in the preamble and variously in the agreement. The onus of creating such an enabling and favorable climate, however, shall rest squarely on individual ACP countries. The Civil Society Dimension This provision is intended to encourage and maximize participation of nonstate economic and social actors in the implementation of the new pact’s programs and projects. It is an attempt to decentralize cooperation and depart from the previous paradigm of state-state political dialogue and top-down implementation of projects and programs. It is, thus, recognition of the failure of the old approach, which excluded civil society and denied crucial ownership of programs and projects that were funded by Lomé. This dimension is intended to facilitate interaction and the sharing of vital information between ‘public actors’, defined as local, national, and regional governments/authorities, and ‘non-state actors’, defined as the private sector, economic and social organizations, and civil society. It is also designed to facilitate networking between EU and ACP partners. In other words, in addition to the accord’s institutions, viz., the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors, and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, political dialogue is to encompass civil society, the private sector, and other non-state actors. This principle of an expanded participatory approach to sustainable development would not only enrich the dialogue among society’s stakeholders, but would also increase the odds of achieving the stated objectives of the accord. The implicit assumption is that the involvement of civil society, both in the development of pertinent initiatives and strategies as 30
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
well as in the implementation of projects and programs, would encourage ownership/empowerment and ultimately facilitate sustainable development in ACP countries. The Poverty Reduction Dimension This is arguably the epicenter of the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, especially given its frequent recurrence in the agreement. The reduction of poverty in ACP countries is explicitly stated as the central objective of the agreement in its preamble, Title 1 of Part 3 ‘Development Strategies’, and other provisions. Indeed, virtually every aspect of the new agreement, directly or otherwise, targets or alludes to poverty reduction/eradication as a major goal. To combat poverty in ACP societies, the strategy reflects both the international commitments of the partners under the auspices of august bodies, such as the UN, as well as the multidimensional nature of poverty. The new accord calls upon each ACP country to design its own consolidated and integrated development framework that is workable and measurable. It further provides for the inclusion of non-state actors in such undertakings in order to encourage local ownership of economic and social programs/projects. To that end, the approach to poverty reduction aims to develop strategies and policies that are broad-based and cover the gamut of important stakeholders. Such an integrated and global approach to poverty reduction/eradication would have to heed private sector development and investment, economic and structural reforms and policies, economic sector development, tourism, social sector development, youth-related concerns, cultural issues, regional cooperation and integration, gender equality issues, environmental and natural resources concerns, and institutional and capacity building. The Trade Dimension The much-vilified nonreciprocal trade preferences the ACP partners enjoyed under the expired Lomé Convention are to be gradually replaced, as expected, by a series of ‘economic partnership agreements’ (EPAs) with the EU, such that ACP–EU trade regime is in consonance with WTO rules. EPAs are to be negotiated and concluded by 1 January 2008, when the new trading arrangements are to enter to force. Formal negotiations of the EPAs commenced on schedule in September 2002. In 2004, the EU is to assess the cases of those ACP countries that are not in the category of ‘least developed’ and are deemed unsuitable for EPAs, and WTO-compatible alternative 31
Olufemi Babarinde
arrangements are to be explored for them. In 2006, a formal and comprehensive review of the arrangements that is planned for every ACP Member State will be undertaken in order to ensure that additional time is not needed for preparations or negotiations. The agreement stipulates that EPAs will be concluded with only those ACP countries that consider themselves ready for the regime, at the level they consider appropriate, and in accordance with regional integration processes within the ACP region. The EPAs will establish the timetable for the gradual removal of barriers to trade between the EU and ACP states, after the entering to force of the new trade regime. Meanwhile, in 2000, the EU commenced the liberalization of all imports from the world’s poorest or least-developed countries (including qualified ACP states), so that by 2005, all exports from the affected countries will enter the EU duty free. Additionally, the accord provides for a ‘preparatory period’, defined as 2000–2008, during which both the public and the private sectors of ACP countries are to enhance their competitiveness, strengthen regional organizations, and support regional integration initiatives. Finally, whereas the new accord maintains the commodity protocols (sugar, beef, veal, banana), they are to be reviewed later in the context of the new trading arrangements and ensured that they are WTO-compliant. In essence, the new agreement aims to gradually liberalize trade between the two partners, gradually integrate the ACP economies to the global economy, increase production and trading capacities, and ensure the compatibility of new trading arrangements with WTO rules. For all practical purposes, the trade dimension is designed to utilize trade as an engine of growth and sustained development, by gradually liberalizing trade relations between the partners and concluding free trade arrangements with ACP countries/groups. This is consistent with the EU’s recent initiative in this regard, such as the FTAs it concluded with the Republic of South Africa and with Mexico.28 It also ensures compliance with WTO principles of nondiscrimination and MFN. Furthermore, the dynamism that would be generated by ACP trade and the gradual integration of their economies into the world market, would, other things being equal, stimulate sustained development. The Financial Cooperation Dimension The agreement includes provisions on both the implementation of development assistance and the size of the assistance. In other words, on the 28
The EU–Mexico FTA, which was concluded in December 1999, entered to force on July 1, 2000 (Eurecom, July/August 2000: 2), while the EU–South Africa FTA, which was concluded in 1998, has also entered to force.
32
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
one hand, the new pact addresses varied reform issues, such as how development assistance will be determined and disbursed, while on the other hand, the pact identifies the financial instruments and their allotted amounts. The instruments and the implementation of the development aid regime are a departure from the past. For example, grants will henceforth be applied to offset shortfalls in export earnings, especially for commodity-dependent ACP countries, thereby replacing STABEX and SYSMIN. The two commodity insurance schemes are effectively converted to structural adjustment support, and enable a broader number of ACP beneficiaries. Additionally, in contrast to past practice, the new aid regime is centralized and rationalized, such that each ACP country is entitled to a lump sum for a five-year period. However, access to the funds will not be automatic, as it will, hereafter, be based on need and past performance—that is, result-oriented. Furthermore, the financial resources will not be locked to specific projects, although certain sectors will be emphasized in order to maximize overall impact. Another innovative idea in the pact is the establishment of a system of Country Support Strategy (CSS), which is designed to take stock of the sociopolitical and economic climate as well as the development strategies of an applicant ACP country. Finally, the new agreement has replenished the ninth EDF to a tune of € 13.5 billion during the first five years of the agreement, € 10 billion of which are intended for long-term financing, another € 1.3 billion for regional financing, and € 2.2 billion for investment financing.29 Moreover, the unspent € 9.9 billion from the previous EDF, plus another € 1.7 billion of funds from the European Investment Bank (EIB), will also be available to the ACP group. 4. In Conclusion: Praxis and Analysis This inquiry has examined the main forces that necessitated Cotonou. After all, Lomé could have been renegotiated and renewed as it had been on three occasions during its 25-year history. However, the environment in which the age-old ACP–EU relationship has existed has profoundly changed since the inception of the first Lomé Convention in 1975. The world has become ‘smaller’ as a result of technological advancement, which has concomitantly altered and broadened the horizon of both partners with regard to new challenges and aspirations. The advent of globalization and regionalization, for example, has impacted both partners differently, and had to be accommodated by the new ACP–EU partnership in the new millennium. 29
As also noted in other chapters of this volume, the 9th EDF was not a significant increase over the 7th and 8th EDFs, in annualized terms.
33
Olufemi Babarinde
Additionally, current international obligations of EU and ACP countries under the auspices of multilateral institutions, such as the WTO and the UN, have made some previously acceptable privileges no longer justifiable. Moreover, both partners have grown in membership, thus suggesting a concomitant divergence of interests within and between the groups. Besides, after 25 years, perhaps ACP–EU relations had become stale, especially since it did little to advance development in most ACP countries. Cotonou is designed to reinvigorate the age-old relationship. Undoubtedly, the new partnership agreement contains some innovative ideas as well as some old ones. On the one hand, the new partnership agreement does not appear to be profoundly dissimilar, at least substantively, from its forerunners, because most of the issues it covers have been broached in the preceding conventions. Cotonou, therefore, amounts to a repackaging of essentially old ideas save a few bold initiatives, such as the (regional) EPAs, augmenting the visibility of civil society and other non-state actors. On the other hand, the new pact has attempted to refine the long-standing relationship in order to make it user-friendly, more effective in the development of ACP societies, and more flexible and adaptive to a dynamic global environment. The jury is still out on how likely the ‘new and improved’ partnership agreement is to alleviate and eradicate poverty in ACP societies, effectively integrate their economies into the global economy, promote pluralist democracy and the rule of law, and, ultimately, advance and sustain the development of their societies. There is little doubt that the ACP group will have to sustain and intensify reform efforts that were begun in the 1990s in their societies in order for the Cotonou Agreement to be effective. Certainly, the goals of any initiative by the ACP group or its subset must be compatible with the agenda of the Cotonou Agreement. One such encouraging example was the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative, which African leaders and the African Union (AU) launched on 11 July 2001 purposely to rid their societies of severe and widespread poverty, promote and sustain Africa’s economic growth and development, and stop the continent’s marginalization in the globalization process.30 From the foregoing, it could be concluded that the aforementioned goals of NEPAD and the ambitions of the Cotonou Agreement are coterminous. It is nonetheless without doubt that the Cotonou Agreement still faces some challenges and lingering questions ahead. First, while the expansion of political dialogue to include civil society is noble and long overdue, are state 30
For more on NEPAD, nepadEngversion.pdf.
see,
for
example,
34
http://www.nepad.org.ng/PDF/About%20Nepad/
The Changing Environment of ACP–EU Relations
actors that had monopolized the decision-making space in ACP societies, virtually since independence, prepared to share the center stage with nonstate actors? Second, given resource constraints, does the EU have the manpower and resiliency to concurrently negotiate several EPAs with ACP countries and groups of ACP countries during the preparatory period? Third, will the ACP states develop the requisite capacity to negotiate, conclude, and implement bilateral trade agreements during the allowed period? Adhering to the specified timetable will be a challenge for both sides, particularly the ACP group, given its antecedents and paucity of infrastructure and qualified personnel. On this point, it is interesting to note that many ACP countries had already missed a March 2001 deadline, when they were expected to indicate their preference on the EPAs, that is, whether they intended to negotiate on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. If the latter, they should also specify the regional bloc with which they preferred to be classified. On the other hand, it is heartening to note, albeit not surprisingly, that the EU came through on one of its obligations under the Cotonou Agreement to liberalize trade for the world’s poorest countries. Specifically, the EU’s Council of Ministers for Trade agreed to a new policy to remove trade barriers to all nonmunitions exports of the world’s 48 least-developed countries, which went into effect 5 March 2001. The ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) concession is in conformity with WTO principles of nondiscrimination, because it is extended to both qualified ACP and non-ACP countries.31 Most notably, by excluding armaments, the EBA can combat a major contributor to instability and, thus, poverty in many ACP countries. What is unclear, however, is how the relatively affluent ACP states will be affected by, as well as cope with, the monstrous and ostensibly irredeemable Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and other EU policies that continue to subsidize EU producers. The EU has yet to develop the political will and muster the courage to seriously address the vexing problems of the infamous CAP, much to the chagrin and the detriment of the farm community in the ACP and other underdeveloped societies. Will Cotonou deliver and succeed where its precursors have not? Only time will tell, but on the basis of the foregoing analysis, its odds of making a difference in ACP societies are better than its antecedents. Meanwhile, some of the pertinent issues raised in this discourse are fleshed out and analyzed further in ensuing chapters.
31
See, for example, Eurecom, March 2001: 3–4.
35
Chapter 3
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE COTONOU AGREEMENT: NEGOTIATING CONTINUITY OR CHANGE? Joseph A. McMahon
1. Introduction This chapter focuses on the negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries of the Cotonou Agreement, the replacement for the Lomé IV Convention that had governed their relationship since 1990. When that Convention was signed, it was hailed as a ‘Convention for a changing world’.1 The major innovation was undoubtedly introduced by article 366(1) under which the duration of the Convention was extended to ten years, although the next paragraph did offer the opportunity of a mid-term review to coincide with the renewal of the Financial Protocol to the Convention. In May 1994, negotiations on the mid-term review 1
The Courier, No. 120 (February–March 1990), p. 2. Olufemi Babarinde & Gerrit Faber (eds.), The European Union and the Developing Countries, pp. 37– 63. 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 14199 5.
37
Joseph A. McMahon
opened. When negotiations were concluded 18 months later, a new Financial Protocol had been signed and various revisions had been introduced to the provisions of the Convention. The mid-term review confirmed the completion of the process of transforming the Convention from a mere economic and commercial agreement to a political and development device.2 It is against this background that the parties would have to negotiate a successor to Lomé. At the opening of these negotiations the President of the Council of ACP Ministers commented:3 ‘Of course, there have been disappointments in realizing the goals of the Convention in full measure; and the faults of omission and commission that marked the progress of Lomé through the last quarter of this century have been on all sides. But those deficiencies have never been so large as to question the value of the journey itself. As we enter into discussions once more at another time that is new, so new indeed that it represents a shift of eras, let us be positive about the past and ambitious for the future. The question that will engage us over coming years is not whether to go on together but how to revitalize our partnership for development.’
A number of questions arise from this. Why have there been disappointments in realizing the goals of the Convention in full measure? Are those deficiencies so large as to question the value of the journey itself? Is this time different? Are there good reasons to be positive about the past and ambitious for the future? How is the partnership for development to be revitalized? This chapter will seek to address these questions through an examination of the history of the Lomé relationship, the nature of the changed environment facing the parties during the negotiations for the Cotonou Agreement and their respective negotiating positions. The chapter will conclude by addressing the final question, namely, what exactly was the outcome of the negotiations, a continuation of the past relationship or a changed relationship to revitalize the partnership for development? 2. Positive about the Past? Answers to the question of why there have been disappointments in realizing the goals of the Lomé Conventions in full measure are many and varied. If the area of trade is highlighted, an examination of the history of the negotiations between the parties may cast some light on why there have been disappointments in realizing the goals of the Conventions in this particular 2 3
Lowe, 1995. EU, 1998b.
38
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
area. As to why the area of trade has been highlighted, it has been a constant theme of the relationship between the EU and the ACP. Even before the Lomé Conventions, article 3(k) of the original Treaty of Rome listed as one of the activities of the Community increased trade with the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) to promote their economic and social development. The Yaoundé Conventions were concerned with the creation of free trade areas (FTAs) between the Associated African States and Madagascar and the Community. Moreover, the Preamble to Lomé I recorded the parties’ resolve to establish a ‘new model of relations between developed and developing nations, compatible with the aspirations of the international community for a more just and more balanced economic order’.4 During the negotiations for Lomé I, the ACP requested that the principle of non-reciprocity should operate with respect to the trading relationship to be established. On this issue, according to article 7(2) Lomé I, the only obligation to be imposed on the ACP was that they should not discriminate against the member states and grant the EU treatment no less favorable than most-favored-nation treatment. This represented a partial victory for the ACP position. Complete success appeared to have been achieved by article 25 Lomé III, which provided that the trading arrangements ‘shall not comprise any element of reciprocity for those states as regards free access’.5 However, the ACP countries were to be disappointed in their request for the free and assured access of all their products to the European Community (EC) market. The request was again unfulfilled when it was repeated in the Lomé II negotiations. The Lomé I provision, article 2(2a), repeated almost verbatim the trade treatment provisions of the Yaoundé II Convention (1969)—industrial free trade and preferential treatment for agricultural products subject to the Common Agricultural Policy. Article 11(4) allowed for the possibility of improving the agricultural trade treatment through consultations with the ACP states should they request special treatment for a product not already covered by such treatment. Requests had been made during the course of Lomé I and II for special treatment to be afforded to certain products, but
4
5
EC, 1976: 5. At the signing ceremony for Lomé II, the President of the ACP Council of Ministers commented that Lomé I marked ‘a first step, albeit a significant one, towards a fundamental restructuring of the international economic system and global power relations’. The Courier No. 58 (November 1979), p. 4. Annex XL Lomé III states that the ‘ACP States shall grant to the Community treatment no less favourable than that which they grant to developed States under trade agreements where those States do not grant ACP States greater preferences than those granted by the Community’. See also Annex XXXVII, Lomé IV.
39
Joseph A. McMahon
these met with limited success.6 The ACP argued that concessions granted to third countries were a factor in the disappointing results of trade cooperation under Lomé but there is little support for this argument. The argument was addressed to the EC’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and it is noticeable that the EC used the need to protect ACP trading interests as a reason for restrictions in the GSP.7 There is support for the ACP position that they had suffered from an erosion of preferential margins thus raising the possibility of preference redundancy.8 The Kiel study of EC-ACP trade went on to identify a number of exogenous barriers to ACP export growth, such as drought and desertification, plant and animal diseases, and costs arising in the areas of transport, travel and communications. In addition to these barriers, there were a number of ACP policy-induced barriers to export growth and diversification. Amongst these were factor price distortions in the areas of minimum wages and low-interestrate policies. Such distortions were often accompanied by price distortions in goods markets as a result of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. The final ACP policy-induced factor identified by the Kiel Study was disincentives to the formation of an indigenous entrepreneurship given the significant size and involvement of the government in economic activities. The conclusion offered was that the only way to achieve success was the definition and implementation of new economic policies by the ACP countries.9 Faced with the evidence of poor export performance and the limited role which preferences could play in the improvement of that performance, Lomé III effected little change on the 1975 provisions. However, a start would be made on eradicating ACP policyinduced barriers to export growth and diversification, such as the establishment of a coherent trade strategy for which financial and technical cooperation was available. Increased emphasis on trade development emerged in Lomé IV as the title on trade development was expanded with a greater emphasis to the development of trade in the context of national and regional programs of EU aid. The mid-term review of the Convention continued the emphasis on trade development and the promotion of internal conditions within ACP states that would lead to export growth and diversification. The review recognized that there had been ‘serious deterioration of trade performance of ACP states over
6
7 8 9
For example, at the second ACP-EEC Council of Ministers meeting in 1977, a request for special treatment was made for melons and tomatoes (The Courier No. 43 (May–June 1977), Yellow Pages II. See also Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers (1982), pp. 6–7, where a request for special treatment of strawberries is reported. On the latter, see Annex XIII Lomé III. Commission, 1980. Kiel, 1986. Kiel, 1986: 91.
40
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
the last twenty years’ despite the provisions of the four Lomé Conventions on trade preferences.10 This analysis of the disappointing results of the trade arrangements of the Lomé relationship was confirmed by the 1996 Commission Green Paper on relations between the Union and the ACP on the eve of the twenty-first century, part one of which was a frank and detailed review of the nature of the ACP–EU relationship. For example, the paper concluded that ‘the bulk of ACP countries have lacked the economic policies and the domestic conditions needed for developing trade’.11 Almost echoing the conclusions of the Kiel study over a decade earlier, the Green paper concluded:12 ‘Furthermore, it is now widely believed that beyond political stability, which is a fundamental precondition for growth, and initial endowments, sound policies play a major role in influencing exports and growth. Macroeconomic stability, realistic and stable exchange rates, good institutions and good governance, and efficient resource allocation policies, in particular stable and credible import and taxation regimes, as well as reduced trade protection…are significant determinants of competitiveness and hence export performance.’
The emphasis on trade development evident in Lomé III, and more so in Lomé IV and the mid-term review, had clearly failed to generate more than a limited number of successes. Beyond trade, the Commission described the results of cooperation on aid under the Lomé Conventions as ‘patchy’. As an explanation of this, the Commission pointed to the range of aid instruments used by the EU and inconsistencies between the conditions governing those instruments as factors that have reduced the effectiveness of aid. However, the Commission highlighted the institutional and economic policy situation in some of the ACP states as a major constraint reducing the impact of aid operations. Reflecting problems that emerged with development aid throughout the 1980s, the approach to development aid had been changing to increase its effectiveness. For example, there was an enhanced political dimension, and an instrument to support structural adjustment at the macroeconomic and sectoral levels had been created. Evaluations of this latter type of aid had confirmed its effectiveness but more could be done to enhance the impact of such support. Overall, the conclusion offered by the evaluation of aid policy
10 11 12
Cosgrove, 1994. Commission, 1996: iv. Commission, 1996: 17.
41
Joseph A. McMahon
was that the institutional and economic policy situation in the ACP had been a major constraint on the impact of aid operations.13 If trade and aid have been unsuccessful in meeting the objectives of the Conventions, the evidence must be that the socioeconomic performance of the ACP has been generally disappointing. This was vindicated in the Green Paper, which pointed to various problems including low per capita GDP, continuing problems of poverty, environmental degradation, and inadequate food production.14 Added to these poor socioeconomic indicators was the political instability of a number of ACP states, largely, but not exclusively, Sub-Sahara African states. There is an evident sense of disappointment in the Green Paper that cooperation has not been successful. The Conventions promised much. For example, Lomé I promised that the Convention would establish a new model of relations between developed and developing countries, but this model was not taken up elsewhere and the partnership envisaged by the Convention did not emerge. As noted above, even within their own terms of cooperation the results were patchy. Successful cooperation would have, for example, created a larger number of ACP countries that were more integrated into the international trading environment. The income generated from this could have brought about real and positive social and economic change in the ACP. The vicious circle could have been completed as greater political stability emerged, and development aid would have become more concentrated on those perceived to be in greatest need. The sense of what could have been achieved by the Conventions may have been influenced the President of the ACP Council of Ministers in commenting on the need to be both positive about the past whilst being ambitious for the future. However, this time the backdrop to the negotiations would be different. 3. This Time It Is Different After the analysis offered in the first part of the Green Paper, the European Commission concluded:15 ‘that future cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries must be seen against a radically changed international backdrop. Also, the European Union is set to undergo far-reaching changes and the various ACP countries will move in 13
14 15
Commission, 1996: 13. Interestingly, the Commission recently asserted that ‘EC external assistance programmes have a reputation for slow and unresponsive delivery, poor quality, and excessively centralised and rigid procedures’. Commission, 2000: 5. Commission, 1996: 21–22. Commission, 1996: 35.
42
Negotiating Continuity or Change? widely divergent socioeconomic and political directions. In the face of a loss of legitimacy for the principle of development aid, compounded by budget constraints and a European social crisis, the lessons learned from past successes and failure should help to improve the effectiveness and impact of future cooperation.’
The most obvious manifestation of the radically changed international backdrop is the influence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and for the ACP, the rulings of its Dispute Settlement Body in the Bananas dispute. In dispute here was the EU Regulation establishing a common organization of the market in fresh bananas, which ACP producers had applauded as it allowed for the continuation of their traditional exports to the EU. However, dollar-zone producers were very critical of the regime. A complaint to the GATT was unsuccessful but a subsequent complaint to the WTO led to a ruling that the EU had acted inconsistently with various provisions of the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Import Licensing Agreement. Attempts by the EU to justify the regime using the Lomé waiver led the Panel to conclude that the EU had gone beyond what was required by the terms of Protocol 5 of the Lomé Convention and the waiver did not therefore cover such actions.16 In their view, the Lomé waiver was limited to that preferential treatment which was required by the Convention; it could not extend to all preferential treatment which the EU might wish to accord to the ACP.17 Further impact on the trading position of the ACP from the outcome of the Uruguay Round in 1994 arose from preference erosion as a result of further reductions in the level of the most-favored-nation tariffs, and will continue as a result of the phasing out of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). The latter involves the complete elimination of all quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing, and a reduction in the tariff levels on these products. As ACP exports of textiles and clothing to the EU have been exempt from the MFA since 1974, the competitive advantage that they have gained on that market will progressively decline.18 However, the most significant impact of the Uruguay Round may well not be in these areas but in the area of agricultural concessions. As a consequence of the Agreement on Agriculture, there will be changes in three areas—market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. As for the impact of such reforms on the ACP, of all the developing countries, it appears almost certain that they will be the most detrimentally affected by this Agreement. 16 17 18
WTO, 1997a, 7.103 and 1997b, 110. WTO, 1997a, 7.108. Davenport, Hewitt, and Koning, 1995: 47–48.
43
Joseph A. McMahon
Davenport, Hewitt, and Koning estimated that the ACP would suffer a loss of $177 million export revenue for tropical products, that they would lose their comparative advantage on the EU market for some other products, and that they would suffer a net loss of $226 million as a result of changes in temperate agricultural trade. Nowhere is this damage more apparent than with respect to trade under the Protocols to the Conventions, which give the ACP special trade concessions for bananas, rum, beef and veal, and sugar. Page and Davenport estimated that the final effects the Uruguay Round changes on net exports would, for example, lead to a reduction of $11.3 million per annum in Botswana’s exports of meat from an average of $67 million per annum in the period 1990–92, and a reduction of $24.1 million per annum in exports of sugar from Mauritius from an average of $363 million per annum for the same period.19 Annexes XXVII and XXIX of Lomé IV recognized that the outcome of the Uruguay Round would affect the trading position of the ACP and offered the possibility of amendments to take account of the outcome, especially for agricultural products. The mid-term review of the Convention offered the EU the opportunity to realize changes to the trade regime to take account of the effect of the Uruguay Round but, as noted above, the main focus of the changes to the trade regime related to the provisions on trade development. As well as a changed international environment, there is no doubt that this time is different for the EU. In addition to the negotiations for the renewal of the relationship with the ACP, the EU will also be conducting negotiations on its enlargement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and attempting to reform various internal policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, ahead of the accession of these countries to the EU. Externally, the EU will continue to develop its relationship with other developing countries in the Mediterranean, Asia, and Latin America.20 The major change in this area is the emergence of a coherent external policy made up of the common commercial policy, cooperation in the area of foreign policy, and the development cooperation policy.21 The insertion of article 177–181 into the EC Treaty as a result of the 1991 Maastricht 19 20
21
Page and Davenport, 1994. The Commission has noted, ‘Over the past fifteen years Community external assistance, originally concentrated on ACP countries, has acquired a global reach. Two-thirds of it now goes to areas outside the ACP—to Central and Eastern Europe, the Newly Independent States, Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean countries, Asia and Latin America’. (Commission, 2000: 3.) See article 3 of the Treaty on European Union that provides: ‘The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers’.
44
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
Intergovernmental Conference marked an important stage in the history of the EU’s development cooperation policy as it provides a road map to the future of the policy. The objectives set in article 177 are a reflection of the past development of the policy. However, the gradual and patchwork development of this policy led to inconsistencies in the treatment afforded to certain developing countries, whereas the new objectives afford the EU an opportunity to develop an integrated policy. However, the measures taken by the Council under article 179 to further the objectives set in article 177, shall not, according to article 179(3), ‘affect cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the framework of the ACP-EEC Convention’. The special position of the ACP in the EU’s development cooperation policy is thus guaranteed. As for changes within the ACP, the foreword to the Commission Green Paper concluded:22 ‘On the threshold of the twenty-first century, the ACP countries are looking forward, perhaps for the first time, to real prospects for development. But, at the same time, the standing and strength of government structures in these countries are under severe strain. This is not the time to slacken our efforts or downgrade the quality of our partnership. We should rather raise our political sights in the best sense of the term.’
This would be accomplished, the Commission argued, through a restructuring of the future of the EU’s cooperation policy with the ACP around three core areas: the social and economic dimension; the institutional dimension and the public sector; and trade and investment. In each case, the EU, in line with its own development cooperation policy, would support the efforts of the ACP to achieve those conditions—political, economic, and social—which would lead to sustainable development. The need for a fundamental revision of the Lomé relationship was thus recognized. 4. Ambitious for the Future The publication of the Green Paper was the starting point for a major debate on the future of the relationship between the EU and the ACP, and the mechanisms for such cooperation. The result of this debate was the publication of a further communication from the Commission on the guidelines for the negotiation of agreements to replace Lomé IV which were the basis of an agreement reached within the Council on the negotiating 22
Commission, 1996.
45
Joseph A. McMahon
mandate for the new agreement.23 Throughout the discussion, it was recognized that the relationship with the ACP partners represented a significant element of the EU's external persona, so the continuation and further development of the Lomé relationship was never seriously questioned despite the disappointing results of cooperation under the Conventions. These results did lead to contrasting approaches between the member states to the question of how best to achieve a new Convention that would help realize the goals set for the EU’s development cooperation policy.24 To promote the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy, several member states advocated the need for a framework that would be WTO-consistent and thus obviate the need for a GATT waiver. Each of the member states adopting this position did so for different reasons. For example, the United Kingdom pointed to the negative impact of a GATT waiver on the predictability of the trading arrangements. Germany, and to a lesser extent, Austria and the Netherlands, indicated the need to avoid discriminating against other developing countries. These countries, supported by other member states, called for a more global approach. This was hardly surprising in the case of Germany and the Netherlands, as they had consistently argued since the creation of the European Community in 1957, for a more global orientation to the EU’s development cooperation policy.25 Other member states, particularly France, objected to the potential globalization of the Convention and argued for the Convention to continue to focus primarily on Africa. Supported by Italy, Portugal, and Spain and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, these member states advocated the regional economic partnership agreements as a means of revitalizing the Lomé trading relationship. The need to protect their agricultural producers can be viewed as one reason for this approach. This approach is also evident in the EU’s relationship with the countries of the Mediterranean. It was against this divergence of opinion between the member states on the geographical coverage of the new Convention, its trade arrangements, and changes to various aspects of aid policies that the Council had to agree on the negotiating mandate of the EU. It could be expected that the new Convention to replace Lomé IV would not therefore be a simple re-working of the existing Convention but rather would require the creation of an agreement establishing a new partnership for development. 23 24 25
Commission, 1997. Posthumus, 1998. Evidence of this can be gleaned from the 1957 Protocol to the Treaty on the import of Bananas from Latin America into Germany, and the 1963 Declaration of Intent adopted by the Council which (cont. p. 10) (cont. from p. 9) essentially offered Commonwealth Africa the opportunity to take part in the renewal of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome or to conclude separate arrangements with the Community.
46
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
The EU Negotiating Position The October 1997 Commission communication set five major policy guidelines for the future of ACP–EU relations:26 – to give the new partnership a strong political dimension; – to make poverty alleviation the cornerstone of the new partnership; – to open up cooperation to economic partnership; – to effect a complete overhaul of the practicalities of financial and technical cooperation; and – to preserve the integrity of the ACP as a group whilst permitting differentiation. For the Commission, the Lomé relationship was, and should remain, a link based on three core areas: political dialogue, development cooperation, and economic and trade cooperation. After many debates, the Council confirmed these core areas on 29 June 1998 when it issued the negotiating mandate for the future of ACP–EU relations.27 Echoing article 177 of the EC Treaty, it was agreed that the eradication of poverty and the integration of the ACP states into the global economy would be the focus of new cooperation with the ACP. There would be three essential elements in the negotiating mandate: an intensified and expanded political dialogue; simplified and more flexible development cooperation; and a new, more balanced approach to economic partnership with particular stress on the advantages of regional cooperation and/or integration. THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE
The goal of this dialogue would be to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation and, in the opinion of the EU, this required discussion of such concepts as good governance, respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law. Given the requirements of article 177(2) of the EC Treaty that EU policy in the area of development cooperation contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, it was not surprising that the EU should attach great significance to the enhancement of political dialogue between the parties. Political dialogue has always been a feature of the relationship between the EU and the ACP, as has the concern with human rights and democratic principles, although dialogue on the latter has been a problem area. For 26 27
Commission, 1997: 3–6. EU, 1998a.
47
Joseph A. McMahon
example, one innovative feature of Lomé III was the Joint Declaration of the parties on article 4 by which they reiterated ‘their deep attachment to human dignity as an inalienable right and as constituting an essential objective for the attainment of the legitimate aspirations of individuals and of peoples’. In Lomé IV this Declaration was transformed into an article, article 5(1), which was located in the chapter dealing with the objectives and principles of cooperation—the Lomé acquis. Article 5 was further amended during the midterm review to include the following: ‘Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpins relations between the ACP states and the Community and all provisions of the Convention, and governs the domestic and international policies of the Contracting Parties, shall constitute an essential element of this Convention.’
A new EU declaration on article 4 of the Convention, Annex IIIa, effectively incorporated article 177 of the EC Treaty into the Convention. Therefore, cooperation under the Lomé Convention would be closely linked with ensuring the observance and enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The allocation of financial resources to the promotion of human rights as permitted by article 5(3) merely confirmed the importance that the parties now attached to this goal. The inclusion of this article constituted a great political victory for the EU as it had long argued for the inclusion of a human rights clause in the Convention.28 If the existing relationship already provided for political dialogue, the question was, what was the nature of the enhancements to be made? What would be added, from the EU’s point of view, was closer coordination between development cooperation policy and the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Logically, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law can only flourish in times of political stability. To reinforce such stability, the enhanced political dialogue would become wider, deeper, and more transparent. In essence, cooperation would no longer be seen as intergovernmental, but should extend to the private sector, industry, and non-governmental organizations—in other words, the broad spectrum of civil society. This would encourage a sense of ownership in the process of elaborating and implementing the development strategy of each ACP State and so promote the success or sustainability of that strategy.
28
See, for example, the 1977 Lusaka meeting of the ACP Council of Ministers, The Courier No. 47 (January–February 1978), Yellow Pages III. See, further, Cremona, 1996, and Commission, 1995.
48
Negotiating Continuity or Change? DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
In this core area, the alleviation of poverty was seen as the primary goal. The range of policies advocated was threefold: the stimulation of economic growth as a result of increased competitiveness and greater private sector development; the boosting of employment and support for social policies; and the integration of environmental protection into the development process.29 In essence, these reflect the goals of the EU’s Development Cooperation Policy by encouraging the integration of the ACP states into the international economic system and integrating the poor into economic and social life. As to how these goals were to be achieved, more systematic and comprehensive support for private sector development would be given through a series of measures to build confidence and allow for reforms in the policy and institutional environment. In combination with the enhanced political dialogue, greater efforts needed to be made to create an appropriate political, legal, administrative, investment, and financial climate. This approach would build on existing elements of cooperation, for example, through a more coherent strategy to support regional cooperation and integration and greater support for trade development measures. Areas of cooperation that had not proved successful in the past would be enhanced. New areas of cooperation, where these can have an impact on socioeconomic development, would be supported. It was recognized that there would have to be an increase in the level of aid dedicated to socioeconomic problems. However, there would be new principles governing financial and technical assistance. These were a result of the demand for efficiency in development aid operations so that they become more effective; a demand which arose, in part, from the experience and evaluation of cooperation under the Lomé Conventions. So, the principles to ensure the effectiveness of aid would be fully enshrined in the new agreement, with a choice of instruments to allow for flexibility and selectivity.30 This would ensure that help is directed to those ACP states who are most in need; need would be defined in terms of development indicators and would be supplemented by criteria based on merit, that is, performance and sound management.31 As for the management of aid, an alternative to the system of joint aid management was considered necessary if aid was to be effective. This alternative would depend on the nature of the dialogue to be 29 30
31
Commission, 1996: 14–21. The criteria are pertinence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability/reproducibility. See OECD, 1992. Commission 1997: 29.
49
Joseph A. McMahon
established by the new Convention. Finally, the new partnership would require greater consistency and coordination within the EU, for the lack of both have hampered past efforts. This would help in the implementation of article 178 of the EC Treaty, under which the EU is required to take the objectives of article 177 into account in the implementation of policies that are likely to affect developing countries, and article 180 of the same Treaty that requires greater coordination between the EU and the member states. TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Whereas the successful realization of the EU’s negotiating directives in the core areas of political dialogue and development cooperation would represent the continuation of the journey initiated by the first Lomé Convention, realization of the negotiating objectives in the core area of trade and economic cooperation would represent a fundamental transformation of the Lomé relationship. The negotiating mandate envisaged the negotiation of new cooperation agreements with the ACP, to replace the current preferential trade arrangements that were seen as not providing sufficient impetus to promote ACP development. So, existing policy would be refocused on the complementary objectives of sustainable economic and social development, the alleviation of poverty, and integration into the world economy, as demanded by article 177 of the EC Treaty. This entailed greater support for regional integration efforts within the ACP through the negotiation of differentiated agreements as part of the process of global integration. Such agreements would take the form of either economic cooperation agreements, which would not be totally reciprocal, or economic partnership agreements, which could include free trade areas, with a long transitional period. The existing preference scheme would be maintained until 2005, and it was recognized that an exception to the WTO rules would be needed not only for the continuation of existing arrangements, pending the negotiation of new agreements, but also for the economic cooperation agreements. The ultimate goal was to ensure the gradual and smooth integration of the ACP into the world economy. What such integration entails is greater trade not only between the EC and the ACP, but also between an ACP country and other ACP countries and other developing countries. However, with the advent of globalization, tariffs have has ceased to be as important as they once were and the focus has shifted to domestic economic/trade related policies. Only some of these policies are regulated through the WTO. This presents a considerable challenge, primarily for the ACP, but also for its
50
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
development partner, the EU. Failure in the negotiations on trade and economic cooperation was not an option for it had been recognized that:32 ‘Failure to devise an appropriate framework may result in the breaking up of the ACP group, the drifting away of some ACP regions and countries from the present link with the EU, and further marginalization of the poorest ACP countries.’
The ACP Negotiating Position The question of how to revitalize the partnership had been the subject of as much debate within the ACP as the same question had within the EU.33 As in the latter debate, the continuation of the relationship was not seriously questioned, however, in contrast to the EU, the prescription of how to revitalize the partnership would be fundamentally different. One starting point for the elaboration of the ACP approach to the negotiations was the meeting of the ACP Heads of State and of Government in Libreville in November 1997. Such meetings were not a facet of the relationships that had developed within the ACP countries. However, faced with the possible breakup of the ACP group and concerns about the geographical coverage of the new Convention, the Libreville meeting was used as an opportunity to signify the solidarity of the ACP as a group in the negotiations that were to come. The ACP negotiating position would be based on the resulting Declaration, paragraph five of which recognized that the ACP–EU cooperation was ‘one of the effective and coherent frameworks for facilitating the achievement of the ACP’s socioeconomic development objectives’.34 As for the nature of ACP–EU relations in the next millennium, the Summit Declaration concentrated on the same aspects of the new relationship as the EU’s negotiating directives—political cooperation, development cooperation (and development finance), and trade and investment. POLITICAL COOPERATION
The ACP Heads of State and of Government recognized that a broader and more intensive political dialogue with the EU would enhance the partnership. Such cooperation could contribute to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In this regard, it was recognized that the achievement of peace and stability was an essential pre-condition for development and that the 32 33 34
Commission, 1996: 63. ACP, 1997a and b. ACP, 1997c.
51
Joseph A. McMahon
contribution to be made to such stability would require greater differentiation in the new partnership. Such differentiation would have to be positive, in the sense that cooperation policies would be adapted to the specific needs of individual countries or regions. Part 3(1) of the Declaration recognized that a positive regional differentiation approach in the new partnership would be seen as supportive of existing ACP efforts to promote regional cooperation and integration. The further development of the Libreville Declaration into the ACP negotiating position confirmed the desire for a broader and more intensive political dialogue.35 However, the negotiating position made it clear that this dialogue should not take the form of political dictation or be tinged with any notion of conditionality.36 It appeared that the ACP was keen to ensure that the EU’s Development Cooperation Policy would not be ruled by the demands of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Such subordination would threaten the success of any development objectives agreed to between the parties. It would also be contrary to the existing Lomé acquis, as article 2 Lomé IV established the fundamental principles of cooperation, equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence, and the right of each state to determine its own political, social, cultural, and economic policy options. For the ACP, the enhanced political dialogue must concern the central objective of the Convention—the sustainable development of the ACP. This would require a dialogue, for example, on the debt problems of the ACP and on activities within the EU that affect the stability of the ACP. There was no doubt that the ACP would welcome dialogue on conflict prevention and management, and dialogue to promote reconstruction in the aftermath of such conflicts. Such dialogue would have to be conducted at an appropriate level. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
The ACP negotiating position recognizes that the central objective of the ACP–EU relationship is development, and the Libreville Declaration stressed, just as successive Lomé Conventions have, that the development of each ACP country is their first and foremost responsibility. This responsibility required firm foundations to be laid for a human-centered, equitable and sustainable development based on sound economic policies, respect for the rule of law, and social justice. Such foundations could be laid by a consolidation, renewal, and upgrading of existing elements of the Lomé relationship. As the negotiating position made clear:37 35 36 37
ACP, 1998a and b. ACP, 1998a: 11. ACP, 1998a: 85.
52
Negotiating Continuity or Change? ‘A key feature of the new agreement should be the eradication of poverty through development of economic and social infrastructure, creation of incomegenerating activities and the fight against exclusion which, after all, is the principal objectives of development cooperation.’
Therefore, both the EU and the ACP agree that the eradication of poverty would be a central element of the new partnership for development. For the ACP, special attention would need to be given to certain issues if this goal was to be realized. These included the enhancement of human capacity through a reduction in hunger, disease, and illiteracy, with especial attention to be given to the young and women. Special attention was focused in this area not only on the need for the ACP to implement the principles agreed at various international conferences, but also on the need for developed countries to honor the obligations assumed in these conferences. As in the EU’s negotiating directives, all sections of civil society were seen as having a role in the realization of this goal. Equally important was the creation of an appropriate infrastructure for sustainable growth and development, through, for example, the modernization of the state or enhanced regional cooperation and integration. In this area, the ACP countries were keen to ensure that the new agreement would provide the necessary financial resources for their development. It should establish coherent and consistent objectives as part of a simplification and rationalization of aid mechanisms and instruments. TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Whereas the approach of the ACP to political and development cooperation could be seen as broadly in line with the approach advocated by the EU’s negotiating directives, the ACP approach to trade and investment was fundamentally different from that of the EU. This would suggest that one of the major problems to be overcome in the negotiations for a successor convention would be the new trade arrangements. The area of difference was not so much the continuation of preferential treatment, which even the ACP recognized as being insufficient to promote their development, but the relationship with the WTO. For example, the Libreville Declaration, after reaffirming the commitment of the ACP to the obligations arising from the international trading system, continued:38 ‘Nevertheless, we are deeply disturbed by the prospect of disruption in our fragile and vulnerable economies and disintegration of the social fabric of our 38
ACP, 1997c: Part II.
53
Joseph A. McMahon countries that would arise from the insensitive application of WTO rules and obligations.’
The WTO ruling in the Banana dispute was cited as an example of the disruption and disintegration feared by the ACP. Further disruption could be caused, according to the Declaration, by the unrestrained liberalization of trade in agricultural products; hence, the call for special and differential treatment for developing countries in the application of WTO rules. In the search for a fair international trading system (i.e., developmentoriented), the ACP proposed that the existing system of non-reciprocal trade preferences be maintained for a period that would be sufficient for the ACP to improve the competitiveness of their economies. In contrast to the EU’s proposal for the extension of the WTO waiver until 2005, the ACP was seeking a transition period that was ‘more realistic and consequently longer’. A period of at least ten years was suggested. Indeed, after the end of this period, the ACP advocated that preferences be maintained for the least developed ACP countries and other vulnerable ACP countries. For other ACP countries, the transition period would be used to promote regional integration within the ACP in preparation for the negotiation of the economic partnership agreements with the EU. Thus, the ACP negotiating position recognized the current limited nature of regional cooperation and integration within the ACP, hence the need for a longer transition period than that advocated by the EU. Such a longer period would allow the ACP to anticipate the adjustment costs of the move towards freer trade. It would also allow the ACP to gauge the impact of developments within the EU (such as enlargement, reform of the common agricultural policy, economic and monetary union, and the proposed review in 2004 of the GSP) as well as international developments (such as the outcome of any new round of multilateral trade negotiations, especially in agriculture). As a result of the demand for a longer transition period, and in contrast with the EU’s position, the arrangements for the period 2000-2005 would, for the ACP, involve an improvement in the existing preferential regime and further development of existing schemes of trade development and investment promotion. The ACP negotiating position also called for the continuation (and enhancement) of the various product protocols to the existing Convention. For example, it was proposed that the existing protocol on beef and veal be improved, whereas the existing banana protocol should be consolidated to guarantee existing market access and quotas. As for the sugar protocol, using the special legal status of the protocol, no review of the protocol was recommended during the negotiations, although the EU was 54
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
urged to adopt measures that would not damage the ACP (and EU) investments in this area. 5. The Negotiations On the opening of the negotiations on 30 September 1998 that would lead to the Cotonou agreement, Commissioner Pinheiro stated:39 ‘Our goal should be to draft a new blueprint of mutual obligations which is better adapted to the challenges of tomorrow's world and which provides a more effective response to everyone's expectations and ambitions.’
The contrasting negotiating positions of the parties did, in fact, reveal a great deal of convergence as to the drafting of this new blueprint, which both parties agreed should be ‘a simple and readable Convention accessible to all’.40 For example, it was agreed that the new Convention should focus on the elimination of poverty whilst ensuring respect for the objectives of sustainable development and the progressive integration of the ACP into the global economy. As for the political dimension of the relationship, a ‘broad measure of agreement emerged on the fundamental principles of the partnership,’ a fact that was not surprising given agreement on the Lomé acquis between the parties in Lomé III. Therefore, the parties agreed that the new agreement would provide for equality between the parties, respect for sovereignty and ownership of development strategies by the ACP. These principles would provide for the greater involvement of civil society and would involve differentiation within the ACP. Building on this acquis, both parties recognized the importance of peace-building and conflict prevention. The ACP expressed concern over the EU’s proposal to replace the notion of ‘conditionality’ with that of ‘contract’. On development cooperation, the parties also agreed on the need for reforms in various areas and the need to design policies to improve access to productive activities and resources. Where the parties disagreed in this area was over the rationalization and simplification of the range of aid instruments. Whilst the EU regarded the existing instruments as too complex, the ACP wished to maintain them. Discussions of the future trade relationship revealed no fundamental disagreements between the parties, which was not surprising given the generality of the discussions. 39 40
EU, 1998c. EU, 2000, Memorandum 1.
55
Joseph A. McMahon
Once the parties had agreed on a working method and structure, the inaugural negotiating meeting was held on 17 and 18 November 1998 between the Commission and ACP Ambassadors. At this point, differences of opinion began to emerge as to how the trade relationship should be strengthened, with the ACP arguing for a ten-year transitional period to prepare themselves for the new arrangements as opposed to the five-year period advocated by the EU. The negotiations intensified in December and January as preparations were made for the first ministerial negotiating conference that was to be held in Dakar on 8 and 9 February 1999. The EU presented its proposals on the rationalization of the existing instruments of financial and technical cooperation and a new rolling system of programming for allocating resources according to need and performance. It was recognized that the parties needed to agree on shared definitions of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance given their importance to the essential elements of the new partnership. However, some doubt was expressed as to whether or not good governance should be one of the essential elements; in the end, agreement was finally reached on this with the parties agreeing to work on an agreed definition. It was also agreed that a range of options would be presented at the ministerial conference on the procedures and arrangements for applying the non-execution clause. As for the outcome of the Dakar Conference, broad agreement was reached in each of the three areas. On the political aspects of the relationship, agreement was reached on the improvement of the implementation of the non-execution clause, which met the concerns of the ACP. However, opinions still diverged as to whether or not good governance should form one of the essential elements of the partnership, with the ACP expressing the view that the concept remained ill defined and subjective. On development cooperation, it was agreed that the conclusions of the various UN Conferences on sustainable development were to be used as a frame of reference for future cooperation. The content of the various policies as well as the principle of differential implementation and the involvement of civil society were all subject to broad agreement between the parties. As for the financial aspects of cooperation, although agreement was reached on the creation of a new Investment Facility and the rationalization of the instruments, no agreement was reached on the number of such instruments. In particular, the ACP wished to maintain Stabex and Sysmin as separate instruments and were undecided about the EU’s proposals for a new rolling system of programming for allocating resources according to need and performance. On the question of trade cooperation, it was acknowledged that the current trade arrangements were not sustainable but as for their 56
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
replacement, discussion of the proposed regional economic partnership agreements and other options would continue. Differences of opinion also emerged as to the future of the various product protocols. The Conference concluded by asking the negotiators to start the process of drawing up ‘key sentences’ in those areas where agreement had been reached.41 In the months that followed, key sentences would be drawn up in the political area reflecting agreement on the fundamental principles of the partnership and on the institutional framework to govern the new relationship. One area of disagreement on the institutional structure was the continuing status of the Committee of Ambassadors. Disagreements also surfaced as to the rules for applying the non-execution clause. For the EU, appropriate measures should be taken if consultations did not lead to a mutually acceptable solution and, in cases of special urgency, without the need for consultations. For the ACP, these approaches ran counter to the fundamental principle of the equality of the parties and the overall objective of establishing a genuine dialogue between the parties. Their concerns were further exacerbated by possible overlaps between the essential elements of the agreement and the political performance criteria in the financial cooperation area. On development cooperation, consensus would emerge across a number of areas, from human and social development to youth and gender issues. Key sentences on financial cooperation were also agreed to as a result of the ACP acceptance of the principle of allocations based on need and performance. However, the ACP remained dissatisfied with the financial arrangements for debt relief initiatives. In contrast to other areas, progress in the area of trade cooperation was not as promising. The ACP returned to the issue of the future of the product protocols and requested improved access to the EU market during the transition period, which they again argued should be ten years. The second ACP–EU ministerial negotiating conference in Brussels on 29 and 30 July 1999 was described as ‘all in all, a disappointing conference’.42 On the political front, discussions on the inclusion of good governance continued to illustrate differences between the parties. However, at least the ACP had now committed itself to this principle being included in the essential elements of the new agreement. More problematic was the question of how to implement the non-execution clause. Key sentences relating to development cooperation were adopted by the ministers, with the parties agreeing on the need to adopt an integrated approach, including not only the parties but also civil society, to the elimination of poverty. Although 41 42
EU, 2000, Memoranda 5 and 6. EU, 2000, Memorandum 9.
57
Joseph A. McMahon
the ACP side committed itself to the principle of involving civil society, it emphasized the primacy of the national authorities. It also considered it necessary to conduct a study on how to identify the various nongovernmental actors and expressed some concern as to the issue of monitoring and evaluating the activities of these actors. Nevertheless, work could begin on transforming the key sentences into the draft articles of the future agreement. On the instruments and management of financial cooperation, progress was also made, although disagreements remained in the areas of arrangements for support arising from export earnings shortfalls and the scope of debt relief. It was perhaps because of the lack of progress on the trade front that the conference overall was described as ‘disappointing’. As indicated, no substantial progress had been made before the ministerial conference. Indeed, the negotiations began to reveal differences between the member states and within the ACP. The United Kingdom argued that a ten-year waiver from international trade obligations imposed under WTO rules was not possible, that regional economic partnership agreements were not practicable for all ACP countries, and that an enhanced GSP might be an option for some of the ACP. The Netherlands, who argued that a menu of options was needed, supported the British position on regional economic partnership agreements. This argument was, in turn, supported by some of the ACP. Having reaffirmed their negotiating directives, subsequent discussions from the EU confirmed the essential elements of the directives: that the new trade agreements would have to be compatible with WTO rules, so preferences could not be maintained indefinitely and an appropriate time limit had to be set on the transitional period.43 The goal was to ensure that the new trade regime was at least as favorable as that of the Lomé Convention. Given the differences between, and within, the parties, it is not surprising that no agreement was reached, beyond recognition that further discussions were needed. The time for such discussions was, however, diminishing as both sides reaffirmed their determination to conclude their negotiations before the expiry of Lomé IV in February 2000. The next ministerial meeting was scheduled for December 1999. On the political front, substantial progress had been made since the Brussels conference, and agreement was finally reached on the issue of good governance as an essential element of the new partnership. Agreement was also reached on the issue of fighting corruption, leaving only various aspects of the issue of migration to be dealt with at the final ministerial meeting. It 43
The details of the EU coordination meeting of 29 July are given in EU, 2000, Memorandum 9.
58
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
was agreed that the parties would initiate negotiations on defining a framework for the repatriation of illegal immigrants. However, the undoubted highlight of the December meeting was the agreement between the parties on the general approach in the area of trade cooperation, with agreement being reached on the principles, objectives, and schedule for the implementation of the new regional economic partnership agreements. The remaining issues were resolved at the ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 2 and 3 February 2000, which also concluded the negotiations. The EC Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid described the resulting agreement as:44 ‘a remarkable, innovative achievement which faces up to the challenges of globalization by setting out an integrated and comprehensive approach to development, poverty eradication, trade and political dialogue. This Agreement represents a major contribution to the effort to create international governance and promote North–South dialogue in the post-Seattle era.’
The reference to the failed WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle is worthy of comment. The meeting witnessed a number of disagreements between the developed and developing country members of the WTO in a number of areas. These included problems with the implementation of the commitments entered into as a result of the Uruguay Round, and the possible expansion of the mandate of the WTO to cover social and environmental issues. For the EU, its position on the negotiation of new commitments in the area of agriculture had caused friction with other countries. As for the future of the WTO, this was by no means assured, for as the prospects of multilateral approaches to trade liberalization receded, regional approaches were seen as one way forward. Against this background, a successful outcome to the negotiations for a successor to the Lomé Convention acquired great symbolic significance. For once, the ACP held the upper hand in the negotiations, and concessions favoring the ACP seemed to emerge on the new trade regime. This may be contrasted with the position of the ACP throughout the previous negotiations, which was essentially reactive. Given the problems of securing agreement on the EU’s negotiating directives, this is perhaps not surprising, as there was little room for the Commission to maneuver in the negotiations. The contrast with the negotiations for the first Lomé Convention is particularly striking, as at that time, it was the EU that made concessions to ensure an agreement, notably on Stabex and aid. This time, all the concessions seemed to come from the ACP as the resulting agreement comes closest to the goals set by the EU’s negotiating directives. This raises 44
EU, 2000, Memorandum 10.
59
Joseph A. McMahon
the question as to the nature of the negotiations and, in particular, the notion of equality incorporated within the Lomé acquis. One approach to the analysis of the negotiations is to use the framework advocated by Galanter for analyzing how the basic structure of the legal system creates and defines the ability of the law to achieve redistributive change.45 Actors in the legal system are placed on a continuum between oneshotters (those who rarely have recourse to the courts) and repeat players (those who often participate in similar litigation), and the approach locates players according to differences in size, state of the law, and resources. Although created to deal with litigation, by focusing on each party’s relative position of advantage and their power to influence the outcome, this approach can also be used to consider the asymmetry of bargaining power evident in the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU is clearly located at the repeat player end of the continuum whereas the ACP countries are located towards the one-shotter end of the continuum. The ACP needed an agreement with the EU, for both economic and financial reasons; the converse is not true. Paradoxically, it could be argued that the EU needed an Agreement with the ACP for political reasons. The conclusion of an agreement with the ACP would help the EU to assert that it was interested in addressing, and solving the problems of developing countries. This would show that it was capable of establishing a constructive dialogue with developing countries, especially as such a dialogue had been absent from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle.46 Moreover, the nature of the parties and the negotiating process clearly favored the EU. In contrast to the relatively homogenous group of countries that constitute the EU, the ACP countries are a much more heterogeneous group. Despite this heterogeneity, reaching agreement on the ACP negotiating mandate was easier than reaching agreement on the EU’s negotiating directives. The fact that the EU is a significant global economic actor and the ACP states are not, may partially help to explain the contrast here. The Commission, using the expertise of the Directorate-General for Development, conducted the negotiations; it could also access the experience of the Directorate-General for External Relations, which had conducted negotiations with other groups of developing countries. The Commission had also been fully involved in the process leading to the establishment of the negotiating directives, so it was fully aware of the scope it had for making 45 46
Galanter, 1974. Interestingly, the failure of the WTO Ministerial also strengthened the position of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Development who had surrendered to pressure from the Directorate-General for Trade to bring the Lomé relationship into line with the requirements of the WTO. On the role of the Directorate-General for Development in the Lomé relationship, see Babarinde, 1995.
60
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
concessions. The ACP Ambassadors in Brussels, who lack the negotiating experience that has been accumulated in the Commission, conducted detailed negotiations for the ACP. The ACP Secretariat played no formal role in the negotiations, and even if it could propose initiatives, its position is weak given its reliance on the Commission for support. However, the Secretariat does have a view of the common good for the ACP, which may not be as well defined in the case of the ACP Ambassadors, where national interest may be the dominating factor. The dominating factor for the ACP was to conclude an agreement. So, for example, despite the fact that the ACP negotiating mandate called for the maintenance and improvement of Stabex and Sysmin, the ACP abandoned this in the face of the EU’s negotiating directives that these schemes could not be continued. Paradoxically, the break up of the ACP into smaller regional groupings, whilst increasing their homogeneity, may also increase their bargaining strength. 6. Continuity or Change? There is no doubt that the first Lomé Convention represented an important milestone in the relationship between the ACP and the EU. Another milestone has been reached with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. However, this time it is different, for this is a time of both continuity and change. Whereas the negotiation of the Lomé Convention heralded the formal creation of the ACP, the Cotonou Agreement represents the beginning of the end for this group as a single coherent entity. Likewise, in 1975, it could not be said that the EU had a consistent and coherent development cooperation policy. By 2000, the EU had developed new relationships with a range of developing countries, of which the Cotonou Agreement is merely one example. This range of agreements is illustrative of a more consistent and coherent development cooperation policy. Take, for example, the development of the EU’s relationships with the countries of Latin America and Asia.47 At the time of Lomé I, the EU’s relationships with the countries of Latin America were limited to a series of commercial agreements, which granted special trade concessions and a promise to consider concessions in the EU’s GSP. Accompanying these agreements was a mechanism for dialogue, which would be limited to economic and trade relations. As the ACP–EU relationship moved into the 1980s, the range of countries with which the EU would establish relationships would expand, and the nature of the dialogue 47
McMahon, 1998, Chapters 4 and 5.
61
Joseph A. McMahon
and agreements would change, all in an attempt to deepen, extend, and diversify the existing relationships. Trade Agreements would become framework agreements for cooperation and agreements would be reached with regional groupings in Latin and Central America. Dialogue between the EU and the countries of Latin and Central America would be further facilitated through the San José and Rio Group dialogues and the scope of cooperation would be extended through the European Communities Investment Partner scheme. The enlargement of the EU to include Spain and Portugal led to further intensification of the relationships in the 1990s through the conclusion of new agreements with both individual countries (e.g., Mexico) and regional groupings, such as Mercosur.48 The pattern of incremental growth evident in the EU’s relationships with the countries of Latin and Central America is also evident in the relationships established by the EU with the countries of Asia. Again, the movement is from Commercial Cooperation Agreements through to Partnership and Development Agreements and from an Agreement with the regional grouping, ASEAN, to the development of enhanced cooperation through dialogue by means of the biennial Asia-Europe Meeting. Beyond the narrow concern with establishing economic and trade relations and, in particular, the encouragement of regional groupings in both areas, the EU has increasingly emphasized in both regions the importance of dialogue beyond the narrow confines of trade, to encompass issues of development, such as poverty alleviation, and political issues, especially human rights. To some extent, this is what the EC Treaty has dictated as the development cooperation policy of the EU; another part of the changed backdrop against which the negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement was to take place. However, the EC Treaty in article 179 (3) also seeks to safeguard the position of the ACP within the development cooperation policy of the EU. In conclusion, it is worth asking whether or not that position has been safeguarded. The ACP no longer stands atop the pyramid of privilege. As has been highlighted, the position of other developing countries within the EU’s development cooperation policy has been significantly improved since the first Lomé Convention. The three pillars on which the Cotonou Agreement is built, political dialogue, development cooperation and trade and economic cooperation, are the pillars on which the EU has built its relationships with other developing countries, either bilaterally or regionally. Those within the EU favoring a global approach, as opposed to a regional approach, to development cooperation are finally winning the struggle. Despite the 48
See the agreement with Mexico ([2000] OJ L 276/45), which establishes a free trade area between the parties.
62
Negotiating Continuity or Change?
admonishment of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands during the negotiations of the new trade arrangements, their approach is at least consistent with the new international reality of trade and the need for a more global approach by the EU to the problems of developing countries. Two points are worth noting. First, only eight of the fifteen member states reaffirmed the negotiating mandate, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden were silent. Second, several ACP countries supported the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on this point. Were these countries acknowledging the new international reality or registering their disappointment with past Conventions? Or both? Returning to the comment of the President of the ACP Council of Ministers at the opening of the negotiations for the Cotonou Agreement, it is clear that the parties have sought to revitalize their partnership for development and to embark on a new journey. This journey is different from that embarked on in 1975 when the goal, according to the seventh recital of the Preamble, was to ‘establish a new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order’. Some of this model remains, however, this time, in the second recital of the Preamble, the parties have affirmed ‘their commitment to work together towards the achievement of the objectives of poverty eradication, sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy’. A similar commitment has been made to the countries of Latin America and Asia in their relations with the EU, as noted in Chapter 2. So, on their journey the ACP will be joined by other developing countries as the Community seeks to implement its global development cooperation policy. Whether the Cotonou Agreement is the most appropriate vehicle through which to realize this policy or promote the commitment of the parties remains an open question.
63
Chapter 4
NEGOTIATING ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: CONTEXTS AND STRATEGIES Stephen Wright
1. Introduction The end of the Lomé Conventions has led to a new era of relations between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of 78 developing countries and the European Union (EU). Disillusionment with the four Lomé Conventions left many observers speculating whether there would be a continuation of agreements once Lomé IV expired in February 2000. However, for political and psychological reasons as much as economic ones, there was consensus that a new agreement should be negotiated between the parties. After several years of discussions, representatives of the ACP and the EU came together in Cotonou, Benin, and signed a Partnership Agreement on 23 June 2000 to deepen development cooperation and to help integrate the ACP economies into the global economy. Much work has still to be done in finalizing the details of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs), as these primarily free-trade
Olufemi Babarinde & Gerrit Faber (eds.), The European Union and the Developing Countries, pp. 65– 84. 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 14199 5.
65
Stephen Wright
agreements are called, prior to their full implementation in January 2008. This chapter focuses upon the international contexts and strategies which are important and relevant in influencing the outcomes of these negotiations. It also seeks to address the question of how best the ACP group can organize itself to gain most from the EPAs. An important issue is how unified the ACP will remain during negotiations, or more significantly, whether EU negotiators will demand fragmentation or differentiation of the ACP group of states. The 1996 Green Paper spelled out the EU’s preference in stating that, ‘Not all ACP states are at present capable of embarking on a standard political and economic partnership with the EU…For reasons of effectiveness, differentiated cooperation policies and procedures have become essential’.1 The Green Paper went on to state four possible options for the future ACP–EU agreement: the status quo, with differentiated procedures; a new agreement supplemented by bilateral agreements; the break-up of Lomé into regional agreements; and finally, an agreement for only the least developed members of the ACP.2 The negotiating position of the ACP group is relatively weak, but members are striving to maintain a unified and coordinated strategy in negotiations, seen most notably during the ACP summit in Fiji in July 2002 where its theme was aptly titled ‘ACP Solidarity in a Globalized World’. The ability of the ACP to alter EU perspectives is likely to be limited, as the case of the Barcelona Accords of 1995 testifies. This agreement between the EU and Mediterranean states to establish a free trade area (FTA) by 2010 was finalized on virtually the exact terms laid down in preliminary negotiations by the EU.3 The agenda of Europe is crowded with perhaps bigger and more consuming issues than development policy, notably with the war on terrorism and the impending enlargement of membership in 2004 and afterwards, and so it is difficult to know how these negotiations will unfold. The ACP has criticized the EU for its lack of interest, evidenced by the abolition of the Development Council, the failure of EU ministers often to turn up to ACP–EU meetings, and the downsizing of EU missions in many ACP states. The EU insistence that the EPA negotiations must include civil society groups and NGOs was coolly received by ACP delegates at the ACP–EU Council of Ministers meeting in June 2002. What will be the likely net benefits and gains for both parties? How will these new partnerships fit within the tightening restrictions of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the intense bargaining surrounding the Doha Development Round, launched in November 1 2 3
See Commission of the European Communities, 1996: 5. Idem: 7. Colton and Neaime, 2003.
66
Contexts and Strategies
2001? Will the changed environment of the post-September 11 world significantly affect the underlying philosophy of North–South relations? Will the ACP be better off with individualized and/or regionalized agreements, or will they continue to strive to maintain the previous model of ‘one-size-fits-all’ development? At this stage, what can be written about the negotiations is still rather speculative, but the issues will be addressed within the following framework. It is important to briefly set out the context of ACP–EU relations within which negotiations are held. This will be taken up in section 2. The main characteristics of the two groups of states will be discussed in section 3. We will draw lessons from previous negotiations between the two groups in section 4, which illuminate the likely paths of this impending dialogue. The final section will draw from international relations theories to see what assistance they might offer in terms of predicting the outcome of these negotiations. 2. The Context for Negotiations The change of name from Lomé to Cotonou indicates the evolution of development cooperation between the EU and the ACP. More specifically, it points to the desire by the EU to reconfigure the structures and parameters of its global development policy, including that toward the ACP group, and to some extent it may reflect a hardening of attitude by policy-makers within Europe.4 Conversely, there have been positive signs in the efforts made to promote economic development, notably with the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ agreement in March 2001, opening the EU market to the world’s poorest fortyeight countries, and the Monterrey Consensus agreements in March 2002, promising more aid and investment for development, in which EU members played an important role. A survey of the contexts within which negotiations will occur is helpful in order to offer insights into likely negotiation outcomes. Emphasis has shifted from aid to investment, from preference to free trade, and reflects wider trends within the global arena, such as the emphasis upon sustainable development. For organizational purposes and to simplify our discussions, three themes are selected: globalization; neoliberalism; and regionalism. These very much influence the scope and role the negotiations will likely take, and in turn help to shape the negotiating stances of the main players.
4
Gibb, 2000.
67
Stephen Wright
Globalization The current restructuring of the international system of capitalism, generally referred to as globalization, is consolidating winners and losers in global political economy, although not all scholars are convinced about contemporary globalization’s voracity or uniqueness.5 ACP countries are striving to find ways to remain competitive within the global economy. Their economies are increasingly marginalized, unable to compete in the high-tech commerce of information technology, finance, and services, and relegated to the continuation of primary commodity exports, the prices of which have generally sagged.6 Forty years of development cooperation with Europe has done little to break this pattern of relations, a stern indictment itself of the Lomé, and their predecessor Yaoundé, agreements. In the 1960s, there was optimism that, ‘The approach to an African Common Market as a complementary institution to the EEC would make the prospect of integration into a world trading system considerably more feasible and less painful’.7 For Africa, and the other regions, that has not happened. As Thomas Klak concluded about the Caribbean, it ‘may be better depicted as a region that is increasingly irrelevant in economic and geographical terms’.8 The ACP group is increasingly marginalized from the EU, as its share of trade continues to diminish, standing currently at about 4 percent of the EU’s total trade. How can the EPAs prevent the ACP group falling off the European economic radar screen? Whatever agreements are hammered out within Cotonou clearly need to address the poor development performance of the ACP economies. However, major differences of strategy are emerging as to what policies to pursue. It is likely that the voice of the EU will dominate here. Agreements on debt forgiveness and foreign direct investment, for example, are crucial economic and social factors to be included by the ACP within negotiations, though how successful the group will be in these areas is uncertain. Efforts to promote greater democratization (and cooperation) both at the national and international levels—what Archibugi and Held have couched as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’9—are to be pursued through these negotiations, though it is unclear what progress will be made. The Monterrey Consensus and the Cotonou EPAs both call for greater transparency, accountability and monitoring of 5
6 7 8 9
For comprehensive discussions on how globalization is affecting the developing world see special issues on globalization in Third World Quarterly, 21(6), December 2000, and The Journal of Development Studies, 37(2), December 2000. Lipumba, 1999. Rivkin, 1963: 46. Klak, 1998: 12. See also Herbst, 2000. Archibugi and Held, 1995.
68
Contexts and Strategies
performance within the ACP and other developing states, and the differing levels of compliance will undoubtedly have implications for the successful and timely negotiation of EPAs with individual states and within regions. Neoliberalism Neoliberal political and economic strategies are likely to provide the basis for agreements between the ACP and EU. The Washington consensus forged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB)—and the U.S. Government—has spread to the Geneva-based WTO, and influences the parameters of the EPAs. Promotion of free trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), rather than trade preferences and aid, have become critical demands for European policy makers. Changes to the Lomé IV agreement on aid were fashioned on a neoliberal agenda, but the Convention’s only moderate success served to intensify EU demands to implement more trade-focused strategies under Cotonou. The successful restructuring of Central European political economies provides ammunition to those who wish to push for ‘meaningful’ change in the ACP region. Neoliberalism also calls for the streamlining and skill-sharpening of the bureaucracies of ACP states, especially those in Africa.10 But it is clear that FDI to the ACP countries has been negligible, and certainly will not come to the ACP countries in equal amounts. Similarly, most ACP economies are considered too weak to simply open up to full free trade, and the espoused benefits of opening borders to trade have been criticized by many.11 EPAs are therefore likely to be staggered in implementation to take account of the inability of many ACP states to completely open up their own markets to EU products, thereby contributing to differentiation of ACP members and their strategies. WTO policy has been especially important in pressurizing change in trade relations between Europe and its ACP partners, most notably in undermining discriminatory and preferential access to the EU market previously allowed under Article XXIV of the GATT agreement. The EU did not negotiate for special dispensation for Lomé IV in the mid-1990s when the WTO was established, but did apply for a waiver in February 2000, to lapse when Cotonou is fully implemented in 2008.12 The ACP, along with most developing states, is already disillusioned about the WTO trade regime because members did not get to participate fully in its development, and also because there is continuing discrimination against the agricultural and semiprocessed goods that 10 11 12
Goldsmith, 1999. For example, see Rodrik, 2001. LeClair, 1997; Weiler, 2000.
69
Stephen Wright
they produce.13 The collapse of the 1999 Seattle WTO meetings can be partly attributed to the pressure exerted by developing countries to seek greater tariff benefits in the agricultural sector, and the outcome of the Doha Round in 2004/2005 will undoubtedly have an impact on the EPA negotiations. In light of this, there was an agreement in October 2002 to forge a joint ACP–EU ministerial committee to monitor developments within the Doha Round, and to attempt to influence decisions there to mesh with the objectives of the EPAs. The ongoing trade tensions and disagreements over development strategy between the EU and the U.S. (added to by U.S. steel ‘protectionism’ in 2002) will guarantee that the U.S. (and the WTO) will not allow European slippage into maintaining preferential treatment for ACP members. There is little to be gained by EU recalcitrance in any case, but the likely impact on ACP trade options could be significant. And as Raffer points out, WTO pressure can be used to EU advantage, as ‘The new WTO regime shaped by the EU and the U.S. will apparently serve to cleanse trade relations from disliked historical obligations’.14 An added dimension to the ACP–EU relationship is the aggressive strategy adopted by the U.S. government at the end of 2002 in pursuing FTAs with a number of countries around the world. On the U.S. agenda are FTAs with Central American and Caribbean states, and with the states of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Opportunities to join FTAs with the U.S. could be used as leverage by ACP states in their negotiations with Brussels. Regionalism Regional organizations have become an integral part of the global landscape since the 1950s, led by the success of the EU. Numerous regional organizations exist in the three continents represented by the ACP, although there are few if any stellar cases of achievement. For Africa, Pius Okigbo’s words on integration written in 1967 still ring true today in that the difficulties, ‘are mainly internal—physical geographic bottlenecks, lack of basic infrastructure, paucity of natural endowments and resources, lack of political will and abundance of political rivalries, suspicion, and jealousies. It is these, rather than threat from an external group, that make the development of an African common market remote’.15 A more recent study of African regional integration lists a variety of problems: lack of sincerity and political commitment; overdependence on foreign donors; foreign countries’ dominance; unrealistic 13 14 15
Helleiner and Oyejide, 1999. Raffer, 1999: 132. Okigbo, 1967: 157.
70
Contexts and Strategies
schedules; uneven benefits; and continuing political instability.16 And one study recently concluded that ‘deeper integration is more likely to occur as a consequence [of structural adjustment policies] rather than through the efforts of regional and subregional entities especially established for this purpose’.17 And yet Daniel Bach argues that regionalization and ‘trans-state integration [are] stimulated by market distortions as opposed to trade liberalization, a situation which accounts for the overall failure of the IGO’s programs towards market integration’.18 The creation of the African Union (AU) in July 2002 addressed some of these issues by creating a vehicle for the pursuit of a single market for the continent, though this achievement is many years away from realization. The AU may help to rationalize the overlapping and often redundant nature of existing regional organizations within the continent. A similar picture emerges when one looks at integration efforts in other regions. A study of Caribbean regional integration by Jay Mandle concludes that, ‘such cooperation looks as if it is not realistically on the West Indies agenda’. Mandle goes on to say that ‘it would appear to be a better choice to get on with the modernization effort on a country-by-country basis than to delay until some time in the indefinite future when regional cooperation will become a reality’.19 And Evelyn Colbert was equally pessimistic about the prospects for regionalism within the Pacific Islands, given their very heavy continuing dependence upon external aid and the 20 million square miles that the islands cover.20 Regional integration and the promotion of intra-regional trade have long been touted as likely ingredients for assisting economic development, and EU negotiators are emphasizing development on a regional level utilizing existing organizations. The EU’s Green Paper argued that, ‘The path of regional cooperation and integration seems advisable not only because of the generally inadequate economic size of many ACP countries but also because such an option can encourage political leaders to adopt a more strategic approach to developing their economies’.21 How this relationship will be used is unclear at present. Will regionalism be used to promote collective self-reliance, or simply to tie these economies more closely to the EU trade orbit? This debate hinges upon how one perceives regionalism. Björn Hettne sees the ‘new regionalism’ as focusing upon political and economic factors, reflecting the post-hegemonic multipolar world order, where pressures for regionalism come from above and 16 17 18 19 20 21
Mshomba, 2000. Fine and Yeo, 1997: 429. Bach, 1999: 12–13. Mandle, 1996: 177. Colbert, 1997. See also Fairbairn et al., 1991. Commission of the European Communities, 1996: 6.
71
Stephen Wright
below, from inside and outside the state. In this perception, regionalism and globalism are both contradictory and complementary elements, making regional ‘strategy’ difficult to pinpoint.22 It is possible that intra-regional trade will be pushed as a boost to development, though it is difficult to comprehend how this could be successful after decades of failure. Intra-regional trade as a percentage of total trade still remains at less than 10 percent for all the regions within the ACP, and it is difficult to see how intra-regional trade can be significantly expanded. Alternatively, regions could be converted into FTAs with the EU and with each other, pursuing the long-term goal in Africa of a single African market. Another possible scenario would see the EU developing differential relations with each of the regional organizations, and/or specified groups of Leastdeveloped countries depending upon levels of development, trade, capacity, etc. The European Commission already has these regional organizations broken down into seven sub-groups for the purposes of regional cooperation fund disbursement, and so it would require little extra effort to differentiate more substantially.23 Or possibly the EU might support the extension of commodity regimes (fruit, timber, coffee, etc.) across the ACP, linking together common economic sectors in non-geographical ‘regions’. 3. The Negotiators While we should not underestimate the complexity of these negotiations, and the many groups interested in their outcome, for reasons of simplicity we will isolate the main actors into two groups, namely the ACP and the EU. Overlapping both groups are other organizations, such as the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, launched in October 2000, which is attempting to influence the agenda of negotiations through frequent assemblies and other meetings. What are the main strategies being pursued by the groups? How unified are the groups in their negotiations? How vital is unity to the success of the respective camps? The ACP Group The ACP group now encompasses 78 developing states, of which the majority is in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite valiant efforts, most states remain relatively impoverished and marginalized, and largely dependent upon the export of 22 23
Hettne, 1994. Kennes, 1999. These seven regions are Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Indian Ocean, Southern Africa, Western Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific.
72
Contexts and Strategies
primary products. As Jean-Robert Goulongana, the ACP Secretary-General, stated at the end of 2000, ‘After more than two decades of cooperation and in spite of successive Lomé Conventions granting this preferential access, there has been no great increase in ACP produce on the EU market’.24 This was echoed in the Nadi Declaration following the ACP Fiji summit meeting in July 2002, where it was stated that ‘the envisaged benefits have not materialized for most of the poor countries’.25 For most states, options are limited. To be competitive in the global economy would require massive changes in technological capability, education, infrastructure, and overall capacitybuilding that appear difficult to achieve. For many states, particularly in Africa, there remain serious threats to political stability, and uncertainties surround the viability of civil society groups to participate in EPA negotiations. The ACP has steadfastly maintained its position calling for a unified strategy to negotiations within Cotonou. As an ACP Deputy Secretary-General has remarked, ‘From an ACP perspective, facing the EU as one rather than three separate regions is probably the best option in terms of the countervailing power it would provide in the context of negotiations’.26 This is logical in that greater negotiating strength is likely from a concerted group position, rather than having states or regions negotiating separately. Furthermore, the ACP wants agreements for which all members are eligible, rather than divide up agreements for specific states and/or regions. But would a fragmented negotiation strategy automatically be detrimental to ACP interests? Do different regions actually have different objectives? How likely is it that the ACP can forge a common strategy in the face of European insistence on fragmentation? There is, after all, relatively little that binds these continents together besides common poverty and an historical association with Europe. These are very different geographical and cultural regions, with different objectives and levels of development, with an understaffed Secretariat struggling to operate in light of payment arrears by members.27 The EU Commission itself does not really see the ACP as a unified group, and is pursuing that viewpoint in negotiations. The Green Paper stated that ‘The “ACP group” is strictly speaking neither a political nor an economic entity. It was established in the framework of relations with the European Union for essentially historical reasons’. The Paper goes on to say that ACP development interests ‘diverge widely because of their very different income levels and living standards, their economic structures and trade strategies, and their 24 25
26 27
Goulongana, 2000. The Nadi Declaration at the ACP Solidarity in a Globalized World Summit, July 2002, Fiji. Full Declaration found at www.acpsec.org. Greenidge, 1999: 119. Ravenhill, 1993.
73
Stephen Wright
relative appeal for foreign investment’.28 The ACP does, however, possess the power to ‘embarrass’ the EU, and in unity there would be a stronger voice to claim that the EU is ‘deserting’ the group. In terms of specific strategies, the Green Paper outlined what the Commission considered to be the possible options for the ACP to pursue. These included non-reciprocity, multilateralism, unilateral liberalization, South–South reciprocity, and North–South reciprocity.29 Perhaps the ACP states will push to benefit from currency protection within the Euro zone, though it is difficult to conceive how such protection will be organized. Another possible strategy will be to exclude non-ACP developing countries from the negotiations for fear of diluting further the preferences that they have gained to date under previous agreements. An important question to ask is whether Lomé failed simply because of its unified structure. A sign of ACP difficulties in a common platform was evident in 2001 when the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative was non-exclusive to the ACP, and some ACP states were excluded. Likewise, some states pushed for continued favored treatment in sectors such as sugar, rum, and rice, thereby breaking from a united stance. This indicates a likelihood in divergence within the ACP, breaking on fault lines of rich versus poor members, or divided over negotiations on specific commodities. Internally, some ACP states are better able to organize civil society groups to promote agreements, whereas other states may be less favorably treated with more closed and non-transparent societies. The effort to maintain a unified stance in negotiations carried on from the July 2002 Fiji summit to the opening of ACP–EU negotiations in Brussels in October 2002. There the ACP was able to wrestle a concession from the EU that negotiations were to be broken down into two phases. Phase I is to be completed by September 2003, and under this phase the ACP is to present a unified stance. Key elements of the overall EPAs are to be agreed upon, particularly relating to market access, agriculture and fisheries, trade in services, other trade related issues, development cooperation, and legal issues. The ACP strategy is to negotiate the fundamental elements of the EPAs with one voice, and then move on to Phase II negotiations which will involve the EU negotiating with regions separately. How successful the ACP strategy will be is difficult to determine, as there remain fundamental differences over the status of Phase I negotiations. The ACP argues that these are formal negotiations that should lead to a written, binding agreement, whereas the EU position is that these are talks merely to clarify the issues, and not binding.30 28 29 30
Commission of the European Communities, 1996: 6. Idem: 10. Details of the October 2002 meeting in Brussels can be found at www.acpsec.org
74
Contexts and Strategies
The EU is also attempting to condense Phase I—thereby weakening the solidarity of the ACP—and move quickly to the ‘real’ negotiations on a differentiated basis with regions and individual states. A report published in October 2002 on the Caribbean highlights some of the likely divergences in ACP strategy.31 The Caribbean states are currently negotiating three different trade regimes: some sort of FTA with the United States, possibly within the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) concept; the Doha Development Round; and the EPA with the EU. Caribbean states also have different priorities concerning their main export products. The challenge of keeping a unified front within the stresses and strains of negotiating several trade regimes simultaneously is evident, and only magnified when one includes other EU and ACP agendas—including some talk during 2002 of an ACP free trade area. The European Union In reality, the EU is the critical player in the Cotonou negotiations. Although there are considerable efforts to create a harmonized European development policy, we can envisage likely fracture points between the fifteen (and soon to be twenty-five) member states who continue to hold different perspectives on development policy, as well as between the different institutions of the EU. There is a multi-layered decision-making structure, including Commission, Council, Parliament, NGOs, and individual states, just to name a few. Even within the Commission, arguably the main player in these negotiations, there are differing preferences as there are currently ‘five commissioners and four directorates-general [who] have active policy responsibilities for development cooperation in various forms’.32 Even within the Europe of Six in the 1950s, it was difficult to reconcile opinions about the relationship with (former) colonies. As the EU has expanded to fifteen members, newer members, such as Finland and Sweden, have strong views on development policy, but do not have the colonial or postcolonial linkages shared by countries such as France or Britain. Spain and Portugal have attempted to shift attention to Latin America as a critical development and trade focus. The May 2002 summit in Madrid brought together Latin American and EU leaders, and offered both parties the chance to improve trade at the potential expense of the U.S.—and possibly to the detriment of the ACP states who have arguably less to offer the EU than Latin American states. A similar ‘distraction’ is the development of the Euro31 32
Davenport et al., 2002. Cosgrove-Sachs, 1999: 352.
75
Stephen Wright
Mediterranean FTA by 2010. The divergence of opinion over priorities has created difficulties for the Commission in constructing development policy, notably in constricting national preferences within an overarching European framework. The further enlargement of the EU into uncharted territory in Central Europe and beyond, starting in 2004, is placing strains on European cooperation and more important issues on the European agenda, and is detracting from a focus on development strategy. And the debate over Turkish membership will likely dominate many minds over the coming decade. The ‘need’ for development spending in the new members of the EU (as articulated by the new members themselves) is also placing significant political strains on the ACP–EU axis of friendship. As Olufemi Babarinde has concluded, ‘each enlargement of the EU has seen a redefinition and elaboration of the EU’s relationship with the South’.33 It is also unclear what impact ‘post-September 11’ thinking is having on traditional development policy, given the U.S. impulse to rid the world of evil, and the growing tensions in Europe and the Middle East in early 2003. At the level of integration theory, there are further complications for a unified European perspective. Arguments abound about the utility of neofunctionalist approaches, the significance of flexible integration, and the likelihood of multi-polar and multi-speed Europe in the light of agreements forged at the Amsterdam and Nice summits. If there can be alternative policy perspectives over Schengen, common defense, security, and the euro, why should there be unanimity over development policy? Similarly, the EU perceives that the ACP group is equally fractured and ‘multi-speed’ with states pursuing different agendas. Having made the case for multiple approaches within the EU, there are some clear indications of what strategies the Commission is likely to pursue in the ongoing negotiations. These were laid out in a 1996 Green Paper, and many elements found their way into the Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000. A key provision of the EU stance is differentiation, namely the breaking up of the ACP into distinct component parts for the basis of negotiations. Another is the emphasis upon regional organizations. A third is the renewed commitment to political conditionalities, notably respect for human rights and democratization. Linked to this is the desire by the EU to engage civil society groups within the ACP in the negotiation process. Overall, the Green Paper indicated a hardening of attitude toward the ACP group. A complete end to agreements is politically unacceptable, but a new agreement primarily written on EU terms is the path EU negotiators are 33
Babarinde, 1998: 140. For broader discussions of EU policy, see Caporaso, 2000, and Dinan, 1999.
76
Contexts and Strategies
following. Strategies of regionalism, differentiation, and neoliberalism hold the key to the likely outcome. The EBA initiative in March 2001 is indicative of a likely strategy. The initiative allowed duty- and quota-free access to the goods of the poorest forty-eight countries of the world, and not just ACP states. However, the EU was unable to agree to open up certain markets, and protection has remained on bananas until 2006, and on rice and sugar until 2009. Although on paper this appears generous, critics argued that this makes little difference to the EU as the LDCs rarely have the ability to compete in the EU market anyway. Development assistance and massive levels of FDI are required to make ACP states competitive, and without this FTAs make little difference. 4. Lessons from Previous Negotiations Previous negotiations have proceeded on the principle of a unified stance and strategy by the ACP group. The issue, since the 1960s, could be phrased as ‘How can the weak confront the strong and “get something out of them”, given the power imbalance’.34 Notable exceptions to this group rule, which could provide a model for differentiation or fragmentation today, are negotiations for Nigeria’s trade relations with the EU in the 1960s, and those of South Africa in the 1990s. Both negotiated individually with the EU, and in both cases obtained significant concessions for themselves. One aspect of differentiated negotiations could be either having regional powers, such as Nigeria and South Africa, conducting separate negotiations on behalf of themselves or for their regional groupings. In the negotiations for Lomé I during the early 1970s, Nigeria spearheaded the talks, but on behalf of the whole ACP group. Although there are similarities running through these negotiations since 1958, the context of the talks has differed considerably. During the negotiations linked to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the African actors were colonies, and so had a very limited role in the negotiations. These Association agreements naturally reflected the disparity in strength between the blocs, but also reflected intense differences between the European Six. In the early 1960s, both in response to Britain’s request for EU membership and the independence of most of Britain’s former colonial possessions, fresh negotiations occurred to which there was considerable opposition within the Commonwealth bloc. The reactions quickly changed when Nigeria decided to apply for preferential trade access to Europe, and negotiated a solid partnership.35
34 35
Zartman, 1971: 5. See Okigbo, 1967; and Zartman, 1971.
77
Stephen Wright
The ACP group’s strongest leverage was in the early 1970s during the negotiations for the first Lomé Convention. In a competitive Cold War environment, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods free trade era, and with the OPEC oil price revolution picking up in October 1973, the ACP group was able to extract a very positive treaty for itself. The EU was clearly focused upon maintaining access to raw materials and trade partners within the ACP, and did not wish to forfeit these relations. Other benefits to the EU, as pointed out by Ravenhill, included maintaining the stature of the EU in global development; the maintenance of francophone and anglophone (and later lusophone) connections with the EU; the psychological satisfaction of promoting noblesse oblige and caring for the global poor; the protection of EU investments in Lomé countries; and the assistance to European countries in multilateralizing their markets.36 To some extent, many of these arguments are still valid today in the context of the Cotonou negotiations. In subsequent rounds of negotiations, the conditions were not quite as propitious for the ACP, and steadily through Lomé II to IV the EU clawed back terms of agreement. As Christopher Clapham laconically summed up, ‘Rhetoric aside, the renegotiations of the Convention from Lomé II onwards essentially consisted in the EC telling the ACP states how much aid they were going to get, and the ACP complaining that it was not enough’.37 There was little need to be concerned about ACP challenges and defections in the postCold War world of the 1990s, and the assumption is that this attitude will carry over to negotiations under Cotonou. One slight pressure for the EU is the apparent new found interest in Africa after 1998 by the Clinton and Bush Administrations, and some speculate that this might have tipped the scales in favor or renewing the ACP–EU agreement in some shape or form. A clear lesson from previous negotiations is that the ACP is in a stronger position when negotiating collectively. However, this is difficult to achieve, and may be strained under Phase II of the negotiations. Although there are pressures to promote horizontal integration via regional organizations within the respective continents, the ACP continues to promote vertical integration with the EU. There are benefits to both the ACP and EU of this ‘collective clientelism’, or ‘vertical integration’, where ‘a group of weak states combine in an effort to exploit the special ties that link them to a more powerful state or group of states’.38 Unfortunately, under Cotonou there is less reason for the EU to maintain these ties. For the ACP, differentiation will diminish their ability to define the agenda. 36 37 38
Ravenhill, 1985: 35. Clapham, 1996: 101. See also Laurent, 1983. Ravenhill, 1985: 18. See also Frey-Wouters, 1980.
78
Contexts and Strategies
5. Negotiation Outcomes Many of the issues that will influence the outcome of the negotiations have been addressed already. The EU is seeking a strategy to differentiate or fragment the ACP countries into regional blocs, or else into developing and least developed categories. The ACP is striving to resist such fragmentation in order to maintain the maximum possible leverage. In this final section, it is worthwhile to consider briefly potential outcomes of the EPAs not solely through ACP or EU eyes, but through theoretical lenses of the field of international relations. How can different theoretical perspectives help predict possible outcomes of these negotiations? How can theory help define gains of the respective parties? For the facilitation of debate and to illuminate various possibilities, I am using five broadly and loosely defined theoretical approaches: normative/idealism, neorealism, postmodernism, rational choice, and dependency. These theories are offered in thumbnail sketch only and are not elaborated upon, nor is there any attempt to test them. They are presented only as brief overviews or characterizations to help us frame some thoughts about possible outcomes of the negotiations.39 Normative/Idealism Though many scholars pay scant attention to the normative approach, elements of this approach touch on the development debate and the Cotonou agreement. Many can see normative elements in the rhetorical policies of support for development, but find idealism much more difficult to see in the real world of implemented policy. The ideal vision is of a developed world, where peaceful integration abounds and the quality of life improves for all. The EU, as the world’s largest trade bloc, has an obligation to help the poor of the developing world—or at least to be seen trying to help the poor. Regional integration, along with global cooperation through the United Nations, aims for the common good of all. From this perspective, one can posit that the EU has a genuine commitment to the Cotonou partnership, and will negotiate to everyone’s advantage. Certainly, the EU will want to avoid the embarrassment of being shown not to care about the developing world. The EU will recognize that the ACP group has the right to protect its interests in a unified stance. Elements apparently played down from Lomé will be revitalized, such as the increased flow of grants and aid, and the softening of structural adjustment requirements 39
Herbst, 1987.
79
Stephen Wright
that impact social programs. The realization that everyone in the world is better off when poverty and hunger is eradicated will lead to an unprecedented agreement, helping to stave off the widening of North and South and the advent of ‘global apartheid’ in development. The EU will work to promote social democracy within the ACP group, but will refrain from pursuing the harsher elements of direct intervention in their policies. Neorealism The neorealist perspective emphasizes the likely importance of these arrangements to the states themselves. The development of an ACP–EU development ‘regime’ is desirable, where common values and norms link the partners together for mutual benefit. However, given the failure of previous agreements and the absence of a common value system, this is unlikely. Interdependency provides an uncertain balance in the world system, and the hope is that a successful Cotonou agreement will strengthen such linkages. But an analysis indicates that this ACP–EU relationship is not truly interdependent, but one in which the EU exerts a form of hegemony over the ACP group. The relationship is certainly not of equals. There is little need to appease the claims of developing states for advantageous access to European markets, and little difficulty in resisting them. The uneasy relationship of the EU with other major trading centers, such as the U.S. and Japan, takes precedence in consideration over those with the ACP. New structures of power relations might well influence the thinking of European negotiators, seeking not only to differentiate ACP countries but also to spin off portions into different orbits. The Caribbean would make more sense being linked to Latin America, the Pacific Islands to the Asia-Pacific bloc. Africa and the Mediterranean could be drawn more into the European umbrella. Another scenario will see ‘soft hegemons’ emerging inside the regions, such as Nigeria in West Africa or South Africa in Southern Africa, and these countries will broker arrangements for their regions with the EU. In this way, new balances of power will develop within Cotonou. The collective voice of the ACP will be demonstratively weakened, and the Europeans will pursue their own agenda without constraint. Postmodernism Postmodernist perspectives (there cannot be one, and apologies for drawing this approach very broadly, and with some abuse) will deny that such a development debate can occur. Grand theory and global solutions are 80
Contexts and Strategies
impossible to define and defend, and simply show underlying power assumptions, in this case the power of the EU to define the parameters of dialogue and negotiation. Probing further, there can really be no EU or ACP position, as this masks multiple positions within countries and constituencies. Finding a true common ground between all these groups is impossible. A postmodern interpretation will likely support a fragmented strategy for all parties, where agreements will be negotiated between individual countries on individual issues. It is impossible to develop a framework of equality without ‘deconstruction’ because the imbalance of power is ingrained. Debates over the meaning of development will essentially derail the negotiations, as participants will want their independent ‘voices’ heard. A meaningful global development strategy is simply impossible, or at best is ‘constructed’ by the powerful voices. Feminists (post modern or otherwise) also raise objections to the current negotiations and the strategies that have underpinned successive Lomé agreements, and most likely the Cotonou partnership. Women have been outside of the development debate, relegated to gendered exclusion. As Eloise Turner argues about the EU position, ‘Neither the complexity of roles nor the gendered income distribution is fully recognized, and the solutions proposed are thus inappropriate’.40 Globalization has increased the marginalization of women and children because of the change of employment opportunities open to them. Low-tech assembly jobs are considered ‘women’s work’ and as Cecilia Green concluded succinctly about the Caribbean, ‘the assumption of male privilege dies hard’.41 A more egalitarian negotiation process will have to bring in the voices of women, and this will have a significant impact on the outcomes. A final area to note here is the emphasis within Cotonou on civil society groups, especially focusing upon human rights. As Karin Arts has stated, since the early 1990s ‘in its relations with developing countries, the EU more and more consistently pursues development and human rights simultaneously’.42 Given the desire to bring in NGOs, political parties, trade unions, human rights and grassroots movements, and other civil society groups, postmodernists see a clear result of developing multiple voices and multiple negotiation strategies within each country’s delegations. How will such opinions be reconciled in a common platform across the ACP, or even within individual countries? How will views of differing social classes be brought into Cotonou? How will different societies, at differing levels of civil society development, accomplish these tasks? How can Cotonou empower civil society groups during the 40 41 42
Turner, 1999: 33. Green, 1994: 171. For a more general discussion of these issues at a global level, see Özler, 1999. Arts, 1999: 8.
81
Stephen Wright
negotiations when globalization has tended to marginalize them?43 To postmodernists, this is ample evidence that such goals are impossible to achieve as laid out, and complete differentiation is the only path to follow. Rational Choice Rational choice theory continues to make advances in the social sciences for its claimed ability to provide explanatory power to understand actions. Policy decisions are made based on rational calculations of gain by the individual actor. Action is taken to bring the greatest rewards. Negotiations can take place individually, or via the group, but will depend upon a clear articulation of preference hierarchies or choices. Economic gain is normally the primary motivation of decision, with little emphasis placed on moral calculations.44 Political incentives are also very high priorities for decisions, such as reelection. Rational choice draws from historical theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and the utilitarians, but more importantly from modern game theory and the enduring capacity of neoclassical economics. Rational choice delineates clear sets of priorities for different groups of actors within the negotiation process, and it gauges where important priorities coincide. It is a difficult task to open the black box of government and unbundle the different roles of individuals. There will most likely be different gains to be made by civil society groups as opposed to government elites, and so it is vital to recognize who has final authority for decisions, something that is unclear under Cotonou. How will one account for ‘shadow or warlord governments’ in Africa or corrupt elites in determining how they weigh their rational choice? And as rational choice emphasizes the importance of electoral considerations in framing choices, how will leaders be swayed by voters in ACP countries (those that have open elections)? Even at a simplified level, it is evident that the rational gain of the EU decision-makers will be different to those of ACP leaders. However, identifying the key European decision-makers will be difficult as rational choice theorists perceive ‘the European Union as a system of countervailing institutions in which actors behave strategically to reach their preferred outcome’.45 Bluntly though, there is little economic gain for the EU in terms of privileging the ACP, and much to gain by developing a more comprehensive trade stance toward all developing countries within the WTO rules. For the ACP, rational gain is to maximize exclusive economic concessions from the 43 44 45
Adams et al. 1999. Rule, 1997: 79–81. See also Geddes, 1995. Moser and Schneider, 2000: 3.
82
Contexts and Strategies
EU, at least in the short term. One question to ponder concerns how much the EU is willing to bear financially in order to make the EPAs successful. Game theory suggests that the ACP will wish to make a quick agreement in order to keep out other non-ACP developing states, which could draw economic benefits away from members. Rational choice also posits that both sides have clear political incentives to make an agreement, as the costs of failure are unacceptable. Whether this all means that the EU will deal with the ACP as a unified group or as a fragmented group (each state bargaining for its best deal) is open to interpretation. Dependency Despite various ideological challenges, dependency theory still holds some sway in discussions of development. Core-periphery relations can still explain some elements of political economy, even though globalization is affecting such relations in dynamic ways. Dependency perspectives highlight the continuing marginalization of the ACP group under the pressures of globalization and neoliberal strategies, and there is the likelihood that any framework within Cotonou will do little to truly improve the status and economic position of the ACP states. An argument can be made that marginalization diminishes the level of exploitation, as multinational corporations become wary of investing in unstable and excluded regions. Cotonou is likely to be a ‘no-win’ situation from a dependency perspective. Political and economic conditionalities will remain key EU requirements, and from this theoretical standpoint there will be little discretion for the weaker ACP during negotiations. The further intrusion of ‘policy dialogue’, under which the EU demands greater accountability from the ACP in development policy, provides a further mechanism to maintain uneven and dependent relations. The creation under Cotonou of a European conflict protection and settlement policy to help Africa police itself smacks of a neo-colonial and paternalistic approach. Fragmentation of the ACP will be pushed by the EU, as it will be easier to control ACP demands and goals. But even an ACP unified stance means little in the face of the overwhelming power, both economic and political, that the EU possesses. And there is always the IMF, the WTO, and the WB to continue to act in the name of the Northern developed countries, pushing structural adjustment that continues to debilitate ACP societies. So, from a dependency perspective, there is likely to be little difference in which negotiation strategy the ACP uses, as the end result will be the same. In fact, radical dependency
83
Stephen Wright
scholars argue for an end to these agreements and a complete change of direction for third world development strategy.46 6. Conclusion This chapter has addressed the main elements of the negotiations within the Cotonou Agreement, and has presented arguments from a variety of perspectives as to the outcomes of a unified or fragmented ACP approach to the negotiations. It is uncertain exactly how unified the EU will be during these negotiations, but definitely the EU holds the dominant hand. There are, of course, many things that can influence outcomes. These can be practical policy issues emanating from the dynamic and changing context of ACP–EU (and global) relations, and we cannot be aware of what international events might take place over the next five years. Similar problems of prediction can be seen when we turn to our international relations theories. So much for the academy! Drawing together all possible scenarios, and taking a pragmatic, personal and ‘balanced’ view of likely scenarios, it appears that the most likely one to occur will be EPAs with terms harsher for the ACP than under Lomé. Greater emphasis will be placed on trade diversification, foreign investment and capacity-building, whereas aid and discriminatory preferences will be eliminated or certainly downplayed. The ACP will attempt to remain unified in negotiations, and its best chances of successful negotiation lie in such an approach. Despite these efforts, however, it is likely that EU insistence on differentiation will win out, and various regional or individual state agreements will be brokered rather than a single common agreement. This will be perceived by the EU as in the best interests of itself and the ACP group. Such differentiation could benefit certain ACP states better able to negotiate with the EU, and there are likely to be ACP members who fare poorly. However the negotiations conclude, Cotonou provides a different type of ‘partnership’ between the ACP and the EU than what has been witnessed over the past forty years. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that these economic partnership agreements will bring any more development success to the ACP than previous ones.
46
For example, increasing ‘disorder’ in developing societies helps prevent the incorporation into Western models of development, as argued by Chabal and Daloz, 1999.
84
Chapter 5
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION AMONG ACP COUNTRIES Gerrit Faber
1. Introduction What would the conclusions be of an unbiased reader, going through the second title—Economic and Trade Cooperation—of the Cotonou Agreement? That reader would probably draw the following conclusions. First, there is a strong emphasis on WTO conformity. Apparently, the wish not to deviate from WTO rules is so strong that WTO conformity has been upgraded to an objective of this cooperation (Article 34). One would expect it to be a principle, at best. Articles 36 and 37 reiterate WTO conformity. Second, the transition period between 2000 and 2007 will be used to negotiate economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between (groups of) ACP countries and the EU that ‘shall aim notably at establishing the timetable for
Olufemi Babarinde & Gerrit Faber (eds.), The European Union and the Developing Countries, pp. 85– 109. 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 14199 5.
85
Gerrit Faber
the progressive removal of barriers to trade between the Parties in accordance with the relevant WTO rules’ (Article 37.7). This hints at the reciprocity of the trade preferences under the EPAs, which will require the ACP countries to give EU exports free entry to their markets. Third, there is strong emphasis on regional integration among ACP countries: there will be support for regional integration in the preparatory phase (Article 37.3), and the negotiations on the EPAs will take into account regional integration processes within the ACP (Article 37.5). It might be concluded that the EU and the ACP have a clear idea of the organization of their future relationship: WTO compatible, reciprocal free trade agreements (FTAs) preferably built on regional integration among ACP countries, supplemented with other cooperation areas. The term EPA has been created for these accords. However, careful reading reveals that other outcomes are possible. For example, non-least-developed ACP countries ‘might decide that they are not in a position to enter into EPAs’ (Article 37.6). Alternatives would be considered for such countries. For leastdeveloped ACP countries, ‘duty free access for essentially all products’ will be introduced (Article 37.9). It is striking that the nonreciprocal solutions get comparatively little attention; by going into much more detail, the agreement, as such, seems to prefer the reciprocal trade arrangements for the post-2007 period. The European Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, confirmed this right before the start of the EPA negotiations: ‘We…expect our ACP partners to do their bit to contribute to the common goal. They have to establish sound policies. They must, above all, foster regional integration in return for EU market opening’.1 The option of reciprocity was not an idea that the ACP group enthusiastically accepted. The European Commission’s November 1996 green paper on ‘Relations Between the European Union and the ACP Countries’ contained options for the future shape of the ACP–EU trade cooperation.2 Two main directions could be discerned; namely, coverage of ACP exports by the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), or the introduction of uniform or differentiated reciprocity. The first option may be attractive for the least-developed ACP countries, as their preferential position remains the same, for as long as they remain least-developed. However, the GSP is unilateral, and preferential margins decline as the general and sectoral competitiveness of the beneficiary countries increases. The ACP group was not in favor of the GSP solution. The group first aimed at maintaining the status quo and, realizing that this position would be unproductive, 1 2
Interview with Pascal Lamy in: The Courier ACP–EU, No. 193, July–August 2002. European Commission, 1996.
86
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
subsequently accepted the principle of reciprocity, which is embodied in EPAs.3 These agreements may cover many areas of cooperation, such as trade in goods, services, direct foreign investment, technical assistance, and harmonization of regulation. The core of an EPA is a Free Trade Area (FTA). FTAs are defined by free trade in goods among the members, while keeping the power to make decisions in trade policy matters with respect to third countries, at the level of the individual parties to the agreement. The EPA approach to the renewal of the trade regime of the Lomé Convention presents a number of questions. First, on theoretical grounds, are FTAs between the ACP countries and the EU likely to produce better results than the nonreciprocal Lomé preferences? Second, even if promising, is it likely that (groups of) ACP countries will be able to conclude viable FTAs (or EPAs) with the EU? Which conditions will have to be met in order to realize the potential benefits? This chapter will address these questions. It provides an economic analysis of the FTA approach for future ACP–EU relations. The composition of the chapter is as follows. In section 2, the background for the new approach is given. Section 3 presents the economic theory of integration in order to explain the (in)effectiveness of both the present and the new approach. Section 4 formulates the conditions that have to be met to make FTAs successful. Section 5 addresses the question of whether the new approach will work in practice. Conclusions are drawn in section 6. 2. The Economic Theory of FTAs Economic theory of regional integration can shed light on the question of whether the EPA approach of the Cotonou Agreement has the potential to contribute to ACP development. EPAs are a kind of regional integration agreement (RIA). As far as trade is concerned, an EPA comes close to a free trade area (FTA). The potential effects of FTAs and customs unions (CU) are best shown by customs union theory. Viner shows that a CU affects trade in two ways.4 First, countries gain from preferences because of the trade creation effect. This takes place if a tariff reduction in favor of the partner country allows high-cost domestic production to be replaced by more efficiently produced goods imported from the partner country. Second, countries lose from a CU because of trade diversion, which arises if trade shifts from sources that have a comparative advantage to sources that have 3 4
ECDPM, 1998. Viner, 1950.
87
Gerrit Faber
preferential access to markets. Two extensions of Viner’s analysis are relevant. Lipsey has developed the concept that positive consumption effects arise if a CU leads to lower prices for consumers.5 Another extension has been made to account for FTAs in particular. The absence of a common trade policy in an FTA can give rise to indirect trade deflection. This occurs if a member country, characterized by relatively high trade barriers, shifts its imports from the world market to the partner, while the latter country— having relatively low trade barriers—increases its imports from the world market.6 In practice, this means a shift of tariff income from the first country to the latter country. A country gains from participating in an FTA if the trade creation and the consumption effects outweigh trade diversion and indirect trade deflection. For this to happen, three conditions are important. First, FTAs must result in a substantial fall of intra-FTA trade barriers. In that case, the price reduction resulting from preferential access has large trade creation effects. Second, if trade shifts to sources in the FTA that are efficient (nearly as efficient as the most efficient producers on the world market), trade diversion and indirect trade deflection do not hurt very much. Third, indirect trade deflection will be absent if the high tariff partner simultaneously lowers its tariffs (and other trade barriers) to the level of the low tariff partner. Therefore, countries that join an FTA that consists of efficient producers are likely to gain from preferential trade, particularly if they lower their trade barriers on imports from third countries at the same time. Venables analyzes the distribution of the gains from regional integration agreements (RIAs) for different groups of countries, particularly poor countries and industrialized countries.7 He uses Ricardian and HeckscherOhlin-Armington models to extend CU theory to countries that are characterized by their factor endowment. Assume that two poor countries that have abundant unskilled labor, compared to the global average, decide to integrate. Assume further that one of the two countries has more abundant unskilled labor than the other. After the introduction of an FTA, the member state that is extremely endowed with unskilled labor will suffer trade diversion as its partner will enjoy a comparative advantage in goods that use skilled labor in production. The other country that is less endowed with unskilled labor will gain from trade creation, as it substitutes its production of unskilled labor-intensive goods for imports from its partner. The result is a divergence of real income levels. This tendency has been observed in the 5 6 7
Lipsey, 1960. Pelkmans, 1997. Venables, 2000.
88
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
former East African Community (EAC) and in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Integration among industrialized countries, by contrast, is likely to give rise to convergence. In that latter scenario, the extremely endowed country is most abundant in skilled labor and thus the richest. Regional free trade will bring trade diversion to the country with the higher endowment of skilled labor, that is, the richer. Gains from trade creation will mainly flow to the poorer, less extremely endowed partner. The conclusion of this analysis is that regional integration among poor countries tends to lead to income divergence, which encroaches upon the viability of these FTAs and CUs. The prospect for North/South FTAs is much better. Trade creation will be concentrated in the poor member state and trade diversion in the rich partner. The trade creation, trade diversion, trade deflection, and the consumption effects are static welfare effects of integration. Since these static welfare effects are generally considered to be small, dynamic welfare effects are more important in the long run. First, trade may create positive production externalities in developing countries. If companies in these countries can produce more, they can create economies of scale and ‘learning by doing’ effects. Second, preferences will change the competitive environment in which firms operate. For instance, this will reduce X-inefficiencies because of foreign competitive pressures, and it will reduce the domestic market power of firms. Regional integration can have effects beyond the static and dynamic welfare effects. What these nontraditional effects have in common is that they tend to increase the credibility of the countries’ policies in ways that cannot be realized through unilateral or multilateral liberalization.8 Two main nontraditional effects are distinguished; namely the effects of overcoming time inconsistency, and signaling. Time inconsistency occurs when a government deviates in the short run, due to strong incentives, from a firstbest policy that is expected to improve welfare effects in the long run. A well-known example in the area of trade policy is a change in the terms of trade. In a free trade situation, the economy will adapt and the allocation of factors of production will change in such a way that a maximum welfare will be attained. This occurs through falling factor rewards in, for example, the import competing sector, and rising factor rewards in the export sector. However, a government will get strong incentives to intervene, for example, to use trade barriers to compensate for the falling wage level or to ‘protect the employment in the sector’, according to the political rhetoric one often finds 8
Francois, 1997.
89
Gerrit Faber
in these situations. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are another case in point.9 An FTA can help to overcome time inconsistency by introducing reciprocity in reforms that makes withdrawal costly, as it will be followed by loss of market access in partner countries. A reciprocal regional trade arrangement, by making the cost of even a small deviation from an agreed trade liberalization large, either by forcing the country to exit from the agreement or by having members punish the deviating country, makes it easier to overcome small temptations that culminate in a greatly distorted economy overall. It can be concluded that an FTA will contribute to overcoming time inconsistency of policy reforms if the first-best policy in a country is time inconsistent, and if the FTA binds the government to the time inconsistent policy, and if a policy reversal—in extreme cases, an exit from the FTA—has a cost that is higher than the benefits of the policy reversal. The second nontraditional effect is signaling. By entering into an FTA, a government may be conveying a message to foreign actors, for example, investors, about its economic policy preferences (making it clear that there is now a liberal government), the condition of the economy (e.g., the export sector is competitive), or the future relationships of the country with its neighbors (e.g., conflicts will be solved by peaceful means). This effect will occur if two conditions are fulfilled: there has to be a significant information asymmetry (e.g., there is substantial doubt about the government’s commitment to reform); and there has to be a significant cost to enter the FTA that cannot be recovered upon leaving, (e.g., the negotiating cost, adaptation of laws and regulations, restructuring of the economy). Ethier shows that FTAs that aim to lock in the less-developed partner’s economic reforms stimulate foreign direct investment.10 He argues that preferences and regional integration may have a dynamic effect on economic development. If reforms are successful and attract an inflow of FDI, countries gain competitiveness. If more countries reform simultaneously, they compete for FDI. Trade preferences by an industrialized country to a particular developing country stimulate FDI to that partner. Therefore, reciprocal preferences ensure the success of reforms and provide pressure on other developing countries to follow suit. Economic theories of CUs and FTAs contribute to the explanation for the lower-than-expected results from the nonreciprocal Lomé preferences. First, 9 10
Collier and Gunning, 1995. Ethier, 1996.
90
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
the positive static and dynamic effects of regional integration derive from falling prices and more competition in the importing country. In a situation of nonreciprocal trade preferences, the welfare improving trade creation and consumption effects will not occur in the preference-receiving countries, since these countries do not reduce trade barriers, as a result of which prices of imported products will not fall and competition does not increase. On the contrary, developing countries in general, and the ACP group in particular, have relatively high trade barriers, as will be shown below. The convergence that could be the result of North/South integration as analyzed by Venables, was not allowed as far as the effect has to come from trade creation in the ACP countries. The main beneficial effects from the nonreciprocal preferences were to come from trade creation and diversion in the EU, which would raise import demand for the products from the ACP. However, trade creation in the preference donor is likely to be limited, as will be argued below. This is, in fact, an adapted version of the Infant Industry argument.11 Like that argument, the reasoning for nonreciprocal preferences may backfire as well. If countries create industries in which they do not have a comparative advantage, but which are only based on preferential market access, preferences have to be kept in place indefinitely; meanwhile these preferences create vested interests to keep them in place. Second, in the case of nonreciprocal preferences, the dynamic effects in preference-receiving countries are limited. As competition is not increased in those countries, since they do not lower trade barriers, economies of scale in export industries are the only source of potential dynamic effects. So, on theoretical grounds, it was not realistic to expect very large effects on economic development, unless there were other strong factors, such as large preferential margins.12 Furthermore, time-inconsistency and lack of credibility of economic policies cannot be solved by nonreciprocal preferences, as sanctions on deviations are completely lacking and no sunk costs are incurred by the preference-receiving country to obtain the preferences. The conclusion of this overview of economic theory is that there are potential gains from regional integration between the EU and ACP countries. It is also clear that these gains cannot be taken for granted. In order to reap these gains, certain conditions have to be met, be it in terms of initial 11
12
A temporary trade barrier may be necessary to create a competitive industry that initially supplies the domestic market, according to the infant industry argument. Equally, a tariff preference could be necessary to protect an exporting industry against its rivals at the export market. As a result of multilateral trade liberalization, these margins have been falling and are low, generally speaking. As far as preferential margins are high (for agricultural products and clothing, for example), quotas limit the trade effects.
91
Gerrit Faber
conditions or of policies that are pursued after the FTA has been introduced. Furthermore, integration theory mostly assumes that there is a high degree of information sharing among partners, that free trade is immediately introduced for all goods, and that policy switches (e.g., between tariff revenue and income tax) are without costs. Finally, integration theory predicts small effects from nonreciprocal preferences. 3. The Sequencing of EPAs The text of the Cotonou Agreement gives the impression that the parties have a clear sequence in their minds: groups of ACP countries integrate among themselves and these regional integration agreements (RIAs) negotiate with the EU on EPAs. Without a proviso, Article 35.2 of the agreement says: ‘Economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world economy’. This sounds attractive for three reasons. First, EPAs with groups of ACP countries lowers the number of these agreements, which makes them more efficient instruments of cooperation for the EU, as every EPA has its negotiations, institutions, and financial and technical support. Second, the ACP countries are in a better negotiating position if they operate in groups. This is not only a matter of power. Given the limited negotiating capacities of individual ACP countries, pooling their resources may increase the effectiveness of their proposals and the way these are handled. Third, the EU runs less risk of being considered a neo-colonialist power if it negotiates with groups of ACP states instead of with individual countries that are very small and less resourceful, compared to the EU. However, the proposed sequence of, first, the development of local trading blocs that, second, conclude EPAs with the EU also has (potential) shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that the economic benefits of integration among (very) poor countries are often very small and, perhaps even more serious, may be unevenly distributed as argued earlier. In the preceding section, the probability of a divergence in economic development among the members of a South/South RIA was reviewed. It is precisely on such RIAs that the EU wants to construct the EPAs. Tables 5.1–5.3 give some basic data on the ACP RIAs that might conclude EPAs. With the exception of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), all RIAs mentioned have extremely low per capita levels of income. Of the 77 ACP countries that existed at the expiration of Lomé, 37 belong to the leastdeveloped category. They fit very well into Venables’ model, which predicts 92
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
that integration among these countries concentrates the trade diversion effects in the extremely endowed countries (i.e., the country with the highest share of low skilled labor) and the benefits in the less extremely endowed member. In addition, the economic effects of integration among countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will most probably be very small. Trade among SSA countries is extremely low, and this also applies to intra-trade inside SSA RIAs. The share of intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports was 8.6 percent for the ECOWAS, 7.0 percent for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 5.1 percent for the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and 10.4 percent for the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) in 1993.13 In the foreseeable future, the prospects for SSA economic integration are not bright, the reason being that ‘SSA countries have the export capacity to meet only a very small share of regional import needs’.14 The reason for this conclusion is that their exports are highly concentrated in a few products that do not cater to the needs of other SSA countries. It might be argued that the economic effects of integration are of secondary importance, as the political objectives are the primary arguments for integration among developing countries. This might be the case, but it is equally true that if integration produces divergent economic development or small net benefits in the presence of concentrated and visible restructuring costs, support for integration will dwindle. This may bring the integration process to a standstill or, eventually, give rise to military conflicts.15 To expect that these RIAs will become the foundations for FTAs with the EU may prove a delusion for many RIAs, particularly in SSA. A second shortcoming—not isolated from the first one—is that there is a lot of overlap in membership of RIAs among developing countries, particularly in Africa. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 list the membership of RIAs in SSA. ECOWAS, UEMOA, and CEMAC (the Central African Economic and Monetary Community) have together a membership of 22 countries. Eight of these countries are members of two RIAs. In East Africa and Southern Africa, the overlapping membership is even more extreme. COMESA, EAC, IOC (the Indian Ocean Commission), IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean RimAssociation for Regional Cooperation), and SADC have a combined membership of 25 countries (not counting non-ACP countries). Of these, eight countries have double memberships, four have triple memberships 13 14 15
Yeats, 1999: 28. Yeats, 1999: 67. World Bank (2000: p. 14 et seq.) mentions the American Civil War, the breakup of Pakistan, the fate of the East African Common Market, and the conflict between Honduras and El Salvador in the CACM, as examples of unequal distribution of integration benefits leading to sharp conflicts.
93
Gerrit Faber
(including South Africa), and three are members of four RIAs. Overlapping membership reduces the credibility of RIAs.16 By being member of more than one RIA, the countries concerned show that they want to keep open alternative options, which enables them to trade off opportunities for regional schemes as they see fit. However, regional integration is a reciprocal process by nature; it can only be successful if there is a firm commitment of the participating countries. Costs and benefits of regional integration are likely to be unevenly distributed over time. If a country has a difficult time as a result of the restructuring of economic activities, a high degree of political commitment is required to defend the RIA domestically. Solidarity from the other member countries is helpful. If governments can easily put their stakes in an alternative RIA, the credibility of a particular RIA is undermined, which makes it a less attractive negotiating partner for an EPA with the EC. A related problem is, that most RIAs in SSA (CEMAC, COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, SACU—Southern African Customs Union, UEMOA) have a CU or higher forms of integration as a final objective. A CU has a common external trade policy which excludes overlapping membership in the sense that a member state of a CU—or a higher form of integration—has shifted the powers over trade policy to the CU and can no longer negotiate on its own over trade policy matters. The fact that there is so much overlapping membership casts further doubts on the commitment of many countries to the objectives of the RIAs to which they belong. A third shortcoming of ACP RIAs is that many of them have a history of member countries not implementing agreed liberalization measures or of indulging in policy reversals without sanctions. The complete collapse of the East African Community in 1977 is a well-known example of nonimplementation. The three members have picked up their integration plans again in the second half of the 1990s. In 2004 the three countries resolved to establish a CU. SADC members concluded a Trade Protocol in 1996 to establish a FTA in 2004. At the turn of the century, the protocol had not been ratified by a sufficient number of countries. The COMESA FTA was launched in October 2000, many years behind schedule. The ECOWAS Treaty envisaged a common market in 1989. However, this RIA ‘has failed to achieve free trade in goods, let alone in factor services’.17 In many instances, countries have reinstated trade barriers on intra-RIA trade that had been removed earlier. Faber and Roelfsema mention such cases for Kenya,
16 17
Matambalya, 1999. World Bank, 2000.
94
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the second half of the nineties.18 As a result of this history of non-compliance with agreed objectives and measures, RIAs in SSA do not constitute lock-in mechanisms that improve the credibility of governments with respect to economic reforms. In the Pacific region, the eight partner countries do not have a formal regional agreement, or something that resembles such an arrangement, that exclusively binds them together. Instead, they are members of the South Pacific Forum Insular Countries (FICs), which is part of the South Pacific Forum, which is mainly political in nature and supports members in negotiations with the EU. Papua New Guinea is member of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which strives for regional free trade on a non-discriminatory basis. A viable RIA among Pacific ACP countries does not exist at the start of the transition period of the Cotonou Agreement. Waiting for such a RIA to emerge might take a long time. In the Caribbean region, regional integration has been established in CARICOM since 1973. Although the economic relations between its members (intra-regional trade) are relatively small, there are working institutions such as a Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which was established to formulate and implement coherent negotiating positions for multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral negotiations.19 CARICOM has working nonreciprocal agreements with Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. The upshot of this discussion is that it is unlikely that the sequence of first, regional, and then interregional, integration that underlies the trade section of the Cotonou Agreement will prove realistic for most ACP countries. The likelihood of a divergent economic development among very poor partners in a RIA, the small economic effects of integration in SSA—the largest of the ACP blocs—and the lack of commitment to RIAs, and the weak or absent lock-in effects in SSA, in particular, do not bode well for the development of reasonably strong RIAs that cover most ACP countries and that are able to negotiate with the EU. This conclusion is underlined by the absence of a RIA among the eight Pacific ACP countries. 4. FTAs between the EU and the ACP? Does this mean that the form of trade cooperation that is preferred in the Cotonou Agreement is bound to fail? The answer to this question is not as simple as the preceding section might suggest. Given the strong preference of 18 19
Faber and Roelfsema, 2000. Nicholls c.s., 2000: 1173.
95
Gerrit Faber
the EU for EPAs, a different strategy should or will be followed: the sequence will have to be reversed. Instead of waiting for viable RIAs to emerge as negotiating partners, EPAs can be used to reinforce regional integration among ACP countries. The EU will have to create or support its negotiating partners, with the exception of CARICOM. The question to be addressed in this section is, in which way and under what conditions will EPAs stimulate integration in ACP regions? It can be argued that the simultaneous establishment of FTAs with the EU will stimulate regional integration among groups of ACP countries. The first argument is that a North-South FTA has a tendency towards concentrating trade creation in the southern partners, which will produce a tendency of convergence with the EU, according to Venables’ approach. Given the right economic policies—this assumption will be discussed below—viable economic activities will be stimulated. Second, regional integration is not costless, as economic theory assumes. In practice, poor countries refrain from integration because short-term costs precede long-term benefits: the trade creation bears fruit only after a painful restructuring of the economy in terms of patterns of production and government revenue. Furthermore, it is the lack of funds for redistribution that often hampers RIAs among poor countries. In an EPA, the EU will provide funds for the ACP RIAs that can be used to sustain social safety nets, to improve regional infrastructures, to increase institutional capacities to participate in regional integration, and to change tax systems away from border taxes. Third, an ACP RIA that concludes an FTA with the EU will be a much more credible commitment mechanism than an all-ACP RIA. ACP countries that have opted for membership of a RIA cum FTA with the EU will have to surrender their trade policy powers to the RIA that negotiates with the EC. Overlapping membership will be impossible. Reversals will be sanctioned, as the process is reciprocal in nature. Thus, a national government can much more easily stick to its economic reforms if these are embedded in such an EU/ACP FTA. These arguments will be further discussed below. The first argument depends on the realization of sufficient beneficial economic effects. It is difficult to give an estimate for such diverse groups of countries, where reliable statistical data are scarce. For some groups, trade with the EU is very small and is likely to remain so. For these countries, the effects of EPAs will be relatively small. This applies in particular to the Pacific ACP countries.20 A number of studies have been ordered by the European Commission in order to get an idea of the size of the static effects 20
The solution for the sugar protocol will dominate the economic effects for the Pacific ACP countries; for Fiji, in particular.
96
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
of EPAs.21 The studies use different methodologies, which complicates their comparability. Taking this into account, it seems fair to conclude that the static effects are small for all potential EPAs, and small and negative for an EPA with SADC and EAC. For the Pacific and Caribbean regions, the discontinuation of the commodity protocols for sugar, bananas, and rum are much more important in quantitative terms than the static welfare effects of EPAs. The static effects do not only depend on the reciprocal liberalization of trade between the ACP and the EU. Much will also depend on the lowering of trade barriers that hamper imports from third countries into the ACP countries. Many of these countries have relatively high trade barriers. For example, the average tariff of many SSA countries was higher than 20 percent, while the incidence of non-tariff measures stood at 46 percent at the end of the 1980s.22 Tables 5.4 and 5.5 give more detailed country information on tariffs and other charges per SSA country at the end of the 1990s. CARICOM is implementing a program to reduce its Common External Tariff (CET). This will bring the number of tariff bands down to three while reducing the height of the tariffs. Still, the maximum rate will still be 20 percent.23 So there is sufficient scope for lowering tariffs on imports from the rest of the world, which will diminish trade diversion, thus contributing to a better net effect. This means that ACP countries entering into EPAs should continue to participate in the WTO-based multilateral liberalization process. Most economists agree that the dynamic effects from integration will be more substantial than the static effects. As far as economic integration increases competition and the size of markets, production will get more efficient. It will rationalize (state) monopolies and force domestic firms to produce more efficiently. Small developing countries, like the ACP countries in particular, would benefit from these effects. These effects can only be realized if trade liberalization is combined with improved domestic market institutions that monitor competition and ensure that regulation does not segment markets. The EU can play an important role in this issue by supplementing trade liberalization with deeper economic and political integration. Experience with FTAs in Central and Eastern Europe shows that FTAs, in many cases, include the ‘export of institutions and regulations’. Vogel shows that in a climate of trade liberalization, countries will harmonize their standards towards the level of the countries with the highest standards.24 If the EU takes an active stance, not only in economic, but in legal 21 22 23 24
McQueen, 1999, reviews these studies. Rodrik, 1998. Nicholls c.s., 2000. Vogel, 1995. This is the California effect. Many U.S. states have implemented the very tough Californian product standards in order to derive a competitive advantage.
97
Gerrit Faber
(competition) and technical (standards) cooperation as well, the benefits from FTAs will be increased considerably. The second argument, mentioned at the start of this section, is that the EU will be involved in ACP integration through the financial support for economic restructuring, policy reform, and capacity building. The gains from integration can only be reaped after a reduction in inefficient lines of production. This process will be painful, the more so because employment and welfare levels are low in most ACP countries. It can reasonably be expected that production will decline in the heavily protected manufacturing and service sectors. Restructuring is less painful, the quicker production and employment expand in other sectors. In theory, this could happen in those sectors where ACP countries have comparative advantages and the capacity to expand production quickly, such as labor-intensive manufactures and agricultural products. An improvement of market access to the EU for these product categories would bring short-term results. Apart from this, funds will be necessary for shifting sources of government income from tariffs to taxes, for social safety nets, for capacity building in order to improve the implementation of public functions that are required if markets are to function for the benefit of the citizens at large, and for retraining. The EU does not stand empty-handed. The Financial Protocol to the Cotonou Agreement supplies the 9th EDF with €15.2 billion. Part of this is to be used for macro-economic and structural reforms, for sectoral policies and reforms, and for institutional development and capacity building, according to Article 60 of the agreement. Under the Lomé Conventions, the EU was also involved in structural adjustment operations. Furthermore, the EU has supported economic integration among developing countries with financial and technical aid through the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) and the Programme d’Assistance Régionale Intégré (PARI). By combining financial support and EPAs, one of the reasons why economic integration among developing countries has been so difficult to realize may be taken away, viz., the absence of funds to bridge periods of painful adjustment in production and policies, and to finance capacity building in the integration institution and its member states. The third argument in favor of EPAs is the increase of the credibility of governments in their structural reform policies as a result of an FTA. As a result of long-term reciprocity, liberalization of trade in goods and services, of capital flows, and the reform of institutions and regulations cannot be rescinded as easily as was the case in Structural Adjustment Programs
98
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
(SAPs).25 This anchor function is considered to be an important advantage of FTAs over nonreciprocal preferences. For an individual ACP country, a linking up with the EU makes a RIA credible: its institutions gain authority— they are negotiating with the EU—and the EU may sanction infringements on obligations. By linking ACP RIAs to EPAs, the RIA becomes much more attractive in terms of economic benefits and credibility. The question, of course, is whether the EU is willing to support sustained adjusters among the ACP and, as importantly, to sanction policy reversals by individual ACP countries or their regional institution? The answer is not readily evident. The EU does not have a tradition of supporting ACP countries that seriously adjust their economy. Faber and Roelfsema concluded that ‘Lomé instruments are not biased in favor of countries that are sustained adjusters’.26 This conclusion draws on research with respect to the distribution of benefits from aid and trade cooperation over ACP countries in the first half of the 1990s. In her analysis of the way the EU stimulates ACP countries to meet their obligations with respect to human rights, good governance, and democracy, Arts finds a number of cases where aid under Lomé was suspended.27 In the 1990s, there is a growing willingness to resort to this kind of action, underpinned by more explicit articles in the conventions. Trade preferences have not been used as a sanction up to now, although this was clearly possible under Lomé IV-bis.28 The Cotonou Agreement opens the same possibility in Article 96. Thus, there is a growing preparedness to use sanctions against ACP countries not meeting their obligations in the areas of human rights, democracy, and good governance. Under an EPA, the reciprocal nature of the agreement would make sanctions in the area of economic policies and trade a logical outcome. However, in practice, this conclusion may turn out not to hold. Is the EU willing to play the role of hegemon in the proposed EPAs? This role implies more than just the preparedness to apply negative sanctions in case an ACP country or ACP RIA does not meet its obligations under the EPA. What will the EU do in case external shocks destabilize an ACP economy to such an extent that it jeopardizes the economic reforms introduced under the aegis of the EPA? Will the EU supply the ACP state with massive and immediate 25 26 27 28
Collier and Gunning, 1995. Faber and Roelfsema, 1997. Arts, 2000: ch. 8. Arts assumes that the most prominent case where trade preferences could have been suspended was Nigeria. From 1993 onwards, the EU suspended aid instruments, but not trade preferences. One could argue that the effects of this suspension would have been small, as Nigeria’s main export product, crude oil, enters the EU duty free from all origins. The suspension would have been a meaningful signal, however.
99
Gerrit Faber
support, as the USA did with Mexico when the latter country ran into the peso crisis of 1994 just after NAFTA was launched? Since a number of ACP countries are tied to the Euro, and most ACP economies are relatively small, the EU is capable of doing this. However, decision-making in these issues has to be very quick. It is not certain, to say the least, that the EU could act effectively in such a situation. Furthermore, the USA has a higher stake in Mexico’s economic performance than the EU has in the economic development of individual ACP countries. The conclusion is that the function of EPAs as a commitment mechanism strongly depends on the preparedness and capacity of the EU to use sanctions to enforce the obligations under the EPAs, and to protect the ACP countries against external shocks that undermine their capacity to meet their obligations. 5. Discussion and Conclusions New initiatives are needed to increase the effectiveness of the trade policy instruments that the EU uses in its policy of development cooperation with the ACP countries. Merely giving nonreciprocal preferences has not worked very well. The main reason for this failure is that nonreciprocal preferences have not improved supply conditions in developing countries. FTAs in the shape of EPAs can give a new impetus to production and trade. For this strategy to succeed, the ACP and EU should avoid trade diversion and deflection, and create as much trade as possible. This requires MFN liberalization together with regional integration. This chapter shows that EPAs could have important benefits for ACP economies by creating competitive market conditions that lead to dynamic welfare effects, and by reinforcing economic reforms. The success or failure of the new approach depends on a number of factors that have been analyzed above. This chapter argues that the expectation underlying the Cotonou Agreement—that effective negotiating partners in the shape of ACP RIAs will develop in the short term—will not materialize, with the exception of the Caribbean region. In the Pacific region, no ACP RIA is in the making. In SSA, regional integration suffers from overlapping membership, lack of commitment, and small or negative economic effects. As a result, the EU will have to use EPAs as instruments to stimulate viable RIAs among ACP countries in SSA. This puts a number of responsibilities on the EU in order to create successful EPAs. First, the EU will have to be willing to act as the hegemon in EPAs, sanctioning infringements on obligations, and supporting ACP countries that have run into externally caused difficulties threatening their participation in EPAs. If 100
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
EPAs are to work as commitment mechanisms that effectively lock-in ACP policy reforms, ACP countries should both run the risk of losing substantial benefits if they do not meet their obligations, and feel secure that they will be supported in case of external shocks. Second, substantial funds will have to be provided by the EU for social safety nets, for capacity building in order to improve the implementation of public functions that are required if markets are to function for the benefit of the citizens at large, and for (re)training. Third, in order to make EPAs successful, the market access for sensitive ACP export products should be improved. Fourth, for the full benefits of regional free trade to be realized, a deeper or a higher level of integration is necessary. Harmonization of competition policy, and of regulations with respect to product norms and standards, is called for. Given these conclusions, it is interesting to read the mandates for the EPA negotiations, as drawn up in the summer of 2002. Although these mandates only indicate starting positions, a few differences of opinion are worth mentioning. The sequencing of the negotiations is a clear issue. The ACP mandate maintains that regional integration among ACP countries could be stifled or undermined by EPAs. For that reason, ‘ACP States must be allowed to first consolidate their own regional integration processes. Moreover, they do not have the capacity to liberalize in parallel and concurrently with the EU’.29 The EU recognizes the problems ACP countries have in realizing regional integration. During the transition period, regional integration processes among the ACP should be supported, and EPAs should be introduced after that period has lapsed. The implicit conclusion of the EU is that after 2007, regional integration and EPAs should develop in parallel. As has been argued in section 3 above, this is a more promising strategy than waiting for the introduction of EPAs until effective ACP integration bodies have arisen, as the ACP prefers. Adjustment costs are a related issue. The ACP mandate argues that ‘The positive impact of EPAs needs to be maximized and their adjustment costs minimized so that their implementation is sustainable. In addition, EPAs should result in trade creation and not in trade diversion so as to avoid any welfare loss’. This is in contradiction with the theory and practice of economic integration. The positive welfare effect of trade creation is produced by a better allocation of factors of production, which means a restructuring of economic activities. Trade creation and adjustment are two sides of the same coin. In addition, the ACP mandate calls for ‘the provision of additional resources, with rapid and flexible disbursement procedures’. 29
EPAwatch, 2002.
101
Gerrit Faber
The EU mandate does not mention additional resources and instruments for adjustment. Instead, it contains a plea to use the period up to 2008 to strengthen the ACP capacity to define and implement appropriate trade strategies and policies, in order to enhance competitiveness, and to strengthen regional organizations and integration ‘where appropriate with assistance to budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform’. This seems to imply that the EU wants to use existing EDF funds for adjustment. A third important issue will be market access. ACP members want a guarantee that they will not be worse off after 2007 in their trade relations with the EU, compared to their present position. Given the interdependent nature of trade policies, this guarantee is difficult to imagine. On the other hand, improved market access for ACPsensitive products in agriculture, clothing, and other sectors would be helpful to create quick results from EPAs. The EU is reluctant to offer this. After repeating that, at present, 93 percent of ACP exports enter the EU duty- and quota-free, the EU promises to ‘further abolish remaining tariffs, focus on cooperation with the ACP countries to remove non-tariff barriers, and assess technical hurdles (such as rules of origin), with a view to facilitating market access for the ACP’.30 Given these starting positions, it is doubtful, at least, whether viable EPAs will come out of the negotiations. Both sides are reluctant to invest large amounts of political capital in EPAs. The ACP countries are afraid of restructuring and adjustment, and for that reason ‘cannot a priori accept to provide reciprocity in EPAs with the EU’, according to the ACP mandate. This is a denial of the basic presumption of the EPA concept. The EU is expecting a great deal from the dynamic and nontraditional effects of FTAs. The problem is that these effects, if they materialize, will do so only in the long run, while successes in the short run are vital to keep the integration going. These could be produced by improving market access for the ACP in the EPA framework, and by creating funds to cushion external shocks on ACP RIAs that are implementing EPAs with the EU. A period of six years has been earmarked for the EPA negotiations. This is not too long, as it is clear that both sides will have to move considerably before these negotiations can give rise to EPAs that will boost development in ACP countries.
30
EU Press Release, 2000.
102
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
Annex Table 5.1
Selected Economic Indicators of ACP Countries GNP p.c. at PPP Dollars 1999
HD Index
Africa Angola*
632
0405
Benin*
886
0411
6032
0593
Burkina Faso*
898
0303
Burundi
553
0321
Cameroon
1444
0528
Cape Verde*
3497
0688
Central African Rep.
1131
0371
Botswana
Chad*
816
0367
1360
0510
Congo
NA
0507
Congo (RDC)*
879
0430
1546
0420
Djibouti*
NA
0447
Equatorial Guinea*
NA
0555
1012
0408
599
0309
Gabon
5325
0592
The Gambia*
1492
0396
Ghana
1793
0556
Guinea*
1761
0394
Guinea Bissau*
595
0331
Kenya
975
0508
Lesotho*
2058
0569
Liberia*
NA
NA
Madagascar*
766
0483
Malawi*
581
0385
Comoros*
Ivory Coast
Eritrea* Ethiopia*
103
Gerrit Faber
Mali*
GNP p.c. at PPP Dollars 1999 693
HD Index 0380
Mauritania*
1522
0451
Mauritius
8652
0761
Mozambique*
797
0341
5369
0632
Niger*
727
0293
Nigeria
744
0439
Rwanda*
NA
0382
Sao Tomé & Principe*
1335
0547
Senegal
1341
0416
10381
0786
Sierra Leone*
414
0252
Somalia*
NA
NA
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa
8318
0697
Sudan*
1298
0477
Swaziland
4200
0655
Tanzania*
478
0415
Togo*
1346
0471
Uganda*
1136
0409
Zambia*
686
0420
2470
0555
Zimbabwe Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda
NA
0833
Bahamas
NA
0844
Barbados
NA
0858
Belize
4492
0777
Dominica
4825
0793
Dominican Republic
4653
0729
Grenada
5847
0785
Guyana
3242
0709
104
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
Haiti*
GNP p.c. at PPP Dollars 1999 1407
HD Index 0440
Jamaica
3276
0735
St Kitts–Nevis
9801
0798
St Lucia
5022
0728
4667
0738
NA
0766
7262
0793
NA
NA
Fiji
4536
0769
Kiribati*
St Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Pacific Cook Islands
3186
NA
Marshall Islands
NA
NA
Micronesia
NA
NA
Nauru
NA
NA
Niue
NA.
NA
Palau
NA
NA
Papua New Guinea
2263
0542
Solomon Islands*
1949
0614
Tonga
4281
NA
Tuvalu*
NA
NA
Vanuatu*
2771
0623
NA
0771
Samoa*
*Belonging to the group of least-developed countries
105
Gerrit Faber
Table 5.2
Membership of RIAs in West and Central Africa* ECOWAS
UEMOA
Benin
*
*
2
Burkina Faso
*
*
2
Cameroon Cape Verde
CEMAC
* *
Central African R.
*
Chad
*
Congo
*
Côte d’Ivoire
Overlap
*
*
2
Equatorial Guinea
*
Gabon
*
Ghana
*
Guinea
*
*
Guinea-Bissau
*
*
2
Liberia
*
Mali
*
*
2
Mauritania
*
*
2
Niger
*
*
2
Nigeria
*
Senegal
*
*
2
Sierra Leone
*
The Gambia
*
Togo
*
*Abbreviations are explained in the text.
106
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
Table 5.3
Membership of RIAs in South and East Africa* SADC
Angola
*
Botswana
*
SACU
COMESA
IOC
IORARC
*
Overlap 2
*
Burundi
2 *
Comoros
*
*
DR Congo
*
Djibouti
*
Egypt
*
Eritrea
*
Ethiopia
*
Kenya
*
Lesotho
EAC
*
*
2
*
Madagascar
2 *
Malawi
*
*
Mauritius
*
*
Mozambique
*
Namibia
*
*
*
2 *
* *
*
Rwanda
3
*
4 2 3
*
Seychelles
*
South Africa
*
*
*
*
Sudan
*
4
*
3
*
Swaziland
*
Tanzania
*
*
Uganda
*
3
*
*
*
*
*
4 2
Zambia
*
*
2
Zimbabwe
*
*
2
*Abbreviations are explained in the text.
107
Gerrit Faber
Table 5.4 Average Applied Tariffs and Other Duties and Charges in West and Central Africa, in Percentage Terms Average Applied Tariffs Benin
Other Duties & Charges
6.7
Burkina Faso
23.8
Cameroon
15.5
26.7
Central African R.
12.6
22.6
Chad
15.5
24.3
Congo
12.9
25.1
Cape Verde
Côte d’Ivoire
15.9
Equatorial Guinea
18.2
18.5
7.6
10.5
Gabon Ghana
NA
Guinea
NA
Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali
16.7
Mauritania Niger
18.1
Nigeria Senegal
28.7
Sierra Leone The Gambia Togo
19.2
108
Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration
Table 5.5 Average Applied Tariffs and Other Duties and Charges in South and East Africa, in Percentage Terms Average Applied Tariffs Angola
21.1
Botswana
12.3
Burundi
12.3
Comoros
30.0*
Other Duties & Charges
DR Congo Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya
14.0*
16.0
Lesotho Madagascar
16.3
Malawi
15.5
Mauritius
21.5
Mozambique
13.1
Namibia
12.3
Rwanda
11.3
Seychelles
28.0*
5.0 18.0
South Africa Sudan Swaziland
12.3
Tanzania*
25.6
Uganda
9.0*
Zambia*
16.0
Zimbabwe
24.1
10.0
*=simple average
109
Chapter 6
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR FREE TRADE AREAS: THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES Christopher Stevens
1. Introduction The arrangement under which the EU offers liberal trade access to the ACP through a unique regime was once a strength, but it is now a source of weakness. It has adverse consequences for the ACP, for other poor developing countries, and for the multilateral system. What holds the ACP back from embracing change enthusiastically is the absence of any clear alternative that guarantees the maintenance of existing benefits (the acquis) whilst providing a more secure foundation for improvements in the future. Among the problems of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), as discussed in Chapter 5, is that they fail to remove the main weakness of Cotonou: the absence of guarantees that the acquis will be maintained.
Olufemi Babarinde & Gerrit Faber (eds.), The European Union and the Developing Countries, pp. 111– 125. 2005 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands. ISBN 90 04 14199 5.
111
Christopher Stevens
This chapter explores an alternative approach. It argues that the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) could be improved in such a way as to secure large parts of the acquis whilst reducing the adverse consequences of current policy for other developing countries and the multilateral system. Parallel reforms would be required to secure some aspects of the acquis (notably in respect of the commodity protocols), and to provide meaningful cooperation in the new areas of trade policy. Hence, GSP reform is not an alternative to Cotonou options such as EPAs; it is an adjunct to them. This complementarity is a strength rather than a weakness of the GSP reform strategy. By removing from contention a large part of the current acquis, it allows attention to be focused on the remaining areas and the need to make trade policy relevant to the twenty-first century. Moreover, it removes the greatest danger for the ACP in the EPA route: that the EU will use the threat of withdrawing existing preferences on traditional exports to secure changes that favor its own interests. 2. The Need for Change Proliferating Trade Agreements The Cotonou Agreement effectively rolls over the Lomé IV trade provisions until 2007, with the proviso that this period is used to negotiate a more secure successor regime. This intention will only be fulfilled if the WTO waiver (obtained at Doha) for the transitional trade arrangement is renewed each year. The ending of Lomé-style preferences for the ACP, whether through a failure to obtain a waiver or to agree on a new regime from 2001, would be damaging to the interests of both development and trade policy. It would leave untouched the extensive preferences of the EU to other countries, many of which are wealthier than the ACP and are already better placed to take market share. It would tend to raise the average level of EU trade barriers. And it would leave the trade policy of the EU no less at odds with the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle of the WTO than it is now. This situation has arisen because during the quarter century since the first Lomé Convention was signed, the EU has negotiated many new agreements. There has been a tremendous growth in the number of countries to which the EU now offers preferences that are as good as (or better than) those available under Cotonou. Moreover, this complexity has grown substantially in recent years since the EU has been in a trade policy negotiating frenzy. Accords have been agreed with non-acceding Eastern European and some former Soviet Union (FSU) states, with Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, Mexico, and Chile. Negotiations are under way with other FSU states and Mercosur. Of the 93 agreements that have 112
An Alternative Strategy for Free Trade Areas
been notified to the WTO Committee for Regional Trade Agreements, the EU is a signatory in 28.1 The result is that the most-favored-nation (in the literal rather than the WTO sense) regime is provided by the bilateral agreements of the EU with its Southern and Eastern neighbors, the special tranche of the GSP that has been dubbed the ‘Super’ GSP and, of course, Cotonou. From the perspective of both development and trade policy, any change to the multi-tiered regime of the EU should now be in the form of upgrading the minority of less favored countries rather than downgrading the more favored. This is the fundamental argument for: – introducing a single comprehensive tariff regime which would initially simply incorporate the multiple high-level agreements and rationalize the status quo; – upgrading most Standard GSP states over the next ten years by including them in this comprehensive regime (with only the most competitive being excluded); – eventual harmonization of the tariffs payable under this comprehensive regime to cover the residual, super-competitive beneficiaries of the standard GSP and the OECD states. The second reform is desirable in its own right, to make EU trade policy more developmentally coherent, but it may also serve the shorter-term interests of the ACP countries. The ACP–EU trade relationship has been under a GATT/WTO spotlight since 1994, when a ruling over the banana regime cast doubt on its legality, and it is likely to remain so. None of the proposed Cotonou regimes is guaranteed WTO-compatible; in all cases, the EU will need to build a consensus. By including ACP preferences within a broader package of measures that benefit other developing countries as well, the task of consensus-building may be facilitated. A reciprocal EPA, by contrast, may be more difficult to sell: nonmembers not only gain nothing positive, they may actually suffer trade diversion in any ACP markets to which they export. New Preferences for Old Not only does the EU need trade policy reform—so do the ACP states. Even without the stimulus caused by the end of Lomé, the ACP states need to refashion their trade regime with the EU. Whilst the Cotonou Agreement provides the ACP with very favorable access for their current exports to the EU market, the regime has a rather short remaining shelf-life. Framed three decades ago, the 1
Cernat, 2000.30
113
Christopher Stevens
regime still reflects the circumstances of the late 1960s/early 1970s in which EU tariffs were generally quite high and preferential rates for favored suppliers were limited. Since then both of these features have changed substantially. Successive GATT Rounds have led to a fall in many EU tariffs and the removal of old-style non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas. At the same time, the proliferation of preferences means that the ACP states are no longer treated m