The New India
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The New India
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The New India Citizenship, Subjectivity, and Economic Liberalization Kanishka Chowdhury
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THE NEW INDIA
Copyright © Kanishka Chowdhury, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10951–3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chowdhury, Kanishka, 1963– The new India : citizenship, subjectivity, and economic liberalization / Kanishka Chowdhury. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–10951–3 (alk. paper) 1. India—Economic policy—1991– 2. Free enterprise—India. 3. Citizenship—India. I. Title. HC435.3.C585 2010 954.05⬘2—dc22
2010027366
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: February 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
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CON T E N T S
List of Figures
vii
Acknowledgments
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Introduction One Going Global: Texts and Contexts in the New India Two Polemics and Promises: Constructing the Consumer Citizen Three The Prompter’s Whisper: The National Imaginary and the Cosmopolitan Subject in Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land and The Hungry Tide Four Transnational Transgressions: Reading the Gendered Subject in Mira Nair’s Kama Sutra, Deepa Mehta’s Fire, and Gurinder Chadha’s Bend It Like Beckham Five “Who Will Build Our Taj Mahal?” Urban Displacement, Spatial Politics, and the Resistant Subject Afterword
1 23
183 211
Notes
215
Works Cited
227
Index
239
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107
145
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F IGU R E S
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 5.1 5.2 A.1 A.2
Rosedale NRI South City Emaar MGF Fair and Lovely ad, Father and Daughter Fair and Lovely ad, “What a face” The market The first building Lake Market, 2009 Those outside the terms of the debate
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90 92 93 99 100 199 205 212 213
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AC K NOW L E DGM E N T S
In the spring of 2004 I was teaching at the University of Glasgow when I started writing down some ideas that later evolved into an essay on neoliberalism, religious nationalism, and the state. It was election season in India, and I was fascinated by the then-ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s “Shining India” advertising campaign. The BJP’s effort both to construct a Hindu nation and to woo international capital renewed my curiosity about a subject that had been of interest to me since the Reagan years: how right-wing governments integrate capital, religion, and nation and attempt to manage the contradictions unleashed by these forces. As it turned out, the BJP was resoundingly defeated by an alliance of the Left and the Congress Party that summer. The electorate, contrary to media predictions, was not taken in by the “Shining India” campaign. In the next six years, returning to India each year from the United States, I realized that the narrative of Shining India had not been abandoned with the entrance of the new government. As I saw evidence of the monuments of “progress” (shopping malls, apartment blocks, foreign goods) in the various Indian cities I visited, it became evident to me that a systematic effort was being made to construct a specific kind of citizen to inhabit this shining paradise. This person was supposedly empowered through his or her ability to consume as a “free” agent. Meanwhile, as politicians and the mainstream media tried to focus attention on the growth rate, inequality persisted, and anxieties simmered regarding globalization, economic injustice, and religious and caste tensions. Interested in the intersections of political economy and culture, I began to see contradictions between the idea of a powerful consuming subject and the persistent inequities and constraints on groups in India. I saw such contradictions in the books, films, advertisements, and media images that were produced during this time. It was also instructive to
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Acknowledgments
look back at the 1990s, when liberalization was formalized, and to notice the patterns and dissonances leading into the present. As I worked, I was fortunate enough to read some of the best books written about what transpired in India after economic liberalization: Aijaz Ahmad’s Lineages of the Present: Ideological and Political Genealogies of Contemporary South Asia, Leela Fernandes’s India’s New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform, Jayati Ghosh and C. P. Chandrasekhar’s The Market that Failed: A Decade of Neoliberal Economic Reforms in India, Barbara Harriss-White’s India Working: Essays on Society and Economy, Amitava Kumar’s Passport Photos, Aditya Nigam and Nivedita Menon’s Power and Contestation: India Since 1989, K. N. Panikkar’s An Agenda for Cultural Action and Other Essays, Arvind Rajagopal’s Politics after Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India, P. Sainath’s Everybody Loves a Good Drought: Stories from India’s Poorest Districts, and Sumit Sarkar’s Beyond Nationalist Frames: Post-Modernism, Hindu Fundamentalism, History, to mention just a few. These writers’ insights were formative in helping me articulate my own positions. I also found the writings of many other scholars and activists indispensible in shaping my understanding of the various political and economic questions that face contemporary India, and, while I cannot mention all of these writings here, I have cited them when relevant in the book itself. Some of my colleagues—Young-ok An, Heather Bouwman, Padmaja Challakere, Carmela Garritano, Todd Lawrence, Amy Muse, Andy Scheiber, and Marty Warren—read sections of this book in early versions, and their critical input and encouragement were invaluable at a time when the idea of “a book” still felt quite hazy. In addition, I would like to offer my gratitude to an extended community of scholars, especially to those at the summer MLG-ICS sessions, the fall South Asian Studies conferences in Madison, Wisconsin, and the spring Left Forum sessions in New York. Thanks to those scholars for their encouragement, support, and feedback over the years. Their comments helped me to recognize and to address many of the more complex theoretical questions related to my topic. I am also grateful to Leela Fernandes, my outside reviewer, for her helpful suggestions and thoughtful comments. Thanks, also, to Priyamvada Gopal and Arvind Rajagopal for their encouragent and support. I would like to extend a special word of thanks to my teachers in graduate school, especially those who were a formative inf luence in my thinking about the ways in which culture and politics come together. I owe a particular debt to Jim Berlin, Tim Brennan, Shaun Hughes, Vincent Leitch, and Aparajita Sagar. Thanks particularly to Tim, whose
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work continues to be a source of inspiration. I also want to thank my fellow students—now colleagues—in postcolonial and cultural studies for their intellectual companionship, especially during those years when the idea of an academic profession seemed rather distant and ineffable: Ken Brewer, Bill Covey, Ross Dawson, Nalini Iyer, Asha Sen, S. Shankar, and Joya Uraizee. A book does not get written without financial help. Thanks to the University of St. Thomas for a sabbatical leave during 2006–07, a sabbatical assistance grant, and a research assistance Maxi-grant. Thanks also to the Department of English for a Luann Dummer course release and to Dr. Marisa Kelly, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, for a Special Projects Award. I am grateful, too, for 2009–10 federal stimulus funds that supported research help and assisted me in completing the manuscript. My chair, Andy Scheiber, went out of his way to find extra resources to help me complete the final manuscript, a gesture that I appreciate. I want to offer a special thanks to my research assistant, Fernando Sánchez. His hard work and relentless attention to detail in the final stages of the book were invaluable. I’m grateful to him for helping me prepare the manuscript during a particularly busy year. I want to express affectionate thanks to my friends in India who have always offered wisdom, laughter, and warm hospitality. Thanks to Rakesh and Nandini for generously providing a home in Bangalore, to Raj and Saroni for their cordial welcome in Delhi, and to my Kolkata friends, Ronny and Aparna, Shanu and Shuma, Pratap and Arundhati: the warmth of your friendship has always made me feel that in some ways I never really left. I am grateful to all those who were able to assist me with my research in India: thanks to the journalists and scholars, Sanjay Kumar at Lokniti in Delhi, Rudrangshu Mukherjee at the Telegraph (Kolkata), and Aditya Nigam at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (Delhi) for helpful conversations and references. I appreciate, too, the research help that I received at the Center for the Study of Culture and Society (Bangalore), the Center for Studies in Social Sciences (Kolkata), the Seagull Media and Resource Center (Kolkata), the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library (New Delhi), and the Nehru Memorial Library (New Delhi). A special thanks to Tapan Sardar for accompanying me on my first visit to Lake Market and for taking a number of wonderful photographs, which unfortunately I was unable to use but which documented an important moment in the market's history. And, thanks, of course, to the vendors who trusted me with their stories.
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Acknowledgments
To my editor at Palgrave Macmillan, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, many thanks for your patience, your f lexibility, and your interest in my work. Thanks, also, to Robyn Curtis, editorial assistant at Palgrave, for being such an immense help during the publication of this manuscript. To Joel Breuklander, production assistant at Palgrave, thanks for facilitating the production process. A special word of thanks to Will deRooy, my copyeditor, for his excellent editing. I want to thank good friends in St. Paul for encouragement and stimulating conversations: Alexis, Amy, Andy, Bartek, Brett, Carmela, Cathy, Doug, Erika, Joan, John, Jonelle, Lon, Lucia, Mary-Anne, Mary Lou, Michael, Nik, Padmaja, Pam, Ray, Sarah, Todd, Tom, U. B., and Young. Special thanks to Mary-Anne and Michael for their ceaseless affection, to Andy and Mary Lou for warmth and solidarity, to Todd and Lucia for laughter, cookouts, and seminars, to Padmaja and U. B. for a home away from home, to Young for her empathy with thoughts about home and exile, and to Carmela and Bartek for their generosity and example as scholars. I am particularly grateful to Erika and John for years of soul-sustaining friendship. You never doubted that this book would one day see the light of day. Thanks, also, to friends Kirsty, Mike, Parvati, and Rob in Britain. Conversations with you helped me clarify my thoughts and plans. To Pat and Clarence, a special thanks for years of support and unquestioning belief. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my mother, Manjusree, my sister, Behula, and my niece, Inaya. I can hardly express how much your love and support have sustained me all these years. Without you, all of this would be fairly meaningless. Profound thanks to my mother for believing in the first place; for providing a home filled with love, sustenance, and warmth; and for engaging in passionate debates about politics. To my sister, heartfelt thanks for your example of academic excellence and your years of unwavering faith in my work; and to my niece, thanks for your affection, laughter, and companionship. And, finally, this book is for Susan. You read every page of this book, helping me clarify and sharpen my ideas. Thank you for letting me see that there was a book somewhere in the midst of what sometimes appeared to be an unrelated jumble of ideas. It would never have seen print without your incisive comments and your constant support. I count on your wisdom more than you know. Your steadfast belief in my work made me pick up the pieces every time I felt like letting go. Your love, affection, and intellectual companionship over the years made this book possible.
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Introduction
Even as India, the largest democracy in the world, is being trumpeted as an emerging economic superpower, a majority of its citizens continue to endure the legacies of colonialism and the policies of ruling governments that primarily protect the interests of the privileged classes. Since Rajiv Gandhi’s Indian National Congress Party government initiated economic “reforms” in the 1980s, Indian ruling parties have continued these reforms, adopting measures that have furthered such interests. They have “liberalized” the economy, meaning that largely deregulated foreign investment has been zealously pursued; public sector industries and financial institutions have been denationalized; the pool of reserve labor has been made available to multinational companies; large-scale social programs, especially in the agricultural sector, have been curtailed; and the public sector has been cut off from state budgetary support. These measures are generally in keeping with similar neoliberal policies that have been instituted across the globe in developing countries as conditions for incorporation into the global capitalist economy.1 Since 1991, when liberalization was officially adopted as the reigning economic doctrine, coalition governments, mostly under the leadership of the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have governed the country. Although the Congress Party was responsible for initiating a series of economic reforms to liberalize the Indian economy, these reforms were also enthusiastically advocated by the BJP during its terms in office (1998–1999 and 1999–2004). The BJP’s election loss in 2004 to the Congress-Party-led coalition did little to halt the juggernaut of liberalization, though it did serve as a significant reminder of the Indian electorate’s disquiet at economic reforms that benefited only a small section of the population. Despite some resistance from a substantial Left segment of the coalition, Prime Minister Manmohan
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Singh, who was the finance minister in 1991 when reforms were instituted, has continued on the path of “reforming” the Indian economy. Under the Congress Party’s auspices in the last few years, the project of liberalization has been pursued with even greater determination. Liberalization has been announced as the magic formula for the reduction of poverty and for economic and social progress. In support of its policies, the party has loudly declared its so-called successes over the last few years. The figures, it claims, speak for themselves: In 2010, foreign reserves were over $280 billion (compared to around $6 billion in 1991), growth rates for 2010 were predicted to be 8 percent (compared to below 5 percent in the pre-liberalization years), the Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive Index (Sensex) was over the sixteen-thousand mark by mid-2010 (in July 1990, it stood at one thousand points), and foreign investment went from $5.5 billion in 2005 to over $20 billion by 2009.2 These are not just indications of India’s economic strength, claim the party economic experts; they are proof that the nation has gone global and has become an equal participant and shareholder in the global quest for wealth.3 Based on such figures, the corporate power brokers, the media, and a majority of politicians have declared a new era: the era of the “New India.” This is a brand that is being marketed with great enthusiasm, supported by myriad advertising slogans. Even the Western media has endorsed this brand. In 2007, Newsweek in the United States and the Observer in Britain published favorable cover stories on the New India. Of course, the attempt to “sell” a version of India is not merely about promoting the so-called new economic achievements cited in the previous paragraph; it also reveals a class project, disguised as “development,” to eradicate all remains of the old. The “old” in a neoliberal world is characterized by any sign of a socialized economy, any sign of a substantial commitment to public expenditure or to the government regulation of business. Thus the branding of the New India is intended in large measure to assure foreign investors and financial organizers that India is “on the right track” and has jumped on the global corporate bandwagon. Quite simply, such national branding is the way for developing countries like India to become part of the “global community.” While propagating the New India brand, corporate and state interests also attempt to elide the grim realities—especially the poverty and inequities—that confront the vast majority of India’s people. The government is less inclined, for instance, to report that structural inequities at the national level are at critical levels. In 2009, India was ranked at 134 on the UN Human Development Index. Poor people in India
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are worse off than they are in the Palestinian Occupied Territories or in Namibia or Botswana.4 Female literacy is barely at 50 percent; rural poverty is over 30 percent (accounting for over 220 million people); and life expectancy at birth is between 65 and 67 years.5 More importantly, various inequities based on caste, class, and gender remain embedded in the social system, and the gap between the rich and the poor, even according to the Asian Development Bank, has widened to a threatening level. Liberalization, rather than easing the suffering of the poor, has contributed to a dramatic evisceration of measures to ease their lot. This evisceration includes a reduction in public subsidies, the forcible displacement of agrarian populations, the hiring of noncontract laborers, and the erosion of industrial jobs. Meanwhile, a small minority continues to amass huge wealth, and a middle class is offered a range of consumer goods even as its foothold on the class ladder becomes ever more precarious. One reason for this growing insecurity, of course, is that although real wages continue to stagnate, this middle class is encouraged to consume goods and services through increased access to loans and credit. Nevertheless, the consuming power of this credit-fueled class is significantly greater than it has been in the past, and along with a construction boom and an inf lux of foreign exchange, the growth rate has been artificially bloated. Continuing structural inequities, and an increasing fall in subsidies for the underprivileged, however, have created an India where the ironies of an incorporation into the global are only too evident: Pepsi and Coca-Cola vie for market share while over 21 percent of communicable diseases are linked to unsafe drinking water; cable television advertising a range of consumer products is widely available, but 44 percent of Indian households have no electricity.6 Medical tourism is a rising industry, attracting over one hundred thousand foreign visitors every year, yet “over 20 million Indians are pushed below the poverty line every year because of the effect of out-of-pocket spending on health care” (Deogaonkar). The contradictions accompanying India’s new global status are too many to recount, and they are the features of the New India that seldom form part of the brand image. The New Indian Subject This book, The New India: Citizenship, Subjectivity, and Economic Liberalization, focuses on this new, “liberalized” India during the sixteen-year period from June 1991, when the Congress Party officially
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initiated a policy of economic liberalization, to the spring of 2007, a specific moment of disruption in this celebratory narrative of the new: a protest at which fourteen villagers were killed in a police firing in the village of Nandigram in West Bengal while rallying against the land acquisition policy by the state government. Although the Nandigram incident mirrored a similar event in January 2006 (when 16 adivasis were killed in a police firing in Kalinganagar, Orissa) while resisting the forcible acquisition of their land for a Tata Steel plant, the former episode was distinctive because it took place under the aegis of the Left government in West Bengal, drawing outrage and condemnation from many of the ruling party’s traditional supporters. These years, however, are distinctive not merely because of the implementation of economic reforms and the multiple acts of resistance to these reforms but also because they were characterized by significant shifts in the political, social, and cultural landscape of the nation. Indeed, some might argue that in the sixty years since independence these years were the most transformative, with the exception of the enormous changes in the five to ten years following independence and partition.7 Major events of the period include the destruction of the Babri Mosque in December 1992, the Bombay blasts in March 1993, the atomic explosions of 1998, the increased militarization of Kashmir in the 1990s, the Kargil conf lict in 1999, the Gujarat massacres in 2002, the resounding electoral defeat of the BJP in 2004, the rise in Maoist insurrection movements in 2005–06, and the Nandigram uprising in January 2007. In this sixteen-year phase, conf licting ideologies of nation, diaspora, religion, capital, and consumerism collided and coalesced as the country tried to shape a new postcolonial identity. A central part of this struggle, I argue, involved an attempt by the state and the corporate media to construct a new Indian citizen, one who was integral to a larger effort to narrate a new, liberalized nation. Alongside, and in response to these hegemonic claims about a new Indian subject, various artists, activists, and ordinary Indians put forward alternative visions of an Indian subject. Of course, these cultural constructions of the subject must be seen in connection with the actual amendment of citizenship laws, such as the 2003 law to create an “Overseas Citizenship of India” (OCI) or the issuing of the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card. The relationships between these two “forms” of citizenship are critical. For instance, the dilution of the juridical definition of the “national” citizen affects the cultural construction of the subject. It instills this cultural process with greater urgency and makes the desire to define Indianness more
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immediate; likewise, cultural constructions of the subject provide an alibi for the state’s attempt to solidify a variety of laws that reaffirm the transnational benefits of upper-class citizens and marginalize those at lower end of the class spectrum; the focus on the metropolitan subject in hegemonic texts, for example, allows the state to further silence and marginalize the rural worker. These relationships and contradictions mark the entire project of subject construction, and my work attempts to shed some light on the precise nature of these relationships and contradictions in particular cultural forms and political contexts and to understand the most significant negotiations and claims from multiple perspectives to frame this Indian subject. In part, my examination of contemporary cultural production is placed in the context of a continual, contestatory process of shaping a national imaginary and a national subject, and this reading highlights post-independence anxiety about the formation and legitimacy of the Indian nation-state. Furthermore, I argue that these constructions of the national have to be understood within the larger framework of global capital. The cultural narratives I have chosen to analyze—literary fiction and nonfiction, film, political advertisements, media images, and the performance of public space—are particularly illuminating, as they represent a range of expressions that are circulated in multiple venues and consumed by various audiences. By studying the ways in which the rituals and forms of this new Indian subject were produced, distributed, posed, and performed during this period—as a result of and in conjunction with the economic reforms that herald new ways of thinking about the nation—I work to trace the complex intersections between culture and political economy in the “new” India. Moreover, by examining the idea of a global Indian subject, I attempt to illuminate the intersections and divergences of the national and the global in the construction of this “new” nation. The New Indian Subject and Public Culture A starting point in my study, however, is to explain more precisely why these questions and concerns are often engaged most productively in the realm of culture.8 One argument for a close reading of cultural texts during this period is that under globalization, above all, the materiality of culture (culture as commodity) has been enhanced, which has made it especially fruitful to analyze cultural expressions as a means of understanding changing social relations. The terrain of culture offers
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immensely rich possibilities for the student of the New India. If the project of capital accumulation under liberalization is inevitably linked to existing and changing social structures, then culture is an arena in which this process of contestation and accommodation, ref lected in attempts to create a new Indian subject, continues to be central. I am persuaded by Raymond Williams’s still-relevant argument that “as government . . . increasingly rests for real power on a modern economic system, older social purposes become vestigial, and whether expressed or implied, the maintenance of the economic system becomes the main factual purpose of all social activity” (188). In Williams’s view, “[p]olitics and culture become deeply affected by this dominant pattern, and ways of thinking derived from the economic market . . . become increasingly evident” (188). Williams’s words are aptly suited to the ways in which culture and politics intersect with economic changes in India, particularly in an understanding of the conf luence of and conf lict between vestigial and modern modes of production. In the spirit of Williams’s emphasis on the economic and in an effort to resist recent moves in cultural studies that focus primarily on the distribution and consumption of culture and posit the immateriality of labor, I want to emphasize that culture is a product of labor and cannot be understood outside the context of the production process. Likewise, the politics of representation and cultural practices are intertwined in the dynamics of a class society, which relies on labor to produce those cultural commodities that are the object of my analysis. Specifically, in post-liberalization India, the boom in cultural expressions arises on the backs of the millions who are responsible for carrying the bricks that build a “shining” India. Even as I pay attention to the patterns of distribution and consumption of cultural commodities, and to the multiple representations of the new Indian subject, my analysis can be meaningful only if I am mindful of the ways in which the labor process is made invisible or elided in creating this subject. Consequently, my analysis is informed by a reading of the labor process as it is represented in texts, as well as by the stories of those who actually produce these texts (such as those displaced by the privatization of space, for instance). My examination of the new Indian subject focuses not on the juridical prescriptions regarding political citizenship, but rather on the political and cultural performance of citizenship—that is, how the citizen-subject is constituted through social relations, and how this subject comes into being through the public circulation of texts. My primary interest, then, is in this public, cultural idea of the subject. I uncover how various ideas of the subject are constructed, received, and
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negotiated in the everyday context of the social and economic life of Indians. My argument is that these constructions of the Indian subject as public texts cannot be understood merely as signifiers of social control or of resistance to such control but must also be seen as narratives that, to some extent, refuse to stay within the conceived boundaries of their producers (even though the production process—where labor is used and erased in the process of putting up a billboard or in producing a film—as I mentioned earlier, must itself be taken into account). As Fredric Jameson suggests, cultural works are characterized by the dialectic of containment and resistance, of reification and utopia. Jameson’s point is that consumers are not simply manipulated nor are they merely clever readers of texts, who can “see through” attempts to manipulate their desires and anxieties (“Reification”). This dialectic animates the process of reading texts and is particularly relevant for an understanding of the Indian “public,” especially as the New India remains fundamentally unstable, encompassing a myriad of social forces and political conf licts that leave the cultural text and the subject always in process. The narratives I analyze span a range of cultural production and are part of an array of texts that constitute public culture in the New India. However, at a time when cultural production is increasingly imbricated in transnational economic relations, public culture cannot be understood purely in a closed, national context but must be appraised within a global logic of circulating commodities. Thus, any notion of an “Indian” public culture must also include attention to issues of class, gender, and religion across both national and transnational contexts. The texts I analyze are all implicated in global structures of meaning, even if the target audience is often intended to be primarily a local one. A transnational view of culture informing my own has been put forward by Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge in the first chapter of Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World, “Public Modernity in India.” Appadurai and Breckenridge identify the term “public culture” as a “zone of public debate” (5). In their estimation, this “zone cannot be understood apart from the general processes of globalization”: the contestatory character of public culture has much to do with the tensions and contradictions between national sites and transnational cultural processes. These tensions generate arenas where other registers of culture encounter, interrogate, and contest one another in new and unexpected ways. . . . This zone of contestation
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The New India and mutual cannibalization—in which national, mass, and folk culture provide both mill and grist for one another—is at the very heart of public modernity in India. (5)
Here, Appadurai and Breckenridge identify the multiple and contestatory ways in which cultural forms come to life in India; however, given the lack of recent examples, and the number and variety of cultural forms and the many ways in which they emerge and interact, gaps necessarily remain in these writers’ work. They themselves acknowledge that they do not address “the major question of how the new visual fields [they] have discussed, the ‘nationalist realisms’ they often mediate and the new capabilities to consume, [have] interact[ed] with the emergence of the Hindu right in India in the past decade,” nor do they discuss “how the new forms of public modernity with which [they] are concerned interact with the present crisis of secularism in countries like India” (13). The authors also focus on a “new cosmopolitanism” that, for them, is linked primarily to their conclusion that “the imagination has emerged as a new force in social life, largely as a result of the spread of electronic media, in the context of rapid f lows of resources, images, and persons across national boundaries” (10–14). Categorizing the new cosmopolitanism principally in terms of consumption and the growth of the “imagination,” however, elides the political economy of cultural texts, restricting them to a modernity outside the logic of capital accumulation. Purpose and Methodology This book is in part intended to address some of the gaps in Appadurai and Breckenridge’s project and to further emphasize that culture is not only a contestatory site where many different texts collide but also an arena that is deeply intertwined in the political economy of the state. My reading of cultural narratives, then, is grounded in the notion that these narratives cannot be separated from the profound effects of economic reforms in the New India. Indeed, in some cases, the narratives are constructed precisely to manage these effects. Certainly, there have been recent works focusing on an analysis of cultural texts in the New India, such as William Mazzarella’s Shoveling Smoke: Advertising and Globalization in Contemporary India (2003) and Arvind Rajagopal’s Politics after Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India (2001), that connect their understanding of these texts to the
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9
context of economic reforms. Both writers scrutinize local cultural practices, analyzing them within the framework of larger shifts in the global economy. My analyses engage in a similar dialectical process and consistently link considerations of public modernity in the local context of the New India to the constraints and demands of global capital, not just to “transnational cultural processes.” Indeed, one important contribution of this book is to demonstrate the multiple ways in which questions surrounding modernity, secularism, fundamentalism, citizenship, and ideas about the public interact with the movement and control of capital and labor. My approach departs from the predominant postcolonial analyses of recent years, which are best represented by the following trends: an attention to a localized micro-politics where class analysis is just one more node of difference; an emphasis on the politics of deterritorialization, where the actions of scattered, decentered groups take precedence over ideas linked to collective action, class conf lict, and class struggle; a reassessment or refusal of the categories of wage labor and surplus value in favor of concepts such as “immaterial labor”; and, finally, a disinclination to regard global capital as a totality.9 The applications of these post-Marxist critical models often relegate questions of class and labor to the background, effectively depoliticizing the terrain of culture. I recognize, along with Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus, that “there are mediations, to be sure,” that prevent any transparent understanding of culture, “but there are (irreducibly) relations between ‘the economic’ and ‘the cultural,’ nevertheless, which are simultaneously multiplied and rendered more elusive as capital permeates more and more aspects of our existence” (5). It is these relations that I uncover, analyzing the construction of the new Indian subject, who resides at the intersection of these economic and cultural formations. Certainly, in the Indian context, capital has permeated “more and more aspects” of society, and because the New India remains a country seriously divided along class lines, many of the Marxist categories for an analysis of social relations that have been cast aside by a large segment of contemporary postcolonial scholars are particularly relevant. Marxist theories of capital accumulation and crisis, for instance, can illuminate an analysis of the New India. While I make class analysis central, a significant portion of my study focuses on issues of nation, gender, caste, and religion, to name a few, that complicate economic categories. Subject formation is not merely a ref lection of the antagonism between labor and capital, but at the same time constructions of the subject cannot be analyzed outside the framework of capitalist social relations. This methodological
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The New India
approach, if nothing else, “compels postcolonial studies to join the economic conversation” (Brennan, “The Economic” 111). My arguments and analyses in this book also complicate some of the more typical binaries that come up in discussions of contemporary India. For instance, even as I acknowledge the importance of the cultural and political questions raised by Appadurai and Breckenridge, I alter the focus of these questions—contesting the notion, for example, that there is a “crisis of secularism” and arguing instead that the Indian state, though the putative guarantor of secularism, has consistently interacted and continues to cooperate strategically with the forces of the Hindu right. Communalism and secularism, then, are not oppositional forces but are simultaneously at play in the dialectical process of political adjustment. As Achin Vanaik has argued, Hindu nationalism and communalism, which tend to be viewed as “completely antithetical to Indian democracy and nationhood,” in fact “can actually be supportive of democracy and nationhood in its own contradictory way” (Painful Transition 149). I would add to Vanaik’s insight that in the age of the New India, the circulation and accumulation of global capital are equally important factors in determining the ways in which we read the traditional communalism/secularism binary. Both categories are enmeshed in ideas related to the nation and to ways in which economic and political struggles are negotiated. Some of the texts that I examine ref lect and refract some of these struggles to contain and promote differing notions of religious and secular identities even as they defer or embrace the neoliberal regime of capital accumulation. I argue that the dominance of the religious text over the last sixteen years, instead of being a primary focus, should be seen as the supplementary text within the larger context of the increasing dominance of capital. Narratives that are coded in religious terms, then, may be concerned primarily with class conf lict and the management of that conf lict. However, I argue, too, that religious tensions cannot be wished away purely through an economic set of determinations. I show, for instance, how much of the fundamentalist, nationalist text in India is about a longing for a lost unity or a past “purity” that putatively existed before partition. The BJP’s attempt to create a new national (Hindu) subject can be read partially as an effort to rewrite the history of the subcontinent. For example, the BJP states as one of its primary positions that it rejects the “two-nation theory on the basis of which our Motherland was tragically partitioned in 1947” (Vision Document 2004).10 Partition, as that anxious trace, remains a factor that lies within the nationalist proclamations of the BJP. Similar claims and their corresponding
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11
reproductions can be seen in a range of Indian cultural narratives, as I demonstrate in later analyses. Taking into account such complex social formations and political intersections, the arguments and analyses in this book address the following questions, which I believe are vital to an understanding of recent attempts to narrate a new Indian subject in the realm of culture: how have constructions of the new Indian subject been deployed, commodified, distributed, and consumed in the age of late capital? Are the prevailing conceptual parameters of late capital and globalization adequate for our understanding of this new subject? How have the sometimes opposing texts of nation, religion, and capital acted as conf licting or contradictory agents for the construction of this subject? How do diverse cultural texts challenge, subvert, and accommodate the dominant subject-citizen model thrown up by capital, nation, and religion? How must we read the various longings for nation or for global “respect” attached to this subject across the fault lines of nation and diaspora? Since I examine diverse cultural forms, I believe my analyses highlight the tensions and nuances that are inevitably a part of imagining and narrating the “new” Indian subject. As I mentioned earlier, I attempt in my analyses to trace the tenuous dialectic between containment and resistance, reification and utopia, rather than merely highlighting dominant and resistant views of the subject. Consequently, in this book, I examine different cultural forms and enunciations of the new Indian subject, exploring the many ways in which cultural expressions challenge, collude with, and contest versions of the national subject. My effort here is not meant to suggest that there is some easy trajectory of meaning that, once uncovered, will reveal all of the many shades, or indeed the “authentic” character, of the new Indian subject. Nor am I suggesting that there is a “real” Indian subject that can be counterpoised against this constructed, new subject. Rather, I bring together political economy and culture in a serious and substantial way so as to provide a materialist reading of the Indian subject in the neoliberal age. What Jameson has said about the emergent moment of postmodernism as a historically specific instance is similarly relevant for the contemporary Indian subject. He views “[the] spatial peculiarities of postmodernism as symptoms and expressions of a new and historically original dilemma, one that involves our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global capital
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The New India
itself ” (Postmodernism, 413). Jameson was, of course, alluding primarily to a Western subject, but in many ways the Indian subject in the age of liberalization is similarly confronted with a “new and historically original dilemma” (413). In the following chapters, then, I explore this dilemma, attempting to unravel the way culture and politics draw upon each other—sustain, enrich, and destabilize each other. I employ a dialectical materialist model suited to the complexity of such relationships. This is not merely an ideological gesture but a methodological practice that has roots in some of the finest works in the field of contemporary postcolonial studies (see previous endnote). The material context of the present informs my analysis of cultural texts. Jameson points out that “capitalism, and the modern age, is a period in which, with the extinction of the sacred and the ‘spiritual,’ the deep underlying materiality of all things has finally risen dripping and convulsive into the light of day; and it is clear that culture itself is one of those things whose fundamental materiality is now for us not merely evident but quite inescapable” (Postmodernism 67). A methodological approach that acknowledges this “fundamental materiality” can best highlight intersections between the political, the economic, and the cultural. “Culture,” then, is not an exclusive site on which fantastical imaginings of the nation and the new Indian subject are projected by a myriad of forces but a contested zone where the notion of culture itself is recast by the material. Who or What Is This New Indian Subject? The new Indian subject resists any absolute definitions, mirroring many of the attendant tensions over nation, capital, gender, caste, and class in the New India. While those people in favor of economic reforms seize on an upwardly mobile middle-class citizen as the exemplary subject, efforts to redefine and shape an alternative subject are also emerging from oppositional forces, such as the writers, artists, and activists that I examine in this book. Many of their efforts to pose a resistant subject attempt to position him or her outside the dominant lines of nation, class privilege, or religion. Also, all these attempts at subject construction are “new,” insofar as every political moment creates historically specific responses. Let me offer a couple of examples. An increasing factor in developing a national consumer subject is the NRI (non-resident Indian). Elite groups in the Indian diaspora, primarily in the US and the UK, have links to
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Introduction
13
dominant groups within India and have started playing a major role in national politics. Their presence and their interests are not dissimilar to those elite groups in India who advocate liberalization: those in the diaspora, too, desire an unfettered capitalism along with a reinforcement of so-called traditional values, represented by religion and nation. Because of their ability to harness capital and foreign exchange, these groups have a disproportionate access to political power. In 2003, the Indian government responded to NRIs’ increasing financial contributions and inf luence by passing a citizenship bill that offers a “Person of Indian Origin” status to citizens of specific countries, notably Australia, New Zealand, and nations in North America and Western Europe. This increasing prominence of the (Western) NRI subject, especially since the mid-1990s, has effectively blurred the inside/outside gap between nation and diaspora—both in cultural and in financial terms. Consequently, even though this elite subject is far removed from the realities of middle-class life, the dominant view of the new Indian subject, an idealized middle-class national citizen produced by the inf lux of capital, is often a ref lection of his (the subject is usually defined as male) successful diasporic cousin. Likewise, cultural representations of the NRI subject, particularly in Mumbai cinema, usually connect this subject to the homeland, which represents a site for unfulfilled longing (e.g., Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge, 1995) and a place of purity, untainted by Western values (e.g., Swades, 2004). India as a political entity and the Indian “national” are simultaneously liminal and fixed in these incarnations of “homeland.” The intersections of these sometimes competing and colluding narratives between class and religion, nation and diaspora are ref lected in the idea of the new Indian middle-class citizen. Another example of an emerging subjectivity is the effort to define a gendered subject. While representations of the new Indian woman are generally constructed by dominant forces to suggest an empowered, consuming middle-class subject, one who is also able to shine in her “traditional” roles as wife and mother, oppositional artists and feminist activists attempt to recuperate this subject as an active agent of her own history. Often this effort is constituted by struggles on multiple fronts. Perhaps the point can be illustrated brief ly by examining a range of responses to a beauty pageant in Bangalore in 1996. A coalition of activists consisting of intellectuals, writers, and artists found themselves articulating a position that was opposed to both the corporate organizers of the pageant, who saw women merely as objects for consumption and as potential customers, and the right-wing Hindu organization
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The New India
(Vishwa Hindu Parishad) that decried the corruption of Indian womanhood it viewed as inherent in the pageant. These activists presented themselves as agents of change, as advocates for women’s rights. In formulating their oppositional position to both the corporate organizers and the religious organization, the activists were trying to bring attention to the multiple, continuing forms of gender oppression, especially to various forms of violence against women, that were entirely outside the interests of either of these groups. The activists were also speaking out against the state government’s unprincipled collaboration with the organizers of the pageant, the Amitabh Bachchan Corporation. They argued that the pageant was primarily intended to allow multinational corporations to enter the Indian market. Indeed, some of the companies that were sponsoring the pageant were directly supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.11 The struggles over the varying views of the new Indian woman, in this instance, are another example of the tensions that erupt along the multiple fault lines of capital, nation, and religion as the new Indian subject is shaped. As I have implied above, the new Indian subject has to be read within the framework of these intersecting forces. My study, then, is not limited to a fixed idea of “India” but takes into account the context of the totality of the movement of global capital. An attention to the effects of transnational capital as a nexus of social relations is particularly important in a country where traditional interactions within communities and between classes are rapidly changing following the increased entrance of unregulated capital. Since the state has promoted and accelerated economic reforms, it has set in motion a series of changes that have affected social relations. Needless to say, attempts to construct a consumer, global subject are connected to these changing social relations. The New Indian Subject and the Indian Polity I read these constructions of the new Indian subject not only within the context of political economy but also with an attention to the Indian polity. I argue that ongoing efforts to shape a new Indian subject highlight continuing postcolonial anxiety about identity and nation. Certainly, these attempts and these concerns have existed since independence, but my study demonstrates the complex and distinct ways in which the Indian ruling classes are negotiating the intersections of nation, capital, and religion in the age of liberalization. Constructing the New India and narrating the new Indian does not merely consist
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Introduction
15
in the enactment of laws but involves a “performance.” Anna Tsing has argued in the context of the Indonesian example that performance is “simultaneously economic performance and dramatic performance. . . . The dependence on spectacle is . . . a regular feature of the search for financial capital. . . . [P]rofit must be imagined before it can be extracted” (118). Yet, wherever it occurs, this performance, this reimagining, cannot be enacted, sustained, nor asserted with any degree of autonomy or control. In the last fifteen years, dramatic performance to create a “shining” new India has existed in congruence with economic reforms, but many of India’s citizens have clearly remained unconvinced by these efforts.12 And any attempt to understand versions of the new Indian subject must consider the situations and resistant acts of those citizens on the margins of this discourse, the invisible “others” who constitute the greater portion of the Indian population. Several forms of resistance to the state have persisted, and most are intended to address social inequities that are a direct result of these reforms. The participants in these movements are active political subjects who are entirely outside the New India brand (landless farmers from Chengara in Kerala to Nandigram in West Bengal, displaced industrial workers, urban street vendors, adivasis [tribal groups], and political resistance groups such as the Maoists).13 There are, of course, other forms of resistance to the state, such as acts of upper-caste violence, most prominently displayed in 1990 in response to the proposed government policies of reserving jobs and university positions for Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and while the scale of those protests has not been replicated, upper-caste violence, especially in rural areas, remains a permanent source of terror for Dalits and OBCs. These actions, however, are about maintaining caste and class interests rather than about forcing the state to meet its obligations to its citizens.14 What I am suggesting is that, on the one hand, the nature of the economic reforms coupled with attempts by the state to delineate a specific kind of new India and new Indian have generated various forms of resistance. Quite simply, disinvestment in agriculture, the erosion of government programs, the lack of real employment, and the increase in income inequality have found expression in the intensification of social tensions and conf licts. On the other hand, these acts of resistance have had a direct effect on the efforts by the state and the proponents of the New India brand to construct a new Indian subject. Thus I am arguing that class-based insurgencies have to be part of our framework for understanding the ways in which citizenship, nation, and state are being
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The New India
redefined and that, likewise, these insurgencies must be seen in light of the state’s attempt to enact economic and dramatic performance. Both the BJP and the Congress Party have tried to minimize these disruptions and marginalize those who are outside the New India brand by constructing a new Indian subject based on an idealized middle-class identity: the parties manage class dissent by selling consumerism along with Hindu nationalism to the middle classes; meanwhile, the lower classes are subjugated by hostile and sometimes violent policies targeted at the poor and placated by a coded assimilation into the national project via religion. This strategy was used with great effectiveness by the BJP in the mid-1990s. As I demonstrate in chapter 2, the party’s construction of this new Indian subject reveals that economic liberalization, privatization, fundamentalism, and nationalism are converging and contesting texts, not contradictory ones. Nation and religion, in this instance, are part of an ongoing dialectic that counters and corresponds with the uncritical celebration of capitalism, globalism, and liberalization, supplementing and contradicting these forces.15 What is especially important to mention here, however, is that the ruling party or the corporate media, because of ongoing political conf licts, cannot completely manage the various circulating discourses about nation, faith, or capital, and I would suggest that, as a result, ambiguity and tension surface in the way the new Indian subject is posed in dominant cultural narratives. The narratives I examine in chapter 2 reveal hegemonic attempts to manage the crisis of statehood and impose a fixity of nation and subject, a fixity that is withheld by multiple, supplementary cultural articulations. Meanwhile, what we see ref lected in oppositional cultural narratives such as Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land or Deepa Mehta’s Fire are anxious disclaimers about the Indian subjects’ cultural identity and purity. In my discussion of these and other texts in chapters 3 and 4, I argue that these so-called resistant narratives, in their attempt to position an oppositional cosmopolitan or secular subject in the national project, often reinsert these subjects into the same global capitalist process that is inextricably linked to fundamentalism and nationalism in the first place. This reinsertion often holds true whether this oppositional subject is based on discourses connected to a globalized notion of gendered human rights and justice or to an earlier, Nehruvian secular socialism. In the case of the narratives that I examine in chapters 3 and 4, calls for equality, justice, and individual rights, embodied in the figures of the Indian subject, need to be seen in the light of their connection to the dictates of the market economy. The concept of rights, I would argue,
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17
is constantly shifting within different economic moments and interests; assertions of individuality, particularly, have to be measured against their positions in relation to the interests of the market. For instance, a middle-class citizens’ “rights” group appealing on environmental and hygienic grounds for the demolition of an urban slum is also impeding the rights of the poor, their right to survive. What I am suggesting, then, is that cultural narratives about nation, religion, and globalism have to be read as occupying an interstitial space between competing, but not necessarily antagonistic, ideologies. As all of the analyses later in the book suggest, the text of global capital inevitably intrudes even as efforts to erase or manage it become more marked. Placing the New India in a Global Context Thus the purity of the nation space, be it religious or cultural, often serves not as an end in itself but as a ref lection of the ironic attempt to garner national pride in the service of global capital. A central ideological marker of the brand image “New India,” therefore, is a trumpeting of the importance of the global, especially a promotion of India’s willing incorporation into the global capitalist market. Consequently, in order to comprehend the economic rationale for India’s “going global,” and the ideological logic of constructing a global Indian subject, this study situates economic “reforms” within the dynamics of late capital. After all, liberalization, as articulated by the ruling parties in India, has not taken place in a vacuum. The economic policies adopted by India’s ruling class are closely connected to adjustments in global capital under the aegis of f lexible accumulation, as described by David Harvey. Harvey argues that one of the features of the current age is a “continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices which Marx had treated as ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ during the rise of capitalism” (Spaces of Global Capitalism 43). These elements would include, among other things, “the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations,” the “conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive property rights,” the “monetization of exchange and taxation,” and the “use of the credit system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession” (Spaces of Global Capitalism 43). In the case of India, all of these elements are in place as the state has colluded with the enforcers of international monetary organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to pave the way for an unregulated and extended
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The New India
exploitation of the country’s resources. The struggle to create an Indian subject thus has to be read in the context of this global totality. For the elite class, both in India and abroad, India’s rise as a world power is inevitably linked to its thorough assimilation into the global capitalist system. One form of subjectivity is defined by privileged membership in the global class system. Meanwhile, for a majority of Indians who are removed from the benefits of liberalization, subjectivity evolves from a combination of assimilation, adaptation, and resistance to this global neoliberal system. Beginning in the mid-1990s with the rise in cable television, the government and its corporate backers have f looded the media with images and documents in favor of liberalization. Their arguments are very much in keeping with the general neoliberal “development” dogmas: that the so-called discipline of the market would replace state corruption and nepotism while increasing efficiency; that the accumulation of wealth and the rising growth rate would gradually eliminate poverty; that India’s position in the world market would provide advantages that would benefit the entire population; and that the inf lux of foreign investment would create jobs.16 These propositions have been linked to the creation of a privatized, global subject who would be the beneficiary of this New India. The so-called discipline of the market, however, has also ensured the exploitation and disenfranchisement of various other citizens. Market discipline, for instance, would dictate that all state regulations and controls be abolished in favor of a deregulated economy; that private capital be given access to all areas of the economy and trade; that employers have the power to hire and fire workers at will; and that trade and currency exchange rules be set up by owners and politicians. These policies have further marginalized those people (farmers and industrial workers, for instance) who were already on the margins of the economy and whose interests are irrelevant to the global neoliberal logic. Subjectivity thus has to be read within the context of existing regimes of capital accumulation, and any study of cultural texts in this environment of capitalist excess must likewise take into account the text’s position as global commodity. So-called Indian films and novels, for instance, circulate in the context of the enormous reach of today’s global media. Indian writers such as Vikram Seth attain huge contracts from Western publishing houses; Indian popular cinema is reaching a far wider audience than it ever did before; and the Indian diaspora is in some ways determining how “Indian” culture gets produced and circulated in the global context. These global factors are particularly
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Introduction
19
relevant in our understanding of the new Indian subject since the construction of this subject is imbricated in global circuits of meaning. Overview of the Argument Chapter 1 focuses on a precise examination of the various contexts of the economic reforms in “the New India.” I explore the many meanings of the New India during a sixteen-year period, 1991 to 2007, and investigate how the new Indian citizen has been constructed during this time. This discussion not only grounds my later evaluations of the creative and critical spaces between opposition, celebration, and assimilation but also informs my estimates of the prospects for resistance to hegemonic claims for nationhood and liberalization and prepares the reader for specific analyses of the new Indian subject in cultural texts. In chapter 2, I explore the construction of the most common of these new Indian citizens, the consumer subject. In this incarnation, the citizen is constructed both as an individual who has the choice to consume within the terms of the free market economy and as a national subject—an heir to a glorious cultural tradition. Thus, this citizen is connected to the global economy but is also rooted in the idea of the national. In this chapter, I examine the Vision Document 2004 put out by the then-ruling party, the BJP, in anticipation of the 2004 general elections. By scrutinizing the dominant narratives of homeland, progress, Hindutva, and national security, which were vital to the BJP’s imagining of the nation, I highlight the document’s attempt to contain the crisis of the contesting ideologies of nation, capital, and faith. Similar tensions surface in contemporary advertising, and I examine selected images over five years (spanning the rule of two different political parties), images that reveal unceasing attempts to unite globalism, consumerism, and nationalism. As I focus on the construction of the modern, “new” Indian subject, I show that in an effort to elide the contradictions of capital, advertisers resort to imaginings of India that paradoxically lay bare these very same contradictions and highlight the fragmented, contingent nature of this subject. Of particular interest are the ways in which corporations and the state borrow images from each other to construct this national, consuming subject. Chapter 3 examines representations of the cosmopolitan subject, a potentially liberatory figure who resists the designation of the subject as consumer by rooting his or her identity in a humanist tradition marked
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The New India
by collaboration, accommodation, and convergence. This subject, in direct opposition to nativist calls by fundamentalists and nationalists, “transcends” the narrow limitations of nation, religion, and space and is captured most effectively in the work of one of India’s foremost writers in English, Amitav Ghosh, especially in an early text, In an Antique Land (1991), and a more recent one, The Hungry Tide (2004). However, as I argue in the chapter, the supposedly oppositional subjects that Ghosh constructs are also characterized by alliances to a romantic cosmopolitan project that is inevitably co-opted by the global reach of capital. Ghosh cannot escape the historical reach of capital, even as he struggles to posit a concerted form of resistance to the current incarnations of globalization. In a sense, neither he nor his characters can contain the crisis of late capitalism. Their notions of agency, historicity, and nation, while challenging the neoliberal vision of the “New” India, participate in imaginings that are fantastical and, in the end, complementary to the forces they oppose. Ghosh’s work, though, serves as an example of a creative engagement with the contradictory forces unleashed by globalization, and it provides an important forum for considering the possibilities for an alternative civic identity in the New India. Chapter 4 also analyzes attempts to pose subjects in opposition to corporate and state constructions of the new Indian. In this case, I examine the female characters constructed by three feminist diasporic filmmakers (Gurinder Chadha, Deepa Mehta, and Mira Nair). The gendered subject they construct can, in their view, forge a new gendered identity on her own terms. I look at their films’ depictions of class, gender, nation, and feminist agency within the context of the politics of uneven development and at the implications of such depictions for the transnational circulation of culture. While the films celebrate a liberal feminism, I argue that they inevitably collude with the forces of global capital: the filmmakers construct a version of a “liberated” Indian female subject who is caught between performing as a halfarticulated nationalist agent—signifying loss—and acting as a diasporic individual whose emancipatory desires are governed by the terms of consumer capitalism. Chapter 5 examines a different formulation of an oppositional subject from either the diasporic films or Ghosh’s narratives, exploring the quotidian resistance activities and commercial practices of a group of market vendors in Kolkata.17 These vendors, resistant subjects, are in the process of being displaced from a civic market that has existed for many decades in South Kolkata. Private developers have purchased the property on which the market is located, and, aided by the state
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21
government, they are building a shopping mall to cater to the city’s middle and elite classes. This chapter examines the politics of dispossession that characterize this transformation, a process that is symptomatic of much larger, even seismic, changes in the social landscape of the city. As I examine the ruling government’s investment in particular forms of symbolic and spectacular capital, I expose the rituals of consumption that are creating both a new type of civic space and new notions of citizenship. I also provide an alternate view of citizenship and civic space by analyzing testimonies from the market vendors who have struggled to maintain their livelihood. In an afterword I brief ly address the immediate consequences of the Congress Party’s win in the May 2009 elections and the relative eclipse of the BJP and parties on the left. I consider how the new Indian subject may evolve in the midst of a triumphal call to accelerate “reforms,” and I comment on the continuing destruction of civic space in Kolkata as both a symbol of a larger disruption in the New India as well as a catalyst for resistance.
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CH A P T E R
ON E
Going Global: Texts and Contexts in the New India
This book is rooted in the claim that culture is a significant site for negotiations about social relations, and that it is only through an acknowledgment of the reach and function of capital, and an understanding of its ability to accommodate and adjust to changing economic conditions, that we can develop a more politically effective form of cultural analysis. In my introduction, I also suggest that the analysis of the constitution of subjectivity or citizenship is a particularly fruitful way of studying the intersections of capital and culture in the New India. These insights govern my discussion in this chapter—and in the rest of the book—of contemporary cultural production and subject formation in India. In this chapter, I examine the specific social and economic conditions that have prevailed in the New India, with its rapid incorporation into the global capitalist economy, and I outline what I believe are the primary issues to consider when examining cultural forms and subject formation in the New India: class, nation, secularism, crisis, and the geography of underdevelopment. These issues inform the analyses of cultural texts in the rest of the book, analyses that weave together the texts of the national and the global, the cultural and the economic. In this chapter, I also demonstrate the connections between these issues, clarifying the contradictions and negotiations that are immanent to any social formation. I pay special attention to one contradiction in the social formation, which is the emphasis on the “new” in subject formation. I explore how the implications of representing and constructing the new Indian subject within the context of a larger global transmission of culture can help us understand the fetishization of the
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new in the neoliberal imaginary. Expanding on this point, I argue that the repetition of newness, as designated in the brand “New India,” is ever present and rhetorically deployed to justify the class project of liberalization. However, as I demonstrate in my analysis of the “new,” the simultaneous erasure and affirmation of a competing myth of the “old” unsettles hegemonic constructions of the nation and the subject, and attention to these processes of erasure, affirmation, and disruption illuminates constructions of subjectivity. Before I discuss any of these issues in detail or even offer specifics about the social and economic conditions prevailing in the New India, let me first clarify why any study of culture has to be woven into an understanding of class politics and economic formations— and note brief ly that postcolonial analyses of specifically Indian cultural forms have neglected to include sufficient attention to political economy.1 Anjan Chakrabarti and Stephen Cullenburg are even more forthright in their criticism. In the conclusion to their study on transition and development in India, they point out that “postcolonial studies are seriously aff licted by the drawback of currently being restricted to the realm of culture.” The “space of the economic,” they claim, “has rarely been touched in this literature.” According to these writers, this is an “enormous gap that needs to be filled, especially against the background of the present situation of the deepening process of globalization” (287). They point to important questions that remain unanswered in their study: “What does the penetration of international capital do to a country’s class structure? In what ways does it change the combined and uneven existence of class structures?” Equally important, they suggest, is this question: “In what way are [the] changes in the financial structures (as is apparently taking place in India due to the liberalization policies) likely to affect the class structure in question?” (287–88). Chakrabarti and Cullenburg’s questions about class structure are a fundamental point of entry into my analysis of cultural texts. That means not only acknowledging that cultural analysis is incomplete outside the purview of these structural issues, it also means recognizing that the cultural performance of citizenship brings to the surface crucial, contested class issues in contemporary India, helping us address some of these neglected questions. In short, culture is a potentially rich site for analysis precisely because class processes and conf licts are being negotiated in multiple ways on this terrain. For instance, the cultural interpellation of the “global” through advertisements is one way to see how “the combined and uneven existence of class structures” is changing as a result of liberalization (see my discussion in Chapter 2).
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Of course, understanding class identity within the context of “the combined and uneven existence of class structures” is complicated by the contradictory nature of class identity under neoliberal capitalism. Jean and John Comaroff ’s characterization of these “experiential” contradictions is particularly helpful: the fact that it [capitalism] appears both to include and to marginalize in unanticipated ways; to produce desire and expectation on a global scale, yet to decrease the certainty of work or the security of persons; to magnify class differences but to undercut class consciousness; above all, to offer up vast, almost instantaneous riches to those who master its spectral technologies—and, simultaneously, to threaten the very existence of those who do not. (8)2 In addition to exacerbating these particularly class-based differences, “The emergence of consumption as a privileged site for the fabrication of self and society, of culture and identity, is closely tied to the changing status of work under contemporary conditions” (Comaroff and Comaroff 9). Deemphasizing labor or the realm of production and the concomitant emphasis on consumption is a defining element of hegemonic constructions of citizenship, and the focus on consumption “intensif[ies] the abstractions inherent in capital itself: to separate labor power from its human context, to replace society with the market, to build a universe out of aggregated transactions” (Comaroff and Comaroff 14). This increasing tendency for capital to reify social relations separates the economic text from the sphere of class struggle. For instance, policy makers in India declare, economic transformations are not a concerted attempt to regularize specific ways to accumulate and distribute wealth, but a result of a country’s need to compete with global forces, to earn global respect, and to lift the Indian people out of poverty. An important way to naturalize this class project is to construct new notions of citizenship, and the struggles to define a citizen aligned to these interests thus become central in the battle for constructing a new national imaginary. Many of these struggles, of course, take place on the political and juridical plain. Rules regarding citizenship, questions about minority rights, and laws concerning public lands and taxation rates are an integral part of circumscribing citizenship. Indeed, these regulatory measures are as much about creating a “legitimate” citizen as they are about excluding, categorizing, and dispossessing those who are deliberately left out of the national narrative. However, establishing citizenship is,
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of course, not merely a juridical enactment; many of the struggles to affirm a national identity take place in the domain of culture, an arena of contested ideas, which ref lects the unsettled nature of real economic “reforms.” After all, the cultural sphere is never entirely under the control of one reigning ideology; instead, it is a sphere characterized by ferment and the unresolved and the oppositional. By paying attention to this sphere of dissent and affirmation in India, a complex picture of the New India and the new Indian subject emerges. It is also instructive to remember Antonio Gramsci’s argument that considerations about the “terrain of culture” need to be connected to an understanding of the structural framework of civil society. Civil society, in Gramsci’s estimation, is the realm in which a social group exercises political, cultural, and social hegemony and the means by which the economy is regulated. Although Gramsci differentiates between civil society and political society wherein laws and state control are enacted, he maintains that the lines between the two are always blurred. This insight is important to us because we can look at cultural narratives not only as a powerful element of civil society, but also as involved in the process of regulating economies, justifying economic reforms, and attempting to resolve social and economic contradictions. In the case of neoliberal India, where local economies have suddenly been transformed by an inf lux of money and products, cultural narratives play a formative role in translating these changes. Metropolitan areas, especially, have seen changes that have been quite rapid (for example, the proliferation of Western-style shopping malls and suburban housing complexes). This new, consumer society is represented in images and narratives, especially visible in billboard and print advertising that f launt the advantages of liberalization. The corporate media, because of its allegiance to the politics of liberalization, has become a primary source for the circulation of these images. However, these texts are circulating in an economy of signs that makes these images fundamentally unstable. In a country such as India, where there are vastly disparate sources, avenues, and audiences for these messages, it is difficult to establish any continuity between the image itself and the various meanings it generates. Thus civil society, as Gramsci saw it, was also a site for resistance, a point from which notions of citizenship, for instance, may be recast or reformed (for a detailed, contextualized discussion of selected pro-liberalization narratives in the New India, see chapter 2). In order to comprehend the trajectory of the new Indian citizen as she or he begins to take shape, it is necessary to retrace a few of the
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political developments that frame the construction of this subject. This subject comes into being at a time when notions about caste, class, national and religious identity are particularly in f lux. To understand this new Indian subject and forms of resistance to it, one must consider the context of the rise of Hindu nationalism; thus, a significant portion of my discussion in this chapter will focus on the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its use of public culture to posit a particular national identity and subject. The narratives generated by this party have been written large upon the national landscape over the last twenty years. Indeed, their inf luence, arguably beginning with the destruction of the Babri Mosque in December 1992, continuing up to the BJP’s election defeat in 2004, spans almost the entire length of my study. The Hindu nationalists’ tale, identified as Hindutva, is a classic example of a cultural narrative that attempts to reintegrate or reimagine the national formation and the national subject. This is not the place to trace the historical origins of Hindutva and the changes and shifts in its expressions over the last twenty years, but suffice it to say, in the words of Thomas Hansen, that Hindu nationalism has “emerged and taken shape neither in the political system as such nor in the religious field, but in the broader realm of what we may call public culture” (4). Hansen argues that the BJP desires “to transform Indian public culture into a sovereign, disciplined national culture rooted in what is claimed to be a superior ancient Hindu past, and to impose a corporatist and disciplined social and political organization upon society” (4). This idea of national culture is tied to an implied threat from the Other, usually manifested in terms of religious identity, and a resolute faith in liberalization and “progress.” The heroic subject of this narrative is a Hindu, upper-caste male who is able to preserve India’s cultural heritage while at the same time increase the nation’s standing in the world. The emphasis on national culture is a particularly important part of the BJP platform and was in evidence in Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s frequent invocation of Hindutva. In a speech in 2003, soon after the electoral victory in Gujarat, Vajpayee maintained that Hindutva presented a viraat darshan (an all-encompassing view of human life).3 He claimed that “Hindutva is liberal, liberating, and brooks no illwill, hatred or violence among different communities on any ground.” According to Vajpayee, Hindutva was “that which makes us capable of meeting the challenges of the modern world, not one that is stuck in the past; that which is reform-minded” (“Hindutva” 6). In this speech, Vajpayee deployed that dual potential of national culture: Hindutva
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invokes the past but embraces reform and progress—tradition and liberalization in wonderful harmony! Likewise, the Hindutva subject must also be a syncretic combination of the forces of cultural tradition and economic progress. It is no coincidence, then, to see Vajpayee’s religio-nationalist rhetoric echoed by the captains of industry, whose allegiances to the project of liberalization are far more overt. Consider Mukesh Ambani, chairman of Reliance Industries, the largest industrial conglomerate in India, commenting on the economic future of India at roughly the same time as Vajpayee’s speech: “Countries have to wake up to the new challenges brought about by full and ubiquitous connectivity. This requires an acceptance of new forms of citizenship.” For Ambani, the requirements of global capital combine seamlessly with the claims of territorial nationalism: “From outsourcing and strategic alliances in business to fighting communicable diseases and terrorism across borders, partnership will be a way of life in a globally networked society” (124). Both disease and terrorism are presented as cross-cultural threats to the nation (note the emphasis on borders), whereas business alliances and the outsourcing of labor, both transcending the national space, are acceptable because they are encoded in the financial logic of late capital. Ambani’s investment in this system is left in no doubt as he expresses hopes that the government will “fully unshackle economic activity from the chains of excessive regulation” (124). The new can be born only by a recantation of the old, a topic that I will discuss in greater length later in this chapter. It is tempting to assume that Vajpayee and Ambani hired the same writers, so closely are their ideas linked, but fundamentally they are connected by their attempt to reimagine India as a resurgent nation and the Indian subject as embracing a new code of citizenship. The claims for nation, capital, and religion are interrelated in their comments, and their calls for a new form of citizenship, not coincidentally, converge with the larger goals of liberalization. The authoritarianism implicit in these messages also emerges: citizens must not be stuck to the past, and they must accept new forms of citizenship. No alternatives are possible. In these leaders’ estimation, civic identity cannot account for difference; it is an identity that must bend to the homogeneous logic of the global. As I have argued, this battle to establish a certain kind of subject is not just being fought on the economic plane, where real acts of legislation and public policy change are transforming the lives of India’s citizens. It is also being staged in the cultural arena, which, in the age
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of increased media inf luence, has become an important site for narrating this subject as well. Thus Vajpayee and Ambani, while ref lecting on the changing national formation and the national subject, are also commenting on the role of the public sphere as the site for these changes. Their designation of public culture, however, is severely limited and does not embrace the complexity of that concept or the multiple conjunctures that shape it. Indeed, the sphere of public culture consists of manifold forms of textual production and consumption. It is also a sphere that accommodates varying forms of resistance and consent in everyday life. Furthermore, in an age of accelerated cultural production and transmission, there are also frequent collusions and redefinitions of what is seen as popular and elite culture, as well as a re-evaluation and a realignment of the categories of the “dominant,” the “residual,” and the “emergent” (Raymond Williams’s terms). Let us now cast our eyes over one of the conf licts fundamental in determining the ways in which battles over the new Indian subject are being shaped. The New India: Competing Myths India’s assimilation into the neoliberal global model has acquired a distinctive brand identity: the New India. Along with this designation comes the ideal citizen for this neoliberal nation: the new Indian. These terms announcing arrival, rupture, and an entrepreneurial energy are increasingly being naturalized in the public sphere. In order to understand the complexity of this process, it is necessary to ref lect on the evolution and deployment of the so-called “new.” How does this newness cast its magical gleam across the Indian landscape? Apparently, a first step is to create a new imaginary consisting of phantasmic images and utopian dreams, linked to a globalized world of privatized comfort, luxurious ease, and seemingly endless opportunities, especially in the urban areas where the majority of the wealthy reside. Then the commodity is enshrined as the symbol of hope, radiating its image from the various billboards that are an inextricable part of the cityscape. The local melts into the global as the allure of commodities evidently brings the previously unattainable glamour of the Western world closer, shrinking the gap between the real and the imaginary. Finally, glittering urban malls and department stores, protected by private security guards, offer the world of commodities even as they seal off millions who live in the very same city.
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And no brand is complete without the element of promise. When the privileged classes appear in their cars, anxious to purchase those products that proclaim—finally—that India has arrived, that the new India is on the march, we see the fulfillment of the promise of “progress.” Affirming this belief are not just the goods on the shelves, but the omnipresent slogans heralding a new India: “India Poised,” “the New India,” and “Brand India.” The national label: insubstantial, insufficient, imprecise, and yet all the more alluring precisely because of its insubstantiality. We must act, we must “do,” says one newspaper advertisement. According to the creators of this slogan, the word “do” in the advertisement is part of the larger word “dominate.” India is poised, declares the Times of India (Bose). Poised for what? one wonders. Amitabh Bachchan, the national film icon, and one of the best-selling brands in India, proclaims in an advertisement for that same newspaper that there are two Indias, one “straining at the leash,” while the other is the leash. Implicit in the celebrations of the new are the condemnations of the so-called old. This shadow of the old India, which symbolizes the ever-deferred promise of wealth and global respect, is countered with the new India, a neoliberal fantasy of wealth and opportunity. This duality of the old and the new is an important ideological trope employed by advocates of neoliberalism. In order to establish the famous point made by Thatcher (that “there is no alternative” to neoliberal capitalism), a necessary accompaniment of the new economic order is to link the “old” to an antiquated and outdated economic system. What constitutes the old, according to the lords of liberalization, in a postcolonial economy such as India’s? On the one hand, any institution or law, such as a regulatory commission or a system of tariffs, that is seen as a barrier to the accumulation of wealth and the free f low of international capital; on the other, the specter of workers’ and agricultural laborers’ rights, or public investment or expenditure. Over the last twenty years, an unprecedented combination of dispossession, legislation, and intimidation has been set in motion to abolish these remnants of the “old.” This destructive element of the New India is seldom acknowledged in the Western media. Instead, we are constantly introduced to the wonders of the New India. For instance, only rarely does an article such as “The Myth of the New India,” by Indian journalist and writer Pankaj Mishra, appear in the New York Times. In this piece, Mishra argues that the “increasingly common, business-centric view of India suppresses more facts than it reveals.” According to Mishra, despite India’s status as an emergent “world leader in information technology
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and business outsourcing,” its “$728 per capita gross domestic product is just slightly higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa” and “nearly 380 million Indians still live on less than a dollar a day.” These contrasts are unremarkable for almost anyone who has studied the effects of liberalization in India over the last twenty years. What is surprising is to see such open skepticism on the pages of a newspaper that is an unabashed propaganda machine for neoliberalism. Of course, Mishra’s questioning of the myth of the New India is juxtaposed with the seemingly endless columns written by the New York Times’ resident New India advocate, Thomas Friedman, for whom India is the shining jewel in the neoliberal crown.4 Certainly the Friedman line has become the most common position echoed in different sections of the mainstream press since the Indian government’s deregulation of the economy in the early 1990s. A more recent example of the familiar binary of the old and the new can be seen in a book-length study of India, In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India by Edward Luce.5 Luce, a British journalist who headed the Financial Times office in New Delhi, cannot get beyond the usual dichotomies that characterize India’s image in the West. The book cover, for instance, features a Rajasthani man in an orange turban speaking on a cell phone. In the background looms the face of a camel. Deploying a tired metaphor for the convergence of the traditional and the modern, Luce shows himself at home with this binary of the old and the new. Unlike the BJP’s use of the old, such as invoking tradition as a source of strength to bolster what may appear to be a mere acquiescence to modernity and the new, Luce relies on familiar Orientalist notions. In a chapter titled “Global and Medieval,” he evokes the “schizophrenia” of the “modern and booming service sector” alongside the “unending vista of rural India, of yoked bullocks plowing the fields in the same manner they have for three thousand years” (25). For Luce, the precolonial India that encompassed many global cultures and established many linkages does not exist. The three-thousand-year-old India, by definition, is not “global.” For Luce, what makes India global now is the statistic that in 2000 there were three million mobile phone users, while in 2005 two and a half million users were being added each month (35). He quotes Nandan Nilekani, the CEO of Infosys, approvingly: “ ‘We cannot modernize the Indian economy—or Indian society—unless we urbanize more rapidly and urbanize better than we have done so far’ ” (57). For Luce, modernity, urbanization, and progress are all untainted ends, not requiring any qualifications. There is apparently no need to question the wisdom
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or the ethics of an economic policy that is more invested in creating a market for cars and cellular phones for 25 percent of its population than in providing cheap fertilizers and drinking water for the vast majority of its citizens who live in rural areas. Luce, like most advocates of neoliberal policies, is convinced that the state is the source of most of India’s problems and that it further exacerbates divisions based on caste, class, or religion; private enterprise, on the other hand, is “subject to global competition,” and companies “are increasingly likely to select their employees on the basis of merit and not blood ties” (335). “The reforms of 1991 have benefited India,” concludes Luce (335). Further “progress” lies in opening up India’s banking and insurance industries to foreign capital. India, after all, “has nothing to fear from further financial liberalization” (340). India must “reform its labor laws” (340), since, for Luce, a trade union “speaks for its members, not for the poor” (341). All of these laws and collectives are remnants of the old and thus must be removed to make way for the new. Luce forwards the ideological work of neoliberalism, trumpeting the party line that reforms are ultimately meant to be for the good of the poor. Perhaps it is just economic chance that so few have acquired such enormous wealth in the process of improving the lot of the poor. Luce is not hesitant to seek solutions in the familiar call to privatize public resources: “both water and power should be priced simply and fairly. Many Indians still believe water and electricity should be provided for free or a nominal cost. But somebody, somewhere always pays” (343). A “simple” argument for privatization of essential resources! In a neoliberal world, no rights are guaranteed, especially for the poor. Everyone must pay! Of course, those who pay are typically those who are least able to pay or those who have little access to resources. Luce and Friedman are fairly typical representatives of Western views of the New India, and this desire to position India within a larger global framework of “progress” on the part of the American media reached its peak during U.S. President George W. Bush’s March 2006 visit to India. While some of the leaders’ conversations were about the proposed nuclear agreement between the two nations, many in the Western media also took the opportunity to hypothesize about the socalled New India.6 The March 6, 2006, cover of Newsweek read “The New India,” and the lead story, “India Rising,” was penned by Fareed Zakaria. Time magazine, not to be left out, the same week featured an article by Alex Perry, “The New India, and the Old One.” The week before, acclaimed broadcast journalist Charlie Rose had done a series
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of interviews from India for his PBS show. His week-long program was headlined by the Business Wire thus: “Charlie Rose conducts conversations with people shaping the new India.” Although Rose interviewed a couple of journalists and activist and actress Shabana Azmi, he focused on India’s elite: along with India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, he was in conversation with as many as five CEOs—leaders of some of India’s most prominent companies. Of course, Thomas Friedman continued penning his paeans to the New India, as did a battalion of Indian journalists and “experts.” What, then, was this “New India” that was the subject of all this media attention? For many of these journalists and “experts,” the New India was the classic capitalist coming-of-age story. India had finally cast off the shackles of protectionism and nationalism (read: socialism) to embrace a free-wheeling capitalist economy. Privatization, deregulation, unfettered foreign investment, and all the other sacred cows of neoliberalism had been embraced by the New India. A process that had been initiated by the Congress Party government during Rajiv Gandhi’s government in the late 1980s, solidified by the same party from 1991 to 1996, elevated to state policy by the BJP, and furthered by the current Congress government under neoliberal economist Manmohan Singh had according to the pundits, finally yielded results and the nation itself was close to reaching its full potential. While many of these commentators were willing to pay lip service to the existing inequities in India, they remained so elated by the glimmering shopping malls and rising paychecks of the executive classes that the poor were thrust into the realm of the residual—annoying remnants of the old India. Alex Perry, for instance, writing for Time magazine, claimed that “Today, there is old India and new India. One is epitomized by the surging chaos that fascinated generations of backpackers and travel writers. The other is the efficient center of outsourcing and IT [information technology] that thrills today’s investment bankers.” For Zakaria, the “India of poverty and disease” is contained in the New India, but there is “something new. You can feel the change even in the midst of the slums.” What is new, as far as Zakaria is concerned, is that there are a “vast and growing number of entrepreneurs who want to make money. And somehow they find a way to do it, overcoming the obstacles, bypassing the bureaucracy.” The inequities of old India, according to Zakaria, were a result of a “shackled and overregulated private sector” and because “in the 1970s India became more socialist.” Now, however, Zakaria is happy to learn that every week “you read of a set of regulations that have been eased or permissions that have been eliminated.”
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Another noteworthy quality of the New India, Zakaria proclaims, is that it has developed a positive relationship with the United States, the “most powerful country in history.” Of course, such comments are not limited to the popular media. India experts such as Stephen Cohen, for instance, who once referred to India as a “large, exotic basket case,” in India: Emerging Power hopes that India can combine economic growth and political democracy. Yet, a few paragraphs later, he praises “India’s active membership in the WTO,” assuming that “this would accelerate the liberalization of the Indian economy and could have a major impact on the rate of Indian development. It would also give American firms greater access to the Indian market” (317). So much for political democracy! Commentators in India have been no less vocal about the New India. Manjeet Kripalani in Business Week praises the Society for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SINE) in Mumbai, a “business incubator where ideas from IIT [Indian Institute for Technology] Bombay students, professors, and alumni can be developed and commercialized.” Like his Western counterparts, Kripalani juxtaposes the old and the New India. Apparently, in order to get to SINE, “You have to voyage through old India to arrive in the new India.” Old India is characterized by a “partially built bridge,” “scooter taxis,” “pedestrians,” and “perspiring policemen.” New India, on the other hand, is removed from “the noise of the street” and can be found in a “serene, tree-lined, airy campus.” This linear account, constructed in the form of a journey, is very much in keeping with the narrative of progress. Of course, this narrative of progress is not merely an economic one; it includes claims for political democracy and secularism. The narrative of the “new” is not only about technological innovations and ostentatious prosperity; it is also supposedly connected to a greater, secular vision of a modern nation. Thus left-leaning commentators in India are not immune to its allure. Harish Khare, for instance, writing in the leftist newspaper, the Hindu, criticizes the BJP for attempting to invoke communal passions, and he hypothesizes that the BJP will fail because “Indian nationalism is self-assured, equanimous, and globally engaged.” India’s adoption of a “new agenda of growth, development, globalization” has, according to Khare, created a “new India that does not want to be distracted by claims made in the name of medieval passions.” Shashi Tharoor—writer, former United Nations UnderSecretary General, and in 2009, elected a Member of Parliament from Thiruvanthapuram, Kerala—joins in this crescendo of praise for the new, announcing a “brave new India”: a “land that throws out the
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intruders of Kargil, that acquires Europe’s largest steel conglomerate in the face of the taunts about ‘monkey money,’ that exports more films abroad than it imports, that challenges the traditional assumption of superiority by others, that wins Booker Prizes and Miss Universe contests” (8). This strange combination of “achievements,” all significantly aligned to a competitive relationship with the West, is apparently positioned within an idea of a neutral nationalism. Although writers such as Tharoor would disassociate their celebration of the New India with the reactionary declarations of the BJP, much of this discourse regarding a New India had come to the fore in a concentrated way during the years of the BJP government, exemplified most colorfully during the party’s “Shining India” advertisement campaign in the months preceding the parliamentary elections of 2004. Much like Tharoor’s assertions about a “brave new India,” as early as 1999, after winning the parliamentary elections, the BJP candidate for prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had proclaimed in an address to the nation that his government was “pledged to the emergence of a ‘new’ India in the new century.” The top four agenda items for this New India were to “speed up economic reforms,” to “introduce new laws for the financial sector reforms,” to aim for “speedier restructuring and disinvestment of Public Sector Units,” and to “promote investment, including foreign direct investment.” Here was fundamentalism in action, except that it was neoliberal fundamentalism. In the next five years, little attention was paid to some of the other promises that were made about primary education, safe drinking water, and non-discrimination, but these four agenda items were pursued with ruthless determination. By 2003, Arun Shourie, the Minister for Disinvestment, wrote a series of articles, published in the Indian Express, where he praised the information technology industry—which was notoriously private, under-regulated, and foreign-investment driven—and announced that the young people driving this industry “had changed the world’s perception of India.” “It’s not just a country of snake charmers,” he declared, apparently an allusion to the timeless Western imaginings of an old India. This worship of the “new,” however, was not without its pitfalls. All the shining monuments to liberalization could not hide the desperate poverty that enveloped a huge swath of the population in the BJP-ruled nation. One of the most significant political statements of opposition came on May 13, 2004. Indian voters sent a startling, but not wholly unexpected, message to the ruling BJP and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) allies. Contrary to media expectations
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and the predictions of the pollsters, the BJP was dramatically defeated by the Congress Party and its allies. More significantly, parties on the Left, including the two major communist parties, garnered sixty-one seats, a record number for them in any general election since independence in 1947. These results were even more dramatic since the BJP had expended millions of dollars on a slick advertising campaign in an effort to paint itself as the party of national unity and strength. Clearly, the f lashy images of “Shining India” had had limited impact, and given the success of the Left parties, a significant portion of the population seemed to be responding primarily to the BJP’s reckless infatuation with liberalization and their craven acquiescence to the forces of multinational capital. Under the BJP government formed in 1999, middle-class spending boomed and an elite few amassed enormous wealth, while millions of ordinary people, especially in rural areas, paid the price for a large-scale disinvestment in social programs. On May 13, 2004, many of these otherwise silenced citizens responded by electing a government whose election slogan was “Congress ka hath, aam aadmi ka saath” (“The Congress Party, friend of the common man”). Reactions from the business elite and the foreign press to the mandate of these forgotten citizens were predictable. Could it be that the “new” was going to be replaced by a return to the “old” ways of conducting business? The Indian Stock Exchange fell by 330 points, the steepest single-day fall in seven years, as panicked investors expressed anxiety about the Congress Party government’s degree of commitment to the policies of liberalization. Prabhu Chawla, writing in India Today, worried about the “red” threat: “The comrades, her [Sonia Gandhi’s—president of the Indian National Congress Party] true loyalists, continue to see the bogey of imperialism in the marketplace; the red version of swadeshi [sic] is certain to damage the reforms agenda” (9). The New York Times, which seven months earlier had announced, “Sizzling Economy Revitalizes India,” now was concerned that “reforms” would be curtailed. Perhaps the ordinary Indian had a say, after all, in whether “an acceleration of the transformation seem[ed] inevitable” (Waldman A6). The avatars of the new India were thrown into disarray. Would the demands from the poor overturn the magical moment of capital accumulation? Would the specter of the old overpower the new? As is now widely acknowledged, none of these fears were justified. Singh’s government, despite giving lip service to the rights of the poor, continued on the same path. This was no surprise for those who saw a clear indication of the government’s intentions by the party’s
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nomination of Singh as the prime minister. Indeed, the same voices that had reacted with such anxiety soon after the elections began to sound reassured once again. The stock exchange began its slow climb back up. The defeat of the BJP government in the 2004 parliamentary elections, then, did not see the disappearance of this category, the “New India.” Manmohan Singh’s government, in spite of promising that “the new government’s emphasis would be on a model for social and economic development that provides opportunities for the poor to participate in the development process” was very soon going down the same road as the previous government (Singh “PM’s Address”). The prime minister’s address at a meeting of the PM’s Council on Trade and Industry on December 4, 2004, in New Delhi indicated a significant announcement of intention. Singh concluded that “it is of utmost importance that we create an enabling environment that rewards creativity, risk-taking and the spirit of enterprise and adventure.” Once again, the language of the new was attached to an Indian who was the entrepreneurial subject: “To promote new investment, to generate higher growth in incomes and employment, we must unleash the full potential of individual initiative and enterprise. We must provide a new stimulus to the ‘animal spirits’ of our entrepreneurs. We must create a social, political and economic environment in which budding entrepreneurs can realize their dreams.” The millions of Indians who were not “budding entrepreneurs” would be taken care of because Singh’s “government believes that processes of wealth creation are essential for us to meet our commitment to eradicating poverty.” Meanwhile, the government will provide the infrastructure “so that India becomes the home of multinational corporations of the future.” Two years later, during a visit to Cambridge University in October 2006, Singh announced in a talk focusing on “inclusive globalization” that “[t]he dismantling of state control has unshackled economic forces. . . . The age of freedom is also the age of economic growth. Prometheus has truly been unbound. . . . In my own country, the economic reforms we initiated in the early 1990s have made our economy more competitive. Indian business is responding to new market opportunities. India’s growth is underpinned by a vibrant and growing entrepreneurial class.” The same day, addressing a group of prominent Indians, he declared, “A new India is emerging,” and he enjoined them to participate in “this great adventure of creativity and enterprise in whatever way you can.” Even these few examples of the use of the phrase “the New India” make one point fairly apparent. The New India is continually generated
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as a designation for a nation that has almost come into being, enshrined within the universalizing parameters of global capitalism. By complying with the dictates of global neoliberalism, India can complete the transformation into the new, eradicate any traces of the old, and join the global community in this universal quest for wealth creation and the accumulation of capital. There are, of course, the obligatory acknowledgments about poverty and existing inequities, and there is an effort to link the forces of the free market with the fulfillment of political democracy or secularism. None of these moves, however, are atypical. These are now the familiar markers of neoliberalism, as I will argue in the rest of the book. An obvious point to be made here is that despite the fact that the accumulation of wealth and the growing gap between the rich and the poor have become the dominant logic of the New India, postcolonial India—the “old” India—was also characterized by similar inequities in wealth. Postcolonial India has always favored the rich; gender, class, and caste privileges were carefully protected even under the so-called socialist egalitarian principles of Nehru’s vision. After all, the Congress Party preserved most of the existing hierarchies of the British Empire and expanded on them by empowering a specific class of individuals, leaving the underclass, Adivasis, religious minorities, Dalits (once known as “untouchables”), and women on the margins of postcolonial India. Ever since independence, the Congress Party, with its mix of cronyism and its ties to the big industrial houses, had maintained a friendly policy toward Indian capitalists. Slogans such as Indira Gandhi’s “Garibi Hatao” (“Eradicate Poverty”) that advocated wealth distribution and Nehru’s state-funded projects, notwithstanding, India was never “socialist” in the way characterized by commentators today or implied by the caricature of the “old” in the discourse recorded above. Indeed, Congress governments under Nehru and Indira Gandhi were actively anti-communist and were quick to pressure and dismiss Marxist governments when they were elected in regional elections. A more accurate historical assessment is that the legacy of decolonization and Nehru’s alliances with the non-aligned movement meant that India was effectively connected to the larger politics of anticolonialism and to the Soviet Union during the years of cold war. While the link with the former was rooted to some extent in Nehru’s own faith in a “third way,” a relationship with the latter was more a matter of political expediency rather than any ideological belief in creating a socialist state.7 Thus evocations of the old have very little to do with actually existing socialism but more with sustaining and expanding an already-
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existing class structure. This is not to suggest that the only thing “new” about the New India is purely an acceleration of a small minority’s accumulation of wealth; as I will argue in this book, class structures in the New India are evolving in both surprising and predictable ways. What is important to ask, however, is what is so “new” about the forms of dispossession and identity formation at this moment in time. What, indeed, is so distinctive about the nature of wealth “creation” in the last fifteen to twenty years, and why is it necessary to create a citizen who represents the values of the New India? One suggestion comes from Aditya Nigam. What may be significant about the period 1990–92, according to Nigam, was that it was a “moment of rupture,” with a constellation around three events: “the anti-Mondal agitations, the structural adjustment programmes, and the demolition of the Babri Masjid” (97). The “argument against reservations,” claims Nigam, merged “in the late 1980s, with the argument of individual merit and accomplishment, pushed forward by the logic of free-market reforms,” and the “argument against reservations became an aspect of the argument for free and unbound labour markets and against protection” (125). This was also an argument against the rights that minorities were guaranteed by the state. In a “free” society, went the argument, why were such protections necessary? Another way to delineate the differences is to point out that for the first thirty years or so of independence, India protected many of its primary services, such as banking and insurance, and nationalized many of its natural resources, such as coal. It was only after Rajiv Gandhi was elected with a huge mandate after his mother’s assassination in 1984 that official state policy began to shift more obviously toward privatization and an encouragement of foreign direct investment. This national policy, of course, was linked to the global ascension of neoliberalism under Reagan and Thatcher. Rajiv Gandhi, at forty, was India’s youngest ever prime minister and projected an image of “progress” and modernity. His government was instrumental in beginning the process of loosening import controls and deregulating industry and other economic activities. Moreover, it is in this period (1984 onward) that the idea of a consumer subject begins to be formed, as more goods and services become widely available. As Nigam puts it, “In material/ economic terms, two developments mark the decade of the 1980s. It was a period of high-growth, based on the pent-up consumerist urges of the middle-class sections of the population, who had by then come into their own. . . . This entire development became possible due to the availability of credit, even to the lower rungs of the middle-class”
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(123). It was this middle-class Indian who increasingly came to be the dominant subject of this period. It was in 1991, however, that the mass process of privatization of land and industries, the selling off of public state enterprises, the entrance of huge amounts of foreign investment, the passing of classist and antilabor legislation, and the decrease in public subsidies and expenditures commenced in serious measure, ostensibly in response to a balance of payments crisis.8 However, these transformations in the economy— and here is where the distinctive effects of the new economic reforms begin to take shape—have created massive inequalities at a scale not seen since independence. These facts are extensively documented.9 In the first forty years of independence, because of strict economic laws regarding the import of foreign goods and finance and a commitment to public expenditure and investment, the Indian government had at least paid lip service to the notion of equality. Indeed, national political debates, television and radio programming, and funding for many “development projects” frequently revolved around the alleviation of poverty. In the New India even that cursory commitment is not necessary. Consequently, there are ways in which the “new” has unsettled existing economic and social tendencies in postcolonial India, but my discussion of the contesting ideologies of the old and the new suggests that this juxtaposition offers us some interesting ways to understand subject formation in the New India. For instance, why is the “old” being denied, elided, or kept in abeyance in this celebratory discourse of the New India? What makes the calls for a New India distinctive within this specific neoliberal context? How is this discourse regarding the new produced in order to construct a particular national imaginary? I would suggest that the category, the “New India,” can only exist and be validated through its supplement, the “old” India. In short, the new can only exist alongside a denunciation of the old. This process is enabled through an act of creative sublimation. First, there is a need to assert the fact that the New India has bloomed almost magically as a result of liberalization. There is no moment of transition between the old and the new. This economic leap, this possibility of acquiring immediate wealth, can then signify the immense possibilities of the New India and can suggest that it could erupt out of the shadow of the old without any costs or consequences to the nation and its many citizens. Perhaps this point is best demonstrated by Kripalani’s journey to the SINE campus, where the “unpleasant” aspects of old India can be left behind with ease. It is, after all, only a short journey that takes
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one from the disrepair and the chaos of the old to the new, where the architects of the New India busily ply their trade in the serenity of a lush campus. Clearly, then, poverty is only a remnant of the old India and is in no way related to the new economic reforms. In this move, the old functions as a category that has been transcended by the economic ingenuity of India’s citizens. It is as if there is no historical link between that which came before and that which now is. Second, as in any act of sublimation, there is an anxious disavowal of that which is unacceptable—in this case the continuing presence of the old India—in every gesture of affirmation of the New India. But the old India, characterized by “crowds,” “noise,” “poverty,” “socialism,” and “state-funded projects,” is a specter that cannot be entirely extinguished. It is the text that constantly intrudes upon the new. When Manmohan Singh alludes to the need for “a more inclusive globalization,” or Zakaria refers to the changes that can be felt “even in the midst of slums,” we are confronted with a ghost that continues to haunt the new. Consequently, the narratives of the “new” are replete with anxious affirmations through figures and statistics. Arun Shourie’s article, for instance, is primarily a cataloging of economic “achievements.” As per the requirements of the global neoliberal mantras, these achievements always focus on rising growth rates, the volume of foreign reserves, and increasing corporate wealth and opportunities. However, the specter of the old will not yield even here, as Shourie decries the “whining” by those who are not fully appreciative of the gains of the new. He makes no allusion to the reasons for the “whining,” but it is obviously a reference to those critics who see these “achievements” as having very little to do with the welfare of the majority of the country’s citizens. Once again, affirmation and disavowal lie side by side. Shourie’s and others’ repeated claims about “progress” and “wealth” are necessary not merely to deny the old, but also to erase the turbulence that is a part of a transition economy. What government and corporate figures, for instance, try to suppress are the many contradictions that exist in the margins of the “official” economy. Consider, for example, Barbara Harriss-White’s point that “[a]pproximately 83 per cent of the population work wholly in the informal sector . . . : 92 per cent of women workers, 80 per cent of men” (India Working 5). She estimates that this sector accounts for “60 per cent of net domestic product, 68 per cent of income and 60 per cent of savings” (India Working 5). How, then, does the neoliberal, universalizing thrust of corporate capital negotiate this so-called marginal, “old” economy? It is precisely the need to extinguish such economic questions that makes it so important for Shourie
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and his ilk to draw a sharp distinction between the old and the new. These moves, however, cannot elide the fact that a considerable section of the economy of the “new” remains lodged in the old. Third, and in some ways a contradistinction from the previously mentioned act of disavowal, there is a need to keep alive features of the old as a way to demonstrate its deficiencies in relation to the new. This latent text serves a purpose as a constant reminder of what the new is attempting to put in its place. In the final chapter of this book, in which I examine the privatization of space, I stress more precisely the attempt by the media to use this contrast to highlight how the new is an infinitely superior alternative. A good example of such a strategy is also the Times of India’s previously mentioned image of the two Indias, one straining at the leash, while the other is the leash. In this instance, this residual idea of a preexisting nation, then, is what drives and gives shape to the new. These assertions of the New India, as we have seen, primarily focus on the narrative of economic and social progress, but any discussion of the new since 1991 necessarily involves questions about nation, gender, caste, class, and religion. It is on these terrains that the contradictions regarding the new begin to multiply. The different deployments of the new do not erase some fundamental questions about the political, social, and cultural questions facing the nation. As Appadurai and Breckenridge remind us, “what is distinctive about any particular society is not the fact or extent of its modernity, but rather its distinctive debates about modernity, the historical and cultural trajectories that shape its appropriation of the means of modernity, and the cultural sociology (principally of class and state) that determines who gets to play with modernity and what defines the rules of the game” (16). In the case of contemporary India, likewise, the debates and terms of modernity are constantly being reshaped. In order to analyze the reinvention of the contemporary Indian subject, it is necessary to pay attention to some of these debates and to trace the contradictions shaping the New India. The following questions can help us formulate our analysis. How does the national subject come into being even as the national incorporates and blurs into the transnational? How, at a time of economic disjuncture and f lux, do hegemonic forces pose a stable economic subject within the framework of commodity capitalism? How should we read these hegemonic constructions of the subject within the contradictory moments of resistance—especially since neoliberalism is a class project, rewarding the few at the expense of the many? In the realm of the political, how do ruling governments
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pose a New India, so accommodating to the demands of Western firms and so accessible to unregulated foreign investment, while still retaining claims to national sovereignty? In the social arena, is it possible for the patriarchal and the high-caste authority of the Indian state, along with the myriad religious and social practices of the family unit, to negotiate the unpredictable consequences of unfettered consumption? Likewise, if the framers of a New India loosen the social bonds of the old through the rise of so-called entrepreneurial innovation, can they continue to maintain control over an increasingly fractionalized population? Finally, how should we analyze the different versions of secularism deployed by the state to regulate, manage, or cohere with the many communal stirrings during the last twenty years? It is with these questions in mind that I now turn to what I suggest are the five essential contrasting and contesting social, economic, and political issues that can further our understanding of the new Indian subject as depicted in cultural production in the New India. The New Indian Subject in the Age of Globalization My discussion begins with an attention to a fundamental ideological project of the New India, which is an attempt to designate a specific class subject. In this context, Gramsci’s notion of culture as a site for class coalitions, assertions of hegemony, and historical reshapings of the class subject are invaluable for understanding the complexity of the sphere of public culture that gives shape to this subject. Indeed, it is particularly important, given the rapid attempt to assimilate the Indian subject within the network of global capital, that we give consideration to the new ways in which class is both erased and emphasized in the realm of public culture. First, a crucial factor in this discussion is to take into account the separation between the urban and the rural, especially in a largely agricultural country such as India. This point is especially important because the new citizen, whether in its hegemonic or oppositional counterpoint, tends to be defined as a metropolitan subject. Additionally, the politics of economic access, kinship rules, gender and caste divisions, and literacy must all be factors when one evokes the “modern,” metropolitan class subject. The new Indian subject, then, must be analyzed in the light of all these intersecting elements. Second, the new Indian subject must be understood in regard to his or her relationship to the emergent nation-state. How, indeed, does this
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subject correspond to or counteract the hegemonic force of the state? In its oppositional mode, does the subject necessarily define himself or herself against the nation-state or is it possible to occupy a position that accommodates the structure of the nation but also asserts an agency that reshapes the fundamental nature of the state? Third, I question the frequently evoked communalism-secularism binary and contest the popular notion that there is a “crisis of secularism” in contemporary India. The new Indian, defined as both secular and singular, then, has to be read within this more complex, contradictory framing of the secular. Fourth, I argue that crisis, both as a symptom of global capitalism and as an indicator of a social process that cannot be exactly calibrated, especially in the face of continuing insurgencies and resistance movements, is a constitutive part of subject formation. In short, the new Indian subject is prone to constant reinvention in the face of present and unpredictable forms of future crisis. Finally, rather than using a broad, neutral concept such as the “global order” or globalization, I propose to examine public modernity within the politically specific context of late capital and the geography of underdevelopment. Specifically, how are claims to citizenship negotiated in the face of the increasing demands and contradictions of global capital? Class In a perceptive discussion regarding the tendency under neoliberal capitalism to further reify social relations, Jean and John Comaroff point to the consequences of such forms of abstraction: “class comes to be understood, in both popular and scholarly discourse, as yet another personal trait or lifestyle choice. Which is why it, like citizenship, is measured increasingly by the capacity to transact and consume; why politics is treated as a matter of individual or group entitlement; why social wrongs are transposed into an issue of ‘rights’ ” (15–16). This insight leads the Comaroffs to attempt to “explain why, in the millennial age, class has become displaced and refracted in the way that it has” (16). In the Indian context, the sudden inf lux of readily available commodity goods has created a context in which class divisions remain starkly evident but within an egalitarian imaginary in which commodities equalize social differences; in short, commodity goods have painted an artificial sheen of wealth over the dull everyday reality of structural poverty.10 Leela Fernandes points out that “meanings attached to such commodities weave together narratives of nationhood
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and development with the production of middle-class identity,” and “[t]he aesthetic promise of the use value of newly available commodities . . . provides a critical rationale for the accumulation of foreign capital within the Indian nation-state” (“Rethinking” 154). In this way, class politics is cast into the background, creating “a new public culture, one that . . . centers on the culture of consumption; such newly available commodities, in effect, serve as signifiers that assimilate globalization to the Indian nation-state” (Fernandes, “Rethinking” 149–51). The culture of the commodity is further buoyed by acceding to the neoliberal fetish of the growth rate. According to the mainstream economic experts, a burgeoning growth rate suggests that poverty is being alleviated, pushing aside the need to focus on class divisions. However, as Jayati Ghosh has argued, “high economic growth does not necessarily lead to high growth of employment, especially of jobs of more desirable forms.” Despite an “increase in managerial salaries and profits . . . average real wages have declined across most activities. For the majority of those seeking work, there has been a tendency to fall back on forms of work (including self-employment) that do not offer a decent wage and involve poor working conditions” (110–11). Thus increasing growth rates, in reality, have little to do with the continuing effects of uneven class structures. Chakrabarti and Cullenburg support this view, explaining that “the seemingly uniform liberalization policies are producing complex changes in society by producing a chain of differentiated and uneven effects on class structure” (238).11 Indeed, class-specific matters refuse to recede into the background and are further enhanced by the context of the social formation that exists in India.12 On the one hand, the burgeoning urban middle classes number between 250 million and 300 million, which is a large number by most standards. Even though there are huge disparities of income within this group, citizens of the metropolis and the larger towns are seen as the thriving face of the new India. They receive most of the media attention, and they are the central target for corporate and political advertisements. On the other hand, this number is only about 25 to 30 percent of the population. A majority of India’s population reside in hundreds of mofussil (district) towns, villages, and tribal areas, and many of them are illiterate, impoverished, and in poor health.13 And here it might be worthwhile to add that the grievances of the rural subject, especially women, Muslims, Adivasis, and Dalits, do not lie exclusively within the capital and labor antagonism (Harriss-White, “India’s Informal Economy” 276). Their subject position opens them up to a whole range of discriminatory policies. Non-metropolitan areas
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and their residents thus form an uneasy distraction from the New India. They are remnants of the old that must be managed, the detritus of a “third world” past that must be rationalized into the narrative of economic growth. Consequently, if the new India is about constructing a specific urban form of subjectivity, then the (in)visible non-metropolitan subject must be part of any critical examination of the images of the new India. An attention, in general, to the invisible subject is fundamental in any discussion of class because it reveals the structural crisis at the heart of liberalization. Chakrabarti and Cullenburg describe this crisis in greater detail: It is difficult to imagine how the surplus population, constituting mostly the illiterate 40 percent of the population, will meet the challenge (of staying on the cutting edge of competition). The other source of employment for this potentially displaced populace is working in the unorganized sector in jobs such as hawking, selling food, and so on. This avenue does not look attractive in the long run since globalization is putting a severe strain on the unorganized sector (directly through competition or indirectly through the process of displacement, that is, primitive capital accumulation), and also since it is difficult to imagine how so many people could be absorbed into this sector. (258) Consequently, existing class structures in India will continue to emphasize the contradictions of liberalization, and the productive process, the site of labor and surplus production, cannot be entirely wished away even in a haze of consumption and commodity fetishism. Subject formation will then have to be studied on the fault lines of these contradictory class conditions. The Crisis of the Nation-State Aijaz Ahmad has commented “that ‘nation,’ like class, is a process, which is made and re-made, a thousand times over, and, more than process, ‘nation’ is a terrain of struggle which condenses all social struggles, so that every organised force in society attempts to endow it with specific meanings and attributes” (“Fascism” 48). It is difficult to discuss the rise of the new Indian subject without understanding the emergence of this subject within the context of the neoliberal nation-state. How
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have existing as well as emergent class formations within the nation created a fertile ground for this subject? How do contesting versions of the nation, both in its Hindutva and its secular incarnations, cohere with its incorporation into global capitalism? There is no single catalyst in the period of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, preceding the rise of liberalization, that will provide an exemplary logic for India’s assimilation into the global neoliberal order. Instead, what we do have is a series of local crises—the increasing militarization of Kashmir (1989), the anti-Mandal reservation riots (1990), and the destruction of the Babri Mosque (1992)—in conjunction with prevailing global crises—the conf lict in the Persian Gulf (1990–91), the fall of the Soviet Union (1991), and the growing demands of the International Monetary agencies—as catalysts for transformations in the nation-state, and all of these factors were inevitably connected to a rise of the Hindu right. Rather than assuming a straightforward causal trajectory for the evolution of the neoliberal nation-state, then, I argue that what was unique about its formation in the early 1990s is that, in lieu of a leftist intervention, the time was ripe for a rightist redefinition of the state as internal and external pressures mounted. So, for instance, the Hindu right came to prominence at about the same time as liberalization was being heralded in India, partly because political and economic conditions were available to create a platform to exploit crisis at both ends of the national spectrum. Because the BJP had strong roots in an upper-caste (diasporic) business community, it could pose a nationalism that was able to supplement the requirements of global capital. It could also use the cloak of religion to appeal to an insecure middle class and an underprivileged majority to exploit the financial and social crisis engendered by liberalization. The emergence of Hindu nationalism on the fault lines of these global and local shifts is not merely a result of crisis in the legitimacy of the state but also a sign of the ongoing struggle within the state to mobilize a variety of class alliances, using the mask of nation and religion. The crisis of the nation-state, then, can be measured in very different ways: for the ruling class, crisis is represented by insurgency and resistance movements and the presence of a few remaining regulations against unfettered multinational capital, both of which inhibit the f low and accumulation of capital; for the middle class, crisis comes in the shape of continuing financial insecurity and indebtedness in the face of an increasing rise in the cost of living and the inability of the state to provide basic services (electricity and water, for instance); and for 75 percent of India’s population, crisis signifies the failure of the state
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to provide fundamental economic, political, and civil rights and access to jobs and resources. Indeed, if anything, the state’s primary role now appears to be to aid in the private accumulation of capital. My readings of the new Indian subject are informed by these variable structural relationships that constitute the role and the position of the citizen in the nation-state. The Myth of Secularism Emphasizing the rise of the Right in the previous section is not meant to suggest that the BJP single-handedly transformed the polity or the notion of the Indian subject. Any discussion of “religion” in contemporary India has to be understood within the larger narrative of class politics, so even though the liberal Left in India and the Western media have focused primarily on the BJP’s insidious and violent manipulation of religious nationalism, positing the Congress Party as a contrasting secular force, the designation of a singular fundamentalist force incorrectly presupposes a clearly defined secular alternative. Instead of constructing a fundamentalist/secular binary in the public sphere, then, it is important to understand that cultural narratives, irrespective of their point of origin, are caught up in the circuits of global capital and in the religio-national imaginary. How these two forces contest and interact must surely inform our understanding of the intriguing narratives that shape the New India. Barbara Harriss-White makes the case that “In India religious affiliation can be found to govern the creation and protection of rent, the acquisition of skills and contacts, the rationing of finance, the establishment and defence of collective reputation, the circulation of information, the norms that regulate the inheritance and management of property, and those that prescribe the subordination of women” (India Working 243). She argues that “because capital accumulation relies on social structures of accumulation, the effect of liberalisation is not to abolish or transform those in which markets are embedded, but to encourage them to rework themselves as economic institutions and to persist” (India Working 245). Thus, structural adjustments and the social insecurity fostered by these differences will only exacerbate divisions based on gender, caste, and religion that have always been used as tools of capital accumulation. According to Harriss-White, “Caste and religion are . . . emerging as structures that may generate exclusive, networked forms of accumulation and corporatist forms of economic
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regulation, and that tend to operate to control labour to the advantage of capital” (India Working 245, emphasis in original). The BJP’s religious agenda, for instance, projected in its attempt to “reclaim” the Ayodhya Mosque as Hindu territory and calling for cultural purification, is only part of its attempt to reimagine India. A larger reimagining is linked to a disavowal of Nehruvian state capitalism, parodied as state socialism, and to an assertion of what the BJP sees as “Swadeshi capitalism,” a perfect blending of economic “reform,” globalization, and cultural nationalism. Also disguised in the BJP’s call for national purity is the systematic persecution of those who are at the bottom of the class ladder. In its five years in charge, the BJP successfully managed to remove state subsidies for farmers, repress trade union activities, and turn a blind eye to state oppression of not only Muslims but also Dalits. All of these measures were implemented even as the battle in the public sphere was characterized as largely one between the secular and Hindu nationalists. By dictating the terms of the debate in the public sphere, the class agenda of the party was skillfully disguised, yet its ideological force was unmistakable: Crafting a range of appeals that converged in the single-issue temple campaign, Hindu nationalism promised a pro-business government combined with strong nationalist discipline, in a solution whose hostility to the poor and to the minorities may actually have enhanced its credibility with large sections of the middle classes. Hindu nationalism worked at two levels, on the one hand offering the cultural and ideological accompaniment to liberalization for middle and upper classes, and at the same time translating it into a religio-mythic narrative that would win popular consent. (Rajagopal 33–34) What makes the BJP’s position singular is that it constructed religious identity as an essential part of its electoral platform and legitimized and valorized it as never before. Of course, one does well to remember that the Congress Party has strategically used religion as a political tool during the last sixty years, and despite its overt rejection of the “religio-mythic narrative” it has adopted the legacy of the BJP, combining nationalism and liberalization as harmonious bedfellows.14 Consequently, when we read cultural narratives circulating in the public sphere, we must attend carefully to the valorization of secularism, just as we do when condemning affirmations of religious nationalism. Rajeswari Sunder
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Rajan and Anuradha Dingwaney Needham in their edited collection The Crisis of Secularism in India, for instance, have argued that “the justification of ‘equal’ citizenship can too easily pass into a demand for uniformity, and secularism can move quickly from its basis in arguments about national unification to legitimizing the state’s regulation of ‘difference’ ” (8). As they point out, “Secularism has been defined by and embedded in not only . . . calculations of electoral politics but in a complex of related issues having to do with shifting modalities of caste relations, subcontinental and international politics, the major economic restructuring beginning in the 1980s, and most of all the rise to power of Hindu political parties” (16). It is therefore critical for us to connect arguments in favor of secularism to existing narratives of the state and to view the longer history of the secular citizen. Nivedita Menon similarly argues that it is difficult to “reimagine secularism today without coming to terms with the violent histories of subordination and repression that have produced the secular citizen. . . . The highly centralized, capital-intensive, and high-technology-based development models adopted by the Indian elites requires the homogeneous subject constructed by the discourse of citizenship” (132). Menon’s point is that not only are the “two sentiments—pro-globalization and pro-secularism—perfectly compatible with each other,” it may well be argued that secularism, with its alliance to a particular vision of modernity and progress, reinforces globalization narratives (135). This is not to imply that the debates about secularism or fundamentalism can or should be reduced to economic factors but to “stress that many, though not all, ‘non-class’ and multi-class’ or ‘sectoral’ conf licts do contain significant and specific class aspirations which should not be ignored because of the ‘broader’ character of these conf licts and which, indeed, go some way toward explaining how they emerged in the first place” (Vanaik, The Painful Transition 68). We may then say that the new Indian subject is clearly not just a class subject or a subject in whom only national-religious longings are invested, but one who occupies a contested and conf licting ideological space. Crisis Management One of my principal arguments regarding the analysis of culture is that in the age of late capital, the potential for crisis remains omnipresent. As Ernest Mandel has argued, one feature of late capitalist economy is
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“the assumption that private and state regulation of the economy have managed to eliminate or suspend the internal economic contradictions of this mode of production” (524). Barbara Harriss-White makes a compelling case that embedded markets in India, especially as they are ref lected in small town informal economies, are resistant to the unembedded and more f luid markets of global capital. “Can the deeply embedded markets” in India “co-exist with an entirely unembedded capitalism enthroned at the apex of the national economy or f loating around the entire globe?” she asks (India Working 43). Her question points to the contradictions that arise out of the conf licting needs and value systems of these competing economies that have to be resolved in order for the BJP, the Congress Party, and the corporate power brokers to celebrate the New India brand. Thus the lords of liberalization must create a “performance,” such as their “Shining India” campaign, in an attempt to manage these moments of crisis. Nowhere is performance as necessary and as fraught with potential success and failure as in the realm of culture.15 This dramatic performance depends on acts of conjuring, yet “conjuring is always culturally specific, creating a magic show of peculiar meanings, symbols, and practices . . . [and] is supposed to call up a world more dreamlike and sweeter than anything that exists; magic, rather than strict description, calls capital” (Tsing 118–20). The evocation of magic is primarily intended for two audiences: the international corporate class and the national bourgeoisie. The magical aspects of liberalization must be continuously reasserted, because the old India cannot be expunged from the national narrative. These assertions are manifested in many ways, including the fantastical recreation of “public” space or through the fetishization of consumer products such as the mobile phone or the Nano automobile. Ultimately, however, these performances cannot be limited to the realm of the fantastical but must become enshrined through the actual rituals of citizenship. Of course, the BJP was enormously skillful in creating magic through strategic calls to modernity as well as tradition. For the ruling classes, the conjunction of an ascetic yet violent form of Hindu fundamentalism and a global, consumerist, capitalist ideology can offer the following promise: “It can, if controlled, enhance national integration and it is an attractive, if partial and short-to-medium term answer to the system’s problem of legitimacy” (Vanaik 146). It is precisely the temporary feature of this performance that keeps alive the potential for crisis. Moreover, performance is limited by the f luid class allegiances
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of the ruling parties. The BJP’s attempt to mobilize the peasantry, for instance, had limited success since their capitalist ethos, loosely disguised as the tools of modernity and development, were directly counter to the interests of the peasantry. The BJP had nothing to offer the farmer, unlike the urban middle classes, for whom “Shining India” promised consumer comforts. Liberalization, in conjunction with International Monetary Fund (IMF)-dictated adjustment programs, had caused a large-scale disinvestment in agriculture, resulting in widespread devastation within the farming community. The farmers’ 2004 vote was a rejection not only of the BJP but also of the terms of the project of modernity. Because liberalization is at its heart a project that fetishizes an exported version of modernity, crisis often takes the form of a challenge to this version of modernity. Modernity, then, is a constantly evolving and unstable symbolic marker that can be evoked and redefined at different moments and sites. However, as the 2004 elections demonstrate and as the potential for future crisis ensures, no one party can completely control the debate about modernity even if it tries to determine the rules of the game. Thus when the BJP attained power, its investment in the temple building project on the site of the Babri Mosque was reduced while antagonistic movements against Pakistan were increased. Meanwhile, the middle and upper classes were given tax breaks and provided the “magic” of commodity culture. However, the harnessing of the circuits of commodity power . . . entailed a certain vulnerability to the rhythms of market cycles, and the need to bolster demand by keeping alive the political purposes of Hindutva. . . . Liberalization could proceed with its re-organization of public and private spaces in ways that were articulated to the Hindu nationalists’ political project but not necessarily identical with it. Late capitalism’s attempts to revitalize itself thus demonstrated an eruption of the contradictions of community onto the stage of capital, and an effort to harness these contradictions in furthering accumulation. (Rajagopal 71) Rajagopal correctly points to the links between commodity capital, the public sphere, and the latent crisis within capitalism, but the issue of accumulation raises the question of global links to the national economy. Clearly, economic patterns in India are connected to the worldwide acceleration of the accumulation process. Similarly, current ideological conjunctures in India are also affected by capital’s attempts
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to resolve crisis. Samir Amin has suggested that the management of capitalist crisis leads to political conf lict. He argues that management through the market is utopian, that the real management of capitalism requires “market plus state”, that the conf lict between globalized economic space and the fragmentation of spaces for political and social management is unbearable, and that it must lead to a renewal of nationalisms and social struggles, which will challenge the utopian globalization pursued during the crisis. (Capitalism 39) We can see the relevance of Amin’s analysis in the Indian context, although it is necessary to remember that the existing social structure is a factor in the way that capitalism develops in that location. The international mobility of capital, although a determining inf luence, cannot transcend the local variations that shape capital growth and accumulation. My examination of the new Indian subject as constructed in cultural texts thus combines an understanding of the social structure of contemporary India and the context of transformations within the crisis tendencies of global capital. The interactions of global and local, as well as manifestations of capital and current global asymmetries, make it “important to situate all cultural works and forms in their specificity, with reference to their conditions of production and circulation at their point of origin as well as in wider circles” (Bartolovich 14). My analysis of a hegemonic narrative (such as the Vision Document of the BJP published in the spring of 2004) points to the continuous efforts to manage dissent, to integrate antagonisms and conf licts into a fixed, stable narrative. I argue that these attempts are part of a larger conf lict within capitalism in which bourgeois economists and policy makers confidently explain crisis as temporary and manageable, soon to be integrated and subdued by the existing social order. Oppositional cultural artists and activists, on the other hand, are often engaged in equally fantastical imaginings of the nation, partly because their resolution of crisis in the form of an oppositional new Indian subject does not free these subjects from being implicated in the workings of global capital. There are, of course, resistant subjects who aim at the root of crisis and try to imagine a citizen who would not be subject to the crisis tendencies of capital. In any case, since crisis is inevitable, and since political agency is often reified in cultural texts, critical work must uncover the traces of crisis that are elided or repressed in a range of narratives.
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The New India The Geography of Underdevelopment
Capitalism has always been a global system, relying on expansion to bring about further accumulation. In the narrative of Western capitalism, primitive accumulation is seen as the starting point of capital accumulation. The seizing of the commons, in Marx’s memorable words, “is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire” (The Genesis of Capital 9). But this process never ends. As Marx puts it, The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property and the means by which they can realize their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale. . . . The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. (The Genesis of Capital 8–9) This historical process, the beginning of the enclosure of the commons, is strikingly similar to the transformation taking place in India in the last fifteen years: “Capitalist adjustments through taxation and other policies all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one” (47). As we know, this national process soon became a global, imperial one, culminating in the late nineteenth century when imperialist nations divided the spoils of accumulation, often through protracted conf licts on the battlefield. In the present, of course, international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF “can divide the world into maps that make visible the irreducibly abstract quality of geography” (Spivak, “Cultural Talks” 337). Indeed, globalization today may be viewed as representing this continual process of differentiating the world along the lines of unequal development and misallocation of resources. A significant change, however, in the age of globalization is that financial centers of capital are more dispersed, and the postcolonial elite increasingly have a significant stake in the circulation of wealth. The demise of industrial capital in the West and the rise of the service sector economy in the third world have also ensured a dramatic redistribution of national authority. As capital travels the globe searching for ever cheaper means
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of production, social arrangements in developing societies are increasingly disrupted. Structural adjustment programs, for instance, have caused widespread depopulation of rural areas, forcing a displaced peasantry into the exploitative cycle of a transnational sweatshop economy. After all, “f lexible accumulation depends precisely on capitalism’s laying hold of ‘traditional’ social formations that have not been leveled by modernity either in terms of labor relations or the political nation; in these encounters, capitalism ‘respects’ those forms even if for exploitative aims” (Lowe and Lloyd 15). However, the larger impact of globalization on a national economy is always mixed, and this is especially true in the case of economies such as India’s, which reproduces “in varying forms and proportions a combination of past and present modes of production, or more precisely, of varying past and successive stages of the present mode of production” (Mandel 23). Trotsky alluded to something similar as early as 1908 when speaking of Russia’s development: “The development of historically backward nations leads necessarily to a peculiar combination of different stages in the historic process.” Trotsky referred to this combination as “the law of combined development—by which we mean a drawing together of different stages of the journey, a combining of different steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms” (4–6). India’s current position as an interstitial economy, an economy that contains traces of varying economic models, is particularly distinctive. Although by and large a capitalist bourgeois democracy, the Indian socioeconomic stage consists of a cast drawn from feudalism, bourgeois nationalist ideology, leftist transformative socialist programs, and laissez-faire globalism. This combination creates a far more unstable conjunction than the architects of the New India would have us believe. Barbara Harriss-White, for instance, sounds warning bells that may well disrupt the rosy economic scenarios of limitless prosperity that are currently being constructed by Indian and Western economists: Liberalisation involves an assumption on the part of employers that India’s comparative advantage lies in the indisputably low cost of labour. But India’s large reserves of cheap labour cannot constitute the foundations of a modern, globally competitive economy. Not only does such a strategy entail the suppression of political and trade union rights for the majority of wage-earners, and the deliberate fragmentation of the labour force, but it also presumes a poorly educated, semiliterate (and poorly nourished) mass of labourers. Such a workforce will not provide the necessary mass
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demand for the goods and services produced by a modern economy integrated into the global system. (India Working 42) This conjunction of economies, devastating in human terms, makes these discontinuous realities particularly visible and also exerts unique pressures on those attempting to form a stable identity for the national subject. As the parameters of class, caste, gender, and nation shift within the different markers of wage labor let loose by liberalization, the new Indian subject remains unsettled. Because this new subject is partially defined in the realm of culture, an attention to the geography of uneven development is important: by the logic of dispersed accumulation, culture is no longer tied to a specific site and often circulates outside a fixed context. Frequent and accelerated transnational exchanges have radically transformed the way culture is produced, distributed, and consumed. These geopolitical effects on culture then have significant consequences on the sites in which the new Indian subject is negotiated and on the cultural forms that gain precedence. For instance, the idea of a national subject is inevitably defined on and against the notion of a global, Westernized subject. In short, it is important to stress the difficulty of understanding cultural production “without considering how processes operating primarily at other scales (transnational migratory currents, interest rate f luctuations, shifts in terms of trade, relocations of industrial activity, environmental changes, etc.) impinge upon them” (Harvey, Spaces of Hope 80). Our task of reading culture, then, must proceed in conjunction with the processes of political economy. The new Indian subject is defined by his or her relation to the shifting modes of production in the new economy, as well as marked as subject through cultural processes within this very same economy. Can these antagonisms be contained? Can the global be embedded in the local? How is this process negotiated? If liberalization is to succeed, then to some extent the local has to become a part of the global. How can institutions deeply rooted in caste, class, and gender politics—particularly active in a large section of the non-metropolitan economy—become active participants in this transformative change? If this dialectic is kept alive, is there a space for resistance, a space for the articulation of alternatives that can be posed in reaction to the assertion of local and global interests? Clearly it is to the benefit of both global and local capital to collaborate in a unified project of wealth accumulation, but if there are continual contradictions between these forces, the project of liberalization and subject construction will be in f lux.
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Moreover, even though I am borrowing the binary language of globalization—the local versus the global—in which this conf lict is often posed, the antagonism I am describing is vastly more complex. What is at stake here is a system of values and political agency entrenched in notions of caste, gender, class, and nation that have to be constantly renegotiated in light of the disruptive power of metropolitan capital. It is especially fruitful, then, to analyze the images and narratives of the new Indian subject while the liminal force of consumer capital casts a surreal light on the everyday, a space where the social antagonisms of class, caste, and gender collide consistently and with increasingly overt resonance. My discussion in this chapter has focused on setting the context for an understanding of varied constructions of the new Indian subject, but any such discussion would be incomplete without attention to the oppositional currents that are a part of the New India. Postcolonial India, after all, has had a rich heritage of protest movements, many of which were launched outside the parameters of the parliamentary parties on the Left. Some examples would be the “grassroots movements launched by the non-traditional Left—Chipko, the miners [sic] struggle in Chhattisgarh, the Ryot Coolie Sangham in Andhra Pradesh, the Satyagraha led by the peasants [sic] movement in Kanakpura in Karnataka against the mining of granite, the Jharkand Mutki Morcha” (Kothari, qtd. in Nigam 90). Along with these are the famous rebellions in Telangana (1946–51) and Tebhaga (1946–47 and 1948–49), and the textile strike in Bombay led by Datta Samant (in 1982). As Aditya Nigam points out, many of these struggles were in some ways an “interrogation of the development paradigm” (117). Within the folds of parliamentary democracy, as well, there have been significant points of resistance: the elections of communist governments in Kerala (in 1957) and West Bengal (in 1977) and the defeat of Indira Gandhi’s government in 1977 are notable examples of these moments. Where, though, is the existing space for resistance and revolution, one might ask? Will the new Indian subject only ref lect the ambiguities of the global age and be subsumed by the logic of transnational capital? Looking closely at the diversity and the range of resistance activities in India, whether cultural or political, we see the potential for a resistant subject, even as neoliberal globalization erodes communities and collectivities. Certainly if the struggles in Kalahandi, Kalinganagar, and Nandigram are any indication, the resistant subject is active and engaged. Moreover, as evidenced by the movements mentioned above, the elements of a vibrant culture of resistance and revolution have always
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existed in India, and neoliberal globalization may change the character of resistance without dimming its f lame. In fact, if such globalization aids in demolishing the boundaries between the high and the low, the local and the global, the popular and the marginal, new spaces for social realignment may become increasingly available through a network of political alliances, both at the grassroots and the transnational levels. Thus, even as the struggles against globalization and state control seem insurmountable, one must historicize the prospect for political and cultural resistance. Current resistance movements have to be seen within the context of decolonization and the immense social changes since independence. After all, postcolonial India is probably one of the few instances in which a newly independent country with such high levels of illiteracy and poverty has continued to function as a democracy. It is also a nation that, despite being left almost penniless by two hundred years of British rule and an inherited parliamentary system run by a postcolonial elite, has successfully redistributed some land to a landless peasantry and built up an industrial base. Moreover, a strong memory of decolonization, the active presence of leftist parties, and a deep-rooted tradition of mass mobilization movements keep alive a potent and vibrant oppositional tradition, and this tradition is certainly visible in the field of culture. Particularly inspiring are those artists who have emerged, organically as it were, directly from social movements such as the ones mentioned above. Although the cultural documents emerging from these struggles remain unknown to most people outside India, they show that artists continue to negotiate the disruptions opened up by globalization. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will highlight the work of artists and ordinary Indians who are attempting to create a new Indian subject in a redefined “New India.” I have tried in this chapter to set the context for us to evaluate this process of redefinition. Let me summarize these contexts. Any redefinition of the Indian subject in contemporary India has to take into account the following points: the rapid proletarianization of the agrarian dispossessed; the state’s ill-considered adherence to the project of liberalization that ruthlessly privatizes public resources and land and undercuts the interests of the poor; the intersections of religious and national texts with the text of political economy; and, finally, the disruptive nature of global capital and its tendency for crisis and planned underdevelopment.
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CH A P T E R
T WO
Polemics and Promises: Constructing the Consumer Citizen
The Neoliberal Citizen Speaking to Women’s Own magazine on October 31, 1987, at a moment of ascendancy for the neoliberal world order, Margaret Thatcher uttered words that have since become the creed of neoliberal regimes: “there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and their families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first” (Deer). This privatized view of the individual as an entity cut off from any collective identity has since attained its own force as the reigning logic of citizenship in the neoliberal world. The individual “free” agent, the active subject, who more than ever is defined by the sum of “his” choices, is starkly contrasted to any collective identity—unless that identity is safely locked inside the marker of the national.1 Pierre Bourdieu has elaborated on the symbolic force of discourses valorizing the private individual and the accompanying efforts to destroy the idea of social collectives: it is a “strong discourse” which is so strong and hard to fight because it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which it helps to make as it is, in particular by orienting the economic choices of those who dominate economic relations and so adding its own—specifically symbolic— force to those power relations. In the name of the scientific program of knowledge, converted into a political programme of action, an immense
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political operation is being pursued, aimed at creating the conditions for realizing and operating of the “theory”; a programme of methodical destruction of collectives (neo-classical economics recognizes only individuals, whether it is dealing with companies, trade unions or families). (Acts of Resistance 95–96 emphasis in original) This destruction of the collective, as Bourdieu argues, has existed in alliance with attempts to create a civic identity based on the supposed “rights” of the individual and was part of the larger Reagan/Thatcher project to “roll back socialism” in the United Kingdom and to advance economic liberalization in the United States. Colin Leys points out that one side of the New Right’s goal was to attack [socialism’s] domestic base in the labour movement through anti-union measures and higher unemployment, privatisation and reduced taxes on capital. The other side was to end controls over capital movements and reduce trade barriers, exposing the domestic workforce to competition from lower-paid workers in countries with weaker regulatory regimes—at the same time making it hard, if not impossible, for any future government to reverse these changes. (12) Leys highlights Thatcher’s methodical attempt to dismantle the organized labor movement, making it clear that the idea ref lected in this attempt was not that governments were unable to “do anything except through people,” but that any notion of “the people” was systematically subordinated to the needs of private capital. A primary goal of this and other projects of liberalization, then, is to control and discipline labor even more rigidly. The neoliberal regime of accumulation requires that the state adjust and adapt to the international needs of capital. Thus, as Neil Smith claims, “national states are reframing themselves as purer, territorially rooted economic actors in and of the market, rather than external complements to it” (“New Globalism, New Urbanism” 87). What this more f lexible role of the state means for our understanding of contemporary capitalism is that the “connections between capital and the state, social reproduction and social control have been drastically altered” (82). This “transformation,” according to Smith, is “being expressed most vividly through an altered geography of social relations” (82). This “altered geography of social relations” has many dimensions, working differently at various class levels. Within the Thatcherite
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universe—and subsequently—this change in social relations was meant to protect and promote the class interests of aff luent citizens, but, perhaps more importantly, the new class relations were furthered by positing a specific kind of neoliberal citizen. This citizen is typically a member of the middle class or of the aspiring working class. The members of Thatcher’s new, aspiring class were those who did not need government entitlements. They were “responsible” citizens who earned their own keep. Meanwhile, people who just lived “off the dole” were informed sanctimoniously that it was their hardworking neighbor “who [was] supplying [the dole]:” “If you can earn your own living then really you have a duty to do it and you will feel very much better!” (Deer). In Thatcher’s world—and in more recent manifestations of neoliberalism—the private, earning individual, a member of the industrious middle class or the upwardly mobile working class, is in stark contrast to those who expect the government to invest in public programs. Thus the material logic of the acquisitive age carries symbolic weight; it is a tale based on protecting the class interests of those in power, but equally importantly, it is a narrative that constructs an aspiring middle-class citizen who is vested with moral authority. The citizen is coded into an ethos of responsibility and commitment to the nation even as that commitment serves the interests of multinational capital. The morality of the earning, responsible citizen, then, is not merely a value-laden imperative for the national project but is linked to the needs of capital. Citizenship under neoliberal rules is not about rights that collective struggle has forced the state to honor, nor even about civic responsibilities such as voting, but about economic responsibilities that accompany the act of earning “your own living.” Within this logic, employment, housing, and education are easily accessible to those who are willing to work for them. The relationship between responsibility and consumption is a complex one. The neoliberal citizen is a responsible earner; thus he has the “right” to consume. Consumption is his reward. Conversely, this capacity to consume also gives him the mantle of responsibility. He is a direct contributor to the economy.2 The notion of a citizen who has been enfranchised to demand that the state honor his or her political rights is reduced in the neoliberal formulation to the responsibility to earn and the “right” to consume. Consumption is ultimately also the extent of the citizen’s rights, but enshrined in this right is an apparent passport to a world of possibilities previously rooted in traditional upper-class privilege. These possibilities include increased access to specially demarcated private spaces and commodities and an unregulated
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imperative to acquire wealth and accumulate credit. Because this world of possibilities seemingly corresponds to and represents the lifestyle of a transnational class, middle-class subjects are offered still another form of supposed enfranchisement: they are encouraged to believe that their tastes, fashions, and desires link them to a privileged global citizenship. Although this form of citizenship has been an important element of capitalist societies in the West since the Thatcher/Reagan years, over the last ten to fifteen years, it has also become the model of citizenship in the postcolonial world, especially in countries such as India that have seen dramatic economic changes. It is well worth mentioning, however, that even though I am describing the construction of a citizen in specific historical contexts, citizenship in the modern state has always been used as a way to organize social relations. Rituals of citizenship, after all, are not just a question of an individual’s relationship to the state. Instead, “it is a more total relationship, inf luenced by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging” (Yuval Davis 4, qtd. in Rajan 1). Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer point out that the state produces citizens in specific ways: “as citizens, voters, taxpayers, ratepayers, jurors, parents, consumers, homeowners—individuals” (qtd. in Rajan 2). Since neoliberal globalization enhances these relations in transitional postcolonial economies by promoting the unfettered entrance of Western capital and the ready availability of consumer goods, it becomes important to examine the distinctive ways in which social relations and notions of citizenship and identity are changing in these economies. Aihwa Ong has put forward an important way to consider citizenship in a developing country in the globalized age. She argues that in the era of globalization, individuals as well as governments develop a f lexible notion of citizenship and sovereignty as strategies to accumulate capital and power. “Flexible citizenship” refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond f luidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. . . . These logics and practices are produced within particular structures of meaning about family, gender, nationality, class mobility, and social power. (6) Although Ong grounds her work in the study of Chinese transnational subjects who are, for instance, able to possess two passports, this notion
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of f lexibility is also appropriate for an Indian context, where both the economy and the nation are in f lux. Certainly, as Ong claims, and as I will demonstrate in my analysis of the new Indian citizen, capital and access to it have become central to the notion of civic identity. It is apparent that access to capital is limited to a very small section of the population in most postcolonial societies, so in these societies the middle-class subject is incorporated into neoliberalism through “his” right to consume.3 How, though, is this link between consumption and citizenship constructed and maintained? One way to address this question is to return to the imperative of capital in the neoliberal age. Capital accumulation at the global level has to be sustained through increasing and accelerated levels of expansion and consumption. A goal of the neoliberal revolution in the third world, then, is to convert economies that have traditionally been characterized by the consumption of essential goods, the promotion of nationalized savings schemes, and the restriction of imported goods, for instance, into neoliberal economies based on increased consumption and debt, deregulation of banks, and a trade structure determined by global capital. While the latter two transformative goals may be met with the implementation of structural adjustments, the conversion of a population schooled in different economic principles—meeting basic needs rather than purchasing non-essential goods (and even incurring debt to do so)—cannot be accomplished by purely legislative means. The ideal of citizenship, then, has to be partially defined through the ideological promotion of regimes of consumption and debt. At the structural level, the neoliberal state enacts a familiar regime of new rules and regulations concerning, for instance, work, investment, and housing. A “mobile” labor economy is created in which some upper-level executives make enormous sums of money while the majority languish in disposable service-economy jobs; laws are enacted that make bank loans and credit accessible to a large segment of the population; a retail and housing boom make new homes and consumer goods more widely available. Accompanying the changes in the economy are attempts in the cultural realm to bring a consuming subject into being. The state apparatus and the corporate media relentlessly drive home the message of consumption through advertising and political messages, and they link purchasing power with the attainment of a social status rooted in a global consumer identity. However, in a country such as India, with a carefully cultivated national identity, this global self has to be linked to the idea of that identity. There are several reasons that this link must be reinforced.
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First, political ties to the nation have been cemented through the tradition of decolonization and the veneration of national heroes such as Gandhi and Nehru in the last sixty years. Secondly, the state has continually reinforced the idea of nation. For instance, nationalism has been employed as a way to counter factionalism within the nation. In addition, nationalism has been reinforced through India’s many conf licts with neighboring Pakistan. Finally, the state, despite its many failures to redress inequities, has been the traditional “provider” of essentials such as food and fuel subsidies. Thus politicians and advertisers have to allay any concerns or anxieties of the middle-class subject who may fear that rapid economic change may unsettle both the nation and his or her own economic and psychological well-being. One of my goals in this chapter is to demonstrate how this process of combining the national and the global is constituted, enabled, and negotiated on the terrain of culture. I also intend to show how the establishment of an intensified commodity economy changes notions of citizenship. In the first chapter, I tried to underline the specific economic reforms that have contributed to the creation of the New India. I argued that accompanying these economic changes have been ideas regarding citizenship that are specific to this age. Many of these ideas are emerging from a combination of government initiatives and corporate marketing strategies that are designed to promote and legitimize the process of liberalization.4 Throughout the mid-1990s, with the liberalization process in full swing, it was in the field of public culture that we saw some of the most complex, if gradual, negotiations to construct a narrative that was at once boldly assertive but also wrapped up in an intricate and often contradictory logic to justify economic policies. Since then, actual economic reforms, such as disinvestment in the social, the privatization of land and resources, a violent pattern of dispossessing the poor, and increased deregulation of modes of capital acquisition and capital transfer have been accompanied by a systematic process to create a new type of consumer and a new notion of citizenship, which at its heart is a class project. Constructing the New Indian Citizen In this chapter I examine the various ways in which the notion of a consumer subject is being constructed in contemporary India, and how attempts to form and/or represent this subject have a direct bearing on the creation of a new Indian citizen. It’s particularly important to
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examine these attempts because even though the Indian media and the ruling political parties passionately celebrate the birth of a “New India,” which, in their view, is characterized by a robust growth rate and the success of economic liberalization, a majority of the country’s citizens continue to remain outside the social and economic parameters of this “success.”5 This obvious reality is a necessary supplement that informs any sound understanding of the attempts to call up a “New India,” creating an omnipresent and destabilizing counternarrative. Recent efforts to revive a politics of nationalism (the atomic explosions in 1998, or the “Shining India” campaign by the BJP in 2004, discussed below) can be seen as an attempt to alleviate some of the anxieties associated with economic liberalization and to distract the vast majority of the people from continuing and newly emergent inequalities.6 National narratives, then, are often aligned uneasily with the promotion of global market forces. The collusion and disjuncture between these narratives and forces have led to an intricate dance on the part of the media and the government in an attempt to articulate a new form of citizenship. A “new” Indian is constructed and projected in the cultural arena through the use of images and narratives rooted in potentially contradictory notions of the global and the national. Examining this interplay is essential in order to deepen our understanding of the complex struggles over forms of identity and self in contemporary India. Let us now take a brief look at the intricate layers of this ideological project and attempt to address those issues that are specific to this idea of a new Indian subject. I must note, however, that I am not posing these particular forms of neoliberal subjectivity as false constructions in contrast to some notion of an authentic Indian subject or a real “national life” or “national culture.” All of these categories are, of course, endlessly evolving, dynamic concepts that are part of the ongoing contestations regarding identity. The continual meshing of regional loyalties, religion, caste, gender, and class politics make any claims for an Indian identity fraught with contradictions. What I am suggesting instead is that there is something significant about the establishment of particular forms of subjectivity at this current conjuncture. I should make one additional clarification. I do not want to make the reductionist argument that this new form of citizenship is only about creating a consuming subject, one who will contribute to and participate in the neoliberal project of capital acquisition. Clearly, constructions of citizenship negotiate tensions regarding all sorts of claims rooted in ideas of the nation, and in the case of India these claims are usually imbricated in ways that position caste, gender, and religion
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within the larger narrative of the nation. Indeed, one element of the specific form of subjectivity that I will examine in this chapter is the need to assuage an enduring postcolonial anxiety about the legacy of colonization, to assert a nationhood that is permanently deferred, as India is still on the lower rungs of the ladder of development in the global sense of progress. Constructing this particular form of the new Indian citizen, then, serves at least two possible ends: it weds citizens to the prospect of a resurgent national identity, and it attaches the middleclass Indian citizen to a universalized globalism, constituting a membership in an international club. For the purpose of this analysis, I will concentrate on examining a “Vision Document” from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) written in 2004; commercial advertising images on billboards and on television since 1999, when the BJP came to power; and a special issue on “youth in India” in an English-language national magazine. Let me explain in some detail the rationale for my choices and note some of the limitations governing these choices; first, I will discuss the inclusion of both political and commercial texts. One reason to explore both state and corporate attempts to construct a consuming subject is to point out the intersections of and the differences between market and state constructions of the subject. My analysis will demonstrate potential sites of conf lict in these different constructions and explore how these constructions are positioned in relation to the larger politics of caste, gender, and class. I will also consider whether or not an entirely new form of civic identity is being created in an attempt to produce a certain sort of citizen/consumer. Does the fetish of the “new,” for instance, elide or build on previous ideas of political citizenship? It is important to address such questions in order to interrogate the various ways in which the “national” is being rewritten in the age of globalization. Clearly, too, all of these issues have to be addressed in light of the tensions that are inherent in the dialectical play between the needs of capital and the needs of the state. In the age of neoliberal globalization, where commercial enterprises rely on the state to regulate financial transactions, it may seem safe to conclude that the state is merely a vassal of the corporate economy, that national images may be used merely to sell economic reforms. However, while such a reading can be accurate in describing some developed societies, a postcolonial state such as India is often steeped in an ideology of the nation and the “national” mode of development. The presence of the “national” means that the relationship between the needs of capital and the needs of the state is necessarily an unstable one. Thus Matthew Sparke’s question about “how
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citizenship is being reimagined, recodified, and, therefore, remade in an era when laissez-faire, free-market capitalism has become globally dominant” is especially relevant for India (255). Second, my choice of texts highlights the effects of economic reforms in India in areas that have become particularly important to the task of creating a new consumer subject. So, for instance, I focus on representations of the subject as connected to home, since these representations are now ubiquitous in Indian cities, where most middle-class citizens reside. These representations are also some of the most prominent ideological markers that have produced pressures on and incentives for middle-class Indian consumers during this process of transformation. The marker of home is also connected to the creation of a debt economy and the recent impetus for the pattern of debt and ownership that has been common in the West. Home and automobile loans, for example, are now available in ways that have completely changed the terms of ownership. Many middle-class Indians now pay Equal Monthly Installments (EMIs) that include a mortgage and installment payment of other loans. Young Indians, unlike their counterparts a decade or two ago, who would have bought cars only if they could have afforded the full price, are now purchasing these items on credit. Automobile loans are now widely available, as are home loans, although interest rates continue to be very high by Western standards (12% for first-year auto loans and over 10% for home loans). Moreover, the use of credit for smaller, non-essential purchases, including spending on travel, entertainment, and dining out, is encouraged by the various banks and companies that offer credit cards. These offers have soared, and although the actual number of cards in circulation (less than twenty-five million in 2007) is small by global standards, more and more consumers have access to some form of credit. The availability of credit has brought the promise—if not the reality—of ownership to the middle class as never before. Neoliberal citizenship is of course as much about the possibility of class empowerment through ownership and consumption as about the actual attainment of these goals. The construction of the Indian national subject is increasingly linked to the idea of class privilege that comes with these consumption patterns. In contemporary India, attempts to construct a consumer subject are directly connected to the construction of this “new” middle-class, metropolitan citizen, but as Leela Fernandes points out, what has become known as the “new” middle class “is not ‘new’ in terms of its structural or social basis. . . . Rather, its newness refers to a process of production of a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays
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claim to the benefits of liberalization” (India’s New Middle Class xviii). In some ways, then, citizenship and national identity in the New India are constantly reshaped within an evolving and dialectical relationship, especially in relocating citizens’ roles in consuming goods and in the acquisition of wealth. This dialectical reading is important, for it emphasizes that there is no simple cause-and-effect relationship in which the economy merely drives the circulation of cultural representations posing a specific citizen identity. Let me also be clear about the specific middle-class subject that is the focus of my analysis. Prior to the implementation of liberalization, the middle class generally constituted a category of people who had a monthly family income anywhere from Rs.5,000 to Rs.25,000. Their occupations ranged from teachers and small business owners to government officers and artists. Liberalization has made this class category far more f luid. As incomes and costs have soared and more and more young Indians have entered the service economy, it is possible that some “middle-class” families may be earning as much as Rs.50,000 a month while a significant number are struggling to get by on a few thousand rupees a month. The image-makers, of course, do not focus on the nuances of this category but proclaim that the middle class comprises over 250 million people, all of whom are potential consumers and participants in a commodity economy. The image-makers include in this vastly complex category the elite classes (about 5 percent of the population), who are the main beneficiaries of liberalization.7 The reality is that a majority of this group are precariously situated in real financial terms. Much of their purchasing power, as I have argued, is attained only through credit. As the cost of necessities such as food, housing, transportation, and utilities (electricity, gas, and water) rise, less and less money is available for the products that are the supposed incentives of a commodity economy. Yet the narratives of consumption consistently represent the middle-class subject as one who has access to a world that is in reality open only to that top 5 percent. Rather than assume a specific middle-class subject, then, my analysis of the narratives will focus on what Fernandes calls the “production of a distinctive social and political identity” (xviii). Clearly, the process by which meanings about citizenship come into being is a complex one. The relationship between a particular representation and what end that representation might fulfill, for instance, is always informed by actually existing political realities. Thus, it is important to make the case that hegemonic attempts at constructing a particular kind of middle-class citizen are sometimes countered by
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these very same subjects, depending on the context of their economic opportunities, and on factors such as gender, caste, region, and religion. Moreover, these ideas are contested politically and socially by those subjects who are outside of this middle-class narrative, whether through the actions of the revolutionary Maoist insurgents in the rural areas who cast a spotlight on the disinherited rural citizen or in the resistance of the urban street vendors—forgotten citizens—who fight against efforts to introduce giant retail chain stores and supermarkets. These oppositional efforts continually challenge existing rituals that govern the rules of citizenship. This contested, dialectical process of naming a citizen is especially discernible when we turn our attention to the realm of culture. In general, then, the analysis that follows will highlight some of these underlying anxieties about the liberalization process. One function of these images and narratives that f launt the “advantages” of liberalization is to win consent for the ruling class’s project, and my analysis will explore that function. Such a reading of these texts, however, will have to incorporate an understanding of the complex interplay of the ideological markers of gender, caste, religion, and nation, as well as an acknowledgement of the multiple acts of refusal and assimilation that are part of this ideological process. Naturally, these contradictions are never entirely resolved, and an examination of these narratives and representations yields meanings that are always unstable, open to multiple readings. The process of constructing this middle-class consuming subject, then, is continual and contested. A few words are also necessary to justify my focus on advertisements. I believe that commercial and state advertisements play a crucial role in expressing and justifying the liberalization agenda; however, I also acknowledge that such a focus is accompanied by some limitations. First, let me articulate a few features of advertisements that make them important to the neoliberal agenda. For one thing, advertising in all its forms has worked to sell the benefits of the new economy, “awakening” people across the middle-class spectrum to the attractions of a lifestyle based on conspicuous consumption. This lifestyle is almost always rooted in upper-class, Western, and urban practices, promoting a curious mix of the global and the local. One ideological task of these advertisements is in line with state efforts to convey the Thatcherite message that there is no alternative: without liberalization, India will remain a poor, “third world” nation. Indeed, both commercial and state marketers imply liberalization is necessary to lift people out of poverty. Another message of the marketers, specifically targeted at a
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country that has been left out of the global narrative of capitalist progress, suggests that economic reform will bring wealth and, along with it, power and respect in the global arena. Many of the images I analyze focus on this element of the global. So, for instance, it is not uncommon to see images in which the local is enhanced by an accession to the global, or political policy statements that argue that the entrance of foreign capital will strengthen the nation. Thus, as I will demonstrate, a complex and often contradictory process of negotiating the global and the local is carried out through many of these images. Another feature of advertising images is that they trade on the seductive promise of material wealth. As the political machinery promotes the acquisition of wealth, the media provides the imagery necessary for an audience waiting to live out this dream. Moreover, since a majority of these texts are primarily targeted at the consumption of the middle and upper classes, the implicit message underlining these images is that the rewards for accepting and supporting liberalization policies are many and that they come in the form of material goods and access to a lifestyle that is equal to the most privileged in the global economy. A key implication is that in gaining access to this lifestyle, the middle classes, unlike previous generations, do not have to leave India. They can enjoy all the comforts of home (class privileges, such as domestic servants) even while being detached from all the deficiencies of home (such as pollution and poverty). This seductive message, wrapped in images of home and wealth, as we shall see, often includes another coded text: the comforting notion that these privileges can be enjoyed guiltlessly despite continuing evidence of both poverty and social unrest. Meanwhile, the political machinery confirms this global-luxury-at-home message, consistently persuading middle- and upper-class consumers that liberalization will address both problems. Liberalization will lift many boats and help people to come out of poverty; technology, the state, and the presence of corporate investment will create jobs and opportunities. Increased prosperity will, in turn, lead to a more peaceful society. Prosperous and aspiring consumers are further comforted with the promise that until the masses are lifted out of poverty, a rigorous state and corporate apparatus will protect middle- and upper-class interests. This promise is promoted on billboards across urban areas, and its proof can be seen everywhere. Gated communities, for instance, are slowly becoming a norm in the New India. The palaces of consumption—the posh department stores and shopping malls—are all protected by phalanxes of security guards.8
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Advertising images in India, moreover, are interesting precisely because they demonstrate the tension between, say, the promises signified by the goods in a Western-style department store and the reality of life in the streets outside, as well as the inherent contradictions in these promises. For instance, many advertisements are for products that may well be out of the reach of most consumers (such as Piaget watches or imported Scotch) or products that are not common items in most Indian households (such as microwaves or washing machines). In short, advertising executives must manage the differences between the promises of the consumer nation and the reality of most people’s lives. Moreover, their images must create a national narrative that will be palatable and believable to a number of consumers even while attempting to allay the fears that accompany the erosion of traditional forms of social transactions. As Fernandes puts it, Languages of commodities and of consumption provide a potentially accessible array of cultural registers that suggest a possibility of access and participation in this new middle-class model of the Indian nation. It is this paradoxical pairing of exclusion/difference and inclusion/universality that constitutes the hegemonic boundaries of the new middle class and characterizes the politics of this group with a continual sense of ambiguity. (35) The new commodity represents all that is possible under liberalization, so commodities attain a fantastical allure in which the nation space itself is being recreated. The ubiquitous foreign brand, ironically, is the best example of a nation that is finally able to fulfill its promise as an economic power on the world stage. Material progress is ref lected in the materiality of the commodity itself. “Visual representations,” argues Fernandes, “of newly available commodities . . . allow us to view the ways in which meanings attached to such commodities weave together narratives of nationhood and development with the creation of middle class identity” (41). An advertisement for a new apartment building promises the consumer safety and security, as well as sending the implicit message that ownership of an apartment indicates that the viewer has attained middle-class status and respectability. Moreover, as Fernandes claims, commodity consumption has taken the form of a kind of public language that holds a promise of potential access to new middle class membership that may otherwise seem too easily foreclosed by
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the linguistic politics of English. This language of class has been coded into narratives of lifestyle that rework existing status distinctions and mediate the anxieties and tensions of social differentiation that stem from restrictions on this promise of access. (71) Fernandes’s point about facility in the English language as a form of exclusion is especially valid since educational opportunities are not readily available for class mobility. Thus, as Fernandes argues, the commodity stands in place of economic equality. I would add that the economic and social anxieties and tensions that Fernandes mentions remain unresolved in these texts and, moreover, that the politics of inclusion and exclusion operate simultaneously—indeed, that one is dependent upon the other. Even as these images try to mediate and manage existing tensions, they further them. In my analysis of specific images, I want to point to one of the characteristic elements of these advertising campaigns: how the Indian self mysteriously remains pure while becoming at one with the rest of the global economy through adherence to Western norms. After all, adhering to these norms and membership in the consuming middle class, as Fernandes points out, does not depend “simply on the purchase of particular commodities or brands. Rather, it rests on the creation of a distinctive lifestyle associated with a broader set of social practices” (73). Also, as Derya Özkan and Robert Foster argue, “[t]he consumer citizen in this era of globalization is no longer an unidentified beneficiary of standardized mass consumption, but instead a supposedly active subject who reclaims a civic identity through unique tastes and consumer choices” (“Consumer Citizenship”). The process by which this “supposedly active subject” is created is obviously not without its limitations, and the extent to which this process is successful depends upon the context in which the subject consumes. So, for instance, media messages reinforce the attractions of dining at Pizza Hut at the local mall rather than in a restaurant serving Indian food. A middle-class family may well spend much more at the chain, but the pattern of consumption in the former instance, advertisements suggest, links the diners to the global middle class. Of course, one has to acknowledge the generational element when discussing consumption patterns. While young, middle-class Indians may readily accept foreign brands, the “strategy of nationalizing foreign products” may soften the older generations’ sense of lack and alienation (Fernandes, India’s New Middle Class 42). Taking the culinary example further, pizza with a tandoori chicken topping might be marketed to the older generation,
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thus fusing the global and the traditional. However, the real-life context of all these consumers is that for a family of four, an outing to Pizza Hut will cost over Rs.1,000, which is conceivably up to 10 percent of a middle-class family’s monthly income. That price tag places this dinner excursion outside the reach of most middle-class Indians. These existing contradictions make it necessary for advertisers to assert one essential element of the neoliberal dream: the affective valorization of individual needs and desires, what Tony Blair’s guru Anthony Giddens has referred to as a “democracy of emotions.” In Indian society, however, where kinship bonds continue to play an important role in determining social relations, this privatized aspect of the dream has to be negotiated with a degree of finesse, and this negotiation is often unsuccessful. For instance, it remains a common practice in many Indian households for the entire family, spanning three generations, to sit around the television set in the evenings. In this situation, privileging the private individual in TV advertisements is often a difficult proposition. So far I have concentrated on providing a rationale for examining advertisements; however, since I concentrate on examining Englishlanguage advertisements primarily viewed in metropolitan centers, I must acknowledge the limitations of my sample. My analysis does not, for instance, consider advertisements in the vernacular, in regional magazines, on radio, or on billboards in small towns in India. My conclusions are thus limited to the middle-class subject as he or she is constructed in a particular class-based urban context. I am arguing, however, that the new consumer subject is being constructed precisely in this political and cultural terrain of class and space, so even though my sample excludes the marginalized other, it is this outside, the repressed other of this exclusive citizen that informs my reading of the new consumer subject. Let me now turn to the overarching text, the union of the local and the global, which positions this new consumer subject. As I mentioned earlier, one way in which this idea is promoted is through notions such as f lexible citizenship, which is linked with the transnational capitalist economy. As Sparke argues, although transnational mobility is linked to a very small percentage of the population, “the processes of producing and disciplining national subjects are being increasingly morphed into processes and disciplinary strategies that support the production and circulation of more mobile transnational subjects” (Sparke 271). Inclusion within the global economy, Sparke claims, “becomes more and more about having capital or thinking of territory and belonging
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in terms of capital” (260). Ultimately, according to Sparke, “the neoliberal vision aims at linking this realm of emergent economic citizenship directly with the realms of political and social citizenship” (266). Although this link is not fully developed in India, it is increasingly the case for the middle-class subject, whose class position is tenuous at best, to be incorporated within the terms of this melded citizenship so that the promise of access to capital aligns him or her to the political interests of the transnational ruling class. This transnational class in the case of India includes both those upperclass Indian citizens who do business and can travel outside the confines of the nation-state and those in the diaspora, the non-resident Indians (NRIs) who can now seek greater access to the privileges offered by the home nation. The Indian state grants these privileged few the status of transnational citizenship, with all the benefits arising from this position: long-term, multiple-entry visas for non-Indian citizens and open entry for PIO (Person of Indian Origin) and OCI (Overseas Citizenship of India) card holders, unregulated travel, the ability to move capital, and access to specialized housing and bank accounts. The NRI/PIO/OCI is also offered a set of promises and privileges about the “homeland.” There, he or she may increasingly find the comforts of the West, such as private housing estates and luxury goods, along with the nostalgic traces of “home,” such as language, family, and culturally familiar fare, and economically friendly private property rights that guarantee generously low tax rates and other investment incentives.9 Like his NRI counterpart, the Indian citizen, although somewhat more limited by travel restrictions, has access to the global economy through transnational business connections and the availability of commodities that his Western cousins also possess. Thus, access to capital, accompanied by the right to consume, determines these transnational subjects, and that right is integral to understanding ways in which citizenship is being recast in the neoliberal age. Of course, this ability to move across national boundaries does not in any way elide the prominence of the nation-state in developing countries, both as an apparatus that grants certain citizenship rights and as a site with an aura of authenticity. Indeed, it is the nation-state that promotes a new kind of nationalism that incorporates the global with the national. In their discussion of neoliberal consumption in Turkey, Özkan and Foster point to the intersection of civic identity and consumption as being a vital component of the new nationalism that is also aligned with transnational capital: “neoliberal nationalism promotes the integration of the national economy with the global marketplace;
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and it seeks the signs of this integration in the sphere of consumption.” According to Özkan and Foster, [t]he current discourse of consumer citizenship . . . promotes an outward looking process of nation making. This process puts less stress on defining markets and identities in terms of bounded territorial units and more stress on asserting membership in an unbounded commercial arena of world class consumption. Consumerism, with its dominant values of personal freedom and choice, thus becomes the main vehicle for realizing national citizenship. The nation is called into being through a complicated process of integrating the local and the global. It attains autonomy, paradoxically, only in relation to the global, and the middle-class citizen as “free” agent realizes this point most prominently through his or her access to consumer goods. Interestingly, the arena of “world class consumption” is primarily accessible to the transnational elite, but it is the middleclass subject who is being positioned as a potential consumer of this lifestyle. Consumerism, then, is not merely about acquiring products but is a passport to the world. The nation and the middle-class subject acquire legitimacy by being linked to a larger international market. As I argued in my example about Pizza Hut, just any consumption will not do; in countries such as Turkey and India, having access to Western products that represent a distinctive Western lifestyle is part of “being” this new, global citizen. Özkan and Foster refer to this form of consumption as “consumer cosmopolitanism.” In their estimation, nationalism and cosmopolitanism are two sides of the same coin: consumer citizenship defined by positive nationalism resembles a consumerist cosmopolitanism that seeks to transcend older modes of modernity and citizenship. Consumerist cosmopolitanism promotes a global civic identity that is not bound by any national territory and that, moreover, gives one the “freedom” to adopt any tradition and to incorporate it within one’s personal consumption habits. In developing nations, the ideological message claims, consumption revives and expands the nation, while foreign direct investment (FDI) and transnational business links legitimize the nation within the global community. Thus growth rates and FDI statistics are constantly
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trumpeted by developing nations such as India as signs of “progress.” In this way, consumerism in the neoliberal age, according to Özkan and Foster, “promises to reconcile the global and the local—to render them commensurable—by dissolving categorical distinctions between East and West.” Of course, what Özkan and Foster do not dwell on is that this seemingly benign process elides the continuing transfer of wealth from the East to the West, keeping alive such material, categorical distinctions. Özkan and Foster argue that this “image of consumerist cosmopolitanism” is a “substitute for old-fashioned nationalisms” represented by principles of sovereignty and economic autonomy, nationalisms considered outdated and incongruous with the aims of nations that want to join the global economy. In the case of India, weighed down by stereotypical images of poverty and “backwardness,” “the image of global locality provides a solution. It promises to banish the specter of provinciality and to assert economic and cultural membership in the new world order.” However, this effort to affirm a national identity while embracing the foreign other is a project fraught with tension; in addition, forms of deterritorialization, which is the hallmark of globalization, are, as we know, accompanied by means of reterritorialization. The state and other ideological apparatuses cannot negotiate and stabilize all the forces that are unleashed by economic liberalization; therefore, forms of reterritorialization, new means of articulating the nation and of representing the population, come into play. In the case of India, the vast presence of the dispossessed and marginalized communities, particularly in non-metropolitan regions, makes such a redefinition of citizenship not without friction. Moreover, there is a whole legacy of national identity grounded in the struggle against colonialism, in the historical framework of Nehru and Gandhi’s vision of an independent India that cannot be wished away. The process of constructing a new form of consumer citizenship is thus a lot less predictable than the vision offered by Özkan and Foster. My contention is that this effort to construct a new Indian citizen is far from complete; indeed the process itself brings to the surface the many tensions that constitute the multiple narratives and formations of the subject in the age of globalization. If postcolonial identity is an identity always constructed within the shadow of Western economic dominance, then an economically determined nationalism is one way to assert identity. This new Indian identity, however, does not mirror the economic nationalism of the Nehru years, which was rooted in a nationalist developmental politics
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of non-aligned third worldism. Instead, it embraces a “nationalism” that is based on a competitive and collaborative alliance with Western capitalism. In this narrative, not only will Indian businesses be equal partners with Western capital, but on occasion, as in Tata’s acquisition of Corus, an 18.2-million-ton Anglo-Dutch steel-maker purchased for US$8.1 billion, they will also outwit and outbid Western firms.10 At a more basic level, primary evidence of a resurgent economic “nationalism” is visible in the form of an explosion of consumer goods like high-end electronics and designer clothes. The narrative of nationalist progress is represented by the widespread availability of these goods (they are now readily available even in small towns), which signifies that now, in contrast to the years of austerity since independence, the nation is on the move. This form of economic nationalism also makes the myth of class mobility seem real to those who are outside the national narrative. The new Indian in non-metropolitan areas can ostensibly surmount certain class and caste barriers through the ownership of consumer goods: products such as mobile phones, which are increasingly used by a wide swath of the population—from CEOs to vegetable deliverymen—can provide membership in a national community of consumers, a group traditionally associated with the middleclass metropolitan population. For the middle classes, many of whom are also upper caste and view with suspicion what they perceive to be the increasing demands of the Other Backward Classes (OBC), the Dalits, and the underprivileged, the process of subject formation through consumption is somewhat different. In their case, consumer goods serve as a palliative for the unfulfilled longings rooted in class and caste privilege, partially allaying the anxieties that come about as a result of an incorporation into a global regime of capitalism and the increasing factionalism within the nation. In short, these goods are a way to “empower” the middle classes through a regime of “rights” rooted in consumerism. Of course, these rights can only be measured in relation to the political privileges granted to these classes; thus, in their case, consumerism in itself is not enough. Their access to consumer goods must be enhanced by changes in the tax laws, by access to public resources and land, and through a stricter policing of labor, “minorities,” and the poor. As I argued in the previous chapter, the constellation of the anti-reservation movement and the liberalization of the economy in the early 1990s created the ideal climate for the production of this new middleclass Indian subject. Advocates for liberalization took this opportunity to highlight the apparent negative effects of a “rewards” system
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controlled by the government and to condemn reservations as strictures against the “freedom” of market reforms. The anti-reservation movement, then, was an essential step in the construction of the new Indian subject. It perpetuated the Thatcherite myth that the ideal citizen is the bourgeois self-subject who is able to use available technology and freemarket opportunities to acquire wealth, often—ironically—through indebtedness, and thereby transcend the limitations of caste, class, gender, or nation. However, not coincidentally, this imaginary subject, the ideal citizen, is often represented and imagined as male, upper caste (certainly not a Dalit), and of metropolitan origin. The much-heralded masses of the postcolonial moment, the people, have been erased from the neoliberal landscape, although they are occasionally called up during election campaigns. As I have argued, this elision has happened at both the economic and cultural level. Draconian laws that further disempower the poor have been accompanied by specific cultural rewritings to refigure the past. Later in this chapter, I will examine the Bharatiya Janata Party’s Vision Document as a way to highlight more specifically how these shifts have been negotiated on the terrain of culture. Certainly a revised civic identity is not possible without a shift in the mythic narratives and figures of the nation. Consider, for instance, the talismanic figures of Nehru and Gandhi. Both embody forms of citizenship that have residual prominence in India. Nehru continues to represent a secular progressivism, while Gandhi stands in for nonviolence (ahimsa) and an ascetic integrity. I would suggest that both of these icons, whose deification has always been problematic, have been recast into figures whose qualities mimic those of the new consumer subject. Nehru as the quintessential secular modernist formerly represented a certain form of third-world nationalism that was at once global yet rooted in an ethos of developmental nationalism. A version of this nationalism has now been linked to the global market in such a way that “global Indianness involves producing self-respect at the national level while simultaneously claiming recognition on the world stage” (Mazzarella 37–38, in Özkan and Foster). According to the avatars of neoliberalism in India, Nehru’s wish for an independent, globally recognized India has finally been realized through its incorporation into the market economy. Gandhi’s legacy, likewise, can be managed in such a way that “honesty” and “integrity” become free-market values juxtaposed against government inefficiency and corruption.11 Of course, when necessary, these icons can also represent ideas that have “failed” and are no longer valid for the new economy. Nehru is deemed a “failed
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socialist,” while Gandhi’s faith in village life and in indigenous development are written off as hopelessly anachronistic. All of these shifts and attempts at cultural rewriting, however, point to the tenuous nature of the economic and political project of creating a new India and a new Indian citizen. This is especially so because, despite the consumer boom or the increase in the growth rate, structural inequities are visible for all to see. Thus the attempt to construct a particular kind of middle-class citizen must be measured against the economic realities of India and the realization that the formation of class identity is not a seamless process. Citizenship formation remains an incomplete practice since, despite existing and new privileges, attempts to create a new class identity point to “the fissures” that exist “between hegemonic representations of new middle-class identity and the contradictory socioeconomic realities of those who both constitute and aspire to this group” (Fernandes, India’s New Middle Class xix). It is “precisely such fissures,” Leela Fernandes claims, “that produce the anxieties, responses, and practices that constitute the daily substance of contemporary democratic politics” (xix). I agree with Fernandes that matters of class, while not the only factors, are undoubtedly the most important elements in this construction of the new Indian. Narrating the New Indian Subject In this section of the chapter, I want to focus on specific examples of constructing the consumer subject. I will look at a variety of forums (an election document, billboards, a special feature on youth in India in a national magazine, and television advertising) so as to highlight the relative effectiveness of these images, depending on the context of their circulation. There are, after all, many avenues in which these texts circulate. For instance, it needs to be said that in the case of print advertising, the readers of English-language publications (such as India Today and the Times of India) tend to be on the upper rungs of the class ladder, while magazines and newspapers in the regional languages (such as Bengali, Hindi, Marathi, or Tamil) generally draw readers whose financial status is far less secure (teachers, government employees, the self-employed, etc.). In the case of television, although the percentages of viewers are still small, audiences have grown incrementally over the last fifteen years and encompass a wider swath of the population. The large-scale availability of cable television, especially in the metropolitan areas, also ensures that millions of people have access to media images,
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many of which are geared to produce a specific form of subjectivity in the viewing audience, encouraging them to be consumers, to be loyal to a particular form of ideological positioning. My examination of a range of narratives will bring to the surface many of the issues that I have already discussed. First, I will analyze a Vision Document published by the BJP on the eve of the 2004 parliamentary elections, when almost all of the media predicted that the party would be swept back to power. The BJP’s efforts to link the consuming subject to the nation through coded religious appeals are particularly interesting for what they reveal about the tensions linking class, faith, and nation. Having highlighted this link, I will then examine selected advertising images that represent a vital component of constructing the new Indian subject: the notions of home and space and their association with a sense of privilege and class position. I also analyze a magazine special feature on youth in India, contrasting the magazine’s examination and advertisement of “youth culture” with that of Lokniti, a non-profit organization research program located in Delhi. Finally, by paying attention to the realm of television advertising, I consider ways in which the local and the global are negotiated in constructions of the new Indian woman. Although it is tempting to view these images purely for their extrinsic value, advocating particular lifestyles, I would like to suggest that the images are wrapped up in their own contradictions, exemplifying some of the anxieties associated with the neoliberal project. Additionally, these images point to the multiple ways in which citizenship is being constructed in the new India. In positing a version of the new Indian subject, these images are at once recasting a specific national identity— one linked to a transnational upper class—and undermining any continuous, stable sense of self. My broad argument is that these images destabilize the promises of the neoliberal dream even as they attempt to fulfill it. Specifically, an exploration of these images will involve the analysis of narratives built upon the following elements that are the cornerstones of neoliberal promise: property, wealth, and commodity. In my examination of these elements, I will attempt to demonstrate the ways in which the consumer subject is constructed. The BJP’s Construction of the Swadeshi Consumer The 2004 Vision Document is an excellent example of the multiple ways in which the BJP has reinvented itself in the last sixteen years. A key
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goal here is to complicate the popular notion that the party is defined primarily by its extremist and xenophobic positions on cultural nationalism and Hindutva. Although these positions have certainly helped define the party, and though they have usually been foregrounded in discussions on their role in Indian politics, it would be safe to say that the BJP’s evolving positions on liberalization and economic reforms are equally important and form a dialectical relationship with its more prominent cultural positions. Examining the relationship can help us understand aspects of the larger project to redefine the Indian polity and the Indian citizen in the age of liberalization, as well as help us comprehend the intricate negotiations between the local and the global, between nationalism and globalization, and between class and religious agency. A significant portion of the BJP’s agenda, of course, is to recreate a specifically Indian subject. It is this element that I want to focus on: the BJP’s construction of this Indian subject in the context of its stance on economic reforms. Specifically, I hope to demonstrate that this making of the new Indian is as much a class project as it is a cultural one and that the class dimensions of this project have become progressively more pronounced as the party has acquired legitimacy as a mainstream force (at one point, gaining a parliamentary majority). The party’s stance on foreign capital, for instance, underwent a significant change between 1992 (when the BJP had no seats in parliament) and the eve of the elections in 2004, in which the party was largely favored to win. I would argue that this evolution was not the mere result of political expediency but also displayed a fundamental anxiety to rearticulate a national subject along religious lines even as that subject became increasingly irrelevant. In some ways, the BJP’s more overt promotion of liberalization during its 1999–2004 leadership of government should come as no surprise since, even early on, the party was deeply embroiled in business interests; it is no coincidence that the present superstar of the BJP, Gujarat’s Prime Minister Narender Modi, is as courted by the top industrialists of the country as he is valued by the cultural right wing of the party. However, because the class dimensions of the BJP project have been overshadowed by its overtly xenophobic cultural stance, I will brief ly outline the evolution of the BJP’s position over the last sixteen years, illuminating these class dimensions, before I analyze the party’s 2004 Vision Document. What the BJP did in the late 1980s was to make religion and nation essential parts of its electoral platform, thus legitimizing and valorizing them as never before and moving both of these topics to center stage. In addition, as the BJP became the dominant party, it linked this
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nationalism to a global, consumerist, capitalist ideology. The BJP’s idea of a New India was thus increasingly characterized by a delicate balance between a celebration of economic liberalization and a puritanical and violent form of nationalist fundamentalism. During its five-year rule (1999–2004), one version of the party—the front offered to the world—was represented by the benign face of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vajpayee was tagged as “the great unifier” by India Today, leading a booming India, an India of technology and entente, and an aspiring global superpower. Meanwhile, the party’s other incarnation, L. K. Advani, the BJP ideologue, placated those who were invested in the principles of Hindutva and nationalism. These two guises were not discrete; in fact, they were an essential arrangement, weaving and interweaving allying and apparently antagonistic narratives. As Uma Chakravarti has pointed out, the Hindu brigade has shown that their political strategies can be “amazingly f lexible” and that they “have a great capacity for redeploying tradition selectively, and innovatively, to forge new meanings” (266). In short, the BJP’s market dictates and its social and political positions are inseparable. I am not, however, suggesting that these negotiations are part of a simple causal chain. While there is undoubtedly an element of truth in views such as Chakravarti’s that the rise of the Hindu right had its origins in “a crisis of the legitimacy of the state” (244), I do not assume such a unilinear trajectory or a crisis rooted in the “national.” Let me explain the complex negotiations and contradictions that were at the center of the BJP’s ascension to power. As the BJP came into its own as a political party in the early 1990s, it was, at least publicly, highly critical of the Congress Party’s advocacy of the policies of liberalization. Global organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that were embraced by the ruling party were criticized as the avatars of foreign domination, compromising India’s sovereignty. Even as the BJP was deeply immersed in its cultural wars, most colorfully displayed in the Rath Yatra to Ayodha, it was in the process of constructing a specific economic agenda that purported to oppose economic liberalization. Indeed, the destruction of the Babri Mosque and the communal riots that followed perhaps made it even more important for the party to articulate an economic vision so that it would be seen not purely as an extremist unit, but as a legitimate party seeking to redress both cultural and economic injustices. From the very beginning, the party tried to link cultural pride and economic justice, connecting these goals to a restoration of national sovereignty. The anti-Mondal agitations also
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gave the party a means by which to tap into upper-caste discontent. Here was a party that not only reasserted Hindu pride at a time when factionalism within the Indian nation was rising (the Bombay blasts in early 1993 only confirmed the BJP’s message that Muslim extremism was a radical threat to India’s security) but also defended the upper castes’ historical “rights” and privileges. Thus the development of its economic program has to be understood in light of the seismic events of the early 1990s. The party’s stated economic platform was an extension of its cultural position, one based on the notion of Swadeshi. As early as 1992, shortly after the Congress Party’s policies of liberalization were put into effect, the BJP defined, in the party manifesto, its version of the concept: By Swadeshi one means that the local resources and talents have the full scope for development in the national interest and the benefits there from should primarily f low to the people. Integration into a global economy should not mean obliteration of national identity and predominant sway of powerful economic forces from the outside. (BJP, Economic Policy Statement 8; my emphasis) In short, even in the early stages of the economic reforms, the BJP was not critical of liberalization, but instead advocated a policy of internal liberalization that would preempt the process of a larger integration into the global economy. This position became even clearer as it was elaborated on the eve of the BJP’s first accession to power as part of a coalition party in 1998. According to the party manifesto released that year, India should engage in “rapid large-scale internal liberalization, but calibrated globalization so that the Indian industry gets a period of seven to ten years for substantial integration with the global economy” (Vote BJP 11). Throughout this process, the BJP said, national interests must be prioritized: “India must move carefully and gradually towards integration with the global economy and even as it so does, it must act in a manner that suits its national interest . . . the objective will be to protect the national economy and national interest like all nations do and not to indulge in economic isolationism” (Vote BJP 11). In this period, the attempt to reassert the national in the face of global pressure to integrate and to open the Indian economy continues to be a characteristic element of the party’s electoral strategy. Somehow India would embrace the global, but only on its own terms. The contradictions evident in this process, of course, are never discussed.
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On the surface, it may appear that the audience for these documents is primarily a national one, representing urban-middle-class and business interests. However, in reality, a significant element of the party’s dance between the global and the national is about addressing a diverse audience. Let me mention a few important segments of this audience here. One segment is the Hindu upper-caste, middle-class community that has to be wooed by an assertion of cultural nationalism and Hindu supremacy that also claims to protect their economic interests and offers them a balm for their larger insecurities regarding the state of the nation; they also have to be convinced that even though a businessfriendly environment will prevail, their financial wellbeing will not be compromised by the entrance of foreign capital. Another group, a larger diasporic Indian community, will also have to be persuaded that the Indian nation will not shut them out but will offer them both an economic and a cultural haven. They will be allowed to invest their capital in this newly regulated economy; in return, they will be given all the privileges of a vicarious cultural citizenship. Still another group, the internal right wing, such as the Rashtriya Seva Sangh (RSS) forces, which were essential to the agenda of cultural revitalization, especially in the early years of the BJP, must be comforted by the explicit adherence to Hindu nationalism. Any involvement with the global has to reaffirm India’s position as “the world’s oldest cradle of civilization” and India’s role in saving the world from “the gathering civilizational crisis” (BJP, Vote BJP 2). Ironically, it was the BJP that precipitated a crisis when it first formed a coalition government in 1998, authorizing the atomic blasts in Pokhran. The blasts, predictably, brought international criticism and economic sanctions. While the party was projecting an overtly nationalist image, however, it was enacting some radical economic reforms favorable to foreign multinational interests, none perhaps as significant as opening up the insurance industry to private enterprise. As Baldev Raj Nayar points out, “the assertion of nationalism through the nuclear tests quickened the pace of government approval of foreign investment proposals in an endeavour to compensate for the fall in official aid f lows and to strengthen the business lobby abroad against the sanctions” (249). Yet, foreign investments had been welcomed even earlier. In fact, soon after taking power, before the atomic tests, Finance Minister Jaswant Singh had assured multinationals that they had “nothing to fear” and that the party would “deepen, broaden and accelerate reforms” (qtd. in Nayar 248). Indeed, the party subsequently implemented the radical measure of allowing foreign companies to invest in the insurance
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industry at an astonishingly “high level of 40 per cent equity” (Nayar 251). This was a position the BJP had adamantly opposed while in opposition. The BJP was, in effect, playing the cards of nation and capital for different groups. While national pride soared in the days following the nuclear weapons tests, the BJP was simultaneously admitting foreign capital into what were then protected, nationalized industries. By March 2001, “the government lifted quantitative restrictions (QRs) on the import of almost all products ranging from consumer items to agricultural and capital goods” (Lakha 86). The Western powers, despite their unease with the nuclear drum-beating, were placated by these moves. They saw a state that, despite its military posturing, was quite happy to allow foreign capital into hitherto-protected economic spheres. Thus the BJP’s Vision Document of 2004, primarily a document stating the party’s platform for the coming elections, has to be seen in the light of this increasingly overt adoption and acceleration of economic reforms after the BJP became the party in power. My analysis of this document will focus on the multiple ways in which the BJP attempts to create a citizen subject in whom contrasting and competing notions of class, caste, gender, and religion are projected. I will demonstrate that although the document purports to pose an inclusive subject, the BJP’s version of the Indian subject is primarily a middle- or upper-middleclass, high-caste Hindu male. He is a nationalist, proud of his Hindu culture, and a supporter of economic reform. An interesting feature of the document is the blurring of this subject’s adherence to a nationalist identity and religious insularity with his advocacy for liberalization and globalism. A close reading of this document reveals many of the contradictions in the BJP project and illuminates the complexities of constructing a consumer subject. One of the twenty-five “highlights” of this document is a “further broadening and deepening of economic reforms,” though these will be “based on a self-reliant approach” (Vision Document 2). Along with this goal is the more ambiguous aim to “[enrich] our human resources . . . and [to turn] our young population into a huge opportunity in the era of globalization” (2). One wonders whose opportunity this process is enhancing. Throughout the document there are calls to assert national pride and a claim that “India is poised for a great leap forward” (4). According to the framers of the document, “the two main issues of Election 2004 are good governance and accelerated all-round development” (6, my emphasis). Anything that smacks of “underdevelopment” is characterized as “negativism.” The document claims that unlike past
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governments, the “BJP is committed to making India a Developed Nation and a Great Power on the global stage” (6). Development is not defined in terms of the benefits it offers for the people—benefits that would actually improve the quality of their lives—but rather as a means to gain global power and respect. Once again this power and development will emerge from a commitment to “Swadeshi, the philosophy of India First, and to the path of self-reliance. Swadeshi means faith in indigenous institutions and a strong belief that the future of India must be secured by Indians themselves” (8). This can be achieved by “further reforming our economy” and by the “banishment of poverty by increasing our national wealth” (9). The cause-and-effect relationship between reform and national enrichment, of course, is never explained, but here the BJP echoes the reigning credo of neoliberalism: a reformed economy—one that embraces global capital—is a successful one. However, the document is unable to elide the anxieties at the heart of this project. So, for instance, even while baldly suggesting that “wealth creation should be applauded and encouraged,” it is quickly asserted that “conspicuous consumption goes against the cultural ethos of India” (10). Likewise, the fundamental tension between encouraging the minimally regulated accumulation of wealth and criticizing existing economic inequities exists throughout the document as issues of “social welfare,” “justice,” and “the alleviation of poverty” are acknowledged, even as the interests of capital remain in the forefront. The section on “poverty alleviation,” for example, calls for “more private investment in backward and rural areas,” for “deepen[ing] rural markets,” for “self-employment,” and for “distribution of surplus-land and making the rural poor partners in the development of wasteland” (12–13). Despite the promising sound of “distribution of surplus land,” all of these statements of course include code words for increased privatization and a recasting of rural livelihoods to suit the “development” interests of corporations. If there remains any doubt in readers’ minds about the party’s commitment to the interests of capital, the document makes clear that the government will create conditions that will meet the “low cost capital needs of businesses . . . and, above all” will provide “maximum government facilitation with minimum government interference” (14, my emphasis). Somehow the interests of the poor are to be supported even while the government is steadfastly retreating from any regulation of the accumulation of wealth. The unabashed support for economic reform also requires the construction of a particular kind of Indian citizen. The BJP is best known
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for promoting the interests of Hindu, upper-caste men, but once again, I am going to focus on the often overlapping class elements of this new subject as a way to highlight its economic dimensions. For instance, one way the BJP proposes to address the employment problem is to enhance the “employability of students and youth, and create an aptitude for self-employment and entrepreneurship” (17). This “aptitude” or natural inclination for “self-employment and entrepreneurship” reinforces the government’s separation from any responsibility to actually provide the conditions for people to acquire jobs. Also, the class elements of this enterprise are evident, since it is not the children of the upper classes who will have to acquire this aptitude. This aptitude, once acquired, opens the path for economic opportunity. Education policies, thus, will aim to anchor citizens “strongly in human values and Indian culture, reinforc[ing] their patriotism, and equip[ping] them to explore opportunities both in India and abroad” (18). Here, there is an assertion of an interesting combination of the national and the global. On the one hand, a narrow culturalist agenda will apparently be enforced, so that Indian students will be provided an education that will rectify “biases in history education, increasing the cultural content in syllabi, and restoring the neglected focus on character-building” (18). On the other hand, citizens will “explore opportunities both in India and abroad” (18). The class exclusivity of “exploring” opportunities abroad does not need further elaboration. The class dimension is reinforced because the citizen of the new economy, despite being linked by the so-called eternal qualities of “Indianness, Bharatiya and Hindutva” (7) has to be part of a neoliberal landscape comprised of a “democracy of stakeholders” (17). Since “less than 2 per cent of Indians are retail investors . . . the base of investment in equities must be broadened” (17). Democracy is explicitly linked to the interests of the market, and individuals must put their faith in the new culture of investment that is directly linked to democracy. In this form of “democracy,” government must step aside to “free” the individual. Indeed, the “principal aspect of Congress misrule” was to cause “the government to enter every sphere of our national life, excessively enlarging the ordinary citizen’s interface with the public authority. The overload of the government has led to inefficiency, harassment, and corruption” (21). The BJP will, instead, “make the government’s principal role that of a facilitator and creator of the necessary environment for the creative energies of the people to find full expression” and to remove “all non-financial barriers to economic growth” (22). The effort here is to construct a citizen whose national and cultural identities
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are never at odds with his or her own economic interests or the interests of the market. Swadeshi is a veil that covers the class-specific attempt to redefine citizenship so that a consuming, “free” subject is empowered to become part of the larger global project of the accumulation of wealth. As Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd put it in another context, in India, we see a “fetishized version of tradition through which a distinct people is to be interpellated by the nation-state. State nationalism then seeks to mask the contradictions that reemerge between formal political independence and economic dependence (the contradictions of neocolonialism) and to contain the excess of alternatives released by the decolonizing forces of which it was a part” (9–10). In India, a rich tradition of decolonization and the presence of leftist movements rooted in class-based resistance to capitalist dictates are alternatives that have to be countered by appealing to fetishized, depoliticized traditions. What these calls for traditions and culture mask is, of course, a specific class project that poses a privatized notion of citizenship. The wedding of tradition to the enhancement of these new forms of neocolonialism requires “new forms of political subjectivity” (Lowe and Lloyd 13), and unlike the claims of the document for inclusiveness (farmers, students, entrepreneurs, etc), the class specificity of the project implies that “[n]ew middle class identities and practices have begun to reconstitute the meaning and boundaries of citizenship by reproducing and intensifying exclusions based on hierarchies such as caste, religion, and gender” (Fernandes, India’s New Middle Class 187). In this scenario, the “middle class consumer-citizen is in effect the new ‘common man,’ victimized both by a corrupt and ineffective political system on the one hand and the supposedly privileged and protected poor and working classes on the other” (187). The BJP’s 2004 Vision Document places the new citizen subject very much within this context of exclusivity. Indeed, as is evident in the passages I have cited, the agenda of economic reform is the super template upon which other interests are superimposed and contested. However, the document poses a fragmented and contradictory citizen subject and ultimately cannot eliminate the tensions that are a part of this project. The document is unable to reconcile the conf licting interests between the local and the global, the poor and the rich, the Hindu upper-caste, middle-class male and the many marginalized communities. This document demonstrates that creating the new Indian citizen is a tenuous process, especially given both the BJP’s subsequent failure to win the 2004 elections, and the existing data that shows that a large swath of the middle-class population remain skeptical about the so-called gains of liberalizing economic reforms.12
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Homes and Space The BJP’s attempt to create a new Indian subject, one who is both attached to the nation and linked to global privileges, is echoed and contradicted in the commercial images that have f looded the media landscape. I want to examine a few of these images and ref lect on some of the parallels and dissonances between these state and corporate efforts at subject formation. Let me begin with the most visible sign of liberalization: the construction boom that has seen thousands of luxury apartment buildings, gated communities, and exclusive shopping malls rise up all over metropolitan India, even in smaller cities like Ghaziabad and Raipur. Many of these buildings are located in city outskirts and are being constructed on agricultural land seized from farmers who had lived off these lands for generations. These farmers are usually provided a pittance for their loss, while the government extracts huge profits selling their land to building promoters and other developers. On their land the wealthy now live, guaranteed a comfortable existence, secure in their gated communities. Quite often, as in Noida (in Uttar Pradesh) and Gurgaon (in Haryana), entire townships have been transformed into shopping centers and luxury office and housing complexes. As these buildings have sprouted over the last ten years, billboard advertisements have similarly proliferated, promising a life of ease and luxury in new housing complexes. Indeed, such housing is one of the more overt symbols of the class project of neoliberalism. The new housing colonies represent a new kind of “home,” one that is no longer a mere abode but an emblematic signifier for success, family life, and individual gain. The most persistent soporific for the targeted upper-middle-class citizens is to convince them of the need for “perfect homes,” homes that take them away from all the pressures of modern life. The homes advertised on urban billboards are depicted as oases in the desert. Their location, in the outskirts of cities, is touted as a safe haven away from the hustle and bustle of urban life. Offering every luxury for the resident, including proximity to schools and shopping malls, these homes are, of course, much more than brick and mortar. They are edifices around which a neoliberal dream has been constructed, and a direct passport to the global. Thus they are not merely habitations; they offer a lifestyle that, in the mind of the Indian consumer, closely resembles the one enjoyed by their aff luent NRI cousins and residents in the North. Indeed, many of these developments are directly marketed to visiting non-resident Indians with the suggestion that they can enjoy exactly the same standard of living
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in their native country but with a national, uniquely Indian f lavor. In advertisements and on webpages, not only do these homes promise to provide comfort and a lifestyle that emulates one enjoyed by a transnational upper middle class, they also seem to offer a haven from the unseemly detritus that is part of the urban landscape. The poor, the landless, the homeless, those whose very presence is a reminder that India continues to be a poor country, ranking 134th on the Human Development Index, are of course absent (United Nations, 145). The faces we see on the billboards are those of the radiant, aff luent, and Westernized minority. Consider this billboard image placed in the lively office and shopping area of Camac Street in South Kolkata in 2006 (see fig. 2.1). The presence of major upscale department stores (Westside, Pantaloons), the British Embassy, airline offices, and restaurants, and proximity to an upper-middle-class commercial hub, Park Street, makes this billboard a perfect site for advertising high-end items. The depiction of a young, attractive NRI woman against the backdrop of plush apartment housing may seem unremarkable at first glance.
Figure 2.1
Rosedale NRI
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However, there are some important points in this image regarding ideas of citizenship. For instance, the slogan, “Touch Your Origin,” is obviously intended for an audience of NRIs, expressing a typical desire for a specific, Indian home, but the depiction of a tower block suggests a globalized “everywhere,” which might be in Hong Kong, in the US, or in Dubai. The local and the global intermingle in this image. The web address and the toll-free US telephone number confirm that these apartments are for an exclusive clientele. A quick visit to the website provides a glimpse of the “home” that is being created: “Home is a dream” was the basis on which these projects are being built. The project pegged at 100 million US dollars aims to match international standards. The main objective behind creating these landmarks is to provide the residents of Kolkata a home that is free of noise and air pollution, a place where they can rejuvenate themselves and spend some ref lective moments in peace and tranquility. After all, according to Alferd [sic] Lord Tennyson, “Home is where the heart is.” (“Rosedale: Touch Your Origins”) This privatized space of “peace and tranquility” is, of course, more than just a home. It is a way to create a new kind of consumer citizen who is very much like his counterpart in the West. He is at once of the city, and free of its constraints. Yet, meaning cannot be contained within the image and spills out into the surrounding space. Since, obviously, the majority of people viewing this image are not NRIs, what does this image, which so obviously excludes the Indian citizen (“homes by NRIs for NRIs”), say about citizenship? And what does the use of a Tennyson quotation to evoke an Indian homeland say about the ironies of globalization? I would propose that within this configuration of home and the NRI, the Indian citizen is an unsettled signifier. The presence of a glamorous other simultaneously suggests to the resident citizens both a realization and a postponement of the neoliberal dream. A small minority may view this image as an evocation of a possibility, but since this dream of global comfort is out of reach for the vast majority of those viewing the image, the advertisement underlines the enormous class divide that is part of the struggle to construct a new Indian. Another 2006 billboard advertisement in Kolkata, at the same location, also makes this point clear (see fig. 2.2). In the graphic, a cluster of cartoonish high-rise buildings are surrounded by slogans, and indeed the text of the advertisements appears more prominent than the
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Figure 2.2 South City
buildings themselves; it is almost as though the buildings are irrelevant. It is what they signify that matters. South City wants its residents to “live the way the world does,” and one way to realize this ideal is to make sure that their consumption needs are readily satisfiable: with “schools, shopping malls, clubs, theatres.” In fact, the graphic, though small, depicts a “slice” of a world, with buildings on a sloping horizon: South City is simultaneously a piece of the global pie and a “mini” world in itself, offering a fantasy of the “best” of the actual world. An overt claim, too, is that the actual city—Kolkata—is peripheral, perhaps unnecessary, and remote. As in the previous example, no reference is made to the actual metropolis. The ephemeral “New Town” and “South City” are of the city and yet outside of it, just as these abodes are of the West but also situated within a sanitized local context. What is suggested in these texts is that the new Indian can have the life of his or her Western counterparts and be sheltered from all the unpleasant elements of Indian urban life. Of course, noise and pollution are not all that is being banished from this space. More importantly, it is the people, those unwashed masses, who are being cast off. After all, how
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can the new Indian really be like his Western counterpart, if he or she is reminded at every turn that he lives in a nation of predominantly poor people? One way to erase the people is to constantly call up the global. Consider this 2007 advertisement on a billboard in central New Delhi that announces a housing complex, Palm Springs, developed by Emaar MGF (see fig. 2.3). The site of this billboard is an exclusive area of Delhi, a city where poor people continue to be displaced by the demolition of their homes. The projected Spanish-villa-type homes accompany the corporate logo, “Creating a New India.” The company home page clarifies what this New India is about: Emaar MGF is looking at building new-age integrated townships and communities that will bring about a lifestyle change in India. These townships planned across the country will include apartments, residential plots, town houses and villas along with convenient shopping complexes, landscaped parks, civic facilities & amenities. Residents of these townships will also have access to world class facilities such as medical care, education and recreation. In addition to this, each of these communities will have Strip Malls with a wide mix of entertainment and branded retails, which will give a vibrant zing to a world class ambience of suburban living. (“Emaar MGF: Creating a New India”) The New India apparently is all about providing the new Indian with the “world class ambience of suburban living.” Once again, the local is simultaneously affirmed and denied through “world class facilities” and a “lifestyle change.” As in the building projects in Kolkata, the national can be pronounced only through an act of disavowal. Like the Rosedale homes outside Kolkata, these homes are located outside the city, in Gurgaon, which is now a Delhi suburb. This image is characterized as much by what it says as what it leaves unsaid. What does
Figure 2.3
Emaar MGF
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one make of the strange dissonance of selling a Southern California lifestyle in a tropical country? The Spanish-style villas and the name “Palm Springs” are bringing “the global way of life” to India. Setting aside the question of what sort of “globality” a Southern California suburban lifestyle represents, globality here, as before, can apparently be achieved with a material transaction that never has to turn its back on home. Ironically, then, the New India here positions the new Indian in a way that leaves the subject homeless in quite a different way—in f lux, grounded in and by space, but also outside of it. Youth and Community Another obvious and potent group for subject formation is of course the much-valued youth demographic. Just as the BJP’s Vision Document 2004 trumpets the idealism, patriotism, and entrepreneurial “spirit” of this group, the corporate media constructs similarly idealized youth figures, celebrating the so-called skills and energies of this group. For this portion of my analysis, I will examine a special 2007 issue of a leading national magazine, India Today, to highlight one example of the media’s construction and representation of Indian youth in the Englishlanguage print media. This issue makes the claim that “young Indians, with everything except time, are taming technology and redefining home entertainment with their mobile phones, laptops, and TV screens” (Rajkhowa 45). The article, accompanied by glossy photographs of young, attractive, urban, upper-middle-class men and women, goes on to say that as “540 million Indians between the age of 18 and 34 take charge of a new, globalised India, they are seeing a never-before boom in careers” (45). Of course, the writer never seeks to provide any accompanying evidence of this so-called career boom, nor is there any attempt to acknowledge the crisis of unemployment—including youth unemployment—that is the reality of contemporary India.13 This omission is not a surprise, especially given the tone of the main editorial. The current group of youngsters, according to the editor, Aroon Purie, is “the first generation that has been born or grown up in relative aff luence. They have never known scarcity. . . . What’s more, by 2015 nearly 60 per cent of Indians will have been born post-reforms—they will carry none of the legacy their parents did.” Yet this erasure of history has not apparently “altered their essential Indianness” (1). The amazing statement that half a billion Indians, people born mostly in the 1980s, have “never known scarcity” perhaps offers some indication of
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the ideological mindset of a section of the respected mainstream media. Even if one accepts the upper-middle-class demographic assumed but not articulated in this article, one would need to acknowledge that these young people face significant obstacles to success. For instance, competition has increased markedly for places in the Indian colleges and universities that qualify young people for professional careers, and graduates of even the most prestigious institutions can find it difficult to secure entry-level positions in their field. In offering the hope that history or the negatively weighted legacy of their parents will be swept aside by the forces of liberalization, the editor mimics a gesture that is characteristic of neoliberal ideology. Even though Francis Fukuyama may now be less sure of his claims about the “end of history,” Aroon Purie is convinced that liberalization has wiped the slate clean. In providing “evidence” for its conclusions, the magazine cites a poll based on 2,846 respondents, all of whom are located in metropolitan areas. The poll is replete with personalized, consumer-oriented details about the young Indian subject. Questions are confined to issues about money, work, technology, sexual choices, leisure practices, faith, and the media, and while these are serious issues, they are treated frivolously as mere lifestyle “choices.” Forty-five percent of the respondents strongly agree with the statement that “money is a very important source of happiness” (Dravid 72). Meanwhile, 65 percent “agree that a person’s physique makes him or her fashionable” (68). Apparently 70 percent own a cell phone, and 52 percent are willing to take a loan in order to buy a house. The magazine is also at pains to suggest that young people are generally traditional (84 percent of women want to live with their in-laws after marriage; 90 percent think women should not smoke) but at the same time globally connected: 50 percent have access to the Internet, either at home or through cyber cafes (49). Nowhere in this mishmash of “information” are there any questions or conclusions regarding war and militarism, the environment, social injustice, or the ethics of wealth accumulation. Liberalization and its benefits for the young are already assumed realities. It is instructive to contrast the findings of this poll with the conclusions of a more neutral polling organization, Lokniti.14 In a poll funded by the Hindu-CNN-IBN in 2007, more attention was paid to the class dynamics of young Indians. Unlike the India Today poll, responses for this State of the Nation Survey were gathered from “833 locations across the country,” ref lecting the “social profile of the rest of society” (Yadav and Kumar, “The Youth” 12). This statement is, of course, intended as a critique of exclusive polls such as the previous
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one that focus on privileged classes in urban areas, and it means that the respondents included Hindus, Muslims, Dalits, and Adivasis. Rather than making frivolous overgeneralizations, Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar draw on the relative sophistication of the design of the study to reach their conclusions, the most obvious being that the “urban/rural divide, class, gender, caste and community” are important determinants in the respondents’ attitudes toward social and economic questions (12). In contrast to the India Today poll and its glossy references to Indians’ “taming technology,” the authors here conclude that “[o]nly one out of six Indian youth has a personal mobile phone or a two-wheeler—possibly the two most coveted consumer goods. Only three per cent have an internet connection at home” (12). Purie’s celebratory comments on the loss of an earlier generation’s legacy seem to be realized, but with no cause for celebration: “Forty percent failed to identify the year in which India became independent. And threefourths had not heard of the Emergency” (12). In general, the findings demonstrate that class “conditions aspirations.” These aspirations may also be connected to the young Indian’s relations to the nation. For instance, “the rural and urban poor reject giving up citizenship more strongly. The urban well-to-do is more prepared to do so” (12). What makes this poll somewhat persuasive is not merely its more inclusive design; the responses also highlight some of the social contradictions that counter the pat declarations of the India Today poll. For instance, even though a majority of respondents “think India will remain united, secular, and emerge as a superpower . . . nearly two-thirds are anxious about their employment and career” (12). The anxieties of young Indians are rarely ref lected in the media images of the new Indian that are seen all over the country. However, these images are as much about suppressing those anxieties as about conjuring up a fantasy of a way of life. The bright, cheerful, fair, upper-caste, and upper-class subjects of advertisements and the India Today feature are a fragment of the neoliberal imaginary. The advocates of the new Indian subject reiterate that the citizen is now remade in a new light, outside the forces of history, embracing the national and the global in an attempt to live in the everlasting present. Television and Gender While media and political images of the new Indian citizen predominantly pose a male subject, the en-gendering of the New Indian Woman
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is also an important element in the construction of the neoliberal imaginary. After all, neoliberalism’s logic of equating individual advancement with capitalist regimes of accumulation means that, when women are considered at all, a whole narrative has to be constructed around their apparent emancipation. Neoliberal television advertisements link a superficial idea of emancipation to the commodity economy in a way that goes beyond mere access to commodities. After all, as the retail and service economy brings middle-class women into low-paying jobs, and as housewives themselves are responsible for considerable spending, women have to be convinced, in general, about the benefits of the new economy and encouraged to buy various commodities. While I will not pause here to address the many ramifications of the political economy of women’s roles in contemporary India (I will discuss these ramifications in greater detail in chapter 4), I will mention that as the informal economy continues to boom, women remain unprotected by labor laws and other government regulations. Furthermore, as public subsidies have been reduced, more and more women have borne the burden of supporting their households, especially in rural India where this responsibility is ever increasing. Many rural women have been forced into wage labor as a result of their displacement from agricultural land. Advertising, of course, fails to represent these difficulties, covering up contradictions, and television (especially its advertisements) can play a vital role in enhancing the neoliberal rituals of consumption. Television viewers have greatly increased in the last ten years. According to recent figures, “sixty percent of Indian households, approximately 119 million, have a television, and 42 percent of these have cable service” (Kamdar 57). Add to these numbers the fact that the state’s denationalization of the television industry has vastly increased the number of commercial channels. On-air advertising time and advertising revenue have reached astronomical proportions.15 As television viewers and television advertising have increased, television programming and advertising have increasingly become a site for the representation of a new middle-class identity. As M. Madhava Prasad puts it, “television is increasingly offering to the consumer a site of economic representation, one in which the subject finds him/herself invoked as the member of a class” (119). This class identity is affixed to a transnational self firmly based on the consumption of brand items. However, even as identity becomes transnational, a national self has to be reasserted, so television introduces viewers to “both the patterns of commonly shared cultures of a pan-India and the multiple landscapes
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of difference, defined and dissected as it were according to age, gender and class” (Scrase 332). Thus, like the BJP’s Vision Document 2004, the billboard advertisements, and the India Today poll, television in India simultaneously announces the inauguration of a global culture even as it anxiously reasserts an “authentic” national identity that is sacrosanct and seemingly inviolable. In television advertisements, these conf licts between tradition and modernity and between nationalism and globalization are sometimes negotiated around female gender roles, establishing a particular form of gender identity. As Shoma Munshi puts it, “advertisers have appropriated the discourses of traditional femininity on the one hand and liberating feminist discourses on the other and threaded them around discourses of consumerism. Once channelled through the ideologies of the marketplace, the potentially threatening force of feminism becomes somewhat tamed, being closely linked as it is, to consumerism” (573). According to Munshi, “[a]stutely incorporating both the ideologies of feminism and femininity within consumerist discourses, [advertisers] have synthesized them into a post-feminist image of the ‘New Indian Woman’ ” (586). This ideological project is particularly necessary in Indian social contexts where women have historically been marginalized and deprived of economic opportunities. Not only is it necessary to recreate a notion of the “emancipated” female subject, it is also important to construct a whole set of “needs” that will contribute to the formation of this supposedly liberated subject. Nowhere are these needs more clearly constructed than in television programming and advertising. Fernandes argues that economic reforms and their effects on middle-class consumption “have led to a need for re-fashioning at the individual and collective level, and it seems that television images are providing some of the material and methods which both ref lect and fulfill this need” (93). Increasingly available, television, both as commodity and as a means of promoting the commodity economy, contributes to this re-fashioning. Tejaswini Niranjana has commented on “the intersection of the new electronic media with the state, technology and multinational capital.” She argues that the “particular definition of national . . . and gender identities or the training in consumerism made available by high-tech advertising would not have been possible without the enormously powerful conjuncture of a state power and a technology underwritten by global capital” (“Introduction” 6). It is often the interests of global corporations, after all, that are being underwritten by Indian television; however, as I have argued throughout this chapter, the national and the global are often caught up in
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their own contradictory positions, never quite resolving the tensions that characterize their intersections. These tensions can be illustrated by examining a couple of advertisements that attempt to construct the “new Indian woman,” a subject that can somehow bridge the national and the global. Let us consider two television advertisements for “Fair and Lovely” skin cream, a staple product for many years. The valuing of fair skin is of course not a new phenomenon in India; what is new is how it is now attached to a specific kind of new woman. A Hindi television advertisement for the cream shows a young, middle-class woman, accompanied by her father, both dressed in traditional clothing, arriving at a “modern beauty company,” where they are turned away by a snobbish receptionist in Western dress (see fig. 2.4). As the woman and her father leave the salon, the receptionist scornfully declares that in order for a woman “like that” to become beautiful, she must leave the age of the Vedas, implying that only modernity can release this woman from the shackles of her dark complexion. The father, furious that his daughter and his culture are the objects of such scorn, returns home with his daughter and unlocks a traditionally carved wooden chest that holds all the Ayurvedic age-old remedies that are available to whiten the skin. The chest is a symbol for the powers
Figure 2.4
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Fair and Lovely ad, Father and Daughter
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rooted in national traditions, which will aid the young woman in her confrontations with modernity. Significantly, it is a man, the father, who unlocks the chest and hands her this magical remedy. Soon a transformed, lighter young woman strides confidently by herself, returning to the salon where she attracts the attention of a young man who can only say, “What a face!” She is then shown alighting from a private jet to be met by f lashes from photographers’ cameras (see fig. 2.5). In this representation, the traditional Indian product ostensibly trumps the “modern,” notwithstanding the inevitable tensions between multinational capital and national tradition. After all, Fair and Lovely is produced by Unilever, a multinational company. The connections and contradictions between class, capital, and nation are also evident in other ways. As I mentioned, the Indian woman who arrives at the salon with her father appears to hail from a middle-class family. However, the magic of the commodity automatically elevates the woman’s class status even as it strips away one traditional marker of her class, caste, and Indian identity—her dark skin. The newly fair and lovely woman now wears an elegant but casual “Indo-Western” ensemble. She sports white (Western) trousers and a close-fitting, modern kurta with a short chiffon dupatta worn in the modern style: thrown over one shoulder. The modesty of her previous attire and demeanor has vanished. Initially, in her visit to the salon,
Figure 2.5
Fair and Lovely ad, “What a face”
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she appeared reserved and demure in public, cocooning herself in the pallu of her sari; now, emerging from the aircraft, she descends confidently to the small crowd of photographers and admirers, head high and shoulders back, and her kurta’s scooped neck and split hem reveal the contours of her bosom and hips. The f lowing dupatta is a mere accessory, trailing elegantly behind her but concealing nothing. The hybrid nature of this attire is of course worth noting, as it signals that the new Indian woman embraces globalization without leaving valuable Indian traditions behind. The advertisement closes, in fact, with a shot of the father and daughter seated together at home on the swing—a shot mirroring the advertisement’s opening shot and differing only in the young woman’s transformed appearance and attire. Tradition here is not opposed to modernity; it persists. Indeed, it is a supplement that aligns the new Indian woman with her interests, especially in terms of access to status, fame, wealth, and admiration from men. Other points are worth mentioning in relation to this advertisement. For instance, there are irresolvable tensions between the power the woman gains in this transformation and her increased vulnerability. She ostensibly achieves a certain independence, gains freedom of movement, and asserts her sexuality, but she simultaneously increases her exposure to the male gaze. A mixed audience that includes parents of young women might find the late image of the woman—alone, independent, faced with a life in an “unprotected” environment— somewhat unsettling. It is precisely the need to allay such anxieties that the final shot reunites the woman with her father. Interestingly, in one respect, the traditional and the modern representation of the woman match: the advertisement reaffirms the regressive notion that for an Indian woman, a curvaceous body and light, conventionally attractive facial features are the keys to success. Thus, although the tradition/modernity binary is deployed quite frequently in advertising images, it is a binary that sometimes enhances the contradictions that are part of creating the image of the new Indian woman. With many global companies now tapping into and creating a large market for beauty products like Fair and Lovely, these contradictions have become particularly pronounced. In a recent article in the New York Times, Heather Timmons, ignoring the complex global ties of “local” companies, points out that in India, “Avon, L’Oréal, Ponds, Garnier, the Body Shop and Jolen are selling lightening products and all of them face fierce competition from a local giant Fair and Lovely, a Unilever product that has
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dominated the market for decades” (C5). Timmons adds that “In a sign of the times, the company’s ads [Fair and Lovely’s] show lighter skin conferring a different advantage: helping a woman land a job normally held by men. . . . ‘Fair and Lovely: The Power of Beauty,’ is the tagline of the company’s newest ad” (C5). This point is borne out in another television advertisement for this product, which shows a young woman who is an aspiring cricket commentator. She recalls practicing while at school, at cricket matches, and while watching televised matches, apparently unsuccessful in her goal (the game itself is represented as an entirely male preserve), until her sister replaces the television remote that she is using as a microphone with a tube of Fair and Lovely cream. Soon she successfully auditions for a network and is hired to break into the world of cricket broadcasting, which is also a traditionally male preserve. The message is clear: with a little help from the right product, women now can have access to new economic opportunities in traditionally male-dominated fields. Moreover, in a sign of the modern age, it is implied that women do not seek to acquire fair skin merely to find suitable husbands. Now they apparently do it for self-advancement, though the admiring gaze of men is still highlighted in the advertisement. In these advertisements, we see an intermingling of the traditional with the new. The choice of cricket is also significant because it is at once the most “Indian” of sports, as well as increasingly a global multimillion-dollar media event. In this global world, a woman must continue to be fair and thus beautiful—the two are unfailingly linked—in order to succeed, but the terms of her success are more in tune with the ethos of neoliberal self-advancement. She uses her beauty to achieve individual goals. As Shoma Munshi points out, “[i]n interpellating the users of these products as ‘new’ women, advertisements provide an appealing self-image and social identity for women, and circulate a normative model of goals and ideals to be pursued in the quest for an ‘Indian modernity’ ” (578). These “normative” models, however, assume that the category of “newness” is already complete and always stable rather than in continual tension with existing identity formations. Further troubling the binaries of the traditional and the new, the national and the global, the newer global companies have recruited homegrown talent to sell their products. The ubiquitous Aishwarya Rai and Sonam Kapur are the face of L’Oréal, and company executives are quick to point out that they are not creating a market, but instead tapping into an existing one. As Timmons reports, Didier Villanueva,
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the country manager for L’Oréal India, feels that the “idea of ‘glowing fairness’ has nothing to do with colonialism, or idealization of European looks. . . . ‘It’s as old as India,’ he said, and ‘deeply rooted in the culture’ ” (C5). “L’Oréal’s super-high-end Vichy line . . . the main advertising image in Asia shows a woman unzipping her blemished, darker face to reveal a light, even-toned one within” (Timmons C5). Apparent in these different advertisements are various forms of interpellation for the new Indian woman. The struggles between these companies signify a range of attempts at subject formation. In my readings of the representations of the new Indian woman, I have attempted to unravel the layers of subjectivity based on class, caste, and a globalized notion of the feminine. One way toward a deeper understanding of the issues involved is to consider the ways in which femininity becomes a transaction to suit different commercial and ideological ends. So, for instance, in order to allay middle-class anxieties about sexual liberation, advertisers take recourse in forms of “tradition” that are reassuring to a wide array of citizens and consumers, such as in the Fair and Lovely advertisements. On the other hand, they are also interested in creating a need for products that are becoming readily available, so calls for self-empowerment, advancement, and “choices” have to be negotiated in the language of the new economy. We see similar struggles in the BJP’s Vision Document and in the images focusing on home; however, it is the gendered subject that invokes some of the greatest tensions in attempting to reconcile the contradictory pulls of class, capital, culture, and nation. Of course, accompanying all the images of self-advancement for women are the realities of gender politics in the media that never quite transcend the realm of the exploitative. If the new economy has created more “opportunities” for women, the objectified, overtly sexualized female body has become much more of a regular element in the selling of products. Scantily clad models, a rarity in the age before liberalization, now sell everything from cars to fast-food products. In the new economy, women’s empowerment is inextricably linked with the commodification of women’s bodies. In attempting to construct the new Indian woman, however, certain tensions refuse to be reconciled. For instance, the conf lict between domesticity and opportunity remains unresolved, as does the desire to embrace tradition and the national in concert with modernity and the global. Since modernity is equated with economic gain and an enhanced class status, there is also an effort by advertisers to suppress a
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latent fear that such changes could create a woman who challenges the structure of the patriarchal family. In the first Fair and Lovely advertisement discussed above, for instance, in the final frame, the “new” woman is with her father once again, despite her ascension to stardom. This reassertion with tradition is ever more pertinent since the new economic reforms have created a booming service economy, which requires a greater supply of labor; women are increasingly entering the labor market and becoming a vital part of domestic financial arrangements. These changes, especially at the lower end of the class ladder, where women’s incomes are crucial for a family’s financial security, have opened up ways to trouble ideas of domesticity and tradition. Studying these images allow us a glimpse at this new subject, one whose f luidity, despite the claims of the dominant culture, defies easy definition. Conclusion By examining a range of texts, I have tried to point out varying efforts within the dominant ideology to construct a new Indian citizen. Clearly, this is a process that is far from complete and is constantly open to the shifting vectors of class, caste, and gender. It is my suggestion that this process is perpetually tenuous and unstable, partially because of the persistent resistance to the program of economic reforms, which presents a constant oppositional other to the hegemonic constructions of citizen, but also because the link between consumption and citizenship breaks down as class privilege remains elusive for a majority of Indians. Moreover, the ongoing tension between the assertion of nation and the functional colonization by Western capital poses an irresolvable problem. Within this dialectic of the dominant and the resistant, subjectivity is constantly shifting, disrupting attempts to construct a singular notion of citizenship. However, as Fernandes reminds us, this process remains important because The emergence of a new middle class model of consumer-citizenship points us to an understanding of the ways in which economic liberalization has resulted in an expansion of political space for the urban middle class to redefine the terms of democratic politics. In other words, the political assertion of this middle class unfolds through everyday discursive, cultural, spatial, and organizational practices that seek to define the terms of citizenship
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and, implicitly, of Indian democracy within the sphere of civil society. (189) What must be stressed is that this middle-class “redefinition” of citizenship functions in conjunction with the continuing dispossession of India’s poor. The specter of “society” that Thatcher so feared cannot be eliminated from the privatized imaginary in which the new Indian subject is placed.
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CH A P T E R
T H R E E
The Prompter’s Whisper: The National Imaginary and the Cosmopolitan Subject in Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land and The Hungry Tide
In March of 2001, Indian writer Amitav Ghosh withdrew his novel The Glass Palace from the list of contenders for the ₤10,000 Commonwealth Writers’ Prize. Ghosh’s letter to Sandra Vince, the Prizes Manager of the Commonwealth Foundation, eloquently stated his reasons for withdrawing his nomination: So far as I can determine, The Glass Palace is eligible for the Commonwealth Prize partly because it was written in English and partly because I happen to belong to a region that was once conquered and ruled by Imperial Britain. Of the many reasons why a book’s merits may be recognized these seem to me to be the least persuasive. . . . I feel that I would be betraying the spirit of my book if I were to allow it to be incorporated within that particular memorialization of Empire that passes under the rubric of “the Commonwealth.” (“Ghosh Letter”) In refusing to be considered for a prize that has had among its notable winners postcolonial literary stalwarts such as Peter Carey, Earl Lovelace, Rohinton Mistry, and Vikram Seth, Ghosh stakes out a position that is distinctive in a number of ways. First, he makes a direct link between the historical injustices of colonialism and present-day forms of cultural imperialism ref lected in the practices of Western literary
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institutions. Secondly, he lays bare the fundamental hypocrisy of the funders of the prize, the Commonwealth Foundation, an organization that claims to promote “democracy” and yet continues to assert the global hegemony of English. Finally, he places center-stage the connections between politics and writing, links that are routinely elided in the upper echelons of literary competitions.1 Of course, most readers of Ghosh would not be surprised by his thoughtful anticolonial stance. In over twenty years of writing, he has consistently commented on and fashioned narratives out of the violence of the colonial encounter and the severe forms of disjuncture that have come out of a relationship based on inequity and injustice. He has been no less harsh about the failures of postcolonial India in works such as Countdown, in which he critiques the country’s aspirations to be a nuclear power. Trained as a social anthropologist at Oxford, Ghosh arrived on the postcolonial literary stage in the mid-1980s along with a slew of new Indian writers. A generation born during the heady years after independence, the group included Upamanyu Chatterjee, Salman Rushdie, I. Allan Sealy, Vikram Seth, and Shashi Tharoor, among others. All of them wrote in English, and unlike an earlier generation of writers, these young writers rapidly acquired an international literary reputation as a result of their historical place within a larger transnational circuit of writers who were literary innovators and whose works fitted broadly into a cosmopolitan aesthetic of storytelling as pastiche.2 Ghosh, however, is not so easily located within this group. Although trained at the elite New Delhi college St. Stephens, and though a holder of an Oxford degree, he is also a member of the culturally eclectic Bengali bourgeoisie. As the first, and in some ways the most ardent, inheritors of British traditions, the Bengali middle class has had a historically ambivalent relationship with British culture. Nowhere is this ambivalence more apparent than in the figures of the Bengali Renaissance of the nineteenth century. Many of the notable figures during this time, such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Michael Madhusudhan Dutt, Raja Rammohun Roy, Debandranath Tagore, and his son, Rabindranath Tagore, were direct beneficiaries of British rule. Some possessed large tracts of property; others, like Roy, were deeply critical of their own Hindu traditions, while Dutt was a convert to Christianity. However, despite their allegiance to and engagement with the terms of British modernity and “progress,” many of them were also committed anticolonials. They were, in modern parlance, cosmopolitans insofar as they drew on eclectic literary, cultural, and political traditions, were dedicated to some notion of an indigenous
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participatory democracy, rejected orthodox religious dictates, and believed in a civic society based on rational, Enlightenment values. Ghosh has written about this moment of cultural rebirth in Bengal, specifically in the context of his own lineage as a novelist in contemporary times. In his essay “The Testimony of My Grandfather’s Bookcase,” he cites the example of the nineteenth-century Bengali writer Bankim Chandra Chatterjee as a way to argue that the novelist is always a cosmopolitan. A young Ghosh absorbed the aura of a transliterary tradition that manifested itself symbolically in the bookcase of his grandfather. As Ghosh puts it, “it is the very vastness and cosmopolitanism of the fictional bookcase that requires novelists to locate themselves in relation to it, that demands of their work that it carry marks to establish their location” (“The March of the Novel” 119). Chatterjee’s cosmopolitanism, however, did not prevent him from being a committed nationalist, deeply immersed in the politics of anticolonialism. Ghosh’s anticolonial credentials, likewise, are well marked, especially in works such as In an Antique Land, where he indicts the violence of Western colonialism for disrupting the world of accommodations that was the life of the Indian Ocean communities prior to the arrival of the European powers. We also see the dark shadow of colonialism falling on the lives of his protagonists in novels such as The Shadow Lines, The Calcutta Chromosome, and The Glass Palace. Unlike his nationalist literary predecessors, however, Ghosh, living in the age of neoliberal capitalism, has a more ambiguous relation to the nation-state than Chatterjee and his contemporaries. For Ghosh, the postcolonial nationstate is implicated in the politics of communalism and in the suppression of difference. Indeed, majoritarian claims to nation and religious orthodoxy are often linked in his works. This is a theme that has been a consistent element of Ghosh’s writings from his first novel, The Circle of Reason, to his most recent essays and The Sea of Poppies. His protagonists are often homeless wanderers, cosmopolitan subjects (Zindi and Alu in The Circle of Reason, Ila in The Shadow Lines, Rajkumar in The Glass Palace, and Piya in The Hungry Tide, for example), who have to seek connections outside the bounds of nation or faith. However, even as Ghosh seeks to destabilize the modernist text of violence and appropriation that is the legacy of colonialism, he is also inevitably embedded in the cosmopolitan politics of a secular modernism, a project that is connected to the nationalist project of decolonization.3 A further complication arises as a result of Ghosh’s belief in a transnational civic space that may override the restrictions imposed by nations. These spaces are often inhabited by wanderers, border-
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crossers, and transgressors, searching for unconventional “homes” and alliances with other nomads. It would appear that Ghosh views this space as an oppositional sphere, perhaps one that is even outside the circuits of predatory global capital, but as I will attempt to demonstrate in my reading of In an Antique Land and The Hungry Tide, such a sphere may be overwhelmed by the force of its own contradictions. Indeed, in imagining such a space, Ghosh may unwittingly find himself allied with the goals of neoliberal globalization, an economic and cultural order that he deplores. Adherents of neoliberal globalization, after all, are constantly promoting the desirability of erasing national and cultural boundaries and regularly encouraging national subjects to become “global citizens.”4 In examining these two works, I will argue that Ghosh’s ambivalence regarding the nation-state and his advocacy of a transnational civic space as well as a cosmopolitan subject as oppositional alternatives to counter the politics of nationalism and contemporary capitalism, exemplified in the new India, results in a fundamental instability in his texts, preventing Ghosh from fully formulating an effective aesthetics of resistance that can move beyond a syncretic transnational idealism, keeping intact the reigning logic of neoliberal capitalism. Cosmopolitanism Now Let me begin by attempting to place Ghosh within the larger global network of cosmopolitan writers. In his historically specific analysis of cosmopolitanism, At Home in the World, Timothy Brennan argues that, in its contemporary incarnation, cosmopolitanism has become “less an analytical category than a normative projection, complementing at once celebratory claims and despairing recognitions” (1–2). Brennan identifies the stock-in-trade claims of this new cosmopolitanism thus: “the death of the nation-state, transculturation (rather than a merely one-sided assimilation), cultural hybridity (rather than a simplistic contrast between the foreign and the indigenous), and a postmodernity (as in the view that consumption is politically exciting, viable, and wholly one’s own)” (2). In a way, Brennan claims, “the [cosmopolitan] thirdworld writer who attains a certain fame plays an intermediary role, the role of ushering-in, critiquing the West, usually in acceptable ways, citing strange names, retelling hidden histories, and doing all this pedagogically” (41). According to Brennan, this new form of cosmopolitanism is particularly hostile to the legacy of decolonization, a legacy
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that problematized and highlighted the unequal dichotomies between the colonizer and the colonized. In a more recent work, Wars of Position, Brennan traces the historical appearance of this concept more precisely: “the proliferation of writing on the theme [cosmopolitanism] is a direct result of the fall of communism, and the groundwork of the concept was provided by cultural approaches to globalization that appeared in social science/humanities crossover journals of the early 1990s—especially Theory, Culture, and Society and Public Culture” (213). Of course, these journals are published in the West, and in effect the critical and creative language of cosmopolitanism is English, and the successful writers are able to craft a vocabulary that is accessible yet imbued with difference. Brennan’s view is supported by Bishnupriya Ghosh’s reading of literary cosmopolitics in her book When Borne Across: Literary Cosmopolitics in the Contemporary Indian Novel. Alluding specifically to Indian writers, Ghosh argues that these writers practice a sort of “global English” that “fracture[s] any prevailing standardized literary English,” but at the “same time, the writers facilitate new passages to India in their wide cosmopolitan address, making the most of the excitement over different Global Englishes” (48). Like Brennan, Bishnupriya Ghosh places the cosmopolitan writer within a larger framework of economic and cultural practices that privilege both difference and access to this difference. I would argue that Amitav Ghosh rests somewhere in between Brennan’s and Bishnupriya Ghosh’s designation of the cosmopolitan writer. While his use of Global English certainly places him in that sphere of postmodernity identified by these critics, Ghosh’s subject matter is often outside the realm of predictable literary material and location. For instance, he frequently writes about “unfashionable” areas of the world that are outside the framework of Western interests (cultural, economic, and political), such as Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, and rural Egypt. He is probably one of the few cosmopolitan writers who is far better known and more widely read in his country of origin than in the West. Unlike those of his Indian compatriots Anita Desai, Kiran Desai, Rohinton Mistry, Salman Rushdie, Arundhati Roy, and Vikram Seth, Ghosh’s books are seldom highlighted in literary magazines. As a writer who is seriously engaged in recovering indigenous histories, he often supports his work with extensive research and a lived knowledge of the vernacular traditions of the area. Yet, as an Indian living in the United States, and as someone who is part of a larger geopolitical hierarchy of English-language writers, he is connected to a privileged network of diasporic cosmopolitan intellectuals.
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Before placing Ghosh within this privileged transliterary tradition, it may be wise to understand how cosmopolitanism acquired its present meaning. Currently our analysis of cosmopolitanism has to be posed against two contending contemporary realities. On the one hand, we live in a world where the United States acts as global judge, jury, and executioner and blithely equates consumer capitalism with the language of universal human rights. To secure these “rights,” the US, as we have seen, acts unilaterally and lethally against any nation or entity that impedes its accumulation of wealth or inhibits its exertion of power. On the other hand, global capitalism in some ways resembles the world that Lenin wrote about in the year preceding the First World War. Wealthy nations are increasingly locked in battles for resources, territory, and cheap labor. Looking back at Lenin’s definition of imperialism, one finds that the richer countries continue to divide the spoils, and imperial wanderings across the globe—albeit through proxy agencies in many cases—are as numerous as ever. Of course, these days the so-called lesser-developed nations are active, if lesser participants, in the global plunder. In this scenario, the US, rather than being the node of imperial activity, is one other element in international transactions, which are always prone to crisis. Both theories of the present, however, do not alter the fact that the international bourgeoisie are dependent on each other in a way that confounds the claims of nation and single-state hegemony. Cosmopolitan writers and critics respond to these contending realities in multiple ways, demonstrating, in my view, their uneasy accommodations to the forces of global power and capital. One stream of “cosmo-criticism” (I use this term for the critics who fall into the school described by Brennan) has been fairly unrelenting in the last fifteen years. Although each critic has his or her distinctive points of entry, critics as diverse as Arjun Appadurai, Anthony Appiah, Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy, and Bruce Robbins have expressed a distaste for the excesses of global capital, but they have also signaled an acceptance of a world where the politics of collective solidarities or of class or nation-based resistance movements are seen more and more as anachronistic. Certainly, the two great anticapitalist traditions of the twentieth century—socialism and leftist decolonization movements, both obviously linked in many cases—are not given any serious consideration as means of resistance in the present. This is particularly true for those scholars and writers who have disavowed the postcolonial nationalist legacy that came out of the decolonization movements beginning roughly with the independence of South Asia in 1947. The oppositional potential of nationalism has been dismissed in large part
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because of the revanchist longings of some nation-states as well as the sad history of many postcolonial nations who have continued to suppress their minority populations with the brutality that they learned at the feet of their colonizers. The success of decolonization movements, especially those that advocated an alternative to neo-colonial capitalism, however, is often ignored in this rush to condemn the failures of nationalism. Unfortunately, these same scholars see such “failures” as proof of the intrinsic limitation of nationalism rather than as part of a historical consequence of the progress of capitalism, especially its evolving ability to forestall revolutionary movements through both violent and nonviolent means. For many of these critics, nationalism as a historical counter to imperialism in our times has thus been replaced with a longing for a benign cosmopolitanism, very often having little to do with the anticapitalist ethos that powered so many decolonization struggles. Indeed, cosmopolitanism is often posed as an alternative to a collective politics emerging from a macro-narrative of any kind, be it based in nation, race, or region. Within this framework, real political resistance to capitalism is replaced by micro-accommodations and gestures of “sly civility” within a capitalist economy. Opposition, then, is confined to localized micro-moments, articulated in forms of subversive adaptation rather than active resistance rooted in the transformative politics of land or wealth redistribution. In their more celebratory moments, some of these critics are convinced that global capitalism has unleashed forces of heterogeneity and creativity that can somehow override the horrible inequities of neoliberal globalization. The mirror image of capitalist excess, according to some of these critics, can be cultural creativity, a world where musicians, writers, and artists are suddenly rid of the chains of tradition, which are burst asunder by the “revolutionary” impulses of globalization. For these critics, the ideal counter to capitalist globalization, then, is the creation of an international civil society and post-national subjects that come together in the magical moment of a borderless world. This is not the internationalist vision of, say, the Third International or of pan-Africanism, both of which, within the critical framework of these artists and critics, were limited by their adherence to some essential identity rooted in class or race. This newly defined civil society is a space, instead, where the ugliness of imperial hegemony and violence is often disavowed even as the language of universal human rights located in free-market ideology is picked up and used for a cosmopolitanism that lauds democracy and free speech. So, cosmopolitanism now is at an impasse: on the one hand, the onslaught of globalization and its
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homogenizing forces has produced an urgency among many intellectuals to conceptualize an international civil society. On the other hand, the call for this society, often embedded in existing structural inequities, has contributed to the erasure of an internationalist anticapitalist tradition, based in decolonization movements, and an unacknowledged acceptance of the ethic of a free-market economy. To some extent, cosmopolitanism has always had a vexed heritage. While this is not the place to trace the lengthy history of cosmopolitanism, it is instructive to understand that in its modern context cosmopolitanism has been conceptualized in very different ways. I want to pay particular attention to its resonance within Marxist thought since many contemporary cosmo-critics position themselves within a leftist tradition. One form of cosmopolitanism in this tradition was seen as a counter to bourgeois nationalism. In this sense, it was a revolutionary notion. Marx made it amply clear that it was only the bourgeoisie that had its own national interests. As famously stated in the Manifesto, the workingman had no country. Since the working people were against the bourgeois nation, they were in a sense cosmopolitan, but this was a communistic cosmopolitanism, which Engels in “The Festival of Nations” distinguishes from “the hypocritical, private-egotistical cosmopolitanism of free trade” (3). As Engels put it: the bourgeoisie in each country has its own special interests, and since these interests are the most important to it, it can never transcend nationality. . . . But the proletarians in all countries have one and the same interest, one and the same enemy, and one and the same struggle. The great mass of proletarians are, by their very nature, free from national prejudices and their whole disposition and movement is essentially humanitarian, anti-nationalist. Only the proletarians can destroy nationality, only the awakening proletariat can bring about fraternisation between the different nations. (6) However, Marx and Engels also understood that the proletariat’s struggle was national insofar as it meant that “the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation” (Marx and Engels 488, emphasis in original). In this sense, the proletariat is “national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word” (488). It is precisely this revolutionary potential of the (inter)national that is often elided in contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism. According to Marx and Engels, the
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proletariat knew ultimately that its struggle had to be fought at the national level, but that its victory and survival were dependent upon an internationalist solidarity movement. The international bourgeoisie, on the other hand, had a very different idea of cosmopolitanism. In Marx’s letter of 1879 to Nikolai Danielson, he discusses the railway industry and points out how the construction of that industry created an internationalization of capital: “They gave in one word an impetus never before suspected to the concentration of capital and also to the accelerated and immensely enlarged cosmopolitan activity of loanable capital, thus embracing the whole world in a network of financial swindling and mutual indebtedness, the capitalist form of ‘international brotherhood’ ” (317, emphasis in original) Thus cosmopolitanism had very different resonances when associated with the workings of (inter)national capital. The bourgeoisie realized that the accumulation of capital was always an international enterprise, deeply rooted in the interactions between so-called national economies. This duality of cosmopolitanism was explored in great detail by Antonio Gramsci, and perhaps it is instructive to contemplate his definition, especially since it is to him that so many postcolonial intellectuals turn in order to explore some of their central questions regarding the intersection of politics and culture. Gramsci was critical of an Italian cosmopolitanism, which for him was merely a replication of the cosmopolitanism of the Italians’ European counterparts. Gramsci provides a brief history of the concept which, according to him, is class-bound and imitative at its roots: “It is necessary to start with the Roman Empire, which produced the first concentration of ‘cosmopolitan’—that is to say, ‘imperial’—intellectuals, then move on to the Christian times, when the organisation of clergy under the Popes gave to the heredity of imperial intellectual cosmopolitanism the form of a European caste system” (qtd. in Ahmad, “Fascism,” 53). Aijaz Ahmad clarifies Gramsci’s notion of cosmopolitanism thus: “that conduct and outlook of the intellectuals which separates them from the life and aspirations of the common people” (“Fascism” 53). It is this elitist cosmopolitanism or the “distance between the language of intellectuals and the language of the common people” that Ahmad hazards “might have contributed to the failure of the intellectuals even of the Left to construct what Gramsci was to call a ‘national-popular’ culture” (“Fascism” 54). Gramsci was equally skeptical of “the so-called ‘internationalism’ of the Italian people, which is linked to the concept of ‘subversivism.’ In reality, this is a kind of vague ‘cosmopolitanism’, related to certain identifiable historical phenomena: to the cosmopolitanism
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and the universalism of the Catholic Middle Ages, centered on Italy and preserved through the absence of any Italian ‘political and national history’ ” (274). Gramsci’s critique here points to the elitist impulses of cosmopolitanism and to its attempt to leap outside the political. In discounting the national, it discounted the people. As Gramsci would have it, “little understanding of the state means little class consciousness” (275). This revolutionary insight into the origins of cosmopolitanism is an important gloss for our understanding of contemporary forms of postcolonial cosmopolitanism. Gramsci’s incisive critique of cosmopolitanism, I would suggest, is instructive, especially as many of the celebratory claims in the present regarding cosmopolitan identity and culture are often torn from their immediate political context. Certainly cosmopolitanism has to be considered in its complex interplay with existing neoliberal ethics. My reading of Ghosh’s works attempts to position his work within these larger political forces and convergences, considering the multiple accommodations and refusals that are possible within the context of these forces. In an Antique Land: Transcending a “Mere Exchange of Coinage” It is with these concerns in mind that we can now turn to Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land. Ghosh, over twenty years of writing, has always been acutely aware of the political realities that shape the movement of people across the global landscape. In his very first novel, The Circle of Reason, he describes with poetic acuity what happens “wherever money and its attendant arms have chosen to descend on peoples unprepared for its onslaughts” (189). In subsequent works such as The Shadow Lines and The Glass Palace, we witness the violent aftershocks of colonialism, and in an extended essay such as Countdown, he painstakingly exposes the poverty of imagination that characterizes the vainglorious claims of an Indian government that defines “progress” through the production of nuclear weapons. His works are also drawn together by a consistent attempt to recover an alternate epistemological tradition, one hidden behind the veil of colonialist or nationalist knowledge. Nowhere is this project more powerfully articulated than In an Antique Land, and it is in this text that we also see the contradictory dialectical pull between history and memory, social relations and individual desires, commodity traffic and cultural exchange, and cosmopolitan subjectivities and national and religious identities.
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Ghosh’s In an Antique Land (referred to as IAAL from here forward) grew out of the research conducted for his doctorate in Social Anthropology from Oxford University. The narrative focuses on two distinct transnational moments. The first is an autobiographical account of Ghosh’s doctoral fieldwork in the Egyptian villages of Lataifa and Nashawy during the 1980s. The second concerns the story of Bomma, an Indian slave and apparent companion of a Jewish merchant from Tunisia, Abraham Ben Yiju, who arrives in India in 1130. Ghosh’s attempt to trace the story of this slave is juxtaposed with his own life in the Egyptian villages in the present. As he discovers the world of the Indian Ocean in the twelfth century, a world of accommodation and cosmopolitan alliances, free of present-day religious and national differences, he is confronted with the erosion of precisely those values in a contemporary landscape marked by division and war, a world where religion and nation cast an ugly shadow over any attempt to construct a secular, cosmopolitan identity. To a large extent, the text works to recast and rehabilitate a lost world external to Europe and imperialist domination. In demonstrating that a world existed outside the cycle of violence and exploitation, Ghosh performs an important task: he recovers an original history that establishes the existence of a cosmopolitan, secular society that thrived and f lourished until the cruel intervention of European barbarity, thus effectively reversing imperialist mythologies that are sustained to this day. In writing a history of the time, he challenges centuries of Orientalist social histories that argued that the pre-European world was without light, without history; As Inderpal Grewal observes, in this text, Ghosh sought to produce a new map of the Old World as the world without Europe. Moving away from the contest between a “West” and the “no-West,” the text created a world where the West was either nonexistent or irrelevant and where the focus was the relationship between two “non-Western” regions. The book proposed a new field whose history and geography could be examined from medieval times to the present in the service of an idealized, nonEurocentric, postcolonial cosmopolitanism. (50) It is this connection between the medieval and the modern that is also an important part of Ghosh’s project. Even as Ghosh deplores the erosion of pre-modern civilities, he finds many traces of the past in the cultural practices, religious traditions, and folk rituals existing across the many divides. In “defiance of the enforcers of History,” he realizes
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that “the threads that connected people over centuries have not been entirely unravelled” (342). Ghosh’s creative act of recovery can be seen as aligned with a specific intellectual project inaugurated in the early 1980s, the Subaltern Studies project. Indeed, he had published an excerpt from IAAL, “The Slave of Ms. H.6,” in a volume of the Subaltern Studies series.5 The Subaltern Studies collective, started by a group of Indian historians, identified their project as one exposing the dramatic poverty of an elitist historiography (colonialist and nationalist) that “fails to acknowledge, far less interpret, the contribution made by the people on their own, that is, independently of the elite” (Guha, “On Some Aspects” 39, emphasis in original). What the Subaltern Studies project attempted to resurrect was the politics of the people and all that has been repressed, silenced, and excluded from the pages of colonial history. As Gayatri Spivak puts it, the project was meant to bring “hegemonic historiography to a crisis” (“Subaltern Studies” 4). More specifically, as expressed by Ranajit Guha, one of the main initiators of the group, the group’s mission was “to confront the philosophically certified ‘higher morality’ of World-history with its politics by asking some difficult questions about the morality of colonizers claiming to be authorized historians of lands and people they have themselves put under a colonial yoke. . . . What concerns us . . . is the representation of the colonial past held in thrall by a narrowly defined politics of statism” (History 5). According to Guha, colonialist knowledge has “had the effect of replacing the indigenous narratologies of precolonial times with ones that are typically modern and Western” (History 5). The collective’s work is thus to set the historical record straight. Ghosh is very much an inheritor of this tradition, and at first glance he seems to meet this goal both in method and in content. IAAL’s thirty-seven-page bibliography, for instance, lists eclectic sources, many of which are nonEuropean in their provenance. Several references are in Persian and Arabic, including citations of the records of twelfth-century travelers, historians, and artists. Commenting on Ghosh’s published work in the Subaltern Studies series, Robert Dixon claims that “[l]ike the work of the Subaltern Studies scholars, and unlike the work of other diasporic Indians such as Spivak and Bhabha, these texts seem almost wilfully to avoid European theoretical models, grounding their method in rigorous elaboration of archival and field research which offers itself as a series of ‘extended metaphors’ for allegorical interpretation” (26, italics in original). While such a claim mistakenly privileges archival research and places Ghosh outside a network of privilege, Dixon does correctly
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identify Ghosh’s conscious attempt to take on the terms of dominant Western historiography. Ghosh’s goal is a formidable one. To write such a revisionist history is to counter centuries of imperialist historiographies. The point is not merely to destabilize these authoritarian narratives, but to demystify an intellectual lineage that has systematically denied precolonial subjects any form of humanity. Dipesh Chakrabarty, in his work Provincializing Europe, points out that “Europe” remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call “Indian,” “Chinese,” “Kenyan,” and so on. There is a peculiar way in which all these histories tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called “the history of Europe.” In this sense, “Indian” history is in a position of subalternity; one can only articulate subaltern subject positions in the name of this history. (27) Imperialist history for Ghosh is a distinct contributor to the exploitation of the peoples of this region. He “simultaneously calls into question the ‘truth’ of historical knowledge and links the production of that knowledge to the expansion of European colonialism; History, therefore, is revealed to be the history of appropriation” (Mondal 22). As Ghosh himself puts it, it is a narrative constructed by “enforcers of History” to “suit the patterns of the Western academy” (IAAL 342). Thus, much of IAAL is about the researcher Ghosh’s actual visits to depositories of knowledge. In comparing the present-day decaying site of the Geniza of the Synagogue of Ben Ezra in modern-day Cairo, looted of all its contents, with the libraries in Cambridge and Philadelphia, where many of the documents of the medieval Geniza “ended up,” Ghosh provides a lesson in cultural imperialism. Those who usurp knowledge change the course of history. Few realize this point as well as the historian who sets out to recover history. Grewal sees it as a problem that “Ghosh’s historical connection was only possible through Europe and, of course, ‘America’ as the repository of the documents that made this history possible” (55). Needless to say, however, the presence of archival sources in the imperialist centers does not reduce Ghosh’s claim; indeed, it affirms the point that the representational histories of the non-West have been seized by the West. Recuperation will always be a vexed exercise for a postcolonial intellectual. That is one legacy of colonialism. The text is thus “a lament for the world we have lost.” “Such loss” Ghosh “blames on the levelling force of colonial ‘History’, which
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appears throughout the book, in its Hegelian incarnation, as an intervention or rupture that ‘cancels’ the heterogeneity of non-western pasts and in so doing, grievously homogenises the present” (Gandhi 67). In reconstructing a “lost past,” Ghosh is also condemning the legacy of imperialism, which in his eyes has led to the erosion of the values of community, cooperation, and cosmopolitan subjects and alliances. My examination of IAAL will highlight Ghosh’s skilful rejoinder to imperial history. I will also explore Ghosh’s attempt to position medieval cosmopolitanism and its subject as a counter to contemporary discourses of globalization and its attendant claims of cosmopolitanism. Finally, I will demonstrate how Ghosh’s longing for a past of syncretic cosmopolitanism, a present of a transnational civil society, and the hope for a transcendent cosmopolitan subject echo some of the dominant texts of contemporary capital, problematizing the terms of his own critique of imperialism and neoliberal globalization. Undoubtedly, IAAL is an effective—even a scathing—indictment of violent imperial practices, but in countering imperial forces with a precolonial Eden where the accumulation of wealth was somehow accomplished with a general transcontinental sensibility but without violence, Ghosh constructs a history that itself elides the processes of wealth creation. Commenting on the arrival of the Europeans in Egypt, Ghosh describes a late-eighteenth-century world that had long been corrupted by earlier imperial intrusions: “The Indian Ocean trade, and the culture that supported it had long been destroyed by European navies. Transcontinental trade was no longer a shared enterprise; the merchant shipping of the high seas was now entirely controlled by the naval powers of Europe” (80–81). The European incursion in the Indian Ocean was horrific in its scale, but most significant for Ghosh was its contrast to an earlier order: “In all the centuries in which it had f lourished and grown, no state or king or ruling power had ever before tried to gain control of the Indian Ocean trade by force of arms” (287). The Portuguese forces’ defeat of a united coalition signified for Ghosh a truism of history, that the “determination of a small, united band of soldiers triumphed easily over the rich confusions that accompany a culture of accommodation and compromise” (288). Centers of culture such as Mangalore on India’s Malabar Coast were destroyed when their wealth attracted the “much less welcome attention of the European maritime and colonial powers and it was in the course of the struggles that ensued that Mangalore came to lose virtually every trace of its extraordinary past” (245). The coming of Vasco da Gama in 1498 signaled the end: “Within a few years of that day the death knell
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had been struck for the world that had brought Bomma, Ben Yiju, and Ashu together, and another age had begun in which the crossing of their paths would seem so unlikely that its very possibility would all but disappear from human memory” (286). All along, even as Ghosh describes the scale and nature of the Europeans’ destruction of precolonial life, he is at pains to identify the richness of all that was lost. But let us brief ly take a look at the pre-European medieval world that Ghosh describes. Ironically, the protagonists of this extraordinary past and more benign social arrangement are a master, Ben Yiju, and his slave, Bomma. Of course, as many works have demonstrated, the scope, nature, and pattern of transatlantic European slavery was very different from anything that existed previously in Africa, Asia, or South America, so my purpose here is not to contest Ghosh’s historical claim that the master-slave relationship was more equitable than what came after. Instead, I want to concentrate on Ghosh’s deployment of cosmopolitan tropes to create a world of precolonial difference and cosmopolitan subjects. Consider, then, Ghosh’s statement about slavery in the medieval age: “the elements of slavery in the ties that bound an apprentice to a master craftsman, an accountant to a merchant, would have appeared, perhaps, not as demeaning bonds, but rather as links that were in some small way ennobling—human connections, pledges of commitment, in relationships that could just as well have been a matter of a mere exchange of coinage” (263). Ghosh is making a number of claims here, implying that the world of the commercial, the “mere exchange of coinage,” ought not to affect what one might call true human relations. However, is it possible to avoid the fact that the exchange of coinage is, in fact, a social relation? Wealth and privilege, after all, do determine the parameters of social relations, even of this medieval world. Indeed, the very fact that the traces of the nameless slave, in contrast to the record of his master’s life, have almost disappeared makes it evident that slaves were the anonymous travelers, both in their own time as well as in ours. His master, on the other hand, was faced, as Ghosh admits, with “the opportunities afforded by the Eastern trade” which “must have seemed irresistible to the young Ben Yiju, reared as he was in a community that had made a speciality of it” (154). This characterization seems to touch upon the lines of privilege that created such opportunities, yet Ghosh falls into a more contemporary form of bourgeois meritocracy by claiming that “it needs to be noted that if Ben Yiju succeeded in finding ready acceptance within the society of wealthy merchants of Aden, despite his comparatively humble standing as a young apprentice
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trader, it must have been largely because of his individual gifts” (158). Not only does Ghosh emphasize the individual qualities of Ben Yiju, he is also at pains to stress Ben Yiju’s cosmopolitan credentials. Unlike the crass raiders of the West in later years, Yiju was a “man of many accomplishments, a distinguished calligrapher, scholar and poet” (19). He was, however, no mere cosmopolitan scholar. He was clearly good at his trade, for “Ben Yiju . . . returned to Egypt having amassed great wealth in India” (19). Whatever Ben Yiju’s individual gifts and business pursuits, he is portrayed as a benevolent master, and indeed the records cited regarding his relation with his slave mostly support such a view. In examples like these, though, Ghosh paints a picture of a world of social relations characterized primarily by acts of accommodation, outside of a network of wealth creation and accumulation, and in doing so falls prey to a more modern ideal of cosmopolitanism. Ghosh posits the medieval world, a world not determined by the “mere exchange of coinage,” as the true cosmopolitan world, unlike the present one that is dogged by violent divisions and xenophobic claims based on nation and religion. Bomma’s medieval world is richly created by Ghosh as a vital, cosmopolitan society that puts to shame current notions of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, Western reviewers find this the most compelling element of the book. Clifford Geertz, for instance, in his review of the book, marvels at a world which is a “mobile, polyglot and virtually borderless region which no one owned and no one dominated,” a world in which people from various communities were “more or less getting along, or getting by, within broad and general rules for communication, propriety and the conduct of business. It was, we might say, a sort of multicultural bazaar” (30). Geertz’s characterization of a world that “no one owned and no one dominated” is certainly worth further examination. Ghosh informs his reader early in the text that “by Ben Yiju’s time Fustat (a couple of miles south of modern-day Cairo) had long since become the largest island in the emerging archipelago of Masr: the juncture of some of the most important trade routes in the known world and the nucleus of one of the richest and most cosmopolitan cities on earth” (38). We meet Ben Yiju’s business associates in Aden, Yusufibn Abraham and Khalafibn Ishaq, both of whose fortunes were “founded on the trade between India and the Middle East but their part in it was that of brokers and financiers rather than travelling merchants” (157). And, of course, the reason for this conjunction of cosmopolitanism and wealth was the trade that took place in the channels of the Indian Ocean. Although Ghosh is clearly trying to differentiate a precapitalist trading system from the
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violent mercantilism of European capitalism, there is no escaping the fact that even the idyllic cosmopolitanism of medieval trade is dependent upon the movement of goods, commodities, and capital, and it is a trade through which a few people amass huge amounts of wealth. As Grewal puts it, the “movement of goods and finance were integral to transnational connectivities, though it is difficult, in this current phase of globalization, to think of trade as either benign or emptied of colonial power relations” (58). The point of course is not so much whether we can “think” of trade in this way, but rather whether commercial trade is ever outside the circuits of power relations. Ghosh demonstrates his awe of this wide-ranging cosmopolitan world and its subjects by giving the example of Abu Said Halfon, “a wealthy merchant, scholar and patron of literature [whose papers] bear witness to a pattern of movement so f luent and far-ranging that they make the journeys of later medieval travelers, such as Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta, seem unremarkable in comparison” (157). Across the seas, among India’s “luxuriant diversities” (283), Calicut was even more “cosmopolitan” than its neighbor to the north, Mangalore: it “appears to have housed an even larger and more diverse merchant community. . . . The lifestyle of these merchants was so sumptuous that even sophisticated travellers and courtiers, accustomed to the refinements of great royal courts, were taken by surprise upon being admitted to their circle” (243). Interestingly, in most of these descriptions, it is hard not to notice the connection between wealth and the acquisition of culture. Indeed, Ben Yiju’s business world can be described in the language of the multinational CEOs of our world today: “In matters of business, Ben Yiju’s networks appear to have been wholly indifferent to the many boundaries that are today thought to mark social, religious and geographical divisions” (286). Geertz’s description of a world without ownership seems open to dispute at this point. In IAAL, the cosmopolitan values of the medieval world are often juxtaposed against the decay and the dissolution of the present one. Here, for instance, is Ghosh’s description of present-day Masr in a Cairo quarter: “The last skeletal remains of the city whose markets once traded in the best the world could offer lie a little further along the path: the outlines of a few foundations and some brick walls and arches, pushing through pools of oily slime, clawing at the earth. In the distance shanties grow in tiers upon the ruins” (39). Ghosh conveys the sense of decay and modern contamination in evocative phrases such as “oily slime” and “skeletal remains,” and in a later description, he alludes to the “the scraggy geometry of Cairo’s skyline” (39). But
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perhaps for him the most damaging changes are not the ones visible to the eye; they are the ones that have transformed human relations. Throughout the book, what comes across to the reader is the immense distance that separates peoples in the present, a distance marked by religion, nation, class, and region. Nowhere is this demonstrated more poignantly than in the passage in which Ghosh and the village imam are reduced to arguing about the superiority of their respective cultures, based on which nation has a larger cache of arms and is closer to the West in terms of its mastery of technology. At this point, Ghosh can only declaim ruefully that we participated in our own final defeat, in the dissolution of the centuries of dialogue that had linked us: we had demonstrated the irreversible triumph of the language that has usurped all others in which people once discussed their differences. We had acknowledged that it was no longer possible to speak, as Ben Yiju or his Slave, or any one of the thousands of travellers who had crossed the Indian Ocean in the Middle Ages might have done. . . . I felt myself a conspirator in the betrayal of the history that had led me to Nashawy; a witness in the extermination of a world of accommodations that I had believed to be still alive, and, in some tiny measure, still retrievable. (236–37) Ghosh’s dismay is understandable, given that postcolonial nations dictated by their elites have enthusiastically acceded to the narrative of “progress,” whereby nations ascend the ladder of development and attain respectability by becoming more like the West.6 This is even truer in the age of globalization, when global membership is measured by a country’s ability and willingness to be a part of a Western corporate hierarchy that determines national policy. Ghosh’s critique of the ladder of development paradigm, however, also represents his clear condemnation of nationalism, a natural offshoot of the “development” game. He relegates nationalism to a catalogue of ideologies that have suppressed the true cosmopolitanism of the medieval age. Indeed, suspicion of nation runs through all of Ghosh’s work, most strongly in The Shadow Lines, a novel in which colonial cartography is rightly identified as the source of much of the human misery that stretches its tentacles into the present and disrupts human relations. As Ghosh himself puts it: “Many of my books, if not all my books, have been really centered on families. To me, the family is the central unit, because it’s not about the nation, you know? Families can actually span nations. . . . I think
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the reason why you see so many Indian books essentially centered on the family is precisely because the nation is not, as it were, the central imaginative unit” (Aldama 89). Certainly stories about families are not limited to being “national allegories,” and they can “span nations,” but it is hard to imagine that these family histories are not interwoven into competing national narratives. Ghosh’s ambivalence toward the nation-state signifies the complexity of his cosmopolitanism. Like many postcolonial intellectuals, he is aware that modernism is a mixed bag. It provides room for the Enlightenment values of egalitarianism and for a civic society based on participatory democracy, and, yet, as a postcolonial subject, Ghosh is also aware that he was never allowed to dictate the terms of this process of modernity. In fact, his protagonists—Alu, Zindi, Ila, Tridib, Antar, Rajkumar, Piya, and many others—are all caught up in their efforts to redefine the modernist narratives of nation and citizenship that are so much a part of their lives. Moreover, these characters also inhabit worlds that often evoke a past that has eroded as a result of modernist intrusions. In Ghosh’s estimation, many of these cultures and traditions had already achieved modernity’s egalitarian goals without its cycle of violence and exploitation. Ghosh’s objection is a laudable one, for he realizes that under the guise of modernity and, more recently, democracy, the West has historically justified conquest and colonization. More generally, Ghosh’s larger claim is that postcolonial subjects have inherited the ideology of nation that has transformed precolonial cosmopolitanism into a present-day xenophobic insularity. This point is forcefully reinforced when Ghosh attempts to visit the tomb of Sidi Abu-Hasira, a saintly figure who was venerated by Muslims and Jews. Upon his arrival at the site, Ghosh is interrogated by a suspicious official who is confounded by the fact that an Indian who is neither Jewish nor Muslim should be interested in the tomb of a Jewish holy man in Egypt. Ghosh’s own surprise at the official’s reaction is measured against his realization that “the remains of those small, indistinguishable, intertwined histories, Indian and Egyptian, Muslim and Jewish, Hindu and Muslim, had been partitioned long ago. Nothing remained in Egypt now to effectively challenge his disbelief: not a single one, for instance, of the documents of the Geniza. It was then that I began realizing how much success the partitioning of the past had achieved” (IAAL 339–40). And this process of forgetting has been aided and abetted by the Western academy. When Ghosh is in the US looking for material on Sidi Abu-Hasira, he is unable to find any information “under subject headings such as ‘religion’ and ‘Judaism’ ” (IAAL 342).
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It is only as he turns to the shelves marked ‘anthropology’ and ‘folklore’ that he is able to find a reference. Once again, the “enforcers of History” had determined the distance between “myth” and “reality.” Amitav Ghosh’s pre-modern cosmopolitanism, a world of accommodations, is clearly juxtaposed against the modernist text of violence and appropriation that is the legacy of colonialism. Ghosh sees little hope in nationalism since the ugly face of communalism and xenophobia continue to be the mirror image of nationalism. However, in making this move, Ghosh effectively erases the liberatory text of decolonization and the possibility of alternative nationalisms as a counter to the imperialist goals of contemporary globalization.7 He has nothing to confront contemporary globalization with other than these pre-modern longings. Ghosh is caught in an impasse. On the one hand, like the narrator in The Shadow Lines, he wants to embrace the modernist, secular vision represented in his uncle Tridib, but the modern with its accompanying legacies of communalism and colonialism is also a ghost that must be banished. In the end, Ghosh “is seeking a syncretism that is an anti-humanist, postmodern recognition of difference and is also at the same time a humanist secular ideal as articulated by a secular nationalism which is humanist and modernist” (Mondal 30, emphasis in original). And it is this syncretic world that many of Ghosh’s cosmopolitan subjects seek, harboring identities that are f luid yet which position them in a world governed by rigid boundaries as incapable of action. One way Ghosh is able to address such paradoxes in his own position is by confronting his role as historian and storyteller. Here again, it is worthwhile to recall the mission of the Subaltern Studies historians. What Ghosh can do, in Guha’s injunction to the historian, is not participate in the “mediation” of a “past consciousness by one conditioned by the present” (“The Prose” 77). Moreover, he must recognize both that recovering the past involves distortion and that he must “acknowledge such distortion as parametric—as a datum that determines the form of the exercise itself, and to stop pretending that it can fully grasp a past consciousness and reconstitute it” (77, emphasis in original). Several critics have pointed out Ghosh’s success in fulfilling this charge. Robert Dixon sees Ghosh’s project as an “exemplary instance of what Spivak calls ‘strategic essentialism’ ” (35), the ability to “strategically use an implied recovery of ‘presence’ while at the same time forever retreating into a post-structuralist lexicon of textual traces” (29). Claire Chambers argues that “Ghosh indicates that knowledge of the Other can only ever be partial, subjective, and historically conditioned” (2), while Padmini Mongia points out the dialogic
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nature of Ghosh’s storytelling: “No passive consumer of a well-crafted story, the reader of Ghosh’s In an Antique Land must pause to ref lect on the conjectural nature of stories and find her pleasure in the interaction between the tale and its tenuous telling” (82). This form of selfconscious storytelling in the eyes of these critics may put to rest Said’s original question in Orientalism: how does one represent a culture in a non-manipulative way and without turning its peoples into objects of curiosity and wonder? A specific strategy by which Ghosh evades the anthropologist’s trap is by turning himself into an object of study. Chambers, in fact, argues that Ghosh is “anthropologized by locals rather than the other way round; his language, customs, and cultural practices are defamiliarized by the contempt and incredulity of his supposed subjects of study” (6). Indeed, there are many instances in the text when Ghosh’s beliefs and cultural practices are ridiculed, most notably Hindu non-circumcision and the practice of cremating the dead. However, I would argue that the privileged gaze of the anthropologist is reasserted through the lens of the cosmopolitan writer who is often startled or dismayed by the limitations of those whom he encounters. For instance, Ghosh cannot hide his disquiet at the absolute sense of identity expressed by his neighbors: “I would go up to my room alone and listen to the call of the muezzin and try to think of how it must feel to know that on that very day, as the sun travelled around the earth, millions and millions of people in every corner of the globe had turned to face the same point, and said exactly the same words of prayer, with exactly the same prostrations as oneself ” (76). He is no less intrigued by the “eccentricity” of insularity: “Zaghoul and Khamees were eccentrics in most things, and in nothing so much as this, that for them the world outside was still replete with the wonders of the unknown” (174). Ghosh is also candid about his realization that “for my own part, it was precisely the absoluteness of time and the discreteness of epochs that I always had trouble in imagining” (201). In a sense, he is most dismayed by the lack of a certain element of cosmopolitanism in the villagers, by their inability to see beyond their own world. When Nabeel, a young boy in the village, comments on the fact that Ghosh is about to make a single cup of tea for himself, suggesting that “it must make [him] think of all the people [he] left at home,” Ghosh is struck by the fact that “it was the first time that anyone in Lataifa or Nashawy had attempted an enterprise similar to mine—to enter my imagination and look at my situation as it might appear to me” (152). Here we do not have what Chambers claims is a reverse anthropology. Rather, it is a reaffirmation of the cosmopolitan
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subject, the anthropologist-writer who, unlike those he writes about, can transcend space and other limitations in a true expression of intercultural understanding. Ghosh’s text is about the loss of this cultural connection between peoples; it is an act of mourning for a world that was, a mourning shaped by a humanist belief in a version of a transcendent citizen-subject. It is a cosmopolitanism that is not very interested in a revolutionary reimagining of contemporary postcolonial societies. Although his denunciation of Western knowledge formations is a worthwhile and necessary endeavor, his idealization of the past is also limiting. Aijaz Ahmad, drawing from Gramsci, alludes to the class complicity of intellectuals who are “unwilling to undertake the tasks of a revolutionary restructuring of society and polity, and thus make a modern nation, [and who] would necessarily over-valorise the monuments of the past” ( “Fascism” 48, emphasis in original). Clearly, Ahmad’s comments do not characterize Ghosh’s enterprise; Ahmad is referring to a different breed of intellectuals who are invested in a form of cultural nationalism grounded in religious and ethnic identity. Ghosh is working precisely against this complicity by contesting fascist-nationalist versions of the past; paradoxically, however, by being invested in “correct” interpretations of the past, he leaves very little to be said about contemporary transformations. As a result, the terrain of the present is almost given over. Ghosh’s emphasis on religious interactions and accommodations posed against fundamentalist identities also reinforces the secular-fundamentalist binary. As Ahmad suggests, Once “religion” has been defined as the essential terrain for contestations of hegemony, this terrain is then necessarily defined by the reactionary forces and the progressive forces are compelled not only to adopt reactive and defensive positions but also to prune down their own projects of a revolutionary re-structuring of material life, which is the only means through which a firm basis for long-term moral regeneration of society can be obtained. (“Fascism” 62) In Ghosh’s defense, it is important to emphasize that he is not seeking a “revolutionary restructuring of material life,” and perhaps his most extended response to a critique such as Ahmad’s comes in an essay, “The Fundamentalist Challenge,” written in 1995. In this essay, Ghosh argues, unlike Western commentators such as Benjamin Barber, Thomas Friedman, or Samuel Huntington, who
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posit West/East, modernism/feudalism, democracy/authoritarianism binaries as explanatory frameworks for contemporary conf licts, that the new fundamentalisms “are not a repudiation of but a means of laying claim to the modern world” (122). Indeed, Ghosh comments that “religious extremism today has very little to do with matters of doctrine or faith, that its real texts are borrowed from sociology, demography, political science, and so on” (135). Ghosh is absolutely right in pointing out the fallacy of the binary of religious extremists versus Western reason, but aren’t the texts he lists also articles of faith, and aren’t these the same texts that inspire those who seek a transnational civil society? Ghosh recognizes that religious extremism is a “form of dissent,” an “inexpressible critique of the political and moral economy of today’s world” (136). In an eloquent passage he explains the causes of this dissent: “It is simply not conceivable that the majority of human beings will ever willingly give their assent to the idea that the search for profit should be the sole or central organizing principle of society” (137). He calls for a “need to recreate, expand, and re-imagine the space for articulate, humane, and creative dissent” to counter religious extremism; however, he does not offer a suitable form of dissent to oppose the profit-based economy that he also critiques, other than finding refuge in “pre-postmodernist currents” that assure him that “matters of the spirit” will survive (137). Perhaps a Gramscian critique is apposite at this point: “Intellectual and moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform—indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself ” (Gramsci 133). What then are we left with at the end of IAAL? It is at once a lament, an act of loving re-creation, a humorous consideration of the ties that bind people of different faiths and cultures, an impassioned denunciation of Western capitalism, and a leap of the imagination. It is perhaps in this last quality that the strengths and weaknesses of the book reside. In imagining a world that was or might have been, Ghosh offers a glimpse of a social life that reveals the possibilities of the human spirit. In imagining a future where wanderers, migrants, and immigrants disappear into the “anonymity of History,” he presents little hope for renewed cosmopolitan connections.8 Finally, in imagining a cosmopolitan subject who can transcend the “mere exchange of coinage,” he provides a corrective for hegemonic notions of the new Indian subject who is defined by state, capital, and religion, but he creates a subject who remains both elusive and paradoxically implicated in all these identity categories.
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The New India “Amra Bastuhara. We are the dispossessed”: Loss and Renewal in The Hungry Tide
If in IAAL, Ghosh travels down the road toward posing an ideal cosmopolitan subject, in The Hungry Tide (2005), written fourteen years later, he returns to pursue and affirm with renewed passion and deliberation many of those cosmopolitan principles that were raised in the earlier text. Arguably, the fourteen years after the publication of IAAL compose one of the most decisive periods in post-independence India. In this time, the nation ensconced itself firmly into the neoliberal regime of capital accumulation. For instance, as a result of the imposition of punitive fiscal policies that drastically cut agricultural subsidies and forced farmers to “compete” in the international market and buy commodities at exorbitant prices, millions of rural Indians lost their land and now face hunger and ruin. In the midst of this process, and specifically relevant to THT, the government acted aggressively and methodically to displace millions of people, forcing them to sell their land for a pittance. Their land was then sold to private developers to build housing and facilities for the upwardly mobile class and for new business developments.9 What we have, effectively, is a massive rite of dispossession on a scale that has seldom been seen since the days of the partition. I would like to place THT as a text that marks precisely this neoliberal moment of the fourteen years since IAAL.10 Although the central event in the novel—the forcible removal of thousands of people from the island of Morichjhãpi, in the Sundarbans—is set in 1979, a period preceding the official inauguration of liberalization, the actual event, I believe, can b