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Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia
Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia Edited by
Koichi Hamada Tuntex Professor of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, USA
Beate Reszat Economist, Hamburg Ministry of Science and Research, Hamburg, Germany
Ulrich Volz Senior Economist, German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Koichi Hamada, Beate Reszat and Ulrich Volz 2009 Chapter 11 © The Peterson Institute for International Economics 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009922771
ISBN 978 1 84844 363 1 Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Group, UK
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Contents List of contributors Foreword by Richard N. Cooper Acknowledgements
vii ix xi
Introduction: prospects for monetary and financial integration in East Asia—dreams and dilemmas Koichi Hamada, Beate Reszat, and Ulrich Volz PART I
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION
1 The ASEAN economic community and the European experience Michael G. Plummer and Reid W. Click 2 The political economy of European economic and monetary union negotiations and implications for East Asia Heungchong Kim 3 International political conflicts and economic integration Koichi Hamada and Inpyo Lee PART II 4
5
6 7
13
41 61
DEVELOPING BOND MARKETS IN EAST ASIA
Learning by doing in market reform: lessons from a regional bond fund Guonan Ma and Eli Remolona Currency denomination in Asian bond markets Eiji Ogawa and Junko Shimizu
PART III
1
87 104
EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES IN EAST ASIA: THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR
East Asia’s role in the revived Bretton Woods system Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber Current account surpluses and conflicted virtue in East Asia: China and Japan under the dollar standard Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl v
141
159
vi
Contents
PART IV
8 9
Three cases for monetary integration in East Asia Ulrich Volz Monetary and exchange rate policy coordination in ASEAN11 William H. Branson and Conor N. Healy
PART V 10
11 12
14
222
267 290 304
THE ROLE OF CHINA
The illusion of precision and the role of the renminbi in regional integration Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii Institutional and structural problems of China’s foreign exchange market and the RMB’s role in East Asia Zhang Jikang and Liang Yuanyuan
Index
195
CURRENCY BASKETS FOR EAST ASIA?
Capital markets and exchange rate stabilization in East Asia: diversifying risk based on currency baskets Gunther Schnabl Asian currency baskets John Williamson The role of an Asian currency unit Masahiro Kawai
PART VI 13
TOWARD MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA?
325
357
387
Contributors William H. Branson, John Foster Dulles Professor of International Affairs and Professor of Economics and International Affairs, emeritus, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, USA. Yin-Wong Cheung, Professor of Economics, Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA. Menzie D. Chinn, Professor of Public Affairs and Economics, Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin at Madison, USA. Reid W. Click, Associate Professor of International Business, George Washington University School of Business, Washington, DC, USA. Richard N. Cooper, Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. Michael P. Dooley, Professor of Economics, Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA. David Folkerts-Landau, Managing Director and Global Head of Research, Deutsche Bank AG, London, UK. Eiji Fujii, Associate Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Japan. Peter Garber, Global Strategist, Deutsche Bank AG, London, UK. Koichi Hamada, Tuntex Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Economic Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven, USA. Conor N. Healy, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, USA. Masahiro Kawai, Dean, Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo, Japan. Heungchong Kim, Research Fellow and Head of the Europe Team, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul, Korea. Inpyo Lee, Professor of Economics, Ewha University, Seoul, Korea; Visiting Fellow, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven, USA. vii
viii
Contributors
Liang Yuanyuan, Research Associate, Center for International Finance Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Guonan Ma, Senior Economist, Representative Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bank for International Settlement, Hong Kong. Ronald McKinnon, William D. Eberle Professor of International Economics, Department of Economics, Stanford University, USA. Eiji Ogawa, Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University; Deputy Director of the EU Institute in Japan, Tokyo, Japan. Michael G. Plummer, Professor of Economics, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center, Italy. Eli Remolona, Deputy Chief Representative of the Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bank for International Settlements, Hong Kong. Beate Reszat, Economist, Hamburg Ministry of Science and Research, Hamburg, Germany. Gunther Schnabl, Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Leipzig, Germany. Junko Shimizu, Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Meikai University, Japan. Ulrich Volz, Senior Economist, German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany. John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, USA. Zhang Jikang, Professor of Economics, Director of the Center for European Studies, and Deputy Director of the Center for International Finance Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
Foreword Richard N. Cooper There is a vague but palpable dissatisfaction with existing international monetary arrangements. These entail few formal rules with regard to how countries should manage their exchange rates, and little coherent guidance from the economics profession beyond an apparent consensus that floating a country’s currency is better than fixing it—albeit with many reservations about free floating for any but the largest of economies. Against this intellectual background, Europeans defied many academic reservations and in 1999 created a common currency among 11, later 16, members of the European Union. The resulting euro has now had a decade of experience, without obviously disastrous results. There have been some strains, particularly, as was predicted and feared, regarding Italy, but also a respectable record of achievement in terms of continued growth with modest inflation. At the same time, there have been large and disturbing movements in exchange rates among the major currencies. During the past two decades the yen has ranged from 85 yen to the dollar in 1995 to 148 in 2005, a range of 75 percent, while during the decade of its existence the euro has ranged by over 90 percent, between USD 0.83 and USD 1.60 per euro. Throughout the period, inflation was relatively low in all three regions. What justification is there for such wide swings among major currencies? What are the implications for international trade and especially for investment in tradable goods? And what are the implications for decisions regarding exchange rate policy for other countries, especially developing countries with imperfect capital markets? It is against this general background that the countries of East Asia, one by one, have managed their exchange rates. But could they do better by cooperating among themselves in monetary and exchange rate management, even to the point of adopting a common currency, as some Europeans have done? This volume usefully explores these issues. By wide agreement, a common currency is not in prospect anytime soon—if ever. There are too many political and institutional hurdles, and even the economic gains are not clear. It is worth recalling, however, that it took Europe over four decades between the conception of its economic ix
x
Foreword
community as reflected in the Rome Treaty of 1957 and the creation of the euro in 1999. Many forms of economic and financial cooperation are possible short of adoption of a common currency, some of which would facilitate an eventual move toward that end, should it prove possible and desirable. The first steps have been taken toward mutual financial support among East Asian economies in times of stress, and toward the creation of an Asian bond market in normal times. China must develop a functioning foreign exchange market and move to full convertibility of the yuan if it is to play a central role in regional financial cooperation. The most vexing issue is management of exchange rates. Economic interdependence within East Asia is growing rapidly, even while commercial interactions with countries outside the region continue to grow. Countries thus face the challenging task of framing exchange rate policy with one eye on the region—containing both customers and competitors—and one eye on the rest of the world. The chapters of this book cover all of these challenging issues, and more. They offer a worthy exploration of a complex set of increasingly important issues and help deepen our understanding of a new financial architecture that might be emerging in East Asia.
Acknowledgements During parts of the work on this book Beate Reszat was Head of Research on International Financial Markets at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics. Ulrich Volz was a Fox International Fellow and Max Kade Scholar at Yale University and a DekaBank Fellow at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics. Ulrich Volz would like to thank the Fox International Fellowship at Yale University, the Max Kade Foundation in New York, and DekaBank in Frankfurt for financial support during the work on this project. The editors would like to express their gratitude to all of the contributors to this book. We would very much like to thank Andrei Popovici, our research assistant at Yale, for his scrupulous proofreading and valuable help with the editing of the manuscript. We also thank Edward Elgar Publishing for the professional and speedy handling of the manuscript. Special thanks go to Richard Cooper for writing the foreword. Sadly, during the work on this book we lost two dear friends and colleagues, both of whom contributed chapters. Zhang Jikang of Fudan University died very unexpectedly and tragically on February 18, 2006. William Branson of Princeton University passed away on August 15, 2006, after a long illness. It is to the memories of Jikang and Bill that we dedicate this book.
xi
Introduction: prospects for monetary and financial integration in East Asia— dreams and dilemmas Koichi Hamada, Beate Reszat, and Ulrich Volz The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 fundamentally changed East Asia’s perspective on economic regionalism and sparked great political interest in monetary and financial cooperation and integration in the region. The crisis revealed the fragility of the region’s prevailing exchange rate arrangements and highlighted the need for a strengthening of the regional financial architecture. Since the crisis, there has been a proliferation of proposals for fostering East Asian monetary and financial integration. Regional cooperation in the field of money and finance already takes place through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) surveillance process, the Chiang Mai Initiative for the creation of bilateral short-term financing facilities by the ASEAN13 countries (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea), and various initiatives to foster the development of regional security markets. There is also a serious debate about establishing a regional exchange rate arrangement or even a common East Asian currency in the longer term. In December 2005, the Asian Development Bank announced its intention to create an Asian currency unit (ACU) comprising a basket of East Asian currencies akin to the European currency unit (ECU), which evolved into the euro. Although this initiative has not come to fruition, a regional currency unit is now being studied by the ASEAN13 countries. Particularly remarkable is the involvement of China, which has demonstrated an increasing willingness to accept responsibility for the economic progress of the region as a whole. The ASEAN countries, as well as Japan and Korea, have also displayed ample interest in fostering regional cooperation. Deeper integration, however, is still a ways away. Countries participating in more ambitious regional monetary and financial initiatives would need to develop a far-reaching consensus about economic policy preferences. Moreover, national authorities would need to be willing to subordinate national policy goals, at least at times, to a common goal of regional 1
2
Towards monetary and financial integration in East Asia
integration and stability. It does not seem that such a policy consensus and integrationist spirit has sufficiently developed in East Asia as yet. Integration efforts remain strained by tensions between major players in East Asia, most notably China and Japan, both of which tend to claim a leadership role in economic cooperation, and each of which is short of having full trust in the other. The aim of this book is to critically analyze these developments, to delineate the conditions for successful integration, and to examine the forms under which regional monetary and financial cooperation may be favorable options for the East Asian countries. It assesses the steps already taken toward financial integration and brings forward different proposals for future exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. In particular, the book evaluates the economic and politico-economic arguments and conditions for monetary and financial integration in East Asia and explores how and to what extent the countries of the region can integrate despite their heterogeneity and their underlying political tensions. Drawing on the European experiences, this book analyzes the economic logic of monetary and financial integration in East Asia and its political feasibility. The book has three unifying themes. First, it highlights the barriers and dilemmas that East Asian countries face in pursuing monetary and financial integration. Despite a common interest in regional cooperation, East Asian countries are confronted with multiple problems that jeopardize a process of closer integration and that could turn their dream into “pie in the sky”. If we limit our attention to the purely economic dimension, in the short run East Asian countries encounter incentive problems, domestic as well as international, that complicate the process of attaining the ideal state of cooperation which would spell increased welfare for all. The dilemma is further intensified in the short run if we consider political elements. The need to satisfy domestic constituencies limits governments’ capability to participate in joint international actions. At the same time, historical disputes, conflicting national strategic interests, and rivalry for economic and political leadership in the region impede cooperation. In the intermediate and in the long run, however, the situation may turn out to be different. East Asian countries may understand that the cost of constraints on monetary policy by engaging in regional monetary integration is somewhat overestimated. If they widen both their time horizon and their criteria for appraising their self-interest, they will understand the long-run merit of being freed from the de facto dollar standard and factor in the geopolitical peace dividends that will accrue from regional cooperation. Second, since the European monetary union is the prime exemplar of a multilateral currency union, it is crucial to analyze its lessons for successful
Introduction
3
monetary cooperation and financial integration in East Asia. European countries experienced many difficulties on their way to monetary unification, with the currency crisis of 1992–93 being the most critical moment. It is important to see how European countries overcame their political and economic differences and how the motivation for peace and prosperity overrode longstanding national antipathies. The common agency approach to the creation of European monetary integration helped to balance the interests of all countries involved. For instance, the creation of the ECU circumvented the political difficulties associated with selecting an existing currency to be Europe’s lead currency (even though the German mark, in practice, fulfilled this role) and can be seen as providing the historical precedent for the launch of the ACU. At the same time, this volume examines economic and political differences between Europe and East Asia and discusses the unique obstacles to a process of East Asian integration. Finally, East Asian integration needs to be seen in the context of the global financial system. The Asian financial crisis, which made the instability of the international financial markets all too manifest to East Asian policymakers, triggered a desire for a greater level of East Asian policy coordination. Regional cooperation, it can be argued, provides a way to insulate East Asia from global shocks and reduces economic dependency on the United States and Europe. In turn, East Asian financial integration may contribute to the stability of the world monetary system itself. Moreover, it would increase East Asia’s presence and influence on the world stage and give it a stronger voice in the reforming of the international financial architecture. The book is divided into six parts. Part I focuses on the political economy of regional integration. While European monetary integration is frequently considered a blueprint for East Asian integration, the relationships between East Asian countries are very different from those between European Union nations. One major distinction lies in East Asian nations’ conflicting strategic interests. In particular, the rivalries between China and Japan pose great questions about the success of efforts at integration. Nevertheless, the global context—including the prevalence of financial shocks, the posture of the IMF, and the policies of the United States—has opened the door to monetary and financial regionalism in East Asia. The first chapter by Michael Plummer and Reid Click provides an overview and assessment of economic cooperation within ASEAN, the only supranational body promoting economic integration in the region. Drawing on lessons from the European integration experience, Plummer and Click elaborate the particular characteristics of the Southeast Asian integration process. The ASEAN countries, which aim to create an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020, have also been eager to cooperate
4
Towards monetary and financial integration in East Asia
with China, Japan, and Korea under the ASEAN13 framework on monetary and financial matters. It is commonly asserted that this group of countries is extremely heterogeneous, in terms of economic development as well as in terms of economic and political systems. However, the European Union, often presented as a genuinely homogeneous bloc, is also composed of a very diverse set of countries, with conflicting national views and interests being the rule rather than the exception. In Chapter 2, Heungchong Kim analyzes the roles and policy positions of the various actors in the European monetary integration process and draws implications for East Asian countries. East Asian cooperation, he asserts, will require a good dose of pragmatism, a common vision, and a long breath. In Chapter 3, Koichi Hamada and Inpyo Lee draw attention to the relationship between international political conflicts and economic integration and examine the incentive structure needed for East Asian integration to progress. They argue that the benefits of regional monetary and financial integration may not only derive from the standard arguments highlighted in the economics literature. According to Hamada and Lee, purely economic incentives may not be strong enough to convince nations to join a monetary union. Just as they were in the case of the European Union’s decision to create an economic and monetary union, security reasons may turn out to be a critical motive for fostering monetary integration in East Asia. Part II is devoted to the very topical matter of developing bond markets in East Asia, presently the most ambitious venture in the area of finance in the region. Financial market development can be seen both as a precondition for monetary integration and as a desired outcome of monetary integration. Moreover, financial cooperation, which does not demand as much commitment as exchange rate cooperation, can be viewed as a testing of the waters before moves are made toward monetary integration. In Chapter 4, Guonan Ma and Eli Remolona discuss the rationale for developing a regional securities market and how cooperation in this area has developed so far. In particular, they examine one of the most important regional initiatives to promote regional bond market development, the Asian Bond Fund II, which was established by 11 central banks in East Asia and the Pacific in 2005. They show how working together to create a regional index bond fund and eight single-market funds helped the involved central banks to identify and overcome market impediments in local currency bond markets. In Chapter 5, Eiji Ogawa and Junko Shimizu turn to currency denomination in Asian bond markets. They estimate the risks of various currency basket denominated bonds and show that bonds issued in a currency basket comprised of East Asian currencies would, in general, reduce the foreign
Introduction
5
borrowing costs for bond issuers in all East Asian countries. Especially in the case of bond issuers in dollar-pegging countries, the foreign borrowing costs of issuing the currency basket denominated bonds would be lower than those of issuing home currency denominated bonds. The two contributions in Part III investigate the special role of the US dollar in East Asia. Before the Asian crisis, all East Asian countries except Japan pegged their currencies to the US dollar, either formally or informally. These (soft) pegs made them vulnerable to dollar–yen fluctuations, which contributed to the crisis. Despite numerous recommendations to freely float their currencies in order to avoid future misalignments and a recurrence of exchange rate crises, East Asian countries have in part returned to their pre-crisis exchange rate policies. In Chapter 6, Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber explain why most East Asian countries continue with their dollar pegs and develop what has become known as the Bretton Woods II view. They argue that the current international monetary system—in which a macroeconomically important periphery, emerging East Asia, fixes an undervalued exchange rate to the US dollar in order to promote an export-driven development policy—is analogous to that of the Bretton Woods period. So far, the US has willingly played the role of center country again, running balance of payments deficits and serving as the global financial intermediary. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber claim that the system will continue for years more because of the incentive that East Asian countries, especially China, have to absorb a vast pool of underemployed labor into the industrial system. Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl have a similar take on the dollar’s role in East Asia. In Chapter 7, they explain why continuing to peg to the dollar is entirely rational from the East Asian perspective and why the “East Asian dollar standard”, as they call it, is likely to continue. Rather than undervaluing their currencies in order to promote exports, as maintained in the preceding chapter, McKinnon and Schnabl argue that East Asian governments, in particular China, are trapped into maintaining soft dollar pegs. Because most East Asian economies have transformed themselves from dollar debtors into dollar creditors, they face what McKinnon and Schnabl call “conflicted virtue”, pressure to appreciate their currencies that could lead to a deflationary spiral and zero interest liquidity trap. In Part IV, the chapters by Ulrich Volz and by William Branson and Conor Healy argue that the region would be better off pursuing a path of monetary integration instead of relying on the external dollar anchor. In Chapter 8, Ulrich Volz puts forward three cases for monetary integration in East Asia. Besides the traditional trade argument that he underscores
6
Towards monetary and financial integration in East Asia
by estimating the effect of exchange rate stability on trade in East Asia, he also argues that monetary integration could help overcome the region’s problems with “original sin” and “conflicted virtue”. Moreover, he questions the conventional wisdom that monetary integration always goes along with a loss of monetary policy autonomy and argues that regional monetary integration could actually increase monetary policy influence for most smaller economies in the region. Volz reasons that the current situation under the East Asian dollar standard already severely limits policy autonomy in most countries and that moving toward regional exchange rate cooperation would increase the degree of policy freedom enjoyed by the region as a whole. William Branson and Conor Healy also speak out in favor of explicit regional monetary and exchange rate policy coordination in Chapter 9. Branson and Healy show that the trade structure of ASEAN and China, in terms both of the geographic distribution of imports and exports and of the commodity structure of trade, is consistent with the adoption of a common currency basket for region-wide exchange rate stabilization. Since East Asian countries’ trade patterns are quite similar and their policies are already implicitly coordinated through their (soft) pegs to the dollar, their real effective exchange rates tend to move together. This means that ASEAN and China are already moving toward integration in practical effect. Branson and Healy maintain that an explicit move toward exchange rate coordination, which would require macro policy coordination, would also support regional surveillance and the development of regional bond markets. Moreover, it would facilitate reserve-sharing under the Chiang Mai Initiative. This would, in turn, release reserves that could be invested in a new Asian Development Fund that could be used to support growth and poverty reduction. Part V is dedicated to one particular form of exchange rate arrangement that has received considerable attention since the Asian crisis—currency baskets. In Chapter 10, Gunther Schnabl discusses the rationale for currency baskets and presents original evidence of a move toward basket strategies in East Asia. He argues that because of underdeveloped capital markets and a very limited international role of domestic currencies, the East Asian countries (with the exception of Japan) are likely to continue exchange rate stabilization and the accumulation of international reserves. Yet expectations of a further depreciation of the dollar may trigger a broader orientation of exchange rate policies toward basket strategies. While the direction of trade would suggest a substantial weight for the Japanese yen in East Asian countries’ optimal currency baskets, the role of the euro is enhanced by high expectations of its long-term stability. Schnabl’s estimations of the basket structures of East Asian countries suggest growing euro and
Introduction
7
yen weights in the currency baskets of Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, while the dollar remains the dominant anchor currency for China, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. In Chapter 11, John Williamson, the originator of the currency basket proposal for East Asia, demonstrates how pegging to a currency basket consisting of the dollar, the yen, and the euro would contribute to the stability of the nominal effective exchange rates of the East Asian countries. Pegging to a common basket of major international currencies would not only stabilize the effective exchange rate against the shocks that would be imposed on a country’s macroeconomy by fluctuations in the value of these currencies (which can be highly destabilizing, as shown during the run-up to the Asian crisis) but also yield the benefit of increased regional stability. Williamson’s results indicate that, for countries already pegging to the dollar, pegging to a basket could result in significantly less instability than the current policy. In case of a desire to realize those benefits but also to avoid the risk of pegging, Williamson suggests adopting a managed float guided by the use of a common basket as numeraire. Such a numeraire is the topic of Masahiro Kawai’s contribution in Chapter 12. Kawai, however, proposes a currency basket different from the one Williamson has in mind. Rather than a basket of international currencies, Kawai envisages an Asian currency unit (ACU) consisting of East Asian currencies. The first idea behind the ACU is to monitor the collective movement of regional currencies against key external currencies (such as the US dollar and the euro) as well as each component currency’s movement against the ACU benchmark. Second, the ACU could be useful for developing new tradable instruments, such as futures or ACU denominated bonds. Third, Kawai argues that at some point in the future the ACU could play a role similar to that of the European ECU within a regional monetary system. The appeal of the ACU is that it provides a venue for initiating regional exchange rate cooperation without instantly requiring far-reaching commitments and without requiring the politically difficult task of selecting a single regional lead currency. The two final chapters of the book investigate the special role of the Chinese currency in the region. In Chapter 13, Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie Chinn, and Eiji Fujii take a fresh look at the renminbi debate that has been one of the hottest issues in international economics in the last few years. They show that the evidence of renminbi undervaluation may not be as strong as it appears, demonstrating that, depending on the estimation method used, conclusions may range from slight overvaluation to undervaluation. Even in the case of undervaluation, the results are not significant in the statistical sense. Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii also note that the fact that China is playing an important economic role in East Asia
8
Towards monetary and financial integration in East Asia
and that it has established a complex production and trade network with the neighboring economies complicates the calculation of the equilibrium exchange rate. Thus, a change of Chinese exchange rate policy in response to pressure from foreign countries and short-run considerations may have undesirable effects not only on the Chinese economy but also on the region as a whole. The final chapter by Zhang Jikang and Liang Yuanyuan examines the institutional and structural problems with China’s foreign exchange market and derives implications for the renminbi’s role in regional monetary integration. While China has made considerable progress in foreign exchange market reform and has thereby met the preconditions for gradually introducing more flexibility to its exchange regime, Zhang and Liang show that the foreign exchange market is still hampered by structural and institutional problems such as low liquidity, high market concentration, limited transaction instruments, distorted market supply and demand, and passive intervention by the People’s Bank of China. Along with the lack of deep and liquid primary and secondary financial markets, these factors will continue to limit the renminbi’s role in East Asia. For the time being, therefore, the renminbi is far from being prepared to take on the role of a regional anchor currency. Certainly, there are many more related topics that deserve our attention, but we believe that this collection of chapters covers some of the most momentous issues. This volume gathers together the cast of authors best qualified, we may be allowed to say, to tackle these questions and to explore the path to monetary and financial integration. Many scholars writing on East Asian integration emphasize that it took Western European countries almost half a century to create a common market and establish a monetary union and that at least the same time horizon might be realistic for East Asia. We are also fully aware of the numerous problems and obstacles—economic and political—that lie ahead on the way to East Asian monetary and financial integration. And, though we may not see an East Asian monetary union within the next decade, isn’t it amazing to observe the momentum gained and the speed with which East Asian countries have been pushing forward toward integration? Who would have seriously believed in a common East Asian bond market or even an ACU just a decade ago? The dynamics of East Asian integration should by no means be underestimated. The economic potential of the region and the shared desire since the Asian crisis to reduce dependency on Western financial markets will make it increasingly unlikely that the countries of emerging East Asia will continue to link their currencies to the US dollar. To draw an analogy to Europe, it is worthwhile to recall that the main impetus for European
Introduction
9
monetary integration was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. If we have a Bretton Woods II system today, it will be interesting to see how long the dollar will be able to provide stability to East Asia and if and when the region will emancipate itself from the dollar the way Western Europe did some 30 years ago.
PART I
The political economy of regional integration
1.
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience Michael G. Plummer and Reid W. Click1
1.1
INTRODUCTION
In November 2002, it was proposed at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Heads of Government meeting in Phnom Penh that the region should consider the possibility of creating an “ASEAN Economic Community” (AEC) by 2020, a timeframe that was later shortened to 2015. The name is evocative, for an “Economic Community” immediately brings to mind the European experience. In fact, when the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was “re-inventing” itself, it was proposed that the words behind the organization’s acronym be replaced with “Asia-Pacific Economic Community”. This idea was rejected explicitly for fear that it would give the impression that APEC was intending to move in the direction of the EC model, which was thought to be too controversial. That the ASEAN Heads of Government should consider an “Economic Community”, even with the baggage the term brings, is in some sense nothing new. ASEAN has always studied carefully European economic integration and seen it as a sort of “role model”, though certainly to be adapted in the Southeast Asian development context. In this chapter, we consider what lessons the European experience might hold for ASEAN, as well as extend some suggestions—based in part on the EU experience—as to how ASEAN might evolve into an AEC. We begin with a brief contextual consideration of ASEAN intra-regional economic interaction, in particular with respect to trade, with some comparison to the early years of the EU. This is followed in Section 1.3 by a review of the evolution of ASEAN economic integration, culminating in the AEC. Section 1.4 then proceeds to delineate some salient lessons of the EU experience for ASEAN. Finally, we give some suggestions as to how the AEC might proceed in Section 1.5.
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1.2
The political economy of regional integration
INTRA-REGIONAL ASEAN CONTEXT
As of 2004, intra-regional trade in ASEAN came to somewhat less than one fourth of total trade (Table 1.1). At the individual country level, intraregional trade as a percentage of total trade was highest for Myanmar (almost one half) and Laos (one third). In terms of the value of intra-regional trade, Singapore is number one (followed by Malaysia), though it should be noted that Singapore’s share is particularly high because of the fact that it engages considerably in intra-regional entrepot trade. The ASEAN trade share was lowest for Cambodia (8 percent) and Vietnam (13 percent). Outside of the region, approximately 14 percent of ASEAN exports were destined for the EU market, less than the 16 percent accounted for by the United States but greater than the 12 percent going to Japan. The EU is the most important single market for four ASEAN countries (Singapore, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam), the United States was the largest market for three countries (Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia), and Japan was the largest market for another three countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei). The “Triad” (the United States, Japan, and the EU) also dominate foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the region. Hence, regional economic integration in ASEAN has to be appreciated in the context of a regional organization whose most important economic partners lie outside the region. As will be discussed below, this important fact has been a key reason why ASEAN economic integration has been mainly geared toward “open regionalism”; the cost of an inward-looking approach to regionalism, or “Fortress ASEAN”, would be far too high. Regionalism in developing countries that have focused on creating fortresses has generally failed (e.g., the Latin American Free Trade Area). It would be a disaster in ASEAN’s case. Economic integration in Europe, therefore, stands in contrast to the ASEAN integration process. As we argue below, the EU2 in its earlier stages of economic integration had fairly high levels of trade protection. This was reinforced in the 1950s by the European Payments Union, which discriminated in favor of intra-EU imports. These policies implied considerable costs in terms of lost welfare, and certain institutional arrangements that emerged from the EU integration process (e.g., the Common Agricultural Policy, or CAP) continue to be expensive to the EU. However, in its early stages the share of intra-regional EU trade and investment in economic interaction was far higher than is the case within ASEAN today. For example, in 1958, the first year of the implementation of the European customs union, intra-EU trade was about two-fifths of total trade.3 By the time the customs union was complete, it came to over 50 percent.4 Today, it stands at about 60 percent.
15
71 550 126 510 39 680 179 674 96 245 4 511 518 170 2 589 540 3 161 25 850 550 310
17.1 24.0 15.5 22.0 18.1 17.2 20.5 3.0 19.4 44.6 11.4 20.2
18.2 25.1 17.2 24.3 22.0 17.2 22.6 7.5 32.8 45.3 13.0 22.2
6.4 6.7 6.7 8.6 7.4 4.5 7.4 1.1 2.1 5.9 13.6 12.2
World ASEAN- ASEAN- CH (%) (USD mil) 6 (%) 10 (%) 22.3 10.1 20.1 6.4 14.0 38.1 12.2 3.5 1.3 5.2 13.6 12.2
JA (%)
ASEAN exports to selected partners: 2004
55.6 51.3 54.8 53.2 50.4 73.9 52.9 12.5 36.5 58.5 39.5 52.1
APT (%) 37.8 44.8 35.0 50.7 38.5 35.8 43.9 9.1 35.3 66.2 26.4 43.0
DA (%) 2.9 3.6 1.3 4.2 2.9 14.1 3.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 7.2 3.6
CER (%) 12.3 18.8 18.2 13.0 16.1 8.6 15.2 55.9 0.6 0.0 20.1 15.5
US (%) 13.3 19.9 19.2 13.7 17.7 8.7 16.3 60.0 1.9 0.6 21.5 16.6
NAFTA (%)
12.2 11.8 16.4 13.7 14.3 2.6 13.3 25.5 27.0 15.5 22.5 13.8
EU (%)
Source:
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, CD-Rom (April 2000).
Notes: CH 5 China; JA 5 Japan; APT 5 ASEAN-10 plus China, Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong; DA 5 Developing Asia, i.e. all of Asia except for Japan; CER 5 Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement; NAFTA 5 North American Free Trade Agreement.
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Brunei ASEAN-6 Cambodia Laos Myanmar Vietnam ASEAN-10
Source
Table 1.1
16
The political economy of regional integration
In addition, it is relevant to note that intra-ASEAN trade has been essentially market-driven, rather than being the result of policy-driven discrimination in favor of intra-regional economic interaction. Again, this distinguishes ASEAN from the EU. Nevertheless, while one could argue that the change from 37 percent to 50 percent in the case of the EU was in part a result of discrimination, it is important to consider the relevant historical context: in the 1950s and early 1960s, Europe was still emerging from the devastation of World War II. Although it would be difficult to assess the economic reconstruction effect (complications with devising an “anti-monde” are many), no doubt the growth over this period was the result of a “normalization process”, during which time Europe grew rapidly relative to the rest of the world. Certainly, given the size, wealth, and distance of European economies, a gravity model would predict high levels of intra-regional trade even in the absence of EU discrimination. This is not the case for ASEAN. Even if ASEAN trades much more than one would predict given the “gravity variables” noted above (see, for example, Asian Development Bank 2002 and Frankel 1997), the economic characteristics of ASEAN member countries would suggest that, while by some definitions it is a “natural economic bloc,” its most important trade and investment partners will continue to lie outside the region, at least in the medium (and probably also the long) run. In sum, in terms of real integration ASEAN’s situation is quite different from that of the EU. Intra-regional trade and investment are considerably less in the case of ASEAN. The differences in the levels of economic development in ASEAN, whose member countries include among the poorest and the richest developing economies in the world, are far more significant than was the case in the EU in its early years, when each EU member country was a developed economy, or at least was so by the end of the 1950s. One should keep this in mind when trying to draw any lessons from the EU for ASEAN. Still, we would argue that the EU process has much to teach ASEAN, both in terms of positive and negative lessons. After all, no two development experiences are going to be the same. But this does not suggest that history has nothing to teach us.
1.3
EVOLUTION OF ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT
There have been many excellent surveys of regional economic integration in Asia (e.g., Kawai 2005, Naya 2002, Asian Development Bank 2002).5 ASEAN tends to stand at the core of Asian integration, at least from an institutional perspective. We provide in this section a brief contextual review of the evolution of ASEAN in a regional context.
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
17
Briefly, we would first suggest several factors influencing the regionalism trend in East Asia that stem directly from the Asian financial crisis, including: (1) the obvious contagion relationships, which demonstrated the presence of policy externalities across countries in ASEAN and the newly industrializing economies; (2) major disappointment with the US reaction to the Asian crisis, which left the feeling of “being in it alone together”; (3) disappointing progress in APEC in achieving closer trade and financial cooperation, as well as development assistance cooperation (“ECOTECH”); (4) Japan’s offer to create an Asian Monetary Fund during the Asian crisis (opposed by the IMF and the United States), which gave the impression that Japan wanted to be pro-active in the region; (5) arguably, China’s decision not to devalue during this period, which may have also created a sense of solidarity; (6) the “New Miyazawa Plan”, launched in October 1998, which dedicated USD 30 billion to help spur recovery in East Asia (and has been deemed highly successful);6 and (7) the discrediting of policies promulgated by the IMF to solve the crisis, which gave greater credibility to the “Asian approach”. Hence, the Asian crisis itself set the stage for serious and durable East Asian regionalism. There are many other internal and external forces at work that have expedited the process, such as the rise of regionalism globally and its potential negative effects on the East Asian region; the successful examples of the Single Market Program in Europe (discussed at length below) and, eventually, monetary union; general pessimism regarding what can be achieved at the WTO in light of failure to move forward at the Seattle and Cancun WTO ministerials; and the potential to tap the inherent benefits of FTAs. Table 1.2 gives a chronology of arguably the most important Asian initiatives, with a focus on ASEAN and “ASEAN Plus Three” (ASEAN13), that is, ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea. As many early agreements in ASEAN’s history were mainly political and token in nature,7 its first major initiative was the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. With the exception of the Japan–Singapore FTA (“Japan–Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement”, or JSEPA), which began implementation over 10 years later, AFTA is the only example of cooperation in Asia that is similar in concept to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, in true ASEAN fashion, rather than overly commit to regional integration in sensitive areas, the specifics of AFTA were purposefully left somewhat ambiguous, with the agreement basically committing the ASEAN members to free trade in a 15-year timeframe. Also, the definition of “free trade” was somewhat loose, as it included tariffs in the range of 0–5 percent, rather than the traditional zero percent.8 After the original agreement, ASEAN broadened the scope of goods covered by AFTA, and
18
Table 1.2
The political economy of regional integration
Chronology of Asian integration: ASEAN and ASEAN13
Main points: ASEAN
ASEAN Year Summit
1st Bali 1976 ASEAN Concord ● Established ASEAN Secretariat ● Treaty of Amity: Mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and identity of nations, i.e. noninterference ● Establishment of “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality” 2nd 1977 ● ASEAN Industrial Kuala Project ● Preferential Trading Lumpur Agreement (PTA) 3rd 1987 ● PTA accelerated Manila ● ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) accelerated and made more flexible ● ASEAN Free Trade 4th 1992 Area (AFTA) Singapore ● Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 5th 1995 Bangkok ● Proposal for 1st 1996 ASEAN Vision informal 2020 Jakarta 1997 2nd ● ASEAN 2020 presented, a broad informal Kuala long-term vision Lumpur for ASEAN in 2020 (with ASEAN Economic Community in mind)
ASEAN13 Main points: ASEAN13 Summits
1st Kuala Lumpur
1st meeting of ASEAN13
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
Table 1.2
19
(continued)
Main points: ASEAN
ASEAN Year Summit
1998 Hanoi Plan of Action 6th Hanoi adopted to move towards Vision 2020: ● AFTA advanced to 2002, 90% intraregional trade subject to 0–5% tariff ● ASEAN Investment Area (AIA): goal investment liberalization within ASEAN by 2010, outside ASEAN by 2020 ● ASEAN Surveillance Process ● Eminent Persons Group (EPG) proposed to come up with plan for ASEAN Vision 2020 EPG develops plan for 3rd 1999 Vision 2020: informal ● Financial cooperation Manila proposed over concern that ASEAN was not effective in responding to Asian crisis ● AFTA to be sped up ● AIA to be accelerated ● To respond to surge of China, need to become more competitive, attract investment, implement faster integration, and promote IT Adopted Initiative for 4th 2000 ASEAN Integration informal (IAI): Singapore ● Framework for more developed ASEAN
ASEAN13 Main points: ASEAN13 Summits 2nd Hanoi
●
East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) proposed by Kim Dae Jung, President of Korea, to look into East Asian integration
●
East Asian Study Group (EASG) to consider
3rd Manila
4th Singapore
20
The political economy of regional integration
Table 1.2
(continued)
Main points: ASEAN
●
ASEAN Year Summit
ASEAN13 Main points: ASEAN13 Summits
members to assist those less developed members in need Focus on factors needed to enhance competitiveness for new economy: education, skills development, and work training
●
●
●
●
●
●
Discussed 7th challenges facing Brunei ASEAN: declining FDI and erosion of competitiveness. Created a roadmap to achieve ASEAN integration by 2020 Proposed going beyond AFTA and AIA by deepening market liberalization for both trade and investment
2001
5th Brunei
●
●
EAFTA and agreement to hold East Asian Summit Two big ideas proposed: (1) Development of institutional link between Southeast Asia and East Asia (2) Study group for merit of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and investment area Financial cooperation begun, e.g., Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of May 2000. By March 2006, bilateral swap arrangements under the CMI came to USD 71.5 billion Expert group study on ASEAN–China FTA proposed EAVG recommendation for EAFTA endorsed but overshadowed by China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement proposal within 10 years, with the adoption of the Early Harvest Provision to speed up FTA Prompted by China–ASEAN FTA proposal, Prime
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
Table 1.2
(continued)
Main points: ASEAN
●
AEC end goal of Vision 2020
ASEAN Year Summit
8th Phnom Penh
2002
9th Bali 2003
● ●
Vientiane Action Plan Australia attends for the first time
Source:
21
10th 2004 Vientiane
ASEAN13 Main points: ASEAN13 Summits Minister Koizumi proposed Japan– ASEAN Economic Partnership in reaction to China– ASEAN proposal ● Japan–Singapore Agreement for a New Age Partnership signed January 2002 and enforced summer 2002 6th Phnom EASG Penh recommendations of deepening and broadening of East Asian integration adopted. ASEAN13 Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) endorsed by ASEAN13 Deputies Meeting in December 2002 in Chiang Mai 9th Bali At the ASEAN13 Finance Ministers Meeting on August 7, 2003, support is extended to the ABMI as well as to other means of closer financial cooperation 10th China speeds up FTA Vientiane with ASEAN from 2015 to 2010
Adapted from Naya and Plummer (2005).
22
The political economy of regional integration
the period of implementation has been shortened such that AFTA was technically in full effect at the beginning of 2004 for the original ASEAN countries and Brunei, though there are transitional periods for products on the temporary exclusion lists (e.g., sensitive products such as rice and automobiles in some cases) and some country-specific implementation problems in certain areas. The original target for full implementation for the newer ASEAN members was 2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia. Recently, ASEAN decided to speed up the process such that AFTA would be fully completed by 2007. ASEAN has also made important strides in the area of investment cooperation, such as in the form of ASEAN “one-stop investment centers” and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).9 These efforts at industrial cooperation have been designed with essentially the same goal in mind as AFTA, namely, to reduce transaction costs associated with intra-regional economic interaction. As was noted above, in November 2002 the ASEAN Heads of Government proposed that the region should consider the possibility of creating an “ASEAN Economic Community” by 2020.10 This explicitly put the European experience front and center in terms of design, though clearly the ASEAN leaders had in mind an economic community with ASEAN characteristics. The ASEAN leaders actually agreed, at the Bali ASEAN Summit in October 2003, to create a region in which goods, services, capital, and skilled labor would flow freely, though the details remain to be worked out. We offer our own recommendations in this regard, colored by the EU experience, in the penultimate section. The reasons behind the decision to create the AEC are many, including: (1) the desire to create a post-AFTA agenda that would be comprehensive; (2) the perceived need to deepen economic integration in ASEAN in light of the new international commercial environment, especially the dominance of FTAs; (3) given (2), the possibility that bilateral FTAs could actually jeopardize ASEAN integration since all member states were free to pursue their own commercial-policy agenda; and (4) the recognition since the Asian crisis that cooperation in the real and financial sectors must be extended concomitantly, and that free flows of skilled labor will be necessary to do this.11 In addition to an ebb in progress related to the APEC “Bogor Vision” of open trade and investment, there have been several events that have shifted the ASEAN focus to its East Asian neighbors. First, even with the successful APEC Summits at Blake Island and Bogor, the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) concept, proposed as an East Asian “trade bloc” by Prime Minister Mahathir in December 1990, never faded away.12 On the contrary, it began to grow in substance. Strangely, the initiative
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
23
came from ASEAN’s effort to expand economic cooperation with the EU, as the EU’s desire to deal with all of East Asia led ASEAN to ask China, South Korea, and Japan to participate. The first Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok in March 1996, and officials from ASEAN and the rest of East Asia met with EU representatives—a format that was regularized and has continued twice a year since. Even though the initial impetus for these meetings was economic cooperation with the EU, the significance for East Asian regionalism lies in the fact that these meetings brought officials from ASEAN, China, South Korea, and Japan together to discuss issues of economic cooperation. In 1997, these meetings culminated in an informal summit of the ASEAN13 heads of state in Kuala Lumpur. The original “Miyazawa Plan” was initiated by Japan during the Asian crisis to create an Asian Monetary Fund to supplement the IMF. It was opposed by the IMF and the United States but eventually led to the establishment of currency swap arrangements among East Asian countries (basically bilateral swaps between Japan and individual countries) during the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in May 2000, the “Chiang Mai Agreement” (CMI). The CMI is actually a milestone in the financial cooperation of the region in that it constitutes the first step in the process of financial and monetary cooperation initiatives, which have become an increasing priority of the ASEAN13 leaders. Since the CMI, myriad proposals for cooperation have been put on the table, and a few have actually emerged as promising new features of Asian regional cooperation. For example, the ASEAN13 Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), which was endorsed by ASEAN officials at the ASEAN13 deputies meeting in December 2002, endeavors to create more efficient bond markets in Asia and to reduce the risks associated with raising international capital.13 A complementary initiative was started by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), which launched the Asian Bond Funds I and II in June 2003 and June 2006, respectively (see Ma and Remolona, Chapter 4 in this volume). APEC’s lack of influence in the Asian financial crisis has served to solidify East Asia’s move in favor of an ASEAN13 approach. The current spate of agreements, however, have not been extended to the entire ASEAN13, but rather have come more from ASEAN to individual countries. For example, the completion of the China–ASEAN joint FTA study in the summer of 2001 prompted Japan to quickly initiate a study of its own with ASEAN. One month later, at the 2001 ASEAN13 meeting in November, ASEAN and China announced their intention to negotiate a free trade area within 10 years (the agreement was formalized in a framework agreement in December 2004).
24
The political economy of regional integration
1.4
LESSONS FROM THE EU
In trying to glean EU lessons for the AEC, we might begin with several caveats regarding the differences between the subjective environments facing the EU (EEC) in the 1950s and those facing ASEAN today: ●
The institutional environment facing ASEAN in the first decade of the 21st century is much different than that facing the EU of the 1950s.
European integration was clearly pushed by both memories of a devastating war and emerging Cold War concerns. The political and social motivations for economic integration were, thus, far different than those driving ASEAN initiatives today, though, it should be added, ASEAN has been instrumental in keeping Southeast Asia a peaceful region, an important contribution that is often underestimated. The “European Good” is interpreted much differently in Europe than the “ASEAN Good” in ASEAN; this puts considerable limitations on institutional development at many levels. Importantly, it reduces the possibility of the relinquishing of power by ASEAN member nations to supranational organizations. Besides, such institutional development is difficult in the ASEAN context anyway, given that: (1) nation-state formation is much younger than was the case in the European context, and in some countries this still requires a strong priority; (2) divergences in socio-political institutions are far greater than they were in the European context, especially as in some European countries these institutions were being created anew after the war; (3) it is not clear that European institution-building has been particularly successful in all areas, though it would receive high marks for economic-related matters (though this, too, is a testable hypothesis); and (4) these European institutions are quite expensive, while ASEAN government budgets are much smaller (though, fortunately, ASEAN would not have to employ an army of translators, as the EU does). That said, it is important to note that the notion of the “ASEAN Good”, though viewed differently in the ASEAN context, has been changing over the past 10 years. For instance, 10 years ago, few in the region (or the rest of the world) knew what ASEAN was; today it is well known. ●
The international economic environment is far different today than it was in the 1950s.
First, the contemporary global marketplace is extremely open relative to the past. This is true because of extensive reductions in trade barriers internationally, as a result of the GATT/WTO rounds as well as unilateral
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
25
liberalization and huge increases in international capital flows (including FDI), which have increasingly been knitting an integrated global marketplace. Hence, the costs of using regional integration as a form of “fortress”, that is, to maximize trade diversion, are consequently much higher than they were in the past. Second, regionalism has grown by leaps and bounds recently; trade groupings reported to the WTO come to well over 200, with a majority being established after 1995. Some of these groupings include ASEAN’s most important trading partners and could potentially isolate ASEAN, as well as forcing it to pay the costs of trade diversion. These trends further underscore the need for the AEC to be open as well as for the organization to be engaged in the regionalism movement. The more integrated the ASEAN marketplace is, the easier this will be. These considerations were far less important in the European context. ●
ASEAN features far greater diversity in terms of economic development.
We mentioned in section 1.2 that ASEAN is far more diverse in terms of levels of economic development than was the case of the EU in its earliest phases, when all countries were developed. While the expansion of the EU to include 10 Central and Eastern European countries in May 2004 significantly increased diversity within the EU, the region is still dominated by developed countries and is far more symmetric than ASEAN, which features developed countries, “dynamic Asian economies”, middle-income developing countries, and least-developed countries. As of 2004, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) on per capita income levels across ASEAN member countries came to 1.62, compared to 0.65 for the EU.14 Hence, the divergence within ASEAN is far greater than that of the EU, and the countries are far poorer. This suggests that matters related to the speed of implementation of the AEC, and even the ability of ASEAN to be completely inclusive for all member states, will be complicated and difficult. Phased “10-X” strategies, which is what AFTA in effect embraces, may be not only desirable but necessary. ●
ASEAN countries are far more open than was the case of Europe in the 1950s.
ASEAN countries are (economically) small and very open relative to the EU of the 1950s (and even with respect to most EU countries today), with the exception of a few of the transitional CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam) countries. ASEAN countries are closely integrated with international markets through international trade as well as multinational
26
The political economy of regional integration
networks. Not only is this a reality, but it is also a policy focus for ASEAN governments. As noted in section 1.2, intra-regional trade and investment in ASEAN is far less important than was the case with the EU and will likely continue to be so in the future. This is another reason why one would expect the AEC to embrace openness much more than the EU might have. In addition, even as an integrated market, ASEAN countries together still could not influence international terms of trade (the AEC would still be relatively “small”), suggesting that the “optimal” Common External Tariff would be zero. This was not the case with the EU. Having noted these caveats, we can delineate at least three major lessons that can be drawn from the real-side integration experience of the EU. First, we might begin with a negative lesson: ASEAN should avoid some of the pitfalls of inward-looking discrimination from which the EU continues to suffer (especially in agriculture) but which would be potentially catastrophic in the context of the ASEAN countries. Intra-ASEAN trade is only about one-fourth its global trade (compared to two-thirds in the case of the EU) and ASEAN member states are highly integrated globally. Hence, any real-side economic cooperation needs to be outward-looking. In fact, this approach is exactly what the ASEAN leaders ostensibly have in mind, that is, using ASEAN as a means of “going global”. Some scholars have noted that AFTA is actually more of an investment agreement than a trade agreement; free trade reduces intra-regional transaction costs and presents to multinational corporations a vertically integrated market. The AEC should never lose this vision, even when, as in the European case, compromises may have to be made. The EU countries are developed, high-income countries that together form a large economic space. They were able to push economic integration behind relatively protected markets, in the context of an international economy that was still fairly closed. Today, the GATT/WTO has opened up markets considerably and most of the world, the EU and ASEAN included, have internationalized extensively. It could be argued that such a protected approach was not necessary to begin with and should have been avoided (the CAP has been, by many measures, a disaster); however, the cost of an inward-looking approach has increased exponentially. It is not a viable option for the AEC. Second, and partly related to the first, the European experience teaches us that trade–investment links matter and that these relationships are shaping in large part the economic structure of the ASEAN economies. While the transitional ASEAN countries are still in early stages of the economic development process, the original ASEAN countries have experienced tremendous changes in their productive structures in general and trade in particular. Primary-based exports (roughly estimated as SITC 0–4) have
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
27
fallen in all original ASEAN economies.15 Of the original ASEAN countries only Thailand continues to have a large agricultural-export base (it is, for example, the largest exporter of rice in the world), but it, too, is falling in importance. Energy (SITC 3) continues to be important to Indonesia and Malaysia, with the former being at present a marginal oil importer. The big change throughout the region has been the impressive—in some cases, spectacular—increases in the share of SITC 7, that is, electronics and transport equipment (for ASEAN this means mainly electronics). Over the 1990s, the share of SITC 7 increased in all ASEAN countries. Indeed, in most countries it is the largest export sector; it constituted 58 percent, 41 percent, 72 percent, and 68 percent of total exports in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, respectively.16 While economic reform has played an important role in this process of structural adjustment, so has foreign investment. Tamamura (2002) uses input–output analysis to capture the FDI–export link in East Asia, as well as to decompose the effect of external demand (by country) on production, using electric/electronics as a case study. He finds that, for 1995 (his latest year), in every (original) ASEAN country, external demand induced more production than domestic demand except (marginally) Indonesia, where, however, domestic demand fell in relative importance from 87 percent to 52 percent. Most countries followed a similar pattern of internationalization of electronics production. The most extreme case among the ASEAN countries was Malaysia, where domestic demand induced only 6 percent production. Next, it is noteworthy that most of the directives that led to the creation of a tightly integrated market for FDI in Europe came with the Single European Act, which commenced in 1986–87 and essentially created what is mostly a common market by 1994. The European experience teaches us that accomplishing such a feat goes well beyond mere national treatment/ most-favored-nation treatment in the regional marketplace: economic cooperation needs to reduce myriad transaction costs associated with FDI, including those related to the labor market, different product standards, and the like. The AEC will have to focus per force on many of these areas. A third lesson relates to how the EU has been able to gain from intraregional trade liberalization, though, as noted above, this could have been better organized to minimize trade diversion. The customs union played an important role in building a regional market; the Single European Act, by creating a Common External Commercial Policy, was able to do much more by keeping real-side transaction costs within the EU to a minimum and producing a truly regional marketplace, resulting in a more efficient division of labor in most markets. It should be stressed, however, that the AEC should be concerned not merely with increasing intra-regional but rather with increasing global
28
The political economy of regional integration
economic interaction more generally, of which the ASEAN market is only one part—in fact, a part that can be used as an international springboard. Trade and investment integration policies in ASEAN should be expected to achieve the same general results as they did in the EU case, but this increased interaction might actually manifest itself in a different way, given the facts that ASEAN countries are so diverse and that most are still developing countries. To reiterate: the AEC should be a means of increasing economic prosperity and the social good rather than focusing on, say, increases in (sometimes, misleading) indicators such as shares of intra-regional trade and investment. A successful integration program could theoretically lead to a decrease in regional integration, as measured by trade and investment shares, for example.17 A final point would regard the European experience with respect to financial and monetary cooperation and integration, though in part this goes beyond the traditional interpretation of the AEC (discussed below). ASEAN member countries have considered the formation of an ASEAN bond market, though problems related to liquidity, potential market depth, and the like have led ASEAN to think more in terms of an Asian bond market. This will be a long process.18 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider the European experience as well, given that empirical studies (e.g., Frankel and Rose 1998) have shown that monetary integration has strong effects on trade and investment flows. In the past, just about every regional economic integration program focused in the beginning almost exclusively on the real side of the economy. Financial integration was always treated as something separate, to be taken up at a later date. In many ways, this is less true for European integration, though the point is debatable. While the European Payments Union was a financial arrangement, it was only ad hoc and was quickly phased out as soon as European currencies became convertible. This was just as the Treaty of Rome actually began implementation. The EC did publish the Werner Report, which mapped out a plan for monetary union at a time of great turbulence in the Bretton Woods System (1968), and after the Bretton Woods System collapsed it tried to create the (short-lived) European Snake and, eventually, the European Monetary System, which expanded the Snake in March 1979. These attempts at exchange-rate cooperation were important because the “customs union plus” needed stable exchange rates in order to run well. Such cooperation was especially necessary for the CAP: the main goal of the CAP was to stabilize farmer incomes, and flexible exchange rates put this at risk, as a country with a depreciating currency had an advantage over an appreciating-currency country, which was incompatible with the acquis communitaire. Hence, the EC had to develop a “green” exchange rate system, called “monetary compensation amounts”
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
29
(MCAs), which prevented this “adverse” structural change from happening. However, this system was very expensive: Pomfret (1997) suggests that the MCAs constituted over 15 percent of the CAP’s huge budget. Nevertheless, European capital markets tended to be substantially segmented until the implementation of the Single European Act was fairly advanced. There had been early attempts to create a single banking market as far back as 1972, 15 years after the Treaty of Rome, and in 1977 the European Council established the First Banking Directive (which did very little to integrate the markets19), but these and other attempts only marginally integrated the regional markets until the Single European Act initiatives. Today, the European banking system is far more integrated, but some aspects of finance continue to be among the few areas in which the single market is still incomplete. Capital controls were removed as part of the Single European Act program. In sum, even in the case of the EU, financial integration did not keep pace with integration in the real sector. The tendency seems to be to let financial issues wait, but experience shows that this is an unwise policy. The Asian crisis might also be seen in this light. Prior to the Asian crisis, APEC, for example, all but ignored financial and monetary cooperation, and ASEAN itself did little. In creating the AEC, therefore, ASEAN leaders would do well to focus on financial issues in tandem with real-sector integration. Regarding EU lessons in monetary cooperation, we must again underscore that comparisons are difficult, as relative economic-divergence problems continue to be critical. Nevertheless, even the EU is a diverse group, especially if one considers regions rather than countries. Moreover, ASEAN’s needs in economic cooperation are obviously quite different than those of the EU. While ASEAN integration may be popular in the region, it is less popular than in Europe, particularly among government leaders. In addition, various EU states had perennial macroeconomic (especially, fiscal) problems; economic and monetary union allowed these member states to implement necessary austerity measures in the name of European integration. The result, after a very long process, has been convergence in terms of interest rates, inflation, and other monetary variables. Yet, the credibility of most of the original ASEAN countries in terms of monetary and fiscal policies is actually quite high, especially for developing countries: inflation tends to be quite low in the original ASEAN countries, and most countries had either budget surpluses or essentially balanced budgets prior to the Asian crisis. Today, most have large current-account surpluses. Nevertheless, there continue to be widely divergent interest-rate spreads within ASEAN; convergence could have a major impact on development in certain member countries (discussed below).20
30
The political economy of regional integration
Hence, neither political nor political-economy dynamics, which were favorable in the case of most Eurozone countries, could be considered as important in the case of ASEAN. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, things are changing. It has become clear to ASEAN leaders that there exist “policy externalities”; some sort of restrictions on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy could not only improve the macroeconomic environment in the ASEAN countries but also promote regional economic stability. Moreover, the possibility of competitive exchange-rate devaluations could be damaging to the implementation of the AEC. Political arguments for wanting to be part of Europe for European countries would be replaced in the ASEAN context by a fear of repeating the economic disaster of the Asian crisis. Such cooperation could be formally arranged inside or outside of the AEC framework, without any pretension to the initiatives leading to monetary union. Based on the EU experience, closer financial and monetary cooperation in ASEAN could have the following benefits: (1) the necessary Maastrichttype agreements (e.g., restrictions on budget deficits, government debt, inflation, even foreign-currency exposure of the banking system), perhaps interpreted more liberally than in the EU context, that would go along with such cooperation would create a more stable macroeconomic environment in the region, thereby producing significant positive policy externalities; (2) as monetary policy would likely be driven by the most credible country/ countries, less credible countries would be able to “import credibility”, much as, for example, Italy was able to import German monetary credibility; (3) interest-rate spreads would converge, making it easier to price risk at the regional level and lower the cost of capital; and (4) the harmonization of rules, accounting standards, and regulatory frameworks that might accompany regional integration as part of the AEC and in associated financial initiatives would render the region more attractive to foreign investors, as well as stimulate intra-regional capital flows.21 It would also make cooperation and even institutional integration of ASEAN equity and fixed-income markets easier, something that has happened partially in the EU (e.g., smaller stock markets have integrated while the larger markets continue to function separately). The process of financial and monetary cooperation is complicated, and effective integration demands a steady pace of progress, rather than abrupt changes, which can actually be counterproductive. The EU process of financial integration and exchange-rate cooperation, leading up to eventual monetary union, is instructive. The European Currency Unit (ECU) was a basket of the currencies of the member countries of the EC, weighted in line with each country’s GDP and foreign trade (and therefore subject to change periodically). It was introduced in 1979 as part of the European
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
31
Monetary System (EMS), to be used as the benchmark for determining the overvaluation/undervaluation of individual currencies and to serve as a unit of account among the central banks participating in the EMS. No physical ECU notes or coins ever circulated, so the ECU was strictly an artificial denomination. However, certain European banks established a banking product that allowed lenders and borrowers to carry out transactions in ECU. At first, an ECU transaction was just a portfolio of transactions in the separate underlying currencies; a deposit or loan in ECU typically was recorded as separate deposits or loans in the individual currencies. However, banks soon established a clearing mechanism for the ECU, thus enabling the transfer of ECU without necessitating separate transactions in each of the component currencies. This facilitated the growth of the ECU for private commercial transactions; residents could use the ECU as a unit of account for bank deposits, and companies could use it for invoicing sales or maintaining their accounting records. The first ECU-denominated bond was issued in 1981, just two years after the introduction of the currency basket. The ECU subsequently became a significant “currency” denomination in the Eurobond markets, outranked only by the US dollar and the German mark. A substantial amount of ECU-denominated bonds were placed privately as well. The use of the ECU in private transactions developed rapidly because the ECU exchange rate tended to be more stable than those of its component currencies. For European investors and borrowers, a depreciation of an individual home currency against other European currencies was offset by an increase in the home-currency value of the ECU, so there was an incentive to hold ECUs to diversify a portfolio. Similarly, non-European investors and borrowers were drawn to the ECU because it was less risky than the underlying individual currencies. In short, the ECU was an attractive alternative to single foreign currencies because it was less sensitive to the volatility of a single currency. On January 1, 1999, the euro replaced the ECU on a one-for-one basis as part of the first stage of European Monetary Unification (EMU). The fact that the ECU existed for 20 years prior to EMU suggests that the simple introduction of a currency basket serves as a useful precursor to closer monetary cooperation. The success of the ECU was partially because its official status within the EMS bound the central banks of the participating countries together. Its success was also due in part to the fact that the private sector found a pan-European currency denomination quite useful, and because the banking system was able to accommodate the demand. Certainly, the creation of an Asian Currency Unit that would enjoy widespread use, or the eventual creation of a common currency in Asia, can
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only be a long-run goal. However, the economics are ostensibly lining up in favor of such an initiative, and certainly Asian governments have been placing a higher priority on monetary and financial cooperation. Hence, perhaps we will not all be dead when this goal is reached.
1.5
ON BUILDING THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Given the tremendous diversity of ASEAN, how will it be able to create its own “customs union plus”, even by 2015? Tariff dispersion rates across ASEAN countries are, indeed, impressive: while ASEAN members tend to have fairly low tariffs and non-tariff barriers relative to other developing countries (except for the transitional ASEAN economies), they still vary considerably across the region. Moreover, Singapore is unique: it essentially has no tariffs. Given the openness of its economy (trade accounts for over 300 percent of GDP), Singapore cannot raise tariff rates to accept an ASEAN Common External Tariff that is not equal to zero. The EEC did not face this problem. Likely options here would include a complete freetrade zone in ASEAN, perhaps with some external tariff harmonization, or a “10-X” customs union, in which the Common External Tariff would be determined through negotiations similar to those of the EEC, but which not all ASEAN countries would join. It is not clear exactly what form the AEC will take. Some scholars have suggested a less ambitious approach to the AEC, including an “FTA-plus” arrangement, which would include certain elements of a common market (e.g., the free flow of capital, the free flow of skilled labor, and zero tariffs on intra-regional trade) but would not have a Common External Tariff. Noting that the European example teaches that without integrated external tariffs markets continue to be segmented and key benefits of integration are stymied, Plummer (2005) recommends that a 0–5 percent Common External Tariff in an AEC at least be explored for the more developed ASEAN countries. ASEAN might accept making exceptions in very few industries that might be integrated later on (this was done in MERCOSUR—the “Southern Common Market” comprising Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil—with automobiles, yielding mixed results). While perhaps more difficult to implement, this option would have the effect of reducing transaction costs in the region substantially, mitigating any trade diversion potential of regional integration, increasing the ability of ASEAN to negotiate integration accords with other trading partners, and augmenting its clout in international organizations. It could be a critical step in turning ASEAN into a truly open marketplace.
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
33
This approach is not really foreign to ideas that ASEAN leaders have proposed in the past, such as the Philippine proposal to multilateralize AFTA cuts. Moreover, many ASEAN countries have committed themselves to “open trade and investment” by the year 2020 as part of the Bogor Vision of APEC. True, it is unclear exactly how the Bogor Vision will be achieved, or even what it means: APEC has not completely spelled out the details, and many ambiguities persist. However, tariffs and non-tariff barriers in ASEAN have been falling over time anyway and will continue to do so thanks to Uruguay Round commitments, potential commitments under Doha (if successful), and the liberal posture of the ASEAN leaders. In this sense, the AEC could be recognized as a purely outward-oriented endeavor. Fortress ASEAN was never an option. Why not, then, create an essentially open region? The economic argument for protectionism is extremely weak, as ASEAN leaders have recognized. Some might continue to adhere to the infant-industry argument. But this argument has been more of an excuse for protection than a true means of efficient industrialization in ASEAN and elsewhere. Even the accelerated AEC process has provided plenty of time for any industry to go through its transition. Besides, in order to make the infant-industry argument convincing, one must identify financial bottlenecks that prevent firms from setting up comparative advantage industries. Given the state of financial markets in at least the original six ASEAN countries, this is not a problem. Moreover, this open-market solution does not mean that governments would have to throw away their ability to foster industrialization directly, should they desire to do so. Regardless of the merits of an active industrial policy, it is still possible even in an open customs union. This is something that the European experience clearly shows. Even today, almost a decade after the completion of the Single European Act and four years after monetary union, governments still tend to have active industrial policies, for example through direct subsidies, special financial and tax credits, and even de facto administrative rules. The EU has formal restrictions on these, but they are constantly tested (e.g., the EU market in financial services is far from complete). Tariffs have always been a clumsy way to foster industrialization, and non-tariff barriers tend to be even worse. Of course, the transitional economies pose an important problem here. Cambodia, for example, until recently received about 70 percent of its government income from import-related taxes. However, it is reducing reliance on international-trade-based taxes as part of its reform program, and this has also been the case in the other CMLV countries. Vietnam has made tremendous progress in its transition program and should be ready to join AFTA in 2006. Allowing the logical progression of this reform program to continue to 2015 will not be easy but would be quite desirable
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The political economy of regional integration
from an economic development perspective. Again, 2015 is a long way off, and much can happen between now and then; Vietnam has reinvented itself from a non-market, closed, and state-directed economy into an increasingly outward-looking, market-oriented economy in less time than it will have for the AEC. It may even be possible for ASEAN to allow for a longer-term transition period for Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, especially since there remain political uncertainties in these countries. Regarding labor flows, we note that it would be politically difficult to adopt the Single European Act approach of (technically) free labor mobility. Moreover, this would not be necessary in the ASEAN context, at least from the point of view of multinationals and of integrating the region with the global marketplace. Yet, the free flow of skilled labor would be important, as would be the facilitation of visas for non-ASEAN nationals in the context of a regional framework. However, the process will be difficult, as it was in the European case. Mutual recognition of professional qualifications, university and technical education, and the like will require a great deal of work. Yet, this process actually presents a good opportunity for the region, and especially for the CMLV countries, to embrace “best practices”. It may well be that the process will be easier for ASEAN than it was for the EU, as fewer entrenched special interests and less general resistance to reform in this area are present. Many would welcome this approach. The idea of adopting “best practices” also extends to other areas that were important in the Single European Act, such as product testing, technical standards, food/health-related standards, and the like. Mutual recognition will be necessary in these areas and, hence, harmonization of at least minimum acceptable standards will have to be developed. Codes should borrow from internationally accepted standards wherever possible. Attracting FDI is an important priority among ASEAN leaders. The usefulness of a regional approach has been recognized from the beginning, with the (generally, failed) attempts at industrial cooperation in the mid-1970s, the (marginally more successful) initiatives of the late 1980s, and, finally, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) in 1998. The AIA is surprisingly comprehensive; once the exclusion lists are incorporated into the mainstream, it will have gone a long way toward creating an integrated ASEAN market, though national policies will have to be increasingly harmonized in order to create a truly regional market. There is no doubt that FDI will be a high priority in the AEC and that this vision of an integrated market for FDI will not be attainable without the transaction-costs-reducing liberalization and facilitation initiatives under other aspects of the AEC. Free flow of services will also be necessary, especially since services are becoming increasingly important in the ASEAN countries, a process that
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
35
will continue as ASEAN countries develop. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), which takes a “GATS-plus” approach, is an important step toward creating an integrated market. Free flow of services in the AEC will merely involve an expansion in existing commitments since the third round of AFAS negotiations, which began in 2001, should at least in theory cover all sectors and “modes” of service provision defined by the OECD, that is: (1) cross-border supply, in which a company exports the service from home, for example by fax or email; (2) consumption abroad, in which the user of the service consumes it outside his/her home country, for example tourism; (3) commercial presence, in which a company directly supplies the service to foreign customers (this involves establishment of an affiliate abroad and constitutes over three-fourths of all trade in services); and (4) the presence of natural persons, in which case the service-exporting country sends personnel abroad to supply services. The AEC will ultimately have to ensure a generally open market in services, including no policy-induced discriminatory restrictions (including trade taxes), national treatment, mutual recognition, and the like. This was a difficult process in the EU, as some of these sectors remain quite sensitive. For example, in the financial services area, the Single European Act stipulated three principles for integration: (1) the observance of specific minimum requirements; (2) the mutual recognition of member states’ legislation; and (3) the prevailing of the “home country principle”, whereby the regulations of the country in which business was taking place would take precedence (rather than those of the host country).22 However, not even the Single European Act has succeeded in fully integrating the financial services sector; retail banking services in particular continue to be segmented and protected on a national basis. Moreover, the “Services Directive”, which would serve to create a more integrated market in EU services (particularly in light of the EU 2004 expansion), was rejected in early 2005. Hence, as the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services is expanded as part of the AEC process, it will be necessary to integrate services sectors carefully, for the service sector is by its very nature more complicated than the goods sector. Moreover, the AFAS progress to date has been weak, and there is a reason for this: certain services are sensitive politically. Most likely, it will be necessary to exclude certain sectors from complete liberalization, but these should be kept to a minimum. Developing appropriate institutions under which the AEC can evolve will be necessary. While the ASEAN Secretariat has come a long way, it will have to be enhanced drastically in order to facilitate the creation of the AEC. It will need to have a much larger professional staff recruited from throughout the region and with a regional—rather than national—commitment, as is the case in the EU. Many of the directorates of the EU could be emulated
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in the ASEAN context. But it is our view that the bureaucracy should be kept, to paraphrase Albert Einstein, “to the minimum possible but no less than that”. The first reason for this is that the EU bureaucracy is simply too big and expensive. In the second place, the drain on human capital in the ASEAN context would be detrimental to other domestic policy priorities, an important consideration for the CMLV countries in particular. Third, at least in the first stages of creating the AEC, ASEAN could keep the “social bureaucracies”, which are fairly substantial in the EU, somewhat of a separate project. While these institutions were important in making the EU what it is today, ASEAN, as noted above, is characterized by a very different socio-political context. A fourth and related point relates to the creation of a “mini-state” in ASEAN, as has been done in the case of the EU, such as in developing an integrated executive, legislative, and judicial system. Because the willingness within the EU to develop supranational institutions is more the exception than the rule, in our view ASEAN should try to minimize the supranational character of AEC, taking the idea of “subsidiarity” to the greatest extent possible. The executive component of ASEAN integration would have to be enhanced considerably, but this could arguably be done by adapting and expanding current institutions. On the other hand, the creation of some sort of judicial authority to “enforce” (hitherto a bad word in ASEAN) AEC rules will be necessary. No doubt this will be difficult; the EU continues to have its own problems (e.g., the Alstom case in France is a good example, but there are many more). As in the case of the EU, it would have to be an evolutionary process. The Asian crisis has underscored the need for greater monetary and financial cooperation, given the importance of these areas to future regional economic development and their importance in supporting initiatives in the real sector. This differentiates it to some degree from the EU experience, in which financial/monetary cooperation came later. Moreover, the fact that ASEAN’s trade and investment links are dominated by partners outside the grouping would suggest that the recent widening of cooperation outside of strictly ASEAN-based institutions to include China, Japan, and South Korea gives it a much greater incentive to promote cooperation in the area of financial and monetary integration, no doubt a reason for the popularity of the ASEAN13 initiatives.
1.6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we have tried to consider what the objectives and substance of the AEC should be, using wherever possible appropriate lessons from the world’s most successful example of regional economic integration,
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
37
the European Union. We note that while there is much that the EU can teach ASEAN, ASEAN leaders should not underestimate the differences between the regions and the differing historical contexts. The EU integration experience is remarkable. It took a great deal of time before it became a truly integrated market—about 37 years from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 until the implementation of the Single European Act, which was essentially complete in 1994. Once the process was given a big push in the mid-1980s, however, integration initiatives picked up steam, culminating in monetary union only five years after the promulgation of the Single European Act. At times, some leaders and experts gave up on the EU; the process certainly was familiar with “crisis”. In 1976, for example, France (temporarily) slapped import tariffs on Italian wine. In the early 1980s, market segmentation increased with the use of non-tariff barriers outside the purview of the EC, leading some to suggest that the EC was doomed to retreat. After the September 1992 crisis in the EMS, it was very easy to be pessimistic about the future of monetary union. There were skeptics up to the very the end. But the EU was able to persevere because of the commitment of its leaders and critical social elements. This is a very basic lesson: given the fact that the AEC will have to be far more comprehensive and “intrusive” in national markets than has ever been the case before, it will take strong commitment, indeed, in order to move the process forward. No doubt this is why there is much skepticism regarding the AEC. It was no different in the case of AFTA: in the late 1980s, many pundits were speculating that since the region’s political exigencies had changed, ASEAN had no future as a regional organization. Instead, the ASEAN leaders responded by pushing forward impressively on the economic front, and AFTA became the first major initiative in this process. Since then, AFTA has expanded and deepened, cooperation has advanced significantly in the area of investment (AIA), liberalization of services is being actively pursued in the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, other “deepening” measures are being spearheaded, and horizontal integration has expanded about as far as it can go, as ASEAN is now composed of all 10 Southeast Asian nations. While the AEC will take a much more extensive commitment, it can certainly be realized if the ASEAN leaders have the political will to see it through.
NOTES 1.
An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Inaugural Session of the Regional Integration Seminar Series, Office of Regional Economic Integration, Asian Development Bank, on November 28, 2005, in Manila, the Philippines (and was
38
2.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
8. 9.
10.
11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16.
17.
The political economy of regional integration published in 2006 as one of its working papers), at the joint session of the American Economic Association/American Committee on Asian Economic Studies (and is published along with the rest of the session’s papers in Vol. 17 (3) of the Journal of Asian Economics), January 2006, as well as at the December 2006 HWWA/HWWI conference on East Asian Monetary and Financial Integration in Hamburg, Germany. The authors would like to acknowledge interesting inputs offered at these meetings, especially those by Drs Kawai, Rana, and Capannelli. All remaining errors are those of the authors alone. We have a difficult acronym issue in this chapter: the European Union (EU) was the successor to the European Community (EC), which integrated the various economic communities in Western Europe, including the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). We use EU throughout this chapter for simplicity, but we are actually referring here to the EEC. Hiemenz et al. (1994), Table 2, p. 8. Ibid. This brief review of ASEAN integration borrows from Plummer (2006) and Naya and Plummer (2005). Kawai (2005). For example, the Preferential Trading Agreement was a positive-list approach to trade liberalization with small margins of preference and limited product coverage, expanded somewhat during the 1980s but with no real impact on trade. Industrial cooperation, such as the ASEAN Industrial Project system, never really got off the ground. In fact, this range of tariffs probably contradicts the requirements spelled out in Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO, but as was noted earlier ASEAN benefits from the Enabling Clause, which has always freed it from these constraints. A salient component of the AIA is the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme, which offers more in terms of tariff (0–5 percent) and non-tariff incentives than the traditional industrial cooperation programs. Moreover, in September 1996 the ASEAN countries created the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, which among other things stipulates the simplification of investment procedures and approval processes, as well as enhanced transparency and predictability of FDI laws. At the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, December 2005, the ASEAN leaders discussed the possibility of expediting the AEC process to actually complete it by 2015 (with flexibility for new member countries). This was agreed upon at ASEAN’s annual meeting in January 2007. The free flow of all labor, including unskilled labor, was deemed too politically difficult to consider in the AEC. When proposed, the EAEG was highly controversial, as it suggested that Mahathir wanted to create what might have been construed as a discriminatory bloc, which ran contrary to the goals of ASEAN and, of course, APEC. At the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, it was downgraded to the more innocuous (and vague) East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). For more details on this initiative, see the ADB’s “Asian Bond Markets Initiative” homepage, http://aric.adb.org/asianbond/ASEAN-ABMI.htm. Authors’ calculations, using data on GDP per capita from World Development Indicators On-Line. In 2004, average per capita income in the 10 ASEAN countries and the 25 EU countries came to USD 5271 and USD 18,984, respectively. Data for this structural-change analysis come from Plummer (2003). The case of the Philippines is the most dramatic and surprising: the value of SITC 7 exports increased over this period by over 100 percent, with the largest changes in SITC 723 (civil engineering and contractors plant and parts), SITC 728 (machine & specialized equipment), 736 (machine tools), 751 (office machines), and 752 (automatic data processing machines). This is because, for example, a successful AEC that brings in higher FDI flows from abroad—a key aim of the AIA—would not only reduce intra-regional FDI but also
The ASEAN economic community and the European experience
18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
39
could reduce intra-regional trade, if multinationals take advantage of the attractive regional division of labor offered by ASEAN. For example, suppose that, as a result of the AIA, a Japanese automobile multinational set up production stages in Indonesia and Singapore, whereby it exports USD 2 billion in car components to Indonesia, adds USD 100 million in labor-intensive value added to production in Indonesia, exports the semi-processed product to Singapore for further USD 1 billion in processing, and then finally exports back to Japan. This means that ASEAN intra-regional trade would have changed at the margin by exports to Singapore from Indonesia (USD 1.1 billion) divided by exports of Japan to Indonesia (USD 1 billion) plus imports of Japan from Singapore (USD 2.1 billion), or 35 percent, whereas extra-regional trade would have increased by 65 percent. The point is that this could be a successful economic activity for all parties involved, but intra-regional trade shares might fall anyway. See, for example, Plummer and Click (2005). Story and Walter (1997) note (p. 14) that of the EU’s 9434 credit institutions at that time, 429 were classified as foreign banks, and only 107 had a parent company based in a member state. Governments were reluctant to grant licenses. See, for example, Plummer and Click (2005). For a more complete discussion of the potential benefits and costs of financial market cooperation and integration in ASEAN, with comparisons to Europe, see Plummer and Click (2005) and Click and Plummer (2005). Story and Walter (1997).
REFERENCES Asian Development Bank (2002). Asian Development Outlook 2002. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Click, Reid W., and Michael G. Plummer (2005). “Stock Market Integration in ASEAN.” Journal of Asian Economics 16: 5–28. Frankel, Jeffrey (1997). Regional Trading Blocs in the World Trading System. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Frankel, Jeffrey, and Andrew K. Rose (1998). “The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria.” Economic Journal 108: 1009–25. Hiemenz, Ulrich, Erich Gundlach, Rolf J. Langhammer, and Peter Nunnenkamp (1994). Regional Integration in Europe and Its Effects on Developing Countries. Kieler Studien 260. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2003). “Concept Paper on the ASEAN Economic Community.” Manuscript, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Kawai, Masahiro (2005). “East Asian Economic Regionalism: Progress and Challenges.” Journal of Asian Economics 16: 29–55. Naya, Seiji F. (2002). The Asian Development Experience. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Naya, Seiji F., and Michael G. Plummer (2005). The Economics of the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Plummer, Michael G. (2002). “EU and ASEAN: Real Integration and Lessons in Financial Cooperation.” World Economy 25: 1469–500. Plummer, Michael G. (2003). “Structural Change in a Globalized Asia: Macro Trends and U.S. Policy Challenges.” Journal of Asian Economics 14: 243–81. Plummer, Michael G. (2005). “Creating an ASEAN Economic Community: Lessons from the EU and Reflections on the Roadmap.” In Denis Hew (ed.),
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Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 31–62. Plummer, Michael G. (2006). “Toward Win–Win Regionalism in Asia: Issues and Challenges in Forming Efficient Trade Agreements.” In Working Papers on Regional Economic Integration. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Plummer, Michael G., and Reid W. Click (2005). “Bond Market Development and Integration in ASEAN.” International Journal of Finance and Economics 10: 133–42. Pomfret, Richard (1997). The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Story, Jonathan, and Ingo Walter (1997). Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tamamura, Chiharu (2002). “Structural Changes in International Industrial Linkages and Export Competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific Region.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 19: 52–82.
2.
The political economy of European economic and monetary union negotiations and implications for East Asia Heungchong Kim1
2.1
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 1997–98 in East Asia provided a valuable—though costly—lesson for the East Asian countries in the importance of regional cooperation. In the course of the developing crisis, East Asian countries observed that neighboring countries were not at all helpful because of the lack of cooperative facilities within the region, and they were shocked by the posture of mere observance adopted by the advanced countries. The East Asian countries realized that the remarkable economic growth they had achieved over the years was based on a house of cards. After the crisis had passed, various kinds of proposals for regional economic cooperation, to strengthen economic stability as much as economic growth, were discussed and developed in East Asia, including the Chiang Mai Initiative, a burgeoning number of regional free trade agreements (FTAs), potential East Asian bond markets, and so on. While trying to develop proper institutions and tools for regional economic cooperation, it is strongly recommended that East Asia take an interest in the European economic integration process, investigate Europe’s past experiences, and creatively adapt them to East Asia’s circumstances and needs. The creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe with the introduction of the euro is a good example of economic and monetary integration that East Asia could follow. An examination of the competing views among the European Union (EU) member states on the path to monetary integration and how they were subsequently resolved provides important insights for East Asian countries that have just launched the early stages of monetary cooperation. This chapter attempts to prove this kind of examination. It analyzes the process of EMU negotiations, mainly during the crucial 1988 to 41
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1991 period, in order to derive lessons for potential East Asian monetary cooperation and integration. It excogitates major issues from the EMU negotiations, compares the views of major member states on each issue, and clarifies the process of reaching agreements from the different negotiative positions. The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 introduces a brief history of European monetary integration, including the European Monetary System; section 2.3 clarifies some points regarding the formation of EMU and evaluates the current developments in monetary integration in East Asia; section 2.4 illuminates the roles played by the major nations in the EMU negotiation process; and section 2.5 applies the roles revealed in that process to the case of East Asia. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION
The idea of a united Europe was once merely a dream conceived of by philosophers and visionaries such as Victor Hugo, who imagined a peaceful “United States of Europe” inspired by humanistic ideals. But the dream was unable to come to fruition because of centuries of war that raged on the European continent. However, the terrible experience of the two World Wars increased the determination to end hatred and rivalry in Europe and build lasting peace between former enemies. The architects of modern day Europe, such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Alcide de Gasperi, recognized that a process of European integration could provide such a lasting peace in Europe and that it could only be achieved gradually by starting with concrete economic and political issues that would have spillover effects in the creation of supranational institutions. This was termed the functional approach toward integration. The motivation for establishing EMU was partly political and partly economic in nature. One impetus was to facilitate trade between the EU countries by eliminating currency exchange costs and uncertainties relating to exchange rates. Another motivating factor was the belief that greater integration between the EU countries’ economies would facilitate the pursuit of common objectives such as a strong growth rate and a high level of employment. However, in a Europe recently ravaged by two World Wars, the ultimate objective was to promote closer European integration in order to avoid future conflicts between former enemies.
European EMU negotiations and implications for East Asia
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The Bretton Woods Era and its Aftermath Despite the fact that the idea of a common European currency began to be discussed in the 1960s, it would take more than 30 years before that vision would materialize. After the Second World War, countries with market economies adopted the Bretton Woods system in order to promote currency stability. The Bretton Woods system was based on a system of fixed but adjustable parities with the US dollar, and it worked well before it faced severe problems in the late 1960s when the credibility of the US dollar was repeatedly damaged. In the European currency market, the devaluation of the French franc and the appreciation of the German mark threatened the stability of the other currencies in the system and jeopardized the system of common prices set up by the Common Agricultural Policy in 1968–69. In light of these developments, the Barre report of 1969 called for greater coordination of economic policies and closer monetary cooperation. The report gave new momentum to the integration process. In December 1969, at the Hague Summit, the European heads of state or government reached an agreement to make economic and monetary union an official objective of European integration. Furthermore, a high-level group chaired by Pierre Werner, then prime minister of Luxembourg, was entrusted with the responsibility of drafting a report on how the goal of economic and monetary union could be achieved by 1980. The Werner Report, submitted in October 1970, envisioned the conclusion of a fully integrated economic and monetary union within 10 years through the implementation of a three-stage plan. The end goal was to accomplish full liberalization of capital movements, the irrevocable fixing of parities, and the replacement of national currencies with a single currency. The report put forward the idea of establishing a European Monetary Cooperation Fund in the first stage as a precursor to a community system of European central banks in the final stage. Despite disagreement over some of the key recommendations of the Werner Report, in March 1971 the member countries gave their approval to pursue monetary integration in three stages. The first stage required the narrowing of currency fluctuation margins and was implemented according to the plan.2 Nevertheless, new developments stalled the progress: the decision of the US government to suspend the gold convertibility of the dollar in August 1971 and the subsequent breakdown of the Bretton Woods system had a destabilizing effect on foreign exchange rates world-wide and also raised questions about the parities between the European currencies. Consequently, an attempt was made in March 1972 to provide intra-regional exchange rate stability by forming the “Snake in the Tunnel”,3 but the oil crises, the weakness of the dollar, and differences in economic policies caused members to back out of
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the Snake until membership was reduced to Germany, the Benelux countries,4 and Denmark, with the Benelux currencies and the Danish krone tied to the German mark. The European Monetary System In March 1979, President Valery Giscard d’Estaing of France and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany proposed the European Monetary System (EMS), an institutional framework that would replace the Snake with a new system of adjustable exchange rates. The EMS was intended to lay the framework for the creation of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary stability in Europe. The EMS was built on three pillars: (1) the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), (2) the European Currency Unit (ECU), and (3) the credit mechanisms of financing facilities. All of the member states of the European Community joined the EMS, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which opted out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. In the period 1979–91, the EMS helped stabilize exchange rate variability, and sustainable currency stability was achieved thanks to the flexibility of the system and the political resolve to attain economic convergence. The ERM was one of the cornerstones of economic and monetary union. The ERM was conceived in an effort to stabilize exchange rates, encourage trade within Europe, and control inflation. It arose as a result of a compromise between France, which wanted the exchange rate band to be defined around the ECU, and Germany, which wanted the exchange rate band to be defined bilaterally. Thus, each participating country’s currency was allowed to fluctuate within a band defined around each of its bilateral central rates and another band defined around its ECU central rate.5 As the EMU process advanced, the ability of each country to keep its currency within its defined margins became one of the convergence criteria that had to be met in order to be eligible to join the single currency. To ensure that each member country had the necessary resources to intervene in defense of the bilateral exchange rate parities, extensive financing mechanisms were created. In April 1973, the member states of the European Community decided to launch the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) in order to facilitate the establishment of an economic and monetary union. The idea for setting up a fund was first proposed by the heads of state or government at the Hague Summit in December 1969, and it was later included in the recommendations of the Werner Report. Within the EMS, the EMCF was responsible for facilitating the gradual narrowing of the margins of the community currencies against one another, the administration of the Short-Term Monetary
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Support Facility established as a result of an agreement between the community’s central banks, and the multilateralization of positions in the Very Short-Term Financing (VSTF) Facility that arose from intervention carried out by the central banks in community currencies. The establishment of the EMCF resulted in the administration by the Fund of all bilateral debts and credits held by community central banks in regards to the VSTF facility of the Snake arrangement. The adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in the mid-1980s allowed the community to fulfill its objective of removing impediments to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. However, the Single Market Program also highlighted the existing problems of high transaction costs related to currency conversions and uncertainties associated with exchange rate fluctuations, both of which hampered the exploitation of the full potential of the internal market. Thus, for federalists and those adopting a functional approach toward integration, the next step after the SEA would definitely be toward a monetary union. EMU The Hanover European Council set up a committee in June 1988, chaired by Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission, to draft a proposal for an economic and monetary union. The Delors Report, submitted in April 1989, proposed a three stage plan, with the execution of Stage I bringing about closer monetary and economic cooperation and with the deadline for implementation set for July 1, 1990 at the latest, to coincide with the implementation of the full liberalization of capital flows within the community. It also emphasized the need for greater coordination of economic policies, rules on the size and financing of national budget deficits, and a new, completely independent central bank, which would be responsible for the union’s monetary policy. On the basis of the Delors Report, in June 1989 the European Council agreed to begin Stage I on the proposed date and reaffirmed the commitment to reach an economic and monetary union in subsequent steps.6 In December 1989, the Strasbourg European Council called for an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that would help identify the amendments that needed to be made to the Treaty in order to accomplish economic and monetary union. The efforts of the aforementioned IGC together with that of a second IGC on political union7 resulted in the Treaty on European Union, which was formally adopted by the heads of state or government at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991 and signed on February 7, 1992. The Treaty set out a timetable for economic and monetary convergence in three successive stages.
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During the first stage, which began on July 1, 1990, the European Council was responsible for evaluating progress made with regard to economic and monetary convergence, and member states would be asked to adopt certain measures to comply with certain restrictions specified by the Treaty.8 Stage I did not precede exactly according to the plan because of currency tensions during the period from September 1992 to August 1993. Nonetheless, the transition to Stage II occurred according to the timeline set forth by the Treaty. Stage II called for the completion of a “convergence play”9 of a majority of the member states and the establishment of an operational framework for a common central bank with a single monetary policy. Thus, at the beginning of Stage II, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was established as a precursor to the European Central Bank (ECB). The EMI was responsible for ensuring a smooth transition to Stage III by strengthening the coordination of monetary policies of the member states with the goal of attaining price stability, making necessary preparations for the establishment of the ECB, and overseeing the progress of the ECU, including ensuring the smooth functioning of the ECU clearing system. Stage III started on January 1, 1999, and it saw the establishment of a single monetary policy that was overseen by the ECB, which took over responsibility for monetary policy from the national central banks. At this stage the euro became the common currency of the 11 members of the monetary union (Greece only joined in 2001). Furthermore, the ERM was transformed into ERM2, the exchange rate arrangement linking currencies of EU countries outside the monetary union to the euro. The crowning achievement came on January 1, 2002, when euro notes and coins were introduced in all EMU member countries. For a specified time, the national notes and coins were legal tender alongside the euro. On March 1, 2002, the euro became the sole legal tender in the countries participating in the monetary union.
2.3
REFLECTIONS ON THE FORMATION OF EMU AND EAST ASIAN MONETARY INTEGRATION
As mentioned earlier, the founding fathers of modern Europe recognized that European integration could only be achieved step by step, by starting out with concrete economic and political issues that would have spillover effects leading to the creation of supranational institutions. The integration process was an evolutionary one, which initially began with real economic cooperation between members. As countries began to realize the gains from real economic cooperation, they came to the understanding that
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they would also need to establish monetary cooperation with each other in order to fully enjoy these gains. European monetary integration can be described as a process of trial and error. It is important to realize that monetary and financial integration was not an explicit aim in the first postwar initiatives. After the creation of the Bretton Woods system, European currencies were embedded in the worldwide system of fixed exchange rates, giving little incentive for European countries to create their own active exchange rate policies (Reszat 2003). It was the problems with, and the eventual collapse of, the Bretton Woods system that provided an impetus for the project of monetary union, as formalized by policymakers in the Barre and Werner Reports. After the first initiative of intra-regional exchange rate stabilization, the Snake, failed to provide the desired sustainable currency stability, European leaders had to conceive new ways of stabilizing exchange rates. Eventually, based on the success of the EMS and the refinement of the process set out in the Delors Report, the plan for implementing EMU was drafted, with timelines created for the initiatives. However, as we have seen, the different stages of advancement were not without problems, and compromises and exceptions had to be made before the end goal, a common currency, could be reached. East Asia can learn from the strategies employed in the course of the EMU negotiation process and recognize the importance of sticking to principles while at the same time allowing exceptions. For example, exceptions were made in the case of the United Kingdom and Denmark, allowing them clauses for exemption from the third stage of EMU negotiations. The protocol was necessary in order to secure the United Kingdom’s agreement to the Treaty. During the process of Treaty ratification, speculation caused by the rejection of the first Danish referendum in June 1992 and uncertainty surrounding the French referendum in September 1992 resulted in speculative monetary turbulence and compelled Italy and the United Kingdom to withdraw their currencies from the ERM. In the summer of 1993, the French franc, too, came under strong pressure. The crisis cast doubts on the feasibility of EMU.10 Despite these setbacks, the preparations went ahead and the set timetables were respected. The important lesson to be learnt here is that when countries have a common goal (such as a monetary union) they can work out their differences and overcome impediments that threaten progress. Consider now the case of the East Asian integration process. East Asia has greatly benefited from the globalization of financial markets. From the middle of the 1980s onwards, the dynamic economic growth of the region was fuelled by huge capital inflows. However, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 triggered huge capital outflows from the region and caused great
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damage to its economies in the form of a sharp depreciation of exchange rates, steep falls in asset prices, collapses in investment and consumer confidence, and a sharp fall in income. The financial crisis acted as a wake-up call to East Asian countries, clearly showing that their capital markets were not adequately equipped to deal with globalized financial flows. In the post-crisis period, there was growing awareness among the East Asian countries of a need to collectively respond to such situations in the future because of their growing regional integration, as evidenced by their mutual susceptibility to contagion (Wang and Andersen 2002). But East Asia faces several obstacles to monetary integration. One major hindrance is the area’s lack of experience with regard to regionalism. The East Asian countries have very little experience of macroeconomic policy coordination and have not developed any institutions to implement it.11 Also, huge gaps in financial expertise, technology, infrastructure, and market size between the East Asian emerging markets and the international financial centers in developed countries have led to the financial services in the region being provided mostly by foreign corporations, often in New York or London. This could in turn act as a barrier against sufficient expertise being developed in the region and also put constraints on the extent to which regional identification develops as a driving force (Wang and Andersen 2002). Moreover, the two largest economies in the region, China and Japan, differ considerably in their strategies. Japan, the most developed country in the region with a strong international currency, is confronted with skepticism by the other East Asian countries and especially China, which is not willing to let Japan play the lead part in regional integration. Also, as a result of Japanese commercial banks having been driven out of the financial services markets because of prolonged financial problems, the yen is declining in importance, thus making the role of Japan as a leader in the creation of an East Asian economic entity seem increasingly unlikely. China, on the other hand, despite its fast growth and expanding trade relations with its neighbors including ASEAN, is presently lacking deep financial markets and an international currency that would enable it to act as the center country of East Asian monetary integration.12 All of these factors will make it increasingly difficult to reach a consensus on economic and financial integration in an increasingly bipolar East Asian region. While an economic upturn in Japan and more intimate Sino-Japanese relations might help in fostering regional cooperation, nonetheless, the greater differences in governments, legal and regulatory environments, levels of economic development, and local histories than was the case with Europe suggest that the integration process will take considerable time.
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Finally, one of the driving forces behind European integration was the desire for a united Europe. This idea of a common citizenship is lacking in East Asia. In order to reap the benefits of a monetary union, countries will have to cooperate in the political arena as well, and East Asian leaders will have to build a common framework in which decisions are reached based on what is best for East Asia. At present, they do not show the same ambitions that European leaders exhibited half a century ago. Furthermore, East Asia needs to develop ways of interacting that promote collaboration rather than competition between countries. In light of all these obstacles, we can easily see that East Asia has a long way to go before regional integration can be accomplished.
2.4
THE MAIN PLAYERS IN EUROPE’S EMU NEGOTIATIONS
East Asia still has a lot of work to do before it can hope to establish an economic and monetary union. As East Asia differs considerably from Europe and cannot simply emulate its experience with monetary union, it will have to chart its own course toward integration. We nevertheless believe that the process of EMU in Europe can provide important lessons and models for different types of possible coordination and cooperation. In order to derive such implications for monetary cooperation in East Asia, we investigate the roles of the major players in European economic and monetary integration—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Benelux, and the European Commission—in negotiating EMU. Germany The joint initiative of Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and President Francois Mitterrand of France resulted in a great leap toward the establishment of EMU during their years in power in the 1980s and 1990s. They were convinced that Europe could only be united on the basis of Franco-German reconciliation, with both countries acting together as a locomotive driving the process of European integration. This shared belief contributed a lot to the success of EMU negotiations by preserving “key bilateral relations” between Germany and France. During his 16 years in power (1982–98), Kohl presided over Germany’s unification and became the driving force behind European integration. Kohl’s early years in power were marked by Germany’s growing pains from unemployment and a deep national divide over the deployment of nuclear weapons on German territory. In 1989, the collapse of the East
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German regime and the fall of the Berlin Wall allowed Kohl to grab the “mantle of history”. He became the main influence behind German unification. By skillfully balancing pressure and persuasion, he convinced leaders in Eastern and Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union and the US to accept a large and unified Germany, ending half a century of Cold War division. In Kohl’s view, German unity and European unity were two sides of the same coin. Tying Germany into the double framework of EU and NATO, Kohl hoped to avoid a replay of great power rivalries. However, the triumph of national unification was soon dampened by a string of problems, not only because of structural problems with the European economy but also because of the costs and consequences of unification itself. Like a majority of European countries in the 1990s, Germany faced increased global competition, rising welfare costs, and high unemployment, particularly in its traditional industrial sector. No less importantly, it also faced the overwhelming added expenses of unifying East and West Germany. As a result of a legacy of inefficiency, the former East German economy collapsed, hundreds of thousands of East Germans faced unemployment, and East Germany became heavily dependent on federal subsidies. In a sense, Germany’s EMU participation added another burden to the economic challenge of German reunification. Within the ERM regime, the German mark was the only currency that had never been devalued and acquired great credibility and a reputation as a “hard” currency. In order to maintain parity with the mark, other countries had to adopt domestic monetary policies as disciplined as Germany’s. This caused asymmetry within the functioning of the ERM, with the burden of adjustment falling disproportionately on other countries. Thus, the West German people were generally opposed to entering into EMU because they feared the loss of their monetary supremacy. There were also concerns that entering a monetary union with less disciplined countries would result in a European currency potentially weaker as compared with the mark. To soothe these concerns, the German government, as well as the Bundesbank, demanded many concessions from the other European countries in order to ensure a stable European currency. For instance, the German negotiators insisted on the independence of the common central bank and pushed through the Stability and Growth Pact to ensure that monetary stability would not be undermined by the fiscal recklessness of individual member countries. Over the course of EMU negotiations, Germany had allies in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Luxembourg (and sometimes the United Kingdom), all of which supported the “economist” approach. The economist approach to monetary integration stressed that monetary
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union must be the end result of a long process of economic convergence, following the freeing and opening of markets and, not least, the complete liberalization of capital movements (Stoltenberg 1988). These strategic allies greatly helped the German view dominate during the planning stages of EMU. France France, under the leadership of Francois Mitterrand, played a great role in the advancement of EMU. Mitterrand’s strategy on EMU—balancing domestic interests against international and European interests—reflected those of former French presidents Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. They all envisaged an EMU that would counter the monetary hegemony of the US with a common European stance on international monetary reform. At the same time, it would deal with German monetary power by Europeanizing it (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Thus, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Mitterrand pushed for the goal of an EMU with a single currency in order to deepen German integration within Europe. Some of the notable influences on Mitterrand’s policy on EMU were a belief in the unique French role in Europe as the birthplace of democratic values, the desire to be disassociated from the fiscal irresponsibility that was linked to the political left, and memories of French humiliation at German hands, this last factor being the single most important one in the decision to forge closer ties with Germany to ensure peace between the two countries. The vested interest that the French had in European integration also manifested itself in the idea that the French had ownership of European integration. The French felt that they could play a special civilizing role in the world. While Germany’s contribution to the EMU would be economic, the French would contribute through their art, language, and culture. In contrast to the economist approach favored by Germany, France took the so-called monetarist approach, as did Italy, Belgium, and the European Commission.13 The monetarists believed that the way to achieve economic convergence was through the establishment of a new monetary institution that would in turn change market behavior. This argument was consistent with the “community method” approach to European integration, which stressed the role of elite socialization in new institutional structures as the most appropriate method for building Europe (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The theoretical premise of the monetarist argument was that external discipline could be used to promote the twin goals of domestic policy reform and external credibility.14
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The United Kingdom As mentioned earlier, the Franco-German alliance formed the core of the integration process in Europe, as it was the political will of these two countries that motivated further integration. European unification and FrancoGerman reconciliation were judged to be in both France and Germany’s best interests. British negotiators, however, held a different opinion about the relation of European unification to vital national interests. They saw Europe as one of several fora, rather than a central forum, through which British interests could be pursued (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Unlike the French and the Germans, the British had a different perception of the necessity of European unification for securing strategic interests. The United Kingdom stands on the boundaries of Europe. As victors emerging from the Second World War, the United Kingdom did not see European integration as a necessary foundation for its security. Furthermore, Britain’s special relationship with the United States caused it to place more emphasis on transatlantic relations. Thus, while the British government favored the single market policy, leading to liberalization, deregulation, and the free movement of capital, it rejected the idea of a monetary union with a single currency, a single European central bank, and stated fiscal policy rules. The then prime minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher, refused to participate in the Stage I negotiations outlined by the Delores Report if there would be any binding commitments requiring participation in the next stage and the eventual adoption of a common currency. British negotiators like Thatcher, Lawson, Major, and Lamont were reluctant to transfer the sovereignty of monetary policy to a European Central Bank and accept EC rules on fiscal policy. Thatcher was deeply suspicious that European integration was progressing in a federalist manner, with institutions such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice increasingly infringing on national sovereignty. The British government proposed a Hard ECU (HECU) that would become the common currency of the Community. It also proposed that the central value of the HECU not be devalued against other currencies and that over time the HECU become the dominant currency of the union. Unsurprisingly, the British proposal had little support, as the Bundesbank did not want to create a European currency without having an independent European central bank oversee it. Like the Germans, the Danish, and the Dutch, the British mostly supported the economist approach to monetary integration. They advocated that a potential monetary union be the end result of a long process of economic convergence among EC countries, beginning with the opening
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of markets and capital liberalization. They also believed that a multi-speed Europe should be a possibility, since different states would converge at different speeds.15 Benelux In the course of European integration and especially the process of EMU, we cannot deny the important role of big member states such as France and Germany. However, it would be misguided to attribute the formation of the EMU exclusively to the Franco-German alliance or to the convergence of the interests of the four largest countries. Rather, the construction of the EMU was a collective, multilateral achievement, in which all member countries, including the smaller ones, played a part (Maes and Verdun 2005). Great achievements such as approval of the Treaty on European Union could not have been realized without support from small and medium-sized member states, as all member countries of the European Union enjoy the same formal rights within the union, irrespective of their population and economic size. In this regard, the Benelux countries occupied a peculiar position in the process of European integration. The three countries had already formed a customs union before the European integration process that started after the Second World War.16 Hence, they were regarded as a model for European integration and, as such, a “testing bed” for Europe-wide integration. The Benelux countries had long realized that smaller countries (or regions) would be better off if they fused their strengths, so it was an easily accepted premise in the Benelux countries that European integration was the best policy for guaranteeing peace and prosperity for themselves as well as for Europe. The Benelux union was a forerunner of economic integration, which made its countries’ voices more credible and persuasive in the negotiation process. The Benelux countries were some of the strongest supporters of monetary integration throughout the whole EMU negotiation process. Benelux contributed to European integration in many areas, developing many new ideas and tactics. The Spaak report, the Werner report, the Tindermans report, and Duisenberg plan, all bear the names of big figures of European integration from Benelux countries that greatly contributed to the acceleration of the integration process when its momentum began to diminish. The idea of a flexible, “multi-speed Europe” was originally proposed by Belgium, which preferred a realistic approach to European integration. Benelux diplomats were famous for being mediators competent at reaching consensus among seemingly conflicting views and contributed greatly to the success of negotiations.
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In the area of monetary integration, however, Belgium on the one side and the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the other side displayed competing views. While Belgium supported the monetarist approach together with France and the European Commission and was very active in creating the institutional background for monetary union in the Community, the Netherlands and Luxembourg went hand in hand with Germany in their support for the economist approach. All in all, Belgium is said to have played a pace-setting role, as it was a consistent demandeur (Maes and Verdun 2005). Belgium’s constant concern was to have EMU on the agenda. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had a more restrictive view of the conditions under which EMU was possible. Together with Germany, they also took a harder line on the criteria for entry and were seen as gate-keepers (Maes and Verdun 2005). The Netherlands and Luxembourg, however, did not merely side with Germany. They, together with Belgium, were keen to promote vivid discussion among member states about monetary integration. The European Commission It is worthwhile to note the central role played by the European Commission in the negotiation process, despite the fact that it is not a nation with sovereignty but an organization. The European Commission was from the start an active participant in negotiations on the proposed monetary union. Within the institutional framework of the European integration process, the original treaties gave the Commission specific duties, chief among which were that it be an advocate of the common interests of the member states, an initiator of common positions, an objective arbiter between national interests, and, lastly, the guardian of the treaties. The Commission generally supported the French positions on the process of candidacy requirements, EMU implementation, such as the introduction of the opt-out clause, the flexibility of convergence criteria, and fiscal federalism, as it explicitly preferred EMU progress under more relaxed requirements to making no progress under stricter conditions. Jacques Delors played a very important role in the relaunching of the project of EMU. As president of the Commission, Delors was extremely invested in the EMU, and after overcoming resistance from Thatcher he went ahead with his goal of putting monetary union back on the EC’s agenda. The Delors Report helped design the EMU and set timelines for subsequent negotiations. He is one of the main actors and contributors of the formulation of EMU in Europe. The European Commission was also important in facilitating the negotiation process, since it was an independent institution. The European
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Commission was actively involved in the negotiation process that resulted in the Hague Summit, which proposed the establishment of a step-by-step plan for the achievement of EMU. It produced a number of documents addressing shortcomings in economic integration and monetary cooperation and thus provided the background for the decisions made at the Hague Summit. The commission created the first plan toward monetary integration in stages, and the Werner Report drew greatly on this plan. The Delors Report became the reference document for the Maastricht Treaty and for the implementation of EMU over the next 10 years, which resulted in the introduction of a single currency in 1999.
2.5
THE ROLES OF THE EAST ASIAN STATES17
Turning to East Asia and its still young attempts to foster regional monetary and financial cooperation and integration, it is still to be seen how the process will advance and who the key players will be. One possible scenario is that China and Japan will come to realize that despite the differences in their political and economic strategies, working together will be in both countries’ interests and crucial to developing a common political will in East Asia. Sakakibara (2003) and Murase (2004) argue that the roles of China and Japan in East Asia’s integration process would be synonymous with those of France and Germany in Europe’s integration process.18 Similarly, the Kobe Research Project report19 states that “[i]t is essential for the Japan–China cooperation, as a core in East Asia, to lead the process of economic and financial integration, as the Franco-German alliance played a central role in the integration and cooperation process in Europe.” Despite this and similar claims, Japan and China are not yet in a position to emulate the Franco-German partnership and promote regional economic and monetary integration. A Sino-Japanese alliance is unlikely for the time being, as the differences between China and Japan—in terms of economic development, political systems, and regional security interests— offset the similarities. In addition, it must be kept in mind that, while Japan is experiencing stagnating economic growth, China is experiencing high levels of growth and could potentially become a superpower in economic, political, and military terms. Thus, in order for any partnership between these two countries to form, many differences would have to be resolved and mutual benefits recognized.20 With the potential leadership roles in a process of East Asian monetary integration assigned to Japan and China, Korea could take on a proactive role in fostering Sino-Japanese collaboration while at the same time acting as a representative of smaller countries in the region. Korea
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could serve as a mediator between China and Japan, helping to cultivate a common political will. Murase (2004) likens Korea’s potential role in a process of East Asian integration to the one the Benelux countries played in Europe. Murase’s argument on the role of Korea is interesting, but a few issues need to be clarified with regard to Korea’s role in the integration process. First, as was mentioned before, it is quite difficult to sort out a common Benelux role, especially in the early stages of the negotiation process. France’s views and strategy for EMU negotiations were more or less duplicated by Belgium, while the Netherlands and Luxembourg firmly stood by Germany during the negotiations. It was only in the last stages of EMU that a common Benelux view developed that was not so different from what France and Germany agreed upon. Second, Korea can take a strategic position between China and Japan. As China is still considered to be an introvert country that lacks policy harmonization with its neighboring countries, while Japan has not yet shown regional leadership, Korea can function as a kind of “honest broker” in dealing with cooperation and integration issues. Third, it is important to note that, unlike China or Japan, Korea maintains a strong will to promote regional cooperation and integration. Korea is one of the countries most concerned with North Korea’s nuclear crisis and would be devastated if a war in the Korean peninsular were to occur. Recalling that one of the strongest impetuses toward economic integration in Europe after the Second World War was an institutionalization of permanent peace in the region, Korea’s position may indeed mirror that of the Benelux countries in that Korea, as a medium-sized country, has strong motives for proposing regional integration and mediating between its two large neighbors. Korea may be a proponent of hard currency if the negotiation process for monetary integration were started, possibly together with Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.21 Korea may also play a gate-keeping role like the Netherlands and Luxembourg did. However, it would be premature to expect Korea to play an active role in the near future, as its role has been rather limited in the past, while ASEAN has had one of the most active roles in ASEAN13.
2.6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter suggests several implications for East Asian monetary integration and cooperation. First, the European monetary integration process has demonstrated the need for pragmatic compromises in developing frameworks for monetary cooperation. All through the process of EMU, there were competing views among the EU member states on the
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need for and the form of monetary integration. To ensure the continued participation of all parties, compromises were struck and exceptions, such as the opt-out clauses for the UK and Denmark, were made. In East Asia, governments also need to take a pragmatic approach in working toward a common goal. This might involve, at times, countries agreeing to decisions that only indirectly benefit their economies by helping the overall integration process. Second, the European experience has shown that integration can only be achieved step by step, by starting out with concrete economic and political measures that subsequently help develop a larger framework of cooperation that could later be enforced by common supranational institutions. East Asian countries need to be exposed to opportunities of binding negotiations on regional issues and to accumulate experience in resolving conflicting issues. It took many years for the countries who designed Europe’s EMU to acquire negotiation skills and to reach a stage of mutual understanding. Similarly, a gradual process of integration would help East Asian countries to develop the mutual trust and understanding that is so crucial for monetary cooperation. Third, while the European monetary integration process was a process of trial and error, it was helpful to have blueprints in the form of the Barre, the Werner, and the Delors reports. Although the Barre and the Werner reports had not been implemented immediately, they contributed greatly to shaping Europe’s monetary integration by stirring up discussion about the direction of integration. The Delors plan, which became the actual blueprint for the creation of the EMU, provided binding benchmarks and timelines for the monetary integration process. East Asian countries should also develop an advanced blueprint for monetary cooperation and integration. This would help clarify positions and force the participating countries to agree on common principles for potential integration. Fourth, a variety of policies are required in order to encourage the possible losers of monetary integration to continue to participate in the process. Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Structural Funds played a key role in this, although the original programs were not developed for that purpose. While it is not recommended that East Asian countries implement programs such as the CAP (and the region would also be lacking the resources to do so), certain fiscal transfer mechanisms would help support the common integration policies within those countries experiencing transitional losses. Fifth, it is recommended that some East Asian countries form a kind of core group so as not to lose the momentum toward integration. In Europe, Germany and France maintained key bilateral relations over the course of the whole integration process. In East Asia, Japan and China could play
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such a role, but, if the two countries are not yet ready, Korea is strongly recommended to initiate trilateral relations. Korea, the uniquely divided country in the region, would have a special interest in initiating and leading a process of economic and monetary integration in order to secure regional peace and prosperity. The process of economic and monetary cooperation in East Asia has just started and is still at a rudimentary stage. However, we need to recall that the original six members of the European Economic Community, which today seem to be more or less homogeneous economies, were regarded as genuinely heterogeneous when the Community was founded some 50 years ago. In those days, the differences between the nations’ economic structures caused people to believe that the integration of such heterogeneous economies was absurd. Therefore, without putting too much emphasis on the differences between East Asian countries, it would be important to encourage closer regional cooperation now in order to prepare the way for solid performances in economic and monetary cooperation and integration.
NOTES 1.
2. 3. 4. 5.
6. 7. 8. 9.
I would like to thank Beate Reszat, Ulrich Volz, and participants of the HWWA/HWWI conference on East Asian Monetary and Financial Integration in Hamburg, on December 15–16, 2005 for their helpful comments and suggestions. The first draft of the chapter was presented at the conference on Regional Monetary Cooperation and Coordination: the Experience in Europe and Feasibilities in Asia, hosted by the Institute of World Economy at Fudan University, Shanghai, on October 25–26, 2004. Comments by the participants of the conference are gratefully acknowledged. The remaining errors are mine alone. The first stage was launched on an experimental basis and did not require a binding commitment from its members to complete the process of economic and monetary union. This was a mechanism for the managed floating of the European currencies: the “snake” within narrow margins of fluctuation against the dollar—the “tunnel”. Benelux refers to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Exchange rates were based on central rates against the ECU, the European unit of account, which was not a numeraire based on a single currency but a weighted average, or basket, of the currencies of the member states. A grid of bilateral rates was calculated on the basis of these central rates, expressed in ECUs, and currency fluctuations had to be restricted to within a margin of 2.25 percent on either side of the bilateral rates (the Italian lira was allowed a wider margin of 6 percent). The commitment to the formation of an economic and monetary union had already been stated in the SEA of 1986. Both IGCs were launched at the Rome European Council in December 1990. These included restrictions on capital movements, constraints on the overdraft facilities available to public authorities and public undertakings, and limitations on giving preferential access to financial institutions for public undertakings. The four convergence criteria that are presented in Article 121(1) of the Maastricht Treaty relate to price stability, government deficits, exchange rates, and long-term interest rates. Each member state must satisfy all four criteria in order to be able to
European EMU negotiations and implications for East Asia
10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
15. 16.
17. 18. 19. 20.
21.
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participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union. Budgetary rules were set to become binding and member states not complying with them were likely to be penalized. During the negotiations, Denmark and the United Kingdom opted out of the third stage of EMU. For an analysis of the ERM crisis see Volz (2006). ASEAN13 Financial Minister’s Meetings have discussed the possibilities of macroeconomic policy coordination, but this remains in the rudimentary stages. See also the chapter by Zhang and Liang in this volume (Chapter 14). The monetarists had nothing to do with the school of thought of the same name that was developed by Milton Friedman and the “Chicago School”. The existence of the monetarist and economist policy advocacy groups added tension to the Werner Group negotiations in the 1970s, and also to negotiations and debates about the ERM. Both groups offered diverse opinions on the relationship between economic convergence and monetary union. Still today, the British government maintains that potential membership in the EMU would depend on the fulfillment of “five economic tests” that would ensure convergence with the Eurozone. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg founded Benelux on September 5, 1944. Before the formation of Benelux, Belgium and Luxembourg established BLEU (the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union) in 1921 and have run a fixed exchange rate system ever since. This section is developed from Section 4 in Kim and Wang (2005). Like China and Japan, France and Germany also had a wartime legacy of animosity. It was submitted to the fourth gathering of the finance ministers of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting) held in Copenhagen in July 2002. Searching for desirable roles of Japan and China, it would be helpful to also take note of other relations such as the Anglo-German relations and the German–Polish reconciliation process. Japan has shown a more or less similar strategic position to the UK in its regional policies. German–Polish reconciliation is also interesting to note, as a wartime legacy between the two countries had not been resolved until the 1990s because of the Cold War. For an application of EMU criteria to East Asian countries, see Kim and Park (2004, pp. 125–9).
REFERENCES Dyson, Kenneth, and Kevin Featherstone (1999). The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kim, Heungchong, and Sung-Hoon Park (2004). “The Political Economy of the EMU Negotiation and its Implications to East Asian Monetary Integration.” KIEP Policy Analysis 04–10. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul. Kim, Heungchong, and Yunjong Wang (2005). “Financial Integration in East Asia: Which Role for Korea?” Paper presented at a conference on The Rise of China and Korea’s Regional Policy at Ifri, Paris. Maes, Ivo, and Amy Verdun (2005). “The Role of Medium-sized Countries in the Creation of EMU: The Cases of Belgium and the Netherlands.” Journal of Common Market Studies 43: 27–48. Murase, Tetsuji (2004). “The East Asian Monetary Zone and the Roles of Japan, China and Korea.” Manuscript, Keio University, Tokyo.
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Reszat, Beate (2003). “How has the European Monetary Integration Process Contributed to Regional Financial Market Integration?” HWWA Discussion Paper 221, HWWA, Hamburg. Sakakibara, Eisuke (2003). “Asian Cooperation and the End of Pax Americana.” In Jan Joost Teunissen and Mark Teunissen (eds), Financial Stability and Growth in Emerging Economies: The Role of the Financial Sector. The Hague: FONDAD. Stoltenberg, Gerhard (1988). “The Further Development of Monetary Cooperation in Europe.” Memorandum to ECOFIN Council, Bonn: Ministry of Finance. Volz, Ulrich (2006). “On the Feasibility of a Regional Exchange Rate System for East Asia. Lessons of the 92/93 EMS Crisis.” Journal of Asian Economics 17: 1107–27. Wang, Seok-Dong, and Lene Andersen (2002). “Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia: The Chiang Mai Initiative and Beyond.” www.unescap.org/pdd/ publications/bulletin2002/ch8.pdf.
3.
International political conflicts and economic integration Koichi Hamada and Inpyo Lee If goods don’t cross borders, armies will. (Attributed to Frédéric Bastiat)
3.1
INTRODUCTION
In ancient times, the Far East, notably China, was a center of civilization and a theater for displays of brilliant military strategies. Now, the Chinese economy is emerging as a dominant player in the world thanks to its sheer size alone. The Japanese economy, with its rapid growth, was hailed as a rising sun. South Korea, Taiwan China, Thailand, and others achieved Asian miracles and then were disrupted by the East Asian crisis but recovered quite successfully. Thus, East Asia—people seldom call it the “Far East” now—has become a dramatic, intriguing, and even threatening area. East Asian countries were notably unconcerned about regional economic cooperation until the late 1990s. The Asian financial crisis of 1997, however, clearly showed that the heightened degree of interdependence in the international economy has increased the need for closer global and regional economic cooperation. Kuroda (2003) suggested a step-by-step plan for financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia: (1) formation of a regional financial safety net, (2) promotion of effective regional surveillance, (3) development of regional bond markets, (4) exchange rate stabilization among regional currencies, and (5) establishment of an Asian common currency. Various efforts for the first to third stages have been taken, with some of them materialized, but the later stages have yet to be realized. After the proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund was shelved, ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN13) agreed to strengthen the existing cooperative frameworks in the region through the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000. Regional cooperation for financial and 61
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monetary arrangements has just started by way of the CMI, but considerable work remains to strengthen cooperation for a safety net, regional surveillance, bond market development, exchange rate stabilization, and a common currency. In particular, building up the Asian bond market has been a focal point of regional financial cooperation.1 The virtual absence of foreign investment in local bonds in East Asia has been highlighted as a great barrier to financial stability. That is, foreign borrowing by the banking sector, which was used to finance domestic fixed investment, was pointed out to have resulted in the so-called “double mismatch” of maturity and currency. If so, the high risk of short-term borrowing and equity investment still leaves East Asian countries vulnerable to shocks in the global financial market. A true Asian bond market could contribute to the stabilization of the regional financial system by reducing the heavy reliance on short-term external financing of Asian companies through the banking sector. In addition, vitalization of the bond market may help reduce the risk of maturity and currency mismatch. More importantly, successful development of the Asian bond market will signify that ultimate economic and monetary integration in East Asia is quite promising and could accelerate the integration process. In this regard, the East Asian economies have just taken the first steps in a process that could eventually result in an economic and monetary union (EMU) in Asia akin to that in Europe, although it certainly will be a long process. On the other hand, we see several unsettling factors in the diplomatic relations between Japan and its neighbors, China in particular. Japan’s Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, threats to reduce foreign aid from Japan, and Japan’s textbook description of wartime conducts generate suspicion about the future course of Japan’s diplomatic policy. China’s alleged operation of submarines within Japan’s territorial sea near the Okinawa islands, its opposition to Japan’s permanent membership in the General Council of the United Nations, and its benign treatment of student protests before the Japan Embassy in Beijing all make Japan nervous. The diplomatic relations between China and Japan appear to have been chilled and to involve more uncertainty and even some military risks. The tension between China and Japan casts clouds over the future of Asia’s political economy, about which serious questions have already been raised, such as those regarding North Korea. This chapter develops economic observations on financial and monetary integration in East Asia. Considering the delicate political situation in East Asia at present, however, we could not help but cross the border of disciplines and discuss the international political implications of monetary
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and financial integration. Needless to say, economic cooperation and integration is not an issue that could be understood and discussed from purely economic perspectives. Peace is of enormous importance for all of East Asia and for the world. In section 3.2, we analyze economic rationale behind the efforts to create the Asian bond market and discuss various policy issues. We address, in addition to the question of what the ideal state of bond market integration would be, the question of what kinds of policy measures should be implemented to achieve a desirable financial integration in terms of the bond market. In section 3.3, we turn to monetary integration and discuss the costs and benefits of joining a monetary union. The normative justification for monetary unification or financial integration is not quite decisive from the purely economic point of view. In section 3.4, we explore the relationship between economic integration and political conflicts from an international political perspective. In order to understand the issues related to economic integration, we have to be aware of the incentives for each participating nation. It is one thing to recommend the formation of a free trade area or common currency area based on benefit–cost analysis, but it is just as important to understand under what conditions nations are motivated to join a club. As is understood from the political economy of monetary integration, purely economic incentives may not exist for nations to join a monetary union. As in the case of the European Union and the euro, security reasons may turn out to be a critical motive for realizing a monetary union in the East Asia. In section 3.5, we illustrate the logic of the situation in East Asia by examining a simple model of nested games, that is, a concurrence of an economic game with a security game between two countries. The economic game can be characterized as a type of the “Prisoners’ Dilemma”, while the security game is characterized as a type of “Hawk–Dove” game. If both governments accurately know the probability of military confrontations, their direct and indirect costs, and the link between the economic game and the security game, then the total game can be seen as a simple game with multiple strategies. The total outcome will not substantially distort the interests of voters in participating nations. In addition, we point out the factors that may distort the play of the above nested game and jeopardize the peace and welfare of nations.
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FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND THE COMMON BOND MARKET
Economic and Conceptual Issues Before going into various policy issues regarding bond market integration, it is helpful to review the conceptual distinctions between three basic forms of financial intermediation: bank lending, bond financing, and equity financing. It is important to recognize, first, that financial integration is indeed closely related to monetary integration, but there exists a fundamental functional difference between them.2 Bank lending is characterized by the face-to-face direct relationship between a lender and a borrower and can be described as the “negotiable form” of financial intermediation. Conditions of loans are worked out between the related parties. A prospective lender investigates the credit conditions of prospective borrowers and screens safe borrowers from less safe ones. After the loan is made, the lender often monitors, if not supervises, the business of the borrower. Activities related to information gathering and monitoring are conducted on a bilateral basis between the creditor and the debtor. Normally, the creditor is supposed to hold the claim until the end of the term unless the borrower decides to pay back the debt, and only occasionally is the claim transferred to a third party. The negotiable credit contract cannot go with anonymity. This form of transfer can exploit lender-specific and borrower-specific information that is unavailable to the public. This is often considered a positive aspect of “relationship banking”. On the other hand, this type of transfer of funds can be associated with the “crony banking” of the Japanese Zaibatsu (literally “financial cliques”) or South Korean Chaebol (family-controlled business conglomerates) in the sense that one lends to the other not because of the borrower’s financial suitability but because the lender happens to be a relative or a friend of the borrower. It is no coincidence that the main bank system grew out of the Zaibatsu relationship that was originally based on family ties. On the other hand, bond financing and equity financing can be characterized as the “market form” of financial intermediation. Because of the absence of a direct information channel between essential lenders and borrowers, firms are required to reveal their essential financial data. Underwriting is important not only for the treatment of risks related to public offers but also for the dissemination of business information of a debtor firm to the public. Bonds are standardized and most importantly transferable from one holder to another in the open market. Public business information is also published in a standardized form in order to be
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able to be transmitted to anybody in the market. Bonds have more liquidity because they can be instantaneously sold. Anonymity works in the market form of financial intermediation.3 At the least, there are various merits to cultivating a well functioning bond market. First, since lenders wish to minimize risks through portfolio management, the existence of new forms of investment always helps. Therefore, adding new bond instruments to an economy dominated by bank lending implies that the economy obtains a new form of financial instrument. Second, for firms that are able to demonstrate their sound financial prospects in the open market, bond financing creates a new and profitable opportunity. This is the reason that many prominent Japanese and Korean firms are successfully obtaining funds through public bond offers. Third, this may be a good way to get away from “crony finance”. Although a holder of bonds has a pay-off profile quantitatively similar to that of a holder of loans in terms of the contingent pay-off schedule, they are constructed differently in contractual and procedural terms, in particular when delinquency or bankruptcy situations emerge. Also, the mode of and costs related to monitoring the agency relations are different. Therefore, it is always better for an economy to be able to use both of these alternative means of finance. Bond market development can thus be regarded as a positive direction for economic development policy from this point of view.4 As an application, consider what happens to various asset holders in the case of a financial crisis taking place in a borrowing country. Equity holders of non-performing firms will lose wealth almost immediately. Bondholders retain claims to the remaining worth of the firm and can join the bankruptcy procedure, but the value of bonds will depreciate. In informal expression, the claim to the firm under problematic conditions will be handled by the asset market almost immediately and in parts. On the other hand, if a firm is financed mainly by a bank, it takes time for loans to be known to be delinquent. The problem of “oigashi” (roll-over loan)—the phenomenon observed when a bank official additionally extends to a delinquent “zombie” firm in order to avoid the revelation that the firm is near bankruptcy—aggravates the situation. If the majority of investments were financed by the market type instruments rather than by the negotiable type instrument, the cost of financial crises would be smaller. Political Economy Aspects In addition to the question of what the ideal state of financial intermediation is, we must address the question of what kinds of incentives promote financial integration in terms of bond markets. In general, unless there are
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regulations against the mode of finance, and unless there are externalities or increasing returns, the financial market will choose the right mode or the right combination of modes of financial intermediation. There will be no need for government interventions to facilitate a particular mode of financial intermediation. In the East Asian countries, when a government preaches the need for a well-developed bond market, it often means the need for a domestic market on which it can sell its public debt with a lower rate of interest. This is the wrong reason to develop mature bond markets. By no means should the idea of common basket bonds be the main device for solving the large debt situation of Japan, Korea, and other countries. It does not make sense to spend more tax money in order to facilitate the deficit financing of the government. Incidentally, since the essential characteristic of the bond market lies in its universal, non-name-specific nature, in contrast to the bank loan market, it is an oxymoron to define an Asian bond market as a bond market “By Asians, For Asians, and In Asian currencies”.5 Indeed, denomination may matter. Because of the existence of externalities in the denomination of bonds, people are motivated to use the denominations that are already prevalently used. This gives governments some rationale for promoting the denomination of the bond market in local currencies. But it should be of little significance in determining who issues and who buys a particular brand of bonds. Such a market would not grow and flourish unless the bonds traded there became accessible to non-Asians. Before making any attempts to encourage the creation of a regional bond market through financial support, governments must start dismantling unnecessary regulations that they themselves imposed, such as regulations on the issuance of bonds and obstructions against the free movement of capital and the acquisitions of domestic firms. It is almost a self-defeating policy strategy to promote the Asian bond market through cooperative actions by using taxpayers’ money while keeping barriers to free capital movements across Asian countries. Governments should also improve the accounting, legal, and corporate governance systems to make them incentive compatible and transparent. As Takagi (2002) maintains, the building of proper infrastructures is a prerequisite for building sound bond markets. Politically, of course, the goal of creating a sound bond market may facilitate the building of infrastructure. Under normal conditions, our recommendation for the creation of bond markets is of the laissez-faire type: let the market mechanism develop any new market. What can be the exception to this principle? In general terms, government interventions are justified under the following conditions:
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Externalities exist among various financial markets or among local markets, so the promotion of a bond market and cooperation among many national markets may yield some positive returns. International cooperation through the initiation of experimental bond markets may give market participants signals for noticing Asian markets as focal points. The bond issue in the currency basket may well be a helpful device for focusing the attention of market participants and for developing a market with a greater degree of depth compared to bonds in a single currency. Here an analogy to language use applies. Although this subject needs further empirical research, by initially promoting the common bond market using public funds, government may possibly gain some advantage thanks to the depth of the market in order to market their government bond on better terms. As it is difficult to disseminate a language to another location, this process will take a long time. Similarly, international cooperation may be a sound device for making use of the economies of scale involved in initiating new markets, because a single country market may be too small.
These attempts are justified only as an analogue to the “pump priming policy” that is reminiscent of the earlier Keynesian economics. Unless externalities or increasing returns and information asymmetry are important enough and also of the nature that interventions would be the only remedies, we do not endorse using government policy to artificially promote debt markets. In conclusion, increasing the variety of financial instruments is always welcome. Therefore, the creation of bond markets through natural market mechanisms is advised. In the mean time, deregulation and the construction of financial infrastructures are also always necessary. Excessive artificial encouragement of a particular form of bond market at the expense of taxpayers’ money, however, could be costly for the regional economy as well as individual nations’ economies.
3.3
MONETARY INTEGRATION OR CURRENCY UNION6
Economic and Conceptual Aspects In order to discuss the costs as well as benefits of joining a monetary union, we have to identify alternative forms of monetary integration on the basis of the degree of the strength of the binding agreement.7
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Under a floating exchange rate regime, monetary authorities can engage in cooperative actions to keep exchange rates within a certain range, or a zone. Naturally, joint interventions are more effective than unilateral interventions. As shown in Hamada (1985), the fixed exchange rate necessitates, at least partially, exchange rate coordination by the nature of its rule, and, if not necessitated, coordination has a positive benefit under the fixed exchange rate. Under the flexible exchange rate, however, national monetary authorities recover the independence of their monetary policies. The need for, as well as the benefit from, coordination becomes almost negligible. In its weakest form, monetary integration implies the linking of national currencies with fixed parities accompanied by a narrowing or vanishing band of exchange without common reserves or a common central bank. This is what Corden (1972) called the “pseudo-exchange rate union”. The coordination of economic policies, particularly monetary policies, is needed to prevent disequilibria in the balance of payments. There are a few sub-examples of this type of union. Governments can announce the fixity of exchange rates. The degree by which the public believes in the endurance of the fixed exchange rates depends on various economic and political factors. The Bretton Woods regime of adjustable pegs is a typical example. Participants could change the parity if there was a “fundamental disequilibrium”, a phrase that caused academic and practical controversies but was never defined clearly by the IMF. Or, under the gold standard and other commodity standards, a metal or some other commodity is used as an anchor for keeping the fixed exchange parities among currencies. Through the price–specie flow mechanism, monetary policy coordination is supposed to function automatically. In this regime, however, confidence in the endurance of parities is not absolute. Governments have the option of changing the parity rate of currency with gold, for example. The degree of monetary integration is enhanced by the establishment of public confidence in the irrevocable nature of the fixed exchange parities accompanied by full convertibility between currencies for capital and current account transactions. This confidence normally emerges only after a substantial transition period during which de facto fixed exchange parities are successfully maintained or after some kind of political unification. Full monetary integration or unification is only realized when a common currency issued by a single central bank circulates in the area of the monetary union. A unified currency may prevail in an area where multiple governments exist; this has been the situation in the euro zone
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since the circulation of the euro. Each participating nation retains the right to exit the union, and an exit option will be conceptually possible. We can also think of the circulation of a unified currency under a single government, where the common currency circulates in all regions of the country or federation. Under a united government, discrepancy of fiscal policy can be neglected as people believe that this currency area will never be divided again. For example, after the German unification, Germans trusted in the irrevocable “exchange rate” between the D-Mark and the O-Mark again. Historically, however, as in the cases of the Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union, a single currency under a unified government could dissolve into multiple currencies under multiple states. Now consider the benefits and costs of attempting monetary integration. Aside from the possible strategic benefits, to be discussed later, the benefits from monetary integration are of a microeconomic nature: users of a common currency economize on information costs and transaction costs. Monetary union members enjoy the benefits of increased trade and differentiated products as a result of the reduction or even disappearance of uncertainty about fluctuations in the exchange rates among member currencies. This benefit is partially delivered by a pseudo-exchange union but substantially realized only after the emergence of public confidence in the fixity of exchange rates. Only after full monetary unification is achieved are the transaction costs arising from currency conversion eliminated and the consequent benefits of increased trade and tourism enjoyed. These microeconomic benefits are closely associated with money’s function as a medium of exchange. Money economizes on the information costs required for transactions and allows for the procurement of a stable bundle of goods at a lower cost than under barter.8 The use of a common currency carries intrinsic externalities as a result of its informational properties. These benefits from economizing on transaction costs and from information spillover have the characteristics of a public good: non-rivalry (consumption by one member does not reduce the good’s availability to other members) and non-excludability (certain members cannot be excluded from enjoying the good). These benefits of complete monetary integration are obtained only partly through the adoption of the fixed exchange rate regime. A secondary benefit of monetary integration is macroeconomic. Mundell’s (1968) theory of policy assignment indicates that the effect of regionally specific real shocks may be absorbed by flexible exchange rates. However, recent studies on regime choice show that country-specific monetary shocks can be better managed under fixed exchange rates or
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under highly managed exchange rates (e.g., Fukuda and Hamada 1987, Eichengreen 1998). Thus the primary benefits of joining a monetary union are microeconomic, while the macroeconomic benefits are limited to smoothing monetary disturbance. In contrast, the costs, making each country vulnerable to real country-specific shocks, are mainly macroeconomic. While countries differ in their rates of productivity growth and in their preferences concerning the choice between unemployment and inflation, countries adhering to a fixed exchange rate or participating in a single currency union sacrifice the ability to independently pursue individual monetary policy objectives. This is particularly true when international capital mobility is high and when wages and prices are rigid. The floating exchange rate system gives national economies the opportunity to secure the minimum state of affairs that can be obtained independently, that is, the opportunity to follow a maxi–min strategy in the interplay of monetary policies. By joining a monetary union, a country gives up this maxi–min position and must seek the mutual consensus demanded by policy coordination. In general, the benefits and costs of monetary integration have several characteristics. First, in contrast to the benefits of monetary integration, which are enjoyed collectively and have a public-good nature across nations, the sacrifices made by joining a monetary union are made at the level of the individual nations. This distinction will play a crucial role in our analysis of the incentives of joining a monetary union. Second, the benefits and costs to participating countries vary over time. Initially, the costs of sacrificing domestic economic objectives and an independent monetary policy are large. As capital market integration proceeds, the financing of fiscal deficits becomes easier, and, hence, these adjustment costs become smaller. However, the common benefits of monetary integration are usually enjoyed only at a later stage when the credibility of the fixity of exchange rates is established or when participating nations’ currencies are unified into a single one. For example, the saving on the costs of currency conversion occurs only after exchange rate union has been accomplished, and the benefits arising from the stability of exchange rates can be reaped only after confidence in the fixity of parities has been established. The only way to make the time profile of the benefits lean toward the present is to adopt a single currency. In this respect the euro zone has had apparently considerable success. We say “apparently” because the assessment of the great euro experiment should be made with caution, as will be discussed later. Third, the openness to trade and factor flows of a monetary union member country has an important influence on the magnitude of the
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benefits and costs arising from monetary integration. If an economy is relatively open, with large import and export flows relative to GDP, the costs of adjusting its output or employment level for balance of payments reasons will be small (McKinnon 1963). The savings in currency conversion costs will also be proportionately larger in a more open economy. If the economy is closed, however, these savings will be less significant, while the costs of adjustment will be relatively large. Prior integration of the markets for goods and services and factors of production among member countries may increase the desirability of monetary integration by increasing average levels of openness.9 Empirical Appraisals First, Andrew Rose, Jeffrey Frankel, and others have conducted extensive research on the benefit of monetary union in numerous articles (e.g., Frankel and Rose 2002, Glick and Rose 2002, Rose and Engel 2002). They conclude, mostly by applying the gravity model to cross-country panel data, that having a single currency exerts a substantial influence on the flow of trade and national income. According to their estimates, the use of a single currency triples the amount of trade and increases national income approximately by a half percent. The effect of the use of a single currency is much larger than the effect of the fixity of exchange rates. The institutional arrangement for keeping exchange parity is one thing, while that for having a single currency is completely different. The latter gives rise to much more confidence in the constancy of future exchange rates and eliminates uncertainty about the future. Although Europe’s experiment with the euro is still young and it is too early to evaluate whether the currency union has resulted in substantial changes, the general consensus in the literature is that the euro’s effect on trade within euro zone countries as well as on trade between euro countries and non-euro countries is positive and significant.10 It is worth noting that the level of trade of member countries with those outside of the euro region did not shrink. Thus, the trade diversion from external trade to internal trade seemingly did not take place in the euro zone. Second, Alesina and Barro (2002) and Alesina et al. (2002) show, based on various indicators, that intra-regional trade in Europe is intense and that there is a satellite-like relationship between the US and many of its trading partners. In other words, one might define a European Trade Area and a North American Trade Area. In contrast, they argue, Japan has many trade partners all over the world, so that it would be difficult to conceive of an entity to be called the Japan Trade Area. In their opinion, the EU had, and NAFTA has, preconditions for a currency, but, compared
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with the EU and the NAFTA area, the Asian region has less compelling reasons for an Asian trade zone and, accordingly, has fewer grounds for an Asian Monetary Union. Third, Goto (2002) argues, on the other hand, by using the principal component approach, that the confluence of business cycles among Asian countries is even stronger than that among European countries and that among NAFTA countries. Principal component analysis is useful for measuring the degree of synchronization of multiple variables in contrast with the conventional method of measuring the bilateral output correlation between each pair of countries (Goto and Hamada 1996). Goto (2002) particularly emphasizes the time series observation that integration among Asian economies has progressed in recent years. While most East Asian variables were correlated with US variables in the past, they are now moving together with Japanese variables, as well. Reservations remain, however, about his findings. First, even though macroeconomic and trade variables are moving together in Asia, as detected by principal component analysis, the openness of Asian countries to trade is not as great as in Europe. In Asia trade moves together, but the amount of trade is often small. Therefore, the level test may fail. The use of the trade intensity index, which is a powerful tool for describing the interdependence of trade flows, may not satisfactorily indicate the closeness of trade relationships between countries because the trade intensity index measures comovements in trade but does not factor in the level of trade. Political Economy Aspects In sum, the pros of creating a monetary union between China, Korea, Japan, and neighboring countries can be stated as follows: The microeconomic benefits will include increased trade and differentiated products for member countries. Moreover, trade partners outside the union will benefit from the savings on transaction and information costs. In addition, we can expect the macroeconomic benefits such as better management of monetary shocks.
Meanwhile, the cons of creating a monetary union can be summarized as follows: Monetary union entails each member country’s loss of monetary independence. Furthermore, the European experience has illustrated that in order to enjoy the true benefits of monetary integration, an exchange rate union is not sufficient, and a uniform currency should be an end goal. Are Asian countries prepared to unify their currency systems despite institutional and cultural difference across
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national borders? Are central banks, including the People’s Bank of China, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of Korea, willing to give up their autonomy and pool their monetary authority?
Even if we admit the findings by Frankel and Rose (2002) of a large and positive effect of currency union on trade, it is not perfectly certain whether this trade-flow effect dominates the cost in terms of the loss of monetary independence effect. The cost of joining a single currency area beyond the present fixed exchange rate regimes to the dollar could be really serious. Inflation is not serious right now, and there is currently a worry of worldwide deflation. We might encourage worldwide deflation by creating an Asian single currency zone. Just as the leader country of the euro zone, Germany, seems to be suffering from recession, might Japan not suffer from deflationary pressure after unification? Though we recognize the long-run benefit of creating a uniform currency in terms of trade creation, in the foreseeable future the cost in terms of loss of monetary control seems to us more serious. Therefore, as far as economic effects are concerned, we are skeptical about the significance of the benefits of Asian monetary unification. There remains the question of incentives. Under what conditions will national governments find incentives to agree on a monetary union with the benefits far into the future? We strongly believe in the merit of and the need for policy coordination among countries in which fixed exchange rates prevail (Hamada 1985). Under flexible rates, the number of monetary instruments is sufficient for each country to be able to conduct monetary policy regarding its price levels and macroeconomic situations as a policy assignment problem (Feldstein 1997, 2000). On the other hand, if 12 countries join a monetary union, then 11 policy instruments will be lost. Of course, this is true only if the participating countries had monetary autonomy before. In Ulrich Volz’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 8), he argues that most (small) East Asian countries do not have full monetary independence now because of external exchange rate targets as well as weak domestic financial markets. In particular, in the problem termed “conflicted virtue” by McKinnon, countries with large international reserves as well as assets denominated in dollars are constrained against the devaluation of their currencies. This argument is rather persuasive, and we agree with it to a certain extent. The loss of monetary autonomy in the case of the adoption of a common currency is, however, definite, and a country cannot easily go back to a floating rate without a substantial transition cost. This cost must be much more significant than the cost of foregoing devaluation because of the large scale of international reserves in dollars.
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Therefore, the answer to the positive (rather than normative) question from an economic standpoint also does not give strong support in favor of a uniform currency.
3.4
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICTS
We have seen that the justification for monetary unification or financial integration is not decisive from the economic point of view. If we extend the scope of the arguments from the purely economic dimension to the political one and further to the strategic or security point of view, however, the outcome changes significantly. A positive political economy analysis of nations’ incentives for joining a currency union can tell us what may be needed to create a currency area in East Asia. Over the past few decades, there has been abundant literature on the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflicts.11 Political scientists’ attention to the relationship between national security and economic integration has been centered on the relationship between trade and international conflicts. Among numerous papers on this topic, Oneal and Russett (1997) conducted an extensive study on the relationship between economic integration and the existence of national conflicts. They found, in general, significant results demonstrating that the openness of the pair (dyad) of countries will reduce the probability of conflicting situations between them. For example, if the dyadic trade-to-GDP ratio increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood of conflict between these countries will decrease by about 4.7 percent. As Mansfield and Pollins (2001) pointed out, the direction and timing of causality between economic interdependence and political conflicts should be examined. Gartzke et al. (2001) indicate that investment flows are important, as well, and that incentive aspects should be clarified. Given the serious damage potentially inflicted by wars, we consider the gain in peace from openness as reported by Oneal and Russett to be a substantial dividend. The process of economic and monetary union in Europe can also be understood in the light of these strategic considerations. If openness to trade is a significant factor, then openness to capital market and financial integration should also be an important factor for peace, and the benefits of using a common currency should be even greater. Unfortunately, empirical research is scarce concerning the relationship between monetary unification and peace. However, we can expect that the use of a common currency will significantly increase the amount of trade
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between participating nations, which, in turn, would reduce the probability of war quite substantially. While most of the literature on the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflict considers that the causal arrow goes from economic integration to the possibility of war, the arrow may also go in the other direction. In their highly persuasive paper, Glick and Taylor (2005) focus their attention on the question of how detrimental war is to trade. They show that wars may cause a serious breakdown in trade and a consequent loss of national and global economic welfare and that the indirect damage to trade by wars may be economic losses of a magnitude equivalent to the direct costs of the war, such as lost human capital. Studies such as those listed above reinforce the argument that a case for a monetary union including security grounds may be much stronger than the case for a monetary union on economic merits alone and that we should develop solid relationships among nations. To this end we have to rely on whatever means are available to foster economic ties between countries, such as free trade areas, foreign investment liberalization, and currency unions. To temper our optimism about the peace effects of monetary union, we should mention the intriguing history of the disintegration of monetary unions, such as that of the Austro-Hungarian empire or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).12 In these examples, economic and monetary union did not preclude political division and even conflicts. Without going into the details of these historical experiences, we will discuss the example of the European Union, where the political leadership apparently succeeded in overcoming the economic difficulties of monetary integration.13 The development of the European Monetary System (EMS) since its inception in 1979 has offered a striking contemporary example of the process of monetary integration. The EMS was founded as a “flexible, symmetric version of the Bretton-Woods system” (Kenen 1992), following long-standing plans of economic and monetary union in Europe. The Werner Report of 1970 envisaged the development of a monetary union by 1980 through economic policy harmonization. Harmonization is a process wherein the differences in participating nations’ key economic indicators, such as the inflation rate, interest rates, and the levels of government deficits and accumulated debt, are gradually narrowed. After frequent early adjustments to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), there were no major realignments from 1987 until September 1992. This period of stability contributed to the sense of inevitability in the progression toward a fixed parity system, but it proved to be the lull before the storm of the suspensions and devaluations of member currencies in September 1992.
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During this period of turmoil the Deutsche Bundesbank increasingly served as the monetary anchor of the EMS by virtue of the size of the German economy and strength of the Deutschmark. This strength was zealously guarded by the Bundesbank, with its strong reputation for inflation aversion. However, the monetary discipline provided by the Bundesbank became punitive as Germany suffered the real fiscal shock of unification. The cost to other countries of enjoying Bundesbank credibility soared, as high German real interest rates were transmitted throughout the ERM. Members with below full employment felt the effects of the squeeze on interest-sensitive sectors like housing and construction. The growing divergence of the costs and benefits of maintaining the fixed parity created uncertainty about the future of currency union as well as of monetary coordination. It opened the door for speculators to bet that the ERM link was too costly for weaker currencies to sustain. Despite regularly reaffirmed commitments to preserve exchange rate parities, and despite defensive purchases of weaker currencies by central banks, the speculative attacks of September 1992 succeeded in forcing several devaluations. Thus, temporarily, confidence in the ERM bands was substantially undermined, and the system tumbled into its most severe crisis in its then 14-year history. Instead of giving up the process of monetary integration, EMS countries (except the UK and Italy) continued their strategy of creating a common currency area without the slow process of converging exchange rates. In January 1999, the euro was introduced as the single currency, and the European Central Bank (ECB) was established to conduct a unified monetary policy. The euro experience lends a new set of insights to the positive theory of monetary integration. Contrary to conventional wisdom, monetary integration could precede political integration. In spite of economists’ criticism (e.g., Feldstein 1992, 1997), and in spite of severe speculative attacks in 1992, the momentum was strong enough to establish the euro zone. The economic benefit of unification is clear: the economy of transaction and information costs. More importantly, the political will, that is, the perception of political benefits by national leaders, must have been the driving force behind monetary unification in Europe. Europe’s perseverant approach to the introduction of the euro, in spite of the speculative attacks in 1992, could hardly be explained without taking political and strategic considerations into account.
International political conflicts and economic integration
Table 3.1
77
Game I: Prisoners’ Dilemma Country B
Country A
3.5
Free Trade Protection
Free Trade
Protection
(4, 4) (6, 1)
(1, 6) (2, 2)
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND THE ARMS RACE AS A CONNECTED GAME
In this section, we present a simple representation of two kinds of nested games—an economic game and a security game—to illustrate the situation in East Asia. There are some typical patterns in the pay-off structures of economic games. First, the trade game is characterized by the prisoners’ dilemma. Let us consider the simple case with the pattern shown in Table 3.1. It is well known that the Nash equilibrium is the protection–protection combination (2, 2), because protection is the dominant strategy for both players. Cooperation may emerge in this situation so that by a combination of trigger strategies the cooperative equilibrium (4, 4) may be sustained. This is known as the Folk theorem. Liberalization of the process of trade, the creation of a free trade zone, and the deregulation of foreign investment roughly fit into this type of strategic situation (e.g., Myerson 1991). Alternatively, the pay-off of currency unification can be depicted as shown in Table 3.2. In this example with China and Japan, disagreement over the choice of currency for a common currency union results in the prevailing of the status quo. If the two countries agree on a currency, they benefit from the formation of a currency union, but the country whose currency is chosen will benefit more than the other. The Nash solution is either (3, 2) or (2, 3). A mixed strategy may be realized through the selection of a currency basket, but technical problems remain with currency basket use.14 On the other hand, the security or strategic game has the nature of a chicken game or a Hawk–Dove game. If both countries take Dove strategies, both share the dividend of peace. If one country takes Hawk and the other takes Dove, then the Hawk country will gain. If both countries take Hawk, the world is subject to at least the possibility of severe destruction. The pay-off appears as shown in Table 3.3. (1, 6) and (6, 1) are the Nash equilibria. Once a country takes the Hawk position, the other country would not take the Hawk because that would
78
Table 3.2
The political economy of regional integration
Game II: Matching Pennies or the Battle of the Sexes Japan
China
Table 3.3
Yuan Yen
Yuan
Yen
(3, 2) (−1, −1)
(0, 0) (2, 3)
Game III: Hawk–Dove game Country B
Country A
Dove Hawk
Dove
Hawk
(4, 4) (6, 1)
(1, 6) (−10, −10)
lead to mutual destruction or at least the possibility of mutual destruction, as represented by (−10, −10). By itself, the repeated game version of this Hawk–Dove game has a sub-game perfect equilibrium that maintains the pay-off close to the cooperative solution (4, 4) provided that the players’ discount rate is sufficiently small. The trouble is that it also has a sub-game perfect equilibrium that maintains the pay-off close to (−10, −10). The evolution of cooperation (Axelrod 1981) is not automatically guaranteed (Myerson 1991, p. 323ff). In the real world, those games are connected. As the reviewed literature has shown, successful completion of currency union is likely to increase the benefits of trade; the successful cooperation in Game II will improve the cooperative pay-off of Game I. The most serious problem is that the strategic game and economic games are nested or connected. The strategic game of Hawk–Dove is played along with the trade game of the Prisoners’ Dilemma and/or the currency unification game of the Battle of the Sexes. And the pay-off matrices are interrelated. If these two games were played by a coherent and rational government, the nested or connected nature would cause few problems. The problem is that it is hard to find such coherent and rational governments. One can explain the connected nature of the games as follows. Cooperative plays in economic games, either trade or currency, will increase the opportunity cost of the war and deter the onset of the war, changing (−10, −10) into a more severe outcome, such as (−15, −15). On the other hand, more peaceful plays of the strategic game (Game III) will create a sense of assurance about future economic relations and enhance the pay-off of the
International political conflicts and economic integration
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cooperation solution of the Prisoners’ Dilemma as well as the pay-off of the choice of currency game.15 Cooperation in one sphere will reinforce the possibility of cooperation in the other sphere. A win–win situation will be realized as a virtuous circle. Mistrust over military matters will result in difficulty in economic matters, and vice versa. Here, vicious circles may develop. In particular, the recent strategic or security-related mini-confrontations may imply that China and Japan are engaging in a pecking order game in order to assume a leadership role in the choosing of a currency to be at the center of possible monetary integration. It is also understandable that Japan tries to avoid the tug-of-war conflicts of leadership in monetary integration and that it encourages bond market integration that is more consistent with the concept of a multiple currency basket, a kind of mixed strategy solution. Even if these two kinds of games, economic and strategic, are played with full consistency by two rational governments, the possibility of the emergence of an undesirable, or even destructive, equilibrium still cannot be completely ignored. Myerson (1991) shows that a near-destructive state can be sustained as a sub-game perfect equilibrium by trigger strategies in a repeated Hawk–Dove game. The situation becomes more precarious when we consider the following: 1.
2.
3.
4.
Military conflicts often take place not as a result of governments’ deliberate decisions, but because of accidental events, such as minor cross-border conflicts. Accidental factors may change the pay-off matrix, or the perception of it, drastically. This will increase the risk of uncalculated war. Psychologists find that people have the tendency to assign a smaller probability to events that they dislike, a phenomenon called “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger 1957). Governments tend to underestimate the probability of war and the resulting casualties triggered by their hawkish attitudes. Governments and voters may underestimate the cost of war. Even if they ever take into account the war expenditure, destruction of military capital, the grave human and health losses, and the destruction of physical capital resulting from a war, they may not fully take into account the economic loss caused by deteriorated trade relationships after the war. If a nation’s government is a coherent entity or an effective common agent of the voters, then the benefit–cost assessment of war as well the benefit–cost assessment of economic relations will be taken account in a balanced fashion. The reality is that economic bureaus and security
80
The political economy of regional integration
bureaus are operated rather independently of each other. The repercussion to one’s pay-off matrix by the other’s is often neglected by the presence of red tape and sectionalism. Historically, East Asia has enjoyed a common cultural heritage. Many nationals can communicate with each other, even though they do not speak foreign languages, by writing Chinese characters. Japan used coins made in China in the 16th century, and the yen itself is allegedly named after the Hong Kong dollar. Confucius’s teaching has long been a guiding principle of government in the East Asian countries. There are many focal elements that would facilitate coordination in the Asian basin. When Myerson (1991) introduces the possibility of good as well as grim equilibrium, he notices the necessity of the cooperative attitude. “Qualitatively, the more cooperative equilibria seem to involve a kind of reciprocal linkage (e.g., ‘expect me tomorrow to do what you do today’), whereas the more belligerent equilibria seem to involve a kind of extrapolative linkage (e.g., ‘expect me tomorrow to do what I do today’)” (Myerson 1991, p. 331). The first cooperative attitude is similar to Confucius’s Golden Rule, expressed in the Analects: “Do not do to others what you would not wish others do to you.” Diplomacy and clever politics must go beyond the difficulty pointed out by game theorists and endeavor to foster mutual trust to prevent the destructive consequences of a war.
3.6
CONCLUSION
On the grounds of economic reasoning alone, the case for financial integration and, in particular, for monetary integration is not decisive. East Asian nations’ calculus of participation does not give strong motivation for the creation of a common bond market, an integrated financial market, or a uniform currency area. Creating a common bond market may seem less painful and involves only a limited degree of commitment, unlike exchange rate coordination, which involves a certain degree of macro coordination and possibly the pooling of reserves. However, the true functioning of a common bond market still requires, we believe, the development of credit market infrastructures in most East Asian countries. Once we introduce strategic or security considerations, however, the situation changes drastically. This chapter is a tentative survey of the ongoing work in the field of economics and political science and an attempt to explore the importance of security considerations in the issue of monetary cooperation. It is meaningful to compare economic costs and benefits. But, at the same time, if we consider the tremendous human and material costs
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generated by possible internal conflicts in the region, we need to consider seriously the mutual causality between economic integration and international conflicts. As an impetus for European countries to agree to implement first economic union and then monetary union, the repentance over the past military conflicts in Europe must have played an important role. This must be an important reason that Germany, an economic leader country whose central bank played a dominant role, agreed to give up some of its monetary hegemony in Europe.16 It may be the time to push forward economic and monetary integration in East Asia, not just in order to realize economic gains but also to prevent unfortunate military tragedies such as those seen during World War II. The following statement by Wim Duisenberg (2005), the founding President of the European Central Bank, well illustrates the intention for peace in Europe: European economic integration—in all its aspects—reflects the desire to integrate Europe politically, which, at least in my view, implies that European economic and monetary integration is irreversible. This has been true from the outset of the European integration process in 1952, when six countries established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The aim of the ECSC was explicitly political—to remove control of the two most important raw materials for the production of heavy weaponry from states that had just fought the bloodiest war in history. This drive for peace remained, quietly, the key motivation behind further steps toward Europe’s economic integration, which was regarded as the vehicle for achieving political integration. […] In particular, Germany under Chancellor Helmut Kohl often linked monetary integration with the objective of political union. Kohl once referred to the single currency’s success as a matter of “war and peace”.
NOTES 1.
The Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), in its first meeting held in June 2002, agreed to set up a working group on financial cooperation in order to set guidelines for the development of Asian bond markets. The second ACD meeting of June 2003 adopted the Chiang Mai Declaration on the Asian Bond Market and the Asia Bond Fund Initiative. In June 2003, the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) agreed to establish an Asian Bond Fund (ABF) of USD 1 billion, which was invested in US dollar denominated government bonds issued by Asian countries. In June 2006, the EMEAP central banks launched ABF2, which has invested USD 2 billion of EMEAP central bank reserves in local currency denominated sovereign and quasi-sovereign issues (see Ma and Remolona, Chapter 4 in this volume). In March 2003, the financial ministers of ASEAN13 agreed to create working groups to promote the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) for the development of regional bond markets. In April 2003, the APEC convened its first meeting for the development of the Asian bond market and emphasized closer cooperation to achieve better supervision and information sharing. For details, see Ryou et al. (2005).
82 2. 3. 4. 5.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
12.
13.
14.
15. 16.
The political economy of regional integration For the conceptual issues, see Ryou et al. (2005). See Cargill and Royama (1988) for the notions of negotiable forms and market forms of financial intermediation. For the contingent nature of financial instruments and its implications, see Allen and Gale (2000). Ito (2003) defines Asian bonds as bonds issued by Asian institutions (government, corporations, financial institutions), denominated in an Asian currency, and sold, traded, and settled in an Asian financial center (Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong). Investors are expected to be mainly from regional economies (in particular, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), but others are also welcome. Hamada (2004) contains a more detailed account of the conceptual issues as well as the political economy aspects of economic and monetary integration. The term “monetary integration” or “monetary unification” encompasses varying degrees of integration, and it is usually used for the union of a group of countries and not for all countries of the world. For an attempt to analyze the nature of this cost saving, see Ryou (2003). Feldstein (1992) makes the case that monetary integration is not a necessary condition for the benefits of other forms of economic integration to be enjoyed. For details on the relevant literature, see Baldwin (2006). One view, held by the so-called “liberals”, is that increased economic interdependence among countries fosters peaceful political relations by generating economic benefits and increasing the costs of conflict. Critics of this view, the “realists”, argue that economic interdependence generates political discord, rather than fostering political cooperation, by intensifying competition between the states and by increasing dependence on strategic goods. Many others hold the view that economic interdependence has no systematic influence on politics, maintaining that conflicts originate mainly from the political arena. For a comprehensive survey, see Mansfield and Pollins (2001). Another example of a monetary union that disintegrated is the Scandinavian Monetary Union, which was formed between the neighboring Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Denmark in 1873. Norway joined the union in 1875. A common currency unit, the krone, which was based on gold, circulated as legal tender in member countries. The union was extended to cover note circulation when note-issuing banks in Norway and Sweden agreed to accept each other’s notes at par in 1894. Denmark joined this agreement in 1900. From 1905, the conditions of note circulation were amended to allow for a commission to be charged on foreign notes. Despite this added cost, the joint circulation of notes continued. In 1914, with the outbreak of World War I, the redemption of bank notes was suspended, and the monetary union effectively ended (Nielsen 1933). The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, from its name in French) is the longest surviving monetary union today. France exercises direct influence over the affairs of the union through appointees to the Board of the Bank. France also exercises considerable indirect influence on individual members through concessive assistance and commercial links. Broughton (1991) suggested that UEMOA does not meet the conventional criteria for an optimal currency union. Its survival should be understood as a result of the parity between UEMOA’s CFA franc and the French franc and of the political leadership by France. If the two countries propose differently, then an agreement will not be reached. In this interpretation, the off-diagonal elements in the pay-off matrix will be (0, 0). If the use of one country’s money is imposed on the other country, then the situation will be a definite deterioration as expressed in the pay-off matrix. Consider the case of foreign direct investment. Investors will worry less about the possibility of hostage effect, or hold-up effect, for example. Some nationals might even have had psychological resistance to giving up the role of being the country that issued the dominant currency in Europe. See Jonas et al. (2005).
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REFERENCES Alesina, Alberto F., and Robert J. Barro (2002). “Currency Unions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 409–36. Alesina, Alberto F., Robert J. Barro, and Silvana Tenreyro (2002). “Optimal Currency Areas.” NBER Working Paper no. 9072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Allen, F., and D. Gale (2000). Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Axelrod, Robert (1981). “The Evolution of Cooperation.” Science 211 (4489): 1390–6. Baldwin, Richard E (2006). “The Euro’s Trade Effect.” ECB Working Paper no. 594, European Central Bank, Frankfurt. Broughton, J.M. (1991). “The CFA Franc Zone: Currency Union and Monetary Standard.” IMF Working Paper no. 91/133, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Cargill, Thomas F., and Shoichi Royama (1988). The Transition of Finance in Japan and the United States. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Corden, W. Max (1972). “Monetary Integration.” Essays in International Finance no. 93, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. Duisenberg, Wim (2005). “Europe, An Engine of Peace.” www.project-syndicate. org/commentary/duisenberg2/English. Eichengreen, Barry (1998). “Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Stability.” Open Economies Review 9:S1: 569–607. Feldstein, Martin (1992). “The Case against EMU.” The Economist June 13: 19–22. Feldstein, Martin (1997). “EMU and International Conflict.” Foreign Affairs November–December 76 (6): 60–74. Feldstein, Martin (2000). “The European Central Bank and the Euro: The First Year.” Remarks prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, January 8. Festinger, Leon (1957). Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Frankel, Jeffrey, and Andrew K. Rose (2002). “An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 437–66. Fukuda, Shin-ichi, and Koichi Hamada (1987). “Towards Implementation of Desirable Rules of International Coordination and Intervention.” In Yoshio Suzuki and Mitsuaki Okabe (eds), Towards a World of Economic Stability. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Gartzke, Eric, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer (2001). “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” International Organization 55: 391–438. Glick, Reuven, and Andrew K. Rose (2002). “Does a Currency Union Affect Trade? The Time-Series Evidence.” European Economic Review 46, 1125–51. Glick, Reuven, and Alan M. Taylor (2005). “Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War.” Working Paper 2005-11, FRB San Francisco, CA. Goto, Junichi (2002). “Economic Preconditions for Monetary Integration in East Asia.” Manuscript, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan.
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Goto, Junichi, and Koichi Hamada (1996). “Regional Economic Integration and Article XXIV of the GATT.” Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper no. 754, Yale University, New Haven, CT. Hamada, Koichi (1985). The Political Economy of International Monetary Interdependence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hamada, Koichi (2004). “A Calculus of Participation Approach to Monetary Integration in Asia.” Paper presented at the Seoul Conference of Korea Money and Finance Association. Ito, Takatoshi (2003). “Construction of Infrastructures for the Development of Regional Bond Market.” In Choong-Yong Ahn, Takatoshi Ito, Masahiro Kawai, and Yung-Chul Park (eds), Financial Development and Integration in East Asia. Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Jonas, Eva, Immo Fritsche, and Jeff Greenberg (2005). “Currencies as Cultural Symbols—An Existential Psychological Perspective on Reactions of Germans Toward the Euro.” Journal of Economic Psychology 26: 129–46. Kenen, Peter (1992). EMU After Maastricht, Washington, DC. Group of Thirty. Kuroda, Haruhiko (2003). “Overview of Financial and Monetary Cooperation in East Asia.” In Choong-Yong Ahn, Takatoshi Ito, Masahiro Kawai, and YungChul Park (eds), Financial Development and Integration in East Asia. Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Mansfield, Edward, and Brian Pollins (2001). “The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45: 834–59. McKinnon, Ronald (1963). “Optimum Currency Areas.” American Economic Review 53: 712–24. Mundell, Robert A. (1968). International Economics. New York: Macmillan. Myerson, Roger B. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nielsen, A. (1933). “Monetary Union.” Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol. 10. New York: Macmillan. Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russett (1997). “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985.” International Studies Quarterly 41: 267–93. Rose, Andrew K., and Charles Engel (2002). “Currency Unions and International Integration.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 34: 1067–89. Ryou, Jai-Won (2003). “Transaction Costs and Welfare Effects of Currency Unions.” Manuscript, Konkuk University, Seoul. Ryou, Jai-Won, Koichi Hamada, and Seung-Cheol Jeon (2005). “The Asian Bond Market: Issues and Tasks for Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” In Bank of Korea (ed.), Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation and the Korean Economy. Seoul: Bank of Korea, pp. 21–63. Takagi, Shinji (2002). “Fostering Capital Markets in a Bank-based Financial System: A Review of Major Conceptual Issues.” Asian Development Review 19: 67–97.
PART II
Developing bond markets in East Asia
4.
Learning by doing in market reform: lessons from a regional bond fund Guonan Ma and Eli Remolona1
4.1
INTRODUCTION
Since the Asian crisis of 1997, local currency bond markets in the region have expanded rapidly; even so, they are still seen as not achieving their potential to intermediate between domestic savers and borrowers. Capital flows since the crisis show that Asians have been investing largely in lowyielding foreign assets and foreigners in higher-yielding Asian assets. While some of these flows are consistent with portfolio diversification, the broad pattern suggests that a sizeable part of financial intermediation is being carried out abroad at significant cost. To bring such intermediation home, Asian policymakers perceive a need for deeper and more liquid local bond markets. This perception has spawned a number of regional cooperative efforts at market reform. In this chapter, we assess one such undertaking—an unusual one in that it involved the creation of an actual bond fund, with financial contributions from the parties concerned. The regional group involved is the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific (EMEAP) central banks.2 The fund they have created is called the Asian Bond Fund 2 (ABF2) which was first launched in mid-2005. We argue that because the group set up an actual fund, its reform efforts enjoyed significant advantages from “learning by doing”. In what follows, we first provide an overview of the recent development of local currency bond markets in East Asia and describe the main impediments in those markets. We then explain the structure and features of ABF2 in the context of various regional initiatives for bond market development. Finally, we comment on the role of the ABF2 exercise in the reform of bond market regulation, providing examples of market impediments that have been reduced in the process of creating the fund and describing the mechanism put in place to provide incentives for reducing impediments further. 87
88
4.2
Developing bond markets in East Asia
AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL CURRENCY BOND MARKETS IN EAST ASIA
In the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997, there was concern at first that the lack of well-developed local currency markets was forcing Asians to borrow in foreign currencies, thus making their economies more vulnerable to a speculative currency attack. Since then, however, governments in the region have accumulated such high levels of foreign exchange reserves that the risk of another currency crisis has ceased to be an immediate concern. Of greater interest to policymakers in the region has been the concern that their stockpiles of official reserves may be a sign of inefficient domestic intermediation, since the reserve assets seem to have been earning much less than what Asians pay when borrowing abroad. McCauley (2003) documents that the broad pattern of gross capital flows since the Asian crisis has indeed been one of Asians investing in lowyielding foreign assets and foreigners investing in higher-yielding assets in the domestic markets of the region. Part of the reason for this pattern is the fact that foreign exchange intervention has resulted in a large accumulation of reserves by central banks, and these institutions by their nature have a safety bias (rather than a home bias). In effect, Asian savings are being sent abroad only to return mostly in the form of private sector foreign investment. Thus, financial intermediation is being carried out in the more developed financial markets of Europe and North America, and the cost of intermediation is reflected in the large differences in returns between Asian assets abroad and foreign assets in Asia. In principle, the importance of local information should lead to such intermediation being done at home. If local currency bond markets in Asia functioned as intended, Asian policymakers now seem to be asking, could they not keep such intermediation at home and in the process save their economies some of the borrowing costs? The Asian crisis did have economic consequences that themselves added impetus to the development of local currency bond markets in the region. As economies contracted, governments in the region found themselves faced with budget deficits. Huge levels of funding were needed for largescale bank restructuring. And this time, the governments in the region made an effort to eschew borrowing abroad, instead borrowing locally in local currencies. As a result, the total amount of domestic debt outstanding in East Asia, excluding Japan, has risen nearly threefold since 1998 (Figure 4.1).3 Hence, to the extent that the sheer volume of debt helps contribute to financial market development, the Asian crisis has contributed to the development of local currency bond markets in the region. Other factors, however, seem to continue to hold back these local
Learning by doing in market reform
89 1800
Total Private*
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
0
Note: “Asia” includes the bond markets of the eight EMEAP members: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Korea and Thailand. *Excluding the Philippines. Source:
Bank for International Settlements.
Figure 4.1
Domestic debt securities outstanding in Asia (in billions of US dollars)
markets. While the strength of issuance has been beneficial to the primary markets, the secondary markets still suffer from a lack of liquidity. A number of market impediments, both cross-border and local, remain. Takeuchi (2004) provides a survey of cross-border impediments in Asia. While most of these cross-border impediments are well known in the literature on capital controls, some local impediments have been relatively less well appreciated and thus have received insufficient attention. Capital controls typically include a ban on investments by foreigners or on repatriation of principal or income on these investments, restrictions on currency conversion, and other prohibitions and regulatory hurdles for both issuers and investors. There is evidence that such controls still bind in Asia. Ma and McCauley (2006), for example, show that there is still not sufficient arbitrage to equalize onshore and offshore yields in various Asian money markets. Specific examples include tight foreign exchange conversion rules associated with China’s “qualified foreign institutional investor” scheme governing foreign portfolio inflows, Indonesian restrictions on domestic banks purchasing local currency instruments from non-resident issuers, Korea’s ceiling on resident investment in overseas securities and properties, restrictions on foreign investors purchasing foreign currency from the local banking system in the Philippines, and Thailand’s limits on domestic banks’ local-currency lending to non-residents.
90
Developing bond markets in East Asia
Local market impediments may take the forms of taxes, insufficient market development, and an inadequate clearing and settlement infrastructure. Withholding taxes and taxes on financial transactions remain a major cost to non-resident investors in some of the local markets. Within EMEAP, some jurisdictions exempt only non-resident investors, and some do so only for certain instruments. Insufficient market development, such as the lack of a broad and diversified bond investor base, issuers and products, is not conducive to liquidity. The lack of an independent and competent rating industry and more consistent rating standards is a barrier to more efficient pricing of credits. In many cases, inadequate disclosure requirements, weak accounting standards, and insufficient creditor rights protection add to the impediment list. For deep and liquid markets in Asia, Jiang and McCauley (2004) identify as essential such factors as market size, the diversity of the investor base, and the availability of hedging instruments. Inadequate custody, clearing, and settlement facilities also hamper bond market development. In most Asian bond markets, it is still rather cumbersome and sometimes impossible to clear and settle cross-border bond transactions.
4.3
REGIONAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES AND THE ABF PROJECT
East Asia has seen several initiatives in regional cooperation to develop domestic bond markets. One focus of the various regional initiatives has been to open up domestic markets to foreign portfolio investment by removing both local and cross-border impediments. Among these initiatives, only the ABF2 effort involves actually setting up funds to invest in the local currency markets. We argue in this section that this unusual approach leads regulators to encounter impediments in their actual operations of establishing bond funds so as to make it an effective mechanism for regulatory reform. In principle, private investors could have also lobbied for reforms as they set up investment funds. However, market reform is a public good in the sense that the benefits are enjoyed by many investors. Individually, investors would be unwilling to bear the costs of lobbying fully for such reforms, because they would not be able to keep the benefits to themselves. At least three major government-sponsored regional organizations in Asia are pursuing initiatives to promote financial development in the region (Battellino 2004). First, under the banner of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum,4 the tripartite structure of the PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) brings together many of
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the initiatives of government, business, and academe. One such initiative is focusing on the development of securitization and credit guarantees. Second, within the Association of South East Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN13) framework,5 six working groups have been set up to address a broad range of issues related to local bond markets in Asia. These issues comprise securitized debt instruments, credit guarantee mechanisms, foreign exchange transactions and settlements, local currency issuance by multinational corporations, local and regional credit rating agencies, and coordinated technical assistance. The third organization consists of the EMEAP central banks, which have been behind the setting-up of the Asian bond funds (ABFs). The initiatives of these three regional organizations tend to complement each other. For example, under ASEAN13 the Asian Bond Market Initiative has helped secure approval from four countries to allow multilateral development institutions to issue bonds in their local currencies. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the World Bank have already taken advantage of this by each issuing bonds denominated in Malaysian ringgit and Chinese renminbi.6 The ADB has also issued in Thai bahts and Philippine pesos.7 Hence, these actions are adding to the supply of paper in the local bond markets, while the ABF2 exercise is adding to the demand for this paper. The ABF exercises are the first initiatives in which a regional organization has contributed financial resources to setting up actual bond funds in Asia. In June 2003, the EMEAP central banks launched the first fund, the Asian Bond Fund 1 (ABF1), pooling USD 1 billion in international reserves from the 11 central banks and investing in US dollar denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign borrowers in eight of the EMEAP economies.8 By design, ABF1 was set up to be restricted to EMEAP central bank investment only and thus would not be open to other investors. Nonetheless, it was the first regional pooling of international reserves in Asia. In June 2005, the EMEAP central banks launched the second fund, the Asian Bond Fund 2 (ABF2), which has invested USD 2 billion of EMEAP central bank reserves in local currency denominated sovereign and quasi-sovereign issues in the same eight EMEAP markets.9
4.4
CONCERTED “LEARNING BY DOING”: THE ABF2 EXERCISE
As mentioned, the ABF2 initiative differs from the others in that it involves the actual creation of local currency bond funds. The earlier ABF1 had limited itself to dollar-denominated issues that are mostly traded in more
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Developing bond markets in East Asia USD 1 billion USD 1 billion
EMEAP’s Investment in ABF2
Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF)
8 single-country funds Local currency bond markets
China fund
Hong Kong fund
China markets
Hong Kong market
Indonesia fund
Jakarta market
Korea fund
Seoul market
Malaysia fund
Kuala Lumpur market
Philippines fund
Manila market
Singapore fund
Singapore market
Thailand fund
Bangkok market
Figure 4.2 ABF2 structure
developed international bond markets. Nonetheless, that first fund was important because it afforded the EMEAP central banks an opportunity to work together to build trust so as to foster cooperation and to further develop financial markets in the region (Leung 2006). ABF2 is actually nine separate funds: a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and eight single-market funds (Figure 4.2). The PAIF is a singleindex bond fund investing in sovereign and quasi-sovereign domestic currency denominated bonds issued in the eight EMEAP markets. The PAIF will be quoted in US dollars on an unhedged basis (for more details about the structure of the PAIF, see section 4.5 below). The eight single-market funds will each invest in the respective local currency bond market. Each of the nine funds will replicate a bond index provided by a third party, the International Index Company (IIC), which has been a major participant in developing the highly successful credit default swap (CDS) indices in Europe and North America.10 All eight single markets funds have been registered locally in their own markets. Private sector fund managers have been designated to individually manage the PAIF and the single-market funds. The mandate of each fund manager is then to try to replicate the relevant index and manage the fund passively. ABF2 has been proceeding in two phases. In Phase 1, investments in both the PAIF and the single-market funds are confined to the international reserves of the 11 EMEAP central banks, with a total sum of USD 2 billion. The EMEAP announced the formal launch of Phase 1 of ABF2 in June 2005. In Phase 2, through public offerings, the PAIF and the eight single-market funds will be gradually opened up to other institutional and retail investors, both within and without the EMEAP region.
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Table 4.1
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Cumulative growth of the ABF2 funds open to non-EMEAP investors
Funds PAIF Hong Kong Bond Index Fund Malaysia Bond Index Fund Philippine Bond Index Fund Singapore Bond Index Fund Thailand Bond Index Fund
Fund size (USD million)
Growth since inception (%)
1156 214 125 57 220 121
14 55 26 3 35 20
Note: As of April 30, 2006, fund size is measured as net asset value, while growth is based on the number of fund units. The IPO dates vary across different funds. Source:
Bloomberg.
The pace and timing of the opening of these nine bond funds could vary across jurisdictions. Between the formal launch of ABF2 in June 2005 and the time of writing, six of the nine ABF funds have opened to the public. They are the PAIF, Hong Kong Bond Index Fund, Malaysia Bond Index Fund, Philippine Bond Index Fund, Singapore Bond Index Fund, and Thailand Bond Index Fund. Some of the remaining three single market funds are expected to be offered publicly in the near future. Undertaking the project in phases has allowed the central banks to identify market impediments in stages and deal with them on a realistic schedule. As more ABF2 funds became available to the public, the total size of the ABF2 funds, including both the USD 2 billion EMEAP seed money and new non-EMEAP investments, increased to USD 2.47 billion as of April 2006. Since their respective listings, the growth of individual funds has varied noticeably, ranging from a rise of 3 percent to above 50 percent (Table 4.1). Part of the reason for the differences is the different timing of their initial public listings. For instance, the Hong Kong Bond Index Fund was listed in June 2005, while the listing of the Philippine Bond Index Fund took place only in late April 2006. Still, these developments suggest reasonable market demand for Asian local currency index bond funds, with the size of the Philippine fund in particular more than doubling since inception. The advantage of creating actual funds in the process of trying to reform markets is that an important element of “learning by doing” is introduced. Informal conversations with the key individuals involved suggest that in
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setting up ABF2 the EMEAP central banks encountered myriad market impediments, many of them seemingly small but each one critical to the operation of the funds. Even when these officials had been aware of the impediments before the exercise, they found some of them to be more significant than initially thought. By undertaking the initiative as a group, the EMEAP central banks improved their understanding of specific impediments in their local bond markets and came up with ways to overcome them. Seeing that the authorities in neighboring jurisdictions had already instituted certain market reforms encouraged the relevant authorities to “fast-track” their own initiatives. Often the central bank officials worked with their counterparts at the finance ministry or the securities regulator to deal with the impediments. Recognizing that their job is far from complete, the central banks have also agreed on an incentive mechanism for further reducing market impediments. In particular, the scheme for allocating the portfolio to the various local markets will take market impediments into account: the portfolio weight in ABF2 for an individual market rises as cross-border and local market impediments in that market are removed (see section 4.7 for a more detailed discussion).
4.5
DESIGNING A LIQUID PAN-ASIAN BOND INDEX FUND11
The Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) is designed to allow institutional and retail investors to gain access to Asia’s local bond markets in a simple and transparent manner. The main challenge was to ensure that investors benefit from the lower transaction costs associated with passively tracking a regional index rather than active management of a portfolio. The specific index is the iBoxx Pan Asia Index, which is constructed to be transparent and to comprehensively cover the eight local Asian bond markets. The index will be quoted in US dollars on an unhedged basis. In practice, the fund will replicate the index closely by holding a selected set of issues rather than all the constituents of the index. Such fund management, however, requires an infrastructure of risk management and analysis of risk factors (Cheung 2006). The fund’s regional scope meant that there was no natural domicile for it in any of the EMEAP jurisdictions. Tax, legal, operational, and marketing considerations suggested that a Singapore-based unit trust listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange would offer the best option for all investors, and this is how it was established. The fund is open-ended as well as exchange-listed. Hence, investors are
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Investors Buying and selling
Buying and selling
Stock exchange
Participating dealers
Subscription and redemption
Liquidity Arbitrage
PAIF trustee
Market-makers
Primary market
Secondary market
Figure 4.3
Two ways to trade the PAIF
able to trade the PAIF in two ways. First, as shown in Figure 4.3, investors can go to fund trustees through dealers to buy or redeem units at that day’s closing net asset value, thus engaging in a transaction in the “primary market”. Second, they can buy or sell units on the stock exchange, thus trading in the “secondary market”. As has been the case with other funds previously launched in the region, there are some restrictions on trading PAIF units in the primary market so as to concentrate liquidity in the secondary market. Nonetheless, the primary market continues to provide an important means for arbitrage to ensure that secondary market prices stay in line with the fund’s net asset value. In the primary market, the PAIF follows the “participating dealer model”. This model limits daily subscriptions and redemptions only to dealers who have signed an agreement with the fund manager. To help the manager deal with cash inflows and outflows, the participating dealers may only transact a minimum size. For cash transactions, there is a limit on the total daily volumes, and the manager charges a dilution fee. The limit is waived if transactions are in exchange of a basket of bonds. These transactions are known as “in-kind” subscriptions or redemptions. The “in-kind” facility makes the PAIF similar to an exchange-traded fund (ETF), the main difference being that in-kind dealing is more formalized with an ETF. In the secondary market, the fund manager has appointed marketmakers to provide liquidity in the trading of units on the stock exchange. The market-makers are expected to maintain tight bid and offer quotes on
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Developing bond markets in East Asia
the exchange and to seize arbitrage opportunities by closely monitoring the fund’s net asset value and comparing it with the prices on the exchange. To help them provide liquidity, the market-makers have priority in the primary market for trades up to a specified limit per day, and they may borrow fund units from institutional investors. The opening of the PAIF to the public took place at the end of June 2005. Before listing the fund on the exchange, a unit trust was set up by the EMEAP central banks with an “in-kind” transfer of the equivalent of around USD 1 billion in local currency bonds, which was purchased during Phase 1 of ABF2. The fund may be further enlarged through private placements by institutional investors, participating dealers, and market-makers. It has been listed to allow all other investors to acquire the units on the secondary market. This strategy is expected to keep costs low and avoid the volatility usually associated with a sale-driven initial public offering. From then on, listings on other EMEAP stock exchanges will be considered, depending on demand from local investors and on whether local regulatory rules permit it. Once listed, the PAIF became the first low-cost, passively managed investment fund invested in the eight EMEAP local bond markets. These features should potentially make the PAIF attractive in the long term to pension funds and retirement accounts seeking opportunities for diversification and favorable long-term returns.
4.6
MARKET IMPEDIMENTS ALREADY REDUCED
For such relatively small sums, the ABF2 initiative has apparently been unusually effective in promoting the reform of local bond markets.12 Because of the other initiatives that are also under way, it is always difficult to attribute regulatory changes to the ABF2 effort alone. Nonetheless, many of the participants feel that the effort has made a significant difference. In this section, we can provide only a few illustrative examples of reductions in impediments. The most apparent area for reform has been in capital controls. Malaysia, for example, has announced measures to liberalize its foreign exchange market, so that it has now essentially restored the regime that was in place before it imposed capital controls during the Asian crisis. The Malaysian authorities have lifted all restrictions on non-resident hedging activities. Companies controlled by non-residents now enjoy full access to onshore ringgit credit facilities. Residents without domestic ringgit borrowing can freely invest abroad. Finally, the Malaysians have permitted multilateral agencies to issue local currency bonds in the domestic
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market and allowed these non-resident issuers to hedge exchange risks with onshore banks. Korea has also recently announced a series of measures to further liberalize foreign exchange regulations. The limit on won borrowing by foreign investors has been lifted from KRW 1 billion previously to KRW 10 billion. Moreover, Korean residents are now allowed to invest in overseas property up to USD 1 million. In China, the investment quota on portfolio inflows by qualified foreign institutional investors has been raised from the initial USD 2 billion in 2003 to nearly USD 7 billion as of May 2006. Measures have been announced to allow Chinese residents to invest in overseas securities, subject to some quota. China’s active participation in ABF2 also bodes well for the country’s willingness to simplify its still extensive regulations on cross-border portfolio investment and to lower hurdles for the still fragmented domestic bond markets regulated by multiple authorities. In fact, the PAIF is the first foreign institutional investor that has been given direct access to the Chinese interbank bond market.13 Withholding taxes and other taxes are another area of reform. Thailand has already granted non-resident investors withholding tax exemption for income from investing in baht-denominated government bonds and, in most cases, government-guaranteed bonds in the domestic market. Malaysia has also announced the exemption of non-resident investors from the withholding tax on the interest income received from investment in ringgit-denominated debt securities onshore. In Korea, the withholding tax on interest incomes that foreign investors earn on local currency bonds has been reduced. So far, five of the eight EMEAP member markets have either implemented or offered exemption from the withholding tax to nonresidents investing in local currency sovereign or quasi-sovereign issues. In the Philippines, the documentary stamp duty on bond trading will be removed with the introduction of the Philippine single-market fund. One unexpected area of reform has been the legal accommodation of national jurisdictions, so that a fund domiciled in one jurisdiction may be sold in another. The PAIF, for example, is to be domiciled in Singapore to take advantage of a host of factors including bilateral tax agreements between Singapore and the other EMEAP members. However, it will be initially listed in Hong Kong, in part to take advantage of the high degree of liquidity and depth in that market. This combination is the first ever in Asia, demanding a significant learning effort on the part of each regulatory authority.14 To make the fund possible, the participating central banks and the regulatory authorities concerned needed to cooperate in reconciling divergent regulatory frameworks. Direct participation in local currency bond markets by the EMEAP central banks has thus helped them to
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further identify, understand the details of, and gauge the importance of market impediments as well as to better appreciate the diversity of each other’s regulatory frameworks. This appreciation should in turn set the stage for further streamlining of market regulation in the region.
4.7
INCENTIVES TO FURTHER REDUCE IMPEDIMENTS
The central banks involved in ABF2 have devised a mechanism to provide incentives to further reduce impediments in their own local bond markets. These incentives are built into the determination of the market weights in the portfolio of the PAIF and the single-market funds. As the assigned weight on a particular market increases, a larger portion of the investments into these index bond funds will be allocated to that market. Determining the Market Weights in ABF The portfolio allocations of the PAIF and the initial EMEAP investment in the eight single-market funds will be determined in large part by market weights that take account of various factors. There are specifically four such factors: the size of the local market, the turnover ratio in that market, the sovereign credit rating,15 and a market openness factor. Starting from an equal allocation for each local market, the allocation will be adjusted to take account of these four factors. The allocation for a given market will be adjusted upwards if the adjustment factors score better than the averages for the eight markets. In the adjustment, market size, turnover ratio, and credit rating will each carry a 20 percent weight. The greatest part of the adjustment will be determined by the market openness factor, which will be assigned a 40 percent weight. The Market Openness Factor IIC, the company generally responsible for the bond market indices to be replicated by the nine ABF2 funds, has constructed a “qualitative factor that gauges the relative openness of the eight markets” (IIC, 2005a). This factor is measured by a so-called “impediments index” (Table 4.2): the fewer the impediments present, the better the openness factor would score. In creating the index, IIC consulted with a “number of international and domestic market participants through its Asian Index Committee and Asian Oversight Committee, as a means to help ensure the credibility and market acceptance of the indices” (EMEAP 2005).
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Table 4.2
Five sub-factors of the impediments index
Sub-factors
Description
Regulatory environment
Degree of investor protection and freedom of action, such as restrictions on foreign investments, currency and capital controls, etc. Legal restrictions or laws discriminating against specific investor classes, corporate governance Tax treatment and other monetary duties State of development of the local capital market and its influence on asset management Degree of sophistication and competition in back office functionalities such as settlement, custody, etc.
Legal environment Fiscal environment Market infrastructure Clearing and settlement infrastructure
Note: The higher the score of each sub-factor, the fewer the market impediments present. These scores are derived from polls among members of the iBoxx Asian Index Committee. The impediments index is a weighted average of the five sub-factors. Source:
International Index Company (2005a, 2005b).
Any assessment of market openness might be expected to take account of such considerations as the absence of capital controls, the level of withholding taxes, the availability of hedging instruments, the facilities for real-time gross settlement, and the ability to clear local bonds internationally. The higher the market openness factor assigned for a given market, the more the portfolio allocation is adjusted in favor of that market. The country weights, and thus the market openness factor, will be reviewed every September. As impediments are removed, the changes can be expected to be reflected in a rebalancing of the regional portfolio. In constructing the market openness factor, the iBoxx Asian Index Committee will treat the regulatory environment as the most important consideration. This sub-factor, which includes capital controls and provisions for investor protection, will alone account for 25 percent of the openness score. Notably, the two considerations that have been most neglected in the academic literature—market infrastructure and the payment system—will together receive a weight of 37.5 percent. The legal and fiscal environments will account for the remaining 37.5 percent. An Illustration Figure 4.4 shows the effects of such weight adjustments. It compares the weights based on raw market capitalization data and the adjusted weights in the PAIF portfolio at the time of launch. The allocation after
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Developing bond markets in East Asia A. Market weights based on raw capitalization data
B. Market weights based on the iBoxx PAIF index
Thailand Singapore Thailand
Philippines Malaysia
China
China
Singapore
Hong Kong
Philippines
Indonesia
Hong Kong Korea
Note: Source:
Indonesia
Malaysia Korea
Weights add up to 100% in total. International Index Company.
Figure 4.4
Market weights for the Asian Bond Fund
adjustments differs considerably from the weights on the basis of raw market capitalization data. The allocations in the PAIF to China and Korea fall noticeably below their capitalization-based weights, while the remaining six markets gain. In particular, the Hong Kong and Singapore allocations rise more than fourfold. There are at least two ways in which the ABF2 indices will help the development of Asian local currency bond markets. First, they provide a dynamic mechanism to encourage the eight EMEAP members to continue their efforts at market liberalization. As discussed above, market openness is the single most important adjustment factor in the allocation weights, and these will be reviewed annually. As new market liberalization measures are introduced, the market openness factor would score better, thus increasing the weights on the market in question. Second, the improved transparency, replicability, and credibility of these market indices will provide the kinds of benchmarks that have proven useful elsewhere for the development of markets in corporate bonds.
4.8
CONCLUSION
The ABF2 initiative is a regional cooperative effort aimed at fostering local currency bond markets in Asia. It differs from other such efforts in that it
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involved actually setting up bond funds. Hence, it contains an important element of “learning by doing”, which has enabled EMEAP to identify in detail significant market impediments that had not been well appreciated before. The process has already helped ease various market impediments, both cross-border and local. The exercise also provides incentives to further reduce market impediments. An important test for the exercise will be whether it sets the stage for the development of local currency markets in corporate bonds. Already, ABF2 is bringing new instruments to the local markets. As a listed openended index fund, the PAIF is a relatively low-cost, low-denomination, and transparent fund, which would be potentially appealing to a broad spectrum of institutional and retail investors. Thus, the PAIF may help broaden both the investment menu and the investor base. The ABF may help explore the potential role of ETFs. As of April 2006, six of the eight single-market funds have been exchange-listed.16 China is currently working its own single-market fund to be an ETF in the second phase of ABF2. The introduction of these funds along with a set of transparent and replicable benchmark indices for Asian local currency bond markets may facilitate the development of other fixed income and derivative products, including corporate bonds and credit default swaps.
NOTES 1.
2.
3. 4.
5. 6.
We thank Claudio Borio, Norman Chan, Guy Debelle, Már Gudmundsson, Robert McCauley, Frank Packer, Sakkapopp Panyanukul, Ramona Santiago, Atsushi Takeuchi, Philip Wooldridge, and Sunny Yung for helpful discussions. We have also benefited from the comments and suggestions of participants at the HWWA/ HWWI Conference on East Asian Monetary and Financial Integration in Hamburg in December 2005. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank for International Settlements. The 11 EMEAP central banks and monetary authorities are the Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Bank of Thailand. For a review of bond market development since the 1997 crisis, see Committee on the Global Financial System (1999), McCauley and Remolona (2000), Jiang and McCauley (2004), Battellino (2004), and Sheng (2005). APEC has 21 member economies: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan (China), Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. The members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The “13” are China, Japan, and Korea. There have been four issues of supranational local currency bonds in Malaysia since late 2004: MYR 400 million by the ADB, MYR 500 million by the IFC, and MYR
102
7. 8. 9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
Developing bond markets in East Asia 760 million by the World Bank. The ADB issue in Thailand in 2005 amounted to THB 4 billion. The ADB came back to Malaysia for a second ringgit offering of MYR 500 million in 2006. In China, IFC and ADB issued so-called panda bonds worth RMB 1.13 billion and RMB 1 billion in 2005. ADB issued PHP 2.5 billion and THB 4 billion bonds, respectively, in the Philippines and Thailand in 2005. The three EMEAP countries in which the ABFs will not invest are Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) acts as manager for ABF1 and as administrator for ABF2. CDS indices are now the most actively traded instruments in credit markets. The main CDS index for Europe is DJ iTraxx and for North America DJ CDX. Both are the result of a merger between two competing families, Trac-x and iBoxx. See Amato and Gyntelberg (2005). This section draws heavily from a box written by Pierre Cardon in Ma and Remolona (2005). In this respect, the small sums involved help in that they avoid the problem of a passive investor taking away from the market too much of the available volume of tradable instruments. Previously, qualified foreign institutional investors were allowed to directly invest in bonds and stocks traded on the smaller Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In the future, the PAIF may be listed in another market in the region, and some of the eight single-market funds could be managed in jurisdictions other than those where they are registered and listed. Local currency long-term debt ratings of the three international rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s) are applied. The PAIF, and the single-market funds of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.
REFERENCES Amato, Jeffrey D., and Jacob Gyntelberg (2005). “CDS Index Tranches and the Pricing of Credit Risk Correlations.” BIS Quarterly Review March: 73–87. Battellino, Ric (2004). “Recent Developments in Asian Bond Markets.” Speech given at the 17th Australian Finance and Banking Conference, December. Cheung, Hon (2006). “The ABF2 Funds: Pushing the Frontiers in Asian Bonds.” Asiamoney May: 36–41. Committee on the Global Financial System (1999). How Should We Design Deep and Liquid Markets? The Case of Government Securities, October. Basel: CGFS. Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (2005). “The Asian Bond Fund 2 Has Moved Into Implementation Phase.” www.emeap.org/ press//12May05.htm. International Index Company (2005a). “iBoxx ABF Index Family Guide, Version 2.0, April.” www.indexco.com/news/Attach/DM73/iBoxx_ABF_IndexGuide. pdf. International Index Company (2005b). “iBoxx ABF Bond Indices Launched.” www.indexco.com/news/Attach/DM74/iBoxx_ABF2_BondIndices.pdf. Jiang, Guorong, and Robert N. McCauley (2004). “Asian Local Currency Bond Markets.” BIS Quarterly Review June: 67–79.
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Leung, Julia (2006). “Developing Bond Markets in Asia: Experience With ABF2.” BIS Papers No. 26, “Develop Corporate Bond Markets in Asia”, March: 74–9. Ma, Guonan, and Robert N. McCauley (2006). “Are China’s Capital Controls Still Binding.” Paper presented at the Seoul National University/Korea International Economic Policy Institute Conference “China and Emerging Asia: Reorganising the Global Economy”, Seoul, May. Ma, Guonan, and Eli M. Remolona (2005). “Opening Markets Through a Regional Bond Fund: Lessons from ABF2.” BIS Quarterly Review June: 81–92. McCauley, Robert N (2003). “Capital Flows in East Asia Since the 1997 Crisis.” BIS Quarterly Review June: 41–55. McCauley, Robert N., and Eli M. Remolona (2000). “Size and Liquidity of Government Bond Markets.” BIS Quarterly Review November: 52–8. Sheng, Andrew (2005). “Corporate Debt in Asia and Asian Financial Market Development.” Speech given at the conference on Advancing East Asian Integration, March 3–4. Takeuchi, Atsushi (2004). “Study of Impediments to Cross-border Investment and Issuance in Asian Countries.” Interim Report for the ASEAN13 Asian Bond Market Initiative, November.
5.
Currency denomination in Asian bond markets Eiji Ogawa and Junko Shimizu1
5.1
INTRODUCTION
One of the main features of financial crises, especially those that occurred in the 1990s around the world, is that they tend to spill over from one country to neighboring countries. This was the case during the Asian currency crisis of 1997–98, when contagion throughout the regional economies was fuelled by strong trade linkages among the East Asian countries. The Asian currency crisis brought about a strong awareness of the necessity for regional cooperation, and, accordingly, several policy proposals have been developed for the strengthening of regional financial cooperation. Kuroda and Kawai (2003) proposed a more effective surveillance process and considered the option of creating a common pool of foreign exchange reserves in order to allow flexible financial support during times of crisis and contagion, which would also reduce the problem of moral hazard. The monetary authorities in East Asian countries in 2000 established, and recently have augmented, the Chiang Mai Initiative, a swap agreement meant to prevent future currency and financial crises by boosting short-term liquidity.2 One approach to strengthening regional financial markets and avoiding future financial crises in East Asia that we feel deserves more investigation is the call for a more efficient regional bond market. Ever since the Asian currency crisis, East Asian monetary authorities have recognized the underlying problems caused by a double overdependence on the banking sector in their financial systems on the one hand and on the US dollar in their currency systems on the other hand. Even though there is an abundance of both savings and profitable investment opportunities in East Asian emerging market countries, the inefficiency with which savings and investments are matched within East Asia through regional financial markets has proven to be a problem. East Asian debtors (but also creditors) have been facing foreign exchange risks because they are only able to denominate liabilities (or assets, respectively) in foreign currency 104
Currency denomination in Asian bond markets
105
when they borrow (or lend) internationally. The establishment and development of regional bond markets in East Asia has been proposed in order to directly circulate regional savings into regional investments (Ito 2004, Ito and Park 2004). In addition, the possibilities of introducing a common currency basket unit and even a common currency in East Asia have been discussed.3 The monetary authorities of East Asian countries have already started promoting the development of regional bond markets through various initiatives such as the EMEAP’s Asian Bond Fund4 and ASEAN13’s Asian Bond Market Initiative.5 Recent discussions of the Asian Bond Market Initiative have focused on the choice of denomination currency for bond issues and the establishment of a credit guarantee and rating agency. One choice is to denominate regional bond issues in US dollars. This is what the EMEAP central banks did when they first launched the Asian Bond Fund 1 (ABF1) in June 2003 as a basket of US dollar denominated bonds issued by Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP economies (excluding Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). Ito (2003) proposed another option, namely, an Asian bond designed as a fund of the local currency denominated bonds issued by governments of East Asian countries. The EMEAP has subsequently worked to extend the ABF concept to bonds denominated in local currencies, which were launched as the ABF2 in June 2005.6 In previous research, Ogawa and Shimizu (2002, 2004) assessed the effectiveness of basket currency denominated bonds in East Asian countries from the points of view of bond issuers and of foreign investors. Conducting empirical analyses, we compared between Asian bonds denominated in terms of a G3 currency basket (a currency basket composed of the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen) with those denominated in terms of a single currency (the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, or one of seven East Asian currencies) in terms of both relative risk and liquidity. The results showed that issuing currency basket denominated bonds would reduce foreign exchange risk for bond issuers in the East Asian countries under investigation, with the exception of the dollar-pegging countries of Malaysia, China, and Hong Kong. Shimizu and Ogawa (2005) considered another type of currency basket, the Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is composed of the currencies of the ASEAN14 countries (ASEAN13 and Hong Kong). As Kawai et al. (2004) noted, an AMU composed of East Asian currencies would be equivalent to the G3 currency basket if all East Asian countries were to use the G3 currency basket as a reference or target in conducting their exchange rate policies, though this is not currently the case. Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed an AMU as well as AMU Deviation Indicators to assist
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Developing bond markets in East Asia
with the coordination of exchange rate policies by East Asian monetary authorities. Shimizu and Ogawa (2005) investigated the risk properties of AMU denominated Asian bonds by comparing them with those of local currency denominated bonds issued in East Asian countries. Building on our previous empirical research into the choice of denomination currency for Asian bonds, in this chapter we focus on the risk properties of AMU denominated bonds as well as the expected liquidity of AMU bond markets. Defining the AMU as a currency unit comprising a basket of East Asian currencies, we simulate a currency basket composed of the currencies of the ASEAN5 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) plus those of Japan, China, Korea, and Hong Kong. Our results indicate that the portfolio effects of holding AMU denominated bonds can reduce foreign exchange risk for both US and Japanese investors. These results, however, depend on the currency systems of the East Asian countries. This chapter is organized as follows: the next section analyzes foreign exchange risk aspects of Asian bonds for bond issuers, and the third section analyzes foreign exchange risk aspects of Asian bonds for foreign investors. The reduction of foreign exchange risk through the portfolio effects of holding AMU denominated bonds is pointed out in the fourth section. In the fifth section, we focus on liquidity aspects of Asian bond markets. Finally, we summarize and conclude this chapter in the last section.
5.2
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKS FOR BOND ISSUERS
Methodology and Data We investigate how much foreign exchange risk bond issuers would face when issuing bonds denominated in terms of various currencies, focusing on the volatility of foreign borrowing costs.7 We compare the volatilities of bonds denominated in terms of the currencies of nine East Asian countries (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and China) against those of bonds denominated in terms of three major currencies (the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen) and those of several types of bonds denominated in terms of currency baskets composed of the three major currencies. For the currency baskets, we consider several different currency shares based on exchange rate movements and the trade weights of the nine East Asian countries with the United States, Japan, and the euro area countries.
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We also consider two types of baskets. The first type of basket is a common basket for the East Asian region as a whole. This kind of basket is based on the proposal for a so-called AMU which was developed by Kawai et al. (2004) and Ogawa and Shimizu (2005). Like the European Currency Unit (ECU) under the European Monetary System during the period from 1979 to 1998, the monetary authorities of East Asian countries could consider creating a common regional unit of account that could be used for trade invoicing, bond issues, and as a reference for their exchange rate policies. For this common basket, we calculate two different kinds of trade weights, named trade-weights I and II, based on the calculation methods of Ogawa and Kawasaki (2003). These trade weights reflect the shares of the total amount of trade between ASEAN514 and the United States, Japan, and the euro area countries. They differ in their inclusion or exclusion of the trade between the nine East Asian countries and the rest of the world. Trade-weight I is based on the share of total trade between the nine East Asian countries and the United States, Japan, and the euro area countries only. Trade-weight II also takes into account trade with the rest of the world. In this case, trade with the rest of the world is added to the share of the United States based on the assumption that trade with the rest of the world is invoiced in US dollars. We calculate both trade weights by using annual data and apply the average share of annual results during the period from 1990 to 2002. The resulting currency basket shares based on tradeweights I and II are calculated as the US dollar: the Japanese yen: the euro 5 35.7 percent: 35.1 percent: 29.2 percent and 69.3 percent: 16.7 percent: 14.0 percent, respectively. The second type of basket is country-specific, tailored specifically for each East Asian country. In order to reflect the characteristics of each nation’s trade relationship with the countries of the three major currencies, we calculate the basket shares based on trade intensity, using the method put forward by Petri (1993).8 The index of trade intensity, which can measure the bilateral trade linkages among countries (or regions), is defined as follows: Ij,k 5 (Tj,k/Tj)/(Tk/Tw),
(5.1)
where Ij,k is the index of trade intensity between country j and country k, Tj,k is the volume of trade between country j and country k, Tj is the total volume of trade of country j, Tk is the total volume of trade of country k, and Tw is the total volume of trade in the world. The index of trade intensity measures the closeness of bilateral trade linkages between countries j and k by comparing bilateral trade volumes
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Developing bond markets in East Asia
with the respective countries’ trade volumes with the rest of the world. An index close to unity can be interpreted as a neutral bilateral trade relationship. Indices less than or greater than one mean that the nation’s trade relationship is biased in comparison with the nation’s trade with the rest of the world. Values greater than one mean that the trade relationship between countries j and k is biased toward stronger interdependence than their trade with the rest of the world, while values less than one indicate that the nation’s trade relationship is biased toward weaker interdependence than their trade with the rest of the world. Our index of trade intensity is based on 2000 trade data.9 The index of trade intensity between every East Asian country and Japan is larger than one. The index of trade intensity between Indonesia and Japan is the greatest, while Hong Kong registers the lowest value of trade intensity with Japan among East Asian nations. The indexes of trade intensity between some East Asian countries and the United States are greater than one but always smaller than those between the East Asian countries and Japan. The indexes of trade intensity between the East Asian countries and the euro area countries are all less than one. Thus, we design three types of currency baskets with different weights for each of the East Asian currencies. With the aim of indicating empirically how the currency basket denominated bonds could contribute to reducing foreign exchange risks, we use historical data on exchange rates and interest rates to simulate foreign borrowing costs by applying these basket shares, which are calculated ex post. Applying these different types of currency basket shares, we can investigate not only whether the hypothetical currency basket denominated bonds would more effectively contribute to decreasing the volatilities of foreign borrowing costs but also which type of currency basket would be more effective in decreasing the volatilities for bond issuers in each of the East Asian countries. Three-month money market interest rates and daily close exchange rates are used to calculate the series of foreign borrowing costs for three-month periods (90 days). Then we calculate the means and the standard deviations of these series for whole sample period. The standard deviation is regarded as the volatility of the foreign borrowing costs. The three-month foreign borrowing costs evaluated in terms of the issuer’s home currency are calculated under the uncovered interest rate parity condition. For example, the costs of three-month borrowing from the United States for issuers in country A are calculated as follows: e
{ 1US$ 1 (1 3 r3 month,us) 3 90/360 } 3 (A/US$) t190 days 1US$ 3 (A/US$) t
2 1 f 3 100 (%) (5.2)
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where (A/US$) t is the exchange rate between the US dollar and currency A at period t. Our empirical analysis covers the period from January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2006. We calculate three-month foreign borrowing costs for each day during the period. As a result, we have 1888 observations for each type of borrowing pattern during the period under analysis.10 First, we investigate three-month foreign borrowing costs for the nine East Asian countries, namely, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and China. For each country, over the sample period we calculate eight different types of foreign borrowing costs associated with issuing bonds denominated in terms of four single currencies (the home currency, the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen) and in terms of four types of currency baskets. The currency basket denominated bonds are a kind of portfolio of bonds denominated in terms of the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen. Results Table 5.1 shows the means and standard deviations of 3 month foreign borrowing costs that debtors in each of the nine East Asian countries would face when issuing bonds denominated in terms of the home currency, the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the eight different types of currency baskets. We regard the foreign borrowing cost in terms of the US dollar to be a benchmark and statistically test the differences between the means and standard deviations of bonds denominated in terms of the US dollar and bonds denominated in terms of currency baskets.11,12 We obtained two important results. First, the standard deviations of foreign borrowing cost incurred by issuing home currency denominated bonds are far lower than those incurred by issuing foreign currency denominated bonds for the nine East Asian countries. This implies that the foreign exchange risk has a heavy weight in the total cost of borrowing by issuing foreign currency denominated bonds. Second, the issuing of currency basket denominated bonds could contribute to decreasing foreign borrowing costs as well as risks. The volatility of foreign borrowing costs faced when issuing currency basket denominated bonds is lower than when US dollar denominated bonds are issued for Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Korea, since the foreign exchange risks of the three major currencies partially offset each other. The costs of issuing the currency basket denominated bonds are lower than those of issuing the US dollar denominated bond for all of the sample countries. The costs of issuing the currency basket denominated bonds are lower than those of issuing the home currency denominated bonds; this is especially true for dollar-pegging
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Table 5.1
Borrowing from
Singapore Max Min Mean Std dev. Thailand Max Min Mean Std dev. Malaysia Max Min Mean Std dev. Philippines Max Min Mean Std dev. Indonesia Max Min Mean Std dev. Taiwan Max Min Mean Std dev. South Korea Max Min Mean Std dev. Hong Kong Max
Developing bond markets in East Asia
Three-month borrowing costs in East Asian Countries (%), Jan 1999–Mar 2006 Single currency type Home currency
USD
0.766 0.109 0.392 0.193
6.627 −4.593 0.631 2.267
13.848 18.174 −9.445 −10.129 0.944 −0.053 4.322 3.942
6.797 −3.727 0.541 1.902
5.481 −3.491 0.587 1.516
11.214 −5.557 0.272 2.300
1.938 0.250 0.631 0.369
14.210 16.051 31.819 −8.312 −12.676 −11.779 1.048 1.340 0.379 3.799 4.836 5.409
19.198 −8.958 0.955 3.528
16.602 −8.514 1.003 3.370
25.092 −7.726 0.657 4.183
1.425 0.713 0.811 0.133
1.665 14.741 17.765 −2.886 −10.365 −10.811 0.704 1.090 0.083 0.543 5.366 4.864
9.046 −5.012 0.658 2.782
4.544 −2.767 0.682 1.308
11.698 −6.817 0.346 3.260
4.181 1.075 1.945 0.566
17.204 2