Towards Sustainable Security: Alternatives to the War on Terror

Towards Sustainable Security Alternatives to the War on Terror Oxford Research Group International Security Report 2007

Paul Rogers

Oxford Research Group

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First published 2007 by Oxford Research Group Development House, 56–64 Leonard Street, London EC2A 4LT www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk Copyright © Oxford Research Group 2007 The right of Paul Rogers to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. 10

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Designed and produced for Oxford Research Group by Chase Publishing Services Ltd, Sidmouth, EX10 9QG, England Printed and bound in the European Union

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Contents Introduction Acknowledgements

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Turning Point 1 Oil Security and the Iraq War – May 2006 9 Spring Offensives in Two Wars – June 2006 18 A Third War – July 2006 26 The Lebanon Aftermath – August 2006 35 The Afghan Summer of War – September 2006 44 Insecurity in Iraq – October 2006 53 After the US Elections – November 2006 61 Responding to the Baker Report – December 2006 69 A Surge in Two Wars? – January 2007 77 Environment and Development: The Underlying Global Issues – February 2007 85 12. Iraq Options and US Politics – March 2007 93 13. Four Years On – April 2007 101 14. Choices 110 Notes Index

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Introduction

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n October 2001, Oxford Research Group published an analysis of the possible responses of the United States to the 9/11 atrocities, warning of the risks of a robust military response.1 Such a response was indeed forthcoming, commencing with the termination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as the presumed sponsors of the al-Qaida movement that was held ultimately responsible for the attacks. By the early months of 2002, the war on terror had been extended beyond a concern with the al-Qaida movement in two important respects. Firstly, it now included an ‘axis of evil’ of states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea who were believed to be sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. Secondly, President Bush made it clear that early intervention, including regime termination, was a responsible policy for the United States to follow, given threats to its security. By late 2002 it was apparent that the Bush administration was preparing for regime termination in Iraq, and Oxford Research Group published a further report on the possible consequences of such an operation – Iraq: Consequences of a War.2 This report pointed to the likely impact of an occupation of Iraq on regional antagonism to the United States extending even to increased support for the al-Qaida movement, and also pointed to the risk of a developing insurgency. Within two months of the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime it was apparent that early expectations of a rapid transition to peace in Iraq would not be realised, the situation in Afghanistan vi

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INTRODUCTION

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was becoming problematic and the al-Qaida movement was continuing to be active in many countries, including attacks in the 2002–03 period in Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In these circumstances, Oxford Research Group commenced a series of International Security Monthly Briefings in May 2003, that were intended to analyse the major developments in the ‘war on terror’, while endeavouring to put these developments in a long-term context. These are currently published in English and Spanish. The core of the present volume, the fourth in a series of annual reports, comprises those briefings produced from May 2006 to April 2007. It analyses what was essentially the fourth year of the Iraq War, while also discussing the evolving conflict in Afghanistan, increasing tensions with Iran, incidents of paramilitary violence related to the al-Qaida movement, developments in US, British and coalition military postures, and the wider global security environment including the potential impact of resource conflicts and climate change. The briefings are reproduced here with a minimum of editing, this being confined to minor matters of grammatical improvement or the avoidance of repetition. They are placed in context in the first chapter with a review of developments prior to May 2006, and detailed endnotes are provided for the individual monthly analyses. There is then a final chapter that places the year from May 2006 to April 2007 in a longer-term context. The 2006 report focused on the transition from a terminology of a ‘war on terror’ to a ‘long war’, with the latter phrase suggesting that the post-9/11 global security environment is likely to take the form of an enduring conflict, principally with the al-Qaida movement, stretching well beyond a decade. This year’s report takes into account the further major problems experienced by the United States and its coalition partners, including the increased unpopularity of the war in the United States and the

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resignation of Tony Blair as Prime Minister in Britain. It then examines the potential for major changes in the approach to the war on terror, embracing the idea of sustainable security. Finally, it explores whether such an approach would also be of more value in responding to longer-term global issues such as the widening socio-economic divide and climate change.

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Acknowledgements

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xford Research Group gratefully acknowledges the support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Polden-Puckham Charitable Foundation and our many supporters and sustainers for helping to make the publication of this book possible. I would like to thank the Director of Oxford Research Group, Professor John Sloboda, and members of staff for assistance and ideas in the production of this annual report, especially Chris Abbott for his work in ensuring the production and distribution of the monthly analyses that form a core part of this report. The origins of the annual reports lie with Dr Scilla Elworthy who originally proposed the idea of analytical briefings for Oxford Research Group following the start of the Iraq War in 2003, and their development has been aided by a number of discussions hosted by Gabrielle Rifkind and other members of the Group. More generally I would like to thank the many scores of people who have contributed indirectly to this report, including those who have responded to individual analyses in their English and Spanish versions. Paul Rogers August 2007

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1 Turning Point

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he 2005 and 2006 editions of this annual report focused primarily on the evolution of the global war on terror, more recently termed by the Bush administration ‘the long war against Islamofascism’. This was in the context of the original response to the 9/11 attacks that had involved a robust and extensive series of military operations beginning with the termination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan followed by a second regime termination in Iraq. The tough actions of the Bush administration were themselves seen as a consequence of an international security paradigm that stemmed partly from the rise of neo-conservative influence in the United States before and after the Bush administration came to power. The conduct of the war on terror was open to question in 2006, given that aspects of the war were simply not going according to expectations. Far from being in retreat, the loose al-Qaida movement remained effective, with considerable influence in West Pakistan, a growing presence in Iraq, and more support across much of the Middle East and SouthWest Asia, this adding to a pervasive anti-Americanism that stretched to much of the majority world. In Afghanistan the security situation remained deeply problematic, with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mired in conflict with a resurgent Taliban, especially in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The situation was made more difficult by an increase in opium poppy cultivation, with consequent flows of illicit 1

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finances into the country. It was also compounded by many incidents of civilians killed in air strikes, especially by US aircraft operating under the terms of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US counter-insurgency campaign in south-eastern Afghanistan that remains largely separate from the NATO operation. In Iraq, a bitter and divisive insurgency continued to gather pace, coupled with an increase in sectarian violence and ordinary criminality. Even by early 2006, many tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians had been killed, either by coalition military operations or sectarian conflict, and the United States itself was losing 200–300 troops killed each month. This enduring conflict contrasted markedly with the original expectation that, after regime termination, Iraq would move rapidly to a stable free market economy under a government that was closely allied to the United States and utilised US expertise and advice in most sectors of the economy. In spite of all of these issues, the 2006 report was deliberately entitled Into the Long War on the grounds that, by the middle of that year, there was little sign of any major change in policy. The coalition of states supporting the Bush administration had certainly declined and there was evidence of a decrease in domestic support for the war, but the administration was consistent in linking operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to the original 9/11 attacks and it believed, in particular, that defeating the insurgency in Iraq was central to the success of the wider war. Even in mid-2006, surprise could be expressed at the manner in which the Bush administration was resolute in continuing its military strategy in the face of substantial problems in Iraq and Afghanistan and little evidence of any decrease in the capabilities of the al-Qaida movement. This can be explained with reference to several factors. One is that President Bush had been re-elected in November 2004 with an overall lead over his Democrat opponent in terms of votes cast. Although it was not the most resounding of victories, it was considerably better

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than the 2000 result and could therefore be seen as providing a mandate to continue with existing policies. A second factor was that although there was an anti-war movement developing in the United States, it did not have a major focus in the same way as the anti-Vietnam War movement forty years earlier. It was more disparate and less organised, at least until well into 2006. A third issue was the continuing confidence of neoconservative and assertive realist elements within the Republican Party. There was little hint of the desperation that was to become more evident by early 2007; instead there remained the belief that the vision of a New American Century could still be realised. There was still abundant support for Israel, making it easier to link groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas with some notion of a united Islamofascist front that included al-Qaida, and the Christian Zionist tendency within US evangelical Christianity remained electorally significant. Much of this changed during the period covered by this report, as will be shown by the month-by-month analyses that follow. Even so, it is also important to remember that in spite of the changes of the past year, there are two substantive factors that suggest it will be very difficult to envisage a major reconsideration of the mode of the war on terror. One factor applies to the al-Qaida movement and the other to the United States. Al-Qaida Aims and Timescales The final chapter of last year’s report pointed both to the overall aims of the al-Qaida movement and to the timescales under which the movement operates. It listed a number of short-term aims: • Eviction of foreign military forces from the Islamic world, the main emphasis being on western Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.

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• The termination of the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia as the corrupt, illegitimate and excessively pro-western Keeper of the Two Holy Places, and its replacement with a genuinely Islamic regime. • The termination of elitist, corrupt and pro-western regimes across the region, with some emphasis on Egypt, Gulf emirates and Pakistan, and their replacement with genuinely Islamic regimes. • The establishment of a Palestinian state in place of Israel. • Support for local movements such as the Southern Thailand separatists, radical movements in Indonesia and insurgents in Indian-controlled Kashmir. By early 2002, the al-Qaida movement could already claim some success in that most of the substantial US military forces that had been present in Saudi Arabia since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were being withdrawn, with the probability of complete withdrawal within a couple of years. Moreover, given that the movement was envisaging a 10–20 year process for the achievement of even these short-term aims, temporary setbacks should not be viewed as substantive.1

The report then went on to describe the much longer-term intention of the al-Qaida movement: Beyond this range of short-term aims, the al-Qaida movement also had the more general aim of working towards the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, not necessarily modelled on the historic Caliphates such as the Abbasids a thousand years earlier but certainly embracing a politico/religious entity that would be formed initially across much of the Middle East. Such a longterm aim would be seen as a process that would stretch over 50–100 years.2

The main point made then, which holds good a year later, is that the al-Qaida movement is essentially concerned with the potential for change over a timescale that is far longer than has been typical of most secular revolutionary movements. Although there is still a tendency to see the al-Qaida movement in simplistic terms as a nihilist entity presided over by insane fanatics, this is a dangerous underestimation of what is, in

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reality, a much more sophisticated phenomenon. Al-Qaida should more accurately be seen as a dispersed transnational revolutionary movement based on a fundamentalist interpretation of a major religion which sees the achievement of its aims as being accomplished well into the future. Most revolutionary movements look to success within years or a very few decades – certainly within the lifetimes of the leaderships of the movements. Largely because of its religious base, the alQaida movement does not operate in this mode of thought and its leaders may not even begin to expect anything approaching major success within their lifetimes. Individual regimes in the Middle East, often termed the ‘near enemy’, may be terminated, and the crusader/Zionist occupying forces may be forced into some retreats in individual countries, but the creation of any substantive Caliphate will not be achieved soon. Western Timescales Al-Qaida is essentially a long-term phenomenon, at least in current trends. It is therefore operating on timescales quite different from those of western political systems where electoral cycles of between two and five years are the norm. This is also different from commercial timescales which tend to be over one to two decades, but it is the western political element that is more important. Put bluntly it is difficult for western political leaderships to even consider the possibility of adopting alternative strategies that might take twenty to thirty years to implement and achieve success. Even with the use of terms such as ‘long war’, there is little long-term planning. At the same time, though, there are certain regional aspects related to the Middle East that mean that in one very important respect the United States is also working to a timescale that is close to that of al-Qaida. One of these is the central place of Israel in US policy in the Middle East. The Israel connection evolved from the strong support of the American Jewish

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community for the State of Israel from its founding in 1948, to which was added the importance of Israel to the United States during the Cold War. While the US government was not notably sympathetic to Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the rise of Arab nationalism in the context of the Cold War meant that by the end of the 1950s Israel was seen in Washington as a key bulwark of western interests in the face of Soviet influence in countries such as Egypt and Syria. The centrality of Israel in US Middle East policy persisted after the end of the Cold War, with the Israel lobby in Washington maintaining remarkable influence into the 1990s, a phenomenon aided by the vision of Israel under attack from Iraqi Scud missiles in 1991. One of the unusual aspects of the Israel lobby in the 1990s was that the support of the American Jewish community for Israel tended to decline towards the end of the decade and into the new millennium but the strength of the Israel lobby was actually undiminished. The change in Jewish attitudes was partly due to a concern over the hard-line policies of some Israeli governments, especially the Sharon administration. The Jewish community in the United States tends towards a liberal political orientation and the treatment of Palestinians, notwithstanding the impact of suicide bombings in Israeli towns and cities, was a cause of some concern. Against this, the Israel lobby benefited substantially from the increasing electoral and political influence of Christian Zionism (Chapter 7). With a substantial minority of the American evangelical Christian community of over 100 million people believing that the Jews of Israel have a God-given dispensation to prepare the way for the End Days and the second coming of Christ, support for Israel is a natural outcome. This is directly reflected, in turn, in support for the Republican Party, the more so as evangelical Christians tend to be of a markedly conservative persuasion and are also more likely to vote in federal elections than the electorate as a whole. While Christian Zionism may not maintain its current political significance in

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future administrations, it is likely to remain a major force in US politics, substantially aiding those who regard the enduring support for Israel as being fundamental to US interests in the Middle East. The second aspect relating to long-term US interests in the region is the significance of Persian Gulf oil supplies (Chapter 2), an issue that has three components. The first is the immense size of the reserves relative to oil supplies elsewhere in the world. Five countries in the region – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates – together have over 60% of total oil reserves, and Iran and Qatar are two of the world’s largest holders of natural gas deposits. Reserves in Siberia, the Caspian Basin and Venezuela, and the low-grade reserves in Canada are all significant, but they are relatively small compared with the Persian Gulf. Secondly, the United States still produces substantial oil supplies from domestic reserves but these are rapidly being depleted. Iraq alone now has some four times the reserves of the United States, even allowing for Alaskan deposits, and the United States is becoming steadily more dependent on imported oil. While strenuous efforts are being made to utilise supplies from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, it is the Persian Gulf that is the core long-term source of supply. As a result, the Gulf region has figured prominently in the US military posture for well over thirty years, including the establishment of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force in the late 1970s and its subsequent upgrading into US Central Command in the mid-1980s. Finally, there is a well-versed recognition in Washington that the United States is far from being alone in depending on Gulf oil. In this respect, it is not so much Europe and Japan that are significant but China, given that China is rapidly increasing its oil imports to satisfy a booming economy. India, too, is becoming more dependent on Gulf oil but it is China that is regarded as more important, given a widespread belief in

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Washington that it is China which presents the most substantial long-term challenge to US economic and military power. Conflicting Timescales In mid-2006 it was reasonable to conclude that the Bush administration’s war on terror was not following the expected path and the United States was therefore embroiled in bitter conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet there were few signs of any major reconsideration of policies. It can also be argued that there were major factors on both sides that militated against change – the al-Qaida movement and its loose associates were engaged in a very long-term struggle to achieve their aims and the prospects for US disengagement from the Middle East were remote. This report will now proceed with a month-by-month analysis of actual developments from May 2006 to April 2007. In the final chapter, the 12-month period will be reviewed and an assessment made of the possibility for changes in the policies and postures of the major parties to the conflict. It will conclude with an indication of what alternative policies might be available to the United States and its coalition partners and whether such policies might also be more appropriate in responding to the major global security issues of socioeconomic divisions and environmental constraints.

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2 Oil Security and the Iraq War – May 2006

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n the first five months of 2006, Iraqi sources reported that the civilian death toll in the greater Baghdad area was running at over a thousand a month, double the figure for a year earlier.1 This alone was an indicator of the deteriorating security situation in much of central Iraq, matched by increased violence in the Basra province that had previously been relatively stable. Although the US military casualties remain very small compared with Iraqi civilian deaths, April and May were also bad months for the American forces, with 145 people killed and 850 wounded.2 Prior to the killing of the Jordanian-born insurgent figure Abu Musab al-Zarqawi at the end of the month, the impact of the problems in Iraq was continuing to intensify within US domestic politics. Partly because of this there were indications that the United States still planned to try and make some troop withdrawals from Iraq prior to the mid-sessional elections to Congress in November, with this paralleled by a partial handover to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.3 The combined withdrawals would probably not amount to more than 30,000 troops, perhaps 5,000 from Afghanistan and the larger proportion from Iraq. Both decisions are fully dependent on an easing of the two insurgencies and, in any 9

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case, they do not imply in any sense at all that the United States is planning to withdraw completely from either country. Although the Department of Defense and the State Department have been cautious in their public statements, there are clear indications that the United States intends a long deployment in Afghanistan, centred on the two bases at Bagram near Kabul and Kandahar in the south. The counter-insurgency actions against a resurgent Taliban were not anticipated but it is likely that the intention was still to maintain substantial air bases with supporting troops for an indefinite period. One function would be to provide a final degree of security to the Afghan government, with this serving to maintain US influence in a key state, linking in with a long-term presence elsewhere in Central Asia. For Iraq, too, the indications remain that the minimum expectation for the United States would be maintaining a small number of large and powerful military bases, combined with a particularly strong political presence. This will be centred on the new US Embassy in Baghdad, now under construction, which will be the largest embassy of any country anywhere in the world. It will have around a thousand staff in a series of office blocks, apartment complexes and leisure facilities all supported by its own electricity supply and water purification system, the whole complex protected by Marines housed in a large barracks. If the insurgency is eventually contained, this political base in Iraq will be supported by a number of ‘super bases’, with four currently being developed.4 One of these, Balad to the north of Baghdad, received over $220 million in development costs in 2005 alone, with Talil in the south getting over $100 million. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States forces will be able to contain the insurgency, what is clear is that a major long-term military and civil presence in Iraq is central to US security policy in the region, and it is appropriate to analyse the geopolitical context of this.

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Origins of US Oil Security Concerns While the close relationship with Israel is undoubtedly an important factor in US policy in the Gulf region, it has also been claimed that an underlying motive has been Iraq’s oil wealth and its potential for exploitation by US-based transnational oil corporations (TNOCs). There may be an element of this in US policy, and there is certainly abundant evidence that US corporations have found Iraq to be a very profitable zone of operations. For the most part, though, the profitability has been focused mainly on reconstruction programmes rather than the exploitation of oil reserves, even if that might become more significant in the future. At the same time, the real importance of Iraq lies much less in immediate requirements for profitability and much more with wider issues of oil security, part of a trend that has been a feature of US defence policy for decades rather than years. This, in turn, is part of an even longer-term process of economic evolution. In broad terms of international political economy, most of the countries that industrialised first, such as Britain, built their industries on the basis of raw materials available in their own states. Most European states exhausted many of their key mineral and energy reserves during the 1800s and early 1900s and increasingly imported their requirements, frequently from colonies. An exception to this trend, sometimes termed the ‘resource shift’, was the United States, which remained almost entirely self-sufficient in its energy and mineral requirements right through until the second half of the twentieth century. It is the changing pattern of US resource requirements, especially for oil, in the last four decades that underlies much of current US security policy in the Persian Gulf. In practice, worries over the security of oil supplies actually date back rather earlier, to the Second World War and the concerns of the Roosevelt administration that the massive

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war-time requirements for oil might exceed what were then plentiful domestic supplies. This did much to convince the US government in the early post-war years that it was essential to develop close relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran which, by that time, had been shown to have very considerable oil reserves. Even in the early 1950s, when the United States was still almost entirely self-sufficient in oil supplies, there was concern that the plentiful Persian Gulf reserves would be a focus for Soviet attention in the event of an East–West confrontation. This was a powerful motive for the Anglo-American campaign to unseat the Mossadeqh government in Iran in 1953 after it had nationalised the oil industry, ensuring that Iran would subsequently be a client state under the vigorous rule of the Shah.5 OPEC and the Rapid Deployment Force By the early 1970s, world requirements for oil had grown enormously, with most of the new reserves being discovered in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in the countries around the Persian Gulf. Although the development of the North Sea oil fields was of value to countries such as Norway and Britain, even at their peak the North Sea reserves amounted to less than 4% of world total reserves, and most of Western Europe remained dependent on imports, as did Japan and the other ‘tiger’ economies of East Asia such as South Korea. More significant still was the increase in US oil import dependency. Despite intensive exploration of the offshore regions of the Gulf of Mexico, and even with the development of the new fields in Alaska, the United States was moving steadily in the direction of a significant import dependency. Meanwhile, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in 1960, was beginning to coordinate pricing policies among member states, especially

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in the Middle East, with this even extending to gaining direct control over oil companies, as demonstrated by the new Gaddafi regime in Libya in the early 1970s. Although OPEC’s ambitions were relatively modest – limited to slow but steady price rises and partial control of national oil industries, there was a major change as a result of the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War of 1973. In order to influence key western governments to obtain an early ceasefire between Israel and the opposing forces of Egypt and Syria, the Arab members of OPEC used oil as a political weapon, combining production cutbacks, embargoes and price increases in a wholly unexpected manner. The immediate effect, in mid-October 1973, was a price increase of over 70%, with this setting in motion an all-time ‘bull’ market that saw oil prices rise by over 400% by the middle of 1974. The global economic impact of this was massive, but it also resulted in a reappraisal of the US security posture in the Gulf, numerous studies having shown that the United States military did not have the highly mobile rapid reaction forces that would have been needed had direct military intervention been required to maintain the security of oil supplies. This sense of vulnerability prompted moves to create joint military forces, even if this was made difficult by inter-service rivalries. In the event, the combination of the Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis in Tehran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at the end of the 1970s combined to give an added urgency to the establishment of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force, known more commonly as the Rapid Deployment Force. By the early 1980s, and with the last phase of the Cold War at a particularly volatile stage, the Rapid Deployment Force was elevated into a unified military command, Central Command (CENTCOM), initially responsible for US security interests across an arc of countries stretching from Pakistan to Kenya, but later widened to include the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia.

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Although the potential Soviet impact had evaporated by 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent defeat demonstrated the value, from a US perception, of maintaining military dominance in the Gulf. Not only did Iraq remain under the Saddam Hussein regime, but Iran was still bitterly opposed to the United States and Saudi Arabia’s rulers were increasingly uneasy at having US troops stationed in the Kingdom of the Two Holy Places. At the root of US concerns are three factors: the dominance of the Persian Gulf in the control of oil reserves; the increasing dependence of the United States on imported oil; and the rise of China as a major oil importer and potential rival, especially in seeking influence in the Persian Gulf region.6 As to the reserves, the figures are remarkable, even allowing for a tendency of some oil-rich states to over-estimate their reserves. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran alone have about 43% of the world’s oil reserves, with Kuwaiti and Emirates oil taking the region’s reserves to at least 60%. If Russian and Caspian Basin oil is added, together with that of Venezuela, then some 75% of the world’s total oil reserves are accounted for. As to import dependency, back in 1970 the United States imported about 10% of its oil, much of it from Venezuela because of the availability of cheap supplies. By 1981 this had risen to 37%, by 2001 it was up to 57% and it is expected to go well above 60% by 2021 even if the newer Alaskan reserves are fully exploited. While much of the imported oil still comes from Latin America, both sub-Saharan Africa and some of the Persian Gulf states are increasingly significant. Moreover, the huge Gulf reserves will ensure a progressively greater dependency on this region. The Chinese Connection Added to this is the changing position of China, self-sufficient in oil supplies until as recently as 1993. Since then the combination

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of depleting domestic reserves and rapidly rising demand has made China dependent on oil imports at an even faster rate than the United States. Within seven years, by 2000, China was having to import 29% of its oil and this is expected to rise to 50% by 2010. Finally, the wider issue is that every other major industrialised region of the world, in Western Europe and East and South-East Asia, is increasingly dependent on Gulf oil, the one notable exception being Russia. While the United States had sought to maintain military dominance in the Persian Gulf through CENTCOM and the presence of the Fifth Fleet, China has sought a different route, making long-term economic agreements not just with Saudi Arabia but with Iran. The Saudis are involved in two refinery projects in China and are also engaged in plans to build a strategic reserve facility in which Saudi oil would be stored in a coastal complex in south-east China, making it available to cope with times of sudden shortage.7 In the case of Iran, the connection is even more firmly cemented in place, to the dismay of the White House. One project, in particular, is indicative of the relationship – a 30-year Sino-Iranian contract valued at $70 billion. Under this scheme, Iran will deliver oil and gas to China, while China will be involved in the development and exploitation of the Yadavaran oil field. China is not being particularly assiduous in developing its military capabilities beyond its own region. A single aircraft carrier is under development and there is increased expenditure on forces available for use close to China, but there is no serious capability available either now or in the foreseeable future that would allow China even remotely to challenge US military power in the Middle East. Even so, Chinese ambitions in the region raise major American concerns – the Saudi deals may be annoying, given the long-term US relationship with the House of Saud, but it is the Iranian connection that really concerns Washington.

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Although Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are both major oil producers, it is the trio of Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia that are seen from Washington as the key oil states of the region. Yet all three are problematic. Saudi Arabia may be regarded as stable, yet there is an unease in Washington which stems from the Kingdom’s refusal to allow US military bases, coupled with a concern over the stability of the Kingdom and its commitment to fighting the global war on terror. Many of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals, the al-Qaida movement has drawn much financial support from Saudi sources and there is a sense in which, from Washington’s standpoint, the Saudi authorities have simply not been sufficiently diligent in their anti-al-Qaida operations. Meanwhile, across the Gulf, Iran remains rigorously determined to go its own way, including frankly maverick statements from President Ahmadinejad, and may be wanting to develop its own nuclear forces which would make any future US intervention against the regime or its successors deeply problematic. If we add to this an unstable Iraq that could potentially fall under Iranian influence or even become a failing state to the extent that al-Qaida could use it as a base, then we have a combination that is simply not acceptable to Washington. Given the uncertainties in Saudi Arabia and the perceived antagonism from Iran, the one remaining major state in the region that can still be under firm US influence is Iraq. As long as the precarious and antagonistic relationships exist with the Saudis and the Iranians respectively, Iraq remains central to the US policy of safeguarding the Persian Gulf, the timescale being thirty years or more. It can be readily argued that the instability and insecurity in the Persian Gulf region, coupled with the potentially disastrous impact of carbon emissions on the global climate, both make it highly desirable to move rapidly away from a fossil fuel-based economy. This would be part of a move away from ‘control’

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security towards ‘sustainable’ security, as argued in the recent Oxford Research Group report, Global Responses to Global Threats, but there is little indication that such thinking has permeated into any significant part of the Bush administration.8 Unless there is such a change, then we should expect the United States to be planning to maintain a large military presence in Iraq for some decades. Indeed, to do otherwise would, from the Washington perspective, be a foreign policy disaster at least as significant as the withdrawal from Vietnam. Whatever may be said about progress in controlling the Iraq insurgency and the possibility of some troop withdrawals, it is far more sensible to assume that the US is in it for the long term. That may well mean that Iraq continues to evolve into a combat training zone for new generations of young jihadists, an advantage to the al-Qaida movement with its plans also stretching over decades. It may well be that the initial failure of al-Qaida to bring US forces into a substantial occupying role in Afghanistan in 2001/02 will be more than counterbalanced by the United States’ decision to terminate the Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently occupy Iraq. Whatever does happen, it is certainly not easily understood unless the oil factor is given a core place in the analysis. Until that changes, the Persian Gulf region is likely to remain a zone of crisis and potential conflict.

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3 Spring Offensives in Two Wars – June 2006

Iraq

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t the beginning of June, an American air raid in central Iraq resulted in the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born paramilitary leader who had figured prominently in US accounts of the insurgency in Iraq. Zarqawi’s death was covered across much of the world, but no more intensively than in the United States. This stemmed from two factors: the need in Washington to link the Iraq war to Bush’s global war on terror, and the specific US focus on Zarqawi.1 The first of these is largely a consequence of the loss of support for the Iraq War that has developed over the past twelve months in the United States. A combination of rising US military casualties, the high costs of the war and the fact that there have been many false dawns in terms of an easing of the insurgency have all combined to make the war increasingly unpopular and even to contribute to the marked decline in support for President Bush himself. There has always been a tendency to regard the war as part of the wider campaign against al-Qaida and its associates, but this has been pressed consistently by the Bush administration in recent months. 18

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Seeing the war in this way originated in the middle of 2003 when the insurgency began to develop as a serious impediment to US policy in Iraq. President Bush made the point in his ‘bring ’em on’ comment, implying that Iraq would serve as a magnet for jihadists, enabling the US military to defeat them there instead of facing the prospect of further attacks on the scale of 9/11 in the continental United States. While Bush has more recently regretted that remark, given the intensity of the conflict in Iraq, his administration has done nothing to diminish the emphasis on the relationship of the Iraq War to the ‘war on terror’. The implication is that the occupation of Iraq is a direct response to 9/11 and therefore demands patriotic support. This is, incidentally, in marked contrast to the attitude of Prime Minister Blair in Britain, where there is a studious and persistent denial of any connection between the London paramilitary attacks of last July and British foreign policy, especially Britain’s sustained involvement in Iraq alongside the United States. At the end of June the UK Home Office published an account of the events surrounding the July bombings that made almost no reference to Iraq, even in the section dealing with the motivation of the bombers. At the same time the Intelligence and Security Committee, a joint and semi-secret select committee of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, issued a more detailed report. While this did make a connection between motivation and Iraq/Afghanistan, it was a minor part of the committee’s consideration. The discontinuity between Washington and London on the Iraq/war on terror relationship has therefore persisted, and was made more obvious by the second factor mentioned above – the US emphasis on the significance of Zarqawi. This was building for the best part of a year before his death, and involved the persistent emphasis on his individual role, both as the key player in the Iraq insurgency and also because of his claimed close linkage with the wider al-Qaida movement. The emphasis on

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individuals in US representations of the war has been notable over the whole of the past five years, with Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar being the original objects of attention, followed by Saddam Hussein and his two sons in the immediate aftermath of the termination of the Iraqi regime. Independent analysts have long questioned the significance of Zarqawi within Iraq, most seeing him more as a selfpublicising radical with a particularly thuggish bent, even to the extent of suspected sharp differences in policy between him and the wider al-Qaida movement.2 For Washington, though, he was the direct evidence of the al-Qaida/Iraq link, so his death meant a major achievement, likely to be almost as significant as the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003. As a consequence, there was an expectation that the insurgency in Iraq would at last stand a serious chance of being brought under control. Among the neo-conservative community in Washington the prospects for such progress required an immediate commitment by Washington – what might amount to a late Spring Offensive to consolidate the gains implicit in Zarqawi’s death. There were immediate calls for an increase in troop levels, not least by the use of reserve units available in Kuwait, and for the ongoing counter-insurgency operation in the key city of Ramadi to be intensified.3 Within days, the Iraqi government announced, in concert with the US authorities in Baghdad, the mounting of an intensive operation in greater Baghdad to clamp down severely on insurgent operations, hoping to use the presumed disruption to the insurgency caused by Zarqawi’s death as a springboard for gaining control of the capital. The Zarqawi factor was regarded as particularly important, both by the Americans and by the newly constituted Iraqi administration, because the first five months of 2006 had been extraordinarily difficult. Civilian casualties in and around Baghdad alone were reported to be of the order of 6,000, running at almost double the rate of

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the similar period for 2005, and US casualties had risen again in March, April and May, following a very low death rate in February, the lowest since June 2003. For a few days after Zarqawi’s death, there was a modest lull, both in US casualties and in the much greater issue of Iraqi civilian deaths. This was similar to the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s capture back in 2003, but, as in that case, it did not last and, during the course of June the violence rapidly intensified once more. At the end of the month, the Central Morgue in Baghdad reported receiving 1,595 bodies during the course of June, 16% more than in the month leading up to Zarqawi’s death. US casualties also showed no decrease, with 62 killed and over 450 wounded, a level similar to that experienced throughout 2005 and much of 2006. One month after Zarqawi’s death, the US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, had to acknowledge that ‘…in terms of the level of violence, it has not had any impact at this point’.4 One of the developing issues in the Iraq War is the rapidly increasing incidence of inter-community violence, with frequent Shi’a claims of Sunni-inspired killings, including many car bombs, but with Sunni leaders pointing to the existence of Shi’a death squads and militia groups, some of them operated by government ministries under Shi’a control. What is clear is that the evolving violence has at least four components. One remains the anti-occupation insurgency, directed primarily at US forces and continuing at an intensity that is resulting in substantial US casualties even if the American forces are relying more on air power and less on ground patrols. In such circumstances, the tendency towards an increased use of the US firepower advantage inevitably results in higher civilian casualties, in turn leading to an intensified opposition to the occupation. Beyond the anti-occupation insurgency is the closely linked opposition to the Iraqi government, with this widely seen as a client administration of the American occupiers. Beyond that but overlapping is the rapid development of the

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inter-communal violence, much of this stemming from the positioning of confessional groups with an eye to the longerterm divisions of power. Finally there is the existence of the foreign jihadist elements that move in and out of Iraq, may number less than a thousand within the country at any one time but, over months and years, constitute many thousands of recruits to the broad al-Qaida cause. Given that the al-Qaida movement and its associates are working on timetables for change that range over many decades, the core value to them of Iraq still lies in the steady accumulation of a cadre of young paramilitaries with experience of a largely urban insurgency against exceptionally well-armed US troops. In this context, the significance of the month of June 2006 is that it was one more occasion in which US forces and their coalition partners could attempt to point to a new dawn in their counter-insurgency operations. In much less than a month it proved to be one more false dawn, yet there remained no sign of any change of US policy. If there was one development of long-term significance it was the confluence of military and political trends in US attitudes. On the military side, the United States forces continued the move towards consolidation of forces into fewer and larger bases, with those mainly being developed away from the main towns and cities, with the hope of cutting casualties and thereby ensuring greater security for the US military. Politically, there was a developing tendency to concentrate on the significance of the Malaki government, with the implication that a civil war evolving out of the insurgency might best be seen, from a US point of view, as a matter of internal Iraqi politics, rather than a critical problem that might be blamed on US policy over the past three years. This may become a major feature of Washington’s political rhetoric in the coming months, especially in the run-up to the mid-sessional elections to Congress in November, but it ignores the fundamental reality that a state that takes over

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and occupies the territory of another state, is responsible in international law for the security of the inhabitants of that state. The United States may gloss over this, and there may be a domestic imperative to do so, but its failure to secure postregime security for ordinary Iraqis is a matter that cannot be ignored, whatever domestic circumstances dictate. Afghanistan Since the termination of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, a number of analysts have pointed to two aspects of that violent event. One was that the Taliban militias, their al-Qaida associates and other allied groups were not so much defeated as melted away into cities, towns and villages in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The second was that some highly experienced UN officials and others pointed to the urgent need, early in 2002, to provide a major stabilisation force of 30,000 or more troops to avoid a security vacuum and enable Afghanistan to stand a real chance of post-war reconstruction and development after more than two decades of war. Such a force was not provided. European coalition partners provided barely 5,000 troops, and the early re-development of insurgent activity in eastern Afghanistan meant that US troops remained in that part of the country in a more traditional counter-insurgency role. Any larger US role was overshadowed and then sidelined by the escalating emphasis on the requirement for regime change in Iraq throughout 2002. Although there was some progress in Kabul and some other northern towns and cities, large parts of the country received little help. By early 2006 there were still barely 9,000 NATO troops in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with the British elements pitched almost immediately into counterinsurgency operations, a very different outcome from the ‘hearts and minds’ operations they were meant to be involved in. Meanwhile, the non-ISAF counter-insurgency forces under

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US control had risen to some 26,000 troops, the great majority of them American, supported by a wide range of helicopters and strike aircraft, extending up to B-52 and B-1B strategic bombers.5 The intensity of the counter-insurgency war has been remarkable, with Taliban elements claiming to have 12,000 personnel active within Afghanistan and perhaps double that number secure across the border in the frontier districts of Pakistan. At least 1,100 people were killed in the violence during May and June, and an Economist report (8 July) cited one US helicopter gunship unit alone as firing 31,000 rounds of ammunition and 1,600 rockets in a recent threemonth period. The upsurge in violence across much of southern and eastern Afghanistan has been anticipated by some analysts for nearly two years, and there were indications of a Taliban resurgence twelve months ago. What has emerged in the late spring of 2006 was therefore predicted at an earlier stage, and three factors suggest that there were good reasons for the apparent delay in the resurgence. One was the subtle change in the Afghan drugs trade, with record harvests predicted for the 2005/06 crop and a marked tendency for raw opium to be refined into heroin and morphine within Afghanistan. This has provided the Taliban, associated groups and allied warlords with major additional sources of revenue to fund their activities and underpin a longer-term strategy.6 The second factor has been the persistent lack of control over the frontier districts of Pakistan by the Pakistani authorities, allowing those extensive districts, especially North and South Waziristan, to become secure areas for the Afghan antioccupation insurgents. The final factor is the very strong suspicion that the reason why there was not the predicted Taliban insurgency in 2005 was that the leadership had taken the strategic decision to bide its time and develop its capabilities, both through recruitment, establishment of the appropriate logistics network and, most important, through

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the progressive takeover of the more remote rural districts of Afghanistan away from Kabul and the northern cities. If this is the case, then the development of the Spring Offensive of 2006 is actually evidence of an insurgency that is far more robust than expected. It would also be wise to assume that the leadership of the insurgents are working according to a three-part programme. One is to progressively re-take control over much of rural Afghanistan, utilising new drug trade money as a useful additional source of financial support. A second is to instil in existing supporters and new recruits an acceptance that casualties will be heavy, and a third is that the aim is actually to regain control of the country as a whole. Since that is entirely unacceptable to the current and probable future administrations in Washington, this implies that Afghanistan will remain a country of conflict involving foreign occupying forces for at least a decade.7 Conclusion The late spring of 2006 has seen two offensives. In Iraq, US and Iraqi government forces have attempted to capitalise on the death of Zarqawi with a major operation to bring the 39-month insurgency under some degree of control. The evidence strongly suggests that this has failed. In Afghanistan, a revitalised Taliban and its numerous associates have bided their time and have now taken control of significant rural areas in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan. By the end of June they were succeeding in their efforts. One spring offensive by coalition forces in Iraq is failing, the other, by their opponents in Afghanistan, is making progress. Both represent major problems for the United States and its coalition partners.

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4 A Third War – July 2006

D

uring the course of May and June there were substantial increases in violence in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and a subsequent attempt to curb the insurgency had no discernible effect and the latter part of June saw a marked increase in civilian casualties stemming largely, but by no means entirely, from sectarian violence. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan there was a surge in activity by Taliban militias and other groups, leading to major problems of insecurity across much of the south and east of the country. At the beginning of July there were few signs of any improvement in the situation in either country, NATO was increasing its forces in Afghanistan and any talk of US troop withdrawals from Iraq had quietly ended. Then, in the middle of the month, a sudden and intensely violent conflict developed within 24 hours between Hezbollah militia in southern Lebanon and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), following the capture of two Israeli soldiers and the deaths of eight more as a result of a cross-border incident. The Israeli reaction involved the use of massive air attacks leading on to a major war between the IDF and Hezbollah. Crucially, Israel had the strong support of the Bush administration in its actions in Lebanon. Indeed, from the start of the war in Lebanon, President Bush made it abundantly clear that the Israeli actions that were intended to destroy 26

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Hezbollah as a military force should correctly be seen as a key part of his overall global war on terror. As such, Israel was playing a core part in that war and there should be no talk of a ceasefire short of the achievements of these aims. By the end of the month, however, the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Lebanon meant that the war was proving immensely unpopular across the majority world and risked increasing the support not just for Hezbollah, but for wider radical Islamist groups including al-Qaida.1 Afghanistan In May and June it became abundantly clear that the Taliban revival predicted by some analysts was actually under way (Chapter 3). The use of the term ‘Taliban’ is somewhat misleading in that the anti-government and anti-coalition groups fighting in southern and eastern Afghanistan include elements of warlord paramilitaries and local oppositional groups as well as groups that could properly be described as Taliban. As earlier briefings have pointed out, substantial Taliban elements have been active in Afghanistan ever since the fall of the regime at the end of 2001, given that the old regime was not so much defeated as melted away. Moreover, the lack of Pakistani central control over the districts immediately to the east and south of Afghanistan meant that Taliban and other elements had secure bases from which to rebuild their capabilities. There was some expectation that a Taliban revival would evolve during 2005, but it now looks as if that did not happen largely because elements of the Taliban leadership were planning over a longer-term timescale, the intention being to delay such a revived insurgency for a year. This is now under way and in the first seven months of 2006, some 1,700 people have been killed in the escalating violence across Afghanistan.2 Most have been civilians, government

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officials and members of the Afghan police, but they also include staff of international and local non-governmental organisations and the employees of foreign contractors. US sources have claimed that as many as 600 Taliban and other paramilitaries have been killed, and it is certainly true that the US and other coalition forces have been using their considerable firepower advantages against targets in towns and villages across much of the country. Extraordinarily this has included the regular use of strategic B-52 and B-1B heavy bombers and of area impact munitions, with this level of firepower frequently resulting in significant civilian casualties. Even so, this has not had a marked effect on the intensity of paramilitary activity. Instead it has increased public opposition to the foreign military presence, including a considerable impact on the activities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) now operating in Helmand Province as well as its more traditional areas in the north of the country. The British forces, in particular, established bases in the province in the spring of this year as part of a policy of ensuring security in the province to aid reconstruction and to exert control over opium poppy production.3 Such an essentially ‘hearts and minds’ operation may involve some limited counter-insurgency actions but the main aim is to be able to use troops to support contractors, Afghan government officials and non-governmental organisations in the overall process of post-conflict reconstruction and development. Instead, the British and other ISAF forces away from Kabul, and especially the British forces in Helmand, have become heavily and almost entirely involved in counter-insurgency operations, including a large element of self-protection. The extent of the problems was illustrated by a revealing interview given by the senior British officer due to take over command of ISAF at the end of July, Lieutenant General David Richards. He spoke of an assumption within NATO after the

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termination of the Taliban regime that Afghanistan would be an essentially benign environment. The reality, instead, was of a country that is now close to anarchy. Not only is there the major problem of the Taliban revival but this is in the context of widespread corruption, feuding foreign agencies and unethical behaviour by private security contractors. It is worth once again recalling that at the time of the termination of the Taliban regime, highly experienced UN officials were pointing to the need for a very substantial international stabilisation force, utilising as many as 30,000 peacekeeping troops. This would need to be coupled with a high level of external aid to help Afghans make the transition to a peaceful society after decades of conflict. This was not forthcoming and the results are now apparent. Even so, the deterioration in Afghanistan attracts little external attention, having been overshadowed by the even greater problems in Iraq. Iraq Even here, the intensity of the fighting in Lebanon and the immediacy of the civilian casualties has meant that the western media was dominated by extensive coverage from Lebanon and Israel during the latter part of July, to the substantial exclusion of detailed reporting from Iraq. Even so, all the indications were that the security situation in Iraq was in marked decline. As the June briefing in the series pointed out, the hoped-for easing of the insurgency following Zarqawi’s death did not happen, with close to 1,600 violent deaths being reported in the greater Baghdad area alone during June, a substantial increase on the month before. More recent figures from United Nations sources have pointed to a much higher death toll across the country as a whole, with 14,338 people being killed in the first six months of 2006, including 3,149 in June alone. The independent non-

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governmental group, Iraq Body Count (IBC) has sought to track the civilian casualties since the start of the conflict in March 2003, and had a maximum figure of around 44,000 by the end of July. IBC uses multiple media reports to track the losses and regards its figures as thoroughly reliable minimum statistics. As such, it is able to put a persuasive case that 44,000 is a baseline figure and that the true figure for civilian losses could well be very much higher. What is significant here is that the trend in insecurity is very much upwards across much of the country. This is important because it comes at a time when the Bush and Blair administrations have been expressing confidence that the elected government of Mr Malaki has the legitimacy to ensure that Iraq can progressively take control of its own security. Many analysts doubt such a representation, pointing to the development of large US military bases and a massive embassy presence in Baghdad as evidence that the longer-term aim of the Bush administration is to ensure the existence of a client government in Iraq dependent on the United States for its survival amidst continuing instability. Within Iraq, though, the issue is not so much instability as escalating violence.4 While by far the greatest impact is on Iraqi civilians, this is also continuing to affect coalition forces including the large US presence, even though the trend over the past year or more has been to rely more heavily on air strikes rather than ground patrols in conducting counter-insurgency operations. Moreover, there has also been a trend towards moving supplies by air rather than by road convoy. In spite of this, US casualties remain serious. The month of July was relatively light in terms of deaths among US soldiers – the figure of 45 killed was the second lowest for a year – but this disguises the serious problem of combat injuries. In the four weeks to 28 July, 461 American soldiers were injured with the last week of that period being one of the worst for well over a

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year – 175 troops were wounded, with 112 of them sustaining serious injuries. The problem from Washington’s perspective is that this substantially interferes with the political intention of demonstrating at least a partial withdrawal of troops from Baghdad in the run-up to the mid-sessional elections to Congress on 7 November. There is now little talk of this, with plans announced at the end of July to re-deploy troops from the Anbar region to boost security in the greater Baghdad area, given the decline of that city into bitter sectarian conflict.5 Given this deteriorating situation, coming on top of a renewed and deepening conflict in Afghanistan, one would have expected that the Bush administration would by now be experiencing severe political difficulties at home. That this has not happened has been almost entirely due to the outbreak of a third war in the region, in Lebanon. This reached an intensity by the end of July that came as a profound shock to many observers and has dominated the media and the political discourse in the United States, Europe and the majority world. The Context of the Lebanon War The election of the Olmert administration in Israel earlier in the year consolidated an Israeli government policy towards the occupied territories and towards the Hezbollah militia in South Lebanon that had three major elements. One was the withdrawal of the few thousand Jewish settlers from Gaza and the establishment of secure borders that still allowed Israel near-total control over the economy of Gaza. A second was the decision to impose a unilateral settlement on the Palestinians as a whole, including limited withdrawals of settlements in the West Bank but maintaining some large Jewish communities together with near-total permanent control over greater Jerusalem. A related aspect was the construction of a massive wall to separate off most of the West Bank from Israel. The

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combination of settlements and continuing controls within the West Bank make an economically viable Palestinian state a near-impossibility. The final element was the development of a very robust set of security and monitoring systems on the Lebanese border to control that border following the Israeli military withdrawal from a ‘buffer zone’ in southern Lebanon in 2000. There remained the problem of the Hezbollah militia and its ability to fire crude unguided Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, and the past few years have seen frequent Israeli air raids into southern Lebanon coupled with actions from Hezbollah which sees itself as the defender of the Shi’a communities of the region. While Israel’s adoption of a secure border policy coupled with a unilateral approach to the Palestinian issue was generally popular within Israel, there remained real concerns over the status of Hezbollah. As a result, reliable reports indicated that the IDF had contingency plans for major operations against Hezbollah.6 The Onset of War At the end of June, Hamas paramilitaries carried out a remarkable cross-border raid from Gaza, using a long underground tunnel and detaining an Israeli soldier in the process. The IDF responded with huge force, including attacks in Gaza that resulted in many civilian casualties. Two weeks later, Hezbollah paramilitaries undertook an even more extraordinary operation on the Lebanon–Israel border, capturing two Israeli soldiers and killing eight others. They claimed that this could lead to a prisoner exchange, given that such exchanges had happened in the past and that Israel was holding close to 10,000 Palestinians, including over 300 children, most of them without charge. The Israeli reaction was radically different and involved not just an immediate military operation against Hezbollah

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but a much wider war against substantial aspects of the Lebanese economic infrastructure, most notably the immediate bombardment and closure of Beirut International Airport. Hezbollah responded with numerous rocket attacks into northern Israel causing some casualties, but these were small compared with the many hundreds of civilian deaths in Lebanon and the movement of hundreds of thousands of refugees. For Israel, though, Hezbollah’s subsequent success in firing longer-range missiles at Haifa, Israel’s third largest city, and its ability to continue firing up to a hundred missiles each day into northern Israel, was a major shock, resulting in a marked feeling of vulnerability despite Israel’s standing as a regional military superpower. International reaction to the destruction in Lebanon included urgent calls for a ceasefire,7 especially after the deaths of more than 50 civilians, mostly children, in an Israeli air raid on the village of Qana at the end of the month, and there was a brief if incomplete pause in the Israeli air attacks into Lebanon. During the course of the first three weeks of the war, the IDF has experienced three major shocks in addition to the original shock of the border incursions, one of them being Hezbollah’s missile capabilities. The second, two days into the war, was the severe damage inflicted on an Israeli Saar-5 class missile corvette, one of the navy’s most powerful and wellarmed warships, by an anti-ship missile of Chinese origin but deployed by Hezbollah. The third was the tenacity and ability of Hezbollah paramilitaries when engaged by IDF infantry during operations in southern Lebanon.8 Given the pervasive mood of insecurity in Israel due to the missile threat, in spite of the massive operations being undertaken in Lebanon, by the end of the month the Olmert administration was not in any way prepared to listen to international calls for an immediate ceasefire. Moreover, where there were calls for such a development among western

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governments, the United States government made it clear that its fundamental support for Israel overrode such proposals. The Bush administration is adamant that the war that Israel is conducting against Hezbollah is an integral part of the wider global war on terror that the US has been pursuing for almost five years.9 Although the termination of two regimes, in Afghanistan and Iraq, has resulted in ongoing conflicts in both countries, there is unlikely to be any re-thinking of the conduct of the wider war. Indeed, what is evident is that there is now an embedded view that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is not just peripheral but is actually central to the overall war. The belief is that if Hezbollah is terminated as a paramilitary movement this will deal a severe blow to wider Islamist movements and to the status and prestige of Iran, a matter of crucial importance since the Bush administration increasingly sees Iran as its main enemy in the war on terror.10 The Israeli government is thus in a position to be able to depend on the support of the United States, in spite of opposition to its policies from many western countries, let alone the increasing anger and hatred that is evident across the Middle East. The Lebanon War therefore looks likely to become a central part of the evolving war on terror and, given the deeply embedded nature of the Hezbollah movement, it is a conflict likely to be measured in months or years, and certainly not a matter of a few weeks.

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5 The Lebanon Aftermath – August 2006

Afghanistan and Iraq

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uring August the security situation in both Afghanistan and Iraq deteriorated further, in spite of efforts by the United States and its partners to stabilise the situation in both countries. In Afghanistan, substantial military operations were mounted by NATO in the south of the country to try and contain an expansion in Taliban activity and influence.1 There was little indication of success with these attempts, and two more general factors gave increasing cause for concern. One was the early indication that the 2006 opium poppy harvest would be the largest ever, providing more financial resources not just for the drugs trade and related warlords, but also for the Taliban and other militias. Given that the majority of all opium is now refined into heroin and morphine within Afghanistan, the potential for an improved financing of the insurgency is clear. The second factor was the increasing concern at the high levels of corruption within the Afghan government, coupled with a decline in support for President Hamid Karzai by international non-governmental organisations and even by donor governments. Many analysts believe that it is not entirely fair to blame Mr Karzai, given the conspicuous lack 35

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of help with security provided to Afghanistan in the crucial period of 2002–03, but the effects of ongoing corruption have been to undermine governmental authority. It even seems possible that in some parts of Afghanistan there is growing support for Taliban elements since the areas under their control demonstrate a higher level of order and security, even if the methods used are frequently extreme.2 In Iraq, the level of civilian casualties has increased substantially, especially in the region of greater Baghdad.3 There is now a complex and insecure environment involving a continuing insurgency that is becoming increasingly enmeshed with severe sectarian violence. The death of Abu Musab alZarqawi, the presumed al-Qaida associate, earlier in the summer was expected to damage the insurgency but it is clear that this has had little or no effect. As such it joins the many other instances that were expected to curtail the violence, ranging right back to the deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein in July 2003, the detention of Saddam Hussein in December of that year, followed by changes in administration and the holding of elections in 2004 and 2005. During August, US forces concentrated their efforts in the greater Baghdad area4 but there was little evidence that this, or the growth in the numbers of personnel in the Iraqi police and security forces, was having any impact.5 Indeed, in terms of casualties, the situation was worsening. Furthermore, a notable feature of the insurgency was the continuing rise in power and influence of the Shi’a cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, and the growth of his associated militia, the Mahdi Army. This group has previously had substantial conflicts with the US forces, notably in Najaf in 2004, and August saw a series of violent clashes suggesting a return to the tensions of mid-2004. Even with the major problems in Afghanistan and Iraq, though, the major emphasis in recent weeks has been on the closing stages of the second Lebanon War, the ensuing ceasefire and the implications of the outcome of the war.

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Lebanon – War Termination The crucial period in the Lebanon war was the first week in August. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had earlier experienced three surprising reversals in the latter part of July (Chapter 4). One was the unexpected attack on the Israeli Navy’s sophisticated Saar-5 class missile corvette fired from a shore-based launcher, a second was Hezbollah’s capacity to launch as many as a hundred unguided missiles across the border into northern Israel every day for weeks on end, and the third was the tenacity and capability of the Hezbollah paramilitaries when engaging IDF infantry and armoured vehicles. Even so, as the briefing made clear, by the end of the month the Olmert government in Israel was still determined to resist international calls for a ceasefire. Much of the pressure came from the political impact of TV coverage of civilian casualties in Lebanon and the considerable damage being done to the Lebanese economic infrastructure, but it was also clear that Israel was under no pressure whatsoever from its key supporter, the United States, to move towards a ceasefire. The Bush administration had been uncompromising in its support for Israel in seeking to terminate the power base of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and there were clear indications that the administration saw Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah in a much wider regional context. From Washington’s standpoint, Hezbollah was little more than a surrogate for Syria and, especially, Iran. There was real concern that the continuing power and influence of Hezbollah, both in southern Lebanon, the Beka Valley and parts of Beirut, as well as within the broader Lebanese political system, meant that Tehran had considerable leverage, stretching right up to the border with Israel. Given the long-standing US concern with Iran as being a core member of the ‘axis of evil’, the termination of Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon could be a

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powerful asset for US policy across the region, especially at a time of substantial difficulties in Iraq. It was in this context that the first seven to ten days in August were so significant, not just for the status of Hezbollah and the Olmert government but for US policy in the region.6 In continuing fighting on the ground, and with a further intense period of Israeli air raids across Lebanon, it became clear by about 10 August that the IDF was having considerable difficulties in limiting the effectiveness of Hezbollah on three different counts. One was that the considerable damage being done to the Lebanese infrastructure was simply not having the anticipated effect of turning the majority of Lebanese, especially Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, against Hezbollah. Israeli planners appeared to have confidently expected that this would happen, but Lebanese public opinion actually moved in the opposite direction. The more Hezbollah demonstrated resistance to Israeli troops moving into southern Lebanon, the more people across much of the country saw Hezbollah as defending Lebanon. The second factor related to the capabilities of the Hezbollah paramilitaries themselves. Time and again they proved able to resist the use of considerable force by Israel, exacting a toll on IDF units that was as severe as it was unexpected. It quickly became clear that Israeli military planners had made two serious errors. One was the belief that air power would have a major damaging impact on Hezbollah, limiting its capacity to engage with Israeli ground forces, and the second was a severe underestimate of the capabilities of the Hezbollah forces themselves.7 The first error may well have stemmed from a belief in air power that draws partly on Israeli successes decades earlier, partly from the US experience in Iraq in 1991 and partly from the Israeli Chief of Staff being an Air Force general. In some ways the second error was more serious, given Israel’s

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reconnaissance and electronic interception capabilities across southern Lebanon, coupled with its experience against Hezbollah paramilitaries in the mid-1980s. During that earlier period, following Operation Peace for Galilee and the siege of West Beirut in 1982, the IDF had found it so costly to maintain an occupation of southern Lebanon in the face of guerrilla action that it withdrew to a narrow border area by 1985, finally withdrawing entirely in 2000. Little appears to have been learnt by the IDF from that experience. Moreover, in the following five years, Hezbollah was able to construct a formidable set of defensive positions, mainly underground, and to train dedicated guerrilla groups that were largely self-supporting and organised in a cellstructure rather than in a more traditional military hierarchy. Most of the Hezbollah paramilitaries were local people who knew their territory intimately, had strong community support and were hugely dedicated to their cause. They were also well-trained and had access to a range of weapons, especially modern portable anti-armour missiles. Many of these had a high level of capability against Israeli armoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles, and some of them had modern shaped charges or two-stage warheads, capable of penetrating the formidable armour of the Israeli Merkava main battle tank. Where the Hezbollah militia proved particularly effective was in their ability to use anti-tank weapons against Israeli troops when they set up locations in buildings, even just for a few hours at a time. Hezbollah militia were able to emerge from bunkers, engage Israeli troops when least expected and stage effective attacks using these missiles. The third difficulty being experienced by the Israelis by early August was the continuing stream of missiles being fired into northern Israel. These were hitting targets south of Haifa and were affecting close to 2 million Israelis, severely limiting

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economic activity and causing many Israelis to live in shelters or else move to central and southern parts of the country. It is probably correct to say that the Israeli Air Force was able to disable a number of the longer-range Zilzal missile launchers available to Hezbollah and this might have prevented missile attacks as far south as Tel Aviv, but the fact that a large part of Israel was still within range had a profound political impact. Bearing in mind the memories of the Iraqi Scud attacks of 1991, the real problem for the Israelis was the inability of the IDF to counter the effect this time round. Most of the rockets were short-range, unguided and of limited impact, but their symbolic effect was considerable. Israelis felt vulnerable, many lost faith in their government and many were critical of the leadership of the armed forces, even if the ordinary IDF soldiers retained considerable support. Ceasefire and Afterwards The combination of difficulties experienced by Israel meant that by 10 August there was a tacit acceptance of the need for a ceasefire and the insertion of a large UN buffer force, and this was agreed by 14 August even if there was a two-week period before key countries such as France and Italy confirmed their willingness to contribute troops.8 It is worth noting the fact that Israel was, under these difficult circumstances, even willing to accept a UN force. Traditionally, Israel has been highly dubious of the relevance of the United Nations. It has been cursory in its treatment of UN resolutions, has been contemptuous of the limited UNIFIL observer operation in southern Lebanon and has been deeply suspicious of the continuing support that the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has given to Palestinian refugees for several decades. In spite of this history, the Olmert government was willing to accept what amounted to a UN solution to its

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difficulties. This alone gives an indication of the extent to which the 2006 Lebanon War was a reversal for Israel. Meanwhile, Hezbollah was able to claim the outcome as a victory, in spite of the heavy losses that it undoubtedly suffered. The fact that its militia were able to survive for close to five weeks was, from its own perspective, a conspicuous achievement, no less than that it was able to launch the largest number of missiles into Israel on the last day before the ceasefire took effect. Moreover, using financial resources provided largely by Iran, Hezbollah was able to move rapidly into a major role in immediate repair and reconstruction of houses, commercial premises and the more general infrastructure of southern Lebanon. Looked at objectively, the extent of Hezbollah’s survival is remarkable, and does have longer-term implications. Israel had total control of the air, had sea control of the approaches to Lebanon and had an impressive concentration of UAV drones that could observe southern Lebanon on a 24/7 basis. It had a wide range of munitions available including precision-guided bombs, area-impact munitions such as cluster bombs and earthpenetrating warheads for destroying underground bunkers. It also had a formidable concentration of ground-based artillery, some of the world’s most heavily armed, and armoured, main battle tanks, and an army that combined professional forces with large numbers of experienced reservists. Despite all of these capabilities, the IDF failed to take over and control even a 30-kilometre belt of southern Lebanon. For much of the last 58 years Israel has relied on conventional deterrence through very powerful military forces to ensure its security. There have been reversals, not least at the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War and the 1982–85 occupation of southern Lebanon, but for the most part this form of deterrence has been presumed to be effective. The Lebanon War of 2006 casts considerable doubt over this presumption,

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and this was quickly recognised by leaders in Syria and Iran, and more widely across the Middle East and beyond. The Global Perspective Towards the end of the month, the political run-up to the US Congressional elections of November 2006 was combining with the impending five-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Having lost substantial domestic support and with the Iraq War increasingly unpopular, the Bush administration also faced the aftermath of the Lebanon War and a confident Iran that was clearly not prepared to abide by UN Security Council demands to halt uranium enrichment. In these circumstances, President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others went on the offensive in a sustained campaign to link Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and al-Qaida in a single phenomenon of Islamofascism that was presented as a threat to the United States that was as great as Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. In particular, they sought to make the point that the Global War on Terror had now been transformed into the Long War, and that the United States was engaged in a conflict that represented a fundamental and persistent danger to its interests. In doing so, they were helped by the discovery in Britain of an alleged plot to destroy a number of civil airliners en route from Britain to the United States. This was seen as proof of the continuing threat to the US, with some suggestions being made that the plot could have caused ‘unimaginable’ loss of life, presumably greater even than the 9/11 attacks.9 Whatever the eventual outcome of any legal action in this matter, the political intention in the United States was to point to the risks being faced and the essential nature of the continuing military response. Beyond this, though, was

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the unsubtle and clear implication that any opposition to the conduct of the Long War, including any talk of a timetable for troop withdrawals from Iraq, was deeply unpatriotic, almost to the point of treason. In the heated atmosphere of the run-up to the November elections it is likely that this approach will persist for the next two months. Whether there is any change in policy after that remains to be seen, and developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon may all be relevant. For now, though, there seems little sign of change.

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6 The Afghan Summer of War – September 2006

Lebanon

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uring September, substantial numbers of foreign troops entered southern Lebanon to act as an enhanced UN observer and buffer force, with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) withdrawing most of their troops by the end of the month. The introduction of Lebanese Army troops and international forces was meant to lead on to the disarming of Hezbollah units but few observers thought that this would actually happen. Even so, there were very few instances of military engagement between Hezbollah and IDF units, and the progressive withdrawal of the IDF forces meant that any unintended flare up of violence became increasingly unlikely by the end of the month. Furthermore, it was clear that while Hezbollah might well be engaged in re-supply of its forces, much of its activity was directed towards reconstruction across southern Lebanon. It was not looking to re-engage with the IDF. In any case, there were indications that the Hezbollah missile forces were not substantially degraded by Israeli air attacks during the war, with the exception of some of the small numbers of longerrange systems. Perhaps one third of the short-range systems were either fired into Israel or destroyed by Israeli military 44

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action, leaving large numbers still available for use without the need for re-supply. The extent of Hezbollah’s capabilities during the war became progressively clearer during September, most notably as their casualties were almost certainly much lower than Israeli war-time estimates. It was also apparent that the network of underground bunkers that had been constructed in the previous six years was hugely more extensive than Israeli intelligence had suggested. Indeed, Hezbollah had become particularly adept at constructing dummy facilities while effectively disguising many of the operational bunkers. In Israeli military circles there were attempts to highlight Israeli successes, especially in terms of the extent and concentration of battlefield surveillance during the war, and the destruction of some of the longer-range Hezbollah missiles in the first few days of the war. This could not, however, disguise the real concern at the outcome of the conflict, and the substantial difficulties experienced by the IDF in their ground force engagements with Hezbollah.1 A number of commentators in Israel and the United States have pointed to the need to take further military action in southern Lebanon and there have been indications of a substantial re-arming of the IDF from the United States. Such action is considered essential in some quarters if Israel is to avoid losing the regional perception of its conventional military superiority, given that such ‘conventional deterrence’ forms the basis for Israel’s security. At the same time, the bitter experience in southern Lebanon suggests that a return to open warfare is now unlikely. It would require the withdrawal of international forces, especially the French and Italian troops, followed by a massive Israeli intervention into southern Lebanon and a protracted occupation. Neither is feasible and there is, instead, likely to be a period of substantial reflection among informed circles in Israel. It is possible that this will lead to an increased acceptance of the need to negotiate a more stable peace, even with Hamas

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and Hezbollah. Alternatively, it could mean some other form of action is considered, possibly against Iranian nuclear facilities, in order to demonstrate the continuing power of the Israeli military system. Given the extent of the control being exercised in Gaza during the latter part of September, it is clear that the ‘negotiation option’ is not yet being followed. Israel does not appear to have yet appreciated the security vulnerabilities demonstrated by its failure in Lebanon. Iraq The security situation in Iraq deteriorated further during September.2 Estimates of civilian casualties across the country now run to around 3,000 each month, roughly equivalent to a 9/11 attack, with most of the violence in the greater Baghdad area and in the important province of Anbar which extends from west of Baghdad to the Syrian border and includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. Although the United States maintains substantial troop deployments in Anbar, it appears that the province is simply not under the control of the US forces or of the Iraqi government. During the course of August and September, as violence escalated in Baghdad, the US military deployed substantially more troops to the city to attempt to restore a degree of security, but there were major questions of reliability concerning the Iraqi police and by the end of the month there was little sign of any improvement. Moreover, the increased deployment of US ground forces in the city resulted in a marked increase in casualties. During the course of September, 71 US soldiers were killed and over 700 injured.3 All talk of US troop withdrawals in the run-up to the midsessional elections to Congress was abandoned, with US troop levels remaining at around 140,000 and indications that the US Army was planning to retain such force levels through to 2010. An overall political response from the Bush administration was to characterise the situation as a central part of a war of national

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importance that was directly linked to 9/11 and the security of the homeland. The term ‘Islamofascism’ is increasingly used to embrace all elements of perceived opposition to US interests including al-Qaida and its associates, the diverse insurgent groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the Taliban in Afghanistan.4 Afghanistan When the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was supplemented by substantial elements from the British, Canadian, Dutch and other armed forces early in 2006, the stated purpose was to aid reconstruction in a number of areas of Afghanistan away from the relatively more peaceful provinces across much of the north and north-west of the country. Helmand Province in the south was seen as particularly important, not least because there had previously been very little of an external security presence, the writ of the Karzai administration simply did not extend to the province and Helmand was possibly the most significant area for opium poppy cultivation. In practice, many of the forces have instead become directly involved in a bitter and intensely violent conflict, as indicated in recent briefings in this series. It may be that there will be some easing of the conflict during the winter months, but it is appropriate to analyse some aspects of the recent experience and to assess the intentions of the insurgents over the next year. In this connection, three aspects are particularly relevant – the trends in opium production, the tactics of the insurgents and the recent developments in western Pakistan. The Drug Trade According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 shows that opium poppy

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cultivation in the 2005–06 growing season reached its highest level ever, an increase of 59% in the area under cultivation to 165,000 hectares.5 The production of raw opium increased to a lesser extent, by 49% to 6,629 tonnes, partly due to drought conditions in some areas, although the increased use of poorer quality soils may have been a factor. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this expansion was the increase in opium poppy cultivation in Helmand Province where there was a massive 162% increase in land under poppy cultivation to 69,324 hectares or 42% of the total area under cultivation throughout Afghanistan. Helmand Province is that part of Afghanistan that has been a particular focus for British troops, deployed partly with the aim of restricting poppy cultivation. However, the recent deployments have come many months after the planting of the 2005–06 crop and could not have had any effect. What will be significant is whether there is any substantial decrease in the area under cultivation, given that the planting season for the 2006–07 crop has recently been under way. Partly because of the size of the crop, what is termed the ‘farm gate’ price of raw opium declined in 2006 but the overall revenues to poppy growers increased because of the substantially larger crop. In more global terms, the substantial increase in opium production in Afghanistan, which accounts for 92% of global production, has resulted in something of a glut on world markets with consequent decreases in street prices. One problematic result is that as finished heroin becomes cheaper to purchase, so heroin use is likely to increase. At farm gate prices, the 2006 Afghan crop brought in an estimated $755 million, about 11% of Afghanistan’s overall GDP of $6.7 billion. This is somewhat misleading as the total value of the Afghan drug economy, including refining into heroin and morphine, smuggling in of pre-cursor chemicals and trafficking is estimated at $2.7 billion. If such a total is taken into account, it is likely that the real Afghan GDP is over

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$8.5 billion with the drug trade alone accounting for close to a third of this. As mentioned in earlier briefings, one of the developments in the Afghanistan drug industry is the tendency to refine raw opium within the country, in marked contrast to the situation a decade or so ago when the great majority was exported as raw opium. This development allows for a greatly increased flow of resources to criminal elements, local warlords and Taliban and associated insurgents. Taliban Developments The term ‘Taliban’ is becoming an all-purpose word describing elements under a degree of central leadership combined with many other local militias, often loosely connected with the Taliban, the leadership of the latter being mainly located in Pakistan. Within Afghanistan there have been three major developments over the past six months. One has been the greatly increased level of paramilitary activity against ISAF units and against Afghan police and army units.6 This appears to have been planned for at least 18 months and has involved the ability to bring together paramilitary concentrations of 100 or more people at any one time. This has been aided by the availability of substantial financial incentives often originating from the drug trade, which has allowed local Taliban commanders to hire young men as temporary paramilitaries, boosting their numbers in specific localities. They may not have much of the ideological or religious commitment of more regular Taliban personnel, but they will frequently have substantial local knowledge and will operate sufficiently close to home for them to require little in the way of logistical support other than weapons. The second feature has been the manner in which Taliban units have learnt rapidly to respond to ISAF capabilities and tactics, enabling them to modify their own modes of warfare.

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During the earlier months of the current escalation in violence, large concentrations of Taliban paramilitaries engaged ISAF troops with some success, but ISAF units such as the British forces in Helmand increasingly utilised their substantial advantage in helicopter and strike aircraft firepower to counter Taliban activities. During the latter part of the summer, large Taliban actions became rather less common, and tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers became more common, especially in urban areas. Finally, in addition to direct conflict with ISAF units, there continued to be a systematic campaign of extending political influence across much of southern Afghanistan, including the assassination of Afghan government officials, attacks on nongovernmental organisations and the closure of schools. This was aided by the failure of the Karzai administration in Kabul to develop effective nation-wide governance and the high levels of corruption evident within the administration. By the end of September there was some evidence of a decrease in paramilitary activity, but this could well be due to the need for labour to plant the new poppy crop. Furthermore, it could also be part of a pre-planned strategy by the Taliban, with the 2006 campaign being part of a longer-term process partly dictated by developments in Pakistan. The Pakistan Connection Following considerable losses experienced by the Pakistani Army in trying to control many frontier districts bordering Afghanistan, the Musharraf regime concluded a peace agreement with elders in the key border province of North Waziristan on 5 September. This provided for the Pakistani Army to withdraw to barracks and to cease offensive military operations, and for the Pakistani government to release well over a thousand detainees. In return, the Pakistani Taliban and other elements would refrain from attacking Pakistani

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Army units, would not establish what would effectively be parallel administrations and would not facilitate cross-border operations into Afghanistan. From the perspective of the Musharraf regime this was a necessary compromise, given the somewhat precarious nature of Pakistani governance and the need for continued support from Islamic political parties. The peace settlement was accepted reluctantly by the Bush administration, dependent on whether it would indeed limit the extent to which the border districts would evolve further as ‘safe zones’ for paramilitaries active in Afghanistan. By the end of September there were indications that cross-border movements had actually increased, one indirect consequence being a delay on the part of the Pakistani government in releasing some of the prisoners as had been agreed in the 5 September settlement. Taliban Aims There is a tendency to see the renewed Taliban insurgency as a rather haphazard development without an overall strategy. In reality it needs to be seen in a longer-term perspective. In early 2005 there were some analysts who anticipated a Taliban revival across the south of Afghanistan during the spring and summer of 2005. Although there was increased activity this was not substantial, but this may have been the intention, with another year spent building up a paramilitary capability for 2006. With the probable lull in activity during the coming autumn and winter, there may be a tendency for western political leaders to assume that ISAF operations over the past couple of months have been successful. This would be a major mistake. It is far wiser to assume that the Taliban leadership sees the 2006 campaign as part of a multi-year process that will lead to the re-establishment of what may be termed the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan. On this basis Afghanistan would once more

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become the significant global centre for al-Qaida and other Islamist activities, providing training and other facilities and thereby enhancing the jihadist capabilities of the wider alQaida movement. Given that that movement has maintained a substantial level of trans-national activity in spite of its post9/11 dispersal, this would mean a major development in the ‘war on terror’. Whether the Taliban movement is in any way capable of developing a nation-wide uprising as a prelude to regaining power remains to be seen. If such a prospect became evident, then the United States and its NATO allies would almost certainly move towards a massive reinforcement of their military capabilities in Afghanistan. Perhaps the key point is that none of this may become apparent until well into 2007. Meanwhile any assumption of a longer-term improvement in the security environment in Afghanistan during the coming months will be dangerously optimistic and thoroughly unwise.7

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7 Insecurity in Iraq – October 2006

Afghanistan and Pakistan

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uring the course of October there was a decrease in the level of paramilitary activity against NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, but there were few indications that this was a sign of the foreign forces making substantial progress. Instead, it looked more likely that Taliban and other elements had been working to a plan that involved higher levels of insurgency during the summer months. Reports from normally reliable regional sources suggested that the fighting would continue during the winter but that there would be more of a focus on small-scale insurgency attacks in centres of population, including Kabul.1 There would also be a further emphasis on attacks on government figures and public servants. During the course of October there were 148 civilians killed or injured in paramilitary attacks, and there were frequent attacks against Afghan police and security forces. There were nine suicide bombings, mostly directed against police and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel. In Pakistan, the agreement reached between the Musharraf regime in Islamabad and local elders in the border district of North Waziristan did not appear to be reducing the level of cross-border Taliban activity. In an action that increased 53

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tensions at the end of the month, the Pakistani armed forces staged a major attack on the Zia-ul-Uloom madrassa in the border district of Bajour that was claimed to be a centre of Taliban activity. Around 80 people were killed in the predawn raid, most of them students, although the government reported that most were potential or actual paramilitaries. An unconfirmed report suggested that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaida strategist who is widely seen as Osama bin Laden’s deputy, had been present at the madrassa shortly before the attack. This contributed to the widespread belief within Pakistan that the air strike was actually a US operation directed at Zawahiri. It was a belief that was strongly denied by the Musharraf regime but government sources in Islamabad did admit to a US involvement in the provision of intelligence prior to the attack. One result was an increased mood of antiAmericanism, especially in the border regions, with a number of protests, including demonstrations in Peshawar, the capital of North West Frontier Province.2 Iraq In Iraq, the US operations against insurgents were further intensified during October. The total number of US forces present in the country remained in excess of 140,000 and their pattern of operations was dictated by two main factors. The first was that during the course of 2005 and early 2006 there had been a tendency for US forces to rely increasingly on air power in their counter-insurgency operations. This was in response to persistent casualties among their own troops but was also made possible by the development of large air bases in which substantial numbers of helicopter gunships could be deployed. Balad Air Base, north of Baghdad, became a key focus for the ongoing war. By the middle of 2006 it was apparent that this strategy was not working – although there may have been a decrease in

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ground patrols, there was no marked decrease in US military casualties. Moreover, and this was the second factor, the level of insurgency increased substantially, with much of Anbar Province becoming a ‘no-go’ area for US and Iraqi security forces, especially in key cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi. The greater Baghdad region also witnessed a marked deterioration in government and US control, with a huge increase in civilian casualties. The US military was therefore in a predicament in that the changed tactics had not diminished their own casualty levels and had also been accompanied by an increase in overall levels of violence. It was for these reasons that there was a renewed emphasis on troop deployments, especially in the greater Baghdad area, an emphasis achieved by withdrawing some troops from relatively quiet areas and also by ensuring an overlap of troops starting or completing their deployments in Iraq. By the end of October there was no substantive evidence that this return to an earlier approach, albeit with larger troop numbers, was having any impact on the insurgency. Iraqi civilian casualties remained exceptionally high, almost certainly around 3,000 for the month of October, and there was also increasing evidence of major population movements as Shi’a and Sunni families in mixed communities sought to move to safer areas. The effect of this trend was to consolidate the process of intensification of Sunni and Shi’a confessional groups in particular areas, even in Baghdad where there had been substantial areas of mixed communities. US Casualties Although Iraqi civilians bore the brunt of the suffering during the course of October, the US military casualties were particularly high. For the month as a whole, 105 US service personnel were killed, the highest monthly total for nearly

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two years, and more than twice as high as some of the earlier months of 2006. Furthermore, the level of combat injuries was unusually high – in the five weeks to 31 October, over 950 US military personnel were injured, bringing the total since the war began three and a half years ago to over 20,000. This is in addition to an even larger number of people evacuated back to the United States over that period for non-combat injuries and physical and mental illness.3 It is not clear what proportion of the 30,000+ personnel evacuated to the United States for treatment actually return to active service, but there are indications that at least half of the 20,000 people sustaining combat injuries do not do so. Although the combat deaths are far smaller than in the Vietnam War, that was in an era of the draft (conscription), with much larger armed forces. The impact of nearly 3,000 deaths and around 10,000 serious injuries in the Iraq War so far is proportionally much larger than at the time of the much longer Vietnam War, and may partially explain the continuing difficulties in recruitment into the armed forces, especially the US Army. Domestic Politics and the Iraq War The Bush administration gives little publicity to the deaths and injuries among service personnel and there is minimal publicity in the national network media. In local and regional media, however, there is more publicity arising from the impact of individual casualties from towns and city districts on their local communities. This may be one of the factors that is sapping public confidence in the war and in the administration’s ability to sustain support. The loss of support resulted in the Iraq issue coming to dominate domestic politics in the run-up to the mid-sessional elections to Congress on 7 November, and meant that the Bush administration had to engage in a vigorous counter-attack on

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its Democrat opponents.4 Two approaches were adopted. One was to enhance the existing process of conflating all the major problems in the Middle East and South-West Asia into a single battle that could be linked directly back to the 9/11 attacks five years ago. In this view, the United States is now engaged in a hugely important ‘Long War against Islamofascism’, with that term encompassing not just al-Qaida and the Taliban, but numerous insurgent groups in Iraq as well as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. Indeed, it extends to any radical Islamist group anywhere. Making such a remarkable connection between diverse groups and 9/11 may seem extraordinary, but its very simplicity is its strength, together with the reminder to Americans of the intensity of the original attacks. Such a reminder is given a particular salience by the many memories re-awakened by the five year anniversary of the attacks. The linking of the Long War with Hezbollah and Hamas is also significant, given the strong support for the State of Israel that remains within the United States. The traditional Jewish lobby is less vigorous in its support, given that many liberal Jews have been deeply concerned at the policies of recent Israeli governments. While such support has declined, though, the rise of Christian Zionism has brought forward a much more widespread base of support. This extends way beyond the convinced Christian Zionists, although that group alone encompasses well over 20 million people. In a poll conducted by Zogby for the CNI Foundation, 31% of those surveyed strongly believed or somewhat believed in the theme of Christian Zionism if defined as ‘the belief that Jews must have all of the promised land, including all of Jerusalem, to facilitate the second coming of the messiah’. A separate Pew poll showed that 53% of those surveyed believed that Israel was given by God to the Jews and a CNN/Time poll indicated that 59% of those polled believed in the prophecies in the Book of Revelations. In such an environment, it makes considerable

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political sense to present the American predicament as a fundamental conflict with the forces of radical Islam, the key point being to ensure that such a term embraces those movements seen to threaten Israel. The second electoral approach adopted was that the Bush administration chose to make a fundamental change in its attitude to the oil issue. For most of the last three years there has been a consistent denial that the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the termination of the Saddam Hussein regime has had anything to do with oil. In the closing stages of the campaign, that stance was reversed and linked powerfully to the risks of a ‘cut and run’ (a rapid withdrawal from Iraq). In a series of campaign speeches President Bush pointed to the risk of extremists taking over in Iraq and then using Iraqi oil as a political weapon causing worldwide shortages and driving the price up to over $300 a barrel. In reality, the problems created by the insurgency for Iraqi oil production have been so serious that Iraq is currently a minor player on the international oil markets, responsible for barely 3% of worldwide production. Its exports of 1.6 million barrels a day are far lower than the spare capacity currently in the hands of other OPEC members, especially Saudi Arabia, so that any temporary disruption would have little effect. Even so, as a political tactic it is useful, in view of the recent period of high gasoline prices in the United States. Given that domestic consumers were unused to such prices, the threat of even worse problems consequent on an Iraqi withdrawal could have a marked political impact. Staying the Course Among analysts of the evolution of the Iraq insurgency there are two broad views as to the consequences of a US withdrawal for the conduct of the Long War, should such a withdrawal be contemplated. One view is that the chaos that would ensue

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would make it possible for radical Islamists linked to al-Qaida to establish an environment in which the Afghanistan of the 1980s could be replaced by the Iraq of the 2010s as a focus for extended activities. Moreover, this would not be in distant and rural Afghanistan but in an urban Iraq in the heart of the world’s most productive oil-bearing region. The longer-term consequences of such a predicament are such that any talk of a US withdrawal is highly dangerous. The contrary view is that the continuing presence of US troops in Iraq is already providing a remarkable opportunity for a new generation of jihadists to gain combat experience against the world’s best-equipped troops.5 This will provide for new generations of paramilitary jihadists experienced in urban combat against regular troops rather than the rural combat against Soviet conscripts of the 1980s. This view tends to be countered by those who point out that the majority of the civilian deaths in Iraq are caused by internal violence rather than the activities of US and other coalition troops. This may be true, but it is also the case that the direct insurgency against US troops is currently at a level as high as at any time since the war began. Beyond all of this, though, there remains the question of regional security and this relates to two core factors: the geopolitical significance of Persian Gulf oil, and the nature of the regimes in Tehran and Riyadh. Although current Iraqi oil production is relatively low, the country still has the world’s second largest oil reserves, around four times the size of the United States’s entire domestic reserves including Alaska. Moreover, the region has close to two-thirds of the world’s total oil reserves at a time when the United States and China are both becoming progressively more import dependent. Thus the Persian Gulf remains the world’s most important resource base and will do so for several decades. The second factor links directly with this – from Washington’s perspective Iran is currently governed by an

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entirely unacceptable regime and the stability of the House of Saud is far from assured. If there was to be a wholesale and precipitate withdrawal from Iraq, it might just be possible to maintain reasonably secure bases elsewhere in the region, but this would be a far weaker situation for the United States. A chaotic Iraq with a strong paramilitary Islamist presence, an oppositional Iran and an unstable Saudi Arabia would be close to catastrophic for US security interests in the region. It follows that the chances of a major change in US strategy in Iraq remain low, and recent Pentagon planning for high troop levels for the next four years are far more realistic.6 However, the level of US military casualties is such that there may well be an even more determined process of withdrawal to key bases within Iraq combined with the use of intensive air power in counter-insurgency operations. This would involve large-scale withdrawal from the cities, except the centre of Baghdad, with the US presence being much more a matter of an insurance against a radical Islamist regime gaining power. That this is the current predicament of the US government gives some indication of the extent of the failure of policies in the region. This does not mean, though, that a fundamental re-appraisal of policy is yet likely.

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8 After the US Elections – November 2006

Afghanistan

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lthough the early part of November saw a particular emphasis on the results of the US mid-sessional elections to Congress, and this will be the main subject of this briefing, the insurgency in Iraq continued with at least a hundred civilians being killed every day, and the violence in Afghanistan persisted into the autumn in a manner which was more intense than the previous four years.1 At the end of the month a NATO summit meeting in Riga was dominated by discussions over the NATO leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The key issue was that the boost given to ISAF in the early months of 2006 had not resulted in a major increase in support for reconstruction and development, but rather it developed into a markedly bitter counter-insurgency operation that caused substantial casualties, especially among Canadian and British troops. Furthermore, these and other troop contingents had to rely frequently on the use of air power to suppress opposition, with this often resulting in the destruction of houses and other buildings that were presumed to be insurgent locations. Thus what was intended to be an operation involving construction actually resulted in destruction as troops sought to defend 61

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themselves against attack by using their airpower advantage. The Afghan civilian casualties were very much higher than those of the foreign forces. Political leaders such as George Bush and Tony Blair hoped to persuade NATO partners at the Riga meeting to make two changes. One was the need to increase the military forces available in Afghanistan and the second was to remove restrictions on how some of the existing troop contingents were used. The countries most heavily involved in counterinsurgency operations are Britain, the Netherlands, Canada and the United States, whereas countries including France, Germany and Italy are involved in more stable parts of central and northern Afghanistan under rules of engagement that limited their use in more overtly military operations. In the event, the Riga summit made little progress on either issue.2 There was some agreement that there might be more flexibility on deployments in response to specific emergencies but without any systematic change in the rules of engagement of all the major troop contingents. On the issue of increasing the size of the force, the proposal put at the summit was for a modest increase of just 2,500 to add to the 32,000 troops currently under NATO leadership in Afghanistan. While there were claims that this commitment had been accepted, it was not at all clear which countries would make the contributions. Moreover, demands for improved equipment, especially more helicopters and transport planes, were not met. What the summit did result in was a renewed commitment to ensure security in Afghanistan by continuing to pursue the counter-insurgency operations, with the leaders pledging ‘to ensure that ISAF has the forces, resources and flexibility to ensure the mission’s continued success’. This was at the end of a summer of intensive fighting against an evident Taliban revival of considerable substance, with the prospect of an even larger spring offensive in 2006.

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There is substantial evidence that one effect of the NATO counter-insurgency operations, especially the reliance on air power with all its collateral consequences, has been to boost support for Taliban groups in many parts of southern Afghanistan.3 It is therefore likely that continued NATO reliance on the use of force will have a similar effect next year, but against a strengthened and more popular Taliban movement. Because of this, there is the suggestion now voiced in many quarters, especially within the UN and among some Afghan politicians in Kabul, that ways must be sought to bring Taliban elements into the political process, even though this would mean negotiating with people commonly considered to be terrorists. However uncomfortable such a prospect might be, there is the view that this is an option that has to be considered, given the extent of support that already exists for the Taliban movement and the extremely unlikely prospect that NATO could deploy sufficient forces to defeat the Taliban movement by military means. At this stage, all that can be said is that the Riga summit indicated that the NATO leadership was simply not prepared to consider such a change in policy, even if that could well change if the conflict continues intensively through the coming winter and then escalates considerably next summer. Meanwhile in the North Waziristan district of Pakistan that borders Afghanistan, the September peace agreement that involved withdrawal of Pakistani Army units has left a territory that is essentially open country for militants, with training camps re-established and fighters coming in from other countries across the Middle East and Central Asia. This reflects the situation two decades earlier when this part of Pakistan served as a crossing point for Islamic radicals intent on evicting Soviet forces from Afghanistan, although such groups were then aided by the United States.

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It is highly unlikely that the Musharraf regime has the military ability, let alone political will, to enforce control in this region. As a result, the evolution of such a locus of instability may become unacceptable to the United States, possibly leading to US military intervention next year. This would have serious implications for the stability of Pakistan. The Elections In the United States, the mid-sessional elections to Congress produced results that were deeply unsatisfactory for the Bush administration. There had been a reasonable expectation that the Republicans would lose control of the House, given that all the seats were up for election and polling suggested that the Democrats would gain a narrow majority. In the event the majority was more substantial than expected, but this was overshadowed by the changes in the Senate, where only one third of the seats were up for election. The result was a 49:49 split for the two parties in the 100-seat legislature, but the two independent Senators were effectively Democrat supporters, so the Senate actually moved to Democrat control. These elections were unusual in US politics in that the most important single issue was foreign policy, especially the war in Iraq. The war has become steadily more unpopular over the past 18 months, partly because of the US casualty rates, with nearly 3,000 killed and 21,000 injured, not counting over 10,000 non-combat injuries. The administration has made concerted efforts to avoid paying attention to casualties, not least in the reluctance of senior officials to be seen at funerals or visiting the wounded, and the national media coverage of casualties has been generally low, except for some of the quality broadsheet newspapers. At a local level though, it is quite different, with radio and TV stations and newspapers being much more likely to cover the funerals of young men and women from the locality, or to interview seriously wounded people.4

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While the effect of this is difficult to judge, it almost certainly contributes to the changing mood about the war. While not on the same scale, it is reminiscent of the impact of casualties during the Vietnam War, although the earlier French Indo China War may be more relevant. Between 1950 and 1954, France was fighting a bitter war against the Viet Minh nationalists under the astute military leadership of General Giap, probably the most successful military commander of the twentieth century. While most of the French forces were from the Foreign Legion, North Africa or Indo China itself, there were many tens of thousands of French regular and conscript troops involved and, over the period, these suffered thousands of deaths. The effect on the French political will to continue the war was slow but pervasive. In early 1954 the Viet Minh laid siege to the strategically significant garrison town of Dien Bien Phu, finally capturing it with substantial French losses in early May. Although the loss of Dien Bien Phu was not wholly calamitous for the French war effort (French forces still held Hanoi, Haiphong and the heavily populated Hong River delta), the political will to continue finally collapsed and disengagement followed rapidly. The US willingness to continue in Iraq is not remotely at the same stage, at least at present, but the parallels are worth considering and may become increasingly obvious. If the United States does eventually withdraw entirely from Iraq, it is highly likely that the 2006 mid-sessional elections will be seen as one of the key turning points. What makes them particularly significant is that they came at the end of a bruising period of campaigning in which the Bush administration tried repeatedly to link the Iraq War to the wider war on terror. The use of the phrase ‘the Long War against Islamofascism’ became almost a standard operating procedure (Chapter 7) but this, in the end, failed to have the anticipated effect. One further point relating to the war in Iraq is that there is a possibility of a substantial insurgent attack on the heavily

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protected ‘Green Zone’ in the heart of Baghdad that houses so many US and Iraqi government facilities. While the insurgents would hardly be able to over-run this zone, a major attack would be a signal demonstration of military power and could have an effect much as did the Viet Cong’s failed Tet Offensive towards the end of the Vietnam War. The Democrat Dilemma The election results were very bad news for the Bush administration, primarily because the Democrats will now be able to control a range of House and Senate committees, determining a range of studies and inquiries that will be able to examine in some detail many aspects of the administration’s policies over the past six years. There is also likely to be particular attention paid to defence budgets, giving the Democrats some political influence over the course of future military policies. There are, however, three aspects of the changed political scene that provide some relief for the Republicans, even if many commentators are now talking of a decidedly lame duck administration through to November 2008. The first of these is that the Democrats will have to be careful to avoid criticisms of US soldiers. By and large, the American armed forces remain popular at home, in spite of the Abu Ghraib episode and a number of other courts martial. Also, in spite of growing concern over the war, there is little direct criticism so far of the military commanders. One of the immediate effects of the elections was the removal of the Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and this has focused attention on the failings in the political rather than the military leadership. The end result is that the Democrats may be able to direct criticism at President Bush and VicePresident Cheney but must do this in a manner which avoids them being accused of being disloyal to American men and women actually in Iraq.

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The second problem for the Democrats is that if they succeed in affecting the conduct of the war, either by an impact on the defence budgets, by preventing particular appointments or by other means, an immediate tactic that will be employed by the Bush administration, especially in the run-up to the 2008 elections, will be to blame the Democrats for further failings in the war. A political theme that will emerge will be that, at a time when the United States needs strong leadership, it will be the Democrats that will have presented the main obstacle to just that leadership. The final problem relates specifically to this, and that is the evident lack of unity within the Democrat Party as to the best way forward. Views range from an early and more or less complete withdrawal from Iraq through to staying the course. In this regard, some of the recent speeches of 2008 Presidential hopefuls such as Senator Hillary Clinton are indicative. Such putative candidates, most notably Senator Clinton, are currently at pains to take a quite hard-line position on Iraq, recognising that it remains easy for the Bush administration, even during its current difficulties, to play the patriotism card. Baker and the Neo-conservatives In an earlier move to deflect attention away from unpopular policies, the Bush administration facilitated the work of the Baker–Hamilton commission on Iraq. This, it was hoped, would demonstrate to voters that the Bush administration was open to new policy proposals on Iraq, but the results of the elections meant that the Baker Report would get far greater media attention. Towards the end of the month a number of press ‘leaks’ indicated that the report would focus on two particular issues – the need to withdraw combat troops from Iraq while scaling up the training of Iraqi security forces to replace them, and an engagement in dialogue with Iran and Syria in order to work for an orderly transition in Iraq.5

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Neither of these proposals was remotely acceptable to the neo-conservative wing of the Republican Party, and there was something of a spoiling operation launched in the latter part of November as the publication date for the report drew near, the aim being to denigrate the report as a study based on appeasement. The idea of any kind of dialogue with Iran was anathema, and there was also a strong thread running through neo-conservative analysis of the war that focused on the need to increase troop levels rather than decrease them.6 One of the interesting aspects of the post-election period was the manner in which neo-conservative elements in Washington were not especially discouraged in spite of the political setbacks. Indeed the tendency was to take the offensive and concentrate on the essential need for victory in Iraq. Motivations varied but there were two key elements. One was that neo-conservative analysts were all too aware that a majority US military pullout from Iraq would take on the appearance of a clear-cut defeat. As such, this would cause terminal damage to the desire to re-make the map of the Middle East in favour of the United States. The second was the recognition of the immense value of the Persian Gulf oil reserves, making the continuing presence in Iraq even more crucial than in almost any other part of the world. Thus the US mid-sessional elections to Congress may have appeared to have been disastrous for the Bush administration. In fact it may be that the capacity for the White House team to use the new make-up of both Houses to its advantage, and the determination of neo-conservative elements to hold on to their vision for the Middle East, suggested that this might turn out to be the case. What was clear, by the end of the month, was that there was no immediate prospect of a major change of attitude by the Bush administration, whatever the Baker Report might say.

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9 Responding to the Baker Report – December 2006

The Execution of Saddam Hussein

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ecember 2006 was one of the worst months for civilian casualties in Iraq, marking the end of a year in which sectarian violence had become far worse, even as the underlying insurgency against US forces and Iraqi security forces had also accelerated. The very end of the year was marked by two events that symbolised the problems – the execution of Saddam Hussein and the death of the 3,000th US soldier. Although the criminal investigations and trial of Saddam Hussein were theoretically under the control of the Iraqi government, the reality was that the United States overwhelmingly funded and advised on both operations. Only in the last few hours of his life was Saddam Hussein handed over to Iraqi forces for execution, with his body being returned immediately to US custody for transport to his home village near Tikrit. The execution itself was marred by a degree of disorganisation and abuse that further alienated Sunni communities but was also significant in that there was no expectation that it would have any effect in curbing the insurgency. This was in marked contrast to the killing of his two sons in July 2003 and to his own detention that following December. 69

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Both events were expected to do substantial damage to the insurgency but neither had any discernible effect. Partly because of this, and also because of the failure of other events such as the end of the Coalition Provisional Authority and various elections to curb the insurgency, there were no expectations that Hussein’s execution would have any effect. It is now recognised that the insurgency has, in the past four years, evolved well beyond being a Ba’athist project. For the United States and its coalition partners, the precise sequence of the trials and the rapid execution had a considerable political value. The charges against Saddam Hussein that were heard first related to the killing of over a hundred villagers in the early 1990s, following an assassination plot against him. It was for these charges that he was executed. Even though these were serious charges, there were much greater offences that were due to come before the court but which will now not be heard. These related to the conduct of the devastating Anfal campaign against Iraqi Kurds between 1987 and 1989. During this campaign, many tens of thousands of Kurds were killed, frequently in mass executions, at least 2,000 villages were completely destroyed, and chemical weapons were used against unprotected civilian populations. The poison gas aspect of the Anfal campaign reached its peak with the attacks on Halabja and other Kurdish towns and villages, mainly in March 1988, and were responsible for several thousand deaths. The problem for the United States, and indeed for France, Russia, Britain and other western countries, was that the Anfal campaign came at a time when the Saddam Hussein regime was effectively allied to western states, primarily because it was seen as a crucial buffer against revolutionary Iran, having been fighting a bitter war with Iran since 1980. France and the then Soviet Union were the main suppliers of arms to Iraq at this time, Britain was minimalist in its condemnation of the attack on Halabja and the United States was actually fighting alongside Iraq in its war with Iran.

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The coincidence of timing was extraordinary in that ships of the US Navy attacked and destroyed a significant part of the Iranian Navy in a series of actions that took place within weeks of the Halabja massacre. While there were escalations by both Iran and the United States, the US Navy’s action and other intelligence aid to the Saddam Hussein regime undoubtedly curbed the advantage that Iran was gaining in the war, helping to pressure the Tehran regime into a ceasefire later in 1988. If Saddam Hussein’s dominant role in the Anfal campaign had been tried in open court, there is little doubt that much evidence would have been presented on the nature of the relationship of the regime to western states, especially the United States. That embarrassment was avoided by the sequencing of the trials and by the rapid implementation of the death penalty. The Insurgency Suicide bombs, kidnappings, torture and numerous murders prevailed throughout much of Iraq, especially in the greater Baghdad area, and December was also a month of singularly high US casualties. During the course of the month, 115 US military personnel were killed, the highest figure for over two years and the third highest figure for any month since the war began. Moreover, there were particularly high numbers of combat injuries, almost 650 in the four weeks to 27 December.1 For 2006 as a whole, the US forces suffered 824 people killed and 5,676 injured. The figures are very close to those for the previous year, but the figures disguise the deterioration in security in Iraq since circumstances have changed in two significant respects. The first is that for much of 2006, US forces were conducting fewer ground patrols and resorting much more to the use of air power. As such, fewer of their troops were at risk from roadside bombs and sniper fire. Secondly, personal and vehicle protection of US forces has improved immensely, especially the almost universal use of personal body armour,

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heavily armoured versions of the Humvee multi-purpose jeep, and the introduction of the Stryker armoured personnel carrier. Given these two developments, the reality during 2006 was that the insurgency actually became more intense, with a marked increase in individual attacks on US personnel.2 During the latter part of 2006 there was a strong tendency in Washington to portray the Iraq War as having made a transition from an insurgency against US and coalition occupying forces to an internal conflict with the foreign forces trying to keep the peace. This was a very long way from the real situation, but there is little doubt that this will be a theme that will be maintained in the coming months. At the same time, in the closing months of 2006 the Iraq War became an even bigger issue in US domestic politics, culminating in the reverses for the Republicans in the mid-sessional elections in early November.3 After Baker Last month’s briefing, After the US Elections, identified two significant features in the run-up to the publication of the Baker Report from the Iraq Study Group. One was the prepublication attempt by neo-conservative elements to rubbish the work of the Group in advance of publication,4 and the other was the manner in which these elements held on to their determination to maintain the administration’s forceful military stance in Iraq.5 In the event, the Baker Report got widespread publicity and there was an assumption that many of its main recommendations would be implemented. Instead, it became a nine-day wonder with virtually no concessions likely from the Bush administration. Of the many recommendations in the report, the two most significant were a slow but progressive withdrawal of US forces from Iraq accompanied by intensive efforts to improve and accelerate the training of Iraqi police

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and security forces, and engagement with both Iran and Syria. Neither of these was taken up by the administration. In the month following the publication of the report it became clear that the Bush administration was not just ignoring the report but was actually developing policy in the opposite direction to the recommendations. This was related to abundant evidence that neo-conservative analysts and opinion formers had retained considerable influence in the White House and that their views were coming to dominate the agenda. This might be surprising given the enthusiastic support from such quarters for the Iraq War, in spite of all the difficulties since encountered, but is probably a true indication of attitudes close to President Bush and, especially, around the office of Vice-President Cheney. The most common view of neo-conservative analysts is that it is essential for the United States to increase its forces in Iraq by around 30,000 troops and to maintain that high level for at least 18 months, rather than have a brief surge of around six months. The time difference is crucial, as a six-month surge could be maintained by re-ordering deployments through keeping some forces in place beyond their normal tours of duty and bringing other forces in early, essentially achieving the surge through overlap. An 18-month surge would require more rapid rotation of troops and the more intensive use of reservists, both likely to lead to further problems of morale.6 The neo-conservative view is, in one sense, an admission of failure for the war so far, in that what lies behind it is a recognition that US attempts to train Iraqi security forces have failed. It is worth remembering that this process, which has been under way for three years, was consistently seen as the main answer to Iraq’s problems. While US forces would remain in the country indefinitely, they would be largely confined to a few major bases with their numbers greatly reduced but serving as a final guarantor of security for a pro-American government. Most issues of security would be handled by the revitalised

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Iraqi army and police forces. This is now acknowledged to have been a failed policy, the recent British dismantling of a corrupt special police unit in Basra being just one small example of a much wider issue. Whatever the developments in US policy in Iraq, it is a domestic issue that will increasingly dominate policy in Iraq – the build-up to the 2008 Presidential elections. Until recently, the view remained within the Bush administration that Iraq was ‘winnable’ within the time frame of President Bush’s second term. That is now seen as a lost cause, and the policy over the next year or so is likely to be much more one of damage limitation. What is more likely is a sustained effort to damp down the extent of the violence without any real hope of developing a long-term solution. That will be a problem for Bush’s successor, but if the Iraq situation can be managed, if need be by an increase in troop levels, then that might at least help ensure that a Republican representative makes it to the White House in 2008.7 Warning Signs on Iran The second main issue in the Baker Report related to contact with Syria and Iran. Although there may be an increase in the low level informal contacts with the Tehran administration, and some attempt to engage with Syria, what is in prospect falls very far short of what was advocated by the Baker Report. Indeed, in the case of Iran, the indications are of a tougher policy. On US insistence, a potentially harsh UN Security Council resolution was passed, even though its full implementation would require the unlikely support of Russia and China. More significantly, the US Navy began to deploy a second carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea area.8 Meanwhile the Ahmadinejad government went ahead with its inflammatory ‘Holocaust Denial’ conference and also used news of the US Navy’s deployment to encourage

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domestic support at a time of student disturbances and a more general decline in popularity. Its response to the UN Security Council’s resolution was to announce an increase in the pace of its uranium enrichment programme. The possibility of US military action against Iran has declined in recent months, although an unexpected crisis is always possible. At the same time, the risk of Israeli action has increased. Within Israel, the government remains troubled after the failures in last summer’s Lebanon War, and there is a possibility of further action in Lebanon this year, not least because of the crucial need to maintain Israel’s posture of deterrence through overwhelming conventional defence capabilities. The issue of Iran, though, is even more deepseated, and it may be that circumstances will dictate 2007 as being the most appropriate year for military action. This is based on three calculations. The first, and most fundamental, is that Israel remains dedicated to the policy of not allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Secondly, any action against Iran is best taken when a broadly sympathetic administration is in place in Washington. If the Bush administration is assessed as being in terminal decline in a few months’ time, and has moved into the status of a true lame duck presidency, then it makes sense to take action against Tehran in the next few months. Finally, the Ahmadinejad government is something of a ‘gift’ to the Israelis, making it potentially easier for them to argue the necessity of taking action. This is not just pure politics – the ‘Holocaust Denial’ conference has struck a very raw nerve within Israel, and would make domestic support for military action very strong indeed. The fact that the Ahmadinejad government might not be averse to being subjected to Israeli military action, on the grounds that it would be a powerful unifying force within Iran, makes the risk of a confrontation more likely still.

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It is in this context that US military developments may be particularly significant. If, in the early months of 2007, the United States maintains two carrier battle groups in the region and also boosts its forces in Iraq, this gives it greater immediate military potential in the region at a time of a possible crisis with Iran. This does not mean that direct US involvement in Israeli action against Tehran is likely. What it does mean, though, is that the Pentagon would expect that any Iranian response to Israeli military action would be directed partly at US forces in the region. With increased capabilities, the United States would be in a better position to respond. All of this means that the attention inevitably being placed on Iraq may just be misplaced, with Iran being the more important focus in the coming months.

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10 A Surge in Two Wars? – January 2007

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n Iraq a surge in US ground forces is under way, with this accompanied by a substantial increase in the naval presence in the Gulf. In Afghanistan, coalition forces are being increased, although not to the level demanded by some senior officers. In both regions of war there is expected to be an increase in the level of conflict in the coming months, although a new conflict with Iran could develop and even overshadow the existing wars. Iraq

In the first ten days of the New Year there appeared to be a marked downturn in the level of US casualties in Iraq, with very few deaths. This may have been an aberration or may have resulted from a pause in the level of patrol activity. Whatever the reason, it did not last, with 84 US military personnel killed during the course of the month and over 500 injured.1 A trend of particular concern was the increased effectiveness of attacks on helicopters in spite of all of the many defensive measures introduced in the past four years. Four helicopters crashed within a fortnight, all of them due to ground fire amid suspicions that insurgents may have acquired supplies of more advanced anti-aircraft weapons, possibly shoulder-launched 77

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missiles. The Iraqi civilian casualties remained hugely greater than those of the coalition forces, with numerous suicide bombings, assassination attempts and other attacks. As the United States begins to increase its troop deployments in Iraq, there are issues relating to the size and duration of the deployments and, more importantly, to the tactics to be used to bring some degree of calm and stability to Baghdad. The reported surge amounts to 21,500 troops but what is not clear is whether these are additional combat troops or total numbers.2 If the former, then there would be expected to be substantial numbers of support troops as well. In Iraq in recent years, a combat brigade of around 4,000 troops has typically been supported by 5,500 other personnel, in which case the total surge could even be as high as 50,000, a number that would hugely stretch the Army and Marine Corps if it had to be sustained for more than six months. The administration has apparently indicated that the total is closer to 21,500, with an implication that support personnel already in place in Iraq will also be there for the new troops as well as existing combat brigades. This will put other strains on the system, especially as the main purpose of the surge is to engage in a vigorous and sustained process of ‘seize, clear and hold’ across the greater Baghdad area. The appointment of General David Petraeus as US commander in Iraq is clearly seen within the Bush administration as pivotal, given his previous success with such tactics elsewhere in Iraq, albeit at the level of large towns rather than a singularly violent and complex metropolis. By the end of January it was reported that a total of 90,000 troops and police were being assembled for the operation, more than half of whom would be Iraqi with most of the soldiers being from Shi’a communities. It is expected that the operation to try and control the insurgency and inter-communal violence in Baghdad will take at least six months, but there are severe doubts that it will work. Recent reports in US newspapers

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from journalists embedded with US troops in Baghdad speak of a very widespread lack of faith in the plan, primarily at the level of the ordinary soldiers who have been engaged in patrols in recent weeks. Some senior officers are reasonably optimistic, but soldiers on the ground see it as a near-impossible task with two main obstacles.3 One is that previous operations of this kind may have had a short-term effect in controlling violence, but mainly because insurgents and other paramilitaries have just melted away into the urban background, waiting to return until the US troops have left. This time, the intention is to maintain a limited US military presence alongside substantial numbers of Iraqi police and soldiers, but many US troops on the ground simply do not regard these as reliable. The second obstacle is even more serious in that there are widespread doubts that the ordinary Iraqis caught up in the violence have any trust in the United States forces. This is partly because of the previous heavy use of force by the US military, with consequent civilian casualties, and partly because the violence is so widespread that there is simply no faith that it will get better. This, in particular, makes it highly unlikely that ordinary Iraqis will come forward with intelligence about insurgents – the risk of reprisal is just too high. The dilemma for the US forces is that this predicament runs directly against most theories of successful counter-insurgency, in that the population concerned has to be ‘with’ the counterinsurgency forces. There may have been some elements of this in individual towns in Iraq on some occasions in the recent past but it is not at all clear that this can apply to Baghdad. Counterinsurgency analysts tend to the view that such operations are 80% political and 20% military. For most of the past four years the approach has been the opposite, and the levels of violence are now such that a concentration on the political process may not even be possible.

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One of the most significant publishing events during January was the release of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) from the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), an assessment that draws on all the major US intelligence agencies. The NIC supports the Director of National Intelligence, the head of the intelligence community, and the National Intelligence Estimates are described by the NIC as ‘the most authoritative written judgements concerning national security issues. They contain the coordinated judgements of the Intelligence Community regarding the likely course of future events.’ The key judgement of the January NIE is worth quoting in full: Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.

It is possible that the current surge will bring calm and stability to Baghdad and that a more inclusive approach from the Iraqi government will begin the protracted and difficult task of reconciling the major confessional groups, but current circumstances suggest that this is unlikely and that the NIE fear of a further deterioration is more realistic. If that does happen, then a US option would be to withdraw most of its forces from the cities to the major bases, even if this meant that a civil war developed while the more concentrated US presence ensured a continuation of the anti-occupation insurgency. This would also mean that Iraq would retain its status for the wider alQaida movement as a jihadist combat training zone – overall an extremely unstable situation with immense human costs. This may be the longer-term consequence of the refusal of the

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Bush administration to engage with the recommendations of the Baker–Hamilton Commission. Afghanistan Although not widely reported in the western media, violence in Afghanistan has continued throughout the winter. While heavy snowfalls have affected the ability of Taliban and other paramilitary groups to move between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the incidence of suicide bombings, roadside bombs and other attacks on NATO forces and Afghan government groups and individuals was unusually high during January. The British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) in its invaluable monthly reviews, has reported on developments in recent months (www.baag.org.uk). In its January 2007 edition it quoted the senior US commander in the country, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, in his assessment that from 2005 to 2006, suicide attacks had increased from 27 to 139, roadside bomb attacks from 783 to 1,677 and attacks involving light arms had almost tripled from 1,558 to 4,542. BAAG also reported six particularly costly suicide bomb attacks in January – including one at ISAF’s Camp Salerno base in Khost that killed eight people including two Afghan police officers, and another at an army base near Herat airport in north-west Afghanistan that killed three Afghan soldiers and two civilians. The Herat attack was of particular concern since it was so far distant from the usual areas of paramilitary action. Foreign military operations in Afghanistan have two separate components. The majority of the forces, over 30,000 troops, make up NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which is intended to promote stability across most of the country excluding some eastern and south-eastern districts close to the Pakistan border. While much of the emphasis has been on reconstruction, significant ISAF elements in Helmand

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and Kandahar provinces have been involved in violent counterinsurgency operations against re-invigorated militias, mostly Taliban. British, Canadian and Dutch forces have been mainly engaged, alongside US units, but ISAF as a whole has frequently sought to engage with local communities. This has even included Helmand Province where British forces have negotiated some partially successful local peace deals in the north of the province. In addition to ISAF, there is the separate Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, led and largely resourced by the United States, with elements of the US Army’s 10th Mountain Division making up much of the combat force. This command’s operation in the Pakistani border areas of Afghanistan has been singularly robust in recent years, with frequent use of air strikes and large numbers of civilian casualties. Relations between the US leadership of CSTC and senior military officers in ISAF have not always been good, with tensions arising as a result of US tactics. It is common knowledge that some senior British officers, for example, regard it as appropriate to negotiate with local community leaders, even if such people have links with Taliban elements. For the United States, on the other hand, the military culture tends to militate against such discussions, primarily on the grounds that this amounts to negotiating with terrorists. There is a general acceptance that the Taliban and other militias will substantially increase their activities in the coming months, with what amounts to a spring offensive, especially in Kandahar and Helmand provinces but even including Kabul as well.4 The United States has already announced an increase in its security assistance. Following a visit from the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, on 16 January, an additional $8.6 billion was announced for security operations, and 3,200 US troops had their tour of duty extended for a further four months.5 Perhaps the most significant development of all in terms of the months ahead was that the command of ISAF was due

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to change at the beginning of February, with General Dan McNeill of the United States commencing a one-year period of command in place of the outgoing British Commander, General David Richards. General Richards has been credited with overseeing a substantial expansion of ISAF and, with it, an unexpected increase in counter-insurgency operations. He was also credited with allowing some of his commanders to negotiate the local peace deals, and one of the most important questions is whether General McNeill will continue with such policies. While he has said that this will be the case, and he is finally answerable to NATO member states and not just the Pentagon, he previously commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2002–03 when there were numerous uses of air power, and is believed to take a more robust and singleminded view than General Richards. A further complication concerns the position across the border in Pakistan, where Taliban and other paramilitaries have had a high degree of freedom of operation as a consequence of the Pakistani Army’s substantive withdrawal from control operations in border districts, especially North and South Waziristan. The regime leader in Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, has strongly criticised Afghan officials who have blamed Pakistan for allowing Taliban activity in the border districts, saying that the centre of the Taliban revival is in Afghanistan, albeit with some support in Pakistan. The Pakistan government has announced plans to fence off the Afghan–Pakistan border to help control Taliban movements but this has been criticised in Kabul on the grounds that it would not be effective and would also involve the fencing of areas where there were disputes over the line of the frontier. For now, Pakistan intends a limited fencing operation in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, but few analysts expect this to have much effect. In a more general sense, the most important factors in the coming months will be the extent of the Taliban offensive

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and whether the ISAF forces under General McNeill seek to maintain a policy that can include local negotiations, or whether they will opt for a more robust counter-insurgency approach. If it is the latter, then substantial tensions within NATO could emerge. Persian Gulf Military Build-up Finally, the naval build-up in the Persian Gulf continued in the latter part of January, with the carrier battle group centred on the USS John C. Stennis en route to the region to back up the existing carrier battle group. A third carrier battle group centred on the USS Ronald Reagan, left San Diego for the West Pacific on 27 January, with the potential to move on to the Indian Ocean. In a separate development, a powerful Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) centred on the large amphibious warfare ship the USS Bataan transited the Suez Canal on 30 January, also heading for the Gulf to join an existing ESG centred on the USS Boxer. Even without additional units that might be moved into the region, this already amounts to a very large naval deployment, certainly the largest for nearly four years. The amphibious warfare ships are particularly relevant because they hardly relate to the situation in Iraq, given that the Iraqi seaboard on the Persian Gulf is under the control of coalition forces. They would, though, be highly relevant to any confrontation with Iran, since they give the United States the capacity to engage in a wide range of actions against Iranian naval and revolutionary guard units on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea coasts. The US military build-up does not necessarily mean that a war with Iran is imminent.6 It does mean that the United States is deploying substantial forces to the region and that these forces are highly appropriate should a conflict with Iran develop in the coming months.7

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11 Environment and Development: The Underlying Global Issues – February 2007

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here was an intense focus on Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan during the course of February, with the US surge in Baghdad getting under way at the same time as a substantial British withdrawal from Basra was announced.1 Although the US reinforcements in Baghdad had an immediate effect in curbing criminality, by the end of the month the incidence of mortar attacks and roadside bombs had returned to the previous level.2 Both US and British military reinforcements are planned for Afghanistan, with a visit from the US Vice-President, Dick Cheney, to the military base at Bagram, outside Kabul at the end of the month, coinciding with a suicide bomb attack on the base.3 Iran defied a UN Security Council resolution over its uranium enrichment plans, but there were also reports towards the end of the month about internal criticisms of President Ahmedinejad’s rhetoric. Meanwhile, US military forces continued to increase in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, with two aircraft carrier battle groups and two amphibious strike groups present in the region for the first time in several years.4 Even so, three other immediate issues were relevant – developments in North Africa, Somalia and Thailand, as 85

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well as some evidence of an al-Qaida re-grouping in western Pakistan. More generally, though, concern about global security trends that are far more substantive than the immediate ‘war on terror’ received a substantial boost as a result of two reports on issues that are not normally linked together by analysts – socio-economic divisions and environmental constraints. Somalia, Tunisia and Thailand In January, an internationally-supported Ethiopian force evicted the Islamist movement from power in Mogadishu, Somalia, even though the Islamic Courts group had brought a high degree of order to the capital after years of disorder and chaos. That movement was seen by the United States, in particular, as far too close to international jihadist organisations, and US military forces conducted operations against groups in Somalia said to have links with the al-Qaida movement. These operations included air strikes mounted from an air base in Ethiopia, and Special Force units crossing the borders into southern Somalia from both Kenya and Ethiopia. Neither of the expectations of the twin operations – evicting the Islamist movement and terminating al-Qaida activity in Somalia – have been fully met. Although US sources cite the disruption of al-Qaida groups, a number of the key leaders have escaped, including two people implicated in the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. In terms of removing the Islamic Courts group from power, the expectation was that Ethiopian forces would, in due course, be replaced by a peacekeeping force drawn from a number of African countries. This would provide a seamless change while maintaining security, especially in Mogadishu, and allowing the newly installed transitional Somali government to take control. This has simply not happened. Ethiopian troops have begun to withdraw, not least because the regime in Addis Ababa is

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only too well aware that the long-term presence in Somalia of troops from what is seen as a Christian country is only too likely to result in a reaction to a foreign occupation.5 The problem is that those African states that appeared to be willing to provide peacekeeping troops are lacking either in capability or political will, especially as the security situation in Mogadishu is declining sharply. By the end of February there were reports of major clashes between government troops and diverse groups of insurgents in the city, leading to large numbers of refugees leaving for rural villages.6 In Tunisia, meanwhile, evidence has emerged of the evolution of radical Islamist paramilitary groups in a country that has been largely regarded as distant from most such problems. In late January there was a major counter-terrorism operation mounted by the authorities that is reported to have disrupted a group planning attacks on the US and British embassies. Although evidence is sparse, the indications are that the Tunisian group formed part of a regional development centred on the Algerian GSPC (an abbreviation for the French title of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) that claimed responsibility for a series of seven bomb attacks against police stations in eastern Algeria.7 The GSPC is seen as collaborating with the al-Qaida movement which has itself been revitalised by the withdrawal of most Pakistani army units from some key border areas adjoining Afghanistan. Not only is al-Qaida in a position to re-establish training camps, it is now in a position to lay claim to firm links with North African paramilitary groups. Given the frequent transit opportunities between several North African states and southern European states such as Spain, France and Italy, this provides al-Qaida supporters and their associates other links into Europe in addition to the Pakistan–UK link. In addition to its developing links with groups in North Africa, the al-Qaida movement retains looser connections with the separatist movement in southern Thailand. This has

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claimed around 2,000 lives in the past three years, and a tough policy of military control that was in place until five months ago had appeared to be largely counter-productive. After a military coup five months ago, a surprising change of policy brought in the possibility of a more conciliatory approach but this has so far failed to have any effect, with separatists maintaining high levels of intimidation and violence.8 There is therefore a risk that the authorities will return to a more repressive approach. If the conciliation efforts are maintained they will require persistence and some courage, requiring years of effort. The separatist movement has its origins in Thailand’s annexation of the southern province with their Islamic majority a century ago, and the repression of recent years will take substantial time to heal. Climate Change and Security Although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan inevitably cause the greatest immediate concern, the most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published earlier this year, is a strong reminder that much larger issues of global insecurity cannot be ignored. Furthermore, it has come at a time when there are clear indications of a widening of the global socio-economic divide, with the combination of the two – marginalisation and environmental constraints – likely to be a dominant feature of insecurity over the next few decades if current trends are not reversed.9 The IPCC report provided a high degree of consensus among participating scientists and their governments and was the strongest international statement so far about the trends and their causes. Although the degree of consensus was impressive, it was made possible by a willingness of many of those involved to accept a wording and an analysis that was safe to the extent that it was almost impossible to refute. The problem with this approach, for all its value, is that it is likely to be an

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underestimate of the sheer scale of the problem. In particular, it does not fully cover particular trends, involving forms of positive feedback, that are thought by many climate specialists to be highly important. One of these is the impact of melting sea ice in the Arctic regions, especially in the north-east Atlantic.10 As the sea ice melts, so the loss of the reflective ice to darker seas means that the absorption of solar radiation increases. This in turn leads to a further melting of the ice, speeding up the whole process. A second issue concerns the melting of the permafrost, a phenomenon that is being seen across much of the near-Arctic. Dead vegetation that may have been frozen for many thousands of years is now tending to thaw out and then decompose. In doing so, it releases gaseous products of decomposition including carbon dioxide and methane. The quantities of carbon dioxide, the most common of the greenhouse gases, may not be huge, but the methane releases could be highly significant, given that methane is a far more effective gas at absorbing solar radiation than carbon dioxide. In global terms, it is apparent that the greatest impact of climate change is currently being felt in polar and near-polar regions. If this process accelerates, partly through permafrost decay, then positive feedback will kick in to further accelerate it. In security terms, though, one of the major developments in climate change research in recent years has been the recognition that climate change will affect the tropics much more than had previously been anticipated. While the effects will be felt through the increased violence of tropical storms and through sea level rises, the most important will come as a result of changes in rainfall patterns, with a tendency for more rain to fall over the oceans and north/south temperate and polar regions and less over the tropical land masses including Amazonia. Any partial ‘drying out’ of the tropics will have two impacts. In environmental terms there is likely to be a further destruction of tropical rainforests, including the incidence

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of wildfires, in turn releasing more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. In human terms, though, there will be the even more important effect of decreasing the ecological carrying capacity of tropical croplands, on which billions of people depend for food. While richer states may be able to cope, the great majority of southern states will find it very difficult.11 Socio-economic Divisions It is in this context that a report from the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), a part of the United Nations University, is so significant. WIDER’s work looks at the global distribution of household wealth and finds that: While the richest 10% of the adults of the world own 85% of global household wealth, the bottom half collectively owns barely 1%. Even more strikingly, the average person in the top 10% owns nearly 3,000 times the wealth of the average person in the bottom 10%.12

There are also remarkable regional variations, with three areas – North America, Europe and the rich Asia-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand) – accounting for 88% of household wealth. While it is true that countries such as India and China are experiencing rapid economic growth, the great majority of that growth is concentrated in a minority of the populations of such countries. This does much to explain the often violent social reactions now being experienced in both countries. In India, neo-Maoist Naxalite rebels are now active in a third of states and China has experienced thousands of riots and other expressions of discontent, even if few are covered in the Chinese or the international media. Current socio-economic divisions are markedly more extreme than forty years ago, with a global elite community of around 1 billion people enjoying remarkable increases in wealth

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while the great majority remain on the economic margins. Moreover, this marginalised majority is better educated and more literate than in previous decades and has access to far superior communications. Knowledge of such marginalisation is far greater, leading not to a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ that was a feature of the consumer society of industrialised countries in the 1960s and 1970s, but a potential revolution of frustrated expectations. Although the effects of the divisions may frequently be felt in the increased crime rates of large urban areas, there may also be the evolution of various radical social movements, with the Naxalites and Nepalese Maoist rebels being particular examples. Beyond that, there is a high expectation of much greater migratory pressures as people seek a higher standard of living in the face of declines in their own economic well-being. Countries in Western Europe, North America and the wealthy parts of the West Pacific are reacting with vigour to what is widely seen as a threat – the term ‘economic migrant’ now becoming almost a term of abuse. Australia’s robust treatment of boat people, the US decision to fence off a large part of the border with Mexico and Southern European resistance to migration from North Africa are all examples of this trend. The problem is that there is now every sign that climate change, in combination with the widening socio-economic divide, will lead to far greater migratory pressures and more radical social movements, with attempts to curb such developments only likely to make them worse. The scale of the potential problem is immense. Some analyses suggest, for example, that migratory pressures might increase tenfold by the middle of the century, producing social disruption that can simply not be controlled by traditional measures of imposed security. The alternative will be to develop fundamentally different approaches to security that are essentially sustainable and see the narrowing of the socio-economic divide and the control of

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climate change as essential features of a new security posture. Indeed, these will need to have a very much higher prominence than traditional reliance on military control. It is an approach to be examined in a forthcoming book from Oxford Research Group, Beyond Terror: The Truth About the Real Threats to Our World, to be published in April. Whether the development of the idea of ‘sustainable security’ can be furthered sufficiently rapidly to make a major difference in the next decade or so remains open to question, but both the WIDER report on wealth and poverty and the new IPCC report on climate change are powerful reminders of the urgent need for such new thinking.

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12 Iraq Options and US Politics – March 2007

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y the early part of 2007, the results of the 2006 midsessional elections to Congress were beginning to have a substantial political effect in the United States. The Democrats in both Houses of Congress were seeking to link military expenditure to a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq and the Bush administration was beginning to use such policies to blame the Democrats for limitations on the conduct of the war. Given that the administration had rejected the recommendations of the Baker–Hamilton Commission and was proceeding to reinforce the US military commitments in Iraq, this meant that developments in that country would be of central political importance in the United States as the 2008 Presidential election campaign began to take shape. Africa and the ‘War on Terror’

While the main international security focus in March was on Iraq, two developments in Africa were also relevant. In Somalia, the month saw a considerable upsurge in the levels of violence, with the end of the month being a period of intense conflict in Mogadishu.1 Following the defeat of the Islamic Courts movement by Ethiopian forces supporting a government in exile, there had been a hope that a transitional 93

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government, aided by peacekeeping troops from Uganda and other African countries, would restore a semblance of order. This has not happened. Instead, the Ethiopian presence has had an unexpected unifying effect, with many clan groups in and around Mogadishu uniting in a quasi-nationalist mood of opposition. A heterogeneous force of rebels, that may be led in part by Islamic Courts elements, has been engaged in bitter conflict that is, according to the Red Cross, at its highest level in 15 years. The fighting has involved Ethiopian use of helicopter gunships against targets in the crowded city, leading to substantial civilian casualties, but the Ethiopians have also had serious losses, not least through the shooting down of a helicopter. An underlying problem is that the head of the transitional government, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, is seen both as too close to the Ethiopians and also very much associated with a single Somali clan, the Darod, rather than truly representative of Somalia as a whole. A wider issue is that Ethiopia is seen to be acting on behalf of the United States, making it possible for Islamist groups to represent the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia as part of a wider ‘crusader’ action. For many Somalis, the view is that the Islamic Courts movement did at least bring relative peace to the country for a few months last year, yet it has been ousted with United States support as part of the ‘war on terror’. This underlying theme, whether accurate or not, may make it very difficult for Ugandan and other forces to bring stability in the coming months. More generally, the concern of the United States with security in Africa has resulted in a decision to establish an entirely new unified military command covering most of the continent.2 Africa Command (AFRICOM) will parallel the development of Central Command (CENTCOM) which developed from the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force. This, in turn, had been set up at the end of the 1970s at a time of substantial concern in the United States over the security of

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Persian Gulf oil reserves. CENTCOM was responsible for US operations in the 1991 Iraq War and, more recently, for regime termination and subsequent operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. AFRICOM will be established as sub-Saharan Africa becomes increasingly significant as a source of oil and other strategic minerals. It parallels China’s increasing involvement in the continent, especially in Sudan.3 While China has little military capability in terms of involvement in Africa, it has increasing economic links in many countries, with these causing concern in Washington.4 Furthermore, the Bush administration regards North Africa and some countries in the Sahel region as being major areas for increased activity from al-Qaida affiliates.5 The Iraq Surge While the security of African strategic resources may be considered important to the United States, they do not match the importance of Gulf oil, and the situation in Iraq remains of far greater concern. The most recent policy development following the rejection of the Baker–Hamilton Report is the reinforcing of the US military presence with the addition of five brigade combat teams concentrated in the greater Baghdad region. The aim is to bring greater security to the city, working with Iraqi security forces and then moving on to other parts of central and northern Iraq. The reinforcements are being phased over the period February–June and there have been two immediate results, a decrease in communal violence in parts of Baghdad, but an increase in insurgent activity in other parts of Iraq. The end of the month, in particular, was marked by intense violence involving the deaths of around 200 people in Tal Afar, a northern city which was reported to have been brought under US control in intensive military operations over a year ago. Furthermore, US casualties have remained at a high

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level, with 82 military personnel killed and over 550 wounded during March.6 It is possible that the surge will have its intended effect, but the prospects do not look positive at present, yet there does not appear to be an alternative plan being considered by the United States.7 Two years ago, in the spring of 2005, there was a questioning of US policy and some analysts discussed a range of options. These were discussed in an earlier briefing in this series (US Options in Iraq, May 2005), and it is relevant to re-examine them in the light of current circumstances.8 US Options in Iraq Elections in Iraq in January 2005 were intended to bring an interim administration to power that would hold office until the end of the year while a constitution was agreed. There were hopes that the elections would serve as a clear sign that some degree of control was being gained by Iraqis and that this, in turn, would lead to a curbing of the violence. Similar hopes had been expressed on previous occasions, including the deaths of Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, in Mosul in July 2003, the detention of Saddam Hussein himself five months later and the replacement of Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority by an appointed Iraqi administration in June 2004. None of these developments had diminished the insurgency, and the January 2005 elections were immediately thrown into some disarray by the failure of the political parties to agree an administration, leading to a three-month stalemate. Even so, there was some decline in the violence around the time of the elections themselves although there were indications that this was due to intensive security operations mounted by coalition forces. In the event, this was short-lived. In May, US casualties were 80 killed and over 500 wounded, and Iraqi casualties, which were mostly civilians, were 550 killed and many more hundreds wounded. The US losses were the worst

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since the assault on Fallujah five months before, and gave rise to serious considerations of a change of tactics. At that time, and given the reality of a developing insurgency, four outcomes were suggested. 1) Insurgents defeated The insurgency would be brought fully under control within a year through a combination of US military successes and increasingly effective Iraqi security forces leading to a peaceful Iraq under the control of a government friendly to the United States. Even if this were to happen, there would be a long-term US military presence at a small number of large bases, with this presence ensuring the stability of the pro-American Iraqi government. Such an outcome would certainly bring a marked degree of peace and stability to Iraq, but would also provide a basis for continued operations by paramilitaries opposed to a US presence in the region. Supporters of the al-Qaida movement, in particular, could well be invigorated by such an outcome. The actual situation two years later is that the intensity of the insurgency has grown, not diminished, the insurgents have been able to develop many new techniques and tactics, often faster than the US forces can counter them, and there is a remarkably ‘flat’ insurgency command structure that is extremely difficult to counter. Reliable reports suggest that as many as 20,000 insurgents have been killed and 27,000 are in detention, yet the insurgency is sufficiently robust to be able to withstand such losses. Furthermore, sectarian violence has increased substantially, with civilian casualties due to the insurgency and sectarian violence reaching up to 3,000 deaths a month. Close to 4 million Iraqis are now refugees, with most of them seeking refuge outside of Iraq. Many of them are professionally qualified people essential to the development of the country.

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2) Re-deployment of US forces A second outcome considered possible in early 2005 was the re-deployment of US forces to a few major bases, with a decrease in numbers to about 60,000–80,000. While this might limit the anti-American elements of the insurgency, it would also involve leaving the cities to look after themselves, even if Iraqi government security forces could not cope. The US strategy would be focused on securing strategic oil resources and also controlling the borders, especially those with Syria and Iran. Two years later it is evident that aspects of this approach were indeed tried during 2005 and early 2006. While there were no major troop withdrawals, there was a very strong tendency to rely more heavily on operations involving helicopter gunships and fixed-wing strike aircraft, while decreasing the number of ground patrols. This was seen as necessary in spite of improvements in the armour of patrol vehicles, including the large-scale introduction of the new Stryker heavilyarmoured personnel carrier. Three factors operated against this approach. One was that the use of such heavy air-based firepower inevitably led to many examples of heavy civilian casualties, given that most of the operations were conducted against heavily populated urban areas. Such casualties, apart from the direct human cost, resulted in an increase in the bitterness directed towards US forces. A second was that the Iraqi security forces were wholly inadequate in providing stability, with a marked increase in violence during 2006. Finally, some insurgent groups proved adept at targeting helicopters, with the first two months of 2007 being particularly difficult for the US forces. Overall, the ‘retreat to bases’ was only ever a partial process, but its lack of effect on the insurgency was sufficient to encourage the US military to look for alternatives.

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3) US withdrawal The third option would have been a withdrawal from Iraq, within a matter of months or a year at most, representing a complete change of policy. Although domestic opposition to the war was beginning to develop in early 2005, there was little prospect of such a comprehensive change of approach. President Bush had only recently won re-election, such a withdrawal would have been seen as a disaster in terms of prospects for a New American Century, and the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf were far too important to allow any serious restriction on US influence in the region. Two years later, and in spite of a surge in domestic opposition that was partly responsible for the Democrat victory in the Congressional elections, there remains little chance of a substantive withdrawal. For the time being, it is the ‘surge’ option that is being undertaken, and this will relegate talk of a withdrawal to the sidelines, at least for the next six months, unless there are extraordinary military reversals for US forces. 4) Endless insurgency The final option would have been an indefinite insurgency with neither the US forces nor the insurgents able to achieve a comprehensive victory. This appeared the most likely outcome in May 2005, and it remains so nearly two years later with the war entering its fifth year. The situation is massively complicated by the interweaving of the insurgency with sectarian conflict, and much of the current US surge is concerned as much with controlling such violence as defeating the insurgents. The tactics are in marked contrast to the recent approaches which have involved clearing particular towns or city districts with little subsequent effort to maintain control. In the current circumstances, US forces are due to remain at up to a hundred locations, initially in greater Baghdad, the intention being to maintain control while progressively handing over to Iraqi forces.

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This is strangely reminiscent of the situation three to four years ago, when there were many scores of US bases across central and northern Iraq, but there was subsequently a marked concentrating of US forces in much fewer bases. It is just possible that the current surge will have a different outcome, but it is frankly more likely that the outcome will be a continuing and bitter conflict. Prospects In the monthly briefing for May 2005, the main conclusion was that: Given current circumstances it is highly unlikely that the insurgency can be defeated within the next two to three years. Nor is it likely that there will be a fundamental change of policy by the Bush administration leading to an early withdrawal of all US forces from Iraq… What does have to be recognised, and is almost always ignored in current analyses of the conflict, is the underlying significance of the region’s immense oil reserves – two-thirds of the world’s total supplies and vital not just to the United States, Europe and Japan, but increasingly to China and India as well. This is the main reason why the United States will not leave Iraq, whatever the difficulties it faces, and it is for this reason that we face the prospect of decades, not years, of conflict.9

Even with the substantial shift in US public opinion, there is little likelihood of any change in policy in the next two years. Instead, the period up to the 2008 US Presidential election may well be marked by the direction of blame towards an inadequate Iraqi political leadership and an unpatriotic Democrat Party as it tries to curb military spending. At the same time, if the situation in Iraq deteriorates still further, and if the Republicans fail to gain the White House in 2009, it is now possible that a Democrat President could make really substantial changes during the initial honeymoon period. That does at least seem more likely than two years ago.

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hese monthly briefings started in May 2003, so the current briefing completes the first four years of the series. The emphasis has been on three main areas – the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the status and development of the al-Qaida movement, although the analyses have also sought to examine some more broadly based global issues such as socio-economic divisions and environmental constraints. Given the four-year collection of briefings it seems appropriate to draw a comparison with the current circumstances relating to two of the main areas of focus, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the situation as it was in early 2003. Iraq In May 2003, President Bush gave his ‘mission accomplished’ speech on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, wearing combat gear and having landed on the carrier in a Navy jet. Although the tenor of the speech was one of victory achieved, there were already signs of an insurgency developing. An estimated 3,000 civilians had been killed in the first three weeks of the war (although this figure was subsequently revised upwards) there were major problems of unexploded ordnance, especially cluster bomb sub-munitions, and there was rampant looting in the absence of any control of public order. What was of particular concern was that the US forces were hopelessly 101

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inadequate in terms of numbers to take control of the disorder and criminality, and most of the US troops had little or no training in such tasks, being focused on combat roles. At the same time, there were clear programmes being formulated for long-term US influence in Iraq as the Coalition Provisional Authority was established and plans were laid for the development of several large US military bases in strategically significant locations. There was to be little or no involvement of the United Nations in post-conflict reconstruction or aid for the development of political institutions – instead, US companies would oversee reconstruction, with Iraqi oil wealth being the main source of funding. It was also clear that the Iraqi economy would be developed in a very strongly orientated free market mode, with wholesale privatisation of state assets. One of the clearest indicators of this policy was the decision to appoint Dan Amstutz, a former senior executive of the world’s biggest grain exporter, Cargill, to oversee the transformation of Iraqi agriculture. As the then Policy Director of Oxfam, Kevin Watkins, put it at the time: ‘Putting Dan Amstutz in charge of agricultural reconstruction is like putting Saddam Hussein in charge of a human rights commission.’ The May 2003 Oxford Research Group briefing, After the War, attempted to sum up the situation in Iraq two months after regime termination: Overall, it is reasonable to say that the United States is in control of organised national political developments, is placing people in control of the two key aspects of the Iraqi economy, oil and agriculture, and is planning a long-term military presence. Whatever the approval of US forces for overthrowing Saddam Hussein, in Iraqi perceptions this very much has the look of replacing one regime with another. Moreover, the new regime, however it is formed, will be essentially seen as under the control of Washington which thereby gets to dominate the world’s second largest reserves of oil, thereby increasing its ‘own’ oil reserves by a factor of five.1

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Four years later, there has clearly been a political evolution within Iraq, with an elected parliament in session, but control of security is almost entirely down to well over 150,000 American forces and the Iraqi government is either unwilling or unable to undertake the political and legislative processes necessary to control the widespread sectarian violence. Moreover, an extensive insurgency has developed which has produced a degree of chaos and disorder across much of central Iraq that has exceeded most of the worst predictions of recent years. Even in the south of the country, the British forces are now starting to be withdrawn, with the admission that they are adding to the problems as a focus for opposition. As they withdraw from Basra, power is now in the hands of competing militias rather than central Iraqi government authority – the withdrawal is effectively a retreat in the face of failure, although this is not how it can be represented for public consumption in Britain.2 With a deteriorating security situation in Iraq in the latter part of 2006, the Baker–Hamilton Report in the United States recommended a phased withdrawal coupled with diplomatic overtures to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Tehran in order to try and minimise the evolution of sectarian conflict into a civil war. By the end of the year it was clear that the Bush administration had not accepted the report either in whole or in part. Instead, a ‘surge’ in military deployments was planned to start in February of this year, with around 30,000 additional troops to be brought into Iraq over the four months to June. The emphasis would be on dispersing troops into combat outposts in the most insecure parts of Baghdad. Putting US troops into numerous small garrisons was a reversal of the previous policy of consolidation of forces in a small number of large and very well protected bases, but was seen as essential to countering an insurgency that was deeply rooted in local neighbourhoods. It would enable an engagement with local communities and thereby bring a degree of security to the city

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while progressively handing over to Iraqi government forces. This would work in parallel with the Iraqi government putting into place institutions and legislation designed to counter the trend towards greater sectarian confrontation. Chapter 12 indicated that the surge was not yet having the effects expected, and the developments in the past month have tended to confirm this. During April, US forces lost 104 people killed and well over 500 wounded. While some parts of Baghdad became more peaceful, other parts were subject to intensive suicide bomb attacks. There was also evidence of insurgents moving their activities to other towns and cities away from Baghdad, reminiscent of the previous experience of major US operations.3 In the massive assault on Fallujah in November 2004, for example, the insurgency almost immediately re-focused on the city of Mosul, necessitating rapid US troop reinforcements to the city to regain control. A particular problem for the US troops deployed to small garrisons has been that insurgent groups have adapted to this by staging suicide bomb attacks against the garrisons. This has required the US units to put in strong fortifications and free-fire zones around the bases, making it much more difficult to engage with local communities. While this may enable US forces to defend the garrisons against truck bomb attacks, the insurgents have responded by adding armour to the trucks, requiring the US forces to deploy even tougher defensive measures, including anti-tank weapons, to the individual garrisons.4 It will be early June before the surge is completed, but plans are already being made by the Department of Defense to deploy these much higher troop dispositions for up to a year. It is fair to say that the US military leadership in Iraq has been cautious about the possibilities of success, in marked contrast to many neo-conservative commentators in Washington.5 This caution is being amply justified and it is now probably fair to conclude that the surge strategy is going to be no more successful than previous initiatives. Moreover, there has been minimal political

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progress, with the Iraqi parliament even planning a two-month summer recess, just as the US surge strategy moves towards full implementation. Afghanistan The long-predicted Taliban spring offensive continues to evolve but not in the manner expected. Moreover, there have also been some positive developments in other parts of the country. In northern and western Afghanistan there have been some significant improvements in health care. According to the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) review for April, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported some initial results of a health survey conducted by Johns Hopkins University that showed a decline in infant mortality rates from 165 per 1,000 live births in 2001 to 135 per 1,000 in 2006. This is still a very high figure, in tune with others of the world’s poorest countries, but the report also indicated an improvement in antenatal care from 5% of women in 2003 to 30% in 2006. These particular indicators also support other evidence of some improvements in development potential, away from the rather artificial booming economy of Kabul, but they also tend to give a false picture of the overall situation. Across much of southern and south-eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban revival continues, with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) conducting numerous high-profile operations in the areas of highest Taliban concentration. There have been indications of some Taliban reversals but these need to be treated with caution for two reasons. One is that April is one of the key months for harvesting opium poppies, and many paramilitaries concentrate on that activity. The other is that BAAG reports a substantial number of paramilitary attacks on Afghan government personnel, foreign aid workers and Afghan security forces. Close to 250 people were killed in such attacks

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during April alone, the indications being that paramilitary groups have tended to go for relatively ‘soft’ targets. Meanwhile, the overall reaction to the Taliban revival is taking two parallel directions. One is the marked tendency for the US forces to use heavy firepower against Taliban units, especially in the south-east of the country. These actions include military operations undertaken by US combat troops that are not part of the 37,000-strong ISAF force, and one of the results is a series of attacks that have killed many civilians, adding to the bitterness directed towards the US presence in particular.6 The other direction involves the possibility of negotiating with Taliban and other militia elements. This was used on a local scale by some British ISAF units in Helmand Province last year, and has also been an approach sometimes employed by Canadian and Dutch troops, although it does run against the tactics of the US forces who regard any kind of negotiation with paramilitaries as unacceptable. Even so, the Karzai administration in Kabul is also tending to favour informal talks with paramilitary groups, partly on the grounds that the Taliban are, in reality, made up of a coalition of different outlooks. What the Karzai administration does insist on, however, is in dealing with paramilitary groups that are essentially Afghan rather than from a Pakistani background, and the administration remains deeply critical of the Pakistani government and what is perceived as interference in Afghanistan. Although there are many uncertainties in Afghanistan, what is remarkable is the extent of insecurity in much of the country in contrast with expectations four or five years ago. It remains the case that the failure to provide an immediate peacekeeping and stabilisation force in 2001–02, coupled with the heavy military tactics subsequently used by US forces, allowed Taliban and other militia to regroup and acquire much public support. As a result, Afghanistan remains deeply insecure nearly six years after the original termination of the Taliban regime.7

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Al-Qaida At the end of April, five men were convicted in London of a 2004 plan to detonate fertiliser-based explosives, possibly targeting gas supplies, shopping centres or a nightclub. There was concern that the British Security Service (MI5) had failed to follow up a connection between some of the men and two other men involved in the 7/7 London bombing the following year. There was, though, a wider concern that the al-Qaida movement as a whole, however loose and dispersed it might be, is undergoing a substantial revitalisation. There appear to be several elements to this. One is the absence of Pakistani government control of frontier districts in the west of the country, providing a safe haven for al-Qaida and other paramilitaries. Another is the rise of al-Qaida-linked groups in North Africa and yet another is the belief that radicalisation of Muslim groups in countries such as Britain (from Pakistan), France (from North Africa) and Germany (from Turkey) may be developing much faster than appreciated.8 MI5 sources claim that the number of radical networks in Britain is growing exponentially, doubling every year since the start of the war in Iraq four years ago. The former head of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, said last November that there were 1,600 active militants in Britain, a figure recently revised upwards to 2,000. MI5 itself is undergoing a remarkable expansion, almost doubling the number of officers by 2008, and it has also established a series of joint regional ‘hubs’ with police forces. Both MI5 and the police are being given substantially more resources, and the situation in Britain, with the close links with Pakistan, is being watched closely by agencies in other European states. One major difference between political attitudes in Britain and most other European countries is that the British government is wholly unwilling to admit any connection between the war in Iraq and Islamic radicalisation among a fortunately very small

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proportion of young Muslims in Britain. While there are many other factors involved, including the ongoing conflict in Israel/ Palestine, the al-Jazeera effect of persistent coverage of civilian casualties and prisoner abuse, vigorous jihadist propagandising and a belief that Britain is inextricably linked to the ‘far enemy’ of the United States, it is still the case that the Iraq War is a consistent cause of anger among many young Muslims. There is no possibility of a change in government outlook during the term of office of Mr Blair, but it is certainly possible that an incoming Gordon Brown administration will speed up the British withdrawal from Iraq and insert a certain distance between London and Washington on the wider conduct of the ‘war on terror’. That in itself is unlikely to substantially diminish the risk of attacks in Britain, but it will certainly not make the situation worse.9 Environmental Issues The February briefing, Environment and Development, pointed to the interconnections between socio-economic divisions and environmental constraints, reporting on the most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). One of the features of that report was its relatively cautious assessment of the rate of change due to carbon emissions, an inevitable result of the need to maintain consensus from a very broad international perspective. The problem with that approach, whatever its advantages, is that it may underestimate the seriousness of the issue. Support for this view comes from a paper in the current issue of Geophysical Research Letters, assessing the rate of loss of Arctic sea ice. The 2007 IPCC report based estimates of this particular trend on an average of 18 climate change models, but actual measurements indicate that the rate of melting is about three times as fast as the IPCC report suggests. According to one of the authors, Julienne

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Stroeve of the University of Colorado, ‘We’re about thirty years ahead of what the models show.’ Most climate change studies now show that the rate of change is particularly high for the near-polar regions, much more so than for temperate or tropical environments. It is probable that the near-polar regions give us a strong early warning of global trends and the fact that the rate of ice melting is so much higher than predicted suggests that the whole process of global climate change is accelerating. If so, then talk of major cuts in carbon emissions to be achieved over a 40+ year time span are woefully inadequate. Much stronger political leadership, supported by a vigorous civil society, is going to be required very quickly indeed.10

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14 Choices

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he preceding chapter compares the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the strength of the al-Qaida movement, with four years ago, and this alone demonstrates that the situation with regard to all three elements did not improve during the 2006–07 period covered by this report. As Chapter 1 indicated, there are aspects both of the al-Qaida movement and of US security policy that suggest there will be a long drawn-out war, potentially lasting for decades unless there are major changes in policy by one or both sides. For the al-Qaida movement and its associates there will be quiet satisfaction at the further progress made over the past year and it is therefore highly unlikely that the movement will seek radically new directions. It therefore follows that it is the policy now being pursued by the United States and its coalition partners that is worth considering. The primary purpose of this chapter is to look at possible alternatives to current policy rooted in sustainable security, but it is first useful to review some aspects of the past year as covered in this report. Withdrawal or Surge One of the most striking aspects of this period is the marked contrast in the US military posture in Iraq in mid-2007 compared with mid-2006. As Chapter 2 identifies, there were strong indications from the US military and the Bush administration 110

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that there would be a progressive withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan during the course of 2006. While this was always dependent on the levels of security achieved there was some confidence that around 30,000 troops would be withdrawn, perhaps 25,000 from Iraq and the remainder from Afghanistan. This view was expressed with some vigour and it is by no means clear that it was based on any firm evidence of a military capability for withdrawal. It may more likely have been due to the need for the Bush administration to suggest progress in the run-up to the mid-sessional elections to the US Congress in November 2006. In the event, the late summer of 2006 saw a substantial increase in civilian casualties in Iraq (Chapters 5 and 6), partly due to the increase in sectarian conflict but also due to coalition military activities in the face of sustained insurgent attacks. Attacks on US forces intensified, a consequence being that by September 2006 there was very little discussion of troop withdrawals. Instead, there was much more emphasis placed on linking the Iraq insurgency with the wider al-Qaida movement. This followed the killing of the presumed leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in early June which was an occasion for intense administration commentary that he was a key figure in the entire insurgency. The focus on the al-Qaida movement’s involvement in Iraq was part of a wider process of linking all the many radical Islamic movements into a single enemy, a return to the rhetoric of early 2006, when the term ‘war on terror’ was being replaced by the ‘long war against Islamofascism’. This term embraced not just al-Qaida and associated groups but a range of jihadist paramilitary groups in Pakistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories and just about all of the diverse insurgent groups in Iraq. In view of the increasing opposition to the Iraq War being experienced in the United States, this approach appeared to have a political value whatever its basis in reality. Evidence

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suggests that the Iraq insurgency is a complex and dispersed phenomenon, without a single leadership and with multiple aims, with many groups having a minimal association with the al-Qaida movement (Chapter 3). Even so, there was a determined effort to represent the insurgency as almost entirely an al-Qaida endeavour, thereby linking the ongoing war in Iraq directly with the 9/11 attacks. While this was a particularly intense aspect of the US political scene in late 2006, it persists and has re-emerged more recently as a fundamental reason for supporting the current surge. That surge, involving at least 30,000 combat troops and support elements, has been the main feature of US policy in Iraq since January of this year. It follows the rejection of the Baker–Hamilton Report that advocated a reasonably rapid phased withdrawal from Iraq in parallel with extensive regional discussions. It is directly counter to the view from early 2006 that a partial military withdrawal was feasible. At the time of writing (August 2007) there is little sign of the surge having any marked effect on the level of the insurgency. There have been some indications of temporary declines in insurgent activity and sectarian conflict but the more marked tendency has been for insurgents to regroup away from areas of intense US military operations, moving back into particular areas when the US forces have moved on. Much of the policy behind the surge has been to provide enough US combat troops to clear areas of insurgents and then hand over to forces made up primarily of Iraqi troops. In many cases, however, these have been too few or too poorly trained and motivated for the tasks in hand. The January assessment by the US government in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate (Chapter 10) concluded that, in the coming 12 to 18 months, ‘the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006’. Although the al-Qaida movement may not be the dominant actor in Iraq, it is certainly the case that Iraq is of great value

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to the movement as a paramilitary combat training zone for young jihadists who may become a new generation of fighters available to support the movement’s aims. They would, in a sense, be comparable to the insurgents fighting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, except that their training is against well equipped and highly trained regular US soldiers and Marines operating in a largely urban environment rather than Soviet conscripts in a rural environment. This is therefore a training opportunity much superior to that of 1980s Afghanistan and more relevant to one of the al-Qaida movement’s main aims of terminating the unacceptable regimes of the ‘near enemy’ in the Middle East. A Question of Perceptions Iraq may be of great value to the al-Qaida movement but both Afghanistan and Pakistan are also useful in the pursuit of its aims. The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan (Chapter 13) means that Taliban and other militias are also acquiring experience against US troops, and in Pakistan the alQaida movement has established safe havens, training camps and many forms of logistic support, all available not just for operations in Afghanistan but for the wider regional and global aims of the movement. In parallel with this, the movement has extended operations in North West Africa (Chapter 11) and has also been boosted by the extensive use of force by the United States and Ethiopia against the Islamic Courts movement in Somalia. More generally, support for the movement, and opposition to the policies of the United States, has been persistently boosted by the coverage of events in Iraq and Afghanistan by professional satellite TV news channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, and by a much more propagandistic collection of websites and DVD/video production systems. Many of these throw up the extraordinary differences in outlook and

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perceptions in the United States and the Middle East. One very simple example illustrates this. In an incident in the Iraqi town of Baquba, a group of US soldiers engaged a group of insurgents in a particularly dangerous operation along the banks of the Tigris. Some of the insurgents were killed, and a US unit then tied the corpses of the insurgents to the front of their trucks as though they were trophies from a deer hunt and drove through the town past sullen onlookers. At first sight this would appear to be a callous and unnecessary show of force intended to intimidate the local population and ensure that they recognised the power of the US military and the futility of opposition. In all likelihood it would actually have had the opposite effect, further strengthening their support for the insurgents. Moreover, records of such an event, and others like them, are widely circulated throughout the Middle East and beyond, serving to convince supporters of the al-Qaida movement of the rightness of their cause. From their perspective this was just one more atrocity by a brutal superpower intent on crushing opposition and maintaining control of a major Arab country. All this may be a realistic accurate assessment of the impact, but it is also necessary to see the incident from the perspective of the US soldiers. They may well have been on their second or third tour of duty in Iraq and may have been tired, frustrated and quite possibly traumatised by the violence that they had both experienced and inflicted. Almost all of them would have believed that the termination of the Saddam Hussein regime was a fully justified response to the atrocities committed against their country in the 9/11 attacks, that the regime represented a direct threat to their homeland. Not only this, but they would have confidently expected to have been welcomed as liberators, freeing an oppressed people from a violent dictator. Instead, they found themselves confronting determined and faceless opponents capable of inflicting death and grievous injuries.

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These opponents were clearly to be seen as terrorists but they had much local support. Although body armour, expert battlefield medicine and casualty evacuation have prevented thousands of deaths among US military personnel in Iraq, there have been many thousands of serious injuries, principally involving the loss of limbs or major wounds to the face, throat and groin of young soldiers. It is probable that many of the soldiers who paraded those corpses would have seen friends suffering just such injuries. They were, in other words, immensely frustrated, angry and quite probably frightened, circumstances that do much to explain if not condone their extraordinary ‘trophy ride’. The overall issue is that both parties to this conflict have deep convictions as to the rightness of their cause. To the al-Qaida movement and its many associates, their particular version of Islam is the one true path and it is under threat both from corrupt regimes and from the immensely powerful ‘far enemy’ of the United States. Not only are they under attack, but their enemy, the United States, is allied with the Zionists in a systematic campaign to take direct control of the heartland of Islam and its valuable natural resources. Whatever the specific aims and motives of the leaderships of the movement this is a message that resonates powerfully not just across the Middle East but around the world. To the Bush administration and to many people in the United States, a fundamentalist, nihilist and thoroughly dangerous Islamic movement has staged a spectacular attack on the homeland and is threatening US security through seeking to control much of the Middle East and South-West Asia. This is a region of great importance to the United States, not least because of the requirement to ensure the security of Israel but also because of the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. The phenomenon of Islamofascism is potentially as serious as the Soviet threat at the height of the Cold War, especially if

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radical Islamists can at some stage acquire crude weapons of mass destruction. Alternatives As the war on terror moves towards its seventh year, there is a serious worry that none of the intended outcomes of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere have been achieved, yet there is no understanding of the deeply counterproductive nature of the conduct of the war. What is difficult for the proponents of current US policies to face is that suggesting alternatives is best served initially by recognising the mistakes so far. The more appropriate response to the 9/11 atrocities would have been to treat them as exercises in mass criminality, aiming to bring those behind the attacks to justice, however long it might take. Terminating the Taliban regime was of direct value to the al-Qaida movement, a circumstance made more valuable still by the failure to recognise that the security vacuum created in Afghanistan allowed for a subsequent renaissance in Taliban activities. Terminating the Saddam Hussein regime and occupying a major Arab/Islamic state was a further disastrous mistake, greatly adding to the anti-American mood across the region, increasing support for the al-Qaida movement and establishing a most valued jihadist combat training zone. Persisting with policies of mass detentions without trial involving many tens of thousands of people while allowing torture, prisoner abuse and rendition has further enhanced support for the movement and its associates. Uncritical support for Israel in its occupation policies and its war in Lebanon has been yet another factor in increasing opposition to the United States. Thus, when taken together, the manner and conduct of the war on terror has been persistently counterproductive to the interests of the United States and its close coalition partners.

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While there is no disputing the validity of conventional counter-terrorism actions in the face of the threat of mass casualty attacks, such actions have little chance of controlling the further development of the al-Qaida movement unless there is a fundamentally different approach developed that seeks systematically to undercut support for the movement. This involves analysing the aims of the movement, as discussed in Chapter 1, and countering them principally by political rather than military means. Even the use of conventional counter-terrorism measures must be nuanced, with an end to detentions without trial unless people are detained as prisoners of war under the terms of the relevant Geneva conventions. Prisoner abuse, torture and rendition have also to cease. Even if such practices may be common in parts of the Middle East this in no way gives the United States and its partners the right to do likewise. Furthermore, it is a constant source of propaganda for radical jihadist movements. In undercutting the reasons for the support gained by the al-Qaida movement, part of the responsibility lies with elite states across much of the Middle East – al-Qaida’s ‘near enemy’ – where corruption, appalling wealth distribution, scant regard for democracy and autocratic control of dissent are commonplace. At the same time, jihadist propagandising is greatly aided by the ability to link such regimes with western states, especially the United States. The very closeness of the linkages, not least with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, makes the process of connecting the near and far enemies very much easier. While the primary responsibility is internal to the countries concerned, sustained efforts by external allies would assist in breaking this connection while possibly initiating a period of evolving good governance. For more than forty years, the predicament of the Palestinians has been a running sore across the Middle East and beyond, with radical elements commonly recognising that regional elite

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regimes frequently point to that predicament as a diversion from their own domestic policies. More importantly, the remarkably close connection between Israel and the United States, especially the day-to-day cooperation between the Israeli Defence Forces and the US military in Iraq, is held as yet another reason for visualising Islam under ‘Crusader/Zionist’ attack. A just and equitable settlement of the Israel–Palestine conflict would massively undercut the appeal of radical jihadist groups such as the al-Qaida movement. Given that Iraq is achieving the extraordinary status of a combat training zone for jihadist paramilitaries, providing a boost for the al-Qaida movement that could have decades of potential, an early end to occupation is essential. To achieve this will require sustained cooperation with neighbouring regimes in Riyadh, Tehran, Ankara and Damascus. While there is a risk of increased violence, it is also the case that states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have strong vested interests in avoiding chaotic violence on their borders. Moreover, much of the violence stems directly from the occupation whereas without that, neither the Sunni minority nor the Shi’a majority within Iraq could maintain control and would have to reach an early political accommodation. The current emphasis on robust counter-insurgency operations by US forces in Afghanistan and, potentially even in West Pakistan, is a fundamental error, aiding support for Taliban and other militias. Given increased assistance, it is possible that Afghanistan can still make a transition to a stable and more peaceful country, but this will require a capacity to negotiate with militias that is conspicuously lacking among most elements of the US military if less so among some NATO contingents. All of these issues represent major changes in policy, primarily for the United States, but also for coalition partners such as the United Kingdom. They represent a broadly different approach in developing a security paradigm that is primarily political

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rather than military and is sustainable in the long term rather than responding to immediate events with considerable force. They take account of the very long timescales in which the alQaida movement is operating and recognise that the movement will be weakened not in a matter of months but over a number of years. In Chapters 1 and 2, some emphasis was placed on the significance of the energy resources of the Middle East as a primary motivation for the United States and some coalition partners to see their involvement in the region as having a military dimension spanning several decades. A sustainable security approach would recognise the political reality of such resources and of the need to diversify away from such a dependency. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 11, the key security issue of the impact of climate change provides an even greater imperative for curbing the oil addiction, moving rapidly to an era of energy conservation and a rapidly increased utilisation of renewable energy resources. Similarly, the other main global trend of increasing socioeconomic divisions demands not a ‘close the castle gates’ approach but an integrated response to those divisions embracing trade reform, debt cancellation and an intense commitment to sustainable development. Sustainable security is essentially about recognising the centrality of human communities and the requirement for states to cooperate in the face of common needs. It is a paradigm that is in its early stages of evolution but may develop rapidly in the face of the manifest failures of current approaches as demonstrated by the conduct of the war on terror.

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Notes

Introduction 1. Paul Rogers and Scilla Elworthy, The United States, Europe and the Majority World After 9/11, Briefing Paper, October 2001, Oxford Research Group, Oxford. 2. Paul Rogers, Iraq: Consequences of a War, Briefing Paper, October 2002, Oxford Research Group, Oxford.

Chapter 1 Turning Point 1. Paul Rogers, Into the Long War: Oxford Research Group International Security Report 2006, Pluto Press, London and Ann Arbor MI, 2007. 2. Ibid.

Chapter 2 Oil Security and the Iraq War 1. As in previous reports in this series, figures for Iraqi civilian casualties are drawn primarily from Iraq Body Count <www. iraqbodycount.net/> a non-governmental organisation that uses a rigorous checking system to determine individual casualties. While it almost certainly underestimates the full casualty figures it provides a robust minimum which is difficult to counter by those seeking to minimise the human costs of the war. The results of some surveys, and some Iraqi government figures, give much higher levels of casualties. 2. Figures for US military casualties given throughout this report come from Iraq Coalition Casualty Count <www.icasualties.org/ oif/>. Monthly figures for deaths are listed and weekly statistics for injuries are divided into two categories – those that return to duty within 72 hours and those that are more seriously wounded. Because of improvements in battlefield medicine and the rapid casualty evacuation of seriously wounded personnel, survival rates 120

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4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

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are much higher than in previous wars, but this does include many thousands of people who sustain serious injuries that may affect them for the rest of their lives. By July 2007, Iraq Coalition Casualty Count had recorded nearly 27,000 US casualties in the war. In addition, at least 20,000 people had been evacuated back to the United States for treatment for non-combat injuries or physical or mental illness. One of the reasons for the change in the domestic mood was the increased cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Congressional Research Service report published at the end of April 2006 estimating costs at $811 billion. See ‘US War Costs Could Hit $811 billion’, BBC News, 28 April 2006. When US Army engineers moved into Balad Air Base in 2003, they developed a 10-year plan to move from tents to air-conditioned trailers to permanent barrack blocks. See ‘Extended Presence of U.S. in Iraq Looms Large’, Associated Press, 21 March 2006. For a more detailed account of the development of US concern with oil security, and the evolution of the US security posture in the Persian Gulf, see Paul Rogers ‘Oil and Persian Gulf Security – The Context of Regime Termination’, chapter in Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers, The Political Road to War with Iraq, Routledge, London and New York, 2006. Part of the concern over Chinese influence was the growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an Asia-Pacific group much fostered by Beijing. See Wendell Minnick and Gopal Ratnam, ‘U.S. Warily Eyes Agenda of Shanghai Organization’, Defense News, Washington, 29 May 2006. ‘Hu in Saudi Arabia and Africa to Talk Oil’, Asia News, 24 April 2006 <www.asianews.it>. Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century, Oxford Research Group, Oxford, 2006.

Chapter 3 Spring Offensives in Two Wars 1. Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, ‘Zarqawi Helped U.S. Argument That Al-Qaeda Network Was in Iraq’, Washington Post, 10 June 2007. 2. Some analysts extend this to the view that Zarqawi was a liability to al-Qaida. By engaging in particularly brutal acts of assassination, including the videoed beheading of hostages, Zarqawi’s group was believed to be damaging the cause of the movement in Iraq. See Michael Scheuer, ‘Zarqawi’s Death an Opportunity for al-Qaeda’, Asia Times, 22 June 2006.

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3. Frederick Kagan, ‘Seize the Day: after Zarqawi’s death stay on the offensive’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 16 June 2006. 4. By late June the situation in Baghdad had deteriorated sufficiently for a state of emergency and curfews to be declared. See Sinan Salaheddin, ‘State of Emergency Declared in Baghdad’, Associated Press, 24 June 2006. 5. Over a three-month period to mid-June, US military forces carried out 340 air strikes in Afghanistan compared with 160 in Iraq. One of the strategies was to deploy B-1B bombers on loitering missions for many hours at a time over central Afghanistan, supported by aerial refuelling, enabling them to be deployed rapidly in response to requests from US ground forces. See Thomas E. Ricks, ‘U.S. Airstrikes Rise in Afghanistan as Fighting Intensifies’, Washington Post, 18 June 2006. 6. Declan Walsh, ‘Afghan Province to Provide One-third of World’s Heroin’, Guardian, London, 14 June 2006. 7. A complicating factor for US forces and for NATO in Afghanistan was the loss of support for the administration of President Hamid Karzai, beset by corruption and by being incapable of administering large parts of the country. See Pamela Constable, ‘Afghan Leader Losing Support’, Washington Post, 26 June 2006.

Chapter 4 A Third War 1. A further concern in the United States was that a plan to attack transit tunnels under the Hudson River in New York was uncovered. It was not clear how advanced this plan was, and some reports indicated a plan in its very early stages. Even so, it had a marked political effect, not least because the results would have been very substantial casualties in New York City. See Spencer S. Hsu and Robin Wright, ‘Plan to Attack N.Y. Foiled’, Washington Post, 8 July 2006. 2. Tom Coghlan, ‘Taliban Use Beheadings and Beatings to Keep Afghanistan’s Schools Closed’, Independent, London, 11 July 2006. 3. There were early indications of a record opium poppy crop. See Jason Motlagh, ‘Afghanistan Reels Under Bumper Harvests’, Asia Times, 11 July 2006. A further complication has been the tendency for more raw opium to be processed into heroin and morphine within Afghanistan rather than exported as opium paste, this increasing the flow of illicit finance into the country. 4. Jim Muir, ‘Baghdad Security Plan Staggers On’, BBC News, 11 July 2006.

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5. Instead, the Baghdad security situation was so bad that further troops had to be deployed to the city. Peter Spiegel and Julian E. Barnes, ‘Troop Buildup in Baghdad Puts Withdrawal in Doubt’, Los Angeles Times, 28 July 2006. 6. The backing for Israel from neo-conservative sources in Washington was singularly robust, including calls for President Bush to travel to Jerusalem as a sign of solidarity. See, for example, William Kristol, ‘Bush Should Go to Jerusalem – and the U.S. Should Confront Iran’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 24 July 2006. 7. Edward Cody and Jonathan Finer, ‘Calls for Cease-Fire in Lebanon Intensify’, Washington Post, 24 July 2006. While there was particularly strong agitation from across the Middle East, Israel also experienced a pronounced loss of support from many governments across Europe. 8. Because of the Israeli infantry losses, there was caution in expanding the ground war, even if large numbers of reservists were called up. See Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, ‘Security cabinet okays mass callup of reservists but nixes expansion of south Lebanon operation’, Ha’aretz, Jerusalem, 28 July 2007. 9. See, for example, Dan Darling, ‘Israel’s Enemy is America’s: The Bloody History of Hezbollah’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 14 July 2006. 10. By the end of July, there remained strong opposition within Israel, as well as in Washington to an early ceasefire. See David Horowitz, ‘Analysis: The Later the Better for an International Force’, Jerusalem Post, 30 July 2006.

Chapter 5 The Lebanon Aftermath 1. For an analysis of the position facing British troops in Helmand Province, see ‘A Thin Green Line’, The Economist, London, 19 August 2006. 2. One of the most significant developments in Afghanistan was the use of tactics developed by insurgents against coalition forces in Iraq. This included the much more regular use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as suicide bombers. See Greg Grant, ‘Afghan Fighters Import Tactics Honed in Iraq’, Defense News, Washington DC, 31 July 2006. 3. Edward Wong and Damien Cave, ‘Iraqi Death Toll Rose Above 3,400 in July’, New York Times, 16 August 2006. 4. ‘US Beefs Up Baghdad Security’, Aljazeera.net, 6 August 2006. 5. A particular problem was that Iraqi security forces were still not regarded as reliable by the US military in spite of nearly three years of training programmes. See Michael R. Gordon, ‘Iraqi Soldiers

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6.

7.

8.

9.

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Refuse to Go to Baghdad, Defying Order’, New York Times, 29 August 2006. There was also evidence of divisions developing within the Olmert government over war strategy, with the Foreign Ministry particularly reluctant to endorse any increase in military operations. See Ze’ev Schiff, Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, ‘PM, Peretz at Odds Over Expanding Ground Assault’, Ha’aretz, Jerusalem, 8 August 2006. Yaakov Katz, ‘Analysis: Hizbullah Still Strong’, Jerusalem Post, 8 August 2006. Some Israeli analysts made the point that numerous army operations against poorly armed Palestinian militias in Gaza and the West Bank had lulled IDF personnel into a false sense of security, meaning that they were quite unprepared for the ability of well-trained, well-armed and highly motivated Hezbollah paramilitaries fighting on terrain that they knew well. What was particularly worrying to the IDF and the Israeli government was that extensive surveillance over the previous six years, including the widespread use of reconnaissance drones, had simply not indicated the level of preparedness achieved by the Hezbollah paramilitaries. Given the intensity of the fighting in the last few days of the war, there was some surprise that the ceasefire took hold and was maintained. In part this was seen as an indication of the high level of discipline present among the Hezbollah paramilitaries and a belief among the Hezbollah leadership that, from their perspective, the war had been a success and it was advisable to avoid further immediate conflict. See Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, ‘Tense Calm Across Lebanon as UN-Brokered Truce Takes Effect’, Ha’aretz, Jerusalem, 14 August 2006. Dafna Lizer, ‘Airliner Plot Had Support in Pakistan, Officials Say’, Washington Post, 12 August 2006.

Chapter 6 The Afghan Summer of War 1. A further issue was the remarkable use of area-impact munitions, especially cluster bombs, with 1,800 weapons fired dispersing 1.2 million sub-munitions. An estimated 500,000 failed to detonate, leaving behind what were effectively anti-personnel minefields. See Meron Rappaport, ‘IDF Commander: We fired more than a million cluster bombs in Lebanon’, Ha’aretz, Jerusalem, 12 September 2006. 2. Louise Roug, ‘Killings in Baghdad Escalate Over Past Week’, Los Angeles Times, 4 September 2006. 3. In contrast to reports earlier in the year of possible troop withdrawals in time for the November mid-sessional elections to Congress, by September that proposal had been replaced by the possibility of

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increased troop numbers. ‘General Says US May Increase Troops in Iraq’, Associated Press, 19 September 2006. Michael A. Fletcher, ‘Bush Warns of Enduring Terror Threat’, Washington Post, 6 September 2006. ‘Afghanistan’s Opium Production Jumps by Nearly 50 percent: UN’, Agence France-Presse, 2 September 2006. Carlotta Gall, ‘Attacks in Afghanistan Grow More Frequent and Lethal’, New York Times, 27 September 2006. The problems in Afghanistan formed part of a wider assessment, in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate, that the global alQaida movement was increasing in capability. See Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, ‘Sobering Conclusions Why Jihad Has Spread’, Washington Post, 27 September 2006.

Chapter 7 Insecurity in Iraq 1. Jim Krane, ‘Taliban Revival in Southern Afghanistan’, Associated Press, 7 October 2006; Ashfaq Yusufzai, ‘Taliban Back in Business in Border Areas’, IPS UN Journal, New York, 3 October 2006; Zia Intezar, ‘Hope Loses Out to Fear on Kabul Streets’, Terra Viva UN Journal, New York, 16 October 2006. For a monthly overview of the security and development situations in Afghanistan, see the Afghanistan: Monthly Review reports from the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, available at www.baag.org.uk/. 2. An indication of the internal tensions was that more than 40 people, mostly Air Force officers, were arrested following the detection of a coup attempt against the Musharraf regime. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‘Pakistan Foils Coup Plot’, Asia Times, 14 October 2006. There was particular concern in neo-conservative circles in Washington that the Musharraf regime was effectively surrendering control of border regions with Afghanistan to Islamist groups. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio, ‘Pakistan Surrenders: The Taliban Control the Border with Afghanistan’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 2 October 2006. 3. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘U.S. Casualties in Iraq Rise Sharply’, Washington Post, 8 October 2006. 4. One of the indicators was the change in view of a key Republican politician, the Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John W. Warner, following a visit to Iraq. Thomas E. Ricks and Peter Baker, ‘Tipping Point for War’s Supporters’, Washington Post, 29 October 2006. 5. While President Bush was advocating a renewed commitment to Iraq to prevent it becoming a safe haven for the al-Qaida movement, other evidence from within al-Qaida indicated that it saw the

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continuing US presence in Iraq as advantageous to the movement as a whole. See Dan Murphy, ‘How Al Qaeda Views a Long Iraq War’, Christian Science Monitor, 6 October 2006. 6. Lolita C. Baldor, ‘Army: Troops to Stay in Iraq Until 2010’, Associated Press, 11 October 2006; John F. Burns, ‘General May Call for Increase in US Troop Levels in Baghdad’, New York Times, 24 October 2006.

Chapter 8 After the US Elections 1. ‘Violence in Afghanistan Doubled in 2006: US Military’, Agence France-Presse, 16 November 2006. On 15 November, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General Michael V. Hayden, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that al-Qaida’s numbers and influence were growing rapidly in Afghanistan and that paramilitaries were using copying techniques learned in Iraq. See Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, ‘Taliban, Al-Qaeda Resurge in Afghanistan, CIA Says’, Washington Post, 16 November 2006. 2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Judy Dempsey, ‘NATO Fails to Lift Curbs on Afghanistan Troop Use’, International Herald Tribune, 30 November 2006. 3. The number of air strikes undertaken by US Air Force planes rose sharply during the latter part of 2006, with 2,000 individual attacks in the six months to mid-November. David S. Cloud, ‘US Airstrikes Climb Sharply in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 17 November 2006. 4. While the levels of US military casualties were having a political effect within the United States, they were still dwarfed by the far higher Iraqi civilian casualties. See Sameer N. Yacoub, ‘UN: Iraqi Civilian Deaths at New High’, Associated Press, 22 November 2006. According to an Iraqi Health Ministry source, total civilian deaths since the start of the war were between 100,000 and 150,000. See ‘Iraqi Official: War Dead 100,000’, BBC News, 14 November 2006. 5. Thomas E. Ricks and Robin Wright, ‘Iraq Study Group to Call for Pullback’, Washington Post, 30 November 2006. 6. Frederick W. Kagan and William Kristol, ‘Time for a Heavier Footprint: More American troops are needed to break the cycle of violence in Iraq’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 27 November 2006.

Chapter 9 Responding to the Baker Report 1. David S. Cloud and Michael R. Gordon, ‘Attacks in Iraq at Record High, Says Pentagon’, New York Times, 19 December 2006.

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2. An added problem was the increased incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among troops serving repeated tours in Iraq. See Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Repeat Iraq Tours Raise Risk of PTSD, Army Finds’, Washington Post, 20 December 2006. 3. There was the additional issue of the impact of US policies on support for the United States across the world, an extensive opinion survey conducted by Zogby International and the Arab American Institute showing a marked increase in anti-Americanism in the Arab world. See Jim Lobe, ‘Losing Arab Allies’ Hearts and Minds’, Terra Viva UN Journal, New York, 17 December 2006. 4. This continued with renewed intensity after the publication of the Baker–Hamilton report. See, for example, Reuel Marc Gerecht, ‘Back to Your Studies: the unbearable shallowness of the Iraq Study Group’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 18 December 2006. 5. Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler, ‘Hawks Bolster Sceptical President’, Washington Post, 10 December 2006. 6. In contrast to this neo-conservative view, the main message from senior military commanders was of the need to engage more fully in training and equipping Iraqi security forces. See Robin Wright and Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Joint Chiefs Advise Change in War Strategy’, Washington Post, 14 December 2006. 7. Although senior military staff were not requesting additional troops for Iraq at this time, they were arguing for an overall increase in the size of the US Army and the Marine Corps. See Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Army, Marine Corps to Ask for More Troops’, Washington Post, 13 December 2006. 8. Thom Shanker, ‘US and Britain to Add Ships to Persian Gulf in Signal to Iran’, New York Times, 21 December 2006.

Chapter 10 A Surge in Two Wars? 1. Right at the end of 2006 the US death toll in Iraq exceeded 3,000. 2. Peter Warren Singer, ‘The Coming Surge’, Defense News, Washington, 29 January 2007. 3. In a singularly pessimistic report, the Brookings Institute pointed to the need to plan for the failure of the surge and of the probability that the US military would then have to withdraw from the cities as a full-scale civil war developed. See Rupert Cornwell, ‘US Must Abandon Iraqi Cities or Face Nightmare Scenario, Say Experts’, Independent, London, 30 January 2007. 4. ‘US Warns of Bloody Taliban Spring Fightback’, Reuters, 26 January 2007.

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5. ‘US Plans Big Spending Boost for Afghanistan’, Agence FrancePresse, 25 January 2007. 6. There was also the possibility of an Israeli attack, with press reports of two Israeli Air Force squadrons training in the use of earth penetrating bombs for destroying underground targets. See Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, ‘Revealed: Israel Plans Nuclear Strike on Iran’, Sunday Times, London, 7 January 2007. 7. One of the problems facing US policy in the region was that the Iraq War had increased Iranian influence, a matter of substantial concern in western Gulf Arab states. See Anthony Shadid, ‘With Iran Ascendant, U.S. Is Seen at Fault’, Washington Post, 30 January 2007.

Chapter 11 Environment and Development: The Underlying Global Issues 1. Although there was an assumption that the surge would amount to an additional 25,000 troops in Iraq, principally Baghdad, the actual figure was reported to be much higher, especially when support troops were taken into account, with a Congressional Budget Office report suggesting a surge of around 50,000 troops. This would make the US presence in Iraq much higher than at any time since regime termination in April 2003. Rick Maze, ‘CBO: Iraq Surge Could Actually Total 50,000’, Army Times, 2 February 2007. 2. The Bush administration remained optimistic in public about the potential success of the surge, but the views of many of the troops on the ground were far more pessimistic. See Tom Lasseter, ‘Soldiers in Iraq View Troop Surge as Lost Cause’, McClatchy Newspapers, 3 February 2007. 3. Although most media attention remained focused on the war in Iraq, there was further concern in Washington and London that the al-Qaida movement was re-establishing itself in border districts of West Pakistan. See Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, ‘Signs of Qaeda Resurgence’, International Herald Tribune, 19 February 2007. 4. An amphibious strike group led by the USS Bataan was moving to join another amphibious strike group already on station, this being in addition to the deployment of two carrier battle groups. See ‘US Navy Strike Group Transits Suez Canal’, Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2007. There was, in parallel, a marked increase in rhetoric from the Bush administration claiming that Iran was heavily involved in the insurgency in Iraq. See, for example, Joshua Partlow, ‘Military Ties Iran to Arms in Iraq’, Washington Post, 12 February 2007.

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5. ‘On a Dilemma in the Horn’, The Economist, 24 February 2007. 6. Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Somalia on the Brink of Total Collapse’, International Herald Tribune, 21 February 2007. 7. In Washington, the Tunisia developments were seen in some circles as part of the wider expansion of the al-Qaida movement into the Maghreb. Olivier Guitta, ‘Terror in the Maghreb: Al Qaeda linked groups are spreading from Algeria and Morocco into Tunisia’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 14 February 2007. 8. Seth Mydans, ‘Bangkok Losing Control’, International Herald Tribune, 26 February 2007. See also Shawn W. Crispin, ‘Dimming Peace Prospects for Southern Thailand’, Asia Times, 15 February 2007. 9. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, Beyond Terror, Rider Books, London and New York, 2007. 10. A two-year programme of polar research involving 10,000 personnel from 60 countries under the International Polar Year (IPY) scheme, is intended to concentrate much of its effort on the effects of climate change on polar regions. Peter N. Spotts, ‘New Search for Global Warming at Poles’, Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 2007. 11. Stephen Leahy, ‘Thirstier World Likely to See More Violence’, Terra Nova UN Journal, New York, 19 March 2007. 12. WIDER Angle newsletter, 2/2006, World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, Helsinki, 2006.

Chapter 12 Iraq Options and US Politics 1. In a two-day operation, Ethiopian troops were reported to have killed 200 insurgents, with aid agencies reporting many civilian casualties. One Ethiopian helicopter was shot down during the fighting. Sahal Abdulle, ‘Helicopter Shot Down as Battle Engulfs Mogadishu’, Reuters, 30 March 2007. 2. Jim Lobe ‘Africa to Get Its Own U.S. Military Command’, Terra Viva UN Journal, 1 February 2007. 3. Early in February, China’s President Hu Jintao completed a 12-day programme of visits to eight African states across West, Central and East Africa. Bright B. Simons, Evans Larty and Franklin Cudjoe, ‘Emperor Hu’s New Clothes for Africa’, Asia Times, 7 February 2007. 4. China is increasingly dependent on external oil reserves, given the progressive run-down of its domestic reserves and the rapid growth in the economy. While the Middle East remains crucial, and a number of agreements have been reached with major producers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has also sought to diversify

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7.

8.

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its sources of supply, with these extending beyond Africa. China’s additional major oil suppliers are Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Yemen, Libya, Oman, Russia and Venezuela. See Wu Zhong, ‘China Aims to Diversify Oil Sources’, Asia Times, 27 February 2007. Olivier Guitta, ‘Morocco Under Fire: The Coming “Terrorism Tsunami”’, Weekly Standard, Washington, 30 March 2007. In addition to the military casualties, US contractors have experienced substantial losses among their employees, with 770 civilians working for US companies killed in the first four years of the war. See Howard Witt, ‘America’s Hidden War Dead’, Chicago Tribune, 26 March 2007. A retired general, Barry McCaffrey, who has published a number of thoughtful analyses of the unfolding war since 2003, reported from Iraq at the end of March, mixing some slight cause for optimism with an overall assessment that was negative in terms of prospects for rapid progress. See Thomas E. Ricks, ‘In contrast to his previous views, retired general writes of “strategic peril”’, Washington Post, 28 March 2007. Available in the ORG International Security Report for 2006, Paul Rogers, Into the Long War, Pluto Press, London and Ann Arbor, 2007. Also online at www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk. Ibid.

Chapter 13 Four Years On 1. Available in the ORG International Security Report for 2004, Paul Rogers, Iraq and the War on Terror, Oxford Research Group. Also online at www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk. 2. An added problem was the development of violent confrontations involving US and Iraqi government troops and Shi’ite militia in southern Iraq. Karen Brulliard and Saad Sarhan, ‘U.S. Fights Iraqi Militia in South’, Washington Post, 8 April 2007. 3. Overall, figures compiled by a number of ministries and released at the start of April indicated that civilian deaths in March were 13% higher, at 1,861, compared with the previous month. See ‘Iraqi Civilian Deaths Up in March’, BBC News, 1 April 2007. 4. One attack, on 24 April, killed nine US soldiers and wounded 20. See Sudarsan Raghavan and Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Outpost Attack Highlights Troop Vulnerabilities’, Washington Post, 25 April 2007. 5. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Top U.S. Officers See Mixed Results From Iraq “Surge”’, Washington Post, 22 April 2007. 6. In addition to civilian casualties stemming from air strikes, there was also the issue of ground troops using excessive firepower. In

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8.

9.

10.

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one incident a unit of Marine Special Operation troops responded to an ambush by ‘opening fire on pedestrians and civilian vehicles along a 10-mile stretch of road and killing 12 people – including a 4-year-old girl, a 1-year-old boy and three elderly villagers – an investigation by an Afghan human rights commission alleges’; Ann Scott Tyson and Josh White, ‘Excessive Force By Marines Alleged’, Washington Post, 14 April 2007. In committing itself to a 1,400 increase in troop levels, the British government called on NATO partners to similarly increase their commitments in Afghanistan. See ‘UK Calls for NATO Reinforcements as It Sends Additional Troops to Afghanistan’, International Defense Review, April 2007. A US State Department report on terrorism world wide recorded an increase in incidents for 2006 nearly 30% up on the previous year at more than 14,000, due primarily to increased violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, ‘Terror Attacks Up Nearly 30 Percent, Report Says’, McClatchy Newspapers, 27 April 2007. At the same time, an added problem for the Bush administration was the increased suspicion of the United States across the Islamic world. In an extensive opinion survey in four states: ‘An average of more than 75 percent of respondents across the four countries – Egypt, Morocco, and the world’s two most populous Muslim nations, Indonesia and Pakistan – said that they believed that dividing and weakening the Islamic world and maintaining control over Middle East oil were key goals of U.S. foreign policy…’. See Jim Lobe, ‘Suspicion of U.S. Found Pervasive in Islamic World’, Terra Nova UN Journal, New York, 25 April 2007. One indication that much of the action to curb carbon emissions will be required of developed industrialised countries was a UN report indicating that newly industrialising countries such as India and China have cut back on the rate of increase of their carbon emissions by more than required under the Kyoto Protocol. See Alistair Doyle, ‘Poor Nations Brake Greenhouse Gas Rise – UN Draft’, Reuters, 3 May 2007.

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Index

10th Mountain Division 82 2008 US Presidential Election 93, 100 9/11 attacks 16, 19, 42, 114

arms supplies (to Iraq) 70 Asia-Pacific region 90 Australia 90 axis of evil vi Ayman al-Zawahiri 54

Abu Ghraib 66 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 9, 18–21, 29, 36, 111 Addis Ababa 86 Afghanistan vii, 1–2, 8–9, 10, 14, 17, 19, 23–9, 31, 35–6, 45, 47–54, 59, 61–4, 77, 81–5, 101, 105–6, 110–11, 113, 116, 118 Afghanistan-Pakistan border 83 Ahmadinejad, President 74, 85 Ahmed, Abdullah Yusuf 94 Al-Arabiya 113 Alaska 7, 14, 59 Algeria 87 Al-Jazeera 113 Al-Jazeera effect 108 Al-Qaida vi–vii, 1–5, 8, 16–20, 22–5, 27–9, 47, 52, 58–9, 80, 86–7, 95, 97, 101, 107–8, 110–14, 118–19 Amazonia 89 Amstutz, Dan 102 Anbar Province 46, 55 Anfal campaign 70–1 Ankara 118 Anti-Americanism 54 Anti-ship missiles 33 Arabian Sea 74, 84 Arctic sea ice 89, 108–9

B-1B bomber 24, 28 B-52 bomber 24, 28 Baghdad 9, 20, 30–1, 46, 54, 60, 71, 78–80, 85, 95, 103 Bagram air base 10 Baker, James 67–8 Baker-Hamilton Report 67–8, 72–4, 80–1, 93, 95, 103 Balad air base 10, 54 Baluchistan 83 Basra 103 Beirut International Airport 33 Bekaa Valley 37 Blair, Prime Minister Tony viii, 19, 62, 108 Book of Revelations 57–8 Bremer, Paul 96 Britain vii–viii, 12, 47, 61, 70, 103, 106–7 British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) 81, 105 British forces in Afghanistan 28–9 Brown, Prime Minister Gordon 108 Bush, President George W vi, 2, 8, 18–19, 42, 62, 66, 73, 99, 101 Administration 1, 26, 33, 58, 64, 68, 103, 110–11

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INDEX

Caliphate (re-establishment of) 4 Camp Salerno attack 81 Canada 7, 47, 61–2, 82, 106 carbon emissions 89 Cargill Corporation 102 carrier battle group 84 Caspian Basin oil reserves 7, 14 casualties civilian (Afghanistan) 27–8, 52, 62, 105–6 civilian (Iraq) 9, 20–1, 29–30, 36, 46, 55, 69, 78, 95, 97, 101–2 US military 9, 21, 30–1, 46, 55–6, 64–5, 71, 77–8, 95–7, 104 ceasefire (Lebanon) 33 Central Asia 10, 63 chemical weapons 70 Cheney, Vice President Dick 42, 66, 73, 85 China 7–8, 14–17, 33, 74, 90, 95, 100 military power 15 oil security 14–17, 59 Christian Zionism 3, 6–7, 57–8 climate change 88–92, 108–9, 119 Clinton, Hillary 67 Coalition Provisional Authority 70, 96, 102 Cold War 6, 115 Combined Security Transition Command (Afghanistan) 82 Congress (US) 64, 68, 93, 99, 111 Damascus 118 Dar es Salaam 86 Darod clan 94 Democrat Party (US) 64, 66–7, 99–100 Department of Defense 10, 60, 104

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Dien Bien Phu (siege of, 1954) 65 drugs trade 35 drying out of the tropics 89–90 Dutch Army 47, 82, 106 East Asia 12 economic targeting (Lebanon) 37 Economist, The 24 Egypt 4, 6–7, 13, 117 Eikenberry, General Karl 81 embassy bombings (1998) 86 Ethiopia 86, 93–4, 113 Europe 7, 90–1, 100 evangelical Christianity 3 expeditionary strike group 84 Fallujah 46, 55, 104 France 45, 62, 65, 70, 107 Gates, Robert 82 Gaza 31–2, 45 Geneva conventions 117 Geophysical Research Letters 108–9 Germany 42, 62, 107 Giap, General 65 Green Zone (Baghdad) 66 Gulf of Mexico 12 Haifa 33, 39 Haiphong 65 Halabja attack 70 Hamas 3, 32, 45, 47, 57 Hanoi 65 Herat 81 helicopter gunships 98 Helmand Province 1, 28, 47–8, 81–2, 106 heroin 47–9 Hezbollah 3, 26–7, 31–4, 37–42, 44–7, 57, 111 Holocaust Denial 74–5 Home Office (UK) 19 Hong River Delta (Vietnam) 65

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House (US Congress) 64, 66 House of Saud 15, 60 Humvee jeeps 72 India 7, 90, 100 Indo-China War 65 Indonesia vii Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 88–9, 92, 108 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 1, 9, 23–4, 28, 47, 49–52, 61–2, 81–3, 105–6 Iran/Iranian vi, 7, 11, 14–16, 37, 42–3, 70, 74–5, 84–5, 98, 118 hostage crisis 13 Navy 71 Revolution 13 Iran–Iraq War 70 Iraq/Iraqi vi, 1–2, 7–10, 14, 17–23, 26, 29–31, 35–6, 43, 46–7, 54–60, 64–8, 71–81, 101–5, 108, 110–14 agriculture 102 Body Count 30 elections 96 oil reserves 11, 102 police 72–3, 78 security forces 67–8, 72–3, 78 Study Group 72–6 War (1991) vii, 38, 40 Islamic Courts movement 86, 93–4, 113 Islamic radicalisation 107 Islamofascism 47, 65, 115 Israel/Israeli 3, 5–6, 11, 13, 26–7, 31–4, 37–42, 75, 108, 115–16 Air Force 39–40 Defence Force (IDF) 26, 32–3, 37–9, 41, 44–6, 118 lobby 5–7, 57–8

Rogers 03 index 134

Israeli-Palestinian conflict 108 Italy 45 Japan 7, 12, 90, 100 Jerusalem 57–8 Jewish community (US) 6 Jewish lobby (US) 57 Jewish settlers 31 Kabul 10, 23, 25, 50, 52, 63, 83, 105 Kandahar Province 1, 10, 82 Karzai, President Hamid 35–6 Administration 47, 50, 106 Katyusha rockets 32 Kenya 86 Khalilzad, Zalmay 21 Khost 81 Kurdish Iraq 70 Kurds 70 Kuwait 4, 7, 14, 16, 20 Latin America 7, 14 Lebanon/Lebanese 26–7, 31–4, 37–42, 44–7, 57, 75, 111 Army 44 London 19 bombing (2005) 107 Long War, the 57–8, 65 Mahdi Army 36 Malaki government (Iraq) 22, 30 Manningham-Buller, Dame Eliza 107 marginalisation 90–1 Maronite Christians 38 McNeill, General Dan 83 Merkava main battle tank 39 methane emissions 89 Middle East 1, 4–5, 8, 12–13, 33, 42, 57, 63, 68, 114–15, 117, 119 Mid-sessional elections (US) 9, 42, 46, 56–7, 61, 64–7, 93, 99

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INDEX

migration 91 Moqtada al-Sadr 36 Mogadishu 86–7, 93–4 morphine 48 Mossadeqh government (Iran) 12 Mosul 104 Musharraf, Pervaz 52, 83 regime 50–1, 64 Nairobi 86 Najaf 36 National Intelligence Estimate (January, 2007) 80, 112 NATO 1–2, 9, 23, 26, 35, 52–3, 61–3, 81, 83, 105, 118 Naxalite rebels 90–1 neo-conservatives 67–8, 73–4 Nepalese Maoist rebels 91 Netherlands 62 New American Century 3, 99 New Zealand 90 North Africa 12, 85, 87, 94–5, 107, 113 North America 90–1 North East Atlantic 89 North Korea vi North Sea oil 12 North Waziristan 24, 53, 63, 83 North West Frontier Province 54, 83 Norway 12 oil addiction 119 import dependency (US) 12–14 OPEC 58 security 7–9, 11–17, 58 transnational oil companies (TNOCs) 11 Olmert government (Israel) 31, 33, 38, 40 Omar, Mullah 20 Operation Enduring Freedom 2

Rogers 03 index 135

135

opium poppy production 1, 24–5, 47–50, 105–6 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 12–13 Osama bin Laden 20 Oxfam 102 Oxford Research Group vi–viii, 102 Pakistan/Pakistani vii, 4, 24, 47–51, 63–4, 82–3, 86–7, 107, 111, 118 Army 50–1 Palestine/ Palestinian 108, 111, 117 territories 47 Peace for Galilee, Operation 39 permafrost, melting of 89 permanent bases (Iraq) 10, 102–3 Persian Gulf 7, 11–12, 14, 17, 74–5, 84–5, 99, 115 oil reserves 16, 59, 68 Peshawar 54 Petraeus, General David 78 presidential elections (US – 2008) 74 prisoner abuse 116–17 Qana 33 Qatar 7 Qusay Hussein 96 radical Islam 57–9 Ramadi 20, 46, 55 Rapid Deployment Force 7, 12–13, 94–5 Red Cross 94 refugees (Iraq) 97 renewable energy resources 119 Republican Party (US) 3, 6, 68, 100 resource shift 11

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136

T O WA R D S S U S TA I N A B L E S EC U R I T Y

Richards, General David 28–9, 83 Riga 61–2 Riyadh 59, 118 Roosevelt administration 11 Rumsfeld, Donald 42, 66 Russian oil reserves 14 Saar-5 missile corvette 33, 37 Saddam Hussein 36, 102 execution 69–70 regime vi, 14, 17, 20, 114, 116 Sahel region 95 San Diego 84 Saudi Arabia 4, 7, 11, 14, 58, 60, 103, 117–18 Second World War 11 sectarian violence 21–2 Security Service (MI5) 107 Senate (US) 64, 66 Shi’a communities 36, 78 Shi’a militia 21 Siberia 7 Singapore 90 socio-economic divisions 90–2, 119 Somalia 85–7, 93–4, 113 South Korea 12, 90 South Waziristan 24, 83 South West Asia 1, 57, 115 Soviet Union 13–14, 42, 63, 70, 113, 115 occupation of Afghanistan 13 State Department (US) 10 Stroieve, Julienne 108–9 Stryker armoured personnel carrier 72, 98 sub-Saharan Africa 7, 14 Sudan 95 Sunni militia 21 surge (of US troops in Iraq) 73, 78, 85, 95–6, 104, 110–13 sustainable security 17, 116–19

Rogers 03 index 136

Syria 6, 13, 37, 42, 46, 74, 98, 103 Taiwan 90 Tal Afar 95 Taliban vi, 23–5, 27–9, 35, 49–54, 62–3, 81–3, 105–6, 111, 113, 116, 118 Tehran 13, 37, 59, 76, 103, 118 Tet Offensive (Vietnam) 66 Thailand 85, 87–8 Tikrit 69 torture 116–17 transnational oil companies (TNOCs) 11 Tunisia vii, 87 Turkey 107 Two Holy Places 4 Uday Hussein 96 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 7, 14, 16 United Nations 23, 29, 40–1, 44 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 105 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 40 UN Office on Drugs and Crime 47 UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 40 UN Security Council 75 United States vi–vii, 3, 6, 8–17, 33, 35, 45, 52, 63–4, 68–70, 86–7, 93–5, 100, 110–19 oil reserves 7, 59 Africa Command (AFRICOM) 94–5 Army 56, 78–9, 82, 113 Central Command (CENTCOM) 7, 13–14, 94–5 domestic politics 56–7, 72–6 Embassy (Baghdad) 10, 30

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INDEX

Fifth Fleet 15 Marine Corps 78, 113 military action against Iran 74–6 Navy 71, 74 options in Iraq 96–100 University of Colorado 109 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 41 USS Abraham Lincoln 101 USS Bataan 84 USS Boxer 84 USS John C Stennis 84 USS Ronald Reagan 84 Venezuela 7, 14 Vietnam War 56, 65–6 Viet Cong 66 Viet Minh 65 war on terror 18

Rogers 03 index 137

137

Washington 7–8, 15–16, 19–20, 22, 31, 72, 95, 104 Watkins, Kevin 102 West Bank 31–2 West Beirut (siege of, 1982) 39 West Pacific 84 West Pakistan 1 White House 15, 68, 74 withdrawal, prospects of US military 99, 112 World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) 90, 92 Yadavaran oil field 15 Yemen vii Yom Kippur/Ramadan War 13, 41 Zia-ul-Uloom madrassa 54 Zilzal missile 40 Zionism 115

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