Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: Comparing Approaches of Russia and the West - Volume 33 NATO Science for Peace and Security ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

TUNING PRIORITIES IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

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Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Comparing Approaches of Russia and the West

Edited by

Alexander Nikitin Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, President of the Russian Political Science Association

and

Morten Bremer Mærli Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: Comparing and Tuning Approaches of Russia and the West Moscow, Russia 25–28 April 2007

© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-824-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007942543 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

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Preface This book presents the results of the Advanced Research Workshop ‘Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: Comparing and Tuning Approaches of Russia and the West’, held in Moscow, April 2007. Co-hosted by the Center for Political and International Studies (Moscow) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Oslo), the workshop was sponsored by the NATO Science Programme. International organizations participating in the convening of the workshop included the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation, the non-governmental scientific network Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and the Russian Political Science Association. The Organizing Committee included such experts as Vladimir Baranovsky, Deputy Director, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (Russia); Sverre Lodgaard, Director, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Russia); and Morten Bremer Mærli, Senior Research Fellow, NUPI. The Organizing Committee focused on bringing to the workshop not only academic experts, but also practitioners from NATO HQ, from the US State Department, and from key Russian bodies (the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the State Federal Agency on Nuclear Power ‘RosAtom’). Additional perspectives were provided by invited arms control experts from around the world. Among research institutes, priority was given to ensuring the representation of major international ‘think tanks’. These included the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, London), the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, Stockholm), the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow), the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies (Moscow) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI, Oslo). A comprehensive international team of experts took part at the workshop: a total of 47 specialists from 14 countries and five international organizations. Speakers were asked to prepare and present written papers on relevant topics. Papers were distributed amongst participants, and later updated on the basis of workshop discussions. The workshop facilitated the intensive exchange of information and views. Moreover, it provided a viable (and perhaps increasingly important) platform for better understanding and mutual tuning of Russian and Western approaches to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, responding to situations like those in Iran and North Korea, synchronizing priorities in the elimination of excessive fissile materials, and, most of all, in the preservation of existing and the development of new agreements in nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. An important aspect of this and similar fora is raising awareness of the current crisis in nuclear arms control. Such international, inter-agency and cross-cultural dialogue provides an opportunity for maintaining the wide-ranging dialogue required for

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strengthening arms control arrangements – and for establishing new ones with clearly defined and measurable scopes and verification systems. In this regard, the need for pragmatism and flexibility was acknowledged by Western and Russian workshop participants alike, who also stressed the need to uphold a genuine commitment to international law. Special thanks are to be extended to Julia Starilova, Adelina Akhmetzyanova, and Eugenia Andryushina, for the way organizational matters where handled in conjunction with the Workshop. Maria Suhanova, Oksana Novikova, and Maria Mukhina skillfully translated Russian chapters into English, and Susan Høvik and Liv Høivik provided swift and precious copy-editing and lay-out assistance during the preparation of the book.

Alexander I. Nikitin and Morten Bremer Mærli, Workshop Co-Directors

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Contents Preface Alexander I. Nikitin and Morten Bremer Mærli

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Chapter 1. Debating Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Alexander Nikitin and Morten Bremer Mærli

1

Chapter 2. The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Sverre Lodgaard

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Chapter 3. US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Robert M. Witajewski

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Chapter 4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

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Chapter 5. De-Coding the Russian Position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis Ivan Safranchuk

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Chapter 6. Interface and Contradictions Between Non-Proliferation and CounterProliferation Mark Fitzpatrick

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Chapter 7. Differences Between Western and Russian Nuclear Security Cultures C. Sellier

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Chapter 8. The Clash of Nuclear Dynamics Lars van Dassen

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Chapter 9. Recent Proliferation Challenges by North Korea and Iran Robert M. Witajewski

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Chapter 10. Dealing with the Iranian Nuclear Programme Tim Guldimann

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Chapter 11. A New Strategy for the Iranian Nuclear File Jerry Sommer

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Chapter 12. Responses to Proliferation Challenges in South Asia Talat Masood

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Chapter 13. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Challenges on the Korean Peninsula Alexander Zhebin

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Chapter 14. Proliferation and Security in the Middle East Riad Kahwaji

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Chapter 15. Missile Defences and Proliferation Vladimir Dvorkin

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Chapter 16. Political Aspects of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defences Grigoryi G. Tishchenko

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Chapter 17. Accelerated Blend-Down of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Laura S.H. Holgate Chapter 18. New Approaches to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Missile Technologies Pavel S. Zolotarev

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Chapter 19. A SORT of a ReSTART for Nuclear Disarmament? Morten Bremer Mærli

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Chapter 20. Implementation and Verification of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties Viktor I. Yesin

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Chapter 21. Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Alexander Nikitin and Morten Bremer Mærli

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Chapter Summaries

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Author Index

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Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 1 Debating Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Alexander NIKITIN and Morten Bremer MÆRLI1

New challenges are evolving while some old threats persist in the realm of nuclear security, making it increasingly important to correlate counter-measures and perspectives and priorities in the field. Yet, there have been surprisingly few efforts at comparative analysis of threat perceptions or non-proliferation and arms control measures by the leading nuclear weapon states. By ‘Comparing and Tuning Approaches of Russia and the West’, this book seeks to contribute to clarify ‘Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’ – as heralded in the title and sub-title of the workshop on which this volume is based. The international arms control structures face serious challenges today. Every effort should be made to handle nuclear threats and to prevent horizontal as well as vertical proliferation. However, there is no international consensus on how to proceed about this. In addition to the erosion of major arms control agreements, relations between Russia and the West are made more complicated by the introduction of the US missile defence and associated plans for deploying its elements in Europe. As several important arms control treaties are disappearing from sight, Russian analysts claim that the US arms build-up is becoming dangerous, rendering Russia vulnerable to attacks by endangering its ability to deter and retaliate. This may prove to be a recipe for new spins of arms races, placing more pressure on the already strained Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Crisis in Nuclear Arms Control The START I Treaty is set to expire on 5 December 2009, three years before Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) reductions are to be completed. That will leave SORT without verification procedures, unless an extension of the START verification package can be negotiated. The status of warheads headed for storage pursuant to SORT is unclear; however, SORT requires that the USA and Russia each reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. In the summer of 2006, at the G8 summit in St Petersburg, Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush agreed to start consultations on replacing START I with a new arrangement, or extending the procedural side of it. Such negotiations started in 1 Alexander Nikitin - Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, President of the Russian Political Science Association. Morten Bremer Mærli - Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

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2007. While Russia has insisted on a legally binding agreement, the USA has shown a preference for transparency and confidence-building measures that would allow each side to verify the other’s arsenals and capabilities. A major aim of a new agreement could be the creation of a new (or adaptation of existing) verification mechanism, with suitable schemes and procedures in accordance with specified goals. There are obvious differences in how the tasks of arms control and disarmament are emphasized. Russian officials hold that main priorities in WMD disarmament are the elimination of decommissioned nuclear submarines and fulfilling obligations under the CWC, thereby demoting the elimination of accumulated Pu and HEU to the ‘second tier’ of priority. However, concerned about the dangers of nuclear terrorism, European countries insist that greater priority must be placed on eliminating the huge stocks (more than 1,000,000 kg outside direct military use) of HEU in Russia. The priorities of adding more transparency and opening negotiations on sub-strategic nuclear weapons are understood differently between European NATO member-countries on the one side, and the USA and Russia on the other. 2 There may very well be legal problems in implementing CTR programmes in time, with START due to expire already after 2009. The elimination procedures of Russia’s strategic weapons are regulated by the START conversion or elimination protocol and verified under the START inspection protocol. Thus, the United States and Russia would have no legal basis for the elimination of Russian arms or the verification of this elimination, even if such efforts continued to receive financial support under the CTR programmes. Transparency efforts have faced several set-backs. The inter-MFA US–Russian working group on nuclear transparency has been abandoned, and there is a lack of transparency on the new mechanisms to replace it. There have been no public declarations or clear announcements on tactical nuclear warheads (TNWs). With the planned US ABM components in Europe, TNW seem to be back in demand. In this setting, removal of the remaining US TNW from Europe may make a significant difference, although it remains unclear whether that would motivate Russia to further cuts in its own TNW arsenal.

Good Buy, Old Treaties? Kremlin officials announced in early 2007 that Russia might withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and re-create an arsenal of short and intermediate range missiles, possibly with non-nuclear warheads. The INF Treaty has been provided with an unlimited time-frame, and it seems worthwhile to uphold it. Two competing explanations as to possible withdrawal have been given by different sectors of the Kremlin leadership: x

…Because states like Iran, North Korea, Israel, etc., have developed intermediate-range missiles (President V. Putin in Munich and Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov)

2 Cooperative Threat Reduction, renewed in mid-June 2006. These projects are currently carried out under the CTR umbrella agreement, formally titled the US–Russian Agreement Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation

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x

3

…Because the USA will be deploying ABM elements in Poland and the Czech Republic (Chief of General Staff of Russian Armed Forces Gen.Yu.Baluevsky)

Withdrawal from the INF would inevitably raise anti-Russian fears within NATO and would further militarize the Alliance, which in turn would decrease Russian security. Moreover, INF withdrawal would be seen a violation by a nuclear power of the obligation under Article VI of the NPT. Moscow hints that it may use INF missiles in nonnuclear mode, as conventional carriers in regional balances. Although NATO governments stress their continued interest in cooperating with Russia on missile defence issues, including within the NATO–Russian Council, they have only to a very limited extent discussed with Moscow the features and parameters of NATO’s planned missile defence architecture. The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty is now seen by many as less and less compulsory. Withdrawal of residual conventional Russian armed forces from Moldova and Georgia will require significantly more time than the West has allocated to Russia for this task. US plans to deploy key components of its missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic may spur the Russian side to re-deploy more conventional forces to areas from which these can threaten or cover by strike the new military objects in Eastern Europe. These steps may lead to new violations of the CFE Treaty. Would that be an extra argument for Russia to abandon the CFE Treaty? Putin’s administration put a freeze on Russian CFE participation in the summer of 2007 until all NATO countries had ratified the adapted version of the CFE.

Diverging Views on Financial and Technical Assistance From the Western point of view, dangers of nuclear terrorism demand swift disposal or elimination of excessive fissile weapons-grade materials. Russia, however, does not attribute high priority or urgency to these issues. The multilateral plutonium disposal programme will need total funding of roughly USD 2 billion (1 billion in capital costs, $1 billion in operating costs) to dispose of the 34 tons of Russian Pu covered by the year 2000 agreement; approximately half of this amount has been pledged. The 34 tons are not expected to be disposed of within the 2020–2030 time-frame, based on the current commitment of only four tons per year. There are no agreements dealing with civilian plutonium stocks. The US and Russian Presidents at their summit in Bratislava agreed to initiate joint efforts to limit the circulation to third-party countries of HEU fuel originating from the superpowers. Programmes for Russian-origin HEU reactors in countries targeted for conversion by 2014 or repatriation by 2010 will succeed only if stronger incentives can be given to host-nation governments to convert these facilities. An estimated 45% of the research reactors currently using HEU fuel are not targeted for conversion by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. These are issues that need to be addressed by Moscow and governments in the West. Debates on priorities touch upon issues of upgrading safety of existing nuclear facilities. The planned completion dates for all bunker security upgrades is end of 2008. A large number of warhead storage sites – potentially as much as half of all estimated sites – are not set to receive upgrades at all. Security upgrades for nuclear warhead handling sites (temporary storage sites where warheads are handled during training

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operations or deployment) have been limited due to a 2003 US inter-agency decision preventing work at operational storage sites that support Russian military units. The current US–Russian HEU agreement involves the conversion of 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian warheads into LEU (equivalent to 20,000 nuclear warheads) by 2013. After these 500 tons have been down-blended, more than half of Russia's estimated inventory of military HEU will still remain. Efforts are needed to accelerate current efforts and substantially increase the quantity of weapons HEU stockpiles targeted for down-blending. This could involve re-instating the effort to down-blend additional HEU, or constructing a managed storage facility for LEU to offset effects on the market. Studies have shown that an increase is feasible, with very little investment. Accelerated down-blending, however, requires new Russian HEUexcess declarations, and thus is a political-military issue, not only commercial one.

Non-Nuclear World as a Non-Priority Innovative arms control thinking seems unlikely to find much fertile ground in the current setting. From the experts’ debates at the workshop it became clear that views diverge significantly on policies in arms control and nuclear proliferation. While acknowledging the problems, all three major players – the USA, Russia and NATO – seem fairly content with their own current and planned nuclear policies. Indeed, the problems are numerous, priorities diverge, and readiness for selfexamination and correction of political positions seems low. This is obviously a poor starting point for any ‘tuning’ between Russia and the West of priorities in arms control or non-proliferation. Moreover, it is likely to maintain rather than to resolve the mounting proliferation challenges. But might there be at least a shared vision that ‘at the end of the tunnel’ the world will have to find strategic stability on a non-nuclear basis? Table 1. Russian and US nuclear postures compared3 Russia

USA

Keep nuclear weapons and their production Keep nuclear weapons and their production infrainfrastructure structure CTBT ratified in 2000 Testing moratorium, yet testing capabilities maintained The USA still unofficially perceived as a Russia perceived as one among many possible advermajor adversary saries 1700–2200 warheads after 2012 1700–2200 warheads after 2012 Keeping the classical ‘triad’

NPR’s ‘New Triad’ concept

‘Minimally sufficient’ level of deterrence

Adaptive planning

ABM penetration systems

National ABM system + international ABM system components Tactical nuclear weapons maintained

Tactical nuclear weapons maintained. Hints towards return to arsenal of intermediate and short range missiles

3

Table presented at the Workshop by Vitaly Fedchenkov.

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There is a difference in threat perceptions, a difference in preferred counter-measures, and a profound difference in the understanding of the state of the non-proliferation regime. The Reykjavik consultations of the late 1980s between Reagan and Gorbachev on the complete abandoning of nuclear weapons seem further away than ever: the current presidential administrations of both the USA and Russia have not posited even a theoretical goal of denuclearization: instead, they maintain reliance upon nuclear weapons as an important part of their national security strategies, and are ready only for very pragmatically motivated and mostly marginal steps in nuclear disarmament.

Non-Proliferation: Close or Similar Goals, Diverging Priorities On the positive side, not one of the old or new nuclear states supports further nuclear proliferation in general. Countries may decide that they need to possess nuclear weapons, but no government is using the argument that ‘more nuclear states is better’ when speaking about nuclear weapons proliferation. Moreover, there is growing concern within the international community regarding the state of international nuclear affairs – not least, the prospects that other new nuclear states may emerge, as well as potential non-state nuclear actors. Though in general Russia and the major Western countries agree on the necessity of preventing further nuclear proliferation, they preserve pragmatic ‘exceptions’ in their policies. Russia has been mildly critical to the US–Indian nuclear deal, which it sees as ‘unnecessary legitimization’ of Indian accession to the nuclear club, while the USA expresses suspicions that Russia may, by constantly maintaining a ‘special position’ on the Iranian case, indirectly assist Tehran to continue in the direction of a military nuclear programme. At the workshop, some Russian participants opined that, in setting policy towards North Korea, the USA had pushed the other delegations at the six-party talks away from the real negotiations table; in their view, Russia should form and pursue its own line regarding settlement of the Korean nuclear crisis, distinct from the US line on ‘buying out’ Korean nukes under pressure towards regime change. In the course of debates at the workshop it was noted that countries may decide that they want to acquire nuclear weapons for two basic reasons: x x

Presence of an external threat, especially, but not exclusively, when the external threat is represented by nuclear weapon states (whether P5 or new). Prestige, status upgrade and actual forceful power associated with nuclear weapons.

The NPT up to now has done a remarkable job in inducing countries to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons by addressing, albeit in an imperfect way, both of these motivations. The principle of non-proliferation in the NPT helps in creating an environment partially free from nuclear threats, while the requirement of disarmament addressed to the major old nuclear powers aims at decreasing both the relevance of nuclear weapons and the prestige and status associated with their possession. The NPT distinguishes between nuclear-weapon ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. This was meant to be temporary: it has always been recognized that the only way to move towards a stable equilibrium is by resolving the distinction between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ – by making them illegal under international law, as has been done in the case of chemical and

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biological weapons. Progressing towards such stability necessitates making manifest, unequivocal and sustained advances in nuclear disarmament. As noted by some Western experts at the workshop, NATO, itself a multilateral entity, needs to pay particular attention to having a clear ‘counter-proliferation policy’, which at the same time requires coordinating the positions and policies of its memberstates concerning responses to proliferation challenges and acceptable/unacceptable forms of counter-proliferation measures. Not only would this provide considerable leverage with regard to the coordinative and preventive role of NATO. One suggestion debated was a proposal to make it much more difficult for any state to withdraw from the NPT, by maintaining a narrow interpretation of Article X of the Treaty. Such an interpretation would require the instigation of complicated procedures involving automatic, immediate and deep IAEA inspections of all nuclear infrastructure of the state wanting to leave the NPT. Such deep IAEA inspections must find assurances of nonuse of peaceful nuclear assets (acquired by country within the NPT) for military purposes after withdrawal. A major problem facing the NPT is that some nuclear-weapon states, most notably the United States but also some other countries, have developed a strategy where they, while paying formal tribute to the role of the NPT, in fact sidetrack it. A unilateralist approach has created more problems than results, and has significantly eroded the wide consensus on the non-proliferation regime in general. Both the USA and Russia will have to engage substantially in nuclear disarmament if they wish to support the NPT principles and mechanisms.

Undermining the NPT Comparing current approaches of Russia and the West to preservation and use of the NPT, it is useful to recall that the NPT was born as an agreement between states that held very different, indeed conflicting, visions of the world. Within the NPT, the ‘imperialistic’ USA agreed to work together with the ‘evil empire’ USSR in keeping proliferation under mutual control and, through a series of arms control agreements, in dramatically reducing the nuclear arsenals. The different visions of the world shared by the major founders of the NPT regime did not impede the NPT from working. As emphasized by some workshop participants, this should be recognized as a precedent today: differences in arms control priorities should not prevent Russia and the USA from having joint policies and approaches to third countries and common challenges. The NPT itself was extended indefinitely in 1995, setting perspectives both for nuclear non- proliferation and for disarmament. The sentiments of a ‘failed NPT’ – based largely on the flawed outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, rather than a comprehensive assessment of the role and provisions of the treaty in confining nuclear explosives over four decades – stand a severe risk of becoming self-fulfilling prophesies. Fluffy talks about NPT substitutes and amendments may fail to recognize the inherent complexities and obligations embedded in the treaty. It was of high concern for workshop participants, that Russia and the USA have basically frozen their disarmament agendas, thus indirectly undermining the NPT regime. Most participants expressed dissatisfaction with the 2002 SORT Treaty, which was seen as a kind of ‘face-saving’ excuse for the non-entry into force of START II. SORT limited the ceiling to 1700–2200 deployed strategic weapons per side, but not dealing with an unspecified number of tactical weapons as well as large reserve arsenals of retired – not destroyed – nuclear weapons on each side. Moreover, the other

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(smaller) nuclear powers – France, the UK and China – very clearly stayed away from the nuclear disarmament arrangements. Experts called for the involvement of these three other ‘old’ nuclear powers, and of India, Pakistan and Israel (even in as yet preliminary and incomplete form) into a multilateral framework for nuclear arms control, nuclear transparency and – in tendency – nuclear disarmament. Participants noted as an important precedent Russia’s efforts to separate its military and civilian nuclear programmes which had until recently stayed mixed under the State Federal Agency Rosatom, and to consider possibilities of placing the main civilian parts of the country’s nuclear complex under IAEA safeguards. That was one of the recommendations to other nuclear powers to follow. Application of the same requirement to Indian nuclear complex under US–Indian nuclear agreement is another step in the same direction. At the workshop, experts expressed concern that some notable initiatives – such as the establishment of a CTBT treaty prohibiting nuclear tests and hence hindering the development of new types of nuclear weapons – basically failed to enter into force, thus contributing to the feeling that the era of nuclear disarmament was over. Some basic initiatives, like the 2000 Plan of Action for Nuclear Disarmament and NonProliferation (also known as the ‘13 steps’), for re-invigorating nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation had been discussed and approved at the 2000 NPT Review Conference – but they were not dealt with at the 2005 Review Conference, which ended without producing a final document. The need to understand non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament as an indivisible and deeply interconnected triangle should be obvious – and yet, such a realization seems further away than ever since the end of the Cold War. Mutual adjustment of the nuclear mentalities of Russia and the West must lead to better coordination of their policies in keeping and advancing the non-proliferation regime. If the two sides can manage to coordinate priorities in dealing with arms control treaties, fissile materials, resolving the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises, as well as approaching other proliferation challenges, this may provide a vital contribution to greater international – and hence, national – security.

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Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Chapter 2 The Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Sverre LODGAARD1

At each and every review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), arms control and disarmament have been at the centre of controversy. Implementation of the disarmament provision of Art. IV of the NPT remains unsatisfactory; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not in force; there are no negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); and the total number of nuclear weapons exceeds that of 1968, when the NPT was signed. Even though it did not produce a consensus final document, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference proved less acrimonious than the others. By then, South Africa had become the first state to eliminate its nuclear weapons; Russia had become the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons; NPT membership had increased considerably; the safeguards system was further improved; nuclear arsenals were significantly reduced; and the CTBT was in sight. The 1995 Conference came at the end of a period of good news, facilitating the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. A little later, indefinite extension would no longer have been possible. New problems emerged along with new ways of handling them. Whereas the NPT operates with nuclear weapons as the units of account – it is the weapons that should not proliferate and that should finally be eliminated – the Bush Administration shifted attention toward their possessors, repeatedly emphasizing that nuclear weapons must remain in the right hands/must be kept out of the worst hands. This was a selective policy targeted at US enemies, not a universal non-proliferation policy. US policy became selective in other respects as well. It said ‘no’ to some arms control agreements, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the CTBT – and ‘yes’ to others, among them the NPT. In the NPT, it highlighted some provisions, notably the commitments of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) parties, paying less attention to the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and their obligation to disarm. Gone were the commitments to the ‘principles and objectives’ and the ‘13 steps’ towards nuclear disarmament that had been adopted by the review conferences in 1995 and 2000. This affected the entire review process: if governments ignore or discard com-

1

Senior Research Fellow, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs..

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mitments whenever it proves convenient, it will never be possible to build an edifice of international cooperation.2 In short: common ground no longer exists. In the spring of 2005, the NPT Review Conference got nowhere, and a few months later the UN Summit failed to agree on any statement on non-proliferation and disarmament. Under such circumstances, how long can the Treaty and the regime that it harbours stay intact?

Resilience The resilience of the regime should not be underestimated. The NPT has more members than any other arms control agreement. Except for the special case of North Korea, only Israel, Pakistan and India remain outside. Many members follow what has become known as the Swedish example: regardless of what the NWS do, it would not be in Sweden’s interest to acquire nuclear arms. 3 In Europe, Africa and South America, many NNWS have remained committed to that kind of thinking and to the NPT. In East Asia and the Middle East, where proliferation pressures are considerable, the great majority of states still hope that the Treaty will survive. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5) also want the NPT to stay. If it unravels, there are no NWFZ to fall back upon in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, where proliferation pressures are strongest. Thus it seems that the regime may linger on for quite a while, even in the absence of common ground. It has to do so in order to survive, for, even at best, time will be needed to develop a renewed convergence of interests. At present, all that can be achieved are small-scale adjustments buying time for common ground to be rebuilt at a later stage when – it is to be hoped – the political constellations make that possible. To buy time, incrementalism is a sine qua non, but can common ground be recreated without a new comprehensive agreement – another grand bargain? This is basically a world order issue. In 1968, the victorious powers of the Second World War, which did so much to shape the United Nations, managed to orchestrate another comprehensive deal in their own image. Having made the P5 synonymous with the NWS, they drew the ladder up after themselves. Today, a new grand bargain would be difficult to make: in order to reflect contemporary realities, it would have to define a particular role for the particularly strong – i.e. the United States – and it is hard to imagine that the other four, as well as the great majority of NNWS, would accept anything of that sort. Only a dramatic shake-up of world affairs could lead states to reach out for another grand compromise. The way forward must be a matter of buying time, not for a new bargain to be struck, but for the basics of the Treaty to be reconfirmed and some substantial steps to implement the disarmament commitment of Art. VI to be taken.

Return to Nuclear Disarmament? What can realistically be achieved under current circumstances? Recently, various disarmament experts were asked to present their best candidates for answers. Not surpris2 Steven E. Miller, ‘Proliferation, disarmament and the future of the Non-proliferation Treaty’, in Morten Bremer Mærli & Sverre Lodgaard (eds), Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, London: Routledge 2007. 3 The only reservation was in reference to possible long-term developments that might make nuclear weapons the standard equipment of ordinary states. Jan Prawitz, From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Sweden case, Research Report No.20, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

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ingly, the answers were twists and turns of well-known propositions: strategic arms limitations, building on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START); elimination of tactical nuclear weapons; finessing the cut-off issue to get negotiations going; de-alerting and de-activation; 4 support for NWFZ; a gradual approach to no-first use; transparency measures; and disarmament education.5 The elimination of tactical weapons is more of a problem for Russia than for NATO. Russia deploys some 3000 of them, and their roles have been upgraded to compensate for conventional weakness. Still, they could be separated from their delivery vehicles and withdrawn to central storage without any loss of security. No conflict scenario calls for them to be activated at short notice. If the 480 US weapons in Western Europe were brought back to the continental United States, it would make little or no difference. Their rationale – connecting conventional and strategic weapons and linking Europe and the United States, as spelled out in NATO’s strategy document of 1999 – is empty nuclear theology. This is a remnant of a bipolar order that disappeared some 15 to 20 years ago. Another remnant is the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. China and India have doctrines of no first use, and China and Russia have exchanged no-first-use statements. In Europe, the European Union and Russia have named each other strategic partners. Nevertheless, in their military doctrines, Russia, France and Great Britain threaten to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other.6 In this respect, there is no sensible relationship between the political landscape and the military postures. Clearly, there is a role for declaratory measures as well. In the Final Declaration of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the member-states clarified and confirmed their unequivocal commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Since then, however, some NWS have returned to guarded, conditional statements, while others have simply fallen silent.7 In an important op-ed of 4 January 2007, four senior US statesmen – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – took issue with those policies. Calling for ‘reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical steps towards achieving that goal’, they emphasized that ‘without the bold visions, the actions will not be perceived as realistic or possible. Without the actions, the visions will not be perceived as realistic and possible’.8 Perhaps there is a mentality change in the making, moving nuclear disarmament up again on the radar screen of international security affairs. In a sense, the history of the nuclear age suggests that this may be the case. During the first decade (1945–55), three NWS emerged (the USA, the USSR and the UK). The second decade saw another two (France, China), and the third decade, one (Israel readied the first couple of weapons in 1967, before the Six-Day War). In the fourth decade, South Africa produced half a dozen bombs, but they were eliminated during the fifth decade. That far, the NWS 4 ‘De-alerting’ should be understood as measures that substantially increase to hours or days the time required to launch nuclear weapons in the active operational forces. De-activation means that weapons are unusable for weeks and months. 5 Sverre Lodgaard, Is Anything Doable in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament?, Policy Brief from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2006. 6 However, in NATO’s strategy document, the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons is deemed ‘extremely remote’. 7 Christophe Carle, ‘Nuclear Disarmament: For Starters, Just Say It’, in Sverre Lodgaard (2006), op. cit. 8 ‘Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn call for A World Free of Nuclear Weapons’, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007.

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might have seen non-proliferation as a winning proposition. After 1995, however, India and Pakistan – which had been NWS in the making for quite a while – tested; North Korea has done the same; and Iran is a case of grave concern. More states now have their eyes on the nuclear-weapon option; and some non-state actors want to acquire nuclear devices in order to use them. This is a turn of trends, and a more dangerous world also for the NWS. Hopefully, the linkage will cut both ways: the NNWS react to the behaviour of the nuclear powers, threatening to proliferate, while the NWS react to the threat of proliferation by constraining and reducing their nuclear arsenals. Another factor, much noted during the period of opportunity in the early 1990s, may work in the same direction: had there been no nuclear weapons in the world, the USA would have been even more superior, for no one can match US conventional strength. In the view of many observers, nuclear weapons are the sole equalizers. Disarmament is a far more cost-effective way of dealing with states that aspire to such equalizers than missile defence. For disarmament to be jump-started, US leadership is needed. In their Wall Street Journal article, Kissinger et al. advocate ambitious policies in this direction. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether economic measures and security assurances (on paper) will ever be enough to convince states like North Korea and Iran to be nonnuclear. As long as the NWS emphasize how important nuclear weapons are for them, it is hard to convince everybody else that they serve no useful purpose.

Reconfirming the Basics For many years, nuclear arms control arrangements revolved around two treaties: the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the NPT. The ABM Treaty is gone, and the NPT is under severe pressure. It may not survive another set-back at the review conference in 2010. If that conference fails, it is conceivable that members of NWFZ (members of the non-aligned movement) may leave the Treaty, protesting the growing imbalance in rights and obligations. In itself, this would not be of any great concern since these states would remain under an international legal obligation to stay non-nuclear and still be subject to IAEA safeguards. However, if a few states leave, many others may follow suit – in which case the legitimacy of the NPT would be so seriously undermined that it would almost certainly come to an end. North Korea has left already, and Iran may do the same if subjected to more sanctions. This means there is a need to reconfirm the basics of the Treaty. These are, first of all, the balance that was struck between its three pillars – non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses – and the operative meaning of ‘cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date’ of Art. VI. This wording was always taken to mean a CTBT and an FMCT. Another element of the regime, much emphasized from the beginning of NPT negotiations, is security assurances for NNWS.9 Furthermore, it should be recalled that Art. IV was carefully drafted to avoid any detraction from the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, the only qualification being that transactions must be in conformity with Articles I and II, precluding acquisitions for weapons purposes. Limitations on commerce in fuel-cycle technologies must therefore be seen in

9 George Bunn and Roland M. Timberbaev, ‘Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States’, Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1993.

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conjunction with other measures in order to maintain the overall balance of rights and obligations. To save the NPT, Harald Muller10 has argued that, first, the CTBT will have to take effect and be accompanied with an NWS undertaking not to develop or deploy any qualitatively new type of nuclear weapons. Second, a verifiable FMCT must be negotiated, possibly together with a set of NWS declarations stating that national holdings will not surpass certain specified levels. Third, the USA and Russia – which account for more than 90% of total arsenals – should undertake to reduce existing stockpiles by transferring significant amounts of fissile materials to civilian uses. Fourth, the 1995 Security Council resolution on security assurances should be reconfirmed and national strategy documents brought in line with it. Today, some of the national nuclear posture documents are at variance with the resolution. Fifth, space weapons should be prohibited, and limits agreed on missile defence systems. Finally, the phrases ‘...not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever...’ of Art. I and ‘...not to receive...from any transferor whatsoever...’ of Art. II, which apply to non-state as well as state actors, have got their own disarmament agenda to avert nuclear terrorism, such as elimination of HEU and dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons without electronic locks. This is yet another important matter for urgent action. This list may seem overly ambitious. However, it amounts to no more than a capping of nuclear arsenals – ‘cessation of the nuclear arms race’ – at long last. Except for reductions of US and Russian stockpiles of fissile materials (which are widely considered to be an integral part of an FMCT), it does not require disarmament in the literal sense of the term. It falls short of the demands of the Non-Aligned Movement for a nuclear weapons convention, a timetable for nuclear disarmament to zero and an international convention on security assurances. Yet it may be enough to maintain the integrity of the NPT. Of particular concern in this connection is the UK decision to go for a succession of the Trident submarine system. If Trident is replaced by a modernized version of similar size, extending the technical lifetime of the nuclear deterrent to 2070 or so, this will have a distinctly negative impact on the 2010 review conference. Europe has become a pacific region; Germany faces no external military threat from any of its neighbours, which is historically unique; and neither does the UK. Should Britain nevertheless go for near full-scale replacement of Trident, a great many countries may table an equally if not better justified rationale for nuclear weapons. And now for a concrete proposal: that in the autumn of 2009 – mid-way between the inauguration of a new US president and the 2010 NPT Review Conference – a UN summit meeting should be called to confirm the basics of the NPT. The summit would not necessarily be confined to non-proliferation and disarmament, but should be prepared and convened with special reference to these issues. Neither would it have to address disarmament measures at length: confirmation of the validity of the three pillars along with some measures for effectively capping nuclear arsenals would be enough to justify the meeting. This proposal is offered in the belief that policies of exceptionalism, unilateralism and coalitions of the willing may soon be modified in favour of multilaterally negotiated international agreements – and here the NPT occupies the centre stage.

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Harald Müller in Sverre Lodgaard (2006), op.cit.

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Conclusion The UN Secretary-General is mandated to draw the attention of the Security Council to matters threatening international peace and security (Art. 99 of the UN Charter). As the survival of the NPT can no longer be taken for granted, the Secretary-General has good reason to alert the Security Council to the risks involved. Art. 99 has been a ‘sleeping’ provision – relations between the Secretary-General and the Council have been of an informal nature – but a Secretary-General from the Korean peninsula may be personally motivated to bring the matter to the Council’s explicit attention. If the Seven-Nation Initiative so agrees, it could offer to be ‘friends of the Secretary-General’ on this matter. Established on the initiative of Kofi Annan, this group consists of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the UK. With a leg in all UN regional groups, the Seven-Nation Initiative is well positioned to exercise such a function. Naturally, it should play a role in setting and implementing the agenda of the meeting. Of course, a UN summit may be decided and convened in other ways – this proposal merely indicates one of them. The essence is that, for all those who are genuinely concerned about the future of the NPT, a reasonable mid-term objective would be to convene a summit meeting in the autumn of 2009 to reconfirm the basics of the bargain that was struck in the second half of the 1960s, and to avoid another review failure in 2010.

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Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Chapter 3 US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Robert M. WITAJEWSKI1

Many students of non-proliferation regimes have recently come to the conclusion that the non-proliferation architecture in the contemporary world is, at the very least, under large and growing stress. The proliferation challenge facing the world has evolved significantly in recent years. The actions of the leaders of the Iranian regime and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have presented the international community with some of the most difficult – and most dangerous – challenges to the nonproliferation system in recent times, a system that up to now has been carefully constructed and managed for decades. In addition, non-state actors – motivated either by ideology or personal financial gain – facilitate the procurement networks that supply, finance and generally enable the illicit weapons programmes of states of concern. Nevertheless, however, despite recent unsettling developments it is important not to forget that in recent years there have also been several important successes in efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – notably in Libya, where the government voluntarily renounced its nuclear weapons and other WMD programmes – and with the detection and ongoing dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network. The United States has taken the lead in addressing the new challenges to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Almost immediately upon assuming office, President George W. Bush took the initiative in emphasizing that WMD proliferation was the major security threat of the 21st century, and that addressing this threat required a new, comprehensive strategy. The substantial increase in both suppliers and consumers of key proliferation technologies and the materials required a new strategy to effectively counter the spread of WMD, a strategy that could take account not only of nonstate actors, but of the actions of proliferating states as well. Under President Bush’s direction, the United States has proceeded to embark upon a complex, and inter-linked, new approach to dealing with the threat of the spread and the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Framework In a speech at National Defense University on 1 May 2001, President Bush set out the basic framework for this new approach: 1 Director, Office of Regional Affairs. Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation US Department of State.

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Today’s world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses. We must work together with other likeminded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.2 The next year, in 2002, this vision was further elaborated in two documents, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’, and the ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Whereas in the past the US administrations had focused almost exclusively on non-proliferation policies, with a heavy emphasis on arms control mechanisms, under this new approach the United States would now seek to combine all elements of national power to counter the full spectrum of WMD threats. The result of President Bush’s new direction would be not only a dramatically expanded US non-proliferation effort, but also a new emphasis on counter-proliferation and consequence management. The new US approach rests on three pillars: x

x

x

First, the United States will strengthen its non-proliferation efforts in order to prevent rogue states, non-state actors, and terrorists from acquiring the materials, the technologies and the expertise to create and to use weapons of mass destruction. Examples of new tools employed against proliferation include the historic adoption of UNSCR 1540 and the inauguration of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Second, recognizing that non-proliferation efforts will not always be successful, the United States has begun developing the capability to deter, detect, defend against and defeat proliferation threats by taking the initiative on a variety of counter-proliferation efforts. An example of a new programme initiated by the Bush Administration in this area is the Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI, described below. Third, the United States will begin developing the capability to reduce and mitigate, to the maximum extent feasible, the horrific consequences of possible use of a WMD through effective consequence management.

These three pillars do not stand alone, but come together as elements of a systemic, unified approach to combating proliferation. Emphasizing this synergy, the National Strategy identifies four complimentary cross-cutting functions that are critical to combating WMD: improved intelligence collection and analysis; research and development; tailored strategies against hostile states and terrorists; and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. With this new conceptual architecture in place, the United States began working with like-minded states on implementation, developing new tools as well as reforming and re-invigorating existing tools in a menu designed to be complementary and reinforcing to prevent the spread of WMD and implement the non-proliferation and counter-proliferation aspects of the US national strategy. The concrete results of US efforts in the international arena can be seen in the adoption of UN Security Council 2

Text available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html

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Resolution 1540 and in the inauguration of such programmes as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Within the United States, President Bush issued Executive Order 13882 to expand and enhance the ability of US law enforcement entities to prevent the spread of WMD by preventing proliferators from receiving financial and other support by blocking the assets of proliferators and their supporters. The Bush Administration has also taken the initiative in promoting counterproliferation and defensive measures as an integral part of its strategic triad. These measures complement, enhance, and help to implement US non-proliferation efforts including UNSCR 1540, the GNEP, and the Global Initiative. As conceived by the United States, these counter-proliferation tools leverage diplomatic, economic, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to protect ourselves and others against illicit and proliferation activities by terrorists and their facilitators, proliferation networks of individuals seeking to enrich themselves, and states that place themselves outside international norms, like North Korea and Iran.

UNSCR 1540 Future historians may well record the adoption of UNSCR 1540 to have been a historic turning point in the international community’s fight against proliferation. This resolution was only the second ever adopted by the Security Council that invoked mandatory Chapter VII authority against a general, rather than a specific, threat to international peace and security. This resolution, passed in April 2004, became the first legally binding Chapter VII resolution that required states to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws that prohibit certain WMD/proliferation-related activities, and take other effective measures to prevent proliferation. Among its provisions, the resolution created a committee with eight experts whose role is to evaluate and assist member states in implementing their obligations and to report to the Council on implementation of the resolution, based on reports to it by states on the steps taken to implement their 1540 obligations. Its followon resolution, UNSCR 1673, extended the 1540 Committee’s mandate for two more years and reinforced implementation of the resolution.

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was announced by the US Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman in February 2006. Under the GNEP proposal, the US Department of Energy, in partnership with other nations with advanced nuclear technology, will accelerate the development, demonstration and deployment of new technologies to recycle nuclear power-reactor fuel without separating plutonium. The goal of the GNEP is to expand the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes around the world, in a safe and secure manner that will support economic development in a more environmentally-friendly way than continued reliance on fossil fuels. At the same time, the GNEP seeks to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation that might otherwise be associated with the broader adoption of nuclear power. The GNEP, as well nearer-term initiatives regarding nuclear fuel supply, address – and seek to resolve – a conundrum that the world has faced since the dawn of the nuclear age over a half-century ago: how to balance and utilize the peaceful potential of the atom while

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simultaneously containing and preventing its exploitation and proliferation in weapons of mass destruction. International cooperation is clearly essential to the success of the GNEP. Initial consultations on international cooperation were held by the United States in 2006 with five potential partners – China, France, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom. On the margins of the 2006 G-8 Summit, Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush noted the commonality of views on the essential role of nuclear energy in promoting energy security and took positive note of the GNEP and of President Putin’s initiative for international fuel-cycle centres. In 2007, members of the US and Russian governments began discussions about nuclear energy cooperation. Initial international reaction to the GNEP from other states has been generally positive. Japan issued a strongly positive public statement, and the United States has held several rounds of detailed discussions on research cooperation with both Japan and France. China has indicated its clear interest as well, and the United States has also held detailed discussions with Canada and South Korea concerning possible joint projects.

ENR and Assurances of Fuel Supply On 11 February 2004, President George W. Bush, again in a speech delivered to the US National Defense University, enumerated a number of challenges to international security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.3 In particular, President Bush proposed a ban on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to additional states not already possessing full-scale, functioning ENR plants. The participating governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group continue to discuss how best to control ENR transfers to prevent proliferation. The United States believes that assurances of reliable access to nuclear fuel are important to reduce interest in the acquisition of ENR technology. The USA has worked with other supplier states to put forward a concept for a fuel-supply back-up mechanism at the IAEA and is working with others, including Russia, France, Germany, Japan and the UK, in developing proposals for assurances of fuel supply that would be supported by both supplier and recipient countries.

IAEA Safeguards Simultaneously with these new non-proliferation initiatives, the Bush Administration believes that the existing IAEA safeguards system must be continually strengthened to ensure that it is sufficiently robust to provide the international community with confidence that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-related activities. Recent events and current trends point to the escalating challenges facing the safeguards system. Barriers to proliferation – whether the sophisticated technology, special skills, or economic resources required – run the very real risk being rendered obsolete by advances in modern technology unless they are constantly updated. Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear capability illustrates the consequences of the spread of what at one time was considered to be sophisticated technology that has now become much more accessible and common, or simply ‘old technology’ that has 3

Text available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html

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become much more widespread – but which remains nonetheless effective for producing WMD. During his February 2004 NDU speech, President Bush also made three key proposals to strengthen the tools of the IAEA in its work against nuclear proliferation that address these concerns: First, President Bush called on all states to sign an Additional Protocol with the Agency, which greatly expands the Agency’s abilities to detect clandestine nuclear activities. Second, he proposed that the IAEA Board of Governors should create a special committee on safeguards and verification, to improve the organization’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance with safeguards obligations. And third, that the IAEA establish the rather commonsense principle that countries under investigation for violating nuclear non-proliferation obligations should not be allowed to serve or continue serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee while accusations against them are in the process of being resolved. Since President Bush made his appeal, approximately 40 states have brought Additional Protocols into force (a 50% increase); 25 states have signed Additional Protocols (a 23% increase); and 34 states have received approval for their Additional Protocol from the Board of Governors (a 29% increase). Moreover, the United States has worked within the IAEA Board of Governors to establish a Committee on Safeguards and Verification to improve the organization’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Since the Committee began in June 2005, the United States has actively supported its work; the Committee held its sixth meeting in May 2007.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism The Global Initiative (GI) is another element of the US strategy to prevent WMD proliferation by highlighting and countering what President George W. Bush has identified as one of the gravest threats that we face: a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist. This voluntary initiative was launched by Presidents Bush and Putin when they met in July 2006. The goal is to develop partnership capacity around the world to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis. The Global Initiative’s aims include: x x x x x x

strengthening material accounting, control and physical protection; and enhancing civilian nuclear facility security; promoting detection of nuclear and radioactive materials, including developing inter-operable national detection capabilities; preventing the provision of safe havens and financial or economic resources to terrorists; strengthening national criminal and civil legal frameworks to provide for the implementation of appropriate liability for terrorists and facilitators of nuclear terrorism; improving participants’ capabilities to respond, investigate and mitigate in cases of terrorist attack involving nuclear or other radioactive material; and promoting appropriate information sharing among participants.

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In addition to Russia and the United States, as of late August 2007, 54 other countries had joined in the Global Initiative, with many more expected to join in the coming months and years. The Global Initiative has begun with a flurry of activity. At its first meeting, held in October 2006 in Rabat, Morocco, a Statement of Principles was developed and endorsed. This was followed up with a second meeting, held in February in Ankara, Turkey, where participants agreed on the basic outlines of a ‘Plan of Work for 2007–2008’. The third meeting of the GI members is scheduled to take place in Kazakhstan in June 2007, to welcome new partners and further refine the Plan of Work. Given this successful inauguration and rapid growth in participation, the United States expects that this Initiative, like the PSI, will gain progressively wide support and provide a valuable avenue for cooperation on what is perhaps the most dangerous threat facing the world today.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) President George W. Bush launched the PSI in May 2003 as a cooperative, international effort aimed at halting the proliferation of WMD. The PSI creates a common framework under the Statement of Interdiction Principles to bring together those nations that are willing to work together to halt trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Governments choose to commit themselves to the PSI by formally endorsing the Statement of Interdiction Principles. This commitment includes action to interdict WMD-related shipments to, or from, states or non-state actors of proliferation concern when reasonable information exists. The PSI is best thought of more as an activity or a regime rather than an organization. States’ actions are governed to the extent that their national legal authorities permit, and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks. The PSI began with eleven nations, but today more than eighty countries on six continents have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. The USA has worked with PSI partners in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to successfully prevent transfers of equipment and materials to the WMD and missile programmes in countries of concern. For example, thanks to PSI cooperation, it has been possible to block some exports to Iran of controlled equipment relating to its missile programmes, as well as of dual-use goods and of heavy water. Endorsing the PSI should focus governments toward examining their interagency process and procedures to ensure they have the requisite capabilities to attack the problem of proliferation across the spectrum of potential action from law enforcement and diplomacy to military. Ideally, proliferation activities will be stopped as early in the process as possible, by governments acting in their own best interests to prevent unscrupulous businessmen who put profits from sales to rogue states or non-state actors above the greater good of mankind. PSI participants seek to interdict shipments of proliferation concern at the moment of maximum legal authority. Participation in the PSI also provides an effective means for countries to implement their obligations as UN member states to comply with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as implement their obligations under UNSC resolutions 1718, 1737 and 1747, which address the dangerous nuclear and missile programmes of North Korea and Iran.

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Executive Order 13382 Executive Order 13382 utilizes the executive authority that US presidents hold under the US Constitution to enact regulations, rules, and procedures to implement US law in the campaign against WMD proliferation. President Bush signed this Executive Order, titled ‘Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters’, in 2005. E.O. 13382 is designed to freeze the assets of designated proliferators and their supporters that come under US jurisdiction, and to deny proliferators and their supporters access to the US financial system in order to prevent their exploitation of US financial institutions and structures. To date, the designation of more than 30 entities and two individuals, including in Iran, North Korea and Syria, has served to impede these proliferators’ access to international financial markets. The UN Security Council has recognized the importance of cutting off financial support to proliferation – in general through the adoption of UNSCRs 1540 and 1673, and in particular through the adoption of UNSCRs 1695, 1718, 1737 and 1747, which call for preventing certain financial transfers related to the nuclear and missile programmes of North Korea and Iran, respectively. Many nations, including Japan and Australia as well as the European Union, have followed suit by designating entities pursuant to obligations under the various resolutions.

Consequence Management Consequence Management (CM) is the third pillar in the US strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. Broadly defined, CM refers to the coordinated, combined inter-agency assistance of the US government to allies and friendly countries following, or in preparation for, an anticipated chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident precipitated either by a terrorist non-state actor or by an accidental discharge of great magnitude. The overall aim is to minimize or mitigate any resulting casualties. In event of an incident occurring within the United States, the Department of State has been assigned responsibility for acting as the intermediary between the US government and other governments concerning requests for, and offers of, assistance. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for domestic incident management. As our experience in responding to widespread natural disasters around the world has shown, crafting and organizing such a response is neither simple nor straightforward. Be it a hurricane, an earthquake, a tsunami, or a radiological event, the key to saving lives and mitigating the impact is intensive advance training by a corps of first responders and follow-up personnel, the pre-positioning the necessary emergency equipment either on hand or nearby and readily available for dispatch, and, finally, adequate coordination from all sectors of the government with a responsibility for public safety, security, and defence. In order to respond to requests for assistance, the United States has begun coordinating both within the US government, as well as with friends and allies, on developing emergency preparedness and CM capabilities. The first step in planning is to ensure that the United States is prepared to respond to requests from foreign governments. Building up and maintaining US capabilities to assess, plan, and respond to the needs is the next level of preparation. After this comes coordination. Subject-matter experts and relief supplies (if not pre-positioned) need to be identified and arrangements made for quick contact and dispatch to the scene of the incident. It is vitally important that governments coordinate so that assistance is cumulative and supportive, not duplicative or irrelevant, and is properly sequenced to provide maximum assistance. The goal is that

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all US government assistance – and that of other governments and aid entities – be both timely and integrated. To be adequately prepared and to have the necessary infrastructure in place, certain assumptions must be made by planners. In the case of consequence management, US planners have made the following assumptions: x x x x

An incident resulting from either a deliberate act, or an accident, will require the same level of response to assist the affected population. A terrorist act will be directed against the United States or one of its allies. A terrorist act will be directed against, or have primary consequences on, civilian populations and economies. The most effective response teams and crisis managers will have received prior training in recognizing different crisis scenarios, have equipment onhand or nearby to respond, and have proficiency in actual responses.

The Department of State is responsible for coordinating US efforts to work with other countries in assisting them to develop their own emergency preparedness and CM capabilities. In the event of an incident occurring outside of the USA, the State Department would lead an inter-agency group of experts that would be quickly sent to assist local and national officials and would serve as the point of contact in receiving and processing other governments’ requests or offers of assistance. The pattern of recent terrorist attacks in recent years shows that terrorists have varied widely their targets and their methods. While, thankfully, none of the attacks have involved WMD, the attacks against office buildings in New York City, train stations in Madrid, night clubs in Bali, underground stations and buses in London, and suicide bombers in Baghdad illustrate the challenge facing officials around the world as they seek to prepare for the unknowable against an adversary that has the advantage of being able to pick and choose the target, the method, and the timing.

Conclusion Faced with a new order of threats to the non-proliferation regime in the world, the United States has responded with a new menu of tools. This array consists of new approaches combined with a re-invigoration of existing tools, structures and organizations. Working with like-minded countries around the world, the USA is confident that it can keep the nuclear genie successfully contained in its civilian bottle, enhance global economic prosperity, improve the quality of life for all of the planet’s inhabitants, and continue to raise the barrier against rogue states and non-state terrorist actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In this effort, however, no single state – however powerful or dedicated – can succeed by itself. To keep the world safe from the effects of the use of WMD requires not unilateral or bilateral, but dedicated and ongoing multilateral efforts. Those who seek to proliferate or seek to make a quick – if illegal and immoral – profit from trafficking in WMD, or the materials and persons needed to finance, design, manufacture or deliver them, will never cease testing for weakness the barriers constructed against them. In this never-ending ‘cat and mouse’ game, no government can ever relax its vigilance. But, given the good will and dedication of responsible, concerned governments around

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the world, the United States is confident that the international community can succeed – not least because of the unthinkable consequences of a failure to do so.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 4 Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO1

Ever since the creation of the first nuclear weapons, scientists, military and political leaders, and opinion makers have raised the question what a nuclear future would look like. One world or none was both the title of a well-known collection of papers and the basic dilemma that characterized the beginning of the nuclear age, which could be spelled out in this way: mankind – if it did not learn to control, in a strongly centralized and super-national way, the nuclear genie that had emerged from the bottle – was condemned to a future of nuclear annihilation. At the start of the nuclear age, the forecast was that either nuclear weapons be centrally controlled, or any nation of a certain size and development would soon decide to acquire its own (albeit small) nuclear arsenal, with the result that nuclear war would be sooner or later inevitable. The RussellEinstein Manifesto of more than 50 years ago expressed a stronger point of view: either mankind renounces war altogether or nuclear weapons would bring universal destruction. The history of the last 60 years has not contradicted this basic dilemma, but did show that the time scale in which the dilemma would force some immediate collective decision, and hence a choice between one world or none, was and is difficult to predict.

Nuclear Stability? In fact, up to now we have not had any use for nuclear weapons in war for two basic reasons. The first reason is that the leadership of the two nuclear superpowers and of the smaller nuclear states behaved a rational decision makers as far as the control of nuclear weapons, and the decision not to initiate the use of such weapons, was concerned. In others words, deterrence worked. The second reason is that, contrary to the expectations of the early nuclear age, most nations remained non-nuclear (in other words proliferation was contained). The nuclear stability which we enjoyed in the last half century should be seen in a significant way as the result of good luck, since the possession of nuclear weapons does not automatically make leaders into rational decision makers, nor are non-nuclear states bound to indefinitely refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The basic document which helped contain the spread of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which is normally referred to as the cornerstone of nuclear stability. The NPT distinguishes its parties between Nuclear 1

Secretary General of Pugwash and Physics Department, Universita’ degli Studi di Milan.

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Weapon States (NWS) – that is states who made a nuclear test before 1967 - and all the other states that, in order to be a member of the NPT, are classified as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). The treaty has basically three legs: x

x x

The Principle of Non Proliferation: The NNWS should refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or from seeking the control of nuclear weapons, while the NWS should not transfer nuclear weapons or parts of them to others. Moreover, all Parties to the Treaty should not transfer [un-safeguarded] fissile material to NNWS. The Principle of Disarmament: Parties to the Treaty, and particularly the NWS, should commit themselves to negotiations in good faith aimed at achieving at an early stage nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The Principle of Access to Peaceful Nuclear Technology. All Parties to the Treaty have the right to develop and be assisted in the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes.

The Cold War ended with a significant effort in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Between the second half of the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s, the US and Russia dramatically reduced the size of their arsenals. Moreover, for some time around the end of the Cold War no non-nuclear state decided to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the set of countries possessing nuclear weapons unchanged, namely the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council and –unofficially – Israel. The Chernobyl accident in 1986 induced a gloomy picture of nuclear civilian activity, and for some time interest in this type of energy dropped worldwide, as did interest in proliferation problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the spread of nuclear energy technology. The NPT itself was extended indefinitely in 1995, contributing to what seemed to be a bright perspective for nuclear non proliferation and disarmament. But after the mid-1990’s, the condition of three legs of the NPT began a significant shift. First, Russia and the US basically froze their disarmament agenda, with the last signed treaty leaving some 1700-2200 deployed strategic weapons per side and an unspecified number of tactical, as well as retired – but not destroyed, – nuclear weapons per side. Moreover, the other (smaller) nuclear powers, France, the UK and China, stayed very clear of the complete nuclear disarmament threshold. In 1998, two new declared (but unofficial from the standpoint of the NPT) nuclear powers arose, namely India and Pakistan. And later, for the first time, one country exited the NPT and made a nuclear test (North Korea).

Extending the Arms Control Regime Moreover, some remarkable initiatives – such as the establishment of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests and hence hindering the development of new types of nuclear weapons – basically failed to become a reality, thus contributing to the feeling that the era of nuclear disarmament was over. Some basic initiatives (the 13 steps) aimed at reinvigorating nuclear disarmament were discussed and approved at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, but were not even mentioned in the 2005 Review Conference, which ended without any final document. Finally, an interest in civilian nuclear energy returned in various parts of the world. Questions about the possibility of an effective control to prevent covert utilization for military purposes of the civilian technology became more and more relevant; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna

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elaborated stricter constraints to be applied to countries developing civilian nuclear programs, notably the so-called additional protocol. These stricter constraints have been received with mixed response. Many critical countries (i.e., critical form the viewpoint of proliferation risks) declined to sign the additional protocol. A specific country (Iran) has been under extensive scrutiny and has been accused of developing an indigenous fuel cycle with the undeclared purpose of taking steps forward in the direction of building nuclear weapons. In article VI of the NPT, explicit mention is made not only to nuclear disarmament as a final goal, but also to the pursuing of negotiation leading to an early cessation of the arms race [among nuclear powers], as an intermediate step. The prevailing idea has been that, in a substantive sense, the arms race ended with the end of the cold war. Now we are seeing more and more signs of a trend going in the opposite direction. We can say that there are worrisome signs of the unraveling of the arms control regime as we know it. The cessation of the ABM treaty, the threat, by the Russian side, of the withdrawal from the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty as a response both to the new propose deployments of missile defense systems in Europe and to the increased intermediate range missile capabilities in many Asian countries, presents a gloomy picture of the status of the arms control regime. It is thus clear why the NPT is seen more and more as being in a critical condition, and why many observers believe that the battle against proliferation is not going well, to put it mildly. However, let us be clear: no country supports nuclear proliferation in general. Countries may decide that they need to possess nuclear weapons, but no government is buying the argument that ‘more is better’ when speaking about nuclear weapon states. The statement that a large web of nuclear weapon states deterring each other may be a more stable configuration than the present one, is only an argument used by some political scientists (such as Waltz) to gain notoriety by denying an obvious wisdom. Where countries differ is in the strategy for enforcing non proliferation, and in their individual perceptions of the threat posed by different cases of proliferation.

Nuclear Acquisition Countries may decide that they want to acquire nuclear weapons for two basic reasons: x x

The presence of an external threat, especially, but not exclusively, when the external threat is represented by nuclear weapon states (whether official or de facto). The prestige and the power which is associated with nuclear weapons.

The NPT up to now had done a remarkable job in inducing countries to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons by addressing, albeit in an imperfect way, both of the motivations above. The principle of non-proliferation in the NPT helps in creating an environment partially free from nuclear threats, while the principle of disarmament aims at decreasing both the relevance of nuclear weapons and the prestige associated to their possession. The NPT, as is well known, discriminates between haves and havenots. This discrimination was meant to be temporary, as it has always been understood that the only way to move towards a stable equilibrium was to resolve the distinction between haves and have-nots by eliminating nuclear weapons, namely by making them illegal (as in the case of chemical and biological weapons). Progressing towards such

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stability is tantamount to having a manifest, unequivocal and sustained progress in nuclear disarmament. While the time scale is uncertain, with the lack of any steady progress in nuclear disarmament we are now seeing very worrisome signs of crisis in the NPT. If, when and how the NPT might seriously crack and possibly collapse is of course not clear, but much depends on how the international community will react to the present difficulties of the non proliferation regime. One of the most notable problems facing the NPT is that some nuclear weapons states, most notably the United States, as well as come other countries have developed a strategy wherein, while paying formal tribute to the role of the NPT, in fact sidetrack it. Their fight against nuclear proliferation takes then a more unilateral approach and includes the following points: x

x

x

x

Nuclear proliferation is a threat to the present system of international relations, but there are serious differences depending on who is in fact acquiring or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. There are very bad (hostile) nuclear proliferators and others who are considered not so bad. The relatively good ones (like Israel and India) of course are treated very differently from the bad ones. Progress in nuclear disarmament is not considered to have de facto an influence on the decision of another country to acquire or not to acquire nuclear weapons. Consequently, neither nuclear disarmament nor the steps related to it (the CTBT for example, or any of the 13 steps) are on the agenda. Token reference is generally made to previous achievements in nuclear disarmament, but with little or no consequence on the political decisions that are to be taken. The fight against non proliferation is primarily based on containment and repression of those countries that are deemed to be both hostile and possible nuclear proliferators. Instruments of repression range from different types of sanctions to actual (preventive) war. The need to control fissile material and to prevent unauthorized use by potential proliferators or non-national groups (terrorists) is acknowledged in principle, although questions arise as to its actual position on the priority list to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Resulting Resentment The concerns raised above may pose several problems: x

One should not underestimate the degree of resentment that is induced by (real or perceived) unfair treatment, and the ensuing political consequences. Israel was never subjected to any pressure to renounce its possession of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan were subjected to sanctions which were later removed, while India in the end got the best deal – the proposed US India nuclear deal. North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT, is (or was) under severe sanctions. While we do not want to deny here that there may be serious motivations and reasonable considerations behind these unequal treatments, the overall impression is nonetheless that nuclear proliferation lost its character of being a shared idea (or value) of the international community and instead became one of the many instruments of some partisan foreign policy. We should recall that the NPT itself was not meant to involve only countries

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x

x

x

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with common foreign policy goals, but was instead an agreement among countries with different if not antagonistic views of the world which agreed to some common constraint. It is true that there is no immediate correlation between the major nuclear powers’ pace of nuclear disarmament and the development of nuclear ambitions among non nuclear states. A country will most likely take the decision to go nuclear under the pressure of security concerns. But if a general trend supporting nuclear disarmament is in place, the global environment is less threatening to potential proliferators, and it is more difficult for countries to become nuclear without losing credibility and influence. So while the lack of disarmament may not be the immediate motivating factor for proliferation, it nevertheless has a general overall influence on allowing proliferation to develop. In other words, if nuclear powers keep telling others to ‘do as I say and not as I do’, there is no guarantee that this message will be listened to indefinitely. What about the motivations behind nuclear weapon states which are not actively pursuing nuclear disarmament? Preserving or enhancing prestige and influence on world affairs constitutes one kind of motivation, but do nuclear weapon states also feel threatened? In this period, not in particular by other nuclear weapon states. Although if this were the case, controlled and agreed initiatives for nuclear disarmament among nuclear weapon states could actually decrease this threat. Moreover the two nuclear superpowers (US and Russia) could still walk a long way on the road of nuclear disarmament without losing their overwhelming nuclear superiority. Are there then other (non nuclear) threats, and in particular is terrorism a real or perceived threat? Yes, but we are talking about threats that would hardly be affected by a substantial decrease in the nuclear arsenal. A large nuclear arsenal is not indispensable or even useful for dealing, say, with terrorism (even with potential nuclear terrorism). Rather, the point is that when the political climate induces the public to believe that there is a war going on, any form of disarmament – be it nuclear or non nuclear – is unpopular and easily falls off the political agenda of even more progressive parties. In particular nuclear disarmament is negatively affected by the so-called ‘war on terror’. Creating an environment where some specific more powerful countries impose independent, autonomous non proliferation constraints might even be considered necessary in order to effectively limit the transfer of dangerous nuclear technology and materials. One might thus appreciate a complementary role between individual countries and international institutions in the battle against proliferation. Problems arise when the non proliferation campaign is used as an excuse to impose sanctions or wage war against a country that is defined as evil, and where the main aim is not to stop proliferation, but to induce a regime change. The problems become bigger if the intervention results not in the restoration of peace and order (not to mention democracy), but in the creation of a seemingly permanent situation of unrest and civil war. The reference to Iraq is obvious, although we have no time to address the complexity of the problems related to Iraq here. We want only to point out that, from the point of view of nuclear proliferation, the Iraqi war and other similar initiatives that might be planned or envisioned have the effect of greatly diminishing the significance of the non proliferation issue, reducing it to a mere excuse for some other goal. Moreover, the war on Iraq sent two other sets of

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x

messages: first, that big powers can bypass international institutions such as the UN; and second, that countries much closer to reaching military nuclear capability (such as the DPRK) are punished far less in the end than countries which are classified as ‘evil’ yet are very far from that capability. In all the issues surrounding terrorism, nuclear terrorism has a special place. The proper strategy to address (potential) nuclear terrorism is to reduce the relevant risks by controlling all fissile materials and eliminating the excess fissile material coming from the dismantlement of weapons (i.e., blending the excess HEU and disposing and/or utilizing in MOX the excess PU). It is also important to get the agreement of all States, irrespectively of their political orientation, in controlling any amount of fissile material produced with the strictest available safeguards. The international community is lagging behind on both counts. There is still a large amount of excess fissile material to be disposed of in Russia mainly (about 20 years after the INF treaty) and, as mentioned above, international consensus about new stringent measures to control nuclear activities is still relatively limited and, in any case, international control does not concern fissile material for military use.. The motivations for this state of affairs are manifold, from commercial problems which slowed the disposal of fissile material in the former Soviet Union, to the perception that stringent safeguards are at times an instrument of discrimination rather than an instrument aimed at protecting the security of every country. Failing a vigorous effort – both technical and diplomatic – to control and dispose of (when needed) fissile material, the spectrum of nuclear terrorism will be with us for some time.

In order to discuss a future reduction of nuclear risks, it is perhaps useful to go back to some of the special features of the NPT. The more unilateralist approach, described before, has created more problems than results, and has significantly eroded the large consensus about the general non proliferation regime.

NPT Strength and Credibility As said before, the NPT was born as an agreement between states having a very different vision of the world. In the NPT, the ‘imperialistic’ US cooperated with the ‘evil empire’ (USSR) in keeping proliferation under control and, for some time, in dramatically reducing the nuclear arsenals. Different visions of the world did not impede the NPT from working. This should be true even now when the states antagonistic to the US are not as powerful as was the USSR, but may still in general be unlikely to yield to repression. In order to be credible, the three basic legs of the NPT should be honestly respected. Disarmament should not be disconnected from non-proliferation, and assistance in the development of nuclear energy should be given without undue restrictions or discriminations. But in order to improve the collective security in nuclear affairs, there is an urgent need to revisit the entire system of safeguards and constraints on the production of fissile materials. The additional protocol itself (not yet adopted by a sufficiently large number of states) is probably not enough, and more stringent international control on the production of fissile material should be established. New ideas along these lines have been put forward relatively recently by the IAEA, but more ideas are needed. IAEA membership could easily become universal, as even countries out-

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side the NPT are members of the IAEA. There is moreover no objective reason why all countries which are members of the IAEA should not be induced to sign and ratify the additional protocol and other possibly more stringent measures, without exception. The issue of addressing alleged violations of non-proliferation rules will come out as it has recently. Dialogue may be very difficult at times, but can go a long way, and should be the principal instrument for resolving disputes. If even a difficult case like North Korea has been put on a totally different track through dialogue and perseverance, many other cases could presumably be solved by a persistent effort towards dialogue. The effectiveness of sanctions depends on many factors; long-term large-scale sanctions, for example, are generally less effective, as countries tend to adjust to a prolonged sanction regime, and the resulting isolation fosters nationalistic attitudes and cuts off the political/economic leadership from the international arena. Moreover, authoritarian regimes tend to be strengthened by isolation and, if there is a determination to build nuclear weapons or WMD, this determination can be strengthened.

Conclusion Military force has recently been used against countries suspected of violating the non proliferation rules. Leaving aside for a moment the important issue of the legitimacy of these actions, the results have been altogether a dramatic failure. In general terms, it may be true that some military actions slow down the construction of nuclear weapons (or WMDs) by destroying some specific infrastructure, but then what comes next? If, after the destruction of some specific nuclear infrastructure, the country is able to restart the program, then nothing has been ‘gained’, except possibly some time. And if military pressure on that country goes well beyond the destruction of nuclear plants, then recent history shows that the end result may be a situation of total chaos, where instability may spread and create an intractable problem. To regain consensus for (and credibility of) the NPT and the non proliferation regime, it is really essential that the agenda for nuclear disarmament is reconsidered, and that some relevant visible steps are taken by the nuclear power states. It is in our collective interest that the non proliferation regime be seen as the result of a choice of the entire international community and not as an imposition of some specific more powerful states. In fact, a different attitude should be taken by nuclear power states. What follows here is a list of reasonable, visible steps that could be taken by the nuclear powers to support the credibility of the NPT, by carrying on their obligation under articleVI and more generally steps that could reinvigorate nuclear disarmament. x

x x

Russian and American strategic weapons and SORT. First, the SORT agreement itself should clearly be made irreversible, and second, a further significant progressive reduction of strategic nuclear weapons should be planned with some stringent deadlines. Withdrawn weapons and delivery systems should be destroyed. Preservation of all the existing arms agreements. No arms control agreement must be abolished. Efforts should be made to enhance the bilateral arms control agreements and to extend them to other parties, when possible. Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Tactical Nuclear Weapons have only been withdrawn by force of unilateral measures. Agreements should be signed for the removal and the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons.

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x x x

x x

x

CTBT/FMCT. The Comprehensive Test Ban should enter into force and this depends primarily on the decision of the United States to rescue the treaty. The FMCT should be discussed and negotiated in a short time. The smaller nuclear powers should also contribute to the disarmament agenda. Modernization of nuclear forces (Chinese forces, Trident in the UK, etc. ) should be indefinitely postponed. Nuclear weapons should not be allowed to be deployed on other countries’ territories. Only American nuclear forces are currently deployed in other countries (six European countries). Other official or de-facto nuclear powers might decide to do the same in the future, creating possibly very dangerous situations. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The nuclear powers should agree with no reservation whatsoever to respect all proposals for establishing nuclear weapon free zones, and commit to respect the zones once established. Reliance on nuclear weapons should be manifestly reduced. Nuclear weapons should be all de-alerted. Military strategies should manifestly relay less and less on nuclear weapons. No first use policies should be encouraged and security guarantees should be extended to non nuclear weapons States. De-facto nuclear powers should contribute also to the disarmament agenda, by signing all the arms control treaties other than the NPT, by respecting the basic NPT constraints, and by stopping nuclear modernization and plans for future developments of nuclear weapons.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 5 De-Coding the Russian Position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis Ivan SAFRANCHUK1

There exists a wide range of opinions on the motivations and reasoning behind Russia’s position on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Some think that Russia has deliberately and cynically been creating problems for the USA with Iranian hands. Others assert – in fact, a kind of mainstream explanation – that the driving force is economic considerations. However, to say that the Russian position on Iran is formed by economic interests implies a level of simplification equal to the explanation that the USA invaded Iraq purely for the sake of oil. Still, this author has repeatedly witnessed how those who shrug their shoulders at the ‘just oil’ reasoning for the US invasion of Iraq, have no hesitation in explaining the Russian position on Iran in the same economic terms.

Strategic Considerations of the Russian Position The Russian position on Iran is formed at the crossroads of various global and regional considerations. The balance of these considerations is always in flux, which makes Moscow’s position volatile. Still, the Russian position has a centre of gravity that is unlikely to shift. Two major dynamics constitute the dominant framework within which Russia’s position on Iran is formulated: the ‘regional vs. global’ dynamic, and the ‘pragmatism vs. principles’ dynamic. Global vs. regional dynamic Russia sees the Iranian nuclear crisis within both a regional and a global context. The global context is obvious: if Iran goes nuclear, the Non-Proliferation Treaty will become meaningless. It is not clear who is right: the optimists, who think that the NPT has really kept states from developing nuclear weapons, or the pessimists, who believe that countries joined the treaty after abandoning their military nuclear ambitions for reasons that had little to do with the NPT. This author is of the latter opinion. But regardless of who is right, both admit that in the world after the NPT becomes meaningless, nuclear risks will grow, although they disagree on the scale. The paradox is that in this scenario, pessimists (NPT disbelievers) become optimists – because if the treaty does not matter much, its collapse won’t change much either. Optimists (NPT believ-

1

Director of the Moscow branch of the World Security Institute

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ers) however, become pessimists – because if the treaty indeed plays an important role, its collapse will have serious consequences. The regional context is less obvious, but Russia is very serious about the Caspian regional perspective. Russia is struggling for influence and economic benefits in Central Asia (the eastern coast of Caspian Sea), and the Caucasus (the western coast of Caspian Sea) is the key region for the transit of Central Asian resources. Moscow is on the verge of losing the influence game in the Caucasus, with Washington developing relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and both these countries thinking about NATO membership. From Russia’s point of view, Georgia – or more precisely, its current leadership – is a hopeless case. This leaves regime change in Georgia the only option for Russia. Moscow is keeping the South Ossetia and Abkhazia cards (two de jure Georgian territories, but de facto independent states) ready to play in Georgian politics. Azerbaijan is not rushing to spoil relations with Russia. But the growing cooperation between Baku and Washington worries Russia. Moscow may not realistically expect to reverse Azerbaijan’s interest in the West, but it has no wish to see Azerbaijan inviting a US/NATO military presence in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea area. However, Azerbaijan does have an incentive for inviting an outside military presence. The region is directly connected to Iran, and Azerbaijan feels a serious threat from this country. Pragmatism vs. principles dynamic On the pragmatic level, Russia is not interested in Iran going nuclear, although it does not feel the same degree of threat as the USA or Israel. In the Russian view, even if Iran obtains a limited nuclear arsenal, it will be fully occupied by holding US, Israeli and Saudi Arabian targets at risk. Russia might be targeted by Iran, but this seems unlikely. On the other hand, of course even low probability in this case is cause for concern. At the same time, there is the question of principles – about international law. Russia hesitates to accept the logic that the Iranian nuclear crisis should be solved by any means. As a minimum, Moscow will seek to make sure that the solution is in accordance with international law. Russia’s interest in international law is rooted in the ‘Primakov Doctrine’ – the line of thought that sees Russia, as the successor to the USSR, as a beneficiary of international law. Russia is too weak to defend its national interests openly, and so should wait for better times, behind international law. This logic was never comprehensively codified or voiced; nevertheless, it became evident in Moscow’s foreign policy activities in the second half of the 1990s. With Russia growing increasingly self-confident and mature thanks to high oil prices, the Primakov Doctrine is challenged by more assertive and pro-active approaches. Russia feels stronger and more capable of pursuing pragmatic interests. Still, international law is seen as an asset which it is too early to abandon. The interaction between these two dynamics (global vs. regional; pragmatism vs. principles) creates three different perspectives on Iran, summarized graphically in the figure below: the global-principle, global-pragmatic, and regional-pragmatic perspectives (there is no regional-principle perspective). These perspectives create three policy options on Iran: a soft, medium, or tough stance on the nuclear issue.

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Gloal

Regional

I. Safranchuk / De-Coding the Russian Position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

TOUGH

MEDIUM

Pragmatism

Pragmatism

Principle

Principle

Global

SOFT

Regional

X

Figure 1: Interactions Between Policy-Pairs Global-principle perspective: Russia generally soft on Iran Within the logic of the Primakov Doctrine, Russia sees international law as an important asset in its diplomatic arsenal. In the 1990s and in 2000–2002, Russia described Iran as a ranking member of the NPT, and said that Iran was not violating the treaty. Russia insisted that Israeli, US and UK allegations regarding Iranian nuclear activities could not be taken for granted – they would have to be verified by the IAEA. In 2002 and 2003, US diplomacy began to accept the idea that Russia would join in Western pressure on Iran only if this were pursued on the basis of IAEA reports. In referring the matter to the IAEA, Moscow felt that the agency would never be able to prove clear Iranian non-compliance with the NPT. Russia was tired of defending its relations and cooperation with Iran and resorted to the position that if IAEA testifies there are problems, Russia joins pressure on Iran. Probably Russia was expecting that the IAEA would never be in the position to confirm Iran’s non-compliance with NPT. Consequently, the IAEA resolution to report the Iranian case to the UN Security

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Council in late 2005 and early 2006 came as a surprise. Russia explained it primarily as a result of Iran’s behaviour under its new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who basically left with IAEA with no choice but to refer the case of Iran to the Security Council. Still Russia may be surprised to learn in the future how uncomfortable it can be to subordinate one’s position to the views of international bureaucrats. The first bells rang when Russia was struggling to keep the Iranian case within the authority of the IAEA, while the agency itself wanted to report the crisis to the UN Security Council. Eyebrows were raised, and Moscow was politely reminded of its commitment expressed some time earlier to follow the opinion of the IAEA. Global-pragmatic perspective: Russia abandons the soft approach and becomes a little tougher (medium) on Iran When asked bluntly by US diplomats – do you need a nuclear Iran? Russia honestly responds ‘no’. To the follow-up question – if so, do you think it is wise to sit and witness how Iran uses loopholes in the NPT, which may end up enabling Iran to reach the bomb? Russia also says ‘no’. Pressed to a more pragmatic attitude, Russia then agrees that the Iranian nuclear case should be tackled. To integrate this with the globalprinciple approach, Russia interprets the need to tackle the Iranian case as a matter of principle as well. The Primakov Doctrine is very helpful in this respect, because it prescribes defending principles of international law since that is in Russia’s pragmatic interest. All this makes Moscow willing to agree to some pressure on Iran. Regional-pragmatic perspective: Russia gets really tough on Iran Azerbaijan is the central element of this perspective. Azerbaijan and Iran tend to portray their relations as ‘normal’. While there is some economic cooperation, and dialogue on the political level, in reality both countries view each other with a great deal of suspicion. In Iran, the Azerbaijani population is regarded as potentially non-loyal. Turk secular influence has the potential to develop among Azerbaijani nationals. Iranian authorities have good reason to be concerned about this, since the Azerbaijani minority is some 20 million strong in Iran, which has a total population of 70 million. Through Azerbaijani eyes, the Shia Iranian leadership with control over the 20 million Azerbaijanis can constitute a challenge and even a direct threat to the 8 million living in Azerbaijan. Who can guarantee that Iran will not attempt to get Azerbaijan under its control? It does not actually matter for Azerbaijan – this threat exists because Iran feels vulnerable and may try to neutralize Turk secular leverages (defensive reasons) or because Iran will try to get its own leverages on Turkey (offensive reasons) or because Iran will go too far in disputes with Azerbaijan over Caspian oil. Because Azerbaijan has no desire to escalate problems in its relations with Iran, the two countries can describe their relations as normal, while huge tensions actually exist. On the other hand, this apparent normality does not stop Azerbaijan from looking for a security provider: and here the USA/NATO is the natural choice. Russia does not want to see an outside military presence in the Caspian region, and thus attempts to dissuade Azerbaijan. The latter has had good reason to be concerned about Russo–Iranian relations, but since 2002 Russia has shared Azerbaijani concerns about Iran. Within the regional scope, Russia has shown an interest in counterbalancing Iran. This signals to Azerbaijan that Russia is not Iran’s friend, but is rather interested in keeping Iran constrained. Russia tries to show that it is counter-balancing

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Iran, so that Azerbaijan does not have to worry. Thus, in order to dissuade Azerbaijan from inviting an outside military presence into the Caspian Sea region, Russia is willing to be tough on Iran in the regional context. Would a nuclear Iran be an incentive for a US/NATO military presence in the Caspian Sea? Growing Iranian nuclear power would probably reinforce Azerbaijan’s threat perceptions. Iran under a nuclear umbrella might feel it could exert pressure on Azerbaijan and threaten its oil reserves and the Baku–Ceyhan transit route. Consequently, Azerbaijan’s interest in having an outside military presence would be heightened. All this would only increase Russia’s interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Limits of US–Russian understanding on Iran The USA was able to secure Russian agreement to exert some pressure on Iran, by pushing Moscow from the global-principle to the global-pragmatic perspective. However, US diplomacy would like to see far more resolution from Moscow to press Iran for concessions. But this is problematic. To muster international support for more pressure on Iran, the USA must tackle the Iranian crisis in the global non-proliferation context. But, as noted, within the global context the most that can be achieved is for Moscow to shift from a soft to medium stance on Iran. Within the global context Russia is very unlikely to take a really tough position on Iran. The only perspective within which Russia is tough on Iran is the regionalpragmatic one. Theoretically Moscow could consider the option of the following exchange: Russia agrees to a harsher stance on Iran in return for a US commitment not to have a military presence in Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, such a deal does not fit into the global context, within which Iran is seen as a challenge to the non-proliferation regime, to international peace and security.

Tactical Dynamics of the Russian Position on Iran Tactically, throughout the Iranian crisis Moscow has been trying to avoid making a choice – the ultimate choice between the West and Iran. Russia does not want to sacrifice relations with the West for the sake of Iran, nor is it interested in paying the price of abandoning ties with Iran for the sake of relations with the West. US diplomacy has demonstrated some respect for the Russian dilemma. Russia was targeted with arguments and IAEA reports, but it was not openly manipulated. On the contrary, it was Iran that was continually raising the stakes, and destroying the grounds for compromise with the international community. Tehran displayed an interest in the Russian proposal for a joint venture on uranium enrichment, but forgot about it as soon as it had served the purpose of delaying transmission of the Iranian dossier to the UN Security Council. It is hard to avoid the impression that Iran was mulling the Russian proposal only to gain time, which is very close to cynical manipulation. Moreover, Iranian authorities and experts noted, off the record, that they felt certain that Russia would not vote for a UN resolution with sanctions. Iran was highly confident that, if forced to make the ultimate choice, Russia would not betray Iran. Moscow did not like this – in particular because it had implications for Russia’s reputation in the Third World. Through 2006, Tehran kept pressing Moscow to make the ultimate choice between Iran and the West. It is hard to judge whether Iran had failed to understand Russia’s

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desire to avoid such a choice, or was simply playing a trick in order to influence Russia’s position. In any case, this pressure served to generate irritation. Russia wanted to downplay the crisis, to de-escalate tensions and find compromise at the lowest possible level (which is why it had been trying to keep the question within the IAEA, without Security Council consideration). Iran was doing precisely the opposite; probably on the assumption (in fact, not groundless) that the higher the level of tension on which compromise can be found, the smaller the scope of the compromise. Voting on the UN Security Council resolution of July and December 2006 and in March 2007, Russia did join the stronger pressure on Iran. But this was not because of the power of US persuasion or due to strategic considerations: it was due to the power of irritation, generated by Iran, which had continuously ignored Russia’s wish to downplay the nuclear crisis.

The Security Council Track Tehran does not agree that the UN Security Council may consider the Iranian nuclear crisis: this is seen as the mandate of the IAEA. On these grounds, Iran has refused to implement the resolutions passed by the Security Council. However, for the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Tehran’s explanations for not meeting the requirements of resolutions do not matter. What matters is the sheer fact that Iran ignores the UN Security Council. Because of this, Iran can be viewed as rogue state – not on the basis of somebody’s allegations, but on the basis of its evident non-compliance with the UN. The tricky thing here, however, is that Tehran’s position on the Security Council resolution is not groundless. The IAEA did not find that Iran had a military nuclear programme: the agency stated that it needed additional powers and inspections in order to verify an Iranian nuclear programme, and that in the meantime Iran should cease uranium enrichment. Originally, the IAEA demand was to stop enrichment temporarily – for the duration of additional inspections. However, the demand for an enrichment moratorium became transformed into a demand for a full ban on enrichment. In either case, whether in the form of a temporary freeze or a full ban, the demand that enrichment cease exceeds the boundaries of international law requirements. Enrichment as such is not prohibited by the NPT: indeed, any country has the right to carry out enrichment. The IAEA was asking from Iran more than Iran is obligated to do under the NPT. Iran rejected the IAEA requests, and now the Security Council demands from Iran more than the country is obligated to do under the NPT. On these grounds, Iran does not accept the legitimacy of the Security Council resolutions in question. All this puts the situation in absolute stalemate. Iran is not ready for any compromise within the framework of the UN Security Council. Tehran wants to talk from the position that it has not violated anything – whereas Washington surely prefers to talk from the position that Iran, being in non-compliance with the UN Security Council, is consequently a rogue state with weak international standing. The first resolution on Iran was adopted on 31 July 2006 and was passed under pressure from the USA. It is important to remember that this was during the period when Iran was considering the EU troika proposal. US diplomats argued that the resolution was needed to demonstrate to Iran the unity of the Security Council permanent members and push Iran toward acceptance of the EU proposal. However this could have been a stratagem. Iran clearly stated at the time that it would not accept the EU proposal under pressure. The Security Council resolution became at least an excuse, if

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not a true reason, for refusing the EU proposal. It cannot be excluded that US diplomacy was deliberately seeking to trap Iran into non-compliance with Security Council resolution. That was precisely what Russia always feared throughout the Iranian crisis. Russia wanted to be sure that Security Council track was needed to help to solve the Iranian crisis, but not merely to build up a record of Iranian non-compliance with the UN. Probably in summer 2006 Russia missed the decisive move in this game. After the first Security Council resolution and the expected Iranian non-compliance, the record on the country’s non-compliance was open. After three or five cases of non-compliance on the part of Iran, the USA would present options to enforce the UN decisions, arguing that the permanent members of the Security Council, if they really valued the Security Council, could not just sit and wait to see how Iran ignores them. After the 31 July 2006 resolution the international community entered on the path leading to the use of military force against Iran, on the basis of Iran’s persistent noncompliance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council. Compromise within the UN Security Council track is impossible. The only conceivable compromise would be to shift to talks outside the Security Council – something like six-party talks on North Korea. However, for this to become possible, Iran should demonstrate willingness to solve the nuclear crisis – and that is now lacking.

War Option and the Russian Position Throughout 2006, the prevailing view in the expert community was that in late 2007 or early 2008 the Bush administration would start withdrawing from Iraq. For this to be possible and proceed smoothly, the USA should make a deal with Iran. The BakerHamilton report2 became the culmination of this mode of thinking. Still, a different view on the situation is also possible. In withdrawing from Iraq, it is in the US interest not to make deal with Iran (which will be fragile, since Washington will not have much leverage to force Iran to implement the deal), but to put Iran under fire – to launch military strikes against its nuclear infrastructure and probably some other important objects, while simultaneously supporting all Iran’s enemies and competitors, who will be inspired by US strikes and will step up their activities against Iran. Iran may wish in response to pay revenge in Iraq. However, Iran may find out that at this same time it has problems on its eastern borders, where ethnic minorities and Taliban forces may go to more open conflict with Iran. By going to Iraq, Iran will also face more resolute and active opposition from the Sunni world under Saudi Arabian leadership and with considerable support from Egypt and Jordan. The same Sunni countries must help Israel to cut Hamas’ links to Iran, which would minimize Tehran’s revenge against Israel. Within this scenario Iran may rush into a trap after the US military operation, exacerbating all the problems it has with the Gulf and with rebellious Sunni groups in the east of the country. Very soon Iran may find out that it has at least two military and numerous diplomatic fronts. These are options – to make deal with Iran while withdrawing from Iraq, or to put Iran under fire. In both scenarios there are pluses and minuses for Russia, and the balance is difficult to calculate. This author feels that Moscow would prefer that force not be used against Iran: not because that would serve any particular Russian interests in the region, but because of Russia’s broader view on the role of force in international relations. 2

Available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-iraq_study_group.pdf

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In becoming an active player in the Middle East politics – what is referred in Russia as ‘Russian return to the Middle East’ – Russia will be able to adjust to either of the two scenarios and promote its own economic interests.

Conclusion The Russian position on Iran has its own consistent logic and fits well into broader Russian foreign policy considerations. Strategically, Russia has three perspectives within which Moscow’s stance on Iran shifts from soft (in global-principle context) to medium (in global-pragmatic context) and to tough (in regional-pragmatic context). The third context is difficult to employ in order to secure a tough Russian position on the Iranian nuclear crisis, as the nuclear crisis must be managed within the global context, in order to raise international support for pressure against Iran. But in the global context it is difficult for Russia to move beyond a medium position. Tactically, Russia neither wants to see a nuclear Iran, nor does it want to slip toward more extreme means of preventing the nuclearization of Iran.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 6 Interface and Contradictions Between NonProliferation and Counter-Proliferation Mark FITZPATRICK1

Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation are sometimes seen as competing concepts. In fact, both are necessary and highly relevant to the global goal of stopping the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Moreover, they both employ many of the same kinds of tools. Before exploring this contention, it is useful to address what is meant by the terms ‘non-proliferation’ and ‘counter-proliferation’, and how they differ. In fact, even among native English speakers, there is no agreed understanding of the definitions, or whether there is a real distinction. A few years ago, for example, the British Foreign Office unit formerly known as the Non-Proliferation Department changed its name to Counter-Proliferation. According to one informal explanation, the change was made because the latter sounded more pro-active, inclusive and modern – and therefore potentially more appealing to the top-notch officers the department was trying to recruit. There was no change of function, however, as the unit continued to conduct all the traditional tools of non-proliferation diplomacy and export controls, as well as the new tools coming into prominence. Non-proliferation tools start with classical arms control architecture. This provides the global norms, neutral rules and universally respected institutions necessary for setting and enforcing the guidelines for the global non-proliferation regime. However, non-proliferation is not limited to the established architecture. It can be just as innovative, forward-looking, and proactive as counter-proliferation.

Military Emphasis When Les Aspin, then US Secretary of Defense, announced a new Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in December 1993, his emphasis was on developing new military capabilities to deal with the new proliferation threat. Because of this emphasis, counter-proliferation was seen as referring to measures to enable the USA to employ force against states that had already obtained nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Such counter-proliferation measures included ballistic missile defence. The concept of counter-proliferation recognized that existing non-proliferation tools and constraints might not prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and that military measures were needed to address this eventuality. In the Pentagon, counter-proliferation is often 1

Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

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seen as the forward-looking, fighting man’s alternative to the failed, State Departmentled policies of non-proliferation. The military emphasis of the term ‘counter-proliferation’ took root elsewhere. A glossary prepared by the Canadian Department Foreign Affairs and International Trade says: ‘counter-proliferation refers to military efforts to combat weapon proliferation, including the application of military power to protect armed forces and interests, intelligence collection and analysis.’2 When Secretary Aspin originally promulgated the counter-proliferation concept, however, his intention was much broader. He meant it as a term that encompassed both the traditional tools of non-proliferation and the newer tools being developed in the Pentagon, including, but not limited to, new military capabilities. His staff had drafted his December 1993 speech to define counter-proliferation as the ‘eight Ds: dissuasion, disarmament, diplomacy, denial, defusing, deterrence, defenses, and destruction’. Aspin decided not to use the ‘8 Ds’ moniker, judging it to be too contrived, but his Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Ashton Carter, who developed the concept, himself later used that term.3 Aspin’s Counter-proliferation Initiative derived from the premise that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the hands of adversaries were the only serious threat to US conventional superiority, and that the USA should do everything it could to prevent it – but, if prevention failed, US forces would have to be able to function in an environment of use or threat of such weapons and to still achieve US military goals. To admit the potential for some level of failure of the non-proliferation regime was not to invite it or to denigrate the regime itself: to the contrary, counter-proliferation as conceived at the time was intended to enhance the effectiveness of the traditional nonproliferation tools.

Pre-Emption Under the evolution from Aspin through to Rumsfeld, however, counter-proliferation underwent a shift in meaning. The term as it is used now in the US Defense Department is often code for ‘pre-emption of WMD capability’ and has lost much of the depth and texture of the original usage. This shift is magnified in a foreign policy environment that is more likely to see the initiation of military action.4 It is not hard to conjure examples of when pre-emptive use of force could be a necessary counter-proliferation tool. Although Israel’s 1981 bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor was met by widespread international opprobrium at the time, later revelations about Saddam Hussein’s intention to develop nuclear weapons persuaded many former critics that the attack was in fact justifiable – even praiseworthy. This perception is particularly strong in the United States, even though the attack did not stop Iraq’s nuclear weapons development effort, which shifted to the uranium enrichment route instead of the plutonium one. Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme did not succeed, for various reasons including traditional non-proliferation efforts. The mistaken argument for invading Iraq over incorrect and misapplied intelligence assessments of the programme stands as a strong caution against overly hasty reliance on pre-emptive use of force. This tool cannot be ruled out, however. If intelligence agencies were to acquire 2

Canada in the World: Canadian International Policy; glossary of terms, http://geo.international.gc.ca/ cip-pic/library/glossary-en.asp 3 ‘Interview with Ashton Carter’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 29: 1, Winter 2005, p. 10. 4 The author is indebted to Laura Holgate for sharing these observations.

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highly reliable information that North Korea was about to transfer a nuclear weapon to terrorists, for example, no responsible leader would preclude the preventive use of force to stop the transfer, although what form the force would take and to what degree would obviously need careful consideration. As Secretary Aspin intended, counter-proliferation is not limited to military efforts. It also includes traditional non-proliferation mechanisms and new tools, including the Proliferation Security Initiative. Although PSI has a military aspect, the coordination efforts involved in the initiative range from diplomatic to intelligence to law enforcement. Interdiction of the German-flagged freighter, the BBC China, in October 2003 was the result of a successful intelligence operation to infiltrate the black market network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Intelligence and diplomatic coordination involving the governments of the UK, USA, Germany and Italy diverted the ship to an Italian port and unloaded uranium centrifuge equipment bound for Libya’s nuclear weapons programme. There was no military involvement. However, one can imagine different circumstances, such as the ship operators refusing to divert, in which case coercive force might have been needed to prevent the illicit transfer. Coercive force in such a case might be confided to the realm of law enforcement, or may only involve coast guard assets. Military forces may also be involved, as necessary. The best way to define the difference, therefore, is that the aim of non-proliferation is to stop the spread of dangerous weapons, while counter-proliferation is for when prevention fails. The former seeks to keep the barn doors closed; the latter to deal with the problem after the horse has escaped. The distinction lies in the timing and purpose, not in the measures themselves. Even this distinction can be blurred, however, especially when it is not easy to ascertain that prevention has failed. In the case of North Korea, for example, nuclear non-proliferation had failed well before Pyongyang proved so by exploding a nuclear device on 9 October 2006.

Non-Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation Tools Many of the same tools are used for both non-proliferation and counter-proliferation purposes, including the most recent, innovative tools, several of which have a law enforcement emphasis: x x x

x

The US Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to help secure nuclear, chemical and biological weapons-related assets in the former Soviet Union is one of the Defense Department’s most important counter-proliferation efforts. The laws required of all nation states by UN Security Council Resolution 1540 are aimed at preventing proliferation by non-state actors but also at punishing violators and thereby at deterring. The Proliferation Security Initiative is directed at the intersection when WMD-related material leaves one country, to stop the transfer before it gets to the next. One could say this is still in the realm of prevention. In considering proliferation pathways, intervention is most possible and most effective when it occurs during the transit phase, before material and technology reach the destination country or end-user. From a legal and political standpoint, financial tools are easiest to apply when there has been a violation. Applied early enough, however, the financial lever-

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x

age of denying access to international financial institutions can also be an important tool to preventing proliferation. Global efforts to wrap up the A.Q. Khan black-market network were a laudable counter-proliferation success, made possible by effective and wellcoordinated intelligence operations. In retrospect, however, it would have been better to put to use the information that intelligence agencies had been gaining about Khan’s proliferation activities before he succeeded in transferring nuclear weapons technology to Iran and North Korea. The effective acquisition and sharing of intelligence to prevent Khan-like networks of the future will be a key non-proliferation objective.

Legally binding instruments and non-binding arrangements also play an important role in setting norms and deterring non-compliance. Other than moral suasion, however, international organizations other than the UN Security Council lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms. IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol have been more effective in addressing non-compliance where the degree of central government complicity and deliberate non-compliance is not clear-cut, as in the recent cases of safeguards violations by South Korea and Egypt. In several other cases, existing arrangements have not been effective in preventing deliberate non-compliance with nonproliferation commitments. Notable violators have included North Korea (violations of obligations under the NPT, IAEA safeguards agreement, the US-North Korea Agreed Framework and the North–South Denuclearization Agreement), Iran (NPT and safeguards agreement violations), Libya (NPT and safeguards agreement violations), India (violations of bilateral agreements with Canada and the USA), Pakistan (violation of commitments to the USA) and Iraq (pre-1991 violation of the NPT and post-1991 violations of multiple UN Security Council mandates regarding weapons destruction and accounting). New non-proliferation and counter-proliferation tools are therefore necessary, including the four sets of tools assessed below.

Security Council Action UNSCR 1540 may be the best international framework for addressing proliferation, in part because it expands the scope of international action to illicit trafficking. Stopping illicit international commerce in WMD means rolling up existing black-market networks (starting, but not ending, with A.Q. Khan and the many associates he did business with worldwide) and taking every possible step to preclude their re-emergence. Where there is a demand it may be impossible to preclude all supply, but making the cost high enough will deter most would-be suppliers. UNSCR 1540 is a key tool in setting the norm and requirements for countries to follow. However, UNSCR 1540 today runs the risk of complacency, because of inadequate follow-through. The United States and Russia led the drive for the new resolution, and the USA has helped many states with their export control systems, but few Security Council members have given a high priority to implementation or provided the energetic diplomacy now needed.5

5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 161.

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Proliferation Security Initiative If all other non-proliferation controls fail, the ability of concerned states to take coordinated interdiction action is the best last way to stop illicit transfers. The Proliferation Security Initiative has helped participating states to improve and coordinate their interdiction capabilities, and holds promise in both its operational effectiveness and its deterrent impact. The PSI has helped to establish greater intelligence, diplomatic and operational coordination among partners and to reinforce their readiness and capability to detain and inspect. The PSI has built a network of enforcement officials who can respond when any of the partners obtain actionable intelligence regarding a suspect cargo. In addition to endorsing the PSI statement of principles, participating states are encouraged to share information on national legal authorities and national assets that could contribute to PSI efforts, and to support participation in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations, should they arise. Among the statement of principles, states resolve to ‘seriously consider providing consent…to boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states’, and to put in place ship-boarding agreements with other states in advance, so that no time is lost, should interdiction be required. None of these steps is mandatory, however.6 The criteria for being counted a PSI participant – and 82 countries are so counted, as of 1 May 2007, according to the US State Department webpage – is to endorse the PSI statement of principles. In principle, the PSI requires participating nations to have the legal instruments to stop transits, trans-shipments and exports of controlled goods. However, many countries still lack export control laws that provide a legal basis for stopping dual-use goods related to a nuclear programme. The PSI has no international secretariat, no shared databases and (in most participating countries) no established funding. The PSI is a set of activities, not an organization. The Bush administration considers this lack of structure to be a virtue, and it may be, but the lack of formal mechanisms or binding commitments raises some doubts about the sustainability of the PSI. Its geographic reach is also limited, as it does not include key littoral states such as India, China and the Republic of Korea or major Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Egypt.7

Financial Controls The PSI-type approach involving like-minded countries is now expanding to cut off financial connections that fund proliferation. In cooperation with the G-8 leaders and other countries, the USA is leading the effort to identify, track and freeze the financial transactions and assets of organizations involved in proliferation activities. Financial controls are one area where Western countries have a natural advantage and leverage. Countries can make greater efforts to put in place regulations to deny financial services to any entities that engage in or support proliferation activity. Controls on banking, insurance and other financial services can be among the most effective tools to combat proliferation. Unless proliferators rely on barter – as reportedly was the case in the North Korea and Pakistan missiles for centrifuge technology transfer – even illicit international commerce must rely on letters of credit and currency exchange services to conduct transactions. Denying such services is an important tool for containing onward proliferation. It can also be a useful tool for putting pressure on 6 7

Ibid, p. 139. Ibid, p. 141.

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proliferators. Both purposes lie behind the increased efforts of the US Treasury Department in warning banks around the world of the risks of doing business with Iranian and North Korean companies involved in nuclear and missile proliferation activities. Even before being warned of the risk of falling afoul of US sanctions laws, banking and other commercial firms in several Western countries began to cut back on their business with Iran on the basis of their own risk analysis. Thus, well before the nuclear issue reached the UN Security Council, Iran began paying an extra financial price for its nuclear programme in the form of above-market credit premiums, lost investments and a significant drop in the stock market.

Information Gathering and Coordination Effective and timely information-gathering and sharing is also important for both nonproliferation and counter-proliferation. Over the years, a lack of knowledge about the real state of the nuclear programmes of countries such as North Korea and Iran has been a major impediment to efforts to preclude the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. One simple and obvious step would be for the United States to open diplomatic posts in both countries. There are more important reasons for establishing relations, of course, including the impact that bilateral relations and daily contact can have on encouraging freedom in the marketplace of ideas. The prospect of having a ground-level understanding of proliferation developments and drivers is not an insignificant side benefit to having diplomatic outposts in potential proliferating states. Intelligence cooperation among and by governments is impeded by legitimate concerns about protecting intelligence sources and methods, and sometimes by less legitimate demands that any sharing must be reciprocal and policy-driven. In recent years, the United States reduced intelligence sharing with the IAEA because of a misguided perception that US intelligence briefings were one-way and not purposeful. Even when intelligence is not directly actionable, however, it is important to build up institutional memory and to provide the wherewithal for overall state evaluations that can prove to be an excellent tip-off as to proliferation intentions. Information gathering in the broader sense is an important function of international inspectors, particularly from the IAEA, whose inspectors serve as the world’s best set of eyes and ears attuned to nuclear programmes of concern. IAEA inspector access in Iran has always been limited, and has been sharply reduced recently. An agreement that increased IAEA access by providing for not just implementation of the Additional Protocol but also more intrusive inspection access – something of the nature of ‘anytime, anywhere’ – would be tremendously useful in keeping tabs on Iran’s nuclear programme. It would also be in Iran’s interest to provide access that could disprove worstcase intelligence assessments about weapons development that could spur arguments for use of force. In North Korea, it is heartening to see renewed IAEA access. This is not a return to the status quo ante, however. North Korea wants to be accepted as a nuclear-weapons state. Until and unless North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is dismantled, the IAEA inspectors will not be able to verify the country’s compliance with its NPT obligations.

Conclusion Counter-proliferation is often, and mistakenly, seen as synonymous with military efforts to control weapons proliferation. The original concept was broader and more nu-

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anced. The aim of non-proliferation is to stop the spread of dangerous weapons, whereas counter-proliferation is for when prevention fails. Both non-proliferation and counter-proliferation purposes are served by many of same new tools, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the universal requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, financial controls and coordinated intelligence operations. In reviewing the history of the non-proliferation regime and recent developments in North Korea, Iran and the proliferation activity of the A.Q. Khan black-market network, it is easy to become fatalistic. Supply-side strategies are not likely to stop illicit trade in nuclear material and technology. When there is a determined demand and the price is high enough, there will probably be a supply. Supply-side controls can minimize illicit exports, however, by raising the costs and risks to would-be suppliers, to the point where most will not find it worthwhile. For those few who might seek to run the risks nonetheless, including those with ideological or religious motivations, the world will have to rely on other tools. To stop nuclear proliferation, a comprehensive strategy involving diplomatic efforts, verification tools, law enforcement actions, financial measures, counter-proliferation initiatives and intelligence collection must be pursued in tandem with policies geared toward reducing the demand for nuclear weapons.

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Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Chapter 7 Differences between Western and Russian Nuclear Security Cultures C. SELLIER1

Can we speak of a Western nuclear culture, as opposed to a Russian one? From my own experience, I would say that differing threat perceptions and security cultures and, more generally, differing historical and political conditions have led to the different approaches to nuclear matters taken by each of the five NPT nuclearweapons states. This might well apply also to the de facto nuclear-weapons states. It may prove instructive to examine some issues in France’s nuclear weapons policy and complex, attempting comparisons mainly with the United States and Russia, but also with the United Kingdom and China as well as certain other states. First, however, let us look at some key dates, as the time frame is a decisive factor in the field of proliferation: x x x x x

1945: Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Second World War and demonstrate that the USA possesses a new weapon more powerful and destructive than any other by several orders of magnitude. 1949: The Soviet Union explodes its first nuclear device, putting an end to the US monopoly and thereby establishing a balance of power – not yet of terror – between the Western capitalistic bloc led by the USA and the communist one. 1952: The UK carries out its first nuclear test in Australia. 1960: France tests in Sahara, then a French territory. 1964: China tests at Lop Nor.

In the 1960s, France and China have demonstrated their success in building nuclear weapons greatly worries the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, as well as a large number of states all over the world. And then President Kennedy announces that fourteen countries are on the brink of gaining access to nuclear weapons. In 1965 the UN General Assembly demands international action to prevent nuclear proliferation. That leads to the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, with each superpower assuming the task of getting its allies and clients to sign it. Even today, the NPT stands as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, still in force since 1970 despite looking more and more frail every year, having survived several crises after a first blow dealt by India’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear test of 1974.

1

Rear-Admiral (Rtd) and former Commissariat on Nuclear Energy official, France.

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The Rationale for the First Nuclear Weapons The US case was very simple: world war. President F.D. Roosevelt had been informed by the prominent and highly respected physicist, Albert Einstein, of the scientific possibility of constructing a tremendously powerful explosive device based on nuclear fission. Obviously the USA would have to do so before Nazi Germany. The British government had reached the same conclusion, so the two allied nations pooled their skills and worked together on the Manhattan Project, in the USA and Canada, far from the military threats of the enemy. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, conditions were different: the world war was over and the USSR was not only victorious, mastering half of Europe, but had become established as the second superpower. Therefore the US nuclear monopoly was unacceptable – a threat to the very existence of the besieged fortress of socialism, an obstacle able to oppose, even thwart, the sacred mission of extending communism all over the world. In the UK there was a Labour government led by Clement Attlee, who concluded that obtaining nuclear weapons was necessary to maintain Britain’s great-power status in the new post-war world order – despite, or perhaps due to, troubles in the Empire and the inescapable process of de-colonization. Moreover, it was seen as only fitting that the UK should derive benefits from its scientific and technical participation in the Manhattan Project. France, like the UK, sought to rebuild its status as a great power after the war, but starting from a less favourable basis: the Nazi Blitzkrieg victory in 1940, four long years of occupation (the presence of German military forces acting with the support of a renegade French political regime), the heavy economic and human costs, the damages of allied bombings and battles on its soil – all these combined and made worse after the war by political turmoil at home and unrest in Indochina and African territories and colonies.2 General Charles de Gaulle – the man who had maintained the honour of France and carried on fighting throughout the war, making France one of the victorious nations with the USA, USSR and UK, the same man who re-established the Republic – had been ousted from power in the 1946 elections. The political situation was unstable; governments were weak, unable to resist internal unrest and strikes, and generally managing to stay in office for less than six months. The war in Indochina was lost and there were 400,000 soldiers deployed in Algeria, trying to cope with an independence insurrection supported by foreign countries. The general mood, both in the political elite and the people, was opposed to nuclear weapons for France: on one hand, they were seen as not necessary, the USA providing its nuclear umbrella under NATO; on the other hand, they were deemed immoral, as held by both the USSR-organized Peace Movement3and the communists, almost 30% of the French electorate. Then came two events that conducted pondering over the issue: the Suez crisis of 1956, and Sputnik in 1957. During the Suez crisis, Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Bulganin threatened France and the UK with nuclear weapons should they pursue their aggression against Egypt. At the same time, the American allies, who were in plain presidential election period, not only offered no diplomatic help to defuse the crisis, but carried out a financial attack against Britain’s sterling currency. This led Prime Minister Eden to give up the British action in the joint French-British military operation, re2

Once, during a Pugwash workshop held in London, I was amused to hear a bright British physicist and political pundit explain that France had no logical reason to possess nuclear weapons and therefore, as an obvious conclusion, had no right to have them. 3 Professor Joliot-Curie, a Nobel laureate and a communist, was the president of the Peace Movement.

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sulting in political victory to Egypt’s Colonel Nasser. Some French politicians started to worry that French sovereignty and political independence were in jeopardy. Not only did the successful launching of Sputnik, the first earth satellite, in 1957 demonstrate the efficiency, if not superiority, of socialist science: it also became clear that, for the first time in the existence of the USA, American soil could be hit and American cities could be destroyed by thermonuclear weapons delivered, without warning, by ballistic missiles. Nuclear deterrence was seen as the sole means of prevention. And now some French politicians heeded this lesson, realizing that never in the future would a US president put American cities at risk to defend Europe. Logically, then, France would have to obtain its own nuclear weapons to be able to deter any major threat and recover outright political independence as well as the ability to act on the international scene. Programmes were set for that aim, accelerated after General de Gaulle was returned to power in 1958. After all, he had understood as early as 1945 that there would be two classes of states in the future – the nuclear ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. Later in 1967, in accordance with this rationale, de Gaulle withdrew the French military forces from NATO, which had introduced its flexible response strategy. France was to remain a member of the alliance, but fielded its own tactical nuclear weapon systems.

The Nuclear Doctrine and Force Structure Having joined the nuclear ‘club’ later, French decision-makers had been able to take time to observe, make up their minds and tailor a doctrine and forces in accordance with the position, interests and capacities of their country. At the beginning of the nuclear era and during the US monopoly, mere possession of such weapons was worth any doctrine. After a second player entered the game, US scholars and authorities published and announced increasingly sophisticated and subtle doctrines about nuclear warfare and deterrence. Similarly, and as it was almost silent on the subject, the USA succeeded in luring the USSR into the trap of arms race which, later combined with arms control, would exhaust it economically and contribute a major part in its collapse and the end of the Cold War. France based its nuclear strategy on an analysis Admiral Raoul Castex made in an article published in October 1945: a weak nation possessing even a small quantity of atomic weapons is able to inflict enormous damages on a strong nation. The ‘equalizing power’ of nuclear weapons was formulated for the first time. In the French doctrine this basic idea was complemented by two corollaries: x x

‘sufficiency’: fielding the lowest number of weapons systems and warheads necessary to exert a credible threat regarding unacceptable damages for the enemy and its defence capacities. ‘high quality’ of weapons systems in terms of military performance and reliability

French defence strategy, as stated in successive White Papers, by several presidents, prime ministers and defence ministers throughout a period of forty-five years, has been noteworthy for its simplicity and its stability: x

France’s nuclear weapons are aimed at defending the country’s vital interests, whatever the nature of the threat;

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x

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the nuclear weapons are aimed not at waging war but at preventing war, and – should war occur – at ending it.

Another revealing point concerns the evolution of naming the weapons in the years since the first alert of the Mirage IV strategic bomber in October 1964. Initially there were ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical weapons’, a legacy of the NATO nuclear doctrine; then in 1985 they were re-named ‘strategic’ and ‘pre-strategic’ – not regarding their military performance (yield, range, delivery mode) but in respect of their potential use. Now since the 1994 White Paper there have been only ‘nuclear weapons’, as the very question of considering the use of any of these weapons dramatically changes the scale in international affairs. France’s defence policy is original and in accordance with its general position on the world scene. We are an old country today and feel no longer entrusted with a mission to dictate our political system and way of life to the others, as we tried to do two centuries ago with the Revolution and Napoleon. On the other hand, we intend to live peacefully – and our long history has taught us the necessity of being able to defend ourselves. As far as the forces structure is concerned, some points should be noted: Construction was commanded by the scientific and technical skills available at the time, as France had to re-invent almost everything from the fission bomb to the ballistic missile and the nuclear submarine and more… We were in a hurry and started fielding the most easy, or least difficult, system to develop – the fission bomb and its associated bomber. However, the main weapon system we intended to field was the SLBM, and this necessitated developing the ballistic missile, a powerful warhead to match the yield/accuracy pair, the naval nuclear reactor, also mastering the design of a large submarine and underwater launching of the missile, etc… Together all these demanding challenges comprised such a huge and risky task that it was decided to build a temporary ballistic missile system in silos. Fortunately each basic programme ran smoothly and the result was a triad – bombers, missiles in silos and SSBMs. This triad was in no way comparable to the forces of the USA, whether in terms of the total number of warheads (550 at the maximum, at the time 1% of the world’s total nuclear stockpile), or the relative weight of each leg (SSBN 75%, bombers 15% and missiles in silos 10%). It was also different regarding the alert regime, as France never carried in-flight alert. As soon as scientific and technical progress allowed, new generations of weapons systems were fielded, incorporating thermonuclear warheads, multiple independent re-entry vehicles, penetration-aids, etc. Supersonic airborne missiles replaced gravity bombs in the early 1980s. From 1983 to 1995, France kept permanently at sea three SSBNs out of four in the operation cycle and a total of five, the last being in overhaul. This performance demonstrated the high level of technical quality, management and command of the main leg of the country’s nuclear forces, the most survivable by nature.As France trusted in the strategy of deterrence and in a different manner from the USA, we never feared a massive Soviet nuclear surprise attack. One could understand the desire of the USSR to conquer Europe or to convert it to communism – but not to destroy it. Consideration was never given to an ABM system, nor even its first stage of early warning. After the Cold War was over, President Mitterrand decided not to field the Hades, a mobile, medium-range (350 km) land missile system due to replace the Pluton, which was to be withdrawn from duty. Then in 1995 President Chirac decided to take out of duty the missiles in silo, maintaining only the sea and air legs with a reduced number of submarines, aircraft and warheads.

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Another important point deserves attention and comparison with other nuclearweapon states, despite the scanty information publicly available: control of nuclear weapons by the political authority. This topic is addressed from time to time – generally when a risky situation occurs – not only by political scientists but also in the general public, through newspaper articles. Here we may recall for example the putsch against President Gorbachev, the collapse of the Soviet Union with thousands of weapons disseminated all over the former republics, or the terrorist attack against General Musharaf in Pakistan. In France, ever since the beginning, the political authorities have applied to nuclear weapons the witty statement once made by former prime minister Georges Clemenceau: ‘War is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to the military.’ Therefore there is very tight system of control of fissile materials and nuclear weapons involving a double chain of command and responsibility, and physical devices as well preventing non-authorized access or use; moreover, should the president order to launch a weapon, an electronic device would make sure the target is the one ordered. After forty-five years, French policy has remained constant – not only in respect of the political aim that sees nuclear weapons as the tools of sovereignty and national independence, but also regarding the principle of sufficiency applied to the country’s nuclear forces.

Nuclear Complexes As a foreigner having some interest in nuclear weapons and having enjoyed some visits to American and Russian complexes, I have been struck by the many similarities, and not only concerning size. The basic reason for this overall similarity is the decisive achievement of Soviet intelligence in unveiling the Manhattan Project, and the natural trend to proceed the same way which had proved efficient. The urgency dictated by the Second World War for the USA and later on the Cold War for both the Soviet Union and the USA, with the same list of objectives and milestones in the general process, contributed to enhance the similarities. The first uraniumgraphite reactor, work on uranium enrichment, the fission bomb, the industrial production of fissile materials, the H-bomb, the nuclear propulsion reactor for submarine – all these challenges were articulated and solved in the same logical way before ‘civilian applications’ were addressed, starting as by-products of plutonium production reactors. To this overall review of common points should be added the supreme priority accorded to the nuclear programme in the two countries, with the involvement of their brightest scientists and most skilled industrial firms. True enough, the Manhattan Project had been shrouded in secrecy. Once the war was over, however, many of its aspects were declassified and even given considerable publicity. Today, the secrecy policy in force in the USA appears well-balanced in a democratic state, regarding the necessity on one hand of restricting access to certain plants and laboratories and protecting certain secrets, while on the other hand according to citizens considerable freedom of access. By contrast, on the Soviet/Russian side it was not until the end of the Cold War that there came some official confirmation of the pieces of information disseminated by the USA concerning Russia’s nuclear complex, particularly the network of secret cities. We all know how slow and frail the changes in the field have been since 1991. The closed-city system is still in force, despite Western disapproval of every kind of apart-

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heid, even if the system did produce some evident benefits during the difficult period of democratic transition. As has been discussed, France followed a different path, due to different conditions. This has had particular effects on its nuclear complex development and the general mood. After Hiroshima, the tremendous importance of atomic energy was at once understood, regarding all facets of human activity: science, medicine, economy, war. This awareness was facilitated by several French prominent physicists like Professor Joliot-Curie, Pierre Auger and Bertrand Goldschmidt. Some of them had been involved in nuclear research in Canada during the war and were well updated on progress made in the field – a bonus after the many years without scientific exchanges. In October 1945, the provisional government of the French Republic issued a decree creating the CEA (Commissariat à l’énergie atomique) in order to obtain for the country the benefits of nuclear energy in all available domains. The CEA started working hard to reconstitute a scientific basis. Its first aim was to construct a uranium-graphite reactor as a laboratory tool in order to study the nuclear physics and associated technology. The main ultimate goal was to foster an industry producing electricity. At the first international conference convened by the brand-new International Atomic Energy Agency, the French scientists were proud to lecture on Purex, the then-secret process used by the USA and Soviet Union to separate plutonium from spent fuel rods – in fact, a contribution to proliferation. The first work dedicated to the making of a French bomb really started in 1955, in two defence laboratories manned by military engineers specialized in explosives and materials, and a small staff from the CEA headed by an artillery colonel. One member of the group was Professor Yves Rocard, an internationally-known physicist.4 In 1958, General de Gaulle being in power, these three laboratories were gathered in CEA/DAM (Department of Military Applications), still in force. The nuclear weapons programme was made public and declared a national priority. One of the main difficulties was to attract bright scientists to work on the weapons programme, and therein lies a main difference with the US and Soviet weapons establishments. Professor Rocard was one among few prominent French scientists who participated. After the war and for many years afterwards, almost all the scientific elite of France were communists or fellow-travellers: in their view, the bomb was good for the Soviet Union but evil for their own country. This was true also of many in the CEA, which brought about the dismissal of Professor Joliot-Curie from his position as High Commissar and resulted in his successor, Professor Perrin, being warned by de Gaulle to do his duty. This then was the manner in which DAM was born: as a house of military engineers, not of scientists.

Conclusion Visitors to Los Alamos, Sarov or even the Chinese complex will immediately notice how people introduce themselves and act like scientists – physicists or chemists or mathematicians – not weapons designers or builders. On the other hand, there are some advantages in having engineers as leaders of the nuclear establishment: programmes are well defined and well managed; they run on time; technical support is ready with documents and spares when the military takes charge of the weapons for active duty, 4 Incidentally, later on his son Michel would be Prime Minister under President Mitterrand and a member of the Canberra Commission.

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and so on. In fact such points were recognized also in the USA and the Soviet Union: we may recall the role of two military engineers, General Leslie Groves as head of the Manhattan Project and General N.L. Dukhov at Arzamas 16. After the Cold War, when the USA, the UK and France started discussing cooperation with the Russian Federation, on helping to reduce the threat of the huge stockpile of unnecessary weapons, we discovered that we managed fissile materials differently. In France, we would dismantle retired weapons, recycle the highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium and use them in constructing warheads of new weapons systems. Apparently, in both the USA and the Soviet Union, since the beginning of the nuclear era, every new warhead was made of ‘fresh plutonium’, the retired warheads being kept on shelves. This rich man’s policy produced two big problems that would have to be solved: x x

the dismantling in safe conditions of a very large number of ‘old’ warheads made of ‘old explosives’; the search for an innovative and politically acceptable use for the large stockpiles of excess fissile materials.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 8 The Clash of Nuclear Dynamics Lars van DASSEN1

A few years ago, the Canadian environmental magazine The Walrus ran an article on an issue otherwise highly unlikely for a journal aimed at a general readership.2 The article examined the Canadian development programme that contributes to controlling and dismantling weapons of mass destruction in the Russian Federation. A Canadian official was interviewed regarding the money Canada paid to the shipyard Zvezdochka near Severodvinsk and Archangelsk in northwestern Russia. The article went on to point out the irony that arises from the fact that Canada – and in fact also other states, such as the UK, Norway and the US – have paid for the dismantlement of old Soviet/Russian nuclear-powered submarines while the shipyard Sevmash, just across the bay from Zvezdochka, has been building new nuclear-powered submarines. In other words, by paying Canada has been making it possible for Russia to pay for other things – like newer, leaner and meaner submarines. If this reasoning holds, then many other countries involved in providing assistance to nuclear security are in the same situation. And this is a situation which we must address and understand if we want international responsibility and common efforts to curb nuclear proliferation to continue in the future. The argument made by the Canadian journalist is of course blunt for people who work in the field of cross-border nuclear non-proliferation matters. Russia is a big country that needs a defence just as other states do, and with a defence come modernization programmes and so on. This is Russia’s prerogative. The only (and best) thing the rest of the world can do is to seek to promote the emergence of an environment and security-political climate where the Russian government thinks that one submarine is preferable to three or four. The argument made against third-party assistance to Russia is also somewhat flawed for another reason: Nuclear materials need security, irrespective of their origins and destination. To contribute to the safe and secure management of these materials is not only an act based on altruism and empathy. Higher degrees of security and safety are also beneficial to states and people outside the country where the material is stored and owned.

1 Deputy Head of the International Co-operation Programme, ICP of SKI, with responsibility for Sweden’s bilateral cooperation activities in nuclear non-proliferation in the FSU. All opinions expressed here are his own unless they coincide with official Swedish policies. 2 Paul Webster, ‘Is the West Rearming Russia?’, The Walrus, November 2003.

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Shared Responsibilities There are other ways of appreciating international cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation as well. The activities defined under for instance the umbrella of the G-8 Global Partnership are an expression of the obligation of participants in the Global Partnership to take a double-edged responsibility. They take responsibility for what they drove each other to make and develop during the Cold War in terms of nuclear weapons and all the auxiliary systems for their production and deployment. But they also take shared responsibility for these old sins in terms of their consequences in later times when old weapons may suddenly emerge as new tools and remedies for a third layer of states with nuclear weapon ambitions and for terrorist groups. The Canadian submarine being dismantled in Severodvinsk can be seen as an expression of this double helix of ambitions, where we assume responsibility for what it was we drove ourselves and others into – the nuclear arms race; and as an expression of our desire to make sure that these materials do not fall into the hands of others – individuals, groups and states – that might want to do evil with them. Nevertheless, when all this has been said and we have praised the Canadians, the British, the Swedes, the Americans and many others for their efforts, there remains a residual of guilt or sins of omission, or the inability to look into the blind angles – and this needs to be addressed. It concerns the risks stemming from the fact that nuclear disarmament has come to a halt and that there are moves towards the qualitative development of new nuclear weapons in the USA, in Russia, China and the UK. If this continues, then it may blow apart the laborious efforts we have invested in nonproliferation assistance across borders – at least as concerns cooperation on the territory of Russia. It is hard to separate the double helix of responsibility for past activities from responsibility for current and future threats. What we did in the past may come back to haunt us later on – and this is a lesson that is just as essential as it is trivial. It is also hard to separate the relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament on the one hand and horizontal proliferation and vertical proliferation on the other. Indeed, there is hardly a truth in international politics and law that is more institutionalized than that concerning disarmament/non-proliferation and vertical/horizontal proliferation relations. This relation is institutionalized in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, where the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) have acknowledged that they can keep the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) from proliferating only if the NWS disarm. Likewise, the NNWS have stated that they will abstain only if the means of oppression and blackmail in the hands of the NWS are reduced in number and ultimately abolished. This bargain between not-having and being able to get rid of nuclear weapons is also found in the speeches and arguments of, for instance, heads of states in countries that currently hold fewer multilateral obligations than those embedded in the NPT.

Cooperative Threat Reduction US government spokespersons often refer to the nuclear perils in North Korea and Iran, how there is a risk that an Iranian bomb may lead to nuclear ambitions in Iran’s near and more distant neighbourhood, and how an uncontained North Korea can create a nuclear arms dynamics in Asia. Thus we see that the NWS acknowledge how proliferation and arms dynamics are related. At the same time, there are too many copycats – actors that use each others’ arguments to justify their own continued possession of nuclear weapons. When representatives of NWS create arguments for their own continued

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possession of nuclear weapons, they are also supplying arguments for heads of state in Pyongyang and Teheran. This being said about the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation, and about how vertical and horizontal proliferation also go hand in hand, one question comes to mind: If successful non-proliferation has to rely on disarmament – next to many other things such as safeguards, export controls, positive and negative security guarantees – then what does this mean for nuclear non-proliferation assistance and cooperation? Nuclear non-proliferation cooperation goes under various names, such as CTR, Cooperative Threat Reduction, as well as references to the specific programmes in the field, but in general it means the assistance given by states to other states in terms of securing control over nuclear materials. There are no contradictions between the aim and objectives that states try to achieve when they implement the NPT on their own territories – and what they work for when they implement international non-proliferation cooperation and assistance. In both cases it is a question of securing materials – be it at home or abroad. It is also possible to turn this relation around and maintain that: Vertical proliferation – be it in the form of deteriorating arms control measures, the absence of new arms control measures, or the qualitative or quantitative development of new nuclear weapons – has a negative impact on non-proliferation – as well as on international non-proliferation cooperation. The reason is quite simple and a parallel to that described in the Canadian magazine: If money is spent on new nuclear weapons and the entire infrastructure to back up these weapons in one country, then it is soon seen as a waste of money from the thirdcountry tax payers’ perspective to invest in dismantling further nuclear facilities and weapons. It can appear pointless to finance nuclear non-proliferation measures if they seem to be undermined by other deeds and actions.

Collective Nuclear Security International nuclear non-proliferation assistance is among the best collective security measures the world has ever seen. Other measures can be imagined, but if we look at the broad responsibility that states are willing to assume on their own territories in cooperation with international organizations like the IAEA and the responsibility that states are willing to turn into active work against proliferation abroad, then it is fair to say that the best operative approach for collective security – on a global scale – goes through international assistance and cooperation on non-proliferation. This stands in sharp contrast to the continued possession of nuclear weapons by certain states. Nuclear weapons are used for states’ individual purposes and sometimes extended to being of use in the defence of other states. But the essence of a nuclear bomb is that you have it to fend and mend on your own against others. In turn, this means that collective security in the form of international non-proliferation assistance and cooperation is basically the opposite of states’ individual possession of nuclear weapons. When we are forced to make a choice between these two approaches, then the short-term choice will generally be for individual security. But if we can be wise and dare look into the future, then collective security and non-proliferation as well as disarmament become the obvious choices. The end of the Cold War was not the end of world history. Today’s world is riddled with new problems and challenges – climate change and scarcity of energy resources, to mention only two. Old issues and problems like proliferation and remaining Cold War deterrence dynamics still reign, obstructing new ways of solving the new

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problems. In this situation a focus on new nuclear weapons and perhaps even more states with nuclear weapons is simply absurd, rendering us incapable of addressing the really pressing issues. We can look back on the early 1990s and understand that international nuclear non-proliferation assistance and cooperation were the right things to do – and that they remain the right thing to do. But what of a situation where people some 15 years hence look back and say, ‘well, there was a time when things were on a good track and when the number of nuclear threats was declining day by day – and then there suddenly was a new nuclear arms race and a worsening security climate, and that washed out all those collective efforts’? The historical lessons from the Cold War and early non-proliferation and disarmament cooperation and assistance would have been lost, and lost in favour of individual actions and vertical as well as horizontal proliferation measures undertaken by the existing nuclear antagonists and some of their prospective followers.

Conclusion It is not possible to predict at what point developments in the vertical proliferation spiral will undermine the international non-proliferation assistance and all that has been achieved and needs to be kept alive. Perhaps much can be saved for as long as the Global Partnership exists and the G-8 heads of state get the Global Partnership on the table when they meet. But after 2012 there are reasons to be less optimistic about the development of the collective anti-proliferation spirit and its impact on the nuclear decisions of individual G-8 members. On the other hand, it is possible to identify what is needed to keep alive the collective spirit concerning international cooperation and assistance against proliferation. We need to go back and learn from the early 1990s when nuclear security and nuclear disarmament were recognized as being related – and strongly related. The START I Treaty had to be implemented, and this led to the dismantling of nuclear warheads and their transformation into nuclear fuel under the ‘Megatons to Megawatts’ programmes. A clear linkage was seen between disarmament and non-proliferation. And not only that: a clear linkage between disarmament/non-proliferation and the use of an energy source that does not create greenhouse gases. We need to look at things as we did earlier and then tailor our suits for today’s needs. Disarmament is essential if we want to keep non-proliferation alive. This may all seem optimistic and idealistic, and it may well be so. On the other hand it also emerges as the best option and one that will work – simply because it has worked before, when the START I Treaty was implemented. The alternative is a situation where a souring sets in among people in countries that pay for non-proliferation assistance implemented in other countries. Little by little, politicians will understand that to their home audiences it is not popular to support non-proliferation measures abroad unless there are other non-proliferation and disarmament measures at play simultaneously. As things are now, we may soon end up in a situation where armament decisions and spirals force decision-makers into being reluctant and negative as concerns international efforts to cooperate on non-proliferation across borders. This development is surely deplorable. But there is still time to turn things around. It will demand boldness and courage in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, Oslo, Berlin and other places to put things on a prosperous track. And while we wait and hope, the scholarly community will have to push and raise its voices and sharpen its pens.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 9 Recent Proliferation Challenges by North Korea and Iran Robert M. WITAJEWSKI1

Iran and North Korea currently present two of the most serious threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and international security for several reasons. Heading the list of the international community’s concerns resulting from Iranian and North Korean actions are the potential for cascading proliferation, the destabilization of regional security, and the spread of the world’s most sensitive and potentially dangerous technology. North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test, as well as its missile tests three months earlier in July – and its continued pursuit or retention of these programmes – could destabilize the northern Pacific region. Its actions could force its neighbours to respond by taking defensive measures – the cumulative effect of which might, as history has shown, have unforeseen consequences that no one desires. As President Bush said following the October 2006 nuclear test, ‘the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action’. Similarly, an Iranian decision to go down the path of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability could also have profound consequences both within and beyond its region. Such an Iranian course of action could engender further proliferation, set off a defensive reaction among its neighbours as they re-evaluate their security requirements, exacerbate regional ethnic and religious tensions, further stress world energy markets, and negatively impact on the non-proliferation regime. Despite the North Korean and Iranian challenges to the international system, their rejection of the will of the international community as expressed by the UN Security Council, and their flouting of solemn national commitments in their leaders’ pursuit of nuclear weapons, the international community has continued to respond in a careful and measured manner, proposing not merely sanctions but indeed offering to these countries a menu of benefits to be provided in exchange for a return to accepted standards of responsible international behaviour and compliance with unanimous Security Council resolutions – or the logical consequences if they do not.

1 Director, Office of Regional Affairs. Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation US Department of State.

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Iran With its ongoing pursuit of its nuclear programme and its progressive constraining of the IAEA’s monitoring ability, the Iranian leadership’s challenge to the international non-proliferation regime raises profound questions about the real goals of the country’s leaders. For almost twenty years, Iran has pursued a covert nuclear programme, and its history of concealment must cast a long shadow into the future about current declarations. Nevertheless, despite the track record of Iranian leaders, President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006 and 2007 have reiterated that the United States remains committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by Iran. The USA has been pursuing a comprehensive strategy to block Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and in this it has been joined by a majority of nations in the belief that a nuclear weapons-capable Iran is unacceptable. Iran’s defiance of the international community is extremely troubling. Its April 2007 announcement that it had achieved an ‘industrial level’ enrichment capability, combined with further restrictions on the IAEA’s capability to monitor the country’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, indicates that Iran has not made a decision to suspend enrichment and related activities, as required by the UN Security Council. The IAEA Director General’s 23 May 2007 report to the Security Council confirmed Iran’s refusal to suspend. Iran’s announcement that it will develop a ‘plan of action’ to resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA in June 2007 has led to some progress; however, it remains unclear whether all IAEA concerns will be satisfied. Furthermore, Iran still refuses to comply with the suspension requirements of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. As a result, the United States and its international partners began consultations in the summer of 2007 on next steps to make clear to Tehran the costs of its continued defiance of Security Council mandates and increase pressure on the regime to comply. In that regard, the United States welcomed the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1747, while regretting its necessity. The Security Council imposed these additional Chapter VII sanctions because Iran had failed to comply with the requirements of UNSCR 1737. Through UNSCR 1747, the international community sent – yet again – an unambiguous message to Iran that it must fulfil its international obligations as set out in UNSCRs 1696, 1737, and 1747.

Defiance UNSCR 1696 was adopted after Iran’s failure to abide by multiple resolutions from the IAEA Board of Governors and the resultant continuing uncertainty as to the nature of its nuclear programme. Following Iran’s failure to comply with UNSCR 1696, the Council unanimously adopted UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, requiring Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA. It also imposed targeted sanctions to prevent the further development of Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. Iran’s leaders should have realized that these actions signalled the international community’s resolve in confronting the challenge posed by Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Through the requirements they impose on all UN member states, UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 are intended to isolate and slow the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. These two resolutions are narrowly targeted at the Iranian regime’s leadership – a leadership that continues to ignore the country’s international obligations. The United States has never had any desire to impose hardships on the people of Iran.

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Taken in combination, UNSCRs 1737 and 1747: x

x

x x x x x x

Require Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in resolving the outstanding questions surrounding its nuclear programme, and to take the steps necessary to build international confidence in Iran’s nuclear programme. The resolutions also establish an obligation for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and stop work on all heavy water-related projects subject to IAEA verification. Require states to freeze the assets of the entities and individuals designated in the Annexes of both resolutions as being engaged in or supporting Iran’s nuclear or nuclear weapons delivery system programmes. Key among these are the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Bank Sepah, several entities and individuals affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and many other Iranian entities and individuals with direct links to Tehran’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes. Require states to prevent the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of a broad range of specified nuclear and missile-related items and technology. Prohibit all financial and technical assistance related to the transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items. Prohibit export by Iran of any arms and related materiel; and call on all states to exercise vigilance and restraint in exporting certain conventional arms to Iran. Call on states to exercise vigilance and restraint in permitting individuals on the Annexes to travel to or through their countries, and, should they grant such access, require notification be given to the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee. Mandate that IAEA technical cooperation with Iran shall be solely for humanitarian, safety, medical, agricultural, or food-related purposes, or for lightwater reactors. Finally, UNSCR 1747 calls upon all states and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans with the government of Iran, except for strictly humanitarian and developmental purposes.

While the United States and its fellow Security Council members were acting vigorously to isolate the Iranian regime, the international community was also offering it a diplomatic way forward by leaving open the door to direct engagement on the nuclear issue. Following the adoption of UNSCR 1747, the P5+1 foreign ministers reiterated the generous terms of the P5+1 proposal first offered in June 2006 that promised to assist Iran with its civilian nuclear programme, guaranteed a nuclear fuel supply, and offered assistance to Tehran in other fields including agriculture, civil aviation, medicine and trade, on condition that all concerns about that country’s nuclear programme were resolved and full confidence created in its exclusively peaceful nature. For Iran to avail itself of these generous offers, all that its leaders must do to resume negotiations on this proposal would be to suspend the country’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA. This avenue of negotiation continues to represent the best path for Iran to satisfy the international community’s concerns about its nuclear programme. We hold that the Iranian regime’s failure, so far, to take advantage of the offer is a missed opportunity.

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Nonetheless, we continue to believe that diplomacy is our best course of action in blocking and containing Iran.

North Korea Since its founding in 1948, North Korea’s armed forces have constituted a core element of its national identity. The pre-eminence given the military for decades has had the effect, today, of making North Korea perhaps the most militarized state on the planet. Its 1.2 million-strong armed forces have made it the world’s fourth largest standing army. Some estimates indicate that as much as 40% of the population serve in some military, paramilitary, or defence-related industry. In addition to these sizeable conventional forces, North Korea has long pursued WMD capabilities, and demonstrated a nuclear capability in October 2006. The country has also continued to develop its ballistic missile programmes and has shown itself a proliferator of missile technology. The United States continues to support a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and to seek the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes through the Six-Party Talks. The USA, along with its Six-Party partners, has been working to ensure concrete action toward implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, in which the DPRK committed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards. The United States has welcomed the 13 February 2007 agreement on ‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’, as well as the subsequent visit of IAEA Director-General ElBaradei to Pyongyang in March 2007 for initial discussions with North Korea. The USA has done its part to ensure that the first phase of the Initial Actions Agreement, including taking steps to resolve the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue consistent with its commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the 13 February Initial Actions Agreement. As agreed to in the 13 February agreement as well, the parties convened five working groups to address denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, economic and energy cooperation, northeast Asian peace and security, USA– DPRK relations, and Japan–DPRK relations. As of late August 2007, the DPRK has continued to publicly reaffirm its commitment to carry out the initial actions of the 13 February agreement, including the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and inviting back IAEA personnel for monitoring and verification. It is essential that the DPRK follow through on its public affirmations and commitments on initial phase actions with action and move rapidly on implementing the next phase. Any further delay would not be helpful to the process. The United States envisions an important and robust role for the IAEA in carrying out the Initial Actions agreement in the initial phase in monitoring and verifying North Korea’s actions, and it looks forward to discussions within the Six-Party Denuclearization Working Group regarding the specific role of the IAEA in subsequent steps. The United States is engaged with international partners to continue diplomatic efforts in the Six-Party Talks framework and to ensure full and effective implementation of UNSCR 1718. Despite the apparent recent positive movement in the Six Party talks through late August 2007 and progress in implementation of the Initial Actions Agreement, UNSCR 1718 remains in effect until terminated by the Security Council, and all UN member states are required to continue to abide by the requirements of this Chapter VII resolu-

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tion. This resolution requires, inter alia, that UN member states prevent the transfer to or from the DPRK of a broad range of items, including certain conventional arms and listed items related to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as to ban the transfer to the DPRK of luxury goods. North Korea is also prohibited from exporting the weapons-related items listed in the resolution. More specifically, UNSCR 1718 requires all member states to: x x x x

x x

prevent transfers of items identified in UNSCR 1718 and additional items designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee or the Security Council; prevent exports of luxury items to North Korea; prevent transfers of technical training and assistance related to the nuclear, missile and conventional weapons-related items prohibited under 1718; freeze assets owned or controlled by persons or entities designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee or the Security Council as being associated with North Korea’s nuclear-related, other WMD-related, and ballistic missilerelated programmes, or those acting on their behalf; prevent entry or transit through their territories of persons designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee or the Security Council as being associated with the aforementioned programmes; and increase scrutiny and inspections of vessels suspected of carrying cargo prohibited for transfer to and from North Korea under UNSCR 1718.

The Resolution also calls upon member states to take cooperative action, including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law.

Conclusion The actions taken by North Korea and Iran present some of the most dangerous and most profound challenges to the non-proliferation regime in recent decades. The nondemocratic nature of these governments, their motivations for engaging in their courses of behaviour, and their recklessness and challenge to international norms demand a creative and determined diplomatic response on the part of the entire international community. The unanimous response of the world as exemplified by the several UN Security Council resolutions indicates that the community of nations is willing to stand up to the challenge to the non-proliferation regime presented by Iran and North Korea.

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Chapter 10 Dealing with the Iranian Nuclear Programme Tim GULDIMANN1

Refusing to comply with UN Security Council decisions, Iran has accelerated the buildup of its uranium enrichment programme and could have at its disposal weapons-grade uranium for a first bomb at the earliest during 2009. This defiance towards the international community reflects the country’s political culture and its traditional attitude to the outside world, which it perceives as threatening. In Iran the programme enjoys broad national support. Most probably, the aim is to build up a strong bargaining position for an eventual future arrangement, which would have to pay full respect and recognition to the country as a regional power, and to its regime. As such expectations collide with the US policy of working for further containment and isolation of Iran, an escalation of the nuclear crisis is the likely scenario, offering the Iranian regime a viable Cuban perspective for justifying internal stagnation and repression by fighting the external enemy. There is no chance for a breakthrough to a real solution of the issue by 2009. If, however, it were possible in time to calm down the tensions and avoid further escalation, then in 2009, under a new US administration and, perhaps, a new technocratic government in Iran, there could be a new window of opportunity for tackling the nuclear issue.

A First Nuclear Device In the context of the Iranian nuclear crisis, there are four areas of interest. The core issue of the debate is uranium enrichment.2 Centrifuges are the key technological factor in the enrichment process,3 and Iran could have about 3,000 centrifuges in operation

1 Tim Guldimann was Swiss Ambassador to Tehran from 1999 to 2004. He is Professor in Policial Sciences and from 2005 to 2007 has teached at the University of Frankfurt. Since October 2007 he has been head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. A shorter version of this article has been published in Survival, vol.49 no.3, Autumn 2007, pp 169-178 under the title: ‘The Iranian Nuclear Impasse’. The article reflects his personal views. 2 Iran has acquired from the Khan network the technology of the first generation P-1 centrifuge as well as blueprints for the improved P-2 version. The Pakistani physicist A.Q. Khan had stolen the technology in the Netherlands in the 1970s and developed Pakistan’s first nuclear bomb with it. 3 Uranium in nature consists of 0.7% fissionable U-235 isotopes and of 99.3% U-238 non-fissionable isotopes. For producing fuel rods the concentration of U-235 has to be increased to about 4%. Weapons-grade uranium needs a concentration of 70–90% U-235. Both can be produced by the same centrifuge technology. According to IAEA standards 25 kilos of weapon grade Uranium is considered to be the minimum quantity for producing a first nuclear device.

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soon. If all these were fully operational and efficient, they could produce weaponsgrade uranium for one or two nuclear devices each year. Second, Iran has successfully tested its medium-range missile Shahab 3. Although it can be assumed that series production is not advanced and is still dependent on imported technology, the missile would constitute at least a considerable political threat, if a nuclear device were developed. Due to the low number of possibly available missiles, Shahab 3 with its mere 1,000 kg loading capacity could be a threatening weapon only if used with WMD-devices. Hence, the missile is considered to be also a hint at Iran’s military intentions behind its nuclear programme. Third, Iran is building a heavy-water reactor in Arak. Once operational, it could provide plutonium for more than one nuclear device each year. However, before it could become operational, considerable technological problems would have to be resolved. In the next few years, this will hardly be possible if only home-based technology or black market supply is available. In any case, Iran’s uranium enrichment programme offers a shorter road to a nuclear device, if this is indeed what is intended. And finally, in Bushehr a light-water reactor is being built by the Russians. As this reactor is under IAEA supervision, it is hardly of any security concern. Moreover, its operational start has been constantly postponed.4 The following elements could explain how far the Iranians are from producing the quantity of highly enriched uranium needed for a first nuclear device, if – contrary to all official declarations – this was their goal. Considering that their centrifuge programme is the key technological element for a supposed military aim, there are quantity, quality and political factors involved. x

Number of installed centrifuges: Iran is able to produce first-generation centrifuges on an industrial scale, and up to summer 2007 has been assembling and installing them in much larger numbers than previously expected. The centrifuges for producing low-enriched uranium (for fuel rods) have to be interconnected most efficiently in cascades of 164 centrifuges each. In April 2007 the Iranians announced that they aim at a final capacity of 50,000 centrifuges – a figure for which the underground facility in Natanz was built. This number of centrifuges would be necessary for producing the fuel of one nuclear reactor, like that under construction in Bushehr. On 25 May 2007, the swift build-up of Iran’s enrichment capacity 5 confirmed by the IAEA: it stated that, apart from two 164-cascades in the pilot plant at Natanz, in the main fuel enrichment plant there, on ‘13 May 2007, eight 164 machine cascades were operating simultaneously and were being fed with UF6 (uranium-hexafluoride); two other similar cascades had been vacuum tested and three more were under construction’.6 In other words, Iran is able to reach its stated immediate objective of operating 3,000 centrifuges soon, however in July IAEA’s Director General stated: ‘there is a fairly marked slowdown. It is not a full-size freeze,

4 Tehran announced in April 2007 that the reactor in Bushehr would become operational by March 2008, but the dispute with Russia on fuel delivery and payments has not yet been resolved. 5 Still on 22 February, IAEA reported (IAEA Rep.GOV 2007/8) that only two 164 machine cascades had been installed and were operating under vacuum and another two 164 machine cascades were in the final stages of installation. 6 IAEA, GOV/2007/22/23 May 2007, p. 2 – source: www.isis-online.org

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x

but it is a marked slowdown’.7 Over the past three years the number of centrifuges was generally seen as the main factor for assessing when Iran could reach a level, which – assuming that these centrifuges were fully operational – would enable the country to produce within months the quantity of weaponsgrade uranium needed for a first nuclear device. Now the critical period until the possible availability of weapons-grade uranium has shrunk, due to the recently reported high numbers of installed centrifuges. This has led to growing concerns. For assessing the real dangers, however, two further aspects have to be analysed: the operational quality of the centrifuges, and the political intentions. Are the installed centrifuges efficient? Is a full speed build-up resumed? What is the final aim: to produce a bomb, or to achieve a military capacity? Operational quality of installed centrifuges: The production capacity of installed centrifuges depends above all on two critical technical aspects: The mechanical equilibration of the centrifuge allowing high-speed spinning at 1200 rps (i.e. supersonic speed at the periphery of the rotating part), and the quality or purity of the uranium-hexafluoride gas fed into the centrifuge. Even if one assumes that in all reported cascades the centrifuges have been successfully interconnected, there seem to be considerable technical problems: There are indications that the centrifuges are still not fed by a quantity of uraniumhexafluoride gas that can allow full efficiency, and that they are not in continuous operation.8 Most probably, Iran’s centrifuges break more frequently than when this type of centrifuge was in operation in the Netherlands in the 1970s. Excess temperature and explosions are the result of still unmastered deficiencies. Moreover, the Iranian centrifuges are possibly not spinning at full speed. In view of these difficulties, it seems that Iran up to summer 2007 has been installing as many centrifuges as possible as quickly as possible in the underground premises at Natanz, and is trying to deal with the inevitable problems. An indication of this hasty build-up could be the fact that one of the two cascades at the pilot plant at Natanz has been disconnected9 and all efforts have been put into building up the large plant. Under these circumstances, it could be expected that there will be a high machine failure rate, many broken cascades, and generally low performance. On the other hand, it is probably only a question of time until the Iranians master the cascade operation and can enrich uranium in greater quantities.10 Considering only the technical potential, assuming continued efforts to improve and even to expand again the enrichment activities and assuming (under the indicated circumstances) minimal technical problems ahead, even in the light of most recent progress it still can

7 Washington Post 10 July 2007, the number of installed centrifuges is estimated to be between 1600 and 2000. 8 Information available in spring 2007 indicates that the installed cascades were not operating continuously, but at only about one fifth of full operating time. See J. Shire & D. Albright: ‘Iran’s Centrifuges, How well are they working?’, ISIS 15 March 2007. – See also D. Albright, J. Shire & Paul Brannan: ‘IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran: Iran Making progress but not yet reliably operation an enrichment plant’, ISIS, May 25, 2007, www.isis-online.org 9 IAEA, GOV/2007/22/23 May 2007, p. 2 – The interpretation of Albright, Shire & Brannan (May 25) of this is that either the Iranians are confident that they can skip the pilot-plant stage, or that they use their large plant as a pilot plant. ‘It is also possible that Iran is taking a technological risk, jumping as quickly as it can into industrial-scale operation without an adequate testing phase and that the speed with which it has installed centrifuges (..) will later prove problematic’. It is this later assumption which for political reasons is considered by the author as the most likely. 10 Personal communication from David Albright, March 2007.

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x

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be predicted that a first critical amount of weapons-grade uranium could be produced (again, if this were the Iranian intention) at the very earliest sometime in 2009.11 IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said on 24 May 2007 that this could be ‘at the earliest in three to eight years’.12 Political intentions: It is difficult to judge whether the build-up of Iran’s enrichment programme thus far has been hindered only by technical problems or whether it has also been slowed down intentionally for political reasons. Presumably the build-up in 2006, also in light of the international proposal of 6 June, was not as rapid as technically possible. President Ahmandinejad’s announcements in April 2007 and activities until summer 2007 indicated a political will to accelerate the programme, followed – as mentioned – by a slowdown. In July, Iran agreed with the IAEA on an agenda to tackle outstanding issues and accepted that inspections are resumed. This new development could indicate a readiness for compromise in the future. For this possibility, the recent accelerated build-up most probably served to strengthen the Iranian bargaining position, as their policy could plausibly explained as follows: In light of the crisis in Iraq and the internal debate on the war in the USA, Tehran considers the danger of a US military strike against Iran as well as the danger of really hurting sanctions as limited, and assumes that international pressure for a negotiated app an tried to strengthen its position by quickly expanding enrichment roach in the nuclear issue will increase.

Aim of Iran’s Nuclear Programme Is Iran building a bomb? Presumably, in the early 1980s, during the war imposed by Iraq, Iran resumed its nuclear programme with military intentions. This was a programme initiated by the Shah before the revolution and pursued into the 1990s. After the US had intervened in Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein and the Iranian regime felt the threat that regime change action could be extended to Iran, Tehran opened the programme for enhanced cooperation with the IAEA, started negotiations with the EU and implemented the Additional Protocol from late 2003 until early 2006. In 2004, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei stressed – in a religiously binding declaration (fatwa) – the exclusively peaceful purpose of the programme for energy production. Today, the most likely position of the regime is to pursue the programme and to achieve a military option – but not to build a bomb itself and thus not to prepare a nuclear explosion. The core issue in this attitude is the aim of mastering the enrichment technology. Since 2003, throughout all international discussions, there has never been any serious indication that Iran would be ready to give up this aim or to ‘sell’ it for any Western incentives. Misunderstanding of this crucial point by the European negotiators was one of the reasons for their failure. The only Iranian concession in this respect was 11 These were worst-case estimates by David Albright and Frank von Hippel of Princeton, in March 2007, personal communication. 12 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 May 2007, p. 7. – Until 2006, worst-case estimates indicated a longer critical period, such as: ‘sometime beginning in the next decade, perhaps out to the middle to the next decade’ (CIA head John Negroponte on 1 September 2006) quoted by J. Cirincione, A. Grotto: Center for American Progress, Contain and Engage, March 2007, p. 10. - All these estimates exclude the very unlikely possibility that Iran has an alternative access to critical material outside the known centrifuge programme, such as a parallel secret enrichment programme or imported fissile material or even an imported nuclear device.

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to suspend enrichment activities pending an agreement, which – for Tehran – would have to involve some form of enrichment on national soil. The suspension was rescinded in early 2006. Despite increasing political tensions within the regime, there seems to be broad consent in Iranian politics to pursue the programme along these lines. Criticism has been voiced by former president Rafsanjani, by reformists and even by the nuclear chief negotiator Larijani13 against Ahmadinejad’s provocative positions, but not against the programme itself. In Iran, the programme enjoys broad national support, as it is presented and understood as a national project for technological progress.14 There is a considerable contrast between the international discussion, focused on presumed military intentions and the internal – although politically guided – debate in Iran. Internal perceptions are influenced by feelings of pride and grandeur, by a deep-rooted ideology of independence and above all by arguments for scientific development in an area that is internationally considered crucial for future energy supply. In this context, there is a widespread impression in Iran that ‘the West’ is trying to prevent the country from access to scientific progress. The international position is perceived as a patronizing attitude designed to keep the country in dependence and tutelage. Tehran can count on strong popular support for the argument that it is the legitimate right of Iran as member of the NPT to develop its own civil nuclear industry as well as have access to nuclear technology, as stipulated in Art. IV of the NPT.15 The Iranians feel that they have been singled out and punished, in contrast to the non-NPT-members Israel, India and Pakistan, which are respected and rewarded despite their military programmes. In reaction to all international pressure so far – a series of IAEA resolutions, three resolutions by the UN Security Council, UN sanctions and unilateral measures as well as the explicit threat of a military attack by the USA and Israel – the Iranians have not wavered in their determination to pursue enrichment activities. Tehran has defied the international obligations imposed by the Security Council, but stated its readiness to negotiate without preconditions.

Inflexibility and Defiance Reflecting Iranian Political Culture Such inflexibility cannot be explained by Iran’s conviction of being on the stronger side of a power game. The Western perception that Iran is generally gaining influence and would benefit from the escalation of regional conflicts is wrong. The only advantage for Tehran stems from the worsening situation in Iraq that led to the first official bilateral meeting with the USA since the overthrow of the shah. But the growing instability in Iraq and elsewhere in the region causes problems for Iran, above all as tensions with its Sunni Arab neighbours have increased.

13 According to al-Sharq al-Awsat of May 21, Larijani submitted – in protest to Ahmadinejad’s radicalism – for the fifth time his resignation to the Supreme Leader Khamenei, who rejected it. 14 Available information on public opinion in Iran indicates strong support for the programme, understood to be civilian. This support, however, weakens as soon as the issue is associated with military aims or foreign isolation or confrontation. Cf. Michael Herzog: ‘Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program’, Policy Focus 56, June 2006, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 15 Art. IV of the NPT stipulates implicitly the right to enrich; however the article is explicitly conditioned by the fulfilment of Art. II: the obligation of a non-nuclear-weapon state to refrain from any military nuclear activities. Doubts about Iran’s compliance with Art. II are the basis for international demands to suspend enrichment.

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It can be assumed that these problems are understood by Tehran, although at the same time radical forces within the regime, above all President Ahmadinejad, abuse confrontation with the West for bolstering their own internal position. Overall Iran’s inflexibility in the nuclear crisis can hardly be explained by national interests but by the country’s political culture and system. An important part of Iranian political culture is based on Shia tradition. The battle of Karbala, in AD 680, when Husayn, Ali’s son and the Prophet’s was killed in a fight against superior forces, has become the key event of Shia identity. The suffering of being the victim of illegitimate power and imposed injustice is a fundamental pattern in Iranian culture. The injustice is hardly fought against – it is lamented. Sufferance is celebrated in numerous mourning festivities. Iranians deeply distrust the outside world, as the result of a long history of what is perceived as continued foreign threats and aggression by the Mongols, the Russians, the British, the Americans, the Iraqis, the Israelis. In this ‘the-world-is-against-us’-perception, Iranians have always been convinced of the legitimacy of their own position against the illegitimacy of foreign action against them. This perception of the world around them has created a strong feeling of self-reliance and independence, which the Iranian revolution has fostered in the political culture of the country. Iran understands itself as the embodiment of an ancient civilization and wants to be respected as such. This claim for honour and respect is central to Iran’s aspiration to be seen as a regional power as well as a leading player in the Islamic world. The regime’s insistence on international respect is supported by a deep sense of national pride in the population. The three words ‘in mutual respect’ have become the precondition for any discussion about dealing with the key problem in Iran’s foreign relations – its relations with the USA.16 As long as Washington considers the Iranian regime illegitimate, a member of ‘the Axis of Evil’, and as long as changing the Iranian regime is a US policy goal, Tehran is not ready to settle any major issues – the nuclear question or other regional issues – with the West.17 Iran’s insistence on bringing back the nuclear dispute from the UN Security Council to the IAEA reflects the sense of offended honour, as well as the refusal to be treated as indicted before court and not as a partner for a deal. Respect and honour will be preconditions for any solution, which must allow Iran to save face and cannot be imposed by external pressure. Iran will never surrender, but it will – as the country has learnt in its long history – avoid open confrontation and take vague positions in order to keep all options open for the future. The Iranian regime consists of various forces in constant competition for power and influence. Implemented policy is mostly the result of an incremental process for establishing internal consent, not of any clear decision by the Supreme Leader. His role is different from that of other rulers in the region. This makes it extremely difficult for the regime to make strategic decisions to change national policy, even if it is in the na16 The offer of an ‘authoritative dialogue between the governments without precondition’ and ‘in mutual respect’ was first put forward by the American side (Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk on 14 October 1999) and confirmed above all by Secretary of State Mme. Albright in her offer to ‘open a new chapter in our common history’ of 17 March 2000. There was no positive response at that time from Tehran. 17 Honour and respect were also important for Iranian negotiations with the EU: in a positive sense at the beginning, with the breakthrough of Iran’s acceptance to suspend enrichment thanks to the common ‘pilgrimage’ of the foreign ministers of the three leading EU powers to Tehran on 21 October 2003, a protocol step unheard of in any other Third World country; and in a negative sense in Iran’s frustration with the European approach in the spirit of the donkey-driver vocabulary of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’.

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tional interest. 18 The nuclear programme has become a central issue in the internal power game. It is not possible for the regime to give in to international pressure and to the Security Council decisions. The terms of an international agreement or even the terms for starting substantial negotiations would have to be very respectful for Iran, in order to allow the regime to take any substantial steps. But a corresponding Western attitude is not likely to emerge soon, neither from the USA nor from the new leaders in France and Britain.

Impasse, Escalation and Confrontation Containment of Iran has become the central feature of US policy towards the Middle East,19 as Iran and its nuclear programme are seen as a major threat to regional stability, above all to the security of Israel. This approach fails to distinguish clearly between three simultaneous US goals: (1) to contain what is seen as Iranian aspirations for regional hegemony, thus to curtail Iranian influence in the region, (2) to stop Iran’s nuclear programme and (3) to change the regime by working for a ‘free and democratic Iran’. A military strike to halt the nuclear program remains an explicit option, accepted in principle by leading Democrats and by a majority in the US Congress. There is hardly any prospect for a substantive change in Washington’s Iran policy for the remaining two years of the Bush administration, although the inception of a bilateral dialogue on Iraq indicates some new flexibility in an area of strong American interests. But even if limited understanding on Iraq has shown some progress, it will hardly affect the general US approach of containment, at least until the new administration takes over in early 2009. President G.W. Bush’s declared intention not to leave the Iranian nuclear problem to his successor suggests further escalation within this general approach. There is no solution of the nuclear crisis without the USA. Any negotiated arrangement has to be supported actively by Washington, as well as by other permanent members of the Security Council. Through the Council’s resolutions, the demand for suspension of enrichment as a precondition for any future agreement has become international law. Although it might be difficult to adopt further sanctions, there is no chance for any reversal to be decided by the Security Council with US consent. If in the foreseeable future there is no chance of a change in the US and thus in the international attitude towards Iran on the nuclear issue, then the question is whether the Iranians, confronted with this position, might change their nuclear policy. Such a change is the declared aim of the international approach. Although sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions themselves did not contain any measures that seriously affect Iran, they – together with US pressure on banks and industrial companies in Europe and Asia – have worsened the general business climate for Iran’s foreign trade. Major international banks (Credit Suisse and Commerzbank) have stopped their clearing activities for Iranian oil export; Iranian importers have growing difficulties in opening letters of credit in foreign banks; and Western export guarantees have become sub-

18 The only decision of fundamental importance taken by the regime in its 28-year long history was the 1988 ceasefire ending the Iran–Iraq war. Conditions for a ceasefire years earlier would have been far better for Iran. 19 cf. Peter Rudolf: ‘Die Iran Politik der Bush-Administration’, SWP-Aktuell 25, April 2007, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. (As for Iran however, the author does not agree with Rudolf that ‘Iran’s position has been strengthened’, p.1).

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stantially restricted.20 These worsening conditions in foreign trade have a negative impact on the country’s internal economy, which is already suffering under the disastrous economic policy of Ahmadinejad’s government. Despite high oil prices, the government has not been able to transform oil revenues into better living conditions for the population at large. The huge influx of money is sucked up by state and quasi-state monopolies (Islamic foundations), populist social expenditures and crude state interventionism (imposed low interest rates for small credits, which banks are forced to provide) as well as by massive liberalized imports of consumer goods. The development of a money and capital market is stalled by state restrictions. All this leads to accelerated inflation and hampers investment for the stillweak private sector. The worsening living conditions of the majority contrast with the booming luxury consumption of a minority. Ahmadinejad’s populist promises have not been fulfilled, nor will they be fulfilled in the future. Tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbours have risen, as the former’s nuclear activities are seen as Shia and Persian hegemonic aspirations in the region. Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council and particularly Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey and even Jordan, have announced nuclear intentions. The developments in Iraq and Lebanon have sharpened the Sunni–Shia conflict. These tensions with the Arab world – supported by US efforts to foster an anti-Iranian regional front – have led to growing Iranian concerns of isolation, as reflected in a new and heightened internal debate on Islamic unity and Shia–Sunni-dialogue. As long as international consensus – above all in the Security Council – over how to address the nuclear issue remains intact, Tehran will have difficulties to portray international pressure as mere Western imperialism. Former president Khatami’s policy of dialogue and détente had managed to overcome foreign isolation, leaving relations with the USA as the most important remaining problem. Now, the nuclear issue has reversed this development, and Ahmadinejad’s provocative handling it has been openly criticized by his opponents. These external difficulties have contributed to – but are not the main factor behind – internal disputes in Iranian politics, where President Ahmadinejad’s radical populism is losing support. His extended tours around the country have lost much of their mobilizing effect. The political system remains stuck. Its specific conditions do not offer a self-correction for maintaining its legitimacy. Ahmadinejad’s shrinking popularity led on 15 December 2006 to the defeat of his supporters in the municipal elections and elections to the Expert Council (which elects and supervises the Supreme Leader Khamenei). The two former presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani appeared jointly at the ballot box. But all the leading politicians are part of the same system. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to develop a credible alternative or a credible alliance against Ahmadinejad. Criticism against him by his opponents in the regime is perceived by the public as ineffective. Khamenei himself explicitly supports the president, who has become more independent from the Leader. Through his populist decrees and declarations, Ahmadinejad openly defies and overrules other state institutions: the judiciary, the parliament, the central bank; he also offends the clergy. Ahmadinejad’s victory in 2005 was a protest vote, but the pendulum will not simply swing back with another protest election. With current economic trends, Ahmadine20 The German export guarantee institution HERMES reduced its coverage from €2.3 billion in 2004, to 1.4 bill. in 2005 and 0.9 bill. in 2006. German exports in January 2007 were down by 10% compared to January 2006; the trend was clearly confirmed by a majority of consulted German firms. – FAZ 12 April 2007, p.2.

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jad’s chances for winning a second term in 2009 are shrinking,21 provided that elections organized by his Ministry of Interior can still guarantee a minimum of democratic standards. The only realistic alternative would be a technocrat government, as a result of a pragmatic reaction by the voters, deprived of a really democratic choice.. For the next two years, no radical change or major concessions in the nuclear field can be expected from the Iranian regime as a result of increasing international pressure . However, there is a chance that Iranian foreign policy – if continuously engaged in dialogue on Iraq and on the nuclear issue – will assume a more moderate profile for avoiding open confrontation and further isolation. It could also be argued in such a positive scenario that Iran’s increasing success in mastering the enrichment technology creates more space for manoeuvring towards an international compromise. The chances of this optimistic scenario depend on the international side: At the least, it would be necessary to abstain from further steps to increase pressure in response to Iran’s current non-compliance with Security Council decisions. At worst, however – and such a scenario becomes all the more likely if US threats and pressure increase – nationalist defiance in Iran against ‘foreign aggression’ could well grow. ‘American imperialism’ could then be blamed for growing internal economic and social difficulties, and the regime would appeal to internal unity in the face of all the suffering, justifying internal repression. Already today the lack of productive investment is explained by foreign sanctions, and people are arrested for ‘contacts with the enemy’. In such a scenario, the regime would be encouraged to pursue the nuclear programme at high speed. The danger of this scenario is not only that it makes any solution – even a mediumterm solution – of the nuclear problem impossible. It also implies an escalated conflict with Washington with dangerous unpredictable incidents in Iraq or elsewhere. Such an escalation might then provoke a US military strike against the nuclear installations, with disastrous consequences for the whole region. External confrontation is the last source of internal legitimacy for a regime which otherwise has lost the popular support it still had in the revolution, in the war against the Iraqi aggression and in the early years of the Khatami presidency. The Fidel Castro scenario of justifying internal stagnation by fighting an external enemy is a viable perspective for this regime to survive – fuelled by an oil production of some four million barrels a day.22

Conclusion The nuclear conflict with Iran has gone through four years of intensive international debate, during which urgent demands have been formulated and short-term deadlines set, without positive results. The conflict is escalating. The next two years, as outlined above, will see neither an Iranian bomb nor a breakthrough to a real solution of the nuclear issue. Under these circumstances, what can the West do? – The internal political development should be left to the internal political disputes. Any effort to influence the in21 Majlis elections are on the agenda for early 2008, and presidential elections for spring/summer 2009. There is a possibility that a bill on holding the two elections together in early summer 2008 could be adopted. 22 At a conference on energy and security in Tehran in late May 2007, several Iranian and Western energy experts told the author that, despite depletion problems in the oil industry, Iran can be expected to maintain production at a level of 4 to 4.2 million barrels/day for the foreseeable future, above all because a growing proportion of the production is no longer used for foreign investment repayments (‘pay-back’ arrangements).

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ternal dispute from outside only plays into the hands of the radicals. There is still a chance for internal correction: Ahmadinejad’s brinkmanship can still be stopped – but only by the Iranians themselves. The best outside support for this lies in simply calming the external front by working pragmatically on limited solutions in Iraq, and with greater flexibility in the nuclear dispute. For this, a ‘nuclear dialogue’ will have to be pursued, avoiding additional Security Council resolutions. New sanctions resolutions will neither resolve the crisis nor have any added value to existing sanctions. The West will just have to live with the fact that Iran will come closer to the military option, at best this progress can be slowed down. In two years from now, however, there will be a new administration in Washington and, one hopes – if the conflict does not escalate into open confrontation – a new technocrat government in Tehran as well. If it were possible to calm the tensions or at least to avoid further escalation23 in the near future, then in 2009 there could be a new window of opportunity for rethinking US–Iran relations and for a new approach to the nuclear issue. The development will depend on US flexibility in dealing with Iran about Iraq, but above all on other international actors – the EU, Russia and China. Will they be drawn into an eventually growing Tehran–Washington confrontation? Will they remain passive bystanders? – or will they actively engage themselves for calming the tensions?

23 Cf. for the argument, this timetable provides time for diplomacy the article by Marc Fitzpatrick: ‘Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Program, in Survival’, vol. 48 no.3, Autumn 2006.

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Chapter 11 A New Strategy for the Iranian Nuclear File Jerry SOMMER1

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme has been smouldering for over five years now. Whereas in February 2007 a promising agreement was reached for the North Korean nuclear programme after the United States changed its negotiating strategy, there have been no signs of any such easing of tension as far as Iran is concerned. The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions because Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities – the international community’s precondition for the beginning of any kind of negotiations. However, Iran is not about to suspend these activities – on this there is broad consensus within the Iranian leadership. On the contrary, Iran is expanding its enrichment plant. A new round of debate about more extensive sanctions is about to begin. The capture of British Navy servicemen by Iranian commandos in March 2007 has illustrated just how quickly the conflict can lead to a military encounter. The ‘affair’ has also shown that diplomatic solutions are possible. The Iranian leaders with their diverse positions, but even President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a so-called hardliner, do not seem interested in aggravating relations with the West in principle. Indeed, it appears that they can be willing to compromise if they consider this to be in Iran’s best interest. Against this background, it is time to take stock of the strategy adopted by the international community towards Iran’s nuclear programme. The balance is negative, as will be shown in the following. To varying degrees, the most important international players – the United States, the European Union, Russia and China – have all been responsible for formulating and implementing the strategy to date. It would behove them all to rethink their policy towards Iran.

Current UN Sanctions and Their Effects Following four months of tough negotiations among the UN veto powers, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1737 on 23 December 2006. This resolution imposes certain sanctions on Iran under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter on the grounds that the country has not suspended all activities in connection with uranium enrichment and reprocessing, as demanded by the Security Council on 31 August 2006. The Resolution bans the provision of technical and financial assistance for Iran’s uranium enrichment and reprocessing programme and for its missile programme. The foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations alleged to be connected with these programmes have been frozen. Additionally, all states are to exer1

Research Associate at Bonn International Center for Conversion, BICC, Germany.

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cise ‘vigilance’ when granting entry visas to these twelve persons and should notify the United Nations accordingly. The UNSC Resolution specifically exempts the Russianbuilt Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran from any sanctions. Because Iran continued with its proliferation-sensitive activities, the UN Security Council tightened the sanctions on 24 March 2007. It imposed a ban on Iranian arms exports and froze the assets of additionally fifteen individuals and thirteen organizations and companies. Furthermore, it generally called upon all states not to support the provision of any new loans, and to exercise particular caution and restraint with exports of military goods to Iran which do not fall under the sanctions. As with the first sanctions resolution, the call for more extensive sanctions (particularly by the United States), such as a general ban on exports of arms to Iran, failed because of opposition from Russia and China. This time also South Africa criticized the extension of the sanctions to cover new branches of industry that are not proliferation-sensitive, before nevertheless finally approving the resolution. Even so, the material effects of the UN sanctions on Iran have been slight. The sanctions regarding technologies connected with uranium enrichment and missiles are purely symbolic, as no country has been exporting such technologies to Iran for a long time now. The ban on exports of Iranian weapons is economically negligible, as income from such exports amounts to only a fraction of the country’s annual revenues of approximately US $60 billion from the oil industry. Iran has reacted to each of the UN sanctions resolutions by reducing its voluntary cooperation with the IAEA, arguing that the minimum requirements of the Safeguards Agreement are nevertheless not touched. In any case, these measures make the IAEA’s work in Iran more difficult. The UN has come no closer – not even politically – to the actual objective of the sanctions: the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. The results of the local elections and the elections to Iran’s religious Council of Experts in December 2006 show that Ahmadinejad has lost some influence at home, particularly because he has failed to keep his social and economic election promises. Foreign policy issues, on the other hand, have played but a minor role in his relative loss of influence. In its latest report on Iran, the renowned International Crisis Group concludes that there are differences within the Iranian elite mainly ‘concerning the style and tactics’ of foreign policy.2 For example, in a leading article of 9 January 2007, the newspaper Jomhouri Eslami, considered to be the mouthpiece of revolutionary leader Khamenei, demanded from Ahmadinejad that to avoid creating the impression that ‘the extreme emphasis on the nuclear question was intended to detract attention from internal problems’.3 Although the Iranian leadership ranges from radical conservatives to pragmatic conservatives and reformists, there is ‘broad consensus within the regime’4 with regard to such basic foreign policy issues as uranium enrichment. All groups unanimously oppose the suspension of enrichment activities as a precondition for negotiations. Even expresident Mohammad Khatami, who is seen as a reformist, is against such preconditions.5 Influential politicians who are considered to be pragmatic conservatives, such as Ali Laridjani, Head of the Iranian Security Council and Iran’s chief negotiator in the nuclear talks, as well as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former President and current 2 International Crisis Group (ICG) ‘Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency’, Middle East Briefing No 21. February, 2007, p. 2. 3 Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Iran-Report 2/07, Berlin, 2007, p. 3. 4 ICG (2007), p. 2. 5 Mohammed Kathami, ‘Iran is ready to sit at the negotiating table. It requires no precondition. It only requires goodwill’. Speech in New Delhi on 23 March 2007. Quote from Indian news agency RxPG News.

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Chairman of the ‘Council of Experts’, also support the objective of expanding the country’s enrichment capacities – and thus developing its technological capability to produce the material needed for producing nuclear fuel rods and/or a nuclear bomb.6

Status of the Iranian Nuclear Programme Iran is suspected of aiming to produce nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear programme. For eighteen years up to 2002, it secretly planned and conducted programmes to enrich uranium, a material which in a low-enriched form (3–5%) is needed for fuel elements in civilian nuclear power stations, but which in highly enriched form (90%) can be used to build a nuclear bomb. So far, Iran has failed to provide adequate answers to the questions posed by the IAEA regarding the clandestine programmes. The enrichment activities currently taking place are proceeding under IAEA control. In its 23 May 2007 report to the Security Council, the IAEA reiterated that ‘the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran’.7 The director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, has declared that the agency has ‘not seen concrete evidence’ that Iran has a weapons programme,8 but as long as Iran has not answered some outstanding questions, the IAEA is unable to say that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran is operating a uranium conversion plant in Isfahan, in which natural uranium is transformed into uranium hexafluoride, the gas needed for the enrichment process. However, it is not clear whether this gas is sufficiently pure for further processing activities.9 Iran runs an above-ground pilot plant for enriching uranium in Natanz. There, uranium has been enriched only periodically to a level of less than 5%. The enriched uranium was transformed back into its previous gaseous state. In addition, Iran is constructing a large commercial enrichment facility underground in Natanz. The declared long-term goal is to run more than 50,000 centrifuges. During a May 2007 visit, IAEA inspectors found that in this enrichment plant eight 164-centrifuge cascades were ‘operating simultaneously and were being fed with uranium hexafluoride’.10 More cascades are being installed and are under construction. Iran has still to overcome considerable technical problems in running these centrifuges smoothly. Nevertheless, one can assume that the country is slowly but surely expanding its ability to enrich uranium on a larger scale. Assuming the worst-case scenario (although this is very unlikely for technical reasons alone), Tehran would have sufficient highly enriched uranium to produce a nuclear bomb by 2009 or 2010 at the earliest.11 The development of a functioning nuclear weapon would need additional time. Even the then head of the US secret services, John 6 Mark Fitzpatrick (2007) ‘Can Iran’s Nuclear Capability Be Kept Latent?’, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 40: ‘Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Laridjani are fully part of the leadership consensus on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.’ 7 IAEA Report by the Director General (2007), GOV/2007/22/23 May 2007, p. 4, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport23May2007.pdf (accessed 5 June 2007). 8 Mohamed ElBaradei (2007), Interview with BBC 4, broadcast 31 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_6700000/newsid_6707500/6707591.stm?bw=nb&mp=rm (accessed 5 June 2007). 9 On the status of the Iranian nuclear programme see e.g. Fitzpatrick (2007), p. 33ff; Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto, ‘Contain and Engage’, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, March 2007. 10 IAEA Report (2007) p. 2. 11 Fitzpatrick (2007), p. 38.

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Negroponte, did not consider an Iranian nuclear bomb to be realistic before 2010 to 2015 at the earliest.12 There is therefore no cause for alarmism. Furthermore, until now there has been no proof of the existence of an active nuclear weapons programme in Iran. Former head of the IAEA, Hans Blix, is critical of the widespread tendency to behave as if it had been proven that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme: ‘Don’t we have sufficient experience in the Iraq affair to be a little cautious about that?’13 Admittedly, among radical conservative Islamist groups in Iran voices can be heard arguing that nuclear weapons are the best protection against an attack by the United States.14 But Ayatollah Khamenei, the country’s supreme religious leader, President Ahmadinejad and more moderate forces in the leadership have all repeatedly stressed that the nuclear programme is intended solely for civilian purposes. The uranium enrichment programme, so they argue, is aimed exclusively at enabling Iran to produce by itself the nuclear fuel elements needed for its planned extensive nuclear energy programme. On the one hand, Iran presents religious grounds for opposing nuclear weapons. Since weapons of mass destruction would kill innocent people, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2004 stating that they were irreconcilable with Islam. In view of the religious justifications put forward by the Iranian leadership, such statements should not be considered irrelevant, as Volker Perthes, Head of the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik suggests.15 Iran also presents political grounds for not planning to acquire nuclear weapons. Ali Laridjani, for example, has declared: ‘If we had nuclear weapons, an arms race would begin in our neighboring countries.’16 He concluded that this was not in the national interests of Iran. According to leading experts on Iran, no strategic decision in favour of nuclear weapons has been taken in Tehran to date.17 Of course, one cannot exclude the possibility of a change of attitude and a future decision favouring the construction of nuclear weapons. However, such a decision could be expected to lead to serious differences within the Iranian elite as well as within society. On the other hand, the Iranian leadership currently unanimously believes that the country cannot do without uranium enrichment. This attitude is also supported by moderate conservatives within the power apparatus as well as by the large majority of the Iranian population. Uranium enrichment is regarded as a question of national prestige and national sovereignty and as being decisive for the country’s economic and technological progress. According to a US survey in January 2007, 84% of Iranians consider uranium enrichment to be ‘very important’, and a majority opposes the termination of

12 BBC (2007), ‘Iran bomb “within next 10 years”’, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/ 5039956.stm. 13 Hans Blix (2006), Interview in Arms Control Today, July/August 2006. 14 For example, the arch-conservative newspaper Keyhan recommended on 12 February 2006 ‘to plan for acquiring the knowledge and the ability to produce nuclear weapons which are necessary for the preparation of the next phase in the future battlefield’. Quoted in Ray Takeyh (2006) Hidden Iran, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 150. 15 Volker Perthes and Eva Wagner, ‘Black Box Teheran’, Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik, Berlin, 7/2006, p. 831. 16 Ali Laridjani, Ali , ‘We guarantee that we are not developing nuclear weapons’, interview in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 February 2007. 17 For example Perthes and Wagner (2006), p. 830; Karim Sadjadpur (International Crisis Group), Götz Neuneck (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik at Hamburg University) and Bernd W. Kubbig (Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung), in ‘Iran: Wege aus der nuklearen Sackgasse’, paper 52, Bonn: BICC 2006 (www.bicc.de).

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such activities.18 At the same time, 66% favour Iran remaining a member of the NonProliferation Treaty, even if this means renouncing nuclear weapons.

The United States, Russia, China and the European Union The United States is the driving force behind the Iran policy of the international community. Relations between Tehran and Washington are strained, for historical reasons (the CIA coup in 1953; US support for the Shah; hostages in the US embassy in Tehran; then US support of Iraqi aggression towards Iran). Since 1979, the United States has not maintained diplomatic relations with Iran and has imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on the country. In addition, the global strategy of the Bush Administration with regard to Iran is to prevent the emergence of a regional power in the region. Because Iran is considered hostile to the West and part of the ‘axis of evil’, the declared aim of the Bush Administration is a regime change in Tehran. Because Washington has been accusing Iran for years of striving for nuclear weapons and of conducting a secret nuclear weapons programme, Washington’s intention has long been to deny Iran any kind of nuclear plants. An Iran with nuclear weapons is to be stopped by all means – including war if necessary.19 For the Bush Administration, the preferred means of achieving these goals is to isolate Iran by political, economic and military pressure. So far, the administration has refused to apply to Iran the policy instruments that it employed with North Korea this year – holding direct bilateral talks and providing security guarantees. But due to increased criticism of this attitude both in the United States and abroad, and against the background of the continuing disaster of the Iraq war and the lost Congressional elections, the Bush Administration has modified its stance to a certain extent. In May 2007 high-level representatives of the United States and Iran met for the first time in many years to discuss about Iraq. Already in June 2006 the Bush Administration had declared its willingness to take part in multilateral talks on the Iranian nuclear programme, however only under the precondition that Iran should first verifiably suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. Robert E. Hunter, former member of President Carter’s National Security Council, infers that this precondition was a ‘poison pill’, which the opponents of any kind of talks with Iran around Vice-President Cheney had managed to impose in the inter-departmental quarrel in the US Administration over the right tactics.20 The European Union has tried to act as mediator between Iran and the United States, and started negotiations with Iran on the latter’s nuclear programme in 2003. Iran was prepared to suspend its enrichment programme during the negotiations. However, the offer made by the EU in August 2005 was very meagre: It demanded that Iran fundamentally renounce all uranium enrichment activities, and presented only vague, unimaginative declarations of intent as incentives in exchange. The newly elected Iranian State President Ahmadinejad rejected the offer outright. But the EU’s offer would most likely have been rejected even by the moderate candidate Rafsanjani had he won the elections. This was due not only to Europe’s Bush-inspired ‘all or nothing’ negotiating tactics, but also to the fact that the EU could not make certain offers which were of significant interest to Iran: security guarantees and the normalization of economic 18

Roy Gutman, ‘Poll shows Iranians support for uranium-enrichment program’, McClatchy Newspapers, 24 January 2007. 19 See e.g. Bernd Kubbig, ‘Thesen zur Iran-Politik der USA’, paper 52. Bonn: BICC, 2006, pp. 24ff. 20 Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, Interview with Robert E. Hunter, 27 March 2007.

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relations with the United States. And for its part, the United States was not prepared to make such offers. When Iran subsequently continued its enrichment activities, the EU tried to employ a kind of double strategy: On the one hand, it agreed to have the case transferred from the IAEA to the UN Security Council. On the other hand, in June 2006, it presented Iran with a much improved offer agreed beforehand with Russia, China and the United States.21 In this new offer, Iran is to be allowed to convert uranium into uranium gas, a preliminary step to enrichment. In addition, uranium enrichment in Iran is not ruled out forever. Furthermore, the offer includes the intention to lift certain US sanctions against Iran with regard to civil aviation, telecommunications and agriculture. Also, the new package repeats the offer to support Iran with the construction of new light-water reactors, and promises a ‘guarantee’ for the supply of nuclear fuel elements for Iranian nuclear power plants. This offer suits Iran’s interests much more than the previous one, although it still does not contain any security guarantees from the United States and remains vague regarding the lifting of US sanctions. Iran has welcomed the offer and spoken out in favour of negotiations. The main crux of the offer put forward by the six powers, however, is that it, too, demands the suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran as the precondition for all negotiations – and this the Iranian leadership has unanimously rejected. Russia and China, like the EU states, have strong economic interests in Iran. Russia is building the first Iranian nuclear power plant in Bushehr, a project worth one billion dollars, and is interested in follow-up orders. Russia and China are also the biggest exporters of military goods to Iran. Whilst they share with the United States and the EU the goal of preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons, they have objected to any military ‘solution’ even more vehemently than many European states. Referring to the USA in his speech in Munich in February 2007, Russia’s President Putin spoke out explicitly against ‘an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations’.22 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called upon the United States to exercise ‘flexibility and pragmatism’ in approaching Iran, just as it had recently shown towards North Korea, as much of the problem was due to the ‘unwillingness of the United States to normalize its bilateral relations with Tehran’.23 He recalled the old concept of peaceful coexistence for dealing with such problems. Like China, Russia has opposed tighter, non-specific sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. This is a stance not based solely on Russia’s own economic interests, including the desire not to jeopardize construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and Russian arms exports. Moscow also has doubts about the utility of sanctions in general and believes that in regard to Iran they would serve to strengthen the hardliners in Tehran rather than the moderate forces. Russia has therefore criticized the US endeavours to urge other countries to introduce economic sanctions against Iran in excess of those imposed by the Security Council.

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‘Elements of a long-term agreement’, published as an Annex to letter 13 July 2006 from the French UN Ambassador to the President of the UN Security Council as UNSC Document S/2006/52. 22 Vladimir Putin, speech in Munich at the ‘43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy’, 10 February 2007, available at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=de&id=179& 23 Sergey Lavrov, speech in Moscow at the XV Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, 17 March 2007, available at http://www. mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb 3/b31681458d90c7b8c32572a3004992f5? OpenDocument.

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Despite such fairly fundamental criticisms, Russia, like China, has approved certain cornerstones of the six powers’ current Iran policy: Both Russia and China support the precondition that Iran must suspend its uranium enrichment activities before negotiations can begin. They leave the actual conduct of talks with Iran to the EU, in this case Javier Solana as High Representative for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moscow has not undertaken any solo attempts to mediate since Washington, in particular, rejected a possible compromise with Iran in spring 2006, which was said to involve the enrichment of uranium for Iran in Russia and a small research project on the enrichment of uranium in Iran itself. As long as Iran refuses to comply with the demand for suspension of its enrichment activities, it seems that Russia and China will agree to extend sanctions further, whilst nevertheless trying to limit these sanctions. But no one can say how far Russia, China – or the EU member-states – are willing to go in supporting Washington’s sanctions policy against Tehran. All these states have in principle a great interest in maintaining good relations with the United States. How this interest will be balanced against other considerations – for example, status perceptions and/or fact-based considerations as to the best policy for solving the Iranian nuclear conflict – will most likely be decided from case to case. In the following, possible scenarios linked to the continuation of the current strategy towards Iran are presented.

Tightening Sanctions A gradual tightening of UN sanctions is to be expected should Iran continue to refuse to comply with the demands of the UN Security Council for the suspension of its activities.24 As long as there is no clear proof of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, the Security Council will probably only be able to agree on sanctions of a primarily symbolic nature. For economic and political reasons, both Russia and China would hardly agree to an oil and gas embargo, which would also have a strong economic effect on Europe, or a ban on exports of weapons to Iran. The US administration will certainly continue to exercise pressure on all the other states to adopt not only strong UN sanctions but also unilateral measures above and beyond these. In particular, it has been trying to prevent further oil and gas projects and financial transactions with Tehran. However, Germany, like other EU countries, has continued to provide guarantees for exports to Iran, although these have dropped in recent years.25 New long-term projects between Iran and the Austrian company OMV are in the pipeline – despite strong criticism from Washington.26 Also, India has publicly refused to tolerate any kind of US intervention with regard to its planned gas deals with Iran. Russia did not deliver nuclear fuel elements for the nuclear power plant in Bushehr as planned in March 2007. According to media reports, there are indications that it will not do so at least unless Tehran lifts the veil of secrecy on suspicious past atomic activities.27 If Russia refuses to deliver the fuel rods as long as the nuclear dispute with 24

For details of international experiences with sanctions and the possible sanctions against Iran see Marc von Boemcken and Jerry Sommer (2006) ‘Der Streit um das iranische Atomprogramm – Auf der Suche nach einem kreativen Kompromiss’, Focus No. 1, Bonn: BICC, June. 25 According to the Financial Times Deutschland of 15 February 2007, such guarantees dropped from €1.4 billion in 2005 to €900 million in 2006. 26 Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 25 April 2007. 27 George Jahn ‘Officials: Russia ups pressure on Iran’, Associated Press, 7 August 2007.

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Iran is not solved, not only the start-up of the Bushehr plant will be delayed even further. For its part, Iran will interpret this in political terms as Russian ‘unreliability’ – thereby underscoring the need to continue with its own uranium enrichment programme. Further UN sanctions as well as any other sanctions imposed by individual states or groups of states will certainly not be entirely without effect on Iran. But Iran has many possibilities to circumvent non-universal sanctions – and it has already begun using these possibilities.28 Iranian companies are moving to Dubai. Instead of its traditional suppliers from Western Europe, Iran is trading more with Russia and China.29 While Iran’s trade with Germany in 2006 dropped by 6% to the amount of €4 billion, China’s trade with Iran will reach its highest-ever level of about $16 billion in 2007. Dubai, which is used by Iranians to bypass sanctions, expects to see its trade with Iran to jump to $10 billion in 2007, from $ 7.8 billion in 2006. Furthermore, Iran is planning to establish an investment fund outside the Islamic republic to raise money for the exploration of gas and oil fields, thus circumventing a financial squeeze by Washington.30 In any case, in view of the high oil prices and the resulting full coffers for Iran, any economic consequences of extended universal or unilateral sanctions will affect that country’s prospects of economic development only in the medium to long term, if at all. Politically, however, further sanctions would immediately expand President Ahmadinejad’s room to manoeuvre. He could instrumentalize them to stir up nationalist emotions and thus make a negotiated solution even more complicated. In addition, the work programme agreed between Iran and the IAEA in August 200731 about the access of the IAEA to nuclear sites in Iran and about the solving of outstanding questions in regard to Iran’s past nuclear activities would most likely be jeopardized. In the contrary, instead of more IAEA controls, more restrictions of IAEA access to these facilities or even Iran’s termination of its NPT membership are to be expected. 32 It seems highly unlikely that further sanctions, even if combined with incentives, will affect the unanimous, negative attitude of the Iranian leadership to the question of suspending and stopping uranium enrichment activities. It is a matter of looking reality in the face, as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies has pointed out: ‘The odds are low that a combination of sanctions and incentives will induce Tehran to give up uranium enrichment or to dismantle any part of its nuclear programme’.33

Military Strike Russia, China, Germany and others have stated that they consider a negotiated solution as the only option to the conflict on Iran’s nuclear programme. Also, IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has argued: ‘There is no military solution. The use of force would

28 Bernd Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (2007) ‘Internationale Sanktionen gegen den Iran: Erfolgsbedingungen und Effektivität’, p. 28. 29 Jim Krane, ‘Analysts say sanctions affecting Iran’, Reuters, 24 May 2007. 30 International Herald Tribune, ‘Iran plans investment fund’, 29 May 2007. 31 George Jahn, ‘U.S.: Iran cooperation insufficient’, Associated Press, 23 August 2007. 32 The Iranian Parliament has passed a resolution under which the government would have to reconsider cooperation with the IAEO as well as its NPT membership following the UN Security Council Resolution. Ali Laridjani recently referred to this: ‘If they continue to pressure Iran over its peaceful nuclear activities, we have no other choice but to follow parliament’s order and review our membership of the NPT’. In: ‘Iran will review atomic NPT membership if pushed’, Reuters, 9 April 2007. 33 Cf. Fitzpatrick (2007): p. 33.

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be catastrophic.’34 In contrast, Washington is keeping all options open, including the military option. There is no doubt that the United States has the necessary military hardware for launching an attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites, especially since the stationing of a second and third aircraft carrier in the Gulf in spring and summer of this year. Plans for such a strike are said to already exist. Even if a US-led military strike against Iran does not seem likely at present – particularly because of the situation in Iraq and the stand of its allies and partners – one cannot exclude the possibility that the United States could take such action unilaterally if it believes that it cannot achieve its goals by other means. Moreover, President Bush could hope that such a strike could influence the US presidential elections at the end of 2008 in favour of the Republicans, while also demonstrating his own strength by not leaving this problem for the next US administration to deal with. Nonetheless, a military strike would involve unforeseeable negative consequences, not only for the Iranian people, but also for regional stability (especially in Iraq and Israel/ Palestine), for the world economy and for the reputation of the West in general and the United States in particular in the Muslim world.35 It might set back the Iranian nuclear programme by a few years, but it would drive Iran to finally decide to build its own nuclear weapons and to quit the NPT. Thus, a military strike against Iran cannot be said to be a solution.

A Way Out of the Deadlock The current strategy employed by the international community towards Iran’s nuclear programme has reached a political deadlock. To continue this strategy does not promise success – a political solution must be given a chance instead. In particular, this will require Washington to turn its back on ideological, maximalist positions. A different strategy towards the Iranian nuclear programme would need to involve several complementary elements. Serious negotiations with Iran must begin as soon as possible on the offer made in June 2006 by the six powers, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA. Iran has declared that it is willing to take part in negotiations without preconditions. The more time passes by unused, the more irreversible facts are established as the Iranian enrichment programme expands. Furthermore, the sanctions against Iran will be extended over time and this, in turn, will damage the political climate needed for achieving a compromise. The unrealistic demand that Iran must suspend its uranium enrichment activities before such negotiations can begin should be dropped, should it not be possible to quickly find a face-saving compromise for both sides. Indeed, it is quite incomprehensible why the suspension of uranium enrichment should be a precondition for negotiations, as that was not the case concerning negotiations with North Korea. In the opinion of Hans Blix, such a precondition does not serve the purposes of a negotiated solution, but is rather an expression of a ‘humiliating neo-colonial attitude’.36 If the parties cannot agree to start formal negotiations, at least intensive, exploratory negotiations-like talks in working groups on main topics of the June 2006 offer to Iran should start as soon as possible. Representatives of all interested parties from the six 34

Mohamed ElBaradei (2007). ibid: p. 46ff; Crisis Action (2007) ‘Time to Talk. The Case for Diplomatic Solutions on Iran’, London, March (www.crisisiran.com). 36 Hans Blix, ‘Blix: Condition for talks with Iran humiliating’, APA/AP Report, 2 March 2007. 35

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powers and Iran should participate. If media reports are correct, in their meeting on 31 May 2007, Ali Laridjani and Javier Solana agreed to expert-level sessions for discussion of several aspects of the problem.37 This could and should lead to preparing the ground for a negotiated solution, even if the precondition of suspension is not fulfilled.

Drawing a New Red Line It is too late to prevent Iran from developing the capability and knowledge to enrich uranium. With this capability, it would also possess the technological capacities to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon – if its leadership so desired in the future. The original objective, pursued primarily by the United States, of ensuring that Iran has zero uranium enrichment capacities is thus no longer enforceable. ‘Nevertheless, it is still not too late to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb’, as Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group, has rightly stated.38 First of all, this means establishing the political preconditions needed to prevent advocates of nuclear weapons in Iran from gaining the upper hand in future. Normalization of relations with the United States, recognition of Iran’s legitimate role as a regional power in the Near and Middle East, as well as the fundamental acknowledgment of Iran’s right to a complete fuel cycle would alter Tehran’s threat perception considerably. This policy of détente would put wind in the sails of those in the Iranian leadership who advocate national enrichment capacities for a civilian nuclear programme, but oppose the possession of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the international community should focus on ensuring maximum possible international control of Iran’s nuclear facilities – not on preventing any enrichment.39 Iran has repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol with its intrusive verification regime. More extensive controls would have to be sounded out. For example, at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, Ali Laridjani declared Iran’s willingness to ‘have all of our nuclear activities in a consortium so that others can participate in our activities and as the result we build confidence’.40 Hassan Rohani, representative of religious leader Khamenei in the National Security Council, has officially put forward a proposal by Iran to establish a joint consortium of states in the Gulf region to produce nuclear fuel elements under IAEA supervision.41 Furthermore, the negotiations could be used to ascertain how serious Iran has been with its various proposals in recent years regarding temporary or quantitative limits on enrichment activities on its territory,42 including the ‘Russian option’ which provides for enrichment on an industrial scale on Russian soil. However, this can only be negotiated when, as noted by the International Crisis Group, the United States and the Europeans abandon ‘the ‘zero enrichment’ goal in favour of a ‘delayed limited enrichment’ plan.43 37

‘Various ideas raised at Larijani-Solana meet’, IRNA, 3, June 2007. Gareth Evans, ‘It’s not too late to stop Iran’, International Herald Tribune, 16 February 2007. In the same vein, see Christoph Bertram (former Director of IISS London and the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) ‘Wer im Loch steckt, soll nicht noch graben’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 March 2007. 40 Ali Laridjani, speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 11 February 2007, available at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=195& 41 ‘Proposals for Persian Gulf Security’, Iran Daily, 11 April 2007. 42 See precise list in Fitzpatrick (2007): p. 49f. 43 Gareth Evans, 2007. 38 39

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The possibilities of internationalization of such sensitive technologies as uranium enrichment should also be discussed in the negotiations.44 However, it is unlikely that such concepts will be able to play a role in solving the current conflict with Iran. A negotiated compromise – in exchange for improved incentives – on the issues of strict international control and, if possible, of limitation of enrichment capabilities would influence important technological factors of Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities. At least, a compromise could serve to delay an extensive independent Iranian enrichment programme and ensure that it was transparent. After all, it is surely preferable to have Iranian enrichment activities under strict international control, to enrichment activities with slacker control or with no control whatsoever. The better the inspection regime, the more difficult it will be for Iran to hide any secret nuclear weapons programme, and the earlier the international community will know of any break-out attempts.

Conclusion A large part of the problem is caused by the unwillingness of the current US administration to normalize relations with Iran. Direct talks between Washington and Tehran should begin, without preconditions, on all topics of mutual interest. The provocative stationing of US military forces in the Gulf should be called off. Moreover, Iran must be offered the prospect of a complete normalization of relations, including the end of US sanctions, and comprehensive security guarantees. The hopeless goal of forcing a regime change in Tehran should be abandoned. Washington has managed to apply such strategy in its relations with North Korea. It is now also time for such a ‘paradigm change’ in US policy towards Iran, as Ray Takeyh, Iran expert with the Washington Council on Foreign Relations, has stated in an article in Foreign Affairs.45 This would dissipate fears of threats in Tehran in general and could help to strengthen the moderate, pragmatic forces within the Iranian leadership. A policy of détente could lead to a more flexible position of Iran in the negotiations in the short term. In the long term, it would help to isolate advocates of nuclear weapons in Iran from ever gaining ground in the future. The change of political strategy towards Iran described here does not guarantee success. On the other hand, it is very likely that the current strategy of escalating sanctions will remain unsuccessful at the best, and at the worst will merely be a prologue to military action on the part of the United States. Whether of not the change of strategy can be achieved will depend largely on just how far the EU, China and Russia, together with states of the developing world and the US opposition, can persuade Washington to show greater pragmatism and more flexibility in its treatment of Iran. However, this also means that the partners will have to demonstrate more self-assurance in dealing with the United States than they have done in the past, and that they put forward their own policy ideas in regard to Iran. After all, the case of North Korea has shown that even the Bush Administration is able to alter its position. The development of the conflict surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme will also influence the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A peaceful solution to the Iran conflict would represent an important contribution to the success of the 44 See Harald Müller, ‘Multilateralisierung des Brennstoffkreislaufs: Ein Ausweg aus den Nuklearkrisen?’ HSFK-Report, Frankfurt/Main: HSFK, October 2006. 45 Ray Takeyh (2007) ‘Time for Détente With Iran’, Foreign Affairs, March/April.

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next NPT review conference in 2010. The effect of escalation of the conflict – a possible military strike or the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb – requires further research. However, it seems likely that such escalation would make it considerably more difficult to strengthen the non-proliferation regime as desired, for example by agreeing new, tighter control mechanisms and by internationalizing nuclear-weapons technologies such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

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Chapter 12 Responses to Proliferation Challenges in South Asia Talat MASOOD1

India’s decision in May 1998 to explode five nuclear devices with varying yields was the most serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime since the coming into force of the NPT in 1970. This was soon followed by Pakistan testing six of its nuclear devices, setting off fears of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The United States reacted strongly to the Indian decision, and relations between the two countries reached a low not witnessed since the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. The USA imposed economic sanctions on India, which in fact were triggered automatically by Congressional legislation. Washington also successfully persuaded major European powers and Japan to impose similar sanctions. Relations between India and China took a steep dive when the Indian leadership cited the Chinese threat as justification for going overtly nuclear. Russian reactions were mild – unsurprisingly, since Russia and India have had close links since Soviet times. There was also a widespread belief that the major and still unresolved Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan could lead to nuclear exchange. However, after a cooling-off period, the USA and India engaged in a bilateral dialogue to resolve their differences. The fact that India and Pakistan are not signatories of the NPT also helped the two countries to cope with initial pressures. A series of meetings between US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, and the Indian Prime Minister’s special envoy, Jaswant Singh, commenced in June 1998 and eventually resulted in the USA tacitly accepting the reality of India as a nuclear power. President Clinton’s visit to India helped in further easing of tensions and establishing closer rapport between the leaders of the two countries. The USA soon realized that strategic, political and economic considerations were more important in the context of India than their differences over the nuclear issue. Washington accepted the nuclear-weapons capabilities of India and Pakistan as a fait accompli – something to be managed rather than opposed. There was a clear recognition that India and Pakistan would not roll back their nuclear capabilities. It was, however, the policy of USA and the other P-5 nations to persuade India and Pakistan to abide by the provisions of the NPT as applicable to weapon states and also work toward a stable and enduring peace in the region, settling their disputes peacefully. After the September 11 terrorist attacks and Pakistan agreed to be an ally in the war on terror, the USA changed its policy toward the latter. The Bush administration, 1

Lieutenant General (ret.), Armed Forces of Pakistan and Member of the Pakistani Pugwash Group

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with the support of Congress, lifted the non-proliferation- and democracy-related sanctions against Pakistan. Moreover, as an incentive for participation in the war on terror Pakistan was granted a three billion dollar package of economic and military assistance spread over five years. This assistance aims at building capacities to enable Pakistan to become a moderate Muslim state that enjoys good relations with the USA and is an active partner in the war on terror. In July 2007, US Congress enacted legislation whereby US assistance to Pakistan will be conditional on US President certifying every six months that he is satisfied that Pakistan is taking effective measures to counter proliferation. The attack on the Indian parliament by militants in 2001 resulted in the two nuclear rivals mobilizing more than a million forces on their borders, drawing the international community and especially the USA to play a crucial role in reducing tensions and bringing about the withdrawal of forces to peaceful locations. Behind the scenes, the USA has also been encouraging the Indo–Pakistan composite dialogue covering eight ‘baskets’ of topics. In this process the two countries have developed a large number of CBMs, also relating to nuclear risk reduction measures and promoting dialogue on Kashmir.

Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Subsequent developments in Indo–US relations have reached new heights of cooperation. The Indo–US nuclear deal passed with bi-partisan Congressional support is the centrepiece of this emerging strategic relationship. That Washington’s non-proliferation policy has undergone a fundamental change is evident from the 18 July 2005 India –US joint statement. This marks a clear departure from the policy pursued by Washington for nearly three decades and indicates that it is prepared to accept nuclear proliferation from allies and partners. This also meant an end to US export policy on technology control, which ironically it had imposed as a consequence of India’s detonation of a ‘peaceful nuclear device’ in 1974. Moreover, counter-proliferation is now the preferred US policy as opposed to relying solely on non-proliferation. Possession of nuclear weapons by friendly regimes is acceptable – but not possession by antagonists to the USA. Non-proliferation has become of secondary importance to strategic and political considerations. The convergence of US and Indian security interests’ vis-à-vis China is cited by many experts as the most compelling reason to overlook non-proliferation. This shift in policy persuaded Pakistan to seek similar concessions from the USA – even though there was hardly any possibility of the request being accepted due to the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network. Nonetheless, Pakistan has been seeking similar cooperation in the field of nuclear energy from China. The US relationship with India is at a different level from that involving Pakistan, and has been aptly described by Under Secretary of State Nicolas Burns as a ‘unique relationship with a unique country’. 2 India has warmed significantly to the United States, and in recent years their relationship has changed dramatically, away from the adverse impact and initial fallout of the nuclear tests in 1998. India–Russia relations have blossomed similarly, without any negative consequences. Defence was at the core of the India– Russia strategic relationship for decades; now energy security appears 2

Briefing in Washington, DC, 19 July 2005. http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr07202005.html

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equally significant. During President Putin’s visit in 2006 India and Russia signed a ‘memorandum of intent’ on cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, under which Moscow has promised to build four more reactors in the southern state of Tamil Nadu and additional reactors in other parts of India. The Russian commitment comes when USA and India have finalized their bilateral agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and negotiate to bring changes to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enable the export of nuclear technology and systems to India. It is expected that NSG will lift restrictions on India and amend its guidelines.

US Contradictions The USA and the Western world assumed a far tougher position towards Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons than in the case of India, and took longer to reconcile themselves to reality. Washington remained coercive in seeking to persuade Pakistan to abandon its nuclear programme, sign the NPT and open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. Later, Pakistan faced additional sanctions and international isolation after the Kargil operations in 1999 and the ensuing military takeover. However, this policy has been somewhat inconsistent, based more on realpolitik than any principles. There have been several contradictions the non-proliferation policy pursued by Washington. The USA has scant justification for imposing sanctions or trying to persuade Pakistan to join the NPT as long as it continues to possess a large inventory of nuclear weapons that play a critical role in its own military strategy. Pakistan seeks a universal, non-discriminatory disarmament regime, not a selective application of nuclear norms. Grudgingly and as a quid pro quo to Pakistan for playing a pivotal role in the ‘war against terror’, Washington has become reconciled to accepting the nuclear reality of South Asia. In mid-1999 the Senate enacted legislation authorizing the US president to suspend sanctions on Pakistan for a period of five years and also removed restrictions on military sales. The initial anger and frustration has given way to working with both India and Pakistan on promoting nuclear safety and stability in the region, without formally or legally endorsing it. US think-tanks have run workshops on establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, crisis management and personal reliability measures and, where legal impediments do not exist, have assisted in strengthening technical stability measures. Russia, like the USA and the rest of the international community, is reconciled to Pakistan’s nuclear capability. It has concerns related to nuclear security, but Pakistan has assured it and other members of the international community of the various measures it has taken in this regard. Taking lead from the United States, the European Union and Japan too softened their opposition to Pakistan’s on-going nuclear programme. Japan, as the only country to have experienced nuclear bombing, was among the first to impose sanctions after the May 1998 nuclear tests. It suspended its USD 500 million development aid and other economic assistance – as much an emotional as a political response. Since then, also Japan has become reconciled to the nuclearization of South Asia and has resumed its development aid. However, it remains wary and has been highly sensitive to the proliferation activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his associates, particularly in connection with North Korea. From the mid-1950s, Pakistan has enjoyed a very close relationship with China, which had contributed in building its defence capability, especially at a time of sanctions from many countries. However, both China and Pakistan officially deny any nu-

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clear collaboration. Pakistan insists that its programme is totally indigenous and that, in some areas like centrifuge technology, it is in fact ahead of China.

Conclusion The proliferation activities of A.Q. Khan have enormously damaged Pakistan’s reputation. They have been a source of grave concern to the international community and a huge embarrassment to the government. The international community was particularly incensed to learn that Khan and his foreign associates had developed a well integrated network that was capable of providing a wide range of nuclear-weapons technology and equipment and working in more than 30 countries.3 The most troubling and dangerous aspect of Khan’s activities was that he was capable of providing a one-window operation, because of his unique position in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, testifying before Congress in February 2004, said that the US and British intelligence agencies had worked together for years to ‘uncover one particular nefarious network, that of Mr. A.Q. Khan’.4 This network had been providing nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and to North Korea. The government of Pakistan claims that it is cooperating fully with the IAEA and the USA in tracking the network that was engaged in non-proliferation activities. Washington would have liked to be more directly involved in the investigation, but recognizes the local sensitivity of the issue and how de-stabilizing that could be if pursued further. In an interview with New Delhi Television on 1 December 2005, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr Mohammed El-Baradei, applauded Pakistan for extending extraordinary cooperation to the agency on resolving many of the ‘pieces of the puzzle’ in the Iranian nuclear programme. Nonetheless, Pakistan has not been prepared to allow Khan to be directly interrogated by foreign agencies, or to accept any intrusive inspection of its nuclear assets. Islamabad has tried to redress the issue by tightening physical and materials control and exercising close monitoring over the activities of personnel associated with nuclear programmes. It is also introducing proven practices and available technologies to secure nuclear facilities and material. Moreover, in accordance with UNSC resolution 1540, Pakistan has submitted its National Report, detailing the measures adopted for the safety and security of the material and technology meant for WMD. Comprehensive national legislation – ‘Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004’ – was enacted by the parliament in September 2004. This will help in further strengthening controls on sensitive nuclear technologies and materials.

3 Squassoni 2004 mentions that what is particularly egregious is the apparent ability of Khan and his associates to provide one-stop shopping. 4 Colin Powell, 28 February 2004. ‘We have possession of quite a bit of it (Libya’s nuclear equipment) and we learned a great deal about A.Q.Khan and the other proliferators in the world’, Mr.Powell’s statement before the Senate.

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Chapter 13 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Challenges on the Korean Peninsula Alexander ZHEBIN1

Since the beginning of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, it has been very important for Russia to understand its background and essence. Elaborating an appropriate approach has required significant efforts. Many experts as well as the mass media in Russia were quick to put all responsibility on North Korea, without even bothering to read the texts of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1994 Framework Agreement and other North Korean–US agreements reached in the 1990s. Certain Russian experts started to interpret the position of the hard-line hawks in Washington as the opinion of the whole ‘international community’, ignoring the voices of more moderate and responsible US and other Western politicians and analysts. 2 Thereby not only Russia itself but also China and dozens of other countries that wanted to avert another Iraq-like scenario in North Korea found themselves excluded from the ‘international community’. Washington’s closest allies in this region – Japan and South Korea – also persistently reminded their senior partner that the situation required a peaceful settlement. In their eagerness to follow the supposedly ‘latest trends’ in international relations and ‘join the train’ of US neo-conservatists (which could only lead up a blind alley, as shown by the situation in Iraq) Russian advocates of a collective hard line towards North Korea totally forget about any peaceful settlement of the crisis. And yet, that is the key point of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as being in the national interests of Russia.

Whose Ambitions are More Important? Following the position of the US Administration, the mass media and certain experts, the international community holds a rather one-sided opinion as to who is responsible for starting this nuclear crisis. The North Korean nuclear crisis formally began in October 2002, when Washington accused the DPRK of possessing a second programme for producing the initial material needed for nuclear weapons parallel to those ‘frozen’ by the 1994 Agreed Framework between the two countries. De facto, Washington reduced its responsibilities within this document to two points: to create an international consortium, KEDO, to build two nuclear power-stations based on the two light-water reactors in the DPRK; 1

Director of the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of the Far East, Russian Academy of Science. Selig S. Harrson et al.,2003. Turning Point in Korea. New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States. Report of the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy. Chicago. 2

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and to supply 500,000 tons of liquid fuel to North Korea annually until the first reactor started up in 2003 as planned.3 On its part, Pyongyang was to ‘freeze’ its gas-graphite reactor and other installations at Nenben that could be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium, and stop building the 50- and 200-megawatt reactors of the same type. Moreover, it was to remain a member of the NPT and observe the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between North and South Korea.4 The United States claims that it implemented its obligations within the Agreed Framework and that North Korea did not. In practice, the DPRK kept the installation specified in the agreement ‘frozen’ till the end of 2002. However, the USA refused to start building the nuclear stations, even though in a letter to Kim Jong-il, US President Bill Clinton promised to do it alone if KEDO failed to solve this task.5 The delay can be mainly explained by the fact that the Clinton Administration expected the North Korean regime to collapse after the death of Kim Il-sung. For their part, the Republicans abandoned the policy of DPRK peaceful engagement, which the Democrats followed (however inconsistently) for ideological and party reasons (Harrison et al., 2002: 8). Today Washington is trying hard not to remember that, apart from the non-proliferation article, the Agreed Framework stipulates certain political moves to be taken by the USA concerning the DPRK: to provide official guarantees that the USA would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, and to seek full normalization of their political and economic relations.6 Neither of these obligations was implemented, not even by the Clinton Administration. Under the pretext that North Korea allegedly admitted the existence of a second alternative programme for producing nuclear-weapons materials using uranium- enrichment technologies, the G.W. Bush Administration stopped fuel deliveries to the DPRK. The formal justification was that, according to the Agreed Framework, the DPRK had pledged to observe the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which states that both Koreas should give up processing plutonium as well as the enrichment of uranium.7 But for all that, the USA preferred to ignore that the Agreed Framework also referred to the necessity of observing the principles of the North Korean–US declaration of 11 June 1993. As specified in this declaration, apart from refraining from the use or the threat to use force, both countries committed themselves to respect each other’s sovereignty and not to interfere in the other’s domestic affairs, and to continue the intergovernmental dialogue based on ‘equality and justice’.8 Boycotting the dialogue with Pyongyang for almost two years after the Republicans came to power in Washington; introducing sanctions against the DPRK and threatening it and following the policy of regime change – these actions clearly contradict and violate the principles of the Agreed Framework. Moreover, in 2002 the Bush Administration included the DPRK in the ‘axis of evil’ and put it on the list of the countries against which the preventive nuclear strikes were deemed possible. In 2002 the US claimed the DPRK was developing a uranium-enrichment programme and building a plant planned to start functioning at full capacity by the middle of 2010. Now US officials, including intelligence-agency representatives speaking in 3 4 5 6 7 8

See: Agreed Framework, 22 October 1994. Ibid. Letter, Bill Clinton to Kim Jong-il, 22 October 1994. North Korea’s Central Telegraph Agency, 22 October 1994. North Korea’s Central Telegraph Agency, 31 December 1991. Nodon Sinmun, 12 June 1993.

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Congress, claimed that although North Korea had purchased some 20 gas centrifuges and other components from Pakistan, it was not possible to state with certainty whether the Koreans had already achieved industrial nuclear production and built the facilities.9 Indeed, experts like D. Olbright in the USA and V. Novikov in Russia have opined that North Korea could create nothing of the kind, as it would need thousands of centrifuges instead of the mere 20 bought from Washington’s ally – Pakistan – as well as massive amounts of energy that the DPRK lacked.10 In North Korea, the USA has been deliberately constructing a situation very similar to that used to justify its intervention in Iraq. It is evident that the intelligence services had been given the same politically motivated order to fabricate the documents used as the basis for the US Administration’s decisions that were to lead to such grave consequences as in Iraq. There are enough reasons to believe that unfortunately neither the USA nor the DPRK is above reproach. At the same time as Washington accuses Pyongyang of violating its obligations, the USA has broken far more international commitments and bilateral obligations with the DPRK.

International Obligations When North Korea is urged to give up its nuclear programme, this can apply only to the military aspects. The NPT does not prohibit any country from engaging in scientific research and developing atomic energy: indeed, it obligates nuclear powers to assist non-nuclear states in this process. When the KEDO was established and its member countries – the USA, Japan and South Korea – agreed to build a nuclear power-plant in the DPRK, that clearly showed their acknowledgment that North Korea had the right to develop atomic energy. The claims that Pyongyang uses ‘nuclear blackmail’ or ‘extorts’ oil and other resources from the international community became commonplace in the US propagandistic war against North Korea. As the situation in Iraq has demonstrated, it is too early to equate the ‘international community’ with the United States, from which North Korea demands fulfilment of its obligations under the bilateral agreements. As the USA had no international legal grounds for demanding North Korea to abandon its national atomic energy programme, Washington was forced to buy out this programme and consent to the signing of the Agreed Framework, including fuel deliveries and building of a nuclear power-station in the DPRK. This was stipulated in the Agreed Framework between the USA and North Korea, so the latter’s demand that the deal be fulfilled cannot be said to be ‘blackmail’. The DPRK is frequently accused of breaking its international obligations. Here it should be recalled that a basic international legal provision, also fixed in the NPT (Article X), states that if a country faces a threat to its existence it has the right to exit from any agreement to protect its sovereignty. What North Korea has done is to avail itself of this right. Obviously, it is undesirable that any state should leave the NPT. The step taken by North Korea resulted in further complications and set a bad precedent. However, it was not in violation of international law. Indeed, IAEA Director-General, M. ElBaradei, has indirectly admitted this, in urging that an amendment be made to Article X of the NPT article, which provides a loophole for potential proliferators. 9

New York Times, 1 March 2007. Financial Times, 14 February 2007; R. Goethenmuller & Y. Fedorov, Korean Nuclear Crisis: Prospects of Regulation. MGIMO University. Moscow, 2005, p.23. 10

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US-Russian Interaction Since the second nuclear crisis in Korea, Moscow has resolutely supported the maintenance of the non-nuclear status of the peninsula and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, Russia has sought to regulate the situation through politicaldiplomatic measures, advocating due consideration of the legitimate security interests of all countries in this region as the way to ensure lasting stability in Northeast Asia. Both through diplomatic channels and publicly, Russia has persistently advised the DPRK to show maximum restraint, and to refrain from taking any steps which could result in an uncontrolled course of events. Treating North Korea’s security concerns with respect and attention, Russia is convinced that the solution to this problem should be found within the negotiations framework and not in the field of arms race, and especially nuclear arms. Finding a compromise acceptable with regard to the interests of all parties involved remains the aim of Moscow.11 Several worries concerning North Korean missile-nuclear weapons which exist in the USA and Japan are not shared in Russia, as President Putin made clear during his Internet conference held soon after the DPRK missile launch.12 If Pyongyang were to have nuclear weapons, or the even probability of possessing such weapons, that would serve rather as a deterrent to Washington’s political expansionism as implemented in the Balkans and now being applied in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, this does not mean that Moscow is unconcerned about the perspectives of a nuclear arms race in a region directly bordering upon its own territory. From considerations of its own security as well as in the interest of maintaining the WMD non-proliferation regime, Russia is not interested in the appearance of new nuclear-weapon states – and especially along its borders. As the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin has stressed, the positions of Russia and the United States concerning the WMD non-proliferation issues have been ‘closer than they in fact appear’.13 This similarity, including the close positions on the DPRK, has been demonstrated during a series of high-level Russian–US meetings and contacts: in St Petersburg (June 2003), Camp David (September 2003), Bratislava (February 2005), Washington (September 2005), Pusan (November 2005), as well as in the documents adopted at the G-8 summits in Evian (June 2003), Sea Island (June 2004) and in St Petersburg (July 2006). As early as 2003 in Evian, arguing that Russia would insist that all Iranian nuclear programmes be placed under IAEA control, Putin promised to build a partnership between Russia and other countries ‘depending on the level of their openness and ability to bring their nuclear programmes the control of the IAEA’.14 Thus the Russian President clearly signalled to Pyongyang that North Korean–Russian relations would, more than ever before, depend on the behaviour of the DPRK in nuclear issues. Unfortunately, the position of the United States with regard to nuclear non-proliferation issues is far from irreproachable and has often been glaringly inconsistent.

11

See statement by the official representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia A. Yakovenko regarding the DPRK decision to suspend its participation in the six-party talks. 10-02-2005. http://www.mid.ru 12 President Putin’s Internet conference. http:// www.regnum.ru/news/669525.html 13 Press release and answers of the President of Russia V. Putin at the joint press conference with US President G. Bush, St Petersburg, 1 June 2003. http://www.mid.ru 14 Presentation made by the President of Russia V. Putin at the press conference at the G-8 summit in Evian. 3 June 2003. http://www.president.kremlin.ru

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First, at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the non-nuclear states agreed to the indefinite prolongation of the treaty, under two main conditions: that the nuclear powers move toward the full liquidation of nuclear weapons, and that they pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. In 2002 the Bush Administration practically broke this promise when he defined seven countries, including the DPRK (and also Russia), as possible targets of pre-emptive nuclear strikes. Moreover, the USA and some other nuclear powers have continued improving their nuclear arsenals – the development of warheads that can strike deep underground bunkers being one point of evidence. It is no secret that underlying the development of such weapons have been plans for use against the DPRK, where most military and some civilian objects are stored underground. For some reason, Washington still holds that, while Japan may process plutonium and enrich uranium in large quantities, other non-nuclear states like, for example Iran or the DPRK, may not be allowed to do so on any account. The inconsistency of Washington’s non-proliferation policy becomes particularly evident in the practice of applying double standards to such countries as Israel, Pakistan and India on the one hand, and the DPRK and Iran on the other. It is considered politically incorrect to bring up the issue of Israel’s nuclear weapon; Pakistan is a valued ally in the anti-terrorist coalition and in capturing Osama Bin-Laden; and India is needed to counter-balance China. Following this line of reasoning, it is possible to cooperate in the nuclear energy sphere with for example India though this country is not an NPT member, whereas, for precisely the same reason, it is not acceptable to build a nuclear power-station in the DPRK. The recent nuclear deal with India approved by the US Congress in December 2006 is perhaps the most glaring example of Washington flouting not only the NPT but a series of other international agreement in the nuclear non-proliferation sphere, as well as contravening US national legislation. The incident when North Korea, with the direct connivance of the USA, sold weapons to Ethiopia after the UN sanctions had been introduced in October 2006 is the latest example of how readily the present US Administration neglects the interests of non-proliferation as well as the resolutions of the UN Security Council, for the sake of its momentary foreign policy goals. According to South Korean scholar Lee Junkyu, ‘almost all states in the world share the opinion that the most serious obstacles for the international efforts in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament sphere creates the USA itself’.15 Washington’s arguments supporting the maintenance of non-proliferation and arms control regimes would have been much more convincing if the Americans themselves set an example in this respect. Instead, in the course of only two years, the United States refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, withdrew from the ABM Treaty, refused to join the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention and refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over US military personnel.16 It seems that the G. W. Bush Administration does not want to acknowledge any international obligations and intends to act on the international arena as it thinks fit. And yet, the United States constantly demands that other states observe those same international rules which the Americans themselves break. Although the actions of Py15 Lee Junkyu, ‘US double-dealing attitude and Japan’s privilege’, 17 November 2005. Available at: //http://Coreafocus.com 16 The Russian Newspaper, 24 April 2003.

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ongyang cannot be fully justified, it is the double standard policy (often followed by threats) that has induced not only the DPRK but a good many other countries to give consideration to the ‘nuclear choice’. Washington’s persistent desire to impose its own order everywhere, also on nations with much more ancient history, culture and traditions – this demonstrates the ‘arrogance of power’ which the late Senator William Fulbright described. Unfortunately, the point is not only the DPRK. This has been proven by both the international NPT Review Conference held in New York in 2005 and the regular summit of the Non-Alignment Movement held in Cuba in September 2006. The Russian– US partnership in solving the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula has repeatedly faced open provocations. The attempt to undermine the mission of the Russian special representative to Pyongyang in January 2003 through an information leak about joint activities of the CIA and the Foreign Intelligence Service against the DPRK revealed the true attitude of certain US circles towards the partnership with Russia in solving Asia’s problems. The same can be said of the statement published by the Associated Press Agency with a reference to unidentified US sources claiming that Russia helped North Korea in developing ballistic missiles capable of reaching US territory.17 Nor have the propagandistic strikes in the US-unleashed financial war missed Russia either. Following certain Japanese mass media, the US press started writing as an allegedly established fact that Moscow was the ‘main market’ of dollars counterfeited in North Korea and almost the hub of North Korean financial operations abroad.18 All this points up what S. Blank, a leading US expert on Russian foreign policy in Asia, has stated: ‘Washington had been trying for decades to minimize Russia’s role in solving the problem of North Korea’.19

The Russian–North Korean Partnership On the whole, Pyongyang avoids commenting Russia’s position regarding the DPRK’s nuclear and missile issues. But judging from the North Korean reaction to certain statements and actions of the USA and its allies which Russia also supported, we may conclude that the positions of Moscow and Pyongyang are far from always being similar. The G-8 Action Plan on Non-proliferation adopted at the Sea Island summit in June 2004 with the participation of Russia provoked negative reactions in Pyongyang. A spokesperson of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the USA and other countries which ‘framed up’ this document of trying to put pressure upon the DPRK, breaking the principles of ‘justice, equality and impartiality’ in international relations.20 In particular, North Korea took negatively the appeal made at this summit to strive for the ‘full, irreversible and verifiable’ dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programmes. It is also doubtful whether the North Koreans liked the demand to stop the uranium enrichment programme – the very existence of which Pyongyang categorically denies. At the same time, it is only due to the position taken by Russia that the Sea Is17

Commentary of the Department of Information and Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia regarding the question presented by mass media related to the Associated Press report on st atements by unnamed US sources that the DPRK received Russian assistance in developing ballistic missiles capable of reaching US territory. 1985-12-09-2003. http://www.mid.ru 18 Wall Street Journal, 8 September 2006. 19 Asia Times, 6 March 2004. 20 Statement by representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. 21 June 2004.

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land summit document demanded that only military nuclear projects be abandoned. Thereby the G-8 de facto acknowledged the right of the DPRK to develop peaceful nuclear energy, as ultimately set down in the joint statement of 19 September 2005 on the outcomes of the fourth round of six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem. Judging by its sharp criticism of the US Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Pyongyang hardly welcomed the decision of certain countries, including Russia, to join this programme. Still, although certain tactical compromises were made with the USA, the basic elements of Russia’s approach to tackling the security problems of Korea have remained unchanged – even though the DPRK officially proclaimed itself a nuclear power in February 2005 and launched several types of ballistic missiles and carried out nuclear testing in 2006. At the Washington summit in September 2005, President Putin pointed out that, in Russia’s view, the potential of diplomatic ways of solving the problems of WMD non-proliferation was by no means exhausted.21 In his Internet conference held shortly after the North Korean missile launches, he urged that the negotiations process be re-established, and stressed that ‘an atmosphere for mutually acceptable compromises should be created’ – thus indicating that concessions were needed not only from the North Korean side.22 Therefore those who look at Russia’s UN Security Council voting on the DPRK missile launches and nuclear tests and conclude that Moscow has lost its influence on Pyongyang, or that the latter is no longer interested in the participation of Russia in Korean affairs, seem to have been overly hasty with their conclusions. The establishment of a Russian Orthodox parish in Pyongyang in August 2006 indicates that both sides realize the intrinsic of bilateral relations and are prepared to work to establish new and untraditional channels of interaction and mutual influence. Thus, after more than a six-year break, sessions of the intergovernmental economic partnership commission between the two countries were resumed in Moscow in March 2007.

In Search of Compromises The deep mistrust that still remains between the USA and the DPRK seems to leave no other way of solving the problem except the implementation of a series of carefully synchronized and coordinated steps aimed at gradually reducing the level of concern regarding the actions and policies of both sides. This approach has now become widely accepted, even by the USA itself. The experience of communication with Pyongyang, including the North Korean– US dialogue of the 1990s, confirms that peaceful engagement has always brought about positive changes in the behaviour of North Korea, while threats and pressure have invariably resulted in a desire to close ranks and snarl. This has been particularly evident in DPRK reactions to the policies of the former and current administrations in Washington. Unbiased analysis of the Agreed Framework and other North Korean–US documents testifies that the USA’s present demands on North Korea remain within the framework of the US promises to the DPRK which were made but never fulfilled. North Korea suggests solving the problem from the point when this process was interrupted on the initiative of the G.W. Bush Administration. At the same time, Washing21 ‘Bush, Putin Focus on Nonproliferation, Russian WTO Accession’, 16 September 2005. http://usinfo.state.gov. 22 President Putin’s Internet conference. http:// www.regnum.ru/news/669525.html

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ton is reluctant to observe any of its past promises and insists that the DPRK should first undertake certain irreversible steps in liquidating its nuclear programmes. However it is time for the Americans to realize that their own country also has to go part of the way. In fact, Washington’s approach to implementation of the joint statement of 19 September 2005 does not differ from the earlier US position as expressed in the wellknown abbreviation CVID – the demand for ‘comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible dismantling’ of all North Korean nuclear programmes. Apart from accusing the DPRK of counterfeiting dollars and engaging in money laundering, the USA demands of North Korea that it stop procuring missiles and missile technologies, liquidate its arsenals of chemical and bacteriological weapon, reduce the number of troops and conventional weapons and remove them from the demilitarized zones, abstain from terrorism and drug trafficking, and observe human rights. The Americans intend to postpone normalization of relations with the DPRK until the whole process is completed – which, according to the most optimistic analysis, could take several years. This in turn means that the negations lose all sense for the DPRK, as the aims become unachievable. The actions of the United States, which had practically opened a ‘second front’ to put pressure on the DPRK on financial and human rights issues right after the adoption of the joint statement of the ‘six’, give all reason to believe that in strategic aspects Washington is not interested in fully resolving the situation, or in the eventual disappearance of the ‘North Korean problem’.23 First, this would have inevitably called into question the motives of the US military presence in South Korea. The withdrawal of US troops from South Korea could bring about a similar process in Japan. This could knock out the cornerstone of Washington’s whole strategy in the Asian-Pacific, as it is based on the bilateral military alliances with Japan and South Korea and front-line deployment of US troops. Their mission is to maintain the US military-political domination in the region – not to deter North Korea, which has become significantly weaker over the last decade and a half.24 Second, if the obviously exaggerated ‘North Korean missile threat’ disappears as a result of the settlement process, the true intentions of the US leadership will be revealed – the plan to neutralize Russian and Chinese missile-nuclear means of deterrence using the missile defence system. Therefore there are two options which are favourable to the United States. The minimum programme consists in sustaining a certain level of tension in Korea, enough to allow the continued deployment of troops and building of the missile defence system. The optimal option is to liquidate the DPRK in one way or another. That would provide Washington with the chance to maintain control over the Korean Peninsula – unique in its military-strategic value at the junction of the borders of Russia, China and Japan. Not least in view of the Chinese–US rivalry for predominance in the Asia-Pacific region, which seems set to increase as the power of China continues to grow, we should not under-estimate the importance of this region. Even if the six-party talks are resumed, the greatest difficulties facing the participants would be yet to come. First of all, there are the problems related to practical implementation of the joint statement provision that all issues should be solved on a step-by-step basis in compliance with the principle ‘obligation for obligation, action for action’. 23

A. Zhebin, ‘Korean Paradoxes’. The Independent, 16 April 2007. A. Zhebin, ‘Nuclear Problem in Korea and Russian Security Interests’, Asia and Africa Today. Moscow. Science, 2005. #3, p.5. 24

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In the view of Pyongyang, international structures cannot give any guarantees against such attack. The DPRK does not hide its deep disappointment with the role played by the UN and its Security Council in connection with Iraq. Pyongyang has stressed how the UN Security Council was unable to oppose to the US arbitrariness. Moreover the DPRK believes that this structure was used to disarm Iraq with the aim of occupation and later justifying the US aggression.25 In these conditions, it would be very hard to impose a ‘Libyan model’ of problem-resolution on North Korea. More likely would seem the ‘Indian model’, with certain modifications. The prospects of North Korean abstaining from nuclear weapons depend to a great degree on what the USA ultimately wants to achieve. Does it intend to limit its demands to nonproliferation issues? Or will it continue using the negotiations to create the preconditions for a change of regime in Pyongyang? In the latter case it appears highly unlikely that the DPRK would willingly give up its nuclear deterrence forces.

Conclusion The United States must understand that Russia has its own interests on the Korean Peninsula, and that they are different from those of Washington. In particular this concerns the methods applied to resolve the present situation. Russia does not need another Iraq, particularly on its far-eastern borders. Nor is Moscow alone on this point. The development of the situation involving the DPRK’s nuclear programmes has shown that, for example, the interests of the USA and China do not always coincide. Moreover, there remain serious differences concerning how to tackle this problem, even between states that are military-political allies, like the USA and South Korea. In a longer-term perspective Washington sees the future united Korea as a member of the US-led trilateral military-political alliance: the USA–Japan–South Korea. Australia is already now being pushed in this direction as well. Such a project could hardly suit Russia and China. After all, it would mean the equivalent of an Asian version of NATO on Russia’s far-eastern borders, covered by the theatre missile defence system that the Americans have created. Until the parties reach mutual understanding on this issue, the Russian–US partnership on Korea must necessarily remain incomplete and limited. Russia is interested in peace on the Korean Peninsula and normalization of interrelations between both Koreas, not only for security reasons.26 Tension in Korea has become a serious obstacle to the implementation of multilateral economic projects which Russia sees as essential to the development of the Far East. Moscow believes that these projects can also serve to strengthen trust, peace and security in the region.27 South Korea has also chosen the way of peaceful ‘engagement’ of the DPRK. To all appearances, the processes initiated at the Inter-Korean summit in 2000 are becoming irreversible. Neither missile launches nor the DPRK’s nuclear-power ambitions have been able to entirely ‘freeze’ inter-Korean economic relations and humanitarian contacts. In both North and South Korea there seems to be growing recognition that under no circumstances can the Koreans afford a second fratricidal war that might threaten the very existence of the Korean nation. There are those who advocate closer coordination of Russia’s actions with the USA on the DPRK missile-nuclear problem. 25

Ibid. A. Zhebin, ‘The Bush Doctrine, Russia, and Korea’, in M.Gurtov & P.Van Ness (eds). Confronting the Bush Doctrine. Critical views from the Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge Curzon, 2005. 27 On the welcoming address by the President of Russia V. Putin to the ‘Russian–Korean Train of Friendship’. Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 29 July 2002. //http://president.kremlin.ru 26

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In fact, that would mean following Washington’s course of strangling North Korea, trying to entangle Russia with Pyongyang and Seoul.

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Chapter 14 Proliferation and Security in the Middle East Riad KAHWAJI 1

The Middle East region was a battleground for Western and Eastern powers during the Cold War era. Subsequently it became an open arena where both powers had proxies fighting their wars. The US-led bloc backed its regional allies, mainly Israel, against the Soviet-led bloc, which was then led by Egypt and Syria. The main wars at the time were between the Arabs and Israel, and at a later stage the Iran–Iraq war. In the postCold War era, the Middle East, like the rest of the world, has witnessed dramatic changes with the shift in alliances. However, the region has remained as volatile as ever, with greater security risks associated with proliferation. Although the USA has emerged in the new era as the sole world superpower, Russia and the European countries have retained considerable influence in the Middle East, and this influence is expected to grow as a result of setbacks in Washington’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This chapter will show how policies of both Russia and the West – led by the USA – have contributed to proliferation and instability rather than preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and consolidating stability. WMD-related control regimes have done little to deter the world powers from providing – directly or indirectly – their main allies with the means to develop powerful weapons in order to ensure strategic dominance and superiority. The chapter examines three cases of verified breaches: Israel, Iraq and Iran. It also looks at the current situation, and how the neverending East–West struggle for influence and control over the strategically-located oilrich Middle Eastern region will always make it possible for countries seeking to acquire WMD to achieve most of their goals.

Israel’s Nuclear Programme Like almost all other cases in which a country managed to build WMD capability, the Israeli nuclear programme started under the umbrella of a peaceful research programme. Under the auspices of the Atoms for Peace programme in the mid- to late 1950s, 56 Israelis received training at US Atomic Energy Commission research centres at the Argonne National Laboratory and at Oak Ridge.2 Under the same programme, Israel and the United States signed in 1957 a general agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, including an agreement for the sale of a small 5-megawatt light-water research 1 2

Director General, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, UAE. Peter Pry: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), p. 6.

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reactor to Israel. This reactor was built at Nachal Soreq.3 In the meantime, Israel was moving faster on a separate track in developing its nuclear capabilities in cooperation with France. The French government, bitter over its failed joint military campaign with Britain and Israel in 1956 against Egypt, was helping Israel to build the Dimona reactor. London also did its part in helping Israel to acquire a nuclear bomb. Documents from the British National Archives revealed two years ago that the UK had sold heavy water to Israel in 1959 and 1960, providing a substantial push for the Israeli nuclear programme at Dimona.4 In 1956 Britain purchased 20 tons of heavy water from Norway. Noratom, a Norwegian company, was then formed to purchase the heavy water and ship it to Israel. The heavy water came in two 10-ton shipments, the first in June 1959 and the second in 1960. The export license was through Norway, yet the shipments were sent from a British port on Israeli ships. British officials never asked for an Israeli guarantee that the heavy water was intended for peaceful purposes. During the 1950s and 1960s Britain also supplied Israel with several other vital materials that sped up the process of developing nuclear weapons. Among these materials were uranium-235, beryllium and lithium-6, which are used in making atomic and even hydrogen bombs. It appears from declassified documents that Britain had its own early version of Abdel Qadir Khan, a person who was passing on nuclear technology without the knowledge of the government. The documents revealed that neither then Prime Minister Harold Wilson nor Minister of Technology in 1966 Tony Benn had any knowledge of the sales. It was a Michael Israel Michaels, a senior official at the science ministry during that period, who played a key role in pushing through some of these sales. Mr. Michaels was Britain’s representative at the IAEA, and was invited to Israel to inspect that country’s nuclear facilities in 1961.5 The United States was turning a blind eye to activities at Dimona, and later agreed covertly to allow Israelis develop their nuclear weapons so long as the programme remained opaque.6 Washington also vetoed or rejected any efforts from international bodies to sanction or reprimand Israel for its stance. It was during the term of President Richard Nixon that the US policy towards Israel’s nuclear programme became established – and it has remained almost unchanged since then. Initial attempts to pressure Israel to drop its programme failed because there was little to use as leverage against the Israelis to this end. From the Nixon era and up until now, Washington’s policy has remained characterized by acquiescence. The implicit US support for Israel has gone on for nearly five decades, appearing in various forms:7

3

Avner Cohen: Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 65. Michael Crick, ‘How Britain Helped Israel Get the Bomb’, BBC, 3 August 2005; Ben Fenton, ‘Britain Secretly Sent Vital Nuclear Bomb Ingredient to Israel’, Daily Telegraph, 4 August 2005. 5 Meirion Jones, ‘Secret Sale of UK plutonium to Israel’, BBC, 10 March 2006; Meirion Jones, ‘Britain’s dirty secret’, New Statesman, 13 March 2006. 6 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 205–7. Cohen said that after the US failed to persuade Israeli officials to accept IAEA safeguards on the Dimona reactor, White House aide Robert Komer reached a compromise with Levi Eshkol, the result of which was a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the two states. The document expressed the US ‘concern for the maintenance of Israel’s security’ and renewed its commitment to the ‘independence and integrity of Israel’. Israel in turn reaffirmed its pledge that it ‘will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab–Israel area’. The document further solidified Israel’s doctrine of nuclear opacity. 7 For more information on implicit US support to Israel see: Cohen, Israel and the Bomb; also Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), as well as: http://www.antiwar.com/ orig/zunes. php?chapterid=2378 4

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x x x x x x

ending regular inspections of the Dimona plant under Nixon and beyond; providing krytons and computer technology; refusing to pressure Israel to sign the NPT or to comply with UNSC resolutions; squelching media reports and keeping quiet on Israel activity – particularly on later-scrapped testing in the South African Kalahari and later in the Indian Ocean; providing ‘dual-use’ items; funding parts of the programme indirectly via billions of US dollars donated for economic aid and scientific research.

Russia/the Soviet Union had reacted with considerable caution to Israel’s nuclear programme. Although Moscow had assisted some Arab countries, like Egypt and Algeria, in establishing small light-water research reactors in the early 1960s, it never helped any of its Arab allies to acquire a nuclear weapon. Moscow seems to have chosen the track of providing its allies with a nuclear umbrella, to act as a deterrent to Israel. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a Soviet ship allegedly carrying nuclear weapons anchored in Alexandria, Egypt.8 The shipment of nuclear weapons to Egypt was reportedly intended to counter-balance Israel’s nuclear capability. To many observers, this action indicated a security guarantee between the Soviet Union and Egypt. At the time, US President Nixon put the military on worldwide nuclear alert, prompting Israel to go on nuclear alert as well. The Russian vessel left Alexandria after the ceasefire between Israel and Egypt entered into effect in late November 1973.

Iraq’s Chemical Arsenal In its 1980–88 war with Iran, Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons. Its arsenal grew proportionally despite the existence of export control regimes. Most violations came from Western companies. Although it was never proven, many observers believe that Iraq’s chemical arsenal was made possible by the implicit complicity of the West, which was opposed to the new Islamic regime in Tehran and wanted to see it removed. Such suspicions grow larger when one compares the outcome of Iraq’s many failed attempts to acquire chemical warfare (CW) material in the 1970s to its generally successful efforts in the 1980s. Iraq had largely depended on dual-use equipment to develop its CW production programme. It imported most of its equipment and material under the pretext of needing them to produce feedstock and pesticides. But its attempts in 1975/76 were unsuccessful, especially after both the US Pfaudler Company and the Chinese Imperial Chemical Industries became suspicious of Baghdad’s intentions and subsequently refused to provide assistance. 9 However, Iraq’s attempts paid off in West Germany, where a report by Minister of Economy Helmut Hussman stated that 25 firms had until 1990 provided CW production technology to Baghdad. Among the first of these West 8

‘Officials Suspect Russians Sent Arms to Egypt’, New York Times, 22 November 1973, ‘Israel Reported to Have A-Bomb’, Facts on File World Digest News, 10 April 1976, Edgar O’Balance: No Victor, No Vanquished. The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 234–235, and Shlomo Aronson: Israel’s Nuclear Options, ACIS Working Paper No. 7. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Center for Arms Control and International Security, 1977, 15–18, and Hersh, The Sampson Option, 231–235. 9 Anthony Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner: Lessons of Modern War, Vol II (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 507.

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German firms were Karl Kolb, which sold a plant capable of producing Sarin; Fritz Werner, which provided technical assistance; and Water Engineering Trading, which exported heavy-duty pumps and chemicals.10 By the time Iraq started the war with Iran, it had stockpiles of CS gas and mustard gas produced at the Samara complex. Chemical weapons were used on a limited scale in the first two years of the war. But as the war intensified and Iranian ‘human waves’ started to overwhelm Iraqi defences, in 1982 Baghdad went on a shopping frenzy to increase its mustard gas capabilities and acquire nerve agents. By early 1983, Iraqi CW facilities were producing two nerve agents or G-agents: Tabun and Sarin, known for their lethality and quick effect on exposed humans.11 Even though Iraqi CW had killed at least 1,200 people by the end of 1984, the international community took no real action against Iraq in the first three and half years of the war.12The first real investigative work on Iraq’s use of CW started in late 1984.13 The major attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988, which left more than 4,000 dead, led to serious world reactions to Iraq’s use of CW, 14 especially against civilians. However, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that has placed Iraq on list of rogue states and subsequently opened its WMD file, including CW and its use against civilians in the Iran–Iraq War.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme The West started the now-controversial Iranian nuclear programme back in the 1960s. The United States, France and West Germany played a direct role in establishing research reactors and later laying the foundations for Bushehr Power Plant in southwestern Iran. It was the West German company Kraftwerk Union (KWU), that had the contract to build the power plan, but work stopped immediately after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the Shah. France and the USA suspended all nuclear cooperation activities with their previous number one strategic ally in the Middle East. Nevertheless, France and West Germany attempted in the late 1980s to resume nuclear cooperation with Iran. A team of 18 French engineers from Framatome inspected the Bushehr nuclear power plant to assess the damage from Iraqi bombing raids and to determine what would be needed for rebuilding.15 Even representatives of the West German company KWU visited the Bushehr site in 1987 to assess the situation. KWU was reportedly concerned about legal difficulties over its cancelled contract and overdue payments for equipment. The company considered forming a joint venture with an Argentinean company, ENACE, and Spain’s Empresarios Agrupados to complete the construction at Bushehr.16 But US pressure put a halt to these efforts. 10 Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (London: Brassey’s, 1991), pp. 63–67. Cordesman also reported that Iraq CW programme received assistance from companies in Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. 11 Cordesman and Wagner: Lessons, p. 512. 12 Ibid, p. 185. 13 See full details of the report in Trevor Findlay (ed.): Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation: With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 139–147. 14 Dilip Hiro: The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989), pp. 200– 201. 15 ‘Iran To Complete Bushehr Site’, Middle East Defense News, 8 January 1990; ‘Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant’, Middle East Defense News, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, ; Kenneth R. Timmerman, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya’, A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Mednews), August 1992; p. 42. 16 ‘Consortium Proposed For Bushehr Completion’, Nuclear News, April 1987, p. 63.

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Russia’s involvement with Iran’s nuclear programme started in 1989, when presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mikhail Gorbachev signed agreements in Moscow that included cooperation in the nuclear field.17 In 1992, Iran and Russia signed two agreements, one on building a nuclear power plant and another on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In these agreements, Moscow agreed to continue the work started years previously at the Bushehr site.18 Russia maintained its active nuclear cooperation with Iran, a signatory to the NPT Treaty. It proceeded with building the Bushehr plant and provided it with two nuclear reactors, all according to IAEA guidelines. But in 2002/03, new revelations about Iran’s nuclear programme drew the attention of the international community to activities undertaken by Tehran in violation of the IAEA. With the help of the father of Pakistan’s nuclear programme Abdel Qadir Khan, Iran had in the late 1990s acquired equipment and designs for a nuclear fuel cycle. Iran had built facilities for uranium enrichment, and the enrichment process was underway. The West, especially the USA, accused Iran of seeking nuclear weapons, a charge Tehran has repeatedly denied. Russia in turn, has supported all measures taken so far by the international community to force Iran to check uranium enrichment and to comply with IAEA requests. On the other hand, Moscow has also continued its nuclear cooperation programme in line with the agreements signed between the two states. Various proposals by the European Union and its member states as well as Russia aimed at reaching a compromise with Iran have failed, leading the UN Security Council to impose, by unanimous decision, sanctions on Iran in two separate resolutions.

The Current Situation Tougher export controls and new control regimes have closed proliferation loopholes over the past years. However, little has been done to undo all the damage wrought in the past. Iraq was the only country that was forcefully – and to a great cost to the Iraqis – stripped of its WMD arsenal. Israel remains an undeclared nuclear power, and the West continues to play its role to ensure the opacity of the programme. In May 2006, the Israeli government opposed a new treaty put forth by the USA at the UN Disarmament Commission that would halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Israeli officials were reportedly worried that it could threaten their opaque nuclear policy.19 France’s nuclear laboratory (GANIL) and Israel signed in May 2006 a memorandum of understanding regarding collaboration in the field of nuclear research and the building of a new accelerator at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center in Israel.20 As for Iran, the US-led Western camp remains determined to prevent the current Islamic regime in Tehran from acquiring any serious technological capabilities that would enable it to become a nuclear power. Russia in turn is still trying to maintain a policy based on opposing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, but at the same time it wishes to pursue its nuclear cooperation business with Tehran in accordance with IAEA rules. Moscow’s offer to Iran to have its uranium enriched inside Russia 17

‘Moscow, Iran Sign Economic Pacts, Hint Future Arms Deals’, Los Angeles Times, 22 June 1989. Viktor Mikhaylov, ‘Minatom and International Cooperation’, Yadernyy Kontrol (Moscow), Volume 44, Number 2, March–April 1999, pp. 62–66. 19 Aluf Ben, ‘Israel, US “At Odds” on Nuke Treaty Proposal; Olmert Asked Not to Raise Issue’, Ha'aretz, 19 May 2006. 20 ‘Israeli Nuclear Research Center, French GANIL Sign Accelerator Construction MOU’, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, 7 June 2006. 18

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seems still on the table even though the latest round of talks between the two on this issue did not achieve a deal.21

Conclusion There is no doubt that WMD proliferation undermines Middle Eastern as well as global security. But for proliferation to take place there must be a party seeking the capability and another one willing to provide it – or at least not opposed. Even though the declared policies of the five major nuclear powers who drafted the NPT have advocated non-proliferation and have aimed at implementing control regimes in that regard, their foreign policies and at times their ideologies have made it easier for certain rogue officials or firms to breach controls – and even get away with it. This situation is more like having a police force with some corrupt elements within it. No matter how much one trains and improves the standing of that police force, the corrupt elements will still undermine it so long as they are not uprooted. The problems of proliferation in the Middle East have mostly originated from the West – whether as a deliberate foreign policy act or the actions of rogue officials and companies. While the tightly controlled economic system of the Soviet Union made it impossible for its officials and companies to export nuclear technology to the Middle East, that was not the case in the West, where the free market economy system with loopholes permitted proliferation-friendly actions. This could be regarded as a set of mistakes that the world powers East and West should work collectively to contain. However, proliferation will be impossible to contain in cases where a double standard apply – as with Israel. The Western ‘ostrich approach’ towards Israel’s nuclear arsenal has been and will always be a chief motive for other Middle Eastern states to acquire WMD. A primary lesson from Iraq’s CW proliferation experience was the cost that the West and indeed the whole world had to pay for the mistake of allowing one party to build WMD capabilities while depriving others. It created a monster that proved hard to contain and could subsequently be removed only at great cost. A.Q. Khan was not the first case in proliferation history of an official in a country to pass on WMD technology to another country, whether for money or ideological reasons. The world learned in 2006 that there was an earlier British ‘Khan’ in London, called Michaels, who had done the same for Israel. With a growing ideologically-based political environment in the ever-volatile Middle East region it seems inevitable that, with time, also other countries will receive nuclear technological capabilities from other Khans or Michaels, despite all the control regimes and treaties in the world. It would be illogical to imagine that countries in a declared state of war and with acute ideological differences would resist the temptation to go nuclear if one of them should do so, because this defies the basic rules of deterrence. In conclusion, it is true that the power struggle between the West and Russia contributed to the instability of the Middle East during the Cold War era. However, while Moscow adhered to a counter-proliferation policy and opted to provide a nuclear umbrella to some of its strategic allies rather than providing the technology, the Western powers failed to respect non-proliferation rules fully, especially with respect to the 21

‘Iran rejects Russian uranium enrichment proposal’, Global Security Newswire, 13 March 2006; Nazila Fathi, ‘Iran rejects Russian offer to Defuse Nuclear Dispute’, New York Times, 13 March 2006; ‘Senior Iranian official to continue nuclear talks in Moscow – Russian Agency’, RIA-Novosti, 13 March 2006, FBIS document CEP20060313950208.

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Arab–Israeli struggle. The same is true to an extent with Iraq, where technology was permitted indirectly through private companies rather than state officials. Iraq’s WMD problem is over, but that of Israel remains, with Western consent. This has incited further regional proliferation with Iran as the most recent case, but not the last one. Since late 2006 and early 2007, several Arab states have declared that they have decided to acquire nuclear technologies for peaceful uses. This could be just a start of something bigger, especially if Iran goes nuclear or Israel refuses to give up its WMD arsenal. The West and Russia must review their current proliferation policies in the Middle East before the nuclear proliferation snowball gets too big to control.

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Chapter 15 Missile Defences and Proliferation Vladimir DVORKIN1

The connection between the processes of developing/deploying strategic and tactical ABM defence systems and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – especially nuclear weapons – is complex and concerns more than the proliferation of selective-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear and other warheads. For if the ABM defence system of a potential target country is sufficiently effective, then the would-be aggressor state could shift to developing other technical and tactical ways of inflicting harm through nuclear weapons – e.g. aerodynamic missiles, small-size naval ships or covert agents installing compact nuclear devices. Thus, the proliferation of such weapons can receive a new impetus. In this context, the USA’s plans for developing strategic ABM defence systems on its territory as well as in Eastern Europe are of special urgency. In what way can these plans influence the ‘vertical’ proliferation of strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities of Russia and China, and then those of India and Pakistan? How the ABM systems can affect the policies of many threshold states – first and foremost Iran and North Korea? How will this influence ‘horizontal’ proliferation which means increasing the number of the countries possessing at their disposal nuclear weapons and means of delivery? To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the potential capability of the existing ABM defence systems of the USA, as well as of components planned to be placed in Poland and the Czech Republic. This means looking into the expected size, structure and capacity of the US ABM systems which are intended to defend the state’s territory, US force groupings abroad and its allies from ballistic missile attacks through interception – whether in the initial, mid-way or descending stages of flight.

US ABM Potential and Its Impact On Nuclear Proliferation As of today, the strategic ABM system of the USA is deployed at the Fort Greely base area in Alaska, where there are 14 counter-missiles Ground Base Interceptor (GBI) and radar sets Ground Base Radar (GBR), as well as two counter-missiles of this type down in the Western USA. By the end of the year 2007, the number of deployed missiles is to be increased to 21 and 4, respectively. By the year 2011, 40 counter-missiles are to be deployed in Alaska. By that same time, 10 counter-missiles and a radar, to be moved from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, can be deployed in Eastern Europe. 1 Maj.General (Ret.), Leading Research Fellow, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences

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What then can be said regarding Russia’s potential for nuclear deterrence against American ABM systems in Europe, after it gains concrete combative force? The flight trajectories of the Russian strategic missiles capable of implementing the hypothetical deterrence of the USA are out of the range of counter-missiles situated in Europe. Moreover, these are designed for defeating warheads in mid-flight and are not designed for boost-phase interceptions. Russia’s strategic missiles are equipped with such powerful systems and ABM counter-measures, including many hundreds of cover targets (decoys) of various types and jamming stations, that even in case of favourable conditions from the viewpoint of ABM, up to a dozen counter-missiles would be needed to intercept only one warhead. Thus President V. Putin and MFA S. Ivanov were quite correct in remarking that an ABM system of any kind does not constitute a threat, even if the USA should succeed in deploying from a dozen bases in Eastern Europe like those planned in Poland and the Czech Republic. This also applies to ABM systems on the territory of the USA. Another important question is connected with long-range plans. The American ABM represents an open system which can be advanced by including new echelons as well as by increasing the number of elements in each echelon. Integrated ABM system of the USA is expected to include land-, sea-, air- and space-based informationgathering means, as well as the means of interception in the initial, mid-way and final segments of ballistic missile trajectories and also means of tactical control and communication. Most of these means were developed in the process of creating the strategic (national) ABM system and theatre missile defence. It is planned to carry through missile interception during the active flight segment with the help of air chemical lasers carried by sea- and land-based interceptors. Airplanes with laser weapon can be operationally flipped and deployed in regions situated not far from the opponent’s missile bases. This makes it necessary to deploy and maintain high alert readiness of some attack aircraft, flying tankers and counter-air support. It is very unlikely that such aircraft means can be used for missile interception, as the bases are situated deep in the opponent’s territory and are protected by effective ABM means. However, air barrage in the vicinity where underwater missile carriers are patrolling can involve a real danger for ballistic missiles which take off from them. The possibility of using sea- and land-based interceptors such as ‘Standard -3’ and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, formerly Theatre High Altitude Area Defense) to counter launched missiles is connected with solving the problem of their location in areas several hundred kilometres from the take-off zone in the sector of target missile trajectories, and the necessity of corresponding information support. Ballistic missiles of submarine-based missile carriers and missiles which take off from land-based launch devices situated relatively close to shore would be more vulnerable to sea-based anti-missiles. The ABM system THAAD is designed primarily to defend troops, military and civil installations by means of defeating the attacking warheads. However, in some cases with advantageous geographical location, this system can be theoretically used for intercepting missiles on takeoff as well. Might Washington reintroduce the plan of the space anti-missile echelon, based on the elaboration carried out under the ‘Star Wars’ programme and project ‘BP’ – socalled ‘Diamond Stones’? Such interceptors, in amounts of hundreds up to several thousands, have to be emplaced in the orbit in the ‘standby’ mode. When necessary, they become active, accelerate and can defeat missiles even before the end of the active segment of the trajectory, including warhead MIRVing phase. In a more distant per-

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spective, the continuation of developments involving the installation of laser weapons on space platforms is possible. Earlier it was planned, according to the ‘Star Wars’ programme, to place the various space laser complexes in different orbits. Up to six different complexes can be in one orbit at the same time. The strategic land-based ABM with the GBI as mentioned above would be used in the middle (high-level) flight phases as main interceptor. With the necessary information support, this system is potentially capable of intercepting warheads at a distance of 4000 km or a height of up to 1500 km. The interception of warheads in the final (descending) flight phase is expected to be implemented by the sea- and land-based complexes THAAD and Standard-3 and also by the anti-missile complex PAC-3, which can hit only short-range missiles. But it cannot be excluded that this complex can be effective also against manoeuvrable and MIRVed warheads, which reduce speed in the descending flight phase and move in the atmosphere for quite a long time. In a more distant perspective, the USA may not stop at the present plans. If massive deployment of laser and kinetic weapons in space should take place some day, this might mean a threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrence capacity. Such a scenario could, with high probability, influence the build-up of strategic nuclear arms not only in Russia, where the possibility of withdrawing from the open-ended INF Treaty is being discussed, but also in China, India and Pakistan. A new and powerful impetus would be given to the vertical and probably also the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a pessimistic scenario is based on the extrapolation of current tendencies, marked by the absence of noteworthy changes in the strategic relationship between Russia and the USA. Despite the end of the ‘cold war’ and the occasionally proclaimed partnership in meeting new threats– including the simultaneous signing the Strategic Offensive Capability Reduction Treaty (SORT) and the joint Strategic Partnership Declaration in May 2002 – a situation of mutual nuclear deterrence still remains between the two countries. Without major changes in this relationship, if agreement cannot be reached about establishing a working partnership in the development and mutual usage of ABM, then it will be extremely difficult to stop nuclear proliferation.

Missile Threats and Missile Defences The question of the urgency of the missile threat to Russia and to the USA on the part of North Korea and Iran – and for Europe as concerns Iran – remains in focus of debates. Missile programmes are at the foreground of Iran’s plans for modernizing and developing its armed forces. Work connected with creating ballistic missile complexes has been underway since the 1980s, and missile production is the most expanding branch in the country. Iran works on creation of the most powerful missile arsenal in the region by the year 2015. However, Iran has refused to accept the Missile Technologies Control Regime (MTCR). Due to the low level of progress in scientific and research, experimental and production capacities, success in development of missiles and their serial production has been largely dependent on foreign assistance, much of which was previously provided by China and North Korea. Since the year 2002, work has been underway on the ‘Shehab’ ballistic missile programme. Within this framework, the problems of creating several missile systems with liquid-fuelled missiles are being solved. Its cooperation with North Korea allowed Iran to be armed with ‘Shehab-3’ missiles based on North Korean ‘Nodon-1’ missile technology. The flight range of this single-stage liquid-fuelled missile is not less then 1500 km, when carrying a payload of about 1 ton. This allows it to hit targets in Turkey,

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Israel, Saudi Arabia and parts of Russia, including Volgograd, Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan. With a halving of its disposable load, the flight range could reach not less than 2000 km; and the range may be further increased by elongating the fuel tanks. The two-stage missile ‘Shehab-4’ (based on the North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missile ‘Tephodon-1’), in progress for more than 12 years, consists of the primary stage, based on the ‘Shehab-3’ missile, using ‘Scud’ missiles as the secondary stage. Despite some technical difficulties, completion of this development in the near term seems highly probable. In that case, objects in Europe at distance of more than 3000 km can be targeted. Information is also available as to ongoing work connected with intercontinental missile ‘Shehab-5’, based on North Korean ‘Tephodon-2’, where the launch ended in an accident. Whereas in the coming years Iranian missiles will constitute a threat mostly for Israel, the possibility of such threat for the whole of Europe cannot be excluded. And if the policy of the existing regime in Iran remains unchanged, then eventually Iranian missiles may become capable of reaching the mainland USA as well. That is why criticism of the USA based on the fact that today’s Iranian missiles do not constitute a threat to the territories of Europe and the USA is unlikely to be convincing. Moreover, the US strategic ABM will be in unfinished mode for a long time to come – indeed, it is unlikely to become usable until 2011–13, when the bases in Poland and Czech Republic are planned to be installed.

Conclusion Are tactical and strategic ABM systems capable of providing deterrence against ballistic missiles and the proliferation of WMD – nuclear WMD in particular? We may readily assume that the deployment of limited ABM systems for missile deterrence in different flight phases may impact on the political decisions of threshold states about ‘freezing’ of programs aimed at the development and deployment of medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, if such proliferation is carried through by unilateral ABM deployment and leads to ‘horizontal’ nuclear proliferation, then the price would be nominal. And the opposite is right: if the ABM will be developed and deployed in trilateral USA – Russia – NATO format, then ballistic missile proliferation will be hindered. Of course, such a scenario does not exclude attempts of employing alternative ways of weapon delivery. But anywaythe new stage of strategic cooperation of great powers in countering common threats requires joint consolidated decisions regarding overcoming all kinds of nuclear crises, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its backbone – the Non-Proliferation Treaty, transforming the MTCR into a legally binding international treaty, strengthening contribution to common counterproliferation efforts.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 16 Political Aspects of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defences Grigoryi G. TISHCHENKO 1

In current political circumstances the analysis of prospects of creating missile defence systems and the consequences of their deployment got special importance. This is related to the active development of US missile defence systems for various purposes, including the global ABM system intended to protect the future ‘American fortress’, its military forces abroad and its allies and friends from the ballistic missiles of potential enemies. A further factor is the growing eagerness of other countries to possess an ‘anti-ballistic missile umbrella’. The main threats to the Western community in the next 10 to 15 years will probably come from Third World countries which possess or seek to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery – including ballistic missiles. The spread of missile technologies seems to facilitate the spread of missile defence systems, and this may become a serious problem. The activities of the United States considerably reinforce this process. For example, some countries (among them Israel) already have national missile defence systems created on the basis of the US anti-missile complexes which Washington plans to use for its own purposes – including defence of troops in the Middle Eastern region, so important from the US perspective. By exporting these anti-missile systems and involving US partners in their development, Washington can exert effective control over the activities of its allies in this sphere and the process of future integration of regional ABM systems into a global system, the creation of which was declared by G.W. Bush on 17 December 2002. The problem of missile defence systems is likely to remain urgent as long as missile-nuclear weapons retain their ultimo ratio status in the unfortunately still-probable conflicts at regional and global levels, in which defeat is viewed as totally unacceptable. Post-Cold War visions of the quick liquidation of nuclear missiles and the automatic withdrawal of ABM problems from the agenda have not been realized. On the contrary, WMDs, missiles and missile technologies are proliferating, and a new channel of the arms race – the anti-missile technologies race – is opening. The threat implicit in the use of ballistic missiles will be great, as they are capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. If a country develops or buys missile technologies, it thereby demonstrates its desire to possess WMD.

1

Head of Department, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies under the RF President.

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Strategic Shift Until recently, many experts believed that one of the most effective ways of eliminating the missile threat lay not in constructing expensive missile defence systems, but in the liquidation of WMD – which can be carried not only by ballistic missiles but by a whole range of air, land and sea delivery means. For example, it was assumed that Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, when put into effect, would help to reduce the programmes of development and production of intermediate- and low-range ballistic missiles. Today, however, this task is far from being solved: the future of these conventions is being questioned, and the process of proliferation of WMD and missile technologies is gaining momentum. Until recently, modern types of weapons were produced only by countries that were well developed in the military and economic spheres. Now, however, also the developing countries are quickly mastering WMD technologies, thereby posing a new threat to security and stability in many regions. As of the beginning of 2007, about 15 countries either possessed weapons of mass destruction or were seeking to buy them. The main motives which induce countries to obtain WMD and the means of their delivery are the following: x x x x x

the wish to significantly increase one’s status and prestige; radically build up its military potential and acquire an effective instrument capable of deterring practically any enemy; acquire an ideal mechanism of pressure on rivals; build a system to counteract covert and asymmetric attacks from other countries, their protégés and terrorist groups; save money: with WMD one may achieve the desired results at far lower cost than with conventional weapons.

Moreover, missiles and missile technologies can be easily purchased on the world market. It is difficult to establish effective control over the trade in these ‘explosive’ products – which are, incidentally, far cheaper than modern airplanes. The proliferation of missile defence systems and technologies has now reached such a point that it may be viewed as a completely new problem. More and more countries are being involved in cooperation in the missile defence sphere. Here we should recall that the European states have intensified the development of such programmes. For its part, the US administration has been making substantial efforts to give programmes like THAAD and ‘Aegis’ an international character, through engaging Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and building regional missile defence systems in Southeast Asia. Although Israel has actively been trying to promote the ‘Arrow’ systems, the export of this system and corresponding technologies seems to be under strict control of the United States. At the same time, the number of countries using the ‘Arrow’ may grow. Indian representatives have already shown interest, and in the future South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Japan and Pakistan may also obtain the ‘Arrow’.

Loosing Predictability The increasing arm race in missile defence will facilitate the rapid proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, as the number of countries wishing to possess missile

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weapons keeps growing. Thus far, these have largely been missiles of the simplest class, but a demand for more complicated types capable of overcoming missile defence systems may well ensue. The international regime of control over missile technology proliferation that has been so painstakingly established and sustained for many years is now almost on the verge of collapse. The idea that a multi-polar world (including the Russian Federation) would be safe is questionable. Maintaining stability in such system would demand a complex model of international security, including a multilateral balance of the power and interests of several different centres of influence. The latest version of the US military strategy involves the notion of a new ‘triad’, with the missile defence system as one of its pillars. This would have a significant influence on stability in crisis conditions, arms control etc. If a new pillar – the potential to deliver non-nuclear strikes – is included in this ‘triad’, that might have a negative effect on predictability in the development of a crisis situation, as it would eliminate the difference between nuclear and non-nuclear strikes and decrease the responsibility level for their delivery. For example, an adversary possessing missile-nuclear capacity might mistake a non-nuclear strike for a nuclear one, and respond accordingly. In a crisis situation, the United States might deliver a strategic non-nuclear strike instead of resorting to non-military means of conflict regulation. Given Washington’s plans for putting into orbit a space component of its missile defence system, the task of preventing the militarization of space is becoming more and more urgent. Active work must be undertaken on an international legal regime banning the deployment of weapons, including non-WMD types, in outer space. All articles of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies aim at the peaceful use of outer space, and regulate interactions between the states involved. However, the Treaty definitely restricts only the deployment of nuclear weapons and other WMD types: existing international legislation does not prohibit the deployment of non-WMD types of weapons in outer space. The United States has insisted on understanding an international missile defence system as the deployment of ABM or one of its elements (for example, the space earlywarning system) by the developed countries – primarily NATO members. But the developing countries may well view this as an attempt on the part of the rich North to shut out the problems of the poor South (especially its Muslim nations) with a new ‘Maginot line’. This would inevitably lead to the weakening of strategic stability. The problems that cause tensions along the North–South line should be first of all solved with non-military means, using political, economic and other mechanisms. As adherents of unilateral actions are clearly prevalent in Washington today, it cannot be ruled out the USA may renounce its signing of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which the Republican Senate failed to ratify in 1999. It is possible that the USA may go even further and resume underground nuclear testing, thereby dismissing the unilateral moratorium on their conduct. In this case, the CTBT would be made redundant for ever or at least for a very long time. The possibility of such a scenario is supported by the fact that Washington attaches growing importance to the development of new types of nuclear weapons – nuclear low-capacity warheads which can turn nuclear weapons into battlefield weapons. It is significant that the US Department of Defense, under the pretext of creating high-precision means of defeating terrorist bases located deep underground and in bedrock, is in such a hurry to start testing micro-nuclear warheads. It should also be kept in

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mind that, according to US intelligence data, most Chinese and North Korean missiles are based in mountain tunnels. The unilateral withdrawal of the USA from the ABM Treaty undoubtedly will have a negative impact on the whole system of international relations, especially in the long-term perspective. The USA, as the most powerful state in the modern world, sets a poor example to countries that are currently playing or seeking to play the leading role in their regions and that are ready to build up their political and military power. The latter could use this extremely dangerous precedent to quit any treaty that does not correspond to their interests. The building and deployment of missile defence systems stimulates the production of ballistic missiles, therefore facilitating the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. This in turn threatens to destabilize the situation in various regions throughout the world.

Arms Races Today, more and more politicians and experts agree that the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty pushed China to modernize its missile-nuclear forces. Already there are indications that both Great Britain and France might follow the example of China. Strengthening the missile-nuclear potential of China spurred India and Pakistan to build up their military power and activated Japan’s activities in the defence sphere. In the near future, China will probably speed up the deployment of the mobile solid-propellant ICBMs DF-41 and multiple individual-targeted warheads capable of overcoming missile defence systems. It is possible that instead of the existing strategy of ‘postponed deterrence’ (missiles are not fuelled, warheads are kept in stock) the strategy of ‘limited deterrence’ (retaliatory strike within several minutes) will be accepted. Beijing plans to deploy the latest generation of ICBMs that have already been produced in its rocket tunnels. This would make them practically invulnerable to the modern offensive means. China may also support North Korea in developing an ICBM and declare the possibility of first-strike capability. The Japanese missile defence programme can seriously affect regional stability, as China as well as other Asian powers may take it ambiguously. If Japan and Taiwan obtain the THAAD system, Beijing would hardly manage to project its power on the territory of these states. Moreover, it would be far more difficult to convince the USA to ‘leave Taiwan’ – which has long been a major strategic goal of China. Furthermore, deployment of the THAAD system may induce Japan to develop its own ballistic missiles and review its defence policy. In that case, Japan would be capable of taking Taiwan under its missile defence umbrella – which obviously contravenes Beijing’s interests. China is most likely to try to neutralize Washington’s plans of creating a national and theatre missile defence system especially if the United States includes Taiwan under its missile defence umbrella. The deployment of US national and theatre missile defence systems in Northeast Asia does not pose a direct threat to India and Pakistan. However, Delhi objects to such actions, realizing that in response China would build up its nuclear potential – and India would also have to take counter-measures. India’s leadership perceives its nuclear weapons as a counter-weight to the Chinese nuclear potential, so the possibility that Indian–Chinese relations may enter into confrontation should not be ruled out. This would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world, unleashing an arms race not only between India and Pakistan but also between India and China.

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In response to the development of China’s nuclear-missile potential, India might accelerate the deployment of Agni-II missiles and the creation of Agni-III. It might start developing intermediate-range missiles and ICBMs, and resume nuclear tests following Beijing’s example. Attempts to acquire foreign technologies, first of all in the sphere of strategic weapons, would become more frequent. An Indian–Chinese nuclear arms race could have much more serious consequences than a confrontation between India and Pakistan, as China’s nuclear systems are capable of striking targets on the territories of the United States and Russia. There are fears that an Indian–Pakistani nuclear-missile confrontation would weaken the system of control over the export of missiles, missile technologies and WMD-related technologies in both countries. Moreover, both Islamabad and Delhi have become unscrupulous in their choice of suppliers. Of particular concern is the possibility that the situation in Pakistan may become destabilized and that its ‘explosive property’ could fall into the hands of US enemies and non-state groupings. Selling the American-Israeli system Arrow II to India and Pakistan, which is being actively advocated by Israel, may destabilize the situation in the South Asia and intensify the arms race between India and Pakistan. The idea of using the experience of Russian–US mutual nuclear deterrence is being suggested to India and Pakistan. However, several technical aspects hamper it. For example, the flight time of Indian and Pakistani missiles to enemy targets would comprise only a few minutes (slightly more for bombers), and both countries do not have nuclear early-warning systems. In a situation of limited potential, only pre-emptive strike can provide the chance to disarm and incapacitate the enemy. Besides, any attempts to increase the nuclear-weapons alert may be viewed by the other side as preparation to attack, and be used to justify immediate reaction.

Proliferating Proliferation? Tokyo is starting to feel the growing power of China. Japan’s traditional ally – the United States – is trying to find a geopolitical compromise with Beijing. Though the US–Japanese alliance looks strong still, the differences between the economic interests of both countries are becoming increasingly evident. The painful process of the change of generations in the Japanese government has been accompanied by a search for new approaches in solving the problems of economic growth and formulating the new military-political role of Japan. Nor should it be expected that Tokyo would keep its nuclear policy unchanged. Tokyo participates in the creation of the US missile defence system. If the North Korean problem is solved (for example, through the conclusion of treaties) and the level of the missile threat is decreased, then US–Japanese interaction in the sphere of tactical missile defence may be temporarily weakened – including the import of US theatre missile defence systems to Japan. At the same time, the growing ‘Chinese threat’ (as a reaction to the US missile defence systems) would probably strengthen Japan’s main course aimed at cooperation with the United States in this sphere and intensified interaction of troops in the region. Japan wants to deploy its own missile defence system, not create a system to guarantee US security. It treats Washington’s plans for constructing a global missile defence system ‘with understanding’, but is wary of the sharp reaction of China and the negative consequences for arms control. In the future Tokyo would probably warn Washington against steps that might lead to the collapse of the arms control and non-

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proliferation regime, but it would not criticize America’s decision concerning a national missile defence system. However, in case of change of government and a further weakening of the non-proliferation regime, Japan would probably react to the US actions with growing criticism. There can be no full certainty that Germany will retain its minor military status. Nor is it even the point that both countries which suffered defeat in the Second World War won the Cold War. A stable system of international relations cannot be built unless Japan and Germany gain status as main power centres in the multi-polar world of the future. Viewing nuclear weapons as an entry ticket into the great-power club would serve as sufficient motivation for both countries, and would bring about similar reactions. Thus, maintaining the non-nuclear status of Japan and Germany becomes of top priority for preserving stability in the whole world. These two countries should have the opportunity to increase their political weight as non-nuclear powers. The question is if this problem can be solved within the framework of the UN Security Council, disregarding similar ambitions on the part of India which are supported by its own nuclear potential. The state of relations between Taiwan and China will probably determine Taiwan’s choice of missile-defence system for the interception of tactical missiles in the upper atmosphere. If China builds up its low-range missile arsenal, Taipei may start buying more Patriot PAC-3 and acquire Aegis as well. It is possible that the Taiwanese authorities would request Washington to help them to create missile defence systems of battle control and communications and to expand the US military presence in the Taiwan Strait. North Korea decisively objects to the creation of US theatre and national missile defence systems, but lacks effective instruments for countering the realization of these programmes. With the deployment of a theatre missile defence system in Japan, North Korea could increase its arsenal of Nodong missiles and Scud-type missiles, in response to similar actions on the part of South Korea. It seems that exerting pressure on North Korea serves only as a stimulus for it to obtain nuclear weapons and to create missiles that can reach the territory of the United States. Pyongyang may expand the export of missiles and missile technologies to countries that Washington sees as ‘unreliable’, in order to get additional resources. Australia fully supports the US actions concerning missile defence and already possesses components of the US early warning system. In the future, growing interaction and cooperation between the USA and Australia is likely, especially concerning R&D in missile defence and even the development of system strategy. Thereby Australia may become engaged in the US–Chinese confrontation, and relations between China and Australia could possibly deteriorate. Analysis of the scientific-production basis and the level of missile development in the countries causing ‘concern’ to the USA clearly reveals the biased and unrealistic character of such assessments. Creating ICBMs that can deliver a strike on the territory of the United States demands solving highly difficult scientific-technical and technological tasks in missile technology, navigation and control systems and warhead construction, as well as huge financial resources. This has clearly been shown by the experience of developing the missile programmes of India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. It is also significant that most of these countries have no reason to want to possess ICBMs. They have sought to develop missile systems in order to solve their own mili-

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tary-strategic tasks; hence, their programmes aim at producing low- and intermediaterange missiles. The US desire to get the possibility of free interference into regional conflicts, creating a technological basis and information infrastructure which could significantly influence the future global balance of power – that is one of the main reasons why the idea of creating a global missile defence system is so popular. This is a point worth emphasizing. Concerning relations with China and Russia in the sphere of armaments, it has been proposed in the Western community to use different agreements that specify the timeframes, qualitative characteristics, places of stockpiling and other aspects but without the status of treaties that require formal ratification. This approach is unacceptable for Russia. The deployment of US or national means for the missile defence system on Taiwan which could ensure interception of ballistic missiles, as well as the inclusion of the island in the list of territories protected by the United States, would inevitably bring about response measures from North Korea and further complicate the situation in the region. As yet, the countries of South Asia do not worry about long-range missiles and the US attempts to build a system of defence against them. This situation may continue until Japan and Taiwan become involved in missile defence programmes and thus practically turn into the ‘front line’ of Washington’s defence strategy. Then serious political consequences could be expected, both within these states and in their relations with neighbours. The Chinese reaction is certain to be immediate. Subsequently, India, Pakistan and other countries would undertake response measures, with all the ensuing consequences for regional stability.

Conclusion Developing countries are becoming more independent in implementing programmes to create WMD and missile weapons. The restrictions and embargoes imposed upon them become less effective – ‘the policy of the stick’ is slipping. The growing influence of economic factors on the activities of the firms manufacturing weapons, the weakening of control over military technology proliferation, the expansion of ‘grey’ and ‘black’ arms markets, the proliferation of dual-use technologies – all these factors significantly simplify access to modern weapons. In order to deter the aggressive aspirations of ‘states of concern’ as to WMD and the means of delivery, it is proposed to employ political instruments more broadly, and actively engage these countries into supporting this praxis with ‘economic carrots’. Transforming missile defence programmes into international initiatives involving a large number of participants, the availability of anti-missile weapons on the world market for more and more countries, the proliferation of missile technologies and related dual-use technologies – all this would, in due course, lead to the complete collapse of today’s regime of control over missile technologies. If the United States created this regime, it would now be burying it. Whereas the US programme is aimed at enabling echelon defence against ICBMs, Europe is mainly concerned with defending its forward defence forces and naval groupings against cruse missiles and low-range ballistic missiles. To undermine Europe’s defence programmes in the future, the United States may actively involve the European countries in its missile defence programmes, while simultaneously trying to keep them under strain by refusing to give big orders. As the creation of such systems is extremely

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expensive, it is quite possible that the European countries would not be able to implement their own projects – in particular, in transport aircraft and outer space – while simultaneously participating in the US programme. A further issue that should be dealt with immediately by the UN and other international organizations is the problem of ‘outer space garbage’ as a result of US activities in missile defence and the growing number of tests in outer space, including real targets. This debris poses an undeniable threat to objects and people in orbit, in the atmosphere and on the Earth, as the fragments emerging in course of testing are sometimes considerable in weight. Thus, US activities in the sphere of missile defence are in contravention of the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1977) which prohibit the infliction of any damage to outer space, which is the property of all mankind.

Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 17 Accelerated Blend-Down of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Laura S.H. HOLGATE 1

Russia and the USA have cooperated since 1992 under the US–Russian HEU Purchase Agreement to blend down 300 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Under this agreement, 30 metric tons of HEU are blended down each year and shipped to the USA, where they supply 50% of US nuclear fuel requirements. Significant stocks of HEU remain in storage in Russia, however, where they have given rise to concerns about the security burdens and risks of long-term storage and the impacts of additional warhead dismantlement. Beginning in 2002, the research that forms the basis for the analysis discussed here was carried out jointly by Russian and US specialists at the request of the NTI. It focused on examining various hypothetical options for accelerating the down-blending of Russian HEU no longer used for defence purposes (hereafter: excess HEU), to lowenriched uranium (LEU) for use in nuclear power plants. This analysis provides a robust basis for US and Russian (and possibly other European) governments to begin negotiations toward accelerating and expanding the blend-down of Russian excess HEU. The initial phase of this project considered twelve options, and its results are summarized in table 2. These options differ in the size of the additional increment, whether and where the output is stored prior to customer delivery, and the enrichment level of the initial LEU product. The analysis considered current production capacities, the infrastructure requirements of accelerated HEU processing, the costs of installing such upgrades, and the time needed to complete infrastructure upgrades. In Phase I, we also evaluated legal considerations and the influence of additional LEU on uranium markets. Current HEU-LEU processing indices were used as the basis for analysis.

1

Vice President for Russia/New Independent States, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

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Table 2: Illustrative Cost and Schedule by Scenario HEU Processing Increment MT/Year

5 5 5 10 10 20 20 20 30 30 30 30

HEU Processing Volume (Includes 30 MT/Year baseline) MT/Year 35 35 35 40 40 50 50 50 60 60 60 60

LEU Product Enrichment %

4.4 4.4 12.0 4.4 19.0 4.4 4.4 19.0

LEU Product Delivery

Temporary LEU Product Storage

Immediate Deferred Deferred Immediate Immediate Immediate Deferred Deferred Immediate Deferred Deferred Deferred

Russia USA

Russia Russia USA Russia USA

Capital Investment (Million $)

Estimated Lead Time To Full Production (Years)

Annual Direct Cost (Million)

157 160 275 360 284 958 967 402 1,565 1,565 653 477

3.5 3.5 2.3 5.0 2.6 8.0 8.0 2.8 10.0 10.0 3.0 4.0

1.5 3.0 19.5 3.8 23.1 13.4 17.2 34.7 20.7 20.7 44.6 35.

The following conditions and assumptions apply for the data given in the table: o Rough order of magnitude; table is not yet optimized o New enrichment capacity, if needed, is largest lead-time and cost-driver. o Blend-down to intermediate assays requires less additional enrichment capacity. Costs of storing 12% & 19% outside Russia and down-blend to 4.4% not included.

Down-Blending Capacities Table 3 provides an estimate of current basic processing capacities and possible reserves for enhancing the volume of processing HEU into LEU products. Operating capacities make possible a maximum increase of 1.6 metric tons of uranium (MTU) per year beyond the 30 MTU per year processed under the HEU Purchase Agreement. This limit is due mainly to a shortage of available separation capacities for the blend-stock production. This, in turn, is driven by the requirement to create blend-stock enriched to 1.5% in order to meet the isotopic specifications of the customer. Other stages of the blend-down process have more unused capacity that could be applied to acceleration options. On the other hand, because Russia is currently carrying out no industrial operations involving 12% and 19% LEU, there exist no capacities for the latter processing stages of options involving those enrichment levels. As shown in Table 2, estimates of capital investment in additional capacities, annual additional costs, and the schedule estimates for HEU accelerated blend-down options range from USD157 million to 1.6 billion in capital costs, from USD1.5 million to 45 million in annual additional costs, and the time period from 2.3 to 10 years.

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Table 3: Production Capacities and Reserves (estimated) to Increase HEU Processing into LEU Products, MTU/year Stage Production of highly enriched U3O8 Production of highly enriched UF6 Blend-stock production Fabrication of 4.4% LEU LEU products 12 and 19% LEU

Production capacity 37 34.0 31.6 43.9 None

Current process 30 30 30 30 –

Reserve capacity 7 4 1.6 13.9 None

Results from Phase I The Phase I analysis forms the basis for the following observations: x

x

x

x

Counter-intuitively, the need for additional enrichment capacity associated with blend-stock production is by far the greatest driver for cost and schedule associated with the various blend-down options. This is so even for the intermediate-enrichment (12% and 19%) options, where the additional expense associated with creating de novo processing capacity is more than offset by the comparative savings associated with the significantly smaller additional enrichment needs. The long lead-time required for the upgrades associated with the high-quantity options means that the HEU under the current agreement will have been mostly or completely blended before the new capacity is operable; this makes the ‘doubling’ notion unrealistic. Even in the lower-quantity options, upgrade lead-times limit the value of acceleration unless additional HEU is made available for blend-down. The rough balance in the medium-term nuclear fuel supply market means that the LEU created through accelerated blend-down options is unlikely to be immediately absorbable by the marketplace. Several mitigation approaches, however, can be pursued to avoid market damage as a result of this additional production – including strategic reserves, new reactor ‘first core’ assignments, and controlled market release. It is unlikely that any of the options can be executed quickly enough to impact the current short-term gap between uranium supply and demand; on the other hand, utilities are eager for clarity in the post-2013 fuel supply, which will experience a 50% reduction in US LEU availability in the absence of either significant new enrichment capacity or expansion of US–Russian understandings on HEU blend-down. The lack of near-term market absorption capacity means any new arrangements will not be sustainable on a purely commercial basis (as the current HEU purchase agreement has mostly been); government funding in some form is therefore likely to be required in the early stages.

Phase II In 2005, the NTI and its Russian partners embarked on a Phase II analysis designed to optimize options for accelerating the blend-down of excess HEU. In contrast to the somewhat arbitrary quantities considered in Phase I, these new options were sized con-

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sistent with standard Russian blend-down process modules. They focused all new upgrades on a single Russian facility at the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk, while taking advantage of existing capacity reserves at the three other blend-down facilities. These options also addressed a variety of approaches to reducing the enrichment requirements associated with blend-stock production. The options analysed in Phase II are depicted in Table 4. Table 4: Options Considered in Phase II Analysis

Option Ⱥ11 Ⱥ12 Ⱥ13 Ⱥ14

HEU annual increment, Ɇ.Ɍ.

LEU product enrichment 4.95% 4

ȼ11 ȼ12 ȼ13 ȼ14

4.4% 19% 4.4%

12 19%

Raw material for blend-stock

Russian uranium tails Russian uranium tails US uranium tails Russian uranium tails Natural uranium

ASTM requireLEU delivery to the ments for the final customer LEU product ɋ996-96 ɋ996-04 ɋ996-96 ɋ996-96

Immediate Immediate Immediate Delayed

ɋ996-96

Immediate

ɋ996-96

Immediate

ɋ996-96

Delayed

ɋ996-96

Delayed

Also in contrast with Phase I analysis, the final report on Phase II will incorporate technical, cost and schedule issues associated with the further down-blend of intermediate products, as well as transportation and processing costs outside Russia. The market analysis will also be updated, although early results indicate little change in the judgments of the previous market evaluation. Although Phase II is still underway, some early observations are possible: x x x x

Production of LEU with a slightly higher enrichment – 4.95% rather than 4.4% – lowers blend-stock consumption and thus reduces the requirement for additional separative work capacity. Revising the specification for the LEU product from ASTM C996-96 to C99604 enables natural uranium to be used for blend-stock production, which significantly reduces the requirement for additional separative work capacity. Using US tails with a higher U-235 assay for blend-stock production also reduces separative work requirements. Assuming that all processing is performed at Russian enterprises, the cost of the two-stage process is greater than that of the direct down-blending process of HEU to LEU.

Conclusion These findings indicate that accelerated and expanded down-blending options can be achieved on relatively fast timelines and within reasonable costs. US and Russian government officials and industry representatives should immediately begin serious consultations to discover under what conditions Russia would be prepared to allocate additional HEU for down-blending at a faster pace.

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Chapter 18 New Approaches to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Missile Technologies Pavel S. ZOLOTAREV 1

The former system of nuclear arms control and counter-proliferation took shape during the era of the Cold War. The leaders of the opposing camps played key roles in building up a system of nuclear arms control under which everything except the direct issues of nuclear control and nuclear counter-proliferation remained in the background. With the end of the Cold War, the situation has changed. Factors previously of no importance as well as several recently emerging aspects have entered the scene. Without taking these into consideration it appears impossible to bring the existing nuclear arms control system into accord with the new circumstances. One possible approach to the problem is to ensure strategic stability as the task of a broader scope which can guarantee the neutralization of all obstacles to effective nuclear control and counter-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Today, strategic stability can no longer be understood in the simplified terms of yesterday: it has become multidimensional. We need to consider several relevant approaches to strategic stability and focus on the key underlying factors in each of the options: x x x x x

The state of strategic stability is linked to the probability of non-use of nuclear weapons by Russia and the USA against each other. The state of strategic stability is linked to the probability of non-use of nuclear weapons by any nuclear power. The state of strategic stability is linked to the probability of preventing wars among states. The state of strategic stability is linked to the probability of preventing internal armed conflicts. The state of strategic stability is linked to the probability of minimizing the threat of international terrorism.

All these approaches are interrelated. It is impossible to ensure strategic stability in the nuclear sphere without finding mechanisms of setting regional conflicts; likewise, it is difficult to solve regional problems without tackling the issues of nuclear armaments or the problems of nuclear energy – and so on.

1 Deputy Director, Institute for the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Science, Professor at the Academy of Military Sciences, candidate of technical sciences.

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Abandoning MAD Under today’s circumstances, ensuring strategic stability in the nuclear sphere means that solutions must be found to three main tasks: x x x

reducing nuclear risks from the continuing state of mutual containment of Russia and the USA elaborating new approaches to the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism elaborating measures aimed at preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

The first task – reducing the mutual nuclear risks between Russia and the USA – can be solved both within the process of implementing the SORT Treaty and in the framework of new approaches to US–Russian strategic relations set by Presidents Putin and Bush in the Joint Declaration of 24 May 2002. Given the political will, specific political-diplomatic and military-technical measures can help to minimize mutual nuclear risks. These measures should include: the harmonization of Russian and US nuclear policies; greater transparency in issues concerning the state and development of nuclear forces of both sides; giving up plans for counter-retaliation strikes and reducing the alertness level of the main part of the land and sea forces of the ‘nuclear triad’; maintaining reasonable moderation in the deployment of the US ABM system, and increasing practical Russian–US cooperation; eliminating concerns about the realization of the START Treaty. The crucial goal of these measures is to lay a solid foundation for the future demise of the strategy of mutual nuclear deterrence. It is proposed that the use of Russian and US strategic nuclear forces against each other should be excluded from the list of toppriority measures and viewed as an emergency fallback option only. Concurrently, the strategic nuclear forces of each side should consist of no more than 500 nuclear warheads on-the-fly (150–200 IBM units, 300–350 submarine-launched ballistic missiles). With these limitations, neither Russia nor the United States would be physically able to undertake mutual assured destruction, but at the same time would be able to ensure the nuclear deterrence of any third party.

Mutual Nuclear Security The next goal is the reshaping of the basis of Russian-US relations, away from the strategy of nuclear deterrence and to a mutual security model instead. It seems probable that political, economic, military and other premises for dismissing nuclear mutual deterrence can materialize by 2010–2015. The further favourable development of Russian-US strategic relations is crucial to this process. This scenario presupposes, on the basis of bilateral agreements, the gradual replacement of the model of mutual nuclear deterrence with a more cooperative model of interaction that would radically change the entire system of Russian-US interrelations in the nuclear sphere. Each side should develop a strategy of nuclear deterrence taking into consideration both its own security interests and those of the counterpart. This demands the implementation of a set of measures that would make it impossible to carry out a pre-emptive counter-strike. The main goal of the evolution of Russian–US relations in nuclear sphere is the transition from rivalry to partnership as the basic principle of military-political interaction. This would allow the creation of a model of mutual guaranteed security, instead of

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that of mutual assured destruction. This can be possible only if Russia and the USA are able to make a political breakthrough and start the true coordination of their nuclear policies. In order to develop partnership relations, all the ‘uncertainties’ viewed as allowable within mutual nuclear deterrence should be eliminated. The level of transparency that both countries should achieve would make continued retention of the policy of mutual nuclear deterrence impossible. The model of mutual guaranteed security should be accompanied by transformations in military policy concerning the tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces of both countries. Both Russia and the United States would have to reduce profoundly the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and even ban some types, as well as establishing clear limitations on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in peacetime, with corresponding mutual notifications. Since the end of the Cold War, there has occurred a ‘separation’ of both Russian and US land forces. This should be expanded to the air and naval forces, in order to prevent situations in which the conventional forces of one country can threaten the strategic goals of the other. This is particularly important in view of the ‘revolution in military affairs’ with drastically increased performance capabilities of the new generation of weapons. The new model of Russian-US nuclear relations would probably demand qualitatively different agreements, resembling the relations between close partners if not allies. Such relations would be in keeping with legal-contractual relations such as the treaty on mutual security.

Preventing Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism The second goal involves elaborating new approaches in the interests of preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. It requires the following: x x x

control of nuclear technologies that can be used to create nuclear weapons establishment of international control over the nuclear fuel cycle consideration of all nuclear energy issues as a part of the nuclear nonproliferation agenda.

In this view it is necessary to implement measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of IAEA activities, by: x x x

strengthening the IAEA system of guarantees ratification of the Additional IAEA Protocol by the official nuclear powers (INFCIRC/540) initiating the elaboration of a concept for universal international control of nuclear energy in the interests of creating a multi-component mechanism for ensuring secure and controlled nuclear disarmament, under the surveillance of the UN Security Council.

The first step should be the adoption of a treaty on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Such treaty should be reinforced either by a special World Bank programme or by the creation of a specialized international agency in order to solve the financial problems connected with control over nuclear fuel.

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Transferring the system of nuclear weapons control to a qualitatively different level in many respects depends on Russian-US agreements on mutual reduction of nuclear risks and measures to eliminate threats related to maintaining the model of mutual nuclear deterrence. In this case, conditions can be created favourable to five-party consultations with the participation of all officially declared nuclear states on the issue of diminishing the nuclear threat. As a result the following steps can be expected to be implemented: x x x x x

common declaration of the nuclear club members on their absence of intention to build up their nuclear forces quantitatively common declaration of five nuclear powers on the reduction of their nuclear forces by 10-15% within the next decade (by 2015) rejection of the production of fissile nuclear materials for nuclear weapons as well as a solution to the problem of aging nuclear warheads and their replacement collective measures on localization (reducing to a minimum) the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD by terrorists against the nonnuclear weapon countries; reaching agreement between the nuclear powers about immediate mutual notification in case of employing, in counter-terrorist operations, dual-use systems (missiles and aircraft facilities) equipped with conventional warheads.

The nuclear powers should confirm their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon states.

Engaging the Hold-Outs A multilateral system of nuclear arms control cannot be effective without the involvement of the unofficial nuclear weapon states as well. On the one hand, it is unacceptable if the unofficial nuclear weapon states get sufficient political benefits from the possession of nuclear weapons. On the other hand it would be impossible to create an effective multilateral regime of nuclear control unless these countries accept certain ‘rules of the game’ in the nuclear sphere. The possession of nuclear weapons by Israel, India and Pakistan is a political and military reality. Under these conditions, it seems rational that these states be silently acknowledged as nuclear powers – provided that they assume certain obligations in nuclear sphere. Such obligations could include the following: x x x x

not to build up nuclear weapons India and Pakistan can join the agreements to stop the production of nuclear fissile materials for military use India and Pakistan can join the CTBT following the example of the official nuclear powers, India and Pakistan could declare their intention not to use nuclear warheads on unmanned aircraft.

India and Pakistan could also join an agreement between the official nuclear powers about adopting collective measures for localization (reducing to a minimum) the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD by terrorists, provided that

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such agreement is open for subscription other parties. It is probable that also Israel could join such an agreement. On the whole, it is a matter of creating conditions under which India, Pakistan and Israel can get the opportunity to participate in the activities of the nuclear club, without being formally confirmed as official nuclear powers. In the course of creating a system of multilateral nuclear control, the practical experience in solving the problems concerning Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues is worth consideration. A new informal political mechanism for solving the most urgent issues in the sphere of nuclear proliferation has emerged. Five permanent members of the UN Security Council and two great powers – Japan and Germany – which are nonnuclear but seek permanent membership in the UN Security Council are taking part in this mechanism. The negotiations format promotes a higher status for Germany and Japan in the world hierarchy, confirming that tackling such key issues of international security as the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation necessitates their participation. Only two countries – Russia and the United States – are represented in both of the Six. This fact reflects the special responsibility of the two nuclear superpowers for the maintenance of strategic stability and preventing an increase in nuclear global threats. This circumstance should help to institutionalize the mechanism of Russian–US strategic partnership aimed at the overcoming the Cold War heritage of mutual nuclear deterrence, and strengthening international security in the 21st century. As regards the third goal of elaborating measures to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, more detailed research is required. Similar tasks were undertaken during the Cold War by the USSR and the United States, but this experience is hardly applicable for the other nuclear states.

Conclusion Some measures for the reduction of mutual nuclear risks that have been proposed for Russia and the USA in this paper could also be used by the other nuclear powers which participated in the global nuclear confrontation earlier (Great Britain, France, China). However, the main problem today relates to conflicts on the regional level and to nonacknowledged or non-declared nuclear states as well as potential nuclear states. The risks of the use of nuclear weapons at the regional level could be reduced through a system of political and military-technical measures which would: x x x

deprive each party of the opportunity to prepare and carry out pre-emptive strikes prevent the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons as a reaction to provocative third-party actions.

The measures proposed in this paper to create a multilateral nuclear control system within a framework of strategic stability do not pretend to be exhaustive. However, it is hoped that they can serve as a basis for further analytical work in this vital sphere.

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Chapter 19 A SORT of a ReSTART for Nuclear Disarmament? Morten Bremer MÆRLI1

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age, the nuclear-weapon states have enjoyed almost complete and total nuclear autonomy. Their nuclear activities have sprouted and developed, outside the bounds of international controls. This privilege became formalized in the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which divided the world into ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ – the states who possess nuclear weapons, and those who do not. Safeguards inspections are conducted in non-nuclear-weapon states to ensure that their nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes solely. The nuclear-weapon states are exempted from such supervision, although some (limited) voluntary safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency do exist. By and large, weapons-useable nuclear material and nuclear weapons are put under a high level of scrutiny in their host countries, simply because it is in the interest of the nuclear weapon-states to do so. Within cultural, financial and political fluctuations, the material and weapons are well-accounted for, protected, and controlled by means of appropriate management procedures and technologies. As a result, nuclear stockpile and weapons security has a strong national – or indeed, internal – predisposition. The primary concern is to meet national security demands, as well as domestic legislative requirements, rather than to address any international audiences. Such domestically geared corroboration could become an obstacle for states desiring a more transparent nuclear posture, as a confidence-building measure or for meeting disarmament obligations. After all, the NPT stipulates disarmament in the countries that possess nuclear weapons. Exposing certain nuclear activities while meeting secrecy and classification demarcations may be demanding – neither individuals nor organizations within the nuclear establishment may be keen on this kind of thinking or disclosure. A status quo, with persistent secrecy and maintained classification levels may simply be easiest and safest – as seen from the ‘inside’.2 Existing boundaries of openness have become more or less well-defined and known after years and years of operational experience. Breaches may lead to legal prosecution. Moreover, to the extent that states have interacted in arms control in the past, this has either been in a context of stringent and carefully negotiated verification procedures like the START process – or in a setting totally lacking in verification, like the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), or so-called ‘Moscow Treaty’. Whereas the START disarmament scheme demanded a sizeable bureaucracy, the latter 1 2

Senior Research Fellow, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. David Albright, ‘Secrets that Matter’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2000.

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is characterized by pragmatism and non-verifiability. None if these approaches may be suited for meeting the nuclear disarmament challenges of today. In addition to the alltoo-familiar political challenges related to nuclear arms control, a range of cultural and/or systemic and technical questions may arise. Hence, a state interested in building international trust in any newly proclaimed or planned nuclear disarmament activities may face an array of challenges. In an international nuclear security environment increasingly shaped by unilateralism, flexibility and pragmatism, and less formalized arms control and negotiated arms reductions, it is vital to understand the dynamics of and prerequisites for (unilateral) nuclear disarmament initiatives. The same applies regarding the conditions under which such activities may best be communicated to a larger international audience, in order to harvest maximum policy gains. As SORT lacks any verification procedures or demands, calls have been made for a verification approach with START provisions as a point of departure.3 While this may intuitively appear attractive from a practical point of view, the two paths – though related – differ in terms of scope and output. Successful and strong verification schemes may demand quite different means and methods. This may seem intuitive and straightforward. But for some reason, such simple interconnections are often overlooked in real-life nuclear security activities.4 In the following, two types of nuclear disarmament activities will be briefly assessed. The first type rests upon one-sided, proclaimed initiatives; the second is treatystipulated and reciprocal in nature. The examples may be related to imaginary verification schemes under SORT and a possible re-start of the START process, respectively. In both cases, it is assumed that appropriate and proliferation-proof verification technologies and methodology are at hand. The chapter starts out with some general considerations on the verification components of proclaimed and defined, treaty-stipulated disarmament activities. Potential pitfalls for arms-control practitioners are then explored, with a view to the two initiatives mentioned above. The conclusion is that, while verification should indeed be revigorated as a disarmament tool, much care should be shown if attempts are made toward integrating the verification schemes of different arms control agreements. Verification scope and objectives – and hence the agreements themselves – would need to be adjusted accordingly.

Verification Components and Conditions The verification process involves series of steps, tools, actors – and agendas. While policy-makers often look for decisive answers to issues of compliance, in the absence of obvious breaches it is not possible to obtain 100% assurance of either cheating or compliance. Verification is an often highly politicized and ‘hot’ issue. Politically, verification may be seen as an activity designed to ascertain whether and to what extent a state fulfils its obligations under a given treaty. Technically, verification should be able to generate the information needed to build confidence in proclaimed or expected conduct, or to reveal any breaches, using appropriate means and methods at the relevant level of intrusiveness. 3 Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov, ‘ReSTART: The Need for a New U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement’, Arms Control Today, September 2006. 4 Ibid.

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Already at this point diverging components and interests become evident. As seen in table 5, substantiating proclaimed nuclear disarmament rests upon unilateral and voluntary activities on behalf of the host country. Such activities will be of a collaborative nature, attempting to convince a wider audience that the nuclear arms reductions are actually taking place. Traditionally, such activities would fit well under the heading of confidence-building measures (CBMs).5 Traditionally in arms control, CBMs either precede the negotiation of formal arms control agreements or are added to these agreements to strengthen them. In general, openness will be essential. Transparency as a society-to-society confidence-building measure has strong potential for furthering nuclear arms control and associated nonproliferation goals.6 But it will be up to the state itself to determine the levels of intrusiveness, and which type of national personnel and domestic technical means to apply in the process. Treaty-stipulated or even reciprocal activities, the other hand, carry another flavour. By definition, they are bi- or multilateral – involving multiple actors, some of which will be operating on foreign soil with their own equipment. This setting will be more adversarial in nature, and quite different from the one trying to build confidence in proclaimed activities. Inspectors are now external, vigorously looking for clues that can indicate compliance – or non-compliance. Clearly, to the extent that nations wish to engage in international arms-control this is a sovereign decision to be made by of the state. Yet, if the state chooses to join a given regime, it will have to subscribe to a specific set of negotiated verification procedures, involving specified means and required levels of intrusiveness.

Table 5: Components and conditions of proclaimed and treaty stipulated nuclear disarmament verification

Approach Primary goal Incentive Mode Means Intrusiveness

Proclaimed Unilateral Confidence-building Voluntary Corroborative Decided unilaterally Decided unilaterally

Treaty-stipulated Bi- or multilateral Compliance-check Voluntary, persuasive Adversarial Negotiated Negotiated

Verification Scope, Mode and Means Even this set of simple, contextual comparisons allows for some observations. It is clear that the means and methods of verification differ with the operational type and setting of the nuclear disarmament verification. Moreover, the context of verification is determined by its associated expectations – in other words, the scope of the verification activity. Hence, a verification hierarchy may be established: 5 CBMs may be understood as out-reach activities that adversarial states can use to reduce tensions and avert the possibility of military conflict. See for instance Sarah Meek, ‘Confidence-Building Measures As Tools For Disarmament And Development’, African Security Review, Vol 14, No 1, 2005. 6 Morten Bremer Maerli and Roger G. Johnston, ‘Safeguarding This and Verifying That: Fuzzy Concepts, Confusing Terminology, and their Detrimental Effects on Nuclear Husbandry’, Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2002. http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/abs91.htm

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Scope

Mode

Means

Figure 2: The verification hierarchy: means, mode and scope Generally, scope may be understood as the range and the extent within which a given activity operates, or covers. The scope of a disarmament effort will be determined by the actors’ demands, as well as their expectations. The scope is, in other words, closely related to the objective of the activity in question. In order to obtain the stakeholders’ formal acceptance of the intended activity and associated deliverables, the scope needs to be clearly (and, ideally, jointly) defined. Moreover, a common understanding of the scope will need to be shared by the actors involved. This is a reasonable prerequisite for reaching consensus with regard to the quality and quantity of information to be released and the attributes to be measured. The mode of a nuclear disarmament activity deals with the practical implementation of the verification measures – as defined by the scope. The mode will be a product of contextual issues related both to the demands outlined by the scope, as well as the physical environment in which verification takes place. For instance, under one treatyscope, on-site monitoring may be permitted (perhaps even expected), whereas it may be prohibited in another setting, due to national security concerns and/or non-proliferation commitments Means may be understood as the tools at hand for performing a defined task. Generally, in the realm of nuclear security, ‘means’ may include technology for detection and measurement, physical barriers, security measures, and procedural rules. Technological developments have made, and are making, available better and better means of nuclear security. The verification means is determined by (or is a function of) the verification mode.

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Integrated Nuclear Disarmament Verification? The START I Treaty expires on 4 December 2009, three years before SORT reductions are to be completed. Without any re-negotiation of the START provisions (what we may term a ReSTART), SORT will be left unverified until its end in 2012 – as intended. When SORT was established, both the US and the Russian governments issued statements claiming that they would use the existing START inspection to verify the Treaty. These intentions, however, never resulted in any concrete SORT measures or provisions.7 The current Bush Administration has as yet not taken a formal position. While Moscow insists on a legally binding agreement, Washington has focused on ‘transparency and confidence-building measures’ that would allow both sides to verify each others’ arsenals and capabilities. The primary aim of a new agreement could be the creation of a new (or adaptation of existing) verification mechanism, with appropriate schemes and procedures in accordance with specified goals. However, as the conceptual analysis above indicates, this may not prove as straightforward as anticipated. It thus would make sense to contrast the two approaches, their arms control objectives – and, of course, verification modes. They differ, and profoundly so. To verify that the number of operational nuclear warheads at a given date is in accordance with the requirements stipulated by SORT is vastly different from verifying the dismantlement of a set of nuclear warheads as specified in the START treaties. Whereas inspectors – if allowed – should be able to identify the presence of between 1,700 and 2,200 operational nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012, it would be extremely challenging to ensure a high level of confidence that these are the sole operational warheads in any given state. Nor do the intrusive and detailed procedures specified in the START inspection protocol always achieve their goals.8 Among the problems are the issues of dual-use delivery capabilities and the lack of detailed warhead accountability.

Conclusion A ‘one-size-fits-all’-approach may fail to meet either national verification expectations or international demands. Integrated verification schemes across differing arms-control objectives should simply not be an option for apt arms control. While existing provisions under the START process – like data exchanges, notifications and inspections – have been envisioned as part of a new verification mechanism under the SORT agreement, the objectives of the two approaches to nuclear reductions will be inherently different. SORT cannot provide the framework for the verification scope, mode nor means needed for warhead dismantlement. Without a renegotiated SORT, there will have to be persistent and deep-going discussions on the information necessary, on data quality and on data completeness. In other words, the Moscow Treaty is a dead-end track for nuclear disarmament, and it should be treated accordingly. By contrast, a restart of the START process, with a particular view to the elimination of fissile material – as indeed was the intention of future START generations – may provide a far more viable path to long-term nuclear security benefits. While representing a shift, the verification scope should be fairly easy to stake out. Moreover, the operational verification mode has been demonstrably successful, and the verification tools are readily at hand. Moreover – and somewhat paradoxically – the level of prag7 8

Diakov and Miasnikov, 2006. Ibid.

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matism associated with pure stockpile-reductions may fit more comfortably with Washington’s current line of thought when it comes to strategic arms control.

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Chapter 20 Implementation and Verification of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties Viktor I. YESIN1

Currently in the sphere of nuclear arms control there are no multilateral treaties which have entered into force. The only functioning agreements in the nuclear field today are bilateral treaties between Russia and the USA – with the exception of the formal participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (which do not possess nuclear weapons anymore) in protocols to the Soviet–US Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The key agreements between Moscow and Washington in nuclear arms control are as follows: x x x

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT)

These three are supplemented with the 1991 unilateral initiatives made by US President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on deep reductions in nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons. This chapter focuses on implementation of the above mentioned treaties and initiatives, and verification activities connected with their observance. The author would also like to express views concerning the appropriateness of maintaining or extending certain nuclear arms control agreements and re-shaping some of them into new treaties.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Signed 8 December 1987; entered into force 1 June 1988; indefinite duration. By 1991, the elimination activities specified in the INF Treaty had been completed: the USSR had destroyed about two thousand missiles; the United States, about one thousand. The inspection regime on the former missile bases and non-production of intermediate and short-range missiles continued over the next ten years until 2001. At present, Russia and the United States exercise control over compliance with the INF Treaty using national technical means of verification (NTM) and through the exchange of notifications. However, Russia now has all grounds for concern as the USA, seeking to build up its missile defence system, has been conducting tests using new ballistic target missiles 1

First Vice-president of the Academy for Security and Legal Studies, Moscow

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which are in fact intermediate-range missiles. This can be viewed as a direct violation of the obligations under the INF Treaty. Russia’s attempts to clarify the situation through the Special Verification Commission (SVC) on the INF Treaty, which is mandated to consider compliance with the Treaty and elaborate measures to increase its effectiveness, have been blocked by Washington. The last session of the SVC was held in October 2003. Since 2004, the US side has refused to re-convene the SVC, claiming that the issues submitted for consideration by the Russian side, concerning the production of ballistic target missiles in the USA, are not directly related to the Treaty. In fact, it is disadvantageous for Washington to conduct deliberately losing talks on the unilateral violations of the INF Treaty provisions. The ongoing correspondence through diplomatic channels resembles a dialogue between the blind and the deaf, while the absence of activity from the Russian side creates favourable conditions for the United States to break the INF Treaty.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Signed 31 July 1991, entered into force 5 December 1994, 15-year duration. The Treaty provides for a broad spectrum of measures for verification and confidence: NTM, information exchange (notifications, reports, inquiries, telemetric information on missile launches, etc.) and a multifaceted inspection regime with 13 types of local inspections. Under START, strategic weapons reductions up to the ultimate level of 1,600 carriers (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers) and 6,000 nuclear warheads had been completed by 4 December 2001. The parties had fulfilled their obligations and reduced the number of deployed nuclear carriers and warheads to the following levels: Russia – 1,136 vehicles and 5,518 warheads, the USA – 1,238 vehicles and 5,949 warheads. As of 1 January 2007, the number of deployed strategic carriers and warheads, according to START counting rules, was 880 and 4,162 units in Russia, and 1,225 and 5866 units in the USA. In the area of nuclear weapons reduction, Russia had actually destroyed its armaments, whereas the USA used the commitment provision to decrease the number of warheads counted in terms of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. In fact, the US side liquidated only a small part of its strategic carriers. Thus Washington created ‘reserve arsenals’ within its strategic offensive forces: these allow the rapid (within four to six months) build-up of its stockpiles of deployed strategic warheads by more than 3,000 units. As concerns verification activities under START, today Russia has far fewer opportunities than the United States, although initially they were equal. Since the Kremlin cut off financial resources assigned to control over START implementation, Russian experts have been unable to carry out the set annual quota of local inspections – only half of the allowed inspections have been conducted. Lacking adequate NTM – especially the relevant space surveillance assets – Russia cannot make up for the reduced number of local inspections. By May 2001, Russia had completely halted its continuous surveillance of US missile production facilities at the ‘Hercules’ factory in Utah. By contrast, Washington’s NTM are practically unlimited, enabling the US side to meet the established quota of local inspections. In 2005, for example, they conducted 47 inspections of Russian strategic nuclear forces units. They still carry out continuous monitoring of Russia’s missile production unit – the Votkinsk engineering plant in Udmurtia. The selective inspections conducted by Russian experts revealed certain

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points of complaints against the USA regarding its compliance with START provisions. These complaints concern the practice of testing the SLBM Trident-II, coastal service of strategic submarines at (non-declared) Cape Canaveral, re-equipping ICBM silo launchers and preparing strategic submarines for other types of armament including interceptor missiles and cruise missiles, as well as non-controlled production of the missile stage component ‘Castor-120’, which is interchangeable with the components for ICBM ‘’MX’and therefore should be counted as a strategic carrier in accordance with the Treaty. And yet, the US side has declared this a ‘commercial space stage’. The above complaints are regularly discussed at the Geneva sessions of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) relating to START, but Russia’s concerns have remained. It seems that US violations of certain START provisions are not occasional, but result from a deliberate policy of blurring the Treaty verification mechanism in order to ensure unilateral advantages for the US military-industrial complex in creating perspective systems of strategic weapons. From the Russian side, important steps in START implementation were including within the coverage of the Treaty and testing the new type of SLBM RSM-56 (‘Bulava’), as well as declaring a new START object – the testing grounds at Kapustin Yar. This object appeared in accordance with the decision of the Russian MOD that the RS12M (‘Topol’) ICBM should be launched from this site in order to test its effectiveness.

The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) Signed on 24 May 2002, entered into force 1 June 1 2003. Expiration: 31 December 2012. By the time of SORT’s expiration, each party is to have reduced the level of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700–2200 units, or approximately three times less than the limits established under START. SORT differs fundamentally from START in its format. There are no provisions for verification mechanisms or stage-bystage implementation of the obligations. Adherence to the START Treaty is confirmed; however, with the limitation that the latter expires in 2009. Both Russia and the United States process the implementation of SORT in accordance with the concept of nuclear force development elaborated by each side individually. The Russian concept proceeds from the appropriateness of real liquidation of nuclear strategic carriers, aiming to reach the level established by SORT by the end of 2012. The United States adheres to the arrangement already tested within START, whereby the level of deployed strategic nuclear warheads is reduced mainly through ‘unloading’ of carriers, or re-equipping them for non-nuclear tasks. In these circumstances it is evident that new measures of trust and predictability need to be elaborated – not least since this was also stated in the declaration between presidents V. Putin and G.W. Bush signed in Moscow simultaneously with the SORT Treaty. In April and October 2005, Russia submitted to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) proposals for consideration which included control and verification measures. However, the US delegation in BIC has been extremely passive. Washington considers the Russian proposals to be unnecessary, and so they have remained unexamined. In the US view, regular exchange of information on strategic nuclear weapons of the parties at BIC sessions is sufficient to ensure transparency within SORT. As yet, there is no agreed understanding of accounting rules for the strategic nuclear warheads that are restricted under SORT. The US side insiststhat, within the land and sea components of nuclear strategic forces, only deployed nuclear warheads on

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ICBMs and SLBMs aboard submarines on patrol duty in the specified time period should be counted. This approach unfairly excludes from then total count various missile assets which can be quickly put in a state of alert. And the advantage here is clearly on the side of the Americans. At present, it can be said that the US approach to practical implementation of SORT aims to avoid the elaboration or inclusion of any measures or mechanisms of verification, as well as structuring and specifying the information on strategic nuclear forces submitted to each other. The US side desires to achieve unilateral advantages through its exceptionally high capability of rapid increase in the potential of its strategic offensive forces, while Russia has only limited opportunities in the ‘reserve arsenals’ of its strategic nuclear forces.

Looking Ahead It is hard to predict the future development of discussions within BIC. However, there are solid grounds to suspect that Washington is set to continue ignoring the concerns of Moscow. Would the sides draw any lessons from the 1991 unilateral initiatives on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons by Moscow and Washington? These stand as are classical examples of an informal regime which allows impressive results to be reached rather quickly, without the many difficulties and complications inevitable in the negotiations process – like careful balancing of mutual concessions, control or ratification processes, dependence on which doomed the now-forgotten Russian–US START 2 Treaty. On the other hand, such regimes also have their shortcomings, especially because they are based not on legal obligations, but on political statements. However, in the conditions of the final decade of the 20th century, with relations of confidence established between Moscow and Washington, neither of the parties harbored suspicions that its counterpart might not be implementing its unilaterally-undertaken obligations. As a result, by the end of 2001, the US and Russian arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons had been slashed by approximately 70%. The issue of sea-launched cruise missiles (which are long-range weapons) was also settled – they were removed from ships and submarines and than stockpiled. Analysis of Moscow’s and Washington’s implementation of the agreements reached in nuclear arms control shows that, despite the existing drawbacks, both parties have generally implemented the obligations undertaken with regard to levels of reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, this has exerted a positive influence on international stability. However, the expiration dates for START and SORT are drawing closer, and the future remains uncertain. Such a situation is fraught with the danger of the collapse of nuclear arms control. What can be done to avoid such a negative scenario? First of all, the Russian–US high-level dialogue on issues of nuclear arms control should be resumed. In March 2007, in accordance with the 2006 agreements between the two presidents, Russian–US consultations on the future of the START Treaty got underway. US Deputy Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Daniel Freed, defined the vector of these consultations as ‘discussing the issues of transparency related to the START Treaty after the Treaty expires’. Such a format seems too limited. Unless it is expanded, achieving adequate progress in nuclear arms control will hardly be possible. START and SORT are mutually

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correlated, as they both regulate the rules of conduct in one sphere – the strategic nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States. Therefore the future of these two treaties must be decided simultaneously and in mutual connection. In fact, that is tactically advantageous – the negotiations field for reaching compromises is broadening. Furthermore, the negotiations process should be brought to a higher level: otherwise it will remain dominated by expert assessments, which, as experience has shown, make coordination very difficult. What is needed to ensure success are political decisions. In view of Washington’s desire to equip strategic missiles with non-nuclear warheads, Russia should insist on signing a new, legally binding agreement with the United States. This would replace the START and SORT Treaties and define practical mechanisms of control over strategic offensive weapons regarding both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. Some Russian governmental officials insist that it is inadmissible to equip strategic vehicles with non-nuclear warheads, but this position can hardly be viewed as viable. Experience has shown how important it is that, when two sides wish to reach an agreement, they should take due consideration of the interests of each other. Otherwise the outcome will necessarily be negative– as, for example, in the case of attempts to adapt the 1972 ABM Treaty. Since the US side seems intent on possessing strategic assets in non-nuclear equipment, Russia should take this into account in the negotiations process. A right approach for Moscow would be to focus its diplomatic efforts on minimizing the possible damage to strategic stability in case of such weapons should be deployed, through reasonable restrictions, instead of maintaining an uncompromising position. Otherwise it would be worse for Russia itself, if the United States should go ahead and do everything its own way. What then should be the fate of the INF Treaty? Experts’ opinion in Russia has begun claiming that this Treaty no longer meets Russian interests and therefore the question of unilateral withdrawal can be raised. A long list of reasons could be cited – from concern with the fact that several states near the borders of Russia now possess over intermediate- and short-range missiles while Russia does not have such weapons and this ‘cannot last forever’, to statements that such a step would be an effective counter-measure to Washington’s plans to deploy anti-ballistic missile defence bases in Europe. Closer scrutiny of the essence of these reasons, however, reveals that none of them corresponds to the spirit or letter of the INF Treaty. According to Article XV of the Treaty, withdrawal is allowed if one of the parties decides that ‘extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests’. But it can be hardly claimed that, for example, the deployment of ten ground-launched cruise missiles in Poland puts Russia’s supreme interests in jeopardy. Moscow should deeply and comprehensively analyse the advisability of unilateral withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Acting in haste would be extremely dangerous – and indeed, there is no need to do so.

Conclusion From a military perspective, Russia could be said to have a vital need to possess intermediate- and short-range missile assets – but there is no such military need to possession nuclear intermediate- and short-range missiles. Therefore Russia should advance the initiative of adapting the INF Treaty to the question of possession of non-nuclear intermediate- and short-range missiles. What is very important is that, in such bundling, these missiles should not pose an immediate threat to Europe nor to other neighbors of

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Russia, let alone the United States. Hence it may be expected that their reactions to such a step on the part of Russia would be moderate. This in turn should help to create conditions that would prompt the USA to agree with the adaptations of the INF Treaty as proposed by Russia. These considerations are worth at least discussing, although of course nothing should be taken for granted. One point, however, is certain: the current stagnation in arms control must be overcome, in order to keep this regime despite its flaws. This is far better for international security than the absence of any type of nuclear arms control – and that could happen in 2013 unless the leadership of Russia and the USA can demonstrate their political will.

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Chapter 21 Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Alexander NIKITIN and Morten Bremer MÆRLI1

This list of current priorities in the field of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation combines the aggregate findings and recommendations from the Workshop and chapter contributions, without the specific endorsement of any participants.2 The list includes steps that could be undertaken by all nuclear powers to support the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by carrying out their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and more general steps that could re-invigorate nuclear disarmament – and prevent further nuclear proliferation. •

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Russian and US strategic weapons, START and SORT Firstly, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, as the only strategic agreement that will remain valid after 2009, should legally be made irreversible and extended in time-frame, possibly by an additional protocol. Otherwise its ceilings will remain formally in effect only until 2012. Secondly, the START I system of verification, inspections and data-exchange measures should be extended, as a package, for at least the period 2009 to 2012 – that is, after the end of the START I limit and until the end of the SORT time-frame. Thirdly, a further significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear weapons should be planned down to a level comparable with that of three other old nuclear powers (this would mean a level of hundreds, instead of thousands), and with stringent deadlines. Fourthly, withdrawn or decommissioned warheads and delivery systems must be destroyed, and the fate of accumulated reserve arsenals must be the subject of a separate strand of negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on the elimination of excessive warheads. Sub-strategic Nuclear Weapons Every possible effort should be made to prevent the dissolution of the INF Treaty and the re-introduction of short- and intermediate-range nuclear (and non-nuclear) missiles into the arsenals of Russia and the USA. An end to the INF could be followed by the emergence of numerous regional imbalances and heightened stakes and risks in many regional conflicts. Among other con-

1 Alexander Nikitin - Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, President of the Russian Political Science Association. Morten Bremer Mærli - Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 2 The list draws upon the chapter and presentation by Paolo Cotta-Ramusino.

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sequences, Russian withdrawal from the INF could lead to additional US substrategic nuclear weapons being stationed in Europe. Tactical Nuclear Weapons To date, TNW have been withdrawn and reduced only by unilateral measures. As a first step towards opening a strand of negotiations on TNW, both sides should provide initial declarations of their tactical nuclear arsenals, in terms of general quantities and composition by types. Transparency, even if only relative and partial, on the tactical nuclear weapons of the two major nuclear powers may exert an important influence on the willingness and readiness of smaller and newer nuclear powers to enter in principle into multilateral dialogue on arms control and arms limitations. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should enter into force as a critical way of preventing further vertical proliferation. This will depend primarily on whether the United States agrees to ratify. Efforts should be made to motivate India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel to accede to the CTBT as well. Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) An FMCT should be discussed and negotiated as soon as possible. The overproduction of weapons-grade fissile materials has become obvious, as well as extremely dangerous in view of the risk of nuclear terrorism. Indeed, the urgent conclusion of an FMCT may become a shared priority for Russia and the West, given the new security concerns regarding nuclear terrorism. The smaller nuclear powers Also the small nuclear powers should contribute to the disarmament agenda. The modernization of nuclear forces (renewal of ‘Trident’ in the UK, upgrading of Chinese nuclear forces, etc. ) must stop – and this can be achieved only through the decisions of those governments themselves, not imposed from outside by the major nuclear powers. Non-deployment abroad The non-deployment of a country’s own nuclear weapons beyond its borders, on the territory of other states, should become a legally binding norm of international relations. At present, only US nuclear forces are currently deployed outside national territory (in European NATO countries). Although quantitively insignificant for NATO strategic tasks, these residual US weapons on European soil create an unnecessary precedent for other P5 or newer de facto nuclear powers who might decide to ‘share’ their nuclear weapons with allies, thus creating dangerous imbalances and promoting further proliferation. Nuclear weapon-free zones The nuclear powers should agree, without reservation, to provide negative assurances against using nuclear weapons against states-members of the established nuclear weapon-free zones, and should respect proposals for establishing new nuclear weapon-free zones. Reliance on nuclear weapons National security strategies should shun reliance on nuclear weapons. All nuclear weapons should be de-alerted, and the strategy of launch-on-warning is to be avoided.

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De facto nuclear powers The world’s de facto nuclear states must be expected to contribute to the disarmament agenda by acceding to relevant arms control treaties, by respecting the basic NPT constraints, and by stopping further nuclear modernization and plans for future developments of nuclear weapons. Some arms control mechanisms, like the INF, should be made multilateral.

Following the example of the Advanced Research Workshop, continuing international and cross-cultural assessments of priorities for arms control efforts could provide practical assistance to decision-makers in Moscow and in Western capitals, so that they may better understand and mutually adjust their policies towards a more coherent, more stable international non-proliferation regime.

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Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1 Debating Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Alexander NIKITIN and Morten Bremer MÆRLI By presenting trends and developments in the nuclear security realm, this introductory chapter aims at setting the tone for the debating of key issues and priorities in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. International nuclear arms control structures face serious challenges. Every effort should be made to handle nuclear threats and to prevent horizontal as well as vertical proliferation. However, there is no international consensus on how to proceed about this. In addition to the erosion of major arms control agreements, relations between Russia and the West are made more complicated by the introduction of the US missile defence and associated plans for deploying its elements in Europe. As several important arms control treaties are disappearing from sight, Russian analysts claim that the US arms build-up is becoming dangerous, rendering Russia vulnerable to attacks by endangering its ability to deter and retaliate. This may prove to be a recipe for new spins of arms races, placing more pressure on the already strained Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Chapter 2 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: No Future Without Disarmament? Sverre LODGAARD The nuclear non-proliferation regime has to linger on in order to survive, for, even at best, time will be needed to develop a renewed convergence of interests. At present, all that can be achieved are small-scale adjustments buying time for common ground to be rebuilt at a later stage when – it is to be hoped – the political constellations make that possible. The way forward must be a matter of buying time, not for a new bargain to be struck, but for the basics of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be reconfirmed and some substantial steps to implement the disarmament commitment of Art. VI to be taken. In the autumn of 2009 – mid-way between the inauguration of a new US president and the 2010 NPT Review Conference – a UN summit meeting should be convened to reconfirm the basics of the NPT.

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Chapter 3 US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Robert M. WITAJEWSKI Faced with a new order of threats to the non-proliferation regime in the world, the United States has responded with a new menu of tools. Examples of new tools employed against proliferation include the historic adoption of UNSCR 1540 and the inauguration of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Recognizing that nonproliferation efforts will not always be successful, the United States has begun developing the capability to deter, detect, defend against and defeat proliferation threats by taking the initiative on a variety of counter-proliferation efforts. An example of a new programme is the Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI. Moreover, the United States will begin developing the capability to reduce and mitigate, to the maximum extent feasible, the horrific consequences of possible use of a WMD through effective consequence management. In this effort, however, no single state – however powerful or dedicated – can succeed by itself. To keep the world safe from the effects of the use of WMD requires not unilateral or bilateral, but dedicated and ongoing multilateral efforts.

Chapter 4 Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO The no-use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki stems from two basic reasons. The first reason is that the leadership of the two nuclear superpowers and of the smaller nuclear states behaved as rational decision makers as far as the control of nuclear weapons, and the decision not to initiate the use of such weapons, was concerned. In others words, deterrence worked. The second reason is that, contrary to the expectations of the early nuclear age, most nations remained non-nuclear (in other words proliferation was contained). To regain consensus for (and credibility of) the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, and the non proliferation regime, it is essential that the agenda for nuclear disarmament is reconsidered, and that some relevant visible steps are taken by the nuclear power states. In order to be credible, the three basic legs of the NPT should be honestly respected. Disarmament should not be disconnected from non-proliferation, and assistance in the development of nuclear energy should be given without undue restrictions or discriminations. But in order to improve the collective security in nuclear affairs, there is an urgent need to revisit the entire system of safeguards and constraints on the production of fissile materials. It is in our collective interest that the non proliferation regime be seen as the result of a choice of the entire international community and not as an imposition of some specific more powerful states.

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Chapter 5 De-coding the Russian Position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis Ivan SAFRANCHUK

The Russian position on Iran has its own consistent logic and fits well into broader Russian foreign policy considerations. Strategically, Russia has three perspectives within which Moscow’s stance on Iran shifts from soft (in global-principle context) to medium (in global-pragmatic context) and to tough (in regional-pragmatic context). The third context is difficult to employ in order to secure a tough Russian position on the Iranian nuclear crisis, as the nuclear crisis must be managed within the global context, in order to raise international support for pressure against Iran. But in the global context it is difficult for Russia to move beyond a medium position. Tactically, Russia neither wants to see a nuclear Iran, nor does it want to slip toward more extreme means of preventing the nuclearization of Iran.

Chapter 6 Interface and Contradictions Between Non-Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation Mark FITZPATRICK

Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation are sometimes seen as competing concepts. In fact, both are necessary and highly relevant to the global goal of stopping the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Moreover, they both employ many of the same new tools, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the universal requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, financial controls and coordinated intelligence operations. same kinds of tools. Counterproliferation is often, and mistakenly, seen as synonymous with military efforts to control weapons proliferation. The original concept was broader and more nuanced. The best way to define the difference, therefore, is that the aim of non-proliferation is to stop the spread of dangerous weapons, while counter-proliferation is for when prevention fails. The former seeks to keep the barn doors closed; the latter to deal with the problem after the horse has escaped. The distinction lies in the timing and purpose, not in the measures themselves. Even this distinction can be blurred, however, especially when it is not easy to ascertain that prevention has failed. To stop nuclear proliferation, a comprehensive strategy involving diplomatic efforts, verification tools, law enforcement actions, financial measures, counter-proliferation initiatives and intelligence collection must be pursued in tandem with policies geared toward reducing the demand for nuclear weapons.

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Chapter 7 Differences between Western and Russian Nuclear Security Cultures C. SELLIER There are strikingly many similarities between US and Russian nuclear complexes, and not only concerning size. The basic reason for this is the decisive achievement of Soviet intelligence in unveiling the Manhattan Project, and the natural trend to proceed the same way which had proved efficient. The urgency dictated by the Second World War for the USA and later on the Cold War for both the Soviet Union and the USA, with the same list of objectives and milestones in the general process, contributed to enhance the similarities. To this should be added the supreme priority accorded to the nuclear programme in the two countries, with the involvement of their brightest scientists and most skilled industrial firms. Today, the secrecy policy in force in the USA appears well-balanced in a democratic state, regarding the necessity on one hand of restricting access to certain plants and laboratories and protecting certain secrets, while on the other hand according to citizens considerable freedom of access. By contrast, on the Soviet/Russian side it was not until the end of the Cold War that there came some official confirmation of the pieces of information disseminated by the USA concerning Russia’s nuclear complex, particularly the network of secret cities. We all know how slow and frail the changes in the field have been since 1991. The closed-city system is still in force, despite Western disapproval of every kind of apartheid, even if the system did produce some evident benefits during the difficult period of democratic transition.

Chapter 8 The Clash of Nuclear Dynamics Lars van DASSEN The end of the Cold War was not the end of world history. Today’s world is riddled with new problems and challenges – climate change and scarcity of energy resources, to mention only two. Old issues and problems like proliferation and remaining Cold War deterrence dynamics still reign, obstructing new ways of solving the new problems. In this situation a focus on new nuclear weapons and perhaps even more states with nuclear weapons is simply absurd, rendering us incapable of addressing the really pressing issues. We need to go back to the early 1990s, when nuclear security and nuclear disarmament were recognized as strongly related. A clear linkage was seen between disarmament and non-proliferation. Disarmament is essential if we want to keep non-proliferation alive, not least the cross-border dimension of non-proliferation. It is not possible to predict at what point developments in the vertical proliferation spiral will undermine the international non-proliferation assistance and all that has been achieved and needs to be kept alive. Perhaps much can be saved for as long as the Global Partnership exists and the G-8 heads of state get the Global Partnership on the table when they meet. But after 2012 there are reasons to be less optimistic about the development of the collective anti-proliferation spirit and its impact on the nuclear decisions of individual G-8 members.

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Chapter 9 Recent Proliferation Challenges by North Korea and Iran Robert M. WITAJEWSKI

The actions taken by North Korea and Iran present some of the most dangerous and most profound challenges to the non-proliferation regime in recent decades. Heading the list of the international community’s concerns resulting from Iranian and North Korean actions are the potential for cascading proliferation, the destabilization of regional security, and the spread of the world’s most sensitive and potentially dangerous technology. The non-democratic nature of these governments, their motivations for engaging in their courses of behaviour, and their recklessness and challenge to international norms demand a creative and determined diplomatic response on the part of the entire international community. The unanimous response of the world as exemplified by the several UN Security Council resolutions indicates that the community of nations is willing to stand up to the challenge to the non-proliferation regime presented by Iran and North Korea.

Chapter 10 Dealing with the Iranian Nuclear Programme Tim GULDIMANN

Refusing to comply with UN Security Council decisions, Iran has accelerated the buildup of its uranium enrichment programme and could have at its disposal weapons-grade uranium for a first bomb at the earliest during 2009. This defiance towards the international community reflects the country’s political culture and its traditional attitude to the outside world, which it perceives as threatening. In Iran the programme enjoys broad national support. Most probably, the aim is to build up a strong bargaining position for an eventual future arrangement, which would have to pay full respect and recognition to the country as a regional power, and to its regime. The nuclear conflict with Iran has gone through four years of intensive international debate, during which urgent demands have been formulated and short-term deadlines set, without positive results. The conflict is escalating. The best way to proceed is working pragmatically on limited solutions in Iraq, and with greater flexibility in the nuclear dispute. For this, a ‘nuclear dialogue’ will have to be pursued, avoiding additional Security Council resolutions. New sanctions resolutions will neither resolve the crisis nor have any added value to existing sanctions. The West will just have to live with the fact that Iran will come closer to the military option, at best this progress can be slowed down.

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Chapter 11 A New Strategy for the Iranian Nuclear File Jerry SOMMER The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme has been smouldering for more than five years. The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions because Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities – the international community’s precondition for the beginning of any kind of negotiations. However, Iran is not about to suspend these activities – on this there is broad consensus within the Iranian leadership. It is very likely that the current strategy of escalating sanctions will remain unsuccessful at the best, and at the worst will merely be a prologue to military action on the part of the United States. To varying degrees, the most important international players – the United States, the European Union, Russia and China – have all been responsible for formulating and implementing the strategy to date. It would behove them all to rethink their policy towards Iran. The idea of forcing a regime change in Tehran should be abandoned. Direct talks between Washington and Tehran should begin, without preconditions, on all topics of mutual interest. A policy of détente could lead to a more flexible position of Iran in the negotiations in the short term. In the long term, it would help to isolate advocates of nuclear weapons in Iran from ever gaining ground in the future. The development of the conflict surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme will also influence the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Chapter 12 Responses to Proliferation Challenges in South Asia Talat MASOOD The proliferation activities of A.Q. Khan have enormously damaged Pakistan’s reputation. They have been a source of grave concern to the international community and a huge embarrassment to the government. The government of Pakistan claims that it is cooperating fully with the IAEA and the USA in tracking the network that was engaged in non-proliferation activities. Islamabad has tried to redress the issue by tightening physical and materials control and exercising close monitoring over the activities of personnel associated with nuclear programmes. It is also introducing proven practices and available technologies to secure nuclear facilities and material. Moreover, in accordance with UNSC resolution 1540, Pakistan has submitted its National Report, detailing the measures adopted for the safety and security of the material and technology meant for WMD. Comprehensive national legislation was enacted by the parliament in September 2004. This will help in further strengthening controls on sensitive nuclear technologies and materials. There was also a widespread belief that the major and still unresolved Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan could lead to nuclear exchange. However, after a cooling-off period, the USA and India engaged in a bilateral dialogue to resolve their differences. The USA soon realized that strategic, political and economic considerations were more important in the context of India than their differences over the nuclear issue.

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Chapter 13 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Challenges on the Korean Peninsula Alexander ZHEBIN

The United States must understand that Russia has its own interests on the Korean Peninsula, and that they are different from those of Washington. In particular this concerns the methods applied to resolve the present situation. Russia does not need another Iraq, particularly on its far-eastern borders. Nor is Moscow alone on this point. The development of the situation involving the DPRK’s nuclear programmes has shown that, for example, the interests of the USA and China do not always coincide. Moreover, there remain serious differences concerning how to tackle this problem, even between states that are military-political allies, like the USA and South Korea. Tension in Korea has become a serious obstacle to the implementation of multilateral economic projects which Russia sees as essential to the development of the Far East. Moscow believes that these projects can also serve to strengthen trust, peace and security in the region. A closer coordination of Russia’s actions with the USA on the DPRK missile-nuclear problem would mean following Washington’s course of strangling North Korea, trying to entangle Russia with Pyongyang and Seoul. When North Korea is urged to give up its nuclear programme, this can apply only to the military aspects. The NPT does not prohibit any country from engaging in scientific research and developing atomic energy: indeed, it obligates nuclear powers to assist non-nuclear states in this process.

Chapter 14 Proliferation and Security in the Middle East Riad KAHWAJI

The Middle East region was a battleground for Western and Eastern powers during the Cold War era. Subsequently it became an open arena where both powers had proxies fighting their wars. However, the region has remained as volatile as ever, with greater security risks associated with proliferation. Although the USA has emerged in the new era as the sole world superpower, Russia and the European countries have retained considerable influence in the Middle East, and this influence is expected to grow as a result of setbacks in Washington’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The chapter shows how policies of both Russia and the West – led by the USA – have contributed to proliferation and instability rather than preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and consolidating stability. WMD-related control regimes have done little to deter the world powers from providing – directly or indirectly – their main allies with the means to develop powerful weapons in order to ensure strategic dominance and superiority.

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Chapter Summaries

Chapter 15 Missile Defences and Proliferation Vladimir DVORKIN

The new stage of strategic cooperation of great powers in countering common threats requires joint consolidated decisions regarding overcoming all kinds of nuclear crises, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its backbone – the NonProliferation Treaty, transforming the MTCR into a legally binding international treaty, strengthening contribution to common counter-proliferation efforts. We may readily assume that the deployment of limited ABM systems for missile deterrence in different flight phases may impact on the political decisions of threshold states about ‘freezing’ of programs aimed at the development and deployment of mediumrange and intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, if such proliferation is carried through by unilateral ABM deployment and leads to ‘horizontal’ nuclear proliferation, then the price would be nominal. And the opposite is right: if the ABM will be developed and deployed in trilateral USA – Russia – NATO format, then ballistic missile proliferation will be hindered. It is hence important looking into the expected size, structure and capacity of the US ABM systems which are intended to defend the state’s territory, US force groupings abroad and its allies from ballistic missile attacks through interception – whether in the initial, mid-way or descending stages of flight.

Chapter 16 Political Aspects of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defences Grigoryi G. TISHCHENKO

The main threats to the Western community in the next 10 to 15 years will probably come from Third World countries which possess or seek to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery – including ballistic missiles. Developing countries are becoming more independent in implementing programmes to create WMD and missile weapons. The restrictions and embargoes imposed upon them become less effective – ‘the policy of the stick’ is slipping. The spread of missile technologies seems to facilitate the spread of missile defence systems, and this may become a serious problem. Transforming missile defence programmes into international initiatives involving a large number of participants, the availability of anti-missile weapons on the world market for more and more countries, the proliferation of missile technologies and related dual-use technologies – all this would, in due course, lead to the complete collapse of today’s regime of control over missile technologies. If the United States created this regime, it would now be burying it.

Chapter Summaries

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Chapter 17 Accelerated Blend-Down of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Laura S.H. HOLGATE

Russia and the USA have cooperated since 1992 under the US–Russian HEU Purchase Agreement to blend down 300 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Under this agreement, 30 metric tons of HEU are blended down each year and shipped to the USA, where they supply 50% of US nuclear fuel requirements. Significant stocks of HEU remain in storage in Russia, however, where they have given rise to concerns about the security burdens and risks of long-term storage and the impacts of additional warhead dismantlement. Beginning in 2002, the research that forms the basis for the analysis discussed in the chapter was carried out jointly by Russian and US specialists at the request of the NTI. The findings indicate that accelerated and expanded down-blending options can be achieved on relatively fast timelines and within reasonable costs. US and Russian government officials and industry representatives should immediately begin serious consultations to discover under what conditions Russia would be prepared to allocate additional HEU for downblending at a faster pace.

Chapter 18 New Approaches to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Missile Technologies Pavel S. ZOLOTAREV

The former system of nuclear arms control and counter-proliferation took shape during the era of the Cold War. The leaders of the opposing camps played key roles in building up a system of nuclear arms control under which everything except the direct issues of nuclear control and nuclear counter-proliferation remained in the background. With the end of the Cold War, the situation has changed. Today, strategic stability can no longer be understood in the simplified terms of yesterday: it has become multidimensional. Factors previously of no importance as well as several recently emerging aspects have entered the scene. Without taking these into consideration it appears impossible to bring the existing nuclear arms control system into accord with the new circumstances. Russia and the United States have a special responsibility for the maintenance of strategic stability and preventing an increase in nuclear global threats. This circumstance should help to institutionalize the mechanism of Russian–US strategic partnership aimed at the overcoming the Cold War heritage of mutual nuclear deterrence, and strengthening international security in the 21st century.

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Chapter Summaries

Chapter 19 A SORT of a ReSTART for Nuclear Disarmament? Morten Bremer MÆRLI Integrated verification schemes across differing arms-control objectives should generally be avoided. A ‘one-size-fits-all’-approach may fail to meet either national verification expectations or international demands. While existing provisions under the START process – like data exchanges, notifications and inspections – may have been envisioned as part of any new verification mechanism under the SORT agreement, the objectives of the two approaches to nuclear reductions will be inherently different. SORT cannot provide the framework for the verification scope, mode nor means needed for warhead dismantlement. Without a renegotiated SORT, there will have to be persistent and deep-going discussions on the information necessary, on data quality and on data completeness. By contrast, a restart of the START process, with a particular view to the elimination of fissile material may provide a far more viable path to longterm nuclear security benefits. While representing a shift, the verification tools are readily at hand. Moreover – and somewhat paradoxically – the level of pragmatism associated with pure fissile material stockpile-reductions may fit more comfortably with Washington’s current line of thought.

Chapter 20 Implementation and Verification of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties Viktor I. YESIN From a military perspective, there is no need for Russia to possess intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles. Therefore, Russia should advance the initiative of adapting the INF Treaty to the question of possession of non-nuclear intermediate- and short-range missiles. These missiles should not pose an immediate threat to Europe nor to other neighbors of Russia, let alone the United States. Hence it may be expected that their reactions to such a step on the part of Russia would be moderate. This in turn should help to create conditions that would prompt the USA to agree with the adaptations of the INF Treaty as proposed by Russia. The stagnation in arms control must be overcome, in order for the regime to sustain. Currently, in the sphere of nuclear arms control there are no multilateral treaties which have entered into force. This chapter focuses on implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I), the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), and verification activities connected with their observance. Moreover, the appropriateness of maintaining or extending certain nuclear arms control agreements and re-shaping some of them into new treaties is considered.

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Chapter 21 Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Alexander NIKITIN and Morten Bremer MÆRLI This concluding chapter provides a list of tuned priorities in the field of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. It combines the aggregate findings and recommendations from the Workshop and chapter contributions, without the specific endorsement of any participants. The list includes steps that could be undertaken by all nuclear powers to support the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by carrying out their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and more general steps that could reinvigorate nuclear disarmament – and prevent further nuclear proliferation.

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Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation A. Nikitin and M.B. Mærli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Author Index Cotta-Ramusino, P. Dvorkin, V. Fitzpatrick, M. Guldimann T. Holgate, L.S.H. Kahwaji, R. Lodgaard, S. Mærli, M.B. Masood, T. Nikitin, A.I.

23 105 39 62 117 98 8 vii, 1, 126, 138 84 vii, 1, 138

Safranchuk, I. Sellier, C. Sommer, J. Tishchenko, G.G. van Dassen, L. Witajewski, R.M. Yesin, V.I. Zhebin, A. Zolotarev, P.S.

31 46 72 109 53 14, 57 132 88 121

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