UNDERSTANDING THE M E D I E VA L M E D I TAT I V E ASCENT
Robert McMahon
UNDERSTANDING THE M E D I E VA L M E D I TA...
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UNDERSTANDING THE M E D I E VA L M E D I TAT I V E ASCENT
Robert McMahon
UNDERSTANDING THE M E D I E VA L M E D I TAT I V E ASCENT Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, & Dante
The Catholic University of America Press Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 2006 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984. ∞ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data McMahon, Robert, 1950– Understanding the medieval meditative ascent : Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, and Dante / Robert McMahon. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8132-1437-5 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8132-1437-8 (alk. paper) 1. Devotional literature—History and criticism. 2. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. Confessiones. 3. Anselm, Saint, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1033–1109. Proslogion. 4. Boethius, d. 524. De consolatione philosophiae. 5. Dante Alighieri, 1265–1321. Divina commedia. I. Title. BV4818.M36 2005 248—dc22 2005007734
CONTENTS
Preface
1. The Meditative Ascent: Paradigm and Principles Ascent and Return
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1
The Interior Journey: Human Being as the Epitome of Being / 9 The Hierarchy of Being and Analogy / 13 Foreshadowing and Fulfillment / 22 The Meditative Ascent and Philosophical Content / 29 Numerological Structure / 34 The Pilgrim Figure / 44 Habits of Understanding / 53 Summary / 59
2. The Unity of Meditative Structure and Texture in Augustine’s Confessions
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Meditative Structure: Return to the Origin / 67 Meditative Texture and Pilgrim Figures / 77 Paradigm at the Climax: Book 13 / 97
3. A Moving Viewpoint: Augustine’s Meditative Philosophy in the Confessions Moving Viewpoint in the Small / 112 Moving Viewpoint in the Large: Books 2 and 8 / 119 Analogy: Friendship and Conversion / 131 Analogy and Reconfigured Understanding: Memory and Conversion / 142 Coda: The Hermeneutics of Meditation / 156
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4. Meditative Movement in Anselm’s Proslogion
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Structure of the Ascent / 165 Patterns in the Ascent / 174 Prayer and Understanding / 185 Reconfigured Understandings / 195
5. Recollecting Oneself: Meditative Movement in The Consolation of Philosophy
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Structure of the Ascent / 214 Metamorphoses of the Circle / 226 Diagnosis and Cure: Recollecting Oneself / 236 Numerological Structure / 249
Bibliography
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Index
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PREFACE
T H E W O R K S treated in these pages—Augustine’s Confessions, Anselm’s Proslogion, Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy, and Dante’s Commedia—are not the preserve of scholars in any single field. They are studied and taught by historians, philosophers, and theologians, as well as by specialists in literature and religious studies. Moreover, unlike most works from late antiquity and the Middle Ages, they are not the preserve of specialists. They have long been available in English translations. They are often taught to undergraduates in Western civilization and humanities core courses. Hence they are often taught by professors with no expertise in medieval studies. In addition, the Confessions and the Commedia are read by truth seekers outside the academy, and contemporary interest in “the perennial philosophy” may well lead readers to the other two as well. In short, these works transcend their times of origin and continue to speak to a wide variety of readers. The present book attempts to speak to all parts of this audience by asking some fundamental questions about these works that specialists have tended to slight. These questions may be termed “literary,” for I learned to ask them by studying Dante’s Commedia. Dante’s poem imaginatively elaborates the tradition of the medieval meditative ascent, as it does so much else, and I hope to show how its literary and philosophical patterns illuminate the Confessions, the Proslogion, and The Consolation of Philosophy. The “literary” questions I pose to these works generate some new considerations affecting the philosophical, theological, and historical issues bruited by scholars. I intend to show how each of these works has been carefully designed by its author and how this literary form reveals the au-
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thor’s designs upon the reader. The meanings engendered by the work are part and parcel of its literary structure and strategies. Hence the following chapters ask and answer certain recurring questions: How does this book “work”? What are its strategies, and how are they designed to move a reader? What are the stages in this meditative ascent to God, and how are they related to one another? The literary unfolding of a work is not a merely neutral framework that contains meanings through explicit statement. Rather, this unfolding is itself meaningful. In other words, each of these works is simultaneously literary and philosophical, and its philosophical meanings cannot be separated from its literary structure. (I use the word philosophical to mean both “philosophical and theological,” for the two are not separate in these works.) In each, a given philosophical discussion receives much of its particular character by the stage of the ascent in which it occurs and the literary style of its expression. A meditative ascent is a literary-and-philosophical unity. It is intended not merely to be read through but also to be meditated upon. Hence its meanings derive not only from what is said but also from what is implied, such as the relations between the unfolding stages of the ascent. Scholarship tends to separate “the literary” and “the philosophical” in these works, rather than understanding them as working together. For example, literary study of the Confessions tends to focus on patterns of imagery and allusion in Books 1–9, while philosophical analysis tends to discuss issues in Books 10–13. “Memory” is a long-standing topic in Augustine studies, and when students of this topic turn to the Confessions they typically focus on Book 10 because it contains an extended discussion of memory. Now it seems obvious that a philosopher interested in Augustine on “memory” should attend to the passages where Augustine discussed it. But an understanding of the work’s literary structure as a meditative ascent would broaden and complicate the issue. For the Confessions progress from an autobiographical record of memories, in Books 1–9, to Book 10
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on memory. Books 1–9 display Augustine’s memory in act. They also contain some explicit reflections on his use of memory to confess in God’s presence. In short, what Augustine had to say about “memory” in the Confessions was by no means confined to its explicit discussion in Book 10. Yet because scholars tend to separate “the literary” from “the philosophical,” they have not used Books 1–9 to study Augustine on memory. My subject, then, is the literary and philosophical unity of these works: in each case, how “literary” structure and strategies shape its “philosophical” meanings. Because specialists have often neglected this unity in their pursuit of specific problems, I hope to show them some new things about works they know well. Because a work’s literary structure and strategies prove fundamental to its character, I hope to bring nonspecialists toward a coherent understanding of each work as a whole. I assume only that a reader has some familiarity with the work under discussion and desires to understand something more about it. Certain features distinguish my treatment of these works. First, the meditative ascent proves to be a genre and structure for the work as a whole. The Christian-Platonist “ascent of the soul,” for example, has been much studied by Augustine scholars, in the Confessions as in other works. Yet they have been reluctant to recognize that the Confessions as a whole unfolds as an ascent, though it has been pointed out. In the present book, the Christian-Platonist ascent is not simply a local topic, theme, or structure within a work but the master pattern that governs the whole. Because the master pattern in each case is a Christian-Platonist ascent, it proves to be no rigid construct imposed on recalcitrant materials, but rather a flexible and open form inherent in the author’s worldview. Understanding the master plan clarifies the work and opens it up to new understandings. In each case, I show how this literary pattern functions and what it implies for the philosophical understanding of various passages.
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Second, each of these works proves to be a journey. This journey character is not well understood, in my view, even when it is explicitly noted. For example, in his “Preface” to the Proslogion, Anselm states that he wrote the work “under the guise [sub persona] of one struggling to raise his mind to the contemplation of God.” Although scholars have duly noted this movement in the work, few have studied it carefully. Perhaps the overwhelming attention they pay to the so-called ontological argument, in Chapters 2–4, has kept them from seeing how the rest of the work reconfigures the understandings reached there. Here again, the “literary” pattern of the ascent as a whole affects the “philosophical” meaning of different passages in it. Third, each of these works contains at least one pilgrim figure making a journey, and in every case this figure is an “I,” for each presents itself as autobiographical. The journey is not being made, in a third-person narrative, by Everyman or Redcrosse or Christian. Rather, the “I” speaks for himself. He may retell events that he has experienced in the past, as do Dante and Boethius, or he may speak in the present, as does Anselm—and Augustine does both. The “I” in these works has so impressed readers over the centuries that they have generally identified him with the author, even though they recognized that Dante’s journey is allegorical and that Boethius’s Lady Philosophy is an allegorical fiction. Today we distinguish more carefully between Dante the poet and Dante the pilgrim, Boethius the author and Boethius the prisoner. All the same, the “autobiographical” character of these pilgrim figures continues to appeal to readers, for it involves us more deeply in their journeys. Fourth, each of these works is meditative, not only explicitly but implicitly. Their explicitly meditative character is well understood. The Confessions proves to be an inquisitio veritatis, an “inquiry seeking the truth” on various issues, as Augustine poses questions, hazards answers, mulls them over, and prays his way toward understanding. The Proslogion, too, is a prayerful quest for truth, and The
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Consolation of Philosophy, in a somewhat different way, meditates on various themes as these recur in Philosophy’s instruction of Boethius. Their implicitly meditative character, however, has hardly been studied. One characteristic of these meditative ascents is their tendency not to remark on the relations between their various stages. Augustine did not describe Books 1–9 as “memories,” nor did he say that because the power of “memory” enables individual memories, its exploration in Book 10 proves a higher stage in his ascent. Rather, he left the relations between Book 10 and Books 1–9 for the reader to discover by meditating upon them. In other words, the ascent proves meditative not only in its explicit style but also in its implicit structure. The meditative ascent invites the reader to meditate on it, in order to understand it more fully, for it implies meditative meanings by its very structure. Philosophers have studied these works for their explicit teaching on various topics. But Augustine’s philosophical achievement in the Confessions as a whole surpassed what the work explicitly states on various issues in its parts. The work as a whole contains implied, or meditative, understandings in addition to its explicit, doctrinal statements. Finally, for this reason each of these works unfolds as a spiritual exercise in two different respects. First, the pilgrim figure in each work undertakes the effort to explore various issues, at various stages of his ascent. His spiritual exercise is explicit at each stage, and readers participate in it insofar as they labor to understand what the work is saying. This labor, naturally, may range from following the text, to interpreting it in one’s own words, to ruminating on its movements and their implications. But, second, each work as a whole invites readers to the further spiritual exercise of meditating on what is implied by its structure as a Christian-Platonist ascent. By definition, a meditative ascent is written from a moving viewpoint. It invites us to discern its stages, to understand their ascending relations with one another, and to reflect on what these relations imply. In a meditative ascent, “everything that rises must converge,” for its
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goal is a vision of Unity. The convergence of its various strands is never elaborated fully. The authors left that spiritual exercise for the reader’s meditation. In short, by treating each work as a literary and philosophical unity, I hope to open it up to new understandings and clarify some existing scholarly debates. A meditative philosophy goes beyond its explicit doctrines. These doctrines are true, as far as they go, but they only represent stages along the way, unless they occur at the climax of the ascent. Sometimes they are explicitly revised at higher levels, but most often they are implicitly reconfigured. Scholars have not explored the implied understandings in these works because they have not understood how the structure of the meditative ascent creates them. This structure is best illustrated by Dante’s Commedia. Because the principles governing its literary and philosophical unity are well understood, Chapter 1 repeatedly draws on Dante’s poem to illustrate the structure and implications of the meditative ascent. Hence Dante appears in my subtitle, even though he does not receive a separate chapter. Chapters 2–5 then use these principles to explore the structure and implications of the Confessions, the Proslogion, and The Consolation of Philosophy. The Commedia elaborates the details of its meditative ascent more fully than its predecessors. Nevertheless, all four works are governed by the same principles because all seek a similar kind of literary and philosophical unity. The differences between them are obvious. The present book explores their common ground. One Christian-Platonist ascent, Bonaventure’s Journey of the Mind to God, is given little attention here because it does not achieve the same kind of literary and philosophical unity. For one thing, it does not have a pilgrim figure. Bonaventure was directing an ascent, not making one himself. The first word in his title, Itinerarium, means “road map” as well as “journey,” and the book does not narrate a journey but rather sketches a map to be followed by a reader
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experienced in meditation. For another, it is not clear to me that Bonaventure used the ascent to create implied understandings, in the way that Augustine and Anselm did. Although he made the structure of his ascent explicit, his road map is so sketchy that I do not find clearly implied meanings in the relations between it stages. In short, Bonaventure’s Itinerarium, though illustrating a ChristianPlatonist ascent, departs significantly from the literary and philosophical genre being studied here. The present book has been written for nonspecialists as well as specialists, and I must ask each to be patient with the different needs of the other. By “nonspecialist,” I mean a nonmedievalist, perhaps a scholar in another field who teaches one or more of these works. On the one hand, the chapters are intended to be clear and coherent expositions for the nonspecialist. Insofar as this is successful, specialists may find a point belabored, but it should not be obscure. On the other hand, nonspecialists may find that parts of this book go beyond their interests. It deals with some long-standing scholarly debates, and its attempt to open up new ways of understanding these works may exceed a nonspecialist’s familiarity with them. I have tried to help both kinds of readers by dividing each chapter into sections, with subheadings. They will not have to read far in order to know whether the section interests them. Chapter 1 describes the literary and philosophical structure of the meditative ascent and what it implies, at least as far as this book is concerned. It is the essential preliminary for the chapters that follow. Much of it will be new to nonspecialists, and though specialists are familiar with the exitus-reditus scheme, they are not familiar with all its implications. After assimilating Chapter 1, the reader may go directly to whatever chapter most interests him or her and expect to understand it. Chapters 2–5 apply the ideas of Chapter 1 to specific works, with two chapters on the Confessions because of its length and complexity. The sequence of chapters moves from Augustine to Anselm, rather than to Boethius, because the Proslogion, like the
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Confessions, unfolds as a prayer from beginning to end. This literary strategy is not well understood, and so I have linked the works using it in successive chapters. Many friends have contributed to this book in various ways, and it is a joy for me to mention them here. Robert M. Durling’s course on the Commedia aroused my interest in the Christian-Platonist ascent in my first year of graduate school, more than twenty years ago. In the course of directing my dissertation, he spoke with me often about Augustine, Boethius, and Dante, sharing his thinking and writing generously. I have lived so long with his ideas about the Christian-Platonist ascent as a literary form that I cannot say what I have taken from him and what I may have added on my own. More recently, I am grateful for Todd Breyfogle’s friendship, conversation, and encouragement. I tried out these and other ideas orally with Todd, who did much to help me winnow them. This book was written in no small part because he found my thinking on Augustine and Anselm valuable. Todd also read the manuscript carefully, making many suggestions for improvement of its manner and matter, which I have tried to take. Several friends contributed to this work in other ways. I am grateful to Glenn Hughes, James Olney, Paul Olson, Zdravko Planinc, and Greg Schufreider for giving me their books, from which I learned a great deal, and to John Protevi for his Augustine bibliography for holdings in the Louisiana State University library. Glenn Hughes and Zdravko Planinc also encouraged this work from its beginning some years ago, and conversations with Jim Babin, Ellis Sandoz, Mary Sirridge, Stuart Warner, and David Walsh helped to shape it. None of these good people, of course, is responsible for whatever misinterpretations and infelicities may remain. Such things of darkness I acknowledge as my own.
UNDERSTANDING THE M E D I E VA L M E D I TAT I V E ASCENT
CHAPTER 1
THE MEDITATIVE ASCENT Paradigm and Principles
T H E M E D I T A T I V E A S C E N T enacts an interior journey: the return of the soul in this life to God, the Origin and End of all things. It is based on the exitus-reditus scheme of Christian-Platonism: just as all things come forth (exitus) from God, so do all things, and especially human beings, return (reditus) to him. The immortal soul’s return is necessarily accomplished after death, when it comes to judgment. But the meditative ascent enacts an interior journey in this life, because the soul longs for loving communion with its Divine Source. “Seek God and ye shall live,” writes the Psalmist, and the pilgrim on the meditative ascent seeks that more abundant life in the presence of the living God. The meditative ascent is both the interior journey and the written work conducting it. As a meditative journey, it is not a mystical rapture: it progresses by stages of philosophical and theological discourse, and it arrives finally at a discursive vision of divine things. It is understood that God can abbreviate the ascent whenever he wills by seizing the soul into his presence with a sudden influx of grace. But though mystical raptus can be described, after a fashion, it is nondiscursive and not a journey. Mystical grace is God’s work, not ours. Nevertheless, God’s grace is understood to be continually present in the meditative ascent, which implies the dialectic of human seeking and divine drawing. The Divine Presence is not only the End of the meditative quest but also its Origin, however obscurely felt. As Jesus tells Pascal in the Pensees, “You would not seek me if
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you did not possess me. Therefore be not troubled.”1 God is present in every stage along the way. “Meditative ascent” names both the journey itself and the written work describing it, both the form of the quest itself and the literary form narrating it. Dante’s Commedia is the best known and most obvious instance of this ascent, because the pilgrim’s journey proves exterior as well as interior, and the poem retells it. According to its fiction, Dante the pilgrim began “far from God,” having lost his way in a dark wood, but his journey culminated with a vision of God in the spiritual radiance of Heaven. So, too, the poem retelling this story follows this movement. The journey took place in the past, while the retelling of it—the poet’s “singing” of his poem—takes place in the present, following the sequence of the journey. The pilgrim’s journey to God purports to have been divinely willed and guided, chiefly through three intermediaries: Virgil, Beatrice, and St. Bernard of Clairvaux. Hence, though God himself appeared only at the end of the journey, he was present from its beginning in Dante’s guides and in the grace enabling it. The pilgrimage itself had three main stages—Hell, Purgatory, and the heavens—each a distinct realm, and the Commedia, concomitantly, has three distinct parts. As Dante the pilgrim traveled through these realms, he was educated about evil, vice and virtue, love, God’s ordering of the universe, the Trinity, and so on. In this way, his exterior journey proved also to be an interior one, as his intellect and will were prepared for the vision of God. Similarly, the poem records this education in its “original” sequence, so that readers may receive, as far as possible, the same education as Dante the pilgrim. After the pilgrim experienced the divine vision at the climax of his journey, he returned to earth to write the poem that narrates it. The Christian-Platonist ascent thereby proves the form of the pilgrim’s journey in the past and the poet’s retelling of it in his poem. 1. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, translated by A. J. Krailsheimer, number 929, p. 320; see also p. 324.
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A meditative ascent, then, unfolds in stages, and each stage represents a level of discourse. In Dante’s Inferno, for example, speeches tend to be relatively brief and filled with dramatic tension. Longer discourses do not appear until the Purgatorio and the Paradiso, and then on philosophical and theological topics, where there is no dramatic tension. In this way, Dante progressively heightens the style and the subject of the Commedia in each of its parts.2 Hence, to understand a Christian-Platonist ascent as a whole, we must first grasp the distinguishing features of each level. These are necessarily explicit in its central themes and key words. Second, we must understand how the levels are related to one another and to the journey as a whole. These relationships are never stated fully: they are left for the inquiring reader to discover. In other words, the meditative ascent is deliberately constructed so that a full understanding demands not merely our reading, but our meditation. This literary strategy, and the kinds of interpretation it demands, have not received the attention they deserve. The distinguishing features of each level may be discovered by reading, but discovering the relations between the levels demands something more. Meditation cannot be separated from reading, for it may be called “intensive reading.” More accurately, meditation implies rereading, and may be defined, for our purposes, as “deeply reflective rereading.” A major distinguishing feature of a stage, like “memory” in Book 10 of the Confessions, will be noted on a first reading. But only a reflectively inquiring rereading will show us the place of Book 10 in the ascent as a whole, and how it relates to what came before and what comes after. This point may be illustrated more fully by considering the pattern of light and darkness imagery in the Commedia. Hell is dark, 2. For a more detailed analysis of how a level of discursive style reveals the moral level of Dante’s characters, see Marcia Colish, The Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowedge, rev. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 207–20.
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and the souls there experience its darkness eternally, that is, constantly and forever. The mountain of Purgatory is on the surface of the Earth, and so the souls there experience the natural light and darkness of day and night. The souls in the Empyreal Heaven experience the supernatural light of God’s presence eternally. There is an obvious progression here, from eternal darkness to natural day and night to eternal light. Since darkness is the absence of light, the progression moves from the defective to the perfect. Nowhere does Dante remark explicitly on this pattern, much less comment on what the quality of light in each realm means. These topics are left for the reader’s meditation. A meditative ascent is necessarily written from a moving viewpoint, for it progresses to stages ever “higher”: to more comprehensive categories, or to more fundamental considerations. Hence, what is true at one stage is qualified by the new viewpoint emerging at a higher stage.3 Key words, for example, acquire new meanings: Virgil’s discourse on “love” in Purgatorio 17–18 offers a breadth of perspective missing from “love” in Inferno 5, when spoken by the adulteress Francesca.4 Often, however, the differences in meaning are more subtle: “memory” means something slightly different in Confessions 11.27–30, where the subject is “time,” than it did in the exploration of memory in Book 10. The meditative ascent is not like an argument composed of a single set of coherent statements. Rather, each level is like a set of coherent statements, and the whole journey proves an ascending sequence of these sets of statements. 3. I take the formulations in this paragraph from Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert Doran, in Collected Works, Vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), pp. 17–19. Like a meditative ascent, Insight was written “from a moving viewpoint” in order to foster the reader’s self-development. 4. All my references to and quotations from Dante are taken from La Divina Commedia, edited and annotated by C. H. Grandgent, revised by Charles S. Singleton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); all translations are mine.
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The set of statements at each level is explicit, but what the relations between stages are, and how the sequence works as a whole, is left to the reader’s meditation. Moreover, the moving viewpoint in the work lends it a kind of dramatic structure: it progresses from level to level climactically (Greek climax, “ladder”). Like the finale of a literary work, and unlike the structure of most arguments, the end is unforeseen, and thus surprising. We cannot see where the meditative journey is going until we arrive at its end, though in retrospect we can understand it as a coherent whole. This dramatic quality is further emphasized by the narrative voice of the pilgrim figure. Like Dante the pilgrim, Augustine, Anselm, and Boethius all seek, ask questions, inquire and reflect, suffer perplexity and anguish, give thanks and praise, and so on, as part of their meditative journeys. These dramatic movements in a pilgrim’s voice involve the reader in the quest emotionally as well as intellectually. The meditative ascent, then, is written from a moving viewpoint, in its structure of ascent from stage to stage and in the textures of its narrative voice (or the voices of its characters). In this way, the reader is moved, by feeling and thought together, along the pilgrim’s way. These considerations will be developed and illustrated over the rest of this chapter. They provide the framework for exploring the works by Augustine, Anselm, and Boethius over the rest of this book. This framework emerges from the paradigm of the exitus-reditus scheme: the meditative ascent enacts an interior journey, the return of the soul to God, the Origin and End of all things.
Ascent and Return Let us consider the paradigm implied in the key terms “ascent” and “return,” both of which are images. An ascent, by definition, involves movement “upward,” to higher and higher levels. A return necessarily involves movement “back.” God is the goal of this ascent and return, and he is traditionally imaged as “above” us, for he is
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perfect, and prior to us, for he creates all things. According to this image paradigm, then, the “ascent to God” is also a “return to the Origin,” where movement forward is simultaneously upward, to higher levels, and backward, to earlier states or conditions. The imagery is best illustrated by Dante’s Paradiso. The poem is set in the geocentric universe, where the Moon, the Sun, and the other stars move around the stable Earth, each on their spheres. As Dante the pilgrim ascends successively to the spheres of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, and so on, he is met by souls who come down from Heaven to teach him. His forward movement proves an upward and “backward” movement toward God, the Origin of all things, for the divine energy quickening the creation pours down into it from above. In the course of this ascent, Dante encounters three of his “fathers” and each successive one is earlier. In Paradiso 15, he is greeted by Cacciaguida, a crusading knight of the twelfth century and the first nobleman in Dante’s lineage. In canto 26 he speaks with Adam, the biblical father of us all. Finally, in canto 33, he sees God, the Original in whose “image and likeness” we are made. Each of these is not only earlier in time but also progressively greater as a “father.” Dante’s ascent to what is “prior” and “higher” proves an image of his growth in knowledge. Because the heavenly spheres of the Paradiso are arranged concentrically around the Earth as their center, as the pilgrim moves higher he encompasses more of the universe beneath him. Concomitantly, as he ascends to higher, more comprehensive spheres, he is given higher, more comprehensive visions about the divine order of things. Most of these visions are discursive, but they lead toward and culminate in Dante’s vision of God in Paradiso 33. Thomas Aquinas’s discourse on the Creation (13.52–87), for example, is surpassed by Beatrice’s discourse sixteen cantos later (29.13–36): she treats the same issues in briefer compass by using more general categories, and her primary subject, the creation of the angels, is earlier and higher than his, the creation of
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Adam. Beatrice’s discourse is further surpassed, in brevity and comprehensiveness, by the pilgrim’s vision of God, when he sees all the possibilities of being existing in a “simple light” (33.90), “bound with love in a single volume” (33.86). But what does this language of “higher” and “prior” mean for thinkers who do not give us images, as Dante does? The sense of these terms may be illustrated by the movement in the Confessions from autobiographical memories, in Books 1–9, to memory, in Book 10.5 First, logically, memories imply the power of memory: memory is logically prior to memories. Second, for Augustine, the power of memory actually preexists the memories it contains. Though a modern thinker might argue that the accumulation of memories creates the memory, Augustine believed that memory was an innate human capacity: human beings acquire memories because they first possess the innate power we call “memory.” In short, there can be no memories without memory. Memory, then, is prior to memories both logically and ontologically. Hence, memory also proves “higher” than memories because it governs and contains them. The various kinds of memories we have depend upon the nature of memory itself. As a preexisting innate capacity, memory is oriented to certain kinds of activity, and this orientation enables it to do some things, and not to do others. Obviously, the memory is fitted to remember: it does not fashion objects and it cannot (by definition) predict the future, though it may be used in the process of fabrication or prediction. The memory contains its memories and thus orders and recollects them. The power of memory is higher than its memories because it controls their acquisition and contains them for recall. Paradoxical though it may sound, memory is higher than mem5. Kenneth Burke points this out in The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 124. He sets out his understanding of “the Platonic dialectic” in the Confessions most fully on pp. 141–57.
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ories because it is their ground. “Ground” is an image of foundations, while “higher” implies an upper level. But in the paradigm governing the meditative ascent, God is the highest End and the ultimate Ground, or Origin. Hence, “higher” also means “deeper, more fundamental.” Because the way forward is simultaneously the way upward and back, progress to higher and higher levels involves the movement of discourse to ever deeper, more fundamental considerations. In sum, memory is higher and deeper than memories because it governs them as their ground, prior to them both logically and ontologically. Thus, the Confessions’s movement from memories, in Books 1–9, to memory, in Book 10, marks a progress to what is higher, deeper, and prior. This directionality is furthered in Book 11, where the subject is “time.” Time is prior to memory, logically and ontologically, for time is the precondition for memory: there can be no memory without time. Because time is prior to memory, it is also “higher”: time, as it were, contains memory and thereby proves a more comprehensive aspect of created being. Hence time is deeper than memory, for it is the ground of memory. Because memory is based in time, one cannot fully understand memory without understanding time. As the Confessions progresses from memories to memory, and from memory to time, it ascends meditatively, in a return to the Origin, to principles of being steadily higher, deeper, and prior. This progress is never explicitly remarked in the work. Augustine left it for the reader’s meditation. The “return to the Origin” of being ascends through ever higher principles of being, for principles are “firsts,” etymologically and philosophically, and God is the First. Memory is a principle of memories, and time is a principle of the power of memory. Hence, in this ascent to principles, “the last are first, and the first are last”: what comes later in the narrative is actually prior in reality. God is the End, or goal, of the journey and the Beginning of all things. The return to the universal Principle thus necessarily passes through a
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series of principles steadily higher and prior: more fundamental, more universal. The Christian-Platonist ascent thereby enacts, in its literary form, a version of Jesus’ eschatological reversal of earthly priorities: its meditative movement to the last things that are really first aims to awaken the eschatological perspective in the pilgrim soul.
The Interior Journey: Human Being as the Epitome of Being From this perspective, we can begin to understand the character of the interior journey. It proves no mere traveling in the inner realms of psyche and spirit. Rather, it has direction: to ever more fundamental constituents of our being. “Higher” and “prior” mean “deeper”: the interior journey is a journey into the interior. As we gradually penetrate the depths of our being, we come closer and closer to the Ground of being, and so we encounter reflectively, at each stage, more fundamental aspects of all being. In the ChristianPlatonist tradition, we cannot plumb the depths of being by looking outward. To encounter the living God, we must turn inward. As Augustine put it, “Do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells Truth.”6 The return to God depends on this return into oneself. To be sure, Christian Platonists recognized the evidence of God’s glory in creation, for the visible world mirrors the invisible things of God, “even his eternal power and divinity” (Rom 1:20). Nevertheless, the meditative ascent demands a conversion: the pilgrim turns away from things outside him (extra se) to those within him (intra se), and with proper guidance and grace he eventually comes to the Divine Presence above him (supra se). This pattern underlies every meditative ascent in the Christian-Platonist tradition. Though visi-
6. Augustine, Of True Religion, Introduction by Louis O. Mink, translated by J. H. S. Burleigh (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), 29.72, p. 69.
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ble evidence of the invisible God can be found in the beauties of creation, the pilgrim encounters God himself not by looking outward with the senses, but by turning inward with the mind. This pattern is evident in the Commedia. Dante the pilgrim’s journey begins with the first verb of the poem, “I found myself again” (mi ritrovai; Inf. 1.2). This conversion, a self-recognition and a turning toward himself, liberates him from his involvement in the dark wood and so enables him to begin his journey upward, toward the light. This inward turn both eventually leads to and obscurely foreshadows his vision of the risen Christ at the end of his pilgrimage. Because Christ is the pilgrim’s divine Original and resurrection is his predestined end, the pilgrim’s final vision proves his highest self-recognition in the poem. The broad pattern of Dante’s cantiche also embodies the movement from things outside oneself to things inside and above. The Inferno concerns external things—sounds, sights, conversations—with no philosophical discourses directing the pilgrim to look inward. The Purgatorio, however, marks an inward turn not only in its philosophical discourses but in its concern with the imagination in art and in dreams. In other words, while the Inferno is taken up with the things of the senses perceived “outside oneself” (extra se), the Purgatorio also concerns things of the imagination and philosophical reason “within oneself” (intra se). The Paradiso then narrates an ascent into the heavens “above oneself” (supra se) with a series of progressively “higher” theological discourses leading to the pilgrim’s vision of God. Although one turns inward in order to ascend upward, it is understood that the “height” of God’s presence lies in the soul’s deepest interior. Augustine called this inner divine dwelling-place the anima animi, literally, “the soul of the mind,” but, more accurately, “the life-principle of all one’s human powers, perceptual, emotional, and rational.” At one point, the narrator of the Confessions addresses God as “more inward than my innermost and higher than my uppermost” (interior intimo meo et superior summo meo;
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3.6.11).7 Interior intimo meo may be freely rendered as “more inward to me than I am to myself.” Because God creates human beings in “his image and likeness,” the Divine Presence is the Ground of every human being: prior to the psychological self formed by experiences, and so deeper and higher than the self. The interior journey is a journey into the interior of the soul, where the divine Original is the living source of the “image and likeness” each human being is. But this interior journey leads to the Ground not only of human beings, but of all created being. It thereby moves to aspects of existence that are gradually more general, comprehensive, universal, and fundamental. We have already seen how Dante’s Paradiso provides an image of this progress in the pilgrim’s ascent to higher, more comprehensive, heavenly spheres, where he is given progressively more comprehensive visions of the divine order. The Confessions, too, as we saw, reflects progressively on memories (Books 1–9), on memory (Book 10), and on time (Book 11). The autobiographical memories are Augustine’s alone, while memory is an innate power of every human being, and time is a constituent of everything in the visible creation. The higher the discursive level, the more universal its exploration: from one man, to all human beings, to all material beings. Just as a mountain hiker’s view of the landscape below increases in scope the higher she climbs, so the philosophical scope of the meditative ascent grows broader as it moves higher. The higher the category of being that the meditation explores, the broader its scope, the more it governs, and the more fundamental, or universal, it is. Now we moderns tend to think of these higher categories of being as mere names for abstractions, but this is not the Christian7. All Latin quotations from the Confessions in this book are taken from Sant’ Agostino, Le Confessioni, edited by Martin Skutella, revised by Michele Pellegrino (Rome: Citta Nuova, 1965); all translations are mine. I have profited by consulting the translations by John K. Ryan and by Henry Chadwick.
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Platonist view. We locate the real in the perceived, the concrete specific thing. An object seems to us more real than the memory of an object, the specific memory is more real than the power of memory, which itself is more real than time. For us, the greater the specificity, the more information is conveyed, the more real the experience. Hence, the higher the category of being, the vaguer it is, and the less real it feels. But for Christian Platonists, the index of reality lies not in perceptual specificity of information, but in universality and what may be called “lastingness.” For us moderns, the water-oak outside my window is more real than the biological idea “wateroak,” but for Christian Platonists the idea applies to more beings and endures far longer than the water-oak outside my window. In other words, when the Confessions moves from memories, to memory, to time, it progresses more deeply into reality. For us, what feels real seems more real than an idea, which is a “mere idea” or “mere words.” But for the tradition of the meditative ascent, what feels real is less real than an idea, because feelings are fleeting and ideas endure. Ideas, in this sense, are Platonic Forms, and these are held to have real and eternal existence in the mind of God. The meditative ascent understands itself not as a movement to ever more abstract and vague categories, but as a journey into reality. It culminates in a discursive “vision of God,” and God is no vague abstraction but the ultimately living Reality. The interior journey, then, penetrates reality because it progresses into the interior not only of the human being, but of all being. This penetration is enabled by the Christian-Platonist understanding of the human being as “the epitome of being.” In this tradition, we humans are unique in creation: we are the only beings simultaneously material and spiritual. The animals below us in the hierarchy of being are material, but not spiritual: they have bodies, but not immortal souls. The angels above us in the hierarchy are spiritual, but not material: they have immortal spirits but lack material bodies. Only human beings participate simultaneously in the material and the spiritual, the visible and the invisible, creation. Hence, according
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to this tradition, we are the only reflective, discursive intelligences in existence. The animals have their own kinds of intelligence, but because they do not have articulate languages, animal intelligence is neither discursive nor reflective. The angels, being pure spirits, do not need linguistic sign systems to communicate, for they commune with one another and with God by direct intuition. In short, we are the only beings in the visible creation who can reflect upon, and so give voice to, all aspects of being, for we alone participate in matter and spirit, time and eternity.8 Hence, the meditative journey into our own depths leads to progressively more universal aspects of being on the way to encountering the Ground of all being. In sum, the meditative ascent, as an interior journey and a return to the Origin, progresses to levels ever higher, deeper, and prior. It understands itself as a journey into ever more comprehensive, fundamental, universal, and governing principles of being. Though these are necessarily named in categories of ever increasing generality and abstraction, the interior journey understands itself as progressing discursively into ever greater realities, until it arrives at Ultimate Reality. Understanding a meditative ascent involves grasping how this progress is actually worked out. Christian-Platonist authors often did not state the relations between levels in the ascent, but left them for the reader’s meditation.
The Hierarchy of Being and Analogy This sketch for understanding the relations between levels in the meditative ascent needs to be filled out. The Christian-Platonist tra-
8. For fuller treatments, see C. S. Lewis, The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 152–69; and Patrick Boyde, Dante Philomythes and Philosopher: Man in the Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 270–95. Modern restatements of this anthropology are argued by Josef Pieper, in Leisure: The Basis of Culture, translated by Alexander Dru, with an Introduction by T. S. Eliot (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1998), pp. 82–97; and by E. F. Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 1–38.
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dition offers two useful models: a philosophical one, “the analogy of being,” and a literary one, foreshadowing and fulfillment in a plot. But because the meditative ascent proves to be simultaneously a literary and a philosophical genre, there is considerable overlap in the interpretive consequences of these two models, and to a great extent they are interchangeable. Nevertheless, each has value and we shall consider both in turn. The ancients held that Being manifests itself in the visible world in different kinds of beings, and these could be ordered on different levels: inanimate things, plants, animals, and human beings. Though a piece of rose quartz, a water-oak, a dog, and a person all possess existence as a fact, they were held to enjoy different powers of existing on an ascending scale. The rose quartz has existence, but not life; a water-oak has existence and life, with its capacities for nourishment, growth, and reproduction, but not locomotion; a dog has existence, life, and locomotion, with the powers of perception and memory needed for survival once a being has locomotion; and a human being has all these powers augmented by “reason” (language, reflective understanding, intuition). Thus there is a Ladder or a Scale of Being (as in a musical scale, a ladder of notes: Latin scala, “ladder, stairway”). The higher levels have the capacities of the lower ones but realized in a more complex way, as animal digestion is more complex than a plant’s assimilation of nutrients. With respect to the fact of existence, then, “being” means the same thing for every existing thing, but, when we consider the capacities that different things have, “being” has a somewhat different meaning. The “analogy of being” is a way of bridging this sameness of existence and differences in capacity.9 Though the analogy of being was 9. For a fuller treatment, see Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). Marcia L. Colish, The Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge, rev. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 142–51, offers a useful brief account.
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explicitly developed in the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas, it offers a useful way of thinking about the different meanings that key words have on different levels of discourse. Hence, it can help us to understand what Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, and Dante were doing with their language at different levels in their ascents. Although the first three did not have the “analogy of being” as an intellectual instrument for reflecting on their uses of language, the hierarchy of being was a cultural commonplace, and all three were not only brilliant writers but also sophisticated philosophers of language.10 They knew what they were doing, and “the analogy of being” can help us think about what they actually did. “Analogy” comes from a Greek word meaning “proportion”: all beings share the fact of existence, but higher beings have a greater proportion of being, considered as capacities or powers. This will become clearer by considering what “goodness” means when predicated of beings at different levels. “A good piece of rose quartz,” spoken by a mineralogist, means that this rose quartz is a representative specimen: it illustrates clearly the color and crystalline structure of the rock. “A good water-oak,” spoken by my tree specialist, means that it remains living and strong: the roots will probably hold through the next hurricane. “A good dog” has a goodness more complex than the health of a water-oak—obedience and affection, perhaps even special skills (those of a guard dog, for example, or of a hunting dog, or a herding dog). When we consider the goodness of “a good person,” so many different qualities, virtues, and skills are relevant that it would be difficult to list them all. In all these instances, the meanings of “good” are related, as it were, “proportion10. For Augustine and Anselm in this regard, see Marcia Colish, The Mirror of Language, pp. 7–109. For Boethius, see Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Theology, and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 108–73; and Jonathan Barnes, “Boethius and the Study of Logic,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influence, edited by Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 73–89.
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ally” or analogously. The beings at higher levels in the Scale of Being have higher degrees of goodness: richer, more powerful, more complex, more difficult to attain, harder to spell out fully in words. When we go on to say that “God is good,” the proportionality far exceeds our understanding. As the Ground of Being, God is the Source of all goodness, and therefore far beyond our comprehension. We finite beings can understand finite goods, but not infinite Goodness. When Christian Platonists affirm that “God is good,” the “analogy of being” argues that the assertion is true, but we do not know fully what it means. God’s goodness is proportional to ours in the same measure that his Infinite Being is to finite being. Now the meditative ascent, as we have seen, mounts to levels of discourse steadily higher, or more universal, until it arrives at a vision of God. The analogy of being provides a model for understanding these levels and their relations: key words have analogous meanings at different levels in the ascent. These meanings are “proportional”: not precisely the same, yet not different. In this light, two interpretive tasks emerge: to assay the different meanings at different levels, and then to describe how they are related. These tasks can be illustrated by considering the meaning of “love” in Dante’s Commedia at three different points, one each in Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise. Inferno 5 describes the circle of “the carnal sinners” in Hell. Their punishment is to be blown about by a whirlwind, like birds in a fierce storm—an image of the passions to which they surrendered themselves. There Dante encounters Paolo and Francesca, and Francesca tells him of their adulterous love affair. In Francesca’s mouth, “love” points to the romantic passions of the courtly love tradition in Italy: “love” is personified as a godlike power that seizes a “noble heart” and compels a person to fall in love (Inf. 5.100–105). Love enters “through the eyes,” as the perception of physical beauty arouses desire, and nobility of heart compels a response. Francesca’s two speeches are so moving, her self-justification so successful, that
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it is easy to forget that she is being punished for adulterous lust. Generations of readers, caught up by her sense of her romantic tragedy, failed to notice her self-centeredness, her narcissistic sense of her own beauty, and her subtle manipulations of her lover, of Dante the pilgrim, and themselves. In Inferno 5 Dante portrays “love” as lust, glorified by Francesca as romance. In Purgatorio 17–18, Virgil gives a philosophical discourse on love as “the seed” of every human act, whether it merits reward or punishment (Purg. 17.103–5). Clearly, “love” in this context is a word for “desire in general.” Here, at the center of the whole poem, is a discourse on the motive of human acts at a high level of generality. The analysis is derived from Aristotle. The appetitive movement of “love” may be described as a horizontal circle, with three stages: (1) the desirability (goodness, beauty) of an object (2) is perceived and arouses desire in the perceiver, (3) who then pursues the desirable object so as to enjoy it (Purg. 17.127–29, 18.19–33). Desire, described as an “inclination” toward the desirable object, is automatic, or necessary: you cannot perceive an object as desirable without desiring it. The perception of something desirable involves desiring it, by definition (18.49–60). But though desire is automatic, pursuit is not: you can choose to restrain yourself. Between the desire and the pursuit to enjoy comes “the threshold of consent” (Purg. 18.61–63). Francesca and Paolo crossed this threshold when their love moved to adultery. Virgil’s discourse clarifies both the necessity in their loving one another and their culpability in acting upon it. Now Virgil’s philosophical discourse on love is true, as far as it goes, but it only goes so far. As a pagan thinker, Virgil gives a valuable analysis of desire in the context of this world, yet he is aware that his understanding is limited (Purg. 18.46–48). He simply accepts the desirability of objects, for he does not explain it, nor does he account for why human beings desire. From Dante’s Christian perspective, a pagan cannot explain these things because classical
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thinkers did not believe in God’s creation of the world. At most, they imagined cosmic beginnings as a kind of birth process, never as God’s creation out of nothing. Aristotle thought that the universe existed everlastingly. Partly on this basis, Thomas Aquinas argued that God’s creation of the world could not be discovered by reason, but only by revelation. For if reason could have discovered that truth, a thinker of Aristotle’s acumen would have done it. In other words, Virgil’s philosophical analysis of love needs to be completed by theology. The “horizontal circle” of love in Virgil’s analysis is completed, and thereby rendered coherent, by the “vertical circle” of God’s love establishing the goodness of creation. In this understanding, objects are good because they reflect God’s goodness, and every human desire implies the desire for God. For Dante, the Christian Bible reveals that God made the world for human beings, God’s “image and likeness,” and human beings to enjoy eternal life with him. Because the human capacity of desire is oriented ultimately to God, it remains fundamentally insatiable in this world. Hence, also, desire for any particular good implies a longing for the ultimate Good. In Augustine’s famous sentence, “Lord, you created us toward yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (Conf. 1.1.1). Dante’s imagery in the Paradiso situates the “horizontal circle” of this-worldly loving in the “vertical circle” of the exitus-reditus scheme and finds the latter within the Trinity. The Father’s Love for the Son through the Holy Spirit creates, sustains, and governs the world, and the goodness and beauty of the universe reveal the goodness and beauty of the Trinity (Par. 10.1–27). In the final canto, Dante sees all the variety of the universe in the single point of the divine Light, “bound with love in a single volume” (Par. 33.86). God is not “outside” the universe: the universe, with all its possibilities of being, exists within God (85–93)! Soon Dante is given a mysterious image of the Trinity: the single point of Light expands into three spinning circles, with three colors yet a single circumfer-
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ence, and the fiery circle (the Holy Spirit, or Love) moves between the other two (115–20). Hence, the vertical circling of cosmic procession (exitus) and return (reditus) lies within the Trinity: the cosmic process proves but a part of the Trinity’s dynamism of love. Finally, in the second circling appears the human form, the risen Christ. Creation is fulfilled in Incarnation and Redemption, when God himself entered the cosmic exitus-reditus to redeem human beings in history. The vertical circling of infinite Trinitarian Love thus proves the Ground of all the circlings of love. Its surpassing manifestation is Christ’s incarnational descent, to life and death, and resurrectional return. Inferno 5, Purgatorio 17–18, and Paradiso 33 lie far apart from one another in the hundred cantos of the poem and in Dante’s journey. Physical distance thereby reflects the semantic differences in the meanings of “love.” Francesca speaks in the first circle of Hell, the underworld below the earth’s surface; Virgil’s discourse takes place well up the ascent of Purgatory, “the highest mountain on earth”; the vision of God in Paradiso 33 takes place in Heaven, beyond the bounds of the universe. The relative physical height at which “love” is considered reflects the relative universality of the discourse, and hence its philosophical depth. Because the stages of Dante’s journey are so clearly marked, the different discursive levels in its exploration of “love” emerge with great clarity. How should we understand these levels and the relations between them? First, they are united in an “analogy of love.” Different as the meanings of “love” are at these three levels, a family likeness links them: their meanings are not radically different. They can be seen to form a Scale, or hierarchy, of forms of love. Indeed, “love” is so fundamental to Dante’s poem that the whole journey may be understood as an ascent on a Ladder of Love. Second, as I have suggested, the higher level clarifies certain details at a lower level. God’s “vertical” love in creating explains why things are lovable “horizontally,” in this world. The Paradiso thereby
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makes Virgil’s discourse on love more fully coherent. Moreover, Virgil’s discourse elucidates Francesca’s insistence that love is automatic, for he qualifies it with this distinction: desire is automatically aroused by the perception of what is desirable, by definition, but we need not pursue the object of our desire. In this way, Virgil’s discourse clarifies what is true, and what is false, in Francesca’s insistence. This is what we would expect from a hierarchy of understandings in a Christian-Platonist ascent: higher levels of discourse, being more universal, have more truth than lower ones. As the image of “ascent” suggests, one sees further, and so understands more, at higher levels: a more comprehensive discourse, by definition, explains details on a lower level. Third, the highest level in the ascent thereby proves the most important. As the most comprehensive and most fundamental discourse, it explains the most. For just as God is the Origin and End of the journey, so the discursive vision of God proves the ground, as well as the climax, of the journey’s record. Because God comprehends all being in the Christian-Platonist ascent, its climactic vision of God simultaneously surpasses, contains, and underlies all its lower levels. In the final canto of the Commedia, Dante sees the Trinitarian Love containing the universe and energizing all its activity. This Love is the Ground of every form of love in the universe of the poem. Hence, every lower love in the work may be fully understood only in relation to the vision of God that concludes it. Francesca does not know that her love for Paolo is grounded in the divine Love, that his desirable goodness reflects the divine Goodness. Hence, she does not know that her desire for Paolo represents, in a distorted way, a desire for God. But a theologically literate reader knows these things, and anyone who reads the whole Commedia becomes theologically literate enough to reflect on Inferno 5 with these things in mind. Nevertheless, the lower levels of a meditative ascent are not simply expendable. The ascent is not like Wittgenstein’s ladder, to be
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cast aside after using it to climb to a new understanding. Virgil’s discourse on love is not repeated in the Paradiso: the new perspectives given there by the images of divine Love do not explicitly incorporate Virgil’s insights on the lower level. The higher level presupposes the lower one and does not replace it. Similarly, Virgil’s discourse does not replace Francesca’s account of love, however sinful it may be. The high level of generality in Virgil’s teaching tells us nothing about deep love between persons. Francesca’s love may be spurious, but at least it proves an image, albeit distorted, of intimate human relationships. Within the poem, her false love for Paolo foreshadows the true love fulfilled in Beatrice’s relationship with Dante. In short, Dante’s lower level perspectives on “love” are not erased or replaced by his higher ones. Even a sinfully distorted perspective, like Francesca’s, has its truth. Understanding on a higher level enables us to interpret it rightly, but not to eliminate it. Characteristically, the author of a meditative ascent does not rearticulate lower level perspectives so as to fit them into a higher level. Rather, he leaves it to the reader to fit the perspectives together into a coherent whole. Virgil’s discourse, though incomplete, remains valid. It is true, as far as it goes. But it does not explain why human beings desire as they do and why things are desirable, and so it needs the perspectives provided by the Paradiso to be fully coherent. Yet nowhere did Dante bring these perspectives together, and he did not do so because he wanted to draw the reader more deeply into the transforming work of his poem. In many different ways, he presented “love” as central to the whole Commedia, but he never developed, in any one place, all the details of a doctrine of love. That task he left for the fit reader. Characteristically, the meditative ascent avoids making explicit the full range of what it would have us understand. It does not aim to develop an exposition, in the manner of Scholastic philosophy. It aims to initiate the reader in ChristianPlatonist meditation. This meditation has a goal: to transform the reader in ways anal-
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ogous to the transformation of the pilgrim. In the course of Dante the pilgrim’s ascent, the meanings of “love” undergo progressive transformation, and this reflects the progressive transformation of his soul. Every first-time reader of the poem witnesses this transformation, and to that extent participates in it. But this participation is rarely deep, and thus hardly transforming. The transforming work of the poem is effected to the extent that readers meditate upon it. In this instance, as we attempt to understand what the Commedia is saying about “love,” we dwell upon its transformations of meaning, and this dwelling allows them to work more deeply upon us. We are involved more deeply in the transformations effected in the poem, and they may thereby effect a transformation in us. Dante wrote for an audience familiar with the meditative reading of Scripture, which was designed to transform one’s life into conformity with Christ. Dante designed the work for the kind of meditation that medieval Christians devoted to Scripture and the Church Fathers, to effect the same kind of transformation.
Foreshadowing and Fulfillment We have seen how the philosophical tradition gives us one model for interpreting the relations between levels in the meditative ascent, “the analogy of being.” The literary tradition offers another, similar in certain respects, “foreshadowing and fulfillment.” Every storyteller knows that the climax of the plot must be set up properly beforehand. Without such preparation, the climax falls apart and the story fails. One way to prepare for the climax is to foreshadow it: early events or images prefigure the ending. Oedipus’s quarrel with the blind Tiresias, for example, reveals his intellectual blindness to his true condition and foreshadows his physical blindness in the final scene. Christian-Platonist writers were especially familiar with this literary technique from their typological interpretation of Scripture. Old Testament persons and events were understood to prefigure
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those in the New Testament. Abraham, Moses, David, and Solomon were all held to be “types of Christ”: each foreshadowed, in different ways, Christ’s saving work in the New Testament. Thus, for example, as Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt and toward the Promised Land, so does Jesus lead the spiritual Israel away from the Egypt of sin to the eternal Promised Land of Heaven. Christ’s mission thereby fulfills and surpasses Moses’ work: Jesus is “the new Moses,” enacting a greater exodus for all humankind. Hence, Christ’s mission is more universal and more spiritual than Moses’: the New Testament fulfills the types of the Old Testament on a higher level. Moreover, Christ’s mission itself points to the higher reality of “future glory,” after the Resurrection of the Dead and the Last Judgment: at his Second Coming, Christ “will make all things new” (Rv 21:5), for there will be “a new heaven and a new earth” (Rv 21:1). In typological interpretation, the Bible reveals that history progresses climactically, to higher and higher levels: the Old Testament foreshadows the New, and the New Testament prefigures “future glory.”11 In the nature of the case, a foreshadowing can only be recognized retrospectively from its fulfillment. A novel or drama diversifies characters and incidents, and though all these contribute to the plot only some foreshadow the ending. We read forward, but we understand backward. The fulfillment cannot be predicted by its foreshadowing, for the foreshadowing can only be recognized in light of its fulfillment. The fulfillment must be a new and surprising event, for if the climax is predictable, the story proves a bore. As we read forward, the plot should interest us with surprising turns. In retrospect, however, we should be able to see how the whole plot holds together. In this way, later passages illuminate details in earlier ones. We may distinguish two broad types of foreshadowing and fulfillment. In the first, the foreshadowing is magnified in its fulfill-
11. Thomas Aquinas summarizes the tradition in this way in Summa Theologica I, q. 1, a. 10.
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ment. Odysseus’s overcoming of the Cyclops foreshadows his conquest of the suitors; Moses prefigures and is surpassed by Christ. Here, foreshadowing and fulfillment are of the same kind but on different scales. The second type of foreshadowing, however, involves contrasts, because stories often turn on reversals. Odysseus, disguised as the old broken-down beggar at the door, is revealed to be the lord of the manor and a war hero, slaughtering the juvenile gang that has been plundering his household. In biblical typology, Adam prefigures Christ, though they are opposites: the disobedient first man of the flesh is redeemed by the obedient first man of the spirit (Rom 5: 12–19). In other words, foreshadowing and fulfillment may oppose one another as contrasting types. Fulfillment through reversal, present in many stories, proves particularly important in Christianity, whose crucified prophet is revealed as the Lord of Glory. Indeed, Jesus often spoke of eschatological fulfillment as a reversal of this-worldly priorities: the last shall be first, the humble shall be exalted. Two examples may illustrate these familiar principles. We have already examined one instance of foreshadowing and fulfillment at a higher level in the beginning and end of the Commedia. Its first verb, mi ritrovai, indicates the pilgrim’s suddenly renewed self-recognition: “In the middle of the way of our life, I found myself again” (Inf. 1.1–2). He had lost himself, but then he returned to himself. The final canto of the Paradiso climaxes with the highest selfrecognition possible, the pilgrim’s vision of Christ “face to face” (1 Cor 13:12). Here is a self-recognition both creational and eschatological: Christ is Dante’s divine Origin and End, and in the risen Christ he sees his vocation to glory, what he is called to become. The first verb of the poem thus foreshadows its final vision. Indeed, mi ritrovai foreshadows the whole journey, for Dante is like the prodigal son, who “returned into himself” (Luke 15:17; Vulgate, In se autem reversus), and so consequently returned to his Father. The Christian-Platonist tradition interpreted the parable of the prodigal
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son in relation to the meditative ascent: the son makes the inward turn and then rises in returning to his Father, God. The second example turns on contrasts. In Augustine’s autobiography there are two, and only two, fruit trees: a pear tree in Book 2 and a fig tree in Book 8. The two trees clue us to an elaborate set of oppositions between the two books.12 Book 2, chapter 4, narrates the adolescent Augustine’s theft of the pears, at night, with a gang of friends, for the sheer pleasure of stealing. In the following chapters, the bishop meditates on the perversity of his sin, and finally realizes that he did it to please his friends (2.9.17). Book 8, in contrast, tells the story of his conversion, which is prepared by stories of conversion told to the young Augustine by two friends. It occurred during the day in a garden, after weeping in repentance under a fig tree. In this example, foreshadowing prefigures fulfillment through reversal. The perversion of sin, at night, through the bad influence of friends “according to the flesh,” is countered by conversion to Christ, in the light of day, through the good influence of friends “according to the spirit.” Fulfillment through reversal is particularly vital to the ChristianPlatonist ascent because the ascent often integrates sinful, or erroneous, perspectives so as to correct them. As a perversion of the good, sin appears to be absurd: a distortion so fundamental as to mock goodness and make it unrecognizable. This perspective is true, as far as it goes, on its own level. But a perversion of the good is, necessarily, a perversion of the good: as the meditative ascent achieves a higher level, it reveals the goodness being perverted at the lower level. This recognition is achieved through retrospective contrast: Augustine’s Christian conversion in Book 8 enables a new understanding of his sinful perversion in Book 2. Similarly, in the Commedia, the erotic passion between Paolo 12. See Leo C. Ferrari, “The Arboreal Polarization in Augustine’s Confessions,” Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 25 (1979): 35–46.
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and Francesca, figured in the whirlwind that torments them, foreshadows Beatrice’s divine eros for Dante, which raises him to the vision of God. In general, images of perversion in Hell are riddling reflections of Christian truths. The whirlwind, an image of sexual passion in Inferno 5, symbolizes God’s love for human beings in Scripture. In the Vulgate, a whirlwind (turbo) clears the Israelites’ path through the Red Sea (Ex 14:21), raises the prophet Elijah into heaven (2 Kgs 2:1, 11), and resounds at the Pentecost (Acts 2:2) before the tongues of flame appear over the apostles’ heads. It is the wind of the Holy Spirit (spiritus, “breath, wind”) acting to save human beings. Thus, in the Commedia the distortions of sexual passion reveal, as though “through a glass, darkly” (1 Cor 13:12), God’s passionate love for human beings, for the divine Love is the ground and goal of all human desire. When the Christian-Platonist ascent represents vices on lower levels, as in the Confessions and the Commedia, it also provides the higher levels whose perspectives enable us to reinterpret the vices correctively, or redemptively. Now it would appear that the models of foreshadowing and analogy work with different materials. Foreshadowing and fulfillment seem appropriate for “literary” events and images, while the ladder of analogies illuminates the “philosophical” use of key terms. These distinctions remain useful as long as they do not become separations. For the meditative ascent is simultaneously literary and philosophical, and we neglect this at our peril. “Literary” surprises, even reversals, often affect “philosophical” passages. Two examples may illustrate this. Book 13, chapter 11 of the Confessions begins “Who can understand the omnipotent Trinity?” (13.11.12). Augustine inquires about the Trinity in the third person. He goes on to correlate the three Persons with being (Father), knowing (Son), and willing (Holy Spirit). He recognizes that being, knowing, and willing are inseparable and yet distinct, and so they offer a model for understanding the Trinity. But he cannot say “whether these three constitute the Trinity, or whether all three are
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present in each Person,” or whether both are true in some mysterious way. He is baffled, and he concludes the chapter by asking, “Who would venture in any way to make a rash pronouncement on the subject?” Yet five chapters later he does make a rash pronouncement on this subject: “Your being knows and wills immutably, your knowledge is and wills immutably, and your will is and knows immutably” (13.16.19). The hesitations and perplexities animating chapter 11 have vanished. He is no longer inquiring about the Trinity, in the third person, but telling the Trinitarian God about Himself. He asserts, briefly and unambiguously, that each Person of the Trinity exercises all three functions. Between these two chapters, something has happened to Augustine. We are meant to understand that a sudden influx of grace has illumined him, transforming his hesitant questions into sure assertions. Within the space of five chapters, and on a profound mystery of faith, the “philosophical” inquiry has registered a “literary” reversal. Foreshadowing also helps us understand the meditative ascent in Anselm’s Proslogion, supposedly a “philosophical” work without “literary” events. In chapter 2, Anselm begins his famous argument by calling God “that than which nothing greater can be thought” (S 101).13 In chapter 15, however, he affirms that God is “greater than can be thought” (S 112). From regarding God as the limit of 13. All quotations from the Proslogion are taken from the Latin edition by F. S. Schmitt, as reprinted in Gregory Schufreider, Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm’s Early Writings (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1994). Schufreider has reproduced Schmitt’s later edition of the Proslogion (Stuttgart [Bad Cannstatt]: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1962), rather than his earlier one in the Opera Omnia, 6 vols., edited by Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, O.S.B. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1938–1961)—the Proslogion is in Volume 1. The former is printed, not in block form, as prose, but “poetically,” with line breaks and staggered indentations that emphasize the rhythm and musicality of Anselm’s language. The editions are very close; I will comment on one minor change, in Chapter 3. The parenthetical “S” references are to the text in the Opera Omnia, as is common in Anselm scholarship. The English translations are mine,
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thought, the meditation has advanced to a higher understanding of God as beyond the limit of thought. The “definition” in chapter 2, adequate on its own level, now appears retrospectively to foreshadow the affirmation in chapter 15. Then, in the final chapter (26), Anselm declares God to be “joy beyond measure” (S 121) as he meditates rapturously on the “full joy” of the beatific vision (S 120–22). By this point, the meditation has progressed from “thought” to “fullness of joy” (26), from intellectual reflection about God to a foretaste of full divine experience. Retrospectively, then, the God of joy beyond all fullness of our experience, in chapter 26, surpasses the God beyond thought, in chapter 15, which foreshadows it. Though the Proslogion presents itself as a philosophical and theological exploration, its progress to higher and higher levels involves “literary” surprise: the final experience of God as immeasurable joy could not be foreseen on the basis of “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” From this vantage point, we can consider some of the formal similarities between a philosophical ladder of analogy and literary foreshadowing and fulfillment. In both, later and “higher” passages clarify details in earlier and “lower” ones. The story of Augustine’s conversion in Book 8 serves to highlight, by contrast, many details in Book 2. Moreover, interpreting their relations makes both books far more meaningful than each is separately. Yet, as in Dante’s discourses on love, the task of perceiving relations and exploring their meanings is left to the reader. The Confessions provides the clues to show us the way to deeper understandings, but it does not develop them explicitly. Furthermore, in both analogy and foreshadowing, the forward and upward movement is full of surprises: only in retrospect can the relations be noted and explored. The pear theft in Book 2 may foreshadow, but does not predict, the conversion in
though I have profited from consulting those by Schufreider, Deane, and Charlesworth.
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Book 8. Without the book titles and chapter headings provided in modern translations, no reader of Book 10 on memory could foretell that “time” would follow in Book 11.
The Meditative Ascent and Philosophical Content The Christian-Platonist ascent thus fuses literary and philosophical forms. These may be distinguished, but they cannot be separated. Hence, a certain difficulty emerges about the philosophical content of the ascent. (Although the “philosophical” and the “theological” may be distinguished in these works, they cannot be separated, and I use the word “philosophical” as a shorthand for both.) Most contemporary philosophy argues for “positions”: one is said to “hold” a philosophical position and to “defend it.” Similarly, Catholic philosophy, with its heritage of Scholasticism, has understood itself to be “doctrinal,” to teach truths as “securely established” as possible. Indeed, these are ancient understandings: Plato’s Socrates insists that philosophical argument “ties down” true opinions and thereby confirms them.14 The language of “positions” and “doctrines” clearly implies fixity. If philosophical content implies “holding” positions or doctrines, how does the movement implied in an ascent affect this positional content? Moreover, what is the philosophical character of a meditative ascent as a whole? For these medieval authors, a meditative ascent does not intend primarily to “teach doctrines” or “establish positions.” The content of a discursive level should be understood less as a “position” to be “held” than as “a station along the way.” As a station along the way, its discourse is like a position, but as a station along the way, it proves but a temporary platform: a true understanding, but not a final one.15 Every discursive level proves “true as far as it goes,” but it is presented only to be surpassed. To be sure, a discursive level is doc14. See the Meno 97d–98b. 15. I adapt the idea of a “platform of understanding” from Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 8–12.
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trinal, insofar as it teaches us something, but the doctrine is never final, because the ascent moves on. It proves less “a doctrine,” or “a position,” than “an elucidation.” On a given theme, it may prove the last explicit word in the ascent and, in that sense, be regarded as final. Nevertheless, ultimately there is no “final position” in a meditative ascent, except God, and the infinite Life is not a “position” in any sense of the term. Rather, the ascent culminates in an apprehension of its Ground, and this clarifies earlier levels, if we meditate retrospectively on them. Hence, the last explicit word on any important theme is rarely the final word offered by an ascent, because its highest level implicitly reconfigures its earlier understandings. The final word must be construed by the reader’s meditation. We have already seen such a pattern of reconfigured understandings at work in Dante’s treatment of “love.” Adulterous “love” in Inferno 5 may be Dante’s first extended account of love in the Commedia, but it is hardly his last: it will be explicitly reconfigured in Purgatorio 17–18 and then again in many parts of the Paradiso. At the same time, though Dante’s later and higher treatments of “love” illuminate understandings reached on lower levels of the ascent, these higher understandings do not erase the validity of lower ones. No single passage in the Commedia draws together all that Dante has to say about “love.” Whatever teaching about love his poem contains must be construed by the reader’s meditation. Such an implied reconfigured understanding may also be seen in the theme of friendship in the Confessions. Books 1–9 contain many representations of friendship, with some explicit remarks about the character of true friendship in Book 4. After Augustine turns to explore memory and Genesis 1 in Books 10–13, he does not mention friends or reflect on friendship again. Nevertheless, though the key word is absent, the theme is implied in the allegory of the Church in Book 13. As Chapter 3 will show, Augustine’s treatment of friendship in Books 1–9 implies the Church as the fulfillment of friendship, and his fullest exposition of the Church in the
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Confessions comes in Book 13. This exposition implicitly reconfigures the earlier understandings of friendship not by altering them, but by setting them in a new context. Indeed, because this exposition stands at the summit of the ascent, it represents the fulfillment of every important theme in the work. Augustine did not elaborate these understandings: he left them implied by the structure of the work. In a meditative ascent, everything that rises must converge, though the convergence is rarely made explicit. Augustine left the convergence of friendship, in Books 1–9, and the Church, in Book 13, to be construed by his readers. The meditative ascent demands the reader’s meditation in order to be fully understood. In this way, the philosophical character of the Christian-Platonist ascent as a whole is not doctrinal, but meditative, and this occurs in three ways. First, to understand what the work presents on any significant theme demands meditation, for the ascent rarely conveys its full understanding of an issue in any single place. A treatment on one level needs to be correlated with other levels and understood in light of the ascent as a whole. What Dante had to say about “love” in the Commedia, and Augustine about friendship in the Confessions, are not explicitly stated in any one place. The genre is designed to provoke retrospective rereading. Second, every ascent aims to initiate its readers into certain practices of Christian-Platonist meditation. These differ somewhat in different works, and even in different parts of the same work. Books 1–10 of the Confessions, for example, initiate us into the practices of Christian self-scrutiny, while Books 11–13 teach us how to meditate, prayerfully and philosophically, on Scripture. Anselm’s Proslogion offers another example of theological reflection in and as prayer, while Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy initiates readers into a dialogue with Stoic and Platonist philosophy. Nevertheless, every Christian-Platonist ascent turns its readers away from things outside (extra se) to things within (intra se) and shows them how to make the return journey to things above (supra se). The meditative ascent
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demands more than mere reading. It is constructed so as to lead us to meditate, if we would understand it fully: to reread, reflect, and explore the relations between its parts. This is how it schools us in its practices. Its final word to us is “Go and do likewise.” Third, the meditative ascent thereby proves a spiritual exercise, in two different ways. In one way, its explicit meditative exercises become ours as we read. We follow its journey in quest of truth, its search for God. In order to read it at the literal level, we necessarily ask its questions, explore the answers it explores, pray its prayers, and so on. Merely by reading it we begin to assimilate the forms of meditation it would teach. In another way, the work invites us to the further spiritual exercise of understanding its structure and what it implies. This meditation is designed to deepen our involvement with the work and our understanding of ourselves. We are led to dwell upon the ascent more deeply as we spend more time exploring its designs. By dwelling in the world of the work, we involve ourselves in its vision of truth and thereby appropriate it. At the same time, because the understandings we seek are implied, what we discover proves more questionable. We wind up asking ourselves not only “Did Dante think this?,” but also “Is this true? Do I think this?” In other words, the spiritual exercise of meditating on the ascent leads us more deeply into ourselves, as well as into the work. By questioning its vision of truth meditatively, we become more aware of our own. Whether, in the end, we agree or disagree with it on an issue does not matter. It has engaged us in a spiritual exercise and thereby succeeds in its intention: to further our knowledge of God and of ourselves. Recent scholarship, especially the work of Pierre Hadot, has recovered the role of spiritual exercises in all the schools of ancient philosophy.16 These exercises use meditation, in various forms, to 16. For a brief treatment, see “Spiritual Exercises” in Hadot’s collection, Phi-
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transform a person’s consciousness by dwelling interiorly on a school’s fundamental teachings. For similar reasons, Christians meditated on the Bible, and their practices have also been recovered by scholars. Lectio divina, the prayerful study of Scripture, involved dwelling on a text so as to assimilate its truth. Though the name is associated with the Benedictine tradition, its roots lie in Jewish practices that were adapted very early by Christians.17 The Fathers of the Church practiced lectio divina in fact, if not in name. Hence, when Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm wrote their works as spiritual exercises, they were writing for audiences who knew how to use them. Their readers knew how to explore relations between passages of Scripture and how to dwell meditatively upon them. The present study uses this recovered knowledge in order to show how to explore these works as fully as they were meant to be read. As in lectio divina, the ultimate aim of these spiritual exercises is contemplative: to lead us to a deeper apprehension of God. God is not only the End of the ascent but also its Origin, and therefore its Mover, Guide, and Path. The ascent aims to lead us through words to the Word, through words about God toward the wordless experience of God. Because God is present throughout the ascent, at any losophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, edited with an Introduction by Arnold I. Davidson, translated by Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 81–125. A fuller discussion may be found in Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, translated by Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002). 17. For fundamental texts and practices, see Mariano Magrassi, Praying the Bible: An Introduction to “Lectio Divina,” translated by Edward Hagman, O.F.M. Cap. (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1990), a florilegium of monastic texts with commentary; and Enzo Bianchi, Praying the Word: An Introduction to “Lectio Divina,” translated by James W. Zona, Cistercian Studies Series, no. 182 (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1998), which contains the famous letter of Guigo the Carthusian on the four stages of lectio divina, pp. 100–114. For a brief treatment, see Jean Leclecq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture, translated by Catherine Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1961), pp. 15–21.
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point a reader may be sparked by grace into awareness of the Divine Presence. But the normal means to this awareness will come through meditating on larger patterns and meanings in the work. In the Commedia, for example, every form of “love” is ultimately grounded in “the Love that moves the sun and the other stars” (Par. 33.145). When we meditate on the relations between a lower love and the highest Love, our minds are induced to jump the gap between them. The spark ignites, the light goes on, we “get it”—at least sometimes. By orchestrating relations between levels, and inducing us to meditate on them, the ascent aims to quicken our awareness of the Divine Presence as always present. A meditative philosophy aims not only at intellectual insight, but also at ongoing personal transformation, and nothing effects this so deeply as the sense of God’s presence.
Numerological Structure Scholars have long explored the ways in which literary and artistic works in the Christian-Platonist tradition use significant numerological patterns. Dante’s Commedia is perhaps the best known instance, with its perfect number of cantos (100, or 10 3 10) and its many forms of “three” in imitation of the Trinity: three major parts of the poem, three guides for the pilgrim, written in terza rima, and so on.18 Recent studies have shown that Dante’s use of number symbolism proves far richer than we hitherto suspected, extending to ra18. See Vincent Foster Hopper, Medieval Number Symbolism: Its Sources, Meaning, and Influence on Thought and Expression, Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature, no. 112 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), for the tradition in general and pp. 136–201 on Dante. Emile Male, The Gothic Image: Religious Art in France in the Thirteenth Century, translated by Dora Nussey (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; original publication by Dutton, 1913), pp. 9–14, writes of number symbolism as a fundamental characteristic of medieval art. For recent work in numerological analysis, see the essays in Caroline D. Eckhardt, ed., Essays in the Numerical Criticism of Medieval Literature (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1980), and her Bibliographical Note, pp. 231–32.
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diating patterns of “seven” from the center of the central canto in the Purgatorio and even to using certain key words a numerologically significant number of times.19 Dante’s practice of numerology was part of a long tradition, both classical and Christian, that continued for centuries after him.20 The principles underlying this tradition are well known. Pythagoras thought that number was a fundamental ordering principle in the cosmos, and the Platonist tradition honored mathematical studies for this reason, among others. Plato’s Timaeus presents the “likely story” of the cosmos being fashioned according to ordered numbers by a divine Demiurge, or artisan. These are the Pythagorean numbers for the ratios of the musical octave, creating the planetary order that came to be known as “the music of the spheres.”21 In the biblical Book of the Wisdom of Solomon, God is said to have “or19. For the radiating pattern of “sevens,” see Charles S. Singleton, “The Poet’s Number at the Center,” in Eckhardt, ed., Essays in the Numerical Criticism of Medieval Literature, pp. 79–90. Manfred Hardt, Die Zahl in der “Divina Commedia” (Frankfurt am Main: Atheneum Verlag, 1973), offers a broader study of numerological symbolism in the poem. 20. See Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, translated by Willard R. Trask, Bollingen Series 36 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 501–9, on “Numerical Composition.” Robert M. Durling and Ronald L. Martinez, in their Time and the Crystal: Studies in Dante’s “Rime Petrose” (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), brilliantly draw on this tradition and others to illuminate some of Dante’s lyric poems. 21. For the numerical ratios in the fashioning of the cosmos, see Timaeus 35b–36b; for the harmonious sound of the planetary movements, see Republic 617b–c. Macrobius’s Commentary on the Dream of Scipio 2.1–4 was an important source for the Middle Ages on the harmony of the heavenly spheres; see the translation by William Harris Stahl, Number 48 in the Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). Chalcidius’s translation of and commentary on the Timaeus (up to 53b) communicated the Platonist cosmological tradition directly to the Middle Ages. See Plato, Plato Latinus. Volumen IV. Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, edited by J. H. Waszink (London: Warburg Institute, 1962). For the Platonic tradition in the Middle Ages, see Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition
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dered [disposuisti] all things in measure and number and weight” (11:21). Writers and artists, classical and Christian, often sought to model their work on the work of the best Maker. The divine Being used numbers to impart a beautiful order (cosmos) to the universe, and writers employed numerical principles and numerological symbolism in imitation of him. The literary microcosm was modeled on the macrocosm. The following chapters will analyze the numerological structures of the Confessions, the Proslogion, and the Consolation of Philosophy. In the works we are studying, numerological structures are never ironic, never at odds with the explicit statements of a work. They are always in accord with what a work says and with the tradition to which it appeals. They harmonize with the work’s literary structure, as determined by its division into books and chapters. As one might expect, the significant numbers in the Confessions and the Proslogion are Trinitarian, while those in the Consolation are Platonist and cosmological. At the same time, all three works employ chiastic patterns in their numerological structures, and it would be well to explore here the significant meanings implied by the chiasm. This, in turn, will enable me to address the philosophical significance of numerological structures. Because these implied patterns add nothing to the work’s explicit statements, it may be objected that they are merely literary and without philosophical import. Because I have been insisting that these works are literary and philosophical wholes, this objection must be addressed. A chiasm is a rhetorical pattern, a cross structure, and it may be rendered as A B B A. As a rhetorical scheme in a sentence, it can be contrasted with isocolon, or parallelism: A B A B. “Many are called, but few are chosen” is a parallelism, while “The last shall be first, and the first shall be last” is a chiasm. The word chiasm derives from during the Middle Ages: With a New Preface and Four Supplementary Chapters; Together with Plato’s “Parmenides” in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: With a New Introductory Preface (Milwood, N.Y.: Kraus International Publications, 1982).
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the Greek letter chi or X, for it names a crossing pattern, which may be graphed by contrast with parallelism in the following way: chiasm
parallelism
AB
AB
BA
AB
A chiastic pattern can also occur in a structure longer than the sentence, and then it is known as an inclusio, or a ring structure. The ring is formed because its first element is echoed in the last, its second element in the second to last, and so on. Often the ring structure has a central part, and it receives a certain emphasis by not being echoed. The simplest form of this structure may be rendered as A B C B A. The prologue in the Gospel of John (1:1–18) provides a useful illustration: A B C D C´ B´ A´
1:1–5 1:6–9 1:9–11 1:12–13 1:14 1:15–17 1:18
The Word with God “in the beginning” John the Baptist’s witness The true light enters the world and is rejected by it But those who accept him are born of God The Word became flesh, and we have seen his glory John the Baptist’s witness, confirmed by the evangelist God’s only Son abides in the bosom of the Father 22
The Word who was with God in the beginning (A) has returned to abide with God in the end (A´). John the Baptist’s witness (B and B´) frames Christ’s descent into the world and its rejection of him (C), the positive results of accepting him (D), and his manifestation in the world as flesh and glory (C´). As a whole, the Prologue enacts the movement of the Word’s descent from and return to the Father. Its ring structure imitates the “circular” movement it describes. 22. This pattern is taken from Bruno Barnhart, The Good Wine: Reading John from the Center (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), pp. 47–51. Barnhart argues that the Gospel of John as a whole is structured chiastically, and he explores the interpretive consequences of this insight.
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In sum, then, although the chiastic structure of a work unfolds linearly, it proves both a cross and a circle. This pattern has obvious Christian meanings. Chi is the first letter in the Greek word for “Christ” and a common sign for Christ. As a cross, it signifies the instrument of our salvation. As a circle, or ring structure, it imitates Christ’s descent from and return to Heaven. It also mimes the cosmic pattern of procession (exitus) and return (reditus), inaugurated by the Word’s creation of the world and fulfilled by his Resurrection and Ascension. Christ’s descent and return proves the archetype for our return to God, even as it effects our redemption. Christ is the crossing point where eternity intersects with time in the Incarnation, when God meets humanity in the fullest way. As cross, circle, and sign of Christ, a chiastic structure symbolizes the central mysteries of the Christian faith. Because Christianity continues in the modern world, these symbolic meanings need only be mentioned in order to be understood. But for all the thinkers in the present study, a chiastic structure also had significance in relation to the geocentric cosmos, and this needs to be recovered. In Plato’s Timaeus (36b–c), the Demiurge fashioned the heavenly movements by taking the world soul, dividing it into two circles or motions, and joining them in a chi pattern. These two are called the Motion of the Same and the Motion of the Different. In this way, the cosmic movements of the stars manifest the numerical order and harmony of the world soul. A chiastic structure in a literary work evokes the divine ordering of the cosmos. A brief excursus on the ancient cosmology will make this intelligible.23 In the Ptolemaic cosmos, the Earth stands unmoving at the center and the stars move about it, each in their own spheres. There are seven planets, or “wandering stars” (Greek planetos, “wanderer”), in seven concentric spheres outward from the Earth: the Moon, Mer23. A good brief treatment of medieval astronomy can be found in Patrick Boyde, Dante Philomythes and Philosopher: Man in the Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 132–60.
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cury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Beyond Saturn, in the seventh sphere, are the “fixed stars” in the eighth sphere, and the primum mobile, “the first mover,” in the ninth and outermost sphere. The “fixed stars” are the constellations and what we call stars today, because they are fixed in their relations to one another: the Big Dipper always looks like the Big Dipper, even though it turns in the sky around the pole. The ninth sphere, the primum mobile, has no stars: it moves in a constant and unvarying motion, and it sweeps all the lower spheres with it. This is the Motion of the Same, moving at a constant speed from east to west along the celestial equator, which is our equator projected into space. (We believe that this occurs because the Earth rotates on its axis at an even pace, once every 24 hours.) Each of the seven planets also has its own “proper motion,” one unique to it, along the celestial ecliptic and (roughly) through the Zodiac. (We believe that this change occurs because the planets revolve around the Sun at different speeds at different distances, and we observe them by way of the Earth’s movement relative to them.) This is the Motion of the Different, in seven different versions, whose intervals reflect the Pythagorean ratios of the octave (Timaeus 35a–36b). The celestial ecliptic is a projection into space of the earthly ecliptic, a circle running from the Tropic of Capricorn, in the southern hemisphere, across the equator, to the Tropic of Cancer, in the northern. Because the Motion of the Same runs along the celestial equator, the crossing of ecliptic and equator forms the chi, or Xpattern, of the cosmic movements. The Sun is the most important star and its movements manifest most clearly the Motions of the Same and the Different of the world soul. Its daily movement, rising in the east and setting in the west, clearly shows the Motion of the Same, and its apparent annual movement along the ecliptic reveals the Motion of the Different. For the Sun rises directly above the Tropic of Capricorn at the winter solstice (December 21), and so that day proves the shortest day of the year in the northern hemisphere: the Sun moves from east to
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west in a small arc in the southern part of the sky. Conversely, the Sun rises above the Tropic of Cancer at the summer solstice (June 21), the longest day of the year, because the Sun moves from east to west in its longest and highest arc in our sky. When the Sun rises over the equator, we have the equinoxes of spring (March 21) and autumn (September 21). In other words, the annual movement of the Sun along the ecliptic governs the seasons. Just as its diurnal movements, in the Motion of the Same, regulate the hours of day and night, so does its annual motion, in the Motion of the Different, regulate the seasonal rhythm of the year. This is why the Sun has been associated with rule and kingship all over the world, not to speak of divinity. For a Platonist who was not a Christian, these scientific observations have spiritual and moral meanings. They reveal the divine and beautiful order of the cosmos as a heavenly harmony—the music of the spheres, the dance of the stars.24 According to the Timaeus, human beings were made erect so that we could contemplate this cosmic order, whose movements manifest the world soul. Because we have sight and can look upward, we observe the Sun and the stars, and this gives us an understanding of number and time and the power of inquiring about the nature of the universe. This contemplative inquiry is philosophy. It enables us to attune the various, and often chaotic, movements in our own souls according to the intelligence manifested in the order of the heavens (46e–47e). Hence, a chiastic pattern in a Platonist work evokes a rich array of meanings concerning the world soul, the cosmic order, the nature and vocation of human beings, and the philosophical life. This understanding of the cosmos was taken over by Christian Platonists, with the exception of the heretical idea of the world soul. In fact, from an early period Christians associated the chi of the cos24. The ancient tradition on the dance of the heavens is extensive studied in James L. Miller, Measures of Wisdom: The Cosmic Dance in Classical and Christian Antiquity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
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mos with its creation by Christ. All things were created by the Word (Jn 1:2), and Christ, as it were, initialed his work with the instrument of salvation, the cross. In this way, “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork” (Ps 19:1). John Freccero briefly reviews this tradition to comment on the opening of Paradiso 10: it was widely diffused in the patristic era and continued into the medieval period in Abelard, as well as Dante.25 Like Dante, Augustine, Anselm, and Boethius lived in this Ptolemaic universe and were familiar with the Timaeus tradition, which was a cultural commonplace. Boethius, writing the Consolation as a philosopher rather than as a Christian, referred to it at many points, most famously in III, m. 9, “O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas” (“O you who govern the world with perpetual reason”). The chiastic structures in their works, then, evoke Platonist and cosmological meanings, as well as Christian and biblical ones. Because we must labor to recover the former, this distinction seems more important to us than it would have to them. The Christian intellectual tradition had already harmonized the two. In sum, then, the chiastic structure in these works proves both a circle and a cross, even as it enacts the meditative ascent. As a circle, it symbolizes procession and return, creation and salvation, and the circular movements of the heavenly spheres. These, in turn, evoke the still circle of divinity, for the circle is an ancient image of perfection, eternity, stability, and wholeness. As a cross, it symbolizes Christ, the instrument of our salvation, and the cosmic chi where 25. See John Freccero, Dante: Poetics of Conversion, edited with an Introduction by Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 239–41; he cites Wilhelm Bousset, “Platons Weltseele und das Kreuz Christi,” Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wisenschaft 14 (1913): 273, on p. 313, n. 50. Chauncey Wood notes that this tradition is relevant to Chaucer, in Chaucer and the Country of the Stars: Poetic Uses of Astrological Imagery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 286n. I have shown its importance for a poem by George Herbert, in “Herbert’s ‘Coloss. 3.3’ as Microcosm,” George Herbert Journal 15, no. 2 (1992): 55–69.
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the Motion of the Same intersects the Motion of the Different in the world soul. As an ascent, it fulfills the human vocation as understood by Christianity, imitating Christ’s return to the Father, and by Platonist philosophy as the return to the One. These ideas are so fundamental in Christian Platonism that their full development would extend throughout all aspects of its beliefs. As themes for meditation, they are inexhaustible. Herein lies the philosophical significance of an implied chiastic structure: it resonates with every explicit theme in a ChristianPlatonist ascent, and thereby helps to effect personal transformation in a meditative reader. For an analytic or Scholastic philosophy, meditative resonance seems unimportant. The goal here is the articulation of truth, substantiated and defended by explicit argument. Analytic philosophers craft their works with care, but they devote this care to the logic of their arguments, not to devising numerologically significant deep structures. For a meditative philosophy, however, the goal is personal transformation, and explicit argument proves but one means toward it. A good argument, valuable though it is, does not normally affect the whole soul, the deeper levels of the person. In order to affect us deeply, an argument must not only be acknowledged as true but meditated on—studied, pondered, reviewed, assimilated. Its relations with the rest of the meditative ascent must be explored. As the work’s numerological structure becomes clear, it, too, generate themes for meditation. A numerological chiasm reveals the beauty of the work, its order and harmony, in a new way. This beauty enchants the meditative reader and deepens participation in the work. Deeper participation enables a more profound transformation: as the reader enters more deeply into the perspectives of the work, the work enters more deeply into him. Above all, a chiastic deep structure has so many resonances in Christian Platonism that it works simultaneously to unify and ramify the meaning of a text. Everything in the ascent is related to the circle and the cross, and in manifold ways. Each theme in the work is related to this deep structure, and hence thereby related to every
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other theme. This network of relations is not worked out explicitly: the writer left that task to the reader’s meditation. In other words, a meditative reader could connect any chapter to the symbolism of circle, cross, or ascent, and thereby explore its relations with any other chapter. In this way, possible meanings ramify beyond the work’s explicit statements. At the same time, they are unified by the deep structure of Christian-Platonist symbols. As is well known, the Church Fathers meditated on the Bible in this way, often relating different passages through a central mystery of the faith. Augustine, for example, begins his allegory on Genesis in the Confessions by relating creation and conversion. As the primal chaos heard and heeded God’s forming word, “Let there be light,” so does a convert to the Word receive “the form of doctrine,” for “[God’s] mercy did not abandon our misery” (13.12.13) but, rather, saved human beings. Augustine’s formulation correlates creation, conversion, grace, and salvation. God’s “mercy” coming to save us from “our own misery” also describes the Exodus, the calling of the Patriarchs and the Prophets, and the signal events of the New Testament: Incarnation, Redemption, Pentecost, and the “eternal sabbath” (Conf. 13.35–38) in the final chapters of the Book of Revelation. God’s mercy saving us from our misery becomes the leitmotif of his whole allegory on Genesis 1 as “the creation of the Church” (13.34.49). His allegory alludes to all these meanings in Scripture, because the Church embodies and carries them forward. Yet they are one meaning, and though it can be expressed in many ways, it is inexhaustible.26 The writers studied in this book meditated on the great works in their tradition in this way, and they wrote their masterpieces to be read in this way. They believed that God structured the cosmos and his revelation in the Bible with significant numbers, and they imitated Him in the numerological structures of their works. We have 26. Hans Urs von Balthasar describes this way of meditating on the Bible in Christian Meditation, translated by Sister Mary Theresilde Skerry (San Francisco, Calif.: Ignatius Press, 1984), esp. pp. 21–26.
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long treated the Confessions, the Proslogion, and the Consolation of Philosophy as intellectually rich and powerful. As works of meditative philosophy, they are also inexhaustible.
The Pilgrim Figure As a journey to the Divine Presence, the Christian-Platonist ascent proves a kind of religious pilgrimage. The Confessions, Proslogion, Consolation of Philosophy, and Commedia each contain at least one pilgrim figure: he makes the meditative journey within the work, and the reader is thereby involved in it. We are seized by the plight of Boethius the prisoner or Dante the pilgrim; we sympathize with the anguish of being in prison or passing a long spiritual night in the dark wood. We identify with these figures and are thereby led, emotionally as well as intellectually, to make the journey with them. For we too seek the light that will liberate us from darkness. All this is obvious enough, and fundamental to these works. But certain aspects of the pilgrim figure prove far from obvious, and we must make some careful literary distinctions to remove ambiguities. The issues are by no means “merely literary”: they have philosophical consequences. Since philosophers and theologians tend to be unfamiliar with them, I will proceed slowly and begin with the Commedia, where the issues are clearest. Dante’s poem presents itself as autobiographical, and so scholars distinguish two Dantes in it: the pilgrim making the journey and the poet who has completed it and now retells it.27 Dante the pilgrim does not know what will happen next: he asks questions of his guides throughout the poem, and early on his doubts and fears are so strong that he even considers abandoning the journey. Dante the poet, on the other hand, always knows what will happen next, because he has completed the journey. Dante the poet recalls, in the 27. Charles S. Singleton first argued this distinction in Dante Studies 1: “Commedia”: Elements of Structure (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954). It has since become fundamental to our understanding of the poem.
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present, a journey he made in the past, as Dante the pilgrim. Hence, in the unfolding of the Commedia, Dante the pilgrim and Dante the poet are dialectically related: the pilgrim is on his way in the journey to become the poet who is telling about it. Early on, the two Dantes are vastly different, but as the journey progresses the pilgrim’s knowledge increases, and so he becomes more and more like the poet.28 Similar distinctions inform The Consolation of Philosophy, which also presents itself as autobiographical. We should distinguish between Boethius the prisoner, who speaks with Lady Philosophy, and Boethius the author, who records their discourse. The dialogue between the prisoner and Lady Philosophy has come to an end, and the prisoner has thereby become the author who can record it. Prisoner and author are dialectically related: far distant in mind at the beginning of the work, much closer toward its end. Philosophy has led Boethius the prisoner on a journey of understanding, and Boethius the author, now that he has completed it, narrates its course. The autobiography in Augustine’s Confessions, of course, is the great antecedent being imitated by Dante and Boethius. We should distinguish, therefore, Augustine the bishop, who is recalling his past journey to Christian faith, from the young Augustine, whose story he is telling. Scholars usually call both figures “Augustine” and rely on the context of their discussions to clarify their intention. But the distinction is so important that I shall always call the character in Books 1–9 the young Augustine, or something similar (like the boy Augustine).29 For the young Augustine is by no means the same 28. Dantists do not usually distinguish Dante the poet from Dante the author, though they should. Dante the poet exists within the fiction of the Commedia: he remembers a journey he once made as the pilgrim. Dante the author made the whole story up. 29. I use “the young Augustine” in deference to John J. O’Meara’s fine book, The Young Augustine: An Introduction to the “Confessions” of St. Augustine (New York: Longman, 1980). John Freccero treats the distinction between Augustine
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person as Augustine the bishop: though they are linked by historical continuity, they are quite different in the values they espouse. The young Augustine is not converted to Christian faith until the final chapter of Book 8, and he is not baptized until the middle of Book 9. Theologically, conversion is a death and rebirth, and Augustine the bishop uses this imagery to describe what happened to the young Augustine in his conversion. Hence, there is both continuity and discontinuity between these two Augustines: continuity because they are the same historical person, and discontinuity because the values animating the young Augustine significantly perished in his conversion, when he received “a new life.” The difference between Augustine the bishop, in his piety and chastity, and the young Augustine, the lustful Manichaean careerist, proves especially marked in Books 1–6. Yet even in Book 9 a difference remains, and the distinction is important for clarity. Like the two Dantes, the young Augustine and Augustine the bishop are dialectically related: the difference between them grows smaller in the later books of the autobiography, but it never disappears. When we turn to the Proslogion, we do not find the autobiographical record of a past journey, but we do encounter an “I” praying his way on a meditative ascent. Earlier, I called this pilgrim figure “Anselm,” as scholars normally do, and sketched the movement of his ascent. But a potential ambiguity lurks in this usage. When the historical Anselm wrote chapter 1, so full of prayerful anguish in its longing for God, did he know how he was going to construct the rest of the ascent? If he did, then the anguish was a fiction: he althe bishop and the young Augustine on the analogy of Dante the poet and Dante the pilgrim in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, pp. 119–35 and 258–71. Literary studies of Augustine and autobiography include Karl Joachim Weintraub, The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); William C. Spengemann, The Forms of Autobiography: Episodes in the History of a Literary Genre (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); and James Olney, Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life-Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
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ready knew the happy ending of chapter 26. If he did not know how the ascent was going to progress, then he must have originally composed it in the sequence of our reading, working from chapter 1 on up through chapter 26. But his “Preface” suggests that Anselm discovered his famous argument, in chapters 2–4, before he began the composition of the work. Anselm’s “Preface” points the way to resolving this issue. There he tells us about his struggle to discover “one argument” sufficient by itself to show “that God truly is, and that he is the highest good .l.l. and the other things we believe regarding the divine substance” (S 93). After long and frustrating effort, a sudden inspiration brought him what he had sought and the discovery gave him joy. Hoping to communicate something of this joy to others, he wrote the Proslogion “under the guise [sub persona] of one striving to raise his mind to the contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he believes” (Preface, S 93–94). In other words, before he began to write the work, Anselm knew that it would climax in joy and the contemplation of God. In fact, he constructed the work as a whole to mime something of his own movement from frustrated longing to joy. When he wrote chapter 1, he knew how the work would end. Nevertheless, the anguish in chapter 1 is real, though it does not belong to the historical Anselm, as such, but to the character he created, whom I will call Anselm the narrator. With the sentence quoted above, the historical Anselm distinguished himself, as author of the whole Proslogion, from his praying narrator within it. Sub persona, “under the guise,” uses an image derived from the theater, for persona originally referred to the mask worn by an actor. It is often translated as “in the person of,” which unfortunately mutes the distinction between Anselm the author and his persona, the praying narrator in the work. It also unfortunately mutes the difference that Anselm established between the Proslogion and the Monologion in this regard, for he described the latter as written “in the person [in
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persona] of someone reasoning silently within himself, investigating what he does not know” (Preface, S 93). In persona and sub persona are not the same. Both suggest a distinction between author and persona, yet “sub persona” implies a greater difference. Anselm the narrator in the Proslogion was created by Anselm the author, the historical human being, as his character in the work. Over the course of the work, Anselm the narrator raises his mind up to contemplate God with joy. Anselm the author designed this movement. He did not experience it as such. Historians and philosophers have not noticed this distinction, despite Anselm’s having made it in his “Preface.” It has escaped their notice, I think, because it does not help them answer the questions they pose. They want to know what Anselm thought when he wrote the Proslogion, and the only evidence they have is the Proslogion itself. Also, their scholarship predominantly concerns Anselm’s famous argument in chapters 2–4, which is almost always separated for analysis from the work as a whole. Thus separated, it loses its meaning as a stage in Anselm the narrator’s ascent, and so scholars do not need to distinguish author and narrator. Unfortunately, this lack of attention to the work as a whole and to Anselm’s effort to distinguish himself from his narrator has limited our sense of Anselm’s achievement. Chapter 4 will show how Anselm the author implied more in the work as a whole than Anselm the narrator says in it. Because this distinction is not only unfamiliar to scholars but fundamental to the Proslogion, let us explore it further. Anselm described the work as an alloquium (Preface, S 94), a “speaking to,” an address. Though it begins with the narrator addressing himself, it quickly modulates into prayer, his speaking to God. On the whole, then, the Proslogion unfolds as the narrator’s prayerful dialogue with God. The narrator is the praying voice in the work: he is the pilgrim figure making the ascent. His anguish in chapter 1 is real, for he does not know where his dialogue with God will lead him. The
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author, in contrast, composed the work as a whole. He was the historical Anselm, who designed, drafted, and revised the Proslogion in a process we cannot now recover. By definition, Anselm the author stood at a certain distance from his narrator’s anguish in chapter 1 because he already understood the happy ending in chapter 26. The narrator, however, does not. He feels his anguish acutely, for he is praying in an ongoing present. Hence, we speak of him properly in the present tense: he asks questions, hazards answers, laments, rejoices, and so on. Anselm the author was a historical person, and we must speak of him in the past tense. As the author of the whole work, it contains no surprises for him, by definition. For the narrator, on the other hand, the ascent is full of surprises, for he is gradually raised to a vision of divine things unforeseeable in his anguish in chapter 1. By definition, we always know what the narrator is thinking: at every moment, his consciousness is explicit, for he is wholly utterance. Hence, the narrator is the pilgrim figure in the work, not the author of the whole: we follow the movements of the narrator’s heart—not the heart of Anselm the author—as he prays his way forward. The mind of Anselm the author, however, is not necessarily explicit at any one moment. To be sure, the narrator’s true statements may be ascribed to Anselm the author, too. But Anselm the author comprehended what is beyond his narrator’s utterances—the Proslogion as a coherent whole—and therefore the relations between its parts, or discursive levels. The mind of Anselm in the work as a whole, therefore, exceeded his narrator’s utterances. By definition, the narrator’s mind is wholly explicit in every part of the work. By definition, the mind of Anselm comprehended the implications of the whole. The narrator, then, is the voice speaking in the work; the author, in contrast, wrote the whole of it, and therefore revised it. By definition, a narrator cannot revise his utterance, because he is speaking: he may retract what he has said by saying something more, but he
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cannot erase what he has spoken. The author, however, had all the tools at a writer’s disposal, and we assume that Anselm drafted and revised the Proslogion until it pleased him. Because the narrator speaks the work, it necessarily presents itself as his unrevised—because unrevisable—utterance. Anselm the author, of course, did revise the work, and he shaped it in order to dramatize the movements of the narrator’s heart in his quest for God. The rise and fall of the narrator’s emotions, his struggle to understand, his achievement of new insights—all these unfold “now” in the course of his prayer. Anselm the author orchestrated these movements to create a compelling literary-philosophical work. By definition, the author stood apart from them because he shaped them into the whole. By definition, the narrator genuinely experiences them “now,” as we read: he is the pilgrim figure making the meditative ascent. Anselm the narrator’s spontaneous affects were Anselm the author’s deliberate effects. This distinction between the speaking narrator in the work and the historical author who wrote it may seem odd, but it would not have troubled medieval readers. They would have readily grasped the oral character of its self-presentation, because they would have read it aloud. Scholarship on “orality and literacy” in the Middle Ages has drawn attention to the differences between medieval and modern readers.30 Though today we usually read silently, readers in Anselm’s time customarily read aloud. Even what they called “silent reading” usually involved murmuring aloud, for they needed to hear the words in order to understand them. Because they gave voice to what they read in order “to hear and understand” it, they would have encountered the oral character of the narrator’s praying directly, as modern readers do not. 30. See Ivan Illich, In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary to Hugh’s “Didaliscon” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); and Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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Because scholars have not distinguished Anselm the author from his narrator, the work’s subtle and powerful literary strategy has not been fully appreciated. For the narrator’s prayer unfolds in an ongoing present recreated by our reading, and every reader necessarily recreates it. Every reader necessarily prays the narrator’s prayer, whether she believes in God or not. Even more, every reader becomes the narrator: to read the Proslogion at all, we must take on the utterance of its “I.” We impersonate his thoughts and feelings: we may not read aloud and so give voice to them, but we do give our minds to them. We are thereby involved in the narrator’s quest for God, not by identifying with a character like Dante the pilgrim, but because we must become the pilgrim narrator in order to read the work at all. The distinction between Anselm the author and his narrator is crucial, not only to the literary qualities of the ascent, but to the philosophical content of the Proslogion. To be sure, the distinction is not a separation: the narrator’s utterances prove a reliable index to the historical Anselm’s thought. Nevertheless, Anselm and his narrator are distinct figures and should not be identified tout court, as scholars do when they confuse both as “Anselm.” When they do so, they reduce Anselm’s thought in the work to the narrator’s utterances, and this leads them to underestimate the philosophical achievement of the Proslogion as a whole. As a meditative ascent, the narrator progresses through levels of discourse: he does not explore the relations between the levels that the historical Anselm established in the work. Anselm’s philosophical achievement in the Proslogion exceeded his narrator’s statements, and he expected his readers to meditate on the ascent and thereby work out its implications. This distinction, between the author who wrote the whole work and the narrator praying “now” in it, also applies to Augustine’s Confessions. Indeed, Anselm imitated the Confessions by constructing the Proslogion as the narrator’s prayerful dialogue with God in a meditative ascent. This distinction and its consequences for under-
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standing the Confessions will be argued in the next chapter, but the salient points have already been set forth here. We should distinguish the historical Augustine, the author of the work as a whole, from Augustine the narrator, praying his way to understandings in the course of his dialogue with God. Augustine the author implied meanings that Augustine the narrator does not utter. One of these we explored earlier: the ascent from autobiographical “memories,” in Books 1–9, to the power of “memory,” in Book 10. The Confessions does not remark on this ascent because Augustine the narrator is too involved in his unfolding dialogue with God to notice it. But Augustine the author designed it, and he expected his best readers to notice it and reflect upon it. One reason scholars have been reluctant to understand the Confessions as a meditative ascent is that they look for only one Augustine. They identify the mind of Augustine with the voice of his narrator, and so they reduce the philosophical scope of the work to its explicit statements. Hence they do not understand the whole Confessions as a meditative ascent, and so they tend not to explore the relations between its various levels. In contrast, once we grasp the distinction between Augustine the author and his narrator, we begin to explore the mind of Augustine in the work in new ways. I hope to show how this distinction leads to a new sense of the work as a whole and to new kinds of questions for exploring it. In short, the Confessions features two pilgrim figures, the young Augustine and Augustine the narrator. Both were the nonfictional creations of the historical Augustine, the bishop of Hippo. Earlier, I described a dramatic change in the work’s theology of the Trinity, between chapters 11 and 16 in Book 13, and ascribed it to “Augustine,” as is common in scholarship. It should now be clear that the change occurs in the narrator, not in the author. Augustine the author did not change his mind about the Trinity between chapters 11 and 16. Rather, he designed these chapters to reveal a change occuring in Augustine the narrator. Though scholars may find these dis-
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tinctions odd, because unfamiliar, they point to Augustine the author’s complex literary strategies and suggest the rich matrix of meanings they generate. Historians using Books 1–9 as evidence for Augustine’s life may not need to make these distinctions. But they will prove useful for anyone seeking to understand Augustine’s literary and philosophical achievement in the Confessions as a whole.
Habits of Understanding I have been arguing for some unfamiliar literary distinctions and new ways of understanding a Christian-Platonist ascent. To make my case persuasive, I need to do more than show how these interpretive strategies illuminate (say) the Confessions. After all, new interpretations are often dismissed as merely ingenious. To persuade the skeptical scholar of my views, two things need to be shown, one negative and one positive. First, some account must be given for why scholars have not already arrived at these views. The Confessions, for example, enjoys an impressive body of scholarship. If scholars have not heretofore distinguished between Augustine the author and his narrator, it is hardly for lack of intelligence, but for some other reason. This task is negative: to remove scholarly resistance to my views by accounting for it. Second, I need to show that, though modern scholars have largely overlooked these ways of understanding a meditative ascent, the original audience would have used them. This task is positive: to show that Augustine and Anselm would have expected their readers to understand the paradigm and principles I have been describing. My response on both these scores has already been suggested and needs only some elaboration here. Modern scholarship on these works has run predominantly in two veins, historical and philosophical. These two veins often come together, for they have some things in common, but I will treat them separately, using the Confessions to illustrate them. In the first, scholars pose questions oriented toward facts. For example, what were the facts of Augustine’s life? What did he do, and where, when,
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and why did he do it? What was his education like and how did it influence him? What sources did he quote from and allude to in writing the Confessions? How was he influenced by these sources? Is the account of his conversion in Book 8 historically factual?31 Scholarship in this vein has amassed a large body of factual knowledge useful to every serious student of the work. Although historians have by no means been literalist readers of the Confessions, their questions tend to seek literalist, because factual, answers. With this orientation, there can only be one Augustine. Augustine the author and the young Augustine are the same person, and the narrator does not exist, because this persona answers no relevant—that is, historical—questions. In the second, philosophical, vein, scholars pose questions oriented toward doctrines or positions. What was Augustine’s position on “memory” in the Confessions? On the nature of time? On the nature of evil? On the hermeneutics of Scripture? They have no brief against “the young Augustine,” but he does not exist for them, because he did not develop any philosophical views in the work. Subtle and discerning as these scholars have been, their doctrinal orientation has literalist assumptions. They assume that Augustine had a position on a particular issue and that he intended to state it explicitly. To be sure, they recognize certain aspects of the Confessions’s meditative character: some have written beautifully about its inquisitio veritatis, its “inquiry in quest of the truth.” But they tend to see this as merely a literary means to engage readers in the pursuit of philosophical truth. The real philosophical action lies in the doctrinal conclusion and the reasons supporting it. Hence, a scholar in this vein labors to tease out Augustine’s doctrine from the often wandering inquiry. Formed by his study of 31. For recent work, a bibliography, and a view of opposite sides in this long debate, see Henry Chadwick, “History and Symbolism in the Garden at Milan,” in From Augustine to Eriugena: Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O’Meara, edited by F. X. Martin, O.S.A., and J. A. Richmond (Washington,
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Scholastic or analytic philosophy, he assumes that Augustine had a position and stated it as unambiguously as he could. He recognizes the work’s meditative texture, its style of posing questions and working toward answers, but not its meditative structure, which implies understandings by the relations between levels of the ascent. A doctrinal philosophy demands explicit positions and arguments. Because it has no notion of implied truths, to be found by meditating on the relations between discursive levels, it cannot seek them. With this orientation, the distinction between Augustine the author and his narrator remains invisible because unthinkable. Augustine’s philosophical achievement in the Confessions is thereby reduced to what it states explicitly. In short, literalist assumptions underlie the prevailing tradition of historical and philosophical scholarship. (Literary interpretation of the Confessions arose more recently and has focused largely on Books 1–9.)32 Scholars have not distinguished between the historical Augustine and his narrator, not for lack of careful reading, but because their assumptions could not admit its relevance. Valuable as their work is, their assumptions have limited our understanding. Now late antique and medieval readers came to these works with different habits of understanding, different questions and assumptions. Indeed, we owe our understanding of these to modern historical research. For one thing, they read these works aloud and so would have readily grasped the oral character of the Confessions and the Proslogion. For another, biblical typology schooled them in the structure of a meditative ascent, for they were used to exploring the relations between levels in a work. Because the Christian Bible unfolded climactically, in a movement to higher and higher levels, it D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), pp. 42–55; and Leo C. Ferrari, The Conversions of St. Augustine (Villanova, Pa.: Augustinian Institute, 1984). 32. Pioneers of literary interpretation include Leo C. Ferrari and Eugene Vance. I do not regard philological research and quellenforschung as “literary” but as historical.
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was held to have four interpretive levels: literal (or historical), allegorical, anagogical, and moral. The Old Testament allegorically prefigured the New Testament and anagogically prefigured future glory. Literal, historical persons and events in the Old Testament foreshadowed their fulfillment in Christ, allegorically, and their ultimate fulfillment at the end of time, anagogically. Moreover, any text could also be interpreted morally, with respect to the reader’s own life. In short, any moment in the biblical history of salvation could be validly understood in relation to any other moment, to the pattern of the whole, and to oneself. Similarly, in the meditative ascent, earlier levels foreshadow later ones, which fulfill them. Each level must be understood “literally,” in its own right, and also in relation to other levels and to the ascent as a whole. In this way, a reader discovers truths that are never stated in any single place. In the Bible, allegorical and anagogical meanings emerge only from relations between texts, and so can be discovered only by retrospective rereading. So, too, full understanding of a meditative ascent emerges only by meditating on its internal relations. Furthermore, I have argued that each of these works aims to initiate readers into its meditative practices. Its ultimate message is “Go and do likewise,” like the moral interpretation of Scripture. In other words, late antique and medieval readers read the Bible meditatively: they sought to grasp its patterns of internal relations and apply them to their own lives. But they also read meditatively in another related sense: slowly, carefully, memorizing long passages and repeating them often, working to appropriate a work deeply, “by heart.” The monastic tradition called this effort lectio divina, the prayerful reading of Scripture, and every monk was schooled in its practices. A monk, for example, would normally spend a year on a single gospel so as to assimilate it deeply and fully. Meditatio was often linked to chewing and digesting the spiritual food of a text, ruminating upon it, savoring the sweetness of its truth. The “four lev-
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els” of Scripture were central to lectio divina, for the meditating monk applied his text morally, to his own life, and sought its deeper truths of faith allegorically and anagogically. The “sweetness” of meditation was frequently extolled, and the monks explored the relations between various biblical texts with astonishing freedom and acumen. The roots of this tradition preceded Augustine by more than a century, and he was adept at meditating on Scripture in these ways. But non-Christian readers likewise devoted themselves to classical texts with similar habits of understanding. They read, memorized, and meditated on works of classical literature, often interpreting them as philosophical allegories. They drew general moral lessons from them, and applied them specifically to their own lives.33 As Pierre Hadot has shown, non-Christian philosophers also engaged in a variety of spiritual exercises, based on their reading and evident in their writing. In general, late antique and medieval readers had very few books but nourished their minds deeply by meditating upon them. In sum, then, late antique and medieval readers expected to interpret the relations between various parts or levels of a work. They knew that a work’s literal meanings were primary, but not final: the literal meanings provided the basis for meanings and patterns not stated explicitly. These readers knew how to meditate on a work, and the authors we are studying knew how to write for them. For such readers, the historical facts of modern historians were relatively unimportant, as such, compared to the deeper meanings they held for faith (allegory), for eternity (anagogy), and for one’s own life (morality). In their reading habits, also, a philosophical position in a meditative ascent proved not the end of understanding, but a beginning for meditation. They knew that the position, however valu33. For this tradition and a bibliography on it, see Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).
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able in its own right, was a station along the way, and they knew how to meditate on its relations to levels above and below. Modern scholars may find my treatment of these relations irrelevant to their concerns, which they rightfully define for themselves. But now, at least, they have a brief account of why they have not noticed the literary strategies so important to the present book. The same point can also be made by comparing the current states of biblical and patristic scholarship. Until the 1980s, biblical scholarship was predominantly historical and philological, so much so that source and redaction criticism were often considered to be “literary.” Early in that decade, however, scholars began to publish books in what came to be called “narrative criticism,” employing the techniques of a properly literary criticism to understand books of the Bible as coherent wholes.34 Where historical and philological techniques tended to fractionate a gospel, the new literary study aimed to see it steadily and whole. These scholars distinguished the author of a gospel from its narrator, and sometimes the implied author from the historical one. The techniques they employed led to new understandings, simultaneously literary and theological.35 Their work recovered the design of a book as a whole, how it was designed to work upon its audience. These studies have repristinated not only the books of the Bible but the field of biblical studies. Patristic scholarship, in contrast, has largely ignored these techniques of literary study. Its prevailing methods remain historical and philological and, in philosophy, analytic. The level of scholar34. Pioneering books in this field include Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981); David Rhoads and Donald Michie, Mark as Story: An Introduction to the Narrative of a Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982); and R. Alan Culpepper, Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). 35. See Thomas L. Brodie, The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 3–76, for an analysis of the differences between different kinds of biblical interpretation and an elegant treatment of John’s Gospel as a whole.
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ship is high—witness the superb commentaries by Joachim Grubar on The Consolation of Philosophy and James J. O’Donnell on the Confessions, Peter Brown’s biography of Augustine and R. W. Southern’s on Anselm, among other achievements. Nevertheless, the prevailing methods of analysis focus on the local and literal level of these works. These methods presume that the author’s meanings can be recovered in this way. My view, in contrast, is that these methods recover only the narrator’s meanings, for the author has implied meditative meanings in the work as a whole, and these can be recovered only by understanding its structure and reflecting on the relations between its stages. Also, although we know a good deal about the methods of literary interpretation practiced by Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm, these methods have not been used by scholars to study their works. As a result, the deeper, meditative levels of the Confessions, Consolation, and Proslogion remain largely unexplored. Although the spiritual value of these works is warmly appreciated, they have rarely been studied as “spiritual exercises,” largely because historical and philological analysis does not ask meditative questions. The present book aims to ask some meditative questions and show how they might be answered. Just as biblical scholars have used new techniques to explore the literary and theological unity of a gospel, so do I employ similar techniques to treat the literary and philosophical coherence of the Confessions, Consolation, and Proslogion. This chapter has set forth the principles of the meditative ascent and explained the rationale to be pursued in the chapters that follow. I do not claim to explore all that needs to be explored in these works. I attempt to chart a new track, hoping that others will follow to develop, and perhaps correct, what is said here.
Summary Let me conclude this chapter by gathering together the principles governing the literary and philosophical structure of a medita-
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tive ascent. As a journey of return to the Origin, the ascent moves steadily “upward” and “back,” to principles of being ever higher and prior, logically and ontologically. Higher principles of being ground, and therefore govern, lower ones: the power of memory, for example, forms the basis of all particular memories. The meditation thereby ascends to levels of being ever more fundamental, more general, more lasting, more universal. Though we moderns may think of these higher categories as “less real,” because vaguer and more abstract, the Christian Platonist found them more real because more comprehensive. They understood the ascent as a meditative journey into greater and greater reality, culminating in Ultimate Reality. This ascent to Reality is both an interior journey and a journey into the interior. By definition, a meditative journey is not made by walking, sailing, or flying, but by reflecting in language. It begins with the inward turn of Christian-Platonist conversion: the pilgrim soul “returns into itself,” away from things outside (extra se) to those within (intra se), and so is led to those above (supra se). It ascends to ever higher levels of being by progressing to higher levels of discourse. But “higher” also means “deeper,” more fundamental: higher principles of “being in general” prove deeper principles of our human being. When the Christian Platonist ascends meditatively, he journeys into the depths of his being and of all being. The interior journey journeys into the interior of reality. To understand a meditative ascent, we must grasp not only its explicit statements on each discursive level but also the implied relations between levels, and especially those with the highest level. The meditative ascent is written with this deliberate literary strategy: we cannot understand it fully without meditating on it. It demands retrospective rereading. Just as God is both the Origin and the End of the journey, so the meditative vision of God at its climax proves the ground of the work as a whole. Hence, we need to understand how successive levels prove higher and prior, logically and ontologi-
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cally. But we also need to understand, in interpretive retrospect, how its conclusion is related to each earlier level as its ultimate ground. In addition to its pattern as an ascent, each of these works is chiastically structured in numerologically significant ways. This structure is implied and can be discovered not by reading alone, but by reflecting on the work as a whole. A chiasm is a ring structure— hence, a circle—and a cross, for the Greek letter chi is an X. The circle and the cross evoke fundamental beliefs in Christian Platonism: procession and return; creation and salvation; the “still circle” of divinity; Christ’s Incarnation, Passion, and Resurrection; the crossing of the two cosmic Motions; and the divine order of the heavens. Chiastic structure thereby unifies and ramifies a meditative ascent because each theme is related to it, and through it can be related to all other themes. Like the Bible, and for similar reasons, these works are meditatively inexhaustible. In other words, a meditative ascent is not an argument, though it uses passages of argument. Primarily, it is a journey made through dialogue, and hence a spiritual exercise. Each of these works features a pilgrim figure seeking God, on a journey in quest of truth. None of these pilgrim figures knows precisely where he is going or how to get there, and so his journey is full of surprising insights and discoveries. The journeys all succeed, moreover, because they all unfold as dialogues and each pilgrim figure is guided to some kind of fulfillment. This is obvious in the Commedia, where Dante the pilgrim is guided on his journey by Virgil and Beatrice, and in The Consolation of Philosophy, where Lady Philosophy explicitly teaches Boethius the prisoner. But it is no less true for the Confessions and the Proslogion, where the pilgrim figures pray to God and are guided to fulfillment by grace. The character of the Confessions as a “dialogue with God” has long been recognized, and Anselm took up its principles when he took up its literary and philosophical form. In all of these works, the pilgrim figure should be distinguished from the author, even
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though both have the same name. Anselm the narrator, “struggling to raise his mind to the contemplation of God” (“Preface”), is a different figure from Anselm the author, who orchestrated his meditative ascent. The author designed the meditative ascent to effect, simultaneously, the progressive transformation of its pilgrim figure and its key words. These transformations are recorded in the work, but rarely reflected upon within it: the author left their rationale to be discovered by the reader. In the Commedia, “love” comes to have new meanings at higher levels of the ascent, and these are analogous to the change being wrought in Dante the pilgrim. In the Confessions, “friendship” means something different in the conversion account in Book 8 than it does in the pear theft in Book 2, and this difference indicates a corresponding change in the young Augustine. These differences are registered in the work, but not remarked upon. The pilgrim figure is too involved in his unfolding progress to reflect on the pattern of his transformation. The author, however, understood this pattern, as the design of his work reveals. But he left its rationale to be discovered by the meditative reader, reflecting on the work as a whole. Our meditating on the transformation of its pilgrim figure and its key words is designed to effect a transformation in us. A meditative ascent is a work of transformation: the transformations within the work are designed to work a transformation in the meditative reader. Hence, each of these works proves a spiritual exercise, both explicitly and implicitly. Each pilgrim figure engages in an arduous quest for truth, and we participate in his spiritual exercise by following carefully the story of his quest. In addition, the author of each work invites us to meditate on what its structure implies. What Augustine the author said in the Confessions surpassed the utterances of Augustine the narrator. The mind of Augustine the author can only be discovered by reflecting on the work as a whole. Augustine the narrator prays his way forward and rarely stops to look back. But as
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in life, so in reading: we read forward and understand backward. To understand the author’s intentions in a meditative ascent, we must meditate on it as a completed whole, something its narrator never does. We thereby participate in the spiritual exercise its author performed in designing the work.
CHAPTER 2
THE UNITY
OF MEDITATIVE
STRUCTURE AND TEXTURE IN AUGUSTINE’S CONFESSIONS
A U G U S T I N E ’ S Confessions is not only the earliest work treated in this book but also the longest, the richest, and the most complex. The later works derive from it, because each looks back to the Confessions for one or more of its fundamental literary principles. Boethius and Dante imitated its autobiographical structure and Anselm its prayerful quest for truth. To understand any of these works, we need to grasp its literary genre and structure so as to understand its unity. We can then go on to explore the philosophical implications contained by this unified structure. These implications are properly meditative and, as such, they may well not satisfy our contemporary, analytical sense of what is genuinely philosophical. Nevertheless, writers in late antiquity and the Middle Ages had a somewhat different sense of what “the love of wisdom” entailed, and we must accept their sense of “philosophy” if we wish to understand their achievement.1 1. For any topic in Augustine’s life and thought, one should begin by consulting Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, edited by Allan Fitzgerald, O.S.A., et al. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999); all the entries are well written and have bibliographies. For specific questions about passages in the Confessions, one should begin by consulting the superb scholarship exhibited in Augustine, The Confessions: Text and Commentary, 3 vols., edited with an Introduction and Commentary by James J. O’Donnell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Colin Starnes, Augustine’s Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of “Confessions” I–IX (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1990), is a useful guide to the autobiography,
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65
In order to understand Augustine’s meditative philosophy in the Confessions, we must first understand the work’s unity, its formal coherence. The present chapter treats this formal coherence in three sections, while the following chapter explores the work’s meditative philosophy.2 The first section describes the Confessions’s meditative structure as a Christian-Platonist ascent, a return to the Origin. The second treats the meditative texture of its literary genre as a prayer, a “dialogue with God.” The final section brings these two themes together and shows how the allegorical interpretation of Genesis 1 in Book 13 provides the paradigm for the whole Confessions. The work is shown to have not merely a unity through its leading themes, as many scholars have argued, but also a plan, a deeply structured formal coherence.3 The distinction between “unity” and “plan” was made by Luc Verheijen in an effort to bring some clarity to the long debate about the formal coherence of the Confessions.4 Verheijen points to several themes and modes of expression running throughout the work, all of which lend it “unity.” This unity derives from Augustine’s “unity while the essays in Kim Paffenroth and Robert P. Kennedy, eds., A Reader’s Companion to Augustine’s “Confessions” (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), cover all thirteen books. 2. Parts of the present chapter are argued, in abbreviated form, in Robert McMahon, “Book Thirteen: Augustine’s Return to the Origin,” in Paffenroth and Kennedy, eds., A Reader’s Companion, pp. 207–23. 3. Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of the Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), treats meditation in Augustine’s works more widely, but his working notion of “meditation” in that book differs from mine. For Stock, “meditation” is discursively explicit, and synonyms for it would include “reflection,” “rumination,” and “mulling over,” as in the monastic tradition of meditatio. But, in the present book, “meditation” points rather to implied meanings orchestrated by the genre of the meditative ascent, a Christian-Platonist ascent enacted over the whole Confessions. 4. Luc Verheijen, “The Confessions: Two Grids of Composition and Meaning,” a paper presented in 1989 at the Patristics, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference, Villanova University. In Verheijen’s absence, Frederick Van Fleteren presented his paper.
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of soul,” for he was a man with persistent concerns and habits of expression. Yet Verheijen finds no coherent plan in the Confessions. Like other scholars, he acknowledges the large divisions in the work: the autobiography in Books 1–9, Book 10 on memory, and Books 11–13 on Genesis 1. But he finds no plan linking them one to another, unifying the work as a whole by some compelling scheme. This seems to be the scholarly consensus. Frederick Van Fleteren, in his entry on the Confessions for the Augustine encyclopedia, says that “[o]f course, Augustine never intended to write a literary classic— Confessiones may in fact be disunited—and, therefore, search for unity may be vain.”5 In my view, however, the Confessions is constructed according to a plan, one that incorporates its seeming planlessness. The work thereby has a deep formal coherence. In Chapter 1, I suggested that scholars have missed Augustine’s plan in the work because they have not distinguished Augustine the narrator, the voice in the Confessions, from Augustine the author, who designed the work as a whole. Augustine the narrator never comments on his plan for the work because he does not have one: it emerges through the spontaneities of his dialogue with God. But Augustine the author did have a plan for the work, for he designed it as a Christian-Platonist ascent. The formal coherence of the Confessions cannot be understood without grasping this distinction. Augustine’s general plan is sketched out in the following section, but the work’s deep formal coherence emerges only by reflecting on its meditative texture as a “dialogue with God.”6 5. “Confessiones,” in Allan D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages, p. 228. Pace Van Fleteren, Augustine sets his Confessions against the Aeneid (Conf. 1.13), the literary classic of late antiquity. See Andrew Fichter’s brilliant (and neglected) analysis in Poets Historical: Dynastic Epic in the Renaissance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 40–69. On Augustine and Vergil more generally, see Sabine MacCormack, The Shadows of Poetry: Vergil in the Mind of Augustine (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998). 6. This chapter abbreviates my book, Augustine’s Prayerful Ascent: An Essay on
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Meditative Structure: Return to the Origin The structure of the Confessions works out the implications of its theological anthropology, epitomized in its most famous sentence. Its first chapter declares that God stirs us up to delight in praising Him, because “You have made us toward yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te; 1.1.1). I have translated this literally and awkwardly, to point up certain features. First, “you have made us” obviously alludes to God’s creation of human beings in Genesis 1:26–27. But for Augustine’s readers, the allusion includes “toward yourself” (ad te) because the Latin Bible renders the act as God’s creating humans “toward [his] image” (ad imaginam), rather than “in” it. According to this understanding, Christ alone is the Image of God, and human beings are made “toward” that Image. The human being is an image of this Image, so to speak. We are made “toward” God—in fact, toward the Second Person of the Trinity, God in Christ. Second, Augustine’s “toward yourself” implies an innate inclination in human nature. Human beings are innately, by our very nature, drawn toward God. That is why the human heart is “restless” amid all the goods of the created world. So many things please, but none of them satisfies. Even all of them together would not satisfy the human heart, so swiftly are we wearied by satiety. Augustine experienced in himself and others this inability to find enduring peace, even in great worldly success. He presents the restless heart as an index in this world that human beings are made by and for Someone beyond it. Hence, the Augustinian heart has both an incompleteness, for it is “restless,” and a directionality, toward God. the Literary Form of the “Confessions” (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989). For scholarship on “the unity of the Confessions,” see pp. xi–xv and 40–42; for a more detailed review, see Gennaro Luongo, “Autobiografia ed esegesi nelle Confessioni di Agostino,” Parola del Passato 31 (1976): 286–306.
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Moreover, his phrasing links the individual with all humankind: “our heart is restless until it rests in you” (my emphasis). This restlessness is manifested in every human heart and in the human race as a whole. As is well known, this sentence foreshadows the peace of heart Augustine experienced at his conversion (8.12.29), the eternal rest he hopes for after death, and the eternal sabbath of all the saved at the end of time (13.35–38). In its context, the sentence explains why we delight in worship, and thus implies the Church. The Church, as we shall see, carries Augustine’s understanding of the meaning of creation and the purpose of history. Because we are made “toward” God’s Image, Christ, we find our fulfillment in his Mystical Body, the Church. Hence, creation is not merely an event that happened long ago, to Adam and Eve. Every human being is made “toward God’s image”: the restlessness of every human heart manifests its creation by God. Later in the Confessions Augustine touches on the Divine Presence in human beings even when we are not aware of it. Remembering when the young Augustine sought for God outwardly “according to the sense of the flesh,” the bishop declares that God is “more inward than my innermost and higher than my uppermost” (interior intimo meo et superior summo meo; 3.6.11). Interior intimo meo may be freely rendered as “more inward to me than I am to myself.” The Divine Presence proves more inward than the self because the self is formed by the contents of experience. The inward Divine Presence, however, constitutes the human being as such, as the creature made “toward [God’s] image,” and thereby enables human experiencing in the first place. Similarly, addressing the divine Beauty “ever old and ever new,” Augustine recalls that “[y]ou were within, and I was in the external world, and sought you there,” for “[y]ou were with me, and I was not with you” (10.27.38). He affirms that God is somehow present in actuating the consciousness of human beings, whether we know it or not. The Divine Presence in our nature makes us “restless” for happiness. Our search for “the happy life” (10.20–23) arises from
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our very depths, for we have no earthly experience of the happiness we long for. This happiness is not an object of remembered experience, yet our desire for it quickens all that we do. This longing for we-know-not-what happiness is a longing to experience the Divine Presence—”When I seek for you, my God, my quest is for the happy life” (10.20.29)—and it arises from the Divine Presence within us. For Augustine, God is the source and term, the Origin and End, of all human desire. Because Augustinian desire seeks its fulfillment by moving toward God, simultaneously its “inward” Origin and its “upward” End, the Confessions as a whole is structured as a return to the Origin, a Christian-Platonist ascent. The ascent, let us recall, is based on the exitus-reditus scheme: as all things come forth from God, so do all things return to God. This “return to the Origin” is a meditative movement to principles: it ascends progressively to principles logically prior, and therefore ontologically higher, for Platonist principles are universals, realms of being. Hence, the ascent moves not merely to categories progressively more general, as in our nominalist way of thinking, but to realms of being more universal and real, because they comprehend more of reality. At the same time, the Platonist arrives at these realms “above himself” (supra se) after taking the inward turn, away from things “outside him” (extra se) to the principles of the soul within (in se). The Platonist ascent moves not only “upward” but also “inward,” to universal principles ontologically higher because more interior. In this way, the meditator moves toward the Divine Presence “more inward than [his] innermost and higher than [his] uppermost” (3.6.11). Let us see how this pattern works itself out in the Confessions, first as a progress to what is prior, logically and ontologically, and then as an interior movement.7 The progress from Books 1–9 to Books 10 and 11 was charted in Chapter 1 and so may be merely 7. My treatment of the ascent as a progress to what is prior derives from Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, pp. 123–24, 141–57; it
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sketched here. After examining certain of his memories in his spiritual autobiography (Books 1–9), Augustine the narrator explores memory, in Book 10, and time, in Book 11. Memories cannot exist without memory, and memory cannot exist without time. Memory, then, is logically and ontologically prior to memories, as is time to memory. Time is the precondition of memory, and thus of memories.8 Book 12 is largely taken up with the narrator’s interpreting “heaven and earth” in Genesis 1:1. He holds that “heaven” refers to the “heaven of heavens,” the “incorporeal creation” (12.8–9), and “earth” refers to the “formless matter” from which the world would be made (12.3–7). Both of these, he argues, exist prior to time, though neither is properly eternal (12.12–13). Before the world exists, there is no time; “heaven and earth,” pure form and pure matter, are the pretemporal constituents of the world. Hence, “heaven and earth,” in Book 12, are logically and ontologically prior to time, in Book 11. Book 13 concludes the work, and it closes by interpreting the seven days of Creation as an allegory for the creation and growth of the Church (13.12–38).9 Summarizing his treatment of the six days in chapter 34, Augustine the narrator begins, “We have seen into [inabbreviates McMahon, Augustine’s Prayerful Ascent, pp. 115–55. Other treatments include R. D. Crouse, “‘Recurrens in te unum’: The Pattern of St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Studia Patristica 14:389–92; and G. N. Knauer, “Peregrinatio animae. Zur Frage der Einheit der augustinischen Konfessionen,” Hermes 85 (1957): 216–48. 8. For the themes of eternity and time in these books, see John C. Cooper, “Why Did Augustine Write Books XI–XIII of the Confessions?,” Augustinian Studies 2 (1971): 37–46; John M. Quinn, O.S.A., “Four Faces of Time in St. Augustine,” Recherches Augustiniennes 26 (1992): 181–231; Roland J. Teske, S.J., Paradoxes of Time in St. Augustine, The Aquinas Lecture 1996 (Marquette, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1996); Katherin A. Rogers, “St. Augustine on Time and Eternity,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1996): 207–23; and Mary T. Clark, “Augustine on Immutability and Mutability,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2000): 7–27. 9. The best treatment of book 13 is F. Cayre, “Le livre XIII des Confessions,” Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 2 (1956): 143–61.
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speximus] these things according to the mystical purpose with which you willed [voluisti] them to come into being in such an order, or to be written in such an order” (13.34.49). Augustine claims that his allegory for the Church reveals the purpose for which God willed the sequential order of the creation, or of the creation story. Odd though Augustine’s allegory and claim may be to us, the fundamental point was entirely traditional. The Shepherd of Hermas affirmed that “[t]he world was created for the sake of the Church,” and Clement of Alexandria explained that “[j]ust as God’s will is creation and is called ‘the world,’ so his intention is the salvation of men, and it is called ‘the Church.’”10 For Augustine, then, the allegory of the Church in Book 13 reveals God’s purpose in creation, or in inspiring its account in Genesis. Since purpose is logically and ontologically prior to act, the Church, as God’s purpose, is logically and ontologically prior to creation. Moreover, as the Mystical Body of Christ, it is understood to be eternal: it preceded the world in God’s mind and will endure beyond the end of the world in the “eternal Sabbath” (13.35–38) of his presence. In this traditional understanding, the Church is the divine origin and the goal of all things. As God’s purpose and goal in creating, the Church is logically prior to and ontologically higher than all created things. Augustine’s meditative ascent can go no further than his vision into the providential order of creation and the Church. His return to the Origin is complete, and his Confessions come to a close. Now let us consider the progressively interior movement of this ascent.11 It proves obvious in the progress from memories, in Books 1–9, to memory, in Book 10, for the faculty of memory proves deep10. See Pastor Hermae, Book I, Vision 2, 4, 1, in Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, edited by J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857), vol. 2, column 899; and Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 1, 6, 27, in Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series Graeca (Paris, 1891), vol. 8, column 281. 11. I am grateful to Todd Breyfogle for helping me to understand the interior progress of Books 10–12.
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er than its contents. In Books 11, 12, and 13, the interior progress of the ascent emerges in the final chapters. Near the end of Book 11, Augustine concludes that time contains memory as one of its aspects. Discovering that only the present exists, he analyzes time psychologically, as “attention” (attentio; 11.28) in the present to various things: memory is attention to things past; the present is attention to things present; expectation is attention to things future. Attention, then, is necessary to memory, prior to it, and deeper in the soul. That is why its scope extends not only to things past but also to things present and future. From “attention,” near the end of Book 11, the ascent moves to “the will” (voluntas) in the final chapters of Book 12. After treating his own and various other interpretations of “heaven and earth” in chapters 2–22, the narrator begins to reflect on hermeneutic principles. These all turn on the moral disposition (voluntas) of interpreters attempting to understand the intention (voluntas) of Moses and of God in Genesis 1 (12.23.32, 12.24.33, 12.28.38, 12.30.41, 12.32.43). Because Augustine refuses to consider the views of heretics or unbelievers (12.14.17, 12.16.23, 12.23.32), the “rule of faith” governs his whole discussion: all the differing interpretations are true, because the rule of faith excludes false ones. He goes on to develop “the rule of charity”: no exegete should prefer his interpretations to other true ones simply because it is his (12.25, 30–31). Because charity is the end or goal of Scripture, what the Holy Spirit willed when inspiring it, charity should bring concord of the will to exegetes with differing views. Book 12 closes with Augustine praying to conform his interpretation to God’s will in Scripture: “I would say what your Truth willed [voluerit] to say to me, which also spoke to [Moses] what it willed [voluit]” (12.32.43). Now faith and charity are dispositions of the rightly oriented will. Clearly, the directing of attention depends on the will, and right attention depends on a rightly oriented will. The will is a principle prior to attention, more important and powerful because more interior, deeper in the soul.
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The movement from “attention,” at the end of Book 11, to “will,” at the end of Book 12, marks an interior progress. Book 13, as we have seen, closes with the purpose God wills in creation. Obviously, God’s will (voluisti; 13.34.49) is prior to and higher than the will (voluntas) of human beings. At the same time, the purpose that God wills in creation is the Church, to share his life with human creatures made in his image, and this divine desire is stamped by its presence interior intimo within the restless human heart. “You have made us toward yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (1.1.1; my emphasis). This formulation points to the Church: not only is every human heart restless toward God, but also a single corporate heart seeks rest in the Divine Presence. In the Church, the divine creation continues in the Divine Providence guiding our restless heart, individually and corporately, toward its eternal rest. In other words, when Augustine recognizes the Church as God’s purpose in creation, at the end of Book 13, he recognizes the deepest aspect of himself. Here is the divine ground of the longing that animates his will (Book 12), his attention (Book 11), and his memory (Book 10). Further inward he cannot go. His innermost is his uppermost, for God is “interior intimo meo et superior summo meo” (3.6.11). In short, as a Christian-Platonist ascent, the Confessions’s end is its beginning. At the literary level, the Church governs the work from its first sentence to its last: as a prayerful dialogue with God, the Confessions enacts the Church throughout. But the Church also functions at the level of universal history: as God’s purpose for creating, the Church is his original intention and ultimate end for the world and human beings. Most obviously, Augustine discovers the meaning of his life in the Church: God’s presence is the origin and end of his “restless heart,” leading him providentially through dissatisfaction with worldly success to Christian conversion. The Providence guiding Augustine’s life and his dialogue with God leads him finally to envision the Providence guiding all human history. Augus-
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tine’s life and Confessions prove, in the end, instances of the Church, the divinely guided universal movement that begins before time and ends beyond it. The allegory of Book 13 thereby completes Augustine’s understanding of his restless heart in his very first chapter. The meditative structure of the Confessions moves to progressively deeper, and therefore more universal, self-understandings. Augustine would have us recognize deeper and deeper aspects of ourselves in this movement and so come to see ourselves as he does, stamped in his origin, longing, and end as God’s. In the Confessions, the Church proves at once the deepest, highest, and most universal form of self-knowledge. As the providential origin and end of the world, the Church is the ground of creation, of Augustine’s restless heart, of his dialogue with God, and of his Christian-Platonist ascent. This ascent over the whole Confessions is never explicitly remarked. Hence, it is not merely a structure but a meditative structure, because it can be discerned only by meditating on relations between the parts of the work. In other words, it cannot be discerned simply by reading the Confessions, but only by reflecting on it retrospectively, as a whole. The “ascent of the soul” not only appears explicitly in certain parts of the work, but is also enacted implicitly over the whole. As an implied structure, it can only be discovered through meditation. Just as Augustine could only understand his journey to the Christian faith after it had been completed by conversion, so we can understand the journey structure of the Confessions only by retrospective meditation on the work as a whole. Within this movement, the autobiography in Books 1–9 enacts, in its own ways, a return to the Origin. For one thing, it tells the story of the young Augustine’s conversion, and as a turning toward God, a conversion is necessarily a return to the Origin. Also, the autobiography moves climactically to gradually deeper, or higher, returns to the Origin: the young Augustine’s experience of God as a spiritual substance (7.9–11), his conversion to faith in the Incarna-
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tion and to chastity (8.12), and his entry into the Church in his baptism (9.6). Each of these proves a return to the Origin by the young Augustine: in his intellect (7.9–11), in his intellect and will (8.12), and in his whole person through the sacraments of the Church (9.6). Book 9 also features his return to the Origin in the meditative ascent of his “vision at Ostia” (9.10), and it concludes with the saintly death of his mother: his earthly origin returning to her divine Origin. Books 1–9 also enact this return in their formal structure as a chiasm. A simple chiastic structure may be represented schematically in this way: A B C B A. This schema clearly shows a movement that enacts a progression (A B C) and a return (C B A). William A. Stephany has shown how this structure functions in Augustine’s autobiography with thematic parallels between Books 1 and 9, 2 and 8, 3 and 7, and 4 and 6.12 Books 1 and 9, according to Stephany, emphasize physical birth and spiritual birth, respectively. Augustine’s narrative of his own life begins with his physical birth (1.6.7) and ends with his spiritual rebirth in baptism (9.6.14). Book 9 also records the baptisms—the sacramental births—of Verecundus (9.3.5), Nebridius (9.3.6), Adeodatus (9.6.14), and Alypius (9.6.14). All except the last are dead when the Confessions is written, and Augustine envisions each as born into eternal life. Also, it may be noted, Book 1 recurrently criticizes the boy’s classical education, while Book 9 begins with the young convert’s decision to give up his profession as a teacher of the classics (9.2) and to immerse himself in the prayerful reading of Scripture (9.4). Let one other set of parallel books illustrate the chiastic pattern 12. See William A. Stephany, “Thematic Structure in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 20 (1989): 129–42. Independently of Stephany, Frederick J. Crosson also found chiastic structure in Books 1–9.; see his “Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1989): 84–97, and, more recently, “Book Five: The Disclosure of Hidden Providence,” in Paffenroth and Kennedy, eds., A Reader’s Companion, pp. 71–88.
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of the autobiography. Stephany observes that Books 2 and 8 feature events around a fruit tree in a garden. Both treat the perversity of human will after the Fall, whether inclined toward evil (Book 2) or unable wholly to will the good (Book 8). The two books also feature contrasting roles for friendship: in Book 2 the young Augustine’s companions lead him to sin, while in Book 8 the Christian friendship of Simplicianus and Ponticianus leads to his conversion. In this chiastic structure of thematic parallels, then, the later books rework themes of their earlier ones in a higher, more converted, way. Book 8 returns to, or echoes, the themes of Book 2, but orients them toward conversion of the will, rather than its perversion through sin. Similarly, Book 9 returns to certain themes in Book 1, but they now appear as spiritual rebirth and Christian studies, rather than as physical birth and classical studies. From this perspective, we can chart the curve of Books 1–9 as a spiritual descent over its first half, followed by a spiritual ascent over its second half. Book 5 is the swing-book at the center, as the young Augustine moves away from the Manichaean Faustus in North Africa, in its first half (5.1–7), to Italy and the Christian Ambrose in its second (5.13–14). The young man’s spiritual nadir may be found in the middle of this central book: he deceives his mother, abandons her in North Africa (5.8), and then nearly dies from fever in Rome, yet in the madness of his heresy refuses to be baptized (5.9.16). Only Monica’s prayers and God’s mercy save him from eternal damnation. To be sure, the spiritual descent of Books 1–4 has certain countermovements, such as the young Augustine’s discovery of philosophy, which inflames him with the desire to fly away from earthly things (3.4). Similarly, his spiritual progress over Books 6–9 is countered by his career ambitions (6.6) and his lustful desires (6.15). Nevertheless, the general movement of Books 1–9 is a descent, followed by an ascent, reinforced by thematic parallels in the chiastic structure. In this way, the formal, chiastic structure of parallel or returning themes participates in the progress of the narrative as a return to the
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Origin. We can now see the Trinitarian numerological structure of the whole Confessions. The nine autobiographical books (3 3 3) form a distinct unity within the work. They are followed by Books 10–12, three books of philosophical and exegetical ascent to themes prior in time and progressively more interior. Book 13 contains the allegorical paradigm for the whole Confessions, the Church as God’s purpose for creating the world. We have here a spiraling ascent to unity with numbers evoking the Triune God: 9, 3, and 1. Moreover, Books 1–9 enact a return to the Origin not only as the story of Augustine’s conversion but also in their formal structure as an unfolding chiasm, which may be graphed as “A B C D E D C B A” for the nine books. And since a chiasm is traditionally understood to be a cross-structure, from the Greek letter chi (X), Augustine’s autobiographical return to the Origin is thereby marked with the sign of the cross and the emblem of the name of Christ. It thereby foreshadows the work’s climax in the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ.
Meditative Texture and Pilgrim Figures The whole of the Confessions unfolds in the dynamism of the heart restless toward God (1.1.1) because God is present in Augustine’s heart interior intimo meo (3.6.11), “more inward than my innermost.” The work is not merely “about” Augustine’s quest for God: it enacts that quest in its literary form. We have examined that literary form in its large-scale meditative structure: it unfolds as a Christian-Platonist ascent, a return to the Origin. To grasp the unity of the Confessions, we must also consider its small-scale meditative texture and grasp its relation to Augustine’s ascent over the work as a whole. In other words, the Confessions enacts a religious journey, a pilgrimage, and we want to understand how its meditative structure and texture work to render that journey so compellingly. The most obvious journey in the Confessions is recorded in Books 1–9, the young Augustine’s journey to Christian faith. Be-
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cause these books tell a conversion story, a spiritual autobiography, we do well to distinguish the young Augustine, the character in Books 1–9, from the bishop telling his story retrospectively.13 The difference proves especially sharp in the early books, when Augustine the bishop records and often criticizes the young Augustine’s attitudes and acts. The young non-Christian Augustine was animated by values and impulses that the Christian bishop finds alien to his present self. Although historical continuity unites the young Augustine and Augustine the bishop, they are divided by the death and resurrection of conversion, at the end of Book 8, as it matures through another decade and an ecclesiastical career. Granted, scholarship rarely confuses the two figures: even when both are called “Augustine,” they are usually discriminated by context. Nevertheless, distinguishing the two figures with different names fosters clarity of analysis. The young Augustine is the primary pilgrim figure in Books 1–9: journey imagery is often used for his spiritual regress and progress. These books cover over thirty years of his life and so, as a whole, they record a considerable development. The young Augustine’s pilgrimage to conversion (8.12) and baptism (9.6) has excited readers for many centuries. Nevertheless, the bishop telling this story also proves something of a pilgrim figure. For one thing, he is not recollecting in tranquility events from his past. Rather, he is making his Confessions, inquiring before God into these events, struggling to understand them and himself. Nor does God prove a mere spectator of this struggle, for the bishop insists that God recalls events to his memory (2.7.15) and helps him to understand them (2.9.17). The Confessions shows us the bishop learning about the past events that 13. John Freccero has developed this distinction for Augustine and for Dante in several essays. See his collection, Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, esp. pp. 119–35 and 258–71. On Augustine and Dante, see also Peter S. Hawkins, “Divide and Conquer: Augustine in the Divine Comedy,” PMLA 106 (1991): 471–93; and Paul A. Olson, The Journey to Wisdom: Self-Education in Patristic and Medieval Literature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 72–78.
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he recalls. He may not be as dramatic a pilgrim figure as the young Augustine, but Books 1–9 show him making a journey of understanding nonetheless. Augustine’s journey of understanding in the Confessions has long been understood by scholars, who describe the work as a prayer, a dialogue with God. Peter Brown notes Augustine’s originality in making prayer the literary form of so long a work and terms it a “lively conversation.”14 Solignac also calls the work “a dialogue with God” and, arguing that God is present throughout as “an invisible interlocutor,” insists that “[t]hroughout these thirteen books, Augustine allows himself to be taught by God” (his emphasis). G. Bouissou describes the Confessions as “a dialogue in one voice” because “only Augustine speaks—or rather, we only hear his voice—but from his language, his feelings, the tone of his discourse, and in a certain way the reactions of his countenance, we sense the divine replies.”15 Augustine scholars have often recorded their understanding and appreciation of this aspect of the Confessions. But they have not understood its consequences: we must distinguish Augustine the narrator, the voice of the unfolding prayer, from Augustine the author, who designed, wrote, and revised the whole work. Although historians have often observed a disjunction between “events” in Books 1–9 and what actually happened in the young Augustine’s life, they have neglected the disjunction between the narrator in and the author of the Confessions. The work presents itself as a prayer that unfolds in an ongoing present, in which Augustine the narrator is guided by the spontaneities of his dialogue with God. In other words, the work presents itself as though it were 14. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 166–67. 15. A. Solignac, “Introduction,” Les Confessions, Bibliotheque Augustinienne, vol. 13 (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1962), pp. 12–13; and G. Bouissou, “Le Style,” chapter 7, in Solignac’s “Introduction,” p. 223 (my translation). See also Jose Oroz-Reta, “Priere et Recherche de Dieu dans les Confessions de saint Augustin,” Augustinian Studies 7 (1976): 99–118.
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an oral dialogue with God, recorded in its unfolding. The etymology of its title implies as much: confessio derives from con-fari, “to speak with.” Hence, as an oral and spontaneous prayer, it necessarily presents itself as unrehearsed and unrevised. A dialogue, by definition, cannot be revised by the speakers in it, nor can a genuine dialogue be rehearsed. When scholars call the Confessions a “dialogue with God,” they implicitly distinguish Augustine the narrator, praying orally in the dynamism of that dialogue, from Augustine the author, who designed, wrote, and revised it. Augustine the narrator and Augustine the author thus parallel Socrates and Plato in a Platonic dialogue. On the one hand, the speaking Socrates cannot properly revise what he has spoken: he can only add to it. He may recant, as in the Phaedrus, or rephrase or qualify, but only by speaking further. So, too, Augustine the narrator may correct an earlier statement on, say, the nature of time, not by erasure and revision but only by adding to what he has said. The narrator can and does come to new understandings in his quest for truth, and we see this happening over and over again in the Confessions. On the other hand, we assume that Plato revised his dialogues as he perfected them, and so did Augustine the author with the dialogue of his Confessions. As authors, they encompassed and stood beyond the unfolding quest for truth in their dialogues. There they telescoped and dramatized a process of discovery which they themselves, as authors, had already completed. Augustine the narrator was created by Augustine the author as his persona, his speaking voice. In other words, Augustine the author created his narrator as a literary, and therefore partial, representation of himself. As a literary figure, Augustine the narrator continues to pray the Confessions every time we read it: the work unfolds in a continuous literary present through the dynamism of his prayerful dialogue with God, recreated by our reading. Augustine the narrator is a pilgrim figure: he learns as he prays, for God leads his prayer in directions that often surprise him. By definition, his consciousness
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is explicit in each chapter of the work. He is, as it were, all utterance in the present: what he does not say, he does not think, by definition. Hence, he genuinely journeys in prayer and experiences surprise at new insights as the work unfolds. Augustine the author, in contrast, stood beyond the completed whole, for he designed, wrote, and revised it. He thereby comprehended the often surprising movements of his narrator’s unfolding prayer, and so the Confessions contained no surprises for him, by the definition of “author.” Augustine the narrator’s spontaneous discoveries were deliberately created by Augustine the author. Let us examine one of these. Early in Book 13, Augustine the narrator discovers the Trinity in the opening verses of Genesis, expressing his surprise by using the word “Behold” (Ecce) three times, once at the beginning and twice at the end of the chapter (13.5.6). At the beginning of the chapter, he insists that he is making the discovery only now, in the present, as he reads Genesis 1:2: “Behold, there appears to me, in an obscure way, the Trinity .l.l.l.” Over fifty chapters earlier, he found God the Father and God the Son in Genesis 1:1, interpreting “In the beginning” through John 1:1 to mean “in the Word, in the Son” (cf. 11.9.11). Yet only in Book 13 does he discover the Holy Spirit in the creation story, in “the spirit of God” who “was borne over the face of the waters” (Gn 1:2). He describes the process of his discovery: In the word “God,” who made these things, I was already understanding the Father, and in the word “the beginning” the Son, in whom he made them. And believing my God to be a Trinity, I was seeking [quaerebam] for the Trinity in these holy words and, behold, your “spirit was borne over the face of the waters.” Behold, the Trinity my God, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, creator of the whole creation. (13.5.6)
Augustine the narrator tells us unambiguously that when he found God the Father and God the Son in Genesis 1:1 (11.9.11), he did not think ahead, or read ahead, to “the spirit of God” in the following
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verse until over fifty chapters later, even though he “was seeking” (quaerebam) the Trinity in the creation story. And when he finds “the spirit” there in Book 13, he registers his surprise with three “Behold’s.” We know that the historical Augustine did not feel this surprise because he had commented on Genesis earlier in his career and found the Trinity in its first two verses. In his unfinished literal commentary on Genesis, composed around 391, he also interpreted “In the beginning” as “In the Son” from “God” the Father, and recognized that “the Spirit of God” could be understood as the Holy Spirit, thus indicating the Trinity.16 The historical Augustine, the author of the Confessions, knew this before he wrote Books 11–13, yet Augustine the narrator experiences surprise and joy when he discovers the Trinity in Genesis. To make this disjunction intelligible, we need the distinction between author and narrator. Evidently, Augustine the author dramatized, through the voice of his narrator, a process of search and discovery that he had already completed. He dramatized it in a particular way, through a contrived order, to accomplish certain ends, and one of these is to involve the reader in the drama of Augustine the narrator’s quest for truth in reading the Scriptures. To be sure, Augustine the author made these discoveries himself, in and through his life of prayer. That he made them while he composed the Confessions, in precisely the way Augustine the narrator does, we have no reason to believe. A similar instance may be found near the beginning of Book 2. The narrator complains that, when the adolescent Augustine was “spilt, scattered and boiled dry in [his] fornications,” God was silent 16. De Genesi ad litteram, imperfectus liber, in Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera, edited by the Benedictine monks of the monastery of Saint Maurus, Primo editio Neapolitana (Naples, 1854), vol. 3: 3.6 (column 111) for the Father and the Son, 4.16 (column 115) for the Spirit and the Trinity, active in the creation of the world.
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(2.2.2). In the following chapter, he realizes that this accusation was incorrect: in truth, God was speaking to him through his mother (2.3.7). Here is an instance of the narrator’s making a discovery in the course of his unfolding dialogue with God: understanding that his earlier accusation against God was wrong, he accuses himself instead (“Wretch that I am”; 2.3.7). At the time the historical Augustine wrote this, he had been a self-examining Christian for over a decade. I cannot believe that he made this discovery about his adolescent “fornications” only when he composed Book 2. Rather, Augustine the author used his narrator to dramatize a discovery he had made some years earlier. We may rightfully assume that the historical Augustine made discoveries as he composed the Confessions, as writers normally do when they work. But since we do not have his working papers, we cannot know precisely what these discoveries were or the stages in which he made them. We do know, however, what Augustine the narrator discovers and how he does so. But we cannot know whether the historical Augustine learned these things while he composed the Confessions or before. Nor can we be sure whether he discovered them in precisely the same stages as Augustine the narrator. It would be historically naïve to equate Augustine the narrator simpliciter with the historical Augustine, the author of the Confessions. We can be sure, however, that Augustine created his narrator as a literary version of himself, and this narrator’s process of discovery through prayer imitates what Augustine practiced over many years. Augustine the narrator should be distinguished, but not separated, from Augustine the author. Augustine the author created this narrator partly to state his views on certain things, partly as an example of prayerful self-examination and the quest for truth. We always know what Augustine the narrator is thinking, because he is a function of what the work is saying at any moment: the narrator’s thoughts are wholly explicit, by definition. Augustine the author, by
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definition, comprehended the total movement of his narrator’s thinking: he thereby implied understandings beyond what the narrator explicitly says. One such understanding I have already set forth: the Confessions as a whole unfolds as a Christian-Platonist ascent, a return to the Origin. Scholars have tended to miss this structure because they recognize only one Augustine in the work, and so they identify the narrator’s voice in the work with Augustine the author’s understanding. They thereby miss larger structures, and the understandings they imply. Since this distinction is unfamiliar in Augustine studies, let us see how it is warranted by the opening of the Confessions. I ask you to imagine yourself in the situation of one of Augustine’s first readers. You do not have your present familiarity with the work, nor does your text have the aids often supplied by editors and translators: no book titles, no chapter titles, no page headings. Hence, nothing advises you of the content of what you are reading except what the text itself says. You are not given a table of contents advising you, for example, that Book 1 will concern Augustine’s childhood or that Book 11 will consider “time,” nor do you know these things from prior readings. Moreover, you live in an oral culture and you are reading the work aloud. Consider, then, how the Confessions presents itself, especially the verb tenses that its “I” uses to characterize his activity: You are great, O Lord, and greatly to be praised: great is your power and to your wisdom there is no limit. And a human being [homo], some portion of your creation, wishes to praise you, a human being bearing within himself testimony to his sin and testimony that you resist the proud. You rouse us so that it delights us to praise you, because you have made us toward yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you. Grant me, Lord, to know and understand which is first, to call upon [invocare] you or to praise you, and also which is first, to know you or to call upon you. But does one who does not know you call upon you? For one who does not know you might call upon another, instead of you. Or must you be called upon so that you may be
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known? .l.l. May I seek you, Lord, calling upon you [invocans te], and may I call upon you [invocem te] believing in you, for you have been preached to us. Lord, my faith calls upon you [invocat te], which you have given to me .l.l.l. (1.1.1; my emphasis)
The work begins with a voice using a quotation from the Psalms to address God in the present tense. This is entirely traditional, as is using the present tense to describe the relationship between humankind and God. But then a first-person speaker appears: “Grant me, Lord, to know and understand.” He presents himself as a seeker, for he prays “to know and understand.” He asks God questions and works his way toward answers. He does not know what he thinks, and that is why he is praying his way through questions toward answers. We hear him thinking aloud in prayer, all the more so when we read the passage aloud. When he presents his activity in the first person, he characterizes himself as a speaker: he uses forms of invocare, “to call upon,” three times. His emphatic use of invocare makes explicit what he has been doing from the very first sentence: calling upon God. All this activity is taking place “now,” in the present. The text does not offer us understandings already arrived at, in the manner of a treatise. Rather, it gives us a man speaking “now,” praying for God’s guidance as he prays his questions and his tentative answers. We have no idea what he will go on to talk about, because he does not project a subject or a theme. At no point in the opening chapters does he ever say that he will describe his childhood, any more than he projects “the pear theft” at the beginning of Book 2. This voice does not know very well what he will say further on, and the reason is that he is engaged in a dialogue with God. The unfolding of the Confessions emerges in the dynamism of the speaker’s responsiveness to God’s grace. It presents itself as an oral and spontaneous prayer. Contrast the opening of On Christian Doctrine, which Augustine began about the same time as the Confessions: “There are two things
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necessary to the treatment of the Scriptures: a way of discovering those things which are to be understood, and a way of teaching what we have learned. We shall speak first of discovery and second of teaching” (1.1.1).17 This person’s voice is not praying to God, but speaking to readers in the third person. He projects an intention for the work. He is not in the process of discovering what he thinks, like the voice of the Confessions. He is not wondering aloud, asking questions, or groping toward answers. Rather, he has arrived at his insights already and he intends to communicate them. Moreover, he has a plan for doing so: he “will speak first of discovery and second of teaching.” He tells us directly that he knows where the work is going. He also communicates this by declaring distinctions and then explaining them, both here and in the following chapters. “All doctrine concerns either things or signs, but things are learned by signs” (1.2.2); “Some things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and there are others to be enjoyed and used” (1.3.3). The voice of the Confessions, in contrast, explores distinctions by wondering aloud about them with questions and tentative answers. In short, Book 1 of On Christian Doctrine present itself as a finished work, written and revised according to intentions decided by the author beforehand, while the Confessions presents itself as an oral and spontaneous prayer, in the process of being composed. Even though we know that Augustine abandoned the On Christian Doctrine for almost three decades after composing paragraph 35 in Book 3, the authorial voice at its beginning projects the plan of a coherent work. The Confessions, in contrast, projects no such plan, because Augustine the narrator—not Augustine the author—does not have one. Rather, he is engaged in an oral prayer, a dialogue with God, and like any dialogue, it does not unfold according to a plan. To be sure, Augustine the narrator’s prayer is recorded in writing. 17. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, translated with an Introduction by D. W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1958).
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Nevertheless, this record is presented as spoken by the writer and heard by the reader “now,” in the present tense of its utterance. Augustine the narrator treats this issue most extensively at the beginning of Book 10, where he describes his work as “confession before you in my heart, yet in my pen [stilo] before many witnesses” (10.1.1). The writing, however, records what “I speak” (loquor; 10.1.1): “I do not say [dico] anything to men that you have not heard from me” (10.2.3; my emphasis). Concomitantly, his readers are those who “hear my confessions” (audiant confessiones meas; 10.3.5). They hear, not only because late antique readers read aloud, but also because confessio implies “speaking” from its Latin root, fari. Granted, it was a convention in Augustine’s day that a writer “speaks” to his audience, and the convention endures. But the Confessions’s being recorded in writing does not compromise the oral and spontaneous character of its narrator’s dialogue with God. Unlike Augustine in On Christian Doctrine, the narrator in the Confessions does not project a subject or declare what he is going to treat: no book contains a treatise-style prospectus introducing its argument. At best, one finds a suggestive promise, as at the beginning of Book 8: “‘You have broken my chains .l.l.l.’ I will tell how you broke them” (8.1.1). For the most part, the opening of each book tells us little or nothing about what will come. In Book 11, for example, Augustine the narrator says that he will meditate on Scripture (11.2.3), and he begins with the first verse of Genesis (11.3.5). But he does not say that he will reflect on “time,” as he winds up doing for half the book, because he does not know that he will do so. The question “What is time?” (11.14) emerges through the dynamism of his dialogue with God. The narrator’s consciousness, let us recall, is explicit in his utterance, by definition. What he does not say, he does not think, and he does not think about “What is time?” in Book 11 before chapter 14. Moreover, when he does begin to think about time, he does not yet know the answer he will eventually arrive at: he
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prays his way through preliminary answers before his dialogue with God brings him to a satisfactory conclusion (11.28). Augustine the author, however, comprehended this whole movement, by definition: he knew the narrator’s final position, and he dramatized the narrator’s prayerful progress to it. The Confessions dramatizes its “spontaneity” in another way. Augustine the narrator insists that he is not in complete control of his utterance because God is active in its unfolding. The narrator forgot about his adolescent pear theft, yet God “recalls these things to my memory” (2.7.15). Because “the living remembrance [viva recordatio] of [his] soul is before [God]” (2.9.17), his recollection of his past does not rely on his merely human power of memory. God’s grace, he insists, aids and guides him. He affirms that God leads his prayer in surprising directions. After recalling his baptism in Book 9 (9.6.14), he digresses into mentioning a series of events in Milan (9.7.15–16), before he notices the digression and prays, “From when and to what place have you led my remembrance, so that I should confess also these great deeds to you, which I had passed over in forgetfulness?” (9.7.16; my emphasis). Augustine the narrator was not intending to record these “great deeds,” and he thought he had forgotten them, but God led his memory to record them. These deeds did not involve the young Augustine directly, yet God’s guidance has made them part of the narrator’s Confessions. Here what seems a digression to Augustine the narrator proves a permanent part of his book. He acknowledges that he is not in full control of his Confessions, because the work unfolds as a dialogue with God and God sometimes guides it beyond his ken. The work thereby presents itself as the unrevised record of an oral prayer—unrevised because oral utterance is unrevisable. The seeming digression is not excised but remains in the work, though the work explicitly records it as a digression. In this way, Augustine the author has reminded us that the Confessions unfolds as a dialogue with two partners, even though it proves a “dialogue in one voice.” God’s
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grace always aids the narrator’s prayer and sometimes leads it in surprising directions. We are surprised by the work’s unfolding because he is surprised by it: “Why do I speak of these things? Now is the time, not to put questions, but to make confession to you” (4.6.11). Augustine the narrator is not in complete control of what he is saying because he is in dialogue with God. His digressions remain in the record of the dialogue precisely because the work presents itself as the unrevised record of the dialogue’s spontaneous unfolding. This self-presentation, to be sure, is a kind of fiction, orchestrated by Augustine the author and perfected by revision. Distinguishing the historical Augustine, the author of the Confessions as a completed whole, from Augustine the narrator, the praying voice in the work, enables us to appreciate more fully its meditative texture, the dynamism of its dialogue with God. This meditative texture is filled with surprises for the reader because it is full of surprises for Augustine the narrator, praying in an ongoing present. The entire work, from its first sentence to its last, uses the present tense for the narrator’s activity as he prays. Open it to any page: the narrator is praying “now,” in a literary present, remembering his past life “now,” unfolding his quest for truth “now,” as we read. The Confessions presents itself as the record of Augustine the narrator’s oral prayer, and all its surprises emerge from the dynamism of his dialogue with God. Augustine the author, however, was in full control of the work, by definition; because he stood beyond the completed whole, as its composer and reviser, it contained no surprises for him. In sum, then, the Confessions presents itself as Augustine the narrator’s oral prayer, recorded in writing. As an oral prayer, the work presents itself as unrevised, because unrevisable, and as unfolding “now” in its original order, from Book 1, chapter 1, through Book 13, chapter 38. The order of our reading reenacts the original order of Augustine the narrator’s dialogue with God. This narrator is a literary figure, and he continues to exist in the literary present of our
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reading: every time we read the work, we are reenacting his oral prayer. Augustine the author, in contrast, was a historical person. He designed and revised the Confessions so as to dramatize effectively his narrator’s oral dialogue with God. Augustine the author deliberately created the spontaneous discoveries that his narrator makes through that dialogue. Augustine the narrator’s sudden insights, musing perplexities, digressions, and lack of plan in his Confessions may be felt as spontaneous defects, but they were all dramatic effects designed by Augustine the author. We always know what Augustine the narrator is thinking at any point in his unfolding prayer because his thoughts are explicit in his words, by definition. We never hear directly the full mind of Augustine the author in the Confessions because he stood beyond the work as a completed whole, by definition. What the narrator says may well prove an index to Augustine the author’s views on a subject, especially when the narrator arrives at a resounding conclusion to an inquiry, as he does with time (11.28). Nevertheless, the mind of Augustine the author comprehended the Confessions as a whole and thereby exceeded what Augustine the narrator says in the work. Augustine the narrator, for example, never recognizes that his Confessions unfolds as a return to the Origin, even though Augustine the author designed it as a Christian-Platonist ascent. What do we gain from making this distinction? For one thing, it enables us to hold together the seeming planlessness of the Confessions with its overarching plan as a return to the Origin. Augustine the narrator does not have a plan for his prayerful dialogue with God, for if he did, it would not be a dialogue. At the same time, the whole work clearly unfolds as a Christian-Platonist ascent, designed by Augustine the author. On the one hand, Augustine the narrator does not know where his Confessions is going, for it emerges through the dynamism of his interaction with God. Hence, he makes errors and corrects them, wanders into digressions, muses over perplexities, is led to sudden insights, and so on. The dynamism of his dia-
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logue with God is a drama of the soul. The Confessions appeals to readers because we are caught up into Augustine the narrator’s drama of self-examination and quest and discovery, with all its unforeseen developments and surprising turns. On the other hand, this drama has clearly been dramatized by Augustine the author. He composed it and revised it, orchestrating its movements to render his narrator’s quest for truth as compelling as possible. He also planned its course: the drama of the soul, in the small scale, unfolds as the ascent of the soul, in the large. When scholars recognize only one Augustine in the Confessions, the drama of the narrator’s soul tends to be slighted, and his ascent over the whole is missed. On the one hand, historians seeking the facts of Augustine’s life interrogate the events in Books 1–9, and the drama of the narrator’s soul is irrelevant to their search. Similarly, philosophers and theologians seeking Augustine’s views on some topic tend to reduce the narrator’s quest to arguments for those views. They may appreciate the drama of his quest for truth, but they tend to treat it as philosophically irrelevant in itself. For them, the meditative wandering of Augustine the narrator’s dialogue with God becomes merely a literary way of working through arguments. On the other hand, all these scholars limit the historical Augustine’s views in the work to what it states explicitly. Hence, they do not recognize the design of the whole as a Christian-Platonist ascent because the work never declares itself as one. When scholars recognize only one Augustine in the Confessions, they identify his achievement with that of Augustine the narrator and thereby miss important aspects of the work. Distinguishing Augustine the narrator from Augustine the author, then, may renew our sense of the work’s self-presentation as a prayer. The Confessions does not present itself as merely the historical Augustine’s autobiography, in the first person, plus his treatment of certain philosophical and theological topics, in the third person. Rather, from its first sentence to its last, it unfolds as Augustine the
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narrator’s prayer. The whole work is spoken attentively to God, in the first and second persons. This is an astonishing literary strategy for so long a work, and it has been little explored, perhaps because it has so rarely been imitated by later writers, unlike the autobiography in Books 1–9. The work is not merely framed by prayers or punctuated intermittently by them: every sentence in the work is addressed to God, even the narrative ones. Properly speaking, the “autobiography” is not the historical Augustine’s retelling of his journey to conversion. Rather, it presents itself as the narrator’s self-examination in an oral prayer that is guided by God to surprising memories and understandings. Similarly, Augustine the narrator’s philosophical and theological reflections arise through the dynamism of his dialogue with God, who illuminates his quest for truth. In other words, when we speak of the Confessions as a work of autobiography and philosophy, we miss the originality of its self-presentation. Properly speaking, and from first to last, the Confessions presents itself as a prayer, and this prayer is led by God into what we call “autobiography” and “philosophy.” Moreover, every reader of the Confessions must, of necessity, pray its prayer. There is simply no other way to read it. Every reader impersonates the narrator’s “I” in his dialogue with God. Indeed, every reader necessarily becomes Augustine the narrator making his Confessions. Our reading inevitably recreates the narrator’s dialogue with God in its original unfolding. Hence, readers do not merely hear about Augustine’s Christianity in the work but rather speak it participatively, whether they agree with it or not. It is difficult to gauge the persuasive effect this may have on a reader, but over the course of the work it would seem to be considerable. With this renewed sense of the work as a prayer comes a livelier awareness of the Confessions as a pilgrimage, a journey of faith. We follow more attentively the drama of Augustine the narrator’s quest for truth in dialogue with God. When we seek the historical Augustine’s views in the work, we tend to read past its dramatic unfolding
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as we look for propositional conclusions and arguments. But when we distinguish the historical Augustine from his narrator, we gain two things. First, we can give full weight to the Confessions’s insistence that the narrator is being guided by God in his prayer. Second, we can see that the whole work does unfold according to a plan, designed by Augustine the author and beyond his narrator’s ken. Hence, the Confessions unfolds as Augustine the narrator’s pilgrimage, his return to the Origin. It is not a journey in space, but a journey of soul, and it does arrive at a holy place: his vision of the Church as God’s purpose in creation. Above all, the Confessions presents this journey as being guided by God. Augustine the narrator does not know where his prayer is going, according to the fiction of its self-presentation. But God does, and he guides it on a ChristianPlatonist ascent. This is the premise of the Confessions’s self-presentation: its prayerful unfolding is guided by God as a return to the Origin, beyond the ken of Augustine the narrator. In other words, according to this premise, God plans the structure of the Confessions, for it unfolds according to a providential order completely unforeseen by the praying voice. There is a certain fictionality in this premise: God is the author of the work’s coherence. Augustine the narrator is praying the words in his unplanned dialogue with God, yet God guides them according to his plan: thematic parallels in the chiastic structure of Books 1–9 and the Christian-Platonist ascent over the whole. According to this premise, there is only one Augustine in the work, Augustine the narrator, for Augustine the author does not exist. Naturally, I treat this premise critically. Although the Confessions presents itself as a spontaneous oral prayer, it was designed and revised by its author, the historical Augustine. Nonetheless, I acknowledge a truth in this fictional premise, for without God’s grace and guidance Augustine the author could not have conceived and constructed the Confessions. The work’s self-presentation as a spontaneous and therefore unrevised oral prayer, unfolding providentially
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as a return to the Origin, is a fiction. Augustine the author revised it to heighten our sense of its spontaneity and he, not God, designed its pattern of ascent. At the same time, this fiction has its truth. Augustine would have attributed all his inspirations in the Confessions to God’s grace, and he probably arrived at them just as his narrator does, through prayer. Moreover, he designed the work’s selfpresentation to imitate the providential design revealed in the Bible: all things come forth from (exitus) God and return (reditus) to their Origin. Once we recognize that the Confessions presents itself as providentially guided, we can discern the parallel between the two pilgrim figures, the young Augustine, in Books 1–9, and Augustine the narrator. Just as God led the young Augustine, despite all his moral wanderings, on a journey to the Church, so does He guide Augustine the narrator, despite all his digressions, on a return to the Origin, culminating in an allegorical vision of the Church in Genesis 1. In other words, just as the young Augustine’s life revealed God’s providential guidance, so does the unfolding of the Confessions: its large-scale structure as a return to the Origin emerges not from Augustine the narrator’s plan, but through Providence leading it to fulfillment. In short, the Confessions does not merely tell a story about God’s providential grace in the young Augustine’s life. Rather, its literary form enacts, moment by moment, the dialectic between human freedom and divine grace in its unfolding prayer. Augustine the narrator does not know where his prayer is going, but its course emerges from the dynamism of his dialogue with God and so its course proves providential. The work’s meditative textures feature the narrator’s human freedom, with all its vagaries and varieties of style and mood. At the same time, the narrator is always turned to God in prayer and he insists that God is guiding his prayer. As a dialogue with God, the Confessions unites speech about God with the action of God. The narrator gives evidence of divine grace in his
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sudden illuminations, in thanksgivings for guidance, and so on. In this way, the work does what it says, is what it talks about. A treatise, featuring its author’s control of his argument, can analyze the dialectic between freedom and grace, but cannot embody it. Only the meditative texture of a spontaneously unfolding dialogue with God can embody and enact this dialectic. The Confessions thereby unites indissolubly logos and ergon, content and form.18 As we have seen, the providential course of the Confessions as a whole follows a Christian-Platonist ascent and culminates in an allegorical discourse about the Church as God’s purpose in creation. Like every return to the Origin, its end reveals its beginning. Augustine the narrator has been turning to his Origin at every point in the work, because he has been praying its every sentence. Hence, because he turns to his Origin at every point in the work, God guides his Confessions as a return to the Origin over the whole. The dynamism of its meditative texture as a dialogue with God generates its meditative structure as a Christian-Platonist ascent. Here again form and content are indissolubly united. We know how important “unity” was for Augustine, and yet scholars have often thought that the Confessions lacks it. Their reluctance to see an ascent pattern in the Confessions may be illuminated by comparing the work to Bonaventure’s Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. The Itinerarium is a classic Christian-Platonist ascent, for it highlights this structural pattern in its title and in its unfolding. It does so because Bonaventure is not making the ascent, but directing it. He has already made the journey and has provided a map for others—itinerarium means both “journey” and “map.” Because he does not present himself as making the journey in the process of writing the work, there is no “Bonaventure the narrator” to be distinguished 18. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Logos and Ergon in Plato’s in Plato’s Lysis,” in his collection of essays, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, translated with an Introduction by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 1–20.
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from “Bonaventure the author” or from “the historical Bonaventure.” There is only one Bonaventure here, and he stands apart from the journey he directs as the author of this map. He presents material that is cogently ordered because already mastered. In his Prologue, he projects the six stages of the forthcoming ascent (paragraph 3) and urges his reader to bring certain attitudes to it (paragraph 4). Its six stages are clearly marked in six chapters. The first section in most chapters reviews part or all of the ascent so far. Certain Christian images are used to feature the patterns in the work: the six wings of the seraph, the six days of creation, the ark in the Holy of Holies (chapters 5–7), and so on. Bonaventure’s Itinerarium thereby highlights its governing patterns. Contrast the Confessions. It does not feature so explicitly the patterns governing its ascent. Its stages are not so obvious as in the Itinerarium. And the reason for this should by now be obvious: the Confessions is so much longer, and its ascent much more diffuse, because Augustine the narrator is making it as he prays his way along. Bonaventure has made the ascent, and so he lays out a plan for it. Augustine the narrator has not made it, and so he has no plan. He is praying his Confessions “now” as we read, and God is gradually leading him on an ascent, as He gradually led the errant young Augustine to conversion, and patiently guides humankind to salvation through his Church. The narrator has no notion that he is making an ascent over the whole work, and we know that he does not know it because his consciousness is wholly explicit in his praying voice. Bonaventure was the author of an Itinerarium, a map. The Confessions, however, is less a map than a territory, not an abbreviated guide to an ascent but a detailed record of the ascending journey itself as it is being made. The historical Augustine wrote it then, A.D. 397–400, but he fashioned it so that Augustine the narrator is always making the ascent now, whenever anyone takes up the book and reads it. Hence, the pattern of the Christian-Platonist ascent in the Con-
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fessions is not explicit, for Augustine the narrator does not plan it, and we hear only his voice. The work presents its ascent pattern as emerging through the narrator’s dialogue with God, in the dialectic between human freedom and divine grace. Hence, it emerges slowly and, as we are meant to understand, providentially. Scholars who prefer a deliberately featured pattern, with clearly marked stages, will not find it in there. If a scholar sets the bar for a ChristianPlatonist ascent at Bonaventure’s Itinerarium or Dante’s Commedia, the Confessions will fall below it, and its ascent pattern will be invisible or negligible. In order to grasp both the ascent plan governing the Confessions and its seeming planlessness, we must distinguish Augustine the author from his narrator. The Confessions thereby mimes human experience as Christians understand it: the seeming planlessness in its small-scale movements is taken up into God’s providential structure over the whole. Although human lives and history seem fraught with errors and accidents, Christians affirm that these vagaries are part of God’s plan for his creatures. The Confessions enacts and embodies this dialectic: the local vagaries of the narrator’s prayer are subsumed into its large-scale structure as a return to the Origin. If we think there is only “one Augustine” in the work, we cannot see this structure, because Augustine the narrator never remarks on it. In order to grasp the unity of the Confessions and Augustine’s achievement in designing it, we must distinguish what its narrator says from what its author accomplished. Once we have distinguished them, we can see the Confessions’s unity of texture and structure, planlessness and plan, in the narrator’s turning to God at every moment and his return to the Origin enacted over the whole.
Paradigm at the Climax: Book 13 We have been exploring Augustine’s extraordinary ambition in the literary form of the Confessions. Its meditative texture and meditative structure work together to mime the dialectic of salvation his-
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tory, of human freedom and divine grace, in its process and goal, our return to the Origin. For Augustine, the Church is the supreme embodiment of that process and goal. As we have seen, he considers the Church to be God’s purpose in creating the universe (13.34.49). In that sense, the Church proves a more universal being than the universe itself. Augustine’s allegory on Genesis 1 as the creation of the Church finds all of creation comprehended in the Church as God’s universal saving will. In this understanding, the Church precedes the universe and endures beyond its consummation. Hence, the Church not only exhorts humankind to return to the Origin but also embodies and enacts that movement from time to eternity. Because the allegory of the Church stands as the climax of the narrator’s ascent, it offers the most comprehensive view of the Confessions within the work. The Church, as the providential origin and end of the world, is the ground of creation. Hence, it proves also the ground of the Confessions in both its meditative texture, as a dialogue with God, and its meditative structure, as a Christian-Platonist ascent. In other words, Augustine’s allegory on the Church in Book 13 reveals the paradigm for the Confessions as a whole. In this section, I want to show how it represents the height of the narrator’s dialogue with God and provides the structures governing the work.19 The allegorical climax of the Confessions has not received the attention it deserves, perhaps because it is so difficult to understand. Yet this difficulty gives it a special status within the work: it presents itself as divinely inspired. Several different aspects mark these twenty-seven chapters (13.12–38) as “divinely inspired”—that is, as the product of an influx of grace carrying Augustine the narrator beyond his normal powers. One of these is the radical change in reflecting on the Trinity, which we looked at in Chapter 1. In chapter 11, Augustine the narrator associates the Father with being, the Son with knowing, and the Holy Spirit with willing. He wonders 19. This section abbreviates Robert McMahon, Augustine’s Prayerful Ascent, pp. 22–116.
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whether God is a Trinity because of these three acts, or whether each Person possesses all three acts. He concludes, “Who could conceive such things easily? .l.l. Who could pronounce on them rashly in any way?” (13.11.12). Yet just five chapters later, the narrator pronounces on these issues in the most authoritative fashion: “Your being knows and wills immutably, your knowledge is and wills immutably, and your will is and knows immutably” (13.16.19). He does not inquire into it, pray over it, argue for it, or hesitate in any way. When we consider how laboriously he earlier inquired into memory and time, this sublime assurance is astonishing. He simply pronounces truth, and on the loftiest mystery of his faith! This radical change from chapter 11 to chapter 16 implies that Augustine the narrator is suddenly possessed by the truth, inspired by God. Other indexes of his inspiration include its suddenly new style, pace, and subject. The style is difficult, in part because it is so crowded with quotations from Scripture. The Skutella-Verheijen edition of the Confessions cites 297 biblical references for the allegory as a whole, chapters 12–38. All of Book 12, with 32 chapters, has only 169, and the 31 chapters of Book 11 only 120. This astonishing increase is especially marked within Book 13: chapters 1–11 have 66 biblical references, while chapters 12–27 have 267. Insofar as the number of biblical references proves an index of Augustine the narrator’s divine inspiration, it would seem that he experiences a powerful influx of grace over the first half of his allegory, which gradually tapers off toward the end. Yet the number and frequency of biblical references indicate only one aspect of the difficult new style. It fuses passages from the Old and New Testaments, often juxtaposing them with no explicit connection. It thereby contains leaps of thought, for Augustine the narrator is associating ideas with astonishing rapidity. A reader needs to devote patient and sustained attention to the text in order to reconstruct its implied allegorical logic. The density and difficulty of the new style, so crowded with the inspirations of Scripture, suggest that the narrator is suddenly inspired.
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The pace of his allegorical exposition is also new, much more rapid than that in Books 11–12. Augustine the narrator has been reflecting on Genesis 1 for 72 chapters, since Book 11, chapter 3, and his progress has been quite slow, as he observes at the end of Book 12 (12.32.43). In the 72 chapters before the allegory (11.3–13.11), he has progressed only to Genesis 1:2a. But when he begins his allegorical interpretation, he begins all over again, with the first verse of Genesis, and he moves much more quickly. In twenty-seven chapters, he covers the seven days of creation, thirty-four verses (Gn 1:1–2:3). Actually, he covers much more than that. Augustine the narrator begins with the intention to explore all of Scripture, “from the very beginning, in which you made heaven and earth, up to the endless kingdom with you in your holy city” (11.2.3). Such an exposition would work from Genesis 1:1, through all of the Old and New Testaments, up to the “heavenly Jerusalem” in Revelation 21–22.20 At the end of Book 12, however, he realizes that he must revise his intention, because his exposition has proceeded so slowly so far. He prays to confess more briefly to God, asking him to inspire “something single, true, certain, and good” (12.32.43) to be found in Scripture. That prayer is fulfilled when God inspires his allegorical exposition of Genesis, for there the narrator finds the Church, “something single, true, certain, and good.” Moreover, this new subject for his exposition embraces all of Scripture, and so does the allegory itself. For Augustine, the Church is the custodian of divine revelation: she provides “the rule of faith” for the right understanding of the divine word. In that sense, the Church comprehends all of Scripture. Also, Augustine’s allegory on 20. Pierre Courcelle argued this in his Recherches sur les “Confessions” de saint Augustin, p. 23. John O’Meara thought that Augustine could not have meant something so ambitious, in The Young Augustine, pp. 14–17. I use the distinction between Augustine the narrator and Augustine the author to resolve this debate in Augustine’s Prayerful Ascent, pp. 18–21.
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the creation of the Church finds “all of Scripture” in its very first chapter. The allegory progresses from the beginning of Genesis (13.12) to the sabbath of eternal life (13.35–38) envisioned in the final chapters of the Bible, and it unites quotations from the Old and New Testaments to “reveal” the creation of the Church implied in Genesis 1. Hence, the allegory fulfills the narrator’s original desire to consider all of Scripture, “from the very beginning, in which you made heaven and earth, up to the endless kingdom with you in your holy city” (11.2.3). Augustine the narrator’s dialogue with God culminates in inspired allegory, fulfilling his earlier prayers (11.2.3, 12.32.43) in ways completely unforeseen by him. Augustine the author designed it that way. The scope of this allegory has long been understood. Over forty years ago, Solignac found there “the totality of the creation in its material reality and in its spiritual signification, that is to say, as a figure of the Church and the spiritual Universe of the saints” (his emphasis). This totality embraces not only the range of being, visible and invisible, but also the movement of Scripture from Creation to Apocalypse. Solignac italicized the following formulation: “The cycle of time is, in that way, dialectically perfected: time is opened for us out of eternity by the fiat of the Creator and it is closed in the eternity of the heavenly rest, without ceasing to be governed by the transcendence of the divine eternity.”21 Augustine’s allegory on the Church embraces the totality of being because it embraces the totality of Scripture in its style, subject, and direction. The allegory encompasses the sweep and direction of all time, which proceeds from God’s eternity and returns to it. In other words, Augustine’s allegory on the Church is structured as a return to the Origin, because the Bible as a whole is structured in that way, and the Confessions’s meditative structure as a return to the Origin proves fundamentally ecclesial. “Return to the Origin” 21. A. Solignac, “Introduction,” pp. 23–24; my translation.
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may have a Neoplatonist ring to it, but for Augustine it was a profoundly biblical and ecclesial reality. Within the Confessions, he treated Neoplatonism as an incomplete Christianity, for the Bible encompasses and surpasses the truths taught in “the books of the Neoplatonists” (7.9), and the Church provides a sure way for returning to the Origin, through Christ, “the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn 14:6; Conf. 7.18–21). Hence, Augustine would have us understand that the meditative structure of the Confessions is grounded in the Church in the sense of Book 13: God’s intention and goal for creation. The Church, in this understanding, is the fullest earthly embodiment of return to the Origin, and the Neoplatonist return would thereby prove derivative and partial, albeit instructive. Augustine’s allegory on the Church ends the Confessions because the Church is its ground from the beginning: a return to the Origin, by definition, ends with its Beginning. Everything in the narrator’s ascent converges at this peak. His dialogue with God, an aspect of the Church, is providentially guided on a return to the Origin, preeminently enacted by the Church, the only institution divinely inspired. Moreover, at this height of the narrator’s ascent he experiences the heightening of his dialogue with God by being divinely inspired. His style is suddenly inspired to expound spiritually, or allegorically, a new subject in Genesis 1, God’s creation of his divinely inspired Church, which contains “all of Scripture” in its master movement of return to the Origin. To be sure, this allegory is not the only passage presenting itself as “inspired,” for Augustine the narrator has other moments of sudden illumination, for which he gives thanks and praise. But it is the most sustained instance of divine inspiration within the Confessions. A return to the Origin, by definition, ends with its true beginning. The style and subject of Augustine’s allegory heighten and epitomize the Confessions’s meditative texture and meditative structure. In these ways, the allegory in Book 13 proves the paradigm for the Confessions as a whole. But, in another way, it also proves the paradigm for Books 1–9. Augustine distinguishes what may be
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called nine “acts” in the creation story.22 God creates twice on both the third and the sixth days, making eight creative acts in the six days of Genesis 1, followed by the creation of the Sabbath. Augustine counts God pronouncing his work “good” seven times, followed by an eighth “very good” (13.28.43), and the seventh day of rest makes nine acts, all told. Now the sequence of these nine acts in Augustine’s allegory underlies the sequence of the nine books in his autobiography. That is, parallel images and themes link Book 1 of the Confessions and the allegory on God’s first act, Book 2 and the allegory on God’s second act, and so on. I have explored these parallels in some detail elsewhere.23 Here I will simply show that they exist, by summarizing those relevant to Books 5 and 9, before suggesting what this pattern of parallels means. In every instance, the imagery and themes of the allegory prove fundamental to the corresponding book. Nevertheless, because each book is much longer than its corresponding allegory, each book necessarily explores themes and uses images beyond those in Book 13. The parallels between Books 1–9 and the allegory in Book 13 prove significant, but not comprehensive. The allegory is a paradigm for the autobiography, not a mould. Book 5, at the center of Augustine’s autobiography, parallels his allegory on the central act of the creation, that of the “lights in the firmament of heaven” on the fourth day (13.18–19). His allegory on God’s second act, the creation of the “firmament of heaven,” associates it with Scripture (13.15), “a firmament of authority over us,” and he maintains this link in his allegory on God’s fifth act. Just as the stars adhere to the firmament of heaven, so should Christians 22. For the creation story as paradigm for Books 1–9, see Robert M. Durling, “Platonism and Poetic Form: Augustine’s Confessions,” in Jewish Culture and the Hispanic World: Essays in Memory of Joseph H. Silverman, edited by Samuel G. Armistead and Mishael M. Caspi, in collaboration with Murray Baumgarten (Newark, Del.: Juan de la Cuesta, 2001), pp. 179–89. Though but recently published, Durling gave me a copy of this essay in 1982, and my thinking on these issues derives from it. 23. McMahon, Augustine’s Prayerful Ascent, pp. 38–116.
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“appear like lights in the world, holding fast to the firmament of Scripture” (13.18.22). Augustine goes on to link the heavenly fires above to the heavenly flames of Pentecost, when the apostles “were made lights in the firmament of heaven, holding the word of life” and then went forth to preach the gospel to all nations (13.19.25). The creation of the stars is thereby linked with the spiritual or allegorical interpretation of Scripture and with preaching its truth. According to traditional doctrine, the apostles became the first bishops at Pentecost, when they were “annointed” by the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:1–4); Peter then gives the first Christian sermon, interpreting scriptural texts allegorically, in light of Jesus’ execution and Resurrection (Acts 2:14–36). Augustine’s allegory implies the ecclesiastical practice of his day: the spiritual interpretation and preaching of Scripture belongs especially to bishops, the successors of the apostles. His allegory also associates the “lights in the firmament” with the gifts of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 12:7–11), especially the moon with “knowledge” and the sun with “wisdom.” The true spiritual understanding of Scripture proves crucial to Book 5 of the Confessions, which describes the young Augustine’s movement away from Faustus and the Manichees (5.3–7) toward Ambrose and Christianity (5.13–14). Ambrose expounds Old Testament passages allegorically, and his interpretations “in the spirit” revolutionize the young Augustine’s understanding of Christianity. He discovers that “the Catholic faith can be maintained without being ashamed of it,” for passages that were unacceptable, when taken literally, proved illuminating and true through Ambrose’s spiritual exposition (5.14.24). Ambrose’s preaching enables the young Augustine to understand how “the letter kills, but the spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3:6; Conf. 5.14, 6.3–4). Clearly, Ambrose is a true spiritual descendent of the apostles, for like them he interprets the Old Testament allegorically and preaches the true faith. In terms of the allegory in Book 13, Ambrose proves a genuine spiritual luminary because he holds fast to the firmament of Scripture. Hence, the light of his preaching proves brilliant with “the gifts
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of the Holy Spirit,” especially “the word of wisdom” and “the word of knowledge,” the allegorical sun and moon (13.18.23). Faustus the Manichee, in contrast, proves a false luminary, because the Manichees do not interpret the Old Testament spiritually and so they do not hold fast to the firmament of Scripture. In this way, Faustus’s spiritual light is phantasmal, a vain imagination, just like the “corporeal phantasms” of the sun and moon in Manichaean teaching, which shed no light at all (3.6.10). This implied correlation between the Manichaean sage, as a false luminary, and the Manichaean sun and moon, as empty phantasms, is a dry piece of Augustinian wit, but we need the parallels with Book 13 to discern it. Among the Manichees, Faustus was considered a sage, and the young Augustine long looked forward to learning from him how to resolve certain questions (5.6.10). But when they finally meet, Augustine finds him to be of limited attainments, and Faustus soon undertakes studies under his direction (5.7.13)! Book 5 turns on the contrasts between Faustus, the Manichaean false luminary with a pleasing style of speech but no substance, and Ambrose, whose eloquence is filled with the true light of the Catholic faith. The allegory in Book 13 also informs Augustine’s critique of the astronomers: they make true predictions of eclipses, but become puffed up with foolish pride in their knowledge (5.3.4). The critique turns on the etymological link between defectus, “eclipse,” and the verb deficere, “to fail, fall away”: “Out of an impious pride they, receding from you and falling away [deficientes] from your light, can foresee a coming eclipse [defectum] long before it, but their own present eclipse they do not see” (5.3.4; my emphasis). Their pride in predicting a physical eclipse of the Sun leads to their spiritual eclipse. Though Augustine’s general criticism proves clear enough, its details depend on the allegory in Book 13, for these are not made explicit in Book 5. A solar eclipse occurs when the Moon passes between the Earth and the Sun, blotting out its light. When astronomers become puffed up with pride at predicting an eclipse, they are putting the moon of their own knowledge (scientia) before
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the sun of divine wisdom (13.18.22–23). “Knowledge” concerns “sensible things,” which vary in their seasons like the changeable Moon and are analogous to the night (13.18.22). “Wisdom” concerns the eternal light of God’s truth, found in Scripture and the Church. Hence, the astronomers’ pride in their own knowledge not only blots out the “sun” of divine wisdom but also darkens the “moon” of their knowledge, for they “do not see their own present eclipse” (5.3.4). The eclipse imagery in Book 5 is both precise and morally instructive, but the precision of its terms can only be discovered by reading it in light of Augustine’s corresponding allegory in Book 13. The correspondences between Book 9 and the allegory on God’s ninth act may be treated more briefly, because they prove more readily grasped. God’s ninth act is the blessing of the Sabbath, which Augustine interprets as “the sabbath of eternal life” with God (13.36.51). The “peace of rest” (13.35.50) is a recurrent theme in Book 9. The book begins with the young Augustine taking a vacation (9.4.12) at Cassiciacum after retiring from his post as a teacher (9.2)—a time of “respite” (9.4.7) and “leisure” (9.4.8). It ends with the death of Monica (9.11–12) and Augustine’s prayer for the eternal rest of her soul with God (9.13). Only two earlier passages in the Confessions record deaths: that of Augustine’s father (3.4.7), mentioned in passing, and that of his friend, explored in Book 4 (4.4–12). In Book 9, Augustine records five deaths: those of his mother, his father (now named: 9.13.37), his son Adeodatus (9.6.14), and his two friends Verecundus (9.3.5) and Nebridius (9.3.6). The last two passages mention the delights of paradise now enjoyed by these faithful souls in God’s eternal sabbath. Book 9 also records five baptisms, the sacramental death and rebirth into the mystical body of Christ that looks forward to life with God in his eternal sabbath. Augustine speaks of his own baptism as a “release from anxiety” entailing “wondrous sweetness” (9.6.14), a foretaste (as it were) of eternal peace. But the keenest foretaste of the
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eternal sabbath comes in the “vision at Ostia” (9.10), when Augustine and Monica ascend beyond all things to hear God’s Word in beatific silence. That chapter ends with Augustine looking forward to the general resurrection on the Last Day. The whole vision, in fact, arises from, concludes in, and is richly informed by the theme of rest in God, “the sabbath of eternal life” (13.36.51). Why did Augustine the author create this pattern of parallels between his autobiography and his allegory on the creation of the Church? What might this pattern mean? Most obviously, it reveals Books 1–9 as God’s creation of the young Augustine, in and for the Church. Perhaps Augustine’s preferred word for the creation, formatio, “formation,” brings out the sense of this more clearly. God’s nine acts in creation are replicated in his formation of the young Augustine as a Christian. Despite the young man’s errors and resistance, God was forming him in and for the Church all the while. In one sense, this meaning simply reinforces what we already know: the autobiography is a conversion story. In another sense, it universalizes the young Augustine’s story in a surprising way: his story replicates, book by book, God’s nine acts in the Creation and the nine stages in his creation of the Church. Scholars often point to the ways in which the young Augustine proves an Everyman, for an act like the pear theft is given universal significance through the narrator’s theological reflection on it. But the parallels with Book 13 indicate a deep structure for the autobiography: it has the same pattern as the universal creation, in Genesis 1, and universal salvation through the Church. In other words, while Augustine the narrator universalizes certain events in the autobiography through theological reflection, Augustine the author universalized the whole of it through its parallels with his allegory on the creation of the Church. These parallels represent a bold labor of self-understanding by Augustine the author. He has integrated, at a deep level, the story of his past with his allegory in Book 13. At this level, the young Augustine’s life recapitulates all that the allegory contains: the scope of the
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whole cosmos, the sweep of all time, the substance of all Scripture, and the meaning of all history, salvation in God’s Church. In other words, Augustine’s autobiography recapitulates universal history, as envisioned in Book 13: its origins, recorded in Genesis; its end, the “eternal sabbath” revealed at the close of Scripture; its meaning, salvation through the Church; and its mode, governed by Providence. According to the premise of the Confessions, these meanings lie beyond the ken of Augustine the narrator but are central to God’s guiding plan for his prayer. Like universal history, these meanings can only be understood retrospectively, from the end, when “everything that is hidden shall be revealed.” In this way, the story of the young Augustine recapitulates the history of salvation, as developed in Book 13. On the analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, we can say that the young Augustine’s microhistory mimes the allegorical macrohistory of salvation. Moreover, according to the Confessions’s self-presentation, both occur in Augustine the narrator’s dialogue with God, unfolding in time. In other words, the Confessions presents itself as a microhistory, guided by Providence. As a whole, it, too, mimes the universal history of salvation, patterned as our return to the Origin. A set of parallels emerges. Just as the young Augustine, unbeknown to himself, was being guided by God to the Christian faith, and just as all human history is providentially governed in ways no one can fully see, so does God shape the narrator’s “Confessions” into patterns beyond his ken. The dialectic between human freedom and providential grace is enacted in the young Augustine’s microhistory, in the macrohistory of salvation, and in the narrator’s dialogue with God unfolding as a return to the Origin. Within the Confessions, all these dialectical parallels prove instances of the Church as God’s intention and goal for creation.
CHAPTER 3
A MOVING VIEWPOINT Augustine’s Meditative Philosophy in the Confessions
T H E P R E V I O U S C H A P T E R explored the deep coherence of Augustine’s Confessions, its unity of texture and structure. This unity lies beyond the ken of Augustine the narrator, for he never remarks on it. According to the premise of the work’s self-presentation, its unity emerges through the dynamism of the narrator’s dialogue with God, according to God’s plan for the work as a whole. Because I view this premise critically, I attribute this plan to Augustine the author. Distinguishing between the narrator and the author allows us to appreciate both the explicit dynamism of the Confessions’s unfolding and its implicit plan, its deep coherence. It also enables us to understand that the work contains understandings beyond what Augustine the narrator asserts. In other words, Augustine the author designed the work to lead readers to insights beyond those achieved explicitly by his narrator. If we think there is only “one Augustine” in the Confessions, we will identify him with the narrator and thereby fall short of the further understandings designed by Augustine the author. In this chapter I want to explore some of these further understandings so as to describe the character of Augustine’s meditative philosophy in the Confessions. By “philosophy” I mean theology as well, all the concerns treated in Books 10–13, even the allegory on the Church. By “meditative,” I refer primarily to understandings implied by Augustine the author. By definition, these cannot be discovered by reading the narrator’s statements but only by meditating
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upon relations between them. In one sense, of course, the Confessions’s meditative character is explicit in its meditative texture: Augustine the narrator wonders, poses questions, hazards answers, searches for the truth, mulls things over, and so on. Because scholars have often commented on this aspect of the work, I say little about it. Characteristically, they attribute it to the historical Augustine as they search the work for his positions or doctrines. In other words, they recognize the work’s meditative style, but they assume that its philosophical substance is doctrinal. In my view, however, Augustine the author designed the Confessions to lead his readers into a meditative, rather than merely a doctrinal, philosophy. The narrator’s doctrinal positions remain important, but they do not constitute Augustine the author’s whole philosophy in the work. Because he designed the work as a Christian-Platonist ascent, it has a moving viewpoint that qualifies the truth character of its doctrinal positions. As stages in an ascent, they remain true on their own levels, true as far as they go. But, as I argued in Chapter 1, none of them is final. Each proves less a position than a station along the way. The only final position in the Confessions is the Church as God’s purpose for creation, and the Church, in this sense, is not “a true position” but a container for all truths. In other words, while Augustine the narrator’s philosophizing in the Confessions has an explicitly meditative style, Augustine the author’s philosophy has an implicit and meditative substance. The rest of this chapter attempts to sketch the character of that meditative substance. The chapter has four sections. The first returns to the Confessions’s meditative texture in order to treat its moving viewpoint in the small. This is the most obvious aspect of its meditative character, and it is best to begin with what is already understood. The following sections explore the work’s moving viewpoint in the large. The second section turns on the relations between Books 2 and 8, perversion of the will through sin and conversion of the will through
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grace. As we saw in the previous chapter, these two books are linked with one another in the chiastic structure of thematic parallels in Books 1–9. This dialectical link, clearly designed by Augustine the author, invites our meditation on what these parallels imply. After sketching out some of the parallels between Books 2 and 8, in the second section I pursue the theme of “friendship.” Book 2 prefigures its fulfillment in Book 8, and Augustine the author thereby implied an understanding of friendship well beyond what his narrator states in the Confessions. The third and fourth sections carry the implications of the Confessions’s moving viewpoint into understanding analogous meanings in the work. In Chapter 1, I showed how a Christian-Platonist ascent creates a hierarchy of analogous meanings: key words have somewhat different meanings at different levels in the ascent. Exploring these meanings is one way to enter into Augustine’s meditative philosophy in the Confessions. The third section explores various meanings of “friendship” and “conversion” in the autobiography against the various levels discriminated by its structure. The pattern of Books 1–9, the young Augustine’s spiritual descent and ascent, provides a grid against which different meanings of key words may be discerned. The fourth section treats analogous meanings of “memory” and “conversion” in Books 10–13. For example, though “conversion” is hardly mentioned in Books 10–12, the Confessions implies a conversion of memory (Book 10), a conversion of time (Book 11), and a conversion of hermeneutics (Book 12). The Church in Book 13 embodies conversion at the highest level, as it does friendship and memory. Indeed, the moving viewpoint of a Christian-Platonist ascent invites us to meditate on how every theme in the work is related to its highest level, which articulates the most universal and fundamental category in the ascent. In the Confessions, that level is the Church as God’s purpose for creation. Augustine the narrator is too caught up in the dynamism of his prayer to reflect on how earlier
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passages relate to later ones. Augustine the author left such meditation for his readers, though he designed the Confessions as a coherent whole to invite it.
Moving Viewpoint in the Small In the previous chapter, we examined the Confessions’s meditative texture as a dialogue with God, with the spontaneity and dynamism of a genuine conversation, even though it is “a dialogue in one voice.” In the course of his quest for truth, Augustine the narrator often makes a discovery that involves some alteration of an earlier view. In such instances, the moving viewpoint generated by the dynamism of his prayer is explicitly marked, usually within a few pages. Let us look at some of these, beginning with the most obvious examples. Sometimes Augustine the narrator explicitly corrects an earlier view. As we saw earlier, he first asserts that God was silent when the young Augustine was scattered in his fornications (2.2.2), but corrects himself some paragraphs later, when he realizes that God had been speaking against his sins through the words of his mother (2.3.7).1 Sometimes he arrives at answers that resolve earlier perplexities. In Book 13 Augustine the narrator has groping questions about the Trinity in chapter 11, and then, in chapter 16, he answers them with complete assurance. Similarly, the narrator’s inquiry into “time” in Book 11 (11.14–28) leads him to gradually fuller understandings. He begins by wondering how the past and the future can be said to exist, since the former has passed and the latter is not yet (11.14.17). Yet as he reflects on how time is measured (11.21–27), he comes to understand time “psychologically”: the past exists in memory, “present attention to things past,” and the future exists in expectation, “present attention to things future” (11.28). In this re-
1. See Sandra Lee Dixon, Augustine: The Scattered and Gathered Self (St. Louis, Mo.: Chalice Press, 1999), for this theme in the Confessions.
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spect, his conclusion resolves his earlier perplexities, and to that extent dissolves them. All these instances illustrate Augustine the narrator’s inquisitio veritatis, his quest for truth, in the form best understood by scholars. The inquiry progresses from partial to fuller insights, and the later insights supersede the former, correcting and completing them. Here, we might say, there is a direct overlap between later and earlier statements, and so the progress of the inquiry is explicitly marked. But there are other instances where later statements do not directly overlap earlier ones, and whether the narrator corrects, or merely modifies, an earlier view remains ambiguous. These ambiguities have proven grist for scholars who debate “Augustine’s view” in the work. These scholars make two assumptions. First, they assume that the work presents the views of Augustine the author, the historical Augustine, directly. Second, they assume that he is philosophizing in a doctrinal manner, aiming at results to be formulated. In my view, however, Augustine the author deliberately created certain ambiguities in his narrator’s views in order to lead his readers to meditate more deeply upon them. Let us consider two cases of this meditative ambiguity in the Confessions. It is well known that when Augustine the narrator reflects on his motives for the pear theft in Book 2, he arrives at two diametrically opposed views.2 At first, he thinks he had no positive motive for the act at all; he only delighted in the wickedness itself (2.4.9). He treats this idea theologically in chapter 6: the theft had no rational motive, in terms of desire for some good, but was purely the perverse act of
2. See William E. Mann, “The Theft of the Pears,” Apeiron 12 (1978): 51–58, esp. pp. 54–57. On the pear theft, see Leo C. Ferrari, “The Pear-Theft in Augustine’s Confessions,” Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 16 (1970): 233–41; William J. O’Brien, “Toward Understanding Original Sin in Augustine’s Confessions,” Thought 49 (1974): 436–46; and, most recently, Lyell Asher, “The Dangerous Fruit of Augustine’s Confessions,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 66 (1998): 227–55.
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his prideful will. In chapter 9, however, he comes to a radically different conclusion, for he did desire a positive, rational good: the friendship of the boys who stole with him. Which one is true? Because of Augustine’s theology of evil, scholars have tended to prefer the earlier view. Jaroslav Pelikan acknowledges and dismisses the later view with a gesture: “Even though [Augustine] might not have done it without the company of his peer group, who egged him on, it was not their companionship but the theft that he loved.”3 But once we grasp the meditative texture of Augustine the narrator’s unfolding prayer, we must give the later view pride of place. For the narrator prays his way to this selfunderstanding, and he underscores it by repetition and by asserting that God has revealed it to him: “But alone I would not have done it, all alone I would not have done it. Behold, in your presence, my God, is the living memory [viva recordatio] of my soul. Alone, I would not have committed that theft” (my emphasis). And he goes on to lament, “O friendship too unfriendly” (2.9.17). This passage affirms unambiguously that the young Augustine had a positive motive for his crime. The narrator’s final formulation on the young Augustine’s motives for the pear theft would seem to be the true one. It corrects the earlier one insofar as it overlaps with it. But the overlap is not complete, and the relation between the two remains ambiguous. The young Augustine unquestionably had a rational motive for the theft. As chapter 9 shows, it is wrong to say that he loved only the wickedness, a motive purely negative and irrational. Nevertheless, the presence of the rational motive does not eliminate the irrational one. It, too, may have been present. Augustine the narrator, praying in an ongoing present, abandons the inquiry after discovering the rational motive. He does not reconsider his earlier view for whatever
3. Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 78.
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truth it might still possess in the light of his later understanding. Augustine the author left that task to us. He deliberately created the ambiguous relation between the two views and left it unresolved. Why? What did Augustine aim to achieve by this deliberate ambiguity? In my view, he wanted us to meditate on these two views, and thus on ourselves. For we cannot meditate adequately on this ambiguity in Book 2 without meditating on the ambiguities in our own motives. The Confessions, of course, does not direct such a meditation, because Augustine the narrator does not undertake it, but the work does exemplify styles of meditation for us to imitate. Hence, we might well wonder whether a fallen human being could ever have pure motives for any act, even purely evil ones. When the narrator reflects upon his purely negative motives, he does not describe the thrill of rebellion, its felt risk, and the sense of excitement at the possibility of being caught. His language does not develop the pleasure of adventure in the adolescent’s crime, surely a component of it. Also, the negative motive of prideful rebellion and a positive one, like the love of friends, can mix together easily in creatures like ourselves. On the other hand, pride and friendship may not be so different. For we might reflect on the motive of rivalry among the boys (2.3.7), and the young Augustine’s desire always to be the best (1.17.27, 1.19.30), even in shamelessness. The desire for status, a worldly value, always partakes of rivalry with others, and therefore entails the risk of pride, when we succeed, and of envy, when we fail. Are our efforts to do well as teachers and scholars, efforts laudably motivated in themselves, free of pride? More troubling still, can we be sure of our answer, one way or another? In Book 10, Augustine the narrator avers that he simply cannot be sure whether he has made any progress in humility, for “in a man’s contempt for vainglory, he often glories still more vainly” (10.38.63). These and other lines of reflection are opened up by the meditative ambiguity that Augustine the author created in Book 2.
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Another instance of meditative ambiguity, in my view, may be found in Book 10, as Augustine the narrator searches for God in his memory. But Nello Cipriani would disagree, for he finds that the result of this quest is unambiguous: “God is in the memory only from the moment he is known, and not before.”4 And the evidence for his position is solid, for the text clearly affirms, “You were not already in my memory before I learnt of you” (10.26.37; cf. 10.24.35). Cipriani finds this definitive because he assumes that the historical Augustine was philosophizing in a doctrinal manner and that the Confessions presents his views directly. Though Cipriani responds sensitively to the process of the inquiry, for him it seems to be a dramatic way of showing the reasons for the doctrine. When we differentiate between the historical Augustine and Augustine the narrator, however, we can see that the results are not so unambiguous, and that meditative philosophizing differs from doctrinal philosophizing not only in method but also in aim. For in the chapter following the unambiguous assertion that God “[was] not in my memory before I learnt of [him]” (10.26), Augustine the narrator addresses the divine Beauty: “Late have I loved you. And behold, you were within me, and I was outside and there I was seeking you” (10.27.38). This justly famous chapter is quite different in tone from the preceding inquiry. The scholarly tradition tends to see it as a poetic set-piece, written by Augustine and inserted here in Book 10, with little direct connection to his inquiry into memory.5 In my view, however, this chapter bursts forth from Augustine the narrator, who is moved by sudden grace in his dialogue with God. This sud4. Nello Cipriani, O.S.A., article on “memory” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A., et al. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), translated by Matthew O’Connell, pp. 553–54, quotation on p. 554. 5. See, e.g., Vernon J. Bourke’s commentary on this passage in Augustine’s Love of Wisdom: An Introspective Philosophy (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1992), pp. 199–200. He does not relate it to Augustine’s exploration of memory, though that is the subject of Bourke’s commentary.
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den grace seems to give him a different understanding: God was in his memory before he learned of Him. At the very least, the chapter unambiguously affirms God’s presence in the young Augustine, even though he did not know it: “You were with me, and I was not with you” (10.27.38). Hence, the question arises, “How shall we understand the relations between chapters 26 and 27 on this score? Does Book 10 say that God is not in the memory before one learns of Him, as chapter 26 asserts, or that God is in the memory always, as chapter 27 implies?” On the one hand, the inward Divine Presence of chapter 27 may not be in the memory, but somewhere else in the mind. On the other hand, Augustine the narrator is reflecting on memory: if this inward Divine Presence is not in the memory, where should it be located? Although God is not in the memory as an object of memory before one learns of him, perhaps the inner Divine Presence enables the power of memory, and so is “in” it in a different sense. Augustine the narrator later reflects on God’s presence enabling his mind as a whole as he searched into the recesses of his memory: “For you are the abiding light which I was consulting in all these things, as to whether they were, what they were, and what value they had” (10.40.65). In this respect, the Divine Presence would be in the memory as its enabling power. The hymn to the divine Beauty in chapter 27, it seems, marks what might be called a conversion of memory within Book 10. Before it, “memory” was defined in relation to its objects, and Augustine the narrator does not find God in his memory until after he learned of him. Within chapter 27 and afterward, however, the narrator recognizes that God was always present within him, and the context argues that God was present in his “memory.” Nevertheless, the narrator does not assert that he was wrong before, as he does in Book 2 when he corrects his lament that God did not warn him against his adolescent fornications (2.2.2, 2.3.7). Hence, this “conversion of memory” within Book 10 is somewhat ambiguous, unlike the one we will examine later.
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The more we respond to the meditative dynamism of Augustine the narrator’s dialogue with God, the less eager we will be to fasten on an explicit assertion as Augustine the author’s position. Book 10 does not actually give an unambiguous answer as to whether God is present in the memory before one has learned of him. Nor is this ambiguity a fault. Augustine the author did not fashion the Confessions as an odd kind of author’s treatise, using an inquisitio veritatis to state and defend doctrines or positions, but as the living record of his narrator’s meditating in dialogue with God. Hence, he deliberately left some issues unresolved, so as to involve his readers in the meditative dynamism of the work. For where the doctrinal philosopher aims to inform readers of his results, the meditative philosopher aims to form readers to the tasks of meditation. He offers his audience an initiation into ways of meditating, by means of an example. Like Socrates in the aporetic dialogues, the meditative philosopher knows that ambiguity spurs attentive students to think for themselves, and that his arriving at a clear result may arrest their thinking. In the Confessions, the historical Augustine created a narrator who meditates on all kinds of questions arising from his past and present life. He fashioned Augustine the narrator as the literary means not merely to inform his readers doctrinally, but also to form them meditatively. The narrator’s neglecting to resolve all the issues he raises was part of Augustine the author’s literary strategy. In short, the Confessions does not directly present the views of the historical Augustine. It directly presents Augustine the narrator praying his way to, and through, various understandings. The meditative dynamism of this process often shows him correcting or qualifying an earlier statement, but whether fully or partially can be hard to say. For the narrator is often so caught up in his dialogue with God that he moves on without resolving the ambiguities he has left behind. Augustine the author has left that resolution to us, if we notice the ambiguities. We are less likely to notice them the
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more we assume that the work presents Augustine the author’s position on some issue. The work records the narrator’s moving viewpoint, the process of his prayerful reflecting. Its meditative texture and ambiguities have philosophical implications and aims, and these were Augustine the author’s: less to inform readers of his positions than to form them in the practices of Christian meditation, through his narrator’s example.
Moving Viewpoint in the Large: Books 2 and 8 In the previous chapter, we examined certain patterns in the Confessions: the Christian-Platonist ascent over the whole work and the chiastic structure of thematic parallels in Books 1–9. Augustine the narrator does not design these patterns because his utterances emerge through the spontaneous dynamism of his dialogue with God. By definition, the narrator’s consciousness is wholly explicit in the work: what he does not say, he does not notice. Augustine the author, however, did design these patterns, and he intended his best readers to notice them and to reflect on their implications. Now one such pattern has often been noticed by scholars—the connection between Books 2 and 8—but they have not ventured far in pursuing its interpretive consequences.6 Because they find only “one Augustine” in the Confessions, they are willing to explore a connection only so far, for they aim, rightly, at faithfulness to his intentions. I share that aim, but I argue that Augustine the author deliberately invited a wider range of reflection than scholars customarily make. In this section, I use the pattern of relations between Books 2 and 8 to show how one might pursue the wider reflections that Augustine designed his work to evoke. Let us begin by reviewing that pattern. In Books 1–9, only Books 2 and 8 feature fruit trees. The fig tree in Book 8 explicitly stands in 6. See Leo C. Ferrari, “The Arboreal Polarization in Augustine’s Confessions,” Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 25 (1979): 35–46.
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a garden, while the pear tree in Book 2 implies a garden. Hence, both books allude, in different ways, to Genesis 3: the archetypal Garden, where the first sin was committed by eating fruit from a tree.7 The pear theft takes place at night, symbolically appropriate for perversion of the will through sin. The conversion of the will through grace takes place in the daylight. The influence of friends is prominent in both, and the two books implicitly contrast two kinds of friendship, “according to the flesh” and “according to the spirit.” This is how the relations between Books 2 and 8 are normally viewed, as a pattern, a static set of contrasts. But, as I suggested in Chapter 1, we can see their relations in another way, the temporal mode of foreshadowing and fulfillment. Book 2 thereby prefigures Book 8 in the manner of biblical allegory, and we are invited to explore their relations in the same way that Christians meditate on Scripture. For example, Book 8 not only fulfills but also reverses the events of Book 2, as conversion through grace reverses perversion through sin. The biblical archetype for this reversal is found in Romans 5, the contrast between the old Adam, whose disobedience brought death to all humankind, and the new Adam, Jesus Christ, whose obedience brings eternal life. From this perspective, Book 8 reenacts the events of Book 2 on a higher level, a level in right accord with God’s will. The fulfillment in Book 8 proves thereby a higher and truer form of its prefiguring in Book 2. At the same time, we cannot know this on the basis of Book 2 or Book 8 if they are considered in isolation: we must read the two in relation to one another. Moreover, noticing a static pattern of contrasts proves only the first step in exploring what the contrasts mean. The analogy with prefiguring and fulfillment in biblical inter7. The conversion account in Book 8 reverses the Fall in Genesis 3 programmatically, detail by detail. See Robert McMahon, “Autobiography as Text-Work: Augustine’s Refiguring of Genesis 3 and Ovid’s ‘Narcissus’ in his Conversion Account,” Exemplaria: A Journal of Theory in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1 (1989): 337–66, esp. pp. 341–55.
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pretation invites us to explore the contrasts meditatively. Hence, just as the disobedience and Fall of the old Adam in Genesis 3 comes to have new meanings in light of Christ’s obedience and Resurrection, so does Book 2 come to have new meanings in light of Book 8. Equally, Book 8 also comes to have new meanings in the light of Book 2, just as Christ’s Passion does when interpreted against other passages in the Hebrew Scriptures. In other words, the relation between Books 2 and 8 is dialectical, because the Confessions was written with a moving viewpoint. Augustine the author clearly planned the pattern of contrasts between them, and he thereby invited us to meditate more deeply on what they might mean. The kind of meditation he invited was the kind that Christians practiced when reading the Bible: exploring one passage in light of another generates meanings beyond what either explicitly states. Similarly, the dialectical relation between Books 2 and 8 creates new meanings. Augustine the author thereby created a synergy between the two books, designing a meditative whole greater than the mere sum of its parts. In theory, therefore, any theme of reflection in one book can be applied to the other. Although Augustine the narrator does not pursue it, Augustine the author clearly designed the possibility of pursuit for us. For example, in Book 2 the narrator describes a long list of vices as perverse imitations of God (2.6.13) because “[a]ll men imitate you perversely when they put themselves far from you and rise up in rebellion against you” (2.6.14). We might explore the conversion in Book 8 to see how many of these are being reversed, and in what ways. It obviously reverses pride through the young Augustine’s humble submission to God, and he also abandons his worldly ambition and the “soft endearments of love” (2.6.14). We might wonder how many other vices in the list are reversed in Book 8, explicitly or implicitly. Working out the details would lead us to reflect more deeply on all that the young Augustine’s conversion implies.
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Similarly, Book 8 contains some trenchant reflections on the power of habit and the “two wills” (8.5.10, 8.9–10). We might wonder in what ways, if any, these function in Book 2. Since the habit at issue in Book 8 involves sexual pleasure, we might reflect on the adolescent Augustine’s burgeoning sexuality and boasting of his sexual exploits (2.2–3) as the first forging of those chains of habit from which God frees him (8.1.1). His sexuality is peculiarly linked with rivalry with the other youths, with “worldly success,” imply