Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page i
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page ii
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page iii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page iv
First published in 2007 Copyright © David W. Cameron 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Every effort has been made to contact the copyright holders of material reproduced in this text. In cases where these efforts were unsuccessful, the copyright holders are asked to contact the publisher directly. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email:
[email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Cameron, David Wayne, 1961– . 25 April 1915: the day the Anzac legend was born. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 978 1 74114 980 7. 1. Australia. Army. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps – History. 2. World War, 1914–1918 – Campaigns – Turkey – Gallipoli Peninsula. I. Title. 940.426 Maps by author, unless otherwise stated Index by Russell Brooks Set in Granjon 11.5/14 pt by Midland Typesetters, Australia Printed and bound in Australia by Griffin Press 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page v
For Signalman Lloyd Alfred Charles Cameron The Australian Army 1st Air Support Signal Unit 1935–2000 and Private John Tunks 4th Battalion, Australian 1st Division killed somewhere on 400 Plateau 29 April 1915 no known grave
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page vi
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page vii
It was truly an impressive scene when those old men embraced each other, trembling with tears in their eyes and flowers and presents in their hands. It was moving enough to make one reconsider everything. On that day, a pall of melancholy and sorrow hung over everything. Interestingly enough, there was no enmity or anger, as if it had never been them who fought there 75 years ago. You could have thought that they were old friends who had just met after a very long time . . . On that day, I met a very old Turkish veteran and an Anzac veteran standing side by side. The Turkish veteran was trying to stand up straight with the help of his walking stick. The old Anzac was looking around with tears in his eyes. Surely, both of them were thinking of the terrible days of the war and of the friends they had lost. At one moment, I saw the Turkish veteran gently putting his conspicuously veined big boned hand on the shoulder of the Anzac who, weeping silently, watched the hills and slopes. I remained speechless and rooted to the spot . . . This scene was an obvious expression of the meaning of the Çanakkale battles. Evidently, the veteran was trying to tell his friend through touch, what he was unable to put into words . . . Professor A. Mete Tuncoku writing of his experiences during the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, 1990. From A. Tuncoku, Anzaklarin Kaleminden Mehmetçik, Çanakkale 1915, Ankara, 2000, pp. 220–1.
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page viii
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page ix
Contents List of maps Key to maps Turkish/English placenames Note to the text Acknowledgements Preamble Introduction—historical debates
xi xiii xv xix xxi xxiii xxv
Anzac 1919 1 Preparations Part I
1 3
The Landing
2 ‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’ 3 ‘Crack! Swish! Ping!’ 4 ‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’ 5 ‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’ Anzac 1919 6 ‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’ 7 ‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’ 8 ‘Yet he was still able to swear gently’ Part II
19 31 40 53 65 66 80 92
The Battle for the Ridges
9 ‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’ 10 ‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’ 11 ‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’ Anzac 1919 12 ‘What’s the matter, laddie?’ 13 ‘His death affected me very much’ 14 ‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
ix
111 124 140 150 152 167 179
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page x
25 APRIL 1915
Part III
The Turkish Counterattack
15 ‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’ Anzac 1919 16 ‘Now then 12th Battalion’ 17 ‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’ 18 ‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’ Part IV
197 212 213 231 246
Night
19
‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’ 20 ‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’ Anzac 1919
265 275 289
Notes Bibliography Index
291 311 315
x
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xi
Maps xviii
Main topographical features at Anzac Map 1.1
Turkish troop dispositions, April 1915
Map 1.2
Overall plan of the Allied invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula
12
Map 1.3
Anzac objectives, 25 April 1915
13
Map 2.1
Disposition of Turkish troops around Ari Burnu, 25 April 1915
26
Faik’s response to the landing of the Australian 3rd Brigade around 4.40 a.m., and the capture of Plugge’s around 5 a.m.
48
The southern end of Anzac Cove and the landing of the second wave (3rd Brigade) in that area, around 5 a.m.
56
Map 6.1
The situation at Fisherman’s Hut, early morning
69
Map 6.2
The early occupation of 400 Plateau by men of the 9th Battalion and Loutit’s advance towards Third Ridge
74
North Beach, the climb onto Russell’s Top and the withdrawal of the surviving men of Faik’s 3rd Platoon
84
400 Plateau, the attack against Sedik’s Battery, and Loutit and Plant’s advances towards Third Ridge
96
Map 4.1
Map 5.1
Map 7.1
Map 8.1 Map 9.1 Map 9.2 Map 10.1
Map 10.2
9
Arrival of the Turkish 27th Regiment on Third Ridge
116
Second Ridge and northern flanks of Anzac around 8.30 a.m.
122
Tulloch’s advance towards Battleship Hill and Chunuk Bair and the occupation of Baby 700 by Margetts and his men, around 9 a.m.
126
Australian 9th Battalion advance across the Lonesome Pine
135
xi
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xii
25 APRIL 1915
Map 10.3
The opening battles for the northern heights
139
Map 11.1
Loutit’s withdrawal from Adana Bair to the base of Mortar Ridge and eventually Wire Gully, and Turkish counterattack from Third Ridge, around 10.30 a.m.
146
Australian reinforcements rush towards the northern heights and Second Ridge; Australians retreat from Baby 700
154
Aker’s 27th Regiment approaches 400 Plateau; Australian 5th Battalion arrives on the plateau, around 10.45 a.m.
158
Australian counterattack retakes Baby 700; Turks withdraw towards Battleship Hill
161
Map 12.4
The battle for Baby 700 intensifies
164
Map 13.1
400 Plateau—Wells and men of the 6th Battalion advance to support Bennett and his men of the 8th Battalion
172
Attempting to plug gap at the Bloody Angle and Pope’s Hill just before noon; advanced parties of the 3rd Battalion, 57th Regiment, begin to arrive
175
Map 14.1
Bennett and Wells advance just after noon
185
Map 15.1
The battle for the northern heights, between 1.30 and 2 p.m.
198
Trying to stop the Turkish advance towards the summit of Baby 700 and onto The Nek, between 3 and 3.30 p.m.
221
The Anzac withdrawal to The Nek and the loss of Mortar Ridge to the Turks
234
Turkish 27th Regiment counterattack against 400 Plateau focusing on Pine Ridge
241
The retirement of the Australian advance parties from the landward side of 400 Plateau
251
Failed attack against The Nek by the Turkish 3rd Battalion, 57th Regiment
253
Turkish 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment’s, failed counterattack against German Officer’s Ridge and other parts of Second Ridge
258
Turkish 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment’s, attack against Bolton’s Ridge, around 10 p.m.
273
Early morning, 26 April 1915
286
Map 12.1
Map 12.2
Map 12.3
Map 13.2
Map 16.1
Map 17.1 Map 17.2 Map 18.1 Map 18.2 Map 18.3
Map 19.1 Map 20.1
xii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xiii
Key to maps X = Turkish positions and dispersed forces (disorganised or small groups)
* = Anzac positions and dispersed forces (disorganised or small groups) = Anzac troop movement (approximate) = Turkish troop movement (approximate) = Turkish organised force (as opposed to dispersed) = Anzac organised force (as opposed to dispersed) = trench Bde = Brigade Bn = Battalion DP = Daisy Patch (400 Plateau) HQ = Headquarters MG = machine gun NZ = parties of New Zealanders Ptn = Platoon Rgt = Regiment All maps orientated so that top of page faces north
xiii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xiv
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xv
Turkish/English placenames Turkish Aghyl Dere Al Bayrak Sirt (Al Bairak Sirta) Anafartalar
English Sheep fold valley Pine Ridge Range of hills including and running north from Hill 971 Anzac Cove First and Second Ridge Vine Valley Fisherman’s Hut Hill Q South Village about 7 kilometres inland from Anzac Quinn’s Post Hill 60 Courtney’s Post Coastal village 2 kilometres south of Eceabat (Maidos) No. 1 Outpost Wire Gully Clarke Valley Valley behind Mortar Ridge Gun or Third Ridge Northeast spur of Hill 971 Australia Valley Main Ridge (including Chunuk Bair, Hill 971) Chunuk Bair Owen’s Gully Battleship Hill
Ariburnu; Ari Burnu Ariburnu ridges Asma Dere Balikci Damlari Besim Sirta Bigali Bomba Sirt Bomba Tepe Boyun Çam Burnu Catal Tepe Cedik Dere Chakal (Çakal) Dere Chatel Dere Chelar Sirt Chifte Tepe Chukur Dere Çonkbayiri Anitlan Dchonk Bair (or Çonkbayiri) Djemal Dere Düztepe (Düs Tepe)
xv
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xvi
25 APRIL 1915
Edirna Sirt (or Edirne Sirt) Gergiri Tepe Gezel Dere Gök Tepe Gulnar Dere Haidar Tepe Hain Tepe (also Khain Tepe) Haliden Rizar Tepesi Incebayir Ridge
Mortar Ridge Camel’s Hump Valley east of Scrubby Knoll Hobbs Hill Wanliss Gully Southern shoulder of Scrubby Knoll Plugge’s Plateau Old No. 3 Outpost Main spur running off Battleship Hill into Legge Valley, inland from Mortar Ridge The Nek Seaward spurs of Baby 700 Gaba Tepe Ari Burnu Knoll Lonesome Pine Aghyl Dere North (leading to Hill Q) Cooee Gully Legge Valley Valley of Despair Valley east of Anderson Knoll Anderson Knoll Southern shoulder of Scrubby Knoll Valley north of Anderson Knoll Bolton’s Ridge Scrubby Knoll Mule Valley Plugge’s Plateau Victoria Gully Gully between Mortar and Incebayir ridges Kilia Bay Johnston’s Jolly Mountain ranges of the Anzac region Village within the valley behind Third Ridge Hill 971 Shrapnel Gully
Jessari Tepe (Jessaret Tepe) Kabak Sirta Kabatepe Kabatepe Ariburnu Kanli Sirt Kara Aghyl Dere Kara Dere Karayürük Dere Kars Dere (Deresi) Kavak Dere Kavak Tepe Kehal Bair Keklik Dere Kel Tepe Kemal Yere (also Sandjak Tepe) Kesik Dere Khain Tepe (also Hain Tepe) Kikrik Dere Kilicdere Kilye Koyu Kirmezi Sirt (also Kirmiz Sirt) Kocacimen Kocadere (Kojadere) Koja Chemen Tepe Korku (Kuruku) Dere
xvi
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xvii
Turkish/English placenames Kücük (Kuchuk) Ariburnu Kulich Bair Kumtepe
Hell Spit Baby 700 Sand Hill (beach area south of Gaba Tepe) North Beach No. 2 Outpost Eceabat German Officer’s Ridge Hill 100 Wheatfield area southeast of Hill 60 Coastal ridge running just south of Gaba Tepe Table top Scrubby Knoll Cliffs by The Sphinx The Farm Plateau Gully near Fisherman’s Hut leading up towards Baby 700 The Pimple Walker’s Ridge Rhododendron Ridge Chathams Post Harris Ridge Ridge running inland from Chunuk Bair (Head of Third Ridge) Bauchop’s Hill Hill 90 The Wheatfield (400 Plateau) M’Cay’s Hill Shell Green Russell’s Top The Sphinx Olive Grove, located in Legge Valley
Kuzey Okyanus Sahili Mahmus Sirta Maydos (Maidos) Mekkes (Merkez) Tepe Musellas Tepe Nahi Sirta Palamutlu Sirt Piav Tepe Sandjak Tepe (also Kemal Yere) Sari Bair Sari Tarla Sazli Beit Dere Sehitler Tepesi (Shuheidlar Tepe) Sercha Tepesi Shahin Sirta Süngü Bair Süngü Bayiri Suyatagi Aniti Yaila Tepe Yaivan Tepe Yeshi Tarla Yeshilik Yesil Tarla Yuksek Sirt Yuksek Tepe Zeytinlik
xvii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xviii
Sazli Beit Dere
Fisherman’s Hut
AEGEAN SEA
Rhododendron Ridge
Chunuk Bair
No. 1 Outpost Battleship Hill
Malone’s Gully North Beach
Russell’s Top
The Sphinx
Plugge’s Plateau Anzac Cove
Second Ridge
Monash Valley
Braund’s Hill
Shrapnel Gully
Incebayir Ridge
Mortar Ridge
Pope’s Hill
Razor Edge
First Ridge
Baby 700
The Nek
Walker’s Ridge
Scrubby Knoll
German Officer’s Ridge Wire Gully
Johnston’s Jolly
400 Plateau
M’Cay’s Hill
Owen’s Gully
Lonesome Pine
Victoria Gully
Adana Bair
Silt Spur Clarke Valley Sniper’s Ridge Weir’s Ridge Bolton’s Ridge
Legge Valley
Holly Ridge Pine Ridge
Anderson Knoll
Legge Valley Brighton Beach
Third Ridge
0
Valley of Despair
Main topographical features at Anzac
xviii
500 metres
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xix
Note to the text Gallipoli military organisation—April 1915
The Anzac Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Birdwood consisted of two infantry divisions: the 1st Australian Division commanded by Major General Bridges (three brigades) and the New Zealand and Australian Division commanded by Major General Godley (two brigades). An Anzac brigade is commanded by a colonel; a brigade consists of four battalions (around 4000 men in total). Brigades and battalions of the 1st Australian Division: —1st Brigade (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions) —2nd Brigade (5th, 6th, 7th and 8th battalions) —3rd Brigade (9th, 10th, 11th and 12th battalions) Brigades and battalions of the New Zealand and Australian Division: —4th Australian Brigade (13th, 14th, 15th and 16th battalions) —New Zealand Brigade (Auckland, Canterbury, Otago and Wellington battalions) An Anzac battalion is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and consists of four companies, with around 250 men in each company. Turkish III Corps, commanded by Major General Esat Pa¸s a, consisted of three infantry divisions: —7th Division (19th, 20th and 21st regiments; fought at Helles, not Anzac) xix
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xx
25 APRIL 1915
—9th Division, commanded by Colonel Sami (25th, 26th and 27th regiments) —19th Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal (57th, 72nd and 77th regiments) Each regiment consisted of around 3000 men, with three battalions per regiment. Note: This breakdown does not include ancillary units, such as engineers, communications, medical, artillery and headquarters staff.
xx
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxi
Acknowledgements It would have been impossible to approach a history of the first day at Anzac without the writings of Charles Bean, Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Bey, Christopher Pugsley and Lieutenant Spencer Westmacott. The first volume of Bean’s Official History was always within reach, along with photocopies of his diary entries. Unlike Bean, however, I have placed the first day within a strong temporal framework—as opposed to discussing the first day in terms of geography (e.g. discussing the first 24 hours at Baby 700, followed by 400 Plateau, then Second Ridge etc.). This approach was decided upon to try to reflect the enormity of the chaos that commanders and soldiers were experiencing along the whole front, during one specific period of time, as opposed to individual sectors. This is not a critique of Bean, it is just this author’s preference. Also, since Bean published his Official History the amount of first hand documentation, not to mention scholarly research, available to researchers has dramatically expanded. Indeed, Bean himself was not insignificant in the formation of the Australian War Memorial, and its outstanding collection of documents, other records (audio and visual), and artefacts available for study. Another whose work has been crucial to this interpretation of that first day is Lieutenant Colonel Zeki Bey, commander of the Turkish 27th Regiment, who, with his men, was the first to confront the invasion. Twenty years later, he published a detailed account of his regiment’s experiences during the first 24 hours of the battles for Ari Burnu. It provides a new and important account of the invasion that has long been neglected—a detailed view from the Turkish side. The work of Christopher Pugsley has also influenced this history, providing important insights into the New Zealanders’ experience at Gallipoli—and, importantly, ‘putting New Zealand back into the word Anzac’. I am also very grateful to Yvonne Riddiford, the daughter of Lieutenant Spencer Westmacott of the Auckland Battalion, who allowed me to copy and quote from her father’s detailed and fascinating diary. xxi
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxii
25 APRIL 1915
Three people I would especially like to thank are James Hurst, Peter Williams and Brett Still (James and Peter have written their own excellent accounts of Gallipoli). All three provided critical comments and advice for which I am greatly indebted. I am also grateful to Harvey Broadbent, Tom Curran, Bill Gammage and Robin Prior for early advice. In Turkey I am grateful to Professor A. Mete Tuncoku and Mr Ken Celik AO (18th March University, Canakkale) and the late Professor Bademli (Gallipoli Peninsula Peace Park, Ankara). Their hospitality and advice did much to enlighten the author on the Turkish side of things, and also to ‘understand’ the tough—mad—country that is Anzac; it is also, however, hauntingly beautiful, nine decades after the event. It would be impossible to write a history like this without walking the terrain of the battlefields. I would also like to thank the following people and institutions for supplying and/or permitting me to quote material in their care: Alexander Turnbull Library, Auckland; Australian National Library, Canberra; libraries at the Australian National University, Canberra; Australian War Memorial, Canberra; Harvey Broadbent, Macquarie University, Sydney; Tom Curran, University of Queensland; Captain Wayne Gardner, Army Museum Perth; Imperial War Museum, UK; La Trobe State Library Reading Room, Victoria; Kippenberger Military Archive, Army Museum Waiouru, New Zealand; Mitchell Library, Sydney; and Penguin Group (Australia). Like all researchers, I am indebted to those soldiers who not only kept a record of their experiences (see notes for details), but also unselfishly donated their documents and writings to numerous research institutions for others to study. This also applies to relatives who have provided similar records. For those copyright holders I was unable to locate, I trust that the material quoted meets with your approval. At Allen & Unwin I would like to thank my publisher Ian Bowring for his support throughout the writing of this history. I am also indebted to my editors, Clara Finlay, Karen Ward and Stephen Roche, who picked up numerous errors and inconsistencies that inevitably creep into such a complex history. Throughout I have tried to be as accurate as is possible; there are likely, however, to be some errors in the text for which I alone take full responsibility. Finally, I thank my wife Debbie for her encouragement, support and advice, along with our children Emma, Anita and Lloyd who have had to put up with Daddy being locked away in his study for far too many weekends. xxii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxiii
Preamble On the morning of 25 April 1915, the Allied invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula started with the two main thrusts being the Anzac landings in the vicinity of Gaba Tepe and the British landings at Helles to the south. The French also made a demonstration on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles at Kum Kale. The first to land would be the men from the Australian 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, at 4.30 a.m. at a place that would later be known as Anzac Cove. It was the Allied ‘failures’ of the first day that would largely dictate the operations and battles that occurred over the subsequent eight-month campaign. Indeed, in the case of Anzac, except for the capture of Lonesome Pine by the Australians, and the momentary capture of Chunuk Bair and Hill Q by the New Zealanders and Gurkhas in the later August offensive, very little was to change in the disposition of the Anzac and Turkish forces. While areas to the north along the coastal plain would be occupied as part of this offensive, these were of little strategic significance. It was the rush from the beach at Anzac Cove up to Ari Burnu Knoll and then onto Plugge’s Plateau by the covering force of the 3rd Brigade, followed by the later reinforcements as they rushed onto 400 Plateau (just to the south of Plugge’s), which defined the Anzac defensive line. Landing further north than planned, confused officers and men of the covering force found themselves on a narrow beach dominated by cliffs and gullies instead of the expected gentle sloping topography just north of Gaba Tepe. Faced with this unexpected situation, officers and men scrambled for the high ground; it had been drummed into them that they had to capture the heights as quickly as possible. At the same time three Turkish platoons were based around Ari Burnu under the command of Captain Faik of the 27th Regiment, and it was the job of Faik and his men to delay the invasion force long enough for the Turkish reserves at Maidos to be rushed forward. The bitter fighting for the high ground around and beyond Plugge’s Plateau would xxiii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxiv
25 APRIL 1915
define the later campaign, but it was the fighting during the first 24 hours that determined who controlled the hills and ridges. During this time small isolated groups of Australians, New Zealanders and Turks fought and died in unknown gullies and ridges in order to capture or regain ground. Out of contact with the main force, junior officers and men defined their own objectives and clung to the edges of cliffs waiting for reinforcements, which often did not arrive. Many Anzacs who died that day fought last-ditch stands well forward of the main Anzac lines beyond Second Ridge, including Battleship Hill, Baby 700 and east of 400 Plateau, their remains not to be found until 1919 and later, if ever. It was also during the first day that the Anzac battle for the high ground was lost, and with it any hope of severing the Turkish communications. A combination of bad luck (the wrong landing place), the forbidding topography, inadequate maps, as well as poor logistical and medical planning, contributed to the defeat. The timely arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Aker and his 27th Regiment along the Anzacs’ southern flank, on Third Ridge, also stopped the Australian advance to this ridge. More importantly, however, it was the foresight of the commander of the Turkish 19th Division, Mustafa Kemal, who appreciated the significance of high ground to the north, including Hill 971, Chunuk Bair and Baby 700, that ultimately sealed the Anzacs’ fate. Indeed, later that first day, the ferocious counterattack by the Turkish 57th Regiment almost succeeded in pushing the Anzacs off Russell’s Top and back into the sea.
xxiv
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxv
Introduction—historical debates This history is focused entirely on what happened during that first Anzac Day. As such, it is a narrative; I am not concerned with a revisionist history or debating the ‘what ifs’. My aim is to tell the story of that first day as it unfolded, from the available official and personal records. Given the inherent bias in surviving documentary records, it should go without saying that this history, like all histories, is biased. We will never know the full story. While this book is written in a narrative style it is important to stress, however, that it is based on documented evidence. It is also necessary at this early point to explain—defend—‘my’ take on a number of historical points that have been and undoubtedly will continue to be debated by historians and researchers of the Gallipoli Campaign. Without doubt, ‘explaining’ the landing of the covering force at Anzac Cove is always contentious. Many explanations have been debated over the years. Until recently, the two most commonly proposed are the movement of a naval buoy further north by the Turks, and the action of coastal currents, which pushed the landing force further north than intended. Both of these explanations have now been largely rejected. More recently, Denis Winter and others have argued that the landings of the 3rd Brigade at Anzac were intentional rather than an error. I do not find this argument convincing for the following reasons. If the landings at Anzac Cove were part of the overall plan, why did no one bother to inform the naval and infantry officers and men of the covering force? The record clearly shows that officers and men (including, importantly, naval ratings) all expected to land north of Gaba Tepe, but south of 400 Plateau. Indeed, Sinclair-MacLagan, commander of the 3rd Brigade, was also confused, declaring on the scene (not after the event) that they had landed on the ‘wrong beach’. This required SinclairMacLagan (and James M’Cay, commander of the 2nd Brigade) to completely change the position of battalions in a haphazard fashion. If xxv
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxvi
25 APRIL 1915
Anzac Cove was the intended beach, why were the brigadier commanders themselves kept in the dark about this? Winter suggests secrecy was the reason—that is surely taking ‘a need to know’ to a whole new level. Also, given that a major objective of the covering force was the capture of Gaba Tepe as well as Anderson Knoll, it would make no sense to land at Anzac, 3 kilometres north of their objective. It would require a long, hard slog south through unmapped terrain. Indeed, with the landing at Anzac Cove the commanders immediately abandoned the objective of the capture of Gaba Tepe. It is possible that other brigades including the 1st Brigade, as well as those of the New Zealand and Australian Division, may have been slated to land further north (including at Anzac Cove) but this was to have occurred after the covering force had secured Gaba Tepe and the heights, including Chunuk Bair and Hill 971. Landing at Anzac by the secondary force would indeed make some sense, but the landing of the 3rd Brigade at Anzac Cove was unintentional—it was a mistake. Rather than formulating a conspiracy theory about shifting blame (see Winter, 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Tragedy, 1994), the most logical explanation is the one described here and previously presented by Steel and Hart in their 1994 book Defeat at Gallipoli, as well as partly suggested by Charles Bean in the first volume of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918. That is, that it was a simple mistake by a naval midshipman who, with the best of intentions, steered the invasion force further north than planned (as described in Chapter 3). An interesting account by Sergeant Mason (11th Battalion), which until now has seldom been referred to, provides evidence that he and his party under the command of Lieutenant Reid may have made their way down to Shepherd’s Hut from Russell’s Top after the evacuation of this position by the Turks. Reading Mason’s account raises many questions, and there are undoubtedly serious issues of timing and some apparent confusion about locations. However, all of those who knew Mason stated that he was a ‘no-nonsense and dependable type of bloke’ and would have been a reliable witness. I, and others, have attempted to make sense of Mason’s account and place it within the ‘known’ framework of the first day’s events. Mason provides a detailed map of his ‘plan of march’ and provides details of Shepherd’s Hut. Originally I decided to avoid Mason’s account because of the apparent contradictions and problems of timing. It was not until reading Ron Austin’s history of the 7th Battalion (Our Dear Old Battalion, 2004) that I took another look at Mason’s account and xxvi
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxvii
Introduction—historical debates
started to see some support for his recording of events, confused as they apparently are. Austin states that one of the mysteries of the 7th Battalion during the landings was that associated with the location of Private Fred Sanders at the time of his death. Originally he landed with Jackson and Layh near Fisherman’s Hut, but within 24 hours he was killed on Walker’s Ridge–Russell’s Top. The survivors of Jackson’s men moved down the beach and eventually reached Anzac Cove after dark. How did Sanders get to Russell’s Top? Given that this area was dominated in the early afternoon of 25 April by men of the Turkish 2nd Battalion (57th Regiment) it is unlikely that Sanders would move inland towards the Turks as opposed to following his cobbers down the beach to ‘relative safety’. Could it be that Sanders joined up with Mason and his party as they moved back up towards Russell’s Top from Shepherd’s Hut in the early morning? This is a possible explanation for Sanders’s appearance on Russell’s Top. Accepting that there are problems with timing and some apparent contradictions (not surprising given the circumstances of that confused day—Mason would clearly not be alone in telling a factual account but getting the details confused), I believe that Mason’s account is worth telling. At the time of the landing, almost all of the topographical features that are now famous—The Nek, Monash Valley, Quinn’s Post, the Lonesome Pine—had no English or Turkish names. For the Anzacs, they were anonymous features in a hauntingly beautiful landscape. For convenience these places are identified by the names that were—often very much later—allocated to them. Indeed, The Cup had no known English name during the whole campaign; it was not identified and named until 1919 when Charles Bean revisited the Anzac area. As such, it must be remembered that while I might refer to X, Y and Z moving to ‘Russell’s Top’, this feature had no English name at that time and directing troops within this complicated landscape without any reference point was a major problem for Allied (as well as Turkish) commanders. While this is a critical point in the confusion of the first day, it would not be possible to write an account of the battles for the ridges without the identification of topographical features by their subsequent names. I use the common spelling for the forces involved, which in some cases may lead to variances in spelling. For example, the Anzacs tended to refer to Gaba Tepe, while the Turks spelt it Kabe Tepe or Kabatepe. I have not tried to standardise the spellings in quoted matter. Also, while xxvii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page xxviii
25 APRIL 1915
there was no such nation as Turkey until after the First World War, Turkey is used here to define what was then the Ottoman Empire. Finally, I originally planned to write an epilogue outlining what happened to the major characters in the book who managed to survive the first day. I later decided, however, not to do this as it provided an artificially neat ‘closure’ or resolution. These men did not know their fate after surviving the first 24 hours and I felt the reader should also be left to ponder their destiny.
xxviii
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 1
Anzac 1919 Long after the evacuation of Gallipoli by the Anzacs in late 1915 the battlefield remained a panorama of death and destruction. No-Man’s Land and surrounding areas were still littered with unburied men, Turk and Commonwealth alike. Almost four years after the Anzac (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) landings the Australian Historical Mission, under the leadership of Charles Bean who was appointed by the Australian government to write the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, returned to the peninsula after the Armistice in 1919. Bean’s team had two main roles: to advise the Australian government on the establishment of war cemeteries on the peninsula, and to collect artefacts for the yet to be built Australian War Memorial. During their visit Bean’s team also sought to solve some historical questions, including what had happened to members of the advanced parties of Australians who had penetrated inland during the morning of 25 April, many of whom were never seen again. Members of the mission found a large number of skeletons around the rugged spurs and gullies of Pine Ridge. Clearly, these men must have been part of the advance on the first day as no other Australian troops reached this point after 25 April. The Turks from then on continuously occupied the ridge. There we found them. From near the northern end of the ridge, just north of where the road climbs it, for about 200 yards southwards along—or rather just in front of—the crest there lay at intervals the bodies of Australians, their bones rather, still associated with the tatters of their uniforms. Far down the slope in front lay a couple more; and about a quarter of a mile down the ridge, on a little knob low down, overlooking Legge Valley, were four or five, grouped in a little half-circle where they had fought it out—[with] a Turk or Turks who had been firing from the other edge of the knob, eight yards away. And at the back of the ridge, up near the road, there lay from top to bottom of a small gully the remains of Australians who had lain there wounded or sheltering when the attack caught them. On 1
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 2
25 APRIL 1915
uniforms, among all these groups, we found the red and purple arm patches or bronze numbers of the 6th Battalion.1 Later, walking out along what had once been No-Man’s Land on Second Ridge, Bean and others from the Historical Mission also found hundreds of unburied dead, some undoubtedly from the first day’s fighting. Indeed, just over 20 per cent of the total number of casualties (on the Anzac side at least) occurred during the first 24 hours. The bodies lay around Second Ridge and other places, having accumulated there over eight months of fighting, now slowly becoming part of the landscape. Men killed in the first day’s advances inland over the ridges lay, of course, where they fell, and the ebb of those advances left many dead behind the Turkish lines; but most of those who fell that day lay thickly in or close in front of the line held at dusk. Many could not be reached and their bodies still lay there when on May 19th the Turks threw in the greatest attack made by them at Anzac, in which 10,000 Turks were said to have been hit, 3,000 being killed, in this same Noman’s-land . . . Those men of both sides who fell in No-man’s-land during the rest of the campaign still lay in No-man’s-land in 1919, very thickly in some parts, especially in front of Quinn’s and Pope’s Posts, and The Nek.2
2
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 3
1 Preparations
y early 1915 the war was not going well for the Entente (Allies), especially for the Imperial Russian Empire. Ottoman forces had just entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary and had begun a campaign in the Russian Caucasus. At the start of this Turkish offensive the Russian Tsar, Grand Duke Nicholas II, sent a harried appeal to London urgently requesting that pressure on the Russian Front be relieved by action against the Ottoman Empire. First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, and Secretary for War, Lord Kitchener, discussed the possibilities. Kitchener, in a letter dated 2 January 1915, informed Churchill that the only place a realistic demonstration could be made was the Dardanelles.1
B
My dear Churchill I do not see that we can do anything that will very seriously help the Russians in the Caucasus. The Turks are evidently withdrawing most of their troops from Adrianople and using them to reinforce their army against the Russians, probably sending them by the Black Sea. In the Caucasus and Northern Persia the Russians are in a bad way. We have no troops to land anywhere. A demonstration at Symyrna would do no good and probably cause the slaughter of Christians. Alexandretta has already been tried, and would have no great effect a second time. The coast of Syria would have no effect. The only place that a demonstration might have some effect in stopping reinforcements going East would be the Dardanelles. Particularly if, as the Grand Duke says, reports could be spread at the same time that Constantinople was threatened. 3
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 4
25 APRIL 1915
We shall not be ready for anything big for some months. Yours very truly Kitchener In November 1914 a British naval squadron had attacked the shore defences of the Dardanelles upon Turkey’s entry into the war. This naval bombardment ended with the destruction of one of the Turkish forts guarding the entry to the Dardanelles as a result of a direct hit on its magazine. No landings were attempted nor were the straits to the Dardanelles entered, but it did demonstrate to Churchill at least that naval power alone might succeed in forcing its way through the Dardanelles and into the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. The success of this naval operation would place the Ottoman capital, Constantinople, directly under the heavy guns of the Royal Navy, without the need to land a significant infantry force. Churchill turned to the forcing of the Dardanelles by the navy as a way of relieving pressure on the Russians. If successful it was believed that this would knock Turkey out of the war, exposing the southern flank of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In turn, this would enable much-needed supplies and munitions to be shipped directly to Russia through the ice-free supply route of the Black Sea. The Imperial Russian Army would then be in a position to steamroll westward towards Germany. A purely naval assault also meant that infantry, who were urgently needed on the Western Front, would not be required for the operation. After all, conventional wisdom dictated that the war would be won or lost in France and Belgium. While the navy prepared to enter the Dardanelles, the situation was no longer urgent from the Russian standpoint. Only two days after Kitchener had communicated to Churchill his belief that a serious demonstration could be made against Turkey via the Dardanelles, the situation along the Caucasus had seriously turned against the Turks with the near collapse of their forces as a result of a number of successful Russian counterattacks. In fact, by mid-January Turkish casualties along this front were truly horrific with an estimated 90 000 dead and 45 000 captured, leaving a total of just over 12 000 men remaining from their original army.2 With this knowledge, by the end of January Kitchener and Churchill’s plan had changed from merely assisting the Russians to an all-out attempt to knock Turkey out of the war. Indeed, even at this early stage of the war Churchill had come to recognise that sending men 4
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 5
Preparations
to the Western Front merely resulted in ‘men chewing barbed wire’—to Churchill a new front meant a new opportunity.3 Others, however, had different ideas about where a new front should be opened; the French believed that it should be in the Balkans in order to attack the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the south, which would also assist Serbia and in the process threaten Turkey. In addition, Bulgaria had just accepted a large financial loan from Germany and it was now likely that it was about to side with the Central Powers. If this happened there would be an unbroken line of the ‘Hun and her allies’ stretching from Belgium, through central Europe and the Ottoman Empire, including what would later be called Saudi Arabia. It was hoped that a show of force in the Balkans would help Bulgaria at least to remain neutral. Kitchener was not averse to a ‘limited war’ in the Balkans as he and others believed that the Dardanelles would largely be a naval action, while any campaign in the Balkans would be limited to land forces. There was no reason why both campaigns could not be waged simultaneously.4 The Greek port of Salonika was agreed by all to be the best base of operations for any campaign in the Balkans. There was only one problem—Greece was still neutral. The Greek government, however, was indicating that it might be prepared to allow the Allied troops to land at Salonika out of fear of losing out on potential territorial gains. This plan would also likely result in the strategically significant event of Greece and other neutral Balkan states joining the Allies. Indeed, Greece was mooting that it might even be prepared to provide three infantry divisions to assist the naval attack on the Dardanelles, by occupying the Gallipoli Peninsula while the French and British focused on the Balkans. On hearing of this the Russians were adamant that Greek involvement was not acceptable—for centuries Russia had viewed Constantinople and the Dardanelles as part of her territorial ambitions and would not countenance any attempts by Greece to beat Russia to the prize. It was not long, however, before the Greeks themselves added a caveat to their original offer: Bulgaria would also have to join the Greek attack against the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Greeks feared—the Balkans being the Balkans—that some of their ‘allies’ (especially Bulgaria) might take advantage of their forces being committed to the peninsula and attack Greece.5 Any possibility of Greece aligning itself with the Allies soon completely collapsed as the pro-Allied Greek government fell and was replaced by one that was more aligned to the Central Powers. This did not displease the King of Greece, who was married to Kaiser Wilhelm’s 5
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 6
25 APRIL 1915
sister. It is indeed unfortunate that the Greek invasion of the peninsula did not progress beyond discussion, as at least three Greek divisions would likely have been able to occupy the peninsula in detail.6 As the Turkish army’s history of the Dardanelles campaign would later state, ‘It would have been possible to effect a landing successfully at any point on the peninsula, and the capture of the straits by land forces would have been comparatively easy.’7 This interpretation was later confirmed by official Turkish records. With the decision largely made for them, the British and French now turned their full attention to the forcing of the Dardanelles as the primary campaign to knock Turkey out of the war. The main opponents of the plan to break through the Dardanelles using the navy alone were the British admirals who would have the task of planning and executing the operation. The narrow straits of the Dardanelles were thought to be heavily defended with around 200 guns, any number of shore-based fixed torpedo tubes, submarine nets and hundreds of mines. The admirals refused to allow their best ships to be used and, apart from the newly built battleship Queen Elizabeth and the battle cruisers Inflexible and Irresistible, most of the other ships were old, due for retirement and manned by reserve crews. The same was true of the French contingent. In spite of this it was still a mighty fleet that began its attack on 18 March 1915. The minesweepers reported all clear at 8.45 a.m. and by 10.45 a.m. the battle fleet was moving in for the attack. Three lines of battleships moved in with line ‘A’ leading the attack; its goal was to silence the forts by longrange bombardment. Line ‘B’ was to engage the forts at close range, while line ‘C’ was held in reserve. The battle did not cease until 6.30 p.m. All day, long rows of battleships and their support vessels pounded the shore batteries and forts. Later in the afternoon, minesweepers were sent forward in an attempt to clear the waters ahead, after which the battleships were to continue up the straits. These minesweepers were not, however, warships but merely fishing trawlers fitted with cable-cutting equipment and crewed by civilians. They had never been expected to perform their task successfully if they came under concentrated fire, which of course is exactly what happened—the minesweepers withdrew. At this point, the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine, capsized and sank in just a few minutes, taking with her to the bottom around 600 men. The battle raged for another two hours when the British battleship Inflexible also hit a mine close to where the Bouvet had sunk. 6
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 7
Preparations
The Inflexible limped back out to sea, listing heavily. Irresistible also hit a mine, forcing her abandonment, and finally Ocean had her steering gear seriously damaged and within minutes she too went to the bottom. The admirals had had enough and ordered the fleet to withdraw to the safety of the Aegean.8 Unknown to the Allies, almost a week earlier a small Turkish minelayer, Nousret, had laid a single line of 26 mines parallel to the Asiatic shore in the sheltered waters of Eren Keui Bay. It was these mines that had dealt the damage to the warships moving parallel to the Asiatic shore.9 Several hundred lives had been lost, three battleships had been sunk and one gravely damaged. De Robeck, who was in command of the fleet, had always preferred a combined naval and infantry operation and now argued that it would take such an operation to break through the Dardanelles. Churchill wanted to order the admiral to undertake another naval assault but, faced with the unanimous opinion of the naval and military commanders on the scene, the War Council was left with little alternative but to abandon the idea. It was now concluded that the forcing of the Dardanelles would require a concerted effort by both the navy and army.10 Lieutenant Colonel Cunliffe-Owen had been the British military attaché in Constantinople from 1913 until the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Turkey. In late 1914 he had reported to British military intelligence regarding the Ottoman Army: there is no doubt that very considerable progress has been made in efficiency, and that it will be far superior to that in existence before the Balkan war. The continuous training . . . and the time which has elapsed for the deliberate organization of mobilization and administrative arrangements must cause the Turkish forces to be now regarded as a factor . . . to be taken seriously into account.11 Unfortunately British planners for the invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula did not heed Cunliffe-Owen’s sound advice. Indeed, preliminary landings at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula in the area of Sedd-el-Bahr, as well as along the Asiatic shore at Kum Kale by parties of British troops between 26 and 27 February 1915 succeeded in destroying a few Turkish guns before the men were withdrawn. In one of these actions Lieutenant Commander Eric Robinson was awarded the Victoria Cross. These successful raids seem 7
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 8
25 APRIL 1915
to have confirmed to Allied planners the impression that the peninsula was not prepared to counter a determined invasion. However, as a result of these landings, as well as the naval action of 18 March, all hope of a surprise invasion by Allied forces was lost. This situation certainly was not helped by the general lack of Allied security, with mail arriving from England to Egypt addressed to the ‘Constantinople Expeditionary Force’. The Turks now knew an invasion was imminent and focused all of their energies into digging trenches, erecting wire entanglements, and setting up machine-gun and artillery emplacements along the peninsula. The defence of the peninsula was made easier by preparations previously made by Turkish forces during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 in anticipation of a Greek invasion of the peninsula—an invasion that was never launched.12 As such, when the British 29th Division landed on the southern tip of the peninsula less than two months later, unlike the previous raids which resulted in few casualties, this division alone lost over 3000 men in just a few hours.13 After the failed attempt by the Entente fleet in March, the Turkish High Command under the leadership of Enver Pa¸s a formed a new army headquarters, which would be directly responsible for the defence of the Dardanelles. This resulted in the formation of the Turkish 5th Army, under the command of the German General, Liman von Sanders. The new commander of the 5th Army arrived by sea at the port of Gallipoli on 26 March and established his Headquarters there.14 The Turkish 5th Army was a relatively strong force consisting of the III Corps, with the 7th, 9th and 19th infantry divisions, and the XV Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 11th infantry divisions. In addition a reserve force consisting of the 5th Infantry Division and an independent cavalry brigade were made available. The III Corps maintained responsibility for defending the Gallipoli Peninsula, while the XV Corps, with its headquarters located close to the ancient city remains of Troy, was to defend the Asiatic coast. The 5th Infantry Division was stationed at Bulair in the northern part of the peninsula, while the cavalry brigade was stationed even further north to screen the long coastline of the Gulf of Saros.15 Major Ismet, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, based at Gaba Tepe, later recalled the disposition of his battalion according to von Sanders’s tactics: 2nd Battalion: To be established in the Ariburnu [Anzac Cove] and also Kaba Tepe sector. 7th Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Mountain 8
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 9
Preparations
Gun Regiment with half a machine gun company to be in position on the ridge behind Ariburnu, and from 3rd Battalion as far as the Ariburnu company and at Kaba Tepe, field guns and Nordenfelts will be placed under the command of the 2nd Battalion commander. It is required that the half machine gun company will establish itself behind the position in such a way as to bring the northern shore of the Ariburnu–Kaba Tepe under fire.16 One direct result of von Sanders’s efforts to further consolidate the forces was to concentrate divisional reserves close to their divisional headquarters. This reshuffle of units was to benefit the initial landings of the Anzac forces, as it removed large numbers of Turkish troops from the immediate vicinity of Ari Burnu. As later stated by Lieutenant Colonel Sefik Aker, commander of the 27th Regiment, prior to the arrival of von Sanders a large part of his regiment was positioned immediately behind Ari Burnu and this in large part was intended to intervene at once in the event of a landing at Anafartalar [to the north] or Kabatepe [to the south]. Under this plan there was no
Map 1.1 Turkish troop dispositions, April 1915 Source: Bean (1937)
9
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 10
25 APRIL 1915
obstacle to the troops being kept active and in training. These reserves could still be moved from where they were to any point where they might be needed at any time. Because the reserves were close to the most probable landing positions they could not be considered a dispersed force lost to the Division. There was nothing to prevent marching and tactical exercises and they still used to carry these out.17 The Turkish defence preparations were based on a number of screening forces scattered along the coast at vital points to watch for an invasion. This was the role of the Turkish 9th Infantry Division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Khalil Sami Bey. It was made up of three regiments, each of three battalions, plus artillery. The 25th Regiment was in reserve at Serafim Farm, so that it could quickly support the screening forces at either Gaba Tepe or the southern tip of the peninsula at Helles, which were likely landing spots. The 26th Regiment was stationed at Helles, with a field artillery battery, while the main bulk of the 27th Regiment (two of its three battalions) was stationed in the Olive Grove just behind Maidos in order to support Gaba Tepe if required. There is little information regarding the demographic make-up of most Turkish forces during this period; however, Lieutenant Colonel Aker provided some details regarding the composition of his regiment at least: Of the soldiers in all three Battalions and the machine gun company of our regiment 50 per cent were inhabitants of Biga district, 15 per cent the Gallipoli Peninsula, 15 per cent Lapser district and 20 per cent were from the villages and small towns of various other districts close to Central Anatolia and Canakkale. These were all mixed up together. 99 per cent of them were agricultural workers. About three quarters of them were married, with families, and one quarter were bachelors. Their ages were between 21 and 35 . . . The men were armed with Mauser rifles: Just as there were no machine gun organizations in the Battalions, so also there were no light machine guns. Each man in every section was equipped with two grenades. Other men had portable digging implements. Large digging implements were also carried in A echelon transport. The guns of the machine gun company attached to the regimental command were the maxim type (four guns). There were insufficient quantities of driving springs and similar spare parts for the guns . . . In regards the men’s clothing, the situation was not too bad. But it cannot be said that they were well clothed. There was a proportion 10
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 11
Preparations
of our loyal minded young men who carried with them their own personal civilian clothes. It was beyond the power of the regiment to make good deficiencies of this kind. For the cause of these deficiencies one had to look to the shortcomings of the Government of the day.18 Of the three battalions belonging to the 27th Regiment, one—the 2nd Battalion—was dispersed along the coast on a 7-kilometre frontage from Aghyl Dere in the north to Semerley Tepe in the south. The 1st Company of the 2nd Battalion was positioned in reserve east of Gaba Tepe, while its 2nd Company was positioned south of Gaba Tepe along Palamutlu Sirt, which was considered a possible landing spot. The remaining two companies were located at, or close to, where the Anzacs would land. The 3rd Company garrisoned Gaba Tepe and its immediate surroundings, while screening the coastline north of Gaba Tepe in the vicinity of Ari Burnu was the 4th Company, under the command of Captain Faik. Each company had three platoons, each platoon had nine sections, and each section contained nine men. The role of the screening force was to alert their battalion and regimental commanders of an invasion. They would then withdraw to pre-prepared defensive positions a little further inland and await the arrival of their comrades from the 1st and 3rd battalions located close to Maidos. The concentrated Turkish forces would then be in a position to counterattack and drive the enemy back into the sea.19 On the night of 24 April the Turkish 1st and 3rd battalions, 27th Regiment, had conducted tactical manoeuvres around Gaba Tepe. They returned to their encampment in the Olive Grove, just outside Maidos, at around 12.30 a.m. and by 2 a.m. most had fallen asleep, exhausted.20 It would not be long, however, before they would be woken from their sleep by the sound of distant gunfire originating from the vicinity of Gaba Tepe and Ari Burnu, just 5 kilometres away. In early 1915 General Ian Hamilton was appointed Commander-inChief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). With the failure of the navy to penetrate the Dardanelles, the MEF was assigned the mission of invading and capturing the Gallipoli Peninsula. The British 29th Division (around 17 000 men) under the command of General Hunter-Weston was slated as the main force to capture the peninsula. It was the only regular division of the British Army not yet engaged on the Western Front and was dispatched to the Mediterranean on 16 March. 11
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 12
25 APRIL 1915
Kitchener, however, made it clear to Hamilton that the 29th Division was ‘only on loan’ and it should be returned as soon as possible for duties along the Western Front. The French also committed a division (around 16 500 men) under General d’Amade to the campaign.21 The invasion plan was for British troops of the 29th Division to land on a number of beaches around the southern tip of the peninsula at Helles, while the French would initially land along the Asiatic side at Kum Kale (as a feint) before later withdrawing to the peninsula in order to support the British at Helles. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was later made available to Hamilton and it was decided that they would land further north in an attempt to draw Turkish reinforcements away from Helles and to cut Turkish communications. The Australian Imperial Force (AIF) had originally expected to disembark in England, before being sent to France to fight ‘the dreaded Hun’.
Suvla Bay
A.&N.Z. Army Corps
Covering force
Mal Tepe
Main body e ep aT b Ga
Killa Liman MAIDOS Kilid
Bahr Plateau
Achi Baba
29 Div. Covering force Main body
4 miles
Map 1.2 Overall plan of the Allied invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula Source: Bean (1937)
12
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 13
Preparations
While at sea the large convoy transporting the Australians and New Zealanders received a message from London. During the voyage the ‘wash-house wireless’ had been active with numerous rumours and outright furphies. Soon, however, official word arrived: ‘Unforeseen circumstances decide that the Force shall train in Egypt and go to the front from there. The Australians and New Zealanders are to form a Corps under Lieutenant General Birdwood. The locality of the camp is near Cairo.’22 Administrative staff soon abbreviated the name of the corps to ANZAC, which was quickly adopted as the unofficial title of the corps. It was thought that the Australians and New Zealanders would adjust better to the desert climate as opposed to the wet conditions in the Salisbury Downs. In addition the training camps in England were full with the arrival of the Canadians and the AIF could not easily be accommodated. It was also strongly suspected that the Turks were planning to capture the strategically important Suez Canal. Keeping the Anzacs in Egypt meant that they could be called upon to help defend this vital waterway. Shortly after the arrival of the Australians at Mena Camp, close to the Pyramids, and the New Zealanders in the desert camp at
ip
70
0
Hi ll
97
1
Ko j
a
Ch
em
n
Ba ir
Bn
en
Te pe
11
Fisherman’s Hut B ab y
sh 6 Bn
5 8B
ttl e
7 Bn
Bn
Ba
Ch un uk
Ri
dg
e
Ari Burnu
Boghali
10 Bn
Kojadere
CT
Mal Tepe
JE
Gu
n
12 Bn
IVE
Hell Spit
B
Anderson Knoll
9
Bn
O
Gaba Te
Wine Glass Ridge
pe
9 Bn 1000 500
0
1000
2000
3000
SCALE OF YARDS
Map 1.3 Anzac objectives, 25 April 1915 Source: Bean (1937)
13
4000
5000
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 14
25 APRIL 1915
Zeitoun, the Anzacs were incorporated into the invasion plans for the Gallipoli Peninsula. With their inclusion the entire force for the invasion now totalled close to 75 000 men, including troops in a support role.23 The plan was for the Anzacs to land just north of Gaba Tepe, which was strategically significant because it defended the relatively flat plain connecting the western and eastern shores of the peninsula. As such, Gaba Tepe was relatively well defended against a sea-borne invasion. Any force that was able to capture Gaba Tepe and the surrounding high ground to the north would be able to move rapidly inland facing little resistance. Therefore it was crucial that the main Anzac force capture the northern heights of Hill 971 and then move in a southeast direction along its inland spur to Mal Tepe. This would effectively cut Turkish communications. The coastline just to the north of Gaba Tepe was considered to be an unlikely invasion place by the Turkish commanders due to the difficult terrain and thus was only lightly defended. Indeed, British aerial reconnaissance flights indicated that apart from some trenches around the ridges close to the beaches, and a few artillery emplacements a little further inland, no substantial Turkish defences were present.24 The 3rd Brigade of the 1st Australian Division was to be the first Allied force to land on the peninsula. This brigade consisted of the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th battalions. The plan was for the 9th Battalion to secure the southern flank, including Gaba Tepe itself as well as the main southern spur running off Third Ridge, later to be known as Anderson Knoll. The 10th Battalion was to capture the bulk of Third Ridge, the 11th Battalion was to capture Scrubby Knoll (the northern part of Third Ridge), as well as Battleship Hill, while the 12th Battalion would occupy 400 Plateau as the brigade reserve. Meanwhile, the 2nd Brigade would land just to the north, with three of its four battalions landing in the vicinity of Hell Spit and the remaining battalion landing in what would become known as Anzac Cove. The 2nd Brigade would climb the heights and bypass Battleship Hill (which at this point should have been secured by the 3rd Brigade) and push on to Chunuk Bair and Hill 971. Later that morning the brigades of the New Zealand and Australian Division would land and these later troops would then push on to the inland heights of Mal Tepe, which would effectively cut Turkish communications north and south.25 On 21 April 1915, General Ian Hamilton issued his final orders to the troops. 14
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 15
Preparations
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 21st April, 1915 Soldiers of France and of the King Before us lies an adventure unprecedented in modern war. Together with our comrades of the Fleet, we are about to force a landing upon an open beach in the face of positions which have been vaunted by our enemies as impregnable. The landing will be made good, by the help of God and the Navy; the positions will be stormed, and the War brought one step nearer to a glorious close. ‘Remember,’ said Lord Kitchener when bidding adieu to your Commander, ‘Remember, once you set foot upon the Gallipoli Peninsula, you must fight the thing through to a finish.’ The whole world will be watching your progress. Let us prove ourselves worthy of the great feat of arms entrusted to us. Ian Hamilton, General26 Rapid deployment and movement was essential to the plan as it was believed that two Turkish divisions of around 20 000 troops were located further inland. In reality, with elements of the Turkish 26th and 27th regiments scattered along the coast as a screening force, only one regiment of the 9th Division (25th Regiment) and the three regiments of the 19th Division made up the entire reserve for the peninsula; that is, less than 13 000 troops. A race between the Anzacs and Turks within the first 24 hours would determine who held the heights surrounding Ari Burnu.
15
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 16
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 17
PART I The Landing
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 18
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 19
2 ‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’ t 1 a.m. on Sunday 25 April 1915, the three battleships ferrying the men of the 3rd Brigade, who were to be the first to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula, came to a stop. They were approximately halfway between their port of origin, the Greek island of Lemnos, and their destination, the Gallipoli Peninsula. Those men who had been able to catch some light sleep were woken with a gentle shake. While the men were taking stock, perhaps sharing a few thoughts with their mates over a hot cup of cocoa, the tows that were to carry them to the beach were readied for their short but decisive passage. Some of the men were offered a tot of good naval rum. Officers in some cases were even offered the keys to the ships’ refreshment cupboard. Major Miles Beevor of the 10th Battalion was escorted to the wardroom of the destroyer Foxhound and later wrote:
A
From sundry aspersions dropped by several naval officers, I gathered that they did not expect any of us to survive the morrow. This MAY have been the reason for the bright hospitality, which handed over the key of the refreshment locker. I really think that kindness was due, however, to the hospitality of the British Navy, coupled with the admiration of the sailor man for the soldier, which feeling is enthusiastically reciprocated.1 Victor Cromwell of the 10th Battalion later recalled as an old man, ‘they gave us a couple of gold sovereigns each to spend on the way to Constantinople . . . but my two sovereigns are still here—we never got far enough to do any spending’.2 The moon was still high and the cliffs of the Gallipoli Peninsula to the east could occasionally be seen in the distance. The sea was calm and all was quiet. It was a cold and chilly night, made worse by the order to roll 19
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 20
25 APRIL 1915
up sleeves. This was to make it easier for the men to identify comrades and for senior commanders watching through binoculars from the battleships offshore to locate the current position of the Anzac troops.3 During this passage many took advantage of the numerous grinding stones aboard ship to sharpen their bayonets, as described by Private Cavill, who would arrive later in the morning as part of the 1st Battalion: My! Didn’t I grin when I saw the ship’s grindstone. The boys were afraid their bayonets would not be sharp enough, so there they were, gathered around waiting eagerly for their turn to get at the stone. By the time we left the ship it was gouged and worn to such an extent that it was fit for nothing but a kellick stone.4 The 5th Battalion diary states, ‘Some made a pretence of reposing on their kit, but the great majority were quite openly excited over the prospect of fighting soon and they played restlessly with the bolts of their rifles, picked imaginary dirt from bayonet springs or wrote in their diaries and pocket books last messages to their loved ones’.5 Corporal Alfred Love (14th Battalion) inscribed in the front cover of his diary, ‘In the event of my death, I wish this book to be sent to my dear wife to let her know that my last thoughts were of her and Essie, our darling daughter’. His last entry on 27 April was, ‘Machine guns are playing hell round our men. They are getting hit and killed all round me but I have escaped so far.’6 He was killed later that day. Byron Hobson, a 25-year-old former stock clerk, was aboard the British transport Ascot, which he described as ‘the dirtiest afloat . . . Any old craft could beat this tub we are on.’ He was now a member of the 13th Battalion, which would not land until late in the day. He wrote in his diary, ‘we are eager to get this fight over. Defeat never enters our heads for we understand the Turks take no prisoners, so that means to an Australian a fight to the death.’7 Earlier, junior officers had inspected their platoons to ensure that troops had two empty sandbags rolled around their entrenching tools; that they had three days’ iron rations; that their pouches contained 200 rounds of ammunition; that rifle chambers and magazines were emptied (there was to be no firing until daylight, prior to which only the bayonet was to be used); that water bottles were filled; and two conspicuously white bags containing two days’ extra rations were attached behind each man. Onboard the ships, men tried to dye these bags a darker colour by boiling them in tea, but to no avail—white they were 20
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 21
‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’
issued, white they remained. The extra rations within these bags included a tin of bully beef, a small tin of tea and sugar, and a number of very hard coarse biscuits. It was widely circulated amongst the troops that these ‘rock chewers’ were originally issued during the Boer War fifteen years earlier and had been unbreakable even back then. In all, each man carried around 35 kilograms.8 At about this time the destroyers and transports, which were ferrying men of the support brigades, were passing Imbros. Charles Bean recorded in his diary from his cabin aboard the 14 000-ton liner Minnewaska a conversation by two mates of the 1st Battalion who were quietly talking outside his cabin porthole: ‘What time is it? Ten past twelve—she’s sailed. Where have you been? Me and Bill have been down below having a farewell yarn.’ Bean described how later he had to pick his way carefully along the promenade deck so as not to step on the sleeping soldiers who covered the deck rugged up in their greatcoats, blankets and balaclavas, fast asleep. ‘“Ahh, it’s chilly” says one yawning. And so it is,’ Bean wrote in his diary.9 Immediately after church parade on the morning of 24 April, commanders had called their men to parade on the troop decks at 10 a.m. They read a special order to the troops from their colonel, Sinclair-MacLagan, a tall, distinguished, no-nonsense Scot, commander of the 3rd Brigade. It is necessary you should understand that we are to carry out a most difficult operation. There is no going back. Whatever footing we get on land must be held onto at all costs, even to the last man. We must expect to be shelled but remember, this is part of the game of war and we must stick it. You may get orders to do something, which, in your position, seems wrong and perhaps a mad enterprise. Do not cavil at it but carry it out with absolute faith in your leaders because we are, after all, only a very small piece on the board. Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game and it is to win the game that we are here.10 In other words, if you realise that maybe you’re just a pawn, and a pawn with a vitally important attack to perform, just know the knights and rooks will be very grateful for your sacrifice—however small it might be! The overall commander of the Anzacs, Lieutenant General Birdwood, gave a more practical and down-to-earth assessment and admitted to the troops that: 21
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 22
25 APRIL 1915
We are going to have a real hard and rough time of it, until at all events, we have turned the enemy out of our first objective . . . the country whither we are bound is very difficult so we may not be able to get wagons anywhere near us for days, so men must not think their wants have been neglected if they do not get all they want. On landing it will be necessary for every individual to carry with him all his requirements in food and clothing for three days . . . to take very great care not only of food but ammunition the replacement of which will be very difficult . . . you must not waste ammunition by firing away indiscriminately at no target but wait until we find the enemy in well entrenched positions when all our ammunition will be required to turn them out . . . make an effort to try and refrain from starting on your water bottle until quite late in the day. Once you start drinking you cannot stop, and a water bottle is very soon emptied.11 As stated by Lieutenant Richards of the 1st Battalion, ‘To-morrow is the all-eventful day. We have our bully beef and biscuits with a full water bottle for two days or more. There is no water on the Gallipoli landing place at all, so we have to take great care of our water and fill ourselves up to the neck before the landing.’12 Officers informed the men of their tasks as they saw them; most troops, while given a broad overview, remained ignorant of the details. Corporal Probert wrote, ‘There are three landing places, but I don’t know where they are’13 while Lieutenant Colonel Marks, who was to land at 7 a.m. with the medical section, was just as ignorant—no one had even thought to show him a map. Those troops assigned special tasks, however, were given a little more detail. According to one scout of the 10th Battalion, which was part of the initial landing force, scouts were informed that they were ‘to proceed, very orderly in certain formations, do this here and that there . . . my platoon had a gun position to capture, after which we were to make ourselves as comfortable as possible, and wait for the enemy . . . We had on no account, to chase the enemy too far, for fear of being cut off or led into a trap and above all we were only to use the bayonet if we encountered anybody, therefore all our magazines were empty.’14 Edward Baigent of the New Zealand First Canterbury Battalion was also a scout and wrote in his diary during the early hours of 25 April: Our ship the Itonus moved out during the night and most of us were on deck before daylight. Plan of attack was made known to the 22
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 23
‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’
troops. Major Brereton took us Scouts and showed us a map and gave us orders to carry out as soon as we got ashore. The 3rd Australian Brigade were to land first and form the covering party at Gaba Tepe. This was to be one of the main attacks and was entrusted to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. Our objective to push across the peninsula and occupy the high and dominating positions. This achieved, the Turks would have to give way at the lower end of the peninsula, as we would have control of their line of communication.15 The plan was for the 3rd Brigade to land in two waves. The first, containing 1500 men from the 9th, 10th and 11th battalions, would secure the beach and immediate surroundings. The first wave was to be launched from three battleships anchored 2 to 3 kilometres from shore. These battleships were the Queen, the Prince of Wales and the London. From these battleships the men of the first wave were to board twelve tows. Each tow was made up of a steamboat towing three boats. These included a cutter (30 men), a lifeboat (28 men) and either a launch (98 men) or a pinnace (60 men). In each was a sailor at the tiller and four seamen at the oars, with a naval officer in the steamboat ahead and a midshipman in the last boat of each tow. Following closely behind would be the remaining 2500 men of the second wave. This wave consisted of men from the same battalions as the first, although it would also include the full complement of men of the 12th Battalion who represented the brigade reserve. The second wave, including Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan and staff, was to be launched close to shore from seven fast-moving destroyers about twenty minutes after the first wave had landed. By the time the destroyers arrived on the scene the tows that had landed the men from the battleships should be returning from the beach to pick up the men from the destroyers.16 Following the landing of the 3rd Brigade, the remainder of the 1st Australian Division (1st and 2nd brigades) would commence landing from transports, battleships and destroyers. These vessels would get as close as possible to the beach, with men being transferred to the returning tows and ferried ashore. It was estimated that the entire infantry component of the division as well as the supporting 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Battery would be ashore by 9 a.m. The other division committed to the Anzac landings was the New Zealand and Australian Division, consisting of the New Zealand Brigade and the Australian 4th Brigade, which would follow later in the morning.17 23
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 24
25 APRIL 1915
The 1500 troops of the 3rd Brigade on board the battleships Queen, London and Prince of Wales were accompanied by the Bacchante and Majestic. They arrived 5 miles west of Gaba Tepe at around 1 a.m., where the Triumph had anchored the previous night to mark their exact position. All six ships then launched their boats, which assembled with two tows alongside each of the three battleships, and the troops began to embark.18 Dr Harry Nott of the 10th Battalion later recalled, ‘I was wakened at 12.45 am on 25 April 1915, put on my equipment and had a hurried meal in the wardroom; and then proceeded to my station with the stretcher-bearers. There was some delay, but eventually we filed down a wooden gangway, constructed for the purpose temporarily, into small open boats.’19 Other troops climbed down rope ladders from the battleship into the small boats. Very little noise could be heard except the odd curse, the muffled sound of shuffling boots and occasionally the grounding of a rifle butt. As well as the troops, each tow contained supplies including two boxes of ammunition, twelve picks, eighteen shovels, 100 empty sandbags, three jars of water, three days’ rations and a large number of wire cutters.20 By 2.35 a.m. the loading was complete; it had taken only 40 minutes. At around 3 a.m. the Queen, Prince of Wales and London proceeded at 5 knots towards shore, with the boats containing the troops strung out behind them on either side. At this point the Triumph, Bacchante and Majestic took up their positions as covering ships.21 Dr Nott recalled that ‘when all the men were settled in the boats, we were towed away into the darkness by small steam pinnaces; and I can remember just seeing in the gloom similar strings of boats on each side of us, and hear the faint thug-thug of the pinnaces. Occasionally we slid past the shadowy outline of some large vessel.’22 Earlier, at around 6 p.m. on 24 April, the men who were to land in the second wave were still on board their transports and had been told that they could rest until 11 p.m. Lieutenant Colonel Clarke of the 12th Battalion advised his officers: ‘You fellows had better go and have a sleep’. Clarke himself lay down in a cabin that was made available to him by the ship’s captain. It was not long before Lieutenant Margetts, who had been a schoolteacher before the war, crept into Clarke’s cabin to see if the ‘old man’ was resting comfortably. ‘Margetts, are the men all right?’ Clarke asked in the dark. With this Margetts climbed onto the deck of the transport and walked amongst the men to ensure that all was well.23 24
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 25
‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’
By 11 p.m. the transports had made their way to the harbour of Kephalos at the eastern end of the island of Imbros. It was here that the destroyers were waiting to take on board the remainder of the 3rd Brigade from the transports. Soon the destroyers were lying alongside the transports and the men started their climb down from the large transports into the smaller ships. Orders were given for no talking or smoking, although Ted Mofflin of the 11th Battalion found a way around this: I went down into the engine room, and there I was quite warm and could talk and smoke away to my heart’s content. Gracious! How I did smoke! As soon as one cigarette was done, I’d start another, my heart was beating like a sledge hammer. I shall never forget that trip . . . we didn’t know what to expect.24 Soon the ‘dark shape of the ship faded slowly behind. The destroyer came up with the six others, all similarly loaded, motionless on the water.’25 The destroyers had begun to move slowly, barely making headway, and after 2 or 3 miles they stopped again, waiting for the moon to sink. Unseen, but not far out ahead of them were the battleships carrying the covering force. By 3 a.m. the battleships and destroyers had moved off towards the shoreline of the Gallipoli Peninsula. While the Anzac taskforce was assembling to the west of Gaba Tepe, Turkish troops under the command of Captain Faik (2nd Battalion), who was responsible for defending the area around Ari Burnu, had spotted the massed convoy. Captain Faik and members of No. 4 Company occupied the area around Ari Burnu to the north of Gaba Tepe. This company consisted of three platoons, covering the region north of Gaba Tepe, through to the area just north of Fisherman’s Hut on North Beach. Platoon No. 1 was defending the landing area around North Beach and was commanded by Second Lieutenant Ibrahim-Hayreddin. These men were entrenched around Fisherman’s Hut. The 2nd Platoon was commanded by Second Lieutenant Muharrem, stationed at Hain Tepe (Plugge’s Plateau) so as to defend the Ari Burnu heights and coastline (later known as Anzac Cove). Three observation posts, consisting of one section each, were positioned at Kabatepe Ariburnu (Ari Burnu Knoll), Kücük Ariburnu (Hell Spit), and another between these two points along First Ridge. The 3rd Platoon was in reserve under the command 25
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 26
25 APRIL 1915
X 2nd Lt Ibrahim-Hayreddin (No 1. Ptn) 1 machine gun
Battleship Hill
North Beach
Malone’s Gully Walker’s Ridge
The Nek
Ari Burnu
X
Incebayir Ridge
Second Ridge
Section (No. 2 Ptn) X 2nd Lt Muharrem (No. 2 Ptn) 1 machine gun
Anzac Cove
Baby 700
First Ridge
X Cpt Faik and Sergeant Süleyman (No. 3 Ptn) Reserve
Johnston’s X Section including Jolly Private Adil Shahin 400 (No. 2 Ptn) Plateau The Cup
X Section (No. 3 Ptn)
X Cpt Sedik Battery (four guns)
Bolton’s Ridge
Adana Bair 0
500 metres
Map 2.1 Disposition of Turkish troops around Ari Burnu, 25 April 1915
of Sergeant Süleyman, located along Second Ridge. One section of his platoon he positioned further south in the region around Çakal Dere (Clarke Valley). With Süleyman at Second Ridge was the company commander, Captain Faik. Overall around 250 Turkish soldiers were covering the initial landing area, dispersed over some considerable distance.26 In addition a four-gun unattached battery was located on 400 Plateau close to what would be called the ‘Lonesome Pine’, under the command of Captain Sedik. 26
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 27
‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’
Captain Faik later described to Lieutenant Colonel Aker the sighting of the Anzac taskforce in the early hours of 25 April: At about 0200 hours that night the moon was still shining. The patrols on duty from my reserve platoon were Idris from Biga and Cennil from Gallipoli. They reported having sighted many enemy ships in the open sea. I got up and looked through the binoculars. I saw, straight in front of us, but rather a long way off, a large number of ships the size of which could not be distinguished. It was not clear whether or not they were moving. I reported immediately to the battalion commander, Major Ismet, first by telephone, then by written report. He said to me ‘There is no cause for alarm. At most, the landing will be at Kabatepe’—and told me to continue watching these ships. I went to a new observation point and kept watch. This time I saw them as a great mass, which, I decided, seemed to be moving straight towards us. In the customary manner, I went to the telephone to inform Divisional Headquarters. That was at 0230 hours. I got through to the Second Lieutenant Nori, at Divisional Headquarters and told him of it. He replied, ‘Hold the line. I will inform the Chief of Staff.’ He came back a little later and said, ‘Of these ships, how many are transports and how many warships?’ I replied ‘it is impossible to distinguish them in the dark but the quantity of ships is very large.’ With that our conversation ended. A little while later, the moon sank below the horizon and the ships became invisible in the dark. The reserve platoon was alerted and ordered to stand by. I watched and waited.27 The disappearance of the taskforce from view of Turkish observation probably occurred around 3 a.m. as it was only at this time that the taskforce commander considered the moon low enough, and the night dark enough, for the ships to creep towards the coast. At about the same time that the taskforce was waiting for the moon to set before moving towards the coast, the Australian submarine AE2 entered the straits of the Dardanelles. It was through this crucial waterway that the majority of Turkish reinforcements and supplies would make their way to the peninsula. While there was a land route, there was no Turkish motor transport; it required a combination of rail and road, the latter using mostly ox carts. The sea route was by far the quickest and simplest route 27
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 28
25 APRIL 1915
to take. Although disembarkation points could be brought under fire by British battleships, most of the resupply would occur at night, which would seriously impact on the ability of the navy to disrupt reinforcements and supplies. British thinking was that if submarines could penetrate the Dardanelles they could ‘run amok’ amongst the Turkish transports.28 Imagine even one submarine boat with a flock of transports in sight loaded each with some three thousand troops! Imagine the effect of one such transport going to the bottom in a few seconds with its living freight . . . Fancy . . . huddled-up troops afloat in frightened transports with these invisible demons known to be near. Dear near— momentarily—sudden—awful—invisible—unavoidable! Nothing conceivable more demoralising.29 Submarines had made two previous attempts to penetrate the Dardanelles. The first was in December 1914, when the British submarine B11 managed to penetrate at least part of the minefield and torpedoed the old Turkish battleship Messudieh in Sari Siglar Bay, before escaping. The next attempt was not so successful. Ten days before the landings in April the British submarine E15 attempted the passage of the straits; however, the submarine ran aground on the southern shores of the Asian side near Turkish Fort No. 8 (Fort Dardanos), close to where the Messudieh had been torpedoed five months earlier. Most of the crew were captured, but Captain T.S. Brodie was killed when a Turkish shell from the fort hit the conning tower of the stranded submarine. The Australian submarine would be the third attempt at getting a submarine into the Sea of Marmara.30 Captain Stoker of the AE2 later recalled: Having proceeded from the anchorage off Tenedos, I lay at the entrance to Dardanelles until the moon set, and about 2.30 a.m. on April 25 entered the straits at about 8 knots. Searchlights from White Cliffs, Kephez Point, and Chanak were sweeping the straits. Weather calm and clear. As the order to run amok in the Narrows precluded all possibility of making the passage unseen, I decided to hold on the surface as far as possible. As I proceeded, the searchlights at White Cliffs, sweeping the lower reaches of the strait, forced me to edge towards the northern shore.31 The AE2 hugged the European coast as close as she dared. Several times a beam of light appeared to pick her out from the darkness, but she sailed 28
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 29
‘Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game’
on unnoticed. Later Stoker recalled that ‘each time, as a beam of light touched the AE2 with brighter and yet brighter finger, one held for the instant one’s breath, lest the steady sweep, arrested for a moment, would show a suspicion of our shadowy presence’.32 The Australian submarine continued her way up the Dardanelles towards the Narrows. At 3.30 a.m. the British battleships towing the covering force of the 3rd Brigade stopped around 2.5 kilometres from the coast. Admiral Thursby on board the Queen used its wireless to order the battleships to cast off their tows. The orders to start the invasion were shouted to the tows by megaphones from the ships.33 The order from Corporal James Bell’s (9th Battalion) battleship was to ‘Get away and land!’;34 while Midshipman Metcalf from the Queen received the order, ‘Go ahead picket boat’.35 With this the twelve tows formed in line abreast, the senior officers of each being aboard the steamboat.36 The twelve small steamboats towing the first wave of troops from the 9th, 10th and 11th battalions took command of their respective boats and headed for the beach. The journey to the beach would take around 50 minutes. The destroyers carrying the second wave of the 3rd Brigade were waiting behind the battleships and were not expected to move forwards until 4.15 a.m. In the boats men watched and waited as they approached the shoreline. George Combs of the 11th Battalion later stated that, ‘All the time we were moving in the boats not a man whispered or coughed or stirred, all that could be heard by those close to the pinnace was the very gentle tick-tick of the engine, no louder than that of a watch’. Corporal Mitchell of the 10th Battalion recalled that a keen biting breeze sprang up in our faces and we were cold. My breath came deep. I tried to analyse my feelings but could not. I think that every emotion was mixed, exultation predominating. We come from the New World for the conquest of the Old. The price of failure we knew to be annihilation, victory might mean life. But even so whispered jests passed round and I remember turning to poor old Peter and asking him how he felt. ‘Good’ [was his reply].37 Lieutenant Aubrey Darnell of the 11th Battalion said that ‘it is hard to describe that . . . voyage, it seemed to go on forever, except for the low throb of the engines was dead silence—got on one’s nerves . . . Excitement was tense and electrical.’38 29
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 30
25 APRIL 1915
Sergeant Turnley of the engineers attached to the first wave was sitting in his tow just 300 metres out from the beach: Shall we be seen, or not? That’s our anxious question. Why don’t they fire at us? Look, there’s a light! No, it’s only a brighter star creeping up behind the hill . . . no challenge rings out. How we wish they would fire—or that we could land . . .! The suspense is very nerve racking. All we can do is follow the pinnace towing us about. The thought comes to me that perhaps we are the unfortunate ones to be sacrificed in drawing the enemy’s fire, such a cheerful thought! Oh, why the dickens don’t they fire at us!39 ‘Sacrificed in drawing the enemy’s fire.’ If Sinclair-MacLagan’s ‘encouraging’ speech of the day before was anything to go by this was indeed a real possibility. As the steamboats neared the shore, one of them let loose a stream of sparks from its funnel, shooting 1 metre into the air, which lasted for almost 30 seconds. By now a number of the pinnaces had already cast off their tows and the men began to row to the beaches.40 As recalled by Midshipman Eric Bush of the 10th Battalion tow: The men have already tossed their oars without waiting to be told . . . Soon it will all be over . . . We stop engines . . . Our heavy laden boats carry their way better than we do and forge ahead . . . Our launch, the heaviest of them all, comes right up alongside for a moment. One of her soldiers holds out a watch for me to send home to his mother, but it is too late to help him . . . we are out of reach. Oars, muffled . . . Some of the soldiers are helping with the oars, others are adjusting their equipment, tightening their chin stays, slinging their rifles. I take all this in at a glance, but what stirs my imagination most is the look on the men’s faces.41 It was at this point that Captain Leane (11th Battalion) heard Commander Dix break the silence in anger: ‘Tell the colonel that the dam’ fools have taken us a mile too far north’.42 The men in the boats could see land ‘which was very high . . . on our right was what was intended for us, but . . . we were heading for the cliffs’.43
30
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 31
3 ‘Crack! Swish! Ping!’
he intended Anzac landing place was just north of Gaba Tepe in the area later to be known as Brighton Beach. Capture of this welldefended area would undoubtedly have resulted in considerable losses to the initial landing force. Its overall low and uncomplicated topography, however, also would have enabled the Anzacs to quickly capture the high ground to the north and then move inland. Instead, the covering force mistakenly landed approximately 1.5 kilometres further north at what was to become known as Anzac Cove. Midshipman J. Metcalf, RNR, who was in command of Boat No. 2, explained 60 years later that he was largely responsible for the change of course which pushed the covering force further north than was originally intended.
T
About 3.40 a.m. the order was called from the Queen’s bridge ‘go ahead picket boat.’ I warned my engine room ‘stand by for full speed’, and watched No. 1 Tow for the first sign of her increase in speed but could not see any. An angry hail came from ‘Queen’s’ bridge, ‘Will you go ahead, picket boat.’ Realising that it was imperative, and I might be accused of cowardice if I did not comply, I rang full speed ahead on the engine room bell, and away we went. A few minutes later I looked astern and could just see No. 1 Tow off my starboard quarter. I was too occupied looking ahead to look astern again, as it was very dark and I had no idea how far we were from rocks or sand. About a quarter of an hour later I realized we were heading very close to the north side of Gaba Tepe which, because of its height, is very conspicuous. Knowing that there were Turkish troops there, and we would get enfilading fire all along the starboard side as well as from ahead, I was confident that we must be heading for a wrong place. There was no one to consult and I felt the lives of the men I was towing were my responsibility. Without any delay 31
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 32
25 APRIL 1915
I altered course two points to port to get away from Gaba Tepe. After a quarter of an hour, finding that the tows to port of me had conformed, I again altered course a point and a half to port.1 Lieutenant Commander John Waterlow, RN, later confirmed Metcalf’s account. All of the eleven other steamboats were to keep in line with his boat as they made their way to the beach. It was still dark when he noticed a prominent headland, which he took to be Gaba Tepe, looming out of the darkness before them. As the invasion force continued, it soon became clear that there was another very prominent headland north of their current position and the line began to vacillate. Faith in their course appeared to have been shaken, and with this Waterlow saw that all of the boats were now steering northward. He also altered course, steering further to the north. Waterlow assumed that the battleship Queen was in her correct anchorage, and working on that assumption he realised that the headland they were now heading for could not be Gaba Tepe. Waterlow altered course and went down the line astern in an effort to draw the boats southward with him. However, his attempt failed, and he was now convinced that the place they were now heading for was too far north of Gaba Tepe. He again tried to steer the boats further south, but all his efforts failed. As dawn was beginning to break and the cliffs and prominent headland loomed larger and larger he now saw that they were indeed heading for the tangled and steep country just north of their intended landing spot. Given that they were close to shore, Waterlow had no other alternative but to dash straight for the cliffs now ahead of him.2 At 4.29 a.m. as the boats approached the beach, a flash of a flare or a signal lamp was noticed on top of a small plateau or knoll (later called ‘Queensland Point’) around 1000 metres to the south. Almost all in the boats noticed it. This flash lasted for 30 seconds then disappeared.3 Captain Leane noticed a figure on the horizon of Ari Burnu. ‘Look at that!’ he said to those in the boat. A yell from shore was then heard, which was quickly followed by the flash from a Mauser rifle. Aitken of the 11th Battalion described it thus: ‘just grating on the beach then Bang! went the enemy signal followed by two more shots followed by a whole fusillade’.4 Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Weir, commander of the 10th Battalion, later commented: Absolute silence was maintained by all in our boats and directly the boats were cast off by steamers we quickly rowed towards shore. Dawn was just breaking . . . and no sound was heard except the splash of the 32
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 33
‘Crack! Swish! Ping!’
oars. We thought that our landing was to be effected quite unopposed, but when our boats were within about 30 yards of the beach, a rifle was fired from the hill in front of us above the beach, right in front of where we were heading for. Almost immediately heavy rifle and machine-gun fire was opened upon us, we had to row another 15 yards or so before we reached water shallow enough to get out of the boats.5 The medical officer of the 11th Battalion, Captain Brennan, noted that just as they cast off and were lowering the oars ‘to pull the last 40 to 50 yards . . . a single rifle shot rang out in the stillness, and everyone jumped about a foot off his seat. But we all soon got over the jumping business, as within about 5 seconds the rifle fire opened from the whole hill in front of us, and then a machine gun opened fire.’6 Twenty-oneyear-old Corporal Tom Louch of the 11th Battalion later described how the Turkish machine gun at Ari Burnu was silenced. There were two Turks in the machine gun nest, and our boat was almost to their direct front. It was not very light at the time, and I must have been very close to them. When they saw us, and other boats approaching, I watched them for a few seconds while they got their gun into action. They fired one or two short bursts, but fortunately not at us, and then the picket boat came in and silenced them. The two men were knocked over backwards, taking their gun with them.7 Corporal Mitchell remarked as the Turkish troops started to fire: ‘Good!’ I remember saying ‘the s—— will give us a go after all.’ ‘Klock-klock-klock. Wee-wee-wee’ came the little messengers of death. Then it opened out into a terrific chorus, and then we knew they had been waiting for us in strength and the lead came in squalls whispering when it came close, and whistling when not, smashing into the woodwork of the boats and splashing into the water. The key was being turned in the lock of the lid of hell. Some men crouched in the crowded boat, some sat up nonchalantly, some laughed and joked, while others cursed with ferocious delight. I turned to scan the dim faces of our platoon and my section in particular. Fear was not at home.8 Another soldier in one of the boats was heard to say in a dry Australian fashion, ‘They want to cut that shooting out, somebody might get killed’.9 33
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 34
25 APRIL 1915
Private Bradford of the 10th Battalion later wrote in a letter home to his family: I was in the scouts’ boat pulling No. 2 oar, and Lieutenant Colonel Weir, Capt. Lorenzo, and Lieut. Talbot Smith (that latter in charge of the scouts), were in the next seat. Our chaps bent down as far as possible in order to present a smaller target for the bullets, but for some time the officers continued to sit erect. A bullet passed between the Colonel and me, and many others nearly found their mark, so somebody leant against the Colonel, thereby compelling him to bend over. This action probably saved him from getting hit. All our officers were recklessly brave.10 Sergeant Turnley also recalled: Crack! Swish! Ping! At last we breathe a sigh of relief, the suspense is over! . . . some get ashore safely, some are hit slightly, others are drowned in only a couple of feet of water because in the excitement no one notices their plight . . . [One] fellow remains in the boat after all the others have disembarked . . . he . . . looks at us dazedly, leaning forward on his rifle. A sailor . . . touches him on the arm, and the soldier falls forward into the bottom of the boat, dead.11 The smaller lifeboats and cutters of the covering force were able to row in close to the beach and the men jumped into the surf with only about 1 metre of water, and rushed to the cover of the beach embankment. Those in the larger and deeper launches and pinnaces, however, grounded further out. The men in the bow in these larger craft jumped into water that often reached their thighs, while those who jumped from the stern found themselves in water up to their chests. ‘Stuff this for a flamin’ joke.’ The shore bottom was not made up of sand, but rather flat, slippery stones and pebbles, causing many men to slip and lose their footing as they rushed for the beach. Others still tumbled out of the larger boats in water that was above their heads. Some of the wounded sank like stones to the bottom, unable to remove their packs. Some, however, were grabbed by mates, ‘I’ll hoy ya up cobber’, and helped into shallow water. One soldier who had jumped overboard failed to reach the shore as he was hung up on the rowlock by his pack, until someone noticed him.12 Lieutenant Nicholas later wrote, ‘Looking down at the bottom of the sea you could see a carpet of dead men who had been shot getting out of the boats’.13 34
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 35
‘Crack! Swish! Ping!’
Private Tom Usher, 9th Battalion, recalled many years later: you’re up to your neck in water—and a lot of them got drowned, too, with the weight of the packs and that—then scramble ashore and take shelter as quick as you could. You’re only looking after yourself, you couldn’t worry about the other bloke, you had to get ashore as quick as you could—just keep your rifle above your head, keep it dry . . . The blokes all falling, getting killed as soon as they hit the beach, getting killed in the boats . . . I could see these cliffs, and I ran for it. You didn’t care who you were with as long as you got away from the fire . . . I remember one bloke, he got hit in the mouth—he lost part of his tongue, I couldn’t understand what he was talking about. Of course, they had to get some of them off back on the ships as quick as they could but they weren’t prepared for it, for the slaughter . . . I got up there, how I got up there I don’t know, but blokes were falling left and right, I put the entrenching tool in front of my head—we had no trenches you know—because I thought I’d get hit with a bullet. It was all mixed up. Men of the 9th Battalion, men from all over the shop.14 Seated alongside Metcalf (11th Battalion) was his mate Kite, whose pulse had quickened at being under fire. ‘How do you like it?’ asked Kite. All Metcalf could think was, ‘What a peculiar sort of fool I am to be here’.15 As the men reached the beach they raced across to the embankment, which defined the end of the beach and the base of Ari Burnu Knoll. As they ran across the beach, bullets hit the pebbles, creating sparks and ricochets. The men had been instructed to remove their packs upon reaching the first embankment. From here they were to form up before heading northeast to capture the inland heights. They instead found themselves at the base of a steep and thickly vegetated ridge. All was confusion as officers and men tried to come to terms with the unexpected terrain surrounding them.16 It was now 4.30 a.m., half an hour before the opening salvoes of the Royal Navy’s bombardment of Cape Helles to the south. The order of the tows was to be from north to south: the 11th Battalion from the battleship London, the 10th from the Prince of Wales and the 9th from the Queen. The boats landing from the Queen on the southernmost flank were to land on the beach about 1.5 kilometres north of Gaba Tepe, those from the Prince of Wales to be around 400 metres north of the Queen 35
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 36
25 APRIL 1915
and those from the London 400 metres north of the Prince of Wales.17 During their approach to the beach, the tows were supposed to maintain a distance from each other of 150 metres; however, as they approached the beach they had begun to crowd together as midshipmen tried to keep track of their course by the boat to their left. This resulted in some fragmentation of the line as the boats in some cases closed to just 50 metres as they concertinaed in and out of sight of each other. The mix-up of the boats and thus unit integrity were probably complicated even further after the tows were released 50 metres from the beach and the men started to row to shore. Indeed, ‘three boats near the point had become so locked that only those on the outside could use their oars. One of these, containing men of the 9th Battalion and Captain Graham Butler, their medical officer, and a boat of the 10th Battalion, with Lieutenant Talbot Smith and the Scouts of the battalion, were among the first on the point.’18 Overall parts of the 9th, 10th and 11th battalions clustered together around Ari Burnu point, while the remaining men of the 9th and 10th battalions landed between Ari Burnu and Hell Spit to the south. Most of the 11th Battalion (nine of its twelve boats), however, continued to row on past the point towards North Beach. These boats still had another 200 metres to cover as they rowed past Ari Burnu, and the occupants were hit as bullets thundered into the boats and churned the sea around them. As men manning the oars were killed, others took their place, desperately rowing towards the beach. Turkish Private Adil Shahin, a sixteen-year-old shepherd boy from the small village of Buyuk Anafarta on the Gallipoli Peninsula, was part of 2nd Platoon, positioned close to the beach at the southern end of First Ridge, close to Hell Spit: I was still asleep . . . It was before morning and the corporal who was the sentry started shouting, saying, ‘There’s something unusual. Get up!’ Then the squad commander ordered us all to move into the trenches . . . There were very few of us in the squad . . . The sentry pointed down towards the sand and we saw there were lots of them pouring out of their boats, and we opened fire and they lay down on the sand with their guns in their hands.19 Rifle fire from his 2nd Platoon confirmed to Captain Faik that the main invasion force he had reported earlier was landing and attacking his own position. He ordered two sections from his reserve platoon, under the command of Sergeant Ahmed, to advance to Plugge’s Plateau 36
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 37
‘Crack! Swish! Ping!’
to help occupy the trenches overlooking the beach.20 At the same time he notified the Turkish commander at Gaba Tepe, Major Ismet, by telephone that ‘a number of enemy troops have landed at Ari Burnu’.21 Faik immediately started to send most of his remaining six sections to Yuksek Sirt (Russell’s Top) to occupy the empty trenches overlooking North Beach.22 He knew he had no chance of stopping the invasion; his role was now to gain intelligence and to delay the invaders as long as possible in order to buy time for his comrades located further inland to reinforce them at their fall-back position. At Fisherman’s Hut, Second Lieutenant Ibrahim-Hayreddin and his men first saw the invasion force approaching via the fading light of the moon. [We] occupied the trenches and waited . . . [We] saw the landing craft carrying the first landing forces coming straight towards [us]. [We] waited for them to approach before opening fire but the craft veered off in the direction of Ari Burnu. [We] saw that as they approached Ari Burnu both sides began firing in the dark and they too began firing despite the darkness . . . the landing forces who tried to approach north of Ari Burnu and later the forces who were trying to come straight towards [us]. As they drew near [we] continued to fire at a number of enemy troops who were desperately trying to get ashore and compelled them to flee under cover in the direction of Ari Burnu.23 The steamboats were still sitting offshore, with their bows pointing towards the beach. Each steamboat had a machine gun attached to its bow, which was to be used only if the senior officer on board ordered it into action. At least one of the steamboats, which had landed men of the 9th Battalion, reversed further out to sea in order to enable its machine gun sufficient elevation to fire at the Turkish rifle flashes coming from the plateau above. The machine gun from this boat wounded Second Lieutenant Muharrem within the first rounds of firing. Captain Faik later recalled a conversation he had with Muharrem when both were recovering from wounds at Bega field hospital. [O]n first sighting the enemy ships a long way off, they occupied the trenches and awaited the enemy. On seeing the craft approaching they opened fire and both enemy replied with fire from the sea. In this battle the Platoon Officer Commanding, Second Lieutenant 37
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 38
25 APRIL 1915
Muharrem, was wounded in both shoulders from shots fired from the sea and as he was withdrawing on account of his injuries he was wounded again. This time in the arm, making three wounds in all.24 While Second Lieutenant Muharrem and his troops stationed on top of Plugge’s Plateau opened fire at the Australians below, the Turkish troops stationed at Gaba Tepe to the south also observed the landing. Lieutenant Asim, commanding officer of the No. 3 Platoon, 1st Company, stated that ‘we saw in the distance the enemy ships and some lights. We kept a close watch on them and got ready. Only when the craft was quite close to Ari Burnu did our troops then open fire on them. There was reciprocal fire with machineguns from the landing craft as we opened up with the Mantelli gun.’25 Most men of the 11th Battalion were still rowing towards North Beach when the Turkish machine gun positioned at Fisherman’s Hut (700 metres north of Ari Burnu, overlooking North Beach) opened fire. An anonymous soldier would later state: [A] terrific hail enveloped us and cut the water to foam. We knew we had been spotted. [I didn’t] bother to row. I threw my oar overboard and got over the side of the cutter at once. For, to remain all massed together (50 men in each cutter) was providing an excellent target for old Jacko the Turk; although he, from his trenches, could not in that light see individuals very clearly. He concentrated his fire on the boatloads of men. So it was imperative to ‘scatter’ and over the side and into the sea we went . . . At last I reached the shore . . .26 Many others didn’t. Many were hit and fell to the bottom of the boat and in one an oar was hit and shattered by the Turkish machine-gun fire. Men and sailors crouched forward as if taking cover from a torrential downpour, trying to avoid the bullets as they smashed into the boats causing parts to splinter all around them. In one boat at least, ‘Combo’ Smith (Smithy), a Boer War veteran, momentarily relieved the stress. Bullets had smashed Smithy’s oar, but all in the boat remained silent as they moved closer to the beach. With Sergeant Ayling sitting within earshot Smithy nudged his mate ‘Snowy’ Howe in the ribs and noted in a slow, bushman’s drawl, ‘Just like little birds, ain’t they, Snow?’ When asked during training what it sounds like to be under fire, Ayling had described it as ‘like little birds passing overhead’, and most in the boat 38
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 39
‘Crack! Swish! Ping!’
would have recalled his reply. The boat erupted into laughter,27 including Major Drake-Brockman, who was sitting nearby. Shortly afterwards the boat grounded just beyond the point facing the northern slopes of Plugge’s Plateau and the men jumped out into chest-deep water.28 Within minutes, other men of the 11th Battalion began to land on North Beach. An anonymous soldier from C Company, 11th Battalion, later recalled: The next and immediate thing to do was to get across the few feet of shore to the base of the cliff for cover, and off I went. Now, I could only stroll; so leisurely, I went along and when I reached that welcome cover down I dropped [gasping] for breath. I thought of my heavy smoking which [had] made me so short winded. I got beside a big bush. The soil being sandy was worse and a kind of thyme grew in profusion all around and in the morning dew gave forth a perfume. I afterwards learnt to loathe [it] and shall always do so now. The bullets came thick. They came past my ears so close I felt the air move as they whizzed past and whispered ‘wzip, zip, ZIP’. This description of the sound is exact and it made your eyes blink, so close they came. After regaining my wind I got rid of my pack and crawled up and up, gradually becoming cased with mud on my wet garments.29
39
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 40
4 ‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
ortunately, where the 3rd Brigade landed there were no barbed-wire entanglements along the beach, or below the water line, like those that had been observed at Gaba Tepe by reconnaissance flights a few days before. On landing, some men around Ari Burnu had the strength to race across the pebble-strewn beach to the cover of an embankment that was about 10 metres from shore; others, whose uniforms and packs were soaked and made heavy, stumbled to the embankment. Still others, after entering the water threw off their kit, keeping only their rifles, and raced across the beach. Those who had not already realised that they had landed in the wrong place must have now known that something was seriously amiss.1 ‘Struth, what sort of dog’s breakfast is this!’ The men had been told that from the beach they were to climb a comparatively low ridge, from whence they were to reorganise and then push on towards a long ridge about 1 kilometre inland. The men, however, found themselves at the foot of an almost precipitous hill (Plugge’s Plateau) about 100 metres high, which blocked out any view of what lay inland. They had been told from the very beginning that, whatever happened, it was imperative that the covering force push on with all speed. Immediately above the beach at a height of about 40 metres was Ari Burnu Knoll and above this the more impressive heights of Plugge’s Plateau. As they looked up at the knoll, those who had not already done so threw off their packs. The battalions had become hopelessly mixed and men tried to find their officers and NCOs. Many men were so waterlogged that they took advantage of the cover of the embankment to take a two-minute breather. Most men focused on their rifles, shaking off water and sand, clipping on magazines, pulling back safety catches and attaching bayonets. Within minutes of landing many men individually, or in small groups, struck for the high ground. These individual forward movements gained
F
40
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 41
‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
momentum as others decided that they too must push onwards. A number of 9th and 10th Battalion men who had landed on the southern end of the beach climbed the ridge facing them as directed by the commander of the 10th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Weir. Overall, however, there was no coordinated decision to move forward; rather, men felt obliged to advance in order to support those who had already started to climb the ridge. Corporal Louch of the 11th Battalion later recalled: As instructed we shed our packs, lay down and awaited orders. Colonel Johnston, who had come in another boat, flopped down beside me and I asked him what we were to do. He said that we had landed in the wrong place, and there was no organization. A bullet spattered into the sand just clear of our noses, and I decided that the beach, where there was no cover, was no place for dallying; so lugging our box of ammunition—my mate and I—we climbed the hill in front.2 Without further delay a rough and uncoordinated line about six companies strong began the difficult ascent.3 In a letter home, published soon afterwards in a local newspaper, a soldier (Overall) discussed the landing and mentioned a family friend as they both charged up the hill close behind the 10th Battalion scouts. ‘The last I saw of Kelsall was going up the first hill. He sang out to me, “Still going strong?” I answered, “Rather!” And that was the last I saw of him.’4 As they climbed, the slopes became steeper until they were nearly precipitous and the men of the navy ‘watching the troops flinging themselves like cats up the hillside, carried back the story of it glowing to the ships’.5 Sergeant Henry Cheney later wrote, ‘I was lost in the wild mob, in the wildest of charges, that I think was ever made. Everybody was taken leave of their senses and certainly not accountable for their actions. Although I know well enough what fear is, it left me completely in that charge. Straight up that rugged, rocky, precipice we went.’6 It is likely that Cheney himself was among the first to climb the slopes as he was part of the 10th Battalion scouts, commanded by Lieutenant Talbot Smith, whose objective was to push inland immediately upon landing in order to silence the Turkish artillery, which was thought to be located somewhere on 400 Plateau. Talbot Smith was heard to yell from the beach, ‘Come on, boys! they can’t hit you’, continuing with, ‘10th Battalion scouts, are you ready?’7 He then led his men up the hill, yelling, 41
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 42
25 APRIL 1915
‘Come on Australians; give them the bayonet—that’s all they want’, while the Turks above fired down on them. Lieutenant Darnell commented: A brief pause on the beach to fix bayonets and singing ‘This bit of the world belongs to us’ much swearing and cheering we charged up a hill so steep in places we could only just scramble up it. No firing all bayonet work. Clean over a machinegun we went, men dropped all round me, it was mad, wild, thrilling and when we were near the top the Turks . . . broke and ran. There was no holding the men they pursued the enemy for three miles inland . . . Not till I was near the top of the hill did I realise that in the excitement I hadn’t even drawn my revolver, so I secured the rifle and bayonet of the first dead man.8 Some of the 11th Battalion men who had managed to land just a little north of Ari Burnu point now found themselves lying under the northern face of Plugge’s, under heavy fire from Turks entrenched around Fisherman’s Hut to their north. They were out of contact with the bulk of the 9th and 10th battalions, who had already started to climb towards the plateau. Soon they saw men climbing up towards the knoll and they too started to climb.9 At the opposite end of the line, to the south, Captain Butler, the 9th Battalion medical officer, who had been attending the wounded on the beach, noticed several men crouching under the bank, loading their rifles and firing at the Turks above. This was not the time or place to be ‘mooching about’ and he urged them to push on with their bayonets; within seconds he found himself leading the men up the slopes towards the plateau above.10 Men pulled themselves up using the vegetation and in many cases digging their bayonets into the soil as picks. This was no easy matter and many slid back down to the beach due to the previous day’s rain that had turned the gullies into wet, sandy washaways. The steep knoll was covered in small bushes of prickly dwarf oak, about waist high, with holly-like leaves.11 This vegetation tore clothing and flesh alike, and men clung to the exposed roots to try to gain a footing. Captain Butler found the going so steep that he had to use his entrenching tool to carve steps into the hillside in order to reach the wounded. These men were often caught up in the undergrowth below the knoll, and it was only the thick bush that stopped many of the wounded from rolling down to the beach. Indeed, some were hanging precariously in midair, held back only by the vegetation.12 Soon a rough, deeply scored gravel 42
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 43
‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
track was located, which led up to Ari Burnu Knoll from the beach. It was only a matter of minutes before the first men reached the top of the knoll. The Australian submarine AE2 had still avoided detection as she moved up the Dardanelles. Just as the first Australians began to land at Anzac Cove, however, the AE2 was sighted by lookouts near the Suandere River, halfway between Cape Helles and the Narrows. Within seconds Turkish shore batteries opened fire on the submarine at a range of about 2 kilometres. Quickly there was the thump of rubber-edged doors slamming as the AE2 submerged. She continued her voyage at a slow speed, at a ‘depth of 70 to 80 feet’ (20 to 25 metres). She was now moving blindly through a Turkish minefield, the mooring lines of the mines scraping along her hull. Undoubtedly the crew occasionally held their collective breath as they waited for one of these lines to become caught on some protruding part of her hull, dragging its mine down onto the submarine. Added to this was the danger of running aground. The AE2 crept onwards further up the Dardanelles.13 Major Ismet, commander of the Turkish 2nd Battalion, was with the 1st Company located just east of Gaba Tepe. He was connected by telephone to an exchange at the 9th Divisional Headquarters at Maidos and to his other companies by an exchange at Gaba Tepe. By now, he had received the news from Captain Faik that ‘a number of enemy troops have landed at Ari Burnu’. Ismet ordered Faik to launch an immediate counterattack and advised that he would support the attack with artillery located close to Gaba Tepe. Major Ismet then received a telephone call from his immediate superior, Lieutenant Colonel Aker (commander of the 27th Regiment), based at Maidos, to enquire about the distant rifle fire that he could hear. ‘This sound of gunfire, where is it coming from? What’s happening over there? Is anything wrong?’ Major Ismet replied, ‘The enemy is landing troops at Ari Burnu’. Aker then asked, ‘Is anything happening at Gaba Tepe?’ ‘No, nothing at present’, Major Ismet replied. Aker hung up and ordered the remaining troops from his regiment (1st and 3rd battalions) to ‘assemble and fall in, load up the A Echelon transport only, distribute the troops’ rations, feed the animals and keep me fully informed of developments’. He intended to force march immediately towards Gaba Tepe in order to support his 2nd Battalion. Five minutes later Aker was ready to march but there were still no orders. He went to the telephone and contacted his Divisional Chief of 43
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 44
25 APRIL 1915
Staff, saying, ‘The enemy has landed troops at Ari Burnu and the Regiment is ready to move’. He was ordered to ‘wait until you hear further from me and act in accordance with orders that will be given’. He waited another five minutes but still no orders arrived. He ordered, ‘Let the men drink their soup up quick on the spot’.14 Even after the men had finished their soup there were no orders. He could hear the battle raging to the west: The sound of gunfire continued at infrequent intervals. But between these sounds there was a buzzing noise which came out of the darkness from afar off and this melancholy and mysterious noise had a profound effect on me. This buzzing was the echo of the explosion of masses of infantry rifles and machine guns and it gave the impression that our regimental comrades, far from help and consisting of a mere handful of men at Ari Burnu, were striving to do their duty in the most difficult circumstances against an enemy many times superior in strength . . . The intermittent sound of gunfire could still be heard but the melancholy buzzing had become inaudible.15 At about the same time Turkish Major Halis, commander of the 3rd Battalion, who happened to be at Gaba Tepe with one of his companies, ordered his men to help reinforce their comrades at Ari Burnu. He sent a signal to III Army Corps HQ stating that, ‘I have reinforced Ari Burnu with a platoon. One platoon holds trenches to the north of Kaba Tepe. There is one platoon left behind. I find it will be needed to hold the southern shore of Kaba Tepe. It appears information and orders will be given to these platoons in the rear to become involved with saving Ari Burnu.’16 Meanwhile, Major Ismet was ordering his artillery battery, consisting of a Mantelli howitzer, two 12-centimetre guns and several Nordenfelts (a quick firing small naval gun) to open fire on the enemy troops storming the heights above Ari Burnu approximately 3 kilometres north of his position.17 As the Australians climbed and scrambled up towards the top of Ari Burnu Knoll, the first round of Turkish artillery fire commenced. Before being silenced by a number of broadsides from the British cruiser Bacchante at around 7 a.m., the Mantelli howitzer alone fired 114 shrapnel and 37 explosive shells.18 Corporal Louch and his mate were at this time still struggling up the slopes towards the knoll carrying their box of ammunition when ‘halfway up we stopped for breath in a sandy 44
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 45
‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
washaway, and saw the first shell to be fired by the Turkish battery near Gaba Tepe . . . We then pushed on to the top where there were some tents and a wounded Turk.’19 At about the same time, Corporal Mitchell (10th Battalion) was approaching the knoll when suddenly there was a weird shrieking note somewhere in the air, which increased in volume every fraction of a second. It culminated in a deafening report and a cloud of smoke some thirty yards on my right, and thirty feet high. Simultaneously there was the swishing sound as the bullets beat down bushes and swept the earth and a devilish scream. The scream was caused by large pieces of the [shell] case, as they spun through the air.20 It was not only the Turkish artillery that let loose; the guns from the Royal Navy soon barked back a response, as later reported by a soldier from the 11th Battalion: There was not two men of the same battalion together. The men did all on their initiative, which was greatly to their credit. They crawled, climbed . . . ever going up and up this enormously high mountain like a cliff, for ever it seemed; this time to the summit which at last we reached and then we dashed along after the Turks who we could see clearly now in the rising of the sunlight. Here a tremendous report came echoing all around. We, for the moment, wondered what had happened. The ground seemed steady. Then it dawned on us. It was the warships that had commenced to back us up. The good old Triumph had sent a 10 inch flyer to Jacko at Gaba Tepe fort and then another in quick succession.21 The first Australians to reach the summit of Ari Burnu Knoll found an abandoned trench and an empty machine-gun post with exposed beams. From the rear of the trench a communication trench ran along the neck of the knoll to the seaward side of Plugge’s slope.22 The Turkish troops who had occupied the trench had bolted further up towards the towering heights of Plugge’s Plateau before the first Australians arrived, leaving only the wounded Turk encountered by Louch. Medical officer Captain Butler, on reaching the knoll, stopped to treat the wounded man. As the men pushed up towards the top of Plugge’s Plateau, the rifle fire became intense. Along the skyline they could make out the forms of 45
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 46
25 APRIL 1915
Turkish soldiers moving around. The Australians continued up the hill, joking with each other, while swearing at the Turks and yelling, ‘Imshee yalla you bastard! Two for arf, Orringas, Eggs-a-cook’ and other phrases they had learnt while training in Egypt. As they climbed, ‘Snowy’ Howe, who had lost contact with his mate Smithy, was next to a man of the 9th Battalion when a Turk jumped up and tried to run. Howe’s rifle was full of sand. He tried to bayonet the Turk but only got him through the haversack and stopped him. The 9th Battalion man hit him on the head with his rifle butt and knocked him senseless. They ratted him but all he had were some raisins and cigarettes in a bit of newspaper and a big red flannel scarf around his stomach. They yelled out, ‘Prisoner here!’ The only advice they got from men passing was ‘Bayonet the bastard!’ They cut off his trouser buttons and gave him a wounded man to take down to the beach.23 Among the first to reach the top of Plugge’s were men from the 10th Battalion scouts, with their commander Talbot Smith as well as officers and men of the 11th Battalion. Two of these officers, Captain Annear and Lieutenant MacDonald, flung themselves behind the parapet of the ‘unoccupied’ trench for cover. All had previously been instructed not to jump into enemy trenches in case the trenches had been booby-trapped. The Australians returned fire from behind the parapet. Three Turks to their right, just below the ridgeline of the plateau, jumped up and fired. MacDonald was hit in the arm, while Annear was hit in the head; he was the first Australian officer killed at Gallipoli.24 Soon Australians were standing and kneeling to get a better shot at the retreating Turks. Combs of the 11th Battalion recorded in his diary, ‘in the faint dim light I saw two great fat chaps clamber over the top. On reaching the top, a Jacko’s head appeared out of a trench a few feet from me, and the chap alongside . . . gave him a bullet point blank, and the Turk fell back wounded.’25 Ted Mofflin later recalled in a letter that upon reaching the top of Plugge’s he ‘saw three Turks firing down onto the beach. There was nobody between them and me, it was a trifle dark for shooting, but I thought I’d risk it, so I dropped on one knee and let him have it. I couldn’t well miss. I saw him drop and when I got up to him I found I had hit him fair between the eyes. Killed my first Turk with my first shot. I was that pleased I could have danced on his body.’26 Two communication trenches ran back from the main trench to the landward side of the plateau. At the other end of the plateau Turkish troops were evacuating. At this point two Turkish soldiers jumped up out of the forward trench and began to fire. Australians jumped up, 46
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 47
‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
bayoneting the first and shooting the second, who rolled down into a washaway.27 As Major Drake-Brockman reached the top of Plugge’s, three other Turks jumped out of the same trench and charged, bayonets fixed. They rushed at Drake-Brockman. One man, Paddy Reid, came to his rescue. Paddy hit the first Turk over the head with his rifle butt. He then bayoneted the second, but couldn’t pull his rifle out of the man and so dropped his rifle. The third came at Paddy but he managed to push the Turkish soldier’s rifle aside, and was able to catch hold of him. Paddy threw the Turk to the ground and kicked him in the head until he was dead.28 Drake-Brockman was very lucky: Paddy had spent the previous month in the ‘clink’ and had been awarded a six-month sentence; however, it had been reduced just two days before the landing—just in time for Paddy to save Drake-Brockman’s life.29 Charles Bean later recorded that Drake-Brockman tried to give morphine to a badly wounded Turk while on Plugge’s but the ‘Turk looked venom at him and spat it out’. It is not recorded whether this Turk was one of the three who had previously tried to kill him. Bean also recorded in his diary that another Turk ‘with his brain exposed, but apparently conscious [tried] reaching for his water bottle. An Australian put it in his hand.’30 By now a large number of Australians were passing across the top of Plugge’s towards the landward side in pursuit of the retreating Turks. Inevitably, as a result of the excitement and confusion some Australians were killed by friendly fire. As commented later by Private Loud, as he neared the top of Plugge’s: Shortly after we came upon a line of Turkish trenches where I crossed them there were two Turks one wounded and I think the other dead but did not stop to look. As we were now on top of the cliff and in some thick prickly scrub . . . the Turks were not in evidence you could hear their bullets cracking like stockwhips all around. A little further on I reached another line of trenches and as we were about knock[ed] up we formed a firing line in it after taking the then empty trench. I am afraid then several of our chaps were shot by their own men as they pushed ahead. But of course there was such a mix up you could not tell as the scrub was full of fleeing Turks and their snipers were busy.31 One of those mortally wounded at the very edge of Plugge’s Plateau by friendly fire was Sergeant Fowles. ‘I told them,’ he said as he lay there 47
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 48
25 APRIL 1915
X 2nd Lt IbrahimHayreddin (No. 1 Ptn)
No. 1 Outpost
Rest of 11th Bn Walker’s Ridge
The Nek
Turkish trench
9th Bn 10th Bn 11th Bn
X Section
X 2nd Lt Muharrem (No. 2 Ptn) X Cpt Faik (No. 3 Ptn)
Wire Gully X Section Johnston’s Jolly 400 Plateau
0
500 metres
Map 4.1 Faik’s response to the landing of the Australian 3rd Brigade around 4.40 a.m., and the capture of Plugge’s around 5 a.m.
dying in the Turkish trench—‘I told them again and again not to open their magazines’.32 On reaching the landward edge of the plateau, the Australians were brought to an abrupt halt by a steep ravine, the sides of which were 48
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 49
‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
almost vertical. Below lay a valley, which gave rise to Second Ridge. The approach to this ridge was even more precipitous than the one just climbed. From Second Ridge, Turks were giving covering fire for their retreating comrades, who were now seen to be running down a zigzag path to the valley below. The Australians began to open fire on the retreating Turks and, on finding the path, some started down in pursuit. To the right of the Australians on top of Plugge’s, other Turks could be seen running across the lower southern spur of First Ridge. These were members of the two Turkish sections that Second Lieutenant Muharrem had sent down the ridge prior to the invasion. The men on Plugge’s started to fire down at them as they withdrew into what would become known as Shrapnel Gully. Amongst these Turks would have been the shepherd boy, Private Adil Shahin. Seventy-five years later Shahin recalled, ‘Some [Australians] fell on the beach and I wasn’t sure whether we’d hit them or they were taking shelter. They made for the base of the rise and then began climbing. We were outnumbered, so we began to withdraw . . . It was confusing, we didn’t know anything about this invasion. We were very scared and retreated to the second ridge, firing as we went. I was frightened.’33 From the top of Plugge’s Plateau the Australians could see at the bottom of the zigzag path close to the valley floor three small Turkish tents, partly screened by brushwood. The valley floor was covered in coarse vegetation.34 The retreating Turks could be seen taking cover in the thick scrub, or else bolting up the path to Second Ridge. The Australians started to yell and cheer. Some even believed that it was just about all over for ‘Jacko the Turk’. Others would have known better. ‘Look at ’em will ya—ya’d think they were at a bloody Christy minstrel show going to celebrate the opening of a new wool shed.’ For a few seconds Talbot Smith checked his map, and then with his scouts he disappeared down the zigzag path in search of the guns believed to be on 400 Plateau, just to the southeast. On reaching the bottom of the valley they came across a few Turks hiding in the scrub, whom they shot. They then went through the three Turkish tents and found nothing to report. They continued on along the valley floor towards the plateau. Upon seeing the fleeing Turks others also rushed down the landward slopes in pursuit. One of these men was George Combs, who later recorded in his diary: Dash down a hill . . . saw a Jacko going away as hard as he could go, so we chased him until we were able to get a shot at him, and when we did, Jacko was no more. We kept on going ahead . . . as long as we 49
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 50
25 APRIL 1915
saw a Turk in the thick scrub we chased him until he dropped . . . [Later, Combs shot a Turkish officer.] He was a fine big fellow and I thought if he is the type of man we are to meet we are in for a rough time.35 Major Drake-Brockman began to organise the men still on top of Plugge’s into their respective units. He sent men from the 9th Battalion to the right of the plateau, the 10th stayed in the centre, while the few men of the 11th Battalion who had made it onto the plateau were sent to the left. In order to help establish some ‘normality’ he forbade firing at the Turkish troops who were escaping down First Ridge, as the men from the second wave who were now beginning to land in this area would deal with them. With the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Weir and most of majors Oldham’s and Jacob’s companies on top of Plugge’s, the first wave contingent of the 10th Battalion was now almost at full strength and they were soon on their way down the landward side of Plugge’s into Shrapnel Gully in an effort to capture 400 Plateau.36 None of the senior commanding officers of the 9th Battalion had yet appeared on the plateau. Major J. Robertson (9th Battalion) had been killed on reaching the summit, while Major S. Robertson and some of his men found themselves along North Beach, with most of the 11th Battalion. It was not long, however, before Major Salisbury appeared and took command of his company. He placed the command of the remaining men of the 9th under Captain Ryder. Salisbury soon saw a number of Turks down in Shrapnel Gully to his right. These Turks were retreating from the Australians of the second wave who were now pushing on over the southern parts of First Ridge. Major Salisbury gave the order for the 9th Battalion to proceed down the slope after them.37 The only troops now remaining on the top of Plugge’s were small numbers of men from the 11th Battalion who had landed around Ari Burnu. Drake-Brockman continued to organise these men, no doubt wondering what had happened to the main part of the battalion, which had landed further north. It was now around 5 a.m., half an hour after the first men had landed. The situation at North Beach for the men of the 11th Battalion was critical. The strength of the Turkish platoon defending this sector was between 60 and 70 men. Most of these Turks were dug in around Fisherman’s Hut and their combined machine-gun and rifle fire was devastating. In addition, men from Captain Faik’s 3rd Platoon had by 50
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 51
‘Imshee yalla you bastard!’
now started to occupy the trench on Russell’s Top (near The Sphinx) which overlooked North Beach and had begun firing on the Australians below.38 On occupying the trench along Russell’s Top with most of his six remaining sections, Faik later recalled: I ordered firing to be opened from 1300 metres. The men in the Hain Tepe trenches [Plugge’s] a little way in front of us had been drawn into the fighting from the start. Torpedo boats towed the enemy craft and as they approached the shore, they slipped the towrope and quickly abandoned the craft, which they had been towing. The torpedo boats then withdrew, firing continuously. The craft on which we were firing remained far from shore because the coastal waters were shallow. Some of the enemy troops were hit and stayed in the craft. Those who were not hit jumped into the sea and only five or ten men escaped by getting into our dead area.39 The combined fire from the two Turkish platoons against those landing along North Beach was devastating and resulted in many casualties even before the Australians reached the beach. Indeed, some boats could not be recovered until later that day due to the heavy Turkish machine-gun fire from Fisherman’s Hut and the intense Turkish rifle fire from the heights above. These boats, with the dead and dying within, had to be abandoned for the time being. The survivors were forced to take cover away from the beach. While the men to the south were storming the heights, the small groups of dispersed men along North Beach could make no progress and crept through the scrub or into available gullies in an attempt to escape the fearsome fire to the north and from above. It became imperative that the machine gun at Fisherman’s Hut be silenced. Soon Lieutenant Strickland, with a small party of men he had managed to collect, moved north in an attempt to complete this objective. As morning broke, the transports carrying the men of the New Zealand and Australian Division were passing Cape Helles. The big guns of the Royal Navy were already pounding the forts at the tip of the peninsula. The navy wasn’t sitting on its hands during this time—there were huge explosions, with red and yellow flashes on shore, simultaneously followed by geysers of earth and other debris (presumably including bits and pieces of the odd Turk or two) being thrown skyward. ‘Get a load of that would yers!’ As later recalled by Major Waite of the New Zealand Engineers, New Zealand and Australian Division: 51
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 52
25 APRIL 1915
The noise of the naval bombardment was truly extraordinary—the sharp crack of the lighter guns; the ear splitting roar of the 12-inchers; and the booming clearly above them all, the tremendous reports from the 15-inch guns of the Queen Elizabeth. Watching from the rail, the soldiers were very sorry for the Turk. It seemed impossible that anything could live through such bombardment. At the morning service, with the reverberation of the incessant gunfire assailing our ears, we found it difficult to hear the padre reading ‘In the midst of life we are in death.’ From across the water the bark of the 6-inch guns struck harshly on the singing of the soldiers’ favourite hymns.40
52
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 53
5 ‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’ efore the first wave had landed, Rear Admiral Thursby ordered that a shaded light be turned out to sea signalling to the destroyers to land the men of the second wave. In the Ribble Commander Wilkinson leaned over the bridge: ‘Lights out, men, and stop talking.’ The speed of the destroyer increased and immediately afterwards she passed close by the dark shape of a large battleship. The men in the Ribble could see ‘all seven destroyers, now in line, moving swiftly in’.1 Sergeant Steele (9th Battalion) later recalled that the engine-room bell of his destroyer clanged, then the vessel surged forward at 20 knots and came to an abrupt stop around 200 metres from shore.2 Only a few men had been loaded into the available lifeboats from the destroyers and they had a wild ride dangling behind the destroyers at such a speed.
B
We were doing 18 knots. The man in the second boat didn’t seem to be controlling his boat at all. She was slewing in and out for two minutes. A seaman called out that the pace was too fast but it didn’t slow up. It couldn’t. The boat then swung into the destroyer, slewed out and started to tip. The water simply washed them all out of the stern except a man on the tiller who managed to catch the stern rope and began to crawl back along it into the boat. He got one leg into the boat on the inside beam when she swung in again and crushed him. The men were all lined up, looking at it over the side. Half a dozen naval men put a rope around the poor chap, who was dying, and hauled him aboard.3 Unlike the first wave, the second wave came under intense fire from Turkish snipers and artillery as they made their way to the beach. As soon as the destroyers came to a stop, those not already in boats boarded lifeboats that were brought alongside. Some of these boats were towed 53
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 54
25 APRIL 1915
towards shore by the returning steamboats from the first wave, while others made their own way to the beach. As one naval officer leaned over the side of his destroyer and yelled out ‘Good-bye and good luck!’ he fell dead, shot through the head. Around this time the transports carrying the remainder of the Australian 1st Division (1st and 2nd Brigades) also started to move slowly forwards, passing through the battleships still about 2.5 kilometres out to sea. At the time that the men from the second wave were climbing into their boats the Turkish artillery from Gaba Tepe also opened fire on the battleships and transports. Bean noted in his diary: Just now there was the sound like a bursting rocket high in the air a little aft of the ship [Minnewaska]. A small woolly cloud unrolled itself. Below it, a small circle of the surface of the silky water was lashed up as if by a very local fierce thunder rain. Presently far away on the face of a small promontory aft two miles to the south of us [Gaba Tepe] is a brilliant pinpoint flash. Some seconds later a curious whizz through the air—a whizz on a descending scale just the opposite to the whiz of a steam siren. The long drawn out whiz sinks and sinks down the scale. There is a flash high in the air a quarter of a mile in front of us this time. Then a bang and the whine of a shower of pellets sprayed as if from a watering can, the whip up of another circle of sea below and another white fluffy cloud slowly floating overhead. The wondering crowd on the promenade deck says to itself ‘So that is shrapnel’. ‘Look mate’, says a voice . . . ‘they’re carrying this joke too far—they’re using ball ammunition’. . . There was a bang which shook our ship—a huge bilious yellow cloud for a moment sprang out from the side of one of the warships just south of us. Far down on the point where that other flash came from a huge geyser of yellow black earth lifts itself—a horrid red flash just showing through the cloud of it. The infantry—they are New South Welshmen—on the deck below run to the side, cheering, delightfully ‘whew! That’s pat’ says one excited boy waving his cap. Several of the other ships begin firing, but the shrapnel still bursts ahead. At five o’clock one seems to burst fair over the stern of a transport ahead of us carrying a battalion of the Second Brigade.4 The second wave of the 3rd Brigade landed in the same general area as those from the first, though on a broader front. The first 54
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 55
‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’
reinforcements started to land around 4.50 a.m.; it was not yet dawn. The 9th Battalion landed to the south, between M’Cay’s Hill and the entrance to Shrapnel Gully; the 10th in the area around Ari Burnu point and the 11th around 400 metres north of the point at North Beach. A portion of the 12th Battalion landed with each of the 9th, 10th and 11th battalions as the brigade reserves. Given the fragmentation and intermingling of units that occurred during the landing of the first wave, however, the units from the destroyers found it difficult to locate their sister companies from the battleships. In the case of the 9th Battalion, for example, the two companies in the second wave came ashore about 1 kilometre south of the two from the first wave. As the reinforcements landed, the outline of Turkish soldiers could still be seen on top of Plugge’s Plateau (at this point men of the first wave had yet to capture the top of Plugge’s) and rifle fire was raining down on the reinforcements as they too made their way up to the plateau. A Turkish platoon under the command of Lieutenant Hakki (3rd Company, 2nd Battalion) was positioned just north of Gaba Tepe along the spur that would later become known as Bolton’s Ridge. It was not long before Australians from the second wave began to land just north of Hakki’s position. Those landing were from the destroyer Beagle and consisted of men from the 9th and 12th battalions. These troops represented the extreme southern flank of the invasion, landing close to the base of what would become known as M’Cay’s Hill. On seeing the Australians landing on the beach to their north, Hakki and his men opened fire. In addition, the section that Sergeant Süleyman had sent earlier to Çakal Dere (Clarke Valley) also opened fire. The Australians, led by Captain Milne, dumped their packs and immediately charged the nearest Turks, just south of their position—Süleyman’s men. At this point Lieutenant Hakki and his men lost sight of the Australians as they moved off the beach in pursuit of the retreating Turks. Hakki and his men remained entrenched along Bolton’s Ridge awaiting further developments. They would soon meet up again with Milne and his men as the Australians tried to complete their objective, the capture of Gaba Tepe to the south.5 From the destroyer Colne, companies of the 9th Battalion under the command of Captain Jackson, and others of the 12th Battalion, landed just north of Milne close to the entrance of Shrapnel Gully and Queensland Point. Captain Jackson’s mission was to help capture Gaba Tepe and he and his troops started in a southeasterly direction, climbing over First Ridge and crossing into Shrapnel Gully. They came upon a stone hut with 55
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 56
25 APRIL 1915
Anzac Cove
First Ridge
Jackson & Dougall’s men Shrapnel Gully Turkish Hut M’Cay’s Hill
Milne’s men
X Section (No. 3 Ptn)
0
X Lt Hakki’s Ptn
250 metres
Bolton’s Ridge
Map 5.1 The southern end of Anzac Cove and the landing of the second wave (3rd Brigade) in that area, around 5 a.m.
a number of Turkish soldiers sheltering inside; no mercy was shown and all were killed with the bayonet.6 It would appear that somehow these Turks were not aware of the invasion force and may have been in some type of acoustic shadow, oblivious to the fighting that had broken out. Such acoustic shadows were often commented upon during the battles of the American Civil War, where men very close to a battlefield were having a smoke of a pipe or brewing coffee, not aware that within a kilometre a savage battle was in progress. After killing the Turks, the Australians took a few minutes off from the war and sat in the hut next to the fire and drank the pot of strong pungent black coffee that was 56
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 57
‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’
brewing.7 Only minutes before some of these men were probably thinking that the war was just one big bloody adventure. Having killed men for the first time they likely came to a revised conclusion: bloody yes— adventure no. Soon after leaving the hut, Jackson was hit and command passed to Captain Dougall. The men continued in a southerly direction and soon met up with Captain Milne and his company on M’Cay’s Hill.8 With these men was Captain Whitham with a group from the 12th Battalion, which had been landed by the southernmost destroyer. Men from the second wave who had landed further north had already started to climb up towards Plugge’s Plateau, which was at this time being captured by men of the first wave. Meanwhile, Major Beevor, commander of A Company, 10th Battalion, was approaching the beach in a small dinghy from the destroyer Foxhound. He was going to land before his men to help supervise them on the beach as they arrived. He jumped into the water from the dinghy only to find himself almost totally submerged, with only his head above water. Taking a few steps forward he tripped over something and found that he was caught: I made another effort, without success, when ensued one of those quaint conversations, which one sometimes holds with oneself. I said to me, ‘You can’t get up.’ I replied, ‘You’ve got to get up.’ Reply came, ‘You can’t.’ Promptly came the answer. ‘You have so nearly got ashore you can’t stop at this.’ The query was then shot back at me, ‘Well if you can’t walk how are you going to get ashore?’ To this there was the prompt answer, ‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl.’ Of course all of this occupied but some 10 or 15 seconds, and I promptly commenced to crawl, when very shortly I felt the water lighten above me and was then able to stand up, the water now being about my hips.9 Beevor made it to the beach just north of where Captain Jackson had landed and as he was taking a breather on the beach he noticed a party moving in his direction. He wasn’t sure whether these men were Australians or Turks and took up a position just off the beach with his revolver drawn. He jumped out from cover as they approached and challenged them, the reply being ‘Brigadier, 3rd Brigade, and staff’. Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan, the commander of the covering force, and his staff had landed from the Colne, just south of Beevor. 57
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 58
25 APRIL 1915
The Brigade commander, Brigadier General [Colonel] E.G. SinclairMacLagan, who was most naturally very disturbed to find all that good staff work gone by the board, grabbed me by the arm and said ‘Beevor, we’ve landed in the wrong place!’ This was not news to me, and I was very wet, which two circumstances no doubt contributed to the rather bored way in which I remembered replying. ‘I know that Sir . . . but as we are here now—my men are assembling a bit further up—will you please give us orders what to do?’10 Sinclair-MacLagan ordered Beevor to collect his men and start up the facing ridge (First Ridge) and upon reaching the top to fan out and head in a southerly direction to clear out any Turks that might be hiding in the scrub. Once this had been accomplished Beevor was to move a little inland, take up a defensive position and await further orders. As Beevor and his men started to climb the ridge, Sinclair-MacLagan yelled out to Beevor for his men to give a cheer. Beevor didn’t get a chance before his men, on hearing the command, yelled back, ‘Beevor’s little lambs!’11 From the earliest days at their Morphettville training camp his company had invariably been called ‘Beevor’s little lambs’—the connotation being ‘Anywhere that Beevor goes his lambs are sure to follow’.12 As Beevor and his men started to clear First Ridge, Sinclair-MacLagan moved into the scrub and started to climb up First Ridge towards the top of Plugge’s Plateau to take command of the northern sector. Before doing so he ordered the brigade-major, Major Brand, to take command of the southern flank in the vicinity of 400 Plateau. While Beevor made his way along First Ridge he noticed a few dead Turkish snipers who had tied branches to their chests, arms and backs, before they dug a hole, just wide and deep enough to stand in.13 It was not long before one of these ‘bushes’ took a shot at Beevor at close range, but the shot missed him: ‘one of my men trotted up to where the spurt of flame had come from and had a good look at friend Turk who was pretending to be a bush as hard as he could. However, my man had a good look at him, clubbed his rifle, measured his distance very carefully, and ——. The “little lamb” then resumed his place in the line and asked me what he should do about the matter; as he had broken the rifle butt clean off.’14 (The likely reply being: ‘Pick one up from the first dead bloke you come across’.) Major Beevor would only learn years later just how close he himself had come to being killed by ‘friendly fire’. As Beevor was hiding in the scrub ready to take on Sinclair-MacLagan’s party he had been noticed by 58
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 59
‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’
some of Lieutenant Loutit’s men (10th Battalion) who had just landed on the beach. Some of his men thought that the figure hiding in the scrub was a Turkish sniper: ‘Please Sir, may we go down and bayonet the ——?’ Luckily for Beevor, Loutit refused as the immediate threat came from the Turks above and they needed to start inland after them. The threat of the ‘sniper’ could be dealt with by others.15 Beevor’s luck was in. Lieutenant Loutit formed up the men before pushing inland over the top of First Ridge in pursuit of the Turks who were now passing over the top of the ridge into Shrapnel Gully. As Loutit and his men got amongst the Turks, most threw down their rifles. Loutit’s party, however, took no notice; there were too many to capture and consequently all were shot.16 At this point there was no provision for prisoners, on either side. When Loutit and other Australian parties scrambled out upon the heights of First Ridge they would have looked down in the growing light upon the scrub-covered slopes of Second Ridge, a few hundred metres distant. Second Ridge shut out all view of what lay beyond, except to the north, where Baby 700 could be seen at the end of what would later be known as Monash Valley.17 The low scrub, which covered the whole region, stood around 1 metre high and was interspersed with prickly oak, its branches and bushes so intertwined with thorns that even a strong man had difficulty forcing his way through it. Indeed, in attack it made a natural barrier by reducing any advance to a crawl. It also meant that when men took cover below the scrub line, it was not possible to see the immediate neighbour on either flank. This seriously disrupted communications and many men became separated and lost in the scrub. For the defender, however, the cover that it afforded was priceless.18 Within this scrub some Turkish snipers had taken up positions in Shrapnel Gully. The experience of Major Beevor and his men was by no means unique. As later recalled by M’Cay, commander of the 2nd Brigade: An officer was leading his party across Shrapnel Gully. A shot was fired at them from behind. The party halted at once. ‘Sniper!’ was the word but no sniper was in sight. One man moved towards some bushes with the rifle ready. A bush moved and jumped out of a hole in the ground. It was a Turk with branches reaching above his head and around his body. The Turk put up his hand but still held his rifle and fired point blank. Instantly, the Australian swung his rifle and struck the head of the Turk. There was no need for a second blow as the head was smashed to pulp. Then our lad surveyed the 59
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 60
25 APRIL 1915
damage. The bullet had hit his left hand. One finger was shot away and one was hanging on by a strip of skin. ‘That will do as a souvenir’ was the only comment of the soldier as he pulled it off and put it in his pocket. The Turk was too dead to understand the rest of the Australian’s words but all were addressed at the dead body and were forcible enough for any human being, alive or dead.19 The landing of the next wave of reinforcements on North Beach, which included additional men of the 11th Battalion as well as those from the 12th Battalion and the 3rd Field Ambulance, was no less dramatic than it had been for the men in the first wave. Lieutenant Margetts recalled his landing from the destroyer Ribble. I turned around to get the second tow ready, when a man just in front of me dropped, hit in the head. This was the first casualty and very soon there were several others hit. There was some difficulty in getting the second tow ready but eventually when the naval cutter came alongside we got in and started for the beach; 3 men were hit before the boat struck the shore. When she hit the beach, I gave the word to get out and out the men got at once, in water up to their necks and in some cases, men actually had to swim several strokes before they got their footing. It was almost impossible to walk with full marching order, absolutely drenched to the skin and I fell twice before I got to the dry beach where I scrambled up under cover of a sand ridge. I ordered the men to dump their packs off, load their rifles, and waited a few seconds for the men to get their breath. It was just breaking dawn and, as we looked towards the sound of the firing, we were faced by an almost perpendicular cliff about 200 feet above sea level, and as we were of [the] opinion that most of the fire was coming from that quarter, it was evident that this was the direction of our attack.20 Bert Facey, of the 11th Battalion, who also landed on North Beach, later recalled: My platoon and other ‘D’ Company men were on the same destroyer. All went well until we were making the change into the rowing boats. Suddenly all hell broke loose; heavy shelling and shrapnel fire commenced. The ships that were protecting our troops returned 60
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 61
‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’
fire. Bullets were thumping into us in the rowing boat. Men were being hit and killed all around me. When we were cut loose to make our way to the shore was the worst period. I was terribly frightened. The boat touched bottom some thirty yards from shore so we had to jump out and wade into the beach. The water in some places was up to my shoulders. The Turks had machine guns sweeping the strip of beach where we landed—there were many dead already when we got there. Bodies of men who had reached the beach ahead of us were lying all along the beach and wounded men screaming for help. We couldn’t stop for them—the Turkish fire was terrible and mowing into us. The order to line up on the beach was forgotten. We all ran for our lives over the strip of beach and got into the scrub and bush. Men were falling all around me. We were stumbling over bodies—running blind. The sight of the bodies on the beach was shocking. It worried me for days that I couldn’t stop to help the men calling out . . . I would think for days, ‘I should have helped that poor beggar’.21 The reinforcements who landed on North Beach found themselves, like those from the first wave, in a natural amphitheatre. To the south lay the steep slopes of Plugge’s Plateau, to their north the rugged tortuous spur of Walker’s Ridge and immediately to their front a weathered ridge, soon to be known by all Anzacs as ‘The Sphinx’. At the base of this natural amphitheatre was a mass of thick and tangled scrub. The Turkish troops at Fisherman’s Hut to the north were still strongly entrenched and poured enfilading rifle and machine-gun fire into the boats as they approached the beach. As in the first wave, many were killed before getting ashore. Also the Turkish artillery from Gaba Tepe had now started to fire at the northern part of the invasion force. Captain Faik and the men of the Turkish 3rd Platoon were also making good their position along Russell’s Top to fire into the oncoming boats below. On reaching the beach some men of the 11th Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Jackson raced across and found refuge in a small creek embankment just south of The Sphinx (later known as Reserve Gully). Men from the 12th Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Clarke and men from the 3rd Field Ambulance also found cover in this area on landing.22 For a short time these men were trapped, pinned down by heavy sniper fire from above. Clarke ordered the men to ‘strip packs, leave them under the bank, open cut-offs, load ten rounds, and pull back safety catches’.23 Many men from the first wave were still 61
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 62
25 APRIL 1915
in the general region of North Beach when the second wave landed; the heavy fire and casualties had clearly rattled them. Thirty-nine-year-old Captain Peck (11th Battalion), who had landed with the first wave, reported to Lieutenant Colonel Clarke and asked for instructions, as he could not find his own commander. In what must be considered an understatement Peck yelled, ‘Come on, boys . . . By God I’m frightened!’ and stormed out of cover and headed for the high ground to his front. The other officers and men followed.24 Lieutenant Colonel Clarke soon found himself standing on top of a small knoll below The Sphinx, taking a breather. As the commander of the reserve battalion, Clarke waited to collect as many of his men as possible before pushing on. He didn’t want them to be part of the general scramble for the heights that was now occurring all around him. The original orders for the 12th Battalion were to assemble as a reserve to the 3rd Brigade at the foot of 400 Plateau, and send a platoon to escort the Indian Mountain Battery that was to take up a position on top of the plateau. Given that his men were equally dispersed some considerable distance amongst the 9th, 10th and 11th battalions he had no chance of assembling his battalion, so he waited with the intention of collecting as many of his northern companies as possible, which were arriving ashore in relays.25 Soon Clarke had managed to collect a number of men, including lieutenants Margetts and Patterson from his battalion. Standing beside Clarke, Margetts took his binoculars out of their case and tried to scan the surrounding highland, but he could see nothing as the lenses were smeared with water and sand, and he had no dry clothing to wipe them clean. Clarke sent Patterson, Margetts and their men up the gravelly slopes of Reserve Gully (just south of The Sphinx), which looked promising for gaining a foothold. It was becoming light and Clarke could wait no longer; he proceeded up the cliffs and left the rest to follow. Before doing so, however, he ordered Lieutenant Rafferty to help silence the Turkish machine gun at Fisherman’s Hut. ieutenant Rafferty’s platoon was originally charged with accompanying the Indian Mountain Battery onto 400 Plateau. Rafferty reminded the lieutenant colonel of his original orders, but Clarke responded, ‘I can’t help that’. Rafferty was ordered to coordinate with Lieutenant Strickland (11th Battalion) who after landing as part of the first wave was making his way north, just inland and parallel to the beach, with the same objective.26 Captain Tulloch of the 11th Battalion and some of Captain Lalor’s men of the 12th Battalion had meanwhile landed at the extreme northern end 62
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 63
‘Well, if you can’t walk you’ll have to damn well crawl’
of the Anzac line as part of the second wave reinforcements. Lalor, the grandson of Peter Lalor, leader of the 1854 gold-miners’ revolt at the Eureka Stockade, had with him—in spite of army regulations—a family sword, its bright hilt wrapped in khaki cloth. The men had taken cover in a gully, later known as ‘Happy Valley’, close to Walker’s Ridge, but they soon found themselves under increasing fire and were forced to move further along the gully towards the foot of Walker’s Ridge, kneedeep in holly scrub.27 Kenneth Fry, a stretcher-bearer of the 3rd Field Ambulance, remembered his experience on North Beach: ‘Rowe hit, could do little, morphia given. Sat tight for 20 minutes or so, and watched the [Turkish] howitzers practice against the big ships, and watched landing on the point. Boat to our left disturbed our friends along the beach . . . Two men down, Eccles and Hudson.’28 Captain Douglas McWhae of the 3rd Field Ambulance, who landed with Fry, stated: A, B and C sections, Bearer Div., of the F. Amb., landed . . . on North Beach at the extreme left flank of the covering force. They could not have been landed where they were more urgently needed. At first the beach was absolutely swept with machine gun and rifle fire so that there was no possibility of going near the boats or to help the wounded lying on the beach. There were great numbers of wounded, whom it took all the morning to attend to and get away. The Red Cross flag was put up after a time. The three sections were going for all they were worth. They had taken ashore the ordinary complement of stretchers. They had a number of casualties among the S/Bearers . . . They had iodine . . . field dressings; all splints improvised [using] rifles and bushes. They were terrible wounds to deal with. They could only do it with the most hurried First Aid. It was done under direct and severe fire most of the time, and under great pressure to get it done in time.29 The men of the 3rd Field Ambulance were seen on their knees tending to the critically wounded. As the infantry pushed on, the stretcherbearers were not far behind, following them up the slopes, establishing collection posts and attending to the wounded. Indeed, medical officers and NCOs went out in small squads to scour the countryside for wounded, and along the beach where possible. Stretcher-bearer Jim McPhee later recalled: 63
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 64
25 APRIL 1915
We didn’t carry arms, just water bottles and a big field dressing for shrapnel wounds, you couldn’t manage any more by the time you got a weight on a stretcher . . . I remember we carried a little bundle of kindling wood on our backs that first day. The sailors had broken up cases and bundled the pieces for us so we could boil a billy. My brother Vic was with me. He was killed later in France.30
64
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 65
Anzac 1919 Charles Bean took a leisurely stroll down the beach of Anzac Cove. Four years after the evacuation, he was now able to walk along the beach and not have to worry about shells from Beachy Bill (Turkish gun battery) or stray—or not so stray—bullets from the northern heights. Bean was keen to rediscover his dug-out, his home during the eight-month long Gallipoli campaign. Now nothing stirred except the waves gently lapping on the shingle, and a few of the piles of our old piers gently swaying in the swell . . . But there were a few of the stranded barges; and white steel lifeboats—originally belonging to transports and used to land troops . . . Naturally I was eager to discover, if possible, the niche where I had lived, worked, slept and eaten, from the first month of the campaign to the last. From the middle of the Beach we turned up Anzac Gully. Several ledges, one of which I recognized with fair assurance as the site of General Birdwood’s old shelter, were on our left. We climbed two hundred yards up the washaway to the two tracks or ledges, one above the other, that used to hold the old 1st Division’s staff. They were still bordered by the row of niches that had contained the offices and bivouacs. There, 150 feet up, each of us used to sit at his evening meal, looking out on those glorious sunsets over the sea and the distant mountain tops of Imbros and Samothrace, with the hospital ship in the cove below us like a beautiful memory of peace, and, closer in, the crowded beach. The shelters were now just holes in a bank, bereft of the roofs of water-proof sheet or iron, and of the biscuit box furniture. I found it hard to pick out which hole had been mine.1
65
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 66
6 ‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’ t around 5.30 a.m. the commander of the 3rd Brigade arrived at the top of Plugge’s. From this vantage point Colonel SinclairMacLagan could see 400 Plateau southeast of his current position, which should have been the centre of his line; it was now close to representing his southern flank. From this position he estimated that his brigade had landed 2 kilometres too far north.1 The original plan dictated that at this point the 11th Battalion should be advancing across 400 Plateau on their way to the northern heights and ultimately Chunuk Bair. The 10th Battalion should be skirting south of 400 Plateau to capture the Turkish batteries and then push on to Third Ridge. The 9th Battalion should have been much further south, capturing Gaba Tepe. Following closely behind should have been the Indian Mountain Battery that was to move onto 400 Plateau, with the 12th Battalion following up as the brigade reserve. Sinclair-MacLagan’s two-dimensional chessboard analogy had now turned into a three-dimensional topographical nightmare. While the men of the second wave had landed twenty minutes after the first wave, those from the destroyers who had landed south of Plugge’s found the heights they faced less precipitous and the way inland more direct compared to those who had landed further north. As such, Milne’s and Dougall’s companies of the 9th Battalion and some portions of the 10th and 12th battalions, although they had arrived after the men of the first wave, were making faster progress inland.2 Sinclair-MacLagan now realised that Plugge’s, which had previously been thought to be a continuous spur leading all the way up to Baby 700 and beyond, was no such thing. The only link between the plateau and Russell’s Top was an extremely narrow ‘bridge’ of land—so narrow that only one man at a time could cross, and even then it was extremely dangerous. Indeed, this feature was soon given the appropriate name of the ‘Razor Edge’. The only real option of reaching Russell’s Top and the
A
66
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 67
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
heights beyond from Plugge’s was to approach it from the seaward side of Russell’s Top or from the inland valley below (Shrapnel Gully), which required another hard climb. For all intents and purposes, Plugge’s Plateau and Russell’s Top were not connected and represented distinct isolated plateaus. From the top of Plugge’s, Sinclair-MacLagan immediately recognised the significance of Baby 700 which lay to the north and he was determined to capture and hold this position. At this time a number of men from the second wave, including Major Hilmer-Smith and his company from the 12th Battalion, had arrived on top of Plugge’s. Sinclair-MacLagan gave orders for these men to cross the valley below and occupy different parts of Second Ridge to their immediate front (although Hilmer-Smith and his men would somehow in the confusion end up on 400 Plateau), while at the same time ordering DrakeBrockman to move northeast to occupy the head of what would later be known as Monash Valley and to capture the heights of Baby 700. From Plugge’s the narrowing of Russell’s Top at The Nek could not be seen as it lay in a depression between the main southern parts of Russell’s Top and the high ground around Baby 700. As such, Sinclair-MacLagan was not immediately aware of its strategic significance.3 If Drake-Brockman could capture Baby 700 and occupy Second Ridge, the strategic importance of The Nek would be muted anyway. Drake-Brockman ordered two companies of the 11th Battalion under Captain Barnes and Major Denton to move off immediately into Monash Valley to occupy the northern parts of the Second Ridge (later to be known as Steele’s and Courtney’s posts), while another two companies of the 11th Battalion under his command would move north along Monash Valley before climbing the heights to reach Baby 700. The Australian submarine AE2 had by now been running blind beneath the waters and minefields of the Dardanelles for close to an hour; it was imperative that Stoker check his bearings. The stress of hearing the creaking and groaning of the mine cables scraping against the submarine’s hull undoubtedly exhausted him and his crew. At around 5.30 a.m. Stoker ordered the AE2 up to periscope depth.4 Choose a wrong moment to rise for observation through the periscope and you choose a moment to hit a mine—so choose as few of these moments for observation as possible. Feel as safe as you are when submerged, and do not think of the result should one of the 67
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 68
25 APRIL 1915
wires, catching a projection of the boat’s side, drag its mine, with a bang, down on top of you.5 He was still south of the Narrows. He continued to creep, submerged, up the Dardanelles. Former schoolmaster, Lieutenant Rafferty, who had been ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Clarke to silence the machine gun at Fisherman’s Hut, had with him 23 men of his own platoon and twenty stray men from other tows. This party formed into an extended line and moved northwards through the scrub until they eventually made their way to the opening of a creek bed which had scored a channel about 2 metres deep through the sand to the beach. In front lay a pasture with a single olive tree. In front of them and to their right was No. 1 Post. About 300 metres ahead across an open field was the smaller knoll, with Fisherman’s Hut on its seaward side.6 At this point Turkish fire from the inland side of the knoll, just behind Fisherman’s Hut, made it impossible to stay in the open creek bed. Men began to fall. Rafferty and his surviving men scrambled up the creek side. Once there he tried to use his binoculars to scan the region around No. 1 Post from where the fire was originating but his glasses were drenched and both his handkerchief and shirt were soaked. With the approaching daylight Rafferty was able to make out a number of trenches, and in one of these on top of the knoll behind Fisherman’s Hut a number of Turks appeared to be firmly entrenched. While deciding what to do, Rafferty noticed four small boats full of troops rowing towards the beach on his left. They were heading directly towards Fisherman’s Hut. He knew immediately that he had to push on to the next rise, the foot of No. 1 Post, in order to offer covering fire to the men in the boats.7 ‘Wait till I give the order, boys.’ Earlier, Commander Somerville, who was the officer on board the Galeka and responsible for the safety of the troops on board ship, decided that the men must land themselves at once, using the Galeka’s own lifeboats. Lieutenant Colonel ‘Pompey’ Elliott, commander of the 7th Battalion, 2nd Brigade, was strongly opposed to this decision, as it would mean that his force would be fragmented. Also it was the tows that were to position his battalion to the left of the 3rd Brigade and neither he nor Somerville knew exactly where the left flank of the 3rd Brigade was currently located. Commander Somerville, however, decided that a start had to be made. Around 5 a.m. Elliott reluctantly ordered Major Jackson to man four of the Galeka’s boats, and with three platoons of B Company 68
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 69
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
2nd Lt IbrahimFisherman’s Hayreddin (No. 1 Ptn) Hut
Jackson & Layh’s men
Shepherd’s Hut Sazli Beit Dere
Sniper’s Nest
No. 1 Outpost
Rafferty’s men Malone’s Gully
Baby 700
Walker’s Ridge The Nek North Beach
0
250 metres
Russell’s Top
Map 6.1 The situation at Fisherman’s Hut, early morning
to make their way to shore, stating that the rest of the battalion would follow close behind as soon as the pinnaces arrived. It was these boats that Rafferty would later see heading straight for Fisherman’s Hut along North Beach. Jackson and his men boarded the four rowing boats from the troopship and headed for shore. On approaching the beach Jackson noted the Red Cross flag of the 3rd Field Ambulance flying near The Sphinx; he set a course well north of this as the mission of the 2nd Brigade was to secure the northern flank. He aimed for a hut that could be seen close to shore; all seemed quiet. Jackson then saw to his right a party of Australians coming along the beach in their general direction, waving frantically at them. This was Lieutenant Rafferty’s party who were trying to warn him that he was rowing into a trap. Soon men in the boats could hear rifle and shrapnel fire that was falling among men landing further south. While Jackson’s men were not advancing into shrapnel fire, they could now see rifle and machine-gun fire cutting up the water in front of them—they rowed on. As they proceeded into the killing zone, men were wounded and killed in the boats, with casualties in one so severe that the boat drifted along the coast 69
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 70
25 APRIL 1915
because there was no one left to man the oars.8 Captain Layh, second-incommand, recalled, ‘as we drew near we could see that the water was being churned up by the bullets and that we were in for a hot time. The rowers pulled hard, and we entered the beaten zone at a good pace. The bullets zipped around us like bees. Before the keel grated on the beach five or six of the rowers were shot . . . only 10 out of 30 left the boats, the rest either being dead or wounded.’9 ‘Charge lads—CHARGE . . .!’ On North Beach Rafferty and his men now charged towards No. 1 Post. Joining them in this dash were members of Strickland’s men who had also gone north to silence the machine gun. From here they could offer some covering fire to the men in the boats. In this brave charge twenty men fell to machine-gun fire, twelve of whom were killed outright. Rafferty, Sergeant Skinner and six others reached the low rise of No. 1 Post and sheltered from the Turkish fire. It was impossible to determine whether any Turks remained in the trenches along the top of No. 1 Post as the rise was too steep. While Jackson and his men from the 7th Battalion reached the shore, Layh was cheering on his men when he was hit through the hip as he jumped into the water. He was soon hit again, this time in the leg, as he tried to help the wounded out of the boats. Somehow he managed to make it to a small grass-covered hillock with the survivors. Many of the wounded would die there. Layh later recounted that ‘once we were behind cover the Turks turned their machine guns on us, and gave us a lively 10 minutes. A poor chap next to me was hit three times. He begged me to shoot him, but luckily for him a fourth bullet got him and put him out of his pain.’10 Rafferty climbed the steep rise of No. 1 Post and looked towards the beach. He saw that one boat was drifting with the current northward, while the other three boats had made it to shore. In front of the three boats, lying on the sand in a rough line, was a large group of Australians. Rafferty tried to attract their attention, but none of the men responded. Private Stubbings, who had survived the charge to No. 1 Post, volunteered to race across the beach to the men. He put down his rifle and took off his equipment and made his way across the beach to the first boat. It was only then that he realised that all the men around him were either dead or so badly wounded that they did not—or could not— acknowledge his presence. Stubbings soon found sheltering behind the same boat four men who were able to confirm what he already knew, that most of the men on the beach were dead. Stubbings dashed back to Rafferty with the news.11 70
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 71
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
Meanwhile, Layh, lying against the slope of the grass-covered hillock, noticed other parties of his men nearby. He called to them, but only six answered. Heavy fire was sweeping the beach and the top of the hillock. This fire was coming from Fisherman’s Hut. Layh ordered his men to lay down a heavy fusillade as he suspected that the Turks were about to charge his position. He then ordered his men to fix bayonets. With this a scattered line of bayonets appeared above the scrub. Moments before, Second Lieutenant Ibrahim-Hayreddin and his men had seen from their position at Fisherman’s Hut other enemy troops climbing towards Russell’s Top. The enemy appeared to be close to occupying the heights above. Enemy soldiers were also now close by in the vicinity of No. 1 Post; closer still were men from the boats who now appeared ready to launch an attack, as their bayonets could be seen above the grassy hillock before them. Ibrahim-Hayreddin realised that he was now in great danger from two separate parties who appeared to be intent on flanking his position. He could also see that the enemy approaching Russell’s Top above might soon be in a position to occupy the dominating heights of Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971). He was determined to intercept them at Düs Tepe (Battleship Hill). Given his precarious position he decided to leave the security of the northern coastal flank to the vigilance of the Turkish Gendarmes who were stationed north of Aghyl Dere. It was now sometime after 5.30 a.m.12 Second Lieutenant Ibrahim-Hayreddin collected his troops and evacuated Fisherman’s Hut, moving inland along a track leading to Sazli Beit Dere, which would ultimately take them up to the dominating heights of Chunuk Bair.13 Shortly Layh realised that the Turks had evacuated Fisherman’s Hut. Jackson went along the beach and into the scrub to ascertain casualties; he must have been shocked to realise that out of the 140 men who had landed, only about 35 were unhurt or lightly wounded. The rest, in the boats or on the beach, were dead or seriously wounded.14 Layh and the survivors made their way to Fisherman’s Hut, while Jackson moved south along the beach towards the Red Cross flag to get help. By the time Private Stubbings had returned to Rafferty at No. 1 Post, they had also noticed that the Turkish fire had ceased. Rafferty had by now already received three orders from the rear that he was to retire. These messages had been shouted and signalled to him. However, because he could not ascertain who was ordering him to retire he 71
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 72
25 APRIL 1915
remained where he felt he was needed most. Soon, however, Rafferty, like Ibrahim-Hayreddin, noticed that Australians were now close to reaching Russell’s Top while others could be seen climbing Walker’s Ridge. Believing that the northern flank was now secure and that most of the men from the boats were beyond help (he was not aware that others from the boats had made it off the beach and now lay just north of their position), he moved south towards Anzac Cove to get help for the wounded in and around the boats; then he would attempt to complete his original mission of supporting the Indian Mountain Battery’s movement onto 400 Plateau.15 While Layh and the surviving men were lying below Fisherman’s Hut their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott, and most of their comrades from the 7th Battalion had, by 5.30 a.m., begun landing at Anzac Cove to the south. Many years later, Adrian Dare of the 7th Battalion recalled: I can still, when I think about it, feel the quick, sharp stabs of cold fear that all of us felt that morning. As our ship moved in close in the semi-darkness just before the dawn, we got the order to form up on the shore side ready to go ashore. Our comrades in the 3rd Bde had already landed, and excitement was beginning to overcome the tremors of fear. We were a very young crowd and, as kids do, were patting each other on the back and wishing each [other] all the best. Then came the order; ‘rowers two paces forward!’ I was one of the eight blokes detailed to the oars in my lifeboat. Down the ship’s side we went on rope ladders, a difficult enough business when you are travelling light, but loaded up as the PBI [poor bloody infantry] was in those days—pack, haversack, entrenching tool, rifle, full bayonet pouches plus an extra 200 rounds of ammo—it was a case of ‘Lifeboat, here I come’. We got our oars in position, and down came the boys 40 to each boat, and away we pulled from the ship’s side, formed into line ahead, and were taken in tow by the Royal Navy Picket boat commanded by midshipmen 14 or 15 years old. They were certainly grand kids, those midshipmen. The boats, seven in number, headed for the beach. Shrapnel was bursting overhead and we were under direct rifle and machine-gun fire. Casualties began to occur thick and fast: one of my pals got a bullet through the neck. About 100 yards from the shore the Navy pinnace cast off the tow line, and we went for the 72
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 73
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
oars with a rush to get into some sort of cover. Fire was now intense and our fellows were going down fast. We began jumping out of the boats in about three feet of water. That last rush through the shallow water to a beach which, though it looked inviting, afforded us no cover at all, was unforgettable. We managed to make it, as wet as shags. I had time to notice the boat next to ours was completely smashed, with all but four of the fellows killed or wounded. We scrambled up the cliffs, and eventually got into position with the rest of the Brigade.16 Lieutenant Colonel Elliott, upon reaching the beach and not being able to find Colonel M’Cay, commander of the 2nd Brigade, or the staff officers who were supposed to be directing the troops on the beach (they had yet to land), made his way up to Plugge’s Plateau in search of Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan. As he started to climb the heights he passed wounded men on their way back to the beach.17 Lieutenant Loutit (10th Battalion), who had earlier helped drive the Turks off First Ridge, was climbing the steep scrubby hillside of 400 Plateau with his men when Major Brand, who had been sent south by Sinclair-MacLagan to take command of the southern flank, joined them. They passed by a small Turkish trench before reaching the top of 400 Plateau at its northern edge. They were the first Australians to reach the plateau. The plateau was relatively flat. The mid-point of the landward side was dissected by a steep gully, leading down into Legge Valley. The landward edge had two lobe-like features separated by this gully. The northern lobe was soon to be known by the Australians as ‘Johnston’s Jolly’ as Johnston’s artillery would later give the Turks a ‘jolly’ time in this area, while the southern lobe would be called the ‘Lonesome Pine’ (later Lone Pine) due to the solitary stunted pine tree growing there. The gully separating these two features, leading down into Legge Valley, was to be known as ‘Owen’s Gully’. The whole plateau was covered with chest-high thick scrub and was separated from the northern part of the Second Ridge by a narrow east–west gully slicing through the ridge, later called Wire Gully. Running from the plateau’s southern edge were five spurs of differing height and length.18 From their position on 400 Plateau, Loutit and Brand could see a number of Turks hurrying about the Turkish Mountain Battery a few hundred yards to the south. Some of the mule teams were already standing by the guns, while others were being brought up. These Turks 73
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 74
25 APRIL 1915
Plugge’s Plateau
Monash Valley
Second Ridge Mortar Mule Ridge Valley
Loutit
First Ridge
Incebayir Ridge
Scrubby Knoll
Wire Gully Shrapnel Gully Johnston’s Jolly
Hell Spit
M’Cay’s Hill Victoria Gully
Thomas Boase
X Tents
Milne X Sedik’s Battery
Clarke Valley
Adana Bair Third Ridge
X Lt Hakki’s Ptn Holly Ridge
Legge Valley
Pine Ridge
0
Valley of Despair
500 metres
Map 6.2 The early occupation of 400 Plateau by men of the 9th Battalion and Loutit’s advance towards Third Ridge
were located on the southern lobe, close to the Lonesome Pine. Loutit’s men opened rapid fire at the battery crew, but the range was too great for effect. With this the Turkish guns quickly limbered up and moved off the main plateau down into Owen’s Gully. Unknown to the Australians, however, the Turks had not retreated off the plateau, but were now occupying a slight depression, later known as The Cup. This position was defined by numerous trenches, covered over with brushwood and heaped-up earth, as well as a well constructed gun emplacement. From their new location the battery, when ordered, could open devastating shrapnel fire upon the enemy as they moved across the plateau heading for Third Ridge.19 Loutit and his men headed off after the retreating Mountain Battery. When they reached the landward side of the plateau’s edge, which overlooked Owen’s Gully, the battery had disappeared. At the bottom of the gully they saw a Turkish encampment. From their position it was impossible to see the new position of the Turkish battery. Loutit and his men moved down Owen’s Gully to investigate the camp, unknowingly passing the battery (to their right) as they descended. They found no Turks in the camp but found the oil lamps still burning, and some personal items, 74
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 75
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
including watches, in the tents. Clearly the occupants had left in a hurry. Some men started searching for a curio or two, but Loutit ordered them out of the tents, and they proceeded down into Legge Valley, heading for Third Ridge. Brand, who was still on 400 Plateau, had assured Loutit that he would send on reinforcements as they arrived.20 Just as Loutit and his men were heading down Owen’s Gully, Talbot Smith and his 10th Battalion scouts were making their way onto 400 Plateau. It was their mission to silence the Turkish battery. They climbed onto the plateau, close to where Brand and Loutit had first ascended to reach the same feature. ‘It is about here that they should be’, remarked Talbot Smith to his corporal as they reached the top of 400 Plateau.21 Talbot Smith raced towards Owen’s Gully in the vicinity of Johnston’s Jolly, while his corporal moved further south towards the Lonesome Pine. Captain Faik had earlier sent an urgent message to Captain Sedik, commander of the Turkish battery on 400 Plateau. He had ordered that the guns open fire on the invading forces around Ari Burnu. Sedik, however, refused to consider this invasion anything other than a feint and held back his fire for what he believed to be the real invasion point just southwest of his position, the southern beaches close to Gaba Tepe.22 While his main priority was to defend the coastal area around Gaba Tepe, the Turkish battalion commander, who was in charge of the battery, had stated in a written order that: In case of necessity, the Battery could open fire only when he gave the order by telephone to Captain Faik . . . But since the Battery Commander had not received orders directly from the Bn. C.O., he was in a position of doubt and stuck to his prescribed duties in the Kabatepe direction, failing to take on his own initiative, the action which the occasion demanded.23 Captain Sedik was still awaiting orders from his commander, orders that would never come. Just after Loutit and his men had ventured down into Owen’s Gully, Milne, Dougall and their men arrived on top of M’Cay’s Hill. Instead of moving further inland across 400 Plateau, the bulk of his force turned in a southerly direction—their objective had always been to capture Gaba Tepe. They moved down Bolton’s Ridge—the southern spur running off 400 Plateau that leads towards Gaba Tepe—the same ridge now partly 75
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:10 AM
Page 76
25 APRIL 1915
occupied by Lieutenant Hakki and his men. Two of Dougall’s platoons, however, under the command of lieutenants Thomas and Boase, were ordered to move directly across 400 Plateau to keep pursuing the retreating Turks from the beach. Milne’s men started moving down the ridge cautiously from the seaward side, while Dougall approached from the landward side. The Australians were soon spotted by Hakki’s platoon who forced them to ground by scattered rifle fire. In the first few shots Milne was wounded. Milne ordered Corporal Harrison (who was part of Lieutenant Thomas’s platoon, although they had become separated) to work his way to the left behind the Turkish trench. ‘Go for it, Corporal, clean the buggers outta there.’ ‘Righto Sir.’ Harrison and his men crept down the inland slope of the spur, just beyond the top of the ridge, and upon reaching as close as possible to the Turkish trench unseen, they then charged up the slope yelling and screaming at the Turks. Within seconds it was all over. They had captured the Turkish position, although Hakki and most of his men had managed to escape suffering one killed and two wounded.24 Hakki and the surviving men moved off the ridge and headed down into the southern gullies and spurs that run off 400 Plateau, in an attempt to get to Third Ridge. The wounded Milne took a breather in the captured trench. ‘They’ve taken more than a couple of bob off this uniform.’ Very soon after this action, other Australians, under the command of Lieutenant Plant (9th Battalion), arrived at the trench with Milne, but did not stay long. With a likely ‘Goodbye and good luck old chap’, Plant and his men continued across Bolton’s Ridge and down into the valley in a southeasterly direction heading for Anderson Knoll, which was part of their original objective. After capturing the trench on Bolton’s Ridge, Harrison went in search of Lieutenant Thomas, who had earlier moved off across 400 Plateau in the direction of the Lonesome Pine and Owen’s Gully. Milne, although wounded, decided after his brief rest to push on across the plateau towards the Lonesome Pine. Dougall and fragments of the 9th Battalion, however, continued down Bolton’s Ridge, until they reached Harris Ridge. They occupied a Turkish trench at the head of the ridge and awaited further developments. This would make a good position to observe any movement by the enemy towards their position from the south. It would not be long before they would see advanced parties of Aker’s 27th Regiment making their way towards Anderson Knoll. Lieutenant Colonel Aker, Commander of the Turkish 27th Regiment just outside of Maidos, was anxiously awaiting orders to move towards 76
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 77
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
the battle that could be heard to the west. He picked up the telephone to his divisional chief of staff: ‘Hulusi Bey, our comrades are burning there under fire. How much longer are we going to wait? I am waiting for a movement order.’ The Chief of Staff, who was still not sure of whether the Ari Burnu landings were a feint replied ‘Sefik Bey! How do we know that this landing is not a diversion? How can I give you a movement order when it is not known where the real landing is to be?’ [I] replied ‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’25 It was not until 5.45 a.m. that Lieutenant Colonel Aker finally got his orders to move towards Gaba Tepe.26 He was instructed that ‘Captain Faik has stated that a number of enemy troops have landed, it is clear that the enemy operations are on a considerable scale. Reinforcements are urgently needed.’27 He was further ordered to ‘take the mountain battery which is at Çam Burnu [a coastal village 2 kilometres south of Maidos], halt the enemy landing, which is being attempted between Ari Burnu and Kaba Tepe, proceed to the Kaba Tepe area and throw the forces which land there into the sea’.28 Aker provided detailed marching orders to his officers: The 1st Battalion will not march on the main road to Kaba Tepe but will take the newly opened narrow road to the right of the main road. The 3rd Battalion and Machine gun Company, which will follow behind them, will take the road branching to the north from the Battalion Camp. Each of them will pass over Boyun in a fast march and will cross the plain in a north-westerly direction. I shall go with the Advance Guard of the 1st Battalion. Accordingly the 3rd Battalion will keep visual contact with the 1st Battalion and as soon as they have passed over the plain they will come to the road on which the 1st Battalion will be marching. When on the plain, if the enemy’s naval gunfire is effective, companies and, if necessary, platoons will cross the field of fire in leaps and bounds of suitable intervals. If advance guards are each in echelon formation, they too should only proceed in threes. The heavy baggage will remain where it is for the moment.29 Aker was concerned that the mountain battery, which was at least 2 kilometres away, would take another half hour to reach him, if not longer. He decided not to wait for the battery, instead issuing orders that: 77
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 78
25 APRIL 1915
one company from the 3rd Battalion will remain here on the road and await the Mountain Battery. In order that they may know and see where the Regiment goes they will post two patrols who are familiar with the roads and the lie of the land to Boyun on the Kaba Tepe road. As soon as the Battery arrives they will set off without delay at a march following the road which the regiment will have taken and join up with the Regiment. They will protect the Battery against all eventualities.30 Aker then turned to the commander of the seventeen mounted troopers who had been posted to his regiment to assist in reconnaissance patrols and ordered that three troopers ride off in the direction of Ari Burnu via the ridges east of Kocadere village, moving up and then turning at Hill 971 and approaching Ari Burnu from the north, while another three were sent close to Gaba Tepe to approach Ari Burnu from the south—from Pine Ridge, which runs onto 400 Plateau. In addition another three troopers were sent straight to Gaba Tepe to make contact with the commanding officer there and get news about the region around Palamutlu Sirt (the ridge running south of Gaba Tepe). Aker now turned to his troops and gave orders to his officers and within minutes the two battalions of the regiment, about 2000 strong, were on the move.31 By 6 a.m. Major Jackson had made his way to the 3rd Field Ambulance collecting post asking for urgent assistance for his men who had been decimated upon landing close to Fisherman’s Hut. McWhae and his stretcher-bearers (including John Simpson Kirkpatrick, ‘the man with the donkey’) were soon heading north to assist Jackson’s men. Meanwhile, Layh and his surviving men occupied the trench above Fisherman’s Hut, while others occupied another trench along the inland side of the knoll overlooking Shepherd’s Hut.32 Within an hour, stretcher-bearers from the 3rd Field Ambulance arrived and began to collect the wounded from the boats and the beach. The surviving men were asked to remain entrenched near Fisherman’s Hut until all of the wounded had been evacuated. Although wounded himself, Layh continued to command the survivors, and he promised to hold the position with the help of Lieutenant Scanlan. In order to let Lieutenant Colonel Elliott know why this part of his battalion had not joined him, Layh scribbled a message to be passed on to the battalion commander: 78
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 79
‘For goodness sake, please hurry!’
7th Battalion, 2 officers and 30 men are holding knoll above landing-place until wounded removed. Will then join battalion. HTC Layh, Captain, B Company33
79
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 80
7 ‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’ ieutenant Colonel Elliott, commander of the 7th Battalion, had by now reached the summit of Plugge’s and found Sinclair-MacLagan. The 3rd Brigade commander was still concerned about the overall vulnerability of his southern flank. Indeed, he had been warned by the ‘Instructions Issued to G.O.C. Australian Division’ to look out for Turks to his south. He expected that any Turkish attack would come from the vicinity of Gaba Tepe. Sinclair-MacLagan was now reasonably confident that the orders he had given to Drake-Brockman and Hilmer-Smith would secure the northern and central sectors. He now ordered Elliott and his men to take up positions to the south at 400 Plateau. This must have been of some surprise to Elliott, as the 2nd Brigade had originally been assigned to cover the left or northern sector of the invasion. Elliott returned to the beach and with the help of lieutenants Swift and Grills began organising the men for their unexpected movement south.1 Shortly after Elliott left Plugge’s, a 2nd Brigade staff officer, Major Glasfurd, found Sinclair-MacLagan and was also directed by him to move the 2nd Brigade south. Glasfurd returned to the beach and found Elliott. It was now just before 6 a.m. Before moving off to 400 Plateau Glasfurd and Elliott decided to wait a little longer in order to collect as many men as possible. Elliott, however, ordered Major Blezard and two of his platoons, with half of C Company, to move immediately up to 400 Plateau to support the 9th Battalion, while Glasfurd organised a 2nd Brigade rendezvous point close to the opening of Shrapnel Gully. This area was chosen because Turkish shrapnel was making it increasingly dangerous to organise along the beach.2 Meanwhile men from the 2nd Brigade were continuing to be ferried ashore and although the Turks had retreated from First Ridge many Australians in the boats and on the beach were still being killed and wounded. Frank Brent of the 6th Battalion later wrote:
L
80
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 81
‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’
We lined up on the Galeka and waited for the pinnaces and tows to come back. The old bosun of the Galeka came along. ‘Any of you got letters to post? Anybody got any of those dirty postcards that you bought in Cairo? If you have, you’d better put them down on the deck because if you get knocked they send them to your next-of-kin.’ By this time I was feeling as brave as a ring-tailed possum and wished I was anywhere but on the Galeka. The boats eventually pulled up alongside. We were all done up like sore toes with rifles and shovels and ammunition and packs. How we got down those rope ladders I just don’t know, what with the nervousness and the excitement of not knowing what was in front of us. I just felt washed out. As I got into the boat there were about three chaps of the 9th Battalion who had been killed and they hadn’t had time to lift them out so we had to walk gingerly over these blokes. Then I heard the voice of the little middie pulling these three boats. It was a child’s voice really and I thought, ‘If it’s good enough for him, it’s good enough for me.’ Well, we packed in together. The shrapnel was falling. The machine-guns were pelting and as the pinnace hit the shore we boats at the back were pulled up into anything up to three, four foot of water. Somebody said: ‘Out you get’ and out we got. Lumbering with . . . shovel and rifle and pack and ammunition we were loaded like blessed elephants. There were dead and wounded of the 3rd Brigade all around. We scampered as hard as we could to a little bit of shelter and dumped our packs and dumped our shovels and picks. We’d had enough of those. Then somebody said: ‘Well, up you go’ and away we went up the slope.3 At the time that the men from the 6th Battalion were landing, men of the 8th, who had been aboard the Clan MacGillivray, were lining up on deck, preparing to climb down the swaying rope ladders into a British destroyer that would take them close to the beach. Later, after having boarded the destroyer and arriving close to shore, the men climbed down into the even smaller craft that ferried them to the beach. At this point the fight for the heights above North Beach intensified and Captain Faik and his men, entrenched along Russell’s Top, soon found themselves under attack. A little while later news was received that the enemy was coming up from Korku Dere [Shrapnel Gully] in our rear. I sent two 81
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 82
25 APRIL 1915
bombardiers under Sergeant Lapsekili Muharrem [not to be confused with Second Lieutenant Muharrem]. They threw grenades from one of the trenches, overlooking the valley. At that moment we came under fire from the enemy who was climbing up to the ridge where we were from a slope 100 metres to our left. We began to engage him on this side. In this fighting the Platoon O.C. Gallipoli Sergeant Süleyman was wounded. Some of our private soldiers were also hit. I too received a severe wound in the groin and was reduced to a state where I could no longer command the platoon. I handed over command to Sergeant Lapsekili Muharrem and withdrew.4 The Australians who were making their way around Faik and his men appear to have been troops from the first wave, who had made their way into Shrapnel Gully after storming Plugge’s. The Australians Faik identified as climbing a ridge about 100 metres to his left are likely to have been Peck and his men who had climbed from Reserve Gully into Rest Gully (part of Shrapnel Gully), via the Razor Edge. Peck had by now left Rest Gully in an attempt to find the battalion headquarters which he believed to be further inland, leaving lieutenants Rockliff and Macfarlane with their men in Rest Gully. Captain Everett, with some men of the 11th Battalion who had originally landed along North Beach, also found himself in Rest Gully. It is possible that the movement over the Razor Edge into Rest Gully as well as previous movements from Plugge’s down into Shrapnel Gully were viewed by Faik as an attempt to directly cut off his line of retreat.5 Meanwhile the real threat to Faik’s men was developing from the Australians who were now climbing up to Russell’s Top from the area around The Sphinx and Walker’s Ridge, on their seaward side. Before this attack started, however, Faik had already been wounded and had left Russell’s Top. Lieutenant Colonel Clarke, who had been below The Sphinx, had already started to climb the cliffs above. Lieutenants Margetts and Patterson, who were earlier ordered by Clarke to move south of The Sphinx to find an easier path leading up to Russell’s Top, began to haul themselves on hands and knees up a gully just south of The Sphinx. A number of men from the 11th and 12th battalions were soon following Margetts and Patterson, all scrambling up the numerous gullies and spurs. Soon Corporal Laing (12th Battalion) came across the old colonel, who was struggling up towards the same heights carrying his heavy pack. 82
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 83
‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’
Laing suggested that he ditch the burden, but Clarke refused, so Laing grabbed the pack and, with Clarke, made it onto Russell’s Top. By the time Margetts and Patterson found their way onto the narrow plateau they must have been astonished to see the old colonel waiting for them, no doubt taking a well-earned breather. It was probably around this time that the Turks evacuated Fisherman’s Hut in an attempt to reach Chunuk Bair before the Australians. From a vantage point behind a small mount, Margetts and Patterson were able to make out ahead of them a trench full of Turks,6 the survivors from Faik’s 3rd Platoon. This trench bisected Russell’s Top just north of The Sphinx. By now around 50 Australians had made it onto Russell’s Top from the seaward side. Margetts recalled: ‘up to this time I had not seen the sign of a Turk, but as we moved a little to our left we discovered a trench overlooking the beach and, fixing bayonets, we received the order to go for it . . .’7 They charged, with Margetts, drawing his revolver, leading the attack. In this encounter the Turks’ most senior surviving member, Sergeant Muharrem, was hit. Realising that their only line of retreat was likely to be cut, the Turks managed to bolt back along Russell’s Top towards The Nek and beyond. A well-worn track ran from the trench to the northern heights, which divided with one branch leading to Baby 700 and the other turning to the right down Second Ridge. Most of these Turks made their way back towards Baby 700 and Battleship Hill, running up the track leading north.8 As the Turks retreated Clarke yelled out to his men from behind, ‘Steady, you fellows! Get into some sort of formation and clear the bush as you go.’9 The men stretched out in a skirmish line about three paces apart and started to move slowly along the plateau towards the feature to be known as The Nek. As Clarke and his men approached The Nek they came across another small track which came up from Monash Valley, crossed the plateau and then disappeared down the seaward side of Russell’s Top. The men stopped for a breather and sat on the goat track keeping an eye out for the Turks who now occupied parts of Baby 700 just north of their position. Lieutenant Margetts was in charge of the men on the seaward side of the plateau, while Patterson was in charge of the men to the landward side. Lieutenant Colonel Clarke remained standing and was in the process of writing a note to Sinclair-MacLagan when he was killed by a shot from Turks to his right. These Turks were dug in along Second Ridge about 350 metres away. At almost the same time Clarke’s runner, Private Davies, who was standing next to him, was also killed. Major Elliott of the 12th Battalion (not to be confused with 83
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 84
25 APRIL 1915
Fisherman’s Hut
No. 1 Outpost
Lalor X X X Baby 700
X Faik’s Ptn
Clarke Margetts Peck Plugge’s Plateau
X Isolated X Turks
Second Ridge 0
Mortar Ridge
250 metres
Map 7.1 North Beach, the climb onto Russell’s Top and the withdrawal of the surviving men of Faik’s 3rd Platoon
Lieutenant Colonel ‘Pompey’ Elliott) advanced to take command but was shot in the shoulder and elbow (fracturing his arm), not far from where the old lieutenant colonel and his runner lay. Margetts was called for, but before he could approach Elliott shouted to him. ‘Don’t come here,’ he yelled, ‘it’s too hot!’ 10 As the first Australians began to move along Russell’s Top, Colonel M’Cay, commander of the 2nd Brigade, arrived on the beach at Anzac. On landing M’Cay immediately moved up towards Plugge’s to get a view of the country to the north around Hill 971, his objective. As he did so M’Cay met Sinclair-MacLagan who was coming down from Plugge’s on his way to 400 Plateau. It was now sometime after 6 a.m.11 M’Cay was undoubtedly surprised to learn from Sinclair-MacLagan that Lieutenant Colonel ‘Pompey’ Elliott and the 7th Battalion had been ordered by him to help secure the southern flank. ‘I want you to take your brigade in on my right,’ Sinclair-MacLagan said. M’Cay reminded 84
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 85
‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’
him that his role was to secure the northern heights, stating that, ‘It is a bit stiff to disobey orders first thing’. M’Cay suggested that he go forward and see the position for himself. But Sinclair-MacLagan argued, ‘There isn’t time, I assure you my right will be turned if you do not do this’. Only after this insistence did M’Cay reluctantly agree to forgo his original mission of securing the northern heights and take up his new role of protecting the southern flank. With this, M’Cay returned to the beach in search of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott and his other battalion commanders. Sinclair-MacLagan continued on his way to 400 Plateau, crossing into Shrapnel Gully.12 By 6 a.m. the Australian submarine AE2 had cleared the minefield. Part of Captain Stoker’s mission was to create a sense of panic amongst the Turks by letting it be known that an enemy submarine had penetrated their defences and was now free to cause havoc against Turkish transports. With daylight approaching, Stoker again surfaced to periscope depth, making it possible for Turkish lookouts to see the wake created by his periscope as it moved through the channel—he was intent on making a demonstration for all to see with minimal risk to his vessel. Stoker later wrote: ‘the shock of projectiles striking the water overhead caused subdued thuds in the submarine, whilst sounds as of hailstones were presumably caused by shrapnel bullets falling through the water on the boat’s deck . . . Around the top of the periscope, the water, lashed into white spray, caused a curiously pretty effect, but added little to the ease of taking observations.’13 At this point Stoker noticed a small cruiser, which seemed to be trying to drop mines along his path. At 250 metres Stoker had the Turkish vessel in his sights and fired a bow torpedo at her. At the same time Stoker noticed that a destroyer, later identified as the Aydin Reis, was rapidly approaching to his port side in an attempt to ram him. He took the submarine down to around 20 metres; ‘a last glance as the periscope dipped showed the destroyer apparently right on top of us, and then, amidst the noise of her propeller whizzing overhead, was heard the big explosion as the torpedo struck’. Stoker now had to worry about what he thought to be the sinking cruiser in his direct path. He ordered the rudder hard to starboard. The Turkish cruiser was later identified as the Turgud Reis. This old warship was the former German warship Weissenburg, which had been sold to the Turks by the German government in 1910.14 However, unbeknown to Stoker he had actually missed the cruiser and torpedoed the gunboat Peykisevket.15 85
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 86
25 APRIL 1915
Stoker brought the AE2 back up to periscope depth as he tried to steer the submarine into the centre of the channel; however, at 12 metres the AE2 hit an embankment on the Asian shore with such momentum that she ran up onto the embankment to a height where the bow and conning tower was exposed well above the water line. Looking through his periscope, to his shock Stoker found that the submarine was now directly beneath the 11-inch, 10-inch and 6-inch guns of Turkish Fort No. 24 (Anadolu Mecidiye). Luckily for the AE2 she was so close to the fort that the Turks could not sufficiently depress the elevation of the guns to get a direct hit. ‘As I looked,’ Stoker recounted, ‘one of the guns fired, apparently right into my eye, and seemingly so close that I involuntarily jumped back from the eyepiece of the periscope . . . With the boat apparently fast aground and a continued din of falling shell, the situation looked as unpleasant as it well could be—suspiciously like the end of the story.’ Luckily, the submarine began to slide down the submerged embankment back into the temporary safety of the Dardanelles.16 The strong current, however, also contributed to another potentially fatal near-miss. Stoker tried to get the submarine orientated in a northerly direction (pointing towards the entrance to the Sea of Marmara). ‘I proceeded at 90 feet on port motor, with hard helm aport to turn up straits. When two points [22.5 degrees] off correct course, with head swinging rapidly, I went ahead on starboard motor.’ Unbelievably, the submarine hit another embankment—this time on the European side. Yet again the conning tower of the AE2 lay completely exposed to Turkish fire, directly beneath the guns of Turkish Fort No. 22 (Cham Kalessi). A quick glance around showed a gunboat and some destroyers, little more than a hundred yards off, blazing hard with all their broadsides, a cluster of small boats which we guessed were picking up the survivors of the sunk cruiser, and then, best of all, a clear view up the strait showing that if we could only get off we were heading on the correct course.17 Unlike the previous predicament, this time it was the stern of the submarine that was pushed up onto the embankment. Stoker’s quick thinking saved the day. He ordered maximum revs from the engine, which violently shook the submarine. The shaking was so violent that the submarine slid down the embankment, the exposed stern and propellers sliding beneath the waters. 86
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 87
‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’
[S]he commenced to move down the bank, gave a slight bump, gathered way then bumped heavily. She, however, continued to descend and at 80 feet I dived off the bank. The last bump was calculated to have considerably injured the vessel, and probably impaired her fighting efficiency; but, as I considered my chief duty was to prove the passage through the Straits to be possible, I decided to continue on my course.18 Stoker later wrote of his crew, ‘In these two highly dangerous situations it was only their cool and intelligent performance of their duties which enabled the vessel to be refloated’. At 21 metres Stoker aimed for Nagara Point, the last significant landmark before he would finally enter the Sea of Marmara.19 It was around this time that the German general in command of the Gallipoli Peninsula, von Sanders (who was based further north at Bulair), was informed of the invasion occurring at the southern part of the peninsula. Von Sanders later recalled: From the many pale faces among the officers reporting in the early morning it became apparent that although a hostile landing had been expected with certainty, a landing at so many places surprised many and filled them with apprehension. My first feeling was that our arrangements needed no change. That was a great satisfaction! The hostile landing expedition had selected those points, which we ourselves considered the most likely landing places and had specifically prepared for defence. It seemed improbable to me that extensive landings would take place at all of these places, but we could not discern at that moment where the enemy was actually seeking the decision.20 Soon after hearing of the invasion, von Sanders, mounting his horse, galloped to a position on the heights of Bulair, accompanied by two German orderly officers. After a while, Esat Pa¸s a, Commander of the Third Army Corps, joined him, bringing detailed reports of the landings to the south. Von Sanders later recalled: The reports stated that British landing attempts at the south point of the peninsula had so far been repulsed by the 9th Division, but that the enemy was tenaciously bringing up more and more troops. At 87
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 88
25 APRIL 1915
Kabatepe (Gaba Tepe) things were going well; the enemy had not been able so far to get a footing. But at Ari Burnu the heights along the coast were in the hands of the British, though the 19th Division was on the march to recapture the former. No detailed reports had yet been received from the Asiatic side. I directed [Esat Pa¸sa] to find any ship he could and go to Maidos to take command of the southern part of the peninsula. I myself had to remain for the present at Bulair because it was of the utmost importance that at this point the peninsula be kept open. The troops on the Asiatic side I knew were in the safe hands of Colonel Weber.21 Von Sanders was still convinced that the isthmus of the peninsula at Bulair was the real likely target. His belief had been such that he had stationed around one-third of his entire force for the protection of the peninsula at Bulair. He would remain at Bulair until events of the next day persuaded him that the landings further south might actually be the real thing. Even so, despite the urgent calls for reinforcements it was not until the night of 25 April that he allowed five battalions to move south to help reinforce their comrades who were in the thick of the fighting at Gaba Tepe and Helles. Indeed, even by the night of 26 April, von Sanders allowed only an additional two battalions to go south. It would be another 24 hours before he finally accepted that the isthmus was safe from invasion and only then did he send his remaining troops in the vicinity of Bulair to the battles raging at the southern end of the peninsula.22 Lieutenant Colonel Aker had got to know the terrain around Gaba Tepe and Ari Burnu quite well. Aker’s initial objective was for his regiment to occupy Third Ridge, which dominates this region. The approach to this ridge, however, was dangerous in daylight as any naval observation balloon or enemy aircraft would be able to spot any marching column attempting to cross the plain. Indeed, over the previous week or so it had not been uncommon to see enemy aircraft flying overhead. These spotters could direct the big guns of the Royal Navy against Aker’s strung-out troops. It was for this reason that he ordered his troops to march along two different tracks, avoiding the major road, which would be the focus of any enemy observation. Also, using two tracks would enable the troops to arrive and concentrate more quickly.23 It was not long before Aker could observe the sea some distance away with vast numbers of ships just off Ari Burnu and Gaba Tepe, and from 88
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 89
‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’
one of these ships (the steamer Manica) Aker’s fears were realised: a naval balloon could be seen floating in the sky above. At any moment they might spot us, for we were within range of the strong-lensed binocularly. It would take almost another hour before the last columns of the battalions [would] pass this area. I thought of the difficulties and dangers to which my regiment would be exposed while crossing this territory which was open to, and favourable for, naval . . . gunfire and I felt some anxiety. All this time enemy aircraft were operating and they, too, worried me. But they passed by without doing anything. Before the aircraft came overhead, I made the marching columns take shelter in a ditch at the side of the road. Perhaps it was for this reason that they could not see us. After we had descended to the plain we could not see the navy. Since the land along the coast was high we were not exposed to the navy. But a balloon was looking down on us from above. Although the high ground (Palamutlu Sirt) along the coast hid our marching columns from view of the navy, it did not protect us from fire observed from the balloon. For shells passing over this elevated land could threaten the whole plain and consequently also our marching columns. The firing, which we expected, did not materialise.24 The British seaplanes were those from the Ark Royal. These aircraft were used for the dual role of spotting for naval gunfire and reconnaissance of all roads leading to the Turkish front positions, including Gaba Tepe and the region around Maidos. They were watching for Turkish troop movements and also observed the movement of enemy shipping in the Dardanelles. In addition, they were trying to gain any intelligence information relating to the location of Turkish artillery batteries, although little success was achieved in this regard ‘partly owing to the nature of the country which is much broken and covered with thick low scrub in which the guns are carefully concealed . . .’25 Observers from the Manica’s balloon had spotted Turkish boats ferrying reinforcements across the Narrows, and at around 7.45 a.m. observed a Turkish battleship lying off Maidos. The British battleship Triumph opened fire upon the Turkish ship, but at around 8.30 a.m. the Turkish ship replied with accurate fire, forcing some of the transports to shift further from shore. Undoubtedly observers from Gaba Tepe were directing this fire. The Turkish battleship withdrew later in the morning, on hearing of the presence of the Australian submarine AE2 in the Dardanelles.26 89
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 90
25 APRIL 1915
As Aker was crossing the plain towards Ari Burnu, Major Halis, still located at Gaba Tepe, continued to assess the situation for his divisional headquarters. He reported that ‘the enemy is in sudden attack on the ridges behind Kabe Tepe. We have no reserves. It appears our reserve forces are still scattered about in the front lines from Kojadere [village behind Third Ridge] in all directions towards Koja Chemen Tepe [Hill 971] and Kabe Tepe . . . The enemy are making a serious attempt to take Koja Chemen Tepe. Reinforcements are urgently needed in the last named place . . .’27 It was also at this time that the Turkish forces northeast of the landings, under the command of Mustafa Kemal (19th Division), first heard about the landings, although they had earlier heard firing coming from the southern coastal region. The 57th Regiment had been positioned near the village of Boghali, east of Scrubby Knoll. With this regiment was the divisional commander. The two other regiments of the 19th Division, the 72nd and the 77th, were camped further inland around Mal Tepe.28 Major Zeki Bey, soon to command the 1st Battalion, 57th Regiment, recalled to Charles Bean in 1919 the situation as it unfolded early in the morning: My battalion was on parade when the news of your landing came to us . . . It chanced that there had been ordered for that morning an exercise over the ground, especially towards Koja Chemen Tepe. There had been previous exercises of that sort, and our regiment, the 57th, had mustered early for this one. It was at that moment that the report came. The regiment had been camped at Boghali. The commander of our Division, the 19th, had received about dawn a report from the commander of the 9th Division [which was guarding the coast] that a landing had occurred at Ari Burnu . . . The Turkish staff and commanders concerned did not expect a landing at Ari Burnu, but they had given a great deal of thought to Gaba Tepe, and that was why the two reserve battalions of the 27th Regiment were placed east of Gaba Tepe. Little thought was given to Ari Burnu because it was too precipitous. The message from the commander of the 9th Division said: ‘About one battalion has landed at Ari Burnu, and this battalion has gone in the direction of Koja Chemen Tepe.’ The message then asked the commander of the 19th Division to send one battalion 90
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 91
‘The firing which we expected did not materialise’
against Ari Burnu from Boghali—because the troops at Boghali were closer to the threatened points than were the 9th Division troops . . . The regiment was assembled when the order came. Mustafa Kemal came himself, and ordered the regiment and a battery of artillery—mountain guns—to intercept the ‘English’ who had landed. He reasoned: ‘If this force has gone in the direction of Koja Chemen Tepe, the landing is not a mere demonstration—it is the real thing, the landing of a main force.’ For that reason he took, not one battalion, as the commander of the 9th Division had asked, but the whole regiment. They went at once straight across country towards the south of Koja Chemen Tepe—towards Chunuk Bair—Kemal himself leading . . . . Mustafa Kemal had gone off straight across country for the threatened point without awaiting leave or instructions from anyone. The regiment was headed by its 1st Battalion . . . Mustafa Kemal ordered a company to advance 200 yards ahead of the battalion; and with this company he went himself, a small map in his hand . . . Probably . . . Mustafa Kemal didn’t know where Ari Burnu was; on the little maps which we then had it was not marked by name. ‘Bee Point’ was perhaps the name given to it by the garrison of the 27th Regiment. Decent maps were then being prepared, but they weren’t ready. However, Kemal was impressed by the importance of Koja Chemen Tepe—or Chunuk Bair, which was practically the same position. He directed the march so as to meet the ‘English’ before they could get there.29 The line of march dictated by Kemal led straight towards Chunuk Bair.
91
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 92
8 ‘Yet he was still able to swear gently’ harles Bean was still aboard the Minnewaska when a destroyer pulled up alongside the troopship. He noted in his diary:
C
Some men on her decks are standing round something which they have protected with a little nest of hammocks. It is a wounded man. One seems to be an Australian—another is a sailor, his face turned away from them very white and still. A seaman sits by him, holding his wrist. Now that one sees them there are half a dozen wounded men on the destroyer. Another has drawn alongside our other beam. She has a dozen wounded on her. Some of the small returning boats come alongside the destroyer. They lift a wounded man or two out of them also. Still that rattle, rattle all along the hillside. It doesn’t sound as if our men had got far. The ships are roaring whole broadsides now.1 Indeed, one AIF officer aboard the same ship as Bean later recalled: ‘The destroyer Scourge came alongside. Her funnel was riddled with bullet holes and her decks were slippery with the blood of the wounded she brought to our ship. I watched them slung aboard. Never did I hate a ship or want to leave it more than the Minnewaska.’2 Only one hospital ship was stationed off Anzac during the morning of 25 April, the Gascon. Within hours of the landings she became full of the wounded and dying. No one had apparently foreseen the rush of casualties that were fast accumulating. Because it was not possible to identify the severity of wounds and injuries on the beach, troops with serious injuries as well as minor wounds were together transferred to the Gascon. Two transports had been assigned for the slightly wounded, the Clan MacGillivray and the Seang Choon, which took up the surplus of wounded, but it was not long before they too could take no more. 92
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 93
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
A backlog of wounded started to accumulate on the beach, while others were ferried from transport to transport looking for medical assistance. The fleet surgeon C. MacMillan, medical officer on board the London, later recalled: the casualties in the first few minutes were heavy and the wounded were removed from the beach in the very numerous boats in which they had landed. Having regard to the numbers of ships of all kinds, destroyers, transports and trawlers landing men on all sides and disembarking stores this was fairly well done, but as only one military hospital ship—the Gascon—was on the scene and very rapidly filled, a number of transports were employed for wounded which had not been previously thought of.3 Private Gissing, a medic on board the transport Seang Bee, later wrote: ‘the mess tables were ripped up from below, blankets spread down and the men were laid here as closely as possible. Before long every available space was covered.’ Lieutenant Colonel Ryan, an experienced Australian surgeon, later wrote about his experience: ‘[I] arrived at Anzac at 6 a.m. on 25 April. Almost at once a boatload of wounded were put on board the Minnesota. We had not made any arrangements whatever, as we did not expect to take on any wounded as the Clan MacGillivray was taking on wounded. I think there were fifteen to twenty cases came on board but no arrangements were made for their reception.’4 Ashore, things were no better. Wounded men from North Beach as well as from First and Second ridges were now starting to make their way to the field dressing stations located along the beaches. A New Zealand soldier recalled later during the day ‘wounded soldiers were coming in, some limping, some carried on stretchers. There was no grumbling nor complaining. A man came along with a bloodbespattered face, bound up in a bloody bandage. Yet he was still able to swear gently while he smoked a cigarette and his disengaged hand clung to his tobacco.’5 At the entrance to Monash Valley, Dr Nott, who had landed as part of the first contingent, had already rolled up his sleeves and got stuck into it, setting up a field dressing station to help treat the growing number of casualties: There was little firing, and no wounded men were coming back; but we eventually came to the top of a gully and found some 93
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 94
25 APRIL 1915
wounded men who said we were holding the ridge in front [Second Ridge] and waiting for reinforcements; the units were all mixed up and I couldn’t ascertain what [battalion] was in front of us; but I thought it a good place to establish a RAP [Regimental Aid Post]; I had no medical equipment but did the best I could with the first field dressings, sending the wounded down to the beach in batches to help one another along. I sent 2 of my bearers forward to direct the casualties back to me and to bring any back best way they could—all the stretchers had been left on the beach or in the boats. After some hours of comparative quietness, the firing began to liven up, both rifle and artillery fire. Wounded began to come back over the ridge fairly fast, including a good few 10th Btn men . . . I spent all day at the head of this gully, dressing wounded that struggled back, and sending them down to the beach in batches, sometimes in the charge of one of my bearers.6 The large numbers of casualties and the small beachfront contributed to delays in getting the troops from the transports ashore. As the empty boats returned to the transports for more troops, they also usually brought back with them wounded, who had to be cleared before the tows could be made ready to ferry more men ashore. The small area of the beach sheltered from Turkish fire soon became congested with the wounded, and the necessary duty of evacuating them was added to the already stretched resources of the navy as they also needed to land men, guns, stores, ammunition and water.7 The situation for the Turkish wounded was no better and probably even worse. An unknown Turkish doctor later recalled, ‘the decks of ships that still contained horse and cattle manure began to fill up with rows of soldiers lying on thin woollen blankets and sheepskins. The wounded seemed indifferent and to have accepted their fate. The glossy covers of the mattresses were stained with blood and faeces.’8 At 400 Plateau to the south, Lieutenant Thomas, who had earlier separated from Milne and Dougall, arrived at the edge of Owen’s Gully and looking down into the ravine noticed to his right a line of freshly turned earth, which he thought indicated machine-gun posts. He headed cautiously into the gully towards the Turkish encampment, previously visited by Loutit and his men. Corporal Harrison, who had earlier captured the trench at Bolton’s Ridge with his men, was now also heading for Owen’s Gully, in search of 94
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 95
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
Lieutenant Thomas. Turkish machine-gun fire from The Cup forced him and his section to ground. Harrison and his men continued to crawl through the scrub to the edge of Owen’s Gully. Looking down, Harrison saw Lieutenant Thomas, who was heading for the Turkish camp below. Harrison and his men went down the gully after them. Thomas soon looked back over his shoulder and spotted Harrison; he tried to warn him that he was heading straight towards what he believed to be machine-gun posts. Harrison, however, could only read parts of the warning being transmitted by Thomas’s signaller using a semaphore. The only word that could be read was ‘gun’. Harrison looked up and noticed that he was below newly constructed earthworks.9 He and his men crawled up towards the edge of the works and found themselves almost directly under the muzzles of two howitzers from the Turkish Mountain Battery located in The Cup. Meanwhile, Captain Sedik, having realised his predicament, had already ordered the guns to be withdrawn back to Third Ridge.10 Harrison and his troops, however, had not been seen. Harrison gave orders for each man to target a Turk; seconds later, ‘Fire!’—most of the Turks fell in the first fusillade. Captain Sedik was killed as he tried to fire his revolver, while some Turks trying to evacuate with machine guns strapped to mules were also shot; ‘one driver fell beside his dead mules with the reins still in his hands’.11 Harrison and his men stormed over earthworks into the position and it didn’t take long to clean out the few Turkish survivors with the bayonet. Within minutes Lieutenant Thomas and his men joined Harrison in The Cup. The men had acquitted themselves well in their first taste of real action. They quickly examined the position for any useful intelligence and came across what appeared to be a quartermaster’s store. Within they found books, papers, bags with spare parts of machine guns, and quantities of tobacco and cigarettes. All around was the battery’s ammunition. For the time being all the enemy’s resistance on this part of the field ceased. The Australians tried to disable the guns either by knocking off the gun sights or by burring the screw inside the breech. Some men tried to wheel one of the guns around to face Third Ridge to be used against the expected Turkish counterattack, however the gun was useless as the Turks had managed to remove its breech block. Thomas now ordered his reunited platoon to move forward towards the edge of the plateau overlooking the valley that separated them from Third Ridge. Orders were given to light up pipes and rest for ten minutes. It was now around 6.30 a.m.12 95
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 96
25 APRIL 1915
11th & 12th Bns
Incebayir Ridge
11th & 12th Bns Anzac Cove
Monash Valley Second Ridge
Mortar Ridge
10th Bn
Shrapnel Gully
Thomas Brand 9th Bn
Daisy Patch
X Sedik’s Battery Legge Valley
Harrison Milne’s men Plant
Adana Bair
Loutit & Haig Pine Ridge
0
500 metres
Map 8.1 400 Plateau, the attack against Sedik’s Battery, and Loutit and Plant’s advances towards Third Ridge
Brand, now accompanied by Lieutenant Boase and his platoon of the 9th Battalion, had crossed the plateau immediately south of Owen’s Gully. They passed along the southern edge of the gully and, halfway between the head of the gully and The Cup, came across a 100-metre square patch of ground as level as a tennis court, consisting of green grass and poppies. It was distinctive from the surrounding coarse vegetation, which covered the rest of the plateau. This area would thereafter be called the ‘Daisy Patch’.13 They continued along the southern edge of Owen’s Gully towards The Cup (which they did not notice) and found Thomas and his men close to the landward edge of the plateau. Unknown to Thomas and his men, one of the Turkish guns had been saved along with the battery’s spare parts (and presumably breech blocks). Indeed, as Thomas and his men took their breather, they could see in the valley below ‘a string of Turks. They were fugitives from this or other batteries. At this juncture Major Brand came up . . . and forbad 96
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 97
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
the men to fire at the string of fugitives on the Third Ridge. The range was too long for useful effect.’14 These Turkish ‘fugitives’ were the last of the mountain artillery crew from Sadik’s battery. This gun was to eventually make it to Scrubby Knoll.15 By now most of the 10th Battalion had started to climb the steep slopes of 400 Plateau. The men from the battleships had previously descended into Shrapnel Gully, after having helped capture Plugge’s Plateau. While these men were reorganising in the gully they met up with many of their 10th Battalion comrades from the destroyers who had crossed the lower part of First Ridge. With their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Weir, they approached 400 Plateau along the track later known as Bridges Road, which led to the top of the plateau just south of Wire Gully. They were soon standing on top of the plateau and Lieutenant Colonel Weir started to organise the battalion for the expected advance across Legge Valley towards Third Ridge.16 However, he gave orders for the battalion to dig in as a precaution, with Major Oldham’s company on the right; north of that Major Beevor’s; then Captain Jacobs; and on the extreme left was Captain Herbert’s whose left flank faced Wire Gully. Most expected this to be only a momentary delay as all expected to push on towards their objective of Third Ridge. Lieutenant Plant and the small group of men from the 9th Battalion who had earlier passed the wounded Milne in the trench along Bolton’s Ridge had already crossed the southern spurs and gullies of 400 Plateau. Their objective was Anderson Knoll. In reaching Legge Valley they would have crossed the major spurs and gullies that run off 400 Plateau in a southerly direction, each dropping into Legge Valley. It must have been an exhausting slog. As described by Bean: Although only the Second Ridge runs into the 400 Plateau from the north, there branch from its southern end five spurs which run southward much as five roots might hang from some deformed bulb. The spur nearest to the coast, Bolton’s Ridge, is the real continuation of the Second Ridge, and lifts its shoulder as high as the plateau itself. But the other four ridges are much lower than Lone Pine, from whose southern side they spring. Three of them (Silt Spur, Sniper’s Ridge, and Weir Ridge) extend only a few hundred yards, with deepening gullies between them opening upon minor flats towards Gaba Tepe. The fifth and furthest inland is much longer [Pine Ridge]. It was covered to about twice the height of a man with thick scrub of 97
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 98
25 APRIL 1915
stunted pine, of which the solitary tree on the plateau itself was no doubt an outlier.17 Plant and his men must have traversed these slopes and gullies in order to reach Legge Valley beyond. While afterwards Plant was not sure of his position, the time, or the point that they eventually reached, he later stated that they came ‘out upon a height which looked down on a low green country reaching apparently to the Narrows and to the Kilid Bahr Plateau’.18 It is likely that Plant and his men were the Australian party that were identified from 400 Plateau at a very early hour reaching south of Anderson Knoll. Plant and his men must have turned back to look at the country just crossed—there was no sign of anyone. They waited and still there was no sign of any reinforcements. What could be seen in the distance, however, were two columns of Turks heading in their direction from the southeast. They belonged to advanced parties of Lieutenant Colonel Aker’s 27th Regiment. Plant had no alternative but to head off back to the Australian lines (wherever they were) and report the information to his commander (wherever he was). As the 10th Battalion began to occupy 400 Plateau in strength, Lieutenant Colonel ‘Pompey’ Elliott (7th Battalion), who was still organising the men of his battalion in Shrapnel Gully, received an order from M’Cay that he was to place his battalion in the firing line on 400 Plateau, and that the 8th Battalion, supported by the 5th Battalion, would hold the right flank (in reality most of the 5th Battalion would fight on their left flank around Johnston’s Jolly), while the 6th Battalion would support his 7th Battalion on 400 Plateau. With this Elliott ordered those present to dump their packs and move up the ‘Razorback’ to 400 Plateau. The men climbed up the seaward side of the plateau, negotiating the thorny scrub. Upon reaching the plateau these men would have seen the Lonesome Pine as well as scattered elements of the 3rd Brigade forming up for what they expected to be the advance to Third Ridge. While his men started to climb the seaward slopes of 400 Plateau, Elliott remained in Shrapnel Gully vainly searching for Jackson, Layh and his lost B Company that, unknown to him, had earlier been decimated along North Beach.19 By now Major Brand, having moved to the Lonesome Pine, was having second thoughts about trying to push on to Third Ridge. He was concerned that this might only result in a further fragmentation of the brigade. While he had earlier promised Loutit that he would send on reinforcements, now as he gazed upon Third Ridge with its many spurs and 98
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 99
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
the broad valley separating Second and Third ridges, his concern only increased. This terrain could easily swallow up the 3rd Brigade. He sent a scout to find Sinclair-MacLagan with a message that the advanced parties heading for Third Ridge were about a company strong and asked whether he should keep them out there or bring them back towards 400 Plateau.20 Major Ismet, who was still with the battalion’s reserve company just east of Gaba Tepe, had earlier sent a patrol towards Ari Burnu, via the track running along Third Ridge, to try to find out what was happening to Faik’s company. While moving north along Third Ridge this platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Mustafa, soon came across the wounded Captain Faik who was making his way to a field dressing station at Kocadere, located in the next inland valley. It was probably around 7 a.m. and Faik and Mustafa could now hear ‘“Halt, Mehmed!” being shouted at us from Kanli Sirt [Lonesome Pine]. We realised this was the British and they had occupied the Kanli Sirt.’21 Faik informed Mustafa of the precarious position facing his men, before moving off to Kocadere village. Mustafa and his platoon moved further along the ridge, passing Scrubby Knoll. Below to their left they could see small groups of the enemy moving across Legge Valley.22 It was probably at about this time that Aker and his two battalions of the 27th Regiment began to reach the southern parts of Third Ridge. It was here that both battalions again came together as one marching column. Aker later recalled: The heads of the columns reached the ridges to the north of the plain. I made the 1st Battalion press on in the direction of Kavak Tepe [Anderson Knoll]. The head of the 3rd Battalion’s column broke away to the left and—in accordance with orders—began to join up with the 1st Battalion at the northern edge of the plain. We now began to forget the naval danger. We considered it our good fortune and an act of providence that although we had been within sight of the navy, the balloon and the aircraft for almost one hour, they had not fired on us. It is a curious fact that only when our marching column which was stretched out at such length reached Kavak Dere [valley east of Anderson Knoll] did the navy begin to fire behind us, traversing and sweeping over the plain which we had passed. But whilst we did not know what target they were aiming at, it was quite certain that the navy did not know themselves, for they could not see any target on the plain behind us.23 99
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 100
25 APRIL 1915
As the Turkish 1st Battalion’s advanced guard reached the mouth of Kavak Dere, Lieutenant Colonel Aker saw that the troops had stopped. He rode on ahead at the gallop and came up to the advanced guard point. ‘Why have you stopped?’ he asked them. An officer informed Aker, ‘There is a wounded man. He says the enemy is near and we stopped to get information from him.’ This wounded man was from Faik’s company. Aker replied, ‘So much the better! We want to meet the enemy as soon as possible. Keep your eyes open in all directions. On that ridge you will be invisible to the enemy but you will be able to see him so proceed straight to that ridge (Kavak Tepe [Anderson Knoll]).’24 With this, the advanced guard made their way to Anderson Knoll (already vacated by Plant and his men). The rest of Aker’s force were now also heading in the same direction. At intervals Aker posted small security pickets in groups of three to act as a screening force to protect his southern flank from any surprise attacks as he moved northwards. Aker soon joined up with the commander of his 1st Battalion and together they arrived at Anderson Knoll, using their binoculars to screen the terrain before them. Further north they could see enemy troops moving across Kanli Sirt (Lonesome Pine) and Kirmezi Sirt (Johnston’s Jolly), and others moving across Karayürük Dere (Legge Valley) towards Third Ridge.25 Soon Aker and the bulk of his force continued their northward march along Third Ridge towards Scrubby Knoll. Lieutenant Loutit and his men, who had been the first to reach 400 Plateau, had by now passed through Owen’s Gully, and were crossing Legge Valley towards Third Ridge. While crossing the valley floor they had met Lieutenant Haig (10th Battalion) along with a small number of men from the 9th, 10th and 11th battalions.26 It is likely that those Australians Aker observed moving across Legge Valley were Loutit and members of his party, or Plant and his men, or both. The valley floor was narrow, grassy and flat and had only recently been cultivated. There were only a few olive trees to offer shade. Running down the length of the valley was a sandy shallow creek and running across the valley, in a rough east–west direction originating from Owen’s Gully, were poles with field telephone wires attached. Crossing into the valley must have been a welcome relief from the thick thorny scrub that they had so far been forced to endure. Loutit, Haig and their party of 30 or so men approached a thickly vegetated spur, known to the Turks as Adana Bair, which would lead them up to the heights of Third Ridge. 100
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 101
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
While the odd spent bullet flew overhead all was relatively quiet with no sign of any Turks. They started to climb the spur, rising to a height of around 70 metres.27 Loutit, Haig and their men were not the only Australians who had pushed on towards Scrubby Knoll; as recalled by Private Blackburn shortly after having been separated from the 10th Battalion scouts: Up till now I had seen no one that I knew, as all the battalions of our Brigade were completely mixed up. Just as I started down into the valley, however, I met Phil Robin and Micky Smith and together we pushed on after the enemy. Travelling across this valley [Shrapnel Gully] was a decidedly lively time as the scrub was full of snipers and every little while a bullet would come closer than was pleasant. However, we got to the top of the ridge [Second Ridge, close to Wire Gully] in safety and there found several other chaps but noone in charge. Just at that moment however, Captain Herbert came up and so Phil Robin reported to him. He decided to entrench there and sent Phil and me out to watch a valley on his front [Legge Valley] and flank while he did so, and this, by the way, was about the only bit of scouting I got to do on the first day. We stayed out there until driven in by the enemy who were coming to the attack in force . . .28 Indeed, while out in Legge Valley, Robin and Blackburn (who would be awarded the Victoria Cross one year later at Pozières), reached the heights of Scrubby Knoll. From here they were able to see the glittering waters of the Narrows. Blackburn later recalled: [We] moved inland very fast (‘a chase’ Robin’s diary calls it), and crossed Third (Gun) Ridge at a plateau north of Scrubby Knoll. Finding few signs of the Turks yet there, [we] moved southwards along the first slope of Third Ridge, and had passed the knoll when numbers of Turks began to appear in a valley east of the ridge. [We] therefore moved back over Third Ridge, first to a point just southwest of the knoll, whence [we] noted a line of men—presumably Loutit’s and Ryder’s.29 Loutit and his men had no idea as they were climbing towards Scrubby Knoll that a whole regiment of Turks were approaching the same point just south of their position from the backbone of the very same ridgeline. 101
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 102
25 APRIL 1915
Blackburn and his mate now returned to Second Ridge and reported to Captain Herbert that the Turks were approaching in force. Captain Giles asked them to ‘get a message through for reinforcements and Phil sent me back to bring some up. On returning some hour or so later with them I got into the trench about fifty yards away from Phil, and I never saw him again as he was shot [killed] a couple of days later.’30 Further north at Russell’s Top, the Turkish fire from Second Ridge which had killed Lieutenant Colonel Clarke at The Nek had ceased. With the death of Clarke and the wounding of Elliott, Margetts was now in charge and he sent two scouts, Tilley and Vaughan, forward towards the higher slopes of Baby 700 to determine whether the Turks were still there and, if so, their strength. Upon reaching Baby 700 they signalled back that the way was clear for an advance. It was around this time that Captain Tulloch (11th Battalion) and some of his men managed to reach Russell’s Top. Tulloch had climbed onto Russell’s Top from Walker’s Ridge and was now collecting and reorganising the men who had followed. It had been a dangerous climb as Walker’s Ridge was open to enfilading fire from the Turks further along North Beach as well as on the ridge. The men had to move in single file dodging bullets. Eventually near the top of the spur they reached a small hillock, beyond which the spur dipped for about 7 metres before rising again to Russell’s Top. At this point each man had to individually make a dash across this spur, completely exposed to fire, before making it to the top of the plateau.31 It was a case of head down, arse up, and run (climb) for it! Upon reaching the top Tulloch could see, about 100 metres in front, a narrow track crossing the plateau, and next to it was someone bending over two bodies (Clarke and Davies). About this time Kenneth Fry from B section of the 3rd Field Ambulance arrived at Russell’s Top. ‘Just getting along the beach, when called to Colonel Clarke and Major Elliott. Sgt Saunders along the beach. Went up with stretcher party. Steep sharp ridges and bluff cliffs. Colonel Clarke dead. Man shot in abdomen, gave morphia. Dressed a Turk, a man with an ankle [injury]. Attended Major Elliott and got him back to the beach.’2 At this point Tulloch moved the men back along Russell’s Top into a small depression to reorganise. Lieutenant Burt (12th Battalion) and some of his men soon joined him. Both Burt and Tulloch organised the men, with NCOs commanding sections. Soon Burt and his men moved towards Margetts at The Nek. At about the same time Captain Lalor of the 12th Battalion also arrived after having climbed onto Russell’s Top 102
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 103
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
from the vicinity of The Sphinx. Three-quarters of Elliott’s company (12th Battalion) were also present. In addition, Lalor had collected about half of his company, while Tulloch had managed to pull together a platoon. Because the role of the 12th Battalion was to be a reserve force, Lalor helped Margetts’s and Elliott’s men dig in and hold this strategically critical position. He began organising a semi-circular trench just short of The Nek, with each flank opening to the valleys below. To their right they soon noticed, across Monash Valley on the seaward side of Second Ridge, other Australians climbing the slopes and digging in along the opposite crest previously occupied by the Turks who had killed Clarke and Davies. These were Barnes, Denton and their men who had been ordered by Drake-Brockman to occupy and hold Second Ridge.33 At about this time, a party of men under command of Lieutenant Reid (11th Battalion) arrived at The Nek, from Monash Valley. Lalor ordered Reid and his men to push on and take care of some Turks who could be seen climbing down towards Fisherman’s Hut. As later recalled by Sergeant Mason, ‘Lalor started to scratch in at the right side of The Nek while he ordered Reid and the rest of us to follow the Turks down the valley from The Nek [Malone’s Gully?]. It was steep but we went straight down it to the “Shepherd’s Hut”.’34 Earlier Denton and Barnes had moved along Monash Valley in search of a way to reach the top of Second Ridge. They reached a fork close to the head of the valley and took the branch to the right, which was relatively short in length, though narrow and steep. This gully ended abruptly on the landward side of Baby 700 (later known as the Chessboard). The head of this gully was to be known as the Bloody Angle. Between the left and right branches lay a long razor-backed hill (to become known as Pope’s Hill) which originated between The Nek and Baby 700. Thirtyfive-year-old former chief-clerk Captain Barnes (who would be killed in action two days later) and his men began to climb the first gully leading to the top of Second Ridge, emerging close to what would become known as Steele’s Post, while Denton and his men moved further along the valley to the next gully leading up to the area to be known as Courtney’s Post. The first Australians to reach the top of Second Ridge found themselves under intermittent Turkish fire coming from the northern heights of the Chessboard. This fire made any attempt at entrenchment along Second Ridge impossible as any activity immediately brought a hail of bullets.35 103
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 104
25 APRIL 1915
Captain Hearder and men of the 11th Battalion soon arrived to help secure Second Ridge with additional men from the battalion’s machinegun company. We dashed over the ridge, carrying our guns, tripods, belt boxes of ammunition when to my dismay there was no sign of the company I had come to reinforce. We got under cover of some scrub and set up our guns and opened fire, immediately a terrific fire opened on us, but we were lying pretty close to the ground and they could not actually see us, I think. During the next half hour our boys appeared some distance on our right and then more and more kept coming and engaging the enemy, but always on our right. Eventually a small body came up about 100 yards on our left rear and relieved my anxiety a little about that flank, but I did not know what Battalion they were, nor their number.36 Drake-Brockman, who was still on Plugge’s, had by now realised that most of the men accumulating below in Rest Gully were the surviving men of the 11th Battalion who had earlier landed on North Beach. Drake-Brockman now had the mission of capturing Baby 700; he needed to view this objective from Russell’s Top but, before moving off in that direction, he and his men went down into the valley to join up with their comrades. They moved down the zigzag path, passing the three Turkish tents at the bottom. In the sand of the gully was a short red signpost with black lettering pointing towards the tents and nearby was a pick handle stuck into the sand. The post was almost certainly ‘a direction stating that the path led to a company post of the 27th Regiment on Ari Burnu. But the suspicion that the enemy would leave his tracks and trenches mined led men to avoid the spot. The red signpost was taken as an indication of a mine, and a sentry was put near the pick handle to warn men against touching it.’37 Back on Russell’s Top, Captain Tulloch had managed to collect most of his company as they arrived in dribs and drabs on the plateau and The Nek. Some of these men approached from the seaward side, while others, including Lieutenant Jackson, approached from Monash Valley. With most of his company now present, Tulloch started to reorganise the men into platoons and sections in preparation for their advance towards Baby 700. Tulloch moved north with around 60 men in an extended line along the landward side of this hill, while he ordered Lieutenant Jackson with 104
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 105
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
twenty men to move across to the seaward slopes to protect his left flank from Turkish infiltration. Tulloch knew that the 11th Battalion was to rendezvous on Battleship Hill and he was hoping that other men of his battalion who had landed on North Beach might be located within the unseen gullies and spurs of that hill which lay about 1 kilometre ahead.38 At around this time Drake-Brockman had left his men reorganising in Rest Gully and pushed on up the slope towards Russell’s Top. It was only upon reaching the heights above that he realised Russell’s Top was not a ‘broad’ continuous ridge leading to the northern heights, but was only connected to the heights and ridges beyond by a very narrow strip of land, The Nek. Drake-Brockman now came across Major Robertson of the 9th Battalion who was conferring with Captain Lalor. After a brief discussion Robertson agreed to push the men forward as they arrived, while Drake-Brockman would climb back down into Monash Valley, join up with his men and bring them forward to reinforce the advance to the northern heights.39 After climbing down into Monash Valley and reaching Rest Gully, Drake-Brockman ordered his company’s second-in-command, Captain Everett, to collect a composite company from the men to support Barnes and Denton, who had already started to secure Second Ridge. Everett and his men moved up the valley and would climb the same gully taken by Denton earlier and take up positions around Courtney’s Post. DrakeBrockman now divided his remaining company into two parties. The first, under lieutenants Rockliff and Macfarlane, was to approach Baby 700 from Second Ridge; that is, to climb in the vicinity of the areas occupied by Barnes and Denton and from there move just below the ridgeline to Baby 700. The second, under the command of Lieutenant Morgan, was to move up to the head of Monash Valley and climb up to Baby 700. Drake-Brockman signalled to Plugge’s a request for another platoon and while Captain Leane (11th Battalion) had been ordered to stay on Plugge’s as a reserve force, he sent Drake-Brockman a platoon under the command of Lieutenant Cooke. With the arrival of this platoon, Drake-Brockman and Morgan moved off along the valley floor to start the climb towards Baby 700.40 Meanwhile, the submarine AE2 had attempted to head for Nagara Point while running blind at a depth of around 30 metres. After a time Stoker brought the submarine up to periscope depth to check his position and found that he was in the middle of the Dardanelles, in an excellent 105
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 106
25 APRIL 1915
position for passing through the point. The wake of his periscope, however, was immediately spotted and enemy fire recommenced, with the destroyers heading in his direction with the aim of ramming the AE2. Stoker took the submarine back down to around 30 metres, remaining there for about 30 minutes. Thinking that he had managed to elude the enemy vessels, Stoker then again brought the submarine up to periscope depth, and saw that the pursuing destroyers and other enemy craft were close by. Moreover, just in front were two tugs, with a wire stretching between them, heading directly for the AE2. I immediately dived to 90 feet. Considering the situation, it seemed possible that our position was marked through catching in a drift-net, or by some other means, and I decided to run in on the Asiatic shore and await developments, as battery power then remaining was not sufficient to get far out into the Sea of Marmora, and thereby gain a fair chance of shaking off pursuit. I therefore altered course 8 points to starboard, and ran aground about 8.30 a.m., lying at a depth of 80 feet.41 Stoker planned to sit it out on the bottom until nightfall and then push on into the Sea of Marmara, from where he could surface in relative safety and recharge his batteries in the dark and calm sea. It was at this point that the stress and strain probably surfaced as each man sat and recounted the last few hours in the quiet and in the foul air of the small metal vessel, sitting 25 metres under the Dardanelles. It seemed obvious to Stoker at least that any sweeping operations in search of the AE2 must focus on the very place where they now lay submerged as it was one of the few bays in which a submarine could hide within the area. Indeed, Stoker later recalled this episode of non-activity as ‘the most anxious period of the day’.42 As the Australians were attempting to dig in along Second Ridge, Charles Bean, aboard the Minnewaska, observed through his telescope a number of men on the Gallipoli skyline: some standing full length. Others moving over it. Certain ones are standing up, moving along amongst them. Others are sitting down apparently talking. Are they Turks or Australians(?) The Turks wear khaki, but the attitudes are extraordinarily like those of Australians. Just below them, on our side of them a long line of men is digging 106
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 107
‘ Yet he was still able to swear gently’
quietly on a nearer hill. They have round caps, I think clearly you can distinguish that round disc-like top. They are Australians! and they have taken that further line of hills!—three ridges away you can see them; the outlines of men on the furthest hill; men digging on the second hills.43 Around this time the transports ferrying the men of the New Zealand and Australian Division arrived off Anzac Cove. As later recalled by Major Waite of the New Zealand Engineers: Like children kept inside on a wet day, we were very impatient. A desire to be doing something possessed all ranks. The men broke up cases and split the wood for kindling fires ashore. Every man pushed seven or eight pieces through the straps on the back of his pack. Many seized the opportunity to write the letter that most thoughtful soldiers write at the beginning of a campaign—a letter to be carried in the breast pocket and only to be forwarded by the comrade that buries him—tender farewells, simply and beautifully written, as men always do write when they are face to face with things that really matter.44 Major General Bridges, commander of the 1st Australian Division, had landed at Anzac Cove with his divisional staff at 7.20 a.m. amongst bursting shrapnel. He found it difficult to gain any information; all around him there appeared to be confusion with men coming down from the heights above asking for orders or looking for their officers, while others moved up to the ‘firing line’. To make things worse, his brigade commanders were nowhere to be seen—Sinclair-MacLagan and M’Cay had already moved off to 400 Plateau. Major Mackworth, the signalling officer of the 1st Division, approached Bridges, informing him that he had already set up the signals office and that soon he would have established telephone lines between the 2nd and 3rd brigades. Believing that any serious Turkish threat would come from his southern flank, he and Lieutenant Colonel White (Birdwood’s representative ashore) moved off in that direction. As they went they gathered information from officers and men and quickly realised that the plan had been changed (due to landing on the wrong beach) with the 2nd Brigade now assigned to protecting the invasion’s southern flank.45 Bridges and White both crossed into Shrapnel Gully from the beach on their way to 400 Plateau. Wounded from the ridges above were already coming down the gully towards the beaches. 107
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 108
25 APRIL 1915
Some odd portions of the 2nd Brigade were in the valley, and a heavy fire of rifles and machine-guns was still playing from Baby 700 upon the flat near its mouth. The first sight which met Bridges’ eyes was a number of these troops, under fire without any protection, sheltering in some disorder behind a high bank in the creek which ran down the gully. This disorganisation was of small importance; possibly it was due to absence of officers or lack of control on the part of some junior. But Bridges had no sympathy for weakness. He made with his long strides straight to the place, and spoke fiercely to the men. For God’s sake let them remember that they were Australians. They looked up rather shamefacedly at the tall cold man standing amongst the bullets, and then came out and re-formed in the open. He left them, and went southwards across the valley and up M’Cay’s Hill.46 Mad dogs and Englishmen out in the midday sun; the 53-year-old Bridges, however, was half Australian, half Scot. By 8 a.m. there appeared to be a lull in the fighting not only at 400 Plateau but also further north; few shots could be heard. As later described by Bean,. ‘The sun had risen on a glorious spring morning, and only scattered, distant shots now broke the silence on most of the battlefield. Men felt that the greatest difficulties were past.’47 It was at about this time that Tulloch’s men were approaching the northern heights of Baby 700 and further out from 400 Plateau Loutit and Haig and their men were approaching the distant heights of Third Ridge and Scrubby Knoll, as were Aker’s men of the Turkish 27th Regiment. The Australians had been ordered to keep going and not to stop until they reached their objectives.
108
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 109
PART II The Battle for the Ridges
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 110
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 111
9 ‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’ y now the sun was bright and climbing well above the horizon. The warmth of its rays had already dried the uniforms of the invaders who had earlier waded ashore from the boats. At this point it was no longer seawater that was drenching their uniforms, but the sweat and perspiration from a hard climb through thick, thorny scrub. Many would later recall, however, the fresh air of spring and the scent of wild thyme that covered the slopes. Bean recalled in his diary, while still aboard the Minnewaska, ‘the morning was glorious—the sea as smooth as satin shining in the sun; the great ships their reflections, with Imbros, Samothrace, being in the skyline make a peaceful and beautiful scene’.1 The men of the 2nd Brigade who had earlier landed to the south began to form up either at the rendezvous site or below 400 Plateau. As each company made its way onto the plateau it was ordered by any number of officers to push forward and start entrenching with the men of the 3rd Brigade in the middle of the plateau. In this way the 2nd Brigade was pushed into the gaps along the line. There was no coordinated movement; rather, sections and companies were pushed ahead as they arrived.2 By now the commander of the 2nd Brigade, Colonel M’Cay, had passed across Shrapnel Gully with Major Cass and staff and they made their way to the seaward slopes of 400 Plateau. Here, near the top of the hill that was to bear his name, M’Cay began to form his brigade headquarters within a leafy gutter leading onto the plateau. He left Cass to establish the headquarters and climbed onto the summit of the plateau to make contact with his brigade. He soon came across Lieutenant Colonel McNicoll, commander of the 6th Battalion, and ordered that one of his companies move to the extreme right of the line towards Gaba Tepe in order to cover the right flank near the sea. With this, Captain Hooke’s company was ordered to cover the southern flank from a
B
111
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 112
25 APRIL 1915
Turkish attack from Gaba Tepe, while a platoon under Lieutenant Prisk was also ordered to cover the same flank from the beach and seaward side of Bolton’s Ridge. On his return to his headquarters, however, M’Cay had second thoughts about pushing too far down towards Gaba Tepe. He ordered Major Cass to collect what men he could at the foot of the gullies below M’Cay’s Hill and bring them up to Bolton’s Ridge on their right, as it was a key feature that needed to be occupied. M’Cay also rescinded the previous orders for Hooke and Prisk and ordered that they too climb Bolton’s Ridge, with the aim of extending the firing line. While Hooke received the revised order and proceeded to move up to Bolton’s Ridge, Prisk had by now moved too far south and failed to receive the order—he was heading for Gaba Tepe.3 At about the same time that M’Cay was establishing his headquarters, Sinclair-MacLagan arrived on 400 Plateau. Within half an hour of arriving on the plateau Sinclair-MacLagan had given up all hope of advancing to Third Ridge. He was now increasingly concerned that an advance to Third Ridge would expose his southern flank to a Turkish attack from the direction of Gaba Tepe, the very region he had been warned to expect the Turks to attack from. The move to Third Ridge would have to wait until the whole division was present, which would be some hours yet. Major Brand was still on the landward edge of the plateau with advance parties close to the Lonesome Pine, when he noticed two companies of the 9th Battalion under the command of Major Salisbury moving across 400 Plateau behind him. Salisbury, who had earlier taken command of the 9th Battalion upon reaching Plugge’s Plateau, had charged down into Shrapnel Gully after a string of Turks. Only scattered fire had reached Salisbury and his men as they approached 400 Plateau from the Razorback. Salisbury and his men were now heading across the plateau a little north of Owen’s Gully. At this point an officer sent by Sinclair-MacLagan reached Salisbury, ordering him to dig in south of the 10th Battalion. Given that he was positioned forward of the 10th, Salisbury ordered the bulk of his men to fall back towards the 10th Battalion so that a defensive line could be established along a rough north–south axis. Before withdrawing, however, Salisbury ordered a platoon under Lieutenant Fortescue to remain at the northern head of Owen’s Gully to act as a screening force.4 Hilmer-Smith and his company of the 12th Battalion, whom DrakeBrockman thought were going to take up a position on Pope’s Hill opposite Plugge’s Plateau, had somehow found themselves in Bridges 112
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 113
‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’
Valley just below 400 Plateau. They were brought forward onto the plateau and were used to help bridge the gap between companies of the 10th Battalion along Johnston’s Jolly.5 Major Brand, who had earlier come to the same conclusion as Sinclair-MacLagan about the folly of pushing on to Third Ridge, decided that the best thing to do was to position the 200 or so men with him along the landward edge of the plateau near the Lonesome Pine to act as a covering force to protect those now digging in behind them. He ordered Thomas, Boase and their platoons to move out to the very edge of the plateau so that they could get a better view of Third Ridge, but not to go too far, and if attacked to fall back. Brand soon recognised SinclairMacLagan some distance behind him and signalled to him asking to confirm his decision to act as a covering force at the edge of the plateau. Sinclair-MacLagan sent back the message ‘keep advanced companies forward . . . Second Brigade coming in on our right’.6 Around this time, Dougall, who had been positioned in the Turkish trench at Harris Ridge, decided to join the Australians he could see moving along 400 Plateau north of his position. He and his men had already seen advanced parties of Aker’s 27th Regiment moving up Third Ridge from the south; closely following behind was a ‘mass of Turks’ that they estimated to be around 3000 strong. Dougall eventually made it onto the plateau and approached Sinclair-MacLagan, full of the news, but by now almost all on 400 Plateau could see the approaching Turks. Lieutenants Loutit and Haig had by now crossed Legge Valley with about 30 men and were climbing Adana Bair, an extension of Third Ridge. As Loutit and his men reached the top they must have been shocked to see strung out along this ridge only a few hundred metres away large numbers of Turks. Loutit’s men, who were in an extended line, immediately threw themselves down into the scrub and opened fire. Bullet after bullet was fed into the chamber of each man’s rifle magazine after each bolt action; lead poured into the Turkish columns; however, there were far too many Turks and far too few Australians for it to be other than a momentary delaying action. Just 300 metres north of their position, Loutit could make out the heights of Scrubby Knoll, their objective—it still appeared to be unoccupied. Loutit decided to try to make his way to the knoll in order to conduct a hurried reconnaissance of the valley beyond. He would only take two men with him. He ordered Haig and the rest of the men to stay put and offer them covering fire. Loutit and the two men took advantage of the 113
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 114
25 APRIL 1915
vegetation and undulations of the northern parts of the spur to push on towards Scrubby Knoll. They made it to the knoll, where, like Robin and Blackburn before them, they could see the glittering waters of the Narrows beyond. Within minutes, however, they were forced to retire due to concentrated Turkish rifle fire, which had seriously wounded one of the men. Loutit and Private Fordham carried their wounded cobber back to Adana Bair.7 On returning to his men Loutit looked back across the valley towards 400 Plateau for the reinforcements that Major Brand had originally promised to send him, but all he could see were men ‘cruising about’ the landward edge of the distant plateau, while behind them others were digging in. Loutit sent a runner across the valley to the plateau to bring up the promised reinforcements. It was now sometime before 8.30 a.m.8 Aker and his men had by now made their way along Third Ridge, passing Gök Tepe (Hobbs Hill), and reached Hill No. 165 and Kemal Yere (Scrubby Knoll). It was here that Aker was convinced that he had found the most favourable position from which to launch his counterattack against the invaders. He and his advance guard of the 27th Regiment reached this position shortly after Loutit had made it back to Adana Bair. It was now that Aker became aware of the enemy nearby. I surveyed the scene around me and investigated where the sound of rifle fire . . . had come from. All that rough area was covered in high brushwood. No human movement could apparently be seen but there was some to and fro movement among the brushwood which caught the eye. At this point the sound of firing from the enemy became more frequent than before . . . It was clear from the whistling noises that some shells were passing above us.9 Within fifteen minutes of arriving at Scrubby Knoll, Aker wrote a note to his divisional headquarters stating that he would soon be launching a counterattack. He ordered each battalion to form up behind the ridge— the 1st Battalion was to form up on his left, and the 3rd on his right. With both battalions now moving along the single track the marching column was extended and progress slowed. As such, the end of the column did not make it to Scrubby Knoll until well after 8.30 a.m. Aker was anxiously awaiting the arrival of his mountain battery from Çam Burnu, which would not arrive for another two hours.10 While he waited for his troops to arrive in full, Aker again surveyed Legge Valley, 114
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 115
‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’
400 Plateau and the coastline beyond. From his position he counted 26 large transport ships, which proved to him that the invasion at Ari Burnu was no feint. He continued to survey the region and began to formulate a plan of attack, an attack that must succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. As Aker was forming his counterattack plans against the central and southern flank of the Australians, Mustafa Kemal and advance elements of the Turkish 57th Regiment were approaching from the north.11 Sinclair-MacLagan was increasingly concerned, not only by the Turks who could be seen massing along Third Ridge, but also by the fighting that could be heard taking place along Adana Bair. He ordered Salisbury’s men forward in sections to the landward edge of the plateau to meet the expected attack. By now most of Captain Milne’s company (also of the 9th Battalion) had joined up with Salisbury’s men and with them they were digging in. Even now, the Turkish fire was only intermittent and the men on 400 Plateau were receiving few casualties. Each section commander of the 9th Battalion now ordered his men to stop digging in and to put their equipment back on in preparation for an advance to the edge of 400 Plateau.12 Thirty-four-year-old Captain Whitham and his men of the 12th Battalion had previously approached the plateau with Milne and his men, and were now digging in to the right of Salisbury, along Bolton’s Ridge, when members of Hooke’s company from the 6th Battalion started to arrive. Whitham decided to advance to Pine Ridge. It is possible that his decision to advance was influenced by news that the 9th Battalion, to his left, was about to move forward. He had also earlier seen a small party making its way along the southern parts of 400 Plateau towards Pine Ridge and thought it best that he join in their advance. As Whitham and his men moved across the landward face of Bolton’s Ridge into Allah Gully, a Turkish machine gun opened devastatingly accurate fire from Third Ridge against his company; while a number of men were hit and fell, Whitham and his surviving men continued the advance into the scrub. By now Hooke’s and Hamilton’s companies of the 6th Battalion were climbing up to Bolton’s Ridge as ordered by M’Cay. Hooke was on the right and Hamilton on the left. As the men from the 6th Battalion reached the top of Bolton’s Ridge they came under the same machinegun fire from Third Ridge that had partly cut up Whitham’s men. With Hooke’s company was Lieutenant Spargo, who later recalled: 115
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 116
25 APRIL 1915
We were climbing up hills into valleys, up again, through tangled undergrowth and low scrub, almost too steep in places to climb, and where we could advance only in single file. The bullets, which were meant for our firing line were now zip-zip-ing over the hill onto us but doing no damage. I took my platoon just over the ridge . . . We were now on a plateau in long grass, and though we could not see our enemy except at long range, he was firing at us with rifles, machine guns, and with shrapnel fire.13 Both company commanders had been ordered to move over that hill and reinforce the firing line.14 Accordingly, they followed Whitham into the southern gullies and spurs running off 400 Plateau. By this time McNicoll, commander of the 6th Battalion, had established his headquarters behind Bolton’s Ridge and sent two officers back to the beach to act as guides for the rest of the battalion as they landed. Major Bennett of the 6th Battalion now went forward to keep in touch with Hooke and Hamilton who were moving across the southern gullies and spurs below 400 Plateau towards Pine Ridge. Bennett soon came across platoons of mostly 6th Battalion men dispersed along the spurs and
Razor Edge
Incebayir Ridge
Second Ridge
Monash Valley
Scrubby Knoll
Mule Valley Mortar Ridge
Wire Gully
10th Bn
9th Bn
8th Bn
Bolton’s Ridge
Dougall
Third Ridge
Johnston’s Jolly Fortescue Loutit
The Cup Lonesome Pine
Thomas Boase
Legge Valley
Whitham Bennett
27th Rgt
Adana Bair Pine Ridge
0
500 metres
Map 9.1 Arrival of the Turkish 27th Regiment on Third Ridge 116
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 117
‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’
gullies, just behind Whitham. He took command and formed these men into a line of advance. At this point both of his flanks hung in midair; he could find no Australians to his left or right. As they advanced Bennett must have anxiously looked to his right hoping to see the men of the 8th Battalion whom he believed were to protect their southern flank. Meanwhile, on reaching the top of Bolton’s Ridge Lieutenant Colonel Gartside of the 8th Battalion could see a line of Australians advancing across the gullies and spurs south of 400 Plateau. These were undoubtedly Bennett and Whitham’s men. Gartside ordered his two companies that were present to push forward to support these men; at this point the remaining two companies of the 8th Battalion were either yet to land, or were organising along the beach below. Soon orders reached Gartside from M’Cay that when his remaining two companies came up they were to establish themselves on Bolton’s Ridge; they were not to advance further.15 Major General Bridges and Lieutenant Colonel White had moved up to M’Cay’s Hill but somehow missed seeing M’Cay’s headquarters. As they stood in the vicinity of M’Cay’s Hill, they noticed large numbers of men lining Bolton’s Ridge. These were probably men of the 8th Battalion who had not yet received Gartside’s order to advance and support the men of the 8th Battalion. Very little firing could be heard at this point and the first instinct of Bridges and White was to go over and order these men to continue an advance to Third Ridge. However, they decided it would be better to hold off, at least until they had conferred with their brigade commanders, Sinclair-MacLagan and M’Cay. While Bridges had yet to find these officers, he was generally pleased with the situation that presented itself on the southern flank and was now keen to reconnoitre the situation unfolding along the northern heights. With this intention, Bridges and White left 400 Plateau in an attempt to reach Baby 700.16 Lieutenant Prisk and his men of the 6th Battalion, who had failed to receive the order to retire from their southern advance towards Gaba Tepe, now found themselves beyond Bolton’s Ridge on its southern extension, Harris Ridge. As he advanced earlier he had come across men of the 9th Battalion who, with no officer present, had joined up with his platoon. The spur of this ridge became lower and gentler as they advanced south. The 200 metres of land between them and the beach was 117
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 118
25 APRIL 1915
under cultivation with wheat and poppy fields. This was the precise area in which the Anzac covering force was supposed to have landed four hours earlier. Prisk sent out a patrol to ensure that they were not ambushed. Even after moving down the ridge for almost a kilometre, Prisk’s party came across no Turks. Prisk ordered half of his men to continue on as close to Gaba Tepe as they dared and get information on Turkish troop dispositions—they were not, however, to attack the garrison as any attack by such a small force would be utterly hopeless. They were then to join up with Prisk and the other men who would turn inland to try to reach Third Ridge.17 Prisk moved across the valley, later known as Poppy Valley, then onto the southern tip of the landward spur (Holly Ridge) that originates from Bolton’s Ridge. From this position he could see to the north other men of the 6th Battalion, Hooke’s and Hamilton’s companies, moving across the same country. For the moment Prisk and his men took a breather on Holly Ridge. From this vantage point, they watched the British cruiser Bacchante shell Gaba Tepe and, as one shell exploded near the point, they saw an object, which they believed to be a gun, being flung into the air. Soon they left the ridge and pushed on to the next spur, Pine Ridge (at this southern extreme, the other spurs to the north already opened onto the floor of Legge Valley). Upon reaching the ridgeline they saw in front of them about 150 metres of grassy valley floor with a couple of horses quietly grazing. Immediately beyond rose Third Ridge; at this point Prisk and his men were close to the southern tip of Pine Ridge and could see a large number of Turks swarming along Third Ridge just a few hundred metres away; further north a battle appeared to be raging along one of the major spurs of Third Ridge, Adana Bair, close to Scrubby Knoll.18 Sinclair-MacLagan moved northwards across 400 Plateau in order to establish his headquarters on the southern part of Second Ridge, just beyond Wire Gully. On his way he came across Lieutenant Colonel Weir of the 10th Battalion whose men were digging in around Johnston’s Jolly. Weir had landed with a rifle, and would for the rest of the day move amongst the ranks leading from the front. He agreed with SinclairMacLagan that it was pointless to push on to Third Ridge, given the large number of Turks who could be seen occupying the ridge to their front. From this same position Sinclair-MacLagan also witnessed to his north large numbers of Australians moving across Plugge’s Plateau down into Shrapnel Gully. Sinclair-MacLagan became concerned, 118
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 119
‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’
however, that while these men started towards 400 Plateau, only around one in five actually made it to the plateau; the rest were drawn away by calls from officers and men now strung out along Second Ridge to join them along their part of the line. This further siphoning-off of men confirmed to Sinclair-MacLagan that any attempt to push on to Third Ridge was only inviting confusion and disaster. He ordered that no further attempts be made to advance beyond Second Ridge and focused on preparing for the Turkish counterattack that was clearly imminent.19 Major General Bridges and Lieutenant Colonel White, meanwhile, descended from 400 Plateau into Shrapnel Gully in an attempt to reach Baby 700. They were planning to approach Russell’s Top from First Ridge, unaware that the Razor Edge which ‘connected’ First Ridge to Russell’s Top would make such a route impossible. Bridges soon came across the first contingent of the 5th Battalion who were forming up at the 2nd Brigade rendezvous area at the entrance to Shrapnel Gully. The Novian was late in landing the 5th Battalion. Bridges immediately waved the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wanliss, over to him: ‘Wanliss, I want you to get your men together and reinforce the firing line with all available tools and ammunition. Don’t wait for the rest of your battalion to get into formation—but push on.’20 The first two leading companies of his battalion under Major Fethers and Captain Flockart ‘formed fours’ and moved up the narrow goat tracks in the scrub of the Razorback. As they reached just below the left slope of M’Cay’s Hill, Fethers halted his company and sent forward some scouts to determine the position of the firing line. He also sent a runner to find Lieutenant Colonel Wanliss, who had now become separated from his battalion. While taking a brief rest awaiting orders, the men watched the occasional ‘fleecy puff’ of shrapnel unfold over the beach and listened as rifle and machine-gun bullets passed overhead and harmlessly out to sea.21 Bridges, in the meantime, had given up on trying to get to the northern heights, as he found the going too rough. Instead by 9.30 a.m. he had settled down at his headquarters close to the cove and attempted to direct operations from there. By now his headquarters was in telephone communications with both Sinclair-MacLagan and M’Cay.22 It was also at this time that the battles for the northern heights turned into a defensive action, at least in the minds of the Anzac commanders. However, for the rest of the day, junior officers and men continued to make determined and heroic attempts to advance and capture their original objectives beyond Second Ridge. They had been ordered again 119
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 120
25 APRIL 1915
and again before the invasion that on getting ashore they were to push on at all costs, ‘no mooching—no dallying’, just push on, and that is what they did. At about this time Sergeant Connell of the 12th Battalion had already started to dig in near the 10th Battalion on Johnston’s Jolly. Soon parts of the 10th Battalion were ordered to move forward as a covering force to the battalion. Connell, however, took this to mean that they were to advance towards Third Ridge. Connell led his men across Johnston’s Jolly in a southeast movement towards Owen’s Gully. As he did so, Turks who had previously been hiding in the scrub ahead of them got up and bolted. The plateau was still not cleared of Turks. Indeed, on pushing further forward across the Jolly, Connell and his men noticed some Turks who had occupied a trench close to the edge of Owen’s Gully. Private William Tope later recalled, ‘They gave us the order to wait, and they sent out a couple of scouts and the scouts reported there was a trench about 50 yards ahead with men in it, and the order came to charge it . . . We had orders not to use any ammunition, so the charge was done without any shooting at all, just the bayonet . . . So up we went and yelled like mad, and got over this trench, took prisoners and put them in a tent . . .’23 Connell and his men started to occupy the trench, but as they did so a Turkish round of shrapnel landed close by and Connell and his men proceeded down into Owen’s Gully and then pushed up towards the Lonesome Pine, occupying a vacant Turkish trench. As recalled by Private Tope, ‘On we went because we knew we had to take the right flank. And I kept telling these fellows, “Keep together boys, not too close, but in touch with one another.” We got to the top of this big hill and Sergeant Connell turned to me and he said “Tope, you’re a corporal now.” I said “right”, and I put two stripes on myself with a pencil . . . And my God, a quarter of an hour after that they turned the big gun on to us. They gave us what for!’24 Further north, Reid and his men, who had previously been ordered by Lalor to chase the Turks who were climbing down the northern heights of Baby 700, had reached Shepherd’s Hut. As recalled by Sergeant Mason: We went down to the farmhouse [Shepherd’s Hut]. The Turks were then—the tail of them—were just disappearing, through a contour and round to right (round Destroyer Hill). We went into the 120
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 121
‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’
farm-house and found two rooms; a wattle partition across middle— rifles (about 100) stacked in a corner, and spare parts for machineguns. A fire was smouldering in an open raised fireplace, no blankets or papers, no furniture, a few tins (meat tins); we asked what to do with the rifles ‘withdraw bolts?’ Reid said ‘no good, we’ll have our own men [here] shortly’. We went about 100 yards beyond house in valley [Sazli Beit Dere?]. We could see up the valley right up to the main ridge. We were still in extended order at three pace intervals, quite 50—perhaps 70.25 They soon began to make their way back to Lalor and his men at The Nek above. On Second Ridge lieutenants Rockliff and Macfarlane had started their move towards Baby 700 as ordered by Drake-Brockman. They had approached Everett’s, Barnes’s and Denton’s positions along the northern parts of Second Ridge but were then ordered to halt and dig in.26 As stated later by Bean, ‘as troops moved up Monash Valley, those lining its tops were periodically calling for reinforcements. These orders were frequently given by senior officers in command on the valley side; and all day long troops who had been directed up the valley to Baby 700, tended, as they went, to be sucked into the fighting on the right-hand side of Monash Valley.’27 Thus instead of reinforcing the men who were advancing towards Baby 700, Rockliff and Macfarlane dug in along Second Ridge, along the forward slopes of MacLaurin’s Hill (just north of Wire Gully, part of Second Ridge). Lieutenant Morgan and his men, who had also been sent to Baby 700, approached the heights from the floor of Monash Valley. The going was slow as men searched the valley sides for Turkish snipers.28 They soon reached the head of the valley; immediately above lay Russell’s Top, The Nek and, just a little further inland, the summit of Baby 700. They started to climb but it was then that Turkish shrapnel began to land amongst this party, causing it to break up. A couple of men . . . were told by some officer to carry a box of ammunition and follow Lieutenant Morgan. They plodded, perspiring, at the tail of Morgan’s platoon to a point near the valley head, where heavy shrapnel fire came sweeping upon the party. The pellets swished like hail through the bushes, and in the rushes from shelter to shelter the party became split. The men with the ammunition went 121
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 122
25 APRIL 1915 Malone’s Gully North Beach
Baby 700
Walker’s Ridge
Jackson Lalor Tulloch Russell’s Top
Drake-Brockman Morgan
The Sphinx
Plugge’s Plateau
Monash Valley
Everett Barnes Rockliff & Macfarlane
Mortar Ridge
Braund’s Hill Shrapnel Gully Wire Gully
0
250 metres
Map 9.2 Second Ridge and northern flanks of Anzac around 8.30 a.m.
up the slope to the left; Lieutenant Morgan and others led up the slope to the right. When . . . the string was broken, the men behind had no direction to follow. Each could only push on as he thought best, until some other officer or non-commissioned officer gave him other orders. Such was the fate that day of many similar parties.29 Some eventually reached Russell’s Top, while others, including Morgan and Drake-Brockman, also found themselves on Pope’s Hill. The AE2 had been lying at the bottom of the Dardanelles for close to an hour. Even though Stoker had ordered the crew to try to get some sleep, it is doubtful whether any managed the task before a vessel passed directly overhead. Something that it was towing now hit the side of the AE2 with a loud ‘clunk’, jumping over her hull. The force of the impact cracked the hull of the submarine and water slowly began to collect in the motor bilges. Unfortunately for Stoker and the crew it was not 122
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 123
‘I put two stripes on myself with a pencil’
possible to pump the water directly out of the AE2 without the telltale sign of oil seeping to the surface. The water was carried forward and emptied into the beam-tube. From this time onwards vessels frequently passed overhead in search of the submarine. The crew quickly got to recognise the sound of one ship in particular, a single-screw ship that repeatedly passed overhead; they christened it the Percival. Later Stoker recalled, ‘Percival’s repeated passages were trying on the nerves, and the fact that we were well out of the track of ships following their ordinary course up and down the strait proved that Percival and his friends were searching for us’.30 Stoker and his crew could do nothing but sit and attempt to wait it out.
123
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 124
10 ‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’ s Tulloch and Jackson approached Baby 700 from Russell’s Top all seemed quiet, with no sign of any Turks up ahead. Jackson took up a position on the seaward slopes of the same hill. Thirty-two-year-old former head brewer Captain Tulloch and his men advanced through the scrub on the opposite side of the hill and could hear firing to the south. They approached the southern parts of Baby 700, from where a major spur—Mortar Ridge—runs off the hill in a southerly direction into Legge Valley below. Soon 30 additional men with lieutenants Reid and Buttle, who had been sent forward by Lalor, caught up with Tulloch and his men as they passed over the landward side of Baby 700.1 Now concentrated Turkish fire opened up from the landward side of Battleship Hill up ahead, hitting ten of Tulloch’s men. Around 60 Turks were positioned on the landward spur, later to be called Incebayir Ridge by the Turks. These Turks were likely a combination of Captain Faik’s 1st Platoon who had earlier left Fisherman’s Hut as well as survivors of his 3rd Platoon who had evacuated Russell’s Top. In addition at least one machine gun was present, probably the same gun that had earlier inflicted severe casualties on those landing on North Beach from Fisherman’s Hut. Tulloch and his men laid down a fusillade of fire and with this the Turks seemed to melt into the scrub.2 As later recalled by Sergeant Mason (11th Battalion):
A
On right where they had retired was some big scrub. A machine gun opened on us suddenly from there and almost immediately after the Turks opened fire from ridge on right. They could be seen, chest and shoulders high, where they got up to fire. They seemed pretty thick. On top of hills on our right (before our machine guns opened) we could hear heavy fire as we dug in. Lt. Reid said: ‘Good heavens our fellows will never last with ammunition going at this rate’.3 124
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 125
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
Captain Lalor with Lieutenant Margetts and his men continued to entrench just short of The Nek. Lalor anxiously searched the heights beyond; while he could hear rifle and machine-gun fire up ahead, he could not see what was happening. Major Robertson was still with Lalor, awaiting the arrival of Drake-Brockman and his men. On hearing what sounded like a major fight developing ahead, Robertson and Lalor both agreed that they should move forward in order to assist. Robertson, with one company, moved towards the seaward side of Baby 700. Lalor, whose role was the brigade reserve, also moved forward just beyond The Nek, and took up a position to reinforce where and if needed. Lalor ordered Margetts to move up to the top of Baby 700 with a platoon and keep to the right of Robertson. Both Robertson and Margetts soon found themselves under sporadic fire from a number of Turks entrenched just beyond the seaward side of Baby 700. This semi-circular trench was located beyond the head of a gully later to be known as Malone’s Gully. Robertson and his men took cover as this trench blocked their line of advance. Upon reaching the heights of Baby 700, Margetts and his men came across a number of dead Turks lying along the summit. Meanwhile, Tulloch’s men had passed the landward side of Baby 700, cautiously approaching Battleship Hill. As they did so, scattered Turkish fire located somewhere near Battleship Hill flared up again. Tulloch and his men continued towards their objective and soon found themselves on Incebayir Ridge, previously occupied by the Turks. The Turks had again retreated further up the ridge towards Chunuk Bair. As Tulloch and his men prepared to push on to Chunuk Bair, a much heavier concentration of Turkish rifle and machine-gun fire swept the ridge. This fearsome fire originated from the heights around Chunuk Bair. Tulloch and his men were forced to take cover in the thick, thorny scrub, depressions and minor gullies. The machine-gun bullets acted as a scythe, cutting through the vegetation and causing showers of shiny, prickly leaves to cascade all over them, some of which found their way inside the men’s tunic collars and down their backs. There was no possibility of entrenching as any movement brought a hail of bullets and showers of leaves down upon their heads.4 The men continued on for another 150 metres by rushes and then crawled for another 100 metres on their bellies. It was around 9 a.m. when they crept down the last 100 metres of their advance. Tulloch noticed that the ‘men were doing everything they had been taught . . . firing only as directed, conserving ammunition’.5 125
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 126
25 APRIL 1915
Behind Tulloch, Margetts’s men had reached the top of Baby 700 and to their right in the distance could be seen the glittering waters of the Narrows, though it is doubtful that any had time to enjoy the view. They moved across the summit with the expectation of advancing to Battleship Hill. Margetts checked his watch: it was 9 a.m. From his position just beyond Baby 700 Margetts could see further north another semi-circular trench running around the seaward summit of Battleship Hill. From this position, however, he could not see Tulloch or any of his men. Now more concentrated fire struck his men. It was coming from somewhere to their right. They were forced to ground and lay in the scrub along the northern slope of Baby 700. Men were hit as they tried to peer above the scrub, while others tried to push through the vegetation to keep in contact with their cobbers. In the thick and tangled scrub it was impossible to maintain contact through sight; the men had to rely on yelling out to those they hoped were still on either side of them. Within a quarter of an hour of taking up their position, Margetts received a message that Turks were creeping down towards his left flank. He scanned the Turkish trench close to the summit of Battleship Hill with his binoculars and noticed Turks coming down from the trench into the valley on his left where they then became hidden from view. Margetts gave the order to his platoon: ‘Communication trench, on left of far hill . . . 900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
Turks X X X
Fisherman’s Hut 0
250 metres
No. 1 Outpost
Trench
Battleship Hill
Trench
North Beach
Malone’s Gully
X
Margetts Tulloch
Robertson Lalor Russell’s Top
Mortar Ridge
The Sphinx
Incebayir Ridge
Map 10.1 Tulloch’s advance towards Battleship Hill and Chunuk Bair and the occupation of Baby 700 by Margetts and his men, around 9 a.m. 126
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 127
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
By now some of the stretcher-bearers of the 3rd Field Ambulance who had attended Jackson and Layh’s men down near Fisherman’s Hut had made their way onto Baby 700 via Walker’s Ridge and Malone’s Gully. Captain Lyle Buchanan of the 3rd Field Ambulance later recalled: The ascent of the slopes below Baby 700 was exceedingly difficult owing to the steepness of the cliffs and the sandy nature of the ground, and those slopes were under sniping fire from the left . . . The section was taken in separate parties to the Firing Line for the collection and evacuation of the wounded, the line here was very irregular and in places incomplete so that parties of stretcher bearers worked their way through and in several instances were between the Turks and our own parties.6 Upon reaching the wounded they proceeded to take them back down from the heights to the field dressing station below along North Beach via Walker’s Ridge. To the southeast at Adana Bair, Loutit had earlier sent a runner back to 400 Plateau in order to bring up reinforcements. The runner eventually reached the forward edge of 400 Plateau where, close to the Lonesome Pine, he found Captain Ryder of the 9th Battalion, who had arrived on the plateau as part of Salisbury’s command. On hearing that Loutit was in urgent need of help, Ryder collected 30 men and pushed out into the valley below. They soon approached the southern parts of Adana Bair and took up a position to protect Loutit and Haig’s lower right flank.7 The large number of Turks and small number of Australians, however, made it impossible to defend the position from being flanked. Many of Loutit’s men were already wounded or dead. Ryder was also now rapidly losing men and was in urgent need of reinforcements. Ryder sent an urgent request back to 400 Plateau; one of the runners arrived on a horse that had been found grazing nearby, while another runner (on foot) met up with Captain Peck, adjutant of the 11th Battalion.8 As Bean later recounted, ‘Ryder got a horse down from mule gully [Mule Valley] and sent his sergeant back on it. The sergeant let the horse go as soon as he got back, and [the] horse went back to the Turkish lines and was afterwards shot.’9 Peck had previously left lieutenants Rockliff and Macfarlane in Rest Gully while he pushed inland to find the brigade headquarters. Peck was moving across Wire Gully, when Ryder’s runner found him, informing him of the precarious position now facing Loutit and Ryder. Peck and 127
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 128
25 APRIL 1915
Lieutenant Newman collected the men around them, and pushed on through Wire Gully to try to assist the Australians along Third Ridge. Meanwhile, Loutit and Haig had sometime after 9 a.m. agreed that it was pointless to try to hold this position as they were in serious danger of being cut off by the Turks who had now started to bypass their lines. If they didn’t get out now, there would be no chance of getting out with the wounded. Indeed, Ryder had passed a message up to Loutit that Turks were moving around his flanks and they were close to cutting his line of retreat. Ryder advised Loutit to get out with his men while he still could.10 Soon Ryder himself was forced to retire with his surviving men. They pushed out across Legge Valley back towards 400 Plateau. Before 9.30 a.m. the two remaining battalions of Lieutenant Colonel Aker’s 27th Regiment had assembled close to Scrubby Knoll. Aker had already formulated his plan and passed on the following report to the 9th Division commander at Maidos. 1. The enemy has occupied the Ariburnu ranges. 2. I shall begin the attack based on Inayeti Hakka from the ridges between the Ariburnu ridges and Kocadere. 3. I respectfully request that you instruct 19th Division to occupy Kocacimen without delay.11 With just two battalions there was no way that Aker could hope to attack the whole of the Australian line; he would focus his attack against the southern flank of the enemy. After having sent his message off by ‘fast messenger’ (trooper?) he turned to his officers and started to issue his orders for the attack: The 1st Battalion will attack the enemy’s right flank on these ridges (indicating the Kanli [Lonesome Pine] and Kirmezi [Johnston’s Jolly] ridges) which constitute the extremities of the enemy’s right flank and they will hold one company in reserve under my orders. The 3rd Battalion will attack on the enemy’s left flank, outside these ridges, keeping in communication with the 1st Battalion. The Machine Gun Company will be positioned here, where we are (I indicated with my hand) and will cover the attack under my orders and supervision. The Artillery Battery . . . when it arrives will also be positioned here (indicating with my hand) and will also cover the attack under 128
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 129
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
my orders. It will be convenient to have the first aid post for both battalions behind the place where we are situated, on the road heading to Kocadere, and the battalion doctors will keep their supplies and attend the wounded here and can ask for a detachment from the Medical Company.12 Meanwhile, Lieutenant Mustafa and his men of the 2nd Battalion, who had earlier encountered the wounded Captain Faik, had made their way down to Scrubby Knoll to meet up with their regimental commander. Aker placed Mustafa and his men under the command of the 3rd Battalion commander.13 The men of each battalion proceeded to unload the ammunition from A Echelon and place the stores to their immediate rear as ordered. The pack animals then proceeded to Bigali in order to bring back additional supplies of ammunition. Aker would stay at Scrubby Knoll and take command of the machine-gun company, which would support his men’s attack. Most of the men had had a chance to get some rest while waiting for the rear of the column to arrive. Some of the ‘Mehmedjiks . . . changed their dirty clothes with clean ones, and thus prepared themselves spiritually for the highest rank possible: martyrdom’.14 Aker went over to the men of his 3rd Battalion who were resting just behind the ridgeline. I made a brief speech to the troops to inspire confidence that we would win the battle and to stimulate the nerves of the troops. Further along whatever needed to be said to the 1st Battalion was said. The Battalion [commanding officers] also spoke words of encouragement to their battalions. At this time I was faced with a suggestion by the men that to enable them to hurl themselves at the enemy with more vigour and agility, they should leave their knapsacks behind . . . I gave the order that they put their knapsacks on the ground (just where they stood, in wide column formation) provided that they had with them all their ammunition, pickaxe, spade, flask and food bags . . . The troops thanked me and their zeal was still further increased.15 It was about this time that a mountain gun arrived from the direction of Kocadere village. Aker asked, ‘What is that gun over there?’ He was informed that the gun had been part of Sadik’s mountain battery, and it alone had avoided capture. Aker took out his binoculars and could see 129
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 130
25 APRIL 1915
enemy troops directly across the broad valley moving about the captured guns close to the landward side of 400 Plateau. He knew that there was every likelihood that the mountain battery from Çam Burnu would not arrive in time to support his attack. He ordered Sadik’s surviving gun crew to position their gun under cover in the immediate area and to be prepared to fire into the enemy troops moving around the captured guns on 400 Plateau. He then told his officers to inform their men to avoid this part of the plateau during their counterattack as the artillery would be targeting this area.16 The battalion commanders now began to deploy their men for their attack. Each battalion commander ordered two companies to spread out into an extended line, each company extended two platoons, with the remainder placed in the rear as reserve. The machine gunners took up their positions to offer covering fire to the infantry. The Turkish riflemen began intermittent fire at the Australians they could see moving around 400 Plateau to their front. It was also at this point that the lone surviving gun from Sedik’s battery opened fire with shrapnel at a range of around 1500 metres. Under cover of our gunfire our riflemen and echelons began to advance amongst the high brushwood. Carefully and at intervals both our own and the enemy’s rifles and machine guns began to operate. Thus these two battalions began to attack against the fronts, which I allocated to them. Our machine gun officers, gunners, myself and my adjutant dropped our binoculars and we turned these binoculars and our eyes on to the whole front. We were looking for the key movements of the enemy and their density. Our artillery and machine gun positions particularly dominated the enemy’s left flank and centre (the position where we were was 165 metres above sea level. Kanli Sirt on which the enemy’s left flank rested was 125 metres high). We were in a position to oppose with effective machine gun fire in a most commanding manner any enemy force that might come to try and reinforce his advance echelons [Loutit and his men], which could be seen on the western foothills of Artillery Ridge . . . Our position was more suited to attack than defence.17 The four Turkish machine guns fired across Adana Bair and beyond at the brushwood where they suspected the enemy to be. In ‘particular we were looking for targets which might try to reinforce the Australian 130
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 131
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
detachments who were close to us and who had been engaged in hand to hand fighting with our riflemen and we greeted with fire anything resembling the slightest movement’.18 Loutit, who was still on Adana Bair, drew up the men as best he could into sections, each leapfrogging over the other, providing the next with covering fire as they moved down the spur. With this they set off back towards Second Ridge, those not wounded helping those who were: ‘Come on cobber, you’ll be right.’ Those unheard and unseen in the scrub and those who were too badly wounded and simply not up to it had to be left behind. Fordham later noted ‘a whole division of Turks in front, which meant, of course, we had to retire, and quick, as both our flanks were exposed. It was an orderly retirement, well carried out.’19 During this withdrawal one of Loutit’s men was captured. Aker later recalled: This prisoner was sent to us with an armed guard from No. 2 company of the 1st Battalion. He was a tall young Australian aged 22 years—a Western Australian type. We were not able to get a statement from him as there was no one among us who knew English. He seemed tired and cautious. We sat on one side in order to listen. A member of my staff showed him a cigarette, asked him by signs whether he smoked and offered it to him. The young prisoner took the cigarette and seemed pleased and at ease, crossed his legs, calmly smoked the cigarette and listened. The man who had brought him showed [me] a handful of metal money and said that this money was his (the prisoner’s). I told him to hand over the money to its owner. He handed it over. The prisoner took the money in his hand and smiled and put it in his pocket. We sent the prisoner with a letter to Divisional Headquarters at Maidos.20 Given the lie of the land and the approach of the Turks, Loutit and his men could not retrace their steps across the valley floor—to do so would have been suicide. Instead they proceeded as best they could down Adana Bair and turned in a northerly direction, moving across the spurs and down into the gullies, taking advantage of the thick scrub running across the northern and seaward slopes of Third Ridge. As such they were ‘running against the grain of the land’ aiming to reach Second Ridge, using the cover of the scrub growing along the seaward side of Third Ridge, hoping to turn west and pass across the base of Incebayir Ridge and Mortar Ridge, then onto Second Ridge. It was now that Aker’s 131
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 132
25 APRIL 1915
battalions started their advance down the very same slopes towards Second Ridge—the race was on. After Loutit and his men had evacuated Adana Bair, Aker was handed a map taken from a dead Australian in the scrub-covered spur. I saw a pencil mark on a map, which was found on one of the British [sic] Officers killed in the first landing operations of 25th April 1915. This mark was a pencil line drawn approximately from the fishermen’s huts on the coast to the Çonkbayiri Hill [main ridge connecting Battleship Hill, Chunuk Bair and Hill 971] and from this hill over Artillery Range [Third Ridge] to Kaba Tepe. This officer was killed in the first clashes at the western foot of Artillery Range [Third Ridge]. The impression was given by this marking that that was the line which the British force wanted to reach on that day.21 As previously ordered by Sinclair-MacLagan, Salisbury’s sections of the 9th Battalion had begun their advance towards the landward edge of 400 Plateau to meet the expected Turkish advance. The order was passed down the line: ‘We’re advancing’. Salisbury himself did not go forward until the last of his men had fitted on their equipment and advanced. With Milne he quickly overtook some men of the 9th Battalion as they advanced beyond the Lonesome Pine. As the sections moved forward individually through the scrub, a sudden and devastating whirlwind of Turkish machine-gun and rifle fire swept across the plateau. Men stumbled and fell; the thump of the bullets hitting muscle and bone was sickening, heard for the first time by almost all. It was as if a giant scythe had swept across the field as men dropped below the scrub line, dead, wounded, or trying to take cover. It was at this point that Aker’s machine-gun company commander witnessed the advance of the Australian 9th Battalion towards the Lonesome Pine. A cover force ‘which was advancing continuously on Kanli Sirt caught the eye of our machine gun company. The area where we suspected this force was hiding among the brushwood was immediately kept under heavy fire. The sight and movement which we saw through our binoculars indicated that our machineguns had caused a terrible and touching tragedy in that area.’22 To make matters even more hopeless, salvoes of shrapnel also started to burst on the plateau. A hailstorm of sizable chunks of scrap metal now belted down upon the killing field, adding to the terror and misery. This barrage was from the batteries located just behind Gaba Tepe, with the 132
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 133
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
lone gun at Scrubby Knoll joining in. Salisbury was wounded in the hand. Each section was forced to take up available cover, the former defensive line, always precarious, was now completely smashed and the 9th Battalion (along with other parties from other battalions who had joined their advance) was fragmented with scattered pockets strung out across the southern parts of 400 Plateau.23 It was not always scrap metal. Many years later Major Beevor recalled the effects of this sudden and devastating rain of shrapnel as one of the shells exploded directly above him and Sergeant Chisholm: I felt thumps on my chest and stinging blows on my face and hands. At the same moment that I considered I had ‘got it’, though I felt no pain beyond the stings, I thought of Chisholm and looked around very cautiously and reluctantly, because I should have been very distressed to see my good comrade lying there bleeding. But as I looked round so reluctantly, I met Chisholm’s gaze, as precisely the same idea had gone through his mind and he was afraid to find me in the same state as I thought to find him. He jerked out, ‘Are you hurt Sir?’24 Both Beevor and Chisholm had been lucky. Both sustained only slight scratches to their faces and hands; however, patches of yellow clay covered parts of their exposed skin as well as their uniforms. Beevor picked up lumps of clay lying around them—it was hot. The reason for their lucky escape was that an unethical Turkish weapons contractor had filled some of his shells with clay instead of shrapnel.25 It was not long, however, before Beevor’s luck ran out. Corporal Outerbridge described the wounding of Beevor in a letter home. All the ‘officers turned out tramps and nearly all got hit. Major Beevor got wounded in the foot. He was crawling backwards and forwards to the firing line with ammunition after he was wounded, and left the firing line only when reinforcements came up, he’ll do me’, Outerbridge added, admiringly.26 Just before this barrage of shell and bullets, Lieutenant Colonel ‘Pompey’ Elliott of the 7th Battalion was in Shrapnel Gully still looking for his lost company under the command of Jackson. He was intercepted by M’Cay, who was still concerned about the gap in the line between the 9th and 10th battalions on 400 Plateau. The colonel instructed Elliott to put his remaining companies immediately in between these battalions to help fill the gap. Shortly after this, Elliott received a confusing message 133
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 134
25 APRIL 1915
from one of his company commanders, Captain R. Henderson, who was already on 400 Plateau: ‘Have been ordered to advance 300 yards beyond the position you have assigned to me.’ It seems that Henderson and his men had been drawn into the general advance of the 9th Battalion. Elliott, who was unaware of Sinclair-MacLagan’s orders to advance, started to climb up to the plateau to sort out the confusion when he was wounded in the ankle, just as the Turks swept 400 Plateau with shrapnel and bullets. Elliott reluctantly passed command over to Major Mason.27 Before the Turkish attack started, Sinclair-MacLagan had countermanded his orders for the advance towards the landward edge of 400 Plateau and ordered that the men be withdrawn to the seaward side of 400 Plateau and prepare defensive positions. Major Brand, who had previously been beyond the Lonesome Pine with Thomas and Boase, was heading back to the line when the message from Sinclair-MacLagan reached him ordering that he withdraw his forward parties and help establish a firing line along the plateau. It was at this point that the Turkish barrage swept the plateau. The advance parties had already been instructed to retire if heavily attacked, and with the summit of the plateau now swept by shrapnel, rifle and machine-gun fire, Brand decided it was pointless to try to recall them—it would merely result in their slaughter; better to stay where they were and provide some covering fire against the Turkish attack.28 The orders to withdraw back to help establish a continuous firing line, however, had not filtered down to those ordered to advance towards the landward edge of the plateau. Communications were a major problem, as orders had to be either shouted down the line, assuming that the line was near continuous—which it wasn’t—or semaphores had to be used; the latter method was decidedly unhealthy for those relaying the messages. When the original order to the 9th Battalion was shouted down the line, ‘We’re advancing’, these same orders were passed on to nearby pockets of men from the 7th, 10th and 12th battalions. This advance created a serious gap in the line. At the northernmost point on the plateau Sinclair-MacLagan could see the bulk of the 10th Battalion digging in, while at its southernmost point, along Bolton’s Ridge, M’Cay had already ordered the remaining two companies of the 8th Battalion to dig in. Sinclair-MacLagan now expected his orders to withdraw from the edge of the plateau back towards the 10th Battalion to correct this gap, resulting in the formation of a continuous firing line between these points. Between these positions, however, there was now a gaping hole of 134
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 135
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’ Scrubby Knoll
500 metres
0
Mortar Ridge
27th Rgt Johnston’s Jolly
10th Bn 9th Bn 8th Bn
Owen’s Gully
Loutit Lonesome Pine
Thomas & Boase Adana Bair
6th & 12th Bn Ryder
Map 10.2 Australian 9th Battalion advance across the Lonesome Pine
about 800 metres, with dispersed parties of 2nd and 3rd brigade men scattered forward of the flanks. For the remainder of the day as ‘company after company, battalion after battalion came up on to the plateau they went forward in a bloody and futile, if heroic, search for an illusory firing line, which simply did not exist’.29 The same fire that fell upon those on top of 400 Plateau also started to fall on those who were moving across the southern spurs and gullies. As Whitham and his men of the 12th Battalion continued their advance to Pine Ridge, heavy rifle and machine-gun fire reached them from Third Ridge. At this point Whitham and Bennett’s men of the 6th Battalion were positioned along Sniper’s Ridge, with Whitham’s men a little way in front. Bennett moved from section to section, through the hail of fire, urging his men to hold where they were; one soldier later recalled, ‘Ginger Bennett’s a man with a charmed life’.30 Soon this concentrated fire was joined with shrapnel. The shrapnel pellets completely raked the gullies as well as the plateau and there was no shelter from it. If you didn’t hear it smacking into the clay it would be smashing into the scrub or, worse, you would hear its sickening thud as it ripped through flesh and bone. Bennett sent urgent messages back to M’Cay asking for reinforcements. One of these messages reached M’Cay at about 10 a.m. He 135
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 136
25 APRIL 1915
immediately sent half a company of the 5th Battalion as well as some men from the 8th Battalion in their direction; however, while twenty or so men would start off from Bolton’s Ridge, only two or three would make it to Bennett’s or Whitham’s position.31 Prisk, who was still positioned on the southern parts of Pine Ridge, sent a scout up the spur through the scrub and stunted pines to make contact with the Australians to their left. While the scout came across no Australians along Pine Ridge he noticed a number of men far up on Sniper’s Ridge. He moved cautiously back across the gullies to join up with them and eventually reported back to Prisk that a party of men under the command of an officer from the 12th Battalion (probably Whitham) was attempting to cross over to Pine Ridge, and would try to take up a position to their left. Also about this time the other half of Prisk’s men who had crept towards Gaba Tepe returned and told him that there were no Turks to be seen between them and the Turkish garrison to the south. Now, seeing the advance of the Turks from Third Ridge, Prisk and his men took cover along the southern crest of Pine Ridge and awaited developments, obviously concerned that they might be about to be outflanked and isolated.32 The forward parties of lieutenants Thomas and Boase’s platoons had each continued to advance down two of the knuckles on the Lonesome Pine part of the plateau. Immediately below was Legge Valley and just beyond was Third Ridge. From here they could see Turks digging in along the ridge beyond. Thomas, Boase and their men sniped at the steady stream of Turks that they could see advancing along the ridgeline towards Scrubby Knoll. Thomas ordered his men to climb further down the knoll towards Legge Valley, and with this they were met with a concentration of Turkish rifle and machine-gun fire. Many of his men were killed or wounded. Thomas made contact with Boase. They could now see the Turks advancing towards their position from Third Ridge. Both of their flanks now lay completely exposed; the Turkish advance threatened to sweep past their left and cut them off. They withdrew alternately by stages of about 50 metres, each covering the retirement of the other. Thomas had sent a runner to Major Brand to inform him of their withdrawal and asked for support along with word of the Turkish advance. The message for some unknown reason was never received. As part of the general advance across the plateau, however, a small party of about 136
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 137
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
50 men reached Thomas, who by now had taken up a position just forward of The Cup.33 This group may have included Private Loud (9th Battalion): On reaching shelter in the shape of an old trench I followed it down & along another narrow communications trench I came upon a gun shelter with funk-pits & deep communication and shelter trench connecting with other shelters in all I think built for about six guns. The shelters & trench were well constructed & had apparently been there for some months. There was two field guns there in the shelter & another with a couple of dead horses alongside a few yards from one shelter apparently the guns had been removed when our chaps advanced as there was a plentiful supply of shells in each funk-pit. There must have been about 60 of our lads in the trench also a machine gun which was doing excellent work until put out of action by a shell.34 Meanwhile Corporal Harrison and his men, who had previously captured the Turkish guns at The Cup, represented the right of Thomas’s platoon. They were, however, separated from the main part of Thomas’s platoon and were positioned further south, close to where Pine Ridge connects with the Lonesome Pine, on a landward spur facing Third Ridge. From this position they could not see that to their left Thomas and his men had withdrawn further up the plateau. Harrison and his men were now in great danger as they were completely isolated and well in front of the Australian ‘lines’. To the north, most Turks on the landward side of Chunuk Bair were making good their position behind three large sand pits, positioned 700 metres to Tulloch’s front. Soon a line of Turks to Tulloch’s right began firing at a line of Australians to his rear. These were a combination of Jackson’s and Margetts’s men who were taking cover in the scrub just beyond Baby 700.35 While Margetts and his men had pushed on over the summit of Baby 700, Robertson and his men had charged the Turkish trench that lay on the seaward side of Baby 700. They didn’t have to use their bayonets, as the Turks bolted, leaving them the trench. ‘You beaut, finally some decent cover.’ No sooner had they settled in, however, when a Turkish machine gun firing somewhere up ahead to their right played down the length of the trench—the position was completely enfiladed by Turkish fire.36 137
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 138
25 APRIL 1915
‘Stone the bloody crows.’ The Australians were themselves now forced to bolt from the trench and retreat back to the head of Malone’s Gully. Hedley Howe and Joe Adam had both been part of the party to assault the trench. Howe later recalled: Joe Adam . . . claimed to have shot him [a Turkish officer] and took off his sword and scabbard. So far as I know, Turkish infantry officers, like ours, did not carry swords. Ten minutes after Joe got his, we knew why [swords were proscribed]. He had become the greatest nuisance on the battlefront. Some Turks evidently saw him with the sword—and as he was the only one carrying that weapon, they must have come to the conclusion he was the Australian Regimental commander—and detailed a machine gun especially to take care of Joe. During the day we were in and out of the trench three times— until finally deciding to stay out of it. So long as we held the head of the adjacent Malone’s Gully it wasn’t any use to the Turks or to us. Four times during the day we also pushed forward over the crest of Baby 700—and four times we were pushed back . . . together with Joe and his sword, followed everywhere he went by the Turkish machine-gun which didn’t hit him but got nearly everybody in the neighbourhood . . . Dozens of times we told him to ‘Throw the damned thing Away!’ but he persisted in hanging onto it.37 As these men withdrew from the Turkish trench, a call went along Margetts’s and Jackson’s lines that ‘the left are retiring’.38 This misinformation was the result of confusion and poor communication, exacerbated by the thick scrub. It appears that someone near the summit of Baby 700 incorrectly thought that their left flank was retreating towards Russell’s Top. With the evacuation of the trench, numerous Turks could be seen creeping down the seaward side of Battleship Hill to the left. With this the Australians along the seaward side of Baby 700 believed that their left was now completely exposed and they were forced to withdraw across the summit of Baby 700 to its southern slopes. Conversely, now Robertson and his men had to retire as they witnessed their right withdrawing back over Baby 700. Communications, or more precisely a lack thereof, would be a major factor in the day’s events—for both sides. It was now close to 10 a.m. and with this withdrawal the seaward slopes of Baby 700 were completely open to the enemy. Turks began to filter back towards the summit of Baby 700.39 138
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 139
‘900 yards . . . three rounds . . . fire!’
250 metres
0
Turks X
X X
Battleship Hill Malone’s Gully
X
Margetts Tulloch
Robertson Lalor Russell’s Top
Mortar Ridge
Incebayir Ridge
Map 10.3 The opening battles for the northern heights
From Sinclair-MacLagan’s headquarters positioned just north of Wire Gully along Second Ridge, he saw for the first time the desperate fighting that was taking place along the northern heights. He became concerned upon seeing a party of Australians withdrawing from the summit of Baby 700. Sinclair-MacLagan, who was now in charge of the northern sector, realised that the defence of the heights might be turning against the Australians and that men were urgently needed in that sector. Satisfied that the southern flank along 400 Plateau was secure, after issuing orders for the forward companies to retire and construct a continuous defensive line, he focused on sending all available reinforcements that came his way towards Baby 700. The southern sector was now under the command of M’Cay, and had already been reinforced with most of the 2nd Brigade and parts of the 1st Brigade. He had originally believed that two companies of the 3rd Battalion and the whole of the 2nd and 4th battalions, which were yet to arrive, were needed to support his southern flank. Sinclair-MacLagan was now in telephone contact with Major General Bridges and impressed upon the divisional commander, however, the need to reinforce the northern heights with these same men.40 139
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 140
11 ‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’ s the Turks began their advance towards 400 Plateau, men of the Australian 1st Brigade continued to land. Two companies of the 1st Battalion were pushed up to the firing line strung out along the plateau. Private Jones described their advance up to 400 Plateau just to the right of the Lonesome Pine:
A
We had advanced over two hills and we had shrapnel and snipers at us all the time. As we were badly needed we had to go at the double. I will never forget that run as long as I live. When we reached them, there was only 6 of my company with our 3 officers and we had to wait till the others came up. I wasn’t sorry for the spell either. When they came up we made a final dash to the firing line. I was sadly disappointed when I got there, for there was not a Turk visible and we were under a hail of fire from shrapnel and machine guns. It was very annoying lying down with shrapnel and bullets cutting the ground all around and not being able to stand. Some of our chaps blazed away on chance of getting something but as we were told to save ammunition I only fired one shot. I only fired that on chance because I knew a sniper was on me. He just missed me 3 times so I fired into a rather prominent bush 50 yards away.1 Even at this ‘late’ stage of the landings, men were far from safe in getting from their transports to the beach, as later recalled by Private De Saxe of the 3rd Battalion: We were only about half a mile out when—bang! A shell burst right in our boat—it was reputed to be a nose-cap of a French 75. Of course we were in the drink, and what a shemozzle! Trying to get my puttees and boots off, and stay above water, you know. Luckily I was 140
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 141
‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’
a good swimmer, but how many drowned around me I wouldn’t know, but must have been a lot of them. A naval pinnace came and hooked us out after about half an hour. They put a boathook round you and hauled you up onto the pinnace. And the place was a cauldron of bursting shells. The pinnace took us to a hospital ship, but the pinnace was hit and sunk alongside the hospital ship! So, in the drink again! Then we had to climb up rope ladders up the sides of the bloody ship . . . I lost my rifle pack and God knows what. And we had a medical examination and they reckoned I was suffering with shock and immersion. Later I was sent back with reinforcements.2 Shortly after Margetts and his men had withdrawn from the summit of Baby 700, Tulloch, still on Incebayir Ridge, noticed in the skyline, about 800 metres away, a solitary tree on the northern slopes of Chunuk Bair, with a Turkish officer standing beneath it. This officer appeared to be giving and receiving numerous messages. Tulloch took careful aim and fired at this officer, but missed. It has since often been suggested that this officer was Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) who had by now arrived at Chunuk Bair with advanced elements of the 57th Regiment. Kemal, on starting his earlier advance to Hill 971, had sent off two guides to find the best way forward; however, they soon became lost in the scrub. It was not only the Anzacs who had to fight the terrain. Kemal’s ‘route’ of march was across rough terrain, covered in thick scrub, marked by endless gullies and spurs. Unlike Aker, Kemal had no roads, but only narrow goat tracks to help him reach the battles around Ari Burnu. While Kemal set a driving pace in front along with Zeki Bey and advanced parties of the 57th Regiment, the bulk of the regiment began to become strung out across the ‘line of march’ as a result of the difficult terrain and thick scrub.3 Mustafa Kemal arrived on the scene just before 10 a.m. with advanced parties of the 57th Regiment. He was now pushing his men piecemeal into the battle for Battleship Hill and Baby 700. It was at this point that he issued his famous order, ‘I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die. By the time we are dead, other units and commanders will have come up to take our place.’ His written orders to his troops that morning were later recovered from a dead Turkish soldier. They read: ‘I do not expect that any of us would not rather die than repeat the shameful story of the Balkan war. But if there are such men among us, we should at once lay hands upon them and set them in line to be shot!’4 141
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 142
25 APRIL 1915
In 1918 Mustafa Kemal recalled: I started the march towards the enemy with the 57th Regiment which was at [the] ready and a mountain battery. This regiment is famous because all of its members were killed. There was no road towards Kacacimen [Koja Chemen Tepe—Hill 971], and it was such a rough terrain. We finally managed to get to this hill which is the highest on the peninsula. However, Ariburnu was in a blind spot and could not be seen, so I could only observe many boats and warships on the sea. I asked the regiment to have a rest and I walked towards Çonkbayiri [Chunuk Bair] with the regimental doctor, the commander of the battery and my lieutenant. As we got there, we saw a group of soldiers running towards us from Hill 261 [the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair]. I stopped them and asked them why they were running, they said, ‘Sir, the enemy!’ and showed a small band of soldiers following them at a distance. Can you imagine, the enemy was closer to me than my troops which I had left behind. I shouted, ‘You cannot run away from the enemy!’ They said they had no bullets left and I replied, ‘If you have no ammunition you have your bayonets’ and ordered them to fix bayonets and face the enemy. Upon this action, the enemy soldiers also laid down. In the meantime I asked my lieutenant to urgently bring the regiment’s soldiers to this spot. Pretty soon, the first company arrived. I ordered these soldiers to start firing at the enemy. Also placed the battery into position in a dry creek bed and began firing on the enemy. It was about 10 a.m. Then I received a report that the 27th Regiment also came to the location and began engaging the enemy further below where we were.5 It is likely that the Turks retiring up the ridge who were met by Mustafa Kemal belonged to Second Lieutenant Ibrahim-Hayreddin’s platoon, who had earlier left Fisherman’s Hut and had been engaged in the fighting along the northern heights for the last hour or so. His men were running low on ammunition and Ibrahim-Hayreddin had ‘sent two patrols to ask for ammunition and to enquire about the situation. When they returned a little later, without ammunition, they were accompanied by GOC 19th Division (Atatürk) and his personal staff, followed by the Advanced Guard of the 57th Regiment. They joined up with that Regiment.’6 Ibrahim-Hayreddin was very soon afterwards wounded, but eventually was able to make his way to a 142
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 143
‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’
field hospital. Very few members of his platoon would survive the next few hours. Kemal ordered Zeki Bey’s 1st Battalion to push the approaching enemy troops—Margetts’s men, who could still be seen just beyond Baby 700—back into the sea. At the same time he also placed the mountain battery near Chunuk Bair. The advanced guard of the 1st Battalion, however, was directed against the inland slope of Baby 700 and Mortar Ridge (Tulloch’s men). As recounted by Zeki Bey to Charles Bean in 1919: the advance was very difficult because we had come straight across country, and by the time when Mustafa Kemal Bey told me to attack my men were scattered and it was possible to get at only one part of them. It was when I was searching for them, looking out from Third Ridge near Chunuk Bair, that I first saw the Australians. There was a line of them on the inland slope of Dus Tepe (Straight Hill, i.e. Battleship Hill) and they were advancing. Some soldiers of my battalion had crossed one of the valleys between me and the Australians—I think it was Dik Dere (Deep Valley i.e the valley in which lay . . . three sandpits . . .) and had attacked the Australians so closely that it seemed as if the bayonets might be used. I could see a line of men of my battalion on the spur.7 As the Turks from the 2nd Battalion arrived they were to cross high up the range to its seaward slope, keeping to the right of the 1st Battalion, and attack Baby 700 and the seaward spurs. When it arrived the 3rd Battalion would be held in reserve, but would eventually be pushed down the landward slopes in support.8 At this point Kemal decided he needed to support the attacks of the 57th and 27th regiments with one of the two remaining regiments of his own division and ordered that the 77th (Arab) Regiment be brought to Ari Burnu and attack between the 57th and 27th regiments. Having satisfied himself that the situation was at least temporarily in hand, Kemal hurried back towards Maidos to report to the commander of the III Corps, Esat Pa¸s a. During a short lull, Tulloch passed up and down the line and found that his men’s ‘water bottles were practically untouched, a sign of high discipline’.9 Soon, however, intense fire recommenced; they started to receive long-distance enfilading fire from their left flank, the intensity and accuracy of which increased as the Turks got closer. Lieutenant Reid, who was in command of Tulloch’s right flank, was ‘in a kneeling position 143
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 144
25 APRIL 1915
examining the ground in front with his glasses’ when he received a serious wound to his thigh.10 One of his men offered to help him back to The Nek, but he refused help and crawled off into the scrub to make his own way back, dragging his shattered leg behind him—he was never seen again. It was about now that Tulloch could see to his right a line of Turks almost in the same alignment as themselves but facing the other way and firing at other Australians who were half a mile south, probably on Mortar Ridge. These would have been Loutit and his men.11 Tulloch also noticed that the Australians who had been on Baby 700 had disappeared and that a number of Turks were now behind his left flank. Numbers of Turks could also be seen approaching Baby 700 and in addition Turks were massing to his front, concentrating behind a crest close to the three sand pits.12 ‘Hey Bill, it’s getting a bit too bloody thick around here with Jacko . . . Bill . . .’ There was no reply. Tulloch now had no choice; he had to retire. He gave orders to his surviving 40 or so men to begin a fighting withdrawal. He organised as best he could for the survivors of his company to form into four lines, which would then attempt to ‘leapfrog’ their way back to the Australian lines, to the rear of Baby 700. Two sections would lay down covering fire, while the other two sections would retire and then take up a position from where they in turn could offer covering fire to the other two sections. As they made their way back through the scrub, the men continued to shout out Reid’s name, but no answer was heard.13 If Tulloch or any of his men had looked down into the valley immediately below they would have seen Loutit and his men making for Mortar Ridge with a mass of Turks now just starting to advance from Third Ridge towards Second Ridge, while even further south they would have seen a concentration of shrapnel shells exploding above 400 Plateau. Loutit and his men were by now leapfrogging across the lower spurs of Third Ridge, turning west towards Mortar Ridge. Just beyond lay the relative safety of Wire Gully. At this point they must have been relieved to see Peck and Newman who were advancing towards them. They met up at a small knoll at the base of the Mortar Ridge, a position they tried to hold, while the wounded were evacuated to Second Ridge via Wire Gully. The Turks, who had already started their counterattack from Third Ridge in an attempt to push the enemy off Second Ridge and 400 Plateau, were now very close behind Loutit and his men and were laying down concentrated fire. Soon Peck was hit and evacuated back through Wire Gully. 144
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 145
‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’
By now the commander of the Turkish 3rd Battalion ordered his 3rd and 4th companies, who had just captured Incebayir Ridge, to charge the Australians and drive them off Mortar Ridge. At the same time he also ordered part of the 2nd Company under the command of Lieutenant Mithat to occupy and secure the right flank of the regiment by entrenching along Incebayir Ridge.14 The Turks charged en masse, but the fire from Loutit’s men, and more importantly from those strung out along Second Ridge above, brought the Turkish charge to a halt; the survivors were forced back to Incebayir Ridge. Private Combs, who was part of Peck’s party, later recorded in his diary that the Turks ‘started to advance on us, so we held them up long enough for the men at our rear to take up a position . . . they came on with a rush and our officer ordered us to retire, which we did, at post haste-speed. Some of our party went back to either flank, and the remainder straight back the way they came . . . those who went to the flanks never returned . . . I don’t think I ever ran so hard before in my life.’15 During their retirement back towards Wire Gully, the Australians positioned along Second Ridge continued to provide covering fire. These men had earlier noticed Loutit and his men retiring from Third Ridge. Major Denton ordered Lieutenant Selby to leave the seaward side of Second Ridge with a platoon to support the retreating Australians from a position on the landward side of the same ridge. Selby and his men occupied what would later become known as German Officer’s Ridge.16 Amongst these Australians was Corporal Ted Mofflin of the 11th Battalion who noticed ‘a thin khaki line of our lads lying down firing. Then they got up and retired a bit and fired and retired again and we could see Turks coming over the hills in front of them in hundreds so we thought the best thing we could do was to drop into an old Turkish communication trench . . . and open a dropping fire over their heads to cover their retreat.’17 Loutit and the others raced into Wire Gully. It was scrubby, broken and narrow, which provided them some shelter from the Turkish fire. Most of them scrambled up its southern slope and found themselves on Johnston’s Jolly. On reaching the top of the plateau about 50 metres behind them, Loutit noticed a firing line being established (men of the 10th Battalion). They did not retire to this line, but instead started to dig in at their present position to act as a covering force overlooking Wire Gully. Of the 40 or so men who had ventured out with Loutit and Haig beyond Second Ridge, only eleven returned to the Australian lines. 145
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 146
25 APRIL 1915
X X X X X X
Tulloch Lalor & Margetts
Baby 700
Mortar Ridge
Incebayir Ridge
3rd Bn
1st Bn
10th Bn 400 Plateau
8th Bn
Boase Thomas
9th Bn
6th & 12th Bns
Loutit
Adana Bair
0
500 metres
Note: Position of the 9th Battalion as shown also includes many scattered parties of men from the 2nd and 3rd brigades.
Map 11.1 Loutit’s withdrawal from Adana Bair to the base of Mortar Ridge and eventually Wire Gully, and Turkish counterattack from Third Ridge, around 10.30 a.m.
Meanwhile, Selby and his men who had offered covering fire to Loutit’s party had been forced to retire from German Officer’s Ridge as it was too exposed to Turkish fire. They withdrew back to the front of Courtney’s Post.18 Lieutenant Colonel Aker’s 1st Battalion had started to move towards the Australians on 400 Plateau and was able to take advantage of supporting machine-gun and artillery fire sweeping the plateau. However his northern flank, consisting of the 3rd Battalion, was now in a potentially very difficult and dangerous position. On occupying the lower parts of Mortar and Incebayir ridges and Kilicdere Gully, they maintained close 146
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 147
‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’
contact with the Australians located on Second Ridge. The commander of the battalion felt that his right flank was relatively secure as the Turkish forces positioned above along the northern heights (57th Regiment) were helping to cover this flank as they followed up on Tulloch’s withdrawal from Battleship Hill and Baby 700. However, their left flank had become exposed, as the area they needed to advance across was too vast for the companies committed to the attack and a large gap had now developed between the Turks of the 1st and 3rd battalions. The commander of the 3rd Battalion just hoped that the 1st Battalion, now some distance south of his position, would be able to keep the enemy from taking advantage of the developing breach between both battalions.19 Lieutenant Colonel Aker was surely wondering whether it was time to send in his remaining men to help cover the gap—but no, he needed to keep them in reserve to exploit any breakthrough that the Turks might make, or to help repel any counterattack that the enemy might launch. Aker later recorded: The more our attack developed and especially as our left flank [1st Battalion’s attack] got into a delicate and dangerous situation, the more our eyes drifted involuntarily to the eastern slopes of the Kocacimen mountains [northern ridge including Chunuk Bair and Battleship Hill]. We saw, in that direction, the forces we were expecting. The 57th Regiment, together with their artillery and machineguns began to arrive from that very direction with the brave Divisional G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] at their head, leading them from the front . . . As soon as I realised that the G.O.C. had arrived I sent him a simplified report explaining the situation of the enemy and the situation of ourselves and thus, from that moment, I came under his command.20 Lieutenant Fortescue (9th Battalion), who had earlier that morning been ordered to occupy the head of Owen’s Gully, had now been forced into the gully itself because of the concentrated shrapnel and machine-gun fire. Soon a captain from the 8th Battalion who had been ordered to reinforce the firing line came across Fortescue within Owen’s Gully and ordered that he join what he believed to be the 9th Battalion ‘firing line’ near the Lonesome Pine. Fortescue and his men were soon moving across the southern part of the plateau and in doing so suffered a number of casualties before meeting up with Lieutenant Costin and a number of his machine-gun section. Costin had no idea where the ‘firing line’ was 147
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 148
25 APRIL 1915
located but believed that a number of the 9th Battalion were now positioned in a ‘gully’ to his left (The Cup). With this Fortescue and his surviving men, around seven in all, joined up with Boase, Thomas and others. By now the Turkish counterattack could be seen driving past their northern flank; the main attack seemed to be directed at Johnston’s Jolly. Further to the north, Tulloch and his men had managed to withdraw behind the southern slopes of Baby 700, where they came across Jackson and his men. He ordered two sections to take up a defensive position along the landward side to hold up the approaching Turks, while he and the other two sections along with Jackson moved around the rear of Baby 700 towards its seaward side. Jackson likely informed Tulloch of how they had been badly mauled as the Turks held the high ground and the thick scrub made it impossible to communicate. It was impossible to know where the men and the Turks were and it was developing into a number of isolated fights—there was no firing line to speak of and any attempt to organise one resulted in a hail of fire from the heights close by: the men just had to keep their heads down. It also seemed that a large number of Turkish reinforcements were now being fed into the battle and the Australians were increasingly becoming outnumbered. By now Turkish shrapnel fire had also started to land just south of Baby 700. Tulloch must have been startled to see that just beyond Malone’s Gully and approaching the summit of Baby 700 were large numbers of Turks. He only now realised how intense the fight had been for the seaward slopes of the hills along the ridge and consequently how lucky he and the survivors of his party had been in escaping total annihilation.21 At this time, around 10.15 a.m., Drake-Brockman and his men managed to climb up to The Nek from Monash Valley.22 DrakeBrockman met up with Lalor just beyond The Nek and asked him if he thought that he could hold his current position from what appeared to be an imminent Turkish attack developing to their front, just beyond the summit of Baby 700. Drake-Brockman realised that it was crucial that the Australians reoccupy and hold the summit of Baby 700. The previous fighting had stretched the line, which was now described as ‘pitiably thin’—losses had been heavy.23 If the Turks were to capture Baby 700 and then push down onto Russell’s Top, they would be in a position to fire on the backs of the Australians strung out along Second Ridge as well as those below in Monash Valley and 400 Plateau to the south. The Australian position at Anzac would be untenable. 148
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 149
‘Those who went to the flanks never returned’
Around the same time Lieutenant Colonel Aker received orders from the 9th Division commander that he ‘should not allow our forces to suffer unnecessary losses and that since, in case of need the defence of the Kumtepe area [beach south of Gaba Tepe] had also been entrusted to my Regiment I was, in any case, to keep one battalion in reserve for that side. I was to inform him immediately of the quantity and type of force which the enemy had landed and I was, without fail, to drive the enemy out . . . I could see the Kumtepe beaches from where I was and there were no enemy ships to be seen there.’24 Whilst Aker was writing a situation report for his divisional commander he received the following two additional orders that had been written almost two hours earlier by his divisional headquarters. Lt. Col. Sefik Bey [Aker] Time 0825 hours A quarter of an hour ago 57th Regiment 19th Division set out from your right flank together with a Mountain Battery and the General Officer Commanding. Halil Sami G.O.C. The second stated: Have just arranged for 57th Regiment of 19th Division to proceed to Kocacimen and your right flank. General officer commanding 19th Division is also going with the regiment. You should cooperate in your communication arrangements. Halil Sami G.O.C.25 With this Aker felt some relief, and ‘in order [to] still further . . . increase their zeal, I immediately told the battalion commanding officers’.26
149
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 150
Anzac 1919 The day before Bean and members of the Australian Historical Mission were scheduled to leave Anzac (6 March), they tried to find the inland route taken by Loutit and Ryder and their men as they approached Third Ridge on the morning of 25 April 1915. They, along with Blackburn, Robin, Plant and their men represent those who made it ‘farthest in’. While the war was still raging in 1918, Bean had met Loutit, who was then 24 years old and a lieutenant colonel in charge of a battalion; just three years earlier he had been a lieutenant in charge of a platoon. Loutit told Bean about his exploits along Adana Bair. Bean, now once again at Anzac, took the opportunity to search the spur he believed that Loutit and his men occupied during the early hours of that first Anzac Day: Over the southern end of [the] spur (which Zeki Bey told us was called Adana Ridge) . . . we found, in the scrub along the summit of the spur, Australian cartridges, some of them opened by the Turks, and a mess-tin. Several hundred yards farther north, along another section of its crest, were similar traces, including an Australian puttee, and close behind them an Australian tunic; and on the ridge to our rear of it (called by Zeki Bey Fondaluk Sirt, ‘Brown Hill’) Balfour found an Australian cap, exactly between the point where the tunic was found and the mouth of Wire Gully. Men lying where we saw the first traces above-mentioned would look across a valley to the Third Ridge itself, exactly 400 yards away; further north the spur came rather closer to it. And along the part of the crest where we found the more northern traces there were also a line of spent Turkish cartridges or clips and the remains of a few Turks. These almost certainly marked the place at which, after the disappearance of whatever Australians had fought there, the Turks had reached the crest and lain for a time firing at someone (probably the retiring Australians) on the next ridge towards Anzac. There seemed very little doubt that the traces we had found were those of Loutit’s and Ryder’s men.1 150
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 151
Anzac 1919
After Bean returned to Australia he wrote to Loutit and included with his letter a copy of a map of Anzac and asked Loutit if he would trace his course on the map to the best of his knowledge. It was not long before Loutit’s response arrived. On the map that I sent him . . . Loutit marked the position of his line and Ryder’s exactly where we had found the two groups of cartridges and other relics; and the red ink line showing his retirement runs across the foot of successive ridges, including the small knoll and the slope where Balfour found the Australian cap. Up the ridge north of it (Fondaluk Sirt) we found where a line of Turks had lain shooting . . . These Turks would have come over Scrubby Knoll, north of Loutit . . . And my diary says that in the valley there, Usum Dere (Long Valley) near the remains of a Turkish camp, Balfour and I found some of our kit evidently taken with unfired cartridges in it; for in it were many empty clips; and one fired cartridge, and one not fired, were not far away. These possibly mean that some man got into the Usum Dere—possibly one of the men who lost themselves.2
151
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 152
12 ‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
fter having received Sinclair-MacLagan’s urgent appeal to send all available troops towards Baby 700, Major General Bridges had ordered two companies of the 3rd Battalion to the northern heights. Major Villiers-Stuart met their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Owen, on the beach with orders from the division commander. ‘Push on. Reinforcements are wanted on the left. Go right forward.’ The companies quickly formed up in the gullies along the seaward face of First Ridge and it was not long before they started to climb towards Plugge’s Plateau along a track now being constructed by the engineers. Having also just landed and seeing a long line ahead moving up to Plugge’s Plateau, Major Swannell (a famous rugby international) of the 1st Battalion ordered his company to dump their packs before following behind Owen’s men. The second-in-command of the 3rd Battalion, Major Kindon, was coming up behind his men and upon arriving on top of Plugge’s was ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Owen to divert Swannell’s men (who were just arriving behind him) towards Baby 700. Kindon himself decided to take direct command of Swannell’s company and with him moved down into Rest Gully. From there they would make their way onto Russell’s Top, avoiding the march up what would later be known as Monash Valley.1 Meanwhile, Major Lamb and his company of the 3rd Battalion had also climbed up to Plugge’s Plateau from the beach. Like others of the battalion, Lamb and his men moved down from Plugge’s into Shrapnel Gully. They found themselves in a long line winding through the gully, approaching Monash Valley. Lamb detached two of his platoons under the command of Captain McConaghy to climb the heights directly to their right. They soon found themselves on top of Second Ridge in the vicinity of MacLaurin’s Hill. McConaghy moved across German Officer’s Ridge and occupied its landward side.2 The remaining two
A
152
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 153
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
platoons under the command of Major Lamb continued up the valley and would eventually find themselves fighting a desperate action alongside others at the head of Monash Valley. Another company of the 3rd Battalion under the command of Major Brown had followed Lamb into Shrapnel Gully from Plugge’s, but upon hearing urgent calls from 400 Plateau for reinforcements Brown diverted his troops towards these calls. Before reaching the plateau, however, they came across Sinclair-MacLagan close to his headquarters on MacLaurin’s Hill. Sinclair-MacLagan explained the situation to Brown. ‘I should like to send you on the left,’ Sinclair-MacLagan stated, ‘because, if they get that high land [Baby 700], we are done. But you must hang on in front of this hill at all costs. I have established my headquarters here, and I am not going to retire.’3 Brown established contact with McConaghy and extended the firing line from McConaghy’s right down to Wire Gully. Their right flank was covered by two platoons under the command of lieutenants Carter and McDonald, who moved into Wire Gully and then took up a position just forward of the firing line. In addition to this another half-company was sent to help strengthen the firing line then being established by Denton and his men of the 11th Battalion a little further north along Second Ridge at Courtney’s Post.4 Lieutenant Newman of the 11th Battalion had by now arrived on Johnston’s Jolly close to the 10th Battalion and set up a machine gun to help cover Wire Gully. By now Turks from Aker’s 3rd Battalion could be seen occupying the lower parts of Mortar and Incebayir ridges only a few hundred metres away, while Turks of the 1st Battalion that they could not see, but were likely aware of, were approaching the slopes of Johnston’s Jolly itself. At this point most of the Australian 3rd Battalion had been absorbed into establishing the firing line along Second Ridge. However, half of Captain Leer’s company of this battalion was ordered by SinclairMacLagan to reinforce Baby 700. Leer moved up Monash Valley with his men. Meanwhile Major Denton, who was still positioned on Second Ridge in the area of Courtney’s Post, had seen the Australians withdrawing from Baby 700 back towards The Nek and was now greatly concerned about the safety of his left flank. He was relatively confident that with the reinforcements from the 3rd Battalion he could hold Second Ridge. He ordered Captain Giles of the 10th Battalion to climb down into the valley to their rear with a composite of around 150 men and make their way to Baby 700. Giles, who had previously witnessed the retreat of Loutit and Ryder and their men from Wire Gully, had also 153
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 154
25 APRIL 1915 X
X X X
1st Bn
11th & 12th Bn men
North Beach
Russell’s Top
Pope’s Hill
Mortar Ridge
Reserve Gully
Incebayir Ridge
Swannell Lamb Leer Anzac Cove
Shrapnel Gully
0
500 metres
Denton Giles Rockliff Mule Macfarlane Valley McConaghy Brown 3rd Bde HQ Carter McDonald MG
10th Bn men
X X X X
X XX X 3rd Bn X X
X
X 3rd Bn
X X X
X
MG = Newman’s section with machine gun (Johnston’s Jolly)
Map 12.1 Australian reinforcements rush towards the northern heights and Second Ridge; Australians retreat from Baby 700
observed a number of Turks crossing Kesik Dere (Mule Valley) in a northwest direction towards the heights of Baby 700. Giles was concerned that the Turks were about to occupy the gap within the Australian lines at the head of Monash Valley and decided that his men must bridge it. Giles and Leer soon met up in Monash Valley where Giles informed Leer of his fears and both agreed that they should urgently occupy the head of the valley before the Turks reached it. Giles was right in this calculation as Mortar Ridge was positioned between Baby 700 and 400 Plateau and was at this point completely open to the Turks. As such, there was a broad opening from the Bloody Angle to Baby 700 that the Turks could charge through, splitting the Australian line in two.5 At around 10.15 a.m., a mass of Turks charged over the summit of Baby 700 towards the Australians’ thin firing line, forcing the survivors to race back to The Nek. This feature, as its name suggests, forms a natural bottleneck where the Australians hoped to hold up the Turkish attack. A number of rifle pits had been dug by Lalor’s men; now the combined rifle fire of the Australians stopped the Turkish advance. The Turks melted into the scrub and started to pick off the Australians one by one with sniper fire. 154
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 155
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
From his headquarters on MacLaurin’s Hill, Sinclair-MacLagan witnessed with dismay what appeared to be the total collapse of his northern flank as the Australians withdrew towards Russell’s Top. He quickly telegraphed Bridges that the northern end of Russell’s Top was ‘seriously threatened’ and that in his opinion it was doubtful whether the available troops would be able to hold the position. The divisional commander ordered parts of his sole reserve from the 1st Brigade to the northern heights. Bridges ordered Colonel MacLaurin, commander of the 1st Brigade, to release two companies from his 2nd Battalion, which were to go with all haste to the threatened position of The Nek and Baby 700. Major Scobie, second-in-command of this battalion, was instructed to take Gordon’s and Richardson’s companies to these threatened positions. The first to leave was Gordon’s company, which arriving just below Russell’s Top came up behind Kindon, who had previously taken command of Swannell’s company with the same objective of driving the Turks off Baby 700 and Battleship Hill.6 Private Cavill, who was with Swannell, later remembered the climb towards Russell’s Top: We commenced fighting our way up the third hill, which, personally, I think was the worst of the lot. Never again do I expect to see such superhuman efforts. Dragging the ammunition and entrenching implements, the men struggled up this almost perpendicular, crumbling, scrub-covered cliff in the face of a withering fire. One exposed knoll, which snipers were paying particular attention to, we were compelled to rush over singly. As it came to my turn, I bolted, pick in one hand and a rifle in the other, as hard as my legs would carry me. One had simply to claw one’s way up the soft, yielding bank. No sooner had I reached the top than a dozen bullets kicked up the dirt around me. An officer who followed me said, ‘What’s the matter, laddie?’—‘Drop’, I shouted. He did so, only just in time to miss a perfect fusillade of snipers’ bullets.7 By now the battalions of the Turkish 27th Regiment were driving across Legge Valley in their counterattack. The main focus of the Turkish 1st Battalion’s attack was the landward slopes of 400 Plateau, while its right flank was trying to keep in contact with parts of the 3rd Battalion in the vicinity of Mortar Ridge to the north. The two battalions of Aker’s regiment were both stretched very thin. As recalled by Aker, ‘this precarious situation was not due to bad judgment. We knew the danger and we 155
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 156
25 APRIL 1915
went into it with our eyes open.’8 While Aker was concerned about the broad front of his attack, he had no choice; were he to focus and concentrate at one point, his flanks would be exposed. He tried to make contact with Kemal’s 57th Regiment to his right (whose advanced parties were now occupying Baby 700), while also attempting to cover his left flank beyond 400 Plateau. The position of his No. 2 and No. 4 companies (3rd Battalion), who were occupying the lower parts of Mortar and Incebayir ridges, represented his extreme right flank. In their present position they could serve the general plan better, that is to say in order to help 57th Regiment’s attack they could have an effect on the flank and rear of the superior Australian forces on that flank and they would also be able to survey the right flank of our firing line which was rather far forward in relation to 57th Regiment. Moreover a withdrawal by one of the two belligerents who are in close contact with each other usually results in the other side advancing in pursuit. To give the Australians the impression that we were weak by withdrawing towards the [left] flank of our force which was about to attack Kanli Sirt [Lonesome Pine] would not have been a correct move. For this reason I decided that our No. 2 Company should continue to fight the Australians from where they were. I also thought it advisable that one of the companies of the 3rd Battalion which was at the southern end of the Edirne Ridge [Mortar Ridge] should be left there in order to oppose the expected Australian advance from the direction of . . . Merkez Tepe [Mekkes Tepe, located on Second Ridge] and at the same time the company would fire on targets which could be seen on Kanli Sirt, could facilitate the attack which we would be making on this ridge and later on could take part from close at hand, by supporting this attack.9 Aker had earlier sent the remainder of his Turkish mounted troops to suitable locations along the road to look for the mountain battery from Çam Burnu. Twenty years later he recalled, ‘As I write this I can feel again the anxiety which that Artillery company caused me and the nervous state in which it left me just three hours after the start of the battle. The fact that our two battalions who had mounted an attack against the enemy’s vastly superior forces had been deprived of artillery help . . . was one of my great worries.’10 156
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 157
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
Around 10.30 a.m. the Mountain Artillery Battery finally arrived at Scrubby Knoll. Aker explained its late arrival: When this company stopped to rest behind a ridge in the vicinity they were seen by the mounted troopers whom I had posted at various points to look for them and they were brought to us. The company commander deserved to be punished for being late without reason. I should have sent him under arrest for a court martial. But he was a young inexperienced officer. I took this into consideration and having regard to his honour and personal dignity warned him that to atone for his crime he must do good work and do no more dishonourable actions. The young company commander was thoroughly ashamed. In order to find out whether or not this officer was a useful member (of the Regiment) it was necessary above all to see whether or not he was an honourable man, repentant of what he had done. I was convinced that this fellow officer would make the grade and overlooked his offence.11 The guns of the battery were moved into position close to Scrubby Knoll. With Sedik’s surviving artillery piece, Aker now had five mountain guns to aid his counterattack. Soon the commanding officer of the battalion to which the Çam Burnu battery belonged arrived and took command of the guns. The battery was set up, the order was given and 400 Plateau was ‘bombed with high explosive bombs and shrapnel. This bombardment proclaimed that a bitter hard wrestling match was about to begin between the brave stubborn Australian soldier and the warlike sons of Turkey.’12 Indeed, the fire was so severe that the Turks on the lower slopes of 400 Plateau took up a defensive position and waited for the barrage to lift—to advance now would likely mean being killed by their own artillery and machine-gun fire. At this point Lieutenant Hakki (2nd Battalion) and the survivors of his platoon, who had previously been pushed off Bolton’s Ridge at the start of the invasion, had made their way to Scrubby Knoll. Aker immediately ordered that he take his men and attack the southern slopes of Kanli Sirt in order to help secure the 1st Battalion’s left flank, to contain the Australians on that part of the field, and to ‘seize and occupy the former position [Bolton’s Ridge] . . . he had been obliged to abandon’.13 Aker was also still greatly concerned about the vulnerability of Gaba Tepe to attack and sent a message to the commander of the 2nd Battalion located there. He later recalled: 157
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 158
25 APRIL 1915
Russell’s Top
Turkish Battery
Plugge’s Plateau
1st Division HQ
Mortar Ridge
Wire Gully
5th Bn
3rd Bn XX 27th Rgt XX X
10th Bn Johnston’s Jolly
M’Cay’s HQ
27th Rgt Reserves
X X X X X
3rd Bde HQ
DP
8th Bn men
Boase Thomas
9th Bn Harrison
Third Ridge
X
X
6th, 8th & 12th Bn men
X
1st Bn 27th Rgt
Adana Bair
X
Bolton’s Ridge
X X
Pine Ridge
X X
0
500 metres
Map 12.2 Aker’s 27th Regiment approaches 400 Plateau; Australian 5th Battalion arrives on the plateau, around 10.45 a.m.
I drew attention to an expected flank counter-attack which the Australians might make, attacking from the southern slopes of Kanli Sirt and I said that if they saw any such move they should intervene. In all there was a force of four platoons in the trenches and in reserve at Kaba Tepe. It would not have been right to take this weak force from the trenches to oppose the Australian attack on Kaba Tepe as well as probable landings from the sea. For this reason I did not order this weak force to take part in the attack on the southern front of Kanli Sirt.14 Meanwhile two companies of the 5th Battalion, under the command of Fethers and Flockart, had started to move onto 400 Plateau as previously ordered by Major General Bridges. Saker’s company of the same battalion had by now landed and was also approaching its sister companies from the rear. They had made it onto the plateau via the Razorback in three long columns. As they started to move across the plateau, they became prime targets for the Turkish batteries as well as machine guns. 158
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 159
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
Fethers pushed on towards Johnston’s Jolly, while Saker took up a position to the right; in between was Flockart’s company. None could find the firing line that they had been sent to reinforce. Saker gave orders for his men to advance in short rushes, soon passing across the Daisy Patch. At the forward edge of the field which was sprouting red poppies, he ordered his surviving men to lie in the scrub. By this time Saker had few men with him. Most were either lost in the scrub, wounded or dead. It was also around 10.30 a.m. that Major Corbin, second-in-command of the Casualty Clearing Station, managed to get ashore. He wrote: Found as expected, heaps of work. The beach a tangled mess of men, heaving and straining to get more men, guns, and ammunition ashore. Shrapnel firing all the while we were landing, and it was no pleasure to sit idle in a boat rowing the last 50 yards under fire. The first men landed did splendidly getting two ridges, but are losing heavily and praying for reinforcements. Wounded pouring in. No chance of getting them off because all towage is used to land men and stores. These are being dressed and put on the beach, hundreds and hundreds of them, dying, dead and slightly wounded. All hands to work at a temporary dressing station over which shrapnel is singing constantly. The ships are bombarding from the sea and the noise is deafening. The infantry on the ridges are firing continuously maxims and rifles all the time. We hear the losses are terrific. No time for fear. Much too busy.15 Charles Bean arrived on the beach at around the same time: The wireless is up. The boys are digging out a place for Headquarters in this gully near the beach. The signallers seem to have been allotted a bit of the gully just above us and the artillery just above them. A Turkish prisoner is being examined at H.Q. . . . We saw a few wounded men, a very few, limping or carried along the beach. I think about half a dozen poor chaps were also lying there dead— with overcoats or rugs over them. Most of these were carried away round Northern point of the beach where they were laid out together, about 30 of them . . .16 By now Kindon, Swannell and their 60-odd men from the 1st Battalion had arrived on Russell’s Top. Drake-Brockman came across Kindon as 159
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 160
25 APRIL 1915
he arrived and told him of the urgency of the situation just up ahead. ‘Come on boys,’ said Kindon, ‘the West Australian chaps are in difficulties up there—let’s lend them a hand’. The men of the 3rd Brigade must have been relieved to see Kindon and Swannell’s men who at once instinctively deployed upon reaching The Nek. ‘No use dallying around here mate, we’re just going to be picked off one by one or get minced up by bloody shrapnel.’ It was agreed that they would charge the Turks in front and push on to their objective, Chunuk Bair. Together with the survivors of the 3rd Brigade they charged the Turks who had started to occupy Baby 700. The Turks were surprised by the sudden onslaught and were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back over the top of Baby 700; one was seen to be lumbering back over the shoulder of the hill with a machine gun strapped to a mule. Private Mustafa Koja (19th Division) later recalled: There was this sergeant from my village who was killed and his place was taken by this other bloke who tried to drive them all into the sea. He killed about five or six ‘Englishmen’ with this portable shovel he carried. He killed them with his shovel, hitting them over the head. We drove them back, but then there were more of them, and we had to retreat.17 For a second time, the Australians swept over the summit of Baby 700, with Margetts and his men reaching the position just beyond the summit they had occupied previously.18 While the battle for The Nek was going on, some Turks had hastily established a reserve trench that could now be seen beyond the summit of Baby 700, which now blocked Margetts’s line of advance. The entrenched Turks were not going to be pushed aside and bullets began to find their targets. The men were again forced to take cover in the scrub and gave up all hope of entrenching as any observed movement brought a concentrated volley not only from the trench in front, but also from somewhere to their right. Cavill later recalled: At the top of the hill we were in the full blast of the enemy’s fire. It was a perfect inferno. A score of machine-guns filled the air with their rat-a-tat; just like a hundred noisy motor bicycles; while the Turkish artillery threw a curtain of shrapnel along the ridge that looked as if it would stop any further effort to advance. But, knowing that our only safety lay in victory, one had to forget self and fight like the very devil. 160
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 161
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
North Beach
Malone’s Gully Walker’s Ridge
Lalor Margetts
1st Bn 57th Rgt X XX X XX X XX X X
Tulloch
The Sphinx
Mortar Ridge
Kindon Swannell
Pope’s Hill
Reserve Gully
Mule Valley
Razor Edge Plugge’s Plateau
0
Monash Valley 250 metres
Second Ridge Legge Valley
3rd Bn 27th Rgt
X X
X
Map 12.3 Australian counterattack retakes Baby 700; Turks withdraw towards Battleship Hill
But many of the boys never passed that shrapnel-swept ridge. One wounded lad, who was bleeding badly over the shoulder, popped himself up as we passed, and grinning hideously with his shattered mouth, he wheezed, ‘got it where the chicken got the axe,’ then fainted. Right and left men were being hit, and a fellow had to just clench his teeth and keep going, with the vague thought somewhere in the back of your cranium that you might be next. It was just here that my chum, Howard Proctor, was killed. A shrapnel burst right in the midst of the platoon in front of me; it cut the haversack from the side of Corporal Turton, and splashed two or three others, but poor Proctor was struck with a piece of the shell, which inflicted a fatal wound. The lads close at hand, after shaking hands with him, offered a few words of cheer, and then had to advance. A few minutes later, when my platoon advanced, I knelt by his side, but he was going fast; I tried to cheer him, but somehow I got a big lump in my throat, my eyes dimmed, and after a few incoherent words I was silent. Then in spite of the fact that he was paralysed by his wound, and almost at his 161
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 162
25 APRIL 1915
last gasp, his face brightened, and with a smile he said ‘Don’t worry about me, Cav., I feel quite satisfied; I feel I have done my bit; take my glasses and try and return them to my mother.’ And so brave Proctor passed away.19 Swannell and most of his men were positioned to the right and just behind Margetts and his men. From their position, Swannell looked into a gully where he could see several Turkish tents. It was from somewhere in this gully that these Australians became exposed to Turkish fire. This fire soon ended the life of the famous rugby international ‘when a Turkish bullet penetrated his forehead’ killing him instantly.20 This fire likely originated from Lieutenant Mithat’s men who were located within Kilicdere. As later stated by Aker: The Australians approached to within 100 to 200 metres over land which was covered in brushwood. At some point they came much closer. Both sides stood firm and resisted one another. The Battalion Commanding Officer saw that the situation was delicate. By this time he was wounded in the arm. Although he was wounded, this esteemed and brave Battalion Commanding Officer, Captain Halis, did not want to leave . . . this dangerous situation and waited a while, but because of the loss of blood and on the insistence of his comrades he was obliged to go back to the First Aid Post . . . After the Battalion Commanding Officer had withdrawn, the situation of the two platoons of No. 4 Company [3rd Battalion] from the small force remaining there, became very dangerous and sacrifice was demanded. The Commanding Officer No. 4 Company also had to withdraw from the battle after he had been wounded at the beginning of the attack.21 Twenty-year-old Lieutenant Ahmet Mucip, who would take over command of this company, later recalled: We started to see the effects of the battle on our side too. As minutes passed, fighting became more intense and horrendous. At that point the battalion commander, Halis Bey from Usak, arrived and began to examine the situation of the enemy . . . You could see in his face that he did not believe the situation was in our favour . . . I tried to understand why his face turned more and more pale and the confident look 162
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 163
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
in his eyes faded away . . . But in a short while the reason became apparent. The khaki cloth of his left arm slowly turned red and blood drops accumulated at his fingertips.22 After Halis was forced to retire, Mucip sent NCO Uskudarli Ihsan with two men to obtain information regarding their left flank. So far the Australian attack had been against the right, with little firing to their left. Soon, however, the firing against the left flank increased. Time passed and ‘no word came from Ihsan. I sent a reconnaissance column also. After a time they came back and brought the news, “Ihsan and his two comrades are lying dead. By their sides were seen two British corpses and a little further on one more. They had been shot from the front.” I sent this reconnaissance column 100 metres away to secure our left.’23 By now Gordon’s and Richardson’s companies of the 2nd Battalion had started their climb from Monash Valley towards Baby 700. Gordon and his men, who had been behind Kindon in the valley below, were the first to reach Russell’s Top in the vicinity of The Nek. Gordon consulted his map, and identified his position. He started to organise his men for their advance towards Baby 700 just to their front, when he was killed, with a shot to the head, in almost the same spot where Lieutenant Colonel Clarke had fallen just a few hours before. The junior officers and men pushed on and joined up with the left flank of Swannell’s men just beyond Baby 700.24 Richardson’s company reached The Nek just in time to see Gordon’s men disappearing over the landward spur of Baby 700. Richardson decided to cover the left flank of Gordon’s men and he and his men made their way over the seaward side of Baby 700. As Richardson’s men advanced over the seaward slopes, they saw around 60 Turks near the head of Malone’s Gully. These Turks appeared to be getting ready to withdraw; Richardson did not hesitate and ordered his men to charge with the bayonet. The Turks hesitated and, when the Australians got to within about 50 metres, bolted. With this, the Australians flung themselves down into a firing line and shot a number of them before the survivors managed to take cover in the northern scrub and seaside gullies.25 At this point increasing numbers of Turks were being pushed into the battles for the northern heights. They started to filter en masse towards the Australian lines just north of the summit of Baby 700, while others, mostly from the Turkish 2nd Battalion, started to move down the 163
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 164
25 APRIL 1915
seaward spurs of the heights and occupy the numerous spurs and gullies just above North Beach. The Australian left flank here was in continued danger of being turned. Indeed, every time Richardson and his men tried to advance, a hail of bullets tore into them and they were becoming increasingly exposed to Turkish fire from the northern heights around Battleship Hill. Richardson, who had already been wounded twice, was again shot: this third wound proved fatal. He was killed just as he raised himself above the scrub line yelling to one of his junior officers, ‘Carry on, Rigby’. Rigby continued onwards until he too was killed. The left flank began to retire towards Malone’s Gully, and the troops just to their right, close to the summit of Baby 700, also fell back, needing to keep in contact with their left. This flank was greatly thinned in numbers, with Richardson’s company fighting desperately to hold the left from further disintegration.26 History was starting to repeat itself. The combined counterattack of Aker’s 27th Regiment and Kemal’s 57th Regiment was now driving in between the Australians positioned on Baby 700 and 400 Plateau. Kindon and his men positioned along the inland spurs of Baby 700 could see small groups of Turks starting to
X X X X X 2nd Bn 57th Rgt X X X X 1st Bn X X X 57th Rgt X X X X X Margetts X Richardson X Kindon Lalor Gordon X
No. 1 Outpost Malone’s Gully
Walker’s Ridge
Mortar Ridge
Russell’s Top
Incebayir Ridge
X X 3rd Bn X 27th Rgt X
Lamb Leer Giles X
X X 3rd Bn X 27th Rgt
Map 12.4 The battle for Baby 700 intensifies 164
0
250 metres
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 165
‘What’s the matter, laddie?’
penetrate their right flank. Other Turks were also beginning to push into the gap between Kindon’s left and the more forward parties of Margetts’s right, just beyond the summit of Baby 700. Aker’s 1st Battalion and parts of the 3rd Battalion were positioned along the slopes of Johnston’s Jolly as well as entering Owen’s Gully. Salisbury and his men, now scattered across the southern parts of 400 Plateau just in front of the Lonesome Pine, could hear ever-increasing fire coming from these directions, while they tried to take cover from the Turkish bombardment exploding across the plateau.27 As later recalled by the newly promoted Corporal Tope: Connell went ahead down the ravine [Owen’s Gully], and that’s the place where they were shot at, from behind, because the boys in the main area couldn’t see them—everything was scrub, you see. The enemy put up an overwhelming fight. They had Gun Ridge, about 2000 yards ahead of our positions, and intervening ridges all higher than ours, and at the same time we were being enfiladed from Gaba Tepe with field guns. There was an olive grove there with a battery of guns firing all the time.28 Many of the desperate actions that took place around the landward side of 400 Plateau during these early hours of the Turkish attack will never be known. A large number of isolated Turks and Australians were killed in the spurs and gullies running off 400 Plateau into Legge Valley; their final moments were never recorded and their remains not recovered until 1919—if at all. Salisbury, Milne and their men had withdrawn towards the Lonesome Pine. Salisbury had managed to collect enough men to establish a thin firing line. Milne, who had already been wounded five times, was ordered to the rear. On trying to establish a firing line Salisbury came across about twenty men of the 2nd Brigade in Brown’s Dip (near M’Cay’s Hill). With these men, Salisbury moved back towards Costin’s machine guns and by the time he arrived some additional men from the 9th Battalion had also established themselves close to the Lonesome Pine. The bombardment from the Turkish guns, however, was now almost beyond endurance. One after another Salisbury’s officers and men fell dead or wounded in the scrub. Salisbury sent runners back for reinforcements, but none of the runners got through, and no more reinforcements arrived except isolated parties already on the plateau struggling to find the firing line. Around this time Prisk and his men, who had taken up a position at the southern tip of Pine Ridge, started to receive ‘friendly fire’ from parties 165
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 166
25 APRIL 1915
of Australians to their rear. They had been mistaken as part of the Turkish counterattack. Prisk sent a runner back to try to get the Australians to stop shooting ‘but officers and men had been lectured upon “ruses” employed by the Germans in France and they were very slow to believe anyone who, coming from the enemy’s direction, shouted that he was an Australian’.29 The fire continued and soon Prisk decided that enough was enough and he began to withdraw his men off the spur, back towards the Australian lines. As they did so the friendly fire continued and Prisk ordered his men, who had been casually strolling back, to double-time it. The men refused. ‘Let the bastards shoot!’ they replied and walked across the flat. While bullets dropped close, no man was hit and they finally made it to the small valley just in front of Bolton’s Ridge, later known as Allah Gully. Prisk realised that his men had had nothing to eat since the invasion, and this was the principal reason for their apathy. He ordered his men to take a breather and open some rations while he headed off to find Lieutenant Colonel Field (8th Battalion) whom he had been informed was in charge of the men strung out along the ridge above (Bolton’s Ridge).30 Meanwhile, some of Whitham and Munro’s men of the 12th Battalion who had taken up positions just forward of Bennett’s men along Sniper’s Ridge, as well as some ‘originals’ of the 9th Battalion, mostly Milne’s men, who had taken up positions within the gullies south of the plateau, had tried to advance towards Weir’s and Pine ridges. On occupying the ridgelines, however, they were forced to take cover in the rear gullies as a result of the concentrated shrapnel fire from the Turkish guns to the south at Gaba Tepe. As later recalled by Lieutenant Spargo of Hooke’s company (6th Battalion): For nearly two hours we were lying there, now a few men would up and rush a few yards, then one or two would attempt to get ahead. Then crawling and creeping, we still struggled to get near enough to use the bayonet . . . we up and dashed on about 10 yards. We were no sooner down than a shell burst just where we had been lying, and made a hole big enough to bury a small horse. I think we all looked at each other with a sickly grin . . . our casualties were awful. Every few yards there was a dead or wounded man. Still there wasn’t any sign of anyone wanting to go back. Some were as cool and nonchalant as possible. One fellow a yard or two from me said, ‘Well the —— are not going to do me out of my lunch,’ and commenced to eat a biscuit. A man next to me had a bullet through the peak of his cap. Another fellow on the other side of me got one in the legs and was groaning.31 166
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 167
13 ‘His death affected me very much’ he submarine AE2 had been lying beneath the waters of the Dardanelles for over two hours, hiding from the ships above. Stoker now decided to move to another hiding spot and the crew went to their diving stations. Instead of lifting off the submerged bank, however, the AE2 started to slide down the embankment. The previous decision to empty the oil-rich water collecting in the motor bilges into the beam tube resulted in the submarine losing trim and it could not be regained without surfacing. Instead, she started to slide down the submerged bank to ‘a great depth’. The depth gauge of the AE2 was fixed to just 30 metres, the hull was only tested safe to this depth and just how close the hull came to being crushed by the ever-increasing water pressure can only be guessed.1 Able Seaman Wheat later recalled: ‘On this occasion our gauge was hard over and the needle of the gauge bending so we did not know what depth we went to, but it was a very close call’.2 Stoker tried to bring the submarine back up towards the bank. Slowly the AE2 raised itself towards the surface and finally the needle of the gauge was free to start swinging anti-clockwise. When it reached 24 metres Stoker sat the submarine back down on the embankment. It was now sometime after 11 a.m. They would have to wait until darkness in order to surface, recharge the batteries and adjust the ballast tanks before making for the Sea of Marmara. Meanwhile the Turkish ships could be heard passing overhead, including the ever-present Percival. Here they would sit for another ten hours, in the dark and foul air, with the continual sound of enemy ships above, searching for their prey.
T
Back at Anzac the Australians strung out along the forward slopes of Baby 700 with Margetts included most of the ‘originals’ from the 3rd Brigade who had landed in the first two waves. By now these men were completely exhausted; the stress and strain was becoming 167
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 168
25 APRIL 1915
unbearable. As described by Charles Bean, ‘The blue sky and the bright sunlight on the sleeping hills, the fresh mountain air which they had drawn into their lungs after that first onrush, still surrounded them as with the evil treachery of a beautiful mirage: the sweet smell of the crushed thyme was never remembered in after days except with a shudder’.3 Indeed, most of those from the covering force positioned along these slopes were now either dead or wounded. Only Margetts and a few others hung on with some reinforcements from the 1st Brigade. The thick scrub did not enable Margetts to know how many men were present, but he estimated that he had about twenty men with him occupying this forward position, as judged by word passing up and down the ‘line’. Major Robertson of the 9th Battalion, who with his men had previously chased the Turks out of the trench just beyond Malone’s Gully during the first advance, was again on Margetts’s left, but he was by now probably already dead, as was Richardson of the 2nd Battalion.4 Kindon and the men of the 1st Brigade, on the landward side of Baby 700, were themselves starting to feel the strain as the fire to their front and right continued to increase in volume. Both flanks were now isolated, as were those of Margetts and his men who lay a little way forward. The Turks continued to filter forward with greater confidence and began to concentrate just forward of the gaps in the Australian line. Kindon and his men could do little but lie in the scrub and try to avoid being hit by the mass of fire pouring into their position. Kindon ‘lay in the line with his men, steadily puffing an old pipe’.5 He later recalled seeing a man from the 12th Battalion just to his left occasionally firing in the direction ahead, ‘presently a bullet zipped past from the right. The man’s head fell forward on his rifle-butt; his spinal column had been severed. From the direction of the shot Kindon knew that the Turks must have outflanked him on his right. By the strength of their determination, and by that alone, [Australian] officers and men were clinging to Baby 700.’6 By this stage almost the entire Australian 1st Division was in the line with only the 4th Battalion and two companies of the 2nd Battalion available as the divisional reserve. Colonel Walker, who represented the corps commander Lieutenant General Birdwood (who had yet to land), agreed with Major General Bridges that the New Zealand and Australian Division should start landing. Indeed, Lieutenant General Birdwood had signalled earlier, at 10.45 a.m., that he was about to start landing the Auckland Battalion and half of the Canterbury Battalion of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade.7 Along with this message was 168
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 169
‘His death affected me very much’
the appointment of Colonel Walker to command the New Zealand Brigade. Major General Godley, the commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division, had earlier transferred to the Queen and informed Birdwood that the original commander of the New Zealand Brigade, Colonel Johnson, had fallen seriously ill the night before and would need to be replaced. At Godley’s request, Birdwood agreed to transfer Walker, his Chief of Staff, to take command of the New Zealand Brigade. Walker was to assist Bridges in determining where the New Zealanders were most urgently needed. Major General Bridges at once decided to throw the New Zealanders in on his left flank, with orders to reinforce the line on Baby 700 by way of Walker’s Ridge.8 Further south on 400 Plateau the Australians were still taking a pounding from the Turkish guns positioned along Third Ridge and south of Gaba Tepe. Salisbury returned three or four times to Brown’s Dip, hoping to find reinforcements. By now Captain Black, medical officer of the 6th Battalion, had set up a makeshift dressing station there. These trips by Salisbury enabled him to reinforce the firing line with small parties of men from the 2nd Brigade, although these reinforcements did not make up for the casualties fast accumulating out on the plateau. By now most of Salisbury’s originals were either dead or wounded amongst the scrub and in the land of the living it was now mostly men of the 6th and 7th battalions who occupied the area around the Lonesome Pine.9 Lieutenant Spargo, lying further south along Sniper’s Ridge, recalled: A man named Roach just groaned and sobbed a little cough and died. He got one through the head. His death affected me very much. He was a good soldier; he was sticking close to me on the field. I felt he was a tower of strength. Just ahead of us was a bit of ground which seemed to afford some natural cover. I decided to get there. I called up the men near me, and ordered a dash. Four or five of us were up and off. I had gone about 10 yards when crash—a sledge hammer struck me in the region of the heart. I said ‘That’s through the heart, I’m dead,’ was perfectly satisfied and commenced to die . . . All of a sudden I felt better. My dying was only a temporary faint. I thought I must be only bruised. I put my hand under my coat and felt a little warm blood.10 169
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 170
25 APRIL 1915
Meanwhile, Saker’s company of the 5th Battalion was still located close to the Daisy Patch with Lieutenant Derham and his platoon covering his left flank, positioned near the edge of Owen’s Gully. Derham searched with his binoculars to determine where the enemy’s fire was coming from. He soon scanned the heights of Third Ridge and just south of Scrubby Knoll he saw the Turkish guns. Below the guns he could see small numbers of Turks advancing by rushes through the scrub in skirmish formation. Derham and others opened fire at the Turks, but this only brought a quick, rapid and accurate response and soon Derham’s men were taking heavy casualties. Previously, Derham and Saker had been able to keep in contact by calling to each other and occasionally catching each other’s eyes as they cautiously peered above the scrub line. Now when Derham called there was no reply. Saker had been wounded and lay unconscious in the scrub. Derham tried to make his way to where he thought Saker was located, but every time he made a bolt for it a machine gun fired at him; twice it followed him closely but the third time he was hit in the leg and, spinning around, he fell into the scrub.11 Although wounded in the leg, Derham continued to try to reach Saker. Before finding him, however, he came across twenty men of his own company, and they decided to push on beyond the Daisy Patch for the Lonesome Pine to try to find the firing line. As they rushed forward in scattered parties, they came across not a firing line, but a number of wounded men from the 3rd Brigade. Only a few had not been hit. Derham and these men soon joined a small handful of others from the 1st Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Cook of the 2nd Battalion; they were probably not far from The Cup and near the line that Salisbury was trying to form, but they saw neither.12 Derham sent Private Pinkerton forward in search of the firing line, but he soon returned with news that no firing line existed. He had, however, noticed a group of Australians (Loutit’s men?) across Owen’s Gully to their left, on Johnston’s Jolly, lying in shallow rifle-pits. Derham and Cook decided that the men should join up with this group. As they started to move off in small parties the wounded asked to be taken with them. About twenty men were able to move. The wounded appealed piteously to be taken with them. But one of the common tragedies of this war was that, if men regarded the appeals of the wounded, they often failed in their duty to their side. A thousand times that day it would have been easy to leave the firing line in order to help a wounded comrade to the rear, and during the later hours many men 170
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 171
‘His death affected me very much’
acted so. But Derham’s men could not take their part in the fight if they carried wounded to the rear; their task was to reinforce the firing line with all possible speed. The wounded had to be left in the scrub, exposed to the dangers of bullets and—what they feared more—falling into the hands of the Turks.13 While Derham sent the men off towards the Jolly, he and Cook moved off in a southerly direction, hoping to find the firing line south of the Lonesome Pine. Major Wells with the two remaining companies of the 6th Battalion had been ordered by their commander, Lieutenant Colonel McNicoll, to move across the plateau to support Bennett’s men of the same battalion now located along Sniper’s Ridge. Bennett had earlier been ordered to ‘plug the gap to the south’ and from this location he was in a position to do exactly that.14 With Bennett were still some of Whitham’s men of the 12th Battalion and some men of the 8th Battalion. Wells and his men moved forward and occupied an area just to the left rear of Bennett’s men on the plateau near a crest just above Silt Spur, which offered protection from Turkish fire and observation. There was now a rough line on the southern parts of the Lonesome Pine, forming an important rallying line upon the plateau. The lie of the land in this position meant that the Turkish artillery could not see Wells’s men and until now they had suffered few casualties, most being from stray shells overshooting the more exposed position occupied by Salisbury and his men of the 9th Battalion who lay ahead and to the left of them. It would not be long, however, before Turkish observers along Battleship Hill to the north would see advance parties of Australians moving towards Wells’s position before disappearing. They would also see the flash of bayonets amongst the scrub; orders soon reached the Turkish battery commanders on Third Ridge that the area should be given suitable attention by their guns.15 At about the same time, Fethers and his men of the 5th Battalion positioned on Johnston’s Jolly were themselves trying to find the advanced firing line. They believed it lay just up ahead. As Fethers advanced 200 metres with his men, a Turkish sniper waited . . . waited . . . and gently, ever so gently, pulled back on the trigger of his Mauser and took out the 28-year-old former bank accountant Major Fethers with a clean shot to the head. His men continued on under the command of the wounded Lieutenant Ross and they soon found themselves crossing 171
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 172
25 APRIL 1915
500 metres
0
Loutit
10th Bn 12th Bn 5th Bn M’Cay’s HQ DP
Boase Thomas
Wells Harrison
8th Bn Bennett
Hooper & Daly
Map 13.1 400 Plateau—Wells and men of the 6th Battalion advance to support Bennett and his men of the 8th Battalion
the Jolly and taking up a position on the edge of the plateau overlooking Wire Gully. Most of the remaining company of the 5th Battalion under the command of Flockart started to move across Johnston’s Jolly behind Fethers’s company. They soon came across the body of Major Fethers. Flockart and Fethers had been mates, and Flockart covered Fethers’s face with his cap. Flockart was now the only company commander of the 5th Battalion on the plateau not wounded. He collected as many men as he could and formed a line some distance out from the summit of Johnston’s Jolly, close to Fethers’s men.16 Not all of Fethers’s men, however, crossed Johnston’s Jolly. A platoon under the command of Lieutenant Hooper had headed off towards the Lonesome Pine in their search for the firing line. They moved in a southeasterly direction and soon found themselves not far from the position occupied by Corporal Harrison, close to the junction where the shoulder of Pine Ridge joins 400 Plateau. At this point they could hear firing just in front, which they believed was the Australian firing line. They made their way towards the sound of the firing. At the edge of the plateau they looked down and saw an Australian from the 10th Battalion lying wounded next to a Turkish tent. The wounded man yelled to Hooper and his men not to come down as the tent was a mark for Turkish fire.17 Hooper and his men, however, dashed down over the edge of the plateau and soon came across an evacuated Turkish artillery battery. Within the 172
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 173
‘His death affected me very much’
gun pits were several small Hotchkiss guns. Behind the gun pits were emplacements built of pine logs heaped over with earth; the emplacements were similar to that observed by others at The Cup a few hundred metres away. Here Hooper and his men took up position. Of the 50 or so men who had started off with him only three reached the gun pits. Soon Captain Daly and about 30 men of the 6th Battalion joined them; other isolated parties of Australians were soon also attracted to the gun pits on hearing the rifle fire and characteristic loud swearing of the Australians below. From this position Hooper, Daly and their men overlooked Legge Valley. It was now sometime after midday.18 The bulk of the Turkish 1st Battalion was cautiously approaching the landward slopes of 400 Plateau. The position of this battalion was in good order as the concentrated fire of the Turkish artillery and machine guns located along Third Ridge covered both flanks. The situation of the 3rd Battalion, however, was still of great concern to Aker as its left flank was unprotected and open to attack. Pockets of this battalion were now trying to infiltrate between the Australians along Second Ridge, to the left of the Bloody Angle, and the Turks of Kemal’s 57th Regiment between Battleship Hill and Baby 700. This part of the Turkish line was becoming greatly stretched. Any successful attack from the Australians above and to their left would isolate the battalions of the regiment, potentially forcing both to retire back towards Third Ridge.19 As later recalled by the Turkish officer now in charge of the battalion, Ahmet Mucip, ‘we were slowly being wiped out. Our firing line gradually disappeared. There were only 40–50 rifles left firing. The time had come to send a messenger to let them know that we were all about to die here.’20 By now Captain Leer with half his company and Captain Giles and his composite of 150 men had reached the head of Monash Valley and were attempting to reach the heights above in order to plug the gap developing between Baby 700, the Bloody Angle and the head of Mortar Ridge. It was vital that the gap between the centre of the Australian line along Second Ridge and Baby 700 be closed. It was here that one of the fiercest struggles of the day took place, seldom remembered today. Leer, Giles and their men found themselves moving over the head of Monash Valley onto the Bloody Angle. Before they arrived, however, Major Lamb (3rd Battalion) and his men had taken up a position at the very head of the valley. Lamb must have been relieved to see the arrival of Leer, Giles and their men to his right.21 173
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 174
25 APRIL 1915
The rear of Leer’s column was still marching along Monash Valley and near the end of the column was Lieutenant Cowey, Leer’s second-incommand. At a point directly below Quinn’s Post a halt had occurred. Not being able to make contact with Leer, Cowey with 50 men climbed the steep valley wall to their right, reaching the top of the ridge just as Leer and his men further north moved off the Bloody Angle into Mule Valley in an attempt to help secure the right flank of the Australians on Baby 700 above. Seeing his commander advancing from Second Ridge into Mule Valley and onto Mortar Ridge, Cowey and his men followed and occupied a minor spur of the same ridge below and to the right of Leer. As recorded by the official historian, Charles Bean: From where they lay Leer, Giles and Cowey could see—a third of a mile to their left—the whole summit and flank of Baby 700 and the Australians’ line upon it. On the other side, looking over their right shoulders, they had in view the whole length of Mule Valley, the flats at the bottom, with the knuckles of German Officer’s Ridge and Johnston’s Jolly dipping down to them, and in the distance, some of the spurs and foothills of Scrubby Knoll.22 Unbeknown to Leer, Captain Jacobs, who had advanced with Kindon in support of the Australians strung out along the landward side of Baby 700, had occupied parts of The Chessboard and the upper shoulder of Mortar Ridge, representing the right flank of the Australians trying to keep at bay Kemal’s men of the 57th Regiment. It was now that the Australians along Mortar Ridge could see to their right the last of the Turkish advance flooding across Legge Valley with about 400 of the enemy approaching MacLaurin’s Hill (location of Sinclair-MacLagan’s headquarters on Second Ridge), with some heading for Wire Gully itself. Still more were massing just below Johnston’s Jolly, but the main thrust of the attack appeared to both Leer and Giles to be to the north along Battleship Hill and Baby 700.23 Before noon, at least four Turkish batteries had taken up positions and were now causing serious casualties to the Australians strung out along the ridges and plateaus. The battery just south of Gaba Tepe was concentrating its fire at the boats still arriving as well as along the beach. Two other batteries were located along Third Ridge and another was positioned close to Chunuk Bair. The northernmost battery was shelling Baby 700, The Nek and the slopes of Monash Valley. The central battery at Scrubby Knoll was focusing exclusively on 400 Plateau, and every 174
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 175
‘His death affected me very much’
Layh 3rd Bn Reserve No. 1 Outpost
2nd Bn 57th Rgt X
X
X X
X
X X
X
X
X
Margetts
Hill
X
X X
X
X
X 1st Bn 57th Rgt
Kindon
Lalor
X
X Battleship
X Richardson
X
X Jacobs
Russell’s Top
Incebayir Ridge
Lamb Leer
X Cowey
X
X Carter McDonald
X Johnston’s Jolly
X
X
X
X X
10th Bn 12th Bn
X
X
3rd Bn 27th Rgt
X X 0
500 metres
Map 13.2 Attempting to plug the gap at the Bloody Angle and Pope’s Hill just before noon; advanced parties of the 3rd Battalion, 57th Regiment, begin to arrive
move was plainly visible at a range of less than a kilometre. The southern battery near Anderson Knoll was harassing Bolton’s Ridge and those strung out along the southern spurs of the plateau. This battery consisted of two guns that had earlier been part of the Scrubby Knoll battery; Aker had ordered two of the guns to take up a position at Anderson Knoll to help support the southern flanks of his counterattack. There was no cover for the Australians from the fusillade of shrapnel, especially on 400 Plateau. If the men stood in an attempt to 175
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 176
25 APRIL 1915
entrench they were immediately fired upon not only by shrapnel, but also by machine guns. There was no respite. The naval guns could not fire as they did not know where the front line was, and while runners had been sent back from the plateau to the beach to try to direct the naval guns towards Scrubby Knoll at least, it appears that these runners never made it off the plateau; no messages were ever received. Indeed by now the naval guns were almost completely silent.24 ‘Where the hell is our artillery?’ many of the men had been wondering. Still aboard ship, was the answer. Around noon Colonel Hobbs, a battery commander who had landed at 10 a.m., was positioned at Plugge’s Plateau and still could not find a position to site his guns and offer effective fire to assist the infantry. With Hobbs on his climb up to Plugge’s was Charles Bean, who later recorded in his diary: At the top we got into a path—I don’t know if it was ours or Turkish, but our engineers were building a quite fine path lower down— which led us for about a half a dozen yards over the beginning of a plateau and then a shallow trench crossed our path, running from right to left; so we dropped into it. There were several men in it and I think they were chiefly engaged in passing ammunition along it. We crept along it, passing a certain number of men—Col. Hobbs seemed rather desperate of getting any artillery up this way. As we went along this trench there was a dead Turk lying in it and there was one of our men, dead, lying just outside the trench. Some parts of the trench had a very nasty smell—there was no mistaking it—the Turks must have used it for purposes of sanitation as well as protection . . . Finally we got to where the trench finished abruptly on the other side of the plateau in a V shaped cut through which you could see down into the valley and across to the other side of it. Col. Hobbs went on and had a look out of the opening and as he could do no good here returned to the beach. I stayed for a bit to talk to some of the men in the trench. One could hear occasionally a burst overhead and a whiz which I took to be shrapnel; but in this trench one was reasonably safe.25 Earlier, before 11 a.m., the two Indian mountain batteries had begun to land. The commander of the 26th Battery ordered one of his batteries (Jacob’s battery)—still unassembled and packed on a string of mules—to advance along the Razorback towards the top of 400 Plateau. Accompanying the battery was Rafferty’s platoon, who had previously tried to silence the machine gun at Fisherman’s Hut. However, instead of the 176
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 177
‘His death affected me very much’
50 men he started the day with, he was now down to just seventeen men. Rafferty and the battery approached the plateau, and there, with three guns on either side of the head of White’s Valley, at 11.55 a.m. Jacob’s six-gun battery under the command of Captain Kirby opened counter battery fire against the Turkish guns along Third Ridge. ‘The mere sound of Kirby’s battery close behind them came to the Australian infantry like a draught of cool water to one perishing from thirst. From end to end of the line it brought fresh heart to the men.’26 Shortly after fire commenced, Captain Kirby moved across the plateau towards Owen’s Gully in order to direct the artillery fire against Third Ridge. He soon observed down the slopes from Scrubby Knoll, almost directly opposite the plateau, a mass of Turks moving through the scrub as well as taking up positions within Legge Valley below. He decided that the best way to assist the infantry was to turn the fire of his ‘six small guns upon the slopes of the Third Ridge’.27 It was just before noon when Prisk arrived at Bolton’s Ridge from Allah Gully. As he approached the ridge he crossed over a patch of cultivated land that would soon be known to all as the Wheatfield. Behind it on the landward side of the ridgeline was another similar field to be known as Shell Green. It was just behind the Wheatfield that Prisk found Lieutenant Colonel Field. Field ordered Prisk to bring up his men and occupy the area just forward of the Wheatfield. Prisk and his men had no sooner taken up their position when the Turkish battery at Anderson Knoll focused all of its attention on the Wheatfield, which made an easy mark for concentrated fire. For all intents and purposes, to the Turkish gunners the Wheatfield was a giant bullseye, starkly set in contrast to the rest of the area covered in anonymous thick scrub. Prisk and his men could do nothing but hug the ground. Luckily for them, however, most of the shrapnel shells burst too low and the majority plunged into the soft soil, where the mild explosion threw up soil but little else.28 Colonel M’Cay could now clearly see the serious effect that the Turkish artillery was having amongst the men scattered out along 400 Plateau. At around 11.30 a.m. he reported that his 2nd Brigade, as well as scattered parties of the 3rd Brigade, were under considerable strain from the continued artillery bombardment. It was the inability to fight back, just having to lie there and take it, that was demoralising, seeing cobbers getting hit by large, sharp, hot chunks of Constantinople scrap iron. There was nowhere to hide, nowhere to get cover. 177
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 178
25 APRIL 1915
There was still no continuous firing line and at any time M’Cay, who was now responsible for the security of 400 Plateau, expected the Turks to charge up and cross the plateau in force, swallowing up the isolated and scattered parties of the 2nd and 3rd brigades who were strung out along the plateau and southern spurs running from it. He urgently requested reinforcements from the commander of the 1st Division in order to try to construct a continuous firing line between the 10th Battalion to the north on Johnston’s Jolly and the two companies of the 8th Battalion along Bolton’s Ridge to the south, but no reinforcements were forthcoming.29
178
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 179
14 ‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’ he Auckland Battalion as well as the two companies of the Canterbury Battalion were ashore by 12.30 p.m.1 Lieutenant Spencer Westmacott, commander of a platoon attached to the Auckland Battalion (16th Waikato Company), was amongst the first to land. Just before noon:
T
All fully equipped we now went below to the troop decks and inspected our men who had fallen in and were awaiting us. All ranks were in caps like the British infantry. This applied to the Australians too, being a corps order. We had noted with disapproval that when the 3rd Auckland went ashore a few men wore hats; but their discipline was slack . . . Alderman said a few words to the whole company ‘We are going ashore now; but I do not think anyone is going to be killed today.’ At which there were roars of sceptical laughter from the listeners . . . Right and left, broadside on to the shore were the battleships steaming slowly and firing at the Turkish positions in crashing salvoes which went booming and echoing among the hills. About halfway to shore we passed on the left H.M.S. [Queen] with General Birdwood on the bridge. He smiled shyly down at us after looking through his glasses; but was unnoticed by the majority. Cotton wool puffs over the ridges ahead showed where the Australians were holding the ground won and being shelled . . . We approached the shore and the beach became visible, lines of wounded lay in the sand. Officers and men were moving about. A party of Australians were building a jetty by throwing stones into the water. A man stark naked was bathing in the sea. A stream of wounded was straggling down from the hills. Parties of men were at work making tracks up the cliffs. From the ridges beyond came the sound of fighting. The beach seemed sheltered and very quiet.2 179
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 180
25 APRIL 1915
Sergeant Scott of the Canterbury Battalion, who would also land around 12.30 p.m., recorded in his diary that: We disembarked into lighters and were towed ashore by the motor launches of the Navy. This was about 11 a.m., under fire of rifles and shrapnel. We did get landed without too many casualties. The place where we landed was rough and hilly and we had to climb almost straight up into fire of bullets and shrapnel. The Australians who first landed must have suffered severe casualties by the numbers that were lying dead and wounded.3 Lieutenant Colonel Malone, the commander of the Wellington Battalion, was anxiously waiting to get to the beach. However, while he commanded a battalion, he had no command over the order of the tows of the boats to the beach. Ted Baigent of the Canterbury Infantry Battalion recorded in his diary: A tug came alongside us and called for the 2nd Company of the Canterbury. Colonel Malone saw red as he was in command of the Wellington Battalion and wanted to go first, but found it a complete waste of time arguing with a Naval Officer. In a few minutes we were heading for the shore and got our first news of how things were going. The Australians had got ashore at daybreak and had driven the Turks well back, but couldn’t hold them. Turkish reinforcements had arrived and were pushing back and the position was anything but bright . . . Troops are now coming ashore steadily with barge loads of ammunition and gear of every description. The wounded are flocking to the beach with shells bursting and bullets playing on every unsheltered spot.4 Ted Baigent went on to write with considerable foresight: It’s marvellous that there is some order and control. Someday [some] would-be Generals will adversely criticize it, no doubt, but it gives us confidence in our staff from Birdwood on down. They have had to fight their way ashore, carry on under great confusion and with no space or time to reorganize. The noise is one continuous roar of rifle and shellfire mingled with the cries of the wounded and dying.5 Earlier, around 10 a.m., most of the New Zealand Brigade Headquarters staff had landed and had established their headquarters on the beach. 180
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 181
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
Colonel Walker, now appointed the New Zealand Brigade commander, had given verbal orders to the staff that the brigade was to extend the left of the 3rd Australian Brigade, while the Australian 4th Brigade when it landed would be held in reserve.6 Walker had begun to make his way north as the New Zealanders landed, heading for the foot of the ridge that would forever bear his name in order to survey the country his troops would soon need to traverse in order to reach Russell’s Top and Baby 700.7 It was also around this time that Captain McWhae, commander of the 3rd Field Ambulance, had started his search for Sinclair-MacLagan. His orders prior to the invasion had been that the 3rd Field Ambulance was to maintain contact with the 3rd Brigade at all times: about noon I left with some bearers and went inland a bit over great cliffs. Rosser and I got in touch with 3rd Brigade Headquarters at top of a gully [Sinclair-MacLagan told him] that it would be advisable to move the Dressing Station to Anzac Cove. We then came back along the gully being sniped at all the time. Attended to a few Turkish wounded in the gully who had their rifle butts broken. Gave one morphia. He was quite surprised. Came back to the beach south of the point then we went along the beach between the two slight points [Anzac Cove] just north of Gaba Tepe at which we should have landed, and about three-quarters of a mile north came to our dressing station [North Beach]. At these were over a hundred wounded.8 Just after midday Kemal arrived at Mal Tepe, where he joined up with his corps commander, Esat Pa¸s a, who had earlier boarded a motorised yacht from Bulair in order to get to the battles raging in the south. Pa¸s a confirmed Kemal’s reading of the situation and agreed that the remaining reserve consisting of the 72nd (Arab) Regiment should also be thrown into the battle. The whole of the 19th Division as well as one regiment from the 9th Division (27th Regiment) were now committed to the Ari Burnu battles. From that day onward, Aker’s regiment operated as part of the 19th Division. Pa¸s a left Kemal in charge of the battle for Ari Burnu and hastened to the battles to the south at Helles. Kemal headed back towards Scrubby Knoll to set up his headquarters, which, when established, enabled him to see the whole of the Australian line. From then on the Turks knew Scrubby Knoll as Kemal Yere—Kemal’s Hill.9 181
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 182
25 APRIL 1915
A few days later from his newly established headquarters Kemal issued the order of the day: Every soldier who fights here with me must realise that he is in honour bound not to retreat one step. Let me remind you all that if you want to rest there may be no rest for our whole nation throughout eternity. I am sure that all our comrades agree on this, and that they will show no signs of fatigue until the enemy is finally hurled into the sea.10 While the Indian Mountain Battery continued to provide vital support to the Australians, the position of the battery, while screened from the Turkish guns along Third Ridge, was completely exposed to the Turkish guns now positioned on the northern heights close to Chunuk Bair and these guns now started to fire a devastating response. It was also not long before Turkish observers to the north were directing the guns along Third Ridge against the Indian battery. The bravery of these British and Indian gunners was an inspiration to the infantry. These gunners ignored the shrapnel that was exploding all around them and continued to assist the Australians, even though their losses were fast accumulating. While the actual damage that these small guns were doing to the Turks was minimal, their significance in raising the morale of the Australian infantry, especially those scattered on 400 Plateau, cannot be overestimated: ‘Give it to ’em boys, let ’em taste some bloody Bombay scrap iron.’ Despite the steadfastness of the British and Indian gunners, the Turkish artillery did not let up on ‘randomly’ shredding scrub, flesh, muscle and bone. Private Perry of the 10th Battalion recalled: ‘Ah, got me!’ says one lad on my left, and he shakes his arm. A bullet had passed through the biceps of his left arm, missed his chest by an inch, passed through the right forearm, and finally struck the lad between him and me a bruising blow on the wrist. The man next to him—a man from the 9th Battalion—started to bind up his wounds, as he was bleeding freely. All the time shrapnel was hailing down on us. ‘Oh-h’ comes from directly behind me and looking around, I see a poor little Lieutenant of C Company has been badly wounded. From both hips to his ankles blood is oozing through pants and puttees, and he painfully drags himself to the rear. With every pull he moans cruelly. I raise him to his feet and at a very slow pace start to help him to shelter past a file of bleeding men some shot through the 182
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 183
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
leg ‘using their rifles as crutches’. . . Alas! I have only got him about 50 yards from the firing line when bang-swish! And we were both peppered by shrapnel and shell. My rifle was broken off to the trigger guard, and I received a smashing blow that laid my cheek on my shoulder. The last I remember was the poor little Lieutenant groaning again as we both sank to the ground.11 Those survivors of the 9th Battalion and other isolated parties lying out near the Lonesome Pine were still also suffering severely from the shrapnel. As recalled by Private Gordon: ‘I was lying next to a chap when he disappeared, having been struck by a percussion shell. How it missed me I don’t know. Chaps were hit all sides and I was the only person alive out of a dozen on either side of me.’12 Something had to be done to suppress the Turkish artillery. Lieutenant Grills of the 7th Battalion located close to the Lonesome Pine had observed the Turkish guns along Third Ridge, south of his position. These guns were likely those at Anderson Knoll. Earlier he had sent back reports to the brigade providing the location of these guns; however, the messenger never made it off the plateau. Around noon he sent another messenger, but again the message never got through. Grills watched in vain as this Turkish battery continued to fire at the Indian battery and the Wheatfield. Major Bennett also sent a message back and while this message did reach the brigade and was telephoned through to divisional headquarters, the coordinates ‘224 T.7’ were mistranslated in the signal as ‘224 B.7’—which was a point near the divisional headquarters itself. As such the message could not be understood and no British naval shells arrived in response.13 Derham and Cook, who had earlier left the Daisy Patch in search of the firing line, now reached the area near Silt Spur, where Wells and his men had taken up a position just to the left rear of Bennett and his men on Sniper’s Ridge. Wells had just moved off the plateau in a southerly direction to find Bennett, his senior commander. No sooner had Derham and Cook arrived, however, when a shout went up: ‘There they are!’ One officer dashed forward over the crest, and soon Wells’s men followed. Derham tried to stop them as he knew that any advance across the crest would leave them completely exposed to concentrated machine-gun, rifle and shrapnel fire. Not being able to stop the men, Derham limped after them. The advance of Wells’s men was swift and short-lived. No sooner had they raced across the bare hilltop than they were decimated by the 183
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 184
25 APRIL 1915
Turkish fire. The Turkish battery stationed at Scrubby Knoll had an excellent field of fire and completely enfiladed the line with no let-up. Bennett’s men heard the same yell and, seeing Wells’s men advance above, Bennett gave the orders for his men to follow. They headed for the major inland ridge to their front, Pine Ridge. Private Ricketson of the 5th Battalion later recalled: We were men from various battalions, all mixed up and quite ignorant as to where we were and what we should do. We knew only that we were a long way forward. From in front, through the shrapnel fire, a number of wounded men suddenly appeared, struggling down the slopes towards us calling out that the Turks were on the other side of the hill ‘coming in their thousands’. Lying on the ground I overheard a discussion between two men lying near me. One was a major in a New South Wales battalion, the other a sergeant. Both agreed that retirement was the only thing possible. They rose to a crouching position and began to make off towards the rear. All of a sudden I became conscious of a slim redheaded major standing just behind me. I recognised him immediately as the second-in-command of the Sixth Battalion [Bennett] . . . Thrusting his revolver against the other major’s chest, he said ‘One more word about retirement and I’ll shoot you out of hand’. . . . Major Bennett ran along the line—there must have been some thirty of us there then—calling at the top of his voice—‘We’ll never go back men. We’ll die here.’ He had hardly got to the end of the line, quite away from where I was lying on the ground, when somebody yelled out ‘Here they come.’ We all leapt to our feet, and I must confess I wondered whether we were going forward or backward. But at once Major Bennett dashed out in front calling ‘Come on men’, and in one wild rush we were running up the hill ahead, yelling like Dervishes. Our bayonets were fixed.14 Frank Brent of the 6th Battalion later recalled that, as he advanced and encountered isolated parties of Turks within the southern gullies of 400 Plateau: I heard somebody say: ‘This is no good to us. Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’ We went into it. We cleared them. Bayoneted them, shot them and the others ran. A little while afterwards a bloke out of the 8th Battalion said: ‘Here look at that bloody bush. It’s 184
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 185
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
moving!’ We looked at it and it was obviously a sniper and he was done up like a Christmas tree. He’d got branches out of his head and shoulders and he was for all the world like a bush. But he didn’t look like a bush when we’d finished with him! One bloke shouted: ‘Share that amongst you, you bastards!’ The bloke next to me was Robbie Robertson, a corporal in my battalion. He was laughing at the remark and I can see him grinning all over his face and the next thing his head fell on my shoulder and a sniper had got him through the jugular vein. I really think that was my baptism of fire, because Robbie’s blood spent all over my tunic.15 Bennett and his men charged down into Surprise Gully, up Weir’s Ridge, down into Wanliss Gully and finally climbed onto Pine Ridge. All the time Turkish artillery from Gaba Tepe and Anderson Knoll, as well as Turkish rifle fire from the south, targeted their advance. Private Ricketson was amongst the first to start the climb up Pine Ridge. He later recalled, ‘as we reached the top of the slope we could see a party of Turks advancing up the hill towards us. I think our appearance and wild cries
X X X
Wire Gully Shrapnel Gully
10th Bn 12th Bn
X X X 3rd Bn X 27th Rgt X X
5th Bn 400 Plateau
M’Cay’s HQ
27th Rgt Reserves X
Owen’s Gully Daisy Patch
X
Boase Thomas
Wells
9th Bn 7th Bn
X X
8th Bn Bolton’s Ridge Shell Green
Bennett
Harrison Daly
Wheatfield
X
X X X
X X X X X
Whitham X Pine Ridge
Brighton Beach
X
27th Rgt Reserves
1st Bn 27th Rgt
X X X X X X
X X X X
Legge Valley
0
Map 14.1 Bennett and Wells advance just after noon 185
500 metres
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 186
25 APRIL 1915
convinced the Turks they would be wiser to retire, which they promptly did at the double, with us chasing after them. I might add the Turks far outstripped us!’16 Bennett and his men made down the landward slopes of the ridge, now overlooking Legge Valley. He extended his line southward as additional men sent forward by Lieutenant Colonel McNicoll made their way to his position. Bennett’s line along the landward slopes of Pine Ridge was now about 300 strong. The thick growth of pine scrub managed to screen Bennett and his men’s movement from the Turks on Third Ridge. At this point some of Bennett’s forward parties and small groups from the Turkish 1st Battalion confronted each other along the lower slopes of Pine Ridge. The concentrated fire of Bennett’s men drove these few Turks off. Lieutenant Colonel Aker recounted an incident that was reported to him, which probably occurred on Pine Ridge at about this time: Some of our men were moving furtively amongst the brushwood when they suddenly encountered some Australians and in this unexpected situation some attacked one another with the bayonet, and some sprang to their feet and fired. Other Australians jumped up waving handkerchiefs and beckoning with their hands . . . Our men assumed that by waving their white handkerchiefs the Australians were surrendering. One of our men accepted their persistent invitation, went up to them and they shook hands with him. Others of our men as a precaution approached to within range of a hand grenade. Our naïve but brave men who had gone up to the Australians told the Australians, by sign, to surrender. The Australians in reply indicated by signs that our men should surrender to them. Our man, who did not understand this, in order to make his meaning clear, held the rifle of one of them and tried to take it. Whereupon another Australian fired at our man. Another of our men, a bombardier from Ankara, Ismail Oglu Ahmed, who had seen this and was standing by in a concealed position, ready with a grenade, immediately threw the grenade at the Australians. When the Australians, who had seen the grenade being thrown, tried to rush off before it exploded, the grenade blew up and several of them were wounded and fell to the ground.17 Bennett’s men had suffered severe casualties in their advance across to Pine Ridge, but now they were able to lie in the scrub along the ridge overlooking Legge Valley and could not be easily seen by the approaching Turks. Their fire, combined with a machine gun now being operated 186
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 187
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
by Sergeant Traills of the 8th Battalion located forward of the Lonesome Pine, kept the Turks at bay for the time being. Meanwhile, most of Wells’s men were either killed or wounded as they charged towards the Lonesome Pine and beyond. Some survivors under the command of Lieutenant Levy moved south onto Weir’s Ridge, with Derham limping after them. Pine Ridge to their front partly sheltered them from the artillery, but even so, concentrated rifle fire originating from a party of Turks who were bypassing the southern spurs of 400 Plateau began to sweep the ridge. Levy and Derham both agreed that the charge had been a fatal mistake, as the line previously protecting the Lonesome Pine from a Turkish attack was now completely broken. As Derham and Levy assessed the situation, the Turkish rifle fire from their right increased in volume and accuracy. Derham, who was already wounded, was hit another three times, one bullet striking his shoulder strap, the second his revolver, and the third going through his shoulder without striking the bone. Derham and Levy realised that their party was ‘bound to be “cut up,” whether it advanced or retired. It was better to die going forward than going back. The word was given to advance, and the line went forward in one long rush down the 200 yards of slope. Derham, now twice wounded, struggled after it.’18 Levy, Derham and their surviving men soon found themselves with Captain Daly of the 6th Battalion and Lieutenant Hooper of the 5th Battalion, who had previously occupied the gun pits forward of the Lonesome Pine. At this time, Corporal Harrison, positioned a little north of them, and Fortescue, Thomas and Boase, located in The Cup, were the only Australian parties covering the southern lobe of the plateau in any ‘strength’ with Bennett’s men protecting the extreme right flank down Pine Ridge. They were protected in their positions below the plateau from the shrapnel fire that was making the top of the plateau a killing field. The fire from the Turks had forced those Australians that could to fall back towards the seaward side of 400 Plateau. Eventually small isolated parties of Turks were able to penetrate different parts of the landward side of the plateau. The Australian rifle fire from Bolton’s Ridge and Johnston’s Jolly, however, denied the Turks the opportunity of occupying these areas in any strength.19 Earlier, Prisk and his men who had lain out in the scrub just forward of the Wheatfield, suffering the onslaught of the Turkish artillery, had seen Wells’s and Bennett’s men stand amid the bursting shrapnel shells and move into the gullies beyond. Minutes later these same men 187
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 188
25 APRIL 1915
reappeared and could be seen climbing the landward side of Pine Ridge, soon vanishing from sight.20 Prisk now turned over on his back and signalled to Lieutenant Colonel Field for permission to move forward and assist those in front. It felt good to be doing something, anything, rather than just lying there having to take it—time to give a little back. They soon advanced again and took up a supporting position along a lower spur of Sniper’s Ridge, later known as the Knife Edge. Here they joined up with a firing line being constructed by Lieutenant Yates of the 8th Battalion, with remnants of Whitham’s men. Together these men, numbering about a company strong (around 200 men), focused on deepening the trench line along the ridge.21 Further north on Mortar Ridge, Leer and Giles could see Turkish troops advancing in skirmish order towards the foot of German Officer’s Ridge and Johnston’s Jolly. Jacobs, who was positioned near the Chessboard, supporting Kindon’s right, could also see the Turks and was desperately hoping that a machine gun would arrive. From his position he could check their movement with concentrated enfilading fire. Cowey, who was positioned just below Leer on Mortar Ridge, signalled to Leer asking permission to push on to the next spur (Incebayir Ridge) so they could concentrate effective enfilading rifle fire against the same Turks. Leer refused permission, as he was concerned about further weakening his position along Mortar Ridge. This was a wise decision, as by now Turkish troops from the 3rd Battalion (27th Regiment) were occupying Incebayir Ridge and the gully in between (Chatel Dere) in large numbers as well as the lower spurs of Mortar Ridge itself. Indeed, within minutes of Cowey’s request being refused, Turks were seen along the lower slopes of Incebayir Ridge and they began to pour concentrated fire upon the Australians on Mortar Ridge.22 By now ‘about 400 of the enemy had drifted, wave after wave, across the Mule Valley flats, and were now in a concealed trench or hollow at the foot of German Officer’s Ridge. Further numbers collected against the foot of Johnston’s Jolly. Half a mile to the north others lapped around the seaward side of Battleship Hill. From all these quarters fire began to be turned either upon the Australians on Baby 700 or on Leer’s small party on Mortar Ridge. Many were killed; the wounded on the southern slope of Baby 700 were seen limping or crawling back.’23 Indeed, little by little the right of the Anzac line along Baby 700 was being drawn in, and the gap between these men and Leer’s began to widen.
188
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 189
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
The commander of the Auckland Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Plugge, had landed just before Lieutenant Westmacott and his men and formed up his companies along Anzac Cove. They soon moved north, passing The Sphinx along North Beach approaching Walker’s Ridge. The scouts of the 3rd Auckland Company were sent forward to search for a route up the steep and narrow slopes in an attempt to reach Russell’s Top and Baby 700.24 Soon Lieutenant Colonel Braithwaite, general staff officer of the division, approached Plugge and ordered him to reinforce the Australians on the left. Plugge turned to Lieutenant Westmacott and ordered that he move up the slopes after the scouts to support the Australians; the rest of the Auckland Battalion would soon follow. Colonel Walker arrived at the foot of Walker’s Ridge (later named after him) sometime before 1 p.m. and was immediately concerned that any approach to Russell’s Top from this position was not feasible. Indeed, he saw the advanced parties, including Westmacott’s men and the 16th Waikato Company, attempting to reach the northern heights by the goat track running up this ridge. However, this track would only allow a single line of men to reach the summit. There was great danger that his men would be committed to the fight for the northern heights in a piecemeal fashion, as opposed to being committed as a compact well-organised force. He likely had visions of wave upon wave of Australians and New Zealanders forming extended lines on Russell’s Top and then advancing and cleaning up the Turks as they pushed their way up towards Chunuk Bair. However, even if these men could all be formed up into respective platoons and companies, the topography, the vegetation, and perhaps more significantly, the Turks, would make such an orderly advance impossible. Like others before him, Walker inferred from his map that the best line of advance to Baby 700 was from Plugge’s Plateau to Russell’s Top and then on to Baby 700. He was not aware that the only connection between Plugge’s and Russell’s Top was the precarious Razor Edge. Walker ordered Braithwaite to recall those attempting to climb the heights back down to the beach; with the rest of the Auckland Battalion they were to approach Russell’s Top via Plugge’s Plateau. Walker and staff remained at the foot of the ridge in order to redirect any stray parties that might try to approach Russell’s Top from this ridge back down the beach to start their approach from Plugge’s Plateau.25 Flockart and his men of the 5th Battalion had meanwhile established an advanced firing line along the landward edge of Johnston’s Jolly. Like 189
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 190
25 APRIL 1915
other Australians on the plateau they were suffering serious casualties from the Turkish shrapnel sweeping the plateau. They must have also suffered some casualties from the more aggressive members of the Turkish 1st Battalion who had by now likely made it onto the top of the Jolly, recklessly disregarding their own artillery fire, where they took up sniping positions with an aim to kill as many of the ‘English’ invaders as possible. Sometime after 1 p.m., Flockart sent an urgent message back to his battalion commander that unless reinforcements arrived he would be forced to withdraw and leave behind his wounded. Captain Stewart, who at this point was acting battalion commander, sent forward the last remaining company of the 5th Battalion under the command of captains Carter and Luxton. Stewart himself went forward with this company towards the advance line established by Flockart and others of the 5th Battalion.26 As these men crossed the northern part of the plateau amongst the exploding shrapnel shells and small-arms fire, they soon saw retiring towards them Flockart and his surviving men, including the survivors of Fethers’s company. Together, they established a new line about 200 metres back from Flockart’s previous position. They had managed to bring in their wounded, which included Flockart who had been wounded in the jaw. It was not long, however, before shrapnel wounded both Stewart and Carter. Major Saker of the same battalion, who had previously been wounded and had managed to get his wound dressed, had climbed back onto the plateau. He came across Flockart’s firing line near the head of Owen’s Gully, and took command of the line. By now, Lieutenant Westmacott and his men had started to climb up towards the summit of Plugge’s Plateau, later named after his battalion commander, who would set up his headquarters there. I came quickly to where a party of Australian engineers were making a zig-zag track to the top, and almost immediately cut off an angle of it by making a run up. I was followed by some of my more active men and from where I was above them helped others by taking their rifles by the muzzle and pulling them up till six men were with me, when I saw it was too steep for most of them and told the others to follow the track already well defined and half formed. The men at work were steadily improving this thoroughfare to the top, picks were breaking down on hard clay and shovels were sending it flying. Our men were pressing up, crowding the workers; 190
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 191
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
but it was the only way and we had to get on. Also, wounded Australians were coming down here and there. We had no heart to stop them; but they delayed us a little . . . Someone tried to pass a box of Australian ammunition forward past us, but it did not fit our long rifles, and Alderman [Westmacott’s company commander] said ‘Don’t worry about that, lad, until we can get forward.’ I said ‘But I think we ought to pass it on, Sir. The Australians must have their ammunition.’ I had more wind than most after climbing Rangitoto [Island] for over four years, and the box went from hand to hand ahead of us. Only about a minute’s spell was indulged in here, until our men began to bunch up behind us, and our next move upward carried us to the hill top, where we found the track entered a Turkish trench which followed the contour of the cliff from which it stood back three or four feet and was fairly straight for most part. It gave a good field of fire out to sea; but obviously any troops who succeeded in reaching the beach were almost immediately in dead ground, unless the defenders climbed out to hang over the cliff edge . . . No General would have dared to launch troops at those cliffs. It was a lucky accident however, for the Turks were well dug in and waiting for us at the obvious place.27 Charles Bean, while looking for his brother John (‘Jock’), a medical officer with the 3rd Battalion, had again climbed onto Plugge’s at the same time that the New Zealanders passed by: I waited tucked up in the trench—and the shrapnel began to pump in salvoes of 4 shots regularly into the backs of the men lying on the opposite side of the valley. You could hear the shots going overhead and see the burst, I think, sometimes. It went on with monotonous regularity—apparently neverending and one began to think the chaps there must be having an awful time. I couldn’t get a man from Jock’s battalion—every other sort seemed to go through the trench. A number of N. Zealanders came along it and filled it up, with some officers and orders seemed to be passed along from a Col. Plugge at the back.28 Westmacott looked over towards the Razor Edge and realised there was no way ahead in this direction; to do so would require his men to cross single file, which would take far too long. Indeed, very few would make it alive to the other side as it was completely raked by bullets and 191
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 192
25 APRIL 1915
shrapnel fire—projectiles of which could be seen smacking into the bare clay and gravel.29 They had no choice but to climb down into Shrapnel Gully via the landward side of Plugge’s, using the Turkish zigzag path. Finally they reached the bottom of the gully, but encountered a line of Australians from the 2nd or 3rd Battalion filing up the valley in front of them. By now Shrapnel Gully was becoming a major bottleneck as men from different platoons, companies and battalions all tried to push on to where they had—or had not—been ordered.30 Like many before him, Westmacott noticed a lone Australian standing ‘guard’ next to the Turkish pick. ‘Beware mines’, the Australian said knowingly.31 The New Zealanders waited for the Australians to pass and then moved forward towards Monash Valley. In a letter home Private Sing, Auckland Battalion, wrote about his trip up the gully. ‘We had to go right into the middle of it and jingo didn’t we catch it. Australians had driven the enemy back over onto the Second Ridge by the time we got there but still we were getting picked off by snipers who were still hiding in the scrub.’32 Unlike Brigadier General Walker, Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan, who was still positioned at MacLaurin’s Hill, could see the congestion that was developing as the troops began to form up on top of Plugge’s Plateau. These troops also offered excellent targets for the Turkish artillery located close to Gaba Tepe, and shrapnel rained down on them as they moved along the plateau. This invariably resulted in unit fragmentation, which was not helped by the lines of Australians carrying ammunition to the firing line, while the many wounded were making their way in the opposite direction. Sinclair-MacLagan sent an urgent message back to the divisional headquarters that all reinforcements should approach Monash Valley via Shrapnel Gully and not approach it from Plugge’s. This message was never received and throughout most of the afternoon most reinforcements to the northern heights arrived to the firing line via Plugge’s Plateau.33 Indeed, along Second Ridge, which now represented the centre of the line, pockets of men occupied a number of isolated positions. Originally men of the 11th Battalion had occupied parts of the ridge and later men of the 3rd Battalion reinforced the men scattered across the ridgeline. Now men of the Auckland Battalion and ‘strays’ from any number of battalions who had found themselves in Monash Valley had started to take up positions along the ridge. Earlier Major Drake-Brockman had moved down Second Ridge from Russell’s Top to try to consolidate the 192
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 193
‘Heads down, arse up, and get stuck into it!’
defence of the ridge. He was intent on trying to form a continuous firing line from these isolated pockets. The line lay in rifle-pits some ten or twelve yards out from the crest, and the only methods of reaching it were either to run out, drop quickly into the nearest hole, and then hop from one to the other as opportunity occurred; or else, as an alternative, to crawl low through the scrub. When men in the firing line were hit, they ran back to the valley, if they could run; if not, they were dragged by their heels to the edge of the cliff and hauled over into safety. Many of the seriously wounded had simply to lie in their pits, some till nightfall, others for days. Meanwhile reinforcements were brought up in rear of the edge of the hill and kept there in support . . . As the line in the rifle-pits became depleted, two or three men would be sent over the top from time to time to reinforce it. Brockman was convinced that to maintain a line hanging as it were by its finger-nails along the rim of the valley was impossible. He considered that the proper position for it was out on the edge of the slope overlooking Mule Valley.34 There was no way that such a line could be established during daylight hours. Drake-Brockman planned to establish this line after dusk. Even further north along North Beach, Captain Layh and his surviving men of the 7th Battalion were still positioned at Fisherman’s Hut. Two of the stranded boats were filled with the wounded and pushed off the beach, a trawler coming up alongside to tow them away. Most of the wounded had now been cleared. It was now that Layh, Scanlan and their men could see Turks of the 57th Regiment (2nd Battalion) occupying the lower foothills close by and soon after they saw the Turks cautiously moving towards No. 1 Outpost and their own position. ‘Get a load of ’em would yers—as soon as the wounded are away, I reckon we should make ourselves scarce.’
193
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 194
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 195
PART III The Turkish Counterattack
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 196
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 197
15 ‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
y now Westmacott and his men of the Auckland Battalion were approaching Monash Valley and he sent a patrol to climb the ridge to their right (Second Ridge) in order to reach the firing line. However Sinclair-MacLagan and his staff at their headquarters on MacLaurin’s Hill were able to redirect them by waving them further on up the valley towards The Nek and Baby 700 beyond. Soon Westmacott came to
B
a group of Turks lying apparently sunning themselves on the bank at the gully bottom. A young Australian soldier stood guard over them, with rifle and bayonet. Somehow I was reminded of a fox terrier with a number of dead rats in a barn. He was wagging his tail I felt. ‘What are the men doing here?’ I asked. ‘They’re dying Sir’ he said delightedly. ‘They have all been bayoneted, and I am posted here to see they do no harm.’ Pride and pleasure was in every note of his voice. The poor fellows were accepting their fate quietly enough.1 Following closely behind Westmacott and his men were Sergeant Scott and others of the Canterbury Battalion. Scott later recalled ‘at this time the Turkish snipers were doing terrible damage to our men, picking them off everywhere that we went. We couldn’t see anything much to shoot at owing to the dense scrub and trees growing on the hillsides. We went straight out to reinforce the Australians who had at this time taken a fair amount of ground.’2 The New Zealanders turned and pushed their way up to the head of Monash Valley before climbing the steep slopes to their left and reaching Russell’s Top. Just beyond lay The Nek. In all, two platoons of the Auckland Battalion, totalling about 60 men, had made it onto Russell’s Top. It was now just after 1.30 p.m.3 197
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 198
25 APRIL 1915
The first New Zealanders to arrive were the platoon led by Westmacott. From his vantage point he could see that some of the Waikato Company had taken a wrong spur from Monash Valley. These men were halfway to the top, but were now climbing back down into the valley at the direction of two officers.4 Closely following behind Westmacott was Lieutenant Baddeley, his pipe firmly fixed in his mouth. Soon the Waikato Company commander, Alderman, approached and ordered Westmacott to advance beyond The Nek and help reinforce the Australians beyond Baby 700 to their front. Baddeley and his men would follow immediately behind them and once there was enough room both platoons would form an extended line. Alderman would wait and push the men forward as they arrived. Westmacott and his men moved forward along the goat track leading towards The Nek and Baby 700. Once beyond The Nek, Baddeley and
X
X
Layh
X 3rd Bn 57th Rgt X
No. 1 Outpost
2nd Bn X 57th Rgt X X X X
X
Lalor
X XX
Margetts Kindon
Walker’s Ridge
X
X
X
X
X 1st Bn 57th Rgt
X X X X X
Incebayir Ridge
Westmacott X Baddeley
X Jacobs Russell’s Top
Lamb Leer
X X
Cowey
X Westmacott (Auckland Bn) MacLagan’s HQ
X
X X X
X
3rd Bn 27th Rgt
X
0
250 metres
Map 15.1 The battle for the northern heights, between 1.30 and 2 p.m. 198
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 199
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
his men came up on their left, the extended line was formed and both platoons headed up the hill. One man stumbled over something and then gave a laugh. ‘It was a dead Turk’,5 he said, and soon quite a number of dead Turks were observed at intervals. As they continued towards the southern slopes of Baby 700 an Australian officer came running back towards Westmacott and his men. ‘Hullo. There you are . . . For God’s sake push on!’ he shouted as he came. I signalled my men to ‘Halt—lie down’ and the officer also stopped, panting. I sat down and he did too. It seemed no place to stand about. He sat there, beating the ground with his hand, his breath coming in great gasps. When he recovered a bit I said, ‘Now, what’s the matter?’ ‘For God’s sake push on,’ he replied. ‘They are getting Hell in front, and I am going back for reinforcements.’ This between gasps. ‘All right,’ said I, ‘I am going to reinforce in a minute. Those are my orders; but I want to know what to expect. Tell me all about it. What do you mean by “getting Hell?”’ ‘Well, they’ve formed a firing line in front—’ ‘Who have?’ ‘The First Australians and they’re getting Hell.’ ‘That’s what I want to know, that the First Australians are there all right. What do you mean by Hell? Are the Turks attacking with the bayonet or what?’ ‘No! No! They are losing a lot of men. They have formed a firing line on the other side of the hill and are holding on; but they need reinforcements badly and I’m going to get some.’ ‘Very well,’ said I. ‘That’s all right. We shall reinforce at once. Now as you go on down this track about a hundred yards you will find my Company commander in a dip on your right. He is an Australian officer. Tell him what you have told me and give him the message from me, that I am pushing straight on . . .’ I rose and waved my men to advance again. It was a pleasure to see the good line all were keeping with the interval named and no bunching. The platoon were moving across a track towards their right which was the directing flank still. As we marched on we began to get it, a heavy fire passing over us. I passed a man called Mullins who smiled at me saying ‘This is a hot corner Sir’. . . My own suppressed excitement was intense and took the form of uttering praise in lavish terms I rarely used, ‘Good boys!’ ‘Good lads!’ and 199
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 200
25 APRIL 1915
ridiculously ‘Good little boys’. The bullets were passing all round us, making a crack as loud as a rifle, and seemed very close to the ears. I marvelled we were not all hit, and thought ‘if I can come through this, I will survive anything’. Yet in spite of talking nonsense, my head was astonishingly clear. I judged it time to pause and get our bearings, so I raised my arm in the signal to halt and take cover again, which the line did, as one man.6 After getting his bearings, Westmacott pushed on with his men over the landward spur of Baby 700 where they met increasingly heavy Turkish fire.7 Private Tony Fagan of the Auckland Battalion recalled many years later: The bullets were zipping through the scrub above my head and I thought I’d better get out of this and get to a bit of cover. There was a little dip ahead of me that I could have laid in you see, so I jumped to my feet, the scrub you couldn’t crawl through. I jumped to my feet to run forward to this dip in the ground where I could get a bit of cover and BANG I was hit on the chest straight away. Do you know what I did, I don’t know why of course one thought if one was hit anywhere except in the limbs one would die you see and what I did was to say the Lord’s Prayer out loud. My passport to heaven I suppose.8 Westmacott later stated: The fire was very heavy, terrific it seemed to me. I doubled back less than twenty yards jumping over dead men, tripping over a bush, fell forward into what had been the firing line of the First Australian Infantry. From the time we moved for this rush we were met by such a hail of bullets I expected each moment to be our last. Yet it is curious I did not seem to care at all. It was all so impersonal . . . Poor old First Australians! Their firing line had almost ceased to exist . . . There was no trench. Lying on the forward slope without protective cover, every man there had been killed or wounded. They had fought on there, unsupported, rather than retire, and I saw at once that the same fate awaited me and the few of my men who had got so far forward. We could not retire of course, nor could we advance until reinforced. Nothing remained but to stay where we were and hope that something would happen to ease the pressure 200
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 201
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
upon us. What could happen we weren’t quite sure. We had some vague idea that the troops on our right and left might get on, and force the enemy back, and we had our rifles to get a bit of our own back if the enemy attacked us with the bayonet.9 The New Zealanders came across Major Kindon, much to his relief; by now he had only four or five effective men with him. The rest were either dead or suffering severe wounds. No other Australians could be seen. By now ‘the greatest problem lay in the fact that they were fighting virtually as isolated units. They couldn’t see each other. They could only be aware with any certainty, of the existence of their immediate neighbours, a few feet or yards away. It was the same on the crest and on the inland slopes.’10 The Waikato platoons of Westmacott and Baddeley helped to plug a gap between Kindon’s right and the left flank of Jacobs’s men of the 1st Battalion at the Chessboard and upper shoulders of Mortar Ridge.11 To their left was the summit of Baby 700. The New Zealanders asked who was on their left, and were told that part of the 2nd Australian Battalion were there. Soon Alderman brought up the rest of the Waikato Company and positioned them just behind Westmacott and Baddeley’s men. Since 1 p.m., the Turkish battery located near Chunuk Bair had been shelling the Australian positions around Baby 700, and to the distress of the few survivors, there was no reply by their own guns.12 As later recalled by Westmacott: So we lay amongst the dead and wounded Australians. One lying just in front of me made me feel ashamed that I was sheltering behind a wounded man, and that I must move away; but taking him by the foot I found he was already stiffening and must have been dead some hours. These men had most of them gone down in the fusillade we had heard from the ship about nine in the morning. A warm sun had been shining on them ever since, and the wounded were calling for ‘Water!’ and ‘Stretcher bearers!’ A man to my left rear called ‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’ Strange the moral effect of the guns! . . . Behind us on the hill we had first ascended from the beach, was an Indian mountain battery. They would fire steadily for a few minutes and then seem to be silenced by the weight of Turkish gun fire, whose shells seemed to be bursting right on top of them. We thought that was the end of them; but presently they would start firing again.13 201
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 202
25 APRIL 1915
Far behind in the distance to their right some would have been able to see 400 Plateau and scattered parties of Australians. They could also, just below the seaward crest of 400 Plateau, close to the Razorback, possibly make out the morale-boosting sight of the Indian Mountain Battery (Kirby’s guns), that had for the last two hours—at great expense to the gunners—been firing rounds into the Turks along Third Ridge and Legge Valley. It was now around 2 p.m. Unfortunately, for those strung out across Baby 700 there was no artillery support forthcoming.14 Major General Godley, commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division, had earlier signalled the flagship, at around 2 p.m., begging that his howitzers be landed as quickly as possible. At this time there were no barges available to land these guns. In any case, Major General Bridges had since then come to the conclusion that there was nowhere to position the guns at that time and he was also concerned that the situation was too fluid, which would endanger the artillery. He expressed his concerns to Lieutenant General Birdwood, who then signalled to Rear Admiral Thursby: ‘Stop sending field artillery’. Thursby ordered his transports to land no more guns and to re-embark any that had already been loaded into barges or lighters. Thus, the Anzacs were ‘deprived that evening of the moral support of hearing their own artillery in action’.15 Captain Layh and his men were still entrenched at Fisherman’s and Shepherd’s huts anxiously watching the approach of the Turks down towards their position. Layh now had with him fewer then 30 men. The wounded that had lain along the beach and within the boats had by now been evacuated by the stretcher-bearers and the navy. Now a formidable Turkish attack was developing from the spurs and gullies between the main ridge and the beach. By the time McWhae arrived back at the 3rd Field Ambulance dressing station the ‘strategic situation had deteriorated alarmingly. The Turks were pressing heavily on the left flank. By 2 p.m. they were holding the foothills above No. 1 Outpost, forcing the ambulance to retire along the beach.’16 The stretcher-bearers had by now carried the wounded down the beach, past Walker’s Ridge and The Sphinx, and came across the packs and other accoutrements of war left behind by the covering force earlier that morning. [T]here was no time for the dead. All thought had to be for the living. And so they passed by, with scarcely a glance at these most visible 202
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 203
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
tokens of war—the discarded packs with their contents strewn about, the fluttering letters, the greatcoats, the rifles, and the bodies all mixed up together in this unholy flotsam, washed up and left littering the beach. They made their way around the point, and into Anzac Cove, carrying the wounded. It was here they established their Main Dressing Station, and the headquarters of 3 Field Ambulance.17 Layh and his men were in great danger of being cut off. They had accomplished their mission of holding the Turks back while the wounded were evacuated and by 2.30 p.m. Layh collected his men and withdrew to the beach through the mouth of the Sazli Beit Dere, just north of their position. As they attempted to make their way back to the Australian lines, a Turkish machine gun opened up, forcing them to take cover. However, the Turks were very wary of the naval guns and never approached the beach itself. This enabled Layh and his men to slowly creep along the beach under cover of the navy. Layh and his eighteen survivors would not make their way back to the Australian lines until after dark.18 To the south at 400 Plateau, the constant Turkish shelling against the Indian battery was having serious consequences. By 2.30 p.m., Kirby, who was already back with his guns, had been wounded in the head, while most of his gunners were either dead or seriously wounded. Kirby ordered Rafferty and his surviving few (who had earlier tried to assist Layh and his men as they landed near Fisherman’s Hut) to the right rear of the guns, while he and Sergeant Piggott of the 5th Battalion rounded up what men they could find in the nearby gullies. Kirby was forced to admit that he needed to withdraw the guns to shelter. The Turkish fire was far too heavy for him to bring up the surviving mules; the valley behind was littered with the dead animals. The guns were run off the plateau by hand, back down towards the beach.19 No one begrudged the gunners; they had done far more then their fair share, and had taken appalling casualties as a consequence—‘those Indian gunners’ll do us!’ Strung out along the plateau, M’Cay’s troops were still feeling the full brunt of the Turkish onslaught. As later recalled by Private Parker of the 5th Battalion, lying just beyond the guns on the plateau above: It was pretty rough, going through the line—the bodies . . . strewn round the place! . . . The same thing applied to the stretcherbearers—they got hit just the same and there was no one, you know, 203
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 204
25 APRIL 1915
to organise extra stretcher-bearers . . . there was little or nothing you could do. It gave me the impression that it was every man for himself . . . You’d hear them calling out for water, the quart of water in our bottles was mostly gone . . . There was quite a number of fellows who took over—privates, a lot of fellows that had previously had little experience—Saturday afternoon experience in warfare or whatever the case may be. We eventually made a line of it, and when it came together I thought they’d done a mighty job to do what they did.20 George Mitchell, of the 10th Battalion, positioned on Johnston’s Jolly, made a short advance under the same fire: A scramble, a rapid pounding of heavy boots and clattering of equipment, a startled yell and a crumpling body which has to be leaped over, a succession of slithering thuds, and we are down in the bushes forty yards ahead . . . In this little advance Alec Gilpin has been fatally wounded in the stomach. All day he begged to be shot. We settled down to a necessary duel. The sharp smacking sound of an impacting bullet caused me to look around sharply. Alf Crowther gleefully showed me his cap which had a bullet hole drilled through in the brim. ‘Well you’re not born to be shot’ I said. But it was a rash prophecy. The men began to get hit, a terrible cry was wrenched from the bravest as the nickel demon ripped through flesh and bone and sinew . . . [Nearby another] fired a few shots and again I heard the sickening thud of a bullet. I looked at him [Crowther] in horror. The bullet had fearfully smashed his face and gone down his throat rendering him dumb. But his eyes were dreadful to behold. And how he squirmed in his agony. There was nothing I could do for him but to pray that he might die swiftly. It took about twenty minutes to accomplish this, and by that time he had tangled his legs in mine, and stiffened. I saw the waxy colour creep over his cheek and breathed freer.21 M’Cay must have now known that the only thing stopping the Turks from taking the plateau was the isolated forward parties of Australians and their few machine guns on the landward slopes of the plateau—not to mention the Turkish bombardment which was not discriminating in whom it killed or maimed. He had already received a message from Bennett on Pine Ridge that he was in urgent need of reinforcements as the Turks were now massing to his front. A company of the 1st Battalion 204
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 205
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
had just arrived and it was immediately sent forward by M’Cay to help reinforce the line. He also ordered one of the two companies of the 8th Battalion on Bolton’s Ridge to advance and occupy the area to the right of the 6th Battalion along Pine Ridge. Now only one company of the 8th remained on Bolton’s Ridge. Additional reinforcements were now urgently needed as just about the whole of the 2nd Brigade and most of the 3rd Brigade had been committed to the battle for the plateau. M’Cay requested additional men from divisional headquarters, but the request went unheeded as there were simply no other troops available; every available man was now being sent north, towards Baby 700.22 About half an hour earlier, the Turks on Battleship Hill and beyond were getting ready to launch an organised assault against the disintegrating Anzac firing line that had until now blocked their advance to the summit of Baby 700. The Turkish fire was increasing but the Australians and New Zealanders lying in the scrub could not see that the Turks were being reinforced, and were starting to increase pressure on Kindon’s right. The captain of the Waikato Company had been lying in the scrub for around half an hour and had by 2 p.m. made his way to Kindon. He suggested that they should retire and dig in at The Nek. Kindon refused, as he had no way of withdrawing without leaving the wounded to the mercy of the Turks. He and his few surviving men would stay put.23 It was around this time that another Turkish battery suddenly appeared close to Kindon’s front and opened fire on his line. First one opened and then a series of four. The first shell went singing over towards the beach; then the gunners gradually shortened their range, till the salvoes fell upon the slope of Baby 700 near The Nek and upon the heads of the two valleys between which The Nek ran—Malone’s Gully on the side nearer the sea, and Monash Valley inland. Any movement on the forward slope of Baby 700 brought upon itself this shrapnel. At the same time the fire upon Kindon’s line grew. ‘We were faced with a machine-gun on the flank,’ he said afterwards, ‘and with shrapnel in front and rifle fire. We were up against a trench and couldn’t shoot much. We could simply lie there, and they couldn’t come on while we were lying there’.24 Kindon realised that the Turks were trying to drive past his right, and if not checked would soon be at the head of Monash Valley. This area 205
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 206
25 APRIL 1915
was being held by the New Zealand platoons of the Waikato Company under the command of lieutenants Baddeley and Westmacott and it was these men who were to feel the full brunt of the Turkish attack along the inland slopes of Baby 700.25 Westmacott later recalled: From the front, from the right, and now from the right rear the rifle fire was coming. The last got several of us, though we did not know it at the time, for a sniper lay there just on the edge of the plateau and picked us off as we showed up, one by one. I think he had crawled up out of the gully after our right flank had passed, I learned this afterwards. Cowdray was the first to get it. He was talking to me one moment, the next his blood was pouring down his face from his forehead. He gave a surprised stare, then quickly laid his head on his rifle on the ground in front of him and was dead. I felt his death dreadfully . . . I could not help talking to his body as if he was still alive, calling him ‘poor little boy’ and telling him ‘never mind . . .’26 Soon Westmacott was scanning the area with his binoculars and saw a large number of Turks advancing towards his position, who had momentarily disappeared into a ravine now hidden from sight: Raised on my elbows I continued to examine the landscape in front through the binoculars, a good pair of Zeiss which my cousin Rupert had given me, when I received a blow on my right arm close to the shoulder, which turned me right over. I was now on my back and my arm completely useless. Reaching down I found something that seemed cold, fat and heavy at my left side on the ground. It was my own right hand. I was lying on my smashed right arm, though how I got there I know not. I looked at my wrist watch. The time was ten minutes past two. I reached for my pipe, but could not get hold of it, as it was in the right side pocket of my jacket. Turning cautiously over on my face again, my arm fell into position. I gave some groans, and was very ashamed of them. They were concern for myself. The arm was not painful; but numb, I got relief by rolling on my left side, taking hold of it and pulling it tight.27 Even though badly wounded, the brave and plucky lieutenant refused to leave the line and remained in command of his men. He soon saw the Turks climbing out of the ravine heading directly towards his position. 206
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 207
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
I shouted, ‘Fix bayonets—Rapid fire’. . . My good Sergeant Ward lying behind us, called, ‘Now then! Don’t forget. Firing with the bayonet on, out the sights up a hundred and fifty!’ Our fire ripped along the ridge and the whole of that leading section went down in the scrub; but more were to follow. I reached for my revolver, knowing I must use my left hand, with which I had schooled myself to shoot accurately; but instinctively trying to rise on my right and getting no action, went face downward in the dust and got my mouth full of dirt. I was spitting this out as I rolled on my right side, drew the revolver and turning to the front again, pushed it along the ground, determined to hold my fire till they were six feet off . . . Our men were fine shots and now, at last were getting their own back. The fire from the ridge behind and to the left was so steady and rapid that the Turks went down like nine pins—as they came in front of the ridge. One moment they were moving towards us, and the next collapsing into the scrub, perhaps crumpling is the better word. The foremost ones got no nearer than sixty yards from us. They at no stage tried to rush; but moved steadily on. No doubt many unwounded took cover in the scrub, as we had done, and hoped for better times; but as the advance came to a standstill these began to get up in ones and twos and ran back to the ridge. The broad flat packs on their backs made a good mark. Not a man got more than a few yards before he pitched forward on his face. Not one reached the ridge.28 This, however, was only a momentary checking of the Turkish counterattack. Within minutes a new and more determined Turkish attack commenced upon the depleted Anzac firing line along the landward side of Baby 700. As recorded by Sergeant Ward of the Waikato Company in his diary, ‘Our major [Alderman] who was also badly wounded and away to our right gave the order to retire because our men were falling all around us and the reinforcements [6th Hauraki Company] had not caught up to us to help. The men began to retire in splendid order and were a sight to watch and to think one had such splendid men to lead.’29 As later recalled by Westmacott: There was now a lull in the firing when from the rear came the word ‘Retire! Retire!’ Several of my men called to me ‘There’s the retire Sir! There’s the retire!’ I was terrified at the thought. Not only did the ‘Retire’ mean to sacrifice the ground we had reached, it meant leaving all the poor boys who lay there wounded, besides the bodies 207
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 208
25 APRIL 1915
of our dead friends. To my concern it meant possibly leaving me, though I did not, as yet, feel disabled . . . But we had been warned about false orders to retire, and I felt I must stop it at once. So I called ‘No! No! Don’t retire. Find out where that word came from.’ There was nothing for it, at any cost I must get up, back to the ridge, and check any movement to the rear. When I stood up the enemy’s fire reopened. It must have been hasty. I was not hit then; but when I turned my back I felt everyone was firing at me. Real fear came upon me and I commenced running. Fortunately—for I might have gone—I only got about fifteen yards when I was hit again close to the spine, and the force of the bullet knocked me over on my face, where I lay thinking I had a mortal wound, for while I had felt the bullet strike me, I had not felt it make an exit and imagined it to be in my innards. I thought I did not want to die there. As if in answer I heard Sergeant Ward’s voice saying they would get me out somehow. He had seen me fall and, at risk of his life crawled forward to me. On the other side a young Australian soldier, quite a boy, crawled to me also, each kept close to the ground. Just behind on the ridge Corporal Grant said, ‘I am going for stretcher bearers.’ I called out ‘keep down for God’s sake’; but it was too late he had risen to his knees. He was mortally wounded through the chest . . .30 At this point Private Sing was still with some men of the Waikato Company, reinforcing Kindon’s pitifully thin firing line. ‘I stayed there for some time then we had to retire because the odds were too heavy. We retired slowly at first then they gave it to us hot. We had to shift. They started to chase us. We had to run. I can tell you I don’t think I ran so fast in all my life.’31 The Turks were now pushing against Kindon’s right, and with this battle, Lieutenant Baddeley’s platoon was decimated— Baddeley and most of his men were never seen or heard of again. The Turks were now attempting to advance towards the head of Mortar Ridge. Jacobs was determined to hold his position at the Chessboard as from there he could offer some support to Kindon’s endangered flank.32 Meanwhile Sergeant Ward and a young Australian were half carrying, half dragging the badly wounded Lieutenant Westmacott towards the rear: Ward crawled to a body a couple of yards [away], to get the sling of a rifle, to put round me and pull me through the scrub. I said to [the] 208
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 209
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
young Australia[n] ‘for God’s sake go back my boy. I’m finished, and you will only get killed’ to which he answered with decision ‘No! I’m bloody near cryin’ myself Sir; but we won’t leave yer.’ Ward returned. I felt he must not help me, and I said ‘Go back sergeant. Leave me. You must take command of the platoon now’. ‘I beg your pardon sir’ said he. ‘It is no use talking like that; but there is no platoon left’. I had not realised we were losing so heavily before; but his statement was true. Meantime we had been reinforced by some of our own men who held on doggedly. So I gave up protesting and allowed myself to be assisted. Ward put the rifle sling round my body; and tried to pull me; but it would not work, as my kit, chiefly the haversack and water bottle, caught up in the scrub on each side of me. We took off the equipment, placing the water bottle for which I already felt the need, on my chest, also my binoculars which had been given me by Rupert and had cost money, and my revolver, taking the lanyard and strap in my teeth. My two rescuers took me by the left arm and pulled. I kicked with my heels at each pull and seemed to go back nearly a yard at a time. I was on my back, and they on their faces, had to wriggle back after each pull. This was good progress; but I soon dropped all my kit, except my cap, which I was able to keep on. The revolver, glasses and water bottle kept rolling off however and catching in the scrub and I had them recovered, till Ward said ‘Don’t worry about that sir. They can be picked up later on. We are trying to get you out’. I did not want to delay or risk their lives more than need be, so I saw the sense of the remark and left the things behind.33 Sometime after 2.30 p.m., three New Zealand machine guns had taken up a position about 70 metres behind and to the right of Kindon and the New Zealanders. Private Watson later described events in a letter to the father of one of his mates killed that day: Here we found the Australians were being driven back from the top [Baby 700] for the third time . . . and were retiring down the spur towards us. We found we could not do any good by advancing so Lieutenant Frater retired the guns, three of which had by now turned up with their teams . . . He lined the three guns across a narrow part of the ridge about 75 yards in width . . . with the lowest point of the saddle between by 350 yards. We had no time to erect 209
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 210
25 APRIL 1915
proper cover for the guns, but just trusted to the natural cover afforded by the bushes which are far from bullet proof.34 These guns were soon pouring lead into the advancing Turks and completely shattered their oncoming ‘organised’ lines. They momentarily at least managed to check the Turkish advance and enabled the surviving Anzacs to retire. Most bolted back towards The Nek, although some New Zealanders also reinforced the Australians at the Chessboard. Kindon and his men had by now also retired; he had few men left and the new line to the rear that he managed to construct was now essentially held by the New Zealanders under the command of Major Grant of the Canterbury Battalion, which included men from the South Canterbury and some of the 6th Hauraki. Kindon left the line under the command of Major Grant, in order to report the situation to Sinclair-MacLagan.35 After reporting to his brigade commander, Kindon would eventually make his way up to Pope’s Hill and told the men there that reinforcements were coming up. These reinforcements, however, would not arrive until after dark.36 By now Leer and the other Australians strung out along Mortar Ridge were facing fierce fighting at ever shorter range; their left flank was now completely exposed to the Turks who were pushing past them. Leer signalled back across to Lamb at the head of Monash Valley for reinforcements and ammunition. At every opportunity Lamb struggled to collect parties of men and send them across to Mortar Ridge, including a party from the 2nd Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Barton, who approached from Steele’s Post, while another party under the command of Sergeant Jones approached from the Bloody Angle. A third party, made up mostly of New Zealanders from the Auckland Battalion, also attempted to get across from Quinn’s Post. These parties tried to approach Mortar Ridge via Baby 700, but by now there were few if any Anzacs along the landward side of the hill. As they approached the head of the Chessboard, they saw that the Turks were now moving in their direction, cautiously pushing across the landward slopes of Baby 700. There was no way that these parties could now approach Mortar Ridge from the northern heights. Leer’s and Cowley’s men were now completely isolated. Jones withdrew his men to the head of the Bloody Angle, where they could offer some covering fire to Leer’s exposed left flank. ‘There they stayed, fighting desperately. They were not far from the position occupied by Jacobs and his men at the Chessboard. One New Zealander, whose left hand had been shot off, lay propping his rifle on the ground against this elbow and firing. Presently he was shot through the head.’37 210
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 211
‘Where’s our bloody artillery?’
At the time that the Turkish Battery to the front of Kindon had opened fire, Margetts and his survivors to Kindon’s left retired over the top of Baby 700 back towards The Nek. As he approached, Margetts was told by a senior officer to help protect Russell’s Top, just in front of Walker’s Ridge, in case the Turks tried to approach from the slopes below. Turks, mostly from the 2nd Battalion, could now be seen reoccupying No. 1 Outpost. No sooner had Margetts and his men started to dig in than they were ordered back up to the front line just beyond the summit of Baby 700. For the third time, with his ten surviving men, Margetts pushed on over the summit. He helped strengthen the thin line being held by an officer and a few men of the Australian 2nd Battalion. At this time Kindon and the right flank were still positioned on the landward side of Baby 700. The lack of ammunition was becoming a crucial problem, and Margetts somehow survived another trip back over the summit in order to bring up ammunition. At The Nek, he came across a platoon that was occupying the little horseshoe system of ‘coffin-shaped’ rifle pits that Lalor’s men had established earlier that morning. He was informed that a runner had left earlier with an urgent request for ammunition, and with this Margetts yet again crossed the summit of Baby 700 with the news that supplies were on their way. When he returned, he found that while the few men of the 2nd Battalion were still there, his men had retired to some unknown position. Margetts, surely exhausted, made another trip back over the summit to find his men.38 His luck was certainly in that day—it would run out a year later at the shattered ruins of a tiny French village called Pozières. Margetts came across Patterson just beyond the summit on the seaward side of Baby 700. Earlier that morning they had together climbed up to Russell’s Top as part of the covering force. Margetts told Patterson that he was ‘done up’ and with this Patterson collected his 30 men and proceeded to push on over the seaward side of Baby 700 to help reinforce the line. From Margetts’s position he could see Patterson and his men heading for Malone’s Gully—Patterson was never seen again. It was now sometime after 2.30 p.m.; unknown to those on the seaward slopes of Baby 700 their right flank had already withdrawn and Turkish troops were occupying the landward slopes of the same hill. The only thing stopping them from storming across and decimating the Australians on the opposite side of the hill was the rifle and machine-gun fire from the isolated parties of Anzacs along the northern parts of Second Ridge, The Nek and Mortar Ridge, the Chessboard and the newly established line under the command of Grant just south of Baby 700.39 211
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 212
Anzac 1919 During Bean’s return to Anzac he crossed over from Second Ridge to Mortar Ridge. He was hoping to find the exact locations occupied by Leer’s and Cowey’s men and determine if any evidence of the battle for Mortar Ridge on the first day remained in situ. Up it ran a sandy gutter about two feet deep, possibly following the line of an old foot-track; and along the whole length of this were the remains of Turks; and also, at intervals of two or three yards all along the gutter, small heaps of empty Turkish cartridges or clips. The men who fired them were shooting, almost certainly on the first day and night, at our men on the Second Ridge at Quinn’s, Courtney’s, Steele’s [posts] and MacLaurin’s Hill; and these Turks themselves had been under heavy fire. At one point six lay together. This Turkish line ended opposite Quinn’s, where a succession of small spurs broke the western slope of Mortar Ridge. From descriptions by those who were with Leer, I felt sure that the second of these minor spurs was his position, but I could find no trace of his presence. This was one of the few exceptions to the rule that where troops attacked we would find traces of them. The gully between there and Quinn’s had afterwards been crowded with the bivouacs of the local Turkish Garrison and its headquarters; and they had probably cremated or buried the dead and salvaged the kit and cartridge cases. . . . I found no trace of an Australian on it [Mortar Ridge] till I reached a clear patch near its head. Turks surveying [after the evacuation] . . . had placed a ‘trig’ station there, and on this patch was a piece of Australian kit. Next, 150 yards north-north-east of the trig was the body of an Australian, and near it, a red cross from one of the field medical-panniers carried by our early battalions. Then 200 yards north of the trig, I began to find, along a sandy path—or perhaps merely an accidental streak of bare gravel, in the scrub—the fired cartridges and graves of the line of New Zealanders seventy yards behind Kindon’s position.1 212
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 213
16 ‘Now then 12th Battalion’
y 3 p.m. the position of Leer and Giles along Mortar Ridge was critical. ‘The Turks are getting round,’ Leer said to Giles, ‘they are enfilading us from the left’.1 At this point he raised his head to see above the scrub line but was instantly hit with bullets through the neck and chest. Sergeant Phipps came to his aid and attempted in vain to stop the bleeding. Before dying Leer passed command to Cowey, who was positioned further south along a spur of the same ridge.2 A few New Zealanders who had previously occupied Quinn’s Post saw that the Australians on the ridge to their front were in need of men and ammunition, and managed to cross over the ridge into Mule Valley and then onto Mortar Ridge, reaching Cowey’s position. No other reinforcements, however, would be able to make their way to these men as Turkish fire now swept the Bloody Angle and any man who tried to reach them was instantly hit. Cowey was in urgent need of a machine gun as it was their only hope of suppressing the Turkish fire; it could also help deal with the Turks who were massing in the lower parts of Mule Valley to the south. Cowey wrote a message on a piece of paper requesting a machine gun and ammunition, as well as providing a sketch of the position and location of the Turks. He tied it around a stone and flung it over to Second Ridge to his rear. The message eventually made its way to the second-in-command of the 3rd Battalion on MacLaurin’s Hill.3 But by then it was too late. Cowey and his men had now almost completely exhausted their ammunition. The men either side of Cowey were dead but Cowey managed to obtain their ammunition pouches and began to throw bullets to the few men who were still alive. Others were no doubt doing the same. ‘Sorry cobber.’ With Cowey were stretcher-bearers who had at great risk to themselves moved around the wounded and continued to dress their wounds until they too were either dead or wounded. The Turks
B
213
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 214
25 APRIL 1915
had now encroached so close that the Australians on Mortar Ridge were now receiving enfilading fire from the Turks on both of their flanks from the same ridge. To make matters even worse Anzac reinforcements along Second Ridge now started to fire at those strung out to their front along Mortar Ridge, which included Leer’s and Cowey’s men. The Australians called back that they were firing at their own men, but the firing continued. Sometime after 3.30 p.m. Colonel Walker left the beach and made his way up to Plugge’s Plateau. As later recalled by Signalman Senn: Walker with rolled up sleeves and in shorts, and armed only with a swagger cane, binoculars and a map case, followed by Coningham and Wallingford similarly attired but also carrying revolvers, compass and a signal and pad decided to leave the ‘point’ and proceed up the spur towards the Plateau. Dick Morgan and I were told to go off with them to handle the communications . . . We were in touch with Russell’s Top all the time and sent and received messages . . . Morgan and I were now learning a bit about war and decided that there would not be much future in standing up and wagging a morse flag, so we looked for and mostly found partial cover. In one of these spots, a dry watercourse with a clay bank as a perfect back-drop, I was wagging the flag with only my head over the top when a burst of machine-gun fire plugged into the banks a few inches from my head.4 From his position on Plugge’s, Walker for the first time became aware of the folly in sending men up to Plugge’s in an attempt to reach Russell’s Top. The only way of reaching this crucial position from the south was via Shrapnel Gully then Monash Valley or from North Beach via Walker’s Ridge. While Walker was on Plugge’s Plateau, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart moved up to the top of the plateau to gain contact with his men of the Canterbury Battalion. Walker and Stewart gathered up all available men that could be found, including men of Stewart’s own battalion. Walker stressed it was crucial that they reinforce the northern heights—if not, all would be lost. Given the congestion below in Shrapnel Gully, he ordered that they approach via North Beach. Together this composite force moved back down the zigzag path they had just climbed in order to reach Russell’s Top via Walker’s Ridge.5
214
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 215
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
At Malone’s Gully a party of Australians, including Lance Corporal Howe, decided for the second time to storm the Turkish trench on the seaward side of Baby 700. Before doing so they waved to a few Australians to the rear who could be seen firing from The Nek, requesting them to come forward to their position. This collection of men from any number of battalions and companies had been searching for their units and had moved to the firing line in search of their commanders. They moved forward to Howe at Malone’s Gully. ‘G’day mate—need a hand?’ After the situation had been explained, the order was given: ‘Chaaarge!’ The Anzacs stormed out of the gully and charged the Turks with the bayonet. The Turks fired into the oncoming Anzacs, trying to hold the trench; some men fell, but most made it to the trench and now a vicious mêlée ensued: bayonets, shots, rifle butts and entrenching tools were used. The Turks were finally driven out; twelve lay dead in the trench. As the Australians again occupied the main trench the Turkish machine gun located just north of their position again barked back a deadly response, forcing the survivors into the communication trenches. From this position the Australians could see a mass of Turks approaching from Battleship Hill, only about 500 metres distant. The trench could not be held, and the Australian dead from the previous attacks lay all around—‘think it’s time we buzzed off, cobbers’. The surviving men dashed back to Malone’s Gully.6 As these men took a breather back in Malone’s Gully, part of Grant’s South Canterbury Battalion climbed and reached the Australians in the gully. They had approached from North Beach. These were likely two platoons under the command of lieutenants Lawry and Mead. The trench to their front had by now been reoccupied by the Turks. One of these officers asked about the trench in front. Howe informed him that it had been charged twice before and occupied but it was impossible to hold because a Turkish machine gun to the right enfiladed the position. The officer decided that a third attempt should be made to reoccupy the trench and ordered the charge. Yet again the Australians and New Zealanders charged out of the gully, head down, arse up, charging in a scrummage up the hill towards the trench. The Turks—seeing it was pointless to die for the position— decided that discretion was the better part of valour and left the position to them, no doubt realising that their machine gun would soon do all the killing for them. The Anzacs who had previously charged the trench had warned the others: ‘Stay outta the main trench—get into the communication trenches’. This would offer some protection at least. In the confusion, 215
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 216
25 APRIL 1915
however, a number of men occupied the main trench, and the Turkish machine gun predictably opened fire. Among the first to be killed was the New Zealand officer who had ordered the charge; almost all who charged into the main trench were killed. Those in the two communication trenches kept low. Within minutes the Anzacs again observed another mass of Turks approaching from Battleship Hill heading straight for the trench. The survivors in the trench could see to their right rear a party of Australians who appeared to be forming a firing line. The survivors of the trench raid decided enough was enough, and they bolted from the trench back towards Malone’s Gully, leaving the trench to the Turks.7 ‘If the bastards want the bloody thing that bad, they can bloody well have it!’ Margetts had by now taken up a support position just behind Malone’s Gully when he came across Lalor. Margetts got a well-deserved drink from Lalor’s whisky flask. Lalor told him to take a breather with Butler, who had earlier been with Tulloch’s party along the landward spur of Battleship Hill. Both rested as bullets and shrapnel passed overhead. It was not long, however, before a call came down from the seaward side of Baby 700 from the survivors of Richardson’s men of the 2nd Battalion that reinforcements were urgently required. Lalor turned to Margetts. ‘Take your men up,’ he said—and then: ‘No. I’ll go. You take your bugler and go down and see if you can bring some support and stretcher-bearers.’ ‘I’ll go forward, sir,’ said Margetts. ‘You’ll do as you’re told,’ was the reply.8 Lalor led his men off around Malone’s Gully. It was here that the ‘final’ battle was raging for the hill. It was now around 3.15 p.m. Margetts climbed down Malone’s Gully in order to make his way to Anzac Cove. I rolled down into the gully, sniped at all the way, and made my way towards the beach. It was just as much as I could do to get back, as in places the mud was up to our knees, and I was thoroughly exhausted before I left the firing line. I met some stretcher-bearers and sent them up and reported to some Colonel that Captain Lalor wanted reinforcements and then went along to Div. Headquarters and reported myself. I then went back to the place where a few slightly wounded and exhausted men of the 12th had collected and here met Mr. Green who had received orders to collect stragglers. Here I lay down, utterly finished; for a while I was too stiff and sore to move. Later on the Provost Marshall told me to form my men up and report 216
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 217
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
to Major Glasfurd, he ordered me to get ready to move out to the right but afterwards told me to stand by for orders. We were afterwards sent off to the right but met Captain Ross who ordered us back for the night.9 Lalor and his men had taken up a position on the further seaward spur of Baby 700 beyond Malone’s Gully, but short of the Turkish trench. Lalor had entered the fight earlier that morning carrying his sword but had by now lost it. He was soon joined by a party of the 2nd Battalion under Captain Morshead, who had previously been positioned to cover the extreme left of the 2nd Battalion platoons positioned along Baby 700. ‘It’s a ——!’ Lalor stated to Morshead as he arrived. ‘Will you come in on my left?’ ‘The poor Colonel [Clarke],’ he said to Morshead, ‘he was killed—dropped just like that! I don’t know where Whitham is—hope he’s all right. He and I were pals . . . Oh, it’s a ——!’ he reiterated.10 The fact that Lalor was located at the extreme left of the invasion force while Whitham was located at the extreme right and both belonged to the same battalion (which was supposed to be held together as the brigade reserve) demonstrates the degree to which battalion and brigade fragmentation had occurred. Morshead would make a successful career of being in a tight spot, surrounded by an overwhelming enemy force and still managing to come out on top. Indeed, in a later war he would stop Rommel’s Africa Corps dead in its tracks for seven months as the commander of the Tobruk Garrison and the famous Australian 9th Division, known as ‘the Rats of Tobruk’. Morshead organised his platoon to cover the left of Lalor along the same spur and together both formed an extended line. By now increasing fire was coming from the lower knolls down by the beach. The Turks had already reoccupied No. 1 Outpost and Fisherman’s and Shepherd’s huts along North Beach. Lalor stood up to see and made ready to advance his small party towards Battleship Hill. ‘Now then 12th Battalion,’11 he cried; and with that he was killed by a Turkish bullet. Down along the slopes and gullies just above North Beach, the Turks of the 2nd Battalion were attempting to drive back the Australians from the inland slopes of the main ridge. By now Layh and Scanlan had left Fisherman’s Hut and under the protection of the naval guns were making their way slowly down the beach towards Anzac Cove. Just after 3 p.m. the parties of Turks who had forced Layh and his men to evacuate Fisherman’s Hut started to advance over and around the four major 217
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 218
25 APRIL 1915
seaward spurs of Baby 700 and towards Walker’s Ridge itself. The only troops occupying Walker’s Ridge were a party of New Zealanders under the command of Captain Critchley-Salmonson of the Canterbury Battalion, as well as remnants of Australians from the 9th, 11th and 12th battalions that had earlier been sent to protect the ridge from the Turks who could be seen approaching from No. 1 Outpost. This Anzac force represented fewer then 40 men.12 Meanwhile, the wounded Westmacott and his companions had made their way back to the Anzac lines at the rear of Baby 700. Progressing painfully . . . and it took time, I thought we went about thirty yards and got well over the ridge before Ward said ‘We are under cover now Sir, and could get back quicker if you could walk’. I stood up and for the first time felt very faint from loss of blood. They both supported me and we soon reached the track, which was being shelled, behind the firing line, where I learned that our whole company was engaged and some of the sixth Hauraki company had also gone in on the left of us. I tried to report to Major Alderman; but we could not find him. I was afraid I was becoming rather too dependent on assistance, and allowed myself to be helped along the track towards the rear. About a hundred yards along I saw Captain Courtnay Sinel kneeling at the head of a platoon of the sixth Hauraki. His commander, Major Stuckey, was already missing by this time, having tried to lead his company along the steep hillside from the Turkish trench, and no doubt died in the scrub, for his body was never found. Sinel and the men with him were under shell fire at this point and losing heavily. I exchanged a few words with him, tried to tell him about the enemy and how our men were holding on on the ridge ahead; but am afraid I was not much help to him, and I learned later that I had bled so much down my jacket front and breeches that many, as they waited, were concerned about me. I certainly was not a nice sight at this stage, my right arm hanging useless and saturated with gore. No doubt Sinel was glad to see me go, for to tell the truth I was beginning to feel a bit faint and did not notice things very clearly. The shellfire at this stage was a thing we did notice. One fourgun battery of the enemy had the range of that track to a yard. It fired in salvoes. There would come one burst of shrapnel ‘Bang!’ and then 218
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 219
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
close following almost all together ‘Bang!—Bang!’ and the bullets and fragments spread with angry ‘sish-sish’ ‘sish-sish’ through the scrub, and then there was a pause before they fired again. At first we threw ourselves upon the ground when the first shell burst and waited for the three to follow, and when the salvo ceased would get up and move slowly on. I was again wounded, this time by a piece of shell casing, I thought, which knocked me down; but apart from cutting my jacket and bruising me did no great harm. Then we moved into the scrub on the right, well away from the tracks, and it was not so bad. Had we been more experienced soldiers we would have done this earlier, as tracks draw shellfire. At this moment a man of ours, with his foot blown to pulp, came hopping out of the scrub behind us and cried out ‘for god’s sake. Don’t leave me.’ The young Australian went back saying ‘Come on mate. Get on my back’ and the man held on to him. I thought I might not see the lad who had helped save my life, again and wanted to know who he was and report his brave action to his officers. So I asked his name. ‘Don’t bother about that Sir’ he replied ‘I know what you want it for. My name is Nip Knox. That’s what it is.’ By this time I could not walk more than a few yards at a time and only very slowly, with assistance, getting up, getting down and staggering along. We now found ourselves over the edge of the steep slope into the gully. Someone said ‘It’s no good. We’ll have to get a stretcher.’ So they put me down on the ground, where I lay very content with my eyes closed, but feeling the thirst. As I lay there . . . Australians commenced to pass me going into action along the ridge, which was a reassuring sight . . . Ward went off and presently returned with a sergeant of the Australian Medical Corps. He cut off the sleeve of my jacket and shirt and bandaged the arm. The bullet had entered the back of it just below the shoulder; shattering the bone and tearing a great hole out in front. The limb dangled. It was still a relief to pull it tight, which I did, sitting up, and I felt it was so numb I could have had it off then and there. The sergeant broke some twigs off a bush close by and tied them round the wound, like a splint. For the first time it began to hurt a little as he did it; but he said it would help me if I could stand it as it was by no means unbearable . . . . . . I asked for some rum to help my thirst, which I felt was unquenchable. He had none; but gave me his water bottle full of brandy, which bucked me [up] considerably. I now asked him to look 219
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 220
25 APRIL 1915
at my body wounds which I thought were serious; but they proved not as bad as I thought. Two small shell wounds were nothing. But the bullet wound which knocked me over the second time was a narrow escape, striking near the spine, it had slid, round the left ribs coming out with a larger exit on my left side; but doing no permanent damage . . . I now felt much more chirpy thanks, doubtless to the brandy . . . They said it was hard to carry a stretcher down the slope, could I walk to the gully bottom? I said I would try. The sergeant took off one of his puttees, tied it around his neck and slinging my arm in it. They stood me up. To the bottom of the gully was about fifty feet I should think and almost precipitous. I could find foothold like a goat at that time, so used was I to steep country and I reached the bottom in about two spurts, my escort being harder put to it to keep their feet than I was.13 On Baby 700, Captain Tulloch, who was now at the head of Malone’s Gully, had managed to creep forward, when above him a shrapnel shell exploded, not far from his head. ‘Oh Christ.’ He must have heard the sickening thud as shrapnel tore into his body; the pain would not be long in coming. He would somehow make it off the northern heights and make his way to a field dressing station below. By now most of the officers were dead, and the shrapnel was taking an increasingly heavy toll on those on the seaward slopes of Baby 700 as well as those further behind the summit close to The Nek. The men within Malone’s Gully were now under the command of Corporal Laing, who had previously helped Lieutenant Colonel Clarke climb up to Russell’s Top. He was now the most senior amongst around 60 men from any number of differing battalions.14 Soon word reached Morshead that reinforcements had made their way onto Russell’s Top in the form of Lieutenant Colonel Stewart’s composite company including men of his Canterbury Battalion. Stewart’s men now moved forward towards The Nek. To Stewart’s front and to his left now lay the remnants of Lalor and Morshead’s men. Just beyond the summit and seaward slope of Baby 700 lay the small party of the 2nd Battalion and survivors of the 3rd Brigade. To the rear of the inland slopes of Baby 700 was the newly established line held by Major Grant and his New Zealanders with the few survivors of the Australian 1st and 3rd brigades who had previously occupied the northern heights. Earlier the two companies of the 2nd Battalion that were being kept as part of the divisional reserve had been ordered by Major General 220
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 221
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
0
250 metres
X X
X
Malone’s Gully
1st Bn 57th Rgt
X X
X
X X
Howe Morshead
Walker’s Ridge
X
X
Lalor Stewart
CritchleySalmonson
X
Grant
Braund
X
X
Jacobs
Mortar Ridge
Jones Russell’s Top
Lamb
Leer
X X
Cowey X
Mule Valley
Monash Valley
X
X 3rd Bn X
27th Rgt
Map 16.1 Trying to stop the Turkish advance towards the summit of Baby 700 and onto The Nek, between 3 and 3.30 p.m.
Bridges to reinforce the men on Baby 700. By 4 p.m. these men, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Braund, had made their way up to Russell’s Top via Walker’s Ridge. They pushed a short distance into the scrub and took up a position behind Stewart. Stewart now sent three messages to Morshead in rapid succession. The first stated that he should retire to his line across Russell’s Top to his rear. A second shortly afterwards stated that he should ‘stay where you are. We will come up to you.’ A little while later a third message arrived, again ordering him to retire to Russell’s Top. At this point shrapnel fire increased across The Nek and Stewart was killed by a worthless piece of scrap metal.15 Just south of this position on Second Ridge, Lieutenant Colonel Owen, commander of the 3rd Battalion, had arrived and established a position at Steele’s Post. He was in direct contact with his brigade commander, 221
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 222
25 APRIL 1915
Sinclair-MacLagan, who was positioned at MacLaurin’s Hill just 400 metres south of Steele’s Post. Drake-Brockman was still planning for his men of the 11th Battalion—Everett, Barnes, Croly, Rockliff and Macfarlane—to form into a continuous firing line beyond the ridgeline immediately after nightfall. However, between the 11th Battalion parties there were now larger numbers of men from the 3rd Battalion and Owen took over command of the defence of Second Ridge. He summoned Drake-Brockman to his position and informed him that he would not send the men out to form a firing line beyond the ridgeline until he himself had reconnoitred the position.16 The situation along Second Ridge was anything but secure. While a number of parties occupied the ridge, the only cover was some hastily dug shallow rifle pits just several metres beyond the crest of the ridge. The Turks previously seen in the northern parts of Legge Valley moving up the slopes of Johnston’s Jolly and German Officer’s Ridge were attempting to capture these positions. It was this attack, from the Turkish 27th Regiment, that drew many New Zealanders piecemeal into the defence of Second Ridge. The intensity of these Turkish attacks forced small parties from the 3rd Auckland Company and the 15th North Auckland Company, who had been trying to reach Baby 700, to occupy Second Ridge as the men along this ridge called to those below in Monash Valley to urgently help them repel the Turkish counterattacks. Frederick Scarborough of the Auckland Battalion later recalled that while passing into Monash Valley ‘a few of us are over a ridge and down we race . . . while bullets rip-rip all around . . .’17 As they began to push their way up the valley an Australian officer along the ridge to their right yelled out for reinforcements. With this the New Zealanders climbed onto Second Ridge, close to what would become Quinn’s Post. Scarborough also later recalled in the present tense: ‘Soon among many dead & wounded lying among the scrub—a fusillade of Turkish rifle & machine gun fire is passing overhead . . . we don’t know where we are . . . troops are all mixed up.’18 Thus, like the Australians before them, the New Zealanders strung out along Baby 700 were now also starved of reinforcements, who were instead being pushed onto Second Ridge south of their position.19 To the south on 400 Plateau, small parties of Turks continued to infiltrate between the advanced parties of Australians. A party of ‘Australians, retiring from Lonesome Pine, found half a dozen Turks in rear of them at the head of Owen’s Gully, and began to drive them towards the 222
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 223
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
Australian line. At the same moment about a score of Turks appeared over the edge of the plateau. The Australian party had to drop into the scrub and to escape under cover of fire from its own line.’20 Still positioned at Scrubby Knoll, Lieutenant Colonel Aker was viewing through his binoculars the progress of his men as they continued to slowly approach the landward side of 400 Plateau. I was keeping an eye on this eastern edge of the Kanli Sirt Plateau . . . [I saw] groups of our riflemen, one lot lying down on the ground with their backs towards us and another lot in a kneeling position. It seemed that a platoon had had its communications with the riflemen on its right and left sides cut by the brushwood and other obstacles. The other riflemen did not seem to be visible. A slight movement among the brushwood caught my eye not more than about 20 or 30 paces in front of the riflemen whom I could see. My eyes were glued on that slight movement. An Australian of whom I could see only the head and shoulders, and who I judged to be an officer brandishing something, which I could not distinguish in the direction of our riflemen. Was it an arm? Was it a sword . . . then all was still . . . Then once more he brandished something. On this second brandishing, all of a sudden, among the thickets, a close packed line of soldiers were seen to rise to their feet. This line suddenly moved through the thickets in front of them and rushed upon our riflemen in bayonet attack.21 Thomas and his men were still located in The Cup and suffering heavily from a concentrated pounding of shrapnel fire. Sometime after 3.30 p.m. Thomas’s shoulder was smashed by shrapnel and he was forced to leave the position under the command of a 2nd Brigade officer. Corporal Loud, who had arrived there earlier in the morning, recorded in his diary: We were there the whole afternoon under a hot fire coming from three directions. Several of our lads were killed around me & a few wounded. It was sickening to watch but one soon gets callous & takes no notice of wounds. One man on exposing himself to get a shot had his jaw shot away—you could see the bone hanging from the flesh. On someone calling him into the trench for shelter he coolly stooped down for his rifle & walked in, whilst another helping me drag a man hit in the shoulder into shelter, was hit in the back. 223
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 224
25 APRIL 1915
On examination we found the bullet had only gone through the muscle on one side . . . making a clean flesh wound while still another was hit in the cheek four teeth smashed & out the other side, without touching the jaw bone. Late in the afternoon some of the slightly wounded left us & made their way back to the main body to ask for reinforcements as we could not leave in a body.22 Boase and his men had already been forced to retire from their advanced positions towards the rear of the plateau. As later recalled by Aker: Our artillery lowered sights 50 metres back and gradually began pounding the area between us and the middle of the plateau. We realised, from their excitable behaviour, which we saw amongst the thickets and even from the fact that they were running away, the effect which this covering fire was having. But since our riflemen on the left flank had advanced more than we realised among the brushwood, they too, were somewhat affected and immediately warned us of this danger by displaying a red flag.23 Major General Bridges had again received word from Colonel M’Cay that he urgently required reinforcements, but the only reserve force left to the divisional commander was the 4th Battalion and he was unwilling to release this battalion as a reserve force until the Australian 4th Brigade (part of the New Zealand and Australian Division) began to land. At this time they were still aboard their transports and would not land for many hours yet. This also applied to the New Zealanders, including half of the Canterbury Battalion, the Wellington and Otago battalions. The transports had arrived late, and as they started to anchor near their designated area a number of large shells arrived in pairs, likely from a Turkish warship in the Dardanelles. This fire forced the transports to move further out to sea.24 The split command between the army and navy was having serious consequences, as the navy refused to adjust its timetable to take into account the urgent demand from the army command ashore for reinforcements. The navy had its own problems dealing with ferrying the wounded to transports as well as trying to land supplies. During these hours of the afternoon the landing of additional men had ceased just when reinforcements were urgently required. ‘From 12.30 to about 4 p.m. not an infantryman arrived on the beach’, Bean noted.25 224
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 225
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
Bridges ordered M’Cay to establish a firing line from Bolton’s Ridge to the head of Owen’s Gully with his available troops, but this was not possible given that the men of his 2nd Brigade and parties of SinclairMacLagan’s 3rd Brigade that were still in the land of the living were scattered across the southern lobe of the plateau (Lonesome Pine) and the few survivors could not be recalled. Orders were orders, however, and M’Cay sent the word to his battalion commanders that their men were to form the firing line ordered by Bridges, knowing that it was unlikely that his officers would be able to carry out the order. At the same time he informed Bridges that his brigade had lost greatly and would not be holding the line in satisfactory strength.26 It was sometime in the afternoon that Talbot Smith, who had been in command of the 10th Battalion scouts, took command of a machine gun somewhere on 400 Plateau. It was no longer possible for him to reconnoitre and he and his men joined the firing line. As later recalled by Lieutenant Colonel Weir, commander of the 10th Battalion: When scouting became impossible he took up his duty on the machine guns, and was working the same when he was wounded by shrapnel in the temple. The five men who were on the gun with him were either wounded or killed, but he bravely stuck to his post and fired his gun until thus severely wounded. He was laid at the back of the gun by Sgt.-Major Sawer, who thought that Smith was dead . . . On Monday morning it was discovered that Smith was still alive. He was then removed to the beach and hence to one of the hospital ships, but his injuries were so dreadful that his recovery was beyond human aid, and he gradually sank and died.27 Close by on Johnston’s Jolly were Signaller Pavey and others of the 10th Battalion. About 4 pm there was a slight lull in the firing. Then I heard a pitiful cry of ‘Water! Water!’ I asked the Captain next to me at the time, ‘Who is it?’ He said ‘Lieutenant Byrne, (my platoon commander) will you go and give him a drink?’ He was lying out in the open, so I had to crawl to him. I reached him in safety and quenched his thirst. There was a clump of thick bushes on the left of us, about 20 yards away, and if we could reach it he might be left there in comparative safety. As he was shot in both legs and in the left side, I had no alternative but to carry him. I raised him gently as I could and got under 225
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 226
25 APRIL 1915
him; then staggered to my feet, and had gone half way when ‘thud’, and down I went on top of my unfortunate officer. I felt a stinging in my thigh, and it was not until I endeavoured to get up and have another try that I realised I had got a bullet and could not use my leg. After lying still for a few minutes (during which the lieutenant gave another cry, indicating that he had received another bullet) I decided that to stay was certain death, and started to crawl to the bushes, as I could do no more for Byrne.28 Major General Bridges was becoming increasingly concerned that both his flanks were urgently requesting reinforcements. It boiled down to one simple question: if he was to release his sole reserve force (the 4th Battalion), where should he send it—to Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan along the northern heights and Baby 700, or to Colonel M’Cay positioned along the southern plateau and the Lonesome Pine? It made no sense to send half to M’Cay and the other half to Sinclair-MacLagan, as this would merely dilute their ability to help decide the outcome at either flank. Bridges had earlier sent one of his staff officers, Major Blamey, to M’Cay to assess the situation. Shortly after 3.30 p.m., Blamey telephoned Bridges and confirmed that reinforcements were urgently needed on the southern plateau; the Turks were massing just below the eastern slopes and would undoubtedly commence a massive counterattack, and the dispersed parties of Australians spread across the field could not possibly hope to stop such an attack. An entrenched firing line needed to be established and this required the 4th Battalion to fill the large gap between Bolton’s Ridge and the men along Johnston’s Jolly. Bridges was still uneasy about committing his sole reserve and promised Blamey and M’Cay that as soon as a battalion became available it would be sent to them. The communications between Bridges and M’Cay were noticeably better than that between Bridges and Sinclair-MacLagan. Along Pine Ridge, Bennett and his men were sniping at the Turks. Major Bennett had pinpointed the position of a Turkish battery along Third Ridge, and had noticed troops moving around the battery, which appeared to be an advance party of reinforcements about to move down into Legge Valley. Bennett at once began to direct the fire of those around him against the battery. He stood up to better direct the fire and began to look for the battery position on his map in order to direct naval artillery fire against it. At this point he was shot in the wrist and shoulder. The force of the impact knocked Bennett to the ground and he was forced to hand command over to an officer from another battalion.29 With his left 226
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 227
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
arm completely useless and bleeding profusely he made his way towards the rear. He soon came across Private Ricketson, who had earlier observed Bennett draw his revolver against a fellow officer on Sniper’s Ridge. Ricketson, who was wounded in the leg, was trying to level himself down the slope of Sniper’s Ridge when Bennett came along and grasped Ricketson around the waist with his one good arm. They both hobbled together, making painfully slow progress up and down the numerous gullies and spurs before finally making their way to the relative safety of Bolton’s Ridge and finally the beach. Sometime after 4 p.m. the Australians had been forced to evacuate The Cup as it was too exposed, not only to shrapnel fire but increasing rifle and machine-gun fire originating from Third Ridge, Legge Valley and the lower parts of Owen’s Gully. Soon small parties of Turks began to reoccupy the position. As later recalled by Lieutenant Colonel Aker: In the area where the [guns were], both sides had fought fiercely. We found the broken parts of a machine gun, which the Australians had used in this area. It was clear that this machine gun had suffered a direct hit from our artillery. As the battle progressed in this way, the number of dead and wounded rose and our line of battle become weaker. Originally on Kanli Sirt [Lonesome Pine], which was the scene of the fiercest hand to hand fighting, Numbers 1 and 4 Companies of the 1st Battalion and No. 3 Company of the 3rd Battalion took part. A platoon of No. 2 Company 1st Battalion was involved on the northern slopes of this ridge. This platoon also tried to advance on the southern slope of Kirmiz Sirt [Johnston’s Jolly] . . . but because the southern slope of Kirmiz Sirt was exposed to severe firing from Kanli Sirt it was not possible to advance along this slope and since they could not take cover on Kirmiz Sirt, this platoon moved to the right and fell back to the northern slope of Kirmiz Sirt.30 Aker’s attack against the Lonesome Pine was stalling as a result of casualties. He was determined to recover his guns from The Cup and ordered some of his 3rd Battalion troops who had previously been protecting his right flank to move south and reinforce his troops from his 1st Battalion who had started to occupy The Cup. ‘As a result of the bayonet and firing assaults, made with the help of this new force at approximately 1600 hours, the Australians were thrown back from the central part of Kanli Sirt and our guns were all safely recovered. It was 227
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 228
25 APRIL 1915
also at this time that [the] 57th regiment also overcame the enemy’s left wing and compelled them to retreat towards Ari Burnu via Dus Tepe [Russell’s Top].’31 Indeed, Lieutenant Mucip and his men of the 3rd Battalion were located in Mule Valley and on the lower slopes of Mortar Ridge when the 57th Regiment launched their attack. Finally at about 1600 hours the heroes of the 57th Regiment were seen in the distance behind our right flank. They were pursuing the routed enemy from the direction of Dus Tepe. The Australians, who were turning our right flank, disengaged when 57th Regiment launched an attack on their left flank. Subsequently all the Australians opposite us suffered casualties and began to get lost in the brushwood.32 Mucip later also recalled, ‘I have no idea when the sun crossed over to the west today. Darkness fell over the sea and the whole area . . . Hundreds of British boys were lying on our land never to open their eyes again . . . These boys with clean-shaven and endearing faces were curled up in their blood-stained uniforms. Their sight aroused in us feelings of both revenge and compassion.’33 An hour after the Indian Mountain Battery had been driven off 400 Plateau the only salvoes that could be heard were those from the Turkish batteries. Such was the situation when, to the north, the scattered remnants of the Anzac line finally broke as a mass of Turks, with bugles blaring and with yells of ‘Allah, Allah, Allah’ swarmed down towards the few Anzacs still on Baby 700, who were forced to fall back. The battle now centred on the newly established firing line behind Baby 700 being held by Grant and his New Zealanders and those Anzacs positioned at The Nek, and those scattered along parts of Mortar and Second ridges. All parts of the Australian and New Zealand line on the left realised that a heavy attack was at this moment coming down upon Baby 700 and the slopes around it. Turks were moving in rough formations of attack from the direction of the main ridge. Even on the 400 Plateau, a mile to the south, where another heavy struggle was in progress, some found time to notice the great numbers of troops who came in company column to the main ridge, deployed into line as they topped the summit, disappeared for a time behind Baby 700, and then at 228
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 229
‘Now then 12th Battalion’
about 4 p.m. attacked. The attack advanced across the slope and spurs of the range both on the seaward and inland side.34 The main attack fell immediately against Grant’s advanced line of New Zealanders and remnants of Australians clinging onto the lower rear landward slopes of Baby 700. If this line was to have any hope of holding back the Turkish onslaught, reinforcements and ammunition were urgently needed. While Lieutenant Colonel Braund and his Australians of the 2nd Battalion had earlier arrived on Russell’s Top, they like many others to the rear of Grant and his men were now pinned down, not only by fusillades of Turkish rifle and machine-gun fire, but by a bombardment of shrapnel exploding above the men’s heads. Those advanced lines beyond The Nek were in serious danger of being cut off and annihilated in detail. Meanwhile just below, the wounded Lieutenant Westmacott had collapsed on the floor of Monash Valley. Collapsing on the soft sand, I lay there on my back whilst the sergeant went for a stretcher. Presently a wounded Hauraki man appeared and sat on the bank beside me. The lower part of his face and jaw were shattered. His eyes looked out of a bloody bandage tied all around his head. Of course he could not speak. Presently, drawing his bayonet, he motioned me to watch, while he wrote with the point in the sand of the bank ‘Lieut Morpeth wounded half an hour ago.’ I felt very pleased, for up to that time I thought I was the only officer of our regiment hit, and felt rather a fool in consequence. The sergeant returned with the stretcher . . . Two men lifted me on the stretcher. I was carried up the winding path and do not remember much about it except that we were very slow and sniped at.35 Finally the embarkation of the New Zealand and Australian Division had recommenced and by 4.30 p.m. Lieutenant Colonel Malone had landed with the remaining two companies of the Canterbury Battalion as well as half of the Taranaki Company. Earlier, Godley and Birdwood had landed and conferred with Bridges, and it was only then that they became aware of the urgency of the situation. The radio communication between Birdwood’s headquarters on HMS Queen and the army ashore had been far from perfect. Soon the Otago Battalion began to land. With this Birdwood went back to HMS Queen, while Godley remained ashore to direct his division. By 5 p.m. all of the New Zealand Brigade had 229
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 230
25 APRIL 1915
landed, the only exception being the remaining companies of Malone’s own Wellington Battalion. The mission of the New Zealanders was to urgently reinforce the Anzacs now desperately fighting for their lives along the northern heights above.36 The question was, were they already too late?
230
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 231
17 ‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’ n the line now formed by Grant forward of The Nek along the inland slopes of Baby 700 was Private Cavill (Australian 2nd Battalion), who had previously been with Kindon on Baby 700. He later recalled:
O
something hit me. I thought at first that I had been struck by a shell. After picking myself up, and regaining a sitting position, I put my hand down to feel if my leg was still there; I was really scared to look, for fear it had gone. Feeling that that really useful member was still attached to my body, I started to discover the extent of the damage. Whipping off my puttee and slashing the seam of my breeches with my clasp knife, I reached my knee, to find a small, quite respectable looking puncture close alongside the knee-cap, from which oozed a thin stream of blood. The bullet—for such it was—had gone right through, coming out behind the knee, severing, en route, some of the important nerves of the leg, thus paralysing the leg. This was temporarily useful, as it saved me any intense pain.1 Just after Cavill was wounded, the Turks counterattacked. It was at this stage that the Turks, heavily reinforced, counter-attacked, and compelled our sadly diminished force to fall back. I knew if I jumped to my feet to retire I would only collapse, as my leg was as useless as though there was no bone in it. The only thing to avoid capture was to crawl, and crawl pretty quickly. So, on one knee and two hands, I started . . . At least a dozen snipers wasted a cartridge on me—the bullets clipping twigs in front of my nose, whistling through my hair, and kicking the dirt up in my face. On one occasion a platoon of Australians passed on their way to the firing line. One man, dropping out, half carried me back about a hundred yards, and with a 231
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 232
25 APRIL 1915
sincere, ‘Good luck, mate, I’m needed up above,’ he raced away to assist the hard-pressed, exhausted men in the firing line.2 Now with the collapse of the thin and scattered Anzac line along Baby 700, the few survivors were in full flight, scrambling over the hill, running back, yelling, ‘Get to buggery, the Turks are coming on—thousands of them!’3 Most of Grant’s survivors made their way back down the lower slopes of the hill towards Russell’s Top, while others moved towards the head of Monash Valley.4 Just forward of The Nek, Sergeant Roy Lambert with the last of the Auckland Infantry was also part of the line constructed by Grant. Lambert had earlier taken up a position for a short time close to Private Watson near The Nek, before advancing to Grant’s forward position just before the main Turkish counterattack swept over Baby 700. Later Watson wrote a letter to Lambert’s father: Your Son arrived with this lot and laid down alongside me for a second or two to recover . . . I directed him to the saddle ahead to which place the main body of the Auckland infantry and Australians had, by this time, retired, after another abortive attempt at carrying the hill. The trouble with taking Turkish trenches . . . was not their infantry but their shrapnel . . . The small force ahead of us was mustered together by Captain Sinel (6th Haurakis) and an Australian Major [Kindon]. There could not have been more than 50 all told, and they made a last stand here, supported by our three guns. Your son was killed [there].5 Another of Grant’s line was Bugler Ashton of the 11th Battalion, who had been bandaging a wounded New Zealander. Within seconds the wounded man was hit again; mortally wounded, the New Zealander begged Ashton to shoot him, but Ashton rose and moved on to get a stretcher-bearer. It was only then that he realised the rest of the line had disappeared. He was alone. Masses of Turks were heading directly towards him and he jumped into a ravine that he believed to be Monash Valley. Here he found a wounded Australian of the 1st Brigade, whom he helped till the man could go no further. Ashton pushed on. In fact, he was not in Monash Valley, but Mule Valley, and he continued down until he neared the bottom. It was now that he found himself surrounded by Turks and was captured. Ashton would be one of the few Anzacs captured during the first day to survive captivity.6 232
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 233
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’
On the seaward side, amongst the last to leave were those Anzacs positioned within Malone’s Gully. Howe and a New Zealander remained behind for a few moments as the others raced back towards Russell’s Top. Presently a mass of Turks came over the skyline, less than 150 metres away, and with them was an officer who momentarily stopped to look through his binoculars. Howe took careful aim and brought the officer down. It was only then that both men turned to head back for the Australian line behind Baby 700. They were probably the last Anzacs to leave the hill alive. As Howe and the New Zealander raced over the seaward spur of Baby 700, the line that had previously been established had vanished. These men had withdrawn to The Nek or towards each branch of Monash Valley, either lining the edge of Pope’s Hill on the western branch, or located along the Bloody Angle and the next ravine south of it on the eastern branch. Howe and his companion raced to The Nek and stumbled into the rifle pits that had been dug earlier that morning by Lalor’s men. Within three of these pits were the two machine guns from the Auckland Battalion and another from the Canterbury. As Howe took a breather a voice in the scrub cried, ‘Snowy Howe!’ It came from one of his mates of the 11th Battalion, Private Ferguson, who had previously been with Howe in Malone’s Gully and had been seriously wounded as he crossed The Nek. Meanwhile, on the slopes of Mortar Ridge, Leer’s and Cowey’s men knew it was now impossible to defend their position. Turks were encroaching around their flanks and they would soon be completely cut off; there was nothing for it but to get out while they still could. At around 5 p.m. some of Cowey’s men ran across to the rear, climbing up to Second Ridge; these men successfully reached the firing line to their rear. Cowey now collected his pitifully small number of survivors and they too retired to Second Ridge, closely followed by the survivors of Leer’s men, leaving over 80 of their comrades dead along the ridge. The men along Second Ridge now realised that the men in front were Australians and offered covering fire. They had pushed into the upper parts of Mule Valley in their attempt to climb onto Second Ridge, with the lightly wounded helping to carry the more seriously wounded, when they were met by Lieutenant Heugh who bravely raced out to help them into the firing line above. Cowey and Heugh proceeded to divide the party into two and with each group covering the other they withdrew towards MacLaurin’s Hill. Almost all made it onto the left shoulder of Courtney’s Post and proceeded to dig in.7 233
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 234
25 APRIL 1915
3rd Bn 57th Rgt Malone’s Gully
Howe
X
Walker’s Ridge
X 1st Bn
X X
Braund
X X
Russell’s Top
Pope’s Hill
X
X Grant
X X X
57th Rgt X
Mortar Ridge
Jacobs Lamb X
Leer X X Quinn’s Post Courtney’s Post
X
Cowey X
Monash Valley
X Mule Valley
0
3rd Bn 27th Rgt 250 metres
Map 17.1 The Anzac withdrawal to The Nek and the loss of Mortar Ridge to the Turks
With the evacuation of Mortar Ridge, the Turks were now in a position to try to penetrate the head of Monash Valley. Lieutenant Campbell of the 2nd Battalion with a few Anzacs was positioned on the Bloody Angle, which now represented the most northerly position in Monash Valley held by the Anzacs. Between this position and The Nek, there was a broad gap that was only occupied by two small mixed parties: the first under a sergeant located along Pope’s Hill; the second was Captain Jacobs and his men, now isolated along Dead Man’s Ridge, immediately in front of Pope’s Hill. The Turks occupying Baby 700 now had a bird’s-eye view of Monash Valley and its many spurs and gullies.8 One Australian located on one of these bullet-swept ridges later recalled: ‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us, never a pause in the whole of that long day that started at the crack of dawn. 234
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 235
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’
How we longed for nightfall! How we prayed for this ghastly day to end! How we yearned for the sight of the first dark shadows!’9 With the loss of Mortar Ridge and Baby 700 the small parties of Turks made their way into the head of Monash Valley. While Kemal’s men were too few and largely too exhausted to take advantage of the rapidly developing situation, some Turks were able to penetrate past the left of Pope’s Hill to the western slope of Monash Valley near The Nek. Working their way through the scrub they were able to snipe at Australians across the valley along Second Ridge, shooting into their backs. Only the northern corner of each of the posts, defined by a gully, was protected against their fire. The aim of these snipers was very deadly and one of the many wounded by this sniper fire was Charles Bean’s brother, a medical officer of the 3rd Battalion.10 Men traversing Monash Valley on their way to the northern heights were still being sucked into the fighting along the centre. New Zealanders of the Canterbury Battalion had joined the Australians and New Zealanders in the area around Quinn’s Post. There were no officers present and each nationality had formed their own group. Private Alfred Smith of the Canterbury Battalion recalled 63 years later, ‘the Aussies had a talk and we had a talk, an Australian said, “You will forget about the Battle of Waza!” [an all-out brawl that had occurred weeks earlier in Cairo]. We all shook hands and said that we would forget bygones and we settled down.’ Soon Major Dawson of the Auckland Battalion arrived and took command of the 100 or so men who were now occupying the position.11 Another legend was about to be born: Quinn’s Post. At The Nek the New Zealanders who had been manning the three machine guns had established a good position to cover any approach from the northern heights and had sixteen belts of ammunition for the machine guns and plenty of rifles. These gunners, however, had by now either been killed or wounded as a result of the concentrated shrapnel fire. Sergeant McLean of the Auckland Battalion was searching for anyone who could operate the guns. Those at The Nek emptied their rifle magazines at the oncoming Turks, forcing them to ground. Given the small number of defenders there was room for all in the rifle pits. ‘Alright boys, make sure you have one in the barrel.’ Men lay there, with the rifle clips out of their pouches next to them on the ground so they could easily be got at. In order to take the position the Turks would have to either charge across the narrow bottleneck, or climb down into Monash Valley and attack from the rear by climbing onto Russell’s Top. There 235
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 236
25 APRIL 1915
was no way of taking the plateau from the seaward side; it was far too steep.12 By now the wounded Cavill lay somewhere on Russell’s Top. While lying on my back, resting in one place, eight or nine shells burst in quick succession right over my head—one bursting so close that the black soot, like burnt powder, fell on my chest. The shrubs were torn and the earth scarred by the hail of shrapnel bullets, but again I got off without a scratch. I came to the hurried conclusion, however, that there were many healthier places about, and made off again. I had gone only a short distance when I came upon a touching spectacle. I was crossing a narrow road on the summit of a hill when I saw an officer sitting upright on the roadside, with his back to the shrubs that grew on either side. I approached, but he did not speak or move, so I crawled up close, and found to my surprise that he was dead. He had just been in the act of writing when a bullet through the heart caused instantaneous death. He had never moved an inch; his notebook was still in the left hand; while the right still held a pencil poised in a natural position over the book. He was . . . past middle age, grey-haired, and wearing a breast full of service ribbons. In a shallow trench close by . . . was an Australian, who had been badly hit. His eyes opened slowly, his lips moved, and faintly he murmured, ‘Mafeesh.’ The Arabic for ‘finished’, and more slowly, ‘Take money-belt—missus and kids—dirty swap dirty . . .’ Dying, shattered beyond recognition, he rose to his knees and dragged his rifle to the parapet. With a weak finger he took shaky aim and fired his last shot, then collapsed in the bottom of the trench.13 Howe and around 50 men remained at The Nek in an attempt to halt the Turkish advance. The Turks now started to set up their own machine guns, which looked down onto The Nek, and back along Russell’s Top. No one could move without drawing a hail of bullets. Unknown to Howe and most of the survivors at The Nek, Braund and the surviving men of his two companies of the 2nd Battalion lay further back on Russell’s Top, close to Walker’s Ridge. Braund knew that there were Australians and New Zealanders up ahead at The Nek, but they could not advance, given the plateau was now swept with shrapnel and machine-gun fire. Braund sent Lieutenant Shout of the 1st Battalion 236
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 237
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’
(who would be awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously for his actions at the Lonesome Pine a few months later) down to the beach with an urgent message for Colonel MacLaurin (commander of the Australian 1st Brigade): ‘Am holding rear left flank. Against us are two concealed machineguns—cannot locate them. In our front are New Zealand troops (and) portions of the 3rd Battalion (probably he meant Brigade). Have held position (in order to) prevent machineguns swinging upon troops in front. If reinforced can advance.’14 Baby 700 was now finally lost to the Anzacs and would from then on until the evacuation remain in Turkish hands. While the Turkish 1st and 2nd battalions of the 57th Regiment had now been fighting since 10 a.m., the relatively fresh reserve force of the 3rd Battalion was only now being committed to the battle. It began to take up a position behind the 1st Battalion overlooking The Nek from the slopes of Baby 700. This battalion had the order to drive the remaining enemy off the heights and down into the sea. Kemal’s men had won the battle for Baby 700; the battle for The Nek and Russell’s Top was about to begin. It was now after 5.30 p.m.15 The Otago Battalion had been sent forward to reinforce the Anzacs’ left flank, but no sooner had they attempted to accomplish this mission when they were ordered to return down the beach and take up a position on Plugge’s Plateau. Baby 700 had already been lost and the senior commanders were now concerned about the safety of Plugge’s. It was crucial that this plateau be held. If it fell, the Anzacs would be fighting on the beach and were sure to face annihilation. The men of the Otago Battalion climbed onto the plateau and began to help entrench the final bastion of Anzac defence. The Turks at Baby 700 could see all movement not only on Russell’s Top, but now also on Plugge’s. Soon they would direct their artillery to fire at the plateau—to deadly effect. Colonel Walker and his staff had already set up their headquarters on Plugge’s.16 Frederick Senn of the New Zealand Engineers later recorded: The Turks were counter-attacking and endeavouring to get shell and machine-gun fire over the top onto the beach. The shells were clearing the Plateau by as little as 4 feet. At this time . . . Walker, Conningham and Wallingford were watching the position from about five yards from the edge of the Plateau, and Morgan and I were to take cover behind the edge. We did not need to be told twice. The 237
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 238
25 APRIL 1915
Otago Infantry were now ashore, and had just reached the Plateau and were starting to make their way across . . . One of the low shells passed so close to [Colonel] Walker’s solar plexus that it knocked him flat on his back. We thought he was dead, but when we picked him up, he gasped ‘all right’. He was only winded, and was still groggy when we noticed that some of the Otagos, suffering heavy casualties and halfway across the plateau were faltering . . . and were turning around looking for cover. Calling out ‘Come on Conningham, they’re turning back’, he dashed across the plateau with Conningham in tow, waving his cane and shouting, ‘Come on boys, here’s the front line over here.’ The Otago boys turned round to a man and followed him to the rim overlooking the valley. Here they had a pretty bad time digging in, with many casualties but were consolidated by dark.17 The situation for the Australians to the south on 400 Plateau was not much better. While the wounded Major Bennett and Private Ricketson made their way slowly and painfully across the southern spurs and gullies of 400 Plateau back towards Bolton’s Ridge, a small but determined party of Turks was approaching the same region from the south. They were trying to infiltrate behind the Australian line strung out along Pine Ridge, as well as outflank those along Sniper’s Ridge. It is likely that Lieutenant Hakki and his men were part of this group who had earlier been ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Aker to reoccupy the southern parts of Bolton’s Ridge. These Turks were soon forced to ground by rifle fire from isolated parties of Australians scattered across these spurs and gullies, as well as those along Sniper’s and Bolton’s Ridge. M’Cay had unsuccessfully tried to establish a firing line between Bolton’s Ridge and the head of Owen’s Gully and, just as the Turks were pushing over the top of Baby 700 to the north, he again telephoned Bridges. It was now around 4.45 p.m. The reply came from Colonel White: ‘The General has only one battalion left; MacLagan has been very hard pressed, and the General is loath to dispense with this battalion until other troops come ashore to-night.’ M’Cay answered that he could not manage to bridge the gap in his line; unless reinforcements arrived, the Turks might come through it at any moment. Major Blamey standing beside M’Cay, added that in his opinion the situation was very dangerous—that some men were giving way. 238
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 239
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’
A few minutes later the voice of Bridges came to M’Cay through the telephone. ‘M’Cay,’ he said, ‘I want you to speak to me, not as a subordinate to general, but as M’Cay to Bridges. I have only one battalion left. Do you assure me that your need for it is absolute?’ M’Cay replied that he did; unless it were sent to him, the Turks could come in behind the right of the line. Bridges promised him the 4th Battalion, and ordered Blamey to come down and lead it up.18 The 4th Battalion made their way up towards 400 Plateau. There was now no reserve force that could be called upon: the whole 1st Division and a large part of the New Zealand and Australian Division were now committed to the fight. Meanwhile, Saker, who had taken over the 5th Battalion line near the head of Owen’s Gully, had managed to partially bridge the gap between the 10th Battalion (and others) positioned along Johnston’s Jolly and those to the south occupying Sniper’s Ridge and Bolton’s Ridge. Before establishing this line he had formed a thin line near the Daisy Patch, but it had been driven in by Turkish fire. Now he was plugging the gap between the 10th Battalion to his left and the 4th Battalion on his right. His ‘cheerful courage and energy caused the remnants of all battalions in the neighbourhood to look to him. Boase, who had been fighting all day forward of the Lonesome Pine; Whitham, returning wounded from the south; Rafferty, sent forward by Major Villiers-Stuart with the remnants of the gun escort—all gathered in Saker’s neighbourhood, each collecting what men he could.’19 Sometime after 5 p.m. a rough firing line had been established across the western side of the plateau, while the Australian dead and dying occupied most of the eastern side of the plateau, which now lay open to the Turks. The only force stopping the Turks from occupying this part of 400 Plateau was Bennett’s men located along Pine Ridge, which included men mostly of the 6th Battalion, but also remnants of the 5th, 8th, 9th and 12th battalions. To the south near the end of Pine Ridge was Knightley’s small party of survivors from the 9th Battalion. They had originally been part of Salisbury’s advance earlier that morning and had made their way down Pine Ridge, taking up a position similar to that previously occupied by Prisk earlier in the morning. Scattered to the north of Bennett’s men was Daly’s party, mostly men of the 6th Battalion, in the gun pits, while a little further north still was Corporal Harrison’s small party of men from the 9th Battalion. This advanced ‘line’ was now in great danger of being swallowed up by the encroaching Turks.20 239
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 240
25 APRIL 1915
Still in the vicinity of the Lonesome Pine, Grills, who had earlier tried to get a message back to the 7th Battalion headquarters about the location of the Turkish artillery, had put his men to sniping at the gun crews. He now decided to make the fourth attempt himself and with his men he rushed back over the plateau and while ‘knocked’ by an artillery shell, remained unhurt. He and his men flung themselves down into Brown’s Dip where to Grills’s relief he found Lieutenant A. Henderson of the 7th Battalion and some signallers, who had established a telephone line back to battalion headquarters. The message was sent and between 5 p.m. and 5.15 p.m. the naval guns opened fire on Anderson Knoll. With this whirlwind of naval shells exploding on and around the knoll, the Turkish battery was finally silenced for the remainder of the day.21 Meanwhile the party of Turks who had made their way behind Pine Ridge now lay in the scrub sniping at those along the southern spurs and gullies of 400 Plateau. Bennett’s men had not seen these Turks. Knightley’s party at the southern end of Pine Ridge had been the only Australians on the ridge to observe them. Sergeant Knightley soon saw a ‘few figures on the foot of Holly Spur in rear of him. By their baggy trousers he judged them to be Turks, and then noticed that they had their backs to him and were shooting at someone still further back. There were not enough of them to amount to a serious danger.’22 Now advanced parties of the Turkish 77th Regiment appeared. They had earlier been sent to the south of Gaba Tepe on false information that the enemy were landing there. As they now returned towards Ari Burnu and topped the ridge, one of the battleships saw them silhouetted against the skyline and fired a number of shells amongst them. Australians seeing this were greatly elated by the support of the naval guns. With this, however, the Turks made their way down the slopes of Third Ridge and for a short time disappeared into the gullies of the ridge. Soon afterwards they reappeared and could be seen heading across Legge Valley en masse, straight towards Pine Ridge. At the same time Aker was throwing in his reserves; every man that he could muster was now sent forward into the battle to finally capture 400 Plateau.23 Knightley’s men were forced to retire; their small party could not hope to hold back the flood of Turks now charging across Legge Valley straight towards Pine Ridge. As Knightley and his men withdrew down the seaward slopes of Pine Ridge they opened fire on the Turks to their rear, who had been sniping at Australians on 400 Plateau. They cleared the scrub of Turks as they withdrew towards Bolton’s Ridge. Behind, Knightley and his men could not fail to hear the rapid and increasing 240
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 241
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’ 500 metres
0
10th Bn 12th Bn M’Cay’s HQ
5th Bn 9th Bn, 7th Bn, 6th Bn
X X
X
X
X
4th Bn X
X X
8th Bn
Sniper’s Ridge
Harrison Daly
Yates
Bolton’s Ridge
X X
Bennett
Prisk
X
27th Rgt Reserves
X
X
X Pine Ridge
X
1st Bn 27th Rgt
X
Knightley
X
Third Ridge
X
Map 17.2 Turkish 27th Regiment counterattack against 400 Plateau focusing on Pine Ridge
crescendo of rifle and machine-gun fire coming from the landward slopes of Pine Ridge. A father of one of the 6th Battalion soldiers killed on Pine Ridge as the Turkish counterattacked described what he learnt in an interview he had with a mate of his late son in 1916: Benson said now’s the time to get a mouthful of something to eat. My boy said I can’t eat anything, but must have a drink, and on putting his hand down to get his water bottle, found it empty, as a 241
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 242
25 APRIL 1915
bullet had gone through it. Benson handed him his, but while he was drinking, the Turks re-opened fire, and they had to drop everything and charge. Benson was shot through the shoulder and from where he lay on the ground, he saw the rest of the party about 150 yards ahead, entirely surrounded by a large body of Turks, and that was the last that was heard of any of them.24 Lieutenant Colonel Aker later recalled: Our troops climbed the eastern slopes of Kanli Sirt, which was covered in firs and was invisible to the Australians (in the dead area) under cover of artillery and machine-gun fire, without suffering any losses. Our riflemen held the edge (intersection) produced by the joining of the steep fir-covered slope [Pine Ridge] with the horizontal Kanli Sirt Plateau, from end to end and as soon as they got up to this edge they were confronted by Australians who had taken up positions in the brushwood, very close (between 30 and 50 paces) and they engaged in fierce and stubborn fighting at very close range.25 The details of the fight along Pine Ridge will never be known, as most Australians who fought on the ridge simply did not survive. Indeed Major Bennett’s brother, a twenty-year-old sergeant, was one of these. He had been commanding a small party and had last been seen with his men fending off an attack from Turks who had them surrounded. Others must have individually or in small groups counterattacked in sheer desperation as the Turks flooded through their lines. In a galvanised collective rage both sides fought frenzied and violent hand-tohand struggles, shooting, stabbing, punching and kicking—men cursed, swore, and yelled foreign incomprehensible insults at each other in fear and frustration. Turks now flooded up towards the backbone of the ridge, the majority pushing past the isolated pockets of stubborn resistance. The fate of the few surviving Australians was in the lap of the gods. All efforts were to no avail, no quarter was expected and none given. In this way the Turks worked around and annihilated the last few stubborn Australian positions. The Turks took no prisoners, and few Australians managed to escape. Indeed, by the time the Turks from the rear made it onto the ridge it was all over and the Turkish advance parties were already flooding down the opposite slope into the gully beyond to press further their attack. A month later, during the 24 May armistice (organised so that each side could bury the mass of dead bodies 242
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 243
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’
between the lines), a Turk who had been part of this counterattack stated that they had passed ‘Australians who seemed to be dead, but who fired on them afterwards. We were forced to kill all of those’, the Turk added.26 As stated later by Charles Bean: The men who held the line upon Pine Ridge were not of the sort that would give an enemy the chance to wreak his vengeance on their bodies while they lived. They died where they fought. The fighting never again came near the Ridge. Four years later, when the Australian historical mission visited Gallipoli, skeletons of the men in the rags of Australian uniform still lay scattered in threes and fours down the length of Pine Ridge, the red and violet of the 6th Battalion still discernible on their sleeves. One group of five lay in a semi-circle, close above the open grass of Legge Valley, on a mound which they had defended. In one of the crevices in rear of the ridge, near Lone Pine, were the remains of many men—probably the wounded who had crawled there. Here, where the tide of the advance ebbed and left them, they lay until, four years later, an Australian burial party interred them. They needed no epitaph. It was enough that they lay on Pine Ridge.27 The Australians along Sniper’s Ridge and the Knife Edge (occupied by Prisk and Yates) could hear the fighting in front of their position. Soon they saw large numbers of Turks moving along the ridgeline of Pine Ridge and down through the seaward slopes, through the pine and scrub. The Australians opened a heavy fire, forcing the Turks to take cover. The Turks were also concerned about being exposed to the naval guns and remained in the gully behind Pine Ridge (Wanliss Gully) with the intention of renewing the attack after dark. All the time Prisk, Yates and their men must have been wondering what had happened to the advance line of Australians on Pine Ridge. At this point Prisk, who was moving along the line, was seriously wounded. Sergeant Williams rushed to him, asking him what they should do. ‘Hang on till nightfall and give the 8th a chance to dig in! We can retire on them after dusk.’ It was now about 5.30 p.m.28 Daly and his men were still in the gun pits and a little further north were Corporal Harrison and his men. Those in the gun pits had been sniped at all afternoon, but the men had good cover; even so, of the 30 or so men present at least half were now killed or wounded. Lieutenants 243
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 244
25 APRIL 1915
Hooper and Levy were in charge of the men in the trench that connected the gun pits, while Daly commanded from a position just to the rear of the pits and trench with the wounded Lieutenant Derham. These men could do little to help Bennett’s men as they were isolated from the main line. It was not long before Turks who were pushing their way up Pine Ridge in order to reach 400 Plateau itself were approaching their position. The position that they occupied, however, had been originally orientated to cover the head of Pine Ridge and at the backs of the Australians was the southeastern shoulder of the Pine; thus the Turks were approaching the Australians not from a flanking position, but more or less head on. While the Turkish attack on Pine Ridge had succeeded, as had those slightly further to the north of The Cup, these attacks had resulted in many casualties and the Turks, who had awoken at 4.30 a.m. and had now been in action since 9 a.m., were surely approaching exhaustion. As later recalled by Aker: It would have been possible by a strong attack to drive the Australians onto the beach. But the strength of our force on Kanli Sirt, which since morning had been weakened by losses of wounded and dead . . . was no longer sufficient for the purpose. In order to bring the attack to a completely successful conclusion, I put to the commander our urgent need for reinforcements. Basically our commander, Mustafa Kemal, fully appreciated the weakness of our position there and he ordered Saib Bey, Commanding Officer of the 77th [Arab] Regiment to reinforce our left wing with his regiment and, by extension, to take part in the attack. I learnt this from Saib Bey himself when he passed by at about 1700 hours. Saib Bey came away from the commander having received his orders and went straight to his regiment. Now at last, we felt we could certainly throw the Australians into the sea. Evening approached. In the instructions, which we received from the new Commander, a night attack was ordered . . . We gave the necessary orders for this attack and awaited the advance of [the] 77th Regiment to our line of battle.29 Indeed, the 77th Regiment could have entered the battle for Ari Burnu earlier if it had not been misdirected to the south. Kemal had earlier received news that an invasion was taking place just south of Gaba Tepe. He sent this regiment to help secure the beaches to the south 244
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 245
‘There was no rest, no lull, while the rotting dead lay all around us’
around Palamutlu Sirt. Kemal himself had gone south to take command of the situation and consequently the 19th Division, now completely committed to the battles for Ari Burnu, was without its commander. On approaching the supposedly threatened sector, it was clear that no such invasion was taking place and the regiment was ordered to turn around and march back towards Ari Burnu and to assist the 27th Regiment in its attack against 400 Plateau. It was now to help fill the gap between the tired and exhausted survivors of the 27th and 57th regiments.30
245
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 246
18 ‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’ t 5.30 p.m. the guns of the Australian 4th Battery began to land at Anzac Cove.
A
[T]he wounded, lying in hundreds at the southern end of the Beach—on stretchers and off stretchers, doctors hurrying through them, naval officers giving orders, boats pulling alongside—heard a sudden bustle and clatter and a shout ‘Look out—make way!’ Stretchers were hurriedly pulled aside, and between them came a team of gun horses, the drivers urging them; and after them, deep in the sand of the beach, a single gun of the 4th Battery, Australian Field Artillery. The wounded—and even the dying—cheered as it passed through them. Willing hands undid its chains and dragged it up a steep path made by beach party and engineers.1 Having already committed the last reserve to Colonel M’Cay to the right, Major General Bridges now received news that his left flank was in great danger. Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan at 5.37 p.m. reported from MacLaurin’s Hill: ‘Heavily attacked on left’.2 At about the same time, Lieutenant Shout, who had earlier been ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Braund to report to Bridges, had been sent back to Russell’s Top with a collection of around 200 men from many different battalions. Bridges also told Shout that the New Zealanders and men of the Australian 4th Brigade would soon be landing and he would be sending additional reinforcements consisting of about two battalions his way. Braund was to hold Russell’s Top at all costs.3 Within 30 minutes of landing the lone gun from the Australian Field Artillery had been positioned on Plugge’s. ‘At 6 p.m. this gun opened upon Gaba Tepe, and its second Round of Shrapnel appeared to silence 246
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 247
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
for the night the last of the persistent gun in the Gaba Tepe battery.’4 Indeed, just before this gun opened fire, the 26th Indian Mountain Battery had reopened fire at the Turks from around 5.45 p.m. and at the same time its sister battery, the 21st (Kohat), had landed. ‘Thank God for those magnificent Indian gunners!’ Charles Bean, who was still looking for his brother, was on Plugge’s Plateau at the time that the Australian guns opened fire. He recorded in his diary: It was getting on towards evening so I decided to go on and find 3rd Bn . . . I went along the trench to near the mouth, jumped out, and ran across the top and at once found myself in a little dip in the front side of the hill. There were a few men there, all lying down under the brow of the slope. On the edge of the slope was standing . . . Evans, the machinegun officer of the 3rd Bn . . . He didn’t know where Jack’s dressing station was and the men of the 3rd Bn., with him didn’t either. As I lay there a lot of New Zealanders came up the hill and lined this ridge to the left and right: the firing seemed to be heavy away to our left all the time and I couldn’t help thinking that the Turks were getting round our left flank . . . As we were lying there [a gun] just behind us . . . opened over our heads with a delicious salvo . . .5 As the Australian and Indian guns started to bark back a response to the Turks, the battalions of the Australian 4th Brigade had finally started to land. The first ashore were two companies of the 16th Battalion with its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pope. Pope came across his divisional commander, Major General Godley, who was by now aware of Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan’s concerns about the Turks who were threatening to push down towards the head of Monash Valley. Godley ordered Pope to plug this gap. He was to take his two companies of the 16th, as well as one company of the 15th and two platoons of the Auckland Battalion who were now just landing. Major VilliersStuart was sent with Pope as a guide. As they moved into Shrapnel Gully, they came across the mules and teams of the Indian 21st Battery. Unfortunately, the battery team inadvertently cut across the path of the column of troops, splitting it into two separate parties. Villiers-Stuart moved back to the rear of the column to bring it forward, while Pope led the lead column further into Monash Valley. It was now close to dusk.6 247
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 248
25 APRIL 1915
As Pope was making his way into Shrapnel Gully, Shout with his reinforcements arrived on Russell’s Top and took up a position close to Braund and his men. Shout then climbed back down to the beach to assist the line of men who were trying to hold back the Turkish attack against Walker’s Ridge from North Beach. Previously a small party of less than 40 Anzacs under the command of New Zealand Captain CritchleySalmonson had occupied parts of Walker’s Ridge. Shout with Lance Corporal Frame collected as many men as he could and took up a position near the base of Walker’s Ridge to help ‘extend’ CritchleySalmonson’s thin line. Indeed, just before dusk Cecil Malthus of the New Zealand Canterbury Battalion and his colleagues who had landed earlier were now ordered to assist the Anzacs who were defending Walker’s Ridge from the Turkish attack. In making their way to the threatened position, however, Malthus and his small party became separated and spent the next 24 hours with a group of Australians. By the time we reached the top of the ridge on the left flank (Walker’s Ridge) not only had we lost our mates and ourselves, but we had perforce thrown away our carefully packed valises, which we never saw again. We could get no information from the scattered parties whom we passed. A state of muddle and utter exhaustion existed everywhere and the defence was terribly weak. Finally, we were seized upon by a harassed Australian Lieutenant who begged us to strengthen his handful at the top of the hill. And so expecting our companies to arrive and reinforce the position, we stayed there and dug in. The whole night was spent improving our trench, while a cold misty rain reduced us to cowering misery. Such was our inglorious share in the landing.7 On Russell’s Top, the wounded Private Cavill was trying to get to a dressing station: I was crawling along, dragging a rifle which I had picked up in case I met any stray Turks, when right before me, at no distance, I spotted a rifle poking through a shrub, and behind it a New Zealander in the act of pulling the trigger. ‘Don’t fire; I’m wounded,’ I yelled and immediately a New Zealand officer jumped from behind the bush. He was just rushing a company of infantry to reinforce the line. 248
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 249
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
‘Where’s the firing line?’ he asked. ‘Straight on . . .’ I answered. With a ‘Sorry you’re hurt, my boy!’ he rushed his men on. After escapes innumerable, and a struggle that I never expected to accomplish, I reached the ridge of the first hill in company with a New Zealander, who was also wounded. Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck, finally rolling over the brow of the hill into a hole that afforded some little amount of shelter.8 As dusk was setting, Jacobs and his party, who had held back the Turks from approaching the head of Monash Valley, were forced to retire further down the ridgeline. With this movement a figure appeared against the fading skyline. ‘Set of cowardly bastards,’ he cried. ‘I never thought Australians were such a lot of curs!’ It was a young and clearly distressed man from the 3rd Battalion, sobbing, half-crying with rage. Jacobs approached him. ‘What’s the matter, son?’ ‘My officer’s out there wounded, and you are leaving him,’ he replied. He had been attempting to carry him in alone over his shoulder. Jacobs and others advanced with him to the officer and they together brought him in. They then moved down the ridge and took up a position along Dead Man’s Ridge facing the Chessboard, with Pope’s Hill just behind them. Just south of them were the 150 or so Anzacs digging in along the ridgeline at what would become Quinn’s Post.9 Meanwhile the Turkish attack to the south, against Pine Ridge and the Lonesome Pine, was beginning to push back the isolated parties of Australians still lying forward of the main Australian line. To the rear some sort of firing line had been established along the southern part of the plateau with the reinforcements of the 4th Battalion sent by Bridges and with the tireless efforts of Major Saker. M’Cay’s line extended from the seaward end of Bolton’s Ridge to a point on 400 Plateau northeast of M’Cay’s Hill (White’s Valley), a total frontage of around 1200 metres. However, beyond White’s Valley and further north (Wire Gully) there was still a broad gap of about 300 metres that any concentrated Turkish attack could flood through.10 Well forward of this line the wounded and exhausted Derham, who had been sleeping near Daly in the forward position at the Turkish gun pits east of the Lonesome Pine, was now awakened as the Turks began to make a serious effort at dislodging this small party. All had heard the 249
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 250
25 APRIL 1915
bitter fighting just south of their position and had for some time now seen increasing numbers of Turks cautiously approaching their position. Soon the scrub about 100 metres below their position along Pine Ridge was ablaze, the fire having been set by the Turks in an attempt to drive the Australians out of the position and hopefully blow up any munitions still in the gun pits; the wind now changed direction and carried the flames back into the faces of the Turks.11 The southern thrust of the Turks continued, however, and they crept ever nearer to Daly’s position. ‘The fight became a contest between marksmen who could but dimly see each other in the fading light. Derham and a Turk had a duel, shot for shot, blazing at the flashes of each other’s rifles.’12 Within the gun pits was a Turkish machine gun that had been abandoned earlier in the morning, but unfortunately no one knew how to work it. Bean recounts that, ‘The enemy were already very close, when down from the summit of Lone Pine came a dozen Australians under a sergeant-major’.13 Luckily for Daly’s men the sergeant-major understood the mechanism of the Turkish machine gun, and it was immediately set up facing the approach from Pine Ridge. A belt of ammunition was likely fired off, not only to check that it was working, but also to lift the morale of the Australians and hopefully lower that of the Turks. Light was quickly fading. Just as the machine gun was placed in position, all could hear cries coming from that very direction—‘Allah, Allah, Allah!’—and with this a mass of Turks charged through the scrub towards the Australian position. Hooper and his men, who had been the first to occupy the position earlier that day, bore the full brunt of the attack. Hooper and some of his party were sitting back in the dark shadow of the roofed emplacement, when one of the leading Turks came shouting wildly towards them. An Australian in the opening shot him. Another Turk followed, running up the gully near the top of which stood the gun-emplacement. He stopped for a moment outside the opening, the moonlight gleaming on his bayonet. Then, bending, he ran on through the opening. Someone in rear shot him, and he dropped. The machine-gun opened, and the enemy fell back.14 The Turkish officers tried to organise another counterattack but the machine gun as well as the entrenched Australians seemed to have ‘taken the heart out of the men, and they refused to come on’.15 As the Turks were attacking Daly’s party at the head of Pine Ridge, another Turkish attack was focused against Corporal Harrison and his 250
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 251
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
Monash Valley
Incebayir Ridge
Second Ridge
Braund’s Hill
Mortar Ridge
X X X
Wire Gully
10th Bn
Johnston’s X Jolly
12th Bn
X X
X X
X X
X X X
X X 8th Bn
X
X X
Harrison X
Daly
Prisk
X X X
X XX X
Adana Bair
X
Yates Holly Ridge
77th Arab Rgt
3rd Bn 27th Rgt
X
5th Bn
4th Bn
Scrubby Knoll
57th Rgt
X
X X
Third Ridge
1st Bn 27th Rgt
X
0
500 metres
Pine Ridge
Map 18.1 The retirement of the Australian advance parties from the landward side of 400 Plateau
men of the 9th Battalion. Harrison and his men, who had been defending this position for most of the day, were now forced to retire as Turks were filtering around both flanks. As they started to retreat back to the Australian lines to the rear of the plateau, Lance Corporal Kenyon ‘stepped upon a group of six Turks lying in a depression of the ground in rear of the party. He escaped unhurt.’16 With darkness, the wounded Prisk and his men, who had lain along Sniper’s Ridge and the Knife Edge, made their way back towards the Australian lines on Bolton’s Ridge. Corporal Holloway and Private Matheson, both of the 6th Battalion, carried Prisk back to the lines. The exhausted Knightley and his men also reached the Australian lines, the only exception being Private Gibson, who through utter exhaustion fell asleep on the way back; he was never seen again. Now the only organised force of Australians known to be beyond the Australian main line was Daly and his men in the Turkish gun pits. 251
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 252
25 APRIL 1915
Lieutenant Colonel Aker and the men of his 27th Regiment had managed to occupy parts of 400 Plateau, but not in any strength. Casualties had been heavy and his surviving men were spent and spread out in numerous isolated pockets within Legge Valley and parts of the Lonesome Pine, including The Cup: ‘The subsequent fighting continued until dark and when darkness came the Australians had been thrown back . . . Our line of battle which had been weakened by heavy losses had been able to advance about 100 metres beyond the point where we had found our guns.’17 Saib Bey, commanding officer of the 77th Arab Regiment (around 3000 men strong), who had been ordered by Kemal to fill the gap between the 57th Regiment to the north and Aker’s 27th Regiment to the south and to assist in a night attack against 400 Plateau, was now positioning his men for the attack as ordered. As later recalled by Aker: Now, at last, we felt we could certainly throw the Australians into the sea. Evening approached. In the instructions which we had received from the new Commander a night attack was ordered . . . We gave the necessary orders for this attack and awaited the advance of 77th Regiment to our line of battle. It was necessary for us to advance together with 77th Regiment as soon as evening came in order to direct from close at hand the attack that was to be made at night. For this purpose, as soon as the sun had set, our Machine Gun Company set out for Kanli Sirt to take the position, which we had indicated. At the same time orders were given to the Commanding Officer of the Mountain Artillery Battalion to recover the three mountain guns which had not yet been retaken because of the effects of the daytime barrage. Necessary instructions were given to Major Fuad Bey who was in charge of the field guns, which had arrived there as evening approached. We left the guns there in his charge and set out for Kanli Sirt together with the Regiment Adjutant Second Lieutenant Cevdet, attached from 9th Division.18 Further north, just as dusk was setting in, the Turkish 3rd Battalion of the 57th Regiment was thrown into the battle for The Nek. With yells of ‘Allah, Allah, Allah!’ and ‘Mohammed, Mohammed, Mohammed!’ the Turks charged towards the bottleneck. As later recalled by Hedley Howe: Shortly before sunset a strong force of Turks attempted to cross The Nek, moving carelessly, bunching together. There was great 252
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 253
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
excitement among the machine guns. Men whispered to each other ‘Let the bastards come.’ The sergeant ordered everyone to hold fire until the machine guns opened, which they did when the leading Turks were less than 20 yards distant. The attack stopped dead, the relatively few unwounded enemy escaping by jumping into the valleys on either side.19 Leading from the front of the Turkish attack was the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Hairi Bey. Having been forced to ground, he estimated that he had around 80 or 90 men with him. The machine-gun fire had been devastating. He sent word back to Kemal that he was rather anxious lest, ‘if attacked, they might not be able to hold their own’. He also added that, ‘he needed reinforcement, but that things were now fairly quiet on their front’.20 When this report reached Kemal he decided that he would send all available reinforcements to Hairi Bey. Those Turks who had been part of Hairi Bey’s attack but had been forced to take cover in the gullies either side of The Nek were now attempting to flank the Anzac position. The main threat was coming from those who had penetrated the gap at the head of Monash Valley. For the moment the Turkish attacks were beaten back.21
Malone’s Gully
X
Walker’s Ridge
XX X X
Howe NZ
Braund
X Mule Gully
X X X X
3rd Bn 27th Rgt
X
X
X Russell’s Top Rest Gully
X
X Pope’s Hill
Monash Valley
Baby 700
0
Mule Valley
Mortar Ridge
250 metres
Map 18.2 Failed attack against The Nek by the Turkish 3rd Battalion, 57th Regiment 253
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 254
25 APRIL 1915
In this action Sergeant McLean was badly wounded. He moved back along Russell’s Top to gather up reinforcements and ammunition before seeking medical attention. He left the position under the command of a corporal from the Canterbury Battalion and Howe of the 11th Battalion, the only NCOs still present. After 7 p.m., however, no reinforcements or ammunition had arrived. Howe, along with a stretcher-bearer, moved back along Russell’s Top in search of reinforcements. Soon they came across a party of New Zealanders who were digging a trench across the plateau; they were likely the survivors of Lieutenant Colonel Stewart’s companies. Howe brought some of these men back to The Nek with their picks and shovels. Soon the horseshoe trench was around 1 metre deep. The whole party signed a note asking for reinforcements and sent it to the rear. They said that the bearer of the note would guide the men up. No other troops as far as they knew, were near them, except the thin line of New Zealanders close behind. Eventually a note came back to them ‘Hang on at all costs,’ it said ‘Reinforcements are on their way.’ Unknown to those at The Nek, Braund and his survivors were positioned close to the head of Walker’s Ridge along the seaward side of the plateau.22 It was also at about this time that advanced parties of the Turkish 72nd Arab Regiment began to arrive to the north and were approaching Hill 971 to reinforce the hard-pressed 57th Regiment. The bulk of the 72nd Regiment, however, would not arrive until after midnight. The severely wounded Lieutenant Westmacott, meanwhile, was finally approaching the beach. It was dusk as we reached the top of the hill and the landing place was below us. Just over the crest was a small dressing station where they examined my wounds. I asked for brandy and got it. They sent me down the path. I lost my cap here, which I valued and clung to all the way. Down the slope, which was crowded with little parties of troops, men were still cutting tracks whilst others were making little shelters to sleep in. Others again were boiling water in their mess tins, heedless of the turmoil and the smoke from countless little fires ascending in thin wisps into the still air. Seaward lay the ships, black hulks upon the still water, while boats of all kinds swirled in with 254
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 255
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
troops who were still disembarking, all along the shore, and picking their way amongst the wounded, who still lay in rows upon the sand. Overhead still burst the shells, whilst ever and anon came the roll of rifle fire from the hills inland. On reaching the beach a surgeon came to my stretcher and asked me about myself. I told him how the sergeant had tied my arm up with twigs, in case it needed further attention. On looking at it the surgeon said ‘It is a rough job; but quite a good one. He stopped the bleeding.’ He examined my other wounds quickly and told me I ought to be all right under cover when I could be properly attended to. ‘I tell you what I will do,’ he went on, ‘I’ll put you on a lighter straight away.’ There was one lying close to us, on the beach, being filled, at the moment, with wounded. I was hoisted in, two blankets placed over me and what with the day’s excitements not forgetting the brandy, was soon fast asleep.23 Pope and his men were now approaching the end of Monash Valley and the foot of the spur leading up to its head, the spur that would forever bear his name: Pope’s Hill. They could hear small-arms fire coming from Anzacs and Turks near The Nek. The fire was deafening and Pope was not to know that along Russell’s Top and the heights immediately above there were few Anzacs left to defend these critical positions. Soon Pope, with his two companies of the 16th Battalion and two platoons from the Auckland Battalion, began to climb towards the head of Monash Valley. The rear of the column that was being guided by Villiers-Stuart had climbed onto Second Ridge and was now occupying positions close to Steele’s and Courtney’s posts, south of Quinn’s Post.24 On reaching the top of the spur, Pope could see little and he sent one of his officers, Captain McDonald, to scout around. Soon McDonald reported back that a small party of Australians was close by under the command of a sergeant of the 11th Battalion. This sergeant believed that a number of Indian troops were to his left. (In fact these ‘Indian’ troops were likely the same Turks who were now trying to flank Howe and his men at The Nek.) When this news was reported back to Pope, he decided to try to make contact with the Indians. Pope ordered Lieutenant Elston to move to the left of their current position, taking with him Private Lushington, who could speak Tamil and Pathan. After moving about 150 metres in the dark towards The Nek they found themselves surrounded by a number of men. Pope could hear what he thought 255
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 256
25 APRIL 1915
was a conversation between Lushington and Elston as well as the Indians. Pope and McDonald continued to listen to the conversation. McDonald then moved off towards the party of men, who could be heard but not seen. Scarcely had he moved off when: He was held up by a figure kneeling before him with a leveled rifle. ‘I’m an English sahib,’ McDonald said. ‘I want burra sahib.’ The man lowered his rifle. McDonald went forward, and he too was surrounded. Pope again heard a voice, which he took to be McDonald’s . . . calling, as he thought, for a senior. He too advanced; but a movement of the strangers made him suspect that they were Turks. He dived down the steep slope. His suspicion proved true. A shot or two rang after him. He escaped, but McDonald, Elston, and Lushington were captured. Except for Bugler Ashton of the 11th, they were the only Australians who remained prisoners in Turkish hands at the landing.25 As this was going on, others of the 16th Battalion along Pope’s Hill had made contact with Captain Jacobs and his men positioned to their right on Dead Man’s Ridge. Along the right the flashes of Anzac rifles and some machine guns could be seen firing into the darkness down the length of Second Ridge. To their left, however, the firing had mostly ceased and ‘beyond the left fork the steep side of Russell’s Top rose black and empty’. It was now sometime after 7.30 p.m.26 It was not only those to the north who believed that Indian troops had arrived to help reinforce their position. Major Drake-Brockman after dusk had sent for Captain Croly, who had occupied German Officer’s Ridge during the afternoon. It was only with darkness that Croly could move over the ridge to its seaward side. While doing so, he and many others stationed on Second Ridge could hear repeated cries of, ‘Don’t shoot—don’t shoot—Indian troops—Indian troops!’ Looking up in the failing light, they caught sight of a mass of troops climbing German Officer’s Ridge, as well as others moving across the southern slope towards Wire Gully. Earlier in the day, a rumour had been circulated (from no one knew where) that an Indian brigade was to be landed to help reinforce the Anzacs. Many now believed that these troops were part of an Indian brigade that had successfully penetrated the Turkish lines to the south. Others had been expecting the imminent arrival of the British 29th Division as it forced its way up the peninsula 256
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 257
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
from Cape Helles; perhaps these ‘Indians’ were part of the British advance guard?27 Croly’s men looked on at the approaching men in the fading light. At the same time, Croly was standing with Drake-Brockman close to the ridgeline. He could speak Hindustani so he moved down with a runner to see if the troops moving up German Officer’s Ridge were really Indian. Another officer, Lieutenant Booth, positioned near Courtney’s Post, also moved forward to determine who the men were. Meanwhile, from all directions messages were arriving at Lieutenant Colonel Owen’s headquarters asking him whether he was expecting Indian reinforcements. Owen himself was unsure who these men were and sent Lieutenant Howell-Price forward to ascertain their identity. Howell-Price found Major Brown standing near the approach of the ‘Indians’; coming towards them were three men in blue uniforms. Others were not so trustful. Sergeant McClelland of the 3rd Battalion had no doubts that the approaching body of men were Turks. ‘Come on, lads, we’ll charge them! Give them the bayonet!’ With this he charged forward, followed by a number of men. However, someone from behind yelled, ‘You fools—they’re Indians!’ The men hesitated and a Turkish bullet killed McClelland. Just south near the top of Wire Gully a small number of Australians from the 10th and 11th battalions under the command of Corporal Louch also saw the large body of men approaching their position. With these men was an old ‘Anglo-Indian’ soldier named Thompson who bravely volunteered to go out and meet the men to determine who they were. He had taken about ten steps when a bullet from these men killed him. Lieutenant McDonald and his men, who had earlier that day moved out as a covering force just in front of Wire Gully, held their fire as the strangers approached. They had also heard the calls from Second Ridge that Indians were approaching. A youngster in a rifle-pit fired and one of the strangers dropped dead. There was a panic amongst them; but they could still be heard shuffling in the bushes. Presently a tall figure came to within a few yards of the post. McDonald himself, bending low so that the stranger stood out against the skyline rushed and seized him. The man shouted some instructions to those behind him before McDonald, with his bayonet against his captive’s ribs, drove him to the post. The prisoner was a tall well dressed Turk with a medical armlet around his sleeve. He was sent under guard to the Australian Lines.28 257
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 258
25 APRIL 1915 X
Russell’s Top
X X
Pope’s Hill Second Ridge
Everett
Monash Valley
Mortar Ridge
Booth Barnes Croly X McConaghy
Kesik Dere
X X
X
X
X X
Louch McDonald
X X
Wire Gully
X X
X X
X X
Loutit Johnston’s Jolly
X X
Owen’s Gully
X X
3rd Bn 27th Rgt
0
250 metres
X
Map 18.3 Turkish 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment’s, failed counterattack against German Officer’s Ridge and other parts of Second Ridge
At about the same time both Croly and Booth realised that the men approaching were indeed Turks. Croly sent his runner back to DrakeBrockman informing him of the men’s identity and while Croly himself remained forward of the firing line, his voice could be heard ordering the men to fire at the approaching Turks. Booth, although mortally wounded, made his way back to his men at Courtney’s Post with the same information and the whole line opened up, along with two machine guns of the 11th Battalion, which swept the Turks off the ridge—the mass of Turks to their front melted away, the survivors retiring back into the valley below.29 Loutit and Haig, who had earlier established a position overlooking Wire Gully on top of Johnston’s Jolly, had not fired, instead allowing the 258
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 259
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
Turks to establish a position close to Wire Gully. They too believed that those approaching were Indians as the yells just north of their position seemed to confirm. It was only after these troops began firing at McDonald’s position in Wire Gully that Loutit and Haig realised their mistake. McDonald and his men could hear the Turks moving within the scrub nearby. He requested reinforcements and soon Lieutenant Beeken’s platoon from the 3rd Battalion was sent. McDonald was now in a relatively strong position and was confident that he could stop any Turkish assault pushing further along the dry creek bed. He probably also felt secure to some degree knowing that above him on either side were the posts of Loutit and Haig to his right (Johnston’s Jolly) and McConaghy to his left (Second Ridge), who could offer supporting enfilading fire.30 Sinclair-MacLagan had previously telegraphed divisional headquarters and asked whether the troops to their front were part of the Indian brigade. The reply was that no Indians were expected in the Anzac sector. Sinclair-MacLagan then gave orders that anyone in front of the firing line was to be shot.31 Confusion of this sort was not unique to the Anzacs. Lieutenant Colonel Aker and Second Lieutenant Cevdet were making their way down Adana Bair to make contact with the battalion commanders and officers of the 77th Arab Regiment to their right. Twenty years later Aker recalled: From Adana Ridge we went among the brushwood. From places we had not expected, from the right and from the left, we heard a series of separate rifle shots. Without doubt these shots could have endangered our forward troops. We came upon one of those who had done this foolish thing. Three or four men were talking in Arabic. It seemed that they and all those who had fired the rifle shots, which we had heard among the brushwood on the ridges and in the valleys, were Arabs belonging to 77th Regiment. We learnt from a group which we subsequently encountered from their Regiment . . . [that they] had gone forward for battle, [and] had hidden among the brushwood and had fled. They spoke Turkish mixed with Arabic . . . It was impossible to overpower them in the dark because they ran away again in the darkness. So we gave up the attempt and continued on our way. When we met the Commanding Officer of our 1st Battalion on Kanli Sirt he showed us how unpleasant the situation was by 259
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 260
25 APRIL 1915
telling us that as soon as darkness had arrived one more attempt had been made with his troops to attack the enemy, but without reinforcements success was impossible. There had been no sign of 77th Regiment and our troops had encountered fire from their rear.32 Indeed, the 77th Regiment failed to support the attacks of either the 27th or 57th regiments. As soon as the troops arrived in their position, most of the poorly led and unmotivated Arabs, who had no love for their Turkish ‘masters’, utilised the terrain and scrub to disappear or melt away from the fighting. [T]hey took advantage of the brushwood and obstacles of the terrain and then the evening darkness to run to right and left in threes and fives and hide at the rear and they remained hidden among the brushwood of that whole vast area consisting of ridges and valleys whilst some of them went to the eastern edge of Kanli Sirt and stayed there . . . Some lay on the ground firing their rifles in front of them, behind them and in all directions even at the Arab troops who were hiding behind our men on Kanli Sirt, that is to say on the eastern edge of Kanli Sirt. They too, fired to their front. Our troops were caught between the fire of these Arab troops behind them and that of the Australians in front of them . . . The officers of 77th Regiment on the southern slopes of Kanli Sirt were alone and in despair. Things had reached a point where they could do nothing with the few men left with them. The Battalion Commanding Officer told the Commanding Officer of the Regiment that their situation was perilous. The Regimental Commanding Officer withdrew them in great annoyance. But since the officers could not all be there at once, those who had fallen back could not be re-formed. In short, on that night the regiment was completely lost and dispersed.33 Even so, it would not be the last time that the 77th Regiment would further complicate and frustrate Aker and Kemal’s attempts to throw the Anzacs off the ridges and back into the sea during the remaining hours of that first day. By nightfall Birdwood had around 15 000 troops ashore, while Kemal had probably less than 8000 at his disposal, although he had the advantage of holding the high ground. In reality, however, both sides by now had considerably fewer men, as these figures do not include those killed and 260
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 261
‘Together we hopped and stumbled, with our arms about one another’s neck’
wounded. Indeed, in the first 24 hours over 3000 Anzacs had become casualties, with the Turks suffering greater casualties, perhaps as many as 4000. The survivors from both sides were now utterly exhausted and even the most recent reinforcements, including their officers, were confused and unsure of what was expected of them. While darkness brought some relief from artillery and small-arms fire, it also brought with it increased uncertainty.
261
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 262
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 263
PART IV Night
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 264
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 265
19 ‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’ urther north at Bulair the German General Liman von Sanders received a report regarding the position of his troops just north of Gaba Tepe.
F
[A] report was received that all attempts of the enemy to land at Kepetepe [Gaba Tepe] had been repulsed and that the 19th Division had driven back the enemy troops, Australians and New Zealanders, advancing via Kodjadere [Koja Dere] and were now contending with them for the heights along the shore.1 At The Nek, one of the men who had been part of the New Zealand party digging a trench across Russell’s Top returned to the position and found that it was now empty. He returned to The Nek. ‘Hey, Corp!’ he said, ‘that mob behind us has gone’. Howe and the New Zealand corporal went back and found that the trench was indeed empty. It was around 8 p.m. Unknown to them, someone had earlier ordered the New Zealanders to retire. It was at this point, on the Monash Valley side of the position, that they heard low whispered voices. Howe and the New Zealander at first thought they were Anzacs, until the now familiar but still haunting yell of ‘Allah! Mohammed!’ began; just in front of them, but well behind the horseshoe trench at The Nek, the Turks appeared and charged. The attack was beaten back, but with the Turks now attacking to their front, and with parties of Turks attacking from their rear, it was time for the survivors to get out while they still could. Even so, it would be a close-run thing.2 Those at The Nek followed the white track back to the Anzac position. Those manning the three machine guns had no idea how to dismantle them, so they retired carrying the guns, tripods and all, towards the rear of Russell’s Top. The remainder collected the badly 265
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 266
25 APRIL 1915
wounded who could not walk; four were too badly wounded to be moved and had to be left behind. They had managed to retire about 200 metres, when the Turks to their front noticed the movement and charged after them en masse. The unencumbered Turks almost caught up with the small party—it was an anxious moment. The men carrying the machine guns put them down and opened fire; the Turks melted into the scrub and the small party moved off again. They soon reached the trench near The Sphinx, which had earlier that morning been charged by Lieutenant Colonel Clarke and his men. Nearby was Clarke’s pack that Laing had carried up to the plateau, and which Howe now picked up. They continued along the path, which led them into an old Turkish communications trench that ran down into Rest Gully. The survivors set up the machine guns and fired on the Turks, who had by now recommenced their pursuit. ‘Deal it to the blighters!’ The Turks took cover and began to dig in about 150 metres to their front. A small but determined number of Turks now lay within the heart of the Anzac position.3 Meanwhile, the wounded Cavill and his New Zealand cobber had managed to climb down from Russell’s Top to the beach. We settled down there for a short spell before continuing to the dressing station on the beach. The wounded still passed in apparently endless procession. They were wonderfully cheerful and full of information. But here our peace was short-lived. Gradually the enemy’s range lengthened, and shells crept nearer and nearer; machine-guns and rifle fire commenced to whisk about us again; then suddenly through the scrub broke the head remnant of the firing line. Slowly they came, disputing every inch and reluctantly yielding the ground which they had so gloriously occupied during the earlier hours of the day. The Turks evidently intended to drive them into the sea by sheer weight of numbers, but they were determined to die rather than surrender the position dearly won. Having retired some little distance in an orderly manner, they concentrated on the ring of hills commanding the beach, and, hastily entrenching, prepared to meet the massed infantry that were being hurled forward.4 Following the Anzacs’ retreat from The Nek a number of Turks had penetrated onto Russell’s Top. However, these parties approached from the landward side of the plateau. Lieutenant Colonel Braund and his 266
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 267
‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’
men were still located on the seaward side, close to Walker’s Ridge. This part of the plateau was still vulnerable to Turkish machine-gun fire from Baby 700 and Braund’s party had no idea what was happening to their right. Whether friend or foe held The Nek or the head of Monash Valley was unknown. There was now a gap between Braund’s right and the inland slopes of Russell’s Top and it was this gap that the Turks were moving through, bypassing Braund and his men.5 While Braund was not aware of his predicament, those at headquarters on the beach were aware that a gap had developed, although the degree to which it existed, and the degree to which the Turks had managed to take advantage of the situation, was vague. It was known that the left of the line had been driven in. Bridges and his staff were now concerned that any concentrated Turkish attack from Baby 700, which seemed imminent, would drive his men off Russell’s Top, leaving the backs of the men occupying Second Ridge completely exposed to fire from the rear, forcing them to retire. Bridges was undoubtedly hoping that Pope and his men whom he had sent to occupy the head of Monash Valley would swing the situation back in the Anzacs’ favour.6 Still located along Pope’s Hill and near the head of Monash Valley were Jacobs’s men, Pope’s reinforcements, as well as remnants of those men who had been fighting all that day along Baby 700. These men were now in great danger as when daylight came the Turks who now occupied The Nek, and other parties penetrating the ridgelines on Monash Valley and Russell’s Top, would be in a position to fire into their backs. By now the Anzac position was such that the senior commanders were in fear that the whole line was about to crumble. This led to serious consideration of withdrawing the men as it was clear that the first day’s objectives had not been reached and that they were now completely surrounded by a large Turkish force. To make matters worse, the Anzacs occupied a very restricted beachhead. The next day would undoubtedly result in a massive Turkish counterattack and almost all senior commanders believed that the line would not hold. The likely result would be disintegration of the line and a corresponding massacre of the survivors as they withdrew to the beach. Even if the Anzac force had been able to capture and hold Chunuk Bair or even Battleship Hill there was some hope that an advance might be possible, however as it was they did not even hold Baby 700 and had now lost The Nek, effectively cutting the Anzac force in two. The Turks now not only surrounded them, but occupied all of the high ground, 267
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 268
25 APRIL 1915
looking down on the Anzac positions. The military enterprise had clearly failed. The senior commanders believed that the British landings to the south at Cape Helles had been a great success, when in reality they were anything but. Under this misconception they believed it was wise to evacuate ‘Z Beach’ (Anzac) and move their force south to assist in the ‘successful’ British and French advance up the peninsula. This was based not on panic but on sound military logic. The first to seriously consider a withdrawal were not the senior commanders, but the brigade colonels who had seen the strain along 400 Plateau and Second Ridge during the afternoon. Many men were understandably clearly rattled as they tried to find and construct a firing line, without artillery support. They lay there completely exposed to the heavy shrapnel fire of the Turks and could do nothing but grin and bear it. The commanders were the first to acknowledge that the lack of Anzac artillery was having a seriously demoralising effect on the men. For hours now men had been picked off one by one or in groups and they could do absolutely nothing about it. It was not until the afternoon that the Indian battery had responded brilliantly, which immediately restored morale to those who could now see their own artillery barking back a response to the Turkish onslaught. However, it was only a matter of hours before the brave Indian gunners were forced off 400 Plateau. It was at this point that those slightly wounded or unwounded began to help the more seriously wounded to the beach. This meant that the firing line was in a constant state of flux with men withdrawing from the line while others were moving up to occupy it. Strong and brave men ‘lay in torment out in the scrub, racking their brains for some pretext for retirement sufficient to satisfy their own consciences. Was it not their duty to take back information which might be all-important—to obtain reinforcements—to bring up ammunition—to find the rest of their battalion, which might be needing them?’7 After 5 p.m., Colonel M’Cay reported to Major General Bridges that a considerable number of unwounded men were withdrawing from the firing line. At the same time Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan reported that he was under heavy attack and that artillery was urgently needed. Lieutenant Colonel Owen also reported that his position on Second Ridge was precarious, as he had lost a large number of men. It looked like Russell’s Top was now in danger of being completely overrun. Sinclair-MacLagan made his way down to Bridges and informed him that the situation was ‘touch and go. If the Turks come on in mass formation . . . I don’t think anything can stop them.’8 268
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 269
‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’
When darkness fell the question of withdrawal arose seriously for the first time. Walker, in charge of the New Zealand Brigade, was clearly against such an evacuation. The narrow beach was congested with wounded and supplies and those on the firing line could not possibly be recalled before morning. Indeed, with darkness morale had begun to rise as the Turkish batteries were now largely silent, and most in the line were determined and in no way expected to be withdrawn.9 On 400 Plateau, there was still a large gap between the 2nd and 3rd brigades. Luckily for the Australians, however, the Turks appeared largely ignorant of this vulnerability. Even had they been aware it is unlikely that they could have taken advantage of the situation. The failure of the 77th Regiment to attack this very point, along with the exhaustion of the survivors of the 27th Regiment meant that such an attack was unlikely to succeed even if enough men could somehow be found to launch it. The main threat was actually developing further south, from the gullies and spurs that run off 400 Plateau: the area that was now held by the survivors of the Australian 4th and 8th battalions. The men of the 8th Battalion occupied the southern part of Bolton’s Ridge, while those of the 4th Battalion held the northern part, with its left flank anchored to the plateau itself. Both battalions linked up at the Wheatfield. The main valley below was to become known as the Valley of Despair. Branching off this central valley, however, was a short gully immediately below the Wheatfield, later known as Allah Gully. The next inland ridge was Silt Spur, then unoccupied. Not long after dark, the Australians on Bolton’s Ridge could hear the Turks below who appeared to be creeping up the Valley of Despair and Allah Gully. It was not long before shouting could be heard as well as whistles and bugles being blown. It appeared to the Australians that a serious attack was about to commence. ‘Gee cobber—it’s as noisy down there as Bourke Street on a Saturday night.’ Two scouts of the 8th Battalion were at this point beyond Bolton’s Ridge helping to screen it from a surprise attack. Word was soon passed back from these scouts providing details of the Turkish positions. All waited anxiously for the expected attack.10 The Australian submarine AE2 had been resting on the bottom of the Dardanelles for almost ten hours. The ships that had for most of the day been passing overhead had been quiet for some time now. Captain Stoker recalled that at 9 p.m., ‘I rose to the surface, found no ships in sight, and 269
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 270
25 APRIL 1915
commenced to charge batteries. No ships passed in [the] straits during the night.’11 Stoker remained in this position for some time, no doubt allowing the men to get some much-needed fresh air and allowing them to leave the claustrophobic confines of the submarine. A heavy fog surrounded the submarine affording cover and the men were allowed to smoke as long as they did so below deck. A light and refreshing rain began to fall.12 Stoker now attempted to send a signal to the fleet informing them that he had penetrated the Dardanelles and with luck would soon be in the Sea of Marmara. Far in the distance could be heard the British naval guns at Cape Helles; it must have been frustrating for Stoker’s signalman, William Falconer, who continually tried to raise the fleet using a new Marconi wireless set. There was no reply to acknowledge receipt of his messages and so Stoker and Falconer were unsure whether the fleet had received the news. The signal had in fact been received, however, and would eventually make its way to Commodore Keyes and the Commander-in-Chief Sir Ian Hamilton after midnight.13 Meanwhile below 400 Plateau Lieutenant Colonel Aker ordered his machine-gun company under the command of Lieutenant Saadet to move onto the high ground of the plateau on Johnston’s Jolly. As long as men of his 1st Battalion were able to remain on the southern sector at the Lonesome Pine these men could offer covering fire to the exposed position. Much of Johnston’s Jolly was not covered with the thick brushwood that dominated the rest of the plateau. Because of this exposure, during daylight hours the two companies of the 27th Regiment assigned to attacking the Jolly could not press the attack. Now in darkness they were able to occupy the largely empty part of the plateau and attempt to dig in.14 Those of Aker’s 3rd Battalion positioned further north along Mortar Ridge were either taking up a defensive position and entrenching, or climbing the landward slope of Second Ridge in darkness—in preparation for a counterattack. A machine-gun platoon of this battalion under the command of Lieutenant Halil had been positioned on the southern sector of Mortar Ridge in order to offer enfilading fire against any Australian attack against this sector from the area around German Officer’s Ridge or Wire Gully.15 However, Aker was aware that even with these machine guns, the devastating losses of his men during the day’s fighting meant that he could not possibly hope to stop any concentrated attack against his thin and dispersed line. Consequently, Aker and his staff went back into the scrub to the rear and tried to collect as many 270
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 271
‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’
men as possible from the 77th Arab Regiment who were now scattered over a very broad area in groups of twos and fives. [A]mongst them we obtained about 20 men belonging to that regiment who did not know where they were to go, under the command of a first sergeant. We located them at this point with suitable admonitions and threats and we got them to dig trenches with portable digging implements and put both the machine gun platoon and these infantrymen under the command of Captain Hamid . . . to whom we gave the necessary instructions about his task.16 Aker proceeded north to try to make contact with the left of the 57th Regiment to make sure that some form of continuous line was being established between his regiment and that of the 57th. Aker later recalled, ‘we began to hear various sounds very close by. We realised that these were the sounds of English conversations. We knew that we had arrived between Boyun [Courtney’s Post] and Merkez Tepe [German Officer’s Ridge] and that here it was under Australian occupation.’17 Major General Bridges, commander of the 1st Australian Division, was concerned that a massive Turkish counterattack would result in the collapse of the Anzac line. He was now of the opinion that the force should be withdrawn as quickly as possible. Major General Godley, who was in charge of the New Zealand and Australian Division, agreed with Bridges that any Turkish counterattack the next day would result in disaster. Bridges signalled to the Corps commander, Lieutenant General Birdwood, still onboard the Queen, ‘General Godley and I both consider that you should come ashore at once’.18 On landing at Anzac, in Bridges’s rudimentary dug-out Birdwood conferred with his two divisional commanders about the situation. By flickering candlelight Birdwood listened to their grave doubts about whether the overstrained men could withstand further shellfire and the massed Turkish counterattack that would surely follow the next morning. Clearly the idea of evacuation came as a shock to Birdwood. He argued against such a proposal, but he was greatly concerned that both of his divisional commanders, each of whom he greatly respected, were arguing for evacuation. Birdwood could not possibly make the decision himself to re-embark from the beaches; there was a bigger picture and he needed to pass on this information to the Commander-in-Chief.19 He ‘simply put the case most strongly before Hamilton, and left the 271
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 272
25 APRIL 1915
responsibility of decision to him’.20 Godley wrote a message that was not addressed to anyone in particular, but signed ‘Birdwood’. It was sent to Rear Admiral Cecil Thursby, who upon receiving it believed it was addressed to him: Both my divisional generals and brigadiers have represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralized by shrapnel fire to which they have been subjected all day after exhaustion and gallant work in morning. Numbers have dribbled back from the firing line and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even New Zealand Brigade which has only recently been engaged lost heavily and is to some extent demoralized. If troops are subject to shellfire again tomorrow morning there is likely to be a fiasco, as I have no fresh troops with which to replace those in firing line. I know my representation is most serious, but if we are to re-embark it must be at once. Birdwood21 On Bolton’s Ridge, the Australians were still anxiously listening to the Turks below in the Valley of Despair and Allah Gully. The voices and bugle calls had been heard for almost two hours, when at around 10 p.m. the noise suddenly increased. ‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’ recalled a soldier. A wave of Turks, yelling, ‘Allah, Allah, Allah’ charged up from Allah Gully (thus providing its name) and through the Wheatfield. The Australians’ reply: ‘Come on you bastards.’ Previously two machine guns of the 8th Battalion had been set up in preparation for the expected attack. These two machine guns swept the Wheatfield; the Turks fell in large numbers in the small field, with the survivors driven back into the gully below. Just south of the Wheatfield another Turkish attack started. Two or three waves of Turks now charged up the shallower slopes towards the ridgeline. Again Australian machinegun and rifle fire forced the Turks to retire, leaving a mass of dead and wounded lying on the slopes of the ridge. Corporal Roberts of the 8th Battalion later described this attack: Instinctively we knew that the enemy were attacking. It was not possible to see them in the darkness, but without waiting for any command a fairly hot rifle fire commenced. This must have been heard on the water for the [ship’s] searchlight was again turned on, revealing the advancing foe. The rifle fire had been heavy, but it now 272
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 273
‘It was as though the band struck up all together, only out of tune!’ 250 metres
0
4th Bn
Wheatfield
8th Bn Knife Edge X Holly Ridge
X
X X
X
X X
X
X
X X
X
X Pine Ridge
X
1st Bn 27th Rgt
Map 19.1 Turkish 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment’s, attack against Bolton’s Ridge, around 10 p.m.
opened out in volume and force until it became deafening. One could look along the trench for several hundred yards, and see a continuous stream of red and orange flame burst from the hundreds of rifles. The Turks beat a hasty retreat, leaving many dead and wounded.22 On seeing this, a number of men of the 8th Battalion let out a yell, and charged forward in a bayonet attack, but were soon recalled to the line by their officers.23 273
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 274
25 APRIL 1915
Further north, on Russell’s Top and the northern parts of Second Ridge along Pope’s Hill, the fight for the gap between these two points continued into the night. The fight for Walker’s Ridge was also far from settled. The Turks of the 2nd Battalion, 57th Regiment, which had earlier that afternoon recaptured Fisherman’s Hut, were still intent on driving the enemy off Walker’s Ridge. Shout and his men were still occupying a position at the foot of the ridge, while Critchley-Salmonson’s men occupied the ridge itself. Around 10 p.m. Major Loach, commanding officer of the Canterbury Battalion, approached Shout and agreed to help reinforce CritchleySalmonson’s men along the ridge with two full companies. With these reinforcements, Walker’s Ridge was secured, as Loach lined the ridge on the left of Braund on Russell’s Top. With Loach was Private Baigent who was amongst the first of the New Zealanders to land that day. Major Loach was in charge and I was told to take a fatigue party back for picks and shovels. I wasn’t keen on the job, but however I was a Scout and the party looked to me and this helped considerably. We got back to the beach safely and took the first bundles of picks and shovels I saw. Now it was pitch black so we kept to the beach most of the return trip and again arrived safely, only to have Hannah put a pick through his boot as soon as he started to make a trench. As Scouts we were sent out to patrol the beach and a small grassy flat.24 At certain points of Walker’s Ridge the Turks attacked fiercely. In some parts the gullies in front were too steep to enable an organised attack, but at the foot of the ridge and along its top the Turks constantly approached. In between these positions were Critchley-Salmonson and his men. Although continuously pressed, he and his men, consisting of New Zealanders and survivors of the 11th and 12th battalions from Baby 700 and The Nek, remained together at this post and repulsed all attempts by the Turks to take their position.25 Indeed, by the next morning the Turks who had tried to push the Anzacs off Walker’s Ridge had been devastated to the point where the 2nd Battalion, 57th Regiment, no longer existed. Above, on Russell’s Top, the right of Braund’s command was also in constant contact with small parties of Turks who were trying to make their way down the plateau towards The Sphinx. Exchanges of rifle fire in this area could be heard throughout the night, but Braund’s men remained determined to hold their position as ordered by their division commander. 274
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 275
20 ‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’ n 400 Plateau at around 11 p.m., M’Cay again voiced his concern to Bridges that a gap still existed between the 2nd and 3rd brigades. Bridges was now able to send M’Cay two companies of the 15th Battalion (Australian 4th Brigade) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Cannan. These companies began to help fill the gap. Soon an odd company of the 16th Battalion also arrived and by around midnight the gap had largely been bridged. Nearby Saker and his collection of men, mostly survivors from the 5th and 6th battalions, had also managed to construct a substantial defensive line by midnight.1 Major Cass and Lieutenant Colonel Wanliss along with other officers moved up and down the line and pushed the small numbers of men who were continually arriving on the plateau into the line. As a result ‘one of the . . . important chasms in the line—that which existed between the 2nd and 3rd Brigades ever since Salisbury’s advance on the previous morning—was at last more or less bridged’.2 At about the same time that the companies of the 15th Battalion were arriving, word reached Daly and his men at the Turkish gun pits beyond the Lonesome Pine that they were to retire to the main Australian line. At around 11.30 p.m., the position was evacuated as quietly as possible. The unwounded and walking wounded helped to carry the seriously wounded. No doubt as they withdrew they could hear the Turks talking amongst themselves in the scrub all around. Derham and another wounded man carried between them the Turkish machine gun. When ‘half-way to the line, they came upon an Australian with a broken leg. They dropped the machine-gun and picked up the soldier. About midnight the party reached the line in rear of 400 Plateau.’3
O
On receiving the message from Birdwood, Rear Admiral Thursby was completely ‘flabbergasted’ at the idea of re-embarking the men from 275
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 276
25 APRIL 1915
Anzac. Re-embarkation as far as he was concerned was ‘out of the question’. However, he sent a message to the fleet off Gaba Tepe to ‘Lower all boats and stand by to send them to the beach’. This was in preparation for a possible order for re-embarkation of the troops. He was about to land and confer with Bridges at the cove from the Queen, when the Queen Elizabeth with Ian Hamilton on board arrived off Gaba Tepe. Rear Admiral Thursby along with two staff officers, Carruthers and Cunliffe-Owen, instead of conferring with Bridges, left for the Queen to confer with the Commander-in-Chief on board the Queen Elizabeth. Lieutenant Colonel Braithwaite, after listening to the senior officers in the Admiral’s Dining Room, proceeded into the next room and awoke Hamilton. ‘Sir Ian, Sir Ian, you’ve got to come right along—a question of life or death—you must settle it.’ As later recalled by Hamilton: Braithwaite is a cool hand, but his tone made me wide awake in a second. I sprang from my bed, flung on my British ‘Warm’ [coat] and crossed to the Admiral’s cabin for a full briefing. ‘Admiral, what do you think?’ ‘It will take the best part of three days to get that crowd off the beaches.’ ‘And where are the Turks?’ ‘On top of ’em!’ ‘Well then, Admiral, what do you think?’ ‘I think they will stick it if only it is put to them that they must.’4 All agreed with Thursby’s assessment. ‘Well, on that I decide it’, replied Hamilton. He sat down and began to write to Birdwood but just at that point Charles Brodie burst into the room with a message from the captain of the Australian submarine the AE2. Commodore Keyes was extremely annoyed as Brodie had been ordered to wait outside and stop any interruptions to the crucial meeting. Keyes went out into the passageway with Brodie. His anger quickly dissipated on reading the message and, clutching it, he went back into the meeting and informed all those present of its content. It began, ‘from AE2 for Commander-in-Chief’, and while the receipt of the message was slightly garbled it clearly indicated that the AE2 had achieved her objective of penetrating the Dardanelles and in addition had managed to inflict damage on Turkish shipping. Commodore Keyes turned to Hamilton. ‘Tell them this. It is an omen—an Australian submarine has done the finest feat in submarine 276
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 277
‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’
history and is going to torpedo all the ships bringing reinforcements, supplies and ammunition into Gallipoli.’5 Hamilton nodded in agreement and wrote his message to Birdwood: Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out. It would take at least two days to re-embark you, as Admiral Thursby will explain to you. Meanwhile, the Australian submarine has got up through the Narrows and has torpedoed a gunboat at Chunuk (sic). Hunter-Weston despite his heavy losses, will be advancing tomorrow, which should divert pressure from you. Make a personal appeal to your men and Godley’s to make a supreme effort to hold their ground. Ian Hamilton PS:—You have got through the difficult business, now you have only to dig, dig, dig, until you are safe. Ian H.6 Just before midnight the commanding officer of the 77th Regiment, Saib Bey, made his way into Owen’s Gully together with about half a company which he had held in reserve. The commanding officer of Aker’s 1st Battalion, Captain Ibrahim, located near the Lonesome Pine, on hearing that Saib was nearby, moved down into Owen’s Gully to confer with him. Saib believed that there was ‘now nothing to prevent the enemy attacking the Karayürük Dere [Legge Valley] from the south of Kanli Sirt, [he] . . . decided to occupy this valley with the small force’. He ordered Captain Ibrahim to withdraw his men from the forward positions on 400 Plateau and take up a position to the rear of the plateau. Ibrahim, not being able to confirm this order with his own commander, had no choice but to obey Saib Bey’s orders, and began recalling his advance parties back to the rear and off 400 Plateau.7 Further north, at around the same time, Aker and his staff were still located below Second Ridge in Mule Valley. Although the Australians having been defeated were withdrawing from all pockets, they apparently held the upper edges of the land which began to rise steeply from the seashore. For this reason they would still have to face bloody battles in the morning. Our situation on Kanli Sirt was therefore delicate because we felt doubt and anxiety about the dispersion which we had seen of 77th Regiment, and about the presence of that Regiment and its situation.8 277
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 278
25 APRIL 1915
Aker and his staff now moved back from the front line through the scrub and gullies and climbed onto Third Ridge in ‘order to face the bloody events which morning would bring and we presented our battle report to the commanding officer; mentioning the result of that day’s battle, our situation on Kanli Sirt, the fact we had recovered the guns which the enemy had captured in the morning but that the position of 77th Regiment remained unknown and that our left flank was not secure because of the doubts we felt about that Regiment . . . [L]ight rain began to fall.’9 At Anzac Cove the beach barges were landing and being unloaded, after which they were loaded up with the wounded. However, the wounded in the barges had nowhere to go. Lieutenant Westmacott was still asleep in a barge beached on the cove. Some time later I awoke. Darkness was complete by now; but I could see boats on the water and the forms of people moving about the beach, a light here and there where a surgeon attended his work, and the spark of little fires on the hillside, whilst now and again a shell would burst and illuminate its immediate surroundings in a momentary red glow. Everything was quiet and businesslike. The lighter was towed onto the shore, her nose resting on the sandy beach. A seaman of the Royal Navy was sitting in the bow close to me, and another dimly visible at the stern. The intervening space was crowded with wounded on stretchers and there was an undercurrent of grumbling which I realised from the occasional remarks of one or two lying close to me, though the quiet patience of the men, many of whom were suffering, and none crying out, made me proud to be among them. They bore their wounds in silence. Our seaman at the bow was sitting there smoking philosophically, and discussing everyday affairs with one in a lighter lying close to us. I soon got sick of this so I said, ‘What are we waiting for? Why don’t we push off to a hospital ship?’ Our seaman replied in tones of weariness, ‘Well Sir, we can’t, you see. Both hospital ships have gone to Alexandria. They were full at midday.’ ‘But,’ said I, ‘It will take four or five days to get there and back.’ ‘Yes Sir,’ said the seaman. ‘That is just what it will do,’ in a tone apparently quite pleased at my mental grasp of the situation. 278
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 279
‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’
‘But,’ said I, ‘You can’t stay here all night.’ Everyone was listening in the boat now, so I was determined to have local public opinion on my side. ‘There are wounded men in the boat, and it is going to do them no good lying in the cold like this.’ ‘Yairs,’ said a wounded Australian, lifting his voice, ‘and I’m shot through the bloody belly. It is no good to me stopping out here all night, either.’ ‘There you are,’ I continued my oration once more. ‘Listen to that man. He’s shot through the stomach. Just you get us taken on board the first ship you come to whether it is a hospital ship or not. At least we’ll be under cover.’ ‘Well Sir,’ answered the seaman, ‘We can’t get a tow out.’ ‘Nonsense!’ said I. ‘Call out to the nearest destroyer or picket boat. Say you are full of wounded and there is an officer here who wants you to be towed out to the nearest ship.’ This was done. Our seaman only needed someone to speak with the voice of authority and after an interval we were made fast to a picket boat and underway. The first ship we came to would not have us, had no doctor on board, they said, and we were towed slowly on, feeling very forlorn, wandering round like a lost dog in the night; but we had more luck at the next ship. We went slowly past her anchor cable and stopped. ‘Who are you?’ they hailed us. ‘Wounded men from the shore. There is no hospital ship. Can you take them aboard? Who are you?’ The young naval man in charge of our towing craft spoke for us. ‘City of Benares with First Australian Field Ambulance, waiting to land,’ was the reply. ‘Wait a minute till we see the captain.’ The interval did not seem long as we drifted on the still dark water, before we were hailed again by the same cheery voice. ‘All right. Send em up.’ . . . So ended the most glorious day of my life.10 Thursby and Carruthers had been tasked with carrying Hamilton’s letter to Birdwood, who was still on the beach. It was pitch dark, so we stood in until we could see the white breakers and hear the noise of the surf. It looked as if it would be impossible to land in the steam-boat, when, fortunately, we saw a small merchant ship’s boat rowed by two naval seamen and called them alongside. They said they had just landed two officers and were returning to their ship. They were just as unconcerned as if they had 279
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 280
25 APRIL 1915
been coming off from a routine trip after dinner in peacetime, although bullets were coming over our lines and dropping all around them. We got into their boat and after several attempts and getting very wet, we got on shore. We found ourselves on the right of our position in what was afterwards known as Anzac Cove. Rows of wounded men were laid out in front of us under the shelter of some rising ground. The doctors in charge, who evidently expected that the beach might be rushed at any moment, implored me to have them taken off as it was murder to leave them there. I promised to do my best for them and went off to find Birdwood who, I was told, was on the beach, a little further along. The beach was crowded with men; some, exhausted after the strenuous day, had just thrown themselves down and slept like logs; some were getting food and drink for the first time for many hours, others were being collected by officers and N.C.O.s and being formed into organised units, being sent either to reinforce the fighting line or to prepare positions to fall back on in case of necessity. I found General Birdwood sitting down with his Divisional Generals and Staff. Birdwood, whom nothing could daunt and who is never so happy as when in the fighting line, and for preference in a tight spot, was cheerful but not very hopeful. I gave him Sir Ian’s letter and said I hope he would be able to hold out till the morning, when we could take stock of the situation, and I thought when daylight came, many isolated positions we had seen holding on before dark would be able to join hands and form a continuous line on which they could consolidate and dig themselves in.11 On hearing Hamilton’s reply a palpable sigh of relief was heard; a decision had been made. With this, all turned their attention to the work at hand—the defence of the Anzac perimeter. Charles Bean later recorded hearing while standing outside Bridges’s hastily constructed dug-out that ‘Sir Ian Hamilton hopes they will dig . . . and that the morning would find them securely dug in where they are . . . The Australian sailors have just got a submarine through the Dardanelles and torpedoed a Turkish ship.’ The decision was made to stick it out—it was now around 2.30 a.m., 26 April. With this news the group that had formed around the signals office broke up and everyone seemed to start digging in. As Bean recorded in his diary: 280
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 281
‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’
they were digging in the moonlight above the D.H.Q. [Divisional Headquarters] office; clink of shovels everywhere—there was just 2 hours to daylight. The warships were firing all night and the two on the N. and S. flanks kept their searchlights steady on the low country on the flanks. It was raining slightly but a waterproof sheet overhead and a drain leading out of one’s dug out kept the rain from making much discomfort. I went back to the dug out as most others now did, and got a snatch of sleep before dawn.12 While this drama had been playing out amongst the senior commanders, most in the front line were not aware that an evacuation had even been considered. Along the beach there were indeed stragglers, but most were genuinely worn to exhaustion. Charles Bean noted in his diary: Men had come back down the gully to the beach in search of someone who could tell them where to go. Many of course were stopped and taken back by officers on the way. But many came down the beach. The stronger sort would go at once to divisional HQ or some officer and try to find out where their battalion was (of course DHQ scarcely knew—it knew where the HQ of most battalions was, that’s all). I saw many men come up to DHQ, even to the General or Col. White and ask this. The weaker sort would get into dugouts on the hillside, and sleep there . . . I saw many who were simply down on the beach for information and swapping yarns . . . Of course the beach was fearfully congested. As night went on a great number of these stragglers were organised into parties to carry water, ammunition and food up to the lines . . . many of them came down with wounded men. This is an offence in war, but few realised it at this early stage.13 A similar pattern of behaviour was also occurring to the south with the British at Cape Helles, and in one case it got to such a state that a beach was evacuated when panic set in during the early daylight hours of 26 April.14 There is no disputing the demoralising effect that the Turkish artillery had had upon the Anzac force during that first day. Of similar significance was the almost total lack of Anzac artillery support. However, with the coming of night Turkish artillery had largely ceased firing out of fear of hitting their own men. Now for the first time since landing it was possible to stand up and move freely. 281
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 282
25 APRIL 1915
With this the spirits of the men rose rapidly. With the enemy’s artillery silent, they were on even terms with the Turk. Only officers like the gallant Braund, lying out with their troops, and with their fingers on the pulse of the front line, could realise this change. The officers of Bridges’s and Birdwood’s staffs had been constantly in the firing line during the day, but their work was now that of guiding troops and supplies up all the gullies. No report of the rising spirit of the men came to Headquarters. At dusk there was far more anxiety upon the Beach than in the firing line. Throughout the whole area, after dark, the manifold work of an army was going forward incessantly with whatever organization was possible, the troops were able to stand and dig. Their officers were sending to the Beach or to the valleys for tools. Parties of the 2nd Brigade were scouring the slopes for picks and shovels left behind in the climb. In a few places men were being sent back with waterbottles to springs found in the gullies.15 Earlier Corporal Mitchell, still located somewhere on 400 Plateau, expressed in his diary what most had been through during the day and were hoping for with the coming of darkness: ‘All day long there had not been a minute when we were not under fire, and most men had hardly raised themselves an inch from their stomachs. The darkness would certainly be a relief even if it only gave us the opportunity of moving our limbs, but we would also have the chance of improving our cover, by digging deeper.’16 Towards dawn, along the southern part of the Anzac line, the Turks in the Valley of Despair and Allah Gully again attempted to take Bolton’s Ridge. However ‘their forms could be seen dimly in the growing light, and their line withered under the fire poured into it. Further south, on the seashore itself, movement was made almost impossible for the Turks by the warships, two of which kept their searchlights steadily turned upon the beach and the valleys on either flank.’17 These ships were the Majestic, who turned her searchlights on the northern part of the invasion, and the Bacchante, who turned her lights upon the southern slopes.18 Along 400 Plateau itself the firing line was still attempting to dig in. The 15th Battalion, who had arrived just before midnight, had suffered like most from a lack of entrenching tools and had by dawn only managed to dig a number of unconnected rifle pits. Further south, men 282
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 283
‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’
of the 6th and 7th battalions were also attempting to dig their way to safety before the morning arrived. Indeed, between alternately firing and digging few barely took notice of the light rain that was falling. The 1st Battalion later recorded ‘Bugles (really Turkish) blowing the “Cease fire,” messages, reports, rumours, information that the troops in front were Indians. Then the news that such information was false, alarms and false alarms of attacks, sudden panics, and so on kept the rifles going all through the night, firing into the darkness at nothing and keeping our pluck up.’19 Aker’s men of the 27th Regiment were completely exhausted. This regiment was stretched between the southern spurs of 400 Plateau to Mortar Ridge. In the rear the 77th Arab Regiment continued to fire into their backs and refused to come up and support the depleted Turkish line. In fact, during the night men of the 27th and 57th regiments were largely ignorant of the presence of the 77th Arab Regiment to their rear. The Turks of the 57th were continually calling to those of the 27th to stop shooting into them; conversely men of the 27th were calling back to the 57th for their men to stop firing into them. In reality it was men of the 77th Regiment firing into the rear of both Turkish regiments. With the approaching daylight most officers of the 27th Regiment were either dead or wounded and it was badly in need of reorganisation. There was no way that the survivors of these two battalions of this dispersed regiment could hope to attack in any coordinated or organised manner.20 Unknown to Aker, Captain Ibrahim had already withdrawn most of his men off 400 Plateau as ordered by the commanding officer of the 77th Regiment, Saib Bey. Undoubtedly small isolated pockets remained on the plateau, out of touch with their commander. Ibrahim moved into Legge Valley and took up a position on Mortar Ridge.21 The Australian commanders were also ignorant of the Turkish evacuation off this part of 400 Plateau. They were too busy preparing for the expected Turkish counterattack which they believed would undoubtedly occur at first light, only a few hours away. Further north on the inland side of Russell’s Top, from Pope’s Hill to the extreme right of the line a constant volume of concentrated fire continued throughout the night. On Pope’s Hill the 16th Battalion fired from the crest of the spur while also attempting to dig in. Behind them they could see the dark shape of Russell’s Top with the occasional flash of a rifle, which they believed to be from an Enfield .303; however, they were more often than not from a German Mauser in the hands of a Turk. 283
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 284
25 APRIL 1915
Like the Anzac commanders, Kemal appears to have been largely ignorant of recent developments concerning the position of his troops below Baby 700 and The Nek. While Kemal had some idea that his 1st and 3rd battalions of the 57th Regiment were positioned somewhere near the head of Monash Valley, he probably was unaware that Russell’s Top itself had been penetrated by a number of his men. He also had no idea of what had happened to his 2nd Battalion of the same regiment. The last he had heard was that it was attempting to recapture Fisherman’s Hut, but that was some hours ago. By now it probably existed in name only. With the arrival of the bulk of the 72nd Arab Regiment at Chunuk Bair after midnight Kemal must have felt increasing relief. Overall, he was satisfied that his troops had held back the advance of the enemy.22 Also positioned with men of the 57th and 72nd regiments along the northern heights were parties of men from Aker’s 27th Regiment who had occupied the lower slopes of Mortar Ridge. Amongst these Turks were the survivors of Mucip’s men of the 1st Battalion. Mucip later recalled to Aker, ‘we satisfied our hunger with bully beef and preserves etc., which we found on the dead Australians. We passed the whole night with the sound of firing on both sides. The next day we rejoined our regiment.’23 Further south at Quinn’s and Courtney’s posts the Turks had managed to climb the landward side of Second Ridge and throughout the night intermittent charges had to be repulsed by the Anzacs, sometimes hand to hand. Between these attacks the Anzacs tried to dig in along the seaward side of the ridge, while the Turks began to dig in along the landward side of the same ridge. Picks and shovels were now more precious than rifles and many Anzacs went down into the gullies and along the beach in order to bring back these tools. Captain Stoker of the AE2 now decided to attempt the passage into the Sea of Marmara. About 4 a.m. on April 26 I proceeded on surface up straits; just before dawn sighted ships ahead, and dived to attack. As soon as light permitted, I observed through periscope two ships approaching— probably small ship leading, and larger ship astern—both men o’ war. Sea was glassy calm, and I approached with periscope down. On hoisting periscope (trained on port beam) I observed ship on line of sight of port tube. I immediately fired, and ship altered course and torpedo missed. I then discovered I had fired at leading ship and 284
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 285
‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’
found it impossible to bring another tube to bear on second ship (a battleship of Barbarossa class) with reasonable chance of success. I therefore did not fire . . . I continued on course through straits, examined the Gallipoli anchorage and found no ships worthy of attack, so proceeded on into the Sea of Marmora . . .24 The smaller of the two warships encountered was later identified as the torpedo boat Kutahya, which was escorting the battleship Barbaros Hayraddin. The battleship was on her way to bombard the Anzac front with her high-calibre guns from the relative safety of the Dardanelles side of the peninsula.25 Back at Anzac, along First Ridge and Plugge’s Plateau, Bridges, Godley, Sinclair-MacLagan and staff were trying to construct a last line of defence in case the front line collapsed with the coming of dawn. Since the order had been given to hold Anzac, every effort was now being made by Birdwood to land as many troops as possible to reinforce not only the line, but also the proposed last line of defence. Along First Ridge was positioned the Otago Battalion and part of the 11th Battalion who were occupying Plugge’s Plateau. Entrenching along First Ridge itself was a company and a half of the Wellington Battalion. Just before dawn, the partly assembled 12th Battalion also filed up First Ridge as a reserve line behind the men of the Wellington Battalion. In addition, two guns of the 21st and two of the 26th Indian Mountain Battery were placed on Plugge’s Plateau. The clink of shovels sounded over the whole face of the hill. Gradually the rain stopped. The sky paled. The crack of rifles came interminably from the hills like the cracking of stock whips. ‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’ muttered one weary officer on the Beach, as he opened his eyes. The dawn broke. The staff, after working through most of the night, expected momentarily the sound of the first howitzers which should herald the Turkish attack.26 At dawn on 26 April Lance Corporal Howe and his small party of Anzacs were still positioned on Russell’s Top, with a number of Turks 100 to 200 metres away in the scrub. A staff officer had climbed up to them to order them off the Top as the navy was going to shell the Turks ‘off the Plateau’. Whether any word reached Braund and his men who were also on the plateau near the head of Walker’s Ridge is unknown. 285
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 286
25 APRIL 1915
However, before Howe and his men could evacuate the position, a naval ‘6-in. shell hissed low overhead and burst a few yards beyond them’.27 A few of Howe’s men were wounded, but the bombardment that followed resulted in most of the Turks withdrawing from the Top. It would still be a number of days before Russell’s Top would be finally cleared of the X
2nd Bn 57th Rgt
X
X
X
X
X
X X 1st & 3rd Bns
57th Rgt
X
North Beach
X X X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X X
X
3rd Bn X X 27th Rgt X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
400 Plateau
77th Rgt (scattered) X
X
X
X X
X
X
X X
1st Bn 27th Rgt
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
Map 20.1 Early morning, 26 April 1915 286
X 0
500 metres
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 287
‘Those damn boys again, driving in the cows!’
troublesome Turks who had taken up a number of sniper positions not only along the plateau, but also along the inland slopes of Monash Valley. These snipers would continue for days to fire into the backs of the Anzacs strung out along Second Ridge, until Anzac snipers themselves ‘took them out’. The Turks would, however, forever hold The Nek, which was now the most strategically significant position at Anzac—by holding The Nek, the Turks dictated that the northern Anzac flank along Russell’s Top would never be linked with the Anzac central line, strung out along Second Ridge.28 As dawn was approaching, Ian Hamilton was just off the coast of Gaba Tepe on board the Queen Elizabeth. After being briefed of events during the morning of 26 April he wrote in his diary: The Australians have done wonderfully at Gaba Tepe. They got 8,000 ashore to one beach between 3.30 a.m. and 8.30 a.m.: due to their courage; organization; sea discipline and steady course of boat practice. Navy report not one word spoken or movement made by any of the thousands of untried troops either during the transit over the water in the darkness or nearing the land when the bullets took their toll. But, as the keel of the boats touched bottom, each boat-load dashed into the water and then into the enemy’s fire. At first it seemed that nothing could stop them, but by degrees wire, scrub and cliffs; thirst, sheer exhaustion broke the back of their impetus. Then the enemy’s howitzers and field guns had it all their own way, forcing attack to yield a lot of ground. Things looked anxious for a bit, but by this morning’s dawn all are dug in, cool, confident. But for the number and good shooting of Turkish field guns and howitzers, Birdwood would surely have carried the whole main ridge of Sari Bair. As it is, his troops are holding a long curve upon the crest of the lower ridges, identical, to a hundred yards, with the line planned by my General Staff in their instructions and penciled by them upon the map.29 The sound of the naval bombardment had further raised Anzac morale. They had been largely without artillery support for the previous 24 hours and the sound of 15-inch guns and the sight of the hills ablaze with bursting shells, clouds of dense smoke, and geysers of earth was a godsend to the Anzacs. Conversely, it was demoralising for the Turks. 287
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 288
25 APRIL 1915
During the rest of 26 April the Anzac and Turkish positions were continually being strengthened and stabilised and with this some sense of ‘normality’ was established. The front line was becoming more clearly defined and the warships were now in a position to offer covering support as they became aware of where the Turkish lines were. Added to this, the Anzac artillery was finally being landed and placed in position. The infantry no longer had to fight it out alone. Indeed, the front lines as they were now defined after the first 24 hours of the landing would change very little, with the only significant advance being the capture of Lonesome Pine by the 1st Australian Division and the brilliant but momentary capture of Chunuk Bair and Hill Q by the New Zealanders and Gurkhas during the August offensive four months later. The first long day and night at Anzac was over. Morning broke and the Turks did not attack. The Anzacs had been able to establish some form of firing line, although between Russell’s Top and those strung out south along Pope’s Hill and Quinn’s Post a broad gap remained—a gap that would never be bridged. With dawn, picks and shovels were put aside and Anzac and Turk alike took up their rifles to face the new day.
288
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 289
Anzac 1919 The Australian artist George Lambert was part of the Australian Historical Mission to Gallipoli. He had been commissioned by the Australian Government to paint two epic paintings depicting two significant events of the Anzac battles. The first was the landing itself, the second was the charge at The Nek by the 3rd Light Horse during the August offensive. Both of these paintings now hang in the Gallipoli Room at the Australian War Memorial. Bean later recalled Lambert’s experience at The Nek the day before leaving Anzac for the last time. George Lambert and his voluntary Australian orderly, a trooper named Spruce . . . had been even busier than usual during the last few days . . . but before leaving Anzac he [Lambert] insisted on going out in the small hours to The Nek, so as to be there in the dawn light in which the charge was made. ‘Very cold, bleak and lonely’ he noted. ‘The jackals, damn them, were chorusing their hate, the bones showed up white even in the faint dawn and I felt rotten; but as soon as I got to my spot the colour of the dawn on this scrubby, shrubby hill-land was very beautiful and I did my little sketch quite well before breakfast. Ten-thirty saw Spruce and self struggle with a water-colour of a very impressive subject, impressive both in art and military tradition. The worst feature of this after-battle work is that the silent hills and valleys sit stern and unmoved, callous of the human, and busy only in growing bush and sliding earth to hide the scars left by the war-disease. Perhaps it is as well that we are pulling out tomorrow; this place gives one the blues, though it is very beautiful.’1
289
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 290
This page intentionally left blank
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 291
Notes
Anzac 1919 1 2
C.E.W. Bean, Gallipoli Mission, Australian War Memorial (hereafter AWM), Canberra, 1952, p. 153. ibid., pp. 58–9.
Chapter 1 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
T. Örnek and F. Toker, ‘Gallipoli—Companion to the feature length documentary’, Ekip Film, 2005, p. 2. E.J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001. Robert Rhodes James, in Gallipoli—the fatal shore, April 1988, documentary, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. J. Keegan, The First World War, Pimlico, Great Britain, 1999; G.J. Meyer, A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914–1918, Delacorte Press, New York, 2006; A. Palmer, The Gardeners of Salonika, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1965; A. Palmer, Victory 1918, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998; G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War—Myths and Realities, Headline, London, 2001; H. Strachan, The First World War Volume I: To Arms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; A. Wakefield and S. Moody, Under the Devil’s Eye: Britain’s Forgotten Army at Salonika 1915–1918, Sutton Publishing, United Kingdom, 2004. Erickson, 2001; R.C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War, Routledge, London, 2000; Meyer, 2006; Palmer, 1965, 1998; Strachan, 2001. Meyer, 2006. B.H. Liddell-Hart, The Real War 1914–1918, Little Brown, Boston, 1930, p. 147. The Mitchell Report, Report of the committee appointed to investigate the attacks delivered on the enemy defenses of the Dardanelles Straits, CB1550, 1919, AWM51 Part 1; C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol. 1, Imperial War Museum, London, 1929; T.R. Frame and G.J. Swinden, First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli, Kenthurst, Kangaroo Press, 1990. 291
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 292
25 APRIL 1915
9 10 11 12 13
14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26
ibid. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Strachan, 2001, p. 693. Hall, 2000; Erickson, 2001. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; P. Chasseaud and P. Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2005. L. von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, 1st English Edition, Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, London, 1927; Lt Col Sefik Aker (Ret), ‘The Dardanelles. The Ari Burnu Battles and the 27th Regiment: The Battles of 25th April 1915’. The Military Journal, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 1935 (in Turkish). English translation: Rayfield Papers, Imperial War Museum, London. 69/61/Box 8 (copy provided to the AWM by author); C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18. Vol I: The Story of Anzac—From the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4 1915, 7th edn, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1937 (1st edition published 1921). von Sanders, 1927; Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937; Erickson, 2001. H. Broadbent, Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore, Penguin Books, Camberwell, 2005. Aker 1935, p. 35. ibid., pp. 49–50. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937. Aker, 1935, p. 52. Mitchell Report, 1919; R.R. James, Gallipoli, Pimlico, London, 1999; N. Steel and P. Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli, Papermac, London, 1994; N. Steel, Gallipoli, Leo Cooper, Yorkshire, 1999. Bean, 1937, p. 110. Mitchell Report, 1919; Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937; J. Robertson, Anzac and Empire: The Tragedy & Glory of Gallipoli, Hamlyn, Port Melbourne, 1990. I. Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 1, Edward Arnold, London, 1920, pp. 120–1.
Chapter 2 1 2 3 4
M. Beevor, ‘My Landing at Gallipoli’, unpublished manuscript, AWM PR/MSS761, p. 3. H. Broadbent, The Boys Who Came Home: Recollections of Gallipoli, ABC Books, Sydney, 1990, p. 47. C.E.W. Bean, Diary, April–May 1915, AWM 38-3DRL 606/item 5. H.W. Cavill, Imperishable Anzacs: A Story of Australia’s Famous First Brigade from the Diary of Pte Harold Walter Cavill N. 27 1 Bn., William Brooks & Co, Sydney, 1916, p. 66. 292
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 293
Notes 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31
A.W. Keown, Forward with the Fifth: The Story of 5 Years’ War Service, Speciality Press, Melbourne, 1921 (from Winter, 1994, p. 86). A. Love, Diary, La Trobe State Library Reading Room, MS9603 MSB422. A. Marie Conde and C. Goddard, ‘The remains of the day: a boat and a diary from the landings on Gallipoli’, Wartime—Official Magazine of the Australian War Memorial, Vol. 5, 1999, p. 15 (Byron Hobson Diary AWM 2DRL/0694). Bean, 1937. C.E.W. Bean, Diary, April 1915, AWM 38-3DRL 606/item 4. D. Winter, 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Tragedy, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1994, p. 81. C. Pugsley, Gallipoli—The New Zealand Story, 3rd edn, Reed Publishing, Auckland, 1998, p. 102. Original quote contained in S Sgt K.M. Little, Div. HQ, on staff ANZAC, diary and papers (QEII Army Museum, Waiouru). J. King, Gallipoli Diaries: The Anzacs’ Own Story Day by Day, Kangaroo Press, Sydney, 2003, p. 15. Winter, 1994. Original held in Mitchell Library, NSW, MSS2945. H. Cheney, 806 Sergeant H.A.M. Cheney 50th Battalion A.I.F. AWM 1DRL199 (no page numbers). C. Townsend, Gallipoli 1915: From the Uttermost Ends of the Earth, Patricia Townsend, Paeroa, 1999, p. 16. Bean, 1937. Mitchell Report, 1919; Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937. Mitchell Report, 1919. Beevor, unpublished manuscript, AWM. Bean, 1937; Winter, 1994. Mitchell Report, 1919. H.C. Nott, Medical History of the 10th Battalion, AWM 224 MSS136, p. 10. Bean, 1937, p. 245. J. Hurst, Game to the Last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 39. Sergeant E.W. Mofflin letter, original held at the Army Museum, Perth. Bean, 1937, p. 247. Aker, 1935, pp. 34–5. ibid., p. 36. Mitchell Report, 1919; A.W. Jose, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18. Vol IX: The Royal Australian Navy, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1928. Frame & Swindon, 1990, p. 78. Mitchell Report, 1919; Jose, 1928; C. Avci, Thirteen Leagues under the Dardanelles, Nart Yayincilik, Turkey, 2002. Jose, 1928, pp. 241–2. 293
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 294
25 APRIL 1915
32
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
F. and E. Brenchley, Stoker’s Submarine: Australia’s Daring Raid on the Dardanelles on the Day of the Gallipoli Landings, HarperCollins Publishers, Sydney, 2001, p. 59. Steel & Hart, 1994, p. 54. Winter, 1994, p. 92. Original held Oxley Library, Brisbane, OM64-5/517/25. J.S. Metcalf, Captain RNR—Imperial War Museum Documents. Mitchell Report, 1919. G. Mitchell, Diary 1915, AWM 20RL928, p. 1 (25 April); G.F.S. Combs Diary, original held as part of the Ellam-Innis collection, Perth, Western Australia. A.H. Darnell, letter dated 27 May, 1915, AWM 1DRL233, 8042, item 7. B. Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, Penguin, Ringwood, Australia, 1972, p. 54. Bean, 1937. E.W. Bush, Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, London, 1975. Bean, 1937, p. 252. Hurst, 2005; Combs Diary.
Chapter 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
J.S. Metcalf, Captain RNR—Imperial War Museum Documents. Steel & Hart, 1994. Bean, 1937, p. 252. J.M. Aitken, letters, AWM 1DRL/0013. S.P. Weir, Diary, AWM183/47. Hurst, 2005, p. 42. Original Dr E.T. Brennan, unidentified newspaper. Bush Papers Imperial War Museum Documents, Papers Box 75/65/2 file ‘Anzac Day’ letter from Brigadier T.S. Louch MC dated 15 December 1969. Mitchell, Diary 1915, p. 2. Örnek & Toker, 2005. C. Lock, The Fighting 10th: A South Australian Centenary Souvenir of the 10th Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919, Web & Son, 1936, pp. 148–9. Gammage, 1972, p. 54. Bean, 1937. Robertson, 1990—no reference provided. Broadbent, 1990; Gallipoli—The Fatal Shore, 1988, documentary. Hurst, 2005, p. 42. Original unpublished memoir held in J.S. Battye Library, Perth, MN 1265. Bean, 1937. Steel & Hart, 1994. Bean, 1937. Broadbent, 1990, 2005, pp. 47–8; K. Fewster and V. and H. Ba¸sarın, Gallipoli: The Turkish Story, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003, p. 63. Aker, 1935, p. 12. 294
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 295
Notes 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
ibid., p. 43. ibid., p. 36. ibid., p. 39. ibid. ibid., p. 37. Imperial War Museum, Miscellaneous 262, anonymous typescript account, pp. 1–2. Bean, 1937, p. 254. Bean, 1937; Hurst, 2005. N. Steel, Gallipoli, Leo Cooper, 1999, p. 110.
Chapter 4 1 2
3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Bean, 1937. Quote taken from Steel & Hart, 1994, pp. 62–3. Original unpublished Louch Memoir held at the Imperial War Museum (IWM), London Department of Documents. Bean, 1937; R. Kearney, Silent Voices: The Story of the 10th Battalion AIF in Australia, Gallipoli, France and Belgium during the Great War 1914–1918, New Holland, Sydney, 2005. Mrs Groom’s newspaper cuttings album, AWM 940.42 596/1696. Bean, 1937, p. 258. Cheney AWM 1DRL199. Bean, 1937, pp. 256–7. Darnell, Diary 1915, AWM 1DRL233, 8042, item 7. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. T. Curran, Across the Bar: The story of ‘Simpson’, The man with the Donkey— Australia and Tyneside’s great military hero, Ogmios Publications, Brisbane, 1994. Jose, 1928; Frame & Swinden, 1990. Aker, 1937, p. 52. ibid. Broadbent, 2005, p. 62. Aker, 1935; Mitchell Report, 1919. Aker 1935, p. 45; Bean, 1937, pp. 278–9. Steel & Hart, 1994, pp. 62–3. Original unpublished Louch Memoir held at the IWM, London Department of Documents. Mitchell, Diary 1915, AWM 20RL928, p. 5. Imperial War Museum, Miscellaneous 262, anonymous typescript account, pp. 1–2. Bean, 1937. 295
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 296
25 APRIL 1915
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
ibid. Bean, 1937; Hurst, 2005. Hurst, 2005, p. 44—G.F.S. Combs Diary. ibid.—T. Mofflin letter. Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937; Hurst, 2005. Hurst, 2005. Bean, 1952, p. 78. Frank Loud Diary AWM PR89/132 (p. 4 of Bill Gammage’s typed copy—part of AWM file). Bean, 1937, p. 261. Fewster et al., 2003, p. 63. Bean, 1937. Hurst, 2005, p. 46—G.F.S. Coombs Diary. Bean, 1937. ibid. Aker, 1935. ibid., p. 36. F. Waite, The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, Auckland, 1921, p. 76.
Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Bean, 1937, pp. 249–50. Winter, 1994, p. 99. ibid. Bean, Diary 5, AWM, pp. 19–20. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937. Winter, 1994. Bean, 1937. Beevor, AWM, pp. 10–11. ibid., pp. 11–13. Lock, 1936, p. 159. Kearney, 2005. ibid., p. 95. Beevor, AWM, p. 14. ibid., p. 13. Bean, 1937. ibid. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Winter, 1994, p. 174. 296
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 297
Notes 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Ivor Margetts, typed copy of letters 25/10/1915–9/5/1916 AWM 1 DRL/0478 — quote taken from letter 23/5/15. B. Facey, A Fortunate Life, Penguin Books Australia, Camberwell, 1981, p. 254. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 269. ibid., p. 270. ibid., p. 271. Bean, 1937. ibid. Curran, 1994, p. 209. D. McWhae, Notes from Colonel McWhae—The landing—Gallipoli—3rd Field Ambulance, AWM 25 [481/133]. P. Adam-Smith, The Anzacs, Claremont, Camberwell, 1991, p. 92.
Anzac 1919 1
Bean, 1952, pp. 53–4.
Chapter 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Bean, Diary, April–May 1915, AWM 38-3DRL 606/item 5. Bean, 1937. Bean, Diary, April–May 1915, AWM 38-3DRL 606/item 5. Frame & Swinden, 1990. Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, p. 60. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. Letter published in the Melbourne Argus newspaper, 9 June 1915. ibid; Bean, 1937, p. 327. Bean, 1937; R. Austin, Our Dear Old Battalion: The Story of the 7th Battalion AIF, 1914–1919, A Slouch Hat Publication, Rosebud, Victoria, 2004. Bean, 1937. Aker, 1935. Bean, 1937; Curran, 1994; Austin, 2004. ibid. Austin, 2004, p. 42. R. McMullin, Pompey Elliott, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2002. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. Bean, 1937, p. 340. Aker, 1935, p. 42. ibid. 297
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 298
25 APRIL 1915
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
ibid., p. 41. ibid., p. 52. ibid., pp. 67–71. ibid., p. 43. ibid., p. 53. ibid., p. 55. ibid., p. 54. ibid., pp. 67–71. Curran, 1994. Bean, Diary, April–May 1915, AWM 3DRL 606, item 26 (2), p. 14.
Chapter 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Bean, 1937; McMullin, 2003. Bean, 1937; Austin, 2004. Quote taken from Steel & Hart, 1994, pp. 67–8. Aker, 1935, p. 36. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937; C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1948. Bean, 1937. L. Carlyon, Gallipoli, Pan Macmillan, Australia, 2001, p. 139. Aker, 1935. Bean, 1937, p. 273. ibid., p. 274. Bean, 1937; 1948. Bean, 1937, pp. 364–5. Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, p. 61. Jose, 1928; Frame & Swinden, 1990; Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, pp. 61–2; Avci, 2002. R. Pelvin, ‘First through: the epic voyage of AE2’, Wartime: Official Magazine of the Australian War Memorial, Vol. 6, 1999. Jose, 1928; Frame & Swinden, 1990; Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, p. 63; Avci, 2002. ibid. Jose, 1928, p. 243. Jose, 1928, p. 243; Frame & Swinden, 1990; Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001. von Sanders, 1927, p. 63. ibid., p. 64. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Aker, 1935. ibid., p. 58. Chasseaud & Doyle, 2005, p. 195. Bean, 1937. 298
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 299
Notes 27 28 29
Broadbent, 2005, pp. 87 and 89. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937; 1948; 1952. Bean, 1952, pp. 131–3.
Chapter 8 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Bean, Diary 4, AWM. D. Blair, Dinkum Diggers: An Australian Battalion at War, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p. 76. Fleet surgeon C. MacMillan, Extract from Journal of Medical Officer HMS London, (Fleet Surgeon C.C. MacMillan), 1 January–31 December 1915, AWM 252 [A7], pp. 1–2. Ryan, AWM 27 370.5, item 1; M. Tyquin, Gallipoli—The Medical War, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, p. 15. R.R. James, Gallipoli, Pimlico, London, 1999, p. 110. Dr Nott, AWM, p. 11. Mitchell Report, 1919. Örnek & Toker, 2005, p. 34. Bean, 1937. Aker, 1935. Bean, 1937, p. 342. ibid.; Bean, 1948, p. 95. Bean, 1937, p. 343. ibid. Aker, 1935. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 405. ibid., p. 406. Bean, 1937; Austin, 2004. Bean, 1952. Aker, 1935, p. 36. ibid., p. 44. ibid., p. 59. ibid., p. 62. ibid., p. 63. Bean, 1948; 1952. Bean, 1937. A.S. Blackburn, Typed copy of letter 3/6/1915, AWM 2DRL/650, p. 5. Bean, 1937, p. xxii. Blackburn, AWM 2DRL/650, p. 5. Bean, 1937; 1948; 1952. Curran, 1994, p. 228. Bean, 1937; 1948; 1952. 299
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 300
25 APRIL 1915
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
C.E.W. Bean, Notebook April–May 1915, AWM 3DRL 606, item 31. Bean, 1937. Steel & Hart, 1994, p. 64. Bean, 1937, p. 277. Bean, 1937. ibid., Bean 1952. Bean, 1937. Jose, 1928, p. 244. Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, p. 65. Bean, Diary 5, AWM, p. 23. Waite, 1921, p. 77. Bean, 1937. ibid. p. 266. Bean, 1948, p. 96.
Chapter 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Bean, Diary 5, AWM, p. 24. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid., p. 344. Bean, 1952. ibid., p. 117. Aker, 1935, p. 65. ibid., p. 77. ibid., p. 68. Bean, 1937. Letter published in the Melbourne Argus newspaper, 9 June 1915. Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937; R. Austin, Cobbers in Khaki: The History of the 8th Battalion, 1914–1918, McCrae, Australia, 1997. ibid. ibid. ibid. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 382. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 295. Broadbent, 1990, p. 51. ibid, p. 52. Bean, Notebook 31, AWM, April–July 3DRL 606, item 29. 300
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 301
Notes 26 27 28 29 30
Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 285. Bean, 1952. Bean, 1937, p. 285. Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, p. 66.
Chapter 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Bean, 1937. Aker, 1935; Bean 1937. Bean, Notebook 31, AWM. Bean, 1937; Curran, 1994. Bean, 1952, pp. 85–6. Buchanan, 3rd Australian Field Ambulance historical material, AWM224, MSS 287/288. Bean, 1948. Bean, 1937. C.E.W. Bean, Notebook, April–June 1915, AWM 3DRL 606, item 25, p. 10. ibid. Aker, 1935, p. 72. ibid., p. 74. ibid., p. 84. Turkish Official History 1914–16, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 2002. Aker, 1935, pp. 75–6. ibid. ibid., pp. 79–80. ibid., p. 102. Bean, 1937, p. xiii. Aker, 1935, p. 54. ibid., p. 15. ibid., p. 103. Bean, 1937. Beevor, AWM, pp. 23–4. Kearney, 2005. Lock, 1936, p. 159. Bean, 1937; Austin, 2004. Bean, 1937; 1948. Curran, 1994, p. 239. F. Legge, The Gordon Bennett Story: From Gallipoli to Singapore, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965, p. 43. Bean, 1937; Legge, 1965. Bean, 1937. ibid. 301
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 302
25 APRIL 1915
34 35 36 37
38 39 40
Loud Diary, AWM, p. 6. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 294. H.V. Howe, Bean Collection, Letters from H.V. Howe with Enclosures, AWM38/6673/477 (Letter to C.F.H. Churchill from H.V. Howe dated 30 November, 1962). Bean, 1937, p. 294. Bean, 1937; 1948; 1952. ibid.
Chapter 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
V.E. Jones letter dated 2 May 1915, AWM/PR00360. Broadbent, 1990. Curran, 1994. A. Mango, Atatürk, John Murray, London, 1999, p. 147. Fewster et al., 2003, p. 67. Aker, 1935, p. 39. Bean, 1948, p. 136. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 289. Hurst, 2005, p. 48. Bean, 1948. Bean, 1937. Bean, 1948. Aker, 1935. Hurst, 2005, p. 47. Bean, 1937. Hurst, 2005, p. 47. Bean, 1937. Aker, 1935, p. 113. ibid., pp. 114–15. Bean, 1937; 1952. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 294. Aker, 1935, p. 87. ibid., pp. 85–7. ibid., p. 88.
Anzac 1919 1 2
Bean, 1952, p. 120. ibid., pp. 121–2. 302
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 303
Notes
Chapter 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid., p. 431. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. Cavill, 1916, pp. 75–7. Aker, 1935, p. 113. ibid., pp. 117–18. ibid., p. 83. ibid., p. 124. ibid., p. 126. ibid., p. 120. ibid., p. 121. Corbin diary AWM41[1/5/18]. Bean, Diary 5, AWM, pp. 27–8. Broadbent, 1990, p. 55. Bean, 1937. Cavill, 1916, p. 77. Quote from Cavill, 1916, p. 78; see also Bean, 1937; Blair, 2001. Aker, 1935, p. 107. Örnek & Toker, 2005, p. 29. Aker, 1935, p. 165. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. ibid. Broadbent, 1990, p. 52. Bean, 1937, p. 411. ibid. Letter published in the Melbourne Argus newspaper, 9 June 1915.
Chapter 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Jose, 1928; Frame & Swinden, 1990. Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001, p. 66. Bean, 1937, p. 298. ibid., p. 299. ibid. ibid. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937. 303
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 304
25 APRIL 1915
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937; Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937. Letter published in the Melbourne Argus newspaper, 9 June 1915. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid., p. 387. Legge, 1965. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. ibid. Aker, 1935. Örnek & Toker, 2005, p. 29. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 433. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937; Curran, 1994. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937. Bean, Diary 5, AWM, pp. 27–8. Bean, 1937, p. 394. ibid. Bean, 1937; Austin, 1997. Bean, 1937; Curran, 1994.
Chapter 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Waite, 1921. H.H.S. Westmacott, Lt, Diaries Vols 12–13, copies held at Alexander Turnbull Library, Auckland (Micro-MS-0847-3), pp. 1746–8. Townsend, 1999, p. 131. ibid., pp. 16–17. ibid., p. 17. Waite, 1921; Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937. Curran, 1994, p. 230. Bean, 1937. Carlyon, 2001, p. 158. A. Perry, ‘The Men of Anzac’, The Anzac Book, Cassell & Company Ltd, London, 1916, pp. 3–4. J. Gordon, ‘The Military Adventures of John Rutherford Gordon 1895–1983’ (manuscript by Peter Murray, 1988), AWM PR89/85, p. 14. Bean, 1937. Legge, 1965, p. 59. F. Brent, IWM DOCS SR 4037. 304
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 305
Notes 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
Legge, 1965, p. 60. Aker, 1935, p. 137. Bean, 1937, p. 397. Bean, 1937. Legge, 1965. Bean, 1937; Austin, 1997. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937, p. 434. Pugsley, 1998. Waite, 1921; Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937. Westmacott Diaries, pp. 1749–50. Bean, Diary 5, AWM, p. 28. Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1751. Pugsley, 1998, p. 122. Bean, 1937; Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937, p. 438.
Chapter 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Westmacott Diaries, p. 1752. Townsend, 1999. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1754. Pugsley, 1998, p. 124. Westmacott Diaries, pp. 1755–6. Pugsley, 1998. Gallipoli—The Fatal Shore, ABC documentary. Westmacott Diaries, pp. 1757–8. Curran, 1994, p. 234. Bean, 1937; Pugsley, 1998. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1758. Bean, 1937. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929, p. 194; T. Travers, Gallipoli, 1915, Tempus, South Carolina, 2001. Curran, 1994, p. 230. ibid. Bean, 1937. ibid. Broadbent, 1990, p. 56. 305
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 306
25 APRIL 1915
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Mitchell Diary, AWM, pp. 8–9. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid., p. 303. ibid. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1759. ibid., p. 1760. ibid. Pugsley, 1998, p. 129. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1761. Pugsley, 1998, p. 129. Bean, 1937; Pugsley, 1998. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1761. Pugsley, 1998, p. 131. Bean, 1937; Pugsley, 1998. Bean, Notebook, AWM, item 25. Bean, 1937, p. 435. Bean, 1937. ibid.
Anzac 1919 1
Bean, 1952, pp. 105–6.
Chapter 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Bean, 1937, p. 435. ibid. ibid. F.V. Senn, Gallipoli Recollections (MS 1697). Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937; Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937, p. 308. E. Margetts, Diary, AWM, letter dated 23 May 1915. Bean, 1937, p. 309. ibid. Bean, 1937. Westmacott Diaries, pp. 1763–5. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 313. Bean, 1937. P. Stanley, Quinn’s Post, Anzac, Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2005, p. 18. ibid., pp. 18–19. 306
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 307
Notes 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Pugsley, 1998. Bean, 1937, p. 403. Aker, 1935, p. 135. Loud Diary, AWM, p. 7. Aker, 1935, p. 136. Bean, 1948. Bean, 1937, p. 314. Bean, 1937; 1948; 1952. Kearney, 2005, p. 84. ibid., pp. 100–1. Bean, 1937; Legge, 1965; R. Austin, As Rough As Bags: The History of the 6th Battalion, 1st AIF 1914–1919, McCrae, Australia, 1992. Aker, 1935, pp. 137–9. ibid., p. 141. ibid., p. 167. Örnek & Toker, 2005, p. 35. Bean, 1937, p. 313. Westmacott Diaries, p. 1765. Pugsley, 1998; Travers, 2001.
Chapter 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Cavill, 1916, pp. 78–80. ibid., p. 80. Bean, 1937, p. 315; quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 133. Bean, 1937. F.W. Watson, Letter on death of Sergeant Lambert, dated 7 September 1915 (QEII Army Museum, Waiouru). Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937; Curran, 1994. Bean, 1937. Curran, 1994, p. 253. Bean, 1937. Stanley, 2005, p. 19. Pugsley, 1998. Cavill, 1916, pp. 80–1. Bean, 1937, p. 318. Bean, 1937. Pugsley, 1998. Senn, MS 1697. Bean, 1937, p. 401. ibid., p. 404. Bean, 1937. 307
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 308
25 APRIL 1915
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
ibid. ibid., p. 419. Aker, 1935; Bean, 1937. Bechervaise letter, 1916, LaTrobe Reading Room: MS10153 MSB177, State Library of Victoria. Aker, 1935, p. 132. Bean, 1937, p. 420; see also Bean, 1952. Bean, 1937, p. 421; see also Bean, 1952. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929, p. 194; quote from Bean, 1937, p. 422. Aker, 1935, pp. 144–5. Travers, 2001; Broadbent, 2005.
Chapter 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Bean, 1937, p. 464. ibid., p. 318. ibid. ibid., p. 464. Bean, Diary 5, AWM p. 28. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937; P.A. Pederson, Monash as Military Commander, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1985. C. Malthus, ANZAC: A Retrospective, Reed, Auckland, 2002, p. 54. Cavill, 1916, p. 81. Bean, 1937, pp. 320–1. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 423. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid., p. 424. Aker, 1935, p. 142. ibid., pp. 145–6. H.V. Howe, ‘ANZAC: Sparks from an old controversy’, Australian Army Journal, Periodical Review of Military Literature, April, 1965, p. 15. Bean, 1937, p. 478. ibid. Bean, 1937, p. 319; quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 138. Westmacott Diaries, pp. 1765–6. Bean, 1937. ibid., p. 470. ibid., p. 471. ibid.; Travers, 2001. 308
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 309
Notes 28 29 30 31 32 33
Bean, 1937, pp. 441–2. Bean, 1937. ibid. ibid. Aker, 1935, pp. 147–8. ibid., p. 153.
Chapter 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sanders, 1927, p. 66. Bean, 1937, p. 319. Bean, 1937, p. 320; 1952, p. 94. Cavill, 1916, p. 81. Bean, 1937, p. 320, pp. 334–5. ibid., p. 335. ibid., p. 453. ibid., p. 454. Steel & Hart, 1994. Bean, 1937, p. 475. Jose, 1928, p. 244. Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001. Frame & Swinden, 1990; Brenchley & Brenchley, 2001; Avci, 2002. Aker, 1929, p. 149. ibid. ibid. ibid., p. 150. Bean, 1937, p. 456. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Bean, 1937, p. 458. Bean, 1937, p. 475. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1937. Austin, 1997, p. 59. Townsend, 1999, p. 17. Bean, 1937.
Chapter 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Austin, 2004. Bean, 1937, p. 468. ibid., p. 423. Hamilton, 1920, pp. 143–4. Frame & Swinden, 1990, p. 83. Hamilton, 1920, p. 144. Aker, 1935, p. 144. 309
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 310
25 APRIL 1915
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
ibid., p. 151. ibid., p. 152. Westmacott Diaries, pp. 1766–7. James, 1999, p. 131. K. Fewster, Gallipoli Correspondent: The frontline diary of C.E.W. Bean, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, p. 75. Bean, Diary 5, AWM, p. 37. Travers, 2001. Bean, 1937, pp. 464–5. Mitchell Diary, AWM. Bean, 1937, p. 475. Mitchell Report, 1919, p. 167. Blair, 2001, p. 83. Bean, 1937, p. 479. Aker, 1935, p. 154. Bean, 1937. Aker, 1935, p. 165. Jose, 1928, p. 245. Avci, 2002. Bean, 1937, p. 476. ibid., p. 481. Bean, 1937; J. Hatwell, No Ordinary Determination, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, Fremantle, 2005. Hamilton, 1920, p. 149.
Anzac 1919 1
Bean, 1952, p. 281.
310
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 311
Bibliography
This selected bibliography lists published literature only. All unpublished materials referenced within the text are documented in the Notes. While most of the publications below have also been referred to in the Notes, some additional material not directly sourced or quoted from, but referred to while writing this book, has also been listed for completeness. Adam-Smith, P., The Anzacs, Claremont, Camberwell, 1991. Aker, S., ‘The Dardanelles. The Ari Burnu Battles and the 27th Regiment: The Battles of 25th April 1915’, The Military Journal, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 1935 (in Turkish). English translation: Rayfield Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 69/61/Box 8 (copy supplied to AWM by author). Aspinall-Oglander, C.F., Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol. 1, Imperial War Museum, London, 1929. Austin, R., The White Gurkhas: The Australians at the Second Battle of Krithia, McCrae, Australia, 1989. —— As Rough As Bags: The History of the 6th Battalion, 1st AIF 1914–1919, McCrae, Australia, 1992. —— Cobbers in Khaki: The History of the 8th Battalion, 1914–1918, McCrae, Australia, 1997. —— Our Dear Old Battalion: The story of the 7th Battalion AIF, 1914–1919, A Slouch Hat Publication, Rosebud, Victoria, 2004. Avci, C., Thirteen Leagues under the Dardanelles, Nart Yayincilik, Turkey, 2002. Bean, C.E.W., Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18. Vol I: The Story of Anzac—From the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4 1915, 7th edn, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1937. —— Anzac to Amiens, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1948. —— Gallipoli Mission, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952. Belford, W., ‘Legs-eleven’: being the story of the 11th Battalion (A.I.F.) in the Great War of 1914–1918, Imperial Printing, Perth, 1940. Blair, D., Dinkum Diggers: An Australian Battalion at War, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001. 311
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 312
25 APRIL 1915
Brenchley, F. and Brenchley, E., Stoker’s Submarine: Australia’s Daring Raid on the Dardanelles on the Day of the Gallipoli Landings, HarperCollins Publishers, Sydney, 2001. Broadbent, H., The Boys Who Came Home: Recollections of Gallipoli, ABC Books, Sydney, 1990. —— Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore, Penguin Books, Australia, 2005. Bush, E.W., Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, London, 1975. Carlyon, L., Gallipoli, Pan Macmillan, Australia, 2001. Cavill, H.W., Imperishable Anzacs: A Story of Australia’s Famous First Brigade from the Diary of Pte Harold Walter Cavill N. 27 1 Bn., William Brooks & Co, Sydney, 1916. Chasseaud, P. and Doyle, P., Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2005. Curran, T., Across the Bar: The story of ‘Simpson’, the Man with the Donkey, Australia and Tyneside’s great military hero, Ogmios Publications, Brisbane, 1994. Erickson, E.J., Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001. Facey, B., A Fortunate Life, Penguin Books, Australia, 1981. Fewster, K., Gallipoli Correspondent: The frontline diary of C.E.W. Bean, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983. Fewster, K., Ba¸sarın, V. and Ba¸sarın, H., Gallipoli: The Turkish Story, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003. Frame, T.R. and Swinden, G.J., First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1990. Gammage, B., The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, Penguin, Australia, 1972. Hall, R.C., The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War, Routledge, London, 2000. Hamilton, I., Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 1, Edward Arnold, London, 1920. Hatwell, J., No Ordinary Determination: Percy Black and Harry Murray of the first AIF, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, Fremantle, 2005. Hickey, M., Gallipoli, John Murray, London, 1995. Hurst, J., Game to the last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli, Oxford University Press, 2005. James, R.R., Gallipoli, Pimlico, London, 1999. Jose, A.W., Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18. Vol IX: The Royal Australian Navy, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1928. Karsh, E. and Karsh, I., Empires of the Sand: The struggle for mastery in the Middle East 1789–1923, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999. Kearney, R., Silent Voices: The story of the 10th Battalion AIF in Australia, Gallipoli, France and Belgium during the Great War 1914–1918, New Holland, Sydney, 2005. 312
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 313
Bibliography Keegan, J., The First World War, Pimlico, London, 1999. Keown, A.W., Forward with the Fifth: the story of 5 years’ war service, Speciality Press, Melbourne, 1921. Legge, F., The Gordon Bennett Story: From Gallipoli to Singapore, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1965. Liddell-Hart, B.H., The Real War 1914–1918, Little Brown, Boston, 1930. Lock, C., The fighting 10th: A South Australian Centenary Souvenir of the 10th Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919, Web & Son, Adelaide, 1936. McMullin, R., Pompey Elliott, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2002. Malthus, C., ANZAC: A Retrospective, Reed, Auckland, 2002. Mango, A., Atatürk, John Murray, London, 1999. Meyer, G.J., A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914–1918, Delacorte Press, New York, 2006. Moorehead, A., Gallipoli, Ballantine Books, New York, 1956. Newman, S., Gallipoli—then and now, After the Battle Publications, London, 2000. Newton, L.M., The Story of the Twelve: a record of the 12th Battalion, A.I.F. during the Great War of 1914–1918, 12th Battalion Association, Hobart, 1925. Norman, H., From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line: the history of the 9th Battalion, A.I.F., 9th Battalion A.I.F. Association, Brisbane, 1941. Olson, W., Gallipoli: The Western Australian Story, University of Western Australia Press, Perth, 2006. Örnek, T. and Toker, F., Gallipoli: Companion to the feature length documentary, Ekip Film, Turkey, 2005. Palmer, A., The Gardeners of Salonika, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1965. —— Victory 1918, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998. Pederson, P.A., Monash as Military Commander, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1985. Perry, A., ‘The Men of Anzac’, The Anzac Book, Cassell & Company Ltd, London, 1916. Perry, R., Monash: the outsider who won a war, Random House Australia, Milson’s Point, 2004. Pugsley, C., Gallipoli—The New Zealand Story, Reed Publishing, Auckland, 1998. —— The ANZAC Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed Publishing, Auckland, 2004. Robertson, J., Anzac and Empire: the tragedy & glory of Gallipoli, Hamlyn, Australia, 1990. Robson, L.L., The First A.I.F. A study of its recruitment 1914–1918, Melbourne University Press, 1970. Rodge, H. and Rodge, J., Helles Landings—Gallipoli, Leo Cooper, South Yorkshire, 2003. Rule, J., Jacka’s Mob, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1933. 313
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 314
25 APRIL 1915
Sheffield, G., Forgotten Victory: The First World War—Myths and Realities, Headline, London, 2001. Stacy, B., Kindon, F. and Chedgey, H., The History of the First Battalion, A.I.F., 1914–1919, 10th Battalion A.I.F. Association, Sydney, 1931. Stanley, P., Quinn’s Post, Anzac, Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2005. Steel, N., Gallipoli, Leo Cooper, Yorkshire, 1999. Steel, N. and Hart, P., Defeat at Gallipoli, Papermac, London, 1994. Stowers, R., Bloody Gallipoli: The New Zealanders’ Story, David Bateman Ltd, Auckland, 2005. Strachan, H., The First World War Volume I: To Arms, Oxford University Press, 2001. —— The First World War, Simon & Schuster, London, 2003. Townsend, C., Gallipoli 1915: From the Uttermost Ends of the Earth, Patricia Townsend, Paeroa, 1999. Travers, T., Gallipoli, 1915, Tempus, South Carolina, 2001. Tyquin, M., Gallipoli—The Medical War: The Australian Army Medical Services in the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 1993. von Sanders, L., Five Years in Turkey, 1st English edn, Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, London, 1927. Waite, F., The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, Auckland, 1921. Wakefield, A. and Moody, S., Under the Devil’s Eye: Britain’s forgotten army at Salonika 1915–1918, Sutton Publishing, United Kingdom, 2004. Westmacott, S., The After-Breakfast cigar: Selected Memoirs of a King Country Settler, ed. H.F. Westmacott, A.H. & A.W. Reed, Wellington, 1977. Williams, J.F., German Anzacs and the First World War, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2003. Williams, P., Anzac Ridge, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2007. Winter, D., 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Tragedy, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1994. Wrench, C., Campaigning with the fighting 9th (in and out of the line with the 9th A.I.F.) 1914–1919, Boolarong Publications, Brisbane, 1985.
314
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 315
Index
Adam, Joe 138 Adana Bair xviii, 26, 74, 96, 100, 113–15, 116, 118, 127, 130–2, 135, 146, 150, 158, 251, 259 AE2 27, 28–9, 43, 67–8, 85–7, 89, 105–6, 122–3, 167, 269, 276–7, 284–5 aerial reconnaissance 14 Ahmed, Ismail Oglu 186 Ahmed, Sgt 36 aircraft 88–9, 99 Aker, Lt Col Sefik xxiv, 9, 10, 27, 43, 76, 77–8, 88, 90, 99–100, 114–15, 128–9, 131–2, 147, 149, 155–7, 162, 173, 175, 186, 223, 227, 238, 240, 242, 244, 252, 259, 260, 270 Alderman, Maj 179, 191, 198, 201, 207, 218 Allah Gully 115, 166, 177, 269, 272, 282 see also Bolton’s Ridge Anderson Knoll xviii, xxvi, 13, 14, 76, 97, 98, 99, 100, 175, 177, 183, 185, 240 Annear, Capt 46 Anzac artillery 268, 281, 287–8 communications 95, 119, 134, 138, 226, 229 evacuation 268–9, 271–2, 275–7, 279–81 first wave 23, 29, 30, 50, 53–4, 55, 57, 60, 61–2, 66, 82 landing xxvi, xxvii, 31–9, 57–8, 60–1, 72–3, 81, 107, 119, 140, 159, 168–9, 176, 179–81, 224, 229–30, 246, 247, 254–5, 278, 287, 289
main topographical features xviii, xxvii positions 267–8, 285 second wave 23, 24, 29, 50, 53–7, 62, 63, 66, 67 vegetation 59, 63, 73, 96, 100, 111, 115, 118, 125, 168, 242, 270 Anzac Corps xix 1st Australian Division xix, 107, 168, 178, 239, 271 1st Field Ambulance 279 3rd Field Ambulance 60, 61, 63, 69, 78, 102, 127, 181, 202 3rd Light Horse 289 4th Battery 246 Battalion 1st 20, 22, 140, 152, 159, 170, 201, 204–5, 227, 283 2nd 139, 155, 168, 170, 192, 201, 210, 211, 217, 220, 229, 231, 234, 236 3rd 139, 140, 152, 153, 192, 221, 222, 249, 257, 259 4th 139, 168, 224, 226, 238–9, 249, 269 5th 20, 98, 119, 136, 158, 170, 171, 172, 184, 187, 189–90, 203, 239, 275 6th 80–1, 98, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 135, 166, 169, 171, 172, 173, 184, 187, 205, 239, 241, 243, 251, 275, 283 7th xxvii, 68, 70, 72, 79, 98, 133, 134, 169, 193, 240, 283 8th 81, 98, 117, 134, 135, 147, 166, 171, 172, 178, 187, 188, 205, 239, 269, 272–3
315
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 316
25 APRIL 1915
9th 14, 23, 29, 35, 36, 41, 42, 50, 55, 66, 76, 80, 97, 100, 105, 112, 115, 117, 127, 132–3, 134, 135, 147, 148, 165, 166, 168, 171, 218, 261 10th 14, 19, 23, 24, 29, 32, 36, 41, 42, 46, 50, 55, 57, 62, 66, 97, 98, 100, 112, 113, 118, 120, 133, 134, 135, 145, 153, 172, 178, 182, 204, 225, 239, 257, 274 11th 14, 23, 29, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 50, 55, 60, 62, 66, 67, 82, 100, 102, 103–5, 127, 145, 153, 192, 218, 222, 232, 255, 257, 274, 285 12th 14, 24, 55, 57, 60, 62, 66, 82, 102–3, 112, 115, 120, 134, 135, 136, 166, 168, 171, 213–30, 239, 285 13th 20 15th 247, 275, 282 16th 247, 255, 256, 275, 283 Brigades (1st Australian Division) 1st xix, 23, 54, 139, 140, 155, 168, 220, 237 2nd xix, 14, 23, 54, 68, 69, 80, 84, 107, 111, 119, 135, 139, 165, 169, 177, 178, 205, 223, 225, 269, 275, 282 3rd xix, xxiii, xxv, xxvi, 14, 19, 21, 23–4, 25, 29, 40, 48, 54, 62, 68, 80, 81, 98, 107, 111, 135, 160, 167, 170, 177, 178, 181, 205, 220, 225, 237, 269, 275 Brigades (New Zealand and Australian Division) 14 4th Australian xix, 23, 181, 224, 246, 247, 275 New Zealand Brigade xix, 23, 169, 180–1, 229, 269, 272 Casualty Clearing Station 159 New Zealand and Australian Division xix, xxvi, 14, 23, 51, 107, 168–9, 179–81, 197–201, 202, 205–10, 212, 213, 220, 222, 224, 228, 229–30, 235, 239, 254, 265, 271, 288 4th Australian Brigade xix, 23, 181, 224, 246, 247, 275 16th Waikato Company 179, 189, 198, 201, 205–8
Auckland Battalion xix, 168, 179, 189, 192, 197, 200, 210, 222, 233, 245, 247, 255 Canterbury Battalion xix, 22, 168, 179–80, 197, 210, 214, 215, 218, 220, 224, 229, 233, 235, 248, 254, 274 New Zealand Brigade xix, 23, 169, 180–1, 229, 269, 272 Otago Battalion xix, 224, 229, 237–8, 285 Wellington Battalion xix, 180, 224, 230, 285 see also artillery/batteries; Indian Mountain Battery Anzac Cove (Ari Burnu) xv, xxiii, xxv–xxvii, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 25–6, 31–2, 36–8, 40–5, 50, 55, 56, 65, 75, 77–8, 88, 90–1, 99, 104, 107, 115, 141, 143, 181, 189, 216, 217, 228, 240, 244–5, 246, 268, 276, 278, 280 Arab troops 244, 251, 252, 254, 259–60, 271, 283, 284 Ari Burnu Knoll xvi, xxiii, 25, 35, 40, 43, 44, 45, 77, 88 Ark Royal 89 armistice (24 May) 242–3 artillery/batteries 4th Battery (Australian) 246, 247 7th Indian Mountain Artillery battery 23, 62, 66, 72, 176–7, 182, 201–2, 203, 228, 247 21st Indian Mountain Artillery battery 247, 285 26th Indian Mountain Artillery battery 176, 247, 285 Anzac 268, 281, 287–8 Indian Mountain Battery 23, 62, 66, 72, 176–7, 182, 201–2, 203, 228, 247, 268, 285 naval bombardments 4, 51–2, 88–9, 99, 176, 226, 240, 281, 285–6, 287–8 Turkish 41, 44–5, 54, 61, 66, 74–5, 89, 157, 158, 160, 171, 172–3, 174, 177, 182–5, 187, 192, 201, 203, 205, 211, 218–19, 226, 228, 237, 240, 268, 269, 281–2, 287 Ascot 20 Ashton (Bugler) 232 Asim, Lt 38 316
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 317
Index Australian Imperial Force (AIF) 12 Aydin Reis 85 Ayling, Sgt 38 B11 28 Baby 700 xviii, xxiv, 13, 26, 59, 66–7, 69, 83, 84, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 117, 119, 120–2, 124–7, 137, 138–9, 141, 143–5, 147, 148, 152, 153–6, 160–1, 163–5, 167–9, 173–4, 181, 188–9, 197–202, 205, 206–7, 209, 210–11, 215, 216–17, 218, 220–1, 222, 226, 228–9, 231–4, 237, 238, 249, 253, 267, 274, 284 see also Chessboard Bacchante 24, 44, 118, 282 Baddeley, Lt 198, 201, 206, 208 Baigent, Pte Edward (Ted) 22–3, 180, 274 Barbaros Hayraddin 285 Barnes, Capt 67, 103, 105, 121, 122, 222, 258 Barton, Lt 210 batteries see artillery/batteries Battleship Hill xviii, xxiv, 13, 14, 26, 71, 83, 105, 124, 125, 126, 132, 138, 139, 141, 143, 147, 155, 161, 164, 171, 173, 174, 175, 188, 205, 215, 216, 217, 267 Beagle 55 Bean, Charles xxvi, xxvii, 1–2, 21, 47, 54, 65, 90, 92, 97, 106, 108, 111, 121, 127, 143, 150–1, 159, 168, 174, 176, 191, 224–5, 243, 247, 250, 280–1, 289 Bean, John 191, 235, 247 Beeken, Lt 259 Beevor, Maj Miles 19, 57–9, 97, 133 Bell, Cpl James 29 Bennett, Maj 116–17, 135–6, 166, 171–2, 183–6, 187, 204, 226–7, 238, 239–40, 241, 242, 244 Bennett, Sgt 242 Benson, Pte 241–2 Bey, Hairi 253 Bey, Lt Col Khalil Sami 10 Bey, Maj Zeki 90, 141, 143, 150 Bey, Saib 244, 252, 277, 283 Birdwood, Lt Gen xix, 13, 21–2, 65, 107, 168–9, 179, 180, 202, 229,
260, 271–2, 275, 276–7, 279–80, 282, 285, 287 Black, Capt 169 Blackburn, Pte 101–2, 114, 150 Blamey, Maj 226, 238, 239 Blezard, Maj 80 Bloody Angle 103, 154, 173–5, 210, 213, 233, 234 Boase, Lt 74, 76, 96, 113, 116, 134, 135, 136, 148, 158, 172, 185, 187, 224, 239 Bolton’s Ridge xviii, 26, 55–6, 75, 76, 94, 97, 112, 115–18, 134, 136, 157–8, 166, 175, 177–8, 185, 187, 205, 225, 226–7, 238–9, 240–1, 249, 251, 269, 272–3, 282 see also Allah Gully Booth, Lt 257, 258 Bouvet 6 Bradford, Pte 34 Braithwaite, Lt Col 189, 276 Brand, Maj 58, 73, 75, 96, 98, 112–13, 114, 134, 136 Braund, Lt Col 221, 229, 234, 236, 246, 248, 253, 254, 266–7, 274, 282, 285 Brennan, Capt 33 Brent, Frank 80–1, 184–5 Brereton, Maj 23 Bridges, Maj Gen xix, 107–8, 112, 117, 119, 139, 152, 155, 158, 168–9, 202, 221, 224, 225–6, 229, 238–9, 246, 249, 267, 268, 271, 275–6, 280, 282, 285 Bridges Road 97 Brighton Beach xviii, 31, 185 British Army 29th Division 8, 11–12, 256, 268, 277, 281 Brodie, Capt T.S. 28 Brodie, Charles 276 Brown, Maj 153, 154, 257 Brown’s Dip 165, 169, 240 Buchanan, Capt Lyle 127 Burt, Lt 102 Bush, Midshipman Eric 30 Butler, Capt Graham 36, 42, 45, 216 Buttle, Lt 124 Byrne, Lt 225–6 317
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 318
25 APRIL 1915
Çam Burnu 77, 114, 130, 156, 157 Campbell, Lt 234 Cannan, Lt Col 275 Cape Helles see Helles Carruthers 276 Carter, Lt 153, 154, 175, 190 Cass, Maj 111–12, 275 casualties 2, 4, 8, 51, 60, 62, 63, 69, 71, 72, 78, 83–4, 92–4, 115, 124, 147, 166, 169–71, 174, 180, 182–3, 186, 188, 190, 203, 225–8, 231–7, 238, 244, 252, 260–1, 275, 278, 280 see also hospital ships; wounded Cavill, Pte 20, 155, 160, 231, 236, 248–9, 266 Cevdet, Second Lt 252, 259 Cham Kalessi 86 Cheney, Sgt Henry 41 Chessboard 103, 174, 188, 201, 208, 210, 211, 249 see also Baby 700 Chisholm, Sgt 133 Chunuk Bair xviii, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, 13, 14, 66, 71, 83, 91, 125–6, 132, 137, 141, 142, 143, 147, 160, 174, 182, 189, 201, 267, 284, 288 Churchill, Winston 3–5, 7 Clan MacGillivray 81, 92, 93 Clarke, Lt Col 24, 61–2, 68, 82–4, 102–3, 163, 217, 220, 266 Clarke Valley 26, 55, 74 Colne 55, 57 Combs, Pte George 29, 46, 49–50, 145 communications 95, 119, 134, 138, 226, 229 Connell, Sgt 120, 165 Cook, Lt 170–1, 183 Cooke, Lt 105 Corbin, Maj 159 Costin, Lt 147, 165 Courtney’s Post 67, 103, 105, 146, 153, 212, 233, 234, 255, 257, 258, 271, 284 Cowey, Lt 174, 175, 188, 198, 213, 221, 233, 234 Critchley-Salmonson, Capt 218, 221, 248, 274 Croly, Capt 222, 256–8 Cromwell, Victor 19
Crowther, Alf 204 Cunliffe-Owen, Lt Col 7, 276 The Cup xxvii, 26, 74, 95–6, 116, 137, 148, 170, 173, 187, 223, 227, 244, 252 Daisy Patch 96, 159, 170, 183, 185, 239 Daly, Capt 172, 173, 185, 187, 241, 243–4, 249, 251, 275 Dare, Adrian 72 Darnell, Lt Aubrey 29, 42 Davies, Pte 83, 102, 103 Dawson, Maj 235 De Saxe, Pte 140 Dead Man’s Ridge 234, 249, 256 Denton, Maj 67, 103, 105, 121, 145, 153, 154 Derham, Lt 170–1, 183, 187, 244, 249–50, 275 Destroyer Hill 120 Dix, Commander 30 Dougall, Capt 56, 57, 66, 75–6, 94, 113, 116 Drake-Brockman, Maj 39, 47, 50, 67, 80, 103, 104–5, 112, 121, 122, 123, 125, 148, 159, 192, 193, 222, 256–8 E15 28 Egypt 13 Elliott, Lt Col ‘Pompey’ 68, 72, 73, 78, 80, 84–5, 98, 102–3, 133–4 Elliott, Maj 83–4 Elston, Lt 255–6 equipment/rations 20–1, 24 Everett, Capt 82, 105, 121, 122, 222, 258 400 Plateau xviii, xxiii, xxv, 14, 26, 41, 48, 49, 50, 62, 66, 67, 73, 75–6, 78, 80, 84–5, 94, 96, 97–9, 100, 107, 108, 111, 112–19, 127–8, 130, 132, 133–5, 139, 140, 144, 146, 148, 153, 154, 155–7, 158, 164–5, 169, 172, 173, 174–8, 182, 184–5, 187, 202–3, 222–3, 225, 228, 238–9, 240–1, 244–5, 249, 251–2, 268–70, 275, 277, 282–3 Facey, Bert 60 Fagan, Pte Tony 200
318
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 319
Index Faik, Capt xxiii, 11, 25–7, 36–7, 43, 48, 50–1, 61, 75, 77, 81–4, 99–100, 124, 129 Falconer, William 270 Ferguson, Pte 233 Fethers, Maj 119, 158–9, 171–2, 190 Field, Lt Col 166, 177, 188 First Ridge xviii, 25, 26, 36, 49, 50, 55, 56, 58–9, 73, 74, 80, 97, 119, 152, 285 Fisherman’s Hut xxvii, 13, 25, 37, 38, 42, 50, 51, 61, 62, 68–9, 71, 72, 78, 83, 84, 103, 124, 126, 127, 142, 176, 193, 202, 203, 217, 274, 284 Flockart, Capt 119, 158–9, 172, 189–90 Fordham, Pte 114, 131 Fortescue, Lt 112, 116, 147–8, 187 Fowles, Sgt 47 Foxhound 19, 57 Frame, L Cpl 248 Frater, Lt 209 French Army xxiii, 5, 6, 12, 268 friendly fire 47, 59, 165–6, 214 Fry, Kenneth 63, 102 Gaba Tepe xxiii, xxvi, xxvii, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 23, 25, 31–2, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44–5, 55, 61, 66, 75, 77–8, 80, 88–90, 97, 99, 111–12, 117–18, 132, 136, 157, 165, 166, 175, 185, 244, 247, 265 Galeka 68, 81 Gallipoli military organisation xix–xx Gallipoli Peninsula xxiii, 5, 7, 8, 10–12, 14, 19, 25, 36, 87 Gartside, Lt Col 117 Gascon 92–3 German Officer’s Ridge (Merkez Tepe) xviii, 145, 146, 152, 156, 174, 188, 222, 256–8, 270, 271 Gibson, Pte 251 Giles, Capt 102, 153–4, 164, 173–4, 188, 213 Gilpin, Alec 204 Gissing, Pte 93 Glasfurd, Maj 80, 217 Godley, Maj Gen xix, 169, 202, 229, 247, 271–2, 277, 285 Gordon, Maj 155, 163, 164
Gordon, Pte 183 Grant, Cpl 208 Grant, Maj 210, 211, 215, 220, 221, 228–9, 231, 232, 234 Grills, Lt 80, 183, 240 Haig, Lt 96, 100–1, 108, 113, 127–8, 145, 258–9 Hakki, Lt 55–6, 74, 76, 157, 238 Halil, Lt 270 Halis, Capt 162–3 Halis, Maj 44, 90 Hamilton, Gen Ian 11–12, 14–15, 115, 116, 118, 270, 271, 276–7, 279, 280, 287 Happy Valley 63 Harris Ridge 76, 113, 117 Harrison, Cpl 76, 94–6, 137, 158, 172, 185, 187, 239, 241, 243, 250–1 Hearder, Capt 104 Hell Spit 13, 14, 25, 36, 74 Helles xxiii, 10, 12, 35, 43, 51, 88, 181, 257, 268, 270, 281 Henderson, Capt R. 134 Henderson, Lt A. 240 Herbert, Capt 97, 101, 102 Heugh, Lt 233 Hill 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe) xxiv, xxvi, 14, 71, 78, 84, 90–1, 132, 141, 142, 254 Hill Q xxiii, 288 Hilmer-Smith, Maj 67, 80, 112 Hobbs, Col 176 Hobbs Hill 114 Hobson, Byron 20 Holloway, Cpl 251 Holly Ridge xviii, 74, 118, 251, 273 Hook, Capt 111–12, 115–16, 118, 166 Hooper, Lt 172–3, 187, 244, 250 hospital ships 92–3, 141, 225, 278–9 Howe, Lance Cpl Hedley ‘Snowy’ 38, 46, 138, 215, 221, 233–4, 236, 252, 253–4, 255, 265–6, 285–6 Howell-Price, Lt 257 Hunter-Weston, Gen 11, 277 Ibrahim, Capt 277, 283 Ibrahim-Hayreddin, Second Lt 25, 26, 37, 48, 69, 71–2, 142 Incebayir Ridge xvii, 74, 96, 116, 124, 319
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 320
25 APRIL 1915
125, 126, 131, 141, 145–6, 153, 154, 156, 164, 175, 188, 198, 251 Indian Mountain Battery 23, 62, 66, 72, 176–7, 182, 201–2, 228, 247, 268, 285 7th Indian Mountain Artillery battery 23, 62, 66, 72, 176–7, 182, 201–2, 203, 228, 247 21st Indian Mountain Artillery battery 247, 285 26th Indian Mountain Artillery battery 176, 247, 285 ‘Indian’ troops 256–9 Inflexible 6–7 Irresistible 6, 7 Ismet, Major 8, 27, 37, 43, 44, 99 Itonus 22 Jackson, Capt xxvii, 55–6, 57 Jackson, Lt 61, 104, 122, 124, 127, 133, 137, 138, 148 Jackson, Maj 68–70, 71, 78, 98 Jacob, Maj 50 Jacobs, Capt 97, 174, 175, 176–7, 188, 198, 201, 208, 210, 221, 234, 249, 256, 267 Johnson, Col 169 Johnston, Col 41 Johnston’s Jolly 26, 48, 73, 74, 75, 98, 100, 113, 116, 118, 120, 128, 135, 145, 148, 153, 154, 158, 159, 165, 170, 171–2, 174, 175, 178, 187, 188, 189, 204, 222, 225, 226, 227, 239, 251, 258–9, 270 Jones, Pte 140 Jones, Sgt 210, 221 Kaba Tepe 8–9, 44, 77–8, 132, 158 Kemal, Lt Col Mustafa xx, xxvi, 90–1, 115, 141–3, 181–2, 237, 244–5, 252, 253, 260, 284 Kenyon, L Cpl 251 Keyes, Commodore 276 Kilicdere Gully 146, 162 Kilid Bahr Plateau 12, 98 Kindon, Maj 152, 155, 159–60, 161, 163, 164–5, 168, 174–5, 188, 198, 201, 205, 208–11, 212, 231, 232 Kirby, Capt 177, 202, 203 Kirkpatrick, John Simpson 78
Kitchener, Lord 3–4, 5, 12, 15 Knife Edge 188, 243, 251, 273 Knightley, Sgt 239, 240, 241, 251 Kocadere (Kojadere) 13, 78, 90, 99, 128, 129 Koja, Pte Mustafa 160 Kum Kale xxiii, 7, 12 Kutahya 285 Laing, Cpl 82–3, 220, 266 Lalor, Capt 62–3, 84, 102–3, 105, 120–1, 122, 124, 125, 126, 139, 146, 148, 154, 161, 164, 175, 198, 211, 216–17, 220, 221, 233 Lamb, Maj 152–4, 164, 173, 175, 198, 210, 221, 234 Lambert, George (artist) 289 Lambert, Sgt Roy 232 Lawry, Lt 215 Layh, Capt xxvii, 69, 70–2, 78–9, 98, 127, 175, 193, 198, 202–3, 217 Leane, Capt 30, 32, 105 Leer, Capt 153–4, 164, 173–4, 175, 188, 198, 210, 212, 213, 221, 234 Legge Valley 1, 73–4, 75, 97–9, 100, 101, 113, 118, 124, 128, 136, 155, 165, 173, 174, 177, 186, 202, 222, 226, 227, 240, 243, 252, 277, 283 Levy, Lt 187, 244 London 23, 24, 35–6, 93 Lonesome Pine (Lone Pine) xviii, xxiii, 26, 73–6, 98, 99, 100, 112, 113, 116, 120, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 147, 156, 165, 169, 170–1, 172, 183, 187, 222, 225, 226, 227, 237, 239–40, 243, 249, 250, 252, 270, 275, 277–8 Louch, Cpl Tom 33, 41, 44, 45, 257, 258 Loud, Cpl 47, 137, 223 Loutit, Lt Col 59, 73–4, 94, 96, 98, 100–1, 108, 113–14, 116, 127–8, 130–2, 135, 144–6, 150–1, 153, 170, 172, 258–9 Love, Cpl Alfred 20 Lushington, Pte 255–6 M’Cay, Col James xxv, 59, 73, 84–5, 98, 107, 111–12, 115, 117, 119, 133, 134–5, 139, 158, 172, 177–8, 320
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 321
Index 203–5, 224–6, 238–9, 241, 246, 249, 268, 275 M’Cay’s Hill xviii, 55–7, 74, 75, 108, 112, 117, 119, 165, 249 McClelland, Sgt 257 McConaghy, Capt 152–4, 158, 259 McDonald, Capt 255–6 McDonald, Lt 153, 154, 175, 257, 258, 259 MacDonald, Lt 46 Macfarlane, Lt 82, 105, 121, 122, 127, 154, 222 MacLaurin, Col 155, 237 MacLaurin’s Hill 121, 152–3, 155, 174, 192, 197, 212, 213, 222, 233, 246 McLean, Sgt 235, 254 MacMillan, C. (fleet surgeon) 93 McNicoll, Lt Col 111, 116, 171, 186 McPhee, Jim 63 McWhae, Capt Douglas 63, 78, 181, 202 Mackworth, Maj 107 Maidos xxiii, 10, 11, 12, 76, 77, 88, 89, 128, 131, 143 Majestic 24, 282 Mal Tepe 12, 13, 14, 90, 181 Malone, Lt Col 180, 229 Malone’s Gully xviii, 26, 69, 103, 122, 125, 126, 127, 138–9, 148, 161, 163–4, 168, 205, 211, 215–17, 220, 221, 233, 234, 253 Malthus, Cecil 248 Manica 89 Margetts, Lt 24, 60, 62, 82–4, 102–3, 125–6, 137, 138, 139, 141, 143, 146, 160–2, 164–5, 167–8, 175, 198, 211, 216 Marks, Lt Col 22 Mason, Maj 134 Mason, Sgt xxvi–xxvii, 103, 120, 124 Matheson, Pte 251 Mead, Lt 215 Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) 11 Mena Camp 13 Messudieh 28 Metcalf, Midshipman J. 29, 31–2 Milne, Capt 55–6, 57, 66, 74, 75–6, 94, 96, 97, 115, 132, 165, 166 Minnewaska 21, 54, 92, 106, 111
Mitchell, Cpl George 29, 33, 45, 204, 282 Mithat, Lt 145, 162 Mofflin, Cpl Ted 25, 46, 145 Monash Valley xviii, xxvii, 59, 67, 74, 83, 93, 96, 103, 104–5, 116, 121–2, 148, 152–4, 161, 163, 173–4, 192, 197–8, 205, 210, 214, 221, 222, 229, 232–5, 247, 249, 251, 253, 255, 258, 265, 267, 284, 287 Morgan, Lt 105, 121–2, 214, 237 Morshead, Cpt 217, 220, 221 Mortar Ridge xviii, 74, 84, 116, 122, 124, 126, 131, 135, 139, 143, 144–6, 154, 155, 156, 158, 161, 164, 173–4, 188, 201, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213–14, 221, 228, 233–5, 251, 253, 258, 270, 283–4 Mucip, Lt Ahmet 162–3, 173, 228, 284 Muharrem, Second Lt 25, 26, 37–8, 48, 49 Muharrem, Sgt Lapsekili 82, 83 Mule Valley (Kesik Dere) 74, 116, 127, 154, 161, 174, 188, 193, 213, 221, 228, 232, 233, 234, 253, 258, 277 Munro, Lt 166 Narrows 28–9, 43, 68, 89, 98, 101, 114, 126, 277 naval bombardments 4, 51–2, 88–9, 99, 176, 226, 240, 281, 285–6, 287–8 The Nek xviii, xxvii, 2, 26, 48, 67, 69, 83, 102–5, 121, 125, 144, 148, 153, 154, 155, 160, 163, 174, 197–8, 205, 210–11, 215, 220–1, 228–9, 231–7, 252–5, 265–7, 274, 284, 287, 289 New Zealand and Australian Division see Anzac Corps Newman, Lt 128, 144, 153–4 Nicholas, Lt 34 Nori, Second Lt 27 North Beach xviii, 25, 26, 36, 37, 38–9, 50–1, 55, 60–3, 69, 70, 81, 82, 84, 93, 98, 102, 104–5, 122, 124, 126, 127, 154, 161, 164, 181, 189, 193, 214, 215, 217, 248 Northern Heights 14, 65, 66, 83, 85, 103, 105, 108, 117, 119–20, 139, 321
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 322
25 APRIL 1915
142, 147, 152, 154, 155, 163–4, 182, 189, 192, 198, 210, 214, 220, 226, 230, 235, 284 Nott, Dr Harry 24, 93 Nousret 6 Novian 119 Ocean 7 Oldham, Maj 50, 97 Ottoman Empire xxviii, 3, 5, 7 Outerbridge, Cpl 133 Owen, Lt Col 152, 221, 222, 257, 268 Owen’s Gully xviii, 73, 74–5, 76, 94–6, 100, 112, 120, 135, 147, 165, 170, 177, 185, 190, 222, 225, 227, 238, 239, 258, 277 Palamutlu Sirt 11, 78, 89, 245 Parker, Pte 203–4 Pa¸sa, Enver 8 Pa¸sa, Maj Gen Esat xix, 87, 88, 143, 181 Patterson, Lt 62, 82–3, 211 Pavey, Signaller 225 Peck, Capt 62, 82, 84, 127, 144–5 ‘Percival’ 123, 167 Perry, Pte 182 Peykisevket 85 Phipps, Sgt 213 Piggot, Sgt 203 Pine Ridge 1, 78, 115, 116, 118, 135–6, 137, 165, 166, 172, 184–8, 204–5, 226, 238, 239, 240–1, 242–5, 249–51 Pinkerton, Pte 170 placenames, Turkish/English xv–xvii, xxvii–xxviii Plant, Lt 76, 96, 97–8, 100, 150 Plugge, Lt Col 189, 191 Plugge’s Plateau xviii, xxiii, 25, 38, 40, 45, 47, 49–50, 55, 57, 59, 67, 73–4, 84, 97, 112, 118, 122, 152–3, 161, 176, 189–90, 192, 214, 237, 247, 284 Pope, Lt Col 247–8, 255–6, 267 Pope’s Hill xviii, 2, 103, 112, 122, 154, 161, 175, 210, 233, 234–5, 249, 253, 255–6, 258, 267, 274, 283, 288 Poppy Valley 118
Prince of Wales 23, 24, 35–6 Prisk, Lt 112, 117–18, 136, 165–6, 177, 187–8, 239, 241, 243, 251 prisoners 20, 46, 59, 120, 131, 159, 197, 232, 242, 256, 257 Probert, Cpl 22 Proctor, Howard 161–2 Queen 23, 24, 29, 31, 32, 35, 169, 179, 229, 271, 276 Queen Elizabeth 6, 52, 276, 287 Queensland Point 32, 55 Quinn’s Post xxvii, 2, 174, 210, 212, 213, 222, 234, 235, 249, 255, 284, 288 Rafferty, Lt 62, 68–70, 71–2, 176–7, 203, 239 rations 20–1, 24 Razor Edge xviii, 66, 82, 116, 119, 161, 189, 191 Razorback 98, 112, 119, 158, 176, 202 Reid, Lt Paddy xxvi, 47, 103, 120–1, 124, 143–4 Reserve Gully 61, 62, 82, 154, 161 Rest Gully 82, 104, 105, 127, 152, 266 Ribble 53, 60 Richards, Lt 22 Richardson, Maj 155, 163–4, 168, 175, 216 Ricketson, Pte 184, 185, 227, 238 Rigby, Lt 164 Roach 169 Roberts, Cpl 272–3 Robertson, Cpl Robbie 185 Robertson, Maj J. 50, 105, 125, 126, 137, 138, 139, 168 Robertson, Maj S. 50 Robin, Phil 101, 102, 114, 150 Robinson, Lt Commander Eric 7 Rockliff, Lt 82, 105, 121, 122, 127, 154, 222 Ross, Cpt 217 Ross, Lt 171 Russell’s Top xviii, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, 37, 51, 61, 66–7, 69, 71–2, 81–4, 102, 104–5, 119, 121–2, 124, 126, 138–9, 148, 152, 154, 155, 158, 159, 163, 164, 175, 181, 189, 192, 197–8, 211, 214, 220–1, 228–9, 322
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 323
Index 232–7, 246, 248, 253–4, 255, 256, 258, 265–7, 268, 274, 283–8 Ryan, Lt Col 93 Ryder, Capt 50, 101, 127–8, 135, 150–1, 153 Saadet, Lt 270 Saker, Maj 159, 170, 190, 239, 249, 275 Salisbury, Maj 50, 112, 115, 127, 132–3, 165, 169, 170, 171, 239, 275 Sami, Col xx Sanders, Pte Fred xxvii Saunders, Sgt 102 Scanlan, Lt 78, 193, 217 Scarborough, Frederick 222 Scobie, Maj 155 Scott, Sgt 180, 197 Scourge 92 Scrubby Knoll (Kemal Yere) xviii, 14, 90, 97, 99, 100–1, 108, 113–14, 118, 128, 129, 133, 136, 151, 157, 170, 174–6, 177, 181, 184, 223 Seang Bee 93 Seang Choon 92 Second Ridge xviii, xxiv, 2, 26, 49, 59, 67, 73, 74, 83, 84, 93–4, 96, 97, 101–6, 116, 118–19, 121–2, 131–2, 139, 144–5, 147, 148, 152–4, 156, 161, 173–4, 192, 197, 211, 212–14, 221–2, 228, 233, 235, 251, 255–9, 267, 268, 270, 274, 277, 284, 287 Sedd-el-Bahr 7 Sedik, Capt 26, 74, 75, 95–6, 130, 157 Selby, Lt 145, 146 Senn, Signalman Frederick 214, 237–8 Shahin, Pte Adil 26, 36, 49 Shell Green 177, 185 Shepherd’s Hut xxvi, 69, 78, 103, 120, 202, 217 Shrapnel Gully xviii, 49, 50, 55–6, 59, 67, 74, 80, 81–2, 85, 96, 97, 98, 101, 107, 111, 112, 118–19, 122, 133, 152–4, 185, 192, 214, 247–8 Silt Spur xviii, 97, 171, 183, 269 Sinclair-MacLagan, Col E.G. xxv, 21, 23, 30, 57–9, 66–7, 73, 80, 83–5, 99, 107, 112–13, 115, 117, 118–19, 132, 134, 139, 152, 153, 155, 181, 192, 197, 210, 222, 225,
226, 246, 247, 259, 268, 285 Sinel, Capt Courtnay 218 Sing, Pte 192, 208 Skinner, Sgt 70 Smith, ‘Combo’ 38 Smith, Micky 101 Smith, Pte Alfred 235 Sniper’s Ridge xviii, 97, 135, 136, 166, 169, 171, 183, 188, 227, 238–9, 241, 243, 251 Somerville, Commander 68 Spargo, Lt 115–16, 166, 169 The Sphinx xvii, xviii, 51, 61–2, 69, 82–3, 103, 122, 126, 161, 189, 202, 266, 274 Steele, Sgt 53 Steele’s Post 67, 103, 210, 212, 221–2, 255 Stewart, Capt 190 Stewart, Lt Col 214, 221 Stoker, Capt 28–9, 67, 85–7, 105–6, 122–3, 167, 269–70, 284 Strickland, Lt 51, 62, 70 Stubbings, Pte 70, 71 Stuckey, Maj 218, 232 submarines 27–8 AE2 27, 28–9, 43, 67–8, 85–7, 89, 105–6, 122–3, 167, 269, 276–7, 284–5 B11 28 E15 28 Süleyman, Sgt 26, 55, 82 Swannell, Maj 152, 154, 155, 159–60, 161, 162, 163 Swift, Lt 80 Talbot Smith, Lt 34, 36, 41, 46, 49, 75, 225 Third Ridge xviii, xxiv, 14, 66, 74–5, 76, 88, 90, 95–7, 98–101, 108, 112–20, 128, 131–2, 135–7, 143, 144–6, 150, 158, 169–70, 171, 173–4, 177, 182–3, 186, 202, 226–7, 240–1, 251, 278 Thomas, Lt 74, 76, 94–6, 113, 116, 134, 135–7, 146, 148, 158, 172, 185, 187, 223 Thursby, Rear Admiral Cecil 29, 53, 202, 272, 275–7, 279 Tilley, Pte 102 323
Anzac 1915 PAGES
22/2/07
11:11 AM
Page 324
25 APRIL 1915
Tope, Cpl William 120, 165 Traills, Sgt 187 Triumph 24, 45, 89 Tulloch, Capt 62, 102–3, 104–5, 108, 122, 124–6, 137, 139, 141, 143–5, 147, 148, 161, 216, 220 Turgud Reis 85 Turkish III Corps xix–xx, 8, 87, 143 1st Battalion 77, 91, 99, 100, 114, 128, 129, 143, 146, 147, 153, 155, 157, 165, 173, 190, 227, 237, 259, 270, 277, 284 2nd Battalion 43, 129, 143, 157, 163, 193, 211, 217, 237, 274, 284 3rd Battalion 44, 77, 78, 99, 114, 128, 129, 145, 146, 147, 153, 155, 156, 165, 173, 175, 188, 227, 228, 237, 252–3, 270, 284 7th Division xix, 8 9th Division xx, 8, 10, 43, 87, 90–1, 128, 149, 181 19th Division xx, 8, 15, 88, 90, 128, 142, 160, 181, 265 25th Regiment xx, 10, 15 26th Regiment xx, 10, 15 27th Regiment xx, xxiii, xxiv, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 43, 76, 90, 91, 98, 99, 104, 108, 113, 114, 116, 128, 142, 143, 155, 158, 164, 181, 188, 222, 241, 245, 252, 258, 269, 270, 273, 283–4 57th Regiment xxiv, xxvii, 90, 115, 141–2, 147, 149, 156, 164, 173, 174–5, 193, 228, 237, 245, 252–4, 260, 271, 274, 283, 284 72nd Regiment xx, 90, 181, 254, 284 77th Regiment xx, 90, 143, 240, 244, 251, 252, 259–60, 269, 271, 277–8, 283, 286 Arab troops 244, 251, 252, 254, 259–60, 271, 283, 284 artillery/batteries 41, 44–5, 54, 61, 66, 74–5, 89, 157, 158, 160, 171, 172–3, 174, 177, 182–5, 187, 192, 201, 203, 205, 211, 218–19, 226, 228, 237, 240, 268, 269, 281–2, 287 Turkish 5th Army 8–10 Turnley, Sgt 30, 34 Turton, Cpl 161
Usher, Pte Tom 35 Valley of Despair xviii, 74, 269, 272, 282 Vaughan, M.C. 102 Victoria Cross 7, 101, 237 Villiers-Stuart, Maj 152, 239, 247, 255 von Sanders, Liman 8–9, 87–8, 265 Waite, Maj 51, 107 Walker, Brig Gen (Col) 168–9, 181, 189, 192, 214, 237–8, 269 Walker’s Ridge xviii, xxvii, 26, 48, 61, 63, 69, 72, 82, 102, 122, 127, 161, 164, 169, 189, 198, 202, 211, 214, 218, 221, 234, 236, 248, 253, 254, 267, 274, 285 Wanliss Gully 185, 243 Wanliss, Lt Col 119, 275 Ward, Sgt 207, 208 Waterlow, Lt Commander John 32 Watson, Pte 209, 232 Weber, Col 88 Weir, Lt Col Stanley 32, 34, 41, 50, 97, 118, 225 Weir’s Ridge xviii, 97, 166, 185, 187 Weissenburg 85 Wells, Maj 171–2, 183–5, 187 Westmacott, Lt Spencer 179, 189–92, 197–201, 206–8, 218, 229, 254, 278 Wheat, Able Seaman 167 Wheatfield 177, 183, 187, 269, 272 White, Lt Col 107, 117, 119, 238, 281 White’s Valley 177, 249 Whitham, Capt 57, 115–17, 135–6, 166, 171, 185, 188, 217, 239 Wilkinson, Commander 53 Williams, Sgt 243 Wire Gully xviii, 48, 73, 74, 97, 101, 116, 118, 121, 122, 127–8, 139, 144, 145–6, 150, 153, 158, 172, 174, 185, 249, 251, 256–9, 270 wounded 170–1, 182–3, 190, 202–3, 213, 218–20, 232–3, 255, 260–1, 265–6, 275, 278, 280, 281 Yates, Lt 188, 241, 243, 251 Zeitoun Camp 14 324
