A Companion to Applied Ethics

A Companion to Applied Ethics Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a c...

Author: R. G. Frey | Christopher Heath Wellman

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A Companion to Applied Ethics

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole Written by today's leading philosophers each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures terms topics and problems of the field Taken together the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike

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Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

A Companion to Applied Ethics Edited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman

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Contents

Notes on Contributors Preface 1 The Nature of Applied Ethics Tom L Beauchamp

ix xvii 1

2 Theories of Ethics Stephen L Darwall

17

3 Property Rights and Welfare Redistribution Jeremy Waldron

38

4 Civil Disobedience and the Duty to Obey the Law A John Simmons

50

5 Capitalism and Marxism Richard W Miller

62

6 State Punishment and the Death Penalty David Dolinko

75

7 Racism Michele Moody-Adams

89

8 Sexism Ann E Cudd and Leslie E Jones

102

9 Affirmative Action Bernard Boxill and Jan BoxiR

118

10 The Legal Enforcement of Morality Larry Alexander

128

11 Hate Crimes, Literature, and Speech L W Sumner

142

CONTENTS

12 Pornography and Censorship Lori Gruen

154

13 Dirty Hands Gerald F. Gaus

167

14 Sexual Ethics Alan H. Goldman

180

15 Gun Control Lance Stell

192

16 Citizenship Wayne Norman and Will Kymlicka

210

17 Immigration Michael Blake

224

18 World Hunger Hugh LaFollette

238

19 War and Terrorism C. A. J. Coady

254

20 Nationalism and Secession Christopher Heath Wellman

267

21 Intergenerational Justice Clark Wolf

279

22 Bioethics Margaret P. Battin

295

23 Abortion Margaret Olivia Little

313

24 Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Michael Tooley

326

25 Reproductive Technology John D. Arras

342

26 Genetic Engineering Dan W. Brock

356

27 Surrogate Motherhood Rosemarie Tong

369

28 Cloning John Harris

382

29 Allocation of Medical Resources H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr and Ana Smith litis

396

vi

CONTENTS

30 Experimentation on Human Subjects Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald

410

31 Disability Leslie Pickering Francis

424

32 Moral Status Mary Anne Warren

439

33 Killing and Letting Die Alastair Norcross

451

34 The Doctrine of Double Effect R G Prey

464

35 Bad Samaritans Acts and Omissions Patricia Smith

475

36 Moral Dilemmas N Ann Davis

487

37 Education Amy Gutmann

498

38 Personal Relationships Lawrence A Blum

512

39 Animals Jeff McMahan

525

40 Business Ethics Patricia H Werhane and R Edward Freeman

537

41 Corporate Responsibility R Edward Freeman and Patricia H Werhane

552

42 Whistle-blowing Terrance McConneU

570

43 Professional Ethics David Luban

583

44 Media Ethics Judith Lichtenberg

597

45 Computer Ethics Deborah G Johnson

608

46 Engineering Ethics Michael S Pritchard

620

47 Environmental Ethics Andrew Light

633

vii

CONTENTS

48 Values in Nature Dale Jamieson

650

49 The Tragedy of the Commons David Schmidtz and Elizabeth WUlott

662

50 Global Warming Robert Hood

674

Index

685

viii

Nt

Ctibt

Larry Alexander i W D i t i i h d P f fL t th U i i t fS Diego He specializes in the areas of constitutional law (especially First Amend ment) criminal law and jurisprudence The author of numerous scholarly articles that have appeared in leading law reviews and philosophy journals Professor Alex i l th ( i t h P l H t ) f Whom Does the Constitution d Command? d dit f Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations An Anthology H th d i t i l b d f th j l Ethics d Law and Philosophy d i dit f th i t t i l t l Legal Theory John D. Arras is Porterfield Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Professor of Philoso phy at the University of Virginia where he directs the Undergraduate Bioethics Program and participates in the MA degree program in bioethics He is a fellow of C t d f b fG C ' N Y kStt th H t i T k F Lif dL P f A i th dit f Bringing the Hospital Home: Ethical and Social Implications of High Technology Home Care d th th f til bithi Hi i f h i t t i l d th thi f h i i i t d i i d AIDS t t t d h l b l ti d t t i l h d t i thi d th t h d l i f t i l thi Margaret P. Battln is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor Diii f M d i l Ethi t th U i i t f U t h Sh h f I t l Mdii t h d ditd ditd t l b k ildi Puzzles about Art; Ethics in the Sanctuary; The Least Worst Death; Ethical Issues in Suicide; Drug Use in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide; d Physician-assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate I 2000 P f Btti i i t f th R b l t t P i th U i i t f Uth' t tii d Tom L. Beauchamp is Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Scholar at the Kennedy Institute Georgetown University He is series editor of The Foundations of Philosophy Series and general editor with David Fate Norton and M A Stewart of The Critical Edition of the Works of David Hume A i t t P f Michael Blake i t tH d U i i t Hi k

t

t th J h F K d th i l i t i

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Lawrence A Blum Fidhi

Alti

d Mlit

Ml

P t i

d P t i l i t

Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald

Bernard Boxill

Jan Boxill

Dan W Brock

Didi Philhil

f E

Oth Th Ethi f S i B i d i l Ethi

t

Dii

Mki

Lif

d

Dth

C A J Coady

Testimony: A Philosophical Study Ann E Cudd

Stephen L Darwall

16401740;

Impartial Reason; The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought": Philosophical Ethics; Welfare and Rational Care

N Ann Davis

Ethics

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

David Dolinko

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr Th F d t i Th J

l

f Mdii

d Philh

f Chiti

Bithi Bithi

Leslie Pickering Francis A i cans with Disabilities: Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions Sexual Harassment as an Ethical Issue in Academic Life Legitimate Expectations in a World of I f t Jti R. Edward Freeman

Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach; Business Ethics: The State of the Art; Corporate Strategy and the Search for Ethics Environmentalism and the New Logic of Business R. G. Frey

E t h i

dP h i i i t d

Siid

Gerald F. Gaus The Modern Liberal Theory of Man; Value and Justification; Justificatory Liberalism; Social Philosophy; Plitil C t d Plitil Thi Ct Libli Thi f Pbli R Pbli d P i t i S i l Lif Pbli R Th Philhil Th f th Stt d Rltd E A t l i J l f Philh Pliti Philh dE i Th Hdbk f Plitil Th Alan H. Goldman Jti D i i i t i P t i l Rl

Th Ml F d t i Wh W Nd Th

f P f i l Ethi d Wh W D't

Ml

d R K l d

Lori Gruen Overcoming Moral Alienation

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Amy Gutmann i L S Rkfll U i i t P f f Pliti d Director of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University She s a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Education Among her books are Democratic Education; Liberal Equality; Democracy and Disagreement ( i t h D i T h ) d Color Conscious ( i t h A t h Aih) hih i d th R l h J B h A d H til l d litil h i l h i Ethics Philosophy and Public Affairs Political Theory Social Philosophy and Policy d th j l John Harris i b f th U i t d K i d H G t i C i i d th Ethi C i t t f th B i t i h M d i l A i t i H i th th dit of fourteen books and over one hundred and fifty papers including Clones Genes and Immortality; The Future of Human Reproduction; and Bioethics He is the series editor of "Social Ethics and Policy" published by Routledge and the founder and a l dit f th "I i B i d i l Ethi" i blihd b Ofd U i i t P H l t d Fll f th U i t d K i d A d f Md i l Si i 2001 th fit h i l h t h b l t d t thi l t f dil itit Robert Hood i A i t t P f fP h i l h t Middl T Stt U i versity He works on environmental ethics and is currently writing a book on clinical approaches to environmental ethics Ana Smith litis i PhD didt bithi d litil h i l h

t Ri

U i i t

H

ff

thi

Dale Jamieson i H R L Pf i th H D i i f Glbl Ch t C l t Cll H h itt idl i i t l h i l h moral and political philosophy the philosophy of biology behavior and mind Professor Jamieson has edited A Companion to Environmental Philosophy Deborah G. Johnson is Anne Shirley Carter Olsson Professor of Applied Ethics at th U i i t f V i i i Sh i th th f Computer Ethics d th b k d til thi i d t h l Leslie E. Jones i U i i t fK

d t l

t d t

i

th

D

t

t

f P h i l h

t th

Will Kymlicka is Professor of Philosophy at Queen's University in Ontario Canada He has written many articles and several books in moral and political philosophy ildi Liberalism Community and Culture; Contemporary Political Philosophy; Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights; Finding our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada; d Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism Multiculturalism and Citizenship Hugh LaFolIette i P f fP h i l h tE t T Stt U i i t H is a coauthor of Brute Science: The Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation the author of Personal Relationships: Love Identity and Morality and editor or coeditor of seven volumes He is currently writing The Practice of Ethics which seeks to integrate d i i f til thil i ith t h i l th ii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Judith Lichtenberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy Research Scholar in the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy and Director of the Committee on Politics Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland She writes in the areas of ethics and political philosophy and has edited Democracy and the Mass Mdia Andrew Light is Assistant Professor of Environmental Philosophy and Director of the Graduate Program in Environmental Conservation Education at New York University as well as Research Fellow at the Institute for Environment Philosophy and Public Policy at Lancaster University (UK) In addition to founding and co-editing the journal Philh d G h y Andrew Light is the author of over fifty articles on environmental ethics the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of film and has edited or co-edited twelve books including Environmental Pragma tism; Social Ecology after Bookchin; Philosophies of Place; Beneath the Surface: Critical E th Philh f D Ely; Thl d th Gd Lif?; and Th Athti f E d Life He is currently completing a book on pragmatism and the relationship between environmental ethics and environmental policy-making Margaret Olivia Little is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Senior Research Scholar in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University She is co-editor (with Brad Hooker) of Moral Particularism and is currently finishing a book on abortion entitled Abortion Intimacy and Responsibilities to Gestate David Luban is Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University Law Center He has written or edited five books on legal ethics: Th Gd L L ' Rl d L ' Ethis; L d Jti A Ethil Stdy; Th Ethi f L s ; L l Ethi (co-authored with Deborah L Rhode); and most recently a Japanese-language anthology of his writings His other writings nclude Legal Modernism and many papers on legal and political philosophy Terrance McConnell is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro He is the author of Gtitde; Ml I i Hlth Ce; and I l i b l Rihts Jeff McMahan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbanat th Mi f Lif Champaign He is the author of Th Ethi f Killi Pbl and is currently working on a sequel that discusses killing in self-defense in war and as a mode of punishment Richard W Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University His writings in social and political philosophy ethics epistemology the philosophy of science and aesthetics include A l i M Mlit P d Hity; Ft d Mthd E l t i C f t i d Rlit i th N t l d th Sil S i s ; and Ml Diff Tth Jti dC i i Wld f Cflit Michele Moody-Adams is Hutchinson Professor of Ethics and Public Life as well as Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University She teaches and does research n contemporary moral theory moral psychology and applied ethics as well as n the history of moral and political philosophy and the philosophy of law xiii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Alastair Norcross is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rice University He works both in ethical theory and in several areas of applied ethics such as euthanasia abortion and animal rights He has edited (with Bonnie Steinbock) Kitting and Letting Die He is currently writing a book arguing that consequentialist ethical theories should not be interpreted as theories of either the lightness or goodness of actions but instead as scalar theories that evaluate actions as better or worse than possible alternatives Wayne Norman is Chair of Business Ethics with a cross appointment in the Centre for Applied Ethics and the Faculty of Commerce at the University of British Columbia He has written on a wide range of topics in moral philosophy specializing recently in political philosophy as well as business ethics and corporate citizenship He is the author of Taking Freedom Too Seriously? and has edited Canadian Political Philosophy (with R Beiner) as well as Citizenship in Diverse Societies (with Will Kymlicka) Michael S. Pritchard is Willard A Brown Professor of Philosophy Director for the Center of Ethics in Society and Associate Dean of the Graduate College of Western Michigan University His publications include Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases (with C E Harris and Michael Rabins); Reasonable Children; and On Becoming Responsible David Schmidtz is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona He works principally in moral and social philosophy and has authored The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument; Rational Choice and Moral Agency; and (with Robert E Goodin) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility He has edited Robert Nozick and (with Elizabeth Willott) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works A. John Simmons is Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia specializing in political legal and moral philosophy He is an editor of the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs and the author of Moral Principles and Political Obligations; The Lockean Theory of Rights; On the Edge of Anarchy; and Justification and Legitimacy Patricia Smith is Professor of Philosophy at Baruch College and Graduate Center City University of New York where she specializes in legal political and social philosophy feminist jurisprudence and action theory She is the author of Liberalism and Affirmative Obligation and Omission Law and Responsibility as well as editor or co-editor of five volumes including Feminist Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law: Theoretical Issues and Practical Applications (with P Commanducci) She is currently working on a book on the evolution of values during cultural revolution Lance Stell is Charles A Dana Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College where he directs the Medical Humanities Program He also holds an appointment as a medical ethicist in the Department of Internal Medicine at Carolinas Medical Center (Charlotte NC) He publishes in the areas of ethics medical ethics political philosophy and the philosophy of law

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

L. W. Sumner is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Toronto He is the author of Abortion and Moral Theory; The Moral Foundation of Rights; and Welfare Happiness and Ethics as well as numerous articles on ethics applied ethics and the philosophy of law He is currently working on a book on The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression Rosemarie Tong is Distinguished Professor of Health Care Ethics in the Department of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte An awardwinning teacher and prolific writer and lecturer she is the author of Women Sex and the Law; Feminine and Feminist Ethics; Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Applications; Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction; and Globalizing Feminist Bioethics: Crosscultural Perspectives Professor Tong currently serves as Co-coordinator of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics Michael Tooley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado He is coeditor (with Ernest Sosa) of Causation the editor of the first five volumes of Analytical Metaphysics and the author of Abortion and Infanticide; Causation: A Realist Approach; and Time Tense and Causation Jeremy Waldron is Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law and the Director of the Center for Law and Philosophy at Columbia University He has written widely in political and legal philosophy including The Right to Private Property; Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man; Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-91; The Dignity of Legislation; and Law and Disagreement Professor Waldron was elected a fellow of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences in 1998 Mary Anne Warren teaches in the Department of Philosophy at San Francisco State University Her publications include Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things; The Nature of Woman: An Encyclopedia and Guide to the Literature; and Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection Christopher Heath Wellman directs the Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics and teaches in the Department of Philosophy at Georgia State University He works broadly in ethics specializing in political and legal philosophy Patricia H. Werhane is the Ruffin Professor of Business Ethics and Co-director of the Olsson Center for Applied Ethics at the Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Virginia Her works include Ethical Issues in Business (edited with Tom Donaldson and Margaret Cording); Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modern Capitalism; and Moral Imagination and Management Decisionmaking She is the founding editor-in-chief of Business Ethics Quarterly and on the editorial board of the Journal of Business Ethics Elizabeth Willott is Assistant Professor in Entomology at the University of Arizona She has co-edited (with David Schmidtz) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works and has presented papers on environmental ethics in Italy Australia the US and to the Convocation of World Leaders She has published on xv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

human population trends and on the management of insect resistance to transgenic cotton With David Schmidtz she has done fieldwork in sub-Saharan Africa on wildlife management In addition she works on the immune response and biochemistry of insects Clark Wolf is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Georgia He specializes in ethical theory political philosophy and the philosophy of law

xvi

PREFACE

ethics, as a reader on topics in a particular area or on interrelated topics bridging several areas, and as a collection of individual essays on topics of great moral, social, and political interest. We would like to thank Stephan Chambers, Steve Smith, Jeff Dean, and Nirit Simon of Blackwell for their enduring support for and help with this project. We would also like to thank Sue Ashton, Brad Champion, Elisa Marchetta, Karen Mazner, Eric Rovie, and Sara Zenlea for their very extensive help in preparing the manuscript for publication. RGF and CHW

xviii

1 Th N t

f A l i d Ethi

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Th t " l i d thi" d it " t i l thi" it i h 1970 h h i l h d th d i b t dd i l bl i it di f i l thi ( i l l d i l thi d b i thi) P i t l th d bti t h i th t ti fh d i l bjt i h i i f f t i ti acceptable risk in the workplace the legal enforcement of morality civil disobedi ence unjust war and the privacy of information

H i t i l

B

k

d

D i t th t ii f th t " l i d thi" i t i tht f t bjt tt b t d t i t ti F l libti t blih controversial opinions engage in civil disobedience commit suicide and choose one's religious viewpoint are matters of perennial interest as are questions of unjust wars and the moral status of animals Although moral philosophers have long d i d th bl it i bl th tht j h i l h t h h t th h i t f l h i l h h d l d thd f lid thi M l h i l h h tditill f l t d t h i f th i h t h d d th i t tht t t i th t lt A til i i id f thi t h t i l lit it i ll h hth d if h th i t b lid t t bli li ttl l bl d d t i t i l It is not obvious that applied ethics is the offspring of or even dependent upon general moral philosophy Its early successes in the 1970s owed more to arguments directed at pressing and emerging moral problems in society than to traditional theor i f thi M idiidl i l h i l h i l d t h l i l thi litil th d th f i ildi dii b i i i d itifi h d d d th i Th idiidl f d l fftd b i th id it di i d i i d l l i b t i il lit d i f f b dijti d i t d t l b l Th i i d b iil iht ' iht i l i h t th t th i t l 1

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t d th i h t f i d th t l l ill ft i l d d thil issues that stimulated the imagination of philosophers and nonphilosophers alike (A volume that nicely illustrates the state of one area of interdisciplinary ethical inquiry around 1970 is the massive compendium on research involving human bjt titld Experimentation with Human Beings [ K t 1972]) I th l t 1960 d l 1970 h i l h i i l it t t ith l f th d i i l i h i t t d i l bl ldi th f th h l t h f i l b i i i d th il d b h i l i P h th t i f l t i l f l d i th d l t f hl l litt i l i d thi l d l h i l h M bl f applied ethics have since been framed in the vocabularies of these two disciplines This is not surprising since moral philosophy and law have common concerns over matters of basic social importance and share various principles requirements and iti f id L i i t th bli' f t l t i lit i t liit il idli d ti df tilti i h t f ff C l i til h idd d t db i t i l tht i f l t i l i ll f l i d thi D i th 1970 d l 1980 b f h i l h b t fhi their careers around interests in applied ethics an almost unprecedented develop ment in a profession generally skeptical that "applied ethics" was either a scholarly enterprise or had a future in the university The late 1970s and early 1980s saw th bliti f l b k d t d t h i l h i l t t t f bjt l i d thi Vitll b k blihd i l i d thi i t th l t 1970 h d b id t i l l th th i t f l i i l h i l h i l t h i Thi itti h d idl i th l t 1970 d 1980

Problems of Definition M

h i l h h i d l i d thi th t t t t i l t ith l l lt h i ith th l f li til bl Th th t d l i t l tht b d t i th l bl H it i t d ll td tht t i h t f d tt til j d t i ibl b l ith t l t h i t l l i i l ( h "O ht t t t t l t th d f t h " "O ht t k i " "O ought not to inflict harm or risk of harm;" "One ought to treat people fairly and with equal respect;" and "One ought to respect the autonomy of others") This s the socalled gap between theory and practice Theory and principles must it b l t d i b di f iht ti i i l dt i t i l i d th lik B t i il hih ()? Thi ti h l h " l i d thi" i difflt ti t d t d d df A d i l it d b t f l tht l i d thi i b t d f d th li ti f l thil t h i t til l bl ( h l th d f i t i l

2

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

ffd b G t 1982 5 1 2 ) Thi d f i i t i i tht ill t recognize it as reflecting either the appropriate method or content of applied ethics A weaker and more defensible view is that "applied ethics" refers to any use of philosophical methods to treat moral problems practices and policies in the f i t h l t d th lik Thi b d k i t t t th l f l t h i i i l d d t i i t b l l i th l It b th t d t d i f th t ithi th f i f h i l h b t it ld b i d tid h i l h flti i i f i t diili bi A d i f f t bi i f d i th id t h t " l i d t h i " i ith "professional ethics" Problems such as the allocation of scarce medical resources unjust wars abortion conflicts of interest in surrogate decisionmaking hate crimes pornography war and terrorism whistleblowing the entrapment of public ffiil i t t i l jti h i l d th fidtilit f t i f t i t d b d f i l d t t ll t i i th d i f l i d thi Th t l ti b t th t f" l i d thi" l d t idti f b t h th t t d th thd f l i d thi

Problems of Moral Content Th

i f l t i l t f h d i th l i t t th it f t t i l i d thi i t l t t l t d i d i t l t l t Th t i fit f h i d f th l i f f i l thi b t th b l i d t th h i t i t t i l d thi f ll t Th fit d f d thi d i d f f i l i t i t t i l ti t d d Th d iti tht t i tti f l i d thi l d i jtifiti b external standards such as those of public opinion law the common morality religious ethics and philosophical ethics The third claims that distinct forms of t i l thi internal t f i d ititti t h l d l i f l d b b d ( t l ) l t l f k Internalism S

h i l h h i t i d tht tblihd ti id th i f t i l thi I f l t i l i thi l i t t i Aldi M l t ' f "practice" to designate a cooperative arrangement in pursuit of goods that are internal to a structured communal life He holds that "goods internal to a practice" such as those found in the professions are achievable only by engaging n the ti d f i t it t d d f ll S t d d i t l t th f i t h f d t i h t it t b d titi E h f i h hit d ifi h t tht ti tditi ii f i l t l t i t it i t (Mlt 1984 17 175 187 1 9 0 2 0 3 ) H d B d d F k Mill ff f f i t l i t l i th f d t i f d i l thi

3

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Physicians by virtue of becoming socialized into the medical profession accept alle i t t f l l h i h dfi th t f dil ti Th l i ri t t l t f th l dti i b t hii i thi f i l l d i d i t th i t t hii Th professional integrity of physicians is constituted by allegiance to this internal morality (Brody and Mill 1998 386) These writers and others like them maintain that moral frameworks in the profes sions derive from rolespecific duties and professional virtues N bl d i t t h t f i l l i t l bliti didl H i t l lit t i l tb d t l h i h t ll t b l Trditi d f i l t d d t f l d d f t t l f i l d i dii b i j l i i i d th fild ft ilif l i t k th idfibl iid li lt d th ity than they are entitled to claim Brody and Miller address this problem by distinguishing between the core moral norms appropriate to a profession and the dogmatic and unsystematic provisions f d i d f f i l thi A th it i t l lit d hld l i th f f il h "Even the core f dil lit t b thhtfll l t d d t t d t i t l d th t t i ill b id t b th h li i d it h i i t b l i f l d b itl l th i t t th h i t " ( B d d Mill 1998 3 9 3 4 397 h i ddd) T h h t thi i i ftl t i t l i It h tht i t l t d d may be shallow and expendable whereas some external standards are deep and essential Even current practice standards might be weak and insupportable We also know from recent history that a meaningful reconstruction of traditional pro f i l di t i t t i l liti t dt l t l h i likl t b l t th i t l t d d f f i l lit C i d thi h i t i l l I th l t 1960 th b k A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research b il h l i t H b t Kl b lihd j t b f t i l f d f b fh bjt b i l i t i t (Kl 1968) K l ' b k d th f t i d k ll l t i i l i t i t t th f t t h t th h d i d f i i i in standards of research ethics Careful attention was subsequently paid to the moral judgments that psychologists should make in carrying out their research and to the many defects of standards in the then prevailing practices Problems were f d i ti h th i t l d t i f b j t th llti f dt i i d i i d l l idtifibl f d th f fiil i ti t bti bjt It b l t h t th ili ti t d d d t t dd th ti Externalism A th t i l

4

t l b t t lit? A t l

t i t l lit i

t d d tht i

f

f i l t

d itit d l

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

tht ti l t t th f i t l lit P b l i ii law religious institutions and philosophical ethics have all served (whether justifi ably or not) as sources of external morality One influential answer in philosophy to the question of which external source is t i t i t h t t h i l th id th it b i f lid thi A l i f d i th k fB d G t dD Cl Th i t i tht t k dj d t i l i d thi th t b " i l i f d t h i l t h " Th l f t h i th i t id " f k h i h ll f th d i t i ti " d t i "id i t tht tititil ll l " Th b l i t h t t h i th will alert attentive persons to issues of applied ethics identify the morally relevant features of circumstances determine the difference between morally acceptable and unacceptable solutions to problems and show which conditions are necessary and f f i t t j t i f th ilti f l l (Cl d G t 1990 2 3 1 2 f G t t l 1997 3 6 1519) Gt d Cl d t h l d t h t th i l li it t l t d d f f i l thi O l t h i th d ll th t h i ftll f l d di b l f d di P t f th t h i ll assume a similar partisan stance Independent of this confusion over whether one particular theory is morally authoritative it is often unclear whether and if so how a philosophical theory is to be used to criticize internal standards or address a diffilt l bl If ld b fidt tht t h i l th lid h b t b i ld k t t i l til d li ti b i l ki th i t h t th ifi H t t h h th d l it tht th f thi d i ti i likl t B t h ithi d i t h t h i l h th t h i tht i f t t d th th i t t f th il lit f h i h th i E if idiidl i i d tht til theory is correct (authoritative) he or she needs to deal responsibly with the fact that other morally serious and informed individuals reject this conviction Skepticism about the practical relevance of theory is not surprising in light of the li d jtif lit t f t tht h i l h h tditill tid t lif l t t i h lj d t d t d d t b i i i l f l t t ti t h i t l til l bl d l i t d f f i l thi G l t h i ill i t d ll itd f til kb th dd h i l h i l bl tht i t h l d i d f ti Althh b t l ity philosophical theories are primarily attempts to understand or unify morality not attempts to specify its practical commitments Mixed interncdism and externalism

A thid t f bth i t l i d t i l t d f th f i d

h t th t t f lid thi i t l i It t t ith th iti i difft i di lt th t t d i t i t t i b d b

t tht d

l t f l it M b l t d d ht 5

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

fid t l b thi b h i ( i t l l i t ) b t l b th moral standards of the broader culture or community (an external morality) The authority to practice is itself granted by society on the condition that its professions and institutions will in a responsible manner be educated in and adhere to the high l t d d td b tht i t If f i d ititti td t f thi ti t h t th ili l l f th l it ill b h d i ti Th il t d d di t th t ti ill f it t it I t l liti i th f i ill dil b th i i i f i t d d t th t l liti A theory of this description has been advanced by H Tristram Engelhardt He holds that profound disagreement exists about the nature and requirements of professional practice across larger communities such as Orthodox Judaism Roman Cthlii Hidi d l h i There is no way to discover either a canonical contentfull secular morality or the t ll ttfll lti t t h th t b d b th lit f h d l ii t h t bid lf i d M l t d t see the world in the same way Moral strangers [cannot] resolve contentfull moral t i b d t i l t M l fid th th h d di idl h d h h i i (Elhdt d Wild 1994 136 l 13547) A d i t E l h d t ttfll lit difft iti Th t l k f Othd Jdi f l d t i ht i t bl tbl l f tht ti f th J i h ti hih t it dititi F thi ti l t d d f ht i blit d permissible for professionals in medicine politics law and business derive from the more general moral commitments of a larger community beyond the narrower community of professionals Th d lthi t k i thi t i k t i l th btti f d t i f l l i d thi d lki h f d t i th f d t i f t f l i d thi th th h i t i l t i iti N i t l lit it t i th t l lit f til lt (Elhdt d Wild 1994 1 3 7 8 E l h d t 1 9 9 6 1 0 5 2 4 ) Thi t h i i h t i t th lti bt t l d i t l liti b t it h k B h i i d i i t it i t overlook basic similarities; that is to neglect the core of near identical moral goals interests and commitments that exist among welltrained professionals from differ t l t l b k d F l h i i ll th ld h l d t h i fhli lliti hbilitti i d i f t di ti t t i d th lik Th i h d l i i t (h iitd) d h d f f i l ti th iti P d i l l thi th l tt th d f h d t ithi "th iti f l f i d " tht f th i f th t Th th ii h i i l h d ifit i h it

6

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

ff i d hih bl tbl d libl t di th l f th professions and professional ethics However in communities of almost any size there exists a pluralism of viewpoint These communities are not lacking in sub groups with different moral points of view and hopes to revise prevailing conditions ti d d C h i i t f b i t i d t i i d t i liti th lti f iil i h t d th lik k f flid i t th iti ith t dt l iti Ath k i t h t thi i d i t l i t t l i t t fftil ld l t l tht i it j d t Th lidit f l dj d t d d i thi t thi d t b nity; no transcendent principle warrants crosscultural appraisal It follows that there are no universal human rights that protect individuals Human rights are by definition valid claims that are justified by reference to morally relevant features of h bi tb f t l t d d It i l d i f f l t t h i thi th ll td bli li i t b f h i d i lliti i t It i t h thi th tf i t lii i i t ititti b t it i b i l i t t li tif d iti i bli li k it t ft h ith th d ld d bl t apply ethics to our deepest social problems

Problems of Method and Justification S l dl f thd ti lld thd dl f tifti h b d i d i l i d thi Th f th t i f l t i l dl t t d i thi ti Th fit dl h jtifiti d thd f t d ti t h t h i l d t h i l th Th d approaches justification and method from a bottomup perspective that emphasizes moral tradition experience and particular circumstances The third refuses to assign priority to either a topdown or a bottomup strategy Top-down models I

th

fit dl iti Thi dl f t th ll it thd i l li t h t fll d th l Th "applying" a rule: ti

l

lid t hih i t l l ll l l ( i i l idl flli i th d d t i f i

ti l iht i

l

it t thik t) t l d i

1 Every act of description A is obligatory 2 At bi fd i t i A T h f 3 At bi blit Thi d

dl libl b i l d d i i hih t h i

i

th l d

i l

f j d t b h t ditl i i l b t it l t l libl l i i l j i i t i thi

7

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

t d i t i l ti i t i t t i l l d j d t Whil h i th moral life conforms roughly to this conception of moral priority much does not There are several problems with this moralpriority thesis First moral judgments in hard cases almost always require that we make the norms themselves more ifi ( th ti "Pbl f S i f t i " b l ) bf bi til i t d i l i i l I th f ifi di ki til j d t ft t tk it t f t l blif b t th ld l t l tti j d t f likl t d i d t t h l fill t d i iht t l i i l d t h i Th i l l i i t i th S d th f t f itti also be such that no general norm (principle or rule) clearly applies and the differ ent moral norms that can be brought to bear on a set of facts may yield inconclu sive results For example destroying a nonviable human embryo or fetus does not l l ilt l i t killi d d th l tht h iht t t t bdil i t i t d t l l l t thi li E if h ft t i h t th h i fft d th h i f l tht d l t ill t j d t tht i i t i b l ith th ' hi fft d l Slti th i h t t f f t db i i th right set of rules to bear on these facts are not reducible either to a deductive form of judgment or to the resources of a general ethical theory The topdown model also creates a potentially infinite regress of ustification a di d d f fil j t i f i t i b h l l f l t i t i hih l l t j t i f it If t d d jtifid til b h t d jtifid i t it ld th ti f thi h t h t th jtifid i i l j d t I th ld h d l thi bl b ti tht i lfjtifi t h t it i i t i l t t hld b t f tht thi t t d t h t th j t i f ll th i i l d l i t d d tht t thil theory is well equipped to meet Bottom-up models S it i l i d thi t thi ttti l h til d i i d th th l i i l d t h i Th bli tht l i d jtifiti d btt t t d Th it t f iti il t d ti i i h t d i l d ti l i th t t i i t f hih commonly make moral decisions They also depict an evolving structure of moral beliefs based on exemplary lives and narratives experience with hard cases and analogy from prior practice Btt dl ttill i l d lditit t h d l i C i t h b th t idl d i d i l i d thi b t i f f ti t i l i d th thd l lif P t f th h l i i l d i t i i th d fk l d t i T h t i th i f t i d iht f i i l di f i l t l i til i t (J dT l i 1988) F l h i i 8

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

dd i t h d i i l i f i t h l i f tit t fi missible killing But progressively after dealing with many agonizing cases they and society came to frame many of these acts as forms of permissible allowing to die or even as morally required acts of acknowledging refusals of treatment All practical l l b t killi d ltti di i d f d ti th b th i i l l it i l t l ti f idli A it' l i fid thi tt h h bddd l tditi d t f d tht it d ft iiht d j d t A l t th thit ti i l i ti id t b t th h t f thi thd h th d i i f jit fj d b thitti i case the judgments in their decision are positioned to become authoritative for other courts hearing cases with similar facts Defenders of bottomup reasoning see moral authority as analogous: social ethics develops from a social consensus formed d hih th b t d d t itht l f th ltd l id A hit f iil d iil d t t it b i i l f d t i it l l i d k l d liti ( l i i l ) i it li tditi f thil flti Case analysis which is central to casuistry has long been used in law schools and business schools Training in the case method is widely believed to sharpen skills of legal and business reasoning as well as moral reasoning One can tear a t d th t t btt ft t i iil itti I th t h t d l tti t h d t d t lik h l i b t iht d b t t i Th b j t i i t d l it t bl d t fd l lti tht k i th t t k i h t d ti i d th k i tht thi i th th b i f f d t i l l fl i t Th thd i l h t b d t d ble facts and judge the weight of evidence enabling the transfer of that weight to new cases This task is accomplished by generalizing and mastering the principles that control the transfer usually principles at work in the reasoning of judges Use of the thd i b i h l i f idl f d t i tht t th t d t i th d i i k i l ft iitil i i i t th f t f l itti H th f th thd i t t itti lt ith th f t ii d jdi tht iht t dt fd f ki it d i i i h i t A ith t d t h i i bl li i it f d f d f btt up theories First defenders sometimes write as if paradigm cases or particular circumstances speak for themselves or inform moral judgment by their facts alone Clearly they do not To move constructively from case to case or to attend to the l t f t f til itti id l f l l t t th itti Th l i t t f th itti bt th f i t t i d liki itti All l i l i i ti t i d i t tht bjt t i ik lik th i l t t Th ti di f th i t l i k i t b h i d b l itlf Btt t

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t h f t i i l l i til l l ents in the case or set of facts at hand "Paradigm cases" and "morally relevant features of circumstances" seem to com bine facts that can be generalized to other situations (for example "The employee bl th hitl th l " ) d ttld l (f l " K l d b l l h iht t d i l th di f th l " ) Th ttld l ltill ditit f th f t f til Th l th t l l ti th l th t th t t f l i i l l Btt t l t bl h th it fliti l gies judgments and case interpretations Defenders stress that cases and particular circumstances point beyond themselves and evolve into generalizations but they also may evolve in the wrong way if they were improperly grounded from the t t Btt t h l t h d l i l t t b i d d l t f l t f l t ft f Th bl l d t ti b t th j t i f i t f th t H d jtifti ? I it l b il ti d l ? Miht t difft l i d l t ti "iht" ? With out some stable framework of norms there seems to be a lack of control over judgment and no way to prevent prejudiced or poorly formulated social conven tions This criticism is a variant of the muchdiscussed problem that bottomup t l k i t i l dit f l t l blid h l d l ii Idtifti f th ll l t f t f d d th h k j d t b t d th idiidl ld t f tilit d i i bi jdiil f l tht i h k d b tbl t fi t i l i i l dh iht Th h t f th bl b t h t th t t thd itht t t tht i t l ft h h t tht dil th f d t l i t f comparison and analogy in moral thinking but that lacks initial moral premises It is certain that we reason morally by analogy almost daily and we are often confi dent in our conclusions However such analogies also often fail and analogies t li ftth tit Thi t h d th l ith th bl tht tt h ti t i t iitill h if f th f t i t t t th t i th d i t i l d d fl t t t Coherentism "The top" (principles theories) and "the bottom" (cases particular udgments) are both now widely regarded as insufficient resources for applied ethics Neither gen l i i l til i t h ffiit t t l i ith th dd libilit P i i l d t b d if f d l i d i l l i t i f l i i l I t d f t d btt dl t i f th dl i l f d t "flti ilibi" d" h t h "

10

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

Jh R l ' l b t d t f "flti ilibi" h b th t influential model of this sort In developing and maintaining a system of ethics he argues it is appropriate to start with the broadest possible set of considered moral judgments about a subject and to erect a provisional set of principles that reflects th Rflti ilibi i i t i t i i thi ( d th t t i ) flti tti f l i i l t h t i l tlt d th l t l blif t k th h t ibl " C i d d j d t " i t h i l t f i t j d t i hih l blif d iti t likl t b td itht ditti bi E l j d t b t th f il d i i i t i li gious intolerance terrorism torture and political conflicts of interest These con sidered judgments occur at all levels of generality "from those about particular situations and institutions through broad standards and first principles to formal d b t t diti l t i " E th i d d j d t tht t" i i l l fid it" R l "libl t i i " Th l f flti ilibi i t th d djt i d d j d t i d t d th h t ith th i f t l l i t t W t t ith d d t of moral lightness and wrongness and then construct a more general and more specific account that is consistent with these paradigm judgments rendering them as coherent as possible We then test the resultant actionguides to see if they yield i h t lt If d j t th id i th d th W ltl tbl ilibi th i d djti b td t t i l l ( R l 1971 20ff 4 6 5 0 5 7 9 8 0 [1999 d 17ff 4 0 5 5 0 8 9 ] 1996 8 381 384 399) T tk l i th thi f t l t t i i i tht t t t d t h ft lii (1) d i t i b t b td b f f i l (i d t i i th b f i i l t f th d ) d (2) distribute organs by time on the waiting list (in order to give every candidate an equal opportunity) As they stand these two distributive principles are not coherent because using either will undercut or even eliminate the other We can retain both (1) d (2) i th f fi ditibti bt t d ill h t i t d liit bth i i l t t h ith t fh t if i t t d bl th i t t i t th i t t Th liit d t ill i t h t b d h t ith th i i l d l h di d i i i t i i t th l d l d th l f bilit t i j t h f th l l t i f i dil d We have no reason in applied ethics to anticipate that the process of achieving moral coherence will either come to an end or be perfected A moral framework adequate for applied ethics is more a process than a finished product; and moral bl h d l i th t itbl t f t d ditibti hld b i d d j t i d f t i l d j t t b flti ilibi W hld i l i d thi t h t f di h f i h df l itti tht hll t lf k ( R l 1971 1 9 5 2 0 1 [1999 d 1716])

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One problem with this general model is that a bare coherence of norms never provides a sufficient basis for justification because the body of substantive udgments and principles that cohere could themselves be morally unsatisfactory This points to the great importance but also the great difficulty of starting with considered judgments that are themselves morally justified These considered judgments presumably will have a history rich in moral experience that undergirds our confidence that they are credible and trustworthy; but how is one to justify such a claim in the case of any proposed set of considered judgments? After all the persons codes institutions or cultures from which the premises descend may not themselves be highly reliable For example the Hippocratic tradition the starting-point in medical ethics for centuries has turned out to be a limited and generally unreliable basis for medical ethics In addition vagueness surrounds the precise nature and scope of the method of appeals to coherence A philosopher seeking coherence might be pursuing one or more of several different interests: evaluating public policy constructing a moral philosophy improving his or her personal set of moral beliefs and so on The focus might be on judgments on policies on cases or on finding moral truth It is also not clear how we should and should not achieve coherence or how to be sure that we have done so In light of the differences in the models explored in this section and the diverse literature in applied philosophy it is questionable whether applied ethics has a distinct method or type of justification Applied philosophers appear to do what philosophers have always done: they analyze concepts examine the hidden presuppositions of moral opinions and theories offer criticism and constructive accounts of the moral phenomena in question and criticize strategies that are used to justify beliefs policies and actions They seek a reasoned defense of a moral viewpoint and they use considered judgments and moral frameworks to distinguish justified moral claims from unjustified ones They try to stimulate the moral imagination promote analytical skills and weed out prejudice undue emotion false authority and the like From this perspective differences between traditional ethical theory and applied ethics can be easily exaggerated In philosophy journals that publish both applied and theoretical work no sharp line of demarcation is apparent between the concepts and norms of ethical theory and applied ethics There is not even a discernible continuum from theoretical to applied The applied-theoretical distinction therefore needs to be used with caution (Beauchamp 1984: 514-31; Gert 1984: 532-48)

Problems of Specification It is now generally agreed in literature on the problems addressed in the previous two sections that specific policy guidelines and truly practical udgments cannot be squeezed from abstract principles and general ethical theories alone Additional content must be introduced from some quarter General theories and principles f used at all must be made specific for contexts; otherwise moral guidelines will be empty and ineffectual The implementation of these general norms must take account of feasibility efficiency cultural pluralism political procedures uncertainty 12

THE NATURE OF APPLIED ETHICS

b t rik li b difftd ti l dil d th lik I short theories and principles must be specified for a context Specification should not be understood as a process of producing general norms; it assumes they are already available It is the process of making these norms t t h t th ifll id d t Sifiti i d i th i d t i t f th l t i th i d ti idi it hil tii th l i t t i th i i l Filli t th i t t f th ith h i h t t i lihd b i th f th t l b lii h t th l Th i d H Rihd t it b " l l i t where when why how by what means to whom or by whom the action is to be done or avoided" (Richardson 2000: 289; see also Richardson 1990: 2 7 9 3 1 0 ) For example without further specification the principle "respect the autonomy of t t " i t t hdl litd bl f ht t k f i liil dii d h i l i h bjt A dfi iti f" t f t " ( " l l i t t t i thi libt riht") iht lif ' i bt ld t th l d it if S i f t i i d i f f t kid f lli t th analysis of meaning It adds content For example one possible specification of "respect the autonomy of competent persons" is "respect the autonomy of compe tent persons after they become incompetent by following their advance directives" Wh i th f thi til ifti b t l t diffilti i l i d diti ld if f t h fll " R t th t f t t ( f t th b i t t ) b flli thi d diti if d l if th d i t i l d tii t th i t t h d " A th bl th f ifi ti ill ti Tht i l d ifd l idli d lii ill b fth ifd t h d l l i t Thi i specification is one way to practice applied ethics and it may be the best way In progressive specification there must remain a transparent connection to he initial norm that gives moral authority to the string of norms that develop over ti Th i l th ibilit f th ifiti bi bl d it i ibl t h t d i f f t ti ill ff d i f f t ifti Th ti ifti ll b t t t i d jtifibl Of t ll ifti j t i f i b l Th t f f i l iti (i d lii d j d t ) h ft b t d i thi th h b b i d d l f t t i P f i l thrit i thi way protect shoddy moral reflection In the process of specification overconfidence in one's specifications is a moral vice that can have profound consequences Moral disagreement in the course of formulating specifications is inevitable n t t I i b l t i d i l t i l ti ifti itll ti t b ffd bt l t t i ifiti d t b tt f t th th i th t t i hih flti ff l t t i lti t til bl Thi b t i tk t th bjt fh hld i itti i hih llitdd d i i dk l d b l fid t h l i d i t 13

TOM L BEAUCHAMP

Problems of Conflict and Disagreement Moral disagreements emerge in the moral life from several different sources These include disagreements over which specification is appropriate factual disagreements (for example about the level of suffering that an action will cause) conceptual disagreements scope disagreements about who should be protected by a moral norm (for example whether fetuses or animals are protected) disagreements resulting from a genuine moral dilemma disagreements about which norms are relevant in the circumstances and disagreements about the weight of the relevant norms in the circumstances It should not be presumed in a context of disagreement that at least one party is morally biased mistaken or otherwise deficient Conscientious and reasonable moral agents who work with due diligence at specification and reasoning about moral problems sometimes understandably disagree The parties may disagree about whether religious values have any place in political affairs whether any form of affirmative action is viable whether physician-assisted suicide is ever acceptable and dozens of other issues in applied ethics When evidence is incomplete or different sets of evidence are available to different parties one party may be justified in reaching a conclusion that another party s justified in rejecting We cannot hold persons to a higher standard than to make judgments conscientiously and coherently in light of the relevant basic and specified norms together with the available evidence Of course tolerance for some norms rightly has its limits The method of specification offered in the previous section needs enrichment by an account of moral justification that will help distinguish justified and unjustified specifications The models of method and ustification discussed in earlier sections may be our best resources in this endeavor but if so these resources stand in need of further development to be of real practical assistance in applied ethics

Conclusion A robust confidence in and enthusiasm for the promise and harvest of applied ethics is far from universal Many are unconvinced that traditional philosophical ethics or contemporary ethical theory can play any significant role in case analysis or in policy or professional contexts There is for reasons discussed throughout this chapter skepticism that philosophical theories even have practical implications (or applications) However these suspicions may rest on misconceptions of the nature of applied ethics No morally serious individual doubts the importance of the issues treated in applied ethics and virtually everyone familiar with work in the field can cite some examples of outstanding applied work The better view is that adequate conceptions of the method and moral content of applied ethics remain a project n the making

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References Beauchamp T L (1984) On eliminating the distinction between applied ethics and ethical theory The Monist, 67: 514-31 Brody H and Miller F G (1998) The internal morality of medicine: explication and application to managed care Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 23: 384-410 Clouser K D and Gert B (1990) A critique of principlism The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 15: 219-36 Engelhardt H T (1996) The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd edn New York: Oxford University Press and Wildes K (1994) The four principles of health care ethics and post-modernity In R Gillon (ed) Principles of Health Care Ethics, pp 135—47 London: John Wiley Gert B (1982) Licensing professions Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 1: 51-60 (1984) Moral theory and applied ethics The Monist, 67: 532^48 Culver C M and Clouser K D (1997) Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. New York: Oxford University Press Jonsen A and Toulmin S (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning. Berkeley CA: University of California Press Katz J with Capron A and Glass E S (1972) Experimentation with Human Beings. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Kelman H (1968) A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Maclntyre A (1984) After Virtue, 2nd edn Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (rev edn 1999) (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press Richardson H S (1990) Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 279-310 (2000) Specifying balancing and interpreting bioethical principles Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 25: 285-307

Further reading Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (1996) Final Report. New York: Oxford University Press Altaian A (1983) Pragmatism and applied ethics American Philosophical Quarterly, 20: 227-35 Beauchamp T L and Childress J F (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th edn New York: Oxford University Press Brock D W (1987) Truth or consequences: the role of philosophers in policy-making Ethics, 97: 786-91 Daniels N (1996) Wide reflective equilibrium in practice In L W Sumner and J Boyle (eds) Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, pp 96-114 Toronto: University of Toronto Press DeGrazia D (1992) Moving forward in bioethical theory: theories cases and specified principlism Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 17: 511-39

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Dworkin R (1993) Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion Euthanasia and Individual Fd Feinberg J (1984-7) Th Ml Liit f th C i i l L 4 vols New York: Oxford University Press Freeman E and Werhane P (eds) (1997) Dictionary of Business Ethics Cambridge MA: Mthil hy 20: 222-34 Maclntyre A (1984) Does applied ethics rest on a mistake? The Monist 67: 498-513 Alid Ethi i Tbld Wld Dordrecht: Kluwer Rachels J (1990) Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism New York: Oxford University Press Mtt f Lif d Dth N I t d t E i Ml Philh 3rd edn New York: McGraw-Hill Reich W (ed) (1995) Encyclopedia ofBioethics 2nd edn New York: Macmillan

AC

Alid i

Ethi t Ethi

(1993) P t i l Ethis 2nd edn New York: Cambridge University Press Sugarman J and Sulmasy D P (eds) (2001) Methods in Medical Ethics Washington DC: Sunstein C (1993) On analogical reasoning H d Winkler E R and Coombs J R (eds) (1993) Alid well

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L Riw 106: 741-91 Ethi A Rdr Cambridge MA: Black-

2 T h i

f Ethi

STEPHEN L DARWALL

Ethi i t i l diidd i t t t tthi d ti thi ith th l t t b i diidd f t h it ti th d " l i d t h i " th ith h i h d i thi l Thi l t t tb ill t h i it t lti t ti th lik t h t f lid t t h t i h t h i d i d i d d t l d l th lid to cases When it comes to normative ethics theories are often formulated and evaluated by reflecting on the ethically relevant features of cases Thus some phil h i t i tht i t th l l l f diti ti bt killi d ltti di ( ll t bt i il d ltti th h ) b flti ifi lik J d i t h T h ' f "tll b l " i hih di h bt ltti hi t i kill ti b f l dditi it t t k h it ld kill ll b (Th 1976) I t h i k i b t thi it to be relevant that by diverting the train the driver would be killing people or causing their deaths himself whereas if he let the train continue undiverted he would only be allowing deaths to occur By seeing this in a specific case it is d it dititi f lt h t i l l Ath t f " t i l thi" id th iti bt i ildi i difft i it t t h t th l f i t t til ti f ht t d F t l ht t t k i t ht hld d ( hld h d ) bt h t t thik fl b t ' h t b t hi h i d thi t f ti ti A d th th thil ti tht t i i l t i l ith even if they have practical implications: do all living species have intrinsic worth? Is aesthetic appreciation a more valuable form of human experience than the relief of a scratched itch? And so on

C A btt t th fidi

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STEPHEN L DARWALL

ratio

morality

obligations

make

THEORIES OF ETHICS

td ttitd ht t h A l i l tt h thi b true only if something has other properties: the reasons for valuing it And such reasons cannot simply consist in the property that it is good since that is itself the property of there being such reasons Unlike say the property of yellowness which iht t t h t thi ll b i t l f it thil ti i b thi t lti b fth ti t h t thi d If I jd ti i t b lbl I t t h i k it h t tht k t d ft tht th d f it l O if I t h i k t h t ti ti i ll i d I t t h i k th ti h t i t i f th ti d th itti tht k it ll b l i t f t tht th d f it bli toriness And these thoughts commit me to the existence of background normative theories I am committed to thinking there are truths that relate an experience's having certain properties to its value such that any experience that had exactly th ( d th thill l t ) ti ld b lbl l th thi bi l O i i l l I ittd t thiki th it lid l i i l tht lt t i ' h i ti f t t it b i ll i d I thi b d th th i t i t i f ti thil t h i i avoidable if we are to think about ethical issues with any care Any udgment we make about an individual case will be no better than the background theories we commit ourselves to in making it Moreover there are special considerations tht it t ti t h i f dititil b t t h th d t k ti f l iht d Thi i b I t d bifl b th t f thi ll lit i dld l if th t t Wht i i ht i t l hld tbl f di ht t bl l h d t P t i f tbilit i thi t diti df t l i A ith j d ' l l fidi t h f l fl t tilt i ciples (or theories) that are capable both of justifying our judgments and of being publicly addressed to and accepted by other members of the moral community Someone we hold accountable for wrongdoing we think should be capable n f ti j d t f bi b h t t t h t it i bl j d t t h d Thi i difft f th thil t h f l f l didi f d hld h it t b l th th th Didi f di d ' t t t t t d i t th d t h l d hi tbl d b th i iti libtliiti l t th i t h h t tht didi i i ate only if its object should be able to accept it and see things the same way To the contrary disdain may only increase if its object can't "get i t " If however we judge someone to be incapable of assessing his own conduct morally this can l d t thik t h t h i t ft b j t f l lti i h i i b l f t i it tll tbl l it It i t h f bl t t b d f bi bl t f l t bli tifiti f j d t f l iht d tht i iil t i d ' l l fidi N t i l th i i thi t d l f bli l di

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Mtthi O

i i t t i thi h t ill b ith th j ti thil t h i t t l i tili d t l d it th Bf d i i these however we need first to introduce briefly the other main area of ethical theory: metaethics Unlike normative theories which concern themselves with substantive normative questions such as "What is valuable?" and "What is mor ll b l i t ? " t t h i l t h i d ith b t t hil hil i tht d l i th W d i t i i h f d i f f t kid () ti i th h i l h fl i th i d t t f thil j d t (b) l t d i i th h i l h f id i ht tl tt thil j d t h t it i t h l d thil i () t h i l i i th ibilit d t f thil t t h d (d) epistemological questions concerning the possibility and nature of ethical know ledge and how we can justify our ethical views Why however should we care about metaethics? Some people think that case thi b d i d til f tthi Th t tht l i thil ltitl ll normative th b t h l d t h t thi i til i d d t f tthi I t h i k thi i i itk d t h t th h ti ti d bt t t h i l d ti t h h t i ditti bth f h th t t t i t h i l thik (lik A i t t l Kt) dd ll fh d d hld di t l dbt Consider for example issues that arise in environmental ethics concerning the moral claims that other living species make on us How much should we weigh harm to other species either to individuals or to the species themselves in our l d l i b t i ? It i i i b l t t h i k fll b t h ti itht i t t h i l i O th t fh T b bl t b h d thi t h d lf B t h t i it f thi t b d b d for b i ? O i b t th d fh bi ' d it th d i h ld h if f l l i th tifti f di ( l t t i l informed or would if fully informed have for herself as she actually is) (Railton 1986) This view is sometimes put forward not just as a normative claim but as a metaethical position concerning what personal welfare or benefit is But such a tthi f lf l t th ibilit t h t i lki di b bfitd h d R h l thi ill b d b d for bi l it t b d b d to it ( it i h t t h h d i ) I bli thi t t h i l th t b th itk lt f li f t h h t t h t t k it f td tht ' di ht h i ti f h i t i l O tht th t f lf bfit h h i i l d tt f th ti of an agent deliberating about what to do but is one we require rather when we care for some being or thing for its sake (ourselves included) we can appreciate why h dbfit t t i t d t bi ith d i ( D l l 1997 2002) T h f b f th i j t i t di f their

20

THEORIES OF ETHICS

sake that they do well or flourish We can sensibly regard a species as capable of being benefited or harmed therefore if we can care for them for their sake But again what sort of claim does harm make when we understand it n this way? Do we have a moral obligation not to harm members of any species? Or is the fact that an action would harm another person relevant to its being wrong in a way that harm to other species is not? Here again we cannot answer this question without taking a stand on meta-ethical issues concerning what morality and moral obligation are if only implicitly If we understand moral questions broadly enough then it may seem that harm is harm and is no less morally relevant whether the being harmed is a person or a snail darter If however we think of morality as a system of reciprocity or mutual accountability where norms of right and wrong mediate a moral community of free and equal moral persons then harm to other persons will seem to have an intrinsic moral relevance that harm to other species does not For then what is morally wrong will be what one can be held accountable by others for doing in accordance with norms that must in some sense be acceptable to all from a perspective of equality So viewed harm to persons is not simply harm to members of a certain species but harm to a member of the moral community to whom norms of right and wrong must be justifiable This is only one example of how questions of meta-ethics are implicitly involved in issues of normative ethical theory and therefore in case ethics Ultimately we have no alternative but to pursue philosophical ethics, that is to attempt to work out a comprehensive outlook that integrates normative ethics and meta-ethics (Darwall 1998)

Contractarianism/Contractualism We can turn now to a review of different normative theories and begin with one that can be grounded in the meta-ethical theory of morality as reciprocity or mutual accountability just mentioned This is the idea that whether an action is right or wrong depends on whether it accords with or violates principles that would be the object of an agreement contract or choice made under certain conditions by members of the moral community The general idea can be developed in a variety of ways depending on how the choice or agreement the parties who make it and the conditions under which it is made are characterized One broad distinction is between contractarianism, under which the choice of moral principles is self-interested and contractualism, which grounds it in a moral ideal of reciprocity reasonableness or fairness It may seem strange to think that moral principles can in any respect be agreed upon or chosen How can a moral proposition be made true by any choice or agreement? Only rarely however do contractarians or contractualists claim hat right and wrong are determined by actual choices or agreements (Harman 1975) More frequently what they hold is that moral principles are those that would be rationally or reasonably chosen or agreed to under certain (frequently counterfactual) conditions

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C t t i i Contractarianism was initially formulated by Thomas Hobbes (see Hobbes 1994) Hobbes begins by considering the situation of an agent deliberating independently f th f th ti f hi di i t t E h h thik ht h d i d ii hi t k it B t ht lt if ll f t t h ti d i d i t t ? Althh h ' di tll lt i hi i t t bi b t td i th d t f th it d ' t f l l tht ' i hi ti i t t th th ' i th i ti principle other than selfinterest will actually result in everyone's (or even any one's) interests or desires being best promoted In situations where this is not the case where the collective pursuit of selfinterest leads to an outcome that is worse f h h ht i k llti ti bl Thi i i l l t t d b th t h t i l k th P i ' Di l i hih t idiidl jild ii f bb Th d i t i t tt tll h tht h l k h id t i t ith hi hi t f bb bt il it h fb k i d t i ii each a sentence of one year He offers each a deal: if one confesses and his partner doesn't the confessor will go free and the partner will get twenty years If both confess both get five years S tht h l b t di th l t ti Th t t f th itti th i fll If A f bt B d t th A t hi fit kd t d B hi f t h k d ( t ) A d i if B f bt A d t f t h k d f A fitkd f B If b t h f bth t thi t h i d k d t A d if b t h d ' t f bth t thi d k d Wht h l d h d? R fit f A' ti B ill t i d d t l f A d ith f t It t h f tht A h l d f i whatever B does A will do better if he confesses If B confesses then A will get his third as opposed to his fourthbest outcome by confessing And if B doesn't confess then A will get his first as opposed to his secondbest outcome by confessing So A hld f A ill d b t t b f i ht Bd B t B' i t t i i tl l t A' f A t f l ll t B S if A ld d b t t f th ld B It b idt h thi i lld llti ti bl A' d B' ti l t h h liklit t hi th b t t f h h tk idiidll tk t t h ild t tht i f h If b t h i d ht would be best for him given the actions of the other both will confess But that yields each one's thirdranked outcome whereas they could have both achieved their secondranked outcomes by not confessing Although the ailhouse context k thi d t t f i i t l l th ti t t f A d B If A d B ld t t thi t l d t th ld b t h t f d d ith t h i d k d t th th th t h i d k d t tht i d d t l ti t h i i t t ill hi P l t h th f th it f t h i i d d t i t t d fll l l th llti flli f hih t '

22

THEORIES OF ETHICS

i t t b t t th ld h b d b i thi it ests independently. Obviously cooperation is required for many many things that are valuable in life perhaps especially in complex modern societies n which we cannot assume that genuinely common interests shaped by common cultural or lii tditi ill t t h ll f i i f t i t t i Morality b t h h t f ill b d d i f f ti Pi il f l iht d ld th b ht l ifi i t ii d ft i th b d t ibl f f ti l ti i l i t j t thi tht it litil it b t ll t t h t (Atll Hbb' i tht ation among large groups was impossible without political authority since other wise uncertainty of others' participation would undermine the assurance necessary for it to make sense for one to do one's part) A d i t t t i i th hth ti i iht i d t i d b l f ti f th b d t t tht i bt ll h l t Tk f l th l t h t it i tt t th id f th i d l th ifi i l d i tt t( l it i t b l l a d/ th ti f if t di t b l l (3) Arguably there exist some a and p such that it would promote everyone's interests more for everyone to follow the resulting rule than it would for everyone to pursue their own interests independently If that is so then for starters contrac t i i ill h l d t h t it ld b t t fll thi l T fit i t i t t i i hld tht h t it i i h t t d d d ht l it ld b i ' i t t f t t d b idd b i thi d l i b t i d l ti H ht f i different ibl l f i kid f i t t i h th t tht ' i t t ld b t d btt b ' flli tht l th th ld b if t t t d t t thi i t t i d d t l ? H is where the idea of an agreement or contract enters the contractarian picture Taking as a benchmark the "no agreement" point in which all regard themselves as bound by nothing but their own interests and values contractarians treat the ti f hih i i l tll ll b d b th lti t t i l b i i bl f thi b h k i hih ll h t i t t i i t tll d t i i l t h b idi th " t" it bt h diffi i t t i tl hih i i l tll d (Gthi 1986) H f b l th ltt i i l t t th difft titi t ill d d h h th t t l if th i agreement Consider for example what principle of mutual aid would be agreed to If those with fewer resources and greater vulnerabilities have more to lose from the lack of agreement than those with greater resources and fewer vulnerabilities then t i l b i i l d t l i i l f t l id th ld lt if l b l th ith l Thi th i t t i i ' b i f k f i li T k t l bliti i ifi th b l i t i f ih d ti i d i lbl i h t thik b t ht t i i l f dli ith th i ld lt f titi f

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STEPHEN L DARWALL

th " t" it i hih h t t t t t d it it ests and values In acting on the principles that would be agreed however the parties are not simply promoting their interests; they are cooperating Cooperation promotes everyone's advantage but as in the Prisoner's Dilemma it does so by ii idiidl t f ti thi i t t E h ld f h i h i h th if b i t b th bt h t i d t d it t i d b i i l f ti tht ld t i l l t Contractualism Contractualism has a similar structure It too understands principles of right con duct as the object of a rational agreement But whereas contractarianism takes l i i l t lt f t i l b i i t t l i th t i i l db lidl f l t tht ld b i i t t ith b i i f d t l t f iti F t t l i ' it f i th bl ith t t i i i t h t it t tht i d i i d l h i fft l l i t th th ld h f th d l f ti O t h i th l tht lt b b gaining from that position will have no moral force But why assume that people have such a moral claim? From a moral point of view this seems entirely arbitrary unless some background theory of natural rights is assumed And contractarianism 't j t i f that ti i it l f ld h l d t d d it Thi bl f th d i t i if id h idiidl iht tf l f i t t d til i t t t i l i If h t i t f h i d d t i t t th f itti i h i h th tblihd l f ti h ill t h i k it rational to bargain to an agreement with others to be bound by certain rules But how can this give her a reason actually to follow the rules? The reasons of nterest she has for agreeing to follow the rules can't give her a reason actually to follow th i th hl it df t i f l f ti i t h t th constrain h it f h i t t F h t b bl t th l i h t l d t l f ti It b tht it i i h i t t t b h d t t t i l f ti bt hil thi ld i h t want t t th l l for these reasons. h l d ' t accept th The animating idea of contractualism is implicit in Kant's "kingdom of ends" formulation of his Categorical Imperative Kant maintains that anyone subject to the moral law must be able to be regarded also as "making the law" (Kant 1998) O l th th l l b t h h t f l f it f f l t bjt l t l th l i l t t h l Thi i i f R ' id f l i t i t litil it iti i hih 1987) h "hil iti ith ll thl b l h i l f " (R A d i t R thi i l ibl if l ht h ll th " l ill" th ill f h as f d l b Siill K t i f

24

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ll " d " b h l t h h ld " l i l t " it as f and equal member of the "kingdom of ends" Here we have the central difference with contractarianism Moral principles of right are not rules that individuals would prescribe and attempt to gain acceptance for from their different individual perspec ti b i i t f l f i t t Th th l idiidl ld ib ( d t) f ti f d l th Bt h i f i l l i thi ti t b d t d ? K t i hit i tht i " t t i i f t i l bi d bjti l " l if " b t t f th l diff bt rational beings and also from all the content of their private ends" (Kant 1998) This suggests the contemporary contractualist John Rawls's idea that principles of justice are those it would be rational to choose in an "original position" behind a " i l fi " di f t tht i d i i d t d i f f t thi i t i ( R l 1971 1 3 6 4 2 ) I til th h i ti i t f thi i d i i d l biliti t l t d i i iti and t h i i t t idiidl l R l t h t th ti h i t t i t l h i d i thi i t t ( h t th turn out to be) and therefore that they value the "primary goods" that are neces sary for these: freedom opportunities wealth and the "social bases" of selfrespect Rawls's idea then is that justice is determined by whichever principles the parties ld h f b h i d th il f i t h t i as f d l th R l d t h t thi h i i l f i t t d ithi th t i t l d b th il b t thi d t d l i t l f i t t i T thi th ti titd tb lf i t t bt b f i l th i d i i d l Si th il f i d i th f i f t i tht ld l t th til i i l t any til ' i t t th i f t i l diff bt i th parties to be selfinterested and assuming them to be trustees for another individual The original position is in effect the perspective of a that is an arbitrary free and equal individual R l t h t th t i l hi i th i i l iti ld b t fj t i kd i d f iit fit tht i th it f i i l ti b i iil d litil iht d f d d d th "diff i i l " hih fi lit f tit d tht ii i d h lth d i t i b t d b th b i i t i t t i f it tht k t th t t d t f th h l t d t d I fft this says that inequalities are justifiable only to the extent that they work as a social resource (for example by providing incentives) from which everyone benefits n cluding the least advantaged If we take seriously the possibility that we could be dh f titi bbiliti f di i til iti th t i l thi ld b t t t i t th t ibiliti b h i th t i i l ildi th diff i i l R l t th id f d th fjti "jti f i " h l l d it M tl h h t d t h t it i t b d t d litil th th l l th (Rl 1993) I hi li k

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h h t d t h t it i h t l b i d l th "iht as fairness" (Rawls 1971: 111) To do this we would have to ask: what principles of individual conduct (or of the conduct of groups nation states and so on) would it be rational to choose to govern everyone's conduct (as well as moral criticism and ti f tbilit i it) f th i i l iti Thi ld th i f k ithi hih t id hih i i l ht t l t if iht h d d i i A d t t l i t h b t i t d b thiki b t h t it t k li l Wh li thi i thi h t t t t i th b d h d equal It is as if she says "This is a reasonable claim for you to grant to me as you can see were you to put yourself in my shoes and consider that it would be reason able for you to make it of m e " Such a claim implicitly invokes the idea of principles f d t tht i l l ii l t t l t t bl j t I d l i h t t l i t h T M S l it h b i h t b bl t j t i f t h i d t t h th b i i l t h t th ld t bl j t i f th l h thi i ( S l 1998 1 4 7 2 5 7 ) P i i l f l iht d th b thought of as norms that structure a mutually accountable community of equals To apply this criterion we must make judgments about what is reasonable How can we make these? There seems no alternative to putting ourselves into others' h d i hth ld d ti li bjti i t d i i l ld bl k if i t h i i t t i Thi i l j d t It i t i l th diti tht ld k th li bjti W iht thik ld b t t h t it ld b bl T k th iit j d t it t t t t t t i t th th' ti i t i l l t hth ld d th li bjti bl t k t th i l l ii l Suppose for example we are trying to determine what principles should govern reduction in nations' use of fossil fuels to combat global warming Contractualism will hold that developed and developing countries alike should govern their conduct b i i l tht f th ld bl j t If d t d d i ft j t d b d l i ti f i t it i th t d h t h thi ld b bl b j t i t k i thi h Ad tll b j t d b d l d ti i f t d d tht iht

Consequentialism Wh

t t lit t til E if th th b d Wh k t b bd j d t h i l 26

i i ll d t tili jd f i t i

d

t t l i

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ithi ti f i i t bt l b i ith it h l d t b prior t lit l iht d thi ld till b d d th i d ffi db t l i th l t ki l lti if f lit N i t h th i th t h k d ti l

f

THEORIES OF ETHICS

h i l d h t i Rth di t h t it is a bad thing that the suffering happened that such suffering is a bad state of affairs a bad thing to happen The idea is not just that suffering is bad for the sufferer but that it is a bad thing to occur period As these values and disvalues are independent f lit th l l d non-moral C t i l i t lt h i t t ith non-moral value theory: ti th f hih t t f th ld (thi tht h ) h i t i i l hih h d i l d t fh th l ith ith dil ki ith dil ti Wht k th l l i i t h t th t lti f l h t bt f outcomes or states ways the world might be Of course such states might nclude agency and character But even here the evaluation of the state (as something that happens) can be distinguished from the evaluation of the act or character trait that i t i t t f t h t t t Th iht i t t l t h i k it ld h b d if Hitl h d b i t d tht tht ld h b d thi t h h d b f th li it ld h d if h iti ld h h b ll A ill tilit iht d tht h killi ld b b t th i t i t h t th would be no incoherence in holding it to be wrong and at the same time thinking that the state of the world of Hitler's being assassinated would on balance have been a good thing to have occurred C t i l i t lt h i ll t h t th l iht d f t d t i d b th l d f relevant consequences Th h t kid fi hih tilit t h i diid Fit d t b i l th di b bi b d difft t h i f l l A t i l i t ith h d i t l th di t hih l i th l i t i i d ill di f l ith h hld tht i i h h i t i l l t l t b d thi in themselves Second consequentialist theories can also disagree by holding hat consequences of different sorts are relevant to determining moral right and wrong Act-consequentialism holds that whether a given act is right depends on the value of th f that act d ith th l f th f th t th t ld d i th i t A d i t ruleconsequentialism th th h d th i h t f t d d th t f th t b t f th il t f l ii fbiddi itti th t d ith th f ti th ibl l f tht kid f If ti l ii t f tht kid ld have the best consequences then the act is morally required And consequentialism can take other forms too All forms of consequentialism however understand moral evaluation to be an t f instrumental extrinsic l t th t f d t l l l All b d t h i f th i t i i l l f t d ll th l tt f t d h t b d t i i hih t il l tit f h t th b t i t t f ti th t lbl tt F t t i l i ll i h t t i th t' b t ilbl i t t f d i l l Ad l t i l i d th i h t f t

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b th dit f ill libl l tht i thi tiiti i il practices of moral reasoning and criticism the best instruments of that kind for producing nonmoral value In principle virtually any theory of outcome value can be harnessed to a conse tilit l th Hitill h tili h b d d tf t l b h i l h h h t h h t tht lbl t t h i l th li f i bi W iht ll benefit consequentialism th i tht lbl tt ll th d lf f bi th d tht l t t ltitl b b d thi It i ibl t b l i h tht thi b f t h bi b affecting something other than the quality of its experience or conscious mental states For example perfectionists sometimes assert that a being's approximating an ideal for its kind is intrinsically beneficial to it This is what leads to the conclusion fAittl' f " f t i " t tht h d flihi it i llt dititil h t i i t ( A i t t l 1998) B dl h b f t tilit h t d d t hld tht l b f t d h d til b ht itil til fft thi t l li tht i t f tili h l d ith hedonistic desire-based f The most popular form historically has been utilitarianism which is distinguished by three features First utilitarians are benefit consequentialists who because they hold either hedonistic or desirebased conceptions of benefit maintain either hedon iti d i b d tili S d tiliti h l d t h t th l l f t i d t i d b i th b f t d t t ll f f t d ti A d thid tiliti bli t h t th l iht f ti th

I II

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th

tt

l d t i d b h Th l i l hedonistic t i l i t i f lti i Bth f l hld tht h i i i d tt d tht l b b f t d l b th i t i i liti f thi i i that is by the degree of pleasure that they experience compared to their pain or suffering (Bentham 1970) A different kind of utilitarianism based as much per haps on a freestanding value of autonomy as on a conception of happiness holds tht idiidl' lf i d t i d b hi di d f Si l h f f thi th th th i t i i liti f thi i tt thi desire-satisfaction f f tilitii h th difft i l i t i f h d i t i F l iht t l di th i l f ti ild Adi tifti f f tilitii ld i h thi f t i f f i th if i it d tib tion to the quality of any being's experience (say because the individual in question did not know anything about the area's survival) Although consequentialists have usually been utilitarians or benefit consequen tilit f t th i thi i th l i f tili tht t i t it t th i P h i l h h f t l d tht h thi k ld d t d i fidhi l b t d titi d th l t l ti it d ti h i t i i l tht t b d d t th b f t th bi t h ( th t i t ) lif Aft ll f d t tifti t h l t i l th appreciation f th l th l t

28

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STEPHEN L DARWALL

Th id t h t th l bliti tht t l t i i thi hallmark of moral theories According to deontologists agency and action are not simply instruments for producing valuable states Rather actions are based on reasons and principles and some important moral principles crucially i l th t' lti t i ( th b i ) i th t h f f t It i l t h h t t b ki f t f ti f l t h t it ill i l (tht i )h i th b t i f i d b k i i dili fd d S tilit t h i l t h h t ll ith th t f l R l t i l i ill if d l if it d the greatest overall value (assessed agentneutrally) for there to exist social prac tices of moral criticism and psychological patterns of moral reasoning that are themselves guided by agentrelative rules according to which it is a wrongmaking ft f ti t h t it i l ' (th t') h i th b t i f i d d M it i i d l d t i l i t t h t thi i C t i l i t ll t h t th t ffti t d th t t ll l i W t b idd b t t i l i i thi d l i b t i d l itii th lt ld b h f many different reasons Shared rules are necessary to coordinate complex cooper ation establish reliable expectations diminish selfserving rationalizing and special pleading when the longrun effects of particular actions are unclear and so on In th d h l t i l i t ill t h t th f d t l f ti h t l t i l d i i l i t h t thi i i t tll fl i ti tt h l i t t l

Dtl Deontological theories depart from consequentialism on this fundamental point They hold that what is morally right and wrong is not determined at any level of l i b ht ld t th b t t tt d t t l l Th b k t i l f th ibilit f l lti f tt tht bth t t l d ll l t D t l di ith t t i l i i hldi tht d i d bd t i t th l thi t h t t d t k t iht D t l l di ith l t i l i i hldi t h t th h thi i t tht b l i i it t b itlf d th b t t D t l i t hld that at least some fundamental moral principles or ideas are agentrelative "all the way d o w n " Contractualism is one example of a deontological theory since it holds that moral i i l d d i th f d t l t l t i id f lii ith th t f t l t A thi h t i l i i i Th i t t i i hl fll D t l d tili dfi th tll l i d h t i f ti t h i f l iht d G l l t t l i d t t i i d t l i l t h i f l i d i thi h Vit t h i i d

30

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b S d d t moral t h i t ll b t l t i cases as replacements when put forward as part of a critique of morality (see "Virtue Theory" below) Some are deontological theories And some are consequen tialist in at least some important respects Thus Francis Hutcheson (see below) d d it th di t hih i l b l th h i h t it d d f ttilitii th d t h t thi th t ith th d l i b t i i i l d i thi h i h t i t Bt d t l i l t h i d i i l ft d f d d ditl itht t t t i t d th i th id t h t i h l d t b h b i Hitill th i fd t l h b l l d intuitionist i f intuitionism. What characterizes intuitionism in general is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of different right or wrongmaking features whose moral relevance cannot be derived from some more fundamental principle or reasoning but can only be fid b l flti " i t i t i " Thi iht b d ditl h f l it bi flti t h t th f t t h t ti ld t t b t l b k i t t i t it ll O it i thiki b t l i ifi f i t h flt th " t l l b l " it i d t tht i h d allowing it to happen are morally different Another example defended by some deontologists is the "doctrine of double effect" according to which there is a moral difference between causing harm or evil i t d d idfft f i t d d ti li di t d i th h il d i t l ith d t d Th l t h h it i t i b l thi h i t iili di d i ti f l h b b i ilit t t ll b f lti it ld t b t t t kill th b f iili ditl if d i ld d th lbl d f it i i i O i f thi i h i h thi i i l h l d i t t l i th controversial issue of abortion Since abortion aims directly at the death of the fetus it is sometimes argued that it is morally worse than another action would be which caused the fetus's death only as an unintended sideeffect While it might be permis ibl t f dil d tht i t t ' lif t th i k f killi th f t it i d tht b t i ft t th ' lif i ll th l b it i i i i b l t t i l killi D t l i l ititiit h d f d d id it fi d d t i i l d t i f iht ki ft f d t I dditi t the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between "doing and allowing" there have been claimed to be: duties of beneficence or mutual aid duties of non maleficence ("do no harm" along with the idea that these are weightier other thi bi l th dti fb f i ) dti f titd f b l h dti f titti f di j i d dti f fidlit l t i t i d t t dti f l l t i h i (ildi th f f i d t hild fil b d tk ll) f i l dti dti i t d t ( h t l d ) dti f i i t d fi l fth dti fj t i d t i t th i l (t th t t t h t th h

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tb i l d d l d ) dti t l d i th Of it itionists do not agree about every doctrine or principle not even about all we have mentioned But they are none the less agreed that some such list of independent principles or doctrines is correct and that the principles on the list cannot be derived f f d t l i i l th h t t l i tili Bth i t i t i i t d t t l i t d t l i t h l d t h t th i h t i R l ' h " i t th d" ( R l 1971 3 0 3 ) Th b l i tht t t t t di th i h t f t t l t l i b d t fil i th ti f h t it i i h t t d i tht f t f l ithi the world defined by a complex set of relations to others who make widely varying claims on us owing to these different relations What states of affairs would be good to exist considered as from some agentneutral observer's standpoint may f there h l b th idti tht l t t ht l t h l d d Bt dti d d l ithi th t t b iht t l t ifll th i d lti t d i d tht ti bi t t d i t th t d tit t t t t th h i t i f th ith h i t t d Many of these relations were listed in passing above but we should have them before us more explicitly We cannot begin to exhaust them but it will be helpful to give some idea of their range (1) Dti f bf d lf Lik tilit d t l i t bli tht h ti f f t th d f th (th t l t d h th b i h h lf d) l h l t ht hld d ll B t th l i i t j t t h t th lbl d i l b l t t t It l tt ht t d t lti h t th f f t d ti ( d ht l ti ti bi t h ) H i th i ( ij d t the other) other things being equal than forbearing to benefit It is not ust the causing of a disvaluable state; it is doing harm to some being Doing harm is worse also than failing to prevent it And directly intending harm is worse than causing it i t d d idfft (2) Dti f il Vi i l lti f tki i i t il bliti fb f i Th t h bliti t t th lf f thi hild tht h t th th d t i fb f h t th i l Ad i i l l f t t d th lti f ilid h d t t h d h ibl f t h i tients' or students' medical or educational welfare (3) Duties of honesty and fidelity Obligations not to lie or intentionally mislead to keep promises not to violate contracts and more generally not to encourage tti i t d t t t ll fit d th l t f k i fith d t ilti t t V i l l t i h i lik th f f i d l d b l d d thi bi ll (4) Dti dii f t' d t i t ' hiti f dt Wh d ij th i d t i t th t k l d flt d ff titti ( t f l t ) Wh th bfit i dti f titd t d th

32

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{patient-benevolence) A ' t d t ll f it sponse especially from those who have special responsibilities to respond appropri ately to merit and desert such as judges of various kinds (patient desert) (5) Duties of reciprocity and fair play There is a duty to do one's part in mutually d t ti ill h l t i l t ti bfit C t t i / t t l i t thi d t f d t l F titi i t it i i l i d d t l i t t dt th fth dti fjti d i f litil (6) Further duties of justice V i lti f l f tht f l itihi H h dti t t j t litil d tht tblih d t t b i iht d hi distributive justice Where actual political relations are lacking as in the nter national context justice may require that we do our part to help establish ustice more widely through more extensive political forms i dti d d l lti I (7) Duties to other species H dditi t d t i fb f d lfi i i l bli ti t b f ti i i t hit fi t t i ith th E if th i l t b fll t i ti h i d t i t th i t th i hih h i l d th i lives and ourselves in theirs Pets are an obvious example but no less significant may be cases where species are themselves shaped and cultivated for human pur poses in ways that give them special needs and vulnerabilities Thi l i t i i hdl h t i It h l d b b i t thi it h t h t th d i i f i t l ill i i t b l i l t j t i l i i l iht ki idti bt l bi ti f i i l idti Si ititiiti d t l j t th id tht hi i i l id f i it i t f h i h th i i l idti iht b i t t d iitid h d i t i t i i t bli t h t th b i f l flti i t d thinking about concrete cases? W D Ross distinguished between the claim that a given duty or right or wrong making consideration holds prima facie that is other things being equal and he iti tht i t l i t thi th i l dt ll thi i d d h t it sans phrase (R 1963) (Si " i f i " t thi i t l i l h i l h d ikl t th t "pro tanto" [" f it "] Th t l id i t h t iht ki idti i tht k t iht other things being equal h tht t h t th l ll l t ft th th ti would be right or wrong all things considered or "sans phrase") It was claims of the former sort that Ross held to be selfevident to intuition To render a moral judgment in any actual case however it is necessary to reflect on all of the morally l t f t d h th i t t T tk fili kid f h id t d thi f ltil d i t l t fid lf l d i iti t i th id i t h t hih h h di H bth i d d ti t h iht b t i ihti d id It ld b t t d l i f i it b t th lf f th i ti ii i t i d l bliti t

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t th i i B t thi i t th l i hih l considerations can interact Sometimes one consideration can wholly defeat an other When for example a benefit one is in a position to provide is tainted by injustice this may cancel the positive reason to provide the benefit and not ust t i h it Ultitl i t i t i i t it th i i l btitt t fll idi thil i ll f t h i lit A l i " f t i " it i riht ki f t i f i dti i i t t t f th Bt h b th i t t i tht i t i t i i t bli df l f l t i d b t t th t t grips with these complex interactions in a way that leads to a reflective sense of what moral verdict they will ultimately support

Vit

Th

C t t r i i / t t l i tili dd t l ll l t h i M i thi i d i t l d ith til questions we have been considering these theories as accounts of morally right conduct An approach called virtue ethics frequently associated with Aristotle is orthogonal to these theories in both respects First virtue is concerned primarily ht ith h t th th d t ith h h l d be th th h l d d Ad d it thi i f t l d d t l th bt t f th thill d t fh lif t h t it i ti d ttil i l t d h l t f lit d it dititi f Th ti f lit t f i l d fill thritti l b h i h ll l t t r i l l obligated i far from the only form that ethical reflection can take (Anscombe 1958; Maclntyre 1981; Williams 1985; Slote 1992) The modern idea of morality derives from a distinctive historical tradition the JudeoChristianIslamic idea of divinely ordained l t h i h it i l S h i l h h d t h t thi ti f lit i i l dfti i ri d tht thil flti ld fitbl tk th f S l h h d thi ii thil th l k d t A r i t t l ' Nicomachean Ethics f ti F A i t t l th f d t l ti i t f Mill H b b K t " W h t i th f d t l i i l f l riht d t dh iht thi b d f d d h i l h i l l ? " A r i t t l k th " W h t i th l f human life?" "What kind of life is best for human beings?" Aristotle's is a distinctive kind (a paradigm perhaps) of non-moral virtue ethics "nonmoral" again because although Aristotle's translators frequently use "moral i t " t i l t h t h i tlki b t ll f h t tht d ith h i Aittl d t l t th it t ti f l l d h i h ll tbl l Vit f Aittl di k dt id h t iti t h ht i fi bl (kalori) f it i b Th ti ti i ht N i t h lld " k d i " ideal ith t t hih b btt t l tht 34

THEORIES OF ETHICS

li ith ilt F A i t t l th ti thil ti h esteem pride and disdain or contempt not guilt respect selfrespect and moral indignation Virtues are excellences {arete) traits that is that make something an excellent i t f it k i d It i it i kif f l t h t it h h d t h t it t ll I l k hih t i t ll ( l l t ki) i lti t thi' f t i (ergon) h t i t i tiit A A i t t l bli t h t th h t i t i tiit d i t i t i fh bi i ti ( i ) tht dititil h f f hi (f ti l d i t h l bl fi (kl)) h ld t h t th it tit f character that is settled dispositions to choose certain actions and avoid others as intrinsically noble or base We might put his point by saying that human excel lences are states of character concerned with choices that are themselves guided by idl fh ll I l l it thi i h ( l ) h idl A l t h h it b tid i Aittl' t t l l i l f t i i t i f h t di t h i h th i thi tht h bi i h t l f to b it d t b b d A l it thi b put forward simply as a normative view about which traits in human beings are worthy of esteem (or disdain) Analogously a moral virtue ethics is a theory of what is worthy of distinctively moral esteem that is traits that are worthy of esteem in a moral agent E l f h i b f d i Libi d th i h t t h t Sttih h i l h F i Hth Th H t h d t h t th b i l h i t f b l th d i t b f i t th d k th h M l t h hld i t iril f t bt f ti tit f h t l th d i t d d t f h bi d th t i t bi Th i i h i h th f it thi iht b ti of case or practical ethics First nonmoral virtue ethics reminds us that questions of right and wrong are far from the only or perhaps even the most important ethical questions we can ask in specific cases Thus it might be that failing to provide i i f i t l id t li ld h d ffri l t h h t i l ll th l ift i f l d lftifti O if th i t i t thi t h t b d jtl t t d l t t i till ift i i t t t i t d t d th i t l l t i t tht t dd ith l i i fll tifi h if S d ti f th i t i i d d t h ht action it is appropriate to take in specific cases In considering what to do it may be helpful to ask what a virtuous person or someone with a specific virtue (say generos ity) would do in that case This may simply be a useful heuristic but it may also flt th A i t t l i i t h t th i ff l t i thil iht t tht b d d ll lid b h l k th id " " f th i t A L i A t i td t h "If h t k 'll k " id b t j Thid i t thiit tf d ti f it t i l id t it ( ll i h t ) ti bt t f ht k ti

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it ll i h t Th it b hld tht ti i th iht or appropriate thing to do in some case or circumstance just in case it is what the virtuous person would (characteristically) do in that circumstance (Hursthouse 1999) Such a view might depart from the letter of Aristotle's position since he idtifd it ttld d i i t i t h ifi ti f thi k ( b l ) Thi ld t k hih t i t it d d hih ti bl t i N t h l i it ld h l d t h t t th it f ti i ibl t h h th id d t f it h i ld i it l t Aittl' i f d t l iit W h t i t it thi i th id t h t id t sial questions of case ethics can be gained only by looking to the virtues or the virtuous person as a model Writers on case ethics therefore look to virtue ethics less frequently than they do t th thil t h i ill h th d ith i f l iht d If j d t f l bliti iliitl diti hldi th tbl f li it ill b bl t d d tht tifi ti f th j d t b f l t d i t t h t th b j t t th d t i i i l t It i thi d d tht h l d t th k i d f normative moral theories that have been advanced by contractarian/contractual ists consequentialists and deontologists In each case the goal has been to articu late actionguiding principles of right conduct that can be grasped and applied itht il it th th th j d t f ll t t l t

Rf A b G E M (1958) M d l h i l h Philosophy 33 1 1 9 Aristotle (1998) Nicomachean Ethics trans W D Ross New York: Oxford University Press Bth J (1970) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation d J H B dH L A H t L d Athl Dancy Jonathan (1993) Moral Reasons Oxford: Blackwell Social Philosophy and Policy 14 D l l Sth (1997) S l f i t t d lf Cbid U i i t P 15878 Al i Ell F P l ( d ) Self-interest C b i d CO W t i P (1998) Philosophical Ethics B l d (2002) Welfare and Rational Care Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press G t h i D i d (1986) Morals by Agreement O f d C l d P H Gilbrt (1975) M l ltii d f d d The Philosophical Review 84 3 2 2 I d i l i EST H k t t H b b Th (1994) Leviathan d E M C l Hursthouse Rosalind (1999) On Virtue Ethics Oxford: Oxford University Press K t I l (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals d d t M G N Y k Cbrid U i i t P McDowell John (1979) Virtue and reason The Monist 62: 3 3 1 5 0 IN U i i t fNt D M l t A l d i (1981) After Virtue N t D BbbMrill Mill J h S t t (1957) Utilitarianism d Ok P i t I d i l i The Philosophical Review 95 163207 Rilt P t (1986) M l li Rawls John (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University

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(1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press Ross W D (1963) The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press Rousseau Jean-Jacques (1987) The Social Contract. In The Basic Political Writings, trans Donald A Cress Indianapolis IN: Hackett Scanlon T M (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Slote Michael (1992) From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press Thomson Judith (1976) Killing letting die and the trolley problem The Monist, 59: 204-17 Williams Bernard (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

Further reading Darwall Stephen (ed) (forthcoming) Contractarianism/Contractualism. Oxford: Blackwell (forthcoming) Deontology. Oxford: Blackwell (ed) (forthcoming) Virtue (Ethics). Oxford: Blackwell

37

3 P t

Riht

d Wlf

Rditibti

JEREMY WALDRON

I ll d iti t it it ith b j t t I th U i t d Stt th 1999 fi l t h t th i t l 21 illi fili ith h h l d i i f $100000 d th 16 illi f i l i ith h h l d i l th $ 1 7 0 0 0 M t f th l t t lii i t j d d b ffiil " t li" (tiltd tl b the US authorities as around $ 1 7 5 2 4 per annum for a family of four) Defining poverty is of course difficult and controversial But we may understand it in a h d d l t d i t tht i b f i h h l d t tdl k h d hi bt tifi i d f f thi b (hlt i i l l titi f d bt t bth b i dil hlt bt t bth dil hlt d i i l l triti f d bt t d t lthi d ) P fili th th h d h i d th hih bl th il t t i f ll the needs of all their members and devote an amount to items going well beyond need that would be sufficient if spent differently to satisfy all the basic needs of many many more N dbt h ld b id b t th dfiti M h i l h d il i t i t h d i d f idi b l t dfiti f " t " lid f ll iti d i t (S 1992) Thi i tl b t i dfid i t f d d t t t f d t d t b lti t th i t f i it Wht t b i di ltil b tti lik A r i it iht b d i f f t f ht t b i di l it ( B b k 1987) O i l l it i td tht we should pin down the concept to survival so that we count something as a need only if a person will die without it But even this remains ambiguous How ikely must death be and how imminent? What does the formulation assume about l lif t d tlit t t ? A A t S it t P l h b k t i ith i d i b l littl titi d th t b lti i t f lif tti dit liit id I ft physical opulence seems to go on increasing with nutrition over a very wide range Th i diffilt i d i li h d th lld " i i tri

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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

tional requirements" have an inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations bt d i (S 1981) N t

f thi d

i

tht dfiti bl f th

hld i i d t f d di

t h t tht iti t

i l flti t W d diiti fi d lth d t h t it i th f i th iti t i t i t th t fft

i thil iifi f th diiti A society with great disparities of wealth will face pressure for some sort of redistribution of income so that a proportion of the assets that the prosperous enjoy is diverted to satisfy the basic needs of the very poor Such pressure might be i t d b th llff d b i l th f h i th ditibti ht i i d th t d i d d th it i likl t b B t if th li d t d th l l f it it l th id f ditibti i i t t i i It h l l t t h i k b t th l tt ll th i iifi f th h b lth d i ll d t i d S th l ditibti tht t b l i d t i d b th di ti f kt (ildi th kt f l b ) Is the demand for redistribution a reproach to these processes? Or do these processes have a significance of their own that may be used as a basis for criticizing particular redistributive schemes? Maybe the economist who defends market processes as d i t i ffii l t h i i t i ill t t tht df t itii d i t i b t i h tht h ditt kt t O b ditibti b itiid l d f di th l i i b i l i t f i i t f d i t i th lb i f th t i t l t f th h llff M t f thi h t ill f th l th th th i t It is important however to understand that the two are related Market processes are not just valued instrumentally; economists do not normally advocate setting up any old allocative arrangements that happen to conduce to efficiency Markets are l d b thi titti t t bd i t t i i l f it l t Th f d t l l f kt "N t f itht t" d "K t t " l l i i l d t d t f ll ll ill h th iltd S it' tht lf ditibti d i t t lb kt th t t f kt i t i i ld j t i l i t it ft h t f l reproach as well for it is seeking implicitly to defend institutions that have inherent moral significance even apart from their outcomes Modern societies adopt two main redistributive strategies for mitigating the rigors f t F i t th id b f i d titi (f l bli d t i d i ti i l hlth ) t ll iti ti f t h i bilit t S d th id l i t ith i h i kid t l b f i i h d t h h f th t d th t t f h t d th diti h i h it i granted vary widely between societies and within societies over time Both types of provision raise interesting moral issues but I shall focus mainly on the second type

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ft d i b d " l f " b it ditibti i l i t i evident In fact the extent of the redistribution involved in actuallyexisting welfare schemes is easy to exaggerate At the time of writing in the United States federal b d t t t d lf t i t l t t f d 6 t f t di S lt tk i l l fil ith h h l d i f ( ) $100000 b t 35 t f thi i f d l t Of t h t $35000 t f d f th f i l t th US T d 6 t i d t d t lf t f T t it th th fil i l i i d t tibt l lihtl th 2 t f it t t l household income to the poor (slightly more when state taxes and transfers are taken into account) Given the extent of poverty in the United States a 2 percent contribution from each of the most prosperous households must be regarded as a fil d t t Still th ti ti i i f i t t f ld d th l f $2000 ( ) i bb i l M d f d f lf ditibti ft i t i i th t t f d d th US t i l d th ll f h hih l l f ii f th l l f ii hih might well require a contribution two or three times greater than that currently paid by welloff American households We have to evaluate these proposals as well So how should we think about welfare from a moral point of view? How should we t h i k b t th 2 6 t fi ( th $ 2 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 ) t h t lf d t thik f i l (lt' if th h d f h h h l d " P " ) should f i d i t t t d id t th i d i t ( tti f h hll if "Idi")? P h i l h i l dbt b t th thi f lf ii t d t f th compulsory t f th t f T t i d d i t i b t i i l f d t f t l t f P i d (It i t Idi hth h claims the welfare assistance to which his household is entitled) One could imagine Prospero being quite happy to make a voluntary donation to Indigo's family But he may be affronted by the fact that this money has to be paid to the US Treasury for d it lti fl ffiil d i t i b t i I f t R b t N i k (1974 169) td tht hld dt t i f i " ith f d l b " If P i f d t i 2 t f hi i f k t Idi th h i i f f t f d t k f Idi f b t k N N i k k l d tht P i t litll f d t k f tht k h ld i k ltth db welfare recipient himself Prospero chooses to work and having made that choice he has to devote a week of his year to Indigo's sustenance But as Nozick observes coercion often involves such hard choices When a robber threatens me with a beat i l I t l l hi th biti t f I t k th b t i ( d k th b i t i ) if I t t Still t f ld if I d i th biti d t h t th I f d t d Th bb h fll t k t ti I titld t t h t i keep-the-combination-and-not-get-beaten R l t i tht b l i h h d itti i d t t ht h t (Nik 1972) Th ti i t i i Bt ti t h t t t i th l

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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

N i k t tblih tht k f l f d t t r i b t i t t h an appropriate baseline for thinking about whether taxandtransfer should count as coercing Prospero He must present this as an option that Prospero is antecedently entitled to so that it is wrong and coercive for the government to take it away n d t t hi t k ( littl) f th ll f h i l f Bt f tht' tl f th it ti Oth t b t i t th l lit f th t f S h i l h h d tht t t li d i P ' tibti f l t f it b l f d ditibti th l h f th l lit t h t i h t b hibitd i l t t f hit (Rothbard 1970) But this objection is hardly conclusive For one thing the elem ent of charity or generosity though important is not the only morally important feature of the transaction A benevolent act has two features: the admirable motiv ti f th i d th h d d b f i t t th i i t Th d f th d t l it i i f i h th f i t i d i d W ti ll t tht tibt t th' d d hih t i l l t f dill beneficent t dt b l t ( K t i l i 1976) A it i t l tht tt li does f f t ti i th manner complained of Consider an analogy: most of us refrain from murder be cause of our recognition that murder is wrong; and that does not cease to be our motive when we realize that the state will punish us if we commit such an act The l t f li t b k t th i t ti it d t il l t it Adittdl th f t d t f i litd W l th tt t l t f th t i th f th f h b l i i f f i i t ti bt l t t th t tht lik P ill it i th t t t P h h h ill b f i t f th h Th fit f th ft d i d d h t h t th l lit f th giving is not the straightforward benevolence that is involved in giving alms to a beggar There are other elements as well elements of fairness and mutual assur ance among donors The idea is that each person who can should make a fair t b f i t h li t t (1) d t i ht tibti ld be f i tibti (2) d i t th llti f tibti d (3) id h tibt ith tht h th i tht hi h tiiti i t i i B t th liti d t d i th l t f d i l l I ll t f th h i l t h i t t l l iti t if b t th d t b d d d d ht ld b reasonable amount to give Modern tithing is like that; so is the voluntary support I give to my local orchestra; and a great deal of charitable aid involves money being given to agencies without the donor having any idea of who in particular (in some t th th id f th ld) ill b f i t f hi h d t i O d t d tht b l b l th th i l idd t t d l bl it i l t t th itii tht tt i l t il d i th t h i l l t A hititd i f th bjti li tht t f t d t f t t th bliti tht P d b t d l h t h l th 41

JEREMY WALDRON

t h h it perfect b l i t i lik hi b l i t i t k i Bt maybe the moral obligation to help the poor is more like an imperfect duty one that commands concern for the welfare of others but which is understood to leave a certain amount of latitude for free choice in determining what to do about it (see Stk 1967) F l I t b I lk dN Y k d t h h I it ld b t t i t f th I t b d t i t b h th I id t ifi iti t f t h t i t d h t f C t i l it ld i i l lti t th b t tht f th h I right t f it i i h t f t i d tt i (t least to some) but the choice is mine and it is not the subject of any rightful demand on their part A perfect obligation by contrast that is an obligation determining a particular action that must be performed (or as the case may be ittd) i h it f ( i i ) i i ti II b l t d ith iht I h f t bliti t h f dit h h iht t b id b d I d t h ll t t d hi t bt t ll h th ti f t i Thi b j t i t t d t f i th tj t lit b t li Nor is it a matter of Prospero having the right to neglect the demands of morality for the sake of his own wellbeing According to Kant (1996: 153) an imperfect duty "is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions but only ii t liit i fdt b th ( l f ' ihb lb l f ' t) b h i h i f t th f l d f th ti f it i i d d " It i til t d t flt ht lit h lld " i thi" th h l ti tht ht t th t i l d t th d d b f f d lif if h lif i t ilbl t ll ( N l 1991) I t d th i tht thi i h t l d i t i i th l l i bi td it it i dt minate requirement from which all elements of individual udgment have been removed I think the language of imperfect obligation needs to be examined quite carefully i thi t t A h th id i d t b tht P t dt bt d t d t ll f th l i f d tht t hi ttti Nt li t t li f iht i t hi N h thi? S l it i t b l th d f some l tt ( i til l ti f t h ) Th ll tt Th it f tlk t id t ibilit f fi f t dt t b t h t Prospero i them all In other words a given claim's mattering Indigo's claim for example does not mean it amounts to a right against Prospero But Indigo may still have a right against the class of eligible dutybearers: it ought to be the case that someone f tht l d t hi d d l tht i t ld t b th id f i f t dt Bt h l k t it i thi t h t th id f t d t f t does t th ti f i f t dt A t f lf ii i tb d th i tht Idi h iht i t P It i b d th th i t h t th l f liibl d t b h bt th fll ibilit f th d f ll f th h i i h d

42

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

N tht d d f lit iht b l i d t h h th h h d l tion of random voluntary performances of individual imperfect duties; or it might be satisfied by an orchestrated taxandtransfer system which elicits a fair share from each of the eligible dutybearers for the collective fulfillment of all of the claims that iht b d b h f th it i i t Th diff i f ffi i t l i i l A l t i l l th i thi i th ti f iht i d f ifi h th b f th lti d t ( M C i k 1977 201) A d i t J h R ' (1984) i f l t i l t hld tht X h iht h t tht idiidl i t t fXi ffiitl important to justify holding others not necessarily any specified other to be under a duty There certainly seem to be good arguments for regarding Indigo's interests in this light that is as the basis of a moral right to welfare and I will go nto th i t Bf I d th i lii bjti S iti (Th t 1984 1394) t b d th id f lf iht d l it ith f needs I t h i k thi ti i b d i d t d i It f th t t f li ith th ti f i hih tht li i h d (It i lik i hld t t l dti d tth telling!) The language of rights as nowadays understood is perfectly accommodating to a concern about human need There used to be controversy in the analysis of rights about whether rights should be regarded as essentially negative in character; tht i iht t i t f d t th f f i t i il it tht lf iht ld i ( Wld 1996) B t thi t h l l b b d d th i f t i l d d i i iht h b btti tt t lti Adittdl tti th f lf ii i t f iht d t il th lit b t li f l t h h iht ft dd li t h t it i it t f tht t f th d t fll i t l i l b it f use of the Razian template (I shall return to this in a moment) Also whether we should advocate the incorporation of welfare rights into a constitution and their enforcement by courts is a still further matter and well beyond the scope of this h t Nthi I h t t df f constitutional lf iht I dfdi th id f lf i h t th t fili t t i l t f t l t i f iht tht l d d i t t Th f l H Sh (1980) tht fll j any i h t t h t h h i d t h if h h l k th til f bl hlth d ti lif Th i h t t h t t fili t iht t iil d political liberty evoke images of autonomy rational agency and independence But we know that things like malnutrition epidemic disease and exposure can debili tate and finally destroy all the human faculties that such rights presuppose There is t f Idi lii th t f t lif t h t h i id h tlk b t iil d l i t i l i h t if h i i tt f bjt d d t d Th th h t tht i t tk h t l f ttki t h t i th i l t tk h idiidl d d b f f dtitti t d t ldi f bit If t l t h diitlf t fll tht l h it d

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JEREMY WALDRON

d i th i t fh lif it ll i t t t d t th needs of persons whose ability to function as agents is threatened by poverty or disease or by the fear of those predicaments Or we can try a more direct approach Instead of saying that welfare provision s f thi l (f t f i f l iil d litil libt) iht i l i i t tht ii f di f d t l t f t f N if thi i t t d thi b t iti t d t f h it i littl h d t dit W l f ii tl tid t i t th i t littl l t t b dd f d t l i h t f it h t i t i l l t itlf dd t tblihd h f property and market economy rather than as a basic determinant of social arrange ments If we want to pursue the idea of a basic right to welfare we will do better to regard it in the first instance as a rather abstract right involved in the very founda ti f litil d i th d th k f th t f i b t t d t f W ld t thi f d t i l h h t t th l tt f i lit b t th ditibti t f lf Th lik P h t d t id f d f lf ditibti t d t of wealth and income that is legally theirs (Even when Prospero's salary is taxed at source still the taxes are paid out of funds to which he is legally entitled by contract with his employer for example) But the fact that the money legally belongs t P d t ttl th ti f hth P i titld t it tt fj t i Whth iti h f t di ditibti j t i l ti If th t t h t i if th iti h i j t th t tth h l iht t P ' lit b t bi f d t tibt t lliti fI d i ' liht M b k l tt t P ' iti i l b it f th f t t h t it i id b iti iti l b t th i t h t thi ld i t th level of a justiceclaim is to say the least a very controversial theorem n the theory of justice and false on most accounts We can try a similar analysis from Indigo's end Apart from the taxandtransfer idi I d i ' t f it t l l i t hi t h iht h l l tt ht N t h l it i h t b itk t d I d i ' t l " l " li A b d tht I d i ' t t i li fj t i li tht h b it f th i fjti fit ll l l ititti Idi b lii tht h d l lik hi ( h h d hi t ) t t d fairly in the initial distribution of resources and opportunities Maybe their wealth and livelihood was stolen or maybe they were never given the chance that ustice would demand to secure wealth and livelihood for themselves If this is the basis of I d i ' li d i l l if it i th b i hih ll i ti th iti llti f lth d i t P th P ' lit b t ditibti i ltil f i i l It i lik th lit f b l lltblihd d t fb l h thi i l l t t i fill t d t (th h i f) t h i i t i Phill ditibti i tki l bt t tht i ll i t t T d thi it i l hdi t

44

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

th f f t it t t h thi littl t d lf ii involving this sort of rectification for the welfare schemes that we are focusing on do not involve any serious physical redistribution of land or other assets But that's just because they are so modest (or miserly) The fundamental case for welfare is t h t th lliti f t i th least t h t j t i i l b i ijti i th d i t i b t i f lth d t i t i d d d Th i t f thi f d t i l h t th d f f lf ii i iditd l b f i N i k (1974) A l t h h it i h t i id t b h iht t i l d N i k it t t h t th hih ld h t b d t t i f th d l d b owned by individuals He argues that if private property entitlements in fact cover all the relevant resources there is nothing to be done so far as welfare provision is concerned: the property rights that particular individuals have over particular thi "fill th f iht l i f l iht t b i ti t i l d i t i " ( N i k 1974 238) N i thi b j t i ht li b d d ltil fiil l i l th f i t i t l t It i t h h first d t i d h ht d only then t i d h t d lft tifd S fNik' li t tht this order of priorities is unavoidable: "Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them" (1974: 160) He thinks that this is clearest in the case of body parts: Indigo may need Prospero's kidneys but Pros ' t i t l t t th i il i t I d i ' f t P ' tt itht ii i tht tt ihtfl li t th l i b ll d tht k hi h h i B t N i k t h i k t h t thi i i t t l f th t l b j t tht l k " I ' t it i l i b l tht h hldi d d d t it h f f t t ll h hld h l d h t ? " (1974 155) Th t b l ith lf iht thi t i tht th " t t b j t if th df h t f t h i " lik from heaven "[I]s this the appropriate model" he asks "for thinking about how the things people produce are to be distributed?" (1974: 160 198) I am not saying that Nozick is right about this But the challenge of his objection i t h t it f t f t th i f l iit N i k i it i h t l t h t th id f lf iht th id t h t I d i ' i h t t iht b b d i l d th th hi h i d it f d it d it i hll t d t d i f i t t Th ti f t ill b if it i l bjt t b t hll thi b i S h thik h t h ith til l have acquired property entitlements in particular things or people in general have a right to material and economic security even when they cannot provide it for themselves One or other of these things can be true but not both We do not have t tNik' lti f thi dil i d t ith hi b t th i t f f t i it h t l d liitl If tt f t thi i ithi th fi f Niki th th hld b i b ii tht ll tbl t f P ' t i t l t t hi t tb ditd i th f th initial i iti f f t i l l d d th f t f dti W

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t tlk f t iht i t lf ii til h th tht deals with "the issues of how unheld things may come to be held the things that may come to be held by these processes the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process and so on" (Nozick 1974: 150) What's more we must develop i i l f iiti tht t h ' f d t l iht t d i t f thi ld t h t i hit A l t ll i t h i f t i tht t i t i th J h L k i it i t b l l i iht f t ll t i th l t t f th d (Lk 1988 170) d i t b hi llk t i k th jtifiti f i t t ith th iti tht l i t i t iti leaves "enough and as g o o d i n common for others" (1988: 288) And Nozick despite his exclusionist bluster recognizes it too with his "Lockean proviso" (Nozick 1974: 178) I l th h t th d f f lf iht tht I i d iht b d t i l d fundamental i th fh t d f I t d f ki th i h t th b i f dt f hit i b t iti thld t t k th b i f lli iti t t t h l it ti t h t th it f unsatisfied material need becomes an objection not just to the way property rights are being exercised (selfishly thoughtlessly etc) but to the very shape and distribu tion of property entitlements themselves In proclaiming welfare rights we are not b i thld t b littl W ki th th d ti b h t i h t d th li t hld thi l i l thi i f f t h ' bjt d? W i i t t h t t t t th t i b l f d t th th d A l t t i l iht h th N i k i f k l t t h d tk difft h t jti h t h t f R l (1971) R l t i i t tht lf iht t b id t dd bt i t f foundational theory of the basic structure of society a structure that includes the whole system of property markets and subsistence We justify the basic structure as a package by showing that it satisfies principles that would be chosen (for that )b i R l ' " i i l iti" h i t f h th t d i th t l ltt ft l t biliti d t I lti t thi t k f il j t i f t i i idiidl i kd t id ht h ld t f il t if h d i d ' t k hth h i t t t t b l k lik P f t t lik I d i R l k tht idiid l f t d ith thi h i ld i i t i i l tht d tht il and economic inequalities were regulated to the advantage in the first instance of the leastwelloff group (This is Rawls's "Difference Principle"; Rawls 1971: 7 5 8 ) Such principles would then govern the whole structure of property markets and bit i tht fi t Th i i l ld t t h l d t i ht titld t b t it ld t b ii if th d d th i t i t t i f thi lik d t f lf ii ( R l 1971 276) A d if th did th ld b bjti t h i i th b i f t i h t f th lf ititti d th t ititti ld b t h b j t i f i d t f th b i t t di 46

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND WELFARE REDISTRIBUTION

t th b i i i l (Iidtll I d't t t t tht R l ' theory is the only alternative to Nozick's; but it is the best known of a cluster of theories including Ackerman 1980; Van Parijs 1995; Dworkin 2000 that insist on approaching issues of property poverty and inequality in this holistic ) All thi i b f h i t h t th l i b l d f f lf iht h l d t i t l f i th f d t i f th f t d ti It i t l i ti t libl h i l h Riht t d t bit f d tl t ti f th t d t di d d d ith d ll ith t i ld t h t ti th resources that might (if others let them) enable them to live and flourish The welfare system might seem like an optional addon to a market economy But the advantage of the account I have outlined is that we can view welfare provision as th l i t i l ti f l t h t i l i b It i th flti i d i i tti ti f li tht d d it ll b b t f t thik f it littl th h i t t f t t t d lt h l f th t f hi t h fil t tf d t l h iht i i d i t d b th f t t h t l ti t b itht t th resources that they need in order to live When we take this approach then familiar objections to welfare rights seem much less formidable The objection based on the element of compulsion is no l it b tlki b t iht hih t th b i f th jtifti f th t f t If thik t h t t iht l i t i t l b f d h h t t h i k th b t lf iht h t h b thi iti i t d l f th tifiti f t N hld t h b t th b j t i tht t d t f h i h th h d k i d d th i d l t S h d i t i t i bt it d i dbt i t t B t th t distribution of resources and opportunities; they may not be invoked as a reason for neglecting or postponing economic justice or for failing to do what as we saw earlier may be presented as the very least that justice demands We are not titld t ithhld f idiidl thi tht h h i titld t l b f t h t thi ld i f hi h idl d if thi it li t t it li t lf iht t if th i th b f t f th t ff d t i l tIh td S iti tht lf iht i l t th l i l i i l "Ought i l i can" M ti th d th th t id i i l economic security for masses of their citizens (Cranston 1967) But even if true this is hardly a basis for attacking existing welfare provision in countries where patently the resources are available (even if people would prefer to devote them to thi l) A th l l d i i b i l i t i ft t f ti t h t th iti ditibti f t i t i l l di t b d Wh ti t i t l f lf ii "Th i l i't t h " ht i ll t i t h t it ld b iliti t t t i it f iti thld d i b t t i Th d i l hll t h t th iht t th d l i

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ditibti f lth d i i i l i d O tt t i thi way it becomes pretty clear that the "ought" of human rights is being frustrated not by the "can't" of impracticability but more usually by the "shan't" of blinkered selfishness No doubt where resources are scarce relative to human wants any t f iht t i t l t ill d d i t th h t i d b it If i t i l d ii f lf it it l d d i t t B t if it d ti l d h ii th th t f t iht i h ill l d d i t th ii it d t h t th f i f ki f t h t th d t i A l th ti i t hth t h d i system of demanding rights but how the costs of the demands are to be distributed

References B (1980) Sil Jti i th Libl Stt N H CT Y l U i i t Ak P Braybrooke David (1987) Meeting Needs Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press M i (1967) H iht l d d I D D R h l (d) Plitil C t 4153 Ld Mill Th d th Riht f M Dworkin Ronald (2000) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality Cambridge MA: H d U i i t P K t I l (1996) Th Mthi f Ml dM G Cbrid Cbrid U i i t P K t i l i A (1976) O b l Mid 85 4 2 8 3 1 Locke John (1988) Two Treatises of Government ed Peter Laslett Cambridge: Cambridge U i i t P M C i k D N (1977) Riht i l i l t i I P MS H k dJ R (d) L Morality and Society pp 189209 Oxford: Clarendon Press N Y kOfd U i i t P N l Th (1991) Elit d Ptilit N i k R b t (1972) C i I Pt Lltt WGR i d Q t i Ski (eds) Philosophy Politics and Society: Fourth Series pp 10135 Oxford: Blackwell (1974) A h Stt d Uti O f d B l k l l R l J h (1971) A Th f Jti Ofd Ofd U i i t P R J h (1984) R i h t b d liti I J W l d ( d ) Thi f Riht 182200 O f d O f d U i i t P Rothbard Murray (1970) Power and Market: Government and the Economy Menlo Park: Insti tt f H Stdi dFi A E Etitlt dD i t i O f d S A t (1981) P t Clarendon Press (1992) I l i t R i d C b i d MA H d U i i t P Sh H (1980) Bi Riht Sbit Affl d US F i Pli P r i t NJ Prit U i i t P Stacker Michael (1967) Acts perfect duties and imperfect duties Review of Metaphysics 20: 50733 T h t M k (1984) A riht T L Ri 62 1363403 (1995) Rl Fd f All Wht (if Athi) C Jtif Citli? V P i j Phili Oxford: Clarendon Press

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Waldron Jeremy (1996) Rights and needs: the myth of disjunction In Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns (eds) s pp 87-109 Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

Further reading Arneson Richard J (1990) Liberalism distributive subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare s 19: 158-94 Goodin Robert (1985) Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of our Social Responsibilities Chicago: University of Chicago Press Gutmann Amy (ed) (1988) Democracy and the Welfare State Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Moon J Donald (ed) (1988) Responsibility Rights and Welfare Boulder CO: Westview Press Waldron Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 esp chs 1 and 9-13 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

49

4 Ciil D i b d i d th to Obe the La

Dt

A JOHN SIMMONS

"Ciil d i b d i " i th t i d b H D i d Th i hi f 1848 f th (i B d 1991) t d i b d t h hi f l t hi l l l i d ll t f l b d hi l bj ti t hi t' t f l b f Nti A i d it f i ith M i Th ti f iil d i b d i i l famously associated with the writings of Tolstoy with Gandhi's program of wide spread passive resistance in India (see Gandhi in Murphy 1971) with the Ameri iil iht t ( d i til ith th t h h t d ti f M t i L t h Ki J [ Ki i B d 1991]) d ith th ti t i t th A i d t f th V i t W P h i l h h b ill i t t d i h i i l d dibdi f it t t t b ll j t i f b l i tht i tt f th k i d f i l l l d t Dlib t iti i i l d l b k i b it f it tl l d b l motive appears to be itself laudable or at least excusable (unlike lawbreaking that is merely selfinterested or malicious) particularly when its objective is to maintain the agent's moral integrity or to morally improve rather than to overthrow the iti il litil l l d P h i l h i l d i i f iil d i b d i h t d d t diid t h i t t t it t f th definition f i i l d i b d i d t f th justification f i i l d i b d i Th h b d th h d t d i t i i h iil d i b d i f th k i d f l f l d l f l d t d th th t h h iil d i b d i i t i l l ( i l ) jtifibl kid f d i b d i Th li b t th t d f bound to be blurry (as is clear when we see that the usual object is really to define a class of actions that has a special justification) making for debates about whether various features of particular accounts of civil disobedience are really definitional ft l ft tht k i t f iil d i b d i ill jtifibl N th l if h t i t i f iil d i b d i tht til t d i t i i h i it f i t t l d i f f t kid f d t A t t t t l i th j t i f i t i f iil d i b d i til d b i t h t iti f(t l t ) bl j t t t h l l dt t b th l (i th h ht l l l d " l i t i l b l i t i " ) A d it

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i t h thi ti i l ( b k d ) t f th j t Were there no such general duty there would seem to be no moral presumption in favor of obedience to law hence no special moral justification required for civil (or perhaps for any other kind of) disobedience Obedience and disobedience to law ld b ll i d fjtifiti d iil d i b d i ld b b i l dfibl b it t th ld iil ( l lf i t t d ) dibdi Th iht f b ti h t i t i f iil d i b d i ( it i l t t it l i bli l d t i ) tht k it til bt t il j t i f b l th iil d i b d i i th b f ldt t b Ad i t iti f th law's principal functions is to enforce the society's most important moral require ments (such as the prohibitions on violence or theft) so that disobedience to law will often be independently wrong whether or not there is a general moral duty to b Bt f thi t h t bdi t til l b i l dt b ll i t dibdi ( d l f th ti f ith) l th i l l dt t b ll f th l f th l d I d d i th it f l il titi d i i i t d i f f i t l f d i t iti ( i t h t idi that are more seriously evil) it is hard to believe that absolute obedience to law would even be statistically more likely to be justifiable than would random disobedi ence in the absence of a general moral duty to obey the law Th lti bt th i kid f h i l h i l t f th d t t b th l d th j t i f t i f iil d i b d i ill b d i d bl l ith ld f i t i l dj t i f t b t iil d i b d i Th h fth ltd ti b t h l l th iti ht t t t iill d i b d i t l b k t h t ill t b d d d dtil h If i i l d i b d i j il ljtifti (lti t th k i d fl l d i b d i ) d thi f t ll f il l l t t t f the civilly disobedient beyond the consideration that is already normally given to familiar mitigating factors? Many philosophers have argued that it does (eg Dwor kin in Murphy 1971) But I raise the question here only because it is important to d i d bl i moral b t h t th j t i f t i f iil d i b d i jtifti t (i t iti) legal j t i f t i L l jtifti f tl i l l l ti ( h th j t i f t i f " i t " ) lik l l ( h i i t l i t idt) ll d f d t l t t h f l l libilit M ljtifti ll d t At b t h tht d t d i f th t f ti tht ll j t i f d will come to be reflected in the excusing conditions of the legal system that governs our conduct

Definitions A

h tl b jtifd (

i dfdi dfiiti f iil d i b d i h i l h dt h t i kid f d t t h t th i j t i f b l th th f f d i b d i ) Th

h ill j t f

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dfi iil d i b d i i b d h t ht bit tifi cial in light of the fact that deliberate principled lawbreaking can be divided up into an extraordinarily large number of kinds none of which obviously uniquely deserves the title "civil disobedience" This is especially apparent when it turns out it d i t h i l h ' dfiti f iil d i b d i tht d t lik T h ' f h i h th t i t d i t l d t d i t f iil d i b d i t ll Th h bi t t hih tl libl dfiti f iil d i b d i ill dt W h th f d i b d i i l dibdi l d l i b t (tht i t i t t i l ) i i l d illl d t Thus characterized we emphasize the obvious contrasts with both various kinds of lawful conduct and various kinds of unprincipled illegal conduct Conduct which s uncontroversially lawful can plainly possess many of the other prominent character iti f t i l iil d i b d i f i t it b i i l d bli f f t t ll d t i d i d t k th it j t d Thi i t f i t f f ditd dd i t i b t till ftl l l d t h i d t t liti d i d t t f l f l t d i d t i i t t t Bt h i i l d lawful conduct could never be plausibly described as a form of civil disobedience f only because it is not disobedience (to the law's "letter") at all Similarly unprincipled (eg purely selfinterested or malicious) illegal conduct clearly cannot count as civil dibdi if ( i diil t th ith i l i i l d t ) it i ditd i l t d h th l i k l lt f ti ijti Wht iht b lli i l l l d t " i i l d " i f ht b d thi i tl t b ith th btitti f th I t " i t i " I b " i i l d " illl d t d t f hih f th i titi i th b l i f t h t th d t ( iil illl dt) i ll id ll i i b l Th iill d i b d i t lawbreakers may believe that the legally required act is itself morally forbidden (or the legally forbidden act morally required) or that they are morally required or permitted to break some such law in order to protest injustice (injustice which may b l t d t th t fl b k ) i l t h t it i ll f th l t hibit ( i ) th t i ti tht dibdi t tht l i II iibl ( i h t t li t b "tdi thi iht") ( Fib 1979) It i i i l l l t h h l b i l h t it t t h t th iill d i b d i t d l i b t l i i i l d "illegal" d t M t t ers for example have claimed that the "laws" they have broken are not real laws at all despite the enforcement of those "laws" by the state appealing to consti tutional (or other "higher law") provisions that render the supposed laws nvalid S t i th li h d d/ b h t b ( tittil d) t S h t t (l ith l l t h i t h d f d ti i f ht l ll i ) i h t th bjt t h t i i thi d t i i l d "illl" d t I "illl" h l t t th hititd d t d i f th t i thi lik " t t t d d blil k l d d t b lid l d likl t b f d b th

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li dl t " O thi t f th tt if I f ( i i l d grounds) an act of a kind that I reasonably believe police and courts take to be contrary to valid law and of a kind that I believe they will make a sincere effort to detect and enforce I may count as civilly disobedient (even if the "law" in question i th b t l l th l d t d t b ilid t b " l t ll") B t t d t ill t t iil d i b d i if h i i l d it i t l t "dd ltt" l hih li d t k fft t f ( d l f hth t h l h l d b tk t b lid di t th b t l l t h ) It i til t dd t l t fth lifti t t f iil disobedience This qualification also concerns the motive for the unlawful conduct though in this case it deals with what we can call the immediate aim of the conduct It seems important to try to distinguish the civilly disobedient person from th i i l d lti t h h bth i dlibt i i l d illl d t Th b i diff bt th i t h t th i d i t i f th f diff f t h t f th l t t t h h it i i difflt t t thi diff il M h i l h h t d t h t th i i l l di bdit dil ith hi h d t l fidlit t l t of the nearjustice or legitimacy of the legal or political system as a whole where the revolutionary plainly does not (see for example Rawls 1971) Further of course since civil disobedience on such accounts aims at only limited changes d i d t d btt th iti t it likl t b j t i f b l th th h i h l d i t i ill d th f th lti Th bl ith h t i tht thi t f th h tk t b di iil d i b d i t i l d t lif h Gdhi f i t t i l did t t th jti liti f th t h f t d did Vit W t t bl did Th A i iil i h t tiit ( L 1998) W h t h t f all of them was that their illegal conduct had as its immediate aim only limited non revolutionary ends such as protesting a law or policy frustrating a law's or policy's purpose or bringing about a change in some law or policy While civil disobedience ibl b t fl t lti l ( i Gdhi' ) ht d i t i i h t f iil d i b d i f i i l d lti t i thi difft i d i t i A ki d f i t i f iil d i b d i th t h t it i d l i b t i i l d illl d t ith l i i t d i d i t i Ciil d i b d i b ith d i t h th l b k i i t l f th l ( kid fl ) t h i h th civilly disobedient person objects or indirect when the law broken is itself largely unobjectionable or unrelated to the legal wrong being protested the lawbreaking being used only as a means to call attention to the wrong at issue (for example h t t blk tff t ll t t t i t j t f i li) P h i l h h d f d d h t ffth ( difft) ti b t th dfiiti f iil d i b d i t f hih d i f t l h t i (bt t ll) t l h i t i l i t f ht ld t h t i l l idtif iil dibdi I ti h l f f th t i t ti l ith f bi k t i l b t th d f i t i l ft

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(1) Civil disobedience as disobedience within the system. A h it i common to claim that civil disobedience is disobedience to law that displays fidelity to law that shows one's general acceptance of the system as legitimate and/or nearly just and that is addressed to the sense of justice of the majority in the it B t h l th ft i l d t h t i kid f d t tht t it th "iil d i b d i " M i t t h dibdi tht i j i d ith h ti blif d iti i t b i l j t i f i b l th dibdi b th ti f th t hth t it i jtifibl ill l i l d d th l h t f th t d th l itiit f th j i t i th particular case at issue (see for example Singer 1973; Greenawalt 1986) (2) Civil disobedience as public and political. Closely related to this idea of civil disobedience as disobedience within the system is the idea of it as essentially public d l i t i l Ciil d i b d i it i d t b illl d t f d bli (i t tl) d f l l d b t f th l l l ibd i h t (i itht t t t t d th l l f ' t i ) Fth th f i iil d i b d i t b litil t l i th t h t it tb i d t h i l lii b d t ing and appealing to the public's moral sense and thus must clearly be a part of (not a suspension of) the continuing political processes of the community This allows us to distinguish civil disobedience with its public political character from " i t i f l " (dibdi titd i i l l b th d i t id ti i tht i l t ' l i t i ) " i t i i " ( i t i f l j i d ith f f t t d i h t ) d th " i t" dibdi i d i i l t k i ' h d ll l ( f l Ch 1971 R l 1971) Whil th d i t i t i ti l l fl d th f t idtifid l l h t i t i f t f iil d i b d i it i f l l t h t th should be embraced as relevant to the proper definition of civil disobedience People like Thoreau for instance now turn out not to have been engaged in true civil disobedience at all (since Thoreau's original actions prior to his later lectures were dititl " i t " d " i t i " i t ) If th i f iil d i b d i i bli l d t i d d i t l t th i f th bli d th bli thiti f th t dibdi i likl t lih thi i B t th i f di iil d i b d i t ( h h i d th i t i i i t i i t f th bli) h j t ft b i l t fft ditl il ti t f t t il t id liit i di d these aims require neither public performance of illegal acts nor acceptance of egal penalties for disobedience Similarly principled disobedience that is not made public for very good reasons ( h th it f th l l lti th d t th tht ld b d b t di i t ) fil thi t f th tt t lif iil d i b d i h thi d i b d i i t ll " i t " ( "l h d " ) t t ll b t h th il i f d i i f t t i th f j t l lii I d d h t bt litil d t l t fil t lif " i t i f l " Th thi d dfiitil ft

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l it l h hld lif f l th t i i t i th Boston Tea Party nineteenthcentury American abolitionists who secretly aided fugitive slaves or encouraged escapes or Europeans in Nazicontrolled territories who secretly aided fugitive Jews All seem appropriately classified as civil disobedi t i t b t f th bli (3) Civil disobedience as non-violent If i i l d i b d i litil f th it it ld t h t it t b i l t I d d if it i t b " i i l " d t t ll il iht til A d f th b t k titi f iil d i b d i ( h Gdhi d Ki) l ittd t il Nt i i l th hil phers define civil disobedience (in part) as nonviolent disobedience (see for example Rawls 1971) Since it seems easier other things being equal to morally justify nonviolent conduct than to justify violent conduct characterizing civil dis bdi till i l t l t hl h h iil d i b d i iht b ill j t i f b l f f l f l d t Th t h f t bi difflti F i t it i t i l difflt t j t ht titt " i l " f th l t t Whil i kid f lt d btti ht t l l fit t id hll include "psychological violence" or violence against property in our definition? If so illegal conduct that traumatized slaveholders or destroyed property on which unjust practices relied (say sinking a slave ship or throwing tea into Boston harbor) ld f i l t lif iil d i b d i S d if i l tifibilit i ll th k i i kid f i il i ft h i t j t i f th th i hih i l l l d t til fft th P h i J i th b i t jtif ll th blki J ' t hi l fb i blki th t t hih h d t di Fth f th i l itti i hih i j t i th di i ffiitl i i t d tht i l t dibdi is much easier to justify morally than would be less effective nonviolent conduct In light of these facts it is unclear why nonviolence should be thought to merit a privileged place in the definition of civil disobedience (see Zinn in Murphy 1971; M l l i Bd 1991)

Jtifiti

d th D t t Ob

Jtifi d t i t i l l " d f i " i th tht jtifiti ffd against a background presumption of possible objection to the conduct; to ustify s to show that the objection(s) at issue do not apply in the specific case at hand Jtifiti f iil d i b d i ffd i t th b k d ti tht i l l l d t i ll ll tl t h th l ti t t h l f d l i l j t A d i thi th t ti ( f th filllit) i ll t k t b t b l i h d b th it (ithi t i l d t t t ) f l l dt bliti t b th l P h i l h h d f d d difft t f th t t d d f th d t t b d th diff bt th f f t th k i d

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fj t i f t i f iil d i b d i tht b t d B t it i th b i i by first considering a few more general claims that have been made about the justification of civil disobedience claims that seem not to depend so directly on any very specific allegations about the nature and extent of the duty to obey the l Fit f i t it i ft i t i d t h t iil d i b d i b tifd l if th l i k l i h d f d i b f i l h i ' it b ' di bdi i l t i l h i h (f l R l 1971) f l th jtif i ' i t t th i k f h tht dibdi i b it i d i t d b th b d (i lit) l it t Second it is sometimes argued that civil disobedience is more justifiable the more direct it is; for the more direct it is the more the disobedience seems to target the specific legal wrong by which it is motivated (see for example Greenawalt 1986) Thid h i l h h f t l l i d t h t iil d i b d i b tifd l l t t ft l l f d d i ' l bjti ( h l liti dl f l tt) h ll b h t d Ad f l l h h th t ti f ll h b t h t iil d i b d i b jtifd l if it i i l t We have already seen the proper response to the last of these claims But what of the others? To the first claim's insistence on a high likelihood of producing benefi cial change with one's disobedience we can concede that disobedience that satisfies thi diti ill h h ll ki t b id f it B t l it t b t t h t iil d i b d i t h t fil t t i f th diti t b j t i f i d Ciil d i b d i t ft k tht thi i ltil h l (t l t i th h t t ) t th t k t h l t b ll b l i t d ( it td) t b thi d i b d i thi t t t t d dit f thi tt' lii t ff (b " t d i ") t h i iht ith t h i d i b d i Fth f th b thi d i b d i iti f i j t ice from unmerited harm even where there is no real prospect of changing the unjust policies causing the harm None of these purposes or objectives seem obvi ously to be of a sort that would delegitimate civil disobedience T th d l i ' i i t th j t i f i f " d i t " i di bdi th l i i l Oft d i t d i b d i t j t l ld b f h f l t it ll t th i t i fijti th ld i d i t f fdibdi P t t i idii ("th tik") t t t ditl b itti th i l t f l i tb j t i f i b l th t t i th b blki t th th Th i l t b obvious correlation between the directness of one's civil disobedience and its justifi ability Neither it seems is civil disobedience justifiable only when used as a last resort as asserted in the third claim above For the most pressing moral causes are ft th t i t i t l d b th i ldi i i t b l t i t l b l l dl i th it f l l f d O l i th (b t d d ) i t h tilii l l i hih liklihd f i ' ( h ' i t t i l l t) d it l i b l t i i t t h t iil d i b d i hld l b l d l t t ( G l t 1986) 56

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H t t th l t i t j t i f b i l i t f iil d i b d i h ill have to depend in part on the strength of the moral presumption in favor of obedience that we embrace which in turn depends on the specific theory of moral justification to which we subscribe (and which we use in deriving our version of this presump ti) O lt h i h t t i l i t t h i (lik i l t tilitii) th ttil f d i i t l ti i f f l l bdi liitd d th ttil f d i l jtifiti f ( i t f) i i l d i b d i Wh t h ' l i ti i t d ith ' ti th b t i th i t thi ill d d th t f th i t d th (i th f obedience or disobedience) on the nature of the society and its government The phenomena of inconsequential illegality and highly influential principled disobedi ence are too familiar to make it likely that actconsequentialism will yield a general l i tht i l f bdi t l it i i l d i b d i O th lt h i h ti t l l dii l t h i it ill b till t id j t i f i t i f tl t t i kid f iil d i b d i If f d t l l dti t b dii l b ll b d t b th l f l d l h di i i t t ith b i dii l But this means that any legal obedience is necessarily morally wrong f it mplicates us in wrongs or injustice forbidden by divine law making corresponding disobedience obligatory (hence justifiable) On most moral theories however the ustification of iil d i b d i t tt b l tt F h i l h (i th Middl A tl t ) h t i d t d f d th id f l dt bliti t b th l t h t i b l t (i bidi i ll i t ) th t d d t i i tht h dt bliti i t t i fi l i t i t h t th i t t h l d i th fi t l b l j t l b t i h d b ti l idti i f fdibdi A d i t th b t k t porary defense of civil disobedience that advanced by John Rawls (1971) our duty to obey the law can extend to obeying unjust laws provided these laws do not exceed certain limits on the severity of (or on the inequitable distribution within it f th b d f) i j t i A d i t R l ithi bl t d t i tt iti h dt t t thi ( b l jt) titti d t b th l tht td di t it d l i t Thi d t i b d l t l l dt t t ti tb ti d li ith j t i t i t t i tht it d l t Whil R l iti t h t thi d t b i d t b j t l h ll as well that there is a special justification available for acts of civil disobedience (which he characterizes as public political nonviolent conscientious illegal acts) and acts of conscientious refusal Where injustice is clear and substantial and where l l f d h fild R l iil d i b d i b tifid (t l t h it i t t f t ) tbilii d i i tittil t f di dt t t jti b idtifi ijti lli th jit t t it dt h b t t h i th t t R l ' df f iil d i b d i i l liitd f b it f it li l t dibdi ithi bl j t d i (hih d t

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d i b t f th di h i t i l i t f iil d i b d i ) d have already seen reasons to be skeptical about insisting (as Rawls seems to) that certain features of (some) civil disobedience (for example publicity and nonviolence) are essential to its justification It should be emphasized as well h t h t th t fR l ' jtifti f iil d i b d i t i t tl th i hih h h t d f d th d t t b th l Rli l dt t t jti th f dt t b th l t t l " " i th d t f bdi it hih jtifid d i b d i i f l d i ijti "fit" Thi f t i f t h t i hl f i l f h t th d t t b th l hih ll following Rawls "natural duty" approaches These approaches all derive the duty to obey the law from a more inclusive moral duty to promote some impartial value like justice or happiness So in those "gaps" where the impartial value would be fftil td b dibdi dibdi i tifd ( i d d i d ) Th ( d i t it d i t t d l dd d) t i l i t i t h i f th d t t b ill l t thi l i f t i " t l d t " h A d tili t i df f dt t b ill t i th k i d f " " i th d t idi f j t i f d iil d i b d i t h h i thi th ill i t in those instances where happiness can be more effectively promoted by legal dis obedience As we will see however natural duty approaches to deriving a duty to obey the law will also share certain common problems " N t l d t " h t th d t t b j t kid th tht t h b l d d i th h i t f h i l h i l t h h t th bjt W d i t i i h f thi f i t k i d b t h ( h t ll) "t t i l " h d " i t i " h T t i l h b f th tfili k i d f th th ildi bth t / t t t h i d i t i t h i f th d t t b th l O t t i l h t th dt di th d t t b f ht h b d b f th who are said to be bound by the duty So according to the consent/contract tradition of thought most famously associated with Locke the duty to obey is derived from the express or tacit consent (promise contract) that citizens of decent states are alleged to h i t thi t' t h i t (B 1987) A d di t i ti t h i th d t t b th l i d b iti fd t tt fi t f th i i f t b f i t th h td i d f th ki fthi t t t iti ( K l k 1992) O b t h k i d ft h i th d t t b i d i d f th ll i i f t i t t i t t i bt iti d lit t( th t l dt h) f what best promotes some independent value The difference between these two approaches to the duty to obey is obscured somewhat by the development (in Kantian contractarian thought) of hypothetical t t t h i di t h i h th d t t b i d h t i l idiidl ld h d t b b d b it ( h d th b bl t h d th i i l tht ld thi litil l i ) B t h t h t i l t t t h i d i t th t t i l l d t d tti f th t l dt h t th t t i l h f th f t t ll th t l hit f th l t i h i bt iti d

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lit b t th l ht ill t fftil d th i t i l l that the hypothetical contractors are characterized as seeking Similarly it may seem difficult to distinguish cleanly the third "associative" approach to the duty to obey from the transactional approach Associative theorists mostly following Hegel W i t t t i d tl d i b d t d iti di th d t t b th l f th l l litil idtit l f th b d Si litil l t b f t i f ht Ih d t it tht h h i d i b l t th t t i l Bt iti t h i t t i ll t t h t it i th ft f b h i i il it d b l fl l bdi i d d t f h t I iht h dt or otherwise chosen to do that imposes on me a moral duty to obey Each of the three approaches to the duty to obey the law has a certain source of appeal at least one striking weakness and some clear implications for the justifica ti f iil d i b d i N t l dt h li i i l l b it f thi (i d i i dt t b ) f l i b l l l i i l th idtif i i t i l l lik j t i h i tht t b i l th k i d f thi l t ht t b dt t Ad t l dt h t th d t t b h t i l l amenable to yielding clear justifications of civil disobedience; general duties to do what best promotes some value leave natural "gaps" in any duty to obey the aw that is derived from them But natural duty approaches to the duty to obey all seem t f d th bl f " t i l i t " Whil th h li h ht ti t b th l f t i (i h di i th b t f ti th l i t i ) th t ll li ( th d t ) th b i f l dt f bdi dt particular t t (" ") th If l l " l l i " i t th ti f i t i l l th b i h h l d b tk t it til d t t b til t fl (Si 1979) Associative approaches to deriving a duty to obey the law appeal to us because it seems that many of our important special duties such as those of parents siblings friends or neighbors derive from simple facts about nonvoluntary social roles we (Ht 1992) B t it tht iti t t l k h f jtifti f iil d i b d i hihl lti ibl d i f f i tl bt iti ( d bt iti f th l kid th it tdifft t i ) F hth iil d i b d i ill l l ( )b ll iibl ill t di t h t th ifi t i t t f th il l th f k f il tti th tt f social interaction in force in the society in question We will reject associative justifications of civil disobedience and of the duty to obey the law if we are (appro priately) skeptical about the claims of normative authority for local social practices hih ht h i l (Si 2001) Fill t t i l h t h tht i t l i di t h h t b t th d t t b th l C t t h i t th id t h t litil dl l lli ht t b d d t f hi t bjt l d i t i t h i i i t th iti tht dbt t it (ildi th d b t b t id b b d i t it l) di f 59

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ht iti h d f Bt i th k i d f j t i f t i f iil disobedience that a transactional theory will yield seems to depend very much on the specific circumstances in the political society in question The extent of the duty to obey (and hence the moral space for justified disobedience) must turn on exactly ht h b d t b th iti i ti ( d i t t / t t t h ) ht t fi h f th b d ithi th ifi ti litil h ti ( " f i " i f i t i t h ) ht titt bl i t i f th ifi d i d d b th t t ( " t i t d " i f i t i t h ) All f th ft ftl bl f i f it t it ithi th l kid f society leaving us with no general conclusions about the justification of civil dis obedience In any event these transactional approaches to the duty to obey the law plainly face serious problems before arguments about their implications for civil dis bdi b i F th f i d d i l bidi (i l t ddlibt) litil t i l fiti i th t t i t t d i l l t t f th b f i t h tt id Th b f i t f t i l fll h t h th td t A d it l tht ll d t l dbt f td benefits that are simply conferred on us nor in any event if we did would such benefactors be entitled to specify the precise nature (eg obedience to this set of laws) of the obligatory reciprocation (Simmons 1979) I l i h t f th diffilti f t i h f th th h t d i i dt t b d fill t t h i k b t th f th j t i f t i f iil d i b d i h l d it i i b l t fll d f d h dt A h i t f t h t th i l d t t b th l iti ( ibl) t t If hit t th i l ti i f fl l bdi d iil d i b d i ll f jtifti th i id f ti ll Th i i l d t d liitd dit aim of civil disobedience of course will tend to make it easier to ustify than purely selfish or malicious conduct or riskier revolutionary action But other familiar fea tures of civil disobedience may cut both ways For instance the publicity of much iil d i b d i k it jtifibl ( h bliit likl t iitit i d i l ) l jtifibl ( h bli d i b d i i l t i f l t i l bli l fdibdi ldi t h f l d i i l d i i t t i ) O th hit i th t tht i t h t iil d i b d i ill b j t i f i d il h th b l f l f it d t h t th i t t h t thi ill t b l

Rf Bedau Hugo (ed) (1991) Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: Routledge C Hl B H (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. L d Ch C l (1971) Civil Disobedience. N Y k C l b i U i i t P Feinberg Joel (1979) Civil disobedience in the modern world Humanities in Society, 2 (1): 3760

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Greenawalt Kent (1986) Conflicts of Law and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press Horton John (1992) Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press Klosko George (1992) The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Lyons David (1998) Moral judgment historical reality and civil disobedience Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (1): 31^19 Murphy Jeffrie (ed) (1971) Civil Disobedience and Violence. Belmont CA: Wadsworth Rawls John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Simmons A John (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (2001) Justification and Legitimacy. New York: Cambridge University Press Singer Peter (1973) Democracy and Disobedience. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Further reading Bedau Hugo (ed) (1969) Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice. New York: Pegasus Edmundson William (ed) (1999) The Duty to Obey the Law. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Green Leslie (1990) The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press Harris Paul (ed) (1989) Civil Disobedience. Lanham MD: University Press of America Raz Joseph (1979) The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press

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5 Citli

d M i

RICHARD W MILLER

I l i h t f th t t M ' li tht d itli "th f i i l d d t i d litti bt ith thi th l th lt f th ki l " (1867 929) l k lik hi lti h Hi h t h t th lti t f t i f itli ld titt t i h ff d h f d htl di i th t l t Yt characterizations of capitalism derived from Marx's failed system which describe capitalism as resting on exploitation guaranteeing alienation and making repre tti d i t t f l l till id itii f t ititti Th t f thi l f M i ill i t t j t f l i d thi h i t i i t t th i h t h f itli i t t b dlld b lbti f itli' it i ffii d th t ti f i t iititi

Marx's Capitalism I M ' i iti t f d t l l d i t i i h d b d i t il lti f t l i th dti f t i l d Th d i t f f dti i itlit iti i lb i h i h th th l t i t h t l i i f t f dti ll th f thi l b t th th b i i h t l th f dti t h t th k d th d f th l f h t th d F tl d i d f Ad S i t h ' th f d t i t i Marx believes that proletarians in every capitalist society bargain at a severe disad vantage when they "sell their lives piecemeal" in the labor market Typically when a proletarian seeks employment from a capitalist firm the firm has substantial f d i hil th l i t h b t t i l i d th fi h l f i t t i hii til l i t th th j b k h i ldi jb S th fi i d l t k d l B fi i t i l l l lb kt bth d l d tl l th thi ttil l th i btt iti t l l b t ( l l titl) i iti i d th l t i i iti d

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B f th d i f f t l t i h i f l t h di t t h to personal life "If you don't like it here try to get a job elsewhere" threatens in a way that "If you don't like our terms for working invest elsewhere" does not The bourgeoisie can respond to low unemployment with laborsaving devices while l t i t t h l t d thi d f l t M t h i k t h t f th d th if l d d t h l ll t h h itlit i t t i th l t t ld b hih th h t capitalists i tht k k li t ft i i d k it ibl f k t i hild t ft i t f th i t l i t ill At least in his post1848 writings Marx does not claim that workers will sink to this physical minimum He thinks they can resist this "tendency of things" (1865: 228) through nonrevolutionary collective action transcending market activity; for l b ti t t d i ilit d i i litil tiit ldi t i f I d d M t l th l t k ith t h l i l N th l ill t d k ' d b d l i th i h t thi it id M ' fth diti f ilit lti d i f hi dd itional expectation that an increasingly unified proletariat will be victimized by increasingly violent instability As a result of mounting obstacles to the further expansion of capitalist firms industrial depressions will deepen and wars will b i i l hil l i t d i f t l l d b t i d db t l i t t i th i t t h f th k ' t

Elitti If one subtracts the failed apocalyptic prophecy do the more plausible aspects of Marx's account of the proletarian situation provide useful means of social criticism? M hilf ti i i t tht itlit lb i b d f tht i d d t f th ffi d i b d i hi i t i d i t t "[T]h t f lb i t f l h t h th k i btt t" (1875 329) B till i f dti b lb t h h t i f ti l t i i h h itd h i t t " E l i t t i " d tht M li t itlit lb h h b th t d d t f i th t l ti i thi project of retrieval: "What is it about capitalist wage labor that makes it a form of exploitation?" After examining responses that do not appeal to Marx's other cele brated indictment of capitalist wage labor as alienated I will consider the virtues of i t t i th t t fM ' l At ti b t t t fiil l l it i l h h M t k itlit lb t b liti H t h h t tht itlit t k d t f th i f i b i i f l t i i tht i b j t i b l Bt useful l fM ' d i i ill it f ifi d libl d i t i f th t f th bjti 63

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Force and freedom of contract Although it is selfconscious exaggeration Marx's talk of the wage labor system as a form of slavery does point to one ingredient in the charge of exploitation: proletar i forced t i lb Of l t i i t f d t k f til i t l i t Still M i i t tht l t i i f d t k f th itlit l th b i i tht i f itlit l th Sh i f d t d b h i t i th itlit l b kt t h h f h t i lb Th i t d t t t i th l l t t i F l in Marx's youth in the Prussian Rhineland the alternative for many proletarians was a dreary but physically tenable existence on a marginal family farm Still someone who rationally chooses one option can be forced to do so can have no real choice b ll th l t t i tj t l d bt f f i t l b d Lik th t f l i t h h d d tht f hik t t k th th f k i th t i l thi b d fll f h t f h i l titi If th i t t i i l t i d i d f l k d l i ith t th i h t till t bjti t th il d Bt the crucial constraint the absence of control over the means of production on the part of the vast majority was created and is sustained by coercive acts In blazing narratives Marx describes the role of violent dispossession imperial conquest and i i th h i t i l hih l t i t l d h i t th t i l k ' ft M i t t h l i i t tht i l t itlit titi tti ith itti f l i ld i i t b l d l i t ti t h h th l d i f f t i t i f i d l d thi d d t Wht i t i l t th f d h t f itlit lb i hi i i th t litill f d l f l f d t d th l i i t d l t t i t l b t h t th ild But are the current alternatives to wage labor really so circumscribed? For example proud owners of thriving small businesses sometimes started out as prole tarians getting where they are by working long hours for little initial reward in the f fl ik f fil A k f d it lb if thi i ilbl? C h (1983) tht if h idiidl l t i i f f thi l t i l fr l ti ld tll b thi t i th t d i i f itlit dti ld d i ll it h d d it f l i h i Oth h i i t d t h t th i k db d f th t ilbl t an individual proletarian in the vast majority of cases make these routes fit for a menu of alternatives constituting forced choice Also some (for example Reiman 1987) take the time required for exit to be compatible with an ascription of forced h i i th ti Benefit and weakness A

64

f th ifiti t f lbti f

f th f d t lb i l l i t i

f it

lb it

b

ld i t t

i i l ith th

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alternatives So other ingredients of the "exploitation" charge must be characteriza tions of what proletarians actually choose Of course it is important that capitalists benefit from the circumstances forcing proletarians to sell the use of their labor power Exploitation involves deriving a benefit from someone on account of a weakness (as Wood 1995 emphasizes) But a further ingredient seems to be required After all dentists benefit from others' being forced by toothaches to seek their aid Yet we do not take them on this ground to exploit their patients or their patients' suffering (compare Wood 1995: 136) The nature of this missing ingredient he objectionable feature of the way in which bargaining weakness forces proletarians to work on terms that benefit capitalists is the central controversy over Marxian exploitation (a controversy much invigorated by Roemers thesis that exploitation does not in fact merit normative interest from Marxists; see for example Roemer 1985) According to one standard account the needed ingredient in addition to capitalist benefit from workers' bargaining weakness is provided by Marx's characterization of the benefit itself A capitalist firm will not last long unless the wage paid for a working day is less than the amount that a typical worker adds to output in a working day Marx often characterizes the working day remaining after the worker produces the equivalent of her wage as unpaid (though he also often concedes that this usage is not literally correct) Perhaps Marx thought that capitalism was exploitive because its social structure is organized so that unpaid labor is systematically forced out of one class and put into the disposal of another" (Reiman 1987: 3; see also Holmstrom 1977) But is this surplus extraction sufficient to make a social process exploitive? At he start of the Manifesto, without a trace of irony Marx celebrates a heroic era in which capitalism overcomes technological stagnation geographic isolation stultify ing conformity to tradition and abject feudal deference These benefits depend on the extraction of "unpaid" labor which provides incentives and resources for capitalist improvement of productive powers In principle if not in Marxs view of actual history such benefits could make capitalism the best feasible system on balance for workers in a certain phase of a certain society Marxs quip about wellpaid slaves implies that capitalist wage labor would still count as exploitation But unless more is said about the process of surplus extraction the charge of exploitation seems farfetched (If on account of incentives for land improvement everyone benefits from a rule conferring ownership on the first to farm a plot of land the consequent advantages of firstfarmers over latecomers need not con stitute exploitation) Granted if a capitalist and a proletarian employee are typical occupants of their social roles their incomes will be quite out of proportion to the time that they invest in economic activity But as Arneson (1981: 206-7) and others have noted such disproportion need not be a basis for condemning a relationship as exploitive If healthy workers are taxed to help those who are physically unable to work the frail will benefit out of proportion to their labor but this does not seem to constitute exploitation Indeed such transfers are characteristic of the post capitalist societies that Marx regards as overcoming exploitation (see 1875: 3 2 2 3 325) 65

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Alienation One way of coping with these difficulties is by a more thorough appropriation of Marx's legacy incorporating the discussions of alienation which occur throughout hi lif t h h th t i t l M t k th d i t i i lif b itli t l i t l f th df th f l P l l i t d f th b ll b th t h ' di hih ld b bjt f iti i l d l t i h i i i t d d ft t i l d t ("th means h b I i " 1844b 275) f t d f it t ' aspirations The prime example of this estrangement is the capitalist labor market in which capitalists if they are to stay in business must do what they can to take advantage of needs driving people to seek employment (the word "exploit" comes t l l h ) d t fid th t k ' d d tht t h thi fit B th t h ' d t t h l f t h iti t h diit M h t i l tihi tht h l l d t i d b th i t i f th kt i Kti l t i h i i hih " k f th th hi " ( 1 8 5 7 8 : 243) and the capitalist treats "the real producer as a means of produc tion material wealth as an end in itself" (1866: 1037) It is natural to characterize someone as exploiting another's needs when she bfit f th and i l iti t th fl i f t i i h ti fh i d d t i t t Adtit h h h h f th di b i t k hi i d h id ti d i t h t ill k tit l l t i d l i t hi tit' ffi Bt thi i i i i th i t l i t l t i l t i h i hih titt litti f th l t i tj t litti f hi di Th t i th l i t i f th k f hilf E if th t f th proletarian's bargaining weakness is not a life scarcely better than death by starva tion Marx thinks it is (always or almost always) work that is endured as a sacrifice "not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself" (1844 326) S h it i ti t h t th k if l f t i ld t b i f h h i " titi f his own t " (1866 1044) R t h h tb d i d t i t it t " t h d it f [hi] h t " (1894 959) I t M d thi d t t idtif ith ' k lif th k ' liti f h l f b k lif d itli tk f a proletarian's waking hours But the thesis of selfalienation also reflects an assess ment of the value of production (If Marx thought that only leisure was worthy of enjoyment he would have regarded all work as alienated) Like Aristotle (see Miller t h i k t h t th ldi f ' i t di t ' 1981) M i i t i l f l t d l idd b ' iti i f d t l t thhil h lif C i t tht k ' dti tiit fh j t k it i i b l f h lif hl t b th d t i fh h i t

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Thi dit d t d d th l t i ' d i th i d b i drudgery described in the most heartrending reportage in Capital. But it does depend on the features of work life under capitalism that Marx sometimes calls the "real subsumption of labor under capital" (1866: 1 0 3 4 5 ) which inevitably results f it " f l b t i " th t l f th l b b th b i i I it f d i i l i diti d ffit ft h l i t l i t fi ill t t l t i k tht l t i d d di tiiti tht d t it h i t t it h iititi bili b d fh iti S tht i itlit dti th ith i i f t t l th of production benefit from bargaining disadvantages based on pressing needs that others are forced to endure to which they are responsive as tactical advantages to be used or as sources of discontent whose cost is to be minimized That a relationship is h t i d b thi d t l i t d t t h ' i d k d (hih i tt l i ) t b j t t it dd b i f di th l t i h i liti S i dditi t h t th t f th k t i f d t f ti t f ii ith hih h ld t f l l i d t i f hil f l l ti h l f d t h t th t party benefits from the imposition of these terms Then one might naturally say that the stronger party exploits the weaker party So perhaps Marx's theory of exploit ation and his theory of alienation are continuous Capitalist wage labor is a form of litti b itlit b f i t i l i t d f ill d k i th bfiti f th it t i k li th tht l i t th th f t h l M bbl t i d itlit ld t h l th lit i thi t i t B t th t jit f th thik tht f t h il i f thi f f dti ildi i d i d f d d d ffii k f f itli btt f ki l th noncapitalist alternative Suppose that they are right Does the view that capitalist wage labor exploits workers still have a bearing on modern political choice?

Th R l

f Elitti

If itli i d i b l t h h it i i t litti th lii b t litti iht i t lii b t lif b t d i d t h B t thi ik d i i l ld l t th f t t h t litti comes in degrees so that the intensity of exploitation of people in a certain situation may be too great to be justified even if they are better off being exploited than not bi l i t d t ll Aft ll i th litil l th j t i f i t i f b t t i l diff i d t jtif ll diff I litil t l i iti f litil thit h ifl d i t ti tti i f di iti N th l it ld b j t l j k if ditt t iti b iti t th t t h t h t hi b t t th th h f t t ll

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Elitti b l l d i i Th thjb alienation produced by the "real subsumption of labor" can be more or less ntense (for example because work is more or less monotonous or exhausting) Opportun ities for selfexpressive activity outside work can be facilitated or blocked by different t f l t (H i i t t t h h t ll i t t ) E t t l l i t d k lif b l difflt B i i did t l f l th f th dti i bditi tht i itlf k lif l b d (f l f d il t d th tibti f l ith il t i i di k tht i t ffitl bjtd t dtild i i ) Without calling for the end of exploitation one can recognize that complaints deriving from exploitation are serious and more serious the more intense the ex ploitation The mere fact that a change will deprive some of benefits from the litti f th l i t ll d t f th b f i i t th h S il t it f b th t jtifbl d f litti Thi ti f il itii t dititi liht th l t f itlit iti Capitalism and freedom In one familiar view government interference with individuals' efforts to retain the full benefits of capitalist selfadvancement is a troubling interference with freedom h i h i j t i f i b l if t ll b th d t tk t f th l h i lit B t if lit f litti i l i t fbi f d t h k lif ith h i h t l f t f l l idtif b it d t j b l i bl id f lbl h iti th th h i itlf lit f f d T d t l f R ' (1986 374) h t d iht h d d t i h i t evading a tiger is significantly unfree because of her alienation from her own ife If the Island Council can help her by requiring someone to cage his pet they need not be troubled by the thought that freedom has been reduced to promote another d liberal

neutrality

Th M i t th f litti l t dbt f fl i b l litii in which the ultimate perspective of equality avoids reliance on a ranking of ways of life Mitigation of the distinctive burdens of those whose exploitation is relatively intense may produce a reduction in their net income the "allpurpose " f d b libl tlit ki t id lti bi i t h i j d t f i jti F l thi t d f f i d b th t f titi ti t fi l d b bli f d i f t l t l t h t f i l i t t th j b l i fi t t iti bt d t dd t i At h j t it i h d t h tlit f lif b b d if lit f litti i it iht 68

CAPITALISM AND MARXISM

Beyond equal opportunity Both in current egalitarian politics and liberalegalitarian philosophy the funda mental project of economic justice is often envisaged as the elimination of unjusti fid i l i t i i lif t flti diff i "tti l " t hih l b (Rl 1971 7) Th h thti t M ill til h thi ith th l t f i f th h t iti h t f d ll i itlit titi Bt itiit t h f litti t t itii f th t t f i d fil hih i i d d t f i l i t i lif h Suppose (probably per impossibile) that a reasonably efficient capitalist society could so arrange education and initial economic resources that everyone has an equal initial chance of winding up on top If none the less some inevitably spend i i f i t t f t h i li bi l l i t d th thti t M ill di b j t i b l f f i l i t A l th t d ti d t i ttitd t d liti i t th i l d i t ft i t h i d if l t t t i l iitil h t b t t

Political Legitimacy and the Capitalist State Th h h l t h i M ' ii f t i t l i t it hil thii ith hi t fh td b itli ill l k t t ti t d th h S th d t fth t f M ' th f itli hi i f th b i i th litil li l d itli Talk of a capitalist ruling class suggests bizarre conspiracies But in fact Marx's political tropes are flamboyant emblems for the following threepart thesis (1) Government actions serve the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole even if those interests conflict with those of the rest of society Thi i not t d tht hift i t li tif f t l l l t i d d h it i t i th i t t f th b i i Si th b i i h i t t ( t h h t l l i t t ) i t t i i d tbilit h dti b t i l t it l t i t t h l Still t t i t itlit it M t h i k t h t ll hift i li t h t t k i ilti i i i f i t t th b i i f t i d t t t i l retreats from disruption or the threat of disruption prudent that is from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie (2) This bias in interests served is sustained by mechanisms that are part of the socicd context of political choice sufficient mechanisms which will exist in one form or other so long as capitalism endures I til i d i b i ti b t tl ti d b i i t t i tbl l i t d i M ib th tt f hi th t f fl l t d ffiil t d li lti f i th th bib i Th l f b i t l l d di i l t l d th df b i fii 69

RICHARD W. MILLER

f th t i l dbt l f th i t i l h i h cites (3) If a social movement threatens to end the bias toward bourgeois interests the old connection between class and government wiR be defended through violence which mobilizes residual bourgeois political resources violence which can only be defeated by organized counter-violence rooted in part in non-electoral activity E ithi th b d f t t h th t t ld t b " f th l t f lb b i t l " (M 1871 290) if b i d i f it ld b dd b l l l t t d l t l tiit M t h h t tht b i i f t d ith thi t ld ith fll t i fd i t d i l t pression or at a minimum support a "proslavery rebellion" against an elected workingclass government (see Engels' Preface to the English edition of volume 1 of Capital; Marx 1867: 13) If the latter regime could be defended this would be b f it ld b l t i tki d t f t i i f l t l flit i hih k hd f t d itlit fi d i itlit i I liht f hit i M ' ti th t h i d l i i l till i t t It i t l diffilt t th fit l i iill ith th rival hypothesis that the bourgeoisie (alias big business) is an exceptionally import ant interest group in a democratic process that can produce departures from its longterm interests Still part of Marx's political theory seems both practically rele t d iill t d th it f h i i tht t t ti ill b i t t l b i d t d th i t t f th b i i i i i t bl f t f itli S tht i t i tibti l l l d h th t f litil ii t h h i t l l i t ffi itl l i d di f th t i f t i ilid di Still d f i l t th t f th itlit i diii f lb h t d f bi t i d t i f th i t t f th b i i ith th interests of society as a whole will have knowledge skills and networks of ac quaintance that make them specially likely to be recruited to positions of political power or to offer influential advice Resource allocation will still be dominated by th l t f t f l f i t t d i t tht litil l d t tk t id ti it i t b t thi t Bth M d hi iti t h t th d l i f bi t d th b i i ld tb l i i t d itht d t i i t f bl ffii it lit dti M itlit hi f di i i t d i t i t ifl bli ii hih ( t f d f tltifi domination) pervasive state ownership would not remove given bourgeois nflu ence on the state A common and plausible view of capitalism which I will call "the postMarxist t h i " bi thi f M ' th f th itlit t t ith t th l t Fit if th flit b t th i t t f th b i i d th i t t f t ki l i t M d th ft i flit b t th i t t f th b i i d d i th b d f lif d itli i d i b l t h h fibl dti th d f litti l t i f i i t i i t i t d

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i l i t i tht h iiti t th i f i i lif B h add to the costs of production make work discipline harder to achieve or make t harder for those in or allied with the bourgeoisie to maintain their personal wealth and status and pass them on to their children the structural political power of th b i i ill i l liit t i t d i d t Th th l t i th t M i t t h i i th it M i t i tht f f itli i btt f itll i d d it th f f itli Thi it h i t t b i i f l t i l i f litil liti Lik th iti tht M itiid f hi dil ti th i (if the postMarxist synthesis is right) exaggerate the importance of purely political processes through neglect of inequalities of economic power Ironically these criti cisms are more compelling because of the concession that some form of capitalism is b t T b i ith th t M i t thi i hll t litil l i b l i th t i t t liit f f t i i t litil h i l h f th i f th l litil ( R l 1993) A d i t litil l i b l i iti f d h l d ti t l ll ti fb i jti ildi b i economic justice through principled mutually attentive deliberations establishing a broad consensus concerning the proper interpretation of purely political iberal values such as civil liberty and equal citizenship This restriction to consensus b d libl litil l d i th f f bli i t bi t litil l i b l b it i id t il th i i t b l i f litil h i ith th t l t t h t iti t th H if th t M i t t h i i iht litil h i t i d b litil l i b l i ill i i t t b i t i b l ith t f fll iti S t h t th h litd h i lit i t h l d lii t h t k litti h thi i i t b l th i the higher the degree of exploitation One can combine respect for the exploited with insistence that a political response to their complaints take place through certain channels only if this political process is not biased against them But di t th id f M ' l i l t h i th f f t i t h h i i l d d i i i b i d i t th litd i it lit i t If i th litil l i b l t t tht h i t d d f f bli ld h t t i ditti th th t h i f th iit f f f itli it l C t t h d l i it t iti hld t ti t t th i t tii h unbiased political process since this change would seriously worsen all by depriv ing them of the benefits of capitalism Those who reject political liberalism on these grounds can still regard departure f libl litil ti i t bt fll j t i f b l t i t t i l l i t t B f thi i f th d i f il h th ill b ill d t ll tht ffiil i tit til d ti d thi litil b i bl di ti Th i t d tik f th 1930 i th U i t d S t t C d S d d l h did t it f

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th i f l itihi d iil d litil libti t d l dt sustain their aspirations by appropriate legislation If they had waited this consen sus might never have emerged The postMarxist synthesis also challenges a widely shared assumption of which litil l i b l i i j t il d l t ll ibl iti h l d hl t hi lit h lilti ht t b hld b h iti if h d it i j t b f th t f th litil tht d d it d t j t t fh i t i f f f i t Thi t f h t f th hl f i l d fft t h th l bt h iti hld h grounds for regarding it as everyone's duty to help implement the law until it is changed Whether or not they are political liberals many political philosophers regard this as a feasible goal so that it is at least an open question whether current iti h t t i d it E if th t k th t b " " i l i d t tht t d i h l h t h t th dibdit hld t th l t h th litil hl b d i b i blill d blil d illil bitti t i h t Bt h i d l f liti i t i f th t d i t f th t M i t synthesis Because of the obvious difficulties of claiming actual consent by all (and the less obvious difficulties of claiming that consent has not been manipulated in inappro it ) t h i t f liti t i l l l t diti th th t tht ld k it tt h l d th t f llti i hih t th tk t Plibl i i l i t i t f fi t t t i th l i t h t it i t dib l i llti if h b f t d f l f i t d th b f i t db d f th fil h d B t t l t if llti d i t ' h l lif th f t d it i t i l t h t th f i h i involve adequate equality in responsiveness to one's interests and desires as com pared to others' Given the threat of chaos Ivan the Terrible's autocracy may have been by far the best feasible regime from the standpoint of the serfs but they had no dt t b ll th dt lti f i h i h th td f hl th th Siill f iti f d tt di t t M i t thi fibl d d i b l litil t i th t t t i l l b i d i f f t h ' i t t f th t h h i idi d t t h l d it t

PostMarxist Cosmopolitanism I

dditi lit lti "Th h t iti d f th i t

72

t th

dbt b t t f titi ki h t" (M dE l d i f th t i l l t i

litil liti M ' llti M hilf t W t tk 1848 51) I it f l l t t d t t i f l b th i t t i ld lti

l ild fll j t h l f th h t th thi dil l l l b i i d tht t

CAPITALISM AND MARXISM

d d Th t M i t thi d l f dti f il cern for compatriots that bind proletarians For example a postMarxist could accept that when a worker benefits from a general preference for principled persua sion and support for democratic rights and civil liberties a proper valuing of this h d ii i t t i i l l l t t it h fll iti l t th il l l t i ffidhi Still M ' l dd idbl iht t lit idti tdi th f b d di h i t i t f t i t t i l i lti Th iti f litti t t t th b d b l i tries with high percapita income benefit from the specially intense international exploitation of people in poor countries they have a special obligation to help them A proper valuing of nonalienated relationships in which others' needs are a source f iti til i t t t h ld i h i h th d f th i ti litd ( d ti td) f t t i l d t i tht i filittd b i t t i l ititti F i l l if ( t M i t thik) i l i t i fb i i b d th bilit f itl d th it f i t l i t fi t hift dti t k elsewhere still dominate workers' lives the growth of international ties among workers and their allies is a central means of reducing exploitation "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains They have a world to ll f ldid il i WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES U N I T E ! " it lti th l i f th Mift d lik bd di Yt it i f th ld t ld l i th i h t t d f itli t ft hi k tht ht t b l d if th hld t b b k hi tht h b d d t lit dti f f Th h d f t th ld t till h t lit t it

Rf A R (1981) W h t ' ith l i t t i ? Ethi 91 2 0 2 2 7 Cohen G A (1983) The structure of proletarian unfreedom Philosophy and Public Affairs 12: 334 H l t N (1977) E l i t t i Cdi J l f Philh 7 35369 M K (1844) E i d Philhil M i t I El Witi t R Livingstone and G Benton New York: Penguin 1975 (1844b) E t f J Mill' "Elt f Plitil E " I El Witi N Yk P i 1975 t RLiit dG B t (18578) Gdi t M Nil N Y k Vit B k 1973 (1865) Wages Price and Profit In K Marx and F Engels Selected Works in One Volume N Y k I t t i l Pblih 1968 (1866) Rlt f th I d i t P f Pdti I K M Citl l 1 t B Fowkes New York: Penguin 1976 (1867) Citl l 1 t BF k N Yk P i 1976

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(1871) e In K Marx and F Engels e New York: International Publishers 1968 (1875) e In K Marx and F Engels e New York: International Publishers 1966 (1894) l vol 3 ed F Engels trans D Fernbach New York: Penguin 1981 and Engels F (1848) y In K Marx and F Engels e New York: International Publishers 1968 Miller R W (1981) Marx and Aristotle In K Nielsen and S Patten (eds) y suppl vol 7: y Rawls J (1971) Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press (1993) m New York: Columbia University Press Raz J (1986) m Oxford: Oxford University Press Reiman J (1987) Exploitation force and the moral assessment of capitalism: thoughts on Roemer and Cohen s 16: 3-41 Roemer J (1985) Should Marxists be interested in exploitation? s 14: 30-65 Wood A (1995) Exploitation y 12: 136-58

Further reading Brenkert G (1983) m London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Brudney D (1998) y Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Buchanan A (1982) m Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Chapman J and Pennock J (eds) (1983) XXVI m New York: New York University Press Cohen G A (1978) e Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1988) Oxford: Oxford University Press (includes Cohen 1983) Cohen M Nagel T and Scanlon T (eds) (1980) y Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (includes Cohen 1983) Elster J (1985) x Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Gilbert A (1981) s New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press Miller R W (1984) y Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Nielsen K and Patten S (eds) (1981) y suppl vol 7: (includes Miller 1981) and Ware R (eds) (1997) n Highland Park NJ: Humanities Press (includes Holmstrom 1977; Cohen 1983; Reiman 1987; Wood 1995) Wood A (1981) x London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Wright E 0 (1997) s Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

74

6 Stt

P i h t

d th D t h

P l t

DAVID DOLINKO

Thi

h t l th l tt f th ti f ihi i i l l di til f th h i h l t i l f ti d f i h t Pihi i i l i l d l i b t l ifliti th f f ffi itd f i t d i t i l f lib t h d t h It i l bjti th t t t t ordinarily believe wrongs people or violates their moral rights Justifying punish ment requires explaining why it is morally permissible legitimate or unobjection bl t d h thi t l t f th d ithi it liit t i i l h it d not th i l t thi l iht S h l t i t l i t f ft i l h l f t h h t consequentialism d retributivism. C t i l i t bli tht h t j tif th i t i t t i f i h t i tht l i it i l d t t d th tht ilbl l t t i li ld d P i l h to measure the "goodness" of consequences (and states of affairs generally) will depend on the specific version of consequentialism employed The classic utilitar ians for example identified the goodness of a state of affairs with either the total or th h i f th i tht t t f ffi M t tilit i t d d th tifti fidiidl' f th it f d Th f f t f i h t i k d t li h it ill i l d i l l d i l d d t i th l f b h i th i i l did ( " l d t " ) d t i th i i l hilf f fth ff ( " i l d t " ) h i th i i l ' h t d l tht h l ih t it i ("hbilitti" "reform") disabling even an undeterred unreformed criminal from committing further offenses ("incapacitation") and expressing condemnation of crime n a way that reinforces this societal value judgment ("normative validation") Whatever the fft h i d d ht th f d l d til it t h i " f d l k i " b i th j t i f t i f i h t t td ft lt Rtibtiit t h i b t t " b k d l k i " Abji ti tht i h t i j t i f d b it th t h i i i t tht ht ll l i t i t i h t i th lti it b t th i i l ' i d d

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fl b k i P i h t t i b k t h l breaking is seen as intrinsically valuable or good or appropriate regardless of its results (Consequentialists typically view punishment with its attendant suffering as in itself evil and good only instrumentally by virtue of its consequences) As i t t tibtiit t it " T h t f t i iht l b td b i h t i h l f tibtiit bt t f th jtifti f i h i " (M 1987 180) Bth tilit d tibti jtifti f i h t f h t ith diffilti C i d tili fit It k th ti bt i d i h t hll t i t W d t i i l t b punishing the agent only because we believe doing so will most efficiently achieve our goals; that is that any system of alternative responses would have worse conse quences overall But then critics charge the consequentialist depending on the ft tb d t jtif ith t littl t h If th f tiki th bli t l d ffd t h l it blii tht i i l i d i h t h i f t thi d t th b ftiti h t i t h i i f i t i l i k l t i l b i ti lti i d li b ffiil ht h tilit ht t embrace such a sham punishment regime It would achieve whatever deterrent reformative and normreinforcing consequences genuine punishment would pro duce without imposing the cost of the suffering of those punished Consequential i i thi i t t i ld j t i f t littl b it ld t tif i f l i t i actual i h t i i l M libl tht hl ildd thd f t t i i i l tht l tl d ffti i ti th f ffdi th t d i t i l i h t (Sh thd iht i l d hth d l t h k b i biti f t h ) If th d t f th t t t h t h tili ld th d i h t morally unjustified (Indeed optimism about the potential of rehabilitative therapy motivated calls to abandon punishment during the 1950s and 1960s See for example Menninger 1968: ch 1 0 ) Yet many people find unacceptable any t h h t f dlibtl f i i h t t l t f b t l d hi f f if tilit i ld fl f h i h t (M 1987 1 8 3 5 ) O th th h d id hititil b h t ti l b t l i i h t ihi th f i l i f ffd d th d l i b t " f i " fi t t il t h th l t t of a shocking crime cannot be caught Great suffering would clearly be imposed on the victims of such treatment Widespread anxiety among the general populace might be triggered by overly harsh penalties and by the vicarious punishment of f f d ' lti d ld l i if k l d l k d t tht i t hd b f d Y t if th i i i t ti ildd ffiitl t ff d iti 76

tilit ld k i h f th ti ld k th

ld t k d f bli f

th

t b ll j t i f i d P h t t i t h t th i i dt ld d f th d d thi l d P h th th l i tht f t i l i hd

STATE PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY

b " l d " b fri i t Whil l i k l th thi could h and if they did consequential reasoning would endorse torture and false convic tions Thus consequentialism potentially justifies far too much Consequentialists commonly protest that the objectionable implications alleged to fl fr t h i th ll d d ildl i l i b l ti Sh ih t d th " f r i " fi t f l ld h h t b k t tll t f th l ( t b i l k t th d i i t i th t ) Citi li h tht tili' l i d f t t t h t it ld i f t d th t lii kthd b b t tht t t t th lii " l ibiliti" h i i t i contingent their likely effects Rather the critics insist vicarious punishments the framing of innocents and the rest are intrinsiccdly wrong (Duff 1986: 160) Sophisticated consequentialists may reply that their critics' beliefs about what is " i t i i l l " l ltitl t l ititi A d th hll h l b i t h t th ititi d t f l t i i d b i i d t d f i ith i liti llif itti Th t libl id i th k i d f f f t h d liti i t t i t i k if t l i i lik ti h punishment are even arguably to have the best consequences This sophisticated consequentialist argument raises general metaethical ssues that go well beyond the limited scope of this chapter Equally broad issues surround th l i t h t tili ff f dft f d t l th d i t lii i ti i i b l bt likl f t l tti Thi li i tht tili ilt h t it iti t i b i l i th it f i t f respect for persons. T h h f l t d i th i t i tht ( dlt) t b t t d t d ibl t t bjt t b d i l t d f thi l l d d f th l f th Th t i t i l i t flt l dt for reducing offenders to examples used to scare others into obedience; they fault special deterrence as naked coercion that treats criminals like wild animals to be beaten into submission rather than persons worthy of respect and dignity; and they flt hblitti ttill l i i ht t i l i d l t i t h i ( d i h th lik) ld t ffitl " l d " th f f d ' h t t our d i C t i l i t h i ildi th t t t h t th i l ti btiit h t itlf d " i " ffd t hi th ' l (Dlik 1992 1 6 3 2 4 2 ) Th h h i dt argue that announcing in advance the penalties for lawbreaking acknowledges and respects the potential criminal's status as a rational actor capable of freely choosing whether to obey or to risk the price of disobedience Moreover the very ti f" t f " i hihl ttbl M tilit t tht thi h t i l " t " ll b it ll th l di d i t t f idiidl l iht i didi ht lii ld ii th " d " A d j d i t i th ti ti f" t f " ld i tk f th ifi f th ih t dbt it d h i l h i l t ildi th t l th 77

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i d f th h i l h f th t i t t f " specting persons" Immanuel Kant The belief that consequentialism fails properly to respect persons is one prominent argument supporting the great rival of all consequentialist justifications of punish t retributivism. Whil th t h b lid t it f d i f f t th th f tibtii i th i tht h t k i h t ll i ibl i t i t t i i t it b f i i l bt i l th f t t h t i i l deserve t b ihd C l th t i b t i i t dd t h t th amount f ih t tht i j t i f d tt h f b th t th i i l i ti d dif tht i h t tb t i l t th i f th i Retributivism is occasionally characterized as claiming that punishment is usti fied because it is "fitting" or "just" or "good in itself" (Hart 1968: 231) And critics thereupon denounce it as viciously circular amounting to the unsupported ti t h t i h t i ll j t i f i d h i h i th it t i Bt thi b j t i i i i d if d t d th tibtiit f i d t Sh j t i f ihi i i l t i l b i it i ll bj tibl t i h th bt b i t h t th d i h t Ad ' d i thi i t ith it b i ll b j t i b l ( permissible or justified) that one have or receive it but is a much narrower notion Though it may well be morally unobjectionable for the holder of the winning lottery ticket to receive the prize and for the duly appointed Secretary of State to take up hi d t i th f ld t d i i l b t h h t t deserve hi i th l t t hi iti A i bl f tibtii i thi It t tht ii l h t th d i ll iibl jtifid Yt t t t tht ld t h i ilt h iht i t il iibl i l b h d tht t t t T bli tht l i t f i tht t t diidt d t t f th t t t h d i not to believe it would be morally permissible to torture him (Dolinko 1 9 9 2 : 1 6 2 8 9 ) Many retributivists in fact go beyond merely asserting that criminals deserve pun ishment and try to explain why they deserve it Such theorists can then argue that th ifi b i t h t k i h t d d l h t h t ifliti it i d d ll iibl O ti ith t i K t d i th th fj t i fJh R l i t h t th i i l i consents to wills chooses h ih t At l t h " t i l l i l l " it i tht h i h t i lld f b l f il ti tht t i l t ld ( ld?) t i "original position" of selecting institutions to govern their relations (Murphy 1973) Notoriously however it is difficult to understand the justificatory force of a fictitious or hypothetical "consent" In our case how could such a fiction legitimate th h h t t t f l d ti f f d ? Ad d i d i thi f f d ' it i f f hi i i " t " b d ith th respect for persons t l t th l f t i b t i i ? (S Dff i i t 1986 2 1 7 2 8 ) A i f l t i l l t t i d th ti t h t i i it t t unfair advantage th l b i d i C i i l l h th b f i t

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f f d f f d d i t t th i f t i i hi i impulses The criminal retains the benefit of the compliance of his fellows while renouncing the burden of selfrestraint This "freeriding" gives him an unfair ad vantage over noncriminals which punishment removes thereby restoring the bl f b f t d b d (Mi 1968) U f t t l it it d i f f l t t if tl ht " d t " i i l b t i Th t l ibl didt i f d f l f t i t B t th th i i l ' d t hld b d b th b d f l f t i t h th ff b t th b Thi i t d d h h t t t i l ll f l t it th i i ti Th i i f l t t d t it (lik murder and treason) would yield less "advantage" and hence deserve less punish ment than crimes (like speeding or incometax evasion) that tempt most people more severely Efforts to avoid this unpalatable conclusion by giving a different t f i i l ' " f i d t " h tf d ll M th " f i d t " ti i t ht i b t i W d it d f l f di t h t hi i t i t f fti t th f th f h i h we ld kill b t d t T h t th fl f i i it t t k th i t i ' th i th stone of a third attempt to explain why criminals deserve punishment in a way that shows we are permitted to inflict it Put forward by the late Jean Hampton this s a modern version of Hegel's view that punishment somehow "annuls" the crime I h t i i i l ' t H t d i th f l l li t h t th i i l i i i l t h iti d hi f h Ad h t jtifi ihi th i i l i tht di t llifi t h t l f l h d d t k i f t th il l t t h tht ffd d iti li l l d titld t l t( H t 1991) Thi t i h t fi t i i ti H f l d it l t i itht bi iti lik h i i ? If i i l ' iitil aggression conveys a message of superiority to the victim how exactly is that message "corrected" or "nullified" when the criminal meets "defeat" at the hands not of the victim but of society as a whole? And just who is the supposed audience f th iti H t fid i i h t th tht i i l d iti f l th? Thi i ill li b H t i i t tht i h t b i d if ith i i l it ill h d it d th iti d t d it ( H t 1991 4 0 2 3 ) Th t b i bl ith H t ' th h i thi th f t t h t til ti ld " l l i f " " t " fl l li i l fil t t b l i h t h t th action would be morally permissible I claim that a certain repressive regime is morally praiseworthy; you could "correct" my claim by having me abducted and thrown into one of that regime's vile prisons Does it follow that your doing so is t t i l l ll iibl? A l t h h th i f tibtii it bif illtt th k i d f d i f f i l t it t h i d i lii th l liti jtifiti f th ti f i h t Rtibtiit h l t d diffilt i ii t t t thi f t ti tht i h t i jtifid l if " t i l " t th i ( f l Dlik 1992 79

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163642) Y t li th tilit l t t i h it severe flaws Not surprisingly a number of efforts have been made to craft "mixed" or "hybrid" theories combining retributive and consequentialist elements Such efforts often appeal to the sense that while retributivism is needed to rule out such i h i h t ti d i l b t l lti l lt l i th point f ihi i th fit l Th l i ti l th li i tht fH L A H t H t d tht t k th i t i t t i f i h t t b tifid b it b f i i l d i th i i d f th h f l d t it h d d i i l d t t i l l l t th k i d f b h t ti that consequentialists are accused of regarding as merely contingently inexpedient Questions about the "distribution" of punishment who may be punished and how much are he insists logically separate from the institution's "general justify i i " S tilit t th l t t th l t i d d t tilit i i l f fi jti tht t liit i h t ' "ditibti" fbiddi f i t " f i " th i t ihi i i l ' fili ( H t 1968) Ht' h h d li d i f l t i l B t i it ll tifi resolution of the problems that bedevil pure consequentialism and retributivism? It may instead merely combine elements of those theories in an unstable and ncoher ent fashion For one thing treating "justifying aim" and "distribution" as wholly t i t it i l i b l tht li h " i h t " i jtifid i t h t h i ifid who i t b ihd d f what M th b i j t i f i t ti il h Ht' t i it ll iibl t t t itd f i i tht ld t h i b i l fl? P b l Ht' li i i h t ' " l jtifi i " it b f i i l B t thi i t d tht t t t tht ld t h i i l b ll l i t imate if it is part of a practice with sufficiently beneficial consequences overall And how can one endorse that position yet nevertheless insist that certain ways of treating people are categorically forbidden no matter how beneficial the conse f i h t t tht i t d th ti ld b ? Th h t i ft d i t i l tilit d tibti h h i i d it f th l i t hih idti f ld d i i P h th t i t i i f th k (lik til i ) t hibit i h t i b d i l ii ffd thi d t hil i i t i (lik t i l i ) t h t th lti bt this purpose and punishment is not purely contingent A leading example is the view that punishment is justified as a means of "moral education" aimed at getting the criminal to appreciate and repent the wrong she has done On this view the d t i f t i ll i l l til titi th iibl d f i h t hih t t d i t ith th i i l t i l t Yt t f thi i tt d t h t it f i l t tif th t l i h t ti f t l iti ( M i 1981 2 6 9 7 0 Dff 1986 2 9 1 9 ) A d f t h i t h b d d fft t tif i h t ltth t it b l i t i t l t d t i dti ft i f f 80

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d i t l t i di i h i h th ti t ditl di ticular offense would employ informal procedures aimed at healing its effects and reintegrating the offender into the community (Christie 1982; Bianchi 1994) The preceding sketch of the problems raised by punishment in general can serve b k d i ii th d b t th t t i l f f ih t td th d t h lt P t f itl i h t ( " t t i i t " ) h lid bth tilit d tibti t Thi tilit li i tht d t h i superior deterrent t th ilbl i h t (I ti th t itl lt ld b lif i i t ith i t h t th ibilit f l ) Th tibti t i t h t d t h i th l penalty severe enough to be appropriate for the very worst most heinous offenses Opponents of capital punishment ("abolitionists") challenge both of these argu ments They assert that there is insufficient evidence that death is a more effective d t t th lif i i t Th l t d tht ti dil ll d f t i ttitd t d h lif t h t k it i i t lt f th t i t t tilti ld b F t h bliti it t t k th t l d i i t t i f itl i h t idbl bi t ill d i i l l d i i i t d I th remainder of this chapter I examine these competing arguments In doing so I will at times focus on the capital punishment system of the United States in what may seem a parochial fashion This is to some extent unavoidable Cli b t h itl i h t i d i i t d i ttdi t l ld d t h l t t d th d d i d t i l d ( t J ) tl l th d t h lt Of th 1 8 1 3 ti dd b A t I t t i l d i 1999 (th t t dt i l b l t th ti f i t i ) 85 t t k l i Chi I S d i A b i th C d th U i t d Stt Of th ti th US h d th t t il it d t h lt t ith liti dh l d th t th h t test for those who insist that such reconciliation is impossible Furthermore I will simplify the discussion by considering death as the penalty for "murder" Actually American states punish only the most aggravated murders by death while some th ti l itl i h t t d tffiki i ff d th i bid d Th tilit f itl i h t t l l t h h t l i l tt f i i l ft R t t i i t t tht ti ttil d ill b d t d f killi if th lt i d t h b t ill t b d t d b l i h t lif i i t itht l U f t t l testing this hypothesis is rather difficult Researchers have compared murder rates in jurisdictions with and without capital punishment and murder rates in single jurisdictions before and after they abolished (or adopted) it But so many uncontrol lbl f t ifl th h i i d t t h t it i h d t b fidt t h t th lt f h i flt th b f th d t h lt th th (f l) i l t t lti ditibti d th lik B i i i th 1970 b f hititd tdi l d th t h t i l t h i f ltil i l i fft t t l f th i f l th d t f h t f t 81

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A d jrit f th ri tdi b t h th i l ti t and the more sophisticated recent variety have found no evidence that capital punishment has the superior deterrent effect retentionists claim for it (Bedau 1997: ch 9) S t t i i t d ith l t " " "O i t d t d b ht f t" i l t ll h f dth th t l f libt d t h t dt f l l th lif rit (V D H dC d 1983 69) A b l i t i i t t f i t t h t th t h t f lif i i t l d ffi t d t t t i l kill h ld b d t d t ll A d d th li i hth i d ll risk f d t h deters better than a risk of prison A motorist in a hurry might be willing to accept an (actual) speeding ticket but not an (actual) lifethreatening accident so that the deterrent difference between these outcomes is great But knowing that speeding t ll risk f i idt b t d t t th k i risks t i k t (C 1974 434) E if th i i l d i t dth' d t t ffi l d normative i ld i M t f bli tht ft t i l i h t l i l th t b b d if th ld lt i t saving of innocent lives Torture and extremely painful modes of execution are commonly so regarded along with executing the families of convicted murderers We would not be likely to endorse crucifixion burning at the stake or the use of th k if k th i h t ld d t t t i l kill h th t h t fl lti ( i l d i " h " ti) l d At th f h f th iti t itl i h t i th b l i f t h t d l i b t l killi ti h bi h i l bl t t h t ' if i th bbiti hih i i dt j t i f I ill t t thi b l i f b i f l t th d f thi h t H I i l t tht blitiit h h l d it ld t b d if itl i h t were h t dt more effectively than imprisonment Retentionists have their own normative argument Deterrence aside they claim that some crimes are so heinous some killings so aggravated that a penalty short f dth l b l d i l i i t f f t t th d i i t d h it f th i t i i h t i ijti Hitl S t l i N i t t f id d i f i t l (B 1979 8 V D H 1985 971) S h l b t h l l i h littl l ill f l t h t l l d d ifl t t ld d t l i h Hitl Eih hil th fid h t l d hll irrelevant in thinking about the runofthemill killers who populate actual death rows Retentionists need an argument showing that at least some "ordinary" mur derers deserve death so that on retributive grounds giving them a lesser punish t ld b j t A t d i t i l h b t l t lex talionis th " f " i i l tht d d tht riil b ihd b ffi th f t th i f l i t d t h i iti K t tbl t f thi i iiti t h t " O l th L f tibti {jus talionis) d t i tl th kid d d f i h t " f i d dfdi itl i h t f d thi b i "Th i f kid b t dth d 82

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ii li d th t i b l diti d tl th is also no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the criminal is judicially condemned and put to death" (Kant 1965: 101 102) Lex talionis, however is a completely unworkable principle It dictates unaccept bl t i h t f i bti btt i it t t i t t hil t ti lt f h t f th f f lik t i i f d k dii C t tib tiit ft t i t d l tht i h t t b proportional t th i Th t i hld i th t i h t th t t i t th t t i h t d Whth h ih ment system can possibly be set up is quite unclear But even if it could doing so presupposes that at the outset we already know what is "the most severe punish ment" which can only mean the most severe punishment of those we are willing to inflict S if td d i th t i f i d t h ill b th " t i l " i h t l if h l d d i d d t h t it i ll iibl lt D i t ll thi t t i i t tht d t h t b th l it lt f th t d b l ti i th i h th killer has inflicted on his victim "Does it not cheapen human life to punish the murderer by incarcerating him as one does a pickpocket? Murder differs in quality from other crimes and deserves therefore a punishment that differs in quality from th i h t " (V D H 1982 331 l B 1980 511) B t h i l l lti "diff i lit" f iltl tli hi t

t

ih bth btt d thi ith i i t M killing "diff i lit" f iki hi kt d t d t t ll kill t f i t th h kill t h h l i t dii d ti R t t i i t th l bth tilit d tibti t d abolitionists attack both These arguments are substantive, focusing on whether killing a person is by its very nature intrinsically appropriate or alternatively m proper as a punishment Abolitionists also rely however on a number of procedural t li tht th i fl i f t th thd d t l t th kill h ill t l l b t d (Th f l l i d i i f d l t i d d i ftht i Dlik 1986) P d l t b d i i d b iiti tht itl i h t t d t hibit th til f t f th A i t Bt lti b t h t h t i l t i t d littl t b l t th iti f ht i after all almost the only functioning death penalty in a modern industrialized democracy (Japan where capital punishment is shrouded in remarkable secrecy is believed to have executed about 35 people during the 1990s) O d l t i tht itl i h t i iflitd " b i t i l " itht t i l i i l d dititi bt th d h td d th f l b h i i t (I th U i t d S t t i t l 625125 t f itd f ttill itl d h tll i d dth t f i Bd 1997 3 1 2 ) Th t liit d t i l d i f thi t t d tht t f

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th il t i h i i d ti tht lt i ti tk "under no standards at all or under pseudostandards without discoverable mean ing" (Black 1981: 29) No articulated standard for example controls a prosecu tor's discretionary decision to bring capital charges in the first place or to reject a l t l ff A d th t f" d i t t i " f t l i it f itl d iti i l f " d t d d " th ( ) tt h j i tld tht " d i t t i " i i l i t t d d th t bf th killi Ath d l t hih l fid tbli i tht itl i h t i iflitd i ill d i i i t Thi li supported by many empirical studies which show that killers of whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of blacks A 1990 review of thenexisting research by the US government's General Accounting Office reported that "In 82 t f th t d i f iti f d t ifl th l i k l i h d f b i h d ith itl d ii th d t h l t " fidi " k b l i t t dt t tt dt llti thd d lti t h i " (Bd 1997 271) C t l l i f it f l i t i t l t il ibl d d b t did t l i i t th id f fiti bi The most prominent retentionist academic Ernest Van Den Haag has dismissed both of these arguments by insisting that the justice of executing any individual killer depends wholly on whether execution is what that individual deserves and is fftd b hth th h d dth l i t l t t d ith " b i t i l " f ill b i d (V D H 1982) T h t t i b i ith d t th biti t h il li th l k f t i l thd f d t i i h i h kill " d " dth M it i d i t i i fj t i h i comparative d i i Yt j t i h b td ith " t t i lik lik" ittl ith " i i h hi d " i d d bth h t i t i t from the same passage in Aristotle Besides if we do take a wholly noncomparative view of justice we are given no convincing reason to believe ustice so conceived must always be preferred to equality Van Den Haag's premise for inferring that d d l i t d t i th it f ti th h i thi " j t d t " Wht th k fV D H ' iti h th biti d d i i i t i t d iit i bjti Th i i l b i f th biti t i tibl P t t d t f hll hth itl d i i k b d b explicit l t h t f f t i l t i their discretion Yet decisions not subject to explicit rules may none the less be made in a consistent rationally explicable manner and standards vague and indeterminate in theory may in practice receive a narrow and principled interpret ti I d d i i l tdi f itl t i t tht ll b fft ill d i t th t i itl th tl t h t th t hl " b i t " th blitiit Th i i l id f fiti d i i i t i hil t hll l i i fl d til f t th th id f " b i t i " Yt thi id i t fliti i t t t i F l ll l 84

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htilit t itl i h t b l k th hit hih iht t l t into less community support for pressing capital charges in cases with black victims Then too the great majority of murders are intraracial meaning black victims tend to die at the hands of black killers so prosecutors trying to avoid an f bi i t blk d f d t iht d i t d i t th li f b l k iti R d l f th l i b i l i t f lii th fiti f f t i th iil th d i i i t i t h bi d f t ith th bi t i t Nith d d il f t fdth ih t h if lid i d i t th i i l jti t dl f ht lt is reserved for the very worst crimes Suppose for example that the criminal justice system is as riddled with standardless discretion as proponents of the arbitrariness argument allege Then whatever penalty is employed against those convicted of "the t i " ld b i d i t h k i l ii d i t i l t b ll l i t i t O kill iht i lif itht l th lif with l thid fi t hil f t h f l t t h ll th ht fd i i d " d t d d t ll d d t d d itht d i b l i " N t h t kill f whites are more likely to receive death sentences than killers of blacks because prejudiced prosecutors judges and juries value white lives more highly than black lives Abolishing capital punishment would not affect those prejudices so killers of hit ld th i th t non-itl i h t d i t i tl ft d t kill fb l k Wht bth t t th i t tht itl i h t h l d b b l i h d b t t h t th h i f iki t "th t i i l " d ifliti th ht i t lt d t h h i f if it i t b ll tbl Of dth i t l th t i h t i th t ti it i littil difft f th l t h i t i t taking everything from the criminal and in doing so irrevocably But the arbitrariness and discrimination arguments do not trade on those features of capital punishment In particular their force does not stem from a fear that we might discover we have td ith " b i t i l " f d i i i t db bl t k th i h t d k d Th systemic t tht i i l d i t i d i t i i h the class f d h t td tht kill f hit as a class h h l t t d t li tht i til idtifibl di biti d i i i t i A thid d l t h l l t th i i ability of capital punishment This is the claim that the unavoidable imperfections of all human factfinding and decision procedures make mistakes in capital sentencing inevitable Every now and then perhaps extremely rarely but sometimes inno t l ill b itd f itl i t d t dth di t l t i t ill t l l d bi t d (Tlk f " i t l" h i ilifiti b th th itl t i " i t k " ik fidi killi d i t t d h it tll i l i iti f d d f d t h t l l klld i l i t i t lfdf l jti lid i i t d f ) Thi td di it f f th hilli t

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fl i tht h b l td d bi bl t ll ff the punishment or compensate the hideously mistreated innocent It has been an increasingly influential argument with Americans in recent years in the wake of several widely reported instances of death row prisoners winning release after new id t b l i h d thi i M t t b l th f Illii d d t i ti i tht t t i J 2000 ft th ti f th t h i t t h d t h i f d t h b l i t d th i 1977 R t t i i t h t t th itk t Th fit i t h t b l i tiit l t th l i k l i h d f ti i t Atll retentionists assert the multiple layers of review and due process protections built into the American capitalpunishment system make it extraordinarily unlikely that a genuinely innocent person will ever be executed When abolitionists note that th i t i h b l d f A i dth i 1973 h id f thi fl iti d t t i i t t t h t thi l if t h i l i t h t th t k t f t t itl iti bf itk ti S d t t i i t t h t th rik f i t k i l l idti relevant to whether execution is morally permissible and can be outweighed or over ridden by competing moral considerations (just as we regard the use of automobiles as morally legitimate despite knowing their use will cause the deaths of faultless individ l) I til it ld b iibl t th rik f d ti i t l itl i h t id ffiitl l t i l i bfit ith b fi d dt ildi t saving f i t li b "di j t i " ii th t kill t h i tibtiit j t d t Ablitiit hll b t h f th t th itk t Th i i t tht ti f th i t i t t ibilit l i i tht t l t t t f h i i d i th 1900 ( R d l t t l 1992) The protections and reviews supposedly built into the system they argue are fre quently more apparent than real given the often abysmally poor legal representa tion of indigent capital defendants at trial and the formidable legal barriers to i f l t i t i i ill i f th btti t f th t dt hth d l ittd T l l i l t l i t f t d itl iti ft ri f th l t f tit i t t i f di fi ll t d t d th t hll t i d th f l riil jti t A f th b f i t f itl i h t t i h i th rik f i t k ll first that there is little evidence of death's superior deterrent efficacy And "doing justice" can provide a retributive "benefit" sufficient to justify risking execution of the innocent only if we agree both that some murderers deserve death as their i h t d t h t it ld t h f b unjust t i th l lt B t td li t h t ith lex talionis th " t i l i t " l t t i h bld t t i i t t li h i i l i l d dth thi i h t Ad h l b d ( d i i tribtii i l) t h t if d d ti t t t ii it t h d t b ll iibl lt l thi j t i ll requires f 86

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I th l t l i th th f f th procedural i t k t t one's assessment of the substantive case for retributivism Indeed one's ultimate view of capital punishment may well be determined by one's reaction to the ultim ate normative claim of the abolitionists presented earlier in this chapter that exe ti ihilti hi ltl d i b l i hll d i h t l i l ft t i fll h i t t tilti Thi b l i t i i t i I bli li t th h t f th i tht f l iti t th d t h lt Y t th h d b thi i h t b bl t t t till lli t t t it It b tht h t f t h i d tht h h hd lti ate ethical judgment on which competing intuitions and emotional responses will necessarily have the final word

References d Bd H A ( d ) (1997) The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies N Y k Oxford: Oxford University Press Berns W (1979) For Capital Punishment New York: Basic Books (1980) D f d i th d t h lt Crime and Detinquency 26 503 B i h i H (1994) Abliti d t I R Dff d D G l d (d) A Reader on Punishment Oxford: Oxford University Press B l k C (1981) Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake 2 d d N Yk W W Nt Chiti N (1982) Limits to Pain O f d M t i R b t Conway D (1974) Capital punishment and deterrence: some considerations n dialogue Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 4 3 1 4 3 f D l i k D (1986) H t itii th d t h lt Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 77: 546601 (1992) Three mistakes of retributivism UCLA Law Review 39: 162357 Dff R A (1986) Trials and Punishments C b r i d Cbrid U i i t P H t J (1991) A th f tibti I R GF d Chrith Mri (d) Liability and Responsibitity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press H t H L A (1968) P l t th i i l f i h t I Punishment and Responsibility O f d C l d P J Ldd I d i l i BbbMrill K t I (1965) The Metaphysical Elements of Justice t Menninger K (1968) The Crime of Punishment New York: Viking Press M M (1987) Th l th f tribti I F Sh ( d ) Responsibility CharCbrid U i i t P acter and the Emotions C b r i d Morris H (1968) Persons and punishment The Monist 52 Reprinted in H Morris On Guilt and Innocence Berkeley CA: University of California Press 1976 (1981) A t l i t i th f i h t American Philosophical Quarterly 18 26371 Mh J L (1973) M i d tribti Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 284 Radelet M L Bedau H A and Putnam C E (1992) In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases B t Nrtht U i i t P V D H E (1982) I df f th d t h lt til d l li I H A Bedau (ed) The Death Penalty in America 3rd edn Oxford: Oxford University Press

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(1985) The death penalty once more UC Davis Law Review, 18: 957-72 and Conrad J (1983) The Death Penalty: A Debate. New York: Plenum Press

Further reading Ezorsky G (ed) (1972) Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment. Albany NY: State University of New York Press Lacey N (1988) State Punishment. London: Routledge Ten C L (1991) Crime and punishment In P Singer (ed) A Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Walker N (1991) Why Punish? Oxford: Oxford University Press

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7

Racism MICHELE MOODY-ADAMS

In several topics of importance to applied ethics it is frequently difficult to find uncontroversial propositions from which to begin a substantive discussion of the relevant ethical problems This phenomenon is perhaps most familiar n discussions of abortion where simply describing the competing positions to be analyzed and evaluated is an activity fraught with controversy Less familiar or at least less frequently acknowledged is the extent to which substantive discussion of the ethical dimensions of racism must begin with assumptions that to some will seem as controversial as any assumptions shaping discussions of abortion But consider three propositions that many including the author believe to be fundamental to any discussion of the ethical implications of racism 1 Racism is morally wrong and should not be embodied in the beliefs and actions of individuals or in the practices and institutions of social groups cultures or nations 2 Racism exists (even in many circumstances where it is the subject of official condemnation) and in its most virulent manifestations continues to have socially and economically important consequences for those unjustly affected by it 3 The effects of even virulent forms of racism can be powerfully mitigated and sometimes even eliminated by collective and sometimes individual efforts of determined moral agents All three of these propositions have long been the source of intense discussion and debate Yet given what seems to be their centrality to discussions of the ethical implications of racism it is important to enquire about the nature and source of the disagreement that concerns these propositions and then to consider whether there are any means for responding to the underlying disagreement in a constructive way Articulating the nature and source of the relevant disagreement is a relatively straightforward task To begin with those who appreciate the depth and breadth of moral disagreement will not be surprised at the contention that the normative claim contained in proposition (1) remains a subject of controversy But it should be emphasized that this claim remains controversial despite the spread of legal political and social orthodoxies officially condemning racism It may be less widely

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i d tht l l i t th i f ffil d t i f i proposition (2) alleging the continued existence and effects of racism is in many contexts as controversial as proposition (1) For instance citing the legal prohibition of discrimination in the United States an increasingly vocal group of social critics h fidtl l i d th " d f i " i A i (D'S 1995) A d i t h iti h l l litil d il t h d i ffiill d i b t t i l l i i diiti bt th il i d litil iti f " f l " d i i i t d i t d th f th il b ttibtd i i l ll t fil th t f th lii t h l E d f i t h i t ll t h t th l welloff groups frequently exhibit failures to take advantage of legally protected opportunities as well as intrinsic "racially based" weaknesses and blameworthy cultural impoverishment or some combination of these three causes S t f thi i t it l i b t th " d " f i iftti f til f f i I ltd i th t h t it b i i b l t t ll b t t i t t i itht li " l i " il lii B t th l t h li t t i d d f " l blid" lii t h t i i l l rely on concepts and methods created by the antidiscrimination movement to give a renewed legitimacy to racial discrimination (Freeman 1978; Crenwhaw 1988) Taken together these fears have given rise to a pessimistic assertion of the "per f i " (Bll 1992) It i th t h t it t iti (3) ith it l i t h t th f f t f i b l i i t d bttill ititd h d l d l l i t l t i tht h d i t th l i f iti (2) B t it i ltil t i l l i t th d f i t i hih d i i f th t h i l d i i f i f t l f d M td flti i i d if t id f l i i h t i t th by which we might move beyond the resultant ethical impasse created primarily by disagreement about propositions (2) and (3) Ethical thinkers have frequently failed to appreciate that the most promising path starts with a clear and detailed under tdi f ht i tll i N h th i t d t h t it i i i b l k f i it t h i l d i i if th fi thi l t t th liitl " l t i " t f i (tht i t l i b t diff i th i t i i l f difft ilid ) (F tii l th " l " lti t f it li t th f th k i d f b tti ti f i ' tdl " i i l " " i t i f i " li ith out which it is impossible to achieve any kind of analytical clarity about the nature of racism) That is only after a careful analysis of the central features of racist conceptions of reality will it be possible to articulate important elements of a robust t t i b t th t h i l d i i f i A b t t i t th id t t t t f th f hih i t b j t d ll Th t t th di th i t i h i h it i ibl t i th it d it f i Fill b t hll t i t l t t l t f blii tht d th f f t f i itht 90

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i t t i l l ffii account that I now turn

i '

t

l

It i t th d t i l

f thi

What is Racism? At th i l i d

f i t f i i th t d ti t h t ( ) th h b diidd i t d i t " " h t i d b fil ittl bdl f til ttibt d (b) th b d l f til ttibt db k thi " b " bl i t i i l l l able (especially socially economically and morally more valuable) than members of other races Racism may be manifested in the behavior of individual persons; it may also shape social practices and institutions either by the deliberate action or the l d i t i f id t f il t B t bf it i d i th ti fidiidl bdid i il ti d ititti i i till dititi ti f th t f lit P l i b l f f t t ti lt ht iht b id t itit l i i t i ' fft t d f i ti f th l i hih i l ith th h agents who (to varying degrees) accept it attempts to construct reality Efforts to scrutinize racist conceptions are surely made more difficult by the fact that racism takes many complex and varied forms It is important first of all to b tht d i f f t il t t h d d it id t f il l i f t i d ll id d t d i fh (lldl) t i i diff i th it f til ill b d i i F i t hil N t h A i i i th d h l f f th t t i t h t d th it ft ibl th " j " t hih l dl i b l b d t t t i t h t Bili i i idl b l i d t h lid ft il t i i hih d t played a very small role (Marshall 1993) Second historical developments within a given society can have profound conse f ill d i t t t f il l i f t i ll f ltt i l i k d ith t h t t t W h t thi i tht i d it f f t d i i f t h i i l it ti ti ltil h t i d f ti I t i l l iid l f thi hl h d t d litill d ill i f l t i l h i h t t fA i i O f th ti t t i h A i d d t f lti h h d i i t d t th U i t d S t t i th l t nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from countries such as Ireland and Italy In the middle of the twentieth century members of these groups gradually went from being members of several distinct "white races" (with varying amounts of t t i b t ) t bi b f i l hit " C i " lldl d i b l l b t d " i " t " C i " ( J b 1998) Oth diffilti t d t l i t th t k f tiii it ti i l l f th t h i l t h i k ki ill t l hitill flti t th ti "Wht' ith i ? " A thid d ill ti fh i liti i tht l i f t i t l t it ti 91

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d

il lit ttt t diid i t ill d i t i t lti fh b l i d b till d i i t t d b t b h t i l l d tl t i l l tt h th O h l i f t i t b l i d t h it it i i h t h t J i t hih dll td t " i l l d i " t t k th Et h b l i d b t b itll iditiihbl f th il l h ld th ( M h l l 1993) A t h h t b h t it it i i l d i th B l i l i t i f t l Afi td " i l l ditit" T t i d Ht i R d t f l h i i l diff bf l i t i d hi f i kid f t Th l i f t i t i th t t d i i t tht d t ll i t b t th h hd f d t tht ( i ft th ) dill i h t i lti d i i t tht d i t Th h i i t tht il l i f i t i t till f t i t dif thi d l " b i " b t h d i i t hld flt th f ith h i h t t th d i i t th li l t fid ith t t i l l it d t i Wht th t t i l l hifti d t i l f til l i f t i t i i ll it id iftti i l t d i i l b t ldi tht it j t h h i l h i l ti b lid t h i i t d th ti d ti hih t f d l i d t b jtifd b it ldi Y t th t k f ki f it ti i fth l i t d b th f t tht f t l th til t f it ti th id t h t th b diidd i t d i t " " d tht h i Homo sapiens i t i i l l h t i d b dl lbl tit t fll tiltd b th h t d t it h t i t i f th i W ll thi th bl f t i l t d i M th h i f ti ltd i i ill di t t (lik t t t i " d l d " t i ) h th i t l t liit il d i l f i t ti d ti I h t t it i t t f d tht i d i f l f d t i d ltd f f fftd i t i d i l t h t ti d ti t bl i t t d t ift i ht bl i t t i h t l t k th t b Of hd i l ihtl t i d l i t th th t ltil i il b N b t th t llibl b i likl t bli ll f t i t b h li tht h t t d d t blk f t th d l i h t f hi ll i t d i t " l i t " th b l k t d t h t k I t t th d t f h i l h f h til di blk t d t f j i i th bjt l i i i l t i t th " i l t t h d k " fh t d t i l likl t b id t l t b th i b id f i It ill b d i f f l t if th f it tdl t t i t i l f fh b l k t d t ' k t ltil t k d i i t tht d i i th f j i i hil h thi b i i l ll i t t i d Th bl i h f i t h t it i ti th i t f i tht b db t l b " l l i t t i d " t h t d th t h t i b l idiidl d F i t th f t t i t t f flti th bi

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d t t i f i th th l lti bt t h d their fundamentally impressionable students (MoodyAdams 1 9 9 2 3 ) However perhaps the most important obstacle to careful philosophical scrutiny of racist conceptions is the fact that some who explicitly affirm racist views claim hat thi i h dll b l d bjti fti I t t t th li d t t i l l t h h t l b th h i i t tht h t i thd ll th t th lti iit d i f i i t f difft l ith id lldl h i tht t l t f th t t i b t t h t k h lti " l b l " ( i l l tlli ) i l t h i t b l Thi th d i t li tht f from being a morally problematic stance a racist worldview must surely be morally unimpeachable The claim will be that it provides morally unimpeachable explan ations of (and ultimately justifications for) differences in the economic and social iti f til d t h i t b l diff i t t t ( h il fili f i t ) S h ti h b ill fl i ill d i i i dbt i th U i t d S t t b t l diff i il i d lit i l tht h f t l b th bjt f l itii Th h wield the psychometrician's axe in these debates claim to have an ironclad method of supporting their case They claim to be able to provide measurements of largely heritable traits that are crucial to economic and social success (in particular a trait th d i b " l i t l l i " ) Th li fth t h t th lt f t h i t h t h t th i thi j t b t iti ditibti f il b f t db d ( H t i dM 1994) B t th li h b th bjt f t bd flitt tht idl itd b h i l h ld l ll thi fd it ti i d i i f l i d thi E t h i i t h f t l d tht d i i f thi l i t t d it i l i t i iht b t it i t critical race theory and possibly in some pockets of work in the philosophy of science But this assumption is to the detriment of work being done on the ethical implications of racism S l d d f kb i f l t i l lti bilit lti ti it h i l t h l i t d il itit t l t t h t th h t i i ' li t b t libl d t t til tbl Thi k h d d i t t hll t h t i thd d ti f i t t ti t h t th i i l tit lld " l i t l l i " tht b d i iltbl " i t " ll t th ti that the psychometrician can claim to have measured it and to have done so reliably (Fischer et al 1996) It has been noted further that even the allegedly most "scientific" versions of the relevant views rely on science to affirm the "real it" f il t l i tht t l d th itif t i bt t h l d d ill dbt ti t l i i l i t i litil di ( M h l l 1993) O t k h t h th th d i fh i hih i l i t i l di h dt b ill libl f itif k l d M l it t th li f il i h td d diffilti ith th id t h t th fft 93

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t d i i d th h i it till d i t il i itlf f d mentally flawed Thus for instance studies of gene differences between the major population groups in America reveal as much genetic variation between individuals from the same "racial group" as between individuals allowed to come from different il (Liit 1964 N i d R h d h 1972 C l l i S f t l 1996) D i th l d l t f h i l h i l k i d it fft h i l h i l i d h d i i d i t thi t l t th t k f tiii th thil d i i f i P t f th l t i f thi i t t t i i l b i d t f the notion that it is possible to challenge racism's evaluative claims while leaving its (purportedly) empirical assertions about races intact But it is difficult to see how to understand racism's evaluative claims unless one understands them as responses t th d l i i i l ti ith h i h th t i l l j i d It i t tht i ' lti li ill i "flk" i f it i t l b d th k i d f f l i f i b l b l i f b t th t t f th t l ld l i k l t d itif ti f th blif ffti hll t i Th f ith h i h t i l d times profoundly irrational attitudes about what it is to "belong" to a particular racial group tend to provide the basis for racism's evaluative claims has ustly strengthened the pessimism of those who fear the permanence of racism Yet a b t t i l b f ill i f l t i l it li t bli tht i ' lti li b d itifll tbl liti b t h lti Th t tht i tht thi it iti till f l i f b l d bjt t ii if d f t d Th it i t i t t f h i l h i t t d i th t h i l d i i f i t tk i l t till l i b l hll t th liti tht d i t it iti F t t l th i i i id tht h i l h illi t debate the strengths and weaknesses of these challenges and that they have inally recognized the crucial relevance of these challenges to applied ethics Several useful and important philosophical discussions of the very idea of race have appeared in the t fft M hd i i h b t t k l th ttill t tli ibilit t h t i t h i l h ( f f t i l "tki id" i iliti l t i ) h l d ill l i hli t f l t id f lt tk ( t i h l l ) b th b i i f th l t i h t t h d l i t t h t i (Gldb 1990 H d i 1993 W t 1994 A i h dGt 1996 Mill 1997 B i 2001)

Why is Racism Morally Wrong? Of M il h 94

t f th ffitd

liti b t h lti th b ll i i f t diff b f til lti F i t d ihtfll itd fdi ti f thi libt P t d t

t i t h l h l h libl id ll

ll bi t l th dt i i f i t

RACISM

b i hih t t t i t d thi difftl f th l I a different but potentially related kind of example it is surely defensible to claim that for some purposes though obviously not for just any purpose it can be morally acceptable to spend social resources differentially in response to certain kinds of diff i th biliti f th h t d t ft f il Citi th b i f hih d i i b t h llti hld b d t l t i l It i th t h t t bli h l t t t l dbti d i i t hift f " t l iftd" t d t t " d i f f t l bld" t d t db k i Wht i l h i tht (t l t l l ) th ill b iti tht li difftil di t i d t diff i bilit On a first reflection what seems morally most problematic in such contexts about relying on racist worldviews to provide any criteria for disparities in treatment among groups is that racist worldviews are profoundly unreliable accounts of real it Th t d i i d th i i tll b l t i d t k li b t th h t i t i f th it l i f tht d t t d t ti If th h l l t t f il l i f i t i t th bl i tht h t l hifti ilitill td d itifill tbl i t t til il d t h t th ik t h acteristics of human beings that have no genuine moral significance But let us in fact suppose that the challenges to many racist assertions about the nature of reality and hence to racism's evaluative claims are correct Does ti thi iti tll l d t l d t i f i idbl Ih td? S tht f d it i d t d tht il l i f t i t f t l kh lit ildi th l i t tht b t h ithi d il ll th l i t tht iti d h i t i l i th i il l i f t i t tht h hld W l i i h d t i i t t h t th " i l " fil f itifi tilit b t tht holding on to racist beliefs possibly on the strength of vaguely particularist notions about the moral value of group membership is not so obviously morally wrong whatever its potential intellectual shortcomings This racist might even t l t i i t il l i f t i t i t l d tht if t i t lti bt il i t d th i f til tit h idiidl b f ti t t t t h th t i t t h t ld b i d t th b th t t b d ftit d t b " t i l " t ii it d i f f t il i t Bt l i i " t i l i t " it h ld insist that there are always a few "anomalies" insisting all the while that the anomalies are simply exceptions that "prove the r u l e " What is the best way to reply to someone whose racism remains resilient in the f f hll t f th d l i ti f it l d i ? I t i l d i i f l i d thi l t thi t iht kt l i f l t i l t lt h i t th bl li t tbl t h i f th f i l i tl fKti d t l i l i tilit ( i l l tiliti) i h l th " " ti d t i kid f iti i Y t hil th i h f i t t

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fili fft t h h tl i f l t i l i iht i l l i t t ary moral problems this method of moral reflection proves remarkably unhelpful on the matter of the ethical dimensions of racism This is because the most compelling account of the moral wrong embodied in racist misperceptions of human reality is not t l th t ll b t t i l l ih i t t t i fh S t i ( d ltitl P l t i ) i f l i b t h ht ith i Th t i f l t i l tilti f thi t i t i d M t i Lth K i ' d l t f th S t i ti t h t i i j t b it " d i t t th l d d d th l i t " (Ki 1964) K i ' ti i l l i t t f th btl b t i h i h i h it id f the psychologically and morally deleterious effects of racism on the personality of the racist as much as on the personality of the objects of racism without diminishing the moral weight of the wrong done to those on the receiving end Th S t i t d l d b Ki i hi l i l f iil d i b d i i th i t t f th i h i h it f t i th l fl f d i iht ll " l t h h " (MdAd 1997) Ulik th l ti th S t i ti ( i h t l i i ) i tht lti b td i d t d i f t l t dtil f historically significant interactions between an agent and those likely to be affected by action Moreover this is the standard for reflecting on evaluations of all sorts whether to be embodied in action or in reflection on the actions of others In the th d f lt l t h h ld dt flt d hl i l l i t ifi d t i l f i t t i t t i bt th it d th bjt fh i Ki did t h i l f l t thi k i d f l t h h f i i ll it lit i h dt t t i t i l tt ti tilti th ti f th i t i f i Yt i th d t h f dtild l flti th i t l ti f f i ' iti t l t t th ti fKi' iti it h ll f f i i t f Ki t concentrate on illuminating the perspective of the objects of racism Equally import ant however is that the Socratic view he defends quite explicitly points to the moral importance of the task of eventually supplying the ethnographic details on id Th dtil ill i l i f t if h t d t d th th th d l t i fft f i th h f th it ll th h bjtd t i M

Kti thik iht t h t th K t i id f " t f " liitl b d i d i th df l t i f th C t i l I t i id ll ( ) lli t th ti b t ht constitutes the fundamental moral wrong of racism After all it might be urged Kant's notion that morality demands fundamental respect for the dignity of human ity whether in the agent's own person or in the person of the other certainly ti i t t t f th t t h b t lit W h t i it i tth tht t h il l i thi t t Bt K t t tht h th ti t t t d t d th l f fili t t h diit i b d i d i th id t h t it i t th th l t d h d t h Thi t fil i i t h h t d t d th f l l f th l d d t th i t Th i

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dbt l f d i i t B t th i i i h t (ft k l d d ) f the conditions that make for a flourishing human life The problem is that this undermining of the conditions for human flourishing is something we cannot see without some effort at a moral ethnography of racism Kant's view cannot show h h t h h i i l I thi i t t h f it f i l t t lt t f th thd f l flti b t bl t th d t i l d i l i t i f i ti t ti Th S t i i bth d l d b P l t i th S t i d i l d t l l b Ki i th L t t f B i i h J i l (1964) h d f liht th ti fh iht t ftbl flt th li l i t i f th ti f i

What Constitutes Racism and When is it Morally Wrong? Ih t d th t lit d fl f S t i i f l l ti ll f t t i flti th l tt f i W h t th S t i i t t i d i t l i P l t ' Socratic Dialogues b t l i Ki' t t i t h t b i i t h t it i f t l i i b l t d t d the moral nature of character and actions without reflecting on the way in which they are situated in various practices (one might even say embedding them in various "moral narratives") extended over time It is thus for instance that we come to d t d th h t fS t l th f l dil d l f d ti ll l t d h i l h i l h ith d i f f t kid f i id i l tti Thi ti t k il i t i th f f t t d t d ht t t h t i ti ti i t f i t i l l h th t t i ti h ith liitl d i d it ti ations or may simply fail to articulate any motivations at all It is equally important when in such contexts we confront social institutions and practices which may well continue to bear the stamp of quite powerful racist intentions and policies ht th f f i l t h d i f th t It t tb f t t tht i ffil t t i hih i i d d bth i d i i d l d ti l b t th it d i i fthi d t th il ti td b tht d t Th d f i t h i t i f t t i thi f t Yt ti l d ' t tll t h t th i f t t t t i t t i it ti d ti ititti bd it ti b t th t fh lti i th b f kid f t jtifi tion or explanation in terms of racist convictions It is in these instances that we must turn to the Somatically inspired notion that moral understanding requires us to put actions along with social practices and institutions into their appropriate il dh i t i l t t Wht iht flti il dh i t i l t t l? T b i ith t it tht i h idiidl ti il ititti t liitl j t i f d ( " l i d " ) b f t it ti hit d il t t id lli t bli t h t th d t ititti i ft d l td i i Th l i t f lli i f 97

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hit d t t b idfiitl l bt t f th ti t t () general consistency with other similar actions or institutions known to be racist (whether or not they are performed by other agents or rooted in the practices of this or other societies); and (b) good evidence that expressions of racial superiority would t ith th l l f i t t f th t t th llti lf i t t f til il tht l l bfit f th il ti ti Th ti f th ( " h i t " ) ll f t i t b h d blkf f i t h lli it ith t ti ti k i th l t it t bd hiliti i t ttitd Bt id litd W iht d h t hit d il context should tell us about cases in which even though we have a strong ntuition that the action practice or institution in question is an instance of racism they are not explicitly justified by reference to racist conceptions and there are strong prima fi t t i t t th ti ti i ti i f i F il t t i hih d i i i t i i l t ll d i i dh i h b ffiill t l d ill t id j t th iht kid f i fi i t fidi i t b th it l t i f i t t il d i i t i i l t ll d i i d housing Indeed "endofracism" theorists tend to assume that many of the actions practices or institutions that contemporary critics tend to describe as racism are best construed as cases where what they see as prima facie reasons against finding " i " t tt b h l i ( " l l thi idd") i t di Y t th l i t i hih t h h th i d d i fi ti b f i tilit th l d d flti b f th idti tht iht t lit flti Of h th t i fi i t lli thi i th t d d f d f t i li f l i t b relatively high But it seems obvious that there can actually be compelling consider ations capable of defeating claims of moral innocence even in these cases For instance if it is impossible to attribute moral innocence to some action or practice itht i l flifi i t t h i t i l dtil itht ii t f i l i b l ti b t th t d fh ti ti th it bl t t h t th ti ti i ti i i l ll i t A tdl ilit il ti tht t f l l i t thi t i th l l d l l "ttitil" h i bki h b blk l k ith d i d l t t h i h th blk applicants with relevantly similar profiles or given the loans at higher nterest rates than applicants with relevantly similar profiles The endofracism theorist wants to view this kind of practice as morally innocent Yet at many points in recent United Stt hit t i d i i i t i ffiil h j t d hi t d ht l l ti t h l l li fi ( l ll l l ) M h d d th ifi t t f th ti ti i ti d th l ti i h i h th ti ti i b d d d It i itll i i b l f i t t k libl d t i t i b t th it ll b i h t f th ti f th d h i l h f h l t

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i l di blk t d t f i h i l h itht fll it of the complex moral context of the conduct Yet it must be reiterated that the social and historical rootedness of moral evaluation should never be overlooked Perhaps the most problematic characteristic of writings proclaiming the end of i i th t d t t h t th d fl l l t i d i h bi ith it f d li f th h b i i d il i t t i ti t b th t i f it ti Th df i t h i t i l i bi di t t ft f il d ill h i t i l l i t tht k i t t i l l fi d t i l l t i i f t il t t To be fair opponents of the endofracism views (especially the permanenceof racism theorists) can be as inattentive to causal complexity as the endofracism theorists are to historical complexity Moreover their inattention can issue n un i i t f ill l h Thi bl i ill di d i i f i h f hih i t b t b t l til l t i ( il t b l t f thi i t ) S h hlfl t i t ill th f t l fi il t i l d hlfl d i i f th A i i i l justice system The problem as many knowledgeable commentators observe s that there is very good evidence in some American jurisdictions of racial profiling of black motorists that discriminates unfairly against them solely on the basis of race Y t th f t t h t th i id f th fi f il fili t i th b l k t ti tht il d i i t i th i i l ti t t id fd i t t t t th b i f ( K d 1997) Th f i l It i dbt t tht b likl t it ti kid f i t it th i i ti tti f h b b j t t th il d i d i t i t b l t th l i i fft f il d i i i t i th if h t b b j t Th fact remains however that there is no evidence that racism is necessarily more than a proximate cause of the crime rate in certain social contexts or that racism (in the criminal justice system or outside of it) is the primary cause of some of the tbli il liti i iti di i t t f Afi ffd Nt h h ffd ti t ff f A i i ' fft i i i l tiit ( M d A d 1 9 9 2 3 ) It i th iliti d d t t t t t t th f il d i i t th A i l l t t th d i t f f t f i

Must We Believe in the "Permanence of Racism?" B t if it i d i i dd t t i t d tht it f l h i t i f th f f t fl i i i it i ll d i i d d t ti f th h kt l i th d f i t d th tii i t f hit I thi t t it h l t ll th bl fH L A Ht' tti tht thiti l l t d t d d bdi t l l b th dll i i t l " i t l ti" 99

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thi l Th i t l ti l di t H t i t h t ti from which agents come to treat demands for conformity to legal rules (and criti cisms for nonconformity) as fundamentally justified (Hart 1961) If Hart is right about the gradual emergence of the internal perspective on the law and I think he i it i l i l i b l t t tht l h i th l f d i i i t i ld ill di d i t l d ll ill i f l t i l t t t t ^ i i t th b i f Thi t l liht f h d i ill bl flti th A i t i l t t i th f t t h t l l l t i d ti i A i l t d f l d th f i d d i d j t t i i t h d it i h t b b t t d Yet while affirming the plausibility of Hart's view suggests pessimism about the possibility that legal change might bring an immediate end to racism it is surely compatible with holding the optimistic conviction that influential social actors can h t d i ifl ( t l ll bli) ll b t th t thiti l l t It i l i t t ith th ti tht t i t t it i A i hit hi f l t i l t hth idiidll lltil h fll dt i t h t ifl ibl il t t Th f i l t iil d i b d i i th A i iil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s in particular is powerful evidence of the moral possibilities available to those who take concerted "direct action" against persistent discrimination This fact surely gives special weight to King's Socratic l i f th l f i Yt t t i th f t th f th iil i h t t dll t b f it d i f f t t t i f hih t h f i d Th d i t i till t f l th " l i " il l i i t h t iti h t " i " thi t i th th l t d b d i t i d i t h t th t t j t il d i i i t i E l l i t t it i f f clear whether those countries (including quite recently Brazil) which have emu lated America's experiment with colorconscious practices as an effort to remedy social injustice will manage to avoid the socially divisive debates that they tend to t Y t th d b t l i lii thi fi thi ffti th l i k l i h d t h t th ill t td b k l h h fi ffti th iht b tdl h f l i F th h t h t th iti f l d t i t t t d d d illi t i difflt b t ill i t t d i i b t th t d i l i t i f i i t d f i l tki it it f td Wht the "permanenceofracism" theorists say this is surely a reason for genuine f cautious optimism about the moral progress of the human species

Rf A i h Ath d Gt A (1996) Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

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Bell Derrick (1992) Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism. New York: B i B k B i R b t (2001) Wh i t d th t f ?Kt' l i th E l i h t t t t i f I R B i ( d ) Race O f d B l k l l CavalliSforza L L Menozzi P and Piazza A (1996) The History and Geography of Human Genes, b i d d d P i t NJ P i t U i i t P C h K i b l W (1988) R f d t h t Harvard Law Review, 101 1331 D'Souza Dinesh (1995) The End of Racism: Principles for a Multi-racial Society. New York: Free P Fih Cld S H t M Sidl A t l (1996) Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press F Al (1978) L i t i i i il d i i i t i t h h t i d i i i t i itil i fS C t d t i Minnesota Law Review 62 1049 Gldb D i d T ( d ) (1990) The Anatomy of Racism M i l i U i i t f M i t Press Hdi S d ( d ) (1993) The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future. B l i t IN I d i U i i t P H t H L A (1961) The Concept of Law O f d O f d U i i t P Herrnstein Richard J and Murray Charles (1994) The BeU Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. N Y k F P J b Mtth F (1998) Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race C b i d MA H d U i i t P Kennedy Randall (1997) Race, Crime, and the Law. New York: Pantheon Ki M t i L t h (1964) L t t f B i i h J i l I Why We Can't Wait. N Yk N A i Lib Livingstone Frank B (1964) On the nonexistence of human races In A Montagu (ed) The Concept of Race. N Y k F P f Gl M h l l G l i A (1993) R i l l i f t i l d itif I S d Hdi ( d ) The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future 11627 B l i ton IN: Indiana University Press Mill C h l S (1997) The Racial Contract. Ith NY C l l U i i t P M d A d M i h l (19923) R l d th il t t i f l f t The Philosophical Forum 24 2 5 1 6 (1997) Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy. Cambridge MA: H d U i i t P Ni M t h i d R h d h A K (1972) G diff bt diidl from different ethnic groups Science 177: 4 3 4 6 W t C l l (1994) Race Matters. N Y k V i t B k

Further reading H i C h l (1993) Whit t Harvard Law Review 106 1 7 0 7 7 9 1 Yk Lf C h l A (1987) The Plessy Case: A Legal-historical Interpretation N University Press Plessy Ferguson (1896) 1163 US 537

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It i

i

l t d i d d l ditbi f t tht b f llbi d th l b li l li th I h f th ld th l ll ihd l hlth d l ll d t d (UNIFEM 2000) E h th l b l t il d b b It h b t i t d tht lt f th f t db i l il babies are disproportionately aborted or killed there are one billion missing women (Dreze and Sen 1989) Many more women in the world lack access to education and many more are illiterate Jobs that are high paying are much less likely to be hld b Tdi d il k i h likl t b d b W i th kf id l th thi l t t ft h d ditiidtd i k d f ft ibl f hild d h k "ft k" I d d t l f thi tiiti i th i kf ff f d t i il t h t t b primary responsibility for childrearing and housework and are much more ikely to be sick and poor in their old age In much of the world women do not have access to safe abortion or sometimes even to contraception further putting women's health and wellbeing at risk Women everywhere bear almost the full burden of unplanned pregnancies Women in many nations of the world lack full formal lit d th l Wh th h it th l likl t b bl t th j d i i l t d till l k btti lit A d l t h th ld d hld hih t ffi t h th t f I h t h th lif t f d fid tht i f likl t b hlth b d d litill d i f chised even while she works longer hours and is largely responsible for the primary care of future generations Two general explanations could account for this remarkable disparity in ife pro spects: (1) women are by nature inferior to men and so less worthy of concern or l bl t b f i t f l (2) t t i l l did t d b it Ud th fit i l d l t i b d hl bil ibil d tht i t i tht t l diff bt d f f i i t t j t i f th til dd lif t f A ill di bl i "Objti" t tht h i

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li d d t t id ( F t S t l i 1985) d tht i d i t normative implications follow from whatever differences might exist between men and women In what follows we proceed on the assumption that the more plausible course is t tk i f th d t T fll thi li i i t i t i th i hih t t i l l d i d t d i t i t i t i W b i ith h t i t i f i W th ff b i f hit f it il iti W t th t th l l t hih i diti h i l lif d di di l f i W th t t th t i i l t ff i i t t h i f i d ld ith b i f d i i f three objections to struggles against sexism

What is Sexism? It i i th

t

t

t i

t

t th

t t tht i i hihl l ti It i h t df tll t h h thi i ll t k th t tl d i l l i d t i f T h h th til t t f sexism on many definitions sexism is often only identifiable by its symptoms or consequences We can quite readily explain that if some distribution of opportun ities systematically deprives women of what is offered to men and there is no t idi hih j t i f h ditibti th h l i fi f i A l l i thi t bth dibl d i l b l Th id t h t i i l t t i i l i t i i h t l i d ki d f i t i Y t th h d t h t th i ( h ) i i th ld i til ft d d l tibl id Objti t i l iti ld b h l f l h d h l f l f di h ki li ll Th t k f fidi h i t i i ft it d i f f i l t d comes from a wide array of theories covering the gamut of the social and psycho logical world For sexism happens not only in explicitly institutionally structured settings such as for example the denial of equal opportunity for obs but also n th d i l d bl h t i t t i bt A th ltt i t t i i l id it f ti d th t b i d i t i d idiidlid th th ill t t d I h th h f i i h t th l t b l th bi Th th t l k f lifi th t f i i f i t k th th til k f h i tht til t i t involving the mistreatment of women is the result of sexism or an instance of sexism It is for this reason that much feminist work focuses on conceptual clarifica tion and the organization of women's experience I it i d t th t " i " b dt f t thi t h t t titt t ti lit jtifibl dititi bt th (F 1983 18) I thi id th t " i " ( d it iti "it") b dt f t td t h h itk diff bt th Thi t l d i t i f th t h i d l tift Fit b th h i t f th t (bif it i ) h it t h b i t t i l l 103

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dld " i " A " i " d t l d i b t t t t difftit between races but instead refers to pernicious distinctions between races the term "sexism" is better understood as referring to pernicious distinctions between the sexes Second a neutral use of the term implicitly denies its conceptual role in binding t t h d i l l i t i th i f f ' i l diff d th i h i h th diff h f l A i j t i i t tl dt f t i f f i i t C i (t l t i W t i t i ) i th t d if ith h i h ill b d h " i " f t hitill d lbll i f f i i t It i thi ifi d liitl ti f sexism that is the subject of feminist inquiry One catalyst for the identification of sexism was women's participation in struggles against racism In fact the first wave of the women's movement began ith th tiiti f b ft h h t f l i th b l i t i t f th i t t h t (Stt d Ath 1981) d th " d " liki t it t th f th i i l i h t t th t t i t h t (E 1979) Wh t l t i f "th bl tht h " Btt F i d (1983 h l ) t it th i littl d b t t h t for many feminists the parallels with racism made the term "sexism" appealing In some ways it might seem that this was an unfortunate start for the differences between racism and sexism are sometimes obscured by the easy way in which they f lit f il P h th ti t t diff i tht i b d dbi t h i b t th diff bt th hil l diff hdl b d i d R i ft t b titd b h t d f f th th f h i h th l i t h t th " " th ' i f i kid f i tht K Ath A i h h lld " i t i i i " S i b t t i t i l l ki t ht h ll " t i i i " h th j d t t h t th th i i f i d i f th d t that aspects or abilities of the other are inferior (Appiah 1990) Thus many sexist men when socharged can truly object that "I am not sexist; I love women" but this only means at best that they are not intrinsic sexists However there are lll b t i d i F thi bth i d h hih h t Bt i t t l th h l i l h i tht k i d i ibl d d i b l iil l h t f t i i b il d ki iidi dititi bt i d t b ( C d d 1998) F t h th il h i tht iti i d i iil Bth i d i maintained through systematic violence and economic disadvantage Both are diffi cult to pinpoint but can be statistically documented and are much more readily perceived by the victims than by the respective dominant social groups Both sexism d i h d t t i h l i l fft idiidl A d bth i i l fl b k l h h th blil h l l d C i d bl k i t b d h th l t i h i bt th t f i d i ( A l f f 1998) If hld d tht i i i bth h i t i l l d lbll th it ill b i t h t it d ill b b t h id dd Ititti 104

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tht it ill b b t h d fft f i Wh dd result of past sexism such institutions will then carry on a tradition of say exclud ing women from available highpaying work Managers and others who carry on this tradition may of course overtly maintain extrinsic sexism They may i l bt fll bli t b i b l f i thi k Thi intentional extrinsic sexism h l d b d i t i i h d f ht iht b lld individuated extrinsic sexism, h i h iti t h t hil ( ) bl f i thi k idiidl i I ith it ill b t l diffilt t i l tblih ht h t ttitd i t I th ltt t h h i l hld t b bl t d thi k the technique of holding that each one now applying cannot do the ob will effect ively if unintentionally maintain the sexist tradition Within that tradition such judgments are considered to be matters of keeping high standards not sexism As thi ti i i i l hih d f dbi j d t th l it ti ti it b dil l bl t ttibt t d th th i blif tht ( ) ll bl I th fi t t i l t i i i th f t t h t th tl f i th fild t i b t t th i tht t d t want to do the work The tradition of excluding women is in this case intentional but is labeled by those who practice it "realism" not "sexism" One important effect of the practice of excluding women in these ways is of course tht d d d t th ll B d i th titi h i l b l t th l bl t l l tblih bth t t h l d t th thi l bilit t lih h i h i ( h i h t t ) t k Wh th tt lft h l l d th i th littl t t th l i tht b t d d t M th fft f i t hii ti i f d i b f Th i f d b tt fl hih k d dliit it tiiti d attitudes on the basis of sex and relegate the activities and attitudes of women to a lower status (ie sexist language) And they are reinforced by systems of education and enculturation which support if not create and coerce discrete proclivities for il db d l t th liiti f il t l tt Th il t f i fth i d i h l i l diiti di d lf t A t i th tiiti ttitd d liiti hih t i l l i t d ith " l " " t d d " f h bi (i th t d d ) ld d th tiiti ttitd d liiti hih t i l l itd ith h difft b l b t d d F i t ill appear "highly emotional" or "hysterical" when they display more emotion and concern than men or "brooding" and "moody" when less More pertinently recog nition of the man standard enables us to make as much sense as one can of the t dibilit h t i t i f f f ill W ttd li t h t i i l t t i i l i t O d i i t thi it h t t t d t l i d t thi ti O i i i t ti i b t ft btl f tht iti th i f d tht i t kt h h i t i t t i l t t i i t l i t t i d th ttitd t h t d i th d i th iti liiti d t i l

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fidiidl id I h t i t t i world and makes that world on the whole worse for women than for men

f th

Background: Language Experience and Recognition T h h i i i f f i th t " i " i f i i l t i fit i i i t i 1968 ( S h i 1985) L d iti l lli h idtifi il bl d titi th ibilit f il t f t i I i thi il h d thus drawing attention to it the secondwave feminists of the 1970s provided the conceptual space within which to recognize and reorganize longstanding moral social and political structures based on and affecting gender and biological sex The lti l t i it i h ildd idbl iiht d b f diffilti Pri t th t ii f " i " th i l t t f t th t f ' i I t d th idtifd ri hih d t b i t t d Ath riti thi bjt ll described fairly "local" forms of mistreatment The primary focus of feminist argu ments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for example concerned the m portance of education for women and an opposition to the absolute sovereignty of ithi i ( A t l l 1694 1700) Th t h l hld t h t h i th iti f d d d l l if t l l h i Th l ft d ith th l i tht hd t l l liitd t i l it ( h d ith ) d tht d t i lif ' t l l h At th d f th i h t t h t M W l l t f t f d til t it f il f t tribti t ' b d i t iti Taking the radical stance that women are not inferior by nature she held that women are naturally deserving of equal rights and could if properly educated t i i t i "th t h t f l i t i " Lik h d h hld tht i l hd d d l d t i l it Th i tht i i t ti l ttribtd t i h i it ll d d "it i d t 0 flih ! h i h th di !" ( W l l t f t [1792] 1988 302) U l i k th h h d t h t it t t bt l k f d t i tht h d tibtd t ' f ltil tiil tt I t t l h W l l t f t did t thik tht education would be sufficient to rectify women's subordinate position She recog nized that what she called the "stream of popular opinion" had an even stronger effect on women's social standing than did any characteristics actually possessed by idiidl ( W l l t f t [1792] 1988 102) F b l t d b th t f l ii d ill d d hibl f l h t h d tht ' b h i ft did " j t i f th thrit t h t h i h k bi t h d t " ( W l l t f t [1792] 1988 319) H j t bl f iri "h i t " h d t h t th il tht bi d d 106

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Lik W l l t f t J S Mill d i th i d i t t h t t h t th i ous forms of mistreatment women suffered were contrary to general utility (Mill 1869) According to Mill the opportunities offered to women and men should be based on a perfect equality of opportunity That is there should be nothing that is ffd t tht i d i d t b th W lik ill diff i titd d i t t b t lik th hld b l l d t i thi il iti t h h fi d it titi O thi iti th i i t d t l t d d f ll A h tb i d d ith th (f l d t i l t titi litil d il t d i ) t t th t d d ht i dd i il t f ation which will give them the levels of access usually accorded men In 1949 Simone de Beauvoir reiterated the argument that women were not inferior to men by nature However de Beauvoir was interested in explaining not l th b d i t iti f i it b t l f ff l bjt iit t h t t i b t t th d b i l i t f ' b d i t i Sh th t iht t ii "th l i d i " f th did fh d I h i bth ' d ' t h b ill t t d H th il t t i f h td " d " in which women do not even regard themselves as a locus of dignity as a self (de Beauvoir 1952) Instead they regard themselves as "other" and like men reserve the notion of selfhood for men The creation of a second sex is moreover the result f i i l i "di f l f j t i f i t i " Tht i th hi bli h k thtill i f h l f th lt f h t t d t th t t i f hih i f th i A l t t i l th ti f "bi " i l iit ifll iit h tk i i t i i ' i f i i t W ' bdi ti i th l i d d i f d b ' d ' f i i th ld T h h i t t i i dliti t ff l bjtiit h k faces serious interpretive difficulties that mirror the main lines of feminist inquiry These difficulties turn on the question of whether her position can be reconciled with some concept of genderneutral standards On the one hand unless we can k f lf h i h i d th t t d lf ti f d t l t d d ill b t I th d itht A h i d it f i d tlit ill " l i t ith " (i th t d d ) d ' diff ill b d t i t l t t h i llbi O th th h d f th i d lf d th t t d diff bt d lft ith th d i f f l t t th l b tk " b t d i f f " th and somewhat uncomfortable goal of establishing "separate but equal" standards To a large measure feminist work on sexism has engaged in exploring developing and critically evaluating these complex lines of thought It ld b d i f f l t t d tht i iti f i ill t f ' l f t i d ' ti f th ld P l t ' ll f th i t f h itil t f t i f i t i thi ld h t d f i t li t h t h t li t l F th iti f i i j t h t f t i F ik h d l l ' f t li f th th iti f i i bth lt 107

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d d i i t i W ti d i b thi f t iti f i moment of realization a "click" in which many previously disparate experiences problems reports and issues become unified What seemed previously to be simply one's own experiences become a woman's experiences What seemed previously to b l bl b ' bl Wht t b t th i i th b t i d i b t lik lf Th iti f i th i l bth f tlii i d idtifti ith th It i l i i l bild i iti ( B t k 1990) F d it i d i f f l t t d t i hih f ' ti d hih t th lt f ' i d i i A the world of personal experience fades and the pervasiveness of sexism becomes more clear few aspects of one's life remain in place Fear anger and resentment at being insulted or threatened (however subtly) can no longer be regarded as simply l ti t l fft Th d ft btt h d d t f t f i i hih i d i i d l t t h k i l ff th b d i lti f i Th iti f i f i dh b bth l d i l it d i f f t ( S l 1990) F t th iti f i "click" It is more likely to take the form of a ploddingly arduous reconstruction of their own experience which will require that they take responsibility for participa tion in sexist practices and reevaluate many of their beliefs and desires Forms of l il i t t i ( jk hidi) t b id t l d l i f A t di f liit t b id lli t i i t t ith iti f bth i l i il ti d d i t l ti Th iti f i th l b t f t i A it i id b tht b f i f f d iil th i f hih d t i ' lti il t d i th t f t i i idbl l i k A it i id b realization of complicity the intentional nature of which is not always clear it carries considerable moral risk Different accounts of sexism will affect the degree of moral risk men face and the degree of personal risk which they ought to undertake T h h th d i b difft ht i l f bth d t h t th iti f i d it di l t f t i iit f il t f t i S i td b k t b f difft l l h i t t i i i i d ffth lifti

Levels of Sexism S i f

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di t d ldi h i t t hl t t t th l l i t i t t i l h th l l f il ititti i t l t h h i t t i idiidl h i l t t d i i hih iti d ffti f i d i i d l It

i i

A hih i t liitl k t th i hlfl t

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t t th l l i d t li h h f i uncontroversial while others are difficult to see or evidence conclusively Institutional

ltil

sexism

I t i t t i l i f t iidi li l i t i i th liit l d iliit i d t t i il ititti Rlii titti id fl l fh liit l d iliit t t ti tti I th C t h l i C h h f i t it i l i i t l t h t ll i t d ll Ol i t th h h h i h d priests outrank nuns in most decisionmaking situations While it is clear how explicit rules can govern and structure institutions this example can also help us to see that implicit norms also structure Catholic experience and create sexual inequal it Whil it i l idl td liit l tht i h t l i th i th h d f th h h l d d th i th h l t it i i l i d b th lti k f i t d i th h h d b it d iti Thi i l i i t iti b i i ( i ll th il ititti i hih bth t) l l idi l i l i t I dditi t th liitl l d ititti f government religion family health care and education there are crucially import ant informally or implicitly structured institutions prime among them being lan guage and the sites of cultural and artistic production To say that sexism is a t t i il i j t i b d ' (Rdliff R i h d 1980) di i i t l difftiti (Btk 1990) i t k f i t i t t i l i S i th t b d t d t f th il d iil t th i d f itli th litil d f libli Interpersonal sexism Whereas institutional sexism involves the explicit rules and their implicit norms tht ti i il ititti i t l i i l t t i bt tht t db liit l I t l i i ti d th i bt tht t titt t ti d/ lit i i d i l i l i t i Th h i ti i it ki it i d t i t d i th i t t i l d i t t i l f f i t l sexism Here are some examples from our experiences: •

As a child the girl is not allowed the free play of her brothers; she is prevented b h t d t h f i i h d t b l l t i ldd i tiiti i l i bildi t t t i t t d t t td t d t t t h t i l d h i tiiti d i d lik h b t h t d d t i h

•

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i h dh

t kl ith b t t

d d

ti f h

h

b h i iit b t b

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•

•

•

ld h f thi d b i t t k th i ttitd f thi fathers In sports she sees males and manhood extolled females and womanhood ridi culed Coaches and teammates insult male athletes by calling them "woman" "il" d i th ith th t " " Wh d tit l h l b i hi th l k l t th S k t d i d hil t h i I ti bt ll til d f d t hil ' k i d Wh l ll t ht f l has said he is complimented for his good idea

Sexism is a key motif that unifies this otherwise seemingly disparate set of per l i Thi l i t ld f b tl dd d h f i i t kh b d t d t i i t k f l i Thi ki i t t b i i h i t l bt k t f th d ld t h t b t h d h d i f f i l t ti ii it F it' d f liti t i tht i j t i b id d ill opposed Yet the injustice of sexism is built into the very fabric of everyone's every day experiences from infancy on Unconscious sexism " U i ti iidi

i " f t th h l i l h i d t i t blif ttitd tht t titt t ti d/ lit l i l i t i Thi t ill b d i d b bl t il i k d B t th bth t l d i i l t i f f it it Th t l t i t h t th ttitil evidence concerning the lesser lives that women live would be completely puzzling given the legal guarantees of equality for men and women in many countries were it not for the possibility of such unconscious sexism Institutional and interpersonal i t l t f ll th d t T h t i l i t h t th i ttitd d b l i f t h t ll i iti f i l t f t h il d ditibtd d t t t t h l b li it t d d Th i i l t i idl d i f f d b t ibl It i t f i t f ll id f th it f i titi hih i t i th h logical literature Second there is evidence that when the same work is attributed to a woman it is judged of less value than when attributed to a man (Valian 1998) Third there is evidence that women find it more painful to think of them l d d fid it i f l t thik f t h l th i i l d d Th th i titi f ith t thik f d d d i t ( B b 1998) F t h th t d l f id f il iti hl t t tht k iidi dititi lit il t i tht t d t lif th ll b d th l diff bt i d i i d l i th t i d 110

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tht i f th t i ( T j f l 1981) N i it l t b argued that men get the worse end of this deal this fact constitutes evidence for the claim that such cognitive processes tend to create unconscious sexist attitudes and beliefs There is no doubt a great deal more evidence that could be cited but this h hld b ffit t k th i t tht i i i l d t d h l i l h H i d t t d it lit h d i i d l ill b hlfl t h i i i iftd dh iht b t d i i it Th k t ii i titi ill tht l t t t k l d i t h l i t l k f d i sions or actions that could not be justified by a reasonable assessment of the avail able evidence What counts as "reasonable" and "available" are crucial issues here of course By "reasonable" we mean consistent with one's other explicitly held blif d idl h d it k l d i th it W it liit b l i f h b f if h tit i t b l i f th ti ld b bl b t it d t t td i B " i l b l i d " f i t t tht ld b d b b f th it h d t h it blif ttitd h it blif l d role in the reports or to widely shared nonsexist knowledge in the community Of course there may be no nonsexist members of any community The practices of sexism affect one's selfconception Internal critique may not be enough to free lf f idtifti ith th ti Bt t b i t idtif it ti h G t i t h t it i ibl t h t ill t i ll i ( i d d ll i ) i till b i b fidi th bi C i d th f l l i l •

•

•

A h i l h d t t i lki t hi f l t b Othid f the applicants are women Onethird of the interview list is made up of women In the interviews the women are judged as doing worse than the men The comments afterwards are that they don't seem "as polished" or "professional" th Th f t i t h t th d t t th i t i ' t ti f ht h i l h f l t b i d t l k lik tht i l d bi t t A d t t i idi h t di f l ll d l ll i thi h f t Th h l bt d t blihi d d hl lbt d t t h i d H th f l ll h f i Bth ll h b ti participants in the departmental politics and have voiced strong opinions in departmental meetings The male is judged to be an excellent colleague while the female is judged to be uncollegial They give the male colleague a very iti t f hi t t d th f l i d tht h t blih d i h t h i t t t I f t th d t t h j d d h t b b th fl ftbl ith t ti hil th i j d d t h l d h i liti A d i bi t t d f it f f t i i ti h t di All th h bjt Wh kd t t f thi th h t

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l d d tht ' h ld i t f ith th t d Whil it is surely true that the drug could affect women differently from men as a result of female hormones it is equally true that it could affect men differently from women as a result of male hormones This symmetry is lost on the research t h lik t f t d t thik f th ith th " i t f i " b l h U i i ft t b i t i th t h t th b l i f fli tht k it i d d ft b d idl h d t t Whth t it i i t l d d th d t h i h th individual has access to information that counters the unconscious sexist beliefs and attitudes a condition that depends on larger social factors Although we do believe that "sexism" names not only a mistake but a prima facie wrong there are h it thi d t tb lbl Th l l f i f i t l t d U d t d i t i t t i l d i i i t i i th i t t i bt d l t f i bl S i l ititti id d t i t l ttitd O l f t i d tion of others are at least partially a product of the social structures through which we interact with one another How they are interrelated is a central question within feminism feminist philosophy and feminist social science Different ways of under tdi th i t l t i bt th l l lt i d i f f t d ti it d i t t T t f t i t i th f i i t litt I th t ti di th t t

T

F i i t Vi

f S i

Though feminists agree that sexism structures our very experience of the world feminist theories of sexism vary considerably None the less they can be very hl d i i d d i t t t i Fit ht b lbld " l i t f i i " iti tht il ititti th i di f i M d d t diff kdl i thi ttil iti i t t d biliti Gi iil t i i d ld d l fil iil t l t t l t iil th bt bt Th if t t f i t it ill i tht it d d i th ititti tht f diff d d i t i t l d i f titi t d l highly valued social skills Equality feminists need not accept what we have above called "the man standard" Rather most contemporary equality feminists employ measures of social value such as utility respect for human rights or hypothetical t i d t d l d t l t d d b hih t d th titi tiiti d liiti f d A l t t i l "diff f i i t " iti tht i di th i di f i A d i l il ititti th lt th th th f i R t l it f f i i t hldi thi i h t t t d t bth t i l t th diff bt d

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d l t lit f i i S lik C l Gilli (1982) N l N d d i (1984) and Sara Ruddick (1989) have argued that women's "different voice" involves a greater emphasis on responsiveness caring and the maintenance of particular concrete relationships This voice is undervalued in society they argue b f th d i f " i b i l i t " ti hih i l tit dh t i i l d h i h th tif th l it f i Oth k t i l f d tlit l k t i l f th id t h t i d l t i h i it b t h t i ' diff Th th k t idtif d i f f t diff Cthi MKi (1987 39) it " l b h l d di t th i th d we could probably use some" In her view since women's subordinate position n society informs their experience of the world and so requires concrete critical evaluation it can also give them a unique and privileged position from which to itii il tditi S h t i i l l L Ii t h t th itil lti f hld ith t ht h tditill b tk t b ' t ti f lit ith Sh iti tht th l h d t t "ff j t i t two genders that differ i t h i d thi di thi t i " (Ii 1993 4) Both views aim to transform institutional sexism interpersonal sexism and un conscious sexism They differ however over just what form such a transformation would take For equality feminists the notion that there is a significant difference bt d diff tht k diff likl t t i th l b l d i i t iti bt d i thi d i i t h b bilt th b i f difftiti F diff f i i t th th h d th ti t h t th i i i f t diff bt d likl t d i ' iti Si h b dfid dh d f d t h l i lti t b d i t t d i t ' i d d d d d i i h i i t i l inventing a different identity Importantly both equality feminists and difference feminists have the same worry For both the idea that an attempted transformation of society will result in a mere modification of sexism rather than its elimination is i it idt t h h d k l d d dth d i d i t bl d l l til

Objti Three kinds of objections have been raised to feminist struggles against sexism which we shall call the objections from essentialism, skepticism, and defeatism. The bjti f essentialism iti t h t th til b i l i l h l i l diff bt d h tht t lit l lti f d ill l t i t l b i i b l ill t tl t i libt S h bjti t f i i t fft t d th f i h l hit f Aittl' i f til t h h b i l i l t h i fi f i i t t d i th i t t h d t t i t h t i t F d i h l t i t h i ff i i i t A t d tl 113

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i f l t i l i f thi b j t i l t lti hl t li the differences between the status of men and women According to evolutionary psychology there are distinct male and female psychologies because of the different reproductive strategies that each sex pursues and the resulting psychologies k l titi i d d t d i hil f l t i d d b t i t l lti I dditi t l t t f lti hl h l i d tht l hl k t i i t b l tht ill " t t i th d tht d i t i t l t d i th t d btt f t" ( G t 2001 B15) Th th b t l tit litii b i d on must be men So Guyot argues it would be inefficient and morally wrong to bring about parity in gender representation of these fields To this objection we have three responses First specifically regarding evolution hl it i hihl t h i d b t l l t t d h t h i t thi it Gi it l th i ti f lldl itifi f f ' i f i i t it i i t t t b k t i l til d l it i i l S d d thi li t i t i f i th b t l diff ti i l i t i f diff ditl i l i d b descriptive differences That is it is fallacious to infer from the fact of sexual differ ence that women should therefore not have equal chances for social success Finally the ideals of liberal individualism and equality require each individual to be t t d i d i f i il d b d hi h t l idiidl it d t b d th it f h l t d S if it t tht l ll i t d t b l ht it d t fll t h t th hld b f d i l t tht t d i i i t d i t b f thi I f t if l ll i t d t i ti it i th l i k l i h d t h t l ill fil jd idiidl b thi rather than their individual merits The objection from skepticism maintains that sexism is admittedly a serious prob lem in some other countries but though it has been a problem in our society in the t i h l l b W t td f ii d t i t i th kf ti thi l iht t t t t t di I t t d f t i l l d ti t f T h f th i t di t i it i l d Thi t f bjti h b l l d b Chiti Hff S (2000) H thi b j t i l k lth f t t i t i l f tion that proves that women's wellbeing is still compromised in contemporary American society The gender wage gap hovers around 75 percent (Institute for Women's Policy Research 1997b) up considerably from the 59 percent of the l t 1970 b t till h d l thi t b t i f i d ith A d i t th J i t C t f P t R h l t h h th ll t f t i th U i t d Stt i 1997 133 t th t f 24 t W ff f d t i il t hl f ti th t f (US D t t fJti 2000) I 2001 73 d i th US C (136 t) thit i th S t d 60 i th H b t h llti h i h Of 114

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h b US P i d t d l t d h been Justices of the Supreme Court Women in state legislatures compose only 2 2 4 percent even of those bodies (Center for American Women in Politics 2001) Women own businesses at approximately half the rate of men and of the top one l t h d d lthit l i Forbes Magazine' l i t f 2001 A d thi i l t i l l i t f th ti l i t i ffd b i t US i t F i l l it i l i t t t it t t th k t i t h t th f t tht ffi f i i h f th ld i i t l f h f l t ll W f il l t il Th t h b h h t h ' ft t t t If h d th t t of Kabul then American women who travel there will be harassed If women are subjected to humiliating or violent treatment in East Asia then American women who travel there will be as well If women are not taken seriously in a country th h d i l t f A i h t d h b t h ? Th k t i th d t i t b t h th d t hih i till i t i W t it d th f f t t h t i ldid h ll Th defeatist t h t th i thi t h t h ll d t fiht i Dftit ft ti b i tht i th t t h l mistreating women do not dislike women or hold them to be inferior they should not therefore be required to do anything to combat sexism; nor do they think that any thing constructive can be done to eliminate it Defeatists overlook the existence of i t i t t i l d i i Th f i l t i t h t th tiit i i itht t i i t ttitd If th t k i l th bl f i th th hld i thi b h i hi d f f h t th t th ld P h th ill fid d t h dilik f ti k jdi i t ti t h t th d t h b i t ti Thi ld b l f i i ( d i ) Th hld l i h th d t th ple's overt interpersonal sexism Do they laugh at wife jokes? Look the other way from sexual harassment in the office? Such behaviors support sexism and thus injustice Finally the defeatist who acknowledges institutional sexism has the obliga ti t t t it t t t f it t t b f it t t it Th d f t i t h l df i th d l h d i t t h t th b i i i t l i th tittil i I l i i i li d ll i t W t it d t t d i h f th t f th ld S i i i f f oppression and as such it is incumbent on decent people to oppose it though the form that opposition should take remains a serious matter for theorists and activists alike

Rf A l f f Lid M t i Blackwell

(1998) R i

I A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Mid

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A i h A (1990) R i I D T Gldb ( d ) Anatomy of Racism M i l i Ui it f M i t P A t l l M (1694) A Si P l t th Ldi f th A d t f thi T d G t t I t t N Y k N Y k U i i t P 1997 (1700) Some Reflections on Marriage N Y k S B k P 1970 B t k S L (1990) F i i i t dD i t i N Y k Rtld d B i S (1952) Th S d S t H M P h l N Y k R d H ( i b 1949) B b N (1998) T h i k i b t ' d ' iil d i d t f llbi i d Bitih J l f Sil P h l 37 16784 C t f A i W i Pliti (2001) i t d / ~ c / f t / fhtl C d d A E (1998) P h l i l l t i f i I C Willtt ( d ) Thii Mltiltli Mid MA B l k l l D J dS A (1989) Hunger and Pubtic Action O f d C l d P E S (1979) P l Pliti Th R t f W ' Libti i th Ciil Riht M t d th N Lft N Y k V i t B k F t S t l i A (1985) Mth f Gd B i l i l Thi b t W dM N Y k B i B k Fid B (1983) Th F i i Mti 20th i d N Y k Dll F M (1983) Th Pliti f Rlit T b NY Th C i P Gilli C (1982) I Difft Vi P h l i l Th d W ' D l t C bid MA H d U i i t P G t J F (2001) Th d f i i tf d it Th Chil f Hih Edti

A i l 20 Ititt f W ' Pli R h ( 1 9 9 7 ) The Status of Women in the States: Highlights R h i B i f W h i t DC (1997b) Th W G M' dW ' E i Bif P W h i t DC Ii L (1993) S dG l i t Gilli Gill N Y k C l b i U i i t P MKi C (1987) F i i Udifid Di Lif d L Cbid MA H d U i i t P Mill J S (1869) Th Sbjti f W N Yk S B k 1970 Nddi N (1984) Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education B k l CA U i i t fC l i f i P R d l i f f R i h d J (1980) Th S t i l F i i t L d Rtld dK P l R d d i k S (1989) Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace N Yk B i B k S l L (1990) Sl Mti Chi Mtiiti Chi M N B i k NJ Rt U i i t P Shi F R (1985) H i t i l t th bl f th W ' M t A i can Speech 1 3 1 6 S C H (2000) Th W A i t B H Miidd F i i i H i Y M N Y k Si d S h t Stt E C d Ath S B (1981) C d Witi S h d E C DBi N Yk S h k B k T j f l H (1981) H G dS i l C t i Cbid Cbid U i i t P UNIFEM (2000) P f th Wld' W 2000 N Y k U i t d N t i

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US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (2000) Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence against Women Survey. Washington DC Valian V (1998) Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women. Cambridge MA: MIT Press Wollstonecraft M (1792) Vindication of the Rights of Woman. New York: Penguin 1988

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P i d t L d Jh d th t "ffiti t i " t f t il fft t tht l i t l d t t t t i i itht dt d l t i l ii Td h th t i d t f t lii t h t i f t i ll Afi A i dH i i i th titi f j b d ti d for places at universities and colleges Such policies have been under attack ever since they were introduced thirty years ago Affirmativeaction policies the critics li j t fi ill d i i i dd t t i f th l f t d lft f th b f i i i Bt b b l th b j t i t l h d tht dititi b d iidi Citi t d t b d i h J t i H l ' dit "O C t i t t i i lblid" Rjid t th itii f ffiti ti h b ith f d l k i b k d l k i F d l k i t d f d ffiti ti th ground that it has good consequences Backwardlooking arguments defend af firmative action on the ground that it is compensation for the harmful effects of past injustices Initially many defenders of affirmative action relied on backward lki t bbl b it i t d d b f i i i ik Afi A i d h d t h t li f ti i t A i i t f th f f t f t ijti R t l h t d f d f ffiti ti h lid f d l k i t I d d R l d D k i th tf d f d f f f t i ti h if ill j t d b k d l k i t i f ff d l k i Th ki f ll d i i h it Blk l i t h riht t f b th b l k f f d fr ijti i th t Bt f f t i ti h riht It h f d looking justification The policy promises a better educational environment and a ess ill t t i f d it f It i tht jdi h i d it f ll f d tht f t i titi f difft t td d k together is part of an eifective even if slowworking antidote (Dworkin 2001) E i d t l D k i bli t h t th f ffiti it i b f i i i Bt h d i t h t thi i b

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injustice in the past On his account it is because the presence of blacks in universities and colleges will make for better educational environments there and will lead ultimately to a less racially stratified and prejudiced society We agree that forward-looking arguments for affirmative action are attractive They make no ugly accusations and dredge up no past crimes that the public is really tired of hearing about As their name suggests they look to the future listing optimistically all the good things that affirmative action will bring Further their appeal to diversity is fashionable and lends them an air of sanctioning the pluralism of modern liberal societies On the other hand dredging up past crimes is the very linchpin of the backward-looking arguments Instead of a rousing call to help realize grand and benevolent historical tendencies they seem to reopen old wounds and to encourage divisiveness We are wary of the current tendency to abandon backward-looking arguments and use only forward-looking ones to defend affirmative action If backward-looking arguments for affirmative action are sound then affirmative action is a demand for justice and a matter of highest priority It will not enjoy such a priority if it is based on forward-looking arguments even if these arguments are sound Improving educational environments for students and reducing racial stratification and prejudice may be desirable goals but there are many ways to achieve them and affirmative action may not be the best Finally we should not overlook the good consequences of presenting affirmative action as compensation Justice is not only the irst virtue of a society Most of the members of a society see it as such Their conviction that their society is acting justly may have consequences that contribute more to the welfare of society than diversity and equality (Hill 1991) Consequently we propose to present here again the backward-looking case for affirmative action This does not mean that we must reject forward-looking arguments Some of these arguments are persuasive In the end however we believe that none of them is as persuasive as some forms of the backward-looking arguments Let us begin with the forward-looking arguments

Forward-looking Arguments The main good consequences claimed for affirmative action include those cited by Dworkin namely improved educational environments and the reduction of racial stratification and prejudice These consequences are important mainly because they help to make opportunities more equal Let us begin with that argument The main idea behind the equal-opportunity principle is that places and positions in a society should be awarded to those best qualified for them That is places and positions should go to individuals with the qualities and abilities which make t likely that they will best perform the functions expected of those filling these places and positions Thus it requires that individuals be evaluated for positions strictly on the basis of their qualifications for these positions and forbids all discrimination on the basis of characteristics irrelevant to adequatelyfillingthe positions At least two considerations favor the equal-opportunity principle The first is straightforwardly utilitarian: if we abide by the equal-opportunity principle positions 119

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ill t d t b d i t i b t d t th h b t d h t th i d tilit ill tend to be maximized The second appeals to the principle of equal consideration of interests The principle of equal consideration of interests forbids giving A's interests greater or lesser weight than the like interests of B Suppose however that both A's d B' i t t tb tifd bt tifi A' i t t ill b t t bl t th t tif t h i i t t hil tifi B' i t t ill bl l fi th t tif t h i i t t I tht th i i l f l idti ld t l l t tif A' i t t Thi t h th l t i t i i l t d t th i i l f l idti fi t t Th l t i t i i l t d t ditibt d i b l iti t th th th t th l t l t d th more and less talented have similar interests in filling desirable positions but the more talented are likely to perform the functions expected of those filling these positions more efficiently than the less talented; consequently assuming that the interests of ll b t t db t th b l ffii it tht f th l t i t i i l th i i l f l idti f i t t Bth t i l i t i i d th i i l f l idti fi t t t tht t t t f th l t i t i i l i i l t W ld award positions to the most qualified although talented people who could be even more qualified are not properly educated But if very talented people are not prop erly educated society is not making the best use of the talents available to it and b t h th tilit i i l d th i i l f l idti fi t t ill b iltd W tt h f d t t t f th l t i t i i l ith th i t t h t ll i d i i d l hld h th h t i th lifiti f d i b l iti At ii thi i tht l t d d h l id ith th d t hth th ih blk hit l f l ( B i l l 1980) M iti til i l t bth t f th l t i t i i l I many societies people are frequently ruled out of consideration for positions simply because they are female or members of a racial minority and as if to compound this injustice schools for the rich are usually better than schools for the poor; h l f hit ll b t t th h l f blk dt l t d il f i i i hitt d th h i l i t d It i t h iti f ffiti ti lik t it J t i H l ' l i t h t th A i Ctitti i l b l i d If t h t iti h th i h t t b l t d f d i b l iti ll th b i fthi lifi ti d tht l i t ll lifiti f iti th colorblind principle and the similar sexblind principle seem to follow from the equalopportunity principle But if so then if affirmative action violates the color blind or sexblind principle it also violates the equalopportunity principle H thi l i i d t ikl S i it likl tht th i l t i i ti f th l t i t i i l t th t t tht blk t fill t i iti If f f i t i t i lii i th f t i l t i i fb l k d f iti tht t t i l d th f thi b k th t t i d th h l t k titi l f blk d F l if t t 120

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tht tb i d ffiti ti bl to become engineers it will serve to undermine the stereotype that women cannot be engineers Since that idea is one of the main reasons why many girls are pre vented from becoming engineers affirmative action will help make the opportunities f i i i l t th tht j Thi i t b k d l k i t Th d blk ii f t i l t t t h h i d d th h d i tht fft blk d d thi f t i l t t t tb i d ti f h th f f d Thi f t i l t t t i jtifd til f d lki idti l t h t it ill k titi l f blacks and women These consequences of affirmative action may be desirable but the practice may still be unacceptable Practices which violate people's rights are normally not ac tbl if th h d i b l Th t i t t bjti i t th f d l k i t i t h f tht f t i l t t t i lt l ' i h t Th h thi b j t i li tht f t i l t t t ilt th i h t f hit l t b l t d f iti ll th b i f thi lifti A li thi f l l f th lblid d sexblind principles that neither color nor sex can be qualifications for positions This objection is not as decisive as it may seem It rests on the assumption that qualifications for positions must be things like scores on aptitude tests grades and i i t dil Rflti t h t h t thi ti b f l if i d i h t t th i i l f l idti fi t t Th b i i t i tht dil h l dl h l f l t tblihd i d t d l ith h i h d d hih titd t t b t t id dil dl l i f th it T thi tht tt tblih dil h l i d t t i d t t it l bt t f th hl' d t ti i iti ith th lt t h t l i l are without adequate medical care In such a case if the state had good reason to believe that doctors from rural areas are more likely to practice in rural areas than other doctors from urban areas and if it gave equal weight to the interests of rural d b l i ii dil t t t it ld ftl jtifd i ii th dil h l t b i idi l ii lifti f d i i If thi b dd l it t i i l d bjti t i lifti f d i i t dil h l ill b d i f f i l t t ti Th flli i tl lll F l if l i blk iti d not get adequate medical care because not enough doctors elect to practice there; in that case exactly as in the previous case if the state has good reason to believe that black doctors are far more likely than white doctors to practice in black commu iti d if it i l i h t t th i t t fblk d hit l i ii dil t t t it ld ftl jtifd i ii dil h l t b i idi bi blk lifti f d i i Th l h h ffiti ti hl it i l idti t th lik i t t f ll th h h blk b f t i l l dittd it dil h l i d t h t th i t t f blk i ii

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medical treatment can be better satisfied And they also show how affirmative action can have these good consequences without violating the rights of white males to be evaluated for positions solely on the basis of their qualifications They show this by demonstrating that race or sex can in some circumstances be a qualification for admission to medical school Critics sometimes object that some white doctors are more likely to practice in black communities than some black doctors What they say may be true but it fails to invalidate the case for considering race a qualification for admission to medical school That case would be invalidated only if black doctors were not more ikely than white doctors to practice in black communities Practically all policies awarding places and positions must rely on generalizations which everyone knows are not true in every case Consider for example the policy of awarding university places partly on the basis of high scores on aptitude tests and high-school grades No reasonable person suggests that the policy should be abandoned although it s well known that some people with high scores and grades will not do as well in the university as some people with low scores and grades It thus seems that the color-blind and sex-blind principles are based on an excessively narrow conception of what can count as a qualification for a position The qualifications for a position are the qualities and abilities which make it likely that a person who has them will adequately perform the functions expected of anyone filling the position and enable society to give more equal weight to the like interests of all Other things being equal persons with high test scores and grades are more likely than those with low test scores and grades to adequately perform the functions expected of those filling desirable positions Consequently high test scores and grades are usually among the qualifications for desirable positions It does not follow however that they are the only possible qualifications for desirable positions As we have seen race or sex may sometimes be among the qualities which make it likely that a person will perform the functions expected of those filling desirable positions and which enable society to give more weight to the like interests of all In such cases there is every reason to consider race or sex a qualification for that position This argument does not challenge the equal-opportunity principle It allows that people have rights to be evaluated for positions strictly on the basis of their qualifications for these positions What it denies is that affirmative action necessarily violates the rights of white males for it affirms that race or sex may be a qualification Of course when institutions are going to fill positions this does not absolve them from the obligation to publish the qualifications they are going to use to evaluate candidates Further the rights of candidates to be evaluated strictly on the basis of their qualifications can be violated if the published policies are not followed Note however that these rights are not violated simply because the policies rely on distinctions based on race or sex The second forward-looking argument for affirmative action is that it produces better educational environments for everyone including white students At first glance this argument may seem implausible Indeed it may seem more likely that affirmative action will worsen educational environments at least for white students; presumably the best students make the best educational environments but affirma122

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tive action gives preference to black students with lower test scores and grades than some white students Advocates of the forward-looking argument rebut this difficulty with the famous diversity argument According to this argument a class or university filled with students with the highest possible test scores does not necessarily make the best learning environment If students share the same background assumptions they are likely to have the same blind spots and to overlook the same things This may lead them to miss the truth even if they are highly intelligent They are more likely to learn the truth if there are students among them with different backgrounds even if these students have lower test scores and grades than others who might have been admitted It is easy to see how this argument can be used to justify affirmative action The crucial premise of this justification is that black students have different background assumptions from white students Once this is granted a case for preferentially admitting black students into universities and colleges can be mounted on the forward-looking consideration that this will improve the learning environments of universities and colleges This is a satisfying reversal of the earlier argument that justified integrating primary and secondary schools on the ground that white students improved the learning environment for black students Further there is something to it Discovery of the truth does not depend on logical agility alone It also depends on the premises of our arguments on what we notice and that depends on our background assumptions and attitudes There is no need to collapse into relativism here The facts may be the same for everyone and everyone may be capable of noticing these facts Still different background assumptions and attitudes may dispose different people to notice different facts The third forward-looking argument for affirmative action is that it reduces racial stratification and therefore racial prejudice; this argument is less compelling Dworkin is obviously right that preferential admission of blacks into universities and colleges will reduce racial stratification At least he is right if such admissions will get their beneficiaries better jobs But reducing racial stratification may not reduce racial prejudice Germany and Austria were not racially stratified before the Second World War because the assimilated Jews of those countries had high positions and good jobs But their success did not save them from the anti-semitism of the majority Indeed on many accounts it exacerbated anti-semitism; many Germans hated the Jews in part because the Jews were more successful than they were Plausibly blacks who are successful because of affirmative action will fare even worse because resentment of their success will be fed by the belief that they got it by unfair means If the forward-looking case for affirmative action is sound such a belief could be false but it may nevertheless be irresistible We are not going back on our earlier argument that affirmative action may help to undermine stereotypes of black or female incompetence This argument may or may not be sound but undermining stereotypes is not the same as reducing racial prejudice The fact that blacks hold responsible positions successfully may help undermine the belief that blacks cannot hold such positions but it may increase the prejudice against them Blacks may be hated precisely because they hold responsible positions successfully We can know that better jobs for blacks and their presence in universities and colleges will reduce racial prejudice only if we have a correct 123

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th f th f il jdi Af d l k i t f f f t i action that relies on the premise that it will reduce racial prejudice cannot be accepted unless it produces such a theory and uses it to justify that premise However is reducing racial stratification not a worthy goal of affirmative action if it d t d il jdi? W lli t thi ti i th f f t i t l t if th b k d l k i t f ffiti ti i j t d N t i t h t td i tht d i i l iti i it i th l It i ill i it ith id i i l i t i lik th t i A i Bt f f t i ti d t d i i l i t i i i i f i t d it i i t t ith widening economic inequalities It is quite possible for the gap between the haves and the havenots to widen even as some blacks join the ranks of the haves The critics of affirmative action have made this point repeatedly and it is a serious blow t th f d l k i t Of d i il ttifiti ld b th l f f f t i ti if it d d il jdi R i l jdi lifdl il d thi t h t d it i d t l t if it d t thi bt h d d t f th f d l k i t h tb t h d t tilt th tht h tht d i i inequalities reduces racial prejudice Let us now see how the backwardlooking arguments may help to resolve this difficulty

Backwardlooking Arguments B k d l k i t jtif f f t i ti ti f t j t i j i Wh l i d t b l k th t i t i f Th f i t i t h t f f i t i ti t b l k f th i j i th ff a result of unjust racial prejudice and discrimination directed at them There are two versions of this argument: one is that affirmative action is compensation for specific acts of discrimination such as being denied admission to a university simply b f ' Th th i t h t f f i t i ti i ti f i j i ffd lt f th i i i it W ill b t th fit i f th t b t h i l h tht f fiti ti ll b it ti f ifi t f d i i i ti t l t h th d i i i t th t f ti Th d i f th t i t i l O tht t ll b l k h ffd i j i tht d ti if th h ffd ifi acts of racial discrimination As Thurgood Marshall says "It is unnecessary in twentieth century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination [It] has been so pervasive that none regard l f lth iti h dt it i t " ( T h t 2001 353) Thi t li ll t d t ti kt f l l hit A d th t it if t f ld i i i t i t h t b bl t t l tht h h b i j d b th i i f it Siill i l i iti h E l d th l l ff f i l jdi tht ij th ll Thi tb 124

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marked in the United States as in other countries but it does exist to a certain extent The second main backward-looking argument is that affirmative action is justified as compensation to present-day blacks for the injuries they have sustained as a result of the enslavement and unjust racial treatment of their African and AfricanAmerican ancestors This argument differs from the first because it appeals to njuries suffered by the ancestors of the present generations of blacks Perhaps the most priceless of the many criticisms aimed at this argument is that compensating present-day blacks for the enslavement of their ancestors is impossible because such compensation would mean that present-day blacks would not exist (Boxill 1992) This objection relies on a certain conception of compensation; namely that to compensate someone for an injury is to bring him or her to the position that he or she would have been had the injury never occurred But if the African ancestors of the present generation of African Americans had never been enslaved they would have met and had children with different people and consequently the present generation of African Americans would not exist Accordingly it is impossible to compensate the present generation of blacks for the enslavement of their ancestors Despite its popularity this objection thoroughly misunderstands the argument t aims to rebut The problem does not lie in the conception of compensation that is used It lies in a misunderstanding of the injury that is supposed to be compensated The argument does not say that present-day blacks should be compensated for the enslavement of their ancestors That would indeed be impossible because logically speaking no one can be compensated for injuries that another suffers; one can only be compensated for injuries that one suffers oneself The argument in question satisfies this key condition It says that present-day blacks should be compensated for injuries they have sustained It only adds that some of these injuries result from the enslavement of their ancestors No reputable historian has dared deny that the legacy of slavery has deeply affected and harmed present-day blacks There are at least two ways in which the legacy of slavery has harmed the present black population First the black population starts off with less wealth and education than other people because their ancestors were slaves This should be easy to see People bequeath their money property and position to their descendants Slaves generally have less money and property than free people Consequently the descendants of slaves start off with less money and property than the descendants of free people Finally this hamstrings them for desirable places and positions in the society And consequently harms them The second way in which the legacy of slavery has harmed the present black population is less obvious than the one just described but is perhaps more mportant The legacy of slavery has harmed the present black population by intensifying the racism against it Black people are despised and hated because they are the descendants of slaves But the intensity of the racism against black people has played a major role in holding them back If black people have not matched the success of other groups in America it is because the white population has hated and despised them so much; and it has hated and despised them so much because they see them as the descendants of slaves

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Other minorities and immigrant groups have boasted of success despite the racism directed against them The implication is that racism cannot prevent people from succeeding if they have talent and are determined to succeed We submit however that the racism directed at these minorities and immigrant groups is different from the racism directed at blacks It was not animated and intensified by the contempt of the racism directed at descendants of slaves If this is correct the racism directed at blacks is not only pervasive but also more virulent and harmful than that directed at other groups It is also more virulent and harmful than sexism and class prejudice What made it so harmful is that it must have seemed so effective When few blacks succeed blacks must conclude that the racism against them is not only intense but also effective in holding them down In such circumstances hopelessness is rational When racial prejudice is pervasive intensive and seems effective in blocking black success it is rational for a black person to conclude that he or she will not succeed In these circumstances black success was always accompanied by a sort of craziness a refusal to draw the conclusion that logic seemed to demand; namely that being black one would fail Earlier we argued that the bare fact that affirmative action reduces racial stratification is not enough to justify it; some other premise is necessary before we can draw the conclusion that it is justified We now have that premise One of the few consequences of affirmative action that is not controversial is that it will reduce racial stratification (Bowen and Bok 1998) With the elimination of racial stratification it will no longer be rational for blacks to infer that they cannot succeed The evidence of black success of blacks in the middle and upper classes will support the inference that blacks can succeed Affirmative action then is ustified because it provides for compensation in the form of restored hope This argument does not depend on the idea that racial stratification will abolish or even reduce racism We have seen that this optimistic argument is unwarranted That would of course be a happy circumstance if it did but there is no guarantee of this nor does the argument depend on it What really robbed blacks of hope was not only racism but the apparent effectiveness of racism in keeping them down The elimination of racial stratification will demonstrate that racism if it still persists is no longer effective in keeping black people down One might claim here that we are appealing to the same questionable empirical assumptions that we used to reject earlier versions of the forward-looking argument That is is the claim that abolishing racial stratification will restore hope to the black population really less controversial than the claim that black doctors will work in black communities? Or that abolishing racial stratification will abolish racial prejudice? We believe that it is Our position rests on the assumption that with experience human beings are usually able to know when to stop wasting their time on impossible projects Racial stratification makes the goals of reaching the middle and upper classes an impossible project As we have said it makes hopelessness rational If no blacks are succeeding it is not rational for any particular black person to believe she can succeed On the contrary it may be crazy for her to think she can The elimination of racial stratification will at least demonstrate that the American dream is as available to blacks as it is to any other group; there will no longer be a rational basis for not having the hope to succeed 126

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W h j t t d tht t i difft fr d libl than the argument that affirmative action will reduce racial stratification and con sequently will reduce racial prejudice Our argument is also different from the argu ment noted earlier that affirmative action will undermine stereotypes of racial i f i i t W t t tht t Th t t fblk i t did t il ttifiti W d b t t h t b l k bli th t t Th f il ttifiti th f hit i d th t ffti f tht i i k i blk d A h t d i h i t i h tilit it ditbl tht tblk ld t t t d T i t d i th i t ld b t i l With the ending of racial stratification caused by affirmative action then again (given human rationality) blacks will conclude that they can succeed Only then will it be true as the conservatives like to say that racism cannot keep blacks d O fil it ffiti ti i t it i t li d i d t ll it' ijti il i It i li d i d t tif t ijti d t ll th i l t t d jtl t th titi f it Lik li it i ith ft til f f ti effects However we believe that affirmative action is justified when we look at the fuller picture using both the forwardlooking and backwardlooking arguments

References NJ P i t U i i t W G d B k D (1998) Shape of the River P i t P Boxill B (1980) Sexual blindness and sexual equality Social Theory and Practice 3: 2 8 1 9 8 d Littlfild (1992) Blacks and Social Justice 2 d d N Y k R D k i R (2001) R d fl The New York Times O E d A i l 13 Hill Jr T E (1991) The message of affirmative action Socio/ Philosophy and Policy 8: 10829 Th L (1993) W h t d I? I St M C h ( d ) Affirmative Action and the University Chi IL T l U i i t P Tushnet Mark (ed) (2001) Regents of the University of California v Bakke (1978) in Thurgood Marshall Chicago: Library of Black America Lawrence Hill Books Chicago Review P

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th l l f t f lit i ll t k t t th hth ' tt lid l i ffiit t tif it f t t h h th i i l l Tht ti i t i ft h d th ti f th l i t i f"i i " "itil i " Ad d d th i i l f f thi h t ill b i l thi ti It i however to begin by setting aside some other issues that "the legal enforcement of morality" might suggest F i t th fli id f th ti f hth i l i t i sufficient f i l l l i t i th l ti f hth i l i t i necessary f i l l l i t Althh f th t i h d b th i i l l f l d btt thft d kl d t t i h t f d l i l th ihbl t t I th b f th f d l I t l R C d th i l tht i t i l 36 t f i t the federal government In the absence of the California Motor Vehicle Code there is no moral norm that requires me to drive no faster than 35 miles per hour on Sandburg Avenue And similarly although many of the acts that are legal wrongs iill th th i i l l l i l f l i t t i l b h f t t ti t t ti i th t t l t i th b fl l iti If h fi l t l l l ibi d dti d t d t th id l l l t h t dfi t iti tblih i t i t t i d fth d l ibi d dti d t ht td b " l l f t " th til b d that despite first appearances immorality is necessary for illegality Even if there s no moral norm (in the absence of a legal norm) requiring me to give precisely 36 percent of my income to the federal government there may be a moral norm ii t d fi h t t tl i dt l ith th ifiti f tht fi h l th ifiti fll ithi bl l i i t di i d tt h h bl f i d Th t ith d i i 35 il h Sdb A O ill i thi t ti f th d i t i t i ithi i i l l bt th i i l t tht mala in se ( i t h l ) h ti

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d d d th tht mala prohibita, b hibitd But the distinction is misleading in this sense: although many specific acts are wrong only because they are prohibited they are tokens of types of acts that are wrong in themselves such as failing to do one's fair share to support the govern t dii t bl d Th d b d f th iti tht i f l ditl lt d t t h h iti d d t th i l i t f th d t ibd d th l it f th d t dtd diti f th l i t i fl l f t Lt t t t l ti l hth th i l i t f conduct is a sufficient condition for legal proscription As a preliminary matter t should be noted that although this issue has usually been debated with only crim inal proscription in mind it is at least conceivable that immorality is not sufficient f i i l iti b t is ffiit f iil ti h d d At l t thi i h t b th ith t t th i l t tht h th bt tt t t ffiit t jtif i i l i h t F l b h f i b i l d l i t i t l id th b i f iil d B t th tb i l t th d sary to justify criminal punishment especially in light of the social costs of their criminalization and the adequacy of civil remedies The same might be true of some immoral tortious conduct offensive conduct and minor nuisances For example as hll J l Fib bli tht titi f tht h t th t h h iitti d t hld t b i i l l ihd i t b ff d f h bt h d t t h t iil d iht b dd i t th f (Fib 1984 2 4 4 5 ) Th t f i l i t b l i t i t l bjt t l l f t bt t i i l f t T i t hth i l i t i ffiit f l l f t t h h th criminal law opposition to sufficiency is frequently based on the socalled "harm principle" The "harm principle" which limits the legitimate scope of the criminal law to those acts that harm others is associated historically with John Stuart Mill d i t ti ith H L A H t i th H t D l i d b t It t t h h i l b t i h i i J l F i b ' t f l f l k The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law ( 1 9 8 4 8 ) Fib bli t h t th i i l l l l i t i t l b lid t d t tht h tht i ff ( i ff b l ) " H " f thi "f t th tt f t b k i t t tht the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions by others" (Feinberg 1984: 215) Thus "transitory disappointments minor physical and mental h u r t s ' and a miscel lany of disliked states of mind" although evils are not harms for Feinberg because th d t i l t b k f i t t (1984 2 1 5 1 6 ) t b k f i t t db d t tht i ll iibl ( h b i ti ti l i t i t l f d f ) tht i t d t b th h i t t t b k (1984 215) O th th h d t tht jtifibl ik h d f l l ithi th h i i l d b l i t i t l ihd t h i h l t tht h h t d (1984 216) 129

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N t ll h d b fl d t jtif riil i h t F example harms caused by imitative conduct should not be imputed to the conduct imitated for purposes of criminal punishment in the absence of extreme culpability (1984: 2 4 4 5 ) Moreover even the harmfulness of conduct is not sufficient for ts riiliti i i l i t i itlf h d tb jtifd l th h it i l th th h d b th d t riilid (1984 217) Fib t t th it f i l i t f ( r i i l ) illlit H ll j t riil riti f d t tht i h f l l t th h l t i l i it ( l l t l i ) b th t d (Fib 1986) But he rejects the sufficiency of immorality for criminal punishment If the immoral conduct causes no harm to others or causes harm to others too minuscule to justify the harms caused by criminal punishment then it may not legitimately be i h d t h h th riil l (Fib 1988) F i b ' iti th l l f t f lit i f it t i l M fid b l t i hi d i l t h t d t tht h t h h iitti b th hld b i d d h f l i th tht ld tif riil riti t l t i th b f hih d f lbilit (Feinberg does however allow criminal punishment of those who "incite" others to engage in harmful conduct [1984: 240]; and as noted above he appears to ap prove of civil liability even for those whose conduct is harmfully imitated by others) J t t i l l Fib d i t h t th d l t r i fft f i l d t th t ' h t hld t h jtifi riil ih t if ii ii h t i b d f th t h l f if th t ih t t h l f ii h h t ( l f t l i ) d if ith ii h t i likl fll t h th (Fi b 1988 285) ( F i b tt j t tt f riil i i l i i d t tht h t th l b i ii h t tit bt he is quite skeptical of the efficacy of the criminal law in that endeavor; 1988: 132) And similarly Feinberg denies that the coarsening effects of harmless immor alities on the public culture should count as harms to others justifying criminal i t t i (1988 128) F i l l h j t th i i t d ith P t i k D li (1968) i hi d b t ith H L A H t t h t it l i t i t l riili t h i h l i l d t th d tht ihd i l t d i th l d t h t dfi th it d th t h t th it' it qua it (1988 1 3 3 4 0 ) ( J h K k h d t h t thi i i i t t t i fD l i ' iti d tht Dli only arguing for the enforcement of that portion of the moral code essential to protect minimally good lives perhaps the very portion of the moral code Feinberg would enforce: Kekes 2000: 2 7 8 ) Fib t fth fil i ti f i l i t tht i l d d t tht d t h t th i F i b ' f i h d t h th d d d d d d Th h i i l h d b t d t dfi i l d t bt th l i i t it l i t i t lti t h h th riil l Tht l l ilbl f ttki Fi b ' iti 130

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Fit iht t bth F i b ' b d ti fi l d t d the harm principle but reject his restrictive view of the latter Thus one might have a more capacious view of harm and thus for the scope of the criminal law Or one might take a more generous view than Feinberg's of how immoral conduct causes h t th Th iht ji D l i i l i i tht d t t i f itdfi l d hld t h jtifi i i l ih t O ld l i t h t th i fft bli lt i h h t h t th l lik b t i l i t ii h t f t i d h t th ffiitl t t t i i l iti f lit Alternatively one can accept the philosophical position that Feinberg rejects legal moralism the position that immorality is sufficient for criminalization but come to conclusions similar to his by rejecting his broad view of what counts as i l F l R l d D k i i hi tibti t th d b t i t Dli' iti i i l i t i d t i t Dli' l l li bt th i t Dli' th itil i f ht td i l (D ki 1977 2 4 8 5 3 ) D k i ' iti tht thi h lik F i b ' Mill' h i i l f t i t t l t i t ht kinds of immoral conduct can be legitimately criminalized but rather as an internal constraint on defining conduct as "immoral" Similarly Michael Moore endorses legal moralism and its principle that those who do wrong deserve to be punished (M 1997 6 8 7 8 ) N th l M ' ti f ht t " " i f l i th Dli' d till h l t th d t F i b ' h i i l ld it t b i h d (1997 h 18) Ath iti i t tht F i b ' h i i l it t much i i l i h t Thi iti i t k b J t h S h h k h tht F i b l tk h t th ti i f f i i l i h t hih i t b " b l d " i t tht t against criminal punishment reasons such as the restriction on liberty that crim inal statutes represent and the various costs in terms of social resources loss of privacy possible corruption crowded courts and so forth that criminalization of d t t i l ( S h h k 1994 h 1) S h h k th th h d i t b l i d i f f i f "flt" F i b ' h i i l tblih l t h t th t t h l i t i t thit th d t i ti At t h t it i i l i t i t t h h t flt bf it b d d j t i f d Th tb l t t i t i i l i t i h i i l i i tht d th h f l d t t ceptable levels (Schonsheck's "presumptions filter"; 1994: 6 8 9 ) Moreover the costs of criminalization which include moral costs such as loss of privacy corrup tion and diversion of resources from other social goods must not exceed the bfit f i i l i t i i t f dti fh i d t (Sh hk' " t i f i l t " 1994 7 0 9 ) N it i t l S h h k dit tht F i b j t S h h k ' "filt" i tht F i b d h t th t b l i f f i i l i t i t l i F Fib d t t t h t th l h th l f libt tht ih i t i i l i t i N th 131

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l S h h k tht i f th l f i i l i t i i tht Feinberg discusses Feinberg fails to take these countervailing reasons seriously enough and is led in Schonsheck's opinion to the wrong conclusions Finally one could like Feinberg hold that the class of immoral conduct includes h tht i t h i i F i b ' bt j t hi h i i l ltth F h th l l lit t tht i l d d d i b i i l l ihd if th h f l i th F i b ' ih d i i f th t fh t th tht tif i i l i h t t i tht l t h h it i t t i thi iht i h l t i thi h t A th t i hth l can be wrongfully harmed posthumously; whether exploitation counts as a wrong ful harm; whether failures to prevent harm can be wrongful harms; whether other regarding interests can be the basis of wrongful harm (not if they are malicious or diti di t F i b ) h t h ft di f t th l t d d d il d i l b fll h d d hth b fll h d b t f ' it ( t h t i th t t f D k Pfit' " f f t i " i i l ) F h h ht ti t t F i b ' jti f l t l i th iti t h t th criminal law can legitimately be employed to protect people from harming their own moral character and his rejection of legal moralism which deems immorality to be sufficient for criminal enforcement even if it is "harmless" Moral paternalism i b t i d d t f th b d t i f t l i ll F th h i l h i l i i l t l i i t hth th immorality f lf ti b h i jtif it i i l i t i bt hth th h t lf tht iht jtif i i l i h t f h t h i t t l i t i jtifti f i i l l i l d h t ' l h t i dditi t h h dth h i l ij d Tht i h F i b ' j ti f l t l i d t hi jti fl l li i t within the scope of this chapter Before turning to legal moralism however it is important to examine a category of conduct that Feinberg excludes from the purview of the harm principle but not f th l i t i t thit f th i i l l Th t i tht f d t tht f d ff t th Fib d t ti l t th t f ff (Fib 1985) H ld t h t ff tt h i d t t h h dfi it i hi fit l Harm to Others N th l h ld tht d t tht i f d l ffi l i t i t l b i i l i d (th ff i i l ) (1985 1) E l f foundly offensive conduct in our culture are public fornication and masturbation public bestiality public handling of excrement and public desecration of corpses (1985: 1 0 1 3 ) Fib ld t i t th f d ff ti t th h i i l t d t tht i bli B k l d tht h d t i i i i t tt h ditbi t jtif i i l i i it i t (1985 6 0 7 1 ) O t h i h i i i l i i ffi d t ld likl ll it l l li ( W h t h hi titi f i i l i t i t bli ffi d t i dfibl d th hth h id l l 132

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li hil b i i h t f ffi d t i tt hll take up below) Turning now to legal moralism it is important to get some sense of the type of conduct that the legal moralist would punish but that "liberals" like Feinberg ld t f i h t tt f i i l Th d t ld f h t b i l At th ti h it ld t fll t b k th i t t f th ( l it ld f l l ithi F i b ' h i i l ) ld it b blil d i ( l it i h t f d l f f d th db l i t i t l i i l i d tht d) H l f d t tht iht b d d i l bt t harmful: bestiality (sex with animals); exploitation (taking advantage of another's dire straits to extract most of the contractual surplus from transacting with him); producing and consuming hardcore pornography that appeals to lurid and sadistic i l d tti d ttdi lditil t t i hih t t t l t i l f h t t th d t h tt t l tibtd b I i K i t l (1971) B t i l i t t f l l ithi th h i i l if i l ithi th tti f th i i l b th h i t t tht b t b k if b t i l i t d ti f t t b k th i t t Elitti t fall within the harm principle because the "victim" is not harmed but is inad equately benefited Pornography may not fall within the harm principle unless t "causes" its consumers to harm others (Feinberg 1988: 2 132) And gladiatorial t t t f l l ithi th h i i l f t h Y t bl h f th t f d t i i l Fib t th i l i t f th d t i th l bt h d i t h t th d t b l i t i t l i i l l i h d i th b fh ff H i ht i l b t th l d i t i l l i t b h h dbt b t hth lditil t t ld id h t th f l h t h th ld id t t t i ldit h " t " t truly voluntary (1988: 3 3 0 1 ) or whether they could avoid so coarsening their audience that they cause an increase in violent crimes (1988: 132 3 2 9 3 1 ) In the final analysis however he appears to concede that preventing evils other than h t th b l i t i t f i i l i t i t tht i l t l t i h d b th h f i i l i t i bt h t t i h d i th f lditil t t Wht ld F i b ' jti fl l li til f " i t i l i " h titti bli dd ? Th i t t ll l O liitti f titti i h t f l l ithi th i i l itti i i l i t i of acts that are profoundly offensive Acts within any of these categories might involve harm to others (for example adultery use of joint funds without consent) And particular instances of gambling and drug use might involve the wrongful iki fh t th h i likl t l th f i l ' ilk di hil i i d b t d d i t d t flfill ' l l bliti Th f Fib d i t hi jti fl l li iht d i i l i t i f tl t i t f th tiiti ( I d d thi i h iti lik S h h k bli F i b ' h i t ii f i i l i t i th th t t i t i ) 133

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Aid f j i fl l lik K i t l ' l d i t i l t t tht weaken the conviction of antilegal moralists like Feinberg what can be said more systematically on behalf of legal moralism? One approach for the legal moralist s that taken by Michael Moore Moore argues that the point of criminal law is to see tht di ( d lbl t t t d ik f d i ) i ihd (M 1997 70) A d di i l d t l th fl t t h t fll ithi Mill' F i b ' h d ff i i l F M if t i ll th i l t t d i h it t h h th i i l l D i t hi l l li h M ld bbl h l i punishment very similar to Feinberg's For Moore holds that while the immorality of conduct is always a reason for its proscription the reach of the criminal law s tempered by three countervailing moral concerns First like Dworkin Moore refuses t t h t is i l ith h t lilti jit jit f th believes t b i l A i i l ttt i l i t i t f M l if l th d t it f b i d i t l i l d hth d t i t l i l tt f l lit t l b l i f (1997 6 6 2 3 ) F l M hilf bli tht t l l tiit i l d i h l i t i t moral and therefore should not be criminalized regardless of the views of demo cratic majorities (1997: 756) Second Moore like Schonsheck believes that the costs of criminalizing conduct t i t f iti l f i ti d d i t f th l tht ih i t i i l i t i di ditt tht i l i t i h d (1997 6 6 3 5 ) A d d i t i l l th ht M d th " t i f l i b t " tht t t th i i l l ' dti f t d ti f it l bd tht ih i t i i l i t i (1997 7 6 8 7 4 7 8 ) S l i i l i t i f l b k i i hld ihd b th l t f criminalization outweigh the retributive principle that immorality should be pun ished? Third Moore endorses a right to liberty a right that immunizes from punishment t f i l d t (1997 7 6 3 7 7 ) M j t Mill' d Fi b ' h i i l th b i f th i h t di t d h t i th i h t tti h f "lfdfii h i " (1997 775) Th lfdfii hi tht t t d b th i h t t l i b t i l d hi tht i l d t h i l i t i t l bjt t i i l iti d i h t Th M d "iht t d " Moore applies his right to liberty to the question of criminalizing drug use (1997: 7 7 9 9 5 ) He canvasses various arguments to the effect that drug use is immoral: t contravenes the ideal of asceticism; it creates the risk of wrongdoing; it reduces dtiit it i d flihi d it l d t th d t t i f th lf M j t l bliti t b dti ibl t tti h idl t f l i h (1997 7 8 0 1 7 8 3 7 ) H d bli h tht i d t i i l b it i k i j i th itht t i lbl t Bt d ik i j t h h i i th l i k l i h d f th d ' ft lbl di dh j t d i th d 134

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f th i l d t it i h t k l i k l (1997 7 8 2 4 ) H d accept however a moral obligation to refrain from destroying our capacity to act as moral agents (1997: 7 8 7 8 ) At this point Moore's right to liberty kicks in because the selfdestruction is a selfdefining choice So although it is morally t tk d t th it f l f d t t i it ld l b ll f th t t t ih h di (1997 7 9 2 5 ) J h R lik F i b bli t h t th ll t ti tht d t h th i F i b ' fh (R 1986 397) H l d i t t l i b l tht tf t i t l t i f ll h f l hi (1986 3 8 0 1 ) A t hi h l R l when they are directed at ends that are truly morally valuable (1986: 380 412) Therefore eliminating morally base choices as options does not impair the value of autonomy (1986: 3 8 0 8 1 4 1 0 1 2 ) D i t hi f d i l i t hi d i t d t d ll b ( t h h h l ) d R th l d thi lik F i b ' h i i l t ld i i l i h t fh l i l i t i (1986 4 1 8 2 2 ) R h l d i t i i h bt i i l iti fh l l d t d fl i lik t d bidi t th morally good and discourage the morally bad Coercion through the criminal law he says is "an indiscriminate invasion of autonomy" (1986: 418) That is because "imprisoning a person prevents him from almost all autonomous pursuits" (1986: 418) S R j t f t f lit t h h th i i l l if t t h h l i l l Bt f hi iti h itd t th ll t h t f hi t b t th l f t t f l l l i Aft ll th t h t t t i ihi th h i h l i l i t li t i th f f i h t h i i t bt th til l i f th i l ti F i i t i l h i t i l form of criminal punishment Fines are another yet they leave those subject to them with every bit as much autonomy as those who are taxed Similarly if the punishment for harmless immorality were electric shocks or whippings people ld b d t d f i l hi b th t h t f h i h t b t th i h t t h l ld t i d t Ad R t d tht ki th h i ttti ilbl i i i th l f t i t h t th l f t i lid l t h h th hi Th R h idd fl t f l l li d i t Feinberg's harm principle despite his endorsement of that principle If there are harmless immoralities the choice of which is valueless no matter how autonomous then Raz should endorse their criminalization in the absence of excessive costs n di Lt t t th ti f hth t f i i l i t i f f d l ffi d t i i t t ith jti fl l li Fi b iti Th t t d b t t h t it i Si Fib d l l lit ld d i i l i i th h l i l i t i tht ffd th f b f th ff th l t t b f th i l i t d i 135

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( t ? ) h l i l i t i ill ffd th f th ht left for the operation of Feinberg's injunction against legal moralism? One area s where harmless immoralities fail to offend seriously enough to warrant their crim inalization A legal moralist might reach exactly the same anticriminalization con l i Fib f th Thi i b th ill b i t t f th t t h t ill b tb k b i i l i t i tht ll t i h th i t t i ihi i l i t i h th i l i t i i t h t it ill t i ff A l t h h it i t l tl h th l l l i t ill i h th b t t l f ihi i l i t i t th i t i t t t h t ill b tb k b i i l i t i th i t thik h ill ignore or heavily discount the latter The area where Feinberg and the legal moralist clearly part company is that of offensive and immoral conduct that occurs in private This is what Feinberg calls th "b k l d b l " (Fib 1985 6 1 7 1 ) S Alfd i f d l ffdd lt f l k i f Btt dC l ' lbi lti hi th i t i t ti f hih bhid l d d i thi t t S Alfd i t b l i hi ff d tht ff tlbi ti i i d d d i Ad f th k f t tht lbi ti are immoral though harmless Will Feinberg's offense principle then legitimate for liberals the criminal prohibition of lesbian practices? Feinberg wants to deny that it will He draws a bright line between offensive i i l ti t h t Alfd i ditl i bli l d th tht Alfd k f th th t h h d i t ti It i h t h t th ti f di l l d th ff i i l it d d th h i i l T b ihbl d t t t l ffd it t l it iti Thi i Fib t h t th i t i ' i b l Alfd t l i t h t he i d b Btt dC l ' i l d t d i t hi bi ffdd b th t h h t f it At an earlier point in his argument Feinberg claims that one can suffer lower order non"profound" offenses such as revolting or disgusting or boring sights and smells only if one directly perceives them rather than merely learns of them (1985 5 7 8 ) Wh does i th d t h b ff th ff th i f l i flt t b l t th i Th ff ff b f ilti f l i F i b ' t " f d " ff d td d ' ii dt k i b t th i l t i Alfd ff f d ff hth t h it Btt d Cl i thi l b i i t i i l k f th But where he does not witness the conduct, but merely knows of it, his grievance is not a personal one because he cannot claim the conduct is a wrong to him. And if the conduct because unwitnessed wrongs no one it cannot be prohibited under the offense principle I til ith F i b ' l i f f d ff t f th l i h d f it ( A l d 1994) Th t h Fib iht id h d ith ill t hi h h t t O i th d i t i t i bt i d d t d k d t Th th i th d i t i t i b t d t tht ffd b it i l t d d t tht ilt b it ffd L t tk h f th dititi i t 136

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Fib t hi iti th d i t i t i bt i d dk duct He wants to say that if Alfred were to be unwillingly forced to view Betty and Clara's lovemaking then even with respect to his profound offense (the offense he suffers as a result of the violation of the moral norm) he has a personal grievance liibl f tti d th ff i i l If A l f d l k f Btt dC l ' d t h th h l k l i Wht th d f F i b ' dititi bt ti d k l d ? Th t ibiliti O ibilit i t h t th i difft lit t ff tht i d d t ff tht l k b t Th th ibilit i t h t ti bt t k l d idiidt th h f offense in a way that makes the resulting grievances capable of characterization as wrongs to particular people The first possibility overlooks the fact that we are dealing here with profound ff ff i t th f t t h t l h b iltd Whth Alfd d i t l i Btt d Cl l k b t th tht t f hi ff tht i f d ff ld b t t At l t F i b i t t h t it ld t b A l f d ' d i t ti i t f hi t k b t Btt dC l ' f d l ffi d t I ll it is his knowledge that moral norms are being violated that causes his offense Consider Agnes who believes that extramarital sex including heavy petting is immoral (but harmless) She has learned that Barbara and Charles unmarried are h i ffi d h i f d l f f d d At d h b th l Bill d C d i i th h tti At f i t h b l i th id d h i t f f d d b thi b h i t h h it i i d i t Wh h i i f d t h t th t id h ff f d ff Cll h ff i bth i d t fh k l d tht l bi iltd P t i i th d l id h ith id f th ilti The other possible basis for Feinberg's distinction between perceived and known immoral conduct is that perception but not knowledge somehow personalizes the offense in a way that allows us to identify specific persons who have been wronged Thi t i b l t i C i d t fi l d t tht i i d b t h d f l d tht i i t b t tht i l d f b f l Th i t l b t l i i t h t th f h b d ("If ti l l d th fid t h d th thi i ik tk h t i l l " ) N i th t l b t l i i tht t h d h h b ll d i th fit M numbers are irrelevant though if they were relevant they would cut in favor of not against mere knowledge I conclude that Feinberg has not offered a convincing rationale for distinguishing bt f f d ff tht i l d i t ti f ffdi d t d f f d ff tht i l b k l d f ffdi d t M Fib i tiili hi l i b l f d f liti i i l hibiti b f i th h ld i h l liti t d bhid l d d B h h l d d i t d thi i t t i i i h d t did d i k d if th t t t t i

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t i t id th ill l t i th b l i d th ff principle unless they retreat from the public realm But why if we are to bar legal moralism through the front door should we allow it in through the back door in the form of protecting against profound offense a protection that makes the i l i t dl iti h t i hi f i t ti t f d ? If i th f f d ff j t F i b ' dititi bt i d d l k i l d t lft ith th ibl di titi tht iht t th ff i i l f l l i it l l li th d i t i t i bt d t tht i l t l b it offends and conduct that offends because it violates moral norms Although Fein berg does not ultimately rely on this distinction in making his case against crimin alizing immoral conduct that occurs in private it is useful to consider the i l i t i f l i h dititi Aft ll th d i t i t i h l l l t d t th jti f l l li th d th d i t i t i bt i d d l k d t Fib k l d th d i t i t i bt d t tht i i l b it f f d d d t t h t ffd b it i i l d t it h appears to be drawing the boundary between the offense principle and legal moral ism on the basis of it Ultimately however he countenances prohibition of conduct that offends because it is immoral so long as the conduct occurs in public Bt h t j t thi d d d tht d t b ffi d dtl f i l i t bf it b hibitd d th ff i i l W l d thi t hi h h t t b? S l t If l i i t f th liti f th ff i i l ll d t tht ffd b ilti f ( dt d t hih i l t b it ffd) th ff i i l ill b i t d It ill l h t d t th i h t ll d f hih ld b ffi i ll lt h th ll f l h i acid or the sound of chalk screeching on a blackboard But most of the offensive conduct that Feinberg wishes to criminalize as profoundly offensive would not be eligible for prohibition under the offense principle M t f th d t tht ffd d b it f it f l t i f Thi i b i l t f h thi blhi i bli It i bbl l t f bli b l i i h i d t i th ll b lt tht t fid h d t lti A d it i t f h d t bli dit d bli f i t i Fib t i t t bli t h i H it t tht offended by public nudity or fornication but not by private nudity or fornication (Feinberg 1988: 1 5 1 6 ) Therefore it is our perception of the conduct not its violation of norms that causes our offense The norms against public nudity and f i t i th l th ilt d th d t li bt l i d b th ff d Thi l i f h i i t Pbli dit d f i t i d t h d t ll ti f f d Th ffd h th ilt b t bli b h i tht i i l It i t f tht dit df i t i i i t d t ilt dd t ffd Ad

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it i t h f l t t h t it i thi b t thi bi bli t h t l d t our condemning public nudity and fornication But it is incorrect to conclude that bare perception (no pun intended) rather than norm transgression is the source of our offense in such cases There are norms about proper conduct in public that are f ff h i l t d b t tht d t t t i t ff tht it th t h l E l i i t th d l i i t th ff Cid i thi ti th f l l i l Bill d C d i bli f i t i bf thiti d ft t l k N t i ffdd b d th i t bli f i t i Alfd h h t t bt h ld h b ffdd hd h b present he subscribes to the norm against public fornication hears about Bill and Candy Will he be offended by what they did and if so why? I believe that Alfred may very well be offended (in the profound sense) even though t A d th f h ff ill t il b hi i i i f h t Bill d C d l k d lik t th ti Alfd b f f d d j t b th f t t h t Bill d C d iltd t hih Alfd b i b t l t if t h t th d t dit f ti h th l k ill t b f f d d (Th i t bli f i t i iht i d d t dit f h exception: we may think that public fornication is improper even if no one present minds it) Feinberg must admit that many offensegiving public acts are so because they ilt tht i t ff Tht d i i l d ith th i t t h t th t i / k l d dititi i i l t i th f ff db ilti ( f d f f ) t h t ith t ll th ff i i l it l l li l t ltl l t t i l t th ff i i l b d i it l i t i t th ll b f f i l l lti iht ll d d T b t ff i i l d t id l l li Fib might resort to the following argument It is true he might say that most of the cases of offense that I would allow to be punished involve norm violation as the source of the offense But the norms in question as opposed to the norms with hih jti fl l li i d d t d ltll lti ti b t b h i i bli d th b t h t h t ( d d i t ) t th t E lt d ti f thi kid b i lt l dt k h t h th bi h d i t ( d hld thf f l f f d d ) Th t t f th b it ibl i thi t t i ltil i t t Tht i thi t t i relatively unimportant in the same way as the content of the norm about which side of the road to drive on is relatively unimportant There surely are norms that fit this description Their public violation causes ff t th t ( t l t if th b i b t th ) Thi i t il ti d t ff b th t b i t l i l t d (Th l l t d t i th' d th t t d th it hil f d t t i t) Thi tti t t i blti f l F i t it ddl iil l t i l blid t b i l Th

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former can be enforced through the criminal law under the offense principle; the latter are legally unenforceable (at least through criminal sanctions) Second many of the acts that a Feinberg liberal would presumably find punishably offensive consist of publicly flouting norms that are believed to be universal moral norms not conventional norms of the respect/offense-giving kind Consider homosexual embracing and kissing in public The strategy in question would apparently rule out punishment for this even if the offense it caused (by its direct perception) were serious widespread and so forth and not outweighed by free speech or other interests of the actors For unless there were a conventional norm deeming homosexual kissing in public to be disrespectful of those present - as opposed to a moral norm condemning homosexual behavior generally - the offense felt by the witnesses would be of the profound variety and no different or so I have argued from the offense they would feel if they merely learned of this conduct but did not see it Of course there might be a conventional meta-norm that deems publicly flouting moral norms to be disrespectful of those present and violation of this conventional meta-norm might then legitimate punishment even if violation of the underlying moral norm would not But this tack for legitimating punishment exposes a third and I believe quite devastating weakness in the strategy I am describing The weakness is this There is nothing in principle that keeps us from having norms governing how to demonstrate respect (and give offense) that deem as disrespectful all public flouting of non-conventional moral norms Whenever therefore we wish to criminalize public immoral conduct it will be unclear even to ourselves whether we are criminalizing it because it is immoral (legal moralism) or because it violates our norms regarding offense Moreover there is nothing in principle that prevents us from regarding private immoral conduct as disrespectful to anyone who learns about it at least if we jettison the distinction between perceiving and merely knowing about conduct (If no one ever learns about private immoral conduct it will not be punished anyway even under legal moralism) And given that private immoral conduct wUl cause profound offense among those who learn of it we may in fact deem it disrespectful of those whom it offends In that case the line between the offense principle and legal moralism is all but obliterated In any event under the argumentative strategy we are considering private immoral conduct is always hostage to the content of conventional norms regarding how respect and offense are shown In the end once the perception/knowledge distinction is dropped the fact that those offenses which Feinberg would punish are more often than not products of norm violations leads to the result that the offense principle covers most of the territory that legal moralism might otherwise occupy Feinberg cannot want this result but neither can he avoid it unless he eliminates norm violations as legitimate sources of punishable offense His choice then is between a denatured liberalism one that through the offense principle embraces most if not all of what the legal moralist wants and an anemic offense principle one that covers only universally noxious sights sounds and smells

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References Alexander Larry (1994) Harm offense and morality Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7: 199-216 Devlin Patrick (1968) The Enforcement of Morals London: Oxford University Press Dworkin Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Feinberg Joel (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol I: Harm to Others Oxford: Oxford University Press (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol II: Offense to Others Oxford: Oxford University Press (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol Ill: Harm to Self Oxford: Oxford University Press (1988) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol IV: Harmless Wrongdoing Oxford: Oxford University Press Kekes John (2000) The enforcement of morality American Philosophical Quarterly 37: 23-35 Kristol Irving (1971) Pornography obscenity and the case for censorship The New York Times March 28 Moore Michael S (1997) Placing Blame Oxford: Clarendon Press Raz Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom Oxford: Clarendon Press Schonsheck Jonathan (1994) On Criminalization Dordrecht: Kluwer

Further reading Arneson Richard J (1990) Liberalism freedom and community Ethics 100: 368-85 Greenawalt Kent (1995) Legal enforcement of morality The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 85: 710-25 Hart H L A (1963) Law Liberty and Morality Stanford CA: Stanford University Press Mill John Stuart (1956) On Liberty Indianapolis IN: Bobbs-Merrill

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11 Hate Crimes Literature and Speech L W SUMNER

How should a liberal society respond to those who preach or practice hatred toward some of their fellow citizens? The issue is an agonizing one for liberals because it seems to expose a conflict between their two most cherished values A liberal society prides itself on its acceptance of a wide diversity of communities and on its fostering of a climate of equal consideration and respect for members of those communities It therefore rejects all forms of discrimination or intolerance based on such factors as race ethnicity national origin religious affiliation gender age disability and sexual orientation At the same time liberals are commited to a vigorous form of freedom of expression which requires them to tolerate the advocacy of opinions which they regard as false offensive and even malicious The activities of hate groups threaten to reveal a contradiction between liberal equality and liberal freedom The ideology of these groups decisively rejects the iberal deal of equality of respect and the public advocacy of this ideology arguably serves to undermine the equal social status of its targets whether they be members of visible minorities Jews or gays However as a form of political expression that advocacy seems to call for particularly robust protection in a liberal society Liberals must therefore decide how far they are prepared to tolerate the activities of those who are themselves intolerant However this issue is resolved it looks as though it must be at the cost of limiting one of the values that liberals hold most dear Are they to side with liberty at the cost of threatening equality or equality at the cost of restraining liberty? The issue is more acute for hate speech than for hate crimes For our purposes hate speech is any form of expression or communication not itself violent which insults or defames a social group identified by such factors as race ethnicity and so on or which insults or defames individuals by virtue of their membership of such a group The notion of speech must here be construed very broadly so as to cover besides oral or written messages such further means of communication as visual materials (photographs cartoons videos) body language (gestures intended to express contempt or to intimidate) and symbolic acts (wearing a swastika burning a cross) A hate crime on the other hand requires an overt act of violence motivated by hatred of a target group Paradigm instances are assaults on the person (for example gay-bashing) or the desecration of property (for example vandalism of 142

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J i h t i ) B th ti f ht i i act whose criminal status is uncontroversial there is not even a putative case for tolerating it in a liberal society There is such a case however for tolerating (non violent) expression even when its content is odious and hateful Hate speech thus t it i i l d tt ithi libl it hih i t h d b ht i it i h t h t th d t th h t flibli i t t d t t

Ht S h

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Hate speech is undoubtedly as old as hate and speech But we are concerned here with its contemporary manifestations in the liberal democracies of the West For i db th th j i d i t i ith h i h I t fili I ill fi lf t h t d th l l lti f thi tiiti th U i t d S t t d C d A ill th A i d C d i t h tk th d i f f t h d hd th d i f f t l i i th t t f th t' i h t t i liit ht h These two jurisdictions therefore represent two possible resolutions of the liberty/ equality dilemma But first the hate groups themselves Glorying in such names as Aryan Nations th C h h f th C t Whit A Rit th H i t F t d f th il ( d tl t) K Kl Kl th ltil ll h d fi iti titd b h t d f ll " hit" i i t i d d d i t d t th t b l i h t b f if f h hit it Thi f d t t iiti blk th Ai dJ F ht i ti t t i b t th i the role played for them by hate literature All of them either produce or distribute materials both vilifying racial or ethnic minorities and preaching intolerance of them (and often also violence against them) These materials still circulate n print f bt i i l i l b l ith id th I t t All f th j ht h b t b l i h d W l d Wid W b it hih b iitd b ith I t t (Th Si W i t h l C t t i t t h t th th 600 i t it th b ) Th i f th d h i h th i l t i i t t f b d i f t f l th t f iti b I th d ht litt l d i t t i i t i i i i th b h i f ht groups; it is designed not so much to win acceptance of the gospel of white suprem acy in a broad public forum but rather to attract and retain those who are already receptive for whatever reason to its message H i th t t t d t th h t d i i t d b h ?I th U i t d S t t t t t t liit l t th i l t i f th ikl i t th i j t i t h t "C hll k l b i d i th f d f h" t i d i th F i t A d t t th Bill f R i h t Thi i j t i h b i t t d b th A i S C t itti titi f "ti d i t " if th h ( h 143

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tti th bli i t i ) th th i th i l t i of the ideas being expressed Content restrictions on the other hand are forbidden At the same time the Court has distinguished between degrees of First Amendment protection for different forms of speech some (such as political speech) receiving the t t i t tti th l l d d ( h df ti) t ll Thi i t d i t t i l d h t th C t h lld "fhti d" d f d "th hih b thi tt iflit i j t d t iit i d i t b h f th " {Chaplinsky New Hampshire [1942]) Thi iht l d t t t h t th t t h ht l t i t t titi fhti d f i t t b ti i l t or epithets standardly directed at members of racial minorities However the most recent leading case RAV v City of St Paul (1992) suggests otherwise The case involved the burning of a cross by white teenagers inside the f d d f blk fil A h ft i t R b t Vikt ( j il t th ti f hi t) t i l bt h l h d d it di hih hibitd th d i l f b l hih " l t t i th th b i f l d lii d " D i t ti t h t th di lid l t fhti d th S Court none the less struck it down primarily because it violated "viewpoint neu trality" by prohibiting abusive speech directed against certain target groups (the ones enumerated in the ordinance) while permitting it if directed against other B fili t b i i t t l i t th C t l d d th di f f t t titi I th k f thi d i i it difflt f t t lti fht h if l d t t t l fhti d t i ti l it i d i th t h d d A t t t t ff il tti t iiti i d t b ill l b l b f t i d i i i t i ill b f d t ilt i i t tlit A lt i th U i t d S t t th f effective legislative controls on the circulation of hate messages The situation in Canada is quite otherwise The Criminal Code which falls under federal jurisdiction contains a provision which makes it an offence to "wilfully t h t d i t idtifbl " b " i t i t t t th th i i t t i " Th t t t d f "idtifibl " " ti f th bli d i t i i h d b l lii thi i i " B it t l i t t titi bt l ilt i i t t l i t thi l ld i tittil ti i th U i t d S t t H th C d i S C t h l d it i th l d i fR Keegstra (1990) James Keegstra was a secondary school teacher who used his class room to inculcate a number of antisemitic doctrines which depicted Jews as personally odious politically dangerous and enemies of Christianity When his t h i ti t liht h d i i d f hi t h i b bt l h d ith ilfll ti h t d Th tittil i bf th ti tht th i i i t f th h t d l ith th i h t t "fd f t h h t blif ii d i " t d i Sti 2(b) f th C d i Cht f Riht dF d Th C t f d t h t hil th l did i d d i i thi i h t th i i t jtifd d th S t i 144

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1 ii t h t th i h t t d i th C h t bjt t " h able limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo cratic society" The justification for the law which was endorsed by the Court was in part that its objective protection of the equality of the enumerated groups i d b t t i l H th C t idd b S t i 15 f th Cht hih hibit d i i i t i " b d t i l thi ii l lii tl h i l dibilit" B th C h t iil th lit i h t f th d i t d d b th h t d l ifill i d t tti f th lf th l ' ilti f i i t tlit t i f th C t As a result of the different constitutional climates in the two countries Canada has a law targeting hate speech which has no American counterpart It therefore seems appropriate to conclude that Canada and the United States have come to difft lti f th flit b t libl f d d libl lit hil A i h t d d t l fth i th d i t i f th f C di h b l i th tti f th l t t

Two Theories of Rights The American and Canadian courts have not only reached opposed conclusions i h t h lti th h l tk ht d i t t t th l i I d t i t thi l t t diff dt tk dt f th j d i i l t it b t t d h i l h i l t i t Bth h ) f d f i d lit f t t iht i libl i t If ( th flit h i thi flit t b ld? H t d t i hih d d th th l t t i l h th t iht t be brought into congruence with one another? There seem to be two different ap proaches to these questions which correspond to and flow from two different views about the nature and justification of rights O f th i iht t b jtifid i t t l l d i f d i tti ti i t t i t t (Mill 1969 h 5 S 1987 h 6) Th i t t l i t iht i d i b l t fth d lbl t i t h l b t f th l th t If f ttti f h i h t th thi h ill l d t i d t i f th i t t db h iht hih b l l t d i t th i (Mill 1977 h 2 S l 1979 C h 1993) Th fit it f speaker interests which collects together the many ways in which being able to express ideas or indeed to engage in any form of communication can be a benefit for the person who exercises this freedom Speaker interests include but are not restricted t th lfflfillt lft tht fl f bi t i i t bli f bi id iti ith i i th ffi f ' it audience interests, h i h i t f th C l t i ith k i t t bfit lid b bi th i i t f t h ' h Lik k i t t th i i b l t t h t i l b t th t i l l it f bi 145

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btt i f d bi d t l i d d i id bi filittd in the pursuit of one's tastes or values and so on Communication is a relationship between one or more speakers and one or more listeners (or viewers or readers) and the first two groups of interests served by free speech underscore the ways n which thi l t i h i b tll ftbl Th t h i d bystander interests, i t t fth d i i f th iti l t i h i l it ill f f t f th h t ditl ti t it Th fft f b ti b t h f i f th t tl t th iti ff f f i Th t t t f th i t f th bfit d i iti f lii i it i which our fellow citizens are open minded inquisitive and well informed In add ition to benefiting those directly involved in particular communicative exchanges the free flow of information can be a public good by contributing to an atmosphere i h i h th l l l f i i d dbt i i d Thi t h i t i l l i t t i f t i i d h t tl t l lti bt th lit f t d th d f tiiti th litil t b i f d iti F h t h f b i d t b f lbl d Bt it can also be thought to have a different kind of value one which belongs to it as a part of a valuable whole Let us call this kind of value constitutive rather than instrumental The larger whole in which free expression stands as an indispensable t i ll t k t b d itlf ( D k i 1996 h 8) O thi i l l d d d i t fth dt hih i iht i l d i f h tibt Rth it i litil t hih it t i l l i th iht t lki th i l d t t d ti Whil f d f i i ll i d d t li t th f th t f d it i t th l iht i l i t d i tht t Oth iht tt t ibl j t h th i l d f t h f d (li gion association peaceful assembly) as well as rights to vote run for office and so on The justification of these rights is provided by their constituting a particularly valuable kind of political order If we ask in turn what is so good about democracy th thi f t h ti b d b l t h l ti ( d t i d i l fi f bitti ti i i t t ) th d i i t t f iti Bt i th i titti th th i t t l d bdi b i i i l f jti t diit d t Th i fth d t h i h it The right to freedom of expression can therefore be given either an instrumental ist or a constitutive justification But so can the right to equality: it too can be seen either as a necessary means of protecting the (individual and/or collective) nterests f b f l b l iiti th til t f t d t i d Th diff bt th t f fj t i f t i t d t b hihlihtd h t t th i h i h th bitt flit i h t Th i ff h iht b h t t h t th lit iht f thi t t tti th l t t th i liiti th f S i f th ti h h flit t b djditd?

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Si bth iht j tittil tti ( t l t i th U i t d S t t d Canada) this question takes us back to the courts When courts are confronted with this conflict what method do they use to resolve it? When one constitutionally protected right putatively conflicts with another the t d h t b b h t it O f hii thi i t liit ( b t h ) f th i h t t h t th f flit i l i i t d Th t h t th liitd f d t ht t t b t th b f il thi iiti t h t th l il tt f th iiti If th th f d iht b liitd titd t ld t i kid f iti h ht h "fihti d" The now delimited freespeech right it is then thought does not conflict in the same way with the equality right Let us look more closely at what is involved n limiting a right The process is what Judith Thomson (1986: 3 7 4 2 ) has called " i f t i " Th k i d f i h t t likl t b i l d i flit th d i b d i i t T h ' l th i h t t lif d th iht t lfdf S d i b d flit b t th iht ill h t kill ttk i d t d f d h lif B t h th flit di if if t l t f th i h t i ti fll The needed specification Thomson says may be either moral or factual It is moral if we redefine the right to life as say the right to not be wrongly or unjustly killed Since killing in selfdefense is arguably not wrong or unjust then the right of self df l flit ith th i h t t lif Th ifiti i f t l f th i h t t lif i d f d th i h t t t b killd l i t i t kill l h d f d h l f i lthl S ifd i th flit ih B t h th C d i d th A i t h l i i t d th i h t f f i b ifi it th f th i h t d ti l d hf f i ti d f t i i i l i f d "fhti d" d (i C d at least) hate speech However they have carried out the specification exercise n somewhat different ways In interpreting the Charter guarantee of freedom of ex pression the Supreme Court of Canada has construed "expression" very expan i l t i l d tiit hih " t t t t i " dl f it t t d it h i l d d ll h i ithi th f th C h t tti l it t k h i l l i l t f Si th t t lt f f i b fl th ttil th f h lilti t ifi thi ti f th C h t It ld b itk h t tht h lilti i t h b d d Ud Sti 1 f th Charter all of the protected rights and freedoms including freedom of expression are guaranteed "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" It is therefore possible f lilti hih liit f f i d t h f ifi Sti 2(b) t b d d Sti 1 if th l i i t it i i f d b th t t b bl Th S C t h d t d b f t t f bl hih till i l b l i th b f t t b td f th l i ti i t th t h i h fl f it i i t ff i 147

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I Keegstra th b f t t k th f f h d it d/ lit f racial ethnic or religious minorities while the costs took the form of damage to the various interests safeguarded by freedom of expression After balancing its benefits and costs the majority and the minority on the Court reached contrary conclusions b t th h t d ttt H th d t h t b t h f th flit i i t t t t k i th th i t t d b f d d lit til i t t i libl it Th d f d f th ttt d l d t h l illi i thi i t t liit i i t t i d t f d lit i t t hil it t d l d t h l illi t t th l t t t ik i d t t t th f A l t h h th t id f th d b t defended opposing resolutions of the conflict they both got there by engaging in the same exercise of balancing the two values in question against one another The balancing metaphor presupposes that we can determine the relative weights f fliti iht H th t b t t thi i hih d t l k b h i d th i h t t th i t t h i h th t t Riht "i th b t t " h i h t th ihtl Bt ti (idiidl d llti) i t t h iht d it i l b ihi th i t t tht it bl b t k bt th i h t t h t t t th The balancing procedure that the Canadian Court uses to specify and limit the right of free expression therefore seems to presuppose the instrumentalist ustification of rights Th C d i Cht liitl d i t i i h bt i f i t f th i h t t f i d jtifibl i f i t f thi i h t (Th 1986 40 51) B th A i Bill f R i h t l k l t th l i i t i i i fSti 1 it id l f jtifbl i f i t ff i df b l i A i t h t h f t d d t djdit Fit A d t i b ditiihi difft t i f h ith i d fFit A d t tti d( t h f ) difft b d f jtifi tion on legislative restrictions In the US system the important question is usually whether the form of expression in question falls under full First Amendment protec tion; if so then it is subjected to "strict scrutiny" a burden of ustification which s itll i i b l f th l i l t t t L d f tti d l d t d d f ti libl t th f f i Plitil h (hih i l d ht h) b l t th fit t hih h itll t t lti i i i b l f it A h i i i l t l t lti f fhti d hld b i f l i l t t j t i f b t i th k f th RAV d i i t t tlit i f d i this case Why more stringent protection and stricter scrutiny for some forms of speech rather than others? The reasoning of the US Supreme Court seems to be that the more vital the form of speech to the operation of a functioning democracy the i l it ill b f d d litil h t h f i t tti th il h Thi iit i d t b i d t i iht l t l i th d th C t h i fft d d th Fit A d t t ff h th F t t h A d t t f" l tti f th l " I th C t ' i f d f i li l t th f d th d lit f tt t I 148

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harm test:

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d bl t i th il fbi ldi th t ithd it quietism or apathy Socially marginalized and relatively powerless groups are at genuine risk of harm from the racist attitudes of employers landlords police bureaucrats and the thugs which hate groups use their propaganda to recruit Th h t t l t h f ill t l t titi ht h H it ill t th f t h diti hih titi li t tif 1

2

3

Efficacy Th d titi t h bl tti f Whil it b t h h t d i b l t ihibit ht h b l l it i fth ti hth di i ibl T th t t that the restriction can be readily circumvented by an underground market or by technological innovations such as the Internet the case for it is weakened Minimal impairment. There must be no lessintrusive policy available for securing th lt E h it i t b ffti i ti i i f i t il h hi b i d l libt d d i f ht b f t th d i f th hibitd f f i It t t h f b th l t t th fit t f tf ti th h i ti Wh l i ( d t i counterargument and so on) promise similar results they must be preferred Where a narrower infringement of freedom of expression will be equally effect ive it too must be preferred Proportionality. Th td b f i t f th titi t bl tif it t C h i i th i t t il l h i ti bli d b t It h "hilli fft" liti t f f i (lit titi t ) Th d d i t i l tti f l bl idd b hi t b t h t tif th l l t l t

These three conditions raise a high justificatory threshold for restrictions on free dom of expression Could content restrictions on hate speech surmount this thresh old? The instrumentalist approach to rights teaches us the valuable lesson that the iht t thi ti f it b th f th Whil f h iht b i l th i t l i i t t th iht ill t t Wki t th i h t f til it b d d t ill b l tt ii id d t d ill tl b tll t iti d ii E if til bl t t t b l l iditd f jiditi b it f it til history or political culture it cannot simply be extrapolated to others This degree of social relativity notwithstanding the Canadian experience with its hatepropaganda legislation may be instructive While the law has been on the b k f th thit it h ld b i k d (J K t th ti t th l ) Th l i h d d d b b f f d d i d t d it hilli fft " l i t i t " litil h ildi th i t t h t th t t th k ' ifi i t t t t h t d d id it f df i l b l t th d (ildi tth d bli b f i t ) Th t fft f th f d i t i hih t h h l d i t 150

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fl ti h i h t h t th f f t t iti ld worth the bother (especially because the very process will afford hatemongers much more publicity than they could ever expect to gain by other means) The Canadian law therefore faces a kind of dilemma When the Supreme Court majority upheld th l i Keegstra it l i d h i l th f d i ldi t h t th i i t ff d f i i i l i t h t th f d th ld til h b t k d Y t th ii d th l itll f b l It i t t i t ld tht t l t h i i l t i t i ti ff d i i l i i t tll tibl I f f t thi h b th l i f th A i t T h h th are virtually alone in the larger global context perhaps they have got it right after all

H t Ci

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I J 1998 hit it d J h Ki dt f hi f i d h i d blk J Bd t ik t k dd d hi l t d until his body was torn to pieces In October 1998 two men viciously beat Matthew Shepard a gay student at the University of Wyoming and left him to die tied to a fence in nearfreezing temperatures In July 1999 a student named Benjamin Smith t i Idi d Illii i hih h h t b l k J d Ai killi t l d di t l I A t f th hit it d B f d F h t fi l i J i h it t i L A l All f th l i ht i lt d titd b i h h b i At f i t l th i i d b th i it d i f f t from those we have so far been discussing After all no sensible person will doubt that these deserve to be crimes or that the protection of the law against such attacks should extend equally to all citizens including members of minorities How i th fh t h th i i f th it l l t th i Hihfil ht i h th f i ti l l t f li i d t l Ati thi li h ld b fj i d i t i ildi C d d tA i tt t i l t ht i ( "bi i " th ft l b l d ) f l l t t t th h t t i t d lt d Th il tt dd t ht i tk ith ft f dfii i l ff f ht motivated violence with a more severe penalty or enhancing the penalty attached to the "generic" offense when hatred is perceived to have been a factor in its commission For simplicity we will confine our attention to the second option of lt h t f ht i H th l i k ith h t h i b t E h i th lt f h t t i t d il t t ihi t t f hi t ( l t d ) b t l f hi t t f id Fth th t t f id i ti ( h t d f dfid b h ft l i t t i ) i i l th d i ht h If th i tifiti f 151

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i i l i i ht h th d f it t i l l di t t th perhaps there is also a justification for enhanced penalties for hate crimes In both cases the argument would take the form of pointing to the ways in which the harms done by the speech or by the crime ramify beyond the immediate victims to i l i t th f h i h th b ( d th b i f h i h th i l d t) O th th h d if h t h hld b dd l l tti th ht ld b th d f t t i ht i l? Th i (th lt th d ) ill b ihd i t fth lt d i t d t h t th f f d thik th th ht h d ? A i th fht h t b d ith id f th question of penalty enhancement Proponents claim that hate crimes do more harm than "parallel" nonhatemotivated crimes to the immediate victims to the broader target community and to society at large (Lawrence 1999) Opponents respond t h t it i i h t l diffilt t d f ht i ( h i h kid f jdi t t?) d t t b l i h th l t titi i til d tht di il l l tt t il i t b f ti d i t d l d t th b l k i t i f th i i l jti t ( J b d Ptt 1998) M t f th i hld b l k fili Th l d diffilt and I will make no attempt to settle them decisively here Instead I want to point to the ways in which this particular controversy like the one concerning hate speech reflects some larger issues in legal and political philosophy M f th t b t h id f th t ildi th bifl kthd b i t t l i t H th i i hth lt h t ill b f f t i i di t t hih d f tti i t th f f il t h i h th lil tibl itht l ildi idfft (t id i l i t i d ) hih t i h hibl b f t Sttli thi i i b t h th k i d f i i l if ti d th ihi f t db f t hih t i l f th i t t l i t approach to free speech On the other hand two kinds of noninstrumentalist argu ment are also available to the proponent of penalty enhancement One takes the line that is familiar in a retributivist theory of punishment: the enhanced penalty s jtifid t f it d t t f f t ( t h h it h h fft) b t b th t t f i d f th t t f ht i i ll th th tt f i d f th h t t i t d ffd P i thi li f t ld i h i h bi titd b il jdi h h b i i ll ki th bi titd b d th l t f It b t t lft t th h fid it ii th I d The other noninstrumentalist argument is that singling out hate crimes for special treatment has an important symbolic function since it expresses a society's peculiar abhorrence of the threat these crimes pose to the ideal of equal respect The df i ti f f d f th i i l i t i f ht h Stti id h t thi ll b l fb f t t iht b ( hth th h ) h t h h t i l it i id t tilt d dli f th b i l f libl i t Th i t t l i t ill h f thi t It b t t h t th it f h l k b f iiti fl hihl l d if th th 152

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must be counted as benefits But they are but one factor and far from the most important in the cost-benefit calculation that needs to be done before concluding that these laws are justified An expressive theory of law may be tempting precisely because it promises to bypass all of the empirical messiness of an instrumentalist justification but taking this route just means avoiding all of the hard but indispensable questions

References Cohen J (1993) Freedom of expression s 22: 207-63 Dworkin R (1996) n Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Jacobs J B and Potter K (1998) s New York: Oxford University Press Lawrence F M (1999) w Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Matsuda M J Lawrence m C L Delgado R and Crenshaw K W (1993) t Boulder CO: Westview Press Mill J S (1969) Utilitarianism In J M Robson (ed) y pp 203-59 Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1977) On liberty In J M Robson (ed) y pp 213-310 Toronto: University of Toronto Press Scanlon Jr T M (1979) Freedom of expression and categories of expression w 40: 519-50 Sumner L W (1987) Oxford: Clarendon Press Thomson J J (1986) y Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

Further reading Cohen-Almagor R (ed) (2000) University of Michigan Press Fiss O M (1996) Greenawalt K (1995) ton NJ: Princeton University Press Schauer F (1982) Press Schneiderman D (ed) (1991) Thomson Walker S (1994) Nebraska Press Waluchow W J (ed) (1994) Press

e Ann Arbor: h Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press h Princey Cambridge: Cambridge University r Scarborough Ontario: Lincoln: University of y Oxford: Clarendon

153

12 P

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d C h i LORI GRUEN

P h

th th t i dli ith h ittl d t th l i t d thil litil l l d it i Th t l i i l d ti f dfiti ( h t i h dh i it d i f f t if it i f ti?) dt h i f tti (d h d i t lit d it h lit i it f t or is it some combination of all of these?) Legally in the US debates about pornog raphy have focused on competing interpretations of the First Amendment right to f d f i i i h t i th h d th I t t d th l i t i f th t t t l l l f lit P l i t i l l i th US th h b t j t i t i tht h i d b t th d ti ditibti d ti f hi t i l lii ti d f i i t Th ti t d t tht h d b i t d i important social values and diminish the dignity of human relations Feminists are politically divided on the topic Some feminists see pornography as one of the pri mary sources of violence against women and thus argue that the abolition of h hld b t l t k ff i i t l i t i l ti Oth f i i t d b t f f hi tti f d hil d bt d t bli t h t iddi it f h ( d t iddi it f d t i t tht t lid i t il f l ) ill l i i t d i t ttitd d ti Still th f i i t bli t h t th hi f h ill b d t fth tifl ' l i d id i b l k i t f h t l monogamous sexual desires From an ethical point of view the existence of pornog raphy adds important dimensions to discussions of the nature of harm and the success of various normative strategies for weighing conflicting values such as libt t d lit I thi h t I ill t h h f th diffilt i F i t I ill b i f l t th h i t f b i t l i th U i t d S t t i t t i hit li t h t th t btt i t i d th th t f t d t i ht h i d ht hld b d b t it Th id f th d i i ill b d t d t ii t f th t i t t li f k i t l i

154

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t i t h tht h h d tht h violates women's equality I will argue that while some versions of these arguments are sophisticated and important they ultimately fail in making the case for censoring pornographic material

Hit

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Th fit l l t d d i th U i t d S t t f l i i t i th dti ditibti ( " b i t " ) d ti f k tht ti ll liit t i l was borrowed from British common law In 1868 in Regina v Hicklin (LR 3 QB 360) Lord Chief Justice Cockburn wrote: "The test of obscenity is this whether he tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose id t h i l ifl dit h h d bliti f thi t f l l " Th ti t h t b i t i tht hih d d t ti t ifl b i t l t thi d H th b t t i l t t tblihd d Hicklin t h t b i t i t b j d d b d th f f t i l t d t f kh t i l l tibl i d i i d l h b b d d A number of cases served as forerunners of contemporary standards for restricting pornographic material The first of these was decided in 1933 in a Southern New York District Court where US District Judge John M Woolsey presided In US v One t d t i hth tJ J ' b k Book Called Ulysses, W l b d th hld b d i d i t t i i t th U i t d S t t d b j t d t i ffit f t i d d t t i I hi d i i W l t i it tit dIh d th f h i h th d Ulysses till li l ti Ulysses i t b k t d ld h t d t d Th tti f Ulysses i th lit ranted my taking such time as was necessary to enable me to satisfy myself as to the i t t ith h i h th b k itt f f i h b k l i d t b b it t fit b d t i d h t h th i t t ith h i h it was written was what is called according to the usual phrase pornographic that is itt f th f liti b i t i Ulysses i it f it l f k Id tdtt h th l f th lit I h l d t h f tht t i t hi Ih G

t

B f i th i t t f th k d i f j d t b d solely on isolated parts of the work taken out of context Woolsey laid the groundwork for future shifts in obscenity law Perhaps most importantly however Woolsey's ruling significantly altered the standard set by Hicklin whereby obscenity is deter i d b d it f f t t i l l tibl I t d W l ld t " b l " t d d "Whth til b k ld t d t it h i l dt h h t t b t t d b th C t ' ii t it fft ith i t i t h l i thi b h f l l i i th l fh t h t i l t d th ' b l ' i th l f t t "

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Th t i t t hift i b i t l d i th 1957 S C t case Roth v US (354 US 476) This case raised questions about the constitution ality of obscenity law Prior to Roth it was simply assumed that obscenity like libel and fighting words was not protected under the First Amendment But in Roth the t liitl h l d t h t th HicMin t t " t b j t d tittill titi f th f d f h d " I l f th HicMin t t th t tblihd t d d f i b i t t h t th b l i d d tittil t A d i t Jti B iti f th jit b it "i t t l itht d i il i t " d th t t t d b th F i t A d t Th t tblihd b i t t t b d "whether to the average person applying contemporary community standards the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest" The Roth case adopts the standard of the reasonable person judging the work as a whole tht t i l t d i W l ' li d dd t l t th k ffd it t d d d l k d i il i t ( l t hih dbtd d l b t d i tht f l l d d fill b di fid i llti f 1973 t t b l Miller California [413 US 15]) I Miller J t i B iti f th jit tblihd t t f b i t that is still in place today In order to determine that a work is obscene courts must look for the coalescence of three elements: • • •

hth "th li t ld fid t h t th k tk hl l t th h t h th k d i t d i b i ttl ffi d t i f i l l d f i d b th libl tt l h t h th k tk hl l k i lit itifi l

it i t

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titi

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The Supreme Court was not unanimous in this ruling however The dissent led by Justice Brennan expressed significant concerns about the inadequacy of the defin iti t h t ill ti t ll th t d d t b lid b d th bjti t t d i f th j d A h t " h t h k b t f ihb Wht t bil i h lt i flt l hi i t h d b t h " B th dfiiti f b i t h h tb ifid ith f f i i t lit th d i t i d t h t it ld b i i b l t id f i ti t h ih t t ditibt ll liit t i l W ll "k it when we see it" but that does not serve as enough of a warning for those who may face legal challenges after the fact In 1984 in what can arguably be thought of as a response to the concerns set t b B bt t l tht f i i t l l hl Cthi MKi d tiit Ad D k i dftd d l di f th it f I d i l i hih liitl d f i d h P h i th hi ll liit b d i t i f tures or in words that also includes one or more of the following: 156

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American Booksellers Assn

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LORI GRUEN

The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than i t bl l f l d id di O h

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t th t h b l b t h t b i t d h hld b titd bt h b h d I t h i k it i f t tht h ti t d l t h l i i hih ll liit b d d d ditibtd ( i i i t l l lit hi!) will continue to be debates over control and censorship

thi l t i l th

Arguments against Pornography Based on Harm Why th

hld h b d d h h l d th t t b i l d i t t ? I thi d th f l l i ti I ill l b f t tht iht jtif tt liitti th dti ditibti d ti f h I ill f fit t i f t b d the claim that pornography causes harm The first is an argument based on the view that the existence of pornography causes harm to society; the second is an argument based on the view that pornography causes violence (an obvious harm) i t I th f l l i ti I ill f i f t tht li tht h t i b j t i b l b t h i t j t t h t it h b t t h t it d i lit b h b d i t d i th tt lit db h il d i h tiit lit Aft fll ii h f th t I ld tht d i tblihi t h t tif hi Harm to society The community morality version of the harm argument against pornography takes the familiar form of arguments grounded on some version of legal moralism The t ll d b ti t tht iti h iht t t t t h l f f tht l d t h t th d t t i f h d l P h i f it t "iftil t b t " lit i t f ith i t i bt id l d fth t iti t h h it d i l f i d t ffi l b h i d t it l S i t th h i h t t b th dti d ditibti of pornography and to prohibit its consumption Some proponents of this type of argument for censorship liken pornography to threats to public health Just as society is thought to be justified in placing certain people under quarantine ii dt tti f b d i l flid h idiidl td f h i t t d d t i b th it i t i t t h f l di f di th it tifibl h tht t h t t t i t iil it A it tht tl t h t l di d th d b t f it iti Thi ti d t t f hih lit f bli lif A d i t th it 158

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lit i f th h t h tb dt id th threat that it poses to traditional values and decent living Surely harm should serve as a justification for societal action even state interven tion but the idea that there can be "harm to traditional values" raises serious ti Wht t d i t i l l ? It h b t d t h t th U i t d S t t f d d t t d i t i l l libt d lit t h t ft i flit I dditi t d i t i l l ft ht t h T d i t i l i b t th l tt f Afi A i Ai A i d f l idl hld b t l l itk C i itk bt t d itil l l d t t il d th d i t i t h f community norms would Further many liberals have argued that only when a harm can be identified as affecting a particular victim or victims is the state justified in interfering Harm to it h d h l bli lif i th f f d tht ffd b th i d t d b l t i t t h t i t f ith i d i i d l l i b t M l i t id h l f l i b t th ti f hih i b t f i t i th l Af it i hih l t t d t k thi itk d t th will allow for the fullest expression of human potential and flourishing There will be occasions when the citizenry at least according to the judgment of some does not act in ways that are honorable or desirable but it is not the business of the tt it t t i t f l til idiidl bi h d If th d i th dti ditibti d ti f h ti d l t th it b jtifd i blil h i th d d i i i th tiit itl b t t h t i ll th tifd i di C h i i th b fh t ifibl i d i i d l i t jtifd Harm to women Some feminists have argued that there are indeed identifiable victims of pornog raphy namely women (and children) Proponents of censoring pornography tht h d b h i it f W h d i th dti f h Th t td l f thi t f h h b d i b d b Lid ( L l ) M h i ( L l 1981) h h itt d ttifid b t h l b i th ki f th fil Deep Throat fil l ll Sh l i tht h bdtd d ltd d i th dti f th fil C l l if i d d forced to engage in sexual activity without her consent she is being sexually assaulted and sexual assault is a harm to that woman and it is illegal When women are physically and/or sexually harmed in the production of pornography or i th t t tt ti i j t i f d i ti th h d ihi th t t Th i h t t f d f i b t h h t t b ffitd f tht i t d th dti f h tht ditd illl tiiti B t thi t fh i bl f th h tht f i i t d b t h d b th d i t i b t i d ti f h d hih t l d idtifibl illl 159

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F i i t iti f h iti tht i d i i d l d battered harassed and subject to other forms of violence by men who consume pornography and women as a group are harmed because of the climate of violence against women that pornography engenders Feminists who are opposed to pornog h d i hih h b d d th it li tht h d hi d it ( S i l kill T d B d h d d d ll b d t l t thitfi lldl l i d bf h td tht h i f l d b h) S i l itif tdi l l tti td t d d l f t d liklihd t ft i i h h l b itd i t f th l i t h t t h causes violence against women During the height of the protests for women's rights in the 1970s feminism itself was equated with an antipornography position All feminists are opposed to violence against women pornography causes violence i t ll f i i t dt h Whil it i til t t h t ll f i i t d t il i t d it i l t tht i l t i ittd i t t t d b h h th l i t h t h causes il i t i bjt t dbt f i i t d th It i difficult to establish the causal role that the consumption of pornography plays n violence against women Perhaps pornography leads men to act out their violent fantasies on real women perhaps pornography creates those fantasies perhaps h d i t i t il i t h h t l f il tht ld t h i b t t d h h i ll i t A t i d b il itifi tdi t t h t th i l lik b t t h d il i t th tdi t th it d till th i l i A Ndi St b if th t l ti b t th ilbilit f h d il i t th might expect a higher incidence of violence against women in places where pornog raphy is widely available and conversely we might expect a lower incidence of violence against women where pornography is banned These correlations do not it h F l Uth k th l t i ilbilit f h i th U i t d S t t d k t t f i f t h i th b f tht td N H h i k ith i ilbilit f h d f t f t h i th b f (St 1995 2 5 3 6 ) E if l lti ld b tblihd i ti hldi th d d ditibt f h ibl f th ti f th sumers of their products will be difficult to justify legally politically and economic ally Perhaps more importantly though holding pornographers responsible for violence against women diverts attention away from those who are ultimately lbl th h h btt d ll b R t t b l th h h d btt ft t t bl th i l l th i t i (th " k d f i t " th d d til "th ld't h t ") H l d i ibl f t h i i l t ti d i t bi h h i i l l l il i t th il f i i t j t 160

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A t

it P h

Bd

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MKi d Ad D k i l t d th t f th d b t b t h d hi i th l 1980 ith t h i l i tht h is not just harmful but in addition its production distribution and consumption silences and subordinates women How we are to understand the claim that porn ography silences and subordinates women has been debated among feminists legal t h i t d h i l h Wht i l i t h t th l i k t t th i f i h difft l l fti If it b tblihd tht ' iht t lit b f th l i bi iltd b h th th l l i i t E t b k i Hdt dibl t l h f iil iht tht f f h (f h ) f h (f ) bt th l h f ti i h t (t h) d iti i h t (t l i t ) Th new arguments against pornography do not rest on it having objectionable content that is destructive to social values and do not rely on establishing that it causes harmful outcomes particularly violence against women Instead the new argu t li tht h tll d thi it d i lit b it il d b d i t th S h t d t h t th id i i l tht h d t j t tibt t th i l i d b d i t i f bt tll il d b d i t th P h i tti it i it i i f d i fi idt fl d h thi cannot d anything However feminist philosophers such as Rae Langton and Jenni fer Hornsby (see Hornsby 1993; Langton 1993; Hornsby and Langton 1998) drawing on the speechact theory elaborated in J L Austin's H t D Thi ith Wd h t t t d t k f th id t h t hi d d i d thi l il d b d i t Th i i t b d A t i ' dititi bt l t i h t tt b t th ld t h t ith t fl ( "Th id Cf Flh i tfi i t l " "Mik T itd f " "Ni H t l i d $20000 f h f i Dbbi D Dih") l t i h t tt that persuade someone to do something (eg "Let's watch Bhid th G Dr" fO do you?"); and illocutionary speech acts "You don't really want to read St utterances the saying of which accomplishes a particular goal (eg saying "I do" in f t f jti f th i th t t f ddi i i

"Y' hid" l t li f jb h il t ttil l ki th i f "T" ith b t h h d i bktbll ll th th t t h t f t h ) P h th tht i f i t h t h th " " th " " (thi i th l t i t) d it d t t t women as if they are inferior or believe that women don't mean "no" when they say it (this is the perlocutionary act) but the claim that pornography silences and subor dit t h tht h f illti t I h t fll I ill i h f i i t h t th t t t t tblih tht h d f illti t di di d i bl f

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lit I ill di th t tht h b d i t fit d i women equal status with men and then turn to the argument that it silences denying women equal participation in civic life Subordinating women: a violation of status equality I b

d

t k f th l i t h t h b d i t it ill fl t b liit b t ht b d i t i i d th t tblih h d i i l b d i t Th it b d t i d hth hi d i illti i th t b l i h d F th purposes of this discussion let us understand subordination to occur when an individual (or group) is placed in a position of inferior worth or lesser status by another individual (or group) who has the authority to place him or her (them) n h iti dfth t h t thi l t i j t d i i i t th i ll b j t i b l N id th f l l i t d thi ith d If I l i i "Elld S t d t Ol" th d f l I ii thit t d i i i t bt lld t d t d ll th t lld b t I t l i th ldd idiidl' tt th i tht ld b b j t i b l i th t t f i i t where the conditions of participation in classes are established The sign is meant to be performing an illocutionary act that of excluding nonenrolled individuals but it is not a subordinating act If however the owner of a grocery store places a sign tht "Whit O l " th h i f i illti t tht f ldi l f l hih ld b i d d b d i t i t i f it b j t i b l d i hit t th t l t h i h hit l h Thi i l if th t t th i i f t f ti tti I thi ith thit i d i litil t t t th tht i h i thi litil t t d i i i h d Nti tht h i authority is crucial If I a university professor go to a voting station and put up the sign I have not acted with authority Government officials act with legitimate authority in taking the sign down and nonwhites have the authority to ignore th i I d i f i i ffi illti t b l i h i h I d bt I h t dd i f i b d i t i D h f b d i t i illti t? M K i li tht Sil i l i t i bttill d i Sil h i h i d di

td d f d t dd t iti (MKi

t h t i done t h h d it i t h t bi bdid 1993 13)

Pornography institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy which fuses the erotiza ti fd i d b i i ith th il t t i f l d f l Gd i l P h t i t t th i f tht lit M t t women as who they see women as being Pornography constructs who that is Men's t h t th dfi h b P h i tht (MKi 1987 148)

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P h li d i l i t di f i i t A d i l it i d i things (it is illocutionary): constructing women as of less worth discriminating against women and denying women the equal status they deserve But does pornography do these things? And more importantly does it do them ith th iit thit h tht h ld b i d d t f bditi ? I ld t h t it d t M ll liit id i d t t tht d d d d i t i b t d b th h i d t i d t d lbi Th d t d t fll th h t l tt f b d i t i tht f i i t iti d Ath i t f th h i d t i id f t i l d d b df women some claiming to be feminists and most of these cannot be described as sexualizing gender inequality Another fairly large section of the pornography industry consists of comical videos and cartoons media that are not particularly likl t b t k i l h t t d ti il h i h i Th b l k f idl ilbl hi id f l it f l ditd l lit l itd f d l b d t t ith b d i dbbd i Bt if d i d th b l k f th i d t d l id th d and images that portray women as subordinated does it have the authority to be considered as subordination generally? Consider what it would mean for pornog raphy to have this sort of authority Remember the canonical examples of illocu ti t th f ki th i f "T" ith h h d t i l t h i l f l i bktbll tti th d "I d " th t t f ddi i d t b id l i " ' hid" t f ffi ti l jb I h f th th diti tht t b t A h f i l i "T" d t d thi tti th d "I d " t hi l t th t t f ddi i G i d t d thi d mother offering you a job as CEO of a lucrative business that she has no part in does not do anything either In order to have the authority to do things with words one must participate in a specific set of practices in the appropriate way Different t t ill t difft ti ti di d t f illti t th ti t b f l l d i th i h t t t (E ffil f i l i "T" t ddi d t d thi it i t f t t ) S b d i t i t i il t f ti Nt t i lt l C i i t f h ill b i d h i th thit t f h t ( d thi acting as if they have authority does not make it so) It might be claimed that young people learn about sex and gender subordination through pornography and they thus enact what pornography teaches them Rather th i h t i t t t h i t it i l b tht h thit i td h i t k l bt th l tll b l d th h d't k btt P h b id t h th thit i f b b d i t d t i d b d i t i ti B t thi t k b k t th li t i d bl f ti d th i l i l ti f th i l l t i

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t f bditi Ultitl h t h th it f hi d images that portray women as sexually subordinate causes women to be sexually subordinated is an empirical question that is very difficult to answer n a culture n which sexist messages and institutions are ubiquitous This question may be easier t h h th l t i l it ti d t f dii iti liitd Silencing women: violation of participatory equality If h b h t il h th it b diffilt if not impossible to establish that these other forms of sex discrimination and subor dination even exist How might pornography silence women? Pornography might condition women to believe that they deserve their inferior status and discrimin t t t t It l t i t iht t illi tht k l t t t k l t i lii t h t th bi t t d i ll bjtibl hibl It i t tht d t i d i i i t i h b t i th t t f i t t ith d lit th id d li f t l thi t f li b t i l i ill k Perhaps women are unable to perform perlocutionary acts as a result of pornog raphy Women may be unsuccessful in persuading others that discrimination s occurring Again there are certainly individual cases in which women's perlocu ti t fl b t tht i likl lt f ki bd t th th lt f h' i l i fft S tdi h td tht d iliti tibt t ' ibilit t k t t t i l l i l d i t d t t b t hth h th f thi iliti dh h f i tt f iil i t i t i Fth ii i t t l t i (th f t that MacKinnon's arguments against sexual harassment in the workplace have ed to the creation of federal laws which have allowed for successful lawsuits against harassers or the fact that "date rape" has become a topic of muchneeded educa t i l d i i i hih h l d ll f l) d i th f th l i t h t bl t fll f l t i t A th ith b d i t i th h t f t i th f i l i illti H h th i i t h t h th h h th thit t f bditi h t bt whether pornography denies women the authority to perform certain illocutionary acts If pornography can disable women so that they cannot do certain things with their words if an act of saying "no" to sex cannot be perceived as an act of refusal th h b id t il dd th l tii ti i b t h i t ( l ) d bli ( l l ) tt H iht h dibl h t h t th bl t d ti thi ith d? P h bl t t ti f th tht iht H i libl ti A l b k k li t t i th d th f th h h j t t t f th h tht tb

164

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t d ff d t th d d d i l t l th t th h the woman (accidently?) drops her towel the plumber makes sexual advances he woman protests he is insistent they have sex in the shower the woman appears to enjoy it the plumber turns off the shower the woman thanks him and smiles The ' t t i t i d t t I thi ll ti id l i t i t d th t W ' t t f l t id l i t i t Thi h t i f f t l th i l d Thi i til ibilit b t it i h t b t h t th ll d t i i t ith h bt i il ti d tht h ii t l l t l ti Th i id t t the latter hypothesis A social psychological study conducted in 1988 of female undergraduates at a Texas college reported that 39 percent of the women said "no" when they wanted to have sex; 6 0 8 percent of the women said "no" when they i t d d t h Wh k d h th ld " " h th td t h 90 t id t h t f f i i t t ft th th f t h f f ll t i t t d di M f t d d t lii ititti d th di h th d d il ti tht t difftil l f ll games There is clearly a problem when saying "no" is not perceived as an act of refusal But it seems unlikely that this particular kind of illocutionary disablement which happens all too often can be attributed to pornography Th i d b t tht hild d h t l iiti t ik i lt tht i d i t d b i h t l l lit Th U i t d Stt i bl h lt Th h tht t l t h thi t f th dbll f US lt d th h ittd t ti th d i i t d llbi f t t ith d l B t it i h d t tblih tht h h d d i lit A d th d l i t d t l information in the hands of a maledominated state is not likely to bring about he cultural changes necessary for gender equality More speech more arguments and more education have led to changes in social conventions in the past and there is t b t i l t i i t i t h t th thd ill tibt t f th i t i th t t f

Rf Hornsby J (1993) Speech acts and pornography Women's Philosophical Review 10: 3 8 4 5 dL t R (1998) F h dillti L l Th 4 2137 L t R (1993) S h t d kbl t Philh d Pbli Affi 22 293330 Lovelace L (1981) Ordeal London: W H Allen MKi C A (1987) F i i Udifid Cbrid MA H d U i i t P (1993) Ol Wd C b r i d MA H d U i i t P St N (1995) Dfdi P h F S h S d th Fiht f W ' Riht New York: Scribner

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Fth

di

Cornell D (ed) (2000) y New York: Oxford University Press D k i A d MKi C A ( d ) (1997) Cbid MA H d U i i t P Dworkin R (1981) Do we have a right to pornography? s 1 177212 (1993) L i b t d h O t b 21 D S ( d ) (1995) B l t CA W d t h Gruen L and Panichas G E (eds) (1997) w New York: Routledge H k D N d Th EL G C (1992) D t il ti d bl itk 11 9 5 1 2 6 M h l h d C d H l l b h L (1988) D ti h th yes? The prevalence and correlates of women's token resistance to sex J 54 8 7 2 9 0

166

13 Dit

H d

GERALD F GAUS

APbl

i A l i d Ethi

Ethil

T h ?

M t thi

h i l h id th " b l f dit h d " t b i i lid d ifill litil lit D fl litil ti h ll i tl t it litil l d t d ht ld t h i b wrong or perhaps is still wrong and yet is nevertheless in some sense required? As Machiavelli saw it a prince must "learn how not to be good and to use this know ledge and not use it according to the necessity of the case" (1950 [1515]: 56) It is idl t h h t t h t litii f ill h d l hi itti hih ht th d il i l i t ill lt Th it i id litii t t h h d dit t d h j b ll h ill b ll t i d b h fi i l i d thi i ibl f il Y t i t t t th t jit i d i thi l th l i t t th bl f dit h d i h t id b t i d d i t b t h t h th i h bl t ll ( Donagan 1977: 1 8 4 9 ; Nielsen 1996); and even among those who believe that there is some special moral issue we find deep disagreement about what it might be Some insist while others deny that dirty hands involve a moral dilemma or a type f i d t i t h t it i bl between lit d liti hil th i i t t h t it i bl within lit bt t difft t f lit ( C d 1993) A d fid d i t b t h t h it i il bl f liti l bl f l lif I thi h t I hll t h t th bl f dit h d i l i b h th th i i l i d thi it i th d d t T b sure almost all issues in applied ethics are theory dependent in so far as recommenda tions about what should be done say about multiculturalism immigration pornog raphy abortion and so on all depend on ethical theories such as utilitarianism virtue th d t t l i Th bl f dit h d I hll i th d d t i b i h t h th b h bl t ll dh it ill b d t d t i l l t fil b t t i i t h i l th ft t t h i l th A l t h h th lti f th b t t i ill t f tll litii ht t d i diffilt l itti th t i l l ill d t i h t h it k t t l k b t "dit h d " d h t thi iht 167

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I id f difft ti f dit h d (1) flit f i i l (or values) entailing opportunity costs; (2) as a conflict between moral principles and valuable consequences; (3) as a moral dilemma with no right answer; (4) as a manifestation of vice; and (5) as a coerced choice resulting from an evil project that i l ll di I hll t tht f th f lti t l i f lit d t i l i t tht i bth lli d tblih i t t i l bl f dit h d Ulik t i l i d thi i thi tti th tthi iht l th bl

O t i t

C t

C

i

d P l i t i l Ati

A t litil tt h tl i i t d t h t liti i f l l d with "dirty issues" in which it is impossible to take a stand and yet remain "clean" or retain one's "purity" (Postrel 2000) In the real world of messy politics we are told to take a side by endorsing one party to a dispute usually requires that one d ti l d ti tht ffd f ' i i l F l Lt' tht thik t d d ditibti i b d d t h t th h l d ' t tll l h t li t h i li d thi I you wouldn't want any taxes at all or would want them only to support tiiti t h t b f t h th t d t i l df thik t hld b l l l Y l tt t b tl hld tt lt i t i l b k if a new home for the first time or pay college tuition? (Postrel 2000: 48)

t rft ld government Eith H th th b

You favor lower taxes and tax neutrality; this proposal will lower taxes but decrease neutrality If you take any active stand for or against you will be true to one principle at the cost of forgoing the other You must rank the principles: "To dd dit i 't j t h i i l Y h t h iiti" ( P t l 2000 48) S th tht h t l i i l low taxation d neutral taxation N ti i t f t tk t d i i hih ' i i l flit t h t i h th it t ti d i f f t id Thi ht tt Viii P t l ll i i t i " t i i t " If i t i t l litil d i t h ihtl tll t k ' principles: one must decide either that in this case low taxation is more important than neutral taxation or vice versa What is hard to see is how there is anything morally unusual problematic or "dirty" about such a choice Perhaps the most tht it h t h t i tht h i bt l lbl l d i t h ti h t k t l d t t th t f t hii th l Th id f t i l ti bilit t k l d t d t th b i f h k i If t h t i h t i i l d i d i t h d it l h t i t i f t i l ti t il l bl Whil P t l i til iht tht

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DIRTY HANDS

liti t t i l l dit ' h d b i l ( i i l ) at the cost of others such grime is the stuff of rational action in a world of oppor tunity costs Admittedly one may sometimes feel regret that one had to give up something important to achieve something else; one can feel the loss of a valued d Bt t b t i t hih t i l l tt bl hdl t i t t dit h d T t il l d/ t i l bl i th hi bt fliti i i l ( bt l ) O iht f l th di k t d i t i i h i l faiRng to promote a value or principle f acting against it betraying it (Stak 1990 27) Th id h i t h t to t one principle rather than another is simply a rational choice but to act on one principle and so against the other to somehow reject one through endorsing the other is morally problematic It is though hard to see how to explicate this idea S i th b tht libti th t t b th i h b t i low taxation? Sh i ki it i l t neutral taxation; i h t l i th i t b t to i iit t i t il t b t th th " B t l " i t h i d i i fl l t i hih tht hih h li ( i th " t h l " ) It i h d to see how ranking one principle as less important is to betray it A lower ranking of one principle only constitutes a betrayal if it not only has a call on your devotion but insists on being loved more than other values If one has an di f l di to h i h t l ( i i l ) h hld t b b l t i th tht t till f tht l f th k f th th hi titt b t l f S f l h b i f i d to i di f i i l h t h t (1) low taxation neutral taxation, d (2) neutral taxation b f f th k f low taxation O i d d ill h l dil if f d ith th it f h i B t i thi th " d i t h d d i l " d t i i l f hi b tween values (or principles) but from a particular sort of value structure containing incommensurable values and the possibility of their conflict (cf Donagan 1977: 1809) It is akin to giving supreme devotion to two gods: any choice of one consti t t b t l f th th I ill t t thi i bl Th id fb t l k h h i l it t ti t h t k it i i b l t h l d th th l S f l t h t th l f t i l it d i ld t blkil fid t blkil fid i t i l to k t i l it b f i d h i it i t l th f i d h i l b fid to blkil I this case the cost of securing the favored value is higher: one is not simply forgoing this opportunity to promote it one gives it up altogether

The Conflict of Consequences and Principles A t ilti

t th th

i th l i t t i ill i i l f d

dit h d i t h t th it f l b l i t i liti d thi ft l d t lit ( N l 1978) H th flit 169

GERALD F GAUS

t bt t i i l bt bt l riil d l d d Stanley Benn has argued that "states and their agents are licensed to set aside moral principles for the sake of good outcomes (or more usually to avoid bad ones)" because states and their officials are "the champions and trustees of the bli i j l ld" (B 1983 167) O thi i th litil d i t i i h d f i t lif b t ft (1) ill b t t ll i t t i l ffi it i l ditbl d l d it i i f th tt f t d (2) l i t i l t t t i f th h i bilit t ti tht t t th b i iil i t t f t h i iti A d i t (1) litii t t ti l b h i f th ith whom they interact and as Machiavelli famously observed "A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good" (1950 [1515]: 56) But by (2) a politician has no right t h i t if f h i t f th di ittd t t t i thi i t t C t l it t h t i th ditbl d ll i t i hih litii ft t th t i th l t f d lit dl k t t th d fthi i i l All thi k ft th ti i h t h it l d t libl ti of dirty hands Consider two interpretations First suppose that the pursuit of good consequences is required by morality: if one finds oneself in the position of a trustee operating in an environment of danger and uncertainty then the moral thing to do i t k d t b fidlit t l i i l If thi i th it b k t th t i t t t t k d hi bt ti l idti d ht d thi i t t ill b l t B t Ih h i d thi i d i t t i l hi ( G 2001) Gi t h t tiliti l th i i t t h t th it f d i thi ( i ll )i ll i d it i t t ll li t h t tilitri i i t t tht h t bl f dit h d One is not guilty of immorality or wrongdoing even though sensitive people may feel guilty (Hare 1989: 58ff) The conflict between the political pursuit of good consequences and moral prin il bl ditit f th l d i th i ti f lit ii h l bliti t th d b ilti i i l Thi ld b flit between l i t i l i d l i litil i i t t th litii t b il t i l Thi i ldi id f th lit t d i t i i liti hih i i t "th i l t b l t i bt th l d d th i t f successful political action" (Morganthau 1973: 10; see also Niebuhr 1963) Here we seem to have a basis for describing the hands of the successful politician as "morally dirty" for he seeks political success by doing what is all things considered, i l Thi i h t b S t ' i t i hi l Dirty Hands h i h th t thi d b t H d th i d lti li th t th liti H h i i t t i !H fid t il h d l All H li t it right stay pure! What good will it do you? Why did you join us? Purity is an ideal for a 170

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moral

Weber on the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility

GERALD F GAUS

Th thi f l t i t d Wb t i i th ld f liti Politics he argues constantly confronts its participants with the choice between using evil means or failure to achieve good ends Those idealists proponents of the ethic of ultimate ends who insist that no good can come from violating moral i i l l i t i l i f t (1958 [1919] 123) Th f h Wb i l t h td tht t i l t l t i l d liti ill i th t f ilti i i l i d t t l A h i liti b t f t if i i l f l d d ill l d ll t d i t Whil ll thi it t libl tht l i b tilit i liti th i di lif (G 2001) need more to establish a problem of dirty hands Weber points to two features of political action that seem to give rise to a special moral stain: (1) the possibility that politicians are confronted with a moral "paradox" or dilemma and (2) that a cost f thi fl it f l i t i l d i l f li t i t th lti ti f i I id (1) i thi ti d (2) i th t Irreconcilable duties "Politics as a Vocation" is not clear about the precise relation between the ethics of ltit d d ibilit At it Wb tll t h t th " t b l t t t bt th l t hih l i i titt i h h 'lli f l i t i ' " (1958 [1919] 127) A h h h l d i b th " f d t l l difft d i ilbl d " If f thi l t t id ft i i l b l thil t d t d th l litii t b fi ht Wb ll "paradox" or what others deem a dilemma If the two types of ethics cannot be reconciled and if they require inconsistent acts of a politician no matter what he d h fil t t i f th i t f Th id t h t f dit h d th i hih litii f t dil i f ht h d i f it f i i t th h t fMihl W l ' l i S ti Wl iti "it i i h t t t t d d th it t l b iht t t ' h d dit B t ' h d t dit f di h t it i t d " (1973 164) W l bli tht litii f dil b h d stands moral rules as absolute in the sense that (1) "moral rule R requires act A" entails (2) "it is wrong not to A " Thus he says: Wh l idd d t tlk t if th h d b t id cancelled or annulled They still stand and have this much effect at least: that we k h d thi if h t h d l th b t thi t d th h l i th i t (Wl 1973 171) Ad it i tt A if th l idti d thi idti id R It i th b l t l ( l ) b f i i f A-i Of if th idti tht id R f b i d t A it i l t A Th it i b t h t t A Wht d d

172

i t

ilt ll t A

t-A R d

DIRTY HANDS

It i i t t t t tht Wl d t i t i t h t th litii f moral dilemma in the sense that he cannot decide what to do; apparently he knows what is the best thing to do Consider Walzer's famous example of a politician who has seized upon a national crisis a prolonged colonial war to reach f H d hi f i d i ffi ldd t d l i t i d th h t l ittd t b t h t h h t itht f th d t f th i t t I th h ibilit f th th h t d fastly opposed it Immediately the politician goes off to the colonial capital to open titi ith th b l B t th i t l i i th i f t r i t i d th f t d i i th ld f i thi h i k d t t h i th t t f t d bl h k bbl k th l t i f b f b b hidden in apartment buildings around the city set to go off in the next twentyfour h H d th t t d i d tht h td f th k f th l h iht t h i di i th li t h h h bli tht torture is wrong indeed abominable not just sometimes but always He had expressed thi b l i f ft d il i th i th t f t k it i f hi d H hld d hi ? (H hld h d h i l f ? ) (Wl 1973 1667) Th litii d t ht i dil i th tht h d t k ht t d Wl t l l th t it tht t t i i th l thing to do His moral dilemma is that no matter what he does it will be wrong Thus it is wrong to do that which is all things considered the moral thing to do It is certainly true that when one duty overrides another the agent may owe thi t th h th b f i f th l t t f f ti b id h t id l i t i t li i f f i Bt i t thi t f idl l li bt hth th t ll i tt ht h d N it i t t i d th b d f t d ti f l l h t h t th ild i ibl ( l l thi i d d ) dti " h t " ( Willi 1973 1981b) T d so however commits one to an unorthodox metaethics and one which under mines the actionguidance function of moral duties For if both A (torture the prisoner) and not-A (do not torture the prisoner) are all things considered one's d l dt th l i tht h l dt t A l t A f lit l i i t h dt t t-A M t t d d Wl tht i d i t h d it i it t d th litii ll ilt f d i ht l d t i i i t ti f ilt b l t h i d ibilit It l fll tht i b l t h for A-ing only if (1) it was wrong to A and (2) one should have known better than to A; for in some dirtyhands cases what is wrong is what one has most moral reason to do and so even an ideal moral agent could not have known better than t d it f it th ll b t thi t d If f t b th t i l d I thik f i l i l i b l t h i b t d t i l i d th t l iti f ilt d b l t h i W l ' l i f th d i t h d dil i d i d

173

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Dilemmas incommensurability

and dirty hands

A

A A

anti-torture

saving innocent lives anti-torture

A

-A -A

saving innocent lives

A

-A

A

-A

A not

A

-A

not

-A

tragic chokes

A

A

-A

facing a dilemma A -A

A

-A

DIRTY HANDS

h t resolve the dilemma i t di h hld "f" ll ranking She resolves the dilemma by filling the gap in her preference structure such that she now is a different sort of person And should she face the same choice in the future she will not face a dilemma; for she would then have an overall reason to h If h d B ' l l i f t i l l th h resolves th dil l f i b l j d t d l i bjt t i i t t l dti B t thi b i b k t th t f i d d b Wl d i hi f lli f dit h d

Dirty Hands and Vice Ih b f i t f dit h d t h t l i th ii f i i t t ti diti lj d t I "Pliti V t i " Wb t th d t d i f bl i t h t "H h k h lti f th l hi l d th hld t k it l th f liti f th it d i f f t t k f liti l b l d b i l " (1958 [1919]: 126) And Machiavelli tells us that the nature of politics requires the cultivation of "vices" such as hypocrisy (Grant 1997) Rather than seeing dirty hands arising from the guilt of performing wrong actions we might view it as d ith th t f tb t b fl i liti iht it f d t lti th th t lti ( C i h 1992) I d t b fl i liti t b th t f h kill li d i h i t ii bli l l i t it tht tl i O th b bd ii t l t h l itiit i tl i i d A d t h t i h i t i d b liti it i t h tht ' h d dit ' li A Mhilli t lit ician may lose his soul for the good of the community Now this conception of dirty hands makes sense if we adopt a view of vices and it di t h i h ti A i i ( i t ) if it i t ft V if A i ll iibl ( i i i b l ) A l t h h thi i f i i t b d ith d it lli I d t l t it id lihtl t i i th iit ti A i i ( i t ) if it i f t V if Ai ll i d ( hibitd) Thi l k tt dd S f i t tht litii fi f li i i h i h li ll id Sidik d i t h t i thi it i t it " t h h th t l tion of such acts excites in us a quasimoral admiration we certainly should not call them v i r t u o u s " Sidgwick thus concludes that "it will therefore involve no material deviation from usage if we limit the term 'Virtue' to qualities exhibited n iht d t " (1907 219) A l i th i t i liti hibitd i ll i h t d t ld t b t i thi til th h " l l iht" " l l i d " b t it l i libl h i l " l l i i b l " If Sidik' l i l d t j t th ti f it d i tht i i t th ti f dit h d A i fd l i d i i f b t t t h i l th 175

GERALD F GAUS

B d Willi t tht h d t i f th litii' "vicious" lie does not arise from its vicious nature in the case in which it is justified but from our fear that the politician's disposition to lie will manifest itself in cases where it is unjustified "The point is that only those who are reluctant or disin l i d t d th ll d i b l thi h it i h h h f t di it h it i t " (Willi 1981 62) A b f h i l h th tht litii' di t li kill thi l ibilit d k t l i l ti i t f ( H h i 1978) B t l it i b j t i b l t bl t h i ll ll f A-i h A-i i ll j t i f d i th h fd t i h d th from A-ing in future cases in which it is not justified: this is to abandon the tie between wrongness and blameworthiness guilt or moral stain It is rightly objected to utilitarian theories that they could sanction "punishment" of the innocent to dt ft i i l t T hld tht litii " d i t " h th tifibl A i th h f d t i t h h h l i l h i d i i ft j t i f i d A-i i i l l j t

Dit H d

C d

B t l Rlti

f

Eil P j t

M i h l Stak h d l d l d hititd t f dit hih i i t tht t h h h t jtifid " b l i t " th l ll f h d ilt (1990 lift) S t h d Wij (1994 30) h marized (and developed) Stacker's main point thus:

h d th

p]n all cases of dirty hands what is common is that actions involve the ustified b t l f l riil d t th i l i t td b th ( iti f ) ithi hih t fid h i l f I h i t d fid it i i b l tt b db l id erations to commit moral violations In order to minimize further evil arising from the hkd il f th i l i t th ti f d t t ith il f t h i it i l jt Stk i i th

h l th t i ditiihi di il f i l tit t f ti i d i t h d th t f ' ti t hih i l i b t l H id f l th (f Willi S t ' l Shi' Chk) i hih N i f Shi Plih mother in a concentration camp to choose which of her children will live and which will die Stocker concludes "She picks one And she does so with dirty hands" (1990: 19) She has been forced by the Nazi to participate in his evil j t d th b t h d h t h h h b t b di h h i i i d il d d th i h t thi N t h l Stk i i t it it tht h f l ilt d h f h hi Thi l i f S h i ' dil i li l d Fit Stk i h i i t tht h i bl t h Shi li i d i

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tht h 't h A d thi th fh liht f til f d t t she cannot compare the importance of the lives of her children they are iterally incommensurable and so she is literally unable to choose. The incommensurability analysis (see above) seems much nearer the mark here (Gaus 2000: 1 3 5 6 ) To be l t i t l th N i d Shi it ki h i b th t h t t kill b t h hild if h d t h Ad h d h (h l d d i ) Gi h i i t tht h t h bt h hild it tti fh ti i t h t h hi i i l tht hild i i t d f b t h f th di th th i f f hild th th I t ht i ditbi b t Stak' l i i t h t th t coercion under which Sophie acts does not in his view undermine the appropriate ness of guilt Under a standard analysis of free action and responsibility that one is coerced and under extreme duress into A-ing obviates responsibility for A-ing and so ilt f A-i i A-i i t th t' h i (G 1999 2 0 3 5 ) Th b k tll h h d th b k ' t it i t hld ibl f th t h f t h h t i ilt t h h h h " h " t i th b k ' Ad f tht i b h h t ll h t ll Y t S t a k ttibt hi t Shi d i t h i i t tht h t choose and despite the incredible duress she is under; he insists that guilt and shame are appropriate for this victim of the Nazis For Stacker the person "has chosen even if coerced to bring about what is terrible" (1990: 26): coercion and voluntariness are hld tibl A d b Stak' l i f dit h d f bi coerced i t il j t thi i t i d i t i ft f th f hi l i i th l i t h t t i d t d i th t t i b t i f hi d ilt t th t I f h il j t i liti d i t h d i l f t f l i t i l lif b t S t a k l l thik tht h il j t l it tiiti dit h d i Stacker responds to this line of criticism by insisting that "there need be no conceptual or moral error in thinking that even though agents of dirty hands are morally unable to avoid the dirty act they can and should feel guilty and ashamed f di it" (Stak 1990 31) S t a k th d l ilt f lbilit N i b d f di S h i l h i f l d b Aittl tht b d d ilt f i t t i l di f ti i i t t i l it i l t d ilt i it Ad i Shi' d i i t h i t t i l ilt i i t B t thi i dbi i d d f h th it i t t i l t it i t voluntary act One suspects that underlying Stacker's analysis is an archaic under standing of guilt: one is stained by an intentional act of betrayal regardless of whether one is culpable or responsible A person who is coerced into such an act is ll t i d d i ilt "th h l d f l th d f t t d l i b i h t " (1990 31) T d thi h i i t i t i k "t t h i f l " (1990 26ff) H hi t f hi l t i ibilit d ilt t h l th ittl t d til t lli

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C

l

i

Thi h t h d li t t l f dit h d T h h t Ih ht t k t l it Fit l th t of dirty hands we quickly become immersed in questions of deontic logic rational choice theory the nature of virtues issues concerning freedom of action culpability and guilt and so on Whether there is a distinct problem of dirty hands i t i l b difft f l t i ll d d t l d t i l li i h i l h Of thi i tt t h t it i t i l tht litii ft f t tht i l t d lit tht i t i l l th d d t W h t h thi i l il bl f dit h d h i i d d d d t th lti f th li W d t i th h f dit h d i iti h d hi t d t l d th iti f th t d f our choices but whether all this involves incompossible oughts or duties necessary moral guilt and so on is a matter of rather subtle ethical theory Secondly I suggested and because of space limitations it could be no more than ti tht h i th li f d tht t f dit h d dbi i f t i l hi d t i l i it th lti f l t i t ilt d Plitii d thi tht ll i l h t h th jtif h ti i l di t t li H it f d t tht thi h d i dit f such actions are justified

Rf B

S I (1983) P i t d bli lit l lii d dit h d I S I B d G F Gaus (eds) Public and Private in Social Life pp 1 5 5 8 1 New York: St Martin's Press Cbid U i i t P (1988) A Theory of Freedom C b i d 1679 N B l i I i h (1969) T t f l i b t I Four Essays on Liberty Yk Ofd U i i t P Coady C A J (1993) Dirty hands In Robert E Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy pp 4 2 2 3 0 Oxford: Blackwell C i h Ath B (1992) Th l i r t f dit h d Journal of Value Inquiry 26 2 3 9 5 0 Donagan Alan (1977) The Theory of Morality Chicago: University of Chicago Press F h P t (1983) Ethics in Government E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l G G l d F (1999) Social Philosophy N Y k M E Sh (2000) Political Concepts and Political Theories Boulder CO: Westview Press flit f l d riil I Gld (2001) Th l i i t f homo economicus: th G Jli L t d Chriti D F ( d ) Values Justice and Economics B f f l NY H i t Bk Geise J P (1989) The problem of dirty hands: political necessities and liberal values International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 4: 9 5 1 1 3 U i i t f Chi P G t R t h (1997) Hypocrisy and Integrity Chi

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Hampshire Stuart (1978) Morality and pessimism In Stuart Hampshire (ed) Public and Private Morality pp 1-22 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Hare R M (1989) Essays on Political Morality Oxford: Clarendon Press Levi Isaac (1986) Hard Choices: Decision-making under Unresolved Conflict Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Machiavelli Niccolo (1950 [1515]) The Prince In The Prince and the Discourses New York: Modern Library Morganthau Hans (1973) Politics among Nations 5th edn New York: Alfred A Knopf Nagel Thomas (1978) Ruthlessness in public life In Stuart Hampshire (ed) Public and Private Morality pp 75-91 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Niebuhr Reinhold (1963) Moral Man and Immoral Society London: Student Christian Move ment Press Nielsen Kai (1996) There is no dilemma of dirty hands South African Journal of Philosophy 15: 1-7 Postrel Virginia (2000) Impure thoughts Reason 32 (4): 4 8 5 0 Sidgwick Henry (1907) The Methods of Ethics 7th edn Chicago: University of Chicago Press Stocker Michael (1990) Plural and Conflicting Values Oxford: Clarendon Press Walzer Michael (1973) Political action: the problem of dirty hands Philosophy and Public Affairs 2: 16080 Weber Max (1958 [1919]) Politics as a vocation In H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology pp 77-128 New York: Oxford University Press de Wijze Stephen (1994) Dirty hands: doing wrong to do right South African Journal of Philosophy 13: 2 7 3 3 Williams Bernard (1973) Ethical consistency In Problems of the Self pp 166-86 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981a) Politics and moral character In Moral Luck pp 5 4 7 0 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1981b) Ought and moral obligation In Moral Luck pp 114-23 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Winston Kenneth I (1994) Necessity and choice in political ethics: varieties of dirty hands In Daniel E Wueste (ed) Professional Ethics and Social Responsibility Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield

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S It i thik

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bbl till f t tht h th jit fA i f l f th t f lit th t h i k fit f T h t i th t h i k t h t l di d tiiti i t h l t l hibiti b f their sexual nature Certain sexual activities are taken to be among the paradigms of moral wrongness This belief is one legacy of the JudeoChristian moral tradition although its roots go back further to Plato's ethics Its clearest contemporary articu lti i h th V t i ' " D l t i S l E t h i " f 1975 I thi d t th C t h l i C h h l t l ti f l iditd t l l b th " l t t i f " S t i d th t t f ti d th l i i t t f i i itlf hld t b ll b it i i flit ith G d ' t l l H diit i bdi t tht l hih titt h t ll S l lit i t h f based on the natural function of sexuality: reproduction in the context of longterm commitment for raising children "Every genital act must be within the framework of marriage" (The Vatican 1975: 306) Sex is here reduced to genital acts and t i t d t th f dti i l i l t i h i Th dti id h i t d h t ti k i i hldi h d b t th titi hibit t l t i t l d h l i t bt ith d d tbti ll Th l t t i liitl h l d t b l (Th Vti 1975 308) d i t th f t t h t it h dd t fft th thi i t t Let us examine critically the links between reproduction and sex and love and sex and their alleged moral implications First it must be granted that though the reproductive function may be the biological origin of the sex drive psychologically th t it d i t i t M t l i i i th t f dti t h t t l d t l di b d h i l b t t dti fit Pi t th d t f libl t t i th i t t f hild h b d t lik t dti bt ht i f tht i l th d d t b itbl ti h i i 180

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S d d d tht th h i l b d l f thi principal biological functions Mouths may be principally for eating but no one condemns their use for speaking breathing expressing or even kissing The main biological function of hands may be for grasping food or tree branches but we b l l l th f iti t i thi i d l i t i S t i li l th f th b d f l d ll t f l ll i h t If idiidl h l bliti t b hild th h hld b blitd t l l f tht ? Wh h l d d th b d ' i f l liit th l t f t i ? The explanation for the Christian sexual ethic probably lies not only in its origin prior to artificial contraception but in its more distant origin in Plato and in the particular way Christianity adapted the ambivalent Platonic attitude toward sex Thi t d i t i h i d th id t h t i i i t "l l " i l t i dditi t h t t d lltil t iiliti i t l f Th id h t k d t i W t lt h tht th h kd h i d th d fV i t i i i th l t idttith t ld t f t h l til f it F d l t l d repression the redirection of sexual energy as central to the development of civil ization even if dangerous to the individual psyche while Marcuse held that capita lism's desexualization of the body was necessary to make it available for labor Even th j iti f l i th d t tht bidld l di d i t lif t th d t i t f th tiiti Bt h h ith id t tht jti f th t l titi l thi t h t l i k it iibilit t dti lt i dditi t W t f l itht b i ltt d j ki itht b i i l h d Th l i t h t i difft libl t l d ii f th i d t i f t i ith bdi tht ldi d tiit entails The claim that moral sex must be linked to love is somewhat more complex as well as more popular Here adequate criticism requires first a distinction between ht i idl ht i iibl d ht i t b td S d t k t t t t l bth ldi dl i d t hth i itlf t il l titi d h t h it i t l l b t likd t l i l t i h i Lt b i ith l L i i fit f ll t h d i it i l idtifiti ith th l d ' i t t d i t d d l t it ment to further those interests It is secondarily selfregarding: a desire for constant companionship with the person and therefore a pleasant emotion in their presence and a longing in their absence It tends to be relatively exclusive; while we may l l l t ildi ll hild th d d li t l i liti i l i b l It i l t h h t t h t th i i l kid f l ti l hih till i l d ti d i It i il kid l b th l i l t i h i f l l f hild d t i l h di Bt t h i k f thi ti i l l dfid b l th bl l di S l tiit ik th

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tiiti til l ll th ti bt h sexual desires for and relations with those we do not love and love those for whom we have no sexual desire Sexual desire itself even when expressive of or linked to love seems clearly ditit Fit l t h h it i d i f th ' bd lik l it i i i l l f d i di f th l tht h i l t t ith th t h ' bd d S d hil ldi i t i l l li i i t til th it i t l i i th l h i if f l t i ldi f th T h i d it i t l t i i t t Th l f i i t l f li i it i t h i l l l tht i at best repetitive not cumulative as is the value of a longterm loving relationship It might be objected that the claim that love and sexual desire are distinct and separable reflects a male bias Popular literature suggests that for many women tift ti l d t i l i t t hil th i tt f O th li tht t i l t t h t i t i l f l di i hil th i t f (Rbi 1983 101) S i b i l t l t i f h d diff M i thi h f th lb h i l t hil d b k i man for support through pregnancy and childrearing This explanation is highly speculative however And even if this generalization about different attitudes toward sex is true as a generalization it leaves much room for differences in desires d f bth ithi d d Th it i tht l di i ltill ditit f l At it t b i it i di f h i l t t ith th' bd d f th l tht h t t ffd If i ditit f l till k fit h t h it i t tht i best likd ith l d d hth th l i l i t i t th t thi fit ti A t b t h id f th f i t ti b idd A l t h h l desire is distinct from loving commitment certain of its features might suggest a natural link First sex is naturally a private matter It involves exposure vulnerabil ity and intimacy so that others third parties are naturally excluded No third t ll h iht t b ' lb h i d h b t i ld t i l l d i t b l tiit W h t i i t ld th d l i l t i h i I bth i f d l i l th b j t f ' di ti d thi f t t t l ti S d iht b id t b i fh t d id d i f bdi i h t th b t h h t t l t th i d l l t i h i L l ld i i thi i an affirmation of the whole person something we might all seek We derive pleas ure not only from the physical aspects of sex but also from expressions of affection from our partners O th th id it b d t h t th i i t tht b i t d ith l i i i t t i it i t i l l t i t d b th id t h t i itlf h t f i l t b iliti titil h i l litti B t if i itlf i b i th h it b itbl f i l ? I d d h i lit b th b t t t d d ffti (V 1980 12 26)? V i i l 182

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t thi l th i fl iht d t t f th i t physical pleasure that is its chief value for many people If in sexual acts one must be constantly monitoring that one's communication of affection is succeeding this will certainly lessen physical spontaneity and pleasure Finally restricting sex to the t t h i till i t t d f th l t d i f it d lt hih dd t th l f I hll t t t t t ttl thi d i t h i I d t bli th i i l t Whth i j b l di i th t t f l i l t i h i i tt f i idiidl hl d i til lti bt difft idiidl M i t h t fil l d so because of a confusion between sexual desire and love when the intensity of the former fades somewhat and when the idealization of romantic passion succumbs to reality For many other luckier couples sex remains an integral part of a deeper l t i h i It i i t t h t h i tht ki f h t i btt idl t f ht i ll iibl E if lik th tiiti tk h i h t d i d i t h i fl thi d t i l tht dbt itht l i ll i i i b l Sti t k i b t t th h b f t l b t ti t k i t l il able or preferred and eating hamburger is not prohibited Meals that are also celebrations are more meaningful and better for being so but we are not morally required to make all meals celebrations W t if f l th b t t i i i b l f t iht t i t f Th f th f h i btt i l i t t th t b dditil t if tht i itht l W t d t th i t bt td ii tht i l h i l t i itlf ll t Bt j t f l l d t b dditi it d t b i i d t ilti W k bfit i i l i i t t i itht i t t i h t h enter into these transactions voluntarily Similarly we can seek our own pleasure primarily in sex without mistreating partners whose participation is voluntary Physical pleasure is something generally good not bad in itself although once t th k i d f l t h t bild itlf l t titt j lf t i l lif l Th t b t hth ht t b td ith l i dtil t l d th d f h dtil t l t i t th idiidl ith t h i i di t h th d i t d

Privacy Consent and Homosexuality If

l di i itlf l k l i t th th t iht t l t l th l d i h i d b t tht t t b i t f d ith A i h t t l i t f l iht t d l l d ti t d t l f f i l i t thi l

idti tht k ll Th i f l t ithi t i t l b d t h th d tibt fi h

t

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t th l lf Th t i t t t h F i t th riht i indicated a right against outside interference It does not imply that consensual sex is always right or morally permissible One may have a right to do what may sometimes be wrong and persons may be wrongly harmed by actions to which th t P t t t t h i d i d i h f th thi th t d hil l t i t l i t i d thid ti t h th riht t i t f th diri b t liit d t h t S d d i t t t t b i f d dt l l t i d t b i d lk li i th d i f i l th ti f h t ti t l l tary that is not based on coercion or exploitation Once more however a general aversion to paternalistic interference would require a strong burden of proof of coercion or unjust harm before consent could be concluded to be involuntary W l f th l l i i d t b t ifi l ti d l i i d t th Wh d fid t h t ti ti d d l b f th triti l thi j t d b t h t th i th i f i t d t h t till th dit f l I ill t k l i illtti th types: homosexuality harassment and rape prostitution and adultery Most Americans continue to believe that homosexual behavior is immoral When pressed for a reason a variety of answers might be given: (1) homosexuality is t l (2) it i t d (3) it i t h t t th h t l fil (4) h l i d bi thi tiit i t f t i i bridld i i t (5) h l b h i d AIDS (6) f i lid h l i t ld ll th d f th h Th d i l d ritil ti (1) H l i t i t t l i di It i i d d i th i l kid di l l t tht i d d h t l as well It may be more natural in not repressing these acts as some hetero sexuals do The only sense in which it is unnatural is in its not fulfilling the "natural" function of reproduction The claim that morally permissible sex must flfill thi f t i itiid d j t d b W dd h tht l t ll f h lf d d ltri th f t bildi hlt ki f d ll f d t h l dii d C t i l t ll t h t i t l i thi fd t i f t b i l Th f h l i t t l i thi di thi ld l k l li ti (2) Although most people equate sexual perversion with moral depravity our intuitions regarding specific perversions and degrees of moral wrongness do not align Most think that drinking urine for example is perverted but they would be h d dt i ( t h th ti th h f i ) h it i ll (R 1984 385) W h t h t l f th t f i i tht td t t b bth l l d d i t i Wht i d i t i i lti t l' t t H l i t l bt t l bi f d b hl 5 t f th l ti S fid it d i t i Bt thi l k li l i t i Off 184

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ffiit t til i t b h i d bli h l dil if of the type that are allowed to heterosexuals should not be prohibited on grounds of offense To do so is to discriminate against people for an inborn trait that is part of their identity (3) H l i t tb t h t t th i t i t t i fh t l i if h l titt h ll t f th lti Th t h t th libt l h t l b h l If th l i i t h t h l ld titt h l t f th lti f t d i d th thi l i til tb b i d ith th id t h t h lit i t l td l Attti t homosexuals into marriage with the opposite sex is itself more likely to result n many more failed marriages hence itself more a threat to the institution On the other hand homosexuals themselves can make up families if allowed to marry and d t hild (4) H l ttitill b i th h t l bt thi l i f t l b libl ttibtd t l k fi t i t t i l tf ll il i t l t l t i h i Witht h th i littl t thik t h t h l ld b l fl t i taining longterm loving relationships (heterosexuals are not all that successful as a group either) Thus if sexual activity must be socially restrained and once more this requirement may be only a corollary of the Platonic antipathy toward our i l t th i t f thi t i t th h l it (5) P i b h i iht ll t i b t t th d f th AIDS i bt h l i t d t AIDS h i h i db h t l tiit ll I t th di i t di idl ldid h l th h t l Th t h t f AIDS i ti f ll ll ti idiidl h t ' hiti t known as well as warnings to potential partners by those infected by the virus In this respect homosexuals are no different from others (6) If universalized homosexuality would spell the end of the human race Kant's t t f ilibilit t i t d d t l t ti th d tht th f ll ti i th ld b b d Th i l i t i f i l i i i l f ti hd t lt i tditi flit i th ill B t K t h i l f ld h f d flit i ti i l i t i ld d t h i t t i l t dh f t h d i d f h l i t ( K t 1963 164) N t h l h d i l does not result from the proper application of his general criterion On the same grounds celibacy would have to be impermissible if homosexuality were The key to the proper application of the criterion of universalizability is the proper specification f th i bjti i i l tht d l i th ti bi i d d All d l th l t t th ti t b i l d d i th i If ll th l i th ld t t t t t t l l kt h I l t thi ft th lt ld bbl l k th d f th h B t th l t i t b i l i d i l d ti f th d i t th th Siill th K t i t t i i l i t i f h l

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b h i th ith h l di f d th t f that test would be neither contradictory nor dire Critics of homosexuality nclud ing Kant also see homosexuals as violating the second formulation of his criterion of using each other as means only but without restricting permissible sex to pro ti th i t thik tht h l t td ft th h t l W h t th f d d t d h l b h i i itlf i l I t d th lthi i f i d t h t th til l t f b h i i ll t l i itlf l t tht b ff t tht d ti l t ll

Rape and Harassment O

iht thik t h t ith i i t l t th l t li tiit t h t i i l b f it l t B t thi i t Th t f th t t h l i t ht k th f th th t tht f d ith d l t W h t k ith i i th l k or impossibility of genuine informed consent the fact that such acts are therefore coercive manipulative and harmful to the psychological wellbeing and future mental health of the victims Siil k l t hih i h ith i i l i d d f f It i t th f f th l t tht k h i b t th f t t h t i h i l lt i i f i hili ti d th f itht h t R i th h i l lt i th tht dh i i d bb i th l f t It i i i f th i t d th i i f the body is the worst form of such violation of privacy Beside these serious wrongs and harms longerterm damage might result from the selfidentification of women in primarily sexual terms and although rape is almost exclusively a male crime f i i t h t h i k f ll l t i i l d t d h ll h t l it f littl h l h Th i thi ll t i l b t l f bt t d i ith dt h ti i t l t d h t fll l t d i tht i ith dt b d l i f "dt " d lh t S t i i t idli f t d t i tht liit bl t b liitd d i f h t fi i l activity from holding hands to kissing to petting and so on This seems excessive if sex is to be at all spontaneous and pleasurable instead of an academic exercise but it remains a difficult question how to specify consent and refusal Clearly "no" t " " t t f l t i i t b t it i t l t h t il l k f it l titt tit t tht t i t t l btitt f liit t E liit t h flti i i d b l h l d ll t b i bt d thi tht ft d i k i i iibl? M h d d i hit d fll t t

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Similar problems arise regarding the newer category of sexual harassment Harassment is defined not as sex without consent but primarily as certain unwelcome sexual advances or overtures Of course not all unwelcome or rejected offers can count as harassment as morally wrong or there would be very little sexual or romantic activity in the world among morally minded people One possible place to draw the line is to say that advances that constitute harassment must be continuous or continue after their rejection has been made clear But in certain contexts this is not necessary for harassment to occur The relevant contexts are those involving unequal power relations such as those between teacher and student or doctor and patient Here any sexual overture can be considered coercive and so it is proper to prohibit all such conduct In contexts of equal power by contrast it seems that individuals can be left on their own to make their desires and intentions or lack of them clear Harassment is also said to occur in working environments when there is sexually explicit or implicit discussions jokes or displays Here once more we must attempt to draw a line that will prevent unduly hostile environments without stifling free and spontaneous expression In the entire general area of free expression versus offense such lines are hard to come by and defend I have claimed that in contexts of equal power or when power relations are absent explicit consent and rejection or refusal should be taken at face value Some feminists argue that in the present social context such relations are rarely if ever equal or absent Consent by women to sex is therefore on this view rarely f ever uncoerced or non-exploitative Heterosexual sex in Western society is seen as a typical expression of male domination and to be avoided The conclusion of this argument is again a restrictive sexual ethic not now from the supposed links between sex love and reproduction but from the supposed link with economics and politics Just as there need be no such links of the former type however sex need not be linked with economics or politics even in capitalist societies that have been white male dominated Sex no more than other non-political and noneconomic activities need be viewed as an expression of economics and politics whatever the nature of the latter in particular societies This is not to say that some individuals do not use sex for political or economic purposes while others are forced to do so in socially and economically oppressive conditions Whether the former is always morally impermissible is our next topic

Prostitution and Adultery Before leaving the topic of genuine consent we can consider one last issue n which the questions of truly voluntary consent and what it permits figure prominently the issue of prostitution Grounds for morally condemning prostitution independent of the issue of consent were dismissed above Sex with prostitutes is certainly sex without love or reproduction and for mere pleasure but that is irrelevant to its morality Prostitution can also be harmful to prostitutes themselves: they endure not just indignity and social ostracism but danger of physical harm risk of disease exploitation not only by customers but by pimps and landlords and damage to their non-commercial sexual relations This is a more serious charge against prostitution 187

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bt t li h b td i i d i i Fit i th of homosexuality much of the danger risk of disease and exploitation results from social stigmatizing and criminalization Thus these harms argue more for legisla tion regulation and change of attitudes than for the conclusion that prostitution is i i t l f (Ei 1980 3 6 1 2 ) A f d t tid l lti f l i t t t i kid f tilti t tl bt d thi f i tht d S d I h d ll t i t l i t i t tht hld t i t f if t d t i f t l t if h f l tiit t h t d t h th H t d t th ti hth titti b t l l t sensual and whether if so it might nevertheless constitute one of the few excep tions to the permissibility of mutually consensual behavior There are certain things that one is not permitted to sell in Western society: for l l i li hih b i dft l t t i t C t t i t t i i th d t d th t t i iibl Bt i th thi i b th t t i ld b f i t th ld d f t th f llti t O l t ll d li t i b t i th thi i b th l ld b h f l t th buyers who are incapable of informed and voluntary consent Prostitution does not appear to be unfair to third parties or harmful to buyers in these ways There is yet a third type of case however that may seem more analogous: the impermissibility f t t t ll lf i t l Th i l i d i t f h t t di f th i t i l i t f ti t l fth f t f l d titti i t l i thi t Bt i lli h bd titt b id t ll h l f d lli h l f b id t b l t lli lf i t l Th ti h h i hth titt d ll h b d d h h l f Thi b f ki b t it l i t l t t h d th it moral import can be questioned Its plausibility derives from the fact that in sex one identifies with one's body The body in turn may be constitutive of the self at its most basic level the primary criterion of personal identity If the prostitute sells her b d th h b dit h l f d hld tb d iti B t d i t thi th b t t t it i libl t th titt lli i t h l f (Ei 1980 341) If h l i t l l ld h l f h ld b th t f th t t d ith di f h l d Bt hi t th S i f l i t ld Thi t t i l l l t t t f l It can still be claimed on the other side that prostitution is a paradigm hence a symbol of the oppression and dehumanization of women that the prostitute is used as an object a mere means to the pleasure of the John and that sex is a private i t i t tt t fit f t t i il b i Bt t t t th l bjt i d h i i l if i itlf i b d bjti bl T t t th with t h i ti ftl iibl d i i t t i d i ll l lti ll W hi d i t tk f i t di t i t h i tt f th ldl d i i t t d d bjt t h i il b i 188

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tht Fill if titti itd f b i th it would be a paradigm of male oppression and domination But if as claimed above this model is not fitting and many if not most customers of prostitutes are shy inexperienced and weak not dominating types then prostitution in itself is dom iti d bjti l if ll i d l lti I ih t ld l tht titti need t b ll b j t i b l if b d i t t t bt l ti d t h t it i ibl f il t b b d h t t N d it b tt f l t df l titt h b i Bt f thi i t d th ll b j t i b l t f titti i W t it M t prostitutes are from socially and economically oppressed classes and are further exploited degraded and harmed in their careers So it is not unrealistic to view prostitution in this context as a symptom if not a symbol of oppression The issue h i d l f tht d d th ibilit f f l l l t d i t Tht ibilit i ith t t Y t th l ti b t til l tiiti dit f i bilit i t h i Th l tt f dlt f l t b d i d d l l b th t f th ti d i t l i l d i th i t t f h other spouses and indirectly those of any children in the marriages can be affected as well The first source of variability here is that there are different sorts of under standings between married couples with regard to sexual exclusivity Those who hld tht dlt i l d thi Th i i l i b dfiiti i t t t l l i i t (W 1986 45) A d l t h b tditi i th ill i t t t bth i d ilti f th i h di t th K t i iti E ith t l t thi iti if th i liit iliitl td d t d i f l liit th dlt ill i l th b k i f i dd t i flit i dilti f th i But even granting this understanding of marriage and these consequences of adultery there is room for different overall judgments of its morality depending on the specific circumstances Whether secrecy and deception are wrong f they will t flit i f l t b d i f l Th i fi if h i fi iht t i f t i di t h i t ' tiiti B t h t h th h iht t h if ti h t h th l i t h iht i b d l th b j t i b l ti f i dj l i t dbt O bl h iht t k ti i f t i i l i ' l lif f ' tht regarding fantasies during sex for example but sexual activities with other partners may not fall into this class if there is a mutual understanding of sexual exclusivity that has not lapsed for both parties And whether deception is wrong once adultery h di t ti f h t h it h l d i th fit l if d t i ill b f t d Bt i th t th l t t ti d d ibl i t H tift th l l ti ithi th i f l ? Th b d f i i d i t f l th idl ithi it d th iht iht t jtif ffi t i d th i

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I th i h d f th k f t d t d ing of sexual exclusivity as a necessary part of marriage But this assumption is false Certainly there are reasons for being married aside from sex let alone exclu sive sex for example the creation or maintenance of a lasting family whose lives are h d E if l liit t f th l l d f i t i f i thi ld t bid l ll A d i f t dlt d t l l l l i i tht l liit i t t f th l l dfiti Whth it i b t t t it t l liit d d th i d i i d l i l d It d d th d t hih l t d t d l i it f th d th d t hih i t d ith l W h td that these connections are variable On the one hand the desire for exclusivity in love or sex might be seen as an unwelcome corollary of possessiveness and jealousy Nonexclusivity can be held to t di l i l l t i h i If ll thi t th fi t l l t l d t i l i h t th l f i d h t th l ? O th th h d it i h t b h l d t h t d t h f l t i hi i l i ti l i i l t i l t bdth d tht tid l ffi l t d t t h t i b l th d i for exclusivity is a natural concomitant of deep love Outside affairs themselves however can range from loving commitments to casual recreational sex and the latter may be less threatening to most marriages Th th difft idl f i ith d i f f t i l i t i f lb h i ithi it i f l i i t t ith d t bth ti l d t th t f liit ith d t b t h th i fj l d i It t b h i d t l tht th dl b itbl f d i f f t i d i i d l d l ith d i f f t t t b t t h t th t f d i t th i i l d til A f d t b th ith th l tiiti ll d l t i morally wrong not in itself but when it violates norms that govern nonsexual acts also for example when it unjustifiably deceives or harms a spouse or destroys a family to the detriment of its children by careless impulsive or shortsighted behav i I t l tiiti d b iti l t th d t d fft l f ' t E t i t l ffi diff i t h i ttil th ti d th l idti b l d t ibl

Rf Ericsson L 0 (1980) The charges against prostitution Ethics 90: 33566 L Ifild N Y k H K t I ([1924] 1963) Lectures on Ethics, t

dR

R b i L B (1983) Intimate Strangers. N Y k H dR Ruse M (1984) The morality of homosexuality In R Baker and F Elliston (eds) Philosophy and Sex 3 7 0 9 0 B f f l NY P t h V R (1980) Sex without Love: A Philosophical Exploration. B f f l NY P t h

190

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The Vatican (1975) Declaration on sexual ethics Reprinted in J E White (ed) Contemporary 3 0 3 9 B l t CA W d t h 2000 Moral Problems, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 4 5 9 W M J (1986) W h t ' ll ith d l t

Fth

di

Baker R and Elliston F (eds) (1984) Philosophy and Sex. Buffalo NY: Prometheus B l l i t t i R (1993) Good Sex: Perspectives on Sexual Ethics. L KS U i i t P f K Bertocci P (1949) The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage. New York: Association P N J (1999) Moral Matters, h 11 P t b h O t i B d i P P i t I (1999) Ethics and Sex. L d Rtld Scruton R (1986) Sexual Desire. New York: Free Press MD R d Littlfild S b l A ( d ) (1991) The Philosophy of Sex. S Sddl T R Z k A d B h t D ( d ) (1997) Philosophy of Sex and Love. U Ri NJ P t i H l l

191

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Ctl

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Wh G

C t l Mtt

It i i t i t h t th t t t l l il ithi it iditi Y t th " b l i i d t i " h l d t h t th t t dt t t t idiidl f il i t i f th f t t h t it l l li ance on its protective services "Reliance" especially when encouraged tends to be dutycreating but the "noduty rule" eliminates negligent failure to protect as a cause action against the state Since no one has a right against the state to minim ll d t tti f il th t t h libilit f d i i i t fil t t t F t t h A d t l tti ilti t h i Th bl f t l f t i l thi i f idi itill th f l l i iti (1) th t t hibit i l t i t i i t i d t it li t it (2) th t t t t th f d t l idiidl i h t t bdil i t i t (3) th t t ' li t il includes the authority to threaten nonfelons with criminal penalties for having arms for selfpreservation and defense; (4) the state has no duty to provide minim ally adequate protection to any individual Affi (l)(4) i i h t (2) d (4) l t (3) ( W h l 1997) G l ill f f t th b l bt (1) d (2) f h ditl i d i t l If th t t b iili i f" l i " b i k i l d (1) d (3) it d t t dt ( f t h ) t th f k id ti libilit t fft lti ik l it (4) Prohibiting civilian possession of "equalizers" also has distributional wealth effects even among the lawabiding It marginally increases the risks of violent victimization for poorer citizens who cannot afford the services of bodyguards l t d th h d it i t d ith l i i i td iti S i i l l b i " h " S t d Niht S i l fftil d i t th ( b l ) l bdil i t i t i t t f ll iti t l th i t t f dt i i l h t d ll t b th B i " h " t h t t t f bt t h i l b i d i iti i t fl ll f h i d t th b i f ffdbilit I 192

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dditi liiti l f" h " il d t " i l l cheap" guns to "cheap" gun status Since gun laws implicate the fundamental interest in bodily integrity affect the balance of advantage between felons and he lawabiding and have distributional wealth effects among the lawabiding every t i l h t b t t l P t i l thi f t blili i b dfi d l i l t l d i i l i itil ttti t th idti b i f i i l li di il ti d tki i l i t i fft d i i tti t d imperfect compliance. Th ti f i f t li id li l i d i f ik h thil l l d ti tutional rules prohibiting violent victimization are never fully effective not against private violence nor against official violence The assumption is well founded Pro hibiting criminal violence does not eliminate it Similarly official violence whether i f l i t d b li t i b ' t d th l fl h tibl d i hit P i t il iilit l i (Whl 1999) I thi h t I k t h b i f l th " i i t i l t i t l t b l " i iht d d i t i i h it f th bl f lti th i f i h t Th I distinguish two major types of gun control outline the ethical assumptions that support them and critically evaluate the causal argument that gun proliferation among American civilians irrespective of whether they possess them lawfully or t i sine qua non f d i th t i ' t i l hih h i i d t

Th I i t i l E t i t l t

Pbl

S h l l th t t ' li i t l ? O h l d th power over arms be vested in "the people" incorporated among their inalienable rights? A society's constitution whether a written document or a set of historically based political understandings distributes the initial entitlement Incorporating an l th t t ' i h t li i h l l k f h it i t t i titti Th t t ' l d ll i i l i i d i t i iltll bl iil If th t t li i i l i i d i b t ilt iti' iht G iht t th " i i l di i t i " f iti A b l i i i d titti b t t t th i i t i l t i t l t "th l" l th b f th litil it h nized as its full and equal citizens According to Aristotle the right to possess arms along with the rights to own property in land to participate in community govern d t h l d ffi f bli t t titt fll i t i h i d bli titti A b l i ' iti th " d i thi h d t i d t iti thit bth i t dibdit bjt d i t t l i l t " C l i l libli td Aittl' ti f itihi It i t d th i h t t "th iil d i i t i " f iti (Hh d H t 2000) Si bli titti d i tht h t t hll j l it t l t ld 193

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b i t i ' i f H th t t i d d t i specification to the right and reasonably regulate the operation of it Despite the fact that Article IV Section 4 guarantees a "Republican Form of Government" to every state in the Union guncontrol partisans disagree how the US C t i t t i d i t i b t th i i t i l t i t l t di D th C t i tti t th i i t i l t i t l t i th f d l t i th l tt i "th l ? " Th ti f ht t t hld b i t th A t i l IV Sti 2 "riil di i t i f i t i " i l l l t t thi d b t h d t ttti h f d i t t i "A ll ltd Militi b i t th rit f f S t t th i h t f th l t k and bear Arms shall not be infringed" Three theories of Second Amendment interpretation may be distinguished The "states' right" view claims that the Constitution secures monopoly power over arms t th f d l t h h it ith th l tt b lldl th A d t subordinates riht f th l t k d b t th t t ' i t t i i t i i l l l t d iliti Th " i d i i d l iht i " ti l l d th S t d d M d l I t t t i li t h t th l ii tt i t t i i t i i l l l t d iliti id a non-exclusive reason for recognizing the right of the people to keep and bear arms The "modified individual rights" view claims that the Amendment vests the nitial entitlement in the people yet only individuals actually enrolled in the federal militia h th i f r i b l iht t k db Th t t ' i h t i i i d i b l Nt l i it i i t t ith th bli ti f itihi it i d i th t t ' liit l ("th riht f th l t k db ") d th C t i t t i ' it f Th C t i t t i ditribt " " t th f d l t d t th l tt bt " r i h t " Th l i b i l i t f th t t ' riht i t f i th t t ' t l t iht ith th hi f riht The modified individual rights view is not incredible The Amendment's language clearly recognizes a state interest in maintaining a wellregulated militia However the Amendment's prefatory clause is not followed by "therefore the right of militia t k d b hll t b i f r i d " O th t th h " r i h t f th l" i d i t d Th i bit t i thi h difft i i th S d A d t th it h i A d t 1 d 4 I dditi f d l l d l t h t th iliti f th U i t d S t t i t f ll b l b d i d l iti t l t 17 f d d 45 d th f l iti h b f th N t i l G d I i l l f "the right of the people" were interpreted to forbid infringement of the right to keep and bear arms for members of the militia only a huge body of citizens would be rendered immune from indefinitely many federal and state guncontrol laws The difd i d i i d l i h t i til b t t i l d i i t t i t l h tht i dd f d iliti b ' riht th i d t f libilit t i t

Th S t d d M d l ' " i h t f th kbl C t i t t i l j i d i d l riht i t t t i d t l

194

l" i t t t i i i l It l d Th l t i t riit f th t t l O th t th

itlf di tt

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ti th ibilit t if due process of law (Stell 2001)

d

lt

th

iht t k

db

b

The Regulatory Power All i h t i l d i th i d t i t l t ab initio i l i b l td i th l i ifti d lti b d fl Th process t ht b liibl t i th i h t h of specification dd liibl tblih lifiti f ii it h t iil t included in the right who has standing to complain about alleged government infringements in court and which government official must respond to such com plaints what relief is available and so on The process of regulating rights addresses h th titti iil li d i i t i t h th b i d dl t h dh th b i d (if ) d h iht titti iil t i t lli bli i t t Sifiti d lti l b t i h t b t l l i i t th Riht h littl til l i t h t bth I A i "th f d f h" i l d the right to display publicly a jacket embroidered with "Fuck the Draft" {Cohen v California 403 US 91 [1971]) It does not include the right to lie under oath about a material fact to make fraudulent promises or to shout "fire!" in a crowded tht N t d t h t th f d f h i b l t d i t t b l N hld if f th f t t h t th t t lt f h iht b d fl t h t "th f d " i ll " l l t i " t h t "th i h t f h l bl t bl" i ll f th t t ' i h t li Th i liti S t i b i t t f f t th f ifi d lti f d t l iht t t i f i t f l h " i f i t i " f iht b hibit i t i l l Bt the state's regulation of gun rights may also infringe when the regulation manifests inherent hostility to the right or imposes burdens on its exercise that lack any reasonable foundation t h t i i t arbitrary and capricious i f ffiil d i t i if h f lti i invidiously discriminatory

D

G

C t l

D t l (DPGC) f t i fl l l f b l restrictions disabling from gun purchase possession and use persons who by virtue of past wrongdoing disloyalty or legal incompetence are widely perceived t t t h DPGC h l b th d i t f f t l A i D i th l i l id dd iliibl fit f itihi l th i d i lti di t d l l l l dibld f i d t h t th t l l il t t t h il d/ i t t A idl h d bli litil h i l h ikd i dibiliti ith l i t i l i l i t I l i t l i k d dibiliti 195

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i it l b t i i th l d f th R b l i A i ' l tion of black freemen grew ever larger (Franklin 1971) Enlightenment political philosophy denied that there should be a racebased legal distinction between "free men" and "citizens" A culture based on raceslavery prompted the opposite Whit' lli t i f blk litil l di t l l Th l i d dititi dibiliti "f f l " F l N t h C l i ' 1840 l i d d " T h t if f N ltt f f l hll b t hi h k i hi h h ht k t ifl itl d d b i kif l h h hll h btid li t h f f th C t f Pleas and Quarter Sessions of his or her county within one year preceding the wearing keeping or carrying thereof he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be indicted therefore" Georgia's Supreme Court distinguished between i t i h i t i t t i iht f h i h it b l k f ttll b f t d l l i b t "F f l h b i d h iti th t titld t b t f b f th l i l t t hld i i l ff Th h l i t i l i h t b t th h l iht f hih i l libt" Raceconscious interpretation of raceneutral laws often elicited candid commen tary from the courts Thus in 1824 the Supreme Court of Virginia opined: Th titi i d thi l f l [fr f l] of which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution both of this Stt d f th U i t d S t t t th fr hit d t t tht h th i t t h tb idd t t d ll t b t h l f population We will only instance the restriction upon the migration of free blacks into thi S t t d thi iht t b This "freebutnotequal" regime reached its apogee in Dred Scott, when the US Su preme Court ruled 7 2 that blacks were not citizens of the United States hence they l k d " t d i " t bi li it f d l t {Scott Sanford [1856] 60 US 393) Chif J t i T d t h t th t fiitil t i t l t (th " i i l d i i t i " ) d t "th l " b th C t i t t i ldd hit T h f blk t d i tit f l i i thi ti th iil di i t i f t i l i t i h i T thik t h i ld t i l (i T ' id) bdit l tht ittd b l k ld b titld t t l f l f t t t t t t hld bli ti l i t i l ffi and "to keep and carry arms wherever they w e n t " The history of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that Congress explicitly intended to overturn Taney's Dred Scott jurisprudence Today guncontrol laws no longer wear a racist face de jure C t l i t d fl liftidibld b f d l l f h i i f iti A d d i t i l l it i f d l ff t ll di f f iti t (1) h d i t d f fl f i i th t ( t f tt id ) (2) f i t i f jti (3) f dditd t l l l d (4) djditd tll i t t (5) dittd t tl 196

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ititti (6) d i h b l d i h d f th ilit (7) h has renounced US citizenship; (8) illegal aliens; (9) anyone under a court restrain ing order for stalking or presenting a credible threat to an intimate partner or partner's child (Halbrook 1998) Violators face up to ten years in federal prison A DPGC i i tht t ifill dd t t th b l t i th l i b t i h t t h d d iti f t h ifd b lt l F l h th G C t l A t f 1968 t d i t th f d l i i l d C d l d it i t th f thi titl t l d F d l titi or burdens on lawabiding citizens with respect to the acquisition possession or use of fi i t t th fh t i t h t i t t h t i l tti th l f l t i i t d t h t thi titl i t i t d d t di l i i t th i t hi f fi b l bidi iti f l f l ( K i 1995 137)

Strict Gun Control Stit h d i t

t l (SGC) f t l l i tht ill tit h d i d t li d th ffiil dt iili i i t b i Th d i b i l i t h l d i t i f d d t dfii djditd i t d t l f t h mental illness The resulting inequality between "the people" and the state could not be clearer Machiavelli put it plainly "There simply is no equality between a man who is armed and one who is not" (Machiavelli 1981: 88) f SGC t ti f iitil titlt l tht Jtifiti A l t t i l th t t ' i h t li i t l lt bli it t t jtif i f t f SGC f d t l t i t t i l iht i P t f SGC l dili i t ti b ll t F t t i l th it "t b t " Th A i A d fPditi (AAP) h ftd " d l " SGC sans strategic disclaimers The AAP's model law would ban the manufacture purchase and possession of handguns Among the bill's legislative "findings" s: "except in the hands of law enforcement officers or others specifically authorized by l h d l i t i t l f l d titt h d t h bli h l t h d lf f th l d i l l th hild f thi S t t " d l i litil ti i l d th f l l i (1) i Th A d ' th l i l t i d t i f i d i h t b t th t i b it l t th f th t t ' i h t li t h ti l d iht l ildi th t b production sale purchase or possession of handguns on publicinterest grounds; (2) by excluding selfdefense as a legitimate lawful purpose for possessing a hand gun and by recognizing "sporting purpose" as the only legitimate lawful purpose f i f k i d th l j t f th if fidi i l d d t l l l t h t lfdf i l i t i t l f l i f d l 197

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sine qua non

Ipso facto,

(n/

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N t i l Sft C i l ' d t d t d dli an especially steep decline over the past decade

i ftl f

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Guns as Environmental Toxins G per se f i l t d l t d J i l Jti d Dli

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very strong relationship between owning illegal guns, delinquency and drug use Sev it t t i 24 t it tf t f th i l l l i d 41 t d Boys who own legalfirearms,however, have much lower rates of delinquency and drug use and are even slightly less delinquent than nonowners of guns.

The socialization into gun ownership is also vastly different for legal and illegal gun Th h l l h fth h f t d hti O th th h d th h illl h fid h illl d are far more likely to be gang members For legal gunowners socialization appears to tk l i th f i l f i l l l it t tk l th t t (Offi f J i l J t i d Dli P t i 199418 hi ddd) A l i td ld h fild t d i t i i h b h d l l l f th h d th i l l l l It ld h " f d " tht " i b " h h d dli t h h i h th i b Th t t study would have ignored that socialization and parenting are the key independent variables and urged more stringent gun control instead Since at least 1986 criminologists have had good evidence that felons despite t h i lifti l l dibilit f i d iti t hih t th th l lti O b i l it i i t h th lti bt i d il th t i t i t hth i i l il i i f i t l lt ith l f l i bt t ith l l i H th lti h fil t id i f t i dd f t i l li d k littl b t d l t litil t i t d

G

P l

Sil C

f th US H i i d

Rt

Th A i i t i hl bl t t h t f th G7 ti A ica's assault rate is also roughly comparable to those countries However the American homicide rate is much higher The number of guns owned by American civilians is much greater Does America's higher homicide rate result from the t b f i i l i d ? Fi dt it i t l 70 t fh i i d i th U i t d Stt H d d t it th d t jit f fi h i id I d d th t fh i i d i t t d ith f h hld kbl t d i th 1920 ( K l k 1991) C i i l i t Zii d H k i l d t h t "Th i t t i l i d i t i tht i l i t

199

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Shooting Industry

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Figure 15.1 Homicide rate in the US 1900-1998 Source: National Center for Health Statistics Vital Statistics

1980

1985

1990

1995

Figure 15.2 Homicide victimization by gender in the US 1976-1999 Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics How can we explain the recent sharp drop in the homicide rate? Handguns have not become scarce among American civilians On the contrary gun industry production data reported to the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms says that Americans own more high-capacity pistols and assault-style rifles than ever But even more remarkable we have no evidence that handguns suddenly have become scarce among felons or other illegal possessors. Nevertheless the decline in the homicide rate of the past decade is almost entirely owing to a decline in handgun homicides Obviously the addition of millions of handguns and assault-style weapons to the civilian gun supply during the past decade is compatible with a substantial decline in both the homicide total and the rate An economic theory might hypothesize that 202

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1980

Figure 15.3 H i i d Source B fJ t i

itiiti Sttiti

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Figure 15.4 P t Source B fJ t i

1985

b

1990

1995

i th US 19761999

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Age of victim

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i l i

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f iti

i th US 197699

t t d t d th h i i d t hil h d i ti tend to increase it During the 1990s the economy was very strong Ergo The National Center for Health Statistics graph (figure 151) enables cursory exam ination of this hypothesis (and many others) The Great Depression was obviously a id f b t t i l i t t th h i i d t d l i d d i th D i N th f i i l il t th h f th t i ' d dii lt i h i i d t f th ti t Slti ad hoc l i i tilfit h S l l dt t f i d d P h th t h dli i th h i i d t lt f ddi t th lti 3 5 illi iili l i d t h d ld l l novation that began in 1987 and now includes thirtythree states (Lott 2000) The reasoning might go like this Uniformed police officers because of their high visibil ity almost certainly have higher "reassurance value" to the lawabiding public th d d ffi Bt i f d ffi h l d t t fft

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1980

Figure 15.5 H i i d Source: B fJ t i

b Sttiti

t

1985

1990

1995

i th US 19761999

on violent criminals because their visibility makes them avoidable However the deterrent effect of undercover officers on predatory criminals is likely to be much h i h th tht f i f d ff b thi " f l " t i tl tit Th it i t bl t tht l i i iili t ld h d dt i i l il btt th d t h t it t iti tliti f th d t b t Th i l t t i i l t i h th td i ( d i d ) lti f dti i t d d t t that his victim or someone nearby may be armed Perhaps the decline in the homicide rate results in part from the legalization of abortion in 1973 Legal abortions total between 1 1 and 1 6 million per year Suppose hlf f b t d i l H d th i d d h d th idiidl b ilid d i t hihl dti f il l th ti t h i t i t th lti ld t d t h b t t i l d d ft th ld h b b i t th h i i d t 182 5

Guns and Social Causation of the Homicide Rate Social causation is a troublesome concept Poverty youngadult age and male sex l t hihl ith th tti f il H f th i th j i t l jitl ffiit diti f h i i d ffdi Y blk l i ti likl t t t d t b iti f il th thi hit t t H t l hth blk hit kill lt M t dt i i l t t l lt kill Siill h i i d ittd with myriad sharp and blunt instruments as well as by kicking and punching So guns are neither necessary nor sufficient for homicide Are poor young males who own guns legally more likely to commit homicide than poor young males who do fJ t i Stti t h illll? W d't k b t th B

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ti' td fj i l dli t t h t th dititi tt O b i l characteristics significantly associated with an increased probability of homicide offending are not thereby social causes of homicide offending A theory of social causation does not ask whether gun possession might have h l d t d th l f t l f l f hi d i d t i t th tibti t hi i iltl N F d i h lid th th f l d i ( l "hlli i i " ) t hi Th tht hi blit b i dit lti f b i f f l i d G i i d d h i t t d ith hi b l hl i thi Bt i l l i l t strengthen others' sense of personal responsibility and selfrestraint we can con clude nothing whatsoever about the net social tendency of gun possession of illegal gun possession or of legal gun possession For example Thomas Jefferson wrote to hi h Pt C "A t bd k th id t A t th i f i I d i th Whil thi i d t i t th b d it i bld t i di d d t th id lt t h f b th t t i f lk N thik f tki b k ith " A dt h iti d h thi ht b t th ti net social effects of illegal versus legal gun possession among the population Establishing causation for rare events is a trickier business still For example the incidence of suicide in the US is approximately 1 1 / 1 0 0 0 0 0 It follows that 9 9 9 8 9 t f th lti d t it i i d i i S i i d l i t h t t t d t t t dl bli libl diti f iid t il I i dl itiit i l d t fl iti I i dl ifit ild t fl ti ( J b 1999) H t h f tht diti d t lf i h i h l bjti d "liil" M h i t tk i i I l t i l itti "d tlf" d t l t h l i b t it t i t i h idfiitl

Mechanism in Causal Accounts A d t t f" i l t i " i (1) t b l i h i th it f d itt iti bt d d t ibl ( th h i i d t) d i d d t ibl ( l ) d (2) th f h i lii h th dti fh i i d t d t lt f possession How closely matched should the concomitant variation be in order to nominate it for candidacy as a causal relation: 90 percent? 50 percent? 20 percent? Even when the covariance is "close enough" it remains to be determined what ht? D il l t i f tti d ii k t h i i l t l ill ikl t it i l t t? G il (ldd) i S th d t jit f it i l t t If ht (ldd) i i l ? A th f h i f il f t i it i diti t l lti b li tb k d ti db ldi i ttibti f

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ti F l td " f d " b iti " i i f i t relationship" between "increased risk of mortality" and "hospital admission" Fur ther suppose that "hospitalization" was "independently associated" with a forty eight times greater risk of mortality (compared to nonhospitalized patients) Should li tiht tht h i t l i t i " i " f t i h t f l d tit' ik f tlit? " I " i i t ti If hld't i f l hll th ti t h t tit i diil ll d i d t t d i l dti f h i t l i t i ? I th U i t d S t t i t l 2 3 illi dth h th jit i h i t l T i l l l h i t l i d b th ffitl ill to meet admission criteria or have symptoms that warrant careful study Both factors are associated by common sense with an increased risk of mortality quite apart from hospitalization Thus hospitalization is a "marker" associated with the b l t i ti d ik f tlit t fi d ik

M t l

C t i

A plausible theory of mental causation makes lethal violence the upshot of desire strength Possession of a loaded handgun may play a causal role in the etiology of violence by (1) seeding the agent's motivational structure with a new rresistible di t iflit l t h l i j (2) t t h l d t di t iflit ij ffitl t th t' f l ffti ihibit di (3) k i hi t h i ffti ihibit di fth biti ( M l 1987) It i tht f lif' ti t i l t i l i bt t i t di t i f l i t bdil h B th di h t l i d lbit i t t ft th b t bf i t t iflit ij H if ti d l d d iid th i t t i effects with desire strength will tend to result in death or crippling injury Causation might proceed as follows Joe SixPack acquires a handgun (and am i t i ) Hldi th l d d ( i t t i l l ) d k d J Si P k bl t k hi l d i t i ( t) l t h l d i ffitl t t hi ti it Th lti t i t i l tt b h tht J bl t d i t hi t t t i f il b i t t i l l thiki f thi l f l b iidl ti t h i l f th lti h i l i l fft f ht flh th i i b l l f hi t f lif t h t bl ld lt f hi lli th t i d I t d h f exclusively on the favorable aspects of destroying what angers him His will is overwhelmed Without deliberation he fires the gun On this account Joe Six Pack's agency is destroyed His abilities to access and to effectively employ his t h i ffti l f t l t h i d i d h l d b iitibl di J b i l i t t h iti f i th h h t t H th di l ti't t libl i it t k it Th i i t i b l d i t iflit i l i ij dth lti i J ' l f l f t l i l t ff fth f t J ' i t t i i li

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i ht h d b t t th l t h l d i ' d t ttl d i It remains unexplained why Joe holds the gun by its grip rather than by its barrel or in some other way why he places his finger inside its trigger guard rather than somewhere else and finally how it comes to pass that of all the possible directions th iht h b i t d it i t d t th i t i il i i d t ith th ' dih I h t th " i i n b l d i l n i l f t l " t k l h ffd t t i ( l f i ? ) h l i l k t h It k l h ffd libl t f tl ti i l i fi t t i l t l If th f f d l t t l t it d i d f making reference to the guiding force of his intentions after that in which case it is hard to explain how things actually worked out as they did A refined version of mental causation might propose that the formation of the iitibl di t iflit i l i ij dth b f ht d t d i J ' i t t i f t l l i d i ht h O th dd t J ' l f l f t l i " f l " l l f bilit t d t t t h ihibit di ffiitl t t th d f t t h t h t hi l t h l d i h i d Th lti l t h l d i th id all the things he does subsequently But he does them all intentionally even f he acts contrary to his prior allthingsconsidered better judgment Such an account makes perfect sense It is consistent with what the law calls a "ht b l d d t" " kti t " Wh d t i i t h t h killd i th h t f i f k f ill dittd d i ld t l h t i th t tht b d i t hi ( i i liti ff l d ) H ith l t h i k th i thi il b t i th t i l fiitibl d i killd d i i t kill i f l i t i l i ij

The Paradox of Gun Control and Reasonable Policies D i f3

th d d f th 1990 d t i dti ttl id f illi (1992) t h i h f 4 9 5 1 d 4 3 illi i 1993 1994 d 1995 t i l I 1996 dti fll b 5 0 0 0 0 0 Th B d L d 1992 d td N b 30 1993 Th lld A l t W L d i 1993 d td S t b 13 1994 I 1999 th D t t fJti blihd td f th l t t ' i i l i l f f t It ld t detect any because "the weapons banned by this legislation were used only rarely in gun crimes" However the law had other effects that were clearly detectable " F l d b th b lti i b dti f lt d i th th l d i t th b [ P d t i ] b th 120 t f t i t d f 91000 ll b t 1989 d 1993 t b t 2 0 4 0 0 0 i 1 9 9 4 " Th d f t l tht t l l h d l i t t i t iili t ifi t f d i ( " l t t l " ifl d h i i t i ) ill t i l t dti d i

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d i i t i f th t t d it iili A ll t gun market where almost everyone who wants a gun probably owns several exogenous factors (eg "reasonable" gun control) will stimulate demand more strongly than endogenous factors (eg product improvement or novelty) Thus the lilti l f tll tt h "ild" itd d t i t b d l

C

l

i

When thinking about further guncontrol measures in America the following con siderations should be kept in mind:

1 Th

iili

l i A i

A l d i th il t 3 E "ild" t l 4 H d b l They will likely fail to be targeted by prohibition 5 There is some evidence i i l il d 6 It i t bl t h d i 7 P l h hld t l l l dibld f

i

2

l

l i

tibl

ith

t i d

dli

l ill t i l t l ill t l tit t f tit t l enacted They will strongly stimulate demand for items that concealed carry laws have a deterrent effect on t b f i l tliti f i tht ti dditil l l titi ill d th h i i d t b t t d ith f b t f d l l i d iti f lifti

A

k

l

d

t

I am indebted to and here rely on the analytical work done by Tyler O'Connell Davidson Class 2000 Tyler worked as my research assistant during the summer of 1999

Rf Franklin J H (1971) The Free Negro in North Carolina 1790-1860 New York: W W Nt H l b k S (1998) Freedmen the Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms 18661876 W t t CT P Hughes Todd C and Hunt Lester H (2000) The liberal basis of the right to bear arms Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (1) 1 2 5 J b D l G ( d ) (1999) The Harvard Medical School Guide to Suicide Assessment and Intervention S F i J B Kleck Gary (1991) Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America New York: Aldine de Gruyter

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Korwin Alan (1995) Gun Laws of America Phoenix AZ: Bloomfield Press Lott Jr John R (2000) M G L Ci Udtdi Ci d G Ctl Ls Chicago: University of Chicago Press Machiavelli Niccolo (1981) Th Pi New York: Penguin Mele Alfred R (1987) Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia Selfdeception and Selfcontrol New York: Oxford University Press National Safety Council (1999) Ij Ft (wwwnscorg/irs/statinfo/99reporthtml) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1994) Ub Dli d Sbt Abuse: Initial Findings (wwwncjrsorg/pdfflles/urdelpdf) Stell Lance K (2001) Gun control and the regulation of fundamental rights C i i l Jti Ethis 20: 28 Wheeler Samuel (1997) Self-defense and coerced risk-acceptance Public Affairs Quarterly 11: 431 (1999) Arms as insurance Pbli Affi Qtly 13: 111 Zimring Franklin E and Hawkins Gordon (1992) Th Citi' Gid t G C t l New York: Macmillan

Further reading Calabresi Guido and Melamed A Douglas (1972) Property rules liability rules and inalien85 (6): 1089-128 ability: one view of the cathedral H d L Riw DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989) 489 US 189 Donohue m John J and Levitt Steven D (2001) The impact of legalized abortion on crime Q t l J l f E i s 106 (2): 379-420 Feldman T B and Johnson P W (1992) The self-object function of weapons: a self-psychAd f P h l i s 20 (4): 561-76 ology examination J l f th A i Higginbotham Jr Leon (1978) I th Mtt f Cl R d th Ai Ll Ps New York: Oxford University Press Jh Aldid v Th C l t h (1824) 4 Va 447 LaFollette Hugh (2000) Gun control Ethics 110: 266 Roth Jeffrey A and Koper Christopher S (1999) I t f th 1994 A l t W B 199496 Washington DC: US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice Shk v Uitd Stt (1919) 249 US 47 Stell Lance K (1986a) Close encounters of the lethal kind: the use of deadly force n self defense Law and Contemporary Problems 49 (1): 113-24 (1986b) Gun politics and reason J l fA i Clte 9 (2): 126-53 (1991) The legitimization of female violence In Newton Garver (eds) Jti L d Vile pp 241-59 Philadelpia: Temple University Press W v Ditit f Clbi (1981) 444 A2d 1 Wright J D and Rossi P H (1986) Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and thi F i s New York: Aldine de Gruyter Zimring Franklin E (1997) Ci i t th Pbl Lthl Vil i A i a New York: Oxford University Press

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16 Citihi WAYNE NORMAN AND WILL KYMLICKA

Citihi i b h i f l f i litil it N d th i l f i t i h i t d t b th t t b t l l b iti f btt litil iti h f d l i f tt iti lik th E Ui Citihi t t ith b h i f th kid f d iti d f d b f l lii d l preference and ethnicity Like "justice" in the 1970s and "community" in the 1980s "citizenship" has b f th t l ii t f ti litil t h i i t R t t i f ll th j h l f litil t h h t libl ti iti ilit f i i t d bli h f l t th d t dd th " i t i h i d b t " (Shfi 1998) I d d th i t t i i t i h i h b it t h t it t h t t tk th fild Aft ll l t bl i l i t i l th d l i t i l thi can be redefined as an issue concerning the complex relationships between the individual society and the state that are the stuff of citizenship Moreover because the term "citizenship" has such positive connotations in political argument it s ft d t d t tht ll b t th i l A D i l W i t k t th h t i l lt itihi ft " t h th th t dd ti iht t li ititti ti t h t ld j t tl b d i b d itht f t i t i h i " ( W i t k 2002 244) It i till ti ht t fi b t d i d i t f th f itihi th th th f jti d W ill t t thi ti ft l k i t f th i t t t debates What is undeniably helpful about the recent "return of the citizen" to Anglo American political thought is the renewed understanding of how "the health of the libl bli d d d bilit t titt t l litil i t i t ti bt it tt f i l lif d iti h t " ( M d 1996 240) Thi f th b h i d l f i d i i d l iti k itihi t l t i f l dditd t i i l i d thi

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Th N t

f Citihi

T i l l t t th fi flli d th bi ditiihi f i t l t d t fi d i i d l ' munities and the sorts of debates they raise

f " i t i h i " it i b h i f litil

th

Citizenship as a legal status Citizenship is in part a legal status and contrasts with the status of noncitizen immigrants and refugees or in earlier times with the status of noncitizen subjects hild f d l C t dbt di th l l tt f itihi h t d d t f t ti f t ht th t d hih i i t h l d b bl t i itihi tt i thi h ? S d h t h l d b th ifi l l i h t d bliti h i h t t h t th tt f iti? W ill t di th f ti h l t h h it h b j t i i t ill i E ti hih h t hitill t h l " i i t t i " bt hih h l numbers of foreigners living permanently in their countries Our main focus is on the second question and on recent debates to expand or restrict the rights and duties of citizenship Citizenship as identity It i l t h h t t b i t t t h t th t t f i t i h i mean thi t i d i i d l i th d t h t th identify ith t h i litil it h ih thi b h i i it d fl ti id b t it A i t i h i idtit t ith i t i d i i d l i t i i t t bt l ith b h i f th litil iti ( h f d l i th t ) d b h i f th t f "idtit " dfid b lii d thi it l f Th i tht l' i t i h i idtit h been losing out in this competition with other individual or communal identities and that action must be taken to strengthen it Citizenship as solidarity Cll hld The idea complex to divide

l t d t th b t i t i h i i d t i t i th b l i f t h t i t i h i l h th primary l f it d lidit here is that it can provide the most appropriate form of "social cement" in diverse modern societies in which anonymous citizens are otherwise ikely along other identity and class lines Citizenship as civic virtue

C t l t th d f i i t i f i t i h i i t h t it i litil it U l i k bjt iti h tiit til d ibl i th th d t t

b h i f self-governing th i h t d h l litil il d l t l 211

WAYNE NORMAN AND WILL KYMLICKA

b t t t f thi it H th i i f t h t th ii virtues are in decline in Western societies replaced by civic apathy or passivity f not individual egoism or group fundamentalism Much intellectual effort has been devoted to identifying the primary virtues of citizenship and the best ways for state t t ititti t t th it d

Rt

f th Citi

Attti t th d t i kill it d l l t f iti i ld W t political thought itself Socrates chose execution over fleeing the city in violation of his duties of citizenship Aristotle and Roman thinkers reserved a central place for theories of citizenship even if they held rather exclusionary conceptions of citizen hi b t d d S t h i l t d ti f itihi R i d i E l i h t t thik i th b b f d i th I t l i li tditi f Mhilli M t i dR t th th f th Federalist Papers d T i l l F h f th t t i t h t h b t itihi t k back seat to concerns about justice and what John Rawls (1971) would call the "basic structure" or major institutions of society and the state As democracy spread throughout the century so too did state bureaucracies and a belief among bth litil thik dt h t t h t th f d t l hll t di t t ititti tht ld d l i llbi d t t th d d i t i b t it f i l Citi l t h h t f h th th I h llbi d t h t k O i l l th lld t d f d thi h l d d h t f t l th kd t t dt t b l l t f th litil t th f l t proposing the best set of institutions and public policies A confluence of largely unrelated factors began to conspire against this dominance of "institutionbased" political thinking in both political and intellectual circles in the 1990 Aft l t t i i i tW t t t t h h t th t i d b t h th l f t d th i h t b t d i t th i b i l i t f th d lf tt t f d i t i t t i l f f h i bl fl t l t lf d d d di bli d t i At th ti h i i f th t iti ( dlii ti t ) d li ti f t d i t i l t liti Al f fidtit liti f i l t thi tili i E t E t f ff i i ltiltli aboriginal and black militancy in Western Europe and North America seemed every where on the rise challenging traditional assumptions about common membership of society Western Europe faced difficult debates over the maturation of the European kid f t t ith f l i t i h i ll d t d Ui ( d ft l ) fl f i t f th t df f l i Ad II Et E d i t l i t f th i f ith littl " i l itl" i iil it i till All f th bl ld d h l l d th b i ti f tt ft b t th id i b t th tiiti it idtiti d 212

CITIZENSHIP

llti f iti N f th bl ld b l d ll b ti and better institutions They also required the creation of good citizens: citizens with capacities for cooperation and tolerance and the virtues of publicspiritedness and responsibility In short many political observers came to see changes to our prac ti f itihi ith diti f bjti f fibl ti t t i l lti t th bl Th i iti f th i t f ti d ibl i t i h i f th h l t h f l i b l d t th ti th i b t th d l i i iilit d bliiitd I d d th h tlk t litil t t b t " i i " f itihi By the early 1990s several academics had also announced more or less inde pendently that "citizenship" was the new "buzzword" of political philosophy Part of the explanation for this is that academics had begun looking at the political hll i th ld d i b d b d f d t h t th b t t ti t h i fi t i t t i l j t i th h d b dfdi f l t ti hd littl di t ff At t th d b t f d i t R l i libl t h i fj t i hd b i f t d d d b i i i l b t t d f t l Th f itihi ffd t b t h if into these debates In particular citizenship seemed like an ideal concept to inte grate the traditional liberal concern about justice with the concern of communi tarians conservatives multiculturalists and disaffected socialists about community Citihi i l l dfid i t fidiidl t i t l t lik l i b l ti fjti b t it i l b t b h i f d idtifiti ith iti Citihi t h f idd l t h t ll id ld i k d f Ad th d i l t d t tt f itihi i j i d i i l l th f ii bli ddlibti d t h hd i l f d t h l t th i fd b t tht h d l t d th democratic id f l i b l d t i th

Liberal Citizenship on Trial I th 1970 d 1980 th i i l dbt i A l A i l i t i l hil h i l d th d f iti flibl t h i fjti ith t i i t lii h t th d d i d ith i R l ' A Theory of Justice Wh th l f th d b t hiftd t i t i h i i th 1990 l i b l i i provided the focal point although theorists no longer looked to Rawls for the touchstone interpretation of a liberal theory of citizenship Instead most partici pants in the new citizenship debates turned to a 1949 essay by the British sociolo it T H M h l l " C i t i h i d S i l C l " ( M h l l 1965) F M h l l l i b l d t i i t i h i i fll d l b h i f th t t d th t ffti b h i i f th t t t t id f iti hi i h t M h l l d i i d d i t i h i i h t i t th t civil i h t h f d f lii df d f bit t political i h t i l d i th iht t t d f bli ffi l ith f d f th d social iht h th i h t t bli d t i hlth lf d ld 213

WAYNE NORMAN AND WILL KYMLICKA

i I E l d M h l l th th kid f i t i h i iht i successive waves with civil rights arriving in the eighteenth century political rights in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century And along with the gradual expansion of the rights of citizenship came an expansion of th l f iti hih iill i l d d l t i t t t A l t h h thi did t l i th t i (f l R i hd i l iht bf th hd i i f t l i t i l i h t ) it ff iid i l l t t i fh th t t d i f itihi tt i i b th btti i h t t h t b k it Thi l i b l ti f itihi i t h f i h t b d (A th A i Supreme Court once put it citizenship "is the right to have rights") There is no corresponding emphasis on the need for citizens to be active patriotic or virtuous Of course Marshall hoped that securing these rights would promote active citizen hi titi lidit d ii it I d d h d t h t ll f th ld fl t l l f l l f t i i lf tt M h l l t l d ith th status f d itihi bt l ith it l i filitti th solidarity d identity t f itihi F M h l l d ti t f libl flli hi th f l l t i f itihi i a liberaldemocratic welfare state By guaranteeing civil political and social rights to all the welfare state ensures that every citizen feels like a full and equal member able to participate in identify with and enjoy the common life of the it Thi l t d i d f l f t t libl d ttk f ll id b th d f th t t i t h t Of th hd l b itii f b t h th i h t d th lft t h t th lf tt j t b it ith t t h Th " i t i h i " bjti h d i t d th tti t h t th lf tt d th f l l tii ti f ll iti R t h th i tht lf i i t t d i or that it was unfair to force the better off to pay for those unwilling to work conservative theorists now argued that many social rights actually served as barriers to full participation of the lesswelloff in society Welfare they argued creates lt f i d d tht t th it bjt th th ti ibl iti M th lft h l d iil i b t th iit d d b th lf tt l t h h th t h h t t h t thi id t i t t t i f il iht Ol ith i l d f l ld h t hi fll lit t h d i th kl Lfti i t l l t l l b d th iit f th l d d th ki who failed to mobilize and to actively demand justice (or revolution) Much of the leftwing discourse after the retreat of democratic socialist parties in the West and state socialist regimes in the East shifted from an explicit critique of capitalism to a d d f t titi f d th d b t b l ti tht t l d tiit d t i di ld l d t f ill i lii I h t libl itihi fltd i Mhll' dl f d t i lf tt i i l b d i lfih i d i i b l iti th th ti l l d it iti

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Schools of citizenship The new discourse of citizenship also gave rise to competing accounts of where to find the best "schools" of citizenship and civic virtue If the liberal status quo breeds l i iti h iht b t t hi h t b ti d i t ? O t t it th th l i b l t t t th rights f itihi bt h iti t l b t db t i t d t flfill t h i duties d responsibilities i t i ? T h i t fdifft h l h l k d t th t i it f thi t th ti th k t iil i t d t If welfare breeds passivity then the obvious solution according to conservatives is to expose the longterm unemployed s t a y a t h o m e single mothers and the like to the rigors of the market Part of the idea here is that a primary responsibility of b l b d i d iti i t d h t th t tt h l d thi f i l i Fil t t t t t t thi b l i t i i t diiih ' tdi fll d l b f th i t i th f ' fll iti Thi i d dt " b d t i t l t " i i d " k f " hih id lf i i t t k f thi b f t ll it f h to disqualify large numbers of people from welfare altogether While this "citizen ship" rationale for trimming back welfare entitlements first arose among conserva tive thinkers and politicians in the 1980s by the 1990s it had spread far enough th litil t tht tit D t i i d t f th U i t d Stt ld t k id i hi ti "di lf k it" i iil t Of it i ildi t t il i t i h i d th lf tt ith th f lf it t th h i l l l d It ld b diffilt t t h t th t l f th lf tt h hih lit bli d t i i l hlth d ld i b d i ity among their recipients On the contrary ensuring that the less welloff are healthy and well educated is an obvious way to support their full participation n society Few people argue that the quality of a child's education or health care hld d d h h hi h t k S b i th i f th kt t b th l th i fiihi h l f d itihi I d d tl t i T i l l ti iti h id b t th i hih kt tiiti i tithtil t l itihi d l i d i t it d d if lfih d t i i l b h i d th ifl f i liti t th f l lit f l i t i l tii tion Another school of citizenship is participation in civil society Civil society is that sector of society that lies between government and the market on one side and the l i t l ff i l df i d th th It i d f l t iti lik h h ti hiti thi iti t t l i t t i lb dditi t i t l iti t d i d th lik F T i l l (2000) i d d tii ti i i i l it f th k t th fA i d i it fit t H th iti i iil it " h l f d " 215

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t h i th it f bliiitd ti d iilit B th tk V l H l th f i t ( d l t ) t i t idt f C h l k i th lt b f iil it t i d th C i t P t f th t t b t l t th t i t i t d i E t E Th d iti f th i t f iil i t f th i d i tii f hlth il fbi i f th t fhi tibti f th itihi t i t litil t h h t C h i f iil it h l f itihi l t t h t iil it id th f h iti t likl t t k ti l dbti lii d ti t li llti l It i l t tht iti f t d i t thi iti d i t l i t l l i th l d t i di b hli t l th i d litil fl b fidiidl t h th f t i di l t t i f bli li Bt iti h itd t iil it t th i b d f d t i iti f fll tiiti i di d t i i t Th l t t f b h i f th iti f iil it tht l likl t fid t h l dbti d ti ith i d i i d l h h lik t h l (fll i t h i t J h h ' Wit S bi A i t ) O th h d thi k i d f i d littl t b f th dil l l i fi t t d l tht h t i t d i Ad th th "th i ik tht ' idtit d i t t b i i l d ith til iil it ill t li i hih b th i t t f ll ' fll iti t h h th i tittd b ' idtit" ( W i t k 2002 255) I i h b h d l t b d ihb d d l i h t i th l iit b t i h b h d iti l t h

l

t

t

th

"NIMBY" ( " t

i

b k

d")

i i l

h

it

t th l t i f h hlf h d bli k Siil thi ld b id f f i l i hih d t i h l h i h i f ti t ti h h h i h i h t t h blid df d tl f th f i t h thi hih iht t h jdi i t th d Th t k i it f b d i kt d thii iil it Bt t t f t t h t ith f ti th f f i t d t f f i t iti d t it t d th f d t i itihi ( i t iti d ti lik th B S t h thi ii t h i t i h i b t th t i ) it h l d h d l b ii t h t th f l l h t If ith th kt iil it d th f i l b lid ll d d h l f th i t f itihi tht ld t l t itlf t l t th t k Th t b thi dd b t hifti th f f i t i h i th t th i f h tt ititti hl t i it itihi Aft ll th i i l i f thi k i d f t h i i t h it iti ld k th i t i t t i f tt k btt th th i t i t t i f tt ld k iti k btt O b i l 216

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t h h th i d i l t i h i bt th ffti fititti d the quality and activity of citizenship and there may be much that state institutions can do to improve this relationship Unfortunately most of the critiques of the orthodox liberal model of citizenship h f t ti i thi d If th bl i i b l b t iht d ibiliti th bl lti ld b ith t tk itihi iht t f dditil i t i h i dti H it i h d t f d iti h f dti i th b i litil iil i h t f l i b l i t i h i ( l lf iht i l d ttk) h f tt ti t f i t i h i dti O til imagine some potential policies in this regard If civility is important we could pass Good Samaritan laws If political participation and voter turnout are mportant we could make voting mandatory If publicspiritedness and patriotism are important ld i id f dt t i l it i If i i l i t i t h h t t b th b t h l f itihi ld tt f i i f lii d th iti l ith t lti i iil it t t th f f itl d i i i t i i tid b fit iti If bli h l b t bl t teach responsible citizenship because they require children of different races reli gions and social classes to sit together we could prohibit religious and private schools B t th t fh h d d d t t i l l illibl lii h t b f d i th iti f l i b l i t i h i ( l t h h th d i f t it i d d i ) I t d ll t ft i th i t i h i l i t t th i littl th l t tht i t i h i d iilit th d tht it ld k b t t if th l i it i d i d t I th tt h h i d t t i iti f th t l f t t ti f itihi h f ithi th l i b l t d i t i itself; in part because it has most fully taken up the challenge of how to rethink he state's role as a "school of citizenship" with special emphasis quite literally on how state schools and education policy could be harnessed to cultivate and promote it lik iilit t l bliiitd d f jti

Citihi Th f i d i i did not live up to their seriously the cultivation 1990 h t h i t b th i Th id h i tht iti tht t i l l ti d i h b "

d D i i t

h d d d th b l i f t h t l i b l d t i iti promises in the postwar era because they failed to take of a virtuous active and patriotic citizenry By the late likl t d i i t th th th hll t t ti f itihi t d i t i l dl t k f td ltll h diidd i i l l l li M h l l f l d t i t t th ki l h l k f d l d d th f th " l t " tht h l d i d h i t " Of i f i d t i d

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t ti t l d th tff f tki fll d t f t h i iti ship rights But many groups including racial minorities women indigenous peoples religious minorities gays and lesbians feel excluded from a common culture not primarily because they are economically disadvantaged (although ex l i ft l d t thi) b t b th different. I d d t h i t ti h t h th it lt i thi t d h t h thi i thi t h t it d th t t h l d b t i t t At t i f thd ti f itihi d lt tht i t t d th ti d thiki Ath fd i b i th t hll f i t i h i i di iti is to think of this as a fourth wave of citizenship rights Having gained civil polit ical and social rights we are now seeing demands for cultural rights: rights to the accommodation of cultural difference On this "multiculturalist" view members of ti ld b i t d i t th litil it t l i d i i d l b t l t h h th d thi i t i h i iht ld d d i t thi b h i Ii M i Y (1990) ll thi " d i f f t i t d i t i h i " W hll i l f d i f f t i t d iht bl F t h i t th id fdifftitd i t i h i i O the standard view citizenship is by definition a matter of treating individuals as equal persons with equal rights under the law This is what distinguishes modern democratic citizenship from feudal and other premodern views that determined l' litil t t b thi lii thi l b h i M ll iti tht l t i l t l iht d i th t b i l f l i b l d t i itihi ildi f d jti dd Th ltiltlit d f d fdifftitd itihi d tht l iti hi tll i d i f f t i l ditibti f itihi iht i d t d t th il d d idtiti f th b f l t l Lt ikl f th l t i l t l iht bi d d d d then examine how they may or may not challenge the values of democratic citizen ship

M l t i l t l Riht A lit f d d i l t i l t l i h t i t h t th i b l tt i ti i t t l ith tt lt I ll t f it f th d i t l t l M t f th il dti d d d b minority groups are meant to address what they see as the inherent unfairness of an "undifferentiated" citizenship that does not recognize the special predicament of ti iiti J b L (2000) h d i t i i h d i h t t f l t l iht tht ht b i Difft t f t d t kf difft t f l t l iht d f if d d ll f th Th i t t ll f th t fd d h ( K l i k dN 2000 2 4 3 0 ) b t it i th ti t h i i t if l b iti f ltiltli ft i t ll h d d ith th b h 218

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F i t it h

l

b

f F

t i l h th l

tW t ti hd S d l i l f h td il ti t J i h h k h ihd f lii t l S t d bt S d If th t l l d t S d th it ld b i i b l f th h t t b bl t b t h ti t h i lii d i titi i b i G t i th ti fi b th d i t i f S d th "d f t" l l t ltll t l d i i i W t tt it t d f th f t t h t th h d Chiti jiti I ti t f th " t i iht" d d d i l th b l i f f lii iiti Th i l d ti f ti d d h th flit ith l i i i t f ilit i f lii ifit df h i hild ttd t i kid f l ( d t i ) i bli h l Rltdl kf d S h " i t iht" l fili ft f t libl d i f bth l t l d " l t l " ( h th d i b l d ) Th i l d f fititi t hl b f hitill d i d t d d i i t l iht hth t i th titi f b f t i l iiti t bl i i t t i it i f bli i t i t t i M t i l l ill idi l d t i l iiti d d A l i th l lilti d t d b th t fQ b tht t i t d th i h t t Elih il i d t t t th lt f th F h k i j i t i th i E t i l S t i th l f d th ll i i i l it b t h t f t i d iti i hih t t d t t t i l d Bt ti l d d th I l i i l diidd iti lik I d i dI l lii h i i f i t d f t l fil l d thi thit t l b k th l tt f (f l t d th l i h t t i i t i t di ihit t ) It i l i i l t i t f th l l t d i t i f idi l i t th l tt' l if thi ti t i t th iht f f idi iti idi idi l d I dditi th t difft t f iht d d d b ti i i t F i t th Th i l d d d t d th b d i f l t l d i t i t f th f i i th tti f d t d ll i t i l i t ffi i tt ititti f b f d i td thi lii d S d i t d f ( i dditi t) d d i i i t l ititti th tht d d th iht t i t l thi ffi S h t i l l df t i t i l l t t d t i l iiti (lik th Q b i C t l ) idi iti t h h it i t i th 219

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d l i ld f h t t b td t t h l t l ethnically mixed territories through "consociational" rather than federal arrange ments Finally there is a grabbag of cultural rights that answer to demands for symbolic recognition of the worth, status, or existence of various groups within the larger state. At tk h tt "th f th lit it fl it t f it t i l th it bli h l i d th b h i h th l t l ill b k th th ' hit i t d " (L 2000 154) A i th b i tbhid hd d i t h t th t t i t ltll t l d it bl d l f d t d i ft flt th f th d i t l t l group

Multicultural Fears Whil i i l l t d i l i t i l th til tl th t f lti l t l iht i ft it i l t ll W t d i d i t t t f th " l ld" f l i b l d t i i t i h i Wht i t do such rights have on the principles and practice of democratic citizenship? Given the vast array of rights just discussed as well as the variety of groups demanding them there is no simple general answer to this question And for that reason l hld b ii f iti f l t i l t l iht tht th i i t b l i i i l t itihi Thi i t t d tht ti ti l t l iht i ti i t ill d itihi Bt hll th l t l iht l l h itihi l d idtiti f b f i i t I d t d i t i i h i t i h i d i d i t i h i t i l t l i h t it i th t i t th d i t i t i bt th f t f itihi introduced earlier Let us briefly consider in turn the basis for fears that cultural rights are eroding the equal status identity solidarity or civic virtue of citizens Equal status W h l d td tht iti t h i k t h t ti il iht t i iti necessarily i l t th f l itihi tt B t thi it il ith th f t t h t j d t i tt d d i f f t i l iht f hih it t i l d b j t i f d i th f lit ( i the otherwise unequal situation of members of some identifiable groups) What we need to know is when differential status creates a disadvantaged or stigmatized status for some groups or individuals (whether members of the minority or of the jit) Th t thi ti ill ith th i t t i O th h d it i h d t h it i l t ' l tt if t i l i i t ik th Sttih l l d t h f thi t i l b l (th f St A d ) th l t t ' fl ( B i t i ' U i f l ) O th th h d h i i t iht d i l titi th l i b t f ith th b f

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th i i t (f l if th t t ll lii i i t t f it illiberal family law on its own members) or of nonmembers (as for example when Anglophones could not post commercial signs in their own language in Quebec n the 1980s) In cases like these minority claims may threaten equal citizenship tt h th t d b f t f i i t tti fil ditibtd h b ithi th i i t ( ) h l t d b (Qb A l h ) kd t b t ll f th t f l t l dti hil th j th b f t Fragmentation of identity and solidarity One of the most common fears about differentiated citizenship in a multicultural society is that it would lead to a proliferation of "hyphenated" citizens individuals h idtif ith t h i t h i b th ith t h i fll iti With itihi t i l idtit liti ld b d d t modus vivendi t ith littl t l d t d i t t l i d i t Th i i f d i th l 1990 b t i th f S i t Ui E t E Y l i d R d h i t t h i il t h t d b t h li d th i t i t f tt N i l t tit t i W t Europe and Canada also seemed to the critics of multiculturalism to show the dangers of allowing or encouraging ethnic groups to maintain and reinforce their own identities Thi f i tl i l d Th bhid thi il i tt itht d t i tditi t l t di h t h h l h f t t f th l t d i refusal b jiti t i t i l iiti l ith t h i l d lii Bt if id l th d ti i i t t i th W t it i i l t l h ti lf t iht l iht t t i l iiti ltitl f f t th citizenship identity of the members of the minority nationalities Granting auton omy to such groups often gives their leaders the means (for example control over education) to promote the group's identity at the expense of the citizenship identity B t thi f f t h t b b l d i t th liti tht h t i l i i t i d i d t d iti Th i f tit ti t i Q b i th l 1990 b d i t l l i k d t th f i l f Elih ki C d i i t tif d ii Q b ditit ithi C d it M t th i t it i itk t t h t ll t l t i l t l rights are designed to help groups to separate from the larger society Most minority groups do not act like historic territorially concentrated national minorities The special accommodations demanded by immigrant minorities religious groups gays d lbi d th h idtit t i l l d i d t f i l i t t th integration f t h i b i t th l it t thi ti C i d th d d b b f lii ildi J d Sikh t b tf ilit d d t h t f b i d th i fthi lii h d S h d d i t bli f t t t t t ltll f th l it t t d it t i l bl d idtit th it h tht 221

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b f th lki t ltll b i d being able to participate fully in important national institutions

b t l

t

thi

Civic virtue Thi b i it

fill t th ti f hth l t l iht t h t ii d litil tiiti A i th h i ith th k i d f d th k i d f i h t b i d d d Th l f lii h d ti i l i f l t l iht i t b i t ii tiiti Th ti f i i t l iht ffiill tt for minority languages is another such case: this makes it easier for native speakers of the minority language to have professional careers in public life or the civil service Other minority rights might indeed erect barriers to civic participation For l lii kf tt fdi ( t t i ) t t thi h l Bt b l i th t t h l t i thi t h i hil d b d i d f th tit t l h t t l t t d t d d b f i d ith l h d t h thi lii d thi i i thi it f it i t i h i lt

Conclusion I th l f liti b t i t i h i i di iti i t h t th f liti F thi i th t f h i l h i l li b t th i h f iht d i litil jti f ltiltli h i t d t i l d tdi f th i l i t i f itihi fdifft l t l iht d litil t Th b id f th i f th b t " h l f i t i h i " d i d b Plitil philosophers and other scholars are now looking much more closely at specific case studies in order to finetune claims about how civil society or the education system can be used to promote civic virtues or how political institutions can be arranged t ft hih lit fd t i dlibti Thi d t t t th f itihi t dil li t h i fjti B t it d h h ttti t th t t idtiti d it f iti i l i t i t t f h i th f litil lit f d d t i tt

References Klik W dN W ( d ) (2000) Citizenship in Diverse Societies. O f d O f d U i i t P L J (2000) The Multiculturalism of Fear. O f d O f d U i i t P Macedo S (1996) Community diversity and civic education: toward a liberal political sci f lif Socio/ Philosophy and Policy, 13 (1) 2 4 0 6 8 d il l I Class, Citizenship and Social Development. M h l l T H (1965) C i t i h i New York: Anchor

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Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Shaflr G (1998) The Citizenship Debates. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press de Tocqueville A (2000) Democracy in America, ed and trans Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (orig pub 1835-40) Chicago: Chicago University Press Weinstock D (2002) Citizenship and pluralism In Robert Simon (ed) Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, pp 239-70 Oxford: Blackwell Young I M (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

Further reading Beiner R (ed) (1995) Theorizing Citizenship. Albany NY: State University of New York Press Bohman J and Rehg W (eds) (1999) Detiberative Democracy. Cambridge MA: MET Press Callan E (1997) Creating Citizens. Oxford: Oxford University Press Carens J (2000) Culture, Citizenship and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press Gutmann A and Thompson D (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Kymlicka W (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press Miller D (2000) Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press

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17 I i t i MICHAEL BLAKE

I i t i h t i d t d l f h i l h i l ttti Whil th i di i i t i h b bjt f i bli d i i lik d i i h tb f t h i i th h i l h i l it I d d th b f l i t i l lif i hih h t d i h t ith littl t i d ti t h i i In what follows I do not propose to remedy this lack but to offer one possible explanation for its existence An adequate analysis of immigration I suggest i f d t l ii i th thdl flibl litil h i l h I i t i i t i l i t h i h th hi fl i b l litil h i l h iht b l i d b it t it f th ii f f th ti tditill d b libl t h i t A h it i i i l diffi lt i l t f t h t di th thi f i i t i lt l t d l d t th b h i h th thi iht b d t d It should be noted at the outset that the issue of immigration involves not one question but many I cannot hope to address all of the questions raised by the phenomenon of immigration in the present chapter My attention will t h f b liitd t ht I th t b i ti i thi t t hth t libl it ittl ith it l i b l i tit i ti t ll Thi ti I thik t b d bf ifi t fi i t i li b d t l d l t ith Th tf h ll b t i dbt i thi t i h i l h h l i d t h t ll titi i i t i i h t l j t dh th f d t d li f" b d " th l li i t t ith i b l equality Other philosophers have replied that such an implication is not and indeed could never be a correct interpretation of the sort of liberalism we have reason to endorse I h t fll Ih t i d i t i l l di th t bth id f thi d b t W h t I h t d t t i tht ith id h ffd t fi i t i t h t i fll d f i b l It i tti tht b t h id h d i th th h t tk d t t f ht i ditit b t i i t i litil i I ill k thi tti i f t F i t I ill tli ht k i i t i h

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difficult issue for liberals to address I will then discuss arguments made in favor of open borders and examine whether these arguments are ones liberals are bound to accept I will then do the same for arguments in favor of the legitimacy of restrictions on immigration I will conclude by offering a few hints about how an adPolitical Equality and Moral Equality There is a wide academic literature on immigration; very little of it has been produced by philosophers Much of the writing deals with the issue from the standpoint of sociology history policy or law Some of this literature includes normative tion is found within several anthologies (Gibney 1988; Barry and Goodin 1992; Schwartz 1995; Bader 1997) and a handful of philosophical articles and books as discussed below As already mentioned I think this shortfall can be explained in part by the difficulties involved in writing coherently about immigration from a liberal point of view What I want to do now is explain what I take this difficulty to be To begin we may note two things about liberalism The first is that liberalism begins with the idea of the moral equality of all persons The precise contours of this idea need not equal moral concern and respect for all who share common humanity No person or group of persons is to be arbitrarily excluded from the reach of liberal justice The second thing to notice about liberalism is that it has been developed as a theory primarily within the context of the nation-state This is not a logical fact about the nature of liberalism; it is simply the context within which most liberal theorists have developed and articulated their political views Within this context liberalism condemns arbitrary inequalities of treatment by the political institutions of society What liberals have traditionally defended therefore has been some condemned The task of the liberal on this understanding is to figure out what principles could justify political power to all those who live within the society such political power creates This approach - the search for principles reciprocally acceptable to all - derives principles guaranteeing equality under political nstitutions from the more basic conception of moral equality We can call this methodological approach the framework of political egalitarianism. It is I think implicit in much of how liberals think about political justification In the context of the state the equation it makes between moral equality and political equality is entirely appropriate The history of differentiated citizenship is a history of oppression and injustice; distinctions in political status tend to bespeak deviations from the ideal of moral equality The difficulty arises when we move from this case to one in which individuals are not subject to the same political institutions Immigration is distinct from the standard cases discussed in liberal theory precisely in that the 225

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ldb i i t i not b j t t th l f th it b t k t become subject The liberal equation of moral equality and political equality may not work under such circumstances The wouldbe immigrant and the citizen have distinct relationships to the political society in question The usual methods of liberal political h i l h t h f tt l W th k ht ld we t dh i i l f litil j t i hih t l lit? A d t k thi b th t ti i h h l l b d i t t d t thi l i t i l we i th fit l ? A l i b l th fi i t i t h f i t i th thdl b hih d l th i l i t i f libl i t t M f th problems implicit in our current analyses of immigration stem from the persistent hold this methodology has upon our thinking Much of what has been written about immigration insists that moral equality and political equality are nherently l i k d thi ti h d t hld t i th t t i hih i ti I h t fll I ill i th iti i dtil d h h thi ti d i th l i b i l i t f ht h b id Aft di t h t I ill b i f l i ht th fi i t i tb d th litil liti f k i h t l k lik

Cosmopolitanism and Open Borders Th

ti t h t titi i i t i i h t l j t i t t l fid i t i t i Th i h t t t l t i l t i d i d d liit df f tht iht til f t hih i l i d i t b th i l bi t f th i h t i ti S l t h i t h h ffd t t th f f t t h t thi t d i h t i i f t ill Restrictions on immigration are on this analysis at odds with the moral egalitar ianism animating liberal thought Closed borders are therefore morally llegitimate (Ackerman 1982: 8 9 9 5 ; Carens 1987 1999 2000 forthcoming; Bader 1995) J h C h f f d th t l l d l d i f thi t d it i thi i t h t I ill i i h t fll Th t h h t idi C ' h t i i t i i i l d ttti Libli C t d th f t i t f t t jtif i l i t i i t t t A bi t t f th h h thiit t l i t i t l t d diff i litil t t t A litil it hih d i d iht t l i it f thi ld ll b i l of an illiberal and unjust community Citizenship however seems to be as morally arbitrary as any other factor we could name None of us chooses our place of birth or our parentage; we deserve ith bl dit f th i t it hih b R t i ti i i t i i th d i f f t i t iht b d h bit ft t h f t b ll f f i th th bi f ijti Th f t t h t b id f bit li dI th th t t d diff i ht h t d db If t t f i i t i d tki d t f th

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titi f i t it d ijti If thi i j t i h less intuitive than injustices such as racially discriminatory political rights that simply shows the degree to which our ordinary moral beliefs have yet to grasp the egalitarian potential of our liberal commitments Liberalism can have radical and f th ti ft ll i h i h th i j t i f il d i i i t i t it bi ith (C 1987 268) Th l i b t t d b C b f lit di fR l i h i h th i i l iti dt d i i i l f ti t b l d lbll th th i th t t f th t i t t (f j t i f t i f thi di B i t 1983 1999 P 1989) R l ' thdl k t develop principles acceptable to all by eliminating knowledge of social contingen cies which could result in illegitimate bias Given the contingent nature of the border it is inconsistent on this reading not to apply the original position at the lbl l l Ad f ithi thi i i l iti ld l d i i il t i th f d t b d itht i t f J t R l ' d t i i i l iti ld d f d f d f t ithi th t t C ' i t t i l i i l iti d f d f d f t i t t i l l [0] h l t k h t h th i h t t i t f l ithi i it i important liberty The same sorts of considerations make migration across state bound i i t t N libl tt tit i t l bilit Th t t tht d tit i t l bilit itiid f d i bi h frd If frd f t ithi th t t i b i t h t it id th l i fl l litil iti ht d tit frd f t tt? (Carens 1987: 258 267) If this analysis is correct then the denial of entry to a wouldbe immigrant is an injustice More generally the conventional account of immigration in which liberal states are justified within very weak limits in looking out for their own llbi i th d i fi i t i li i f d t l l i t i ith libli itlf Th lit i i t tht l i b l i ' t f l lit t t t th b d i l t i t t l i b l th t th l tt f tid C d dit f i t h t thi f t ill h i l i t i t j t f th fl f d bt f ll Whil it possible for us to challenge Carens's reading of Rawls as Rawls himself has done (see Rawls 1999) it is more difficult to reject the intuition undergirding Carens's project None the less I believe it is possible for us to challenge the equation of itihi d bit ft h thiit W t I thik tht i h th t i bit f th l it f i M d itihi bth d d b i t f hih I tk ith dit bl Bt f th f t t h t th i t ii i t il l i t i l diff bit t l d t h t t h t diff i ll irrelevant T thi t t h t th b d h bitil t t d k t thi f t l iif It k t

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th thi th b d i f h d libilit t l i t i l t t Thi diff I think may well create some legitimate differences in what sorts of ustification we can expect from that state The state can do powerful things to all and only those who live within its sphere of authority; citizens may be taxed punished coerced d i th l i i t t d b thi t Ul f i iti f il tt tt h l ithi th t' h f ifl th i f h i ti It i h t th tht th il l t i h i bt th iti d th t t i i t ditit d d f jtifti If I b j t t th i litil ti f tt d l seek t b b j t it d t tht d I ill sarily be entitled to the same sort of justification from the state in question The contingency in the world creates a difference with some moral relevance; in this way the analogy between race and citizenship might be somewhat undermined Thi b l i d b t ith f t th f l t t f C ' t f b d Th i t i t i idi thi t b h t d t th i l t t b i i th f l l i l Y li i B f f l d libli i i t tht h th l iht t t B t I li i T t d tht f t t t h ith th f t t h t th it t i l b d bt is the result of a contingency which cannot ground a legitimate difference in the administration of justice Therefore I must also have the moral right to move to Boston If this right to mobility is important domestically it must be important i t t i l l ll d h iht t d thi i h t t tid h t it t i i d Bf thi t d h t ti t h t iht b t d t d lt f th d t jtif tt thit i f l l t th h li ithi t h t t' h f thit I thi it l l Lt tk litil iht l With th iht d idti t l l l t th b t iht b d follows You live in Buffalo and liberalism insists that you have the moral right to vote in United States federal elections I live in Toronto and that fact together with the fact that there exists a national border between us at all is the result of a ti hih t d l i t i t diff i th d i i t t i f jti T h f I t l h th l iht t t i U i t d Stt f d l lti If thi i h t i i t t d t i l l it t b i t t i t t i ll ll d h iht t d thi i h t t tid h t it t iid Thi t ld t i d d I t h i k th ld b right to resist it While one's status as citizen might ultimately be causally deter mined by arbitrary facts in the world the status of citizen does create some distinct demands for justification In this case the political institutions of this society have a dt t b i t th ddi f th h b j t t it t h i t th t h f ldd f i itht ti btti t f litil tiiti If litil t i i t t k itlf t h i d t i th i h t i litil it t i f l l t th bi d Th t h d t l t th h not b j t t th thit f th t t Th diff i 228

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i t t diff i ht if litil iht th t which we are entitled This difference moreover does not offend moral equality n the slightest Moral equality here lives in perfect harmony with differentiated polit ical rights When the political circumstances are relevantly different moral egalitar i i d d th th d l i t i l diff i t t t Thi b t h h t fi t C h k l d th ttil it f l i t i t il bliti bt tit t i f thi h d l i t i l lif (C 1992 44) I t h i k h tht d i t th ti bilit f l lit d l litil iht C ' ititi t b diffilt t t I til t tht C h argument as to why the right to mobility should be treated as something which s always an implication of moral equality rather than a specific implication of moral equality which applies only within the context of shared liability to the state My i hih I td f d h i t h t it i th l t t i d t b jtifid t it iti t t ff ti t ildi if t f l i b t Th l i b t i hih t it bf t thit ld b j t i f d i l d bth litil libt d litil libti h th i h t t bilit O thi l i th U i t d S t t ld t both d th B f f l i the right to move to Boston and expect that Buffalonian to accept the government's legitimate authority Neither could it allow any subordinate political institution such as the Massachusetts legislature or the Boston City Council to act so as to d h thi i h t Gi th l t i h i i ti k i th B f f l i tt N Y k i t h ill d ti i t l h if ld b f d t l l illibl Th i i t ' l t i h i d t i i t thi i l i t i I d i th T t i th i h t t i t d li i B t th U i t d S t t l l lf i t t h d Thi h tb b fft hi i t libli i it i l l t h t th ti f the Torontonian ought to be considered as affronts to his status as morally equal Given that he does not live under the authority of the United States but asks admittance to that status it seems a mistake to consider him as equivalent to those h already t d i h l t i h i f litil thit Id t l i t h t thi i th b t l t i f th i h t t bilit l t h h it d ht ititi t Th i i t f th b i tht C ' ititi t tht h t i ll bit i i t l i t i t diff i iht d thi ti I thik i t t S ti l litil t t t i ilti f l lit b t t l Given the differences between the citizen and the wouldbe immigrant moral equal ity may not issue in a perfect equality of entitlement A theory of immigration must not assume the borders as moral watershed and Carens has done a great service in iti t tht f t b t ith t th fi i t i th b d' l i l I ld t thi j t it t l t t fC ' t h h t hih d ti Th b l i f b d d th it f il li th t f th ldb i i t d kd hth l i i itlf ilti flibl lit O i i th i t th 229

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possibility f l i t i t l i It i ibl t d f d thi ibilit d the less insist that contingent facts of global economic inequality condemn much current exclusion as illegitimate The reality of extreme global economic inequality I think may serve to place considerable restrictions on how a liberal state may i it t ld C t l h l f th ld' lti h i d t itti d t h f f di d tlit t t h t th t h t f d i th lti f W t i d t i l d i ( C t t 1999) U d th i t itihi i W t i d t i l d t b C t t f f d l b i t h i h t iil l k idt f bith d i t diff i lif tti (C 1987 252) W take for granted I think that any plausible account of moral equality will condemn this sort of inequality as morally indefensible Even if we deny the cosmopolitan reading of Rawls employed by Carens we must none the less apply our iberal i i l f l lit t th i t t i l l l th i i l ill l t d f fd i t i ll i i i b l Thi t b i t i ith h t h bf b t I bli thi t b illi Iiti tht tt d t h th same litil dti t f i th d t iti i t th iiti tht tt nothing to foreign nationals The current economic circumstances of the world I think cannot be justified on any plausible theory of liberal justice Exactly how unjust they are depends upon which theory of justice we employ and so is beyond th f thi h t B t it d l i b l tht W t i d t i l d i t j t i f th d t hih thi lth d t h t f th d l i ld If thi i th jti i th iti t d thi itti di ill i l d i ditibti di t i t t i l f b t th ill l i l d t i t th bilit f lth t t t l d th h d T f t t i i h d f i iti i i t h t ifi h lif f th k f lth d l Thi i if I think a liberal can never legitimately make

Partiality and Restrictions on Immigration Th

idti I thik it ith h i h t b i ft h i t h h ffd jtifti f l i T ft I h jtif l d b d d i b i i ht iht i th lit t f i i t i th l lit f iti d foreigner Even if those who defend the possibility of legitimate border restrictions are correct in their conclusions I think they are too often incorrect in the theoret ical assumptions they employ in defense of these conclusions W b i b ti t h t th h i t b d l k h t thi i f Th t i i ll i t d d li ti f id h i l h i l j t d ft d i d l i i Th f t tht i h t litil h i l h h th f f t f l i t i t i l d b d i ll t k b h t h i t t b l i l i t i i th i t i t i ll f l d b d t t th l i t i f

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th ll j t A h th id t h t l i b l i i ittd t b d and freedom of immigration is often taken as a reductio of liberal thinking If liberal ism implies that we cannot legitimately close the borders then we have reason to reform our liberalism rather than as was the case for the theorists discussed b litil i t i t t i (Wl 1983 3 1 6 3 T i 1993 1 2 4 3 0 K l i k 1995 1 2 4 6 ) S h t ll b i b ti th i fft f f t ht i ifill l l Th t f th l l it hih f t ld d i ll d i b d i t f lt d l l f d l t Th i l t l l f d t d i l d i l this community and the inability to exclude would undermine the possibility for this cultural group to maintain its distinctiveness and collectively guide its internal development (see generally Walzer 1983) Arguments for closed borders therefore ll b i ith l i f th l i t f ifill l l d tditi Th i t d l f iti i h th f thi i t i d d t h f h i t t th l l f t d d t b F i th diff di i ll b t h th l i k b t th i t f lt d th l i t i f l d b d i t be made out Culture on these analyses is a sort of good which is necessarily local; it is a good in virtue of what it does for those who live their lives within the norms and values t i d ithi t h t lt Th i t f ht i i f l l l l i th f tk t l i t i t diti f libl i t i l i t Th h bl t tht lt h il bliti t hld d it i t i t t i Th t h f h il bliti t th bliti f i t t f th d d i t t f h th b th f t b f th l t l it G t t h f h il lti t iti hih b d i d f th il bliti d b th iti t another A legitimate project of governance indeed for some thinkers the domin ant project of governance is the preservation and protection of the local cultural community The implications of such a view of politics for immigration are not difflt t d l Th d i i b t i i t i t b d ith f t th i t f h i i t i th li d j t f th l d ithi th l t l If i i t i ld d i l t l i t i t d hi i t i l i t i t l b ldd t i i t th Th i t l t fjtifiti i t d ith thi i f i i ti Th t t i f i l idtifid ith th i t t d d f th l l community Justification of that state's actions is something to which the citizens of that state are entitled; they are entitled to justifications moreover which acknow ledge that their interests and projects are to be preferred to those of individuals t i d th t t If kt d l i i l f litil j t i t b l t ll t i t t th h t i t b i d th iti f th l l it I i d h iht i it f thi l lit t i il ll ld t l i t i t i i thi t l i t t i Ot id h d t h i l t tdi t hll th ti d d i i f th t t i ti Si th t t i dd t b t i l t th 231

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i t t f it iti it i bjti t t t h t th i t t f tid are not being given equal attention Such a view of the relation between the state and the citizen is implicit in much of our ordinary political discourse It is therefore not surprising that this view would t d t d l i b t i i t i hih k d l i i l t th f d i t i l l l ti W t t t f thi i t O i tht i i t i ill b l l tt f d i t i ti th t f th t t If i tt d t l l i i t i i it lf i t t it h th l iht t f h i i t i Th l i f th h k d i i t i l t t th l i f th l d h T tht given denial of immigration is unjust would on this account be an exceptionally difficult proposition to establish In some very limited set of cases however such a case might be made out This leads us to the second way in which this picture of i i t i t k t l l ti Libl ti b d b thi l db i t t i l t l t ll f i iti t t h i f ifd f f ti i th th i li t t hih t b bttd b h i f ditilit th t f th l l iti Siill t t h i t f l d b d d i t t h t th i stances under which the general right to exclude outsiders would become unrea sonable to exercise Michael Walzer for example argues that a state may have special duties to take in needy foreigners under some highly constrained sorts of i t t tbl h t il i th ld ld b idd t liibl tt l (Wl 1983 4 8 5 1 ) Th i thi li i thi i t it i th it f il l t i h i bt th t t d it iti d k l d tht i thi l t i h i th ldb i i t b ditit i litil t t f th t iti Th i h thi d l tbli h ll Th tbli t f th l i I thik b t b d t d b ii t aspects of the picture under consideration We may inquire about the precise struc ture of the argument by which these cultural facts are supposed to legitimate a deviation from impartiality; and we may ask about what circumstances in the ld tb d bf th tf lt l i t i t l d b d I ill id th i i t W b i b ti th d t h i h th thri d d th iti t h t th it ifd d h t t f l t l ithi litil it I i l thi i t th M t tt th ld ti rit f t i l iti ithi t h l ( ll Kymlicka 1995) Under these circumstances it is difficult to apply a theory such as Walzer's; legitimating partiality with reference to the local culture is difficult when the very existence of such an animal is in doubt This in itself might pose a consid bl d i f f l t ith th l i t i t liti ft h i h W l ' t lit i l ti Wht I t t li h h i th thi I b l i tht th f h thdl t tit i i t i i i t i l t h t i l l jtifid b t ii T i d t i f th f th t t ith th ti f l t l i i i t b l t d iidi dititi i t th iti h d th t bl t tht it I ll

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i h i h th t i l thi iiti hih i t th t jit of actual cases to restrict immigration for national or ethnic reasons is to make some citizens politically inferior to others To see this we might briefly examine Walzer's analysis of the infamous "White Australia" policy by which the Austra li t t t t d t dfi A t l i hit it d t hit i i t i Wl d thi li bt i ht I fid bj tibl k Th Whit A t l i li W l ' di l t i t l b d ti f t ft i t i l i th A t l i t b k Th i t h thi ll ith th l itlf tht f ti thill it A i th t h t th tll i fl l d th l i f it ld force a political community like that of White Australia to confront a radical choice Its b ld ild l d f th k fh i t th ld i h it ( t th ti f ltiil i t ) f th k f th l d A d th ld b t h i l hi Whit A t l i ld i l Littl A t l i (Walzer 1983: 4 6 8 ) There is I think something important here that Walzer overlooks It is the fact that Australia was not and indeed never was a purely ethnic society trying to maintain itself as such It like most of the world was a state containing within its borders ltil l t l tditi d thi t tbl f l lti fA b i i l A t l i It i l t ht t t Wl i t d hi l t i th h i t i l f th li b t hi f th l t tht h thi ith it t t t i t dfi itlf t h t diff f th i h i h it i tl t t d W l ' l i th t t d A t l i t idi titi ltithi A t l i f t t t i t create Whit A t l i t h h immigration This I think cannot be correct Even if a hypothetical pure society could close the borders to preserve itself a modern multiethnic democracy could t d itht iliitl t t i idiidl l d t ithi th it dl iti Ski t l i i t th f i f it b lti i i t i i ilti t th b f tht l d t thi i bl I thik if tW l ' i tht l iid h i ith h i h t h l l li Thi d i f f i l t I t h i k i idt i l litil l f i i ti h tht f f d b Pt B i l (1996) B i l f il quotas on immigration to the United States in terms quite similar to those employed by Walzer The United States on this analysis is a cultural and ethnic nation whose identity is defined by its cultural and ethnic ties with Europe Widespread i i t i f E ld t h f d i th it d tiit f th l t l tditi B i l idtifi ifill A i It d t tk t h litil t h i i t h h thi th d d th tt f E iti b dfii E f i d i b l di dt f i i t i Thi i d i tht E ll d t i t l t th A i j t S h t t t ld f b

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tbl t E iti d B i l ' h t i t i would thus be unacceptable even if those outside the borders were assumed to have no moral status at all The statement is moreover somewhat repellent on its face; if the American project means anything it means that arbitrary classifications such dd t t b t d f d t i l i th t i ' lf d i t i Thi l d t th l t t f th t bjti I thik b d i t t h i t f l d b d Thi l i d f d l d b d l i t i t li ti fl l t i l i t If ih t d l libl t tb i f il h thi tilit t i i d i t b j t i f i d Th I think two ways of doing this from within the liberal project The first is to take the closing of borders as beneficial to all citizens throughout the world It might be the case on this analysis that a world without walls would be an unpleasant d i t i l t li df thi t k f d li E h tt lki ft it i h t b i th d jtifibl i ti l lit Thi i th t jtif tilit ith f t th l l tt f ll it i t ff i t i l df f tilit ( W l 1983 39 th i td i l i R l 1999 39 48 l Gdi 1988) The alternative is simply to argue that we have no need to inquire about the effects of closed borders on the world as a whole; we are better off with closed borders and the partiality legitimated by cultural facts means that this is all we have to do to j t i f th O thi l i libli itlf ht t b i d it i t h t i l t t ith i h t liitti (f th id f hih Wld 1993) L i b l i ' t fi t i l l h l b t f h t h d Th f l l i i i t tht l i b l t t b til between iti d t i l towards th Th fit i i i t tht ld i t h t b d i l i k l t b th b t t f ld t h t l i i t d t h l ld i h b i t I b t the strength of this argument as an abstract statement Local difference as Carens has noted flourishes quite nicely within states in the absence of legal restrictions on movement; Alabama is not California even though citizens of the one could freely i t t th th (C 1987 2 6 6 7 ) I h t h t thi t i it i d t jtifiti f th l f b d i th t idl ld W h t h t b d ld b f i t ll i th i d l ld th d t d i t ld f i i l i t T it th b f i i l fft f th b d t dtitt ldb i i t f th d l i ld i l b Will K l i k t k l d th f of this objection asserting that a nation which has more than its fair share of resources thereby loses the right to exclude which he has otherwise defended (Kymlicka 1995: 224 n l 8 ; see also Rawls 1999: 8 9 ) This admission I think s d b l it d h d t t th d t hih titi t lik K l i k ' tb i l d t jtif t tt ti Th l t t i i t d i b libli t h t it t f l lit li l ithi th t i l it th th i l l O thi t l i b l i ' t i h t l liitd i tt t t t ll citizens li l tt b t th d h t i t d

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f i M l l fi i t i I thik i l i i t l l thi analysis; it allows us to make judgments about immigration based solely upon the economic and social interests of the local community (see for example Beck 1996; Brimelow 1996) This picture of liberalism I think has certain advantages: t l th d i f f i l t fd l i l i b l th fi i t i libli thi t has d i t i l i t i f i i t i Th bl h i t h t it libli t th t f ki it th li M t i b l t h i t i t t d t th lit f persons t j t f iti th i thi ll i i f t b t h bi hih k th it bjt f liti t h h t d thi thi ht it i d t depend upon legal standing To place an arbitrary limit on the applicability of liberalism would be to rob liberalism of its intuitive pull As Carens points out moreover liberals have often been surprised by the implications of their commit t libli h hd i l i t i f il d d lit it i i t i l f l t ld h f d bffli T h libli tht h i i lt ld t ab initio i h t f h i t d l ith bl ti b t it ld d thi b ki l i b l i ith fl ttti Th t i f f l d b d th b l t i t b t I thik one basic conclusion given by the theorists described above is correct: exclusion s not inherently illiberal The methodology used to establish this claim however s deeply flawed The flaw in this methodology I believe is equivalent to that identi fid i th li d i i f b d Th i i h t idi th h tif l i i tht l i b l liti t b d i th C t i l ld t b i dlibti ith ll f h i t dt h b d l lbl litil i i l hih ld id t l i t t i Th lti hi b t th i d i i d l d th l l it i ll i i f i t d ld t thi thdl itht d i i tht l t i h i S i t d th t h i t d th f l t th l l it b seeking to justify a partiality which is in most practical cases equivalent to an absolute trump We deal with the difficulties involved in globalizing politics by localizing moral concern Thi i h t th l t d It i ibl f t k l d l lit d t i i t t h t thi l lit ill h ditit i l i t i i ditit litil t t L l iht b d i t i t i t h t th iht bi i d th d d l tt f tid I h l d i t fh bth bilit i h t d litil iht iht b d t d lti f th d t jtif litil thit t i f i l l th idiidl who face such authority Such an analysis does not depend upon outsiders being subjected to a moral discount rate in our evaluation of their claims It acknowledges that we can be moral egalitarians and none the less justify distinct political rights d ditit litil i t It ld h th d i t i t d t I thik f t d i t i th l lit f f i iti W d l i i t tht h t li b d i t i tt tk t f th l i t ' l t i h i t tht t t Citi titld t thi tht f i t bt h dt d l litii i th f tb lihi thi l i

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Conclusion As I noted at the outset I believe a single error informs much of what has been written about immigration The conventional methodology of liberalism is quite innapropriate for use when the question is not one affecting the rights of members but the composition of membership itself To use the political egalitarian framework to develop principles of immigration is either to assume the border as moral watershed or to assume away potentially relevant political differences Neither is attractive as a liberal vision of immigration What we therefore need I think is a fresh beginning in our task What we ought to do is to see what moral equality actually implies when it is interpreted n the international context This task I think is exceptionally difficult I will therefore end simply by asserting two conclusions that I think would follow from a theory developed in this way Thefirstconclusion I think would be that much of the exclusion we currently employ is illegitimate Moral equality may not have the same distributive constraints internationally as it does domestically but it must condemn certain sorts of poverty and immiseration as illegitimate Restrictions on immigration which help perpetuate such poverty - as I think those of all Western liberal democracies now do - are illegitimate If this is correct then the category of those whose claim to immigration may not be refused is wider than we usually think; in particular those fleeing famine and extreme poverty have legitimate claims to entry despite the absence of such persons from our current categories of refugee law (see Shue 1996) The second conclusion however would be that not all forms of exclusion are unjust To take my own example: I am a Canadian citizen who is currently seeking mmigrant status in the United States If I were to be excluded there are a variety of things I could say I could point out that the United States had by its actions adversely affected my well-being I could note that it was precluding me from exercising valuable options I could say that the decision was disheartening unwelcome and incredibly disruptive to my plans What I do not think I could say is that the decision was inherently unjust A United States citizen has claims against the United States government that I do not; preventing such a citizen from taking a job in Boston is quite a different matter morally speaking from so excluding me These conclusions of course do not constitute a theory They are regrettably sketchy and insufficiently justified I would take these facts however to serve as an invitation We do not have enough good philosophical minds presently examining the issue of immigration Given the political importance of this issue the world could only benefit from careful and precise analysis of the moral issues nvolved We have not developed an adequate theory of immigration but we may hope that the best philosophical work in this area has yet to be written

References Ackerman Bruce (1982) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven CT: Yale University Press 236

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Bader Veit (1995) Citizenship and exclusion: radical democracy community and justice Or ht i ith i t i i ? Political Theory, 23 2 1 1 4 6 ( d ) (1997) Citizenship and Exclusion. N Y k St M t i ' P B Bi d G d i R b t E ( d ) (1992) Free Movement. U i i t P k PA U i sity of Pennsylvania Press B k R (1996) The Case against Immigration. N Yk N t Bit C h l (1983) C l i t idl d t i l t i t Journal of Philosophy, 80 65919 (1999) Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University P B i l P t (1996) Alien Nation. N Y k H P i l Carens Joseph H (1987) Aliens and citizens: the case for open orders Review of Politics, 49: 25173 (1992) M i t i d lit libl liti ti I B B d R G d i ( d ) Free Movement, 2 5 4 7 U i i t P k PA U i i t f P l i Press (1992b) R f d th l i i t f b l i t i Public Affairs Quarterly, 6 3 1 4 4 (1996) R l i t i d idliti h t th thi f i i t i International Migration Review, 30 1 5 6 7 0 (1999) Reconsidering open borders International Migration Review, 33: 1 0 8 2 9 7 (2000) O b d d l i b l liit t Ibit International Migration Review 34 6 3 6 4 3 ( f t h i ) Migration, Membership, and Morality. Crossette Barbara (1999) Half the world lacks sanitation says Unicef New York Times, July 23 A9 Gib M k ( d ) (1988) Open Borders? Closed Societies? N Y k G d P Goodin Robert (1988) What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics 98: 6 6 3 8 6 K l i k Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship. O f d O f d U i i t P Ntt R (1971) Th i i l i h t t d f th i h t f f t Ethics, 81 2 1 2 2 7 Pogge Thomas (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press R l J h (1999) The Law of the Peoples. C b i d MA H d U i i t P S S k i (2000) Guests and Aliens. N Y k N P S h t W ( d ) (1995) Justice in Immigration. C b i d Cbid U i i t P Shue Henry (1996) Basic Rights. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press T i Y l (1993) Liberal Nationalism. P i t NJ P i t U i i t P Wld J (1993) S i l ti d t l dti Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 3 3 0 Walzer Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books W F k H (1996) Th l i i t fb d d t l f i i t i f Stanford Law and Policy Review, 7 3 5 5 5

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W thi t l i i d d t i t f UNICEF O f th C h i ti C h i l d ' F d i t t f i t h W b t d ikl fli t th h l P h t th k i t h f k M b j t it t i t t t h Th hiti b i h th h t i i fdtitt t i hild f TV d t h h t b t th d not alter the brutal facts: millions of people in the world are undernourished; thou sands die each day; most of those who suffer and die are children; and with llti fft ld d th ffi f illi itht t h t i At th ti f tlk if l i d i t Rlti t th ih i it b fiill t d B t lti t t iti f th ld h ith Gi tht h t if thi hld d idiidll lltil t l l i t thi ffi d thi l i ? M t f i t t thi ki hld b hitbl d if h h i t b l ? Tht seems to be the guiding premise of organizations who implore us to send money: they tell us to open our hearts to be generous to give of ourselves to help those in need The character of their appeal reveals just how pervasive the "charity view" is W t h i k t h t l t h h it ld b i f t i t th t i f i ll i d t i t th tht h d thi ( ) if i th t i d I d d t l t h t if h l th l h Th th i d i h i t i l i i tht fil t it i t j t tihtfitd b t itil S f th ill l i tht bliti i b d i h t f th t i t it (Li 1996 Sh 1996) while others who claim we have strong obligations to assist will eschew rights talk because their preferred ethical theories do not countenance them (Singer 1996/1972) But all these thinkers emphatically reject the charity view They aver tht iti th d t i t t i t l ti b t l i t Th f till h d l tht h iti bliti not t h l i it di t thi diti ld t l l th h ' i bt i th b f d t h ( H d i 1996/1974) D i t th diff t d t f h i f th l ti iill Th k I did i th b i i h t if thi h l d th ltil fflt d 238

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t

id th t i ? F l l i th k fD d S i i b hl j t thi f l t i (S 1981 D d S 1989 1 9 9 1 ) hl tt i l tht ki thi ti i thi i itk d likl l fili (Ck 1996 211) Th k f th d l t l t h i t is i t i l It li d i l l i t ft f ld h t ti i th t d d ff i th d b t (f l i t f t d i Aik d L F l l t t 1977) It l l i t th i t di d th f bth d i d idi h It ff i id b t ffti fft t llit h Th D d S ' k h i i f t l d til i l i t i H th i l i t i ith d i t i d i t d t thik Thi k d t l i i t th d t dd th t d d l ti W t till ti hth d h th f i lti ffl hld ll d t th b t f t f t t i d t th diti tht t d t i it Th l i fd l t l thi d t i th ti th l i tht f th B t bf tl h t i th i hld f t d t d th t d d ti f Th

Th B i

Oti

Charity M t l i th U i t d S t t d b b l i th d l d ld b th hit i i ft i t i O i being h i t b l i hll l t hil th th to whom hitbl i hll l t A d i t th f i t iti h dt f k i d t th d ( H i 1999) A d i t th d t b l t K t h imperfect d t t hl l i d H l t h h ht t b h i t b l t d th i til blitd t it d til til t lt l d d it D i t t h i diff bth i hld () tht til d d t hit d (b) t h t t t l i t i t l ( i t t i ) t b h i t b l (N 2000 317) M l t h h th d iti hld tht ll ht t b h i t b l flfill t h t i f t dt itht hli h i t i W ld i t d h l th l d i i h b h d t lit i t P l d P t h d Pt difftl dt b d t t t d bf t i l b t t i l Si th i d l t h it i i k l ld tif i f t dt f hit itht hli f th ld' t i Th bth h i t i l h fil t tibt t f i lif i h t b ti ll h t i h t d b t th ld t il b i l I thi h t I ill t d i t l di thi l t t i I i l t k it th dflt iti I t k it t b t if l t t i b d f d d I ill f th l t t i l t h h i d i i th I ill i d i t l dd th h it i 239

HUGH LAFOLLETTE

We should not aid the starving Most of us think that feeding the starving is good even if it is not something that we do We think it is good because (a) we think it relieves human suffering and most t f lit h l d t h t (b) l i i h ffi i tl t iibl d h ll i d H d i di H thik t h t ( ) i fl d thf l d tht h l d not f d th t i B t h th d t d th hit i Hdi li tht bilit t f d l i b d l It i t "A t i ' l d h liitd it t t lti d th t ii h h i h l d d d th carrying capacity of our land" (Hardin 1996/1974: 12) Given these imitations some countries are like overcrowded lifeboats Their land cannot support the cur rent population and certainly not future generations given current population th t A l t h h f d i th t i l t i l k f th li i th l it ill i th l t i t th it h l f d th if t d T h t ill i ffi d d ft ti Tht i h it i ll H ' l t illtt Hdi' i t At th ti Hdi f t t about the subject in the early 1970s India had a population of 650 million people Despite the large number of people dying from starvation its population was grow ing at a rate of 2 6 percent per year At that rate India's population would double t t Th bl t i Clbi E d d Pkit hih h d l lti th t f th 3 t At t h t thi lti ld d b l t t If th ti bl t f d t h i t lti h ld th ibl f d lti t i f ti tht i ith i it f fflt t i ? H lthh iitil i l i t f d th t i hld t W hld i j t "h it b " (Flth 1977: 105) A strong obligation to feed the starving Th f

tht h t bliti t i t th t i tk t b d flti ' lt h t i l f k Th f t l i tht h iti bliti t ffi d t h i h hld it the starving (Singer 1977/1972: 28) The second claims that people have a right to food and that right undergirds our obligation to assist them Of course rights absent compelling obligations or duties are effectively empty (Pogge 2000) That s why th h li tht l h i h t t f d ill l i t h t th ltil fflt h t lti iti bliti t i t th i d H l t h h th d i t i t i b t th t iti i t h t i l l i t i i d ld ll h some t i l iifi f t I ill ll th d i l t l k b t th t bliti t i t th t i Th h l i th ltil fflt h thi t bliti t other things show why Hardin's projections are either morally irrelevant or mis taken A hearty few take the former tack: they claim that we have a strong obliga 240

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ti i

t

id th t i if ld tll b t i lifbt th k i t h t th f t t i ld i i f idiit d ll (Wt 1977) It ld b ll f b l t di lif f ll th t ti t li t th f th thik ht t f d th t i ill l i i l h d th t i b l Hdi d i t th 1977/1972 34) T h f t h j t Hdi' t h t th j t d tl t i l i b l T t th t f h i tht H d i ' i d l t l l t t i

Th

D

l

t

l

l i h d b d th t l i t t t i H t h t if f d i th hld t f d th M l t h i i if t d t b l I t fit d i t d

O thi i t th titi d t t h t i (Si t h b

th

A l t t i

The basic idea M t d i i f ld h tt i l tht () t t i i db h t ff d i i (b) h i h i i t l f ll db t l d i t ( d h t fld t ) Gi th ti th k ( ) h t if thi hld ll d t h l l th f f t f th f i ? If hld i t th (d) t d i d "who i ibl f idi thi h l " ( M K i l 1981) J D dA t S t h t thi ff i th i i t k l t t h t l l i d d h t d t th il lit i l d i ititti ithi h i h it i (1989 1 9 9 1 ) Th li thi i itk h thiki b t f h h l d Th f ' bilit t b t i h f d d d t l th i d lit fh l d l ifll dh h d k bt l th ti f th Will l lii t d l l t th t fli t h h h ld? Will th it t h i i l t th l d th i f h ? Will th ll h th li h d d i l fd d f i t ? Will th b h d t h h t b th li h d ? Will th h fi i ? Will th i t h if d i t i t f ith h t h f h t i it? U l th d th ft t i f d th ll th l d dh d k i th ld ill t ff t f d h fil T h f h fili l k d t f d th h ittl t d ith th l ilbilit f f d i th Hit t thi hi i D i th 1974 f i i B l d h th t ff d it th t h i d h i h t d i t id (D d S 1989 27) Thi fidi d l i t d ithi th i f th t t hit b th f i "O f th f i ditit ( D i j ) hd th highest ilbilit f f d i th ti t d i d d ll f f th f i ditit th t fi i t f f d ilbilit hd" (D dS 1989 28) Th bl D dS l i i t h t th f i l i h d i f f i i t " t i t l t " t f d Th " t i t l t " d t i d t 241

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l b h t th d bt l h t th b d ht i d i l b l t th (S 1981 4) Thi h h t d t i th f ith idi d i h b i l ki h t h th t ' ll l l ff d h d l i d W t d t i hth th l h ffiit t i t l t t f d Of th ll ilbilit f f d i ft d t i i l' titl t (D dS 1989 2 5 9 ) A l t h h d t t l i it i th i l t i t t f t ( B b i k 1987) t h ith D d S t h t it i i f i ft h i d ( P i k h 1991 S b h 1991) I t l thi d b t h l t h h lt t ill h b i th i i l i H if f d ilbilit th t t t ft it i t th l Whth dli i ll f d ilbilit l d t t t i d d it f il litil d i ft The moral implications Thi th thi hl l W

d l t l ti i tht l b d ti b t litil il d i l t i h i ithi d bt ti Bt d t b i t th d t th l ti h t if thi d th f i fflt ti d t hl i i h d ti d idiid i l l th fi idi d i h ? It j t l i h t l h t hld k "A blid t i t h t th h d t f d titl t?" Tht i t k ld i t i ti d h bliti t ( ) thi t t h thi t i t l t ? A blitd t tblih t d lti ith th ti t h thi i t i ' t i t l t ? D h bliti t d f d t hl ditibt f d h th t td it ? A l t h h th d l t l ti d t l th l ti it h iti i l i t i Miill it blitt i l i fH d i ' t C l i h H d i' t fil l i d t i i f i t f t f th d l t l ti Hdi li tht t ' bilit t f d it l d d ll it l d ' bilit t d ffiit f d D l t l t h i t t t h t th l d ' ftilit i f l i t t th ( ) it i t l i d litil t t h d (b) it t t i l i d litil t Th l h h i l d d t th b t h ithi d bt ti Th h tht d t i hll l f l i t F l hil f f th ld' llt dl t ti i t d l d t l 10 t f thi t i l d t (GNP) th t ti i t i t d i l t t t f it GNP M t E d l d t t th thid f t h i ti GNP ( U i t d N t i D l t P 2000 213) A l t h h th ti d t ditl fd thi l thi l th l ll f d Aft ll th h t i l d dh kill t t d f f d d th til d M Hdi' jti lik th f Mlth bf hi h t d t t b ildl itk I th l 1970 h j t d t h t th ld' lti t th t f th t ld b 6 6 billi It i f t lihtl th

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5 8 billi (Uitd Nti D l t P 2000 226) A d I d i hih according to Hardin had a population growth rate of 2 6 percent in 1973 had a rate of 2 percent by the turn of the century; that is projected to decline to 1 2 percent by the year 2015 (United Nations Development Program 2000: 225) Th l liit t h l th l d t bt t hi th l i i t t th b k k dHdi li It i t h t k t h t hi jti f i l It i il t d t d h th f i l Th l t i f t h i fil l i i f i t ft b t th t fh d t t t t t i f it t l if t diti P l ti t d b t l i d b th " d h i t i t i t h " (DTT) sociological theory around long before Hardin first advanced his views on hunger According to one prominent formulation of DTT population trends move through four distinct stages In the first the combination of a high birth rate and a high dth t d t d lti I th d t dth t dli hil b i t h t i hih l d i t hih lti th t I th t h i d bith t dli idl th dth t tl lti t i bt t h l I th fil t lti b tbl l bith t lll l dth t W h l i d th fit t and the declining population rates worldwide suggest that most of the world has passed the peak of the second stage Even those developing countries still in the second stage are ambling toward the third while countries in the highly developed W t l d ftbl t t l d i t th f t h I th lt t lti th t tbili hil d t h t dli Tht h tht d t "lt ' t " t t l lti th G l i d l t l t i i t th ltt t i hih l h t h l fili dh i h t d t h ll (H 1975 1 3 1 4 ) Th d h i t i t i th i bth t h t i l l libl d it ith th i i l dt It t h t i l libilit i l i i h d l have strong incentives to have large families especially in countries with poor medical care In an environment with high infant mortality rates people can rea sonably expect to have surviving children only by having many of them Having hild h i h d t f d th f i l ith b ki th fild ki i ihbi iti t l t th f i l i Th l th d ' l f i i ti itht il it C l ltil fflt ti d th hih i f t tlit d t h i iti d hild t l t th f i l i t f th old age Such countries also have high educational attainment Although education may enlighten students about the scope of the population problem its most powerful influences on population growth are indirect First postsecondary education delays i d tl d th b f hild b S d it t i l titi f f hildbi Thid l ith h i h d t i t d t h hih i d th l likl t d hild t id ld it F t h i t t ith l d t i th hild t bttill t i b t t th f i l fi i t d th d i i Fifth t t ith l d t i

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likl t h il it f th l d l All th ft i t ant in tightly knit traditional societies in which individuals are sustained not primarily by the nuclear family but by extended family and social groups (Caldwell 1976: 3 3 9 ^ 4 ) Th ft lltil li lti th t Th dit t h t l l i d t d l k i it d li i t ith h i h i f t tlit d il it th th ill h l fili C l hlth i i f t tlit d d t f d il it d tblih l d t i th b i t h t ill d l i dth t dli Th t h t i l diti h b borne out time and again by epidemiological facts (World Health Organization 1999: 3 2 3 ) The difference in population growth rates between countries is dra matic In 1998 rates in the lowest developed countries averaged 1 9 percent; in di d l d ti 16 t d i th h i h t d l d ti 06 t (Uitd Nti D l t P 2000 226) F i l l th H D l t Id ( ilti ff t flti hlth d i llbi) h i d ldid th t t t (Uitd Nti D l t P 2000 1 7 8 8 5 ) Thi t d l t ftl l l l th decline in the number of people starving (Bread for the World 2000: 4) The DTT is a theory well established in fact Hence we have compelling theoretical and empirical evidence that Hardin's pro l ld b likl t h th it lt t t h t d i t d Tht' t it i h t Aid t h t i l k t th t i li d did thi t h thi ll llbi iht ll h hi ditd lt It ld bl l th d t ft i t i di ffi H i d i t f d id d dil it ld ith d l t l it t h i it l i f t tlit t d i th d t i l tti t f it iti ld i t i f l fili d l th with incentives for smaller ones Since Hardin's position is both theoretically and empirically flawed we are left with two basic options As I stated at the beginning however I take the charity iti t b th d f l t T h t i if th l i t h t h t bliti t it t b d f d d th hld ld tht iti i ll i ibl b t t ll b l i t Whth t bliti b d f d d i ht ill d t i

St

Obliti

t

A i t

A responsibility to help the vulnerable Th tfili df l i i tht h t dt t it i i l that if we can alleviate people's suffering or prevent their dying at little personal cost then we morally ought to do it (Singer 1996/1972: 28) This seems especially plausible when those in need are in no way responsible for their own plight Since th h l i jit f th h i l d i h d hild

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h d i t i l l i t d l b l ( B d f th W l d 2000 1 0 0 2 ) then their need would arguably demand our assistance (LaFollette and May 1995) In this world we are mutually dependent We live in the conditions which constitute the "circumstances of justice" (Hume 1978/1740) OUR DEPENDENCES ON OTHERS

Althh l d i l l hild l b l th th ll f d d d t th N f i ld b hll lf ffiit M t f i tht t hd t f l t di B t that is only the beginning of the debt to our predecessors Our abilities to speak a language to read literature to appreciate art to live in cities to travel the world and to purchase the goods we want and need arose only because of the efforts of th h bf "It i f d t f l tht li iilid l i " (D 1988/1922 19) W liki d d t t i bth df Of i f l d b Ad Sith iht thik t h t l' b h i bfiti th i ll j t d i i d d i t d l f i t t I tht li hb h i I t t h i k t h t it li it ll Th b t evidence suggests a biological basis for altruistic tendencies (Ridley 1996; Sober and Wilson 1998) Had others acted solely out of their own interest wholly indif ferent to us and our vulnerabilities most of us would not be alive Had they largely i d lbiliti i h t b li bt i bttill diiihd diti Nti lik i d i i d l l l b l I th d i t t t ti h b ltil lfffiit N l N t i l b l t t h ' ti A th li d t lbl i t iditd h i l d d th ti t d i ith I d d th d l d t ' omy the more dependent it is on others although in many respects it may have immense power which masks that vulnerability For example the powerful econ omies of the United States Japan and Western Europe cannot survive without he i t d il d i l tht di thi ti i d t i (B 1974) O lbl k t l d d l I h t di t th i d f d i t t th i lit' f k l d i i l lbilit h i t It flt th f t t h t l b l l li i th i t fj t i (H 1978/1740 b k III ti II t II) O t difft dl i l i i f f li (Sh 1996 1 1 9 2 2 ) PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE

R b t Gdi tht bilit b t i O th til f Gdi

(1985) ff i t i i d fl i t f thi t H bliti t i t th l b l i t i iti i th l ld t tht i d ll il l ibiliti i f lit il bliti ill t t d i l t i l d bliti ( H t 1955 1 8 3 4 ) H thi l t i t dl t l i th t t t t

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f

t t h f bliti t fil d f i d dti f titd bliti ii f i t t d l f i l dti Th ti l f i l iht i f btt l i d ii f t h ' l bilit i lti t "It i lbilit h d d tht l th il l i ti il i b i l i t i " ( G d i 1985 107) Th l t i t dl t d t l l i th lt l t t h f dti t k i F i h thi i t tk l i i l l bidi d th l f l tilit At th ti b l i t d t flfill t h ' tti h th ill l b l t itht liit i t h l th Thi bliti d i f d i th l l d t i f t l (Gdi 1985 4 2 8 ) If G d i i iht tht h thi l d t th h l d h l th h ill l b l t t i l l h i t th t l t i l littl t t l Wh th ill l b l t th ti f ti th th d d i t i l thi b b il ibilit t h l ( G d i 1985 1 3 5 4 1 ) Thi t if l i b l ld b l t th i tht h bliti t th l b l ill i lltil d idiid ll i t th t l t i l littl tt l A d th f t i th li f A d i t B d f th W l d th U i t d S t t ld h l th b f it d th ld' h ith i t t f $6 billi j t lihtl th $20 ( B d f th W l d 2000 3) E if thi t i t ifltd b ft ft t h h td ti l l d ld h b i t i $100 US iti ith th t diiihi ti A d ith th ti f th t f th d l d ld ld ith th tibti likl d h d dit t d ll i i th l t f th th billi l h tl l i i i t l th $1 d ( W l d B k 2000 46) It difflt t i i ht t ld b t d t t t h t ( ) thi i t t i t th t h t t t h t (b) t l b l d t h bi ld t b illi t tht t It ld b i G d i ' d t th flfllt f llti didiidl ibiliti H th t d t t h l t h h ft it d O t l i t d d d th t lbilit f th th f d ttill t t t t t h t if d h h libti ld l i t h t h bliti t i t th t i A duty to rectify injustice M t d i i f ld h id th t i (Cllit 1996 f t h t th t i l hll i d d t f E D th " b l " ff i d h f "bli t i " (D dS ti t th l i h d t l

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h t h th ltil k thi liit) til ditt d i dS ft k thi i h d th " d " ( 1989 17) H thi d ithi t bt l

fflt hld Th i l i t t th k f t i t ) t t l t h h t th

WORLD HUNGER

ld It tht i ibl f t h i l i h t Y t if th assumptions are false then we arguably have a potent "negative" obligation to assist them to rectify the wrongs we helped create the suffering we sustain and the inequalities from which we benefit H ' h A d i t t lt h i h ill t ti bliti t t h If b t l h th h t t bliti t d tht h d i t k f i d d W h t t h i k t h t th f i fflt ti h tl d th l i h t f th d i h d tht til t i thi i h t d tht b f t f thi d i i i h d diti If any f th claims is true then we have not only the "ordinary" positive obligation to assist the vulnerable but also a negative obligation arising from the harm that we caused and/or sustain If all are true then the negative obligation would be very strong Lt l k t hi t WE CAUSED THEIR PLIGHT

The same economic social and political interdependencies that explain our mutual lbiliti t tht likl till d th t i l' liht Dii i t f th ld h i i l l h S i l b tidl W h d b t b t thi h th h t i h Wh OPEC hik li i it i t f lii d i f i t d Wh J b t t i f f it hit l l t Wh th h t d f th i tik ikl i tht t h ' decisions to sell or withhold goods or to increase tariffs negatively impacts on our economies Yet we conveniently forget the impact of our economies on others That is a factual and moral mistake For as potent as the actions of others are on us our ti i i f t f th Th W t i ill fl tht i l i i i f t ti h d t i fft ill Thid W l d ti Th fft lt difft i hih bl th ffi f th ld' i i h d l C i d t iti i l l I th fit l illi ldit it ith li Wh killd I cannot wash my hands of their deaths Although the lions and not I were the immediate cause of their deaths I am responsible since I placed them in this vulner able position Two I do not place gladiators into this arena Rather I "offer" men i th i th " t i " f b i ldit Id k i fll ll t h t i th l fi i th I ilt b l i i tht i th h l t d t fiht th li th I t ibl f thi d t h N th l b i thi t lbilit t t th t d ht ld d if th h d ti th I till ibl f h tht lt A i h bl k l d i thi if th vulnerable parties; why should we deny it when we are the exploiters? Arguably we (partially) caused the plight of the starving in one of these senses We are highly advantaged people whose economic social and political nstitutions " l l d l t l d i th i f th " (P 1997 505

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2000) M lti il t t i iti "h d fr i l h i t i l tht dd b i " (P 1997 509) T h t i h "W h l d tt l t h dil i l i t i i il t t i iti if th l l t i f th iti d d h i t i l i h i h ll i t t l ( d l l ) l d i i l i l i l t d " (P 1997 509) A d i t t d l th l t k f hih P k t d i l l Tht i h ldit l i ht d i l I tht I l d ( t i d ) th i t th ith th li H t i l h d d l t d th diti hih ld t t t i Tht i h i wholly ibl f th l i h t f th i i h d d t i O ld d lbl lt fr fl fft ildi th hi f billi f l t d d ti C t i l h ll b f l t d t i l l i i f t i thi l hi H l k il h d ht M f thi i lt ff th l h k I d t h W d t b th l f t t b (till) ibl f it Aft ll t i t l th l f t ti h l ithi ti t t d b k d diti (Ht d H 1973) ( h i h i h th OPEC ti t ll ibl f k k t i il i i t h ! ) If ll ibl l f th thi f hih th l th bl ld t b ibl f thi A d if ll ibl l f th thi f hih th d i t ld b ibl f littl N d b t l t h b k d diti ditbl tbl iht f l jtifid i ibi l ibilit f ti Bt tht i F t f ht i i t t i li th ti i t I solely predomint k did I antly ibl f h b t hth I responsible enough? W l sufficiently important l t h t it i t ttibt ibilit t t bl f itk ( d t t t t f t h ) t i f ? Lt i t l M t l i t l f ki h I N th l it ld b i t k t t h i k th hll ibl Th i d th f t f hih I k th f hih I i t D i t th f th th f t ld b f l i h t d t' l l i ki h I T f t hll ibl f th d fil f thi t d t T t h i k t h t th f h f th th d Thi i i t k tht bth d i i t t d t d t ft k Yt hld t th th t b i f i tht f t ibl t ll f t d t l i Th f t i t d t l i i f t i f it f f t f hih i l th f Th i hildlik t f tht t t l ll th l ibilit ( d i l l th l b l ) f hld lik tl diidi th ld i t th d d th b d Bt tht d t f l t th th ld k A th i l idit th f tht k h 248

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d th f tht t i i f i t litil il d i changes are not singular but arise from a convergence of factors That is true not only of work habits or student learning but also of special relevance to the current issue of endemic and episodic hunger I h t d t il d t i ' tibt l bf ti i i ibilit O k tht l d tibt l i ti th h th hld k l d til ibilit d h i h t d bliti t it t hl d th f f t f ht h d Si th i f th W t ld b t t i l l i f l l th Thid W l d tht llbi h t d t thi then we should accept some responsibility for their plight WE ACTIVELY SUSTAIN THEIR IMPOVERISHMENT

S

i h t t h i k it i t t t tht d th diti tht k i d d h likl E if t h t t ft ti tht ti th diti f th l i h d T th li l if I h d thi t d ith l i l i th ith th li bt b t l d hi f htl t i t f h t t h th ti til t th exploitative practice I am partly responsible for the death of the gladiators The relevance to world hunger is clear We are voracious consumers Because we want fresh fruits coffee and spices and we want them at a minimal cost we bi it b t ( ) t ( t i ) fft t t ' t bl l d f i t l f th l l t i iti f S t i thi i d t t i t th l l ( if d i d b th l l ih) i l l f th d d f th l i bt it ft d Fth i t f h d fiill d th b i i i litti hii ti i th T h i d W l d t h b till i th ffi f th l b l (Wolff 2001) We also politically support the international borrowing and resource privileges that burden democratic regimes with debts generated by former dictators and that allow those dictators to legally abscond with the country's natural re (P 2001) A l t h h i l l li b t th ( d th ltd) ti th f t t h t t th t h h ti d litil d i i h tht t i th i i h t f th t ff dt h b till thi t i t i WE BENEFIT FROM THEIR SUFFERING

Even if we do not actively support the systems that harm the impoverished most people in the Western world benefit from the poor's predicament and do nothing to t it I t h t l tibt t thi d i t i S iht li tht l l d l ibilit diiihd i i l fild t t th h I th t t h i tht i t i h If t t fil t l d t id ffdbl hlth t it hild th th t h d t h i illit ill h l t h if t fil t h t f i ith t l d i t th it i ibl f th d t h it ld h td Ad 249

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if I f i l t t lt thid t i l l if th t ik f i t i is minimal then most of us will say that my inaction contributes to any harm befalling the victim This is especially true if I benefit from that harm (the victim has me in her will) For then my refusal signals that my action is in some sense i t t i l Responsibility in the real world Th th t i t thik tht h ti i bilit t t h t th f th ld fd H th t though powerful are not beyond dispute Does this give us a reason to do nothing? Of course not We should act on the best evidence we have The degree of epistemo logical certainty we require before acting depends on the relative costs of action i t i Bf i i i l lti h th t t d i i l bl d d very t id f thi ilt H d t i t d t ld t h ti t d d W hld l th t d d f id h () ti i (b) h l d i th ibl f h th till ti ld remedy and (c) accepting responsibility for similar harms we partially cause sus tain or could remedy We use a more relaxed standard of evidence when accepting (and expecting) praise for our successes and when attributing blame to those who h W hld th t d d h d t i i ibilit f ti i t i If d th ill i l ibilit f th l i h t f th i i h d i ld A d if G d i (1985 1 2 6 7 ) i t tht d tb ll ibl f h t h t k ibilit t d h th h l d hl ill i d thi diti t l t i l littl tt l

Conclusion W h l t i l d t tht t h t bliti t b l t th llbi f th i l i i h d Fit h iti bli ti t i t th h l b l t ti S d l h t thik till ibl f th ffi f th ld' d h h t ti bliti t t fth h Thid ld f d them and ease their suffering and pain with relatively little effort If we do nothing in the face of these arguments we have reason to think that we are complicitous in the deaths of many people We might be wrong but when with only a relatively ll ifi id th d i d d ibilit t h t li l ' d t h th ll ht t t K i il h t t i l Dbtl i l t d idiidl h liitd t d th bl T d f d th ihd d llti ti d h i lbl ititti (Sh 1996 1289) S i f i l l if th t i th l t ti t th i t

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fft

hld b t ti i tht ti t h ' i t Th h l d () k t bi i t t i l fft t b t t (b) lbl (P 1997) t t d l t t h t ill k d i h ifl t f llti d () tblih t hih f f t i l dt idi h Likl t h h b litil fft ill t t i l d i h dti i i h d i k tht t likl t h t i th t th hld H hld l tibt t iti ith t k d i liiti h ti d l t d i th Th tibti ill i t th d th ill h th tht i b t th tl di t i t t i l h Th t t t hih hld i f t i l it i th i i b t th d hih lit b d d i (Willi 1985 K 1989 S h f f l H hi b d th f thi h t

A Thk

t t

Th

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Rf Aik W d L F l l t t H ( d ) (1977) World Hunger and Moral Obligation E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l Food Policy B b i k P (1987) R j i d t b l h t h i th ff i 12 (1) 5 9 MD B d f th W l d B d f th W l d (2000) A Program to End Hunger Sil S i Yk B L R (1974) In the Human Interest: A Strategy to Stabilize World Population N Nt Population and C l d l l J C (1976) T d t t t fd h i t i t i th Development Review 2 (3/4) 3 2 1 6 6 Population and (1997) Th l b l ftilit t i t i th df ifi th Development Review 23 (4) 80312 C k D (1996) H it dd l t I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) World Hunger and Morality 2 d d 21130 U Sddl Ri NJ P t i H l l Cllit G (1996) Th lif i l I W Aik d H L F l l t t ( d ) World Hunger 5169 U Sddl Ri NJ P t i H l l and Morality 2 d d Illii Ui D J (1988/1922) Human Nature and Conduct C b d l IL S t h it P D J d S A (1989) Hunger and Political Action O f d O f d U i i t P ( h t t / / l i f t / d / h / h O h t l ) ( d ) (1991) The Political Economy of Hunger: Entitlement and Well-being l I O f d Ofd U i i t P ( d ) (1991b) The Political Economy of Hunger: Famine Prevention l II O f d O f d U i i t P

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( d ) ( 1 9 9 1 ) Th Plitil E f H E d i H l IE O f d Ofd U i i t P Flth J (1977) Gi if it h l bt t if it h t I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Ml Obliti 1 0 3 1 4 E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l G d i R E (1985) P t t i th V l b l A R l i f S i l Ribiliti Chi U i i t f Chi P Hdi G (1996/1974) L i f b t thi th i t hli th I W Aik d H L F l l t t ( d ) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 515 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l H t H L A (1955) A th t l i h t ? Philhil Ri 64 1 7 5 9 1 dH T (1973) C t i i th L Ofd C l d P H D M (1975) S i t dP l t i 2 d d E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l H i J (1999) Gd i Gd Th Citlit Pi Gid t I t i N Yk H C l l i H D (1978/1740) A Tti fH Nt 2d d Ofd Ofd U i i t P I t i f f M (1985) Th Nd f St N Y k Viki K S (1989) Th Liit f Mlit Ofd Ofd U i i t P LFlltt H dM L (1995) Sff th littl hild ibilit dh I W Aik d H L F l l t t ( d ) Wld H d Mlit 7084 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l Li X (1996) M k i f th riht t f d I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 15370 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l MKil M (1981) O b l i t i t th t i N 15 3 0 9 2 4 N J (2000) L i b t r i i I H L F l l t t ( d ) Th Blkll Gid t Ethil Th 30624 O f d B l k l l P i k h K S (1991) C h i h i th ld i t fi t t i l lii I J D d A S ( d ) Th Plitil E f H E t i t l t d Wllbi l I Ofd Ofd U i i t P P T W (1992) A i t i t t i l h t h i t t i Pbli Affi Q tl 6 (1) 8 9 1 0 3 (1997) A l b l diidd I D C k d T Lid ( d ) Ethi f C ti 50138 T t NJ R d Littlfild (2000) I t t i l iif fh iht J l f Ethi A 4 5 6 9 (2001) O l b l i jti MthUh 32 6 2 4 (2001b) P t i h i t r i i t t i I I Crt d M R i d i (d) F d P d Plitil Mlit E f Fli O h i L d Pl Ridl M (1996) Th Oii f Vit L d Viki Shffl S (1992) H Mlit Ofd Ofd U i i t P S A (1981) P t dF i A E E t i t l t dD i t i Ofd Ofd U i i t P Sh H (1980) Bi Riht Sbit Affl d US F i Pli P i t NJ P i t U i i t P (1996) S l i d r i t t d th riht t f d I W Aik d H LFlltt ( d ) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 11322 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i Hll Si P (1977/1972) F i ffl d lit I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Ml Obliti 2 2 3 7 E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l (1996/1972) F i ffl d lit I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) Wld H d Mlit 2d d 2638 U S d d l Ri NJ P t i H l l

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Sober E and Wilson D S (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Sobham R (1991) The politics of hunger and entitlement In J Dreze and A Sen (eds) The Potitical Economy of Hunger: Entitlement and Well-being vol I Oxford: Oxford University Press United Nations Development Program (2000) Human Development Report 2000 Oxford: Oxford University Press (http://wwwundporg/hdro/) Watson R A (1977) Reason and morality in a world of limited food In W Aiken and H LaFollette (eds) World Hunger and Moral Obligation pp 115-23 Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Williams B A 0 (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Cambridge MA: Harvard Uni versity Press Wolff J (2001) Economic competition: should we care about the losers? In H LaFollette (ed) Ethics in Practice 2nd edn Oxford: Blackwell World Bank (2000) World Development Report 2000/2001 Oxford: Oxford University Press (http://wwwworldbankorg/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/indexhtm) World Health Organization (1999) World Health Report Geneva: World Health Organization (2000) World Health Report Geneva: World Health Organization (http://wwwwhoint/ whr/2000)

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O

d i i b t b i ith Th Hbb i f i i l it t l th bl d b th d i h lif H b b t h h t t h t i l td h i i iil diti (hi " t t f t " ) tht id t i l thi t l iht t l f t t i i d t t sole right of the sword His solution to the problem posed by lence of the state of nature is to monopolize the potentiality Th lti

Hbb iil it l f il i iil t l i t l t i ith th the widespread vio for violence in one

h f d t i i thi d i f f t hll thi Hbb' litil h i l h f ti t i bl bt it t id l l lti t th bl f il it ld d t th t f tblihi lifti f ( l t ) b l t i Th ld bbl f t h th ( H b b lid) i t f manent hostility akin to the war of all against all with which his problematic begins This "anarchy" of the international order thus poses almost intractable difficulties for the peace that Hobbes took to be a primary objective of the laws of t df hih i t id th t Hbb t b hld t b l f th i t t d d i l h t d t t t bld f N th l hi d i t i t i t f bth i t d jti bt th i t l l t l d i f f l t i f i ith th t d A d th d i f f l t i th t h t i l Hbb' h i l h fl d th d l t f"lit" t h i fi t t i l lti tht h t hd i t dil d litil ti I thi difft ways the names of those avowed "realists" Henry Kissinger and George Kennan stand testament to this impact Not that modern realist thinkers have always pro moted war over peace but their theoretical posture tends to make them misunder t d d i t t th l til d d i t i ibiliti f th i t t i l F Hbb t l i th i itll b l t b t it l d f th t fj t i i h thi th i d b j t H t it i j t i i t hi bjt th i d thi bjt H it i t ii t h t th id fj t i dijti i th i t t i l

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d th i t d id fj t d j t i i ttti from him His attitude is neatly captured in his famous remark: "Where there s no common power there is no law: where no law no injustice Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues" (Hobbes 1968: 188) Elsewhere this bleak verdict is d t d b th t Th i t b d fijti bt i l t th l f t d b bl t G d f h t Hbb ll i i i t Th th i h ti bliti l t th d i b d bf Gd t f t th t t f t l l C t l t t ld b ld t dtil d l d N Hbb' lifti t i t d t th lit f b i i f hi brief discussions of honor cruelty and necessity in war allow some minimal room for moral restrictions on how a war is conducted (Hobbes 1969: 78) Hobbes's qualifications mirror the twofold division of discussion within the justwar tradition th fit d ith th lit it t t t t ll d th d ith th lit t h t h l d th i f h t Th f i ft l l d jus ad beUum d th l t t jus in bello. Th H b b i i i i dti th f l h f th jus ad bellum i th thi f f " i d " (i d t f i h t ) d th d d i diti f th jus in bello reflected as the (largely unspecified) requirements of honor This suggests that the totally amoral attitude to war much discussed by philoso phers is in reality exceptional both theoretically and even practically If we regard j t thiki d ith th ljtifti ( l k f it) f fhti th l t ift d ihilit i thi i not j t t h i t Y t it b t dititi d t t t d th t id W d b t t t t th it d b bt t i t th t "jt t h " t tht b t fjtifti tht i l th t d i t i f thiki b t d th i t t i l i t fjti Thi t d i t i i b t i t d t Cthli thik t h h f th h i f l d t development It might be more accurate to see it as an outgrowth of natural law theory since many of the significant thinkers in its development in the West were natural lawyers such as Vitoria Suarez and Grotius who were also founding f i th d i i l i fi t t i l l N th l St A t i i hdl t l l t h i t i M i h l Wl Y t it i b d l t tht t t h i t t t thi hibiti d l h i th tiliti t i l i t bit Utilit d i d d i t t i d i i th lit f (h ld th f i l t b ? ) t it i hd h th i t i fjti i d d f it i t i t tk b d th Bt more of this below

The Just War: Jus ad Bellum A l t h h it i t tlk f " j t t h " th d f thiki iditd i b d tditi th i l ifd i t l l t l ti It i l lik th th f th t i l i t i d lik lit N th l ti l d i i k d

t h b t d I

ill

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bi ith d i t f th tht right to go to war: the jus ad helium. 1 2 3 4 5

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War must be declared and waged by legitimate authority Th tb j t f i t W tb l t t Th tb bl t f Th i l d tb t i l t th bi

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E h f th diti i bl W hll bifl i f th diffi culties with conditions (3)(5) and then comment more fully on condition (2) Conditions (3) and (5) are specifications of a commonsense understanding of the rational limits to selfdefense Given the ambiguous benefits and definite risks of t f il d th i h t t d it h t b d t l th id f "lt t" it th d i b i l i t f ti h t f N th l th diti t i tht ti t tt l ti S f th ill b t b d t ft it h t i d every th dti th dl th i i t b l t th d i d t f t cause Last resort requires the use of imagination and some degree of risktaking n the search for reasonable alternatives to war but it does not counsel peace at any price Hence it will be a matter of practical judgment whether the relevant alterna ti t h b h t d M it h l d tb f t t tht f th l t t i t h thi i l t i illttd b i d i h t t ith th h t f ti t f ti Th i t f tilit th jus ad bellum d th jus in bello d i i t tht lthl il hld t b l d itht idti f th bl bt th il it b i d th dt b hid i iti il Th i h l t f llti b t th lt ti ality is not fullbloodedly consequentialist This is because its focus is narrower We are not asked to consider whether going to war is the best thing for the universe all things considered but whether the foreseeable costs of this resort to violence are t f kilt ith th i i l b h i it k t d Cid th i t t ddfit F h i t i it ht id Elih fihi t i 1992 id b l l l fF h il (tti Elih t d may j t i f h i l t t fibl d i Elih b t littl) Thi ff Bitih b d i fi t i F h fihi b t b t it ld t i l t li th tt f l l l Condition 4 is also a reflection of common sense but at an even more basic level since it is merely an application to warfare of an apparently fundamental condition of rational action Normally one is irrational to engage in a plan with ittle or no id t f Y t th d t i t i hih dt t i t th dd Th ti lib h f dit f l h b t i l t t t t th l i h h thik it likl h k it I th f fiht i t th dd b jtifibl h th t k hih h fl i d t i d t l t bt l Thi l i b l b t it d t ft di 256

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ti 4 h i btl i t t t i f " b l " F th desperate mountain climber it may be reasonable to attempt the unlikely jump and so too for those resisting slavery against "hopeless" odds But what if the odds really are hopeless? The climber confronts not just a crevice but a sheer cliff with no other id t h d th it f h l i iht d b L i th l i b t hi dil id th ilit S ld t h t th i t i h i h fiht t th d t h i fbl t itlti Thi h t libilit h th i b t l t t i t i Bt ld t d th i t fth t th bli ti f t i l h M i h l Wl t d i hi d i i f Fild' "futile" war of defense against the Soviet Union in 1 9 3 9 4 0 What these argu ments show is that the concept of "success" is open to complex interpretations At first blush one naturally takes it to mean winning the war but the counter l t th N th l h i h b i t t d i th f t i l h t t t f ti b t lf i l t i f it k Cditi 2 i j t l h it ii i ititi bt i it i t t t i i bl Th diff bt th ld tradition and much contemporary theory The medieval tradition of the ust war stems primarily from St Augustine and was generally more permissive though sometimes the differences are only terminological The classical texts as both John (1975) d B (1992) k l t d d t ll id f th d th lik M i h l W l ' th tht ld b t t d f th UN C h t Th d i l iti i titi th i t h l b t it i l i t i t f ilit i t t i th df i t i A th t d i l H Gti t t "th f hih i th f hih l i t i " (Gti 1925 171) Y t it i l tbl tht G t i ' b t discussion stresses the centrality of selfdefense and response to aggression (Grotius 1925: 7 0 4 ) Barnes asks whether medieval theory sanctioned what he calls "humanitarian w a r s " such as one waged against a government that is injuring ts iti H li t h t th l t t f th th t t thi b t t h t th iit i i t it dh t S i l i " h t t tht i ki h t ih i j i th hl ld i l t t h fl d f d ll d d dititi f i d i t i " (B 1992 779) Thi i bth i t t i h i t i l d btti thil ti O th h i t i l ti it i th ti t h t B t f the very late medieval theorists the sixteenthcentury Jesuit Suarez to make his point It is possible to argue however that by the time of the Spanish theologians Suarez and Vitoria the spirit of the theory had begun to change partly under their ifl A l t h h th d f lfdf hd l l d l i liti ti t t A i d th hd l l l d i " i j i " f lii t H i i t t t h t i l l t thd t hth didt f t Bth Viti dS dlt Gti i t liit f t h h it i libl t th tdi t th b i i f t d

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titi ttitd t j t (Gti 1925 5 1 6 1 7 5 5 3 4 S 1944 Vitoria 1991) The current ban on "aggressive war" can be seen for all its obscur ity as the outcome of such a development The strength of this ban is also of course connected with the rise of the modern tt d th d t i f i t tht h i d it I d d t d i i f ht i lld " h i t i i t t i " tk t i t i t h t th l i t ilit i t t i i th i t l ffi f th tt t i i l th d t i f i t it d l d i d ft th T t fW t h l i tht t d t th W fRlii i 1648 Th tti f S k it l h tht l ti against armed intervention in the affairs of other peoples predates Westphalia and is based on considerations other than the apparent sanctity of sovereign rights n the modern sense Hence any presumed breakdown in the modern conceptual f k f i t h th d l t f " d i t i l i t " ff l i th f l li f i t t i th i i i l b l i d Adittdl th t bh f " i " h th iti th t i f " i " i l i d t litti None the less the moral power of the idea of defense against aggression comes from the moral significance of selfpreservation and particularly selfdefense It is not a uniquely modern concept as Anscombe (1970) for instance seems to believe (see b l ) i it b f d itll t ti l h ti b t th l i t i f id S f l k l dititi bt i d i ( d f i ) d f l it t k il f th l i t i f i (S 1944 8025) M i t Chi d i i f th lit f if ll dt j t th l i t i f i d l t h h th t f i t ki ht difft f tht h i d i th UN C h t it is a recognizable relation (Tzu et al 1964) The basic moral intuition draws much of its appeal from the legitimacy of personal resort to selfdefense Hobbes for instance treats the legitimacy of self ti th f d t l iht f t Th til bl t l t i f th f i d i i d l t tht f t i t t di l i dti t f t i l iht b t h th t t i l l d f d i it l th th it h th f lit th th t i h lbl f M it i t th it f th t i tht h hd i t d i t i l d i i If ti i ti titld t th f l violence in its own defense then surely other nations may come to its aid as long as their objective is to help repel the attack and no more This parallels what seems allowed with regard to aid in the case of individuals Of course in both the domestic d th i t t i l ht i b t t l ll iibl i t th hl t Th b fl dtil f t hli th d f d t h l Wh th S i t U i i d d H dlt C h l k i th ld t d b i i l l b f f f l d th f liti h t l t t k bl f h ii i t i 258

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defense against aggression

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ld t t jtti th t f i d t i l l h poses since her argument seems to presume the existence of a struggle in which actual blows have not yet been struck though they or something like them have been extensively prepared for So some form of aggression (different from the UN dl) h d l d b i th f l i t i t ti d i d li Bt i t t i t l f "th fit bl i th t l " ld f t th i bl tht iitit d flit Thi i td b l ith h i h A b i t d th d i i l th i l t B i t i h i f th l t d d P l t ( A b 1970 43) H h clearly has in mind justifying resort to war by the idea of suppressing some grave evil in the international order even where it constitutes no aggression of any sort against your state Taken with her remark about "the only question" being that of " h i i th i h t " thi k t t th li d t d i f j t It ld th id f ilit i t t i i th tt' ffi d t fl t d ti t l il h ti f i i t F l l i t fhi lt ll th di itti " h i t i " Th t h i l h ' f t i wars in Uganda Cambodia Somalia and Kosovo have recently shown Support for humanitarian warfare strengthened amongst philosophers and other theorists at the end of the twentieth century though politicians were generally less thiti S h i t i h d th th f th i dl t h d l b t th t d t t t ii t t i t d t th j t d t b t t d ith i Th i ti i t th l lidit f t t i ht k f th h i t f f f th t d t t i it l d th d b i ti tht h ft f l d it F th th d l t fj t th h b i l f ltiti l i t i t i f O i f f lii f trade and imperialist wars and of what tends to happen when one nation conquers another "for its own good" speak against allowing expansive accounts of "just cause" (compare Walzer 1977: 1 0 2 5 ) Thi id fl bjti t h i t i b t th f t i t h t th b t tht hll th bjti Wl t t th Idi i i f B l d h i 1971 h h th i t t i t t th f lti b ht i l l it t Th V i t i i fC b d i b iil th T i fU d t h h th h i t i f th ti i th h b l th happy Anscombe's example of the use of violence against "the manstealing busi ness" is another case that has good claims to exception from the ban though the example is complex because it sometimes involved armed action against criminal d i d b thi t At th ti h tbl th f B i l th B i t i h d i t l iltd f i i t ( C l d 1964 h 6) A t t t t d l ith i th h i h i d ti th hijki f i f t i iil liti A thid ltd bl ith th i d l i t h t it tifi iti t i l t t t Citi k h h l d these b d i d these 260

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tt b i h t? Th ti i i ddd f b th i which colonization and decolonization have created states with whimsical boundar ies This is not the place to engage in a fullscale discussion of sovereignty national determination nationalism and the justification for state authority but we can t t thi O i tht id f i t tht i b l t i it f tid i l t h d h d k l th t ld th d i tht i t h l i f d i till ll i d h i f d l iti iif b th bjt t t H tid i t i tt h ll i t t i d ill ft f d l d litil bl Th f h i t i d t b conscious of these drawbacks (For objections to Michael Walzer's restrictive view of the right to humanitarian intervention see Doppelt 1978: 3 2 6 ; Wasserstrom 1978: 5 3 6 4 5 ; Luban 1980: 1 6 0 8 1 ; also Beitz 1979: 4 0 5 2 4 Walzer has since b thti t i t t i d tl t f hi iti h hiftd h t i th th d i t i Wl 1992 i i 1995 L b d)

Th Jus in Bello Moral restrictions on how one conducts oneself in war are apt to be met with incredulity "You do what needs to be done to win" is a common response There is ti l i thi ti t l k b t it fli i th f t l f t thiki bt f h t Th t f t i t f i t h d l i thiki E tht t h i th US G l Chk Y ffd i l li t d t it " t i t i " t h t h i d l i d ith i W l d W n H ill " t d" f hi t i th i d i i i t t f f 50squaremile area of Germany (Yeager and Janos 1986: 8 9 9 0 ) The idea that there are nonlegitimate targets amongst "the enemy" is the basis of one of the two primary rules of the jus in bello: the principle of discrimination Th th i th i i l f tilit th ti f hih l l l it k i th jus ad bellum f th ti t b i d bth b t hth th tt i t i l t ij d hth tti i t i t t it j t d fft A j t f th d i i i t i i i l th i i t f b t t f d i t t t k Thi i k i t t hih tiliti h t th j t i f t i f t d t t ith th l i l j t tditi Either they deny that the principle obtains at all or more commonly they argue that it applies in virtue of its utility The former move is associated with the idea that war is such "hell" and victory so important that everything must be subordin td t tht d bt i tiliti t it i l t h t thi f f thl h th b t t ill h it i h d b th i id H th i t t h t th i i t f b t t i fl l f titi th d ht b N t i l i t i (I h l l ll th " i t i i l i t " b th bli t h t th i t i i th th fili t i i d) t h t th h t i i 261

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f th i i t l b t th ill thi f t i i f i t dditil reason to conform to the principle Intrinsicalists will argue that the principle's validity springs directly from the reasoning that licenses resort to war in the irst place This resort is allowed by the need to resist perpetrators of aggression (or on th b d i t dl ith d ) d h it li il l i t th t Thi i th it bhid d i t i i h i b t t f b t t i th t i l d di t I thi t t h lif l b t t i t d t t h t th h il i t h i h t lk thi f thi t ' lii d t h t th b t t h h il thi Th lifiti concerned with the role the individual plays in the chain of agency directing the aggression or wrongdoing And it is agency not mere cause that is important since the soldier's aged parents may be part of the causal chain that results n his being ilbl t fiht i t h t t h i h i t ibilit f h t h i di Th b t t b d t fiht b t h h i till ti th if th t bl li ith th h O th th h d th hlhild b thiti b t h t' bt i t ti t Nith i th f h d t f d th t f h ld f d th (if they'd buy) whatever their role But even when these distinctions are made there seems room not only for doubt about the application of the distinction to various difficult categories of person such l lb dt ki iti f t i b t l it libilit t ll t th h i h l i t t d iti f d tt It i l h i t i t thik f t d bt i it i ll ti i t ti i t l i t l Bt l t h h d h lft it " t t l " t i i d t t i th flti f h d lit E i W l d W II t iti b t t I th i illi f l h are not plausibly seen as involved in the enemy's lethal chain of agency There are for instance infants young children the elderly and infirm lots of tradespeople and workers not to mention dissidents and conscientious objectors Moreover the dl f t t l tht d i thi b j t i i i t l f t d t d Th i f th 1990 t tht f th f t likl t i l h l dl M ill b lik th lli i t I d th i t t i i t Sbi K ht Mihl Itiff h lld " i t l " (I tiff 2000 200) Oth lik th d t i Si L k ill b i t t b l iil N b t t ill f b t t d b t th i t believe that we can never tell who they are In fact there has been a remarkable change on this issue in the strategic doctrine and military outlook of many major powers since the end of the Cold War It is now t t l t li i t th i i l i d d b ti t i t h di th Glf W d th b b i f Sbi d b th i d d d t i fR i btlit i Chh Th l ti i t h h t h it i i l t t t b t t (it i ) b t h " l l t l " d ddth t b t t b d f d d Thi l bl i j t f th i i l f d b l f f t Thi th ft ld b tt f 262

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l l d f th h i f b t t i i t f but unintended sideeffect of an otherwise legitimate act of war The "circum stances" included the proportionality of the sideeffect to the intended outcome Not everyone agrees with the principle (and this is not the place to discuss it in detail) b t th d t f i t i t i ll i i b l l th tiiti f i l l d t t b t t t ik i ti i t S difiti t th i i t i i l t ll d i t h i t b i li ith lit i th f lif d t b i t t d b th i t f If it i t i l b l th ifi Hl (1989 193203) h d th l l ti

Terrorism F

h tht h i d d it d di t i i i l d i f f i l t t dfi It h b t i t d t h t th ll h d d d i f f t dfiiti ft i i th h l l litt (L 1999 5) Thi di f l t th f t t h t h di l i th t highly polemical so that the act of defining becomes a move in a campaign rather than an aid to thought Consequently many definitions are too broad to be of analytical value conflating terrorism with any form of violence the authors disap f R t h th t i l i i th iti f dfiiti I t t t k l t i t df b t t i l th id t h t it i l " i t " iti Thi id it f ti ith th l t fj t th i f i l l th i i l f d i i i t i d it i t f b t t i i t Of t i d t l tk l i th t t f l l t i t t i l bt t usually has a warlike dimension I will define it as follows: "the use of violence to target noncombatants ('innocents' in the jus in bello sense) for political purposes" This definition has several contentious consequences One is that states can them l t i th i t h t h litil il b tt t ill t b t i t A t th f th i t d ill t th tti f tt t t i t th ibilit f t i t t t tt t B t if thik f t i i th l i h t f th d f i i t i b tti th th idl thi t d hld b itd i tt d d th t t i f ttki th i t S t h i t h thik t i t b t t d b t t h f d ti ith different definition They define terrorism somewhat in the spirit of Hobbes as he use of political violence by nonstate agents against the state Some would restrict it to violence against a democratic state This is the way many political scientists view t i d t l t i th f d t i t t th it ll C l l thi th litil dfiiti t t t ith th t t i l d f i i t i A fth f th t t i l d f i i t i i t h t it i l i d f i tht t i i t h h t t l k S t h i t h l i d tht t i i till " d " th t h t it i till " i " I bth th l i i t h t f t litil i i i t I l t i

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b d tht tlk f t i d i t d b th i tion that it does not restrict its targets to the obvious military ones but this does not mean that it is wild and purposeless Indeed most terrorists think that the best way to get certain political effects is to aim at "soft" noncombatant targets Simi l l th b d b t tht t i t ttk i d bli i l i th ffiti f th t t i t d "W till h tk ti f " Y t th i d t l d th i th ti "Tht' t t l k " h b d i d t di d tt ft S t i t t b d bth i d litill i It i fth ti h t h th t i l l l i t i Th id tht terrorist acts are merely expressive is partly sustained by the belief that when viewed as purposive the acts are basically futile The futility is often real enough but purposive acts abound that are in fact futile Th t t i l d f i t i f th bl l d d i d i th i f th t " b t t " bt tl I ill i t tb il i d t i f i b l b t t d ill kt lit l th ill d l l i h b i t t i th i t h b b l i thi tt b t t O th th h d tt ffiil h t ditl ecuting the campaign against the insurgents may be plausibly viewed as implicated in the grievances the revolutionaries are seeking to redress There are certainly problems here but they do not seem insurmountable In the heat and confusion of b t t l it b diffilt dd t t t hild b t t ill h hild d d d it b t t l ( i i t flit) N th l dittd i fb b i i l h i t l t id iili l k f ti ith b l i th d fi f t d th t t i lbl ilti f th jus in bello. S f tt ffiil h t thiti tffi li h l ll t t i l l l t d t th f th flit It i t tht i d l i purport to have enemies so comprehensive as to make even small children and helpless adults into "combatants" Western advocates of "totalwar" strategic bombing of cities share with the Islamic fanatics who incorporate American air t l l d d iti fM h t t i t thi h l t t iliti d M i h ii f th ld t h t i t dd ith th j t tditi' t t t t bi l it t b th f litil il I t i ? Gi j t th d th t t i l d f i t i th i l l A d if t k th i i l f b t t i i t t k b l t l hibiti j t thik h l d th it i always wrong Yet many contemporary moral philosophers sympathetic to ust war thinking are wary of moral absolutes They would treat the prohibition as expressing a very strong moral presumption against terrorism and the targeting of b t t b t ll f ti i t i t S Mihl Wl thik t h t i diti f " " th ilti f th l i i t i iibl i f t h h l ith h b d f ( t d i t t i ) H t h i k th Allid t b b i f G iti i W l d W II (i th l t ) l i t i t d b th it f th N i t h t J h R l h tl d d thi i hil d i 264

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th

b b i i t t i

f Hihi i l l d t th t "

tt

d N k i it Th l "

(Wl

1992 it

l t k

t d t t b l

t

R l ll litil

1999) If thi it t tt t tht h j d t

Rf A

b G E M (1970) W d d I R W t ( d ) War and Morality B l t CA W d t h B J (1992) Th j t I N Kt t l ( d ) The Cambridge History of Later Cbid U i i t P Medieval Philosophy C b i d B i t C (1979) B d d lit j t i d th t t i ld liti International Organization 33 4 0 4 2 4 C l d R (1964) The British Anti-slavery Movement ith it b J F N Yk B d Nbl D l t G (1978) W l ' th f lit i i t t i l l t i h i Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 3 2 6 Gti H (1925) The Rights of War and Peace (De jure beUi ac pads libri tres) l 2 d F i W Kl ( i b 1682) O f d C l d P Hbb T (1968) Leviathan d C M h H d r t h P i (1969) The Elements of Law: Natural and Political 2 d d d F d i d T i ith it b M M Gldith L d C Hl R (1989) On War and Morality P i t NJ P i t U i i t P I t i i f M (2000) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond N Y k M t l i t B k Jh J (1975) Ideology Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740 P r i t NJ P i t U i i t P L W l t (1999) The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction N Y k Ofd U i i t P Lb D (1980) J t dh riht Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 1 6 0 8 1 ( d ) Intervention and Civilisation: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War ( b l i h d it i t d t th) R l J (1999) Fift ft H i h i I S F ( d ) Collected Papers 56572 Cbid MA H d U i i t P S i d i k H (1898) Th lit f trif I Practical Ethics L d S S h i dC S F (1944) Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez l 2 d J Stt Ofd C l d P T H T H F dT M (1964) Basic Writings of Mo Tzu Hsun Tzu and Han Fei Tzu t B Wt N Y k C l b i U i i t P U i t d Nti (1974) General Assembly Ruting 3314 N Y k U i t d N t i d V i t r i F (1991) Political Writings: Francesco de Vitoria d A P d dJ L Cbid Cbid U i i t P Wl M (1977) Just and Unjust Wars N Y k Bi B k (1992) Just and Unjust Wars 2 d d N Yk B i B k (1995) Th liti f Dissent 42 1 W t R (1978) R i f Just and Unjust Wars Harvard Law Review 92 5 3 6 4 5 Y C dJ L (1986) Yeager L d A B k

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Further reading Chang, Iris (1998) The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. London: Penguin. Coates, A. J. (1997) The Ethics of War. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Gray, J. Glenn (1998) The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press. Paskins, Barrie and Dockrill, Michael (1979) The Ethics of War. London: Duckworth. Ritchie, R. (1986) Pirates: Myths and Realities. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Shue, Henry (ed.) (1989) Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Teichman, Jenny (1986) Pacifism and the Just War. Oxford: Blackwell. Villar, R. (1985) Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980. London: Conway Maritime Press.

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d

S i

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T h h i tilit t i l l h it bjt f l idtifti t d th d (3) h ti Aft lii f th t " t i til ttti t th t h i d

i th li (1) ti (2) t i l h il bliti h iht t litil l f d t i t i i " I ill i h f th ti li d it i l i t i f i

What is a Nation? 0

i ti i l t l f l h idtif ith th d ith h k d f litil l f d t i t i U d t d thi ti h th t ff t l t l h l i l d litil C i d hi t Nations are cultural groups in that their members must share some combination of the following attributes: language religion dress territory ethnicity holidays values etiquette history traditions crafts arts and social mores This is not an h t i lit i f th f t ith ffit A 1 d t d it ti i l t t tht d i f f t lif ti i it f h i i f t i f th h t i t i d th f t b l i t t t difft ti Wh ki F h i t t th Q b i l i t th S i f i t It i t h h l bjtil t h th ttibt th common characteristics must make a subjective difference To qualify as a nation a group's members must view themselves and others as belonging to the group n virtue of these common characteristics Thus the Basques might constitute a nation h th llti fl f t h d d h l d l ld t b l th f f f i t l idtif ith th T i l l thi i d t i f t i i h tht ill t l tk id i th ( d b h d f th f i l ) f h fll t i l h ill l i k l d h l f h i il tdi h t i l tdi hih i l il iht d ibiliti A i C t i f l i likl t f l ll 267

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titd d ll b l i t d t it th C t i bf h ld b inclined toward a similarly imperiled nonnational Finally a group must either have or seek political selfdetermination At its ex treme a nation might have or covet its own state but this is not necessary Less d t i l l l t l h k l il tt ithi l l t i t i l tt T i l l ti lbb f il l lii t iht Nti A i i th U i t d S t t d C d i l f ith d i t i t i litil t t Bf i lt t t h t thi ti f ti i l t l th th t t i t I th d hil it i t f t litil it ti I do not Thus on my view Kurds qualify as a nation even though they have no sovereign state of their own; most states are multinational in so far as they house more than one nation; and a "nationstate" is a country with only one nation J b l

Nti

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Nationalists point to the great diversity of circumstances in which national senti ment flourishes as evidence that it is natural to identify with one's conationals They typically not only suggest that there is nothing irrational about fastening ' t i l b h i t f ' l i th ld th ll fth t h t th ld b thi i i t b t not t k i id i d fli h d f th ti f t i l W f d t l l il bi d t i ltth d t d b l tht h l d dfi l t l t till i t f l t t h t N t i l i t t d t h t it i fitti t h t hld k th f l th l f ti t d th f dh il f t i l W t ll lik th i t diversity of ways to approach life and it is natural and appropriate to feel most comfortable with and interested in those who share one's values customs and l i f lif I h t th i thi i b t idtifi ith fll t i l Citi t d tht t i l i ' t l d t h tht ti li i i d i d b h t T th t th ik E t Gll (1983) i t i t h t it i t i t h ibl l ithi th l i i t i litil d i diti f d i t O thi t tili k it ld t h d l th i i environment had fostered occupational mobility common educational systems as well as the widespread literacy and mass media which this type of educational system allows What is more critics argue that nationalism is a regrettable phe hih h l d ti t Albt E i t i k f h h td tht tili i "iftil d i " bl t th " l f k i d " (Bk 1990 144) A d i t th d t t t i l t i t i i t i l titi i hih i l l t t i th d fil f th if th ' Th i thi ith t k i id i ' di t i i ' ft bt h hld 268

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tk id i th i t i th f t f th l ? If th accomplishments are someone else's it just seems wrongheaded to take pride n them as if they were one's own And since the future of other people affects them rather than oneself it seems the very picture of irrationality to ignore one's own it i f f th i f l d ti N t i l i t ld d b thi b j t i b it tl li i l t i t i t f h tilit A h idtifid ith l h idiidliti j t i ibl bt h ld t i k t f b t h dd d li I i h flt ti t h ibli d l t f i d f i t Wht h l d thik f h was no more moved by her best friend's winning a Nobel Prize than if a stranger had won it? Indeed just asking the question reveals that one could not really be said to have close friends unless one is somehow personally invested in them These idti i d i t tht hld j t t f tilit hih i t b i d i f f t t ll b t idiidliti it Th f t tht l l d i t l idtif ith i t h h l t t h t d th hld k t l i f th ti fl t d th This alone however is not enough to exonerate nationalism To defend national sentiments fully one must explain why conationals are like friends and family appropriate objects of personal identification The problem is that whereas we have t i l l t i h i ith i t i t d t k th t jit f th i ti Th it i f kti f tili t d th it fidtifi ith fil b d till ti th tilit ffli td t t i l I th d b k ldi th i t f l l t i h i i li th iti f tili id th h f t i itht b d i h ttk N t i l i t h d d t thi h i t i t d bjti i i but one prominent approach is to admit that nations are "imagined" communities and then suggest that they are none the less real communities and appropriate objects of personal identification (Anderson 1983) The first thing to note is that t f h " i i d " ti i th d th l ith h idtif d i t h i l l t i h i ith th R l l h l i t l d b Pi D i ' dth f i t All th ld l h hd t Di i d h h did A l t t i l ti h itd l t b t ti t b i t d i th t t h h h l l t i h i ith f the participants That is to say we often root for a team and experience varying degrees of joy or disappointment when "our" team wins or loses As these examples illustrate there is nothing extraordinary about the "imagined" l t f t i l iti Still iti iht i i t tht d i t bi ll i i d ti i t i l it i i b t tilit t l i th it f idtifi ith t i l h t H I t h i k th tilit' t ii i t li h t i l h l t i h i ki t t h t t t Thi l i hlfl b f t h t th i thi t b t f l l f l i

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t t I d d b f th l l t i h i hih when people work together for a common goal teammates typically form close friendships which transcend normally unbridgeable differences in social economic or cultural background Nationalists can invoke the relationship among teammates b th i i hih t i l i i d " t t i lif" C t i l t t i lif i f th h i fh h l d li ' lif T h t i ti l l i t t i it f btl d t b t l h t li d lif Thi ti f th d lif k t i l lik t t b (i th i bl d i f f t t li ' lif f hih tb kd di t objective criteria) ways of life are appealing to the extent that they enable their adherents to flourish As a result the extent to which my way of life strikes me as sensible and worthwhile depends upon the degree to which I and those who live like me f l i h Th if I d ll f th h b fbi i th ld t l i t fd i i t h i li th I l likl t thi f lif th f it If t f th h h l f l i h i th th h d th I b thi th ith fd t h t it i i t (if t the it) f bi i th ld M t f ll it i important to recognize that our selfesteem depends crucially on our confidence n our way of life One does not choose among ways of life in the same manner as one shops for a candy bar: we typically mature into adulthood with a relatively well d f d d i l t i ti f th d lif M t f d th t f li tiki ith th i ilt f l b t t i l l th d i hl i i hih h l i l l bl t ti l t l h Ad b b h l li d thi tt it i il t lf t tht h fid i it If th di i t t th it i t h t i l lik t t i lif V i l (1) b lft i i t i b l d ill tid to our confidence in our way of being in the world; (2) because our confidence in this conception of the good life depends on the extent to which those who embrace it flourish; and (3) because our conationals are those who in fact share in our concep ti f d lif it f l l t h t (4) lft i f d t l l tid t hth t i l f l i h f d A t i l ' it i it f b th f i id tht h d ti fh t b i th ld i th hil d h id hl btt lft di d Th t i l t t i lif i f l db i l df ll d l d i t i l d i t ll Th j t no one would question the joy I would feel when a close friend wins a Nobel Prize no one should be suspicious when I take pride in a conational winning such an honor Given this it is perfectly understandable that conationals should root for nvest in k th f l th l f dtk id d h i th I h t it it tht t i l h l d idtif ith th Whil I t h i k thi l bt t i l dt t i li t t h t il ll iti At l t t ttil bl i Fit t d tht ti i t t l d i l t t b t i l ti t i ft b d fl h i t i d td ti f th

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liti t i l d thi d i t i t i fr th Th d t t allege that conationals are at least twice removed from teammates in that the former not only do not have personal relationships with one another they also are prone to base their allegiance on fabrications Second critics object that these false t i i i i t i l il bt th i i d " t " Th bl t h t th tb " " itht " t h " d ti h tibl hit ft i t l t t h l b d d i th E h f th bjti i i t t bt f d f d f tili t k th t b d i i I t th f t tilit t tht hil l dbtdl li t tiid i f thi t i ' hit thi does not show that there is no distinct nation any more than an individual's self deception entails that she is not a distinct person (Indeed team "histories" may also be distorted but this does not make their members any less teammates) More th lik D i d Mill (1995) h d t h t th t t h f t i ' t b t itlf i l i t t th h it i i it b t bh If td t b t t i ' h i t i l t l i i it b t b i i i d d d t k t if h t h ' bhlf f i t th it ftihiti b t tth t d d tht h l d id th nationals of their misconceptions And while no one would claim that nations have never warred with one an other many nationalists assert that there is no necessary connection between sup ti ' ti d ttki th I ft f th t ti t i t l i t i l th i t tht tili i ftl tibl ith i d d it i hlth l t t th i l iht f libli Libl tilit ll tht t i l t i t b fl ddd t i t t t th t d i t i l l i b l i h t tht b f ti t d i l b d b d th ii d d f i l lit t i il idti d it t f l l t i l ( T i 1993; Miller 1995) Not everyone is convinced that nationalism is fully compatible with the liberal ideals of equality and liberty but the most promising theories of nationalism today strive to combine these two historically antithetical approaches

Nti

dA i t i

Obliti

A iditd b idtifi ith ' ti i l th thi having a sense that one enjoys a special standing among one's conationals a standing which carries with it additional moral responsibilities According to na tionalists these perceived special duties are real; the obligations among fellow na t i l t i dd d i th th S i t dti t h h t t it t Lik th t i l i t li b t l idtifti h thi ti i h t l d b t d Th bl i t h t th i l bli ti t flit ith lit i f th t dd ith d f th i d l f lit d libt A d i t ht S l Shffl (1994) h d b b d th " d i t i b t i bj t i " il bliti t i l i t i b l ith it 271

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d f th lit f ll b th t d ll bit d t t national members Why should one enjoy a privileged status merely because she belongs to my nation? An even more popular concern is the "voluntarist objec tion" which contends that these special obligations are inconsistent with each idiidl' l h f t (Shffl 1994) Th id h i tht h f i iti f ld i i l f d i ffi hih t t f ll b t t l h i t t B ti l t iti dti hih t l f t i l b h i ld i itht t Th t th t t tht l t i i ft f lit th il bliti conationals appear incompatible with our ordinary moral thinking Nationalists attempt to defang the distributive objection by emphasizing that the extra rights correlative to the special obligations of nationalism are a supplement to th th btitt f th b i h iht d b ll M th t i l iht " i t t i " hih i t tht h ti h it t f il li d ibiliti (Mill 1995) Th bii th t it hil A l b i iil h th til C h f i t th A l b i t t ll f th C h ' b i iht d th C h may in turn privilege one another over Albanians Understood thus the special obligations posited among conationals do not seem so antithetical to equality In response to the voluntarist objection nationalists contend that our common lit i t l t thi b j t i b hil t f d i d d l libt l l i l i d l ik f t i t J t di l thiki ffi th il bliti ibli d ll f i t it l l l f ll iifi t ti t i l M ffiitl it th ti f f th b d iti fll t i l t h t th il bliti d t t f ll bit I h t tilit maintain that there is room both to conceive of individuals as largely free and equal and to view them as morally encumbered by their communal ties If so then the special obligations which accompany national membership need not conflict lit ith Whil h i till b i d t d l thi li f t I i k t i l M hif i tht t k l d h td d t l t i t h h t i l b d t dti M ifll h bilt bid f th l i b l d i t i i tht t i l do idtif ith th t th biti d t i l ti clusion that nationals ought to do more for one another (Wellman 1997) To repeat: there is a huge difference between claiming that Xs are typically inclined to assist one another and asserting that Xs are specially obligated to do so Until ff lli l t i t h th f i i t th ltt I thik hld ti th it f th t dti A i t thi t f lit tilit t tht l t i b lidtifti i ll b i t Th id h li J ' h i i tht j t d th "J i d X" t il dt t X d it l J i f ' lidtifiti ith Y t li

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h il bliti t Y O thi i d t i i l i t d jtifi cations for why a Jewish American philosopher has special obligations to other Jews Americans and philosophers because it follows simply and directly from the fact that she identifies with Jews Americans and philosophers (Tamir 1993) Whil thi t k f ii f lidtifti b i f l ii lti t th t bl it l d t th l i hih l l t b l (Wll 2000) C i d tt l M t f f t l idtif ith i t bt f ld t h t it fll t h t th h il bliti t t th t (W i h t ll h t h b k "h" t th l " f i t h f" bt I will suggest below this is an indictment of her character rather than an allegation that she has disrespected a duty to continue to root for the team) A second less benign example is the racist or sexist who identifies with other whites or men Given that we ld b l t h t tht hit it h t d t i t th hit tht i i t h il bliti t th ht t t b th i t h t ll li d t i f t i t dti Of t i l i t iht b j t tht it' i d t i f i t i ith th hit i i t i l i i t b t thi i bl f it Fit b t h i t ti th ti ality of national sentiments and second the most promising argument for the special duties among conationals relies on the contention that identification creates obliga tions not the view that we are obligated just in case we ought to feel connected B f th bl I i k t i l f th l i t h t h ti t il bliti it t i l Th t h t i t th dti d t i h h b thiit t b f i t t l dti ith d t d i M i i t h t thi h i h t d ttti ill l t i t l h t h t if th i thi i l i i b l l b t th t d b i t th th th l b d ti t i l it i b t t f dti A th l f th " f i t h f" i l l t t l l ith someone who claims an allegiance during the good times but disassociates during the bad is that she reveals herself to be objectionably selfcentered We think she would be a better more loyal person a person with a more laudable character if her alle i i d t t t h h d ti dbd S i i l l h tk l i h t fh t i l d t dit h l f h id i ll f th h ti d t l h l f t b b j t i b l lfih Th hil I t h t th i thi ll t b t h li "we " h h t i d "they l t " h h t l I l t t t l i thi ld f t i t fd i t d d t i In sum much interesting work is currently being done on this topic but no argument has yet been furnished which convinces me that conationals have special obligations to one another

Nti Th t

t f

t

t if

f t t b k i h h iht t

d S t t b k i td litil t h i t t d (Bh 1991) Th

l t

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l th illi t ti th t i t r i l i t r i t f iti tt i the principle of national selfdetermination the view that each nation has a right to its own state (Margalit and Raz 1990) In this section I will first explain the appeal of this nationalist principle and then argue that while it contains an important k l f t t h it l t i t l i th k Bf i th l i b i l i t f th tilit i i l I h l d dd t lii tt F i t l t h h I ill lf l t l i l ith i i t flit b l it i i t t t i t t h t th rit f t j l f d t i t i itht tlli ' tt A th lik Y l T i (1993) d All B h (1991) h i it i t for groups to exercise a degree of cultural selfdetermination with highly specified collective rights within their larger multinational state Some Native American groups in the United States for instance exercise collective control over the sale of t ithi ifid t i t With th l l t b l k th l f t t l t i d th t i b th i t h b bl t l i i t th l t l ifl f tid Siill th Q b i i C d h il l iht h i h h l th i t i thi d i t i t i idtit B d i t i F h th f f i i l l i th h l d t f l db hibiti th public posting of commercial signs which are not predominantly in French the Quebecois are able to exercise considerable control over their cultural environment The lesson to be gleaned from these examples is that even when cultural l f d t i t i i d f i l political l f d t i t i (hih d t l b th ) hld t t h t th l i t i l lf d t i t i t i th f f lt i t A d lii it th t i i th d i t i t i bt i d d i l riht t d A iht h remedial i h t t d if it h th ffti t t t itlf i t d tii j t i t t d b th h t t t (Th K d i I iht lif h ) One has a primary right to political divorce on the other hand if one has the discretion unilaterally to withdraw from the remainder state even when the latter has committed no injustice Although individual cases will often be controversial d i l riht t d idl i d b litil t h r i t Tht i t itll k l d tht tt l it l li t trit if it t t it t i t t ffiitl jtl It i h t i l h h t h th ri l riht t d A I d t d it th tilit i i l i th i tht h ti h primary riht t d Th b diti i l i t i l di (just as there are often conditions placed on marital divorces) but thorough going nationalists typically assert that each nation stands in a privileged position of moral dominion regarding its own selfdetermination a position which gives t th i h t iltll t did hth t t t it i ti tt Th h i f t i f f th tilit i i l i t i h t f d d i l l t riil i (1) t i ' hlth ditl f f t it b ' lf d (2) l i t i l l f d t i t i ll ti t blt thi h l t h B t h f th li libl id hi t

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B i i id d i i b di th i hih l t i ally identify with their nations it is easy to see how a nation's health can affect ts members' welfare In so far as nations offer the values that guide our choices of which type of life to pursue nations supply the foundations for us to live rewarding d i f l li Ol hlth flihi ti bl t t ih d di f i f l li b th t t h f lt d t i it bilit t t t t f hi ithi hih b t l df l t i h i A f d i lt ill b l bl t i t it b thi t t t t bild i f l di li i th b ill h t d i f f l t bildi l t i h i d i l hih tll t h other Because of this the prospects for selfesteem and selfrespect depend largely on the health of one's culture As a consequence the first premise that a nation's health effects the welfare of its members seems unobjectionable Th i t f hlth ti t idiidl i l th ttil l f t i l l f d t i t i A l t h h th b l i l ti bt t i ' j i lf d it f l i h i it i l tht l f t i ll d i t t i ' it d d i i t Th t bi d t t litil i t i hild i t ti b t it l help minority groups who suffer from a majority's neglect ignorance or indiffer ence The central idea does not require an elaborate explanation: a nation stands to prosper when its members can freely debate among themselves what rules should il h it b dft l t d d j d i t th l d h it b t l l t k t th t t d f th l I h t j t idiidl t i l l fl t f t b l i thi h ti h btt h ff l i h i h it li it t Gi th libilit f b t h f th li I h t th f th t i t f t i l l f d t i t i It i il t ti h t h t hil th i f f th tilit i i l i t it i l i facie Before we can conclude that the nationalist's claim for selfgovernance is decisive we must weigh it against competing claims And because secession as opposed to emigration invariably involves taking territory away from an existing tt t bl th tilit' l i t th t t ' l l i t it t i t E l i i tt' d i i it t i t i j t i litil th tht h td t it f t hih I t i h M i hl i t h t litil t t jtifid i i thi t i t t b d it ibl l h ll f l l i l t f l d th l f t f l t i i ll giance is if they are nonconsensually imposed upon all those who are territorially contiguous (Wellman 1995) Assuming that something like this account of political legitimacy is correct we btt th tilit i i l Tht i ih t i ' li t t i t ( b d th i t f t i l l f d t i t i ) i t th t t ' li t it t i t ( b d th i t f i d it) A tilit i t t it t thi t f litil liti l l f tilit t t b k i b h th tit ti i bl f f i th litil f t i f i

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d rit th iti tt h jtifiti f it l i In other words when a nation is sufficiently large wealthy politically organized and territorially contiguous it can secede and thereby enhance its national self determination without jeopardizing the benefits of political stability I t h t i t thi d f f t i ' riht t d b t it i i t t t ti t h t thi i tll l h th tilit i i l i th k Thi i b hil litill ibl ti iht h riht t d th ti h i h l k th iit litil biliti ill t h l i t i t li t b f f th t tt' i t M i t t l i th i hih ti h iht t d m; rather it will be its political capacities If so then there is a sense in which a group's cultural status s beside the point; the crucial variable will be the separatists' ability to govern the t t d trit i f dj t T h i it i t t t h t ll d l ti h riht t d b t i l ith th iit l i t i l biliti ill h iht t d d litill ibl ti ill t It ll b t h t t tit i ft titd b ti lit iti b t th ti h li l i t i t ill b tifid b their political capabilities not their cultural attributes Even though there is no perfect correlation between a group's being a nation and its deserving political autonomy there is some truth underlying the principle of t i l l f d t i t i Thi t t h i t h t (1) ti t d t b h i th th f t h i i (2) th lf f ti i ft ill i t t t th b f th d (3) t i ' lf b i d b i d litil t Th i i f i f th ft b t d i th f l l i t F i t l t h h th f t t h t titt ti i t ditl i t t t it l i t d (i ht i til i ' bilit t i t l f ) it i i d i t l i i f i t b t i ' i d h i h t capacity to perform the requisite political functions and consequently makes t a better candidate for the right to secede The idea here is that its national allegiance enables a nation to motivate its members to make sacrifices on behalf of the political i Ad d i t i l t i l l l litil l f d t i t i h i h l th t i l thi i th f ' li t l i t i l lf d t i t i h i h th l i f th l k Thi i t t i it b tht l i t i l tbilit ld b j d i d if ll i t t d f ti i l l d t d b t t h t th litil l i t ld il ith t d liitd b f th f i thi tt U d th i stances we could utilize additional criteria to distinguish among the eligible secessionist movements and the nation/nonnation distinction might well be the deciding factor In the case of Canada for instance Quebec's FrenchCanadian lt ld i it i i t l irit iil li d d b E l i h C d i i Th I t tht hil th tilit i i l t ftl t t it d t i t t k l f t t h b t th ( d ) iifi f t i l lli i tt f t t b k i Bf l i it i i t t t t tht if h th i iht t d it d t fll t t i l l tht hld i i t t i l

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l t i d f th iht I f t th lik B h (1997) suggest that it would be shortsighted and reckless to amend international law n this way because of the perverse incentives it would create Buchanan worries hat supporting viable secessionist movements will undermine federalism by giving states th i t i t tht i i t d tb ibl tit t I B h ' i f d l i th li f ti l i i t d i t i th f f i llti iht t dititi l t l i th h l t h i t f l t i l t l tt t d t th ttill l i d i i t ithi t h i b d If t t k t h t th i t t i l it ill t th i i t l f ll i b l tit t h th th ill be disinclined to extend special collective rights to cultural minorities for fear that any additional bit of sovereignty will make each of these groups more interested in and more viable as an independent state And because most countries are loath to l f thi t i t th ill kt th th t i i t l t l Th i th d i i t t i l l t f i i t iht iht d i f d l i dt h b d h d th d It h l d b td tht t i i d ith th t f i Did C (1998) f i t tht i t t i l l f i i rights to political divorce will likely produce substantial benefits Copp acknowledges that there is the possibility for perverse incentives (though he contends that these worries have been exaggerated) He argues both that (1) most of these ncentives l d t d t h t (2) th ibilit f i l i i i t i ld b th t d f b th b f i t fh i l l dfid d itittill i t d iht t d id i i t t i l l I til C t tht tit t d tt lik t d t i f l hih i t i l l d dfiitil l i i t flit I t h i h id i thi d b t i i h t b t it d t t h t th presence of moral rights to secede does not automaticaEy entail that we should use international law to globally enforce these rights Those who draft laws need to be vigilant to their likely actual effects and it would be reckless to enact international l f i i i i t iht l hd l t bli t h t th l ld d d th h

C

l

i

In the end I have mixed reactions to the three standard nationalist assertions I am genuinely unsure about the appropriateness and rationality of identifying with one's ti I k t i l f th it f il bliti t i l d I t h i k t h t th tilit i i l itk i t t d ibl i i i t l f th il lft i t t b k i I h f t i l t i t i i d ith th psychological i t bt I t t i d t h t th ft t b l i h th t t h f th moral l i tilit d I th d hil th i d i t h t (1) l f t l idtif ith t h i ti (2) l fl fl l l i t

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t i l d (3) t i l thi i i l t amounts in an effort to establish sovereign nationstates it does (1A) it is natural and fitting that we understand ourselves in terms ity (2A) we have special obligations toward our fellownationals ti h i h t t it tt

if not follow that of our national and (3A) each

Rf V Ad B d i t (1983) Imagined Communities L d Baker David (ed) (1990) Political Quotations Detroit: Gale Research Bh All (1991) Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec B l d CO W t i P (1997) Theories of secession Philosophy and Public Affairs 26: 3 1 6 1 C D i d (1998) I t t i l l d lit i th th f i The Journal of Ethics 2 2 1 9 2 4 NY C l l U i i t P Gll E t (1983) Nations and Nationalism Ith Margalit Avishai and Raz Joseph (1990) National selfdetermination Journal of Philosophy 87: 4 3 9 6 1 P Mill D i d (1995) On Nationality O f d C l d ShfQ S l (1994) F i l i ti d t The Lindley Lecture L University of Kansas NJ P i t U i i t P T i Y l (1993) Liberal Nationalism P i t Wll C h i t h H t h (1995) A d f f i d litil l f d t i t i Philosophy and Public Affairs 24: 1 4 2 7 1 (1997) A i t i lli d litil bliti Social Theory and Practice 23 181204 (2000) R l t i l f t i l i b l l i t i l th i th i i th ""? Ethics 110: 53762

Further reading K l i k Will (1989) Liberalism Community and Culture O f d C l d P C l d (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights O f d Press Lhi P B ( d ) (1998) Theories of Secession L d Rtld L J b T (2000) The Multiculturalism of Fear O f d O f d U i i t P McMahan Jeff and McKim Robert (eds) (1997) The Morality of Nationalism New York: Oxford University Press C t M i i N d ( d ) (2000) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict L S l l IL O M M t ( d ) (1998) Nationalism Self-determination and Secession O f d O f d U i i t P (2001) The Ethics of Nationalism Oxford: Oxford University Press M i C h i t h (1999) An Essay on the Modern State C b i d Cbid U i i t P

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Skepticism about intergenerational justice A d i t fili i th i t fjti th t i i l l i t tht l t B j t ti h f l t th duties of justice are the most pressing and urgent of obligations If we fail to be courageous or charitable we may have only our conscience to chide us But when we fail to be just then those to whom we have been unjust have a wellfounded lit li i t O thi f i l i i j t ti d titti th tht t iti " l i t " h h l fil ffd t b k t thi i t t h iht h b iltd d h b d ti Th h t thi f i l i t fjti f d it d i f f l t t li how we could possibly have obligations of justice toward members of distant future generations Suppose we understand "future generations" to include all and only those persons who will exist but whose lives will not overlap the life of any pres tl iti Th l h ill b b f th "ft t i " d t it Thi it ill d d th hi f tl iti f l if i diki t tht b t i l th th ill t i t It b d tht thi identities d d hi i difft l t it d d i ht d If l did t h hild thi th th t then the child they have will (it is sometimes argued) be a different child from the one they would have had if they had chosen differently If the child they have is worse off than the child they would have had even much worse off can she li t h b h d b h t' h i ? H ld b h d b hi bt f hih ld t h i t d t ll? C l l h i tht d t i who ill i t "identity-determining choices" It b d tht f i t t hi i d t i t d t i i hi d t h t th i d t i t d t i i fft f th hi ill d di ti E t l l f h l ill i t h ld h i t d if hd h difftl B t if 279

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t b h d b i i d t i t d t i i hi ( hi bt f which one would not have existed at all) then distant future persons cannot be the victims or complainants of present choices Considerations like these have led some to conclude that present actions cannot h th b f ft ti d t h t th i f " i t t i l j t i " d t i ( S h t 1979) It ld f l l tht thi d i th t ld ibl b j t t th l h ill i t i th d i t t ft A d th th diffilti tht f th f ti bt ti Ft i iti t li fijti i t i th ill t i t til h ll d i d A d h t ld it k t say that nonexistent persons could have rights or that we might owe compensation to them? How could nonexistent persons have anything at all? If they cannot "have" anything then they surely cannot "have rights" These are difficult ques ti bt f l l th fi t t i l jti ld d t th P i i b t th t f h th h ld t ld tht bliti f" j t i " i l t t d t d i t t ft ti It ld fll t h t if tb h i h i i th d i t t f t thi b f t t f b fft ti b t it ld t b j t In favor of intergenerational justice It is easy to see why one might conclude that there can be no question of "justice" bt ditt ti B t th idti hld tit t id th bl fll b f ti h t l i I i t t t t ti ( d i i ) fft ft h th t h t th fft t F l hi k ft ti btt ff i it f difft It i tl i t d t th th' t t d d th rich diversity of species Our choice to consume (or our failure to conserve) non renewable resources will make these resources forever inaccessible to future gener ations who might have used them Some of the issues of resource depletion are idtil t d i t i bl fjti d fi llti f d fj t i b fll lid t l th It i th t t h i ti t h t t ti t l d i ft ti f b f i t th iht h j d th l fflit f t ti ith bl d d i d t F l if l l t t t ltiit th d i t t f t ti ill til ihit ld t h t ti h d ous nuclear waste It is clear that present actions can sometimes determine or at least importantly influence future advantage or disadvantage suffering or well being To most people this consideration alone suffices to support a strong prima fi bliti tt d h t ill b i l d i d t t ft Sktii b t i t t i l jti i diffilt t t h id t d bl O t ti d t i th i t f lif f f t ti d hi d l ifl thi li f btt B t if ti k th ff d it k t tht h harmed th tht ti unjust? C ft

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b th victims f t h i ? I i t it t l t say that present actions can harm people who do not yet exist and it does not seem at all odd to think of them as the victims of present choices Joel Feinberg (1986: 154) gives a colorful and persuasive example: A Wikd M i t h di t bl hlh i d t kill tilt th il H l b b i l t i th k i d t d t tii It ff h d l killi tilti d ff di t ff i i year old children It was the evil action of the wicked criminal six years earlier before th i d t h t h d th It t i t i l tht ld d i t l t th h Of ld d i b F i b ' l h t h t th lif f thi W i k d Mith ld t l th li f th h h d b hi lii d j t ti h lti th ti b b i hi l t t bf dth d h ith il l t th t h h t f th d h h d t th t i d iti f hi i It ld b f f t h d t h h t i i b l t k " l t i th b b " i d t i t d t i i hi that those who are killed in the blast would not have existed but for the prior actions of Feinberg's Misanthrope But setting a time bomb of this sort would be a h i b l thi t d b i l l h bliti t t d thi ik thi A d it it i l i b l t t h t th h ff i th b l t t " i t i " f th M i t h ' i ti A th tht l i l l l i d th i ld b t i d d Ft tb i iti t press thi li i t tl iti b t thi d ti d i t l l t h t th h i h t If h i h t th it f l l t h t th h lti bliti b t it d t fll t h t th i h t h l d h th t force others to respect those obligations So from the fact that future persons cannot press claims it does not immediately follow that they have no rights or that "obligations of justice" do not apply between members of distant generations S l bli tht t ti d lii t i t t th l i l t f i t t i l ti b b It h ti b d tht li l i tbl ik ft ti i t t tht t l t ill b fl t d til it ditiit h d l i d t f l l S i i l l it h b d tht tibl litti f t l tit d t th th' environmental ecosystems and humancaused decrease in global biodiversity are likely to be much worse for people who will live in the distant (or even the not so distant) future and that these actions are therefore unjust We have good reason to l d t h t th W i k d M i t h i F i b ' l h h d th hil d h i j d b hi b b d tht h iltd l l bliti h h t it P h th hld l d t ld tht iil ti ill b h f l t th b fft ti d t h t th tiiti titt ilti f bliti t th ft whose misery will result If there are such obligations to the members of distant future generations we should be able to situate those obligations in a theory of

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i t t i l jti t h t ill h l t d t d thi t t d iht A theory of intergenerational justice would be a somewhat general background theory that would explain the justification nature and content of our obligations (if any) to future generations Ideally one might hope that such a theory would be hlfl f l i k h h t tilt il l i i t h t ill d i t l t th i h t di t t f t d ft Thi b i f h t t h t ff f l l th fi t t i l ti b t ill i ldifft t h i fjti i t f th th ff f h th Aft idi libti d libl t h i d di i th bl fi t t i l i it ill i l ti of "sustainability" and will offer a conception that may be a plausible minimal requirement or first principle of intergenerational justice

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C t litt i litil h i l h i d i t d b t d i f f t kid ft h i fj t i liberal t h i d libertarian t h i It ld t b priate to identify these as two general theories of justice: each is a family of different conceptions of justice loosely united by some common features So for example while John Rawls is often taken to offer a paradigmatic liberal conception of justice d libl h b t t i l d i t ith th R l i i Th b id f l i b t i ti f jti I h t fll I ill d i b lf t tht d i t i i h l i b l dlibti ti f j t i d th f t t iht tk i tdi th ti it till Libti hld tht litil i t i t t i hld t t t iht d enforce people's purely negative rights "Negative rights" include only claims against unprovoked interference while "positive rights" would include substantive claims to goods or perhaps to others' assistance in times of need Libertarians hold tht bli i t i t t i hld f ti iht d tif th i j t i tht lt h ti iht i l t d b t tht h ititti d thi ihtfl thit h th d t k j t d i d t t lf d th bli d A d i t libti it b d thi t i lf i tht l' d tifid dt t t th h d l b l b t th j t t id b libti ti d libti ll h l d t h t it ld b j t t t th h btt off in order to benefit those who are worse off Most libertarian theorists hold that future generations are not directly protected by norms of justice (Nozick 1974; Gauthier 1986) That is most libertarians are skeptics b t i t t i l jti Ft t h t t iht d th t h i t t h t it ld b jtifid t t i l th libt f t t l t t th lf f ft ti H libti k l d dti f hit hih l i h t imperfect b l i t i t d t th d f th S h libti iht d tht h i f t (thf f b l ) bliti t

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id l i ft ti dtitt d i d Fth i b t i have argued that free libertarian markets will in fact promote the interests of future people And some like David Gauthier (1986) have even argued that free markets will provide optimally well for the interests of future generations Gauthier argues t h t th bl fi t t i l jti i l ill t i i k i i tht l l f t i i kt ill d t l d t th i t t fft ti H iht kt id b f i t f f t t i ? Th l difft t h i b t h thi iht tk l F i t f ll h b kt t i t i f h di t i i th who discover economic substitutes for scarce resources can expect a brisk market for such products For example as copper resources dwindle we might expect increased investment in alternative conductors and in fiberoptic technologies that f t i l l l i f Ad kt l id ti t d t t i thi l i ith thi it D f d f th k t ft it lik th i df f th li tht kt ill d t l t ft d Th l d t h t th d f b f th t ti t k ifi f th benefit of future generations Future generations are not specifically protected by norms of libertarian justice but libertarians comfort us by urging that members of future generations will be well taken care of in any case (Gauthier 1986; Simon 1996) It i i d d ibl t d i b i t i hih hi d f kt likl t t t f th f t ( S h i d t 1994) B t th d f ktii b t th b d i i l li tht l i b t i kt ill d t l d t th d di t t fft ti i th l ld d btt t d b t tht ld k i i tht kt ill d thi F it i l ibl t d i b i t i hih rational economic agents will deplete and destroy resources and in which t is economically rational for earlier generations to do what would leave later gener ations much worse off (Wolf 1996) We need to look closely at our own economic itti t d t i hth t l l d kt likl t t t th i t t f ft ti Th ilbl i i l dt t ii thi d hil f kt h b h t i it t th b f l h li b l th t l l h tdil i d ti d th i d t d b t t h t thi f t t t d ill ti th f b l ft If thik tht h iti bliti t id leaving the members of future generations without resources to meet their basic needs (at least when we could do so without excessive cost to ourselves) then one may remain unsatisfied with libertarian accounts of intergenerational justice

A L i b l Th Th ti

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iti f libti libl t h i fjti d t h t th t "libl" i t b d t

d it h t b

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i f l A I ill th t h "libl" t h i f jti hld b understood to include all theories that have the following properties: (1) like liber tarians liberals take the right to individual liberty seriously and place a high priority on preventing public institutions from interfering in people's lives; (2) lik l i b t i libl l h l d t h t it i ti l i t i t f bli i t i tti t d t k iti j t (bli d d h l f l) dt t t t l t i i l t f iti i h t (lik th i h t t d t i t b i ii f lf t) D i f f t l i b l t h i t ff d i f f t k i d f t h t i l t f th l i tht bli i t i t t i hld f iti iht d bli d S t th li hl tili tarian grounds while others argue that just institutions are those we would choose as the object of an ideal contract According to contractarian theories the concept of justice is essentially associated with a companion concept of free and rational agree t i l t t i ti fjti h l d t h t ll d l th il t j t t h t ith ld b th b j t f f d t i l t th t f ll h tiit i f f t d b th B t l iit i ll hibl t t i tht j t ititti th t h t could be th b j t f f d t i l t To use such a theory to examine whether actual institutions are "just" we would not ask whether those who participate have actually consented to them but would instead ask whether they could hypothetically consent For this reason such theor i ft l l d hypothetical contractarian conceptions of justice. Rawlsian hypothetical

contractarianism

t t t t th f t J h R l ' Theory of Justice (1971) i t i i hil idi d i f f l t i tht l l t t i t t i t h i H t h t th i i l fj t i th i i l tht bl would accept as fair terms of cooperation among citizens regarded as free and equal persons and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life from one generation to the next To help understand what such principles ld l k lik R l t tht th t f i t t i l il ti t th t f i d l l fi t t tht ld t b j t d b bl t i i t T d t d th ti f "idll fi t t " R l t tht id ht t t l t ld b illi t if t it itti i hih f d t id th t t f th ti f th i t t f h b f i ety Accordingly he suggests that we consider the principles we would choose from an "original position" from behind a "veil of ignorance" that blinds us from any knowledge of ourselves that would make it possible for us to tailor the agreement bitil t f l R l tht ti t h i i l iti ld h t i i l t th b i i t i t t i f it th f i t i i l hih R l ll th E l L i b t P i i l t tht h i t h l i h t t th t t i ttl t f b i libti tibl ith iil t f ll Th d i i l i i t t It t i l t tht il d i i l i t i t b d t h t th

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b t h (1) tthd t ffi d iti t ll d diti f fi l ity of opportunity and (2) such inequalities are tolerable only when they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society Intergenerational choice behind the veil Bt

ht d jti i i th i t t i l ?R l i h l if i ht h b t i t t i l jti d ht h d i fi R l ' il f i d t d t t i l b h i idi th i i l iti hi hld i i ht ld h if we did not know in which generation or at what stage of social and economic development we might live This insures that the choice will not be partial in favor of earlier generations over later ones or vice versa In the first edition of A Theory of Justice (1971) R l t Th ti d tk t hih ti th b l ht t th thing the stage of civilization of their society They have no way of telling whether it is ltil lth l l i l t l l d idtilid d Th il f i i l t i th t Th th i th i i l iti t kt h l h h th ld b illi t t h t th assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rates That is they are to id t h i illi t t i h f iiliti ith th d tdi t h t th t th t l t th h l f lti I ffet th th t h j t i i i l tht i it rate of accumulation to each level of advance (Rawls 1971: 287) A d i

t R l t th i t t

i i l ill b i t t i l l fi l if th t k t f l h ill li t d i f f t ti ddifft t f h i d l t Bt h ld t i l h k h h i ? I hi l k R l t h l f l i ii t f th ti t h i i l f i t t i l ditibti H t i l t d tht ti t th i i l iti hld d t d t h l t b h i "heads of households" or as "fathers looking out for the interests of their sons" Concern for later generations was thus a function of the altruistic concern that members of earlier generations were supposed to have for members of later gener ti Th ihtl itiid f i d biti (B til ti t h t th 1978 Oki 1989) d b th l b h i d th i i l fj t i th tht t i l d tll d i i t t d t ld h f b h i d th il f i I t k R l h i d hi t f th h i f i i l f i t t i l jti d i Whil h till d th it i i l of saving as the one that would be chosen from the original position he has recently argued that parties to the choice should understand themselves to be ti t h d t d h i t h t i i l th ld t earlier [ P j t i [t th O i i l P i t i b j t t th f t h diti

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followed it Thus the correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and ll t i ) ld d t th thi ti i t fll d th i i l th ld t di ti t h f l l d ( d lt ti ( R l 19932 74) t fll) tt h f b k ( f d ) i ti Thi h i i t i i t l i t t d it id f the problems that plagued the original account Most importantly it recovers con cern for future generations as a function of rational choice from behind a veil of ignorance in the original position But what intergenerational principles would ra t i l t h f b h i d th il f i ? R l li t h t th ti fi t t i l jti fll d th bl fj t i M i b l t h i t h f l l d R l i idtifi th t l ti f i t t i l dh h hld t ti jti th ti f just saving: h t f th b f t f ft t i ? A th fj t i ld id i i l d t thi ti d it i t thi bl tht t

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The general problem of intergenerational saving Exactly what and how much are we obliged to "save" for the benefit of future t i ? Wh th t ti i th th ill h ti t thi d i l hil th ill h b i b l d If t t h d littl th ft ti ihit ld bl t t thi d B t if t h dll i i h l f th b f t f lth d d t Th ti f just i b t fll t ht i t (if ) ld th t of saving by earlier generations be so low that it would constitute a violation of obligations to future generations? It is worth settling a terminological issue right from the start: by "save" we need t i l tti id d f d f lt b ft d " i " i th l t iht ti l thi lik i l il l (f l) tht lt ti ill h it I th l t h " i " li t ht t b t th d i l f ft hth i l t th id t W i h t " " i thi i l b bl t ikl ht th ll d not because we have any concern for the welfare of future persons And it is sometimes pointed out that conserving oil or coal for the benefit of future generations might be a way of saving less not more for future generations since the opportunity costs of ti fll th f t ll th t It i d i t b l hth t d t " i " ill i lii f ti d ti It i l th hil t ti t h t " i " i th t h t th t i i h b l d i d d t l f th i t i t t i d t l i h it It iht t t h d tht f kt ill d t l " " this sense for future generations and that the best way to save for the future would be to protect property rights and economic liberties Or it might turn out

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tht kt ill d thi b d l l i b l If th fid it it to put in place alternative institutions aimed at increasing the rate at which re sources are conserved for the benefit of future generations Is there an obligation to save for future generations? Consider what it would mean t t h t th i h bliti It ld f l l tht ld t " " th th' dl ft ti ith thi t ll E if i tl t if fil t th lt f dl d t t i f dd b ft ti ld thi i ilt bliti if t d t th f th th d l ft ti l t ll S l h t l h l d thi i bt hope that they are few Those who are inclined to reject this view face the problem of identifying some nonzero rate of saving and arguing that this rate meets minimal obligations to future generations We can set up the problem of saving without any th b t bliti t ft b t th h i f btti t f i ill d d th t d t t h f bliti t th f t Choosing a saving rate I idi th h i f i t it i h l f l t b i b diidi i rates into three classes (1) In the first class there are saving rates that are "unsus tainable" in that they tend toward zero saving in the long run The "zero" saving rate falls in this class but there are many other ways to save unsustainably If we ittl t t ft th th d l d ith btitt th k it ti tht ft ti ill t l l b lft ith thi t ll (2) Th d l f i t th tht i l iti lti i t h t th l lt ti btt ff th li If ti if th b l d b btt i btitt th it b ibl t i th i th l f th t t l resource set left for future generations (3) The third category is unlike the other two in that it is unique: while there are many unsustainable rates of saving and there may be a variety of different rates that will allow positive accumulation ( d d i th t t hih l d ) th i l h t f i tht i i l " t i b l " W hi tibilit t tl th t t hih ith l th d l i b t i t t f th It i t diffilt t h l h dd " t i b i l i t " ii didt f i i l f t t t i l i ( D t 1974 B 1989) O thi i i l li ations have an obligation to avoid using resources faster than the rate at which they are replaced or substituted J t

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t i b l i d ti ld b f b f lt ations If as Rawls suggests we should select that saving rate that we would like the previous generations to have adopted then it might seem natural to conclude that "sustainability" would be a lower bound on the range of saving rates that could till b h f th i i l iti R l hilf if t t i hih i ill t k l h it i l t i l b t ill d l i i b li ti i th i t t i fl t ti A d i t R l i " t j t ( d t ) b i ititti h b tb l i h d [ A d ] t thi it l i (tht i t dditi t l itl) fll t d iti t k l d t b i t i d l d d bl resources carefully husbanded for future use as appropriate" (Rawls 1999: 107) Thus parties to the original position will choose a principle of intergenerational justice that requires savings at stages when there is too little wealth to secure just basic insti tti bt i l iti iti jti i Problems with Rawls O

iht dR l ii tht li ti hld til th h th l t ii l l f il lth th l l f th maintenance of just institutions and that saving after that point must simply be sustainable But this view faces objections that Rawls fails to consider: importantly this account of intergenerational saving does not take into account changes n lti i Wh lti i i ti li ti ti t t t f t th th t i b l t bt h th ii l l t hih j t i t i t t i b i t i d Ad t ititti i l i i lti i tht ti bilit ld l lt ti bl t t d b i jti I d d i th ti it ill b lbl t id l t t i ti f "sustainability" to see whether there is a conception that could fill the relevant role in a theory of intergenerational justice

Stibilit

A l t t i

C t i

M t fi t t i l jti t i l t tht j t ititti t b i t t i l l tibl Wht d it t tht ititti " t i b l " tht it i i t tibl t? S i i l there are many different interpretations of this seemingly simple idea This section will review a series of alternative conceptions of sustainability and will evaluate them for their suitability as candidates for a principle of just intergenerational i Sustainable Ph th ment O thi 288

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endowments f

t i b i l i t i t h t f sustainable endowt i b l if d l if

INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

t th t ti d t tht i i l t t th inherited from the previous generation But stated in this way sustainable endow ment is ambiguous and may be impossible to satisfy By equivalent endowment, one might mean to require that the same resources must be available to subsequent ti d i th titi tl U d thi i t t ti t i b l d t ill t b t i f i d if l f ft ti t f d l t d il bt t b l i t h l i l b k t h h tht id bl d llti l t t i t il d It h ti b d t h t th t i t i l f bl ill b f l t i t l tti d f th l t satisfaction of human needs If so it would seem strange to adopt a conception of sustainability that would prohibit us from taking the necessary steps to move toward reliance on energy sources that would serve human needs without inflicting h i t l d Sustainable productive opportunities C i d t i lik th h ld t tilt difft tibilit t d d hih iht b l l d sustainable productive opportunities. O thi ti advocated by Brian Barry among others we should strive to leave for future gener ations productive opportunities that are comparable to those we ourselves nherited from previous generations (Barry 1989) "Productive opportunities" are stable h it i ibl f f t ti t d th titi f d d th t f d f th b f i t f t h i b S thi ti f tibilit d l t i f bl ill b ti bl l " f f t " th t t ft ti ith t h l i l d tht ft ti ill t h f titi th h j d But like sustainable endowment, this conception of intergenerational sustainability has some obvious problems First some goods may be "nontradeable": there may be nothing we can provide for future generations to compensate them for the d t t i f th M i i i i d l t th b f t f bthbl t h b thi d tht ld d t l t f S i i l l th th l f bidiit d t t h tiiti M i t t l th ti t h t hld l ft ti diiihd titi fil t d t th f t t h t l t ti b h th li A h lti i t dti t b inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population Where population is grow ing stable productive opportunities may leave all members of later generations worse off than their predecessors Surely it will seem strange to regard such steady dli " t i b l " i ti Sustainable welfare: two conceptions O ti

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f i titi A d i l iht id stable welfare conception of sustainability attractive Such a criterion would recognize institutions as "sustainable" when they provide future generations with undimin ished welfare as compared with present generations Something like this conception d t d b R b t Sl (1974 1991) h tht hld i h b t i t i ffit lth t h t f t ti ill h th t i tt hi th lf l l t ti Th t l t t i t t t i f th t b l lf ti d tht i t i th t l l f total lf th d tht i t i t b l average lf SUSTAINABLE TOTAL WELFARE

Th total i i i d l db it d ti d f d d (N 1989 t thi i i t t i l i i tibl B 1992) A d i it id th t t l lf t l t ti t li T h f i d th lf t t l ld t th lf f h it t i ti ( i i t i ) d t h t t th t t l lf j d b h it t th ti ti A d t f th total view recognize of course that we cannot do this directly But they would urge that we often have justified beliefs about which actions will tend to increase or decrease total utility If so then the total standard can be used even without b t ' lf dtild i f t i Th t t l i h b idl d i d d i tibl t bjti F i t th t t l i ill ti di i th t f lti th t f f t th lti i f If l i b l d d i d d t t h i l i h t ith id t d titi Bt iht db i i th b fh l t h h d t i policies that promote fertility The total view is indifferent between these two alter natives and some people regard this as a decisive objection to that view But second total welfare may remain stable or increase even when all members of later th i li ti thi ld b f ti ff th l if lti i i I t i l t i b l t t l lf i t t ith t d i l d l i i lf it i ibl t i t i t b l t t l lf l l ti if h b f h b t ti i h ff th h b f di ti ( P f t 1982) A i ill d thi d i i bjti t th t t l lf ti fi t t i l tibilit SUSTAINABLE AVERAGE WELFARE

Th h j t th t t l i iht b t t d t f i t i i tbl average welfare i t d T fid th lf ld fit t th (dditi) lf l l f ll b f l t i th d i i d b th b f i d i i d l i th l t i Th i ill t d i i lti d ( l i k th t t l i ) ld f ti ll bttff ft lti th th l ff M l f i d th i l i 290

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ti f th i li Bt flti hld k it l t h t thi conception is also extremely difficult to accept In particular average welfare can remain stable even if more and more people in each succeeding generation are destitute and starving This could be the case for example where the wealth and ti f i i t i ti hil th ii jit l ih i t d t S h i i t d i l i t d i f t f l t th t l tt f th ld b t f l d thi d thi F th hld t tbl lf i fft t k ititti tibl

Intergenerational Justice and Sustainability The need for an alternative conception Th

i ti i d d l t t i ti f " t i b i l i t " d t i t h f th Th t bif b t h th ffiit t h tht d l t t i ti f tibilit bf tht t i th fi t t i l jti d i A tive conception of "sustainability" cannot simply focus on welfare or resources or opportunities it must also appropriately accommodate likely changes n popula tion size and the effects of resource depletion on people's ability to meet their needs It b it d i f f i l t t k h ft " l f " h l d fi i d l i b t i b t i t t i l i S i l itit ll it lf ith ti f tifti bt t il k h t ft ti ill tt k h t th ill f B t it ld b ildi t h i t i b t h t ft ill t W l i b l if fllibl dit t h t thi b i d ill b similar to our own It is surely implausible to suggest that we should frame social policy around the possibility that future generations will be so different from our selves that they will not have similar basic needs Several alternative conceptions of t i b i l i t fll t i di h i lti i A h b it i ibl t iti tbl d t dti titi d lf h lt ti i l d ff ith t t th l idtifid Th idti ilitt i f f l t t i ti f tibil it h i h (1) t k d ii (th th lf titi ) as a plausible value to be sustained and which (2) is formulated as a negative principle rather than a positive one Focusing on what future generations are likely t d ll t b tit b t h t th ill want A d f l t i tibilit diti i ti t k it ibl t dt lti h G H l B d t l d ' f dfiiti f " t i bl d l t " i t bth f th ft h t i l t tht tibl d l t i " d l t tht t th d f th t ith t ii th bilit f f t ti t t thi d" ( B d t l d et al 1987: 43) In the spirit of the Brundtland proposal we might define "sustain ability" as follows: 291

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Ititti humanly sustainable if d l if t h i ti d t l future generations worse equipped to meet their needs than members of the present generation are to meet their own needs A principle requiring that present institutions must be humanly sustainable would require that present institutions should not reduce the ability of future generations to meet their needs There are two different ways to reduce the extent of future t d O i t t it t h t th b f ft ti ill h th bilit t tif t h i d A t h i t d ftilit tht ft ti ill b ll d tht f d l ill it it Th i i i l id t h t th t i ll t d ftilit dli h l' d

Human sustainability and intergenerational justice Is there any reason to regard human sustainability as a requirement perhaps a minimal requirement of intergenerational justice? There are several ways in which such a claim might be supported First we may note that future generations l b l t hi d t h t it i t i l l dd " j t " h l dll d i th f th bilit t tb i d Th i t fh tibilit i i l t d l if l ft ti ff th l ith t t th tifti f d ilti f th i t f h tibilit ld k lt ti ff i d t bfit i bttff ti But there is an odd feature of such an argument: it treats "generations" as if they were individual persons While earlier generations may be better (or worse) off than later ones there may be members of these same earlier generations who are much ff th b f th l t ti If th l fh tibilit d i f th h i h i i t thi i i l i t th tifti f d th it i l i b l t t h i k t h t t t d t l t i t t f th l it f i ft t d F th iht d it iibl t dd t d first h f t i hi bt th d f t d ft ti Thi i i l priority for the present is plausible for other reasons as well: we know more about the needs of members of the present generation than about the needs of distant future generations A d t i t f th l i t h t "h tibilit" i i i l i t fi t t i l jti d th i d l t t i tditi i litil h i l h it i bl t h t ti t R l i i i l iti hi tht i l d d ti blid ld h h ti bilit i i l i t fi t t i l jti F l t t i i il ld i th i k t h t ti t th h i ld b bl t t basic needs Rawls argues that parties to the original position choice will be unwill ing to consider principles that raise this downside risk

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Thi d i i t li t h ffd lti t th bl itd ith th d l t f th fi t t i l jti Whil I ld t the principle of human sustainability as a plausible first principle of intergenera tional justice one may have several reservations about it First even if we wish to save in such a way that future generations will not be left unable to meet their d h l id h t l i h thi W t k hih lii ill b t t t ft d S d ti d i i d d i i l i t h b dfiti it i th t i i l i t ld i It b tht hld d h f ft ti th l t d ht t t h t th ill t b bl t t thi d A f l l th f i t t i l jti ld ff lt account of our obligations to future generations

Rf B

Bi (1978) C i t fjti d ft ti I R i h d Sik and B M Barry (eds) Obligations to Future Generations Philadelphia: Temple University P (1989) Th thi f dlti I Democracy Power and Justice O f d C l d P Broome John (1992) Counting the Cost of Global Warming Cambridge: White Horse Press B d t l d G Hl t l (1987) Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and Development N Y k O f d U i i t P D t P t h (1974) O l t t i iti f j t i bt ti Journal of Public Economics 3: 4 0 5 2 3 Fib J l (1986) W f l lif d th t f t l l t i h i Philosophy and Social Policy 4 (1) 14578 Gauthier David (1986) Morals by Agreement Oxford: Clarendon Press N Y K (1989) W h t h l d d b t ft t i ? Th i i b i l i t f P f l t ' Th X Economics and Philosophy 5 2 3 5 5 3 N i k R b t (1974) Anarchy State and Utopia N Y k B i B k Okin Susan Moller (1989) Justice Gender and the Family New York: Basic Books P f l t D k (1982) Reasons and Persons O f d O f d U i i t P MA H d U i i t P R l J h (1971) A Theory of Justice B t (1993) Political Liberalism N Y k C l b i U i i t P (1999) The Law of Peoples Boston MA: Harvard University Press d S h i d t D i d (1994) Th i t i t t i f t I El F k l P l F d D Mill Jf& P l ( d ) Property Rights N Y k C b i d U i i t P Schwartz Thomas (1979) Welfare judgments and future generations Theory and Decision 11: 18194 NJ P i t U i i t P Si J l i L (1996) The Ultimate Resource E P i t Review of Economic Sl R M (1974) I t t i l it d htibl Studies Symposium Issue pp 2 9 4 5

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(1991) Sustainability: an economist's perspective In R Dorfman and N Dorfman (eds) Economics of the Environment, 3 d d 17987 N Y k W W N t Wlf C l k (1996) M k t j t i d th i t t f ft ti Ethics and the Environment, 1 (2) 15375

Further reading A

K t h (1973) R l ' i i l fj t i Swedish Journal of Economics, 75 2325 Dasgupta Partha (1994) Savings and fertility: ethical issues Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (2) 9 9 1 2 7 S A t (1994) P l t i dli d lit New York Review of Books, 41 (15) 6271 deShalit Avner (1995) Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. L h MD R d Littlfild Wlf C l k (1997) P ffti tilitii d lti li Si J ' th f il hi I Nik F t i d J Hll ( d ) Contingent Future Persons. Dordrecht: Kluwer

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M f l l h b i d th f i G M d l ' d bithi i t j t th f f i ft t fild b t l i f t l t th difft diili Th th d i t t i ithi b i t h i h i l h di i d l it i ibl t i l t d b t h l i l i h i t i d lit tdi thl litil i d many others It is this richly mixed ancestry that gives bioethics much of its remark able vitality Bioethics is in part an academic field (a trait it inherits from philosophy d t t t t h l ) it i tl t f l i i l ttitd d ( tit dd i dii ll t h l d i l ) d it i tl l i i t d f f il l i ( t i t it d i f l d l t d fild i d litil i ) Yt h l it t d it lik hbid t bithi i i t l l t l d il h tht h t l idl d f I hll t t h l l fll th past several decades and now represents a significant cultural force as well as an important practical one When bioethics first emerged as a new field several decades ago it looked ike a fd f th d i flh i th tht b t i t fhi t t t ttti f l f d th i l i h ll id i th d i litt d f d t h i ti bt ll It i l tht l t h h bithi t d ith kbl d h lik f d it t f t dditi t t t h h t It i h t b fi t l l t l t i h t ll ( t h h ill b idt ith i t t t i ) t l i t l l t l d bli success

Bioethics as "Dilemmamotivated" S t i t bli f t h i ftl d t k t h t th hi? O th

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d ill di i t h t it b t l i t i ilbl hih tit hld get it? Suppose researchers want to test a treatment or a vaccine for a highly lethal disease but the disease is particularly prevalent in areas of the world where local culture means that obtaining informed consent in the standard Western ways ill f t d ill t b ibl h l d th d th td? Bithi f t l bl lik th i liil dii dil h dil li tt lti di i i l b d f i t d ith h l t h dhlth bth i t i l di t t i l t t I d d it i l bl lik th tht h tditill titd h f bithi Nt l i it fild t h t b ith f l t i b t i llif bedside dilemmas about what to do (or not do) for this patient here and now but such reallife dilemmas continue to motivate the field They are its intuitive motivational core the deepest source of energy in the field In bioethics unlike th h i l h i l fild til d dil h di th d l t t th th d Th th b i f t i f thi t i t i t fild h i l h i l flti liil ltti d li d l t ll d i b d i l t i it i th ifi t f tht i t h t i l i tht i liil lti d tht ti f th h the higher courts become the landmark legal cases that shape public policy and practice The dilemmamotivated character of bioethics also in part explains its extremely f t i t S dil d i h l d th d t t l l th t i t th t t h hth b t i d i i b t t ' HIV tt b t th l i k l i h d t h t ii ill t d? S h l d il idti t i didi h t l l t th l ilbl i t ti tit? Shld t h l i b d t t h dti t t f iftilit t tif tl di f ti t f hild t t il d? M fili i arise in new more urgent contexts spurred particularly by new biomedical re search or new events Does in vitro fertilization or gestational surrogacy or cloning change the nature of parenthood? Does it affect the importance of reproduction? Wht ik b tk ith t h l t i l l h it fft ft t t i t i h t t t th ik? I ti t t i l il ti i ? Ad F l l f t i t K A Q i l ' illftd f l h l dd t t i 1975 dN C ' t b i l i d t i 1983 h l h d h f d i i fi b t dth d di tht t th cases both similar and dissimilar ones What is a person? Does a human being who has become permanently comatose vegetative or braindead cease to be a person? Should a person's antecedent wishes control their treatment after they have become l t t ? Wht th i t t f h i tl t ?Wht d it t tht t t t i "ftil" d if t t t i ftil it b i l t i l d i d t th tit h t it t h l ? Nt l d fili i i t t bt dil l i ll th ti i t t h l i l d l t di t b k litil d il i t d lblid Wht b t 296

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th t t i fd i d t l Thid W l d lti h tit or governments may be unable to pay for drugs even if they do prove effective? What about cloning and genetic engineering? What about using transplant organs from other countries where the conditions of donation do not appear fully volun t ? Wht b t d t h d t t f tit ith t b d i l i b t th t t i Pegram Heydrich i hdld f iht d lt fift il t f t h i lii ith h i h th d t i i l d ? It i th ti d f d l l t dil d t f h i t l h filiti t d d tti d bdid h tht k bithi i t h b k neck pace and that adds such excitement to its public as well as professional appeal These dilemmas drive its theoretical agendas not the other way around

Th E d i

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Th t l f bithi l I thik tf h f it t l l t l d bli Nt lik i tht d t d i ll d i t i from an original central big bang bioethics began with comparatively narrowly focused attention on the doctor/patient relationship but has continued to explode outward in innumerable new directions Originally called "medical ethics" (a clue t it th liitd f ) bithi h d l d i i l b d d hititd t f it h t d dti d d d dti t h l i ildi bti t t h h d l i ti i i d t l l h i t t i h d i l bjt dth d di ildi ithdi d ithhldi t t t h i i i t d iid d t h i llti f d h much more Prodded by specific individual dilemmas bioethics as a discipline came into being as it began to generalize these questions raising systematic theoretical issues ike th d i t i t i bt killi d ltti di th iti f h d d th t f lit f lif Th h b id b ttti t till l b k d l i tht i i fild f l i d thi ( l t h h d i i f th b i bithi) tthtlli fidtilit i f d t d t l i ft i t b k d fi i il jti A bithi h l d th l ti f th i iitill i d d i th t t f th i d i t d t / t i t l t i h i h t have much larger scope The concept of "informed consent" for example was initially important in the context of a therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient but has begun to take on additional complexity as it has been extended to dditil f l t h t i i t l h i t i t t i l l t i h i lik th bt b i b d thi h l t h i l d l il i lik th l t i h i bt iti d thi hlth t ' fdi iiti Siill ithhldi ithdi f t i l l ill t i t i h i l h i i h i t ith th tit' f i l fi i

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fr idi i t t f i CPR i tibiti t t t pneumonia for a single patient but withholding and withdrawing treatment also raise a much broader range of issues when such practices become a matter of policy for whole classes of patients for example the very elderly those with poor progno th ith ltil dil bl hth d t d b h i t l h l t h i t iti tl hlth t Th bl tb i d j t dil ithi th d t / t i t l t i h i bt t l b itl i fditibti j t i i t b k d f ith t t l I d d f th i f bithi t l i f d t bt fdtilit tthtlli t l i jti i llti d on have this outwardexpanding character: they were originally explored in the intimate context of one doctor and one patient back when bioethics was still usu ally called medical ethics but are now coming to be seen as of much broader scope Th t h f t d d i i i t t ll i i t f th d i l t i t d h t f bithi th i i t i l ifi ill ft t tt h b d i i l i t i Fth l t h h f th i bithi dd h th iti f thd i i b t dti t h liitd libilit i other areas of bioethics other concerns like the risks of the "slippery slope" or dilemmas about distributive justice play a role in many or perhaps most of the issues bioethics addresses Bioethics also shares many concerns with other areas of applied thi d lid f i l thi b i thi d i t l thi ll i b t l t i d th l t i h i bt f i l d lit b t i d bi i t l ith d i b i l i t i b t i t t fit d t lit d b t lbl it d jti

Institutional Settings of Bioethics In tandem with the expansion of the intellectual concerns of bioethics the range of i t i t t i l tti i h i h it f l i h h l b idi A l t h h bi thi b t th b d i d i th l i i l tti fl tti h i t l h th fi t i t d tbli hi it h tht f l t it t i t i t i t l l t l t I th fit l t h t i l bithi f t i fllbl d i fild lt ith j l f d ffi t d d t d d t d t i l ititti ldi dil dl h l th t i l l i l h i l h i l l i h di sions oriented toward the exploration of issues qua issues Second in partial contrast clinical bioethics has become a familiar consultative practice in many f fhlth ititti ildi h i t l i h h i t t i t lii d h it t i l l i l th d i i f d i t d tht i h th i d i t titi tit fil b ill id th I thi l i i l f th ti f bithi ft i l f l t th i t i t t i l thi itt bdid ltti b th i t i t t i ' dilthi t f f it itti t t d th l b t i b t i t d t d th lti fi Cliil bl

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li

b bithiit ft l i l f ( thi l t ) ki t ltt f i th ilti I th t h i d f it i i l i l i i t d bithi l i l th t t i d l i f f i l i t i t t i l d bli li M h f h ki l i i t d bithi i d t d i th i bithi t tditi ihitd f th i i l Hti C t f d d b D i l Cllh d Willd G l i d l th K d Ititt f Ethi tG t Ui it Th bithi t i th U i t d S t t t i t d ith i i t i d i dil t d hil f thi k i d i i h t t f f d d j t tht i lt d l i i t d Siill th bithi ii b i i ith th N t i l C i i f th P t t i f H Sbjt f B i d i l d B h i l R h (19748) i t l t t t d h th P i d t ' C i i f th S t d f Ethil P b l i Mdii d B i d i l d B h i l R h (19803) hih d d i f Deciding to Forgo Life-sustaining Treatment and Securing i f l t i l t ildi Access to Health Care th N t i l B i t h i A d i C i t t (NBAC tblihd 1999) d it f ilf ii h th A d i C i t t H Rditi E i t ll f li i hth i i t li f l t i li N t h l d i t th id t i t i t h t f th i t i t t i f bithi th diff it th b i f t h Th t th t fild d i liil d li b i t h i b t th t f i l fild M f th l d i ht fi t i t t i l tti d ithi it t i l iti i l l th A i S i t f Bithi d H i t i d it i t t i l ildi i l iti lik th E S i t f P h i l h fMdii dHlth C (ESPMH) th A i Bithi N t k (ABN) d th lbl I t t i l A i t i f Bithi (IAB) P t f th t t h f t bithi i t i th flidit f it i t i t t i l t d th ith h i h i d i i d l b i t h i i t th

Bithi Bithi

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ith t dil f dil ti d hlth ll b t it tiit hth i d i l i liil lt ti li f t i it i b i i t b bd f l i th I it l d bithi d ith th f f t t l th i dt fid lti t t dil d l d d i i t t d i t t h i l b t t i t h t it i d til i b t it f f l i it flit h t dt tiliti f l d t i t d thiki i i l b d d t l i l thiki d it thi h d d i i d f f ti thiki fil i d i i i t l d ll t A bithi hititd d b t t t tii it thil f d t i h T B h dJ Child d l d ht 299

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h b th b t k d t idl l d t t i t i f it mative method a set of four midlevel principles intended to cover the full range of applied ethical considerations relevant in bioethics Often affectionately chided as "the Georgetown Mantra" in recognition of the fact that both Beauchamp and Child t h i tG t thi h ff i i l t lfi b f i djti i l l f b t h tiliti idti ( l f i b f i ) d d t l i l ( t j t i ) Whil it h b bjtd t t h t i l hll thi i ilit h it i ti lld h d i l k b l i th l i t i fbithi C t f th t fb k d t h i l th especially Thomist and other sorts of divinecommand normative theories as well as various forms of virtue ethics also play a role in the thinking of some bioethi cists In its international forms bioethics also involves efforts to introduce norma ti idti f Ai Afi d th j l t l d lii tditi T b bithiit t h l ki d ifi ti ti Pt Si f l d i b hilf Utiliti O O'Nill l f Kti flki t i d Chl C Jh N d K i Wild id Cthli bithi cists but in its remarkable multiplicity bioethics appears able to accommodate all these ways of approaching normative issues at once In mainstream bioethics no single normative theory has ever become dominant

Bithi Nt

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l i bithi t d i t d b i l ti th b t it h l i d til i t th d l t f i t l l t i l methods of analysis often reflected in other academic fields in the use of jargon Terms like "the Georgetown Mantra" recourse to principles like "double effect" concerns about the "slippery slope" and appeals to "the yuk factor" are about as close as bithi t t j t th i ti tht j t t Thi ll bithi t i ibl t titi f id it f b k d fild i l d i it t diili f h i l h dii d l h d b thl t h l i d th il i It l ll bithi t i ibl t th d th bli t l It i t d t d ht bithiit d it i t i bithi d i i d d i t Otid d t h t t t d d h i th f i t l convention Of course bioethics has developed a few characteristic responses For example the "yuk factor" refers to a reaction of repugnance for a practice like terminal sedation and "yuk" has come to have a fairly specific almost technical meaning: "t thti b t l i i t d t h i l d i l " i th tht " ld til t t it f lf b t ld t b l k it f t h " Th "k" iht t j bt b d l th fild i blil i t l l i i b l d til j f T th t t tht ti ithi th d i d f i l diili l fhl d d h t i t i l l t t d i j bithi i til li t i l fild

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Itdiili

Fth t l d bithi i til t i l j fr df f th d i f i l l th bt l i l background field among those in its multihybrid parentage has become dominant and no background field has been either excluded or lionized as a participant n bioethics discussions Doctors do not have the final say in bioethics discussions; nor d l d f tht tt d h i l h th f f th th fild tibti t bithi Bithi i d l d t h h l itdiili T b bithiit f th b k d fild f h i l h dii l d th d t l i i it th d i d d k difft ti b t h t it i t " d " b i t h i hld t h t it i t l th f t h t i l i th t h t it i t i d t i f and resolve a clinical dilemma and still others that it is to formulate a successful social policy They may make very different assumptions about whether bioethics dilemmas including the specific concrete cases with which bioethics often begins b l d t ll Th l h difft iti f ht t d bithi dh t d i t i i h it f t d bithi Y t th i iti ith h th thi i h t i t l t th ltihbid h t fbithi Bithi i fild t tht i i t d i i l i i th t j t t h t it bjt tt li tl i th i t t i bt d i t t i d i f f t fild b t i t t l t h t it i d t d b and under the working assumptions of the full range of quite different background fields This too is part of what accounts for the intellectual and public success of bioethics This is not to say that problems in bioethics are always solved "cor tl" bt th t h t it i fild t h t f t i l d fitfll d ith l iifi f f i l tit d th bli i hi th bl t h t it d

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W th h h d ti it ld b it t t exhaustive account of the core issues of bioethics the theoretical problems which occur and recur throughout its academic discussions in its clinical problemsolving and in its efforts at policy development Instead here is a quick overview: autonomy W h t i it f t b t l f d t i i ? A t hi l t b t d ? A th hi l hld t k ? I th l i i t t i f ' t hi f t l i t i l ?A t ll h i ltll h d tht l t i t ibl? competency What is competency a legal notion a medical one a philosophical one or all of the above? Is competency general or is it specific to certain kinds of decisions and tasks?

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consent Wh i t i t t ? Wht i id f tt b i f d information understanding freedom from internal and external pressure and what else? Is the consent of a patient or of a research subject a sufficient protection against abuse? personhood W h t i d ht i h d ? Wh i it id t ht it bt ti d bith l t ? I it l t h b i i b l t b i d d ? A th iti f hd? lif l ? D lif per se h l i it th i value of life W h t i tht l h i lif t h t f l ? D ll lif h l t h lif? quality of life Quality of life? How do you measure it? Is there some minimum below which it ought not fall? Is this a subjective matter or an objective one? needs and wants What is a need? Is it different from a want? Do other parties h bliti t (t t ) tif ' d ? W h t i th diff bt d d basic d? bt ill d d i ? (Th i illness and disease W h t i th diff l tditi f flti h ) W h t i th l f il f t i lbli ll d d i ? W h t i th b f ill di l ? N l f t i ing? Or is it to be identified in terms of the patient's perceptions? Is "mental illness" another sort of illness like physical illness or something different in kind? And what about situations like "terminal illness": what exactly does this label mean and h t h l b l b ? W h t i th f f t f l b l i " t i ll ill?" futility Wh i t t t f t i l ? Wh it ill t k i b l diff i th tit' itti t d diff diff t ll? H hld d t itti f ftilit b ii d ithdi ?I it iibl t ithhld ithd h th h i i bli t t t i f t i l b t th tit th tit' f i l d t? pain Okay so we know what pain is we have all felt it But how do you measure it given the theoretical problems of intersubjectivity? Does the patient have a moral right to have his or her pain controlled to the best of current medical k l d ? W h t if it tb tlld? suffering S f f i i t th i it i b d hd t dfi d h hd t "tt" D ffi h th li i dil ttti? disability H i h litill d t h t i l l iti i ht i dibilit? W h t dti d/ ti i it? D l have the right to refuse treatment for disability in their dependents e g deaf chil dren? Are conditions like pregnancy obesity and depression disabilities? How ex tensive an effort should society make to accommodate people with disabilities and d th b i t f t i ? A l ith d i b i l i t i l b l i th f bi bjt t il tht iht d i t t thi hi b t hlth ? death D d i d d B t th i b i dth ildi b i dth d l b i d t h th diti lik PVS i h i h th tit' it f il i t t i i tl t th i hl i hih ift'

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iti i h t b d t d Wh i d d d d d when should patients in these conditions be treated as dead? racism sexism agism There are plenty of problems with these and other "isms" in all sorts of areas of human activity; the question is what forms they take and h t h th t i l l ii i hlth justice fairness equality W k th f il d l i t i l th d th thi d i f f t i th t t f hlth ? Wht b t i t t i l jti d th l l t i fhlth t th th th th ld? W h t b t lit b t t t i l l ill t i t h bth h t di b t i i t h ld h d i t d hil th th i t dependent on life support and so must wait until the disease kills him? What is fair in distributing donor organs or limited quantity vaccines or coverage for expensive pharmaceuticals etc? Issues of justice fairness and equality permeate virtually all f bithi Thi i j t th b i i f thi l i t

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Attacks on Bioethics Experts - Consultations - Fees - Testimony before expert panels - Testimony in legal cases - Testimony before government commissions - Bioethicists in the hire of private industry T h i k b t it iti h i th h t fbithi h i ? Th i i l f t tiiti th t fbithiit t h l dl i ith th ld flti f h i l h fi l dil ith th f h i i f t d ith h d h i t th b d i d th th tiiti f th tti th t th l f d i i tl t th new critics of bioethics claim They see bioethics as making claims to moral author ity that are unwarranted and they charge that bioethics as a discipline as a field l bd ft h h t d ti h b t l b l t i l i bli lif M l i j t tht t f thi itii hld l issues Th b h thi " t " h " k " th " i h t " th dil d th t fbithiit didi h ti (f f) i l l t Th t know h t i ll iibl d ht i t th i il b i t h i l k l d t h i h th l h th k N d bithi cists have "special" moral sensitivities Nor should public policy be determined by bioethicists who claim to be unusually sensitive to moral issues or to know what s right or who are supported by or in the hire of commercial corporations: the whole t i f bithi thi li f t t k hld i i f itlf jtifid bli l A dill ti li ft h h t idt i i f t t i G l i t b i t h i i t P t Si bt l till ht i d t i th U i t d S t t d l h h l d t h t th d i i fi as issues t d t li th ti i ti T tlk b t t h i

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i i t i d t th i tht t h i i i sible; to talk about genetic engineering does the same thing After all these critics hold we do not talk about "moral issues" in murder; we simply agree without question that murder is wrong Thus this line of attack holds bioethics ought not tlk b t l i i t h i ti i i th tt h th i t thi t b id b t h id d t h t it d h th ii ifl f thi l l illitit diili F i t bithiit t thi i l l b th d t t h t th li b t tt lik t h i d ti i i Bt til f bithiit h tid t tk i l th f the radical right and except for continuing discussion of the issue of universal health care (both nationally and globally) few bioethicists have found themselves very far to the political left For the most part bioethicists have been content to l th dil hih ithi iti t f hlth

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A

?

So what about truth? Can bioethics actually provide answers? Can it capture the truth? Is it even capable of providing real solutions to the dilemmas it addresses? Its critics claim that it pretends to do so; the question is whether it is at all possible tht bithi ld id tht th till fl tht d t b l true O b i i i lik b t i t h i t ll h d t it t h i I i thi ti it i i t t t d i t i i h th i l tht bithi l it d i h l l l it l i i l l d it l i th d l t f bli li I it d i l bithi k li t tth th h t it l i i il ti i th it f l i f patterns of reasoning and logical implication in the literature of bioethics and the history of the issues at hand and in identifying the background moral theory to hih ifi l i liitl iliitl l I thi d i l bithi th lidit f t f ifi l l i itht i th t t h f th l i itlf I d d " t t h " i t i h t h h i i th t it t t i idl td f t tht th h l lif i b t t th d t h t h t th h l h l t h i btt th ill d tht th hl l i b t t th i B bithi d t t if i l l th t it hih ld b bl of adjudicating these questions in a consistent way it is not uniformly Kantian or uniformly utilitarian or uniformly committed to theologically based premises of any sort it does not reach agreement at the deepest level Despite the widespread t f b i i bithi h i l h i l l flti t i t i l d ith t tth I it l i liil ltti i t t bithi l l lik t h t f thi f l it h l ti t dd ith h th d t d th t d i t it d i t i i h bt i i l d i t d d i t f l d it thd h l l i f i t i d l t t i d i t

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lti t t t bi th ti i t i th d t th t i t th f i l the hospital the insurer or whatever to understand and resolve the nature of their disagreement Bioethics does not decide cases like a court; rather it assists the parties involved in deciding how to resolve them Here it does seek answers but makes no t f hi th " t t h " F i l l i it blili l bithi bi b t h it h l l ti d it l i i l i t b i i il li bt h t it d h i l bjt t litil It d t t t t f l t l l d iti li it th t f th P i d t ' C i i th k f ii lik NBAC b t th ii t h l bjt t political pressures and are established and discontinued as the winds of politics blow They have no way to pronounce definitively on what is "right" and what is "wrong" though they nevertheless make an important contribution to public ife b ii th l t i Th i l bithi d t d t l i i t thitti l i bli lif iti h t d d d it t t d t ff th t t h t h h it l i t t bli l

The Scope of Bioethics: From Western to Global A bithi h dd t d f it i i t i l ith th i d i t d t / t i t l t i h i d dil fditibti j t i i th di iti t t i l itti f dii i th d l d i d t i l ti it h b t l k t h b d fbithi i d th ld Th d t th f t t h t th d t / t i t l t i h i d th f t l t t hlth b difft i difft iti Bth d t d tit h difft tti b t hlth d hlth i th th "Western" countries from those in the southern "nonWestern" countries Patterns of illness and disability and causes of death as well as background social institu ti idl b t ih d ti Th b difft tti b t tthtlli fidtilit t l i d th t l f l i lt ( th US) it i th t tll tit th t t h b t ftl d i i i th ( R i G ) it i th t t t l l i till th ( J ) it i th t tll f i l b bt t th tit d i till th ( th N j ) d i l b l i i itd l t t h Furthermore types of disease conditions vary dramatically in different parts of the world: bioethics in the industrialized nations has been concerned primarily with conditions occurring in laterlife degenerative disease and reproductive issues asso i t d ith h i h t h l i t d ftilit l b i t h i h t t d th l ifti di tht h t t t d h ttti i bithi t ll h b fflV/AIDS dd i t t t b l i Cditi i th i d t i l i d ti tht bl fifti di i d t dti hlth i t l hlth bl d l k f hlth t l

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Wh i f ditibti j t i l d i th F i t W l d t i l l l lack of access to extremely expensive hightechnology therapies such as organ transplantation or sustained artificial nutrition and hydration in the Third World in contrast issues of distributive justice the same in theory but vastly different n bjt tt i l t i i l l b i lik i i t i l h dti tibiti t t i d th h tt ti di f d d tbl t Mdii l k b l th i th i h d ti Bithi ith i i f lbli d f ltil t l diff i b i i t d t th diff F l Pt A Si it t bithi d l t f ti tlki b t dth d di bt almost all its discussion is focused on the withholding and withdrawing of the high technology "tubes and machines" form of endoflife care common in tertiary medical centers in the advanced medical systems of the West though just 8 percent of deaths i th i h ti d 87 t i th d l i d difft i t df difft Th h h i f d i bithi i h dflif d h i h t h l dti d ifi i h h t h th f t i h t h killi i l th l t t i di lt i tf it origins in the hightechnology hospitals of the industrialized nations Yet not every resident of the industrialized nations gets inside the hospital door and residents of the poorer nations threequarters or more of the world's population have virtually no t ll t t h l i l l hititd hlth Th ii f bithi W t i d t i l i d ti l t h t it h d l d ithi l t l i t tht t libl idiidli il d litil f d kt d th l f th W t l i b l tditi It h b l iti t i t l t l di t t i l i til f i l tl d it h b l d til l t l ith f fhlth t i d th h i h t h l h i t l h blihlth i ti d t l f i b l di or "homecare" issues where housing is rudimentary or the care of dying persons who have no resources or family members at all Many of the same issues arise n comparing urban and rural bioethics in First World contexts To some degree as bithi ti t d l d d th i i d ti b t th hdl t f th i i l fbithi d til tl h t b dd t l Bithi i i th t d f l bl i th dii f d d i d t i l i d ti ith h i h l hititd t it i j t b i i t d till f t h t d t hlth i th it d i f f t h l t h d i f th l i i l d t f th ld

The Future of Bioethics A bithi ti t b t h i th d d it b i t f h t i t i i it l t i h i t it t diili b d l i ltihbid i t d i i l i h i l h thl dii l litil

306

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i d th it i ti hth bithi ill ti t function in this crossdisciplinary way or whether it will become an autonomous fully fledged field in its own right On the one hand it might seem that bioethics is so fully dependent on its original background fields that it could not function with t th d t h t it ill ti t f t i t i d i t t i h i l h d t l d f i l i th fild H it l tht h fild id i d d t d t f l hl t h l d i iill d l d ithi t diili ( l l h i l h ) bt b h d ff f tht t th i d lit t h t i l hititi d bli t t t i bithi t may already be in the process of branching off from its parent disciplines into an independent and autonomous field If this process is actually already occurring philosophy medicine law and the dditil fild b td t ti t l tibt l bithi d l i th f t b t bithi itlf ld l it fll l f t i d t fild S h lti ld b kd b h i t i i bi thiit ld l b iitill t i d h i l h d t l t h l i i l i t i t t h t i th ld l b t i d hl and professionals in the various parent fields who are then typically drawn to bioethics later in their careers as they respond to the range of dilemmas they have encountered Rather new bioethicists would be trained primarily as bioethicists d t d i i l l i th d i t i t i i d litt f thi fild bi thiit f th t t I thi d ? Th i f d t i bithi iht t t h t it i M t d t t th fild f b i t h i d i t l th th fit b i h i l h d t l I t i t t i l ti h dtilli ( l d d d i i ) f fl i i f tii bithiit l t i th fild' f fii f it t diili though of course it depends on many other factors as well My own view of this branchingoff process is guarded and only partly optimistic: yes I think fission is well underway but I am not sure whether it is a desirable thing

Th S i l R l

f Bithi

T h t thi fb h i ff f it t diili i l d d and is likely to continue is as I see it in part a function of the social role of bioethics Like several other commentators I see the social role of bioethics at east in some of its forms as supplanting a role earlier played by religion In the 1950s d 1960 i f lii ii d ld t h i di i fb i l b i t h lif ffi i dth i th i f th h h hih i tht f ii ld f i l i t t b d it d i t d i t i l d i i f h i E i l lii i d d th t k f l t l k b t lif d d t h Bt ith th idtit liti t h t f l l d th i i l i h t t th " t " t d th t h i i d t i t t f th l t d d f th t t i t h t li

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i h b i i l t i l d ith i l conversation among themselves and with a broader public than with doctrinal commitment internal to themselves What might have been a broad albeit amorphous discussion of "the nature of suffering" tended to become an account of "the Jewish i f f f i " "th C t h l i iti th f it t li f f i " At th ti t i l t d b d i dii d t h l hih d ti b t l i lif i i dti d ilti d t h bithi b t l b i i lik lif d t h h d d j t i i t h t did t i d t i l i t t d tht i d d ld b fll l Th b i t h i d i t fill th id lft b th i t i ism of religion replacing it with a deep but secular discussion of values Further more the multihybrid character of bioethics rooted in the vastly different fields of philosophy medicine law social theory literature and others kept it from becom i hll d i f b i j i d d f d l i i t t i i b l t tid Th fbithi ld b d b th di fil dt l i i f d bithi' "hd " ftil i t i th f lt di d d hl h lik ER Th bli th d l k ld ll d t d th b i t h i h d b h t t th f Bith ics was a remarkable public success: it was accessible; it was morally important; it was compellingly interesting; and in order to achieve its wide scope it was forced to remain wholly secular That did not mean of course that the principal people i l d i th i bl d d d b bithi ld t h li i i t t f thi bt th t h t th lti f th d l i dil ld t b dittd b th t i lii Th l ititi t th f th dil h d t b bl t b i d b ll Tht bithi h d i t fill th id lft b th i i t i i f lii l tl li h l t h h bithi ith th k f t h l i lik J h F l t h P l R dRihd M C i k t h l i now have comparatively little input into current bioethics Religious bioethics was increasingly marginalized in the early 1970s and some among those bioethicists who have remained have found themselves constrained by institutional and dog ti idti i thi k Of th l tbl b i t h i i t h b k d t i i i i thl lik A l b t J d th iti tti tht t h l i i l ith i i bithi th b i lii lik th P k Rid C t Bt b dl l t h h bithi b iitl t f l f th i i f i f lii blif d ti i t i t ' li f l i l i th dil itd with the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses bioethics itself does not for the most part countenance religious claims in its argumentation It is a primarily secular discipline enjoying the expansive social role that a less sectarian f f lii did B i t h i i l th l h fild bfild f l i d thi l iil il l ll i l d i i t l thi b i thi thi fl i i thi d b t bithi l l th i i thi l S h l i t i t h t ik Bithi i l th l t i fi f l d i th i i th b th iti d th 308

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i t l t l b t i th t itti it i h d t bithi' philosophic legacy of reflection Crises in the newborn nursery demand quick clear decisions Policies about the care of geriatric patients and those near death require general formulations that cannot always take account of the nuances of ndividual dil Wht t b b l flti iid iiti th d l t f t f l thd th i k f bithi l tht h t b i issue d i l t i t d i ill l i f i t position b t th i h i h th dil hld b l d Thi t b til i k if b i t h i t ff i t d d t t h t i fild f it d l i it i t l ti and assumptions Some observers already see bioethics as authoritative as actually capable of resolving dilemmas in medical practice by reaching the (sole) morally sound answer a field with real claim to moral authority (this is the view that iit th t f ttk bithi d i d li) d hil th j t thi i t t d t i th fild lik th t f th P i d t ' C i i d th ii f th AMA' C i l Ethil d J d i i l Affi tib t t thi ti Th i k i t f " l i t h d " H Tit E l h d t J t it d i d f lii j t bt thl invested with the mantle of knowing what is right

"Uncontested Core" of Bioethics Y t th iti fbithi d iti f it l " l i t h d " d t it t h it Bithi thi l i l l f h i l h i l l i i l ttitd d li i l h liitti d t it b d i b t it l h t d i t t h It i t t t h t it accessible and interesting and that everyone patients physicians academics journalists the public can more or less follow its principal concerns Rather what is important is that it takes as its focus a field an area of practice namely dii d hlth tht h ht b lld " t t d " I t t th f t i l thi lid f i l thi ik thi f l b i thi i i thi d t i thi thi f i d lii (t bt f f th l i d thi bfild t h t h d l d i th k f d i l thi i t ) f diili h " jt" t l li l b l t i Th j t fl f l tht l bjti t t l t th institution of law as a whole is to defend and protect opposing parties' rights; this is evident not only in the courtroom but in most of law's other occupations as well including the conduct of business and the development of new law This is not to d t h t th l il l bl ft t i t tht it l tiit i lititi bt i th l f bl it t l f t i d bjti i t t t th i h t f ti h i t t b t dd S i i l l th " jt" l fb i i ki fit t h h it t l tiiti i th h d l i f i id I fild lik th th t l til fiil i t b id b t 309

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it fl l b i ti h fidtilit it b t th challenges to the core project itself: in law the defense of rights in an adversarial situation; in business the pursuit of profit from other parties' wants and needs In such fields the core project whether adversarial representation or profitmaking b d l t t d Bt i bithi th ti d ti dii d hlth ll h it j t l b d l t d th / t t i f hlth ti lld " " t t h ith ltd l ildi th lif f f f i th ititi f dibilit d th ti f di tllti f d th ti f " " I h t th j t f dii th f ti f bithi i t itself problematic In this specific sense bioethics does yield answers and indeed does harbor " t r u t h " To cure a patient's illness is in general a good thing The moral questions in bioethics all arise where cure is not possible (for instance n a b ith i t dfit dlt ith i i b l t i l i l l ) h ditibti it tht t b idd f ll (f i t i t l t t i i i ditibti i d l i t i ) h diti i i t l idtifd ill (f i t h l i t ) V i t l l th ti d i t f i i bithi i l itti where health care cannot accomplish its core project of cure whether because the patient's condition is beyond retrieval or because of background scarcity; but bio ethics does not normally challenge the central assumption that it is a good thing to k ill ll Of d i t ti fl b t ht titt ill (th i l t i l l l i hit d i d dii) d ht t d f f hld b ittd i t t t i t ill b t th j t itlf i t i l h l l d E th t t h h i iti f dii lik Th S f h t th td li b t ill bt ld t b j t t ffi th ibilit f h th ill i h th d t h th t d h th ld work; it is just that such critics think there are virtually no such cases Serious questions also arise concerning physicianassisted suicide with deep divisions about the propriety of physician aidindying and causing the deaths of patients but here t th j t f dii i t tll h l l d If it ibl t k th t i l l ill t i t ll i t " " th ill t h t ill t h i dth ll ti ld l b t thi t M l bl i dii i j t h fil t h t i h it t t d j t t b h i d W h t thi f b i t h i i t h t it bl ti i i l i l b l To be sure they are recurrent in that there are always more patients who are irretrievably ill and always more situations of scarcity but the central commitment of bioethics to explore how the core project of health care can most ethically be t i t i itlf b l t i Of ifi t t t t l th i b i d l i l l l t d td i i ti thil t h i bt thi d t t h t th il d i t i t h i l D bithi ild ? Y d Bithi i ll it ltihbid lit t t i l l t i d iti f dii d hlth ti bt dii dhlth ti thl i h i h th tiit

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d ti i t till t t d d i t thi l bl Hence one might say bioethics is a fortunate field a spectacular success both intellectually and I think it is fair to say (despite the continuing critiques) publicly as well This does not mean that bioethics will not continue to "make trouble" n h l l i ll l t tt f ti d j t f f il li bt l t h t it ti t hld t fid it tht f t i t t h t th i hih dii b t lihi it t l j t thill tbl d i d d tht f t i t t h t i th f f ti it dh t thi j t t ll F ll it lit it till k t it t l h t h t thi btt f tit df those who provide patients with care

Acknowledgments I

ld lik t t h k J J b d Will M t i f d i i

MD L l i F i f thi h t

F t h

M i

Millt C h i

B t t

di

Btti N

M t P b t (1994) Yk Ofd U i i t P (1996) 2 d d E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l B h T d Child J (1989) 3d d N York: Oxford University Press B k D W (1993) N Yk Cbid U i i t P Buchanan Allen E and Brock Dan W (1989) N Yk Cbid U i i t P Cllh D i l (1995) W h i t DC Georgetown University Press (1995b) E t " B i t h i " l 1 C C h l E (1978) Nt D IN U i i t f Nt D P Dil N (1985) Cbid Cbrid U i i t P Engelhardt Jr H Tristram (1986) s New York: Oxford University P (2000) Li S t d Zitli Fletcher J (1954) ( i i l l th 1949 L l l Lt tH d U i i t ) P i t NJ P i t U i i t P F l t h J h C (1997) B i t h i i t i l l f f i f " t " it T y 27: 297324 Gi G G d B l J M J (1979) fNt D P Nt D IN U i i t Jkbit I l (1959) s New York: Bloch

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Jonsen Albert R (1988) The Birth of Bioethics New York and Oxford: Oxford University and Toulmin Stephen (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning Berkeley CA: University of California Press McCormick Richard A (1981) How Brave a New World: Dilemmas in Bioethics Garden City Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradition: Tradition in Transition Crossroad Macklin Ruth A (1999) Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine McGuire Daniel C (1974) Death by Choice Garden City NY: Doubleday Noonan Jr John Thomas (1986) Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice Oxford University Press Ramsey Paul and Farley Margaret A (2002) The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics A Theory of Justice Press Singer Peter (1993) Practical Ethics 2nd edn New York: Cambridge University Press The New York Times August 2 Szasz Thomas (1984) The Myth of Mental Illness New York: Harper Collins Veatch R M (1981) A Theory of Medical Ethics New York: Basic Books The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27: 365-71

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23 Abti MARGARET OLIVIA LITTLE

It i ft td tht bli d i i f th l tt f bti i d i i t i l d Th iti tkd t d th i ffd t flt littl f th btlt d t t ti bil tht k i t flti th bjt D i t t t t b i ti t fid iddl d th d b t i l l l i d t it t d t i ith t conservatives claiming abortion to be the moral equivalent of murder even as extreme liberals think it devoid of moral import T t t thi l i t i i d t th l l b t t l t h t ti t hd l d i i Adii f thil it i f d ill l i th d l t t d ti f hth bti hld b l l l t t d ti f Bt t t t bl f th t i d d b l i d t th d t f l th itlf F thi th t h i l l i t t bti h f d l t l i l on the thinnest moral assessment on whether and when abortion is "morally permissible" This question is of course a crucial one its answer often desperately sought But many of our deepest struggles with the morality of abortion h t t d ti b t it l t th l f decency respectfulness, d responsibility. It i thi t d i d tht bti iibl it th t d i d t h t it honorable thi t d i d tht bti i i i b l it th t d i d t h t it monstrous It i th ltt t i tht d t i ht iht ll th t h i k l i t t ti f th t d ith it th i th t li ith d th ti ttitd h d i t fb d i t i tht h d th think the act deserves A moral theory that moves too quickly or focuses too exclu sively on moral permissibility will not address these crucial issues Moreover the tools that mainstream moral theory has used for analyzing abor ti fit l k d l t thi bjt tt M t t t l bti i th t df i h i jtifid th t t f bli ti t d t th tti d t th iti fL d d V i i Whil th i l fi h t t t d l i id f th t i t t th l t t th thi f tti ht t t l l i creating h t ibiliti t h t i l

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t j t iki ' bd d lif h t fll f th f t t h t th entity in question is or would be d Nor are such lacunae incidental glitches As theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon (1991) and Robin West (1993) have pointed out our moral and political theories have been forged by and large t d l ith i t t i bt i d d t l ittd d ltil l t H ll thi iht kf ldil h i db b l ( ti th i i it iht) h th iht tb td t d ll ith l ti dli ith th t fi t t i t t i If thi i i h t it it i ill i t t tt f ll i many treatments are wont to do arbitrating the question of fetal personhood The question certainly matters: the moral contours of abortion as we shall see are importantly different depending on the answer we give it The question is moreover i l l i i th t t t hih l tt i f t i f th t fbi thi l d i j d d b it t ti d th t f t it ld b if it d l d (M i hih I ill t d f d h i t h t fll l tt i i t tiit d i t thi h i d th f t ' tt b i l iht nancy continues For the debate on moral status see Brody 1975; Marquis 1989; Feinberg 1992; Steinbock 1992; Quinn 1993) Complex as the issue of personhood is though the temptation to think our work done if only we could settle it as t h h th l tt f bti fll l k t f th l tt f th ft h ld t h i t t i th i h t h i l i tht i d b th hll th d i t i t i itti i h i h th f t i l t d T k th l tt f bti it t t i t j t t bitt l d fili t i i t h i d thi bt t t t d t th d i t i t i t f t h t ft t d t thi i I th f l l i I t t t h t if k l d tti motherhood as a p and creation as a s we will be in a far better position to appreciate the moral textures of abortion I explore these textures in the first half on stipulation that the fetus is a person in the second half under suppos iti t h t l h lif h i t t l th f t

Ftl P

h

d

F

W f l Itf Ribiliti

t Piti

If fetuses are persons then abortion is surely an enormously serious matter: what is at stake is nothing less than the life of a creature with full moral standing To say that the stakes are high though is not to say that moral analysis is obvious (which s h l h i l th ti ll t t t t li l ' li t i ) I t h i k th t idl hld b j t i t bti i bdl i i d d i t t l it b th d thil ti ti O th l i it i ftl bi ht t b t bti iti fftl h d if f t th bti i d P ft ll h f d t l i h t t lif d bti it ld t it 314

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ilti O thi i th t t f bti it l l I particular we need not delve too deeply into the burdens that continued gestation might present for women not because their lives do not matter or because we do not sympathize with their plight but because we do not take hardship as ustifica ti f d I ft t h h b t i ' iilti t d ill l t l if h l d i d k f t f tti Whil ti t h d i t tti i i t h h th f t i l i til it i b th t t h i f f difft O h i tti i id i th f t ith t d t i i h t ti bld d l i i oxygen providing hormonal triggers for development without which it could not live For a fetus to live is inextricably tied to receiving aid (see Bolton 1979) And whether the assistance is delivered by way of intentional activity (as when the t tk h tl i t i ) b fb i l i l h i it it l i l i B t thi h il i l i t i f b t i ' l l d tt d T t it i l th i h t t lif J d i t h Th (1971) f l t it d t i l d th i h t t h ll it dd t i t i t h t lif Edi tti ill t l t t l t t i l l d t th f t ' d i but that does not mean that doing so would constitute murder Now Thomson herself illustrated the point with an (in)famous thought experi ment in which one person is kidnapped and used as life support for another: staying t d t th F Viliit h it t b th k i d thi t d b t d i t i lf d t i l t th V i l i i t ' i h t Th d t i l f thi th t i l h ld t i d d h tht T h ' it i h dititi bt killi d ltti di d ld l t t l t i h i h th t ibl f ti i I f t t h h I t h i k th t l iiht h i b d th th l T h ' l i idit As Frances Kamm's work points out (Kamm 1992) in the usual case of a killing if you stab a person on the street for instance you interfere with the trajectory the person had independently of you She faced a happy enough future we will ti h d tht tki f h thi h ld h hd bt f ti I di tti t h h ht tki thi i thi h ld t h hd t b i ith i t h t f id Sh t ith " d d t j t " it bt f h ld l d b d d I i tht it t ilti th ' i h t t lif j d d i th t d i t i l t f iht i t i t f While all killings are tragedies then not all are alike: some killings as Kamm puts it share the crucial "formal" feature of letting die which is that they leave the person no worse off than before she encountered you Th t i t d tiliti di t hih t t kill th b d h lif ( t h h h i i i l f bithd I t h f lt t l it ith i i t ) Th it th i tht h I till i th f i tii bli lif d t h t lif t b th d t i d b l di t h t it b ti d t ilt i h t t lif 315

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N f ill tht tt h h th i ally responsible for procreation In such cases it will be said she is responsible for introducing the person's need She is not like someone happening by an accident on the highway who knows CPR; she is like the person who caused the accident Her ti i t d d t f lbiliti d d h il dt t l lbiliti d i h h iflitd th B t th i d d i l bt i th idt d ti Th f t f i h itlf i t d h t di d i th i iti f h i t d tht di B t th i l t f ti d t th f t ' iti itht ti th f t ld t it at all and the mere fact of being brought into existence is not a bad thing To be sure creating a human is creating someone who comes with needs But this cru cially is not the same as inflicting a need onto someone (see Silverstein 1987) It is t t h h th f t l d itd ith l l f d d th ddd ( d h f i t if tk d ft ti tht i th f t ' lbilit t ti ) Th i (till) ibl f ti lif d it i lif t h t il i l d d b t tht i t th bi ibl f th bi needy rather than not The pregnant woman has not made the fetus more vulner able than it would otherwise have been: without her procreative actions it would not have existed at all E if th f t i th bti ld t b d M b d l t bti ht it i h t d i t i f wrongful interference N f thi t h h i t tht b t i d h iti i t h f b l t i It i t i t d t h t th il li d t b l t d W f l i t f i t l i lit b t it i t th d disregard l W l d ith ti f neglect abandonment These are issues that involve abrogations of positive responsibilities to help others not injunctions against interfering with them If fetuses are persons the question we really need to decide is: what positive responsibilities if any do pregnant h t ti t t i l i t ? Thi i ti tht tk it f ih df i t t i t i t th tht id b d i i f d O k ti i h t hld t t th f t th f f i l i l diid tt f general beneficence P h i l h th biti fb f ill t d bt bti i ditit difficulties of its own On the one hand the beneficence called for here is of a particularly urgent kind: the stakes are life and death and the pregnant woman s the only one who can render the assistance needed It is a rare (and many of us ill t h i k d d f l ) l th tht ill t h i k h f ibiliti t it h i d i f i h l ithi h t i dit i d l f lid O th th h d tti i t j t t i i t It i l h i ' bd It bi ith it t i l i t t i t tht h ' ti if It dd th t ' fil Bi kd t tt th tht

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i t lik b i kd t it h k t t i i h d hild it i like being asked to adopt the child Doing so is a caring compassionate act; it is also an enormous undertaking that has reverberations for an entire lifetime Deciding whether and if so when such action is obligatory rather than admirable is no light tt Id t thik l th h b t dd th i h ti ti h Wh i t i t ti dt i t h ? H d i h th if lit i f h it i d ti t f ik b t f i t t i t? W h t h l d thik f h bliti if th i d t ld b f d d diti f f d l f l i t i ? Th type f i di matically represented by gestation an assistance that combines life and death stakes with deep intimacy is virtually nowhere discussed in ethical theory (We are not called upon in the usual course of events to save people's lives by say h i lit ith t h ) B i i th i i t l th h dd d l d l l i th l lit f bti Diffilt th ti t h h it i tll di I t tht i tht d bti iti f ftl i ibl f h f th h d O flti ill th i f t i th t woman are not about generic beneficence at all The considerations she faces are not just those that would face someone uniquely well placed to serve as Good Samaritan to some stranger as when one passes the drowning person: for the pregnant woman d ft ill t t If th f t i ill it i her child d f thi h h il ibiliti t t it d I th d I bli h f th i t i ith b t i i t b t ht t i th it i b t ht t t h i hild B t if it i t h d tht i i ti i h t th d thi f thd th f ht k t i thi t h i k l ti d h t th t f it ibiliti ll Thi h l d i something of a warning flag Philosophers it must be said have by and large done a rather poor job when it comes to parenthood variously avoiding it romanticizing it or assimilating it to categories like contractual relations to which it stands n d i t i t t Thi l h t i i idt i d i i f b ti h t kbl hlfl dl d i t O iti d t d b J d i t h Th d f th t t t t t f bti i l i l l libl It tht il ibiliti tth t thd bt tht thd i t h b tt tht i t d it l b t Tht t i ll t i t t b tki th b b home from the hospital qualifies None the less special responsibilities to a child accrue only when one voluntarily assumes them Such a model is surely an odd one The model yields the plausible view that the iti d t f th t f dti th t b t it d b i l i tht h fth hild d i iht t d h il ibiliti t d t h t hild l h did h d P h t tikil h i h f k l d i tht th b l h should t t th t t Th h ti b i l i l ti h t d t t th l f t 317

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bt thi h it i h l i l l i i t t h t id t thi normative Another position is classically conservative According to this view the special responsibilities of parenthood are grounded in biological progenitorship It is blood ti t th l d f h i d l " i ' " i t t l t i tht k t d d h i h t d ibiliti Thi i h it blid t It h th f i tht h fth hild f iht t d f il ibiliti f th hild h t h h lik it t bt f ditiihi bt th ibiliti f h h d th il t d f hild h h df years in the activity of parenting and the responsibilities of someone who bears literally no connection beyond a genetic or causal contribution to existence On this view a sperm donor faces all the responsibilities of a social father Wht bth iti h i i th iti tht thd i l l t h i ffi A l i d t th tti ith thi i i t th hild l d h thi b d lb f l h did h d Bt thd lik ll filil lti i l litd l ti th thi P t hood and its attendant responsibilities admits of layers It has a crucial existence as a social role: something with institutionally defined entrances exits and expect ations that can attach to us quite independently of what our selfconceptions might It l h il it relationship t i l ti h d hit i t t i t f li It i b ftht i t t i t tht t' titi t if i ft i d i t B t it i l b f tht l t i h i tht ill biti if l i t i t l td d h fil t d t k th ld b b l t i b t l i t it b b t l f th l t i h i itlf I h t thd i t lithi f th ibiliti d i t i l l it tl attach not to the role but to the relationship that so often accompanies it These layers matter especially when we get to gestation for the pregnant woman stands precisely at their intersection If a fetus is a person then there is surely an i t t i h i h h i it th t dh j t i t i l bl t h l it ld l d i t t th i t t i Bt h i t t th t thikl d i b d th i t d i l t i h i ith hild ith th ibiliti b f h d hit d th t i f tki Th d t i i t l I thik t d t d i th d i t i t i t f flit t h t t ildi t t b l th flit t bring within the mantle of motherhood Women sometimes decide to abort even though they regard the fetus they carry as their child because they realize grimly that bringing this child into the world will leave too little room to care adequately f th hild th l d ii Thi i flit t h l bitt t d d i if th f t i h hild h ld h ibl h t if it lif l th t k litll i l t f th t h ? B t thi i t i th l f t h d Sh i th l f th t th f t b t ith th th hild h i b d i t f ti i t t i d i t t i t i l t i h i f t h h d Th f t i h bb th

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types

for the painting for the fetus

some

respect-worthy

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t d k ll P h t b i l l it i h th thought of someone aborting with casual indifference fills us with misgiving Abor tion involves loss Not just loss of the hope that various parties might have invested but loss of something valuable in its own right To respect something is to appreci t f l l th l it h d th l i it t t h b t bt i it dt h h t h t hibitd i iti f th l d l tt ftht hih i B t if h th i t i t i tht l h lif h l d i f t th i idbl d i t b t h t tht t l k lik Th i idbl flit t h t i ht dti t b i human life In part of course this is due to disagreement over the degree of value such life should be accorded: those for whom it is thoroughly modest will have very different views on issues from abortion to stemcell research from those for whom it i t d t B t thi i l t f th t O b d b l i t D Vii iti f th t i t t f flit i l l f th t iddl k f d t id t h t " d " f ftl l If lit t ' t l b t h it i ll d t t d ht h th b t motherhood d respect for creation. These themes are enormously complex I want to argue for they enter stories on both sides of the ledger: for some women as reasons to continue pregnancy and for others as reasons to end it Let me start with motherhood F h t l t bti th d i t d i t t tll d i t id th i th f it i t id h t li th f id f th th l t h h d If tti i l tt f di h t ik it t hl b i h lif th h if th ld h d tht it itht t h b ddi b t thi f i l th d i i f d ld b f diff t Bt tti d t j t ll ll t b it t it a mother One of the most common reasons women give for wanting to abort is that they do not want to become a mother now ever again with this partner or no reliable t ith th f th tht ft f thi ltd fll t th (Hth 1987 h 8 4 ) N d dti t i l lti T i hild ld b f lif l t th f t t i t tht ld b t h i liht k it jtifid t i hild f th t O i d t f t l h d t tt i hild j t bt k t h t if h does carry the pregnancy to term she will not want to give up the child for adoption Gestation she knows is likely to reshape her heart and soul transforming her into a mother emotionally not just officially; and it is precisely that transformation she does t t t d It i b tii bi ith it thi idtit d likl l t i h i th tht f l it l i t i t t d l i Bt ' ti t t h h d l t th h l f bti i j t th it d i t i F t h t it ld b h hild i il h h fl h t ti th if t h h d t ht h d i d T b t i t h ' t t i l hild k k i t

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' d t b t i t t ' b k it d i i tht would haunt them forever On this view the desire to avoid motherhood so com pelling as a reason to use contraception is uneasy grounds to abort: for once an embryo is on the scene it is not about rejecting motherhood it is about rejecting ' child N t l i t l l f i th i hild t t t t t d th bjt f jti B t th t h l d tk t ht t i f acceptance h ttil fil b i k k i t th d hld k d l h i Th t ititi t tj t f d l difft f gestalting th i t t i f di O th f t i bti i l t t tion: hardly equivalent because it means the demise of something of value But he desire to avoid the enterprise and identity of motherhood is an understandable and honorable basis for deciding to end a pregnancy Given that there is no child yet on th d t il t th l t i h i tht t d t h d f ' t j t O th d i bti i l t iti tl l t i h i hdl i l t f f th k lt i t t fll t Bt ' d i i b t hth t ti th l d fl ill t i d tht ld b l t d t th lti t some moral force It would take especially grave reasons to refuse assistance here for the norms of parenthood already have toehold Assessing the moral status of abortion it turns out then is not just about assessing the contours of generic t d t b i h lif it i b t i th li f impending relationship. A d thi i i tht f t i i difft f difft d ti i d th I i til th f t i hld i l ti t d l i thd d d th Nt b t h h d il b d ( t h h it b) b t b it t h h l h ht iht ll ' f d t l practical identity. Th t i f thi restructures the self changing the shape of one's heart the primary commitments by which one lives one's life the terms by which one judges one's life a success or a failure If the enterprise is eschewed and one decides to give the child over to th th i d t i t f th till h th ti f t t h t t f th i b h d ll l ( R 1982) A d ith hth th hild l t it t ti tht i f ' h t th i ill f lk tid ' bd A f d th t hld h f b i h lif hld k l d l ti i d t i t t i t t i commitments and enterprises as profound as motherhood Whether one agrees with this view or not there is at any rate another layer of the moral story here If women find themselves with different ways of gestalting the ti l t i h i i l d i it i i t b th h d i f f t idtiti i t t d i d l tht h t i t t ith i t t hih hil iibl i d i t i ll thitti f them If fl l d d t b d b th f thd t t thi t f l it b f th d tht i i t t l h l d is it th Sh f d h l f ( h t 321

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h i) ith t l i t t t thi t B t tki th identity of mother toward something just is to take on certain imperatives about its wellbeing as categorical Her job is thus clear: it is to help this creature reach its fullest potential For another woman on the other hand the identity of mother s t t b tk it i t i d h td bt h d l i d i hih t i d bt l i d f d f th th lti hi th j t th i Ad i if fl h t f l t b i h lif t h t h it b t b h thik h t thitti f ll b t b f th i t d hih h t i l idtit is now oriented: receptivity to life's agenda for instance or responsiveness to that which is most vulnerable For another woman the virtues to be exercised may tug in just the other direction: loyalty to treasured life plans a commitment that it be h t th h f bil tht h l d d t i h lif' b l t i lfditi ft lif t l ld b diit d ft Didi h it i ll d t t d it t t i di t f ttli i l l i l l thitti l i t d f d i i d bitti ti ft ii dlibti ti i decision no less deep for its immediacy one's own commitments identity and defining virtues A similarly complex story appears when we turn to the second theme Another t h d tht i ' t i i th f f ht t f th iht ibilit i l d i ti h lif O i it i th tht ll dt i difft diti I it t fili diti it h i t i f h ht i t i d M l bli tht ' ibilit t t lif i i t t l l i f d if i ibl f b i i b t it it i th fit l J t h t it t k t t ibl h i it hih individuals diverge (whether voluntary intercourse with contraception is different from intercourse without use of birth control and again from intentionally deciding to become pregnant at the IVF clinic) But triggering the relevant standard of ibilit f ti it i f l t b i ith it h i h t d ibilit t t it i d i t f l t t h lif l t ll it t ith Pt i l h i ibl f b i i b t t tht h i t i i l i it f it ttil t b h il ibilit t h tht d tt bl it t B t th id f tf ti i l if l f t l k l d d times the reason why women are moved to end pregnancies As Barbara Katz Roth man (1989) puts it decisions to abort often represent not a decision to destroy but a refusal to create Many people have deeply felt convictions about the circum t d h i h th f l it i h t f th t bi hild i t th ld C it b b h t i t d t ld i t t fil it tht i i l l t it ? Th idti it ft ti h tk l f hil th embryo h l d b td h t S did t b t tht i tb th d t want th lti hild i d d th f thi dd t l ih tht thi i

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t t h i bt b th d t thik b i i hild t th world the right thing for them to do These are abortions marked by moral language A woman wants to abort be cause she knows she could not give up a child for adoption but feels she could not i th hild th t f lif b th t f t h thik hild deserves h ld h t i th hild t h i k it ld b unfair t b i hild i t it l d b d d b jti h ll d d it lii i t kd b t d d thid t t b t b h did it ld b wrong f h t b d h t h lif lik h ld b f l l d ith hijti d hdhi Some have thought that such decisions betray a simple fallacy: unless the child's life were literally going to be worse than nonexistence how can one abort out of concern for the future child? But the worry here is not that one would be imposing harm th hild b b i i it i t it ( t h h hild h i th itti t i d h li tht t th l i i ) Th l i i t h t b i i b t ' lif i th i t ld d i l t h idl f ti d t h d Sh d t t t bi it it d h t h t l d f h d t t t bi it it h life will be marked by disrespect or rejection Nor does the claim imply judgment on women who do continue pregnancies in similar circumstances as though there were here an obligation to abort For the i ti i d t b i l l thitti l li Lik i d l f d ti th k t idti ll h l d b iti t h bt ll bl l dh t difft i ti d ihti Still th ti f th h d h th f f i tt ft t th i d l d t i t t kid f t i i t i i i t i h thit i t dibl t d th i t f i t i i di Th t t i b t integrity, integrity over one's participation in this enterprise precisely because it is so norma tively weighty What is usually emphasized in the morality of abortion is the ethics of destruc ti b t th i b l i thi f ti Ad f l flit b t bti i flit within t h t thi O th h d h h d tit t h t h f tit t h t it h b i t h l it ti h i l l if h hd l i it ti hih i h l bti i t til i l t t t t i O th th h d t t d is t d thi l l t ti ti and for some women pregnancy strikes in circumstances in which they cannot countenance that enterprise For some the sanctity of developing human ife will be strong enough to tip the balance toward continuing the pregnancy; for others thi f tfl ti ill h l d F th h bli t h t th i ti f ild l t i t th ti t l f b i lif b i ibl t tii t tt d di th b t t bi b t th diti d hih tht ti ill b tfl F th t h h th tiit fftl tl i ild d t h i t d d f tfl ti h i h d th l i j t th th diti

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it i i f t tt ti ti h ti b k d diti such as a loving family or adequate resources are not in place However one thinks these issues settle out they will not be resolved by austere contemplation of the value of human life They require wrestling with the rich i f ti ibilit d kihi A d th i I h td j t h i b t ' i t i t th b t ht i i l l blit O t t t f bti idti b t hth t t ti h t d b f th h d d i l l thitti ld d th th bt f th ti t t t i li i b t

References Blt M B (1979) R i b l d bti dii I 0 O'Nill d W R d dik ( d ) Having Children N Y k O f d U i i t P Brody B (1975) Abortion and the Sanctity of Life Cambridge MA: MTT Press D k i R (1993) Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion Euthanasia and Individual Freedom N Y k Alfrd A K f NJ Fib J (1992) A b t i I Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays P i t Princeton University Press Hth R (1987) Beginning Lives O f d O U i i t P K F M (1992) Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy N Yk Ofd U i i t P MacKinnon C A (1991) Reflections on sex equality under law The Yale Law Journal 100 (5) 1281328 The Journal of Philosophy 76 183202 M i D (1989) Wh b r t i i i l Quinn W (1993) Abortion: identity and loss In Morality and Action New York: Cambridge U i i t P Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 R S L (1982) A b t i d th d t h f th f t 232^5 Rothman B K (1989) Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society N Y k Nrt S i l t i H S (1987) O ' " i b i l i t " f th f t Socio/ Theory and Prac tice 13 10319 Steinbock B (1992) Life before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses New Yk Ofd U i i t P Th J J (1971) A d f f brti Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 4 7 6 6 West R (1993) Jurisprudence and gender In D Kelly Weisberg (ed) Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations 7 5 9 8 P h i l d l h i T l U i i t P

Fth D

di

S dFib J ( d ) (1997) The Problem of Abortion 3 d d B l t CA W d th Finnis J (1973) The rights and wrongs of abortion: a reply to Judith Thomson Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 11745

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Harman E (2000) Creation ethics: the moral status of early fetuses and the ethics of abortion Philosophy and Public Affairs, 28: 310-24 McDonaugh E (1996) Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent New York: Oxford University Press Noonan Jr J T (1970) An almost absolute value in history In J T Noonan Jr (ed) The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, pp 1-59 Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Wertheimer R (1974) Understanding the abortion argument In M Cohen T Nagel and T Scanlon (eds) The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, pp 23-51 Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press

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24 Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide MICHAEL TOOLEY

The questions of the moral and appropriate legal status of assisted suicide and of different forms of euthanasia have been and continue to be the focus of serious philosophical discussion and intense albeit not always well-informed public and political debate I shall focus upon what seem to be the most important arguments on both sides to see what the prospects are for resolving these crucial ethical issues The discussion is organized as follows In the first section I set out some preliminary concepts and distinctions along with the main alternative views that people have embraced Then in the next section I offer an argument for the claim that assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia are morally permissible Finally in the third and fourth sections I examine some important arguments either for the view that voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide are morally wrong or for the view that regardless of their moral status they should not be legally permitted

Important Concepts and Distinctions and Alternative Views Euthanasia may be defined as an action in which a person is intentionally killed or allowed to die because it is believed that the individual would be better off dead than alive - or else as in the case of irreversible coma at least no worse off So understood is euthanasia ever morally acceptable and should it ever be legally permitted? Two familiar distinctions are important for the discussion of these issues First there is the threefold distinction between voluntary euthanasia non-voluntary euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia Thus euthanasia is voluntary when t s requested by the person who undergoes it It is non-voluntary when the person n question is not able to indicate whether or not he or she wants to undergo euthanasia (This will include cases involving infants and adults who have permanently lost consciousness) Finally it is involuntary when the person who undergoes euthanasia wants to go on living The second important distinction is between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia How this distinction is best drawn is controversial and there are two slightly different ways of doing so depending upon how cases involving the withdrawal of 326

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l i f t t l i f d Th fd i th d i t i t i terms of the contrast between acting and doing nothing at all: it is a case of active euthanasia whenever anything at all is done including the withdrawal of a life support system that facilitates the person's death and a case of passive euthanasia l if thi i d tht bi b t th ' dth A difft f d i th d i t i t i bt ti d i t h i i i t f hth ht iht b l l d th i fdth i h ti i t d ij di h f ti t h i h th i fd t h i h ti d f i t h i h th i fd t h i ij di Precisely where the line should be drawn between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia is important if one holds as a significant number of people do that passive euthanasia is morally permissible but that active euthanasia is not Here h i thi i i th tf d t l ti ll b d d d b f i f t h i h i d i i d l i killd d h dth i tb h t b t b ithdi l i f t t Ath i t t lii tt th f t t h t h t h i fb i i b t th d f ll f th lif f i i i of euthanasia depends upon how death is defined Suppose for example that one accepts the definition proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School (1968) according to which the criterion of death is irreversible coma based th t t l d t f t i i f th hl b i Th f h i h tt df l i f t t tht ld t b f t h i d bl ld t b ll b l t i P il h t th i h t i t i f dth i th th il I d t h f th h l b i th i h t i t i ? O i it i t d d t h f th b i ? O i it i l th i i b l l f i ? A libl i if id bjti t th ti t h t it i the irreversible loss of consciousness that is the right criterion The objection is that strictly speaking one never has an irreversible loss of consciousness since though it is not possible at present it is in principle possible to restore consciousness to any h i b f l idi th b d i ti ith b i Di ld t f t th h itd ith t h t b d th ihbiti th b d ld b th h b i hd b t l t d i t th b d B t thi i t th t th t t i it b i t tht h t i t i t t h i iti f h a person h d i d d thi i it b l t h t th iti f dth needs to be formulated in terms of those states such as certain memories beliefs attitudes and personality traits that are the basis of personal identity Both whole brain death and upper brain death ensure presumably that all such states have b d t d Bt hil th f f i t f t h t th t th tt ld b d t d i t h t th d t t i f ll f th b i " I i b l " l f i th th h d i ith f f i t th t t t h t th b i f l idtit i th d t ti f th h i l i l b i f i d l it f i i th d t t i f th t t t h t k f l idtit

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A f l i th f t t h t th d f i i t i f t h i ffd b involves no reference to a terminal illness Why has this been left out? The reason is that if euthanasia is potentially justifiable in the case of a person who is termin ally ill it would seem that it must be at least in part because that person's ife t h tht h h t i l l jd t h t ll thi i d d t i d it i likl t b th d t h Bt h i ffi b b l i f i b l di tht i t l i f t h t i l b i itti h it i t i l t hld tht ll thi i d d t i d it i likl t b th d t h Wht t l i th f dil ill l l i th l t t It i itk t h f t tit euthanasia to cases where an individual is terminally ill Given the distinctions on the one hand between voluntary nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia and between active and passive euthanasia on the other h i t f ti l t ti t h i l t i t h i l t ti t h i l t i t h i i l t ti t h i d i l t i t h i d h th i th ti f th i fi l tt f th ti d f it it l l tt As regards voluntary euthanasia the view that voluntary passive euthanasia s in general morally permissible is very widely accepted indeed although it is cer tainly possible to hold that voluntary passive euthanasia is prima facie wrong ill i tht t hih h b ffd i t l t ti t h i dil t b t i t l t i th i ll ( T l 1995) I i f th id t f l t i t h i h it ill b b t t f th k f d i i tht l t i t h i i ll iibl d th t k i t hth l t ti t h i i b l t i d dl hth if it i th diff i h t d it i fi ll How does nonvoluntary euthanasia compare with voluntary euthanasia? This is a place where one's definition of euthanasia may make a difference Earlier I de fined euthanasia as involving the death of a person and when it is thus defined it l i b l t h t killi h i bl t k t b killd i th thi bi l ll b l t i th killi h h kd d i i l l f ltti di If th th h d t h i t b killd d f d b d l t h t it i l d d f killi d ltti di h th i ti h l d d t i t th h ld b l b l t i th f l t t h i h i il ent Because consent is absent more is needed by way of argument if one is to show that nonvoluntary euthanasia is justified even in the passive case So n addition to the questions of whether there is a significant moral difference between l t ti t h i d l t i t h i d hth if th i it i h t d l t ti t h i i fi ll th i l i t t ti f hth l t t h i i jtifibl i th i Fill d t b l t i f ll i i l t t h i d it t t k it f td tht i l t t h i t l b i fi 328

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

i l ( R h l 1993 33) Thi h i f f l C i d particular a case of involuntary passive euthanasia in which the continued exist ence of the person is very much contrary to his or her best interests Does the right to life involve a right to be given assistance to continue living even in cases where th idi ftht it ill k h ff? If t th it ld tht i l t i t h i i ti ll iibl Th ll i t i h t i tht idd t h t t h i i d f d t h t it i l th d t h f th i l t t h i ill th thi bi l b b l t i th l t t h i hih i t ill b b l t i th l t t h i I th d i i t h t fll I hll focus exclusively upon the case of voluntary euthanasia

A Brief Defense of Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active Euthanasia A d 1

2

3

libl itd iid

8

ll

li i I

tht t

l t fll

ti

t h i

'

itti

iid i

h i

t

ld

tb

It could be morally wrong to assist a person to commit suicide only if either it was morally wrong for that person to commit suicide or if committing suicide t t th ' i t t

6 Thf i t 7

t f th

If a person is suffering considerable pain due to an incurable illness then that person's continued existence may very well not be in his or her own interest There are circumstances accordingly when suicide is a rational action A ' killi h i l f h l f i h i t ll t i f th f l l i t diti ( ) It ith ilt l' iht (b) It d t k th ld l A ti t h t t i f diti () d (b) d tht i t t t ' i t t tb ll

4 Thf morally wrong 5

ti t

it

ld t b d i b d b

Wh iti t h i i l jtifid T h f l t ti cumstances in question

t i t h i

it

t

itti

it

iid i j t i f d ld

t b

ll

iid i th l t

ti i th

i

This argument progressing from suicide through assisted suicide and on to volun t ti t h i i t l d th ti i l d it d t M d f d f l t ti t h i ld tt tb lih h t l i t th f f t t h t it i i fi ll t d l t itd iid t l t ti t h i Th l t f f d f tht l i i ht i ti f d t th A t f M O ff l t i thi ti fll 329

MICHAEL TOOLEY

1 I 2 3

4

t

idiidl h

iht

tt

d

t

ffi

If one has a right to something then others are under a prima facie obligation to provide one with assistance in acquiring that thing The only way in which one may be able to avoid great suffering in some cases is t h h t it i itti iid t l t ti th i T h f it i i fi t t ll l i h i t t it i itti iid t l t ti t h i

Thi t i l I thik libl B t it d i l ti that is controversial: the assumption namely that a right involves a right to assist ance rather than merely a right to be left alone Assume for the moment that the first of the above conclusions that assisted iid d l t ti t h i ll iibl b t i d Wht h l d thi l l t t b? C t i l th f t t h t ti i t ll titt t i fi d f ldi t h t it h l d t b i l l l It i ibl h f ti tht t ll thl t b h hld b hibitd th d tht l l i th ti i question would give rise to other actions that would harm individuals or violate their rights Thus for example if voluntary active euthanasia is legally permitted then people may choose active euthanasia in circumstances in which it is not really i thi i t t t d A l t t i l hil i d i i d l t f t h i t ilt ' i h t if h t b th l ti f t h i d h t h t d i l t th i h t fidiidl Fth idti i t h f d i th fil ti f thi h t t i t t bjti t th l l i t i f itd iid d l t ti t h i ill b i d

Arguments for the View that Voluntary Active Euthanasia is Morally Wrong Fit h dt id h iht hll th i tht itd iid d l t ti t h i ll i i b l Th t th th id fll b d i i d d i t lii d t h l i l t th h d d l h i l h i l t th th A d th f h i l h ft f l I t h i k t h t l iti i t ll sary on the grounds that even if some religiously based argument turned out to be sound it would be wrong at least in a pluralistic society to base any legislation or any policy decisions upon such an argument Whether such a response is satisfac t i t til l It t fbl t i h t idiidll d t id hth th lii i tbl S h iti I bli ld h tht lii t i t l t ti t h i i itil ti H tblihi tht li ld i l dtild iti f i i th h i l h f lii tht tb d t k h A d lii t th t t

330

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

ft d d li ith t h t l t ti t h i i b ti contrary to human nature or that it is wrong because it involves the direct killing of an innocent person The former line of argument however seems deeply prob lematic in an evident way For even if it is granted for the sake of argument that a di t i i h d i d it h bi h h l d it b t t t t tht d i h it i t i ' i t t l' it t tht l i i ? I hll f dil th d t th t h t f h i h i t h t ti t h i bth l t d l t i i fi i l b th d i t killi f i t i i fi i l (O l t t i l th l i b tht active euthanasia is absolutely wrong because the direct killing of innocent persons is absolutely wrong: Sullivan 1975; Sacred Congregation 1980) There are three main philosophical responses to this type of argument The irst b t fll 1 2

V l t i I t t i l l killi l ll

3

The only morally relevant difference between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia is that the former is a case of killing and the latter a case of letting die T h f l t ti t h i i t ll

4

t h i

i

t

ll di t t i l l

ltti

di

Gi t

i

t h t (3) i l iht d t h t f t h i k t h t (1) i i t k thi (2) I it t th t h t killi d ltti di ll t thi ti i f f l O th h d b f h h d t h t i t t i l l killi d i t t i l l ltti di h i l th l tt (Rhl 1975 T l 1980 Oddi 1997 and one very interesting way of attempting to establish this conclusion is by of a Bare Difference Argument Thus James Rachels for example in a discussed article focused upon the following two cases:

th

t ? Th hil 1998) means much

I th f t S i t h t d t i l ihrit if thi hld h t hi sixyearold cousin One evening while the child is taking his bath Smith sneaks nto th b t h dd th hild d th thi t h t it ill l k ik idt In the second Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his sixyearold i Lik S i t h J k i l i t d th hild i hi b t h H j t h t th b t h J th hild li d hit hi h d d fll f d i th t J i dlihtd h t d b d t h th hild' h d b k under if it is necessary but it is not necessary With only a little thrashing about the hild d ll b h i l f " i d t l l " J th d d thi ( R h l 1975 79) If t th bt

t f i t t i l l killi hd iht t f i t t i l l ltti di th i Sith' ti dJ ' ti i t h t th f i

th

ki l diff f killi

d 331

MICHAEL TOOLEY

th l t t f ltti di S i t h ' ti t b i l th Jones's But Rachels suggests and most other writers seem to agree that our moral intuitions do not support the view that there is any significant moral differ ence between Smith's action and Jones's action Hence an act of intentionally killi i t t h i ki t th t fi t t i l l l l i i t t di Th t t fB Diff A t h b d i t d ith hil h hldi t h t thi f f t i d (Rhl 1979 M l 1992 Oddi 1997) d th hldi t h t it i t d ( B h 1977 F t 1977 1 0 1 2 K 1988) O th f f it h th t til appears sound For if one tries to hold that while the distinction between killing and letting die makes no difference in Rachels's case but does make a difference in other cases it would seem that the morally relevant properties cannot be simply those of bi f i t t i l l klli di t t i l l lli t di th t th b l ti t h t t t i R h l ' bt t i th B t th it i i b t th iti t if h t th l ti d t h dd i di thi Nevertheless there is a problem with this first response in that there are cases where the intuitions of most nonconsequentialists are that killing and letting die are not morally equivalent One of the most famous cases discussed at length by J h H i (1975) i l th ibilit f killi hlth i d t tht ' t t l h d t l t if th t i If killi d ltti di ll th killi th t t hld b t l iibl b t hihl dbl M l h f l t h t thi i t Whil thi d h fth d i i it ill b b t h t t t t th h l t i l Lt id th th sponse that also focuses upon the relation between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia This second response grants at least for the sake of argument that the following asymmetry principle may very well be true: B t h th di t th

t th

f killi ki ltt

ti

d th b t th f

t i

f l l i ihti

t ki

Gi thi i i l th h hld tht l t ti t h i i morally wrong in itself can argue as follows First in cases of voluntary passive euthanasia the benefit to the person of greatly reducing that person's suffering may outweigh the wrongness of letting the person die Secondly an identical bene fit i f l t ti t h i ll t b ffiit t t i h th t f killi H f l t i t h i ll b ll iibl ll thi i d d h di f l t ti t h i t Wht i t b t thi t? O ld b t h t f thi tt k it h t b th t l t h t killi i ll th

332

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

l l i t di b t t h t it i h F if th f l lihtl than the latter then surely there would be cases where the benefit from reducing the person's suffering would be sufficiently great that the slight moral difference between killing and letting die would not be enough to change what would otherwise be a ll iibl ti i t tht t ll iibl Tht h i i i t Th il i th t h t th t i i l ttd b i t tift ff l t i th i i ti i th lti bt killi d ltti di Th i tht Did B i (2000 1 6 0 1 ) h b d d f hldi t h t th i l diff bt killi d ltti di t l b d f hldi tht h general principle is correct the principle namely that intentionally causing a given harm is intrinsically more wrong than intentionally allowing that harm to occur Or to put it in terms of wrongmaking properties: B t h th ll l l i ihti

t h

fi t t i l l t ki t th

i

h th

ki ltt

d th ti

t f i t t i b t th f i

Thus for example someone who holds that murdering someone is morally more wrong than intentionally allowing say a homeless person to die of starvation will also hold that inflicting pain upon someone is morally more wrong than intention ll l l i tht t ff bl i d i i l l tht d t i ' t i ll th i t t i l l lli tht ' t t b d t d Th h t i t h t t th t t t h t th killi ltti di d i t i t i i i t f th l ll i i f i t it i precisely because it i j t dititi bt i t t i l l i h di t t i l l lli h t h B t th th i i l t i i l ttd b i t t formulation of what is true in the killing versus letting die case since it fails to distin guish between cases where killing or letting die are harms and cases where they are benefits What is needed then is the following modified asymmetry principle: B t h th t ki

t f l l i t th

f killi

h h

t di ki th l t t

ti

th killi h l l i th b t th f i

th t di h ihti

d th th

But now it is clear that one cannot support the claim that there is a moral differ ence between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia by appealing to the thesis that there is an intrinsic moral difference between killing d ltti di i i f t h i h th i d i i d l bi bfitd th d b bi killd b bi l l d t di T h f if l t i t h i i ll i i b l th t b t f l t ti t h i Th l i fB i ' t th i tht t t th i tht l t ti t h i i b l t i th l t i th

333

MICHAEL TOOLEY

i lt l th i tht l t ti t h i i i itlf ll by appealing to the thesis that intentionally killing an innocent person is more seriously wrong than intentionally letting an innocent person die But I want to argue that Boonin's line of thought can also be extended to support a more striking l i Th id b h i d th t i i tht t h t th killi ltti di i i l tb il f th f l l i i i l B t h th ll l l i ihti

t h

fi t t i l l t ki t th

i

h th

ki ltt

d th ti

t f i t t i b t th f i

The question naturally arises as to whether there is a principle dealing with benefits that corresponds to a principle in the case of harms In particular if it seems plausible th it ld t h t th f l l i i i l hld l libl B t h th t fi t t i l l till lli bfit t i ihti i h t k i

i

b f t i h t k i th l t t

t th

d th

t

ti

f it b t th f

But if this principle is right then one will also have the following principle as a particular case: B t h th th th ki

t

t f killi f lli i h t k i t th th l t t

h t di ti

th killi h l l i b t th f

bfit th i

th t di ihti

d bfit iht

B t th th t t t t t th l i t h t l t h h l t i th nasia is morally acceptable voluntary active euthanasia is not by appealing to the killing versus letting die distinction will not merely fail to support any such distinc tion: it will provide a positive argument for the claim that voluntary active eutha i i i t i i l l ll fbl t l t i t h i Th t i d d f bth i d i t t th l i tht ti t h i i i itlf b it i l th d i t killi f i t i th th ilti ht i ith th l t t i i l th t t t b d th l i tht l t i t h i i ll i i b l Th t h i d b t t l showing exactly what is wrong with the claim that the direct killing of innocent persons is always morally wrong in itself This final response begins by asking what account can be offered of why the d i t killi fi t i l ll i itlf O ibilit ld b i l i l d i i di t h i h th it f i t f ki th ld b t t l B t thi f i valuable, i th t t t i t l i th i i l i ti i t t i bjti Th fit i t h t if thi l t i f th f killi i t t th i t t i l l f i i f b i i i t it it

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EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

ld l b ll d t th d i th f i l t create an object that would have a certain value makes precisely the same differ ence with regard to the overall value of the world as the destruction of an already existing object of the same sort other things being equal But the failure to bring an i t it it i t ll ith d t i i t h l d i t S th i i l t h t th d i t killi f i t i l i itlf tb l i d i l i l l Th d bjti i thi C i d i t h i ffi tibl f i b l ill d h ld f t b killd th th t lii If h l d t h t killi h ld b b would thereby be destroying something of value then one should also hold that one would make the world a better place by creating an additional innocent person who one knew would suffer to the same degree due to the same incurable disease B t th l t t l i i l i b l A d f t t t i t d f d th l i t h t th d i t killi f i t i l i itlf i b li t th id f iht d b hldi tht h ti i b i t h iht t lif B t thi ti l t tl t t bjti Th fit i t h t l can in general waive their rights Thus for example the fact that one has a right to some property does not mean that one does something wrong if one destroys t or gives it to someone So why should the situation be any different with regard to th i h t t lif? Wh h l d it t b iibl f l t it iid t i l ii t kill ? Wh h l d th i h t t lif tb i h t t h t lik th iht i ? A d dd bjti i l ki h iht f t i A libl i I t i tht iht f t i i t f i t th f t i t t t idiidl' i t t d dl th f t i t id i d i i d l ith h f d t k d i i i h t th ill d ith t h i li B t if thi i right then in a situation where a person wants to die helping them to do so will further that person's autonomy while if the situation is one in which it is in the person's interest to be dead killing that person will further his or her interests So if iht f t i t t t i t t d t th h bth diti tifid t h t it i i th ' i t t t b killd d th k t b killd ti t h t t ill t b t t ith f th thi tht iht f t i t t t A d i l th l i t h t th d i t killi f i t i l i itlf tb d f d d b li t th id f i h t Th l i td b l t th id f i h t t lif ill b t t th h t h t ill b more limited one that the killing of an innocent person is wrong in itself if that action is either contrary to what the person really wants or contrary to the person's interest

Shld A i t d Siid A iid

dV l t be Legal?

Ih d t h t th d d l t ti t h i i t h l i h t b f f d f hldi t h t th hld

Ati

E t h i f

hldi tht ll iibl thl b illl?

itd Wht

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MICHAEL TOOLEY

Th i t h b d d Th fit i t t f d by Yale Kamisar (1958) which focuses upon possible harm to those who choose to undergo euthanasia The thrust of Kamisar's argument is that if voluntary active euthanasia is available some people will choose to be killed in circumstances where bi killd i t t thi i t t K i ' t i b l t i i t I th fit l if t t d t h t h i i itti h tht t t hi h i t t d h th t t l l d i t b d it i h d t h if th td ith th h it ld b b t t t lii h h ld b bl t i t th f f th In the second place it can be shown (Tooley 1995) that the possibilities for irrational choice that Kamisar suggests whatever weight they have generally have precisely as much weight in the case of voluntary passive euthanasia So one t K i d hld tht h ibiliti titt d f t l l i i ti t h i itht ll h l d i t h t th l d f t l l i i t h i Th th t t i t l l i t i d fl idti F i t th ht ft f d t " d " "li l " t against voluntary active euthanasia These come in two forms Both maintain that legalizing active euthanasia would be a mistake because doing so would be ikely to lead to undesirable consequences involving the legalizing of other things According t i f th t h th ld f l l b it f l i l lti if l l i l t ti t h i th l i l it i tht l l l i f l i l t t h i ll (Slli 1975 24) Th d i f th d t b t t iti t h t th d i b l ld f l l i l d t ti f t b t h hl Th bl ith th " l i l i t " i f th t ill b l from the discussion in the previous section For the present argument ike the earlier one can be seen to rest upon the assumption that the relevant basic moral principle involved here is something along the lines of: (1) Th d i t killi h b i ) i l Bt l d

i

fft

i t d

b

f

i

t itlf

i li i i l

(

h

i i l

i

l t t i l

i

t

t It

d t

t

b

h

(2) Innocent persons have a right to life B t th

th

i t i tht

(3) It i i fi i t h hi h It d

336

t

t

li

hil (2) d lif

t kill i t i t d h

t t

li

h h h

t i

i

EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

(4) It i i fi t kill i t h h fid d rational desire for death and who has given permission to have his or her life terminated Th l

th

d li t h t th d i t killi f i t i i itlf i l d b th d i i l tht i t h i h t t lif th t t ll i i t t l hld bth tht l t ti t h i i ll iibl d tht i l t t h i i t Th d f f th d t b t t d t i l unsound assumption about the relevant moral principles For here it is granted at least for the sake of argument that voluntary active euthanasia is not wrong n itself It is then argued however that acceptance of voluntary active euthanasia l d t th t f ti tht i t h l h l t ti t h i Bt ht th f thiki t h t thi ill t k l ? K i (1958) i d i thi i f th d t ff th Fit h li tht d t f th l l i t i f l t ti t h i often seem to hold that the case for legalizing certain types of nonvoluntary eutha nasia is at least as compelling (Kamisar 1958: 1 0 2 7 8 ) Secondly he cites a poll which measured the amount of public support for on the one hand euthanasia for dfti i f t d th th h d t h i f i b l d i f l l ll dlt d h th lt tht l d f th f th f th l t t (45 t 373 t) (1958 1029) F i l l h l (1958 1 0 3 1 2 ) t ht h d d th N i iti th d i t i ffd b L A l d (1949 40) Th b i i tft l btl hift i h i i th b i ttitd f th h i i It started with the acceptance of the attitude basic in the euthanasia movement that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived This attitude in its early t d itlf l ith th l d h i l l i k G d l l th h f th t b i l d d i thi t l d t th ill dti th i d l i l l t d th ill td dfll ll Germans But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedgedin lever from h i h thi ti t d f i d i d it i t th ttitd t d th hbilitbl i k How strong are the considerations offered by Kamisar? The problem with the irst two types of support that Kamisar offers is that they concern attitudes toward nonvoluntary t h i d th t l t t th li tht i i d f lii d l tht l d f l t ti t h i t thi tht ll l hld tht l t t h i t t d ith i l t t h i i ll B t i th f i t l thi i d l t i l li i h b f th ft tht K i it l tht A i i th ll t h t K i f d t d f t h i i th f"dfti i f t " th i th f "i

337

MICHAEL TOOLEY

bl d i f l l ill d l t " S d l th t t tht b offered in support of euthanasia in the case of severely defective infants arguments that Kamisar does not even address This leaves Kamisar's appeal to the case of Nazi Germany Here there are at least t ti tht dt b i d Th f i t i h t h th l i t h t i d d i th b i i ft t F it h J h Flth (1973) dM i K h l (1975) h d t h t th N i d th th i t f ttitd t d th hbilitbl i k b d th id f th tti d ifiti f th A t k d it t b tiiti M if i H i t l ' Mem Kampf, th very strong evidence for that view and against Leo Alexander's claim Consider for example the following passages: Wht

t fiht f i t f d th it d dti f d l th t f hild d th it f b l d th f d d independence of the fatherland so that our people may mature for the fulfillment of the ii l l t t d it b th t f th i (Hitl 1971 214) The Jewish doctrine of Marxism withdraws from humanity the premise of its exist d lt A f d t i f th i thi d t i ld b i b t th d f d itlltll ibl t Ad i thi t t f ll ibl i [ h ] th lt f liti f h l ld l b h th it ld l b d t t i f th i h b i t t f thi l t If with the help of his Marxist creed the Jew is victorious over the other peoples of d thi l t ill it th ld hi ill b th f l th f h i t did t h d f t h h th th d i d f (Hitl 1971 65) In the light of passages such as these Leo Alexander's claim that the startingpoint of the Holocaust was "with the acceptance of the attitude basic in the euthanasia movement that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived" seems clearly t b l S d l if L A l d iht ld till dt t k t ht t t th N i i hih d i ditthi i d idit f h t i likl t h i d t i it h th U i t d Stt Th l i t h t it i t if i th U i t d S t t t advocate such things the opposition would be massive Finally it is also possible to offer empirical evidence against the wedge argument as is done for example by James Rachels (1993: 62) He argues that there is "historical and anthropological id tht l f killi i t t d t il l d t killi i difft i t " d it illtti th killi fdfti i f t i i iti d th killi f l i lfdf i it S th i d f thiki tht l bl f d i l l li d th f t lidi d ht l i d t b li l I dditi h ff i i l id f d i t t i th i it h l t ti t h i h f th t f years been permitted: namely the Netherlands Thus while some who oppose legalization of voluntary active euthanasia have claimed that the Dutch experiment

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id t f th li l t th d t h t th h been cases of involuntary euthanasia in the Netherlands in fact the opposite is the case as emerges if one compares the situation in the Netherlands with what obtains in societies where voluntary active euthanasia is not permitted In particular if one th lt f id t i th N t h l d i 1990 d 1995 d i A t l i i 1 9 9 5 6 th f l l i f t F i t i th N t h l d th t f ti t i t i i t h t th tit' liit t fll f 08 t 07 t th id f 1990 t 1995 h i A t l i th t f h i 19956 35 t t h t i fi ti h i h th i th N t h l d S d l i th N t h l d i 1995 1 3 5 t f ll d t h involved a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment whereas in Australia n 1 9 9 5 6 this occurred in 3 0 5 percent of cases; moreover in Australia in 2 2 5 percent of the cases the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment was done i t h t th tit' liit t (Kh t l 1997 Oddi 1998) Th l i dil i t h t th i h t fidiidl likl t b iltd h l t ti t h i i i l l l th h it i ittd Thi b i t th f i l b j t i tht I hll id t th l l i t i f l t ti t h i Th t h t f thi b j t i i t h t th i problems about how to implement the legalization of euthanasia Should there be no laws at all concerning voluntary active euthanasia? That surely would lead to significant abuse But if there need to be laws what form should they take? If the l i t d d l d t i t d th ltil f l h ld b f i t f l t ti t h i iht i d bi bl t d O th th h d if th d l d ld th l i k l i h d f b t ? I t thi bl J R h l (1993 6 3 5 ) h td tht ld b th bl f iti diffilt d dtild lilti dli ith h l t ti t h i i iibl b i t d i t d i l t the effect that just as the fact that a killing has been done in selfdefense may serve as a defense against a charge of homicide so the fact that a killing was one of voluntary euthanasia could function in the same way; that is as a satisfactory df i t h f h i i d R h l ' l i i t t i d it ld til t b d i b l h It i l h h h l ld h t l t ti t h i lt B t h ld bi R h l ' ti ith th i t d t i f th ti l i l t i tht ld ib d d hih l t ti t h i i ti l t types of cases would be legally permissible The combination of these two ap proaches might then both provide access to voluntary active euthanasia for those in need while minimizing the likelihood of abuse since anyone committing eutha i i b d l i ld dt b dt t h t it i d d f l t t h i O fil i t t i i thi It i ll d t h t if l t ti t h i itd iid t b l l i d th h ti ld b id tb d t Thi ti h l d t t iti t l l i t i th t f th A i Mdil A i t i hih h hld t h t i i f 339

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th b i itti f th ti f dii t d th i f li d t should not perform active euthanasia Advocates of legalization have tended to respond by challenging the latter view arguing for example that assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia are not really contrary to the Hippocratic Oath Bt if thi i iht ll k h t h it i h t t i f t b btt if d t t i l d d if i t d b t h th l t li d th f f th ti i ti i th h d f th t i d f i l F i th f i t l it ll b h l i l l diffilt f l t hift f t t t i t d thi t h t b d t ' lif t d i thi t d tht ' lif I th d l ld it t be better for euthanasia and assisted suicide to be carried out by people who have been especially trained to do this people who are willing to step in when doctors have done all that they can who are knowledgeable about the needs and the hl f th h di d h t h f btt bl t id th t d f t tht i dd t h t i ?

References Ad H

C i t t f th H d M d i l S h l (1968) A dfiiti f i i b l rt f th Ad H C i t t f th H d M d i l S h l t i th dfiiti f b i d t h Journal of the American Medical Association 205 (6) 3 3 7 4 0 Alexander Leo (1949) Medical science under dictatorship New England Journal of Medicine 241 3 9 ^ 7 B h T L (1977) A l t R h l ti d i t h i I Th Mappes and Jane Zembaty (eds) Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy pp 6 7 7 6 New Yk MGHill Journal of Apptied Philosophy B i D i d (2000) H t i t ti t h i 17 (2): 15768 Fletcher Joseph (1973) Ethics and euthanasia In Robert H Williams (ed) To Live and to Die 11322 N Y k S i Vl R i t d i J h Flth Humankind: Essays in Biomedical Ethics 14958 B f f l NY P t h 1979 Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2) 85112 F t Phili (1977) E t h i Harris John (1975) The survival lottery Philosophy 50: 8 1 7 Hitl Adlf (19257) Mein Kampf M i h F Eh N h f Editi t Rlh M h i Bt H h t Miffli 1971 Kagan Shelly (1988) The additive fallacy Ethics 99: 5 3 1 K i Y l (1958) S lii i i t d" k i l l i " ilti Minnesota Law Review 42 (6) 9691042 Kohl Marvin (1975) Voluntary beneficent euthanasia In Marvin Kohl (ed) Beneficent Euthanasia pp 13041 Buffalo NY: Prometheus 1975 Kh H Si P B P Clk M d R i k d M (1997) E d f l i f d i i Atli dil ti Medical Journal of Australia 166 1 9 1 6 M l H (1992) I d f f th t t t t I Jh Mti Fih dM k R i (eds) Ethics: Problems and Principles pp 2 7 2 7 New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Oddi G h (1997) Killi dlttidi f b diff t l diff Philosophical Studies 88 2 6 7 8 7

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(1998) The moral case for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 28 2 0 2 2 4 R h l J (1975) A t i d i t h i The New England Journal of Medicine 292 (2) 7 8 8 0 (1979) Euthanasia killing and letting die In John Ladd (ed) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death 14663 O f d O f d U i i t P (1993) E t h i I T R ( d ) Matters of Life and Death 3 d d 3068 N Y k MGHill Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (1980) Declaration on Euthanasia Rome: The Vti Slli J h V (1975) Th i l i t f t h i I M i K h l ( d ) Beneficent Euthanasia pp 1 2 3 3 Buffalo NY: Prometheus T l M i h l (1980) A i l t idti killi ltti di I B i S t i b k ( d ) Killing and Letting Di 5 6 6 2 E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l (1995) V l t t h i ti i d th ti f it Revue Internationale de Philosophic 49 (3): 3 0 5 2 2

Further reading D

H t h G t (1998) Th li l t I Hl Kh d P t Si ( d ) A Companion to Bioethics O f d B l k l l GayWilliams J (1979) The wrongfulness of euthanasia In Ronald Munson (ed) Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics 1 4 1 4 3 B l t CA W d t h H D i d (1777) Of i i d R i t d i E F Mill ( d ) Essays Moral Political and Literary pp 5 7 7 8 9 Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1985 Kh H d Si P ( d ) (1998) A Companion to Bioethics O f d B l k l l L d d J h ( d ) (1979) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death O f d O f d U i i t P L b D i d (1988) Down the Slippery Slope L d C Hl Maguire Daniel C (1975) A Catholic view of mercy killing In Marvin Kohl (ed) Beneficent Euthanasia 3 4 4 3 B f f l NY P t h T l M i h l (1979) D i i t t i t lif d th t f I J h Ldd (ed) Ethical Issues Relating to Life and Death pp 6 2 9 2 Oxford: Oxford University Press Wlt D l (1992) Slippery Slope Arguments O f d O f d U i i t P Willi G l i l l (1958) " M k i l l i " l i l t i jid Minnesota Law Review 43 (1): 1 1 2

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T h l

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Pi

t th t lti i dti t h l i d h t i bi hild t t h d littl h i bt t il th l t thi b i l i l d t i I i l h id t f bth l dh i h t h l i ki hi ilbl t ti t O th l t h l id tifiil i i t i d t ti (also known as contract pregnancy) have allowed many previously infertile couples to reproduce merely with the help of a turkey baster or a change in the law On the h i h t h l id h l il t h l f d i i d lifti f i t t i ildi in vitro f t i l i t i (IVF) d b d t i th f i f t d b th i j t i f i l it i i t t l i ijti (ICSI) d h i th t t d i t t ft l i (Gd 1999) I dditi t i h t h l i t h " hild f t h i " i th sense of genetic relationship to at least one of the parents prospective parents are now making use of other techniques such as prenatal and even preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screening in order to control the characteristics of their ffi Althh h t h i tl d l t " t" i d i b l tit h ib ti tbli d i d b f d i t i tti d bti th bi i th f t ith i ti d dti t h i t ffd t hi f iti h t i h t i t i I i l th liitti l' bilit t h hild t h th k i d f hild th f i d l tt f b i l i l dti d more as matters for technological intervention and personal choice Boundaries that previously had seemed fixed for eternity such as the inability of postmenopau sal women to have children have been exploded by the seemingly inexorable h f b i d i l Pditbl h f thi itd t h i f h f d l d il iifi hildbi d f i l lif i d b l d d d Whil l bfit f tl dd f l dti hi th i b t th idiidl d il t Will hild i d b f l t h l i h IVF b f i d l i b bjtd t h l i l h i l ld

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h ? Wht th i l i t i f l ti t h tract pregnancy for our conceptions of lineage and the traditional family? Will this technology be used to liberate women or further subordinate them to men's reproductive designs? And what are the implications of such "quality control" h tl ti i f th t t f dibld l it? Thi h t t t t t l th d b t h ti ithi th t t f h i l h i l f k B t i t ld t d d di i f h t t d f itd dti I hll i t d t t t ff d t l thil ti t h t th ll t d t i ht l d interests are at stake for individuals as they confront decisions to have children with the assistance of reproductive technologies? What special moral concerns and complexities are generated by the current generation of assisted reproductive tech l i (ART)? A d h hld flit b t idiidl' dti libt d t i l i bhlf f t d i t i l l ft hild d th d i b l d b f f t i l ld?

Reproductive Liberty Since debates about social policy bearing on reproduction usually pivot on the il f f th i h t di t t i l d t b i t ith lii k th t f " d t i l i b t " Thi t b diidd i t t j t i th f d t id ti d h f d t i ti E h f th t i b fth diidd it " t i " iht i t t t b lt l b t d " i t i " iht i t t i th t i l t hi ' i I hll focus here exclusively on the "right to reproduce" understood as a negative right to be free of social or governmental restraints bearing on whether and how one might reproduce Th ihi t i tt i hild h ft b f t d ith t t f d l d lii d i d t i d th ih Th l tditi i th US d th ti f l fi l t i l tilii ti l f l h th tll t d d il i i t i d h (Cl 2001) L i k i th ldb t h i th ilid it f th h lbi l ii IVF t i hild id l ki t ti t ith illi thid party often find their desires thwarted by laws or professional norms prohibiting such efforts at "collaborative reproduction" Some social critics moved by reports of the high incidence of child abuse and neglect have even called for the licensing of ll ti t li t h t ld l t h t th i t t f idiidl i b i d ii hild All h l d lii ld th flit ith i d i i d l ' ti f d d t d f d f tt ill i d liitti h i hild Th t i l bhid tti "iht t d " i l if t th th fili f idi ti hih t i l l h i

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ti f bdil t l f d t i t i i th b d i of one's children and social equality between women and men The impact of infertility on women and couples desirous of having a child is often devastating Their selfconfidence can be destroyed they are often haunted by feelings of inad d ilt d thi b i h t l f blifl ft d h d Bt h d th l d i t h hild i th fit l ? Althh t l h i hild i " t h t i l " tt f i l "di ht t l l " idtif l t f t d d t thi ti F th ih t t i t i t d b th d i f l t b d thi l f h th i th lif f F th h i children establishes a satisfying link to the future wherein their DNA and hope fully some of their values will inform the lives of future generations For those who do not believe in an afterlife this aspect of procreation can provide at least a i l fi t l i t M i t t i ti hil f i i th i t i t d f d f tti d bith Oth di t h th h i l i f ii bith th ibilit f ii hild d h i d d lti l t i h i ith th F th f h i hild f " ' " t f th l t t simply having a child to love and rear is enough Having children can also signal a decisive step into adulthood for many individuals and couples No longer primarily their parents' children they are now responsible parents with children of thi i iti f h d t ithi th it (Al 1992 1 4 7 7 0 ) O i f l t i l tt h t t t d t th iti ith th b t i tht ti itll i l i t t t f i idtiti i lfflfillt i hii d i t i i f diit di d t d i ti th i f li (Rbt 1994 2 2 4 2 ) Thi i fl t fi t t tht l l d b t t i l tti i both social custom and law Whether the desire to have children especially chil dren of "one's o w n " should be universally and absolutely honored is however another question Many people who advocate nearly absolute negative reproductive iht i i h t not t h hild i t t i d bti hitt t b ll t iht t h hild O f h l t t f th f t t h t th ti f hild t iti ibiliti t ffi ibiliti t h t iht b fll hikd h t t i d bti til t th d i f h bliti Liki l h iht d t iht t d naturally h qualms about the capacity of artificially assisted reproduction via gamete donation and embryo freezing to confuse children's sense of location on their family tree The question then is whether the weighty interests invoked on behalf of assisted dti dd t b t "iht t d " d if h h iht iht i h i th b l i t ti idti b d th l f f ffi th h l t h d l f i it df l t d t th difiti f hild d hildbi (St 1997 1 1 2 6 B h t l 2000 2 0 6 2 0 )

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Strong Libertarianism O i f l t i l t th ti tk d i i t d th id f i d i i d l libt A d i t l f d bithiit Jh R b t (1994) th i t f ti f th d l t fidiidl i diit d idtit i i t l b l t iht t d Althh R b t i f i t i l i idti (f l t h t t traditional morality the status of women the wellbeing of children) he contends that procreative liberty should enjoy a presumptive priority i i all such factors Robertson develops a twostep procedure for testing the adequacy of claims on bhlf f dti libt i t d ll i l idti Fit t d t i hth til li t d i l fll d th tti bll f dti libt R b t di th d i i f h libt t b i l i l d il d i i tht idll ifd t d itil ti f t h d I th f l l t t d i t i l t i h tibt t t th ti f h bi ( t i thd) id bi h i h th f t hild i h t b t d ( t t i l t hood) and provides the child with a loving home (rearing parenthood) The advent of ARTs has fractured these various components of parenthood so that now it s pos sible for a child to have five distinct "parents": i e two unrelated gamete providers a " t th" h tt th lti b d i l idiidl l l t d t th th th ti h i th lti hild R b t li tht h f th l t i biti i ilti ( h d t ll t ith i t t i t tt i hild h tt itht d t i t i t d i t ) fit ftbl d th bi f dti f d H l b tht tti li to reproductive liberty might turn out to lack such protection; for example claims made on behalf of seriously retarded persons who may lack the requisite comprehension to intend to be a parent or on behalf of emerging technologies such l i tht bl f df t d i t i l ti f ti t h t th f l l t i d th t l b d f dti f d 0 li thi i i t i l h d l ithi R b t ' f k it i th bjtd t d " b l i tt" i d t th i f i t l i tht iht t i h ' i t t i dti S h li i l d i b t th i fft f ART th t d i t i l f i l h i l h t hild d h t idiidl h l i l and as a class Robertson contends that the presumptive value of liberty in the sphere of reproduction is so great that we must demand a clear showing of substan tial harm to the tangible interests of others before we limit reproductive iberty Wht l iht f it thi i t d i i l t i t t t f t bl l i i t t i dti f d I ti R b t i h d d t k l d liit th f ART 1 t h l l th R b t ld tht iht t d itht it f f th t t i j t t th i h t t t d t h h

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t t i d bti t h t th i h t f i l l t d hild just as strong as the right of married couples; and that the right to oin with others in noncoital procreative projects (such as IVF or contract pregnancy) is ust as strong as the right to procreate naturally We shall now take a closer look a several t l i t f t t d dti libt i d t th d f R b t ' i f l t i l iti

Reproductive Liberty in the Balance " U t l "

dti?

O bjti t f t t d dti libt i h t i d t i f i d ith th R Cthli C h h d it f f i i l th f" t l l " ( C t i f th D t i f th F i t h 1987) A i ll k ffiil C t h l i iti t contraception stems from the view that all acts of sexual intercourse must "remain open" to the possibility of reproduction In other words the socalled "unitive" function of sex (ie the psychological and spiritual benefits associated with nter ) t b d i i t d f th ti f t i ( t l t th ibilit t h f ) B tifiil t t i t thi t l b d b t th iti d ti f t i f ki ibl itht ti ffiil C t h l i d t i d l it t b t l d l C l Cthli d t i ll ART i l d i th i l t f IVF i l i l th t fh b d d if th d t h t th k possible procreation without sex Focusing on the simplest case of IVF using gametes from a husband and a wife with blocked fallopian tubes a robustly libertarian view of reproductive liberty li i i t i t th f f i i l C t h l i hibiti f d ll ART ithi th t t f i A i tht h b d d if ld h iht t dti libt b d th i t f hild b i t i b l i f thi t l i t t dl f th it i diffilt t h th id l i idtil i t hld t h i d t i l iht l b th if' f l l i tb h t b blocked In such a case IVF would seem to be morally analogous to a heart bypass operation in which a natural function is rerouted in order to achieve a desired and morally licit goal In the case of IVF the goal is the establishment of a family til ithi th fi f h t itl l t i h i hih l h t b th h i f d i d t f th f f i i l C t h l i i (Lit 1993 2 6 4 3 ) Ath bl ith thi l t t i t i t d d i t h t it i b d t i i f "th t l " tht tt b h d b t th l i l l l d htill lliti it A t h b d hibiti f ll f f ART i l d i IVF ithi i th d tht they all fail to conform to a particular metaphysical and theological vision of "the natural" would clearly amount to a tyrannical imposition of a sectarian religious view on the rest of society Equally tellingly it would clearly fail to meet Robertson's i t f b t t i l h t th t i b l i t t f th At t

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h h tti " i i t l " ff i t til ti fh nature (as opposed to particular human beings) It remains to be seen however whether libertarian arguments of this sort will prevail against other more problem atic variations on assisted reproductive technology Some feminist objections S f i i t tht lt i i f l " t l i t " t h t ft th d i f hild b t t i b t d t th i fft fb t il ditii th th t ditbl h f i d idtit A d i t th critics calls for unlimited procreative liberty especially in the area of ARTs must be viewed with skepticism against the backdrop of the socalled "parental prescription" Other feminists object to reproductive technologies on the ground that they tend to t f d f t th i f t h h d (f l it t ti t t i l d i t) hil l i it d th t h l i l tl f A l t h h th iti ll h t i l t th C t h l i f t i Chh' t h i th h th C h h ' d ii ith th t l b i l i l d f thi Whil k l d i th l f idiidl f th i h t t th t h l i thi f i i t iti t tempts to reveal the negative impact of ARTs on women as a class (Corea 1985) A third feminist objection to ARTs highlights the physical and psychological risks imposed upon individual women by these technologies IVF for example typically i th d i i t t i f fl d t t i l t " l t i " hih ll liii t h t d th ftili l b f f bth i d i t i l t t i i th t df i f lt A l t h h th d tl t h h t t b ffiitl f k h t thi l t fft i h t b Gi th h i t fd i t l t f d i t f b i f l DES antinausea drug that was found decades later to be responsible for many serious health consequences including cancers we cannot rule out the possibility that many women are routinely being harmed by current IVF techniques An example f h l i l h i idd b th ti f t t h i " t " i f th t t i l d t l i i h h bb t bith A l t h h h f d thi " i " f th i t h t hith t h i d d t d t h l i l ffi th l f th hild t h th h i bith (O ll 1987 T 1997) Feminist objections to ARTs based upon our culture's allegedly "coercive" pro natalist ideology harbor a grain of truth but must ultimately be rejected as guides to policy The element of truth consists in the astute observation that many infertile d th fll t f ART ith ll f t h i l f l compelled t i t dd i f t bf ditti "dft" d ttli f dti Dii t h ff th dti tdill t i t bf th bitt d ft h t d b iii tht ld d h l d h d Th bl ith thi itii h i t h t it t h t ll t dii t t t hih i iftl fl 347

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F i i t b t th d i t i d f t t i f ' t l role in motherhood in the service of a maledominated technology may have some validity but they are significantly undercut by the fact that hundreds of thousands of women have actively sought out these technologies evidently viewing them as a th t h l i th d tht iti d all things considered. T th h dldd ff f fl i ld id ith d l ft b d t i ii f "th t l " Objti b d ttil h i l d h l i l h t idiidl t b tk h i l Cll thi t b d t make the practice of assisted reproduction as safe as it possibly can be Promising research in the area of in vitro maturation (IVM) of eggs for example could eventually displace superovulation with all of its known discomforts and unknown risks And t h l d dfitl b tk t d th l i k l i h d t h t ti t th ill tll t thi iitil d i i t f f i t thi tl li It i l bi h hth dt ht t t h ttil f h hld l d t b d t i l ART l t l t th fll Harms to future children In contrast to those religious and feminist objections based upon speculative offenses against nature or illdefined threats to women as a class reservations b t ART b d ditd h t th hild th d i tt i d d If l h i f i h l i l h i l h t th hild b f h t ld b d th t libti lik J h R b t ld h t d i t t h t th i h t t d hld b idd A i t f l l d h i l h iht l d th i h t i k f bith d f t ibl d b IVF b f i i t t l mic sperm injection (ICSI) or cloning Potential psychological risks could include feelings of abandonment on the part of children born to surrogate mothers ("My biological mother gave me away so she could afford a college degree or a new dk") l d hild' f l i tht h i " l " f hi it P t i t h d i th f f h ik iht ll b i h t l d f ti i i b l A l t h h th b j t i b d h t hild i l l th right sort f t l i t f t t d dti libt R b t bli t h t it f t i b l h i l h i l i d d t h i l b t l D i th k of Derek Parfit (1984) Robertson points out that whatever alleged harm might befall the children of ARTs would be due to the very fact of their being born In other words the only way to avoid harming such children would be to avoid giving b i t h t th i th fit l Bt t d tht ld b i l t b f t th i th ld th t i t t ll S th h i i t th f i l i bt h i l h l i l ffi d l bt th bt ffi d it (Rbt 1994) I Pfit' t i l thi k i d f i t t i i l i t th lld " idtit b l " M t f fili l hi di t P f i t t d t b 348

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" " bl tht i bl h hi ill fft l d existing persons making the same people better or worse off He points out how ever that some choices are "different person" choices that is situations wherein our very choices will cause different people (and sometimes different numbers of l) t it E l f h difft bl ld i l d hi b i lti lii d th t f t didi t bi it it hild h dibilit ld b i b l f it b i t h If hild tb b i t h t bi bjtd t ti ik f h l i l h i l h it i R b t t l l t ij t t h t hild t b b d th i t Th l ti t thi l i ld b th f children whose lives would be so miserable that it would be better (for them) had they never existed Such cases constitute the legal and moral category of "wrongful life" Thi li f i l d R b t t th t t l i l i tht l hild' lif ill t b " f l " i th b tit b i i hild t th ld i d i d h d i d d i d t d tt t b "i i b l " if th i l t t i bid it f th (Thi l i b i l d t i l d " " h t' ti h i drinking during pregnancy or exposure to toxic chemicals make the child worse off than she otherwise would have been) Although Robertson concedes that parents who bring children into the world in a damaged state can perhaps be faulted for "ffdi h t b l d b tit ffi" h d i tht h hild h t h l b h d A d i th b f "tibl h " R b t l d t h t th i i l f dti libt h l d il M iti h b ditbd b h t th d R b t ' " l i i l i " di th ti f i i d hild S l th t d h i t tk h th l ffdi th ibiliti f th h f t t it t ffi S l h t t i b harming or wronging the very children whose lives are blighted by profound m pairments One way of shoring up this intuition is to posit something ike a "right to a minimally satisfying life" where the bar of moral acceptability would presum bl b t h h i h th b l i f f l lif ( S t i b k d MCl k 1994 P d 1996) U d h i i l t h k i l b h t hild i t th ld ith d d f l di d f t ld b d f ilti t h i hild' " b i t h i h t " Th iti d tht hi t h t fi th t h h l d f i i l tifti iht d t i t k W l d th b b t t blid d f ? D ' d ? Hti ton's chorea? HIV/AIDS? But they are united in rejecting Robertson's drawing the line at wrongful life One way of approaching this question they suggest would simply be to ask what a loving parent would want for his or her child Parents who f i l d t li t thi t d d ld th b b l d f dti i bilit Ath h t thi bl ld i l h b d ti f ht t h Th h Pfit dR b t l t t t tht t h t h i hild i h bith i i b l f dibilit i tht h hild' i t t t d l fftd t b k b bi b

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( R b th l t t i f th i it t l ) S if tik with our standard definition of "harm" as a setting back of one's interests from some prior baseline then it indeed seems conceptually impossible to harm such children by giving birth to them One possible remedy would be to broaden our t d d ti fh t i l d thi lik "tt f ill f f i " (G 2 0 0 1 1 1 8 2 2 ) If hild h d t li lif h t i d b i i t d ffi ( h t f f l lif) ld th t h t thi hild i i " h d t t " t h h h t diti d t t tbk f i btt b l i A l t h h b t h th " b i t h i h t " d " h d tt" t t i t strongly held intuition that such parents do wrong and that the wrong they do s to their children neither approach seems to have fully absorbed the lesson of Par fit's nonidentity problem So long as there was no other way for these children to h b b d l th hild t h l t h i li bi b f t t th if t h i li t " i i l l tifi" ( h t tht ) lid i " h d tt" th it i h d t h th ld h b victimized. Th i l th liti i d h i h th ld h b d btt ff W til tibt t d i intuition here by lamenting that it is too bad that such children have to suffer and live with such impairments but we cannot meaningfully say that they have been victimized We cannot say that the child has a legitimate complaint against her t f hd h t d t h i h ld t h b b A h i l h i l l tifi b t till i t i t i l ttli lti t thi bl i t h l d th t tbl f h i b h t b t " f l d i b i l i t " i th b f til h h b h d d I Pfit' t i l t k t " ffti" i i l H i libl l f h i i l Individuals are morally required not to let any child or other dependent person for h lf th ibl i i ffi liitd tit i l fh i d if th t tht itht ffti th b f h ill i t d i t h t i i bttil bd t loss of benefits on themselves or others no child or other dependent person for whose lf th ibl ill ri ri ffri liitd tit ri l fh i d (Bh t l 2000 249) This approach to the problem is admittedly "impersonal" (or nonpersonaffecting) in the sense that it objects to bringing about states of affairs characterized by serious suffering without attaching those states to any particular victims It does neverthe l ll t t t pace R b t t h t th t t l t i l b th h offended l h d t th di f i ffi bt th il b th h b h t tht ffi i t th ld Th i k i ffti i i l l i iit th d i h t f th l i b t i ' l b l t iht t d If h ffti i i l i t th it h l d b f to reproduce when serious suffering is highly likely to result Contemplating

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th t f h ik ibl t ld bl it til th threat could be removed or failing that possibility he or she could decide not to reproduce at all or any further Of course everything depends here on a number of important variables bearing on the magnitude of threatened suffering the probabil it f th i k d th d fb d i d b d i i tt d F l i th t tt f l i t h l it ld l l b i i b l f t l hilf d t h b b j t hi l t t ik f i bith d f t (Dll th h i td t b l b d i t l ! ) It ld b l l hth bl it ld b i ibl f l d t th t t hild h iht ff some speculative psychological harm The specter of commodification and

instrumentalization

W t d i th t t f i th f f i i l C t h l i iti th f IVF b h b d d if t h t th t i h f th l i b t i i i l h did t il i l iil lt i litd f itd dti W t id f th Th f t tht t d t k th b t litd d d i f f l t i l d th f l l i (1) t from sources outside of the married couple; (2) the freezing of embryos for later uses which could include subsequent implantation donation to other parties (in cluding postmenopausal women) and research; (3) the use of "surrogate mothers" t tt hild f il f (4) th f i l t t i ti i t t th b i t h f hild ith i d i b l h t i t i d (5) th f t biti f t ll d l i t h l i t t b ith d i d h t i t i R b t ' t libti i i l tht i liit dti libt itht l h i f b t t i l h t th t i b l i t t f th may well prove to be problematic in the context of ARTs that commercialize repro duction and instrumentalize the human embryo in the service of the "perfect baby" Consider first the practice of traditional commercial surrogacy in which women i hild t h h tifiil i i t i t t t h t hild f 9 th d th ll t h i t l iht t t t i l f b t t i l f Whil libl f i i t i th f d t d th thi t d l f l d it lt iht t l d bdil t th (ildi f i i t ) l d t th h t f kt l i t th h ffil l t i h i Th iti t d t h t th mercialization of reproduction and the selling of parental rights threaten to under mine the genuine autonomy of women the personhood of children and the social conditions for the flourishing of family life (Anderson 1993; Radin 1996) A d i t thi i t d d t t t d thi t t l fli f thi f f i t h t t d th h d f hild t th t l f thi i h t i t i d l th " t l i t " f fil l t i h i ith th h d d d it f th kt I dditi f i i t hihl i t i l f th kt' lt b d i t i f th i d l f tti t th b t t 351

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d d f t t d l l i t t i Th t d t h t th f d i ences of gestation and birthing make women into genuine mothers and that the law and the market should not attempt to annul this important fact (Rothman 1989) From this angle genuine liberty means more than the mere ability to sell ' dti t th h i h t bidd Ath t i l h i th kti d difiti f d F h b lli t h i t d t i ( $50) f t l i tifil i i t i I it f i t' i t lli b b i d th b d t ( t l t b l ) thi l t d i ti h t t t t d h ti thil t Si controversy has arisen however over the more recent practice of egg retrieval and sale for rather large amounts of money Payment for human ova has risen sharply in the past decade in response to competitive market pressures among fertility clinics f hih h $5000 l F f i il iti i thi h tl b b t d b th tht t i i ftilit t h l d d t i t i i t d t i thi illi t bt $35000 d $50000 t ith th iit I L b k d d thlti ( S t i b k 2002) (Th day may not be far off when US News and World Report begins to include the asking price for coeds' eggs in the formula for ranking colleges and universities) Many of these egg brokerages now offer their wares to interested parties via webbased cata l f t i th h t i t i f th d d th ki i f thi A l t th bit lt ith d i t d biliti f t h t th iliti fh dti t i l i i fll i A ditbi t id i th ttil f i ART t i t t l i th h b i th i f iti i d I i i th t t d i t t ft t h t ftilit i l i t fid t tk l' b t t t ll f it t tblih l f t t i ll i and then subject the entire cell colony to a highly efficient vector containing "en hanced" DNA for various human characteristics The specialists then take a treated stem cell from this colony and insert its DNA back into an enucleated human egg ll th f i t h h l i h d h b f l t t i Th lt f thi fl f t ll d l i t h l i ld b hild " d t d" i i i f t t O d t i t th ti f h ftiti i I d d i th ttil f d l t i t k h h li ld i i l b f i l ti i f h t h l (i designed to screen out horrible defects) One can also imagine some salutary posi tive eugenic uses designed to engender various positive traits such as enhanced immunity to disease better memory more acute vision; i e traits that would tend t b b f i l t j t b t tt h t thi ii f th d lif Bt l il i i h t h l i ldi t th t t l i t t liti d d h i t i f h lif i th i f " b t i " i di Nt tt i t (K 2001) Th t i t f difti di t t l i t i i b l f th t l i b t i ' l b l t i i l f dti libt

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Tht i i l ' i i t clear h i f substantial h t identifiable individuals makes it the moral equivalent of the legal "clear and present danger" test for the constitutionality of free speech As such this test will automatically disqualify any and all objections to assisted reproductive techniques that invoke ft h t idiidl ititti ( th f i l ) t l f l ( ) Bt i f t l t tht t l d dti libt ill l d t iftl d i b l il h th difiti d iliti f hildbi th t libti i i l ill il f i l t k l d idti tht iftl l t f th f l t i f d bli li If it i th tht f th values we embrace regarding the family (broadly defined to include many "non traditional" arrangements) and much of the autonomy that we cherish in the reproductive domain are themselves supported by an underlying cultural context b ht iht b lld " l f iht" t h t t tht d l i t t t b tk i l S h l d it t t tht f th ditb i f ART d i d d t h t f l t ' t d t i i th i i f f thi dti lb ( i t t ) t th d i i t d h d f hild th it i b l regimes would be entitled to consider such threats and weigh them in the balance against the freedom of individual agents to engage in market transactions with like minded others (Murray 1996) Thi i t t tht d ll lti t h t t il l f dti hld t t i l l t l t dti ibt f f it B t ith h l d it f l l f th l i b t i ' h i dti f d tht d ll i ft t h t t tht l hld b ldd ldlibti il li H t thi ill on principle f d d it ff t b i th itd f th t h t d h it bbilit d th t f titi i d i i d l libt F l li that nullified commercial surrogacy contracts would also necessarily constrict he ability of many poor or lower middleclass women to advance their own socioeco nomic standing by entering into such contracts Such restrictive policies would th difflt flit b t di t f d th diti f h flihi i difd d ilid dti i t d di t d th i f d i d t d M t J R d i (1996) h d b b d thi k i d f l flit "th d b l bid" d h h d f f l l tht h d i i tb d " t i l l " ith i t th tilit f all th l t l idti Th strong libertarian's nearly absolutist principle seems ill suited to this kind of nuanced and contextdependent inquiry

Conclusion Th th ti

lld " t h l t i " h b h t ld b iti t h d fi d i i d l d f thi iftilit A th t libti

h j l t h h

d

tifti t th i i t i t t i

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ti i l l tid t i t t i t t i idiidl lfdfiiti d wellbeing and so should not be limited by sectarian appeals to "the natural" or to rigidly defined conceptions of "family values" On the other hand the potential of some uses of ARTs to introduce serious suffering and impairment into the world id tht dti hi d ibiliti t th h ill b b Ad h ibiliti h l d i t id t h t th d i i t t i t l tt f individual i l f d t i t i d lf dfiiti It i th d i i t bi th h bi it it d i i fihtd ith i ibilit f th k i d f lif t h t th f t hild ill li W h l tht f ART i t h t t th dignity and personhood of children and women and that our methods of moral deliberation over social policy should not automatically exclude such threats simply because they do not happen to pose here and now a clear and present danger to idtifid i d i i d l d h i h d il ti F th l d d b ht h t i likl t fld l i d f ti il l f dti dll d l t i t i b l b t th d i d d l " tl i t " f th kt

Rf Alpern K D (ed) (1992) The Ethics of Reproductive Technology. New York: Oxford University P MA H d Ad E S (1993) Value in Ethics and Economics, 1 6 8 9 C b r i d University Press Bh A B k D Dil N d Wikl D (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics Cbid U i i t P and Justice. C b i d NY Cld S i Cl E (2001) The Unfit: A History of a Bad Idea. Cld S r i H b Harbor Press C t i f th D t i f th Fith (1987) Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day. R Itl Th V t i M h 10 Corea G (1985) The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs. N Y k H Gd R (1999) Designing Babies: The Brave New World of Reproductive Technology. N York: W H Freeman G R (2001) M h d b t tt thil i f th l i t I P Yk Lit ( d ) Cloning and the Future of Human Embryo Research, 11431 N Ofd U i i t P Kass L (2001) Preventing a brave new world The New Republic, May 21: 3 0 9 Lit P (1993) Pursuing Parenthood: Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction. B l i t IN I d i U i i t P CA U i i t fClifi P M T (1996) The Worth of a Child. B k l Overall C (1987) Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis. Boston: Allen and U i P P f l t D (1984) Reasons and Persons. O f d C l d Purdy L (1996) Reproducing Persons: Issues in Feminist Bioethics. Ithaca NY: Cornell Univer it P

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Radin M J (1996) Contested Commodities Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press R b t J (1994) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies P i t NJ P i t U i i t P Rth B K (1989) Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society New York: W W Norton Stibk B ( f t h i ) P t t d Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine d M C l k R (1994) Wh i b i t h f i t th hild? Hastings Center Report 24 (6) 1 5 2 1 Strong C (1997) Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine New Haven CT: Yale Univer it P T R (1997) Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Applications Boulder CO: Westview Press

Further reading Cllh

J C ( d ) (1995) Reproduction Ethics and the Law B l i t IN I d i Ui it P Cohen C B (1996) New Ways of Making Babies: The Case of Egg Donation Bloomington IN: Idi U i i t P Fild M (1988) Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues C b i d MA H d U i i t P Glover J (1989) Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies: The Glover Report to the European Commission D K l b IL N t h Illii U i i t P G t i L 0 ( d ) (1990) Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy B l i t IN I d i University Press H i J (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology O f d Ofd U i i t P Hlld S dD i D ( d ) (2001) S i l i h' fid f d i f i t i ? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11: 3 Mahoney J D (2000) The market for human tissue Virginia Law Review 86 (2): 1 6 3 2 2 3 N Y k Stt T k F Lif d th L (1998) Assisted Reproductive Technologies N Y k N Y k Stt T k F Lif d th L (1988) Surrogate Parenting New York: New York State Task Force on Life and the Law

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26 G t i

E

i

i

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I J 2000 t di d t jitl d t h t th l f th ldid H G P j t (HGP) t d th ti h hd till b l t d Of k till l h d t d t d th if tht tibt t h di d di bilit h l t th ltitd f l h i l iti t i l d behavioral traits of normal humans No one can confidently predict the rate at which that understanding will be achieved in the future nor the ultimate limits on it Th i hih i t t ith th d ith d i f f t i t l ltili ht till f th t t d t t d t d Bt d i t h h i t b l d h l d d t tid i b i i t d t d th ti b fh t M h f th itil k i th HGP h f d h f th if ti tibti t h di d d i b i l i t Th h b idtifd d t t f it d veloped that allow prediction with a very high degree of certainty of whether an individual will develop Huntington's chorea an adultonset single gene disease that leads to devastating neurological deterioration and death over a period of years In th h b idtifd d t t f th d l d tht l i i d i i d l ' ik f d l i di lik b t At t thi i f t i till ll l liitd d ltil d t l th ti i h i t f A l h k f f i l hit th tht bth t ik f i til ti di t t h i hild t t f thi ik f d i bf ti If ik i f d t b t i h d t i in vitro fertilization (IVF) preimplantation embryo testing or forgoing conception are now available to avoid transmission of the genetic disease to future children After conception testing of the fetus is sometimes possible to determine whether t carries th f th di d th t th d i d hth t b t f f t d ft Whil h tti i ibl f l it l i i t d b f di dibiliti f h i h th i i i f i t ti t t th iti t ti t d idl i th f t M th it t d t t d l t i i likl t b b i d ith biliti f in utero t h t i i t t i ti ilti t t f th d l t i

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( ) Th t tht d i ti k l d d t h l will increase our ability to prevent or to reduce the prevalence of disease caused n significant part by deleterious genes It is not just much disease however but virtually all normal human traits that h i i f t ti b i Th d i ti k l d d t h l t h t ill bl t t di ill l t i t l bl t d tk i t t i t i l t th d l i ltit d f t i dt h th tit df t i i th b f di dibilit it b ibl t i l t t h l itlli i t h di h i l t t h d t ity and life expectancy to take only a few examples Thus we face the prospect of being able to take control over and to design human nature and the nature of our progeny What was once in the hands of God or the natural lottery will come i i l ithi d l i b t h hi d t l Thi h t i b t f th t h i l i tt f h i tht t l I th l i i t d ilbl h I ill t th t h i l b h i h th ti i t t i ill likl Whil b f th l d i l h th ill d l i lti d ti t thi ti d while some of the ethical concerns will be specific to particular technical means as they develop over time most of the deepest ethical concerns do not turn on the specific technical details of genetic interventions I will understand "genetic engin i " h t th d l i b t ltti dditi f i h b thi i l d ti ll ti i t t i tht fft l th bjt f th i t t i ll ll i t t i h th h ill b d t th f th b j t f th i t t i Thi tht t td b f ti th i f ti di t i t f ti i i I ill d t d it h bt tl t f th thil i i d b th t ill l i ith ti i i to prevent such disease Let us begin to explore these issues

The Various Uses of Genetic Engineering C i d f t th f ti i i t t di It i i t t t d t d tht t f th t difflt t h i l i tht i ith t f ti ti t i i f di ill t i ith th f ti i i t d Th f " f l lif" d " f l disability" (Buchanan at al 2000) Cases of wrongful life arise in the relatively rare cases of diseases like Tay Sachs and Lesch Nyhan that are so awful as to make a person's life not worth living to make it better for the person never to have been b Bt t d h i l h h d d h bi b ith h diti ld b h t th i d i i d l i h i i f th i d i i d l ' diti lt f th h f l t ith h t it ld h b h d th h f l t th b f d B t h th l t t th h f l diti i t t th i d i i d l f i it it th th i t b i h t it i t

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diti t h t b d ith th i d i i d l ' it ith T S h Lesch Nyhan disease because nonexistence is not any condition at all So many have wondered how it could be a harm and in turn a wrong to bring someone nto existence even with such a devastating disease I f f l d i b i l i t th d i b i l i t i l b td b t b i i th i d i i d l i t it ith b t ii tht d i i d l b bti ft ti b t th i d i i d l ' d i b i l i t ld t b i t k it lif t th l i i t ll th h th f f l lif I h i tht hth til fil t t ti t i i f dibilit i ll d d id ations and in nearly all cases that choice should be left with the parents The systematic philosophical difficulty here is that the individual is born with a disability like blindness or moderate mental retardation which still leaves him with a life well th l i i d hih ld l h b td b t b i i hi t it t ll H ld d i h di t hi? H ld it b b t t f hi t t i t th t i t ith lif ll th l i i ? Thi lld idtit bl ( P f i t 1984) h i d h h i l h i l tt ti d I bli h i lti t it till b d H in the case of genetic engineering which prevents the transmission of genetic dis ease by altering or adding genes in an embryo it is arguably the same individual who will exist with the disease if it is not prevented and without the disease f it is td if th h b i t t it i th ii bi idiidl tit t h t ill i t ith i t h t th ti di N i ith it db d d it t i l t h t it i b t t f tht i d i i d l tt ff b l i d d t tl t d t i I d d if t fild t bti dil f thi b hild t t blid d t tl tdti t h i fil ld ll titt hild l t d th t t ld t i l l i t i l if t i that the child received the needed treatment Nevertheless while these ethical issues do not arise with genetic engineering to prevent the transmission of genetic disease other issues do arise

Th Dibilit Riht Chll

t th P t i

f Dibiliti

O t l t f bjti h b d t l d f f l l b disability rights groups (Asch 1999 2000) The disabling conditions from genetic disease that genetic engineering would be used to prevent are the same conditions that persons with disabilities now live with To use genetic engineering to prevent th b i t h f ith th dibiliti i b dibld i th t h t it ld b b t t f lik th d f th tt it Thi i d t d b l tbli dt h t i A d it l d t ti bi d ith h i t i l i t i til th N i h t k ti t t l i i t dibld t tb t ti f th bt b t i l killi t i t i th ( P l 1995) If i ti i i t t ti di d dibilit ill i b l 358

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l i k l l d t th h f th N i i t th l h th strongest of ethical reasons to avoid it Disabled persons point out moreover that they have satisfying and worthwhile lives in spite of their disabilities and that the disadvantages they suffer are often a lt f j t il diti di d i t Th t h t t h i li ft lt f t h i d i b i l i t i th li f dibld l d t h t it i i t k t bli tht dibld h l lit f lif A b f tdi h h tht dibld t thi lit f lif h i h th th dibld t it i l d i thi f i l b d d t (Sktt dT 1978) M d t d h thi i First societal prejudices and stereotypes about disabled persons and their ives remain powerful and strongly influence common beliefs many of which are false beliefs about disabled persons and their lives Second disabled persons often suc d i d i th ti i t f t h i dibilit t h i li Chith M (1996) h d i t i i h d th tht t i l l ft ff i dibilit A d t t i i th b hih h f t i l f t h h f l i d kill d l t C i i th b hih djt d l thi tti for functioning to reflect their lowered performance and which thereby increases their satisfaction with their level of performance Accommodation is the process by which individuals adjust their life plans and activities to deemphasize or eliminate tiiti d diffilt i i b l b t h i dibilit d btitt ti iti t i i l l liitd T t h th f dtti i d dti lt i ith dibilit tl lti h lit f lif l d d b t t th it i t h t th dibilit M k tht b i dibld d i t h h th f dtti i d dti i d iiht d h t t t h tht ih dibld ' lif i d t extent that would not have been possible by other means And so when persons with even severe disabilities claim that their overall quality of life is no worse than that of nondisabled persons there is often good reason to accept their evaluation as t d if it i t h hld t t t h i h l i ? H thi b d ith th blif tht b i l dibld i ift tht h l d b idd td h ibl? S l it l t Fit ith d i b i l i t i h li j t d t i l dibld t h h th f d t t i i d dti F th ith d i b i l i t i th h l limited or partial success and both they and others would rate their quality of ife as significantly diminished by their disability Since we can usually not predict the effect of a disability on a particular individual's quality of life so long as the ll f f t th ti l f ith i d i b i l i t lik b l i d d t tl t d t i i ti li f ti f th d i b i l i t b jtifd A d i t i t h t th f dtt i i d dti if f l l fl i t i dibld ' lit f lif t it l l bf th d i b i l i t ft d d b d f l 359

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iri l t h tl d diffilt hbilitti O bl k t avoid the necessity for these processes for oneself or others in order to avoid their burdens even if one could know ahead of time which of course one cannot that they would in the end be fully successful This point is illustrated by the fact tht dibld ld till f tt h b dibld if lt f d t t i i d dti th t thi lit f if diiihd f h t it h d b bf b i dibld I t b t th b d f dibilit tht ' lif ti i i f t b d d hdhi d t h t it i itk t t h i k it i ibl h d i b l t t ll b d Seeking to do so involves a misplaced perfectionism and a fundamental misunder standing of the human condition But seeking to prevent serious disabilities need not involve these attitudes Recognizing that every life will have some share of b d ift d hdhi i fll tibl ith ki t t th h t h h h lif ill h f th it i b t t if h lif h f th th A thid i t i t h t th f f t f th f i th lit f ' lif l d b l t i O th h d di l psychologically healthy who realistically adjust their expectations in the face of significant disabilities and "get on with their lives" as it is sometimes put Since one aspect of quality of life is one's subjective level of satisfaction or happiness with ' lif thi f i ll t t ti tifti d h i ith ' lif i th f f i f t i l liitti l Bt th bjti l l f tifti h i ith ' lif i l t f th lit f lif t th hl f it (Griffi 1986 B k 1992) I dditi th th tiiti l i h t d l lti tht tll k t h t lif t h t k i th b j t i t t f th lif If th bjt i t t i i f i t l i r i h d th ' lit f lif ill b diminished even if he remains satisfied and happy with his life In many parts of the world today deepseated gender bias remains so powerful that many women simply do not form expectations for their lives expectations about career opportunities i d d dil triti tht i thi iti tf t h l ( N b 2000) Thi l d t diiihd lit f lif f i d d t f h t h it l d t t h i h i diiihd l l f tifti h i ith t h i li

The Goal of a World without Disabilities Th th d t b i d i b l d hih tifti h i f tl fi d itk t dibiliti b ti i r i ith h dibiliti t fll it ith ll th riht d tt 360

ti i r i t i t t ith ii dibld M bli tht d f d i th i l l fll i dd ll th

t t t t t th h i h lit f lif d it i i l f d t t t t t ri i i tht b f th l l d t f

GENETIC ENGINEERING

ll th B t i th l f ld i t h t d i b i l i t i if it ill b realized morally problematic? Some worry that reducing the number of disabled persons may in the real world lead to reduced social and political support for meeting their needs in a just manner The extent to which this is so is an empirical question b t h i h it i d i f f i l t t b fidt Bt if i d i th l f dibilit ld h ti fft th ith th d i b i l i t h i tht ld b d l t b l i f t t t t i t t dibil iti t h t titt i d i d t It ld b l t i tht hld tt t d ki i d t t di lik d h t di if t h t ld d h th di d t t t f th who have them This would be deliberately to use the preventable suffering of some persons without their consent for the benefit of other persons A second concern about the goal of eliminating disabilities is that even though dibiliti ll b b d f th i d i i d l h h th thl th ld ld b l itht l ith d i b i l i t i i it It i dibl t tht l ith d i b i l i t i h h i d h f l f t h l th d it ll b t t h i d i b i l i t i ll t til t thi h i t d tibti I h ' dibliti have played an essential role in their achievements for example by directing their efforts along particular lines by building character strengths in the overcoming of their disabilities and so forth But once again if the disability is on balance a b d f th ti l f l h ff it th tt t it f th k f th bfit ld b t i l ifi b d f th k f ll b f i t t dibld t i t N i th i h i h th h ill b b d d ld t t th ifi i d th f th k f th t bli t h t th ld i f t t tht ibl t th if b i i d th f th k f th Nt ti th d i b i l i t i f thi l t persons without their consent as mere means for the benefits of others

Use of Genetic Engineering to Enhance Normal Function T

ti i i th t kt t ti di d th ffi d d i b i l i t i t h t th d t ll d ti b ll i d Thi i i k i ith f f t i dii ll t t t t di d th ffi d d i b i l i t it H people worry that the use of genetic engineering to enhance normal function n persons who are without disease raises fundamentally different and deeper moral concerns than the medical use of genetic engineering Yet what could be wrong ith t i th t h l f ti i i if it b ilbl t i t h i h i l d ' li d titi? P t ll dd h i ii d i bliti t d th b t hild th Th td f l t k thi hild hlth ibl If ti t h i t t h thi hild' i t d th i t t i d l ik bl t iti

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hld t t b f id i t th? P t invest time efforts and resources in developing athletic talents intellectual abilities and prudential or moral virtues in their children If parents have great leeway n attempting to produce the best children they can according to their own view of ht i b t h t t d thi l i b t t ti ? E

i

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S t f ti i i i t k l it h i th f d mental identity of a person in a way that parents' environmental efforts do not They see parental efforts as environmental in helping to develop the capacities their children already have as bringing out the potential that is already there In con t t ti i t t i h i hild i f d tl ki th difft f h th t h i ld h b B t thi t t i b l t i Wh t thi tl i t l ft t "bi t th b t " i t h i hild th dif h t Gi t h i hil d ' t th ftit d biliti bth h i l d b h i l that constitute the phenotype of the child we see and interact with is very much a result of the environment that parents and others create There is no preexisting and fixed best in the child that is brought out by parental manipulation of environ tl h ilti h fft i h i d d t i i h t Wh t th dd t t' l f thd ht ti i t t i k it i t lih t h i l f thi h i l d ? P t f ht ditb l i th itk blif tht ti i t ti dif th i d t i t f th i d i i d l h i t l t ti l dif idtl ft dl idtit h d Th id seems to be that genetic interventions result in a new individual whereas environ mental interventions merely modify the same individual But our genes do not constitute our identity in any deep sense Suppose the operation of our mmune t ld b h d l h d b ti i t t i W ld t b i l i d t "I d h I ld h b if t hd t ltd i t l i thi ?" W iht h difft if th ltd tht d d j h i t f th lf t h t id tl t f lf l idtit F h f it i til l t f h t h bi itllit i t itt t t f t tht tk t b tl t conceptions of self and to our essence as a particular individual These traits are produced by interactions between our genotype and our environment and neither means of altering them is more fundamental

Wh

T t t t i l l 362

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GENETIC ENGINEERING

b t ti i i i hth h i idiidl' lh tit would in fact be beneficial for them In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley (1946) imagined engineering some persons to have limited abilities and aspirations and to be happy doing menial jobs in society While this might be beneficial for the society it ll b j t i b l i liti th i d i i d l f th b f i t f th t f it M l l tbl ti i i fidiidl h l d til i th t jit f l i b l b f b f i t t th idiidl f thi ti A t t t f di bjtil d f i t i hih h t t? F l t t t tht t l i uncontroversially and objectively beneficial to anyone whereas enhancement of a capacity to excel in athletics or play a musical instrument may only be beneficial for a person with interests in these activities However this is not a contrast bt ti i i df t t t h t bt th t t bt biliti t h t ll fl i i t l l l f lif d biliti fl i l f lif b t ti th S h t f iti lik th bilit t f ttti t k f t d d i d f ti ld l i k i b fl i l l f lif h treatment for example of a disease that impairs fine motor skills might be very important to a pianist but of little importance to a person who did not make significant use of those skills There is no systematic contrast between treatment of di d h t f l f t i tht k th f bjtil b f i i l i th l t t i t

Th M i t d

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If disease is understood roughly as a condition causing an adverse deviation in normal species function however treatment that prevents or treats disease and so maintains or restores normal function will be at least prima facie beneficial for a M th t t i i f lf t i id h t i it f fl t t t O th th h d i th f ti i i f h t th l i i t f ibl h i l' ti i h i t d d b t h i th iti t h t i h t b h d d i th d t h i h th iti iht b i d th i bi d i t t ttil h t bl t th l lf t i l ith t t t H h t t hld i t? It might seem that the more a desirable trait is enhanced by genetic engineering the better but that would be a mistake for at least two reasons First some enhance ments would only be beneficial within a limited range because of how the enhanced it tit ld i t t ith th i d i i d l ' th iti tit F l h i f f b d liitd iht i t f ith th f f th iti t b ll d i b l i t d f b f i t Th d h h t ld l b b f i i l ithi liitd i tht b d tht idiidl ld b itd f h i l lif F l th llk il

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b f i t t bi tll Tht i h th h h l i l i t t i that raised a normal individual's height to several inches above the norm might be a beneficial enhancement But there are limits to how much of an increase in height would be beneficial To grow to be 9 ft tall certainly not now possible with growth h ld b bl h f l i l h it b 7 ft t il ld i t t d f h hiht l h b d t O ld l i t l l b i h i l t fit f h A d if th h till d t i i th f Glli i L i l l i t it ld b h d t th i d i i d l till b f th i M h i h ft d iti b ti i i ld l b beneficial within some range and public policy could quite appropriately regulate its use to ensure that it stays within the beneficial range

Th M

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t

I it ll i t t tht ti i i i th d t h h i t i ? Of i i ll i t t such as the risks they carry but is there something about genetic manipulation itself that raises moral worries? Many people admire others who have developed skills and abilities through long hard effort that they would not admire when the d ti i i M ti l d tiit i dfid i t b th it l t j t b th d t h i h it i It t h i t l h IBM' t "Bi B l " b t th th ld h h i G K B t it l difft h i t f th i hih h hll tl b t K Ad IBM i h d i d Bi B l ' d i l t d the moves it chose claimed that he was the new world chess champion Here means make all the difference in the chess skills and successes with which the engineer should be credited In many valued human activities the means of acquir i th iti h l d d d i d th f itlf O t f ti i i th d ill dt h tht h i til h iti b ti i i d t th t f dd l i t t tiiti t h t l th iti

Wh

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It will often be morally important who is using genetic engineering technologies to h til it I b l i th ti t t diff bt th fit h t l t l thi d h idiidl th th t i t t l t thi hild thid h i d i i d l th t h thi iti ( t i t l thi l t ld t b ti i i dfid b bt ti i t ti b ibl l t th th b t fd l t ) Th t bi diff i bt th fit t d th t h i d i th fit t

364

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i th i f th j t i f t i f ti t f f t l f example it is widely held that individuals are justified in taking risks for themselves that they would not be justified in imposing on others Less obvious but at least as important are the different degrees and forms of neutrality about what is a good life tht l td f th t t f t t d t h i hild d f i d i i d l i thi li I libl d i it i i d l h l d t h t th t t hld k t b t l bt difft h i ti f d lif t h t it iti h l d Thi l i b l tlit l b t t i l liit tl ti t l i th f ti i i tht ld l b beneficial in some specific conceptions of a good life The genetic engineering com patible with this liberal state neutrality is roughly that which enhances what John Rawls (1971) called primary goods that is general purpose means useful in a wide it f if t i t l l ll l f lif P l i f l i d i th t l i jtifd th d h i it t tth d i b f i l tt ht ' til l f lif E h i b ti i i iht b ll C i d t' f ti i i f t h i hild Wh h primary responsibility for raising children in most societies parents must have substantial discretion in the values they impart and the particular capacities they seek to develop and enhance in their children There are moral limits however on t' thit t h thi h i l d ' iti hth b ti i i th th f l l i illtt S t t thi 7 l d d h t it i t i t i t i i t d l h t til t b f i l t i l hth i t t ll td t h th i h t t d thi B t th t l dt ithd h f h l b th b l i d h d t i i t f i ith h t i t i i Pbli li it l ld t it th t d because although it might enhance her tennis skills it would be at the cost of severely limiting or neglecting many other capacities and opportunities she would otherwise have later to choose and pursue other different life plans Parents do not h liitd l iht t h t h i hild d thi h i l d ' iti t th t fd i th bl f titi t l t d thi ti f d lif th t d d l th iti t k th hi Child h ht J l Fib (1980) h lld iht t " f t " hih i d i t i f th f d t l iht f dlt t l f d t i t i i ki i i f t hi b t t h i li f t h l and according to their own values or conception of a good life Disagreements will arise of course about the extent or scope of a child's right to an open future and what would violate that right but the right places significant limits on the use of ti i i b t f t h i hild If i d i i d l ld ti i i f t h l ith f th f f tlit ld b i d b thi d i ld b i t i f i t f l f d t i t i t Pbli li iht l i t i t l k t tht h hi ll i f d t i l l h th i i f t d i i b l i k b t it h l d t b t i t t it d t 365

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b t h ti i i ld b d i b l f th l t i f d judgments of competent adults As a general matter we have seen that who would be using genetic engineering could be important for the moral ustification of that use

I

t

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E i i

Fi

d I l i t

I tfll t id h t I bli i th ti t t l f th l i bli li ill f i di t i d d iti f ti engineering that enhances normal capacities The problem arises when an en hancement by genetic engineering would confer a substantial competitive or pos itional advantage on its recipient thereby strengthening an individual's position l t i t th i titi f l b f t If th ti i i i i dditibtd th b i f bilit t f it th l th ill ll ff ill t it Thi ill i b t fi d lit f t i t ifll hth th h t ffd ti i i h fi tit t t f th b f t i t th h iti t compete have been enhanced by genetic engineering Imagine that the children of the higher socioeconomic classes not only have the social advantages they now typically have but that they also have certification that their intelligence memory i t d it t t t ttti t k f t d d id f ti h ll b h d b ti i i Thi ld b i i f i t d t i k d th t t it ld l i k l i i f t l i l i t d ld i i i f fi d lit f tit f bli li Pbli li ld bl l t th f ti i i tht ld f i l i i l i t b t th ld b i t t l liti i di it t f ti th political will to do so Many real enhancements that may become possible through genetic engineering will in part confer positional or competitive advantages but will in part confer non titi i t i i b f t ll T k th l f h i idiidl' iti t f thi t t t i i t l f i i f t i d f ti til t k tiit M dlt ith di dfit th d Ritli f thi Thi ld f i i f t d t i k t t B t it ld l i idiidl' i t i i tifti f t i i t i lik liti t i thi fl t d fth f hih competitive benefits that make anyone else worse off The quandary for public policy is that concerns about fairness and equality of opportunity would support limits on this use of genetic engineering but these limits would at the same time d i d i i d l th tit f ii i i f t titi b f t t h i li Pbli li ill f th d i f f l t i i di t iti f ti i i ildi lti f titi h t tht ld b lfdfti if i d l d d lti f th i k t h t ill b i h t thi Whth df t t t f di f h t ti i

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i i h h l d tk l l ft fl lti t tht t risks are justified by its potential benefits this will be especially important for any germline interventions But the potential longterm adverse impact on nequality and fairness may well prove to be the greatest challenge Th l d li i t h t ill l i k l b i d i th f t b i ti t l ti i i t t di d dibilit dt h l h iti ill l t i t l h t h t h S l ill d h i t t i " l i Gd" b t I bli th ttil f h b f t k l l b t thi jtifid Wht I h t i d t d i thi h t i t tilt f th moral and policy issues that we must confront if we are to use genetic engineering wisely safely and ethically

Acknowledgments Thi

h t

d

h i l

B k

(1998)

dB h

t l (2000)

Rf A h A (1999) P t l d i i d lti bti hll t ti d li A i J l f Pbli Hlth 89 164957 (2000) Wh I h ' t h d id b t tl d i i flti d fi d Dibilit Riht W h i t DC t I EP d A A h ( d ) P t l Tti Georgetown University Press B k D W (1992) Q l i t f lif i hlth d d i l thi I A S d MN b ( d ) Th Qlit f Lif O f d O f d U i i t P (1998) Enhancement of human function: some distinctions for policy makers In E P (d) T h l i f th E h t f H Citi W h i t DC G t U i i t P Buchanan A E Brock D W Daniels N and Wikler D (2000) From Chance to Choice: Gti d Jti Cbid Cbrid U i i t P Fib J (1980) Th hild' riht t ft I W Aik d H LFlltt (d) d Stt P Tt NJ R Wh Child? Child' Riht P t l Athit d Littlfild Griffin J (1986) Wellbeing: Its Meaning Measurement and Moral Importance Oxford: Oxford U i i t P H l A (1946) B N Wld N Y k M d Lib Murray C (1996) Rethinking DALYs In C Murray and A Lopez (eds) The Global Burden of Di A C h i A t f Mtlit d Dibilit f Di Iji d Rik Ft i 1990 d jtd t 2020 198 Cbrid MA H d U i i t P Nussbaum M (2000) Sex and Social Justice Oxford: Oxford University Press P f i t D (1984) R dP Ofd Ofd U i i t P P l D (1995) Ctlli H Hdit 1865 t th P t A t l t i H i h l d NJ H i t i P Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

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Sackett D L and Torrance G W (1978) The utility of different health states as perceived by the general public Journal of Chronic Diseases, 31: 697-704

Further reading Duster T (1990) Backdoor to Eugenics. New York: Routledge Harris J (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford: Oxford University Press Kitcher P (1996) The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities New York: Simon and Schuster Roberts M (1998) Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Silver L M (1997) Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World. New York: Avon Books Walters L and Palmer J (1997) The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy. New York: Oxford University Press

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S t ll i l

t h h d i f f llbti itd dti tht t i th id iftil l (th i t d d t) d t th Th t b i t f t d i t i l d t t i l I t d i t i l th t th i tifill i i t d ith th f th l B th t th i th child's genetic as well as gestational mother at some point after birth she must legally terminate her parental rights and the intended mother must adopt the hild I thi th i t d d f t h bt t th i t d d th h ti ti t th hild Th i t t i i th i t t i l H bth th i t d d f t h d th i t d d th h ti ti t th hild Th t th i l tt th l' b d d t h h th f in vitro f t i l i t i I lti iti t t i l th i t d d t ld k t th t tt b t h t th have adopted In such a case neither the intended parents nor the surrogate mother would have a genetic connection to the child (Robertson 1983) An intended mother who herself gestates an embryo that she and her husband h d t d h h l f tt b t h t i th d t fh h bd' d d ' i t lifid t th Th f t t h t i t d d ( f l ) t b t ith th i t t i fk i th bb d i t i i h h f t th h b t ith th i t t i f l i i h i th b b t th h i i d h dti i U i d l (f l h t l l l) id fertile couples who do not want to interrupt their lives with a pregnancy and single men or even single women may also seek the services of a surrogate mother However since many centers for surrogate parenting limit their services to infertile id h t l l l f th idiidl ill b fl thi h Phii t i l l l t t t it l h h medical f ki th i f t th d t d lii d i i t t diilid t it idiidl th th h t l l f f f di th l l ik d thil tht l d d t

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Fth liti t i th f t t h t t mother arrangements are commercial while others are noncommercial Commer cial surrogacy arrangements involve monetary payments to the surrogate mother and to the third parties who facilitate the pregnancy In 2000 the average cost of h t $60000 Th t th' f ildi i i t l $ 2 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 ith th t f th i bi id t t hii l d th bk (Ct f S t P t i I 2000) I t t il "ift" t i t l titd ll b t iftil id l d f thi l f l lti fid N h d f th t th' t tional services although the couple typically cover the surrogate mother's medical expenses

Ml A t S

it

df S t

Mthhd

t

t h h d h t ll d t f h tditil h i l h i l ti d th f dititil feminist perspectives Although more heated views have been exchanged about commercial than noncommercial surrogacy arrangements "gift" surrogacy ar rangements have not gone unchallenged f

Moral arguments against surrogate motherhood Mt

t i t t t h h d b d th h t h t th ti i t h h t t d F i t it i l i d t h t t t h h d ik h t th lti hild Citi lt tht b th t th i t tti th hild f h l f b t f th h b l titd t take care of herself and the fetus throughout the pregnancy and less emotionally committed to the fetus should the pregnancy become in her estimation too taxing for her to continue For example in one of the few peerreviewed retrospective tdi f t t h h d i th dil litt t dt t t h i d f th 41 t th i th l hd t l t f th f l l i t l ik f t ki l i id it f 0 >4 ( = 5) (Ethi C i t t f th A i Ftilit S i t 1994 715) H t th lti hild l if th i t d d t d/ th t th t dill d h l i l l df tl " f t " th ld be in the course of traditional adoption proceedings Finally the resulting child may be harmed if he or she becomes the object of an acrimonious childcustody suit; s rejected by both the intended couple and the surrogate mother because he or she s i b l di t ltihi ith th t th th ith th i t d d t illi t it th t th illi t t S d it i l i d t h t th ti f t t h h d ik h t th i t d d t d/ th t th d h fil Sifll t i d tht i t d i thid ti i t th fh dti 370

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k ti itl d filil l t i h i If l f th i t d d parents is genetically connected to the child that parent may view himself/herself as having a greater claim to the child a claim that may be recognized by the courts in the event of a divorce for example In rare instances it is conceivable that i t d d fth f i i t h l i l b d ith th t th i i h th th hi if th " l " th f hi hild Oth ibl h t th i t d d t if f l th t th d l i b t l th f t t h t h t t t i t th l h i id f t l i i h th hild t b i t h Pibl h t th t th i l d t t t b th i t d d t to impose autonomyrestricting contracts on her that require her not only to agree to prenatal care but also to have amniocentesis and depending on the results to abort or not abort the fetus Although such contracts are generally viewed as non bidi l i f d t th t li th t t h f h iht t f t t t t h bti I dditi th i t d d t f t th t th f t t th hild t b i t h ith b th hild i t t t h i liki i l b th h l t i t t bi t I f ltiti th i t d d t dl pressure a friend or relative to prove her love for them by giving them the gift of a child Harm may also befall the family of the surrogate mother If the surrogate mother i id h h b d t f hi if " k i " t th t i l l if h i hi if i th ' hild if h d th ik dtki f hi if If th t th h hild th t t i b t h i t i t k th b b d ht ' d i i t d f thi it O d b d th ibl h t i d i i d l th di t th iti th l il h tht t t h h d iit A th t surrogacy arrangements harm women in several ways First these arrangements exploit vulnerable women who need money or who are trying to make up for the fact that in the past they voluntarily aborted or gave up a child through adoption I d d i td t bjtif ll b d i t ftl ti b f t dti hi T h i d th t t d t t i diii Rltil ih hi ltil t t thi dti d ddi hildbi i t th h i l d i i hih ill d i d t d tditill idd t ill i i l d I d d f h the few US Office of Technology Assessments of surrogacy programs it was reported that seven of the thirteen programs surveyed were willing to accept as surrogate mothers women on welfare and that the average income of all th t th t d b th t h i t $ 1 8 0 0 0 i 1987 (US C 1988) W t t d i l i th dti ti i t th ti th t t i l th d i th I th f t th iti ill b t b d hild R t h till i ill b t b in vitro t b d i d ill th "tttb bbi" t t 371

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d t t d ill th b f if t dlthd (Corea 1985: 276) Over and above raising concerns about the exploitation of women critics of surrogate motherhood raise concerns about the commodification of children Rather th dti hild i t t ith t h i hildl iftil l i i t tht l ti hild ill d ffi t ht th h t t t th k i d f hild th t O i l f f i it ftil th t d th i k d d i f t f f h Ud h diti b th iti tl l b ditil i d d d th i t hll th i t d d t' ability to make necessary sacrifices for their child Babies say the critics ought not to be viewed as "products" to be manufactured in women's wombs for a price They are not "Ken" and "Barbie" dolls to be ordered from a catalogue Moral arguments for surrogate motherhood A d t f t t h h d l i t h t th " id b t t t h h d hl lti db lti t th t th tl it" (Ad 1995 8) S i f i l l th h f arrangements claim that it is highly unlikely that the children resulting from them will in any way be harmed For example reproductive rights lawyer Lori Andrews claims that the surrogate mothers she has interviewed have uniformly described t h l t t i thi " " ith t th th ld bbl t t f thi i precisely b th i l' hild ( A d 1995 13) M Ad lik th d t f llbti dti iti t h t it i t fi t i llbti d t b dill d h l i l l df tl fit i l h bl t d t l l ittd t d with no screening whatsoever To be sure proponents of surrogacy arrangements concede that there have been some cases of children being rejected by both the intended parents and the surrogate mothers as in the notorious Malahoff case in hih hild b ith i h l iitill j t d b ll it d d W l l 1984) bi f h t i td d i t f S l i (Si ti i th t i l i d Bb M {In re B b M [1988] 537 A 2 d 1227 NJ) B t i ti t ll ll d t d hild i b h t h t th th i t d d t h l i l f i h d A d t f t l t h t th i littl i ical evidence for claims that the intended parents the surrogate mother or the surrogate mother's family are harmed by surrogate motherhood On the contrary in their estimation there is every reason to think that such parental arrangements f i d b l b f i t t ll th ti i l d Th i b f i i i f th i t d d t h ld t h i t h th ibilit f h i hild till l t d t th B t th t th i l j b f i i f t A d t f t t h h d li tht t t l l lti t most t th fiill i l d d

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t h h l i f d h ih t ll i thi lbl ductive services Moreover most surrogate mothers have little if any difficulty relinquishing the child to the intended parents Rarely does a surrogate mother report experiencing anything like the psychological trauma that many birth th t i i h th d i d t i t h i hild f dti Wh 75 t f bith th i th d t i tti did t k thi hild ilbl d t i d i t t h t f th 1 t f t th h thi id b t ii th hild t th i t d d t (Ad 1995 10) F i l l it i i l tt t h t th t th' hild tht h h i t t i f ii th t th fit bidd O th t th speculation is that they are proud of their mother for giving a lonely couple the opportunity to have a family of their own Defenders of surrogacy arrangements also claim that far from creating divisions bt th i id tht h t tll bi l t t h h iti " t f t i fft" F l i td f t t h d l dt t h d t th h l i t Hil H f i b d t h t "th i t d d th h h ll b ki l b t h i l d i f th gate and deemphasize career once they have a family The surrogate mothers on the other hand are motivated by the intended mothers to expand their horizons Many pursue further education or make career advances after being surrogates" (Ad 1988 7 1 2 ) Fill th h t t t h h d i i t tht t b i t d d t i t t th t th d th t h i d ti d t t h t th i t h l b i "thi" "t" f t d f thi l I d d L i Ad t "th i id tht th l h $10000 t t i l i k l t t t th hild dit th th l h $10000 t in vitro f t i l i t i d t " (Andrews 1995: 20) Nor is there any evidence to think that just because the government publishes reports about how many thousands of dollars it costs to raise a child from birth to adulthood the government assigns no more value to children's li th f l f i l ' li

L l R d i

f

S

t

M t h h d

At l t f j l l di ( i t h i t i ) h b df surrogate motherhood They include: (1) the nonenforcement of all surrogacy ar rangements commercial or noncommercial; (2) the criminalization of commercial bt bbl t il t (3) th f t f il d bbl l il t t h h t t l d (4) th iilti f il d h l il t it ith t d i t i l difid d t i l E h f th di h it t dd t t H i th U i t d S t t th t lilti t t h b tht f f t ( f l R b t 1996 924)

373

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Non-enforcement of all surrogacy arrangements whether commercial or non-commercial I

t i Jd H R S k ' li i th 1988 t t d Bb M i h i h th t th M Bth W h i t h d f d t l i i h th hild t th i t d d t th N J S C t b d tht t t f t th d i i d f fb b l l i tht l l d t th litti f fiill d d th difiti f hild P l i i h t t l l i t bli li th t ruled that they are legally unenforceable No state should recognize contractual agreements that egregiously violate the rights of human persons especially vulner able ones Since 1988 nearly half of all US states have enacted surrogacy statutes Th jit f th h f l l d N J ' l d b fi t h t t (D 1999 475) D i t t f t th f b l t h t if ith th t th th i t d d t b h th t t th t t ill l th ti it fid th S f l if th i t d d t fil t th t th h f th t t ill t h l h l l t it O if th i t d d t refuse to take the child from the surrogate mother the state will not force them to do so Instead the state will require the surrogate mother either to maintain her paren tal relationship with the child or to put the child up for adoption In the former case h b titld t hild t f th i t d d f t h d i th l t t h b titld t hi f i i l it i th ff h d t h Th i t t i i l t d f t di f th i t d d t If th t th f t l i i h th hild t th i t d d t d ith th ill t b bl t td f th hild b d th contract th th t th H b th t t h td l f f th child of the surrogate mother and the intended parents the court will rely on trad itional family law and the "best interest of the child" standard to resolve custody disputes In cases of traditional surrogacy in which the surrogate mother is the child's ti th ll t t i l th itll ll US j i d i t i ill i th td d i t bt t ti t th t th d th i t d d fth I f t t i l i h i h th t th l th t t i l th US t ill i th td d i t flit bt t t i l th (i th t th) d ti th (i lt b i l i l iti f li f th i t d d th) t b didd b parenthood Thus in Johnson v Calvert (851 P 2 d 776 [Cal 1993] cert denied 1145 Ct206 [1993] and cert dismissed 1145 Ct 374 [1993]) a gestational surrogacy case th C l i f i S t t S C t l d t h t th ti th h d li t th hild th th t t i l th did Th t h d thi l i b th U i f P t At d t d b C l i f i it t h h d t b dt i d ith t t i l or ti d F d ith t l i i t b th l th f hild th t f d t h t th ti i t t i f bth th t th d th i t d d t d i d d th i i f f th ti th i t d f th t t i l th ( R b t 1996 923)

374

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The criminalization of commercial but probably not non-commercial surrogacy arrangements Some legal theorists equating commercial surrogacy with a disguised form of baby selling argue that criminalization rather than nonenforcement is the legally cor rect remedy for surrogate motherhood Thus in 1985 the United Kingdom passed th S A t At hih b il bt t il Thi t ih l h th " i d d l " i il titi Elih l h i i d t b k f fi d/ i i t if th () iitit

tk ti titi ith i t th ki f t (b) offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement or () il i f t i ith i t it i ki titi th ki f t (S A t A t 1985 h 49 2 (1) a c ) I t

dditi blih d i t d f idil d i t i t bjt t fi d/ i i t if th t d t i t h " b f hi" " l illi t ll f h t w o m b " Significantly the intended parents as well as the surrogate mother escape punishment on the grounds that it is not in the best interests of the child to be born of parents "subject to the taint of criminality" R l t i l f U i t d Stt j i d i t i h d di t fll th Uitd K i d ' l d Mihi th l t i it b il t h h t il I 1993 th M i h i Stt l i l t l d t h t it i id t t t t d fl t " t b k " ith i lt f $ 5 0 0 0 0 fi d fi i (Mihi C i l d L A t t d 7 2 2 8 5 5 [ W t 1993]) W h t h such outright bans on commercial surrogacy arrangements are constitutionally per missible however remains to be seen It may be argued for example that if the only way a married infertile couple can have a child genetically related to them is by i t th f h t t i l i th t hibit th f di i jtifid i t f ith t h i f d t l iht t t l

Enforcement of commercial and probably also non-commercial surrogacy arrangements through contract law Unconvinced that contracts for surrogate mothers go against public policy some legal commentators urge that these contracts be recognized as legally binding collab t i d t i t I thi titi ll d i t bt t th di t d d t hld b dd b h f t t t b d i d ith b ifi f d h S f Ak Flid d N d th l US j i d i t i t b t t l d l Th

375

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jiditi i th i t d d t th l l t b t th F l i d d Nevada laws apply only to gestational surrogacy arrangements (Andrews 1995: 6) Supporters of a contract approach to surrogacy arrangements argue that this approach is best for all the involved parties but particularly the child who will not b d th b j t f t d d i t i th t fd i t bt th i t d d t d th t th N ill th hild h t b "lit" bt it i t d d t d it t th I dditi th i t d d t ill t h t li t h h i th f l i b iti t hth th t th ill i f t l i i h th hild t th F i l l th h t t t ht t l i t h t thi hi best for women in general Not only does it recognize women's right to control their own reproductive destiny it also illustrates that just because a woman bears a child does not mean that it is she who must assume or wants to assume primary or total ibilit f i th hild Assimilation of non-commercial and perhaps also commercial surrogacy arrangements into either traditional or modified adoption law Because there is arguably little difference between making arrangements to adopt a baby before it is born and making arrangements to adopt a baby before it has been conceived some legal theorists argue that the kind of rules that govern adoption titi hld l t Althh t f h thik i t i tht t th hld b id l f t h i bl dil f th i t i tht i t d d t hld l b ittd t t th d d i t i l "fi f " f t h i t d i i I ft l h i l h P t Si d hii D Wll d th t b l i h t f S t t S B d A ti t th ti t t th ld b id t t t nonprofit State Surrogacy Board; that is a very specialized type of public adoption agency that would screen all the parties to a surrogacy arrangement supervise their dli d t "fi f " f th t' i (Si d Wll 1984) Yt if t f th d t i ht t di b t th it f i th t th f thi th h th ll t h t th t th hld b idd ith "h fh t " id d i hih h did hth t h ll t t l i i h th hild t th i t d d t T th b j t i tht ii tdil d t t th t th i f i t th i t d d t supporters of the adoption approach reply that it is no more unfair to the intended parents than the kind of disappointment adopting parents sometimes sustain From the very beginning of the adoption negotiations adopting parents know that f the bith th d i d t t i h hild f dti ft ll th ill h t t Th idd t h t th i t d d t k f th t t t h t th t th i ittd t h h id b t l i i h i th hild h d th i j t i if h d i d t k th b b T th f t h bjti tht d t i d t t h h d d i l b i th ft d i t i l th i t d d f t h i l th hild' 376

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

ti f t h d i th f t t i l th i t d d th ll the intended father are both the child's genetic parents supporters of the adoption approach claim that genetic linkage is not necessarily the determining criterion for parenthood For example philosopher Sara Ann Ketchum notes that as soon itit d l lii d h l i i t h i it ill b ibl t t hild ith l l ti b k d Wh th ill t th ti t f h hild? O l th d h t i b t d th t h t th hild? O l th d h tibtd j t l h th th h i h t d ? O ll th d tt h h f h th tibtd to the child? After all had even one gene or chromosome been different the child in question would not be the same child Under these circumstances the genetic rela tionship does not seem nearly as important as the gestational and rearing relation hi Wht i t t ti ti th til iti f t h d i t i l tht d t i t t l t (Kth 1987) F i l l t th b j t i t h t th d t i h t t " d i d f th t dititi t i t tht k h " b i i "th i i f fdlibti d tti th it t i sion and shape the future through intentional choice" (Schlultz 1990: 3 7 7 8 ) defenders of this approach point out that mind is not everything and that it should not automatically be presumed to rule over matter On the contrary there are at l t t l h th t th th th th i t d d t hld b l l l dt h i t l iht t th hild I h fit l b it i th t th d t th i t d d t h th j ibilit f b i i lif i t th ld h d iti h l t i h i ith th hild l th i id f hild b h t S d b th t th " i l l f it b t t bith di d i t l t h f t t f th hild" d i t i h th l l "natural" mother of the child is more likely to protect the child's interests than any alternative arrangement (Annas 1988: 2 3 4 ) In sum what makes a person a parent is the degree to which that person has shown that her or his commitment to hild i th tt f ti ti i t t i Th f t t h t th t th tt th hild f i th ti th i i d ik f tht h i i t t d t th hild' H ti k l d l th d d til i t t i llbi f i t t t th hild S t h i lik th d t i hi f d i th t h i t tt tht tk familylaw approach to surrogacy arrangements tipping the balance in a custody dispute in favor of the surrogate mother and/or giving the surrogate mother a certain time period during which to change her mind about relinquishing the child F l Flid thi ti f t d i t i l t ithi d f bith N H h i it t th (tditil t t i l ) t h h id ithi 72 h f bith d Viii ll t th ( t d i t i l t t i l ) t h h id ithi 180 d f th l t f f itd ti (Ad 1995 6 7 ) t

377

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P t i

fHlth Ptiti Mthhd

S

t

Given fragmented confusing and in many instances nonexistent statutory guidance for surrogacy arrangements collaborative reproducers need to proceed ith idbl ti bf th d i d t tit h t S t d l b k d t i l l hlth titi ith t h t l t t t i l i i i b l t hi M th f i l it i h l t h titi h th tk f th ti f t t h h d T b it i ibl f idiidl l t ith h i h t tifiill i i t t th although it is quite medically and legally risky to do so But it is not possible for an individual or a couple to fertilize an embryo in vitro and transfer it into the womb of a surrogate mother as is the procedure in gestational surrogacy Thus it is not ii tht h dil iti th A i S i t f R d t i Mdii (ASRM) d th A i Cll fObttii d G l i t (ACOG) h i d idli ii t d d f in vitro f t i l i t i t it flli t f d ltd d I dditi th dil iti h bliid dti b t th t hdl t ethically ll l l l ACOG proposes that surrogacy arrangements be considered only when medically necessary that the surrogate mother should be "the sole source of consent for medical decisions regarding pregnancy and delivery" and that compensation to the t th hld b b d h i d t hth h i bl t id th i t d d t ith i l th k i d f hild th t (ACOG 1990 133) Of il i i f i th f t t h t ACOG d tht t "b b i t fit i ith dtil iil t th f dti i " (ACOG 1990 133) d t h t th t mother be given a certain period of time after the child is born to decide whether she really wants to relinquish the child to the intended parents ACOG's recommen dations are nearly identical to Singer and Wells's (1984 see above) except for the f t tht lik ACOG Si d Wll f public d t private t l t Th ASRM ff ht difft dti f t t i l t th f t d i t i l t A l t h h it h ti b t bth f f t d t tht i i l h d t b d th h b f i t ti f ll h t the ASRM appears somewhat more comfortable with gestational than traditional surrogacy arrangements Like an increasing segment of the legal establishment and the general public the ASRM believes that the more connections parents have to a hild th t t h i l i t b it t i Th i t d i t i l th t th ld t h th t t t l l i t th hild b h i th l ith two ti t it ti d t t i l I t t i t t i l th i t d d th ld t h th t t t l l i t th hild b h i th l ith two 378

SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

ti t it ti d i t t i l Still th ASRM i ll thi tic about any widespread clinical application of surrogate motherhood at this time and emphasizes that healthcare practitioners may ethically decline to participate in surrogacy arrangements

P t i

fS i t

S

t

M t h h d

E b t t illi hild b i th U i t d S t t A i t l 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 f th b ith th it fd 716 with the assistance of donor eggs and 7456 with the assistance of in vitro fertiliza tion (IVF) (Robertson 1983) As techniques for egg freezing and IVF improve the total number of assisted births is expected to increase; nevertheless the general i i tht itd dti i likl t b l th itd dti i th f ft F it f th f th l t i f th " " d i t i f " t l " ti blk t t h l i l dti Th i i dditi th h t ikl t remain few and far between for quite some time: namely the financial cost Relatively few people have the $61975 necessary to participate in stateoftheart traditional surrogacy arrangements or the $66975 necessary to participate in stateoftheart t t i l t (Ct f S t P t i I 2000) l Cll t l f d t i d and l l t d Bt if t t h h d b i d d th ti ff i t th tit t k itlf d i ti b t thd P d i l l lthh t it it t ll hild t b till l t d t ith (i th f in vitro f t i l i t i ) b t h t h t h lld i t ti th l tht hld l in assigning parental rights and responsibilities Adoption caused society to think that the rearing parents of a child not genetically related to them may have the same claim or even a greater claim to that child than its genetic nonrearing parents Why then hld t t t t i l l t t i l t t i t t thik t h t h t k ti t h genetic t i b t i t hild it i gestational ti t hild? O dill h hld t t i i t t h t i th f t it ill ftbl ith th id f llbti d d d t th d th l h ih t l ti role in rearing a child banding together in a new sort of family in which they all fully share all parental blessings and burdens?

Conclusion Cll i l hll tt

t

t h h d t Th lit f thi h i t fll i f d

l thil l l dil d ti h l d bbl dt b t it i k ll it b f i t d 379

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h i t i t t d t th llbi f th hild h ill lt f it C tainly until society comes to terms with the full implications of procreative freedom it must use its powers of moral persuasion and legal coercion to eliminate any exploitative aspects of surrogate motherhood Too much is at stake to do anything l th thi

Rf A i Cll f Obttii dG l i t (1990) Ethical Issues in Surrogate Motherhood (ACOG Committee Opinion 88) Washington DC: ACOG L i B (1988) A l t t i d f d t i I Shill Ch d Ndi Ad T b ( d ) Reproductive Laws for the 1990s 361403 Clift NJ H P (1990) The aftermath of Baby M: proposed state laws on surrogate motherhood In R i h d T H l l ( d ) Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies 186201 B l t CA W d t h (1995) B d d t i l b d i l l f k f t thhd I Virginia Law Review 81: 2343 Annas George J (1988) Death without dignity for commercial surrogacy: the case of Baby M The Hastings Center Report 18 (2) 2 3 4 Ct f S t P t i I B l Hill C l i f i (2000) ( t i f i l i com) C G (1985) The Mother Machine N Y k H dR dti t h l i d th d D Jdith F (1999) A i t d veloping an equality model to protect reproductive liberties American Journal of Law and Medicine 25 (4) 4 5 3 7 8 f th A i Ftilit S i t (1994) E t h i l idti f itd Ethi C i t t dti t h l i Fertility and Sterility 62 (5) ( S l 1) 15125S Ketchum Sara Ann (1987) New reproductive technologies and the definition of parenthood: a feminist perspective Paper presented at the Conference on Feminism and Legal Theory: d Iti d b th I t i t t f L l Stdi t th U i i t f W W i i M d i Robertson John A (1983) Surrogate mothers: not so novel after all The Hastings Center Report 13 (5) 2 8 3 4 (1996) A i t d dti t h l d th f i l Hastings Law Journal 4J (4) 91133 t h l di t t i b d thd S h l t M j i M i (1990) R d t i rtit f d t l i t Wisconsin Law Review 2 3 7 7 8 Pt d Wll D (1984) Making Babies: The New Science and Ethics of ConcepSi tion New York: Charles Scribner's Sons United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1988) Infertility: Medical and Social Choices W h i t DC US G t P i t i Offi OTABA358

Fth

di

Bayles Michael D (1990) Genetic choice In Richard T Hull (ed) Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies 2 4 1 5 3 B l t CA W d t h

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Th S d

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Reproductive Laws for the 1990s Ethil I

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Issues in Modern Medicine Th Hti

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28 Cli JOHN HARRIS

D l l th ldf l d h b i Fb 1997 D l l ' " t i " t i l t i d d it t ti It til t h l d d b li iti B t thi tithtdi it i t h b t d d th ld D l l h l i bith t b f th t l t h i h i th th t h t h t d t h i t th human gene pool genetic diversity the ecosystem the world as we know it and to the survival of the human species Thi h t ill h f t F i t it ill d i b th d i t f d t f l i It ill th t th il litil d lilti t th b i t h f h T h i d it ill l k t th t tht h b d d i th thi fh dti l i d fll t ill bifl id l t hih b l i l i dti t h l ff l df f th ti

Process Cli t t i l

did t t t ith th b i t h ith th b i t h f D l l Th fit l dti f lld h l b ith t h k i d h t th S th fit t fd l i b t which results in monozygotic twins

f Dll t did t i f i l l d d l t f l i f th ti idtil ( t i ) ti Th t f d fii l t h f th d th hl fl i ith l i t id i " b litti"

Embryo splitting Idtil ti lt f th litti f th l b l b ith d th lti t i h idtil b i i k d i th l b t d in vitro b thi ibli

382

in utero. Th Thi b lit

h ti

CLONING

Thi itlf h b f thill li if t b l t i ft If you have a preimplantation embryo in the early stages of development where all cells are what is called "totipotential" (that is where all cells could become any part of the resulting individual) and if you take this early cell mass and split it let it f l f ll h f th f l titt b hih i ibl d ld b i l t d ith h f fl d l t it dlthd E h l i th l idtil " t i " f f th th d it bi tt h h ti b t b f th d i i i f th l ll M th f l b bid it b i Thi t itti h i t h t th d t t i f i l human cell one human life if that is what it is can be split into four and can be recombined again into one Did "life" in such a case begin as an individual become four individuals and then turn into a singleton again? We should note that ht t thi ti ll thi d i t h t th ti f t tt d i t h t th d t t i f i l ll Th h thik tht ensoidment t k l t ti h i t t i bl t t f th litti f lit f d f th d t t i f th l h th f b bid it dt tf ( d l th thi f) th destruction of three individuals without a single human cell being removed or killed These possibilities should perhaps give us pause in attributing a beginning of morally important life to a point like conception M t i ti hth td th t l lt f l dti b litti i l t t i b i th l b t th t l l thd l ibl If h ti h th t i i t th t l d th h i ll t h i DNA b t th ill l h th th t l d b b l th th i t t i t l ifl tht h ll Nuclear replacement This technique involves (crudely described) deleting the nucleus of an egg cell and substituting the nucleus of a cell taken from one of the body's organs or tissues Thi t h i h b fll id t i th l b t d l d h t i d i h ll b d d thi i th hih d d Dll U l th d i l t h t f th ll l d h l ill t h i t h d i l DNA ith th ll l d d ill tb till l l thd l hih lt f b litti t t h t it i f l t t h i k t h t th l i th ti hild f th W hld nucleus donor It is not The clone is the twin brother or sister of the nucleus donor and the genetic offspring of the nucleus donor's own parents Thus this type of cloned individual is and always must be the genetic child of two separate geno t f t till d i f f t i d i i d l h ft it i l d l d Th i i t b l f th i t h d i l f thid diidl t h t th ti i h i t f l i i f t ih th t h t f th idiidl ih i th f bi i l d i d Ul f th l d i l th d Thi b i t t if th l d

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JOHN HARRIS

i bjt t i t h d i l di ihitd f hi h child genetically related to her that will be free of these diseases

th

d

t

The Reaction to Cloning Wh D l l ' b i t h t d i Nature Fb 27 1997 th ti i d i t d h i l h t i l Th th P i d t f th U i t d S t t Bill Clit lld i d i t l f i t i t i i t th thi f h d d d t i bli di h l i Clit' investigation has long since reported and commenting on its conclusions Presi dent Clinton said "there is virtually unanimous consensus in the scientific and medical communities that attempting to use these cloning techniques to actually l h bi i t t d d f d ll tbl" I t t i l th N t i l B i t h i A d i C i i (1997) t t d t h t it th i l because f Eith C l i t i d hi d i ' t didd t dd " l l tbl" t f th f t t h t it t t d d f th th i l b it t t d d f George W Bush (2001) has repeated this ritual genuflexion in the direction of hostility to cloning "I strongly oppose human cloning as do most Americans We recoil at the idea of growing human beings for spare parts or creating life for our i " Th B i t i h P i Miit T Bli h d tht Biti i t th h h t I th " G t R t th R d ti d i th Chif M d i l O f f i ' E t G R t St Cll R h Mdil P ith R i b i l i t ' " th t t d th td li tht h dti l i "thill tbl" d hld ti t b t l d (Hi 1999) M b f th E P l i t (MEP) d d d tht h EU b " t bidi lilti hibiti all research on human cloning and providing criminal sanctions for any breach" (Biocentury 1998) E tt f h i d d h iht h b td ikd it i t t ti D H i h i Nkji D i t G l f th W l d H l t h O i t i id "WHO id th f l i f th liti fh i d i i d l t b thill tbl it ld i l t f th b i i i l hih dill itd ti Th i l d t f th d i i t f th h bi d tti f th it f h ti t i l " (Wld Hlth O i t i 1 9 9 7 ) WHO f l l d the line taken by Nakajima with a resolution of the Fiftieth World Health Assembly which saw fit to affirm "that the use of cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethically unacceptable and contrary to human integrity and morality" (Wld Hlth O i t i 1997b) D i t th f d i f ti f th S i tifi d Ethil R i G ( N t i l Bithi Adi C i i 1997) hih d d t h t "th t t hld b t h h l t i d fll d i i f th [ i ] " F d i M f UNESCO ll i k ff th k t d "H bi t t b l d d i t " (UNESCO 1 9 9 7 ) O D b 3 1997 UNESCO b l i h d l l d Universal

384

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Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, t i l 11 f h i h d "Practices which are contrary to human dignity such as reproductive cloning of human beings shall not be permitted" (UNESCO 1997b) In a staggeringly compla cent preface Federico Mayor states: "The uncontested merit of this text resides n th b l it t i k b t f d i t f h iht d f d tl f d d th dt f d f h" Th E P l i t l hd t h h lti l i i 1997 th bl f h i h td ( h B) [T]he cloning of human beings cannot under any circumstances be justified or toler td b it b it i i ilti ff d t l h iht d i t t th riil f lit f h bi it it i d it l t i f th h it ffd i t h diit d it i experimentation on humans And which went on to claim (clause 1) that "each individual has a right to his or h ti i d t i t d tht h l i i d t ti t b hibitd" Th t t t l t til d i d f t d t i l Th f t "h iht" "bi i i l " ith littl t t t t li h t th i i l t idit h th iht l t l i

Arguments against Human Reproductive Cloning The security of genetic material Th WHO t t t f l f t th b i i i l hih h dti d i l t " t f th d i i t f th h b i " d " t t i f th it f ti t i l " O ti tht i i h i th it f ti t i l i d ? I it l h i t d with precision by scientists or when spread around with the characteristic negli gence of the average human male? If security of genetic material is really an issue and since we know that skin cells hairs and other detritus from the human body hd i t d t i th f l l f th i d i i d l it i diffilt t b i b t it f ti t i l Human dignity The idea and ideal of human dignity has been much invoked in these debates T i l f l t h diit tht t i d i th W l d H l t h O iti t t t l i i d M h 11 1997 "WHO id th f l i f th liti fh i d i i d l t b thill tbl t ld i l t f th b i i i l hih dill itd ti Th i l d t f th d i i t f th h b i " A l t h diit f i l l ttti th th political equivalents of motherhood and apple pie Like motherhood if not apple pie

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th l h i l A fit ti t k h th id f human dignity is invoked is: whose dignity is attacked and how? If it is the duplica tion of a large part of the human genome that is supposed to constitute the attack on human dignity or where the issue of "genetic identity" is invoked we might l i t i t l k hth dh th d i i t f t l t i i t h t d b th it fh it d h t fll t th iibilit f t l ti t i i ? H th ti fh d i i t i ft l i k d t K t i thi d it i thi l i k I i h t i l l h At i l l d tht t t t t id b i f bjti t l i b d h diit A l K h ' (1997) i t i f thi principle in his commentary on cloning in Nature Kahn a distinguished molecular biologist helped draft the French National Ethics Committee's report on cloning In Nature Kahn states: Th ti fh l ll f ll li ld f h i l h i l it f i b i bi t d i t i t th riil db I l K t tht fh d i i t Thi riil d d tht idiidl dI ld t d this to read human life should never be thought of as a means but always also as an d (Kh 1997 119) The Kantian principle invoked without any qualification or gloss is seldom helpful i dil b i i t t (Hi 1997) A f l t d b K h f l it ld l tl bld t f i Th b f i i fbld d ti ith k i f ll i b t th d th b l d ( d it d ) l i l t h d Th i i t f bld d t i d t ll k f b t th i d t i t f th b l d d Th d fi i th lif f th i i t fb l d l i l An abortion performed exclusively to save the life of the mother would also pre sumably be outlawed by this principle Instrumentalization

and the right to an open future

Thi id f i idiidl t th f th i ti t d " i t t l i t i " t i l l i th E t t I th t t th t t t t d t i i th lif fidiidl ft iliit i t t l i t i i ft t h h t t ilt l l d iht t ft (Fib 1992) Th " O i i f th f di th t h i l i l i t i of biotechnology to the European Commission" for example in its statement on "Ethical aspects of cloning techniques" uses this idea repeatedly For example refer ring to reproductive human cloning (paragraph 2 6 ) it states: "Considerations of i t t l i t i d i d h t thill tbl" Mki f th id f" i t t l i t i " i t If t t h hild th th ti f h i h th i d i i d l td ith ll i l t b d i t t th l idti S tht h f l hild i d d l i l t id " d hi" ( ft i l t ) it i l h hth Kt' i i l

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li Eith th ti l t t i b t d t th t t tl purposes with Kant or the child's eventual autonomy and his or her clear and substantial interest in or benefit from existence take precedence over the compara tively trivial issue of parental motives I t tht l d i d th jit f hild i d ith thi l i i d b t th l l f bth t th t h h t ( i d d f ) f ti bi f f thi id T h f t b f f l l bti ft t h t th i ti i fftil th l ti Oth i l i l d "hi " " t i i th ti l i " idi " h i t th f i l f t " A fairytale F i t l b i t t i tk S lt id llk t Th i h fll i l B t hi h i l ith h f t t l t i d id t l Sh t h f i d d itbl ti if Th Q ld l t hi d i d " " B t it hi d t t d h children to be heirs to the throne that he was heir to So he found a very young and beautiful princess who did not know any better and married her in order to fulfill his duty to provide heirs and become a suitable candidate to be king when his th d i d Th h d t fi h f hi if d h bth l d d l Bt l ll th ld k th did t li h i l ft F h t d t h t th f i t l i ' ti b d t h t hi i hld h b td lld t h t fili t i l tt i t t i hi hild h b tbl d d b thi k l d f thi i f t i hi t f th H t b th b t t moral prince in the world of the imagination but he is not accounted irredeemably wicked In some future fairytale he may even become king Although many argu ments have been adduced against the institution of the monarchy denial of an ft t l hild h ld b i t th H i idl b t th it fr f id f d f ti i l f id t h t th ith th id i l tht l i l t i hld t thi ti hi W hld t f idl d f f l i i l hld i i tht titld il t f f h t l h l d th Autonomy again F d i M (1998) h ld th i th ' idtit" A tiht l i t h i t i t t h i t h d i t " Th t t h ith th

d d i f thi t l i i "Cli tht h h d i t t l i d R b t Wit (1997 9 1 3 1 4 ) h td " f d th th ld tibt i t t l i t t i ifl d b t th i f l ld t t d t i t i 387

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f bdil f d ti i d t i t F l diff i and anno Domini between clone and cloned would all come into play

i

t

Another story: fewer fairies L i ' b l d b d li i it l i M P b l ll f thi bd ld b d l t d dL i ' l d Cld h k L i i t l d ll t t h bdil f d ti k t t ti hi h t d idiidlit ld b " t l didd b th h b i " ? I h th i bi Vldii Ilih Ul b A i l 10 1870 i th t fSibik th V l It i thi h b d h i k t t f V I L i E ith thi ' di t t ill L i i S f th thi tht d Vldii Ilih ht h t b d d if hi W t t lti R i W t i l t hi i t d d t i t t hi t t bi hi d ifl hi d l t f d l th d b t d l did W t k th t h h t f K l M h f l it t th h d W t i h t d thi bt d hi d tht ld b l h It b tht " kth "bt t til d t At k f ti t i i fftd b l iil it f b d i l f d thi Genetic variability It i ft l i d tht h l i ill d ti ibilit ith t t h i lt Th UNESCO ht l i f l f t "th vation of the human genome as common heritage of humanity" Well normal genetic reproduction does not preserve the human genome rather it constantly th i l i i l l ld b th i it If preservation b t t hi thi ( l l d b i ) b j t i O l if ll i t i l l d ld th h b " d " i t t A t ti d i i t l i tb id t i t th ibilit f th h it l t ifiitl ll t f it t tht i td t t l t f b t 35 t h d b i t h It i likl t h t " t i f i i l " l i ld h h t lbl l d ld f lti mechanisms to prevent this without banning the process entirely I take this figure f th t f t l t i i Th t t i d i 1 270 i (M d P d 1993) Th h i t h t t th h f i ti ith h l i l t i fh th h ti ibilit iht b d l fftd It i t i hih h b lih t h t t i t h t tht ifl bt d t d t i ht tit l ill h Pt h t l t d fil i d d ilbilit f l i Bt i th t d th f i h t id ( i d f l d t i ) it i likl t b t d d thd f dti th i IVF At 3 5 t h d i 388

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t l ti t i i i l d it frt it i l likl t h t the cloning rate would match this Would more than one in every 270 couples or individuals for that matter want or be able to use cloning technology? Suppose this rate were doubled or even tripled by cloning would anyone even notice? If the rate ft i i i th i ld f lt t l i t h l th th b it l t t h Eugenics Th lti f th E P l i t tk difft t k H i td the now mandatory waft in the direction of fundamental human rights and human dignity it suggests that cloning violates the principle of equality "as t permits a eugenic and racist selection of the human r a c e " Well so does prenatal d i l t t i i t t ti d t i d t i bti d h f i hi f l t Th f t tht t h i ld b b d d t titt t i t th t h i l th i t f ti th b fl T b l i th d t h t it i h t b df it i t t t t i tht l it hld b hibitd b it it th i bility of rape Genetic identity Th d i i l l d t b th E P l i t tt tht " h idiidl h i h t t hi h ti i d t i t " L i id th i i t bl tibti f i t h d i l DNA h tht i th f t l idtil ti ti i d t i t i t til t f l identity nor is it necessary for "individuality" Mitochondrial DNA individualizes the genotype even of clones to some extent The mitochondria are particles of DNA present in each egg cell and are derived from the mother of that egg They are d d i t i l t th f t i h tht k th hih i l d i l btitti M l ti i d t i t i i d ith f l idtit f i d i i d l i t it i t l h th hld b iht t h thi B t if th i ht t d b t th i h t f i d t i l t i ? S th i t bi l i f t h t i ( dibli) diti tht fftd t d t h t th ffti t t t th l idfft f hih t h t it d th b t diid lti i ti Would the existence of the supposed right conjured up by the European Parliament mean that the therapy should be outlawed? Suppose that an effective vaccine for HIV d l d h i h h d th f f t f d b l i th t l t i i t ilti ff d t l h iht? A t f l th ld thi b ibl b f t t b d i d f h l i fli b i ? W hld 2 70 ll t h t th t l f ti ( i d t i l ) t i i i Thi t h t i th U i t d K i d ith lti f b t 58 lli tht 200 t h d h i h d H t dh iht ilti h d l? 389

JOHN HARRIS

Cll th b i t h f D l l d th ibilit f h i l t h lft many people feeling not a little uneasy if not positively queasy at the prospect It s perhaps salutary to remember that there is no necessary connection between phe nomena attitudes and actions that make us uneasy or even those that disgust us d th h ttitd d ti t h t th d f jdi thil N d it f l l t h t th thi tht f d t are thil t b hibitd b l i l t i tlld b lti Th t t hih i t t Moral nose Th id t h t l t i t i d d t ti t l il l th d t i t i f ht i ll iibl i t i Thi id iiti ith D i d H (h bl k d i hi A Treatise of Human Nature (1738) t h t lit i " l f l t th j d ' d f") h b i f l t i l th k f b f t l h i l h I til M W nock has made it a central part of her own approach to these issues Briefly the idea is: If

lit hih be passed Wht fli tht ti ( W

i t dl

it f

t ll

ith

k t th b i i t it ti k 1987 8)

i t l blil hld tb d ft

f ld b i d t

th b i t

if t f th

t b thi hih h l d thi ll

t

i d f iili

A i t t i l i th t t f l i f L R K pointed by George W Bush to head up his new "President's Council" on bioethics In a long discussion entitled "The Wisdom of Repugnance" Kass (1997) tries hard and thoughtfully to make plausible the thesis that thoughtlessness is a virtue: t f l i h bi tb f th t lld b th lt f th dtki bt b itit dfl i d i t l d argument the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear

W

itht

Th d i f f l t i f t k h ' f t i id f thi ll d i t b i d h it i i l i fb jdi thi h f l Th E l i h lit G O l l f d to this reliance on some innate sense of right and wrong as "moral nose" as if one could simply sniff a situation and detect wickedness The problem as I have ndi cated is that nasal reasoning is notoriously unreliable and olfactory moral philoso h it t h t i l "bi b t h " h d littl t f it i it tbl f d t i W hld b t h t i th t t th d i d itbl f lld " l f l i " l h b d i t d b th i h t f J blk l di d d bi t t d l d ii t f lit ith th I th b f i i t hld b ii f ti th l i f th h l i th b i fthi l iti

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I K ' ti (h d i i l dit li "i t t") th giveaway is in his use of the term "rightfully" How can we know that revulsion however sincerely or vividly felt is occasioned by the violation of things we right fully hold dear unless we have a theory or at least an argument about which of th thi h t hld d rightfully h l d d ? Th t "ihtfll" i l i j d t hih f th tbilit f th f l i If it i i l fli f i th th ll i th i t t i W i t t t i l d b i d f th t fi th t t h f ht d i th fit Th t h i d bth f i t i dditbi ditbi because the individuals concerned occupy positions of power and influence world wide and their instant reactions and "offtheshelf" arguments have been translated into resolutions and regulations which are likely to prove seriously prejudicial to h lf d ibl l t h iht Wh l i d lft l h i l h t bd t d th d l d i th f liitti h iht d f d thi itlf titt ttk th f d F bli d t dit tht h iht df d b titd hi or simply to assuage feelings of unease or even of revulsion or to protect beliefs that are themselves expressions of prejudice or bigotry One of the hallmarks of a moral position is the preparedness to deploy evidence and argument in its support Wh th d l d th t l d t t th f ti th l iti d th adequacy f th b t th l t b l i h th iti ll t b l (if t t) d it d h t l bi d i f t Wh th t d l d i t f l iti i d t fld th th iti i lft i t h t tifiti d t Af d t l i i l f th lit f ll d t i ti i tht h liberty should not be abridged without good cause being shown Now where the liberty in question is trivial or vexatious or is itself morally dubious or even morally neutral it is plausible to claim that no harm is thereby done particularly h l t f th l i i t t i f thi d f d b d t t d H h b d t th f f t t h t th f d hih ti ll d b i bt th i h b bidd i t l ttiil i t l f th i f d i i f thi ll i i f i t th it b i d t b i tt Th h id f th likl didt f h l i Everyone has in mind the "Boys from Brazil" scenario of maniacs choosing to clone Hitler's genome (but not of course Hitler despite their hopes to the contrary) umpteen times in the jungles of South America However the fantasies of film k l i hld t ditt t l d i d Lt l k t b f likl hih iht b d f h l i d t t ititi b t th bf i t i th t f dti t W ill i ll tht h l i b l btitti i f in vitro f t i l i t i h it fit f d

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Nine cases

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per se

JOHN HARRIS

A b l D k i ' dR b t ' t bth t h t I bli t b the key idea namely respect for autonomy and for the values which underlie the importance attached to procreation These values see procreation and the founding of a family as involving the freedom to choose one's own lifestyle and express t h h ti ll t h h d th d l hld blif d th lit hih f i l i h d t ft ti Gi t h t th f d t ' i idl i d t b i t t l it i t l t thi f d libl d i i f ti t tl t b l d i h b t t t d b th id f th il t f dh l i k d th ti i t i to the genetic imperative Whether or not this suggestion is ultimately persuasive it is surely not possible to dismiss reproductive cloning in such short order as does the report of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1997) Reproductive choices hth t th t b t t d b iht t ti libt t h itht dbt li t b t k i l l li A h th t i l b d i i d h d h ti jit b bld i t th Th h kt d th l li f th t h d d ffit It i j t h d t h t th N t i l Bioethics Advisory Commission report and all the other recent pronouncements on cloning have failed to demonstrate

Acknowledgments Thi h t d id fit f l t d i "Gdb D l l th thi f h l i " i Th J l f Mdil Ethi 23 (6) ( D b 1997) 3 5 3 6 0 "Cli db l d t h i " i Ii T ( d ) Bithi i th N Mill i (St A d P 2000) " C l i dh d i i t " i Cbid Q tl f Hlth Ethi 7 (2) ( S i 1998) 1 6 3 8 d "G l d Riht h iht" i Jti C B l ( d ) Th Gti R l t i dH The Amnesty Lectures 1998 pp 6 1 9 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) Some of the material was presented to the UNDP/WHO/World Bank Special Pro gramme of Research Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction R i G Mti G A i l 25 1997 dt h i l i hld b th E P l i t i B l M 7 1997 I tfl t t i i t t th t f tilti iiht

References BiCt (1998) Th B t i R t BiBi J 19 ( b i t ) Bh G W (2001) R k b th P i d t t ll h Th Whit H ( h i t h / / l / 2 0 0 1 / 0 8 / 2 0 0 1 0 8 0 9 2 h t l ) Dworkin Ronald (1993) Life's Dominion London: Harper Collins Fib J l (1992) Th hild' riht t ft I Fd d Flfilt 7697 P i t NJ P r i t U i i t P

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Harris J (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997) Is cloning an attack on human dignity? Nature 387: 754 (1999) Genes clones and human rights In Justine C Burley (ed) The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights: The Amnesty Lectures pp 61-95 Oxford: Oxford University Press Kahn Axel (1997) Clone mammals clone man Nature 386: 119 Kass Leon R (1997) The wisdom of repugnance: why we should ban the cloning of human beings The New Republic 17: 26 Mayor F (1998) Devaluing the human factor The Times Higher Education Supplement 8: 47 Moore Keith L and Persaud T V N (1993) The Developing Human 5th edn Philadelphia: W B Saunders National Bioethics Advisory Commission (1997) Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations Rockville MD: National Bioethics Advisory Committee Robertson John A (1994) Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1998) Liberty identity and human cloning Texas Law Review 76: 6 Slack J M W Isaacs H V Song J Durbin L and Pownall M E (1996) The role of fibroblast growth factors in early Xenopus development Biochemical Society Symposium 62: 1-12 UNESCO (1997a) Press release no 97-29 New York: UNESCO (1997b) Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights New York: UNESCO Warnock Mary (1987) Do human cells have rights? Bioethics 1: 1-14 Wilmut I Schnieke A E McWhir J Kind A J and Campbell K H S (1997) Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells Nature 385: 810-13 Winston Robert (1997) The promise of cloning for human medicine British Medical Journal 314: 913-14 World Health Organization (1997a) Press Release (WHO/20 11) Geneva: WHO (1997b) WHO 5037 14 May

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29 Allocation of Medical Resources H TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT JR AND ANA SMITH ILTIS

The Conceptual Geography To morally justify in a principled fashion the allocation of medical resources one must first determine who is in authority to make such allocations and what pattern of allocation should guide them The resolution of the latter depends on moral accounts of the limits of the authority of governments to (1) acquire resources by taxation (2) distribute those resources in particular ways and (3) constrain the free choices of their citizens in the market as well as an appreciation of the empirical views regarding the marginal return on more than very basic health care The more it is plausible that there are significant moral restraints on the power to tax and to constrain peaceable market behaviors the less morally plausible it will become to impose by governmental force a single all-encompassing pattern for the allocation of medical resources even if that particular allocation is recognized as n some sense morally ideal As doubts increase concerning the legitimate political moral authority of governments to impose one all-encompassing understanding of the appropriate allocation of medical resources the concurrent existence of numerous allocational approaches will be morally inescapable For example one may be morally constrained to allow private approaches to health care in addition to and parallel with any governmental approaches Further if there are diminishing returns in relief from morbidity and mortality risks the importance of guaranteeing all equal access to health care will be brought into question Beyond the question of the limits of governmental authority to impose a particular all-encompassing approach to the allocation of medical resources there s the core issue of determining what allocation if any is uniquely morally obligatory To establish an allocatory approach as morally obligatory or to restrict all to one encompassing package of health-care services (eg as in Canada) requires resolving a number of key value-theoretical quandaries First one would need to determine how to compare morbidity and mortality risks so as to establish health-care priorities because health care addresses not just risks of death but of suffering For instance one must compare the moral importance of treating cancers with treating forms of osteoarthritis which are not life-threatening but painful One must n addition compare various forms of suffering such as the suffering of migraine with

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ALLOCATION OF MEDICAL RESOURCES

th ffi fh i bld th b d i l i l t fd t b t able and in need of remedy Second allocations of medical resources will depend on the amount of resources available for allocation to health care versus those to other needs or goods This will require comparing the goods of being relieved of particular bidit d tlit ik ith d h d t i d btt d ll th i f ilbl t d ih Fill ill dt d t i hth li f t t t t ti it h lif h i h t th th d t th it F l d hild h h t lid f l l lif h t li t f th t t t f diti l k i d th l i f t h t i ldi th th ld t iti treatment? The application of a theory of justice to medicine requires establishing how par ticular medical needs or desires generate particular rights This is a core challenge f t h t i l t f li i jti P t i l tt f ffi t b t l t b ith f t t f t t bt i fi j t ii tifiti ildi th t f f f th i h t th I til th fjti t li h l t th t l d il l t t i hih l ill d i i h d t li i t others for their resources or provide grounds even to restrict the purchase of health care in a private market in order to satisfy a particular norm for equality of oppor tunity or outcome S i l bl i h t h i fjti lid t i f dii I t f lif l t th t l d il l t t i b td b d hl If th f f t d t ' h t fild b i t b d h l If il t t l d t th t t i i i h t f til l f i d i i d l th il t t b tifid H if ' l t th t l ltt l d t iifi t dibilit li d t h ft d t ti b d If class of patients is blind paralyzed or likely to die early and if there is only a possibility of slightly ameliorating these defects but not of curing them and slightly but not appreciably postponing death one will not be able to make whole such l t th t l ltt Th l l t i f dil ill ft ith ti t hlth bt l dtl l i t di d f t dibilit th t f l dth M i dil k l d i bbiliti l l t i l li i t t t t i d d d t d i f h t bl ith i d t l bidit d t l i t i k Th ll h t th l l t i fhlth ill th d d it what risks should be accepted in order to husband resources and expend them on goods other than for health care or in order to avoid interfering with the choices of individuals regarding the use of their own resources In short a theory of justice n hlth ill h t h h tblih tht til llti f dil i itl i d b tl f Th i ll h b hd b li t h i f ti t hlth llti Thi h t i h til t h i f ti h b tt h i Fit i d t tht t th l l i i l iii th d S d l i ill b i f th

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accounts that rely on an understanding of right or fair action held to be independent of considerations of the good Finally libertarian approaches to resource allocation will be considered as a limiting instance Special attention is given to the implications of each of these approaches for issues of macro-allocation (ie decisions concerning how many resources go to health care as opposed to other areas); meso-allocation (ie how the health-care budget gets divided among various endeavors of health care); and micro-allocation (ie what health care individual patients receive) The last concerns regarding resource allocation are expressed n conflicts between institutional interests in resource utilization and the particular commitments of health-care professionals to particular patients (eg may physicians play the role of therapist gatekeeper and allocator?)

Some Teleological Approaches to Distributing Health Care Teleological accounts of what is right and just reduce the issue to what is good If particular patterns of health-care allocation will maximize the good and there are no non-teleological moral constraints on the pursuit of that good then the realization of these patterns will be morally obligatory In such a case right and ust choices will be those that maximize the net good Utilitarian accounts regard decisions concerning the allocation of resources as opportunities to maximize total net or average utility There are of course important distinctions among different utilitarian theories First utilitarians differ with regard to the nature of the good to be maximized Different background understandings of morality result in different conceptions of what counts as the good They thus provide different assessments of the merits of competing systems for health-care allocation (Engelhardt 1996: 45-6) In particular different understandings of the good will yield radically different recommendations regarding how appropriately to allocate resources For example if longevity is deemed inherently valuable then a utilitarian would urge that resources be allocated in such a way as to maximize the total number of years a population lives or perhaps to maximize the average life span If on the other hand quality of life is most valued then a calculation to determine how to maximize the quality and not merely the quantity of life-years will be pursued Even if one agrees that the focus must be on quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) one will need to compare different understandings of quality To determine which system of health-care distribution s best on teleological grounds one must know what counts as best This requires a background moral theory Second utilitarians have different assumptions concerning the background empirical states of affairs; for example what will actually maximize the good and in which state of affairs there is more net utility A socialist utilitarian might argue that state ownership of property will maximize the total good while libertarian utilitarians will argue that private ownership a free market and a very imited government will yield the most good Both have as the basis of their views the idea that the right is reducible to the net good The disagreement lies in how to maximize that good and/or in the nature of the good Thus utilitarian accounts can be

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dill d i f f t d d i th b k d th f d ll ht assumptions are made concerning empirical states of affairs The contrast between Peter Singer and Richard Epstein exposes these variations For Singer the mpartial ity of the moral point of view requires treating persons equally Equal interests hld t ll dl f h h l d th d lit i tht i i th i t t A lt Si f t f ll ti t h t t k th li t t f ll ll i l d tht li "th b t ibl l f h dll t" ( K h d Si 1988 102) I t t i tti th f d ft t d t i th ll td t hlth i t idi li Si i t h t th primafacie reasons to avoid such restrictions but he argues that it is defensible to do so and that a national health service funded by tax dollars is morally appropri ate Resource allocation should not be determined by a free market because of he i t i i t i di l i t i f th f kt H k thi tf titi t ' f d b l i i t h t "it b [th ] t h t th it ti t t h hi d t h t th idiidl ld t hi tt h h h didd t d hlth " (Si 1976 188) F t h Si li t h t "th il t f medical care may make it unsuited to market control" (1976: 189) Market struc tures may ultimately result in individuals spending more on health care by discour aging preventive office visits and ultimately resulting in expensive hospitalizations (1976 189) Si l " t i l hlth i [] ffti f ditibti i " (1976 190) Thi tht h dt diti bti i itlf i t F Si h th i l ti t t li t f th l l t i f i th t t f t i l hlth i i t h t it i d i b l t li i it i hih " t i f d t l f lif" i t t d (1976 191) A Si d t d it h t t d t d i t t i id i f it t h t k idiidl "tht when it comes to vital things like medical care we are all in it together and your money cannot buy you anything that I am not equally entitled to" (1976: 1 9 1 2 ) The sense of being bound together with regard to important aspects of ife and he t h t ll i d i i d l i ll titld t d d t iti f Si itil I h t th f i h t b t i th t t l / b f t / df h dll t At th llti l l th i hth dll b hlth dll f d dll hlt dll d At th llti l l th ti i h t k i d f h l t h i l d th b t l The critical issue is how to answer this question Singer and Helga Kuhse face this issue by addressing newborn care They are critical of the use of the concept of qualityadjusted lifeyears QALYs involve determining "[h]ow many years of ife ith til diti [ ld b ] dt i i d t h f l lif i t h t tht d i t i " (Kh d Si 1988 1 0 3 4 ) Th j t th f QALY f t Fit " [ ] l l t i fh h it t t dd litdjtd t t i t ' lif t k t f th i t th f f t d b th t t t " ( K h d Si 1988 104) Th f iii th t t l t d i l h S d "[] l i 399

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b d th b f b h i h lif i l d ill ll f th provision of treatment to younger people rather than older people so long as the treatment is successful in restoring the patient to a normal lifeexpectancy" (1988: 105) Th bl f Kh d Si i t h t it ill l t l t t tht h QALY l l t i it ill b b t t i f t dlt d thi th i Thi li i dd i thi i i th l f tdi li th l f ti lif filitti ti "th i t l i tdi lif t h t i l d ll d th i ti lif" (1988 106) K h d Si h l d thi b th d stand life as a journey marked by goals When conception has not yet occurred there is no individual bearing goals whose ends are thwarted Therefore they main tain it is better to extend a life than to create a new one They extend this argu t t th f th f t b "th j [ f f t ' lif] i t d i fl f th f t i t f itlf bi ith t d ft Th f t h l h di t t i " (1988 107) F i l l K h d Si h l d t h t th i t fi f t b "th i h ll i i f i t b d bt th f t d th newborn infant" (1988: 107): infants have no goals hopes desires and expect ations Thus it is better Kuhse and Singer maintain to extend the life of an adult than to extend that of an infant At the microallocation level the issue is much the hld k llti fhlth dll t th tit h ill i th b t l A tiliti t tht t t h l ith S i ' i tht f R i h d E t i I Mortal Peril (1997) E t i ti ht t b l i l ti l tht i d i i d l h iht t h l t h f d d b th tt Fit h tht h l liitd ibilit f th lf f th tki hi b k d lit t h t f th l tditi Second he argues that not to have state regulation of health care will ultimately lead to increased rather than decreased access to health care: "The simple and compact set of common law rules does a far better job of providing health care than th dl t fl i l t i djdiil i t i f d " (1997 23) T h i d h tht i d i i d l h iht t t t thi bdi dt k if hi f t h l T t h th li i d i t t h t th kt ht t l i i f i t l i th llti f hlth tilit d E t i ' t bi tilit idti ith iti f ti iht f d i d t i t ht i f others These sideconstraints as well as the empirical assumption regarding which conditions will maximize access to health care together suggest for Epstein that resource allocation ought to be unregulated and addressed by the free market Th t t bt Kh d Si th h d d E t i th th k l t f th i i l diffilti ith tilit d ti l l tiliti t h i f th i f llti Fit h t d d ll db k d l ti b t th ki f l d t Th ll ti di il i i i l tt f ffi t h t ill k th liti f th d l

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hih i t li i d ffi It i i t t i thi dt i that not all hypothetical contractor theories would necessarily agree with Daniels's conclusion that there may be an appropriate place for some agedependent rationing though they would follow the same general methodology For example iht thik tht h t h t i l t t ld tt f lit f lif th th l tit f lid It h l d l b td tht D i l t t t t id j t f f t hlth i d t i th lif t f th h ld t h i di A t l l t i l i D i l t d tht h thtil t t ld h t id b h i d th il f i ti of how much of society's resources should be spent on health care rather than on the satisfaction of other needs and desires Though Daniels holds that healthcare needs have a powerful claim because of the role health care plays in maintaining ' titi it it i t b l i i t d thi i t i t t d h d t i D i l hld tht h t h t i l t t ld t thi l i b th j t d dtil t h d t k ht ti th b l t H li ilifid i fR l ' il f i d tht " d t d l i b t itl t i d ld k healthcare and longtermcare system that protected their normal opportunity range at each stage of their lives" (Daniels 1985: 103) He expands on the concept of an agerelative opportunity range in order to avoid problems of age bias or age d i i i t i " d t dlibti b t th d i f [hlth ] ititti rid t ith th d f b t t i f idiidl ti rit t th t k ld t t t t idiidl fi h t j t f th l t i t f h lift With thi fit th f i lit f tit tI i f hlth ill id th itfll f b i " (1985 104) T ti th f d t i fD i l ' li hlth i i t t and not all kinds of health care are equally important (Daniels 1985) Health care is important because of the role it can play in preserving normal functioning which in itself plays a role in determining what opportunities are open to an individual F th hlth i il d di f llti hlth i t t d titt i f il j t i (Dil 1985) M hlth ititti th i t i t t i ibl/blitd f tti fi lit f t i t (1985 45) t h t thi riil ht t ititti (1985 86) If h l t h d t th th i i l f fi lit f t i t i t tifid D i l li (1985 86) D i l ' emphasis on fair equality of opportunity stands in contrast to Singer's focus on fair equality of results This difference rests ultimately on the fact that Singer's view s a consequentialist and in particular a utilitarian one while Daniels's account s a d l h i i fi d D i l idtifi f l l f hlth ititti h f hih til l i hlth F i t l l ititti " t t i i i th l i k l i h d fd t f th lit t i " (1985 47) S d l l ititti t " d t f th i d l i t [ d ] dli l dil d hbili tti i " (1985 48) t h i d l l i t i t t i id " t d d dil

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d il t i f th ( d t l ) h i l l ill d d i b l d d th frail elderly" (1985: 48); and fourthlevel institutions provide "health care and related social services for those who can in no way be brought closer to the idealiza tion" (1985: 48) "Each corrects in a particular fashion for a type of departure from th R l i idliti t h t ll l f t i l l l ll th ti tti d i d d if f i lit f t i t i t b td" (1985 48) D i l i hi i f fi t hlth i th flli [H]lth ititti hld h th l i i t d b t i t t tk f tti l i t ri i d i t t tit t h i fili t j l species functioning On this view shares of the normal range will be fair when positive t h b tk t k tht i d i i d l iti l f t i i h ibl d t h t th th d i r i i t i d i t t thi h i f lif l Still f i h t l i idiidl t l t d kill ill till differ and these form a natural baseline against which individual shares of the normal d f d ( D i l 1985 57) One of the most farreaching or ambitious attempts to apply Rawls's theory of justice to health care is that of Ronald Green Green argues that Rawls's account hld tll i l d thid i i l fj t i tht t t h l t h f th b i il d b hlth i f l t h i t th b i iil libti R l i t f ll (1976 1 1 7 1 8 ) Th h t h t i l t t ld d t " i i l f l t hlth " tht ld t t h " l i h t t th t t i hlth i th it l l " (1976 117) Thi i i l G hld l th d i i l d th d i f f t i i l h l d b th t h i d f th l i l l ordered principles of justice (1976: 118) According to Green then the hypothet ical contractors would require an egalitarian system of resource allocation Green's account rests ultimately on first the assumption that Rawls's use of hypo thtil t t d th i i l iti i i itlf it d d lti t ht i i l f jti th h t h t i l t t ld d t Jh M k l id i f t hlth i liht f R l i t t i i d tht "hlth i il i d l hih i th ti f if l l iht" (Mk 1983 329) B i i ith th assumption that "one of the proper functions of government is to enhance the welfare of its citizens" Moskop argues that "providing health care becomes a social ideal when it contributes importantly to human welfare through its significant f ill d d i t hlth d d i " (1983 336) Th l l t i d i i d ithi h it tht llti llti d i l l t i d i i ill i t i (1983 336) A id f hi ill t j t b t th t h t ill t b tbl F l h hld tht " i i t fi d tti d i i k i " d h idtif t llti i i l tht h li hld id resource allocation decisions:

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(1) More effective inclusive or secure means should all other things being equal be f d t th hih l ffti i l i [ d ] (2) S i i l ii hld b d f iil d F l it hih d t i i f t t th h dfd dh i hld t l t th with needs for basic health care (Moskop 1983: 337) For Moskop basic assumptions concerning the appropriate functions of govern t d th d i f t i l t t di t hlth i th d t i f llti h tht i liti ibl R b t V t h d l t t i th f d i l thi t h t i t td i th R l i t fjti D i l ' G ' d t t t M k ' t t h h h li iilit V t h (1981 125) i k it i f t t ki t hil idi t h l t b impartial contractors In A Theory of Medical Ethics (1981) Veatch begins his dis cussion of justice in health care with the recognition that medical ethical decisions are made in the social context and thus require a "commonly acceptable basis for thi l t i " (1981 100) V t h ' t f" l f k " (1981 111) h i h h h l d b i d f t i l it i liti dd th dil i (1) Human beings are of equal moral worth in the sense that no human deserves a li t th l th l h f ilbl (2) Th t l f th ld h l d b l h i hd l ti t t h d t thi Th h b " d " d ilbl f appropriation and use without conditions attached prima facie ibilit l t t th (3) H bi h f th ld t it t d ditibti f tht i l ( V t h 1991 85) Veatch then argues that equality requires that each person have "an opportunity for equality of objective net outcome (probably most easily measured by equality of resources)" (1991: 92) Veatch also addresses the problem of the natural lottery n hlth if ll h t th hlth d t ll t t ff ith l h f t l ( ) d th d th l d I lliti it i h i h th i i l t id t fj t i i lft t i t lf k ( V t h 1981 118) I hi t f d i l thi thi i th t t i i t f t t i medical ethics: "The creation of a contractual framework could provide a basis for making medical ethics decisions that would be commonly recognized as legitim ate" (1981: 120) Veatch envisions three contracts First there is "a basic social t t [tht] t i l t [th] f d t l i i l " (1981 138) F thi (1) t t b f it t th t t d i d (2) t t bt it d f i (1981 1 2 7 3 4 ) d (3) t t bt f i l d t i t (1981 1 3 4 7 ) Th t ltt t t t tdit th lit f th b i il t t (1981 138) h i h V t h h l d i t t f i i i l b f t t k i t h t th

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id f killi djti It i thi fil i i l fjti tht i f il importance for the issue of resource allocation Veatch (1981: 276) argues that "people have a right to enough health care to provide an opportunity to be healthy" This raises the question of the extent to which th i h t t h l t h i V t h ii it l i i t d b i d i i d l h i d ti tht d idiidl' t i t f hlth V t h ld tht The principle of justice is focused on the fair distribution of burdens from paying for health care not on the goal of decreasing healthrisky behavior That might be the bjt f t d i th i i l fb f i bt h tliti l ld l flit ith th i i l f t A t d i th i i l of justice on the other hand simply concentrates on the fair distribution of the cost of th b h i Hlth f ld b ddd t l t i l hlth i t h l t h i fdi l Thi ld th t th i t f th i l costs to the extent that those costs could be calculated Of course if a behavior is td t h hlth t b t tht th b d it ld f i d t h h l t h f f th b h i (1981 279) V t h ff t f llti tht i tht h h t i t "f l t lf (bt db l ti) justice would require giving persons an equal opportunity to be as healthy as others" (1991: 96) Although Veatch acknowledges that no "definitive rational defense" (1991: 83) can be offered to support "any [particular] interpretation of th i i l f j t i " (1991 83) i l d i litii h fil t dd h it i thl i i i b l t idiidl t ti f i t ith l l i hlth t Althh L C h h i l l (1987) liitl j t t t i h t llti hi tb i t t bl t i tht l ht h t h t i l h ith til ldi ld d Chhill holds that contractarian accounts rest on an inappropriate understanding of he relationship between the individual and society Such views according to Churchill give priority to the individual over the society because they are grounded on the L k ti tht i d i i d l h t t d li i i t Th iti tht Chhill d i th b d ti f l tilit hih h iiliti t h t h t i l t t t F C h h i l l th i d i i d l t b d t d i th t t f th il d j t it t i th idiidl " i t d d i [th] il ld t h t d d i h " idiidli (1987 61) With th iti f th i d i i d l il social Churchill argues that individuals will perceive the interconnection between their needs and the needs of others including strangers Individual selfsufficiency will be recognized as inadequate and incomplete Churchill's conception of the self il i t t idiidl i ti t h t i iht t h l t h dd i h d F thi ti idiidl hld t i t h t ll tibl t ill ddth d th ll dhlth S h idiidl h d t d i f t h l il bi d h d t d i lt i th d i f it i t b i Fth Chhill iti h d t d i ft iti f th d t

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ll tilit t services

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Libti fll i t t th h l b t f d l d th f d i d t i t diti f ll l i t i t h ment For those who recognize freedom as a sideconstraint allocation at all levels will be patterns that develop as spontaneous orders out of decisions of all individ uals who decide freely to collaborate with each other This latter genre of libertar i t h t th b d t i l t f t i l i i t t t i f th i i l fj t i I th b f dfiiti t d ii tht i t t t i f th i i l fj t i i it th i i i t i f i ditibti h Th B l III (1991) f l i th d i t i t i bt iti d ti iht th lt t i f llti B l (1991 2) t t h t iht t h ' d t ' d lid iti riht ll l li th l b d f th Piti iht i r i b ti riht th riht f th t b lft l I t i l th j t i f i t i f iti rights involves seeking the authority to impose a particular moral vision coercively on h t t h l i iti b l i t i f t i l kid t th th b f i th t k f th Thi f B l i th i t i l t t h t l d t th j t i f t i f th l i b t i approach Unless and until one has the moral authority to justify the coercion of others one cannot violate the right of individuals to be left alone Thus negative rights constrain the distribution of resources (1991: 11) E l h d t J f libti h t th l l t i f H Tit hlth i h t i i l f h i (1991 1996) E l h d t h th it dflt iti i th k i d t i f i th l i b t i f di th f l d l i i l i l l l iti i t Whil th h t llti kb d t i l argument to establish a binding contentrich normative account Engelhardt appeals to permission as the source of moral authority This libertarian account recognizes freedom not as a value but as a sideconstraint: "One is moved to a libti iti t hb f fl t bhlf f li libt i t t b tb h l idiid f t h thi " ( E l h d t 1991 104) l Athit f ti i l i th i l llit i t i d r i d f thi permission As a consequence 1 Witht h i i t th i thit i t h thrit b l t h i th f l i ilt 2 Ati tid th l it i l d ki liit ( b t t b l i t ) t l i atory defensive or punitive force (Engelhardt 1996: 122)

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I th d i th d thi t i t h t thi ii ilt what is by default the cardinal rightmaking condition As a result the golden rule is recast: "Do not do to others that which they would not have done unto them and do for them that which one has contracted to do" (1996: 123) 0 f th i i l bjti id i t th l i b t i h i tht t lik ll th h l d d t h t th t t i b t i f idi 1 t f d i j t i f i d th th t t i b t i f l t th d Y t E l h d t lik N i k (1974 3 0 4 ) d i t i i h bt f d l df d i d t i t S h libti t i t h t th f d f idiidl ( ti iht i B l ' t i l ) tit ht we may do to persons without their permission not because this is harmful but because this violates the default basis for a general secular morality Without a clear and convincing argument to the contrary we may not infringe upon ndivid l' h f l f h i d t l

C

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To address issues of the allocation of medical resources requires first an under standing of the authority of government to tax redistribute income acquired by taxation and to restrict the choices of individuals in the market Second resource llti d i i i iti f th i i l id di th i l t btid f th b i hlth Th iti f llti i thid d t d i f hth t f llti i ll b l i t d if hih Thi i iti f bidit tlit i k ll i f i f f bidit d bidit t difft i t i lif F i l l if t idtif til t f llti j t th t d t d which theory of justice is right and how it applies to health care in particular The attempt to apply utilitarian conceptions of justice to the issue of resource llti ff f th d i f f l t i i t d ith ll t i l i t i t Utili t i l i f d i l d b k d ti di ht d d th i i l tt f ffi t h t ill d tht d S h t fil t t th d i l d liti h i h th d d A t t t t dd i f llti t h t li h t h t i l t t h D i l ' t tht i dd i i ht h t h t i l idiidl ld d i h Chhill' t ff f th f i l t dil th background conceptions of the good attributed to the hypothetical choosers Such accounts lack an appreciation of the fact of moral pluralism and they rely on speculation concerning states of affairs and individual preferences Moreover it s t h h th i i t i f til ldi tht h t hi th i i t t h t th f it h t h t i l i d i i d l Fill ibt i d t d t h t b d f l t th i bliti t t th t f idiidl B f th i b i l i t t tblih til t t i h ti t t t t t d ill b th ti d l d t i l Witht hjtifti idiidl tb l l d t iti h

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of self-ownership and control Thus libertarian accounts of resource allocation recognize that it is impermissible to impose a particular understanding of health and health care on others The allocation of resources then must be left to individuals through peaceable market activity

References Bole m Thomas J (1991) The rhetoric of rights and justice in health care In Thomas J Bole III and William A Bondeson (eds) Rights to Health Care pp 1-19 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Callahan Daniel (1987) Stti Liit Mdil Gl i Ai Sity New York: Simon and Schuster Churchill Larry R (1987) Rationing Health Care in America: Perceptions and Principles of Jtie Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Daniels Norman (1985) Jt Hlth Ce New York: Cambridge University Press (1988) A I P t ' K ? New York: Oxford University Press Engelhardt Jr H Tristram (1991) Rights to health care: created not discovered In Thomas J Bole m and William A Bondeson (eds) Riht t Hlth C pp 103-11 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic (1996) The Foundations ofBioethics 2nd edn New York: Oxford University Press Epstein Richard (1997) Mtl Pil New York: Perseus Press Green Ronald (1976) Health care and justice in contract theory perspective In Robert M Veatch and Roy Branson (eds) Ethics and Health Policy pp 111-26 Cambridge: Ballinger Kuhse Helga and Singer Peter (1988) Age and the allocation of medical resources The J l f Mdii d Philh 13 (2): 101-16 Moskop John C (1983) Rawlsian justice and a human right to health care Th J l f Mdii d Philhy 8 (4): 329-38 Nozick Robert (1974) Anarchy State and Utopia New York: Basic Books Rawls John (1971) A Th f Jti Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Singer Peter (1976) Freedoms and utilities in the distribution of health care In Robert M Veatch and Roy Branson (eds) Ethics and Health Policy pp 175-93 Cambridge: Ballinger (1993) P t i l Ethis New York: Cambridge University Press f Mdil Ethi New York: Basic Books Veatch Robert M (1981) A Th (1991) Justice and the right to health care: an egalitarian account In Thomas J Bole III and William A Bondeson (eds) Rights to Health Care pp 83-102 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

Further reading Aaron Henry (1991) Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America's Health Care Washington DC: Brookings Institution American Medical Association (1990) Hlth A A i Th AMA P l t I Access to Affordable Quality Health Care Chicago: AMA Basson Marc (1979) Choosing among candidates for scarce medical resources Th J l f Mdii d Philhy 4 (3): 313-33 Battin Margaret and Huefner Robert (eds) (1992) Chi t Ntil Hlth C Ethil d Pli I s Salt Lake City: University of Utah

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Contemporary Issues in Bioethics Philosophy and Public Affairs

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy

Ethics Justice and Health Care The Hastings Center

Report The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Rights to Health Care The Dependent Elderly: Autonomy Justice and Quality of Care The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Rights to Health Encyclopedia of Bioethics Encyclopedia of Bioethics Strong Medicine: The Ethical Rationing of Health Care The New England Journal of Medicine Justice and Health Care The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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i dii d d h i t t i b t t t ld t b d l d i t h t it B t i t t i l t h bjt t ik b t t d t t t t k i t i t h C tl t th h t f h i t t i li flit bt th d f dil d th h l t h i t t f h bjt H d balance these interests? When should experimentation proceed? After a series of research scandals in the twentieth century a broad consensus developed around th b i i i l f h thi tf b f i d jti Iitil liti f th i i l f d i d t tti f h bjt I h titi h i t t i d t l t t h bjt d i th h b h fild t tti

Scandalous Research in the Twentieth Century I

1947 th ld l d f ht i th t if dl i dil h dil i t d t d b N i d t N i d t f d it fditbi i t i i tti S i t d i d t f t h th fft B f ti lti N i d t i t t d i l i h t t t ht d h t t t di h t h dh t fftil ilt h ht d i th i t f th N t h S T td ht d N i d t ht inmates and examined their wounds To study diseases such as typhus Nazi doctors intentionally infected inmates with the disease To study human capacity to with stand exposure to cold Nazi doctors stripped inmates and exposed them to icy water b l i d i t hd l t d ith i i th d t d ith Oth ti bttiti N i idl D t i t t d i tilii " i " h l i t d tblihi t h l i l diff d i b l T fid ffti f tiliti N i d t i j t d bt f ith ti bt i th h f b t t i thi f l l i 410

EXPERIMENTATION ON HUMAN SUBJECTS

tb d iflitd b difti bth l df l i by exposing them to high doses of radiation To "cure" homosexuality Nazi doctors injected hormones into inmates suspected of being homosexual To catalog physical differences in race Nazi doctors killed a number of prisoners stripped the flesh ff t h i b d d thi k l t f t h l i l (Lift 1986) Aft th N i d t tid t N b G f i d i i t h i t Fift N i d t itd tN b d t d t d t h Y t th h b th t if N i d t J h M l fld t S t h A i d d ti Mengele known to some concentration camp victims as the "Angel of Death" participated in the killing of 4 0 0 0 0 0 victims When shipments of new prisoners came to Birkenau and Auschwitz Mengele would often sort through the crowd ll lti ti th ii h bjt d d th tt th h b Hi i t M l d t f bjt t i i l l f l t i h k i t t t t t b l i h th l i i t f h d H f d l df l ti t h t h t h th ld h ti children He injected blue dye into the eyes of children to see if he could change their eye color He surgically grafted the back and wrists of one child to his fraternal twin in an attempt to create conjoined twins P h b th N i i t h i f th j d t t N b h d littl i d i t i t h ti i A i Th f i d th bli h d f i tht A i h ld t t t h l thil h B 1966 h h i A i t k t t I tht H B h dil f t H d blihd d b k i t i l i th New England Journal of Medicine i hih h d ibd t t t "thill d b i " dil i t td i dil journals (Beecher 1966) Two of these experiments are of special note The first was conducted by Chester Southam at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in New York Dr Southam was i t t d i th l l d b th b d ' i t i th d f i t T hi h ti Sth i j t d li ll t t t t h i t l t i t Th tit t t l d f th i t I t d " l t l d th ld b ii ' ll'" ( B h 1966) th Th d td d t d b S l K t th W i l l b k S t t S h l Stt I l d N Y k W i l l b k ititti f " t l l defective" children and the institution had a problem with a relatively mild strain of hepatitis In hopes of developing an effective prophylactic agent against the strain Krugman and his associates set up a special hepatitis unit and deliberately i f t d hild h lid th it P h th b t k dl i A i h d i 1972 I tht l d f f t l td d t d b th U i t d S t t Pbli H l t h S i i T k Alb I th T k i t 399 A f i A i ith hili d 201 f f th di lld th t d Th i f t d bjt t t d f thi hili th 411

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t l d t h t th h d th di Th t d t t d t i h hili progressed when it was left untreated (Jones 1993) Two years after the Tuskegee study was exposed The New York Times broke a story about research conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The CIA's k

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t h i tht ld b dt t l h b h i Blii t h t th h t i d LSD h l d i th CIA d i i t d it t F k Ol itit i t h t hi k l d O k l t Ol did f t suicide Another subject Harold Blauer died from a similar experiment (sponsored by the Department of Defense) designed to test the drug mescaline For the next two decades headlines about research ethics more commonly re f d t tl lti th d l b t i 1993 if ti b t ld i t d I tht th Albuquerque Tribune b l i h d i f t i l tlli th t f i t d t d b th M h t t P j t d i th fil d f W l d W II d t i d b th A t i E C i i (AEC) d i th l f th C l d W I th experiments eighteen individuals were injected with plutonium without their con sent Similar experiments were conducted with other radioisotopes including uran ium and polonium The experiments were conducted in the hope of establishing t idli f th ft f t i k A th t f th l t i ijti bi tld t i f th t b l i i t i l i diti t f Th td i t h i h d thi t t i l b th f f t f d i t i th l dti t i d i t d t hl d t i d i t h tll t d d hild fd d i t i t l t f t i t i l t d (Adi C i t t H Rditi E i t 1996)

Basic Principles of Research Ethics E h f th d l h i h l i h t d th d f th t d th dil f i t i h ti Wh th N b t i t d th N i d t f i d i i t h i t it t i l t d i f t i i l k th N b Cd A th i i l i ments that research subjects give their voluntary consent before they take part n an experiment that investigators minimize any risks research subjects might face that the degree of risk taken should never exceed the humanitarian importance of th bl t b l d b th i t d tht h bjt h l d l b f t ithd f i t Oth f i l d f l l d N b I 1964 th W l d M d i l A iti d t d f i l d f thi l l d th D l t i t H l i k i Th D l t i hih i d i 1975 1983 d 1996 d t d f th i i l f d d b th N b C d b t it l d t d t t t i i l t d i d b N b F i t th D l t i td tht h 412

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i t i t t b i t hi h h lt " i d d t it tee for consideration comment and guidance" This principle was an important step toward the establishment of institutional review boards (IRBs) ERBs are local com mittees called upon to review research proposals for potential ethical problems S d H l i k i l l d f th ibilit f h hild d th i d i idl h iht t b bl t i t l fil b " t" ( N t i l C i i 1978) If h hd b i d t fll th N b Cd t i t l th ld t h d t d h hild i th d t t t h t "th i l d hld h l l it t i t" Both the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration at Helsinki had profound impacts on governmental regulations and theories of research ethics but a third document has perhaps been more influential on theories of research ethics The Belmont R t b l i h d i 1978 th f d i f th N t i l C i i f th P t t i fH Sbjt fB i d i l dB h i l R h It i d t i f i d th b i i i l f thil h t f b f i d jti Th i i l dd lt i f t b th N t i l C i i lti d t d b th F d dD Adiitti (FDA) d N t i l Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1981 and current "Common Rule" which governs fifteen federal agencies They are also the most commonly used framework for understanding the ethical issues of human experimentation

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Th fit i i l i d t i f d b th B l t R t i t f " R t f " it t t " i t tl t t b i thil iti fit tht individuals should be treated as autonomous agents and second that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection" What does it mean to treat indi viduals as autonomous agents? Autonomous actions are usually understood as ones tht d i t t i l l ith d t d i d itht tlli ifl T t idiidl t t i t id th i d i i d l h "hld b f t h d t itht tlli t i t i d b t h " (Fd dB h 1986 8) Th i i l i t i f thi i i l f h i t t i i th i t f i f d t T t h bjt i t i t t bti thi i f d t S bithiit i f d t "autonomous authorization" (Faden and Beauchamp 1986) suggesting that an individual must authorize rather than merely acquiesce to being a research subject must intentionally choose to be a research subject must have a substantial d t d i f h t thi h i d t k thi h i itht b t t i l t l tlli ifl Ptti thi l i it ti i t d t b i l i i t i t t dil i t t i f t i b t h j t d i h bjt t t bi t f th j t R h h hld d th thi I f d t i ll h i t l t fi t t dil d t d i

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l t i d t Th diti f t i th i t i t to determine that subjects are able to understand and appreciate the mplications of their consent before informed consent is possible Disclosure requires the investiga tor to reveal all information that may be relevant to the potential subject's decision U d t d i i th i t i t t dil i f t i i tht d th ttil bjt t it ht i t tk V l t i i t h t th bjt b f f i ilti ifl If ll f th diti d if th i d i i d l i hi h t t bi t f h bti t l th th i d i i d l h i hi h i f d t All f th dl i l d i d hd bl ith i f d t I most of those cases there was no consent at all The Nazi experiments were done against the will of their subjects In MKULTRA Frank Olsen was given LSD without his knowledge In the case of the plutonium injections some of the subjects seem to h b t h t th t f h j t lt l t h t th i ijti f l t i Liki t th J i h C h i Di H itl t i t hd t bli th h bjt d t l d th t i ijti f li ll Th T k i t l hd i bl ith t Sbjt told they had "bad blood" rather than syphilis In order to follow the progression of the disease subjects were given spinal taps a fairly painful procedure where a needle is inserted between two vertebrae and a small amount of cerebrospinal fluid is with d Whil i l t f l d i t i th bjt tld t h t th " t t t " f t h i b d b l d E h f th 600 b j t d i d b t th f th t d d th d t i t i d f th f t d t i f th h M thiit h l i t i i d th W i l l b k i t f lki i f d t b t th i h btl th th N i i t MKULTRA th l t i ijti T k O df D S l K gave for his research was that "only children with parents who gave informed consent would be included" (Beauchamp and Childress 1994) Critics however question whether this parental consent was adequate First some maintain that t itti i hihi f d t ibl If W i l l b k fll th N b C d "[T]h i l d h l d h th l l it t i t" d " h l d b ittd t b bl t i f f h i " B t th W i l l b k b j t h d ith th l l it t t th bilit t i f f hi Th bjt i t i t t i l i d th hild d th l t d d Th D l t i t Hliki k room for proxy consent but some critics of Willowbrook suggest that research should never be conducted on retarded children unless there is therapeutic intent Second critics questioned whether parents were adequately informed about the ik f th h B h f l li t h t "it t l hth ll t tld tht h t i t i ti t f t l li d t t i t h t th i ibilit t h t i h i d l i l t i if h h d it ii i li h t i t i " ( B h 1970 125) T h i d th h d tht t t t l l t S f th t f th hild l l d i th t d h d i i t i l l b t d f 414

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W i l l b k b f di th t l d t h t th i i th special hepatitis unit Thus some parents faced the choice of whether to include their children in the study or lose the option of placing them in Willowbrook Given the shortage of institutionalized care at the time some critics maintain that the ti i Th th l d t ld tht h t dt ll t h i hild i th W i l l b k i t th did t i thi i f d t

Bfi The second principle of research ethics identified by the Belmont Report is the principle of beneficence The Belmont Report interprets the principle as creating two bliti "(1) d t h d (2) i i ibl b f t d i i i ibl h " ( N t i l C i i 1978 6) Oth h i l h k btl d i t i t i bt t fb f Th h i l h Willi F k (1973) f l d i i d th i i l fb f it f l bli ti (1) ht t t iflit il h (2) ht t t il harm (3) one ought to remove evil or harm and (4) one ought to promote good Both Frankena and the Belmont Report begin with the obligation not to inflict harm (sometimes called the principle of nonmaleficence) but Frankena gives us a more dtild t ht b f i i dditi t lf Th i liti f th i i l fb f i t h i t t i i th i t tht b f t f i t b itl b l d ith i k Thi f t i tht ik i t t h bjt t b t hi th h bjti If h ld b d i d i tht ld l i i t ik d till hi th h bjti then it should be so designed Some risks however cannot be avoided so we must determine which of these risks are justified While there is no formulaic method for making this determination the goal is to weigh risks against anticipated bfit Wh th i i l fb f t i th h dl f th t t i t h t tht f th fll h t S f th l l h

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i t d H l d Bl did f iil i t d t d b th D t t f Df Y t i th th i th N i i t th i fh i l th i h t iitill bli J h M l claimed that his experiments did not harm his subjects Since prisoners who were not used as experimental subjects were typically sent straight to the gas chamber Mengele claimed that his research did not make prisoners worse off For th f i h i d M l ' i t d f d t th d f th M l i h t b i h t t h t hi i t lft th i ff th th l t t i D tht M l did t h hi b j t ? Th i hih M l l l did h th th ll f f d d did t hi h d M t i t l bjt ff f t l d t h t it ilt th i i l f b f i ? 415

PATRICK BOLEYN-FITZGERALD

A iil i i h i th T k td I th T k study researchers left 399 cases of syphilis untreated Apologists claim however that the Tuskegee study did not harm the health of its subjects The treatment for syphilis in the 1930s was neosalvarsan which required 2 0 4 0 injections over the f i d did t l lt i B 1948 iilli idl k t b ffti t t t f hili b t it i ffti f t i t i th i i t i l t f th di t f tit h h hd hili f d d I th d b th ti iilli k t b ffti t t t it h b t lt t hl T k ' bjt C t l t h t th i th T k td ld h b better off if the study had not taken place While there may be many cases where it is difficult to claim that research subjects would have been better off had they not taken part in experiments this does not i l t h t th i i l fb f i h liitd libilit R h fb f i if hd tl bjt ff i l t th i i l F k ' iti f th i i l i hlfl h Th i i l fb f i t l d i t i t i t t id ki bjt ff B f i l d i t i t i t t th h d t d M l l l fil on this account He had numerous opportunities to prevent suffering and save lives Instead of taking those opportunities he contributed to the suffering and carnage of the concentration camps The Tuskegee researchers also fail They could have tried to i th h l t h f t h i b j t Th ld h t t d th ith l h th t d b th ld h t t d th ith iilli i th 1940 d th ld h d th t h b i i i i th h f t i i W tb tht f th ti ld h td h f l b t th h bl ti Th ti ld t f i t t d i ti hiliti tit' llbi Th t t f th i i l fb f i i t hth k h bjt ld h been better off had they not participated but rather whether investigators seek to protect and promote the health of their subjects

Jti Th fil i i l f h thi i d t i f i d b th B l t R t i th i i l fj t i I it tb i f th i i l fj t i i t i i d i i d l thi d d t t th f i l Wh l thi i i l t h experimentation we are typically referring to the more specific idea of distributive justice the idea that social benefits and social burdens ought to be distributed fairly H i t t i t bth il b f i t d il b d E i tti tibt t bilit t t t di d h t t t bfit f i d i i d l hlth Bt b th f i t i t dt i hth t t t k i t i t h h bjt l b th i k f i ij dth h t t t f i l t li t tti Th bfit d ik t l t l t ' h th fit l i d d l b t jti i h i t t i

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Th i liti f th i i l fj t i t h i t t i h been in the area of subject selection When the Belmont Report addressed justice it expressed concern about the possible exploitation of vulnerable populations It stated that "the selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order to d t i hth l ( lf tit til il d thi iiti fid t i t i t t i ) bi t t i l l l t d i l b f thi ilbilit t h i i d iti thi ilbilit th th f ditl l t d t th bl bi tdid" ( N t i l C i i 1978 9 1 0 ) F t h it td " h hld t dl i l f likl t b th b f i i i f b quent applications of the research" Some of the cases we have reviewed seem to violate the principle of ustice by selecting subjects in an exploitative manner Tuskegee is one obvious example All f th 600 b j t i thi t d Afi A i I th d d ldi t T k i l t i A i dii Mdil litt th lt i t t h d l t t i t h t i ft d i t ttitd Thi i ill t th t i f lit h h i i ft t d Afi A i h i idibl l tit ith littl l f t l O physician at the time wrote "Virtue in the negro race is like 'angels' visits' few and far between" (quoted in Jones 1993: 25) Another doctor referred to African Americans as a "notoriously syphilissoaked race" (quoted in Jones 1993: 27) The l f th i t ttitd d th d i f th t d h d iti t ld tht T k h h d littl t f thi bjt O hiti l d d "Th b littl d b t t h t th T k h dd thi bjt l th h " ( B d t 1978 2 1 9 ) Th i t f i t ttitd bjt lti i th T k td i l l i fjti b t it i t th l R d l f th h ' it ti h th d i d th t d th f f t t d i t i t l b d social group Only African Americans bore the burdens of the research Since the selection of AfricanAmerican subjects served no scientific purpose it would have been problematic even if there were no racist intent Problems of overprotection i i l t l i d i th B l t R t id f k f l Th th i thil i Th h b t l h l f l i thi t k d h b i t d it tl lti f i l d d t h t i l models Initial attempts to apply these principles focused on the protection of sub jects Respect for persons focused on informed consent so that individuals would be protected from coercion fraud and deceit Beneficence focused on protecting indi idl f t d ik A d j t i f d tti f litti Thi f hld i i th th t t i t h t dl l k f tti f h bjt Whil thi i i t i l lt f h b it t th bl hihlihtd b h d l th i t thik t h t h thi tf th th tti f bjt E l lti t 417

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h b tti i t l t t t i t l d f terminally ill patients and access to participation in research protocols for women and minorities Consider first the case of terminally ill patients and their access to experimental drugs In recent years patients with endstage cancer AIDS and other ttill lthl diti h d d d t i t l d hih h tt l t th l t h l Th tf d t If t i t ih t t i t l d i l l if i t l t t t h littl h f i th t i t th h hld t t d i th f tht tit' i h ? I t thi t th F d l D Adiitti dt lti h i h ll tit quicker access to new treatments First the Treatment Investigational New Drug Program allows patients who are likely to die within a matter of months access to unapproved drugs as long as there is no "satisfactory alternative drug or treatment i l b l " ( B d 1998 39) S d th A l t d A l P t fil l t ill ii t t t (Bd 1998) B t h f th t t h t th l f liiti ik f tit hld b b l d ith th l f bli t h i f th t i l l ill A d bl ith tti i i th d t t i f women and minorities as research subjects Consider the case of women For most of the twentieth century research subjects were predominantly male From the perspective of the protective ethic this would seem to harm men more than Ui tl h bjt t th t di t i t i k Citi f th d t t i f h l i t h t th l b d h b b b Th it f h bjt d i th ti b f i t W t t dil t t t difftl f If t t t l t t d th i t l fidi b i i t l lid t Thi d th P b l i H l t h S i ' T k F W ' Hlth I t l d "Th h i t i l l k f h focus on women's health concerns has compromised the quality of health informa tion available to women as well as the health care they receive" (US Public Health Service 1985) This call to include women as research subjects (and a similar call t i l d i i t i ) t t h t th l f liiti ik t f l d i i t bjt hld b b l d ith th l f ditibti th b f i t f h fil Problems of insufficient protection Despite the focus of research ethics on the protection of human subjects and despite occasional problems of overprotection insufficient protection remains a serious concern Part of the problem is a practical one A recent study found that research bjt ft f d b t th d i t i t i bt th d h i f d b t th t t i l ik f h d litill h f l b t th tti h f hbfti th ll I ti th l f th thi ft t t Bt t h t i l i l i R t hi d l i ti i l l t t l i i d i t b t h t kid f bliti h h t t t h bjt

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I 1997 P t L i d Sid Wlf t d t f th P b l i C i t i ' Health Research Group criticized the ethics of several experiments conducted on HIVinfected pregnant women in developing countries (Lurie and Wolfe 1997) More than a thousand children become infected with HIV every day This problem it d i t ilbl t t t tht liit ifti Wh id di (ZDV i l AZT) i d i i t d t H I V i t i t bf d d i lb d th d i i t d t i f t htl ft th b th iid f HTV t i i i d d b t t h i d Aft tdi h d d t t d th iti f f t f ZDV it b th t d d f i th U i t d S t t d th d l d ti B th i t b t $1000 h millions of HIVinfected women in developing countries do not have access to t This economic barrier has motivated researchers to find a cheaper regime of drugs No one doubts the importance of studies that might find cheaper alternatives N li t tk L i d Wlf h i t i i d th b hih l tdi tid t t t i thi l th i t i i d th f l b tlld til P l b t l l d til i t l t t t t t t t t h h t t h h i l i l f f t Si th k t t t f d i HIV t i i th l b t l l d t i l k i l ith held effective treatment from patientsubjects Instead of a placebocontrolled trial Lurie and Wolfe (1997) argued that research ers should have conducted an equivalency study The new regime should have been t t d i t th i f ZDV k t b ffti If h hd td t d t t d i th U i t d S t t th ld h hd hi bt t d t i l td R l t i f th tti fh bjt ld h i d it L i d Wlf d tht hld t d l tti t h bjt h d t t d i i th d l i ld Th d tht h j t hld b id ti d l i t f it ld b i d d thil i d l d t Other scientists have defended the studies arguing that the use of placebos did not harm the subjects If women who received a placebo had not been enrolled in a study then they still would not have had access to effective treatment The same i ti tiltd i t f th h flli th " l l t d d f " Th t d d f i A i i t i HIViti t ZDV b t th t d d f i d l i ti i t t t t ll Th i l b t i th t d d f tblihd f A i dil ti b t th t t d di t th " l l t d d f " Shld h t t d i t th l l t d d f should they afford the same protections to research subjects in developing countries as they do to research subjects in developed countries? Marcia Angell executive editor of The New England Journal of Medicine, agreed with L i d Wlf' itii d fth td tht t t t t tif th h l l l d th f T k "Th j t i f i t i " h t " ii t f th f th T k td i th T h i d W l d ld t i [ZDV] th i t i t i l b i ht ld h t th b j t ' i f t if th t d " ( A l l 1997 847) A l l ld tht "it if h t f f T k ft ll" ( A l l 1997 848) 419

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A l l itd t l i ith T k bt I td li th t of justification was used by Mengele He claimed to have left his research subjects no worse off than they would have been if he had done nothing There does appear to be a parallelism in the justifications used by HTV researchers and the ustifica ti d b M l B t thi llli hld i N ld l i t h t HIV hi d l i ti i ll i l t t th h i f i i t d t d b M l S h t i th d i f f ? O t d dititi i t f th i i l fjti W h l d t t fi j t i i th T k i t i d i i i t ti t l t bjt d lti th i tht d i t i t l burdens one social group There is however another type of injustice relevant here It is unjust to exploit an existing injustice When individuals suffer an injustice t is exploitative for others to use it to their own advantage while doing nothing to correct it Thi t f litti i t i bth M l ' i t d T k M l l i t d th i j t i f th " f i l l t i " I t d fdi thi tht ld i h i b i t N i t t t t id h t i b t d t th d th d th iti t hi d t Th T k h l i t d th il j t i f 1930' Alb I t d f idi d iiti th h d their subjects' disadvantaged position as an opportunity to collect data Focusing on the exploitation of existing injustices gives us one explanation for how Mengele's experiments and Tuskegee were unjust Focusing on exploitation l i t th i j t i f th i t M l l i t d th i d i ti f i Th T k h th th h d litd il d i i i t i d th d i d t d iti tht lti f tht d i i i t i Whil b t h j t M l ' litti i Th T k h d th l t d hlth f thi bjt t thi d t d did thi t t tht l t Th b t iht li f M l h i t h t h lft f hi bjt ff th th alternative of summary execution We can apply the same reasoning to the placebocontrolled HIV trials No one would suggest that these trials are morally equivalent to Mengele's experiments b ld t t h t th t i l litd ijti id B t th ll i l t t T k ? Did th i t lit ijti th i f Afi A i i 1930' A l b ? S iht id th litti ll i l t Th l b l d i t i b t i i P l i d l i ti di b th l k f hlth t l i f i t t t S t h t th ditibti f h an important human good is morally arbitrary and unjust If we accept this argu ment then the neglect of HIV patients in developing countries is unjust for the same reasons that the neglect of the Tuskegee subjects was unjust The placebo t l l d HIV t i l ld b l t T k W iht h d dititi W iht th l t f Afi A i hlth i 1930' Alb j t itht i th l t f HIV t i t i d l i ti j t W iht th l t i T k j t b it th lt f il d i i i t i Th l t f tit i d l i ti th th h d iht b ttibtd t it

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f tht tijti Thi ld t t h t th l t f HIV tit in developing countries is merely unfortunate Some commentators who defend the trials take this kind of position The Center for Disease Control (CDC) for example describes the lack of access to medicines in developing countries as "an unfortunate f t " If d t id th l b l ditibti fhlth t b ijti th th l b t l l d HIV t i l ld t h litd jti Th HIV t i l ld t b l t T k F i jti illtt h t i h th l b t l l d HIV t i l b l t i hil th h th dl U f t t l th i i l fj t i i t hlfl i li th d i t t is in explaining it The question of just access to health care is hotly contested and nothing indicates that this debate will be resolved any time soon If we want to move toward consensus on this issue we will have to approach it from a different ti F i th i i l fb f iht id ith hlfl h B dti l b t l l d tdi th th i l tdi h i d tit t t h Th i t i t ld h d t d thi tdi i tht ld h d d k l d hil also preventing an estimated thousand babies from becoming infected with HIV The investigators may defend themselves by arguing that they did not cause any harm and that the research subjects were not made worse off by the study b t thi ld l t tht i t i t did t i l t th i i l f lf B f i i th t i h It i t i h i h d ti d I th l b t l l d t i l th i t i t fild t tf b l h Thi itii i difft f b d th litti f iti i j t i If f litti th th bl i t l tht h b j t did t i ZDV b t t h t tl HIV t i t i d l i ti d not receive ZDV The real problem would be the inequitable distribution of health care If we focus on the principle of beneficence however we can discuss research ethics without having to answer the larger and more difficult questions of global jti I t i t h il l t i h i ith t h i h bjt d th fb f i t tht ti bliti l ith thi l i i l tihi I t i t h bliti t t t d t th llbi f idiidl h th ll h bjt A l t th i l t i l i i l tht dil f i l ht t th t idiidl d thi h th th t i l ll b l t i

Conclusion Th t t i t h t it t ditbi b i l h Ethiit dil f i l d d d t th b b t i t d t bjt A lt h b d idi td ik dj t lti f bjt

fh

bjt d t ffiil i i t i l l tti f h i f d t T t h th i i l

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constitute a protective ethic While this ethic can prevent egregious abuses of science there are strong reasons to move beyond it Sometimes the protective ethic can lead us to ignore other important values If we try to ensure protection before we pursue any other social value then terminal patients may be denied autonomous choices and both women and minorities may be under-represented in research In other cases application of the protective ethic has resulted in too little protection Investigators who conduct research in developing countries have at times interpreted their obligations to protect human subjects in a very narrow fashion These investigators see their research as unproblematic as long as they obtain informed consent and as long as the research does not leave subjects worse off But investigators have an obligation to prevent harm to research subjects under their care When investigators can design a study in a way that prevents harm to their subjects or improves their health they should

References Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (1996) Fil R t New York: Oxford University Press Angell Marcia (1997) The ethics of clinical research in the Third World Th N Eld f Mdiie 337: 847-9 J l Beauchamp Tom and Childress James (1994) Principles of Biomedical Ethics 4th edn New York: Oxford University Press Beecher Henry (1966) Ethics and clinical research N Eld J l f Mdiie 274: 1354-60 (1970) R h d th Idiidl London: Little Brown Brandt A M (1978) Racism and research: the case of the Tuskegee syphilis study The Hti Ct R t 8 (6): 21-9 Brody Baruch (1998) Research on the vulnerable sick In Jeffrey Kahn Anna Mastroianni and Jeremy Sugarman (eds) Beyond Consent: Seeking Justice in Research New York: Oxford University Press Faden Ruth and Beauchamp Tom (1986) A Hit d Th f Ifd C t New York: Oxford University Press Frankena William (1973) Ethis 2nd edn Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Jones J (1993) Bd Bld Th Tk Shili E i t New York: The Free Press d th Phl f Gide New Lifton Robert Jay (1986) Th Ni Dt Mdil Killi York: Basic Books Lurie P and Wolfe S M (1997) Unethical trials of interventions to reduce perinatal transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus in developing countries Th N Eld J l f Mdiie 337: 853-6 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978) Ethil Piil d Gidli f th Ptti f H Sbjt (the Belmont Report) Washington DC: Government Printing Office United States Public Health Service Tk F W ' Hlth I (1985) W ' Health: Report of the Public Health Service pp 73-106

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Further reading Kogan E (1950) Marks J (1978) York: Times Books and Pappworth M H (1968) Beacon Press

l New York: Farrar Straus and Cudahy l New Boston:

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Th fil ti hihliht l f h t i b t dibilit misunderstood if they are viewed in terms of ideal moral theory rather than as problems of what it is just to do under circumstances of significant injustice

U d t d i

Dibilit i R l t i

t S i l Jti

O l l i f i t 15 t fA i tl idtifid dibld ti i i l i th d d i d t i l i d ti A lti ti t th ti ill Yt th description of the classification is contentious In the United States the term is "people with disabilities" emphasizing that the disability is a separable feature of the individual In the United Kingdom the preferred term is "disabled people" liki th d i b i l i t t th ' idtit I F th t les handicapes t th f f t f il t i t ( A l b h t t l 2001 3) Th diff i b i t i l flt th ltil i h i h th t "dibilit" d ltd t h " i i t " " h d i " h b d t d Thi h t l ltil t d d bt t t i l t i l i l (one associated with WHO 1980 until its recent also controversial revisions) An "impairment" is a departure from ordinary biological functioning It rises to the level of "disability" when it limits a major life activity such as moving working or d i A " h d i " lt f il i il i t h th t k d j t t i lf ( h i h " l l th l i fild" b d lf' t h i t ) th hibiti f lf t i t t l ( d l t t d b d d ith ill t t d b i t lf ith l di t f th f lf ill d f i d PGA Tour, Inc. Martin 532 US 661 [2001]) th t t i f t t b ( h i h f f t th l t i diffilti ft t i h l h i l ) (Sil t l 1998 8 9 ) All too frequently terminology in the literature of disability conflates descriptive and normative judgments Terms such as "impairment" while used descriptively in the WHO's classificatory scheme too often also carry normative force such as he j d t tht diti i d i b l (Sil 2002) Th t i l i thi h t i i t d d f ibl t b til t l Th d t tht h i i d h i i i i l j d t tht dit f t i b l f l b f d Th ti d t t h t thi i tt f ffi t h t ht t b t d if ibl i difft d d l t t d li Sil t l (1998 87) i thi l f th flti drawn from genetic counseling: the chance of having a child with an anomalous condition is described as a "risk" carrying the judgment that it is the chance of a bad thing The more neutral description would refer to the "probability" not risk D i t fft t d i t i i h i i l d ti li h it t b k l d d t h t th li b t th t i ti d t b l i th litt B h i d th t i l i l d i t li th f tdbt b t dibil it d jti h l d th f f ttti f dibilit li b i i t dibilit il h d i ? O id th i ht jti i th

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t t t f l h h ri f t i l li Th th l t b lems of justice and disability to a greater or lesser extent in the construction of the world Major policy innovations such as the Americans with Disabilities Act may be assessed differently depending on the model employed On the social model the At lll th iil i h t l i i d i i i t b i t th i f i h t If d i b i l i t i d f t i th h t t t h th ADA th DDA b ti l f thi l di th i l iil ( F i d Sil 2000) Th id t h t li hld f idiidl i i t h b h t i d th " d i l " d l f dibilit S i l ff t i i fl dft in the person whose condition it is A blind person lacks vision a quadriplegic cannot ambulate and a person with Alzheimer's disease has developing cognitive deficits Some philosophers of a naturalizing persuasion (eg Foot 2001) have d tht h j d t b t t l f t i t ti ( l t h h t l) j d t f d bd I i d ii i th b d f th h ri it M dibilit hl h d i l tht thi h f ttitil d t i i t (Sil 1998 A h 2001) Th hl bjt ll t th f t h li tht ti f th problematic vision would be "good" for the person at issue Perhaps the most common approach stemming from the medical model regards disability as a grievous loss to the person who suffers it a loss presumably not his or h flt h i h ll f ti " S i l " d t i tht t t t t k f f t i l dfiit l f thi t h C t i h k d l b l t i i f dibilit li Di bilit i i d t i f i d ith j d t fd f i th th ith diff (Sil 1998) Thi i d t i f t i th l i tht l ith d i b i l i t i t f d f t h l d d tb dt d F til ti h i fd d l d tht f t isolation and dependency rather than independence and selfsufficiency The develop ment of institutions such as "training schools" for the disabled has been attributed to this version of the medical model of disability (Braddock and Parish 2001) t t i d d t lii d i t i h b d f d d I lli l ith d i b i l i t i t d l thi biliti (S 1980) t th fllt d th it ll t b f t f th riti f h ibiliti (Kitt 1999 B d d k d P i h 2001) Th l f i d d t lii i tk i th ADA h i h t i ti f l ith dibiliti lilti Th ADA h b i t t d t i tht public services be provided in the least restrictive setting appropriate {Olmstead v LC 527 US 581 [1999]) However this Olmstead requirement is also subject to the defense that responsibilities are "not boundless" and states are not required to " f d t l l l t " thi i d Thi bttl i t b th tii b j t f lititi i th U i t d S t t it i itiid ti th i d t d i t h t h t th ADA i i f d t l l tt f ti l ith d i b i l i t i f t h i d f i i A fth til itii i tht l i k i th dil dl h ltd i tht d t i ft bfit l ith d i b i l i t i Th i

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id tht " l f " f l ith d i b i l i t i t i t i d tib ute to isolation in lowpaying and lowstatus jobs (Drake 2001) The welfarist approach to disability policy also risks putting people with disabilities in conflict with each other Silvers et al (1998: 24) give the example of a limited transportation b d t d hih l ith d i b i l i t i t f t t A d h i k i ith th dil dl i dibilit li t f th bl f ditibti jti i hlth ith t t th d Efft t t t i i t d lik t t t f th t f ill h l t h Si th bliti f R l ' A Theory of Justice i 1971 ih it f h t ditibti j t i h b d l d ith diffi li cations for disability policy Daniels's (1985) argument that a Rawlsian chooser ignorant of his or her health status would allocate health care to attempt to achieve normal speciestypical functioning across the lifespan is perhaps the best k k i thi i Th P (1989) h d f th liitd l i tht R l i h t ditibti jti hld t t l k f i d h th b i ii k f hlth f ildi th ith d i b i l i t i R l d D k i (1981 b) h td i i dl tht lit i idi l with disabilities with the protections they would find it rational to purchase in a hypothetical insurance market The goal of these approaches is to distribute ustly in the face of disadvantages due to impairments differences in natural endowments bth itht i k i fll btti th f th d i i i t t t llbi ll Oth t h i t h d t h t ditib ti j t i i i b d lit f tit h i d t lit f lf llbi E h f th h t ditibti j t i h f b th bjt f it ti Of l h th til b t thi li ti f dibilit li Th i l i t i h b itiid bth d underinclusive Several themes stand out in the critical literature One is the dis tinction between impairments and significant variations in talent Daniels for example contends that the former fall within the scope of distributive ustice n hlth h th l t t d t A hild h h t i lt f h t h ld th h li th h tht hild h i l h t ld t Sil t l (1998) tht i i l d t i l f th d i t i t i i lki Ath b l t i li i th d i t i t i bt t l i d iti tht lt f il diti h fil t t d t i P (1989) f l bli t h t it i j t for society to compound the effects of natural inequalities This view too is criti cized for lacking a justification of why natural disadvantages are arbitrary from a moral point of view but social disadvantages are not It is also criticized for failing to i h th b t difft titi i th liti f d i f f t i d i i d l ' li O th th id th h h i ll bi d f d l i l l f tifti i th li f l ith d i b i l i t i ( A h 2001) Th l itiid f l i i lif ith d i b i l i t t i f (Ad 1999) Th h l b i d t h t th ll diiihd tti lti f il i j t i t litii

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diiihd d f llbi ( A d 1992) A t h i i th d b t i whether equality requires putting the natural endowments of some to the service of others Defenders of the social model of disability claim that many of these issues can be bypassed if we regard disability not as a defect of the individual but as a diti f it Hlth tii id fl i l l t t i fh th th l t th li l l O l f th b f i t f th t b d i t f l i t d j t d lif (QUALY) Th d b t t d jtifti f QUALY i t i Jh H i (1996 1999) f l h d tht b h idiidl i titld t l tit to benefit from a public healthcare system the use of QUALYs in rationing cannot be justified Julian Savulescu (1998) has contended that if wellbeing is the good achieved by health care there is reason to consider equally the claims to care of t l h ill h diffi liti f lif b t t t i diff til If h l d i t b f t i th f dibiliti th d th i t f l ith d i b i l i t i i th tii t i If li i l d QUALY th iil l h d i t i ill tii dibilit h i i d bilit adjusts the quality measurement downwards (Silvers 1998) To the extent that measurements are nonscalar as Savulescu (1998) contends discounting will not occur Finally there are also data that physicians downgrade life satisfactions in dli ith t i t ith d i b i l i t i d k b l t i d i i t ith hld ithd lt ( A h 2001) Th iidtifiti f dibil it d ill ll i j d t b t lit f lif b f l d b th f t tht h l t h id t likl t b b l d t h l d t l ith d i b i l i t i i ti f ik ( B t t 2001) At th it l f th dil d l i dibilit li t h t f th l il ti f " h d i " ft f il i d world design Our world foregrounds sight to touch legs to wheels and shortterm to longerterm memories Lennard Davis (2000: 56) writes: "An impairment s a physical fact but a disability is a social construction" Had it been designed differ tl th ld i h t h i i l d t h h l d th ditt t P h th ld f d it d b l l fll i h t th t h h i b t thi i f t i f b d diff th th lit l It i l lt f i t t d f f k iti i i t l h d i i f l h f i th d i t f f i t i i t A N l l (1999 173) writes: "Those of us with disabilities tend to have to rely upon Social Security because of the way society is ordered rather than there being an economic situ ation which enables and facilitates our contribution to society" Defenders of focus i dibilit li th il t f hdi d t d th f t f h i l i l diff th th t d t h t th il i f dibilit i ht tt f th it f i f jti B d th iti f th dil dl iti t h b d df d t d i dibilit il h F i t f ll diff i h i l i l f t i d t il t k f t i l i t i th ld W h t 428

DISABILITY

i f t i l i ld i h t b h i h l d f t i l i th S d th social model better accords with the selfunderstanding of people with disabilities who experience their handicaps not as a function of their own deficits but as a matter of barriers erected by the way in which the world is designed (Silvers 1998) P h th t t l it db d f d f th il d l i t h t it d t d ttt h th A i ith Dibiliti A t t d i t i l iil iht l Th A i Ciil R i h t A t f 1964 i d t l i i t b i b d d i bli dti l t d d t i Th ADA f l l thi d i It i l f l t k bl accommodations for otherwise qualified employees Viewed through the lens of he medical model this provision of the ADA "compensates" people for their deficits by accommodations On the civil rights model by contrast the ADA removes barriers hih k it h d f l ith b d i l diff t k th l ith th O thi d l th l i i t t i t " b l d t i " i t liit l d t d il iil I t d it f l t th i tht i di ijti tb i ith tl iti ld d i ( F i d Sil 2000) In defense of the social model Anita Silvers urges the thought experiment of imagining how social practices would be transformed if unimpaired functioning were atypical (Silvers et al 1998: 129) To the extent that our social practices b b d t t h l th itd d d f thi tilit th f t t h t bilit i l i i t t ttitill d i t i h i i d ld ti ld l l diff I th t ld idi i til l t t h i f d i b l d hik hil idi i h l h i iif l k h th l lki (Sil t l 1998 62) O itii fS i l ' t h h t i t i t h t i th t l ld i t l d t h i i d f t i i it i ffit t design for the majority Silvers observes in reply that current world design may not be efficient; "universal" design modalities might have been ust as efficient and more inclusive Moreover from the point of view of justice Silvers argues inclusive i t b f d t ffi Sil i h th t d f f b t i l i d ffi M i l i d t tk difft f i f i i f t iti dibiliti S h i t Sil t d hld b dd bl f ditibti ti f i th th f l ith d i b i l i t i t h l Wh li t b d dh th t bl fjti fit t t h h i i issues for defenders of the social model (Goering 2002) The above discussion suggests that the medical and social models of disability ie in tension with one another Several recent theorists however have contended that d t h t i l l l th h t jti t i flit t l t t h t th t t t h i h th flit i thiki I i f til Did W (Sil t l 1998 W 2000 2001) h l d th iblit t h t th t d t i d i i i t i dl b dd i l t th fj t i C t i hth b d lit f tit lit f lf k t k f idiidl' 429

LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS

d f i i d dl l biliti t t it llbi Compensatory approaches falter from an apparent reliance on limits that cannot be drawn in a principled way They falter as well from regarding people with disabilities as suffering from medical problems diagnosed lacks or deficiencies n llbi h t h i difflti t l t h tt fh it i d B t th f di d i b i l i t d i i i t i flt i it W S i l t f f t b t h th li f l ith dibiliti d th li f l ith i t biliti D i b i l i t d t tht hit f t i t i t i k th f bt t th l t t W t tht idil j t ll f f t th li f l ith b l t training the airplanepropeller mechanic in today's world of et engines for example or limited talents such as mathematical abilities (Silvers et al 1998) Wasserman also points out that changes in society alone are unlikely to ameliorate th i t t i f l ith f d iti d i b i l i t i T h i i b t l it i t f biliti bi bth f i d i i d l diff d th i t f il t bt W (2001) d b t t h t thi h b i fll i i l d tilti H t i t d t h t th f d tl bl i ht jti i i th f f th iti fh diff Viewed in this way the problem foregrounds basic conflicts between efficiency and equality in the design of social institutions Wasserman is pessimistic that more can be said by way of a solution Elibth Ad (1999) h d liitd lti f th di l f lit A d bli t h t th flit tlid b d i t t l t t t f i d t d i th t t f lit Th i f lit i t lit f i d i i d l llbi i it ti di tibti t k f d d b d l k i th t It i t h i d i i d l d i thi i t li I t d th t t f lit h l d b h l lt t th il litil t Thi d t d i tures the traditional target of egalitarianism: undeserved hierarchies that under mine the equal moral worth of persons People should be guaranteed as a matter of equality "the capabilities necessary to functioning as a free and equal citizen and idi i " (Ad 1999 327) Th bli i b i d h i t ili d b t f hld b t i l filiti fftil t ll N hld b td t i d b f thi diff b f th l ' ii b t ht ld b d f th Ahii th l f lit ill i diff i ditibti ill h l h i t i b i l l Th diti f l itihi must be afforded as well to those in dependency and their caregivers although spelling out these conditions requires much further work Throughout Anderson's account the lodestar is equal citizenship not equality of tit tifti llbi Yt thi i t i l id t ffi f t fj t i d dibilit W (2001) h t i d t th tht d t i lit i i t t diff h l f Pi hdhi tht d t f f t th bilit t f t i iti i l fft lit f lif th l Withi d t i iti hi W t d l k th h i bl fh t bl ffi

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d lit F i th f ith f d iti d i b i l i t i t be difficult or impossible to guarantee equal citizenship If equality of citizenship includes capabilities to live independently to the extent possible conflicts between efficiency and distribution reappear To be sure Anderson does not claim to have i fll t f th diti f l i t i h i f th ith f d dibiliti h l th i f fth d l t I t d h it t th t f itihi th th th tifti f i t lif db iti i thi d i t i t h t d h t i t th f th f dibilit d t Bt h i t b id b t h t it t t ith f d iti d i b i l i t i l iti

Cognitive Disabilities and Equality If

d t b id b t lit f itihi f ith f d iti d i b i l i t i ht diti h l d it t k ? O d i t i ld b dil thiki f ht lit f i t i h i Ath diti td b Ad (1999) d Sil (2002) ld b t t t t t d l fll count of how to achieve the capabilities of equal citizenship for those with profound cognitive disabilities One motivation for taking cognitive disabilities as a basis for rethinking equality of i t i h i i th i k f iliti Dibilit d t iht t b d b t kid f t tht tk t d d i f l tt d ith f d dibiliti liiti F l i th i l iht dbt f d l dibld h ti d t t f hth li b d bt h d h i l N h i l it i id l t h t i t i tht f d l dibld h d t thus it is inconsistent to argue that all and only humans have rights What disturbs disability advocates about this argument is that it treats profoundly disabled humans as marginal and marginalized cases (Fairbairn 1991; Byrne 2000) Whether the t thi ti t t i hift i d t d i fb i t t th h t f thi h l f d t i t i h i difft tt S l t t h i t h d t h t th i l i t i f iti dibilit h t thi i it f d t l Aldi M l t (1999) t d tht ll " d d t t i l i l " d th h d f th i t th ft fd d h hi h t b i l th E Kitt (1999) t h t th h i iti f hih i i l fj t i t b d f d d must be reconceptualized to incorporate dependency Kittay's view is not merely that we must rethink the substantive demands of justice to recognize the nevitabil ity of dependency It is that the very moral point of view is itself a position of d d Bth Kitt' d M l t ' k h i th i f dibilit i li di l t i h i ith th Kitt f l i l l iht i h d i i fh t it ili bth th ith d i b i l i t i d th h d th k f ll Kitt' k t i l l h l bl th li bt th i i f i f dibilit f j t i i it d th i i f f dibilit f d t d i 431

LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIS

f th j t fjtifi i i l fjti C t h i S t k (1997) h diti guished between a decision procedure for selecting principles of ustice and the substantive principles of justice themselves To incorporate dependency into the Rawlsian choice procedure as an additional feature of the perspective from which i i l fj t i t b jtifd i li t difft l l f th li tht tt fj t i l i d t th h d d t d th h f th Kitt bli t h t th f i i d t hi th l t t b t it i t l h thi h l d b A d i i d iht i i i l fj t i t b j t i f i d t th h d d t ll t th h tl t t ti i t h i li thik f t h l i d d t rational agents It might achieve the project of justification on behalf of those with profound disabilities by constructing representatives for them In this way t would assign independent moral status as subjects of justification to all The substantive i i l f jti tht ld lt f thi h t h t i l d i i d iht b thi lik th t f lit f d t i itihi tht Ad f Th iht l i l d t f th ith iti diff tl t t bi ht l thi iht t tt i t f th d l t fthi iti What kind of a justification might be forthcoming on the other hand when the decision procedure itself features dependency? Kittay suggests that dependency ought to be added to Rawlsstyle decision procedures but provides no account of h t th lti j t i f i t i h t b lik (H btti t ll d i t d t th t l d i ijti i t t t t f l ith d i b i l i t i d k ) Th i k f l i d d t th h t f d f jtifi i i l fj t i i t h t th i i f f th i d d f li ill b l t t th l l f j t i f t i 0 th btti l l ll k b hl i t t d i dibilit i h tk ttill b l t i diti b t d t d i f tonomy and the nature of the individual In her work on people with Alzheimer's disease Jaworska (1999) argues that the capacity to value and with it the capacity to exercise autonomy in at least rudimentary form can persist in the face of major iti l F J k th it t l i th tti f ' i i t t i f It d t i b t biliti f til h th bilit t thik l ih l f 1 A ith A l h i ' di h ti f hilf itit t h h h d th i f th tiit ftht it id t l Wht tt i hi f i t t Wh t ld b others then help him to apply those values to make decisions they are helping him to achieve autonomy The "prosthesis" of assistance in decisionmaking in the form of a surrogate functions much on the analogy of the prosthesis of assistance i blti J k d t t k thi it fth t d i i f it i l i t i f d t d i f th lf B t h i th " l f " h tiit i d i i k i iht b d t d t d d lf d f th l f th A l h i ' tit d th i kill f th t Oth it dibilit h i f t tk thi t E d d (1997) f

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l t d tht idiidliti d t d i f th lf ill constituted is more fertile ground for understanding disability as integral to identity But the wisdom of abandoning the idea of the ontological independence of the self or the value of autonomy might well be questioned The risk of Jaworska's ap h i l f th d i t i t i bt th l f th ith d i b i l i t i d th l th h f d ith hi T th t t t h t th thti b i t f t i til f th ith d i b i l i t i ihi th i t th th th ft f li f l th li ill b b l d C t i l th li bt ' l d th l th h ith f hi b difflt t d cases Values of parents and their children with disabilities may be the same or utterly intertwined (Ferguson 1998) But the line may nevertheless matter if the possibility of conflicts between the values of the person with disabilities and the l f th i t b k l d d Th i d d f th lf tt f lll Witht h i d d th d f i h th i d i idl hld t i hi h iht b ddl tbl I d d it i bl t h t th t fd l i t f d t i itihi f l ith f d dibiliti f t h d b th ibilit f independence and the understanding of what autonomy requires At the outset t should be noticed that there are many different kinds of cognitive disabilities and what is required to pursue equal citizenship in the face of these differences may i d l (B 2000) B ti b d i b i d l ditbi hit f ti liti d i l ith iti d i b i l i t i P t (2001) d i b h b d t d i t i t t i l i t i h b l d b fft t li th i t t i f l ith iti i t A t di t t i h l l k f thi h Wh (1998) h d l d t f l f d t i t i f l ith j iti i t hih d t d l f d t i t i th f t l ' life and destiny For people with significant cognitive impairments the goal should be helping and supporting their selfregulation and involvement in the process of decisionmaking to the extent possible It should also include recognition of how th tibt t th (Ah d Fi 1988) T t k l f th t f hild ith iti dibiliti f til litt l l b t "thi" d l t h d t t h (F dF 1996 F 1998) Thi b th l fJ k ' i t d t i f th id f thti d i i k If it li t d d d t d i f t d th t f th lf l lbit tht l b flfilld i ltil ways Writers on disability quite rightly protest against regarding persons with severe cognitive impairments as cases at the "margins" of humanity The response of at l t hl h b t l ii tht f d d d t b i l l l Th l t t i ti d l d h i tht hld k t d t d i t i l ti f d t i lit h tht d l d b Ad t b i l l i t l ith di biliti

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C i d i It i

Dibilit

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t i tht l i d thi i b t th liti f l th t l ld bl Thi t i h l d l bl F t moral theorizing takes place against the assumption of idealworld conditions In A Theory of Justice, for example John Rawls (1971) famously disavowed any efforts at partial compliance theory leaving such messy problems to another day But the bl f l i d thi j t bl f til li th i th d ithi th t t f th id d ti i i ijti f di lif If k i l i d thi i th diff bt idl d til li th tht i d l t h i b lid itht l t t i t til li t t it t A fll t f til li th li f t i d th f thi h t Thi fil section however sketches several illustrations of how disability policy might profit by being seen through the lens of partial compliance theory rather than ideal theory Applying the distinction between partial compliance theory and ideal theory as i b t h th ld i j t d h it i j t It t b k l d d t th t t tht t f ht i t t d b t dibilit li th t t d t f iti ijti Tk l th d i f t t ith b If t h t d i i t tt fjti h b it i i t d ith th i fk i f h th ld ith b ill t b j t ld O th th h d if i j t i i tt f barriers which could have been or now could be otherwise affecting peoples' ives then street curbs would be regarded as an existing injustice Partial compliance theory on the view sketched briefly here holds open the possi bilit t h t h t it i j t t d d i t fi j t i i td t i d b th d i t liti fi d l i i l fj t i b jdi lii i t f thi ti d i t tibti t li t d idl jti R t f ll t t i i i l t t d jti t dditil l i til li t t ( F i 2002) Th i h t i l d th f l l i It i i t t i til li t t t avoid creating new moral roadblocks in progressing toward ideal ustice In partial compliance contexts priorities of ideal theory should be followed unless there s a moral reason to the contrary In attempting to achieve progress toward ideal justice l ditibti idti i d d t l i i f t Th t f t d jti h l d b ditibtd idl ibl L i t i t tti d l d d i t t fijti d lid b th h h th hld b t t d t th t t ibl F i l l h l d b tk i d l i t d jti tt l t t i tht b d b f th did t d Th l f th i th d i b i l i t d b t several of which are treated briefly here First consider the concern about abortion in the context of disability policy M dibilit hl d f d f t Th d f i i t if th ti hth ti t hld ' iht t bti h th f t h d i d dibilit B t t h i

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b d f d d tt f til li th W li i t t f injustice toward people with disabilities Part of what contributes to that context s that people with disabilities are in the minority If abortion reduces their numbers we may expect the risks of injustice to worsen for them (Silvers 1998: 95) Thus t h h dti libt iht b i i t i i d l th th f til li th h it i h t b idd P h i i i t d iid i lll l Althh t l th f ' di iht b i t t i t t f i d l th it i h t b idd b th t h t it i k i l d i t i ijti i th d i t i b t i f hlth Next consider the limitation in the ADA's ban on employment discrimination to the requirement that employers provide "reasonable accommodations" When the ADA is viewed as a compensation statute this is taken as the boundary of required ti Wh it i i d t i d i i i t i t t t thi i t k i t th i t t f l i th f f t t b i V i d i t f til li th thi l i i t b i d d i liht S l h d i t t i bl li iti ti I h l i t i t tti f l iht b dditil moral consideration to be weighed in the balance of making progress toward ust ice Perhaps the right way to strike this balance is to set some limits to what the employer is required to do; perhaps an even better way is to provide some shared ti ( t h h t dll likl ) h th l b ill h t i ki t d jti S l th th h d ill h d i t t tht t bl tht h l d h tiitd i l d th hld t b f t b liit bidi Ptil li th d i t t d th l i t i f th i t t t th i f th if f th l F i l l th Olmstead d f k t h d bifl b b j d d t i l l problematic in light of partial compliance theory Olmstead permits the state to defend against the claim that it has unjustifiably failed to offer community place ments to qualified people with disabilities The defense is that to provide the l t ld f d t l l lt iti tt Thi d f h ll th t t f tt t ditt ht tt i id t d t t th bilit f l ith d i b i l i t i t b i th ld It d t i df i t f th j t i f b i l i t f tt' ll it t t l ith d i b i l i t i I t d th Olmstead d f l k t hth tt i ti d d f it l t ld d t djt t programs in a manner disadvantageous to existing services It thus allows the pursuit of justice for some those currently without community placements to be traded off against the pursuit of justice for others those served by existing pro Olmstead l t th b d f ki t d jti fll th l b l th th bi d idl i it t h h i d t dit bth i t t f til li th P h ti i d t l l it l d i t ttti f iti l d b l k i th d t d i f ht jti i i th ii f l itihi f l ith f d dibiliti

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Handbook of Disability Studies J

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Americans with Disabilities: Exploring Implications of the Law Ititti B d th Mdil Mdl? Th Dibilit Riht M t d th E t i for the "Profoundly Impaired Bithi Bithi f

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Jaworska A (1999) Respecting the margins of agency: Alzheimer's patients and the capacity t l Philh d Pbli Affi 28 1 0 5 3 8 W Elit dD d N Y k Rtld Kitt E (1999) L ' Lb E M l t A (1999) D d t R t i l A i l Wh H Bi Nd th Vit Chi cago: Open Court il t f d i b i l i t di d ti t Gill N l l C (1999) Th P Hlt D dChdik J l f Mdil Ethi 25 1 7 2 5 T R (2001) I t l l t l d i b i l i t i di? I G L A l b h t K D S l P t and M Bury (eds) Handbook of Disability Studies pp 2 6 7 9 7 Thousand Oaks CA: Sage P T (1989) Rlii R l Ith NY C l l U i i t P R l J (1971) A Th f Jti Cbid MA H d U i i t P Savulescu J (1998) Consequentialism reasons value and justice Bioethics 12: 2 1 2 3 5 S A (1980) E l i t f ht? I S M M i ( d )T Lt H Vl 1 Cbid Cbid U i i t P Sil A (1998) P t t i th i t f h i i i t d i i d dibilit d i i ination and the duty to protect otherwise vulnerable groups In M P Battin R Rhodes d A Sil ( d ) Phii Aitd Siid E d i th Dbt 13348 N Y k Rtld (2002) R i h t f l ith d i b i l i t i I H L F l l t t ( d ) Ofd Hdbk fP tical Ethics Oxford: Oxford University Press W D d M h l d M B (1998) Dibilit Diff D i i i t i P ti Jti i Bithi d Pbli Pli L h MD R d Littlfild d t d d f iht di t i l i t N 31 S t k C S (1997) D i i 47895 t B k J (1966) Th i h t t li i th ld th d i b l d i th l ft t Clifi 54 8 4 1 9 1 9 L Ri Wasserman David (2000) Stigma without impairment: demedicalizing disability discrimin ti I LP F i d A Sil (d) A i ith Dibiliti E l i Iliti f th L f Idiidl d Ititti 14662 N Y k R t l d (2001) P h i l h i l i i th d f i t i d il t dibilit I G L Albrecht K D Seelman and M Bury (eds) Handbook of Disability Studies pp 2 1 9 5 1 T h d O k CA S Wh M L (1998) S l f d t i t i didiidl ith i i f t dibiliti ii i d i i t t t i J l f th A i t i f S Hdi 23: 5 1 6 Wld Hlth O i t i (1980) I t t i l Clifiti f I i t Dibiliti d Hdi G WHO

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Asch A (1998) Distracted by disability Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7: 7 7 8 7 B i k b h J E (1993) Phil Dibilit d S i l Pli T t U i i t fT t P (1998) D i b i l i t dl i f d i d i i I M P Btti R R h d d A Sil (eds) Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate pp 1 2 3 3 2 New York: Routledge T B (1999) M d l fd i b l t i l i d th i t t i l d Ut fi i t dibiliti dh d i S i l Si d Mdii 48 l i f t i 117387

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Brock D W (1988) Justice and the severely demented elderly Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13: 73-99 (1993) Life and Death Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Buchanan A (1996) Choosing who will be disabled: genetic intervention and the morality of inclusion Socio/ Philosophy and Policy 13: 18-46 Brock D W Daniels N and Wikler D (2000) From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice Cambridge: Cambridge University Press DeRoose F (1989) Ethics and marginal cases: the rights of the mentally handicapped Journal of Applied Philosophy 6: 87-95 Kuczewski M (2001) Disability: an agenda for bioethics American Journal of Bioethics 1: 36^4 Morris J (2001) Impairment and disability: constructing an ethics of care that promotes human rights Hypatia 16: 1-16 Raskind M H and Higgins E L (1995) Reflections on ethics technology and learning disabilities: avoiding the consequences of ill-considered action Journal of Learning Disabilities 28: 425-38 Stone D A (1984) The Disabled State Philadelphia: Temple University Press

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A l t h bliti t d th Th bliti ld ti ith t f th' b i l i h t t lif l i b t d f d f th j t i f d ifliti f h M t f bli tht i f t d tll d i b l d l h th b i iht t h h th t ( ) b l t Th i h d i t b t hth human zygotes embryos and fetuses ought to have the same basic rights And there is even more uncertainty about the moral status of animals plants species d t D l bliti b i d d t th b d f i ? If t h f d th td? S f th t i li f ti t i t th t th ti b t l tt Ib i ith d f i t i f l tt N t I di i t h i h f hih t t idtif i l d ffit diti f th i f fll l tt I tht f th unicriterial theories captures all of the considerations that are relevant to what we owe to human beings animals plants plant and animal species and ecosystems In my view an entity's moral status can only be determined by considering a com biti f ti f it i t i i ti d ti f it l t i l ti Fill I id th i l i t i f thi ltiitil h f bl h ft h i l d tit hi

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To have moral status is to be an entity toward which moral agents have or can have moral obligations We can have moral obligations regarding almost anything f i t h h d i i l i it B t h l bli ti t d l titi th tht b ll d I iht b dlibtl t i ht bt ill bbl t thik t h t I h d th h t B t h t if I h d t d t? W l d I h iltd l bliti t th t? I d l l h ti ld b d b li t dfiti th f l tt H th t h dfiti th

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P h i l h h df it fi t i b l t h i b t th b i f moral status and the preconditions for having it Many hold that there is a single intrinsic property the possession of which is both necessary and sufficient for full moral status The properties most often nominated for this role are moral agency ti h i t ti d i lif Oth h i l h tht l tt d d t h i t i i ti b t il t i l tihi E h f th t h i i i i t i l i t h t it i t t ltd t f ti d t i t i f l tt E h h it b t l i k

The Moral Agency Theory I

K t (1997 66) " R t i l d i t d l t d t t h i " B " " h t i l l t tht i bi h bl f l i d f i thi b h i b th i l l i i l hih l M l t d i t h l th h i t i i l d b t t d l t th d f others (Kant 1948: 90) All moral agents have the same basic right to ife and to liberty as is compatible with the like liberty of others (Kant 1991: 63) These rights are not absolute; for example killing in selfdefense is sometimes ustifiable How th tb iltd l f td i i tilit O th th h d i Kt' i h i l d th titi t h t t t i l l t thi th h i t i i l d b t t d W h l bliti di th bt h bli ti t d th Th t t t h f thi th i t h t it i fll d l l tt t ll idiidl h bl f l R d d th diff between human moral agents are not to be used to justify invidious discrimination Even extraterrestrial persons would qualify for full moral status provided that they bl d illi t t th ll O bjti t th l th i t h t it l h i l til b d th h f h l bliti If i l t l t th it f l l tht th thi t tti f l t t t K t tht lt t i l i l i f it i d i t l h h bi f i t b d i th t' l h t (Kt 1963 2 3 9 4 1 ) Thi t i i d t f if th thi h t l wrong with needlessly harming animals then why would we expect it to damage the agent's moral character? An equally serious problem is that this theory appears to place infants young hild d th h bi tht t tl bl f t i l l i th t f thi Thi i h i h l tititi I f t d tll d i b l d ll t h h t t h b i l i h t Whil thi libt ti b liitd i tht ld b b j t i b l th t t d l t th liitti t l b jtifid i t f thi b t i t t tti th b i i h t f th

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A thid f dbti th d f th l th i tht despite its endorsement of equal rights for all human moral agents it has often been used to disenfranchise members of socially subordinated groups who were fully capable of moral agency Since the time of Aristotle the claim to superior rationality d l h b d t j t i f th f f l ih d thi th (Aittl 1932 63) Th t t i ft k i ill b d i t t il d t t thi t i l l t thi il i h h th t i li h d t t i O t th d d thid b j t i i t d th th ki potential moral agency sufficient for full moral status This enables us to include infants and mentally disabled persons who may someday return to full moral agency However the amended theory still excludes human beings whose disabil iti t thi b i t i l l t t i t l N d it t th i f th th t d b i iht t b l i t b d i t h b d i t d lki th ttil f t i l l K t f i t t h b l i d tht l k tht t t i l i hi i ft d th i h t thi f t i t l emotional reasons but they cannot reason and act upon universal moral laws (Kant 1960: 81)

The Genetic Humanity Theory O t t h t ll h bi h fll l tt i t k ti h i t ffit diti f h i it O thi th ll b f th i Homo sapiens h th b i l iht f ti t dth This is the view of the Roman Catholic Church and of many other groups that oppose the legal right to abortion In John Noonan's words "The criterion of hu manity is simple and allembracing: if you are conceived by human parents you h " (N 2000 235) Th h bli tht ti h i t i f f i t f fll l tt f t l t h t it i l di ti l t h h thi ti i t l d d d O t t h f th ti h i t th i t h t it t fll l tt t i f t hild th tll d i b l d dh bi tht l t h h t t b tll i f i O thi th h ti b dt d h b i ' b i iht But is genetic humanity either sufficient or necessary for full moral status? It is clearly not necessary since it would make good moral sense to treat friendly extra terrestrials were we to meet them as our moral equals Why should differences i bil l t ii t t ? Wh f t h t tt hld bli tht h ft t i l ii h l tt dl f ht l b t it tl d i l biliti? It i ll d b t f l t h t ti h i t i ffiit diti f f l l l tt Ftilid h till h i b t th diff f i f t hild d d l t i t h t th t t t i t bi Th t 441

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suffer pain frustration or the loss of a life that they have experienced as pleasant As we shall see these differences have moral significance

The Sentience Theory Sentience is the capacity to experience pleasure pain and other conscious mental states Some moral theorists maintain that this capacity is both necessary and sufficient for having moral status Of these some argue that all sentient beings have the same moral status (Singer 1992) Others hold that while all and only sentient beings have moral status their relative status varies depending upon their degree of sentience self-awareness or other forms of mental sophistication (Sumner 1981; Steinbock 1992) Both versions of the sentience theory require us to extend our moral obligations well beyond the boundaries of the human species It is highly probable that most vertebrate animals (mammals birds fish reptiles and amphibians) are sentient Their behavior and the similarity of their sensory and neurological equipment to our own provide strong evidence of their ability to experience pleasure pain and other conscious mental states The sentience of complex invertebrate animals (such as cephalopods arthropods arachnids and crustaceans) is less certain since their nervous systems are very different from those of vertebrates However the fervor with which many of these animals pursue some things and avoid others argues for some form of sentience Another argument for that conclusion is that sentience has great survival value for mobile organisms such as these which must actively ind food shelter and mates avoid predators and so on The primary argument for the view that sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status is that all and only sentient beings can mind what happens to them Although the ability to experience pain is valuable to mobile organisms serious pain is itself a harm Pain is an inherent evil to the being that experiences it and pleasure an inherent good Thus sentient beings can be harmed and benefited in ways that non-sentient entities cannot Not only can they be caused to suffer they can be deprived of lives that may (on the whole) be pleasant to them The primary objection to the strong version of the sentience theory is that it would be virtually impossible to live by On this theory we are morally obliged to give equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings regardless of their species Thus the suffering of a mouse or a mosquito must weigh as heavily on the moral scale as comparable suffering on the part of a human being (Singer 1992: 15) But even vegetarians must sometimes harm creatures that chronically threaten human well-being such as mice rats flies and mosquitoes In practice this means that some sentient beings cannot be accorded equal moral status To be sure killing such animals is often a matter of self-defense; and we are sometimes ustified in killing other human beings in self-defense But the standards for the ustified killing of mice and mosquitoes are inevitably much less stringent than the standards for justified homicide We may not kill other people because they carry pathogenic organisms but we sometimes need to kill rodents and insects for that reason

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These considerations suggest that while sentience may be sufficient for some moral status it is not sufficient for full and equal status Thus the strong version of the sentience theory is inadequate However the weaker version is not refuted by these considerations On this version of the sentience theory harming large-brained mammals is more difficult to justify other things being equal than harming insects and other organisms that are probably less highly sentient This leaves more room for self-defense against insects and rodents But even the weaker version of the sentience theory is vulnerable to the objection that while sentience may be sufficient for some moral status it is not obvious that it is necessary Plants and non-sentient animals are living organisms and as such they are vulnerable to human-caused harm Why should the non-sentience of these organisms automatically mean that we cannot have moral obligations toward them?

The Organic Life Theory Some environmental ethicists maintain that organic life is the only legitimate criterion of moral status Paul Taylor (1986) points out that living organisms are teleologically organized systems which strive to maintain their existence and reproduce their kind Consequently he says they have a telos or good of their own which demands moral respect He rejects the arguments for the view that human beings have greater intrinsic value than other organisms Our distinctive abilities do not demonstrate our greater value because every species has distinctive abilities that have been shaped by its form of life Thus Taylor (1986) concludes all living organisms have equal moral status This means we may harm living things only when necessary for self-defense or for the preservation of human life One strength of the organic life theory is its thoroughgoing rejection of anthropocentrism The science of ecology has taught us that all natural terrestrial life-forms play a role in the functioning of the biosphere Indeed non-sentient ife-forms are more crucial to that functioning than are sentient animals Moreover Darwinian evolution and contemporary biochemistry have taught us that we are biologically related to virtually all terrestrial life These discoveries cast doubt on the belief that we have no moral obligations toward so-called lower forms of life The primary objection to the organic life theory is that human beings cannot give equal respect to all living organisms while still surviving and living tolerable lives To protect ourselves we must destroy millions of micro-organisms for example by bathing or cooking food To grow crops we need to plant cultivate and harvest all of which activities are likely to harm many small beings such as worms insects and spiders We can justify these activities on the grounds of self-defense and human preservation However we cannot at the same time claim that we are according the same moral status to microbes as to human beings Thus while ife can reasonably be viewed as sufficient for some minimal moral status it is not sufficient for full and equal moral status

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T S

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h i l h tht l tt d d t tit' tl iti b t th il th l t i h i tht t it t h l t Nll Nddi (1984) tht h l bliti t th human beings because we have a natural capacity to care for and about one another We have obligations to sentient humans not only because we are psycho logically capable of caring for them but also because they are capable of responding t tht If th d l t th th bbl bl f f l l i l i Bt i f t d tll d i b l d d ith i ti d iti d thi i h t d bliti t d th W l t h l bliti t d l t d i l hld b i l d i i f th H th t bli ti t h bi b th ttil f i i t i l J Baird Callicott (1989) argues that moral status is based not only on such social and emotional relationships but also on ecosystemic relationships He follows Aldo Leopold who held that all moral obligations flow from community relation hi E h f i i l d i b f il iti A b f il it h bliti t th b d l t th it i t l f H l b fb i l i l iti d h bliti t fll b f th iti t Th b i h it t l f lii i bt l f il i t d th lii thi B t f th th' lif it d d d t it f it ll b l i d t t t ll f it b i tht protect its integrity stability and beauty Callicott points out that human beings have social relationships not only with one another but also with animals of other species These animals belong to what M M i d l (1983 112) ll i d il iti C l l i t t tht th i t i f il l t i h i til il l bliti Th bli ti h d b th l d iliit il t t bt h d i l f i i hih diff f i t th Th ht t ttl d hik b difft f ht t d t dh ( C l l i t t 1989 56) Each of these relationshipbased theories provides important insights about our moral obligations Noddings's insight is that we cannot be obliged to treat all living organisms or all sentient beings as moral equals because our social relationships to th h bi difft f l t i h i t t th i W h il bliti t tit h bi b d t l bilit t f d b t th d th il l f tht i Cllitt' i i h t i tht t i l tti t ll h i b i i t t t thi t th th d d d b h tiiti R d d t i t t t th tl t f th P i f N t h t th ddli d thi lti are much more vulnerable The redwoods are an endemic species that is ecologic ally crucial and very slow to reproduce; while the dandelions are prolific non

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ti d i d fl l lbl titi C t l tti redwoods must be a higher moral priority than protecting dandelions The primary objection to these relationshipbased theories is that they deny or understate the ways in which an entity's mental and social capacities can entitle t t l idti i th b f i il t i lti hi S i l d l i l l t i h i t il l bliti bt h b i bliti t d t i t bi tht d t h l t i h i C i d f i t th l i l bl db i t d d i l I A t l i th f l d d t f i t d bbit h l i t buffalo and other nonindigenous herbivores have damaged native vegetation leading to erosion and loss of habitat Predation by feral dogs cats foxes and pigs has driven many small marsupial species into extinction or nearextinction These ft f tlli th lti f idi i l f b lthl H it ld b itk t ld tht l i l l d t t i idi i l h l tt t ll A t i t bi th titld t tti i t lt Th h ti it ltil il thd f killi f b l t th tht t t d ffi and nonlethal methods of control such as the use of speciesspecific contraceptives ought to be sought Moral agency is also directly relevant to moral status We are obliged to respect th b i i h t f ll l t idd l t h t th ill t I th St Silb fil ET t t t i l bi i idtll t d d th Th hild h f i d hi li t h t h i d d tl d t t hi I thi th h t l id th th d l t h t t kill hi i t h t fit d t i i hth h i htil d Th t b t h f ti bt h tht iitill li t th I ith d th b f i il l t i h i tif unprovoked aggression

Combining these Criteria N

f th i i t i l t h i f l tt i tift M l lif d il d l i l l t i h i ll l t t l tt h i difft Th t h i t ' t k t h f i t bi th iti i bl A fit t bi th i i h t t h t we have reached about the moral significance of certain intrinsic properties This results in a scale of moral status On this scale all living organisms have some moral status but those that are sentient have more than those that are nonsentient; and l t h t tt th ld b b d ti l Th i hld dlibtl b h d itht d bt tit i ti b h d f tht l lli th itl h d I f i t ll d d l i l t i th f th d H i t i t bi i t jtifti h lfdf th ti fh lif A d h i l t ti

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requires the strongest justification of all one compatible with their basic moral rights However an account of moral status based entirely on these intrinsic properties remains inadequate It cannot explain why we owe more to human infants than to mice or why protecting elephants from human poachers is more important than protecting rabbits from foxes To explain these legitimate distinctions we must appeal to social and ecological relationships We have special obligations to infants because they are part of our social communities And it is important to protect elephants not only because of their unusual intelligence and sensitivity but because their very slow reproductive rate makes their species highly vulnerable to human predation In contrast natural predation does not normally endanger prey species which have evolved to withstand it

Principles of Moral Status Combining criteria of moral status based on intrinsic properties with criteria based upon social and ecological relationships will inevitably result in a theory that s somewhat more complex than any of the uni-criterial theories However the complexity need not be so great as to make the approach impractical One strategy s to express each criterion as a general principle allowing each principle to clarify others This will result in a set of principles such as the following: 1 2

3 4 5 6

7

e: Living organisms are not to be damaged or destroyed without good reasons that do not violate other sound moral principles e: Sentient beings are not to be killed or subjected to pain or suffering unless there is no other feasible way of furthering goals that are: (1) consistent with other sound moral principles; and (2) vital to human beings or to other entities that have a stronger moral status than could be based upon sentience alone The more highly sentient and mentally sophisticated a being is the stronger the obligation to avoid harming it e: Moral agents have equal basic moral rights including the rights to life and liberty e: Within the limits of their own capacities and of principle 3 human beings who are capable of sentience but not of moral agency have the same basic moral rights as do moral agents e: Within the limits of principles 1-4 non-human members of mixed social communities have a stronger moral status than could be based upon their sentience alone e: Living things belonging to species that are important to their ecosystems and endangered by human activities have within the limits of principles 1-5 a stronger moral status than could be based upon their intrinsic properties e: Within the limits of principles 1-6 and to the extent that is feasible and morally permissible moral agents should respect one

446

MORAL STATUS

th' ttibti f t l tt t ti based upon their intrinsic properties (Warren 1997)

titi

th

ld b

Principles formulated at this level of generality will inevitably leave room for dis t b t til I bti ll iibl t ll t f ?D th t i l t i i l f b i d killi i l f t? H h fft h l d d t t th titi f b fih i t i? R b l l di b t h ti hil i b t th l t l i i l H t b t i i l id b i f fth d i i d th h f t l

Human Zygotes Embryos and Fetuses O th i i l bti b ll b l t i l ft th f t b i t b t i t Thi t bbl ith t i t l t i th d t i t i th t h i d t i t f H t b d t i t ft h l tt b it fbi lii i B t th are not the moral equals of sentient beings The presentient fetus cannot value ts life or be deprived of a life that it has consciously enjoyed Thus death cannot harm it in the ways that it can harm a sentient being Because it is presentient it is not (t) b f h il it It i t b f l i l l i t t i tht i i d f titi d t lti dli S h bi l it d ih t t t it b t th t i t i i t f t i i l d t it th t t t it i tht i l t ' b i l iht E l bti i ti t h t d t t t t h i li libt d h i l i t i t F th it i t th l i l t fh i i d d requires no justification beyond the woman's voluntary decision Once the fetus begins to be sentient its moral status changes somewhat As a being that can suffer and enjoy it is protected by the anticruelty principle More it i lik i f t d it i t l f t tt t t it H lt bti i ti ll j t i f i d I it i t t t ' lif h l t h I th h d tk d b h i l d lf bi l t d b f th il it I th it i j t i f i d b f t l b l i t i tht ld i l lif f i i l l d lit I th li b i t h ff littl b f i t t th ibl t i t ft d bti i ll d f i b l ti

Are All Animals Equal? Wht f Fit

ti ill

i l ft d d thi i Th ii difft l bliti t d i l d th t l biliti i d It i t l tt t th t (hi

t l t th fd i f f t it t b b

d i d ill

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MARY ANNE WARREN

d t ) d th l b i d l h dlhi hl d elephants because it is reasonable to believe that their intelligence and mental so phistication make their lives more valuable to them than those of mentally simpler animals such as mice or rabbits S d h il bliti t d t h d th b f i h l t i h i t h bi h ft i l d fidhi d t l ffti W l h bliti t i l tht h t i l l b d f f d b t th d t l i l d th b l i t i t t kill th If h bi h itl d tht t b t itht t ilk d th i l d t th liti th i l t b t i th d t i t always immoral However even these animals are entitled to protection from cruelty Rearing chickens pigs calves or other highly sentient animals under con ditions of extreme confinement and crowding is likely to cause them serious and h i ffi Thi i l t b t h th t i l t i i l d th i l i i t il t t bt kid d thi Thid l i l l t i h i t id th l l t t f ti d t th tti f i l f i i It i i t t t t t th lif f hClifi d th th lif f h hittild d b th d are a desperately endangered species while the deer are not On the contrary n the absence of natural predation their numbers must often be reduced to prevent serious ecosystemic damage It b b j t d t h t th l l d diff i l tt i l l i t i t If ( ) i l h th b i l iht h bi th it i j t t t t i l f i i f t th f th it i t t t l iht t h bi f th t th f th (R 1983 3 6 1 2 ) Th it i t ii t h t th h b f t flit b t i l iht d t h li t iht f idiidl i l d i t l i t h l th d f th t tht f individual plants or animals I believe that in this debate the environmentalists have presented the stronger case We cannot provide the same protection to all sentient animals while also tti th t i h i h th i t Th i till d b t b t hth th b i h i itlf lii i H it bl i i th l i t d d f it t Th l f i i l t th l f bdil h h l i likl t d th t W i i f titi th tht h d i th t it i d i th illi d thi d i t i h d T ht f th earth's biodiversity we will need to favor some plants and animals over others especially in ecosystems that have already been seriously disrupted

Machines and Artificial Lifeforms Th S d l

448

t f

lif

i i l

h

d

t

t i

d th

ld t

i

tt

ti h i l

If th

lii t

hi

tht l

f

thi i

MORAL STATUS

f th f t i h t i t i f lii i h l f l i t i th th should probably be regarded as artificial lifeforms However they need not be organ ically alive to deserve protection against cruelty If a machine could suffer then causing it to suffer needlessly would be cruel and a moral wrong against it Whth tit hi ht t b dd l l iht ld d d it th iti bth tl d i l If it lf d bl f l i it t i d it th th f l lit ld b tl t t h d bt t til t t l d If it i l d i il l tihi ith h bi thi ld b dditil f ti t l bliti t d it A d if it bl d illi t t l agent with due concern for other beings then it would be manifestly unjust to deny it the basic rights to liberty and continued existence If on the other hand t behaved like a human sociopath then granting it full moral status would be ex t l d If h bild hi tht bth tit d tl l i t th it ld b i t i th ith thi ki t I A i ' Th L fRbt hih d i d t t h i l bi f b i th t fh i t (Ai 1991) W h t b t th l tt f tit h i ? If hi i hll nonsentient then it is unlikely to have much moral status A thing that can neither suffer nor enjoy and that has no desires regarding its future cannot be harmed in ways that matter to it Damaging it may defeat its teleological organiza ti h i th tht d i l t f t t it t l l b t it ill t ff b d i d f it t h t it i l j B t h t if tit hi t d t t l ?Wht f de facto b f h il it dh bi d it b t it? Thi i th i b h i d th h t f D t th bl h i d d i d f th t l i i i Star Trek: The Next Generation. A hi lik D t ld bl b titld t l b i iht H I t t h t it ld be very difficult to build a machine that is both a reliable moral agent and entirely nonsentient If it is to understand the effects of its actions on sentient beings then it will need (something like) a capacity for empathy And if it is to be motivated to t i th i t t fh th b i th it ill dt b t th I h th i f th iti i l i i d th iti f i i t th A tit hi iht bl t d t d th li f t i t bi ll h t b iti d ibl l t A l t t i l it i h t i hii h d t d i l hi f f ti

Conclusion Wht t titi f i t d d bth thi i t i i ti d thi l t i l ti W hld t dlibtl h lii i itht d bt t i t bi titld t idti th i tht l l tit Ab i ' d f ti d tl hititi k diff t th l f it lif t it d th t it

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moral status Moral agency is sufficient for full moral status It is not however a necessary condition since we have good reasons to accord basic moral rights to sentient human beings who are not moral agents Sentient machines would be entitled to protection from cruelty; and if they were capable of moral agency they would have the same basic moral rights as sentient human beings Social and ecological relationships can also alter moral status Sentient human beings and non-human members of our mixed social communities are entitled to special protection That is why both infanticide and late abortion require compelling reasons to be morally justified; and why we owe more to human infants than to most sentient animals What we owe to animals also depends upon how endangered their species is locally and globally and how much its loss would impoverish the ecosystems to which it belongs

References Aristotle (1932) Th Plitis trans H Rackham London: William Heinemann Asimov I (1991) I Robot New York: Bantam i E i t l Philhy New Callicott J Baird (1989) I Df f th Ld Ethi E York: State University of New York Press Kant Immanuel (1948) The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Life dt Mh Libt i Ctibl ith th Lik Libt f Oths trans H J Paton London: Hutchinson (1960) Obti th Fli f th Btifl d th Sblie trans John T Goldthwait Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (1963) Lectures on Ethics trans Louis Infield New York: Harper and Row (1991) Th Mthi f Mls trans Mary Gregor Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997) Critique of Practical Reason ed and trans Mary Gregor Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Midgley Mary (1983) A i l d Wh Th Mttr Athens Georgia: University of Georgia Press Noddings Nell (1984) Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press Noonan John (2000) Abortion is morally wrong In Louis P Pojman (ed) Lif d Dth A Rd i Ml Pbls pp 235-9 Belmont CA: Wadsworth Regan Tom (1983) The Case for Animal Rights Berkeley CA: University of California Press Singer Peter (1992) A i l Libtin New York: Random House Steinbock Bonnie (1992) Lif bf Bith Th Ml d L l Stt f Eb d F t s New York: Oxford University Press Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Sumner L W (1981) Abti d Ml Th Taylor Paul W (1986) R t f Nt A Th f E i t l Ethis Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Warren Mary Anne (1997) Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press

450

33 Killi

d Ltti

Di

ALASTAIR NORCROSS

I th ll i i f t d i t i t i bt killi d ltti di? I ti l i killi i i t l f th ltti d i ? Thi ti h i d h ttti i t i l t d t th i d ti ith th li di t h i Al l d dil h dll d i th U i t d S t t t h t " t i t i f lif t i l i t i t d certain circumstances" (Meisel 1992) The consensus which is grounded in he right of both competent and incompetent patients to refuse treatment also recog i l dititi bt ti t h i d itd iid th h d d f i l i f t i i t t t ti f d t " i t h i " th th Thi d i t i t i ft idtifd ith th d i t i t i bt killi d ltti di i itl l t i i t i i th T h h th l l i t h t th i h dititi bt ti d i t h i th i b bli thi i t Th activities of Dr Jack Kevorkian who has assisted in numerous suicides n recent years command as much public admiration as condemnation Before I examine the philosophical debate over killing and letting die I should set id ibl liti Th d i t i t i bt killi d ltti di t b if f th l dititi bt di h d l l i h B t thi i t it i h t M t f killi i l di h d t f ltti di i l l l i h H th hih d t h i t h dt h f i h i h killi d t i l di h Th i l th i h i h th l f t h i ith ti i i t t Wh t i d lif i l h l i ffi death may be a benefit to the sufferer It follows that even if doing harm is morally worse in itself than allowing harm active euthanasia may not differ morally from passive euthanasia In what follows however I shall ignore this complication and t t killi if i t fdi h P h i l h i l dbt th d l diff bt killi d ltti di h f l i h d i t I f th l i ttk th d i t i t i J R h l (1975) l i t h t th A i Mdil A i t i li tt t t h i d th d t i t h t th i i t t l diff bt killi d ltti di H f t h t h t th i h 451

ALASTAIR NORCROSS

diff d th t h t th AMA li i ment consists of the following pair of cases:

i l

f l d

R h l '

i

In the first Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should happen to his i l d i O i hil th hild i t k i hi b t h S i t h k t th b t h dd th hild d th thi t h t it ill l k ik an accident I th d J l t d t i if thi hld h t hi i l d i Lik S i t h J k i l i t d th hild i hi b t h H j t h t th b t h J th hild li d hit hi h d d fll f down in the water Jones is delighted; he stands by ready to push the child's head back d if it i b t it i t With l littl t h h i b t th hild d ll b h i l f " i d t l l " J th d d thi (Rachels 1975: 115) The two cases differ only in that Smith kills his cousin while Jones "merely" lets his cousin die If the difference between killing and letting die were morally significant in itself claims Rachels Smith's behavior would be morally worse than Jones's b h i H th t ll hibl S killi i t i t l f th l t t i di R h l ' t fll t d d f t f t b t th l tt f ti f t tt i fb h i t h t diff l ith t t th f t i ti If th b h i diff ll th f t i ll iifi t i i t l f If t it i ll i i i f i t Thi thdl i b t i l t h h It t th ti t h t if ft i ll significant in itself it will be significant wherever it appears Against this assump tion some have argued that a factor such as the difference between killing and letting die could sometimes be morally significant and sometimes not (The claim is t t h t th f t ld ti l t th i f l f th f t ti b t t h t th f t ' ifl ld i h all other factors are equal) F l F K li t h t th f l l i ti " t l t " f ltti di d t f bt t ll f killi (b') Letting die does not create a threat d t h t (c7) Viti i l d (d') Viti l ht h ld h h d i th t i ti (kill ) (f) The agent's efforts would provide the victim with continued life (Kamm 1983: 301) Fth i i f i t i f killi hih l i tht th h

452

h li th dfiitil ti f ltti di iht b ll tht " i t d i t tll t f ltti di i t iht k th til killi il j t i f i d th killi l k d th t " (1983 301) S i f ti t h t diff i killi d th th ltti di i h t diff ll hil i iht t Th killi d ltti di i h t diff ll

KILLING AND LETTING DIE

t h h ti i t f killi d ltti di d t diff h ll th factors are equal In a different article Kamm (1992: 370) focuses on a combin ation of factors (d') and (f'): ltti di b d f i t i i l li only lif h ld h h d b it f it M ti t d t h ill b d i f f t i ll i i f t way from my letting die by inaction when the act causes someone to lose life he would h hd i d d t l f it (thh h h it b irt f th it f th) S h

d

it f l l

t h t killi

i

i i t l f th

ltti

di?

S

ltti di h d t t f it b dfiiti h i h did k l ll b j t i b l hil killi did t h dfiitil t ith th effect I suggest that other things equal between them this would indicate that killing 1983 301) d ltti di diff ll per se (K

Thi i diffilt l i t C i d th f l l i f i th t l f d fitd d dd S d d d l i bth l l l d ll th fitd d b it l k premeditation which firstdegree murder includes Do murder and seconddegree murder differ morally and legally per se? The question appears to be ill formed The correct comparison with seconddegree murder in this case is not simply murder bt fitd d Th f t ith l iifi i t th diff bt dd d d d bt th th diff bt dittd d d dittd d It i th b f ditti tht h iifi Liki h id K ' t th it li h l d b t h t th f t ith l iifi th f ( ) tht h li t b " t l t " f ltti di t th difference between killing and letting die itself It is furthermore not at all clear why the factors she cites should be thought to have moral significance Another possible objection to Rachels's example is that it may not be possible to li f it t th k i d f tht t Th l i l t i f l l t b h i P h th i l diff bt l l t l killi d l l t l ltti di B t t il li f thi t f t h i hih i l b l t titi P h b l t killi i th b l t ltti di Of thi k i d f bjti l b id i t t f thd i f examples Whatever the distinction we are trying to isolate if the examples differ only with respect to that distinction there will be any number of other factors held equal that could have been different Merely identifying one such factor poses no l t h t t th i i l t R h l ' l bth i bth bt it ld b i d i l t t tht ld t li t killi d ltti di i th l t i It i h t b b j t d t h t th diff bt l l t db l t titi i ititil ll l t th th d i t i t i bt l t i d th M b bt ht i ititil ( t h h t t i l l ) l t i th d i t i t i bt i fb l t b h i

453

ALASTAIR NORCROSS

d i f l l t b h i It i tititil bi t h t th d i t i t i between a distinction involving malevolent behavior and a distinction involving benevolent behavior is morally relevant At the very least the objector to Rachels's argument owes an explanation of why such a distinction should make a moral diff bt dititi Th di d i i illtt i t t t h d l i l it i t f th l l i l f dititi It i l ibl t b j t t t f i f l tht til dititi i ti ll l t d ti t Th b j t i b itlf t h h h f It tb id b l t i f h th d i t i tion is morally relevant in some cases and not in others This is much harder to provide At the very least then Rachels's argument puts the burden of proof squarely on those who would invest the distinction between killing and letting die ith l iif S f Ih b t t i R h l ' t ll i l t Th t jrit f l ititi til jd th t b i l t Bt l t iti b ifllibl id t l lit P h Sith' b h i ll i th J ' b h i bt i bth bh bdl l intuitions are not sensitive to the difference The difference between the two cases is "drowned out" by the immorality of both of them While the discussion focuses on the distinction between killing and letting die in particular this problem is hard to id E l i l i dth tt b ll h d Ptl i t thi k i d f J t h B t t (1993) f l dititi hih h i l l t t ith ll t l l B t t l b l hi d i t i t i th " k i / l l i " d i t i t i bt h d t l i t h t it l d t th di f th t H t hi d i i i f i l i id lli ff liff I "Ph" t i tti h " k i " it ll ff th cliff to its destruction In the other case "Stayback" the car is already rolling toward the edge of the cliff The agent could prevent it from falling by placing a rock in its path but she does not do this thus "allowing" it to be destroyed An k ht b t if h b h i i " i t i l l t " t th t h t h ll it t b t if h b h i i " t i l l t " t it Th i t i / t i dititi "d t d i t i i h t kid f ti th ti t i " ( B t t 1993 232) It i th dititi bt t kid f iti d th l f t Th iti i ti h t bh t ti ifill h h h bd A ti proposition about an agent's behavior at time t is a very uninformative proposition in that it does not tell us very much about her behavior but merely excludes a few possibilities That the agent did not place the rock in the car's path at t tells us very littl b t h t h did d t t It l l d th ltil ll ti f ibl b d i l t tht ld h t th k i th th f th Sh ld h b di b f th thi i t d h d i i iki dii itti t k till A iti iti b t t' b h i t t th th h d i i f t i iti i t h t it l t t f th ibl b d i l t h ld h b ki T h t th t

454

KILLING AND LETTING DIE

h d th t t tll td l b t h b h i li t t fh possible bodily movements We can now see what it is for an agent's conduct to be positively or negatively relevant to a particular upshot Suppose that an upshot U comes about at t2 and furthermore that an agent called Agent could have be h d t h t it did t b t L t ti b th l t t ti t hih A t ld h b h d difftl tht U ld t h d Wht l k f i th k t ft A b t A t ' d t t fi h i h h ddd t d i t i fA t ' i t ild lt l l t i f U If A i ti A t ' d t t t\ i til l t t 17 t h t i h ll Ut If Ai iti h d t i itil l t t U tht i h k U When Bennett first presented his distinction he intended it as an analysis of the distinction between killing and letting die In fact the distinction fits the vast major ity of cases of killing and letting die However it is a fairly easy matter to concoct tldih l tht t i l killi bt j d d t h i b B tt' t I th l i h t f h l B t t l li t h idd l i f di f "kill" d " l t d i " b d l " k " d " l l " Hi i t t dititi tht dli h f thiki th tt d t h t h t it t b f l l Few if any would dispute his claim that his distinction cannot bear any moral weight Those who think that there is a morally significant distinction between making and allowing must come up with an alternative account Bennett himself t ht h id t b th t idbl i l t hi t i d d b Al D (1977) d b t h t h t th t t l l b t i h i ititi d tht l t t i t h ibl b t d t d i fD ' t D dfi ti " d d d i til itti t f i t [ i t i ] tl f [th t'] bdil d tl t t " (D 1977 42) H ti Shld h b d i d f ll f ti th i t t i ildi hi bdil d tl tt ld h di t th l f t Hi d d t either interventions in that natural process or abstentions from intervention When he it h b d i b d i ht ld t h d hd h btid d h h bti lli t h ht ld t h happened had he intervened Hence from the point of view of action the situation s conceived as passive and the agent qua agent as external to it He is like a deus ex machina h i t t i k diff t ht t h i ld t l l b t i t h t th (1977 4 2 3 ) In considering what would have happened if Agent had not acted what would have happened in "the course of nature" (his phrase) t i l d t l A t ' h i l bt l "bdil d t l t t " It i th i fh tht ti t i t i th f t t ll t t tk fA t ' d d ith i t t i btti Th tht t th f t ht ld h h d ti th tht l th f t h d btti

Donagan asks The course of h i h i A t th it All k diff t

455

ALASTAIR NORCROSS

T l k f th f t ltti t t k it l l dli good deal of unreflective thinking about morality It is no doubt connected to the equally unreflective notion of "playing god" When confronted with the familiar example of a runaway train heading toward five people trapped on the track some l ill f t t ithi th t i t i d t k ith l th d t h t th hld t i t f ith th t l f t t h t th hld t "l d " (Th l h k b l littl l t t i t f ith th t l f l i f t h t i ill b i th f tibiti f l) S h ttitd bdi ti tht h lldfid ti f th f t tht k ht d plans Presumably god was somehow instrumental in sending the train hurtling toward the five people trapped on the track If we switch the train to the other track we will have usurped god's unique role in making life and death decisions It rarely t t f thi li f i tht i t t bi iht h t t t h h th d i i f l t At l t i t i th f t ith l iifi d ti l th liti i h t i tlti t l bi h ih b It d h i t tht t d t itil ti D dfi th f t ith respect to an agent's action at a time in terms of the exercise of human agency Something happens in the course of nature just in case it would happen if the agent did not exercise her agency However it is not clear just how we are to evaluate the t d t f t f t l f th f "if A t h d t id h x ld h d" D t t h t th f t i l d h i th t' b d i l d tl tt B t h t kid f h th f t d t lt f th i fh ? P b l h i l fl t i th f t If fl t d h d h d t b h it i th f t I I f b l i f i th f t f l t h t fl i i t d head Could I save or end someone's life in the course of nature? Consider a bigoted policeman challenging a black suspect in the street The suspect reaches into an inside pocket to produce his wallet The policeman shoots him before he can produce th llt A b i t d l i ' hti blk t h h f iid kt ld b j t h fl ti b h i fl O D ' if t h t li i hi t h t th t h l t th II hi t di A d i f f t li h ld t f l i l h t ld b j d d t h killd th t i th i t If h i th i d l t h d t f h t l ll th t b h d th occasions when the harm results from an exercise of agency Conversely if helping others is a deeply entrenched part of your character you actively harm them on those occasions when you decide not to help If doing harm is worse than allowing h thi i i lt I ti i t th b t t h t th ti d th h t th b t t ti A t f th f t tht i t d i l k ill h t id h th E if th ti f th f t t b i tift hil hil di it i t l h it l iht B t t

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d i t tht D ' i t t i / b t t i dititi i t b i l d i d of moral significance as his own making/allowing distinction However it is hard to see how it can carry moral weight If my behavior leads to a harmful upshot and I could have behaved so that the upshot did not occur what difference does it make h t h th ht ld h d if I h d t i d t ll? B t t t h f l th b d f f th h ld i t D ' dititi ith l i h t If t h t h t th diff bt ki d l l i i ll i i f i t t ith li h D ' diti ti i l iht id difft t f th d i t i t i d l t i fh that ti ll l t Philippa Foot (1984) attempts to invest the killing/letting die distinction with moral significance by presenting a version that appears to be a variation of Dona gan's She presents a distinction that focuses on the question of whether someone is "th t" f h t l Wh th h i ti i d t h thi dititi d hl t th k i l l i / l t t i di d i t i t i Sh i l l t t thi ith th f l l i t t i I R I ith fi l i d fd i i l d i h l I R n th fi d i l l b dii d killi who is trapped on the road In Rescue I we act permissibly if we save the five even though the one dies as a result We let the one die In Rescue II we do not act permissibly if we save the five The only way to save the five involves killing the Th d i t i t i di t F t i b t iiti tii ftl th h d d l l i h t it th th It i ft iibl h li t bi b t h b th l t t thd tht ld t iibl b b h t b t b th f Wht li thi l d i f f ? Th d i f f t t f i thi l iifi i thi ti ith d i f f t t f i h t "F th iht t i t f hih f l f iht d th l iht t d i which are different Typically it takes more to justify an interference than to justify the withholding of goods or services" (Foot 1984: 284) Originating or sustaining a harmful sequence will usually involve the violation of iht t i t f h l l i h t it ill t t i l th i l t i f iht t d i Th f t f iht i t th th l t t th f t f i l likl t b i i b l th th l t t Nti t h t thi f i f th l iifi f th d i t i t i d t i l t h t th d i t i t i l tt ll Th b i t i hih til h f l lt t i sibly by brought about either by interference or by withholding aid Even f a right to noninterference is stricter than a right to be given aid it will often be the case that neither right can permissibly be violated Ft' li b t th lti tit f iti d ti iht d dti h d d l fititi t M iht tt b i d d t th i h t if t b i th f d I d t i H l t i f ll i i f t diff bt killi d ltti di thi l t difft t f iht i l d i t th ti If th l diff bt iti d ti iht i t id tift l t i f th

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l diff bt killi d ltti di l d l t i f th former difference Why is my right not to be poisoned stronger than my right to be given the food I need to survive? The answer that springs most readily to mind is that it is worse to kill me than to let me die But this can be of no help to Foot's h i it l tk i il Th i fth bl ith h lik F t ' t h t l t th ti f W h t i it f t b l d i ti? C i d Ft' R I If th fi dl ll ftl tht i l d t h t i th t it Bt i ht i th ftl l d t h t i th ?T b if I d t hi h ill di But consider the one in my path in Rescue II If I do not stop or divert my car before I reach him he will also die Is there a fatal sequence already threatening him? Perhaps so Now consider a pedestrian by the side of the road If I swerve t d hi I ill kill hi S if I d t id hi h ill di I th t h f ftl l d t h t i him? It t h t th ftl l d t h t i t t i l iti f ith killi ltti di W h t d t i th h t h th i t i i killd l t di? R l l F t ' I kill if I initiate sustain f t l I lt di if I allow ftl sequence to run its course What distinguishes between initiating or sustaining on the one hand and allowing on the other? If I run over the one in Rescue II he dies because I hit him with the car If I do not run over the one the five die because I do t th P h th I iitit ti ftl h di b I d thi I ll ftl t it h di b Id td thi Thi l t i ld l l d th ti f d d t d d Ft' t t iti B t t ' H id iti R II I th d i t h h d t th ll f h l f th fi Il tht f J i l d th H Ik tht J tiliti ill t h i t t t run over someone trapped on the path in order to get to the five I also know that another rescuer Smith is closer Smith is a strict deontologist who will not run over someone trapped on the path even to save a hundred Knowing this I send Sith d ll ff J Sith f t th th th ith th lt t h t th fi di Th fi d i d b I l l d ff J Th l f b h i t thi d t h i B t t ld t it iti Bt h I iititd t i d ftl th " l " l l d t it ? Iti til Ih l l d th fi t di d h l l l d ftl t it One response to this kind of complication is to declare that the ordinary uses of such terms as "kill" "let die" and "allow" are pretty poor guides to any well grounded distinctions that could do any useful moral work This is Bennett's re d I t h i i h t Oth h ld d b i t d i t d f liti i t thi t Mtth H (1999) f l tht hld l t th t i f killi d ltti di ith t h i d ti l f bi d Thi H i i f di h lik killi bt i ll ith l t t i di H ' l ti f th l diff bt killi th h d d b t h ltti di

458

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d ti l f bi d th th l t d i f f t kid f rights Specifically killing involves the violation of the "right to continued life" whereas both letting die and preventing people from being saved involve the viola tion of the "right to lifesaving aid" The former right is more stringent than the ltt iht b " t h thi bi l l d iht t b i ' d i t i t th l d iht t d td b tht b i d" (H 1999 294) A l t h h thi i i t t i ti it i d i f f i l t t k h t it i t h t l t i f h th f iht i t i t th th l t t iht I t tht h l t i ill b h d t b Th d i t i t i bt d i f f t kid f iht l ill For example consider someone dying of thirst in the desert If I make a hole in her water canteen have I violated her right to continued life or her right to lifesaving aid? Would it make a difference whether I make the hole while the canteen is full of t bf th d t t h t fill it ? W Qi (1989) t i f th d i t i t i bt " h f l iti " d " h f l ti " tht i i t d d t l iht b t tht t t t l thi l t B t t ' dititi H tt hi iti fll " H f l iti i tht i hih agent's most direct contribution to the harm is an action whether his own or that of some object Harmful negative agency is that in which the most direct contribu tion is an inaction a failure to prevent the harm" (Quinn 1989: 367) Further h li th ti fd i t tibti fll A t' most direct contribution t h f l h t f hi tht t ditl l i th h Ad tibti tl th th if th l t l f th di explains the first (Quinn 1989: 366)

i th tibti li h di h t d i th it

Quinn's account thus relies on the notions of action and inaction He is not of course claiming that an agent has to be inactive in order to allow something to h It i th t' i t i i t i til t tht i i t t I iht b dil ti t th ti t h t I ll h t bfll bt i t i i t ith tt ti th h i td i t tibti t th h It i fil t t th h tht tditl li th h Thi d h lik B t t ' t Tht I fild t t h t til ti i t likl i f t i ft b t Q i ' ti f d l d i t l t i ld b d i t f B t t ' t the weakest fact necessary to explain an upshot Although such a reading of Quinn seems to make a lot of sense on its own terms it is clearly not what Quinn intended He explicitly rejects Bennett's approach in terms of facts about behavior 0 th th h d it i h d t h t k Q i ' h k itht t ft If i i tht t' b h i it f ti d i t i d t b bl t l i th diff bt th t Odi 1 ill t b f hl W j t il d i b fil t th i R I i i hi t hi f t I thi i f b h i ti i t i ? Liki dii th i R II ld b

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d i b d fil t id hi W iht l th f ti di to which my failure to save the one and my consigning him to his fate are actually two different pieces of behavior the one an inaction and the other an action This will not help Quinn's analysis though since the inaction in this case does not l i th d t h f th d i t l th d th ti If Q i ' t i b t d t d i f B t t ' t it l l t li h h f l iti i ll th h f l ti E if it i t i fB t t ' t it i h d t h t t l iif f th d i t i t i Wh h l d it tt hth t d i t tibti t h i ti i t i ? The ease with which it is possible to invent counterexamples to suggested criteria for the uses of "kill" and "let die" may ring warning bells concerning the whole enterprise of supplying such criteria It could be that there simply is no systematic t h t i th di f th t tt h h li ti dt d P t f th bl i t h t th i dd l f d i t b t til h f hih i f th f t t h t l idd i t h i liti f th t t l t i t b thi l j d t f th t h l F l th h d th d i t i ation of lifesupport for a dying patient as wrong are more likely to label it "killing" while those who regard it as permissible are more likely to label it "letting die" Jeff McMahan (1993: 402) has a different explanation for the difficulty of the task f dfii th d i t i t i bt killi d ltti di "O i t i t i b t killi d ltti di i d d b d idti tht ltil i l Bt b f th l lit f lit it i ft diffilt t d t i h t th idti i l b t th l i f t i f til " (MMh 1993 402) A d h t th ltil i l iti? I h r t th f d t l i t i t i diff bt killi d ltti cases of killing we assign primary causal responsibility for a person's t' i t t i i th ' lif h i f ltti ibilit f th d t h i t t i b t d t f t th th i t t t (MMh 1993 411) Thi

di i t h t death to an di i i b th

iil t D ' t i / i dititi hih i l hd i t f " i t t i " A d lik D ' dititi it d t l l b l iht A M M h "it i d i f f l t t b l i t h t th in which an agent is instrumental in the occurrence of an outcome could be more important than the nature of the outcome itself" (McMahan 1993: 413) Thus a deeper understanding of the distinction between killing and letting die may reveal tht ititi tht " t l t lit t h t ld b i l t t" " t l dd" (MMh 1993 413) W h t th l i th i d d bt b l i f t h t killi i i i t l f th ltti di? O i t t ft th k i d f l th dititi ft b i t id E l f killi ft i l illi iti d l l t tl t l l l l f i t t d t t E l f ltti di ft i l t h ld h t d t fft tk t ik

460

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to save the lives of the victims or victims who would not be benefited by continued life In many of these common examples then it is easy to avoid killing but costly either to the agent or to the victim to avoid letting die In many of these examples the agent of a killing intends the death of the victim either as an end in itself or as a means to personal gain whereas the agent of a letting die either does not ntend the death at all or intends it for the benefit of the victim Factors such as these at best contingently connected with the distinction are often relevant to the morality of either actions or character Another and perhaps more significant reason for the widespread belief that killing is worse than letting die concerns the cost of rejecting that belief As I said the alternatives to the commonly discussed examples of letting die often involve great cost either to the victim or the agent It is risky to run into a burning building to save someone trapped inside A terminally ill patient may receive no benefit and sometimes considerable harm from strenuous efforts to prolong her life Such cases of letting die may therefore involve either excusable wrongdoing or no wrongdoing at all However most actual victims of letting die would benefit considerably from being saved and could be saved with very little effort or risk on the part of those of us who let them die Millions die every year in all parts of the world many of them young children as a direct or indirect result of extreme poverty Modern relief agencies such as CARE and UNICEF have made it very easy for those of us who are even mildly affluent to save significant numbers of them Most of us do very little to help If we reject the belief that killing is worse than letting die it is hard to see how we can judge our behavior as anything less than abominable This clearly constitutes a powerful motivation though not a respectable reason to believe that the distinction between killing and letting die carries considerable moral weight It seems that McMahan is right to claim that the intuition that there is a morally significant difference between killing and letting die is ungrounded It is less clear that he is correct in his contention that this intuition is central to any morality that we could bring ourselves to accept However as I have said if we reject the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die we will most likely have to accept more than just the permissibility of active euthanasia If there s no morally significant difference between killing and letting die it is that much harder to justify our neglect of the underprivileged both in our own country and abroad We might well be forced to conclude that most of us who possess even modest resources are seriously at fault for not doing more to help others This conclusion would certainly be painful The unpleasantness of a moral conclusion is however neither evidence for its falsity nor even its unacceptability If we have to choose between a position that is ungrounded and one with painful implications we should grit our teeth and choose the latter

References Bennett Jonathan (1993) Negation and abstention: two theories of allowing In B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds) KUling and Letting Die, pp 230-56 New York: Fordham University Press

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Donagan Alan (1977) The Theory of Morality. Chicago: Chicago University Press Foot Phillipa (1984) Killing and letting die In B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds) KUling and Letting Die, pp 280-9 New York: Fordham University Press Hanser Matthew (1999) Killing letting die and preventing people from being saved UtUitas 11: 277-95 Kamm Frances Myrna (1983) Killing and letting die: methodological and substantive issues Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 297-312 (1992) Non-consequentialism the person as an end-in-itself and the significance of status Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21: 354-89 McMahan Jeff (1993) Killing letting die and withdrawing aid In B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds) KUling and Letting Die, pp 383-420 New York: Fordham University Press Meisel Alan (1992) The legal consensus about forgoing life-sustaining treatment: ts status and its prospects Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2 (4): 309-45 Quinn Warren (1989) Actions intentions and consequences: the doctrine of doing and allowing In B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds) Kilting and Letting Die, pp 355-82 New York: Fordham University Press Rachels James (1975) Active and passive euthansia In B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds) KUling and Letting Die, pp 112-19 New York: Fordham University Press

Further reading Abrams Natalie (1978) Active and passive euthanasia Philosophy, 53: 257-63 Belliotti Raymond (1978) Negative duties positive duties and rights The Southern Journal of Phtiosophy, 14: 581-8 Bennett Jonathan (1967) Acting and refraining Analysis, 28: 30-1 (1973) Shooting killing dying Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2: 315-23 (1981) Morality and consequences In S McMurrin (ed) The Tanner Lectures on Human Value vol 2 pp 47-116 Salt Lake City UT: University of Utah Press (1983) Positive and negative relevance American Philosophical Quarterly, 20: 185-94 (1995) The Act Itself. Oxford: Oxford University Press Casey John (1980) Killing and letting die: a reply to Bennett In B Steinbock (ed) Killing and Letting Die, pp 132-8 Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Chandler John (1990) Killing and letting die: putting the debate in context Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 420-31 Conway David (1988) Is failing to saves lives as bad as killing? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 5: 109-12 Glover Jonathan (1975) It makes no difference whether or not I do it Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 49: 171-90 (1977) Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin Hanink J G (1976) On the survival lottery Philosophy, 51: 223-5 Harris John (1975) The survival lottery In B Steinbock and A Norcross (eds) Kilting and Letting Die, pp 257-65 New York: Fordham University Press (1980) Violence and Negative Responsibility. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Kagan Shelly (1988) The additive fallacy Ethics 99: 5-31 (1989) The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press Malm H M (1989) Killing letting die and simple conflicts Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18: 238-58

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(1990) Directions of justification in the negativepositive duty debate American Philosophical Quarterly 27 3 1 5 2 4 Mill C l (1976) A hti Philosophy 51 8 0 9 (1977) D i f i i d th t f lit American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 2 9 3 9 N A l t i (1995) S h l d t i l i t i i dt l d i l ? Philosophical Studies 79 5 9 8 5 P f i t D k (1984) Reasons and Persons O f d O f d U i i t P Singer Peter (1972) Famine affluence and morality Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 2 2 9 4 3 (1977) Utilit d th i l ltt Philosophy 52 2 1 8 2 2 Stibk B i d N A l t i ( d ) (1994) Killing and Letting Die N Yk Fordham University Press Th Jdith J i ( 1 9 8 6 ) Killi ltti di d th t l l bl I W P t ( d ) Rights Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory 7893 C b i d MA H d U i i t P (1986b) The trolley problem In W Parent (ed) Rights Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory 94116 C b i d MA H d U i i t P (1990) The Realm of Rights C b i d MA H d U i i t P T l M i h l (1994) A i l t idti killi ltti di I B S t i b k and A Norcross (eds) Kitting and Letting Die pp 1 0 3 1 1 New York: Fordham University P T l l R i h d (1976) T l ' l t i i l Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 30513 Unger Peter (1996) Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence Oxford: Oxford U i i t P

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34 Th D t i

fD b l

Efft

R G FREY

Th d t i fd b l f f t (DDE) i i i l f i i thi t h t h i t t f i t l i d i i f killi i l i d thi It h l b ft f Cthli lthl f d it h f d iifi tl d t i l l i th l it h t i t i f tht t h l M tl d t l i t ll h DDE i ltil iti iht and it broadly may be thought to characterize a difference between deontological and consequentialist normative ethical theories (though a few consequentialists hopeful f tri ti d t l i l t i t i thi t h i thti t f th d i t i t i tht i DDE th t h ) Bt ht h i d f i t t b d th fi f l i t t i DDE d d it i thl d ti ti d b t h b th f l i d thi ill d i l thi d th f t h i th k i l l i / l t t i di d i t i ti th t i / i d t / i i dititi th d i t i t i bt ing and allowing death and most importantly the distinction between ntentional killing and knowingly bringing about death Revived interest however has not stilled controversy and appeals to DDE continue to spark debate It is not difficult to d t d h (I h t fll I hll dil l f f iti bt l f th ill i k l t d ) DDE i i i l f i di t hih t ith t fft d il b f d (1) if th t i riht ( t ) (2) if th d f f t i i t d d t h h th il f f t b f (3) if th d fft d t t h h th il f f t d (4) if th d h i d b th d fft i i i f t h t it th il f th il f f t t t Contemporary discussion of DDE has focused heavily upon condition (2) and t s common today to come across accounts of DDE which hold it to be the view that say doctors may in certain circumstances bring about a patient's death indirectly f f thi t f lii i dth h i h th ld b fbidd t bri b t d i t l t h h i t t i l killi I th d DDE h b d d t th i t t i / f i h t d i t i t i A d i l thi i h I h l l di it B t thi dti i f t t f th th th diti i t t t f th d t r i d l d i t l i t th d i i f hth iibl bi b t th il f f t

464

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Cditi (1) f i t k h t h th t tht i di right or wrong and this condition has almost always gone along with the view that some acts are intrinsically (or nonconsequentially) wrong How one discovers which acts are on this list of intrinsically wrong acts can be controversial The source of such lit f t d h tht h l d b tk thitti l b tt f t M t i l till h b th i l i b l th l i t h t lit f h thi b l h d tbti ll d if ll th thi ll B t th til f t f diti (1) i tht h f fidi t t h t th t i iht i d d t l f it If th d t lit f i t i i l l t th t would not matter whether it had good (as well as evil) effects; it would be forbidden Condition (3) makes a causal point: the evil effect may not be the cause of the good effect Were it otherwise then one would be doing evil that good may come l thi fbidd t th ll C t i l d d h t f DDE l t Cthli lt h l i f ld did Thi diti i b f i t t i i ildi th hl ti fh th l f f f t i th l f fft b th lit f h t d d th i I hld tt ti i t f h li Condition (4) is in essence a proportionality requirement: the evil permitted to occur must be offset by the good achieved This condition raises the whole issue of how we determine proportionality and decide how much of this balances or outweighs h h ftht S l f t d t b d d d f thi t f thi d it i l h i t i kid f ht l ld l k lik i t h i C t i l i t h l tiliti ft t h h t lki i thi d b t th bl i f d h t f DDE ll M t t h t th d f th d fft ld t b b l d d ihd i t th il f th il f f t b h l d th l ti t b i b l th DDE ld t b libl t l t itht reformulation For with Catholic moral theologians of old if the good of the good effect did not balance out the evil of the evil effect then even if the act were otherwise permissible it could not be done Nor is it clear what the reason would be for doing it A I it i diti (2) d d i t it t h t i th i h di t d i i f DDE N i it d i f f l t t d t d h th t l i diti (2) i ikl j i d D t it i id t i t t i l l kill t h i tit Ditl t i t d tit' d t h tht i b i t t i t i t t h t d t h ith d ( t li ffi) i t d ' tit d t h t i t i t l fbidd Yet the very same people hold a conception of the physician according to which while doctors may not intentionally kill they can in order to relieve pain adminis ter a dosage of morphine that will in fact prove fatal or hasten death provided they d i t l i t d th lif f i d t dth d l f idfft f d i i t i tht d f hi tht i t d i ill d dth ill b h t d If th d i t l t i t d th tit' dth ith d th d i i t i th hi ld b i i i b l it ld b d S h it b t h h t d i t i i h ll b t t d t f h d i t l i t d hi t i t ' d t h th

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th f h f hi tit' dth f h t h i di and proceeds The degree of foresight involved here is not that of mere probability All compe tent medical people know that the patient requires ever larger doses of morphine to t hi i d th d id i likl t b l h ll t t dil l l k t id i t d i d h t dth Dth i t lt t i t b t it i l til th d f hi i i d S ht h t d t f h i t d t kill hi t i t th th f h i t d t li hi tit' ffi ll th hil f i t reasonably high degree of certainty that his patient's death will ensue or be hastened Are they morally different? At first blush it can seem that the answer turns upon whether there is a morally significant difference associated with how th d d t h T h t i if th t i t ' d t h i i t d d ith d th th t fb i i it b t i t iibl h if h dth f i d f f t f th d t ' t f lii i t h i h th d t ' i t t i i i d th th t fb i i b t th d t h i iibl (th diti t) I j t i f ti d f hi i th t if d t produces death and intends the death the injection is impermissible; if the doctor produces death and foresees (even to a high degree of probability) the death the injection is permissible In the former case one intentionally kills the patient; in th l t t k i l bi b t th t i t ' d t h A th ll d i f f t ? It i t l tilit h ill h t h i d b t Th t th b i t h t th t i t i bth d d d Rth it i t h t th d t t b lf t i th t i t ' d t h i bth Tht i t t t tht bth d t dti l t i dth d bth k i l d ith th i j t i T f l i l i t t i d t fll t thi l i t It i ith thi f t f ti d it opposition to the focus upon intention that I shall now proceed What is true of the morphine case in the tradition holds true of (turning off) ventilator cases and cases involving the withdrawal of treatment by doctors: n all th d t t ll t b i b t tit' dth idd t h t th d i t l t i t d t h t d t h Th ll k l d tht tit ill i ti d b d hl t h t t t t th d h diti ftil thi th t t t t l lif f it k it i itk t i th d t h f th tit hth i f k i l b i i b t dth th il i i l i t b i t t i l killi tween them But there certainly does appear to be a crucial similarity between them namely the role of the doctor as a causal factor in producing the death of his patient It is precisely this appearance of similarity between the two doctors that prompts k i h t t t t l lif ld ll l d h t f DDE t t t fth i i th tit' i f i t t t d " l l i " " i t t i " dth t f "ltti t t k it " Thi kid f tlk i d i d t i fd t h t f th l t h t ff th tilt d th tit i th likl t di ith d f d d hdti d th tit ill t i l di Wh t d ff th

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THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT

tilt d ithd f d d h d t i ? Th d t T l k f "ltti t take its course" is especially common in ventilator and withdrawal cases that in volve omission: with the doctor removed as a causal agent nature or the under lying illness is then said to kill the patient (The morphine case is different in this d i th d t i j t th hi i t th t i t Th i tht " t " d ith th hi t i t ) It i thi l i t t h t iti f DDE b l i t h t DDE l k d tht l i f i t t i fil t ik Bt tti h d f l h I th hi th d t f dth til tit d f thi t likl t i d i t d i d h t dth With this the case can the doctor actually withhold intending that which he knows is overwhelmingly likely to occur? (Notice a possible variation with the ventilator case here If the ventilator is turned off perhaps the patient will not in fact die; at l t tht ti d i ibl Wh d f thi t f hi i h l i l likl t i d i t d i ) Thi ti f hth th d t ithhld i t d i tht hih h k i itll ti t d t assume t h t th d t k i dth ill likl di t t h t d t h Th ti tht di tht hih intends is sometimes warranted: when I intend to see my friend home I want to see her home; when I intend to have people round for dinner I desire to have them round But it seems reasonably clear that there are cases where I do not desire what I i t d I i t d t t thi bt I til d t d i t d Ii t d t b i t d t t hi t th tf l t ti t h h I h di t d Th ti bf h i t hth th d t t di tht hih h i t d it i th hth h ithhld itdi tht hih h k i l t til i t if h i j t th hi Th ti i th d i t b t th lti bt i t t i ddi bt bt i t t i d f i h t Here too however it seems reasonably clear that there are cases where I can foresee something as a very probable consequence of my act without intending t: I can foresee reasonably clearly that the department will be upset by my account of a t d t ' fil bt Id ti t d t it t b t I f i t l t i t tht it ill b i d b t i d bt Id t i t d th t b i d Whil ll i t d ht f hihl bbl f t thl t ll f i h t it i t t i I th d t i l ld t i h t f d l tht i th d t f i t l t i t t h t hi t i t ill di if h i j t th hi h t h f i t d hi patient to die or that he cannot withhold intending his patient to die Of course in the examples above I do not want the consequence I am said not to intend and it might be that to both foresee and want the consequence in question h th i t t i C t i l i th f d t th i bi i h i h th d t h bi b t d t h i illi t hi tit d d Fit h it i i t t t d t d h th i f h t h th d t ithhld i t d i hi tit' dth i If h i j t th hi h f hihl bbl tht d t h ill b h t d d h i j t th hi Th d t h t h t d th th lt f i t k

467

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idt li it d tj t t f th bl It h b h injects the morphine So if he chooses to act this way death ensues; if he does not choose to act this way his patient does not die from a large dose of morphine It would be seriously misleading in the case to say only that morphine produced the t i t ' d t h f it l d th d t h if th d t h t d i i t t Th t t t i t ll th i t t i / f i h t d i t i t i i i th fit l th b tt t thi t f l th d t ' t d t t d thi b b i l d i it i t th d t ' i t t i if it i l t h h F i t t i th t t f i t t i tht i f t i t l f i th th d t h f th tit t th lt f i t k i d t b t th lt f choice or decision It seems intentional or deliberate but this way of speaking risks confusion through it being assumed that therefore the patient's death was part of the doctor's intention Yet the death was chosen or decided It is this aspect of the d t h tht t t t I f t th f th i t t i / f i h t dititi fil t t i t t l t h t fi i d t i i ht ll f t d t f h i t t i l l kill hi tit th th f h k i l bi b t hi tit' dth I h t ht i t l t th f th d t h k i l bi b t the death of his patient is that his patient's death is chosen or decided that he is an agent in his patient's death and that any account of his moral situation must take this fact of agency into account Certainly it cannot be ignored and this seems so t h h it i t t h t th tit' dth f t f th d t ' i t t i Pt difftl it i i l itk t t h i k t h t th l lit b i t d i t th d t ' i t h h ht h i t d f t h t fil t t k t t th f t t h t th tit' dth i h didd h didd b th d t W i dditi t h l d i th d t ibl f thi hi d i i ll ht h t k it t d h t h lft ti ki it Thi t h t fid i th hi i t l i th tilt d withdrawal cases Thus in a ventilator case if the doctor turns off his patient's ventilator (say because he comes to regard further treatment as futile) it would be wide of the mark to ascribe the patient's death to respiratory failure alone since this fil t i d i t ht b h t b t t h t fil W h t b h t it b t i dditi t di f th t i t hih f f t d h b t h i i th d t ' t i ff f th tilt O b i l th tit ld t b t i l t i th fit l l h dil diti i d it b t th tilt t tht dil diti f d i i t fil d i t i ff th tilt th d t tht l t f ti f th Th i t i th where the doctor withdraws feeding tubes: when the doctor decides to withdraw treatment by withdrawing those tubes it simply makes no sense to say only that the patient died of starvation when the tubes prevented that from occurring By with d i fdi tb th d t h h d i d i th d t h f hi tit b t t i Ijti hi t i ff tilt ithdi fdi tb th t ii th t f th d t bt iti ti dh h t l ibilit th ti i th t h t th d i i t t i th th th i hi H i ll ibl f ht lt f h h k thi d i i H t b th hl f hi tit' dth bt

468

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h i th t t t ftht d t h df ht h h i prima facie morally responsible The point here then is that causal responsibility for an outcome is the hook upon which we can hang at least prima facie moral responsi bility for that outcome and control responsibility for a choice or decision makes one ll ibl f ht lt f h tht h i d i i i d O k i l did thi tht k i l bi b t thi t tht hth tht t i i t d d f O k tht t ill if did dt th d k th d i i tht d tht t It i thi f t f t l ibilit t h t tt t d t h t th f i t t i f i l t d T h t i it iti f DDE fails to capture important causal concerns that figure in the cases of our doctors and that we think make a material difference to how those cases and the doctors' action in them are to be morally regarded Gi t h t thi lt t t f th f t d t h h th b dlt ith i d t t ft i l d i i t t i l l killi d k i l b i i b t dth ft tht h l i t I tt t t th i f h t h th d t if h t th h l f ill til i ht h i t d D f i h t this kind of case in the end raise questions about what the doctor intends? There certainly appear to be features which suggest that this is so First of the doctor who foresees death as highly probable and knowingly brings it b t it i i t t tht h tht h k hilf f illi t h t h i h h k h i til i t d I th h th d t ithd fdi tb h f lt t i t t h t th ith d l ill l t i t l th d t h f hi tit b t t i k t h t thi i th l t i t t f hi i t h d l d d ith th i t h d l If h d t t i t d th t i t ' d t h th i t h d l ld b id t b i iibl it b th i t t h h k i l bi b t ceeds to the outcome he foresees as a certainty in this case that he always keep his intention away from that which he knows is certain to occur if he acts as he proposes Earlier I raised the issue of whether he can avoid intending that which he knows is ti t d hil I h l l d tht dititi b d bt i t t i df i h t d t h t th d t d t( t h h h ll d ) i t d tht hih h f likl t h i i t h t i i t l k i hilf f illi t h t h i h h k h i til i t d F h i t i t d tht d t h b itk idt i li kl it i i t b d d i th it deliberately and it is going to be produced by him So it can seem that for him successfully to employ DDE he has constantly to direct his intention away from that which he knows he is certainly going to produce and which he then proceeds deliber tl t d Whil I t tht h b bl t d f l t hi i t t i i thi ht I t i i tht t h h f ti t i t t h b i t d d th i bi i h i h th d t bi b t th f f hi tit' dth i dlibt B "dlibt" h I tht h h did t ti tht bi it b t t h t hi tit i d d d t h t th t l ibilit h b f thi h i d i i

469

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i t ititd b lt itk idt i li kl ness He knows how the world will be if he proceeds with the withdrawal (it will be a world in which his patient is dead) and he proceeds with the withdrawal He must therefore be quite prepared to have the world this way indeed to make it this way d hil th ld i t thi th lt f hi i t t i (t l t f ) it i thi th lt f hi d l i b t l ki it thi Wh i h t ll ibl f ki it i t l ibilit f th ti d i i i th i hi? S d th d t t ll l i t h t h i t dt h th ld b th h k it l t b ld i h i h hi tit i d d f in that case he has only to decide the other way to decide not to withdraw feeding tubes and his patient does not die of starvation as the result of withdrawn feeding tubes He cannot claim in other words that he is not willing to see his tit d d i h h t l th d i i b h i h hi tit ill di k i thi k i t h t i if h d i d d t th th tht hi tit ill t di f t t i t h h ithd fdi tb h d t ithd fdi tb H i h t b dibd? H f t h t if h d i d d t th th hi tit ill t d th d t k the world into one in which his patient is dead of starvation His willingness to see his patient dead in this way indeed his willingness to cause his patient to be dead through withdrawing her feeding tubes seems every bit as relevant to assessing his l itti i th d i t i t i bt i t t i d f i h t M i l h i k i l b i i b t hi tit' dth h tb illi t hi tit d d d th t h h ithdi fdi tb t k hi tit d d T t h t h did t i t d hi tit' dth bt illi bth t h d d d b i t h d l t k h d d i th d i f f ? C t i l th i diff l ibilit f d t h t h h tht ibilit t h h i t t i t th d h t f DDE h it through causality on my account But is there a genuine distinction between nten tion and foresight? It should be obvious why many opponents of DDE have wanted to conclude that foreseen consequences that are highly probable are ntended in t t f d t f h f hi tit' dth i illi t hi th tit d d i illi t h h i t h d l t k hi tit d d d th bi b t h d t h Wh h l d it tt h t h th d t fll d f l t hi i t t i f th d t h f hi t i t if i th i t h k i l bi b t hi tit' dth? I d d h f l l d f l t hi i t t i i h i t ? Third our doctor foresees death as certain to occur if he withdraws feeding tubes and he then chooses to act precisely in this way Not all cases will be ones like this as I have allowed; sometimes he will not foresee an outcome as certain but as only b l ibl I h th b l libilit i t i tht b di ht h d th d t t t k th ld ti il it t h i ld t t i B t i th f d t d b t f thi t t dth b t t i i i t b l it hi t i t if f d i tb ith d ( t h h it h tht th lit ill t k th tit bf t t i kill h ) W hi i t t i thi h f tht

470

THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT

th ld ill b til if h d i d t d thi d t tht dh then causes the world to be this particular way He cannot claim therefore that he was unwilling to have the world be this particular way How does what he is willing to see and to make the case interact then with what he intends to be the ?T t h t th f i h i t th l t t l ibl tl t i ti A i th f i l th f t h i l t l l i k lid f l f fth t t t d d tht fdi tb b ithd d t d t t th f f t t h t th fil t f lif hd t ht b tk t hi M h t fth d t i d t h t hi f i l ihit his insurance monies to the effect that he is not committing suicide because he has no intention of killing himself Is this person a suicide? To say that the steps he takes in order to bring about his death in no way have impact upon the decision of whether he i iid i l i b l tl t di d t d i f iid f th t h k i l tk th f f t f h i h ill b ti d t h d hi d t h tht h t tl t l t t d t i i hth h ittd i i d Wh C t i O t lkd i t th bitt ld f Stt' i th A t t i h dlibtl th i l f it i t h h k th t was his certain death by freezing; he knowingly took precisely the steps that would causally produce his death Thus in walking away he foresees that he will die will ingly walks off into the cold and dies To claim that he did not intend his own death in th i t i df i ititil b d ti it t illil t i b i i b t ' dth d tht did t i t d it O iht f kt t O t ' i t t i ith h i h l if t t ( t S t t th t b l fh i f t h t l k ft h i ) d d tht h lkd i t th ld hi i t t i id h k h ld f k h tti h i l f i t i t h f i t dth hi f t illil d d th t t h i l f i t th i t bt never allowed any of these factors to seep into the content of his intention He intended only to save Scott trouble not to die even though were we to observe someone n Oates's situation going through the steps that Oates went through we should con l d t h t h i t d d t di b h i t d d t bi b t hi dth d did Gi t f d th li f iti i b i i b t ' dth t l t i df t th l i t h t i t d d t di Th i i bildi tht i fi th fl di th bildi f fl t fl h th f d j if I d tht th fl l i th t b i d f th t b id t be threatened by fire then if he jumps from the roof is he a suicide? DDE will justify his jumping if his intention is to escape the flames not to die; he is not a suicide because he is only trying to escape the flames Of course he knows that umping ill likl hi d t h dh d j bt h i t d l t t t f th f th fi Y t h j h d t f l l ff th b i l d i D h h h i ? Y h h t b b d li Bt h d t h thi H h t j S l thi f t i l t t hth h ittd i i d ? A d th l it h i t k ti hth th ll did i th d i t d t di I th i t h d l d th f C t i Ot ht

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tit b t illil fi f d d hdti d illil lki ff into the cold manifests is our uncertainty whether if someone did these things willingly they in the end intended their own deaths There are features of these cases then that suggest that what the agent intends i th i i t i d b ht h f ti t if h t h t d Th l l i i d d f th i t t i f d t hld h t h thi i t bt it f th f t t h t th i h i h f i h t did t ll it i i t t i I h l l d ld t h t h t th t i h i h it did ll it i i t t i Adherents to DDE are not going to accept the causal analysis that underlies my treatment of cases and it is true that complicating the cases can muddy the waters In the ventilator case for example the ventilator is turned off as the result of a lid f l th tit' t ffth t t t S l th d t i b dd t f th t i t ' d t h if h i l i l t i th lid f l f th tit t fth t t t ? I ld t t d i t thi t ll b t h t th tit' t lt th d t ' l itti i th b t it i t h t if th d t t ff th tilt hi t f turning off the ventilator is not a part cause of his patient's death Or consider a withdrawal case which takes the form not of a positive action on the doctor's part (removing feeding tubes) but of an omission (the patient refuses further treatments d th d t fi f ii i l i ijti tht ld t th tit f i it ) if th ld t i tht ii t i t d th th d t i t t f th tit' dth Id i t tht thi li f t t l ibilit f th d t t h h I t tht i i t ( t h h I hld t t i i t tht i i t t t th t lik ) A d th th liti tht d th l k i ll h liti th t t t i t t th d t as not having control responsibility over the decision for what ensues in the patient's case so that the doctor cannot be portrayed as a part cause of the patient's death with the result that at least prima facie, we do not examine whether we t h i k th d t l tl ll ibl f t h t d t h th i i l tht i tl t i fi ll ibl f ht Oth i t t i tti th ibl i l d i hih th tit t i h t t di d th i i t t h t th d t h tht iht b ti t i db i i tii t t t i h tlit th t t t i th ll th li i t k f d hih t claim that the doctor who knowingly brings about death but does not intend that death is not even a part cause of the patient's death The fact of his being a part cause cannot be used therefore in order to try to see whether he is morally respon ibl f th t i t ' d t h I bli th tti th ll b t bt ht i i t t i t h t th ll i h t th l l i i ki t d l t t thi f li t b t th tht d t t h h th i t t i f th d t d t i th i f hth il tht f tit d illil d d d i f t i f t th t f th d t ' i t t i

472

THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT

Th l l i f fit th l l d i d i i f DDE Consider the wellknown craniotomy case: does the doctor perform the craniotomy and save the mother or does he deliver the child by Caesarean section after the mother's death? To crush the fetus's skull is to directly intend its death whereas to fi fb f hi it k l l d " l l " th th t di i i l t f th th' dth f t ti d " l l i " h i t fbidd B t it i dill i d t t f th th' itti t d i b h bi " l l d " " i t t d " t di i f t h i l l d i t t d t di b th d t O l if h d i d ht t d d t th th d th th di d thi d i i h ti t l Accordingly he is answerable for what ensues in the mother's case To be sure she need not have died; then again the fetus need not have had its skull crushed Whichever of these comes to pass is traced to how the doctor decided to exercise his t l th d i i hth tt t th f t d t h h thi t l h i bl f ht h i th f th th th f t Tlk b d h t f DDE f " l l i " " i t t i " dth "ltti t t k it " i thi ll t t h t th d t i t lft th d t h tht d thi i i l t t W h t h th th li di depends upon how the doctor exercises his control over the decision to operate She dies only if he decides one way; if he decides the other way the fetus's skull is crushed In fact then causally the doctor is in a bind; for he is a causal factor in hih dth th lt f h h i hi t l th d i i t t H i bl f ht h d thi hi t l h d d i ht k f hi f ii hi t l d t th th F l if i th it th d t " l l " th th t di t h h h h d dil t bli t h t th hild ill di h t l ft b i t h i t dh d t tk thi i f t i it t i ki hi d i i b t hth t t operate we may well want to look more closely at the doctor morally For we shall want to know why he chose to lose two lives instead of one something that anyone who values life will see as a morally relevant question Nothing here mputes guilt t th d t b t th i th l i l i t i tht hll i th l l ht h i hi f ti h did h t h i t d df t d t h t i th hi tilt d i t h d l Fill Ih dli ith iti t th t f th d t h k i l bi b t dth d t ith ii O i i i l t t i f th l it d f bi S t lki i i right at us and while I see it and jump out of the way I do not push you out of the way: the car kills you While it may be tempting to conclude that my failure to push you out of the way in the circumstances suffices to kill you this is not so My fil t h t f th d t kill th d Wht fil d ffi i th i t t d i t ll t b killd A l l i t b killd h i t th thi killi l l i t b d i t th thi i Th l t I i t h f ill d t b l t d i it t f i l lj d t ith tibt t f ti i it d i i f ii It ill d t d i t i i h bt

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causing death and helping to bring about death My failure to push you out of the way not only allows you to be killed; it actually helps to produce or bring about your death in the circumstances If asked what killed you we cite the car; if asked what helped to produce or bring about your death we cite the car and my failure to push as a significant contributory factor to that outcome This complication difficult and necessary as it is is beyond the reach of the present chapter

Further reading Anscombe G E M (1962) War and murder In Walter Stein (ed) Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response pp 45-62 New York: Sheed and Ward Bennett J (1981) Morality and consequences In S McMurrin (ed) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values vol 2 pp 47-116 Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press (1995) The Act Itself Oxford: Clarendon Press Boyle J (1980) Towards understanding the principle of double effect Ethics 80: 527-38 (1991) Who is entitled to double eifect? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16: 475-94 Finnis J (1991) Intention and side-effects In R G Frey and Christopher W Morris (eds) Liability and Responsibitity: Essays in Law and Morals pp 32-64 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Foot Philippa (1978) The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect In Virtues and Vices Berkeley CA: University of California Press Frey R G (1984) Killing and the doctrine of double effect In Rights Kilting Suffering pp 1 1 8 ^ 0 Oxford: Blackwell (1998) Distinctions in death In Gerald Dworkin R G Frey and Sissela Bok (eds) Euthanasia and Physician-assisted Suicide pp 17-42 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Kamm Frances M (1991) The doctrine of double effect: reflections on theoretical and practical issues Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16: 571-85 (1993) Morality/Mortality vol 1 New York: Oxford University Press Quinn W (1989) Actions intentions and consequences: the doctrine of double effect Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-51 Thomson J J (1976) Killing letting die and the trolley problem The Monist 59: 204-17 (1992) The trolley problem Yale Law Journal 94: 1395-415 Unger P (1992) Causing and preventing serious harm Philosophical Studies 65: 227-55 Uniacke S (1994) Permissible Killing: The Self-defense Justification of Homicide Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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35 Bad Samaritans Acts and Omissions PATRICIA SMITH

Bad Samaritan laws are those that impose sanctions for the failure to come to the rescue of an imperiled stranger when such rescue could be executed without risk or serious inconvenience to the rescuer Such legislation has caused considerable controversy within Anglo-American legal thought which from a certain perspective is peculiar On the surface the debate involves a minor exception to the presumption against imposing general legal duties to aid others in order to accommodate a narrowly constrained special need namely an easy rescue in an emergency There is no reason to think that the practical consequences of this legal duty would be especially great since such statutes have been in force throughout much of the world for some time without any particular legal problems following from them (see for example Ratcliffe 1966) Furthermore no one suggests that rescuing a stranger in an emergency is immoral Unlike pornography for example everyone agrees that helping someone in a crisis is a good thing Finally it imposes a small and infrequent burden in exchange for a significant benefit Hence the very existence of controversy is intriguing Obviously this debate is over a matter of principle Indeed the basic questions at issue have been recognized for centuries What is the nature and scope of obligation? Should providing aid be required in certain circumstances? Or is it strictly a matter of charity? And either way why? Is there a causal difference? A difference of agency? Is there a fundamental difference between act and omission as such? Or is failing to prevent harm ceteris paribus morally equivalent to causing it? Two kinds of question are raised here One is a set of moral questions about the nature and scope of duty The other is a set of metaphysical questions about the nature of human action and its effect (or causal implications) on the world At the heart of this continuing debate are two general presuppositions of AngloAmerican law and liberal moral theory: the doctrine of positive and negative duty (PND) and the act-omission distinction (AOD) What they mean and whether they are defensible is the essence of the debate

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in general simply

BAD SAMARITANS, ACTS AND OMISSIONS

"ll t" hih t ( h liti bbi l l t i ) tht i l no movement (Davidson 1985) Some have argued that intentionally refraining from action is itself negative action because this is the clearest characterization one can make of "refraining" from a theoretical perspective Put informally an nten t i l ii i ti tb it i i t f t i t t i l l b i i b t tt f ffi ( l i hih h d t i ifd ) O thi i i t t i l ii i di thi It i i t l f t ( B d 1971 V 1985) Th i th i hih ii i l di thi O i i l ilt t d d f lb h i tht ld k it bl t expect the act in question to be performed This shows that all omission is an aspect of agency There is no omission without specifiable human conduct that defines each instance Each instance is contextually embedded in an overall course of h t i i t ( K l i i 1986 S i t h 1990) Thi k ii ti l t fb h i tht f t d i t i f th d t ti C t l it ill t d t tht t d t d i i t Bth d t hih tht bth t f ( B t t 1995) T h f it i ildi ( ti b i ) i l t t that Strohmeyer committed a harmful act and Cash did not If acts and omissions are both conduct then both engaged in harmful conduct Indeed if the negative action thesis is correct both committed harmful acts M t bli tht S t h ' d t h h f l th tht f C h Bt i tht necessary f t f th d i t i t i bt ti d i ( iti d ti) dt? Cll t It til i t th tht h f l th i d t If I h h d f ti d t i always i li t t I t t d t i t bt t h If I l t d bldi th t t ii ld t lif Eith t ii b tiil i S th t b th f t tht accounts for the moral significance of the distinction if anything does Yet there is nothing apparent about the nature of agency itself that suggests any difference in moral evaluation within the context of bad Samaritan laws Intention f l k th f t ii i thi t t d ti O iht t fi f ti ith b f ti t ti Ad hth i ti h i l tt f ffi b h t b t b t Tht i hth ti f i i f ti th t fft h hi iti i th t t f ffi Th iti f th t qua agent i th ith S th diff bt ti d i d t h provides no necessary basis for a moral distinction But surely there is some important difference here Indeed it seems misleading to describe both Strohmeyer and Cash as engaged in harmful conduct Strohmeyer h bt C h d t h th i t i H l d t hl h Th it i ft d tht bd S i t ttt i hih t d d f libilit th th l b ii iti it th th l hibiti h ( M k 1980) Thi i i d d i t fi b t it hift th i i f t ti Th i ti tht bth S t h d C h d i

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i t t i l d t tht i d i t l l t t th llbi f th i t i i tion They are both agents; the question is what effect their conduct has on the world That moves us to the issue of causality

Th AOD O

C t i

W h t i th diff bt i h d f i i f ti it ( K 1993 M 1993 M M h 1998 S i t h 2001)? C t i i t i t d dil b if d t d h t it t C ation we suppose is a part of the physical makeup of the universe like gravity or centrifugal force It is a valueneutral empirical explanation of states of affairs that provides a basis for moral and legal judgments of responsibility but is not itself a l t Th bl i t h t hil l liti b l t l i l l t t t t Bt i l d l i t t d il i l l t t t Wht d this fi? W h t d that d t h ? A d i t t d i th ith til i id l t t t h bl or liability to an agent We want to know whether the agent did something that contributed to the outcome in a way that justifies holding her responsible for it What exactly the connection between agent and outcome must be is a good ques ti d tht h td idbl t l i l d h i l h C l t t t t h h t t b tt fft i i l d i t i Bt i l l t t t j d t tht ik t ll l t ft f diti dd l it t b the hih i t th t i i f i t ft f i t t i th til Tht d t hdl i i l l t l F l t l f f l l t i lt f fi it i i i f i t tht k f h t d i ignited a wastebasket full of paper than that the sprinkler system failed to respond to the blaze Similarly it is no more causally significant that Strohmeyer murdered than that Cash let him In each case both factors were causally necessary If either d th t ld t h tk l (Mki 1974 H t d H 1985 W i h t 1988 S i t h 2001) Y t thi t l ( t f t l ) t l h bdl ith di titi b t ti d ibilit O d i i l t t tht " t i " l t f tt f ffi l bt " i " t Thi i h t bl F i t it b th ti l jtifiti i idd S d it meaning is unclear if it is about the metaphysics of causation Does it claim that omissions or absences of any kind have no consequences? That would be false Absentminded Albert forgot to pick up his daughter from her music lesson Wht d h t it? Hi f i l t ik h A b l it t l hi f t t i b t l hi i i tht d h t it T h t h i l illtt ht l d t d b t th t t f ii th (lik t) l bddd i b d f d t Yt t d i t i f th t t f ffi i i i b l itht ildi th ii It til t th i l tht th d h t ' it It i th i 478

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l f t t i Th ii i diti f th l l t i d hence a causal condition Some philosophers have argued that an omission cannot be a cause because t s a mere absence of some specifiable act (Mack 1980; Moore 1993) That idea i itk t t F i t it i t " " b f t b t th b f t t h t it ld b bl t t Tht i t b b t th i l t i f ( K l i i 1986 S i t h 1990) S d l b h f f t Il fll i hl db k h l If it t f th h l h l ld b fi E d d t d i h h did f l k f i I t Did L i d i b th f f t f th id The void he points out kills people makes their blood boil and produces many other grizzly consequences (Lewis forthcoming) Now what could be more empty more passive more illustrative of negativity more exemplary of absence than he id? E t h i l l b i t itht Ad td b b d i h t d A L i hlfll t bdi dd b f d t f tht k th l df t i i ll R th f d th lt di A l l b h i hth iti ti d t tk l i a vacuum It is intelligible only as embedded in a complex network of shared attitudes practices institutions and expectations that make up (the environment of) human activity Indeed there is no such thing as an act that takes place outside tii f d t H b h i i t Thi t i fftd bth b iti d ti f t S t t tht ii h I tt b it i ti i l b i l l i t W h t th li th ti t h t i i i l d l ? Odi l b d l d i t i i h ti d i l t f l fild d i t i th f d th l t t " " conditions (Hart and Honore 1985) In this way causal language is ordinarily reserved for dynamic elements of a causal field that most directly explain a change from the status quo There is wood and air in my fireplace all winter So it is the th tht th fi b tht li th h With i l l t t t i t t d i i i t i ht b h t b t h d ht II th S t h ' t h d th i t t i Ch' ii did t th j d t ll tt f ti? A i i th t Bt ?P h it d d ht i t d t t b it If t l it i thi t f t d/ ffiit diti tht li tt f ffi then the use just alluded to would be misleading Under the circumstances Cash's inaction was just as necessary for the outcome as Strohmeyer's action If on the other hand we want to say what intervening event changed the status quo Stroh ' t h d th t t d C h ' did t Th b t ib ibilit i b t h ith bt d h d t i f i h d th th i t? T d ld tll t ( t t ) i i i t i th l di ii Th l t d d i t h t th i libilit f fili t id l th i iti dt t t b h l f f th i t i A t b libl f 479

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t i f h hild ( d t f h tit d ) b t th general duties to help other people (Feinberg 1984; Smith 1998) The question that arises is do the cases of preexisting duty meet the causal requirement or eliminate it? The language generally used in court cases suggests that the require t i t Th t ( d t ) b h d ith l i t h i i d f l ith i dth b l t N h d ( h hld ) t h t th t( d t ) h b fili t it i itti bt bd l h tht ? C i d th f l l i illtti T l it kb h thi bb d i d k d O i hi th Litl Lil Sh ill b h d ith negligent homicide (or even murder) for causing the child's death by neglect The other is David Cash He will be charged with nothing because he has no duty to help an unrelated child Does that mean that Lily caused harm but Cash did not? H ld th t h i f ti b d i f f t f th t bjt f thi ? I d d (i ) h ld th t h i f ti t th b f dt h dfit iti? It b dl l li t l i i t libilit f i i t h th i iti dt f b t th f tht liit i t tht ii h causal effects The baby drowns if and only if no one pulls him out not just his mother Consequently if we hold that the bad Samaritan causes no harm the implication for the legal treatment of omission would seem to be that moral rela ti (i th it f d t ) bt t ( ) ti h th t h i f ti bt th If th i d t th ii h l b t if th i d t th th l ith T h t t ibl b i h t W h t th k l d t f l tt f ii i f iti dt ll h i t h t th l i tht ii d h i W th d causal l t i f h ii d t h i other cases Lacking that the law is simply inconsistent about causation just as the ordinary person on the street is As Hart and Honore (1985) realized long ago we say people cause what we want to hold them liable for There is really not anything ith t h t b li tht i ibl f thi h did t i f t it B t h S t h d Lil d h Wh di l d ititi d i t f lit i i l i i tht l d not h b d t t t h l d th libl C h h th h Lil H th h Sth Si h ld h t d th h d h t t hi omission was necessary for the harm to occur and sufficient for it under the circumstances That fits one definition of a cause But Cash did not initiate the harm and that could be significant in connection with other factors Consequently we h l f t hldi th b d S i t l i b l If it ld b b t t t i d t i f it th t f it ith d i l f l tt O l l th th i i f i f th d i t i t i bt i h d fili t t it i t l i d b th t h i l ti f ti If thi l i i t th AOD h h l iif At l t it i t th tht t i l d ii d t i it t tht t h

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d ii d t I t i i l l th it i t l i t i t df j d t of responsibility But what then accounts for the pervasive intuition that the dis tinction is morally relevant? What is the significance of intervention or positive action? 0 ti h b tht if th AOD h i t i i l iif it b h t h d f t th f t tht t d t d t it hih ll l t O i f thi id i t h t i th AOD hl d t th d i t i t i bt iti d ti d t (PND) it f l t th l iif idl t h h t t l t tht dititi H th d ti f iti d ti d t i i t l f t i l

The PND: Continuing Debate Bifl th h i l h i l d t i i t h t th i ll l t dititi bt iti d ti d t i N t i dti hibiti Th t t ht t d t th itht ilti t h i i h t (i ti iht iht t t b i t f d ith h d ) F l t ttk b kill or defraud our fellow human beings because justice requires respect for the integrity and individuality of other persons Thus negative duties are based on the value of justice and respect for human dignity autonomy freedom and rights Gi thi f d t i ti d t i i l f d t l d til idi C t t d ith ti d t i iti d t i Piti dti b d th l f hit b l ( d t j t i ) Th dti i i iti ti dti t hl th ( d t hibiti i t h i t h ) d th h l d ll ( dt i l l ) Th diff in application is that we all have negative duties not to harm others which hold universally We all have a positive duty to help others in general but exactly how and when we fulfill it in any particular case is left up to each of us Th ti dti d t ti iht d i l Bt th i l iti iht dti Althh I h dt t hl th h iht t hl l I i l bli ti t til Piti dti d t iti iht 1 i f il bliti d t il l t i h i h t t l tl Th lld il iti d t i Th l t t i tht ti d t i ( d t i fj t i ) til idi i l d respond to universal negative rights Positive duties (duties of charity) are unspeci fied general and do not have correlative positive rights Thus the traditional PND (Feinberg 1984; Smith 1998) A l i d t th i f th b d S i t thi d t i li i d d Sth iltd l ti d t d th lti iht f hi i t i t t b t t d thi f hi l d tifti Lil i l t d l il iti d t t f h hild ll th hild' lti iht t b df b h C h th th h d iltd iht dt b th l iti iht d th l iti dt 481

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t id th t b iltd i i l bt l b i f f i i t hit over a lifetime or at least over some extended period No right is violated no injustice done if Cash chooses not to be charitable in any particular instance Benevolence cannot be required (especially by law) Only justice is enforceable QED Th l i d S h t i th b l ? M t h i k t h t th PND i t dfibl if it i dfibl i l it tb t d b l t Th b ti d th f th b d S i t i f th I ill t id h t h th d t i i dfibl ll Th l li i ffiit t i th i l t h A th d t id b d S i t ti t the general doctrine? I maintain that there are Against this position there are three main arguments (besides the issues of agency and causation already considered) First and most generally it is argued that the requirements of ustice must be l l d i t i i h d f th i t fb l hit b j t i b dfiiti if ht t th h hit i d i t i Bi j t i l i l Bt bi b l t i i d l It b l d bl t b k i d b t d t it t th ti ld th f i l t hl i til i t il i l Fth ti dti ably imposed universally "Do no harm" is a universal moral prohibition that can be met precisely because it is negative We can all meet our universal duties not to murder rob or defraud anyone simply by not doing any of those things Ordinarily thi t k ti fft Bt iti d t i i ti d t t th tb i l Th ll iti d t i tb i i b d d l l t d di t i i l f ditibti Th t d i t i l i i l i tht il iti dti d l th b i f il l t i h i (f l fil t t ) tht id b t h j t i f i t i d liit G l iti dti b t t liitd i th tb d i t i N i t all charities or help everyone in need So each individual must be able to decide which aid to offer and which to withhold Thus there is a significant difference between positive and negative duties that follows necessarily from the diff bt ti d t ti (Bt ti t h t thi i t th t ii N t i dti i l i l t i ) Thi i ll i h t b t t b l t I th f th b d f l it Ih d l h t h t th t S i t ft tht li h th b d S i t hld b i d d ti t th ld t i ( S i t h 1998) The first is that justice and benevolence (or respect and concern as they are sometimes represented) overlap at their lower edges If you are so unconcerned about your fellow human beings that you would not bother to lift a finger or call t i t ' lif th l k f h d th li t b l k f t f th it ftht Wht ld it t li tht t fll h bi d t h l d f t l t i t i i l th b t ld l t th di ith i i t th th ff th l i h t t i i t h l th ( S i t h 1998)?

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Bd S i t l t B dfiti th i l i emergencies that are addressable with little inconvenience by an onlooker In such cases refusal of help amounts to a denial of the worth of that life That is not only uncharitable but a violation of the requirements of justice (Feinberg 1984; Smith 1998) Thi " fft" i f l t d i th t t i t d d ti f t l t t f th f i l t id i h Did C h i i l l d d E t h i k hi th i l Bt h if it t l tt f d i t i ? If l hitbl dt i t i th hld t h k t h t h h h l d th th i ? H d hi th basis of one case? Charitable duties are interchangeable I may give to the heart fund to Oxfam or to Care I may help the homeless or the arts However I allocate my time and i titld t d B t if I d i i th Slti A b k t ( t d t ) i t d f lli th b b t f th d k d ti th d tki l tid id th h l t h h Ih d th it fd i t i dt t th t h th b ijti ii d d i case just like an act of harm In this respect the duty involved in the bad Samaritan case is much like a universal negative duty based on justice and respect for human life in itself This is the first factor that explains why the bad Samaritan case should b i d d ti t th ld t i ( S i t h 1998) Th df t i l d t i t f i bd S i t ttt l tht ii iti t t id ltd idiidl i bl titi ff d Th b i f thi l i i liti th f t t h t iti d t i t d t b titi th ti If hibitd f h i th th ll titd f di i t th thi tht h th thi l B t t if i d t hl others then you are restricted from whatever you would have done with your time or money instead of providing that help Given this feature positive duties tend to be more restrictive than negative ones A i thi l t d i t l t th t f ti Piti dti i iti t hih i t i ti t h h t N t i dti l ti (Bt t ii N t i t h t it d t d i f thi t b ii t fi f bbi d i th b i i i th i l t i f t th f l f l l t f ) Th it i t l t if tht iti d t i h tl tit f d d ti d t i d t Bt this is not necessarily the case A particular negative duty may be very restrictive and a particular positive duty may not be For example women in Afghanistan under Taliban rule were prohibited from leaving their homes unescorted by a male fil b Thi i l hibiti b t it t t i i t Obi l hibiti titi if t B i hil t iti d t i b titi th d t t id i i t F i t th d t i d f d tht i ik i i i S d th i t i h i h thi ll d t ld i

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C t l th i t h t thi d t b i ilti ff dom By definition it imposes a small and infrequent burden that may well never arise in a person's lifetime Anything more is called heroism or at least supereroga tion Thus the second factor that supports considering this particular duty to be an ti t th PND i t h t lik iti d t i thi tit f d littl Thi i b b dfiti it h liitd f ti I tht t it i lik il iti d t th l ( S i t h 1998) Gi th f t I t t h t th d t t f d t fit th l tt f hitbl l iti d t i d hld b i d d an exception It is really a hybrid that incorporates some features of negative duties (especially its justification as founded on a respect for human worth and therefore required by justice) and some features of special positive duties (especially that the f liti i l t i d b il i t tht ht bl t il l t i h i bt th ti i l d t h t ld d i f f t i t th f th t f th ld) Th ft d ft dt hih i t it i t ithi th d i t i f th t It i b i d i i i t h it li Thi l id b t t fit ith th i d d d ments of most people about these cases (Smith 1998) Another problem that the acknowledgment of such a duty raises may well be a worry that underlies all the others It is the specter of the slippery slope If accepting l iti d t t i th ti f d tht l d t i l iti dti t hl i d th i d i i d l f d i til d th d i t i t i bt jti d hit Wh h l d thik t h t h lt i i l i d ? Th l i i t h t th i i i l d t d li b t ii id i tiitd i ditl f t i d th d f th i tii i h ditt H hld d i t i i h th b b i th d k d f th t i around the world? Since there is no principled way to do this general positive duties must always be discretionary No exceptions can be made This is certainly an understandable concern but there are several salient re h l d d i t i i h th l l f th l bl A t it F i t I I bl thi i i Th l i l di d i li Tht i j t h t th l d f l t t i d li t t liit df t f liti Th f t tht li d ill b bit i f til Th i bjti jtifiti f tti th ti t 18 f l A li i dd th l i dt d it Th l ti tht line drawing is a problem (rather than a task) of law is when something about the objective makes it impossible or particularly susceptible to abuse But those con cerns do not apply to requiring easy rescues This point is demonstrated by the fact tht h ttt it i ti ith til bl lti f th S f l l ti th li l i il bl It j t i l ti F th l it f i th i l bt t it b d It i t l t bl t h t th d t t ( d hld) b d f d t id li l l d Th k t thi iti li i ii

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the difference between individual and social (or collective) responsibilities The duty to rescue is distinctively random and individual It arises when and only when some special circumstances select an agent as uniquely positioned to address an emergency that cannot be handled by the victim or by pre-arranged social mechanisms The good Samaritan duty relates only to emergencies that confront an agent with a clear immediate unaddressed need over which the agent has control and the victim does not The circumstances thus enable the agent to prevent serious harm with minimal cost or effort Anything more is not required Why should the duty be so minimal? First if the victim were not incapacitated then the victim would be responsible for himself No intervention would be required (or possibly even appropriate) Second if other resources are available then the rescuer is not needed - at least not as a rescuer (A charitable duty may still exist to contribute to a common cause but that is a different sort of duty) Ordinarily special positive duties and social institutions eliminate the need for intervention by a stranger Pooling arrangements provide greater security efficiency and equity of distribution Pre-arrangement allows for greater freedom So the good Samaritan duty is a default duty; a duty of necessity It picks up only those victims who fall through the cracks of individual self-reliance social organization and special positive duties based on special relationships There is no reason to think that this duty would lead to a slippery slope (Smith 1998) Even if it did however one thing is clear and worth noting A justified moral duty cannot be undermined by a slippery-slope argument Imagine someone arguing this point about lying or killing for example Obviously such an argument would not be persuasive because duties against lying and killing are justified by the basic respect we owe our fellow human beings that they not be harmed and manipulated Even if the duties are not absolute it does not follow that there are no duties at all Even if we are faced with difficult situations and competing moral considerations these duties are justified so they are binding We cannot ust say that we will not recognize them because it would create an inconvenient slippery slope Similarly the duty to rescue If it is correct that the duty is required by a minimal respect for the basic worth and dignity of every human being then t is binding whether it begins a slippery slope or not Most moral duties create conflicts and many carry implications we might prefer not to trace out in full It does not follow that there are no moral duties because they are too hard to delineate or too uncomfortable to face If duties are justified then they are binding Just so the duty to rescue

References Bennett J (1966) Whatever the consequences Analysis, 26: 83-102 (1995) The Act Itself. New York: Oxford University Press Brand M (1971) The language of not doing American Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 45-53 Davidson D (1985) Replies to essays In B Vermazen and M B Hintikka (eds) Essays on Davidson. Oxford: Clarendon Press Feinberg J (1984) Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press 485

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Foot P (1967) The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect Oxford Review, 5: 2 8 ^ 1 Hart H L A and Honore A M (1985) Causation in the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press Kamm F M (1993) Morality/Mortality, vol 1 New York: Oxford University Press Kleinig J (1986) Criminal liability for failures to act Law and Contemporary Problems, 49: 161-80 Lewis D (forthcoming) Void and object In J Collins E Hall and L Paul (eds) Causation and Counter/actuals. Cambridge MA: MIT Press Mack E (1980) Bad Samaritanism and the causation of harm Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9: 230-59 Mackie J L (1974) The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press McMahan J (1998) A challenge to common sense morality Ethics 108: 394-418 Moore M (1993) Act and Crime. Oxford: Clarendon Press Rachels J (1979) Killing and starving to death Philosophy, 54: 159-76 Ratcliffe J (ed) (1966) The Good Samaritan and the Law. New York: Doubleday Singer P (1972) Famine affluence and morality Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 229-43 Smith P (1984) Allowing refraining and failing: the structure of omissions Philosophical Studies, 45: 57 (1990) Contemplating failure Philosophical Studies, 59: 159-76 (1998) Liberalism and Affirmative Obligation. New York: Oxford University Press (2001) Legal liability and criminal omissions Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 5 (1): 69-102 Unger P (1996) Living High and Letting Die. New York: Oxford University Press Vermazen B (1985) Negative acts In B Vermazen and M B Hintikka (eds) Essays on Davidson, pp 93-104 Oxford: Oxford University Press Wright R W (1988) Causation responsibility risk probability naked statistics and proof: pruning the bramble bush Iowa Law Review, 73: 1001

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P h i l h ' d i i f l dil h b l l d i t d b t i th ti f what a moral dilemma is d th ti f hth th genuine moral dilemmas S h i l h h d ktii b t h t h it i possible f th t b i l dil T ll dl h h it ith i t t th character of much of the philosophical discussion may seem strange for the answer to the questions just posed may seem obvious Whether our attention is directed to th t l i f ll i dlt t th d i t f lit fi th t b id f itti i hih i d i i d l f i l b l flit b t ll lli bt ditl ti l i t d th h t ilt fil t tif t l t f th Th th t b l itil d f i tht h l t d dt h f t i l dil But philosophers who question the existence of genuine moral dilemmas do not usually concern themselves with trying to discredit the testimony of actual agents in the real world Rather what they are trying to do is challenge the supposition tht l t l' i ( d t b t thi i ) ld b t h h t t id ffiit df i tht thi titt i l dil Th l t i f thi li i th h i l h ' blif b t ht li ti ld f l l f th d i i tht i l dil ibl Th t h t th d i i t h t th ld b i l dil ld h b l t i l i l i t i b t h f th i t l l i i b i l i t f l cepts and the coherence of our moral theories The admission that there could be moral dilemmas might lead us to conclude that the moral concepts we use are untenable or that the logical structures we take to underlie them are incoherent t h i ftll f l d At l t th f f it it l t h t th l i t h t th i l dil d flit ith f f d t i l ti b t th ki f lit If f l th ld b itti i hih ld b f t d ith th it f h i bt t ( t i d tll l i ) f ti (a d not-a) h f hih ll

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ll b l i t ll i b d th it ld t h t th ' moral theory and perhaps morality itself would be logically incoherent and practically useless The moral theory would seem to tell those who seek to follow t both to do A and to refrain from doing a; to support the assessment of a and not-a as h blit d t d th l i tht bth di not-a d d i a ld b B t if thi th l th ld l l b ii it ldb fll di tht i i h t d h itlliibl i i t t If b f l l i ht t h i d t b libl d ttti l th t ld f d t h l i h d i t it i h d t h th ld ti t d tht l th libl f itlli gible plans of action or as providing grounds for the moral defensibility of their plans and choices If there can be genuine moral dilemmas this seems to raise a host of questions about whether moral theory and perhaps morality itself can l th t f l i li tht bli it d d hld h it ld b i f l itlliibl till h t t i i d i d tijtifi It b t t h t th h i l h i l d i i f l dil t ith i t t i d ti t f hll t iit d tii b l i f b t th t t f l t d th l i l lti tht bti among them and to reassess our presumptions about the structure and content of moral theories But I do not believe that philosophical discussion has really engaged with the issues that concern agents who are (or believe they are) confronted with l dil Th ti f h t it i t h t k t dil i d hth i l dil ibl ti h b tb t tt f l d i i t t M l l i i t t d i th i f l dil b f th i til d l i tht h d i iitt d b ti b t h th hld h d d t l di l i t i t l t d ith t h i f thi l idtiti I cannot hope to produce a compelling case for this claim within the confines of this chapter But what I will do in the first longer part of this chapter is explain why I think that the questions that have engaged many philosophers who have discussed l dil l i t t d l i t t i th th h ll b tk t b I th d h t ti I ill t t tilt f th f thiki t h t it i th l d itil t f l di l tht td l t tbl thi it t f d ti b t th l idtit f th t h f th

What are Genuine Moral Dilemmas? T ll ( i b l hi

thi moral dil dt l practical bl i d i t i l ) personal d i t h i t h t th f t i th ti tht till i l i f l iifi P h bli t h t th f t d ith l dil i tht thi d i t d h thi d l i b t i b t ht t d i l tt f l Th thi tht t t flt i l d

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( b t ill t ril b t i t d t) h tt th d iht f the obligation to promote the wellbeing of those who stand to be affected by their actions; the character and force of their obligation to uphold the rights and protect the interests of relevant other parties; the proper interpretation of what is involved i t t i th b i ith t d th ti fh h iht h l d b t t h d t th b l i t i t t t th ith t h di t i t f ith t t t t t th idiidl' llbi T ll it dilemma dt problem t h t i f d i h l d i f f l t t till ibl t l i t t t h t th i t t t i f th i t t i f t i th t ith th f d hi bt t tll l i ll attractive (or equally repugnant) options is correct The appearance of limited options is not a chimera or a distortion to be explained away by appealing to defects in the agent's psychological constitution or character The agent is not i l i l t k i h t b i l i t t til i N d th t' ti t b k d b k l d d lii ti (lik h ) i f t i l Fill th t' i f t i t tit b t ht t d t b d t l d t d i l iftti f th t f i t i limitation that casts a shadow over the undertakings of all finite situated human beings It is true that before the fact no one can know what all the consequences will be of doing a (or doing not-a) But the claim that there are genuine moral dilemmas itti i hih t f i l b l flit b t ll lli bt ditl ti l i t d th t ilt fil t tif t l t f th i t tt b l k l d t t h t th i t i liit Cditi h i i f i t l ti i h t i th H T ll it genuine l dil dt l apparent dil dil l f thi til t i thi t f ifi i t i t t t h t th dil i i i b l I til it i t suggest that the dilemma's genesis does not lie in identifiable prior moral miscon duct on the part of the agent who now faces the dilemma It is not unusual or surprising or particularly controversial to discover that people may find themselves fi l dil h ( d b ) th i l d d t tht ll b l t i l It i l tht i fl d t l th d f th f l dil I h d ht I hld h k fliti i t h h t l l tk t i t t O I h td k l l d t d i tht b h i iht ll i l d th l b t fli i t t i I tk b t h f th conflicting promises or meet both of the competing commitments I have under taken though each may be equally binding and the consequences of failing to honor either one equally catastrophic But since in such a case the moral dilemma f ri l i d t it i t i l dil it t idbl It i th ti t h t th b i l dil t h t i th li tht h i l h h b d d i i thi d i i f l dil A d it i t h t l i t h t h b t t i l d i t d F it i th t t h ftht li tht t th t b l t t t h t t th i t l l i i b i l i t

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f di l t th h f l th d th tibilit f morality itself If we allow for the possibility that I could be in a situation in which I acknow ledge that I am obliged to do x (or that I morally ought to do x) yet admit that my di x ld t b i h t ( t h t it ld b ) thi t dd ith th diti f f th di l t l dil b i th t f iht d bliti It l hll t d t d i fh th l t f ihtfl d fl ti l i k d ith th ti f blit ti dt di i i b t th l i l lti tht bti b t th If I ti I blid t d then it seems what I am doing is right And I cannot (at the same time by performing the very same action) be acting wrongfully "I am obliged (all things considered) to do x but I believe with full and complete conviction that it is wrong t d x" i if t tl tdit tibl i h t tl t li d i d f i i f i t l t i d df Th l i "I t i h t l h I t I ll b l i d t t" d "If I l t i l h tt d x h I bli I ll b l i d t d x I t l " bth ll t i f ( f) th l i l lti bt th t f bliti iht d wrongness and may seem like uncontestable truths: theorems if not axioms of any adequate moral theory Similar considerations apply to the presumed connections between my choosing t t d thi b I bli tht di it ld b d d lbilit ( d d lbilit) f t di it T h h l iti i h ll f th ibilit t h t th btl f diff i th diti f ibi bl t t djdi ti t b b l t h till it ld b i fi tbli t t h t th ld b il i f th h i f bl d d t i h td x ( not-x) b l i i tht bth di x d di not-x ld b If it can be the case that both of the choices that face the agent would involve wrongful action as could be the case if an agent faced a genuine moral dilemma we would have to admit that our prereflective views about the logical connections bt fl d bl dd i idti It i t tht t b blid t d thi if ( t h h flt f ) t d it A d if t id d i thi th it i i d l t h h t tb id t h td fll h d it B t if thi i th t b bl b t h th til d th t h t i l f t d h f i b t th lti bt th d tice When can the agent who cannot avoid doing the proscribed x or the pro scribed not-x be said to have acted in accord with his or her moral theory or for that matter in conflict with it? And what critical force can attach to the judgment tht hd td l i di x h h h ld l h td l i di not-x? Th k l d t f th it f i l dil t i t b d th idl hld i t h t ought implies can d it t lli If tk i l th ibilit t h t th b i l dil th i t t d ith t i l jti f th l t

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ll i i th d i i th d lti t k t hld between them and spelling out the different presumably more complex moral (and logical) relations that obtain between them There are a number of good reasons for supposing that the tasks of conceptual scrutiny and revision are worth dtki tht k dit f t th t t ibilit f l dil Philh h id dibl ti b t th h f th ti tht dli t f l ibilit d b t th ibilit f bi bl t k td t i t i f i bilit i ti A b f th f t tht d l i th t t i hih t t b li tid th t' tl S h b as matters of "luck" and hence by many people's lights not proper objects of moral assessment But the role of luck in affecting how an agent acts and indirectly in our assessments of the Tightness or wrongness of the agent's action the degree of ibilit h h l b hld t b f h i td tht d th ti f hth t tht i i i f t ditid b l ftit i t l k b thht t b t t t t t' i t i i ld I h t t th i d t ti hth ititi i b t th ti between responsibility and ability expressed in the doctrine that ought implies can is really defensible or rests on firm wellunderstood foundations Certainly the (al leged) fact that the admission that there can be genuine moral dilemmas is prima t fi i t i b l ith th t f th d t i t h t ought implies can b tk lli d f d i t h t th b i l dil Philh h k t i l b t th ibilit f i l dil bli t h t th t h t i l bl d b th ibilit f l dil d th th t h t t t d th i t t t i ( t t h ) f th d i t t h t ought t h t th ibilit t h t th ld b i l implies can Th bli dilemmas wreaks havoc at the very core of moral theory It allows for the possibility that moral theories which seem in other respects quite satisfactory plausible comprehensive explanatorily satisfying for example can be incoherent (their t d t fit t t h ) i i t t (th i t d x d not-x) d i t i b l (h bi h fk i ht titt d liti f thi t h i ' t d ht d t) B t if thi i th th k l d t tht f i l dil if ( d b ) bib t til l th tld t l fid i tht l th f t f ti d hih jtif our choices as morally defensible Whether this would impugn otherwise plausible and attractive moral theories on purely intellectual grounds or (merely) render them hopelessly unreliable or irrelevant in practice is largely an academic question Eith it t l ll i l b f t f th t f id th k d h t fid h th f d ith i l di bl tht t d t d l t tk i l E if t it i f i ttti th t tht hld d th it ( d h th ibilit) f i l dil b fil t i h d i l ld t h t f t l d t h t i l

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bl i t hld i dii ill lli For if as certainly appears to be the case there is a series of other (ostensibly unrelated) reasons for questioning the soundness of our presuppositions about the nature and logic of moral concepts and the role of moral theory the fact that t t i l dil h th k t t thi l th it ti t b thi t h t i (i d f itlf) f t l t th l th It b tk idi id t h t th (th) bl ith th th Bt tht i h k d ttbl li T h h t h i l h h b d ith th t t h f l h d f th l i l d t h i l li b t hth i l dil possible it may be worth considering the plausibility of a more modest claim: the claim that there are in fact few if any moral dilemmas To defend such a claim philosophers would not need to wrestle with the complexities of the logical relations bt t ll t th fi d t i l f h t it i f thi t t till i i b l I t d th iht k f difft t f t t hih h i h I h l l ll the strategy of retrospective assessment. Thi t t till i l th t t t t t d d i i t t d ftthft t f th t' ti d thi l t h lt t d it Di sions of the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas are a prioristic, and thus un affected by any of the actual details of actual agents' moral experiences and moral struggles But those who appeal to the strategy of retrospective assessment can h i th i t fbi iti t th d liti f th t l i t di th f( h t d t b) i l dil Th th i d iti b t h t li h t b l i d t h t th i t tittd i l dil dh d h tht t' i i itk A l t th t t f t t i td f thi libilit f iti f th i i t i l f ftthft l When we look back on someone's predicament we can do so from a perspective that is in several other respects superior to the one the person actually occupied at the time of deliberation and action Not only is our perspective one that is more fll i f d it i l tht i tbd d d i i t t d (Th k f "20/20 h i d i h t " d "Md i t b k " i l i i t i bth h i th ti t h t l' t t i i i t i l d i f d th th ti f th d t ) F thi t f t t i t it h t ld h b l i d t h t th l t ( t l l l i ) ti ilbl d h h h ld h i d the two options as equally problematical But we can also recognize that the agent was in material terms wrong: there were more than the two options open to the agent or whether or not the two options were exhaustive they were not equally b l t i l Fill h t t b th t f h i ti t h t l ith d t i th t t f t t i t bl h t b bl t hi t iti f th l t t i h i h th t' d I thi i l i t bli tht i l t i f th i f th t' d i l th di tht i l i d t f th t

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i i t t d th f th dil I h i t fl justified in saying that the agent did indeed face a moral dilemma while nsisting that since emergence of the problematical situation was in some fairly straight forward sense the agent's fault the moral dilemma was not a genuine one Th i t i f th t t f t t i t i bth f i l i d ititil l i b l It l t hl t t d l t i f th h h tht l dil Wh lt t t i t i d d b t h f th f t t h t h t i l i i bl lbiliti di i t b l ditti fj d t d ti d f th f t tht h ditti b th fd li d i i fi d regret When we make use of the strategy of retrospective assessment we enhance our appreciation of the fact that the theater of human action is one in which the stage is not fully visible to the actors as they act and thus that their perspective is inevitably f l d d l i i t d Th l i i t t i i h t i til t' ti ti b tk bth t li h th l d i di l b l t hi h dt id ith b i f d i t h t th t l i l b l A t h t d flti d t t t i t i i thi ( t ) d d d th t d tht f th t Th th able to appreciate that there are limitations inherent in their stance as finite and engaged human actors and acknowledge the importance of recognizing that a prob lem that appears to be insoluble in the heat of the moment may not actually be so A l t th t t f t t i th th ttti Wh i k th t hll th t t f tti i l dil l t i t i i d bt t il f t tht i l tt i itll ll th t f h lif i i t t h ill h it i i f d b i flti d l i W th i t i tht t h h i d i i d l f dil tht t th t b i l b l d ff tl i thi id d f supposing that there are indeed genuine moral dilemmas My inability to find a solution to what I take here and now to be a genuine moral dilemma does not show that the dilemma is genuine (or that my moral l l t h t i l th i i h t ) th ibilit t bl h t h t th bl t b l d ( tht t h t i itlf i ftll fld) H hil th l t th t t f t t i t l d t ld tht i l dil th iht iitill h d th t b it t j t i f th b l i f t h t i l dil are impossible We make use of retrospective analyses to diagnose the flaws in our own and others' perceptions after the fact But this does not in itself cast doubt on the possibility that a moral dilemma may in fact have been genuine We do not tht h bi i ft tht h ti i ll i l b l B t thi d t l d t ld tht t ifll h it d ii ( t j t " t l i t " ) thi d d iht d Wht t b ii f d i i f l dil i th iti tht hll t th it f i l dil d t ll

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ti b t th diti d h i h it i possible ( i t l l i i b l ) f to criticize people's moral choices after the fact so much as questions about the significance of our being able to do so The possibility that afterthefact criticism is more informed and dispassionate is counterbalanced and perhaps outweighed b th i t f ttdi t th i t tht b d th t' d i t d hi Th itil t f th t' l t ith th bl th t' iti f th df ti h d i i t tht h h i bth l d t tll b t th t d iif f l dil th l f diti t d ft th f t When we confront the vexing question head on are there genuine moral dilemmas? it is not clear that we should privilege a retrospective comprehensive disinterested stance over a practical limited engaged one Perhaps the question t i th d l t ti f ti h th bl ith t i t d f d th i tht i l dil ibl b iti t t h t th k l d t f thi ibilit ld k h ith l t d d i th l i f l th it i t l tht h f bt t th ti f hth t th dil that an agent faced can be certified (retrospectively) as genuine To put the point another way: an agent's circumstances may present him or her with a serious personal practical and moral quandary whether or not that quandary is classifi bl ft th f t h i b genuine l dil Th f h i t t d i l' l li i l i f thi l t l d ki btt f h b jtifd i i i th ti f hth th i l dil l d i ti d tht t b i l i t t i i th t

Applications A th i l dil tht ld t h b idd b ihtti idfl iti l t? T h h h i l h h i i t d t h t th tb I td b ( d hll l b t fth b l ) h l k t th i f ll i dlt t id d f ffiti Wh f i t ' dlib ti th til i t d th h l f ll d i f f i l t hi th t b d t h f l f ( h t t b) i moral dilemmas Indeed so wide is the recognition that we are frequently faced with truly insoluble quandaries not merely ones that simply appear to be insoluble that people have come to speak of "the" moral dilemma of abortion capital punish t d itd iid ( d fth) C l i i i d ildi h l t ll f th l ti th i tl d t d ti t ith l t i hi d th t ll h t i b l dil t ll Th l d t i t th ti tht i lik b t i itl i h t d itd iid l d t d i iliti d dti

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t d th i l i d ( l ) ti t ith even one set of moral dilemmas Yet I believe it is true that if we appeal to the moral experience of mature human beings and to what might be called moral common sense we will be inclined to conclude that there are genuine moral di l Ik f bif t t h t ill k th it t b l i h it l i l It t t h t th i t i btt d d d t d t h h th id ti f l S h t i l h i ith thi th t h ' l i l t t d it iti If I h td ith l dil t d f b d thi d l i l implications for moral theory and deep into people's actual experience of searing moral conflict then we should be interested in exploring examples that are highly specific and well fleshedout Considerations of space pose constraints in written d i i lik thi (hih l d t t tht ti i btt di f l i th i i f f l d i l ) N t h l d i l' i d i th fldi f th t f S t b 11 2001 d t t t t t t ith th d thi f t t h ht I ih t d h i d i b i i d t t h t I bli i tl i d i a genuine moral dilemma (and doing so not merely through the lens of retrospect ive analysis but in "real time") Though I have altered some details and changed the names of the principals the incident is one that actually occurred T h ill ll B b d Td l f i d h h d iitill t i th kl b t fft O S t b 11 b t h f th i T d ' ff th t t i h t h fl f th W l d T d C t Wh th i t t t k b th ( f i t ) h i j k d i l th ff hih l t d tht t hd b th it h l Bt hd b i l h t th d i d i t l l i f t h t i i j i d hih th fl tht l t th it f i t After an initial period of confusion and distress it became clear to everyone that it was necessary to get out of the building as quickly as possible Employees who worked on higher floors told tales of fire and destruction and rescue workers urged l t i l bt t t t th t i ikl ibl dd d t th it Whil h f ti dil t Bb h bl bdid d bl fit it t fibl f Td Td l dh bth fid t h l h i d tthd t i dil d i hih h ld t b fl h k d f i i f i t i d f ti T f t Td t f th b i l d i it ld i th d i t d fft f fil l group: five or six people to carry him (he weighed well over 300 pounds) and at least two others to carry his medical equipment The process of attempting to transport Ted safely down all the flights of stairs had other drawbacks: the stairs l d dd d i Td ld t b t l t th t h i f fl f f t tffi d th b t h ttill l t h ' i i j d d th i k f i d i i i l d il d ltil ( b t f f t i l ) itti dd kfilld t i tht l ll i t d Thiki b t th d i f f i l t t h t t i t t t hi ld i l d dbt f i h t d t th t f bi id d ll th fliht f

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t i lik id f b f T d i i t d ii h h bt i l d Bob to make haste to leave the building Bob thus faced what certainly appears to have been a genuine moral dilemma If Bob were to do as Ted bade him and run down the stairs he had reason to suppose tht h iht ll di i hilf P b l B b l d hi if d t h t hi i l f th ti f i t t d th titi f ltihi ith th h l d d th t f t f hi d d t B t hi l i Td b h i d i h di i t ld i l b d i h l d fid t ti d it ibl h i b l ft N k h l it ld b b f itbl i d team could return for Ted No one knew whether the effects of the explosion would worsen and thus place Ted in imminent peril In addition Bob would surely have recognized that Ted's requests for him to leave notwithstanding his own departure ld b t i b l thi f T d it ld k T d f l i b l d fihtd H ld h d h thi t hi f i d ? If i th i t t i ith th id f hidiht i h t Bb' d i t t l Th d t ld b hit b th il ithi i t d ithi i t f t h t th fit t ld ll Bob's survival did in fact depend upon his leaving Ted behind and doing so without delay (Bob's leaving would not of course have guaranteed his survival But it was necessary for it) Bb' i t t i t d hi ith i l dil t l b it d bl tht t l l lbl Wht B b did h ld b di thi t h t bth ll b l t i l d ll i t h L i Td ld i l th b d t f f i d i t h t f i d ' ti f tt d thi t h t ld b i d f d t l iti f bth tht f i d h i dfidhi h Sti ith T d ld d t t d l l t fith d f d i Bt t i ld l Bob's placing his own life in almost certain jeopardy and thus being willing to bring grief as well as actual hardship to those who were involved with him or dependent on him N i th it fd i b i thi i l dil l t k it l t h t Bb' d i i t h b i i l diffilt f hi It th b Bb d i d d t t dh d Td ihd d th ill k h t h th d i i t t diffilt f Bb t h (W h b it fdt i t f it i f l d i i ) Th t lit ft f Bb' i t t i th i it f h i h it it d i tion as a genuine moral dilemma has to do with the significance of his making a decision in such circumstances The significance lies in the fact that in the very act of deciding Bob defines himself morally: the decision that he makes is one that f l i k f hi l idtit T thi i t t d tht l idtiti i l t t i t t d b th tidi hi k d dd f It i th t t t h t th b t t f i t h iifi i i ti t b th t t h t di ll i th i f th h l B b h t i ith T d T h t t l l thi f d b t h Bb h t b d h Bb

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I t h i k it i bl t t h t th t fS t b 11 2001 sented many agents with genuine moral dilemmas: situations in which their choices were horribly constricted and in which neither choice was plausibly identi fiable as the better or morally preferable or (even) least wrong one Though many f th t l f l' l t l k f h i di th k l d t t h t th b i l dil i t th h d h l d ti t h t lif i t i th l t i li tht lit t d t fil i itti tht bli t ith t i hi T thi i t l k th fl l tht l dil l i f i t' l idtiti i hli th t hi l d t d i f what things they take to be the most important and meaningful and why If issues about the existence of genuine moral dilemmas are ones that matter to us as moral agents the explanation of their significance I think lies here: in our i t t i ht l l' ll d i f f i l t d i i l i th f t i ( d t ) f thi l idtiti Thi t t ith th t d i t i l hil hil i tht l dil b t b d t d d thi iifi itd i t h t i l d a prioristic t I bli tht l dil t i l b th l about how we are to make sense of our moral concepts and the logical relations between them or how we are to understand the commands of a moral theory that is ostensibly not coherent: they concern us because we care about who we are n lt dh h ftill tht i t t t lit ill b bl t id t h h th t t b l t t Tht th b t id b i f f i i t t h t it i f t f th l d tht t tt f d l ht hi k ht i l dil bth thi i d thi

F t h

di

Gowans C W (ed) (1987) Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford University Press G P S (1995) Practical Guilt. N Y k O f d U i i t P M H E ( d ) (1996) Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. N Y k O f d U i i t Press Cbid U i i t P N b M C (1986) The Fragility of Goodness. C b i d R J (1999) Engaging Reason. O f d O f d U i i t P Stk M (1990) Plural and Conflicting Values. O f d O f d U i i t P

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"Th t h i t i hih b i d d d i f f i l t th th th t f t d th t f d t i d l till t d t thi i " ( K t 1900 12) I l Kt' flti th l d t i l t f d t i i ll th t td Th t f d t i i t d i i th t f t governments subsidize and oversee the education of children as future citizens (Gutmann 1999: 3 4 7 )

Mltil

E d t i l

Ai

d Athiti

W h t i th thi f d t i i d t i i t ? Th thi f d t i d d it i th i f d t i t i l d t h f the ethics Many liberals inspired by Mill (1962) view the autonomy of all individ uals as the aim of education They defend a state of individuals where citizens are educated to choose their own conception of the good life consistently with the equal f d f th i d i i d l t h (Cll 1997 B i h 2000) Child hld b d t d f l libt d tit d t i hld t bi thi h i th idt f d li tht b d ilbl t th l b i (Ak 1980 1 3 9 4 8 ) L i b l l hih l f d d tit b t th d t i f d th l lbl i f d t i (Gt 1999) E d t i t i l th d i t f btt d f lif th i f d t i hild f hi " d " lives admits Responsible professional educators who many liberals view as the ultimate authorities in education have no better alternative than to use their judg ment to distinguish between more and less valuable lessons to teach children M l l d i i j d t th t f f i l d t i i t t ith th i fhli hld t d l thi itil f l t i t h t th l jd th j d t fthi d t i d C t iti flibli j t th i f t ith tti bl d i b l Th t t f idiidl i t idiidliti th Child d t d t b t t titt ibl it i hih 498

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l l th l f it di t d d Th iti diidd in what they offer as an alternative to education for autonomy While some defend a state of families which places the ultimate educational authority with parents others defend a family state in which the ultimate authority over the education of hild id ith th litil thit tht d f d ifd ii f th d lif f ll iti I tt ff i l i t h th l t i t thit t d t t h i hild i t thi f d ti f th d lif F l lif i i d th i t f l l d t i d d th l t i t d t i l thiti b t h i hild i d d t i f thi liti (Gilles 1996) an idea that is anathema to a liberal like Mill But because parents typically also know their children better than any other paternalistic agent the state of families can be defended on grounds that other educators are less likely to serve the b t i t t f hild Th t t f t th l t i t thiti d t i i i f i t l difft Pli ltit d t i l thit th h d f t b hild i d t i f thi t' liti i i i t id t hth d h f i l d t btt th i t t f hild i bi d t d f f d d t ity It neglects their interests in becoming free and equal citizens of their society and the interests of their society in subsidizing their education for citizenship Other critics of education for autonomy focus precisely on the society's interest in d t i hild b f l it t h t h ti f th d lif Th d f d fil tt i hih t h th ltit thit t d t hild i t th ti f th d lif t h t tibt t th d f ll iti Thi P l t i ii ( P l t 1978) i t i t t b t d t i l t it t I i d l th it it t h t l h i l h ki ld b bl t it i h i h ll hild d t d t tibt h th t it Child t h b hi th greatest harmony of their souls and satisfaction of their spirits when they mature In nonideal practice this vision defends an educational system that teaches chil dren not for their own sake but rather for the sake of social harmony To value il h f it k i t jtifbl b d i t th d t i f hild t t thti i d l t l B t t t th i f d t i hild t i f thi t' liti il t d t i hild f t i ll d fibl i (Li 1999) B t thi i ill h tk t tif f i l d t th ltit d t i l thiti i t i l t capture the multiple purposes and values of education in a democracy No single aim or authority can do justice to the demanding project of educating children n contemporary democratic societies The education of children is a private and a bli t i d th bli t itlf i ltil thiti h hld th d t i f hild i t t Pblil bidid d t i t it b t ld t h hild t d t d thi iht d ibiliti iti t thik f t h l t d l kill d it tht bl th t li d lif f t h i h i d i ll tibt t it Pi t blil bidid d t i d iti

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l i d it t h h t i d d d t i t h t h their children as members of a family Parents professional educators and the accountable representatives of free and equal citizens are all indispensable educa tional authorities in a contemporary democracy and no single educator should be dd l t i t thit ll t f d t i if ll it d i b l i t b ll d A ti fd t i d t i i ittd t d t i hild f d l h i d t h i d t i th t ti f f d l (Gt 1999) D t i d t i i litil i d l ( t h i idl) f d t i It i id bli d t i l ti i a democratic society and help citizens to assess existing educational institutions and practices and develop better ones Democratic education recognizes that educational aims and authorities are multiple and partly for this reason debates about education b d i f i t O th i f d t i l thit ti i ithi d t i d t i b t h h bli d tl t l th hld b blil bidid h l i O th i f th t t f th i l j dbt t dh l t i l t l th i l f h l hld b I kd b id l b l i t i di i i t d d among societies the question arises whether democratic education should cultivate cosmopolitan or patriotic sensibilities among students Higher education which s not compulsory raises questions about both freedom and opportunity Colleges and i i t i tk t hihl l d f i th d i t i b t i f hih d t i i t h f i t t t f th tit i l b l t iti Cll d i i t i l d i i t th t t t t i f id M l d litil i t h f i fi d l i l l titd i i th t t fhih d t i b t hth ffiti ti i d i i i jtifibl dh th d i f d f hl hld b d t d b th tt

Vouchers Parental Choice and Public Voice O t ti d t i l l i t lt t d i d f thi hild ht l hld h i i t i thi h i l d ' d t i (Chbb d M 1990) A t h i t lt d t i iti d i d ithi b lil bidid h l i t t ith ti th d t i l thit f parents within the family (Gutmann 1999) Both responses are political and controversial; they compete with one another since educational authorities may disagree S d t i it lt t did h t t t h t h i hild blil bidid h l Thi d i i i iti d thi tbl tti t ditibt bli t t t th d th th h l f thi h i A litil d i i l d t b d b t ht hld t blil ditd d t i E t b blihi dt hli th i f idi litil d i i b t th t t f hli it d i t i b t i d th d i t i b t i f d t i l thit

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Ad th d i i t blih dt hli ld f b lit ical decision Advocates of educational vouchers defend mandatory schooling and they there fore defend public standards but they argue that a system of schooling that pays l f bli h l i fi t t h d thi hild t i t h l Citi f h l t h t it i t fi t i i t t h t blil f d d h l t h bli l dt h f t h t th d t (f l) d i i i t th b i f d lii i thi d i i lii M if ti f h h d tt i bli d th h l tht t h Chitiit Jdi Il f tht tt thi th t t h d i f t children of parents who have the true religious faith or eschew all faith should not be publicly funded The absence of school vouchers is not in itself unfair What is unfair is the b f d h l f hild f t I itti h t fid b t t i t h l f t h i hild t th i f blil bidid h h ld k diff i ititi th fi i h t i th b f d t bli h l Th f i l fi i t bli h l h b j f th l f h t b d workingclass parents in the United States who are disproportionately members of disadvantaged minorities (Gutmann 2000) The problem with defending vouchers on grounds of fairness to poor children is t h t th l i f h l d th i f t i l bli f i f i t d bli h l t t f d hli f hild Th f d t l t i tht t h f t d t d i t h l d b l t d Th d l i id ffi h i tht th t dll h l d fll ll hild tj t t h i did t d hild t i t bli h l (Th i t h l h ld t b blil d hil th bli ld b ) Si thi i th logic of vouchers the controversy at base is not about achieving parity between rich and poor but rather about whether private schools in fairness to the rich more than the poor must be publicly funded I kt hi i hli th k t i i th lit f d t i f d i d t d i i t h i l d ? Milt Fid h b ditd ith i t d i th h l h id d h l d t t Th l l f t i d t i b d fdi h l h h d hld b t i t h l t t h t th t i i l i l t d d " h it i t t t t t h t th iti ii i tary standards" (Friedman 1955: 123) If the public's interest in schools and res taurants is similar however it follows that citizens have no obligation to pay for other people's children to attend schools Citizens do not have a public obligation to ik th l' t t t b Th l l t t h t th bli h bliti t tht h l d t d t h t th t h t h i h t d d th th j t i i l Citi d t h bli bliti t di t l tbl t t h t t d f d Ulik t t h l bli Th hld tht ll hild dl f thi i i tt d thiit 501

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lii i d t i tht th t i thi iht d flfll responsibilities as citizens The downplaying of the public purposes of schooling in a voucher system is not accidental It coincides with the idea of consumer sover eignty: the market should deliver whatever the consumers of its goods want There t t bl ith li th kt dl t i d d hli F i t th kt dl i b d i t bt t t th f d t i Child E th t d t d t f th kt dl d t tht h i l d ' f th tht h l d b td i i d d d t i (Thi i h hih d t i i difft d t f th kt dl h sumer choice make far more sense there than in the schooling of children) Second the market model is based on the idea that "he who pays the piper picks the t u n e " But democratic citizens not parents pay the piper If their tune is that schools hld bli th th kt dl ll it df f d t i t l blil f d d hli I i l l if th kt dl t id i thi t it t th id f bli t l Th t dfibl l f tl hi i bli hli i t i t hi d h l ll f h i h id d t d t i f hil dren where adequacy is a high standard This is because the public's obligation in a democracy is to make all schools good schools (for all students) and voucher plans do not do this But neither do public schools as they now exist in most democracies d thi d til thi b l i t i i h d t d t hld b ll d ibl Th i thi t b id bhlf f h l tht d i d t d t d t b t t th th t t Nbd tll A f i A i i i t t i th U i t d S t t h t th h t d h hild t btt bli ( i t ) h l tht h lfih t i i illitit H tl t d th tht l d h iddll t t t it btt h l d i t i t ft the suburbs Moreover there is no evidence that without public school choice failing schools will improve faster or that with public school choice failing schools cannot be improved There are ways to improve public schools and to give parents hi th Yt bli h l hi i t d t t th bl f d t i d i d t d hild Th i i l fi i d t i Rth th f hih i f f i i t ( d th f ti d i t i i bd h l ) P i " t i f " f ii th li i l d S f th t ii improvements are mutually reinforcing They include decreasing class size expanding preschool programs setting high standards for all students engaging students in cooperative learning exercises empowering teachers to innovate n i il i ffd t t d t d thi f i l i d idi i ti t th blt ll t d t t t h i h l tht d i d t d t d t Th l i t ld b l b t it tb f l i Th i t hth f tl hi d t i t l A d it h l d b b d tht h l d t t l b ht dh th t h b t l b h th bi t t h i thi l T d t i it' t f

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datory schooling we therefore need to ask: do schools educate children from many backgrounds together in the same classrooms to a high level of literacy numeracy economic opportunity toleration and mutual respect?

Curricular Controversies in a Multicultural Society Whoever contributes to decision-making concerning the curriculum of elementary and secondary schools in a constitutional democracy must confront the question of what constitutes a good education Modern democracies are multicultural: their histories combine and their citizens identify with not one but many cultures Yet public schools in many democracies have taught their domestic history and civics curriculum as if the society were mono-cultural Many history curricula not only downplay but also disparage cultural identities other than the dominant one within a society Many public schools in the United States for example assigned American history texts that referred to Native Americans as savages neglected the Spanish exploration of the New World and were almost entirely devoid of the voices of AfricanAmericans and women (Stille 1998: 15-20) School days commonly included Protestant prayers readings from the King James Version of the Bible and Christian hymns All children whatever their religion were expected to participate Practices like these illustrate two features of public schooling that are insufficiently attentive to the educational needs of a multicultural democracy Excluding or disparaging the contributions of non-mainstream cultures illustrates how a curriculum can treat the experiences of disadvantaged groups with disrespect Pressuring students to engage in religious practices illustrates intolerance of dissenting beliefs and indoctrination rather than education Discrimination and indoctrination in public schooling are ethically indefensible Public schools in a democracy should manifest and cultivate mutual respect among individuals as free and equal citizens This aim is basic to every defensible ideal of democracy and therefore of democratic education Two different responses to the multicultural nature of modern democracies are defensible on the basis of the dea that all individuals not only people who identify most with the dominant culture should be treated as civic equals and accorded the mutual respect that is due to civic equals The first response - in reaction to the exclusion of the experiences of women and minority groups from the curriculum - is publicly recognizing the experiences of groups rather than neglecting or denigrating those experiences and thereby exalting those of the dominant group or groups The second response to a relevantly different set of practices is toleration: agreeing to disagree about beliefs and practices that are a matter of individual freedom Toleration substitutes for imposing a single comprehensive system of beliefs and practices on all students regardless of their religious or other spiritual convictions Public debates over how best to respond to the multicultural nature of a society often pose an all-or-nothing choice: either citizens should tolerate their cultural differences by privatizing them or the state should respect cultural differences by publicly recognizing the cultural beliefs and practices of all groups The irst 503

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i t i l l idtifd ith l i b l idiidliti l d th d response is often identified as opposed to liberalism and individualism But all of these identifications are misleading The two responses toleration and public rec ognition are compatible and defensible as long as they are selectively applied h th k th t T l t i d bli iti it t difft i A ti f d tht i ittd t t t i l ii l d t d f d bth l t i l d d i ht i b t t i l t tk i d t i T t h t ' hit l l itht f t th i d tibti f d iiti titt i t l l t l fil th f i l to recognize the contributions of these groups to that country's history This ntel lectual failure is also a moral one; democracy is damaged when public education conveys a false impression that women and minorities have not contributed signifi tl t ki it h t it i t d It d i t t d l h idtif ith th Wh hit t t b k ld ' i d i f l th th f l i i tht h t i b t d littl thi th f t t d t i it C i thi i i i t b d ki it d i f f l t f th t be empowered to share as civic equals in shaping their society Something similar may be said about the exclusion of the contributions of other disadvantaged groups from public school curricula A l t i l t l hit hld tt h f li tht ti l t l blif d ti ll lbl Th ld b littl it i d t d i di blif d ti if t h i l l ld i l b d I l i f t d t f di l t l b k d i l filitt d tdi It i ll i t t tht t h i b ll i f d d idd b t th l f ti blif d ti O i d d l i i l t i l t l tti t hih t d t bi ti iti d victions is a prelude to democratic deliberation about matters of mutual concern in a multicultural society and world Not all matters are of mutual concern in a multicultural society or world Some blif f l hth h t hi G d b b t lft t i d i i d l th th bjt t itil ( iti) ti i bli d t i hi d t i dlibti T t th it ht difftl it i tt f t l i libl d t h t iti t l t th li i diff tht h t th t t h t th l bli t d d t thi lii diff T l t i f di f hi ping is mutually justifiable in a democracy not the diverse ways of worshipping themselves Democratic education tries to teach toleration of competing conceptions of the good life not public agreement upon a single comprehensive conception T h i hild t t di b t ti f th d lif i til t i ' b i libt O tt f b i libt d t i d t i t h t l t i f l t l diff d f i i t t l t f th i t i t f ll Ad t i d t i l t h t d t th i t l l t l kill t th it d liit f t l t i

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E d t i

C l i t

P t i t ?

Th d l i f d t i t hild i till l l l l i th f th I t t F lti t h hild titd t l f t f education still tends to be more effective than distance learning In an increasingly interdependent world however the ethics of education requires educators to take into account the effects of their teaching on people who live far beyond the borders f thi h l ditit d thi i t Th l f i i t i d i i d l tht t th i t t t t h i t l t i d t l t i i l it idiidl h idtif ith d i f f t l t t h i t l t i d t l t idiidl h li b d th b d f i l it Cltiti t l t til d t d i l t l bt tions upon whom teachers and students project their own conception of what constitutes a good life but understanding people in their particularity with their own lives to lead and their own conceptions of what constitutes a good life Under tdi i ld t i f d j d t i liti U d t d i f difft f lif dd t th t f ii k l d tht i ilbl f iti t i ki hi f thi it h th hi d t ditl f f t th iti I i i l i t d d t ld ii th i h t f ll l ht thi i t i h i t li d lif i j t i t t ii h rights of one's fellow citizens to a good life as long as they do not violate the equal rights of others (Cohen 1996; Gutmann 1999: 3 0 9 1 6 ) Understanding and as sessing foreign societies and ways of life present a similar challenge to understand i d i l t l d i i t ithi i l it With ll it il h th t l ti f ltil fl d t i liti t d t b d i t ltiti t l t iti th th t l ti f ld liti i t ltiti t l t l th ld Thi i ll th f bli h l t t h t d t b t th l d liti f iti ith h i h th ld t h i b l t ltl f i l iar as well as about the history and politics of their own society as it relates to others Students need to understand and assess the contributions of political and eco i ititti d ti tht t if t i l it d t id th i h i h th liti f thi it hl h di h d b t h t f th iti D d t i d t i t h f t lit i th th t i t i ? Wh h i l h d liti titi th ll i ll d i b l k i d f lit i lit h i tthd t h bi h h they may live and therefore is prone to accord equal respect to all human beings whatever their nationality ethnicity religion race or gender It is important to k l d tht t ll lit liti i thi t t h t C l i t i per se d t df liti t t h t t ll h bi Th til kid f lit t i t tht i d i t

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tdi th h f i i t ldid i tht flt liti commitment: an attachment to all human beings regardless of their more particular identities Egalitarian cosmopolitanism flows from the same moral source as a democratic education: both are fed by a commitment to equal respect for persons D t i d t i b it f it l i t t t th l diit d ii lit f ll i d i i d l i d i t ltiti liti lit if it d t i f ltiti lit it i i Th ltil f bi tthd t l tht tibl ith d t i i t t t t t i ll i d i i d l ii l Eliti liti i f th What is the relationship between democratic education and patriotism? Love of country commonly understood as "my country right or wrong" is dangerous to the wellbeing of individuals which democratic education is committed to advan i T th t t tht d t i d t i t d t t thik b t thi llti li i ll i i l d t it di blid f f titi P h i l h d f d th ltiti f titi tht i t blid b t th i tibl ith d t i (th th i d t i t i ) itill idd iti Ptit h t h t t b d i i i t i ill ijti h ethnic cleansing racial segregation and gender discrimination They stand ready to aid their fellow citizens but opposed to nationalistic practices that subordinate just ice to the cause of state power or ethnic religious or racial purity D t i d t i l lit d t i t i idtiti tht t th b i i h t f ll i d i i d l b t it d t i bd t b l it tit D t i d t i b i l d ffti f it d ti i t t h i t d t t h t ll l t idtif t h l i i l hth lit tit D t i d t i i t d i t t h d t d i d iti f libt d jti f ll f ltil ti Th ltil f d t d i th l d many selfidentifications that converge on the idea that individuals the world over are entitled to the liberties and opportunities necessary to live a good life consistent with respecting the equal rights of other individuals Democratic education wel ll i d t i f i t i tht tibl ith i libt d ti f ll Wh th i f d t i d t i i f d b d l t th it f l i b t djti f ll it b id f t t h t d idtiti t th ti it i t h t th l bliti f itihi d t t t tt b d i It l bl t d t t d th h i f their own lives by learning about lives that otherwise would be less accessible Teaching students about foreign countries and cultures need not be a recipe for homogenizing the world It is consistent with every society giving greater attention t th h i t lt d liti fthi t th t th W h t th if thi k it l i t i t f iti t t t f bli hli tht f d i t i t l l t h h t l i l th hiti d lt f thi t ? Th tl t t h iti l i t i t l t hli tht f d i t i t l th h i t i lt d liti fthi t Th fit i b i t h t it i

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t l k Shli i t h t t t h thi d t iti d t have time to learn as much about all societies as they need to know to be even minimally informed citizens in their own societies Schooling can better inform the particular identification of citizens with their own society and also show that a tiliti idtifti i ht f i t h i d i th l iht fidiidl ith i i l l tiliti idtifti th ld A d f th f f h l d t i hit d liti i t h t d t i litil i t i t t i f ibl t t iti th th f th i t ( i t t i l i t i t t i ) Si iti dil lit their own society's institutions in pursuit of justice not only within but also beyond their country's borders democratic education needs to teach them as much as possible about how those institutions work As international institutions become i i l i t t t hld hli i t d t ' d t d i f h th ll th ititti f litil B t th i till ll tht i l iti d t fth th f ti b liti th it f th litil i t i t t i f thi i t It i th f ibl t t h t d t b t th liti fthi i t th tht of any other single society but also to teach them about other societies and their interrelationships In this way students are educationally equipped to combine both patriotic and cosmopolitan perspectives on democratic politics if they so choose

Affiti

Ati

A d i

F d

d Hih

Edti

Hih

d t i t d l l d t i d If l t d d h l t d t l d t i t d t th ll d i sities will not be able to make up the shortfall in educational opportunity Poorly educated students need better schooling not more; making more years of education compulsory is no substitute for improving primary and secondary education Higher d t i hld b l f t th l t f hih i tht t ll t d t dlt h hld tb lld t t i h l bt hld b i hi fh th t t li t h i li Shli d t t i t d t iti h it t b l Hih d t i i t t th f i i d d i d it i l ititti tht b l k i t i d l i l i b th t t d th fl litil f h ll t ft titd t repress ideas that are unpopular or offensive (or both) Two controversies attend these two purposes of higher education One is the challenge of how to provide adequate opportunities on a nondiscriminatory basis for as many students as are illi d bl t b f t f hih d t i h i d d hli i f f i d l Th t th t l d d h f d hth d if h t kid f f f t i ti i tifd (Ch t l 1977 F l l i i d 1980) Th d hll i h t i t t d i f d i tht t t t t th l f i t t f hl b t thi h l l f d i th i f it S f th t difflt t i

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th l i i t f d i f d d th d ff d f tal control that colleges and universities need in order to protect academic freedom The strongest defense of affirmative action connects it to the widely accepted principle of nondiscrimination Although no one has a right to be admitted to a til ititti fhih d t i h iht tt b d i i i td i t i d i i N d i i i t i it li t i i t d i i h t t Fit lifiti f i i t l t b l t t th l i t i t f th i i t S d ll l i t h lif h l d b i l idti f d i i Wht d d i i i t i til it tht ff f hit fd i i i t i i t b f did taged groups? Part of the controversy over affirmative action concerns what qualifications are relevant Can race and gender for example be relevant qualifications in university d i i i th t t f it till f f i f l f d d il d i i i t i ? A l t h h ith d i d f itlf i lifi ti bth b h bid ith id f t titi d bilit t d d i l l h i th tit t d Ath i hih d d b l t lifiti i if th i tht women and minorities bring to a university campus contribute to the way in which students learn from each other's diverse experiences and perspectives on life not only from classroom pedagogy Universities legitimately aim to contribute not only t th dti f l l i b t l t th dti f k l d d d t d i b d l Th l l i t i t l i t d t l h ill thi b d k l d d d t d i t th ld ll i l d hi iti L d h i i d t i it d ld i b t t t t d i d thi il th i d t i t b t idl d i t i b t d Affiti ti i t jtifibl h if it i d t dit t d t h t d d i l l S i i l l it i t j t i f i b l if it i t tht do not even consider the qualifications of some students because of their group memberships But neither of these practices is necessary for an affirmative action policy Both tend to be used by universities that are unwilling or unable to devote th ti d t d t l thhtfl d t h h d i i li O h ll d i i t i hld b litill f t i jtifibl f f ffiti ti i t h t th hld h b t t i l t f tt lti f thi d i d ti Thi t d i d f th i t l l t l ii f th i i t i it dh t b called academic freedom Derived from the German concept of Lehrfreiheit, the aca demic freedom of scholars is perhaps best understood as a special right tied to the particular office of scholar similar in form (but different in content) to the particu l iht f i t d t d l Th f d i f d i th libt f hl t iti t h i t tblihd ititti d idl hld blif di t h l l t d d hih iti f hl tf t h l th th h i th tb litil thiti Th iti l t b t i t l l t l l ibl d i t t h i th t ld i l t th d i f d f hl

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Ititti f hih l i h iht t d i f d tht d i f their responsibility to protect the academic freedom of scholars Together the aca demic freedom of scholars and of universities serves as a safeguard against political repression for the sake not only of scholars but also of citizens They help prevent a btl b t i i d i f f jit t D i ft th l f d f h d i b tti th til f d f dfdi l id ithi i i t i Shl d i i t i l i i th i h t t d i f d l hld i lti dti Th d t i i l d idi ifl tht likl t i t f ith d h l l d t F i i l ifl tht t flit f i t t ith i th th f knowledge and understanding wherever they may lead are the most obvious m pediments Not only individual scholars but institutions of higher learning should protect themselves against conflicts of interest with their primary academic mission Th hld t diti h l l ti f l lit th th th it f h d t h i Th hld t t f l t d t d t i t t t t t il t h i id b th l Th hld ti k d i f d h t t t t h l f liti t t l tht i t t ith d i t thi d i mission Academic freedom is not absolute; it should serve the purpose of stimulat ing the creation and dissemination of knowledge and understanding throughout society and the world

D

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t

i

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d Dlibti

If th i i l i i d l tht t th d th f t f d t i d t i it i i i t l i d f d l idiidl (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 5 2 9 4 ) Almost all contemporary conceptions of democracy agree that every person should be able to enjoy a set of basic liberties and opportunities and be free (not forced) to engage in the political processes by hih l d bli lii t l l j t i f d Pblil dtd hli hld t h f i t d t ith th d t i l kill t j b i libt d tit dt i f t l tifiti f l d bli lii N l hih d t i tht i tt t hld fth th i d l f libt d tit f ll U i i t i hld t h f b l k i t i d d i i i t t t th f i The opportunity to live a good life today requires many basic skills and virtues such as numeracy literacy and nonviolence but it also requires the more complex skill and virtue of deliberation Deliberation is not a single skill or virtue It calls kill f lit d i t i l thiki ll t t l k ld d t d i d iti f th l' ti Th it tht d l i b t i i l d it il til d t ii i t i t d iit B ltiti th d th d l i b t i kill d it d t i it hl b t h th b i l i b t d t i t fi d i i d l d th llti it f i d i i d l t jti

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The willingness to deliberate about mutually binding matters distinguishes democratic citizens from self-interested citizens who argue merely to advance their own interests and deferential citizens who turn themselves into passive subjects by failing to argue out of deference to political authority Justice is far more likely to be served by democratic citizens who reason together in search of mutually ustifiable decisions than by people who are uninterested in politics or interested in it only for the sake of power Even when deliberative citizens continue to disagree as they often will their effort to reach mutually justifiable decisions manifests mutual respect Because continuing disagreement among reasonable people of good will s inevitable in any free society mutual respect is an important virtue Deliberation manifests mutual respect since it demonstrates an effort in good faith to find mutually acceptable terms of social cooperation not merely terms that are acceptable only to the most powerful or for that matter to the most articulate One feature of democratic education is its dedication to teaching (not indoctrinating) the skills and virtues of deliberative citizenship It does not follow that cultivating deliberative citizenship should be the focus of all educational institutions or all educators Parents the primary educators of children need not focus on educating their children for citizenship as long as publicly funded primary and secondary schools are teaching children the skills and virtues of free and equal citizenship Teaching children to be responsible members of a family is likely to have positive spillover effects for responsible citizenship Both require the virtue of reciprocity Similarly colleges and universities need not primarily aim at educating democratic citizens; their primary aims are appropriately more globally intellectual But a good liberal arts education is likely to cultivate many skills and virtues of citizenship out of a commitment to careful critical inquiry

Acknowledgments Parts of this chapter cite passages of my D t i of Princeton University Press

Edti

(1999) by permission

References Ackerman B (1980) Sil Jti i th Libl Stte New York: Yale University Press Brighouse H (2000) School Choice and Social Justice New York: Oxford University Press CaUan E (1997) Cti Citis Oxford: Oxford University Press Chubb J E and Moe T M (1990) Pliti Mkt d A i ' Shls Washington DC: Brookings Institution Boston: Beacon Press Cohen J (ed) (1996) F L f Cty Cohen M Nagel T and Scanlon T (eds) (1977) Elit d Pftil T t t Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Friedman M (1955) The role of government in education In R Solo (ed) E i d th Pbli I t t pp 123-44 New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press Fullinwider R (1980) Th R Diiiti C t y Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefleld

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Gilles S (1996) On educating children: a parentalist manifesto University of Chicago Law Review 63 9 3 7 1 0 3 2 Gt A (1999) Democratic Education P i t NJ P i t U i i t P (2000) W h t d h l hi ? Dissent S 1924 and Thompson D (1996) Democracy and Disagreement Cambridge MA: Harvard Univer it P K t I l (1900) Kant on Education B t D C Hth L i M (1999) The Demands of Liberal Education N Y k O f d U i i t P Mill J S (1962) On liberty In M Warnock (ed) Utilitarianism On Liberty Essay on Bentham N Yk N A i Lib P l t (1978) The Republic of Plato t A Bl N Y k Bi B k Stifle A (1998) The betrayal of history The New York Review of Books June 11: 1 5 2 0

Further reading B

W d B k D (1998) The Shape of the River P i t NJ P i t U i i t P Galston W (1991) Liberal Virtues New York: Cambridge University Press Gt A (1982) W h t ' th f i t h l ? Th bl f d t i i tilit i d iht t h i I A S d B Willi ( d ) Utilitarianism and Beyond 261 77 C b i d C b i d U i i t P (1995) Civic education and social diversity Ethics 105: 5 5 7 9 (1996) C h l l f ltiltli i l i t i l thi Philosophy and Public Affairs

22 171206 Henig J R (1995) Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor Princeton NJ: P i t U i i t P M d S (2000) Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy C bid MA H d U i i t P Rousseau J J (1972) Emile or On Education trans B Foxley New York: Everyman

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l h i l h th th f l l l t i h i t i fh l t i h i fidhi filil l tihi ti l Filil l t i h i i t ll d t d t f bt t/hild h i l d / t d ibli Lt k liit t h t t t th i i di f th l t i h i f i d ships can be between persons of different sexes romantic love can take place between persons of the same sex and families can be adoptive "Spouse" is in this chapter an bi t lii i i d l i t i l titi i i i f tht h f ht l diil b " " lb f t iitti iht d i h i t l i t i th bilit t d t hild t t h d Lt ll thi th " t i l " f" l l t i h i " P l l t i h i diff i l t i ff t i ith f i d h i ti l d l lti t th voluntary end childparent and sibling at the nonvoluntary end and parentchild somewhere in between (We may choose to have a child but not a particular child) Social and legal conventions govern both ease and form of voluntariness of both t d it f difft t f l l t i h i N t h l l l t i h i t k th f f pure t t l lti i hih thi d f d t th th i liitl d b f h d Bt " l l t i h i " l f t th lit f if l t i h i h t h it t l l i l d i l t i t t lt iti d th it t i t d liti t k t h t i th i t f l l t i h i i th t i l Lt ll thi th "quality" sense of "personal relationship" The categorial and the quality senses can differ because some instances of categorial personal relationships lack these qualities Some parents children and siblings barely relate to their children t d ibli S l d f i d d littl th " t h h th t i " ith til l f i d Th ltt l t i h i i h t i th " l i t " tb t h h t personal l t i h i t ll if it till li fi t f l t i h i ll " l " O th th id i t f t i l l l l t i h i iht h t i t i f l l t i h i i th lit F i t ll

512

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i t

ti

PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

d t iht d l l l t t h t di l t ith tit Indeed while categoriaUy "professional" and "personal" name two distinct types of relationship what it is to be a good doctor teacher or social worker involves some such characteristics; for example caring knowing the other well being strongly i t d i th t h ' llbi Th ld till b i t t th t i l dititi h T ll th ltihi " f i l " ld (i t) l b d i t h t th f i l b f th i ld t ti d ld di th l i t f di It ld l t h t th di i f th tit' llbi b t h i h th f i l d iitd d i l i d (th d t f th tit' hlth bt t il h ) it d not extend to the individual's wellbeing as a whole as does the caring involved n friendship and parenthood Finally professional relationships lack the reciprocity of friendships; the caring is primarily in one direction for example (They do not h diff f t t h i l d lti i thi d)

P

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A relationship can be personal in the categorial but not the quality sense in a different more subtle way as well In the quality sense care intimacy commitment and involvement are properly directed toward the other person in that person's particular it ifi d h i idiidl H l b tthd t t h i idiidl bt lifi l t ( L F l l t 1996) I i h t t fid fid d XiSh l t tht t If t t h t t XiSh bt ti t i hi f th t " f i d " th th i idi i t h b l i t i d l th l f h fidhi ld t b td f b fidi th f i d H th th i i " i l " th th " l " The extent to which elements of impersonality must be absent from worthy personal relationships (in the quality sense) can be overstated In practice most ltihi i i l d l l t E h d l b t fid idiidl b ld tht h f i d of this sort d t l thi til fid P d i t l i l ltihi h t i l l h ith l d l l l t ii f f t t t

Personal Relationships and Morality P

l ltihi i lti i l l thi i d l f tb b obligation t f t h f f friendship. W h l difflt hi A ( ) hild h

l ditit li O i hth i t It t h t th d t i d l d f th t h ' llbi th f i d ' llbi t b t dd k l d i bliti

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titd d i i t f h i b tk f Ad t l bliti to look after their children rest in part on a social foundation Society has a stake in seeing that the young and vulnerable are cared for Indeed if parents (or other relatives) are unable to do so the state generally assumes this responsibility Never thl i fidhi it i h f b l if th t ( hild) t k f th hild ( t) t f l th th t f bliti Althh it l k iil t k i th it ff i d h i fidhi l i l l i t F l f i d i ll b d b f l l t t t d f h f i d i th f f j t ttk if b d i h j d i h t i th didi h f i d O l h bliti of beneficence toward friends (children parents siblings lovers) which prescribe many of the same actions as would characteristically be prompted by care and love But it is a familiar and not shameful aspect of human nature that we sometimes lack th i l i t i t id ht l i t t t f i d bid Th l bliti ffidhi l th ii titi I d d Jh D i h (1989 112) i t t th t t t h t b t i bt df i d t t iti t h t th f i d t th l i t t t h h f h f i d h l d h l k th d i t i l i t i t d M l i t d not in any case function in personal relationships solely as a direct source of action but sometimes as a reminder of legitimate expectations that might elicit an attentive ness to the friend and the friendship that evoke caring motives N t h l l l t i h i i hih t f ht i d f th th i td b bliti th th l i i l b l t i dfiit Thi i tl b bliti l b t f th d t it t l lti A fth h did f hi hild l h t th dti f thd i d hi ld b fth M ht i i d d t th th d i t l f bliti f l fti th d d h difft lit f th t t td b l Loving comforting has a different quality from dutiful comforting (Indeed the duti ful comforter has a metarequirement to keep the comforting from seeming to the child or friend too dutydriven) Moral requirements are integral to personal rela tihi b t it i b t if th i f t l d t d t ditl

Idl Fidhi

dM l l

Gd

C h t

Mlit i t h h t t b l l t i h i i th ll Following Aristotle some like Hugh LaFollette (1996) argue that the best form of friendship is one between two people who love one another for their morally excellent ( t i t f) h t I t h t th b t f i d h i i l l i th f i d f h k I thi d Aittl tt t t hfidhi ith t l f hih h lld " d t " d" l " fidhi d d i th i b d ti th f i d h i Th fidhi f l d b th ti t d i i t l l bfit f h th' th t bi f i d Aittl iht h t i d f t h t b d h d t t f tiit h t h i f i d i 514

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thi k tti b t if h d j b thi f i d h i ld l it f d t i While these are all less than ideal forms of friendship John Cooper (1980) has argued that (at least for Aristotle) they do involve a genuine concern for the other's well being; otherwise although they would possess some sort of relationship it would not b fidhi Y t it il t t "li Xf h k" "li X f th k fh ll l l t t i t " Th t f thi Wh I l f h k Il ttlit tht t i l l i l d d l th h ll dtit f h t (Thi d t h tht h I l Il everything b t t h t )I tht she attains her deepest wishes even if these are not morally exemplary (although perhaps they must meet some minimal moral standard to be worthy of an admir able form of friendship love) S d l t h h f i d t fid liti i h f i d li th th f l th bi ll d i b l bi iihtfl b t l h i i t t i thti ibilit bi l f l M i i f i t th liti t h t l i th th t b bjt i l lbl Aittl' dl i bt th d l i lti t the other person in question For example Keisha may make Ana feel comfortable able to "be herself" and this may be the main source of Ana's attraction to Keisha Perhaps for whatever reason both Keisha and Ana feel uncomfortable with most th l Thi ft ith h th h l l t i Yt t it di b i f d d tii fidhi i hih h t l th th f h k t tht f d t i h littl t d ith i h t l ll d i b l h t i t i P h th i thi ill th A i t t l i l i fidhi ft ll l idiidl h it h th' l ll Bt t l th ld i i ff i d h i t t ll tht llt d d i b l friendships involve the friends loving each other for their own sake without either of them being particularly morally exemplary in any general way and without their moral traits playing such a central or defining role in their friendship

C

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A l ll d( t il ll l ) l bl f t b lishing and maintaining close personal relationships as LaFollette claims and Aris totle implies? This seems too restrictive People's caring and their moral energies more generally can be "specialized" Just as some people can show generosity l l t ttti d l i h t i th h i f t h i hild thi t bt b ll lfih d (i t d t th ) d th ith f i d til f i d T b th bilit t f i d i i d l th th lf i l k i i ttl h t h I tht i i l l l f l bt i i d f fidhi Bt h fidhi ll d t l t i th f lifi ti it tht l d d t f t 515

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th M d ' h t h l It tb f t t f t b t human beings that they are capable of moral specialization compartmentalization (Badhwar 1993: 12) and moral inconsistency but it is a fact

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l dfi t t h l l t i h i i th lit l t t b ll l t b f ' fil t h th liitd d f i l f i d h i ) ? It b S i l b too selfish to be willing to expend energy attending to the wellbeing of any other person But there may be other reasons much less connected to one's moral charac ter for being incapable of friendship One may find intimacy threatening or other i t i l l difflt t M f hibiti f th lf f th t h h ' ti ii it i l t d t i l l t i h i i th lit A idiidl l d ll l lif hil h i h l l t i h i M lif itht h l l t i h i d t d idiid ual unhappy Many forms of engagement with the world (as above) are not only worthy even morally worthy but can also be sources of deep satisfaction Never theless a life without personal relationships in the quality sense is a life that lacks f lif' t i d d it ld til b t tht th li f h l k d h l t i h i t i d th f fd tifti tht d d t h i li h d tifi N t h l i th d i i t fh hl ith d t fidhi Aittl tt h h "N ld h t li itht f i d if h h d ll th th d " ( A i t t l 1985 VIII I 207) Althh fidhi i l d hihi f th th f h k than do what I have acknowledged as "lesser" forms of friendship the importance of this value hierarchy should not be overstated Ideal forms of friendship should not be overvalued Friendships involve a range of human satisfactions largely un t d ith th liti t h t d th ll th th j t f th' d th bilit t b d h ' ith th th f l I thi d it t t d t d l fidhi th l l Aittl t d Th f i d ' j t f th i h t l t f i d h i th i t l bfit ith d t d t l t f i d h i itlf

Friendship and the Demands of Impartiality I h it

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l t it i l th M T (fth 516

tii i t lid d t d i ffidhi d hih t f l ditit B t th i th ithi b t h h i l h d ti lii tditi hih ld it lit tht f i d h i t d i iti t lit t BC) th Chi h i l h h h l l d th C f i

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h i th l iifi f til l t i h i d S Kik gaard ( 1 8 1 3 5 5 ) regarded universal love as the highest form of human love and found romantic and philial (friendship) love to be deficient in being particularistic For Kierkegaard (in Works of Love, 1962) Christianity bequeathed to the world the id f i l l f ihb dh ihtl d t d ll f f " f t i l l " ( K i k d ' i i i t i b l lii d it i l hth h i l l dd l f ihb morally i ill i liht f hi li k Fear and Trembling, i h i h th l i i d dititl l tt th th l i i )

Kierkegaard: Universal Love and Unconditional Love K i k d ' i i k d b hi di l f ihb th l f fl tht i i l d i t d t d th d f th th f h k H ll f i d h i d ll f f lfl (1962 65) i l i " t h i l t k " (1962 64) K i k d i d i t i t l K t i i idtifi thil t k ith b l i t i H i t dfidhi dl d i d f bliti and as mere forms of selflove The attainment of a satisfying friendship is in part a matter of good fortune (as Kierkegaard agrees with the figure he calls the "poet" in claiming) However attending to the other (in both the sense of seeing the other l l d i tki f th th h i t ) bi l l itl t t i i f h f h k d th l t f fidhi "thil t k " til t h fidhi I d d i d f f i d hi d th l l t i h i i tht i d f th t id th d t f fh tifti f th t f i d h t ll t ditl k th d ffidhi bt t t l t i lfll bhlf f h f i d T h t i it i i d b th f th t h ' llbi tht friend must be willing to place the friend's good above (the good of) preserving the relationship itself in the infrequent situation when the two diverge (for example h it i t th f i d ' b f i t t t k jb i th t h i t i i f t di t i t t t ill b diffilt) O l b ti l f l l f th d f th th hi th l tifti ffidhi f th h i h t d S t t K i k d f i d h i (i it h i h t f ) d i l lfl l K i k d d l f ihb i l l th l f fl tht i ditil i d d t f th l liti f th b l d I i ally a more common model of unconditional featureindependent love in the Western tradition is that of parents for children The good parent loves the child unconditionally independent of what the child is like Romantic and friendship love t t i thi t i bi i dd i ifi f t f th th I i tl l di i f th hild th t t h t k th hild' t i l i t it t A hild t l i lf d b t tht itlf i l h i t t th t i l d l th th fidt i hild b t th f t b t d t d d l i hi i t ith hi d b t P t l l i th t i l i d t 517

LAWRENCE A. BLUM

ditil hil f K i k d l f ihb i i l d di tional Secular Western philosophical traditions such as Kantianism and utilitarianism or consequentialism have emphasized the need for a universal impersonal or m til i t f i t it f hih tiliti ltihi thill d f t i Wh h l d f th lf f l d fid hild t t h t f di t ? M h t t h i l th tl ith thi R h l t ditit f f hll t l ltihi f th i t i l i t t ith l ltihi O i tht bliti t h bi qua h bi i d d t f til relationship in which they may stand to us must be given their due and sometimes allowed to override preferences for and even obligations toward friends and other loved ones This approach does not deny obligations and other forms of moral pull td b l ltihi bt tht i l l li id th h ft th ld t ti (Thi i ft t i t d ith th idti t h t th l i t d ii f l ltihi t h l h i t i l di i i t h t th li f t i l b f t d fid d fil the part of anyone standing in that relationship)

Challenging the Legitimacy of Personal Relationships Th f

h ld f l l l hll t l ltihi f l ltihi l t h h th h l l i ti ttd i ht liitd h hld f (i ttti d b f ) fid l df i l b th h b i ? Th framing of the question implies that our conception of friendship parenthood and so on is intelligible without those relationships exerting distinct moral pull on the parties to them Bt l t i h i bt t ti ( l l d t b f i d ) i h i h t i ttl t th d t id it d ttti t h i h t i th t i th l t t d it th th " f i d " ld t b h t thik f f i d h i Ad h hd b t t hild b t th l d th hild i th f i h b th b t t t b bl t b t i i h i h th hild (i th i h b h d l h th ld) ld i b f t f hi th hi f f i ld t the child's "parent" in only a biological sense As James Rachels says in the process of lodging this second form of challenge to personal relationships "All these relationships seem to include as part of their t il b l i t i " ( R h l i G h d L F l l t t 1989 47) T hll th il bliti i t hll th l liti f th ltihi t h l It i t ti h t h it i tll ll l i t i t hild hth i t d hld fi f ll t have f i d l h ltihi th b t t t b bl t flfll ' bliti t h i t O thi h it i h t t t Rhl i t i thht i 518

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t t h t if h d t i bith t hild i h t b " i d " thi child to care for on the grounds that doing so would turn out to be the best arrangement for ensuring that child's care (Graham and LaFollette 1989: 56) Many children might thereby become their birth parents' wards; but the idea of a t ith it i l i t i f ih d f t d t i l d l l t i h i ill h d i d Siill ld h fidlik ti t th Ad iht id th j t b i i th b t iti t d j t i Pt S i ' (1972) f l ld h t d it dt d i hild j t b h d t b th i b h th hild fll i t the pond What one could not do is to adopt the sense of morally charged commit ment bound up with a range of emotions and attachments that is integral to what we mean by "friendship" This is not to clinch an argument against the impartialist h f l l th it ti bliti i t t f l l t i h i B t it i t k l h t it t t k i t h t h l l D b t tht h l d tk h d t i th f l t L Th (1989) i h i l h i l h t i i l id tht l h t f th d t b i t l idti i intimate personal relationships especially with one's parents but with one's friends as well A child brought up without the particularistic unconditional love of parents is much more likely to be unable to care about others to lack both the h l i l it t d l it t dt l k dl fh t d A d it t t tht ibilit t b t lt ith i i t t i db db l d d I dditi b t i t tht l h i t th li fh i t h i th f f th l i h t f k t f l fld f i iti h l i thi iti l likl t h th t l k ll ittd l l t i h i A t l responsiveness to the claims of distant others has not been shown to correlate with the lack of personal moral involvements and it is not likely to be

Th R l M l C f l i t b t Itilit dP l Rltihi It i th thi fth tht di lt h h t d d d i t i bt ld d f i t i l i t d th l i f l relationship For example an individual sitting on a hiring committee for a ob for which a friend applies is morally bound to give no preference to his friend; if he feels unable to manage that impartiality he is expected to recuse himself That there are ti t t i hih d tt d th l fl d d tht f f f i d d l d b t id k it l tht di l t h h t d t d h d d tdi i t libl t t f ' lif N t h l f th t f h tht i fhi lit d t t k th f f i l i t i t i l i t d d tht 519

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b d th l i t t f l l t i h i tht b d h relationships in the forms that we know them because of their partialist challenge But they do throw into some question whether the claims of humanity in general will actually be well served by such a drastic move Nor do they engage with the counter t tht if th i t i bt i t i l i t d til l t i h i tht flit h l d b t l t ft l d i f f th l t t I thi d it i t i k i tht t t d h t fK t i i d tili d t fll R h l ' i l i d th i t h i l l tihi ith t h i l li it ti Rth b t t i l ti i h it h i t h t th i t i l it f i d d d b lit is perfectly consistent with all of what we pretheoretically regard as valuable and morally significant in personal relationships Whether these attempts at reconcili ation are ultimately successful they greatly mute the challenge that impartiality d t t l l t i h i Th i l littl f t i l iifi d I ill t di th fth

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The first more modest charge from the impartialist against personal relationships that we use the demands of personal relationships to inappropriately license un h k d llti ill t hild d t h b d f d i t th l i t i t li fh i t i till i U iddl l A i ( d h thi t t l h ) d t f t h i hild t lth d d t i l t t h thi d d f t t t d t th i th t h f d t i l lti I th f f th idi t f f th ld' inhabitants and the diminished life prospects of many of their fellow American citizens this is not a morally acceptable arrangement Rachels proposes a plausible modest moral principle that we should not prefer a trivial item for our children h th hild l k iti t it i h t ( ti th i i t b l d i t ht t "tiil" d " " ) ld i bttill ht i i l d A i d it t id f t h i hild R h l ' t f thi l i i l i ( t i d l i ) t h t th tiliti d d f l l t i h i ll t i b l B t th l i d t i thi t It i l th t d j t i i t i i life chances among the world's populations that renders certain forms of familial preference problematic not those preferences themselves Those inequities are not for the most part the fault of welltodo Americans (and their counterparts n W t E d l h ) Th lti t th i i t i t i il f th f f t fi d i i d l db l t b t th li fh i t bt f t i t i l di t t i l iiti (dbt lif f i id U i t d N t i d l t fft d th lik) Still i d i i d l h li ithi j t il t b bjt t l i t tht ld t l i j t iti Lihi d

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t ' hild h t b ll t i d Y t i dditi t nizing such constraints perhaps addressing the claims of humanity could be accom plished through considerations internal to those particularistic relationships We want our children to grow up with good values with a sense of what is important i lif d ht k lif th l i i Th iiti d i tht fflit l f iddl t iddll fili ( d th ll) i bl t t h l Child ll db ii f l i t h i li tht ld t th f t i l bjt d b iti tht d t i th f t t th t tii h l ll d jb fi d th f th Th might well be better people and lead better lives if their parents succeed in teaching them that persons in comfortable circumstances must forgo certain wants so that for example other children do not go hungry and if they construct a set of values f t h l i hih h l liitti k ft O i bl btt t if t id l thi i ' hild tht id th ith l t it t i d thi f b l l i d d t f th f i f th diti i hih h i h i d In contrast to an argument that throws into question the moral legitimacy of personal attachments with their partialist implications this argument brings a regard for the claims of humanity into those very relationships Doing so would not f t l l ll flit b t tiliti d i l i t i li bt th li fl d d t Th d i t ll d it Th i f l f li th l t h h l f t h b b f d H thi flit d t titt f d t l hll f til lit t th lit f l l t i h i It t bth l i t i t d th di l t i h i t i l l ii lif i

Feminism and Personal Relationships F i i t h i l h h t th d i t b t i t i l lit d l l t i h i it h i t i l ti Th d i f l l t i h i d th d t i d i i til h tb dd h ttti l i d l h i l h Aittl' l i i f f i d h i th t d tiki ti i th h i t f W t h i l h F i i t h d blid bi b h i d thi l l t M h tk th bli ld of the state law markets and other relations between nonintimates as the para digm moral domain This accounts for the centrality in moral philosophy of imparti li i l l d i i l d t t dl fh l t i h i C t f i i t h tk th tilti f lit it t th i d i f l l t i h i t b t f th t k f i d l i i ' li d i Bt l t h h f i i t t i th idtifti f ith th d t i h t f i i t th lit it t tht h libl t ll If l lti l b l th lbl t ll

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"C thi" h b th t i t i f l thi i f thi f i i t ith th d i f l l t i h i D l d itill by Nel Noddings (1984) though influentially suggested by the psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982) care ethics emphasizes attentive concern to the individual other person in her particularity rather than a focus on universal principles C thi i l l i t d t th d i f l l t i h i h t i l i d f th t h ' llbi i it H it i f l l libl t l t t h iht b ltd d t d t th tbt h t d b h i th f d i l lif F l i iht itl l d t i t h l th t t d t d i tht t t hi ith t d dignity rather than perfunctorily or with a devaluing gesture Responsiveness to encountered others in their particularity is part of care morality So while care s always particularistic it does not require personal relationships for its appropriate ti S f i i t h i l h h Nddi V i i i H l d (1993) J R l d M t i (1992) dS R d d i k (1989) h t d t h t th i lti t d i t i l l i d d i l l t i h i l t t til dl f b d il ititti ( h l dil ititti k l f t)

Th L i i t

fC

Ethi

At th ti f i i t h itiid thi f itil l i i f i d f l l t i h i i l M l l t i h i i th t i l it d t t i t bth i d i i d l dfti in some other way Feminists have pointed especially to sexual physical and emo tional abuse of women by men (and some have recognized that women can abuse other women in lesbian love relationships for example) Even in the absence of t l b l t i h i i hih t h t h th th d/ i hih t d l hlth d d i t f hlth dd i l l t i h i I dditi th t ti d l f f t l d d tht d t it ik bii d t t i t bth ti I difft t f t d l l t i h i hih hil i flfilli t them can become an "egoisme deux" in which they support one another in callous treatment of others This critique goes beyond the mistreatment of women in personal relationships ( if t t l f t d d tti i iti k likl t b i t i i d th ) It k l it b t l l t i h i ft l t d i th h i l h i l l i t t P l l t i h i i th t i l t t t i l l t b l d Th l f til i t d d h it til lit S t i l t f

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l l t i h i iti t t h t d d b d litd (consciously or not) by one party to victimize the other Some feminists have sought norms to protect personal relationships against such turns for the worse in concepts like justice respect reciprocity and equality some f hih itd l ith i l i t i t i l i t tditi Mil Fid (1993) h i l l killfll t t t d t bl f d jti ithi th f l l t i h i ill fidhi Oth h Nddi h ht h f ithi thi i t l f f l b bildi i t i t f th i t til t i i th t l lf f th th t l ti ht t th agent to be what the other needs

Personal Relationships and Culture H

th idbl l t l ltiit i i th l f l l t i h i F l th Chi C f i tditi l t h i h i ' t ( d ' t ll) than does Western ethical thought If a culture views familial relations as more important and valuable than friendship; or if cultures differ in the relative mport ance placed on adhering to the formal role requirements of a relationship as con t t d ith h i ti ti i t t it it i d i f f l t t h ld tht lt i iht d th th W h b bl t tht ti d t fll i d i lt th th Rf A i t t l (1985) N i h Ethi t T I i I d i l i IN H k t t Badhwar Neera Kapur (1993) Friendship: A Philosophical Reader Ithaca NY: Cornell Univer it P C J h (1980) A i t t l f i d h i I A l i R t (d) E Aittl' Ethi Berkeley CA: University of California Press D i h J h (1989) M l i t d l ltihi I G Gh d H h LFll tt ( d ) P t P 10623 P h i l d l h i T l U i i t P Friedman Marilyn (1993) What are Friends For? Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press Gilligan Carol (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development Cbid MA H d U i i t P Gh G d L F l l t t H h (1989) P t P Phildlhi T l Ui it P Held Virginia (1993) Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture Society and Politics Chicago: P U i i t f Chi S Chiti Rflti i th F f Di K i k d S (1962) Wk fL trans Howard Hong and Edna Hong New York: Harper Torchbooks d Mlit Ofd Blkll L F l l t t H h (1996) P l Rltihi L Idtit Mti J R l d (1992) Th Shlh Cbid MA H d U i i t P Nddi N l (1984) Ci AF i i A h t Ethi d Ml Edti Bkl CA University of California Press

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Ruddick Sara (1989) Material Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. Boston MA: Beacon Press Singer Peter (1972) Famine affluence and morality Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 229^3 Thomas Laurence (1989) Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character. Philadelphia: Temple University Press

Further reading Baier Annette C (1995) Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Blum Lawrence (1980) Friendship, Altruism, and Morality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1994) Moral Perception and Particularity. New York: Cambridge University Press (2001) Against deriving particularity In Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (eds) Moral Particularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press Gilbert Paul (1991) Human Relationships: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Herman Barbara (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Lewis C S (1960) The Four Loves. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Meilaender Gilbert (1981) Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press Tronto Joan (1993) Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New York: Routledge

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39 Animals JEFF McMAHAN

The Differences between Human Beings and Other Animals A dramatic way of calling attention to some important property that we share s to assert that it is our possession of this property that distinguishes us from animals The history of rhetoric thus abounds in claims about the differences between human beings and other animals But what is it that really differentiates us morally from animals? Most of us if asked this question would initially respond by citing some psychological capacity or set of psychological capacities: for example that we but not other animals are self-conscious rational autonomous have the ability to use language have a moral sense or conscience have free will or are responsible for our acts and so on The problem with this response however is that for each capacity that might be cited there are some human beings who lack it (Sometimes the claim is that we possess certain capacities to a much higher degree than any animal The parallel problem with this claim is that for each such capacity there are some human beings who possess it only to the extent that certain animals do) Some human beings who lack the relevant capacities may nevertheless have he potential to develop them Many fetuses and infants belong in this category And other human beings who currently lack the relevant capacities may once have had them Those who are demented or irreversibly comatose may be in this category Human beings in these two categories might be thought to be relevantly different from animals by virtue of their past or potential possession of the relevant capacities But there is a third group - human beings who are congenitally severely cognitively impaired - whose members have never had psychological capacities higher than those of certain animals and also lack the potential to develop them n the future If it is the possession of certain psychological capacities or perhaps he possession of such capacities to a high degree that endows people such as you and me with a higher moral status than animals it seems that those human beings who lack the capacities or who possess them to no greater degree than certain animals do cannot share our high moral status Their status should instead be comparable to that of animals with similar psychological capacities These facts pose a challenge Most of us are disposed to think that it is by virtue of our psychological nature that we are fundamentally different morally from 525

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i l Bt ti h bli t h t all h bi difft from animals in morally important ways If we are right about that it cannot be our psychological capacities that distinguish us since there are some human beings whose psychological capacities can never be higher than those of certain animals If blif t b i t t t h f t ith f i d l t t i b i f i tt l b d th i t h t th i f d t l l diff bt ll h bi d ll th i l Th l t t ti ld ill i d t i h i ti Lt id h t h th i l t t i f d t i f i tt Th t ibiliti ith th l t diff i iill dttbl it is not Many people embrace the second option They believe that all human beings have souls but that no animals do This view is however very difficult to defend According to what seems to be the most common conception the soul s a h i l bt tht till h th it f i d tl t i i t If h th l i th bjt f i t ith d tht i l h l ll l ld i l i b l t h t th i t t A l t t i ti i t h t th l i th " i i i i l " tht imparts to the human body the powers of a human person According to this conception just as the shape of a statue is not separable from the material of which the statue is made so the soul is not separable from the body but is rather mani f t i th i h i h th tt f th b d i i d t d th iti d f If h th t f th li ld th iti f th b i h b d it i f hld ld tht l t d d h bi d t h " t i l l" ( h i h di t A i dli th iti f t i l b i ) bt i t d h " i ti" " i l " l iil t tht hih if th b d f bl d d i l A i th i d diff bt ll h bi d all other animals Other conceptions of the soul tend to be defined by negation: for example the soul is neither body nor mind nor the essential union of the two But once the soul i t i d f ll iti f t th t b t tht th i h thi It i t h f t id hth th i ll i i f t diff bt ll h bi d ll i l t h t t lt b t tt f t l d t B th if diff f hl diff i t l ti t b h i l It i bl t t h t th l h i l ti t h t d b ll human beings but not by any other animals and that are likely to be morally significant are those properties that are necessary and sufficient for membership n the human species How then are members of the human species distinguished fr th b f th i? O ki iti f d t i i hth ti i d i i d l t t h titt i i hth th ttill i t b d t d ftil ff i B t thi iti i t l l b l t t l (f l "i i " ) it i l b i l ll i i i f i t Th bjti l t th id t h t th b f i ll h th h i l h t

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Th id i lld " l t i i " h b have widely varying phenotypes More importantly even if we suppose that all members of the human species share a distinctive gross morphology at the various stages of their development that can hardly be what distinguishes them morally f i l A thid ibilit i t h t b f th h i h i l l ditit b it f thi i f It i t f tht i d i i d l kd " h " th it i t h t th t t f th hl i d t i t i f b h i i th i I ti thi iti i l i l f thi bi ill h thi d i t i t i f bt l if it is the genetic product of parents identified as human This may well be the best way to distinguish human beings from the members of other species But there are decisive reasons for rejecting the assumption that this iti f b h i i th h i i ll i i f t It i b h th f t f th t itlf i d d t l f thi h t i iftti ld b b t b ll i i f t A d i th ti diff bt h bi d thi l t lti lti hi t i t l ll h bi d hi h approximately 9 8 4 percent of their genes in common In most cases of course the 1 6 percent difference in genotype yields profoundly important differences of pheno type But these differences are of psychological endowment and as we have seen d t d i t i i h all h bi f th i l F i t tht i ibl h thl l k th f di titil h h l i l iti T i t t h t th t per se i ll i l t id f d ibl b t h l i f bii f difft i Sitit h l d td " t i " i b i t i i l h i t th l f i t (Thi i i t t i ith li tht could be transplanted into human beings without provoking a lethal mmune re sponse) Just as it is possible to produce a pig in which each cell carries a single human gene so it is possible to produce a chimpanzee with a single human gene t h th I i t f ibiliti At d f th t i hi ith h N t th i t i hi ith t h Ad ith h diidl fth i th t h i l hi bt h th th i Si th l bt th h d th hi i h i h it b ll b d th iddl f th i i d spectrum before there are individuals that are parthuman partchimpanzee with bizarre blends of human and chimpanzee characteristics At the far end of the spectrum is an individual grown from a chimpanzee zygote from which all the hi bt d d l d b di h Th i t f thi b d th iddl i l i b l t d t i d b h

t

i b t h t th

t j t t h t th i b h i f idiidl i l i d t i t it i l t h t it ld b l tt f i d i i d l i th t i ht ti f it h tk

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from a human being Rather it seems that the moral status of each individual is determined by its individual phenotypic characteristics particularly its psychological capacities Compare for example two possible transgenic individuals In one 999 percent of its genes are of human origin though the genes responsible for the growth and development of its brain are from the original chimpanzee zygote If species membership is determined by the genome this individual is presumably a human being though its mental capacities are those of a chimpanzee In a second individual 999 percent of its genes are of chimpanzee origin but the genes responsible for the development of its brain have a human source This is presumably a chimpanzee with human intelligence If moral status is a matter of species membership the individual with the mind of a chimpanzee should have a higher moral status than that of the individual with human intelligence This is highly implausible Most people however persist in believing that membership in the human species is morally significant How can this be if the properties that are necessary and sufficient for membership are not morally significant? One possibility is that the special moral status that severely retarded human beings are presumed to enjoy derives not from their intrinsic properties but from their relation to us Just as I owe more to my own children than I do to other children - not because my children are intrinsically more worthy but simply because of the relation I bear to them - so I may owe more to a severely retarded human being than to a comparably endowed animal simply because we are both human - that is belong to the same species Is co-membership in the human species a morally important relation? It seems unlikely that it could be since the relation is just a matter of biology and genealogy and thus is similar to co-membership in the same race which most people now reject as a legitimate basis for partiality But suppose for the sake of argument that co-membership in the human species is a special relation Could it be sufficiently important to justify the difference between our treatment of the severely retarded and our treatment of animals with comparable capacities? If there is no relevant intrinsic difference between the severely retarded and comparably endowed animals and if we are thus required to treat the severely retarded differently only because of our relation to them then we must accept that it would be permissible for Martians who are not specially related to the severely retarded to treat them in the ways that we treat animals if other things were equal Most of us will find this difficult to accept If so and if we are unable to identify and defend a significant intrinsic difference between the severely retarded and comparably endowed animals we must revise our beliefs - about the moral status of the severely retarded or the status of animals or both Consideration of what we believe Martians would be morally required or forbidden to do provides a test for consistency in our beliefs Other things being equal we must treat animals at least as well as we believe Martians would be required to treat severely retarded human beings with comparable psychological capacities If co-membership in our species is a special relation we may be required to treat the severely retarded somewhat better than Martians would be required to treat them and therefore somewhat better than we are required to treat animals with comparable capacities 528

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The Morality of Causing Suffering and the Morality of Killing I bli t h t th t th t Ih d d i t dif our moral beliefs both about animals and about the severely retarded We should conclude that in virtually all respects animals merit better treatment than trad itional human practices have accorded them But we should also accept that n at l t t t ll required t t t th l t d d ith it th d f liitd tht blif d d I ill f t t i l l i t t f ft t t killi d th ifli ti f ffi C i d f t th i f l i t i f ffi Sffi i bd i i l b f it i t i i t it i b d i i t l f S f f i f ti i t i t d d t i i ll b d l t ll b d h it Th f inflicting it is therefore not appreciably diminished if the victim's cognitive capacities are comparatively low as in the case of animals and the severely retarded (Of course it appears that some lower animals are so rudimentarily developed neurologically t h t th i b l f t ffi i thi ti b t th lit f ifliti t ffi d t i ) It ld t h f b l l bjti bl ll f Mti t iflit t ffi l t d d h bi th it ld b f t i f l i t th d f ffi ith l iti iti A d thi t t h t th i f l i t i f ffi i l hld b l t ll if th thi l th i f l i t i of a comparable degree of suffering on a person One has of course a stronger reason to prevent one's own suffering or the suffering of one's child than one has to prevent the same suffering in an animal B t thi i b f th i l lti (ildi idtit) tb h ffi h t i t i i iif If b h i i th h i i i l lti it f l l tht h t tl t ht b t h ffi th b t i l ffi th thi bi l Th th f thiki t h t th ffi f tt ht Whil ffi i bd i i l b f it i t i i t it also be bad because it precludes activities or experiences of positive value Because the activities and experiences of persons are generally more valuable than those of animals the "opportunity costs" of suffering are in general greater for persons Sffi l h fft tht if t h h t th id f if Th i f l i t i f ffi h i f t f l h d i fft th hl f it b t lif Of i lt h iil f f t i th lif f i l Bt b th lif f i l i h t d ti l f l tht b ild b hi i th th lif f person does these effects are less serious Finally in persons but not animals the anticipation of suffering may itself be a cause of suffering and suffering may be intensified by anxiety about its significance t h h th ft tl f f t b th f t t h t ' ffi l b ititd b d t d i f it t h t it ill d It i i t t t t t h t th f thiki i l ffi tt ht l l l t ffi i d b th l t d d

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Next consider the morality of killing Most of us believe that wrongful killings of persons - by which I mean individuals who are self-conscious and at least minimally rational - are equally wrong at least in the sense that the wrongness does not vary with differences in the age or quality of life of the victim or with other factors that affect the degree to which an act of killing harms or is bad for its victim The morality of killing persons varies only in ways that are compatible with the basic moral equality of persons: thus for example the degree of wrongness may vary with the intention of the agent and some acts of killing may not be wrong at all for example if the victim has through his own wrongful action made it necessary as a matter of justice that he be killed It is however impossible to believe that the killing of animals regardless of their cognitive and emotional capacities is equally wrong as the killing of innocent adult persons While it may be almost as seriously wrong to inflict great pain on a squirrel as it is to inflict a comparable degree of pain on a person it would clearly be a mistake to suppose that to kill a squirrel is as seriously wrong as it is to kill an innocent person While the killing of persons s in general egregiously and equally wrong the killing of animals is less seriously wrong other things being equal It is tempting to explain this difference by noting that a person has more to lose and is therefore harmed to a greater extent by being killed But the assumption that the wrongness of killing varies with the degree to which the victim is harmed s incompatible with our intuition that killings of persons are equally wrong An alternative and more plausible explanation is that killing persons and killing animals are wrong for different reasons It can be argued that because persons are rational and autonomous each has exclusive moral authority over his own life that is each has the right to determine how his own life should go provided that he does not encroach upon the equivalent rights of others Because to kill a person against his will is the ultimate usurpation of his authority over his life it constitutes the most serious possible violation of his rights If we assume that the right not to be killed unjustly is one that all persons possess equally this would explain why all wrongful killings of persons are equally wrong (Most lesser non-lethal harms seem to violate lesser rights ones that vary in strength These rights seem merely to protect interests not autonomy Thus the wrongness of inflicting these lesser harms even on persons seems to vary with the magnitude of the harm other things being equal) The explanation of why killing animals is morally objectionable is necessarily different Because animals (or most animals) are not rational and autonomous it makes no sense to suppose that they have the same kind of authority to direct or determine how their lives will go They lack the degree of self-consciousness necessary to conceive of deliberate about and plan for their own future lives Thus to kill an animal cannot be objectionable because it is contrary to its will But it is objectionable if it is contrary to its good - that is if its future life would be worth living Indeed it seems that an appeal to the loss of future good that an animal suffers in being killed provides an exhaustive explanation of what is intrinsically objectionable about killing it Because of this we should expect that the degree to which the killing of an animal is objectionable varies if other things are equal with the extent of its loss (or in other words with the degree to which it is thereby 530

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h d ) A d thi tti i b t b ititi W bli f example that it is worse to kill a dog than to kill a frog It seems then that we do not have a single unified understanding of the moral ity of killing Instead our beliefs suggest that killing persons is in general wrong b it i i t i b l ith t f thi iht t i l d t bi hil killi i l i b j t i b l h d t th t t t h t it i i t thi i t t B t it i tb fthi i b h i tht t t d b difft d t i t l i t It i i t d b th h iti d t i l iti t h t k th l l d i th th th th thit thi i If this is right however severely retarded human beings who lack these capacities that distinguish persons from animals cannot be entitled by virtue of their intrinsic natures to the moral protections enjoyed by persons The morality of killing the l t d d i d f th t t b th idti tht th killi f i l ith bl iti Th i h i t t diff hih i tht i t l l l t d d h bi i i t t l ill ltd t ti E h l t d d h bi i f l ' hild A d th h closely personally related to the severely retarded have special reasons to protect and care for them and are usually motivated by love and compassion to do so The rest of us must respect these people's feelings and commitments We therefore have i d i t t b ill liit b t th llbi f l t d d h bi tht d t h i th f bl d d i l (W h iil t t t l' t difftl f th i hih i h t t t th i l if th ltd t b t th h k b th lti bt d hi h t i bttill l i i f t th th lti bt t d hild f th l t t ' h l i l iti h i h th th f t i l )

Practical Issues Ih td tht t t t f i l i db l i t t t thi i t t (I h l td tht t i h iht t th i t t f i l bli Mti ld b id t i t th i i l i t t f l t d d h bi ith bl h logical capacities) Because our treatment of animals is constrained only by their interests and not by rights it is appropriate to deliberate about the morality of practices involving the use of animals by weighing their interests against ours or ll i t ht i t t flit ith t h i Althh h iht tht fbid t h th if t h t i t t t h t th th d t t b lll t i t i t ifii i l f th t d f th hth h i l Th b d fjtifti f ti t h t i f l i t ffi i l kill th h th i th i t h f t h t th ti t b h t b i d t t t h t d

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b f i t tht t i h th h iflitd Lt id hth ti id spread practices can pass this test Our most common use of animals is to rear and kill them for food In order for this practice to be justified the benefits it offers us must outweigh the harms it inflicts on animals And the harms are substantial I d d d i t td iti iti l h d thi i t d I th US l billi f i l killd h f h ti Th jit f th i d i "ft f " diti i hih thi llbi i t t i l l ifid i tht iht d dit d t h b ii fit Il th h i f i d t i l f thi t t t th it (f l Pt S i ) It i ffiit h t t tht our practice of eating meat causes billions of animals to endure lives of continuous misery The practice also involves billions of killings annually most of which are carried out in ways that are terrifying and painful to the victim This dimension of th ti i h d t l t i f th li tht dd ld t h b th l i i if th h d t i d Y t it bi tht t f killi t b d th d t h t it d th i t i ft tht ld h b d b l because the killer himself would have made it so. Killi b h f l i th diti What then are the benefits we derive that can be weighed against these harms? It would be cheating to say simply "the pleasures we get from eating m e a t " The proper answer (or part of that answer) is: the difference between the pleasure we get f ti t d th l could t f hll t i dit W t t h f kh h l t t tf thi l th t i t f thi M t t i tht ti t f l t t Ad t ill t t i f t h t t h i lit f lif d l i d l i i l l if t ll h th t i l d t ll M h b t i i f t fid t h t t h i lit f lif i h i h t d h d fhlth d itlit th t f th d range of dietary options Indeed it is clear even when we factor in any pleasures meat affords that cannot be equaled by the pleasures of a vegetarian or vegan diet that most affluent Westerners and especially most Americans would be substan till b t t ff if th t t i d i t th th thi t dit f h i hih i l d l titi f t S i t f bit d i l di dibt d i f f ld d d l ld i l ith t i df h i i l t d dibiliti ttibtbl t t b d dit I ill d l d iti t h f th i ll nothing bl t ih i t th h iflitd i l i th of turning them into meat apart from opportunities for imprudence in elevating transient pleasures of the palate over health and longterm wellbeing (In poorer societies meateating may still be necessary for adequate nutrition The case for t t i i h diti i it t B t th t diti) Th b i l t thi i t h t if th tW t dit i hlth d i t ith ll t fl ti l h l t h th t i dit B t th bl ith thi i t h t d i t ith l ll t fl t ill l diff t ll i th l it f f d f hll t i dit S t h h th b f i l killd ld d l i i i f i t l f l t

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t th tibl ith d h l t h th b f t fr th ti would still be clearly insufficient to justify the harms Advocates of meateating have further rejoinders I will briefly discuss three First it can be argued that even if there would be no case for adopting a practice of t t i if h ti l d i t d th t f blihi th iti ti ld b hibiti F th t i d t i t i T b l i h it ld t h t th l i l i h d fh d d ft h d if t illi f l i th US l Th d i t i f th ld b t t h i H t ti t if t b f th b f t f tii th b f th h tht ld ff if th ti t d The problem with this argument is that it can be advanced on behalf of any largescale social practice however iniquitous The same claim has been made n support of slavery in the South the sale of tobacco products at home and abroad d th l f d d t t dillitit t It i i t b l t h t th ill b it t h i t i l ti f th h lilihd d d it t i t i B t th lti i ll h ildi th ti f t t i i t d f i i t i bt ti f th d l liiti f th ti i h i h th t fili tates the process of economic conversion for example conversion of arms factories to civilian uses or the conversion of tobacco farms to benign forms of agriculture perhaps assisting and compensating those who would otherwise be adversely fftd A d df f t t i t t th i d i i d l l l O fll "E if we it ht tt t t it d t fll tht I ht t t F th i t t t i i t h t it i f l i t t i b l h i l t if I t i t tht ld t t th t t dth f i l i l Th kt i i l i f f i t l iti t it d t t h i idiidl tt f ti T h f tii t eat meat will not cause any animal to be harmed The reason why we ought not to eat meat does not apply to me on my own I ought to give up meat only if most others will do so as well and that is not going to happen" O t thi t i t li tht hil f i t f i ld k diff btti f t f th hl f dlt lifti ld b b d t k some diff t th b f i l killd li i ll it i hih ti l l l lid L t t i l l if f th k f t t h t thi i t Th bl i tht f lifti' btti ld d b l f th b f i l ith t cated and miserable lives it may not be morally required For the net amount of pleasure of which one would be deprived by abstaining over so long a period could well exceed the harm to only a few animals that one would thereby prevent A f f l l t thi d f fidiidl t t i i t h t it i l f f t k th i i t i t i i b d i th ti t h t h f ill d t k i i f t diff Thi i i tj t tt fl i B t it i l t i l li F i d i i d l th l t b t i i t h t id h i idiidl i l it i t b bli it t th f th il ti f t t i t t l f th d

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t h b t id i t d t t il ti t h t ill i i f t l diminish the harms that we as a society inflict on animals (There is little doubt that the combined action of all the vegetarians in the US today does make a substantial difference to how many animals are tormented and killed) Thus even if for the ti bi ' idiidl ifi ill t ild t i t dti i th h i f l i t it till b id b f it ibl l t i t th b h i f th F th i t f liiti th ti i t tht ll bbilit f tibti t tht l k it ll i t i t t th til i ifi t h t b i l d b i t i A third and final defense of meateating does not attempt to vindicate the present practice but instead claims that a different practice could be justified if the animals were treated differently Suppose that certain animals were bred and reared n diti i h i h th ld b t t d d t h t th ld b i l l killd f h ti l ft h i lid bl f l l lif If t h i li ld b t l t d ll th li th ld h if th i d i th ild it i h d t h th i l ld b dd victims f th ti t i l l if th ld t h i t i t t ll If i l tonomous and had a right to determine how their lives should go such a practice could not of course be justified But if only their interests are at issue it seems that the practice could be justified for it would enable the animals to fare at least as ll th ld d l t t i t ld bl b i d t id f th It i t i l i b l t bli t h t thi k i d f ti ld i i i l b i i b l B t it i t liti ibilit tid ll l tti It ld t b ill ibl l l b th i t t id t iti i l f l t h id i diti itd t thi t ld b h t th t h t h i h i id l t k th li til th h grown to full size (as is done at present) In order for producers to recover their investment and make a profit the cost of meat would have to be correspondingly high far higher than most people could afford to pay at present rates of consump ti A ti d l i d it t iht i E t l l t ld b l tht l th ih ld j ith lit t " i d t " (h Th t h t thi i t liti ibilit i t h t th i t t lik th f th t b d i d t i llid ith th perceived l f i t t t h h t th lb t i t t f l ll) ld it ith ll th idbl t it d i l Of thi i t well of efforts to achieve universal vegetarianism though as a Utopian goal uni versal vegetarianism is unlike the practice I have described at least mmune to objections on egalitarian grounds Th l i Id f thi d i i tht ti f ti t i i l d tht hdl likl t l ll tbl f f t t i th t b l i h th ti ltth Th h th ti tht i l h i d killi i l tht t l i l idfibl A th t l t t i (th t l t t i f tk f i l i t th b d i fh b i ) d i f f i

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tti Th t h t th l i k l t b d f i b l i t h t th benefits they offer are very significantly greater than those people derive from eating meat In xenotransplantation (which is not yet effective but is on the horizon) the painless killing of an animal might save a person's life Since the harm that a ff i di i ll idbl t th tht hih i l ff th h td t h h t l t t i ld ll tl t i h th h i f l i t d S i i l l th i t f i t t i tht i t b f t t h bi d i l l t i l ll M h i t likl t b ll j t i f i b l t h h i t f i t t i i l ibl th jit d t d benefits that outweigh the harms they inflict Many experiments yield compara tively trivial results uselessly duplicate work already done are unnecessary because alternative methods of investigation are available or yield results that cannot be libl t l t d t i l i h bi M t i t h li tht thi k i ffiitl i t t t j t i f th ifi f i l H tll h t h thi j d t i b d bl d i t i l t d d ? H i ti M f th t t t i t i t d d t ild k l d b t h bi f example what medicines may benefit us what substances may harm us and so on The data obtained would therefore be far more reliable if the experimental subjects were human beings rather than animals Most human beings with psycho l i l iti d ttil bl t th f i l ld t i t l b j t b it f thi lti t th h bi Bt i l l l t d d i f t i h d t bith d i t i i f i t l ill ltd t Wld i t t t h t hi h i t ffiitl i t t t jtif i h i f t ? Th h b i t i h i h th t f hli i f t ( i f t lki b l h i h d th d i d f it f i ness) have sought thus far unsuccessfully to make the organs of their living infant available for transplantation Would an experimenter be willing to use such an infant assuming that the parents could be persuaded to give their consent? If an i t ld t h i k it t h bi f f th t bt ld b illi t i t i l ith i l t hih h l i l iti ld b titld t d d lli l t i f th diff If I d li thi d d ld t b t hld d b t t h t th i t ld b j t i f i d

Further reading C l k S R L (1997) Animals and their Moral Standing. L d Rtld C t J M (1999) The Lives of Animals. P i t NJ P i t U i i t P DeGrazia D (1996) Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Cambridge: Cam brid U i i t P F R G (1983) Rights, Killing, and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics. O f d B l k l l

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McMahan J (2001) The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York: Oxford University Press Pluhar E (1995) Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Durham: Duke University Press Rachels J (1990) Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press Regan T (1983) The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Singer Peter (1990) Animal Liberation, rev edn New York: Avon Books (1993) Practical Ethics, 2nd edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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D i t th j k t h t h ("It tb " "It tb h t ") b i thi i b t d i diili tht h ildd h ftil t i t i t B i thi i th t d f h thi d b i td d th l i f thil d i i k i i O f th f i t ti tht i i i ft hth b i d thi b connected at all Indeed there is often a presumption that "business" refers to a purely economic activity which only coincidentally may have important conse f th I t th d l t fb i thi d i diili h i l d i b d ki i l ti bt thi db i I d d th i td l f k bi d d l i t f t l f k t h i d id i hih t h i l t b d d d i th b i fb i hih h l l ll l ti d t d Business ethics is both normative and descriptive; that is it describes and evalu ates individual and corporate behavior and practices that managers and corpor ations ought or ought not to engage in In this regard it also evaluates the role of t l d bli li i f f t i b i bth till d i t t i l t d

T

Tditil T i i Bi Ethi and Responsibility

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Tditill h i l h ki i b i thi h tk h h b th ti f th t t f th t ti t i t b ttld b f i t t i btti ti b k d Th th conditions under which we want to ascribe moral agency to managers and to corporations and the extent of their responsibilities have been seen as the founda tional questions of business ethics We shall divide this section into three parts: the l f ti th l ibilit f ti d th l f d l lit

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The moral agency of corporations Some of the early work by philosophers in business ethics concerned the question of corporate moral agency Specifically can a corporation be held accountable in the fthi t i ? tht i d i i d l b hld t b l f th fft A ti i ith idiidl ttl il t It i id f idiidl i i l d t h i d b th l it t f t i f ifi ft l d f d O i t i lik i d i i d l t l C t i " t " l t h h th ti f iti ft th lt f llti tidiidl d i i k i C t i ll idiidl normatively evaluated Just as individuals are expected to meet their responsibilities and are blamed if they fail to do so corporations and other organizations have responsibilities and are expected to meet them B f th ti d i i f ti it h b db Pt F h (1979) d th tht ti l t l C ti t t d l l d th l it i t t t thik f th l ll Th d i f f i l t ith thi l i M W h d th h d i t h t it t iti ith i d i i d l While it is true that corporations act as moral agents in ways described above they do not literaEy act; rather people act on behalf of the organization and indeed people create the organization in the first place (Werhane 1985; May 1987; M Philli 1992) B ti d t litll t Vl (1983) d K l (1988) h d tht l l d l t thil i b d d t ti thil i f d b th i d i i d l h ll t i t t th iti Gi tht ti th i l ti t d ll i t i l ti b h i d t t idiidl ti ti d lti h f l it f i Thi iti M dW h tl t h i l b l i th f t f l l t i i t i l action that occurs within almost every mediumsized and large corporation It s true that the purposes mission and goals of any organization are created by groups of individuals; nevertheless these phenomena function as guides for individual and i t i l b h i as if th iti idiidl diti th tiiti f it t i t t The moral responsibility of corporations Whil thi d b t i f t h t i l i t t t d i l thik h d that what is important in business ethics is to get at the nature of corporate responsi bility whatever its origins or structure (Donaldson 1982; Goodpaster 1982 1983) Some time ago the Nobel Prize economist Milton Friedman declared: "There is one d l il ibilit f b i t it d tiiti d i d t i it ft l it t ithi th l f th hih i t i df titi itht d t i f d " (Fid 1970126) M h j l h b d t d t i F i d ' li B t it i i t t i t t tht h d ti f t tht b i h l i 538

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biliti Hi i i t f" t h i " df f" b itli" some call it Rather "ethical custom" "open and free competition without deception or fraud" or "staying within the rules of the game" are all to be seen as constraints on the operation of markets Law and common morality should guide our actions in the ktl j t th id ti l h Fid i l i i tht h i fi dt fdi dt t h h l d Odiil th dti t ii t i t t b t th bjt t thil t i t A d i t th l " t l " f h i it ff k t titi ( f l H 1979 M i t l d 1994) Th k f th l i itl d b Ad S i t h i The Wealth of Nations some two centuries ago (see Werhane 1991) and there are a number of developments in business ethics that serve as an antidote to this stereotypical view Early work by Thomas Donaldson (1982) on the nature of corporate responsibility d t kb D l d d Th D f (1995) h t th ll I t t i S i l C t t Th (ISCT) I b i f D l d d D f tht h thil i i b i f th ti f il t t f th b d d t f thi th Th "All t i l h tilit ld tt h t h t i l il t t i social contract' that would preserve for individual economic communities significant moral free space in which to generate their own norms of economic conduct through actual 'microsocial contracts'" (Donaldson and Dunfee 1995: 89) Donaldson and D f ' tibti i t t h t th b i l ii h tht ll il l t i h i th l l W h t th i bjt t dbt bt l ii h t i tit h h i t t ti tl t td i t i b i iht t t i l d i ti fil didt f h (Dld d D f 1995 9 5 6 ) Th l ii ld ll d f th " t h i l t " tht Fid li t i ft i i t i Thi i li ti flli Wl (1994) Moral minimums are invaluable as justifications for making and evaluating moral judgments that cross organizational cultural or ethnic boundaries and they make possible organizational and role evaluation Managerial moral responsibility, role morality, and employee rights Pllli th k t ibilit b i thiit l i ti b t th t t f il ibilit M i t t tti h ibiliti t h t d f d b thi i t i t t i l l td l As Judith Andre (1991) has carefully argued the existence of roles and role obliga tions permit a predictability of human behavior and stability in social relationships A mother who ignores her children or a manager who does not take seriously his fdi ibiliti t hi d t i t j d d t b i l b t h b th t d d f l lit db j d t f ti Th llbi f iti d d t l t i t th f l f i l l t f l b l i t i b it t i t t B t th ti i h t i th f l l t t f il l b l i t i ? D l bliti h t i l d i b th t t f il ibiliti? A d 539

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d h d th l bliti id di l l? Werhane (1985 1998) and Luban (1988: chs 6 and 7) have argued that because an organization could mandate questionable activities one needs to be able to evaluate roles role obligations and role acts not merely in terms of the organiza t i l ii bt l i l t f lit I d d ft jd t i l because f th l bliti h h h f d T h f l lit h i t t bt liitd tibti t k i b i thi If l ibiliti t h i f t t d i b th d t t f il ibiliti thi i l i tht d th l h moral obligations connected with but not defined by their employment roles For example employees who find that safety is not mandated in the workplace have obligations according to this implication to try to change these conditions or to t t bl th h i t l if th h d t C t d ith th bliti l iht i thi th i h t t f h d b f thik h t ti l i th t d f l i h t (f l W h 1985 R d i dW h 1996) I t til lik litil iht iht f l ki i th i t t not guaranteed This is because constitutional guarantees apply only to relation ships between individuals (or organizations) and the state and not in private agreements or relationships such as family or employment relationships except h th i h ittd t f th ti i th l t i h i I d d th d f l t l t l i th U i t d S t t i ht i lld E l t t Will (EAW) EAW i l d t tht ifi t h t i th b fl lti t t th liit t l t l tihi "t ill" l t i h i h t h t ith t t th t th l th l t i t th t t ti f ht (Bld 1967) In fact however what appears to be a draconian common law while not abol ished is scarcely practiced in most employment settings in the US at the beginning of the twentyfirst century The new literature focuses on three aspects The irst t i f th t i t t i l iht f l t b t t d fil f th t j f d f h d l t fd (Wh d Rdi f t h i ) d tiiti (MMh 1994) Th d t d tht th ti t t iht f l d i t b t i d t b l bl i th h i k i t (Kt 1993) Th t h i d t k th tiliti i d t h t i d d fi t t t t i d t i i d development employee participation in decisionmaking and a policy of retention for the best employees create economic valueadded to corporations that institute these practices (Pfeffer 1998)

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th fi t t i thi k ith i t b i t h i t Thi has often meant assuming a critical stance toward these theorists as the vocabular ies of business theory and that of ethical theory have little in common at first glance For the most part management theory and our ordinary view about busi h l d l th li f h t iht b l l d "th ti t h i " M f l l F (1994 412) l i t h t th ti t h i i th flli id "The Separation Thesis (ST) Th di fb i d th di f thi b td tht t lik " i b i d i i " h l t t d" i ld i i " h b i t t " At th l l f l lt itli db i ft i d t i f d ith "no holds barred" or "anything goes" kind of action so that the idea of ethics is an anathema hence the earlier joke about business ethics At the level of more rigor ous and systematic thinking ethics is often shunted to one side under the guise of th " i i l t i " " d i t i i t i " dititi Th lt th i fb i " l " d th th d f t di f"thi" i hih t hld b i ll tbl It i th i t i t tht l th h t hd b t id b t b i J t th di fb i h d l d i ilti (f th t t) from ethics so the discourse of ethics has emerged in isolation from the very practical human institutions that are involved in value creation and trade The first question of political philosophy is always "how is the state justified?" The resulting normative i f th t f liti d lit l h hititd i f l ti dt d U l l i i d t i f d ith iti ti ft i i t i d l l k f lit O i th ti thi d l i di tht i b i t d thil t i l td i b b f h fft i b i thi E b i d i i ti fft l l t i h i bt l h tht l t t i ti i t i ld f f t th difftl d economic decision or set of decisions is embedded in a belief system that presupposes some basic values or their abrogation So the separation thesis marks out a bankrupt discourse because it forces false dilemmas on business practices: mental models that t th i l l i tht b i ith b ll d ftbl tht di d (h i t t th t " d " ) d di ll f l idi l t f h h l d ft i t i b l (F 1994) T h t thi i b k t di i i d d i t td b J Clli dJ P (1994) Th th it b f i tht h i d d i t h i t d t d l t d i business cycles Those that have flourished over the long run the authors argue are companies that have a stable core mission and vision that are the basis for all corpor ate activities and drive decisionmaking through various dramatic business changes Wht l tdi b i iti i t h t th b t iti it t th ii ith th i f ftbilit d di t Clli dP (1994) th b t ( l t ii d t fitbl) b i iti th tht d tf ftbilit thi i ii O f th ti thi f l t b f h j t t i t i t it f f t i th d i i l i fb i F i t 541

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i l idtifti f th t h i l i i l d i kti f k h the "4 Ps" of price place promotion and product would allow us to routinely combine ethical and business analyses Questions that would naturally arise n clude: (1) Under what conditions does it make sense to talk about "fair prices"? (2) Shld b i h i tht flt h t illi t ?F ll k i d f d ? (3) A i t t t li d t lik i ? (4) A th liit th k i d f l i tht f k b t it d t ? (5) Wh i ibl f " d t " h h th l hi l d t t i d i t f d t ? Siill ddi f ll ti f f t d b th h i t f organization's purpose might broaden the scope of finance to include corporate stakeholders and the financial/economic effects on them Finance could apply its formal instrumental reasoning approach to other stakeholders Questions nclude: (1) H th i t f ti th i t ? (2) W h t b t t d hih th bt ltil tk h l d ? (3) D t t h h l d d " t " t th tkhld i th d i t i ? (4) C k f th l i t h t " ht t t i th i t t f tkhld h l t li nities and shareholders? (5) What are the normative implications of using sophisti cated models such as the BlackScholes option pricing model? Organization studies is another fruitful area in which to explore how concepts n thi db i b bid P t t i l h j t i l d (1) H thi dl d h i b b i d ? W h t i th ti f"thil l d h i ? " (2) D t d d iti t h i h " l t i l " d " d d " ti iliit l d i i ? (3) A th l i t f thiki b t th l f ii idl i t i ? (4) W h t th ti bt " t t i h t" d thi? Th th ti tht b id t t i t t human and organizational questions in purely instrumental or purely "share holderserving" terms Overcoming the separation thesis opens up a great deal of possibility for business ethics There is an opportunity to literally rethink the discip fb i f "fll l" it f i d h t t h i k th li b i t t f l th f hititd d t d i fh l ti dt d i ibl I d d h h b th l f b f b i thi hl ki "tkhld t h "

Stakeholder Theory Wht b i t h i t i ibilit t h h l hld i til t h h l d O ld t i b i l ith td il tiit i t t t l b

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th bt l b th idiidl f idiidl h beings with rights and interests Once the separation thesis is abandoned it becomes crucial to see the actors n business as part of common morality Ordinary morality requires that agents take ibilit f th f f t f thi ti th Th t k h l d id t thi b i id f ibilit d li it t b i Stkhld th i ii f k f b i thi b it k l d llit f l d l difft l l d it l i k t h i l t ith th b i fb i h bliti t t d li B lli ttti t th it f l tht b id b i d i i d l ll f h h l tk i the organization it can provide a framework for understanding and explicating he possibility of conflicts of value of loyalty of commitment and of interests Widely defined a stakeholder is "any individual or group who benefits from or is h d b h iht fftd ( iltd titd i d ) b i t i ' t i " (F 1997 250) F i l tkhld i " idiidl h l l t i h i ith iti () hl t dfi th iti it ii it l d/ (b) i i t l t th d l t f t i i i l d llbi f th iti d its activities" (Freeman 1997: 250) or (c) is most affected by the organization and its activities In a modern business corporation "stakeholders" narrowly defined yields at least employees shareholders customers suppliers and communities Th i t b t th f i d dfiiti (F 1994 M i t h l t l 1997) At fit l tkhld th t b i i l d i t i tkhld l t i h i tli i t i l l lti hi ithi d t i d th fi H th f th t " t k h l d " btitt f " t k h l d " t t h t th ti t h i i b i t i d I f t th id f" t k h l d " lid i b i th b dt d t th " t i d i t i " dititi Under the narrowly defined version stakeholders appear to be those who are instrumental one way or another to the firm and its wellbeing (Donaldson and Preston 1995) Prioritizing stakeholders helps to sort out and clarify organizational iiti tht t th iti ffti fftd b th iti i ti i ll i t t tkhld T iiti tkhld li i i t i ' d ii ki tkhld i t f h h l i t i t it li d h i til t tht ii d t th i l d flihi f th iti ( M i t h l l t l 1997) Challenging the claim that a manager's primary responsibility is to maximize profits or that the primary purpose of a firm is to maximize the welfare of its stockholders stakeholder theory argues that the goal of any firm and its manage t i or should be th f l i h i f th fi d all it i tkhld Th f fi [ d th it ]i t hil f di ti tkhld i t t It i t h h th fi [ d it ] tht h stakeholder group makes itself better off through voluntary exchange The corporation t th l f it t k h l d d b d t th d

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of another without full rights of participation of that decision 1988 104)

(Evan and Freeman

Obliti t tkhld d th lti tbilit d i d t l f th f t t h t t k h l d l t i h i l t i h i bt f I dditi t th di l bliti t t t idiidl ith t l fil d id tit h tkhld l t i h i til d d i t i l bliti b f th i d ifi i t i l l dfid relationships between the firm and its stakeholders Organizations have obligations to their employees because they are human beings and because they are employees of the organization (R Phillips 1997) Conversely employees have role obligations to th iti tht l th d it th tkhld as well as di l bliti t tht iti d it th tkhld "Eh f f t th th i t fh db f i t ll iht d d t i " (F 1997 69) N B i i hi b k Kantian Capitalism (1999) h d l d Kti ht tkhld th Thi i d i k l f th t i t t i i t b i thi i l d i t il sibility international issues employment practices and environmental ethics from a Kantian point of view concluding that one can make a strong case for principled rulebased decisionmaking in commercial activities without threatening ndeed by bli f t i i ibilit d flihi S thik h R b t Philli h d l d t d d f fi th ti b i f tkhld l t i h i Thi i i l d i d f R l ' th fj t i tht Wh f l t i l t th b f t f tll beneficial scheme of cooperation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the t i i t d th i t th ibilit f f r i d i bliti f fi td th t i i t i th ti h i ti t th b f t t d (Philli 1997 57 hi ittd) B

li t l ii th f l idti id i ii idli f lti tkhld d i i b t h ithi iti as well as by appeal to something like Donaldson and Dunfee's notion of hyper norms for macroeconomic judgments Stakeholder theory is fast becoming a rich and fertile area in management theory i l d b i thi i til A il i f The Academy of t th d l t f th id l Management Journal (1999) i i l li

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Organizational Ethics and the Good Life E d i H t (1996) h d tht think of the corporation as a commons a complex form of community with shared contracts agreement and culture Like a commons a good corporate culture should serve and develop the interests of its "inhabitants" or members Moreover h t th i t t h th hld b d d ht l d th hld b l t d hld b tt f d b b f th " " iti i ti Whil H t ' thi i til t i l it t dl f iti d i t i l if t h t ill h l t dfi h f th t h i k i d t lit R b t Sl llk h i l h i b f fild i hi b k Ethics and Excellence (1992) goes back to an Aristotelian approach to business Solomon argues that we should scrap most of ethical theory particularly models proposed by Kant and the utilitarians and appeal instead to an Aristotelian notion f it C t d i t h t th d l t f l h t i f d t Sl t t ti f l ll H iti ht h ll th i l lf ith it i i it fl l t h d h i t i Aittli t f b i thi it ll bli i d t i t hli bilit d j d t Thi h k t t h i k th t f business as a contributor to the common good and proposes that we reformulate our model of the manager in terms of moral virtues moral excellence and corpor ate citizenship Daryl Koehn's (1995) work on business ethics also takes an Aristo tli h Ulik H t Sl d K h f i i l th th th th ti B t lik H t d B i ll th t th d ith f h d l f thiki b t th i d i i d l d th ti t f d iti t i b t t th it I k tht t it t f th A i tit t d i t i S d R t h l d E B h h l ' b k Rethinking Business Ethics: A Pragmatic Approach (1999) f k f b i thi b d th t h i f Mead and Dewey Richard Nielsen in The Politics of Ethics (1996) draws on contin ental philosophers such as Habermas and Gadamer to suggest how organizations can use dialogue communication strategies and multiloop learning to put pro i l f thil ti Willi F d i k (1995) i Values Nature t t tliti thi d and Culture in the American Corporation i th i f b k d diili i b i thi F i l l i Moral h l d Imagination and Management Decision-making (1999) P t i i W h th l tht l i i t i l i i t i l lif Sh t tht l fil i l fil t th i i t i f h reason

Some Contemporary Topics I dditi t th t h i k i t d i th i ti th t i tht tl ti td l f h dd i i dd t t i th fl f th k i d f k tht i bi d b i thi d i t l i i b i thi

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International business ethics That issues in international business are a top priority in business ethics is obvious given the contemporary focus on globalism How one shapes and deals with those i f l it f i i l bi A D l d (1989) D G (1993) d B i (1996) h td f th h l l t t lbl b i l ltiit Si it i t tht thil ti diff i difft lt h hld l t i t i l t i f i h t t ? A d if th i lbl iti itht t b h h l d it t i i l t l tti? A number of thinkers have argued that cultural differences do not entail ethical relativism the view that there are no general moral principles and that moral disputes therefore cannot be resolved The weaknesses of the latter position are l d t l t h b F d G i l b t (1988) A N B i (1996) l t l diff hld tb t d ith i l b l moral differences. B i it t tht h t t b l t l diff ll i ft diff i ti M t l t b i t f ii l t d d ildi tht t t d d tht ht t t one another that some principles of fairness are necessary for a working society and so on Indeed the United Nations has tried to codify universal principles n ts Declaration of Human Rights While these are not accepted or practiced universally thl th idl f lb h i tht i b i td ideal l b l l Wki t d ii idli f l t i t i l Th D l d (1989) t f l ii tht bth t h riht d f l t l d i i t Th ii i l d f d f iti h d t t riht i h t t fi tril d i i i t i h i l d litil rit d riht t bit d ii d t i D l d son develops what he calls a twostep moral algorithm that takes into account basic rights economic development in the host country and host and home country norms Whether this algorithm works in all cases is subject to debate but Donald ' l ff t id libl i l b l t t Rihd D G (1993) lik B i d D l d fid ltii i l ibl H it t h t h t th t i l difflti i ifi til thil riil tht l i l l Thi i b b k d ititti h ili itli d l t l d lii f d l t l ti Th b k d ititti t difft ethical points of view and because of their endemic nature they are difficult for a corporation to confront Business ethics is always embedded in socioeconomic reli gious and political institutions and dealing with these background nstitutions can l h l l i t l t i t i l ti (D G 1993) Environmental issues in business ethics Environmental ethics began as a critique of current societal environmental prac tices but the field has grown to become an important new area of business ethics

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ll Th t l t f difft ti b t ti i development the multinational expansion of business and their effects on the eco system all of which are dealt with in the business ethics literature The first set of narratives is one most often reiterated by scientists ecologists and philosophers ki i th fild f i t l thi Thi ti t h t th ti d i th t h t h f l d th i f th i d t i lid t i (HDC) i t l l tibl l i l l d t t i d hibl i l d l d ti (LDC) (M d Si 1994 R t h l dB h h l 1998) I t t l d b th i t Jli Si d t f ti that despite or because of economic development the planet earth is not in dire straits We are not running out of natural resources in any crucial sense improved technology creates efficient and clean processes and biotechnology increases food dti I d d titi b d t id d t f d f i i b f l d i th i l d l d ti db i i til lbl ti h titi d ibiliti t dit d l i f th l b (M d Si 1994) M k Sff d th tht hth t i t f sources or destroying the planet nature has value for its own sake as an aesthetic feature of our way of life So wilderness areas lakes and streams beaches and prairies are important to preserve for their own value and we should factor these l i t h t f i d i i ( S f f 1998 W t 1994) Af t h t f ti tk difft h tht i t t i t t b i Fil t l th t bt d d i i t dt t ti th t Rth th i t t i tt b lbl b d th ll th d t th f t f th l t Gi th tit b t th f t f th l t R E d d F Jessica Pierce and Richard Dodd (1998 2000) argue that we should accept Pas cal's Wager Blaise Pascal was a seventeenthcentury French mathematician and philosopher who argued that we do not know whether or not God exists but we hld bl th f t t h t G d d i t Thi i btt i if G d it d k l d tht ill b t d t l lif If G d d t it it d t tt Si d t h l i id b t th ft f th l t hld t bl h i l d ' ft th ibilit tht ti t l t i d i t l d d t i d d fft ft ti th t If ti ill not h we lose the wager we will become extinct William McDonough (1998) challenges us to rethink our story about environ mental sustainability and waste in terms of zero emissions zero pollution and zero t Hi d i t " t l f d " i t t hll t d i i d t i d t d i tht ltl l f t i d bl lbl d ti F d hi k dM D h t ki t tit f t i t d Rth thi t i t t th f t t h t i t l tibilit i l i d id f b d i E i t l l t i b l b i i t l ibl b t it i i

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PATRICIA H. WERHANE AND R. EDWARD FREEMAN

titi d t it d th d f d offers companies opportunities in global markets that does not degrade or exploit IDCs

C

l

i

Thi h t h l t h d th f f th d l i fld f b i thi It h b f h t i F i t h tf d b i bd f i i l ki b i thi W h id littl b t i body of work by scholars who are social scientists and who study "social issues n management" We have had little to say about exciting research in accounting marketing finance operations and organization studies that is combining key con t t i th fld ith id f b i thi I t d h f d ttti ii h i l h i l ki b i thi A b f d b k h b itt th i t t i f t t d thi S i l l th k f D i l R G i l b t J (1996) M k t i thi i flihi fild f it ( f l L i k d M h 1993 B k t 2000) A d there is a great deal of work on ethics in finance as summarized in Ethics in Finance by John Boatright (1999b) In addition economists such as Robert Frank Michael McPherson and Amartya Sen have been working on the intersection of ethics and i i iti f l i l i th d t f t h thi i t t i ( S 1987 1993 F k 1988 H d MPh 1996) J h B t i h t ti t lik b i thi ith th li C i dfiiti f ti f t t (C 1937 B t i h t 1999) B i thi i i i t l l t l diili i i th h i f id d th i i f flit d t W t it t develop along multifaceted lines but we see a great deal of room for the following kinds of research:

1 A l b i 2 3 4

f th d i i l i thi t t

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C t i d itdiili k thiit B d i th b fb i h lit tdi hit Strengthening the conceptual ties ethics" disciplines such as medical so on

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thi t i l d b k d diili t h l d between business ethics and other "practical ethics environmental ethics legal ethics and

fb i thi

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BUSINESS ETHICS

of new and exciting frameworks for a more comprehensive understanding of how business and ethics go together are all on the horizon as business ethics takes ts place among the critical pillars of applied thought

References Andre Judith (1991) Role morality as a complex instance of ordinary morality American Philosophical Quarterly 28: 73-80 Blades Lawrence (1967) Employment at will versus individual freedom: on imiting the abusive exercise of employer power Columbia Law Review 67: 1402—48 Boatright John (1999a) Does business ethics rest on a mistake? Business Ethics Quarterly 9: 583-92 (1999b) Ethics in Finance Boston MA: Blackwell Bowie Norman (1996) Relativism cultural and moral In Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H Werhane (eds) Ethical Issues in Business 5th edn pp 91-5 Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall (1999) Kantian Capitalism Boston MA: Blackwell Brenkert George (2000) Marketing Ethics Boston MA: Blackwell Coase Ronald (1937) The nature of the firm Economica 4: 386-405 Collins James C and Porras Jerry I (1994) Built to Last New York: HarperBusiness De George Richard (1993) Competing with Integrity in International Business New York: Oxford University Press Donaldson Thomas (1982) Corporations and Morality Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall (1989) The Ethics of International Business New York: Oxford University Press and Dunfee T (1995) Integrative social contracts theory: a communitarian conception of economic ethics Economics and Philosophy 11: 85-112 and Preston L (1995) The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts evidence and implications Academy of Management Review 20: 65-91 Evan William and Freeman R Edward (1988) A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism In Tom Beachamp and Norman Bowie (eds) Ethical Theory and Business 4th edn pp 75-84 Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Frank Robert (1988) Passions within Reason New York: W W Norton Frederick William (1995) Values Nature and Culture in the American Corporation New York: Oxford University Press Freeman R Edward (1994) The politics of stakeholder theory: some future directions Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 409-22 (1997) A stakeholder theory of the corporation In T L Beauchamp and N Bowie (eds) Ethical Theory and Business 5th edn pp 66-76 Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall and Gilbert Daniel (1988) Corporate Strategy and the Search for Ethics Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Pierce Jessica and Dodd Richard (1998) Shades of green In Laura Westra and Patricia H Werhane (eds) The Business of Consumption pp 339-54 Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefleld and (2000) Environmentalism and the New Logic of Business New York: Oxford University Press French Peter (1979) The corporation as a moral person American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 207-15

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Friedman Milton (1970) The social responsibility of business New York Times Magazine September 13: 122-6 Gilbert Jr Daniel R (1996) Ethics through Corporate Strategy New York: Oxford University Press Goodpaster Kenneth (1982) Morality and organizations In Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H Werhane (eds) Ethical Issues in Business 2nd edn pp 137-45 Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall (1983) The concept of corporate responsibility In Tom Regan (ed) Just Business pp 292-323 New York: Random House (1996) Business ethics In Lawrence Becker (ed) Encyclopedia of Ethics pp 111-15 New York: Garland Hartman Edwin M (1996) Organizational Ethics and the Good Life New York: Oxford University Press Hausman David M and McPherson Michael S (1996) Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Hessen Robert (1979) In Defense of the Corporation Stanford: Hoover Institution Press Kanter Rosabeth Moss (1993) Employability security Business and Society Review 87: 11-14 Keeley Michael (1988) A Social-contract Theory of Organizations Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press Koehn Daryl (1995) A role for virtue ethics in the analysis of business Business Ethics Quarterly 5: 5 3 3 ^ 0 Laczniak Gene R and Murphy Patrick E (1993) Ethical Marketing Decisions: The Higher Road Boston: Allyn and Bacon Luban David (1988) Lawyers and Justice Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press McDonough William (1998) A boat for Thoreau In Laura Westra and Patricia H Werhane (eds) The Business of Consumption pp 297-318 Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield McMahon Christopher (1994) Authority and Democracy Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Maitland Ian (1994) The morality of the corporation: an empirical or normative disagreement? Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 445-58 May Larry (1987) The Morality of Groups Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press Mitchell R K Agle Bradley and Wood Donna (1997) Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts Academy of Management Review 22: 853-86 Myers Norman and Simon Julian (1994) Scarcity or Abundance? New York: W W Norton Nielsen Richard (1996) The Politics of Ethics New York: Oxford University Press Pfeffer Jeffrey (1998) The Human Equation Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press Phillips Michael (1992) Corporate moral personhood and three conceptions of the corporation Business Ethics Quarterly 2: 435-59 Phillips Robert (1997) Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness Business Ethics Quarterly 7: 51-66 (2002) Normative stakeholder theory: toward a conception of stakeholder egitimacy Business Ethics Quarterly 12 Radin T J and Werhane P H (1996) The public/private distinction and the political status of employment American Business Law Journal 34: 245-60 Rosenthal Sandra and Buchholz Eugene (1998) Toward an ethics of consumption: rethinking the nature of growth In Laura Westra and Patricia H Werhane (eds) The Business of Consumption pp 221-37 Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield

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and (1999) Rethinking Business Ethics: A Pragmatic Approach New York: Oxford University Press Sagoff Mark (1998) Do we consume too much? In Laura Westra and Patricia H Werhane (eds) The Business of Consumption pp 271-96 Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Sen Amartya (1987) On Ethics and Economics Oxford: Blackwell (1993) Does business ethics make sense? Business Ethics Quarterly 3: 45-53 Solomon Robert (1992) Ethics and Excellence New York: Oxford University Press Velasquez Manuel (1983) Why corporations are not morally responsible for anything they do Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2: 1-18 Walzer Michael (1994) Thick and Thin Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press Werhane Patricia (1985) Persons Rights and Corporations Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall (1991) Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modem Capitalism New York: Oxford University Press (1998) Self-interests roles and some limits to role morality Public Affairs Quarterly 12: 221-41 (1999) Moral Imagination and Management Decision-making New York: Oxford University Press and Radin T J (forthcoming) Employment at will and employee rights: retrospection and a prognosis Business Ethics Quarterly 10 Westra Laura (1994) An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Wicks Andrew Gilbert Daniel and Freeman R Edward (1994) A feminist reinterpretation of the stakeholder concept Business Ethics Quarterly 4: 475-98

Further reading Buchanan Allen (1996) Toward a theory of the ethics of bureaucratic organizations Business Ethics Quarterly 6: 419—40 Freeman R Edward (1984) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach Boston: Pitman Gauthier David (1986) Morals by Agreement New York: Oxford University Press Goldman Alan (1980) The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Hosmer LaRue (1994) Strategic planning as if ethics mattered Strategic Management Journal 15: 17-34 Ladd John (1970) Morality and the ideal of rationality in formal organizations The Monist 54: 488-516 Paine Lynn Sharp (1994) Managing for organizational integrity Harvard Business Review March/April: 106-17 Singer A E (1994) Strategy as moral philosophy Strategic Management Journal 15: 191-213 Werhane Patricia (1996) Business ethics Encyclopedia of Philosophy supplement pp 67-8 New York: Macmillan and Freeman R Edward (eds) (1997) The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics Oxford: Blackwell and Radin T J (1999) Employment at will and due process In Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H Werhane (eds) Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach 6th edn Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall

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A Brief History of Corporate Responsibility Wht i t i ' ibilit t i t ? Thi l d ltiftd ti ti btlti b t h it i b t t t t ith th ti f b i th th h i l h i l th Th t th ti d th t h t it i l i ti t h b i b i i l l technologically sophisticated and pervasive in a global sense Increasingly both critics and defenders of the corporate form agree that a corporation has a large responsibility to society that companies should be held accountable for all the fft f thi ti bth i d i l if it k t t th t k i d f f f t W h t i th i f thi i d ? blihd b k l l d The Gospel I 1899 A d C i f d f US S t l of Wealth ( P t 1986 F d i k 1987 F d G i l b t 1988 St F d G i l b t 1996) I thi b k C i t f t h th l i t t t f t il ibilit C i ' i b d t i i l th hit i i l d th t d h i i i l Bth t l i t i d th viewed business owners as parents to childlike employees and customers who lacked the capacity to act in their own best interests The charity principle required the more fortunate members of society to assist its l f t t b ildi th l d th h d i d th i k d th ldl Th " f t t " ld b i t d ith d i t l iditl t h h h ititti h h t t l t h d (f th 1920 d) th C i t Cht t Of lltd l t h l didd h h t tibt d hit bliti f lth idiidl t fb i i t l f A F d i k (1987 143) t it b th 1920

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" i t d t th lth f th t lth diid u a l s " Business was now expected to contribute its resources to charities aiding the unfortunate Carnegie himself practiced what he preached by giving away millions of dollars for charitable and civic purposes Th t d h i i i l f th C h i t i Bibl It id b i d lth i d i i d l t t h l th t d tk f thi t C i ' i t h t th i h h l d t h i "i t t " f th t f i t Hldi it i t t f it h l th it f tht it d l i t i t H it i l f t i fb i t ltil it' lth b i i it t h h d t i t t f th under its care US Steel like Carnegie before it embarked upon an active program of philan thropy although the immense size of US Steel inspired fears that it and other big ti t h t d f t i dd A d i t t d l US S t l ti C i ' id th ti th th th l bt th Ciil W d th G t D i i th US t t i t t t il l f db l b l b t (Pt 1986) N t til th 1930 did l b f ti tk i d d t i t t i th social impact of business In 1936 for example Robert Wood (the CEO of Sears and Roebuck) pointed proudly to his "stewardship" of "those general broad social responsibilities which cannot be presented mathematically and yet are of prime i t " ( W t h 1984 td b P t 1986 3 4 ) B th 1950 d 1960 th h i t d t d h i i i l hd b idl td i A i b i d i b t i tht " b t ibilit" M i tht j t d h i i l th l l i d t h t if b i did t t il ibiliti f it f ill th t ld f h ibilit it S h id f t il ibilit b il i d t i f d ith " l i h t ened selfinterest" However even at the high point of concern for corporate social responsibility there seemed to be more at stake than initially met the eye H R Bowen widely credited with one of the first coherent defenses of the idea of t ibilit i i t d t h t b i ti morally bound t " th lii t k th d i i t fll th li f ti hih d i b l i t f th b j t i d l f i t " (B 1953 td i W t i k d C h 1985 7 5 8 9 ) Thi th difft t f th il ibiliti fb i tht b i bth flti f il "bjti d l " d f ti th inspired much new thinking on the subject The basic problem with trying to define a corporation's "social responsibility" is that it is impossible to separate "social" effects from "economic" effects For in t i th f i t t t f l i il t li? I ki d lit d t tht f d t i d i il it? I i i b k t th it i hih l t ittd i hih l li d i fili il li i ? Thi i l i d ti ld b t k t tht lii fft d "i t d" bt ll t i l B f l d i thi d i t i t i

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(hih i h t ll th " t i thi" F 1994) th id f t social responsibility began to take on a life of its own outside the mainstream of business Socialscience scholars sought to put the concept back in the mainstream by f i " t il f " d bildi i l i dl f th id I t t kb P t d P t (1975) C l l (1979) W t i k d C h (1985) d W d (1991) ll ht t d f il f d t l i k it t i f P h i l h tki difft h b t till l i d ti t l ti f i Th h i l h i l t d f t i bility has its roots in business ethics and in business law Technically defined business ethics is the study of ethics and economics and the analysis of the role of ethical decisionmaking in commerce The subjects of business ethics include ndi idl f i l il d i i k ti t bli li d th t l i t B i thi i ti d d iti It l t idiidl d t b h i d ti i hih d ti ht ht t t d it i b h i l d i l i l tdi f ht i f t d i d It also describes and evaluates interactions between business and government busi ness and the community and business and the natural environment (Goodpaster 1983; Werhane 1996) Whil th ti di t ibilit till h i l h i l l h l l i hll f t l l i l i h Th f i t i td f iti d ti t bliti d th lti f t ibilit Th di d i t i l i f t ii l t l i t d l d l t i f h th ft tibt t t l tbilit It i t l fl t l l t th d i i ld h d Th tht ti k d the nature of corporations are surely relevant to how they could work Fact and value theory and practice are inevitably intertwined in applied ethics

The Nature of Corporate Obligations and the Scope fC t Ribilit The nature of corporations and their obligations I th U i t d S t t th d blil d ti i iti i I I tt b tt h t t t i l it ith l i i t d libilit idfit i d f ti C t i h i t t b th db h h l d h i t t t d b th iht f b d fd i t Fi th th h d ll d b th hid ifll f tht t k S h h l d thi tti on boards of directors usually do not participate in the d a y t o d a y operations of the firm The unlimited life and shareholder limited liability all granted by laws in the United States raise some interesting ethical issues on the macro level However

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i i t th l i f ti bt t sponsibility There are a number of senses in which we ordinarily think of firms as moral agents Like individuals corporations set goals It is tempting to make a mistake h d li tht b ti b l t th b l W h (1985) ti th t h thi i t d t Th l ft d f d i ii t t t d l i t d i lii t i l i d i th t lt d tiiti i h i h th ti i d I di l f t ti t d h l d th lik i d i idl ibl F l tht F d fild t t h it did t initially change the design of the Pinto despite its knowledge of the unfortunate placement of its gas tank We praise 3M for its environmental programs or DuPont for initiating an alliance of chemical companies to improve environmental and il f W hld i lik i d i i d l tbl f thi ti D C i t i l it ti hld ll ll l l l libl f lldl h f l ili b t i l t it f t d d ld ( S t k t l 2000) it t d t b f itifi tdi h h tht i l t known dread disease (Angell 1996) Given that we now exempt Dow Corning from these liabilities; that is we "forgive" the company (Spencer et al 1999: 26) Corporations sometimes act as single units and exhibit intentional behavior (Wer h 1985) M ti t "thik b t " thi d i blif d l d ti ti bhlf f ti t i l dlibti d l f l i ll F l d i th ili b t i l t t D C i th l d i f t f ili b t i l t d b t d b t th lit d fibilit f f t i i l t Of D C i th f did t litll i lf flti d l l f l i b t b t i l t f t th t constituents (the board managers employees and legal agents) did so on behalf of the corporation Dow Coming's socalled "corporate actions" were a result of these deliberations that subsequently directed actions of persons who functioned as agents f th ti T ti th l D C i ibl f th f t f ili b t i l t B t th ti i f t did t d i ft kt i l t i d th l ki tD C i did Still hld D C i ibl b th h d i l t ti t b h l f f th ti W th t h t th ti f d i t t i l ti B t l i t l l th ti were a result of the activities of a collection of persons or groups operating on behalf of Dow Corning Thus the intricate web of intentional behavior exhibited n corporate decisionmaking procedures coupled with resulting actions by agents on b h l f f th ti d t " t i " Fi l i i l tkhld F l fi l t t i tdi tiit d il j d t th tti Fi i

tbilit l t i h i ith t h i i i l t i h i ith t h i d ki diti dbfit f d h h t i t b l t th th f iil l t i h i ith l i t t

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eliminatable

shared learn

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t h h th llti i t l f did t litll thi th ti Th llti action may not be identical to individual action because of the rolerelated nature of managerial decisionmaking and the impersonal character of the authorization process C t i lik i d i i d l d t l " d " itil til t l b t l i t i d d t f th l i t f t lt d it d t Th l ti f (bt t ffiit) f llti l ti Th k i d d d f t l " t i " d l " " d d th k i d dd f i t i t t l ti d ti F l employees at Shell did not feel responsible in any way for Shell's alleged question able activities in Nigeria Some do not even recognize that there is a moral issue n this case Therefore Shell as a collective did not initially "respond" morally to llti b t it N i i lii b t S h l l th l t i fidiidl li d i t i t th ti tht iititd t l " t i " t th ti (Nb d Gldi 2002) Thi l t i d t Shll it f l l b i l i t b t thi thl hl t li h t lt d l i t t l blid Still although they sometimes appear to take morally neutral stances and do not always "recognize" moral demands corporations are collectives made up of persons who can "act" as moral agents and therefore are morally responsible Moral blind d t ti f l ibilit t it d t t i l f idiidl l t Responsible to whom: the shareholder thesis and moral

minimalism

Th d td f t ibilit i i l l h t f l til b i t Milt F i d h i tk t h d tht the only responsibility of managers and corporations is to maximize profits In fairness to Friedman he also suggested that managers' and thus corporate fiduciary duties to shareholders should be constrained by law ethical custom and social (Fid 1970) W h l l ll thi i i i l i t ti f t ibilit W h t i th t t f h i i l i ? Th dfth ff t i d b i thi Ad Sith d tht kt d il t i ill d d diti f " t l libt [i h i h ] ll t f t i t bi ltl tk " ( S i t h 1976 687) H Smith goes on in the same passage to qualify that statement arguing that in commerce "[e]very man so long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own i n t e r e s t " (our emphasis) Further according to Sith kt h jtifd l d th l fl d l if i d i idl d th di t ith d ith t f b i iht h t t id i t h d d t b i fil (Wh 1991) Th i t b fil i i l i t bt if thik till f dti t i ith h l t h tf iht hih ld idi th ti iht f l t d

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h h l d ll ith tilit t f th ti h principle which today would involve respect for the natural environment as well as worker and consumer safety and with the operationalized ideal of fair play one may be quite far from the minimalist conception of corporate responsibility that s ft ibd t F i d ( S i t h 1976 W h 1991) Whil i i l i t i t t t i f t ibilit i till l th b i thi d t litt h b d l b d thi ti A th ti i llti l t ith t l t l d f d t f d fdi ibiliti t h h l d it ld tht t ibilit b l d d liitd t l d l responsibilities "Role refer[s] to constellations of institutionally specified rights and duties organized around an institutionally specified social function [where] an institution [is any public system or social arrangement that] includes rules that df ffi d iti hih b id b d i f f t i d i i d l t diff t t i " (Hdi 1994 3 3 4 5 ) F i l i (h dfid) f i t d d t d i ti h h d tt ll i t i t t i E h h ill d f d l bliti Additill ti lik t th i t i t t i h l bliti ifid b t h i ii lii d procedures These help to clarify rank and specify obligations to various stakehold ers including obligations to the communities in which they operate The roles of corporations are related to their function their mission and their goals As with idiidl hld ti ll ibl f i t thi l ibiliti Wh th b b f d ft B h N t apple j i th h l d libl f d t k l j i tht t i d l t f tht i h t (Hllid d Pi 1992) S i i l l Ui Cbid h b hld ibl f th B h l d i t b it i d it ithi th tti f thi l ibiliti ft fd h i l t h itittd ft tht ld h t d thi idt f occurring We can assess organizations and institutions their roles and the ends they al legedly serve just as we evaluate people As David Luban carefully argues we can d hld th t l f lit f j d i iti d ititti (Lb 1988 h 6 d 7) Th i l d l t th l t tht t f t i t f l djdi th ld d l i h d th ht t b h h l tf id fh tf iht d fi h i t t d t f t h t i l l d f d (Wl 1994) A d i t Luban we can evaluate any role its roledefined obligations and the mission of an organization as well as whatever acts the role role duties and/or organization seem to demand At each step we evaluate the role role obligations and the organ iti ititti i t fbth h t jtif th i t i t t i l bliti t d dl h t th iti l bliti t tif F l hil B h N t ' t ii t b d l t th i i t t t i f l bliti t B h N t I th H B F l l l t th f it ti f it l ibiliti

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Corporate responsibility and integrative social contracts theory O t h t t ibilit i lld i t t i il t t th Fit d i th t t h t b Th Hbb il t t th t th id t h t i th t l t h bi t t i t t h i iti d tl t titl t l d lti t h t th li i h d hi thi d i lti t th A it l t t corporate responsibility social contract theory focuses primarily not on how corpor ations are constituted but instead on their status in society According to this pos ition as initially proposed by Thomas Donaldson in brief because a corporation s t i d b it t t i i it th ti k iliit i t t t tht it Th i t t f th b i f il t t bt ti d it A ti i l l d t it b it i t h h t t h t "th b f t f thii th it f dti iti t i h th d t i t fdi F th t d i t f it the goal of a productive organization may be said to be to enhance the welfare of society through a satisfaction of consumer and worker interests" (Donaldson 1982: 44ff) Soci ety has high expectations of corporations and because they are allowed to exist and t f l ti h bliti t hi th tti A ti t h t d t li t it id f th b i i t f i it b l i t i ithi th it d th i t h l d i it t t Th il t t t h ' h i th b l i t i f ti id i t t i i h t i t th f t l ibilit b t th th tht ti l t hil b i l l t h t thi til M hil th th f t l t i t l relationships one has to account for corporate responsibility to its employees shareholders and customers as well Such work has recently been developed by Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee through what they call integrative social t t th (ISCT) I b i f ISCT i b d th f l l i ti "All t i l h f th b d d t f thi tilit ld t t h t h t i l il t t i ' i l t t ' ht ld f idiidl i iti i i f t lf i hih t t thi f i d t t h h t l i il t t ' " (Dld dD f 1995 89) Donaldson and Dunfee argue that there are basic moral minimums or hyper norms that govern all social relationships on the macro level What those are is subject to debate but moral minimums such as not causing gratuitous harm h i t t ti tl t td i t i b i iht d t t i l d iti fil didt f h (Dld d D f 1995 9 5 6 ) S h h id th l b l i f i t i l ti d l i t i l i t l t i h i O i l l ithi til iti d b l ithi til iti th i ht D l d dD f ll " l f " d i t t d b th it 559

R EDWARD FREEMAN AND PATRICIA H. WERHANE

or organization in question Although subject to compatibility with moral minimums or hypernorms communities and firms can spell out specific norms acceptable customs and agreements among themselves Again on the micro evel these are tacit agreements since one seldom sits down in a community or n an organization to spell out or vote on these arrangements There are a number of useful concepts from ISCT that are worth emphasizing: the idea of a hypothetical social contract (or the expectations that follow from that idea) the notion of tacit consent and the notion of moral minimums an idea developed by Michael Walzer (1994) In most societies corporations have been allowed to come into being and operate because we believe in expanding and improving our well-being Therefore one could conclude that there is a tacit social contract between companies and the societies in which they operate to carry out that mission For instance we find ourselves angry when a firm fails n its mission or becomes distracted with concerns for expansion or profitability that seemingly cause harms ISCT explains the source of our anger and concerns and helps to justify those conclusions While the notion of a hypernorm is somewhat unclear following Walzer and others the idea of a moral minimum is an appealing one Moral minimums are invaluable as justifications for making and evaluating moral judgments that cross organizational cultural or ethnic boundaries and they make possible corporate role evaluation What is less helpful about ISCT is the idea of a moral free space on the micro level a space that could allow the production of untoward actions by less than perfect firms Moral free space for example allows for the domination of role morality in the organizational and cultural domains While role morality has an important function in organizations one must be able to evaluate roles and role obligations by more general moral principles than those merely generated by role norms in an alleged moral free space The connection between role morality and more general moral evaluations of those domains remains indeterminate and ISCT does not thoroughly work out that link In discussing corporate responsibility we need to be much more explicit than ISCT about what is acceptable on the micro level in the allegedly moral free space Corporate responsibility and employee rights Because corporate action is derived from collections of individual actions it is tempting to argue that the primary responsibilities of firms are or should be to their employees and managers those who initiate corporate action These responsibilities are often formulated as reciprocal obligations between firms and their employees Employees and managers have certain role responsibilities job specifications defining their responsibilities at work These include role responsibilities to perform efficiently and productively in the workplace not to cause unwarranted or slanderous disturbances and not to engage in activities that would put the corporation out of business Accompanying employee and managerial role responsibilities are correlative reciprocal responsibilities of the employer that is the corporation to its employees and managers These include of course the obligation to pay employees fairly for 560

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thi k I dditi ti h l ibiliti t i l moral rights claims to entry and exit voice safety information and due process and some argue participation in corporate decisionmaking (Werhane 1985; McMahon 1997; Werhane and Radin forthcoming) What is interesting s that th l l ibiliti ii t l f l ' l l bliti t hi/h l bt f th f t t h t l d lik fi l t i d d th l persons ( W h 1985) It i diffilt t t t t ibiliti t l d i t d ti d i d f l d l d ti H th h t i ith thi h i tht t prioritizes corporate responsibility in ways that tend to neglect other corporate responsibilities in this case responsibilities to shareholders to customers to sup pliers and to communities A stakeholder view on the contrary tries to balance t ibiliti th th t f f bliti Corporate responsibility and stakeholder theory Stkhld l iiti i th b i t t litt d id i F (1984) h b t d d t l corporate annual reports Challenging the position that a manager's primary re sponsibility is to maximize profits or that the primary purpose of a firm is to maximize the welfare of its shareholders stakeholder theory argues that the goal of fi d it t i or should be, th f l i h i f th fi d all it ri tkhld Th f fi [ d th it ]i t hil ti tkhld i t t It i t h h th fi [ d it ] tht holder group makes itself better off through voluntary exchange The t th l f it t k h l d d b d f th i t h t fll i h t f rtiiti f tht d i i (E 1988: 104)

f

di h tk corporation t th d dF

Widl d f i d t k h l d "G idiidl h b f i t fr harmed by and whose rights are violated or respected by corporate actions" (Free m a n 1 9 9 9 : 250) The core thesis of stakeholder theory is the normative claim h a t the interests of all the parties involved in any transaction ought to be considered in d t i i t ibilit I d t d t i h idiidl fi ht t t t i t i l itti it i fit t idtif ti ( i d i i d l d llti) ith h th iti i t t h f th d ht h t h t tk I d b i ti th i t i t t tkhld l i l d l t / h h l d t d ll li d th it Mitchell et al (1997) have argued that prioritizing stakeholders further helps to sort out and clarify a firm's priorities so that not every person group or other organization affecting or affected by the company in question is equally i t t tkhld O t iiti tkhld li i t i

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i t i ' d ii ki tkhld i t f h h legitimate or appropriate claims who is essential to that mission and to the survival and flourishing of the organization and who is most affected by corporate decision making The apparent instrumentality of the prioritization deals only with part of ht i i t t i tkhld l t i h i I f t th i t t f tkhld th i l l ti Th d i t i f th th th t t h f th ti ti i f it tht d th t (or should act) if ll t k h l d ' i t t h i t i i l I t iti f th ltit l l d bliti i tkhld t it f d t l tive base (Donaldson and Preston 1995: 74) Let us assume for our purposes that all stakeholders in question are individuals or groups (including institutions) made up of individuals If stakeholder interests have intrinsic value then in every stakeholder l t i h i th " t k [tht i ht i td dd t h t] f h i l [ l t h h tidtil] i h f f t th th i t fh dbfit ll iht d d t i " (F 1999 250) Obliti bt tkhld d ti f tkhld tbilit drid f t d Fit d b i l tkhld l t i h i l tionships between persons or groups of persons So the firm and each of its stake holders are reciprocally morally accountable to each other just because they are people What is distinctive about stakeholder relationships however is that these l t i h i til d d i t i l bliti b f th i d ifi i t i l l dfid d l d f i d l t i h i bt th fi d it t k h l d F l iti h bliti t it l b th h bi and b th l f th iti (R Philli 1997) C l b f thi i t i l l dfid l l d h l bliti t th iti tht l th d it th tkhld as well as di l bliti t tht iti d its other stakeholders Stakeholder theory raises a thorny issue Is a stakeholder analysis even an instrumental analysis merely selfreferential? That is could one make a case for an iti tht i i t i d it t k h l d i t f it ii d id i l tbilit l t i h i bt th iti d it i tkhld bt di t d il t i i t i ? I lti tk hld li E d F (1988) t f th i i t i t f tkhld th fit t k Kti h i tht b tkhld lti hi l t i h i bt idiidl fidiidl d i i must be one that affords equal respect to persons and their rights valued for their own sake In addition to autonomy and respect for individuals procedural fairness informed consent and respect for contractual agreements are means tests f tkhld l t i h i Additill i l t t d tkhld t tkhld hld h ibl f lf d R b t Philli h d l d tkhld l t i h i Thi tht 562

t d d f fi i i l drid f

th R l '

ti th

b i f f ti

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Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually b f i l h f ti ii ifi tibti th t f th t i i t d th i t th ibilit f f i d i bliti f fi td th t i i t i th ti h i ti t th b f i t accepted (R Phillips 1997: 57 emphasis omitted) Dii tht fft i tkhld t t th ii t d d f t f i d i i d l fi f d d t i f d t d availability of recourse These formal considerations of a fairness standard provide a set of externally derived minimum guidelines or moral minimums for evaluating iti d tkhld d i i f jdi f th ll t bl ll b l t i Stkhld th tibt t thiki b t t ibilit th f l l i F i t it h l l th i i l i t dl f t i bilit f ti d d i t i it f i It l i tht ti tll d t l f tkhld ( t l h h l d ) d tht there are good reasons for their doing so Second it helps to prioritize those affecting and affected by the organization in particular usually employees man agers customers and shareholders without being preoccupied with one set of tkhld Stkhld th ll t i l tbilit l t i h i td t i t i l tbilit t h t t k i t t th f t t h t f ' tkhld idiidl ll iti Fill tkhld th l i i t th i / dititi d th id f lf i t d d b ISCT b d l i lti t l ithi th iti b d it i i d t l l ll Corporate responsibility as citizenship If firms like ordinary individuals are subject to moral evaluation that goes beyond role responsibilities it is tempting to identify corporate responsibility as social re sponsibility or to analogize corporate responsibility in terms of corporate citizenship lll t i d i i d l i t i h i B th h th iil f i t i d iht t i ithi il t t it i ft d tht l fidi dl l bliti (f fi h il ibiliti ll l Ell d Wlt 1961 C l l 1979) C t itihi b dfid liitd iht riil dti d bli ti i t t ith b i i t i ' i ii f ti di vidual autonomy and goal attainment and institutional viability especially by defense against common enemies such as social injustice (Wood and Logsdon 2002) Corporate citizenship has even been defined as aiming "to enhance the lit f it lif t h h ti tiit i d i l t " (Tih t l 1997 3) Th ti f t itihi t l t lifid i th t dfi iti i t t ll d l d Whil th t b fil b i dfiti th i th ti f th t t t h i h fi h bliti t dd il i j t i W h d tht ti h ibiliti t t h i

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i tkhld d f i d b thi ii d tiiti d t i d b precepts of common morality Fuller has responsibilities to make a good glue ust as BeechNut has responsibilities to put apple juice in a product so named Each has responsibilities not to create or abet human rights violations or cause egregious h Th l th ibiliti f di iti W ft i t f di iti t h t th tiit i it d litil tiiti d i ti tht il j t i Bt th l i t f t i t i ? M hil US iti f l h t f it d litil ibiliti i t t i l l th ibiliti i i b d b th i t f th ti W itil f individuals as well as countries that interfere with other nations and similarly we are critical of firms that expand their sovereignty internationally So even if we limit corporate citizenship to citizenship in the country from which they operate one t tk bf ibi iti t ibiliti C t ibilit t h t t d itlf i t t l i b libtliiti l f" t " i th l t i t t h d l t t i t h t hld id O i t t i l l l l t i t i l fi t h t t i i ll ti l fid t h l di litil t ference as well This does not mean that any company should encourage abet or contribute to harmful practices but corporations are ordinarily not experts in polit ics or macroeconomics and the question of national sovereignty cannot be ignored Th i thi li b t t ibilit d i i l i Th diffilti th i thiki b t fi iti i h d t l t h ti difft f i d i i d l Th til d h ti t th ti f t itihi f l t i t i l lbl i tht t i ti A fitfl h t l t hth til t f tiiti i td d i b l tibl t f t il ibilit O k ti h • • • • • •

Is this activity necessary in order to conduct business? I it t d h d b th ? I th tiit tiiti ithi th f th fi' l d ? C h tiiti b id t itht h i th fi' C h tiiti b id t itht i t f i ith it t i l t ? D thi t f tiiti tkhld d That is can we make these activities public? Will the including its shareholders applaud or disapprove (Werhane

ti b i th

d k t i ? il fbi

tt"? it " b l i i t firm's stakeholders 1994)?

Corporate Responsibility and the Limits of Minimalism Gi h

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if d

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l bliti d t f lit B t h hld poration interested in efficiency productivity survival growth and profitability take seriously its moral obligations to stakeholders other than shareholders beyond minimal requirements? And why should its shareholders allow such moral "indul "? I t h i 1994 b k Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies, J C Clli d J I P t d i d th h t i t i f th " i i i " ( idtifid b lli th CEO f 700 j t i ) d i d h th i diffd f th " i i " Clli d P df ii th i iti i it ti industry as being widely admired by its peers and as having a long track record of making a significant impact on the world around it Each of the visionary com panies chosen by the CEO poll has faced setbacks and each has made mistakes Still th l t fiil f f h h b kbl A dll i t d i ii t k f d J 1 1926 ith d i i d d i t d d ki it d j t t f h th i b ilbl th t k kt ld h b D b 31 1990 t $6356 T h t dll i t d i l kt f d ld h t $415 What was different about visionary companies as compared with the comparison companies? Each operates in the same market and each has relatively the same opportunities What is critical for the visionary or successful companies according t Clli dP ' fdi i tht ii i di b idl t h t "it li b t h d i ll it d A ii l t l i i l it idl h i it ld if " (Clli dP 1994 8) M [ j t t bi h l dtri " i i i hhld lth" "fit maximization" has not been the dominant driving force or primary objective through the history of the visionary companies Visionary companies pursue a cluster of object i f hih ki i l d t il th ri Y th k ft b t th ll idd b idl l d f b d j t ki Yt dill th i i panies make more money than the more purely profitdriven comparison companies (Clli dP 1994 8) Th ti f t ibilit i til tht tf di l tht hld i ll idiidl ll ibl Th liit t ht tf ti j t th liit t idiidl l ibiliti H it b th tht i i l i t ttitd i t d i t b t ti d i d d it tht i ii i th ttitd t d t i kid f l i f f ii malist These companies are more imaginative creative and for the most part more responsible as well However one question remains concerning corporate responsibility Can business d " d k ? " It i t d h t h it i ki t h f i t i d k b d i i t b t ti H 565

R EDWARD FREEMAN AND PATRICIA H. WERHANE

d fd l f t b h i i b i f l 3M ith twentyfiveyear record of positive environmental initiatives; Steelcase the largest manufacturer of office furniture in the world which now makes environmentally compostable materials; Unilever which has developed a Triple Bottom Line ac ti h i tht ll i il d i t l t dM k h "ift" f 400 illi d fMti f i blid t l i d l i ti h itll t d t tht di Th d k d th th hih h t t i d l t h t t t l i i l i E h i t f tht ' b t ti h h t d ith th ti f th fi i ti d i d d many cases the "good works" enhance the competitive advantage of that firm by enhancing or broadening that expertise Each presents a model of corporate respon sibility that goes beyond what is ordinarily expected while staying within the b d i d f biliti

Rf A l l M i (1996) Science on Tried N Y k W W N t Bowen Howard R (1953) Social Responsibilities of the Businessman New York: Harper Academy of C l l A h i (1979) A t h d i i l dl f t f Management Review 4 497505 Collins James C and Porras Jerry I (1994) Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Bi Companies N Y k H Dld Th (1982) Corporations and Morality E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l dDf Th (1995) I t t i il t t th iti ception of economic ethics Economics and Philosophy 11: 85112 and Preston Lee (1995) The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts evidence Academy of Management Review 20 6 5 9 1 di l i t i H d Ell R i h d d Wlt Cl (1961) Conceptual Foundations of Business EL: Richard D Irwin E Willi dF R E d d (1988) A t k h l d th f th d ti K t i itli I T B h dN B i ( d ) Ethical Theory and Business 4th edn pp 7 5 8 4 Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall F d i k Willi C (1987) Theories of Corporate Social Performance I P Sthi d C Flb ( d ) Business and Society: Dimensions of Conflict and Cooperation 14261 L i t L i t Bk Freeman R Edward (1984) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach Boston MA: Pit Business Ethics Quar(1994) Th liti f t k h l d th ft diti terly 4 4 0 9 2 2 (1999) Stakeholder theory and the modern corporation In Thomas Donaldson and Ptii H Wh ( d ) Ethical Issues in Business 6th d 24757 U Sddl Ri NJ P t i H l l and Gilbert Jr Daniel R (1988) Corporate Strategy and the Search for Ethics Englewood Cliff NJ P t i H l l U i i t f Chi P Fid Milt (1962) Capitalism and Freedom Chi

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(1970) The social responsibility of business New York Times Magazine, September 13: 122-6 Goodpaster Kenneth (1983) The concept of corporate responsibility In Tom Regan (ed) Just Business pp 292-323 New York: Random House Halliday Bronwyn and Paine Lynn Sharp (1992) Beech-Nut Nutrition Corporation. Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration Case no. 9-392-084. Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press Hardimon Michael (1994) Role obligations Journal of Philosophy 91: 333-63 Jacques E (1951) The Changing Culture of a Factory. New York: Dryden Press Luban David (1988) Lawyers and Justice. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press McMahon Thomas (1997) History of business ethics In P Werhane and E Freeman (eds) Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, pp 317-20 Oxford: Blackwell Mitchell R K Agle Bradley and Wood Donna (1997) Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts Academy of Management Review 22: 853-86 Newburry William E and Gladwin Thomas N (2002) Shell and Nigerian oil In Thomas Donaldson Patricia H Werhane and Margaret Cording (eds) Ethical Issues in Business, 7th edn Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall Phillips Robert (1997) Stakeholder theory and a principle of fairness Business Ethics Quarterly 7: 51-66 Preston Lee E (1986) Social Issues and Public Policy in Business and Management: Retrospect and Prospect College Park: University of Maryland College of Business and Management and Post James E (1975) Private Management and Public Policy: The Principle of Public Responsibility. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Smith Adam (1976) The Wealth of Nations, ed R H Campbell and A S Skinner Oxford: Oxford University Press (orig pub 1776) Spencer E Mills A Rorty M and Werhane P (1999) Organization Ethics for Health Care. New York: Oxford University Press Stocker J Gorman M and Werhane P H (2000) Dow Corning corporation breast implant design In Michael Gorman Matthew Mehalik and Patricia H Werhane (eds) Ethical and Environmental Challenges to Engineering, pp 32-58 Engelwood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Stoner James A F Freeman R Edward and Gilbert Daniel R (1996) Management, 6th edn Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Tichy Noel M McGill Andrew R and St Clair Lynda (eds) (1997) Corporate Global Citizenship: Doing Business in the Public Eye. San Francisco: New Lexington Press Walzer Michael (1994) Thick and Thin. Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press Wartick Steven and Cochran Philip (1985) The evolution of the corporate social performance model Academy of Management Review, 10: 758-69 Werhane Patricia H (1985) Persons, Rights, and Corporations. Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall (1991) Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modem Capitalism New York: Oxford University Press (1994) The moral responsibility of multinational corporations to be socially responsible In W Michael Hoffman Judith Kamm Robert Frederick and Edward Petry (eds) Emerging Global Business Ethics pp 136-42 Westport CT: Quorum (1996) Business ethics Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supplement pp 67-8 New York: Macmillan and Radin T J (forthcoming) Employment at will and employee rights: retrospection and a prognosis Business Ethics Quarterly, 10

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Wood, Donna (1991) Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management Review, 16: 691-718. and Logsdon, Jeanne (2002) Business citizenship: from individuals to organizations. In R. Edward Freeman and S. Venkataraman (eds), Ethi d E t h i p , Ruffln series no. 3, pp. 59-94. Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center. Worthy, J. C. (1984) Shi A i Ititti Rbt E Wd d S Rbk. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Further reading Boatright, John (1997) Ethics and the Conduct of Business, 2nd edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (1999a) Does business ethics rest on a mistake? Bi Ethi Qtly, 9: 583-92. (1999b) Ethics in Finance. Maiden, MA: Blackwell. Bollier, David (1996) Aii Hihr. New York: American Management Association. Gd , Weiss, Stephanie, and Hanson, Kirk 0. (1991) Mk dC H d U i i t t Shl f Bi Adiitti C 9991021. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Bowie, Norman and Lenway, Stephanie (1999) H. B. Fuller in Honduras: street children and substance abuse. In Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H. Werhane (eds), Ethil I i B i s , 6th edn, pp. 234—46. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bratton, William (1989) The nexus of contracts corporation: a critical appraisal. Cornell L Riw, 74t: 407-65. Carnegie, Andrew (1889) Wealth. Nth A i Riw, 148: 653, 657-62. Coase, Ronald (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica, 4: 386-405. Coleman, James (1990) Fdti f Sil Thy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dennett, Daniel C. (1978) B i t Philhil E Mid d P h l y . Cambridge, MA: MTT Press. (1995) D i ' D Ida. New York: Simon and Schuster. French, Peter A. (1979) The corporation as a moral person. A i Philhil Qtly, 16: 207-15. (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility. New York: Columbia University Press. Goodpaster, Kenneth (1997) Business ethics. In Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman (eds), E l d i Diti f Bi Ethis, pp. 51-5. Oxford: Blackwell. Goozner, Merrill. (1996) The mensch of Maiden Mills inspires. Chicago Tribune, December 26, 1:27. Hessen, Robert (1979) I Df f th C t i n . Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. f O i t i s . Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Keeley, Michael (1988) A S i l t t Th University Press. McMahon, Christopher (1995) The moral status of organizations. Business Ethics Quarterly, 5: 541-54. Millon, David (1990) Theories of the corporation. Dk L J l , 2: 201-62. Nader, R., Green, M., and Segilman, J. (1976) Taming the Giant Corporation. New York: Norton. Narva, Richard (1996) The real story on Maiden Mills. G R Ic. (www.genusresources.com/msepcv_7.html).

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O'Kelley Jr Charles R (1979) The constitutional rights of corporations revisited: social and litil i d th ti ft First National Bank Bellotti Georgetown Law Review 67 134784 Philli M i h l (1992) C t l h d d th ti f th ation Business Ethics Quarterly 2: 4 3 5 5 9 (1995) C t l ibilit Business Ethics Quarterly 5 55576 Philli R b t (2002) N t i t k h l d th t d ti f tkhld Business Ethics Quarterly 12 liti Sethi S Prakash (1975) Dimensions of corporate social performance: an analytical frame k California Management Review 17 5 8 6 4 Sll Gd ( f t h i ) P t i l libilit Journal of Business Ethics Velasquez Manuel G (1983) Why corporations are not morally responsible for anything th d Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 1 1 8 Vit B t d Cll J (1988) Th i t i l b f thil k l i t Administrative Science Quarterly 33 10125

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f i bl th h i t l thi i t i l l t i d i t t h t f l ilti f th l h d N h l t th bli t i d d t t d b iti f hih h h i b t h t thi h bl th h i t l Th b l t h i th E l i h l Thi h t ill di l l f hitlbli will outline some of the main elements of whistleblowing and will address some of the (sometimes neglected) ethical issues raised by this phenomenon for individuals f iti df it tl

S

E

l

Th h " h i t l b l i " i t l d i th t t f b i ethics But it is more properly situated in the larger arena of organizational ethics Example 1 Jff W i d h l d PhD i h i t d kd i h d d l t f th B d Willi Tb C H ki h d l d di it ll til h i d bjti t l i l t d b B d Willi Th td t h th t f iti i thi i t t B lld i t b t i B d Willi d l d i t t tht l l d iti t b b b d idl b th body Such cigarettes were apparently more addictive and more dangerous to smokers Because of this Wigand took exception to marketing them As a result he was fired by Brown and Williamson He subsequently revealed some of the infor ti t t f th t l i i h 60 Minutes d hi i t i tll id A th thi W i d d j i tti b tb ti t h t th hd t bli tht i t i i dditi D i thi ti W i d f l l d h d d i d dth t h t H dd t h i h i t i hih h l

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Example 2 In 1966 the physician Henry Beecher published an article in The New England Journal of Medicine (Beecher 1966) After examining published studies Beecher idtifd fift i t i l i h b j t tht h id thil thill tibl F f th blihd til d i d l t t t f th tdi I t b k J t h M f d t th bliti f thi til d t d t f hitlbli d id h t it " t d il b f hi [ B h ' ] l l " (M 2000 242) Whil it i d i f f i l t t i l ffi i h l f human activities it is nevertheless plausible to hold that the impact of Beecher's article was enormous; for it was in the early 1970s that the popular press began exposing ethically questionable scientific research including the Tuskegee syphilis i t d th h htiti t th W i l l b k S t t H i t l ( M C l l 1997 h 6) Th ti t t lt f B h ' til tt til td bt t t th t h i l tliht d i i d h i i idiidl h k til th l d t b ll tbl Td th t t thi l i t t th f h bjt experiments is vast and most revelations have been after 1970 Example 3 O J l 13 2000 th USA Today b l i h d til b t C h l Mthi i t d f Tl Oklh ( P d 2000) I th i f 1999 M t h i dd t jb d f h t th U i i t f O k l h ' Cll fMdii i Tl T h h Mthi h d l i i t d i i liil h h h i d B t i th t h t f l l d Mthi b th i th id f h i d ltitl hitlbl On June 1 1999 Mathias went to work as a coordinator on a clinical trial studying a cancer vaccine The principal investigator of this study was Michael McGee In the months that followed Mathias became alarmed about numerous i l i t i d ilti ff d l l Th i l d d ijti bjt ith ttill d i bf it t t d i l tti th i k l b f i t f th bjt d b t l t i t th ilti D i th f l l f 1999 M t h i tdl i d th ith M G bt h i d I Otb h tifid f f i i l f th C l l ' I t i t t i l R i B d di D b th ffiil t ith M G d Mthi Th meeting resulted in an agreement to bring in an outside company to evaluate the study In March 2000 that firm issued two reports that were critical of the study and recommended that it be suspended because it was endangering the welfare of b j t I A i l D MG did d th t d b t h tld b j t t h t th h di tht h h d t f i Mthi d th l l ' t ffiil t t th ltt' fidi b t th fild t d B f thi f l Mthi t t f d l lt b t th i ti th tid t d th f i l t l t f d l f f i i l Th th dl b bli Th C l l f Mdii blil k l d d tht t t i f 571

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th i t i h t bjt h hd t i i t d i th l t i l h d did b t they insisted that there was no evidence that these deaths were caused by the vaccine Mathias still has her job but fears that she will be ostracized for not being a good team player She did report that one of the subjects in the trial had called h dt h k d h f tdi f th

P i i l Ft

f Whitlbli

B f th lit f th h d th it f t t hih it can occur it is difficult to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for an action's counting as an apt instance of whistleblowing We can nevertheless highlight some of the prominent features associated with this practice A hitlbl k accusations i t iti Th ti ll ttti t l l d i t f li b ti t h t damage the public interest or harm others. Th ti t i l l i l t idiidl responsible for th h bi t t d I ithi th iti " i t i " th th " b i " dlibtl F t h h f l stances of whistleblowing occurred within forprofit businesses it can also occur within charities universities and other notforprofit organizations (as some of the examples above show) Whitlbl make public t h i h f di If l t tll f i d b t th t i b l ti thi ld t t hitlbli Th difft i hih iht bli ith th i f t i ildi tlli ' t t t f t l i i tti i O iht l l t tid tht h th thit t tk ti thi i ht C h l Mthi did H B h ' whistleblowing went public in a more complicated way; he published an article n a prestigious medical journal But one might ask since many of the studies to which Beecher called attention were themselves already published n ournals was th i f t i t l d bli? I th h i " " Th tdi h t t d i l d th thill b l t i t f th tht bjt t t ik d tht i f d t ft b t bt t f bi d l i t d it d t thi t h t th th t h l h i d It t k ith B h ' t i i d ti t b i th dtil t t h dt h h i d d ithi th itifi it ti b h i Pblihi thi i f t i in The New England Journal of Medicine, Beecher no doubt knew magnified the attention that these morally troubling practices would receive Taking responsibility by identifying oneself as the source of the allegations is cen t l t t i l i t f hitlbli W h t h thi i diti i bl d t i l diffilt t B t it i t i b l hth ti i t f hitlbli h th h k th l l t i i i t tht hi h idtit hld t b l d I thi d t h i k f "D T h t " th d tht C l B t i d Bb W d d i d t th lki i f t i t th b t t i i t i i th Ni Whit H ( B t i

572

WHISTLE-BLOWING

d W d d 1974) " L k i " f thi t fil t b f hitlbli for a second reason I think (Bok 1983: 2 1 6 1 7 ) "Deep Throat" gave Bernstein and Woodward only bits of information at a time Whistleblowers intent on put ting an end to the injustice they are revealing give all of the information they have t th ti th k thi lti Whitlbl h expertise inside knowledge hih thi h b d A i h t h thi i diti i t bi Bt t i l l th hitlbl i i l itid t b i t f th lldl b h i d thi itii i ll d t biti f th ' l i th iti d hi h bilit t d t d ht i i Thi i clearly the case with Jeffrey Wigand And think again about Cherylynn Mathias Her training in a medical field and her knowledge (though limited) of what is expected in medical research were crucial to her being able to see the problems and dibl h th h d S b d ith t i i dii d k l d f th h d tht bjt ti t i i t bbl ld t h i d th i l i t i ttd b Mthi Whitlbl t h h i k l d d h i iti ithi th organization typically have no means of ending the harmful practices within the organization's structure Blowing the whistle is usually the last resort an act engaged in only because working within the organization's structure has proved to b fitl I t if th ll d b i t ti ld b t d itht ki bli lti th ldb hitlbl ld h tht f ti Th t f hitlbli i l i k l t affect adversely the interests f ltil ti th iti itlf l f th iti lldl ibl f di lit f th iti d th hitlbl hilf h lf Si th h i t l b l ' h dbt i th iti ill have its good name and reputation tarnished If the organization is forprofit ts bottom line may be adversely affected too If the charges prove to be true at least some of the organization's employees are likely to be penalized possibly even ired If th iti i i t i i d t l lit ith d t th lli thi t th bli' t t t i ill h ti f th ll A d f tliti i t hitlbl t h l i lit Fill ldb hitlbl tt thi i t t i f flit i bliti T i t th it f idi th t f hitlbli the agent must believe that the organization is engaged in serious wrongdoing and that it is his or her obligation to take steps to stop such conduct At the same time the wouldbe whistleblower is probably under obligations to the organization n ldi bliti f fidtilit Th fB h d i b d b t b ti t thi f it t iti lt l tht l d hi i t h i h h bl th hitl E h h th it hld B h bl th hitl i t dil h Ad t l did B h hilf i dil h bt h dbt i t t d t th li tht h h d d f l B h ' t f

573

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i thill t d t dil h h d th bi potential of setting back the entire enterprise So even here Beecher no doubt felt the pull of conflicting obligations

Ethil C t t Bf d i i f th i i d f idiidl d f ititti b hitlbli lt l k t th b d t t i h i h th ti i Wh th ibilit f b l i th hitl ' iti t itself as a plausible option the wouldbe whistleblower is likely to experience con flict Here I shall explain one way of understanding why there is such a moral conflict and then I shall explain two broad ethical perspectives for thinking about h t l th flit Th ibilit fb l i th hitl t t ith l flit A ldb hitlbl i b f th iti hih h h b li i di M b h i t i l l i ith it b l i t i Th role-related obligations l i t tht h i it f hi h position job or role A physician's obligation of confidentiality to her patients is an instance of a rolerelated obligation A lifeguard's requirement to assist struggling swimmers is another example Loyalty to the organization and keeping secret com i f t i i t t l l t d bliti tht t flit f

ldb

hitlbl

B

t t

general obligations

i

t

tht

h

i l b i l t E l i l d bliti t t kill tt t l d tt lt th If il t i i f i t h t th t ill d t h t th i l bliti t d i t thi i th l bliti tht flit ith th h i t l b l ' l l t d bliti d t hi h iti If rolerelated obligations always prevailed over general obligations in cases of conflict or if general obligations always took precedence over rolerelated obliga tions then any wouldbe whistlerblower would have a structural answer to his or h flit N i t h f th liti libl h O t t h t it ld b t d l h ititil l l t d bliti h l d tk d d th l h l bliti hld

il A d i h t t l lti ld t i t ll h i t l bl f i th flit i b t t l l t d bliti C id i th i t t i fC h l Mthi A l f th C l l f Medicine Mathias has obligations to the institution and to her research colleagues But as a nurse she has obligations to the patient/subjects Thus she is faced with a conflict between two rolerelated obligations Instead of looking for simplistic struc t l lti t h flit d l thil ti S h ti i i l b l Th d i t t t b ht iht ll th future-oriented view f i h t A d i t thi i it i ll i h t t bl th hitl d th b l i l ffi ibilit t ' iti l if d i ill t dt t Th id i t h t b l i th hitl d th b h i l l t i iht l if d i t h

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WHISTLE-BLOWING

i th ft S i l Bk t d h i h h t that a whistleblower's accusations should concern "a present or an mminent threat" She goes on "Past errors or misdeeds occasion such an alarm only if they still affect current practices" (Bok 1983: 215) Such a view need not be purely t i l i t it d ti l f l t h t it i i i b l t bl th hitl l if th h t d t th i t th th h t h t ill t th iti b f th t' lti B t it d l tht l i t di i t ffit t bl th hitl i t d di t t t ft h t th Th f t i t d i t t ith iti t h t i l t th ti butivist theory of punishment: an agent should blow the whistle ust n case the organization did in fact commit the wrong in question The point is to call attention to wrongdoing even if doing so will not prevent additional harm While here I shall tt t l th d i t b t th f t i t d i d th tibtiit t Id tt t t h t ith l i h t l t t i th f t i t d i h f th it t fit l t h Th td l t t i i i B k t t th i i t f ffti h t ti Sh t h i i d th ti f th organization the whistle is to be blown If we expand this to include not just the practices of the organization in question but also the practices of similar organizations and if we also count as a relevant factor making reparations to living victims or heirs of th d d ( if th j t ti h d) th th f t i t d i h idbl C i d fit th id f ki ti S tht iti did i ti tht h d th bt h i b d d th ti Y b f thi iti d di d t hih d t t tht iti b h d i tht h d th f thi hid thi i f t i f th bli b t did th h f l b h i If we focus only on the organization's current practices blowing the whistle will not prevent harm to others But it remains a fact that the organization's past activities did cause harm and that those victims (or their heirs) have not been compensated Wh th iti l it i t hf iti l t t tti ijti it t l k d t th h it h d If t bl t i iti t d thi th b l i th hitl i td t h h th iti d t tl i ti tht h Th l t d i f th f t i t d i d t thi ititi b ti l t d th f t t h t it i d likl t h t victims will be compensated Sometimes exposing a past injustice can open people's eyes to similar injustices This is a second factor that the altered version of the futureoriented view can take it t Cid i B h ' (1966) t i l thil dil h B B h "iid" f t h hilf d dil h iht t h t h bl th hitl ll Ad t h h i i l t h ti bddd i l il ti i diffilt t t h t th t f til db k b l i h d i th 1970 d 1980 i thill tibl dil h 575

TERRANCE McCONNELL

it ii t B h ' i l i (f l M C l l 1997 1 9 2 9 ) Note too that most of these critical studies were done by "outsiders" Thus one act of blowing the whistle prompted many outside the relevant professions to examine questionable practices and to expose serious injustices And it is at least ibl t h t ll f thi ld if th i i l ti i l d t b th hitlbl hd l i d A thid f t t h t th l t d i f th f t i t d i tk it t i th d t i l l f i ti Wh iti h b h t h d it l i t t t l t b l t t thi ibilit ith i i l iti A d if t d lit are more alert this should result in fewer wrongs being perpetrated Thus when companies in the cigarette industry are shown to have systematically deceived customers about the dangers of their product this should create a more informed d ii litl Wh ti ft i h t h k i l ktd dfti d t th bli i d d l t Ad h it i h t h t th t f th U i t d S t t d h j t tht d itti bjt t i d d ith th lti b t th h diti i t f th 1940 d 1950 (Faden 1996; Welsome 1999; Moreno 2000) this should make citizens question both the medical establishment and projects initiated by the government This can of course have a serious down side: citizens may become paranoid and trust no B t t th t t tht ii k t i ti d h l d l th hld bth i d i i d l d it ll

I

f

I d i i d l

If (for the sake of simplicity) we focus on the modified version of the futureoriented view then an individual contemplating an act of whistleblowing should ask him or herself what good will result and what bad will result if he or she carries out the t Ad hil d t ith t i l i t i tht h i t l b l i i tifd l if th b l f d il i b t t f ll f f t d ti th if th hitl t bl l d t t t h t th d d ( h td) b b l i th hitl t b i i f t if it i t b tifd Th tb i ti tht ldb hitlbl t k t h l it th I b l i th h i t l i thi i t t i permissible? I it obligatory? H ld b t biti t t t t t t t th d ffit diti for the permissibility and obligatoriness of whistleblowing Instead I shall more modestly deal with some of the pertinent factors First let us consider the permissibility of whistleblowing As noted earlier acts of hitlbli ill f f t ' iti d f it b d l It i b h f l l t it ib di t th iti d b it t i t t d it i t t l t i h i tl If h ti thl i i b l it ill h t d i i f i t d( t i i f t h ) t f f t th bd fft If iti i di thi thill t i b l b t th h d i i it likl t h t

576

WHISTLE-BLOWING

t d t i b l i th hitl ill b iibl O h t h t thi be handled behind the scenes but if it cannot blowing the whistle may not be the best option If a wouldbe whistleblower has decided that the harm being done by her organ iti i i i f t h t t i bli th h hld k h l f ti ti Gi th lit f th ti j d t i l d h hld k h l f h fidt h i i h t I h b t th ft? I h t h t th bi h d ittil t t i k ? I ll f thi j t j i d t d i ? Th ti ill i t t f th ldb hitlbl bli tht h iti d th l h k for it are by and large good People and organizations do not change their character over night If something appears to be morally askew make sure that it is Because of the complexity involved nothing can eradicate doubt completely but seeking the di f t t d ll hl Bf b l i th hitl t hld l k tht h h tl t i t d th d tht h t ill d t th iti A t i f di d h t iti if th t b fl d thi h b t t th l d/ lit A b i i t h fl charge is made may suffer enough that it is forced to layoff employees And a not forprofit organization may find its funding cut back severely because of an accus ation O th it i th ti h It i l id t h t b f b l i th hitl h bliti t t h t ll i t i f h ithi th iti h b l d ( B k 1983 221 D h t 1995 2552) Thi libl f b bd b i d d if th hitl i t bl Th t ill b f d ith t b h fidtilit t b d i l l A d th iti ill t ff b t tibl h Th i f tii thi idl td claim however Within the context of the futureoriented view more may be at stake ethically than simply stopping the organization's currently wrong behavior At least two possibilities come to mind First if some have already been victimized b th i t i ' b h i th hld b td i B t it i h d t t iti itht k l d i i ibli tht h d S d if h t t bl th hitl b th iti h d it h i d i t d b l t l ti th iti f bl iti f iil ti I t t thi l t t it b i t t E h dl b h i by cigarette companies automobile makers supermarket chains and medical re search protocols have been exposed that it is unlikely that many remain naive about these organizations The overall point is this: the mere fact that an organiza ti i illi t lt th ti i d t i f i d b th ldb hitlbl i t l ffiit t til tht l t i d th iti hld t b i f d b t th ti Th fil j d t i l d th l t ft hld tb l k d N lt id th th ti tht i d i i d l t f l hth b l i th hitl ' iti i obligatory A i t h t th

577

TERRANCE McCONNELL

t h d th i t t i tl h ill b li th it f serious moral wrong and rendering more likely that the wrong will cease and that the victims will be compensated Why would anyone deny that such an action s required? Here we shall consider but one reason for such a denial A i ll k hitlbl ft d t f ll S h b fid d th h b d t d i d t f l d i b l iti ( Shh 2000 1 0 1 3 1 5 ) S h b id t d hiti iti th bli th d f i l t d i i i h th dibil it f th hitlbl Oft hitlbl t d b l d i t l d d i b d i t Jff W i d t d h l i l l unstable and many apparently irrelevant incidents from his past were leaked to the press In short whistleblowers and their families are apt to suffer as a result of their revelations Given the size of these sacrifices some will argue that the actions b d th ll f d t Ethiit t l t i ti ll id ll f b i d d d t l bt l f t th l b l " t " Th t tht b d b d th ll f d t Th ll dbt t i d thi t t i l l d i bt ld t b th f bl if th omitted the act (for an account see Heyd 1982 and Mellema 1991) Acts involv ing great sacrifice are often thought to be supererogatory such as a soldier covering an exploding grenade to protect his comrades But it is doubtful that sacrifice is ith ffiit f ki t b d th ll f d t It i t b ll f d f t i ti t It i t ffiit b ti ifi i i d h h t ifi f hild l i f d i k hi lif t i N t h l b if i ft t d b hitlbl t th l t ik hld tht b l i th hitl i blit I hll itht t j t thi i A libl iti I t h i k i t h t th l status of whistleblowing is contextdependent In some cases it may be wrong especially if the harm being done is minimal and will be stopped (and victims compensated) immediately In other cases it may be justifiable sometimes re id ti t f l b d i d f ditiihi h hitlbli I d b t tht i id d h it i t I t i itht t tht th ft itil i d t i i hth b l i th hitl i b l i t b d th ll f d t Th fit f t i th d fh bi t t d b th iti Th i th h th likl it i t h t th t required to go public with her charges The second factor is the degree of sacrifice that the whistleblower must make The greater the sacrifice the more ikely it s that blowing the whistle is supererogatory The third factor is the whistleblower's f i d/ hi l t i h i ith th i t i A th l f th i f d b t i l ifi jtifibl td D i ti f l h i i t k it t b t h i d t t t t tid tit t h h th t t ik I i ldb hitlbl i t ht h i h i i d h If h fid t t h t th i t l d bi i t h t i t / b j t i h f l bt h l d h t 578

WHISTLE-BLOWING

ti d i i l t bth h f i d h l t i h i ith th iti suggest that she is required to violate these orders even at great cost to herself None of this tells us how to distinguish precisely whether blowing the whistle is obligatory or optional but such precision is difficult to attain

I

f

O i t i

Offiil ti bhlf f iti t k t h l h t d t h f hitlbli M i t t t h h iti t h within their structure ways of dealing with such cases Assuming that organiza tions want to be ethical what should their approach be? Organizations must make their commitment to ethics known to employees t h h idl l t d lii At l t th thi dd t d F i t th hld b i t l h i f hdli l ' lit h i t l i b d I d t b th i d d i h b d t lit i l t lit db illi t t if Ad h b d th tf th i t i ' t S d l ees who use this mechanism must be protected from retaliation The whole point is to resolve the problem internally and so employees must know that they will be protected if they do not go public Recall that Jeffrey Wigand raised his objection ithi th t t bt thl fid B f ik thi h td tht i d t bill f i h t f l Thid iti hld i l f t l l d i d iht t l ' i d i thi t t (O th it B k 1983 2 2 5 6 d D h t 1995 2 5 5 2 ) Th ti d i d t k hitlbli B t if f th f i l d b d bli ith h th th t b dlt ith it it Th public's perception I suspect is that organizations typically deny charges and at tempt to cover up wrongdoing and hide their dirty laundry And in many cases this may be true Independent of the accuracy of the charges however it is a t l h f i t i l ffiil t f l b t d ill f th t h l h i th h f th f i t ti At thi i t i th d i t l h tht h id ill b h t d k t lti B d t h t it i h d t thi fl Th i h i t t h t ft d i h bli d i t tht d il t I f th th l i ti has signed a contract that includes a confidentiality clause And the organization often cites this clause as its moral (and legal) trump card showing that the disgrun tled member has acted unethically As an ethical solution to the dispute this strat hld b j t d Th f d f fidtilit l B i dt t t i f t i itl t thi ki it i b i l lit i t t t t t h d f th titi d l h i t d l t hld b l i d B t th t t d t h t h t morcdly hld bl th h i t l Th i j diff bt l lli t d t t th titi f l ft db l i th hitl 579

TERRANCE McCONNELL

b M th

f h hitl di

T hld t h t th ildi th th t f id any th i h h bli tht di M C l l 2000

i i t i t h t th l d l t t t t t i l t h t it i always t bl t h i it t i l i b l blti F th t t ld b f itd t ll d il T tht t t l bliti thill li thi il til tht h t t l bliti i t ith h i h it flit B t thi l k dibilit l ff A i t d thi if i ll id b lid (f th f l l t h 3)

I

f

S i t

N t ll iti ill d t t h l thill d if th did t ll f thi b ld th A lt th ill b f hitl b l i d th ill likl t i d i t H hld it d l ith t h ? O ' f t i t i t I thik i t t t th hitlbl Th bi iti i t i l b i l i i t h d th d d d it S tt h i ft d lilti d i d t t t l i t i t f i l S h l ll i t d d b t th t i difflti ith th Fit h i t iti fl ti l i i l titd ti b h t t th l ' i t S d iti h f ki lif d i f f l t f b t h t ffti lilti i diffilt t ft B f th l iti i til t h j d t fft d lbilit ill h t b d tt ht ttt it h Of idiidl d iti l il t h l f th i i l l h th b l i tht thi iht h b iltd ith j t dit fl h f idiidl d i t i l tliti hld b d i d I th d h th b t t h t bl h f i dfith fft b ll ti ti ddlibti bf ti b ldb hitlbl diti f t f b iti d h f th t t h b th t Th lih bt t t t l lti l i I l ith th B Ad t Y i l l Hlth C C t t d d filit i C b i d M h t t Ad fid 1996 b hi i A P t H tht h fid f ki t b t ki diti (i t i d i i ) tht td ft h d f tit h it b fi b d i t i Thi d lt f ttti i t b it i ti b t th tbilit f h i l t ttti i d b thi iti Ad h d P t ith f i l d t d tit l t Offil f th B d fR i t t i i N i (f M h t t ) l d t h t Ad fild t t h t P t fid hi b f hi lit th th i b d i t i dt h f d i i d hi h Did Shildi k f th M h t t N A i t i f d t b t d b th d i i

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WHISTLE-BLOWING

From afar most of us have no idea who was right in this situation But independent of this the case raises broader questions In the United States some professionals including physicians nurses dentists pharmacists and attorneys are given considerable latitude by society to police themselves How diligently these professions do this job is open to debate Many suspect however that peer-review committees are reluctant to make rulings against one of their own If this is true it puts members of any of these professions who blow the whistle on colleagues - as Barry Adams did - in a difficult position If these peerreview committees indeed are seldom willing to sanction colleagues members of these professions will understandably be hesitant to blow the whistle even if the wrongs being done are great Even if blowing the whistle in these cases is obligatory - not supererogatory in spite of the sacrifices the agent will undergo - it is both prudent and right for society to protect those who come forward Perhaps a detailed study of professions given the privilege of policing themselves is in order; and if the results bear disappointing news perhaps society should revoke the privilege

Conclusion Whistle-blowing occurs when a member of an organization openly accuses colleagues of professional wrongdoing through a public medium Because such an action is likely to affect the organization adversely and be contrary to role-related obligations it requires ethical justification Such justification is most readily found in stopping harm to the public effecting compensation for victims and opening people's eyes to similar wrongdoing When such good effects clearly outweigh the bad whistleblowing is permissible; whether it is obligatory depends in part on the degree of sacrifice the wouldbe whistleblower is apt to undergo Organizations committed to being ethical must provide internal mechanisms for listening to em ployees' concerns seriously and evaluating them fairly Just societies must protect to the degree feasible individuals who blow the whistle in good faith

References Beecher Henry K (1966) Ethics and clinical research Th N Eld J l f Mdiie 274:135460 Bernstein Carl and Woodward Bob (1974) All the President's Men New York: Warner Communications Bok Sissela (1983) S t O th Ethi f C l t d Rltin New York: Vintage Books Dougherty Charles J (1995) Whistle blowing in health care In Warren T Reich (ed) E l d i fBithis pp 2552-3 New York: Simon and Schuster C Faden Ruth (ed) (1996) Th H Rditi E i t Fil R t f th Adi mittee on Human Radiation Experiments New York: Oxford University Press Heyd David (1982) S t i n New York: Cambridge University Press McConnell Terrance (1997) Ml I i Hlth C 2nd edn Belmont CA: Wadsworth (2000) I l i b l Riht Th Liit f C t i Mdii d th Lw New York: Oxford University Press

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Mellema Gregory (1991) Supererogation Obligation and Offence Albany NY: State University P fN Y k M J t h D (2000) Ud Rik S t Stt E i t H N Y k W H F Pound Edward T (2000) Nurse's clues shut down research USA Today July 13 Shh M i i (2000) C fb l i th h i t l i d i l h A l f I t l Mdii 131 101315 (1999) Th P l t i Fil A i ' S t Mdil E i t t i i th Wl Eil Cold War New York: The Dial Press

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DAVID LUBAN

Th l b l " f i l thi" b d t d i t bii d i l b l l th t i l thi f dii l li b i d f t h A l t t i l it f t th d t i d t t ll th bjt' ifi bfild Th f tk f i l thi th i f d i l thi l l thi d f t h th l t t thi ik the intersection of the individual fields rather than their union The latter forms the subject of this chapter

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O ith f i l thi ll t t th difft bjt A l d t d b titi "i th t h " f th f i professional ethics has to do almost entirely with sex lies and money Unethical practitioners are those who become embroiled in financial conflicts of interest who lie and cheat or who sleep with their vulnerable patients and clients The physician h f tit t ilit h h k i k b k f th f l th i tit h t th i t f hi d i i t i t hi bith th t h i t d tti th l h li t jd h tit t t l t tti f bt bd d l f th l i t th hitit h hi hf tiiti f iti t th t h t i ti th t th h i f f i l thi f i l t i l l i it Wh f i l b t thi th ll differ over which ways of dealing with sex lies and money cross the line and which do not Is it unethical for lawyers to collect large contingency fees on easy cases? For professors to date graduate students? These are questions that profession l d b t t thi ti d it thi d t ttl (Th difiti f f i l thi i i t l f i t t i bjt h tht d t it t t t i thi h t F d i i Lihtb 1996) U d t d i th t f i l thi i bjt f t til i t bt f littl if h i l h i l i t t b lthh f i l diff b t

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til di ith th i i l fbiddi f i l f lying cheating and using their clients for their own profit and pleasure Among the leadership of the professions a different issue lies at the forefront of professional ethics This is what is often described as professionalism; more specific ll th dl f f i l i d th i f ili I th f i l i d b t th b i li th i f t i h d d idl b kt f d l l k t i t d titi P l ij l hi f t b l l l t hill f th l t i h t t l i i ("I d ' t lik t l d I d ' t thik d ith!") ti dil b f d f t ht f jb i b d b Nt l d tblid advertising debase the profession it goes hand in hand with competition and competition drives down not only price but quality leading to impersonal assem blyline service Until the mid1980s the ethical codes of the professions focused to kbl t t liiti kt titi b fi i d b i d t i i (A G l kd t t h t " l l thi lti f th i f b i d") N t i i l th t th th id f th f i l i dbt f kt d t Citi h tht f i l lti d th i d l f " f i l ism" are little more than a conspiracy by professional guilds to limit competition and extract oligopoly rents from consumers (see for example Larson 1977; Abel 1989: 4 0 7 3 ) But this reply is not entirely fair to the ethics of professionalism b ili h ll h l th Wh h ii til t t t t i ' ifiti h j l i t b ditil li ht ll th th h t if h l j t pro bono b th d t t t t i lth lit h di i t f i l l t ith d tht kt l h i h d th l f th f i i ft d diit (F i t t i d i i f th i P 1995 3 7 6 0 ) Distinct from both the practitioner's ethics of honesty and the professional leader ship's ethics of professionalism stands the philosophical subject of professional ethics Even here more than one subject can be identified The first is a kind of casuistic study f th i t f th f t h i l dil b liti f l th B d d t i l thi h b t l f h i l h d t t h f t t l it i ft dd d i d thild P f i l thi i i tht b i i i t t itd it t h i E h t it ll f t d t t ith i t t l i l h th h i l h Th t h t t t h d f l f ll (if k t h i l d i b d ) tdi th fireprone Ford Pinto the lawyer whose client tells him in confidence where the bodies of his victims are buried the Challenger disaster any of a dozen examples in medical ethics and rehearses what "the utilitarian" "the deontologist" and "the virtue thit" h t b t th tl thd ft h i th j tditi f t l th T i h i l h th f i l thi i tb t ditti f th diili At t it b t l i i d d fft t d t i t h i l h d k it f t d h l If th i t t d i d t t t th bjt it t th th hil f t h i lt h i h ill d t h l f b t th f i Wh h

584

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

d h i k l di t h t th f ld t i h t f d the textbook makes them appear The actors knew too little at the time; or they were constrained by law; or "the bad guy" was really a more complex and ambiguous figure than the cartoon villain portrayed in the textbook Given these complications th lt h i l ild l l t d d d l th tdi b i t d i th th h i h l i h t th fl f l th til i N t th i t t di tht i d f ithi th ti f th f i th h i l h i l t h i t b t t t b fl b i th d f Oli W d l l Hl J " l iti d t did til " (f ill i i h t f l d i i f th h Bi 1985) Furthermore in their mature forms the moral theories incorporate exceptions and refinements introduced to take care of troublesome counterexamples and then they beg the question in the hard practical dilemmas because there is no way to t l l h t h th dil i itlf t l t th th H d f i l thi ll i t ti th d f th lt h i tht h i l h iill h d ld l th Wht b h i l h i l i t t i f f i l ti d ith h i l h i t l f th t ti

Role Morality I dditi t th it f h f i l thi i f d tl d i l i t t i h i l h i l bl ft k th problem of role morality. C il il l t thi i l bliti difft f i i t t ith d l i t h h t b l fi d l i h id tf t h ? F h t may label the latter "common morality" The precepts of common morality are widely recognized and understood across all orders of society Unlike the hothouse tomatoes of moral theory the categorical imperative the principle of utility and their more ti d d t th t f lit b d l h d d t d ll d t d l Fth th t f l it l li t l t Th lit i " " t f th d it i ordinary everyday, d it i universal. O b i l ti t if d t i f thi Ol h i i h dti di i t i i t i d l t h i d t d il f i l Th t i i f i dti i il bl f l l ity because they have no commonmorality counterparts with which they are n tension The problem of role morality arises when rolerelated duties do have coun terparts outside the role and the counterparts clash with role obligations (The dititi bt l i f bliti tht i th bl f l lit d th tht d t f Gld 1980 1 8 ) A f l ill i l l t t th bl Aj l i t h t i th t t f d th b t tht t t blihi th t t h i f l l k l d tht di ill d t th t ti f h f d d i th I th d fj l i t J t M l l

585

DAVID LUBAN

"E j l i t h i tt tid t fll f h i l f t ti ht i i on knows that what he does is morally indefensible He is a kind of confidence man preying on people's vanity ignorance or loneliness gaining their trust and betraying them without remorse" (Malcolm 1990: 4) When Malcolm calls journal it ll i d f i b l h i k th t d d f lit B t th j l i t ' l lit i i t t h t i th b f l bliti t th ld i l t j l i t i i t i t l lit requires h t lit f d "idfibl" Al h t k htil it l k lik f l li k i fll ll t h t th it i tlli th t t h L t posed to worry where the chips fall when they advocate for their clients In the oft quoted words of the nineteenthcentury barrister Lord Henry Brougham: f hi d t k bt i ll th ld d A d t i th d i h tht i hi l i t T t h t l i t b ll d dit d t ll hazards and costs to other persons and amongst them to himself is his first and only dt di f i thi d t h t t d th l th t t th d t t i hih h bi th S t i th d t f t i t fr that of an advocate he must go on reckless of consequences though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion (Nightingale 1821: 8) B h t t d th d d i ltil litil i h i h hi d f f hi l i t i l d t h t t f t tht d bli ld t th Ki f E l d hi C it ll b t h t ki th t h t B h ' d t ? Shld d d B h dfdi dt i t i thi ittl b t h t i t l id tht ld bl th f t t i htil ti ti th thi l i ? R l lit common morality at least as many people view it says no Political professionals may confront the "problem of dirty hands" on an almost daily basis To win elections the democratic politician may have to cut deals with l il i t t tht t d f thi th didt I i l t d t i iti th bl b t f l d t jil kill t h i thl t h ill t h i t d t th f L bf Mhilli t th i i l it d litii d t d tht fl i t l h not t b d d th h d d d ll th i d llt lli t h t fll f thi i i l Failing to operate by Machiavelli's rules because of moral qualms merely dooms your followers and constituents to defeat in the worst case to emiseration enslavement or even death Small wonder then that the philosopher Stuart Hamp hi ti A litil l d h ll i t t t fi d l i dt bttil jti i all circumstances to override his determination to retain power and to protect the i t t f hi t ill l b iffti di t t d h ld ll h d btt t h ht td bli i bilities (Hampshire 1989: 1645)

586

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T t Mhilli d tht i h l ibilit t t b good is to assert the problem of role morality in its starkest form A physician treating an HIVpositive patient learns that the patient has had unprotected sex with several partners Should the physician try to contact the t t th t h t th h l d b t t d ? W h t if th tit t th t kt? C lit k th lf f th t b th ttil b t t th tit bt dil l lit i l d t dti f fdtilit tht bl thi j d t Cfdtilit l lik th l t th t lli i t f th bl f l lit d I ill t k th th i i l examples in the ensuing discussion Many of the professions have strong duties of confidentiality Traditionally this included lawyers doctors and the clergy all of whom were exempted by law from the duty to testify in court about what their lit tit d ihi t l d th i fd P h l i t d t t l i fidtilit bliti d j l i t h d hild l t h t ll th t t t th i d t i t i f thi fdtil B t h t if th l l f h l i t tht i t i i t i dth f i th l i t i t t d ? W h t if i i l defendant needs the testimony of the journalist's source and unless the ournalist reveals the source's identity the defendant will wrongly go to ail? From the point of view of common morality it can seem utterly immoral to stand idly by while an i t i td jild i f t d ith AIDS f i l bliti f i l bliti Bt f i l i i t t h t if th l fd ill f l f t t i th ith i f t i d th th t d thi j b I th d iil l th t i bt f i l l lit d lit t t i i l lit i ht l it bl f b i d Th d h i l h i l ti h t h thi ll b t d if it i h ( P i i iti f thi bl P t 1980; Wasserstrom 1984) These questions are deep because they test the very foundations of ethics and moral theory Which is more fundamental common morality or role morality? We fl t l lld t d b t h E lt k l d f i l l l ( i l i th t h t th l t dl f il l) h th T C d t t f "D t d " d "D t t l " Fth th t i t h i l h i l t h i f lit K t i i d tili i l i th Kt' t i l i t i d th i i l f tilit l t ll f dl f hth are doctors lawyers students or hardcore unemployed Viewed from the univer salist perspective the special obligations attached to professional roles seem like a dubious overlay on core morality They may even seem like special moral dispensa ti tht l f i t t d f i l d t h l t h thi k thi i lbl d thi i O th th h d it ti id il l ith t h i i dti P t dt tk f t h i hild d t h did t h th h d t dti t thi hild th t t ' hild ld t b ' id f l Liki ll iti h

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ldi d i t d b t t h t i df f thi t ldi violence that would be abominable for others to use Furthermore we all live in networks of unique and individual attachments and these naturally generate loyalties including the loyalties of professionals to their clients Loyalties are parti liti t i l d i l lit t h t f i l t i th l f l l t ih d dill d f t i ( O l d i t 1982 F l t h 1993) Th l k it l tht i l lit itht l i f i bli ti h littl t d ith th l li tht l tll l d It th tht lti t t i i t f l i b th ti If t t f th ti t h t l bliti b thi t i sal the claims of role morality automatically fall under a cloud of suspicion But if we start from the assumption that morality is built up like a mosaic out of rolespecific duties and loyalties then common morality threatens to dissolve before our eyes Th h i f t t i i t i i t l til i d ith hi f d t h t t l i t i t If l lit t k d th h itii f i l f di h t thi b d d ? Th t h t i l d idl bdi B t if lit t k d h th l lit tit d constituents ever count on us to do our job? The threat is a selfrighteous adoles cent betrayal of expectations out of a refusal to get our hands dirty As F H Bradley once wrote "to wish to be better than the world is to be already on the threshold of i l i t " (Bdl 1927 199) B t h t h t i t i l bdi d i i h fkl fili d tht i

A Fit T

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One familiar way to try to reconcile universalist common morality and particularist role morality is through the twolevel structure of rule utilitarianism Rule utilitar ians deny that their basic universal principle the principle of utility should b lid d i t l t i d i i d l l d i i Th i tht li th i i l ditl ld t t h tit di i t i dli ith h th T tk h t i t i l f f i l thi lit ld b bl t t h (tiliti) l k i iti if ti fdtil b th t th l ld tht li th i f t i ld t b f i t th h h ld h t d I d d J Bth f th f d f tilitii liitl d tilit ian grounds that lawyers should be permitted to reveal that their clients are guilty because then the law would be better enforced and society would benefit (Bentham 1827: 3 0 2 4 ) Bentham seemed untroubled that none of us would ever be able to t th l l t i f l f tht tt f i d if k tht l d th ld b t h th l l f tiliti t l d th t d Jti Hl j k d b t hi df i d L i B d i tilit i b t t i "I t tht h ld't b t l fi if it i th i t t f ibl d i i t t d i " ( l t t f Hl t H l d Lki J 12 1921 i H 1953 304) 588

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Rl tilitii d t h b iiti t h t th i i l f utility is used to choose rules not individual acts Once the rules are chosen we follow them not because doing so creates more utility than breaking them (it may not) but because they are the rules in place That solves the insecurity problem b l l flli th l th th di b llti f tilit S th tht df f i l l b thi l f d t I tht il th t d i t f i l i t lit h tiliti i ith th til d d f i il l Th l d l jtifd i i l t b t th i l i f dti L fll rule of keeping clients' confidences The standard justification of the rule is univer salist and broadly utilitarian: the duty of confidentiality reassures clients that they can discuss embarrassing or sensitive problems with their lawyer without the nfor ti l k i t Bt th l i i l it i l t f thi lit th l i tht lit d F l th l h t k th l i t ' f i fidtil t h h t t i f i th l i t ittd A it t t thi i th t l l t t i th d l i l ity to be utilitarian A nonutilitarian still faces the choice of whether to apply moral reasons to individual acts or to general rules or policies Any moral system that evaluates rules rather than acts and then judges individual acts through the l f l l th t l l t t I tht i l i t l tlk t il l liti i d d t h t th l dfii l t h l ll j t i f i d

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As it stands however the twolevel structure seems incomplete Consider once again the lawyer's duty of confidentiality Lawyers keep client confidences we have id b t h i lit ill b l t t t h t ith t h i l B t thi i i t th "S h t ? Wh i it i t t tht l i t h t ith l ? " Th b i i tht t h i l t d thi j b I th d th rule f fidtilit t j t i f i d b th role f l Ulik l tilitii d t l t th fl f th l ditl b ki h h tilit it t W l t it i d i t l b ki h t l it i t th l But that invites the next question: why is the role important? What is so great about the lawyer's role that we should require lawyers to keep confidences even when innocent people may suffer? Here a typical answer is that lawyers play an i d i b l t i th d i l t Witht l f fidtilit lit ill t t l l t h i l h t th dt k i d t d t thi fftil d th d i l t k l if b t h id h ffti social institution. d t Th role t j t i f i d b I i t b l tht h t k h l b l th i t i t t i i Th t th l t t ti d l t i l I l f i d t i l i t

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l t i l l l th f l l i li th d i l t id th h f t t h O th d i l t i d t k tht litit' iht h l d O th d i l t ll t t i i t i l b th d t th th th j d b th i bilit f d l i d i All f th t dbtbl f t l i It t t tht thi i t b t th d i l t d tht k it l t fi t i b it i t th th fibl l t t i If th bl th d t i f l lit h k th th ld b if th i t i t t i t l jtifd At thi it h l d th t l l t t f l tilitii ith f l l t t A i d i i d l act f k i lit fd t jtifd b rule f f i d t i l i t Th l i j t i f d b it i t f social role, tht fl Th l i jtifd b h i t h t it i t l t institution, th d i l t F i l l th i t i t t i i j d d di t h h d it d ( Lb 1988 1 2 9 3 9 ) F l l i thi f l l t t hl t th ibilit f i t i i i f i l l liti l d If th l th i t i t t i i ll jtifd th l f f i l thi d th l i t h t it i f i l ' d t t fll th Ath A l b ff tlli l i hi l i f l f i l tht f C h l H i S th bli ti i P i d i th F h R l t i (Alb 1995 1999 1542) S idd th i l l t i t h h t th T ith f l b l f i l i d i t i l tt dth C i i l d th tittil h lit " l t t " t th d i t i f th P i C th ki i t i b th N t i l C t i th d d b th J b i th t i t Hbtit t th i t i t i f t Gidi h D t th i d l t D t i t ft t h i d i t i b R b i d R b i hilf h fll t d b th T h i d i (Alb 199917) A t l t th

S

f d thi kbl d ft d ' dt d ' t th f idl bdi t f i l d t f itii th lit bditl C itl i h t t h h l d th l f l b j t i f i d ? Of t b jtifd Bt h th i i i h t likl t t h t th ti ti f th T If th S ' l th d ith th l id ti

A

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b t bhdi t d ' d ft ' If l l thi i it F l l f th i t i t t i S dlikd f d l l bli t h t no itl difft E t f i ll d t t b l d th l it i i t d th t b j t i f d ith

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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

th f th l d t h f i f i l t h perhaps a completely innocent person on behalf of another Adversarial roles plainly include courtroom lawyers political consultants soldiers and business executives But other professionals may occasionally take on adversarial roles n th tht f i thi f i l dti i th t h h i t A HIV fdtilit l h h i i d i l l D f d f d i l l ff t f th bt h i i l f th tll f ll A A l b li h f th t d d df f d i l l lit flt i i l d i li tht are actually quite different Consider for example the adversarial practice of polit ical deception and slander Defenders of the political consultant's "anything goes" role morality often argue that political opponents expect to be slandered and voters t t b d i d B t th d f d lid f thi b t i hih ll b t t th difft t tht litil t b i f ff consent t b l d d b th k h t th tti i t K i ht tti i t i l i t th ti t it h S th f " t d it" t " t d t it" i i l l i t i t I th same way defenders of adversarial roles sometimes slide from the valid point that a political consultant should filter out her own selfinterest to the very different con clusion that she should filter out her own moral judgments Or they slide from the t b t i t h t th l f th f liti f i l d t d th l it l d d d t i t th td l i tht l d d d t i fi b th l l t O th t h t th d i l ititti t b f i t th h b t th ld tht bfit f d i l ititti Alb it t tht i h td f d b i ith li tht b t bt d t jtif h d th l t i i l d i l i tht jtifi d ial behavior but is not true (Applbaum 1999: 4) All the arguments Applbaum criticizes are standard in the literature of profes sional ethics: he is not assailing a strawman But Applbaum's critique yields a diiti l i If it t t tht d i l l t b jtifid h th l i f d i l l lit l t ll ( l Lb 1988 1 4 8 5 6 ) Th litil ltt l lt h f i l l t jtif M h i l l i tti d th l h ithhld l i f d d t h i f ti f i t l t id i l i t t t t libilit l h il b li t th d t f fidtilit i th d i l system So much the better we might believe What makes this conclusion disquieting s that it also suggests that professionals in adversarial settings have to "fight clean" if t h i d i fihti dit T h t f d t l l fi Ud th l f t lit f" l " f i l ill ff d f t t h h d f " b b " th th id C l i t ill l t h ll d t f i l hl d k t th b b D t l d litil lt t ill b d i t f b i l i l th b b S h l i tititi h d d 591

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Tht i b th th l i t d f A l b ' ment The argument says that if justifications for adversarial institutions and roles fail then adversarial role morality fails as well The conclusion stated carefully is that adversarial role morality cannot prevail over common morality But what is lit i d i l tti h t fiht d i t ? Th tiki f t i tht f f h l h t t thi ti O th id ti tll l tht t d't k iht d i it i t i th th h k O th th id l tll l tht h t fiht fi ith fi d t h t t b t i fi l O thi i lit i t dd ith i t l f t k id whether we accept or reject the morality of tit for tat Small wonder then that insisting on unilateral upright behavior by professionals in adversarial settings seems wrongheaded Common morality does not insist on unilateral upright behav i ith W d i l tht h th i t Bt l i tht t i th th h k l d i t k fihti dit d tht i l d tliti til t k i th if d ' lit b l l G t h i t fi thi i t i t i i tht l i t i ' dil (th l i d i l t t i ) ill seldom find a better strategy than tit for tat behaving "nicely" until your adver sary strikes a low blow then retaliating (Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1987: 6 7 7 1 ) For the same reasons that few people actually believe in turning the other cheek few l t t b d f d d b f ifit l h t th th h k h th th id' l t t dit t i k Th l i tht lit itlf ti d i l l t d t itit A l b ' iti f d i l l lit Oth i f l td d i l l lit h blkt fidtilit l t i th liti tht d i l ititti d i t idfibl I d d l l t h i tt h d against stringent confidentiality requirements because the arguments for an adver sarial role morality that includes them are so weak (Luban 1988: 1 4 9 5 0 2 0 2 5 ; Simon 1998: 5 4 6 8 ; Rhode 2000: 1 0 6 1 5 )

Th R i l

A d j t t

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A d i t th f l l l i f l lit f i l l bddd in social institutions that can be morally evaluated The less compelling the moral justification of the institution the less powerful the demands of the role Role morality wins if the institution is sufficiently valuable the role is sufficiently central t th i t i t t i d th l ffiitl f th l W k f th l i k f thi h i fj t i f i t i k th d d f l lit Y t th i thi t i d i t i l b t thi l i L Fll (1955 916) tht f i l dti t b j d d b "thil t d d i d d t f ti l d i t " I t d jdi th "l l i l d j t t bt d d " S f i l d ll tbl til di h di th ilbl 592

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f i l dti i b l til id h much injury abandoning them would do to a worthwhile institution On Fuller's view institutions cannot be judged abstractly apart from the means required to make them work (1981: 2 5 6 6 0 ) Conversely professional practices should not be d d l b t fit l th h k th i itht ki hth b d i th ti ld d i il l idi bl idi l l d dil i I t d b t t l i t bth j d t F l tA i jiditi t ti t fidtilit b ii l t l lit j t th t Th lt i t h t d f lawyers often take care not to learn the truth from their clients so that they will never be in the position of knowing that a client has perjured himself Not infre quently this willful ignorance lowers the quality of the defense because the lawyer's fl t i t i d th t t h h k t h f l i f t tht h ll dd S l l d t h t f j t th l h l d not b id t l lit j (Fd 1975 2 7 4 2 ) th i t t l f ffi th b t d f B t th i ithi th f i i t h t if th b t i i l df i l t l ith l i t perjury then worse criminal defense is morally preferable This illustrates Fuller's point that sometimes we should abandon an otherwise worthwhile end (the best criminal defense) because of the odious means it requires Conversely we have come t t tht ilt d f d t hld h d t l l tti d tht d t tti d t i l d l h t d i t d "G ht h l i t tld t h t h did it!" Gi tht d f d t t id t i i i t t h l tht ld b th l t ll W t h f t i i l l t d f d th ilt itht li thi ilt d tl t f h t d thiki it ll f i i l d f d t k h k l d f th l i t ' ilt f i d t i l Thi ll trates Fuller's other point that we sometimes mitigate our moral condemnation of a professional duty because it is the means to an end we value highly We have now modified the original twolevel structure of role morality twice first b di th l i t ll f l l (ititti l l t) d d b ti Fll' i t tht jtifiti i bth d i t i th l l O dditil it d h i P f i l t i t i h t t th j t i f i d d d f thi l Tht i l lit t b i l balanced i t lit O t h i h ti flit b t l lit d lit i f i als will defer to common morality because the injury that any single defection from the role inflicts on the role or the institution will usually be slight But a profes sional person who defects from the role in every case of moral conflict will have no f i l i t i t lft d l b id t b tii th f i (Lb 1990 4 4 3 5 2 ) T h l d lf t l d t i tht t t th d d f th f i l l dflt tht b iltd l i t d i i t Th t t h f th dt i d b th l dtil f th il ititti ti th l tll h t d i h i t tb 593

DAVID LUBAN

Rl M l i t

N t l L

Fuller was among the first writers to use the term "role morality" which he insisted is "no mere restatement of the moral principles governing human conduct ll b t il t d d l i b l t th d i h f dititi il f t i " (Fll 1969 193) F l l d i d t h t l lit ld b tifd I b bddi it i lit th t df t d f jtifti d (Fll 1981 2 0 0 1 ) Hi tf t l l it i b d t f f i l thi t h t h l t d f th dititi t h i l h t f th k f i l d A fair amount of ink has been spilled by sociologists attempting to define the concept of a "profession" For our purposes the important feature distinguishing the professions from other occupations is that they require specialized training n a bjt tt t h t i i t l f i t l l t l l i th bjt f ilid h Th b d t liti f th bjt tt d f d t i ht f i l d th i h t Fll lld " t l i t i " ditiihi df d f i l ti S h i t i l Wht i t i l i Fll' fth b l i f t h t th bjt tt f th f i i l II t h i l t i t t t f i l ti kid f t l law of the professions An example will illustrate what Fuller meant In order to carry out the technical t k f ii tit d t ti t t ith t i t i tht i tt t th tit' t d itiit th h i i ' W t d b f d t ith lthi ff d t h t i j t th b i i Th l k t h d i l t d th k i t l i t i t ti I th l b i l th d i h t b k h iit ith it f ill i l d h i A fl t t t f th tit i i dli the doctor's part The natural facts of the human body make it impossible for a phys ician to treat a patient without creating a moral relationship between them This moral relationship is the true source of the physician's role morality I t t i l f i th t h i l bjt tt f th f i Fll d t t l th bl f l lit b t l th t h i l bl f f i l i d it h i t i ith ili Wh th l d f th f i d ili it i b th i tht i lth dflt f i l f di h t th j b i With t fdi th li th i t t h t th h t t l Challenger can launch on time but you cannot fool Mother Nature and the shuttle explodes (Vaughan 1996) Professionalism viewed in this light consists precisely in placing the natural necessities of doing the job right above commercial interests Fll' i t i t h t th l l t i h i dd f fl f i l ti j t h t l iti fdi th j b i h t th t h i l t f f i l k Fll' fl t t th t d f f th i f l lit It t t h t th t df t d f bddi l lit i lit f i l b th i th t l l t d b th liti ith h i h f i l d l Th l l 594

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

tihi

bt f i l d th i f th th ld i Th t i l thi tht f i l td tht b b d d f l flit I l l i t i F l l ' id b h Id t bli t h t th lii t th bl f l lit d it t i ith lit Th l l t i h i bt f i l d th i t l l t i h i f reliance C l i t tit d d ihi l l h i i t d i t t dih thi f i l dti fithfll Th dti h b difid d t i l i d d if f i l d i t f th th b t th t t t h t th h d i th Thi i ht Bdl t h h d t h t th h i h t b b t t th th ld t d th t h h l d f i l i t t i l l ti bt th h ti th Bt t t li d tbl tti d t h t th i f l D t h lid S t b h d th H b t i t bt l th H b t i t ' i t t td f thi ll! F l l ' t hihliht th t t l t i h i tht d i d f i l k b t th ti th tliti th d d tit t tht f i l ti iflit thid ti t h h l l t t t h i tit d l i t A l t h h Fll h t h h t t h i li t t il t l l tht h i h th th d d f lit R t h li t th i th t ithi lit d th t th l t ithi lit l th t i t t I th d th bl f l lit t d t hll t th h f l t h h t Th flit b t l lit d lit k flit ithi th lf h t t it l d t i l l flit bt t l ithi O i th " i l " lf t d b th l l d th li l t i h i th l id Th th i th lf ll h b ithi th lf t h t h l d i t l f f d l f f ft i i i l Thi i t flit t h t ill P f i l thi hih t fit t b i d fiil i ithi l t h h t hl i lit t k d l lif i t l f

Rf Abl R i h d L (1989) American Lawyers. N Y k O f d U i i t P Alb Ath I k (1995) P f i l d t h t th ti f P r i Harvard Law Review, 109 4 5 8 8 6 (1999) Ethics for Adversaries: The Moratity of Roles in Public and Professional Life. Pri t NJ P i t U i i t P A l d R b t M (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. N Y k B i B k B i A t t (1985) Th d flti ti I Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind U i i t fM i t P and Morals. M i l i Bth J (1827) Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice, l 5 N Yk G l d

595

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Bradley F H (1927) Ethical Studies 2nd edn Oxford: Oxford University Press Fletcher George P (1993) L l t A E th Mlit f R l t i h i s Oxford: Oxford University Press Freedman Monroe H (1975) L ' Ethi i Ad Stm Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Fuller Lon L (1955) The philosophy of codes of ethics E l t i l E i i g 74: 916-18 (1969) Th Mlit f Lw 2nd edn New Haven CT: Yale University Press (1981) Th P i i l f S i l Odr ed Kenneth I Winston Durham NC: Duke University Press Goldman Alan (1980) Th Ml F d t i f P f i l Ethis Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Hampshire Stuart (1989) Innocence and Experience Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Howe Mark DeWolfe (ed) (1953) H l L k i Ltt Th C d f M Jti Hl d Hld Lki 19161935 vol 1 Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Larson Magali Sarfatti (1977) Th Ri f P f i l i A S i l i l A l i s Berkeley CA: University of California Press Lichtenberg Judith (1996) What are codes of ethics for? In Margaret Coady and Sydney Bloch (eds) Cd f Ethi d th P f i Melbourne: Melbourne University Press Luban David (1988) L d Jti A Ethil Std Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1990) Freedom and constraint in legal ethics: some mid-course corrections to L d Jtie M l d L Ri 49: 424-62 Malcolm Janet (1990) Th J l i t d th Md New York: Alfred A Knopf Nightingale J (ed) (1821) Trial of Queen Caroline vol 2 London: J Robins & Co Albion Press Oldenquist Andrew (1982) Loyalties J l f Philhy 79: 173-93 Posner Richard A (1995) Overcoming Law Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Postema Gerald J (1980) Moral responsibility in professional ethics N Yk U i i t L Riw 55: 63-89 Rhode Deborah L (2000) I th I t t f Jti R f i th L l P f i n New York: Oxford University Press Simon William H (1998) Th P t i f Jti A Th f L ' Ethi Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Taylor Michael (1987) Th Pibilit f C t i n Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Vaughan Diane (1996) The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology Culture and Deviance t NASA Chicago: University of Chicago Press Wasserstrom Richard A (1984) Roles and morality In David Luban (ed) Th Gd L Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics pp 25-37 Totowa NJ: Rowman and Allanheld

596

44 M d i Ethi JUDITH LICHTENBERG

Th t t l i i

" d i " lt f d ildi i fil di il d th I t t I thi h t I hll " d i " i h t i l t th di d i f i l l I ill i i t d i i t tht t f th di ll d i b d j l i Thi h t th i b t th thi fj l i I hll t di thil i that arise for art or popular culture nor shall I consider pornography Journalism has been slower than law and medicine to develop a set of principles idli dil th t h i l i f d b it titi Tht b b lik b i j l i t th f i tditill i d I th l f th di i h i id h t d bli li h b idt th t t f t tt ft W t t th d f i i t l it h f d thi ti i i l th b j t f bli ti d h come to engage in a good deal of ethical selfstudy

Deception and Dishonesty A l

th t i t t d l t thil i j l i t f b t d ith d t i d d i h t S h bl t t h l it f Th tb l t t i l th k i bliti f f l h d ll l i i f J t C k ' 1980 f b i t i f t i The Washington Post about a supposed eightyearold drug addict that won her a Pulitzer Prize (later retracted) to Stephen Glass's many inventions in the New Republic and other maga zines in the late 1990s I th t i t t i thil bl i it t i l tht j l i t t t k t i Bt h i btl i f th t f idiidl j l i t b t f th i t i t ti ithi h i h th k O ht t f ti it i bl t t di iti t tk i d t t f l h d d l i i Wht titt d ?N t h i iti f t i l h d tht d tth d b th i d th 597

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f j l i it i t i ith th l t f bl t d d Ath bl th b l i f th li bt f t d fiti hih i d d b t i f h i b l t d i lit th E lit h j t th hititi d f d th f it h t b d l l bt t t h l t b f d i th ld B t l t h h it b tbl t i l fl th i jtifiti f th f it i k tht t t b f t l A ll bl i th f tti tht h b l d d f d th lik hih t h f l th l i t l d h k C l d tti d i i th ld f j l i d h t t t i i t b l Still th t b i i f i t liit thi d it t l b bi h t d th li b t th iibl d th i i i b l I h b l i i d 1991 i l i th it f th New Yorker, J t M l l th US S C t hld t h t bli f libl d h it ttibt l t d tti t hi {Masson New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 US 496 [1991]) C t i thi t h i l i ti b t d t i d di h t J l i t ti d i i i t t h l t i t i f t i R l l i l d t i t i hlth k t d t i h b j l i t h th i l f hid b l tblid i d t d it d t l i i j l i t hid d fl t b kt h td bd f d h d l i ti (Thi l t ld t l i t i h i h F d Li S k t d th t f ABC N Th US C t fA l h l d i Food Lion, Inc. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (194 F 3d 505 [1999]) t h t th t " b h d thi dt fl l t d ittd t " b t it did t t h f f d d fi t d ti d it d i d F d Li bliti d ) S ill tht d t i ti b jtifid M t l h t h t f thi b l t i t iti A libl t h t i l t t jtif d t i i iht lik thi hth d t i i td i til d d th i t f th i f t i t b td th i t f th d t i i l d d th ilbilit l k f it f l t t i f ii th i f t i S i l B k (1989) h td th iti d t i ti i j t i f i d l if it ld b l dbtd d td t i d b fftd ti (It i h t t t t h t th t iti ld i l d th t til ) J l i t d i i btl ll J t M l l b i The Journalist and the Murderer ith d tht h i b f t i "E j l i t h i tt tid t fll f h i l f t ti ht i i k tht h t h d i ll i d f i b l H i k i d f fid i l' it i l l i ii thi t t d b t i th itht " (Mll 1990 3) M l l iti til b t J MGii h b k Fatal Vision h i l d th t i l d f Jff M D l d ti d f killi hi if d hild MGii h d b f i d d M D l d bf hi t i l d i t i d th 598

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l t i h i f f t d hil iti th b t l l i b k tht ld ld b ti M D l d ' ilt ( T h t M l l h l f d fj l i t i b t l h d i b d b h l t d th d f Jff M f h d f th F d A h i iht lik i ti ti hd t M l l h l f d tht h d t i i i l l it) M l l ' i i l t til t t d b t it i t t i iht j l i t lik ll h k kid f t df it l l t i h i t ft thi bjt d h d thi ti Th l li t b d h bt th iibl d th i i i b l th tbl d th t d i i l l f lit df l ( K t i i t d tht t t t th solely th ti i j t h t l i i t thi d i t i ) O l t f t i th lti hititi f th bjt th Th i th bli b td t d t d th l f th j l i t i d it i bl t l d t h t th l f t l t i t h bli ffiil d bli f i l d ( A i libl l i i l l d i t i i h bt bli f f i i l d bli fi th h d d di l th t h ) Wh j l i t i t i th i i th f th h h ht t b b t ht h d d ill d A t t i The New York Times Magazine i l l t t th i t Th t Mihl L i t l d th t f h i h h l t d t f b b N J h d $800000 th t k kt t h h I t t tiit h d b th S i t i dE h C i i f t k k t f d (H d hi t tll ttld t f t ith th SEC) L i h d th b ' t ( i l l hi f t h ) b d S i l i k h t Th t l til d d d t th i t t f th t d f it h b t l t h h it h d b i th b i bl i d b th b ' tiiti Y t it i ti b t th t ' d hi d H did h t ht h di t th f i l ? W th fh th iht th t ? It ld b bl t i tht j l i t t th f t t h f t l f d b j t f th t i th it d h l i ith ffit diti f t tbl t N t h l j l i t dt d ith i h th t t h l t d bjt di h t h h thi k th t th t th bli

A Riht t

K?

At th

t

l t h l i l l t t th fliti ibiliti lit f t O id i th j l i t ' h l t i h i ith th bjt dh dt tt lit l t t th t t l Th d t i th th id diffilt t d i b t idtif J l i t ti k f thi bliti t tll t th it thi bliti th t t h t th bli i t t O th t l k b t "th bli' i h t t 599

JUDITH LICHTENBERG

k " I d d th S i t fP f i l J l i t Si D l t Chi t tht the public's right to know is "the overriding mission of the mass media" and that "journalists must be free of obligation to any interests other than" promotion of this right Cll h th b l iht t k iht t k thi d thi I d d th l f iht i t t i l l hlfl h th i hih iht l i b l k f iht t k it i i b d Oft fid thi t th d i t k Th ti i ht f t l t t didi hth i f t i d i i t idiidl ht t b b l i h d I th fil Absence of Malice, suspect's friend provides an alibi for him to a reporter claiming the suspect accom panied her to an abortion during the time when the crime was being committed The friend is emotionally unstable and a devout Catholic and commits suicide h th t ildi h i b l i h d th t d i th l l Th t li t h t th dibilit f th t i hih th i t ' tti i t tk d d d iti th ' Hd th t t d t h t th iht it i i d f h d i i iht h b difft d ll k h l t th t hld have been to the risks In addition the claim that the credibility of the story depended on using a real name must be evaluated in the light of the widespread use of unnamed sources in news stories also staunchly defended by journalists Phili M i th l f i t Midt b i tii i Flid h hi h t l b d (M 1987 26) Th i i t l i t hi th h d i j d d i d t i f i th h t l t Th b i t h t i i d if hi i b l i h d i th t b hi h t S h l d th b l i h th t it i i t h t hi itti th l ? O h l d it kill th t ? T did h li l t th i t f th t th likelihood and magnitude of harm to the individual; the relevance of the disputed information to the story (can the story be usefully told without it?); and finally the extent to which the person in question has chosen the limelight or is responsible for fidi h i l f i it E h f th ti b diffilt t ( B t th t b Attti t th f t ld t l l i t Mihl L i ' t l f th h i h h l t d t d hi t) Wh l i t th i b ki b t th it f ti tibl i t b h i ( h l tiit) f bli f f i i l bli fi th ti b diffilt W t h t th t the question "When should reporters write about the private lives of public offi cials?" is "When the behavior is relevant to their fitness for office" But agreement about when that condition is fulfilled is difficult to achieve There is profound dis t i W t it ( h l i th iti t l t di t t i l i d ) b t hth t ht t t ' i t h t d h t fl l thi i i f i t b t hi bilit t l d dt Nthi i i l i f i d b th f t t h t th bliit j l i t t b thi t dill h th bli i t d t h f l lt th 600

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t th fit ti S f l i h t bli tht litil leader's sexual peccadillos are not in and of themselves relevant to his fitness for office but also that once these become public knowledge or the object of public obsession the formerly private behavior no longer is When Franklin Roosevelt or Jh K d id ith t thi i it t bli k l d t l t tl b j l i t f th ti h t i d i t i b t h t th k S i h t till t h t th i d i t i t l l fl b t t h t th d i d th idt' bli d t Bt l thi l d i t f d i d i t b tki t h ti ditti th f i t t bli b i it i i l i b l to maintain that such acts unknown to the public could be relevant to evaluating their public success We may wish for a kind of moral unity in the universe according to which all the virtues go together and all the vices do too but alas th i ti b t i t lit d bli t Ulik t h i d t j l i t h h t t th l tiiti f litii S th t ibilit f thi idbl l t l i hli t d t i th fh i t i l t bt l i ki thi t tht iht t h t h i b t such as that a politician's sexual practices are relevant to his ability to lead Of course journalists and news organizations are likely to argue that as long as other journalists cover these issues they have little choice but to report them if they h t i i b i Th titi df i i d d It i l it i At th l t if l di tlt td t ( tht ld i li ti h i d k ) td h t i ft t k lif f t h i tht k it h d f j l it t i th J l i t i ti tht d th h d i f" t i th b d " ll t b h i h f l ffi t d b th di But they can also include practices that offend audiences such as the use of profan ity or the publication of shocking pictures In some cases we may find both at once: the photographer who pushes himself on the grieving family taking pictures of d d hild tht h k d th i i di Y t it b d t h t th bl f t i lit t l t th i th b i f dil d i t d j l i th th th f lit d d fil d i b MGii M l l d kid L i i t th b t l f d bjt M l l h i bt th th it t l t i h i i hih bth j l i t d h interest in remaining on good terms even at the cost of other values they are supposed to serve To be effective in their respective positions the ournalist needs the source especially when the source is a politician public official or some other fi ith d i l d th litii bli f f i i l d th j l it B t h biti l t i h i d th j l i t ' l tth k d thd f th bli i t t Thi t i bt th lit' dt ltit d th i t fd t h t f th lt i f d flit f i t t d bi i th i hih t td ll i t t t td 601

JUDITH LICHTENBERG

M d i Bi Thi b i t b d ti b t bi bjtiit d tlit li Th i i l f l F i t it i ti t l b t thi b t b t i t l ht k h k d th liit t d t i t k l d S d it b t l th b h i fidiidl j l i t bt t l t h th i t i t t i ithi hih they operate The subject is complicated also because although in our society the accusation that journalists are biased is widespread according to a recent poll (ASNE 1999) 78 t fA i d l t bli th i bi i th di t i th i tht f j l i t di d d f tth d bjtiit i ibl d bi i i i t b l B t th d i t tht " h t " i l i " " it ld b fi t itii j l i t f di h t th t hl di If it i i i b l f l t thi t "f thi t i " ( d f thi i t i l t t l ) t t t t b bjti i fitl It ld t k t f fild t id th l i t h t i j l i d broadly objectivity and truth are impossible even as ideals (but see Lichtenberg 2000) So I shall assume here that they are possible and plausible ideals I shall ask what lies behind accusations of journalistic bias and to what extent they are justi fid T l t th ti d t k dititi O i b t d ii N iti d h li b t th d d i t i l id f thi ti Th ti f bi i i l d ith tt ditil hih d t b " b i d " (Thi t t t l th dd h t f th t " b i " O th h d th t i j t i l describe a view as biased if we mean to condemn it or the person who holds the view On the other hand the popular outcries of bias in the media suggest that a view is equivalent to a bias Deeply embedded here is the assumption that views b t il litil tt t b t bt i l th t i l i t t f th h h l d th i t I hll t t i th t t i ) It i ibl t ti th it it f th li bt d ditil b f l ktii i bjtiit f th t j t t i d b f th ltd i tht f t " t h l d " " l l d " b f th i di i l d i " l sis" that partakes of both news and opinion Nevertheless I shall take the distinc tion between news and opinion to have some validity even if the line is not sharp Another distinction relevant to evaluating the accusation of bias is between ndi idl j l i t th iti f hih d ithi h i h th k d thi " d t " th lti f thi l b Wht i t f t b t f th S f l i 1996 " t f 179 d i l d i i d t i l h f l Dl d th t f 111 " hil P i d t C l i t d l itfi (Gibb 1996 7) At th ti di t tdi d t d b th A i S i t fN 602

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Edit A i j l i t " likl t ffilit ith l toward' the Democratic party (53 percent of the journalists vs 35 percent of the public)" (ASNE 1999) Clearly the distinction between news and opinion is also relevant here; the owners f iti t l th d i t i l id f th ti d d t i ht ii th hil ki j l i t th id B t iti d b t di bi t thi it b i l i d t b tht ditil lii th l t f it O th d i t i l d d d t t fid l' ii it i i th hih dt b t l d b i d tht j l i ' iidi b btl l t l itself It will be easier to evaluate this charge by making it more specific I shall there fore focus on the common claim that the American news media suffer from a liberal bi l t h h f ht I li ll t ti f th t f bi Th h f l i b l bi i ll d i t d t th l t i l di h t k t th t i f l t i l h The New York Times d The Washington Post, d th f bli di dt l i i T l t it dt t t l l t i (1) First it is worth noting how relative the notion of liberalism is What passes for liberal bias in the United States would be considered rightofcenter in many European countries whose conservative parties generally lie to the left of the A i D t i t (2) O i f id ti f f d f th l i t h t th i t A i di h l i b l bi i t h t t A i lit l i b l (Gldb 2001) B t th l i tht t h f thi li t l b libl i non sequitur d d t t h t If td i ldi tht l i b l j l i t t d libl j l i th it i ll l i b l t h t ti j l i t t d ti l ism; more generally journalists of persuasion X must produce journalism of persua sion X On this view truth or accuracy are hopeless ideals; no one can escape his or her biases I have already rejected this view To make the complaint about bias th t t d i t t tht t t h d libl idl idti f th j l i t ' Th ti i h jd apart f litil l i hth i b i d (3) T f til t i i b i d i t it t th f t t h t it it l t f t t h t it i t t f t t i i til dittd T k tht t th f t omits relevant facts would seem to require an independent source of information about the situation In some cases when we ourselves have been participants n or eyewitnesses to an event we may be in a position to judge that media coverage i dittd f l d Bt t f th ti t h i f t i itlf d d di d i th t f th thi b i l b l Of t bi itht tll h i i d d t f t i b t i t I l l likl t t tht t i b i d if it flit ith d i thi litil i M tht t h t fA i d bli th di b i d d th t l ll 603

JUDITH LICHTENBERG

th litil t (ASNE 1999) C t i d t t l i b l bi hil members of minority groups find bias in coverage about their groups Accusations of bias may be more farreaching involving the claim not simply that this or that story is told in an unfair or distorted way but that important issues or problems are i d d l d b th di hil th i d i t i t Th ti t l b t th i l l diffilt t d l t (4) Th ti f l i b l bi td i ti ith th t i t f idiidl j l i t i th id ti bi f th di It iht b d t h t th t i t t d t i t f ht i d t i get covered and how (not to mention what does not get covered) are not the beliefs or values of individual journalists but rather the structures and institutions within which they work Massmedia organizations are vast corporate entities; they are th thtb d th h f d i t t i ti tt i th th th P t b d i t bt ft th ill b btl d i l i i t (At th ti th ft ti f di iti ti ll i t t h i th i l itil i t t i til l t th i th b f Th profit motive can contain its own sorts of biases: not so much political biases as biases toward the sensational the entertaining and the accessible) The adherence of journalists to the standard norms of their profession such as their reliance on ffiil l fft ht t d d h d tibt t ti t d i i di F l li t h i t t i i t i i d lti ith t ffiil h il fi f t i Th lt b kidl t t t f th fl

Is Neutrality a Virtue? S f th t h t f thi d i i h b t t t th l i t h t i t di h l i b l bi Ih d t h t th f t t h t lit t d t b libl d t tht thi j l i i l i b l t h t th fl ti bi i th di t l t i t t libl d tht "libl" i lti t t h t i th A i t t i t f t th lft Ath t t ld b t d tht i t th di h l i b l bi d t t h t thi i t il b d thi C i d example of the kind of coverage that raises the ire of conservatives A recent story on National Public Radio's All Things Considered described the experiences of gay teenagers and how they have changed over the past few years Although the story did t liitl d i t i l i th b j t it td b lbi it d bhdl t h t i t th bl t f tii td b H Riht W t h th h t f t b thi A h d i l d b ft t l i i d th kl i d t d f thi t h i t t i d " " th ibilit f bi l l l i d l i l l t l li i 604

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A d t th t t t h t j l i t f th l t i l iti tend to be urban bicoastal affluent and well educated they are likely to cover and impart the cultural and political points of view associated with those traits Is this a problem? If so what is the appropriate response to it? One answer is ditl l t d t th i t f th l t ti Th t h d ti t d i f th di ht t b t t d ith l i b l th Milli d tht t t h ill t likl f th d i l t i l i t t i bt th O iht l ll t h t d i f f t h i i t b l bi ith th d i f f t bi d litil t d i It b t l t l t i til l t l t t tht i i t i bti flibli d tht ations are not We might say in other words that there exists a division of political labor That mainstream journalism is more liberal than the general public f it is is not necessarily problematic Of libl likl t ith thi t th ti tl t i tb th b i l i d t d t h t l i b l bi is bi A d thi b i t th d f i t th h f l i b l bi hih i t l f ti b t tlit l d th ibilit f t t h C i d i th t b t th t hih iti iht exhibits the liberal cultural biases of our society's elites A more sympathetic ap praisal might see it instead as one element in the movement to expand the circle of human rights to include not only women and ethnic and racial minorities bt l l ith d i b i l i t i d th ith t d d l itti D th h d l i b l bi td i th f bli tht thti fi t t i f f t i Littl R k M t ii l l fld? Th l ti iht b t thi i th thi bjtil iht b t ti blk h iht? Ad l d l ith d i b i l i t i i i l l titld t th i h t ? If ( d f Id t pretend that everyone would agree nor that it is obvious what the human rights in question amount to) we can ask how this should affect the journalist's stance The standard view in American journalism has been that the journalist should be neu t l Sh h l d t tk iti bt hld t d t d t th iti th t k Y t thi i ll t d i t t h th fliti t i l iti b t h t th t t h i I lbl i tki l ? Did G W B h t l th 2000 l t i ? W ft i d ll th h i li tht l ft b t hil l h blif b t h iht i l th i t t f th h hold them Nevertheless as certain values become entrenched in a society as civil rights for racial minorities for example have become entrenched in ours they come to be seen as "true" or "objective" and one is no longer required or expected ( ibl ittd) t b t l b t th (Th BBC d t h l "Bt d d il t tl") A lt d t d b i d thti j l i t i t l f l ffi l t ijti d d t tj l i t t b d t h d d t l b t h tt Tht i tl d f t th ll j t i i f th t "bi" W it t f th ti t

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ld i t d t h t bi i h i d thi S i i l l th f thetic portrayals of gay teenagers If you believe that they ought to be treated as others are treated and not punished for their sexual orientation then you will say either that sympathetic media portrayals of them are not biased (because they th i h t i ) l t h t th b i d b t t h t bi i h i dbl Th ti th t th h t f th j l i t ' iti i i th l t itti d i h t T ht t t hld t i i t tlit l tditill tlld i A i j l i ? N t l i t ' l h b bjtd t hll i t f variety of sources including not only critics on the left but also proponents of "civic" or "public" journalism who readily acknowledge that their values do and ought to shape their reporting (Lichtenberg 1999; Rosen 1999) The foregoing d i i t tht thik b t di i t tlit l h th j l i t ' i t t diff bttill f f i td t b t l b t ht ll i th t th d Wh th j l i t ' l d di f th f hi di th d i i t ill ll b t Ad h thi i i th d th b t h f tht b able to recognize a dissenting perspective for what it is For then we can employ our critical faculties to determine how that perspective colors the stories that are told how they are told and which stories still lie in the shadows

References A i Sit fN Edit (ASNE) (1999) E i i Cdibilit P t i f th Pbli d th Ps available at: wwwasneorg/kiosk/reports/99reports/1999exam i i d i b i l i t / B k S i l (1989) Li Ml Chi i Pit d Pbli Lif N Y k V i t Gibb D t h (1996) D l i i d t Edit d Pblih N b 9 7 E h th Mdi Ditt th Ns Wash Goldberg Bernard (2001) Bi A CBS Iid i t DC R L i M i h l (2001) J t h Lbd' t i l tiiti Th N Yk Ti M i Fb 25 26 Lichtenberg Judith (1999) Beyond the public journalism controversy In Robert Fullinwider ( d ) Ciil Sit D d Cii R l 34154 L h MD R d Littlflld (2000) In defense of objectivity revisited In James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (eds) M Mdi d Sit 3d d 23854 L d E d d Ald Mll J t (1990) Th J l i t d th Md N Yk K f M Phili (1987) Ethil J l i N Yk L Rosen Jay (1999) Wht J l i t f? New Haven CT: Yale University Press

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Further reading Christians, Clifford, Fackler, Mark, Rotzoll, Kim, and McKee, Kathy (2001) Media Ethics: Cases and Moral Reasoning, 6th edn. New York: Longman. Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (eds) (2000) Mass Media and Society, 3rd edn. London: Edward Arnold. Fallows, James (1997) Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy. New York: Vintage. Gross, Larry, Katz, John Stuart, and Ruby, Jay (1988) Image Ethics: The Moral Rights of Subjects in Photographs, Film, and Television. New York: Oxford University Press. Kieran, Matthew (ed.) (1988) Media Ethics. London: Routledge. Klaidman, Stephen and Beauchamp, Tom (1987) The Virtuous Journalist. New York: Oxford University Press. Schudson, Michael (1995) The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

607

46 Engineering Ethics MICHAEL S PRITCHARD

Engineering ethics is an area of practical or applied ethics It is practical in the sense that its aim is to shed light on ethical concerns related to engineering practice It s applied in the sense that ethical considerations are directed to practice rather than theory Although theories of ethics come into play in engineering ethics the aim is to illuminate the ethical dimensions of engineering practice rather than to illustrate the strengths or weaknesses of this or that ethical theory Thus engineering ethics is not simply if at all the application of ethical theory to practice Inquiry proceeds best from practice to theory rather than theory to practice with thefirsttask being that of identifying the basic ethical concerns that arise in engineering practice Although this does not necessarily require technical engineering knowledge it does require familiarity with the context of engineering practice including the kinds of organizational structures within which most engineers operate However given their lack of exposure to the formal study of ethics it is understandable that engineers would turn to philosophers for assistance in conceptualizing engineering ethics In the late 1970s the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) sponsored a series of workshops to assist the engineering faculty in developing ways of bringing ethics into the engineering curriculum The engineering faculty was paired with ethics teachers mainly philosophers Although there was a modest literature of engineering ethics prior to this this is the period when engineering ethics as a formal area of academic study began to come into its own In the 1970s the ethics landscape in higher education began to change dramatically With medical ethics taking the lead practical and applied ethics seminars workshops and semester-long courses proliferated across the curriculum - n business communication engineering journalism law psychology and the social sciences generally The explanation for this phenomenon is complex but public response to bribery scandals in government and industry as well as a number of notable technological disasters played no small part in alerting engineering educators to the importance of introducing their students to the ethical dimensions of engineering practice However it is clear that it is expected that much more than scandals and disasters should be included in this introduction In 1985 the Accreditation Board for 620

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E i i d T h l (ABET) i t f ditd i i programs in the United States included providing students with "an understanding of the ethical characteristics of the engineering profession and practice" The ABET 2000 requirements are more specific requiring that graduates of engineering h d t d i f th i t f i i i lbl d itl t t ll d t d i f t i ltd t i i ABET 2000 l i tht t d t h " j di i " tht i l d thil f t i dditi t i i t l il d litil f t Althh dl d d i t d it fl iti th titt only a small part of engineering ethics Most engineers will never be featured n the "big news bad news" stories that appear in the media However the everyday working world of engineering is filled with ethical responsibilities and challenges i f ldt t t t th ft h l t h d lf f th bli t t t l bliti t lit d l R t litt i i i thi i t d t l i h ft h t d libilit lit t l tibl i t hi f i f t i bib flit f i t t i i i i t t i l t t d hitlbli E h f these topics raises important conceptual (eg what does "safe" mean?) and norma tive (eg under what conditions is whistleblowing justified?) issues Newsworthy stories can surface in any of these areas but for the most part they do not espe ill h th t i f ibl th th i i b l b h i U f t t l th i i b l i th di f i i thi d i th i i thi l i t t i l Th d i t f i di d it ti I t t thi i ibl i i ti i ht i dd d thi f th id d ti f di t l k Th ti t f ibl ti d fll d i i ( P i t h d 1998 2001) For an overview of major areas of ethical concern to professional engineering societies a good startingpoint is their codes of ethics However at the outset it is necessary to respond to a radical objection Since codes of ethics are sometimes used t ti th d t f th t h th l b j t t thi b i d f ethics (Ldd 1980 L b i h l 1983) Th i f f d t d d it d f conduct th bt t d f ethics Ethi i dt t t Thi d t t f itii t i b t it h l d b f f i t h h th f t f ti In response it should be pointed out that engineering codes of ethics do not by themselves have the force of law Although commitment to a code's provisions is understood as a condition of membership of a professional engineering society b h i itlf i l t C t i l l it' d b i f i i ti b t thi i t ii f th d itlf Whth t thi i it f i i d f thi thi d t t i t i t it t t d f ethics Th lf t i d tht d t t lli it 1994 h 4 D i 1998 h 4) F i t it h d d f ethics (U 621

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i t t th t f f i l it' b t ti t tif certain ethical standards and principles Second it can help foster an environment in which ethical behavior is the norm Third it can serve as a guide or reminder in specific situations Fourth as will be illustrated below developing and revising a d f thi b lbl f f i Fifth d b lbl d t i l t l f i kh d f i l ti Fill blil d l d t t t d f thi idit t th tht b i l ittd t ibl d t I th f i i h ill i t t b f th i t tht i i ti h bli h l t h ft d lf d i l i h t f th fact that the public largely ignorant of but very dependent on the expertise of engineers must trust that this expertise will be exercised responsibly Engineering codes of ethics are the result of the careful deliberation of experi d f i l i h dti h i d th l f b f thi ti f i l iti F t h t ill b t bl d f thi h d l th l t d i i i thi bt l th i t bli tht f i l i i iti i b l f idtifi th j thil d i i f thi f i it i i t b i ith their consensus views on these matters Furthermore engineers who oin these societies are expected ethically to commit themselves to the provisions of the codes Although the vast majority of practicing engineers are neither licensed profes i l bl t f i l i i iti th d t t t t dd th t h i l ibiliti f ll h i i i ti S i th d d thi ll th bl id f ll i t i l th h b f f i l it T h i t i l l i l l t t thi t t i l th A i A i t i f E i (AAE) d th N t i l S i t fP f i l E i (NSPE) Th AAE f d d i 1915 I t d d bll iti f ll engineers one of its major tasks was to formulate a code of ethics In 1922 H W Clausen treasurer of the AAE wrote: Effective bodies have long been in existence to deal with the technical side of engineer i i d i th f thi k hh l b d t d th t d d f ti fr thil t d i t ll It thht h tht th t b l i h t f th A i A i t i fE i ld b h l f l i id ing a means for determining a general code of ethics and in interpreting that code n if bl f d ti (Cl 1922 90) Dr Isham Randolph an engineer noted for his integrity and high standards was kd t dft d f th i t i ' idti Th d iti f ll t f l i i l d ll t f ifi til d t d b th iti b B t th AAE l tblihd P t i C i t t h i h h d th b f hli b i t t th d i if i t Thi itt' t k t l l fift d d th d t i f it d i i tti d t f it b h i i iil i t Th i t t i tht 622

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th iht thi iil t td i i i l Cl reported that the committee was to "continue to study and work out the itemized list of specific principles of good professional conduct in such completeness that infractions of ethical practice may be specified by clause and sentence" (Clausen 1922 90) P i t th d t i f thi i th itt' l f b l i h d f AAE b h i i t d t di th d k ti Th P t i C i t t ' 1921 l t id f it Th itt i d t i f d t l l f Th f t it id it f i hih ft i d i t Th l ti i h t h th d t in question conforms to the adopted code of ethics The second consists of cases n which the facts are in dispute This second kind of case the committee said re quires very careful analysis and should be decided only after "a thorough examin ti f ll f t d i t di th t " (Cl 1922 92) Th b l d l ith t difflt It i h t b t h h t t h t th itt' i t h t th fit k i d i hih ft i d i t i bl t d dfiiti lti B t thi i t h t th itt id A l t h h it t h h t t h t d d i i hld function like common law the committee insisted "These decisions are subject to change from time to time as engineering opinion becomes more and more crystallized resulting from experience and investigation They are of prime importance because th itt d b f d t f ti t t i " (Cl 1922 92) S l t h h th itt h l d tblih libl t f thil idli f i it did t d it k ttli tt d f ll C l T h (1926 101) d i b d th itt' k i thi Aft

ft ti hd l t d th AAE d ilti f if i i l f th dd d i i i th d th dd t accumulate a further set of practice cases authoritatively interpreted by a representa ti d ibl itt Th C d f S i f P i i l i dd li dii f l t d

S

th AAE d d th P t i C i t t ' k tii th th thi t b f l l ltd I k i ith it f l i d t i i th itt d T l i t h l d t i l l casuistic t h d (J 1988; Boeyink 1992) One begins with particular cases rather than general prin ciples looking for relevant paradigm cases of appropriate or inappropriate conduct that can serve as a reference point for more complicated cases An effort is made to tblih d t f C t d idti d ith l ith l t iiliti d diff fll td I tii f it likd t l t i i l tht b d t id idli f ft bt i i l i t dd i i l bjt t ii i th l i h t f d i t Th AAE ltil h t l i d bd fdi bf th d f th 1920 h i it f t h t ti t t d t i ii 623

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i it d l i d H t i l l t t h i th fit S i f i Principle listed in the code once the Practice Committee had completed its first forty cases: "The engineer should regard his duty to the public welfare as paramount to all other obligations" This principle is very much like those appearing in nearly i i it' d td bt l ft b f l ft Th dilltti th d f thi f th N t i l S i t f P f i l E i (NSPE) h h d h l d i d hit Th NSPE ik th AAE i d t b bll iti f ll f i l i F d d i 1934 th i id t h t th NSPE h d t d d of ethics as early as 1935 But by the mid1950s it had already undergone many changes In June 1954 the NSPE established a Board of Ethical Review (BER) Its task was to analyze real and hypothetical ethical cases in engineering practice and th BER d lik t h t f t b l i h it d i i i Professional Engineer. Th th AAE itt i till i t i I 1965 NSPE b l i h d it fit l f BER d i i d t i S th l h b t l b b l i h d th ki th 300 l i l b l t NSPE b Si th d h h d l ti tht i d BER t i h undergone changes However many of the code's revisions have resulted from BER recommendations based on its efforts to apply sections of the code to particular circumstances E h l b it d l i t th di t th k i d f thil i th i i lti t th d t t t h t ti (f l flit f i t t bli ft t i t i ) S b t f t i di f it i i t b h i tblihi d t f th t bi l t l difft f th t P f i d t it i b t t k f ifi d ii i i flit f i t t th BER t i C 856 b While that provision of the Code has been interpreted many times over the years t is ll C d ii bjt t t t iti d i t t t i F d f thi t h i it tb lii bthi d t hih d t itti tht l d d l Th li ii id t h t " i ill d t id flit f i t t ith hi l lit" hih i ith d i t i lf f th i t t i ti dlii t f i Nti t h t thi i t was replaced with a less restrictive one (one requiring only initial disclosure) the BER goes on to explain why It does not reject the notion that there are clear cases i hih i ht t id flit f i t t Th th i ith th i h i h thi i t bl ti Th

diffilt ltiftd itti i d i i d idti th d ti i l b l A d h l d dd d id id f these kinds of conflicts of interest We believe the new code provisions sought to t b l i h th t h i l b l i t i t i dil ith lit l th l

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difficult questions relating to conflicts of interest We think that it was for this reason t h t th C d ii ltd Given this alteration the BER concludes: W

t illi t t t did i BER C 6 9 1 3 t h t th i h flit ith b " d i i f hi l d d hldi i t th ii b dlii t f th i if it i t fibl for him to dispose of his land at the particular time" id

l dtki dibl

So the more settled determinative language of the earlier provision is now seen to b i d t t d l bl ith ti G d j d t t l t i h t f d liti f l titi l O th th t f t l d i d BER th i l i flit f i t t T i th h i t f h i th NSPE flit f i t t ii d BER t i ld k i t t i t b t it i f t l t dd h A bl if t i l t i i ti gent fees Even here the story is complex Beginning with Case 6 5 4 a paradigm of inappropriate conduct in this area a path can be traced through at least twelve later cases that use it as some sort of standard for analysis this despite the fact tht ii i t i t f d tiki h b th ti th l t 935 i hd Th BER t 6 5 4 it th f l l i ii i th d "[A i ] hll t liit t i i t t i t f b i if td d fidi f i fibilit th l i b th i " H th t i l f f d b th BER ht difft l It ld t h t th i t f thi ii "i t h t th i t render completely impartial and independent judgment on engineering matters with out regard to the consequences of his future retention or interest in the project" It is interesting that this language dominates subsequent case analyses and that in 1969 thi l t i t th d itlf l i th i i l ii "A i hll t t t f i l ii t i t b i d i t i h i h hi f i l j d t b i d " Th ti f hth i ' j d t iht b i d i th k i i ll b t t 654 ith 6 5 4 i di f id j d t d th fll d d/ t t d ditl ith it Reference to 6 5 4 occurs in virtually all cases dealing with contingent fees So what began simply as a general worry about contingent fees became a more focused concern that contingent fees might compromise engineering udgment H th i t thi t Thi ii b t t i t f i t d b t i fSti 11 f th d hih i d ith fi titi i ("Th i ill t t fil ith th i b t t t i t b th i tibl thd") It i d b t i d fi titi i til 1987 when it was placed under a category that read: "Engineers shall not attempt to obtain employment or advancement or professional engagements by untruthfully

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itiii th i b th i tibl thd" M f the same words are retained but it is clear that competing unfairly with other engineers is only one of many possible concerns Examination of BER commentaries on contingent fee cases shows that safety and quality of service concerns vastly t i h b t titi f i t th i I ft b t titi f i ld t i d d it i ld l h th iht i i f i t l t it l f th td Th f t t h ltd f flti th f til b h t bf th BER th th i l flti b t t i i l Piil d t i t BER l bt l ith tice Broader principles of engineering ethics are viewed by the BER as providing a framework within which ethical analysis is to be understood But these principles must be interpreted within the context of engineering practice thereby being con t i d b tht ti th f it It i l l f th h i t f i i ti t h t l f i i i l f i i thi d t il i fid A l d td th AAE i i l l h d f i i i l th t i t t dt f i t h l d bli h l t h d ft t Thi i i l i h d ith th AAE in the 1920s The NSPE's code like most other engineering codes for years empha sized fidelity to employer or client as the engineer's first duty It was only in the mid1960s that the NSPE adopted a section specifically devoted to the engineer's t dt t t t bli f t h l t h d lf i th f f hi h f i l dti I J 1981 th NSPE h d th f t f it d P i l th d t i d bif bl f l l d b fift ti ith ll b t f th ti h i ll t f b t i Sti 2 i d t i f i d th i ' ibiliti f bli f t h l t h d lf I th 1981 d ( d i ll b t i i ) th bl i f l l d b th j hdi (I) F d t l Canons; (II) Rules of Practice; (III) Professional Obligations The preamble now emphasizes engineering's "direct and vital impact on the quality of life for all people" The first Fundamental Canon says that engineers shall "hold paramount th ft h l t h d lf f th bli i th f f thi f i l d t i " Th fit ii d Rl fP t i t thi F d t l C d ti fi bti Th th NSPE' d d t j hift h i i th d i t i f bli f t h l t h d lf Th h b t t j t f b t t h i l h i l flti h t th fit i i l f i i thi hld b bt f flti th t l itl l f engineering practice (particularly with regard to actual or threatened harms to the public) Principle was driven by practice rather than the reverse It might well be argued that engineering practice has always had a "direct and itl i t th lit f lif f ll l " Th NSPE d th i i iti h j t b lt i k l d i th fll t h i l i l i t i f thi N t h l th i d i t i t i t b d bt th t h i l i l i t i f ti d f i l it' bilit d illi t k llti bli i t t th tt Th NSPE' l t i t i thi d i i f i t l i h t h l t i th d

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At th ti thi l f th l i i t t i f it i i i ethics As Jonsen and Toulmin (1988: ch 17) point out casuistry operates within certain kinds of social contexts Historically they say conscience for casuists s a kind of "knowing together" (con-scientia) This presupposes shared institutions ithi hih t h i l flti tk l ith th Tditill J d T l i (1988) h ititti h th l t bd f bli i t t t h l h i d f i l t Th tht dii d hlth j tht h tl t b t id itbl tti f it E i i l t h d b i i b t it i l tht Th l l j liitti A td t tii i d not belong to any professional engineering society let alone the NSPE So there is a problem determining the proper reach of engineering societies and their codes Even if their reach could be said in some way to include all practicing engineers a code h NSPE' i l i i t d i th It t t b t th h i h t thil d i t th t h it li At t it i l d ii tht t h l thill t i b l (f l f ti ti d t i i d titi biddi ii tht d i d t bfit i t th f th bli) F t h th tt of ethical importance that go virtually unmentioned The most conspicuously underplayed area of concern is the environment The NSPE's code like most others has no special sections directly addressing environmental responsibilities Thus far l th f th j Uitd S t t ' i i iti k liit f t tti th i t th A i S i t f Ciil E i (ASCE) th Ititt f E l t i l dE l t i E i (IEEE) d th A i S i t f M h i l E i (ASME) P h d h h d ith bli ft h l t h d lf th NSPE ill i t d il ii f thi t H til it d th BER i l i i t d i h t it id b f iti i b t i t l It f t i i i i l t id guidance to NSPE members by interpreting the code with regard to particular kinds of cases that fall under the purview of the code On matters about which the code is silent either the BER is itself silent or it gives the verdict of "it would not b t h i l " f th d i d Y t it i t h i l l i t t f i t flt fth b t h tt if th t t ith t h i f i l Ath liitti i tht f th ii f th NSPE d f thi d t il l d t h l t iti i t t t i C tht i i t t ti f th i ' tdt t t t bli ft h l t h d lf are discussed relatively infrequently in BER commentaries and typically the discussion is restricted to whether there is a duty to report violations to appropriate authorities This is in line with the code's own further specification of the para t dt It l d i t l b t i ht t d h i bli th ii i bi iltd H if it i i ' d t t hld t bli ft h l t h d lf i th f f hi h f i l dti th hld b ti id ll W h t d it f i t ti t t thi d t ? Th i b t d t d i t f i ' ll d i i t i 627

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th th i t f til t b l d F l if i is disposed to spot trouble take preventive measures alert others to problems work on imaginative ways of improving the quality and safety of products or become involved in projects that promise improvements in safety or health he or she is to tht t t ti thi d t It i d i f f i l t if t i i b l t lt f thi i " " tht i i t iti i B dl th i ifi thil i t b l d Th BER t i dd i h i h th ti i hth ti d t i thil thil ( d i t th d ) I f t th NSPE d d ll f ttitd d d t tht d t fit ll i t t h i l / t h i l diht omy in a casebycase context The code stresses the importance of integrity honor and other commendable qualities that it is expected will have a positive mpact on engineering practice and at least indirectly society However these appeals are d i i t i l t th th dti bliti d th l ifid th t f d t tht ld lif th A illtti f th i t f th i t i l id f i i thi i th f Willi L M i td i J h M t ' "Th F i f t i St C i i " (1995) L M i l d d t t l engineer designed the structural frame of the Citicorp Center in Manhattan which was completed in 1977 Through a seemingly fortuitous set of events in 1978 he discovered a structural problem that because of the building's unusual features d d th b i l d i h l b l th h i i l l t h h t it D i t th i k t hi tti d tt k f th illi f dll it ld t t t th bl L M i tl tifid l th h i f h i t t f th b i l d i d Citi ti Th t ' h di i t h t ll ti td i ki th ti d L M i l d d th th b t d I t The New Yorker t i l L M i d l d ith l t t d phone calls from engineers around the country Some openly wondered whether faced with a similar set of circumstances they would act as admirably as LeMessur ier did However some might argue once he discovered the problem he had an obligation t d il h t h did If it ld h b thill b j t i b l f hi t t h td h did h h l d h b praised f h i d it? W h t h h d d i d i t h t k j i t i th t t bltd th th ldd l l d f i th i i l d i H L M i did t l b t thi h til lti h t i i l bildi j t i Pitt b h h l l d hi h ffi t fid t h t it t t ld th i t i th Citicorp Center In some instances learning of such a change could be cause for concern f not alarm However according to Morgenstern's account this was not so in this case: Th h i f bltd j i t t h i l l fil f hi i t t fl hi th d decision on the site in Manhattan waited for ld h b fiihd Mt i r t tht t t h i ll i t idd

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limit a building's sway [the purpose having welded joints] they do so for the tenants' ft ( M t 1995 48) If thi i i h t L M i ld ll h d i d hi l i t i P i t t b h t h t th ld b blti th th ldi th j i t d th t th tt H j t h i t k i l l i d th i t f hi ld i t t d t h f t l d hi t h t th b i l d i bdl designed LeMessurier decided to engage in some "intellectual play" and calculate how wind resistant the building might be with bolted rather than welded joints By his original calculations LeMessurier had determined that even considering t id f 45 t l th b i l d i ith it ldd i t ld i th t t tht likl t h d d id Fth tti id f 45 t l hi id Th N Y k bildi d i d tti l f 90 t l A t l L M i t h h t th t b d b t bltd it t tifi tht i t A bf llti b d 45 t l winds were not required This suggests that LeMessurier had no obligation to engage in the "intellectual play" that led him to the shocking conclusion that because of the bolted joints the Citi C t ld b td t i th t t l it id t h d d H ll thi h d h d th llti W h t i d hi pected an almost ld h d " L M t tht l I l t I l d f d tht t h '

i t t lt til i i b it giddy sense of power "I had information that nobody else n the i ll "I h d i h d t fft t d i ld i i t i t I it t fil tht i l t id ' T h k d Ld f ki thi bl h l hi t k'" ( M t 1995 48)

It seems that LeMessurier's "intellectual play" his exercise of engineering imagin ation was also a playing out of his persistent concern for public safety This ex li hi i i t i l i t t i d i th llti ll hi illi t th t t thi d i t b i l i L M i ld h d t d hilf it d i f f t l C f i d t tht ith th ith f l d d t b l t d j i t th Citi C t ll ithi bildi d i t h ld h i l hiftd hi t t t i t th tt Althh h ld h b f l t d if h h d d thi h discovered the problem it is not at all clear that he had an obligation to recalculate in the first place Perhaps even the idea of recalculating would not have occurred to many engineers But this is just the sort of thought one would expect someone like L M i t h d t fll ith ti k i t h t i th d h iht h t t hi tti d th li Cd f thi bl t id ffiit id f i t k thi t h h th f t i th Citi Thi i l t f t h h l d t i itti i hih d d i t i d i ti d i t td lt i l i t

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A d t d f thi tl h t i d i i d l di tion both within the code itself and outside the code As the Citicorp example suggests the paramount duty to protect public health safety and welfare is broadly stated and is consistent with a wide range of conduct Although blatant disregard f bli ft i ld t i l l f i t t t i i ft i i b l Thi i f l t d i th l d i BER i i "It ld b t h i l t " "It ld t b t h i l t " "It ld b t h i l t " H idiidl i fi thil ti t b tifd t l i l tht ith th d lti hibit ti f d t Of th ti t hibitd ( d th b ) th i might want to determine which is best This one may say is a matter of personal rather than professional ethics Even if this were granted it is a matter of personal ethics about what in one's professional role one should do For the individual i it i till ti b t ht i h h h l d d It i l ibl t h t l t h h f i l i i it h b bl t t th it i ti th i dfibl thil ti t h t k t th i f th l ti I f t thi libl f i i th d t t t t bli h l t h ft d lf independently of its inclusion in engineering codes of ethics It may also be a plausible way of viewing the virtual silence on environmental concerns in the current codes Fortunately there is a growing literature on environmental ethics ifill d d d t i i ti ( V i l i d dG 1998 G t l 2000 H i t l 2000 h 9) N t h l j t i h d t bti t ffiitl ifi l l i f i l i i iti it i h d t b t i h i l h thl i d th flti M h i l i till h t did ht t d d i t th f t t h t l l i f d bl diff Thi h l it b i i t t t f i i thi There are other serious limitations to engineering codes of ethics Although the vast majority of engineers work in large corporate settings this is not adequately reflected in existing engineering codes of ethics which seem written mainly with ltil i d d t lti i i id E i i thi i l b t th thi fl iti hih i h l l i ti b t llti ibilit l t i h i bt i d d th it i h i h i l iti Th bl f ddli ilbilit d t f t i l d th ' "btt l i " Th i i thi t b td f th bl fb i thi E i with ideas for improving products only to discover that management finds the cost prohibitive or that marketing has its doubts Engineers must learn to deal with such disappointments without getting discouraged to the point of becoming indiffer ti t d Th i ltd t f i i thi l l l d tht it d i i T i l l i t l ki l iti th l k i t Thi t h t th bl i t t l t i l thi i d i i d l Th l bl tht i f b f t Tht i til bl b " " t i l " i "

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d thi h l d f bl tht h thil d i i ll th tht d not Furthermore the group or team may need to decide together what should be done This means they will have to negotiate their differences and this may call for compromise How ethically should such negotiations proceed? What are the re ibiliti fi d i i d l i i thi ? Gi th l i k l i h d t h t ' i ill t b f d ltl t b l b th t ht t t i itht ii ' i t i t ( B j i 1990)? Fill i f ti b t hi d b t hth t bti f dtki ti j t th fid t h i l l b l t i F it i t h i l l i t t t id i i j t tht d i t l i l the military For others certain engineering projects in Third World countries are problematic Still others have certain reservations about the appropriate develop ment and use of technology Professional engineering societies cannot be expected t ttl th i f i Yt flti d i i i lld f hth ithi th ti d bliti f i i iti t h l hih d t i d th f tht id f i iti f thil i ltd t i i

Rf Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) (1985) Fifty-third Annual Report 98 (2000) ABET 2000 ( h t t / / b t / E A C / h 2 0 0 0 h t l ) Benjamin M (1990) Splitting the Difference Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas B d f Ethil R i N t i l Sit fP f i l E i (19652000) Opinions of VA NSPE P b l i t i ( i dt) the Board of Ethical Review l IVTH A l i t Journal of Mass Media B i k D (1992) C i t b d thd f j l i t Ethics Summer: 10720 Cl H W (1922) P d i d l i thil t d d d t d b th A i Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 101 A i t i fE i (190) 9 0 2 Davis M (1998) Thinking like an Engineer New York: Oxford University Press G M E Mhlik M M dWh P H (2000) Ethical and Environmental Challenges to Engineering E l d Cliff NJ P t i H l l Harris C E Pritchard M S and Rabins M J (2000) Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases 2 d d B l t CA W d t h J A L dT l i S E (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning Bkl CA U i i t fC l i f i P Ladd J (1980) The quest for a code of professional ethics In Rosemary Chalk Mark S F k l d Slli B Chf ( d ) AAAS Professional Ethics Project: Professional Ethics Activities of the Scientific and Engineering Societies 1549 W h i t DC A i A i t i f th A d t f Si R d d i D G Jh ( d ) Ethical Issues in Engineering Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall 1991 Business and L b i h l H C (1983) C d f thi d th l d t i f i Professional Ethics Journal 2 (4) 4 1 6 1 R d d i D G J h ( d ) Ethical Issues in Engineering Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall 1991 M t J h (1995) Th fifti t i i The New Yorker M 29

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Pritchard M S (1998) Professional responsibility: focusing on the exemplary Science and Engineering Ethics, 4 (2): 215-33 (2001) Responsible engineering: the importance of character and imagination Science and Engineering Ethics, 7 (3): 391-402 Taeusch C F (1926) Professional and Business Ethics. New York: Henry Holt Unger S H (1994) Controlling Technology: Ethics and the Responsible Engineer, 2nd edn New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston Vesilind P A and Gunn A (1998) Engineering, Ethics, and the Environment. New York: Cambridge University Press

Further reading Baum R J (1980) Ethics and Engineering. Hastings-on-Hudson NY: The Hastings Center Herkert J R (ed) (2000) Social, Ethical and Policy Implications of Engineering. New York: TKRK Press Johnson D G (ed) (1991) Ethical Issues in Engineering. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Martin M W and Schinzinger R (1996) Engineering Ethics, 3rd edn New York: McGrawHill Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science: http://wwwonlineethicsorg Pritchard M S (1992) Good works Professional Ethics, 1 (1/2): 155-77 Whitbeck C (1998) Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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i t l thi i t h t b h f l i d thi t h t h b t d ith th l d f th ti d t t i f th i t Bt lik th f l i d thi it h l d i f dbt i i i tthi th th t i h t f d li ti f ti thil t h i t i t l bl h th ii of moral arguments for the protection of rainforests or moral reasons for requiring a comprehensive global agreement on the production of greenhouse gases Since its i t i fild f f i l h i l h i th l 1970 th i i l ti t h t h i t d i d th ti f t h i l h i thi i h th l f t b t b d i b d h t h t it i d i t l ll id bl i d f itlf th th l iditl ll idbl b it itd dd b h Nt iht b i d i t l ll idbl b it i th f thi that humans need such as natural resources used to provide the foundations for building and sustaining human communities As such we might consider it unfair if one human community has greater access to a share of those resources thought t b hld i (i t il d ) th th h it I t t t iht b d i t l ll i d b l if it kid f l (f l kid f i t i i l i h t th) d t b l t h h bjtiit bjtiit t t h i l iti If t i th t f thi tht i d i t l ll idbl ( thil t h i ld l i h ) th dti f l t t l k f d l t ld t b t i t tilti l t h t th k has for humans but would instead be grounded in a claim that the park has some kind of value that necessarily warrants our protection (for example because t s a wild place or because it is the home of an endangered species) without needing fth l Th ibilit t h t t h i l iht b d i t l ll idbl h l h d t h d t t h i l d t h i l hi i t l thi Wh th f l d f l i d thi (f l b i thi d d i l thi) iill l d l th t d i t i l i f dbt i ti thi i t l thi ( i l l f th " h l i t " it 633

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h i h I ill li b l ) h b d ith d i f f t t f dbt altogether In part because our traditional models of moral inquiry have not previ ously been applied to nonhumans let alone entire ecosystems it is not clear what the scope and limits of this form of philosophical inquiry should be And while there h b i t l thiit f th K t i tiliti tditi h h l d d th t h i l tditi t h i l d t (f l R 1983 T l 1986 Si 1990) i t l thiit h i t d thi lld " t i i t " h Adifft t f t t h i l ti h d d i t i th fild Qti h hld i t l thi b i l i f f th individual welfare of animals or should it only be directed at questions that are inclusive of entire ecosystems? Should the field be concerned only with "natural" environments that are not the creation of humans or should it also be concerned ith h l td d i l t d i t ? S h ti thht t b t l til diti ttti t ti bl d t t th bt l h i l h i l li t id th f l flit I thi h t I ill t t li h i t l thi h l d i th way that it has such that only a discrete set of answers to the predominant meta ethical debates in the field seems to count properly as what we call "environmental ethics" If environmental ethics is to be considered one form of applied ethics rather th t kid f h i l h i l t i ltth th d b f itil d i i f ht b j t th fild h l d b lid t t l t h t it h l d tb titd t Aft tlii th iti f i t l thi t d I ill t t th ti f h i t l thi h f d th ti f th d i t l idti f t dl l jtd h f ( t h t i f ) f li t I ill th ld ith d i i f ht t f applied ethics environmental ethics could strive to become Before starting out however one word of warning: this chapter does not intend to provide a complete overview of the field Because of the focus of this chapter many important figures d th ill t b d i d I t d l i t bifl i f th j i f h i l h i l d b t i th fild d th t di i t h t I fid t i l l l t t th i f th l t i h i bt i t l thi d th f f lid thi di t t th ti f h bt t h thil dbt i fild f lid thi d ith t i l l i t fi Th i t t d i h h i overview of the field should consult Ouderkirk (1998) Wenz (2001) and Palmer (2002)

Varieties of Environmental Ethics Th t t th h l ft h h t tht h h d th d t l thi M f i t t k thi d

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ith th fit d t i t t i l i th jti f " t h trism" Tim Hayward defines ethical anthropocentrism as the view that prioritizes those attitudes values or practices which give "exclusive or arbitrarily preferential consideration to human interests as opposed to the interests of other beings" or he i t (1997 51) Whil I ill b t th jti f th ti bl it i i t t t it t tht l i t l thiit d t t h t if i t l thi i t b d i t i t i fild f thi it t il i l jti f t h t i i thi Ui H d ' dfiti thi td t jti f th l i t h t thi hld b titd l t th ii f bliti dti d th lik d between humans thereby prioritizing in moral terms all human interests over whatever could arguably be determined as the interests of nonhumans species or ecosystems A th fit blihd b f i l h i l h i th fild (f l N 1973 R l t 1975 R t l (lt S l ) 1973 Si 1974) i f t h t i ft th t t if it t liitl lbld h F Si th ifill " i i " h bit ti tht l th i t t f b f th h i matter in moral systems which otherwise provide no necessary reason for excluding the interests of nonhumans (such as the pain/pleasure criterion of utilitarianism); for Routley the worry was over "human chauvinism" or as put in a muchcited ith V l R t l ( l t P l d ) th l i t h t " l d lit ltitl b d d t tt fi t t t th l f h " (Rtl dRtl 1979 36) H h i i i d h t f l idti dfid i hih il f iti f d l t d i t i l l i h ( h tilit l ) Th i h d i t hth ii dh h i i hld b t d ith h th ith t h t i ( H d 1997; Eckersley 1998) Regardless of the debates over terminology the assumption that axiologially anthropocentric views are antithetical to the agenda of environ mentalists and to the development of environmental ethics was largely assumed to b th t l t t i i t f i t l thi S i th ti t h t it ft t d t l d f d d It h b f ht G V (1998 142) ll th "t d f i t l thi" Fth th ti f ht t h t i t d tl ht i t h t i tild ft lid t dfiiti f t h t i A t h t i td ith f f valuation which easily or even necessarily justified the destruction of nature (rather than anthropocentric values such as aesthetic values which might count as reasons to preserve nature) Therefore a corollary of this dogma has been that liitd d t f t h t i f f lti f t ld il i d t th t h t i l hih f d l t ti A i I ill i i t th l f th jti f t h t i bl F th fit d i i d i t l thiit bt th h t th jti f t h t i iit f tblihi 635

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i fild f i t l thi d th h d t t thi iti arguing that "weaker" forms of anthropocentrism (for example those which admit humanly based values to nature other than mere resource value) are sufficient to generate an adequate ethic of the environment (see Norton 1984) But even the l it f thi d i i d i l i t d If i t l thi t t t ith jti f t h t r i th th t t t ith d i t i f th l f h th h t l ld t h t r i t Th f d d i t i f thi f f l h ll b f fi t i i l t h h t t tht h t t f l i d f t h l ( d t l i instrumental value to the achievement of human ends) (The term "intrinsic value" has many senses and many debates in environmental ethics hinge on competing conceptions of how the intrinsic value of nature should be decided and further hth d i t i f tit h i f fi t i i l il t l t t f l bliti t it [ O'Nill 2001] T id f th bl [ h Kt 1997] h b d d th t "itii l " hil i t i i f jtifi i t t l f d ti f i t l l ) Early on those rejecting nonanthropocentrism argued that there were no rigor ous grounds on which we could base claims for the intrinsic value of nonhumans or the natural world Such challenges included those of John Passmore (1974) and R G F (1983) F P l i f f t h t i ld b d t id l d f i i t l lii b d f f l h i h did t h l l t d i t i l ti f th i lit f h l d l i t t Th iti h b tk d t d d i ri d b fi h B N t (1987) E H (1992) d i th thrit ti lltil k " i t l tit" ( Liht d K t 1996) Th ht h that the debate between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists in environ mental ethics has long been entwined with debates over the validity of ascribing intrinsic value either to n o n h u m a n animals or to species or ecosystems If t i t ith f f t h t i th t l t ti b h t df th d liit f d i t i f th i t i i ( t l t i t t l ) l f t ? Th d f V ' "t d " i th fild i th jti f i l riht i l lf i ( h i h I ill j i t l ll " i l l i b t i " i ) f th t i l d t d i i i d th fild f it E t h h th fild bl b ith d standing that the work of an animal liberationist like Singer was as much a part of the history of environmental ethics as that of figures like Naess and Routley very quickly a new debate emerged between "individualists" and "holists" or "sentien tit" d "hlit" hih d l l ldi i l libtiit f th d i f i t l thi Idiidlit th h t h t th t i f l idti b d h h l d b liitd t th i d i i d l l th idiidl h ld b dt h i t t i th f titit tit h th i l (Th it f dititi t i t i t tht 636

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b d th f thi h t F hlfl i V 2001) Primarily these arguments no matter what their normative foundations (for example consequentialist nonconsequentialist or virtue theory) result in moral arguments for vegetarianism and against industrial animal agriculture arguments i t itif i t t i i l ( i l l f th f i l it h f tti ti) d ti t i t h t i Hlit i t t tht i d i i d l i titi i i d t f i t l thi b it f i l t ff d i t f th l id ti f t ild d d d i ll t i i t i f th i t l t B tiit d i t l itit evaluate the workings of nature at the ecosystemic level (without much by way of worry over the welfare of individuals so long as a species is not in danger) then an ethic covering the same ground should also try to describe the value of nature and th iiti f ti t th l l ith iil d i d f th lf fidiidl A d i l t ti th d fidiidli d hli d t flit h i th fh t i h hlit h i t i d t h t killi idiidl b f d d i i tifid h th b f tht i d t h t t d d i fragile ecosystems The debate between individualists and holists has evolved in much the same way as the debates between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists For example titit t h t th l l dfibl d f d i b i th i t t l l f t per se i t h t l t thi i t tht b i d d t h i t t h i l Th t k d hl t tb ditl ll idbl t h h it i bl th tht th h l t h d lf f hl t d f d d i ld b d iditl b biti f f th i t t f h d f ft h ti Oth i d i i d l i t t tbl T R (1983) have gone on to press harder still arguing that holism entails a form of "environ mental fascism" whereby the strong likelihood is raised that the welfare of ndivid uals will often if not always be sacrificed to the needs of the greater biotic good S h i bt th t b i t i idiidlit h P l T l d G V h h h d th b d i f idiidli b d titi i f h t idiidli t d d t th l f th it f f l i h i f tit i F T l th b d l ki Aittli i h i h ll t l titi f l i h d ht i d b d f th i tt f ht i d b d f thi f l i h i a claim that is not dependent on human interests This expansion of individualism in part helps to bridge the gap between holists and individualists even though biocentric individualists are adamant that holism in itself must be rejected Not all i t t ll l i i i d i i d l thi td l tt h i ith i t t f d f hih i t t t th th (f l th i t t f th idiidl bl f d i iht b i d d i t t th th t bl f d i ) N th l d i t h ii iti hlit h J Bid Cllitt ( i l l C l l i t t 1980) d Hl Rlt HI h ild 637

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tki li f i t l thi i f f hli tf f l l b recourse to the argument that many forms of individualism encounter problems n their plausible extension to species and ecosystems While many important chal lenges have been made to try to bridge this gap between individualists and holists ( i l l b J i 1998 d V 1998) d h t h t i l btlt h b b h t t b f flit lik h t i t bi i t i th fild t h t ld ld i l libtiit iti f th f i t l thi A h l i t th till f t h dbt t h h t h th f i t l thi Th dbt l l t l th li f hth a case for the noninstrumental or intrinsic value of nature can best be made on subjectivist or objectivist grounds Leading subjectivists include Robert Elliot (1997) and Callicott the latter most well known for developing a Humean and what he f t " i t i " li f i t f th k f th f t d t i i t Ald L l d L l d i t ll k f hi 1949 th l blihd i A Sand County Almanac i hih h d l d hlit " l d thi" ( C l l i t t 1989 1999) Cllitt' li i tht l hld b d t d b d l b engaged in by those beings with the capacity to value namely humans though perhaps some nonhumans as well There are things in the world which can be subjectively considered to be intrinsically valuable (valued by a valuer for it own k) t h h lti t i f ht t i l i l i t t it f l I th t ht h b i d d lbl f h b titd t th b f th h it ( h i h h d f th thti b d f th f i l t th l t th t i b t th t d ) th t i f thi lti hld b t idti f h d t i i l l lbl I L l d ' d th t lti f thi hld b t h l d lti Sti t flit i l among competing demands from different communities that demand our attention (for example between duties to our immediate families and duties to ecosystems) requires adopting two secondorder principles for Callicott ranking as higher our bliti t i t i t iti ( h fili i ) d t "t i t t " ( h d t i t th ti f d d i) I t t Rlt ( Rlt 1988 1989 1994) tht i t i i l i t bjti ti f th ld H d t li tht i d i i d l i l i t t ( t h h h d t h t l i t th dti d ti f th i l i d d h li tht t eating is necessary to maintain our identity as a species) Rolston's position is initially at least compatible with some form of individualism arguing like Taylor that every living organism has a telos from which we may derive a baseline of i t i i l Bt difft h t i t i h th it f i flti dd l t h i Al ith thi h f l h l ff t f th i t i i l f i ll t F Rlt th i t l fi i l d i th l i t h t ld l idiidl i itht li th l hl hih d d th t h h l ti (Still it h l d b t d t h t th i d i i d l i t h l i t d i i d d 638

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t t th b j t i i t b j t i i t diid I d i i d l i t h P l T l and Robin Attfield [1987] are also objectivists about the existence of ntrinsic value while holding individualist positions of the deontological and consequentialist var iety respectively) Afth dbt b h t b th f hli h l d th ti f hth t ti f th i t hld b dd iti f d t i hth it t l t l l i i f i h t thil i M i t i i t l thi ll tht i l h f lti i i d t h i dti d bliti i i t l thi ( f l C l l i t t 1990) Thi ld tht thil framework would have to cover the range of diverse objects of moral concern included under holism: other humans other animals living organisms ecosystems species and perhaps even the Earth itself Such a view would have the advantage of ti l thdl f li d i t fliti bliti t d th b j t itlf i bl i t l thi h dt i ti li f l idti th t d i t i l thi Pllit t t h t it t b th tht ld h thil theory that covered this range of objects either because the sources of value n nature are too diverse to account for in any single theory or because the multitude of contexts in which we find ourselves in different kinds of ethical relationships with bth h d t d d llit f h f flfilli l bliti ( f l B 1988 1992) A d i l f Ad B (1992 6) th i " t f i i l i t f f l tht id ltit tf t i " S h li l d Cllitt t h l l i t ith l ltii Whil l d th t h t i d hli t l i ti t h th lti f th fild t i l l th issue of the relationship between theory and practice in environmental ethics The debate over pluralism raises the question of how appeals concerning the welfare of the environment cohere with other issues in moral philosophy in particular situ ti M if t t f ttil h t th l f t ft l f lh t h iti hih b bjtd t f i d d t t h t i l Th l i t t " i t l j t i " th tht i i t iti ft b d i t i t b d f i t l h h t t i t i b d liki b t h hlth d llbi t i t l tti (see Schlosberg 1999) A truly pluralist environmental ethic would not be terribly concerned with whether the claims to harm to the interests of a minority commu nity by the siting of a toxic waste dump could or could not be based on the same h f l tht ld d i b th h d t th t b th d A l l i t thi ld b t d i b i th h t th t d t th h it i d i f f t t h h tibl t f th f f i b d liti f fihti th d ( L i h t 2002) T l d thi ti k t fdbt t h t i v th ti idiidli v hli bjti v bjti hli d i v 639

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l l i h l l h d th d l t f t i t l ethics At a minimum the field is most clearly defined though not always adequately defended through its rejection of anthropocentrism and its commitment to holism But the portrayal here of the varieties of this connection have been far f d t C i t t ith th t i t b d ti i il d l h i l h i d b th i l l i dbt t i i t t h d l d ti i t l thi t f i i (f i f f i i D i 2001) ll titd litt h i (B 1988) i t th (O'Nill 1993 W l h 1999) ti (Liht d K t 1996) i t i i ( d S h l i t 2000) d d understandings of human selfinterest (Hayward 1998) All of these alternative directions in the field have presented new challenges in metaethics and normative ethics but they have also done something more In their own ways all of them h d b d th b t t ti f th t t h i l dbt i t h t i i t i i l i t t id i J h O'Nill' d " ifi ii t d di li b t th i hih t l bjt f d th f ti th i k i f l ithi id h i t " (2001 174) Th question that I will take up in the remainder of this chapter is how best to provide a platform in which such further discussions can take place and have more of an impact on bettering the health and sustainability of the natural world

E

i

t

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Ethi

A l i d Ethi

With thi it f i i th fild h hld i t l thi d? O ld b t h t it i l ill d h t h it h l d t set of debates between the more traditional nonanthropocentric varieties and the new biocentric anthropocentric or other alternative views briefly mentioned at the end of the last section Many anthropocentric environmental ethicists seem deter i d t d j t tht ( th d b t b t N t 1995b d C l l i t t 1996) Th i h l t t i th th tii th t d i t i f t i t l thi h i l h i l i ith th h i l h th dbt d th ld i t d t ttti t th ti fh th k f i t l thiit ld b d fl i d d i t l i t l bl Th bl ith t i t l thi ( i d t i V ' dogmas) are arguably more practical than philosophical or at least their resolution in more practical terms is more important than their resolution in philosophical terms at least at the present time For even though there are several dissenters to th d i t t h t i tditi i th fild th i t t idti i t h t it i idl k l d d t h t th ld f t l t ( hih i t l thiit lid t h i i t h l d h t h ifl i th tht d i l thiit h kd f ifl th dil f i ) tk d i t l t h t i h t i t l l d t th h ( thi it 640

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below) As such environmental ethics appears more concerned with overcoming human interests rather than redirecting them toward environmental concerns As a consequence a non-anthropocentric form of ethics has limited appeal to such an audience even if it were true that this literature was providing the best reasons for why nature has value that should be respected (de-Shalit 2000) Why this lack of attention to human interests? When surveying the various non-anthropocentric and holist views n the field one is struck by the assumption that if a reason could be provided for directly protecting nature or wildlife which would trump traditional anthropocentric valuations of nature then one could reasonably expect that it would be followed But why should we assume the validity of this assumption? Anthropocentric reasoning is a foundation of the development of many if not most human cultures If it were not then it would not present the hurdle to overcoming the environmental crisis that most environmental ethicists claim But what would motivate humans to shift away from this approach to moral reasoning if it is so commonplace? The lack of attention to this question in the field belies a common assumption of a kind of rationalist motivational internalism for much environmental ethics Rationalist motivational internalists hold that the truth of a moral requirement guarantees compliance for those who understand it No antecedent desire to follow the requirement or principle need be demonstrated While such internalism is not in and of itself objectionable its function in environmental ethics generates two particularly troubling problems (1) Because non-anthropocentric holism is admittedly such a departure from the long history of moral theorizing (and the longer history of human moral interaction) the hurdles involved in it eventually influencing aws or policies enforced over the traditional human-centered approach to such problems are substantial and the time horizon for overcoming these hurdles is quite long And relatedly (2) because the environmental problems facing us are so pressing it is not clear that such an approach will have much practical effect on our ability to resolve these problems thus raising the question of why such philosophical pursuits are valuable outside their inherently interesting philosophical qualities Of course the effects of moral theories on policy are difficult to discern and are not an allor-nothing game The development of the field and the presence of environmental ethicists in policy-making structures and bodies have been influential even when they have not always persuaded non-philosophers of the truth of their schemes of value None the less given these two problems a strong case can be made that an environmental ethic which actively discouraged a parallel development of an approach more attuned to moral motivation - one which assumed that theoretical justifications do not necessarily motivate agents from acting independently of their interests - would not be an applied ethic at all but more an exercise in a purer form of philosophical activity one less concerned with its impact on the concerns to which it was being applied How then to open the path for the development of this alternative approach in a way that will not automatically beg the questions around which the meta-ethical debates in thefieldhave been prosecuted? Looking at some of these debates a pattern emerges Most often those philosophers working on environmental issues are at great pains to prove to each other that their respective approach though different from their colleagues none the ess 641

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t th d It i l t if th i i i t b l h t d of these differing views For example in a debate between Dale Jamieson (1998) and Callicott (1998) on the merits of individualism (animal liberation) versus holism (environmental ethics) Jamieson takes on the claim rehearsed above that idiidli i i f f i i t f i t l thi b it ff t ditl l t d d i J i ' t t i t t h t th i h f l h b titit l t t i i ll t h h th l d i t i l lbl (th th b f " i l " h h d th tit i l h h ti fr h i h t h i li t btt ) F h J i ti t h tht because such traditional subjects of a holist environmental ethic can be valued by a sentientist then they ought to be valued by sentientists Callicott in his reply to Jamieson takes great pains to try to show that there are cases of ecosystemic value hih l d titit l f thi i t tht iht i t i t i l fl ( i t l i t ) tht hld bt ld t b f ffiitl t d i t i l t t th iti f l tild b J i ' h Cllitt k th li i t k t h t i t ll i thi h d liki k t h t i t h l tid t t thi projects off the ground by proving that their methods of valuing nature capture the same ends as various forms of nonanthropocentrism (see for example Norton 1991) The suggestion however that any of these approaches cannot ustify even d i t i lti f th b j t i th ld i bit blibl M i th b d h i l h i l it fid thi tt i th d f th dbt t b d t th b i i Th i bt th t id t t t l h tht thi i l hi th d itht h b f hih h tk th f t h t t E i t l thiit t k th f t th i i t t d fit l i i t h t th t reach the agreedupon finish line But how can we be so sure that these ends are philosophically justifiable? While certainly there are disputes about the ends of environmental practice it is surprising how rare it is to find debates between phil h b t th d O i lft di h t ll th f i b t O ibl i t h t th t t h f th tt ht ll d tif th d ? i i itlf i t t i h t j t i f th f dbt i th fild B t thi i t th i tl t d i t Rihd Wt (1995) t t k j t l h d t h t th fild hl ff t h fr l k f i h i l h i l t d l i i f f ht orical moves which rather assert the existence of value than demonstrate it This tendency not to argue according to Watson "but merely pronounce" the existence of obligationgenerating values in the world "gives so much environmental philoso h f d t i tht d h t h t th bi t d ith d t i th th h i l h " (1995 204) If h li b t t h th th ld b t h t th d b t tlid b l l th idi titi f d i f f t id f litil t t jtif thi iti i th i f h i l h i l lthi th thi l Whil I fid W t ' d t i f th fild t i I ld b i 642

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t t dit thi f ht h h id t iti i th fild specifically to the way in which these positions have interacted with each other n the debates which have shaped the field Varner's claim that environmental ethics holds on to two dogmas is a good case in point: it is not as if nonanthropocentrism d hli h h dfiitil th h i l h i l d i dfiiti tt Th i i fild f h i l h i diffilt t di E ill i fild i t l thi it i l ht dfiiti tt ld t t A d t btt it h l d t t ith h f i t fid i t l thiit t l i th d Ei mental ethics does not exist in a vacuum of philosophical argument If environmen tal ethicists were to suddenly come out strongly against preservation of biodiversity for example then one could wonder about the viability of the field not necessarily fild f h i l h b t th fild f i t l i i Whil i t l thi t b likd t til i t l ti ( h th t ti b t d i l thi d th dil ti d f i t i d b ) it i th l t t h d t i l l if t thdli ll t l i t l it At l t t f th titti f thi community is a strong commitment to the priorities of environmental protection and restoration demonstrated by the science of ecology itself a form of science which is strongly normative as it assumes in part a focus on how the workings of t tb hidd hld b h d d t If i t l h i l h t fl i th f f l tbl i f l i l i th t th l t h t tifiti ld b d d f thi iti th iht t f l t l iil iti i dbt l ith th h i l h I th fil l i dbt i i t l thi ill t likl t b ttld b t h t th b t d i d d tblihd b l t individual welfare or the assessments of ecological science Following Watson the debates in the field will only be settled in the traditional philosophical manner once the positions at stake are adequately justified: a reasoned assessment not of who t ht d i th tdit b t h h th t i h i l h i l t f th h i h l tti li tht d i t l idti b t d d b d th h it ( d f i i t i l t h t it t) d h thi th th h b thht t h kid f l i d f li ill b l ti t h l ( dfiitil tht d ) S h dfiiti i i tl t f i l i l th h i l h i l i t l agreement among environmental ethicists will be much further down the road Watson is skeptical that in the interim while these debates are being decided we can meaningfully apply our views to any actual environmental problems Watson k h t ft ll l i ? I l t li b t ffi th l f t i t lif ( W t 1995 212)? W t t h i k t h t i th b f ttld i ld l b li d t i i i t V i i t tht t d t h ttld l ti i th h i t f h i l h h th fi t i i l th it fd t ti i d t d it hih till th b j t f id d d t b l i b l 643

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iti E i t l h i l h dt b k t th d i b d h the larger guild is still hard at work To do otherwise perhaps for Watson is to abrogate our professional responsibilities as philosophers But here Watson and I part company For environmental ethicists to take his di ld t b d t f thi di i i l f idiidl d bl f th f l d h l Th iti f i t l thi t l lid fild t l t kt l it t f th l d ld dbt t th tifti f th id h i l h i l it I h i l t h t thi fild f thi f d d ti t d thik t it t f t fid l f h i l h i l flti ( t simply a role for professional philosophers) in the resolution of environmental prob lems rather than simply their discussion or elucidation As suggested above success in such an endeavor requires environmental ethicists to expand the audience to h th i h t hld thi tiit ibl b d th t d i t i l i f th h i l h i l bfild N l i t l thiit t fid t h i l i th l i t l it f h i h th bl l d t Whil th ti h b l th fild ti t b t f t l t tii ti b t i t l i i th id ld b d the academy if not an outright intentional community of environmentalists The focus therefore on ends in the current debates in environmental ethics is really not out of place Instead I would maintain that in the context of our role n th l i t l it thi f d h t f h W hld d i t t l t t f k ( h ll it th " l i d " t t h h th f th t " t i l " N t 1995) hli th i t l it t b t t k thil t i t f th lii hih i l d l l Th it f i l i i t d tl t til b l i t d i t l thi i di b th til i i f th i t l it d th problems that it orients itself around This drive to apply ethical theories in this way is not only motivated by a desire to actively participate in the resolution of environmental problems but to hold up our philosophical end as it were in the it f i t l i t T k i t l thi f l fild f l i d thi d t i ii ll lil h i l h i l dbt Th dbt d i f t i d ttti B t if t t t d t th d f l it t i th d i th fild t th l t i th t t h i i h d d h i b i l i t i bt iti do not arise There are other changes in the application of ethics to environmental problems which would have to occur as well Here I will only make one other suggestion A more fully responsible environmental ethics must abandon the whole l jti f t h t i f tti f th i t t t t f lid d if ill bli t k I dditi t th ffd b th t l t t til f idti f th jti f t h t i t id ll F i t id t h t th f i i t l thi th h f d i t i f th t h t i l f t l t it f th f f i

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onmental inquiry Most other environmental professionals look at environmental problems in a human context rather than trying to define an abstract sense of natural value outside the human appreciation or interaction with nature Fields such as environmental sociology and environmental health for example are concerned not with the environment per se but the environment as the location of human community This is not to say that thesefieldsreduce the value of nature to a crude resource instrumentalism It is to say instead that they realize that a discussion of nature outside the human context impedes our ability to discuss ways in which anthropogenic impacts on nature can be understood and ameliorated If environmental philosophers continue to only pursue their work as a contribution to value theory then they cut themselves off from the rest of the environmental community which seeks to provide practical solutions to environmental problems solutions that it is almost trite these days to suggest must be interdisciplinary One may fairly wonder how environmental philosophers can make a contribution to something other than value theory After all what else are they trained to do as philosophers? My claim is that if philosophers could help to articulate moral reasons for environmental policies in a way that is translatable to the general public then they will have made a contribution to the resolution of environmental problems commensurate with their talents But making such a contribution may require doing environmental philosophy in some different ways At a minimum it requires a more public philosophy as the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey envisioned though one more focused on making the kind of arguments that resonate with the moral intuitions which most people carry around with them on an everyday basis A public and applied environmental ethics would not rest with a mere description of the value of nature (even a description that justified a secure foundation for something as strong as a claim for the rights of nature) A public environmental ethics would further question whether the description of the value of nature t provided could possibly cause human agents to change their moral attitudes about nature taking into account the overwhelming ethical anthropocentrism of most humans As such a public environmental ethics would have to either embrace an enlightened anthropocentrism about natural value or endorse a pluralism which admitted the possibility indeed the necessity of sometimes describing natural value in human-centered terms rather than always in non-anthropocentric terms The empirically demonstrable prevalence of anthropocentric views on environmental issues is the second practical reason for reconsidering the wholesale rejection of anthropocentrism In a survey by Ben Minteer and Robert Manning (1999) about the sources of positive attitudes toward environmental protection n Vermont respondents overwhelmingly indicated that the reason why they most thought the environment should be protected is because they think that we have positive obligations to protect nature for future human generations More exhaustive surveys of American attitudes toward environmental protection have also found such results In the preparatory work for their landmark study of American environmental attitudes in the US Willett Kempton and his colleagues found that obligations to future generations was so powerfully intuitive a reason for most people to favor environmental protection that they would volunteer this view before they 645

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kd I i fi t i hih h l d d t i questions for the survey the authors remarked:

th f

f thi

W f d tht i f t ' d d t l l i t h i thiki b t i mental issues Although our initial set of questions never asked about children seven t f th t t l i f t t h l b h t hild ft ti jtifti f i t l tti S h hih ti f d t mentioning the same topic is unusual in answering an openended question In fact f th f t f hild dd d t d f th t t l i th i t i ( K t t l 1997 95) Th l d t d b K t hih i l d d ti b t bliti t th f t f i d th fidi A h i l h i l i hih ld t d h ititi ld f it h t t t ith t h t i i I dditi t t ii i h i l h i l dbt ti tht b i t k t l t t h t i d l t iti l d t t h t th h h t t i thi it f theory of nonanthropocentric natural value They can continue this work as one of their tasks as environmental ethicists But another task that they must accept (if they are to rise to their larger role in the environmental community) requires t h t th b illi t t i l t thi h i l h i l i b t th l f t h i t t h t ill ll tit l i k d th l bli h th h t thi i b t th l f t t h h t h t i h I th k (Liht 2001) I h kthd i dtil h h t d h ld k H I ill l t t h t thi t t ki tht thiit ti t l t thi i into a language more resonant with the public is only required where convergence has been reached That is where the preponderance of views among environmental ethicists of various camps as well as among environmentalists themselves has d th d th th bli k f th h i l h i t tilt th t tht ld t fftil ll tit i t l i t t t tht d E i i l l f i thi ill i l ki k t h t i t (hih l h th i t f ft bi l hil hill t t i ) Bt i i tht i th ti li ld b li ll W h t li b t i i i l ti Wh h t b h i d h thi bli t k f translation is not warranted There we must continue with our "environmental first philosophy" h Watson's suggestions attempting to hammer out the most plaus ible and defensible views Wh d i thi bli t k i t l thiit ill b t i t h dd i i i l l hl Bt h i it i th i d t ttd t i t l bl (Nt h tht I h t d t h t thi bli t k i tll till j t i f d f th f l i d thi F I ki thi t l i th t t f t dbt i i t l thi d

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th i t f th bl t h i h it i d d d ) Thi h i l more consistent with a robust pluralism even though its pluralist components are practically rather than philosophically justified There are many other details to fill in with this approach; I trust charitable readers will allow for its full defense else h I ll th i tht k it l i b l f t tk h iti " t h d l i l i t l t i " B thi t Id t liti f th t d i t i l iti f th A i tit t i t l bl I t d I tht i t l h i l h f it ht t b d ithi th t t f iti tht ibl d lt lid environmental ethics includes a public component with a clear policy emphasis Environmental pragmatism in my sense is agnostic concerning the existence of nonanthropocentric natural value or the relative superiority of one form of natural l th Th b i thi i ith ti t t h t i t h i th tk t d i t i l tit t d i th it f h l ( W t 1992 P k 1996) l th d t th it f h i l h i l ti t b th dl d t it t t h i l dbt I believe that the principal task for an environmental pragmatism is not to re engage the metaethical and metaphysical debates of environmental ethics but rather to impress upon environmental philosophers the need to take up the ques ti f ht ld tit h t h thi ttitd b h i d li f t d th ti fl t i t l t i b i l i t Whil th th t hi thi di thil ti t b d h j t ld b i i b l t th d i f f t iti ihbit i t l thiit ll bi b d l i i t t ith h d i b l h thi fild t t t d i th fit l

Rf C Hl Attflld Rbi (1987) A Theory of Value and Obligation. L d GA U i i t fG i P B Ad (1988) Thinking about Nature. Ath (1992) Moral pluralism and the environment Environmental Values, 1: 1 5 3 3 Callicott J Baird (1980) Animal liberation: a triangular affair Environmental Ethics, 2: 31138 NY S t t U i i t fN Y k P (1989) In Defense of the Land Ethic. Alb (1990) Th i t l lli Environmental Ethics, 12 9 9 1 2 4 (1996) On Norton and the failure of monistic inherentism Environmental Ethics, 18: 21921 (1998) " B k t t h i" i Environmental Values, 7 4 6 1 5 (1999) Beyond the Land Ethic. Albany NY: State University of New York Press Di V i t i (2001) E f i i I D J i ( d ) A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, 2 3 1 4 7 Mid MA B l k l l deShalit Avner (2000) The Environment between Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford Univer sity Press Environmental Values, 7 16582 E k l R b (1998) B d h i

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Elliot Robert (1997) Faking Nature London: Routledge F R G (1983) Riht Killi d Sffi Ofd B l k l l H E (1992) W k t h t i Itrii l Th Mit 75 1 8 3 2 0 7 H d Ti (1997) A t h t i i d t d bl E i t l Vl 6 4963 (1998) Plitil Th d E l i l Vl N Y k St M t i ' P J i D l (1998) A i l l i b t i i i t l thi E i t l Vl 7 4157 Katz Eric (1997) Nature as Subject Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield K t Willtt B t J dHtl J i f (1997) E i t l Vl i A i Clt Cbid MA MIT P Light Andrew (2001) Taking environmental ethics public In D Schmidtz and E Willott (d) E i t l Ethi Wht Rll Mtt? Wht Rll Wk? 55666 O f d Ofd U i i t P (2002) Th f til l l i I A Liht dH Rlt m (d) E i mental Ethics: An Anthology pp 2 2 9 4 7 Maiden MA: Blackwell d K t Eri ( d ) (1996) E i t l P t i L d Rtld Mit B dM i R b t (1999) P t i i i t l thi d l l i d th t f t E i t l Ethi 21 1 9 1 2 0 7 Naess Arne (1973) The shallow and the deep: longrange ecology movements Inquiry 16: 95100 N t B G (1984) E i t l thi d k t h t i E i t l Ethi 6 1 3 1 4 8 (1987) Why Preserve Natural Variety? Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (1991) T d Uit E i t l i t Ofd Ofd U i i t P (1995) A l i d til h i l h I D E Mitt J d L Eb (d) Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism pp 1 2 5 4 8 Lanham MD: Rowman d Littlfld (1995b) Wh I t t h t r i t Cllitt d th f i l f iti i h t i E i t l Ethi 17 3 4 1 5 8 O'Neill John (1993) Ecology Policy and Politics London: Routledge (2001) M t t h i I D J i (d) A C i t E i t l Philh 16376 Mid MA B l k l l Odkik W (1998) M i d f l f th th b i b l i h i l i t l philosophy The Centennial Review 42: 3 5 3 9 2 Pl Cl (2002) A i f i t l thi I A Liht d H Rlt III ( d ) E i t l Ethi A Athl Mid MA B l k l l Parker Kelly (1996) Pragmatism and environmental thought In A Light and E Katz (eds) E i t l P t i 2137 L d Rtld P J h (1974) M' Ribilit f Nt L d D k t h R T (1983) Th C f A i l Riht B k l CA U i i t fClifi P Rolston in Holmes (1975) Is there an ecological ethic? Ethics 85: 9 3 1 0 9 (1988) E i t l Ethi P h i l d l h i T l U i i t P (1989) Philh G Wild B f f l NY P t h (1992) Th ild id f f d Th E i t l P f i l 13 3 7 0 7 (1994) Conserving Natural Value New York: Columbia University Press Rtl (lt S l ) R i h d (1973) D d i t l thi? I Philh d Si Mlit d Clt T h l dM P d i f th XVth World Congress of Philosophy pp 2 0 5 1 0 Varna Bulgaria: Sofia

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and Routley (later Plumwood) Val (1979) Against the inevitability of human chauvinism In K E Goodpaster and K M Sayre (eds) y pp 36-59 Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press Schlosberg David (1999) m Oxford: Oxford University Press Singer Peter (1974) All animals are equal 1: 103-16 (1990) n 2nd edn New York: Avon Books (2001) Animals In D Jamieson (ed) y pp 416-25 Maiden MA: Blackwell Taylor Paul (1986) e Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Varner Gary (1998) s Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001) Sentientism In D Jamieson (ed) y pp 192-203 Maiden MA: Blackwell Watson Richard A (1995) The identity crisis in environmental philosophy In D E Marietta Jr and L Embree (eds) m pp 203-14 Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Welchman Jennifer (1999) The virtues of stewardship s 19: 411-23 Wenz Peter (2001) Oxford: Oxford University Press Weston Anthony (1992) Before environmental ethics s 14: 321-38

Further reading Jamieson Dale (ed) (2001) Light Andrew and Rolston III Holmes (eds) (2002) Maiden MA: Blackwell

y Maiden MA: Blackwell

649

48 Vl

i Nt

DALE JAMIESON

I 1973 R i h d R t l i t d d i f t i l tht h b f d t i l i d i i f i t l thi R h l ht Rtl kd t id h k t h t h i th l t i bi h ill i l t N i th f t ill b bl t it Eth' ti f t dd t F ht thi " l t " i desire to destroy these natural features Would he be wrong to act on this desire? Writing in the 1980s Holmes Rolston III discussed a similar case in which diti f l l t tili h d l bt i h l t th fl i t b t til d bid R l t t h t it ld b f th "lt f l " t d t th ii b i h "f it ld b b t t f thi h t t ti if th i i l l tk t" (Rlt 1986 114) M i t l i t ld ith R l t It i th j b f i t l ists to speak on behalf of the canyons the ecosystems and the forests (Stone 1974) Environmentalists value these features of nature because they are valuable; it is not the case that these features are valuable because environmentalists value them Only b i t h t th l i t i d i d d t t f th f i b t tti t f l tht i d d d t h t t th fl fh d i d f Ol h i d i d d t l d i t i l th th bi b j t t th Ul l i d i d d t thi E i hi d i D i d t i th th l thi d S d Sh ll i th b i ( tikil f l th the other) Many environmentalists see a commitment to mindindependent values as what distinguishes a deep green from a shallow pale environmental ethic Before we decide whether to accept or reject such views let us canvas some of the alternatives

AT l O ttitd 650

i th C l l thi

i

f l i th subjectivism d

f Vl idiidl h tht thi i

l ll

l

d hi fl

h f

VALUES IN NATURE

individuals O d i l ill t t d C l l thi view conventionalism and say that it holds that value flows from communities as well as perhaps from individuals A third view maintains that there is a source of value external to individual valuers and communities Call this view realism and say that it t h tht l fl fr nature B f d i i th i i dtil I tt k th lii it F i t it h l d b t i d t h t thi t i i ildi Idiid l t f iti d iti d idiidl ( G t ti f tlli ) t f t N i " l i " d f th i tht t i th f l F it i t j t t tht i l conventions and attitudes are real too and conventionalists and subjectivists should not give away this word without a fight But for present purposes I will contrast realism with conventionalism and subjectivism S d th t i l d i th l i t t t f t ti i t l i l d l h l i l i ll t h i l Al t h h I t th it h I bli tht b t t i l l th i i i h f th idi l t h h h i ht difft f Fill bjtii I d t d it i th i t h t ll l bjti conventionalism is the view that some values are conventionalist and no values are realist; and realism is the view that some values are realist Thus conventionalism can encompass subjectivist values and realism can encompass both conventionalist d bjtiit l I h t fll I ill b d ith tti l t h t d i t i i h th i th th th t h t ll i iht k t d t i th Whil th th ft i i thi d i I' i t d it M W Rli i t i f naturalism d non-naturalism N t l i i th i tht l i t i t t i t d b itbl t t d t f t l ti (f l B d 1988) E l f t l ti i l d t sion and mass and may also include complex or relational properties such as genetic structure species membership naturalness wildness and so on It is sets of natural properties that matter since value may require the instantiation of a disjunction or j t i f ti Thi f d t l t th ibilit t h t t f l i t t i t i ti b i l t F l ld h l d tht l i t i i t t i t d b ild d t h t th ti f t i l t t t h i l Th id t h t th t f ti i ti tb itbl t t d ll t i f ibl lti tht l b t th t f ti t h t i t t i t it F l hold that value in nature is identical to wildness others may hold that in some sense it supervenes on wildness while still others may hold that value emerges from wildness The second form of realism is nonnaturalism (for example Moore 1903) Non t l i h l d t h t th ti i i t f hih l i i t t i t d t t l ti h t i d bt th t l ti h th i l idfibl t f d Of th liti d iti d i d li b t tl h ti i t tit l (f l t h h idtit i th l t i ) bti h ll

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Wht l b t f li it i in nature Consider the following sentence:

t

h

it

t

l

(1) The Brooks Range is valuable A d i t li (1) i t i it f th B k R i t t i t i itbl t t d t f t l t l ti Si ti f th B k R f t l l i th t t h k f (1) it i t l t k f l i h i i th B k R d th thi b i i t f l t S liti id li i l l il t ti f l in nature It is the other families of views conventionalism and subjectivism that have come under suspicion Let us examine how subjectivism and conventionalism might treat sentences such as (1) C i d fit bjtii O i f bjtii hld tht t h (1) itil i fidiidl k ' i tt (A 1952) Th ti lifid b k b th B k R d t fi i t t h k f th t i h t d t h tth diti H d i f bjtii hld tht t h (1) are true just in case the speaker approves of the Brooks Range The speaker's approving state with respect to the Brooks Range is central to the truthmaker for such sentences Th h t f tili i th i tht l l t l t t i O i f tili i i l tifid i f th d i f bjtii d i d b A l f h i ld h l d t h t t (1) i t j t i t k i it f th B k R Th f i f tili (f l H 1977) C i t i t t l i difft d th tifi th t l b Fth li l f th attitudes that might be thought to underwrite value claims Other such attitudes may include beliefs that the thing in question is of merit desires that it be widely appreciated and so on W h t thi b i f h i t h t th i f bjtii d tili tht i l tht t h (1) h t t h k S h i hld f l t h t (1) i t j t i th k t b f th k ' it f th B k R Th it ld tht h i t l i t H lit ld b j t t th l i t h t bjtii d tionalism can countenance values in nature They would agree that from the perspective of these views claims such as (1) have truthmakers but since proper ties of nature do not centrally figure in these truthmakers they would deny that h i i ft t l i t t tl l ht t ti f t I th td It i bjtiit libl li tht bi d f b th k t b t f th B k R d t h t thi t fi t l l i th t t h k f (1) Th lit tt d tht h t ti l ti f t b t th i hi t h h It ld b i l 652

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ibl t l i t h t th l t i l ti f th B k R d t t l properties of nature since such important properties of the Brooks Range as its wildness naturalness uniqueness fragility and its being prime grizzly and caribou habitat are all relational Indeed in the eyes of many people it is precisely in virtue f lifi th ti t h t th B k R i lbl Th lit' t l itk di t thi iti i t h t h f th f l ith t h i t t ( C l l i t t 1989) S b j t i i d tili th b t ht k l tt t t th b t h t t f l tt E if I th f th B k R h i l t (1) i b t th B k R t b t Consider how a subjectivist might try to defend the view that her theory counten ances values in nature She might begin in this way Suppose that subjectivism is true and that I approve of the Brooks Range It follows from these premises that (1) i t Th t t i th t i t h t h t th t t h f (1) i ffiit f i t h t th l i t t h t i t h t it f l l f th f t t h t th B k R i l b l t h t th l i t O th f f t thi i f t b it l i b l If h l l d t id id f th t t h f th l i t h t th l i t it ld t l t t sentences such as (1) And indeed this move is what we might expect from both subjectivists and realists despite their metaphysical differences A further more general argument can be given on behalf of the view that bjtiit t l i t S b it fidt f th t t h f (1) t it ti b t t t h i l tt Sh ld b fi d t f h b l i f t h t th l i t d tht d ti i t t t l l fl f th blif t h iht b l l h t t djditi d i t bt lit d t i l i t I d d h tk tht h d i t it D i t h i tii h d ti db h i b i b l If thi t i l i b l th t ethical views (or the lack thereof) are quite detachable from the belief that there are values in nature If this is so then there is no inconsistency in the idea of subjectiv ism countenancing values in nature l i t ill i h t l f l b t thi t Th b i bjti i t A i f i th l i tht t t h i l i t t d t h b l f ti i t t f th f h ti h l f bt th Aft ll h ld b O t th billi l ki if d t k it lid W h t i t i i l i l t h l i l it Maybe However I submit that most people do not have consistent coherent reflective metaethical views In everyday life we commit acts of metaethics when reflective thought unreflective argument or the simple pressure of serious d i t tk t th b i k f h t i l b At h t l t t h i l t t i i th i f til d O thi i tthi hld b f f t i l i tht i t f d l ti th th i l t ti t h t it i j d t ti Of thi i t t tht thi M l t h i i h i h it b t tthi d d i h t lii i l

653

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l t it i l i t i t t l tilit d Wht I i i t i tht these activities are all part of everyday moral discourse and that fullblown theories are philosophical constructions that are (in part) hypostasizations of these activities (Jamieson 1991) H th t t h i l j t f h i l h ihtl d t d i difft f ith f th h It i ttt t k f h ll Th f t t h t i d lif i t t h i l i d t fi t (t ) t h t th h d f t i lit f d l ti d td d thi bi b k d b til t t h i l i Whth lit bjtiit I t most of us are metaethical opportunists we go on arguing about sentences such as (1) in more or less the same way some of us asserting some denying and most of us dodging This suggests that an attempt to impose metaethical correctness on th d t d i f t h (1) i t f f i h i l h i l j t th th t t t t it d di d ti I th d it i h i l h k Th k ill t i l b th b t ti tt bt id th ti ftth hih i i l Tarski's definition of truth (for example) may be important for many reasons but not because it dramatically vindicates all those hapless souls who go around saying that various things are true or false in complete ignorance of Convention T The h i l h i l j t f dfi tth i difft f th di ti f ibi t t h d flit O d td d th th d thi i h t I ti ith t t th lti bt tthi d d l ti Ath f t h t th lit h i t h t th bjtiit b t bjti t h i h th lit i i I til b i d b t h i l t i t bjtii hih h t t i against realism A realist may (grudgingly) be brought to agree that in principle subjectivism can account for our normative responses but still may insist that the actual patterns of our normative discourse are more plausibly captured by appeal to th t f ti t h t lit l i th th th t hih bjtiit th ith thi i ill b l i th t l I h ti H it i i t t t tht hil li f btt th bjtii ith tt bjti th b t ith t t th C t h i l ititi (th f h i l h ) b more difficult for subjectivism to cope with than for realism but realism has a more difficult time than subjectivism in explaining the connection between motivation and normative commitments If I approve of something it is easy to see why I am titd t t t it It i l t h I hld b titd t t t thi b it i t t i t t d d i h t difflt t h I hld b titd t t t thi b thi titi i i t t ith ili i l ttitd Th t h i l b t f li l k it t t i t t f i t l i l bjti t hih bjtii i ltil i It i 654

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diffilt t h t l d i t bt l h h difft views about whether the Brooks Range instantiates some nonnatural property or whether the set of natural properties which it instantiates is suitably structured so as to constitute value On the other hand skeptics will not get very far challenging th i t l i l b i f k l d li b t ht I f li b t th i i ti ti f it W h t th k t i l t bi t i tht d i f f t t t h i l i h difft i l i t i b t h th f l i t ld h t b d Vi t t h i l t d ttti t i ft f l it d th ld B t hil th t bi t i t t differences between metaethical views and may provide some reason for preferring one to another they do not add up to a demonstration that one view is uniquely enabled or disabled with respect to supporting deep green commitments

A Altti

Vi

Th f h i d d i tht b l t i ti Th i f realism conventionalism and subjectivism that we have discussed are at war Each denounces the other without taking on board the considerations adduced by parti sans of the other perspectives Thus for example according to the versions of li tht h d i d th l h tht i d i i d l d iti h l t l i thi titti A iil liit i l h t i t i f th i f tili d bjtii tht h i d d Whil i f h f th i t f th t t h f t h (1) d th t l i t i ii f th b l t ti i libl A ititil libl tthi i opinion would find a place for elements of all of these families of views Individual responses may be the ultimate source of all values but these responses are con strained and guided both by nature and communities and they occur in particular t t f f M i f h i iht b l l d sensible objectivism. It i bjtii i it f d l i h b i th bjt' l b t it i ibl i t h t it li It i l l i t i t h t it i l ii f t t i bt idiidl iti d t i til t t It i i l i t i t h t th tibti f h l t t h t fi th t t i diff i Whil it b ibl t it some very general true biconditional that links what is valuable to contexts individuals communities and nature I doubt that it would be very informative On a particular occasion say one in which vitamin B12 is the object of value nature l t l i t t l O th i h k f t l t i th b j t f l t l l t l i th t ti U d t d i i d f li i thi t b d th d t f th i I h t fll I ill t h t d l thi i d l t f it F t ht i i t t i t h th f i l

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t h h t tht l i i t t l i d t i d bjtditd tiit O we see that the concept of value is a derivative notion a hypostatization of contextual constrained objectdirected valuing activities we can better under stand and resist the temptations of realism Perhaps then we will feel free to adopt ibl tthil i btt t t b i ith tthil ti ltth Vli i thi t h t l d O th f f it thi t d tibl t i l i t t i bt thl b d f di th l f l t d t di t th l f li d thi i t l tt f b t i t t i h l t i l i l i l t Th f tlk b t valuing to the language of values is a move toward greater objectification which itself reflects an escalation in speakers' concerns about what is at stake in the discourse Consider the following trios of sentences: (2) I lik h l t (3) I l h l t (4) C h l t i lbl (5) I like solitude (6) I value solitude (7) Solitude is valuable (8) I lik (9) I l (10) W l d

ld ld i

lbl

S t (2) d ftl t l hil b t h t (3) d (4) d dd C h l t i thi t h t lik t it i t th t f thi t h t thik of as valuable or even the sort of thing that it seems natural to value It is more plausible to value solitude however so (6) sounds about as natural as (5); (7) is acceptable as well but seems to invite completion: for what purpose is solitude l b l ? Wld th th h d i l l d t h t hil (10) t l (8) i i l k A l t h h th h lrif th fit t f l h f i t th l f ld N d (10) t i l t i i th t h t (7) d Whil it bl t k ht litd i d f it t t k th ti b t ld The moral of the story is this As the stakes become higher as the object of our desire becomes more important to us we tend to objectify the desire We begin by expressing our desires in terms of what we like or prefer; then it becomes a matter f ht l d fill it i ti f ht i l b l Th ff f thi hld ti l If thi i l b l th {ceteris paribus) t t t it b t hiliti i d i t l fll f th f t t h t I lik thi W l k dititi th thi tht fid lbl A d i t h i l h thi l fi t t l l hil th thi 656

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fi t i i l F h it i t b i tlki b t "itii l " and soon we may find ourselves on safari in search of values in nature Part of what drives this dynamic is the elusive search for (rhetorically and rationally) commanding heights Intrinsic values trump mere preferences: so wilder if it b h t h i t i i l i i t l i d f i t l h i l h ith th h till fi t i i l t h i id t i h it h h l th l i h t f f t thi d i l A t h t i l l t i f thi t t t i t bjtif l t th i d d l k f iti f th d t h lit d ilbl i our evaluational structures Environmental philosophers have tended to fixate on the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value Yet intrinsic versus instru mental is only one of many distinctions in our evaluational repertoire Indeed this dititi i t l f i ft tbl d fil t h th i t tht ld Thik f P l h I l f h k d l i t t l l f th f f i i t tht h k t f hi O id th flli litd t S tht I b iti t h l i th ll I i t i l l I l th painting instrumentally but when it is hung on the wall I come to value it intrin sically as well Indeed I come to value it so greatly that I hang it on another wall where it can be seen to greater advantage I no longer care about its role in i th h l i th ll I h t l th iti l i t i i l l ti t t l l B t t h h ti Ib t i d f th iti Af i th b k d b i t id f th ikd tfth h d hildhd i f l I fid t h t I l l th iti i t i i l l I t it t it i iti B t th i f th ikd tfth ti t h t Th h i ' t bi h f th t f Lik th thi ld ti idfiitl Th i t i tht l t i l tlk dynamic; they are not boringly stable through time life and experience As for the idea that what I value intrinsically is always more important to me than what I value instrumentally suppose that I am on a cliff hanging by a thread b th b i l i t t h d ff t bl I l th t h d b hih I tl th t llti t h h I l t h i llti i t i i l l d th t i i t t l l A h th dl i l dititi bt i t i i l l d i t t l l li t t t b i i l l d thi i l th b i i f th t I h t fll I ill t t d f f th remaining complexities Let us begin with a paradigm of instrumentally valuing something: I value the matches in my kitchen because they allow me to light the stove Now notice how d i f f t th f l l i f i t i i l l li f thi di f i t t l l li I l th h t h f Gt b it t Gt h I l i t i i l l I l th h f l b k f th d t d b it id f G t ' ifti b I l l ' il b it bdi h kid d it I l h t th t f Mt P i t (i th C l l i t P k Wild A i C l d ) t

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i t t l l b it ill lt i tti t th it b t b it partconstitutive of mountain climbing an activity which I value intrinsically These examples only begin to suggest the richness of the relationships that exist n our evaluational structures Wht I h b ti i tht b i i f th id f li t t l i d t i d b j t d i t d tiit d t d d k itlliibl id f lti tiiti H th f th t tht I h i i t l i l t b t l thi d b t t I t t t t ftt it b tlli t b t h tll t l t f t Many people think of deserts as horrible places that are not worth protecting I disagree I value deserts intrinsically and think you should too How do I proceed? One thing I might do is take you camping with me We might see the desert's t l i h b i t t th l t t h t h d t d t th diti th hifti l f th l d th d d th i i f th th t k ft f th d t T t h iht i th f l f th d t id h th il f th d t d it litd Y b i t t d h it i t h t thi l f d ht ti it h it l t d i l make a living As you learn more about the desert you may come to see it differ ently and to value it more This may lead you to spend more time in the desert seeing it in different seasons watching the spring with its incredible array of flowers t t th h t i till f Y iht t t di d t litt f th ti f t h f th h h t E d d Abb Y i ti ld ti t B t th i t t h t thi ill thi Y t f ti i th d t h t d i t h f b thit f b d d t l t i t th US A C fE i (h d't t b t fld h f th E t h ' f ibl) S i i l l people see Venice as a dysfunctional collection of dirty old buildings find Kant boring and wrong and hear Mahler as simultaneously excessively romantic and annoyingly dissonant More experience only makes matters worse If fil t i t th d t V i Mhl th d t h d l i l O lti t i l d t i d b titti th ld W b b h t t it V i Mhl th d t b lltil d i t t i l d t i ibiliti t t d j d t bt h h ft i l d itti fh th ld Wh I t t t t i t th d t I d i t ttti t objects in your visual field but I am trying to change your way of seeing and thinking and your whole outlook toward nature I am also trying to change our relationship from one of difference to one of solidarity Althh I h l b bl t h i t t f l l t b i t h f i iti d d t d i l lif f th ti f t t h i l l l i tht tk i l th id t h t li t t l i d t i d bjtdi tiit I bli ( d h ) t h t th ttti f li ill

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A

Objti

Of lif d h i l h t l M i i b d t t t t th b j t i tht I h l k d th i t f th l i t h t l in nature Perhaps I am right in supposing that various subjectivists and conventional ists can supply truth conditions for sentences such as (1); it does not follow from this that there are values in nature What the objector balks at is the inference f (1) t th l i t h t th l i t H i h th t iht C i d th f l l i t (11) K l l i i th Wh t h t K l l i i th tht Kll' bi i th i not dependent on my grasping the fact that Kelly is in the gym Kelly would still be in the gym whether or not I grasped this fact; or indeed whether or not I was around at all Whether or not Kelly is now pumping iron is completely independent f t h h t tht I ( ) iht h b t th tt A ith K l l i th ith l i t W ( fil t ) l i t bt thi it d t d d i th hth it Vl tht t l i t i d i d d t j t Kll b i th i i d i d d t W h t thi l i d t bi t i tht l li t f th i d i d d f l i t Sbjti ism (for example) may be able to recruit truthmakers for (1) and convince us that they can rightly be said to reflect properties of nature but such properties as "being approved of by the speaker" have no claim to mindindependence Thus they t d i t th l i t h t th l in t O ld b t it t tht thi tht i thi i d i d d t d thi t I it ld b t i i l t it t t h t th t ki f F i d l t iht d t h t hi it i til t i d i d d t It i t tiil h t it t t h t it i t l t ttbl b t ht hld i h liti color That colors are not mindindependent yet are in objects appears to be one respectable opinion Are values in nature like Kelly in the gym or are they like redness in the balloon? O t t t t thi ti t t R t l ' t h h t i t Cll f ld t h i k t h t th l t hd d thi fh d t d ll f th E t h ' t dl d H th l difft f di thi hil till j t i th l i t h t th id i d d t l O i thi T h ft hi d i th i d i th ld f th l t b t th l j d t b t tht ld i made by us now in our world The value that we judge to be lost necessarily stands in relation to us Thi b j t i l d bl h Th h ff thi it b t hth l i d i d d t f i t f l ith h l i tittd Vl i i d d d t b t it i thi i th ld t h t

659

DALE JAMIESON

are valuable or not The fact that we draw attention to features of objects in our evaluative discourse is the common property of all theories of value The anxious philosophers who raise this objection fail to appreciate how powerful psychological and cultural mechanisms can be in constituting objectivity Culture history tradition knowledge and convention mediate our constitutions and the world Culture together with our constitutions and the world determine our evaluative practices Since the world and our constitutions alone are not sufficient for determining them common values should be seen in part as cultural achievements rather than simply as true reports about the nature of things or expressions of what we are essentially Evaluative practices are in the domain of negotiation and collective construction as well as reflection and recognition But the fact that these practices are in part constructed does not mean that they cannot be rigid and compelling

Conclusion The main conclusion I have tried to establish is that a variety of meta-ethical views is compatible with a commitment to values in nature Because the largest shadow in this regard has fallen over subjectivism much of my attention has been devoted to showing that it too can countenance values in nature However my preferred view is sensible objectivism - a version of meta-ethical pluralism that views valuing as a contextualized constrained object-directed activity - but I have neither developed nor defended that view in detail If I have been successful in achieving my main purpose the result should be the deflating of some of the more ubiquitous metaphysical pretensions of environmental philosophy Yes deep ecologists ecofeminists process theologians and postmodern bioregionalists love nature; but so can expressivists projectivists and even logical positivists Different meta-ethical theories provide various accounts of the roles that a range of considerations about how to live and what we should care about play in structuring and producing moral practice but it is these fundamental considerations themselves that animate our moral lives and motivate change The power of the Green case is to be found in facts about the human domination of nature not in dubious metaphysics

References Ayer A J (1952) Language, Truth, and Logic, 2nd edn New York: Dover Boyd Richard (1988) How to be a moral realist In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed) Essays on Moral Realism, pp 181-228 Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press Callicott J B (1989) In Defense of the Land Ethic. Albany NY: State University of New York Press Harman G (1977) The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press Jamieson D (1991) Method in moral theory In P Singer (ed) A Companion to Ethics, pp 476-87 Oxford: Blackwell

660

VALUES IN NATURE

Moore G E (1903) Principia ethica Cambridge: Cambridge University Press HI H (1986) Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics B f f l NY Rlt P t h R (1973) D d i t l t h i ? I Philosophy and Science Rtl Morality and Culture Technology and Man Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philh 20510 V B l i Sf St C (1974) Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects L Alt CA W K f

Further reading Blkb S (1998) Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning O f d O f d U i it P Elliot R (1997) Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration London: Routledge D ( d ) (2001) A Companion to Environmental Philosophy O f d B l k l l J i B (1991) Toward Unity among Environmentalists N Y k O f d U i i t P Nt O'Nill J (1993) Ecology Policy and Politics: Human Well-being and the Natural World L d Routledge m H (1988) Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World Phil Rlt dlhi T l U i i t P

661

49 Th T d

f th C

DAVID SCHMIDTZ AND ELIZABETH WILLOTT

Th L i

f th C

T d th d" t d " f ill t thi ll b d Th dh an older meaning though referring to literary works that depict a protagonist caught up in events that inescapably lead to his or her doom Some of that older i i i l i i t i th l i f ht ll th t d f th Th h i t d b H d i (1968) H d i dit th id t L l d (1833) G d (1954) did ht d l th t H i i th bl S th i l t f l d Th l d h carrying capacity, h i h i th b f i l th l d t idfitl (Th t f" i it" i ht blti Obil t it to something real because there really are limits to what the land can support On the other hand such limits are not fixed Carrying capacity is somewhat fluid and is a function of many variables) S th l t ' i it i h d d i l Th l d i itl d b t h h d h f h t i l f t t l flk f h d d i l Th l d i th t it i it A thi t d h i l i th (lt' ) d l l t it tht t i it h d d i l th $100 C i l l l t h h th t h h d t t thi i d i i d l flk i t t th j i t l t t th l d l t i l f l ith i t l f tht h f thi 10 shepherds x 10 animals each = 100 animals I d i i d l flk' T t l flk' N ltth 662

l

= 10

i l

x $1 = $10

l

= 100

i l

x $1 = $100

d th

h h d h

dd l t h d d th l d '

i l i

W it

h Th

101 i l i t it

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

h f d i l t h f th bit l d th l animal drops to 95 cents per head At that rate the total stock of 101 animals is now worth $ 9 5 9 5 which is $ 4 9 5 less than the total stock was worth before when it was kept within the land's carrying capacity T t l flk'

l

= 101

i l

x 095 = $9595

S

h ld h h d dd th t i l h it l l i l i iti? H i h At th i i l i it th i d i i d l f l k f t th $10 H i ddd h th h h d h l and each is worth 95 cents That works out to $ 1 0 4 5 which means the ndividual shepherd actually made a profit of fortyfive cents by adding the extra animal even though the value of the total stock went from $100 to $ 9 5 9 5 I d i i d l flk'

l

= 11

i l

x 095 = $1045

Wht h d i thi l t h h th t t l t t th f ddi th t i l d d th t t l b f t th i d i i d l h h d i 100 t f the benefit while paying only 10 percent of the cost The remaining 90 percent are paid by the other nine shepherds: because they own 90 percent of the animals they suffer 90 percent of the loss involved in the falling price per head Individual h h d t h h l idiidl t d b f t d t dil Th l i f th h b it i l i i t b l i d t d it t i ft

Prit P r t

Slti

t C

Pbl

Is there nothing those shepherds can do? One option would be to cut their ointly owned territory into ten smaller parcels so that each shepherd now owns a small l ith it i it U d thi t h h h d 100 t th th 10 t f th t f di i it I t d f d i i th i t l d d t i h ti th d i t t d tfld th f f d ' i t l d Th i th h t h t i l l i t d fd i i d th $ 4 9 5 h d d i l d t th d i t t d ithi th individual shepherd's own parcel which we may suppose covers an area onetenth the size of the original communal plot To keep the example simple we suppose straightforwardly linear relationships so that when the damage is concentrated n t t h f th th lti d i b t t ti t f t Th f l k f t hih h d b th t d l l i t i flk f l th b t $ 5 0 5 Th l f h i l h b t hl i h l f ifll bi itk C t l d thi i t i t t i l t l i h t t dd l t h i l

663

DAVID SCHMIDTZ AND ELIZABETH WILLOTT

Example: A Successful Privatization F

l l d l f ltd li it i f i t l i i tff b i t d i it id H l d D t ' (1967) t fh t ititti l d di tib f th L b d i l A D t t l l th t th i ' l hd f ti t t d th l d Th human population was small There was plenty to eat (The renewable resource n the previous example was grass Here it is populations of small game but the issue is roughly the same) Thus the pattern of exploitation was within the land's carry i it Th i t i d itlf I tht i t t i hd ltd tht kd ll h l th l l f i d ithi th l d ' i it With th d t f th f t d t h h th l fh t i dt i l t d Th lti f i l b t didl Th ltd hd kd f hil b t th t i b fi l i t d In response people within the tribe began to mark out family plots The game animals in question were small animals like beaver and otter that tend not to migrate from one plot to another Thus marking out plots of land effectively privat i d ll ll th l d i t l f I th t i b t d th i i t f b i t fil l h th f t d b t ii d d tht d d th l d ' i it O th f th ititi f f b i l t h h f i t i d t t Th till l t f tt d tibl l l l d t th f i l ' l d t h t f t T ld kill beaver and take the meat but had to leave the pelt displayed in a prominent place to signal that they had eaten and had respected the family's right to the pelt The t t t th h t f th tt itii ht hd t b i t i d l i i t t l libti t h t l hd l j d ith t t th h titd hd t tb bl Th l h tht l bl f i t h t th h bl

d f di ith j d i i i t i t t i l h At th ti d t t t it litill it f h hit B d thi l t t thi ll W f titi f megafauna occurred in the Western hemisphere about twelve thousand years ago at the same time as waves of humans were arriving We have seen places where more recently tribes (before they acquired guns and horses and thereby became bl f h t i l t i l ) h t d bi b t d i hl h d th d f liff Th B l k f t f h l t l t "Hd S h d i Bffl J " S t D k i i d K i ' (1993) i i t f i " dl ti i f Nti A r i lt i t id tht A i th i l f ' i i l i t i ' Th i idbl Idi trib th th b i t l l i t h lid i tfl h ith th l d l i t d th i t thll b h t i d t i burning of forests" (1993: 62) 664

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

A Altti

Slti

C

l

M

t

I

l f d i i t l f th l d i t ibl l t t i t i l d ltd It i t l the only viable alternative Here is another option The shepherds could leave the territory in a common pool and instead of each tending a small flock of ten sheep ignoring the costs they impose on each other as they add more sheep they could l thi f l k db jit f i l l flk f h d d H d thi l th b l ? It l th bl b h h h d h i t t i ll f th h Ud l t h h d id t hth t dd l t h h bt hth t dd th h d d d f i t Addi t h tht f h h h d th lt i t t h t th l f hi f l k f $10 t $ 1 0 4 5 I t d th l from a 10 percent ownership stake in $100 to a 10 percent ownership stake n $ 9 5 9 5 Therefore under the communal arrangement no one wants to add he extra sheep An external cost has been "internalized" and each of the ten shepherds h l f i t t d t t th l d ' i it (A external cost l lld t l i t ill t i th ti f d i i ' t tht i b b th th th d i i k I th i i l l 90 t f th t f ddi th h t l t th d i i k b b th th i h h d W ti " i t l i d " h th t i h d tht d i i k b th ti t f thi d i sions) Whether or not they cut their land into parcels or pool their flocks of sheep the fact remains that in the real world a community of ten people has a good chance of bi bl t t t h t d i d f l i th l d ' t h t ill bl th t id l l t i iid H th i dditil i t id

Th O

A

C

ADifft S t

f Pbl

Suppose the group has gone communal pooling both their land and their ivestock So far so good Now however suppose we have an additional problem Whatever l th t h h d iht t t h l i th dditi f t animals th t bl t t l t h shepherd f ti d k t f l ibl th it ith t th f l k With f d ti td t b t if it i t bl t t i t th ifl f hih k th h ht i k open access th t d f likl Sometimes everything depends on whether it is possible to add the extra player rather than for existing players to add the extra animal For a community to manage itself successfully it must be able to control negative externalities within th it b t it i ll i t t t h t th it b bl t tit tlli th i d b h i f th it f 665

DAVID SCHMIDTZ AND ELIZABETH WILLOTT

Th l f iti t h t ti t hld f thi land in common yet manage to regulate access in such a way as to maintain a pattern of sustainable use Following Robert Ellickson (1993) we can contrast the unregulated or openaccess commons with communes A commune is a restricted I t i d b th th th b idiidl b P l li d i iht t ld T i ll d h dititi bt b d b d lt dil A t bli t t d t b t i t d b ti fd S tiiti i t t d th t

Custom Ellik

(1993) b l i tht b d i t b l i h ith i t t d l t ld b l d i E h kid f t il lf i it Liki hi i h it t lit bl P i t l d l l d t i d i i i t d i f t it i t l ik (i d t ) tht i i th I practice communal regimes also lead to indiscriminate dumping of wastes ranging from piles of unwashed dishes in a communal household to ecological disasters that threaten whole continents But not always A C l R (1986) li th fild i l t l ti f d i l ti t l i i iht t t t d thi t i f bl l d i h f th ill fild Th t i i t l d i th i ft h i h th l d t d t th f th d t i f th i Th hi f l usufructuary i th tht th h t i hi t d t th h d itht titi f l t f (M ll usufructuary i h t i t i t l t tht persists only so long as the owner is using an item for its customary purpose Thus you establish a usufructuary right to a park bench by sitting on it but you abandon tht iht h l ) Th f hd l i l i t th l d l l h i it f th fb i i i h t Th tti f ti fdiifiti d i th i k f b i i d b ll di t ll fi tiftti d Th t h t i i l d litd i f l i f i dtdi h d C t f d i l h d d ith titi liiti dlti f C t hibitd t i i t i i i t t ith th l d ' bilit t (Rose 1986: 743) In particular the custom of "stinting" allowed villagers to own livestock only in proportion to the relative size of their (growing season) land hold ings thus maintaining the total livestock at a level consistent with people's estimate f th l d ' i it G b t bld l t id t d i (Of thik b t t t i l l l bl C t k h l l tit tid d it i i d b h i b t th diti t l t) A d i t M t i Bil (1992) th tt b d b R d Ellik l b i i l tib T h t i tib t h t tid ilt bli

666

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

Custom

DAVID SCHMIDTZ AND ELIZABETH WILLOTT

A idiidl h ti i th t i ht iht ll small event (Ellickson 1993 and Demsetz 1967 both use a smallmediumlarge typ ology The discussion here is based on their work modifying the distinctions slightly for the purpose at hand) When the commons is being ruined by small events t h i d i i d l fft i titd t ll th i d bi lti d it h t th l d i t l If t th t it t i t l th ht h t i f t l Th i l l P l t i thi l d b t th d t thi Wht bl i th bl h b l d For better or worse though events come in more than size Suppose that under neath the pasture there is a pool of oil Perhaps six of the ten parcels are situated over the pool in such a way that via oil wells their owners have access to the l Th ll i k th il t t t it H th b f llhd il llhd dli Nt l i th t f il l t i t l fid b t th t f it t h t i ti ll t t b l dli ( ti i t ) ith th b f ll k T h f l h itti i hih h t d side of the fence is no one else's concern Instead the six owners are part of a medium event, the kind of event whose effects are not strictly localized within a parcel but instead tend to spill over on to one's neighbors The six owners cannot l th bl i l b tti f N t h l h ititi h d t Fit d h t i t t it i d i t l t i t th b f ttil i thi t i ihb t h b idi ttil l h ft i t h l i t t t h t th f th l i th h t t Th i jitl tlld b hdfl f l h l i th di t f th di t Si th h th t l d th d l worry about how to control themselves not how to control outsiders A further virtue of privatization is that if there are disputes about how the resource should be handled the disputes will at least be left in the hands of people in the i i i t P l i th i d i t iiit t d t h btt d t d i d i t i fl l diti d th b i btt iti t d i lti itht h f l i t d d Th ll i th b t iti t f th t dbfit f di t Th b t iti th d d l f il l f th i i ih ht h th th fi l t h b ti th l' it ll t Fili tht the group of neighbors that finds itself sharing the common pool resource needs to develop conventions governing their respective rights to drill and extract oil Now though suppose we are dealing with a larger problem an externality with ffl ti fft d i d l h d t h f t f l t i h i P h b i fii il i i d t i l tht fft i t lit f il d Thi ld b point source t l it l il t d t i l itt If l b i t di li d t b i l i l h b t f l th i th dli ith d i d ll d i d f f t I ith fi

668

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

what Ellickson calls a large event The difficulties in detecting such large-event externalities tracing them to their source and holding people accountable for them are difficulties for any kind of property regime It is no easy task to devise institutions that encourage polluters to take responsibility for their actions while simultaneously encouraging everyone else to take all reasonable steps to avoid being harmed by large-scale negative externalities Ellickson (1993) says that private regimes are clearly superior as methods for minimizing the costs of small and medium events When it comes to large events though there is no easy way to say which mix of private and public property is best According to Ellickson there is no general answer to the question of which regime best deals with them Large events also can be divided into subcategories along other lines Releasing toxic wastes into the atmosphere for example may violate existing legal rights or community norms Or such laws or norms may not yet be in place Most of the problems arise when existing customs or laws fail to settle who (in effect) has the right of way That is not exactly a problem with parceling land but more precisely with the fact that key resources like air and waterways remain in a largely unregulated commons So privatization exists in different degrees and takes different forms Different forms have different incentive properties Simply parceling out land or sea is not always enough to stabilize possession of resources that make land or sea valuable in the first place Suppose for example that fish are known to migrate from one parcel to another In that case owners have an incentive to grab as many fish as they can whenever the school passes through their own territory Thus simply dividing fishing grounds into parcels may not be enough to put fishermen in a position to avoid exceeding sustainable yields It depends on the extent to which the soughtafter fish migrate from one parcel to another and on conventions that are continuously evolving to help neighbors deal with the inadequacy of their fences (or other ways of marking territory) Clearly then not all forms of privatization will be equally good as ways of internalizing a given externality Further generally speaking every kind of regime private property regimes included will have a problem handling large events Privatization is not a panacea and not all forms of privatization are equal as ways of avoiding commons problems To repeat we do not wish to paint an overly rosy picture Private owners do have a history of degrading those resources that remain in the commons Privatizing land solves the problem with land but it fails to solve whole classes of problems: external effects spilling over to degrade resources like air and water that remain in a common pool Of course showing that one solution is imperfect is not the same thing as showing we have a better alternative For an especially deft analysis of atmospheric pollution as a commons tragedy see Danielson (1993) Preceding sections borrow from Schmidtz (2001)

Overpopulation In a reference work ranging widely over issues in applied ethics it is worth mentioning what is thought by many to be the greatest of all commons tragedies

669

DAVID SCHMIDTZ AND ELIZABETH WILLOTT

I th h

'

lti

li

Th R

d

Th

Mlth'

Essay on the Principles of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society is a seminal work on the implications of exponentially growing population in a world of limited carrying capacity Among contemporaries Garrett Hardin (1968 1974) th l h l i d th t f t d ifll d l t l l t ti f lti dh i t i bliti t th d l i ld Th bl i Hdi' d i th " f d t b d " S l l f t h hild th t d l th Wld B k d th lif iti f l b l i d t f d th h t fd t h l lbl lti ill i till til th lb' are exhausted at which point we will see global starvation The Green Revolution cannot help Hardin says for if we are looking at a commons tragedy then supply ing exploding populations with more food will only make the problem worse To use t h f d b Hdi th d d f d b t th h b db tti it I 1968 P l E h l i h b hi b k ith th t t t "Th b t t l t f d ll fh i t i I th 1970 th ld ill d f i h d d f illi f l i t t t dth i it f h embarked upon now At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death r a t e " Was Ehrlich right? In fact where one in four people was chronically hungry in 1970 today fewer than one in seven is despite a huge i i th l b l lti di t th U i t d N t i F d d A i lt O i t i (1999) Th US C B (2000) l l t t h t th t f i i th l b l lti k d i 1962 d 1963 t t f 219 t t h b idi b i f Hdi' d Ehlih' di ti H b th 2000 th ( t i t d ) li hd d d t 126 t Wht h b h i ? Fit id h th lti h b i ing The UN World Health Organization (1998) reports a dramatic and widespread increase in life expectancy Worldwide infant mortality was 148 per 1 0 0 0 ive births i n l 9 5 5 ; i n l 9 9 5 it was 59 Expected lifespan at birth worldwide increased f 48 i 1950 t 68 i 1999 Th l l li th th ill b f th t ti J t thi i l diff t f 1 billi f th 3 5 billi l d d d t th lti t bt 1950 d 2000 S t l t f th i h th lti h b i i h thi t d ith th k i d f t d f d b H d i tht i h i bbi h l ill b ibl f f d i th (It d t h have something to do with vaccinations improvements in sanitation increasing food supply and so o n ) Second consider why the rate of increase has been dropping Around the world h d t i l l d d t h i bith t G l b l l th b i t h t t f 5 0 i 1950 t 2 8 i 1999 di t th W l d B k (2000) Th d h b ik tht t l i th l i i t t b t th b l t b f l d d d t th l b h i d i II Th US C B (2000) t i t tht ld lti i d b 8 7 4 illi i 1989 h i 1999 th i 7 7 6 illi Thi i 670

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

happening despite life expectancies still increasing in most countries of the world The UN Population Division (1998) reported in 1998 that 61 countries accounting for 44 percent of the global population have rates of fertility now below replacement levels (Replacement fertility is generally taken to be a birth rate of 2 1 per woman in developed countries where infant and child mortality is minimal) Already by the mid-1970s some of the more developed countries were below replacement fertility Would developing countries follow suit? Although many poorer countries do not have effective data collection virtually all developing countries show an apparent drop in fertility rates Some have dropped to below replacement fertility Why did birth rates drop? The hypothesis before us is that human reproduction is a commons tragedy The data are not in line with the tragic commons prediction though so we now suggest an alternative hypothesis In the example with which we began each shepherd makes a profit from each sheep added to his own flock In the crucial respect though raising children is not like raising sheep for money The first point here is that even women who truly want a larger family do not want a family whose size is increasing without limit So long as someone else pays the cost of feeding the sheep a rational shepherd adds sheep without limit The larger he flock the more rewarding it is to be a shepherd But notice that there is no analogous reason to believe that the larger the family the more rewarding it is to be a mother Thus to the extent that women have control over their fertility they will stop having children at some point Presumably when the birth rate was 5 0 per woman some women were having that many babies by choice while others were having that many babies not by choice but because they were more or less helpless in the face of their cultures and biology The second point then is that sometimes a woman has a child not for the sake of marginal profit but rather because she does not have sufficient control over her fertility in the first place In so far as women have children for the latter reason we can expect birth rates to drop as women acquire the technological tools and cultural freedom to limit family size And indeed birth rates have dropped One major change starting in the 1960s was the development and deployment of highly effective birth control technologies In the 1960s and 1970s Ehrlich (1968) and Hardin (1968) had no way of knowing that almost worldwide women would acquire the cultural and technological resources to better control family size and that when women acquired such resources we would see a striking pattern of movement toward zero population growth Where do we go from here? We do not know The changes have been too dramatic and too rapid for us to dare predict far into the future Many countries have been below zero population growth for over ten years We know that Malthusian growth is not occurring Evidently the tragic commons hypothesis is misleading as a framework for understanding global population problems The UN projects world population to increase but at a decreasing rate until population stabilizes (or even starts to decline) The projection for the earliest stabilization has world population peaking at around 8 billion between 2020 and 2050 then starting to decline We shall see At the moment we do not know ust as back in the 1960s we could not know that so many women would practice effective birth control if given the option (Willott 2001) 671

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Conclusion The logic of the commons is real and cannot be ignored but it is not inexorable The concept of a commons tragedy is an indispensable tool for explaining and understanding many environmental problems facing us today but the concept must be applied with care Commons problems are ubiquitous in human history but not every problem is a commons problem Moreover just as history is replete with commons problems so too is history replete with people who figured out how to solve or at least survive commons problems One main purpose of social institutions especially legal institutions is to internalize externalities preventing people from shifting the cost of their activities on to others Private property is one of the pre-eminent institutions people have developed for the purpose of internalizing externalities The implication is not that everything should be privatized though Instead the implication is simply that institutional frameworks can be judged according to whether they put people in a position irst to recognize when they face a commons problem and second to respond to that problem in a measured effective peaceful way References Bailey Martin J (1992) Approximate optimality of aboriginal property rights Journal of Law and Economics 35: 183-98 Reprinted in D Schmidtz and E Willott (eds) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters? What Really Works? pp 341-7 New York: Oxford University Press 2001 Danielson Peter (1993) Personal responsibility In Harold Coward and Thomas Hurka eds) Ethics and Climate Change: The Greenhouse Effect pp 81-98 Wilfred Laurier University Press Demsetz Harold (1967) Toward a theory of property rights American Economic Review 57: 347-59 Dukeminier Jesse and Krier James E (1993) Property 3rd edn Boston: Little Brown Ehrlich Paul R (1968) The Population Bomb New York: Ballantine Ellickson Robert C (1993) Property in land Yale Law Journal 102: 1315-400 Gordon H Scott (1954) The economic theory of a common-property resource - the fishery Journal ofPolitical Economy 62: 124-42 Hardin Garrett (1968) The tragedy of the commons Science 162: 1243—48 Reprinted in D Schmidtz and E Willott (eds) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters? What Really Works? pp 331-40 New York: Oxford University Press 2001 (1974) Living on a lifeboat BioScience 24: 561-8 Reprinted in D Schmidtz and E Willott (eds) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters? What Really Works? pp 374-86 New York: Oxford University Press 2001 Lloyd W F (1833) Two Lectures on the Checks to Population Oxford: Oxford University Press Malthus Thomas (1803) Essay on the Principles of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society London: T Bensley Rose Carol (1985) Possession as the origin of property University of Chicago Law Review 52: 73-88 (1986) The comedy of the commons: custom commerce and inherently public property University of Chicago Law Review 53: 711-87

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Schmidtz David (2001) The institution of property In D Schmidtz and E Willott (eds) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters? What Really Works? pp 361-72 New York: Oxford University Press United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (1999) The State of Food Insecurity in the World: 1999 (http://wwwfaoorg/NEWS/1999/img/SOFI99-EPDF) United Nations Population Division (1998) 1998 Revision of the World Population Estimates and Projections: Below-replacement Fertility (http://wwwpopinOrg/popl998/7htm) United Nations World Health Organization (1998) Fifty Facts from the World Health Report 1998 (http://wwwwhoint/whr/1998/factsehtm) United States Census Bureau (2000) International Database Total Midyear Population for the World: 1950-2050 (http://USCensusBureauorg/ipc/wwwworldpophtml) Willott Elizabeth (2001) Recent population trends In D Schmidtz and E Willott (eds) Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters? What Really Works? pp 274^83 New York: Oxford University Press World Bank (2000) World Development Report 1999/2000 Selected World Development Indicators (http://wwwworldbankorg/wdr/2000/fullreporthtml)

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Th f thi h t i t i d lif thil i i l i t h Th h fft fit td b S d i h h i t S t A h i i 1896 f t th lld " h " hifl b diid th d t t h t dk th l t h f if Th it f th h fft i t t i th th t h i l d b t f on implications of increasing levels of greenhouse gases and global warming The burning of fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution is the chief cause of increased l l f h i th t h Si i d l l f h lt i it f fft tj t i d i bt l th d h i id tt d t it i t t " l i t h " t f t ll th f f t fi i l l f h Th fit ti f thi h t ill id i f th bl f l i t change Then the next section will survey the science and explore some reasons for the uncertainty in climate science The final section will explore ethical issues such as questions of fairness between industrialized countries and lessdeveloped coun ti bliti t ft ti d ti b t th t d kid f bliti t d th i t itlf

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Clit h h b th b j t fi i d d b t bth b i t l ists and the mainstream public On one side environmentalists have worried that climate change is a threat of such magnitude that "conditions that are essential to lif k it t i k " ( F l i 1991 79) Bill MKibb (1989) tht l i t h th " d f t " b b h i th l i t h " d i d t f it i d d " ti t i f t "S i tit l d b thi l t h t ill b lld ' ' b t it ill t b j t th b t thi i t l " (MKibb 1989 59) I t t th h d i i d i b t l i t h d i th t iht l i i t h t th ii i t l i t h b t th litiiti f i 674

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d i t l li t it th il i t t f i t l i t (Bt t l 1994; Simon 1996) While these debates were largely limited to environmentalists arguably it was the testimony of respected climate scientist James Hansen before the United States Congress in 1988 that made climate change an issue of mainstream bli t t t i H t t d l i l t h t it i "ti t t ffli h" d d i t tht "Glbl i i h " (St 1999) Thi t ltd i id d di f l i t h ildi d i i b th dit f Time i t th i Eth it " f th " f 1988 It i i t t i i ll f thi t h t i t l h i l h h id l t i l littl b t l i t h Th l h d f l f til f i solely on climate change in the major peerreviewed journals in the field (Lemons 1983; Jamieson 1992; Kverndokk 1995) It is possible that the limited discussion of climate change as such is due to the especially technical nature of the science t h h thi h t t d i t l thiit f di i t th t h i l dbt i f l i titi th f till difd i i ilt M l i k l it i b th t h i l i id b l i t h h b i t f l l h h f ft ti A l f thi B N t (1991) discusses climate change as just one example of a class of problems that he char acterizes as "third generation" environmental problems These problems differ from earlier environmental problems because they involve "apparently small risks of t l i fft" (Nt 1991 210) Th th ft tht d i t i i h l i t h f li i tl bl F i t th t lit f l i t h ll tht f th ltil i t l bl h th t f l t k idtifi th l diffilt t h i l d ll t tit dd i t Th ltil l t i f f i d ii f h t th f f t f l i t h d th b i t d lit of the causal chains make identifying and characterizing the effects of climate change particularly complex This is compounded by the fact that there will be some good effects of climate change alongside the bad effects A result of this uncer t i t i tht d i i b d d diti fl th ft k ld tht h ttill t t h i Th titi diffilti f l i k b f th ttill ti f fili t t th bl B th ti th i lt itifi tit b t d f l i t h b th ti th t l d it ill b t lt t th fft f l i t h hih expected to last for several centuries after greenhouse gas emissions are reduced A second feature of climate change concerns uncertainties about moral obliga tions and responsibilities Those who enjoy the benefits of industrialization and the i d h ii t b th t f f t d b th lt f l i t h itti tht i ti b t it Fth f th l h t likl t b f f t d t b b t d i i bi d hih fft t l t h i li b t l th diti f t i th f t Th l i b l h ti t th i t i l i t h i d b t bliti 675

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A thid f t f l i t h i tht llti ti i t i l l t t in understanding its dynamics Collective action problems are those where individ ual actions may not be themselves harmful but result in harms when coupled with the effects of others (Olson 1965; Hardin 1994) Climate change is a function not j t f ht i l idiidl i l t d bt l f h t th idiidl th t i d Gi tht tit i i th f f t f l i t h l ill f t it t tt i t i t th fft I d d t h i k it i t t i l t t i th tit th f t it t if th ti f th i d i i d l ti lii t th f f t f l i t h I th dti d i th amounts of emissions then the lower the total amount of warming and the smaller the ecosystemic and economic effects

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Si h f th bli d b t h h i d th tit f th i it i i t t t b l b t ht i t i d i t i l i t h d what remains to be discovered The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (EPCC) comprised of two thousand climate scientists reported in 1995 that climate change existed and is caused by human activity The most recent IPCC report ndi t t h t th i " d t id tht t f th i b d th l t 50 i ttibtbl t h tiiti" ( I t t l P l C l i t Ch 2001) Th b f i t i t i l d i thi j t d th i ltil d d t h t it f l t th i f l i t itit M th fidi f th IPCC h b h k d b th N t i l R h C i l t th t f th U i t d S t t t Th N tional Research Council concluded that the evidence for climate change was stronger than that found by the IPCC and concluded that "Temperatures are in fact rising" and that "Human activities are responsible for the increase" (Committee on the Si f C l i t Ch N t i l R h C i l 2001) Th d t d i f l i t h h b d d ti d it t t f id ildi b t i ll t i l ti f l i t Eid f l i t h f it f ildi b t i h h i t i l d t t h i d t t di tdi f th t h d i th l i h t (i dt) hik f l i t h i f f t d h i th d i t i bution and range of plants and animals and an increase in average global ocean levels In addition to these observations of climate change computer models are used to both understand and predict global climate change Due to the increased d t d i i d d b thi b d id th i l i t i t i t t h t th ld i i d t h t th h i l i t d d t h t th f l i t h i h tiiti t i l l th b i ff i l f l H th f f t f l i t h th ld' t d i t tl l ll d t d Th IPCC t t h t th " t k f 676

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l i t h hih" di l d dditil i h i th d i t i b tion and amounts of precipitation change in the distribution and number of ex treme climate events such as droughts and hurricanes changes in the distribution of human and animal diseases and sealevel rise There is also uncertainty whether l i t h iht i l t h h l d fft f d b k l hih ld d t i h i t C t l th f t t tit b t l i t h th fft f l i t h h iti I l th il i idit tht l i t h ill t f f t ll h i t i i th d t th d Th tht td t b t fftd b l i t h have the least capacity to adapt and change because they lack education infor mation wealth and resources and management capacities There are several reasons why uncertainty exists in the science of climate h Cl C (1993) h l d th i h i h th iti f i t l i ili it t d t i kid f tit A l t h h hi k h l k d t ik f i t l t t i h i l it b t d d t l i t h E i t l itit b i ith th ti tht h h fft til th h b di it ways Demonstrating these properties often requires substantial technical sophisti cation which is perhaps one reason why the hypothesis of global warming irst proposed in the late nineteenth century took another century to be demonstrated I dditi th d i i t i f i t l itit i t id kid f (fl iti) h thi l i i t k l h tht ii itd ith l i t h h th i ft t C t id f l iti ttill k it likl t it th t f h d i t k l h tht ii t i t d ith l i t h h th i f t (fl t i ) Th b d f f i t fl iti if tti f ttill l i t h i bt Th ti i i onmental science and regulation is that a product has no effect until proved other wise unlike the situation in the medical sciences where the presumption requires that substances be shown to be safe and effective before use A fth liti i t h t th f f t f h h l lt id t b b l h i d i l thhld fft h fft tid til ti tti i hd G h fft tht ll d t i d tht i h fdifft lt i th fft F l i b b tit b f l i t h bt l b thi hbitt i reduced due to human actions and any number of other potential reasons Another reason for uncertainty about climate change is that there is an asym metry between information about the benefits of climatechanging substances and thi d fft F l il i d t i h bi i t i t d t d th t f d i thi d t bt h l f i t i t di th ttil i t l t f llti d b thi d t Th l ti bt d l d ti hih d t f th h ii dl d l d ti hih td t b th b t f th fft 677

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L t l th il h th t b tit than is actually the case For example climate scientist Richard Lindzen has asserted that climate research is "polluted with political rhetoric" and that in creased emissions of greenhouse gases due to the burning of fossil fuels have about h fft lbl l i t h " bttfl h t it i " (G 2001 39) U d t d t f itifi dil hi i id d i t i f jit ii M t ll f hi i d i t f th ii h b f th N t i l R h C i l t d tht l d d tht l i t h i i d t h t it d t h ti H th t l f l i t i i th l di i d vertently give greater weight to such views than they have within the scientific community Portraying the scientific debate as having two equal sides and giving both views similar amounts of time serves to overemphasize disagreement and fails t i th d t h i h th jit f l i t itit i t b t l i t h I t th i hih i t l i i d i d t ti kid f tit di t th f t t h t i t i t lld b l i k f i f t i d t k dti l i t h some have advocated a "precautionary" approach to environmental science (Bar rett and Raffensperger 1999) Precautionary science is a view about how science should proceed in the light of uncertainty and argues that in the face of scientific titi l hld fi f ti tht iht h th i t I dditi thi i t t h t th b d f ff i th ft f ti f l l th h ti it Th i dbt b t hth th ti h i l h i i hth it i t d i i t t t ti l b t th i t E if thi ik ti ht l i t i ld h t d d f id th f i i li it i i t t t t tht d i i till d t be made concerning how to prioritize environmental policy Ethical issues will continue to exist even after the effects of climate change are well understood It s to a discussion of the uncertainties concerning environmental values that I turn n t ti th

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It i t d d i i t l thi t d i t i i h b t f th humans in our dealings with the environment and concern for the environment itself The discussion that follows first reviews obligations toward other humans di l i t h d th di th l ti b t bliti t th i t i t l f Si it i td tht l i t h ill t f f t ll l d ll ti th i i d b l i t h it d jti i th t t t f th l Rltd t i f it t d iti l i fi t t i l it d t th f t t h t t f th f f t f l i t h ill h i t l i d t i th f t Si l i t h d t h

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th fft difft t d iht h difft fft ithi a given ecosystem a third moral issue about climate change raises questions of he way in which we characterize the harm to the environment as well as the nature of our obligations to the environment R i t h h ll f th i i th thi f l i t h i th ti f ht hld b d h it i ti ht lit i (Lk h t 2000) U t i l th i i th diffilti f d i hth t t i th t tit ill i Th i b d t d i i f th j t i f i t i f l l i i l tiliti jtifiti d t l i l jtifiti f i i t jtifiti d th b t th t t t f iit questions has received less discussion There is a similar diversity of justifications in environmental ethics (Hargrove 2001) However the issue of how to prioritize issues in environmental ethics needs to be explored in greater detail For example l t h h it i ibl t d h ii b i l thi l ith it t fl t d ttill l b l fft i d i l i t f l t Clit h i i f it d jti b it i td tht l i t h ill t fft ll l ll ti th Th number of approaches to equity focusing on maximizing the greatest good for he greatest number on minimizing the impact on the least fortunate on determin ations of who is most responsible and on the allocation of property rights In dditi it i ibl t d i t i i h d i f f t t f lit h iti i fi i fi t d i fi titi S h d t h t it b ibl t fid t f f i b f i th h th t ff ( D t 1993) E i tl tit h h i d tht li jtifti ill b t h th i fdifft t h t i l i (Liht d K t 1996) T i t hth f thil i i ibl i l i t change is particularly helpful given the controversy over climate change Historically land use practices concerning pollution involve norms of dilution and dispersion So long as an individual's pollution is less than the capacity of the t t b b d i l t it d l th llti i t i i th th i ll t l bl Th t h i l bl f l i t h t f th f t t h t th llti f h d ht b diltd d b b d b th t h Wht iht b l l d th d f l t i i llti i k th " l l t i i i l " d t t t h t th t f llti h l d b i t l i d i t th t f th d t Thi i b d th straightforward idea that if someone causes a problem whether intentionally or not they should in the future take steps not to cause the problem again However the pollution principle is "forwardlooking" and does not address the problem of h f l fft f l i t h d t ii f h i th t H Sh (1999) h d f bliti b i d t i l i d ti t d h ii i th f t ll t t th ti f h i l i t ii Th t i t h t it i il l i i d t i l i d ti h h d th bl Th i d t i l i ti tht l i t h t bl f th l t bt 679

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l l h i d bfit f it E if i t d d i d t i l i d countries have got benefits without paying for them they have exacted a taking against nonindustrialized countries However emissions of greenhouse gases are far from unintended Industrialized countries have continued to produce greenhouse ii l ft it h b k t h t th l i t h Sh l d t h t t th t t tht i d t i l i d ti h d t tibti t th bl f l i t h th th h bliti t "hld b d tht l t l t t th t t f th fi d t i l t k " (Sh 1999 534) S d Sh tht l i i d t i l i d ti h t bilit to pay to fix the harms caused by global warming Given the assumption that industrialized countries have managed to produce a surplus of individual wealth and nonindustrialized countries are struggling to provide a basic minimum then fi i th ith t bilit t h l d t ti f th b d Thi it i t i l B t Sh t t h t if i d t i l i d ti j t ith f th i t d t h t th i l bliti t hl l d l d ti th "iti f tt h l bli ti t it lth t t i d l i ith th i t l bl t h t th wealthy states' own industrial processes are producing" (Shue 1999) If an indus trialized country were to reject the argument about responsibility or the argument about ability to pay and assert that there is no obligation to help developed coun ti th l d l d t h Chi h bliti t hl t th U i t d Stt If i d t i l i d ti h i t t i idi h f l i t h th th h i t t i l d l d ti d l i thi i i tht i i i th ii f h C tl l i d t i l i d ti t hl f l d l d ti t t bt l i t h th i d t i l i d ti d bliti t hl t th l d l d ti An additional argument could be made that if some countries can reduce their greenhouse gas emissions more efficiently and less expensively than others then all things being equal the lessexpensive options should be tried first (Claussen and M N i l l 2000) Thi t i t h t th i diiihi t d i h ii f i it f i t t At thi it it i fl t d i t i i h bt i ibiliti f ii i t f h idiidl' tibti di t f h t ' tibti Sti t th d t i l f th i i b i l t h i l d h b th bjt f titi f th U i t d N t i C f Glbl C l i t Change Markets in emissions are advocated by freemarket environmentalists who think that market forces and the rule of law should govern environmental policy concern i l i t h (Ad d L l 2001) If t iht td t th t h th th f th th td h ld titt i i t i t h ' t M k t h t t h t th ihi t th thi h ld h t h iht f th Si t i likl t h t th U i t d S t t ld th it h f t i h t t th t h it ld h t h th f t h ' ii h It ld 680

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tht t h h th t h t i l h f Sh d th f k t environmentalists differ there nevertheless appears to be convergence about policy: industrialized countries such as the United States who are causing the problem are bound to compensate nonindustrialized countries I dditi t it iti l th i l th ti f it t i l it dti t ft ti h td t b t f th h f l i t h Th i t i litt b t dti t ft ti (d S h l i t 1995) S t d d t h i fi t t i l it h l d d tht bliti t hild d t h i hild t th bliti t l h i h t li i th d i t t ft I t t i onmentalists have generally held that there are obligations to distant future gener ations of people as well as to the future members of species and future ecosystems and that if standard theories do not account for these obligations then new theories dd N t f l ld t h t if t d d t h i f bliti t ft ti hibit " i t i f flt b l i t i t ditt ti th th t h i i d t b thi til t " t d l ith i tl bl h l i t h (Nt 1991 216) Th bl f dti t ft ti b h i d h I l t ti which will prevent harms to future generations also will lead to increased quality of life for the current generation Developing alternative and cleaner energy sources and improving conservation efforts benefit those currently living as well as future ti ( B t i t l 2001) Thi d i i i il k t h dd t dd b f l iti F l it d t dd th i l i t i f difft tl f ik l illi t t k i k i th i t t i th ik th ( S h d F h t t 1991) N d it dd th f i t l i t t h t th ti t h t d i th dti f h i itlf ll d ifliti fi b d th currently living and on those in the future (Milbrath 1993) Perhaps the most important omission of much discussion of climate change is the implications of climate change for other species and ecosystems E i t l thiit h l d b i iti t t i b t t th d i i f th t h i l i l i t i f l i t h f th i d t d th id f thi h t kth ibiliti Th i it f f jtifi th l f th i t h Th t likl didt t dd bliti t d th i t i l i t h i tht f bliti t d t d l i l th th species or individual animals (Rolston 1975; Scherer 1988; Callicott 1989) It s helpful to distinguish between different timescales to evaluate the effects of climate change on species and ecosystems From a very longterm perspective of tens of t h d f t h d d f t h d f th h b l b f i titi ll th ti f i I th l i i ill b tit d i ill b t d th bli ti i t h t t t til i it t bt th t t t ll b i l i l d i i t d th ll it f t t iti t h l 681

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Obliti t d th i t i th h t idbl complex and turn on questions of how to characterize harm to ecosystems and on questions of how to prioritize ecosystem management Given the scientific consen sus that currently there is continuing global loss of biological diversity and assum i t h t th t t ll i t t ll t ll th th ti i th h t i f t iiti I i l th i iti f th d t i d t i f "th k i d f b i d i i t t h t t i i f i t t th t f t i " (Wlk 1992) P t t i th i tht h d i t i t fft t f t i id t iiti t fft F l it i ibl t d i t i i h b t called "driver" and "passenger" species in ecosystems on the grounds that ecological functions are disproportionately affected by the removal of some species (drivers) and that the loss of others (passengers) has relatively little effect on t f t i (Wlk 1992) A t h dl f th d i t i t fft f i t f t i i t fthi hbitt ilti i til th t t l h d d b ti i lld " t i " (J t l 1994) E t i ildi h di i l b d t ll h d i t i t fft on ecosystem function by creating structures that other species can also use That ecosystem engineers create goods and services for other species and that their removal results in loss of ecosystem functions are reasons for making their man t iit Ath ii f ti i t l i hih l i t h iht h i t th i t h t th i t id t h iti i th h t R t litt t t h t i t idi i d d i h hbitt f d ll it f i l f d i t i t t t h h dti dfld t l Th id h i t t t th iti f t to provide ecosystem goods and services as a way of prioritizing management To the extent that the interests of n o n h u m a n species in ecosystems are frequently the same as those of humans then protecting the capacity of ecosystems to provide d d i i liht f l i t h i l f bt h d i t l thi T th t t tht t l bl b th id t d d i d t th t t tht h l thi ii f t d th t hld l i t i iit t tti th iti b th thi d i i i f h d l i t h A th f f t f l i t h continue there will be an increasing need to think seriously about obligations to restore ecosystems and to protect biodiversity if only to protect human nterests (Gobster and Hull 2000; Throop 2000) I l i thi h t h t d t h t th i l t l tit b t th fft f l i t h d l t b t it t ti t iit h ii Gi thi tit it i likl t h t th t i i diti ill f h th i bt th thi f f l i t f it d th thi f f th i t f it k I til h th t ii f 682

GLOBAL WARMING

focuses on protecting and restoring those ecosystem goods and services that protect people from the effects of climate change and those that protect biodiversity and the capacity of ecosystems to adapt to climate change

References Free Market Environmentalism Barrett K and Raffensperger C (1999) Precautionary science In C Raffensperger and J Tichner (eds) Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle Eco-sanity: A Common-sense Guide to Environmentalism Lanham MD: Madison Books May Cooler Tempers Prevail: Let Technology Reduce Hot Air over Global Warming Callicott J B (1989) In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy Albany NY: State University of New York Press Equity and Global Climate Change: The Complex Elements of Global Fairness Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions Washington DC: National Academy of Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law York: Oxford University Press Dasgupta P (1993) An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution Oxford: Clarendon Press Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Pohcies and Future Generations York: Routledge Flavin C (1991) The heat is on: the greenhouse effect In L Brown (ed) The World Watch Reader on Global Environmental Issues Restoring Nature: Perspectives from the Social Sciences and Humanities Grossman D (2001) Dissent in the maelstrom Scientific American November: 38-9 A Very Brief History of the Origins of Environmental Ethics for the Novice Center for Environmental Philosophy Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001) Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report Science Technology and Human Values 17 (2): 139-53 Oikos Kverndokk S (1995) Tradeable C0 2 Environmental Values Lemons J (1983) Atmospheric carbon dioxide: environmental ethics and environmental Environmental Ethics Environmental Pragmatism Lockhart T (2000) Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences New York: Oxford University Press The End of Nature

683

ROBERT HOOD

Milbrath L W (1993) Redefining the good life in a sustainable society Environmental Valves, 2 (3): 261-70 Norton B (1991) Toward Unity among Environmentalists. New York: Oxford University Press Olson M (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press Rolston H I (1975) Is there an ecological ethic? Ethics 85(2): 93-109 Scherer D (1988) A disentropic ethic The Monist, 70 (October): 3-32 Shrader-Frechette K (1991) Risk and Rationality. Berkeley CA: University of California Press Shue H (1999) Global environment and international inequality International Affairs, 75: 531-45 Simon J L (1996) The Ultimate Resource 2. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press Stevens W K (1999) 1998: warmest year of past millennium Science News, 155 (March 20): 191 Throop W (ed) (2000) Environmental Restoration: Ethics, Theory, and Practice. Amherst: Humanity Books Walker B H (1992) Biodiversity and ecological redundancy Conservation Biology, 6 (1): 18-23

684

Id

bti

344 t f t 31314 ibilit t f t l 31419 sanctity of human life 3 1 9 2 4 Absence of Malice ( f l ) 600 The Academy of Management Journal 544 Aditti B d f E i i d Technology (ABET) 6 2 0 1 t i i dititi (AOD) 4768 ti 47881 d f i d 475 iti d ti duties 4 8 1 5 Ad B 5801 thti b f t tili 289 ffiti ti b k d l k i arguments 1 1 8 1 9 1 2 4 7 ; forward lki t 11824 i h i h d t i 5079 agism and bioethical issues 303 ilt / i t t 66272 AIDS see HIV/AIDS Alexander Leo 3 3 7 8 All Things Considered ( d i ) 604 A l h i ' di 432 A i A d f P d i t i (AAP) gun control 1 9 7 8 A i A i t i fE i 6224 American Booksellers Assn Hudnut 157 161 A i Cll fObttii d G l i t 378 A i Mdil A i t i bioethics 309; euthanasia and assisted i i d 339 killi d ltti di 4 5 1 2

A i S i t f Ciil E i (ASCE) 627 A i S i t f M h i l E i (ASME) 627 A i S i t fN Editors 6 0 2 3 A i S i t f R d t i Mdii t t h h d 3789 Americans with Disabilities Act 424 429 A t I t t i l 81 Ad E l i b t h 430 431 Andre Judith 539 Ad Li t t h h d 372 373 A l l M i 419 animals: biotechnology 5 3 4 5 ; d i t i i h d f h 5258 t dbidiit 4445 6812 i t i i l f 6389 l agency 4 4 0 1 ; moral status 446 4 4 7 8 ; ti 4423 ffi d killi f 52935 Anscombe G E M 258 2 5 9 6 0 t h t i 6357 6401 6447 A i h K Ath 104 Alb Ath 590 5 9 1 2 l i d thi h 1012 flit and disagreement 14; defining 2 3 ; d l t f 12 l 1213 i t l i d externalism 3 7 ; role of 14; ifti 8 1213 t d d btt dl 710

685

INDEX

Nicomachean Ethics see also

Ethics in Finance see

Kantian Capitalism How to Do Things with Words Brave New World

see

Rethinking Business Ethics Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies

INDEX

obligations of corporations 5 5 4 7 ; ti t h i 5 4 0 2 554 il t t th 55960 t k h l d th 5424 5613 t d d t i 5449 Bd J 151 B Pt 433 Cllh D i l 299 4 0 1 2 C l l i t t J B i d 444 6 3 7 8 639 642 C d itihi dd i i t 219 221 hate crimes 144 1 5 0 1 ; Quebecois 267 274 276 i h t 1 4 7 8 Capital ( M ) 67 itli i jti 69 f d dlibl t l i t 68 M 629 litil liti 6972 thi d l l t i h i 5223 C J h 2 2 6 3 0 234 235 C i Ad The Gospel of Wealth 5 5 2 3 C l l A h i 554 thi 9 1 0 1 7 1 8 C h D i d 47683 it btt dl 8 9 Cthli C h h riti f h i t 441 " D l t i S l Ethi" 1801 dti t h l 351 " t l " dti 346 causation: actomission distinction 4 7 8 8 1 hi I t t 1 5 7 8 l f b i t / h 1558 C t l Itlli A (CIA) MKULTRA

hit Chh hild

41 ld h

rit

412

t t l i 23941

414

5523

262 see b t i d t i ti i r i dti t h l t t h h d Childress James 2 9 9 3 0 0 Chitiit 1801 Chhill L 4056 Citi C t M h t t 6289 itihi t f 21112 d iti dibiliti 4 3 1 3 t ibilit 5634 d i i t d ltiltli 21722 idtit 212 d

i i t i 22635 l i b l d b t 21213 litil litii 236 " t M i t t h i " 71 t t l i t i l t h h t 210 2 1 2 1 3 h l f 21517 "Citihi dS i l C l " ( M h l l ) 21213 iil d i b d i dfiiti 50 5 1 5 jtifti 501 5560 d il 55 rii d ti 50 Civil Rights Act 429 l itlit litti 64 d i t i h i 21718 M t l f 6972 Cl H W 6223 l i t h see l b l i / l i t h Clit Bill D l l 384 di bi 6023 l i 351 D l l th h 382 i t d 388 ti dbt 385 3 8 8 9 0 i t t l i t i 3867 i 3923 h i l h i l d il dbt 3858 3901 ti t 3934 bli d f i l ti t 3845 t h l f 382^ Cl D 5 Cochrane Philip 554 Ch G A 64 h th 1012 l l t i i t t 2 1 6 676 Clli J C 541 Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (ith P ) 565 i t i i 638 b d i t l 59 t bithil i f 3012 t thi tt d t tokens 610 612; applied ethics dl 61618 i 61215 i t t t i f ti 608 6 0 9 1 2 t h l ' i 61516 i i 608 6 1 1 1 5 fidtilit f i l thi 58990 flit 14 t bithil i f 302 d i l 41315

687

INDEX

C C C C C C C C

tili 2630 d b l f f t d t i 465 t t i h t 757 t t i i / t t l i 2 1 6 iil dibdi 5860 i t t i il t t th 55960 i t t i l jti 2846 tili d t 6523 k J t 597 Jh 515 D i d 277 ti see b i thi C l 677 t i 2678 N 296 Chl 300 h l k i 258

D i l N 427 h l t h 4014 D i l Pt 669 D i L d 428 D G R i h d 546 dth bithil i 302 see also t h i d itd i i d killi dth lt 8 1 7 iti 86 Deep Throat ( f l ) 159 d i f d t i 498500 t M i t thi 702 D t H l d 664 d t l 304 d t i f dbl f f t 464 i t t i 314 D l i P t i k 1301 Di Pi fWl 269 Dirty Hands ( S t ) 1 7 0 1 dibilit t i d i i i t i dl 42930 b i t h i l i 302 hll ti i i 35861 iti 4 3 1 3 t dl 42930 t i 4245 dil f lit 4 3 0 1 dil dl f 4267 til li th 4345 d dti t h l 34950 d il jti 42531 il dl 4279 Dibilit D i i i t i A t 424 d i i i t i ffiti ti 1182 7 see also l d i i d t i fd b l f f t 31 4 6 4 5 D d d R i h d 547

688

Dl R b t 6023 D l l th h 382 ti t 3845 D Al 4 5 5 7 killi d ltti di 460 D l d Th 539 546 5 5 9 6 0 d b l f f t d t i 31 4 6 4 5 D C i 555 Dred Scott d i i 196 D J 239 2 4 1 2 246 d 134 D k i i J 664 D f Th 539 5 5 9 6 0 dt t i i dititi (AOD) 4 7 5 8 5 i i l b l litil t 1 7 2 3 " t l " 58 b d i ddibdi 5560 iti d ti 4815 D k i Ad 1 5 6 7 161 D k i R l d 118 bti 319 ffiti ti 123 d i b i l i t 427 l d lit 131 iht f dti 3934 E I ( f i l ) 445 E t b k Jd 157 161 i f 66272 i t t i l jti 283 kt ht l i t h 6801 kt hi i d t i 5003 f t ti 534 d t i f f t i ti 5079 i f 498500 i i t i h i 21517 i l t i 5034 d 498510 h i h 5079 kt hi 5003 ltiltli 5039 d liti 5 0 5 7 d 106 109 E d d S D 4323 E h l i h P l 670 671 E i t i A l b t 268 Ellik R b t 666 6 6 7 9 Ellit R b t 638 E l t t Will (EAW) 540 E l h d t J H Tit 6 4067 E l F i d i h Manifesto of the Communist

Party ( i t h M ) 65 73 i i thi 6 2 1 3 d l i f 6203 i f 621 ti f t f 62231

d d

INDEX

environmental ethics: as applied thi 6 4 0 7 db i 5468 llti ti 676 d i 66272 t d biodiversity 4 4 4 5 6 8 1 2 ; t i i 634 h l i 633 6 3 7 4 0 tthi 201 lti 66971 l l i 6 3 9 ^ 0 647 pragmatism 647; rejecting t h t i 6357 6401 6447 i 286 ibl objectivism 6 5 5 6 0 ; uncertainty and l i t h 67683 l d t 65060 iti f d b t 6 3 3 4 0 see also i t t i l justice E t i R i h d 399 Mortal Peril 400 lit f f t i ti 11827 f i l 4478 i t i h i d multiculturalism 2 2 0 1 ; and dibilit 4 3 0 1 d t i f litii 5057 l d litil 2256 d l relationships 5 2 0 1 ; using genetic i i 3647 Essay on the Principles of Population (Malthus) 670 t h i l th 1718 tili 2630 t t i i 214 contractualism 21 2 4 6 3 0 1 ; d t l 304 t f 17 tthi 17 2 0 1 ti 17 1 8 1 9 "th l " 3901 virtue 31 3 4 6 Ethi C i t t f th A i Ftilit S i t 370 Ethics and Excellence (Solomon) 545 Ethics in Finance ( B t i h t ) 548 thiit d t i 5012 i i t i titi 2 3 3 4 see also i i t i race and racism E C t i H R i h t 393 E Ui 385 euthanasia and assisted suicide 302 3 0 3 4 ; t i t 3305 df f 32930 d f i t i d distinctions 3 2 6 9 ; doubleeffect

d t i 4 6 4 7 4 killi d ltti di 4 5 1 6 1 l l idti 33540 E Willi 562 experimentation animal 5 3 4 5 i t t i h 4212 b f i 41516 t 41315 thil i i l f 41213 justice 4 1 6 2 1 ; respect for 41315 il h 4 t t i t h t d l 41012 whistleblowing 5 7 1 2 ; see also whistle b l i fili l bliti 51314 parentchild love 5 1 7 1 8 ; see abo l t i h i Fatal Vision ( M G i ) 5 9 8 9 601 Fib J l 1 2 9 ^ 0 281 365 feminism: equity and difference 1 1 2 1 3 ; t f 104 d l l t i h i 521 d h 154 160 d dti t h l 3478 fertility see reproductive technology F i l d 257 Flth J h 308 338 food: meateating and animals 5 2 9 3 4 F d dD Adiitti 413 Food Lion, Inc. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 598 F t Phili 4578 Ford Motors 555 F k R b t 548 F k Willi 415 416 F d i k Willi C 5 5 2 3 Values, Nature, and Culture in the American Corporation 545 f d d itli 68 freedom of expression: dilemma of 1 4 2 3 ; dht h 14951 i t t l titti iht 1459 lti 195 F R E d d 546 i t d business 547; separation thesis 5 4 1 2 ; t k h l d th 5 4 3 4 561 562 F h Pt 538 F d S i d 181 Friedan Betty 104 Fid Mil 523 Fid Milt 501 5 3 8 9 5 5 7 8 friendship see relationships Fll H B 558

689

INDEX

Fll L 5925 F B f d 151 ft ti see jti

i

t

t

i

l

th 592 Gdhi M h d K iil d i b d i 50 53 Gthi D i d 283 G l i W i l l d 299 Gll E t 268 lii 10 ti i i dibiliti iht hll t 35861 h t 3614 t d 3567 f 3647 " f l dibilit" 357358 " f l lif" 3 5 7 8 see also l i dti t h l ti h d i l 5278 Gt B d 5 G i l b t J D i l R 546 548 Gilli C l 113 522 Gl Sth 597 lbl i / l i t h l ti f 674 t h i l titi 67883 f t f l i t h bl 6746 h 674 6 7 7 9 679 itif t i t 6 7 6 8 see also i t l thi G d i R b t 2 4 5 6 250 Gd H S t t 662 The Gospel of Wealth ( C i ) 5 5 2 3 G R l d 403 Gti H 255 2 5 7 8 t l i i l d b t 199207 d i 1957 d t h d ij ttiti 198 t i t l t t 1935 i t l d b t 199 i f 1923 hi d t d 200 d f 2078 d 196 201 tit i 1979 H h i S t t 586 H t J 79 H f i Hil 373 H J 675

690

H Mtth 4589 H d i G t t 662 lti 670 671 ld h 240 241 2 4 2 3 H E 636 H l Jti 120 H i J h 332 428 H t H L A 80 480 f i t t l l l 99100 i l i t dh 129 130 H t E d i Organizational Ethics and the Good Life 545 H d M d i l S h l 327 Hti C t 299 ht i df h 1423 14951 h t t 14950 i t t l titti iht 1459 d th l 1435 1512 H l V l 216 H k i Gd 199200 H d Ti 635 hlth fft f t 389 h t h t i l t t th 4016 i fj t i 3968 l i b t i h 4068 t U i t i / t l l i l h 3 9 8 4 0 1 407 see also bithi i t t i ti i i H l G W F i t i i 59 i h t 79 H l d V i i i 522 Hliki D l t i t 4 1 2 1 3 414 H l t t P k d 556 Hicklin 1556 Hitl Adlf Mein Kampf 338 HIV/AIDS b i t h i 305 h l t h 418 41921 dh l i t 184 185 Hbb Th 559 t t i i 22 23 l f t i 258 d il 2545 Hl J Oli W d l l 585588 h l i t ht i 151 l l li 1 3 6 7 140 di d tlit 6046 N i hf " " 410 411 h 163 i d t 1 8 3 6 see abo h t i H A M 480 How to Do Things with Words ( A t i ) 161 Hudnut 157 161

INDEX

human beings: distinguished from i l 5258 ti h i t th 4412 K t diit 3867 H G P j t 356 Human Rights Watch 604 H D i d 390 H 258 h 2389 2501 hit option 2 3 9 4 1 ; duty and responsibility to it 24450 i d l t 2414 Huntington's chorea 356 Hth F i it th 3135 H l Ald Brave New World 363 IBM's "Big Blue" 363 idtit d l i 389 d i i t d i t i h i 21722 d ti 26771 bliti f 2723 Pfit' idtit problem 3 4 8 5 0 ; politics of 212 307 I t i f f M i h l 262 i i t i d itihi 22730 liti db d 22630 issues of 2 2 4 5 ; partiality and titi 2305 litil litii 2256 India 260 Ititt f E l t i l d E l t i E i (IEEE) 627 i t t l i l i 3867 environment 645; reproductive iht 3513 i t t i d t l 314 d b l f f t d t i 46474 intergenerational justice: alternative ti 2912 l i t h 681 i t l thi 646 h f reproductive technology 3 4 8 5 1 ; and libli 281 2 8 2 6 d l i b t i i 2813 l t i t l bl 675 i for 2 8 6 8 ; skepticism and t 27982 tibilit 28893 I t t l P l C l i t Ch (IPCC) 676 International Covenant of Civil and Political R i h t 393 I 262 Irigaray Luce 113

J 264 268 J k A 432 433 Jff Th 205 Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 411 414 J dJ d i itihi d d i i t 2 1 8 1 9 Hitl M i 338 il t t i f t i 123 Johnson v Calvert 3 74 J H 611 J A l b t 308 627 journalism 5 8 5 6 ; falsehoods and l i i 5978 di bi 6 0 2 4 d tlit 6046 thi b d t i 5989 bli' i h t t know 5 9 9 6 0 1 The Journalist and the Murder ( M l l ) 5 9 8 9 601 J J Ulysses b i t 155 justice: affirmative action 1 1 8 2 4 ; capital i h t 817 tili d tibtii 7581 d t l 33 d dibilit 4 2 5 3 1 h l t h 3968 human experimentation 4 1 6 2 1 ; and h 24650 i t t i l 27993 til li d disability 4 3 4 5 K h A l 386 K i Yl 3368 Kamm Frances 315 4 5 2 3 K t I l 78 518 itli 544 t i l i t i 587 t t l i 2 4 5 d t 42 239 education 498; ends and means 599; h d i i t 3867 tf 9 6 7 440 t i b t i 823 universalizability 1 8 5 6 Kantian Capitalism ( B i ) 544 K G 363 K L R "Th W i d f Repugnance" 3 9 0 1 K t J 144 148 150 Kl M i h l 538 Kl H b t A Time to Speak 4 Kempton Willett 6 4 5 6 K d J h F 601 K d Ititt f Ethi 299 Ketchum Sara Ann 377 K k i D J k 451

691

INDEX

K i k d S i l d ditil l 51718 killi t i i dititi 47585 f i l 5301 itl i h t 817 d t i f dbl f f t 4 6 4 7 4 killi d ltti di 315 3 3 1 4 4 5 1 6 1 see also t h i d itd iid Ki Jh 151 Ki J M t i L t h iil dibdi 50 L t t f B i i h J i l 97 l f i 96 97 Kitt E 4312 Klk G 200 K h D l 545 Khl M i 338 Ki J E 664 Kitl I i 133 K S l 411 414 Kh Hl 399^01 K d 268 274 K l i k Will 234 lb

itlit litti 629 l ' iht 5601 i 110 L b d 664 LFlltt H h f i d h i 514 l jdiil bd S i t l 47585 btt 910 i t i h i 211 iil d i b d i 5060 t 617 i i l h fi l i t 12840 d l t f l i d thi 2 t h i d itd iid 33540 t l lit 5 h t t 14950 ht i 1512 dl 593 b i t / h 1558 t i h t 44 l lit f l 586 58990 t t h h d 3737 t t i l d iti h 5 8 6 0 see also i h t l t l dii 34 l lit 5 9 4 5 d 255 see also iht L M i Willi 62830 L l d Ald 444 A Sand County Almanac 638 L h Nh di 3578 ltti di 315 3 3 1 ^ 4 5 1 6 1 L J b 21819

692

L i D i d 479 L i M i h l 599 libli itihi 21213 i 68 i t t i l jti 281 2 8 2 6 di bi 6 0 3 6 see also t l liti l i b t i i hlth ii 4067 i t t i l jti 2813 dti libt 3456 lif b i t h i l i f 302 lit f 3 9 8 4 0 1 see also b t i L l d W F 662 L k Jh t / t t 58 t llti 46 l 1 8 1 2 see also l l t i h i d lit L l L i d ( M h i ) 159 l k 491 L i Pt 419 li j l i t 5978 f i l thi 583 M C i k R i h d A 308 M D l d Jff 5 9 8 9 601 M D h Willi 5478 MG M i h l 5712 MGii J Fatal Vision 5 9 8 9 601 Mhilli N i l 167 175 d lit 197 f i l d 170 l lit 5 8 6 7 hi d tifiil liff 4489 M l t A l d i 431 MKibb Bill 674 MKi Cthi 113 1 5 6 7 161 162 164 314 MMh Jff 4 6 0 1 MPh M i h l 548 Mlhff 372 M l l J t 5 8 5 6 598 The Journalist and the Murder 5 9 8 9 601 Mlth Th 241 242 Essay on the Principles of Population 670 M W 61516 M h t t P j t 412 Manifesto of the Communist Party (M d E l ) 65 73 M i R b t 645 M H b t 181 i see l t i h i

Marshall T H 217; "Citizenship and Social C l " 21213 M h l l T h d 124 Mti J R l d 522 Marx Karl: alienation 6 6 7 ; Capital 67; the itlit t 629 liti 723 t l 62 Manifesto ofthe Communist Party (with Engels) 65 73; political liti f itli 6972 " t M i t t h i " 702 Masson Jeffrey 599 Masson The New Yorker Magazine 598 Mthi C h l 5 7 1 2 572 573 574 M L 538 Mayor Federico: on cloning 3 8 4 5 387 dii i t l i 4 see also b i t h i i t t i ti i i MeinKampf ( H i t l ) 338 Mengele Joseph 411 415 416 4 1 9 2 0 M k 556 M Phili 600 Midl M 444 Mill John Stuart 18; education 4 9 8 9 ; h i i l 129 134 107 Mill D i d 271 Miller Frank 3 4 Miller California 156 i i l i l 5 5 7 8 560 Mit B 645 Mitchell R K 5 6 1 2 MT 51617 f i l thi 5 8 3 5 see t lth d t Moor J 617 M Mihl l d lit 131 134 Moral Imagination and Management Decisionmaking (Werhane) 545 l tt f i l 446 4 4 7 8 dfi 43940 t i l t i h i 4 4 4 5 446 ti humanity 4 4 1 2 ; human zygotes b d ft 447 i t i i ti 4 4 5 6 f hi d tifiil liff 4489 d l agency 4 4 0 1 ; organic life theory 443; i i l f 4467 h l i l l t i h i 4445 ti 4423 446

lit th 4401 d lid thi 1 2 i i l h f i l i t 12840 d f i d assessing dilemmas 4 8 8 9 4 ; external 5; ki d i i 4 9 4 7 ff i i l 13240 t l i 132 h i l h i l d i i f 4 8 7 8 th and practice 2 3 M J t h 571 M t J h "Th F i f t i St Crisis" 6 2 8 3 0 Mortal Peril ( E t i ) 400 M k Jh 4034 ltiltli d d i i t 21722 i education 5 0 1 2 5 0 3 9 d see killi M Chith 359 Naess Arne 636 Nkji D H i h i 384 N t i l Bithi Adi C i i 384 394 National Center for Health Statistics 200 201 203 N t i l C i i f th P t t i f Human Subjects of Biomedical and B h i l R h 413 N t i l E d t f th H i t i 620 National Institute of Health 413 N t i l P b l i R d i 604 N t i l R h C i l 676 678 N t i l Sft C i l t l 1989 N t i l S i t fP f i l E i (NSPE) B d f E t h i l R i 6247 nations: defining 2 6 7 8 ; and idtit 26771 bliti t t i l 2713 i h t 7587 iht t d 2 738 Native Americans 2 74 t l i d li 6512 t see i t l thi N i G H i t l ' Mein Kampf 123 medical experiments 4 1 0 1 1 414 415 41920 il t t i f t i 338 Th N t h l d l t ti euthansia 3 3 8 9 N l l C 428

693

INDEX

Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle): nonmoral it thi 34 Nil R i h d The Politics of Ethics 545 N i t h Fidih k d i ideals 3 4 5 N i i d S h l l Oil 557 Ni R i h d 5723 Nddi N l 113 444 522 523 Noonan John 300 441 N t B 636 675 N i k R b t 4 0 1 4 5 7 407 Nuremberg Code 4 1 2 1 3 414 N b T i l 411 Ot C t i L 471 objectivism sensible 6 5 5 6 0 OlmsteadLC 426435 Ol F k 412 414 415 O'Nill J h 640 O'Neill Onora 300 O i t i fP t l E t i C t i (OPEC) 247 248 Organizational Ethics and the Good Life (Hartman) 545 O l l G 390 Odkik W 634 overpopulation 6 6 9 7 1 ; growth t 2424 Pl Cl 634 Parfit Derek: nonidentity problem 3 4 8 9 ; ffti i i l 132 P t T R 433 P l Bli 547 Passmore John 636 Pegram Heydrich 297 l l t i h i see l t i h i Phillips Robert 544 5 6 2 3 Pi J i 547 l i i 5978 Plt ll f th 107 education 499; and sex 180 181; S t i dil 96 97 P l d V l ( R t l ) 635 P Th W 1 4 7 8 427 politics: capitalist state 6 9 7 2 ; "dirty h d " i 1678 dti d dil 1725 litii 2256 identity groups 212; legitimacy of

694

i 2738 di bi 6024 i i l d iriti 16871 i d dit h d 1756 W b ltit ends 1 7 1 2 The Politics of Ethics ( N i l ) 545 "Pliti V t i " ( W b ) 175 lti see lti pornography 1 5 4 5 ; context of 1 6 3 4 ; d f i d 1567 d l t f l 1558 lit t against 1 6 1 5 ; harm to society and 15860 P J I 541 Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies ( i t h Collins) 565 P t J E 554 P t A 580 P t l Viii 1689 poverty and wealth: defining poverty 3 8 9 ; i d 11415 t t i f ditibti 3940 lf ii 4 0 8 see also h t wealth and poverty ti btt dl 8 i t l 647 Preston Lee E 554 P i ' Dil 22 24 i t thi 610 618 t d 1836 professional ethics 3; adversarial l 5902 f d t i l i t 587 f l l t t 5 8 9 9 0 592 i t l lit 4 d d 5923 natural law 5 9 4 5 ; professionalism and h i l h 5845 l lit 5 8 5 8 5945 li d 583 il standards 6; twolevel rule tilitrii 5889 t t 6667 ritii 6624 prostitution 133 Pbli C i t i ' H l t h R h G 419 bli ii thi 18 t l lit 5 punishment: disputeresolution 8 0 1 ; for i l i t 1 2 8 4 0 lex talonis/ t i l i t 8 2 3 86 punishment (state): capital 8 1 7 ; tili d tribtii 7581

INDEX

Quinlan Karen Ann 296 Qi W 45960 RAV City of St Paid 144 148 race and racism: basic ethical implications f 8990 b i t h i l i 303 itl i h t d 845 i t f 979 i i l jti t 99 defining 9 1 4 ; education 5 0 1 2 ; gun t l 196 201 i i t i titi 2334 d l 9 4 7 ; "scientific" theories 9 3 4 ; and i 104 il h d 99100 T k i t 417 see also f f t i ti thiit h t i Rachels James: euthanasia 338 339; killing d ltti di 3 3 1 2 4 5 1 2 4 5 3 4 l l t i h i 51819519 i see d i Radin Margaret Jane 3 5 3 4 R P l 308 R d l h D Ih 622 R l Jh b i thi 562 citizenship 212; civil disobedience 5 7 8 ; t t l i 256 d t l 32 ditibti j t i 42 7 h l t h 401 402 403; immigration 227; i t t i l jti 2 8 7 8 292 jtifi 2645 i d 365 i h t 78 flti equilibrium 1 0 1 2 ; stakeholder th 544 A Theory of Justice 212 2 8 4 6 401 434 lf ii 467 R J h 43 1 3 4 5 realism: environmental values 6 5 0 5 flti ilibi 1012 R T 637 Regina v Hicklin 1 5 5 6 l t i h i dlt 18990 d thi 5 2 2 3 df i i 521 d h t d lit 5 1 4 1 6 d impartiality 5 1 6 1 7 5 1 9 2 0 ; K i k d 51718 l i t i f 51819 bliti f 51314 l di l 513 t of 5 1 2 1 3 lii d bithi 3078 it l t d d 6 t l lit 5 in schools 501 503 504; sexism 109

RenoACLU 157 dti t h l 3534379 diflti d i t t l i t i 3 5 1 3 ; enhancement by engineering 3614 f i i t bjti t 3478 h t ft hild 34851 i t t l i t i 3513 libertarianism 3 4 5 6 ; liberty and rights f 3434 d biliti 3423 " t l " 3 4 6 7 see also cloning; genetic engineering ibilit t i i dititi 47585 litil 1712 Rethinking Business Ethics ( R t h l d Buchholz) 545 tibtii 75 7 7 8 Rihd H 13 iht i t i h i ' th t 21213 f employees 540 5 6 0 1 ; instrumental or titti 1459 bli k l d d di 5 9 9 6 0 1 f dti 3934 i i 43 47 Robertson John 3 4 5 6 3 4 8 5 0 3 9 3 1 R J 65 Rlt m Hl 6 3 7 8 650 Roosevelt Franklin 601 R C l 666 667 R t h l S d Rethinking Business Ethics ( i t h B h l ) 545 Ross W D 33 Roth US 156 Rth B b K t 322 R J J 24 Routley Richard 650 Rtl V l ( P l d ) 635 Rddik S 113 522 Russia 262 f t see i i thi S f f M k 547 A Sand County Almanac (Leopold) 638 S C h l H i 590 S t J P l Dirty Hands 1 7 0 1 S l Jli 428 Scanlon T M 26 Shffl S l 2712 Shildi D i d 580 Schmidtz David 669 S h h k J t h 1312

695

INDEX

Scott Robert F 471 S t t v Sfd

196

Sen Amartya 38-9 239 241-2 246 548 sentience: and moral status 442-3 446 Serbia 262 sex and sexuality: adultery 189-90; Catholic Church on 180-1; criminal immorality 132-3 136-7; harassment 187; harm from pornography 158-9; privacy and consent 183-6; professional ethics 583; prostitution 187-9; public figures 601; and racism 417; rape 186; reproduction and love 180-3; see also homosexuality; relationships sexism: bioethical issues 303; defeatist objections 113 115; defining 103-6; education 501-2; equity and difference feminists 112-13; essentialist objections 113-14; gender disparity 102-3; institutional 108-9; interpersonal 108 109-10; language and experience 106-7; and pornography 154; and racism 104; recognition of 107-8; skeptical objections 1 1 3 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; unconscious 108 110-12; l affirmative action Shell Oil 557 Shepard Matthew 151 Shti I d t (journal) 200 Shue Henry 43 679-80 Sidgwick Henry 175 259 Silvers Anita 425 427 429 431 Simon Julian 547 Singer Peter A 300 303 306; health care 399-401; personal relationships 519; speciesism 635 636; surrogate motherhood 376 378 Slack Jonathan 392 slavery compensation for 125 Smith Adam 557; wage determination 62; Wlth f Nti 539 social contracts see contractarianism/ contractualism social institutions: professional ethics 589-90

696

society: communities of moral friends 6-7; harm from pornography 158-9; and whistle-blowing 580-1 sociobiology 182 Solomon Robert: Ethi d EU 545 Solow Robert 290 Sommers Christina Hoff 114 Sophie's Choice (Styron) 176-7 Sorkow Judge Harvey R 3 74 souls 526 Southam Chester 411 Soviet Union 2 5 7 2 5 8 Spielberg Steven: ET 445 stakeholder theory 542^1 561-3 564-5 St Tk Th Nt G t i 449 Stark Cynthia 432 state punishment punishment (state) Stacker Michael 176-7 Strohmeyer Jeremy 476-83 Strossen Nadinne 160 Styron William: Shi' Chi 176-7 Suarez Francisco 255 257-8 subjectivism: environmental values 650-5 suffering: of animals 529; bioethical issues 302; see also euthanasia and assisted suicide suicide euthanasia and assisted suicide; killing Surrogacy Arrangements Act 375 surrogate motherhood 347; arguments against 370-2; arguments for 372-3; and health care 378-9; legal aspects 373-7; social perspective 379; types and features of 369-70 Szaz Thomas 310 Taeusch Carl 623 Tamir Yael 274 Taney Justice Roger 196 Tay Sachs disease 357-8 Taylor Paul 443 637 639 tenBroek Jacobus 424 terrorism 263-5 A Theory of Justice (Rawls) 212 2 8 4 - 6 401 434 A Th f Mdil Ethi (Veatch) 4 0 4 - 5 Thomas Lawrence 519 Thomson Judith 17 147 315 317

Thoreau Henry David: civil dibdi 50 52 53 54 A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research ( K l ) 4 tobacco: Wigand blows whistle 5 70 T i l l Ali d itihi 21516 Tlt L 50 t t l i t i l 173 Toulmin S E 627 t t i l th d iil dibdi 5860 Tuskegee experiments 4 1 1 1 2 414 416 4 1 9 2 0 571 U d 260 Uniform Parentage Act 3 74 Uil 566 Ui C b i d 558 U i t d Nti C f Glbl Climate Change 680; Declaration of H R i h t 546 lti 6701 U i t d Nti E d t i l Sitif d Cultural Organization (UNESCO): on l i 3 8 4 5 388 U i t d Nti U i l D l t i f Human Rights 393 U i t d Stt itl i h t 817 dibilit l i l t i 424 1939 199207 h t i 1435 rights 1 4 7 8 ; surrogate t h h d 3737 t i t t t k 264 4957 U i t d S t t Off f T h l Assessments 370 US One Book Called Ulysses 155 tilitii f f t i ti 120 approaches to health care 3 9 8 4 0 1 ; from tili 289 d b l f f t d t i 465 l i h t 540 i l it f i 518 litil dirty hands 170; suffering and moral 29 t l l l 5889 l l 27 t t l d 10 Values Nature and Culture in the American Corporation ( F d i k ) 545 V D H E t 84 Varner Gary 635 637 640 643

V t h R b t A Theory of Medical Ethics 4 0 4 5 t i i 5324 Velasquez Manuel 538 Vit 260 V i k t i R b t 144 il il f iil disobedience 55; procapitalist t 70 186 see also t l virtue theory 31 3 4 6 Viti F d 255 257 Wl M i h l 231 2 3 2 3 255 2 6 0 1 539; irreconcilable duties 1 7 2 3 ; moral ii 560 257 259 f Hbb 2545 h i t i i t t i 2 6 0 1 th j t / / u s ad helium 2 5 5 6 1 ; necessities/jus in hello 2 6 1 3 lfdf 258 f diti 256 dt i 2635 W k M 390 Wartick Steven 554 W D i d 42930 Wt R i h d 6424 wealth and poverty: bioethical issues 3 0 5 6 ; lbl i l i t i 230 H D l t Id 244 i d t i l i d llti 6 7 8 8 0 see also h property Wealth of Nations ( S i t h ) 539 Wb M "Pliti V t i " 1 7 1 2 175 Wehmeyer M L 433 W i t k D i l 210 216 Wll D 376 378 Wenz Peter 634 W h P t i i H 540 555 Moral Imagination and Management Decisionmaking 545 West Robin 314 Wthli T t f 258 hitlbli "D T h t " 5723 l 5702 f t d t t of 5 7 2 6 ; issues for society 5 8 0 1 ; L M i f 62830 d 57980 iibilit d iti obligation 5 7 6 9 Whithd M B t h 374

INDEX

Wiesenthal (Simon) Center 143 W i d J 570 573 578 Wij S t h d 176 Wild K i 300 Williams Bernard 176 W i l l b k S t t S h l 411 4 1 4 1 5 571 Wit R b t 387 "The Wisdom of Repugnance" (Kass) 3 9 0 1 W i t t t i L d i 59 W l f Sid 419 Wollstonecraft Mary 1 0 6 7 d i i t f li 1023 d t i f i l 5 0 1 2 504 h f h 15960 h l t h 418

698

subordination by pornography 1 6 1 4 see also i W d R b t 553 554 Woodward Bob 5 7 2 3 W l Jd J h M 155 156 Wld Hlth O i t i l i 384 385 d i b i l i t 425 lti 670 world hunger see hunger W l d W II j t i f i t i 261 264 Yeager Chuck 261 Y Ii M i 218 Zimring Franklin E 1 9 9 2 0 0