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Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series Editor: Oliver P. Richmond, Professor, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, UK Editorial Board: Roland Bleiker, University of Queensland, Australia; Henry F. Carey, Georgia State University, USA; Costas Constantinou, University of Keele, UK; A.J.R. Groom, University of Kent, UK; Vivienne Jabri, King’s College London, UK; Edward Newman, University of Birmingham, UK; Sorpong Peou, Sophia University, Japan; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, University of Sheffield, UK; Professor Michael Pugh, University of Bradford, UK; Chandra Sriram, University of East London, UK; Ian Taylor, University of St. Andrews, UK; Alison Watson, University of St. Andrews, UK; R.B.J. Walker, University of Victoria, Canada; Andrew Williams, University of St. Andrews, UK. Titles include: Roland Bleiker AESTHETICS AND WORLD POLITICS Morgan Brigg THE NEW POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION Responding to Difference Susanne Buckley-Zistel CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN UGANDA Remembering after Violence Karina Z. Butler A CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION APPROACH Jason Franks RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM Vivienne Jabri WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF GLOBAL POLITICS James Ker-Lindsay EU ACCESSION AND UN PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS Roger MacGinty NO WAR, NO PEACE The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords Carol McQueen HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SAFETY ZONES Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda Audra L. Mitchell LOST IN TRANSFORMATION Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in Northern Ireland Sorpong Peou INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE FOR PEACEBUILDING Cambodia and Beyond
Sergei Prozorov UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU The Limits of Integration Oliver P. Richmond THE TRANSFORMATION OF PEACE Bahar Rumelili CONSTRUCTING REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND ORDER IN EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA Chandra Lekha Sriram PEACE AS GOVERNANCE Power-Sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations Stephan Stetter WORLD SOCIETY AND THE MIDDLE EAST Reconstructions in Regional Politics
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–4039–9575–9 (hardback) & 978–1–4039–9576–6 (paperback) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach Karina Z. Butler Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK
© Karina Z. Butler 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–21656–3
hardback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Figure, Box and Tables
vi
Preface
vii
Acknowledgements
viii
List of Abbreviations
ix
Introduction 1 2 3 4
1
The Theory of World Security and Humanitarian Intervention
21
Problem-Solving Solidarist Theorising on Humanitarian Intervention
55
International Society’s Role in the Restructuring of Yugoslavia’s National Economies
102
A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach: How Might We Act to Prevent in the Future
144
Conclusion
179
Notes
189
Bibliography
194
Index
211
v
List of Figure, Box and Tables Figure I.1
Solidarist theorising as legitimising the structures of the neo-liberal international economic order
13
Box 2.1
Free market beliefs Source: Cited in Thomas (2000: 40)
93
Tables 2.1
Underlying assumptions of neoclassical economics Source: Adapted from Korten (1995: 70)
3.1
Inter-regional trade in South East Europe with percentage of total exports of SEE economies Source: Adapted from Bjelic (2005: 6)
4.1
FTF principles and practices Source: Adapted from Fair Trade Federation (2006: 3)
4.2
How Fair Trade Organisations differ from commercial importers Source: Adapted from Fair Trade Federation (2006: 5)
vi
94
137 166
167
Preface This book explores how reconceptualising security in terms of Ken Booth’s Theory of World Security can improve the theoretical and practical limitations of solidarist theorising on the subject of humanitarian intervention. These limitations stem from solidarism’s problem-solving approach to analysing Supreme Humanitarian Emergencies (SHEs), where the focus is on intervention to manage them rather than on preventing them in the first place. In an attempt to move beyond these limitations, this book proposes an alternative perspective, a ‘critical humanitarian intervention approach’, which argues that theories of humanitarian intervention need to focus on the prevention of SHEs rather than their management. This could be made possible if greater attention was given to the economic conditions that contextualise SHEs in the first place. This claim is substantiated with an analysis of the SHE in Kosovo (1998–9) where economic factors played an important role in the outbreak of violence. Failing to consider the economic context in which SHEs erupt brings with it the risk of missing opportunities for their future prevention. Only when the wider context in which SHEs occur, what I call the neo-liberal international economic order, becomes an integral part of theorising about them can solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention genuinely claim to promote international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world.
vii
Acknowledgements This book would not have been written if it was not for the support of my two colleagues Paul Williams and Matthew Watson. They have repeatedly gone far beyond the call of duty to give me the support, advice, encouragement and feedback that I truly needed. While a great many other people have helped me along the way, I would particularly like to thank Professor Stuart Croft at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick for his involvement in the final stages of writing A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach. This book would never have had been published if it was not for the support I have received from the Economic and Social Research Council working as one of their postdoctoral research fellows. I would also like to thank Eve Richards for her support and feedback, which was found particularly valuable at the ‘writing up stage’ of my book. Next, I must acknowledge the support I received from Nicki Smith and Julie Gilson. I treasure their friendship. None of this work would have been possible if it was not for the dedicated support I had from the Barrow Cadbury Trust and in particular Mr Eric Adams, thanks to whom I was able to fulfil my dream to study. Last, but by no means least, I am indebted to my family and friends. My dearest June for her faith in my ‘big ideas’ and my parents, Zofia and Krzysztof Pawłowscy for instilling ‘the love for knowledge’ into me. Above all else, I am grateful to my dearest friend and soul mate, my husband, Simon, for his persistent belief in my abilities. It is his love, dedicated support, patience and endurance which made my experience of this project as enjoyable as it was. To Simon, together with our three little children, six-year-old Adam, three-year-old Anna and nine-month-old Oliver; this book is dedicated to all four of you. Karina Z. Butler (née Pawlowska) Birmingham
viii
List of Abbreviations AAK
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
AVNOJ
Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia
BAOL
Basic Organisation of Associated Labour
BSEC
Black Sea Economic Co-Operative
BIS
Bank of International Settlements
CMEA
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CEFTA
Central European Free Trade Agreement
CAFOD
Catholic Found for Overseas Development
CHIA
Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach
Comecon
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
EU
European Union
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EBRD
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB
European Investment Bank
EFTA
European Free Trade Association
ECC
European Economic Community
ESAF
IMF Emergency Social Adjustment Fund
FYROM
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
FRY
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FDI
Foreign Direct Investment
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDOs
Grassroots Development Organisations
HDI
Human Development Index
HIPC
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IBRD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICISS
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IFIs
International Financial Institutions
IMF
International Monetary Fund ix
x
List of Abbreviations
ICJ
International Court of Justice
IPE
International Political Economy
IFC
International Finance Corporation
ICG
International Crisis Group
IPA
International Peace Academy
KLA
Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK
Democratic League of Kosovo
LCY
League of Communists of Yugoslavia
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAM
Non-Aligned Movement
NAFTA
North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODI
Overseas Development Institute
OSCE
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRGF
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
SAPs
Structural Adjustment Programs
SEE
South East Europe
SHEs
Supreme Humanitarian Emergencies
SPSEE
Stability Pact for South East Europe
TNCs
Transnational Corporations
TDF
Territorial defence forces
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK
UN Mission in Kosovo
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNRATTI
UN Regulatory Agency for Transnational Trade and Investment
UNCED
UN Conference on Environment and Development
WTO
World Trade Organisation
WBG
World Bank Group
WHO
World Health Organisation
YPA
Yugoslav’s People Army
YCLCC
Comité Central de la Liga Comunista de Yugoslavia
Introduction
Following the military humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in March 1999, a new ‘moral [international] imagination’1 was born. It promised a better world in which human rights would be respected, encouraged and exercised. Indeed, no one better than the solidarists used the concept of humanitarian intervention to argue that a better world was on the horizon. This book argues that claims of a better world will remain nothing more than ‘imaginary’ unless the workings of the international economic order are included in the analysis of humanitarian intervention. Two central debates can be identified at the heart of thinking on humanitarian intervention, between both theorists and practitioners. One debate concerns theorising the primacy of either state sovereignty or international law; the second concerns the alleged progressive evolvement of international norms relating to human rights and the use of military force. It is within the context of the second debate that I consider the subject of this book, which is the solidarist theorising of humanitarian intervention. Although solidarist thinking, when considered in general terms, is less established than, for instance, that of realism or liberalism, its proponents’ particular view on the subject of humanitarian intervention is not. This is the case because solidarist thinking about humanitarian intervention (especially in the context dictated by the case study considered in this book) is shared by the most powerful state practitioners: influential United Nations agencies and prominent NGOs. The particular view shared is that an agreement to intervene militarily in circumstances dictated by Supreme Humanitarian Emergencies (SHEs) demonstrates international society’s overall moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world. This shared belief is further 1
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A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach
considered in a progressive sense, as a part of evolving international norms within international society on the subject of human rights. In contrast to the above, it is regressive, I argue, to consider the act of military intervention in terms of evolving international norms on human rights. This is because the criterion upon which international society’s commitment to human rights around the world should be judged is the act of prevention of SHEs. The need to make this case becomes even more urgent given that scholarly debates and their influence on subsequent practice are mutually constitutive. Seen in this light this book has two aims. Through reconceptualising security by means of Ken Booth’s Theory of World Security its first aim is to explain why solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention prioritises the act of military intervention over the practice of prevention. Its second aim is to propose an alternative to the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention perspective, which in this book is called a critical humanitarian intervention approach (CHIA).
Why solidarist theorising? Deciding on the exact intellectual boundaries of the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention is contested; what follows is a wide rather than a narrow view of the approach. Accordingly, I distinguish between the central figures, regular contributors and participants of the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention. Central figures of this approach include the later work of Hedley Bull, Tim Dunne, James Mayall, R. J. Vincent, Nicholas J. Wheeler and Peter Wilson.2 Regular contributors to the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention include Alex J. Bellamy, Andrew Linklater and Fernando Teson.3 The participants who share the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention are divided between theorists and practitioners. Theorists who contribute (although not exclusively) to the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention are Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse.4 In selecting the practitioners who have contributed to the solidarist view on humanitarian intervention, I focus on the years immediately before and after the intervention in Kosovo. Therefore the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report and speeches made by political leaders and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan become significant.5 Parallel to the developments among the practitioners are the advances made within the intellectual arena. Indeed, the subject of humanitarian intervention has inspired a variety of intellectual debates.6 However,
Introduction 3
it is the pluralist/solidarist divide within the English School approach that has arguably dominated these debates; it has also championed the normative content of those debates.7 The debates of the English School8 are characterised by two different conceptions of international society, those of pluralism and solidarism (Bull, 1966). These two approaches share a principal composition of international society that is characterised by shared values, rules and institutions. While both approaches agree on the principal composition of international society they differ on the normative content of this society. For pluralists, international society is characterised by ‘enough commonality to generate rules of association that are generally respected, but not enough to overcome local particularities’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996b: 31). From this perspective humanitarian intervention is not encouraged. In contrast to pluralism, solidarist opinion on the subject of humanitarian intervention differs considerably. Most solidarists would agree with R. J. Vincent’s classic definition of intervention as: ‘an activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states, or an international organisation which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state … It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations’ (Vincent, 1974: 3). Further, solidarists argue that its purpose is to address ‘SHEs’ and this gives the military intervention its humanitarian character (Wheeler, 2000: 13). Accordingly, the notion of ‘supreme emergency’ has two components: its immediacy and the nature of the danger involved. A supreme emergency arises in situations of imminent danger and horrific circumstances. In other words, ‘a supreme emergency occurs where the danger is very close and in order to qualify it must be of an unusual and horrifying kind’. For solidarists ‘if humanitarian intervention is to be contemplated at all it must be only in situations of supreme humanitarian emergency’ (Bellamy, 2003a: 335; emphasis in original). Solidarists distinguish between extraordinary oppression and dayto-day oppression, where only the former is a legitimate reason to intervene on humanitarian grounds (Vincent, 1986: 126–7). Similarly the ICISS has concluded that military intervention for humanitarian purposes could be legitimised only in circumstances of ‘extreme and exceptional cases’ (ICISS, 2001: 31). Nicholas Wheeler also analyses what constitutes a SHE. First, he refers to the general concept of SHE as one which ‘captures the exceptional nature of the cases under consideration’ (Wheeler, 2000: 34). Second, he observes that there are no
4
A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach
objective criteria which help to decide when a supreme emergency becomes a humanitarian emergency or vice versa, because such an emergency exists when ‘the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the rescue’ (34). Consequently, as Alex Bellamy observes, the key defining element of the solidarist definition of SHE ‘is not the scale or nature of human suffering but whether that suffering requires outside intervention to alleviate it’ (Bellamy, 2003a: 335). Critically, and in relation to the already mentioned normative composition of international society, solidarists believe that international society shares common rules and values and, crucially, that these provide a ‘springboard for progressively greater convergence and co-operation in the future’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996b: 31). Indeed, an agreement within international society to intervene is treated by solidarists as an example of this progressive convergence.9 The reason why it is treated as a progressive convergence, according to the solidarist approach, is that it is supposedly indicative of an international society in which states accept not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their own citizens, but also the wider one of ‘guardianship of human rights everywhere’ (Bull cited in Wheeler, 2000: 12). In other words the concept of convergence in the context of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is used to demonstrate the act of humanitarian military intervention in terms of a change or a move away from the non-developmental international society perceived by pluralists to an international society which claims to be morally responsible not only for its own citizens but for the guardianship of human rights everywhere. This leads solidarists to call for turning such military practices into an acceptable universal norm by developing a theory of humanitarian intervention. As Wheeler observes, ‘there has been no systematic attempt to develop a theory of humanitarian intervention’, and although he never claims to have developed one, he does ‘develop a framework for deciding what counts as legitimate humanitarian intervention’ (Wheeler, 2000: 12). The solidarist commitment to building a framework, which might later be developed into a theory to address SHEs, is the main reason why the solidarist and not the pluralist approach is the subject of this book. Indeed this book is sympathetic to the solidarists’ objective of addressing SHEs; however, it is highly critical of their methods of theorising about those emergencies. In particular it is critical of the consequent effects of this theorising (encouraging common sense for intervention,
Introduction 5
as opposed to prevention) upon the role of international society; above all, upon the moral responsibility expected of international society as an agent for encouraging human rights everywhere. This criticism is incurred by what I consider a serious limitation within the normative purpose of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. The normative purpose of humanitarian intervention as pursued by solidarists is described as ‘putting the victims of human rights abuses at the centre of its theoretical project’. Solidarists further argue that their claim is validated by them being ‘committed to exploring how the society of states [international society] might become more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics’ (Wheeler, 2000: 38). It is, of course, not disputed in this book that the rights of victims need to be addressed. This is why it is accepted that an intervention of some kind to address SHEs may sometimes be necessary. Crucially, however, it is disputed that an agreement within international society to engage in military humanitarian intervention should be taken as indicative of international society’s becoming more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics. My judgement and opinion is further explained by the ‘paradox’ of the case study pursued in this book.
Why Kosovo? The case study explored in this book is the SHE of 1998–9 in Kosovo. Indeed Kosovo, in my view, represents the paradoxical nature of the solidarists’ normative argument. Its paradoxical nature derives from two observations. While at the point of humanitarian intervention Kosovo supposedly signified international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world, at a different time, which I call the stage of ‘economic statism’, Kosovo represented the same international society discrediting its moral commitment. The use of ‘moral imperatives’ used by international leaders to justify NATO’s intervention into Kosovo exemplifies the first element of the paradox. President Bill Clinton, for instance, suggested that ‘by acting now, we are upholding our values. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative’ (Clinton, 1999: 1). Similarly, Prime Minister Tony Blair described NATO’s intervention in terms of a just war, based not on territorial ambitions, but on the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society (Blair, 1999a: 1). In other words it was accepted among Western leaders that the practice of intervention could be treated in terms of protecting ‘fundamental principles necessary for humanity’s progress’ (Blair, 1999b: 2).
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A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach
Paradoxically, however, the protecting by international society of principles necessary for humanity’s progress before Kosovo’s capacity for violence developed into a SHE was not considered with equal importance by international society, thus completing the second part of the paradox. The inconsistency between solidarists’ overall normative purpose of their theorising and their particular theorising on humanitarian intervention becomes even more significant when considered in the context of international society. This is the case because an important part of international society’s composition is its economic sphere, which in this book is identified with the neo-liberal international economic order. Bull clearly states that the economy is a part of international society and (his idea of) justice should rest on a fairer international political economy (Bull, 1990: 72–3).10 Further, it can only be assumed that the economic sphere composes part of Wheeler’s international society. Indeed, his starting point for Saving Strangers is Bull’s definition of international society (Wheeler, 2000: 2–7). Therefore, I argue that although solidarists, following pluralists, recognise the existence of the economic sphere within international society, they fail to consider the part played by the economy in contextualising what is considered a SHE. In substantiating this particular claim I trace back the effects of international society’s economic activities in the former Yugoslavia, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s and 1990s and up to the present. My focus is directed at both particular International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the EU in their project to integrate the former state into the global economy. The moral content of the solidarist claim is further questioned now that the socio-economic situation in post-1999 Kosovo continues to be demonstrative of the same neo-liberal economic mismanagement policies which contextualised its SHE in the first place. Admittedly, it should be noted that although this process of economic integration occurred all across Eastern Europe, it did not have the same causal effect everywhere in the region. For instance, although economic integration was encouraged in Poland, the country did not witness a SHE on the scale of Kosovo. Here what is meant by the phrase ‘the contextualisation of Kosovo’s SHE’ becomes important for the argument. Contextualisation is to be distinguished from direct causation, for it is not the subject of this book to decide what directly caused the 1998–9 SHE in Kosovo. Contextualisation suggests the provision of
Introduction 7
favourable conditions for something to develop, in this case situations entailing the capacity for violence. Accordingly, it is argued that conditions where violence in Kosovo was possible, even likely, emerged during the process of integrating the former Yugoslavia into the global economy. This process involved the structural and institutional altering of Yugoslavia’s national economy, which (among other things) contributed to its vast unemployment, changed the socio-political dynamics between different ethnic minorities and consequently contributed to an overall sense of insecurity among its people. These unfavourable circumstances created a situation in which violence became likely. The definition of ‘contextualisation’ suggests that for such situations to develop into SHEs other factors must be included. Within the literature on the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo some examples of these additional factors would include the role of ethnicity, the end of the Cold War, the role played by individual political leaders, and other external influences such as the regional power politics of the former Yugoslavia.11 For that reason, it is not the focus of this book to distinguish between the different degrees of direct (or otherwise) causation. To focus on such subject matter, as appropriately observed by Oliver Ramsbotham et al., would involve entering ‘a difficult field much disputed by historians, philosophers and philosophers of science: namely, the issue of causation and counterfactuals’. It is a demanding requirement to know exactly how particular wars have been caused, ‘what particular cause would have had a particular effect, or that it was the agenda of a particular effect’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 111). Moreover, whatever causes seem to be the primary ones they always operate together and in combination with other conditions. The authors further observe, ‘the effects of a cause are dependent upon other background conditions … conditions which shape events’ (111–12). What I identify as contextual conditions work together with primary causes to bring about conflict or war; ‘neither by themselves can satisfactorily explain war’ nor can they prevent SHEs (112). All in all, an intervention to manage SHEs may sometimes be necessary but it is disputed that such actions should be defined as demonstrative of international society’s overall moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world. It is in addressing the contextual causes, identified within the economic realm that methods could be identified for preventing SHEs in the future. It is therefore imperative to include the elements of contextualisation in the analysis of SHEs. This is for two fundamental reasons: first, because
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A Critical Humanitarian Intervention Approach
economic factors played an important role in facilitating the outbreak of Kosovo’s emergency and, second, because unfavourable economic conditions should be treated by international society as opportunities to prevent SHEs that should not be missed in the future. In the meantime, it is argued in this book, solidarists encourage the act of intervention over the act of prevention because they maintain a problem-solving method of theorising about SHEs. This, at its most basic, is caused by its confined ‘whether or not to intervene’ logic of theorising on the subject of humanitarian intervention. A short demonstration of the ‘whether or not to intervene’ logic follows.
Whether or not to intervene Here it is important to say that it is not in my intention to provide either a detailed literature review on the subject of humanitarian intervention or to criticise the viability of the individual debates absorbed by the subject of humanitarian intervention. Rather, my aim is much more straightforward: to demonstrate that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is preoccupied with the ‘whether or not to intervene’ method of theorising. This pattern is conceptually too limited to encourage practices other than those of either intervention or non-intervention. This is a serious limitation, as it has consequences for what international society understands in terms of its moral duty to take on the guardianship of human rights everywhere. In fact, solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention can be divided between moral and legal debates. The moral debate, already presented above, claims as its main concern the well-being of human beings regardless of what international law implies. Accordingly, pluralist and solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention are typically presented as being about either the primacy for international order or individual justice. Considered in the context of SHEs and following the pattern of ‘whether or not to intervene’, pluralists regard intervention as undesirable, whereas solidarists regard it as necessary. For instance, pluralists argue against humanitarian intervention as it has major implications for international order.12 Solidarists, in contrast, claim that states need to intervene in order to help others.13 In other words, the focus here is the act of intervention, whereas I argue that reciprocal prevention should dictate the normative content of a theory which claims to fulfil the moral duty of assuming the guardianship of human rights everywhere.
Introduction 9
An identical approach to theorising about humanitarian intervention is taken within the so-called legal debates.14 These focus around three main questions: what does international law imply about whether humanitarian interventions can or cannot occur? Are there any exceptions absorbed by international law which would allow humanitarian intervention? And, finally, what happens when the Security Council does not authorise humanitarian intervention? Once again, the sophisticated character of these individual debates is not disputed; nevertheless, their focus remains the process of deciding whether or not to intervene. Finally, the solidarist search for justified humanitarian intervention continues the pattern of finding good enough reasons ‘to intervene or not’ by regulating the act of intervention through the application of the test of appropriate ‘criteria’.15 Both the logic of the solidarists’ argument16 and that of the political representatives of Western governments17 persist in asking for appropriate rules or criteria to make the act of intervention more acceptable through the method of regulation. Indeed, the search for criteria ‘essentially suggests what is now in the policy mainstream’ (Weiss, 2005: 233). In other words the ‘test of criteria’, as referred to by Farer, dictates when the use of force could justify the act of military intervention (Farer, 2005: 211–20). The debates in the search for criteria further endorse my main observation about the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention, which is that it is too limited in its theoretical and practical scope to encourage the prevention of SHEs. This is as much as to say that the Just War is beguiling because it ennobles the profession of violence and offers a set of conditions that seem to suggest rational control and restraint (Booth, 2000: 314). To use Chris Brown’s words, ‘the test of criteria is one of execution’, without providing enough understanding of why it was needed in the first place (Brown, 2005: 226). I argue that the solidarists’ search for criteria does not exhaust the potential normative scope of a humanitarian theory. This means that the standards of normative theory – how states and therefore people should behave at their best when committed to the moral responsibility of encouraging human rights everywhere – is not given the chance to be put into practice. Here once again I agree with Brown, who in reference to the subject of criteria has argued, ‘If we are concerned about the existence of human rights violations on a large scale in the world, as we should be, but if we are also worried by the idea of the powerful engaging in repeated attempts to right these wrongs, as we also should
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be, then the answer is not to devise external objective tests for action, but to do our best to promote both prudent statesmanship and a wider and more generous definition of state interest’ (Brown, 2005: 228–9). In the context provided by this book, the main interest, I argue, should be associated with the reciprocal prevention of SHEs. Thus the next question to be asked is: why does solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention not sufficiently encourage the practice of prevention? This book argues that solidarists do not sufficiently consider the subject of prevention primarily because they are preoccupied by the decision of whether or not to intervene, and this in turn is caused by a problem-solving method of theorising about what is considered a SHE. My explanation of why solidarist endeavour is problem-solving in nature and my proposal of an alternative to such an endeavour depends on the analytical wealth offered by Ken Booth’s Theory of World Security.
Applying the Theory of World Security The Theory of World Security derives from a body of ideas defined by Ken Booth as ‘critical global theorising’ (Booth, 2007: 3, Chapter 2). The two main aims of his work are to understand current interpretations of world security better and to promote a reciprocal world security that contributes to the invention of a more inclusive humanity. By the concept of reciprocal world security, Booth means: ‘structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that work towards the reduction of threats and risks that determine individual and group lives’. The notion of reciprocity implies that ‘the greater the level of security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive’. Security is ‘synonymous with the freedom of individuals and groups compatible with the reasonable freedom of others’ (2000: 2, 4). The theoretical framework for the Theory of World Security is developed upon Philip Allott’s typology of transcendental, pure and practical theories, which correlate to the themes of being, knowing and doing in relation to world security (Booth 2000: 3; emphasis in original). While all three components are relevant for a CHIA, it is the analytical validity of pure and practical theories that I employ to explain why solidarist theorising is inescapably problem-solving and what the alternative approach should look like.
Introduction 11
Why problem-solving In summary, a problem-solving theorising, as defined by Robert Cox, is characterised by two key features: a positivist method of theorising and a tendency to legitimise dominant political, economic and social structures (Cox, 1986). Although I use Cox’s interpretation of problemsolving theorising as my framework to demonstrate solidarist theorising in terms of problem-solving, it is Booth’s pure theory and its characteristics which I use to explain in more depth why solidarist theorising is problem-solving. Why solidarist theorizing maintains a positivist method of theorizing Accordingly, Booth’s pure theory is considered in terms of an emancipatory approach to epistemology where the notion of epistemology is pursued in terms of a method of exploring various ways of knowing about the world (Booth, 2007: 192). At its most basic, this method involves paying attention to the process of theorising itself, which within critical theorising is associated with reflexive theorising. An element of reflexive theorising, to which I pay marked attention, is one which calls theorists to recognise ‘the inherently politico-normative content of their paradigms [theories] and the normal-science tradition [common sense] they generate’ (Neufeld, 1995: 41). This element of reflexive theorising stands in direct contrast to the positivists’ method of theorising, in particular to their analytical consideration of their ‘truth as correspondence’. It has already been shown that the ‘truth as correspondence’, or the starting point for solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, is an appropriate SHE presented in the context of its two characteristics: its urgency and the nature of the danger involved. These characteristics explain why the act of military intervention and not prevention follows the solidarist project. While it is not disputed that emergencies of this kind need to be addressed, it is questioned whether the common sense generated as a consequence of solidarist method of theorising is appropriate to consider in terms of international society’s overall commitment of encouraging human rights around the world. It is argued in this book that the common sense generated by solidarist theorising on the subject of humanitarian intervention overwhelmingly describes military intervention and not prevention as the ethically relevant action in circumstances dictated by SHEs. This is not to say, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, that the proponents of humanitarian
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intervention do not favour prevention over intervention (ICISS 2001: 31). What is argued instead is that, due to their positivist method of theorising about SHEs – where the emergencies are the main focus – prevention is desired yet remains outside the subject of their theorisation of humanitarian intervention. This results from the fact that such theorising is restricted to the process of deciding whether or not to intervene in SHEs rather than about ways of preventing them. The overwhelming focus on intervention brings two further consequences upon the solidarist project. The first is that the welfare of victims is considered before the welfare of all individual human beings and that the commonsensical theorising on military intervention dictates the boundaries of what it is possible for international society to accomplish in circumstances dictated by SHE. Unsatisfied by the above assumptions, which also explain why the positivist method of theorising is considered in this book to be problematic, I pay attention to the process of theorising itself and question the commonsensical validity of solidarist theorising. This is analytically possible because, following Booth’s analysis of the way in which power and knowledge are related, I argue that the subject cannot be separated from the object which it describes and so the ‘dependent and derivative status’ arrived at as a result of the subject/object association can be critically reassessed and changed. The critical reassessment becomes especially necessary when one learns from pure theory that theories have constitutive properties, which means that they can shape how one sees reality and therefore how one acts (Booth, 2007: 240, 247). In the context of this book, this means that unless the solidarist description of the SHEs scenario is challenged a military intervention will become the commonsensical prescription when international society has to deal with such emergencies. This is a disturbing observation because it has immense implications and consequences for what international society understands as the carrying out of ‘moral duties’ (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2001: 447) to fulfil the role of ‘guardianship of human rights everywhere’ (Bull cited in Wheeler, 2000: 12). The boundary of moral duty is from this perspective no more than an agreement to intervene militarily on a humanitarian basis. I argue that this is a serious limitation because it is the prevention of SHEs and not their management that should be the criterion for assessing the normative agenda of international society. This is even more serious because
Introduction 13
prevention is within the reach of international society – in particular its economic sphere. Consequently, the next question to ask is why solidarists do not include the economic part of international society in their analysis of SHEs. Answering this question also explains how solidarists exemplify the second feature of problem-solving theorising, which is the legitimisation of prevailing political, social and economic structures. Why solidarists legitimise prevailing political, social and economic structures18 In its second role, problem-solving theorising legitimises existing political, economic and social structures, which in the context of this book bring about further two limitations upon the solidarist project. First, the ways in which liberal economic remedies can increase the likelihood of violent conflict are rarely considered by solidarist theorising and, therefore, second, solidarists have a narrow understanding of why conflict occurs and how it can be prevented. Figure I.1 explains why I believe solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention legitimises the structures of the neo-liberal international economic order. This illustrates the way in which solidarists treat SHEs separately from their context (X 2), which I identify in this book as the neo-liberal international economic order (X 1). The international order is ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society’ (Bull, 1995: 8). The patterns of activity sustained by the neo-liberal international economic order include the ‘conceptual separation between economics and politics, giving politics the lesser but important status, that of ensuring the specific political conditions necessary for efficient economic activity’ (Tooze, 1992: 236).
X1
X2
X3
Neo-liberal international economic order
Intervention (SHEs)
Peace-building
Figure I.1 Solidarist theorising as legitimising the structures of the neo-liberal international economic order
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Therefore, as Tooze argues, the goal of the neo-liberal international economic order is efficient economic activity. Further, economic activity is treated as apolitical and rational. This was reflected in the post1945 economic order represented by the Bretton Woods institutions, which were considered to be non-political organisations carrying out technical functions. The agencies of neo-liberal international economic order, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, continue to separate economics from politics (236). Following Booth’s pure theory and his explanation of the knowledge/ interest relation in the particular context of the purpose of ‘Critical’ change, I argue that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention and SHEs fails to question whose interest ‘liberal knowledge’ serves and therefore it embodies liberal assumptions about the separation of politics and economics (Booth, 2007: 238). Consequently, the social, political and economic structures, which, I argue, contributed in the case of Kosovo to the outbreak of SHEs, are further legitimised and replicated in the peace-building stage (X 3).19 This is a crucial limitation because those ‘false’ legitimate structures once more fail to be included in solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, associated in this book with the neo-liberal international economic order, and in fact make the eruption of a SHE more likely. This is the reason why I argue that the solidarist provision of security in the context of humanitarian intervention theorising is merely problem solving. This is the case because while solidarist theorising seeks to stop SHEs per se it does not transform the context within which these emergencies arise, and thus risks future SHEs. In contrast to problem-solving solidarist theorising, the alternative perspective, called a CHIA, aims to overcome the problematic positivist method and change the undesired structures instead of replicating them.
A critical humanitarian intervention approach Going beyond the positivist method of theorising Fundamentally, a CHIA is also committed to exploring how international society might become more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics, but it uses the potential for convergence and the common rules and values which already exist within international society to argue in favour of prevention, while solidarists use the potential to argue in favour of intervention. In an attempt to go beyond the positivist method, a CHIA does not reject the existence of
Introduction 15
SHEs but it rejects considering them in terms of their foundation for knowledge or seeing them in terms of their ‘truth as correspondence’. It takes this approach with the aim of avoiding the commonsensical properties generated by all theorising, discussed in this book in terms of the power–knowledge relation and the constitutive properties of theorising. This means that a theorist working within a CHIA is aware that treating SHEs as the starting point for further analysis will encourage intervention instead of the preferable prevention of crisis. Aiming to overcome this limitation, a CHIA, following Booth’s pure theory, rejects the positivist method and instead uses the analytical insight of the metaphor of anchorage to elevate methods of prevention over intervention. The metaphor of anchorage, by rejecting the idea of objective foundations, enables other arguments to enter the particular debate on humanitarian intervention. Crucially, despite the fact that the metaphor rejects the idea of objective foundations for the formation of knowledge, it nevertheless still shares the aims of objectivity. Still characterised by reflexive theorising, a theorist working within a CHIA argues that even though no neutral, context-independent standards exist to assess competing theories, reasoned judgements can be reached by means of argument in favour of a better theory that is judged by the worth of its standards (Neufeld, 1991: 15). Judgements in favour of a better theory are not based upon Archimedean points from which a positivist theorist proposes relevant practice correlative to her/his observation. Rather, these judgements of a better theory are made by determining which theory and therefore which consequent practice offers greater scope for lasting transformation. Accordingly, it is argued in this book that the criterion upon which a perspective is judged to be better is whether it provides greater scope for the future prevention of SHEs. To aid the task of finding a ‘better theory’ I use Robert Cox’s method of achieving a ‘perspective on perspective’ to orient the goal of the future prevention of SHEs (Cox, 1986: 204–54). A theorist working within the method of achieving a ‘perspective on perspective’ takes on what Booth described as the critical distance. According to pure theory, this means standing outside the common sense of theorising generated by a particular Archimedean point and, instead, asking whether that commonsensical view offers us ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (Booth, 2007: 236, 250). Crucially, the scope for developing a better alternative theory is developed upon the potential that already exists in a given context. A critique which is based upon
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the unfulfilled potential for transformation is identified by critical theorists as what they call ‘immanent critique’. In this regard, I argue that a CHIA is judged to be a better approach than solidarist theory on humanitarian intervention because it aims to elevate the act of prevention over intervention. In striving for prevention it argues that the referent object of security, that is, individual human beings, cannot be restricted to the role of victim, an argument explored in Chapter 2. Rather, the referent object of security needs to be individual human beings considered at all stages of their development and in every condition. Consequently, I argue that providing for security in terms of ‘human security’, as defined by Caroline Thomas, is better able to do this. Challenging and not legitimising the structures of the neo-liberal international economic order In Chapter 2 I will present different understandings of the concept of human security. These developments are found to be encouraging and, indeed, are considered in terms of the ‘unfulfilled potential’ upon which Caroline Thomas’s concept of human security could be built. Her concept of human security differs from the other concepts not only because it extends the primary subject of security from a state to human beings but, critically, because in doing so it highlights the importance of scrutinising global processes which may impact or jeopardise such security (Thomas, 2000: 6). The global processes in this book are associated with the workings of the neo-liberal international economic order. This means that in overcoming the second characteristic of problem-solving theorising, a CHIA includes the neo-liberal international economic order in its analysis of SHEs. This does not change the definition of SHEs but situates them within a wider analytical context, in particular the context of the neo-liberal international economic order. This has two main implications for this book. First, in conformity with the concept of human security as Thomas defines it, the political, social and economic structures of the neo-liberal international economic order (which in the case of Kosovo contextualised its SHE) are not further legitimised but are critically readdressed and changed. Second, addressing and changing the social, political and economic structures of the neo-liberal international economic order provides a better chance of preventing SHEs in the future. I propose, therefore, an alternative analysis of prevention that addresses the deeper structural causes of SHEs – what I call reciprocal prevention. This
Introduction 17
assumption is supported by the intellectual space already provided by the existing body of writing on deep prevention (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 108). Deciding to identify the prevention of SHEs with the notion of ‘reciprocity’ is deliberate. Its purpose is to make it consistent with Booth’s already mentioned understanding of the purpose of security that it is ‘conceived as an instrumental value concerned to promote security reciprocally, as part of the invention of a more inclusive humanity’. This interpretation is to be distinguished from nationalist and statist interpretations, which promote an understanding of security ‘against others’ (Booth, 2007: 2). In other words the notion of reciprocity asks any theorist who takes a CHIA to include the working of the neo-liberal international economic order in her/his analysis of SHEs. The notion of reciprocity should be distinguished from sustainability, because reciprocal prevention does not guarantee the final end to SHEs. What it does, however, is provide favourable conditions within which the capacity for reciprocal prevention of SHEs could be built. These conditions are identified with economic and political measures, including the assessment of global economic structures, to address the sources of conflict. The ‘global economic structures’ in this book are identified with the ordinary workings of the neo-liberal international economic order described in Chapters 2 and 4. Accordingly, it is argued in Chapter 4 that challenging the workings of the neo-liberal international economic order alongside the eight characteristics of Booth’s practical theory challenges the current legitimacy of this order. I begin the process of reconstruction by explaining why the particular nature of the solution presented by the solidarist approach does not represent reality or ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (Booth, 2007: 250). This is the case because international society, and in particular its economic instigators of the neo-liberal international economic order (including the IMF, the World Bank and the European Union), helped shape the context in which the 1998–9 SHE in Kosovo took place. This is why this book argues that international society, instead of treating outside conflicts as separate from the Western world, needs to consider them as part of the context of the contemporary patterns of the neoliberal international economic order. For that reason, while solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is satisfied with the deployment of forces and resources first to end the suffering and next to prevent its recurring on its own terms – this
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is the stage defined as peace-building – a CHIA by contrast begins the stage of peace-building with a sense of failure within international society due to not having prevented a SHE in the first place. This shift offers reciprocal preventative methods a better chance of being adopted by international society, because, it is argued, it is within the economic sphere that preventative methods could be applied. Consequently, a theoretical change in international society’s attitude to possible action in an emergency of this kind will change the nature not merely of the action to be taken but also of the choices made before the need for such action arises. The changing of international society’s attitude is pursued instrumentally through the book’s conception of the purpose of theorising in terms of the implementation of theory because, it is argued, ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’ because theories help to create realities which they go on to explain (Booth, 2007: 264). The conditions upon which the reciprocal prevention of SHEs could be built are encouraged along the so-called alternative path as defined by Thomas, which is complementary to Booth’s definition of an emancipatory community (2007: 268). The building of such a community, following Booth’s work, is considered in terms of an ever evolving project ‘a process and not of an end point’ (257). It is beyond the scope of this book to demonstrate how an emancipatory community should look; however, what is relevant for a CHIA is its focus on the problematic of the political/economic divide associated in this book with economic statism. Further, economic statism embraced by the neo-liberal international economic order implies a situation where domestic relations are more morally binding that international relations. In stark contrast to the above, a CHIA following Booth argues ‘equality is the condition for humanity’ and in this particular context it means that the impact of economic decisions that it has on society at home, needs necessarily have an equal consideration of their impact abroad (2007: 273). These different arrangements would apply to the normal workings of the neo-liberal international economic order, for the focus in this book is on international trade, finance, investment and global economic governance. I will add that although I accept that reciprocal prevention is a distant future I nevertheless consider reciprocal prevention and not military intervention in terms of progress because, following Booth, emancipation is about the politics of inventing humanity (256).
Introduction 19
Book outline The division of this book into chapters reflects its overall aim, which is to demonstrate how reconceptualising security in terms of Booth’s Theory of World Security explains and aids the limited solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention. It is considered to be limiting because it is primarily concerned with the process of deciding whether or not to intervene in situations of SHE, which ultimately focuses on the act of intervention as opposed to prevention. The aim of Chapter 1, therefore, is to propose putting in place alternative theoretical foundations, which will assist in the process of pushing beyond the confined solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. While the purpose of Chapter 1 is to present the alternative theoretical foundations of the Theory of World Security, the purpose of the remaining chapters is to put these into practice. In Chapter 2 I first explain why the solidarist endeavour is problemsolving and focus in particular on its positivist method of theorising and its characteristic legitimisation of structures of domination. In an attempt to overcome the problem-solving solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention I further propose an alternative to the problem-solving approach perspective, which I call a CHIA. Accordingly, a CHIA, in contrast to solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, seeks to present reciprocal prevention and not the management of SHEs as dictating the normative agenda of a theory which might consequently claim to be demonstrative of international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world. This task is pursued first through overcoming the positivist method of theorising and, second, through seeking to change, rather than replicate structures which have contextualised SHEs, as demonstrated with the case study of Kosovo. Indeed throughout the book I am critical of the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, which, in its analysis of SHEs, ignores the wider international context. In order to stress the significance of my claim, in Chapter 3 I show how liberal institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, contributed to the outbreak of violence in Kosovo. I treat these findings as significant for two reasons. First, they are representative of a far more complex understanding of SHEs, in contrast to what is at present reflected by the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. But they also represent an array of opportunities, which, when taken into consideration by international society, could be seen as helping to prevent future SHEs.
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Following the latter belief, Chapter 4 continues to build upon a CHIA. Guided by the requirements of practical theory the emphasis in this chapter is on building favourable conditions within which the capacity for reciprocal prevention of SHEs may be built. The focus is on the normal workings of the neo-liberal international economic order, in particular the normal workings of international trade, finance, investment and global economic governance. Chapter 4 concludes that although reciprocal prevention does not guarantee the ultimate end to SHEs it nevertheless considers reciprocal prevention and not military intervention in terms of humanity’s progress.
1 The Theory of World Security and Humanitarian Intervention
Introduction The purpose of this chapter, divided into two parts, is to explore the possibility of putting in place alternative theoretical foundations which will assist the process of pushing beyond the theoretically confined solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. This confined theorising focuses on the process of deciding whether or not to intervene. This decision-making process is in turn encouraged by the problem-solving method of theorising. It is argued that reconceptualising security in terms of Ken Booth’s Theory of World Security gives better scope for remedying this limitation. The two-part structure of this chapter facilitates the above task. In Part 1.1, I will summarise all three components of the Theory of World Security; I here pay particular attention to transcendental theory because a detailed analysis of pure and practical theories will continue throughout the rest of the book. The purpose of Part 1.2 is to propose an approach to epistemology that will be used in Chapter 2 to explain, first, why solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is problem-solving and, second, to propose an alternative approach to humanitarian intervention to that of solidarist theorising. In this book the alternative is called a CHIA. There are two main problems identified within problem-solving theories and these are also relevant for the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. The first is their positivist method of theorising and in particular their treatment of the analytical element of the ‘truth as correspondence’. The second is their legitimisation of structures of inequality without any critical assessment. In order to substantiate both observations, I will first explain why the positivist method of theorising 21
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on the part of solidarist endeavour is problematic and why the analytical insight provided instead by Booth’s pure theory is a better alternative. The alternative theoretical foundations are identified with the process of reflexive theorising and in particular its elements of the relation between power and knowledge, the constitutive properties of theory and the metaphor of anchorage and its components of critical distance and immanent critique. In addressing the second problem associated with problem-solving theorising, I go on to propose alternative theoretical foundations to solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, which in this particular context do not replicate existing structures but challenge and change them instead. Here the analytical insight of the particular ‘critical’ understanding of change and its element of ‘knowledge and interest’ is considered in some detail. While the purpose of this chapter is to explain the alternative theoretical elements of theorising, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to put them into practice.
Part 1.1 Theory of world security Ken Booth’s general understanding of theory comes from Philip Allott’s conception of theory defined as ‘a mental ordering of the reality within which a particular society constitutes itself’, a reality in which it explains and justifies the beliefs required for ‘society’s self-constituting’ (Booth, 2007: 207). This definition absorbs three different dimensions of theory, defined as ‘transcendental’, ‘pure’ and ‘practical’ theory. Indeed it is this typology which lends Booth the framework for his Theory of World Security. Transcendental theory Transcendental theory represents the grounding for society’s reality; it is society’s ontology because it provides society’s understanding of the source of truth and value; as such, it is theory entrenched in society at its deepest level (Booth, 2007: 207–8). Transcendental theory tells us what is real or what is the ‘is’ in world politics. For instance, realism claims that it deals with what is in international studies, but every theoretical system starts with this claim, that every theory has to assume, that human relations are founded on some sort of order and therefore every theory needs some sort of is-foundations (210). The strength of Critical Theory is that, as well as what exists, it considers how such an existence occurs in the mind of the person who makes the claim. The eight propositions of the transcendental theory of Theory of World
Theory of World Security and Humanitarian Intervention 23
Security, according to Booth, can be best summed up as ‘human sociality’ because this carries with it the radical possibilities immanent in the biology of being human (210). A summary of the eight propositions follows next. Biology is freedom It is our origin as biological entities and the relationship between our origins and our upbringing which make us open to change. This relationship forces us to be aware of what we can change (our created environment) and what we cannot (our biology); this in turn makes us conscious of choice and thus of freedom. What is human sociality Sociality, at a lower level than our human origin as biological entities, is low enough to be considered the matrix for our critical security. By sociality, we refer to our power to behave as a collective, which craves change as an expression of freedom and rejects the familiar. This inherent urge to be free from what we already know and hence independent of others long ago set up options for us which over time have created today’s complex global society. Since we know we have changed in the past, we can hope for change in the future; we need not be inhibited by a sense of what our common burdens are. Though we may never fully understand the results, we should try to work towards the limits of human potential, responsible for what we do, even when we are constrained by historical forces. Being adaptable to our circumstances, we can choose to go forward or hesitate; if we choose the former, we are even free to change the fundamental conditions of existence for international society. One example would be the creation of conditions for sustainable world security according to Booth or, in the context of this book, conditions for the reciprocal prevention of SHEs (Booth, 2007: 215). Cognition is first In the process of providing for the conditions of sustainable world security social scientists will enquire about the agent/structure dichotomy. Treated separately, an agent can be a person or a group of people capable of making things happen. Structure, however, is something that exists outside the agent but which, crucially, shapes the agent’s actions. Booth, following the tradition of Anthony Giddens, describes the agent/ structure association as follows. First he argues that agents and structures are not separate entities but entities which are mutually constitutive.
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Second, human beings are unique: however similar they are, they react in different ways to the same circumstances and can always imagine something outside these circumstances. Therefore, third, we use our cognition to respond both to the nature of our being and surroundings (‘structures’) and to our knowledge of choices made in the past. Fourth, structures are powerful and they affect human decisions but, crucially, they do not determine them. It is the interplay between human cognition and the dominant structures which ‘keeps alive the idea that change is possible, while at the same time providing a reminder of the power of structures’ (Booth, 2007: 219). History is made up as we go along Since all human institutions were made by our choice, they can equally be destroyed by choice. We can use our knowledge of the past, which changes according to our present standpoint, to illuminate what we do now. In other words, knowledge is seen by Critical Theorists as historically produced: this means that, ‘as the historical situatedness of an observer changes, so does our understanding of our past’ (Booth, 2007: 220).1 Was does not equal is or will be Considering the above analysis, it will come as no surprise that Critical Theorists fight essentialist sentiments. ‘Essentialism is the idea that some phenomena have intrinsic properties, an eternal nature’ (Booth, 2007: 221). If a reality were merely something constructed by those who assume it to exist, then it could easily be deconstructed. Too often it is assumed to have an absolute existence. It is the aim of critical theorists to untangle a ‘presentist’ mindset that, for instance, assumes static and timeless social conditions and to present in its place the potential for different sensibilities, for instance, one of world citizenship (222). To be human is to make meaning Human beings thinking symbolically have produced systems of culture and relationship, even of morality. Now they must turn to inventing systems for being human which will replace the exploitative, institutionally unjust relationships of the past by modes of interaction for mutual benefit. The individual is the ultimate referent Fundamentally, Booth in his work challenges the traditional referent of security, which was a state; he is ‘one of the most prominent advocates
Theory of World Security and Humanitarian Intervention 25
of making individuals the referent [instead]’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 114). In ‘Security and Emancipation’, his three reasons against privileging the state as the referent object of security are, first, that there are different kinds of state, some providing for security and others not. The latter kind cannot be treated as referents of security. Second, states are too diverse in their character to be used as the bases for a theory of security. Last, a most persuasive argument in his overall work, is that it is illogical to think of a state as the referent of security, on the grounds that to do so is to confuse means with ends. States are or can be the means for providing security, but ultimately it is only with reference to individuals that the notion of security has any meaning. ‘It is illogical therefore to privilege the security of the means as opposed to the security of the ends’ (Booth, 1991: 320). All in all, security makes no sense unless it is the property of an individual. Essentially, however, and relevant for the subject pursued in this book, judging Booth’s analysis in terms of the straightforward refocusing of its referent object of security from state to an individual is not sufficient to challenge solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. This is because solidarists also claim that their referent object of security is an individual. The question therefore is what is the difference between them? It will be explained in Chapter 2 why the referent object of security within the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is an individual, but only an individual in the role of a victim. This is an important observation, as it suggests solidarists’ limited understanding of human rights and the implied limitation of the duties which they would impose upon state leaders within international society. Therefore, Booth’s way of treating individuals as the main object of security is different from that of the solidarists, for, following the work of Gerard Delanty, he considers the individual as part of a set of complex collectives. These can include the family, state, particular community or a nation. ‘Community is not opposed to the individual [but rather] in collective action the self is enhanced in its identity’ (Booth, 2007: 226). In other words, Booth’s concept of the security of individuals covers their existence within their various groupings, since they think and behave in relation to these. Further, Booth’s reading of the individual as the referent subject of security can be enhanced in the light of Max Horkheimer’s isolation of one particular aspect of emancipation. Horkheimer believed that Critical Theory should be concerned with the corporeal, material existence and experience of human beings (Horkheimer, 1972a: 200). In so arguing, he does not deny the importance of class, state or other
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collectives. Simply, he does not believe that the existence and experience of individual human beings can be understood without viewing them in their context. On the contrary, he continually stresses that, in analysing various societies and their institutions, theorists should never lose sight of the effects on and the implications of these for individual human beings. ‘Those who are concerned with humankind as a whole rather than humans, in particular, need to keep in mind that the emancipation of the whole is the means to the emancipation of those who make up the whole’ (Booth, 2007: 226). Therefore, for both Horkheimer and Booth, the individual is always the ultimate referent for Critical Theory.2 Essentially, then, the emphasis on the individual does not acquire the limiting and reductive implications which might arise from ‘false liberal individualism’, wherein the individual is seen ‘in reductionist, atomistic terms’ (Shaw, 1994: 96–100). The point of the above observation is that identity considered in terms of ‘the whole [being] more than the sum of the parts’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 115) must form an element of any analysis which claims to have an individual as its referent object of security. In other words, the concern of Critical Theorists is the individual in his context of social institutions. He cannot be approached except through his institutions and he is whole only in relation to them. Reality is holistic Thus embracing holism, which is the recognition that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, protects us against the false antitheses that limit the notion of the individual. Instead, Booth advocates a view summed up as embracing the ‘I-that-is-another in all of us’ a phrase of ‘hyphened commonality’ as opposed to the ‘imposed slash of necessary difference’ (Booth, 2007: 229). Indeed, any plan for world security seeks out unifying forces rather than reductive alternatives. Pure theory For Critical Theorists, the only legitimate knowledge is to seek to free others; this can be effected through pure theory. Pure theory provides a framework for an emancipatory approach to epistemology understood in terms of ‘what society says to itself about what it is and why, and what it might choose to be’ (Booth, 2007: 207). That is to say, the task of transformation or change needs to be informed by the normative purpose of a theory which within Critical Theory is associated with emancipation. Indeed, Critical Theory has been defined as an emancipatory theory (Devetak, 1996: 163). And ‘a cluster of themes inspired by
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emancipatory intent’ (Bronner, 1994: 56). Hence, Critical Theory stands or falls by the possibility that the potential for emancipation exists. In fact ‘epistemologically, it is only this possibility that gives Critical Theory coherence and, indeed, purpose. Without the ability to claim that a better world is possible or even conceivable, there is no means by which the present can be criticised’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 56). Epistemology consists of theorising about knowledge but it includes also, with respect to the above, theorising about political potentiality. Different types of theory create different sorts of potential. Paying much attention to the concepts of epistemology, Critical Theorists ‘explore ways of knowing about the world’ (Booth 2007: 192) with the intention of transforming it for the better. The process of transformation, therefore, is not instigated at the practical level only but before the practice is implemented, at the stage of theorising about it. Considered in this way, one can understand why ‘much more than epistemology is at stake’ (Smith, 1996: 38). What is at stake is thinking and deciding about what is possible with the aim of advancing emancipatory ends. For the present book, this is an important procedure and therefore its detailed analysis, together with its eight propositions, will be investigated separately in the next part of this chapter. However, what is important to consider on separate terms is the concept of emancipation itself. Defining emancipation Emancipation as a political term dates back to the Enlightenment, but the idea of a ‘critique’, as associated with Critical Theory, goes back further and so therefore does the notion, if not the word, of ‘emancipation’. The word ‘critique’ was used by humanists and reformers during the Reformation period and has been described as ‘the art of informed judgement appropriate to the study of ancient texts’ (Connerton, 1976: 15). Its purpose was to comment on biblical texts, so ‘as to uncover hidden assumptions and, above all, to debunk claims to authority’. In other words, a ‘critique’ in its pre-Enlightenment sense was used as ‘a powerful weapon in the hands of those engaged in the criticism of established ecclesiastical practice’ (Neufeld, 1995: 14). By the nineteenth century, emancipation, for its part, was associated with progress, defined as a movement towards freedom and equality. In particular, progress – which engendered reason – was thought to abolish inequality among nations; thus progress was the process of emancipation (Pieterse, 1992: 5–41). Consequently the term was adopted by the nineteenth-century liberal and radical thinkers who claimed the duty to liberate slaves, workers, women, Catholics, Jews and others (Pieterse,
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1992: 7). Its main appeal was its unifying theme, of not only liberating oppressed minorities but also of liberating the world ‘from the apronstrings of the privileged classes’ (Feuerlicht, 1983: 41). Despite clear ideological differences among those who aspired towards ‘progress’, they agreed unequivocally that ‘mankind was on the way to freedom’ (Pieterse, 1992: 8). More recently, Booth has developed his understanding of emancipation. His explicit position is expressed in one of his early articles on the subject. Although the definition of emancipation is reviewed at a later stage in ‘Security and Emancipation’, he defines it here as follows: True (stable) security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it. Security means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security. (Booth, 1991: 319) Booth here makes a direct reference to equating emancipation with security; indeed, ‘the starting point of analysis is that, after Booth, security is conceptualised in terms of emancipation’ (Wyn Jones, 2005). However, while ‘Security and Emancipation’ sums up the relationship between security and emancipation in a general sense, Booth’s other work, called ‘Three Tyrannies’, explains it in more detail. Here he defines emancipation as: The freeing of people as individuals and groups from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do; this means identifying and struggling against oppressive structures of power, and creating new structures of power relationships that promise to enhance human potentialities. (1999b: 40) This definition first clarifies what emancipation is not. It is not a static concept, nor a fixed idea of what the world would look like. The purpose of emancipation is not an ultimate utopia, a recipe for a perfect world. Because the concept of emancipation takes history into
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account, it recognises that the world is always changing and therefore every emancipation will unavoidably create new margins (just as every new technical break-through creates new dilemmas) (Booth, 1999: 41). This explains why emancipation must be continuously contextualised, because conditions are always changing. It is also a reason, Booth further argues, why perhaps it is more appropriate to use the concept of emancipatory policies, which imply movement and mutability, rather than emancipation, which risks being associated with static ideas. It may be appropriate to think of the process of emancipation as a ‘political horizon: something to aim for, something that establishes perspective, but something that by definition can never be reached. Emancipation is not a state of being; it is the condition of becoming’ (41). Second, emancipation cannot be bought at the expense of others. Emancipation is based on the belief championed by Kant that ‘I cannot be fully emancipated until everybody is emancipated’ (Williams and Booth, 1996: 9). In political terms, as Booth argues, this accepts that not all oppression can end at the same time, but what it claims is that all ‘are moving in the same direction, towards human flourishing and away from oppression’. Accepting that emancipation can take place at different speeds at different times acknowledges that some can be emancipated before others – but this should not be ‘at their expense’ (Booth, 1999: 42). Third, Booth explains that emancipation is not synonymous with Westernisation. While it is important to include a Western contribution to the flourishing of ideas on human rights, it is also pivotal not to concede a Western monopoly on these ideas as ‘such a conclusion would be contradictory to the spirit of emancipation’ (42). This is understood, since Western society cannot represent the best of all possible worlds, if only for the reason that Western society does ‘not attain its own best standards’ in claiming superiority and is therefore hypocritical (42). Having established what emancipation is not, Booth gives it three main purposes. They may be summarised as follows: the first purpose of emancipation is to give a grounding for knowledge. Booth defines this in terms of emancipation as a philosophical anchorage. Valid knowledge is decided upon emancipatory potentials. In other words, truth is produced by human beings and a pragmatic truth, such as security, is created intersubjectively. The metaphor of anchorage implies a resting point in a dynamic process, to help recognise the better possibilities inherent in an existing situation (42). The existing situation is that international society has within it a realisable potential to converge into
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the sort of society which could respond more truly than at present to its moral responsibility to encourage human rights everywhere. Second, emancipation needs to be used as a strategic process. The idea of a ‘process utopia’, as opposed to an ‘end-point utopia’,3 emphasises the desirability of a dynamic rather than a static conception of the future; for this reason ‘the best way ahead is through benign and reformist steps calculated to make a better world somewhat more probable for future generations’ (Booth, 1999: 44). Last, Booth argues, the purpose of emancipation is to provide a tactical goal. This means that the idea of emancipation should be turned into effective action. Indeed, like early writers on Critical Theory, who called for a synthesis of philosophy and practice, Booth says that emancipation needs to be concerned with praxis and not critique alone, a purpose which he later explains in practical theory (44). Practical theory The final element of the Theory of World Security operates at the most immediate level of theorising, which is the constituting of ideas as practice It asks us how we might act when we compare ‘the reality of world politics constructed through statism with practices shaped by the promotion of cosmopolitan democracy’ (Booth, 2007: 207). Practical theory absorbs and advocates ideas already manifested in our behaviour. Primarily it is characterised by advocating the unity between theory and practice, where theory itself is considered in terms of political practice. Admittedly, theory considered in terms of practice and practice considered in terms of theory are not measured in the same way because generally, and, as observed by Booth, it is actions, not words, that speak the louder. Still, words lead to action and therefore scholars and their academic analysis have a direct role in either challenging or replicating the already existing situations of inequality. It is in their power, and therefore it is their responsibility not only to understand the world but also to change it, in Marx’s famous words (2007: 198–9).4 With regard to the practical dimension of theorising, it is always important to ask a theorist how her/his theorising affects the lives of ordinary people; how one person’s theorising influences another person’s policies and circumstances. Throughout this book, I describe the current neo-liberal international economic order as having contextualised the SHEs in Kosovo in 1999. I further argue that it is not enough to question particular policies which may have had a direct impact on what happened in Kosovo, but also the philosophies or commonsensical assumptions upon which these policies were built. For this reason
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my focus in this book is on de-legitimising the common sense of the so-called false neo-liberal legitimacy. This task is considered in terms of ‘practice’ because it necessarily needs to happen simultaneously with the implementation of relevant policies. Admittedly, putting practical theory into practice is challenging because, as Booth observes, it runs counter to the prevailing order; but at the same time it is inviting, because it represents an approach to world security in which everyone can get involved. This means that it may be a challenge to have a direct influence on decision-makers within actual governments, but influencing society at local and global levels is not in itself a challenge. Indeed, at present, civil societies are directly involved with issues of international significance and it is their attention which academic enquiry should take into account. As Booth argues, ‘we obviously do not have the agency of government … but we all have some space (talking to friends, choosing research topics, supporting particular charities, etc.) … to act as agents of common humanity’ (Booth, 2007: 199, 249). The theoretical practice of ‘a theory by doing’ works in the sense that a theorist’s practice may not be taken with the consideration it deserves, but if appropriately sustained by various supporting groups it cannot be ignored. Booth prescribes eight separate elements to practical theory, which I will use in Chapter 4 to suggest ways on which conditions for reciprocal prevention could be built.
Part 1.2 Pure theory The purpose of this part is to propose an emancipatory approach to epistemology, which I will use in the next chapter; first, to explain why solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is problem-solving and, second, to build an alternative perspective which will be judged to be true to the extent that it provides favourable conditions for building upon the reciprocal prevention of SHEs. Accordingly I first explore the analytical validity of reflexive theorising where, guided by Ken Booth’s pure theory, I pay particular attention to explaining why the positivist method is problematic, why power and knowledge are related and why it is important to remember that theories are constitutive. Dissatisfied with the positivist method of theorising, I will argue that the so-called method of anchorage, which is still committed to a conception of truth but crucially informed by what it means to keep what is called a critical distance, is a better theoretical alternative to the positivist method. Second, I will continue explaining the process of theorising, focusing on elements which challenge the existing
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structures of domination as opposed to replicating them. Here the element of Critical Theory’s particular understanding of change and Booth’s interpretation of why all knowledge has interest become significant. Exploring the process of reflexive theorising Critical Theorists consider the process of theorising itself to be an important part of political practice. This process is informed by an element of critical theorising, defined as reflexive theorising. Mark Neufeld defines this ‘as a theoretical reflection on the process of theorising itself’ (Neufeld, 1995: 40). Within this definition, at least three core elements can be identified. The first element of reflexive theorising asks a theorist ‘to be aware of the underlying premises of one’s theorising’ (41). The second element of reflexive theorising encourages theorists to recognise the ‘inherently politico-normative content of their own paradigms and the normalscience tradition they generate’ (41). Here it is important to note that Neufeld, in referring to the entity of a ‘paradigm’, is not confined to any particular interpretation of it. Accordingly, he associates the entity of a paradigm with ‘a theory’, ‘theoretical tradition’, ‘discourse’ or ‘presumptions upon which theoretical edifices are erected’ (1995: 41–2, 58). The purpose of this elusive association is to characterise reflexive theorising as part of a larger theoretical project. This is a project that always rejects the assumption that subject and object can be separated, in the manner postulated both by positivist theorists themselves and also by theorists who postulate within theoretical traditions derived from positivist forms of theorising. The distinction between the positivist theorists themselves and those theorists who work within theories derived from positivist methodologies is an important feature of this work and leads to a second observation. This is that while most theorists use reflexive theorising to indicate the weaknesses of positivist theorising I use the characteristics of reflexive theorising to illustrate the limitations of problem-solving theorising, as defined by Robert Cox.5 Indeed, I argue that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is problem-solving in its nature. This means, first, that it is characterised by the positivist method of theorising but not necessarily by positivism itself. Second, it legitimates social and political structures, without considering their part in contextualising SHEs. This subject is explored further in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Finally, the third element of reflexive theorising leads Critical Theorists to argue that, despite the absence of neutral observation language, ‘reasoned judgments about the merits of
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contending paradigms are possible’ (Neufeld, 1995: 41). All three elements will be considered in turn, but it is the second and the third elements which are particularly relevant for this work. The positivist method of theorising versus the method of anchorage: Explaining how power and knowledge are related and why theories are constitutive According to the first element of theoretical reflexivity, as analysed by Neufeld, the ‘theorist needs to be aware of the underlying premises of [their] theorising’ (1995: 41). In other words, the first element of reflexive theorising obliges theorists to pay attention to, and disclose, the assumptions upon which their theoretical edifices are created. This is an important characteristic of reflexive theorising, but in itself it would not qualify theorising as reflexive. For instance, even a positivist theory requires that ‘the sum total of generalizations be derived axiomatically from clearly identified starting assumptions’ (41). Consequently, it is the analytical quality of the other two elements of reflexive theorising which distinguishes it from positivism itself and, with relevance for this book, from problem-solving theory (41). The second element of reflexive theorising calls theorists to recognise ‘the inherently politico-normative content of their paradigms [theories] and the normal-science tradition [common sense] they generate’ (41). This second element of reflexive theorising is in direct opposition to positivist theorising (and also to problem-solving theorising), which uses the element of ‘truth as correspondence’ as a reference point for further analysis. The tenet of ‘truth as correspondence’ stipulates that ‘theoretical explanations will be true to the extent that they accurately reflect empirical reality; to the extent that they correspond to the facts’.6 In order to understand how this element has been criticised by Critical Theorists, it is helpful to follow Horkheimer’s response to the above. He believes that with the Enlightenment came the understanding of the world as a scientific universe, which could only be understood by science itself. Within this kind of world, every object became a possible focus of study. The Enlightenment project became ‘the development of universal, mathematically formulated science’ which brought European civilisation to an era of positivism (Held, 1980: 161). The term ‘positivism’ in Horkheimer’s understanding often refers to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.7 It is beyond the scope of this book to provide a detailed analysis of Horkheimer’s rejection of positivism. However, it is relevant to learn how Horkheimer saw what were considered the two main goals of the
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positivist approach. These are to be used later to associate the solidarist approach with maintaining some aspects of a positivist method of theorising of the problem-solving solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, the first goal of positivism is to construct an objective empirical and systematic foundation for knowledge, and the second goal is to confirm that the world is composed of facts, which, given directly or indirectly, are the only objects of knowledge (Held, 1980: 164; emphasis added). Responding to the above, Horkheimer argues that both of the above goals rest on a particular set of assumptions, which is that subject can be separated from object, the observer from the observed. This means that theorists who hold ‘the truth as correspondence’ to guide their research assume that through proper methods of research design the researcher(s) can be factored out, leaving behind a description of the world as it truly is. Dividing the subject from the pursued object was one of Horkheimer’s main concerns. In his work ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, which begins with the question ‘What is theory?’, he criticises what he calls ‘traditional theory’ (the mainstream understanding of theory) which is associated with the empirical method (Horkheimer, 1972a: 188). Accordingly, as Wyn Jones observes, in ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, he criticises René Descartes’ understanding of scientific method, in which ‘deductively conceived and logically consistent assumptions are tested against empirically observable reality. Those assumptions are proven correct to the extent that they are confirmed by experimental observation’ (1999: 17). This observation leads to Horkheimer’s criticism of foundationalism; that is, the attempt to ground theory in a framework which presents ‘the truth as correspondence’, upon which theorists build their theoretical constructions. Pursued in this way, judgements about what is right or wrong can be made ‘because foundations exist on which all theories can be judged, regardless of time and place’ (Booth, 2007: 235). Horkheimer accepts that the world of experience or perception might appear as the foundation for knowledge. However, essentially for this book, he disagrees with the so-called dependent and derivative status of such conclusions (Horkheimer, 1972a: 138; emphasis added). In other words, he recognises the importance of basing a theoretical endeavour on ‘facts’, but what he is concerned with are the consequences of such an endeavour. Privileging a certain epistemology, or treating ‘the truth as correspondence’ as a main tenet of theorising, means that a number of ‘problematic issues’ are ignored (Neufeld, 1995: 41). For instance, the
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role played by a theorist or a community of researchers themselves in the production and validation of a particular view in effect undermines the truth claims of those who wish to challenge those views (41–2). It will be argued in the next chapter that solidarist theorists consider SHEs in terms of their ‘truth as correspondence’. The urgent characteristics of these emergencies not only condition their consequent theorising to intervene, but also give them the somehow ethical and therefore justified authority to claim to be describing the world as it really is. It is argued that claiming to describe the ‘real world’ makes other ways of knowing – other ways of being – (other ways of practice) illegitimate (Wyn Jones, 1999: 20).8 In other words, and following Booth’s pure theory, I argue that solidarists fail to reflect that power and knowledge are related in the sense that our language – our perception of things – can sustain a particular view which then legitimises a particular kind of action. The deeper the discourse is embedded, the greater is its power to structure a particular kind of behaviour. This risks maintaining social practices which reproduce only the dominant forms of social activity (Booth, 2007: 240, 242). As Horkheimer observes, traditional theorists (or problem-solving theorists, as this book argues) are unaware of how deeply they are involved in social processes and hence cannot see their theory’s social determination and lack of autonomy. This has resulted in traditional theory’s becoming conformist, uncritically submitting to the dominance of particular times and values: ‘theory was absolutised … and became a reified, ideological category’ (Horkheimer, 1972a: 194). Consequently ‘the scholar and his science are incorporated into the apparatus of society; his achievements are a factor in the conservation and continuous renewal of the existing state of affairs, no matter what fine names he gives to what he does’ (196). The most relevant implication of the power/knowledge relationship for the subject of this book is that it imposes a task, ‘to seek to uncover the sources of power in particular contexts, and what work it is doing’ (Booth, 2007: 242). It will be argued in the next chapter that solidarist theorising, intentionally or not, normalises and therefore gives a sense of priority to the act of military intervention over the act of prevention. This is considered a serious limitation, for it is argued here that the act of prevention should instead become the normalised part of theorising on humanitarian intervention, in particular if considered in terms of international society’s overall commitment to encouraging human rights around the world. Identifying the relationship within knowledge/power association becomes inescapable when one learns that theory is constitutive (Booth,
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2007: 247). This means that powerful theories shape the way in which we see reality and therefore how we act. In the context of this book, if the solidarists’ views on humanitarian intervention remain unchallenged, international society will continue to associate its duty to encourage human rights around the world with the act of military intervention in emergencies and not their prevention. Critical Theorists argue that all theories are inescapably part of society in general and subject to the pressures existing within it. The question is how these societal pressures are transmitted to the theorists. The answer is through so-called incalculable social mechanisms: whether they are aware of them or not, they cannot avoid their surrounding structures. Horkheimer does not think, however, that this is a one-way deterministic process. Just as structures influence theorists, theorists can also influence the prevailing structures: ‘Horkheimer was convinced that theorists and their theories play a vital role in the production and reproduction of the prevailing structures’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 18). As Horkheimer writes: There is a human activity that has society itself for its object. The aim of this activity is not simply to eliminate one or another abuse, for it regards such abuse as necessarily connected with the way in which the social structure is organised. Although it itself emerges from the social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention, or in its objective significance, the better functioning of any element in the structure. On the contrary it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order. (Horkheimer, 1972a: 206–7) As Wyn Jones notes, links between theory and practice, although not immediately apparent, may still exist – either in a very mediated form or over time (1999: 18). Therefore, Horkheimer says, there is no theory of society that does not contain ‘political motivation’, even if this motivation is often unconscious, ‘and the truth of these [motivations] must be decided not in supposedly neutral reflection but in personal thought and action, in concrete activity’ (Horkheimer, 1972a: 222–3). Crucial to the above observation is that through the process of theorising and actual political practice theorists can reproduce or change the status quo. Thus, as noted above, ‘descriptions of the world (can) merge into prescriptions through legitimising and naturalising certain ideas about human society’, for example that war is inevitable, or that ‘the poor will
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always be with us’ (Booth, 2007: 248). Once again, the point here is that if we accept the above ideas as somehow natural or inevitable then our theorising and hence our behaviour will continue to replicate them. ‘If people act as if something is natural (or otherwise true), they will make it so. If, on the other hand, societies are organised in ways that regard such behaviours as unnatural and ethically abhorrent then what becomes politically desirable and feasible will change accordingly’ (248). Hence, I argue that if solidarists continue to encourage a view that SHEs can be addressed only through a military intervention then this indeed will become the only option. In other words, and following Booth, ‘what purport to be descriptions for the purpose of explanation merge into prescriptions for the purpose of policy relevance’ (248). Critical Theorists, however, being able to distinguish between description and prescription, are well equipped to reject the replication of traditional problems and seek instead emancipatory practices (248). In other words, facts do not provide the foundations for social theory; instead, every aspect of social theory can be understood only in the context of its conditions and relations. These do not appear in ‘immediate experience but are important in the understanding and explanation of things’ (Marcuse cited in Held, 1980: 165). To recall the above and following Horkheimer: ‘the world of perception is not merely a copy nor something fixed and substantial, but to an equal measure a product of a human activity’ (Horkheimer, 1972b: 159). An observation, he argues, is not a copy of a given reality, or a given objective world: ‘the world of objects is always the world of our objects – of our interpretation’ (Horkheimer cited in Held, 1980: 64). Crucially, to sum up, in challenging the positivist method Critical Theorists do not deny all facts or reject empirical enquiry: what is equally important to them is to recognise the so-called dependent and derivative status of conclusions based on such facts. Being aware of the power/knowledge relation and theory’s constitutive properties makes the task of recognising such conclusions or consequences feasible. This is why the positivist method is considered problematic and empirical enquiry is indeed critical (Booth, 2007: 244). As mentioned above, it has already been conceded that the foundational position promotes a view which claims that the world can be tested against ‘grounds’ that may be considered neutral and objective. They can be judged to be either right or wrong on the bases of their foundations. In contrast, the anti-foundational position considers all knowledge about the social as contextual. Instead, Booth rejects the foundational/anti-foundational divide by introducing what he calls the
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metaphor of anchorage. A dialogue between the foundational and antifoundational positions of the two methods allows him to incorporate elements of both (2007: 234–6). The metaphor of anchorage, Booth says, ‘represents the best resting place in a dynamic environment, but one that is subject to change. Anchorage will shift in the course of a ship being at sea … and they represent the most secure points contingently available to assess where we have come from and where we might head next’ (235). Corresponding to the earlier analysis of the validity of objective truth, Critical Theorists who think in terms of anchorage as the securest basis for knowledge do not allow the setting of ultimate answers but instead ‘give the opportunity for asking the big question (as far as possible at the time) about directions for thinking about what is real, what we can know, and what might we do’ (235). The method of anchorage provides the conditions for the concept of truth, which is to be discussed in the next section. Further, Booth associates the method of anchorage with Karl Popper’s ‘falsifiability’ thesis, which means that while one cannot prove that the idea of anchorage is valid across the world – like ‘love’ and ‘hospitality’ – all such ideas are worth adopting, at least until better options are found (Booth, 2007: 235). Love and hospitality, for instance, are ideas that have travelled well in our human social composition and therefore they can ‘provide a platform for the “time-transcending dialogue”’ absorbed by universal social facts’ (Gallie quoted in Booth, 2007: 236). Universal social facts arrive from Geoffrey Warnock’s list of plain facts, which state: That it is bad thing to be tortured and starved, humiliated or hurt is not an opinion: it is a fact. That it is better for people to be loved and attended to, rather than hated or neglected, is again a plain fact, not a matter of opinion. (Warnock, 1967: 60) Thinking of anchorage as the basis for knowledge instead of foundationalism, Critical Theorists do much to avoid the commonsensical properties of all theorising. Rather than being limited by a one particular view or dictating boundaries for any alternative debates, following the work of Mary Midgley, for Booth the metaphor of anchorage encourages and gives opportunity for asking a multitude of questions and in this way they call for a plurality of methods. The purpose of such methods is ‘to sharpen critique in the interest of better reconstruction’ or of creating a better life for future generations (Booth, 2007: 246). As already mentioned, a theorist working within the metaphor of anchorage is
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‘cautious’ about claiming to describe the real world. Rather, she/he asks whether her/his theorising contributes to creating a better life. The metaphor of anchorage, underlined by reflexive theorising, must not only describe, explain and understand but also be capable of recognising and eliminating the distortions within it, which serve to reproduce and reinforce a particular order as universalised and ahistorical (Hoffman, 1987: 237). Theoretical reflexivity rejects the notion of objective truth, because the truth cannot stand independently of human thought and practice. Subject cannot be separated from object, and one of the consequences of this statement is a questioning of the existence of objective standards for assessing competing knowledge claims. To sum up, knowledge claims are never ‘natural’ but human, not given but made, not imposed by nature but adopted by convention by the members of a specific community (Neufeld, 1995: 43). One should be aware of the politico-normative content of knowledge because ‘ideas, words, and language are not mirrors which copy the real or objective world – as positivists’ conceptions of theory and knowledge would have it – but rather tools with which we cope with our world’ (West, 1989: 201). However, when it is argued as above that Critical Theorists reject the existence of objective standards of knowledge (and do so for the consequences they bring, not the substance they form), at the same time they seek to achieve universal emancipation. Indeed, the knowledge which Critical Theory generates is by no means neutral, it is ‘politically and ethically charged by an interest in social and political transformation’ (Devetak, 1996: 161–2). Therefore the next question is: if theorists cannot arrive at objective standards of knowledge, how can they affirm the possibility of reasoned judgements? Substantiating an answer to this question comes next. Looking beyond Archimedean assumptions: The validity of critical distance, the concept of truth and immanent critique Despite the above observation, that no neutral, context independent standards exist by which to assess competing theories, human beings and theorists in particular can still use their faculty of reason in a given context to articulate standards and to persuade others, by means of argument, of the worth of these standards (Neufeld, 1995: 15). This can be done in a two-stage process. First, associated with the previous element of reflexive theorising Critical Theorists, working within the metaphor of anchorage, must acknowledge that doing without a neutral observation language is the necessary condition of all theorising, that knowledge has power and that all theories are constitutive. Rather than rejecting this inevitability, they acknowledge and deal with it. In its second stage, they
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deal with it by applying what Booth calls ‘a critical distance’, in place of objectivity, which entails more fallacies (2007: 236–8). Critical Theorists working at a critical distance seek to move beyond the limited implication of treating ‘the truth as correspondence’ as their reference point for further analysis. This is achieved through extending the conception of reason beyond the limiting implication of facts, or what are called their Archimedean point. Instead, Critical Theorists can choose a perspective which is judged to be true to the extent that it offers better scope for transformation. In terms of this book, for instance, a better perspective is one which enhances the scope for preventing SHEs. In the next section of this chapter, I describe how one arrives at a better theory. However, before I do so, I should discuss an immensely important quality of Critical Theory: one which commits a CHIA to a modern project, namely, its commitment to a conception of truth. A descriptive analysis of both stages comes next. In response to the first stage, it was shown above that there are no objective theoretical frameworks outside history or society from which to engage in ethical criticism or judgement. This is the case because it is not possible to separate subject from object, also shown in the lack of a ‘neutral observation language’. Since it is accepted that all theories have politico-normative content, such as legitimating particular knowledge (associated in this book with the act of intervention), what is essential is to reflect on knowledge and ‘judge’ whether this legitimised knowledge is the best of all possible kinds of knowledge, on the basis of its fruits. Before expanding on this issue any further, it may be helpful to consider why positivist theories and theories derived from positivism do not include this reflexive analytical possibility in their own theorising. It is because they share the element of so-called Cartesian anxiety (Bernstein, 1983: 18). This means that unless a theorist finds an Archimedean point of indubitable knowledge which can serve as the foundation for human reason upon which further theorising can be pursued, then rationality must give way to irrationality or reliable knowledge to madness. Richard Bernstein observes: With a chilling clarity Descartes leads us with an apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our being … our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos. (Bernstein, 1983: 18; emphasis in original)
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Further, the ‘Cartesian anxiety’ is bound up with the conception of knowledge which Aristotle called episteme, defined as an apodictic knowledge of the order of nature and cosmos (Neufeld, 1995: 43). Neufeld’s point is that if episteme is the only meaning we are prepared to give to rational knowledge, we reach a point where the world is reduced in its normative scope by restricting the uses of episteme. Critical Theorists overcome the above problem by working under the umbrella term of anchorage. Instead of searching for objectivity, which ‘is not possible because social theorists cannot escape the contexts in which and from which they observe’, a theorist can still achieve a degree of so-called critical distance (Booth, 2007: 234, 236). To achieve a degree of critical distance, according to Booth, means ‘to step back from one’s context … while realising that one is not stepping onto neutral ground, an Archimedean point, from which to describe and observe matters of interest. While the aim of critical distance shares the aims of objectivity … it recognises what is possible and what is not, and in that sense begins from a categorically different place’ (237). It begins from a very different place because critical distance is a means of engaging in ‘immanent critique’, the aim of which is the promotion of emancipatory politics. Here one aspect of emancipation should be recalled. It has been explained that emancipation provides a standpoint for a critique of a state of affairs. However, the status quo is not criticised for lacking some sort of blueprint of what an ideal international society would look like. Rather, the status quo is criticised on the basis of the unfulfilled potential which already exists within it. This method of theorising is called an immanent critique. Moishe Postone and Barbara Brick define this as follows: An immanent critique does not critically judge what ‘is’ from a conceptual position outside of its object – as a transcendental ‘ought’. Instead it must be able to locate that ‘ought’ … as a possibility that is immanent to the unfolding of the existent society. (Postone and Brick, 1993: 230) In other words, an immanent critique is the ability to identify immanent, unrealised or unfulfilled possibilities within the reality of any given order. Related to this is the overall argument made in this book, which is that a critical humanitarian intervention approach is judged to be a better perspective on humanitarian intervention than the solidarist perspective, because it aims to encourage the act of prevention over
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the assumed-to-be-obligatory implementing of the act of intervention. It does so because, as argued above, its referent of security is individual human beings considered as part of complex collectives. This is to be distinguished from individual human beings in the role of victims, which, as Chapter 2 argues, is pursued by the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention. Considering the referent of security in terms of an individual as part of a complex collective, however, requires either a sustainable approach to security or providing for security at all stages of human development. It is argued throughout this book that this condition could be fulfilled and this aim pursued along the lines of the concept of human security developed by Caroline Thomas.9 Her particular interpretation of human security could be built upon the immanent, unrealised and unfulfilled possibilities embraced by an already existing work on the general concept of human security. A detailed description of her concept of human security and the description of the general concepts upon which her particular interpretation could be built is to follow in the next chapter. Continuing and recalling the above, however, it is clear that Critical Theorists, instead of basing their theorising on objective or neutral standards of knowledge, use the method of critical distance, which in effect encourages them to use immanent critique. Immanent critique works within the immanent potential upon which a better life can be built. However, the building of something that is considered to be ‘better’ than something else requires Critical Theorists to have a conception of truth. Indeed it is the very commitment of Critical Theorists to the conception of truth which commits them to the modern project. At a basic level, as Booth demonstrates, a distinction can be made between objective and intersubjective conceptions of truth (Booth, 2007: 231). It is the latter concept of intersubjective, historical and daily truth that is closest to a Critical Theorist’s heart. Having a concept of truth is essential for Critical Theorists’ theorising but it must be pursued in a non-dogmatic manner. Explaining what he means by the concept of truth, Booth invokes Bernard Williams’s two virtues of truthfulness, ‘Sincerity’ and ‘Accuracy’ (Williams, 2002: 123–48, 172–205). Williams described the above virtues as having at all times a necessary existence within societies within which members have needed to communicate with each other. Without these virtues communication would not be possible and, therefore, without them a society could not prosper. This means that both virtues convey the notion of truth as something which is indispensable (Booth, 2007: 233; emphasis added).
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For example, ‘Accuracy’ is associated with seeking best evidence, which in turn is dealt with in an impartial and logical manner. ‘Sincerity’ means communicating in an honest manner – saying what one really means, as opposed to being dishonest. These virtues, as interpreted by Booth, are not relative; yet crucially, and deriving from his non-dogmatic conception of truth, ‘different people have different understandings of truth’ (2007: 233). For example, two historians may approach the same data with ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’, but they still may arrive at different truth about this evidence. In other words, although truth is not accessible in its absolute form it nevertheless imposes an ‘indispensable condition of truthfulness’ without which the working of society would not be possible (233). A critical understanding of the concept of truth, following the work of S. R Bronner, is not about finding the absolute truth, but the search to establish conditions within which truth may be pursued (Bronner, 2004: 29). In the context of this book, the normative commitment of the CHIA is the prevention of SHEs. The prevention of SHEs dictates in this case the ‘truth’ of the CHIA. Indeed, even though the absolute prevention of emergencies may be a distant prospect, this does not mean that the conditions within which an absolute prevention should be pursued, that is, a fairer neo-liberal international economic order, do not better dictate international society’s moral commitment of encouraging human rights around the world. In other words, although the reaching of an absolute truth may not be possible in its absolute form, this does not mean that we should stop searching for it. Such reasoning is immensely important to reflexively orientated theorising. Hence, with its normative commitment to social transformation, this reasoning allows Critical Theorists to argue that what limits theories – the politico-normative content of the normal science which they generate – also makes a reasoned assessment of them possible. This means that ‘judgments about contending theories are possible by means of reasoned assessments of the politico-normative content of their projects they serve, of the ways of life to which they correspond’ (Connolly cited in Neufeld, 1995: 46). This feature is important because it makes possible a method (which this book pursues) of affirming the possibility of reasoned judgements in the absence of objective standards of knowledge. What follows in the next section is an analysis of this method. To sum up the above, an emancipatory approach to epistemology gives much attention to reflexive theorising, seen as a process which ascribes particular importance to the formation of knowledge. It is
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conscious of underlying premises, which means that it investigates the relationship between knowledge and the normative purpose of an inquiry. This will have implications for whether appropriate theorising challenges such injustices as are built into the prevailing order. Further, reflexive theorising asks theorists to pay attention to the inherently politico-normative content of paradigms or the relationship between power and knowledge and the constitutive elements of all theorising, in order to recognise the normal science tradition or the common sense being generated. This is an important aspect of a CHIA, associated in this book with the rejection of the positivist method, because, by not refusing to claim objectivity or to describe the real world, it yet allows theorists to consider alternative claims for inclusion in evaluating the normative content of a theory. It is important not to imagine that Critical Theory relinquishes objectivity on the grounds of its being irrelevant. Quite the opposite, it is relevant; but as encouraged by the metaphor of anchorage and its element of critical distance, it is important to be aware of the consequences of claiming objective knowledge in truth statements. This is because to do otherwise prevents other debates, such as debates on prevention, from being seen as relevant. Last, the third element of reflexive theorising informs Critical Theorists about theorising’s overall purpose; that is, to instigate emancipatory politics. This involves deciding upon contending theories/perspectives by means of reasoned assessments of the politico-normative content of the projects which they serve, of the ways of life to which they correspond. In short, it is the third element of reflexive theorising which commits the CHIA to the modern project or a conception of truth generally defined as the search for a better life, or, as referred to in this book, a search for a theory which encourages the prevention, as opposed to the management, of SHEs. Facilitating the process of implementing practice: Rejecting replication and seeking emancipation instead It is argued in this book that people can decide which projects encourage a better world through a process of ‘achieving a perspective on perspective’ to orient a specific goal, this being ‘to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective’ (Cox, 1986: 207–8). Accordingly, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 aim to present two contrasting perspectives: one of problem-solving, demonstrating the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention; and the other of a CHIA as an alternative to solidarist theorising. These are judged upon their usefulness for encouraging a humanitarian theory which prevents, instead of manages, SHEs.
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To recall my previous analysis, while the third element of reflexive theorising implies the method of ‘persuasion by means of argument of the worth of contrasting standards’, it should be observed that the method of persuasion is immaterial in situations where it is required for the prevention of SHEs or the reverse. Considering the extended work on human rights by solidarist theorists (see Introduction), one could comfortably assume that they also would choose the act of prevention over the act of intervention. In fact, the method of persuasion is relevant for showing a genuine political possibility that future SHEs could be prevented. This is why it is important to say at this stage that the assumption upon which I build my argument is that the prevention of SHEs is to be preferred to intervention. I approach this method using Robert Cox’s idea of contrasting perspectives. Such logic is closely connected to William Connolly’s view of contending theories. Connolly argues that in instances where there is not enough evidence to judge between two contending theories, certain assumptions should allow us to favour the theory which is more optimistic. He claims: Concepts and beliefs about social life help to some degree to constitute that life. Therefore, privileging the more optimistic assumption … might well help both to bring out evidence in its support previously unavailable and to contribute itself to the optimistic possibility. Those with the shared belief in a society that people must seek aggressively to exploit others justifies that conduct on the part of the privileged and contributes thereby to the assurance that such relationships are inevitable. Similarly, conduct based on more optimistic beliefs can sometimes contribute to their fulfilment. (Connolly, 1974: 64; emphasis in original) Connolly’s view of what one does when faced with contending theories resonates with one of Booth’s elements of practical theory, which says that one does not have to accept a given situation unless it is defined in terms of the best of all possible worlds. This is the case because his practical theory or his philosophy-by-doing operates within the already mentioned immanent critique, defined as an idea that situations have within them unfulfilled potential which could be used to promote a better life. The task of a theorist who uses immanent critique is to identify these potentials and then work through the politics required to strengthen them. The practice of immanent critique is partly about careful calculation but also about hope (Booth, 2007: 250). The element of hope is important and deserves some additional consideration.
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As observed by Booth, it was and still is the case that the idea of tragedy, not hope, receives most attention from scholarship. Yet reconciliation between former enemies, harmonious coexistence between people of different religions, the successful pursuit of social justice and so on, can appear. Therefore what exists in society is possible (181). This is why a world that does not work for the majority is not the best out of all possible worlds or, as I argue in this book, a world where one cannot prevent SHEs has an absolute need to be changed. Again, a theory or perspective will be found to be ‘true’ – will be judged to produce reliable knowledge – to the extent that it demonstrates its ‘usefulness’ as a guide to action in terms of the general political vision in which it is embedded and of the concrete political project to which it is directed (Neufeld, 1991: 16). This is important in that it provides a way of assessing contending theories which is not bound to the notion of ‘truth as correspondence’, but which is also capable of going beyond a logical ‘temperament’ to justify a choice of perspective (17). By linking the ‘epistemological’ and the ‘political’, it becomes possible to assess rival theory-specific standards knowledge definition in terms of the relative merits of the political visions/projects in which those theories are embedded (17). In short, it is possible rationally to compare contrasting theories once theorists recognise that the question of ‘which paradigm [theory] is superior?’ can be restated as ‘which general political vision/concrete political project is most appropriate to the global polis?’ and once it is recognised that, at the meta-theoretical level, the question of ‘what is reliable knowledge?’ can be reformulated as ‘how should we live?’ (17). The ‘perspective on perspective’ involves distinguishing between two contrasting types of theory, namely, problem-solving theories and critical theories (Cox, 1986: 207–8). Accordingly, as Robert Cox describes it, problem-solving theory, • ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relations and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action’; • has as its general aim to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble; • considers particular problems in relation to the specialised areas of activity where they arise, because it does not call into question the existing pattern of institutions and relationships. This results in the fragmentation of problem-solving theories among a multiplicity of spheres or aspects of action, each of which assumes a certain stability
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•
•
•
•
in the other spheres (which enables them in practice to be ignored) when confronting a problem arising within its own; appears to be more fixed and hence accurate because it works from a fixed order as its point of reference. This makes it attractive as a method of enquiry. However, some treat this as the most serious of its weaknesses, because it rests upon a false premise, since the social and political order is not fixed, but (at least in the long run) is for ever changing; has the ideological bias inevitable with this assumption of fixity, despite the convenience of method. Problem-solving theories, from the broader perspective of critical theory, can be represented as serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order; has a conservative purpose, since it aims to solve the problems arising in various parts of a complex whole in order to smooth its functioning. This very aim contradicts the frequent claim made by problem-solving theories to be value-free; is methodologically value-free, insofar as it treats the variables which it considers as objects, but it is value-bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework. This also results in problem-solving theorists ignoring the question of how power and interest shape knowledge claims (208).
In contrast to problem-solving theory, Critical Theory fundamentally ‘stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about … it does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origin and how and whether they might be in the process of changing’ (208). Therefore, while problem-solving theory replicates, Critical Theory emancipates (Booth, 2007: 242–4). Critical Theory attempts to avoid the negative consequences of problem-solving theories; for example, the legitimising and replicating of the regressive aspects of prevailing situations (Booth, 2005a: 263, 2007: 242). This is why ‘critical theory questions existing [orders] while problem-solving theory accepts [them] as its parameters’. While problem-solving theory leaves power where it is, Critical Theory attempts to bring about structural change in the human interest (Booth, 2005a: 263). Indeed the question of ‘change’ is essential to the emancipatory project as envisaged by Critical Theorists. It is in fact the understanding of the concept of ‘change’ which fundamentally distinguishes critical from problem-solving theorists.
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In the implementing of change, Critical Theory, as mentioned above, does not accept a reality as given, but asks how it has come into existence (in this case, how SHEs have developed) and what the possibilities are of changing this reality or order. It is concerned with exploring any potential for structural change, as well as the construction of strategies for change. Using a Coxian analysis of change, I attempt to explain what is meant by the specificity of ‘critical’ change. Cox argues that Critical Theory is concerned with the historically constituted framework or structures within which political and economic activity takes place (Cox, 1995: 32). What is unique and specific about critical change is that it has two purposes, practical but also analytical, both to be applied jointly. The practical implementing of critical change in this book is associated with practices complementary to preventing SHEs, which can be facilitated by restructuring the working of the neo-liberal international economic order along an ‘alternative path’, a subject to be considered in Chapter 4. Here, however, I explain some elements of all theorising which theorists need to be aware of in order to implement change in an analytical sense, or, as Booth puts it, in the theorist’s head. This is crucial because unless change in the way we think is implemented, practical change will replicate and not emancipate. Here it is useful to observe that the understanding of ‘analytical change’ or change that takes in the theorist’s head relates to what has already been explained in terms of reflexive theorising and, in particular, taking on the critical distance as defined by Booth. Therefore a degree of convergence with the previous section on reflexive theorising cannot be avoided. In fact it is the reflexive element of critical theory, or taking on of a critical distance, which makes it possible to apply analytical change. Robert Cox shows awareness of the reflexive element within theorising while observing the politico-normative content of any theory. He recalls that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1986: 207), meaning that a theory is always influenced by ‘human experience that gives rise to the need for a theory’ (217). What this observation mainly implies is that the reflective element teaches us – the theorists – that ‘there is no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space’ (207). Therefore, in particular when a theory or theorists claim some sort of neutrality, ‘it is more important to examine it as an ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective’, or, more simply, it is more important to ask whose interest such theory serves (207). Here it should be noted that not everything understood as
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‘an ideology’ always has associations. Rather, once something becomes an ideology, other ways of knowing it become redundant. This is the case because, Cox argues, a structure represents a picture of reality which is true for a given group, community, relationship among states, workplace or other body. If the view of this picture is shared by many people then this is what is real to them, ‘and because they think of that reality in the same way, their actions and words tend to reproduce this reality’ (Cox, 1995: 33). In other words, knowledge has interests and, regardless of our approval or disapproval, these realities make the world and they are the parameters of experience (Booth, 2007: 238–40). Thinking of knowledge as having an interest will become significant in the questioning in the next chapter of what may be called the ‘false legitimacy’ of the neo-liberal international economic order. For instance, it will be argued that the undesirable elements of economic neo-liberalism are historical creations, in the sense that they have been built by people as their response to conditions which have provoked them to do so. This is why Critical Theorists reject so-called immutable reality; that is, they tend to examine, say, the origin of a state, or of economic neo-liberalism, and look for the forces which may be changing the nature of the state and the inter-state system (Cox, 1995: 34). To resume, it is enough to know that those realities are there for us to act as if they were ‘out there’, even if they are not physical things. In other words, Cox says, in the mind there is no clear separation between the object out there and the subject. All in all, ‘the ontology which defines the “real world”, the world of non-physical realities which shape our existence, is sustained by intersubjective meaning derived from long years of collective experience’ (33). These things which have intersubjective meaning have been built over time by human responses to material conditions; these are the intersubjective entities which are associated in this book with the privileging of the economic/political divide, an element sustained by the liberal logic that will be examined in subsequent chapters. The configuration of intersubjectively constituted entities, Cox continues, we can call an ontology, borrowing from philosophy. For each era and each object of interest, there is a relevant ontology. Ontologies tell us what is significant in the particular worlds we delve into – what the basic entities and key relationships are. Ontologies are not arbitrary constructions, but the specifications of the common sense of the epoch. Essentially, in this regard, it is necessary to go beyond the common
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sense of an epoch or, more precisely, beyond the ontology of a particular time, ‘to find the mental tools capable of understanding change in historical structures’ (Cox, 1995: 34). Once again, it is the understanding of change in terms of historical structures which makes it possible to argue, as the next chapter does, that what is constructed can also be deconstructed. In this sense, to facilitate the possibility of change, Cox argues that critical theory is a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not only with the past but also with a continuing process of historical change. Critical theory, like problemsolving theory, takes as its starting point some aspects or a particular sphere of human activity. But where the problem-solving approach leads to further analytical subdivision and limitation of the issue being dealt with, the critical approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole, of which the initially contemplated part is merely one component, and seeks to understand the process of change in which both the parts and the whole are involved (Cox, 1986: 209). Similarly, it is argued, a critical humanitarian intervention approach considers SHEs not only within the context of the urgency and danger involved in them, but within the whole complexity of humanitarian intervention, in which the neo-liberal international economic system constitutes a significant part. Therefore, critical theory contemplates the political complex as a whole and seeks to understand the process of change within both the whole and its parts (Cox, 1986: 209). Due to its reflexive element, practitioners of Critical Theory are able to stand back from the assumption of an immutable present/reality and ask how this reality – understood by Critical Theorists as set of structures – came about, with its political as well as its economic elements; how it is changing or how it may be induced to change (Cox, 1995: 32). To relate to the solidarists’ theorising on humanitarian intervention, I argue that they consider SHEs per se, rather than within the context of which the liberal international order constitutes a part. Cox understands structures in historical terms, as elements formed by collective human activity over time. Within them, there is no distinction between actors and structures; essentially, there is ‘no question of sacrificing the one or the other’ (1995: 33). Institutions such as states or economic orders are human institutions; therefore they are historical phenomena and not biological necessities (Booth, 2005a: 266). Denaturalising or inquiring into the growth of state formations will help the process of problematising all the institutional identifiers that divide humanity and that get in the way of recognising and implementing the view that all people, in principle, have equal moral worth (267).
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Historical change is the reciprocal relationship of structures and actors. Where problem-solving theory thinks of action as being confined within fixed structures, critical theory sees the structure-actor relationship as ‘a process configuring structural change’ (Cox, 1995: 33). Such a configuration of the implementation of structural change ‘does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way, but imposes pressure and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them’ (33). In this fashion, it is argued that progressive moral change, in the context of the conditions implied by humanitarian intervention, should be associated with the prevention of SHEs and not their management. In pursuing this as the normative goal, values such as human rights and, equally important, economic justice should be pursued. Even though a specific conclusion (here associated with the total prevention of SHEs) may be out of reach, the means which are its equivalent, that is, the encouragement of economic justice, are not (Gandhi cited in Booth, 2005a: 268). By associating issues of economic justice with issues relevant to humanitarian intervention, theorists may resist or oppose the implications of economic justice, but they will not be able to ignore them. All in all, Cox presents the characteristics of reflexive theorising by reminding theorists that theories reflect diverse perspectives associated with different social and political projects. This is why theorists must provide a ‘perspective on perspectives’ by becoming ‘reflective upon the process of theorising itself’, that is, by becoming ‘clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising, and its relation to other perspectives’ (Cox, 1986: 207–8). This is why Cox’s analyses do not proceed with the positivist ‘truth as correspondence’ endeavour. Instead, he affirms that achieving a ‘perspective on perspective’ is oriented to a specific goal: ‘to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective’ (207–8). Summarising the above, four concluding observations can be made. First, any theory including critical theory is time-bound and derivative of historical experience, which means that it stems from a perspective. While problem-solving theorists replicate the existing order, critical theorists call for change (or emancipate). Second, critical theorists analyse historical structures, which are the ways in which reality is defined for different people in different places; it takes apart the very framework used by people to cope with their reality. The intersubjective experiences of finding and using this framework reproduce reality in the form of continuing institutions and practices. While critical theorists, too,
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may maintain this element of problem-solving theories, it nevertheless contains such theories in the form of identifiable ideologies, therefore pointing to their conservative consequences (209). Third, people create reality as a response to the environment. Finally, therefore, change needs to be understood in terms of the fact that ‘each successive historical structure generates contradictions and points of conflict that bring about transformation’ (Cox, 1995: 33–6). Transformation is understood in terms of clarification of the ‘range of possible alternatives’, ‘[allowing] for normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order’ (Cox, 1986: 210). In the context of this book, the alternative valid perspective is judged to be a better perspective or theory in the sense that it encourages the act of prevention over the act of intervention. This is an important condition, because it is argued that, as long as international society claims to be fulfilling its alleged moral responsibility of encouraging human rights everywhere, it needs to exhaust all possible methods for preventing what is defined as a SHE in the first place.
Summary To summarise, the main purpose of Chapter 1 has been to explore the possibility of putting in place alternative theoretical foundations, which in the following chapters would assist the process of pushing beyond the methodologically confined solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. This method of theorising focuses only on the process of deciding whether or not to intervene, a claim considered in the Introduction. It was argued in the present chapter that reconceptualising security in terms of Booth’s Theory of World Security would help, first, to understand why the solidarist approach to humanitarian intervention focuses on the act of intervention, as opposed to the act of preventing SHEs, and, second, it would facilitate the process of proposing an alternative perspective. This perspective in the following chapters will be judged to be true to the extent that it demonstrates its usefulness in leading to a humanitarian theory whose normative purpose will be guided by the possibility of preventing SHEs. Accordingly, I have explained why it is important for theorists to become aware of the process of theorising itself and the impact which it has on political practice. While presenting what is meant by reflexive theorising, I have focused in particular on exploring why this book presents the positivist method as problematic and prefers instead the method of anchorage. Accordingly, I argue that considering ‘facts’ as
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the starting points for analysis (the main analytical component of the positivist method) is problematic because, as the next chapter shows, it overwhelmingly restricts humanitarian intervention theorising to the subject of military intervention. What is considered a more desirable alternative to military intervention is the encouragement of reciprocal prevention, which, theoretically, can be supported through the method of anchorage, as described by Booth. Endorsing the method of anchorage, a theorist, taking on a critical distance, learns that power and knowledge are related and that all theories have constitutive properties. This is why she/he is well equipped to diagnose the restrictive common sense of a theory (here associated with the privileging of the act of intervention over prevention) and instead seek an alternative perspective. Achieving critical distance means being able to stand ‘analytically’ outside a given local or global framework, give a critique, and then explore the immanent potentials in order to release ideas which might promote the emancipation of people(s) from oppressive structures of domination (Booth, 2005b: 11). Critical distance implies being engaged in an immanent critique, which is the idea that ‘instead of trying to move forward on the basis of utopian blueprints, one should look for the unfulfilled potential already existing within society’ (Booth, 2005b: 11; see also 1999: 43). Critical Theorists, while paying much attention to the process of theorising itself, at the same time equally consider the importance of political practice. Admittedly, and as Stephen Leonard has observed, ‘forging a link between social theory and political practice is … no mean task’ (cited in Sterling-Folker, 2006b: 163). For one thing, how can a theorist move from an ontological position shared with post-modernism to one in which an enlightenment project may be treated as a foundational narrative? How can this project, together with its goal of human emancipation, be realised in an actual political practice? And how can International Relations (IR) theorists recognise and promote the actions and policies necessary to achieve this goal? (Sterling-Folker, 2006b: 163). Not forgetting that different answers to the above questions produce different kinds of Critical Theory, the variant proposed by this book views the economic sphere as the best potential site for change. However, before political practice can be encouraged within the economic sphere, a theorist needs to judge which political practices are more desirable and which less. The way in which a theorist can arrive at such a judgement is through a process of ‘achieving a perspective on perspective’ to orient a specific goal, which is ‘to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective’ (Cox, 1986: 207–8).
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The ‘perspective on perspective’ involves distinguishing between two contrasting types of theory, distinguished as problem-solving theories, which replicate existing structures, and critical theories, which change those structures instead (207–8). It was argued, although still unsubstantiated, that in order to encourage the prevention of SHEs a critical understanding of change needs to be incorporated into the process of theorising on humanitarian intervention. In particular, it was explained how ‘change’ should be understood, in order to reject the replication of existing structures and accept instead the obligation to change them. Here the association of knowledge with interest became most significant. Accordingly, accepting that all knowledge has an interest, the crucial question to ask is whose interest the appropriate knowledge serves. It will be argued in the next chapter that although solidarists claim to have changed the ‘statist’ normative context of international society by ‘normalising’ the action of military intervention, and they may have addressed SHEs per se, they have not changed or even critically addressed the international context within which these crises arose. The international context in this book is associated with the neo-liberal international economic order.
2 Problem-Solving Solidarist Theorising on Humanitarian Intervention
Introduction In light of the findings reached through reconceptualising security in terms of Ken Booth’s Theory of World Security, my purpose in the current chapter is two-fold. My main aim is to explain why solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is problem-solving in character; the second purpose is to propose an alternative perspective to problem-solving solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention: CHIA. Further substantiation and elaboration of this CHIA will continue throughout Chapters 3 and 4. The two-part structure of this chapter fulfils this aim. Part 2.1 explains why solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is considered problem-solving. Briefly and following Robert Cox’s framework, I define such theorising as problem-solving theory, first, because it maintains the positivist method of theorising and, second, because it ‘legitimises prevailing social and political structures’, which in this book are associated with the neo-liberal international economic order (Cox, 1986: 207). These two reasons dictate the subsequent evolution of this chapter. Primarily, I evaluate the significance of the solidarist treatment of SHEs in terms of their ‘truth as correspondence’. I argue that such treatment is limiting because it prioritises the act of intervention over the act of prevention. Further, it treats the act of military intervention as exhaustive of international society’s moral responsibility in the event of SHEs. Solidarist theorists on humanitarian intervention continue with problem-solving theorising by following a liberal approach to international order, in which ‘artificial’ divisions are drawn between the political and economic spheres. This creates two main limitations for the consequent theorising. The first is that the way in which liberal 55
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economic remedies can influence the likelihood of violent conflict is rarely considered and, second, solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention has a narrow understanding of why conflict occurs and therefore how it can be prevented. Responding to these limitations, in Part 2.2 I propose an alternative perspective: a CHIA. This perspective, as already explained in Chapter 1, is judged to be a better alternative, to the extent that it gives a better chance of preventing SHEs. In proposing the preliminary elements of a CHIA, I reject the positivist method and encourage the method of anchorage instead. Theorists working inspired by the metaphor of anchorage do not reject the existence of SHEs but they do reject those solidarist conclusions that accept military intervention as a way of managing crisis under international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world. A CHIA argues that what should be associated with international society’s commitment to uphold those rights is the prevention of SHEs. Having the prevention of crisis as its normative starting point a CHIA builds security alongside Caroline Thomas’s concept of human security, which first considers the welfare of all human beings, not merely of victims, and, second, runs counter to the existing legitimacy of the current economic order. A CHIA avoids replicating an existing international economic order and instead seeks to change it. Analytically, it is able to advance this argument because it works within an assumption that all knowledge has interest, which means (among other things) that all knowledge has been historically constructed. Therefore, a CHIA argues that a historical understanding of the assumed legitimacy of the neo-liberal approach to development, and hence to security, makes the reciprocal prevention of SHEs more probable.
Part 2.1 Problem-solving theory In the Introduction to this book I showed how solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention is primarily concerned with legal and moral debates. I further argued that such theorising is essentially about a process of deciding whether or not to intervene, and this is what makes the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention methodologically confined. Accordingly, the legal debate essentially asks three questions: • What does international law have to say about whether humanitarian intervention can or cannot occur?
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• Are there any exceptions which would allow humanitarian intervention? • What happens when the UN Security Council does not authorise humanitarian intervention? Similarly, within the moral debates the realists contend that intervention can only take place when it benefits state interests, pluralists argue against intervention because it has implications for international order and solidarists claim that states need to intervene in order to help others. However, I argue that a theory whose normative commitment claims to uphold a moral responsibility to encourage human rights everywhere – a subject considered in the next section – needs to reach much further than an agreement on whether or not to intervene in the event of a SHE. In order to reflect the moral responsibility on the part of international society for the guardianship of human rights everywhere, international society should feel impelled to prevent situations requiring outside intervention from ever arising. It is argued and demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the moral argument of having a duty to others ought to apply to political, social and economic international relations, in order to minimise the need for intervention. Accordingly, states need to have a positive and sustainable duty of economic and political assistance, practising fair trade and allowing dignity to everyone. Following Parekh, I argue that theorising on humanitarian intervention should encompass the patterns of a fair world (Parekh, 1997: 49–69). While solidarists claim that legitimating humanitarian intervention in situations of SHE illustrates a ‘new solidarism in the society of states’ (Wheeler, 1992: 285), I argue that their theorising continues to be deeply influenced by the liberal assumptions which dominate the contemporary order. Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate, solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention legitimises the prevailing neo-liberal international economic order. This is only possible because solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention maintains a problem-solving approach in dealing with SHEs. Problem-solving theory takes the world or reality as given, without questioning it. It uses existing parameters to correct dysfunctions or problems which arise within this order or reality. It is therefore concerned (consciously or not) with specific reforms aimed at maintaining this reality. In Chapter 1, I explained in some detail what is involved in presenting the characteristics of problem-solving theory.
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In this chapter I synthesise these seven characteristics into two. First, problem-solving theory is characterised by positivist methodology (though this should be distinguished from positivism itself: see Chapter 1) and, second, it has the tendency to legitimise prevailing social and political structures, without considering their part in contextualising SHEs. Robert Cox argues that there are three main reasons why a theory would legitimise social and political structures Cox (1986: 206–8). First, it takes the world as it finds it; hence, second, the existing order is not questioned. Consequently, the general purpose of problem-solving theory is to make the system work smoothly. Seeing the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention as problem-solving is a consequence of reconceptualising security in terms of the Theory of World Security. Presenting solidarist theorising in this way explains why solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention has a methodologically confined approach to what are considered SHEs. The positivist method In the Introduction to this book I claimed that the humanitarian content of solidarist theorising about humanitarian intervention is viewed through the lens of SHEs. SHEs have two components: their urgency and the nature of the danger involved. Therefore, for solidarists, ‘if humanitarian intervention is to be contemplated at all it must be only in situations of supreme humanitarian emergency’ (Bellamy, 2003a: 335; emphasis in original). Indeed, core theorists (Vincent, 1986; Wheeler, 2000) and participants (ICISS, 2001: 31) within the solidarist effort have reaffirmed this requirement by distinguishing between what are assumed to be more and less ordinary abuses of human rights. In this situation a more serious emergency such as a SHE becomes the primary focus of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. To be more precise, SHEs are treated as the ‘truth as correspondence’ (see Chapter 1) of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, and in accordance with the positivist method described in the previous chapter, the solidarists theoretically explain, or rather justify, the practice of humanitarian intervention as appropriate because it reflects the reality (‘the facts’) which their theorising identifies, in terms of an existing SHE. Solidarists argue in this way because they build their analyses on a particular set of assumptions: in this case the positivist method’s analytical condition that it is possible to separate subject from object or the observer from the observed, an analytical property explained in Chapter 1.
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Solidarist theorists (the subject) observing a SHE (the object) together with its two components, its intensity and the nature of the danger involved, claim to describe the world as it really is, a world where the only option for addressing SHEs is through military intervention. It is understood why SHEs provide the foundations for solidarists’ theorising; what is questioned, however, is the features of their subsequent theorising, in which the positivist method is not critically addressed, in particular the analytical validity of the power/knowledge relation and the constitutive properties of theories. This is problematic because it has two important effects upon the consequent solidarist practice towards humanitarian intervention. First, solidarists view the practice of prevention through the prism of military intervention. This also means that the welfare of victims is considered before the welfare of individual human beings at all stages of their development. Second, the act of military intervention dictates the boundaries of moral responsibility on the part of international society or dictates what international society is able to achieve in circumstances of SHE. I will look at the two consequences in turn. Accordingly, theorists (in this case, solidarist theorists) who hold ‘the truth as correspondence’ (in this case, the truth that a SHE exists) claim to guide their research in such a way as to filter out their role as theorists living behind a description of the world as it truly is. The description of the real world where intervention is the only option is clearly implied by a conversation held between Nicholas Wheeler and Bhikhu Parekh (Wheeler, 2000: 308). Parekh is known to argue that, although humanitarian intervention may sometimes be necessary ‘it is too limited, too late and too superficial to be of lasting value, and needs to be embedded in and undertaken as part of a larger project of creating a just … global order’ (Parekh, 1997: 49). In other words, he argues that the way to address SHEs is not through military humanitarian intervention but through developing global economic policies to address the underlying structural causes of poverty, which contribute, in his view, to causing SHEs. Therefore, when he asked Wheeler ‘why suffering and death become a matter of humanitarian intervention only when they are caused by the breakdown of the state or by an outrageous abuse of its power’, Wheeler, implying that nothing could be done except intervention, responded in the words of Mahatma Gandhi that using humanitarian intervention to end starvation and poverty would require ‘that the rich … learn to live more simply so that the poor can simply live’ (Wheeler, 2000: 308).
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The point here is that Wheeler claims to invoke the real world (where the rich will never learn to live simply), whereas Parekh does not. As Wheeler argues: ‘at the beginning of the new century, there is little evidence that the global rich in the West are ready to end their position of power and privilege’ (308). In other words, in the response quoted above, Wheeler claims to describe the world as it truly is. Thus, in his world, the only solution to SHEs is the act of military intervention. That is to say, his focus on intervention not only gives a sense of urgent priority to intervention but also limits the normative scope of what is possible within the so-called humanitarian intervention complex. Indeed, contradicting Wheeler’s above observation that ‘there is little evidence that the global rich in the West are ready to end their position of power and privilege’, the starting point for Saving Strangers is Bull’s definition of solidarist society. This however, entails a responsibility on the members of international society not only for their own citizens, but also for citizens everywhere (Wheeler, 2000: 2–7). In other words, Wheeler suggests that solidarism challenges the moral minimalism of pluralism by prioritising justice over order, or the welfare of human beings over the welfare of the state. This is reflected in the way that it establishes the minimum criteria for a legitimate humanitarian intervention. It is closely associated with its referent object of security, the individual human being. Accordingly, Wheeler announces that solidarism places ‘the victims of human rights abuses at the centre of its theoretical project’ (2000: 38). And he further argues that this is the case ‘since it [solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention] is committed to exploring how the society of states [international society] might become more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics’ (38). In sum, it is the practice of military humanitarian intervention, not prevention, that signifies international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights in the world. I argue, however, that while the welfare of the ‘victim’ may be considered by Wheeler’s theorising on humanitarian intervention, it is questionable whether the welfare of human beings is equally encouraged. This, I argue, would be a better demonstration of ‘international society becoming more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics’, as noted above. This observation is key to much else (and is further explored in this chapter) because it is argued that unless solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention engages with the wider
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issue of human rights and not with victims alone, its claim to be a human-centred theorising will continue to be limited. It is argued that, unless solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention takes into account the whole context of SHEs (which I call the humanitarian intervention complexity), the above limitation will persist. The fallacy of viewing the world through the prism of SHEs is that it describes only a singular, temporal part of the real world, a part characterised by the gruesome reality of SHEs. Such a description does not include the circumstances and epoch which contextualised SHEs in the past, nor those which still continue to do so. In this book this so-called context is identified as the current neo-liberal international order, paying particular attention to the neo-liberal international economic order which the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention excludes. And because the potentials for reciprocal prevention are identified within the economic sphere in situations where such a sphere is not part of the debate, the hope of such prevention is not considered. This is why it is important and, as explained in Chapter 1, why theorists must become conscious of it: that while the world of experience, in this case SHEs, might appear as the foundation for knowledge, what is equally important is to be aware of the so-called dependent and derivative status of such conclusions (Horkheimer, 1972a: 138). Theorists must acknowledge the relation between power and knowledge or the ‘inherently politico-normative content of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain’ (Neufeld, 1995:41). It is argued in this book that the dependent and derivative status of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention culminates in the act of intervention, as opposed to prevention. This is not to say that the proponents of humanitarian intervention do not favour prevention over intervention. However, the limitation of their approach, as observed in this book, is that their understanding of the act of prevention is viewed through the prism of military intervention. Solidarist international leaders, organisations and academics all demonstrate this approach. Kofi Annan understands prevention in terms of an act which prevents already existing conflicts from escalating beyond borders. In his 1998 Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation, Annan observes: ‘In some cases effective prevention is actually impeded by the traditional focus on external threats to a State’s security. [If] … social justice, material well-being and peace [are] to be taken into account … an action needs to be pursued far
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enough to prevent local conflicts from escalating and spilling over into the international arena’ (Annan, 1998: paragraph 27). The association of prevention with the act of extensive pre-emptive intervention is most notably articulated in the document Responsibility to Protect. The Commission suggests moving from a ‘culture of reaction to a culture of prevention’, where prevention involves ‘forestalling the human cost from violence and war … to prevent extremely deadly conflict’ (ICISS, 2001: 27–43). A similar attitude is reflected in the academic literature. It is argued that, in the solidarists’ theorising about SHEs, where the emergencies are the main focus, while they want to prevent emergencies, the concept of prevention still remains outside the subject of humanitarian intervention. This results from confining the theorising to making a decision over whether or not to intervene, as explored in Chapter 1, and not to finding ways to prevent SHEs. For instance, in their theorising on humanitarian intervention the theorists do address prevention, though not as the principal aim of this theorising. Indeed, it is often not until the concluding paragraphs of their works that prevention is addressed.1 Or, as reflected by the remarks above, the kind of prevention considered is strongly conditioned by the concept of intervention. This is plainly demonstrated by Wheeler, who says: ‘Those who support a doctrine of humanitarian intervention do so on the solidarist grounds that preventing gross human rights violations [that is, by means of intervention] ranks with peace and security as one of the primary goals of the UN Charter’ (Wheeler, 1992: 471). In other words, those who support the act of military intervention, according to Wheeler, are committed to the ‘prevention’ of gross human violations. More recently, however, Alex Bellamy, in describing the important work of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), gives the practice of prevention significantly more attention than his predecessors did and this is seen as an important and significant step in changing the way in which practitioners and theorists think about humanitarian intervention (Bellamy, 2009: 101). However, Bellamy’s understanding of the concept of prevention remains firmly situated within already violent situations, such as those of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. These violent situations are considered yet again because their two components, urgency and scale, dictate no option beyond intervention or non-intervention. To Bellamy, thinking of these atrocities in terms of their two characteristics, intervention/non-intervention is the only
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antithesis; intervention is understood as the only humanitarian or moral option and no other is considered. It is disappointing to learn, further, that Bellamy argues that associating R2P with broader projects, such as those of economic development, would ‘mire’ R2P’s overall purpose and endanger the development of ‘concrete measures to protect endangered populations’ (101). In contrast to what the author argues, a CHIA maintains that the implications of ‘responsibility to protect’ should involve a sustainable approach to security which necessarily involves the inclusion of the economic sphere in its analysis of crisis prevention. It is quite likely that including the economic sphere will ‘mire’ the R2P agenda, but this is no reason to reject its relevance; one must deal with its complex implications. Note, for the purpose of this section, that I do not claim that the key writers on the subject of humanitarian intervention, Nicholas Wheeler in particular, have been consciously intending to limit their theorising in terms of what is possible. Nevertheless, the influence of Wheeler’s theorising2 has made the theorising on humanitarian intervention methodologically confined. The above reflection also occurs to Steve Smith when he accuses International Relations theorising of not paying enough attention to the impact of theorists’ identities and their definitions of the issues in world politics. He observes: Relying on assumptions about sameness has meant that the discipline [International Relations] has taken the policy agendas of the dominant powers, and hence the dominant identities, in the world as those of all the world. This has created a chasm between the world as seen in the textbooks of the discipline and the world as seen in most of the world. This leads to a fundamental problem for the discipline, namely that it has played, and continues to play, a significant role in recreating the world of the powerful, which it sees as the ‘natural’ focus for explanation. (Smith, 2004: 506–7) Ironically, Wheeler argues: ‘It is a categorical error to posit a separation between words and deeds when thinking of how the social world hangs together; the former constitute the latter by establishing the boundaries of what is possible’ (Wheeler, 2000: 286). Despite his evident awareness, shown above, about the relationship between the process of theorising and its practical consequences for the subject, he still fails to observe the effects of his own theorising and that of the theorists who share
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his approach to the subject of humanitarian intervention. Solidarists fail to consider the relation between knowledge and power, which in this context is associated with their legitimising, through their theories, the act of intervention over the act of prevention. This means that the theorising continues to give overwhelming support to intervention over prevention, which, in turn, they associate with international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights around the world. Taken in sequence, solidarist theorising makes the possibility of preventing instances of SHE less likely. In contrast to solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, a CHIA overcomes the consequences of the positivist method, for it pays much attention to the process of theorising itself and as such it owns a different normative startingpoint, one associated with the prevention of SHEs. How this takes place will become the subject of Part 2.2. In sum, solidarists’ ‘positivist’ treatment of SHEs limits their theorising on humanitarian intervention in the sense that it makes preventative measures seem unviable, however much they may be desired. This happens primarily because they are limited, in the sense that their referent of security is limited to anyone in the role of a victim, and this also means that only one aspect of the context of SHEs is considered. This context dictates only one viable option, that of military intervention. This being so, it follows that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, as will be argued next, runs on what I call the ‘liberal scenario’ and in particular its liberal logic of dividing the ‘economic’ from the ‘political’. This is caused by not explicitly including the neo-liberal international economic order in the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, but taking it for granted. In this way the economic order is further legitimised and not critically readdressed as such, fulfilling the second characteristic of problemsolving theorising.
Legitimising the prevailing social, political and economic structures and following the patterns of the liberal approach International order is ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society’ (Bull, 1995: 8). However, the agencies of the neo-liberal international economic order conceptually separate economics and politics. This conceptual separation has immense consequences for thinking about and understanding the purpose of humanitarian intervention. The solidarist approach to thinking about humanitarian intervention reflects those
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assumptions about order which draw divisions between the political and the economic spheres. This in turn produces a situation where the context of humanitarian intervention is artificially divided between three stages. The first of these, ‘economic statism’, is not a constitutive part of solidarist theorising about humanitarian intervention; the other two are at the stages of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘peace-building’. This has two major consequences. First, because the economic aspects of the international liberal order are neglected, the ways in which liberal economic remedies can actually increase the likelihood of violent conflict in certain parts of the world are rarely considered (Woodward, 1995). Second, solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention has in consequence a very narrow understanding of why violent conflict occurs and how it can be prevented. Solidarist theorists’ taking of the world as they find it and therefore failing to question an existing order First stage: Economic statism The first stage of the context of the humanitarian intervention complex reflects a variety of political, social and economic relations, corresponding to normal, everyday domestic and international relations, which may contribute to the outbreak of violence. Chapter 3 identifies these in terms of the policies of economic mismanagement which contextualised the 1998–9 SHE in Kosovo. This stage can be defined as economic statism, because political, social and, in particular, economic decisions are still being dictated by the rules of statism. This means that citizens are the primary responsibility of their own state alone; it has the primary responsibility for its own domestic activities but not for their international consequences. Thus, domestic relations are more morally binding than international relations.3 Even if the decisions, in particular the economic decisions, of different international institutions or specific states have contributed to undesirable international circumstances, as will be illustrated in Chapter 3 with reference to the Yugoslav crisis, solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention often ignores or fails to question them. Such logic is perfectly acceptable within economic liberalism where wealth is associated with national security: legitimate economic statism is justified by normal liberal practices. In the context of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, this implies that dying from unjust economic relations is less alarming
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than dying from physical violence. This claim has already been justified, in identifying the solidarist approach as one which distinguishes between ordinary and extraordinary abuses. Prioritising one act of wrong-doing over an assumed more serious act of wrong-doing creates an artificial logic, which excludes noting the early signs of crisis as a way of preventing SHEs. Indeed, the missing element of economics is evident within the solidarist literature, and it has been considered a significant limitation.4 Accordingly, Bull mentions trade as an important factor in cooperation within society (Bull, 1977: 70). He clearly states that economics is a part of international society and (his idea of) justice should rest on a fairer international political economy (Bull, 1990: 72–3).5 He is critical of Martin Wight’s limited orientation towards the economy (Bull, 1991: xix–xx), but nevertheless he himself, as noted by Barry Buzan, never develops a persuasive case for including economics in the discussion of international society (Buzan, 2004: 19). Similarly, Vincent criticises Bull for failing to include the economy as significant in his analysis of international order (Vincent, 1988: 196, 204). This means that he himself puts ‘economic’ on the agenda and his book Human Rights is a fine example of so doing (Vincent, 1986); but his focus nevertheless remains on the political side of the international economy (Buzan, 2004: 19). This being the case, he argues for the right to subsistence, defined as the foundation of a global human rights programme, and is aware that this implies a ‘radical reshaping of the international economic order’ (Vincent, 1986: 127). Vincent further observes that, ‘in regard to the failure to provide subsistence rights, it is not this or that government whose legitimacy is in question, but the whole international system in which we are all implicated’ (145). Regrettably, Vincent’s initial insight into International Political Economy (IPE) is taken no further, either by him or his followers (Buzan, 2004: 20). The exception here, as also observed by Barry Buzan, is the work of James Mayall, who in his early work did consider economic liberalism in terms of international society (Mayall, 1984: 313–21; 1989: 297–307). Unfortunately the potential for developing economic solidarism came to nothing in his later works (Mayall, 1990, 2000). Consequently, the next question which arises is why solidarists follow the tradition of economic liberalism or, more specifically, of neo-liberalism? An explanation of this can be found in the field of IPE. Fundamentally, in pursuit of joint gains, including the pursuit of collective security within international society, solidarists follow the liberal understanding of organising the economic sector (Buzan, 2004: 151).
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The pursuit of joint gains is legitimised by a number of liberal prior assumptions. Explaining the construction of what may be called the ‘false legitimacy’ of these presumptions is imperative for the purpose of proposing the alternative approach of critical humanitarian intervention. This is the purpose of the final part of this chapter. The purpose of the present section is, first, to identify those presumptions and, second, to demonstrate how these have been put into practice by such institutions as the IMF and the World Bank. Accordingly, neo-liberal presumptions draw their legitimacy first, from a conception of freedom based on private power, second, from placing much significance on individual choice in the market place and, third, from critiquing the public realm and therefore the associated ideas of collectivity and society. Finally, economic activity is not viewed as political in itself because it is assumed to have a distinct and superior rationality. One reason for the separation of economics and politics is that free-market economic behaviour is assumed to be highly rational, while politics is irrational, hence efficiency requires the minimum of political interference.6 Another reason is that it is assumed that conflict can be managed by international economic agencies because it takes place within a system which generates continual, pacifying economic growth (Tooze, 1992: 236). All the above assumptions have been embraced by global economic governance, represented by public institutions such as the IMF the World Bank, other multilateral development banks and the World Trade Organization (WTO), not forgetting the majority of governments. These institutions are defined as if they were all public institutions because they are expected to represent the interests of global citizens and to promote the global public good (Asetto, 1988: 20). This is a significant observation, because this chapter and the next question the credibility of such (publicly orientated) global economic governance, as well as proposing a possible alternative to it. The purpose of both the IMF and the World Bank, as Asetto observes, was set out in the Articles of Agreement, which state that their purpose is to promote stability in the international monetary system through the promotion of free trade, stable exchange rates and economic development (1988: 11). The IMF and the World Bank were established in 1945 with their main offices in Washington, DC. The IMF, representing 184 states, has the role of overseeing short-term cross-border money flows and questions of foreign exchange. Article I of the Articles defines the IMF’s particular purpose as promoting international monetary cooperation through consultation and the collaboration of members
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on international monetary problems. The Articles exhort the Fund to work towards the establishment of exchange rate stability, the establishment of a multilateral system of payments and the reduction of foreign exchange restrictions (1988: 12). The purpose of the World Bank Group (WBG) is to provide project loans for reconstruction and development in poor countries. Article I of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement (IBRD, 1994: 1) states that the Bank is to: 1. Facilitate the investment of capital for productive purposes; 2. Promote private foreign investment and to supplement private investment through loans out of its own capital; 3. Promote the balanced growth of international trade and equilibrium in the balance of payments; 4. Ensure that adequate financing exists for the ‘more useful and urgent projects’; and 5. Pay due regard to the effects of its options on business conditions among its members. World Bank loans facilitate credits for projects where the risk is considered too great for private lenders alone; significantly, several conditions govern the use of Bank credit. World Bank loans must be used for productive purposes and essentially to finance the foreign exchange needs of a project. The borrower must be unable to finance the project with funds from the private sector – the reason behind this condition is to promote private investment and enterprise (Asetto, 1988: 12). An essential observation for this book is that the activities of both the IMF and the World Bank are considered apolitical in nature, simply reflecting the ‘value free’ principles beneath ‘positive economics’ (Thomas, 2000: 56, Mirowski, 2002: 99). Indeed, this is confirmed by the Articles of both organisations. The Articles of the IMF are constructed in such a way as to exclude both political factors from consideration in decisions to lend and the formation of stabilisation policies designed to restore a balance of payments equilibrium. The so-called performance criteria, which apply to states which intend to borrow, are formulated ‘in arithmetic or other objective terms’ so that members of the IMF can be assured ‘that the Fund could [not] impede purchase under the Stand-by arrangement by decisions motivated by subjective or discretionary considerations’ (Gold, 1980: 12). In other words, and as embedded by the Articles of Agreement (Article IV, Section 3(b)) ‘the purpose of a program or loan conditions, according to the Fund, is not to alter a member’s economic
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or political structure, and thus, a member’s social or political policies are emphatically excluded … from consideration’ (20). Similarly, the character of the World Bank prohibits it from considering political criteria: it stipulates that [t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially. (IBRD, 1994: Article IV, Section 10) In other words, the Bank asserts that its decisions to lend are formed on economic criteria alone (Asetto, 1988: 19). Both the IMF and the World Bank have been involved, in particular since 1979, in the structural adjustment programmes in the South and, relevant for this book, the former East (Scholte, 2005: 601). The so-called global economic integration is supported by neoliberalism as the most natural and universal path towards the economic growth and therefore the security of all humankind. This is why it is possible to argue that liberal ideology is promoted around the world as the only proper approach to issues involving security and development (Thomas, 2000: 13; Tooze, 1992: 236). However, while the World Bank and the IMF, among others, are associated with the instigators of this form of global economic integration, the integration itself is promoted through the liberalisation of trade, finance and investment.7 Trade liberalisation has been a significant characteristic of ‘global economic integration’ since the end of the Second World War. Then, through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), developed countries sought to reduce barriers to trade, which has encouraged a number of rounds of ‘tariff-cutting exercises’ (Thomas, 2000: 70). From 1948 GATT brought major reductions in customs duties, quotas and other measures which had previously inhibited the cross-border movements of merchandise. In 1995, when its membership reached 122, it was absorbed into the WTO, a name indicative of the global movement towards trade liberalisation. Since then, it has increased its power to reinforce existing trade agreements and to pursue new avenues of liberalisation, such as investment flows (Scholte, 2005: 603). Free trade has also been encouraged at a regional level; one example is the North American Free Trade Agreement
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(NAFTA) (Thomas, 2000: 70). Trade liberalisation was especially significant in the early 1980s and 1990s, where the assumed free trade benefits outflanked the unexplored social implications of free trade, a subject to be further explored in this chapter. The liberalisation of finance can be summed up in terms of the ‘framing of the new reality of the late 20th century global financial system [where] the private sector is the overwhelming source of capital for growth’ (cited in Thomas, 2000: 76). Until 1999 the IMF actively sought to amend its Charter to enable its members to open their capital markets to overseas investors (Scholte, 2005: 608–12). Finally, global economic integration is encouraged by the liberalisation of investment. Indeed, Article II of the World Bank’s constitution identifies the promotion of private foreign investment as one of its fundamental purposes. And as early as 1956 the International Finance Corporation (IFC; an affiliate of the World Bank), was set up to invest in private sector companies, as opposed to governments. This is indicative of the overall neo-liberal principle where the role of the state is redefined as providing support for the private sector (Thomas, 2000: 84). Carla Hills, the US Trade Representative under the Bush (Senior) Administration, argued: ‘we want corporations to be able to make investments overseas without being required to take local partners, or export a given percentage of their output, or to use local parts, or to meet any of a dozen other restrictions’ (cited in Korten, 1995: 123). Reflecting (at least to some degree) the above liberal ideology, in the early 1980s and 1990s neo-liberalism led the international financial institutions (IFIs) to emphasise the role of the private sector in issues concerning development. One example is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Set up in 1991, it directs 60 per cent of its lending to the private sector (Thomas, 2000: 84). Its role is significant for post-1999 Kosovo and will be explored further in Chapter 3. In the above preliminary description of the instigators and their functions in the process of so-called global economic integration, it should be understood that these functions form a blueprint for policy prescriptions and these, in turn, have been marked with the powerful language of ‘There is no alternative’, or TINA, as observed by Caroline Thomas (2000: 13). Besides the appeal of neo-liberalism’s promises, such as the individual’s control over or consumption of the products which capitalism generates, Thomas observes further that neo-liberalism is further legitimised through the incorporation of an inclusive language. Some
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examples would include the terminology of sustainable development, transparency or accountability which is embedded in the language of the neo-liberal development approach. However, this book asks that the relation between the knowledge built by the instigators of the neoliberal international economic order and the interests of those whom it serves necessarily requires investigation. This is the case because, in line with Caroline Thomas’s view, it is argued that the neo-liberal legitimacy assumed above must be seen as a ‘false legitimacy’ (2000: 14 and Chapter 2). This argument rests on the clear discrepancy between the theoretical aspirations of neo-liberalism and its practical outcomes. For instance, as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has shown, over the past decade the world economy has experienced high levels of growth. During this period the expansion in world merchandise trade has been nearly twice as high as the growth of world output. In 2005, the value of world merchandise exports for the first time reached the $10 trillion mark (UNDP, 2006: 28). • However, despite this apparent success, inequality, both globally and within countries, is rising (28). • The poorest 40 percent of the world’s population, the 2.5 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, account for five percent of global income, while the richest 10 percent account for 54 percent (8). • Despite growing advances in medicine and technology, every hour 1,200 children die from preventable diseases (9). • Although there are technical resources and no longer the logistical obstacles to abolishing poverty, more than 800 million people suffer from hunger and malnutrition. • 1 billion people do not have access to clean drinking water. • While trade can be one of the most effective engines of economic growth, many producers in poor countries remain cut off from international markets because they cannot compete with heavily subsidized goods produced in the developed world or because they lack the basic infrastructure and know-how needed to participate in the global economy (29). • Failure to break the vicious circle of poverty and conflict can have regional and global consequences. For example, of the 32 countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI), 22 have experienced violent conflict at some time since 1990; and of the 52 countries in which child mortality statistics are constant or even increasing, 30 have experienced violent conflict since 1990 (29).
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The significance for this book of the above list is that it demonstrates that the continued solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, with its problem-solving logic of theorising about SHEs, replicates an order of significant injustice. It is inadequate in considering political violence to be different from ‘economic’ violence. It lets solidarists make assumptions about what constitutes violence and, more unfortunately, which deaths are relevant to explaining the world of international relations.8 Following Booth’s pure theory, I argue that solidarist theorists fail to consider that all knowledge has interests. Consequently, without questioning whose interest is served by the liberal assumptions upon which the economic international order is built, liberal analysis, like solidarist analysis, is quickly seen to be system-supporting analysis (Tooze, 2005: 293–4). The contradiction here, which also explains why solidarist theorising cannot claim to encourage human rights around the world, is that while solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention prides itself on being morally responsible within international society for encouraging human rights everywhere, the working of the current international order (associated at its most basic level with the liberalisation of trade, finance and investment) discourages these rights. Unless the international order is adjusted to accept that economic activity is political activity, solidarist theorising will encourage and reinforce the same order, which in the circumstances of Kosovo contextualised a SHE. Consequently, there is a significant risk that further intervention will be required. In this way, solidarist theorising has encouraged a systemsupporting analysis of international order, which has failed to prevent the need to intervene. The question why the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention has not problematised sufficiently the structures and inequalities built into the prevailing order has a twofold answer. First, as explained above, it has not done so because it is an entrenched part of the liberal logic of dividing the political from the economic, where the economic is considered as apolitical and therefore excluded from the theorising of humanitarian intervention. In other words, SHEs are dealt with because of their political violence and not for the sake of their economic context. Second, it has not done so because it maintains a logic which claims that change is already happening and that the implementing of change is associated with arriving at an agreement within international society to intervene in order to address SHEs. Here, as outlined in Chapter 1, the difference between a problem-solving and a critical understanding of change is cardinal. This sequence of ideas reaffirms
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the final attribute of problem-solving theory, which is to make the system work more smoothly but not to change it. Solidarist theorists – making the system work more smoothly Second stage: Intervention as demonstrative of problem-solving change The second stage of the humanitarian intervention complex is intervention itself. According to solidarist theorising, it is a situation requiring an immediate decision on whether or not to intervene. Since there is no legally binding agreement among states to permit humanitarian intervention, it is argued that humanitarian intervention is grounded in the statist manner of thinking. There would be no need to justify humanitarian intervention ‘unless states were assumed to be sovereign and entitled to immunity from external interference’ (Parekh, 1997: 56). Consequently, much current theorising on the subject of humanitarian intervention is about finding good enough reasons to maintain or abandon statism. In the solidarists’ view, upholding or abandoning the properties of statism, that is, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, begins the process of change or, of moving from one stage to another. Essentially, the explanation for doing so is grounded in moral rhetoric, such as intervening to protect human rights. There is much evidence in the literature on humanitarian intervention which endorses the above. Hoffman et al. argue that the change in attitudes to sovereignty may signal a more widespread acceptance of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. They argue that ‘there is a growing discrepancy between the norms of sovereignty and the traditional legal organization of the international system, on the one hand, and the realities of a world in which the distinction between domestic politics and international politics is crumbling’ (Hoffman et al., 1996: 13). Further, Weiss acknowledges a subtle but fundamental change in political attitudes to the concepts of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction in which ‘the rights of individuals take precedence over the rights of repressive governments and the sovereign states they represent’ (Weiss, 1999: 21). Further, Richard Caplan argues that the 1991 unauthorised intervention in Northern Iraq led by the US, the UK and France; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia in 1990 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 ‘are part of a larger trend that has seen states give increased weight to human rights and humanitarian norms as matters of international concern’ (Caplan, 2003:
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134; 2000: 25). He further argues that the international community has taken enough important steps to give international humanitarian law greater substance,9 and that ‘alongside these developments and the broad shift in international concerns, NATO’s enforcement actions in Kosovo, although unauthorised, begin to look somewhat less irregular’ (Caplan, 2003: 134–5). The theorising on humanitarian intervention has also influenced the secondary literature on humanitarian intervention: in this instance, the definitions of a good international citizen. Andrew Linklater, responding to the question of what it means to be a good international citizen when dealing with ‘states that are at war with sections of their own population’, gives four possible responses (Linklater, 2000: 50). First, the statist response would be that international society needs to respect the rights of sovereignty and therefore must not intervene. The second response is one of modified statism, which still accepts the responsibility to maintain sovereignty. In this instance, economic and diplomatic pressure would be deployed first to bring about changes in regimes which fail to comply with international conventions on human rights. However, such a position may be ineffective, and a genuine commitment to protecting human rights may in exceptional circumstances require resorting to force. Third is the legalist response, which accepts the logic of modified statism, but points out that international law does not entitle states to engage in war for humanitarian ends. Therefore, the good international citizen cannot act against the consent of the Security Council, even though inaction allows human rights violations to continue. Finally, as Linklater defines it, the moralist or cosmopolitan position argues that international relations privilege the rights of states over the rights of individuals, but it would be better if: International law [could] move away from its statist roots when faced with regimes guilty of genocide and ethnic cleansing. The good international citizen should be prepared to engage in humanitarian war to protect distant strangers and to force the international community to consider how best to change international law. (2000: 50) Nicholas Wheeler approaches the debate between statism and nonstatism by distinguishing his position of solidarism from that of pluralism. Pluralist international society theory, he argues, forbids humanitarian intervention on the grounds that it would disturb international order, which is based on the rights of sovereignty and non-intervention.
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Pluralist support for not intervening is described as statist. Fernando R. Tesón, from whose work Wheeler draws his conclusions, argues that objections to humanitarian intervention on the basis of its undermining international order are based on ‘statism which treats states as the relevant units in international relations’ (Tesón, 1988: 14). Therefore humanitarian intervention can take place only when the values of statism are questioned or broken. In the context of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, the values of statism are challenged by the values that place the welfare of individual human beings above that of the state. Essentially, however, as mentioned in Part 2.1 of this chapter, it is in some ways questionable to treat the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention as evidence that international society is more hospitable to the promotion of justice. In the context of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, the values of statism are challenged by the normative purpose of the solidarist approach, which is to ‘put the victims of human rights abuses at the centre of its theoretical project’ (Wheeler, 2000: 38). The justifications associated with this purpose imply a non-statist environment. It is non-statist because the theorising on humanitarian intervention implies that ‘international society has become more hospitable to the promotion of justice in world politics’ (2000: 38). Not only the core theorists but also the practitioners demonstrate this observation. This was evident in the language used by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in a reference to humanitarian intervention as a challenge to the dominant understanding of state sovereignty (Annan, 1999a: 4). The rejection of statism does not per se make humanitarian intervention legal. However (and to recall the power/knowledge relation), it does give intervention a moral basis upon which it is easier to accept and morally require acts of military intervention. This is an important point, because it has immense implications and consequences for what international society understands as ‘the provision of moral duties’ (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2001: 477), fulfilling the role of ‘guardianship of human rights everywhere’ (Bull cited in Wheeler, 2000: 12). Solidarist theorising implies a situation where political violence is being addressed. Yet the suffering caused by economic relations within the statist system is ignored. Third stage: Peace-building to restore the neo-liberal international economic order The inconsistency between economic practice and political aspirations often remains after an intervention has taken place, and this is why
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solidarist theorising continues to follow the liberal logic of dividing the economic from the political, even after intervention. For instance, after NATO intervened in Kosovo, purportedly on the basis of having a moral responsibility to protect human rights, what followed was a period usually defined as peace-building (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). But the policies that were to help the process of peace-building in Kosovo reflected the failures of the neo-liberal international economic order. Detailed analysis of post-1999 Kosovo will be presented in Chapter 3; for the purpose of the present section, it is enough to say that the socalled reformist change took place immediately after the war, as much to ‘reconcile the ambitions of different international actors as to meet Kosovo’s needs’ (ICG, 2004: 1–36). Six years later, however, it was evident that the ‘international community has neglectfully cast Kosovo’s economy adrift’ (ICG, 2004: 36). This was confirmed seven years after the conflict when the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) did not appear to have Kosovo’s social and economic development as its primary objective (ICG, 2005: 5–7). Kosovo’s economic future still remains unclear, despite its recent declaration of independence. The EU is not united in its commitment to support its economic development, while the US and the UK consider its independence ‘conditionally’ (Sörensen, 2009: 280). The point here is that the economic situation is part of the neoliberal international order as instigated by the IFIs. This is an issue to be more systematically explored in the next chapter. Even though they justify intervention on humanitarian grounds and challenge political statism, the powerful states continue to disengage economic aspects from the political by using the logic of the first stage, economic statism – that is, considering economic decisions as non-political. If the solidarist theorists are to take the moral responsibility of implementing human rights everywhere, they should not limit this to times of acute crisis only. This is an important observation, because it is argued that claims signifying international society’s ‘implementing of human rights everywhere’ or ‘fulfilling the obligation to humanity’ cannot be reduced to heeding the plight of victims only. Rather, as this book argues, ‘implementing … human rights everywhere’ or ‘fulfilling the obligation to humanity’ needs to extend the responsibility of states to acknowledge ‘the duty to refrain from pursuing their interest in a manner that is prejudicial to others … exploiting their economic vulnerabilities, pressuring them for unfair economic privileges … all in all, principles of humanity [need] to create a fairer world’ (Parekh, 1997: 39).
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To recall: the first purpose of reconceptualising solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention in terms of the Theory of World Security was to make it easier to understand why such theorising is problemsolving. Taking the two main components of problem-solving theorising, I have explained why it maintains the positivist method and why it legitimises prevailing political, economic and social structures. Accordingly, I have argued that that solidarists consider SHEs in terms of their truth as correspondence, and when this in itself is not considered inappropriate the dependent and derivative status of their conclusions is. It is argued that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention uses SHEs as the starting point for theorising without reflecting upon the analytical validity of the power/knowledge relation and the constitutive properties of all theorising. In practice this means that the act of intervention is prioritised over the act of prevention, which means in turn that the welfare of victims is considered as opposed to that of human beings at all stages of their development. The second consequence is that in instances of SHE the act of intervention dictates the boundaries of what international society can do. The solidarists’ focus on SHEs also means that the existing context within which these emergencies arise has not been sufficiently problematised as a legitimising structure, in this way demonstrating the second characteristic of problem-solving theorising. What is meant by the liberal scenario is the dividing of the humanitarian intervention complex into three separate stages: economic statism, intervention itself and peace-building. Critically, the first stage is not considered relevant for theorising about SHEs. One of the reasons why solidarists have not searched for change within the economic system is that, as far as they can see, the desired change has already taken place, since they associate it with the agreement on the part of international society to intervene. Theorising about humanitarian intervention without considering the working of the neo-liberal international economic order as integral to it comes to nothing because it does not explore or even consider the part played by this order in contributing to (or, as argued in Chapter 3, contextualising) SHEs. This, I argue, brings two more major consequences upon solidarist theorising. First, it fails to consider the function of liberal economic remedies as increasing or otherwise the likelihood of violent conflict and, second, solidarists as a result have a narrow understanding of why conflict occurs and consequently how it can be prevented.
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Part 2.2 A critical humanitarian intervention approach A CHIA rejects the problematic positivist method and instead encourages a method inspired by Booth’s metaphor of anchorage. The metaphor of anchorage is an umbrella term to include the analytical validity of two of its main theoretical characteristics, those of critical distance and immanent critique. In view of the above, a CHIA rejects the problematic positivist method, whose theorising is dictated by its correspondent truth. It does not reject the existence of SHEs; it does reject, however, the consequent practice arrived at as a result of considering SHEs in terms of their correspondent truth. A theorist taking a CHIA is able to do so because she/he, in theorising about SHEs, considers the relation between knowledge and power, an analytical property, which in this book explains the solidarists’ preference for the act of intervention over the practice of prevention. Dissatisfied with these conclusions, a CHIA, rather than treating an agreement to intervene as an act of moral value, considers it a failure on the part of international society not to have prevented the emergency in the first place. A theorist working within critical distance is able to judge the consequent theory on the basis of its fruits or, as considered in the context of this book, judge which theorising serves a better way of life. I have argued and showed that treating SHEs as a starting point for theorising has problematic consequences. Therefore, equipped with the knowledge that theories are constitutive and they can encourage or normalise only one view, a CHIA aims to encourage the reciprocal prevention of SHEs. In turn, only this way of thinking is claimed to imply the commitment of the CHIA to the promotion of justice in the world. Essentially, however, in striving for this goal a CHIA considers human beings as its referent point for further analysis, but essentially they are all considered as part of ‘complex’ collectives. This avoids considering human beings as solely in the role of victim and considers individual human beings at all stages of their development. This requirement asks to search for security is consistent with Caroline Thomas’s interpretation of human security, a detailed description of which is given below. Further, the building of Thomas’s concept of human security is made possible because of the unfulfilled potential already present within the broad area of work on the general concept of human security. The building of an aspiration upon an unfulfilled potential is associated with the practice of immanent critique. Accordingly, what follows next is a short demonstration of the work which has already been done on the general
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concept of human security, followed by the description of Thomas’s notion of human security itself. The unfulfilled potential of the concept of human security The concept of human security, considered in a general sense, involves a very broad collection of propositions. Presented as a concept, it is a relatively new term, ‘but one that is now widely used to describe the complex of international threats associated with civil war, genocide, and the displacement of populations’ (Human Security Centre, 2005: 1). All proponents of the concept of human security converge on the point that its primary goal is the protection of individuals. They differ, however, over what threats individuals should be protected from and consequently what action needs to be taken to address these threats. Here I distinguish three different concepts of human security, providing a brief summary of the first two and a more detailed description of the third kind. The first type is defined as a ‘narrow’ concept of human security, a significant characteristic of which is the distinction that it makes between human security and national security. Proponents of this particular concept of human security observe that, while national security focuses on the defence of the state from external attacks, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from all forms of political violence (Human Security Centre, 2005: 1; emphasis added). They pay much attention to the fact that even secure states do not always provide for the security of their own people, and therefore envisage that protecting people from their own governments is an important part of providing for human security, in its ‘narrow’ definition. It is into this context of providing for the security of individuals that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention fits most comfortably. Indeed, the literature situating humanitarian intervention within the debate on sovereignty versus human security is most relevant here. One example is Boutros-Ghali’s view of human security, which infers that the sovereign equality of states and consequent prohibition of intervention forms an effective obstacle to human security (BoutrosGhali, 1995: 11–12). Further, military interventions, since the Cold War are justified by some in terms of protecting human security, as opposed to national interest (Cooper, 2004: 74). The second concept of human security is identified as ‘broad’ in nature (Human Security Centre, 2005: 2). The proponents of the ‘broad’ concept of human security are those associated with the UN Development
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Programmes, the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) and the Commission on Human Security’s 2003 report, Human Security Now (Commission on Human Security, 2003). They argue that the ‘threat agenda’ must necessarily be broadened to include ‘hunger, disease and natural disaster because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined’ (Human Security Centre, 2005: 1). This particular concept of human security received its first global attention in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports. The late Dr Mahbub ul Haq argued that [f]or too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of cataclysmic world events. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (UNDP, 1994: 3)10 The 1994 report on human security was built on and refined throughout the 1990s. The 1995 Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, argued that to address underlying the causes of conflict, ‘political, social, economic and environmental’ was ‘clearly, the best solution to security crises … to remove or alleviate the factors that cause people, groups and governments to resort to violence’ (The Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 93, 97). The observed relationship between potential conflicts and unfavourable economic circumstances was further endorsed by the 1997 UNDP report, which sought to change the focus of poverty from its association with income only, to a concept of poverty associated with the denial of choices and opportunities for living a tolerable life. The report drew a distinction between income poverty – an income of US $1 a day – and human poverty, associated with illiteracy, short life expectancy and so forth (UNDP, 1997: 2). These are important aspects of human security, marking a distinction between its quantitative and qualitative aspects, which will be considered in more detail shortly. A year later, in 1998, in the UN’s Annual Report, Kofi Annan suggested an expanded role for the United Nations and the Security Council; that of ‘addressing the root causes of violence – whether political, legal,
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institutional, military, humanitarian, human-rights related, environmental, economic and social, cultural or demographic’ (Annan, 1998: paragraph 29). Similar objectives were set in his 1999 speech on Facing the Humanitarian Challenge; Towards a Culture of Prevention, where he called for preventative strategies to address the root causes of conflict (Annan, 1999b). Essentially, the UN and the UNDP have played a substantial part in agenda setting, while at the same time encouraging a broader and wider understanding of security among international bodies, such as the World Bank, IMF and also some governments, the most significant being the Canadian and the Japanese. Here the distinction between a narrow and a broad concept of security becomes relevant, for the position of the Canadian government is best described in narrow terms, whereas the position of the Japanese government is broader in concept. Accordingly, the Canadian government’s meaning differs from that of the UNDP, but still changes the focus from the state to human security. The very breadth of the UNDP approach … made it unwieldy as a policy instrument and largely ignored the continuing human insecurity resulting from violent conflict. By the UNDP’s own criteria, human insecurity is greatest during war. Of the 25 countries at the bottom of the 1998 Human Development Index, more than half are suffering the direct or indirect effects of violent conflict. (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999) In contrast to the UNDP, the Canadian government’s main concern was to lessen the effects of violent conflict on people. Hence, its focus was on measures such as the ban on landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court where people could be held responsible for war crimes (Smith, 2005: 53). In contrast, the Japanese government’s approach to human security is much nearer to the UNDP’s notion. It observes that, while it is important to put a ban on landmines, at the same time ‘it is necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict situations’ (Takasu, 2000: 1). Accordingly, the Japanese not only broadened the concept of security but also recognised that ‘human security requires conceptual clarification if it is to be taken seriously as a vision or instrument of foreign policy’ (Suhrke, 1998: 219, 221). Significantly, in 2003 a Commission on Human Security was established under the chairmanship of Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. Their report, submitted to the UN in May 2003, states that the security of
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people around the world is interlinked – as today’s global flows of goods, services, finance and people highlight. While political liberalisation and democratisation open new opportunities, at the same time they bring new disadvantages, such as political and economic instability and conflicts within states (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 7). While more than 8,000,000 people a year lose their lives to violence, about 2.8 billion suffer from poverty, ill health, illiteracy and so forth. Conflict and deprivation are interlinked, because deprivation has many causal links to violence. Wars kill people, destroy trust between them, increase poverty and crime and slow down the economy. Addressing such insecurities demands an integrated approach (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 9). The above are only some examples of how the concept of human security considered in both narrow and broad terms has gradually found its way onto the agenda of some international institutions and state leaders. The question which then arises is why it has done so. As I argue in this book, in common with other theorists, the reason is that poverty and inequality are beginning to be associated with national, regional and ultimately global security threats. In particular, Thomas argues, ‘there seems to be a correlation between the level of entitlement to human security and the propensity of conflict, defined not in orthodox interstate terms but in the wider sense to include the most frequent form of warfare, intrastate’ (Thomas, 2000: 8). Indeed, between 1990 and 1995, 57 per cent of countries experiencing war were scoring low on the UNDP Human Development Index, while only 14 per cent were ranking high (Smith, 1997: 15). In other places, as I explore in Chapter 3, poverty and inequality played a significant part, for instance, contributing to the 1998–9 SHE in Kosovo. Both the narrow approach, which focuses on direct violent threats to individuals, and the broad approach, which calls for recognising that these threats are closely associated with various forms of socioeconomic and political inequality, are considered necessary and important. This is because, first, they change the referent of security from a state to an individual and, second, because they share, although to a different extent, an approach to security which links human security with economic development (Human Security Centre, 2005). It is a useful step in proposing an alternative perspective where security is linked to economic development, in a debate already in progress. However, while it may be considered a step, it is still insufficient to address ‘fundamental economic and social structures which allow a privileged
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global and national elite to control a disproportionate share of available resources’ (Thomas, 2000: 8). Considering that poverty, inequality and security are linked together requires a shift in focus from states to individual human beings or the will to address inequality and poverty in their own terms. It also requires, as pointedly argued by Thomas, a ‘shift in focus to human security [which] also highlights the importance of scrutinising global processes that may impact on, even jeopardise security and global governance structures which drive these processes’ (2000: 9). This is where the third type of human security becomes most pertinent. The third concept, more specifically the concept of human security as defined by Caroline Thomas, differs from both the narrow and broad concepts in the sense that its proponents seeks to understand global economic integration and to associate it with a certain distribution of costs and benefits. It follows that the unequal distribution of resources is not caused by bad luck, but rather by existing global structures, which can in fact be changed (9). However, this change can be applied only when the workings of these structures are included in the debate on how to understand and provide for human security. In the meantime, the solidarist theorists on humanitarian intervention do not share this view. This is not to say that the general approach of solidarists to international politics fails to promote issues concerning the reduction of poverty and underdevelopment. My point here is that although the solidarists generally hold that combating underdevelopment should continue, it should also become part of their particular approach to humanitarian intervention. I argue that unless international society addresses the economic aspects of security it cannot claim to be upholding the moral duty of guardianship of human rights everywhere. In other words, working towards achieving only one aspect of security makes the other aspect insignificant. This is a crucial observation, as it has implications for understanding the sources of threats to security and consequently for the strategies to overcome these threats. To conclude, the developments within the narrow and broad concepts of human security are considered in terms of unfulfilled potentialities and it is upon these that Thomas’s third concept of human security could be built. They are unfulfilled because they do not reach far enough on their own to challenge the unfavourable structures of economic global processes, which in this book are associated with the workings of the neo-liberal international economic order. However, they are still considered in terms of ‘potentialities’ because they represent
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a debate already in progress, which links the issues of security to those of economic development. Overall, providing for security in terms of Thomas’s concept of human security, the next issue to be explored in more detail, provides a basis upon which one can explain why ‘social and economic structures allow a privileged global and national elite to control a disproportionate share of available resources’ (2000: 9). This is a pivotal explanation which must be mastered by theorists of security in order to change the structures that Chapter 3 argues have contextualised the 1998–9 SHE in Kosovo. Solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention fails to implement or even consider such an insight because when the issue of humanitarian intervention arises this theorising remains methodologically confined to deciding whether or not to intervene. This in turn results from the solidarists’ problem-solving approach to a number of issues embedded in the humanitarian intervention complexity. Caroline Thomas’s concept of human security: The ‘truth as correspondence’ of a critical humanitarian intervention approach As already discussed, there are different understandings of the concept of human security. However, the understanding which has been found most persuasive and which is also in agreement with the aspirations of Critical Theory is described by Caroline Thomas. Thomas, like Booth, not only moves from considering the state as the referent of security to considering the individual, but even more, she envisages an individual not as conceived in the ‘individual neo-liberal sense’ (Thomas, 2000: 6) but as part of a series of complex collectives: an individual who is not a ‘socially transcendental and ontologically self-contained being … for his humanity is articulated in and realised through social identities’ (Parekh, 1997: 61).11 Therefore human security responds to ‘conditions of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another’ (Thomas, 2000: 6). Considered in this context, Thomas’s interpretation of human security complies with Booth’s element of practical theory, which suggests a commitment to the unity of progressive means and ends through being true to each other. Indeed, he argues, it is the only way in which change can be brought about and also sustained. This is in contrast to a dualistic approach, which often replicates the ways which it claims to have changed (2007: 253–5). Further, the mutual working of means and ends is understood on the lines of what is called the ‘virtuous
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circle of security and emancipation’ (Booth, 2005d: 183). The test of this ‘virtuous circle’ is that it should pursue security (reducing the threats which determine the conditions of insecurity) and promote emancipation (reducing structural oppression), while the pursuit of emancipation (becoming more fully human) is to practise security (not against other people but together with them; Booth, 2005d: 183; 2007: 256). I argue that solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention fails this test. In the context of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, the pursuit of security – that is, bringing an end to SHEs – does not promote emancipation or conditions which would minimise the likelihood of SHEs later. Solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention may arguably give a clear message that SHEs are not acceptable, but it does not do enough to stop them reappearing. The test of the ‘virtuous circle of security and emancipation’ in turn requires a pursuit of security which would be congruent with the needs of an individual human who is being considered as part of a complex collective. The concept of this ‘virtuous circle of security and emancipation’ shifts the attention from ends (pursued sometimes at any price) to means. It is associated with the concept of virtue because it tells us how a virtuous person should behave. It does so in a normative sense for the potentiality of human becoming. It resonates the aim of applied ethics, which seeks to promote Aristotle’s belief that by acting virtuously we become virtuous (Booth, 2007: 256). Relating the above to human security, human needs are both material and non-material. Material needs lie at the core of human security, but the concept of non-material dimensions forms a qualitative whole (Thomas, 2000: 6). In other words, as Thomas observes, while material sufficiency is necessary it is not a sufficient condition of human security. These different needs can be categorised as either quantitative or qualitative aspects of human security. Quantitative aspects of human security refer to human material needs, such as food, shelter and health care. Thomas builds this argument on work done by the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, who emphasises the importance of the ‘human needs’ approach to human security. He argues that ‘At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met’ (Axworthy, 1997: 183).12 However, while on the one hand Thomas builds on Axworthy’s ‘human needs’ aspect of human security, at the same time she has regard to its qualitative aspects. These involve the non-material human needs which make up human dignity, a concept which encompasses the values of meaningful participation in the life of a community and
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respect for cultural diversity. Admittedly, my focus on the qualitative aspects of human security is selective at this point, since it is beyond the scope of this book to provide a detailed review of this intricate subject.13 However, what is relevant to this book about the qualitative concept of human security is that it necessarily includes global economic structures in the theorising about human security. The characteristic of including global economic structures in analysing the provision of human security, although to a smaller degree than required by Thomas’s concept, has already been put upon a global agenda by the UNDP. Indeed, the historical development of the concept of ‘human development’, which would later be associated with the concept of human security as recently examined by Craig Murphy, conveys in my view the essence of the qualitative aspect of human security. Murphy, in tracing back the idea of ‘human development’, associates its ‘uniqueness’ with a speech made by Robert Kennedy, shortly before his assassination in 1968: Too much and too long, we seem to have surrendered community excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our gross national product … if we should judge America by that – counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for those who break them. It counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and the cost of a nuclear warhead, and armoured cars for police who fight riots in our streets … Yet, the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage; neither our wisdom nor our learning; neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country. It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. (Robert F. Kennedy cited in Murphy, 2006: 243) The association of Kennedy with the concept of human development is not coincidental. Its purpose was to mention Barbara Ward, who indeed influenced Kennedy’s thinking, but also people such as Mahbub ul Haq, who was the first person to associate human development with
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the concept of human security (Haq, 1993). Ul Haq’s concept of human security, as observed by Murphy, can be traced back to the thinking of Ward, who once observed ‘our physical capacity has gone beyond our ethical capacity: [as much as to say that] there was more to a human being, than producing wealth’ (cited in Murphy, 2006: 243). Amartya Sen remembers discussions with Ul Haq about life expectancy, literacy and other measurable things, beyond money ‘that might provide a better indication of whether people have been given a chance of a complete human life’ (cited in Murphy, 2006: 243; emphasis added). Regarding aspects other than money that make up for human development, the concept of human development allows a theorist to recognise that ‘as human beings, we value a multitude of things – many of which have no market price. Our sources of fulfilment are many, and the potential impediments to our fulfilment just as varied’ (Murphy, 2006: 244). To substantiate this observation, Murphy quotes from Martha Nussbaum, who observes that human development’s central question is not, ‘How satisfied is this woman?’ [or] ‘How much in the way of resources is she able to command?’ It is, instead, ‘What is she actually able to do and to be?’ The core idea seems to be that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes her/his life, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around the world in the manner of a flock or herd animal (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993: 858; Nussbaum, 2002: 123). Critics of the qualitative concept of human security focus on the potential ‘richness of human needs as a recipe for a policy gridlock’ (Murphy, 2006: 245). While this is a fair observation, it is not the purpose of this chapter to categorise different human needs as prescribed by the concept. However, what is significant for my book, and is the subject of Chapter 4, is that the above analysis of the qualitative aspects of human development, which correspond with Thomas’s concept of human security, seek to change not only global policies affecting particular states but also the global economic structures upon which these policies are erected. The above ideas about human security converge with this book’s formulation of a CHIA. By this I mean that I propose including the neo-liberal international economic order in the analysis of SHEs and in consequence encourage international society to recognise its shared responsibility for such events. Crucially for this book, emancipation from oppressive power structures, be they global, national or local in origin and scope, is necessary for Thomas’s interpretation of human security. Substantive democracy at local, national and global levels and
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empowerment at the level of global governance through the wider representation of states are also to be desired. Thomas further argues that human security is pursued by most human beings, as part of their collectives, that is, households, villages or communities. At a global level, states have the authority but even more the responsibility to provide for the needs of human security; global governance institutions could set global development policies to apply the global rules of entitlement. All in all Thomas notes, A consideration of human security in the contemporary era requires us to consider humanity embedded not simply within discrete sovereign states, but within a global social structure, the capitalist world economy that has been developing since the sixteenth century. (2000: 7) It is argued that understanding the normative purpose of humanitarian theory in terms of providing for human security gives a better chance of reciprocally preventing SHEs. Having outlined the concept of human security, in Chapter 4, I look at ways of providing for these needs and consider how this in turn gives more scope or a better chance of reciprocally preventing such emergencies in future. Fundamentally what distinguishes Critical Theory from any problem-solving theory is its proponents’ understanding of change. So long as problem-solving theory works within the parameters of an existing order it fails to question the relation between knowledge and interest, but the CHIA, through the process of applying critical distance, stands apart from the prevailing order and asks how it came about and whether it might be in the process of changing (Cox, 1986: 208). Chapter 1 mentioned that two main purposes are ascribed to a critical change. These involve both analytical and practical qualities, to be considered jointly. The practical implementing of critical change in this book is associated with practices complementary to the principles of Thomas’s human security, which would help to provide more scope to prevent future SHEs; these practices can be facilitated by restructuring the working of the neo-liberal international economic order along an ‘alternative path’, a subject to be considered in Chapter 4. However, before such a change can be practically implemented, a theorist needs to learn that knowledge and interest are related; in this particular context, this means that the structures of neo-liberal economic international order are not nature’s own, but are constructed by human
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subjects. The result of this belief is to conclude that if the neo-liberal economic international order is constructed it can also be deconstructed, if this would make it easier for international society to take on the moral responsibility for encouraging human rights everywhere. The intersubjective construction of economic statism Accordingly, Susan George argues: ‘Once you understand that neoliberalism is not a force like gravity, but an artificial construct created by people, you can also understand that what some people have created, other people can change’ (George, 1999: 3). Indeed, the development of economic liberalism cannot be understood without analysing its historical circumstances, one of which is the modern state that accompanied its development. The history of the modern state is the history of the institutionalisation of security, which was closely linked to the idea of modernity and therefore to the concept of human progress. In fact, the notion of state security, after Jeremy Bentham, was inseparable from the idea of an economy (Tooze, 2005: 136). According to Anthony Burke, ‘this involved a series of shifts, firstly from economy as a principle for the government of the family to one for the general organisation of society, and then of sovereignty from a rule over territory to the government of a “complex of men and things” which would incorporate territory into a set of economic relations’ (Burke, 1997: 7). The key observation here is that, historically, security and political economy have been two inseparable elements of the construction and continuing reproduction of the state and modernity (Tooze, 2005: 137).14 It was not until the late nineteenth century that the process of explicit disengagement of the political from the economic was begun, a phenomenon described in Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation (Polanyi, 1957). The internationalisation of ‘political economy’ and the separation of the ‘economic’ from the ‘political’ on the basis of the political imposition and then elevation of the ‘capitalist’ market become the necessary core social formation (Jessop and Sum, 2001: 89–101; Tooze, 2005: 137; Watson, 2005: 149–53). ‘Political economy’ was established and defined directly as being constituted by the interest of the state through the doctrine of mercantilism (where power was associated with wealth). Hence, any political challenge to the state from those who gained power and wealth from incipient capitalist industrialisation and the creation of surplus capital would need to split the economic realm from that of political economy. This historical explanation partly accounts for the liberal doctrine of the separation of politics and
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economics, a separation still embedded in theory and in practice within current international economic neo-liberalism (Tooze, 2005: 137). In Chapter 3 it is argued that this is what has contextualised the 1998–9 Kosovo SHE. Derived from the political/economic divide is the association of security with economic prosperity, which in turn is associated with the so-called statist international economy. Roger Tooze makes this observation on the basis of what he calls the ‘twin track for investigations into security by political economy and into economics by security’ (Tooze, 2005: 148). Accordingly, track one starts with ‘politics’ as the traditional concern of security, but with ‘economics’ added as a new domain of threat to the state. Track two starts with a re-politicised ‘economics’, leading to literature on ‘economic security’, where particular attention is paid to the global financial system (148). Essentially, however, the way the ‘economic’ is then related to the ‘political’, or the political to the economic, ‘[depends] upon prior ideological commitments as to the nature of the relationship between ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ normally expressed in paradigmatic terms of perspectives, or contesting approaches’ (Tooze, 2005: 148; Watson, 2005: 19–27). One example would be a liberal interpretation of economic security directly linked to and conditioned by the prior assumption of the link between economic prosperity and war, based on the assumed beneficial rationality of markets (Tooze, 2005: 148). This is why, as Tooze observes, economic security as a concept and as a political issue has been clearly constructed as an extension of statist International Political Economy (IPE). A statist IPE theorist ‘brings together the twin tracks by grafting the agenda of economics onto the classic concerns of state security via economic nationalism, otherwise defined as mercantilism’ (148). Mercantilism, or what Robert Gilpin calls ‘economic nationalism’ (Gilpin, 1987: 12–14) associates economic management with national interest: ‘any state [which] voluntarily ceded economic sovereignty operates against its national interest by jeopardizing the security of the nation’ (Watson, 2005: 23–4). In the tradition of mercantilism, power and wealth and hence national security are complementary and inseparable. This is particularly the case in the so-called strategic industries, considered as those industries whose healthy development is necessary for the maintenance of national military-political security (Tooze, 2005: 148; Watson, 2005: 23). However, despite the implications of mercantilism, after the Second World War the international economic structure emerged as a US hegemony but crucially was developed on the public basis of a liberal
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trade and investment order with a legitimating ideology of liberal political economy. An important characteristic of this order was the role of a state which could intervene in the market in order to facilitate the functioning of capitalism and the promotion of global stability. This was defined in terms of ‘embedded liberalism’, where states worked towards reducing barriers to trade but at the same time recognised the political importance of state intervention in national economies (Ruggie, 1982: 379–415). The spirit of the Keynesian approach of the early post-Second World War years is well summed up by George: The idea that the market should be allowed to make major social and political decisions; the idea that the State should voluntarily reduce its role in the economy, or that corporations should be given total freedom, that trade unions should be curbed and citizens given much less rather than more social protection – such ideas were utterly foreign to the spirit of the time. (George, 1999: 1) The underlying philosophy of embedded liberalism continued between the 1940s and the late 1960s. However, between the 1970s and the present, this approach was replaced by neoclassical economic theory. Admittedly, the shift between the Bretton Woods order and the ensuing period was more complex and fragmented than the present book suggests. It is beyond its scope to describe it with the degree of sophistication it deserves.15 Nevertheless, the focus on the privileged role of the market over that of the state, typifying post-1970 economies, remains, and is therefore appropriate for my own analysis. The ideological shift thus formed the foundations upon which the political and economic philosophy of neo-liberalism (also identified with neo-liberal pre-assumptions) was being further encouraged. Above, I identified those neo-liberal pre-assumptions together with the institutions which put them into practice, but here the focus is on the neo-liberal approach to development and therefore to the provision of security. Fundamentally what distinguishes the neo-liberal approach from the previous philosophy of embedded liberalism or subsistence economy is its emphasis on the privileged role of the market over that of the state and the other actors in the distribution of goods and services (Thomas, 2000: 36). The main aim was to replicate in the developing countries, including the former Yugoslavia, the social and economic changes which
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had already appeared in the North, following their scientific and industrial revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The fundamental logic guiding this neo-liberal plan was ‘the possibility of unlimited economic growth within the context of liberal international economy. Wealth would “trickle down” through societies, and ultimately everyone would benefit’ (Thomas, 2000: 34–5; emphasis in original). Correspondingly, in the spheres of international trade and finance, the purpose of the IMF and the World Bank was and is to maintain and support a system of stable exchange rates and free trade, not forgetting undisturbed private foreign investment (Payer, 1982: 345). On this basis the major financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, encouraged policies acceptable to their major founders, that is, the Western powers and in particular Britain and the US (Asetto, 1988: 21). This can also be explained in the sense that Britain and the US were the crucial actors in the funding of both organisations and it was values and perceptions of those countries which formed (in the past and still nowadays) the basis upon which the international economy was organised. The predominantly Western economic governance, as well as favourably distributed towards the voting power of Western governments within the IMF, guarantees a predominant position of these countries within the global economy (Thomas, 2000: 19). In the 1970s it was observed by critics of the World Bank and the IMF that the policies of both were an ‘integral part of the foreign policies of Western capitalist nations towards underdeveloped countries’ (Hayter, 1971: 6). Indeed, in the 1980s, a period relevant for the case study of this book, Presidents Regan and Bush, as well as the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, put the underlying philosophies of these institutions into practice. This approach to the economy and therefore security became known as the Washington consensus and was encouraged in regions as diverse as sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Latin America and, relevant for this book, Eastern Europe. The origin and meaning of the term the ‘Washington consensus’ are well described by Paul Krugman: By ‘Washington’ Williamson [who first used this term] meant not only the US government, but all those institutions and networks of opinion leaders centred in the world’s de facto capital – the IMF, World Bank, think tanks, politically sophisticated investment bankers, and worldly finance ministers, all those who meet each other
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in Washington and collectively define the conventional wisdom of the moment … One may … roughly summarise this consensus … as … the belief that Victorian virtue in economic policy – free markets and sound money – is the key to economic development. Liberalise trade, privatise state enterprise, balance the budget, peg the exchange rate. (Krugman, 1995: 28–9) The working of the ‘Washington Consensus’ was most prominent in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the neo-liberal overall agenda, the market rather than the state determined entitlements to the fundamental material aspects of human security (see Box 2.1). The validation and legitimacy of neo-liberalism, essentially accompanying laissez-faire economics, also has a historical origin. It arrives from the famous phrase of Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) ‘the survival of the fittest’ (cited in Thomas, 2000: 40). It was used to justify beliefs such as that welfare provisions had a detrimental effect on the development of society as a whole and therefore should be made redundant. This was demonstrated throughout the 1980s and 1990s where advocates of neoliberalism argued that ‘the welfare state should be “rolled back” in order to eradicate the “culture of dependency” which it breeds, and that all areas of life should be opened up to “economic competition”’ (Thomas
Box 2.1 Free market beliefs • Sustained economic growth, as measured by gross national products, is the path to human progress • Free markets, unrestrained by government, generally result in the most efficient and socially optimal allocation of resources • Economic globalisation, achieved by removing barriers to the free flow of goods and money anywhere in the world, spurs competition, increases economic efficiency, creates jobs, lowers consumer prices, increases consumer choices, increases economic growth and is generally beneficial to almost everyone • Privatisation, which moves functions and assets from governments to the private sector, improves efficiency • The primary responsibility of government is to provide the infrastructure necessary to advance commerce and enforce the rule of law with respect to property rights and contracts Source: Cited in Thomas (2000: 40)
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and Reader, 1997: 9). Influential economists such as F. A. von Hayek (1899–1992) and his student Milton Friedman (1912–2006) helped to validate and legitimise such neo-liberal beliefs, defending their natural and commonsensical character (see Table 2.1).16 The deepening global inequality which accompanied these changes was not perceived as a problem, but quite the opposite (Thomas, 2000: Chapter 2). Inequality has been seen as ‘good’ for growth, because in the neo-liberal approach it stimulates entrepreneurial activity, helps generate jobs and keeps unemployment low. The so-called growth– equity trade-off is perfectly acceptable (Thomas, 2000: 39). The above logic of neo-liberalism was confirmed by Margaret Thatcher who once observed: ‘It is our job to glory in inequality, and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all’ (Thatcher, 1996: 52). It is important to observe that such an approach not only increases global social division, but also validates and legitimises a situation of unacceptable inequalities which was to be mirrored not only in the former Yugoslavia but also throughout the world. The approach received a boost of confidence with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, because with it fell the state-controlled economies of the former Eastern bloc and the economic and political liberalism of the West had triumphed (Fukuyama, 1989: 3–4).
Table 2.1 Underlying assumptions of neoclassical economics Underlying issues of neoclassical economics
Resolved as:
The pervasiveness of self-interest
Humans are motivated by self-interest, which is expressed primarily through the quest for financial gain.
The issue of the greatest financial return
The action that yields the greatest financial return to the individual or the firm is the one most beneficial to society.
Competitive versus cooperative behaviour
Competitive behaviour is more rational for individuals and firms than cooperative behaviour; consequently, societies should be built around the competitive motive.
The measure of human progress
Human progress is best measured by increases in the value of what the members of society consume; ever higher levels of consumer spending advance the well-being of society by stimulating greater economic output.
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Since the late 1970s the IFIs provided a vehicle used by the G7 throughout the world to promote an approach to security which disengages ‘the economic’ element necessary for providing for sustainable security. Indeed, the IMF and World Bank were the principal instruments through which the doctrine of neo-liberalism in relation to development was encouraged.17 The US-trained economic advisers, as well as US government officials, significantly influenced the workings of the World Bank and the IMF.18 The role of the IMF and the World Bank in encouraging a neo-liberal approach to development is especially significant because of the part it played in introducing structural and institutional reforms to national economies, such as in the former Yugoslavia in the process of integrating the former federation in the global economy. The IMF is described by Thomas as the ‘linchpin’ in the implementation of the neo-liberal vision of development and therefore of security (2000: 55). In addition to its usual role of providing short-term balance-of-payments support, in coordination with the World Bank, the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s encouraged the reform of national economies so as to reflect better the dominant vision of market-led rather than state-led development (Piper and Taylor, 1998: 38; Watson, 2005: 226). The reasoning behind such a vision was that this would facilitate a suitable environment in the borrowing countries, such as the former Yugoslavia, for attracting private capital in both the domestic and foreign spheres. This in turn would promote global economic integration along free market lines being institutionalised by the IMF and the World Bank as debt management strategy and formally defined as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs; Cheru, 1997: 165). An SAP is defined as ‘an attempt to establish a system of price-making markets in order to regulate and guide economic activity’ (Watson, 2005: 227–8). The main objective of the SAPs, along neo-liberal principles, was to remove distortions from the process of resource allocation, by subjecting this process to the disciplines of a supply-demand-price mechanism (227). SAPs enabled the IFIs to advance the role of the market and change the role of the state in order to create a prosperous environment for the private sector (Edwards and Wijnbergen, 1988). The consequence of this was that at the same time as structural adjustment loans were introduced, core neo-liberal components were also unconditionally encouraged. Some examples include the privatisation of public services and public assets, liberalisation of trade, finance and production and the relaxing of labour and environment laws (Mehmet, 1999: 127). Because the market and not the state became the motor
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for economic growth, the state could not determine the entitlement of citizens to the basic elements of human security. These included food, education, health care, transport and access to essential basic credit. The reasoning behind these decisions was that ‘the export-led growth expected to arise from these changes would generate the foreign exchange income necessary for countries to keep up debt repayment’ (Thomas, 2000: 56). Chapter 3, below, presents this logic as applying to the former Yugoslavia, where ‘structural and institutional reforms have redrawn the social as well as the economic map, profoundly altering the relationship between state, market and citizens’ (Thomas, 2000: 55). Significantly for this book, according to the neo-liberal approach to development and therefore security, the role of the IMF and the World Bank is considered apolitical, because it reflects the value-free principles uncovered by positive economics (Watson, 2005: 228). This is clearly a false assumption to make, as it manifests its own political position by its neo-liberal agenda of minimal government interference, a laissez-faire free market economy, free trade, financial liberalisation and the promotion of private business. To be apolitical is not an option. Discussions about development to provide for security for all were guided by a neo-liberal belief in the private sector and, by implication, a conception of the civil and political rights of the individual – or, more appropriately, the liberal individual (Thomas, 2000: 43). Compatible with political liberalisation, economic neo-liberalism justified the expansion of human freedom through better institutions and good governance. This in turn explains why in the late 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s, IFIs were interested in political conditionality. It meant then and still means now that the World Bank, the IMF or the donor governments can withhold funds where political liberalisation is not sufficiently encouraged (Cheru, 1997: 165; McMichael, 1998: 105). Political conditionality, as will be explored in the next chapter, had a significant negative impact on the political, social and economic organisation of the former Yugoslavia. While a detailed analysis is to follow, what is principally questioned in Chapter 4 is the neo-liberal logic of development, which seeks political stability before economic development. For example, where, as a general rule, the history of the developed countries showed them pursuing political liberalism after economic development, political liberalisation throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s was being (as it still is) promoted as a precursor, if not a prerequisite, of economic development (Thomas, 2000: 43). The neo-liberal democratic reforms, as Thomas continues, ‘may give the illusion of empowering people, but without economic
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transformation the illusion may not be translated into anything more tangible’ (44). As will be shown with reference to the socio-economic situation of post-1999 Kosovo, the neo-liberal approach to development and security most effectively serves the interest of those in the possession of capital. Such an approach is complementary to economic neo-liberalism, which prioritises the creation of favourable conditions for foreign investment before securing favourable conditions for human development. These and the above-mentioned core ideas upon which the global neo-liberal economic order is built considerably undermine the solidarists’ and international society’s claim to fulfil the moral responsibility of encouraging human rights beyond their own states. Meanwhile, in conclusion to the above, the prevention of SHEs is not considered because the solidarist understanding of change continues to be problem-solving, the main consequence being that solidarist theorising does not consider the first stage of the neo-liberal international economic order as an opportunity for preventing SHEs. It is only when the whole context, which the solidarist theorists on humanitarian intervention artificially divide into a first, second and a third stage, is considered as one entity – the humanitarian intervention complex – that the need for intervention can be obviated. In the meantime solidarist theorising supposes that the ‘change’ to an alternative order is already taking place. This ‘change’ in the context of humanitarian intervention is understood as the breakdown of political statism, which implies extending our obligations to the rest of humanity. However, this logic is deeply problematic because obligations to the rest of humanity, when applied in situations of acute crisis, become inconsistent only with the principles of common humanity which solidarist theorising claims to uphold.
Summary This chapter has argued that the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention in its analysis of SHEs is problem-solving. This means that it maintains a positivist method of theorising and it legitimises the prevailing social, political and economic structures of the current neoliberal international economic order. Solidarist theorists, it is argued, maintain the positivist method because they consider SHEs in terms of their ‘truth as correspondence’. In this book, I appreciate the solidarists’ need to consider SHEs as the starting point for their analysis, but I am critical of the failure of solidarist theorists to observe and address the consequences of their theorising, which are as follows.
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First, solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, focusing on the two components of SHEs, the scale and the nature of the danger involved, overwhelmingly focus on the act of military intervention. The action of prevention is desired, yet it is seen through the prism of intervention and therefore it remains outside the subject of humanitarian intervention. This also means that the solidarist referent of security is considered in the role of a victim, as opposed to that of a human being at any stage of development. Treating SHEs in terms of solidarist correspondent truth also dictates their second limitation. This is the presenting of military intervention as exhaustive of international society’s moral responsibility in the event of SHEs. Indeed, the circumstances dictated by such emergencies as require an outside intervention are presented in terms of the ‘real world’ and therefore no other option seems viable. Solidarists claim to represent the real world and my rejection of this claim also explains why they legitimise the social, political and economic structures of the current neo-liberal international economic order as also representing the real world, fulfilling the second characteristic of problem-solving theory. Solidarists’ legitimisation of the neo-liberal international economic order implies two further limitations. The first is that the ways in which liberal economic remedies can increase or otherwise the likelihood of conflict are rarely considered; and, second, that solidarists have a narrow understanding of why conflict occurs and how it can be prevented. There are three reasons why these theories legitimise appropriate structures. They do so because in their analysis of SHEs they take the world as they find it; as a result they do not question it and therefore the overall purpose of their theories is to make the ‘world’ work smoothly. Accordingly, it was argued, the solidarists’ claim to describe the real world was limited because the world which they describe is seen through the prism of SHEs. It was argued, on the contrary, that their description of the world is incomplete precisely because it describes a singular and temporal part of the world, that part which is characterised by a SHE. It was further explained that solidarists theorise in this way because they follow liberal assumptions about the separation of politics and economics. This, in turn, produces a situation where the context of the solidarist understanding of humanitarian intervention is artificially divided between three stages: the stages of ‘economic statism’, ‘humanitarian intervention’ and finally ‘peace-building’. In the section called ‘Solidarist theorists taking the world as they find it and therefore not questioning it’ I explained the first stage, the
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stage of economic statism. Economic statism constitutes a context for situations requiring outside intervention, although the relations thus entailed are not included in the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention. This, I argued, makes the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention encourage unsustainable provision for security. It is unsustainable, even though solidarist theorising encourages the stopping of SHEs, because the wider international context has not been transformed. In other words, the solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention has not sufficiently problematised the structures and inequalities built into the prevailing neo-liberal international economic order because such theorising does not consider that order to be necessary to the analysis of SHEs. The context continues to be unquestioned at the stage of intervention itself. This happens because the solidarist approach by now considers the action of humanitarian intervention in terms of a normative shift; that is, that it is enough to demonstrate international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights everywhere. This means that, as far as solidarists are concerned, the rules of statism (where the security of a state is prioritised over the security of an individual) are being broken and therefore international society’s moral commitment to encouraging human rights everywhere is being fulfilled. Failing to address the structures of the current economic order happen at the third stage, more properly described as ‘peace-building to restore the liberal international order’, where the inconsistency between the flawed neo-liberal international economic order and the political aspirations continue after the intervention has taken place. Given the limitations of solidarist theorising on humanitarian intervention, part 2.2 proposed an alternative perspective called a CHIA. This alternative perspective is considered to be a better alternative because it gives more scope for the prevention of SHEs. Accordingly, a CHIA, informed by the problematic positivist method of theorising, has instead built its analysis on SHEs, according to the framework suggested by Booth’s metaphor of anchorage. The metaphor of anchorage implied working within critical distance, which means being able to reflect upon the common sense of particular theorising. The theorist’s awareness about their theorising’s appropriate common sense puts them in a position to change it if they disapprove of it. A CHIA in its attempt to change the common sense of humanitarian intervention theorising from intervention to prevention does not reject the existence of SHEs; far from it. It accepts that in rare
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circumstances a military intervention may be the only option to stop immediate violence. Essentially, however, a CHIA argues that, should this be the case, the very need for intervention should be considered in terms of a failure on the part of international society to prevent it in the first place. Refusing to consider intervention as exhaustive of international society’s moral responsibility to encourage human rights and encouraging, instead, the practice of prevention in terms of what international society should do when faced with SHEs gives a different starting point for further analysis on the subject of humanitarian intervention. In striving for this goal, a CHIA considers the human being in the role of someone who is part of a series of complex collectives and not in the role of a victim. This book argues that the consideration of human beings at all stages of their development is consistent with Thomas’s interpretation of human security. Thomas’s conception of human security was considered most appropriate, since not only does it address the ill-treated operation of different economic policies but crucially it also questions the philosophies upon which those policies were built. It is accepted that the building of human security, as explained by Thomas, is no easy task but one which should not be discouraged, because there is unfulfilled potential upon which this distinct concept of security could be built. The unfulfilled potential was identified with the narrow and broad conceptions of the general concepts of human security. Both concepts were considered in positive terms but even so they still insufficient to question the assumed legitimacy of the current neo-liberal international economic order. Indeed, a theorist working within a CHIA is equipped with the knowledge that the concepts of knowledge and interest are related. The implication that this has on the alternative perspective of a CHIA is that a theorist working within this approach does not accept the given order as somehow ‘natural’, but questions it instead. The question asked in this book is whose interest the current neo-liberal international economic order serves. If the Kosovo crisis is viewed in the context of the neo-liberal international economic order it offers, among other things, an alternative perspective. This perspective is needed before a theorist can learn how the neo-liberal approach inescapably leads to unfavourable consequences. The underlying assumption of a CHIA is that the existing rules of society (here associated with the unfavourable rules of economic liberalism) are not natural and inevitable and therefore can be changed.
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This is why a historical understanding of the processes of global economic integration and the associated costs and benefits can help to inform a debate on the prevention of future SHEs. In other words, while solidarist theorists, intentionally or not, reproduce society through their descriptions of it, a CHIA affects society by understanding it and then seeking to change it. This chapter concluded by demonstrating that the statist working of the neo-liberal economic international order itself is historically constructed, which the next chapter will confirm as a fact too pernicious to ignore in the analysis of humanitarian intervention.
3 International Society’s Role in the Restructuring of Yugoslavia’s National Economies
Introduction The purpose of Chapter 3 is to trace back the effects of international society’s economic activities in the former Yugoslavia prior to the 1998–9 Kosovo crisis. In particular I analyse the role played by IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as EU in their project of integrating the former state into the international economy. I argue that the project of integrating the former Yugoslavia into the neo-liberal international economic order, as instigated by these institutions, was prompted by the neo-liberal economic ideology of the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s as presented in Chapter 2. This reflected the fact that structural and institutional reforms to the national economy of the former Yugoslavia were a condition for its integration into the global economy. In order to substantiate the above claims I explain what particular factors constituted the stability of the former federation preceding the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence on 25 June 1991.1 Next I consider the Yugoslav political and economic situation in the context of the external conditions of the global economy in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Here I suggest that the key dates of that country’s decline in the 1970s closely corresponded to the unfavourable events of the oil and debt crises of the late 1970s and 1980s. These significantly contributed to Yugoslavia’s economic decline, here ascribed to its astronomical foreign debt. This phase in economic history is also associated with what was defined in Chapter 2 as the spread of the neo-liberal economic international order or neo-liberalism. In accordance with its core principles, neo-liberalism supports global economic integration as the best, the most natural and universal path towards economic growth and therefore 102
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security for all of humanity. Consequently, Yugoslavia found itself totally dependent on outside financial help, which it could receive only by participating in neo-liberal global economic integration. This meant undergoing a number of SAPs, significant reforms of the national economic system that had political consequences that gradually contextualised the different violent crises that ensued. Altering the internal arrangement of the economic and therefore political spheres contributed to Yugoslavia’s vast unemployment totals, which changed the socio-political dynamics along different ethnic lines, consequently contributing to overall insecurity among the Yugoslav people. Finally, it is argued that by changing the internal arrangements within the national economy of Yugoslavia, the IFIs – the representatives of the neo-liberal international economic order – significantly changed the dynamic between all the different republics and also the autonomous provinces of the former Yugoslavia. It is argued that all the above events, which resulted from neo-liberal policies, contributed to the conditions which led to violence in the former federation. It is in the context of these consequences that I then consider the case study of Kosovo, looking both at what preceded its 1998–9 SHE and the sociopolitical circumstances of this post-1999. The purpose is to provide analyses of change, which show that the SHE of 1998–9 Kosovo cannot be sufficiently explained without considering international society’s economic involvement (through its neo-liberal economic component) in contextualising that emergency. Indeed, this chapter further suggests that the post-1999 situation in Kosovo continues to demonstrate a problem-solving approach to crisis management. This means that while Kosovo’s 1998–9 SHE has been brought to an end, the conditions of neo-liberalism, which contextualised these crisis in the first place, remain there. I use the economic policies instigated by the EU to argue this point.
Part 3.1 Yugoslavia’s basis of stability before the 1991 wars2 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in the province of Kosovo, has predominantly been portrayed as resulting from centuries-old ethnic hatreds (Dunne and Kroslak, 2001: 35). Indeed some of the most important political actors were allegedly influenced by the accounts of different historical writers (Pugh et al., 2004: 149). Robert Kaplan’s 1993 book had an influential impact on the thinking of US President Bill Clinton and EU mediator Lord David Owen, presenting
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the Yugoslav people (according to Kaplan) as ‘unusually wild and predisposed to violence’ (Ramet, 2005: 3).3 The Kosovo crisis of 1998–9 was closely associated with ethnic cleansing. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated in March 1998: ‘we believe that in 1991 the international community stood by and watched ethnic cleansing [in Bosnia] … We don’t want that happen again this time’ (Wheeler, 2000: 258). British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said that the use of force in Kosovo was ‘to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo’ (Wheeler, 2000: 259). Ethnic cleansing was further reaffirmed in April 1999 by Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, who condemned ‘the vicious and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing’ conducted by Serbian forces against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo (Annan, 1999d). Reference to genocide was also made. For instance the British Defence Secretary, George Robertson, claimed that ‘the air strikes have one purpose only: to stop the genocidal violence’ (Dunne and Kroslak, 2001: 35). Certainly some solidarist academic analysis shares this point (Wheeler, 2000: 265, 282). Alex Bellamy argues that ‘Kosovo in 1999 must be seen in the context of a traumatised population subjected to almost complete ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide’ (Bellamy, 2001: 120). The present book does not deny the gruesome violence which took place in the former Yugoslav state. Whether the former federation witnessed actual ethnic cleansing or genocide is debatable and has been considered in detail elsewhere (Booth and Walling, 2001). Nor does this book argue that the former federation was not ethnically distinct and that ethnicity played no part in its turbulent history.4 However, as discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2, this book rejects the solidarist analysis of Kosovo’s 1998–9 SHE through its two components: its urgency and the nature of the danger involved. It argues that analysing crises in a manner identified with problem-solving methods limits the ways in which similar crises could be prevented in the future. In contrast, by considering SHEs in the context of the neo-liberal international economic order, one realises that this order significantly contributed to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia’s economic and political system. This in turn facilitated the many different crises which followed. However, before exploring the different ways in which the neo-liberal economic order contextualised the collapse of the system, it is important to consider exactly what things broke down. I identify these as Yugoslavia’s unique international position, its constitutional order defining governmental powers and property rights, and its social
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order, defining the concept of citizenship. Understanding how all three of these elements were disturbed provides clues for preventing a similar disintegration in the future. Yugoslavia’s international position Many have argued that there were two Yugoslavias, both shaped by the politics of the Great Powers. The circumstances of 1918–41 determined the composition of what was to become a multinational state. Responding to nationalist struggles against the empires of Austria, Hungary and Turkey, the great powers at Versailles (using the new principle of self-determination to justify the dissolution of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires) enabled a new multinational country to be formed (Woodward, 1995: 23; Bennett, 1995: 7; Glenny, 1999: chapter 4;Malcolm, 1994: chapter 7; 1998: chapter 13). Predictably and understandably the process of integration was a challenging one, most evidently represented in the choice of a unitary constitution over a federation, which meant a lack of autonomy for particular nations. The process of integration was made particularly difficult by the existing economic circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s. Eventually, however, the country was enriched by the cultures of ‘Habsburg, Venetian and Ottoman legacies; Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant religions; Slavic dominance mixed with non-Slavic indigenous and immigrant traditions’ (Woodward, 1995: 23; see also Malcolm, 1994: 164–71). The later experience of the Second World War determined additional characteristics. United by anti-fascist bonds and the region’s vulnerable geopolitical position, the Yugoslav leadership paid particular attention to the potential threat from outsiders in war characterised as a struggle for territory between competing political systems, those of the capitalist West and the Soviet East (Woodward, 1995: 24; Bennett, 1995: 42; Malcolm, 1994: chapter 13). For several reasons the overall lack of trust played a significant role in the origins of the Cold War. The most evident reason was Tito’s disproval of Stalin’s regime or, to put it more simply, the fact that ‘Yugoslavia was not part of the Soviet camp’ (Bennett, 1995: 56). This resulted in Yugoslavia’s exclusion from the newly forming Eastern bloc. In other words, the Yugoslav leadership choose to be socialist but independent of Moscow (Woodward, 1995: 25). Despite its pivotal role as an anti-Soviet campaigner, the US refused to reconsider Yugoslavia’s request for inclusion in the Marshall Plan and therefore its early membership in Europe. Not surprisingly it was also blocked by the USSR from joining the Council for Mutual
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Economic Assistance (CMEA). Its difficult economic position was, however, eased by US military aid,; US initiated economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, the US Export-Import Bank and foreign banks; and the restoration of its trade relations with the West after August 1949 (Bennett, 1995: 59). Accordingly, some argued that the US in particular, both directly and even more through the above financial institutions, rewarded and cultivated the former state as ‘a virus which could infect the corpus communist body’. The former state was to be kept afloat as an example of ‘dissidence’ within the Eastern bloc (Freyberg-Inan, 2006: 228). As such, between 1961 and 1990 the former state signed ten standby agreements with the IMF, amounting to $3.5 billion in the period 1979–90. The World Bank, in the period from 1949 to 1991, lent a total of over $6 billion distributed through ninety loans (Freyberg-Inan, 2006: 240). The European Investment Bank (EIB), between 1976 and the beginning of the UN sanctions, granted 21 loans totalling over ECU760 million, 50 per cent of which was disbursed (Freyberg-Inan, 2006: 240). This outside economic help and Yugoslavia’s own internal political organisation helped the federation to modernise politically and be successful economically. Between 1958 and 1965 Yugoslavia reformed its economic system to the point where it could join the GATT as a full member. To accompany this relatively strong position in 1971, it negotiated association agreements with the European Community and, after 1979, with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA; Woodward, 1995: 26). Besides forming an example of dissidence within the Eastern bloc, more especially Yugoslavia impeded Soviet influence in the Mediterranean by providing a strong military deterrence against potential Soviet aggression in the Balkans. Essential to its position on the world stage was Tito’s particular care to found the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 as ‘alternatives to the superpower blocs’ (Woodward 1995: 26, emphasis added). Further, Yugoslavia’s goal of remaining independent and neutral dictated its economic and political system. To achieve this, Woodward argues, it needed to be self-reliant, for example by protecting strategic industries; defending the interior of the country by the most critical defence plants and governmental regulation of agriculture to ensure self-sufficiency in food. To reduce any potential attacks from either West or East, the leadership spread its military purchases between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The operational controls of the armed forces were moved depending on the security threat and, as a result, in the early 1950s the Yugoslav’s
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People Army (YPA) was the third-largest regular land force in Europe, consisting of around 220,000 people (Woodward, 1995: 26; Bennett, 1995: 76–7). Significantly for the arguments used in this book, Yugoslavia’s need for neutrality also dictated its foreign economic relations. Yugoslavia operated in three distinctive markets: the West, where it mainly borrowed capital, such as commercial loans, imported advanced technology and spare parts; the third world, especially oil rich Iraq and Libya; and the second world of the USSR and CMEA, where the government negotiated secure access to fuel and other strategic resources in exchange for armaments, construction projects and manufactured goods (Woodward, 1995: 27; Bennett, 1995: 7). Yugoslavia’s economic openness in all three opposed Cold-War systems gave it flexibility and a potentially strong position, but at the same time it dictated certain areas of vulnerabilities, as will be explored in the next part of this chapter. Yugoslavia’s international position had significant implications for its domestic politics. As noted above, its unique position of being a communist state but at the same time being economically open to the West meant that liberal economic policies had some influence over the domestic political arrangements of the former state. One liberal policy, which is particularly significant for this book, was the policy of territorial decentralisation (Bennett, 1995: 68; Judah, 2000: 36; Malcolm, 1994: 202). Although the policy of territorial decentralisation is not the focus of this chapter, it is nevertheless essential to understand it as it helps explain the complex political and economic arrangements within Kosovo and indeed all the other republics. This arrangement was to be substantially undermined by the process of integrating the former Yugoslavia into the global economy in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The implementing of territorial decentralisation in practice meant a combined system of liberal markets and socialist elements. For instance, emphasis was put on increasing the autonomy of ‘private’ firms. Further, foreign borrowings reinforced this government role in managing money because public loans from the IMF and the World Bank were made only to governments and commercial banks. This meant that the territorial organisation of economic decisions and strategically based industrial policy gave the former Yugoslavia a ‘distinct geopolitical character’ (Woodward, 1995: 28–9; see also Judah, 2000: 36–7; Bennett, 1995: 68). The economic organisation, Woodward further describes, was directed according to different localities and regions, which in turn become identified with different specialisations. For example, out of the six republics of the federation, Slovenia and Croatia were more integrated
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into European networks mainly because of the Habsburg legacy, their geographic proximity, and an industrial policy that favoured export production. In Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina the economic organisation was mainly directed towards the Middle East and the Greek port of Thessaloniki (1995: 28). The republic of Serbia favoured business in Eastern Europe mainly because of its metal industry and heavy manufacturing. Macedonia, Bosnia and the province of Kosovo would mainly concentrate on the exporting of primary goods. Essentially the system of regional specialisation, reinforced by the territorial decentralisation introduced to the Yugoslav government by the Western institutions worked so long as the demand for Yugoslav goods remained stable. However, this situation was to become devastating for the federation once the demand for its products declined, especially after 1975. For the purpose of this chapter it is important to observe, however, that before this became a devastating reality, Yugoslavia enjoyed its prestigious international position of national independence, its organisation of defence and its role as an important state in European security and the Western anti-Soviet campaign. The second source of political stability in the former Yugoslavia was its constitutional arrangement. Yugoslavia’s constitutional order The constitutional order of former Yugoslavia is defined by Woodward as ‘a complex web of public property rights, federalism, and individual, group and national rights to social and economic equality’ (1995: 30). The bases for the constitution were drawn during the Second World War when the government of the time, called the Anti-Fascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), announced in 1943 that it would replace the monarchy with republics to create a federation based on the territorial organisation of the partisan, antifascist resistance. The constitution was ratified on 31 January 1946. It was Yugoslavia’s first communist constitution. This was a pivotal time for Kosovo, as it confirmed Yugoslavia’s new structure as a federation of six republics, together with the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo (Bennett, 1995: 53; Mertus, 1999: 288). The principle of sovereignty was particularly important for the constitutional order of the former Yugoslavia. It implied simultaneously the right to self-determination, obtained by the first Yugoslavia, together with democratic and socialist ideas of popular sovereignty. For instance the Slavic word ‘narod’ does not distinguish between the nation and the people. It was the republics, or the founding nations of the federation,
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which had rights, as well as the individual members of those nations, the ethnic people, who had the right to express their nationality and culture freely and without discrimination (Mertus, 1999: 288; also see in Malcolm, 1998: 327–8; Bennett 1995: 53). The choice of national identity, as described by Woodward, was voluntary – citizens had a right not to choose. However, once chosen, the identity was formally recorded and used to register at schools, hospitals or to vote. The concept of identity ‘conferred language rights and psychological security about the survival of a cultural community but also required that all federal activities take directly into account the proportional representation of individuals by constituent nationality – called the national key or quota system’ (1995: 36–9). Woodward further describes that those constitutional provisions to accommodate the conflict between the territorial and personal concept of a nation were essential for those areas of Yugoslavia which, for historical reasons, were nationally mixed. Constitutional protections also facilitated freedom of cultural expression for nationalities, such as using their own language in public forums, having their own newspapers and other media, forming cultural associations and in some cases being taught in their own language. Clearly there was a commitment to multiethnic coexistence. Therefore any political expressions of nationalism were treated as a threat to the socialist regime. Admittedly, though some of the measures were oppressive, they were applied evenly and often the ‘authorities went out of their way to balance a particular prosecution with charges against persons from other ethnic groups in the area’ (1995: 37). Indeed, it was the responsibility of the Communist party to ‘knit this all together … through creating political harmony, through party loyalty, rules of democratic centralism, and the patriotic principle – under the slogan “brotherhood and unity” of equal nations in one state’ (Woodward, 1995: 37). Therefore, the purpose of the constituent nation was to accommodate itself to the realities of an ethnically mixed country. Indeed it is important to observe that rather than denying the presence of an ethnically mixed population, the state acknowledged it, and even catered for the population’s different needs throughout its political and economic organisation. The federal institutions worked closely with a government based on a council which represented the republics and provinces. Those provinces were consulted and all decisions were made on the basis of consensus. The country’s mixed economy involved a number of institutions involved in a necessarily complex decision making process (38).
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For instance, Woodward continues, the retail market was regulated by free prices, though bilateral supply contracts were compulsory for all transactions between public enterprises, as well as between processing firms and private farmers. The way it worked was based on wide consultation of firms, localities, republics, producers’ associations, and civil servants, which had to be approved by the federal parliament. Most economic decisions involved consultation and debate between republican representatives, the federal government and the people involved. The federal government did not itself own productive assets but was responsible for the state’s common market, such as its monetary and trade policy, and for defence and foreign affairs. Therefore the republican governments were responsible for manufacturing, agricultural transportation and communications (1995: 38). Local governments were responsible for consumer markets, housing, welfare, local roads, schools, health care and employment. Because the republican government owned the productive assets it was their responsibility to support the common or federal expenditure. Like everything else, the YPA was also shared; it was under federal jurisdiction and hence the federal budget. The territorial defence forces (TDF), however, were under republican authority but funded from republican, local and enterprise revenues (1995: 39). The Yugoslav government’s provision for individual security Provision for individual security was the third major element of pre-war stability in Yugoslavia. The main concept of self-determination was the idea that ‘workers and citizens, in association, would govern their workplace and local communities’ (Benett 1995: 7–8 and Woodward 1995: 41). This system replaced private property and the market for capital and labour with shared, equal property rights for all employed persons and equal participation in managing this property. Those who managed property would be checked by constitutional obligations to consult with the representative workers and citizens. The self-fulfilling logic of the system was the belief that people with long-term employment, who were involved in decision-making about key functions would develop a sense of respect for common property. The government hoped that this in turn would encourage people to seek employment, therefore increasing the workforce and productivity (Woodward, 1995: 42). Alongside this system, as Woodward continues to describe, would be a society based on a guaranteed system of welfare. It was guaranteed welfare and employment which provided the communal and individual security of the Yugoslav people. The right to equal treatment in the
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economy therefore limited the part played by private wealth through restrictions on the amount of income-yielding private property and through progressive taxation on individual income and wealth from market profit. Essentially, people were the citizens of both their republic and Yugoslavia, but it was the federal government which granted the rights. It was the responsibility of both local and federal governments to provide for individual welfare. For instance, the federal government would provide set rates for wages, social benefits such as pensions, health care and social security, but essentially the practical realisation of these rights depended on local funds. This meant that the standard of living depended mainly on where one lived, meaning that richer republics provided better than poorer ones for the needs of their people (Woodward, 1995: 41–2). This observation is significant for Kosovo and its dependent position upon Serbia, an issue which will be explored in the last part of this chapter. Another significant observation is that social equality (or more appropriately inequality) depended on where one was employed. Yugoslav employment was of two kinds: by the state and by the private sector. The former qualified people for provision of health care, social benefits, social insurance and many other benefits. In other words, social benefits were not market purchases but distributed through the workplace. T